Subject: RE: iSCSI-12-95

From: "THALER,PAT (A-Roseville,ex1)" <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 30 May 2002 15:52:09 -0600

Julian,

I am having two problems with the second MUST in the following paragraph
from iSCSI-12-95 7.2.1:
If CHAP is used with a secret that has less than 96 random bits then
IPsec encryption (according to the implementation requirements in
Section 7.3.2 Confidentiality) MUST be used to protect the connection.
Moreover, in this case IKE authentication with group pre-shared
keys MUST NOT be used. When CHAP is used with secret shorter than 96
bits, a compliant implementation MUST NOT continue with the login
unless it can verify that IPsec encryption is being used to protect
the connection.

Who or what does the requirement apply to? Is the iSCSI implementation
expected to check whether IKE is using pre-shared keys or is this a
requirement on the person setting up the security? It isn't clear to
me that an iSCSI implementation has access to that information.

Secondly, it isn't clear to me why it is required. I'm assuming the
concern is that a member of a group with preshared keys could use
an off-line dictionary attack to crack the CHAP secret of another 
member of the group but it seems to me that there are situations 
where this is not a threat. For instance, one could have a group that
was a host and multiple equally secure disk arrays. If one isn't 
concerned about one of the arrays trying to impersonate another there
isn't a danger in allowing them to authenticate with CHAP protected
by IPsec enryption with a group pre-shared key.

Could the MUST be made a SHOULD with a statement that ignoring the 
SHOULD means that one member of the group could crack the CHAP 
secret of another member?

Regards,
Pat

-----Original Message-----
From: Julian Satran [mailto:[email-masked]]
Sent: Wednesday, May 29, 2002 3:02 PM
To: [email-masked]
Subject: iSCSI-12-95

12-95 is out.
It has the latest wording on security and text negotiation (including the
spanning).

Still to go - text fixes in chapter 11.

Julo