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From: Julian Satran <satran@haifasphere.co.il>
Reply-To: Julian_Satran@il.ibm.com
To: Black_David@emc.com, Julian_Satran@il.ibm.com
CC: ips@ece.cmu.edu
Subject: Re: RE: FW: Redirection (was UNH Plugfest 5)
Date: Fri, 17 Jan 2003 18:38:05 +0200
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OK - Julo
> 
> From: Black_David@emc.com
> Date: 2003/01/17 Fri PM 04:21:47 GMT+02:00
> To: Julian_Satran@il.ibm.com
> CC: ips@ece.cmu.edu
> Subject: RE: FW: Redirection (was UNH Plugfest 5)
> 
> I certainly don't want to forbid redirection w/o authentication.
> "SHOULD be accepted during authentication" is ok, although we
> should point out that there may be valid security concerns that
> lead an administrator to do otherwise.
>  
> Thanks,
> --David
>   
>  -----Original Message-----
> From: Julian Satran [mailto:Julian_Satran@il.ibm.com]
> Sent: Friday, January 17, 2003 5:55 AM
> To: Black_David@emc.com
> Cc: ips@ece.cmu.edu; owner-ips@ece.cmu.edu
> Subject: Re: FW: Redirection (was UNH Plugfest 5)
> 
> 
> 
> 
> David, 
> 
> The only way to do it cleany the way you want it is to allow the redirect
> response (0101 and 0102) only in operational parameter stage. 
> But that seems rather excessive. If we want to mandate a single way of
> handling I would suggest stating that 0101 and 0102 
> SHOULD be accepted even during authentication (Paul's POV). Again I don't
> thing it adds anything as local policy may prevent an initiator from 
> considering those values. 
> 
> Julo 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Black_David@emc.com 
> Sent by: owner-ips@ece.cmu.edu 
> 
> 
> 17/01/03 01:11 
> 
> 
> To
> ips@ece.cmu.edu 
> 
> cc
> 
> Subject
> FW: Redirection (was UNH Plugfest 5)
> 
> 	
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Forwarding an off-list note on this topic - a SHOULD is useful
> here to express a preference for which redirection mechanism
> to use in the presence of authentication.  I prefer the SHOULD
> for redirection after authentication because rogue target attacks
> are more dangerous to iSCSI than rogue initiator attacks because
> the initiator authenticates first when using CHAP.  Redirection
> prior to authentication makes it easier to mount a rogue target
> attack.
> 
> Thanks,
> --David
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Paul Koning [mailto:pkoning@equallogic.com]
> Sent: Thursday, January 16, 2003 3:57 PM
> To: Black_David@emc.com
> Cc: Julian_Satran@il.ibm.com
> Subject: RE: Redirection (was UNH Plugfest 5)
> 
> 
> >>>>> "Black" == Black David <Black_David@emc.com> writes:
> 
> Black> The most I could see doing here would be: - In the absence of
> Black> explicit administrative action, - If a target is contacted by
> Black> an Initiator requesting SecurityNegotiation, - And the target
> Black> would issue a redirect to that Initiator based on the target
> Black> name the initiator is trying to contact, - Then the target
> Black> SHOULD negotiate security before issuing the redirect.
> 
> My preference is to swing the SHOULD in the other direction, because
> there is no security issue in doing so.  (In other words, if the
> initiator requests  security negotiation and the target replies with a
> redirect, the initiator SHOULD accept that redirect as valid without a
> full security negotiation.)  But your proposal still serves to
> strengthen the spec.
> 
>                    paul
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 

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<DIV><FONT face="Courier New" size=2><SPAN class=196012014-17012003>I certainly 
don't want to forbid redirection w/o authentication.</SPAN></FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face="Courier New" size=2><SPAN class=196012014-17012003>"SHOULD be 
accepted during authentication" is ok, although we</SPAN></FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face="Courier New" size=2><SPAN class=196012014-17012003>should point 
out that there may be valid security concerns that</SPAN></FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face="Courier New" size=2><SPAN class=196012014-17012003>lead an 
administrator to&nbsp;do otherwise.</SPAN></FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face="Courier New" size=2><SPAN 
class=196012014-17012003></SPAN></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><FONT face="Courier New" size=2><SPAN 
class=196012014-17012003>Thanks,</SPAN></FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face="Courier New" size=2><SPAN 
class=196012014-17012003>--David</SPAN></FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face="Courier New" size=2><SPAN 
class=196012014-17012003></SPAN></FONT><FONT face=Tahoma><FONT size=2><SPAN 
class=196012014-17012003><FONT face="Courier New">&nbsp; 
</FONT></SPAN></FONT></FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Tahoma><FONT size=2><SPAN 
class=196012014-17012003>&nbsp;</SPAN>-----Original Message-----<BR><B>From:</B> 
Julian Satran [mailto:Julian_Satran@il.ibm.com]<BR><B>Sent:</B> Friday, January 
17, 2003 5:55 AM<BR><B>To:</B> Black_David@emc.com<BR><B>Cc:</B> 
ips@ece.cmu.edu; owner-ips@ece.cmu.edu<BR><B>Subject:</B> Re: FW: Redirection 
(was UNH Plugfest 5)<BR><BR></DIV></FONT>
<BLOCKQUOTE 
style="BORDER-LEFT: #000000 2px solid; MARGIN-LEFT: 5px; PADDING-LEFT: 5px"></FONT><BR><FONT 
  face=sans-serif size=2>David,</FONT> <BR><BR><FONT face=sans-serif size=2>The 
  only way to do it cleany the way you want it is to allow the redirect response 
  (0101 and 0102) only in operational parameter stage.</FONT> <BR><FONT 
  face=sans-serif size=2>But that seems rather excessive. If we want to mandate 
  a single way of handling I would suggest stating that 0101 and 0102</FONT> 
  <BR><FONT face=sans-serif size=2>SHOULD be accepted even during authentication 
  (Paul's POV). Again I don't thing it adds anything as local policy may prevent 
  an initiator from</FONT> <BR><FONT face=sans-serif size=2>considering those 
  values.</FONT> <BR><BR><FONT face=sans-serif size=2>Julo</FONT> 
  <BR><BR><BR><BR><BR>
  <TABLE width="100%">
    <TBODY>
    <TR vAlign=top>
      <TD width="40%"><FONT face=sans-serif size=1><B>Black_David@emc.com</B> 
        </FONT><BR><FONT face=sans-serif size=1>Sent by: 
        owner-ips@ece.cmu.edu</FONT> 
        <P><FONT face=sans-serif size=1>17/01/03 01:11</FONT> </P>
      <TD width="59%">
        <TABLE width="100%">
          <TBODY>
          <TR>
            <TD>
              <DIV align=right><FONT face=sans-serif size=1>To</FONT></DIV>
            <TD vAlign=top><FONT face=sans-serif size=1>ips@ece.cmu.edu</FONT> 

          <TR>
            <TD>
              <DIV align=right><FONT face=sans-serif size=1>cc</FONT></DIV>
            <TD vAlign=top>
          <TR>
            <TD>
              <DIV align=right><FONT face=sans-serif size=1>Subject</FONT></DIV>
            <TD vAlign=top><FONT face=sans-serif size=1>FW: Redirection (was 
              UNH Plugfest 5)</FONT></TR></TBODY></TABLE><BR>
        <TABLE>
          <TBODY>
          <TR vAlign=top>
            <TD>
            <TD></TR></TBODY></TABLE><BR></TR></TBODY></TABLE><BR><BR><BR><FONT 
  size=2><TT>Forwarding an off-list note on this topic - a SHOULD is 
  useful<BR>here to express a preference for which redirection mechanism<BR>to 
  use in the presence of authentication. &nbsp;I prefer the SHOULD<BR>for 
  redirection after authentication because rogue target attacks<BR>are more 
  dangerous to iSCSI than rogue initiator attacks because<BR>the initiator 
  authenticates first when using CHAP. &nbsp;Redirection<BR>prior to 
  authentication makes it easier to mount a rogue 
  target<BR>attack.<BR><BR>Thanks,<BR>--David<BR><BR>-----Original 
  Message-----<BR>From: Paul Koning [mailto:pkoning@equallogic.com]<BR>Sent: 
  Thursday, January 16, 2003 3:57 PM<BR>To: Black_David@emc.com<BR>Cc: 
  Julian_Satran@il.ibm.com<BR>Subject: RE: Redirection (was UNH Plugfest 
  5)<BR><BR><BR>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; "Black" == Black David 
  &lt;Black_David@emc.com&gt; writes:<BR><BR>Black&gt; The most I could see 
  doing here would be: - In the absence of<BR>Black&gt; explicit administrative 
  action, - If a target is contacted by<BR>Black&gt; an Initiator requesting 
  SecurityNegotiation, - And the target<BR>Black&gt; would issue a redirect to 
  that Initiator based on the target<BR>Black&gt; name the initiator is trying 
  to contact, - Then the target<BR>Black&gt; SHOULD negotiate security before 
  issuing the redirect.<BR><BR>My preference is to swing the SHOULD in the other 
  direction, because<BR>there is no security issue in doing so. &nbsp;(In other 
  words, if the<BR>initiator requests &nbsp;security negotiation and the target 
  replies with a<BR>redirect, the initiator SHOULD accept that redirect as valid 
  without a<BR>full security negotiation.) &nbsp;But your proposal still serves 
  to<BR>strengthen the spec.<BR><BR>&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; 
  &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;paul<BR></TT></FONT><BR></BLOCKQUOTE></BODY></HTML>


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