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Date: Tue, 2 Mar 2021 12:23:00 +0200
From: Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>
To: "Valery Smyslov" <smyslov.ietf@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] Review of the draft-smyslov-ipsecme-rfc8229bis-02
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Valery Smyslov writes:
> so, what is the outcome? Do you think we should add a recommendation
> not to include source IP address in cookie calculation when TCP is in use?

I am not sure. Perhaps just add comment, that when using TCP the outer
IP address of the NAT might change more often than in UDP, as NATs do
assume that they do not need to keep outer IP address stable for TCP,
as TCP is statefull protocol anyways, and because of this using IP
address in cookie calculation for TCP might cause it to fail.
-- 
kivinen@iki.fi


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Subject: [IPsec] IPsecME agenda for IETF-110
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Here is the IPsecME Agenda for IETF 110 meeting. Please submit your
slides before the Friday this week.

----------------------------------------------------------------------
IP Security Maintenance and Extensions (IPsecME) WG.

IETF 110 - Monday March 8th, 2021

Agenda

- Note Well, technical difficulties and agenda bashing - 
  Chairs (5 min)
- Document Status -
  Chairs (5 min)
- Work items
  - Group Key Management using IKEv2 -
    Valery Smyslov (10 min)
  - IPTFS Base Draft WGLC Changes - 
    Christian Hopps (10 min)
  - Management (Yang adoption and update, new SNMP draft) - 
    Christian Hopps (10 min)
- New items
  - IKEv2 Configuration for Encrypted DNS - 
    Valery Smyslov (5 min)
  - Compact payload format for IKEv2 - 
    Valery Smyslov (15 min)
  - IKEv1 graveyard - 
    Paul Wouters (5 min)
  - BGP UPDATE for SDWAN Edge Discovery -
    Linda Dunbar (10 min)
  - X.509 extensions and alternative signature schemes in IKEv2 -
    Leonie Bruckert (5 min)
- AOB + Open Mic
-- 
kivinen@iki.fi


From nobody Tue Mar  2 07:58:57 2021
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From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] IPsecME agenda for IETF-110
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On Tue, 2 Mar 2021, Tero Kivinen wrote:

> - New items

Can we talk 5 minutes about draft-kampati-ipsecme-ikev2-sa-ts-payloads-opt as well ?

The IPR issues are resolved, and I think it is a useful document to implement.

Paul


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Subject: Re: [IPsec] IPsecME agenda for IETF-110
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Paul Wouters writes:
> On Tue, 2 Mar 2021, Tero Kivinen wrote:
> 
> > - New items
> 
> Can we talk 5 minutes about
> draft-kampati-ipsecme-ikev2-sa-ts-payloads-opt as well ? 
> 
> The IPR issues are resolved, and I think it is a useful document to
> implement. 

The draft is expired, are the authors going to resurrect it? Are you
going to present the issue or what?

I can allocate 5 minutes for that, as we seem to have time in agenda.
-- 
kivinen@iki.fi


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On Tue, 2 Mar 2021, Tero Kivinen wrote:

>> Can we talk 5 minutes about
>> draft-kampati-ipsecme-ikev2-sa-ts-payloads-opt as well ?
>>
>> The IPR issues are resolved, and I think it is a useful document to
>> implement.
>
> The draft is expired, are the authors going to resurrect it? Are you
> going to present the issue or what?

Yes they are willing to, now that the IPR is not an issue.

> I can allocate 5 minutes for that, as we seem to have time in agenda.

I can do a quick presentation on it, sure.

Paul


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> -----Original Message-----
> From: IPsec [mailto:ipsec-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Paul Wouters
> Sent: Wednesday, March 3, 2021 2:56 AM
> To: Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>
> Cc: ipsec@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [IPsec] IPsecME agenda for IETF-110
>=20
> On Tue, 2 Mar 2021, Tero Kivinen wrote:
>=20
> >> Can we talk 5 minutes about
> >> draft-kampati-ipsecme-ikev2-sa-ts-payloads-opt as well ?
> >>
> >> The IPR issues are resolved, and I think it is a useful document to
> >> implement.
> >
> > The draft is expired, are the authors going to resurrect it? Are you
> > going to present the issue or what?
>=20
> Yes they are willing to, now that the IPR is not an issue.
>=20
> > I can allocate 5 minutes for that, as we seem to have time in agenda.
>=20
> I can do a quick presentation on it, sure.
>=20
> Paul
>=20

Thank you Paul very much.
As one of the authors of the draft, I can re-active it after the submission=
 reopening.


From nobody Wed Mar  3 11:36:52 2021
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] [Cryptography] Direct public confirmation from Dr. Rogaway (fwd)
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   Faster and more secure seem to be compelling reasons. Those reasons are
probably more compelling for ESP than they are for IKE.

   The license for OCB always had some caveats like the code could not 
be used
for military purposes which is something of a nightmare for a 
manufacturer of
general purpose hardware/software. Considering how difficult it would be to
ensure that your product is never used by a military anywhere in the world,
that's probably enough of a reason for TLS to not support it. Remember how
long ECC was delayed for (imagined) IP reasons?

   IP is bad news. People don't want anything to do with partially 
encumbered
technology. Now this technology is not encumbered at all so, yea, let's 
do it.

   If an individual draft was to appear would the WG adopt it as a work 
item?

   regards,

   Dan.

On 2/28/21 1:47 PM, Yoav Nir wrote:
> IIRC the license has allowed OCB to be used for TLS for several years. 
> They haven’t taken it up. There are no AES-OCB ciphersuites 
> inhttps://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xml#tls-parameters-4 
>
>
> So I’m wondering right with you: It has a theoretical advantage in 
> security and a measurable advantage in speed in software.  Neither 
> were compelling enough for anyone to bother adding it in TLS 
> ciphersuites.  Why should our conclusion be any different?
>
> Yoav
>
>
>> On 28 Feb 2021, at 22:35, Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca 
>> <mailto:paul@nohats.ca>> wrote:
>>
>>
>> So now that OCB is finally free, do we want to implement it? :)
>>
>> I'm honestly not sure if the improvements of AES-GCM are worth it.
>> I haven't heard of vulnerabilities in IKE/ESP wrt. IVs or counters.
>>
>> Paul
>>
>> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
>> Date: Sat, 27 Feb 2021 14:37:30
>> From: "Salz, Rich via cryptography" <cryptography@metzdowd.com 
>> <mailto:cryptography@metzdowd.com>>
>> To: "cryptography@metzdowd.com <mailto:cryptography@metzdowd.com>" 
>> <cryptography@metzdowd.com <mailto:cryptography@metzdowd.com>>
>> Subject: [Cryptography] Direct public confirmation from Dr. Rogaway
>>
>>
>> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/cfrg/qLTveWOdTJcLn4HP3ev-vrj05Vg/ :
>>
>>
>>
>> I can confirm that I have abandoned all OCB patents
>>
>> and placed into the public domain all OCB-related IP of mine.
>>
>> While I have been telling people this for quite some time, I don't
>>
>> think I ever made a proper announcement to the CFRG or on the
>>
>> OCB webpage. Consider that done.
>>
>>
>>
>> I hope people will use the scheme to do positive things.
>>
>>
>>
>> phil
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> The cryptography mailing list
>> cryptography@metzdowd.com <mailto:cryptography@metzdowd.com>
>> https://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
>> _______________________________________________
>> IPsec mailing list
>> IPsec@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> IPsec mailing list
> IPsec@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec

-- 
"The object of life is not to be on the side of the majority, but to
escape finding oneself in the ranks of the insane." -- Marcus Aurelius


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    <tt> <br>
        Faster and more secure seem to be compelling reasons. Those
      reasons are<br>
      probably more compelling for ESP than they are for IKE.<br>
      <br>
        The license for OCB always had some caveats like the code could
      not be used<br>
      for military purposes which is something of a nightmare for a
      manufacturer of<br>
      general purpose hardware/software. Considering how difficult it
      would be to<br>
      ensure that your product is never used by a military anywhere in
      the world,<br>
      that's probably enough of a reason for TLS to not support it.
      Remember how<br>
      long ECC was delayed for (imagined) IP reasons? <br>
      <br>
        IP is bad news. People don't want anything to do with partially
      encumbered<br>
      technology. Now this technology is not encumbered at all so, yea,
      let's do it.<br>
      <br>
        If an individual draft was to appear would the WG adopt it as a
      work item?<br>
      <br>
        regards,<br>
      <br>
        Dan.<br>
    </tt><br>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 2/28/21 1:47 PM, Yoav Nir wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type="cite"
      cite="mid:EB8AA402-560E-4039-9ED1-427EF294BAF9@gmail.com">
      <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
      IIRC the license has allowed OCB to be used for TLS for several
      years. They haven’t taken it up. There are no AES-OCB ciphersuites
      <a
href="inhttps://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xml#tls-parameters-4"
        class="" moz-do-not-send="true">inhttps://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xml#tls-parameters-4</a>
      <div class=""><br class="">
      </div>
      <div class="">So I’m wondering right with you: It has a
        theoretical advantage in security and a measurable advantage in
        speed in software.  Neither were compelling enough for anyone to
        bother adding it in TLS ciphersuites.  Why should our conclusion
        be any different?</div>
      <div class=""><br class="">
      </div>
      <div class="">Yoav</div>
      <div class=""><br class="">
        <div><br class="">
          <blockquote type="cite" class="">
            <div class="">On 28 Feb 2021, at 22:35, Paul Wouters &lt;<a
                href="mailto:paul@nohats.ca" class=""
                moz-do-not-send="true">paul@nohats.ca</a>&gt; wrote:</div>
            <br class="Apple-interchange-newline">
            <div class="">
              <div class=""><br class="">
                So now that OCB is finally free, do we want to implement
                it? :)<br class="">
                <br class="">
                I'm honestly not sure if the improvements of AES-GCM are
                worth it.<br class="">
                I haven't heard of vulnerabilities in IKE/ESP wrt. IVs
                or counters.<br class="">
                <br class="">
                Paul<br class="">
                <br class="">
                ---------- Forwarded message ----------<br class="">
                Date: Sat, 27 Feb 2021 14:37:30<br class="">
                From: "Salz, Rich via cryptography" &lt;<a
                  href="mailto:cryptography@metzdowd.com" class=""
                  moz-do-not-send="true">cryptography@metzdowd.com</a>&gt;<br
                  class="">
                To: "<a href="mailto:cryptography@metzdowd.com" class=""
                  moz-do-not-send="true">cryptography@metzdowd.com</a>"
                &lt;<a href="mailto:cryptography@metzdowd.com" class=""
                  moz-do-not-send="true">cryptography@metzdowd.com</a>&gt;<br
                  class="">
                Subject: [Cryptography] Direct public confirmation from
                Dr. Rogaway<br class="">
                <br class="">
                <br class="">
                <a
href="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/cfrg/qLTveWOdTJcLn4HP3ev-vrj05Vg/"
                  class="" moz-do-not-send="true">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/cfrg/qLTveWOdTJcLn4HP3ev-vrj05Vg/</a>
                :<br class="">
                <br class="">
                 <br class="">
                <br class="">
                I can confirm that I have abandoned all OCB patents<br
                  class="">
                <br class="">
                and placed into the public domain all OCB-related IP of
                mine.<br class="">
                <br class="">
                While I have been telling people this for quite some
                time, I don't<br class="">
                <br class="">
                think I ever made a proper announcement to the CFRG or
                on the<br class="">
                <br class="">
                OCB webpage. Consider that done.<br class="">
                <br class="">
                 <br class="">
                <br class="">
                I hope people will use the scheme to do positive things.<br
                  class="">
                <br class="">
                 <br class="">
                <br class="">
                phil<br class="">
                <br class="">
                _______________________________________________<br
                  class="">
                The cryptography mailing list<br class="">
                <a href="mailto:cryptography@metzdowd.com" class=""
                  moz-do-not-send="true">cryptography@metzdowd.com</a><br
                  class="">
                <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography">https://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography</a><br
                  class="">
                _______________________________________________<br
                  class="">
                IPsec mailing list<br class="">
                <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:IPsec@ietf.org">IPsec@ietf.org</a><br class="">
                <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec</a><br class="">
              </div>
            </div>
          </blockquote>
        </div>
        <br class="">
      </div>
      <br>
      <fieldset class="mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
      <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">_______________________________________________
IPsec mailing list
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:IPsec@ietf.org">IPsec@ietf.org</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec</a>
</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    <pre class="moz-signature" cols="72">-- 
"The object of life is not to be on the side of the majority, but to
escape finding oneself in the ranks of the insane." -- Marcus Aurelius</pre>
  </body>
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From: Graham Bartlett <graham.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 2021 20:00:01 +0000
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] [Cryptography] Direct public confirmation from Dr. Rogaway (fwd)
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Hi Dan

Glad you replied to this, OCB seems to be a hot topic at the moment. There
seems to be some interest in this simply due to the potential speed
increase.

Would anyone know the potential % difference in speed compared to GCM ?

In summary I think it should be discussed.

cheers

On Wed, Mar 3, 2021 at 7:37 PM Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org> wrote:

>
>   Faster and more secure seem to be compelling reasons. Those reasons are
> probably more compelling for ESP than they are for IKE.
>
>   The license for OCB always had some caveats like the code could not be
> used
> for military purposes which is something of a nightmare for a manufacture=
r
> of
> general purpose hardware/software. Considering how difficult it would be =
to
> ensure that your product is never used by a military anywhere in the worl=
d,
> that's probably enough of a reason for TLS to not support it. Remember ho=
w
> long ECC was delayed for (imagined) IP reasons?
>
>   IP is bad news. People don't want anything to do with partially
> encumbered
> technology. Now this technology is not encumbered at all so, yea, let's d=
o
> it.
>
>   If an individual draft was to appear would the WG adopt it as a work
> item?
>
>   regards,
>
>   Dan.
>
> On 2/28/21 1:47 PM, Yoav Nir wrote:
>
> IIRC the license has allowed OCB to be used for TLS for several years.
> They haven=E2=80=99t taken it up. There are no AES-OCB ciphersuites
> inhttps://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xml#tls-=
parameters-4
>
> So I=E2=80=99m wondering right with you: It has a theoretical advantage i=
n
> security and a measurable advantage in speed in software.  Neither were
> compelling enough for anyone to bother adding it in TLS ciphersuites.  Wh=
y
> should our conclusion be any different?
>
> Yoav
>
>
> On 28 Feb 2021, at 22:35, Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> wrote:
>
>
> So now that OCB is finally free, do we want to implement it? :)
>
> I'm honestly not sure if the improvements of AES-GCM are worth it.
> I haven't heard of vulnerabilities in IKE/ESP wrt. IVs or counters.
>
> Paul
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> Date: Sat, 27 Feb 2021 14:37:30
> From: "Salz, Rich via cryptography" <cryptography@metzdowd.com>
> To: "cryptography@metzdowd.com" <cryptography@metzdowd.com>
> Subject: [Cryptography] Direct public confirmation from Dr. Rogaway
>
>
> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/cfrg/qLTveWOdTJcLn4HP3ev-vrj05Vg/ :
>
>
>
> I can confirm that I have abandoned all OCB patents
>
> and placed into the public domain all OCB-related IP of mine.
>
> While I have been telling people this for quite some time, I don't
>
> think I ever made a proper announcement to the CFRG or on the
>
> OCB webpage. Consider that done.
>
>
>
> I hope people will use the scheme to do positive things.
>
>
>
> phil
>
> _______________________________________________
> The cryptography mailing list
> cryptography@metzdowd.com
> https://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
> _______________________________________________
> IPsec mailing list
> IPsec@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> IPsec mailing listIPsec@ietf.orghttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ips=
ec
>
>
> --
> "The object of life is not to be on the side of the majority, but to
> escape finding oneself in the ranks of the insane." -- Marcus Aurelius
>
> _______________________________________________
> IPsec mailing list
> IPsec@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec
>

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Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">Hi Dan<div><br></div><div>Glad you replied to this, OCB se=
ems to be a hot topic at the moment. There seems to be some interest in thi=
s simply due to the potential speed increase.</div><div><br></div><div>Woul=
d anyone know the potential % difference in speed compared to GCM ?</div><d=
iv><br></div><div>In summary I think it should be discussed.</div><div><br>=
</div><div>cheers</div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr=
" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Wed, Mar 3, 2021 at 7:37 PM Dan Harkins &lt;<a hr=
ef=3D"mailto:dharkins@lounge.org">dharkins@lounge.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></d=
iv><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;bord=
er-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204=
);padding-left:1ex">
 =20
   =20
 =20
  <div>
    <tt>=C2=A0<br>
      =C2=A0 Faster and more secure seem to be compelling reasons. Those
      reasons are<br>
      probably more compelling for ESP than they are for IKE.<br>
      <br>
      =C2=A0 The license for OCB always had some caveats like the code coul=
d
      not be used<br>
      for military purposes which is something of a nightmare for a
      manufacturer of<br>
      general purpose hardware/software. Considering how difficult it
      would be to<br>
      ensure that your product is never used by a military anywhere in
      the world,<br>
      that&#39;s probably enough of a reason for TLS to not support it.
      Remember how<br>
      long ECC was delayed for (imagined) IP reasons? <br>
      <br>
      =C2=A0 IP is bad news. People don&#39;t want anything to do with part=
ially
      encumbered<br>
      technology. Now this technology is not encumbered at all so, yea,
      let&#39;s do it.<br>
      <br>
      =C2=A0 If an individual draft was to appear would the WG adopt it as =
a
      work item?<br>
      <br>
      =C2=A0 regards,<br>
      <br>
      =C2=A0 Dan.<br>
    </tt><br>
    <div>On 2/28/21 1:47 PM, Yoav Nir wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type=3D"cite">
     =20
      IIRC the license has allowed OCB to be used for TLS for several
      years. They haven=E2=80=99t taken it up. There are no AES-OCB ciphers=
uites
      <a>inhttps://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.x=
ml#tls-parameters-4</a>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>So I=E2=80=99m wondering right with you: It has a
        theoretical advantage in security and a measurable advantage in
        speed in software.=C2=A0 Neither were compelling enough for anyone =
to
        bother adding it in TLS ciphersuites.=C2=A0 Why should our conclusi=
on
        be any different?</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>Yoav</div>
      <div><br>
        <div><br>
          <blockquote type=3D"cite">
            <div>On 28 Feb 2021, at 22:35, Paul Wouters &lt;<a href=3D"mail=
to:paul@nohats.ca" target=3D"_blank">paul@nohats.ca</a>&gt; wrote:</div>
            <br>
            <div>
              <div><br>
                So now that OCB is finally free, do we want to implement
                it? :)<br>
                <br>
                I&#39;m honestly not sure if the improvements of AES-GCM ar=
e
                worth it.<br>
                I haven&#39;t heard of vulnerabilities in IKE/ESP wrt. IVs
                or counters.<br>
                <br>
                Paul<br>
                <br>
                ---------- Forwarded message ----------<br>
                Date: Sat, 27 Feb 2021 14:37:30<br>
                From: &quot;Salz, Rich via cryptography&quot; &lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:cryptography@metzdowd.com" target=3D"_blank">cryptography@metzdo=
wd.com</a>&gt;<br>
                To: &quot;<a href=3D"mailto:cryptography@metzdowd.com" targ=
et=3D"_blank">cryptography@metzdowd.com</a>&quot;
                &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:cryptography@metzdowd.com" target=3D"=
_blank">cryptography@metzdowd.com</a>&gt;<br>
                Subject: [Cryptography] Direct public confirmation from
                Dr. Rogaway<br>
                <br>
                <br>
                <a href=3D"https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/cfrg/qLTve=
WOdTJcLn4HP3ev-vrj05Vg/" target=3D"_blank">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arc=
h/msg/cfrg/qLTveWOdTJcLn4HP3ev-vrj05Vg/</a>
                :<br>
                <br>
                =C2=A0<br>
                <br>
                I can confirm that I have abandoned all OCB patents<br>
                <br>
                and placed into the public domain all OCB-related IP of
                mine.<br>
                <br>
                While I have been telling people this for quite some
                time, I don&#39;t<br>
                <br>
                think I ever made a proper announcement to the CFRG or
                on the<br>
                <br>
                OCB webpage. Consider that done.<br>
                <br>
                =C2=A0<br>
                <br>
                I hope people will use the scheme to do positive things.<br=
>
                <br>
                =C2=A0<br>
                <br>
                phil<br>
                <br>
                _______________________________________________<br>
                The cryptography mailing list<br>
                <a href=3D"mailto:cryptography@metzdowd.com" target=3D"_bla=
nk">cryptography@metzdowd.com</a><br>
                <a href=3D"https://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/crypto=
graphy" target=3D"_blank">https://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptog=
raphy</a><br>
                _______________________________________________<br>
                IPsec mailing list<br>
                <a href=3D"mailto:IPsec@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">IPsec@i=
etf.org</a><br>
                <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec" tar=
get=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec</a><br>
              </div>
            </div>
          </blockquote>
        </div>
        <br>
      </div>
      <br>
      <fieldset></fieldset>
      <pre>_______________________________________________
IPsec mailing list
<a href=3D"mailto:IPsec@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">IPsec@ietf.org</a>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec</a>
</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    <pre cols=3D"72">--=20
&quot;The object of life is not to be on the side of the majority, but to
escape finding oneself in the ranks of the insane.&quot; -- Marcus Aurelius=
</pre>
  </div>

_______________________________________________<br>
IPsec mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:IPsec@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">IPsec@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

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Subject: Re: [IPsec] [Cryptography] Direct public confirmation from Dr. Rogaway (fwd)
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Dan Harkins writes:
> If an individual draft was to appear would the WG adopt it as a work item?

Can't say what WG would decide, but I would support such work, and
would be willing to start a process to adding such item to charter if
WG feels that is something we want to do. 
-- 
kivinen@iki.fi


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From: Dan Brown <danibrown@blackberry.com>
To: Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org>, "ipsec@ietf.org" <ipsec@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [IPsec] [Cryptography] Direct public confirmation from Dr. Rogaway (fwd)
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] [Cryptography] Direct public confirmation from Dr. Rogaway (fwd)
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Deciding whether to use OCB sounds like a job for CFRG!

=20

As I understand it, OCB2 is severely broken: https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/3=
11

=20

That said, OCB1 and OCB3 may be just fine, but a broken OCB2 is not a good =
sign.  All the more reason to defer to CFRG, unless you want to play Monty =
Hall problem.

=E2=80=8B=E2=80=8B=E2=80=8B=E2=80=8B=E2=80=8B

Dan

=20

From: IPsec <ipsec-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Dan Harkins
Sent: Wednesday, March 3, 2021 2:37 PM
To: ipsec@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [IPsec] [Cryptography] Direct public confirmation from Dr. Rog=
away (fwd)

=20

=20
  Faster and more secure seem to be compelling reasons. Those reasons are
probably more compelling for ESP than they are for IKE.

  The license for OCB always had some caveats like the code could not be us=
ed
for military purposes which is something of a nightmare for a manufacturer =
of
general purpose hardware/software. Considering how difficult it would be to
ensure that your product is never used by a military anywhere in the world,
that's probably enough of a reason for TLS to not support it. Remember how
long ECC was delayed for (imagined) IP reasons?=20

  IP is bad news. People don't want anything to do with partially encumbered
technology. Now this technology is not encumbered at all so, yea, let's do =
it.

  If an individual draft was to appear would the WG adopt it as a work item?

  regards,

  Dan.

On 2/28/21 1:47 PM, Yoav Nir wrote:

IIRC the license has allowed OCB to be used for TLS for several years. They=
 haven=E2=80=99t taken it up. There are no AES-OCB ciphersuites inhttps://w=
ww.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xml#tls-parameters-4=
=20

=20

So I=E2=80=99m wondering right with you: It has a theoretical advantage in =
security and a measurable advantage in speed in software.  Neither were com=
pelling enough for anyone to bother adding it in TLS ciphersuites.  Why sho=
uld our conclusion be any different?

=20

Yoav

=20





On 28 Feb 2021, at 22:35, Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca <mailto:paul@nohats.=
ca> > wrote:

=20


So now that OCB is finally free, do we want to implement it? :)

I'm honestly not sure if the improvements of AES-GCM are worth it.
I haven't heard of vulnerabilities in IKE/ESP wrt. IVs or counters.

Paul

---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Sat, 27 Feb 2021 14:37:30
From: "Salz, Rich via cryptography" <cryptography@metzdowd.com <mailto:cryp=
tography@metzdowd.com> >
To: "cryptography@metzdowd.com <mailto:cryptography@metzdowd.com> " <crypto=
graphy@metzdowd.com <mailto:cryptography@metzdowd.com> >
Subject: [Cryptography] Direct public confirmation from Dr. Rogaway


https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/cfrg/qLTveWOdTJcLn4HP3ev-vrj05Vg/ <ht=
tps://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=3Dhttps-3A__mailarchive.ietf.org_a=
rch_msg_cfrg_qLTveWOdTJcLn4HP3ev-2Dvrj05Vg_&d=3DDwMDaQ&c=3DyzoHOc_ZK-sxl-kf=
GNSEvlJYanssXN3q-lhj0sp26wE&r=3DqkpbVDRj7zlSRVql-UonsW647lYqnsrbXizKI6MgkEw=
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n2wTtSrkJa_-l3hZK-AO8&e=3D>  :

=20

I can confirm that I have abandoned all OCB patents

and placed into the public domain all OCB-related IP of mine.

While I have been telling people this for quite some time, I don't

think I ever made a proper announcement to the CFRG or on the

OCB webpage. Consider that done.

=20

I hope people will use the scheme to do positive things.

=20

phil

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=20





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nk=3Dpurple style=3D'word-wrap:break-word'><div class=3DWordSection1><p cla=
ss=3DMsoNormal>Deciding whether to use OCB sounds like a job for CFRG!<o:p>=
</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>As=
 I understand it, OCB2 is severely broken: <a href=3D"https://eprint.iacr.o=
rg/2019/311">https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/311</a><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3D=
MsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>That said, OCB1 and OCB=
3 may be just fine, but a broken OCB2 is not a good sign.=C2=A0 All the mor=
e reason to defer to CFRG, unless you want to play Monty Hall problem.<o:p>=
</o:p></p><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>=E2=80=8B=E2=80=8B=E2=80=8B=E2=80=8B=E2=
=80=8B<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-CA>Dan<o:p></o:p>=
</span></p></div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><div style=3D'bo=
rder:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 4.0pt'><div><div=
 style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in =
0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal><b>From:</b> IPsec &lt;ipsec-bounces@ietf.org&gt;=
 <b>On Behalf Of </b>Dan Harkins<br><b>Sent:</b> Wednesday, March 3, 2021 2=
:37 PM<br><b>To:</b> ipsec@ietf.org<br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [IPsec] [Cryptog=
raphy] Direct public confirmation from Dr. Rogaway (fwd)<o:p></o:p></p></di=
v></div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal styl=
e=3D'margin-bottom:12.0pt'><tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;</spa=
n></tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New"'><br><tt>&=
nbsp; Faster and more secure seem to be compelling reasons. Those reasons a=
re</tt><br><tt>probably more compelling for ESP than they are for IKE.</tt>=
<br><br><tt>&nbsp; The license for OCB always had some caveats like the cod=
e could not be used</tt><br><tt>for military purposes which is something of=
 a nightmare for a manufacturer of</tt><br><tt>general purpose hardware/sof=
tware. Considering how difficult it would be to</tt><br><tt>ensure that you=
r product is never used by a military anywhere in the world,</tt><br><tt>th=
at's probably enough of a reason for TLS to not support it. Remember how</t=
t><br><tt>long ECC was delayed for (imagined) IP reasons? </tt><br><br><tt>=
&nbsp; IP is bad news. People don't want anything to do with partially encu=
mbered</tt><br><tt>technology. Now this technology is not encumbered at all=
 so, yea, let's do it.</tt><br><br><tt>&nbsp; If an individual draft was to=
 appear would the WG adopt it as a work item?</tt><br><br><tt>&nbsp; regard=
s,</tt><br><br><tt>&nbsp; Dan.</tt></span><o:p></o:p></p><div><p class=3DMs=
oNormal>On 2/28/21 1:47 PM, Yoav Nir wrote:<o:p></o:p></p></div><blockquote=
 style=3D'margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt'><p class=3DMsoNormal>IIRC t=
he license has allowed OCB to be used for TLS for several years. They haven=
=E2=80=99t taken it up. There are no AES-OCB ciphersuites <a href=3D"inhttp=
s://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xml#tls-paramete=
rs-4">inhttps://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xml#=
tls-parameters-4</a> <o:p></o:p></p><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</=
o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>So I=E2=80=99m wondering right with=
 you: It has a theoretical advantage in security and a measurable advantage=
 in speed in software. &nbsp;Neither were compelling enough for anyone to b=
other adding it in TLS ciphersuites. &nbsp;Why should our conclusion be any=
 different?<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>=
</p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>Yoav<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=
=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><br><br><o:p></=
o:p></p><blockquote style=3D'margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt'><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>On 28 Feb 2021, at 22:35, Paul Wouters &lt;<a href=3D"mai=
lto:paul@nohats.ca">paul@nohats.ca</a>&gt; wrote:<o:p></o:p></p></div><p cl=
ass=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><br>So =
now that OCB is finally free, do we want to implement it? :)<br><br>I'm hon=
estly not sure if the improvements of AES-GCM are worth it.<br>I haven't he=
ard of vulnerabilities in IKE/ESP wrt. IVs or counters.<br><br>Paul<br><br>=
---------- Forwarded message ----------<br>Date: Sat, 27 Feb 2021 14:37:30<=
br>From: &quot;Salz, Rich via cryptography&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:cryp=
tography@metzdowd.com">cryptography@metzdowd.com</a>&gt;<br>To: &quot;<a hr=
ef=3D"mailto:cryptography@metzdowd.com">cryptography@metzdowd.com</a>&quot;=
 &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:cryptography@metzdowd.com">cryptography@metzdowd.com=
</a>&gt;<br>Subject: [Cryptography] Direct public confirmation from Dr. Rog=
away<br><br><br><a href=3D"https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=3Dhtt=
ps-3A__mailarchive.ietf.org_arch_msg_cfrg_qLTveWOdTJcLn4HP3ev-2Dvrj05Vg_&am=
p;d=3DDwMDaQ&amp;c=3DyzoHOc_ZK-sxl-kfGNSEvlJYanssXN3q-lhj0sp26wE&amp;r=3Dqk=
pbVDRj7zlSRVql-UonsW647lYqnsrbXizKI6MgkEw&amp;m=3D2DcLjYKtazJ6kYTZx5uowgB-q=
JRp6_C8W0rBOr7ZOUI&amp;s=3DLZV-8STdDDeui1TmXz2JORn2wTtSrkJa_-l3hZK-AO8&amp;=
e=3D">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/cfrg/qLTveWOdTJcLn4HP3ev-vrj05V=
g/</a> :<br><br>&nbsp;<br><br>I can confirm that I have abandoned all OCB p=
atents<br><br>and placed into the public domain all OCB-related IP of mine.=
<br><br>While I have been telling people this for quite some time, I don't<=
br><br>think I ever made a proper announcement to the CFRG or on the<br><br=
>OCB webpage. Consider that done.<br><br>&nbsp;<br><br>I hope people will u=
se the scheme to do positive things.<br><br>&nbsp;<br><br>phil<br><br>_____=
__________________________________________<br>The cryptography mailing list=
<br><a href=3D"mailto:cryptography@metzdowd.com">cryptography@metzdowd.com<=
/a><br><a href=3D"https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=3Dhttps-3A__ww=
w.metzdowd.com_mailman_listinfo_cryptography&amp;d=3DDwMDaQ&amp;c=3DyzoHOc_=
ZK-sxl-kfGNSEvlJYanssXN3q-lhj0sp26wE&amp;r=3DqkpbVDRj7zlSRVql-UonsW647lYqns=
rbXizKI6MgkEw&amp;m=3D2DcLjYKtazJ6kYTZx5uowgB-qJRp6_C8W0rBOr7ZOUI&amp;s=3D_=
9IPM1exZqE6F4PLBAvpqDF-bHkBi5JPiUyq3eeyfwo&amp;e=3D">https://www.metzdowd.c=
om/mailman/listinfo/cryptography</a><br>___________________________________=
____________<br>IPsec mailing list<br><a href=3D"mailto:IPsec@ietf.org">IPs=
ec@ietf.org</a><br><a href=3D"https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=3D=
https-3A__www.ietf.org_mailman_listinfo_ipsec&amp;d=3DDwMDaQ&amp;c=3DyzoHOc=
_ZK-sxl-kfGNSEvlJYanssXN3q-lhj0sp26wE&amp;r=3DqkpbVDRj7zlSRVql-UonsW647lYqn=
srbXizKI6MgkEw&amp;m=3D2DcLjYKtazJ6kYTZx5uowgB-qJRp6_C8W0rBOr7ZOUI&amp;s=3D=
B4s3eO4jZ5UhqwAPEQu9SxQaSVWKuM4HcC1moozCyBc&amp;e=3D">https://www.ietf.org/=
mailman/listinfo/ipsec</a><o:p></o:p></p></div></div></blockquote></div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><p class=3DMsoNormal><br><br><=
o:p></o:p></p><pre>_______________________________________________<o:p></o:=
p></pre><pre>IPsec mailing list<o:p></o:p></pre><pre><a href=3D"mailto:IPse=
c@ietf.org">IPsec@ietf.org</a><o:p></o:p></pre><pre><a href=3D"https://urld=
efense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=3Dhttps-3A__www.ietf.org_mailman_listinfo_ip=
sec&amp;d=3DDwMDaQ&amp;c=3DyzoHOc_ZK-sxl-kfGNSEvlJYanssXN3q-lhj0sp26wE&amp;=
r=3DqkpbVDRj7zlSRVql-UonsW647lYqnsrbXizKI6MgkEw&amp;m=3D2DcLjYKtazJ6kYTZx5u=
owgB-qJRp6_C8W0rBOr7ZOUI&amp;s=3DB4s3eO4jZ5UhqwAPEQu9SxQaSVWKuM4HcC1moozCyB=
c&amp;e=3D">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec</a><o:p></o:p></pre=
></blockquote><p class=3DMsoNormal><br><br><o:p></o:p></p><pre>-- <o:p></o:=
p></pre><pre>&quot;The object of life is not to be on the side of the major=
ity, but to<o:p></o:p></pre><pre>escape finding oneself in the ranks of the=
 insane.&quot; -- Marcus Aurelius<o:p></o:p></pre></div></div>
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Date: Thu, 04 Mar 2021 14:29:46 -0800
From: Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org>
In-reply-to: <dcc427f3a3a8450fa032890143f83f69@blackberry.com>
To: Dan Brown <danibrown@blackberry.com>, "ipsec@ietf.org" <ipsec@ietf.org>
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ipsec/HdKG9uUInv_dXfGCDG-wHz5R_X8>
Subject: Re: [IPsec] [Cryptography] Direct public confirmation from Dr. Rogaway (fwd)
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   Hi Dan,

On 3/4/21 11:04 AM, Dan Brown wrote:
>
> Deciding whether to use OCB sounds like a job for CFRG!
>
> As I understand it, OCB2 is severely broken: 
> https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/311
>
> That said, OCB1 and OCB3 may be just fine, but a broken OCB2 is not a 
> good sign.  All the more reason to defer to CFRG, unless you want to 
> play Monty Hall problem.
>
>

   CFRG already produced RFC 7253. That's really all they can
be expected to do. It's up to individual IETF WGs to define
how to use that cipher mode in their particular protocols.
That's where we come in.

   regards,

   Dan.

> Dan
>
> *From:* IPsec <ipsec-bounces@ietf.org> *On Behalf Of *Dan Harkins
> *Sent:* Wednesday, March 3, 2021 2:37 PM
> *To:* ipsec@ietf.org
> *Subject:* Re: [IPsec] [Cryptography] Direct public confirmation from 
> Dr. Rogaway (fwd)
>
>
>   Faster and more secure seem to be compelling reasons. Those reasons are
> probably more compelling for ESP than they are for IKE.
>
>   The license for OCB always had some caveats like the code could not 
> be used
> for military purposes which is something of a nightmare for a 
> manufacturer of
> general purpose hardware/software. Considering how difficult it would 
> be to
> ensure that your product is never used by a military anywhere in the 
> world,
> that's probably enough of a reason for TLS to not support it. Remember how
> long ECC was delayed for (imagined) IP reasons?
>
>   IP is bad news. People don't want anything to do with partially 
> encumbered
> technology. Now this technology is not encumbered at all so, yea, 
> let's do it.
>
>   If an individual draft was to appear would the WG adopt it as a work 
> item?
>
>   regards,
>
>   Dan.
>
> On 2/28/21 1:47 PM, Yoav Nir wrote:
>
>     IIRC the license has allowed OCB to be used for TLS for several
>     years. They haven’t taken it up. There are no AES-OCB ciphersuites
>     inhttps://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xml#tls-parameters-4
>
>
>     So I’m wondering right with you: It has a theoretical advantage in
>     security and a measurable advantage in speed in software.  Neither
>     were compelling enough for anyone to bother adding it in TLS
>     ciphersuites.  Why should our conclusion be any different?
>
>     Yoav
>
>
>
>         On 28 Feb 2021, at 22:35, Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca
>         <mailto:paul@nohats.ca>> wrote:
>
>
>         So now that OCB is finally free, do we want to implement it? :)
>
>         I'm honestly not sure if the improvements of AES-GCM are worth it.
>         I haven't heard of vulnerabilities in IKE/ESP wrt. IVs or
>         counters.
>
>         Paul
>
>         ---------- Forwarded message ----------
>         Date: Sat, 27 Feb 2021 14:37:30
>         From: "Salz, Rich via cryptography" <cryptography@metzdowd.com
>         <mailto:cryptography@metzdowd.com>>
>         To: "cryptography@metzdowd.com
>         <mailto:cryptography@metzdowd.com>" <cryptography@metzdowd.com
>         <mailto:cryptography@metzdowd.com>>
>         Subject: [Cryptography] Direct public confirmation from Dr.
>         Rogaway
>
>
>         https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/cfrg/qLTveWOdTJcLn4HP3ev-vrj05Vg/
>         <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mailarchive.ietf.org_arch_msg_cfrg_qLTveWOdTJcLn4HP3ev-2Dvrj05Vg_&d=DwMDaQ&c=yzoHOc_ZK-sxl-kfGNSEvlJYanssXN3q-lhj0sp26wE&r=qkpbVDRj7zlSRVql-UonsW647lYqnsrbXizKI6MgkEw&m=2DcLjYKtazJ6kYTZx5uowgB-qJRp6_C8W0rBOr7ZOUI&s=LZV-8STdDDeui1TmXz2JORn2wTtSrkJa_-l3hZK-AO8&e=>
>         :
>
>
>
>         I can confirm that I have abandoned all OCB patents
>
>         and placed into the public domain all OCB-related IP of mine.
>
>         While I have been telling people this for quite some time, I don't
>
>         think I ever made a proper announcement to the CFRG or on the
>
>         OCB webpage. Consider that done.
>
>
>
>         I hope people will use the scheme to do positive things.
>
>
>
>         phil
>
>         _______________________________________________
>         The cryptography mailing list
>         cryptography@metzdowd.com <mailto:cryptography@metzdowd.com>
>         https://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
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>         _______________________________________________
>         IPsec mailing list
>         IPsec@ietf.org <mailto:IPsec@ietf.org>
>         https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec
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>
>
>
>     _______________________________________________
>
>     IPsec mailing list
>
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>
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>
>
> -- 
> "The object of life is not to be on the side of the majority, but to
> escape finding oneself in the ranks of the insane." -- Marcus Aurelius
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    <tt> <br>
        Hi Dan,<br>
    </tt><br>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 3/4/21 11:04 AM, Dan Brown wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type="cite"
      cite="mid:dcc427f3a3a8450fa032890143f83f69@blackberry.com">
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      <div class="WordSection1">
        <p class="MsoNormal">Deciding whether to use OCB sounds like a
          job for CFRG!<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">As I understand it, OCB2 is severely
          broken: <a href="https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/311"
            moz-do-not-send="true">https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/311</a><o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">That said, OCB1 and OCB3 may be just fine,
          but a broken OCB2 is not a good sign.  All the more reason to
          defer to CFRG, unless you want to play Monty Hall problem.<o:p></o:p></p>
        <div>
          <p class="MsoNormal"><br>
          </p>
        </div>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    <tt> <br>
        CFRG already produced RFC 7253. That's really all they can<br>
      be expected to do. It's up to individual IETF WGs to define<br>
      how to use that cipher mode in their particular protocols.<br>
      That's where we come in.<br>
      <br>
        regards,<br>
      <br>
        Dan.<br>
      <br>
    </tt>
    <blockquote type="cite"
      cite="mid:dcc427f3a3a8450fa032890143f83f69@blackberry.com">
      <div class="WordSection1">
        <div>
          <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
          <p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-CA">Dan<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        </div>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <div style="border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0in
          0in 0in 4.0pt">
          <div>
            <div style="border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1
              1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in">
              <p class="MsoNormal"><b>From:</b> IPsec
                <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:ipsec-bounces@ietf.org">&lt;ipsec-bounces@ietf.org&gt;</a> <b>On Behalf Of </b>Dan
                Harkins<br>
                <b>Sent:</b> Wednesday, March 3, 2021 2:37 PM<br>
                <b>To:</b> <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:ipsec@ietf.org">ipsec@ietf.org</a><br>
                <b>Subject:</b> Re: [IPsec] [Cryptography] Direct public
                confirmation from Dr. Rogaway (fwd)<o:p></o:p></p>
            </div>
          </div>
          <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
          <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:12.0pt"><tt><span
                style="font-size:10.0pt"> </span></tt><span
              style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier
              New&quot;"><br>
              <tt>  Faster and more secure seem to be compelling
                reasons. Those reasons are</tt><br>
              <tt>probably more compelling for ESP than they are for
                IKE.</tt><br>
              <br>
              <tt>  The license for OCB always had some caveats like the
                code could not be used</tt><br>
              <tt>for military purposes which is something of a
                nightmare for a manufacturer of</tt><br>
              <tt>general purpose hardware/software. Considering how
                difficult it would be to</tt><br>
              <tt>ensure that your product is never used by a military
                anywhere in the world,</tt><br>
              <tt>that's probably enough of a reason for TLS to not
                support it. Remember how</tt><br>
              <tt>long ECC was delayed for (imagined) IP reasons? </tt><br>
              <br>
              <tt>  IP is bad news. People don't want anything to do
                with partially encumbered</tt><br>
              <tt>technology. Now this technology is not encumbered at
                all so, yea, let's do it.</tt><br>
              <br>
              <tt>  If an individual draft was to appear would the WG
                adopt it as a work item?</tt><br>
              <br>
              <tt>  regards,</tt><br>
              <br>
              <tt>  Dan.</tt></span><o:p></o:p></p>
          <div>
            <p class="MsoNormal">On 2/28/21 1:47 PM, Yoav Nir wrote:<o:p></o:p></p>
          </div>
          <blockquote style="margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
            <p class="MsoNormal">IIRC the license has allowed OCB to be
              used for TLS for several years. They haven’t taken it up.
              There are no AES-OCB ciphersuites <a
href="inhttps://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xml#tls-parameters-4"
                moz-do-not-send="true">inhttps://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xml#tls-parameters-4</a>
              <o:p></o:p></p>
            <div>
              <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
            </div>
            <div>
              <p class="MsoNormal">So I’m wondering right with you: It
                has a theoretical advantage in security and a measurable
                advantage in speed in software.  Neither were compelling
                enough for anyone to bother adding it in TLS
                ciphersuites.  Why should our conclusion be any
                different?<o:p></o:p></p>
            </div>
            <div>
              <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
            </div>
            <div>
              <p class="MsoNormal">Yoav<o:p></o:p></p>
            </div>
            <div>
              <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
              <div>
                <p class="MsoNormal"><br>
                  <br>
                  <o:p></o:p></p>
                <blockquote style="margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
                  <div>
                    <p class="MsoNormal">On 28 Feb 2021, at 22:35, Paul
                      Wouters &lt;<a href="mailto:paul@nohats.ca"
                        moz-do-not-send="true">paul@nohats.ca</a>&gt;
                      wrote:<o:p></o:p></p>
                  </div>
                  <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
                  <div>
                    <div>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"><br>
                        So now that OCB is finally free, do we want to
                        implement it? :)<br>
                        <br>
                        I'm honestly not sure if the improvements of
                        AES-GCM are worth it.<br>
                        I haven't heard of vulnerabilities in IKE/ESP
                        wrt. IVs or counters.<br>
                        <br>
                        Paul<br>
                        <br>
                        ---------- Forwarded message ----------<br>
                        Date: Sat, 27 Feb 2021 14:37:30<br>
                        From: "Salz, Rich via cryptography" &lt;<a
                          href="mailto:cryptography@metzdowd.com"
                          moz-do-not-send="true">cryptography@metzdowd.com</a>&gt;<br>
                        To: "<a href="mailto:cryptography@metzdowd.com"
                          moz-do-not-send="true">cryptography@metzdowd.com</a>"
                        &lt;<a href="mailto:cryptography@metzdowd.com"
                          moz-do-not-send="true">cryptography@metzdowd.com</a>&gt;<br>
                        Subject: [Cryptography] Direct public
                        confirmation from Dr. Rogaway<br>
                        <br>
                        <br>
                        <a
href="https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mailarchive.ietf.org_arch_msg_cfrg_qLTveWOdTJcLn4HP3ev-2Dvrj05Vg_&amp;d=DwMDaQ&amp;c=yzoHOc_ZK-sxl-kfGNSEvlJYanssXN3q-lhj0sp26wE&amp;r=qkpbVDRj7zlSRVql-UonsW647lYqnsrbXizKI6MgkEw&amp;m=2DcLjYKtazJ6kYTZx5uowgB-qJRp6_C8W0rBOr7ZOUI&amp;s=LZV-8STdDDeui1TmXz2JORn2wTtSrkJa_-l3hZK-AO8&amp;e="
                          moz-do-not-send="true">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/cfrg/qLTveWOdTJcLn4HP3ev-vrj05Vg/</a>
                        :<br>
                        <br>
                         <br>
                        <br>
                        I can confirm that I have abandoned all OCB
                        patents<br>
                        <br>
                        and placed into the public domain all
                        OCB-related IP of mine.<br>
                        <br>
                        While I have been telling people this for quite
                        some time, I don't<br>
                        <br>
                        think I ever made a proper announcement to the
                        CFRG or on the<br>
                        <br>
                        OCB webpage. Consider that done.<br>
                        <br>
                         <br>
                        <br>
                        I hope people will use the scheme to do positive
                        things.<br>
                        <br>
                         <br>
                        <br>
                        phil<br>
                        <br>
                        _______________________________________________<br>
                        The cryptography mailing list<br>
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                          moz-do-not-send="true">cryptography@metzdowd.com</a><br>
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                        _______________________________________________<br>
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                          moz-do-not-send="true">IPsec@ietf.org</a><br>
                        <a
href="https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.ietf.org_mailman_listinfo_ipsec&amp;d=DwMDaQ&amp;c=yzoHOc_ZK-sxl-kfGNSEvlJYanssXN3q-lhj0sp26wE&amp;r=qkpbVDRj7zlSRVql-UonsW647lYqnsrbXizKI6MgkEw&amp;m=2DcLjYKtazJ6kYTZx5uowgB-qJRp6_C8W0rBOr7ZOUI&amp;s=B4s3eO4jZ5UhqwAPEQu9SxQaSVWKuM4HcC1moozCyBc&amp;e="
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                    </div>
                  </div>
                </blockquote>
              </div>
              <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
            </div>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><br>
              <br>
              <o:p></o:p></p>
            <pre>_______________________________________________<o:p></o:p></pre>
            <pre>IPsec mailing list<o:p></o:p></pre>
            <pre><a href="mailto:IPsec@ietf.org" moz-do-not-send="true">IPsec@ietf.org</a><o:p></o:p></pre>
            <pre><a href="https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.ietf.org_mailman_listinfo_ipsec&amp;d=DwMDaQ&amp;c=yzoHOc_ZK-sxl-kfGNSEvlJYanssXN3q-lhj0sp26wE&amp;r=qkpbVDRj7zlSRVql-UonsW647lYqnsrbXizKI6MgkEw&amp;m=2DcLjYKtazJ6kYTZx5uowgB-qJRp6_C8W0rBOr7ZOUI&amp;s=B4s3eO4jZ5UhqwAPEQu9SxQaSVWKuM4HcC1moozCyBc&amp;e=" moz-do-not-send="true">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec</a><o:p></o:p></pre>
          </blockquote>
          <p class="MsoNormal"><br>
            <br>
            <o:p></o:p></p>
          <pre>-- <o:p></o:p></pre>
          <pre>"The object of life is not to be on the side of the majority, but to<o:p></o:p></pre>
          <pre>escape finding oneself in the ranks of the insane." -- Marcus Aurelius<o:p></o:p></pre>
        </div>
      </div>
      <hr>This transmission (including any attachments) may contain
      confidential information, privileged material (including material
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    </blockquote>
    <br>
    <pre class="moz-signature" cols="72">-- 
"The object of life is not to be on the side of the majority, but to
escape finding oneself in the ranks of the insane." -- Marcus Aurelius</pre>
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Thread-Topic: [IPsec] [Cryptography] Direct public confirmation from Dr. Rogaway (fwd)
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Date: Thu, 04 Mar 2021 17:25:31 -0800
From: Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org>
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ipsec/oxL7sH0Lj22jSuoWway0un0yliA>
Subject: Re: [IPsec] [Cryptography] Direct public confirmation from Dr. Rogaway (fwd)
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On 3/4/21 4:46 PM, Dan Brown wrote:
> Sorry for foolishly forgetting about the OCB RFC, which specifies OCB3.
>
> But that OCB3 RFC is from 2014, five-ish years before the OCB2 break.
   It says:

"The version of OCB defined in this document is a refinement of two
    prior schemes.  The original OCB version was published in 2001 [OCB1]
    and was listed as an optional component in IEEE 802.11i.  A second
    version was published in 2004 [OCB2] and is specified in ISO 19772.
    The scheme described here is called OCB3 in the 2011 paper describing
    the mode [OCB3]; it shall be referred to simply as OCB throughout
    this document.  The only difference between the algorithm of this RFC
    and that of the [OCB3] paper is that the tag length is now encoded
    into the internally formatted nonce.  See [OCB3] for complete
    references, timing information, and a discussion of the differences
    between the algorithms."

So this RFC describes OCB3.

> Again, the OCB2 attack severely erodes my trust in OCB3, though maybe 
> I'm an outlier. Maybe I'm also forgetting recent CFRG or other effort 
> to regain trust in OCB3 relative to OCB2?

And it also says:

   "OCB has received years of in-depth analysis previous to its
    submission to the CFRG and has been under review by the members of
    the CFRG for over a year.  It is the consensus of the CFRG that the
    security mechanisms provided by the OCB AEAD algorithm described in
    this document are suitable for use in providing confidentiality and
    authentication."

   So CFRG has produced a document defining OCB3 and that document
represents the consensus of the CFRG. I'm not sure what else you think
CFRG should be doing but maybe mention it on the CFRG list instead of
IPsec. Also, Phil Rogaway is on the CFRG list but I don't think he's
on this one. If you have trust issues with OCB then maybe bring them
up with him there.

   Dan.

>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> *From: *Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org>
> *Sent: *Mar 4, 2021 5:29 PM
> *To: *Dan Brown <danibrown@blackberry.com>; ipsec@ietf.org
> *Subject: *Re: [IPsec] [Cryptography] Direct public confirmation from 
> Dr. Rogaway (fwd)
>
>
>       Hi Dan,
>
>     On 3/4/21 11:04 AM, Dan Brown wrote:
>>
>>     Deciding whether to use OCB sounds like a job for CFRG!
>>
>>     As I understand it, OCB2 is severely broken:
>>     https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/311
>>     <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__eprint.iacr.org_2019_311&d=DwMDaQ&c=yzoHOc_ZK-sxl-kfGNSEvlJYanssXN3q-lhj0sp26wE&r=mf6j6fOClApRsArWE9wqI1rEGUVkfxZ0aXWmn35nK_c&m=8aGCbnoSU7ozJ-QSzxHGokOgKsea7IZq6669KyaMNNA&s=bSN3q8CM03xYZRbPi2KanYD7GKxGF2HjAZ9AjTc5Nvk&e=>
>>
>>     That said, OCB1 and OCB3 may be just fine, but a broken OCB2 is
>>     not a good sign.  All the more reason to defer to CFRG, unless
>>     you want to play Monty Hall problem.
>>
>>
>
>       CFRG already produced RFC 7253. That's really all they can
>     be expected to do. It's up to individual IETF WGs to define
>     how to use that cipher mode in their particular protocols.
>     That's where we come in.
>
>       regards,
>
>       Dan.
>
>>     Dan
>>
>>     *From:* IPsec <ipsec-bounces@ietf.org> *On Behalf Of *Dan Harkins
>>     *Sent:* Wednesday, March 3, 2021 2:37 PM
>>     *To:* ipsec@ietf.org
>>     *Subject:* Re: [IPsec] [Cryptography] Direct public confirmation
>>     from Dr. Rogaway (fwd)
>>
>>
>>       Faster and more secure seem to be compelling reasons. Those
>>     reasons are
>>     probably more compelling for ESP than they are for IKE.
>>
>>       The license for OCB always had some caveats like the code could
>>     not be used
>>     for military purposes which is something of a nightmare for a
>>     manufacturer of
>>     general purpose hardware/software. Considering how difficult it
>>     would be to
>>     ensure that your product is never used by a military anywhere in
>>     the world,
>>     that's probably enough of a reason for TLS to not support it.
>>     Remember how
>>     long ECC was delayed for (imagined) IP reasons?
>>
>>       IP is bad news. People don't want anything to do with partially
>>     encumbered
>>     technology. Now this technology is not encumbered at all so, yea,
>>     let's do it.
>>
>>       If an individual draft was to appear would the WG adopt it as a
>>     work item?
>>
>>       regards,
>>
>>       Dan.
>>
>>     On 2/28/21 1:47 PM, Yoav Nir wrote:
>>
>>         IIRC the license has allowed OCB to be used for TLS for
>>         several years. They haven’t taken it up. There are no AES-OCB
>>         ciphersuites
>>         inhttps://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xml#tls-parameters-4
>>         < >
>>
>>         So I’m wondering right with you: It has a theoretical
>>         advantage in security and a measurable advantage in speed in
>>         software.  Neither were compelling enough for anyone to
>>         bother adding it in TLS ciphersuites.  Why should our
>>         conclusion be any different?
>>
>>         Yoav
>>
>>
>>
>>             On 28 Feb 2021, at 22:35, Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca
>>             <mailto:paul@nohats.ca>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>             So now that OCB is finally free, do we want to implement
>>             it? :)
>>
>>             I'm honestly not sure if the improvements of AES-GCM are
>>             worth it.
>>             I haven't heard of vulnerabilities in IKE/ESP wrt. IVs or
>>             counters.
>>
>>             Paul
>>
>>             ---------- Forwarded message ----------
>>             Date: Sat, 27 Feb 2021 14:37:30
>>             From: "Salz, Rich via cryptography"
>>             <cryptography@metzdowd.com
>>             <mailto:cryptography@metzdowd.com>>
>>             To: "cryptography@metzdowd.com
>>             <mailto:cryptography@metzdowd.com>"
>>             <cryptography@metzdowd.com
>>             <mailto:cryptography@metzdowd.com>>
>>             Subject: [Cryptography] Direct public confirmation from
>>             Dr. Rogaway
>>
>>
>>             https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/cfrg/qLTveWOdTJcLn4HP3ev-vrj05Vg/
>>             <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mailarchive.ietf.org_arch_msg_cfrg_qLTveWOdTJcLn4HP3ev-2Dvrj05Vg_&d=DwMDaQ&c=yzoHOc_ZK-sxl-kfGNSEvlJYanssXN3q-lhj0sp26wE&r=qkpbVDRj7zlSRVql-UonsW647lYqnsrbXizKI6MgkEw&m=2DcLjYKtazJ6kYTZx5uowgB-qJRp6_C8W0rBOr7ZOUI&s=LZV-8STdDDeui1TmXz2JORn2wTtSrkJa_-l3hZK-AO8&e=>
>>             :
>>
>>
>>
>>             I can confirm that I have abandoned all OCB patents
>>
>>             and placed into the public domain all OCB-related IP of mine.
>>
>>             While I have been telling people this for quite some
>>             time, I don't
>>
>>             think I ever made a proper announcement to the CFRG or on the
>>
>>             OCB webpage. Consider that done.
>>
>>
>>
>>             I hope people will use the scheme to do positive things.
>>
>>
>>
>>             phil
>>
>>             _______________________________________________
>>             The cryptography mailing list
>>             cryptography@metzdowd.com <mailto:cryptography@metzdowd.com>
>>             https://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
>>             <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.metzdowd.com_mailman_listinfo_cryptography&d=DwMDaQ&c=yzoHOc_ZK-sxl-kfGNSEvlJYanssXN3q-lhj0sp26wE&r=qkpbVDRj7zlSRVql-UonsW647lYqnsrbXizKI6MgkEw&m=2DcLjYKtazJ6kYTZx5uowgB-qJRp6_C8W0rBOr7ZOUI&s=_9IPM1exZqE6F4PLBAvpqDF-bHkBi5JPiUyq3eeyfwo&e=>
>>             _______________________________________________
>>             IPsec mailing list
>>             IPsec@ietf.org <mailto:IPsec@ietf.org>
>>             https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec
>>             <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.ietf.org_mailman_listinfo_ipsec&d=DwMDaQ&c=yzoHOc_ZK-sxl-kfGNSEvlJYanssXN3q-lhj0sp26wE&r=qkpbVDRj7zlSRVql-UonsW647lYqnsrbXizKI6MgkEw&m=2DcLjYKtazJ6kYTZx5uowgB-qJRp6_C8W0rBOr7ZOUI&s=B4s3eO4jZ5UhqwAPEQu9SxQaSVWKuM4HcC1moozCyBc&e=>
>>
>>
>>
>>         _______________________________________________
>>
>>         IPsec mailing list
>>
>>         IPsec@ietf.org  <mailto:IPsec@ietf.org>
>>
>>         https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec  <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.ietf.org_mailman_listinfo_ipsec&d=DwMDaQ&c=yzoHOc_ZK-sxl-kfGNSEvlJYanssXN3q-lhj0sp26wE&r=qkpbVDRj7zlSRVql-UonsW647lYqnsrbXizKI6MgkEw&m=2DcLjYKtazJ6kYTZx5uowgB-qJRp6_C8W0rBOr7ZOUI&s=B4s3eO4jZ5UhqwAPEQu9SxQaSVWKuM4HcC1moozCyBc&e=>
>>
>>
>>
>>     -- 
>>     "The object of life is not to be on the side of the majority, but to
>>     escape finding oneself in the ranks of the insane." -- Marcus Aurelius
>>     ------------------------------------------------------------------------
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>>     please immediately reply to the sender and delete this
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>
>     -- 
>     "The object of life is not to be on the side of the majority, but to
>     escape finding oneself in the ranks of the insane." -- Marcus Aurelius
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
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    <br>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 3/4/21 4:46 PM, Dan Brown wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type="cite"
      cite="mid:b482f169cc8f492abba8835717d7ef49@blackberry.com">
      <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
      <div id="gw-compose-body-div"
        style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;; font-size:12pt;
        color:rgb(0,0,0);">
        <div>Sorry for foolishly forgetting about the OCB RFC, which
          specifies <span style="font-size: 12pt; display: inline
            !important;">OCB3.</span></div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>But t<span style="font-size: 12pt; display: inline
            !important;">hat OCB3 RFC is from 2014, five-ish years
            before the OCB2 break.</span></div>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    <tt>  It says:<br>
    </tt><br>
    <tt>  <tt>"The version of OCB defined in this document is a
        refinement of two<br>
           prior schemes.  The original OCB version was published in
        2001 [OCB1]<br>
           and was listed as an optional component in IEEE 802.11i.  A
        second<br>
           version was published in 2004 [OCB2] and is specified in ISO
        19772.<br>
           The scheme described here is called OCB3 in the 2011 paper
        describing<br>
           the mode [OCB3]; it shall be referred to simply as OCB
        throughout<br>
           this document.  The only difference between the algorithm of
        this RFC<br>
           and that of the [OCB3] paper is that the tag length is now
        encoded<br>
           into the internally formatted nonce.  See [OCB3] for complete<br>
           references, timing information, and a discussion of the
        differences<br>
           between the algorithms."<br>
        <br>
        So this RFC describes OCB3.<br>
        <br>
      </tt></tt>
    <blockquote type="cite"
      cite="mid:b482f169cc8f492abba8835717d7ef49@blackberry.com">
      <div id="gw-compose-body-div"
        style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;; font-size:12pt;
        color:rgb(0,0,0);">
        <div>Again, the OCB2 attack severely erodes my trust in OCB3,
          though maybe I'm an outlier. Maybe I'm also forgetting recent
          CFRG or other effort to regain trust in OCB3 relative to OCB2?</div>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    <tt>And it also says:<br>
      <br>
        "OCB has received years of in-depth analysis previous to its<br>
         submission to the CFRG and has been under review by the members
      of<br>
         the CFRG for over a year.  It is the consensus of the CFRG that
      the<br>
         security mechanisms provided by the OCB AEAD algorithm
      described in<br>
         this document are suitable for use in providing confidentiality
      and<br>
         authentication."<br>
      <br>
        So CFRG has produced a document defining OCB3 and that document<br>
      represents the consensus of the CFRG. I'm not sure what else you
      think<br>
      CFRG should be doing but maybe mention it on the CFRG list instead
      of<br>
      IPsec. Also, Phil Rogaway is on the CFRG list but I don't think
      he's<br>
      on this one. If you have trust issues with OCB then maybe bring
      them<br>
      up with him there.<br>
      <br>
        Dan.<br>
      <br>
    </tt>
    <blockquote type="cite"
      cite="mid:b482f169cc8f492abba8835717d7ef49@blackberry.com">
      <div id="gw-compose-body-div"
        style="font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;; font-size:12pt;
        color:rgb(0,0,0);">
        <div><br>
        </div>
      </div>
      <hr style="display:inline-block; width:98%">
      <div class="quote"><b>From: </b>Dan Harkins
        <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:dharkins@lounge.org">&lt;dharkins@lounge.org&gt;</a><br>
        <b>Sent: </b>Mar 4, 2021 5:29 PM<br>
        <b>To: </b>Dan Brown <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:danibrown@blackberry.com">&lt;danibrown@blackberry.com&gt;</a>;
        <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:ipsec@ietf.org">ipsec@ietf.org</a><br>
        <b>Subject: </b>Re: [IPsec] [Cryptography] Direct public
        confirmation from Dr. Rogaway (fwd)<br>
        <br type="attribution">
        <blockquote class="quote" style="margin:0 0 0
          .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
          <div><tt> <br>
                Hi Dan,<br>
            </tt><br>
            <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 3/4/21 11:04 AM, Dan Brown
              wrote:<br>
            </div>
            <blockquote type="cite">
              <style>
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              <div class="WordSection1">
                <p class="MsoNormal">Deciding whether to use OCB sounds
                  like a job for CFRG!</p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">As I understand it, OCB2 is
                  severely broken: <a
href="https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__eprint.iacr.org_2019_311&amp;d=DwMDaQ&amp;c=yzoHOc_ZK-sxl-kfGNSEvlJYanssXN3q-lhj0sp26wE&amp;r=mf6j6fOClApRsArWE9wqI1rEGUVkfxZ0aXWmn35nK_c&amp;m=8aGCbnoSU7ozJ-QSzxHGokOgKsea7IZq6669KyaMNNA&amp;s=bSN3q8CM03xYZRbPi2KanYD7GKxGF2HjAZ9AjTc5Nvk&amp;e="
                    target="_BLANK" moz-do-not-send="true">
                    https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/311</a></p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                <p class="MsoNormal">That said, OCB1 and OCB3 may be
                  just fine, but a broken OCB2 is not a good sign.  All
                  the more reason to defer to CFRG, unless you want to
                  play Monty Hall problem.</p>
                <div>
                  <p class="MsoNormal"><br>
                  </p>
                </div>
              </div>
            </blockquote>
            <tt> <br>
                CFRG already produced RFC 7253. That's really all they
              can<br>
              be expected to do. It's up to individual IETF WGs to
              define<br>
              how to use that cipher mode in their particular protocols.<br>
              That's where we come in.<br>
              <br>
                regards,<br>
              <br>
                Dan.<br>
              <br>
            </tt>
            <blockquote type="cite">
              <div class="WordSection1">
                <div>
                  <p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-CA">Dan</span></p>
                </div>
                <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                <div style="border:none; border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;
                  padding:0in 0in 0in 4.0pt">
                  <div>
                    <div style="border:none; border-top:solid #E1E1E1
                      1.0pt; padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in">
                      <p class="MsoNormal"><b>From:</b> IPsec <a
                          class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E"
                          href="mailto:ipsec-bounces@ietf.org"
                          moz-do-not-send="true">
                          &lt;ipsec-bounces@ietf.org&gt;</a> <b>On
                          Behalf Of </b>Dan Harkins<br>
                        <b>Sent:</b> Wednesday, March 3, 2021 2:37 PM<br>
                        <b>To:</b> <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated"
                          href="mailto:ipsec@ietf.org"
                          moz-do-not-send="true">ipsec@ietf.org</a><br>
                        <b>Subject:</b> Re: [IPsec] [Cryptography]
                        Direct public confirmation from Dr. Rogaway
                        (fwd)</p>
                    </div>
                  </div>
                  <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                  <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:12.0pt"><tt><span
                        style="font-size:10.0pt"> </span></tt><span
                      style=""><br>
                      <tt>  Faster and more secure seem to be compelling
                        reasons. Those reasons are</tt><br>
                      <tt>probably more compelling for ESP than they are
                        for IKE.</tt><br>
                      <br>
                      <tt>  The license for OCB always had some caveats
                        like the code could not be used</tt><br>
                      <tt>for military purposes which is something of a
                        nightmare for a manufacturer of</tt><br>
                      <tt>general purpose hardware/software. Considering
                        how difficult it would be to</tt><br>
                      <tt>ensure that your product is never used by a
                        military anywhere in the world,</tt><br>
                      <tt>that's probably enough of a reason for TLS to
                        not support it. Remember how</tt><br>
                      <tt>long ECC was delayed for (imagined) IP
                        reasons? </tt><br>
                      <br>
                      <tt>  IP is bad news. People don't want anything
                        to do with partially encumbered</tt><br>
                      <tt>technology. Now this technology is not
                        encumbered at all so, yea, let's do it.</tt><br>
                      <br>
                      <tt>  If an individual draft was to appear would
                        the WG adopt it as a work item?</tt><br>
                      <br>
                      <tt>  regards,</tt><br>
                      <br>
                      <tt>  Dan.</tt></span></p>
                  <div>
                    <p class="MsoNormal">On 2/28/21 1:47 PM, Yoav Nir
                      wrote:</p>
                  </div>
                  <blockquote style="margin-top:5.0pt;
                    margin-bottom:5.0pt">
                    <p class="MsoNormal">IIRC the license has allowed
                      OCB to be used for TLS for several years. They
                      haven’t taken it up. There are no AES-OCB
                      ciphersuites
                      <a href=" " moz-do-not-send="true">inhttps://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xml#tls-parameters-4</a>
                    </p>
                    <div>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                    </div>
                    <div>
                      <p class="MsoNormal">So I’m wondering right with
                        you: It has a theoretical advantage in security
                        and a measurable advantage in speed in software.
                         Neither were compelling enough for anyone to
                        bother adding it in TLS ciphersuites.  Why
                        should our conclusion be any different?</p>
                    </div>
                    <div>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                    </div>
                    <div>
                      <p class="MsoNormal">Yoav</p>
                    </div>
                    <div>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                      <div>
                        <p class="MsoNormal"><br>
                          <br>
                        </p>
                        <blockquote style="margin-top:5.0pt;
                          margin-bottom:5.0pt">
                          <div>
                            <p class="MsoNormal">On 28 Feb 2021, at
                              22:35, Paul Wouters &lt;<a
                                href="mailto:paul@nohats.ca"
                                moz-do-not-send="true">paul@nohats.ca</a>&gt;
                              wrote:</p>
                          </div>
                          <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                          <div>
                            <div>
                              <p class="MsoNormal"><br>
                                So now that OCB is finally free, do we
                                want to implement it? :)<br>
                                <br>
                                I'm honestly not sure if the
                                improvements of AES-GCM are worth it.<br>
                                I haven't heard of vulnerabilities in
                                IKE/ESP wrt. IVs or counters.<br>
                                <br>
                                Paul<br>
                                <br>
                                ---------- Forwarded message ----------<br>
                                Date: Sat, 27 Feb 2021 14:37:30<br>
                                From: "Salz, Rich via cryptography" &lt;<a
href="mailto:cryptography@metzdowd.com" moz-do-not-send="true">cryptography@metzdowd.com</a>&gt;<br>
                                To: "<a
                                  href="mailto:cryptography@metzdowd.com"
                                  moz-do-not-send="true">cryptography@metzdowd.com</a>"
                                &lt;<a
                                  href="mailto:cryptography@metzdowd.com"
                                  moz-do-not-send="true">cryptography@metzdowd.com</a>&gt;<br>
                                Subject: [Cryptography] Direct public
                                confirmation from Dr. Rogaway<br>
                                <br>
                                <br>
                                <a
href="https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mailarchive.ietf.org_arch_msg_cfrg_qLTveWOdTJcLn4HP3ev-2Dvrj05Vg_&amp;d=DwMDaQ&amp;c=yzoHOc_ZK-sxl-kfGNSEvlJYanssXN3q-lhj0sp26wE&amp;r=qkpbVDRj7zlSRVql-UonsW647lYqnsrbXizKI6MgkEw&amp;m=2DcLjYKtazJ6kYTZx5uowgB-qJRp6_C8W0rBOr7ZOUI&amp;s=LZV-8STdDDeui1TmXz2JORn2wTtSrkJa_-l3hZK-AO8&amp;e="
                                  target="_BLANK" moz-do-not-send="true">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/cfrg/qLTveWOdTJcLn4HP3ev-vrj05Vg/</a>
                                :<br>
                                <br>
                                 <br>
                                <br>
                                I can confirm that I have abandoned all
                                OCB patents<br>
                                <br>
                                and placed into the public domain all
                                OCB-related IP of mine.<br>
                                <br>
                                While I have been telling people this
                                for quite some time, I don't<br>
                                <br>
                                think I ever made a proper announcement
                                to the CFRG or on the<br>
                                <br>
                                OCB webpage. Consider that done.<br>
                                <br>
                                 <br>
                                <br>
                                I hope people will use the scheme to do
                                positive things.<br>
                                <br>
                                 <br>
                                <br>
                                phil<br>
                                <br>
_______________________________________________<br>
                                The cryptography mailing list<br>
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                                  href="mailto:cryptography@metzdowd.com"
                                  moz-do-not-send="true">cryptography@metzdowd.com</a><br>
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                                  target="_BLANK" moz-do-not-send="true">https://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography</a><br>
_______________________________________________<br>
                                IPsec mailing list<br>
                                <a href="mailto:IPsec@ietf.org"
                                  moz-do-not-send="true">IPsec@ietf.org</a><br>
                                <a
href="https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.ietf.org_mailman_listinfo_ipsec&amp;d=DwMDaQ&amp;c=yzoHOc_ZK-sxl-kfGNSEvlJYanssXN3q-lhj0sp26wE&amp;r=qkpbVDRj7zlSRVql-UonsW647lYqnsrbXizKI6MgkEw&amp;m=2DcLjYKtazJ6kYTZx5uowgB-qJRp6_C8W0rBOr7ZOUI&amp;s=B4s3eO4jZ5UhqwAPEQu9SxQaSVWKuM4HcC1moozCyBc&amp;e="
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                            </div>
                          </div>
                        </blockquote>
                      </div>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
                    </div>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"><br>
                      <br>
                    </p>
                    <pre>_______________________________________________</pre>
                    <pre>IPsec mailing list</pre>
                    <pre><a href="mailto:IPsec@ietf.org" moz-do-not-send="true">IPsec@ietf.org</a></pre>
                    <pre><a href="https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.ietf.org_mailman_listinfo_ipsec&amp;d=DwMDaQ&amp;c=yzoHOc_ZK-sxl-kfGNSEvlJYanssXN3q-lhj0sp26wE&amp;r=qkpbVDRj7zlSRVql-UonsW647lYqnsrbXizKI6MgkEw&amp;m=2DcLjYKtazJ6kYTZx5uowgB-qJRp6_C8W0rBOr7ZOUI&amp;s=B4s3eO4jZ5UhqwAPEQu9SxQaSVWKuM4HcC1moozCyBc&amp;e=" target="_BLANK" moz-do-not-send="true">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec</a></pre>
                  </blockquote>
                  <p class="MsoNormal"><br>
                    <br>
                  </p>
                  <pre>-- </pre>
                  <pre>"The object of life is not to be on the side of the majority, but to</pre>
                  <pre>escape finding oneself in the ranks of the insane." -- Marcus Aurelius</pre>
                </div>
              </div>
              <hr>
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            <br>
            <pre class="moz-signature" cols="72">-- 
"The object of life is not to be on the side of the majority, but to
escape finding oneself in the ranks of the insane." -- Marcus Aurelius</pre>
          </div>
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      <hr>This transmission (including any attachments) may contain
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"The object of life is not to be on the side of the majority, but to
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ipsec/Dhf3hQky2pHOsoA9hi2wWnRpvzk>
Subject: Re: [IPsec] [Cryptography] Direct public confirmation from Dr. Rogaway
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From nobody Fri Mar  5 06:16:58 2021
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From: Christian Hopps <chopps@chopps.org>
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To: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] WGLC for draft-ietf-ipsecme-iptfs
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> On Feb 27, 2021, at 3:14 PM, Michael Richardson =
<mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> wrote:
>=20
> Signed PGP part
>=20
> Christian Hopps <chopps@chopps.org> wrote:
>>> I still don't really see enough explanation of:
>>>=20
>>> 1) what do my probe packets look like?  Can I, for instance, send
>>> regular traffic, padded to the extra size?  That's an optimistic =
view
>>> of things, but maybe appropriate.  How do I get positive response =
that
>>> it was accepted?
>>>=20
>>> 2) How do I learn about traffic that was dropped?
>=20
>> This is what https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8899
>> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8899> documents. All that this =
document
>> should do is provide the on the wire mechanism to send a probe packet
>> and get a reply that it was received, as well as provide for not
>> considering probe loss as loss events for CC (the p-bit). The CC =
header
>> does this (the sender timestamp is echo'd back for RTT estimates). =
The
>> implementation of RFC8899 can choose to send user data or not =
(RFC8899
>> recommends that one should avoid doing this if possible).
>=20
> I'll read again, but I am still perceiving a gap between RFC8899 and =
TFS.
> Perhaps it is obvious to you, having designed and implemented it all =
over
> three or four years.  In reading it, I didn't understand.
>=20
> As I understand it then, I have to send a AGGGRAG_PAYLOAD packet of =
the new
> size I want to test, I include a sender timestamp in TVal, and I look =
for
> that echoed back in the TEcho to confirm receipt.  That's my PL?

Correct.

> I would know that it failed if I get a sender timestamp X (getting =
X+1),
> that the oversize packet was lost.

Correct.

Thanks,
Chris.

>=20
> --
> Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>   . o O ( IPv6 I=C3=B8T =
consulting )
>           Sandelman Software Works Inc, Ottawa and Worldwide
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20


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Subject: Re: [IPsec] [Cryptography] Direct public confirmation from Dr. Rogaway (fwd)
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> On 3 Mar 2021, at 21:36, Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org> wrote:
>=20
> =20
>   Faster and more secure seem to be compelling reasons. Those reasons =
are
> probably more compelling for ESP than they are for IKE.

Yes. If we were back in 2008 and figuring out which AEAD we should be =
using and they were both as unencumbered as they are now, maybe we would =
prefer OCB over GCM. 13 years later, every IPsec implementation has =
AES-GCM, so to add OCB to a product, it needs to be significantly =
better.  I haven=E2=80=99t seen recent numbers, but if I remember =
correctly, the performance difference was in the single-digit percentage =
points. It=E2=80=99s harder to quantify the security differences, but I =
don=E2=80=99t think they were compelling.  However, these arguments =
apply to a product, not necessarily to the protocol.  Adding this as an =
option for IPsec (and IKE) is just fine, whether vendors adopt it or =
not.

>=20
>   The license for OCB always had some caveats like the code could not =
be used
> for military purposes which is something of a nightmare for a =
manufacturer of
> general purpose hardware/software. Considering how difficult it would =
be to
> ensure that your product is never used by a military anywhere in the =
world,
> that's probably enough of a reason for TLS to not support it. Remember =
how
> long ECC was delayed for (imagined) IP reasons?=20
>=20
>   IP is bad news. People don't want anything to do with partially =
encumbered
> technology. Now this technology is not encumbered at all so, yea, =
let's do it.
>=20
>   If an individual draft was to appear would the WG adopt it as a work =
item?

Up to the WG, but I would support it.

Yoav

>=20
>   regards,
>=20
>   Dan.
>=20
> On 2/28/21 1:47 PM, Yoav Nir wrote:
>> IIRC the license has allowed OCB to be used for TLS for several =
years. They haven=E2=80=99t taken it up. There are no AES-OCB =
ciphersuites =
inhttps://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xml#tls-p=
arameters-4 =
<inhttps://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xml#tls-=
parameters-4>
>>=20
>> So I=E2=80=99m wondering right with you: It has a theoretical =
advantage in security and a measurable advantage in speed in software.  =
Neither were compelling enough for anyone to bother adding it in TLS =
ciphersuites.  Why should our conclusion be any different?
>>=20
>> Yoav
>>=20
>>=20
>>> On 28 Feb 2021, at 22:35, Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca =
<mailto:paul@nohats.ca>> wrote:
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> So now that OCB is finally free, do we want to implement it? :)
>>>=20
>>> I'm honestly not sure if the improvements of AES-GCM are worth it.
>>> I haven't heard of vulnerabilities in IKE/ESP wrt. IVs or counters.
>>>=20
>>> Paul
>>>=20
>>> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
>>> Date: Sat, 27 Feb 2021 14:37:30
>>> From: "Salz, Rich via cryptography" <cryptography@metzdowd.com =
<mailto:cryptography@metzdowd.com>>
>>> To: "cryptography@metzdowd.com <mailto:cryptography@metzdowd.com>" =
<cryptography@metzdowd.com <mailto:cryptography@metzdowd.com>>
>>> Subject: [Cryptography] Direct public confirmation from Dr. Rogaway
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> =
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/cfrg/qLTveWOdTJcLn4HP3ev-vrj05Vg/ =
<https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/cfrg/qLTveWOdTJcLn4HP3ev-vrj05Vg/> =
:
>>>=20
>>> =20
>>>=20
>>> I can confirm that I have abandoned all OCB patents
>>>=20
>>> and placed into the public domain all OCB-related IP of mine.
>>>=20
>>> While I have been telling people this for quite some time, I don't
>>>=20
>>> think I ever made a proper announcement to the CFRG or on the
>>>=20
>>> OCB webpage. Consider that done.
>>>=20
>>> =20
>>>=20
>>> I hope people will use the scheme to do positive things.
>>>=20
>>> =20
>>>=20
>>> phil
>>>=20
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> The cryptography mailing list
>>> cryptography@metzdowd.com <mailto:cryptography@metzdowd.com>
>>> https://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography =
<https://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> IPsec mailing list
>>> IPsec@ietf.org <mailto:IPsec@ietf.org>
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec =
<https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec>
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> IPsec mailing list
>> IPsec@ietf.org <mailto:IPsec@ietf.org>
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec =
<https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec>
>=20
> --=20
> "The object of life is not to be on the side of the majority, but to
> escape finding oneself in the ranks of the insane." -- Marcus Aurelius
> _______________________________________________
> IPsec mailing list
> IPsec@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec


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Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Type: text/html;
	charset=utf-8

<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D""><br =
class=3D""><div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div =
class=3D"">On 3 Mar 2021, at 21:36, Dan Harkins &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:dharkins@lounge.org" class=3D"">dharkins@lounge.org</a>&gt;=
 wrote:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D"">
 =20
    <meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3DUTF-8" class=3D"">
 =20
  <div class=3D"">
    <tt class=3D"">&nbsp;<br class=3D"">
      &nbsp; Faster and more secure seem to be compelling reasons. Those
      reasons are<br class=3D"">
      probably more compelling for ESP than they are for IKE.<br =
class=3D""></tt></div></div></blockquote><div><br class=3D""></div>Yes. =
If we were back in 2008 and figuring out which AEAD we should be using =
and they were both as unencumbered as they are now, maybe we would =
prefer OCB over GCM. 13 years later, every IPsec implementation has =
AES-GCM, so to add OCB to a product, it needs to be significantly =
better. &nbsp;I haven=E2=80=99t seen recent numbers, but if I remember =
correctly, the performance difference was in the single-digit percentage =
points. It=E2=80=99s harder to quantify the security differences, but I =
don=E2=80=99t think they were compelling. &nbsp;However, these arguments =
apply to a product, not necessarily to the protocol. &nbsp;Adding this =
as an option for IPsec (and IKE) is just fine, whether vendors adopt it =
or not.</div><div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div=
 class=3D""><div class=3D""><tt class=3D"">
      <br class=3D"">
      &nbsp; The license for OCB always had some caveats like the code =
could
      not be used<br class=3D"">
      for military purposes which is something of a nightmare for a
      manufacturer of<br class=3D"">
      general purpose hardware/software. Considering how difficult it
      would be to<br class=3D"">
      ensure that your product is never used by a military anywhere in
      the world,<br class=3D"">
      that's probably enough of a reason for TLS to not support it.
      Remember how<br class=3D"">
      long ECC was delayed for (imagined) IP reasons? <br class=3D"">
      <br class=3D"">
      &nbsp; IP is bad news. People don't want anything to do with =
partially
      encumbered<br class=3D"">
      technology. Now this technology is not encumbered at all so, yea,
      let's do it.<br class=3D"">
      <br class=3D"">
      &nbsp; If an individual draft was to appear would the WG adopt it =
as a
      work item?<br class=3D""></tt></div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div>Up to the WG, but I would support it.</div><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div>Yoav</div><div><br class=3D""><blockquote =
type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div class=3D""><tt class=3D"">
      <br class=3D"">
      &nbsp; regards,<br class=3D"">
      <br class=3D"">
      &nbsp; Dan.<br class=3D"">
    </tt><br class=3D"">
    <div class=3D"moz-cite-prefix">On 2/28/21 1:47 PM, Yoav Nir =
wrote:<br class=3D"">
    </div>
    <blockquote type=3D"cite" =
cite=3D"mid:EB8AA402-560E-4039-9ED1-427EF294BAF9@gmail.com" class=3D"">
      <meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3DUTF-8" class=3D"">
      IIRC the license has allowed OCB to be used for TLS for several
      years. They haven=E2=80=99t taken it up. There are no AES-OCB =
ciphersuites
      <a =
href=3D"inhttps://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.x=
ml#tls-parameters-4" class=3D"" =
moz-do-not-send=3D"true">inhttps://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters=
/tls-parameters.xml#tls-parameters-4</a>
      <div class=3D""><br class=3D"">
      </div>
      <div class=3D"">So I=E2=80=99m wondering right with you: It has a
        theoretical advantage in security and a measurable advantage in
        speed in software. &nbsp;Neither were compelling enough for =
anyone to
        bother adding it in TLS ciphersuites. &nbsp;Why should our =
conclusion
        be any different?</div>
      <div class=3D""><br class=3D"">
      </div>
      <div class=3D"">Yoav</div>
      <div class=3D""><br class=3D"">
        <div class=3D""><br class=3D"">
          <blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D"">
            <div class=3D"">On 28 Feb 2021, at 22:35, Paul Wouters =
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:paul@nohats.ca" class=3D"" =
moz-do-not-send=3D"true">paul@nohats.ca</a>&gt; wrote:</div>
            <br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline">
            <div class=3D"">
              <div class=3D""><br class=3D"">
                So now that OCB is finally free, do we want to implement
                it? :)<br class=3D"">
                <br class=3D"">
                I'm honestly not sure if the improvements of AES-GCM are
                worth it.<br class=3D"">
                I haven't heard of vulnerabilities in IKE/ESP wrt. IVs
                or counters.<br class=3D"">
                <br class=3D"">
                Paul<br class=3D"">
                <br class=3D"">
                ---------- Forwarded message ----------<br class=3D"">
                Date: Sat, 27 Feb 2021 14:37:30<br class=3D"">
                From: "Salz, Rich via cryptography" &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:cryptography@metzdowd.com" class=3D"" =
moz-do-not-send=3D"true">cryptography@metzdowd.com</a>&gt;<br class=3D"">
                To: "<a href=3D"mailto:cryptography@metzdowd.com" =
class=3D"" moz-do-not-send=3D"true">cryptography@metzdowd.com</a>"
                &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:cryptography@metzdowd.com" =
class=3D"" moz-do-not-send=3D"true">cryptography@metzdowd.com</a>&gt;<br =
class=3D"">
                Subject: [Cryptography] Direct public confirmation from
                Dr. Rogaway<br class=3D"">
                <br class=3D"">
                <br class=3D"">
                <a =
href=3D"https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/cfrg/qLTveWOdTJcLn4HP3ev-vrj=
05Vg/" class=3D"" =
moz-do-not-send=3D"true">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/cfrg/qLTveW=
OdTJcLn4HP3ev-vrj05Vg/</a>
                :<br class=3D"">
                <br class=3D"">
                &nbsp;<br class=3D"">
                <br class=3D"">
                I can confirm that I have abandoned all OCB patents<br =
class=3D"">
                <br class=3D"">
                and placed into the public domain all OCB-related IP of
                mine.<br class=3D"">
                <br class=3D"">
                While I have been telling people this for quite some
                time, I don't<br class=3D"">
                <br class=3D"">
                think I ever made a proper announcement to the CFRG or
                on the<br class=3D"">
                <br class=3D"">
                OCB webpage. Consider that done.<br class=3D"">
                <br class=3D"">
                &nbsp;<br class=3D"">
                <br class=3D"">
                I hope people will use the scheme to do positive =
things.<br class=3D"">
                <br class=3D"">
                &nbsp;<br class=3D"">
                <br class=3D"">
                phil<br class=3D"">
                <br class=3D"">
                _______________________________________________<br =
class=3D"">
                The cryptography mailing list<br class=3D"">
                <a href=3D"mailto:cryptography@metzdowd.com" class=3D"" =
moz-do-not-send=3D"true">cryptography@metzdowd.com</a><br class=3D"">
                <a class=3D"moz-txt-link-freetext" =
href=3D"https://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography">https://ww=
w.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography</a><br class=3D"">
                _______________________________________________<br =
class=3D"">
                IPsec mailing list<br class=3D"">
                <a class=3D"moz-txt-link-abbreviated" =
href=3D"mailto:IPsec@ietf.org">IPsec@ietf.org</a><br class=3D"">
                <a class=3D"moz-txt-link-freetext" =
href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec">https://www.ietf.org/=
mailman/listinfo/ipsec</a><br class=3D"">
              </div>
            </div>
          </blockquote>
        </div>
        <br class=3D"">
      </div>
      <br class=3D"">
      <fieldset class=3D"mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
      <pre class=3D"moz-quote-pre" =
wrap=3D"">_______________________________________________
IPsec mailing list
<a class=3D"moz-txt-link-abbreviated" =
href=3D"mailto:IPsec@ietf.org">IPsec@ietf.org</a>
<a class=3D"moz-txt-link-freetext" =
href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec">https://www.ietf.org/=
mailman/listinfo/ipsec</a>
</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br class=3D"">
    <pre class=3D"moz-signature" cols=3D"72">--=20
"The object of life is not to be on the side of the majority, but to
escape finding oneself in the ranks of the insane." -- Marcus =
Aurelius</pre>
  </div>

_______________________________________________<br class=3D"">IPsec =
mailing list<br class=3D""><a href=3D"mailto:IPsec@ietf.org" =
class=3D"">IPsec@ietf.org</a><br =
class=3D"">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec<br =
class=3D""></div></blockquote></div><br class=3D""></body></html>=

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From nobody Mon Mar  8 01:46:07 2021
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Subject: [IPsec] WGLC Summary [Re: WGLC for draft-ietf-ipsecme-iptfs]
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Here's a summary of the changes based on WGLC WG mailing list =
discussions and reviews (published in the latest -07 document).

There were 2 minor normative clarifications/changes, clarified the =
intent that fragmentation should not occur over different SAs, and added =
a P-bit that is for external use by PLMTUD (it's unused by =
IP-TFS/AGGFRAG itself).

Informative changes included many editorial changes, some organizational =
cleanup, changing identifiers from IPTFS to AGGFRAG and making the text =
a bit more generic in this regard. The text on ordering packet reception =
as well as how extra padding can be used to avoid fragmentation was =
expanded. A summary section with pointers for the reciever side was =
added, and finally the overhead calculation was fixed in the appendix =
comparison data which didn't change the conclusions.

Thanks,
Chris.

P.S. A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-ipsecme-iptfs-07


> On Jan 24, 2021, at 8:55 PM, Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi> wrote:
>=20
> This is the start of 3 week WGLC on the document, ending 2021-02-15.
> Please submit your comments to the list, also send a note if you have
> reviewed the document, so we can see how many people are interested in
> getting this out.
> --
> kivinen@iki.fi
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> IPsec mailing list
> IPsec@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec
>=20


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From nobody Mon Mar  8 06:08:47 2021
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Subject: [IPsec] The IPSECME WG has placed draft-pwouters-ikev1-ipsec-graveyard in state "Call For Adoption By WG Issued"
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The IPSECME WG has placed draft-pwouters-ikev1-ipsec-graveyard in state
Call For Adoption By WG Issued (entered by Tero Kivinen)

The document is available at
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-pwouters-ikev1-ipsec-graveyard/



From nobody Mon Mar  8 06:10:03 2021
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the IP Security Maintenance and Extensions WG of the IETF.

        Title           : IP Traffic Flow Security YANG Module
        Authors         : Don Fedyk
                          Christian Hopps
	Filename        : draft-ietf-ipsecme-yang-iptfs-00.txt
	Pages           : 27
	Date            : 2021-03-08

Abstract:
   This document describes a yang module for the management of IP
   Traffic Flow Security additions to IKEv2 and IPsec.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ipsecme-yang-iptfs/

There are also htmlized versions available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ipsecme-yang-iptfs-00
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-ipsecme-yang-iptfs-00


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/



From nobody Mon Mar  8 06:21:48 2021
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Subject: [IPsec] WG ADoption call for draft-pwouters-ikev1-ipsec-graveyard
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kivinen@iki.fi


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Subject: [IPsec] The IPSECME WG has placed draft-fedyk-ipsecme-mib-iptfs in state "Call For Adoption By WG Issued"
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The IPSECME WG has placed draft-fedyk-ipsecme-mib-iptfs in state
Call For Adoption By WG Issued (entered by Tero Kivinen)

The document is available at
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-fedyk-ipsecme-mib-iptfs/



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This is the start of 2 week WG adoption call for this document ending
2021-03-22. Please send your reply about whether you support adopting
this document as WG document to this list.

This is part of the Traffic Flow Confidentiality work in the charter.
-- 
kivinen@iki.fi


From nobody Mon Mar  8 06:46:59 2021
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Date: Mon, 08 Mar 2021 06:46:54 -0800
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   Oh for gaia's sake....

On 3/8/21 6:33 AM, PMDF Internet Messaging wrote:
> This report relates to a message you sent with the following header fields:
>
>    Message-id: <a17d4097-9904-0860-5a86-e22cbc9204e4@lounge.org>
>    Date: Mon, 08 Mar 2021 06:33:15 -0800
>    From: Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org>
>    To: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
>    Subject: comments on graveyard draft
>
> Your message cannot be delivered to the following recipients:
>
>    Recipient address: paul@nohats.ca
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>    Diagnostic code: smtp;550 5.7.1 <dharkins@lounge.org>: Sender address rejected: Exercising my freedom to not hear you scream
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>
   Let freedom ring :-P

   Comments on the draft, make them official I guess. What I wrote was:

-------------------------------------------------------------

   Hi Paul,

   I kind of ran through my comments pretty quickly so let me repeat
them here so they don't get lost:

   - like the TLS 1.0 to historic, I think this draft should be BCP
   - make the title ikev1-to-historic, get rid of cutesy name
   - remove all the subjective opinion in section 3-- all the "high
     chance" or "most likely" or "quite often" etc-- and just mention
     that anything IKEv1 can do IKEv2 can do better, and that the
     reasons to do IKEv1 in the past-- PQ and labeled IPsec-- are
     no longer legit due to the advancement of the relevant drafts
   - I don't think deprecating the registries is necessary if the
     RFC goes to historic, as you note, there's been no work on IKEv1
     for over a decade so leaving the registries alone will not be
     some backdoor way of sneaking in IKEv1 changes. Other orgs are
     using the repository so just deprecating is not right.
   - If you're gonna reject any DH groups then reject the weak ones,
     it doesn't make sense to do 1 and 22 and leave 2 and 5 (and 23
     and 24!) alone.

It didn't look like there was any opposition to adopting this so
just consider these as comments on the draft as adopted.

   thanks,

   Dan.

-- 
"The object of life is not to be on the side of the majority, but to
escape finding oneself in the ranks of the insane." -- Marcus Aurelius


From nobody Mon Mar  8 07:10:59 2021
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From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
To: Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org>
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On Mon, 8 Mar 2021, Dan Harkins wrote:

>   Oh for gaia's sake....

>>     Recipient address: paul@nohats.ca
>>     Reason: Remote SMTP server has rejected address
>>     Diagnostic code: smtp;550 5.7.1 <dharkins@lounge.org>: Sender address
>>     rejected: Exercising my freedom to not hear you scream

I had put that in after a rather unpleasant email exchange and forgot
about it. I've removed it now.

>   I kind of ran through my comments pretty quickly so let me repeat
> them here so they don't get lost:
>
>   - like the TLS 1.0 to historic, I think this draft should be BCP

Ben said this might not be the best example and was an excepion in the
process? I'm also not sure if a BCP can have IANA Considerations ?

>   - make the title ikev1-to-historic, get rid of cutesy name

That is really only in the draft name, not the title. The title is:

 	Deprecation of IKEv1 and obsoleted algorithms

I'm fine changing the draft name to draft-ipsecme-ikev1-algo-to-historic
and the title to "Moving IKEv1 and obsoleted algorithms to Historic"

>   - remove all the subjective opinion in section 3-- all the "high
>     chance" or "most likely" or "quite often" etc-- and just mention
>     that anything IKEv1 can do IKEv2 can do better, and that the
>     reasons to do IKEv1 in the past-- PQ and labeled IPsec-- are
>     no longer legit due to the advancement of the relevant drafts


It would be nice to keep some of the justifications in there.  I can
look at rephrasing it a bit.

>   - I don't think deprecating the registries is necessary if the
>     RFC goes to historic, as you note, there's been no work on IKEv1
>     for over a decade so leaving the registries alone will not be
>     some backdoor way of sneaking in IKEv1 changes. Other orgs are
>     using the repository so just deprecating is not right.

I thought it would just be a stronger signal to implementers, but if
there are practical concerns, like people still shoehorning things in
there then it can be removed from this document. As Tero said, those
registries cannot really be populated with new stuff without involving
the WG, so we can just count on our regular IKEv1 change pushbacks.

>   - If you're gonna reject any DH groups then reject the weak ones,
>     it doesn't make sense to do 1 and 22 and leave 2 and 5 (and 23
>     and 24!) alone.

DH updates should be done in RFC 8247bis. This document only obsoleted
the algorithms that either had no specifiction to begin with, or have
been stuck in MAY because no one cares about them.

> It didn't look like there was any opposition to adopting this so
> just consider these as comments on the draft as adopted.

Will do, thanks!

Paul


From nobody Mon Mar  8 07:12:34 2021
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Date: Mon, 8 Mar 2021 10:12:27 -0500 (EST)
From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
To: Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] WG ADoption call for draft-pwouters-ikev1-ipsec-graveyard
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On Mon, 8 Mar 2021, Tero Kivinen wrote:

> Subject: [IPsec] WG ADoption call for draft-pwouters-ikev1-ipsec-graveyard
> 
> This is the start of 2 week WG adoption call for this document ending
> 2021-03-22. Please send your reply about whether you support adopting
> this document as WG document to this list.
>
> This work is considered as maintenance of the IPsec, thus is covered
> by the generic maintenance work.

I support my own document for adoption of course, AND I have no IPR
on anything in this document (or any other document :)

Paul


From nobody Mon Mar  8 07:23:46 2021
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Date: Mon, 8 Mar 2021 10:23:40 -0500 (EST)
From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
To: Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] WG Adoption call for draft-fedyk-ipsecme-mib-iptfs
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On Mon, 8 Mar 2021, Tero Kivinen wrote:

> Subject: [IPsec] WG Adoption call for draft-fedyk-ipsecme-mib-iptfs
> 
> This is the start of 2 week WG adoption call for this document ending
> 2021-03-22. Please send your reply about whether you support adopting
> this document as WG document to this list.
>
> This is part of the Traffic Flow Confidentiality work in the charter.

I am fine with adoption.

I would use "Bytes" instead of "Octects" for the byte counters. And I
don't see any idletime counters? There are usually also soft and hard
limits which I don't see support for here? Either add those, or clarify
what values are expected if your implemention supports soft/hard limits.

Paul


From nobody Mon Mar  8 23:44:26 2021
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Subject: [IPsec] I-D Action: draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-intermediate-06.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the IP Security Maintenance and Extensions WG of the IETF.

        Title           : Intermediate Exchange in the IKEv2 Protocol
        Author          : Valery Smyslov
	Filename        : draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-intermediate-06.txt
	Pages           : 11
	Date            : 2021-03-08

Abstract:
   This documents defines a new exchange, called Intermediate Exchange,
   for the Internet Key Exchange protocol Version 2 (IKEv2).  This
   exchange can be used for transferring large amount of data in the
   process of IKEv2 Security Association (SA) establishment.
   Introducing Intermediate Exchange allows re-using existing IKE
   fragmentation mechanism, that helps to avoid IP fragmentation of
   large IKE messages, but cannot be used in the initial IKEv2 exchange.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-intermediate/

There are also htmlized versions available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-intermediate-06
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-intermediate-06

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-intermediate-06


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/



From nobody Mon Mar  8 23:50:31 2021
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From: "Valery Smyslov" <smyslov.ietf@gmail.com>
To: <ipsec@ietf.org>
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Date: Tue, 9 Mar 2021 10:50:26 +0300
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] I-D Action: draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-intermediate-06.txt
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Hi,

a new version of the draft is posted to prevent its expiration.
No changes in the text, minor changes of the figure 
to improve its readability.

Regards,
Valery.



> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
> This draft is a work item of the IP Security Maintenance and Extensions WG of the IETF.
> 
>         Title           : Intermediate Exchange in the IKEv2 Protocol
>         Author          : Valery Smyslov
> 	Filename        : draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-intermediate-06.txt
> 	Pages           : 11
> 	Date            : 2021-03-08
> 
> Abstract:
>    This documents defines a new exchange, called Intermediate Exchange,
>    for the Internet Key Exchange protocol Version 2 (IKEv2).  This
>    exchange can be used for transferring large amount of data in the
>    process of IKEv2 Security Association (SA) establishment.
>    Introducing Intermediate Exchange allows re-using existing IKE
>    fragmentation mechanism, that helps to avoid IP fragmentation of
>    large IKE messages, but cannot be used in the initial IKEv2 exchange.
> 
> 
> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-intermediate/
> 
> There are also htmlized versions available at:
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-intermediate-06
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-intermediate-06
> 
> A diff from the previous version is available at:
> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-intermediate-06
> 
> 
> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
> 
> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> IPsec mailing list
> IPsec@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec


From nobody Tue Mar  9 04:33:40 2021
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From: Timothy Winters <tim@qacafe.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Mar 2021 07:33:18 -0500
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To: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
Cc: Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>, ipsec@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] WG ADoption call for draft-pwouters-ikev1-ipsec-graveyard
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--000000000000ef002005bd19c187
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On Mon, Mar 8, 2021 at 10:12 AM Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> wrote:

> On Mon, 8 Mar 2021, Tero Kivinen wrote:
>
> > Subject: [IPsec] WG ADoption call for
> draft-pwouters-ikev1-ipsec-graveyard
> >
> > This is the start of 2 week WG adoption call for this document ending
> > 2021-03-22. Please send your reply about whether you support adopting
> > this document as WG document to this list.
> >
> > This work is considered as maintenance of the IPsec, thus is covered
> > by the generic maintenance work.
>
> I support my own document for adoption of course, AND I have no IPR
> on anything in this document (or any other document :)
>
> Paul
>
I support adoption of this document as a working group document.

>
> _______________________________________________
> IPsec mailing list
> IPsec@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
<div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, Mar 8, 2021 at 10:12 AM Paul =
Wouters &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:paul@nohats.ca">paul@nohats.ca</a>&gt; wrote:=
<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8=
ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">On Mon, 8 Mar 2=
021, Tero Kivinen wrote:<br>
<br>
&gt; Subject: [IPsec] WG ADoption call for draft-pwouters-ikev1-ipsec-grave=
yard<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; This is the start of 2 week WG adoption call for this document ending<=
br>
&gt; 2021-03-22. Please send your reply about whether you support adopting<=
br>
&gt; this document as WG document to this list.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; This work is considered as maintenance of the IPsec, thus is covered<b=
r>
&gt; by the generic maintenance work.<br>
<br>
I support my own document for adoption of course, AND I have no IPR<br>
on anything in this document (or any other document :)<br>
<br>
Paul<br></blockquote><div>I support adoption of this document as a working =
group document.=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margi=
n:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex=
">
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
IPsec mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:IPsec@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">IPsec@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div>

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From: "Valery Smyslov" <smyslov.ietf@gmail.com>
To: "'Tero Kivinen'" <kivinen@iki.fi>, <ipsec@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] WG adoption call for draft-smyslov-ipsecme-rfc8229bis
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Hi,

the 1.5 week period is over and nobody objected the adoption.
Is there any reason the draft is not WG document yet?

Regards,
Valery.

> This is the start of 1.5 week WG adoption call for this document,
> ending 2021-02-07 (just before our IPsecME session in IETF 110).
> Please send your reply about whether you support adopting this
> document as WG document or not.
> 
> Our charter has item for:
> 
> 	RFC8229, published in 2017, specifies how to encapsulate IKEv2
> 	and ESP traffic in TCP. Implementation experience has revealed
> 	that not all situations are covered in RFC8229, and that may
> 	lead to interoperability problems or to suboptimal
> 	performance. The WG will provide a document to give
> 	implementors more guidance about how to use reliable stream
> 	transport in IKEv2 and clarify some issues that have been
> 	discovered. A possible starting point is
> 	draft-smyslov-ipsecme-tcp-guidelines.
> 
> and during that process we decided it might be better to do full bis
> version of the RFC8229 instead of just providing some kind of
> guidelines document. This work is that bis document.
> --
> kivinen@iki.fi
> 
> _______________________________________________
> IPsec mailing list
> IPsec@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec


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From: Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] WG adoption call for draft-smyslov-ipsecme-rfc8229bis
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Valery Smyslov writes:
> the 1.5 week period is over and nobody objected the adoption.
> Is there any reason the draft is not WG document yet?

Nope. Done.

I still have the WGLC calls for labeled ikev2 and multiple-ke drafts
in my todo list, but those will take few days, as I want to read the
drafts myselfs first once more to make sure they are ready for WGLC...

And to do proper review of the g-ikev2...
-- 
kivinen@iki.fi


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Subject: Re: [IPsec] WG ADoption call for draft-pwouters-ikev1-ipsec-graveyard
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I support adoption.  I will definitely review.

Cheers,
spt

> On Mar 8, 2021, at 09:21, Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi> wrote:
> 
> This is the start of 2 week WG adoption call for this document ending
> 2021-03-22. Please send your reply about whether you support adopting
> this document as WG document to this list.
> 
> This work is considered as maintenance of the IPsec, thus is covered
> by the generic maintenance work.
> -- 
> kivinen@iki.fi
> 
> _______________________________________________
> IPsec mailing list
> IPsec@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec


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From: "Valery Smyslov" <smyslov.ietf@gmail.com>
To: "'Tero Kivinen'" <kivinen@iki.fi>, <ipsec@ietf.org>
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Hi,

I support adoption of this document.
FWIW, I also support Dan's comments regarding the draft.

Regards,
Valery.

> This is the start of 2 week WG adoption call for this document ending
> 2021-03-22. Please send your reply about whether you support adopting
> this document as WG document to this list.
> 
> This work is considered as maintenance of the IPsec, thus is covered
> by the generic maintenance work.
> --
> kivinen@iki.fi
> 
> _______________________________________________
> IPsec mailing list
> IPsec@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec


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--=-=-=
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Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi> wrote:
    > This is the start of 2 week WG adoption call for this document ending
    > 2021-03-22. Please send your reply about whether you support adopting
    > this document as WG document to this list.

I support adoption.
I am frustrated with the WG because we've been talking about this for at
least two years (maybe four?): documents don't need to be perfect to be adopted.

So, just do it already.
Please plan to WGLC this before the next IETF.

I'd *like* section 3 to enumerate the claims clearer (Maybe just new
paragraphs).  Pretty much each sentence is a claim, and I think that they
should point to references.  That will make it much more impactful a
document in my opinion.
But, I'd rather publish it if adding such references is hard.

I think that the third paragraph (labelled IPsec) should be a new section
3.1.

--
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] WG Adoption call for draft-fedyk-ipsecme-mib-iptfs
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--=-=-=
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Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> wrote:
    > On Mon, 8 Mar 2021, Tero Kivinen wrote:

    >> Subject: [IPsec] WG Adoption call for draft-fedyk-ipsecme-mib-iptfs
    >>
    >> This is the start of 2 week WG adoption call for this document ending
    >> 2021-03-22. Please send your reply about whether you support adopting
    >> this document as WG document to this list.
    >>
    >> This is part of the Traffic Flow Confidentiality work in the charter.

    > I am fine with adoption.

    > I would use "Bytes" instead of "Octects" for the byte counters.

The use of the word "octets" is traditional in MIB documents, going back to
the 1980s, when ASN.1 originated.
Some machines had 9-bit bytes and 36-bit words :-)

I also support adoption.

--
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works
 -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-




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From: "Panwei (William)" <william.panwei@huawei.com>
To: Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>, "ipsec@ietf.org" <ipsec@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [IPsec] WG ADoption call for draft-pwouters-ikev1-ipsec-graveyard
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Hi,

I support adoption of this draft.

Regards & Thanks!
Wei Pan

-----Original Message-----
From: IPsec [mailto:ipsec-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Tero Kivinen
Sent: Monday, March 8, 2021 10:22 PM
To: ipsec@ietf.org
Subject: [IPsec] WG ADoption call for draft-pwouters-ikev1-ipsec-graveyard

This is the start of 2 week WG adoption call for this document ending 2021-=
03-22. Please send your reply about whether you support adopting this docum=
ent as WG document to this list.

This work is considered as maintenance of the IPsec, thus is covered by the=
 generic maintenance work.
--
kivinen@iki.fi

_______________________________________________
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From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
To: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] WG ADoption call for draft-pwouters-ikev1-ipsec-graveyard
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On Sat, 13 Mar 2021, Michael Richardson wrote:

> I'd *like* section 3 to enumerate the claims clearer (Maybe just new
> paragraphs).

You mean a textual change? like split out more, or bullet points?

> Pretty much each sentence is a claim, and I think that they
> should point to references.  That will make it much more impactful a
> document in my opinion.

Ahh, so that part is content. So let's split up that first paragraph
(the last two paragraphs just reference IKEv2 replacement RFCs)

 	IKEv1 is deprecated.  Systems running IKEv1 should be upgraded and
 	reconfigured to run IKEv2.

This is basically the conclusion of the claims below.

 	Systems that support IKEv1 but not IKEv2 are most likely also
 	unsuitable candidates for continued operation.

I know from vendors I've talked to that they froze their IKEv1 stacks. I
can't enumerate those in an RFC though. I think only the opensource
stacks are still fixing IKEv1 stuff or enhancing it (usually it is to
improve interoperability).

 	Such unsupported systems have a much higher chance of containing an
 	implementation vulnerability that will never be patched.

That's a logical conclusion from being frozen, but I'll admit the draft
didn't mention the freezing of IKEv1 stacks. We could mention it.

 	IKEv1 systems can be abused for packet amplification attacks.

This could be clarified, or reference CVE-2016-5361. CVE links aren't
that stable over the years though.

 	IKEv1 systems most likely do not support modern algorithms such as
 	AES-GCM or CHACHA20_POLY1305 and quite often only support or have been
 	configured to use the very weak Diffie-Hellman Groups 2 and 5.

(and I just helped migrate a Bell Canada IKEv1 3des-sha1-dh2 setup just last week
to IKEv2)

In my (pretty elaborate) experience, people tend to not use DH14 for
IKEv1.  CHACHA20_POLY1305 is not defined for IKEv1 or IKEv1-ESP. AES-GCM
is only defined for IKEv1-ESP, not IKEv1 itself. So running IKEv1 means
you are running IKE as a non-AEAD. Often at best with AES-CBC because
AES-GCM is not implemented. But again, I can't really give you
references for this.

 	IKEv1 systems should be upgraded or replaced by IKEv2 systems.

Repeat of the conclusion.

> But, I'd rather publish it if adding such references is hard.

If you have text of references, please share.

> I think that the third paragraph (labelled IPsec) should be a new section
> 3.1.

We can make PPK and Labeled IPsec their own sections, but I don't see
why you would do labeled ipsec but not PPK. also, I guess Group IKE
should be listed too as we have a draft and had support in IKEv1 but
not in IKEv2.

Paul


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Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> wrote:
    > On Sat, 13 Mar 2021, Michael Richardson wrote:

    >> I'd *like* section 3 to enumerate the claims clearer (Maybe just new
    >> paragraphs).

    > You mean a textual change? like split out more, or bullet points?

Yes.  I am imagine an argument between an operational person who wants to
authorization to upgrade/replace a gateway with the CFO.  This document is
his ammunition, so we need to make the CFO consider that the risks of
not updating exceed the risk of change.
Fundamentally, the CFO is risk averse, and thinks that "it ain't broken"

    > 	Systems that support IKEv1 but not IKEv2 are most likely also
    > unsuitable candidates for continued operation.

    > I know from vendors I've talked to that they froze their IKEv1
    > stacks. I can't enumerate those in an RFC though. I think only the

agreed.

    > 	IKEv1 systems can be abused for packet amplification attacks.

    > This could be clarified, or reference CVE-2016-5361. CVE links aren't
    > that stable over the years though.

That's okay, it's stable enough, and the form of the reference makes it cle=
ar
that there are issues.

    >> I think that the third paragraph (labelled IPsec) should be a new
    >> section 3.1.

    > We can make PPK and Labeled IPsec their own sections, but I don't see
    > why you would do labeled ipsec but not PPK. also, I guess Group IKE
    > should be listed too as we have a draft and had support in IKEv1 but
    > not in IKEv2.

I want labelled IPsec to be a separate section so that it will have an HTML
link, and can be referenced easily in the government RFP that justifies the
upgrade.

=2D-
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>   . o O ( IPv6 I=C3=B8T consulti=
ng )
           Sandelman Software Works Inc, Ottawa and Worldwide

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From: "Valery Smyslov" <smyslov.ietf@gmail.com>
To: "IPsecME WG" <ipsec@ietf.org>
Date: Mon, 15 Mar 2021 18:53:38 +0300
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Subject: [IPsec] Proposed changes to draft-ietf-ipsecme-iptfs-07
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Hi,

as suggested by Tero at IETF110 I've prepared concrete proposal for the text changes in draft-ietf-ipsecme-iptfs-07.
I tried to make minimal changes - mostly they consist of more accurate (as it looks to me) naming
of things and more accurate separation of AGGFRAG and IP-TFS. No bits on the wire are affected.
Document structure and section numbers are not changed. However, the name of the draft
is changed as well as its abstract.

The only technical change is in Section 2.2.3, where I suggest to change:

   When using the AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD in conjunction with replay detection,
   the window size for both MAY be reduced to share the smaller of the
   two window sizes.

to 

   When using the AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD in conjunction with replay detection,
   the window size for both SHOULD be reduced to share the smaller of the
   two window sizes.

I suggested it before but it seemed to be lost in a long list of suggestions.
The rational for this change: if reassembly window size is greater than
replay protection window size, then not yet reassembled packets will never be reassembled,
because needed fragments will never be received. So, having reassembly window longer
than replay protection window is a waste of resources, thus SHOULD instead of MAY.

Instead of long list of small suggested changes in the body of this message I've
edited the .txt version of the draft and fed current and my versions to rfcdiff.
The result is in attachment. Note that I didn't touch ToC.

Regards,
Valery.



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href=3D"https://www6.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-ipsecme-iptfs-07.=
txt" style=3D"color:#008; text-decoration:none;">&lt;</a>&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ipsecme-iptfs-07.txt" =
style=3D"color:#008">draft-ietf-ipsecme-iptfs-07.txt</a>&nbsp;</th><th> =
</th><th>&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ipsecme-iptfs-07-svan.txt"=
 style=3D"color:#008">draft-ietf-ipsecme-iptfs-07-svan.txt</a>&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"https://www6.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=3Ddraft-ietf-ipsecme-iptfs-07-=
svan.txt" style=3D"color:#008; =
text-decoration:none;">&gt;</a></th><th></th></tr> =0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">Network Working =
Group                                           C. Hopps</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">Network Working Group                           =
                C. Hopps</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">Internet-Draft    =
                               LabN Consulting, L.L.C.</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">Internet-Draft                                   LabN =
Consulting, L.L.C.</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">Intended status: =
Standards Track                       February 22, 2021</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">Intended status: Standards Track                =
       February 22, 2021</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">Expires: August =
26, 2021</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">Expires: August 26, =
2021</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr id=3D"diff0001"><td></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock">  <span =
class=3D"delete">IP-TFS:</span> IP Traffic Flow Security <span =
class=3D"delete">Using Aggregation and Fragmentation</span></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"rblock">        <span class=3D"insert">Aggregation and =
Fragmentation Mode for ESP and its Use for</span></td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"rblock">                   IP Traffic Flow Security =
<span class=3D"insert">(IP-TFS)</span></td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">                  =
    draft-ietf-ipsecme-iptfs-07</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">       =
               draft-ietf-ipsecme-iptfs-07</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">Abstract</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">Abstract</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr id=3D"diff0002"><td></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock">   This =
document describes a mechanism <span class=3D"delete">to enhance =
IPsec</span> traffic flow</td><td> </td><td class=3D"rblock">   This =
document describes a mechanism <span class=3D"insert">for aggregation =
and fragmentation of IP packets</span></td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock">   <span =
class=3D"delete">security (IP-TFS) by adding Traffic Flow =
Confidentiality</span> (TFC) <span class=3D"delete">to</span></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"rblock"><span class=3D"insert">   when they are being =
encapsulated in ESP payload. This mechanism can be used</span></td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock"><span =
class=3D"delete">   encrypted</span> IP <span =
class=3D"delete">encapsulated traffic.</span>  TFC is provided by =
obscuring the</td><td> </td><td class=3D"rblock"><span class=3D"insert"> =
  for various purposes, such as: improving performance when IP</span> =
traffic flow <span class=3D"insert">confidentiality</span> (TFC) <span =
class=3D"insert">is in use,</span></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock">   size and =
frequency of IP traffic using a fixed-sized, constant-send-</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"rblock"><span class=3D"insert">   decreasing =
encapsulation overhead for small</span> IP <span =
class=3D"insert">packets and so on.</span></td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"rblock"><span class=3D"insert">   The document is =
focused on using this mode for IP traffic flow =
confidentiality.</span></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"rblock">   TFC is provided by obscuring the size and =
frequency of IP traffic using a fixed-sized, constant-send-</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   rate IPsec =
tunnel.  The solution allows for congestion control as</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   rate IPsec tunnel.  The solution allows for =
congestion control as</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr id=3D"diff0003"><td></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock">   well as =
non-constant send-rate usage.  <span class=3D"delete">The mechanisms =
defined in this</span></td><td> </td><td class=3D"rblock">   well as =
non-constant send-rate usage.</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock"><span =
class=3D"delete">   document are generic with the intent of allowing for =
non-TFS uses,</span></td><td> </td><td class=3D"rblock"></td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock"><span =
class=3D"delete">   but such uses are outside the scope of this =
document.</span></td><td> </td><td class=3D"rblock"></td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">Status of This =
Memo</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">Status of This Memo</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   This =
Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full =
conformance with the</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   provisions of =
BCP 78 and BCP 79.</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">   provisions of =
BCP 78 and BCP 79.</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   =
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet =
Engineering</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">   Internet-Drafts are =
working documents of the Internet Engineering</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   Task Force =
(IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also =
distribute</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   working =
documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The =
list of current Internet-</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   Drafts is at =
https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   Drafts is at =
https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr id=3D"part-2" class=3D"change"><td></td><th><small>skipping to =
change at</small><a =
href=3D"https://www6.ietf.org/rfcdiff/rfcdiff.pyht#part-2"><em> page 3, =
line 27<span class=3D"hide"> =C2=B6</span></em></a></th><th> =
</th><th><small>skipping to change at</small><a =
href=3D"https://www6.ietf.org/rfcdiff/rfcdiff.pyht#part-2"><em> page 3, =
line 27<span class=3D"hide"> =C2=B6</span></em></a></th><td></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   obscuring the =
data with encryption [RFC4303], the traffic pattern</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   obscuring the data with encryption [RFC4303], the =
traffic pattern</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   itself exposes =
information due to variations in its shape and timing</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   itself exposes information due to variations in its =
shape and timing</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   ([RFC8546], =
[AppCrypt]).  Hiding the size and frequency of traffic is</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   ([RFC8546], [AppCrypt]).  Hiding the size =
and frequency of traffic is</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   referred to as =
Traffic Flow Confidentiality (TFC) per [RFC4303].</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   referred to as Traffic Flow Confidentiality (TFC) per =
[RFC4303].</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   [RFC4303] =
provides for TFC by allowing padding to be added to</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   [RFC4303] provides for TFC by allowing padding to be =
added to</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   encrypted IP =
packets and allowing for transmission of all-pad packets</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   encrypted IP packets and allowing for =
transmission of all-pad packets</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   (indicated =
using protocol 59).  This method has the major limitation</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   (indicated using protocol 59).  This method =
has the major limitation</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   that it can =
significantly under-utilize the available bandwidth.</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   that it can significantly under-utilize the available =
bandwidth.</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr id=3D"diff0004"><td></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock">   <span =
class=3D"delete">The IP-TFS (IP</span> Traffic Flow <span =
class=3D"delete">Security)</span> solution provides for full =
TFC</td><td> </td><td class=3D"rblock">   <span class=3D"insert">This =
document defines Aggregation and Fragmentation (AGGFRAG) =
mode</span></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"rblock"><span class=3D"insert">   for ESP and its use =
for IP</span> Traffic Flow <span class=3D"insert">Security =
(IP-TFS).</span></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"rblock"><span class=3D"insert">   This</span> solution =
provides for full TFC</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   without the =
aforementioned bandwidth limitation.  This is</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   without the aforementioned bandwidth limitation.  =
This is</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   accomplished =
by using a constant-send-rate IPsec [RFC4303] tunnel</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   accomplished by using a constant-send-rate IPsec =
[RFC4303] tunnel</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   with =
fixed-sized encapsulating packets; however, these fixed-sized</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   with fixed-sized encapsulating packets; =
however, these fixed-sized</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   packets can =
contain partial, whole or multiple IP packets to maximize</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   packets can contain partial, whole or =
multiple IP packets to maximize</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   the bandwidth =
of the tunnel.  A non-constant send-rate is allowed,</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   the bandwidth of the tunnel.  A non-constant =
send-rate is allowed,</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   but the =
confidentiality properties of its use are outside the scope</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   but the confidentiality properties of its =
use are outside the scope</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   of this =
document.</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">   of this document.</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   For a =
comparison of the overhead of IP-TFS with the RFC4303</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   For a comparison of the overhead of IP-TFS with the =
RFC4303</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   prescribed TFC =
solution see Appendix C.</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">   prescribed =
TFC solution see Appendix C.</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   Additionally, =
IP-TFS provides for operating fairly within congested</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   Additionally, IP-TFS provides for operating fairly =
within congested</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   networks =
[RFC2914].  This is important for when the IP-TFS user is</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   networks [RFC2914].  This is important for =
when the IP-TFS user is</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   not in full =
control of the domain through which the IP-TFS tunnel</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   not in full control of the domain through which the =
IP-TFS tunnel</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   path =
flows.</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">   path flows.</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr id=3D"diff0005"><td></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock">   The <span =
class=3D"delete">mechanisms defined in this document are</span> generic =
with the intent</td><td> </td><td class=3D"rblock">   The <span =
class=3D"insert">AGGFRAG mode defined in this document is</span> generic =
with the intent</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   of allowing =
for non-TFS uses, but such uses are outside the scope of</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   of allowing for non-TFS uses, but such uses =
are outside the scope of</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   this =
document.</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">   this document.</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">1.1.  Terminology =
&amp; Concepts</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">1.1.  Terminology &amp; =
Concepts</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   The key words =
"MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", =
"SHALL", "SHALL NOT",</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   "SHOULD", =
"SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT =
RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   "OPTIONAL" in =
this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be =
interpreted as described in BCP</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   14 [RFC2119] =
[RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they =
appear in all</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   capitals, as =
shown here.</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">   capitals, as shown =
here.</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   This document =
assumes familiarity with IP security concepts including</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   This document assumes familiarity with IP =
security concepts including</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   TFC as =
described in [RFC4301].</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">   TFC as =
described in [RFC4301].</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr id=3D"diff0006"><td></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock">2.  The <span =
class=3D"delete">IP-TFS</span> Tunnel</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"rblock">2.  The <span class=3D"insert">AGGFRAG</span> =
Tunnel</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr id=3D"diff0007"><td></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock">   As mentioned =
in Section 1 <span class=3D"delete">IP-TFS</span> utilizes an IPsec =
[RFC4303] tunnel</td><td> </td><td class=3D"rblock">   As mentioned in =
Section 1 <span class=3D"insert">AGGFRAG mode</span> utilizes an IPsec =
[RFC4303] tunnel</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock">   as its =
transport.  <span class=3D"delete">To provide for full TFC,</span> =
fixed-sized encapsulating</td><td> </td><td class=3D"rblock">   as its =
transport.  <span class=3D"insert">For the purpose of IP-TFS</span> =
fixed-sized encapsulating</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock">   packets are =
sent at a constant rate on the tunnel.</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"rblock">   packets are sent at a constant rate on the <span =
class=3D"insert">AGGFRAG</span> tunnel.</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   The primary =
input to the tunnel algorithm is the requested bandwidth</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   The primary input to the tunnel algorithm is =
the requested bandwidth</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   to be used by =
the tunnel.  Two values are then required to provide</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   to be used by the tunnel.  Two values are then =
required to provide</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   for this =
bandwidth use, the fixed size of the encapsulating packets,</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   for this bandwidth use, the fixed size of =
the encapsulating packets,</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   and rate at =
which to send them.</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">   and rate at =
which to send them.</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   The fixed =
packet size MAY either be specified manually or be</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   The fixed packet size MAY either be specified =
manually or be</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   determined =
through other methods such as the Packetization Layer MTU</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   determined through other methods such as the =
Packetization Layer MTU</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   Discovery =
(PLMTUD) ([RFC4821], [RFC8899]) or Path MTU discovery</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   Discovery (PLMTUD) ([RFC4821], [RFC8899]) or Path MTU =
discovery</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   (PMTUD) =
([RFC1191], [RFC8201]).  PMTUD is known to have issues so</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   (PMTUD) ([RFC1191], [RFC8201]).  PMTUD is =
known to have issues so</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   PLMTUD is =
considered the more robust option.  For PLMTUD, congestion</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   PLMTUD is considered the more robust option. =
 For PLMTUD, congestion</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   control =
payloads can be used as in-band probes (see Section 6.1.2 and</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   control payloads can be used as in-band =
probes (see Section 6.1.2 and</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   =
[RFC8899]).</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">   [RFC8899]).</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   Given the =
encapsulating packet size and the requested bandwidth to be</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   Given the encapsulating packet size and the =
requested bandwidth to be</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   used, the =
corresponding packet send rate can be calculated.  The</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   used, the corresponding packet send rate can be =
calculated.  The</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   packet send =
rate is the requested bandwidth to be used divided by the</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   packet send rate is the requested bandwidth =
to be used divided by the</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   size of the =
encapsulating packet.</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">   size of the =
encapsulating packet.</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr id=3D"diff0008"><td></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock">   The egress =
(receiving) side of the <span class=3D"delete">IP-TFS</span> tunnel MUST =
allow for and</td><td> </td><td class=3D"rblock">   The egress =
(receiving) side of the <span class=3D"insert">AGGFRAG</span> tunnel =
MUST allow for and</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock">   expect the =
ingress (sending) side of the <span class=3D"delete">IP-TFS</span> =
tunnel to vary the</td><td> </td><td class=3D"rblock">   expect the =
ingress (sending) side of the <span class=3D"insert">AGGFRAG</span> =
tunnel to vary the</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   size and rate =
of sent encapsulating packets, unless constrained by</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   size and rate of sent encapsulating packets, unless =
constrained by</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   other =
policy.</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">   other policy.</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr id=3D"diff0009"><td></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock">2.1.  Tunnel =
Content</td><td> </td><td class=3D"rblock">2.1.  <span =
class=3D"insert">AGGFRAG </span>Tunnel Content</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   As previously =
mentioned, one issue with the TFC padding solution in</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   As previously mentioned, one issue with the TFC =
padding solution in</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   [RFC4303] is =
the large amount of wasted bandwidth as only one IP</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   [RFC4303] is the large amount of wasted bandwidth as =
only one IP</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   packet can be =
sent per encapsulating packet.  In order to maximize</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   packet can be sent per encapsulating packet.  In =
order to maximize</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr id=3D"diff0010"><td></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock">   bandwidth, =
IP-TFS breaks this one-to-one <span =
class=3D"delete">association.</span></td><td> </td><td class=3D"rblock"> =
  bandwidth, IP-TFS breaks this one-to-one <span =
class=3D"insert">association by introducing Aggregation</span></td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"rblock"><span class=3D"insert">   and Fragmentation =
mode for ESP.</span></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr id=3D"diff0011"><td></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock">   <span =
class=3D"delete">IP-TFS</span> aggregates as well as fragments the inner =
IP traffic flow into</td><td> </td><td class=3D"rblock">   <span =
class=3D"insert">AGGFRAG mode</span> aggregates as well as fragments the =
inner IP traffic flow into</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   fixed-sized =
encapsulating IPsec tunnel packets.  Padding is only</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   fixed-sized encapsulating IPsec tunnel packets.  =
Padding is only</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   added to the =
the tunnel packets if there is no data available to be</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   added to the the tunnel packets if there is no data =
available to be</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   sent at the =
time of tunnel packet transmission, or if fragmentation</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   sent at the time of tunnel packet =
transmission, or if fragmentation</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   has been =
disabled by the receiver.</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">   has been =
disabled by the receiver.</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   This is =
accomplished using a new Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP,</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   This is accomplished using a new =
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP,</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr id=3D"diff0012"><td></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock">   [RFC4303]) =
Next Header field value AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD (Section 6.1).</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"rblock">   [RFC4303]) Next Header field value <span =
class=3D"insert">for </span>AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD (Section 6.1).</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr id=3D"diff0013"><td></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock">   <span =
class=3D"delete">Other non-IP-TFS uses of this aggregation and =
fragmentation</span></td><td> </td><td class=3D"rblock">   <span =
class=3D"insert">Besides IP-TFS AGGFRAG mode can be used for various =
purposes,</span> such as increased performance</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock"><span =
class=3D"delete">   encapsulation have been identified,</span> such as =
increased performance</td><td> </td><td class=3D"rblock"></td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   through packet =
aggregation, as well as handling MTU issues using</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   through packet aggregation, as well as handling MTU =
issues using</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   fragmentation. =
 These uses are not defined here, but are also not</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   fragmentation.  These uses are not defined here, but =
are also not</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   restricted by =
this document.</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">   restricted by this =
document.</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">2.2.  Payload =
Content</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">2.2.  Payload Content</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   The =
AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD payload content defined in this document is</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   The AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD payload content defined =
in this document is</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   comprised of a =
4 or 24 octet header followed by either a partial</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   comprised of a 4 or 24 octet header followed by =
either a partial</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   datablock, a =
full datablock, or multiple partial or full datablocks.</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   datablock, a full datablock, or multiple =
partial or full datablocks.</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   The following =
diagram illustrates this payload within the ESP packet.</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   The following diagram illustrates this =
payload within the ESP packet.</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr id=3D"part-3" class=3D"change"><td></td><th><small>skipping to =
change at</small><a =
href=3D"https://www6.ietf.org/rfcdiff/rfcdiff.pyht#part-3"><em> page 5, =
line 44<span class=3D"hide"> =C2=B6</span></em></a></th><th> =
</th><th><small>skipping to change at</small><a =
href=3D"https://www6.ietf.org/rfcdiff/rfcdiff.pyht#part-3"><em> page 5, =
line 43<span class=3D"hide"> =C2=B6</span></em></a></th><td></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">    =
+---------------------------------------------------------------+</td><td=
> </td><td class=3D"right">    =
+---------------------------------------------------------------+</td><td=
 class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">    :             =
     [Optional Congestion Info]                   :</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">    :                  [Optional Congestion Info]        =
           :</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">    =
+---------------------------------------------------------------+</td><td=
> </td><td class=3D"right">    =
+---------------------------------------------------------------+</td><td=
 class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">    |       =
DataBlocks ...                                          ~</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">    |       DataBlocks ...                      =
                    ~</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">    ~             =
                                                  ~</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">    ~                                                    =
           ~</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">    ~             =
                                                  |</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">    ~                                                    =
           |</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">    =
+---------------------------------------------------------------|</td><td=
> </td><td class=3D"right">    =
+---------------------------------------------------------------|</td><td=
 class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">    . ESP =
Trailer...                                                .</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">    . ESP Trailer...                            =
                    .</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">    . . . . . . . =
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">    . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . =
. . . . . . .</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr id=3D"diff0014"><td></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock">                =
Figure 1: Layout of an <span class=3D"delete">IP-TFS</span> IPsec =
Packet</td><td> </td><td class=3D"rblock">                Figure 1: =
Layout of an <span class=3D"insert">AGGFRAG</span> IPsec Packet</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   The =
"BlockOffset" value is either zero or some offset into or past</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   The "BlockOffset" value is either zero or =
some offset into or past</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   the end of the =
"DataBlocks" data.</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">   the end of the =
"DataBlocks" data.</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   If the =
"BlockOffset" value is zero it means that the "DataBlocks"</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   If the "BlockOffset" value is zero it means =
that the "DataBlocks"</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   data begins =
with a new data block.</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">   data begins =
with a new data block.</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   Conversely, if =
the "BlockOffset" value is non-zero it points to the</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   Conversely, if the "BlockOffset" value is non-zero it =
points to the</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   start of the =
new data block, and the initial "DataBlocks" data</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   start of the new data block, and the initial =
"DataBlocks" data</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   belongs to the =
data block that is still being re-assembled.</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   belongs to the data block that is still being =
re-assembled.</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   If the =
"BlockOffset" points past the end of the "DataBlocks" data</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   If the "BlockOffset" points past the end of =
the "DataBlocks" data</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   then the next =
data block occurs in a subsequent encapsulating packet.</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   then the next data block occurs in a =
subsequent encapsulating packet.</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   Having the =
"BlockOffset" always point at the next available data</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   Having the "BlockOffset" always point at the next =
available data</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   block allows =
for recovering the next inner packet in the presence of</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   block allows for recovering the next inner =
packet in the presence of</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   outer =
encapsulating packet loss.</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">   outer =
encapsulating packet loss.</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr id=3D"diff0015"><td></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock">   An example =
<span class=3D"delete">IP-TFS</span> packet flow can be found in =
Appendix A.</td><td> </td><td class=3D"rblock">   An example <span =
class=3D"insert">AGGFRAG</span> packet flow can be found in Appendix =
A.</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">2.2.1.  Data =
Blocks</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">2.2.1.  Data Blocks</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">    =
+---------------------------------------------------------------+</td><td=
> </td><td class=3D"right">    =
+---------------------------------------------------------------+</td><td=
 class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">    | Type  | =
rest of IPv4, IPv6 or pad.</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">    | Type  =
| rest of IPv4, IPv6 or pad.</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">    =
+--------</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">    +--------</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">                  =
    Figure 2: Layout of a DataBlock</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">   =
                   Figure 2: Layout of a DataBlock</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   A data block =
is defined by a 4-bit type code followed by the data</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   A data block is defined by a 4-bit type code followed =
by the data</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr id=3D"part-4" class=3D"change"><td></td><th><small>skipping to =
change at</small><a =
href=3D"https://www6.ietf.org/rfcdiff/rfcdiff.pyht#part-4"><em> page 7, =
line 23<span class=3D"hide"> =C2=B6</span></em></a></th><th> =
</th><th><small>skipping to change at</small><a =
href=3D"https://www6.ietf.org/rfcdiff/rfcdiff.pyht#part-4"><em> page 7, =
line 23<span class=3D"hide"> =C2=B6</span></em></a></th><td></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   number based =
sliding window can be used to correct re-ordering of the</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   number based sliding window can be used to =
correct re-ordering of the</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   outer packet =
stream.  Receiving a larger (newer) sequence number</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   outer packet stream.  Receiving a larger (newer) =
sequence number</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   packet =
advances the window, and received older ESP packets whose</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   packet advances the window, and received =
older ESP packets whose</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   sequence =
numbers the window has passed by are dropped.  A good choice</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   sequence numbers the window has passed by =
are dropped.  A good choice</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   for the size =
of this window depends on the amount of re-ordering the</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   for the size of this window depends on the =
amount of re-ordering the</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   user may =
normally experience.</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">   user may =
normally experience.</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   As the amount =
of reordering that may be present is hard to predict,</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   As the amount of reordering that may be present is =
hard to predict,</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   the window =
size SHOULD be configurable by the user.  Implementations</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   the window size SHOULD be configurable by =
the user.  Implementations</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   MAY also =
dynamically adjust the reordering window based on actual</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   MAY also dynamically adjust the reordering =
window based on actual</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr id=3D"diff0016"><td></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock">   reordering =
seen in arriving packets.  Finally, note that as <span =
class=3D"delete">IP-TFS</span> is</td><td> </td><td class=3D"rblock">   =
reordering seen in arriving packets.  Finally, note that as <span =
class=3D"insert">AGGFRAG mode</span> is</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   sending a =
continuous stream of packets there is no requirement for</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   sending a continuous stream of packets there =
is no requirement for</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   timers =
(although there's no prohibition either) as newly arrived</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   timers (although there's no prohibition =
either) as newly arrived</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   packets will =
cause the window to advance and older packets will then</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   packets will cause the window to advance and =
older packets will then</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   be processed =
as they leave the window.  Implementations that are</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   be processed as they leave the window.  =
Implementations that are</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   concerned =
about memory use when packets are delayed (e.g., when an SA</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   concerned about memory use when packets are =
delayed (e.g., when an SA</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   deletion is =
delayed) can of course use timers to drop packets as</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   deletion is delayed) can of course use timers to drop =
packets as</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   well.</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   well.</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   While ESP =
guarantees an increasing sequence number with subsequently</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   While ESP guarantees an increasing sequence =
number with subsequently</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   sent packets, =
it does not actually require the sequence numbers to be</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   sent packets, it does not actually require =
the sequence numbers to be</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   generated with =
no gaps (e.g., sending only even numbered sequence</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   generated with no gaps (e.g., sending only even =
numbered sequence</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   numbers would =
be allowed as long as they are always increasing).</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   numbers would be allowed as long as they are always =
increasing).</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   Gaps in the =
sequence numbers will not work for this document so the</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   Gaps in the sequence numbers will not work =
for this document so the</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   sequence =
number stream MUST increase monotonically by 1 for each</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   sequence number stream MUST increase =
monotonically by 1 for each</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   subsequent =
packet.</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">   subsequent packet.</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   When using the =
AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD in conjunction with replay detection,</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   When using the AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD in conjunction with =
replay detection,</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr id=3D"diff0017"><td></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock">   the window =
size for both <span class=3D"delete">MAY</span> be reduced to share the =
smaller of the</td><td> </td><td class=3D"rblock">   the window size for =
both <span class=3D"insert">SHOULD</span> be reduced to share the =
smaller of the</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   two window =
sizes.  This is because packets outside of the smaller</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   two window sizes.  This is because packets outside of =
the smaller</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   window but =
inside the larger would still be dropped by the mechanism</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   window but inside the larger would still be =
dropped by the mechanism</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   with the =
smaller window size.</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">   with the =
smaller window size.</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   Finally, as =
sequence numbers are reset when switching SAs (e.g., when</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   Finally, as sequence numbers are reset when =
switching SAs (e.g., when</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   re-keying a =
child SA), senders MUST NOT send initial fragments of an</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   re-keying a child SA), senders MUST NOT send =
initial fragments of an</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   inner packet =
using one SA and subsequent fragments in a different SA.</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   inner packet using one SA and subsequent =
fragments in a different SA.</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">2.2.3.1.  =
Optional Extra Padding</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">2.2.3.1.  =
Optional Extra Padding</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr id=3D"part-5" class=3D"change"><td></td><th><small>skipping to =
change at</small><a =
href=3D"https://www6.ietf.org/rfcdiff/rfcdiff.pyht#part-5"><em> page 8, =
line 32<span class=3D"hide"> =C2=B6</span></em></a></th><th> =
</th><th><small>skipping to change at</small><a =
href=3D"https://www6.ietf.org/rfcdiff/rfcdiff.pyht#part-5"><em> page 8, =
line 32<span class=3D"hide"> =C2=B6</span></em></a></th><td></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   While use of =
padding to avoid fragmentation does not impact</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   While use of padding to avoid fragmentation does not =
impact</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   =
interoperability, used inappropriately it can reduce the =
effective</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">   interoperability, used =
inappropriately it can reduce the effective</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   throughput of =
a tunnel.  Senders implementing either of the above</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   throughput of a tunnel.  Senders implementing either =
of the above</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   approaches =
will need to take care to not reduce the effective</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   approaches will need to take care to not reduce the =
effective</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   capacity, and =
overall utility, of the tunnel through the overuse of</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   capacity, and overall utility, of the tunnel through =
the overuse of</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   =
padding.</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">   padding.</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">2.2.4.  Empty =
Payload</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">2.2.4.  Empty Payload</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr id=3D"diff0018"><td></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock">   <span =
class=3D"delete">To</span> support reporting of congestion control =
information (described</td><td> </td><td class=3D"rblock">   <span =
class=3D"insert">When AGGFRAG mode is used for IP-TFS, on order =
to</span> support reporting of congestion control information =
(described</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock">   later) on a =
non-AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD enabled SA, <span class=3D"delete">IP-TFS =
allows</span> for the</td><td> </td><td class=3D"rblock">   later) on a =
non-AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD enabled SA, <span class=3D"insert">it is =
allowed</span> for the</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   sending of an =
AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD payload with no data blocks (i.e., the</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   sending of an AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD payload with no data =
blocks (i.e., the</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   ESP payload =
length is equal to the AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD header length).</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   ESP payload length is equal to the AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD =
header length).</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   This special =
payload is called an empty payload.</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">   =
This special payload is called an empty payload.</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   Currently this =
situation is only applicable in non-IKEv2 use cases.</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   Currently this situation is only applicable in =
non-IKEv2 use cases.</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">2.2.5.  IP Header =
Value Mapping</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">2.2.5.  IP Header Value =
Mapping</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   [RFC4301] =
provides some direction on when and how to map various</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   [RFC4301] provides some direction on when and how to =
map various</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   values from an =
inner IP header to the outer encapsulating header,</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   values from an inner IP header to the outer =
encapsulating header,</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   namely the =
Don't-Fragment (DF) bit ([RFC0791] and [RFC8200]), the</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   namely the Don't-Fragment (DF) bit ([RFC0791] and =
[RFC8200]), the</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   Differentiated =
Services (DS) field [RFC2474] and the Explicit</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   Differentiated Services (DS) field [RFC2474] and the =
Explicit</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr id=3D"diff0019"><td></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock">   Congestion =
Notification (ECN) field [RFC3168].  Unlike [RFC4301], <span =
class=3D"delete">IP-</span></td><td> </td><td class=3D"rblock">   =
Congestion Notification (ECN) field [RFC3168].  Unlike [RFC4301], <span =
class=3D"insert">AGGFRAG mode</span></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock"><span =
class=3D"delete">   TFS</span> may and often will be encapsulating more =
than one IP packet per</td><td> </td><td class=3D"rblock">   may and =
often will be encapsulating more than one IP packet per</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   ESP packet.  =
To deal with this, these mappings are restricted</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   ESP packet.  To deal with this, these mappings are =
restricted</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   =
further.</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">   further.</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">2.2.5.1.  DF =
bit</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">2.2.5.1.  DF bit</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr id=3D"diff0020"><td></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock">   <span =
class=3D"delete">IP-TFS</span> never maps the inner DF bit as it is =
unrelated to the IP-TFS</td><td> </td><td class=3D"rblock">   <span =
class=3D"insert">AGGFRAG mode</span> never maps the inner DF bit as it =
is unrelated to the IP-TFS</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock">   tunnel =
functionality; <span class=3D"delete">IP-TFS</span> never needs to IP =
fragment the inner</td><td> </td><td class=3D"rblock">   tunnel =
functionality; <span class=3D"insert">AGGFRAG mode</span> never needs to =
IP fragment the inner</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   packets and =
the inner packets will not affect the fragmentation of</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   packets and the inner packets will not affect the =
fragmentation of</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   the outer =
encapsulation packets.</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">   the outer =
encapsulation packets.</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">2.2.5.2.  ECN =
value</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">2.2.5.2.  ECN value</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   The ECN value =
need not be mapped as any congestion related to the</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   The ECN value need not be mapped as any congestion =
related to the</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr id=3D"diff0021"><td></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock">   =
constant-send-rate <span class=3D"delete">IP-TFS</span> tunnel is =
unrelated (by design) to the</td><td> </td><td class=3D"rblock">   =
constant-send-rate <span class=3D"insert">AGGFRAG</span> tunnel is =
unrelated (by design) to the</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   inner traffic =
flow.  The sender MAY still set the ECN value of inner</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   inner traffic flow.  The sender MAY still set the ECN =
value of inner</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   packets based =
on the normal ECN specification [RFC3168].</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   packets based on the normal ECN specification =
[RFC3168].</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">2.2.5.3.  DS =
field</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">2.2.5.3.  DS field</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   By default the =
DS field SHOULD NOT be copied, although a sender MAY</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   By default the DS field SHOULD NOT be copied, =
although a sender MAY</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   choose to =
allow for configuration to override this behavior.  A</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   choose to allow for configuration to override this =
behavior.  A</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   sender SHOULD =
also allow the DS value to be set by configuration.</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   sender SHOULD also allow the DS value to be set by =
configuration.</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">2.2.6.  IP =
Time-To-Live (TTL) and Tunnel errors</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">2.2.6.  IP Time-To-Live (TTL) and Tunnel errors</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   [RFC4301] =
specifies how to modify the inner packet TTL [RFC0791].</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   [RFC4301] specifies how to modify the inner =
packet TTL [RFC0791].</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   Any errors =
(e.g., ICMP errors arriving back at the tunnel ingress due</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   Any errors (e.g., ICMP errors arriving back =
at the tunnel ingress due</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr id=3D"diff0022"><td></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock">   to tunnel =
traffic) are handled the same as with non <span =
class=3D"delete">IP-TFS</span> IPsec</td><td> </td><td class=3D"rblock"> =
  to tunnel traffic) are handled the same as with non <span =
class=3D"insert">AGGFRAG</span> IPsec</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   =
tunnels.</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">   tunnels.</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">2.2.7.  Effective =
MTU of the Tunnel</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">2.2.7.  Effective =
MTU of the Tunnel</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr id=3D"diff0023"><td></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock">   Unlike =
[RFC4301], there is normally no effective MTU (EMTU) on an <span =
class=3D"delete">IP-</span></td><td> </td><td class=3D"rblock">   Unlike =
[RFC4301], there is normally no effective MTU (EMTU) on an <span =
class=3D"insert">AGGFRAG</span></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock"><span =
class=3D"delete">   TFS</span> tunnel as all IP packet sizes are =
properly transmitted without</td><td> </td><td class=3D"rblock">   =
tunnel as all IP packet sizes are properly transmitted without</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   requiring IP =
fragmentation prior to tunnel ingress.  That said, a</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   requiring IP fragmentation prior to tunnel ingress.  =
That said, a</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   sender MAY =
allow for explicitly configuring an MTU for the tunnel.</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   sender MAY allow for explicitly configuring =
an MTU for the tunnel.</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr id=3D"diff0024"><td></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock">   If <span =
class=3D"delete">IP-TFS fragmentation has been disabled</span>, then the =
tunnel's EMTU and</td><td> </td><td class=3D"rblock">   If <span =
class=3D"insert">fragmentation has been disabled in AGGFRAG =
tunnel</span>, then the tunnel's EMTU and</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   behaviors are =
the same as normal IPsec tunnels [RFC4301].</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   behaviors are the same as normal IPsec tunnels =
[RFC4301].</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">2.3.  Exclusive =
SA Use</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">2.3.  Exclusive SA Use</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr id=3D"diff0025"><td></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock">   This =
document does not specify mixed use of an AGGFRAG<span =
class=3D"delete">_PAYLOAD</span></td><td> </td><td class=3D"rblock">   =
This document does not specify mixed use of an AGGFRAG</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   enabled SA.  A =
sender MUST only send AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD payloads over an</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   enabled SA.  A sender MUST only send AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD =
payloads over an</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr id=3D"diff0026"><td></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock">   SA =
configured for AGGFRAG<span class=3D"delete">_PAYLOAD =
us</span>e.</td><td> </td><td class=3D"rblock">   SA configured for =
AGGFRAG<span class=3D"insert"> mod</span>e.</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">2.4.  Modes of =
Operation</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">2.4.  Modes of =
Operation</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr id=3D"diff0027"><td></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock">   Just as with =
normal IPsec/ESP tunnels, <span class=3D"delete">IP-TFS</span> tunnels =
are</td><td> </td><td class=3D"rblock">   Just as with normal IPsec/ESP =
tunnels, <span class=3D"insert">AGGFRAG</span> tunnels are</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock">   =
unidirectional.  Bidirectional <span class=3D"delete">IP-TFS</span> =
functionality is achieved by</td><td> </td><td class=3D"rblock">   =
unidirectional.  Bidirectional <span class=3D"insert">AGGFRAG</span> =
functionality is achieved by</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock">   setting up 2 =
<span class=3D"delete">IP-TFS</span> tunnels, one in either =
direction.</td><td> </td><td class=3D"rblock">   setting up 2 <span =
class=3D"insert">AGGFRAG</span> tunnels, one in either =
direction.</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr id=3D"diff0028"><td></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock">   A<span =
class=3D"delete">n IP-TFS tunnel</span> can operate in 2 modes, a =
non-congestion controlled</td><td> </td><td class=3D"rblock">   A<span =
class=3D"insert">GGFRAG tunnel used for IP-TFS</span> can operate in 2 =
modes, a non-congestion controlled</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   mode and =
congestion controlled mode.</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">   mode =
and congestion controlled mode.</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">2.4.1.  =
Non-Congestion Controlled Mode</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">2.4.1.  =
Non-Congestion Controlled Mode</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   In the =
non-congestion controlled mode, IP-TFS sends fixed-sized</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   In the non-congestion controlled mode, =
IP-TFS sends fixed-sized</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr id=3D"diff0029"><td></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock">   packets at a =
constant rate.  The packet send rate is constant and is</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"rblock">   packets <span class=3D"insert">over AGGFRAG =
tunnel </span>at a constant rate.  The packet send rate is constant and =
is</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   not =
automatically adjusted regardless of any network congestion</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   not automatically adjusted regardless of any =
network congestion</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   (e.g., packet =
loss).</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">   (e.g., packet loss).</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   For similar =
reasons as given in [RFC7510] the non-congestion</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   For similar reasons as given in [RFC7510] the =
non-congestion</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   controlled =
mode should only be used where the user has full</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   controlled mode should only be used where the user =
has full</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   administrative =
control over the path the tunnel will take.  This is</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   administrative control over the path the tunnel will =
take.  This is</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   required so =
the user can guarantee the bandwidth and also be sure as</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   required so the user can guarantee the =
bandwidth and also be sure as</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   to not be =
negatively affecting network congestion [RFC2914].  In this</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   to not be negatively affecting network =
congestion [RFC2914].  In this</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   case packet =
loss should be reported to the administrator (e.g., via</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   case packet loss should be reported to the =
administrator (e.g., via</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   syslog, YANG =
notification, SNMP traps, etc) so that any failures due</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   syslog, YANG notification, SNMP traps, etc) =
so that any failures due</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr id=3D"part-6" class=3D"change"><td></td><th><small>skipping to =
change at</small><a =
href=3D"https://www6.ietf.org/rfcdiff/rfcdiff.pyht#part-6"><em> page 11, =
line 20<span class=3D"hide"> =C2=B6</span></em></a></th><th> =
</th><th><small>skipping to change at</small><a =
href=3D"https://www6.ietf.org/rfcdiff/rfcdiff.pyht#part-6"><em> page 11, =
line 20<span class=3D"hide"> =C2=B6</span></em></a></th><td></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   establishing =
an RTT the information SHOULD be sent constantly from</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   establishing an RTT the information SHOULD be sent =
constantly from</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   the sender and =
the receiver so that an RTT estimate can be</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   the sender and the receiver so that an RTT estimate =
can be</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   established.  =
Not receiving this information over multiple</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   established.  Not receiving this information over =
multiple</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   consecutive =
RTT intervals should be considered a congestion event</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   consecutive RTT intervals should be considered a =
congestion event</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   that causes =
the sender to adjust its sending rate lower.  For</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   that causes the sender to adjust its sending rate =
lower.  For</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   example, =
[RFC4342] calls this the "no feedback timeout" and it is</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   example, [RFC4342] calls this the "no =
feedback timeout" and it is</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   equal to 4 RTT =
intervals.  When a "no feedback timeout" has occurred</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   equal to 4 RTT intervals.  When a "no feedback =
timeout" has occurred</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   [RFC4342] =
halves the sending rate.</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">   [RFC4342] =
halves the sending rate.</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   An =
implementation MAY choose to always include the congestion</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   An implementation MAY choose to always =
include the congestion</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr id=3D"diff0030"><td></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock">   information =
in its <span class=3D"delete">IP-TFS</span> payload header if sending on =
an IP-TFS</td><td> </td><td class=3D"rblock">   information in its <span =
class=3D"insert">AGGFRAG</span> payload header if sending on an =
IP-TFS</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   enabled SA.  =
Since IP-TFS normally will operate with a large packet</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   enabled SA.  Since IP-TFS normally will operate with =
a large packet</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   size, the =
congestion information should represent a small portion of</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   size, the congestion information should =
represent a small portion of</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   the available =
tunnel bandwidth.  An implementation choosing to always</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   the available tunnel bandwidth.  An =
implementation choosing to always</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   send the data =
MAY also choose to only update the "LossEventRate" and</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   send the data MAY also choose to only update the =
"LossEventRate" and</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   "RTT" header =
field values it sends every "RTT" though.</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   "RTT" header field values it sends every "RTT" =
though.</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   When choosing =
a congestion control algorithm (or a selection of</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   When choosing a congestion control algorithm (or a =
selection of</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   algorithms) =
note that IP-TFS is not providing for reliable delivery</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   algorithms) note that IP-TFS is not =
providing for reliable delivery</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   of IP traffic, =
and so per packet ACKs are not required and are not</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   of IP traffic, and so per packet ACKs are not =
required and are not</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   =
provided.</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">   provided.</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   It is worth =
noting that the variable send-rate of a congestion</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   It is worth noting that the variable send-rate of a =
congestion</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr id=3D"diff0031"><td></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock">   controlled =
<span class=3D"delete">IP-TFS</span> tunnel, is not private; however, =
this send-rate is</td><td> </td><td class=3D"rblock">   controlled <span =
class=3D"insert">AGGFRAG</span> tunnel, is not private; however, this =
send-rate is</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   being driven =
by network congestion, and as long as the encapsulated</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   being driven by network congestion, and as long as =
the encapsulated</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   (inner) =
traffic flow shape and timing are not directly affecting the</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   (inner) traffic flow shape and timing are =
not directly affecting the</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   (outer) =
network congestion, the variations in the tunnel rate will</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   (outer) network congestion, the variations =
in the tunnel rate will</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   not weaken the =
provided inner traffic flow confidentiality.</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   not weaken the provided inner traffic flow =
confidentiality.</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">2.4.2.1.  Circuit =
Breakers</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">2.4.2.1.  Circuit =
Breakers</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   In additional =
to congestion control, implementations MAY choose to</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   In additional to congestion control, implementations =
MAY choose to</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   define and =
implement circuit breakers [RFC8084] as a recovery method</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   define and implement circuit breakers =
[RFC8084] as a recovery method</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   of last =
resort.  Enabling circuit breakers is also a reason a user</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   of last resort.  Enabling circuit breakers =
is also a reason a user</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   may wish to =
enable congestion information reports even when using the</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   may wish to enable congestion information =
reports even when using the</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   non-congestion =
controlled mode of operation.  The definition of</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   non-congestion controlled mode of operation.  The =
definition of</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   circuit =
breakers are outside the scope of this document.</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   circuit breakers are outside the scope of this =
document.</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">2.5.  Summary of =
Receiver Processing</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">2.5.  Summary of =
Receiver Processing</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr id=3D"diff0032"><td></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock">   An <span =
class=3D"delete">IP-TFS</span> receiver has a few tasks to =
perform.</td><td> </td><td class=3D"rblock">   An <span =
class=3D"insert">AGGFRAG enabled SA</span> receiver has a few tasks to =
perform.</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   The receiver =
first reorders, possibly out-of-order ESP packets</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   The receiver first reorders, possibly out-of-order =
ESP packets</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   received on an =
SA into in-sequence-order AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD payloads</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   received on an SA into in-sequence-order =
AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD payloads</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   (Section =
2.2.3).  If congestion control is enabled, the receiver</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   (Section 2.2.3).  If congestion control is =
enabled, the receiver</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   considers a =
packet lost when it's sequence number is abandoned (e.g.,</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   considers a packet lost when it's sequence =
number is abandoned (e.g.,</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   pushed out of =
the re-ordering window, or timed-out) by the reordering</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   pushed out of the re-ordering window, or =
timed-out) by the reordering</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   =
algorithm.</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">   algorithm.</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   Additionally, =
if congestion control is enabled, the receiver sends</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   Additionally, if congestion control is enabled, the =
receiver sends</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   congestion =
control data (Section 6.1.2) back to the sender as</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   congestion control data (Section 6.1.2) back to the =
sender as</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr id=3D"part-7" class=3D"change"><td></td><th><small>skipping to =
change at</small><a =
href=3D"https://www6.ietf.org/rfcdiff/rfcdiff.pyht#part-7"><em> page 13, =
line 4<span class=3D"hide"> =C2=B6</span></em></a></th><th> =
</th><th><small>skipping to change at</small><a =
href=3D"https://www6.ietf.org/rfcdiff/rfcdiff.pyht#part-7"><em> page 13, =
line 4<span class=3D"hide"> =C2=B6</span></em></a></th><td></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   receipt of =
this "TVal", the receiver records the new "TVal" value</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   receipt of this "TVal", the receiver records the new =
"TVal" value</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   along with the =
time it arrived locally, subsequent receipt of the</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   along with the time it arrived locally, subsequent =
receipt of the</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   same "TVal" =
MUST NOT update the recorded time.</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">   =
same "TVal" MUST NOT update the recorded time.</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   When the =
receiver sends its CC header it places this latest recorded</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   When the receiver sends its CC header it =
places this latest recorded</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   "TVal" in the =
"TEcho" header field, along with 2 delay values, "Echo</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   "TVal" in the "TEcho" header field, along with 2 =
delay values, "Echo</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   Delay" and =
"Transmit Delay".  The "Echo Delay" value is the time</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   Delay" and "Transmit Delay".  The "Echo Delay" value =
is the time</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   delta from the =
recorded arrival time of "TVal" and the current clock</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   delta from the recorded arrival time of "TVal" and =
the current clock</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   in =
microseconds.  The second value, "Transmit Delay", is the</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   in microseconds.  The second value, =
"Transmit Delay", is the</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   receiver's =
current transmission delay on the tunnel (i.e., the</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   receiver's current transmission delay on the tunnel =
(i.e., the</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr id=3D"diff0033"><td></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock">   average time =
between sending packets on its half of the <span =
class=3D"delete">IP-TFS</span></td><td> </td><td class=3D"rblock">   =
average time between sending packets on its half of the <span =
class=3D"insert">AGGFRAG</span></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   =
tunnel).</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">   tunnel).</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   When the =
sender receives back its "TVal" in the "TEcho" header field</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   When the sender receives back its "TVal" in =
the "TEcho" header field</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   it calculates =
2 RTT estimates.  The first is the actual delay found</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   it calculates 2 RTT estimates.  The first is the =
actual delay found</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   by subtracting =
the "TEcho" value from its current clock and then</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   by subtracting the "TEcho" value from its current =
clock and then</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   subtracting =
"Echo Delay" as well.  The second RTT estimate is found</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   subtracting "Echo Delay" as well.  The =
second RTT estimate is found</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   by adding the =
received "Transmit Delay" header value to the senders</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   by adding the received "Transmit Delay" header value =
to the senders</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   own =
transmission delay (i.e., the average time between sending</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   own transmission delay (i.e., the average =
time between sending</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr id=3D"diff0034"><td></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock">   packets on =
its half of the <span class=3D"delete">IP-TFS</span> tunnel).  The =
larger of these 2 RTT</td><td> </td><td class=3D"rblock">   packets on =
its half of the <span class=3D"insert">AGGFRAG</span> tunnel).  The =
larger of these 2 RTT</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   estimates =
SHOULD be used as the "RTT" value.</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">   =
estimates SHOULD be used as the "RTT" value.</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   The two RTT =
estimates are required to handle different combinations</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   The two RTT estimates are required to handle =
different combinations</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   of faster or =
slower tunnel packet paths with faster or slower fixed</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   of faster or slower tunnel packet paths with faster =
or slower fixed</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   tunnel rates.  =
Choosing the larger of the two values guarantees that</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   tunnel rates.  Choosing the larger of the two values =
guarantees that</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   the "RTT" is =
never considered faster than the aggregate transmission</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   the "RTT" is never considered faster than =
the aggregate transmission</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr id=3D"diff0035"><td></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock">   delay based =
on the <span class=3D"delete">IP-TFS</span> tunnel rate (the second =
estimate), as well</td><td> </td><td class=3D"rblock">   delay based on =
the <span class=3D"insert">AGGFRAG</span> tunnel rate (the second =
estimate), as well</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   as never being =
considered faster than the actual RTT along the tunnel</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   as never being considered faster than the actual RTT =
along the tunnel</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   packet path =
(the first estimate).</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">   packet path =
(the first estimate).</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   The receiver =
also calculates, and communicates in the "LossEventRate"</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   The receiver also calculates, and =
communicates in the "LossEventRate"</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   header field, =
the loss event rate for use by the sender.  This is</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   header field, the loss event rate for use by the =
sender.  This is</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   slightly =
different from [RFC4342] which periodically sends all the</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   slightly different from [RFC4342] which =
periodically sends all the</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   loss interval =
data back to the sender so that it can do the</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   loss interval data back to the sender so that it can =
do the</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   calculation.  =
See Appendix B for a suggested way to calculate the</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   calculation.  See Appendix B for a suggested way to =
calculate the</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   loss event =
rate value.  Initially this value will be zero (indicating</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   loss event rate value.  Initially this value =
will be zero (indicating</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   no loss) until =
enough data has been collected by the receiver to</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   no loss) until enough data has been collected by the =
receiver to</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   update =
it.</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">   update it.</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">3.1.  ECN =
Support</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">3.1.  ECN Support</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr id=3D"diff0036"><td></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock">   In =
additional to normal packet loss information <span =
class=3D"delete">IP-TFS</span> supports use</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"rblock">   In additional to normal packet loss information =
<span class=3D"insert">AGGFRAG mode</span> supports use</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   of the ECN =
bits in the encapsulating IP header [RFC3168] for</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   of the ECN bits in the encapsulating IP header =
[RFC3168] for</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   identifying =
congestion.  If ECN use is enabled and a packet arrives</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   identifying congestion.  If ECN use is =
enabled and a packet arrives</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   at the egress =
(receiving) side with the Congestion Experienced (CE)</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   at the egress (receiving) side with the Congestion =
Experienced (CE)</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   value set, =
then the receiver considers that packet as being dropped,</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   value set, then the receiver considers that =
packet as being dropped,</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   although it =
does not drop it.  The receiver MUST set the E bit in any</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   although it does not drop it.  The receiver =
MUST set the E bit in any</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   =
AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD payload header containing a "LossEventRate" =
value</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">   AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD payload =
header containing a "LossEventRate" value</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   derived from a =
CE value being considered.</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">   derived =
from a CE value being considered.</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   As noted in =
[RFC3168] the ECN bits are not protected by IPsec and</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   As noted in [RFC3168] the ECN bits are not protected =
by IPsec and</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   thus may =
constitute a covert channel.  For this reason, ECN use</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   thus may constitute a covert channel.  For this =
reason, ECN use</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   SHOULD NOT be =
enabled by default.</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">   SHOULD NOT be =
enabled by default.</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr id=3D"diff0037"><td></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock">4.  =
Configuration</td><td> </td><td class=3D"rblock">4.  Configuration<span =
class=3D"insert"> of AGGFRAG Tunnels for IP-TFS</span></td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   IP-TFS is =
meant to be deployable with a minimal amount of</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   IP-TFS is meant to be deployable with a minimal =
amount of</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   configuration. =
 All IP-TFS specific configuration should be specified</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   configuration.  All IP-TFS specific configuration =
should be specified</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   at the =
unidirectional tunnel ingress (sending) side.  It is intended</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   at the unidirectional tunnel ingress =
(sending) side.  It is intended</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   that non-IKEv2 =
operation is supported, at least, with local static</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   that non-IKEv2 operation is supported, at least, with =
local static</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   =
configuration.</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">   =
configuration.</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">4.1.  =
Bandwidth</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">4.1.  Bandwidth</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   Bandwidth is a =
local configuration option.  For non-congestion</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   Bandwidth is a local configuration option.  For =
non-congestion</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr id=3D"part-8" class=3D"change"><td></td><th><small>skipping to =
change at</small><a =
href=3D"https://www6.ietf.org/rfcdiff/rfcdiff.pyht#part-8"><em> page 14, =
line 39<span class=3D"hide"> =C2=B6</span></em></a></th><th> =
</th><th><small>skipping to change at</small><a =
href=3D"https://www6.ietf.org/rfcdiff/rfcdiff.pyht#part-8"><em> page 14, =
line 39<span class=3D"hide"> =C2=B6</span></em></a></th><td></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">4.3.  Congestion =
Control</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">4.3.  Congestion =
Control</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   Congestion =
control is a local configuration option.  No standardized</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   Congestion control is a local configuration =
option.  No standardized</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   configuration =
method is required.</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">   configuration =
method is required.</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">5.  =
IKEv2</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">5.  IKEv2</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">5.1.  USE_AGGFRAG =
Notification Message</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">5.1.  USE_AGGFRAG =
Notification Message</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr id=3D"diff0038"><td></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock">   As mentioned =
previously <span class=3D"delete">IP-TFS</span> tunnels utilize ESP =
payloads of type</td><td> </td><td class=3D"rblock">   As mentioned =
previously <span class=3D"insert">AGGFRAG</span> tunnels utilize ESP =
payloads of type</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   =
AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD.</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">   =
AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD.</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   When using =
IKEv2, a new "USE_AGGFRAG" Notification Message enables</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   When using IKEv2, a new "USE_AGGFRAG" =
Notification Message enables</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   the =
AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD payload on a child SA pair.  The method used is</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   the AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD payload on a child SA =
pair.  The method used is</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   similar to how =
USE_TRANSPORT_MODE is negotiated, as described in</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   similar to how USE_TRANSPORT_MODE is negotiated, as =
described in</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   =
[RFC7296].</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">   [RFC7296].</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   To request use =
of the AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD payload on the Child SA pair,</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   To request use of the AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD payload on the =
Child SA pair,</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   the initiator =
includes the USE_AGGFRAG notification in an SA payload</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   the initiator includes the USE_AGGFRAG notification =
in an SA payload</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   requesting a =
new Child SA (either during the initial IKE_AUTH or</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   requesting a new Child SA (either during the initial =
IKE_AUTH or</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr id=3D"part-9" class=3D"change"><td></td><th><small>skipping to =
change at</small><a =
href=3D"https://www6.ietf.org/rfcdiff/rfcdiff.pyht#part-9"><em> page 15, =
line 25<span class=3D"hide"> =C2=B6</span></em></a></th><th> =
</th><th><small>skipping to change at</small><a =
href=3D"https://www6.ietf.org/rfcdiff/rfcdiff.pyht#part-9"><em> page 15, =
line 25<span class=3D"hide"> =C2=B6</span></em></a></th><td></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   receiver then =
the receiver SHOULD NOT enable use of AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   receiver then the receiver SHOULD NOT enable use of =
AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   (either by not =
responding with the USE_AGGFRAG notification, or in</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   (either by not responding with the USE_AGGFRAG =
notification, or in</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   the case of =
the initiator, by deleting the child SA if the now</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   the case of the initiator, by deleting the child SA =
if the now</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   established =
non-AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD using SA is unacceptable).</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   established non-AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD using SA is =
unacceptable).</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   The =
notification type and payload flag values are defined in</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   The notification type and payload flag =
values are defined in</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   Section =
6.1.4.</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">   Section 6.1.4.</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">6.  Packet and =
Data Formats</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">6.  Packet and Data =
Formats</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr id=3D"diff0039"><td></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock">   The packet =
and data formats defined below are generic <span class=3D"delete">with =
the intent</span></td><td> </td><td class=3D"rblock">   The packet and =
data formats defined below are generic <span class=3D"insert">and =
not</span></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock"><span =
class=3D"delete">   of allowing</span> for <span =
class=3D"delete">non-IP-TFS uses, but such uses are outside</span> the =
<span class=3D"delete">scope</span></td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"rblock"><span class=3D"insert">   specific</span> for <span =
class=3D"insert">IP-TFS use, although IP-TFS is =
considered</span></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock"><span =
class=3D"delete">   of this document.</span></td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"rblock"><span class=3D"insert">   as</span> the <span =
class=3D"insert">primary application for AGGFRAG mode.</span></td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">6.1.  =
AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD Payload</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">6.1.  =
AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD Payload</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   ESP Next =
Header value: 0x5</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">   ESP Next Header =
value: 0x5</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr id=3D"diff0040"><td></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock">   An <span =
class=3D"delete">IP-TFS</span> payload is identified by the ESP Next =
Header <span class=3D"delete">value</span></td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"rblock">   An <span class=3D"insert">AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD</span> =
payload is identified by the ESP Next Header value</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock"><span =
class=3D"delete">   AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD which has the</span> value 0x5.  The =
value 5 was chosen to</td><td> </td><td class=3D"rblock">   0x5.  The =
value 5 was chosen to</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   not conflict =
with other used values.  The first octet of this payload</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   not conflict with other used values.  The =
first octet of this payload</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   indicates the =
format of the remaining payload data.</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right"> =
  indicates the format of the remaining payload data.</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">     0 1 2 3 4 5 =
6 7</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">    =
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">    =
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">    |   Sub-type  =
  | ...</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">    |   Sub-type    | =
...</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">    =
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">    =
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   =
Sub-type:</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">   Sub-type:</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">      An 8-bit =
value indicating the payload format.</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">  =
    An 8-bit value indicating the payload format.</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr id=3D"part-10" class=3D"change"><td></td><th><small>skipping =
to change at</small><a =
href=3D"https://www6.ietf.org/rfcdiff/rfcdiff.pyht#part-10"><em> page =
21, line 47<span class=3D"hide"> =C2=B6</span></em></a></th><th> =
</th><th><small>skipping to change at</small><a =
href=3D"https://www6.ietf.org/rfcdiff/rfcdiff.pyht#part-10"><em> page =
21, line 47<span class=3D"hide"> =
=C2=B6</span></em></a></th><td></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">      =
TBD2</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">      TBD2</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   Name:</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   Name:</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">      =
USE_AGGFRAG</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">      USE_AGGFRAG</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   =
Reference:</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">   Reference:</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">      This =
document</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">      This document</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">8.  Security =
Considerations</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">8.  Security =
Considerations</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr id=3D"diff0041"><td></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock">   This =
document describes a<span class=3D"delete"> mechanism to add TFC to IP =
traffic</span>.  Use of</td><td> </td><td class=3D"rblock">   This =
document describes a<span class=3D"insert">n Aggregation and =
Fragmentation mechanism and its use to add TFC to IP traffic =
(IP-TFS)</span>.  Use of</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   this mechanism =
is expected to increase the security of the traffic</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   this mechanism is expected to increase the security =
of the traffic</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   being =
transported.  Other than the additional security afforded by</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   being transported.  Other than the =
additional security afforded by</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   using this =
mechanism, IP-TFS utilizes the security protocols</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   using this mechanism, IP-TFS utilizes the security =
protocols</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   [RFC4303] and =
[RFC7296] and so their security considerations apply to</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   [RFC4303] and [RFC7296] and so their =
security considerations apply to</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   IP-TFS as =
well.</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">   IP-TFS as well.</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   As noted in =
(Section 3.1) the ECN bits are not protected by IPsec and</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   As noted in (Section 3.1) the ECN bits are =
not protected by IPsec and</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   thus may =
constitute a covert channel.  For this reason, ECN use</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   thus may constitute a covert channel.  For this =
reason, ECN use</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr id=3D"diff0042"><td></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock">   SHOULD NOT =
be enabled by default.</td><td> </td><td class=3D"rblock">   SHOULD NOT =
be enabled by default<span class=3D"insert"> for AGGFRAG =
tunnels</span>.</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   As noted =
previously in Section 2.4.2, for TFC to be fully maintained</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   As noted previously in Section 2.4.2, for =
TFC to be fully maintained</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   the =
encapsulated traffic flow should not be affecting network</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   the encapsulated traffic flow should not be =
affecting network</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   congestion in =
a predictable way, and if it would be then non-</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   congestion in a predictable way, and if it would be =
then non-</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   congestion =
controlled mode use should be considered instead.</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   congestion controlled mode use should be considered =
instead.</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">9.  =
References</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">9.  References</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">9.1.  Normative =
References</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">9.1.  Normative =
References</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr id=3D"part-11" class=3D"change"><td></td><th><small>skipping =
to change at</small><a =
href=3D"https://www6.ietf.org/rfcdiff/rfcdiff.pyht#part-11"><em> page =
24, line 50<span class=3D"hide"> =C2=B6</span></em></a></th><th> =
</th><th><small>skipping to change at</small><a =
href=3D"https://www6.ietf.org/rfcdiff/rfcdiff.pyht#part-11"><em> page =
24, line 50<span class=3D"hide"> =
=C2=B6</span></em></a></th><td></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">     Offset: 0    =
    Offset: 100    Offset: 2900    Offset: 1400</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">     Offset: 0        Offset: 100    Offset: 2900    =
Offset: 1400</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">    [ ESP1  =
(1500) ][ ESP2  (1500) ][ ESP3  (1500) ][ ESP4  (1500) ]</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">    [ ESP1  (1500) ][ ESP2  (1500) ][ ESP3  =
(1500) ][ ESP4  (1500) ]</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">    =
[--800--][--800--][60][-240-][--4000----------------------][pad]</td><td>=
 </td><td class=3D"right">    =
[--800--][--800--][60][-240-][--4000----------------------][pad]</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">                  =
 Figure 3: Inner and Outer Packet Flow</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">                   Figure 3: Inner and Outer Packet =
Flow</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   The =
encapsulated IP packet flow (lengths include IP header and</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   The encapsulated IP packet flow (lengths =
include IP header and</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   payload) is as =
follows: an 800 octet packet, an 800 octet packet, a</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   payload) is as follows: an 800 octet packet, an 800 =
octet packet, a</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   60 octet =
packet, a 240 octet packet, a 4000 octet packet.</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   60 octet packet, a 240 octet packet, a 4000 octet =
packet.</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr id=3D"diff0043"><td></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock">   The =
"BlockOffset" values in the 4 <span class=3D"delete">IP-TFS</span> =
payload headers for this</td><td> </td><td class=3D"rblock">   The =
"BlockOffset" values in the 4 <span class=3D"insert">AGGFRAG</span> =
payload headers for this</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   packet flow =
would thus be: 0, 100, 2900, 1400 respectively.  The</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   packet flow would thus be: 0, 100, 2900, 1400 =
respectively.  The</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   first =
encapsulating packet ESP1 has a zero "BlockOffset" which points</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   first encapsulating packet ESP1 has a zero =
"BlockOffset" which points</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr id=3D"diff0044"><td></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock">   at the IP =
data block immediately following the <span =
class=3D"delete">IP-TFS</span> header.  The</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"rblock">   at the IP data block immediately following the <span =
class=3D"insert">AGGFRAG</span> header.  The</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   following =
packet ESP2s "BlockOffset" points inward 100 octets to the</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   following packet ESP2s "BlockOffset" points =
inward 100 octets to the</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   start of the =
60 octet data block.  The third encapsulating packet</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   start of the 60 octet data block.  The third =
encapsulating packet</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   ESP3 contains =
the middle portion of the 4000 octet data block so the</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   ESP3 contains the middle portion of the 4000 octet =
data block so the</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   offset points =
past its end and into the forth encapsulating packet.</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   offset points past its end and into the forth =
encapsulating packet.</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   The fourth =
packet ESP4s offset is 1400 pointing at the padding which</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   The fourth packet ESP4s offset is 1400 =
pointing at the padding which</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   follows the =
completion of the continued 4000 octet packet.</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   follows the completion of the continued 4000 octet =
packet.</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">Appendix B.  A =
Send and Loss Event Rate Calculation</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">Appendix B.  A Send and Loss Event Rate =
Calculation</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   The current =
best practice indicates that congestion control SHOULD be</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   The current best practice indicates that =
congestion control SHOULD be</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr id=3D"part-12" class=3D"change"><td></td><th><small>skipping =
to change at</small><a =
href=3D"https://www6.ietf.org/rfcdiff/rfcdiff.pyht#part-12"><em> page =
25, line 49<span class=3D"hide"> =C2=B6</span></em></a></th><th> =
</th><th><small>skipping to change at</small><a =
href=3D"https://www6.ietf.org/rfcdiff/rfcdiff.pyht#part-12"><em> page =
25, line 49<span class=3D"hide"> =
=C2=B6</span></em></a></th><td></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   The IP-TFS =
sender now has both the "R" and "p" values and can</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   The IP-TFS sender now has both the "R" and "p" values =
and can</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   calculate the =
correct sending rate.  If following [RFC5348] the</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   calculate the correct sending rate.  If following =
[RFC5348] the</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   sender should =
also use the slow start mechanism described therein</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   sender should also use the slow start mechanism =
described therein</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   when the =
IP-TFS SA is first established.</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">   =
when the IP-TFS SA is first established.</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">Appendix C.  =
Comparisons of IP-TFS</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">Appendix C.  =
Comparisons of IP-TFS</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">C.1.  Comparing =
Overhead</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">C.1.  Comparing =
Overhead</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr id=3D"diff0045"><td></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock">   For =
comparing overhead the overhead of ESP for both normal and <span =
class=3D"delete">IP-TFS</span></td><td> </td><td class=3D"rblock">   For =
comparing overhead the overhead of ESP for both normal and <span =
class=3D"insert">AGGFRAG</span></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   tunnel packets =
must be calculated, and so an algorithm for encryption</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   tunnel packets must be calculated, and so an =
algorithm for encryption</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   and =
authentication must be chosen.  For the data below AES-GCM-256</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   and authentication must be chosen.  For the =
data below AES-GCM-256</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   was selected.  =
This leads to an IP+ESP overhead of 54.</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   was selected.  This leads to an IP+ESP overhead of =
54.</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">     54 =3D 20 =
(IP) + 8 (ESPH) + 2 (ESPF) + 8 (IV) + 16 (ICV)</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">     54 =3D 20 (IP) + 8 (ESPH) + 2 (ESPF) + 8 (IV) + 16 =
(ICV)</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   Additionally, =
for IP-TFS, non-congestion control AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   Additionally, for IP-TFS, non-congestion control =
AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   headers were =
chosen which adds 4 octets for a total overhead of 58.</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   headers were chosen which adds 4 octets for a total =
overhead of 58.</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">C.1.1.  IP-TFS =
Overhead</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">C.1.1.  IP-TFS =
Overhead</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr id=3D"diff0046"><td></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock">   For =
comparison the overhead of <span class=3D"delete">IP-TFS</span> is 58 =
octets per outer packet.</td><td> </td><td class=3D"rblock">   For =
comparison the overhead of <span class=3D"insert">AGGFRAG payload</span> =
is 58 octets per outer packet.</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   Therefore the =
octet overhead per inner packet is 58 divided by the</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   Therefore the octet overhead per inner packet is 58 =
divided by the</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   number of =
outer packets required (fractional allowed).  The overhead</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   number of outer packets required (fractional =
allowed).  The overhead</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   as a =
percentage of inner packet size is a constant based on the =
Outer</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">   as a percentage of inner =
packet size is a constant based on the Outer</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   MTU =
size.</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">   MTU size.</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">      OH =3D 58 / =
Outer Payload Size / Inner Packet Size</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">      OH =3D 58 / Outer Payload Size / Inner Packet =
Size</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">      OH % of =
Inner Packet Size =3D 100 * OH / Inner Packet Size</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">      OH % of Inner Packet Size =3D 100 * OH / Inner =
Packet Size</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">      OH % of =
Inner Packet Size =3D 5800 / Outer Payload Size</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">      OH % of Inner Packet Size =3D 5800 / Outer Payload =
Size</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">                  =
      Type  IP-TFS  IP-TFS  IP-TFS</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">    =
                    Type  IP-TFS  IP-TFS  IP-TFS</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr id=3D"part-13" class=3D"change"><td></td><th><small>skipping =
to change at</small><a =
href=3D"https://www6.ietf.org/rfcdiff/rfcdiff.pyht#part-13"><em> page =
29, line 37<span class=3D"hide"> =C2=B6</span></em></a></th><th> =
</th><th><small>skipping to change at</small><a =
href=3D"https://www6.ietf.org/rfcdiff/rfcdiff.pyht#part-13"><em> page =
29, line 37<span class=3D"hide"> =
=C2=B6</span></em></a></th><td></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">    256  41.69%  =
16.64%   2.83%  84.36%  93.76%  98.94%  87.07%  77.58%</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">    256  41.69%  16.64%   2.83%  84.36%  93.76%  98.94%  =
87.07%  77.58%</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">    518  84.36%  =
33.68%   5.73%  84.36%  93.76%  98.94%  93.17%  87.50%</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">    518  84.36%  33.68%   5.73%  84.36%  93.76%  98.94%  =
93.17%  87.50%</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">    576  46.91%  =
37.45%   6.37%  84.36%  93.76%  98.94%  93.81%  88.62%</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">    576  46.91%  37.45%   6.37%  84.36%  93.76%  98.94%  =
93.81%  88.62%</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   1442  78.28%  =
93.76%  15.95%  84.36%  93.76%  98.94%  97.43%  95.12%</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   1442  78.28%  93.76%  15.95%  84.36%  93.76%  98.94%  =
97.43%  95.12%</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   1500  81.43%  =
48.76%  16.60%  84.36%  93.76%  98.94%  97.53%  95.30%</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   1500  81.43%  48.76%  16.60%  84.36%  93.76%  98.94%  =
97.53%  95.30%</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   8942  80.91%  =
83.06%  98.94%  84.36%  93.76%  98.94%  99.58%  99.18%</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   8942  80.91%  83.06%  98.94%  84.36%  93.76%  98.94%  =
99.58%  99.18%</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   9000  81.43%  =
83.60%  49.79%  84.36%  93.76%  98.94%  99.58%  99.18%</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   9000  81.43%  83.60%  49.79%  84.36%  93.76%  98.94%  =
99.58%  99.18%</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">             =
Figure 9: Percentage of Bandwidth on 10G Ethernet</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">             Figure 9: Percentage of Bandwidth on 10G =
Ethernet</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr id=3D"diff0047"><td></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock">   A sometimes =
unexpected result of using <span class=3D"delete">IP-TFS (or any =
packet</span></td><td> </td><td class=3D"rblock">   A sometimes =
unexpected result of using <span class=3D"insert">AGGFRAG</span></td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"lblock"><span =
class=3D"delete">   aggregating tunnel)</span> is that, for small to =
medium sized packets, the</td><td> </td><td class=3D"rblock"><span =
class=3D"insert">   tunnel</span> is that, for small to medium sized =
packets, the</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   available =
bandwidth is actually greater than native Ethernet.  This</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   available bandwidth is actually greater than =
native Ethernet.  This</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   is due to the =
reduction in Ethernet framing overhead.  This increased</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   is due to the reduction in Ethernet framing =
overhead.  This increased</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   bandwidth is =
paid for with an increase in latency.  This latency is</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   bandwidth is paid for with an increase in latency.  =
This latency is</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   the time to =
send the unrelated octets in the outer tunnel frame.  The</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   the time to send the unrelated octets in the =
outer tunnel frame.  The</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   following =
table illustrates the latency for some common values on a</td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right">   following table illustrates the latency for =
some common values on a</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   10G Ethernet =
link.  The table also includes latency introduced by</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">   10G Ethernet link.  The table also includes latency =
introduced by</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">   padding if =
using ESP with padding.</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right">   padding if =
using ESP with padding.</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> =
</td><td class=3D"right"></td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">                  =
      ESP+Pad  ESP+Pad  IP-TFS   IP-TFS</td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right">                        ESP+Pad  ESP+Pad  IP-TFS   =
IP-TFS</td><td class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
      <tr><td class=3D"lineno"></td><td class=3D"left">                  =
      1500     9000     1500     9000</td><td> </td><td class=3D"right"> =
                       1500     9000     1500     9000</td><td =
class=3D"lineno"></td></tr>=0A=
=0A=
     <tr><td></td><td class=3D"left"></td><td> </td><td =
class=3D"right"></td><td></td></tr>=0A=
     <tr id=3D"end" bgcolor=3D"gray"><th colspan=3D"5" =
align=3D"center">&nbsp;End of changes. 47 change blocks.&nbsp;</th></tr>=0A=
     <tr class=3D"stats"><td></td><th><i>66 lines changed or =
deleted</i></th><th><i> </i></th><th><i>69 lines changed or =
added</i></th><td></td></tr>=0A=
     <tr><td colspan=3D"5" align=3D"center" class=3D"small"><br>This =
html diff was produced by rfcdiff 1.48. The latest version is available =
from <a =
href=3D"http://www.tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcdiff/">http://tools.ietf.org/t=
ools/rfcdiff/</a> </td></tr>=0A=
   </tbody></table>=0A=
   =0A=
   =0A=
</body></html>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] Proposed changes to draft-ietf-ipsecme-iptfs-07
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If there are no objections from the WG I will incorporate these changes =
with some edits (e.g., we refer to congestion control and non-congestion =
control as modes already so I'll need to change the way those are =
referred to, to avoid confusion with the new term "AGGFRAG mode").

Thanks,
Chris.

> On Mar 15, 2021, at 11:53 AM, Valery Smyslov <smyslov.ietf@gmail.com> =
wrote:
>=20
> Hi,
>=20
> as suggested by Tero at IETF110 I've prepared concrete proposal for =
the text changes in draft-ietf-ipsecme-iptfs-07.
> I tried to make minimal changes - mostly they consist of more accurate =
(as it looks to me) naming
> of things and more accurate separation of AGGFRAG and IP-TFS. No bits =
on the wire are affected.
> Document structure and section numbers are not changed. However, the =
name of the draft
> is changed as well as its abstract.
>=20
> The only technical change is in Section 2.2.3, where I suggest to =
change:
>=20
>   When using the AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD in conjunction with replay detection,
>   the window size for both MAY be reduced to share the smaller of the
>   two window sizes.
>=20
> to
>=20
>   When using the AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD in conjunction with replay detection,
>   the window size for both SHOULD be reduced to share the smaller of =
the
>   two window sizes.
>=20
> I suggested it before but it seemed to be lost in a long list of =
suggestions.
> The rational for this change: if reassembly window size is greater =
than
> replay protection window size, then not yet reassembled packets will =
never be reassembled,
> because needed fragments will never be received. So, having reassembly =
window longer
> than replay protection window is a waste of resources, thus SHOULD =
instead of MAY.
>=20
> Instead of long list of small suggested changes in the body of this =
message I've
> edited the .txt version of the draft and fed current and my versions =
to rfcdiff.
> The result is in attachment. Note that I didn't touch ToC.
>=20
> Regards,
> Valery.
>=20
>=20
> <Diff_ draft-ietf-ipsecme-iptfs-07.txt - =
draft-ietf-ipsecme-iptfs-07-svan.txt.html>________________________________=
_______________
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Date: Fri, 19 Mar 2021 15:36:33 -0400 (EDT)
From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
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Subject: [IPsec] rfc8229bis missing advise on error handling in IKE_INIT
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Hi,

We have implemented TCP but are running in some issues where the RFC and
the bis draft does not give us clarify.

If the IKE_INIT over TCP gets back an INVALID_KE, what is supposed to
happen? Is the responder expected to close the TCP session, since it
never created a state for this exchange? Is the initiator expected
to re-use the TCP connection to send a fresh new IKE_INIT request
with the proper KE ? This case is similar to the COOKIE case, but
there the initiator is expected to keep state and re-use, except
one is not supposed to trigger COOKIES on TCP.

Note I think this sentence is incorrect:

 	Moreover, a TCP Responder creates state once a SYN packet is received

libreswan listens on the TCP socket, but for INVALID_KE responses it
creates a response without creating a state.

Similarly, when IKE_AUTH fails with NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN or
AUTHENTICATION_FAILED, who is responsible for closing the TCP socket?
The initiator or the responder?

Perhaps a similar issue happens when an IKE lifetime is reached before
a rekey or re-auth happened. But in that case I guess the party sending
the delete can linger briefly for the reply and then close the socket
if it didn't get closed by the responder to the delete request.

Paul


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Subject: Re: [IPsec] rfc8229bis missing advise on error handling in IKE_INIT
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> On Mar 19, 2021, at 12:36 PM, Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> wrote:
>=20
>=20
> Hi,
>=20
> We have implemented TCP but are running in some issues where the RFC =
and
> the bis draft does not give us clarify.
>=20
> If the IKE_INIT over TCP gets back an INVALID_KE, what is supposed to
> happen? Is the responder expected to close the TCP session, since it
> never created a state for this exchange? Is the initiator expected
> to re-use the TCP connection to send a fresh new IKE_INIT request
> with the proper KE ? This case is similar to the COOKIE case, but
> there the initiator is expected to keep state and re-use, except
> one is not supposed to trigger COOKIES on TCP.

My interpretation here, and the way our client works, is that the =
connection may be reused.

=46rom 7296:

 If the
   initiator guesses wrong, the responder will respond with a Notify
   payload of type INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD indicating the selected group.  In
   this case, the initiator MUST retry the IKE_SA_INIT with the
   corrected Diffie-Hellman group.

This implies that the new IKE_SA_INIT is a retry of the same IKE SA. =
Indeed, at least for our client, we don=E2=80=99t reset the SA values.

If that is the interpretation of the retry after INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD, it =
doesn=E2=80=99t violate 8229:

   Multiple IKE SAs MUST NOT share a single TCP connection, unless one
   is a rekey of an existing IKE SA, in which case there will
   temporarily be two IKE SAs on the same TCP connection.

>=20
> Note I think this sentence is incorrect:
>=20
> 	Moreover, a TCP Responder creates state once a SYN packet is =
received
>=20
> libreswan listens on the TCP socket, but for INVALID_KE responses it
> creates a response without creating a state.

This sounds like a good clarification to make. We can say that it may =
create state at that point.
>=20
> Similarly, when IKE_AUTH fails with NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN or
> AUTHENTICATION_FAILED, who is responsible for closing the TCP socket?
> The initiator or the responder?

8229 says:

   In order to close an IKE session, either the Initiator or Responder
   SHOULD gracefully tear down IKE SAs with DELETE payloads.  Once the
   SA has been deleted, the TCP Originator SHOULD close the TCP
   connection if it does not intend to use the connection for another
   IKE session to the TCP Responder.  If the connection is left idle and
   the TCP Responder needs to clean up resources, the TCP Responder MAY
   close the TCP connection.

This generally means: client goes first when closing TCP, but server =
should close if the client doesn=E2=80=99t in time.

>=20
> Perhaps a similar issue happens when an IKE lifetime is reached before
> a rekey or re-auth happened. But in that case I guess the party =
sending
> the delete can linger briefly for the reply and then close the socket
> if it didn't get closed by the responder to the delete request.

Note also that a new TCP connection can always be used for an IKE SA =
from an old connection; that is allowed, so it=E2=80=99s possible that =
if the server closes too early, the client will reopen with a new =
connection to send remaining messages.

Thanks,
Tommy
>=20
> Paul
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> IPsec mailing list
> IPsec@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec


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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D""><br =
class=3D""><div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div =
class=3D"">On Mar 19, 2021, at 12:36 PM, Paul Wouters &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:paul@nohats.ca" class=3D"">paul@nohats.ca</a>&gt; =
wrote:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D""><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D"">Hi,<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">We have =
implemented TCP but are running in some issues where the RFC and<br =
class=3D"">the bis draft does not give us clarify.<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">If the IKE_INIT over TCP gets back an INVALID_KE, what is =
supposed to<br class=3D"">happen? Is the responder expected to close the =
TCP session, since it<br class=3D"">never created a state for this =
exchange? Is the initiator expected<br class=3D"">to re-use the TCP =
connection to send a fresh new IKE_INIT request<br class=3D"">with the =
proper KE ? This case is similar to the COOKIE case, but<br =
class=3D"">there the initiator is expected to keep state and re-use, =
except<br class=3D"">one is not supposed to trigger COOKIES on TCP.<br =
class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br class=3D""></div><div>My =
interpretation here, and the way our client works, is that the =
connection may be reused.</div><div><br class=3D""></div><div>=46rom =
7296:</div><div><br class=3D""></div><div><pre class=3D"newpage" =
style=3D"font-size: 13.333333015441895px; margin-top: 0px; =
margin-bottom: 0px; break-before: page; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); =
color: rgb(0, 0, 0);"> If the
   initiator guesses wrong, the responder will respond with a Notify
   payload of type INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD indicating the selected group.  In
   this case, the initiator MUST retry the IKE_SA_INIT with the
   corrected Diffie-Hellman group.</pre><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">This implies that the new IKE_SA_INIT =
is a retry of the same IKE SA. Indeed, at least for our client, we =
don=E2=80=99t reset the SA values.</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">If that is the interpretation of the =
retry after INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD, it doesn=E2=80=99t violate =
8229:</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><pre =
class=3D"newpage" style=3D"font-size: 13.333333015441895px; margin-top: =
0px; margin-bottom: 0px; break-before: page; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); =
color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">   Multiple IKE SAs MUST NOT share a single TCP =
connection, unless one
   is a rekey of an existing IKE SA, in which case there will
   temporarily be two IKE SAs on the same TCP =
connection.</pre></div></div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
class=3D""><div class=3D""><div class=3D""><br class=3D"">Note I think =
this sentence is incorrect:<br class=3D""><br class=3D""><span =
class=3D"Apple-tab-span" style=3D"white-space:pre">	</span>Moreover, =
a TCP Responder creates state once a SYN packet is received<br =
class=3D""><br class=3D"">libreswan listens on the TCP socket, but for =
INVALID_KE responses it<br class=3D"">creates a response without =
creating a state.<br class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div>This sounds like a good clarification to make. We can =
say that it may create state at that point.<br class=3D""><blockquote =
type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">Similarly, when IKE_AUTH fails with NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN or<br =
class=3D"">AUTHENTICATION_FAILED, who is responsible for closing the TCP =
socket?<br class=3D"">The initiator or the responder?<br =
class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br class=3D""></div>8229 =
says:<br class=3D""><div><br class=3D""></div><pre class=3D"newpage" =
style=3D"font-size: 13.333333015441895px; margin-top: 0px; =
margin-bottom: 0px; break-before: page; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); =
color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">   In order to close an IKE session, either the =
Initiator or Responder
   SHOULD gracefully tear down IKE SAs with DELETE payloads.  Once the
   SA has been deleted, the TCP Originator SHOULD close the TCP
   connection if it does not intend to use the connection for another
   IKE session to the TCP Responder.  If the connection is left idle and
   the TCP Responder needs to clean up resources, the TCP Responder MAY
   close the TCP connection.</pre><pre class=3D"newpage" =
style=3D"font-size: 13.333333015441895px; margin-top: 0px; =
margin-bottom: 0px; break-before: page; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); =
color: rgb(0, 0, 0);"><br class=3D""></pre><pre class=3D"newpage" =
style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; break-before: page;"><font =
color=3D"#000000" face=3D"Helvetica" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); white-space: normal;" class=3D"">This =
generally means: client goes first when closing TCP, but server should =
close if the client doesn=E2=80=99t in time.</span></font></pre><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div =
class=3D""><div class=3D""><br class=3D"">Perhaps a similar issue =
happens when an IKE lifetime is reached before<br class=3D"">a rekey or =
re-auth happened. But in that case I guess the party sending<br =
class=3D"">the delete can linger briefly for the reply and then close =
the socket<br class=3D"">if it didn't get closed by the responder to the =
delete request.<br class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div>Note also that a new TCP connection can always be used =
for an IKE SA from an old connection; that is allowed, so it=E2=80=99s =
possible that if the server closes too early, the client will reopen =
with a new connection to send remaining messages.</div><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div>Thanks,</div><div>Tommy<br class=3D""><blockquote =
type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">Paul<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">_______________________________________________<br =
class=3D"">IPsec mailing list<br class=3D""><a =
href=3D"mailto:IPsec@ietf.org" class=3D"">IPsec@ietf.org</a><br =
class=3D"">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec<br =
class=3D""></div></div></blockquote></div><br class=3D""></body></html>=

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From: "Valery Smyslov" <smyslov.ietf@gmail.com>
To: "'Tommy Pauly'" <tpauly=40apple.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, "'Paul Wouters'" <paul@nohats.ca>
Cc: <ipsec@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] rfc8229bis missing advise on error handling in IKE_INIT
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Hi,

=20

On Mar 19, 2021, at 12:36 PM, Paul Wouters < <mailto:paul@nohats.ca> =
paul@nohats.ca> wrote:

=20


Hi,

We have implemented TCP but are running in some issues where the RFC and
the bis draft does not give us clarify.

If the IKE_INIT over TCP gets back an INVALID_KE, what is supposed to
happen? Is the responder expected to close the TCP session, since it
never created a state for this exchange? Is the initiator expected
to re-use the TCP connection to send a fresh new IKE_INIT request
with the proper KE ? This case is similar to the COOKIE case, but
there the initiator is expected to keep state and re-use, except
one is not supposed to trigger COOKIES on TCP.

=20

My interpretation here, and the way our client works, is that the =
connection may be reused.

=20

>From 7296:

=20

 If the
   initiator guesses wrong, the responder will respond with a Notify
   payload of type INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD indicating the selected group.  In
   this case, the initiator MUST retry the IKE_SA_INIT with the
   corrected Diffie-Hellman group.

=20

This implies that the new IKE_SA_INIT is a retry of the same IKE SA. =
Indeed, at least for our client, we don=E2=80=99t reset the SA values.

=20

If that is the interpretation of the retry after INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD, it =
doesn=E2=80=99t violate 8229:

=20

   Multiple IKE SAs MUST NOT share a single TCP connection, unless one
   is a rekey of an existing IKE SA, in which case there will
   temporarily be two IKE SAs on the same TCP connection.


          My interpretation is: the responder MAY close TCP connection =
if it doesn't create

          state. In this case the initiator will have to re-create TCP =
connection.=20

          On the other hand, as Tommy pointed out, according to RFC 7296 =
the responder

          may keep state in this situation, in which case it won't close

          TCP connection.

         =20
Note I think this sentence is incorrect:

            Moreover, a TCP Responder creates state once a SYN packet is =
received

libreswan listens on the TCP socket, but for INVALID_KE responses it
creates a response without creating a state.

=20

This sounds like a good clarification to make. We can say that it may =
create state at that point.



          Well, it was meant that TCP itself is a stateful protocol, so =
if=20

          the responder receives SYN packet it does create some (TCP) =
state,

          which violates stateless nature of cookie. So, even if IKE =
remains

          stateless, TCP doesn't, and thus it is susceptible to DoS =
attacks.

=20

          I think some clarifications need to be done.


Similarly, when IKE_AUTH fails with NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN or
AUTHENTICATION_FAILED, who is responsible for closing the TCP socket?
The initiator or the responder?

=20

8229 says:

=20

   In order to close an IKE session, either the Initiator or Responder
   SHOULD gracefully tear down IKE SAs with DELETE payloads.  Once the
   SA has been deleted, the TCP Originator SHOULD close the TCP
   connection if it does not intend to use the connection for another
   IKE session to the TCP Responder.  If the connection is left idle and
   the TCP Responder needs to clean up resources, the TCP Responder MAY
   close the TCP connection.
=20
This generally means: client goes first when closing TCP, but server =
should close if the client doesn=E2=80=99t in time.

=20

          I concur.


Perhaps a similar issue happens when an IKE lifetime is reached before
a rekey or re-auth happened. But in that case I guess the party sending
the delete can linger briefly for the reply and then close the socket
if it didn't get closed by the responder to the delete request.

=20

Note also that a new TCP connection can always be used for an IKE SA =
from an old connection; that is allowed, so it=E2=80=99s possible that =
if the server closes too early, the client will reopen with a new =
connection to send remaining messages.

=20

          Exactly.

=20

          Regards,

          Valery.

=20

Thanks,

Tommy




Paul

_______________________________________________
IPsec mailing list
IPsec@ietf.org <mailto:IPsec@ietf.org>=20
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec

=20


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</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=3DRU link=3Dblue =
vlink=3Dpurple style=3D'word-wrap:break-word'><div =
class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:14.0pt'>Hi,<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:14.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><div =
style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0cm 0cm 0cm =
4.0pt'><div><blockquote =
style=3D'margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt'><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>On Mar 19, 2021, at 12:36 PM, Paul =
Wouters &lt;</span><a href=3D"mailto:paul@nohats.ca"><span =
lang=3DEN-US>paul@nohats.ca</span></a><span lang=3DEN-US>&gt; =
wrote:<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
lang=3DEN-US><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US><br></span>Hi,<br><br>We have =
implemented TCP but are running in some issues where the RFC and<br>the =
bis draft does not give us clarify.<br><br>If the IKE_INIT over TCP gets =
back an INVALID_KE, what is supposed to<br>happen? Is the responder =
expected to close the TCP session, since it<br>never created a state for =
this exchange? Is the initiator expected<br>to re-use the TCP connection =
to send a fresh new IKE_INIT request<br>with the proper KE ? This case =
is similar to the COOKIE case, but<br>there the initiator is expected to =
keep state and re-use, except<br>one is not supposed to trigger COOKIES =
on TCP.<o:p></o:p></p></div></div></blockquote><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>My interpretation here, and the way our client works, =
is that the connection may be reused.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>From 7296:<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><pre =
style=3D'break-before: page;caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0)'><span =
style=3D'color:black'> If the<o:p></o:p></span></pre><pre><span =
style=3D'color:black'>=C2=A0=C2=A0 initiator guesses wrong, the =
responder will respond with a Notify<o:p></o:p></span></pre><pre><span =
style=3D'color:black'>=C2=A0=C2=A0 payload of type INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD =
indicating the selected group.=C2=A0 =
In<o:p></o:p></span></pre><pre><span style=3D'color:black'>=C2=A0=C2=A0 =
this case, the initiator MUST retry the IKE_SA_INIT with =
the<o:p></o:p></span></pre><pre><span style=3D'color:black'>=C2=A0=C2=A0 =
corrected Diffie-Hellman group.<o:p></o:p></span></pre><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>This implies that the new IKE_SA_INIT is a retry of =
the same IKE SA. Indeed, at least for our client, we don=E2=80=99t reset =
the SA values.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>If that is the interpretation of the retry after =
INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD, it doesn=E2=80=99t violate =
8229:<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><pre =
style=3D'break-before: page;caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0)'><span =
style=3D'color:black'>=C2=A0=C2=A0 Multiple IKE SAs MUST NOT share a =
single TCP connection, unless one<o:p></o:p></span></pre><pre><span =
style=3D'color:black'>=C2=A0=C2=A0 is a rekey of an existing IKE SA, in =
which case there will<o:p></o:p></span></pre><pre><span =
style=3D'color:black'>=C2=A0=C2=A0 temporarily be two IKE SAs on the =
same TCP connection.<o:p></o:p></span></pre></div></div><p =
class=3DMsoPlainText><br>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0 <span lang=3DEN-US>My interpretation is: the responder MAY close =
TCP connection if it doesn't create<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
lang=3DEN-US>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =
state. In this case the initiator will have to re-create TCP connection. =
<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
lang=3DEN-US>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 On =
the other hand, as Tommy pointed out, according to RFC 7296 the =
responder<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
lang=3DEN-US>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 may =
keep state in this situation, in which case it won't =
close<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
lang=3DEN-US>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 TCP =
connection.<o:p></o:p></span></p><blockquote =
style=3D'margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt'><div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:14.0pt'>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0 </span><span lang=3DEN-US><br>Note I think this sentence is =
incorrect:<br><br><span =
class=3Dapple-tab-span>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 </span>Moreover, a TCP Responder creates state once a =
SYN packet is received<br><br>libreswan listens on the TCP socket, but =
for INVALID_KE responses it<br>creates a response without creating a =
state.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div></blockquote><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
lang=3DEN-US><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><p class=3DMsoNormal>This =
sounds like a good clarification to make. We can say that it may create =
state at that point.<br><br><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:14.0pt'>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0 </span><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:14.0pt'>Well, it was =
meant that TCP itself is a stateful protocol, so if =
<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:14.0pt'>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0 the responder receives SYN packet it does create some (TCP) =
state,<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:14.0pt'>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0 which violates stateless nature of cookie. So, even if IKE =
remains<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:14.0pt'>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0 stateless, TCP doesn't, and thus it is susceptible to DoS =
attacks.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:14.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:14.0pt'>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0 I think some clarifications need to be =
done.<o:p></o:p></span></p><blockquote =
style=3D'margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt'><div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US><br>Similarly, when IKE_AUTH fails =
with NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN or<br>AUTHENTICATION_FAILED, who is responsible =
for closing the TCP socket?<br></span>The initiator or the =
responder?<o:p></o:p></p></div></div></blockquote><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><p class=3DMsoNormal>8229 =
says:<o:p></o:p></p><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><pre style=3D'break-before: =
page;caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0)'><span style=3D'color:black'>=C2=A0=C2=A0 =
In order to close an IKE session, either the Initiator or =
Responder<o:p></o:p></span></pre><pre><span =
style=3D'color:black'>=C2=A0=C2=A0 SHOULD gracefully tear down IKE SAs =
with DELETE payloads.=C2=A0 Once the<o:p></o:p></span></pre><pre><span =
style=3D'color:black'>=C2=A0=C2=A0 SA has been deleted, the TCP =
Originator SHOULD close the TCP<o:p></o:p></span></pre><pre><span =
style=3D'color:black'>=C2=A0=C2=A0 connection if it does not intend to =
use the connection for another<o:p></o:p></span></pre><pre><span =
style=3D'color:black'>=C2=A0=C2=A0 IKE session to the TCP =
Responder.=C2=A0 If the connection is left idle =
and<o:p></o:p></span></pre><pre><span style=3D'color:black'>=C2=A0=C2=A0 =
the TCP Responder needs to clean up resources, the TCP Responder =
MAY<o:p></o:p></span></pre><pre><span style=3D'color:black'>=C2=A0=C2=A0 =
close the TCP connection.<o:p></o:p></span></pre><pre =
style=3D'break-before: page;caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0)'><span =
style=3D'color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></pre><pre =
style=3D'break-before: page'><span =
style=3D'font-family:"Helvetica",sans-serif;color:black'>This generally =
means: client goes first when closing TCP, but server should close if =
the client doesn=E2=80=99t in time.</span><o:p></o:p></pre><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:14.0pt'>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0 </span><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:14.0pt'>I =
concur.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><blockquote =
style=3D'margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt'><div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US><br></span>Perhaps a similar issue =
happens when an IKE lifetime is reached before<br>a rekey or re-auth =
happened. But in that case I guess the party sending<br>the delete can =
linger briefly for the reply and then close the socket<br>if it didn't =
get closed by the responder to the delete =
request.<o:p></o:p></p></div></div></blockquote><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><p class=3DMsoNormal>Note =
also that a new TCP connection can always be used for an IKE SA from an =
old connection; that is allowed, so it=E2=80=99s possible that if the =
server closes too early, the client will reopen with a new connection to =
send remaining messages.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:14.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:14.0pt'>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0 </span><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:14.0pt'>Exactly.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:14.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:14.0pt'>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0 Regards,<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:14.0pt'>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0 Valery.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>Thanks,<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>Tommy<br><br><o:p></o:p></p><blockquote =
style=3D'margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt'><div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><br>Paul<br><br>_______________________________________=
________<br>IPsec mailing list<br><a =
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From: Daniel Migault <mglt.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 21 Mar 2021 22:57:39 -0400
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] [Lwip] draft-ietf-lwig-minimal-esp shepherd writeup
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Hi Mohit,

Thanks for the review. Please find inline my responses. I have included
your comments as well as additional nits in [1]. As soon as we believe the
version addresses your concerns a new version will be  published.

Yours,
Daniel

[1]
https://github.com/mglt/draft-mglt-lwig-minimal-esp/commit/47f1351b1928ba687af18e75e253e98720448e8e

On Sat, Mar 20, 2021 at 5:12 AM Mohit Sethi M <mohit.m.sethi=
40ericsson.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:

> I am now preparing the shepherd writeup for draft-ietf-lwig-minimal-esp.
> I wanted to clarify and double check a few things:
>
> - If the SPI is not random and is chosen by some application specific
> method -> it can reveal the application using ESP.
>
<mglt>
It is correct that the use of non random SPI may have some privacy impacts
and one of these impacts is that in some cases, a SPI may be used to track
an application. Note that our intention was to make it clear that when SPI
are non randomly generated, there are some privacy implications to consider
as well as that randomly generated SPI is preferred.

In general an application rarely selects the SPI value to be used. Instead,
the system is rather in charge of applying the security policies and
selects the SPI according to its implementation. Suppose a system is
running X applications and uses Y > X SPI that are not randomly generated
out of the 2**32 possible values. The X applications may be tunneled over
one security association. In that case, the traffic of a specific
application X0 will not be identified from the traffic of the other
applications. So in order to identify one application with an SPI value,
the security association needs to be set for that application specifically.
This may happen in some cases where the device is only running one
application and with a very limited number of SPI. In that case, the
distribution of SPI may have some values that are over-represented.

Note that the draft defined one (common way) to generate the SPI value that
is using a random generator to generate this SPI value. All other means
fall into the category of using deterministic functions. This does not
necessarily mean that a fix of predefined SPI will necessarily be used.
This includes for example the fact that only 2**16 or 2**24 values may be
candidates. The case where one device has a very limited number of SPI is
quite extreme. In any case, it should be estimated how much the SPI leaks
more information than the IP destination and the use of IPsec as well as
the pattern associated with the traffic.
Typically a destination to www.mytemperature.com every 5 minutes with a
fixed size is likely to reveal the presence of a temperature sensor,
independently of the SPI value.

As a conclusion, I am inclined to say, there are some cases when using
nonrandomly generated  SPI over 32 bytes may reveal the presence of a given
application. However, when this occurs, other conditions need to be met. It
seems to me the document mentions clearly that privacy implication needs to
be considered when these alternative methods are considered. If there is
anything that appears not to be clear, I am happy to clarify it.
</mglt>

>
> - I assume a resource-constrained device would not have many inbound
> connections. Would it make sense to generate a byte of randomness
> instead of entire 32-bit SPI? At least some APIs allow asking for a byte
> of randomness (randomByte()). This is assuming an upper limit on the
> number of inbound connections.
>

<mglt>
The text opposes the 32 bit random SPI versus other ways to generate the
SPI. The alternative you propose falls into that category. It seems to me
that the confusion may come from discussions where we discussed the use of
a fixed small number of SPIs. This specific case has been generalized to
any subset of the 2**32 possible SPIs. I mention the text below from the
current draft that I think should address your concern, but I am fine
making it clearer.

"""
However, for some constrained nodes, generating and handling 32 bit random
SPI may
consume too much resource, in which case SPI can be generated using
predictable functions or end up in a using a subset of the possible values
for SPI.
In fact, the SPI does not necessarily need to be randomly generated.
A node provisioned with keys by a third party - e.g. that does not generate
them - and that uses a transform that does not need random data may not
have such random generators.
However, non random SPI and restricting their possible values MAY lead to
privacy and
security concerns.
As a result, this alternative should be considered
for devices that would be strongly impacted by the generation of a
random SPI and after understanding the privacy and security impact of
generating non random SPI.
"""
</mglt>

>
> - When sequence numbers are time -> won't it reveal the time at which
> the packet was sent.
>
> <mglt>
First the use of time is primarily driven to have a always increasing
function, more than the value of the time itself. This could be used with a
clock that is 2 years back in the past or in the future. It is correct that
a few packet analysis may reveal how synchronized the clock of the device
is.
Regarding the time the packet has been sent, it seems to me this is
relatively close to the time the  time is captured, but maybe I am missing
how this could be used or any specific cases where delay tolerant networks
are involved. So I am inclined to say that yes this may leak some
information, but this information may already be leaked.

</mglt>

> - Are we comfortable with the recommendation: 'A node MAY drop
> anti-replay protection provided by IPsec, and instead implement its own
> internal mechanism.'? What might this internal mechanism look like?
>
> <mglt>
Enabling anti reply protection is no mandatory, so that is the default.
RFC4303 mentions:

"""
The field is mandatory and MUST always be present even if the receiver does
not elect to enable the anti-replay service for a specific SA.
"""

Some mechanisms that come to my mind are implementations that receive
packets in a very deterministic manner. Note that the document recommends
to enable anti-replay.
</mglt>

> A few typos:
>
> -----
>
> Section 3:
>
> Please expand SAD on first usage.
>
<mglt>
fixed. Thanks for raising that issue.
</mglt>

>
> Section 4:
>
> Typo: In a constrainted environment -> In a constrained environment
>
> <mglt>
fixed. I also check there are no other occurrence and it seemed that was
the only occurrence.
</mglt>

I looked at old RFCs and they seem to use both crypto-suite and
> cryptosuite. I have a preference for the later. Perhaps we can remove
> the hyphen.
>
> <mglt>
I have removed the occurrences I found of crypt-suite and replaced them by
cryptosuite.
</mglt>

> -----
>
> --Mohit
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Lwip mailing list
> Lwip@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/lwip
>


-- 
Daniel Migault
Ericsson

--0000000000003bae6805be173b5b
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Hi Mohit,=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>Thanks for t=
he review. Please find inline my responses. I have included your comments a=
s well as additional nits in [1]. As soon as we believe the version address=
es your concerns a new version will be=C2=A0 published.=C2=A0=C2=A0</div><d=
iv><br></div><div>Yours,=C2=A0<br>Daniel</div><div><br></div>[1]=C2=A0<a hr=
ef=3D"https://github.com/mglt/draft-mglt-lwig-minimal-esp/commit/47f1351b19=
28ba687af18e75e253e98720448e8e">https://github.com/mglt/draft-mglt-lwig-min=
imal-esp/commit/47f1351b1928ba687af18e75e253e98720448e8e</a><div><br><div c=
lass=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Sat, Mar 20, =
2021 at 5:12 AM Mohit Sethi M &lt;mohit.m.sethi=3D<a href=3D"mailto:40erics=
son.com@dmarc.ietf.org">40ericsson.com@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></d=
iv><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;bord=
er-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">I am now preparing the=
 shepherd writeup for draft-ietf-lwig-minimal-esp. <br>
I wanted to clarify and double check a few things:<br>
<br>
- If the SPI is not random and is chosen by some application specific <br>
method -&gt; it can reveal the application using ESP.<br></blockquote><div>=
&lt;mglt&gt;</div><div>It is correct that the use of non random SPI may hav=
e some privacy impacts and one of these impacts=C2=A0is that in some cases,=
 a SPI may=C2=A0be used to=C2=A0track an application. Note that our intenti=
on was to make it clear that when SPI are non randomly generated, there are=
 some privacy implications to consider as well as that randomly generated S=
PI is preferred.=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>In general an application r=
arely selects the SPI value to be used. Instead, the system is rather in ch=
arge of applying the security policies and selects the SPI according to its=
 implementation. Suppose a system is running X applications and uses Y &gt;=
 X SPI that are not randomly generated out of the 2**32 possible values. Th=
e X applications may be tunneled over one security association. In that cas=
e, the traffic of a specific application X0 will not be identified from the=
 traffic of the other applications. So in order to identify one application=
 with an SPI value, the security association needs to be set for that appli=
cation specifically. This may happen in some cases where the device is only=
 running one application and with a very limited number of SPI. In that cas=
e, the distribution of SPI may have some values that are over-represented.=
=C2=A0=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>Note that the draft defined one (comm=
on way) to generate the SPI value that is using a random generator to=C2=A0=
generate this SPI value. All other means fall into the category of using de=
terministic functions. This does not necessarily mean that a fix of predefi=
ned SPI will necessarily be used. This includes for example the fact that o=
nly 2**16 or 2**24 values may be candidates. The case where one device has =
a very limited number of SPI is quite extreme. In any=C2=A0case, it should =
be estimated how much the SPI leaks more information than the IP destinatio=
n and the use of IPsec as well as the pattern associated with the traffic.=
=C2=A0</div><div>Typically a destination to <a href=3D"http://www.mytempera=
ture.com">www.mytemperature.com</a> every 5 minutes with a fixed size is li=
kely to reveal the presence of a temperature sensor, independently of the S=
PI value.=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>As a conclusion, I am inclined to =
say, there are some cases when using nonrandomly=C2=A0generated=C2=A0 SPI o=
ver 32 bytes may reveal the presence of a given application. However, when =
this occurs, other conditions need=C2=A0to be met. It seems to me the docum=
ent mentions clearly that privacy implication needs to be considered when t=
hese alternative=C2=A0methods are considered. If there is anything that app=
ears not to be clear, I am happy to clarify it.=C2=A0</div><div>&lt;/mglt&g=
t;=C2=A0<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px=
 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
- I assume a resource-constrained device would not have many inbound <br>
connections. Would it make sense to generate a byte of randomness <br>
instead of entire 32-bit SPI? At least some APIs allow asking for a byte <b=
r>
of randomness (randomByte()). This is assuming an upper limit on the <br>
number of inbound connections.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>&lt;mglt=
&gt;</div><div>The text opposes the 32 bit random SPI versus other ways to =
generate the SPI. The alternative you propose falls into that category. It =
seems to me that the confusion may come from discussions where we discussed=
 the use of a fixed small number of SPIs. This specific case has been gener=
alized to any subset of the 2**32 possible SPIs. I mention the text below f=
rom the current draft that I think should address your concern, but I am fi=
ne making it clearer.=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>&quot;&quot;&quot;</di=
v><div>However, for some constrained nodes, generating and handling 32 bit =
random SPI may<br>consume too much resource, in which case SPI can be gener=
ated using<br>predictable functions or end up in a using a subset of the po=
ssible values for SPI.<br>In fact, the SPI does not necessarily need to be =
randomly generated.<br>A node provisioned with keys by a third party - e.g.=
 that does not generate them - and that uses a transform that does not need=
 random data may not have such random generators.<br>However, non random SP=
I and restricting their possible values MAY lead to privacy and<br>security=
 concerns.<br>As a result, this alternative should be considered<br>for dev=
ices that would be strongly impacted by the generation of a<br>random SPI a=
nd after understanding the privacy and security impact of<br>generating non=
 random SPI.<br></div><div>&quot;&quot;&quot;</div><div>&lt;/mglt&gt;=C2=A0=
</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;b=
order-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
- When sequence numbers are time -&gt; won&#39;t it reveal the time at whic=
h <br>
the packet was sent.<br>
<br></blockquote><div>&lt;mglt&gt;</div><div>First the use of time is prima=
rily driven to have a always increasing function, more than the value of th=
e time itself. This could be used with a clock that is 2 years back in the =
past or in the future. It is correct that a few packet analysis may=C2=A0re=
veal how synchronized the clock of the device is.</div><div>Regarding the t=
ime the packet has been sent, it seems to me this is relatively close to th=
e time the=C2=A0 time is captured, but maybe I am missing how this could be=
 used or any specific cases where delay tolerant networks are involved. So =
I am inclined to say that yes this may leak some information, but this info=
rmation may already be leaked.=C2=A0</div><div>=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0</=
div><div>&lt;/mglt&gt;=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding=
-left:1ex">
- Are we comfortable with the recommendation: &#39;A node MAY drop <br>
anti-replay protection provided by IPsec, and instead implement its own <br=
>
internal mechanism.&#39;? What might this internal mechanism look like?<br>
<br></blockquote><div>&lt;mglt&gt;</div><div>Enabling anti reply protection=
 is no mandatory, so that is the default. RFC4303 mentions:</div><div><span=
 style=3D"font-family:monospace"><span style=3D"color:rgb(168,168,168)"><br=
></span></span></div><div><span style=3D"font-family:monospace"><span style=
=3D"color:rgb(168,168,168)">&quot;&quot;&quot;</span></span></div><div><spa=
n style=3D"font-family:monospace"><span style=3D"color:rgb(168,168,168)">Th=
e field</span><font color=3D"#000000">=C2=A0</font><span style=3D"color:rgb=
(168,168,168)">is mandatory and MUST always be present even if the receiver=
 does not=C2=A0</span><span style=3D"color:rgb(168,168,168)">elect to enabl=
e the anti-replay service for a specific SA.</span><br></span></div><div><s=
pan style=3D"font-family:monospace"><span style=3D"color:rgb(168,168,168)">=
&quot;&quot;&quot;</span></span></div><div><span style=3D"font-family:monos=
pace"><span style=3D"color:rgb(168,168,168)"><br></span></span></div><div><=
span style=3D"font-family:monospace"><span style=3D"color:rgb(168,168,168)"=
>Some mechanisms that come to my mind are implementations that receive pack=
ets in a very deterministic manner. Note that the document recommends to en=
able anti-replay.=C2=A0</span></span></div><div>&lt;/mglt&gt;=C2=A0</div><b=
lockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-le=
ft:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
A few typos:<br>
<br>
-----<br>
<br>
Section 3:<br>
<br>
Please expand SAD on first usage.<br></blockquote><div>&lt;mglt&gt;</div><d=
iv>fixed. Thanks for raising that issue.=C2=A0</div><div>&lt;/mglt&gt;=C2=
=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8e=
x;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
Section 4:<br>
<br>
Typo: In a constrainted environment -&gt; In a constrained environment<br>
<br></blockquote><div>&lt;mglt&gt;</div><div>fixed. I also check there are =
no other occurrence and it seemed that was the only occurrence.=C2=A0=C2=A0=
</div><div>&lt;/mglt&gt;=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gma=
il_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,2=
04,204);padding-left:1ex">
I looked at old RFCs and they seem to use both crypto-suite and <br>
cryptosuite. I have a preference for the later. Perhaps we can remove <br>
the hyphen.<br>
<br></blockquote><div>&lt;mglt&gt;</div><div>I have removed the occurrences=
=C2=A0I=C2=A0found of crypt-suite and replaced them=C2=A0by cryptosuite.=C2=
=A0=C2=A0</div><div>&lt;/mglt&gt;=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quo=
te" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204=
);padding-left:1ex">
-----<br>
<br>
--Mohit<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
Lwip mailing list<br>
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iv>Ericsson</div></div></div></div></div>

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Date: Mon, 22 Mar 2021 00:12:35 -0400 (EDT)
From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
To: Daniel Migault <mglt.ietf@gmail.com>
cc: Mohit Sethi M <mohit.m.sethi=40ericsson.com@dmarc.ietf.org>,  "ipsec@ietf.org" <ipsec@ietf.org>, "lwip@ietf.org" <lwip@ietf.org>,  ipsecme-chairs@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] [Lwip] draft-ietf-lwig-minimal-esp shepherd writeup
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On Sun, 21 Mar 2021, Daniel Migault wrote:

(replying to some issues here, but also added a full review of the document)

Side note: I am bit confused why this document would not be a document
from the IPsecME WG ? I know we talked about this before? Did we decide
against adoption at IPsecME ? Can the authors, WG chairs of IPsecME or
the responsible AD shed some light on the history here?

In general, this draft is very "wordy" because it is trying to steer
itself around a lot of problems, without making firm decisions. But
the point of an RFC is that it should make clear decisions that
implementers can adopt clearly. As such, I'm not in favour of this
draft. I believe I stated this before?

> [1] https://github.com/mglt/draft-mglt-lwig-minimal-esp/commit/47f1351b1928ba687af18e75e253e98720448e8e
> On Sat, Mar 20, 2021 at 5:12 AM Mohit Sethi M <mohit.m.sethi=40ericsson.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>       I am now preparing the shepherd writeup for draft-ietf-lwig-minimal-esp.
>       I wanted to clarify and double check a few things:
>
>       - If the SPI is not random and is chosen by some application specific
>       method -> it can reveal the application using ESP.
> 
> <mglt>
> It is correct that the use of non random SPI may have some privacy impacts and one of these impacts is that in some cases, a SPI may be used to track an application. Note that our intention was to make it
> clear that when SPI are non randomly generated, there are some privacy implications to consider as well as that randomly generated SPI is preferred. 

At the time I also mentioned one attack against IKE that was twarted by
having 4 random bytes as SPI. It remains dangerous to change this
property of ESP, and I recommended to not do that.

https://access.redhat.com/blogs/product-security/posts/sloth

But it seems that although my comments caused the draft to be modified,
it still allows non-random SPIs:

    However, for some constrained nodes, generating and handling 32 bit
    random SPI may consume too much resource, in which case SPI can be
    generated using predictable functions or end up in a using a subset
    of the possible values for SPI.  In fact, the SPI does not
    necessarily need to be randomly generated.  A node provisioned with
    keys by a third party - e.g. that does not generate them - and that
    uses a transform that does not needs random data may not have such
    random generators.  However, nonrandom SPI and restricting their
    possible values MAY lead to privacy and security concerns.  As a
    result, this alternative should be considered for devices that would
    be strongly impacted by the generation of a random SPI and after
    understanding the privacy and security impact of generating nonrandom
    SPI.

So I feel I raised a security issue, and the text just copied my concern
but still basically states implementations MAY do this. I believe this
is wrong.

> Note that the draft defined one (common way) to generate the SPI value that is using a random generator to generate this SPI value. All other means fall into the category of using deterministic functions.
> This does not necessarily mean that a fix of predefined SPI will necessarily be used. This includes for example the fact that only 2**16 or 2**24 values may be candidates. The case where one device has a
> very limited number of SPI is quite extreme. In any case, it should be estimated how much the SPI leaks more information than the IP destination and the use of IPsec as well as the pattern associated with
> the traffic.

I'm not concerned about privacy. As you stated, it is usually pretty
clear what an IoT device is based on where it connects to. I am far
more concerned about security.

> However, for some constrained nodes, generating and handling 32 bit random SPI may
> consume too much resource, in which case SPI can be generated using
> predictable functions or end up in a using a subset of the possible values for SPI.

If such a device cannot generate 4 random bytes, how is it performing a
DiffieHellman key exchange? Or is it presumed that IKE is done
elsewhere? In which case "elsewhere" can generate 4 random bytes.

What about IVs ? If you cannot generate 4 bytes of random, how it is
going to generate the IVs required for ESP?

> In fact, the SPI does not necessarily need to be randomly generated.

Yes it is does, see the above link on an attack against IKE where the
randomized SPI made offline attacks impossible and online attacks
impractical.

> A node provisioned with keys by a third party - e.g. that does not generate them - and that uses a transform that does not need random data may not have such random generators.

There is a strong move to AEADs, and it would be foolish to limit IoT to
things like AES-CBC because of the IV generation.

>       - When sequence numbers are time -> won't it reveal the time at which
>       the packet was sent.
> 
> <mglt>
> First the use of time is primarily driven to have a always increasing function, more than the value of the time itself. This could be used with a clock that is 2 years back in the past or in the future. It
> is correct that a few packet analysis may reveal how synchronized the clock of the device is.
> Regarding the time the packet has been sent, it seems to me this is relatively close to the time the  time is captured, but maybe I am missing how this could be used or any specific cases where delay
> tolerant networks are involved. So I am inclined to say that yes this may leak some information, but this information may already be leaked. 
>       
> </mglt> 

The secion on Sequence Numbers concerns me too, and for the same reasons
as above. If you cannot keep a sequence number as state, you cannot do
any AEAD encryption. I believe it is a bad idea to still write
specifications today that require non-AEAD algorithms. Once you can do
it for AEAD, then you can do it for SN too (and using the other draft
that specified re-using the SN for one of these for other saves you
those bytes once).


>       - Are we comfortable with the recommendation: 'A node MAY drop
>       anti-replay protection provided by IPsec, and instead implement its own
>       internal mechanism.'? What might this internal mechanism look like?

Again, I do not think that we should write RFCs where to disable
security meassures because the device is too constrained. If that is
the case, perhaps IPsec is not the protocol that should be used? Yes,
we can use IPsec without replay protection, but it is unwise to do so.
Handwaving it to be the implementors or application's problem is a bit
dangerous (though not as dangerous as the SPI case above)


Padding I am less concerned about. Often it is not needed, and TFC is
indeed not used a lot - mostly I think because it really only makes
sense to use TFC based on MTU size, but that in itself will cause
more MTU related issues. And an IoT device is likely to send a fixed
format packet anyway with minimal or no change in packet length, in
which case all packets will be the same length. It could create real
security concerns though, if one could deduce a password length or
something based on the type of IoT device and its packet length.


 	For interoperability, it is RECOMMENDED a minimal ESP
 	implementation discards dummy packets.

I'm not sure what this means. What else would one do with a dummy
packet? Regardless, I don't know of implementations that currently
support sending dummy packets.

I'm a little confused what Section 7 is saying? What does the
implementer need to take in from reading this ?


 	In the latter case, authenticated encryption must always be considered [RFC8221].

I'm unsure what this means? Do you mean AEAD? Or are you refering to the
obsolete encryption without _any_ authentication (eg ESP without
authentication _and_ without AH ) ? Regardless of that "must always be
considered" is basically saying nothing. It is not strong enough.
Compare this to:

https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8221#section-4

where it clearly states MUST NOT. So your text is is basically negating
that MUST NOT to "consider".

 	When the key is likely to be re-used
        across reboots, it is RECOMMENDED to consider transforms that are
        nonce misuse resistant such as AES-GCM-SIV

But there is no AES-GCM-SIV IKE or ESP algorithm, so you cannot
recommend that. The only thing you can recommend is AES-CBC, and as I
said before, recommending non-AEAD over AEAD is not something I think
the IETF should do.

I cannot parse this sentence:

 	Note that it
 	is not because an encryption algorithm transform is widely
 	deployed that is secured.


I also see some promotion of AES-CTR, which I'm a little uncomfortable
with.


The security considerations section does not list the issue I've raised
here. For AEAD it states that "mechanisms MUST be in place" to prevent
nonce re-use, but the document doesn't really give guidance. In fact,
if anything it is saying there there is no way to carry state across
reboots for that and that keys might be somehow hardcoded and re-used?
So I would like to ask again, what concrete thing should an implementer
take from this section, eg when it is implementing AES-GCM ?

After lots of talk that generating 4 random bytes for the SPI might be
too hard, the Security Considerations lists:

 	When a node generates its key or when random value such as nonces are
 	generated, the random generation MUST follow [RFC4086].  In addition
 	[SP-800-90A-Rev-1] provides appropriated guidance to build random
 	generators based on deterministic random functions.

If you can do that, you can do 4 bytes of random SPI. So these two items
are contradicting each other. Either you can easilly generate random
SPIs and we should keep them at 4 bytes, OR we simply don't have the
resources for RFC4086 and SP-800-90A-Rev-1 based random number
generates. I mean, I can't see them doing a continious self test for
random required by FIPS if you can't even generate 4 bytes of random
SPI.


In conclusion, I think this document is not helpful to implementers. It
is very wordy but lacks clear advise to implementors and while it raises
security issues for those implementers, it does not actually present
solutions for them.

Paul


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From: Mohit Sethi M <mohit.m.sethi@ericsson.com>
To: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>, Daniel Migault <mglt.ietf@gmail.com>
CC: "ipsec@ietf.org" <ipsec@ietf.org>, "lwip@ietf.org" <lwip@ietf.org>, "ipsecme-chairs@ietf.org" <ipsecme-chairs@ietf.org>, Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>, Erik Kline <ek.ietf@gmail.com>
Thread-Topic: [IPsec] [Lwip] draft-ietf-lwig-minimal-esp shepherd writeup
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ipsec/Xyngl4fB3xpUCK8JMRuil7HQRbs>
Subject: Re: [IPsec] [Lwip] draft-ietf-lwig-minimal-esp shepherd writeup
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Date: Mon, 22 Mar 2021 10:03:25 -0400 (EDT)
From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
To: Mohit Sethi M <mohit.m.sethi=40ericsson.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
cc: Daniel Migault <mglt.ietf@gmail.com>, "ipsec@ietf.org" <ipsec@ietf.org>,  "lwip@ietf.org" <lwip@ietf.org>,  "ipsecme-chairs@ietf.org" <ipsecme-chairs@ietf.org>,  Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>, Erik Kline <ek.ietf@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] [Lwip] draft-ietf-lwig-minimal-esp shepherd writeup
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On Mon, 22 Mar 2021, Mohit Sethi M wrote:

> Adding Ben (IPsecME AD) and Erik (LWIG AD) to the CC list for an early heads up.
> 
> Thanks for reviewing the document. I'll let the authors provide answers to your review.
> 
> On the procedural side of things: this document is within the LWIG charter (https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/lwig/charter/) and follows the path taken by Minimal IKEv2 which was also completed in LWIG as RFC
> 7815 (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc7815/).
> 
> During the call for adoption, there was a general consensus to proceed in LWIG while keeping close contacts with IPsecME (as well as an agreement to issue a joint last call). Tero
> (https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/lwip/Shf2oUKvtIsb0uzY2zRwuBurm58/), Valery (https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/lwip/p1i4hZBjn7PD3ksS9kh8C0ouUOU/) and Scott
> (https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/lwip/dF3eZXG8GTV-o7aH4BnFk2zlR6c/) for example provided reviews of the draft.

Thanks for the write up here.

> I think your comments during the adoption (https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/lwip/xDcICiuALZ2ExF3qwRCnhCQC3A0/) did not argue moving this draft to IPsecME (unless I missed something):
> 
> If the document is defining a minimum/battery optimized ESP
> configuartion, I have no problems with it and I will review further
> text and welcome adoption. If it makes changes to the ESP protocol,
> then I think there should be more discussion before adoption.
> 
> Paul

I said that, but I think I am seeing changes to the ESP algorithm that
basically constitute a change to the ESP protocol. Furthermore, a bunch
of advise negating the advise in RFC 8223. And I still haven't heard
a justfication of some issues I raised either. Such as the doing a
full IKE exchange yet not being able to generate 4 bytes of random?

> That being said, I am not fundamentally opposed to moving this document to IPsecME. However, it is important to consider that the document has already had a relatively long lifecycle in LWIG.

After you references I had given feedback, I went back and read that
message. I totally forgot I did that two years ago. But all the issues
I raised back then are still there unresolved.

Paul


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From: Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>
To: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
Cc: Daniel Migault <mglt.ietf@gmail.com>, Mohit Sethi M <mohit.m.sethi=40ericsson.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, "ipsec\@ietf.org" <ipsec@ietf.org>, "lwip\@ietf.org" <lwip@ietf.org>, ipsecme-chairs@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] [Lwip] draft-ietf-lwig-minimal-esp shepherd writeup
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Paul Wouters writes:
> On Sun, 21 Mar 2021, Daniel Migault wrote:
> 
> (replying to some issues here, but also added a full review of the document)
> 
> Side note: I am bit confused why this document would not be a document
> from the IPsecME WG ? I know we talked about this before? Did we decide
> against adoption at IPsecME ? Can the authors, WG chairs of IPsecME or
> the responsible AD shed some light on the history here?
> 
> In general, this draft is very "wordy" because it is trying to steer
> itself around a lot of problems, without making firm decisions. But
> the point of an RFC is that it should make clear decisions that
> implementers can adopt clearly. As such, I'm not in favour of this
> draft. I believe I stated this before?

This draft does not change anything in the ESP, it only gives
guidelines to the lightweight implementations so they can more easily
understand what kind of optimizations are allowed by standard ESP and
what benefits or concerns there might be from selecting them.

Because it does not change ESP, it is not really IPsecME WG job. It is
similar than RFC7815 Minimal IKEv2 Initiator Implementation document,
which was also published from the LWIG WG and not from the IPsecME WG. 

> But it seems that although my comments caused the draft to be modified,
> it still allows non-random SPIs:

This document cannot mandate that SPIs need to be random, as no such
requirement is in the standard ESP RFC. Requiring SPIs to be random
would be a change from RFC4303, and as such cannot be done in this
document.

For example RFC4301 defines SPI as follows in its Appendix A:
Glossary:

----------------------------------------------------------------------
   Security Parameters Index (SPI)
      An arbitrary 32-bit value that is used by a receiver to identify
      the SA to which an incoming packet should be bound.  For a unicast
      SA, the SPI can be used by itself to specify an SA, or it may be
      used in conjunction with the IPsec protocol type.  Additional IP
      address information is used to identify multicast SAs.  The SPI is
      carried in AH and ESP protocols to enable the receiving system to
      select the SA under which a received packet will be processed.  An
      SPI has only local significance, as defined by the creator of the
      SA (usually the receiver of the packet carrying the SPI); thus an
      SPI is generally viewed as an opaque bit string.  However, the
      creator of an SA may choose to interpret the bits in an SPI to
      facilitate local processing.
----------------------------------------------------------------------

>From the last sentence it is clear that SPI can also be non-random.
You can for example take last 8 bits of the SPI and use that as CPU
identifier, and use next 16-bits before that as index to the SPI table
on that CPU specific SPI table, and use 0xff as first 8-bits just so
you never end up having any reserved numbers for your SPI, i.e., have
SPI as 0xffiiiicc, where iiii is index and cc is cpu id. 

> So I feel I raised a security issue, and the text just copied my concern
> but still basically states implementations MAY do this. I believe this
> is wrong.

But wasn't that attack you referenced, talking about IKE SPIs, not ESP
SPIs? At least that is what I remember about that attack...

Also even IKE SPIs are not required to be random, they are just
required to be unique and non-zero.

> If such a device cannot generate 4 random bytes, how is it performing a
> DiffieHellman key exchange? Or is it presumed that IKE is done
> elsewhere? In which case "elsewhere" can generate 4 random bytes.

I do not think SPI issue is about generating it, but using it for each
incoming packet. If device has only support for 4 incoming SPIs, it
might just create SPIs using format 0x8000000x, where x is the index
in its SAD. Then getting address of SAD structure in memory could
simply be (SPI << (sad_table_shift)) + sad_table_start_address after
checking that (spi & 0xfffffffc) == 0x80000000.

Generation of the SPI is single operation, and as such not an issue.
Mapping SPI -> SAD entry must be done for every incoming packet, and
saving cycles from there might make difference.

> What about IVs ? If you cannot generate 4 bytes of random, how it is
> going to generate the IVs required for ESP?

Implicit Initialization Vector (IV) for Counter-Based Ciphers in
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP), RFC 8750,

> > In fact, the SPI does not necessarily need to be randomly generated.
> 
> Yes it is does, see the above link on an attack against IKE where the
> randomized SPI made offline attacks impossible and online attacks
> impractical.

IKE SPI or ESP SPI? My understanding those attacks were against IKE,
not against ESP.

And if what you are saying is true, then we as an IPsecME needs to
start making modification to the ESP to actually require the SPI to be
random. Currently it does not need to be random, just unique from the
local point of view.

> The secion on Sequence Numbers concerns me too, and for the same reasons
> as above. If you cannot keep a sequence number as state, you cannot do
> any AEAD encryption. I believe it is a bad idea to still write
> specifications today that require non-AEAD algorithms. Once you can do
> it for AEAD, then you can do it for SN too (and using the other draft
> that specified re-using the SN for one of these for other saves you
> those bytes once).

You can use AEAD encryption with sequence numbers generated by time
without any problems. I would expect most of the IoT devices will use
AEAD ciphers, as for example IEEE Std 802.15.4 is only defined to
support AEAD ciphers, and the only one currently defined there is
AES-CCM, and that AEAD AES-CCM is used with timebased nonces when used
with TSCH currently.

The problem with regular sequence numbers is that you need to store
them to stable storage every time you go sleep. Storing the SA
information (keys, SPIs etc) to the flash once after the creation of
the SA can be done, as that is just one flash write per SA creation.

Syncing sequence number to flash after every packet would quickly wear
out the flash, and most likely also slow down the system greatly, as
writing to flash is not that fast operation than reading from there.
Note, that lots of these IoT devices wake up, do something, send few
packets, and then go back to sleep. They do have separete hardware
that allows them to wake up after certain timeout, and most likely
also timers that start running when the device was booted up, so they
might have concept of time with certain granularity. They might NOT
have real time clocks or any information how their internal clock
relates to real world clock, and their internal clocks/timers might
not be very accurate, but they should be enough to know that each time
they wake up their time is greater than what it was last time they
woke up. 

> Again, I do not think that we should write RFCs where to disable
> security meassures because the device is too constrained. If that is
> the case, perhaps IPsec is not the protocol that should be used? Yes,
> we can use IPsec without replay protection, but it is unwise to do so.
> Handwaving it to be the implementors or application's problem is a bit
> dangerous (though not as dangerous as the SPI case above)

If you want to change this we need to revise RFC4303 and RFC4301.
Replay protection has always been optional for the receiver. There are
lots of ways to do things in a way where you do NOT need replay
protection on the ESP layer.

The problem with replay protection is again that it needs to be stored
across sleeps, i.e., written to the flash memory.

If the IoT device you are talking about is for example temperature
sensor and the protocol is such that sensor wakes up every 60 seconds,
sends sensor measurement over ESP, and waits for ACK back from the
controller, and after receiving the ACK it goes back to sleep, there
is no need to have replay protection on the sensor end. Yes, attacker
who can block the connection between the sensor and controller, can
replay ACKs and cause the sensor to be happy and not notice that it
has lost connection to the controller, but on the other hand even if
the sensor would notice that it has lost the connection to controller,
there is nothing it can do, as there is no way of indicating that
information other than over the radio and attacker is already blocking
that. Temperature sensors usually do not have displays or keyboards,
and even when there might be LEDs on the board, they do not help much
when the sensor is inside the building wall.
-- 
kivinen@iki.fi


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From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
To: Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>
cc: Daniel Migault <mglt.ietf@gmail.com>,  Mohit Sethi M <mohit.m.sethi=40ericsson.com@dmarc.ietf.org>,  "ipsec@ietf.org" <ipsec@ietf.org>, "lwip@ietf.org" <lwip@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] [Lwip] draft-ietf-lwig-minimal-esp shepherd writeup
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On Mon, 22 Mar 2021, Tero Kivinen wrote:

>> In general, this draft is very "wordy" because it is trying to steer
>> itself around a lot of problems, without making firm decisions. But
>> the point of an RFC is that it should make clear decisions that
>> implementers can adopt clearly. As such, I'm not in favour of this
>> draft. I believe I stated this before?
>
> This draft does not change anything in the ESP, it only gives
> guidelines to the lightweight implementations so they can more easily
> understand what kind of optimizations are allowed by standard ESP and
> what benefits or concerns there might be from selecting them.

I find the guidelines it gives unclear. This email has helped a lot and
I would really like to see some of this text included in the draft.

> Because it does not change ESP, it is not really IPsecME WG job. It is
> similar than RFC7815 Minimal IKEv2 Initiator Implementation document,
> which was also published from the LWIG WG and not from the IPsecME WG.

Thanks for the process explanation. I'm okay continuing it this way.

>> But it seems that although my comments caused the draft to be modified,
>> it still allows non-random SPIs:
>
> This document cannot mandate that SPIs need to be random, as no such
> requirement is in the standard ESP RFC.

Interesting, I did not realise that. The draft could be clarified to
simply state like, something like:

 	RFC4303 states tat SPI's must be unique, but do not require to
 	be random. Most implementations do use random SPIs but this
 	might not be possible for constrained devices. These devices
 	MAY use non-random SPIs.

> But wasn't that attack you referenced, talking about IKE SPIs, not ESP
> SPIs? At least that is what I remember about that attack...

Yes, that is correct.

> Also even IKE SPIs are not required to be random, they are just
> required to be unique and non-zero.

Perhaps we should update IKEv2 to SHOULD make them random :)

>> If such a device cannot generate 4 random bytes, how is it performing a
>> DiffieHellman key exchange? Or is it presumed that IKE is done
>> elsewhere? In which case "elsewhere" can generate 4 random bytes.
>
> I do not think SPI issue is about generating it, but using it for each
> incoming packet. If device has only support for 4 incoming SPIs, it
> might just create SPIs using format 0x8000000x, where x is the index
> in its SAD. Then getting address of SAD structure in memory could
> simply be (SPI << (sad_table_shift)) + sad_table_start_address after
> checking that (spi & 0xfffffffc) == 0x80000000.

Again the draft should be making this distinction clear. To me it seems
to suggest that creating them randmonly was the problem being addressed.

> Generation of the SPI is single operation, and as such not an issue.
> Mapping SPI -> SAD entry must be done for every incoming packet, and
> saving cycles from there might make difference.
>
>> What about IVs ? If you cannot generate 4 bytes of random, how it is
>> going to generate the IVs required for ESP?
>
> Implicit Initialization Vector (IV) for Counter-Based Ciphers in
> Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP), RFC 8750,

That is only for the IV of AEAD algorithms. But the draft wiggles between
discourages these because if you re-use the key along reboots without keeping
state, you would re-use the same IV (counter). Later on in the document,
and along with your explanation in this email, I understand that the
time based counter addresses this. I think it should be made much more
explicitly clear so that implementers know this.


For AES-CBC, RFC 3602 states: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3602#section-3

 	The IV field MUST be the same size as the block size of the cipher
 	algorithm being used.  The IV MUST be chosen at random, and MUST be
 	unpredictable.

So the draft basically states that for systems not able to generate a
random bytes, that it cannot use AES-CBC. It should state this
explictly.

> IKE SPI or ESP SPI? My understanding those attacks were against IKE,
> not against ESP.
>
> And if what you are saying is true, then we as an IPsecME needs to
> start making modification to the ESP to actually require the SPI to be
> random. Currently it does not need to be random, just unique from the
> local point of view.

Based on the attack, this would only be needed for IKE, not ESP. But for
implementations this draft targets, that would be a similar
insurmountable problem? Again, it would be useful to explain why pure
random is harder to do then using something time based.

>> The secion on Sequence Numbers concerns me too, and for the same reasons
>> as above. If you cannot keep a sequence number as state, you cannot do
>> any AEAD encryption. I believe it is a bad idea to still write
>> specifications today that require non-AEAD algorithms. Once you can do
>> it for AEAD, then you can do it for SN too (and using the other draft
>> that specified re-using the SN for one of these for other saves you
>> those bytes once).
>
> You can use AEAD encryption with sequence numbers generated by time
> without any problems. I would expect most of the IoT devices will use
> AEAD ciphers, as for example IEEE Std 802.15.4 is only defined to
> support AEAD ciphers, and the only one currently defined there is
> AES-CCM, and that AEAD AES-CCM is used with timebased nonces when used
> with TSCH currently.
>
> The problem with regular sequence numbers is that you need to store
> them to stable storage every time you go sleep. Storing the SA
> information (keys, SPIs etc) to the flash once after the creation of
> the SA can be done, as that is just one flash write per SA creation.
> Syncing sequence number to flash after every packet would quickly wear
> out the flash, and most likely also slow down the system greatly, as

That's a great explanation of how AEAD can work and the difference
between storing sequence numbers and storing crypto keys. It should be
in the draft too.

> Replay protection has always been optional for the receiver. There are
> lots of ways to do things in a way where you do NOT need replay
> protection on the ESP layer.
>
> The problem with replay protection is again that it needs to be stored
> across sleeps, i.e., written to the flash memory.

Again, please add this to the draft.

> If the IoT device you are talking about is for example temperature
> sensor and the protocol is such that sensor wakes up every 60 seconds,
> sends sensor measurement over ESP, and waits for ACK back from the
> controller, and after receiving the ACK it goes back to sleep, there
> is no need to have replay protection on the sensor end. Yes, attacker
> who can block the connection between the sensor and controller, can
> replay ACKs and cause the sensor to be happy and not notice that it
> has lost connection to the controller, but on the other hand even if
> the sensor would notice that it has lost the connection to controller,
> there is nothing it can do, as there is no way of indicating that
> information other than over the radio and attacker is already blocking
> that. Temperature sensors usually do not have displays or keyboards,
> and even when there might be LEDs on the board, they do not help much
> when the sensor is inside the building wall.

Again, great addition for anyone reading the draft why it is okay.

Reading back now, I think with some clarifications added, I am okay
with the document. I think the list of clarifications we now have is:

- clarifying ESP SPI's do not need to be random, with reference to 4304
   and explain why random ones take more resources and fixed ones might
   be used.
- clarify why counter as entire IV is okay (because AEAD) and why
   storing an absolute counter on  flash is bad, and timing can be used
   instead.
- Clarify why sequence numbers cannot be sequential - flash writes are
   bad.
- A clear section on why AES-CBC/3DES-CBC cannot be used due to IV
   randomness limitations
- clearly recommending an AEAD like AES-CCM or AES-GCM. Consider using
   their IV-less names from RFC 8750.
- Remove reference to AES-GCM-SIV which does not exist for ESP, or
   clarify "once/if available for ESP".
- call "ChaCha20-Poly1305" by its name CHACHA20_POLY1305 (and maybe also
   by its RFC 8750 name)
- clarifying section 6 that this is not about the Next Header (being
   removed) but just about not supporting dummy packets. Probably change
   the title of the section too.
- change "cryptographic suites" and "crypto-suites" to "cryptographic
   algorithms" to avoid TLS confusion
- update the introduction to introduce the constrains (flash writes,
   wake/up sleep vs reboot, getrandom limitations)
- figure out what to do with the FIPS reference on randomness (because
   I don't think with continuous self test, it can be fully FIPS
   compliant?)
- Clarify the list in section 8. Is this ordered from most important
   to least important? I think so but it does not state this.
- Remove reference to I-D.nikander-esp-beet-mode, with the text "not
   standarized yet". This draft has been abandoned in 13 years ago.

I'm willing to help with text if the authors want, but I think if I did
that, the diff would be quite large as I would be clarifying things be
being more epxlicit and use fewer words. So it might be better if the
goal is to keep the changes to a minimum for the draft authors to make
the changes.

Paul


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From: Daniel Migault <mglt.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 22 Mar 2021 12:47:50 -0400
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To: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
Cc: Mohit Sethi M <mohit.m.sethi=40ericsson.com@dmarc.ietf.org>,  "ipsec@ietf.org" <ipsec@ietf.org>, "lwip@ietf.org" <lwip@ietf.org>, ipsecme-chairs@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] [Lwip] draft-ietf-lwig-minimal-esp shepherd writeup
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Hi Paul,

A large part of your comments result from a confusion between the use of
SPI in IKE and ESP. This discussion  has already been set in [1]. Other
comments currently led to two minor updates in the document that have been
published here [2]. So far I believe your concerns have been addressed
unless I am misunderstood them.  Please find my responses in line.

Yours,
Daniel

[1] https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/lwip/ygw567rdae2LLXoWTbdbXMejowI/
[2]
https://github.com/mglt/draft-mglt-lwig-minimal-esp/blob/master/draft-ietf-lwig-minimal-esp.xml

On Mon, Mar 22, 2021 at 12:12 AM Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> wrote:

> On Sun, 21 Mar 2021, Daniel Migault wrote:
>
> (replying to some issues here, but also added a full review of the
> document)
>
> Side note: I am bit confused why this document would not be a document
> from the IPsecME WG ? I know we talked about this before? Did we decide
> against adoption at IPsecME ? Can the authors, WG chairs of IPsecME or
> the responsible AD shed some light on the history here?
>
> <mglt>
The document minimal esp complements minimal IKEv2 RFC 7815 that was
adopted in LWIG and the goal of the document seems in scope with LWIG, that
is building minimal interoperable IP capable devices for the most
constrained environment.  As the matter (ESP) might involve the IPsec
community we always cced the ipsecme as well as by making presentations
during ipsecme sessions.
Maybe you could clarify what in particular you find confusing.
</mglt>

In general, this draft is very "wordy" because it is trying to steer
> itself around a lot of problems, without making firm decisions.

But the point of an RFC is that it should make clear decisions that
> implementers can adopt clearly.

 <mglt>
The scope of the document is to provide guidance for implementers on
minimal implementations while remaining interoperable. The techniques an
implementer will choose depend on its constraints and environment and there
is not an intention to favor one technique over the others.
This document and describes how an implementer may achieve a minimal
implementation while remaining interoperable. Decision of what to implement
is let to the implementer.
</mglt>


> As such, I'm not in favour of this
> draft. I believe I stated this before?
>
> > [1]
> https://github.com/mglt/draft-mglt-lwig-minimal-esp/commit/47f1351b1928ba687af18e75e253e98720448e8e
> > On Sat, Mar 20, 2021 at 5:12 AM Mohit Sethi M <mohit.m.sethi=
> 40ericsson.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
> >       I am now preparing the shepherd writeup for
> draft-ietf-lwig-minimal-esp.
> >       I wanted to clarify and double check a few things:
> >
> >       - If the SPI is not random and is chosen by some application
> specific
> >       method -> it can reveal the application using ESP.
> >
> > <mglt>
> > It is correct that the use of non random SPI may have some privacy
> impacts and one of these impacts is that in some cases, a SPI may be used
> to track an application. Note that our intention was to make it
> > clear that when SPI are non randomly generated, there are some privacy
> implications to consider as well as that randomly generated SPI is
> preferred.
>
> At the time I also mentioned one attack against IKE that was twarted by
> having 4 random bytes as SPI. It remains dangerous to change this
> property of ESP, and I recommended to not do that.
>
> https://access.redhat.com/blogs/product-security/posts/sloth
>
> But it seems that although my comments caused the draft to be modified,
> it still allows non-random SPIs:
>
>     However, for some constrained nodes, generating and handling 32 bit
>     random SPI may consume too much resource, in which case SPI can be
>     generated using predictable functions or end up in a using a subset
>     of the possible values for SPI.  In fact, the SPI does not
>     necessarily need to be randomly generated.  A node provisioned with
>     keys by a third party - e.g. that does not generate them - and that
>     uses a transform that does not needs random data may not have such
>     random generators.  However, nonrandom SPI and restricting their
>     possible values MAY lead to privacy and security concerns.  As a
>     result, this alternative should be considered for devices that would
>     be strongly impacted by the generation of a random SPI and after
>     understanding the privacy and security impact of generating nonrandom
>     SPI.
>
> So I feel I raised a security issue, and the text just copied my concern
> but still basically states implementations MAY do this. I believe this
> is wrong.
>

<mglt>
The security concerned you raised is irrelevant here. The SLOTH attack only
concerns SIGMA protocols and ESP does not involve any SIGMA protocols.
This concern has been addressed and you agreed in the following words [1]:
"""

As Tero pointed out to me just now, those were IKE SPI's and not ESP
SPI's to I guess there is no security issue here :)

"""
[1] https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/lwip/ygw567rdae2LLXoWTbdbXMejowI/
</mglt>


> > Note that the draft defined one (common way) to generate the SPI value
> that is using a random generator to generate this SPI value. All other
> means fall into the category of using deterministic functions.
> > This does not necessarily mean that a fix of predefined SPI will
> necessarily be used. This includes for example the fact that only 2**16 or
> 2**24 values may be candidates. The case where one device has a
> > very limited number of SPI is quite extreme. In any case, it should be
> estimated how much the SPI leaks more information than the IP destination
> and the use of IPsec as well as the pattern associated with
> > the traffic.
>
> I'm not concerned about privacy. As you stated, it is usually pretty
> clear what an IoT device is based on where it connects to. I am far
> more concerned about security.



>
>
> However, for some constrained nodes, generating and handling 32 bit
> random SPI may
> > consume too much resource, in which case SPI can be generated using
> > predictable functions or end up in a using a subset of the possible
> values for SPI.
>
> If such a device cannot generate 4 random bytes, how is it performing a
> DiffieHellman key exchange? Or is it presumed that IKE is done
> elsewhere? In which case "elsewhere" can generate 4 random bytes.
>

<mglt>
As mentioned earlier ESP does not involve any Diffie Hellman exchange and
requirements related to DH exchange do not apply for ESP. The fact that
IKEv2 requires the generation of random does not require the device to
generate SPI randomly. It seems to me the document is usefull to clarify
such misconceptions.
</mglt>

>
> What about IVs ? If you cannot generate 4 bytes of random, how it is
> going to generate the IVs required for ESP?
>
> <mglt>
IV does not necessarily need to be unpredictable as it depends on the
cipher suite. See RFC 8750 for example.  Note also that randomly generating
does not guarantee that no collision occurs.
</mglt>

>

> > In fact, the SPI does not necessarily need to be randomly generated.
>
> Yes it is does, see the above link on an attack against IKE where the
> randomized SPI made offline attacks impossible and online attacks
> impractical.
>
>  <mglt>
I think this has been clarified earlier that there is a
misunderstanding here.
</mglt>

> > A node provisioned with keys by a third party - e.g. that does not
> generate them - and that uses a transform that does not need random data
> may not have such random generators.
>
> There is a strong move to AEADs, and it would be foolish to limit IoT to
> things like AES-CBC because of the IV generation.
>

<mglt>
I am reading this comment as advocating that IVs does not need to be
randomly generated, which seems to me to contradict the previous concern.
Unless I am missing something I agree that random IVs are far from being
necessary in general and that  RFC 8750 provides good examples.
</mglt>

>
> >       - When sequence numbers are time -> won't it reveal the time at
> which
> >       the packet was sent.
> >
> > <mglt>
> > First the use of time is primarily driven to have a always increasing
> function, more than the value of the time itself. This could be used with a
> clock that is 2 years back in the past or in the future. It
> > is correct that a few packet analysis may reveal how synchronized the
> clock of the device is.
> > Regarding the time the packet has been sent, it seems to me this is
> relatively close to the time the  time is captured, but maybe I am missing
> how this could be used or any specific cases where delay
> > tolerant networks are involved. So I am inclined to say that yes this
> may leak some information, but this information may already be leaked.
> >
> > </mglt>
>
> The secion on Sequence Numbers concerns me too, and for the same reasons
> as above. If you cannot keep a sequence number as state, you cannot do
> any AEAD encryption. I believe it is a bad idea to still write
> specifications today that require non-AEAD algorithms. Once you can do
> it for AEAD, then you can do it for SN too (and using the other draft
> that specified re-using the SN for one of these for other saves you
> those bytes once).
>

<mglt>
I think I am a bit confused about what is the concern related to SN. Your
previous concern was to have random SPIs and random IVs, I do not clearly
how this could concern SN, nor how SN and AEAD are related. Maybe you could
clarify the issue related to AEAD and SN.
</mglt>

>
>
> >       - Are we comfortable with the recommendation: 'A node MAY drop
> >       anti-replay protection provided by IPsec, and instead implement
> its own
> >       internal mechanism.'? What might this internal mechanism look like?
>
> Again, I do not think that we should write RFCs where to disable
> security meassures because the device is too constrained. If that is
> the case, perhaps IPsec is not the protocol that should be used? Yes,
> we can use IPsec without replay protection, but it is unwise to do so.
> Handwaving it to be the implementors or application's problem is a bit
> dangerous (though not as dangerous as the SPI case above)
>
> <mglt>
We basically restate the standard ESP and we have no intention to update
ESP. As explained before the dangerosity of non random SPI is a
misconception and does not have any security issues. I suppose the
recommendation is fine then.
</mglt>

>
> Padding I am less concerned about. Often it is not needed, and TFC is
> indeed not used a lot - mostly I think because it really only makes
> sense to use TFC based on MTU size, but that in itself will cause
> more MTU related issues. And an IoT device is likely to send a fixed
> format packet anyway with minimal or no change in packet length, in
> which case all packets will be the same length. It could create real
> security concerns though, if one could deduce a password length or
> something based on the type of IoT device and its packet length.
>
>
>         For interoperability, it is RECOMMENDED a minimal ESP
>         implementation discards dummy packets.
>
> I'm not sure what this means. What else would one do with a dummy
> packet? Regardless, I don't know of implementations that currently
> support sending dummy packets.
>
<mglt>
A dummy packet is indicated by a Next Header value set to 59. The intention
is to prevent these packet to be moved to upper layers and instead
explicitly been discarded. I agree that we may replace the RECOMMEND by
MUST to follow RFC4301. I think the comment was also raised by Valery.
RFC4301 mentions a transmitter MUST be able to generate dummy packets but
does not mandate to generate this packets.
</mglt>

>
> I'm a little confused what Section 7 is saying? What does the
> implementer need to take in from reading this ?
>
>
>         In the latter case, authenticated encryption must always be
> considered [RFC8221].
>
> I'm unsure what this means? Do you mean AEAD? Or are you refering to the
> obsolete encryption without _any_ authentication (eg ESP without
> authentication _and_ without AH ) ? Regardless of that "must always be
> considered" is basically saying nothing. It is not strong enough.
> Compare this to:
>
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8221#section-4
>
> where it clearly states MUST NOT. So your text is is basically negating
> that MUST NOT to "consider".
>
> <mglt>
I am a bit confused by the comment. The text we are refering is in section
8 and mentionned below:

"""
  1.  Security: Security is the criteria that should be considered

      first for the selection of encryption algorithm transform.  The

      security of encryption algorithm transforms is expected to evolve

      over time, and it is of primary importance to follow up-to-date

      security guidance and recommendations.  The chosen encryption

      algorithm transforms MUST NOT be known vulnerable or weak (see

      [RFC8221] for outdated ciphers).  ESP can be used to authenticate

      only or to encrypt the communication.  In the latter case,

      authenticated encryption must always be considered [RFC8221].

"""

It seems to me that we mandate to follow cryptographic recommendations of
RFC8221 and I do not see how this is weakened or contradicting RFC8221.
Would the "MUST always be considered [RFC8221]". address your concerned. I
have updated the text accordingly.

</mglt>


>         When the key is likely to be re-used
>         across reboots, it is RECOMMENDED to consider transforms that are
>         nonce misuse resistant such as AES-GCM-SIV
>
> But there is no AES-GCM-SIV IKE or ESP algorithm, so you cannot
> recommend that. The only thing you can recommend is AES-CBC, and as I
> said before, recommending non-AEAD over AEAD is not something I think
> the IETF should do.
>
> <mglt>
Again the document is on ESP not IKE. That AES-GCM-SIV is not defined for
IKEv2 does not prevent it to be used for ESP. That said, I agree the
negotiation might be harder. It think the recommendation holds that these
suites are available or not. Hopefully in the future these suites may be
defined.
</mglt>

> I cannot parse this sentence:
>
>         Note that it
>         is not because an encryption algorithm transform is widely
>         deployed that is secured.
>
> <mglt>
good catch: the text should be
Note that it
        is not because an encryption algorithm transform is widely
        deployed that it is secured.

This has been changed.
</mglt>

>
> I also see some promotion of AES-CTR, which I'm a little uncomfortable
> with.
>
>
> The security considerations section does not list the issue I've raised
> here. For AEAD it states that "mechanisms MUST be in place" to prevent
> nonce re-use, but the document doesn't really give guidance. In fact,
> if anything it is saying there there is no way to carry state across
> reboots for that and that keys might be somehow hardcoded and re-used?
> So I would like to ask again, what concrete thing should an implementer
> take from this section, eg when it is implementing AES-GCM ?
>
>  <mglt>
If no mechanism cannot be found, I am reading the text as considering
looking at ciphersuites that address this problem. I agree that might be
good to provide some details, but I guess these techniques would be very
much ciphersuite dependent. I am wondering if there are any mechanism you
have in mind you woudl like to be mentioned or a reference you would like
to add ?
</mglt>

After lots of talk that generating 4 random bytes for the SPI might be
> too hard, the Security Considerations lists:
>
>         When a node generates its key or when random value such as nonces
> are
>         generated, the random generation MUST follow [RFC4086].  In
> addition
>         [SP-800-90A-Rev-1] provides appropriated guidance to build random
>         generators based on deterministic random functions.
>
> If you can do that, you can do 4 bytes of random SPI. So these two items
> are contradicting each other. Either you can easilly generate random
> SPIs and we should keep them at 4 bytes, OR we simply don't have the
> resources for RFC4086 and SP-800-90A-Rev-1 based random number
> generates. I mean, I can't see them doing a continious self test for
> random required by FIPS if you can't even generate 4 bytes of random
> SPI.
>
> <mglt>
I think this non issue has already covered.
</mglt>

>
> In conclusion, I think this document is not helpful to implementers. It
> is very wordy but lacks clear advise to implementors and while it raises
> security issues for those implementers, it does not actually present
> solutions for them.
>
> Paul
>


-- 
Daniel Migault
Ericsson

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Hi Paul,=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>A large part =
of your comments result from a confusion between=C2=A0the use of SPI in=C2=
=A0IKE and ESP. This discussion=C2=A0 has already been set in [1]. Other co=
mments currently led to two minor updates=C2=A0in the document that have be=
en published here [2]. So far I believe your concerns have been addressed u=
nless I am misunderstood them.=C2=A0 Please find my responses in line.</div=
><div>=C2=A0<br></div><div>Yours,=C2=A0<br>Daniel</div><div><br></div><div>=
[1] <a href=3D"https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/lwip/ygw567rdae2LLXoWT=
bdbXMejowI/" target=3D"_blank">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/lwip/y=
gw567rdae2LLXoWTbdbXMejowI/</a><br></div>[2]=C2=A0<a href=3D"https://github=
.com/mglt/draft-mglt-lwig-minimal-esp/blob/master/draft-ietf-lwig-minimal-e=
sp.xml">https://github.com/mglt/draft-mglt-lwig-minimal-esp/blob/master/dra=
ft-ietf-lwig-minimal-esp.xml</a><div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div di=
r=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, Mar 22, 2021 at 12:12 AM Paul Wouter=
s &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:paul@nohats.ca" target=3D"_blank">paul@nohats.ca</a=
>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px=
 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">On =
Sun, 21 Mar 2021, Daniel Migault wrote:<br>
<br>
(replying to some issues here, but also added a full review of the document=
)<br>
<br>
Side note: I am bit confused why this document would not be a document<br>
from the IPsecME WG ? I know we talked about this before? Did we decide<br>
against adoption at IPsecME ? Can the authors, WG chairs of IPsecME or<br>
the responsible AD shed some light on the history here?<br>
<br></blockquote><div>&lt;mglt&gt;</div><div>The document minimal esp compl=
ements minimal IKEv2 RFC 7815 that was adopted in LWIG and the goal of the =
document seems in scope with LWIG, that is building minimal interoperable I=
P capable devices for the most constrained environment.=C2=A0 As the matter=
 (ESP) might involve=C2=A0the IPsec community we always cced the ipsecme as=
 well as by making presentations during ipsecme sessions.=C2=A0</div><div>M=
aybe you could clarify what in particular=C2=A0you find confusing.=C2=A0=C2=
=A0</div><div>&lt;/mglt&gt;=C2=A0<br></div><div><br></div><blockquote class=
=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rg=
b(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
In general, this draft is very &quot;wordy&quot; because it is trying to st=
eer<br>
itself around a lot of problems, without making firm decisions. </blockquot=
e><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;borde=
r-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">But the point of an RFC=
 is that it should make clear decisions that<br>
implementers can adopt clearly. </blockquote><div>=C2=A0&lt;mglt&gt;<br></d=
iv><div>The scope of the document is to provide guidance for implementers o=
n minimal implementations while remaining interoperable. The techniques an =
implementer will choose depend on its constraints=C2=A0and environment and =
there is not an intention to favor one technique over the others.=C2=A0</di=
v><div>This document and describes=C2=A0how an implementer may achieve a mi=
nimal implementation while remaining interoperable. Decision of what to imp=
lement is let to the implementer.=C2=A0</div><div>&lt;/mglt&gt;</div><div>=
=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0=
.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">As such, I&#3=
9;m not in favour of this<br>
draft. I believe I stated this before?<br>
<br>
&gt; [1]=C2=A0<a href=3D"https://github.com/mglt/draft-mglt-lwig-minimal-es=
p/commit/47f1351b1928ba687af18e75e253e98720448e8e" rel=3D"noreferrer" targe=
t=3D"_blank">https://github.com/mglt/draft-mglt-lwig-minimal-esp/commit/47f=
1351b1928ba687af18e75e253e98720448e8e</a><br>
&gt; On Sat, Mar 20, 2021 at 5:12 AM Mohit Sethi M &lt;mohit.m.sethi=3D<a h=
ref=3D"mailto:40ericsson.com@dmarc.ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">40ericsson.c=
om@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0I am now preparing the shepherd writeup for =
draft-ietf-lwig-minimal-esp.<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0I wanted to clarify and double check a few t=
hings:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0- If the SPI is not random and is chosen by =
some application specific<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0method -&gt; it can reveal the application u=
sing ESP.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; &lt;mglt&gt;<br>
&gt; It is correct that the use of non random SPI may have some privacy imp=
acts and one of these impacts=C2=A0is that in some cases, a SPI may=C2=A0be=
 used to=C2=A0track an application. Note that our intention was to make it<=
br>
&gt; clear that when SPI are non randomly generated, there are some privacy=
 implications to consider as well as that randomly generated SPI is preferr=
ed.=C2=A0<br>
<br>
At the time I also mentioned one attack against IKE that was twarted by<br>
having 4 random bytes as SPI. It remains dangerous to change this<br>
property of ESP, and I recommended to not do that.<br>
<br>
<a href=3D"https://access.redhat.com/blogs/product-security/posts/sloth" re=
l=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://access.redhat.com/blogs/product-=
security/posts/sloth</a><br>
<br>
But it seems that although my comments caused the draft to be modified,<br>
it still allows non-random SPIs:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 However, for some constrained nodes, generating and handling =
32 bit<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 random SPI may consume too much resource, in which case SPI c=
an be<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 generated using predictable functions or end up in a using a =
subset<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 of the possible values for SPI.=C2=A0 In fact, the SPI does n=
ot<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 necessarily need to be randomly generated.=C2=A0 A node provi=
sioned with<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 keys by a third party - e.g. that does not generate them - an=
d that<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 uses a transform that does not needs random data may not have=
 such<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 random generators.=C2=A0 However, nonrandom SPI and restricti=
ng their<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 possible values MAY lead to privacy and security concerns.=C2=
=A0 As a<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 result, this alternative should be considered for devices tha=
t would<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 be strongly impacted by the generation of a random SPI and af=
ter<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 understanding the privacy and security impact of generating n=
onrandom<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 SPI.<br>
<br>
So I feel I raised a security issue, and the text just copied my concern<br=
>
but still basically states implementations MAY do this. I believe this<br>
is wrong.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>&lt;mglt&gt;</div><div>The se=
curity concerned you raised is irrelevant here. The SLOTH attack only conce=
rns SIGMA protocols and ESP does not involve any SIGMA protocols.</div><div=
>This concern has been addressed and you agreed in the following words [1]:=
</div><div>&quot;&quot;&quot;</div><div><pre style=3D"box-sizing:border-box=
;font-family:SFMono-Regular,Menlo,Monaco,Consolas,&quot;Liberation Mono&quo=
t;,&quot;Courier New&quot;,monospace;font-size:12.25px;margin-top:0px;margi=
n-bottom:1rem;overflow:auto;color:rgb(33,37,41);white-space:pre-wrap;word-b=
reak:normal;padding:0px">As Tero pointed out to me just now, those were IKE=
 SPI&#39;s and not ESP
SPI&#39;s to I guess there is no security issue here :)</pre></div><div>&qu=
ot;&quot;&quot;</div><div>[1] <a href=3D"https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/=
msg/lwip/ygw567rdae2LLXoWTbdbXMejowI/" target=3D"_blank">https://mailarchiv=
e.ietf.org/arch/msg/lwip/ygw567rdae2LLXoWTbdbXMejowI/</a><br></div><div>&lt=
;/mglt&gt;=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" styl=
e=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);paddin=
g-left:1ex">
<br>
&gt; Note that the draft defined one (common way) to generate the SPI value=
 that is using a random generator to=C2=A0generate this SPI value. All othe=
r means fall into the category of using deterministic functions.<br>
&gt; This does not necessarily mean that a fix of predefined SPI will neces=
sarily be used. This includes for example the fact that only 2**16 or 2**24=
 values may be candidates. The case where one device has a<br>
&gt; very limited number of SPI is quite extreme. In any=C2=A0case, it shou=
ld be estimated how much the SPI leaks more information than the IP destina=
tion and the use of IPsec as well as the pattern associated with<br>
&gt; the traffic.<br>
<br>
I&#39;m not concerned about privacy. As you stated, it is usually pretty<br=
>
clear what an IoT device is based on where it connects to. I am far<br>
more concerned about security.</blockquote><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote cla=
ss=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid =
rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">=C2=A0<br></blockquote><blockquote class=
=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rg=
b(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
&gt; However, for some constrained nodes, generating and handling 32 bit ra=
ndom SPI may<br>
&gt; consume too much resource, in which case SPI can be generated using<br=
>
&gt; predictable functions or end up in a using a subset of the possible va=
lues for SPI.<br>
<br>
If such a device cannot generate 4 random bytes, how is it performing a<br>
DiffieHellman key exchange? Or is it presumed that IKE is done<br>
elsewhere? In which case &quot;elsewhere&quot; can generate 4 random bytes.=
<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>&lt;mglt&gt;</div><div>As mentioned=C2=
=A0earlier ESP does not involve any Diffie Hellman exchange and requirement=
s related to DH exchange do not apply for ESP. The fact that IKEv2 requires=
 the generation of random does not require the device to generate SPI rando=
mly. It seems to me the document is usefull to clarify such misconceptions.=
=C2=A0=C2=A0</div><div>&lt;/mglt&gt;=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_=
quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,=
204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
What about IVs ? If you cannot generate 4 bytes of random, how it is<br>
going to generate the IVs required for ESP?<br>
<br></blockquote><div>&lt;mglt&gt;</div><div>IV does not necessarily need t=
o be unpredictable as it depends on the cipher suite. See RFC 8750 for exam=
ple.=C2=A0 Note also that randomly generating does not guarantee that no co=
llision occurs.=C2=A0</div><div>&lt;/mglt&gt;=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=
=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rg=
b(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"></blockquote><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote =
class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px sol=
id rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
&gt; In fact, the SPI does not necessarily need to be randomly generated.<b=
r>
<br>
Yes it is does, see the above link on an attack against IKE where the<br>
randomized SPI made offline attacks impossible and online attacks<br>
impractical.<br>
<br></blockquote><div>=C2=A0&lt;mglt&gt;</div><div>I think this has been cl=
arified earlier that there is=C2=A0a misunderstanding=C2=A0here.=C2=A0</div=
><div>&lt;/mglt&gt;</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:=
0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
&gt; A node provisioned with keys by a third party - e.g. that does not gen=
erate them - and that uses a transform that does not need random data may n=
ot have such random generators.<br>
<br>
There is a strong move to AEADs, and it would be foolish to limit IoT to<br=
>
things like AES-CBC because of the IV generation.<br></blockquote><div><br>=
</div><div>&lt;mglt&gt;</div><div>I am reading this comment as advocating=
=C2=A0that IVs does not need to be randomly generated, which seems to me to=
 contradict the previous concern. Unless I am missing something I agree tha=
t random IVs are far from being necessary in general and that=C2=A0=C2=A0RF=
C 8750 provides good examples.</div><div>&lt;/mglt&gt;=C2=A0</div><blockquo=
te class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px =
solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0- When sequence numbers are time -&gt; won&#=
39;t it reveal the time at which<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0the packet was sent.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; &lt;mglt&gt;<br>
&gt; First the use of time is primarily driven to have a always increasing =
function, more than the value of the time itself. This could be used with a=
 clock that is 2 years back in the past or in the future. It<br>
&gt; is correct that a few packet analysis may=C2=A0reveal how synchronized=
 the clock of the device is.<br>
&gt; Regarding the time the packet has been sent, it seems to me this is re=
latively close to the time the=C2=A0 time is captured, but maybe I am missi=
ng how this could be used or any specific cases where delay<br>
&gt; tolerant networks are involved. So I am inclined to say that yes this =
may leak some information, but this information may already be leaked.=C2=
=A0<br>
&gt; =C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0<br>
&gt; &lt;/mglt&gt;=C2=A0<br>
<br>
The secion on Sequence Numbers concerns me too, and for the same reasons<br=
>
as above. If you cannot keep a sequence number as state, you cannot do<br>
any AEAD encryption. I believe it is a bad idea to still write<br>
specifications today that require non-AEAD algorithms. Once you can do<br>
it for AEAD, then you can do it for SN too (and using the other draft<br>
that specified re-using the SN for one of these for other saves you<br>
those bytes once).<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>&lt;mglt&gt;</div><d=
iv>I think I am a bit confused about what is the concern related to SN. You=
r previous concern was to have random SPIs and random IVs, I do not clearly=
 how this could=C2=A0concern SN, nor how SN and AEAD are related. Maybe you=
 could clarify the issue related to AEAD and SN.=C2=A0=C2=A0</div><div>&lt;=
/mglt&gt;=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px =
0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0- Are we comfortable with the recommendation=
: &#39;A node MAY drop<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0anti-replay protection provided by IPsec, an=
d instead implement its own<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0internal mechanism.&#39;? What might this in=
ternal mechanism look like?<br>
<br>
Again, I do not think that we should write RFCs where to disable<br>
security meassures because the device is too constrained. If that is<br>
the case, perhaps IPsec is not the protocol that should be used? Yes,<br>
we can use IPsec without replay protection, but it is unwise to do so.<br>
Handwaving it to be the implementors or application&#39;s problem is a bit<=
br>
dangerous (though not as dangerous as the SPI case above)<br>
<br></blockquote><div>&lt;mglt&gt;</div><div>We basically restate the stand=
ard ESP and we have no intention to update ESP. As explained before the dan=
gerosity of non random SPI is a misconception and does not have any securit=
y issues. I suppose the recommendation is fine then.</div><div>&lt;/mglt&gt=
;=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px =
0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
Padding I am less concerned about. Often it is not needed, and TFC is<br>
indeed not used a lot - mostly I think because it really only makes<br>
sense to use TFC based on MTU size, but that in itself will cause<br>
more MTU related issues. And an IoT device is likely to send a fixed<br>
format packet anyway with minimal or no change in packet length, in<br>
which case all packets will be the same length. It could create real<br>
security concerns though, if one could deduce a password length or<br>
something based on the type of IoT device and its packet length.<br>
<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 For interoperability, it is RECOMMENDED a minim=
al ESP<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 implementation discards dummy packets.<br>
<br>
I&#39;m not sure what this means. What else would one do with a dummy<br>
packet? Regardless, I don&#39;t know of implementations that currently<br>
support sending dummy packets.<br></blockquote><div>&lt;mglt&gt;</div><div>=
A dummy packet is indicated by a Next Header value set to 59. The intention=
 is to prevent these packet to be moved to upper layers and instead explici=
tly been discarded. I agree that we may replace the RECOMMEND by MUST to fo=
llow RFC4301. I think the comment was also raised by Valery.=C2=A0</div><di=
v>RFC4301 mentions a transmitter MUST be able to generate dummy packets but=
 does not mandate to generate this packets.=C2=A0</div><div>&lt;/mglt&gt;</=
div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;bor=
der-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
I&#39;m a little confused what Section 7 is saying? What does the<br>
implementer need to take in from reading this ?<br>
<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 In the latter case, authenticated encryption mu=
st always be considered [RFC8221].<br>
<br>
I&#39;m unsure what this means? Do you mean AEAD? Or are you refering to th=
e<br>
obsolete encryption without _any_ authentication (eg ESP without<br>
authentication _and_ without AH ) ? Regardless of that &quot;must always be=
<br>
considered&quot; is basically saying nothing. It is not strong enough.<br>
Compare this to:<br>
<br>
<a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8221#section-4" rel=3D"=
noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8221=
#section-4</a><br>
<br>
where it clearly states MUST NOT. So your text is is basically negating<br>
that MUST NOT to &quot;consider&quot;.<br>
<br></blockquote><div>&lt;mglt&gt;</div><div>I am a bit confused by the com=
ment. The text we are refering is in section 8 and mentionned below:</div><=
div><br></div><div>&quot;&quot;&quot;</div><div><span style=3D"font-family:=
monospace"><span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0)">=C2=A0 1.=C2=A0 Security: Secur=
ity is the criteria that should be considered =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0</span=
><span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0)">=C2=A0</span><br><span style=3D"color:rgb=
(0,0,0)"> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0first for the selection of en=
cryption algorithm transform.=C2=A0 The =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0</span><span style=3D"color:rg=
b(0,0,0)">=C2=A0</span><br><span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0)"> =C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0security of encryption algorithm transforms is expe=
cted to evolve =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0</span><span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0)">=C2=A0</span><br><span style=
=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0)"> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0over time, and i=
t is of primary importance to follow up-to-date =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0</span><span style=3D"co=
lor:rgb(0,0,0)">=C2=A0</span><br><span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0)"> =C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0security guidance and recommendations.=C2=A0 =
The chosen encryption =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0</span><span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,=
0)">=C2=A0</span><br><span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0)"> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0algorithm transforms MUST NOT be known vulnerable or weak=
 (see =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0</span><span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0)">=C2=A0</span><br><sp=
an style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0)"> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0[</span>=
<span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:rgb(255,84,84)">RFC8221</s=
pan><span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0)">] for outdated ciphers).=C2=A0 ESP can=
 be used to authenticate =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0</span><span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0)">=C2=A0</span><br>=
<span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0)"> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0only =
or to encrypt the communication.=C2=A0 In the latter case, =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0</span><span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0)">=C2=A0</span><br>=
<span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0)"> =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0authe=
nticated encryption must always be considered [</span><span style=3D"color:=
rgb(0,0,0);background-color:rgb(255,84,84)">RFC8221</span><span style=3D"co=
lor:rgb(0,0,0)">].=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0=
=C2=A0</span><br></span></div><div><span style=3D"font-family:monospace"><s=
pan style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0)">&quot;&quot;&quot;</span></span></div><div><=
span style=3D"font-family:monospace"><span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0)"><br><=
/span></span></div><div><span style=3D"font-family:monospace"><span style=
=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0)">It seems to me that we mandate to follow cryptographi=
c recommendations of RFC8221 and I do not see how this is weakened or contr=
adicting RFC8221. Would the &quot;MUST always be considered [RFC8221]&quot;=
. address your concerned. I have updated the text accordingly.=C2=A0</span>=
</span></div><div><br></div><div>&lt;/mglt&gt;</div><div>=C2=A0</div><block=
quote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1=
px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 When the key is likely to be re-used<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 across reboots, it is RECOMMENDED to consider t=
ransforms that are<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 nonce misuse resistant such as AES-GCM-SIV<br>
<br>
But there is no AES-GCM-SIV IKE or ESP algorithm, so you cannot<br>
recommend that. The only thing you can recommend is AES-CBC, and as I<br>
said before, recommending non-AEAD over AEAD is not something I think<br>
the IETF should do.<br>
<br></blockquote><div>&lt;mglt&gt;</div><div>Again the document is on ESP n=
ot IKE. That AES-GCM-SIV is not defined for IKEv2 does not prevent it to be=
 used for ESP. That said, I agree the negotiation might be harder. It think=
 the recommendation holds that these suites are available or not. Hopefully=
 in the future these suites may be defined.=C2=A0=C2=A0</div><div>&lt;/mglt=
&gt;=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0=
px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
I cannot parse this sentence:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Note that it<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 is not because an encryption algorithm transfor=
m is widely<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 deployed that is secured.<br>
<br></blockquote><div>&lt;mglt&gt;</div><div>good catch: the text should be=
=C2=A0</div><div>Note that it<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 is not because an encryption algorithm transfor=
m is widely<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 deployed that it is secured.<br></div><div><br>=
</div><div>This has been changed.</div><div>&lt;/mglt&gt;=C2=A0</div><block=
quote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1=
px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
I also see some promotion of AES-CTR, which I&#39;m a little uncomfortable<=
br>
with.<br>
<br>
<br>
The security considerations section does not list the issue I&#39;ve raised=
<br>
here. For AEAD it states that &quot;mechanisms MUST be in place&quot; to pr=
event<br>
nonce re-use, but the document doesn&#39;t really give guidance. In fact,<b=
r>
if anything it is saying there there is no way to carry state across<br>
reboots for that and that keys might be somehow hardcoded and re-used?<br>
So I would like to ask again, what concrete thing should an implementer<br>
take from this section, eg when it is implementing AES-GCM ?<br>
<br></blockquote><div>=C2=A0&lt;mglt&gt;</div><div>If no mechanism cannot b=
e found, I am reading the text as considering looking at ciphersuites that =
address this problem. I agree that might be good to provide some details, b=
ut I guess these techniques would be very much ciphersuite dependent. I am =
wondering if there are any mechanism you have in mind you woudl like to be =
mentioned or a reference you would like to add ?</div><div>&lt;/mglt&gt;</d=
iv><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px=
 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
After lots of talk that generating 4 random bytes for the SPI might be<br>
too hard, the Security Considerations lists:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 When a node generates its key or when random va=
lue such as nonces are<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 generated, the random generation MUST follow [R=
FC4086].=C2=A0 In addition<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 [SP-800-90A-Rev-1] provides appropriated guidan=
ce to build random<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 generators based on deterministic random functi=
ons.<br>
<br>
If you can do that, you can do 4 bytes of random SPI. So these two items<br=
>
are contradicting each other. Either you can easilly generate random<br>
SPIs and we should keep them at 4 bytes, OR we simply don&#39;t have the<br=
>
resources for RFC4086 and SP-800-90A-Rev-1 based random number<br>
generates. I mean, I can&#39;t see them doing a continious self test for<br=
>
random required by FIPS if you can&#39;t even generate 4 bytes of random<br=
>
SPI.<br>
<br></blockquote><div>&lt;mglt&gt;</div><div>I think this non issue has alr=
eady covered.</div><div>&lt;/mglt&gt;=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail=
_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204=
,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
In conclusion, I think this document is not helpful to implementers. It<br>
is very wordy but lacks clear advise to implementors and while it raises<br=
>
security issues for those implementers, it does not actually present<br>
solutions for them.<br>
<br>
Paul<br>
</blockquote></div><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div dir=3D"ltr"=
><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Daniel Migault<br></div><div>Ericsson</div></div></d=
iv></div></div>

--00000000000030f40005be22d402--


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Subject: Re: [IPsec] [Lwip] draft-ietf-lwig-minimal-esp shepherd writeup
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Paul Wouters writes:
> Reading back now, I think with some clarifications added, I am okay
> with the document. I think the list of clarifications we now have is:

I think your list of things to add is mostly ok.

Note, that on some enviroments creating random numbers is possible,
but it takes time, and power to do so. For example it might be that
hardware random number generator is normally powered off, and is only
powered on during the IKE SA creation phase, and can only create
random numbers at very limited speed. It also might require some time
do self tests, calibration etc before it can be used, so using it per
packet might not be usable, while using it for generating randomness
during the initial phase is no problem.

Perhaps all this should be collected to one new section of the draft,
explaining that you do need proper randomness for Diffie-Hellman etc,
but for ESP you might not need proper random number generators.

> - A clear section on why AES-CBC/3DES-CBC cannot be used due to IV
>    randomness limitations

That is not true. CBC mode requires IVs to be random and
unpredictable, but they do not really be true random, it is enough to
use pseudo random number generators for that. One way to get that is
to use fixed secret key (only known to the device, and no, do not use
key derived from the serial number or mac of the device or similar)
and encrypt the incrementing time with such key.

That should provide proper random IVs than can be used in CBC mode,
and which are unpredictable to everybody who does not know the key
used to generate them.

> - change "cryptographic suites" and "crypto-suites" to "cryptographic
>    algorithms" to avoid TLS confusion

IKEv2 RFC7296 uses cryptograhic suites. RFC4303 or RFC4301 does not
use term suite at all. I would prefer keeping that same term than what
IKEv2 uses.

> - Remove reference to I-D.nikander-esp-beet-mode, with the text "not
>    standarized yet". This draft has been abandoned in 13 years ago.

There has been some discussion every now and then to revive that
draft. There is some good properties in that especially for IoT
environments, as it does not send the extra inner IP header, when that
IP header can be constructed from the SAD.

Anyways that draft is clearly something that is not in scope for lwig,
but falls in the IPsecME scope, so removing that text now is probably
correct. 
-- 
kivinen@iki.fi


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From: Daniel Migault <mglt.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 22 Mar 2021 16:47:41 -0400
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To: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
Cc: Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>,  Mohit Sethi M <mohit.m.sethi=40ericsson.com@dmarc.ietf.org>,  "ipsec@ietf.org" <ipsec@ietf.org>, "lwip@ietf.org" <lwip@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] [Lwip] draft-ietf-lwig-minimal-esp shepherd writeup
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Hi,

To complement my previous response, I have added some text provided by Tero
to clarify the generation of SN from the time. We also added some
explanation around anti replay as well as some more context on the various
constraints different devices may have. We also add some clarification
about what dummy packet are as it seemed the reference to RFC4301 and
section was not sufficient.
On the other hand, I do not believe that is necessary to duplicate the
discussion around the choice of a specific transform and this discussion
should happen in the ESP cryptographic recommendations RFC8221. This also
avoids the document to be updated as crypto evolves and new transforms are
introduced.

The current version is available here:
https://github.com/mglt/draft-mglt-lwig-minimal-esp/blob/master/draft-ietf-lwig-minimal-esp.xml

Please find my response inline.

Yours,
Daniel



On Mon, Mar 22, 2021 at 12:45 PM Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> wrote:

> On Mon, 22 Mar 2021, Tero Kivinen wrote:
>
> >> In general, this draft is very "wordy" because it is trying to steer
> >> itself around a lot of problems, without making firm decisions. But
> >> the point of an RFC is that it should make clear decisions that
> >> implementers can adopt clearly. As such, I'm not in favour of this
> >> draft. I believe I stated this before?
> >
> > This draft does not change anything in the ESP, it only gives
> > guidelines to the lightweight implementations so they can more easily
> > understand what kind of optimizations are allowed by standard ESP and
> > what benefits or concerns there might be from selecting them.
>
> I find the guidelines it gives unclear. This email has helped a lot and
> I would really like to see some of this text included in the draft.
>
> > Because it does not change ESP, it is not really IPsecME WG job. It is
> > similar than RFC7815 Minimal IKEv2 Initiator Implementation document,
> > which was also published from the LWIG WG and not from the IPsecME WG.
>
> Thanks for the process explanation. I'm okay continuing it this way.
>
> >> But it seems that although my comments caused the draft to be modified,
> >> it still allows non-random SPIs:
> >
> > This document cannot mandate that SPIs need to be random, as no such
> > requirement is in the standard ESP RFC.
>
> Interesting, I did not realise that. The draft could be clarified to
> simply state like, something like:
>
>         RFC4303 states tat SPI's must be unique, but do not require to
>         be random. Most implementations do use random SPIs but this
>         might not be possible for constrained devices. These devices
>         MAY use non-random SPIs.
>
> > But wasn't that attack you referenced, talking about IKE SPIs, not ESP
> > SPIs? At least that is what I remember about that attack...
>
> Yes, that is correct.
>
> > Also even IKE SPIs are not required to be random, they are just
> > required to be unique and non-zero.
>
> Perhaps we should update IKEv2 to SHOULD make them random :)
>
> >> If such a device cannot generate 4 random bytes, how is it performing a
> >> DiffieHellman key exchange? Or is it presumed that IKE is done
> >> elsewhere? In which case "elsewhere" can generate 4 random bytes.
> >
> > I do not think SPI issue is about generating it, but using it for each
> > incoming packet. If device has only support for 4 incoming SPIs, it
> > might just create SPIs using format 0x8000000x, where x is the index
> > in its SAD. Then getting address of SAD structure in memory could
> > simply be (SPI << (sad_table_shift)) + sad_table_start_address after
> > checking that (spi & 0xfffffffc) == 0x80000000.
>
> Again the draft should be making this distinction clear. To me it seems
> to suggest that creating them randmonly was the problem being addressed.
>
> > Generation of the SPI is single operation, and as such not an issue.
> > Mapping SPI -> SAD entry must be done for every incoming packet, and
> > saving cycles from there might make difference.
> >
> >> What about IVs ? If you cannot generate 4 bytes of random, how it is
> >> going to generate the IVs required for ESP?
> >
> > Implicit Initialization Vector (IV) for Counter-Based Ciphers in
> > Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP), RFC 8750,
>
> That is only for the IV of AEAD algorithms. But the draft wiggles between
> discourages these because if you re-use the key along reboots without
> keeping
> state, you would re-use the same IV (counter). Later on in the document,
> and along with your explanation in this email, I understand that the
> time based counter addresses this. I think it should be made much more
> explicitly clear so that implementers know this.
>
>
> For AES-CBC, RFC 3602 states:
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3602#section-3
>
>         The IV field MUST be the same size as the block size of the cipher
>         algorithm being used.  The IV MUST be chosen at random, and MUST be
>         unpredictable.
>
> So the draft basically states that for systems not able to generate a
> random bytes, that it cannot use AES-CBC. It should state this
> explictly.
>
> > IKE SPI or ESP SPI? My understanding those attacks were against IKE,
> > not against ESP.
> >
> > And if what you are saying is true, then we as an IPsecME needs to
> > start making modification to the ESP to actually require the SPI to be
> > random. Currently it does not need to be random, just unique from the
> > local point of view.
>
> Based on the attack, this would only be needed for IKE, not ESP. But for
> implementations this draft targets, that would be a similar
> insurmountable problem? Again, it would be useful to explain why pure
> random is harder to do then using something time based.
>
> >> The secion on Sequence Numbers concerns me too, and for the same reasons
> >> as above. If you cannot keep a sequence number as state, you cannot do
> >> any AEAD encryption. I believe it is a bad idea to still write
> >> specifications today that require non-AEAD algorithms. Once you can do
> >> it for AEAD, then you can do it for SN too (and using the other draft
> >> that specified re-using the SN for one of these for other saves you
> >> those bytes once).
> >
> > You can use AEAD encryption with sequence numbers generated by time
> > without any problems. I would expect most of the IoT devices will use
> > AEAD ciphers, as for example IEEE Std 802.15.4 is only defined to
> > support AEAD ciphers, and the only one currently defined there is
> > AES-CCM, and that AEAD AES-CCM is used with timebased nonces when used
> > with TSCH currently.
> >
> > The problem with regular sequence numbers is that you need to store
> > them to stable storage every time you go sleep. Storing the SA
> > information (keys, SPIs etc) to the flash once after the creation of
> > the SA can be done, as that is just one flash write per SA creation.
> > Syncing sequence number to flash after every packet would quickly wear
> > out the flash, and most likely also slow down the system greatly, as
>
> That's a great explanation of how AEAD can work and the difference
> between storing sequence numbers and storing crypto keys. It should be
> in the draft too.
>
> > Replay protection has always been optional for the receiver. There are
> > lots of ways to do things in a way where you do NOT need replay
> > protection on the ESP layer.
> >
> > The problem with replay protection is again that it needs to be stored
> > across sleeps, i.e., written to the flash memory.
>
> Again, please add this to the draft.
>
> > If the IoT device you are talking about is for example temperature
> > sensor and the protocol is such that sensor wakes up every 60 seconds,
> > sends sensor measurement over ESP, and waits for ACK back from the
> > controller, and after receiving the ACK it goes back to sleep, there
> > is no need to have replay protection on the sensor end. Yes, attacker
> > who can block the connection between the sensor and controller, can
> > replay ACKs and cause the sensor to be happy and not notice that it
> > has lost connection to the controller, but on the other hand even if
> > the sensor would notice that it has lost the connection to controller,
> > there is nothing it can do, as there is no way of indicating that
> > information other than over the radio and attacker is already blocking
> > that. Temperature sensors usually do not have displays or keyboards,
> > and even when there might be LEDs on the board, they do not help much
> > when the sensor is inside the building wall.
>
> Again, great addition for anyone reading the draft why it is okay.
>
> Reading back now, I think with some clarifications added, I am okay
> with the document. I think the list of clarifications we now have is:
>
> - clarifying ESP SPI's do not need to be random, with reference to 4304
>    and explain why random ones take more resources and fixed ones might
>    be used.
>

<mglt>
The text seems as it is sufficient to address your concern:
In fact, the SPI does not necessarily need to be randomly generated.

When a constrained node limits the number of possible SPIs this limit
should both consider the number of
inbound SAs - possibly per IP addresses - as well as the ability for the
node to rekey.
SPI can typically be used to proceed to clean key update and the SPI value
may be used to indicate which key
is being used. This can typically be implemented by a SPI being encoded
with the Security Association Databas
e (SAD) entry on a subset of bytes (for example 3 bytes), while the
remaining byte is left to indicate the re
key index.
</mglt>

> - clarify why counter as entire IV is okay (because AEAD) and why
>    storing an absolute counter on  flash is bad, and timing can be used
>    instead.
>
<mglt>
The text already mentions RFC8750
</mglt>

> - Clarify why sequence numbers cannot be sequential - flash writes are
>    bad.
>
<mglt>
Text proposed by Tero has been included.
</mglt>

> - A clear section on why AES-CBC/3DES-CBC cannot be used due to IV
>    randomness limitations
>
<mglt>
The text delegates the crypto recommendations to 8221 which mentions 3DES
has should not and mentions AES_CBC to be replaced. I do not think that the
discussion should be duplicated here. In addition the text mentions the
following recommendations:
 - Use of counter-based ciphers without fixed block length (e.g. AES-CTR,
or ChaCha20-Poly1305).
 - Use of ciphers recommended for IoT *[*RFC8221].
</mglt>

> - clearly recommending an AEAD like AES-CCM or AES-GCM. Consider using
>    their IV-less names from RFC 8750.
>
<mglt>
The text mentions as a second recommendation:
- Use of ciphers with capability of using implicit IVs *[*RFC8750].
</mglt>

> - Remove reference to AES-GCM-SIV which does not exist for ESP, or
>    clarify "once/if available for ESP".
>
<mglt>
ESP does not define transform these are defined by IKE. AES-GCM-SIV is the
algorithm not the transform. See my response in my previous email.
</mglt>

> - call "ChaCha20-Poly1305" by its name CHACHA20_POLY1305 (and maybe also
>    by its RFC 8750 name)
>
<mglt>
The ChaCha20-Poly1305 is mentioned for its cryptography properties not as a
transform. These remain independent of the multiple associated transform
using it. Again the choice of the specific transform is delegated to
RFC8221.
</mglt>

> - clarifying section 6 that this is not about the Next Header (being
>    removed) but just about not supporting dummy packets. Probably change
>    the title of the section too.
>
 <mglt>
I understand the problem was a mis interpretation of the dummy packet which
has been clarified with the following text:
"""
 i.e. packets with the Next Header with a value 59 meaning "no next
header".
"""
</mglt>

> - change "cryptographic suites" and "crypto-suites" to "cryptographic
>    algorithms" to avoid TLS confusion
>
<mglt>
I think IKEv2 uses suites or transform.
</mglt>

> - update the introduction to introduce the constrains (flash writes,
>    wake/up sleep vs reboot, getrandom limitations)
>
<mglt>
The text has been updated with :
 As a result, constraint devices are likely to have their own
implementation of ESP optimized and adapted to t
heir specificities such as limiting the number of flash writes (for each
packets or across wake time), handli
ng frequence wake/up sleep while limiting wake time, or reducing the use of
random generation.
</mglt>

>  - figure out what to do with the FIPS reference on randomness (because
>    I don't think with continuous self test, it can be fully FIPS
>    compliant?)
>
<mglt>
The reference has been kept as suggested by Scott.
</mglt>

> - Clarify the list in section 8. Is this ordered from most important
>    to least important? I think so but it does not state this.
>
<mglt>
I find it difficult to define a universal order.
</mglt>

> - Remove reference to I-D.nikander-esp-beet-mode, with the text "not
>    standarized yet". This draft has been abandoned in 13 years ago.
>
> <mglt>
I think it is useful to keep the text mentioning that in some case NH is
used otherwise but we do not have to bother. While not standardized, it is
implemented and used. I agree though it is not essential, but I do not see
it as hurting.
</mglt>

> I'm willing to help with text if the authors want, but I think if I did
> that, the diff would be quite large as I would be clarifying things be
> being more epxlicit and use fewer words. So it might be better if the
> goal is to keep the changes to a minimum for the draft authors to make
> the changes.
>
> <mglt>
We want to keep the changes minimal also to avoid overwriting text that has
been agreed before.
</mglt>

> Paul
>


-- 
Daniel Migault
Ericsson

--000000000000f9381c05be262d24
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div></div><div>Hi,=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>To comp=
lement my previous response, I have added some text provided by Tero to cla=
rify the generation of SN from the time. We also added some explanation aro=
und=C2=A0anti replay as well as some more context on the various constraint=
s=C2=A0different devices may have. We also add some clarification about wha=
t dummy packet are as it seemed the reference to RFC4301 and section was no=
t sufficient.=C2=A0</div><div></div><div>On the other hand, I do not believ=
e that is necessary=C2=A0to duplicate the discussion around the choice of a=
 specific transform and this=C2=A0discussion should happen in the ESP crypt=
ographic recommendations RFC8221. This also avoids the document to be updat=
ed as crypto evolves and new transforms are introduced.=C2=A0</div><div><br=
></div><div>The current version is available here:</div><div><a href=3D"htt=
ps://github.com/mglt/draft-mglt-lwig-minimal-esp/blob/master/draft-ietf-lwi=
g-minimal-esp.xml">https://github.com/mglt/draft-mglt-lwig-minimal-esp/blob=
/master/draft-ietf-lwig-minimal-esp.xml</a></div><div><br></div>Please find=
 my response inline.=C2=A0<div><br></div><div>Yours,=C2=A0<br>Daniel</div><=
div><br><div><br><div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=
=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, Mar 22, 2021 at 12:45 PM Paul Wouters &lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:paul@nohats.ca">paul@nohats.ca</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquo=
te class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px =
solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">On Mon, 22 Mar 2021, Tero Kivinen =
wrote:<br>
<br>
&gt;&gt; In general, this draft is very &quot;wordy&quot; because it is try=
ing to steer<br>
&gt;&gt; itself around a lot of problems, without making firm decisions. Bu=
t<br>
&gt;&gt; the point of an RFC is that it should make clear decisions that<br=
>
&gt;&gt; implementers can adopt clearly. As such, I&#39;m not in favour of =
this<br>
&gt;&gt; draft. I believe I stated this before?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; This draft does not change anything in the ESP, it only gives<br>
&gt; guidelines to the lightweight implementations so they can more easily<=
br>
&gt; understand what kind of optimizations are allowed by standard ESP and<=
br>
&gt; what benefits or concerns there might be from selecting them.<br>
<br>
I find the guidelines it gives unclear. This email has helped a lot and<br>
I would really like to see some of this text included in the draft.<br>
<br>
&gt; Because it does not change ESP, it is not really IPsecME WG job. It is=
<br>
&gt; similar than RFC7815 Minimal IKEv2 Initiator Implementation document,<=
br>
&gt; which was also published from the LWIG WG and not from the IPsecME WG.=
<br>
<br>
Thanks for the process explanation. I&#39;m okay continuing it this way.<br=
>
<br>
&gt;&gt; But it seems that although my comments caused the draft to be modi=
fied,<br>
&gt;&gt; it still allows non-random SPIs:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; This document cannot mandate that SPIs need to be random, as no such<b=
r>
&gt; requirement is in the standard ESP RFC.<br>
<br>
Interesting, I did not realise that. The draft could be clarified to<br>
simply state like, something like:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 RFC4303 states tat SPI&#39;s must be unique, bu=
t do not require to<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 be random. Most implementations do use random S=
PIs but this<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 might not be possible for constrained devices. =
These devices<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 MAY use non-random SPIs.<br>
<br>
&gt; But wasn&#39;t that attack you referenced, talking about IKE SPIs, not=
 ESP<br>
&gt; SPIs? At least that is what I remember about that attack...<br>
<br>
Yes, that is correct.<br>
<br>
&gt; Also even IKE SPIs are not required to be random, they are just<br>
&gt; required to be unique and non-zero.<br>
<br>
Perhaps we should update IKEv2 to SHOULD make them random :)<br>
<br>
&gt;&gt; If such a device cannot generate 4 random bytes, how is it perform=
ing a<br>
&gt;&gt; DiffieHellman key exchange? Or is it presumed that IKE is done<br>
&gt;&gt; elsewhere? In which case &quot;elsewhere&quot; can generate 4 rand=
om bytes.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I do not think SPI issue is about generating it, but using it for each=
<br>
&gt; incoming packet. If device has only support for 4 incoming SPIs, it<br=
>
&gt; might just create SPIs using format 0x8000000x, where x is the index<b=
r>
&gt; in its SAD. Then getting address of SAD structure in memory could<br>
&gt; simply be (SPI &lt;&lt; (sad_table_shift)) + sad_table_start_address a=
fter<br>
&gt; checking that (spi &amp; 0xfffffffc) =3D=3D 0x80000000.<br>
<br>
Again the draft should be making this distinction clear. To me it seems<br>
to suggest that creating them randmonly was the problem being addressed.<br=
>
<br>
&gt; Generation of the SPI is single operation, and as such not an issue.<b=
r>
&gt; Mapping SPI -&gt; SAD entry must be done for every incoming packet, an=
d<br>
&gt; saving cycles from there might make difference.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; What about IVs ? If you cannot generate 4 bytes of random, how it =
is<br>
&gt;&gt; going to generate the IVs required for ESP?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Implicit Initialization Vector (IV) for Counter-Based Ciphers in<br>
&gt; Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP), RFC 8750,<br>
<br>
That is only for the IV of AEAD algorithms. But the draft wiggles between<b=
r>
discourages these because if you re-use the key along reboots without keepi=
ng<br>
state, you would re-use the same IV (counter). Later on in the document,<br=
>
and along with your explanation in this email, I understand that the<br>
time based counter addresses this. I think it should be made much more<br>
explicitly clear so that implementers know this.<br>
<br>
<br>
For AES-CBC, RFC 3602 states: <a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc360=
2#section-3" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://tools.ietf.org/ht=
ml/rfc3602#section-3</a><br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 The IV field MUST be the same size as the block=
 size of the cipher<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 algorithm being used.=C2=A0 The IV MUST be chos=
en at random, and MUST be<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 unpredictable.<br>
<br>
So the draft basically states that for systems not able to generate a<br>
random bytes, that it cannot use AES-CBC. It should state this<br>
explictly.<br>
<br>
&gt; IKE SPI or ESP SPI? My understanding those attacks were against IKE,<b=
r>
&gt; not against ESP.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; And if what you are saying is true, then we as an IPsecME needs to<br>
&gt; start making modification to the ESP to actually require the SPI to be=
<br>
&gt; random. Currently it does not need to be random, just unique from the<=
br>
&gt; local point of view.<br>
<br>
Based on the attack, this would only be needed for IKE, not ESP. But for<br=
>
implementations this draft targets, that would be a similar<br>
insurmountable problem? Again, it would be useful to explain why pure<br>
random is harder to do then using something time based.<br>
<br>
&gt;&gt; The secion on Sequence Numbers concerns me too, and for the same r=
easons<br>
&gt;&gt; as above. If you cannot keep a sequence number as state, you canno=
t do<br>
&gt;&gt; any AEAD encryption. I believe it is a bad idea to still write<br>
&gt;&gt; specifications today that require non-AEAD algorithms. Once you ca=
n do<br>
&gt;&gt; it for AEAD, then you can do it for SN too (and using the other dr=
aft<br>
&gt;&gt; that specified re-using the SN for one of these for other saves yo=
u<br>
&gt;&gt; those bytes once).<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; You can use AEAD encryption with sequence numbers generated by time<br=
>
&gt; without any problems. I would expect most of the IoT devices will use<=
br>
&gt; AEAD ciphers, as for example IEEE Std 802.15.4 is only defined to<br>
&gt; support AEAD ciphers, and the only one currently defined there is<br>
&gt; AES-CCM, and that AEAD AES-CCM is used with timebased nonces when used=
<br>
&gt; with TSCH currently.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; The problem with regular sequence numbers is that you need to store<br=
>
&gt; them to stable storage every time you go sleep. Storing the SA<br>
&gt; information (keys, SPIs etc) to the flash once after the creation of<b=
r>
&gt; the SA can be done, as that is just one flash write per SA creation.<b=
r>
&gt; Syncing sequence number to flash after every packet would quickly wear=
<br>
&gt; out the flash, and most likely also slow down the system greatly, as<b=
r>
<br>
That&#39;s a great explanation of how AEAD can work and the difference<br>
between storing sequence numbers and storing crypto keys. It should be<br>
in the draft too.<br>
<br>
&gt; Replay protection has always been optional for the receiver. There are=
<br>
&gt; lots of ways to do things in a way where you do NOT need replay<br>
&gt; protection on the ESP layer.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; The problem with replay protection is again that it needs to be stored=
<br>
&gt; across sleeps, i.e., written to the flash memory.<br>
<br>
Again, please add this to the draft.<br>
<br>
&gt; If the IoT device you are talking about is for example temperature<br>
&gt; sensor and the protocol is such that sensor wakes up every 60 seconds,=
<br>
&gt; sends sensor measurement over ESP, and waits for ACK back from the<br>
&gt; controller, and after receiving the ACK it goes back to sleep, there<b=
r>
&gt; is no need to have replay protection on the sensor end. Yes, attacker<=
br>
&gt; who can block the connection between the sensor and controller, can<br=
>
&gt; replay ACKs and cause the sensor to be happy and not notice that it<br=
>
&gt; has lost connection to the controller, but on the other hand even if<b=
r>
&gt; the sensor would notice that it has lost the connection to controller,=
<br>
&gt; there is nothing it can do, as there is no way of indicating that<br>
&gt; information other than over the radio and attacker is already blocking=
<br>
&gt; that. Temperature sensors usually do not have displays or keyboards,<b=
r>
&gt; and even when there might be LEDs on the board, they do not help much<=
br>
&gt; when the sensor is inside the building wall.<br>
<br>
Again, great addition for anyone reading the draft why it is okay.<br>
<br>
Reading back now, I think with some clarifications added, I am okay<br>
with the document. I think the list of clarifications we now have is:<br>
<br>
- clarifying ESP SPI&#39;s do not need to be random, with reference to 4304=
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0and explain why random ones take more resources and fixed ones=
 might<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0be used.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>&lt;mglt&gt;</div=
><div>The text seems as it is sufficient to address your concern:</div><div=
><span style=3D"font-family:monospace"><span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0)">In =
fact, the SPI does not necessarily need to be randomly generated.</span><br=
></span></div><div><span style=3D"font-family:monospace"><span style=3D"col=
or:rgb(0,0,0)"><br></span></span></div><div><span style=3D"font-family:mono=
space"><span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0)">When a constrained node limits the =
number of possible SPIs this limit should both consider the number of </spa=
n><br>inbound SAs - possibly per IP addresses - as well as the ability for =
the node to rekey. =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0<sp=
an style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0)">=C2=A0</span><br><span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0=
,0)">SPI can typically be used to proceed to clean key update and the SPI v=
alue may be used to indicate which key </span><br>is being used. This can t=
ypically be implemented by a SPI being encoded with the Security Associatio=
n Databas<br>e (SAD) entry on a subset of bytes (for example 3 bytes), whil=
e the remaining byte is left to indicate the re<br>key index.=C2=A0=C2=A0<b=
r></span></div><div>&lt;/mglt&gt;=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quo=
te" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204=
);padding-left:1ex">
- clarify why counter as entire IV is okay (because AEAD) and why<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0storing an absolute counter on=C2=A0 flash is bad, and timing =
can be used<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0instead.<br></blockquote><div>&lt;mglt&gt;</div><div>The text =
already mentions RFC8750</div><div>&lt;/mglt&gt;=C2=A0</div><blockquote cla=
ss=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid =
rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
- Clarify why sequence numbers cannot be sequential - flash writes are<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0bad.<br></blockquote><div>&lt;mglt&gt;</div><div>Text proposed=
 by Tero has been included.=C2=A0</div><div>&lt;/mglt&gt;=C2=A0</div><block=
quote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1=
px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
- A clear section on why AES-CBC/3DES-CBC cannot be used due to IV<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0randomness limitations<br></blockquote><div>&lt;mglt&gt;</div>=
<div>The text delegates the crypto recommendations to 8221 which mentions 3=
DES has should not and mentions AES_CBC to be replaced. I do not think that=
 the discussion should be duplicated here. In addition the text mentions th=
e following recommendations:</div><div><span style=3D"font-family:monospace=
"><span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0)">=C2=A0- Use of counter-based ciphers wit=
hout fixed block length (e.g. AES-CTR, or ChaCha20-Poly1305).</span><br></s=
pan></div><div><span style=3D"font-family:monospace"><span style=3D"color:r=
gb(0,0,0)">=C2=A0-=C2=A0</span></span><span style=3D"font-family:monospace;=
color:rgb(0,0,0)">Use of ciphers recommended for IoT </span><span style=3D"=
font-family:monospace"><font color=3D"#870000"><b>[</b></font></span><span =
style=3D"font-family:monospace;color:rgb(215,0,95);background-color:rgb(255=
,84,84)">RFC8221]</span><span style=3D"font-family:monospace;color:rgb(0,0,=
0)">.</span></div><div>&lt;/mglt&gt;=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_=
quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,=
204);padding-left:1ex">
- clearly recommending an AEAD like AES-CCM or AES-GCM. Consider using<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0their IV-less names from RFC 8750.<br></blockquote><div>&lt;mg=
lt&gt;</div><div>The text mentions as a second recommendation:=C2=A0</div><=
div>-=C2=A0<span style=3D"font-family:monospace;color:rgb(0,0,0)">Use of ci=
phers with capability of using implicit IVs </span><span style=3D"font-fami=
ly:monospace"><font color=3D"#870000"><b>[</b></font></span><span style=3D"=
font-family:monospace;color:rgb(215,0,95);background-color:rgb(255,84,84)">=
RFC8750]</span><span style=3D"font-family:monospace;color:rgb(0,0,0)">.</sp=
an></div><div>&lt;/mglt&gt;=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" st=
yle=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padd=
ing-left:1ex">
- Remove reference to AES-GCM-SIV which does not exist for ESP, or<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0clarify &quot;once/if available for ESP&quot;.<br></blockquote=
><div>&lt;mglt&gt;</div><div>ESP does not define transform these are define=
d=C2=A0by=C2=A0IKE. AES-GCM-SIV is the algorithm not the transform. See my =
response in my previous email.=C2=A0</div><div>&lt;/mglt&gt;=C2=A0</div><bl=
ockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-lef=
t:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
- call &quot;ChaCha20-Poly1305&quot; by its name CHACHA20_POLY1305 (and may=
be also<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0by its RFC 8750 name)<br></blockquote><div>&lt;mglt&gt;</div><=
div>The=C2=A0ChaCha20-Poly1305 is mentioned for its cryptography properties=
 not as a transform. These remain independent of the multiple associated=C2=
=A0transform using it. Again the choice of the specific transform is delega=
ted=C2=A0to RFC8221.=C2=A0</div><div>&lt;/mglt&gt;=C2=A0</div><blockquote c=
lass=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px soli=
d rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
- clarifying section 6 that this is not about the Next Header (being<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0removed) but just about not supporting dummy packets. Probably=
 change<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0the title of the section too.<br></blockquote><div>=C2=A0&lt;m=
glt&gt;</div><div>I understand the=C2=A0problem was a mis interpretation=C2=
=A0of the dummy packet which has been clarified with the following text:</d=
iv><div>&quot;&quot;&quot;</div><div>=C2=A0i.e. packets with the Next Heade=
r with a value 59 meaning &quot;no next header&quot;.=C2=A0<br></div><div>&=
quot;&quot;&quot;</div><div>&lt;/mglt&gt;</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_q=
uote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,2=
04);padding-left:1ex">
- change &quot;cryptographic suites&quot; and &quot;crypto-suites&quot; to =
&quot;cryptographic<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0algorithms&quot; to avoid TLS confusion<br></blockquote><div>&=
lt;mglt&gt;</div><div>I think IKEv2 uses suites or transform.=C2=A0</div><d=
iv>&lt;/mglt&gt;=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"marg=
in:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1e=
x">
- update the introduction to introduce the constrains (flash writes,<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0wake/up sleep vs reboot, getrandom limitations)<br></blockquot=
e><div>&lt;mglt&gt;</div><div>The text has been updated with :=C2=A0</div><=
div>=C2=A0<span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:monospace">As a resul=
t, constraint devices are likely to have their own implementation of ESP op=
timized and adapted to t</span></div><span style=3D"font-family:monospace">=
heir specificities such as limiting the number of flash writes (for each pa=
ckets or across wake time),=C2=A0handli<br>ng frequence wake/up sleep while=
 limiting wake time, or reducing the use of random generation.=C2=A0 =C2=A0=
=C2=A0<br></span></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><span style=3D"font-famil=
y:monospace">&lt;/mglt&gt;<br></span><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" styl=
e=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);paddin=
g-left:1ex">=C2=A0- figure out what to do with the FIPS reference on random=
ness (because<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0I don&#39;t think with continuous self test, it can be fully F=
IPS<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0compliant?)<br></blockquote><div>&lt;mglt&gt;</div><div>The re=
ference has been kept as suggested by Scott.</div><div>&lt;/mglt&gt;=C2=A0<=
/div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;bo=
rder-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
- Clarify the list in section 8. Is this ordered from most important<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0to least important? I think so but it does not state this.<br>=
</blockquote><div>&lt;mglt&gt;</div><div>I find it difficult to define a un=
iversal order.</div><div>&lt;/mglt&gt;=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmai=
l_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,20=
4,204);padding-left:1ex">
- Remove reference to I-D.nikander-esp-beet-mode, with the text &quot;not<b=
r>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0standarized yet&quot;. This draft has been abandoned in 13 yea=
rs ago.<br>
<br></blockquote><div>&lt;mglt&gt;</div><div>I think it is useful to keep t=
he text mentioning that in some case NH is used otherwise but we do not hav=
e to bother. While not standardized, it is implemented and used. I agree th=
ough it is not essential, but I do not see it as hurting.=C2=A0</div><div>&=
lt;/mglt&gt;=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0=
px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
I&#39;m willing to help with text if the authors want, but I think if I did=
<br>
that, the diff would be quite large as I would be clarifying things be<br>
being more epxlicit and use fewer words. So it might be better if the<br>
goal is to keep the changes to a minimum for the draft authors to make<br>
the changes.<br>
<br></blockquote><div>&lt;mglt&gt;</div><div>We want to keep the changes mi=
nimal also to avoid overwriting=C2=A0text that has been agreed before.=C2=
=A0</div><div>&lt;/mglt&gt;=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" st=
yle=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padd=
ing-left:1ex">
Paul<br>
</blockquote></div><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div dir=3D"ltr"=
 class=3D"gmail_signature"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Daniel Migault<br></div><d=
iv>Ericsson</div></div></div></div></div></div></div>

--000000000000f9381c05be262d24--


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Subject: Re: [IPsec] rfc8229bis missing advise on error handling in IKE_INIT
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On Fri, 19 Mar 2021, Tommy Pauly wrote:

> This implies that the new IKE_SA_INIT is a retry of the same IKE SA. Indeed, at least for our client, we don’t reset the SA values.

Yes, for a client sure. But for a server there is no guarantee the
client will come back. There is no point in keeping any state, until
now TCP came along.

>       Similarly, when IKE_AUTH fails with NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN or
>       AUTHENTICATION_FAILED, who is responsible for closing the TCP socket?
>       The initiator or the responder?
> 
> 
> 8229 says:
>
>    In order to close an IKE session, either the Initiator or Responder
>    SHOULD gracefully tear down IKE SAs with DELETE payloads.  Once the
>    SA has been deleted, the TCP Originator SHOULD close the TCP
>    connection if it does not intend to use the connection for another
>    IKE session to the TCP Responder.  If the connection is left idle and
>    the TCP Responder needs to clean up resources, the TCP Responder MAY
>    close the TCP connection.
> 
> This generally means: client goes first when closing TCP, but server should close if the client doesn’t in time.

That makes sense, but again it is different for the server case.
Normally, the server can delete all state after a NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN or
AUTHENTICATION_FAILED in IKE_AUTH, as there is no way to fix this failed
IKE SA negotiation - the client has to start from scratch.

> Note also that a new TCP connection can always be used for an IKE SA from an old connection; that is allowed, so it’s possible that if
> the server closes too early, the client will reopen with a new connection to send remaining messages.

Right. I guess we need to look at moving our TCP connections without
state into a separate corner, and either close them after a short while
or pick up a new IKE message on it from scratch.

But perhaps this is a useful clarification of the draft. That the
responder has to deal with a TCP session that has no IKE state.

In our case, this ended up in a crasher we are fixing :)

Paul


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From: Daniel Migault <mglt.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2021 11:23:10 -0400
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] [Lwip] I-D Action: draft-ietf-lwig-minimal-esp-03.txt
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Hi,

Please find below the updated version of the draft as detailed in [1] and
[2] as well as some nits.
The main changes are that we introduced some more context on
the constraints a device may have which could clarify the motivations for
the optimizations that were detailed. This includes the context being
provided in the abstract, introduction, as well as for SPI, SN sections.

Having not heard any feedbacks to [1] and [2] I believe these updates
address the concerns raised.

Yours,
Daniel

[1] https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/lwip/IHyy2OCA-hWWfjxDrkX-x1yAvFI/
[2] https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/lwip/vBtGKO_0GU_SUNkfu-iSUC-Bq9A/

On Wed, Mar 24, 2021 at 11:11 AM <internet-drafts@ietf.org> wrote:

>
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
> directories.
> This draft is a work item of the Light-Weight Implementation Guidance WG
> of the IETF.
>
>         Title           : Minimal ESP
>         Authors         : Daniel Migault
>                           Tobias Guggemos
>         Filename        : draft-ietf-lwig-minimal-esp-03.txt
>         Pages           : 14
>         Date            : 2021-03-24
>
> Abstract:
>    This document describes a minimal implementation of the IP
>    Encapsulation Security Payload (ESP) defined in RFC 4303.  Its
>    purpose is to enable implementation of ESP with a minimal set of
>    options to remain compatible with ESP as described in RFC 4303.  A
>    minimal version of ESP is not intended to become a replacement of the
>    RFC 4303 ESP.  Instead, a minimal implementation is expected to be
>    optimized for constrained environment while remaining interoperable
>    with implementations of RFC 4303 ESP.  Constrains include among other
>    limiting the number of flash writes, handling frequent wakeup / sleep
>    states, limiting wakeup time, or reducing the use of random
>    generation.
>
>    This document describes what is required from RFC 4303 ESP as well as
>    various ways to optimize compliance with RFC 4303 ESP.
>
>    This document does not update or modify RFC 4303, but provides a
>    compact description of how to implement the minimal version of the
>    protocol.  If this document and RFC 4303 conflicts, then RFC 4303 is
>    the authoritative description.
>
>
> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-lwig-minimal-esp/
>
> There are also htmlized versions available at:
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-lwig-minimal-esp-03
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lwig-minimal-esp-03
>
> A diff from the previous version is available at:
> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-lwig-minimal-esp-03
>
>
> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of
> submission
> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>
> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Lwip mailing list
> Lwip@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/lwip
>


-- 
Daniel Migault
Ericsson

--0000000000001cd9a505be49e1f4
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<div dir=3D"ltr">Hi,=C2=A0<div><br></div><div>Please find below the updated=
 version of the draft as detailed=C2=A0in [1] and [2] as well as some nits.=
=C2=A0</div><div>The main changes are that we introduced some more context =
on the=C2=A0constraints=C2=A0a device may have which could clarify the moti=
vations for the optimizations that were detailed. This includes the context=
 being provided in the abstract, introduction, as well as for SPI, SN secti=
ons.</div><div><br></div><div>Having not heard any feedbacks=C2=A0to [1] an=
d [2] I believe these updates address the concerns raised.=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=
=A0</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0</div><div>Yours,=C2=A0<br>Daniel</div><div><br>=
</div><div>[1]=C2=A0<a href=3D"https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/lwip/I=
Hyy2OCA-hWWfjxDrkX-x1yAvFI/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/lwip/IHy=
y2OCA-hWWfjxDrkX-x1yAvFI/</a></div><div>[2]=C2=A0<a href=3D"https://mailarc=
hive.ietf.org/arch/msg/lwip/vBtGKO_0GU_SUNkfu-iSUC-Bq9A/">https://mailarchi=
ve.ietf.org/arch/msg/lwip/vBtGKO_0GU_SUNkfu-iSUC-Bq9A/</a>=C2=A0</div></div=
><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On We=
d, Mar 24, 2021 at 11:11 AM &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:internet-drafts@ietf.org"=
>internet-drafts@ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmai=
l_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,20=
4,204);padding-left:1ex"><br>
A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts director=
ies.<br>
This draft is a work item of the Light-Weight Implementation Guidance WG of=
 the IETF.<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Title=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0:=
 Minimal ESP<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Authors=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0: Dani=
el Migault<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Tobias Guggemos<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Filename=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 : draft-iet=
f-lwig-minimal-esp-03.txt<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Pages=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0:=
 14<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Date=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 :=
 2021-03-24<br>
<br>
Abstract:<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0This document describes a minimal implementation of the IP<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0Encapsulation Security Payload (ESP) defined in RFC 4303.=C2=
=A0 Its<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0purpose is to enable implementation of ESP with a minimal set =
of<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0options to remain compatible with ESP as described in RFC 4303=
.=C2=A0 A<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0minimal version of ESP is not intended to become a replacement=
 of the<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0RFC 4303 ESP.=C2=A0 Instead, a minimal implementation is expec=
ted to be<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0optimized for constrained environment while remaining interope=
rable<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0with implementations of RFC 4303 ESP.=C2=A0 Constrains include=
 among other<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0limiting the number of flash writes, handling frequent wakeup =
/ sleep<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0states, limiting wakeup time, or reducing the use of random<br=
>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0generation.<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0This document describes what is required from RFC 4303 ESP as =
well as<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0various ways to optimize compliance with RFC 4303 ESP.<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0This document does not update or modify RFC 4303, but provides=
 a<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0compact description of how to implement the minimal version of=
 the<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0protocol.=C2=A0 If this document and RFC 4303 conflicts, then =
RFC 4303 is<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0the authoritative description.<br>
<br>
<br>
The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:<br>
<a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-lwig-minimal-esp/" r=
el=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-=
ietf-lwig-minimal-esp/</a><br>
<br>
There are also htmlized versions available at:<br>
<a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-lwig-minimal-esp-03" rel=
=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-lw=
ig-minimal-esp-03</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lwig-minimal-es=
p-03" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc=
/html/draft-ietf-lwig-minimal-esp-03</a><br>
<br>
A diff from the previous version is available at:<br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-lwig-minimal-esp-=
03" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=
=3Ddraft-ietf-lwig-minimal-esp-03</a><br>
<br>
<br>
Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submissio=
n<br>
until the htmlized version and diff are available at <a href=3D"http://tool=
s.ietf.org" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">tools.ietf.org</a>.<br>
<br>
Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:<br>
<a href=3D"ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=
=3D"_blank">ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/</a><br>
<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
Lwip mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Lwip@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">Lwip@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/lwip" rel=3D"noreferrer" t=
arget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/lwip</a><br>
</blockquote></div><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div dir=3D"ltr"=
 class=3D"gmail_signature"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Daniel Migault<br></div><d=
iv>Ericsson</div></div></div>

--0000000000001cd9a505be49e1f4--


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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ipsec/xTZr9X1Zt8xY8imRiUJs_yaKwVA>
Subject: [IPsec] draft-xu-ipsecme-esp-in-udp-lb-07
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Hi Xu:

We've got a lot of interest in your draft. Are you going to move this forwa=
rd to a working group draft and RFC? We would be happy to help where needed=
.

Cheers,

Paul Bottorff
Aruba a Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company


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<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Hi Xu:<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">We&#8217;ve got a lot of interest in your draft. Are=
 you going to move this forward to a working group draft and RFC? We would =
be happy to help where needed.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Cheers,<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Paul Bottorff<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Aruba a Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company<o:p></o:p=
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<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
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From nobody Tue Mar 30 17:11:29 2021
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Subject: [IPsec] I-D Action: draft-ietf-ipsecme-iptfs-08.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the IP Security Maintenance and Extensions WG of the IETF.

        Title           : IP-TFS: Aggregation and Fragmentation Mode for ESP and its Use for IP Traffic Flow Security
        Author          : Christian Hopps
	Filename        : draft-ietf-ipsecme-iptfs-08.txt
	Pages           : 30
	Date            : 2021-03-30

Abstract:
   This document describes a mechanism for aggregation and fragmentation
   of IP packets when they are being encapsulated in ESP payload.  This
   new payload type can be used for various purposes such as decreasing
   encapsulation overhead for small IP packets; however, the focus in
   this document is to enhance IPsec traffic flow security (IP-TFS) by
   adding Traffic Flow Confidentiality (TFC) to encrypted IP
   encapsulated traffic.  TFC is provided by obscuring the size and
   frequency of IP traffic using a fixed-sized, constant-send-rate IPsec
   tunnel.  The solution allows for congestion control as well as non-
   constant send-rate usage.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ipsecme-iptfs/

There are also htmlized versions available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ipsecme-iptfs-08
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-ipsecme-iptfs-08

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-ipsecme-iptfs-08


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/



From nobody Tue Mar 30 17:39:28 2021
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This version incorporates Valery's WGLC editorial suggestions with some =
minor tweaks.

Thanks,
Chris.

> On Mar 30, 2021, at 8:11 PM, internet-drafts@ietf.org wrote:
>=20
>=20
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts =
directories.
> This draft is a work item of the IP Security Maintenance and =
Extensions WG of the IETF.
>=20
>        Title           : IP-TFS: Aggregation and Fragmentation Mode =
for ESP and its Use for IP Traffic Flow Security
>        Author          : Christian Hopps
> 	Filename        : draft-ietf-ipsecme-iptfs-08.txt
> 	Pages           : 30
> 	Date            : 2021-03-30
>=20
> Abstract:
>   This document describes a mechanism for aggregation and =
fragmentation
>   of IP packets when they are being encapsulated in ESP payload.  This
>   new payload type can be used for various purposes such as decreasing
>   encapsulation overhead for small IP packets; however, the focus in
>   this document is to enhance IPsec traffic flow security (IP-TFS) by
>   adding Traffic Flow Confidentiality (TFC) to encrypted IP
>   encapsulated traffic.  TFC is provided by obscuring the size and
>   frequency of IP traffic using a fixed-sized, constant-send-rate =
IPsec
>   tunnel.  The solution allows for congestion control as well as non-
>   constant send-rate usage.
>=20
>=20
> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ipsecme-iptfs/
>=20
> There are also htmlized versions available at:
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ipsecme-iptfs-08
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-ipsecme-iptfs-08
>=20
> A diff from the previous version is available at:
> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-ipsecme-iptfs-08
>=20
>=20
> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of =
submission
> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>=20
> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> IPsec mailing list
> IPsec@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec
>=20


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From: Daniel Migault <mglt.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 30 Mar 2021 22:45:18 -0400
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To: Nancy Cam-Winget <nance@winget.net>
Cc: iot-directorate@ietf.org, last-call@ietf.org,  draft-ietf-lwig-minimal-esp.all@ietf.org, lwip@ietf.org,  IPsecME WG <ipsec@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] [Lwip] Iotdir last call review of draft-ietf-lwig-minimal-esp-03
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Hi Nancy,

Thank you very much for your review. Please see inline my responses. I
believe all concerns raised have been addressed. I also believe the current
text addresses some concerns also raised by Paul W.

The current version can be found here:
https://github.com/mglt/draft-mglt-lwig-minimal-esp/pull/1/commits/fb9393a2=
46298e37adcf2683afa2061a40b4ed89

I think there are however three remaining issues that might get further
discussions. For all of these I provided a response, but I am unsure it
really addresses the three concerns below:

----
ISSUE 1
----
- I might challenge due to potential collision attacks that at
most, 2^32-1 packets may be sent before the SPI *must* rekey, so the SN and
how
it is used is part of the security context for the SPI/SA.  I might also
challenge that a recommendation for using a rekey mechanism is warranted
because constrained devices tend to stay up for very, very, very long
periods
of time and even with an ESN there can be exhaustion :-)

I am missing the concern. I understand the first concern is that the
current text seems to push the limit of packets being sent being determined
by the SN as opposed to cryptographic properties. If my understanding is
correct, I have the current text seems clear that crypto properties are
given priorities. I suspect more guidance would be given. If that is the
case, I find it difficult as these guidances are really based on the
cryptographic algorithm and the key sizes. In any case, if I am
missing something, feel free to propose some text.

"""
Note that the limit of messages being sent is primarily determined by the
security associated with the key rather than the SN.
The security of all data protected under a given key decreases slightly
with each message and a node MUST ensure the limit is not reached - even
though the SN would permit it.
"""

I understand the second concern as that current text is read as rekey
mechanisms are recommended only when there is a risk the SN get exhausted.
Our intention was to read the text as even if ESN raises the limit to an
acceptable limit, it is preferred to have a rekey mechanism. I propose the
following text to clarify the meaning:

OLD:
In a constrained environment, it is likely that the implementation of a
rekey mechanism is preferred over the use of ESN.

NEW:
Estimation of the maximum number of packets to be sent by a node is always
challenging and as such should be considered cautiously as nodes could be
online for much more time than expected.
Even for constrained devices, it is RECOMMENDED to implement some rekey
mechanisms (see <xref target=3D"sec-security-considerations"/>).
</mglt>
---
ISSUE 2
---
-
Resilience to nonce reuse goes to the SN considerations as well (see my
comments for Section 4).

---
ISSUE 3
---

> Currently RFC8452 is not cited as negotiated ciphers in RFC 8221, so
> considerations for 96bit nonce which doesn=E2=80=99t fit into the ESP hea=
der, so
> while
> a general alternative not sure how you would apply it to ESP unless
> changes are
> made?

<mglt>

This is correct that AES-GCM-SIV was not mentioned in RFC8221, and I
mentioned it as an example. Now, it seems more problematic to have an
example of a cipher suite that does not work for ESP.
I am balanced between indicating that its support is not defined with ESP
so the reader still has a reference to an example of such a cipher suite.

I will raise this issue to the WG, but currently the text is as follows:

"""
When the key is likely to be re-used across reboots, it is RECOMMENDED to
consider transforms that are nonce misuse
resistant such as AES-GCM-SIV for example<xref target=3D"RFC8452"/>. Note
however that AES-GCM-SIV has not yet been defined for ESP.
"""
</mglt>

>
Yours,
Daniel



On Fri, Mar 26, 2021 at 7:27 PM Nancy Cam-Winget via Datatracker <
noreply@ietf.org> wrote:

> Reviewer: Nancy Cam-Winget
> Review result: Ready with Issues
>
> General Comments
> The document flows relatively well; I expect that the editors will fix
> editorial/grammatical issues and I=E2=80=99ve noted a couple below. I did=
 have some
> questions to some of the descriptions where I expected guidance but read
> the
> text as being more considerations so asked questions for clarification.
>
> Technical comments:
> Section 2:
>  - The first paragraph speaks to other drafts defining minimal
>  exchanges/operations and compression to serve IoT;
> and then states =E2=80=9CThis document describes the minimal properties a=
nd ESP
> implementation needs to meet.=E2=80=9D Needs more clarification, is it so=
 that it
> can
> interoperate with non-minimal ESP (e.g. RFC 4303 as defined) or to
> Interoperate
> given a set of constraints e.g. the minimal set to be defined in this
> document
> including RFC 7815, et al? I think it is the former but the flow of the
> paragraph makes it unclear=E2=80=A6.
>
> <mglt>

The purpose of the document is to provide guidance to build a minimal ESP
implementation that remains interoperable with the RFC4303 ESP. In addition
to the properties that needs to be met by a minimal ESP implementation, the
document also provides some guidance on how the properties may be
implemented while also meeting some constraints of specific environments.
Here is the text I propose:

OLD:
This document describes the minimal properties and ESP implementation needs
to meet.


NEW:
This document describes the minimal properties an ESP implementation needs
to meet to remain interoperable with RFC4303 ESP.
In addition, this document also provides a set of options to implement
these properties under certain constrained environments.
</mglt>

Section 3:
> - Why is it RECOMMENDED to have a randomly generated SPI?  The next
> paragraph
> claims that it is not necessary, which in reading RFC 4303 is the case.  =
So
> this statement seems to contradict The following paragraph that relaxes
> this
> constraint.  But the rationale doesn=E2=80=99t seem to coincide; e.g. =E2=
=80=9CA node
> provisioned with keys by a third party =E2=80=A6.uses a transform that do=
esn=E2=80=99t not
> needs random data=E2=80=A6=E2=80=9D Isn=E2=80=99t relevant to the SPI whi=
ch is intended to be an
> Index=E2=80=A6.so better clarification of the security concerns are requi=
red.
> Perhaps
> on the relaxation, inclusion of consideration of non-reuse and uniqueness
> of
> the SPI to reduce replay and maybe cross SA attacks should also be
> included.
>
> <mglt>
Thanks for these comments, that is helpful to clarify this section. While
SPI do not need to be random this is usually how SPI are generated. As a
result, using non random values raised a lot of discussions while the use
of random did not raise any discussions. I think that is the reason the two
visions have been documented in an unbalanced way.
I agree that the text could be clearer and much more concise. I have
restructured the full section exposing what 4303 mentions regarding the
generation of the SPI, what and whay SPI are generally generated randomly
as well as why and how non random SPI may be generated.  I have also added
a section that groups consideration on SPI generation. I hope this is
clearer now.

NEW:
RFC4303 does not require the SPI to be randomly generated over 32 bits.
However, this is the RECOMMENDED way to generate SPIs as it provides some
privacy benefits and avoids, for example, correlation between ESP
communications.
To randomly generate a 32 bit SPI, the node generates a random 32 bit
value, checks does not fall in the 0-255 range.
If the SPI has an acceptable value, it is used to index the inbound
session, otherwise the SPI is re-generated until an acceptable value is
found.

However, some constrained nodes may be less concerned by the privacy
properties associated to SPIs randomly generated.
Examples of such nodes might include sensors looking to reduce their code
complexity, in which case the use of a predictive function to generate the
SPI might be preferred over the generation and handling of random values.
An example of such predictable function may consider the combination of a
fixed value and the memory address of the SAD structure.
For every incoming packet, the node will be able to point the SAD structure
directly from the SPI value. This avoids having a separate and additional
binding between SPI and SAD entries that is involved for every incoming
packet.

OLD:
 <t> It is RECOMMENDED to index each inbound session with a SPI randomly
generate over 32 bits.
Upon the generation of a SPI the peer checks the SPI is not already used
and does not fall in the 0-255 range.
If the SPI has an acceptable value, it is used to index the inbound
session, otherwise the SPI is re-generated until an acceptable value is
found.
A random generation provides a stateless way to generate the SPIs, while
keeping the probability of collision between SPIs relatively low. </t>

<t> However, for some constrained nodes, generating and handling 32 bit
random SPI may consume too much resource, in which case SPI can be
generated using predictable functions or end up in a using a subset of the
possible values for SPI.
In fact, the SPI does not necessarily need to be randomly generated.
A node provisioned with keys by a third party - e.g. that does not generate
them - and that uses a transform that does not needs random data may not
have such random generators.
However, nonrandom SPI and restricting their possible values MAY lead to
privacy and security concerns.
As a result, this alternative should be considered for devices that would
be strongly impacted by the generation of a random SPI and after
understanding the privacy and security impact of generating nonrandom
SPI.</t>
</mglt>

- The last paragraph goes to the consideration that constrained devices may
> suffer from long lag times Between breach-patch availability to actual
> deployment (or lack thereof).  But that rationale, imho, Is not the
> motivation
> for predictable SPIs; unless the consideration is more that if they don=
=E2=80=99t
> adhere to Appropriate key refreshes and SPI rotation that could lead to
> replay
> attacks. On the privacy front, Predictability of SPIs in particular SAs
> could
> over time help an attacker gain more information about The actual devices
> and
> behavior.
>
> <mglt>
If a device of type "A" implements ESP that takes very limited values of
SPI, an observer that monitors the traffic that observes such values will
be able to define that there is a high probability the device is of type
"A". When these devices have vulnerabilities, the observer this information
may be used by the observer to infer potential vulnerabilities the device
is subject to. In my mind the observer is an attacker, so I would be
tempted to consider this as a drawback.
>From your text I have the impression that the use of these non random
values for SPI may be used by an administrator to monitor potential
vulnerabilities in its network - which could be seen as a feature. This is
how I am reading the first sentence of your comment, but I might be missing
it.

In any case, I agree that this is not the rationale for using non random
SPIs. In my view that is more a drawback. "In addition" was intended to
raise an additional security concern which is that knowing the SPI or not
changing the SPI will ease an attacker to forge packets with a valid SPI. I
agree with you that this is also associated with any long term ESP sessions
and can be removed.

As mentioned above, I have restructured and shortened the text and here is
the content of the "Considerations over SPI generation" section:

NEW:

SPI that are not randomly generated over 32 bits MAY lead to privacy and
security concerns.
As a result, the use of alternative designs requires careful security and
privacy reviews.
This section provides some considerations upon the adoption of alternative
designs.


Note that SPI value is used only for inbound traffic, as such the SPI
negotiated with IKEv2 RFC7296 or RFC7815 by a peer, is the value used by
the remote peer when it sends traffic.
As SPI is only used for inbound traffic by the peer, this allows each peer
to manage the set of SPIs used for its inbound traffic.
Similarly, the privacy concerns associated with the generation of nonrandom
SPI is also limited to the incoming traffic.

When alternate designs are considered, it is likely that the number of
possible SPIs will be limited.
This limit should both consider the number of inbound SAs - possibly per IP
addresses - as well as the ability for the node to rekey.
SPI can typically be used to proceed to clean key update and the SPI value
may be used to indicate which key is being used.
This can typically be implemented by a SPI being encoded with the Security
Association Database (SAD) entry on a subset of bytes (for example 3
bytes), while the remaining byte is left to indicate the rekey index.

The use of a smaller number of SPIs across communications comes with
privacy and security concerns.
Typically some specific values or subset of SPI values may reveal the
models or manufacturer of the node implementing ESP.
This may raise some privacy issues as an observer is likely to be able to
determine the constrained devices of the network.
In some cases, these nodes may host a very limited number of applications -
typically a single application - in which case the SPI would provide some
information related to the application of the user.
In addition, the device or application may be associated with some
vulnerabilities, in which case specific SPI values may be used by an
attacker to discover vulnerabilities.

While the use of randomly generated SPI may reduce the leakage or privacy
or security related information by ESP itself, these information may also
be leaked otherwise and a privacy analysis should consider at least the
type of information as well the traffic pattern.
Typically, temperature sensors, wind sensors, used outdoors do not leak
privacy sensitive information and most of its traffic is expected to be
outbound traffic.
When used indoors, a sensor that reports every minute an encrypted status
of the door (closed or opened) leaks truly little privacy sensitive
information outside the local network.


</mglt>

> Section 4:
> - The third/fourth paragraph speaks to the potential use of a clock for t=
he
> sequence counter, which if using an absolute clock with sufficiently fine
> granularity could maybe work.  But stronger language to that granularity =
is
> required, the example lists one where periodicity =E2=80=9Cmay be=E2=80=
=9D every 60sec, but
> there are many devices who will have millisecond (or finer?)
> granularity=E2=80=A6.so
> stronger caution and care descriptions are required.


 <mglt>
The third paragraph says that even if a node knows the other peers does not
implement antireplay, it must increase the SN.

The 4th paragraphe details one way to increment SN based on time. On a
sender side, the only constraint is that the SN never repeats, so the
granularity seems to me that the clock must be that every packet is sent at
a different time. If I interpret correctly the your comment, I think the
text below addresses the concern.

"""
 Using time for SN would guarantee a strictly
   increasing function and avoid storing any additional values or
   context related to the SN.  When the use of a clock is considered,
   one should take care that packets associated to a given SA are not
   sent with the same time value.
"""

Maybe the concern is regarding the synchronization between the sender and
the receiver. The current text mentions that if the sender uses a clock and
the receiver considers an incremental counter value, an anti replay
mechanism is likely to reject the packets.
I think that we could add text to mention that an anti replay window should
take into account time derivation of the devices. I think that both
recommendations should be moved to the receiver paragraph.
So the concern of the receiver implementing a counter base anti-replay
mechanism remains in this section but anti replay mechanisms related to SN
have been moved to the receiving paragraph.

I have also reworded some text in the sendin paragraph, but not changed the
main structure. Here is the current text:

Usually, SN is generated by incrementing a counter for each packet sent.
A constraint device may avoid maintaining this context and use another
source that is known to always increase.
Typically, constraint nodes using 802.15.4 Time Slotted Channel Hopping
(TSCH), whose communication is heavily dependent on time, can take
advantage of their clock to generate the SN.
A lot of IoT devices are in a sleep state most of the time wake up and are
only awake to perform a specific operation before going back to sleep.

They do have separate hardware that allows them to wake up after a certain
timeout, and most likely also timers that start running when the device was
booted up, so they might have a concept of time with certain granularity.
This requires to store any information in a stable storage - such as flash
memory - that can be restored across sleeps.
Storing information associated with the SA such as SN requires some read
and writing operation on a stable storage after each packet is sent as
opposed to SPI or keys that are only written at the creation of the SA.
Such operations are likely to wear out the flash, and slow down the system
greatly, as writing to flash is not as fast as reading.
Their internal clocks/timers might not be very accurate, but they should be
enough to know that each time they wake up their time is greater than what
it was last time they woke up.
Using time for SN would guarantee a strictly increasing function and avoid
storing any additional values or context related to the SN.
When the use of a clock is considered, one should take care that packets
associated to a given SA are not sent with the same time value.
Note however that standard receivers are generally configured with
incrementing counters and, if not appropriately configured, the use of a
significantly larger SN may result in the packet out of the receiver's
windows and that packet being discarded.

</mglt>

> - The considerations for a
> receiver seems lengthy and am not sure of the point being stressed, other
> than
> to RECOMMEND the use of anti-replay protection.  I expected a description
> for
> the need of a replay window and the window being set to discriminate to t=
he
> worst case scenario (e.g. if on a wireless noisy medium where there is
> packet
> loss, then there may be a say 10ms loss/retry window).  I am not
> understanding
> the example of the temperature sensor and the relevance to the SN.

More
> concerning to me is the last sentence: =E2=80=9CA node MAY drop anti-repl=
ay
> =E2=80=A6..instead
> implant its own internal mechanism=E2=80=9D? Is the intent to say if the =
receiver
> has a
> different algorithm independent of the use of SN, then it MAY choose that
> over
> the use of SN?

<mglt>
The intent of the paragraph is to indicate that anti replay is not
mandatory.
The paragraph has been slightly updated to clarify the sensor use case
where implementing anti replay comes with similar issues for a
constraint device as the use of a counter - that is storing a value in a
memory for any received packets.
There are cases where the anti replay mechanism might not be as necessary
as we may think. We expose some anti replay mechanisms that are based on
time and mention some considerations to set the window.
However, we do not provide explicit value as these are expected to be
dependent on the network or type of application.
I hope the text exposes in a clearer way the use case of the sensor as well
as the purpose of the paragraph. Here is the current text:

For inbound traffic, it is RECOMMENDED that any receiver provides
anti-replay protection, and the size of the window depends on the ability
of the network to deliver packets out of order.
As a result, in an environment where out of order packets is not possible
the window size can be set to one.
However, while RECOMMENDED, there are no requirements to implement an
anti-replay protection mechanism implemented by IPsec.
Similarly to the SN the implementation of anti replay protection may
require the device to write the received SN for every packet, which may in
some cases come with the same drawbacks as those exposed for SN.

As a result, some implementations MAY drop an non required anti replay
protection especially when the necessary resource involved overcomes the
benefit of the mechanism.
A typical example might consider an IoT device such as a temperature sensor
that is sending a temperature every 60 seconds, and that receives an
acknowledgement from the receiver.
In such cases, the ability to spoof and replay an acknowledgment is of
limited interest and may not justify the implementation of an anti replay
mechanism.

Receiving peers may also implement their own anti-replay mechanism.
Typically, when the sending peer is using SN based on time, anti-replay may
be implemented by discarding any packets that present a SN whose value is
too much in the past.
Note that such mechanisms may consider clock drifting in various ways in
addition to acceptable delay induced by the network to avoid the anti
replay windows rejecting legitimate packets.
When a packet is received at a regular time interval, some variant of time
based mechanisms may not even use the value of the SN, but instead only
consider the receiving time of the packet.

</mglt>

>

> - I might challenge due to potential collision attacks that at
> most, 2^32-1 packets may be sent before the SPI *must* rekey, so the SN
> and how
> it is used is part of the security context for the SPI/SA.  I might also
> challenge that a recommendation for using a rekey mechanism is warranted
> because constrained devices tend to stay up for very, very, very long
> periods
> of time and even with an ESN there can be exhaustion :-)
>
>  <mglt>
---
ISSUE 1
---
I am missing the concern. I understand the first concern is that the
current text seems to push the limit of packets being sent being determined
by the SN as opposed to cryptographic properties. If my understanding is
correct, I have the current text seems clear that crypto properties are
given priorities. I suspect more guidance would be given. If that is the
case, I find it difficult as these guidances are really based on the
cryptographic algorithm and the key sizes. In any case, if I am
missing something, feel free to propose some text.

"""
Note that the limit of messages being sent is primarily determined by the
security associated with the key rather than the SN.
The security of all data protected under a given key decreases slightly
with each message and a node MUST ensure the limit is not reached - even
though the SN would permit it.
"""

I understand the second concern as that current text is read as rekey
mechanisms are recommended only when there is a risk the SN get exhausted.
Our intention was to read the text as even if ESN raises the limit to an
acceptable limit, it is preferred to have a rekey mechanism. I propose the
following text to clarify the meaning:

OLD:
In a constrained environment, it is likely that the implementation of a
rekey mechanism is preferred over the use of ESN.

NEW:
Estimation of the maximum number of packets to be sent by a node is always
challenging and as such should be considered cautiously as nodes could be
online for much more time than expected.
Even for constrained devices, it is RECOMMENDED to implement some rekey
mechanisms (see <xref target=3D"sec-security-considerations"/>).
</mglt>

> Section 5:
> - If a constrained device does use AES-CBC then padding may be needed,
> shouldn=E2=80=99t that be considered here? That is, it seems that padding=
 is
> dependent
> on the cipher negotiated, right? - =E2=80=9CTFC cannot be enable with min=
imal ESP=E2=80=9D
> seems subjective, given that this is the guidelines perhaps it is a SHOUL=
D
> NOT
> (or NOT RECOMMENDED)?
>
> <mglt>
I interpret your concern as if the current document were not mandating the
padding. My understanding of the section is that we mostly mention how the
padding should be built and that the format should not be checked by the
minimal implementation.
I also believe that the case of AES-CBC has been addressed with the
following sentence. Feel free however to let me know if I mis-interpreted
your comment.

"""
The purpose of padding is to respect the 32 bit alignment of ESP or block
size expected by an encryption transform - such as AES-CBC for example.
ESP MUST have at least one padding byte Pad Length that indicates the
padding length.
"""

I think it makes sense to have it as a recommendation, and here is the new
text:

OLD:
As such TFC is not
   expected to be supported by a minimal ESP implementation.

NEW:
s such it is NOT RECOMMENDED that minimal ESP implementation supports TFC
"""
</mglt>


> Section 6:
> - More concise language/guidance on minimal ESP is required, e.g. =E2=80=
=9Cit is
> not
> expected to be part of minimal=E2=80=9D needs to be stronger.  So, Next H=
eader is
> mandatory, so guidance is that the field is there=E2=80=A6..but is the
> recommendation
> for =E2=80=9Cminimal ESP=E2=80=9D be that it can ignore the field?
>
> <mglt>
The Next Header is a mandatory field, so the minimal ESP needs to support
it, which support the ability to remove "no next header packet". I am
unsure what needs to be added to the text as it specifies:

"""
the Next Header is a mandatory 8 bits field in the packet [...]
"""
and
"""
[...] a minimal ESP implementation MUST discard dummy packets.
"""
I understand that the etxt needed to be more concise. Here are two
sentences I changed. Let me know if there are other I am missing.


OLD:
Next header is intended to specify the data contained in the payload as
well as dummy packet, [...]

NEW:
Next header specifies the data contained in the payload as well as dummy
packet

OLD:
it is not expected to be part of a minimal implementation of ESP.

NEW:
As a result, it SHOULD NOT be part of a minimal implementation of ESP


I am a bit reluctant saying that a minimal ESP SHOULD NOT send dummy packet
as RFC4303 mentions:

"""

A transmitter MUST be capable of
   generating dummy packets marked with this value in the next protocol

"""
</mglt>

> Section 7:
> - Do you mean authentication only w/no encryption?
>
> <mglt>
considering the previous comments as well, here is the new text I propose:

OLD:
As detailed in <xref target=3D"sec-encr"/> we recommend using authenticatio=
n,
the ICV field is expected to be present that is to say with a size
different from zero.
This makes it a mandatory field which size is defined by the security
recommendations only.

NEW:
As detailed in RFC8221 authentication or authenticated encryption are
RECOMMENDED and as such the ICV field MUST be present with a size different
from zero.
It length is defined by the security recommendations only.
</mglt>

Section 8:
> This section starts with eluding that guidelines for cipher selection
> criteria
> are provided, but as I read the list they are more considerations than
> they are
> guidelines?

<mglt>
Yes, I did not want to duplicate the cryptographic recommendations listed
in RFC8221 - which includes some IoT specific recommendations. I agree that
the section may be considered as guidelines but it seems ESP is a bit
decoupled from the cryptography used.
</mglt>


> - Currently, the ciphers that provide confidentiality always
> include authentication, so not sure the motivation for the last sentence?

 <mglt>
If the last sentence is
"""
Recommendations are provided for standard nodes as well as constrained
nodes.
"""

The intention was to mention that the recommendations do not necessarily
apply to a constrained environment. I agree it does not appear to be
essential, so I removed it.

</mglt>

> -
> Resilience to nonce reuse goes to the SN considerations as well (see my
> comments for Section 4).

<mglt>
----
ISSUE 2
---
I think I misunderstood your comment in both places so I leave it open.
</mglt>

> Another recommendation here is to also suggest that
> the provisioned key (and key should be clarified as =E2=80=9Cpre-shared k=
ey=E2=80=9D)
> should
> also be updated with some regularity to address this issue (as in the rek=
ey
> mechanism could lie in the management plane that provisions these keys).
>
<mglt>
Though we do not mention "pre-shared" keys, I am wondering if the text in
the security consideration does not address your purpose:

"""
<t>It is RECOMMENDED to use ESP in conjunction of key management protocols
such as for example IKEv2 <xref target=3D"RFC7296"/> or minimal IKEv2 <xref
target=3D"RFC7815"/>.
Such mechanisms are responsible to negotiate fresh session keys as well as
prevent a session key being use beyond its lifetime.

When such mechanisms cannot be implemented and the session key is, for
example, provisioned, the nodes MUST ensure that keys are not used beyond
their lifetime and that the appropriated use of the key remains across
reboots - e.g. conditions on counters and nonces remains valid.
</t>
"""
</mglt>

> Currently RFC8452 is not cited as negotiated ciphers in RFC 8221, so
> considerations for 96bit nonce which doesn=E2=80=99t fit into the ESP hea=
der, so
> while
> a general alternative not sure how you would apply it to ESP unless
> changes are
> made?

<mglt>
---
ISSUE 3
---
This is correct that AES-GCM-SIV was not mentioned in RFC8221, and I
mentioned it as an example. Now, it seems more problematic to have an
example of a cipher suite that does not work for ESP.
I am balanced between indicating that its support is not defined with ESP
so the reader still has a reference to an example of such a cipher suite.

I will raise this issue to the WG, but currently the text is as follows:

"""
When the key is likely to be re-used across reboots, it is RECOMMENDED to
consider transforms that are nonce misuse
resistant such as AES-GCM-SIV for example<xref target=3D"RFC8452"/>. Note
however that AES-GCM-SIV has not yet been defined for ESP.
"""
</mglt>

> - What is the point driven in =E2=80=9Cinteroperability=E2=80=9D?  Is it =
that constrained
> devices may have limited interoperability given that they may not support
> all
> ciphers in RFC 8221?

<mglt>
It is more that what the other nodes supports needs to be considered in the
selection of the cipher suite. While RFC 8221 ensures smooth transition,
contrainted devices have less interoperability requirements.
</mglt>


> - Similarly, for the power consumption and cipher suite
> complexity; is the point that ciphers are chosen based on the constraints
> (physical, computational and memory) of the device?
>
> <mglt>
yes.
</mglt>

> Nits:
> General throughout the draft:   =E2=80=9Cconstraint devices=E2=80=9D shou=
ld be =E2=80=9Cconstrained
> devices=E2=80=9D.
>
> <mglt>
thanks. I changed them all.
</mglt>

> Abstract:
>  - Last sentence of first paragraph first clause is awkward =E2=80=9CCons=
trains
> include
>  among other limiting=E2=80=A6.=E2=80=9D
> Perhaps you mean =E2=80=9CSome constraints include limiting the=E2=80=A6=
=E2=80=9D
>
<mglt>
done. thanks.
</mglt>

>  - Some qualification of =E2=80=9Cwhat is required from RFC 4303=E2=80=9D=
 is required=E2=80=A6.
> Perhaps you mean =E2=80=9Cthe minimally required set of functions and sta=
tes from
> RFC
> 4303 to achieve compliance and interoperability=E2=80=9D? My suggestion m=
ay be to
> just
> remove this 2nd paragraph as its covered in the 3rd (though I think notin=
g
> interoperability should be there too).
>
<mglt>
I agree. done.
</mglt>

>  - I would think that there would be a strong issue if there are conflict=
s
> with
>  RFC 4303?! So would suggest to remove that sentence or
> Only that the RFC 4303 remains the authoritative spec to detail full
> details of
> ESP.
>
> <mglt>
done. thanks
</mglt>

> Section 2:
>  - =E2=80=9Cconstraint devices=E2=80=9D should be =E2=80=9Cconstrained de=
vices=E2=80=9D
>
> Section 8:
> - For =E2=80=9CSecurity=E2=80=9D, suggest=E2=80=A6=E2=80=9DThe chosen enc=
ryption algorithm MUST NOT be
> known to
> be vulnerable or weak=E2=80=9D
>
> <mglt>
done. thanks.
</mglt>

>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Lwip mailing list
> Lwip@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/lwip
>


--=20
Daniel Migault
Ericsson

--000000000000bf39b105becc1b23
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Hi Nancy,</div><div><br></div><div>Thank you very muc=
h for your review. Please see inline my responses. I believe all concerns r=
aised have been addressed. I also believe the current text addresses some c=
oncerns also raised by Paul W.=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>The current=
=C2=A0version can be found here:</div><div><a href=3D"https://github.com/mg=
lt/draft-mglt-lwig-minimal-esp/pull/1/commits/fb9393a246298e37adcf2683afa20=
61a40b4ed89">https://github.com/mglt/draft-mglt-lwig-minimal-esp/pull/1/com=
mits/fb9393a246298e37adcf2683afa2061a40b4ed89</a><br></div><div><br></div><=
div>I think there are however three remaining issues that might get further=
 discussions. For all=C2=A0of these I provided a response, but I am unsure =
it really addresses the three concerns below:</div><div><br></div><div>----=
</div><div>ISSUE 1</div><div>----</div><div>- I might challenge due to pote=
ntial collision attacks that at<br>
most, 2^32-1 packets may be sent before the SPI *must* rekey, so the SN and=
 how<br>
it is used is part of the security context for the SPI/SA.=C2=A0 I might al=
so<br>
challenge that a recommendation for using a rekey mechanism is warranted<br=
>
because constrained devices tend to stay up for very, very, very long perio=
ds<br>
of time and even with an ESN there can be exhaustion :-)<br></div><div><br>=
</div><div><div>I am missing the concern. I understand the first concern is=
 that the current text seems to push the limit of packets being sent being =
determined by the SN as opposed to cryptographic properties. If my understa=
nding is correct, I have the current text seems clear that crypto propertie=
s are given priorities. I suspect more guidance would be given. If that is =
the case, I find it difficult as these guidances are really based on the cr=
yptographic algorithm and the key sizes. In any case, if I am missing=C2=A0=
something, feel free to propose some text.=C2=A0=C2=A0</div><div><br></div>=
<div>&quot;&quot;&quot;</div><div>Note that the limit of messages being sen=
t is primarily determined by the security associated with the key rather th=
an the SN.<br>The security of all data protected under a given key decrease=
s slightly with each message and a node MUST ensure the limit is not reache=
d - even though the SN would permit it.<br></div><div>&quot;&quot;&quot;=C2=
=A0</div><div><br></div><div>I understand the second concern as that curren=
t text is read as rekey mechanisms are recommended only when there is a ris=
k the SN=C2=A0get exhausted. Our intention was to read the text as even if =
ESN raises the limit to an acceptable limit, it is preferred to have a reke=
y mechanism. I propose the following text to clarify the meaning:</div><div=
><br></div><div>OLD:</div><div>In a constrained environment, it is likely t=
hat the implementation of a rekey mechanism is preferred over the use of ES=
N.<br></div><div><br></div><div>NEW:</div><div>Estimation of the maximum nu=
mber of packets to be sent by a node is always challenging and as such shou=
ld be considered cautiously as nodes could be online for much more time tha=
n expected.<br>Even for constrained devices, it is RECOMMENDED to implement=
 some rekey mechanisms (see &lt;xref target=3D&quot;sec-security-considerat=
ions&quot;/&gt;).=C2=A0=C2=A0</div><div>&lt;/mglt&gt;</div></div><div>---</=
div><div>ISSUE 2</div><div>---</div><div>-<br>
Resilience to nonce reuse goes to the SN considerations as well (see my<br>
comments for Section 4).<br></div><div><br></div><div>---</div><div>ISSUE 3=
</div><div>---</div><div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:=
0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">=
Currently RFC8452 is not cited as negotiated ciphers in RFC 8221, so<br>
considerations for 96bit nonce which doesn=E2=80=99t fit into the ESP heade=
r, so while<br>
a general alternative not sure how you would apply it to ESP unless changes=
 are<br>
made? </blockquote><div>&lt;mglt&gt;</div><div><br></div><div>This is corre=
ct that AES-GCM-SIV was not mentioned in RFC8221, and I mentioned it as an =
example. Now, it seems more problematic to have an example of a cipher suit=
e that does not work for ESP.=C2=A0=C2=A0</div><div>I am balanced between i=
ndicating that its support is not defined with ESP so the reader still has =
a reference to an example of such a cipher suite.=C2=A0</div><div><br></div=
><div>I will raise this issue to the WG, but currently the text is as follo=
ws:</div><div><br></div><div>&quot;&quot;&quot;</div><div><span style=3D"fo=
nt-family:monospace"><span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0)">When the key is likel=
y to be re-used across reboots, it is RECOMMENDED to consider transforms th=
at are nonce misuse </span><br>resistant such as AES-GCM-SIV for example<sp=
an style=3D"font-weight:bold;color:rgb(135,0,0)">&lt;xref </span><span styl=
e=3D"font-weight:bold;color:rgb(95,95,135)">target</span><span style=3D"col=
or:rgb(0,0,0)">=3D</span><span style=3D"color:rgb(215,0,95)">&quot;</span><=
span style=3D"color:rgb(215,0,95);background-color:rgb(255,84,84)">RFC8452<=
/span><span style=3D"color:rgb(215,0,95)">&quot;</span><span style=3D"font-=
weight:bold;color:rgb(135,0,0)">/&gt;. Note however that AES-GCM-SIV has no=
t yet been defined for ESP.=C2=A0</span><span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0)"></=
span><br></span></div><div>&quot;&quot;&quot;</div><div>&lt;/mglt&gt;</div>=
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-=
left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"></blockquote></div><div><=
br></div><div>Yours,=C2=A0<br>Daniel=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div><br></d=
iv><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On =
Fri, Mar 26, 2021 at 7:27 PM Nancy Cam-Winget via Datatracker &lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:noreply@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">noreply@ietf.org</a>&gt; wro=
te:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px =
0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Reviewer: Na=
ncy Cam-Winget<br>
Review result: Ready with Issues<br>
<br>
General Comments<br>
The document flows relatively well; I expect that the editors will fix<br>
editorial/grammatical issues and I=E2=80=99ve noted a couple below. I did h=
ave some<br>
questions to some of the descriptions where I expected guidance but read th=
e<br>
text as being more considerations so asked questions for clarification.<br>
<br>
Technical comments:<br>
Section 2:<br>
=C2=A0- The first paragraph speaks to other drafts defining minimal<br>
=C2=A0exchanges/operations and compression to serve IoT;<br>
and then states =E2=80=9CThis document describes the minimal properties and=
 ESP<br>
implementation needs to meet.=E2=80=9D Needs more clarification, is it so t=
hat it can<br>
interoperate with non-minimal ESP (e.g. RFC 4303 as defined) or to Interope=
rate<br>
given a set of constraints e.g. the minimal set to be defined in this docum=
ent<br>
including RFC 7815, et al? I think it is the former but the flow of the<br>
paragraph makes it unclear=E2=80=A6.<br>
<br></blockquote><div>&lt;mglt&gt;</div><div><br></div><div>The purpose of =
the document is to provide guidance=C2=A0to build a=C2=A0minimal ESP implem=
entation that remains interoperable with the RFC4303 ESP. In addition to th=
e properties that needs to be met by a minimal ESP implementation, the docu=
ment also provides some guidance on how the properties may be implemented w=
hile also meeting some constraints=C2=A0of specific environments. Here is t=
he text I propose:</div><div><br></div><div><font color=3D"#000000" face=3D=
"monospace">OLD:</font></div><div><span style=3D"font-family:monospace"><sp=
an style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0)">This document describes the minimal propertie=
s and ESP implementation needs to meet.</span><br></span></div><div><span s=
tyle=3D"font-family:monospace"><span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0)"><br></span>=
</span></div><div><span style=3D"font-family:monospace"><span style=3D"colo=
r:rgb(0,0,0)"><br></span></span></div><div><span style=3D"font-family:monos=
pace"><span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0)">NEW:</span></span></div><div>This do=
cument describes the minimal properties an ESP implementation needs to meet=
 to remain interoperable with RFC4303 ESP. <br>In addition, this document a=
lso provides a set of options to implement these properties under certain c=
onstrained environments.<span style=3D"font-family:monospace"><span style=
=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0)"><br></span></span></div><div>&lt;/mglt&gt;=C2=A0</div=
><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0=
px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
Section 3:<br>
- Why is it RECOMMENDED to have a randomly generated SPI?=C2=A0 The next pa=
ragraph<br>
claims that it is not necessary, which in reading RFC 4303 is the case.=C2=
=A0 So<br>
this statement seems to contradict The following paragraph that relaxes thi=
s<br>
constraint.=C2=A0 But the rationale doesn=E2=80=99t seem to coincide; e.g. =
=E2=80=9CA node<br>
provisioned with keys by a third party =E2=80=A6.uses a transform that does=
n=E2=80=99t not<br>
needs random data=E2=80=A6=E2=80=9D Isn=E2=80=99t relevant to the SPI which=
 is intended to be an<br>
Index=E2=80=A6.so better clarification of the security concerns are require=
d.=C2=A0 Perhaps<br>
on the relaxation, inclusion of consideration of non-reuse and uniqueness o=
f<br>
the SPI to reduce replay and maybe cross SA attacks should also be included=
.<br>
<br></blockquote><div>&lt;mglt&gt;</div><div>Thanks for these comments, tha=
t is helpful to clarify this section. While SPI do not need to be random th=
is is usually how SPI are generated. As a result, using non random values r=
aised a lot of discussions while the use of random did not raise any discus=
sions. I think that is the reason the two visions have been documented in a=
n unbalanced way.=C2=A0</div><div>I agree that the text could be clearer an=
d much more concise. I have restructured the full section exposing what 430=
3 mentions regarding the generation of the SPI, what and whay SPI=C2=A0are =
generally generated randomly as well as why and how non random SPI may be g=
enerated.=C2=A0 I have also added a section that groups consideration on SP=
I generation. I hope this is clearer now.</div><div><br></div><div>NEW:</di=
v><div>RFC4303 does not require the SPI to be randomly generated over 32 bi=
ts.<br>However, this is the RECOMMENDED way to generate SPIs as it provides=
 some privacy benefits and avoids, for example, correlation between ESP com=
munications. =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0=
 =C2=A0<br>To randomly generate a 32 bit SPI, the node generates a random 3=
2 bit value, checks does not fall in the 0-255 range. =C2=A0<br>If the SPI =
has an acceptable value, it is used to index the inbound session, otherwise=
 the SPI is re-generated until an acceptable value is found.=C2=A0<br><br><=
/div>However, some constrained nodes may be less concerned by the privacy p=
roperties associated to SPIs randomly generated. =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 <br>Examples of such nodes might include sensors looking to reduce thei=
r code complexity, in which case the use of a predictive function to genera=
te the SPI might be preferred over the generation and handling of random va=
lues. <br>An example of such predictable function may consider the combinat=
ion of a fixed value and the memory address of the SAD structure. <br><div>=
For every incoming packet, the node will be able to point the SAD structure=
 directly from the SPI value. This avoids having a separate and additional =
binding between SPI and SAD entries that is involved for every incoming pac=
ket.<span style=3D"font-family:monospace"><br></span></div><div><br></div><=
div><div>OLD:</div><div>=C2=A0&lt;t&gt; It is RECOMMENDED to index each inb=
ound session with a SPI randomly generate over 32 bits.</div>Upon the gener=
ation of a SPI the peer checks the SPI is not already used and does not fal=
l in the 0-255 range. <br>If the SPI has an acceptable value, it is used to=
 index the inbound session, otherwise the SPI is re-generated until an acce=
ptable value is found. <br>A random generation provides a stateless way to =
generate the SPIs, while keeping the probability of collision between SPIs =
relatively low. &lt;/t&gt;<br><br>&lt;t&gt; However, for some constrained n=
odes, generating and handling 32 bit random SPI may consume too much resour=
ce, in which case SPI can be generated using predictable functions or end u=
p in a using a subset of the possible values for SPI. <br>In fact, the SPI =
does not necessarily need to be randomly generated. <br>A node provisioned =
with keys by a third party - e.g. that does not generate them - and that us=
es a transform that does not needs random data may not have such random gen=
erators. =C2=A0 <br>However, nonrandom SPI and restricting their possible v=
alues MAY lead to privacy and security concerns. <br>As a result, this alte=
rnative should be considered for devices that would be strongly impacted by=
 the generation of a random SPI and after understanding the privacy and sec=
urity impact of generating nonrandom SPI.&lt;/t&gt;<br></div><div>&lt;/mglt=
&gt;=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"m=
argin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left=
:1ex">
- The last paragraph goes to the consideration that constrained devices may=
<br>
suffer from long lag times Between breach-patch availability to actual<br>
deployment (or lack thereof).=C2=A0 But that rationale, imho, Is not the mo=
tivation<br>
for predictable SPIs; unless the consideration is more that if they don=E2=
=80=99t<br>
adhere to Appropriate key refreshes and SPI rotation that could lead to rep=
lay<br>
attacks. On the privacy front, Predictability of SPIs in particular SAs cou=
ld<br>
over time help an attacker gain more information about The actual devices a=
nd<br>
behavior.<br>
<br></blockquote><div>&lt;mglt&gt;</div><div>If a device of type &quot;A&qu=
ot; implements ESP that takes very limited values of SPI, an observer that =
monitors the traffic that observes such values will be able to define that =
there is a high probability=C2=A0the device is of type &quot;A&quot;. When =
these devices have vulnerabilities, the observer this information may be us=
ed by the observer to infer potential vulnerabilities the device is subject=
 to. In my mind the observer=C2=A0is an attacker, so I would be tempted to =
consider this as a drawback.=C2=A0</div><div>From your text I have the impr=
ession that the use of these non random values for SPI may be used by an ad=
ministrator to monitor potential vulnerabilities in its network - which cou=
ld be seen as a feature. This is how I am reading the first sentence of you=
r comment, but I might be missing it.=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>In any=
 case, I agree that this is not the rationale for using non random SPIs. In=
 my view that is more a drawback. &quot;In addition&quot; was intended to r=
aise an additional security concern which is that knowing the SPI or not ch=
anging the SPI will ease an attacker to forge packets with a valid=C2=A0SPI=
. I agree with you that this is also associated with any long term ESP sess=
ions and can be removed.=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div><font color=3D"#000=
000" face=3D"arial, sans-serif" style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"=
>As mentioned above, I have restructured and shortened the text and here is=
 the content of the=C2=A0&quot;Considerations over SPI generation&quot; sec=
tion:</font></div><div><span style=3D"font-family:monospace"><font color=3D=
"#000000"><br></font></span></div><div><span style=3D"font-family:monospace=
"><font color=3D"#000000">NEW:=C2=A0</font></span></div><div><span style=3D=
"font-family:monospace"><font color=3D"#000000"><br></font></span></div><di=
v>SPI that are not randomly generated over 32 bits MAY lead to privacy and =
security concerns. =C2=A0<br>As a result, the use of alternative designs re=
quires careful security and privacy reviews. =C2=A0<br><span style=3D"font-=
family:monospace"><span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0)">This section provides so=
me considerations upon the adoption of alternative designs.</span><br></spa=
n>=C2=A0<br><br>Note that SPI value is used only for inbound traffic, as su=
ch the SPI negotiated with IKEv2 RFC7296 or RFC7815 by a peer, is the value=
 used by the remote peer when it=C2=A0sends traffic. <br>As SPI is only use=
d for inbound traffic by the peer, this allows each peer to manage the set =
of SPIs used for its inbound traffic. <br>Similarly, the privacy concerns a=
ssociated with the generation of nonrandom SPI is also limited to the incom=
ing traffic.<br><br>When alternate designs are considered, it is likely tha=
t the number of possible SPIs will be limited. <br>This limit should both c=
onsider the number of inbound SAs - possibly per IP addresses - as well as =
the ability for the node to rekey. <br>SPI can typically be used to proceed=
 to clean key update and the SPI value may be used to indicate which key is=
 being used. <br>This can typically be implemented by a SPI being encoded w=
ith the Security Association Database (SAD) entry on a subset of bytes (for=
 example 3 bytes), while the remaining byte is left to indicate the rekey i=
ndex.<br><br>The use of a smaller number of SPIs across communications come=
s with privacy and security concerns.<br>Typically some specific values or =
subset of SPI values may reveal the models or manufacturer of the node impl=
ementing ESP. <br>This may raise some privacy issues as an observer is like=
ly to be able to determine the constrained devices of the network. <br>In s=
ome cases, these nodes may host a very limited number of applications - typ=
ically a single application - in which case the SPI would provide some info=
rmation related to the application of the user.<br>In addition, the device =
or application may be associated with some vulnerabilities, in which case s=
pecific SPI values may be used by an attacker to discover vulnerabilities. =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <br>=C2=A0<br>While the use of ra=
ndomly generated SPI may reduce the leakage or privacy or security related =
information by ESP itself, these information may also be leaked otherwise a=
nd a privacy analysis should consider at least the type of information as w=
ell the traffic pattern.<br>Typically, temperature sensors, wind sensors, u=
sed outdoors do not leak privacy sensitive information and most of its traf=
fic is expected to be outbound traffic.<br>When used indoors, a sensor that=
 reports every minute an encrypted status of the door (closed or opened) le=
aks truly little privacy sensitive information outside the local network.=
=C2=A0</div><div>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>&lt;/mglt&gt;=
=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0=
.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
Section 4:<br>
- The third/fourth paragraph speaks to the potential use of a clock for the=
<br>
sequence counter, which if using an absolute clock with sufficiently fine<b=
r>
granularity could maybe work.=C2=A0 But stronger language to that granulari=
ty is<br>
required, the example lists one where periodicity =E2=80=9Cmay be=E2=80=9D =
every 60sec, but<br>
there are many devices who will have millisecond (or finer?) granularity=E2=
=80=A6.so<br>
stronger caution and care descriptions are required. </blockquote><div><br>=
</div><div>=C2=A0&lt;mglt&gt;</div><div>The third paragraph says that even =
if a node knows the other peers does not implement antireplay, it must incr=
ease=C2=A0the SN.=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>The 4th paragraphe details=
 one way to increment SN based on time. On a sender side, the only constrai=
nt is that the SN never repeats, so the granularity seems to me that the cl=
ock must be that every packet is sent at a different time. If I interpret c=
orrectly the your comment, I think the text below addresses the concern.=C2=
=A0</div><div><br></div><div>&quot;&quot;&quot;</div><div>=C2=A0Using time =
for SN would guarantee a strictly<br>=C2=A0 =C2=A0increasing function and a=
void storing any additional values or<br>=C2=A0 =C2=A0context related to th=
e SN.=C2=A0 When the use of a clock is considered,<br>=C2=A0 =C2=A0one shou=
ld take care that packets associated to a given SA are not<br>=C2=A0 =C2=A0=
sent with the same time value.=C2=A0=C2=A0<br></div><div>&quot;&quot;&quot;=
</div><div><br></div><div>Maybe the concern is regarding the synchronizatio=
n between the sender and the receiver. The current text mentions that if th=
e sender uses a clock and the receiver considers an incremental counter val=
ue, an anti replay mechanism is likely to reject the packets.=C2=A0</div><d=
iv>I think that we could add text to mention that an anti replay window sho=
uld take into account time derivation of the devices. I think that both rec=
ommendations should be moved to the receiver paragraph.=C2=A0</div><div>So =
the concern of the receiver implementing a counter base anti-replay mechani=
sm remains in this section but anti replay mechanisms related to SN have be=
en moved to the receiving paragraph.=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0</div><div><br></div=
><div>I have also reworded some text in the sendin paragraph, but not chang=
ed the main structure. Here is the current text:</div><div><br></div><div>U=
sually, SN is generated by incrementing a counter for each packet sent.<br>=
A constraint device may avoid maintaining this context and use another sour=
ce that is known to always increase.<br>Typically, constraint nodes using 8=
02.15.4 Time Slotted Channel Hopping (TSCH), whose communication is heavily=
 dependent on time, can take advantage of their clock to generate the SN.<b=
r>A lot of IoT devices are in a sleep state most of the time wake up and ar=
e only awake to perform a specific operation before going back to sleep. =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0<br>They do have sep=
arate hardware that allows them to wake up after a certain timeout, and mos=
t likely also timers that start running when the device was booted up, so t=
hey might have a concept of time with certain granularity.<br>This requires=
 to store any information in a stable storage - such as flash memory - that=
 can be restored across sleeps.<br>Storing information associated with the =
SA such as SN requires some read and writing operation on a stable storage =
after each packet is sent as opposed to SPI or keys that are only written a=
t the creation of the SA.<br>Such operations are likely to wear out the fla=
sh, and slow down the system greatly, as writing to flash is not as fast as=
 reading.<br>Their internal clocks/timers might not be very accurate, but t=
hey should be enough to know that each time they wake up their time is grea=
ter than what it was last time they woke up.<br>Using time for SN would gua=
rantee a strictly increasing function and avoid storing any additional valu=
es or context related to the SN.<br>When the use of a clock is considered, =
one should take care that packets associated to a given SA are not sent wit=
h the same time value.<br>Note however that standard receivers are generall=
y configured with incrementing counters and, if not appropriately configure=
d, the use of a significantly larger SN may result in the packet out of the=
 receiver&#39;s windows and that packet being discarded.<br></div><div>=C2=
=A0</div><div>&lt;/mglt&gt;=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" st=
yle=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padd=
ing-left:1ex"></blockquote><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margi=
n:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex=
">- The considerations for a<br>
receiver seems lengthy and am not sure of the point being stressed, other t=
han<br>
to RECOMMEND the use of anti-replay protection.=C2=A0 I expected a descript=
ion for<br>
the need of a replay window and the window being set to discriminate to the=
<br>
worst case scenario (e.g. if on a wireless noisy medium where there is pack=
et<br>
loss, then there may be a say 10ms loss/retry window).=C2=A0 I am not under=
standing<br>
the example of the temperature sensor and the relevance to the SN.=C2=A0 </=
blockquote><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.=
8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">More<br>
concerning to me is the last sentence: =E2=80=9CA node MAY drop anti-replay=
 =E2=80=A6..instead<br>
implant its own internal mechanism=E2=80=9D? Is the intent to say if the re=
ceiver has a<br>
different algorithm independent of the use of SN, then it MAY choose that o=
ver<br>
the use of SN? </blockquote><div><div>&lt;mglt&gt;</div><div>The intent of =
the paragraph is to indicate that anti replay is not mandatory.=C2=A0</div>=
<div>The paragraph has been slightly updated to clarify the sensor use case=
 where implementing anti replay comes with similar issues for a constraint=
=C2=A0device as the use of a counter - that is storing a value in a memory =
for any received packets.=C2=A0</div><div>There are cases where the anti re=
play mechanism might not be as necessary as we may think. We expose some an=
ti replay mechanisms that are based on time and mention some considerations=
 to set the window.=C2=A0</div><div>However, we do not provide explicit val=
ue as these are expected to be dependent on the network or type of applicat=
ion.=C2=A0</div><div>I hope the text exposes in a clearer=C2=A0way the use =
case of the sensor as well as the purpose of the=C2=A0paragraph. Here is th=
e current text:</div><div><br></div><div>For inbound traffic, it is RECOMME=
NDED that any receiver provides anti-replay protection, and the size of the=
 window depends on the ability of the network to deliver packets out of ord=
er.<br>As a result, in an environment where out of order packets is not pos=
sible the window size can be set to one.<br>However, while RECOMMENDED, the=
re are no requirements to implement an anti-replay protection mechanism imp=
lemented by IPsec.<br>Similarly to the SN the implementation of anti replay=
 protection may require the device to write the received SN for every packe=
t, which may in some cases come with the same drawbacks as those exposed fo=
r SN.<br><br>As a result, some implementations MAY drop an non required ant=
i replay protection especially when the necessary resource involved overcom=
es the benefit of the mechanism.<br>A typical example might consider an IoT=
 device such as a temperature sensor that is sending a temperature every 60=
 seconds, and that receives an acknowledgement from the receiver.<br>In suc=
h cases, the ability to spoof and replay an acknowledgment is of limited in=
terest and may not justify the implementation of an anti replay mechanism.<=
br><br>Receiving peers may also implement their own anti-replay mechanism.<=
br>Typically, when the sending peer is using SN based on time, anti-replay =
may be implemented by discarding any packets that present a SN whose value =
is too much in the past.<br>Note that such mechanisms may consider clock dr=
ifting in various ways in addition to acceptable delay induced by the netwo=
rk to avoid the anti replay windows rejecting legitimate packets.<br>When a=
 packet is received at a regular time interval, some variant of time based =
mechanisms may not even use the value of the SN, but instead only consider =
the receiving time of the packet.<br></div><div><br></div><div>&lt;/mglt&gt=
;=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px =
0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"></blockquote=
></div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0=
px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">-=
 I might challenge due to potential collision attacks that at<br>
most, 2^32-1 packets may be sent before the SPI *must* rekey, so the SN and=
 how<br>
it is used is part of the security context for the SPI/SA.=C2=A0 I might al=
so<br>
challenge that a recommendation for using a rekey mechanism is warranted<br=
>
because constrained devices tend to stay up for very, very, very long perio=
ds<br>
of time and even with an ESN there can be exhaustion :-)<br>
<br></blockquote><div>=C2=A0&lt;mglt&gt;</div><div>---</div><div>ISSUE 1</d=
iv><div>---</div><div>I am missing the concern. I understand the first conc=
ern is that the current text seems to push the limit of packets being sent =
being determined by the SN as opposed to cryptographic properties. If my un=
derstanding is correct, I have the current text seems clear that crypto pro=
perties are given priorities. I suspect more guidance would be given. If th=
at is the case, I find it difficult as these guidances are really based on =
the cryptographic algorithm and the key sizes. In any case, if I am missing=
=C2=A0something, feel free to propose some text.=C2=A0=C2=A0</div><div><br>=
</div><div>&quot;&quot;&quot;</div><div>Note that the limit of messages bei=
ng sent is primarily determined by the security associated with the key rat=
her than the SN.<br>The security of all data protected under a given key de=
creases slightly with each message and a node MUST ensure the limit is not =
reached - even though the SN would permit it.<br></div><div>&quot;&quot;&qu=
ot;=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>I understand the second concern as that =
current text is read as rekey mechanisms are recommended only when there is=
 a risk the SN=C2=A0get exhausted. Our intention was to read the text as ev=
en if ESN raises the limit to an acceptable limit, it is preferred to have =
a rekey mechanism. I propose the following text to clarify the meaning:</di=
v><div><br></div><div>OLD:</div><div>In a constrained environment, it is li=
kely that the implementation of a rekey mechanism is preferred over the use=
 of ESN.<br></div><div><br></div><div>NEW:</div><div>Estimation of the maxi=
mum number of packets to be sent by a node is always challenging and as suc=
h should be considered cautiously as nodes could be online for much more ti=
me than expected.<br>Even for constrained devices, it is RECOMMENDED to imp=
lement some rekey mechanisms (see &lt;xref target=3D&quot;sec-security-cons=
iderations&quot;/&gt;).=C2=A0=C2=A0</div><div>&lt;/mglt&gt;</div><blockquot=
e class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px s=
olid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
Section 5:<br>
- If a constrained device does use AES-CBC then padding may be needed,<br>
shouldn=E2=80=99t that be considered here? That is, it seems that padding i=
s dependent<br>
on the cipher negotiated, right? - =E2=80=9CTFC cannot be enable with minim=
al ESP=E2=80=9D<br>
seems subjective, given that this is the guidelines perhaps it is a SHOULD =
NOT<br>
(or NOT RECOMMENDED)?<br>
<br></blockquote><div>&lt;mglt&gt;</div><div>I interpret your concern as if=
 the current document were not mandating the padding. My understanding of t=
he section is that we mostly mention how the padding should be built and th=
at the format should not be checked by the minimal implementation.=C2=A0 =
=C2=A0</div><div>I also believe that the case of AES-CBC has been addressed=
 with the following sentence. Feel free however to let me know if I mis-int=
erpreted your comment.=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>&quot;&quot;&quot;</d=
iv><div>The purpose of padding is to respect the 32 bit alignment of ESP or=
 block size expected by an encryption transform - such as AES-CBC for examp=
le.<br>ESP MUST have at least one padding byte Pad Length that indicates th=
e padding length.<br></div><div>&quot;&quot;&quot;=C2=A0</div><div><br></di=
v><div>I think it makes sense to have it as a recommendation, and here is t=
he new text:</div><div><br></div><div>OLD:</div><div>As such TFC is not<br>=
=C2=A0 =C2=A0expected to be supported by a minimal ESP implementation.<br><=
/div><div><br></div><div>NEW:</div><div><span style=3D"font-family:monospac=
e"><span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0)">s such it is NOT RECOMMENDED that minim=
al ESP implementation supports TFC</span><br></span></div><div><span style=
=3D"font-family:monospace"><span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0)">&quot;&quot;&qu=
ot;</span></span></div><div>&lt;/mglt&gt;</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote=
 class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px so=
lid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
Section 6:<br>
- More concise language/guidance on minimal ESP is required, e.g. =E2=80=9C=
it is not<br>
expected to be part of minimal=E2=80=9D needs to be stronger.=C2=A0 So, Nex=
t Header is<br>
mandatory, so guidance is that the field is there=E2=80=A6..but is the reco=
mmendation<br>
for =E2=80=9Cminimal ESP=E2=80=9D be that it can ignore the field?<br>
<br></blockquote><div>&lt;mglt&gt;</div><div>The Next Header is a mandatory=
 field, so the minimal ESP needs to support it, which support the ability t=
o remove &quot;no next header packet&quot;. I am unsure what needs to be ad=
ded to the text as it specifies:</div><div><br></div><div>&quot;&quot;&quot=
;</div><div>the Next Header is a mandatory 8 bits field in the packet [...]=
<br></div><div>&quot;&quot;&quot;</div><div>and=C2=A0</div><div>&quot;&quot=
;&quot;</div><div>[...] a minimal ESP implementation MUST discard dummy pac=
kets.<br></div><div>&quot;&quot;&quot;</div><div>I understand that the etxt=
 needed to be more concise. Here are two sentences I changed. Let me know=
=C2=A0if there are other I am missing.=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div><br><=
/div><div>OLD:</div><div>Next header is intended to specify the data contai=
ned in the payload as well as dummy packet, [...]=C2=A0<br></div><div><br><=
/div><div>NEW:</div><div>Next header specifies the data contained in the pa=
yload as well as dummy packet<br></div><div><br></div><div>OLD:</div><div>i=
t is not expected to be part of a minimal implementation of ESP.=C2=A0<br><=
/div><div><br></div><div>NEW:</div><div>As a result, it SHOULD NOT be part =
of a minimal implementation of ESP<br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><=
div>I am a bit reluctant saying that a minimal ESP SHOULD NOT send dummy pa=
cket as RFC4303 mentions:</div><div><br></div><div>&quot;&quot;&quot;</div>=
<div><pre style=3D"font-size:13.3333px;margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:0px;bre=
ak-before:page;color:rgb(0,0,0)">A transmitter MUST be capable of
   generating dummy packets marked with this value in the next protocol</pr=
e></div><div>&quot;&quot;&quot;=C2=A0</div><div>&lt;/mglt&gt;=C2=A0</div><b=
lockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-le=
ft:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
Section 7:<br>
- Do you mean authentication only w/no encryption?<br>
<br></blockquote><div>&lt;mglt&gt;</div><div>considering the previous comme=
nts as well, here is the new text I propose:</div><div><br></div><div>OLD:<=
/div><div>As detailed in &lt;xref target=3D&quot;sec-encr&quot;/&gt; we rec=
ommend using authentication, the ICV field is expected to be present that i=
s to say with a size different from zero.<br>This makes it a mandatory fiel=
d which size is defined by the security recommendations only.</div><div>=C2=
=A0<br></div><div>NEW:</div><div>As detailed in RFC8221 authentication or a=
uthenticated encryption are RECOMMENDED and as such the ICV field MUST be p=
resent with a size different from zero.=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0<br>It length is defined by the security recommen=
dations only.=C2=A0<br></div><div>&lt;/mglt&gt;=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><=
blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-l=
eft:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
Section 8:<br>
This section starts with eluding that guidelines for cipher selection crite=
ria<br>
are provided, but as I read the list they are more considerations than they=
 are<br>
guidelines? </blockquote><div>&lt;mglt&gt;</div><div>Yes, I did not want to=
 duplicate the cryptographic recommendations listed in RFC8221 - which incl=
udes some IoT specific recommendations. I agree that the section may be con=
sidered as guidelines but it seems ESP is a bit decoupled from the cryptogr=
aphy used.=C2=A0 =C2=A0</div><div>&lt;/mglt&gt;</div><div>=C2=A0</div><bloc=
kquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:=
1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">- Currently, the ciphers that =
provide confidentiality always<br>
include authentication, so not sure the motivation for the last sentence? <=
/blockquote><div>=C2=A0&lt;mglt&gt;</div><div>If the last sentence is=C2=A0=
</div><div>&quot;&quot;&quot;</div><div><span style=3D"font-family:monospac=
e"><span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0)">Recommendations are provided for standa=
rd nodes as well as constrained nodes.=C2=A0</span><br></span></div><div>&q=
uot;&quot;&quot;</div><div><br></div><div>The intention was to mention that=
 the recommendations do not necessarily apply to a constrained environment.=
 I agree it does not appear to be essential, so I removed it.=C2=A0</div><d=
iv>=C2=A0</div><div>&lt;/mglt&gt;</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" st=
yle=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padd=
ing-left:1ex">-<br>
Resilience to nonce reuse goes to the SN considerations as well (see my<br>
comments for Section 4). </blockquote><div>&lt;mglt&gt;</div><div>----</div=
><div>ISSUE 2</div><div>---</div><div>I think I misunderstood your comment =
in both places so I leave it open.=C2=A0</div><div>&lt;/mglt&gt;=C2=A0</div=
><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border=
-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Another recommendation h=
ere is to also suggest that<br>
the provisioned key (and key should be clarified as =E2=80=9Cpre-shared key=
=E2=80=9D) should<br>
also be updated with some regularity to address this issue (as in the rekey=
<br>
mechanism could lie in the management plane that provisions these keys).<br=
></blockquote><div>&lt;mglt&gt;</div><div>Though we do not mention &quot;pr=
e-shared&quot; keys, I am wondering if the text in the security considerati=
on does not address your purpose:</div><div><br></div><div>&quot;&quot;&quo=
t;</div><div>&lt;t&gt;It is RECOMMENDED to use ESP in conjunction of key ma=
nagement protocols such as for example IKEv2 &lt;xref target=3D&quot;RFC729=
6&quot;/&gt; or minimal IKEv2 &lt;xref target=3D&quot;RFC7815&quot;/&gt;.<b=
r>Such mechanisms are responsible to negotiate fresh session keys as well a=
s prevent a session key being use beyond its lifetime.<br><br>When such mec=
hanisms cannot be implemented and the session key is, for example, provisio=
ned, the nodes MUST ensure that keys are not used beyond their lifetime and=
 that the appropriated use of the key remains across reboots - e.g. conditi=
ons on counters and nonces remains valid.<br>&lt;/t&gt;<br></div><div>&quot=
;&quot;&quot;</div><div>&lt;/mglt&gt;=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail=
_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204=
,204);padding-left:1ex">
Currently RFC8452 is not cited as negotiated ciphers in RFC 8221, so<br>
considerations for 96bit nonce which doesn=E2=80=99t fit into the ESP heade=
r, so while<br>
a general alternative not sure how you would apply it to ESP unless changes=
 are<br>
made? </blockquote><div>&lt;mglt&gt;</div><div>---</div><div>ISSUE 3</div><=
div>---</div><div>This is correct that AES-GCM-SIV was not mentioned in RFC=
8221, and I mentioned it as an example. Now, it seems more problematic to h=
ave an example of a cipher suite that does not work for ESP.=C2=A0=C2=A0</d=
iv><div>I am balanced between indicating that its support is not defined wi=
th ESP so the reader still has a reference to an example of such a cipher s=
uite.=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>I will raise this issue to the WG, but=
 currently the text is as follows:</div><div><br></div><div>&quot;&quot;&qu=
ot;</div><div><span style=3D"font-family:monospace"><span style=3D"color:rg=
b(0,0,0)">When the key is likely to be re-used across reboots, it is RECOMM=
ENDED to consider transforms that are nonce misuse </span><br>resistant suc=
h as AES-GCM-SIV for example<span style=3D"font-weight:bold;color:rgb(135,0=
,0)">&lt;xref </span><span style=3D"font-weight:bold;color:rgb(95,95,135)">=
target</span><span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0)">=3D</span><span style=3D"colo=
r:rgb(215,0,95)">&quot;</span><span style=3D"color:rgb(215,0,95);background=
-color:rgb(255,84,84)">RFC8452</span><span style=3D"color:rgb(215,0,95)">&q=
uot;</span><span style=3D"font-weight:bold;color:rgb(135,0,0)">/&gt;. Note =
however that AES-GCM-SIV has not yet been defined for ESP.=C2=A0</span><spa=
n style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0)"></span><br></span></div><div>&quot;&quot;&quot=
;</div><div>&lt;/mglt&gt;</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"m=
argin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left=
:1ex">- What is the point driven in =E2=80=9Cinteroperability=E2=80=9D?=C2=
=A0 Is it that constrained<br>
devices may have limited interoperability given that they may not support a=
ll<br>
ciphers in RFC 8221? </blockquote><div>&lt;mglt&gt;</div><div>It is more th=
at what the other nodes supports needs to be considered in the selection of=
 the cipher suite. While RFC 8221 ensures smooth transition, contrainted de=
vices have less interoperability requirements.=C2=A0=C2=A0</div><div>&lt;/m=
glt&gt;</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"ma=
rgin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:=
1ex">- Similarly, for the power consumption and cipher suite<br>
complexity; is the point that ciphers are chosen based on the constraints<b=
r>
(physical, computational and memory) of the device?<br>
<br></blockquote><div>&lt;mglt&gt;</div><div>yes.</div><div>&lt;/mglt&gt;=
=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0=
.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
Nits:<br>
General throughout the draft:=C2=A0 =C2=A0=E2=80=9Cconstraint devices=E2=80=
=9D should be =E2=80=9Cconstrained<br>
devices=E2=80=9D.<br>
<br></blockquote><div>&lt;mglt&gt;</div><div>thanks. I changed them all.</d=
iv><div>&lt;/mglt&gt;=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D=
"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-le=
ft:1ex">
Abstract:<br>
=C2=A0- Last sentence of first paragraph first clause is awkward =E2=80=9CC=
onstrains include<br>
=C2=A0among other limiting=E2=80=A6.=E2=80=9D<br>
Perhaps you mean =E2=80=9CSome constraints include limiting the=E2=80=A6=E2=
=80=9D<br>
</blockquote><div>&lt;mglt&gt;</div><div>done. thanks.</div><div>&lt;/mglt&=
gt;=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0p=
x 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">=C2=A0- So=
me qualification of =E2=80=9Cwhat is required from RFC 4303=E2=80=9D is req=
uired=E2=80=A6.<br>
Perhaps you mean =E2=80=9Cthe minimally required set of functions and state=
s from RFC<br>
4303 to achieve compliance and interoperability=E2=80=9D? My suggestion may=
 be to just<br>
remove this 2nd paragraph as its covered in the 3rd (though I think noting<=
br>
interoperability should be there too).<br></blockquote><div>&lt;mglt&gt;</d=
iv><div>I agree. done.</div><div>&lt;/mglt&gt;=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=
=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rg=
b(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
=C2=A0- I would think that there would be a strong issue if there are confl=
icts with<br>
=C2=A0RFC 4303?! So would suggest to remove that sentence or<br>
Only that the RFC 4303 remains the authoritative spec to detail full detail=
s of<br>
ESP.<br>
<br></blockquote><div>&lt;mglt&gt;</div><div>done. thanks</div><div>&lt;/mg=
lt&gt;=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px=
 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
Section 2:<br>
=C2=A0- =E2=80=9Cconstraint devices=E2=80=9D should be =E2=80=9Cconstrained=
 devices=E2=80=9D<br>
<br>
Section 8:<br>
- For =E2=80=9CSecurity=E2=80=9D, suggest=E2=80=A6=E2=80=9DThe chosen encry=
ption algorithm MUST NOT be known to<br>
be vulnerable or weak=E2=80=9D<br>
<br></blockquote><div>&lt;mglt&gt;</div><div>done. thanks.</div><div>&lt;/m=
glt&gt;=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0p=
x 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
Lwip mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Lwip@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">Lwip@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/lwip" rel=3D"noreferrer" t=
arget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/lwip</a><br>
</blockquote></div><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div dir=3D"ltr"=
><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Daniel Migault<br></div><div>Ericsson</div></div></d=
iv></div>

--000000000000bf39b105becc1b23--


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Date: Wed, 31 Mar 2021 12:32:20 +0200
From: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
To: "Bottorff, Paul" <paul.bottorff@hpe.com>, IPsec <ipsec@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] draft-xu-ipsecme-esp-in-udp-lb-07
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Hi,

This is an interesting draft. I would love to see a generic
solution for network paths and receiver use cases, such as RSS.

The RFC3948 specifies one pair of UDP ports 4500-4500.
Both the IKE flow and the ESP in UDP flow should use the same UDP flow.
The draft seems to suggest new destination port and source ports are
only for ESP? How would this change work with IKE?
May you are not intending to use IKE?

How would the new ESP flow work when there is a NAT gateway along the path?
I ran into issues with both sides choosing different source ports.
It would cause SADB mapping changes which force changes IKE flows. One coul
disable SADB mapping changes. However, that would break real NAT changes.

Should both sides use the same source port? Or can each peer choose its
own source port independently? If both have to use the same port how do
peers negotiate on the ephemeral source port. I ran into issues with or
without NAT. Or do you disable SADB mapping completely?

When the source port is chosen independently the flow will be asymmetric.
The NAT gateway drops the ESP flow in one direction. A typical NAT gateway
only allows symmetric UDP flows. And this flow must be initiated from one
side, the side behind the NAT. So, I wonder how changing the source port
alone would work.

regards,
-antony

On Fri, Mar 26, 2021 at 18:07:37 +0000, Bottorff, Paul wrote:
>    Hi Xu:
> 
> 
>    We’ve got a lot of interest in your draft. Are you going to move this
>    forward to a working group draft and RFC? We would be happy to help
>    where needed.
> 
> 
>    Cheers,
> 
> 
>    Paul Bottorff
> 
>    Aruba a Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company

> _______________________________________________
> IPsec mailing list
> IPsec@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec



On Fri, Mar 26, 2021 at 18:07:37 +0000, Bottorff, Paul wrote:
>    Hi Xu:
> 
> 
>    We’ve got a lot of interest in your draft. Are you going to move this
>    forward to a working group draft and RFC? We would be happy to help
>    where needed.
> 
> 
>    Cheers,
> 
> 
>    Paul Bottorff
> 
>    Aruba a Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company

> _______________________________________________
> IPsec mailing list
> IPsec@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec


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From: Daniel Migault <daniel.migault@ericsson.com>
To: David Mandelberg <david@mandelberg.org>, "iesg@ietf.org" <iesg@ietf.org>,  "secdir@ietf.org" <secdir@ietf.org>, "draft-ietf-lwig-minimal-esp.all@ietf.org" <draft-ietf-lwig-minimal-esp.all@ietf.org>, IPsecME WG <ipsec@ietf.org>, "lwip@ietf.org" <lwip@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: secdir review of draft-ietf-lwig-minimal-esp-03
Thread-Index: AQHXI1GfjWEz1qZlx0uM4o//1Jg8fKqeCHmQ
Date: Wed, 31 Mar 2021 12:46:27 +0000
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ipsec/snaAM1y9yZYaWq8MDrWynmGzr8Y>
Subject: Re: [IPsec] secdir review of draft-ietf-lwig-minimal-esp-03
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From: "Valery Smyslov" <smyslov.ietf@gmail.com>
To: "'Christian Hopps'" <chopps@chopps.org>, "'IPsecME WG'" <ipsec@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] I-D Action: draft-ietf-ipsecme-iptfs-08.txt
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Hi Chris,

> This version incorporates Valery's WGLC editorial suggestions with some minor tweaks.

I reviewed the diff and I think that my concerns are resolved. Thank you for addressing them.

Regards,
Valery.

> Thanks,
> Chris.
> 
> > On Mar 30, 2021, at 8:11 PM, internet-drafts@ietf.org wrote:
> >
> >
> > A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
> > This draft is a work item of the IP Security Maintenance and Extensions WG of the IETF.
> >
> >        Title           : IP-TFS: Aggregation and Fragmentation Mode for ESP and its Use for IP Traffic Flow Security
> >        Author          : Christian Hopps
> > 	Filename        : draft-ietf-ipsecme-iptfs-08.txt
> > 	Pages           : 30
> > 	Date            : 2021-03-30
> >
> > Abstract:
> >   This document describes a mechanism for aggregation and fragmentation
> >   of IP packets when they are being encapsulated in ESP payload.  This
> >   new payload type can be used for various purposes such as decreasing
> >   encapsulation overhead for small IP packets; however, the focus in
> >   this document is to enhance IPsec traffic flow security (IP-TFS) by
> >   adding Traffic Flow Confidentiality (TFC) to encrypted IP
> >   encapsulated traffic.  TFC is provided by obscuring the size and
> >   frequency of IP traffic using a fixed-sized, constant-send-rate IPsec
> >   tunnel.  The solution allows for congestion control as well as non-
> >   constant send-rate usage.
> >
> >
> > The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ipsecme-iptfs/
> >
> > There are also htmlized versions available at:
> > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ipsecme-iptfs-08
> > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-ipsecme-iptfs-08
> >
> > A diff from the previous version is available at:
> > https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-ipsecme-iptfs-08
> >
> >
> > Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
> > until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
> >
> > Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> > ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > IPsec mailing list
> > IPsec@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec
> >



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From: "Bottorff, Paul" <paul.bottorff@hpe.com>
To: "antony.antony@secunet.com" <antony.antony@secunet.com>, IPsec <ipsec@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [IPsec] draft-xu-ipsecme-esp-in-udp-lb-07
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To: Daniel Migault <daniel.migault@ericsson.com>, "iesg@ietf.org" <iesg@ietf.org>, "secdir@ietf.org" <secdir@ietf.org>, "draft-ietf-lwig-minimal-esp.all@ietf.org" <draft-ietf-lwig-minimal-esp.all@ietf.org>, IPsecME WG <ipsec@ietf.org>, "lwip@ietf.org" <lwip@ietf.org>
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From: David Mandelberg <david@mandelberg.org>
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Date: Wed, 31 Mar 2021 22:17:46 -0400
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] secdir review of draft-ietf-lwig-minimal-esp-03
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Thanks for the updates and clarification!

Op 31-03-2021 om 08:46 schreef Daniel Migault:
> Hi David,
> 
> Thanks the review. I think the text  in [1] addresses your concern. I will probably publish the a new version today. Please see my responses inline.
> 
> Yours,
> Daniel
> 
> [1] https://github.com/mglt/draft-mglt-lwig-minimal-esp/pull/1/commits/fb9393a246298e37adcf2683afa2061a40b4ed89
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: David Mandelberg <david@mandelberg.org>
> Sent: Saturday, March 27, 2021 5:39 PM
> To: iesg@ietf.org; secdir@ietf.org; draft-ietf-lwig-minimal-esp.all@ietf.org
> Subject: secdir review of draft-ietf-lwig-minimal-esp-03
> 
> I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG.  These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security area directors.  Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other last call comments.
> 
> The summary of the review is Ready with nits.
> 
> (Section 3, nit) In the paragraph that includes "However, nonrandom SPI and restricting their possible values MAY lead to privacy and security concerns" , it would be nice to add something like "(see below for more details)". When I first read that paragraph, I was about to comment that it's unclear what the privacy/security concerns are, but then it was explained a few paragraphs below.
> 
> <mglt>
> That is correct, we restructured a bit the section to clarify this by having a subsection dedicated to considerations over the generation of SPIs.
> 
> The current section is available at [1] and is mentioned below:
> [1] https://github.com/mglt/draft-mglt-lwig-minimal-esp/pull/1/commits/fb9393a246298e37adcf2683afa2061a40b4ed89
> 
> <section title="Considerations over SPI generation">
> 
> <t>SPI that are not randomly generated over 32 bits MAY lead to privacy and security concerns.
> As a result, the use of alternative designs requires careful security and privacy reviews.
> This section provides some considerations upon the adoption of alternative designs. </t>
> 
> <t>Note that SPI value is used only for inbound traffic, as such the SPI negotiated with IKEv2 <xref target="RFC7296"/> or <xref target="RFC7815"/> by a peer, is the value used by the remote peer when it sends traffic.
> As SPI is only used for inbound traffic by the peer, this allows each peer to manage the set of SPIs used for its inbound traffic.
> Similarly, the privacy concerns associated with the generation of nonrandom SPI is also limited to the incoming traffic.</t>
> 
> <t>When alternate designs are considered, it is likely that the number of possible SPIs will be limited.
> This limit should both consider the number of inbound SAs - possibly per IP addresses - as well as the ability for the node to rekey.
> SPI can typically be used to proceed to clean key update and the SPI value may be used to indicate which key is being used.
> This can typically be implemented by a SPI being encoded with the Security Association Database (SAD) entry on a subset of bytes (for example 3 bytes), while the remaining byte is left to indicate the rekey index.
> </t>
> 
> 
> <t>The use of a smaller number of SPIs across communications comes with privacy and security concerns.
> Typically some specific values or subset of SPI values may reveal the models or manufacturer of the node implementing ESP.
> This may raise some privacy issues as an observer is likely to be able to determine the constrained devices of the network.
> In some cases, these nodes may host a very limited number of applications - typically a single application - in which case the SPI would provide some information related to the application of the user.
> In addition, the device or application may be associated with some vulnerabilities, in which case specific SPI values may be used by an attacker to discover vulnerabilities.
> </t>
> 
> <t>
> While the use of randomly generated SPI may reduce the leakage or privacy or security related information by ESP itself, these information may also be leaked otherwise and a privacy analysis should consider at least the type of information as well the traffic pattern.
> Typically, temperature sensors, wind sensors, used outdoors do not leak privacy sensitive information and mosty of its traffic is expected to be outbound traffic.
> When used indoors, a sensor that reports every minute an encrypted status of the door (closed or opened) leaks truly little privacy sensitive information outside the local network. </t>
> 
> 
> 
> </section>
> </mglt>
> 
> (Section 4) Am I understanding correctly, that the last paragraph is giving the option of resetting the Sequence Number when rekeying? Does IPSec try to prevent eavesdroppers from determining when rekeying happens? (I really don't know that much about IPSec.) If it does, then resetting the SN could leak that information, if not then there's nothing to leak.
> 
> <mglt>
> No. The last sentence of the section intended to prevent implementers to only consider the SN to define the life time of their SA. If implementer choose to use ESN for that purpose, it might be a good indication that a re-key mechanism is needed.
> 
> The current text has been updated to clarify this by the following text:
> 
> """
> Note that the limit of messages being sent is primarily determined by the security associated with the key rather than the SN.
> The security of all data protected under a given key decreases slightly with each message and a node MUST ensure the limit is not reached - even though the SN would permit it.
> Estimation of the maximum number of packets to be sent by a node is always challenging and as such should be considered cautiously as nodes could be online for much more time than expected.
> Even for constrained devices, it is RECOMMENDED to implement some rekey mechanisms (see <xref target="sec-security-considerations"/>).
> """
> 
> Regarding IPsec, a rekey leads to the creation of a new SA, so if you do not want to leak the information you may create the new SA in advance and only use it later. However, the creation is performed via an IKEv2 exchange which is not a very busy channel. As a result, exchanges performed on this channel are potential rekey exchanges. As result, it seems to me a bit hard to hide when a rekey occurs.
> SN do not have to be reset to 0. The only requirement is to increase these SN for each packet. On the other hand, this make it possible to maintain the SN number keep growing while SPI and keys are updated... until you reach the end.
> 
> If you need to keep the same SPI, you may delete the SA first before starting a new negotiation, this would enable you to re-use the same SPI.
> </mglt>
> 

