Return-Path: <owner-ips@ece.cmu.edu>
X-Sieve: cmu-sieve 2.0
Return-Path: <owner-ips@ece.cmu.edu>
Received: (from majordom@localhost)
	by ece.cmu.edu (8.11.0/8.10.2) id h0HAt1013512
	for ips-outgoing; Fri, 17 Jan 2003 05:55:01 -0500 (EST)
X-Authentication-Warning: ece.cmu.edu: majordom set sender to owner-ips@ece.cmu.edu using -f
Received: from d12lmsgate.de.ibm.com (d12lmsgate.de.ibm.com [194.196.100.234])
	by ece.cmu.edu (8.11.0/8.10.2) with ESMTP id h0HAsxW13507;
	Fri, 17 Jan 2003 05:54:59 -0500 (EST)
Received: from d12relay02.de.ibm.com (d12relay02.de.ibm.com [9.165.215.23])
	by d12lmsgate.de.ibm.com (8.12.3/8.12.3) with ESMTP id h0HAspnx014136;
	Fri, 17 Jan 2003 11:54:52 +0100
Received: from d10ml001.telaviv.ibm.com (d10ml001.telaviv.ibm.com [9.148.216.55])
	by d12relay02.de.ibm.com (8.12.3/NCO/VER6.4) with ESMTP id h0HAskRZ087544;
	Fri, 17 Jan 2003 11:54:51 +0100
In-Reply-To: <277DD60FB639D511AC0400B0D068B71E0564C7A3@corpmx14.us.dg.com>
To: Black_David@emc.com
Cc: ips@ece.cmu.edu, owner-ips@ece.cmu.edu
Subject: Re: FW: Redirection (was UNH Plugfest 5)
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-Mailer: Lotus Notes Release 6.0 September 26, 2002
From: "Julian Satran" <Julian_Satran@il.ibm.com>
Message-ID: <OFDE867AC5.1E6CBDB4-ONC2256CB1.0023933B-C2256CB1.003BF212@telaviv.ibm.com>
Date: Fri, 17 Jan 2003 12:54:46 +0200
X-MIMETrack: Serialize by Router on D10ML001/10/M/IBM(Release 5.0.9a |January 7, 2002) at
 17/01/2003 12:54:51,
	Serialize complete at 17/01/2003 12:54:51
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="=_alternative 00249CB8C2256CB1_="
Sender: owner-ips@ece.cmu.edu
Precedence: bulk

This is a multipart message in MIME format.
--=_alternative 00249CB8C2256CB1_=
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII"

David,

The only way to do it cleany the way you want it is to allow the redirect 
response (0101 and 0102) only in operational parameter stage.
But that seems rather excessive. If we want to mandate a single way of 
handling I would suggest stating that 0101 and 0102
SHOULD be accepted even during authentication (Paul's POV). Again I don't 
thing it adds anything as local policy may prevent an initiator from
considering those values.

Julo





Black_David@emc.com 
Sent by: owner-ips@ece.cmu.edu
17/01/03 01:11

To
ips@ece.cmu.edu
cc

Subject
FW: Redirection (was UNH Plugfest 5)






Forwarding an off-list note on this topic - a SHOULD is useful
here to express a preference for which redirection mechanism
to use in the presence of authentication.  I prefer the SHOULD
for redirection after authentication because rogue target attacks
are more dangerous to iSCSI than rogue initiator attacks because
the initiator authenticates first when using CHAP.  Redirection
prior to authentication makes it easier to mount a rogue target
attack.

Thanks,
--David

-----Original Message-----
From: Paul Koning [mailto:pkoning@equallogic.com]
Sent: Thursday, January 16, 2003 3:57 PM
To: Black_David@emc.com
Cc: Julian_Satran@il.ibm.com
Subject: RE: Redirection (was UNH Plugfest 5)


>>>>> "Black" == Black David <Black_David@emc.com> writes:

 Black> The most I could see doing here would be: - In the absence of
 Black> explicit administrative action, - If a target is contacted by
 Black> an Initiator requesting SecurityNegotiation, - And the target
 Black> would issue a redirect to that Initiator based on the target
 Black> name the initiator is trying to contact, - Then the target
 Black> SHOULD negotiate security before issuing the redirect.

My preference is to swing the SHOULD in the other direction, because
there is no security issue in doing so.  (In other words, if the
initiator requests  security negotiation and the target replies with a
redirect, the initiator SHOULD accept that redirect as valid without a
full security negotiation.)  But your proposal still serves to
strengthen the spec.

                    paul


--=_alternative 00249CB8C2256CB1_=
Content-Type: text/html; charset="US-ASCII"


<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">David,</font>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">The only way to do it cleany the way
you want it is to allow the redirect response (0101 and 0102) only in operational
parameter stage.</font>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">But that seems rather excessive. If
we want to mandate a single way of handling I would suggest stating that
0101 and 0102</font>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">SHOULD be accepted even during authentication
(Paul's POV). Again I don't thing it adds anything as local policy may
prevent an initiator from</font>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">considering those values.</font>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">Julo</font>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<table width=100%>
<tr valign=top>
<td width=40%><font size=1 face="sans-serif"><b>Black_David@emc.com</b>
</font>
<br><font size=1 face="sans-serif">Sent by: owner-ips@ece.cmu.edu</font>
<p><font size=1 face="sans-serif">17/01/03 01:11</font>
<td width=59%>
<table width=100%>
<tr>
<td>
<div align=right><font size=1 face="sans-serif">To</font></div>
<td valign=top><font size=1 face="sans-serif">ips@ece.cmu.edu</font>
<tr>
<td>
<div align=right><font size=1 face="sans-serif">cc</font></div>
<td valign=top>
<tr>
<td>
<div align=right><font size=1 face="sans-serif">Subject</font></div>
<td valign=top><font size=1 face="sans-serif">FW: Redirection (was UNH
Plugfest 5)</font></table>
<br>
<table>
<tr valign=top>
<td>
<td></table>
<br></table>
<br>
<br>
<br><font size=2><tt>Forwarding an off-list note on this topic - a SHOULD
is useful<br>
here to express a preference for which redirection mechanism<br>
to use in the presence of authentication. &nbsp;I prefer the SHOULD<br>
for redirection after authentication because rogue target attacks<br>
are more dangerous to iSCSI than rogue initiator attacks because<br>
the initiator authenticates first when using CHAP. &nbsp;Redirection<br>
prior to authentication makes it easier to mount a rogue target<br>
attack.<br>
<br>
Thanks,<br>
--David<br>
<br>
-----Original Message-----<br>
From: Paul Koning [mailto:pkoning@equallogic.com]<br>
Sent: Thursday, January 16, 2003 3:57 PM<br>
To: Black_David@emc.com<br>
Cc: Julian_Satran@il.ibm.com<br>
Subject: RE: Redirection (was UNH Plugfest 5)<br>
<br>
<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &quot;Black&quot; == Black David &lt;Black_David@emc.com&gt;
writes:<br>
<br>
 Black&gt; The most I could see doing here would be: - In the absence of<br>
 Black&gt; explicit administrative action, - If a target is contacted by<br>
 Black&gt; an Initiator requesting SecurityNegotiation, - And the target<br>
 Black&gt; would issue a redirect to that Initiator based on the target<br>
 Black&gt; name the initiator is trying to contact, - Then the target<br>
 Black&gt; SHOULD negotiate security before issuing the redirect.<br>
<br>
My preference is to swing the SHOULD in the other direction, because<br>
there is no security issue in doing so. &nbsp;(In other words, if the<br>
initiator requests &nbsp;security negotiation and the target replies with
a<br>
redirect, the initiator SHOULD accept that redirect as valid without a<br>
full security negotiation.) &nbsp;But your proposal still serves to<br>
strengthen the spec.<br>
<br>
 &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;
&nbsp; &nbsp;paul<br>
</tt></font>
<br>
--=_alternative 00249CB8C2256CB1_=--
