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From: "Valery Smyslov" <smyslov.ietf@gmail.com>
To: "'Michael Richardson'" <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>, <ipsec@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] Cost-efficient quantum-resistant DoS protection
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Hi Michael,

> Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi> wrote:
>     >> Even without surpassing the 64KB limit, this must be a concern.
>     >> IKEv2's cookie mechanism and puzzles try to increase the cost =
of the
>     >> attacker per each connection. Now, an attacker must still =
accept
>     >> these costs but can use one connection to trigger several key
>     >> exchanges, all significantly larger than what we had with DH, =
making
>     >> the trade-off way better for them compared to non-pqc IKEv2.
>=20
>     > No it cannot. Attacker can use cookie only once, and will only =
get one
>     > exchange created by each cookie exchange, thus it needs to do =
puzzles
>     > and cookies again for every single attack packet it wants to =
send.
>=20
> I wonder if anyone has any stats on how often cookie challenge is =
used, how
> often puzzles are invoked.

I've implemented puzzles, but I'm not aware of any other implementation.

What about cookies - in stress tests they are used very intensively.
But I don't have any real life stats for them.

Regards,
Valery.

>     > So I do not think DoS attack properties of the IKEv2 is at all
>     > modified with addition to the multiple ke, or beyond 64k limit =
drafts.
>=20
> I agree.
>=20
> IKEv2 is not SSLv3.
>=20
> --
> Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>   . o O ( IPv6 I=C3=B8T =
consulting )
>            Sandelman Software Works Inc, Ottawa and Worldwide
>=20
>=20
>=20



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Hi

Here is the status of the IP Traffic Flow Security Management drafts.
We have not asked for time on the agenda; however, we can discuss if there =
is interest.

Summary:
draft-ietf-ipsecme-yang-iptfs-02


  *   Received YANG Doctors Feedback and Updated the Draft to address all i=
ssues raised.
  *   Summary of main changes:
     *   Clarified text for readability.
     *   Yang module name now ietf-ipsec-iptfs
     *   Changed unint64 -> yangcounter64
     *   Use Addresses reserved for IETF documentation
     *   Added IPv6 example.
     *   Updated references - i2nsf draft is and RFC.



This draft is ready for publication request.

draft-ietf-ipsecme-mib-iptfs-00

Awaiting Feedback.  This is the same management model as the YANG but using=
 SNMP object to allow reading of the Management items.


Thanks
Don & Authors





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<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Hi<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Here is the status of the IP Traffic Flow Security M=
anagement drafts. &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">We have not asked for time on the agenda; however, w=
e can discuss if there is interest.
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Summary:<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">draft-ietf-ipsecme-yang-iptfs-02<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<ul style=3D"margin-top:0in" type=3D"disc">
<li class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin-left:0in;mso-list:l0 level1 =
lfo1">Received YANG Doctors Feedback and Updated the Draft to address all i=
ssues raised.
<o:p></o:p></li><li class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin-left:0in;mso=
-list:l0 level1 lfo1">Summary of main changes:<o:p></o:p></li><ul style=3D"=
margin-top:0in" type=3D"circle">
<li class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin-left:0in;mso-list:l0 level2 =
lfo1">Clarified text for readability.<o:p></o:p></li><li class=3D"MsoListPa=
ragraph" style=3D"margin-left:0in;mso-list:l0 level2 lfo1">Yang module name=
 now ietf-ipsec-iptfs<o:p></o:p></li><li class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=
=3D"margin-left:0in;mso-list:l0 level2 lfo1">Changed unint64 -&gt; yangcoun=
ter64<o:p></o:p></li><li class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin-left:0i=
n;mso-list:l0 level2 lfo1">Use Addresses reserved for IETF documentation
<o:p></o:p></li><li class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin-left:0in;mso=
-list:l0 level2 lfo1">Added IPv6 example.
<o:p></o:p></li><li class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin-left:0in;mso=
-list:l0 level2 lfo1">Updated references &#8211; i2nsf draft is and RFC.
<o:p></o:p></li></ul>
</ul>
<p class=3D"MsoListParagraph"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoListParagraph">This draft is ready for publication request.<=
o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">draft-ietf-ipsecme-mib-iptfs-00<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Awaiting Feedback.&nbsp; This is the same management=
 model as the YANG but using SNMP object to allow reading of the Management=
 items.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Thanks<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Don &amp; Authors<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
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Date: Mon, 1 Nov 2021 23:26:32 -0400 (EDT)
From: Paul Wouters <paul.wouters@aiven.io>
To: "Panwei (William)" <william.panwei@huawei.com>
cc: "draft-pwouters-ipsecme-multi-sa-performance@ietf.org" <draft-pwouters-ipsecme-multi-sa-performance@ietf.org>,  "ipsec@ietf.org" <ipsec@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] Comments on draft-pwouters-multi-sa-performance
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On Fri, 29 Oct 2021, Panwei (William) wrote:

Hi William,

> Subject: [IPsec] Comments on draft-pwouters-multi-sa-performance

> I’ve read the recent version. This is an interesting solution. I think it should be adopted. Below are some comments.

Thnks for reading the draft and giving us feedback!

> 1.
> 
> The CPU_QUEUES notification value refers to the number of additional
> 
> resource-specific Child SAs that may be installed for this particular
> 
> TSi/TSr combination excluding the Fallback Child SA.
> 
> Is it necessary to limit the amount of additional SAs at the beginning while TS_MAX_QUEUE can be used to reject the request of
> creating additional SA at any time? In the virtualization scenario, the new VMs can be launched on-demand, in other words, it may be
> seen as the number of CPUs isn’t fixed, so maybe limiting the addition SAs at the beginning will damage the flexibility.

The limit is really a very high maximum number and not a very low number
exactly matching CPUs. We had that at first, to try and optimize it but
there were too many race conditions, eg with rekeying. So if you have
a peer with 4 CPUs and a peer with 2 CPUs, you might just want to set
the max to 8 or even 12. It is mostly meant to try and avoid doing
CREATE_CHILD_SA's that are just doomed to failure anyway. So see it
more as a resource cap that a strict physical limitation.

> 2.
> 
> The CPU_QUEUES notification payload is sent in the IKE_AUTH or
> 
> CREATE_CHILD_SA Exchange indicating the negotiated Child SA is a
> 
> Fallback SA.
> 
> Before additional SAs are created, is there any difference between using this first/Fallback SA and using other normal SA? I think
> there is no difference. So maybe we don’t need to add this notification payload when creating the first SA.

the problem right now is that implementations often will discard an
an older identical Child SA for the newest one. So one of the key
intentions of the document is for the initiator/responder to clearly
negotiate from the start they are going to be using Child SA's with
identical Traffic Selectors and they want the older ones to stick
around. Also, it is important that there is always 1 fallback Child
SA that can be used on any CPU resource. So we really wanted to mark
that one very clearly. For instance, if it becomes idle, it should
NOT be deleted.

> When the initiator wants
> to create an additional SA, it can directly send the request with CPU_QUEUE_INFO notification payload.

It would be good to know from the responder if they support this and if
they are willing to do this before doing the CREATE_CHILD_SA. And as I
said above, to ensure both parties agree on which Child SA is the
"always be present" fallback SA to ensure things like adding a new CPU
always results in encrypted packets via the fallback SA.

> There are 3 ways that the
> responder may reply: 1) The responder doesn’t support/recognize this notification, it will ignore this notification and reply as
> usual.

But there is no "as usual" for what happens to the older Child SA. Some
implementations will allow it, some will only allow it if it has its own
IKE SA, and some will just delete the old one. This is the ambiguity we
are trying to address with the draft.

> 2) It supports this function and is willing to create the additional SA, so it will reply with CPU_QUEUE_INFO notification
> too. 3) It supports this function, but it isn’t willing to create more additional SAs, so it will reply with TS_MAX_QUEUE.
> Therefore, it seems like that CPU_QUEUE_INFO and TS_MAX_QUEUE these 2 notifications are enough to use, and the draft can be
> simplified to only use these 2 notifications.

I hope I explained why we think some clear signal has its use. If you
take your assumptions to the max, one would need no document at all,
as the IKEv2 specification states there can be Child SAs that are
duplicates or with overlapping IP ranges, so in theory, nothing is
needed.

> 3.
> 
> Both peers send
> 
> the preferred minimum number of additional Child SAs to install.
> 
> First, I think sending the number of additional Child SAs is unnecessary. Second, when using “minimum” here my first impression is
> that it means 0, so in order to remove ambiguity I suggest just saying “the preferred number” (if you think sending the number is
> necessary).

The use of minimum is indicating what the peer needs. A peer with 4 CPUs
does not prefer 4, it really prefers as many as the highest number of
CPUs of the two peers - within reason. The preference is really a
combination of what works best for the combination of the two peers.

Note the minimum is not about the minimum number required for
functioning, but the minimum number to get optimum performance.

By indicating the minimum, both sides can pick the highest minimum and
then allow a few more (for race conditions during rekeying).

> 4.
> 
> If a CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange request containing both a
> CPU_QUEUE_INFO and a CPU_QUEUES notification is received, the
> responder MUST ignore the CPU_QUEUE_INFO payload. If a
> CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange reply is received with both CPU_QUEUE_INFO
> and CPU_QUEUES notifications, the initiator MUST ignore the
> notification that it did not send in the request.
> 
> I think there is ambiguity here. When the initiator sends the CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange request containing both a CPU_QUEUE_INFO and
> a CPU_QUEUES notification, and the responder also adds CPU_QUEUE_INFO and CPU_QUEUES notifications in the reply, the initiator
> doesn’t know how to process with this situation, should the initiator ignore the CPU_QUEUE_INFO payload or notify an error to the
> responder?

We went back and forth on this a couple of times with the authors. We
really wanted to keep it as simple as possible but also not be too
pedantic. From a protocol point of view, we could say to just return
an error like SYNTAX_ERROR, but that would cause the IKE SA and all
its working Child SAs to also be torn down, and we wanted to avoid
that so bugs in the performance implementation does not result in
completely tunnel failures. Hence our phrasing of "just ignore X"
on both the initiator and responder.

We agree that a broken initiator with a broken responder leads to
something broken. I think specifying how a broken initiator should
respond to a broken responder is taking the Postel Principle a step
too far? :)

Paul
--1858192029-15858328-1635823596=:73832--


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From: "Valery Smyslov" <smyslov.ietf@gmail.com>
To: "'Paul Wouters'" <paul@nohats.ca>
Cc: "'Tero Kivinen'" <kivinen@iki.fi>, <ipsec@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] WGLC of draft-ietf-ipsecme-labeled-ipsec
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Hi Paul,

> On Wed, 25 Aug 2021, Valery Smyslov wrote:
> 
> > sorry for being late, the GGLC is already over, but I was really busy to review the draft before.
> 
> And sorry for my late response..
> 
> > 1. Section 1.2.
> > The last para is erroneous here, since the immediately following the first para of Section 1.3
> > states exactly the same with more details. Either remove it or rephrase and move to 1.3 (e.g.
> > to keep provided example).
> 
> It is actually different. Section 1.2 only clarifies content of RFC
> 7296. Sectin 1.3 describes to update to RFC 7296.

I disagree. Only the first two paras of 1.2 are clarifications. 
The last para of 1.2 is not a clarification, it is a new requirement for what
Traffic Selector Payload must contain, so it's an update of 7296 text and for 
this reason should belong to 1.3. But 1.3 has already contained this requirement.

Compare:

Last para of 1.2:

   A Traffic Selector payload (TS) is a set of one or more Traffic
   Selectors of the same or different TS_TYPEs, but MUST include at
   least one TS_TYPE of TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE or TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE.

1.3:

   This document updates the text to mean
   that the TSi/TSr payloads MUST contain at least one Traffic Selector
   of type TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE or TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE...

> > 2. Section 2.2.
> >   If the TS_SECLABEL is present in a TSi/TSr, at least one Traffic
> >   Selector of type TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE or TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE MUST also
> >   be present in that TSi/TSr.
> >
> > I think this requirement was already spelled out in more generic form in 1.3.
> > Why it is repeated here?
> 
> Defense in depth against sloppy implementers? I removed this one :P

OK.

> > 3. Section 2.2
> >   A zero length Security Label MUST NOT be used.  If a received TS
> >   payload contains a TS_TYPE of TS_SECLABEL with a zero length Security
> >   Label, that specific Traffic Selector MUST be ignored.  If no other
> >   Traffic Selector of TS_TYPE TS_SECLABEL can be selected, a
> >   TS_UNACCEPTABLE Error Notify message MUST be returned.  A zero length
> >   Security Label MUST NOT be interpreted as a wildcard security label.
> >
> > I wonder why zero-length TS_SECLABEL cannot be used to represent "no security label"?
> > This would significantly simplify negotiation when using security labels are optional
> > for initiator. Currently it is proposed that initiator performs two attempts
> > to establish Child SA in this case - with and without TS_SECLABEL.
> > If zero-length TS_SECLABEL meant "no security label", then a single CREATE_CHILD_SA
> > would be sufficient. It would also simplify the IKE state machine for this case.
> >
> > Are there any reasons I'm not aware of?
> 
> If new implementations start using this, it would be incompatible with
> old implementations that would reject any TS set with unknown TS_TYPE,
> and would also lead to two attempts. 

I don't buy this argument - with old implementations two attempts are unavoidable.

> We also wanted to avoid ambiguity
> with NULL or the empty string. 

What ambiguity? There is no ambiguity in representing this in the protocol - 
it's a TS with a type of TS_SECLABEL and no data. If you mean possible ambiguity
in representation this label inside the code, then I think that it's
out of scope of the protocol.

> And wanted a clear signal for wanting
> a TS_SECLABEL to not signify "no sec label". I am nervous that
> implementations would fail to insist on a label because it got an empty
> label. So again, defense in depth against sloppy implementers.

My very deep believe is that you cannot stop some implementers from 
doing thing wrong (some are very creative in this regard) :-/
And I think that adding complexity to the protocol is a penalty
for those implementers, who strictly follow the spec.
So I can't buy this argument too, sorry.

> Note that in all cases I am aware of, there is no use case of "optional
> security labels" and both ends always need to configure the exact same
> label. So there is not really a cause of "retrying without security
> label". I know this might look useful upgrading existing deployments
> from no label to sec label, but in practise, I have not seen this.
> People start with insisting proper labels.

I wonder how they deploy this with more-or-less big system.
Simultaneously upgrade thousands of hosts with no service interruption?

> > 4. Section 2.2
> >   If multiple Security Labels are allowed for a given IP protocol,
> >   start and end address/port match, multiple TS_SECLABEL can be
> >   included in a TS payload.
> >
> > This sentence is unclear for me. If the initiator includes multiple TS_SECLABEL,
> > does it mean that the responder must select exactly one of them or not?
> > If yes, then can you please clarify, that the presence of  multiple TS_SECLABEL
> > means that selection any of them is acceptable for the initiator.
> 
> Changed to:
> 
>        If multiple Security Labels are allowed for a given IP protocol,
>        start and end address/port match, the initiator includes all of the
>        acceptable TS_SECLABEL's and the responder MUST select one of them.

Good, thank you.

> > 5. Section 2.2:
> > What is "TS_set", which is mentioned twice in the last para?
> > This acronym was never used before in the dicument.
> 
> Changed. Old text:
> 
>     A responder that selected a TS with TS_SECLABEL MUST use the Security
>     Label for all selector operations on the resulting IPsec SA.  It MUST
>     NOT select a TS_set with a TS_SECLABEL without using the specified
>     Security Label, even if it deems the Security Label optional, as the
>     initiator TS_set with TS_SECLABEL means the initiator mandates using
>     that Security Label.
> 
> New text:
> 
>     A responder that selected a TS with TS_SECLABEL MUST use the Security
>     Label for all selector operations on the resulting TS. It MUST
>     NOT select a TS_SECLABEL without using the specified Security Label,
>     even if it deems the Security Label optional, as the initiator has
>     indicated (and expects) that Security Label will be set for all
>     traffic matching the negotiated TS.

I'm a bit confused with the part of \new text:

"...all selector operations on the resulting TS."
What do you mean? Did you mean
"on the resulting Traffic Selector"?
Or am I missing something?
 
> (I avoided talking about IPsec SA or Child SA, as one of those _may_
> include multiple different TS'es)

So what? I think that the essence of this text is that if TS_SECLABEL
is used, then it is applied for the whole Traffic Selector for this Child SA.
Am I missing the essence?

> (If you find the term TS confusing, see Section 1.2 where I blame the WG
>   for an unclear definition in RFC 7296 :)

No, I'm fine with TS.

> > 6. Section 3.
> >   Each TS payload (TSi and TSr) MUST contain at least one TS_TYPE of
> >   TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE or TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE.
> >
> > This is repeated for the third time in the document. Can you please keep the only
> > instance of this requirement?
> 
> Okay, I removed the middle one as it really talked about TS_LABEL
> properties only. I left the "update RFC 7296" one and this one which is
> actually about the negotiation.

I still think it's a repetition of a requirement. I believe that properly 
written standard must not contain repetitions of requirements.
If you really really want to keep it here (do defense against sloppy implementers?),
then change the text to something like:

    Section XX of this document updates definition of TS payload,
    so that it must contain at least one TS_TYPE of
   TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE or TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE.

(note lowercase "must" and reference to actual definition).

> > 7. Section 3.
> >   A responder MUST create its TS response by selecting one of each
> >   TS_TYPE present in the offered TS by the initiator.  If it cannot
> >   select one of each TS_TYPE, it MUST return a TS_UNACCEPTABLE Error
> >   Notify payload.
> 
> Changed to:
> 
>        A responder MUST create each TS response by creating one of more
>        (narrowed or not) TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE or TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE entries,
>        plus one of each further TS_TYPE present in the offered TS by the
>        initiator. If this is not possible, it MUST return a TS_UNACCEPTABLE
>        Error Notify payload.

Better. thanks. I'm a bit concerned of the generality of this requirement.
If tomorrow somebody introduces new TS_TYPE, that will be allowed
to have multiple values in response, then the text "plus one of each further TS_TYPE"
will prevent responder from doing that. So this text is true for 
TS_SECLABEL, but is not necessarily true for not yet defined TS_TYPEs.

> > and later
> >
> >   Some TS_TYPE's support narrowing, where the responder is allowed to
> >   select a subset of the original TS.  Narrowing MUST NOT result in an
> >   empty selector for that TS_TYPE.
> 
> I removed this paragraph.

Fine.

> > This is wrong with regard to TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE or TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE.
> > The responder may return any subset of TSs with TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE or TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE.
> > E.g, if the initiator included 5 TSs with TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE and 3 with TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE,
> > then the responder is free to return (just as example) only 2 TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE and no
> TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE,
> > and all of them may have different content (due to narrowing).
> 
> Agreed.
> 
> > 8. Section 3.2:
> >   It would be unlikely that the traffic for TSi and TSr would have a
> >   different Security Label, but this specification does allow this to
> >   be specified.
> >
> > Can you please provide some examples of possible semantics of
> > different TS_SECLABELs in TSi and TSr? Sending different
> > security labels in different directions? Just for curiosity.
> 
> I cannot, but I wanted to ensure not to accidentally forbid it. What
> we do see with our implementation though, that we end up with two
> IPsec Sa's where each is only used in one direction. For example,
> image you have an SElinux context for nfs-server and nfs-client. What
> happens is that the NFS client triggers one label on the outgoing
> connection, triggers ACQUIRE, sets up an IPsec SA with a label
> "nfs-client". The first packet hits the NFS server, which to reply
> hits a different SElinux context of "nfs-server". So it will trigger
> an ACQUIRE and setup a second IPsec SA with a label "nfs-server". Both
> IPsec SA's will only be used in one direction. I did not add any
> of this into the document, as it is very SElinux specific, where as
> the draft is agnostic on the meaning of SEC_LABEL and allows for
> other mechanisms that might not have this complexity.

I understand your example, but I failed to understand how it is aligned
with the current document. In particular, my understanding
of the negotiation process is that the initiator includes 
several possible seclabels and the responder selects one of them, 
which means that both agreed to use the selected seclabel
in both directions.

If my understanding is wrong and you meant that 
the initiator can use "any" of the proposed seclabels,
while responder can only use one of them - which
it has selected, then you must explain this in more details.
Moreover, I failed to understand what the responder
has to do in this situation if its policy allows initiator
to use only one seclabel. You describe a similar case 
for the initiator, but not for the responder.

So, I believe that unless more clarifications are
added to the document and all these cases are
described in details, this para must be removed,
because it describes the case that contradicts
to the rest of the document and cannot be 
implemented using this document.

> > 9. Section 3.2:
> >   Rekey of an
> >   IPsec SA MUST only use identical Traffic Selectors, which means the
> >   same TS Type and selectors MUST be used.  This guarantees that a
> >   Security Label once negotiated, remains part of the IPsec SA after a
> >   rekey.
> >
> > I think it is a too strong requirement. Traditionally in IKEv2 the rekey operation
> > is equivalent to creating a new Child SA with full negotiation of algorithms and
> > TSs.
> 
> I used the RFC 7296 language in the new text:
> 
>       The mechanism of narrowing of Traffic Selectors with
>       TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE and TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE does not apply to
>       TS_SECLABEL as the Security Label itself is not interpreted and
>       cannot be narrowed. It MUST be matched exactly. Since a rekey
>       MUST NOT narrow down the Traffic Selectors narrower than the scope
>       currently in use, the only valid choice of TS_SECLABEL for a rekey
>       is the identical TS_SECLABEL that is in use by the Child SA being
>       rekeyed. If the TS_LABEL is missing from the TS during the rekey
>       negotiation, the negotiation MUST fail with TS_UNACCEPTABLE.

I think that this part

     Since a rekey
      MUST NOT narrow down the Traffic Selectors narrower than the scope
      currently in use, the only valid choice of TS_SECLABEL

must be change to 

      According to RFC 7296  Section 2.9.2, a rekey operation 
      must not narrow down the Traffic Selectors narrower than the scope
      currently in use. For this reason the only valid choice of TS_SECLABEL

So, it's clear that this document doesn't impose any new requirement
here, it only refers to RFC 7296's one.

Regards,
Valery.


> diffs available at:
> 
> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-ipsecme-labeled-ipsec-06.txt
> 
> Paul


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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ipsec/Eyz4jldIZzVm0GgIi2mfWNQvM_Q>
Subject: Re: [IPsec] iptfs publication request
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I'd prefer to see the SHOULD and MAY reversed -- intentionally 
introducing additional reordering is generally considered something to 
avoid.  I'd also be fine with both being a MAY and a recommendation for 
this to be configurable.

Lou

On 10/31/2021 3:53 PM, Michael Richardson wrote:
> Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi> wrote:
>      > Christian Hopps writes:
>      >> Will you be able to provide the text changes that would cover the
>      >> issue you have? Would really like to get this submitted to IESG
>      >> before another IETF cycle completes.
>
>      > How about following:
>
> works for me.
>
> _______________________________________________
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Date: Tue, 2 Nov 2021 13:51:42 -0400 (EDT)
From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
To: Valery Smyslov <smyslov.ietf@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] WGLC of draft-ietf-ipsecme-labeled-ipsec
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On Tue, 2 Nov 2021, Valery Smyslov wrote:

>>> 1. Section 1.2.
>>> The last para is erroneous here, since the immediately following the first para of Section 1.3
>>> states exactly the same with more details. Either remove it or rephrase and move to 1.3 (e.g.
>>> to keep provided example).
>>
>> It is actually different. Section 1.2 only clarifies content of RFC
>> 7296. Sectin 1.3 describes to update to RFC 7296.
>
> I disagree. Only the first two paras of 1.2 are clarifications.
> The last para of 1.2 is not a clarification, it is a new requirement for what
> Traffic Selector Payload must contain, so it's an update of 7296 text and for
> this reason should belong to 1.3. But 1.3 has already contained this requirement.
>
> Compare:
>
> Last para of 1.2:
>
>   A Traffic Selector payload (TS) is a set of one or more Traffic
>   Selectors of the same or different TS_TYPEs, but MUST include at
>   least one TS_TYPE of TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE or TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE.

This is true, even if only because those are the only valid TS_TYPEs
that exist in RFC 7296. I could omit it to better match the old text,
but I find that a bit confusing. The goad of 1.2 is to point out the
problem if RFC 7296 using "Traffic Selector" to mean both the selector
and the selector set / payload. If you insist, I can remove:

 	of the same or different TS_TYPEs, but MUST include at
 	least one TS_TYPE of TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE or TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE.

> 1.3:
>
>   This document updates the text to mean
>   that the TSi/TSr payloads MUST contain at least one Traffic Selector
>   of type TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE or TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE...


>>> Why it is repeated here?
>>
>> Defense in depth against sloppy implementers? I removed this one :P
>
> OK.

>>> I wonder why zero-length TS_SECLABEL cannot be used to represent "no security label"?
>>> This would significantly simplify negotiation when using security labels are optional
>>> for initiator. Currently it is proposed that initiator performs two attempts
>>> to establish Child SA in this case - with and without TS_SECLABEL.
>>> If zero-length TS_SECLABEL meant "no security label", then a single CREATE_CHILD_SA
>>> would be sufficient. It would also simplify the IKE state machine for this case.
>>>
>>> Are there any reasons I'm not aware of?
>>
>> If new implementations start using this, it would be incompatible with
>> old implementations that would reject any TS set with unknown TS_TYPE,
>> and would also lead to two attempts.
>
> I don't buy this argument - with old implementations two attempts are unavoidable.
>
>> We also wanted to avoid ambiguity
>> with NULL or the empty string.
>
> What ambiguity? There is no ambiguity in representing this in the protocol -
> it's a TS with a type of TS_SECLABEL and no data. If you mean possible ambiguity
> in representation this label inside the code, then I think that it's
> out of scope of the protocol.
>
>> And wanted a clear signal for wanting
>> a TS_SECLABEL to not signify "no sec label". I am nervous that
>> implementations would fail to insist on a label because it got an empty
>> label. So again, defense in depth against sloppy implementers.
>
> My very deep believe is that you cannot stop some implementers from
> doing thing wrong (some are very creative in this regard) :-/
> And I think that adding complexity to the protocol is a penalty
> for those implementers, who strictly follow the spec.
> So I can't buy this argument too, sorry.

We do need to take implementations and common implementation mistakes
into consideration when designing a protocol.
But also, a security label of "nothing" isn't really a valid security
label selector. It is too ambiguous with "no security label". It makes
common sense to me to simply not allow it. And comparing a 0 size NULL
with a zero byte also seems just way to risky. Ideally, I would have
stated "a minimum length of one non-zero octet".

I guess we need to get other people's opinion on this.


>> Note that in all cases I am aware of, there is no use case of "optional
>> security labels" and both ends always need to configure the exact same
>> label. So there is not really a cause of "retrying without security
>> label". I know this might look useful upgrading existing deployments
>> from no label to sec label, but in practise, I have not seen this.
>> People start with insisting proper labels.
>
> I wonder how they deploy this with more-or-less big system.
> Simultaneously upgrade thousands of hosts with no service interruption?

In our implementation you can define two "conns", one with and one
without. And choosing the right one will work. On the responder, there
is a connection switching mechanism that can switch to the better
matching connection once the TS payloads are read from IKE_AUTH. So
first you add all the conns with sec_label. And after a while, you can
just remove all the conns without sec_label.

>> Changed. Old text:
>>
>>     A responder that selected a TS with TS_SECLABEL MUST use the Security
>>     Label for all selector operations on the resulting IPsec SA.  It MUST
>>     NOT select a TS_set with a TS_SECLABEL without using the specified
>>     Security Label, even if it deems the Security Label optional, as the
>>     initiator TS_set with TS_SECLABEL means the initiator mandates using
>>     that Security Label.
>>
>> New text:
>>
>>     A responder that selected a TS with TS_SECLABEL MUST use the Security
>>     Label for all selector operations on the resulting TS. It MUST
>>     NOT select a TS_SECLABEL without using the specified Security Label,
>>     even if it deems the Security Label optional, as the initiator has
>>     indicated (and expects) that Security Label will be set for all
>>     traffic matching the negotiated TS.
>
> I'm a bit confused with the part of \new text:
>
> "...all selector operations on the resulting TS."
> What do you mean? Did you mean
> "on the resulting Traffic Selector"?
> Or am I missing something?

I mean to say, if you pick a TS with TS_SECLABEL, you MUST have a
security label as part of your SPD selector mechanism. You cannot
decide to ignore it and only use IP address based SPD selectors.

In our implementation, using the selector means _setting_ the SElinux
context (sec_label) on the decrypted packet before releasing it to the
OS for further processing by the application. The application might make
security decisions based on the sec_label, so not "applying" the sec_label
negotiated would be a security violation of the negotiated policy.

That is, things might appear to work but in fact might be working
without sec_label security and the remote peer has no way of detecting
this. It is trusting the peer to apply the security policy to the
packets.

If you have a suggested text you prefer, please let me know.

>> (I avoided talking about IPsec SA or Child SA, as one of those _may_
>> include multiple different TS'es)
>
> So what? I think that the essence of this text is that if TS_SECLABEL
> is used, then it is applied for the whole Traffic Selector for this Child SA.
> Am I missing the essence?

I avoided talking about IPsec / Child SA because different ones can have
different negotiated TS_SECLABELS - eg they can be independent from the
exchange we are talking about. (I think we are saying the same thing?)

>>> 6. Section 3.
>>>   Each TS payload (TSi and TSr) MUST contain at least one TS_TYPE of
>>>   TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE or TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE.
>>>
>>> This is repeated for the third time in the document. Can you please keep the only
>>> instance of this requirement?
>>
>> Okay, I removed the middle one as it really talked about TS_LABEL
>> properties only. I left the "update RFC 7296" one and this one which is
>> actually about the negotiation.
>
> I still think it's a repetition of a requirement. I believe that properly
> written standard must not contain repetitions of requirements.
> If you really really want to keep it here (do defense against sloppy implementers?),
> then change the text to something like:
>
>    Section XX of this document updates definition of TS payload,
>    so that it must contain at least one TS_TYPE of
>   TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE or TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE.
>
> (note lowercase "must" and reference to actual definition).

sure, if that makes you happy. I have no objection.

>>> 7. Section 3.
>>>   A responder MUST create its TS response by selecting one of each
>>>   TS_TYPE present in the offered TS by the initiator.  If it cannot
>>>   select one of each TS_TYPE, it MUST return a TS_UNACCEPTABLE Error
>>>   Notify payload.
>>
>> Changed to:
>>
>>        A responder MUST create each TS response by creating one of more
>>        (narrowed or not) TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE or TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE entries,
>>        plus one of each further TS_TYPE present in the offered TS by the
>>        initiator. If this is not possible, it MUST return a TS_UNACCEPTABLE
>>        Error Notify payload.
>
> Better. thanks. I'm a bit concerned of the generality of this requirement.
> If tomorrow somebody introduces new TS_TYPE, that will be allowed
> to have multiple values in response, then the text "plus one of each further TS_TYPE"
> will prevent responder from doing that. So this text is true for
> TS_SECLABEL, but is not necessarily true for not yet defined TS_TYPEs.

Yes, so such a new TS_TYPE will have to Update: this document, just like
this one has to Update: 7296. This is exactly the kind of issue Update:
is designed for. The generality is there and we are updating it for
specific TS_TYPEs.

>>> Can you please provide some examples of possible semantics of
>>> different TS_SECLABELs in TSi and TSr? Sending different
>>> security labels in different directions? Just for curiosity.
>>
>> I cannot, but I wanted to ensure not to accidentally forbid it. What
>> we do see with our implementation though, that we end up with two
>> IPsec Sa's where each is only used in one direction. For example,
>> image you have an SElinux context for nfs-server and nfs-client. What
>> happens is that the NFS client triggers one label on the outgoing
>> connection, triggers ACQUIRE, sets up an IPsec SA with a label
>> "nfs-client". The first packet hits the NFS server, which to reply
>> hits a different SElinux context of "nfs-server". So it will trigger
>> an ACQUIRE and setup a second IPsec SA with a label "nfs-server". Both
>> IPsec SA's will only be used in one direction. I did not add any
>> of this into the document, as it is very SElinux specific, where as
>> the draft is agnostic on the meaning of SEC_LABEL and allows for
>> other mechanisms that might not have this complexity.
>
> I understand your example, but I failed to understand how it is aligned
> with the current document. In particular, my understanding
> of the negotiation process is that the initiator includes
> several possible seclabels and the responder selects one of them,
> which means that both agreed to use the selected seclabel
> in both directions.

It does. If both endpoints have an "nfs-client" and "nfs-server" role.

But you are now getting very close to "interpreting sec_labels", which
the IKE stack should not do :)

> If my understanding is wrong and you meant that
> the initiator can use "any" of the proposed seclabels,
> while responder can only use one of them - which
> it has selected, then you must explain this in more details.

Your understanding is right. It is just that the "nfs-server" might
not have any "nfs-client" traffic since it is a server and not a client.

> Moreover, I failed to understand what the responder
> has to do in this situation if its policy allows initiator
> to use only one seclabel. You describe a similar case
> for the initiator, but not for the responder.

traffic covered has 1 seclabel. If the initiator sends multiple
acceptable ones, the responder picks one. I thought this was clear
in the document?

In our implementation, this never happens and there is only ever
one sec_label the initiator proposes. It receives a seperate
ACQUIRE for each sec_label and sets up individual Child SA's for
each sec_label. But that is our implementation. I again did not
want to exclude other implementations with different mechanisms
on their sec_label to be limited to our personal requirements.
It just seemed that allowing multiple sec_labels within one
Child SA seemed dangerous, and one would be better of defining
a third type of sec_label value that incorporations the two
base types of sec_label one wants to include. Eg if you want
the connection to accept SECPOL1 and SECPOL2, define a label
SECPOL3 that means "SECPOL1 or SECPOL2", or even call it
"SECPOL1|SECPOL2".

If the WG believes we should be more generic and allow picking
multiple ones, this can be changed.

> So, I believe that unless more clarifications are
> added to the document and all these cases are
> described in details, this para must be removed,
> because it describes the case that contradicts
> to the rest of the document and cannot be
> implemented using this document.

I don't understand what you mean?

>> I used the RFC 7296 language in the new text:
>>
>>       The mechanism of narrowing of Traffic Selectors with
>>       TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE and TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE does not apply to
>>       TS_SECLABEL as the Security Label itself is not interpreted and
>>       cannot be narrowed. It MUST be matched exactly. Since a rekey
>>       MUST NOT narrow down the Traffic Selectors narrower than the scope
>>       currently in use, the only valid choice of TS_SECLABEL for a rekey
>>       is the identical TS_SECLABEL that is in use by the Child SA being
>>       rekeyed. If the TS_LABEL is missing from the TS during the rekey
>>       negotiation, the negotiation MUST fail with TS_UNACCEPTABLE.
>
> I think that this part
>
>     Since a rekey
>      MUST NOT narrow down the Traffic Selectors narrower than the scope
>      currently in use, the only valid choice of TS_SECLABEL
>
> must be change to
>
>      According to RFC 7296  Section 2.9.2, a rekey operation
>      must not narrow down the Traffic Selectors narrower than the scope
>      currently in use. For this reason the only valid choice of TS_SECLABEL
>
> So, it's clear that this document doesn't impose any new requirement
> here, it only refers to RFC 7296's one.

I'll make that change.

Paul


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Subject: Re: [IPsec] Cost-efficient quantum-resistant DoS protection
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Hi everyone,

we'd like to show some figures at the upcoming ipsecme meeting and  
also give some rationale on our thoughts and elaborate on the current  
discussion. Also thanks for the input so far. Much appreciated!

Kind Regards,
Daniel and Stefan

Zitat von "Kampanakis, Panos" <kpanos=40amazon.com@dmarc.ietf.org>:

> Hi Daniel,
>
>> To give more insight about these measurements, we implemented all  
>> three drafts and tested the performance of a medium-sized McEliece  
>> key exchange under different networking conditions (variable  
>> latency, packet loss, and throughput). Especially when packet loss  
>> or throughput surpass specific threshholds (~ above 1% packet loss  
>> and below 3Mbit of throughput), the overall performance suffers  
>> significantly. Yet, we deem those values acceptable, as long as we  
>> don't use cellular or similarly unreliable networks. Furthermore,  
>> we expect a gateway communicating with many peers to have higher  
>> requirements to its network uplink. Yet, as this will most likely  
>> be positioned in a data center, this challenge should also be  
>> doable. Altogether, this left us with a surprisingly positive view  
>> on the possibility of adopting McEliece-sized key exchanges at  
>> least for some use-cases.
>
>> The introduction of new Transform-IDs like SNTRUP761X25519 is a  
>> good short-term solution, as it addresses the problem without  
>> requiring much effort in terms of standardization or implementation.
>
> Understood. I am curious to see the measurements published btw. Are  
> the public somewhere?
>
> A couple counter arguments:
>
> Cloudflare's tests  
> (https://blog.cloudflare.com/the-tls-post-quantum-experiment/ )  
> showed a bunch of variability for way more compact KEMs than  
> McEliece (SIKE, NTRU-HRSS) at the 95% and 99% percentile.  
> https://www.ndss-symposium.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/24203-paper.pdf  
> tested similar things, but the tails (9x% percentiles) looked better  
> because it was a controller wired environment. Similarly, the  
> datacenter using jumbo frames would not sweat at all, but the issues  
> arise at >90% percentile and affect folks in infrastructures that  
> are not as developed as in the western world. Also think about  
> congestion control and how that could impact infrastructures. These  
> are important challenges that McEliece would bring.
>
> Also think of the loss probability.  
> https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1447 talks about it. If you are sending  
> 2-3 packets for a few KB public key or ciphertext then the total  
> loss probability is 1-(1-p)^3 where p is the link loss probability.  
> Let's say p=1%, that becomes ~3% which is not too bad. Now with 64KB  
> and assuming 1400B packets, the probability becomes 1-(1-p)^45 which  
> is ~36% with p=1%. 36% loss would slow down handshakes  
> significantly, especially UDP-based ones.
>
> BSI may be endorsing the algorithm. It is indeed very mature and  
> trusted. I am sure many others would endorse it too. But it is  
> impractical to say we will standardize McEliece for the environments  
> that can afford it and the rest will pick something else. Migrating  
> algorithms is painful and cumbersome as we have seen in hash and  
> other algorithm migrations. Integrating two new PQ KEMs depending on  
> usecase is not straightforward. History has shown that new  
> algorithms that make sense get deployed in TLS, IKEv2, SSH etc.
>
> Imo McEliece is not viable for the internet, unless there were  
> significant redesigns and no other options.
>
> As a great cryptographer told me one time, if we are to use McEliece  
> what is the point of all this work taking place to come up with  
> better and more efficient PQ KEMs?
>
> Rgs,
> Panos
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Daniel Herzinger <daniel_herzinger@genua.de>
> Sent: Tuesday, October 26, 2021 8:26 AM
> To: CJ Tjhai <cjt@post-quantum.com>; Kampanakis, Panos <kpanos@amazon.com>
> Cc: Valery Smyslov <smyslov.ietf@gmail.com>; ipsec@ietf.org; ietf@gazdag.de
> Subject: [EXTERNAL] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] AW: [IPsec] Cost-efficient  
> quantum-resistant DoS protection
>
>
> Hi,
>
> the fact is that accepting a significantly increased amount of data  
> from an unauthenticated peer also significantly increases the  
> surface to DoS attacks. Even without surpassing the 64KB limit, this  
> must be a concern. IKEv2's cookie mechanism and puzzles try to  
> increase the cost of the attacker per each connection. Now, an  
> attacker must still accept these costs but can use one connection to  
> trigger several key exchanges, all significantly larger than what we  
> had with DH, making the trade-off way better for them compared to  
> non-pqc IKEv2. So, the attacker could, e.g., negotiate several  
> FrodoKEMs (all with different parameters to circumvent the rule that  
> all key exchange methods must be different). Compared to classical  
> non-hybrid (EC)DH, such a DoS attack requires significantly less  
> cost to have the same effect.
> The introduction of MB-sized key exchanges just amplifies this  
> problem even further (also allowing several McEliece KEMs with  
> different parameters circumventing this constraint). Thus, while we  
> should already thoroughly asses and mitigate the risk of this  
> possible weakness for  
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-multiple-ke/, we  
> definitely must do it for  
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-tjhai-ikev2-beyond-64k-limit/.
> Currently, there is no place defined where a McEliece-sized key  
> exchange can take place. So, at least one of the two drafts  
> (probably beyond-64k or multiple-ke) or better both should make this  
> clear. At the moment, beyond-64k defines how the transmission of  
> such key exchanges could look like but the question of where these  
> ideas could be put into action are left to the reader, leading to  
> inevitable confusion. The fact that there are several drafts aiming  
> at the same problem, without really defining their contact points or  
> interactions, further exacerbates this.
>
> The most obvious way to prevent an attacker from exploiting the new  
> attack surface is to accept the larger key exchanges only from an  
> already authenticated peer. As mentioned before, we think childless  
> IKEv2 with immediate rekeying would be a good compromise to achieve  
> that.
>
>> Imo, McEliece is not practical for live protocols like TLS or IKEv2.
> McEliece is more trusted than its pqc alternatives which also makes  
> it the favored choice of some agencies like the German BSI.  
> Obviously, they all know the challenges of integrating such large  
> key exchanges, still they would surely appreciate any effort which  
> goes into this direction. This justifies pursuing the idea further,  
> especially since first measurements look better than one would  
> probably expect.
> To give more insight about these measurements, we implemented all  
> three drafts and tested the performance of a medium-sized McEliece  
> key exchange under different networking conditions (variable  
> latency, packet loss, and throughput). Especially when packet loss  
> or throughput surpass specific threshholds (~ above 1% packet loss  
> and below 3Mbit of throughput), the overall performance suffers  
> significantly. Yet, we deem those values acceptable, as long as we  
> don't use cellular or similarly unreliable networks. Furthermore, we  
> expect a gateway communicating with many peers to have higher  
> requirements to its network uplink. Yet, as this will most likely be  
> positioned in a data center, this challenge should also be doable.  
> Altogether, this left us with a surprisingly positive view on the  
> possibility of adopting McEliece-sized key exchanges at least for  
> some use-cases.
>
> The introduction of new Transform-IDs like SNTRUP761X25519 is a good  
> short-term solution, as it addresses the problem without requiring  
> much effort in terms of standardization or implementation. This  
> becomes even more important, as intermediate exchanges and their  
> high complexity, due to their interconnectedness with  
> authentication, mean that especially the IKEv2 implementations of  
> smaller projects will take their time for its integration. Thus,  
> having an easier short-term solution at hand means a real advantage.
> Also, the constrained size of such transforms mostly eliminates the  
> aforementioned DoS risks.
> Finally, should the beyond-64k draft be adopted, then having a small  
> set of such additional Tranform-IDs is even more beneficial since it  
> makes preventing the unlikely yet possible attack described in our  
> initial mail easier.
>
>
> Regards,
> Stefan and Daniel
> ________________________________________
> Von: CJ Tjhai <cjt@post-quantum.com>
> Gesendet: Donnerstag, 21. Oktober 2021 18:39:16
> An: Kampanakis, Panos
> Cc: Valery Smyslov; Daniel Herzinger; ipsec@ietf.org; ietf@gazdag.de
> Betreff: Re: [IPsec] Cost-efficient quantum-resistant DoS protection
>
> Hi Panos,
>
> There are two drafts involved here.
>
> a) the main draft,  
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-multiple-ke/,  
> cannot support any public-key larger than 64KB, so it can never be  
> used for KEMs like McEliece. So the option 3 is implied here.
>
> b) on the other hand,  
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-tjhai-ikev2-beyond-64k-limit/  
> is an attempt to address the issue with transferring payload larger  
> than 64KB. As you pointed out, transferring large blob of data in a  
> live protocol is challenging and therefore it deservers separate  
> treatments and considerations. It was deliberate that we split the  
> hybrid key exchange drafts into two, the second draft is there just  
> in case there is any interest in the working group on supporting the  
> use KEMs like McEliece.
>
> Cheers,
> CJ
>
>
>
>
> On Thu, 21 Oct 2021 at 16:49, Kampanakis, Panos  
> <kpanos=40amazon.com@dmarc.ietf.org<mailto:40amazon.com@dmarc.ietf.org>>  
> wrote:
> Hi Valery, Tero,
>
>> Not really. First, the situation with seven McEliece is not  
>> possible, since all negotiated Key Exchange methods MUST be  
>> different.
> Then, you seem to assume that the responder blindly accepts all the  
> key exchanges at the initiator's will.
> This is not true. First peers negotiate which key exchanges they  
> will perform (including additional key exchanges), and you can limit  
> the types and the number additional key exchanges the responder will  
> accept via its local policy.
>
> I think the point is valid though if the responder supports  
> McEliece. A miscreant can that way make the responder put a lot of  
> data on the wire like an amplification attack although the initiator  
> has not been validated. QUIC has a 3x amplification protection  
> limits for that matter.
>
> Sure, the issue existed even in ECDH exchanges, but the impact is  
> much higher when we talk MB of public keys.
>
> Imo, McEliece is not practical for live protocols like TLS or IKEv2.  
> Too many packets mean pretty high loss probability in unstable  
> networks which means pretty bad performance unless everything  
> happens in the datacenter or robust end-to-end network paths. The PQ  
> KEMs that will end up being standardized are likely to have just a  
> few KBs of public key and ciphertext which is better for the general  
> case.
>
> So, I would say option 3 (prohibit the use of very large KE payloads  
> like McEliece's MB sized public keys) is more practical.
>
> Rgs,
> Panos
>
>
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: IPsec <ipsec-bounces@ietf.org<mailto:ipsec-bounces@ietf.org>>  
> On Behalf Of Valery Smyslov
> Sent: Tuesday, October 19, 2021 11:46 AM
> To: 'Daniel Herzinger'  
> <daniel_herzinger@genua.de<mailto:daniel_herzinger@genua.de>>;  
> ipsec@ietf.org<mailto:ipsec@ietf.org>
> Cc: ietf@gazdag.de<mailto:ietf@gazdag.de>
> Subject: RE: [EXTERNAL] [IPsec] Cost-efficient quantum-resistant DoS  
> protection
>
> CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do  
> not click links or open attachments unless you can confirm the  
> sender and know the content is safe.
>
>
>
> Hi Daniel and Stefan-Lukas,
>
>> Hi,
>>
>> in response to the new version of
>> draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-multiple-ke-04.txt, we wanted to emphasize
>> the issue of DoS attacks during intermediate exchanges. The new
>> version does address it by mentioning the option of simply avoiding
>> intermediate exchanges altogether but still require additional key
>> exchanges. Yet, this protects only against record-and-harvest attacks
>> but not against an attacker with a strong quantum computer at the time
>> of the handshake, regardless of quantum-resistant authentication
>> (since they can break the initial shared secret and therefore
>> recalculate the MAC which authenticates the followup exchanges, fully
>> establishing a man-in-the-middle). We doubt that an attacker, even  
>> with a strong quantum computer, is able to break a key exchange in  
>> such a short time period. Still, this assumption is too theoretical  
>> to rely on. This, together with the fact that Group-IKE is  
>> incompatible with key exchanges during followup exchanges, makes  
>> the option seem inferior to just sticking to intermediate exchanges  
>> during the handshake. However, we must also consider the  
>> draft-tjhai-ikev2-beyond-64k-limit-01.txt.
>> An attacker who exploits the large key exchanges, e.g., by requesting
>> seven additional maximum size McEliece key exchanges, can force a  
>> gateway to accept and process 1.4MB of data per McEliece KEM.
>
> Not really. First, the situation with seven McEliece is not  
> possible, since all negotiated Key Exchange methods MUST be different.
> Then, you seem to assume that the responder blindly accepts all the  
> key exchanges at the initiator's will.
> This is not true. First peers negotiate which key exchanges they  
> will perform (including additional key exchanges), and you can limit  
> the types and the number additional key exchanges the responder will  
> accept via its local policy.
>
>> This leaves us at
>> a situation where we must pick one of the following options:
>>
>>  1. Accept the highly increased risk of DoS attacks.
>>  2. Prohibit the use of large KE payloads, hence the McEliece mechanism.
>>  3. Prohibit the use of intermediate exchanges, leaving the IKE SA
>> initially unprotected and being vulnerable to an attacker with a  
>> quantum computer during the handshake.
>>
>> To us, none of these options seems desirable. Thus, we propose another
>> solution which sees one new transform type, e.g., SNTRUP761X25519,
>> which then defines a combination of one classical algorithm (like
>
> I'm confused here - did you mean new transform type or new transform ID?
> Transform types define a kind of algorithms (or other features, like  
> ESN), while transform IDs define a particular algorithm of this type.
>
> Unless I'm missing something I presume you meant new transform ID  
> which defines a new key exchange algorithm which is a combination of  
> SNTRUP761 and X25519.
> Correct me if I'm wrong.
>
>> ECDH based on curve25519) and one pqc algorithm which fits into
>> IKE_SA_INIT without fragmentation (like sntruprime761). The two
>> secrets get concatinated and then fed to a hash function. The
>> resulting hash is used as the shared secret for further key
>> derivation. This mechanism is low effort in terms of implementation
>> and does not affect the state machine at all, but already offers a
>> high level of protection against all attacks as long as there is no  
>> major break-through in cryptanalysis. Furthermore, it is the  
>> accepted approach for most of the applications of post-quantum key  
>> exchanges. For higher long-term security, it can be combined with  
>> other, more conventional algorithms which follow either in  
>> intermediate or followup exchanges.
>
> I think that this combined key exchange algorithm can also be  
> implemented (with more flexibility) by doing  
> IKE_SA_INIT(X25519)+IKE_INTERMEDIATE(SNTRUP761). I don't think your  
> approach has real advantages in terms of consuming responder's  
> resources. The responder still needs to perform both X25519 and  
> SNTRUP761 before it authenticates the initiator.
> Yes, you save one round trip, but the amount of data sent on the  
> wire and the amount of CPU cycles are roughly the same. I'd like  
> also mention that while X25519 and SNTRUP761 public keys are fit  
> into a single 1500 bytes IKE message, they leave relatively little  
> space for SA payload, so initiator may be limited in expressing its  
> proposals.
>
>> We then propose to restrict the use of large key exchanges to the
>> context of option 3, which removes the risk of the described DoS
>> attacks. Yet, to prevent the insecurities of plain option 3, we  
>> also propose to make it mandatory to combine it with the new hybrid  
>> transform type, i.e., SNTRUP761X25519.
>
> Are you proposing to stick with these two particular algorithms?
> I don't think it's a good idea, giving the algorithm agility requirements.
> I think that the same result can be achieved with the current draft:
>
> IKE_SA_INIT(X25519 or whatever else)
> IKE_INTERMEDIATE(SNTRUP761 or whatever else with small public key)  
> IKE_AUTH(Childless if you want)  
> CREATE_CHILD_SA+IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE(McEliece or whatever else with long  
> public key)
>
> This leaves much more flexibility in selecting particular algorithms.
>
>> The only downside of this approach is that G-IKE is then incompatible
>> with the McEliece exchange. However, the fact that G-IKE exchanges
>> sensitive information before authentication makes it impossible to be
>> not vulnerable against the discussed DoS attack and, at the same  
>> time, support the McEliece algorithm. Thus, we see that as a  
>> decision to be made in the G-IKE standardization track, not in IKEv2.
>
> I agree that G-IKEv2 is very special, but I also agree with Tero's  
> previous message that protecting IKEv2 and (G-IKEv2 too) against DoS  
> attacks leaves in slightly different area.
> We have some mechanisms for this (not perfect, but that is that).
>
> Regards,
> Valery.
>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Stefan-Lukas Gazdag, Daniel Herzinger
>
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From: "Valery Smyslov" <smyslov.ietf@gmail.com>
To: "'Paul Wouters'" <paul@nohats.ca>
Cc: "'Tero Kivinen'" <kivinen@iki.fi>, <ipsec@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] WGLC of draft-ietf-ipsecme-labeled-ipsec
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Hi Paul,

> >>> 1. Section 1.2.
> >>> The last para is erroneous here, since the immediately following the first para of Section 1.3
> >>> states exactly the same with more details. Either remove it or rephrase and move to 1.3 (e.g.
> >>> to keep provided example).
> >>
> >> It is actually different. Section 1.2 only clarifies content of RFC
> >> 7296. Sectin 1.3 describes to update to RFC 7296.
> >
> > I disagree. Only the first two paras of 1.2 are clarifications.
> > The last para of 1.2 is not a clarification, it is a new requirement for what
> > Traffic Selector Payload must contain, so it's an update of 7296 text and for
> > this reason should belong to 1.3. But 1.3 has already contained this requirement.
> >
> > Compare:
> >
> > Last para of 1.2:
> >
> >   A Traffic Selector payload (TS) is a set of one or more Traffic
> >   Selectors of the same or different TS_TYPEs, but MUST include at
> >   least one TS_TYPE of TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE or TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE.
> 
> This is true, even if only because those are the only valid TS_TYPEs
> that exist in RFC 7296. I could omit it to better match the old text,
> but I find that a bit confusing. The goad of 1.2 is to point out the
> problem if RFC 7296 using "Traffic Selector" to mean both the selector
> and the selector set / payload. If you insist, I can remove:
> 
>  	of the same or different TS_TYPEs, but MUST include at
>  	least one TS_TYPE of TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE or TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE.

Thanks.

> > 1.3:
> >
> >   This document updates the text to mean
> >   that the TSi/TSr payloads MUST contain at least one Traffic Selector
> >   of type TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE or TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE...
> 
> 
> >>> Why it is repeated here?
> >>
> >> Defense in depth against sloppy implementers? I removed this one :P
> >
> > OK.
> 
> >>> I wonder why zero-length TS_SECLABEL cannot be used to represent "no security label"?
> >>> This would significantly simplify negotiation when using security labels are optional
> >>> for initiator. Currently it is proposed that initiator performs two attempts
> >>> to establish Child SA in this case - with and without TS_SECLABEL.
> >>> If zero-length TS_SECLABEL meant "no security label", then a single CREATE_CHILD_SA
> >>> would be sufficient. It would also simplify the IKE state machine for this case.
> >>>
> >>> Are there any reasons I'm not aware of?
> >>
> >> If new implementations start using this, it would be incompatible with
> >> old implementations that would reject any TS set with unknown TS_TYPE,
> >> and would also lead to two attempts.
> >
> > I don't buy this argument - with old implementations two attempts are unavoidable.
> >
> >> We also wanted to avoid ambiguity
> >> with NULL or the empty string.
> >
> > What ambiguity? There is no ambiguity in representing this in the protocol -
> > it's a TS with a type of TS_SECLABEL and no data. If you mean possible ambiguity
> > in representation this label inside the code, then I think that it's
> > out of scope of the protocol.
> >
> >> And wanted a clear signal for wanting
> >> a TS_SECLABEL to not signify "no sec label". I am nervous that
> >> implementations would fail to insist on a label because it got an empty
> >> label. So again, defense in depth against sloppy implementers.
> >
> > My very deep believe is that you cannot stop some implementers from
> > doing thing wrong (some are very creative in this regard) :-/
> > And I think that adding complexity to the protocol is a penalty
> > for those implementers, who strictly follow the spec.
> > So I can't buy this argument too, sorry.
> 
> We do need to take implementations and common implementation mistakes
> into consideration when designing a protocol.
> But also, a security label of "nothing" isn't really a valid security
> label selector. 

It can represent optionality of the security label.

> It is too ambiguous with "no security label". It makes
> common sense to me to simply not allow it. And comparing a 0 size NULL
> with a zero byte also seems just way to risky. 

I failed to understand why do you think implementers are so stupid,
that even such a primitive task would run them into problems.

> Ideally, I would have
> stated "a minimum length of one non-zero octet".
> 
> I guess we need to get other people's opinion on this.

OK, let's wait for other opinions.

> >> Note that in all cases I am aware of, there is no use case of "optional
> >> security labels" and both ends always need to configure the exact same
> >> label. So there is not really a cause of "retrying without security
> >> label". I know this might look useful upgrading existing deployments
> >> from no label to sec label, but in practise, I have not seen this.
> >> People start with insisting proper labels.
> >
> > I wonder how they deploy this with more-or-less big system.
> > Simultaneously upgrade thousands of hosts with no service interruption?
> 
> In our implementation you can define two "conns", one with and one
> without. And choosing the right one will work. On the responder, there
> is a connection switching mechanism that can switch to the better
> matching connection once the TS payloads are read from IKE_AUTH. So
> first you add all the conns with sec_label. And after a while, you can
> just remove all the conns without sec_label.

When upgraded initiator contacts not yet upgraded responder this won't work.
To make this case workable the initiator must implement a complex logic
(first it tries TS with seclabels, then it receives TS_UNACCEPTABLE,
which BTW may come due to any reason, but it guesses that it may be
due to seclabels, and perform another attempt with no seclabels).
This logic complicates IKEv2 state machine and may lead to more
serious implementation errors.

If you make TS_SECLABLE with no data an indication,
that seclabels are optional for this connection, then it would
require require minimum changes to IKE state machine and in fact 
is much safer with regard to implementation errors.
And more efficient from protocol point of view.

> >> Changed. Old text:
> >>
> >>     A responder that selected a TS with TS_SECLABEL MUST use the Security
> >>     Label for all selector operations on the resulting IPsec SA.  It MUST
> >>     NOT select a TS_set with a TS_SECLABEL without using the specified
> >>     Security Label, even if it deems the Security Label optional, as the
> >>     initiator TS_set with TS_SECLABEL means the initiator mandates using
> >>     that Security Label.
> >>
> >> New text:
> >>
> >>     A responder that selected a TS with TS_SECLABEL MUST use the Security
> >>     Label for all selector operations on the resulting TS. It MUST
> >>     NOT select a TS_SECLABEL without using the specified Security Label,
> >>     even if it deems the Security Label optional, as the initiator has
> >>     indicated (and expects) that Security Label will be set for all
> >>     traffic matching the negotiated TS.
> >
> > I'm a bit confused with the part of \new text:
> >
> > "...all selector operations on the resulting TS."
> > What do you mean? Did you mean
> > "on the resulting Traffic Selector"?
> > Or am I missing something?
> 
> I mean to say, if you pick a TS with TS_SECLABEL, you MUST have a
> security label as part of your SPD selector mechanism. You cannot
> decide to ignore it and only use IP address based SPD selectors.

Isn't it obvious?

> In our implementation, using the selector means _setting_ the SElinux
> context (sec_label) on the decrypted packet before releasing it to the
> OS for further processing by the application. The application might make
> security decisions based on the sec_label, so not "applying" the sec_label
> negotiated would be a security violation of the negotiated policy.
> 
> That is, things might appear to work but in fact might be working
> without sec_label security and the remote peer has no way of detecting
> this. It is trusting the peer to apply the security policy to the
> packets.
> 
> If you have a suggested text you prefer, please let me know.

No, I just was wondering why you replaced "IPsec SA" with "TS" in this sentence.

> >> (I avoided talking about IPsec SA or Child SA, as one of those _may_
> >> include multiple different TS'es)
> >
> > So what? I think that the essence of this text is that if TS_SECLABEL
> > is used, then it is applied for the whole Traffic Selector for this Child SA.
> > Am I missing the essence?
> 
> I avoided talking about IPsec / Child SA because different ones can have
> different negotiated TS_SECLABELS - eg they can be independent from the
> exchange we are talking about. (I think we are saying the same thing?)

Of course different IPsec SAs can have different Traffic Selectors.
But you talked not about any IPsec SA, but about the IPsec SA that 
resulted from negotiation, which included Traffic Selector with seclabels:

Old text.

     A responder that selected a TS with TS_SECLABEL MUST use the Security
     Label for all selector operations on the resulting IPsec SA.
                                                                       ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

I think, that this sentence is more clear than the corresponding one from new text
(the rest of new text is OK).

> >>>   Each TS payload (TSi and TSr) MUST contain at least one TS_TYPE of
> >>>   TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE or TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE.
> >>>
> >>> This is repeated for the third time in the document. Can you please keep the only
> >>> instance of this requirement?
> >>
> >> Okay, I removed the middle one as it really talked about TS_LABEL
> >> properties only. I left the "update RFC 7296" one and this one which is
> >> actually about the negotiation.
> >
> > I still think it's a repetition of a requirement. I believe that properly
> > written standard must not contain repetitions of requirements.
> > If you really really want to keep it here (do defense against sloppy implementers?),
> > then change the text to something like:
> >
> >    Section XX of this document updates definition of TS payload,
> >    so that it must contain at least one TS_TYPE of
> >   TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE or TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE.
> >
> > (note lowercase "must" and reference to actual definition).
> 
> sure, if that makes you happy. I have no objection.

Good.

> >>> 7. Section 3.
> >>>   A responder MUST create its TS response by selecting one of each
> >>>   TS_TYPE present in the offered TS by the initiator.  If it cannot
> >>>   select one of each TS_TYPE, it MUST return a TS_UNACCEPTABLE Error
> >>>   Notify payload.
> >>
> >> Changed to:
> >>
> >>        A responder MUST create each TS response by creating one of more
> >>        (narrowed or not) TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE or TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE entries,
> >>        plus one of each further TS_TYPE present in the offered TS by the
> >>        initiator. If this is not possible, it MUST return a TS_UNACCEPTABLE
> >>        Error Notify payload.
> >
> > Better. thanks. I'm a bit concerned of the generality of this requirement.
> > If tomorrow somebody introduces new TS_TYPE, that will be allowed
> > to have multiple values in response, then the text "plus one of each further TS_TYPE"
> > will prevent responder from doing that. So this text is true for
> > TS_SECLABEL, but is not necessarily true for not yet defined TS_TYPEs.
> 
> Yes, so such a new TS_TYPE will have to Update: this document, just like
> this one has to Update: 7296. This is exactly the kind of issue Update:
> is designed for. The generality is there and we are updating it for
> specific TS_TYPEs.

Well, I still don't think that the idea, that this document defines a behavior
for not yet defined TS_TYPEs and will need to be updated if the defined
behavior is wrong, is a good engineering approach. But I can live with it.

> >>> Can you please provide some examples of possible semantics of
> >>> different TS_SECLABELs in TSi and TSr? Sending different
> >>> security labels in different directions? Just for curiosity.
> >>
> >> I cannot, but I wanted to ensure not to accidentally forbid it. What
> >> we do see with our implementation though, that we end up with two
> >> IPsec Sa's where each is only used in one direction. For example,
> >> image you have an SElinux context for nfs-server and nfs-client. What
> >> happens is that the NFS client triggers one label on the outgoing
> >> connection, triggers ACQUIRE, sets up an IPsec SA with a label
> >> "nfs-client". The first packet hits the NFS server, which to reply
> >> hits a different SElinux context of "nfs-server". So it will trigger
> >> an ACQUIRE and setup a second IPsec SA with a label "nfs-server". Both
> >> IPsec SA's will only be used in one direction. I did not add any
> >> of this into the document, as it is very SElinux specific, where as
> >> the draft is agnostic on the meaning of SEC_LABEL and allows for
> >> other mechanisms that might not have this complexity.
> >
> > I understand your example, but I failed to understand how it is aligned
> > with the current document. In particular, my understanding
> > of the negotiation process is that the initiator includes
> > several possible seclabels and the responder selects one of them,
> > which means that both agreed to use the selected seclabel
> > in both directions.
> 
> It does. If both endpoints have an "nfs-client" and "nfs-server" role.
> 
> But you are now getting very close to "interpreting sec_labels", which
> the IKE stack should not do :)

Not at all. I only discuss negotiation of "seclabels" in IKE, 
regardless of what this set of letters mean.

> > If my understanding is wrong and you meant that
> > the initiator can use "any" of the proposed seclabels,
> > while responder can only use one of them - which
> > it has selected, then you must explain this in more details.
> 
> Your understanding is right. It is just that the "nfs-server" might
> not have any "nfs-client" traffic since it is a server and not a client.
> 
> > Moreover, I failed to understand what the responder
> > has to do in this situation if its policy allows initiator
> > to use only one seclabel. You describe a similar case
> > for the initiator, but not for the responder.
> 
> traffic covered has 1 seclabel. If the initiator sends multiple
> acceptable ones, the responder picks one. I thought this was clear
> in the document?
> 
> In our implementation, this never happens and there is only ever
> one sec_label the initiator proposes. It receives a seperate
> ACQUIRE for each sec_label and sets up individual Child SA's for
> each sec_label. But that is our implementation. I again did not
> want to exclude other implementations with different mechanisms
> on their sec_label to be limited to our personal requirements.
> It just seemed that allowing multiple sec_labels within one
> Child SA seemed dangerous, and one would be better of defining
> a third type of sec_label value that incorporations the two
> base types of sec_label one wants to include. Eg if you want
> the connection to accept SECPOL1 and SECPOL2, define a label
> SECPOL3 that means "SECPOL1 or SECPOL2", or even call it
> "SECPOL1|SECPOL2".
> 
> If the WG believes we should be more generic and allow picking
> multiple ones, this can be changed.
> 
> > So, I believe that unless more clarifications are
> > added to the document and all these cases are
> > described in details, this para must be removed,
> > because it describes the case that contradicts
> > to the rest of the document and cannot be
> > implemented using this document.
> 
> I don't understand what you mean?

OK. I seem to understand the source of my confusion.

With first para of Section 3.2 you seem to imply the following negotiation scenario:

Initiator:
   TSi = (TS_SECLABEL="nfs-client", TS_SECLABEL="nfs-server")
   TSi = (TS_SECLABEL="nfs-client", TS_SECLABEL="nfs-server")

Responder:
   TSi = (TS_SECLABEL="nfs-client")
   TSi = (TS_SECLABEL="nfs-server")

Am I right?

If you mean this case, then it's a major change what the semantics of traffic selectors currently is.

RGC 7296 Section 3.13 says:

   There is no requirement that TSi and TSr contain the same number of
   individual Traffic Selectors.  Thus, they are interpreted as follows:
   a packet matches a given TSi/TSr if it matches at least one of the
   individual selectors in TSi, and at least one of the individual
   selectors in TSr.

So, if you install the resulting IPsec SAs, then they couldn't be used - 
a packet with seclabel "nfs-client" will match TSi, but no TS in TSr,
and a packet with seclabel "nfs-server" will match TSr, but no TS in TSi.

You seem to imply that with regard to seclabels matching the following logic applies:
for outgoing packet to match SPD only TSi should be checked on initiator
and only TSr on responder and visa versa for incoming packet.
But this is not how it is defined in RFC7296 and how it works now - 
both TSi and TSr are checked for any packet.

Unless I'm missing something and my speculations above are wrong, 
I strongly believe that this part of the document must be cleaned up.
Either remove the possibility of having different seclabels in TSi and TSr
or add clarification and describe, that this is another update for RFC 7296
(and probably for 4301 too).

> >> I used the RFC 7296 language in the new text:
> >>
> >>       The mechanism of narrowing of Traffic Selectors with
> >>       TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE and TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE does not apply to
> >>       TS_SECLABEL as the Security Label itself is not interpreted and
> >>       cannot be narrowed. It MUST be matched exactly. Since a rekey
> >>       MUST NOT narrow down the Traffic Selectors narrower than the scope
> >>       currently in use, the only valid choice of TS_SECLABEL for a rekey
> >>       is the identical TS_SECLABEL that is in use by the Child SA being
> >>       rekeyed. If the TS_LABEL is missing from the TS during the rekey
> >>       negotiation, the negotiation MUST fail with TS_UNACCEPTABLE.
> >
> > I think that this part
> >
> >     Since a rekey
> >      MUST NOT narrow down the Traffic Selectors narrower than the scope
> >      currently in use, the only valid choice of TS_SECLABEL
> >
> > must be change to
> >
> >      According to RFC 7296  Section 2.9.2, a rekey operation
> >      must not narrow down the Traffic Selectors narrower than the scope
> >      currently in use. For this reason the only valid choice of TS_SECLABEL
> >
> > So, it's clear that this document doesn't impose any new requirement
> > here, it only refers to RFC 7296's one.
> 
> I'll make that change.

Thanks.

Regards,
Valery.

> Paul


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Date: Thu, 4 Nov 2021 06:28:50 -0400
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References: <m2czt1my1g.fsf@ja.int.chopps.org> <24858.42061.118149.546106@fireball.acr.fi> <D4B09F60-61C8-46FF-9693-DA9B71E05718@chopps.org> <24858.54291.205079.485517@fireball.acr.fi> <04158312-E6F2-4467-B435-58D77ED7435E@dell.com> <509B58FB-03A1-4C28-BE47-1E4A47478512@chopps.org> <24859.37908.612701.587580@fireball.acr.fi> <BBBBFFCC-0736-492A-B7A5-2569EDD1C391@chopps.org> <9BD66C9D-9E6C-4BEC-A71F-D74B667EA503@chopps.org> <8B9B2CB1-D470-45AD-9C9A-218FB3DBE811@chopps.org> <24859.55228.954532.765168@fireball.acr.fi> <m2sfz8vzth.fsf@ja.int.chopps.org> <m2sfylke3z.fsf@ja.int.chopps.org> <24886.26315.915608.856404@fireball.acr.fi> <m2fsuhv7j0.fsf@ja.int.chopps.org> <24886.30488.12451.378363@fireball.acr.fi> <3171E295-4AA1-49C2-9F27-1DD2BAC4D19A@chopps.org> <CAGL5yWbpYCuG_bLCsRjmAfOphxc65dmbOYwLnKXYFj5o-Wc41g@mail.gmail.com> <A4456940-6D05-4332-B4D9-566573BED7A1@chopps.org> <m2sfxh8anc.fsf@ja.int.chopps.o rg> <24958.57911.229841.127408@fireball.acr.fi> <8181.1635709987@localhost> <4c96ec28-089e-4519-67e4-0951b28103b8@labn.net>
To: Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>
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I agree with these suggestions.

Tero?

Thanks,
Chris.

> On Nov 2, 2021, at 7:49 AM, Lou Berger <lberger@labn.net> wrote:
>=20
> I'd prefer to see the SHOULD and MAY reversed -- intentionally =
introducing additional reordering is generally considered something to =
avoid.  I'd also be fine with both being a MAY and a recommendation for =
this to be configurable.
>=20
> Lou
>=20
> On 10/31/2021 3:53 PM, Michael Richardson wrote:
>> Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi> wrote:
>>     > Christian Hopps writes:
>>     >> Will you be able to provide the text changes that would cover =
the
>>     >> issue you have? Would really like to get this submitted to =
IESG
>>     >> before another IETF cycle completes.
>>=20
>>     > How about following:
>>=20
>> works for me.
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> IPsec mailing list
>> IPsec@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> IPsec mailing list
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From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
To: Valery Smyslov <smyslov.ietf@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] WGLC of draft-ietf-ipsecme-labeled-ipsec
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On Wed, 3 Nov 2021, Valery Smyslov wrote:

> It can represent optionality of the security label.

An optional security label has no meaning. If you have
a real case of optional security labels, lets year it. Otherwise,
I think we should move on without supporting optional security
labels. From a security point of view, it just makes no sense. From
a migration point of view, it can be done without further protocol
support.

>> It is too ambiguous with "no security label". It makes
>> common sense to me to simply not allow it. And comparing a 0 size NULL
>> with a zero byte also seems just way to risky.
>
> I failed to understand why do you think implementers are so stupid,
> that even such a primitive task would run them into problems.

Experience reading and acting on opensource code ?

>> Ideally, I would have
>> stated "a minimum length of one non-zero octet".
>>
>> I guess we need to get other people's opinion on this.
>
> OK, let's wait for other opinions.

Okay, good.

>> In our implementation you can define two "conns", one with and one
>> without. And choosing the right one will work. On the responder, there
>> is a connection switching mechanism that can switch to the better
>> matching connection once the TS payloads are read from IKE_AUTH. So
>> first you add all the conns with sec_label. And after a while, you can
>> just remove all the conns without sec_label.
>
> When upgraded initiator contacts not yet upgraded responder this won't work.

Correct. this assumes you have an established system of updating
configurations, like cloud/terraform based, or puppet or system roles
or ansible or what not.

> To make this case workable the initiator must implement a complex logic
> (first it tries TS with seclabels, then it receives TS_UNACCEPTABLE,
> which BTW may come due to any reason, but it guesses that it may be
> due to seclabels, and perform another attempt with no seclabels).
> This logic complicates IKEv2 state machine and may lead to more
> serious implementation errors.

I don't think this is a change to the state machine. It is a change
to the allowed configuration and/or default action. No state machine
changes are needed.

You can simple choose to not support the unlikely use case. Security
labels are dictated to systems _before_ you are allowed to access them.
The hypothetical upgrade case is not a real life deployment scenario.

Still, with todays automated (cloud) deployments, you first upgrade the
required software, then upgrade the required configuration files, then
let machines switch to the new behaviour.

> If you make TS_SECLABLE with no data an indication,
> that seclabels are optional for this connection, then it would
> require require minimum changes to IKE state machine and in fact
> is much safer with regard to implementation errors.

I fail to see how it would be safer to include a mechanism for
allowing for mismatched configurations to establish a less secure
connection ?

> And more efficient from protocol point of view.

Thie claimed efficiency is for a use case (upgrading via optional
security labels without configuration change) that I just don't see
a real life use case for. And it comes at a cost of complexity and
error handling of configuration mismatch cases that would be more
likely, not less likely, to be prone to errors.


>>>> Changed. Old text:
>>>>
>>>>     A responder that selected a TS with TS_SECLABEL MUST use the Security
>>>>     Label for all selector operations on the resulting IPsec SA.  It MUST
>>>>     NOT select a TS_set with a TS_SECLABEL without using the specified
>>>>     Security Label, even if it deems the Security Label optional, as the
>>>>     initiator TS_set with TS_SECLABEL means the initiator mandates using
>>>>     that Security Label.
>>>>
>>>> New text:
>>>>
>>>>     A responder that selected a TS with TS_SECLABEL MUST use the Security
>>>>     Label for all selector operations on the resulting TS. It MUST
>>>>     NOT select a TS_SECLABEL without using the specified Security Label,
>>>>     even if it deems the Security Label optional, as the initiator has
>>>>     indicated (and expects) that Security Label will be set for all
>>>>     traffic matching the negotiated TS.
>>>
>>> I'm a bit confused with the part of \new text:
>>>
>>> "...all selector operations on the resulting TS."
>>> What do you mean? Did you mean
>>> "on the resulting Traffic Selector"?
>>> Or am I missing something?
>>
>> I mean to say, if you pick a TS with TS_SECLABEL, you MUST have a
>> security label as part of your SPD selector mechanism. You cannot
>> decide to ignore it and only use IP address based SPD selectors.
>
> Isn't it obvious?

It is. But I wanted to clarify it because it might be that the IKE
daemon needs to "do something" to make that happen that goes beyond
installing an IPsec SA. I'm okay to leave it out.

>> In our implementation, using the selector means _setting_ the SElinux
>> context (sec_label) on the decrypted packet before releasing it to the
>> OS for further processing by the application. The application might make
>> security decisions based on the sec_label, so not "applying" the sec_label
>> negotiated would be a security violation of the negotiated policy.
>>
>> That is, things might appear to work but in fact might be working
>> without sec_label security and the remote peer has no way of detecting
>> this. It is trusting the peer to apply the security policy to the
>> packets.
>>
>> If you have a suggested text you prefer, please let me know.
>
> No, I just was wondering why you replaced "IPsec SA" with "TS" in this sentence.

Ok.

>>>> (I avoided talking about IPsec SA or Child SA, as one of those _may_
>>>> include multiple different TS'es)
>>>
>>> So what? I think that the essence of this text is that if TS_SECLABEL
>>> is used, then it is applied for the whole Traffic Selector for this Child SA.
>>> Am I missing the essence?
>>
>> I avoided talking about IPsec / Child SA because different ones can have
>> different negotiated TS_SECLABELS - eg they can be independent from the
>> exchange we are talking about. (I think we are saying the same thing?)
>
> Of course different IPsec SAs can have different Traffic Selectors.
> But you talked not about any IPsec SA, but about the IPsec SA that
> resulted from negotiation, which included Traffic Selector with seclabels:
>
> Old text.
>
>     A responder that selected a TS with TS_SECLABEL MUST use the Security
>     Label for all selector operations on the resulting IPsec SA.
>                                                                       ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>
> I think, that this sentence is more clear than the corresponding one from new text
> (the rest of new text is OK).

I'm okay removing it.

> Well, I still don't think that the idea, that this document defines a behavior
> for not yet defined TS_TYPEs and will need to be updated if the defined
> behavior is wrong, is a good engineering approach. But I can live with it.

I agree that RFC 7296 should have thought about it and specified it for
to be designed TS_TYPEs, but it didn't. So here we are.

> OK. I seem to understand the source of my confusion.
>
> With first para of Section 3.2 you seem to imply the following negotiation scenario:
>
> Initiator:
>   TSi = (TS_SECLABEL="nfs-client", TS_SECLABEL="nfs-server")
>   TSi = (TS_SECLABEL="nfs-client", TS_SECLABEL="nfs-server")
>
> Responder:
>   TSi = (TS_SECLABEL="nfs-client")
>   TSi = (TS_SECLABEL="nfs-server")
>
> Am I right?

No. Our implementation never uses more than one sec_label, due to the
nature of the sec_label. In our case, it basically comes from an ACQUIRE
message, so the IKE daemon has no way of determining that the reply to
a packet we send would require a different sec_label by the remote peer.
In fact, the IKE daemon does not even know if the reply traffic would
match the inbound SA sec-label or not. The remote peer's sec-label will
receive its own ACQUIRE if the return traffic has another sec-label set,
and will negotiate a second IPsec SA that only differs in label.


> If you mean this case, then it's a major change what the semantics of traffic selectors currently is.

I don't mean that.

> You seem to imply that with regard to seclabels matching the following logic applies:
> for outgoing packet to match SPD only TSi should be checked on initiator
> and only TSr on responder and visa versa for incoming packet.
> But this is not how it is defined in RFC7296 and how it works now -
> both TSi and TSr are checked for any packet.

I do not imply that.

> Unless I'm missing something and my speculations above are wrong,

It is.

> Either remove the possibility of having different seclabels in TSi and TSr
> or add clarification and describe, that this is another update for RFC 7296
> (and probably for 4301 too).

I do not believe our SElinux based labeled IPsec should limit how people
can use security labels in general.

Paul


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Since we continue to have an unresolved issue on the iptfs draft, I =
think it's best if we have a 10m slot to close it, and get the document =
shipped.

Thanks,
Chris.

> On Oct 31, 2021, at 2:39 PM, Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi> wrote:
>=20
> We will be meeting on Monday November 8th 12:00-14:00 UTC, so send me
> agenda request as soon as possible so we get the agenda ready soon.=20
> --=20
> kivinen@iki.fi
>=20
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From: "Valery Smyslov" <smyslov.ietf@gmail.com>
To: "'Paul Wouters'" <paul@nohats.ca>
Cc: <ipsec@ietf.org>, "'Tero Kivinen'" <kivinen@iki.fi>
References: <24831.15082.263253.443690@fireball.acr.fi> <2d1501d799ba$af76bc40$0e6434c0$@gmail.com> <ed3d346-8f66-620-1914-d55e0dd9f2c@nohats.ca> <080101d7cfc5$88f62a60$9ae27f20$@gmail.com> <d297ab6c-a182-3d51-e0b5-ccd7b09dcda8@nohats.ca> <093501d7d0b1$dd0db1d0$97291570$@gmail.com> <4066a22d-fe4b-e27f-3350-f41ab91ff76@nohats.ca>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] WGLC of draft-ietf-ipsecme-labeled-ipsec
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> On Wed, 3 Nov 2021, Valery Smyslov wrote:
> 
> > It can represent optionality of the security label.
> 
> An optional security label has no meaning. If you have a real case of
optional
> security labels, lets year it. Otherwise, I think we should move on
without
> supporting optional security labels. From a security point of view, it
just makes
> no sense. From a migration point of view, it can be done without further
> protocol support.

Migration is not the only use case. For closed environments I tend to agree
with you.
But for open environments, you generally don't know whether peer that 
you contact for the first time supports security labels or not. As far as 
I understand, there is pretty limited support for them in OSes, so 
the use case when initiator proposes both using security labels and 
not using them makes sense for me. After all, initiator's policy
will control which traffic it is willing to send over the SA depending
on whether security labels are supported by the peer.

> >> It is too ambiguous with "no security label". It makes common sense
> >> to me to simply not allow it. And comparing a 0 size NULL with a zero
> >> byte also seems just way to risky.
> >
> > I failed to understand why do you think implementers are so stupid,
> > that even such a primitive task would run them into problems.
> 
> Experience reading and acting on opensource code ?

No. Just my opinion.

> >> Ideally, I would have
> >> stated "a minimum length of one non-zero octet".
> >>
> >> I guess we need to get other people's opinion on this.
> >
> > OK, let's wait for other opinions.
> 
> Okay, good.
> 
> >> In our implementation you can define two "conns", one with and one
> >> without. And choosing the right one will work. On the responder,
> >> there is a connection switching mechanism that can switch to the
> >> better matching connection once the TS payloads are read from
> >> IKE_AUTH. So first you add all the conns with sec_label. And after a
> >> while, you can just remove all the conns without sec_label.
> >
> > When upgraded initiator contacts not yet upgraded responder this won't
> work.
> 
> Correct. this assumes you have an established system of updating
> configurations, like cloud/terraform based, or puppet or system roles or
> ansible or what not.

Please, see above another scenario.

> > To make this case workable the initiator must implement a complex
> > logic (first it tries TS with seclabels, then it receives
> > TS_UNACCEPTABLE, which BTW may come due to any reason, but it guesses
> > that it may be due to seclabels, and perform another attempt with no
> seclabels).
> > This logic complicates IKEv2 state machine and may lead to more
> > serious implementation errors.
> 
> I don't think this is a change to the state machine. It is a change to the
allowed
> configuration and/or default action. No state machine changes are needed.

You have to somehow handle the case when the responder returns
TS_UNACCEPTABLE.
Currently it's a fatal error (requires changing local policy). In your case 
implementations will need to handle it properly.

> You can simple choose to not support the unlikely use case. Security
labels are
> dictated to systems _before_ you are allowed to access them.
> The hypothetical upgrade case is not a real life deployment scenario.
>
> Still, with todays automated (cloud) deployments, you first upgrade the
> required software, then upgrade the required configuration files, then let
> machines switch to the new behaviour.

You are talking here about closed homogenous system.
I don't think it's so simple in multi-domain heterogenous
systems, that are not controlled from a single center.

> > If you make TS_SECLABLE with no data an indication, that seclabels are
> > optional for this connection, then it would require require minimum
> > changes to IKE state machine and in fact is much safer with regard to
> > implementation errors.
> 
> I fail to see how it would be safer to include a mechanism for allowing
for
> mismatched configurations to establish a less secure connection ?

By "safer" I meant less implementation errors.

> > And more efficient from protocol point of view.
> 
> Thie claimed efficiency is for a use case (upgrading via optional security
labels
> without configuration change) that I just don't see a real life use case
for. And
> it comes at a cost of complexity and error handling of configuration
mismatch
> cases that would be more likely, not less likely, to be prone to errors.

See another use case above.

And of course optionality must be controlled via local configuration,
so it is not built in the protocol. If initiator's policy states, that 
security labels are optional, it includes an empty TS_SECLABEL
along with others, if not - it doesn't. So I'm puzzled why you
write "without configuration change".

> >>>> Changed. Old text:
> >>>>
> >>>>     A responder that selected a TS with TS_SECLABEL MUST use the
> Security
> >>>>     Label for all selector operations on the resulting IPsec SA.  It
MUST
> >>>>     NOT select a TS_set with a TS_SECLABEL without using the
specified
> >>>>     Security Label, even if it deems the Security Label optional, as
the
> >>>>     initiator TS_set with TS_SECLABEL means the initiator mandates
using
> >>>>     that Security Label.
> >>>>
> >>>> New text:
> >>>>
> >>>>     A responder that selected a TS with TS_SECLABEL MUST use the
> Security
> >>>>     Label for all selector operations on the resulting TS. It MUST
> >>>>     NOT select a TS_SECLABEL without using the specified Security
Label,
> >>>>     even if it deems the Security Label optional, as the initiator
has
> >>>>     indicated (and expects) that Security Label will be set for all
> >>>>     traffic matching the negotiated TS.
> >>>
> >>> I'm a bit confused with the part of \new text:
> >>>
> >>> "...all selector operations on the resulting TS."
> >>> What do you mean? Did you mean
> >>> "on the resulting Traffic Selector"?
> >>> Or am I missing something?
> >>
> >> I mean to say, if you pick a TS with TS_SECLABEL, you MUST have a
> >> security label as part of your SPD selector mechanism. You cannot
> >> decide to ignore it and only use IP address based SPD selectors.
> >
> > Isn't it obvious?
> 
> It is. But I wanted to clarify it because it might be that the IKE daemon
needs to
> "do something" to make that happen that goes beyond installing an IPsec
SA.
> I'm okay to leave it out.

OK, please.

> >>>> (I avoided talking about IPsec SA or Child SA, as one of those
> >>>> _may_ include multiple different TS'es)
> >>>
> >>> So what? I think that the essence of this text is that if
> >>> TS_SECLABEL is used, then it is applied for the whole Traffic Selector
for
> this Child SA.
> >>> Am I missing the essence?
> >>
> >> I avoided talking about IPsec / Child SA because different ones can
> >> have different negotiated TS_SECLABELS - eg they can be independent
> >> from the exchange we are talking about. (I think we are saying the
> >> same thing?)
> >
> > Of course different IPsec SAs can have different Traffic Selectors.
> > But you talked not about any IPsec SA, but about the IPsec SA that
> > resulted from negotiation, which included Traffic Selector with
seclabels:
> >
> > Old text.
> >
> >     A responder that selected a TS with TS_SECLABEL MUST use the
Security
> >     Label for all selector operations on the resulting IPsec SA.
> >
> > ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> >
> > I think, that this sentence is more clear than the corresponding one
> > from new text (the rest of new text is OK).
> 
> I'm okay removing it.

Or retain the old text for the first sentence (cited above).

> > OK. I seem to understand the source of my confusion.
> >
> > With first para of Section 3.2 you seem to imply the following
negotiation
> scenario:
> >
> > Initiator:
> >   TSi = (TS_SECLABEL="nfs-client", TS_SECLABEL="nfs-server")
> >   TSi = (TS_SECLABEL="nfs-client", TS_SECLABEL="nfs-server")
> >
> > Responder:
> >   TSi = (TS_SECLABEL="nfs-client")
> >   TSi = (TS_SECLABEL="nfs-server")
> >
> > Am I right?
> 
> No. Our implementation never uses more than one sec_label, due to the
> nature of the sec_label. In our case, it basically comes from an ACQUIRE
> message, so the IKE daemon has no way of determining that the reply to a
> packet we send would require a different sec_label by the remote peer.
> In fact, the IKE daemon does not even know if the reply traffic would
match
> the inbound SA sec-label or not. The remote peer's sec-label will receive
its
> own ACQUIRE if the return traffic has another sec-label set, and will
negotiate
> a second IPsec SA that only differs in label.

OK, this all is clear and aligned with my understanding.

> > If you mean this case, then it's a major change what the semantics of
traffic
> selectors currently is.
> 
> I don't mean that.
> 
> > You seem to imply that with regard to seclabels matching the following
logic
> applies:
> > for outgoing packet to match SPD only TSi should be checked on
> > initiator and only TSr on responder and visa versa for incoming packet.
> > But this is not how it is defined in RFC7296 and how it works now -
> > both TSi and TSr are checked for any packet.
> 
> I do not imply that.
> 
> > Unless I'm missing something and my speculations above are wrong,
> 
> It is.
> 
> > Either remove the possibility of having different seclabels in TSi and
> > TSr or add clarification and describe, that this is another update for
> > RFC 7296 (and probably for 4301 too).
> 
> I do not believe our SElinux based labeled IPsec should limit how people
can
> use security labels in general.

Here I'm lost completely.

If my guess of what the first para of Section 3.2 means to say
was wrong, then can you please clarify its meaning?
If it is not about selecting different security labels in TSi and TSr
by the responder, then what it is about?

Regards,
Valery.

> Paul


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Subject: Re: [IPsec] iptfs publication request
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Lou Berger writes:
> I'd prefer to see the SHOULD and MAY reversed -- intentionally 
> introducing additional reordering is generally considered something to 
> avoid.

Yes, intentionally introducing reordering or delay SHOULD be avoided,
thats why it is important to keep the SHOULD and MAY as they are.

The current text does NOT add any reordering, it just does NOT fix the
reordering that has already happened. I.e., if the outer packets come
in-order there is no reordering happening. The question is what
happens when there is reordering happening in the outer packets.
Keeping the SHOULD in first case says that we do not want to
intentionally add any new delay, thus we process the outer packets
immediately when they come in, but to do that we allow the reordering
that happened in the outer packets to be propagated to the inner
packets too. 

> I'd also be fine with both being a MAY and a recommendation for 
> this to be configurable.

I strongly belive that we should not intentionally add reordering OR
delay, and we SHOULD try to keep the conditions as they are, i.e., if
there is reordering happening in the outer packets, lets allow it to
be propagated to inner packets.

If there is lost packet in the outer packets we SHOULD NOT cause extra
delay when trying to fix reordering... I myself think that lost
packets are much more common than reordered packets, and thus causing
extra delays for each lost packets just to be able to fix reordering
cases is much worse than allowing reordering to go through.
-- 
kivinen@iki.fi


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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ipsec/RIHVzAi7ownVZ8b4aNTKQ_VaCi4>
Subject: Re: [IPsec] Comments on draft-pwouters-multi-sa-performance
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Subject: [IPsec] IPsecME Agenda for IETF 112
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IP Security Maintenance and Extensions (IPsecME) WG.

IETF 112 - Monday November 8th, 2021 12:00-14:00 UTC
https://meetings.conf.meetecho.com/ietf112/?group=ipsecme&short=&item=1

Agenda

- Note Well, technical difficulties and agenda bashing - 
  Chairs (5 min)
- Document Status -
  Chairs (10 min)
- Work items
  - IPTFS
    Christian Hopps (20 min)
  - Quantum-resistent IKEv2 and big keys
    Stefan-Lukas Gazdag (10 min)
  - Group Key Management using IKEv2
    Valery Smyslov (10 min)
  - Announcing Supported Authentication Methods in IKEv2
    Valery Smyslov (10 min)
- AOB + Open Mic (55 min)
-- 
kivinen@iki.fi


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Subject: Re: [IPsec] iptfs publication request
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Hi Tero,

see below

On 11/5/2021 3:09 PM, Tero Kivinen wrote:
> Lou Berger writes:
>> I'd prefer to see the SHOULD and MAY reversed -- intentionally
>> introducing additional reordering is generally considered something to
>> avoid.
> Yes, intentionally introducing reordering or delay SHOULD be avoided,
> thats why it is important to keep the SHOULD and MAY as they are.
>
> The current text does NOT add any reordering, it just does NOT fix the
> reordering that has already happened. I.e., if the outer packets come
> in-order there is no reordering happening.

Following this SHOULD will actually *amplify* reordering as seen by the 
end user/application.

Consider a TFS tunnel that aggregates (on average) 3 inner packets.  A 
single tunnel reorder (packet O2 followed by packet O1 in reception 
sequence, i.e. [O2, O1]) will result in each of the miss-ordered inner 
packets being N packets out of order, (for a resulting example sequence 
of [I4,I5,I6], [I1,I2,I3]).  A miss-order of 2 outer packets, would 
result in a 2N miss-order (O2,O3,O1 --> [I4,I5,I6], [I7,I8,I9], 
[I1,I2,I3]).

So in this case a *SHOULD* is likely to result in significant change in 
the number of out of order packets seen in any application that doesn't 
use large packets -- and this might break such applications.  For such 
applications seeing added delay may also have negative impact, but 
variable latency on the internet is a pretty normal event that 
applications already have to allow for.

> The question is what
> happens when there is reordering happening in the outer packets.
> Keeping the SHOULD in first case says that we do not want to
> intentionally add any new delay, thus we process the outer packets
> immediately when they come in, but to do that we allow the reordering
> that happened in the outer packets to be propagated to the inner
> packets too.

I think adding delay is safe for general internet applications, i.e., 
existing end to end applications will continue to function albeit with, 
perhaps, more jitter due to intermediate reordering. Adding more 
reordering is something that applications may not be able to tolerate, 
so this seems quite risky as the RECOMMENDED option.

FWIW I'm basing my comments on my routing area experience where a huge 
amount of work has been put into maintaining ordering experienced by 
user traffic at significant implementation expense, i.e., in support of 
ECMP and other multipath solutions in protocols and hardware.

>
>> I'd also be fine with both being a MAY and a recommendation for
>> this to be configurable.
> I strongly belive that we should not intentionally add reordering OR
> delay, and we SHOULD try to keep the conditions as they are, i.e., if
> there is reordering happening in the outer packets, lets allow it to
> be propagated to inner packets.
>
> If there is lost packet in the outer packets we SHOULD NOT cause extra
> delay when trying to fix reordering... I myself think that lost
> packets are much more common than reordered packets, and thus causing
> extra delays for each lost packets just to be able to fix reordering
> cases is much worse than allowing reordering to go through.

I think this really depends on your operational environment.  If you are 
operating over fiber networks, loss really only happens due to 
congestion and in many place is pretty rare.  On the other hand if your 
tunnels are operating over wireless networks, loss will be quite 
common.  So we may really be heading towards a deployment choice, with 
the recommendation to do both and support configuration.

Lou


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Date: Mon, 8 Nov 2021 09:17:50 +0200
From: Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>
To: Lou Berger <lberger@labn.net>
Cc: ipsec@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] iptfs publication request
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Lou Berger writes:
> Hi Tero,
>=20
> see below
>=20
> On 11/5/2021 3:09 PM, Tero Kivinen wrote:
> > Lou Berger writes:
> >> I'd prefer to see the SHOULD and MAY reversed -- intentionally
> >> introducing additional reordering is generally considered somethin=
g to
> >> avoid.
> > Yes, intentionally introducing reordering or delay SHOULD be avoide=
d,
> > thats why it is important to keep the SHOULD and MAY as they are.
> >
> > The current text does NOT add any reordering, it just does NOT fix =
the
> > reordering that has already happened. I.e., if the outer packets co=
me
> > in-order there is no reordering happening.
>=20
> Following this SHOULD will actually *amplify* reordering as seen by t=
he=20
> end user/application.

Nope. It keeps the same reordering that has already happened and does
not fix it. IPsec does not try to provide ordered delivery, that is
not something it is supposed to provide, and thats why IPTFS should
not even try to provide something that is not requested.

I.e., if the two outer frames are already coming in to the gateway in
different order when they were sent, that means reordering has already
happened. When the gateway processes them, if there is no ipsec or
IPsec without IPTFS it will simply forward those frame in the order
they are received. Doing same when the IPTFS is enabled does not make
things worse, it simply keeps the reordering same.=20

> Consider a TFS tunnel that aggregates (on average) 3 inner packets.=A0=
 A=20
> single tunnel reorder (packet O2 followed by packet O1 in reception=20=

> sequence, i.e. [O2, O1]) will result in each of the miss-ordered inne=
r=20
> packets being N packets out of order, (for a resulting example sequen=
ce=20
> of [I4,I5,I6], [I1,I2,I3]).=A0 A miss-order of 2 outer packets, would=
=20
> result in a 2N miss-order (O2,O3,O1 --> [I4,I5,I6], [I7,I8,I9],=20
> [I1,I2,I3]).

Yes, if you assume there is only a single ordering happening ever.

If there is certain procentage chance that there will be reordering
happening, then over long run the effect is same. I.e., i.e. if there
is 1% chance that two packets are reordered and we send 100 aggregated
packets each containing 3 packets, one of them might get reordered,
thus 3 packets out of 300 inner packets will get reordered. If we send
those 300 packets separately 3 of them on average will get reordered,
which is same amount.

> So in this case a *SHOULD* is likely to result in significant change =
in=20
> the number of out of order packets seen in any application that doesn=
't=20
> use large packets -- and this might break such applications.=A0 For s=
uch=20
> applications seeing added delay may also have negative impact, but=20=

> variable latency on the internet is a pretty normal event that=20
> applications already have to allow for.

On the other hand I would assume that lost packets are more frequent
than reordered packets. Each lost frame will cause delay that is same
as reordering timer, and if we assume that reordering is happening
because of multipath over the internet then I would assume the reorder
window should need to be large enough to cover route transit time
differences between those two paths.

What would you expect to be suitable time for it=3F My feeleing would b=
e
that few seconds or so, but if we add few seconds delay for every
single lost frame that is way too much. On the other hand having
reordering window only 10 milliseconds long does not really allow
that much time difference between routes.

And the issue is that if this is really configurable value the
adminstrator setting this timer might not realize that making it
larger also causes similar delay for every lost frame...

> > The question is what
> > happens when there is reordering happening in the outer packets.
> > Keeping the SHOULD in first case says that we do not want to
> > intentionally add any new delay, thus we process the outer packets
> > immediately when they come in, but to do that we allow the reorderi=
ng
> > that happened in the outer packets to be propagated to the inner
> > packets too.
>=20
> I think adding delay is safe for general internet applications, i.e.,=
=20
> existing end to end applications will continue to function albeit wit=
h,=20
> perhaps, more jitter due to intermediate reordering. Adding more=20
> reordering is something that applications may not be able to tolerate=
,=20
> so this seems quite risky as the RECOMMENDED option.

Internet applications should work both with delay and reordering (and
lost frames), but all of them should be kept minimal by network, and I
think we should not add any of them more than is needed. Thats why
recommending the processing which do not add delay and keeps the
reordering properties same is best.

> FWIW I'm basing my comments on my routing area experience where a hug=
e=20
> amount of work has been put into maintaining ordering experienced by=20=

> user traffic at significant implementation expense, i.e., in support =
of=20
> ECMP and other multipath solutions in protocols and hardware.

So you can probably then tell me what is the expected time delay
between two reordered frames, and how often that is happening in
general. And compare that to how often you have frames dropped.

My normal feeling is that reordering is not very common, but over last
mile copper, and especially over wireless links (4G etc) there can be
significant (up to 10%) packet drop chance, especially when the link
quality is bad. And usually the direction of packet makes huge
difference, i.e., uplink is quite often much worse than downlink.

> >> I'd also be fine with both being a MAY and a recommendation for
> >> this to be configurable.
> > I strongly belive that we should not intentionally add reordering O=
R
> > delay, and we SHOULD try to keep the conditions as they are, i.e., =
if
> > there is reordering happening in the outer packets, lets allow it t=
o
> > be propagated to inner packets.
> >
> > If there is lost packet in the outer packets we SHOULD NOT cause ex=
tra
> > delay when trying to fix reordering... I myself think that lost
> > packets are much more common than reordered packets, and thus causi=
ng
> > extra delays for each lost packets just to be able to fix reorderin=
g
> > cases is much worse than allowing reordering to go through.
>=20
> I think this really depends on your operational environment.=A0 If yo=
u are=20
> operating over fiber networks, loss really only happens due to=20
> congestion and in many place is pretty rare.=A0 On the other hand if =
your=20
> tunnels are operating over wireless networks, loss will be quite=20
> common.=A0 So we may really be heading towards a deployment choice, w=
ith=20
> the recommendation to do both and support configuration.

And what would be your recommendations for the drop timer values for
different networks=3F I have no idea what would be suitable values for
it, and I would expect that most adminstrators are in same situation.
--=20
kivinen@iki.fi


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> On 1 Nov 2021, at 13:07, Valery Smyslov <smyslov.ietf@gmail.com> =
wrote:
>=20
> Hi Michael,
>=20
>> Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi> wrote:
>>>> Even without surpassing the 64KB limit, this must be a concern.
>>>> IKEv2's cookie mechanism and puzzles try to increase the cost of =
the
>>>> attacker per each connection. Now, an attacker must still accept
>>>> these costs but can use one connection to trigger several key
>>>> exchanges, all significantly larger than what we had with DH, =
making
>>>> the trade-off way better for them compared to non-pqc IKEv2.
>>=20
>>> No it cannot. Attacker can use cookie only once, and will only get =
one
>>> exchange created by each cookie exchange, thus it needs to do =
puzzles
>>> and cookies again for every single attack packet it wants to send.
>>=20
>> I wonder if anyone has any stats on how often cookie challenge is =
used, how
>> often puzzles are invoked.
>=20
> I've implemented puzzles, but I'm not aware of any other =
implementation.
>=20
> What about cookies - in stress tests they are used very intensively.
> But I don't have any real life stats for them.
>=20
> Regards,
> Valery.

I also implemented puzzles. So that makes two of us.

Yoav=

--Apple-Mail=_0F45D483-6CE9-49BA-A4FF-E0BEDA5E92DD
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	charset=us-ascii

<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dus-ascii"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D""><br =
class=3D""><div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div =
class=3D"">On 1 Nov 2021, at 13:07, Valery Smyslov &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:smyslov.ietf@gmail.com" =
class=3D"">smyslov.ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D""><meta =
charset=3D"UTF-8" class=3D""><span style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); =
font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
text-decoration: none; float: none; display: inline !important;" =
class=3D"">Hi Michael,</span><br style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); =
font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
text-decoration: none;" class=3D""><br style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, =
0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
text-decoration: none;" class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: =
none; white-space: normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
text-decoration: none;" class=3D"">Tero Kivinen &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:kivinen@iki.fi" class=3D"">kivinen@iki.fi</a>&gt; =
wrote:<br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><blockquote =
type=3D"cite" class=3D"">Even without surpassing the 64KB limit, this =
must be a concern.<br class=3D"">IKEv2's cookie mechanism and puzzles =
try to increase the cost of the<br class=3D"">attacker per each =
connection. Now, an attacker must still accept<br class=3D"">these costs =
but can use one connection to trigger several key<br class=3D"">exchanges,=
 all significantly larger than what we had with DH, making<br =
class=3D"">the trade-off way better for them compared to non-pqc =
IKEv2.<br class=3D""></blockquote></blockquote><br class=3D""><blockquote =
type=3D"cite" class=3D"">No it cannot. Attacker can use cookie only =
once, and will only get one<br class=3D"">exchange created by each =
cookie exchange, thus it needs to do puzzles<br class=3D"">and cookies =
again for every single attack packet it wants to send.<br =
class=3D""></blockquote><br class=3D"">I wonder if anyone has any stats =
on how often cookie challenge is used, how<br class=3D"">often puzzles =
are invoked.<br class=3D""></blockquote><br style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, =
0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
text-decoration: none;" class=3D""><span style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, =
0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
text-decoration: none; float: none; display: inline !important;" =
class=3D"">I've implemented puzzles, but I'm not aware of any other =
implementation.</span><br style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); =
font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
text-decoration: none;" class=3D""><br style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, =
0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
text-decoration: none;" class=3D""><span style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, =
0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
text-decoration: none; float: none; display: inline !important;" =
class=3D"">What about cookies - in stress tests they are used very =
intensively.</span><br style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: =
normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: =
none;" class=3D""><span style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: =
normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: =
none; float: none; display: inline !important;" class=3D"">But I don't =
have any real life stats for them.</span><br style=3D"caret-color: =
rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: =
normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: =
normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; =
white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
text-decoration: none;" class=3D""><br style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, =
0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
text-decoration: none;" class=3D""><span style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, =
0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
text-decoration: none; float: none; display: inline !important;" =
class=3D"">Regards,</span><br style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); =
font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
text-decoration: none;" class=3D""><span style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, =
0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
text-decoration: none; float: none; display: inline !important;" =
class=3D"">Valery.</span><br style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); =
font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
text-decoration: none;" class=3D""></div></blockquote></div><br =
class=3D""><div class=3D"">I also implemented puzzles. So that makes two =
of us.</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">Yoav</div></body></html>=

--Apple-Mail=_0F45D483-6CE9-49BA-A4FF-E0BEDA5E92DD--


From nobody Mon Nov  8 05:33:11 2021
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the IP Security Maintenance and Extensions WG of the IETF.

        Title           : IP-TFS: Aggregation and Fragmentation Mode for ESP and its Use for IP Traffic Flow Security
        Author          : Christian Hopps
	Filename        : draft-ietf-ipsecme-iptfs-12.txt
	Pages           : 31
	Date            : 2021-11-08

Abstract:
   This document describes a mechanism for aggregation and fragmentation
   of IP packets when they are being encapsulated in ESP payload.  This
   new payload type can be used for various purposes such as decreasing
   encapsulation overhead for small IP packets; however, the focus in
   this document is to enhance IPsec traffic flow security (IP-TFS) by
   adding Traffic Flow Confidentiality (TFC) to encrypted IP
   encapsulated traffic.  TFC is provided by obscuring the size and
   frequency of IP traffic using a fixed-sized, constant-send-rate IPsec
   tunnel.  The solution allows for congestion control as well as non-
   constant send-rate usage.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ipsecme-iptfs/

There is also an htmlized version available at:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-ipsecme-iptfs-12

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-ipsecme-iptfs-12


Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/



From nobody Mon Nov  8 06:17:52 2021
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This is the start of 2 week WG adoption call for this document, ending
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Subject: [IPsec] WG adoption call for draft-smyslov-ipsecme-ikev2-auth-announce
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-- 
kivinen@iki.fi


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The IPSECME WG has placed draft-btw-add-ipsecme-ike in state
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The document is available at
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-btw-add-ipsecme-ike/



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The IPSECME WG has placed draft-smyslov-ipsecme-ikev2-auth-announce in state
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The document is available at
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-smyslov-ipsecme-ikev2-auth-announce/



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This is the start of 2 week WGLC on the draft-ietf-ipsecme-g-ikev2
document, ending 2021-11-26.

Please submit your comments to the list, also send a note if you have
reviewed the document, so we can see how many people are interested in
getting this out.
-- 
kivinen@iki.fi


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From: <mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>
To: Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>, "ipsec@ietf.org" <ipsec@ietf.org>
CC: "draft-btw-add-ipsecme-ike@ietf.org" <draft-btw-add-ipsecme-ike@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [IPsec] WG Adoption call for draft-btw-add-ipsecme-ike
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] WG Adoption call for draft-btw-add-ipsecme-ike
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Hi Tero, all,=20

I support adoption.=20

FWIW, I'm not aware of any IPR related to this I-D.

Cheers,
Med

> -----Message d'origine-----
> De=A0: IPsec <ipsec-bounces@ietf.org> De la part de Tero Kivinen
> Envoy=E9=A0: lundi 8 novembre 2021 15:17
> =C0=A0: ipsec@ietf.org
> Objet=A0: [IPsec] WG Adoption call for draft-btw-add-ipsecme-ike
>=20
> This is the start of 2 week WG adoption call for this document, ending
> 2021-11-22. Please send your reply about whether you support adopting this
> document as WG document or not.
> --
> kivinen@iki.fi
>=20
> _______________________________________________
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> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec

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Subject: [IPsec] IPsecME Meeting minutes
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Here is IPsecME WG minutes. Thanks to minute takers, for making good
minutes and including enough of the discussion, especially for the
IPTFS issues. 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
IP Security Maintenance and Extensions (IPsecME) WG

IETF 112 - Monday November 8th, 2021 12:00-14:00 UTC
https://meetings.conf.meetecho.com/ietf112/?group=ipsecme&short=&item=1

Minutes by Paul Wouters, Donald Eastlake, and Jonathan Hammell.

Agenda bashing - no changes.

# Agenda

- Note Well, technical difficulties and agenda bashing - 
  Chairs (5 min)
- Document Status -
  Chairs (10 min)
- Work items
  - IPTFS
    Christian Hopps (20 min)
  - Quantum-resistant IKEv2 and big keys
    Stefan-Lukas Gazdag and Daniel Herzinger (10 min)
  - Group Key Management using IKEv2
    Valery Smyslov (10 min)
  - Announcing Supported Authentication Methods in IKEv2
    Valery Smyslov (10 min)
- AOB + Open Mic (55 min)

# WG Status Update

Non-adopted documents not listed in the WG Status Report haven't had recent activity, so if editors wish to progress they will need updating.

Mohamed Boudacair (on Jabber): Question about draft-btw-add-ipsecme-ike.
Tero: Yes. I think that is ready and we should probably start an adoption.

# Work items
## IPTFS
Christian Hopps, draft-ietf-ipsecme-iptfs

WGLC completed in February 2021.  Versions -08-11 cover post WGLC comments. Clarified that the reorder window should be small. Recommend use of drop timer instead of reorder window to address packet loss. One last issue from Tero (Oct 31) to resolve.

Tero presented on the problem he sees (slides-112-ipsecme-ip-traffic-flow-security-reorderlost-frame-issue-00). 

Christian: The drop timer is meant to address the delay of inner packets when there is a lost frame.

Tero: If IPTFS is fixing reordering, that is a service IPsec wasn't defined for.

Christian: Indeed, we are also defining aggregation of packets and fixing the MTU issues with fragmentation, IPTFS is a new technologoy that does new things.

Christian: Reorder window is useful in non-constant send-rate scenarios. Drop timer fixes the issue.

Ben Kaduk summarized the discussion up to this point. 

Christian: The drop timer determines the delay. The text should already indicate this.

Ben: Others in broader IETF may have thoughts on this. 

Christian: Using MAYs in Tero's text allows for either behaviour. Should not wait to publish.

Ben: Prefer to pick a single solution that we are comfortable with. 

Lou Berger: Protocols are not built to handle massive reorder windows. Some delay is acceptable. Seems risky to recommend SHOULD in Tero's text. It makes a strong assumption on applications. We don't have the operational experience. Could live with MAY. 

Valery Smyslov: Processing in reordered flow may cause congestion when the group of inner packets sent. Transport recommendations should be in the draft.

Christian: This is still an area of study for the transport area.

Tero: Clarified that Valery was recommending documenting the effects of the different scenarios on the flow (will be bursty or delayed) but not on higher protocols.

Ben: There are many things we could document, but we might have to be careful about too much. There are many different applications and it will be difficult to give recommendations. Using MAY in both places in the text will allow for this.

Tero: Could live with MAY. Recommend renaming the 'drop timer' as 'lost timer'. Should also include a note on the burstiness of inner packets with out-of-order outer packets.

Lou: delay and burstiness is documented in the text already.

Yoav: Should have a recommendation for the length of the packet lost timer.

Deb Cooley (in Jabber): Timer could be proportional to the tunnel rate.

Christian: Will publish new draft based on the above agreements/comments.

## Quantum-resistant IKEv2 and Big Keys
Stefan-Lukas Gazdag, Daniel Herzinger, slides-112-ipsecme-quantum-resistant-ikev2-and-big-keys-00

Motivation to use of McEliece KEM. Implemented IKE_INTERMEDIATE, Muliple-KE, and Beyond-64KB drafts, using UDP rather than mixed-mode. First slide 100 Mbps. As long as packet loss rate is not too high, around 10 seconds for SA establishment. May be acceptable for high-security scenarios. Second slide is 1 Mbps. The handshake takes much too long. This draft does not seem to be appropriate for this use case. 

Large key sizes of McEliece could cause memory-exhaustion leading to denial of service attack. Recommend sending large KEs after the AUTH exchange. 

Valery: Using UDP in unreliable networks is not desirable and is why mixed-mode was introduced. A single classical and single post-quantum exchange may not be desired in all scenarios; Multiple-KE gives much more flexibility. 

Scott Fluhrer: Questioned whether a 20 second delay was acceptable. Often a single gateway talks to many clients coming in at the same time. How would this proposal be affected?

Daniel: Hopefully the central gateway would have more than 100Mbps throughput. You will likely run into problems. 

Stefan-Lukas: The high-security use cases often have fewer connection end-points. McEliece is likely not appropriate for mobile workstation use case.

Valery: Tested with McEliece but without simulation of packet loss. It took 2-3 seconds to complete in my experience.

## Group Key Management using IKEv2
Valery Smyslov, draft-ietf-ipsecme-g-ikev2

Motivation to secure IP multicast. Intended to be used in IEEE 802.15.9. Draft adopted in 2019, but underwent major rewrite in July 2020. Couple minor updates since, but editors think the draft is mature. More reviewers are needed.

Tero: Does the draft support IKE_INTERMEDIATE?
Valery: Likely, but not explicit in the text.

Tero: To start WGLC soon to encourage reviews.


## Announcing Supported Authentication Methods in IKEv2
Valery Smyslov, draft-smyslov-ipsecme-ikev2-auth-announce

Unlike IKEv1, authentication method in IKEv2 is not negotiated. Problem first encountered when RSA-PSS was introduced in IKEv2; new initiators sent RSA-PSS, but received authentication failed from older responders.

Proposed solution adds new optional status notification SUPPORTED_AUTH_METHODS. Desire to avoid creating a new IANA registry. Three format options based on whether linked to CERTREQ. 

Paul Wouters: Confusion between configured and supported authentication methods. The responder may not know which authentication methods to send since it does not know the identity of the initiator.

Valery: Provides "supported" methods for initiator and "configured" methods for responder.

Tero: To start WG adoption call.

## Any other Business

Valery: Revised cookie processing draft awaiting adoption. Alternative mechanism for mixing pre-shared key draft is also waiting adoption. The existing PPK draft does not work well with G-IKEv2. Beyond 64KB draft is also waiting for adoption.

Tero: Please request adoption on mailing list.

Paul: Multiple SA draft looking for reviews. Removed QoS based on comments, simplifying the draft.

Christian: Expect to look at the Multiple SA draft relatively soon as we would have a use for it.

Christian: A new version of the IPTFS is posted based on earlier discussion.

Tero: That brings us to the end of this session.

-- end --
-- 
kivinen@iki.fi


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Subject: Re: [IPsec] WG Adoption call for draft-btw-add-ipsecme-ike
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On Mon, 8 Nov 2021, Tero Kivinen wrote:

> Subject: [IPsec] WG Adoption call for draft-btw-add-ipsecme-ike
> 
> This is the start of 2 week WG adoption call for this document, ending
> 2021-11-22. Please send your reply about whether you support adopting
> this document as WG document or not.

I support the idea of conveying a list of DNS servers that support
encryption. I am not sure if this draft's format and content is the
right way forward.

Note the text of the draft claims it updates RFC 8598 but doesn't do so
via an Updates: statement. Also, I think the relaxing of the requirement
is actually wrong, as it might cause lack of interop between newer
servers and older clients not being able to negotiate working DNS if
the new servers no longer serve INTERNAL_IP*_DNS CFG payloads.

I am also not clear on the real use of negotiating hash algorithms for
the digest receiving of the ADD server "identity?", as the document
states the authentication happens as per Section 8 of [RFC8310]
which lists WebPKI or DANE authentication against the name and these
methods do not use this digest. I also do not understand the use of the
digest. For authentication, is it not needed as the entire IKEv2 exchange
is authenticated.

Paul


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Date: Mon, 8 Nov 2021 10:28:54 -0500 (EST)
From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
To: Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] WG adoption call for draft-smyslov-ipsecme-ikev2-auth-announce
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On Mon, 8 Nov 2021, Tero Kivinen wrote:

>     draft-smyslov-ipsecme-ikev2-auth-announce
> 
> This is the start of 2 week WG adoption call for this document, ending
> 2021-11-22. Please send your reply about whether you support adopting
> this document as WG document or not.

I support working on the idea. I am not sure if this document in its
current form, properly conveys the differences between supported,
accepted and unsupported, rejected. This is especially tricky in the
responder side that does not yet know the ID of the peer and cannot
lookup configuration details yet.

Also, as we have been merging authentication methods into RFC 7427
digital signature format, it is unclear to me how we can convey some
of these parameters using existing IANA registries, since the whole
point here was that we didnt need to create and maintain one. Eg if we
support or allow EDDSA or some new signature algorithm, we might not
have any IANA registry for it, and just stating "we support RFC 7427"
does not solve the actual problem.

Paul


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From: <mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>
To: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>, Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>
CC: "ipsec@ietf.org" <ipsec@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [IPsec] WG Adoption call for draft-btw-add-ipsecme-ike
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] WG Adoption call for draft-btw-add-ipsecme-ike
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Hi Paul,=20

Please see inline.

Cheers,
Med

> -----Message d'origine-----
> De=A0: IPsec <ipsec-bounces@ietf.org> De la part de Paul Wouters
> Envoy=E9=A0: lundi 8 novembre 2021 16:20
> =C0=A0: Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>
> Cc=A0: ipsec@ietf.org
> Objet=A0: Re: [IPsec] WG Adoption call for draft-btw-add-ipsecme-ike
>=20
> On Mon, 8 Nov 2021, Tero Kivinen wrote:
>=20
> > Subject: [IPsec] WG Adoption call for draft-btw-add-ipsecme-ike
> >
> > This is the start of 2 week WG adoption call for this document, ending
> > 2021-11-22. Please send your reply about whether you support adopting
> > this document as WG document or not.
>=20
> I support the idea of conveying a list of DNS servers that support
> encryption. I am not sure if this draft's format and content is the right
> way forward.

[Med] Thanks. The format can always be updated to reflect the feedback from=
 the WG.

>=20
> Note the text of the draft claims it updates RFC 8598 but doesn't do so
> via an Updates: statement.

[Med] We considered to have an "update" header because we were concerned wi=
th some MUSTs in 8598. We finally didn't include the update header because =
of a comment we received from you prior to publishing the first version of =
the draft. FWIW, here is the exchange we had at that time:=20

******
Med: I have a question for you: now that we don't depend anymore on INTERNA=
L_IP*_DNS and given that a client can be supplied with 8598 attributes and =
that 8598 says the following:
=20
=3D=3D
If an INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attribute is
   included in the CFG_REPLY, the responder MUST also include one or
   both of the INTERNAL_IP4_DNS and INTERNAL_IP6_DNS attributes in the
   CFG_REPLY.=20
=20
..
=20
   the INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attributes in a CFG_REPLY payload form a
   single list of Split DNS domains that applies to the entire list of
   INTERNAL_IP4_DNS and INTERNAL_IP6_DNS attributes.
=20
=3D=3D

Should we add an update to our daft to indicate that first "MUST" does not =
apply and that the domains are associated with **ANY** supplied server?

Paul: You cannot update that RFC for that kind of processing. The above rea=
lly says that it makes no sense to have "internal domains" without providin=
g "internal DNS servers".
****


 Also, I think the relaxing of the requirement
> is actually wrong, as it might cause lack of interop between newer servers
> and older clients not being able to negotiate working DNS if the new
> servers no longer serve INTERNAL_IP*_DNS CFG payloads.

[Med] Older clients can always ask for INTERNAL_IP6_DNS or INTERNAL_IP4_DNS=
. We will update the note to make this clearer.=20

>=20
> I am also not clear on the real use of negotiating hash algorithms for the
> digest receiving of the ADD server "identity?", as the document states the
> authentication happens as per Section 8 of [RFC8310] which lists WebPKI or
> DANE authentication against the name and these methods do not use this
> digest. I also do not understand the use of the digest. For
> authentication, is it not needed as the entire IKEv2 exchange is
> authenticated.

[Med] We added the digest to address one of the comments raised in a previo=
us ipsecme meetings: allow to not rely on PKI for validating the encrypted =
DNS server certificate but convey the end-entity certificate in IKEv2 itsel=
f.

>=20
> Paul
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> IPsec mailing list
> IPsec@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec

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Date: Mon, 8 Nov 2021 13:06:03 -0500 (EST)
From: Paul Wouters <paul.wouters@aiven.io>
To: mohamed.boucadair@orange.com
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] WG Adoption call for draft-btw-add-ipsecme-ike
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On Mon, 8 Nov 2021, mohamed.boucadair@orange.com wrote:

>> Note the text of the draft claims it updates RFC 8598 but doesn't do so
>> via an Updates: statement.
>
> [Med] We considered to have an "update" header because we were concerned with some MUSTs in 8598. We finally didn't include the update header because of a comment we received from you prior to publishing the first version of the draft. FWIW, here is the exchange we had at that time:
>
> ******
> Med: I have a question for you: now that we don't depend anymore on INTERNAL_IP*_DNS and given that a client can be supplied with 8598 attributes and that 8598 says the following:
>
> ==
> If an INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attribute is
>   included in the CFG_REPLY, the responder MUST also include one or
>   both of the INTERNAL_IP4_DNS and INTERNAL_IP6_DNS attributes in the
>   CFG_REPLY.
>
> ..
>
>   the INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attributes in a CFG_REPLY payload form a
>   single list of Split DNS domains that applies to the entire list of
>   INTERNAL_IP4_DNS and INTERNAL_IP6_DNS attributes.
>
> ==
>
> Should we add an update to our daft to indicate that first "MUST" does not apply and that the domains are associated with **ANY** supplied server?
>
> Paul: You cannot update that RFC for that kind of processing. The above really says that it makes no sense to have "internal domains" without providing "internal DNS servers".
> ****

Note that what I said there was that you should not update the _mechanism_
of how CFG requests/responds are done. You should use the existing
mechanism with a new value, but use the same negotation mechanism.

So the client sends FOO(x) and the server respones with FOO(y)

x can be empty (eg the client has no previous notion or preference for
FOO. Or if it has one, it can suggest it. The server takes that value
only as a preference of the client, but the server is the one making
the ultimate decsion if it returns "x" or "y".

So your draft should not say the initiator MUST send a zero size request
for FOO. That is changing the mechanism.

What I was saying in my last email was that making a protocol update
where a server receiving a INTERNAL_IP4_DNS may choose not to return
any INTERNAL_IP4_DNS is an update to the protocol that would require
the Updates: clause to warn implementers to read this document too,
as it updates older RFC text.

> Also, I think the relaxing of the requirement
>> is actually wrong, as it might cause lack of interop between newer servers
>> and older clients not being able to negotiate working DNS if the new
>> servers no longer serve INTERNAL_IP*_DNS CFG payloads.
>
> [Med] Older clients can always ask for INTERNAL_IP6_DNS or INTERNAL_IP4_DNS. We will update the note to make this clearer.

They can indeed. So I think you should just stick with the CFG request/response
semantics and not talk about omitting INTERNAL_IP*_DNS replies if the
client asks for those via CFG. This way, the ENC_DNS* payloads are
simply defined as new CFG options, and clients and servers will do the
right thing when encountering them. And it requires no Updates: clause
because it does not modify the behaviour with respect to
INTERNAL_IP*_DNS. You might want to say a client SHOULD prefer ENC_DNS*
servers over INTERNAL_IP*_DNS servers.



>> I am also not clear on the real use of negotiating hash algorithms for the
>> digest receiving of the ADD server "identity?", as the document states the
>> authentication happens as per Section 8 of [RFC8310] which lists WebPKI or
>> DANE authentication against the name and these methods do not use this
>> digest. I also do not understand the use of the digest. For
>> authentication, is it not needed as the entire IKEv2 exchange is
>> authenticated.
>
> [Med] We added the digest to address one of the comments raised in a previous ipsecme meetings: allow to not rely on PKI for validating the encrypted DNS server certificate but convey the end-entity certificate in IKEv2 itself.

Ah, I see. I would probably use some different terminology then, and
extend the text talking aboyt "as per Section 8 of [RFC8310]" to
clarify that. I'll see about producing some text for you.

Paul


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Date: Mon, 8 Nov 2021 13:16:25 -0500 (EST)
From: Paul Wouters <paul.wouters@aiven.io>
To: "ipsec@ietf.org WG" <ipsec@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] I-D Action: draft-ietf-ipsecme-iptfs-12.txt
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On Mon, 8 Nov 2021, internet-drafts@ietf.org wrote:

> 	Filename        : draft-ietf-ipsecme-iptfs-12.txt

> A diff from the previous version is available at:
> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-ipsecme-iptfs-12

Looks good to me other than a typo:  s/the they fall/they fall/

(but we can let the RFC editor fix that one without issuing a new draft)

Paul


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Subject: [IPsec] WGLC for draft-ietf-ipsecme-rfc8229bis
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This is the start of 2 week WGLC on the draft-ietf-ipsecme-rfc8229bis
document, ending 2021-11-26.

Please submit your comments to the list, also send a note if you have
reviewed the document, so we can see how many people are interested in
getting this out.
-- 
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Subject: [IPsec] Comments on draft-smyslov-ipsecme-ikev2-auth-announce
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Date: Mon, 8 Nov 2021 23:04:17 +0200
From: Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>
To: "Scott Fluhrer \(sfluhrer\)" <sfluhrer=40cisco.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
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Subject: [IPsec] Comments on draft-smyslov-ipsecme-ikev2-auth-announce
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Scott Fluhrer \(sfluhrer\) writes:
> I=E2=80=99m glad to see this work; however I see a potentially import=
ant
> constraint on authentication that the current draft does not appear
> to address.
>=20
> It allows the peers to specify which signature algorithms they
> accept; however if we are talking about certificates, those include
> internal signature algorithms, which may be different. One instance
> where I expect this to come up is that the root certificate may have
> a more conservative algorithm choice (e.g. a hash based signature,
> or one with NIST level 5) than the device certificates (which may
> have a short expiry time, and so being so conservative might not be
> necessary).
>=20
> Does the AuthMethod apply to the algorithms within the certificate
> as well=3F The RFC should clarify this.

The reason for this notify is that if the peer has multiple key pairs
(i.e., private keys) it needs to pick one private key to sign the AUTH
payload with. If one of those private keys is using EC and another is
using RSA, then without this notification there is no way of knowing
which one to pick (except perhaps by prior configuration or by
heuristics based on the CERTREQ etc).

Also in some cases same private key can be used with multiple hashing
methods etc, thus indicating what formats of signature are accepted is
also needed.

On the other hand the signatures in the certificates are already
there, and the peers do not have any way of changing them, thus
negotiating what are accepted does not help. Peers can already send as
many certificates they want and they can also indicate the CAs they
trust using CERTREQs, so that should be enough for peers to get
algorithms in the certificates sorted out.

I.e., if they have multiple paths from certificate(s) matching their
private key they are going to use for signing to the trusted roots
trusted by other end, they can send all those paths out.

The one who gets all those certificate payloads will then search from
them, and from its local cache, or even querying more intermediate
certificates from the CA and form a trusted path from the one EE
certificate to any trusted root that matches the security policy
required for the that end.
--=20
kivinen@iki.fi


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Date: Mon, 8 Nov 2021 16:12:12 -0500 (EST)
From: Paul Wouters <paul.wouters@aiven.io>
To: Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>
cc: "Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer)" <sfluhrer=40cisco.com@dmarc.ietf.org>,  "ipsec@ietf.org" <ipsec@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] Comments on draft-smyslov-ipsecme-ikev2-auth-announce
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On Mon, 8 Nov 2021, Tero Kivinen wrote:

>> Does the AuthMethod apply to the algorithms within the certificate
>> as well? The RFC should clarify this.
>
> The reason for this notify is that if the peer has multiple key pairs
> (i.e., private keys) it needs to pick one private key to sign the AUTH
> payload with. If one of those private keys is using EC and another is
> using RSA, then without this notification there is no way of knowing
> which one to pick (except perhaps by prior configuration or by
> heuristics based on the CERTREQ etc).

What will be in the notification then? Since the authenticaion method
for both is "RFC 7425 Digital Signatures" as per existing IANA registry
for IKEv2 Authentication Methods.

We would still need a new registry or we need to identify auth algorithms
by their SPKI similar to how we can signature supported hash algorithms.
But we would prob end up with seeing lots of duplicate entries with
slightly different SPKI prefixes.

The RSS-v1.5 vs RSS-PSS is a major pain right now, and implementations
using 7425 and specifying RSA-v1.5 SHA1 are a double pain as the RFCs
clearly doesn't allow that. We run into frequent interop issues with
these.

Paul


From nobody Mon Nov  8 15:00:42 2021
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Comments: In-reply-to internet-drafts@ietf.org message dated "Mon, 08 Nov 2021 05:33:06 -0800."
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] I-D Action: draft-ietf-ipsecme-iptfs-12.txt
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I've read the diff, and it looks good to me.
--
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works
 -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-




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Subject: Re: [IPsec] I-D Action: draft-ietf-ipsecme-iptfs-12.txt
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Paul Wouters <paul.wouters=40aiven.io@dmarc.ietf.org> writes:

> On Mon, 8 Nov 2021, internet-drafts@ietf.org wrote:
>
>> 	Filename        : draft-ietf-ipsecme-iptfs-12.txt
>
>> A diff from the previous version is available at:
>> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-ipsecme-iptfs-12
>
> Looks good to me other than a typo:  s/the they fall/they fall/
>
> (but we can let the RFC editor fix that one without issuing a new draft)

Thanks, I've made the update locally to keep track of it as well.

Also, Yoav flagged "is comprised of" to me off-list, so I locally changed those to "consists of". There's a subgroup of language experts that really don't like people to use "is comprised of". :)

Thanks,
Chris.

>
> Paul
>
> _______________________________________________
> IPsec mailing list
> IPsec@ietf.org
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From nobody Tue Nov  9 01:39:07 2021
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Date: Tue, 9 Nov 2021 11:38:53 +0200
From: Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] Comments on draft-smyslov-ipsecme-ikev2-auth-announce
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Paul Wouters writes:
> On Mon, 8 Nov 2021, Tero Kivinen wrote:
> 
> >> Does the AuthMethod apply to the algorithms within the certificate
> >> as well? The RFC should clarify this.
> >
> > The reason for this notify is that if the peer has multiple key pairs
> > (i.e., private keys) it needs to pick one private key to sign the AUTH
> > payload with. If one of those private keys is using EC and another is
> > using RSA, then without this notification there is no way of knowing
> > which one to pick (except perhaps by prior configuration or by
> > heuristics based on the CERTREQ etc).
> 
> What will be in the notification then? Since the authenticaion method
> for both is "RFC 7425 Digital Signatures" as per existing IANA registry
> for IKEv2 Authentication Methods.

>From the draft:

----------------------------------------------------------------------
   The following format is currently used only with the "Digital
   Signature" (14) authentication method.

                       1                   2                   3
   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |  Length (>3)  |  Auth Method  |   Cert Link   |               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+               +
   |                                                               |
   ~                AlgorithmIdentifier ASN.1 object               ~
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
----------------------------------------------------------------------

I.e., for RFC7425 Digital Signatures, there is also the ASN.1
algorithm identifier to tell which algorithm(s) is/are supported.

> We would still need a new registry or we need to identify auth algorithms
> by their SPKI similar to how we can signature supported hash algorithms.
> But we would prob end up with seeing lots of duplicate entries with
> slightly different SPKI prefixes.

If the Cert Link is zero then the algorithms can be used with any CA,
otherwise they are only to specific CA listed in the CERTREQ, so in
most cases you simply list method 14 few times with the
AlgorithmIdentifiers you support. 

> The RSS-v1.5 vs RSS-PSS is a major pain right now, and implementations
> using 7425 and specifying RSA-v1.5 SHA1 are a double pain as the RFCs
> clearly doesn't allow that. We run into frequent interop issues with
> these.

My understanding is that the one of the reasons for this draft is to
try to solve that issue...
-- 
kivinen@iki.fi


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Subject: [IPsec] I-D Action: draft-ietf-ipsecme-iptfs-12.txt
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internet-drafts@ietf.org writes:
>         Title           : IP-TFS: Aggregation and Fragmentation Mode for ESP and its Use for IP Traffic Flow Security
> 	Filename        : draft-ietf-ipsecme-iptfs-12.txt

I checked the diffs, and I think this text is mostly ok.

I think there is still bit of tweaking that can be done, mostly as
what happens if using the 2nd option and the frame appears after the
lost timer, but inside the reorder window.

My understanding is that it would still be good idea to process that
frame, but there is text which says "Using this method will make sure
the packets are sent in-order, i.e., there is no reordering possible,
...", and that would indicate that we must drop that frame that comes
after the lost timer expire, but inside the reorder window, as if we
process it after the lost timer has expired this may cause inner
packets sent out of order.

The question really is do we want really make sure there can not be
reorderings on the 2nd option, i.e., we will drop all frames that
would send reordered inner frames?

In that case the reorder window size does not have any meaning if we
have loss timer defined.

On the other hand having small lost timer, but bigger reorder window
would allow fixing localized reorderings (i.e., like getting two outer
frames almost back to back, but in wrong order), but still not throw
away frames that come in too late.

To allow that we could simply change text to "Using this method will
make sure the packets are sent in-order as much is possible, ...".

Ps. Other option is to allow that kind of localized reorderings is to
add that option to 1st option, i.e., add sentence to the end of 1st
paragraph saying "The receiver MAY also have reordering timer, so that
when out of order outer packet comes in, the receiver waits for this
reordering timer to see if new packets comes during that time, and if
so it can reorder the frames before processing them.", but on the
other hand I do not think anything in the 1st option forbids doing
that anyways, so I do not think we need such text.
-- 
kivinen@iki.fi


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From: "Valery Smyslov" <smyslov.ietf@gmail.com>
To: "'Paul Wouters'" <paul@nohats.ca>, "'Tero Kivinen'" <kivinen@iki.fi>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] WG adoption call for draft-smyslov-ipsecme-ikev2-auth-announce
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Hi Paul,

> On Mon, 8 Nov 2021, Tero Kivinen wrote:
> 
> >     draft-smyslov-ipsecme-ikev2-auth-announce
> >
> > This is the start of 2 week WG adoption call for this document, ending
> > 2021-11-22. Please send your reply about whether you support adopting
> > this document as WG document or not.
> 
> I support working on the idea. 

Thank you.

> I am not sure if this document in its
> current form, properly conveys the differences between supported,
> accepted and unsupported, rejected. This is especially tricky in the
> responder side that does not yet know the ID of the peer and cannot
> lookup configuration details yet.

The responder has already to deal with this problem - 
it sends CERTREQ in the IKE_SA_INIT with the list of CAs
before it knows the initiator's ID. The same is true for the
SIGNATURE_HASH_ALGORITHMS
notify. So, the problem is not new and the draft doesn't make 
responder's choice of what to send more tricky than it is now.

> Also, as we have been merging authentication methods into RFC 7427
> digital signature format, it is unclear to me how we can convey some
> of these parameters using existing IANA registries, since the whole
> point here was that we didnt need to create and maintain one. Eg if we
> support or allow EDDSA or some new signature algorithm, we might not
> have any IANA registry for it, and just stating "we support RFC 7427"
> does not solve the actual problem.

The draft relies on AlgorithmIdentifier ASN.1 objects, that must exist
for any new signature algorithm. They are assigned and maintained
outside IKEv2 IANA registries.

Regards,
Valery.

> Paul
> 
> _______________________________________________
> IPsec mailing list
> IPsec@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec


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From: "Valery Smyslov" <smyslov.ietf@gmail.com>
To: "'Scott Fluhrer \(sfluhrer\)'" <sfluhrer=40cisco.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, <ipsec@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] Comments on draft-smyslov-ipsecme-ikev2-auth-announce
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Hi Scott.

=20

I=E2=80=99m glad to see this work;=20

=20

          Thank you.

=20

however I see a potentially important constraint on authentication that =
the current draft does not appear to address.

=20

It allows the peers to specify which signature algorithms they accept; =
however if we are talking about certificates, those include internal =
signature algorithms, which may be different.  One instance where I =
expect this to come up is that the root certificate may have a more =
conservative algorithm choice (e.g. a hash based signature, or one with =
NIST level 5) than the device certificates (which may have a short =
expiry time, and so being so conservative might not be necessary).

=20

Does the AuthMethod apply to the algorithms within the certificate as =
well?  The RFC should clarify this.

=20

          Maybe implicitly, but not explicitly. The problem the draft =
addresses is an ambiguity=20

          for an IKE implementation having several credentials which to =
use so that its peer can authenticate it.

          So, if there are several certificate chains for host's =
certificates (e.g. several CAs each issuing=20

          EE certificate), then an implementation selects one of its =
certificates, thus implicitly

          selecting the chain to corresponding CA. But of course, the =
announced Auth Methods=20

          indicate only the algorithm the implementation use to create =
AUTH payloads, not algorithm within the chain.

=20

Listing the AlgorithmIdentifier=E2=80=99s for all the signature =
algorithms we can support seems unnecessarily chatty; would it be more =
prudent to extend the AuthMethod field to 16 bits (and so we (or IANA) =
would feel more free to dole them out?

=20

          I considered this option. My intention was to avoid creating =
new registries so, that=20

          new algorithms can be used without the process of allocation a =
new value

          (that takes a while), so the choice of AlgorithmIdentifier. I =
agree that it makes

          the size of the notification larger. Whether it is a real =
problem depends

          on the number of supported algorithms. RFC 7427 lists a dozen, =
and

          most of them (except for RSA-PSS) have AlgorithmIdentifier =
length 11-15 bytes.

          RSA-PSS is very special, it has a lot of parameters, but in =
practice most of=20

          time it is used with default parameters. We don't know yet =
about=20

          AlgorithmIdentifiers for PQ signature schemes, but it is my =
understanding

          from yesterday's LAMPS meeting that they most likely will =
contain no

          parameters, just a single OID.

=20

          So, it looks like in most cases the size of the =
SUPPORTED_AUTH_METHODS

          notification will be about one or two hundred bytes compared =
to about 20-30

          bytes if we use new registry. One can also use =
IKE_INTERMEDIATE

          if this amount extra bytes overflows IKE_SA_INIT.

=20

          So, there is a trade of, but we can return to this and =
probably reconsider

          if the draft is adopted.

=20

And, finally, a typo: it=E2=80=99s P-521, not P-512 =F0=9F=98=8A

=20

          Thank you. These buttons are so close to each other :-)

=20

          Regards,

          Valery.


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</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=3DRU =
link=3D"#0563C1" vlink=3D"#954F72" style=3D'word-wrap:break-word'><div =
class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:13.0pt;color:#1F497D'>Hi =
Scott.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:13.0pt;color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><div=
 style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0cm 0cm 0cm =
4.0pt'><p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>I=E2=80=99m glad to see =
this work; <span style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p></o:p></span></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:13.0pt;color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:13.0pt;color:#1F497D'>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 Thank you.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:13.0pt;color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>however I see a potentially =
important constraint on authentication that the current draft does not =
appear to address.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
lang=3DEN-US><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
lang=3DEN-US>It allows the peers to specify which signature algorithms =
they accept; however if we are talking about certificates, those include =
internal signature algorithms, which may be different.&nbsp; One =
instance where I expect this to come up is that the root certificate may =
have a more conservative algorithm choice (e.g. a hash based signature, =
or one with NIST level 5) than the device certificates (which may have a =
short expiry time, and so being so conservative might not be =
necessary).<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
lang=3DEN-US><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
lang=3DEN-US>Does the AuthMethod apply to the algorithms within the =
certificate as well?&nbsp; The RFC should clarify =
this.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:13.0pt;color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:13.0pt;color:#1F497D'>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 Maybe implicitly, but not explicitly. The problem =
the draft addresses is an ambiguity <o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:13.0pt;color:#1F497D'>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 for an IKE implementation having several =
credentials which to use so that its peer can authenticate =
it.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:13.0pt;color:#1F497D'>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 So, if there are several certificate chains for =
host's certificates (e.g. several CAs each issuing =
<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:13.0pt;color:#1F497D'>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 EE certificate), then an implementation selects =
one of its certificates, thus implicitly<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:13.0pt;color:#1F497D'>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 selecting the chain to corresponding CA. But of =
course, the announced Auth Methods <o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:13.0pt;color:#1F497D'>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 indicate only the algorithm the implementation use =
to create AUTH payloads, not algorithm within the =
chain.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
lang=3DEN-US><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
lang=3DEN-US>Listing the AlgorithmIdentifier=E2=80=99s for all the =
signature algorithms we can support seems unnecessarily chatty; would it =
be more prudent to extend the AuthMethod field to 16 bits (and so we (or =
IANA) would feel more free to dole them out?<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:13.0pt;color:#1F497D'>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 I considered this option. My intention was to =
avoid creating new registries so, that <o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:13.0pt;color:#1F497D'>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 new algorithms can be used without the process of =
allocation a new value<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:13.0pt;color:#1F497D'>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 (that takes a while), so the choice of =
AlgorithmIdentifier. I agree that it makes<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:13.0pt;color:#1F497D'>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 the size of the notification larger. Whether it is =
a real problem depends<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:13.0pt;color:#1F497D'>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 on the number of supported algorithms. RFC 7427 =
lists a dozen, and<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:13.0pt;color:#1F497D'>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 most of them (except for RSA-PSS) have =
AlgorithmIdentifier length 11-15 bytes.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:13.0pt;color:#1F497D'>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 RSA-PSS is very special, it has a lot of =
parameters, but in practice most of <o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:13.0pt;color:#1F497D'>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 time it is used with default parameters. We don't =
know yet about <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:13.0pt;color:#1F497D'>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 AlgorithmIdentifiers for PQ signature schemes, but =
it is my understanding<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:13.0pt;color:#1F497D'>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 from yesterday's LAMPS meeting that they most =
likely will contain no<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:13.0pt;color:#1F497D'>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 parameters, just a single =
OID.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:13.0pt;color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:13.0pt;color:#1F497D'>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 So, it looks like in most cases the size of the =
SUPPORTED_AUTH_METHODS<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:13.0pt;color:#1F497D'>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 notification will be about one or two hundred =
bytes compared to about 20-30<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:13.0pt;color:#1F497D'>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 bytes if we use new registry. One can also use =
IKE_INTERMEDIATE<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:13.0pt;color:#1F497D'>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 if this amount extra bytes overflows =
IKE_SA_INIT.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:13.0pt;color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:13.0pt;color:#1F497D'>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 So, there is a trade of, but we can return to this =
and probably reconsider<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:13.0pt;color:#1F497D'>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 if the draft is adopted.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US>And, finally, a typo: it=E2=80=99s =
P-521, not P-512 </span><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-family:"Segoe =
UI Symbol","sans-serif"'>&#128522;<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:13.0pt;color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:13.0pt;color:#1F497D'>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 Thank you. These buttons are so close to each =
other :-)<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:13.0pt;color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:13.0pt;color:#1F497D'>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 Regards,<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:13.0pt;color:#1F497D'>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =
Valery.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div></body></html>
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From: "Valery Smyslov" <smyslov.ietf@gmail.com>
To: "'Paul Wouters'" <paul.wouters=40aiven.io@dmarc.ietf.org>, "'Tero Kivinen'" <kivinen@iki.fi>
Cc: <ipsec@ietf.org>, "'Scott Fluhrer \(sfluhrer\)'" <sfluhrer=40cisco.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
References: <BL3PR11MB5682B8216D3A393B4D1771DBC1919@BL3PR11MB5682.namprd11.prod.outlook.com> <24969.37073.626018.820410@fireball.acr.fi> <2fe9aba6-6ac5-5af4-5439-867c5ad6f053@nohats.ca>
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ipsec/fsxgSJeZAU8j7j4f2LL8jyTEe1M>
Subject: Re: [IPsec] Comments on draft-smyslov-ipsecme-ikev2-auth-announce
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Hi Paul,

> On Mon, 8 Nov 2021, Tero Kivinen wrote:
> 
> >> Does the AuthMethod apply to the algorithms within the certificate
> >> as well? The RFC should clarify this.
> >
> > The reason for this notify is that if the peer has multiple key pairs
> > (i.e., private keys) it needs to pick one private key to sign the AUTH
> > payload with. If one of those private keys is using EC and another is
> > using RSA, then without this notification there is no way of knowing
> > which one to pick (except perhaps by prior configuration or by
> > heuristics based on the CERTREQ etc).
> 
> What will be in the notification then? Since the authenticaion method
> for both is "RFC 7425 Digital Signatures" as per existing IANA registry
> for IKEv2 Authentication Methods.

The notification contain a list of supported auth methods.
Each method is represented by a structure containing a value for a auth
method from 
https://www.iana.org/assignments/ikev2-parameters/ikev2-parameters.xhtml#ike
v2-parameters-12
IANA registry AND IF this method is "Digital Signature" (defined in RFC
7427)
then IN ADDITION an AlgorithmIdentifier for the supported signature
algorithm is included. So, there may be multiple "Digital Signature"
auth methods with different AlgorithmIdentifiers.

> We would still need a new registry or we need to identify auth algorithms
> by their SPKI similar to how we can signature supported hash algorithms.
> But we would prob end up with seeing lots of duplicate entries with
> slightly different SPKI prefixes.

We can use AlgorithmIdentifier, so no new registry is needed.
But there is a trade off, so this can be discussed if the draft is adopted.

> The RSS-v1.5 vs RSS-PSS is a major pain right now, and implementations
> using 7425 and specifying RSA-v1.5 SHA1 are a double pain as the RFCs
> clearly doesn't allow that. We run into frequent interop issues with
> these.

That what this draft tries to address.

Regards,
Valery.

> Paul
> 
> _______________________________________________
> IPsec mailing list
> IPsec@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec


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Subject: Re: [IPsec] I-D Action: draft-ietf-ipsecme-iptfs-12.txt
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--=-=-=
Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed


I believe this is a good time to apply KISS method.

We have a lost packet timer and additionally this is the "in order delivery" mode. Let's not make this more complex to try and eek out every ounce of potential, especially given we are already documenting 2 possible receiver behaviors (instead of 1 recommended one) specifically b/c we need to gain more experience for what affects they have on the inner traffic and various applications.

Please also consider this from the perspective of congestion control. When a packet is considered lost it will trigger various actions in the congestion control algorithms.

Let's just keep lost packets lost for now.

Thanks,
Chris.

Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi> writes:

> internet-drafts@ietf.org writes:
>>         Title           : IP-TFS: Aggregation and Fragmentation Mode for ESP and its Use for IP Traffic Flow Security
>> 	Filename        : draft-ietf-ipsecme-iptfs-12.txt
>
> I checked the diffs, and I think this text is mostly ok.
>
> I think there is still bit of tweaking that can be done, mostly as
> what happens if using the 2nd option and the frame appears after the
> lost timer, but inside the reorder window.
>
> My understanding is that it would still be good idea to process that
> frame, but there is text which says "Using this method will make sure
> the packets are sent in-order, i.e., there is no reordering possible,
> ...", and that would indicate that we must drop that frame that comes
> after the lost timer expire, but inside the reorder window, as if we
> process it after the lost timer has expired this may cause inner
> packets sent out of order.
>
> The question really is do we want really make sure there can not be
> reorderings on the 2nd option, i.e., we will drop all frames that
> would send reordered inner frames?
>
> In that case the reorder window size does not have any meaning if we
> have loss timer defined.
>
> On the other hand having small lost timer, but bigger reorder window
> would allow fixing localized reorderings (i.e., like getting two outer
> frames almost back to back, but in wrong order), but still not throw
> away frames that come in too late.
>
> To allow that we could simply change text to "Using this method will
> make sure the packets are sent in-order as much is possible, ...".


>
> Ps. Other option is to allow that kind of localized reorderings is to
> add that option to 1st option, i.e., add sentence to the end of 1st
> paragraph saying "The receiver MAY also have reordering timer, so that
> when out of order outer packet comes in, the receiver waits for this
> reordering timer to see if new packets comes during that time, and if
> so it can reorder the frames before processing them.", but on the
> other hand I do not think anything in the 1st option forbids doing
> that anyways, so I do not think we need such text.


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CC: Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>, "ipsec@ietf.org" <ipsec@ietf.org>, "draft-btw-add-ipsecme-ike@ietf.org" <draft-btw-add-ipsecme-ike@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [IPsec] WG Adoption call for draft-btw-add-ipsecme-ike
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] WG Adoption call for draft-btw-add-ipsecme-ike
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Hi Paul,=20

Please see inline.=20

Cheers,
Med

> -----Message d'origine-----
> De=A0: Paul Wouters <paul.wouters@aiven.io>
> Envoy=E9=A0: lundi 8 novembre 2021 19:06
> =C0=A0: BOUCADAIR Mohamed INNOV/NET <mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>
> Cc=A0: Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>; ipsec@ietf.org
> Objet=A0: Re: [IPsec] WG Adoption call for draft-btw-add-ipsecme-ike
>=20
> On Mon, 8 Nov 2021, mohamed.boucadair@orange.com wrote:
>=20
> >> Note the text of the draft claims it updates RFC 8598 but doesn't do
> >> so via an Updates: statement.
> >
> > [Med] We considered to have an "update" header because we were concerned
> with some MUSTs in 8598. We finally didn't include the update header
> because of a comment we received from you prior to publishing the first
> version of the draft. FWIW, here is the exchange we had at that time:
> >
> > ******
> > Med: I have a question for you: now that we don't depend anymore on
> INTERNAL_IP*_DNS and given that a client can be supplied with 8598
> attributes and that 8598 says the following:
> >
> > =3D=3D
> > If an INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attribute is
> >   included in the CFG_REPLY, the responder MUST also include one or
> >   both of the INTERNAL_IP4_DNS and INTERNAL_IP6_DNS attributes in the
> >   CFG_REPLY.
> >
> > ..
> >
> >   the INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attributes in a CFG_REPLY payload form a
> >   single list of Split DNS domains that applies to the entire list of
> >   INTERNAL_IP4_DNS and INTERNAL_IP6_DNS attributes.
> >
> > =3D=3D
> >
> > Should we add an update to our daft to indicate that first "MUST" does
> not apply and that the domains are associated with **ANY** supplied
> server?
> >
> > Paul: You cannot update that RFC for that kind of processing. The above
> really says that it makes no sense to have "internal domains" without
> providing "internal DNS servers".
> > ****
>=20
> Note that what I said there was that you should not update the _mechanism_
> of how CFG requests/responds are done. You should use the existing
> mechanism with a new value, but use the same negotation mechanism.
>=20
> So the client sends FOO(x) and the server respones with FOO(y)
>=20
> x can be empty (eg the client has no previous notion or preference for
> FOO. Or if it has one, it can suggest it. The server takes that value only
> as a preference of the client, but the server is the one making the
> ultimate decsion if it returns "x" or "y".
>=20
> So your draft should not say the initiator MUST send a zero size request
> for FOO.

[Med] We are not saying that in the draft.=20

 That is changing the mechanism.
>=20
> What I was saying in my last email was that making a protocol update where
> a server receiving a INTERNAL_IP4_DNS may choose not to return any
> INTERNAL_IP4_DNS is an update to the protocol that would require the
> Updates: clause to warn implementers to read this document too, as it
> updates older RFC text.

[Med] OK.=20

>=20
> > Also, I think the relaxing of the requirement
> >> is actually wrong, as it might cause lack of interop between newer
> >> servers and older clients not being able to negotiate working DNS if
> >> the new servers no longer serve INTERNAL_IP*_DNS CFG payloads.
> >
> > [Med] Older clients can always ask for INTERNAL_IP6_DNS or
> INTERNAL_IP4_DNS. We will update the note to make this clearer.
>=20
> They can indeed. So I think you should just stick with the CFG
> request/response semantics and not talk about omitting INTERNAL_IP*_DNS
> replies if the client asks for those via CFG. This way, the ENC_DNS*
> payloads are simply defined as new CFG options, and clients and servers
> will do the right thing when encountering them. And it requires no
> Updates: clause because it does not modify the behaviour with respect to
> INTERNAL_IP*_DNS. You might want to say a client SHOULD prefer ENC_DNS*
> servers over INTERNAL_IP*_DNS servers.

[Med] That's one approach. The one we have in the draft is to enforce a pol=
icy at the responder side:

      The behavior of the responder if it receives both ENCDNS_IP* and
      INTERNAL_IP6_DNS (or INTERNAL_IP4_DNS) attributes is policy-based
      and deployment-specific.  However, it is RECOMMENDED that if the
      responder includes at least one ENCDNS_IP* attribute in the reply,
      it should not include any of INTERNAL_IP4_DNS/INTERNAL_IP6_DNS
      attributes.

This policy allows for more control vs. providing both to the client + let =
the client decide.=20

This is an item for discussion/agreement when the document is adopted. Poin=
t recorded. Thanks.=20

>=20
>=20
>=20
> >> I am also not clear on the real use of negotiating hash algorithms
> >> for the digest receiving of the ADD server "identity?", as the
> >> document states the authentication happens as per Section 8 of
> >> [RFC8310] which lists WebPKI or DANE authentication against the name
> >> and these methods do not use this digest. I also do not understand
> >> the use of the digest. For authentication, is it not needed as the
> >> entire IKEv2 exchange is authenticated.
> >
> > [Med] We added the digest to address one of the comments raised in a
> previous ipsecme meetings: allow to not rely on PKI for validating the
> encrypted DNS server certificate but convey the end-entity certificate in
> IKEv2 itself.
>=20
> Ah, I see. I would probably use some different terminology then, and
> extend the text talking aboyt "as per Section 8 of [RFC8310]" to clarify
> that. I'll see about producing some text for you.
>=20

[Med] Great. Looking forward receiving your text proposal.=20


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Subject: Re: [IPsec] WGLC for draft-ietf-ipsecme-rfc8229bis
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I have reviewed the diff at:
  https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=3Drfc8229&url2=3Ddraft-ietf-ipsecme-rfc=
8229bis-01

and the update seems like a good job to me.

I wonder about keeping more of the original authors on the new document,
since it is substantively the same document.  I can not judge what their
contribution was to the original document, nor do I know if they were asked.
If the design team has gone through this consideration, then that's enough
for me.

=2D-
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>   . o O ( IPv6 I=C3=B8T consulti=
ng )
           Sandelman Software Works Inc, Ottawa and Worldwide





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From: "Valery Smyslov" <smyslov.ietf@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] WGLC for draft-ietf-ipsecme-rfc8229bis
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Hi Michael,

> I have reviewed the diff at:
>   =
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=3Drfc8229&url2=3Ddraft-ietf-ipsecme-
> rfc8229bis-01
>=20
> and the update seems like a good job to me.

Thanks.

> I wonder about keeping more of the original authors on the new =
document,
> since it is substantively the same document.  I can not judge what =
their
> contribution was to the original document, nor do I know if they were =
asked.
> If the design team has gone through this consideration, then that's =
enough
> for me.

All three original authors were asked to co-author the draft.
Tommy agreed, but no reply was received from Samy and Ravi.
I cannot judge their contribution to the original rfc,
but I think that it's a good idea to add them to acknowledgement=20
section anyway. Will do this.

Regards,
Valery.

> --
> Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>   . o O ( IPv6 I=C3=B8T =
consulting )
>            Sandelman Software Works Inc, Ottawa and Worldwide
>=20
>=20
>=20



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Date: Tue, 9 Nov 2021 19:20:10 -0500 (EST)
From: Paul Wouters <paul.wouters@aiven.io>
To: mohamed.boucadair@orange.com
cc: "ipsec@ietf.org" <ipsec@ietf.org>,  "draft-btw-add-ipsecme-ike@ietf.org" <draft-btw-add-ipsecme-ike@ietf.org>,  Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] WG Adoption call for draft-btw-add-ipsecme-ike
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On Tue, 9 Nov 2021, mohamed.boucadair@orange.com wrote:

>> Note that what I said there was that you should not update the _mechanism_
>> of how CFG requests/responds are done. You should use the existing
>> mechanism with a new value, but use the same negotation mechanism.
>>
>> So the client sends FOO(x) and the server respones with FOO(y)
>>
>> x can be empty (eg the client has no previous notion or preference for
>> FOO. Or if it has one, it can suggest it. The server takes that value only
>> as a preference of the client, but the server is the one making the
>> ultimate decsion if it returns "x" or "y".
>>
>> So your draft should not say the initiator MUST send a zero size request
>> for FOO.
>
> [Med] We are not saying that in the draft.

Section 3.1 states:

o  Length (2 octets, unsigned integer) - Length of the data in
       octets.  In particular, this field is set to:

       *  0 if the Configuration payload has types CFG_REQUEST or
          CFG_ACK.


So it says for a CFG_REQUEST the length is 0.

> That is changing the mechanism.
>>
>> What I was saying in my last email was that making a protocol update where
>> a server receiving a INTERNAL_IP4_DNS may choose not to return any
>> INTERNAL_IP4_DNS is an update to the protocol that would require the
>> Updates: clause to warn implementers to read this document too, as it
>> updates older RFC text.
>
> [Med] OK.

But note that I rather that the responder just responds to the received
CFG requests with CFG replies it supports and has data for. So if the
client asks for INTERNAL_IP4_DNS and ENCDNS_IP4, the responder should
return both with values. I also think that in case the encrypted DNS
fails, it would be good for the IKEv2 client to have the INTERNAL_IP4_DNS
as fallback option. Say if the TLS fails for some reason (incompatible
algorithms, expired TLS certificate, DoH server down, etc)

>>> [Med] Older clients can always ask for INTERNAL_IP6_DNS or
>> INTERNAL_IP4_DNS. We will update the note to make this clearer.
>>
>> They can indeed. So I think you should just stick with the CFG
>> request/response semantics and not talk about omitting INTERNAL_IP*_DNS
>> replies if the client asks for those via CFG. This way, the ENC_DNS*
>> payloads are simply defined as new CFG options, and clients and servers
>> will do the right thing when encountering them. And it requires no
>> Updates: clause because it does not modify the behaviour with respect to
>> INTERNAL_IP*_DNS. You might want to say a client SHOULD prefer ENC_DNS*
>> servers over INTERNAL_IP*_DNS servers.
>
> [Med] That's one approach. The one we have in the draft is to enforce a policy at the responder side:
>
>      The behavior of the responder if it receives both ENCDNS_IP* and
>      INTERNAL_IP6_DNS (or INTERNAL_IP4_DNS) attributes is policy-based
>      and deployment-specific.  However, it is RECOMMENDED that if the
>      responder includes at least one ENCDNS_IP* attribute in the reply,
>      it should not include any of INTERNAL_IP4_DNS/INTERNAL_IP6_DNS
>      attributes.
>
> This policy allows for more control vs. providing both to the client + let the client decide.

The client can just omit asking for ENCDNS_IP* to get INTERNAL_IP*_DNS
anyway. I don't think the policy should be encoded in how we return
Configuration Payload information. If you want to convey policy, you
should make it part of the CFG payload.

> This is an item for discussion/agreement when the document is adopted. Point recorded. Thanks.

We don't need to wait for adoption to discuss this. Others can chime in any time :)

Paul


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From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
To: Valery Smyslov <smyslov.ietf@gmail.com>
cc: 'Paul Wouters' <paul.wouters=40aiven.io@dmarc.ietf.org>,  'Tero Kivinen' <kivinen@iki.fi>, ipsec@ietf.org,  "'Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer)'" <sfluhrer=40cisco.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] Comments on draft-smyslov-ipsecme-ikev2-auth-announce
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On Tue, 9 Nov 2021, Valery Smyslov wrote:

> We can use AlgorithmIdentifier, so no new registry is needed.

Ah sorry, it does state that indeed. Although we might almost want to
not support non-RFC7427 "legacy" methods. Then again, if all software
updated and be RFC compliant, we wouldn't need this to begin with :)

> But there is a trade off, so this can be discussed if the draft is adopted.
>
>> The RSS-v1.5 vs RSS-PSS is a major pain right now, and implementations
>> using 7425 and specifying RSA-v1.5 SHA1 are a double pain as the RFCs
>> clearly doesn't allow that. We run into frequent interop issues with
>> these.
>
> That what this draft tries to address.

If that is the most prominent use case, then I'd rather push to fix the
implementations that dont comply to RFC 8247's:

3.2.  Digital Signature Recommendations

    When a Digital Signature authentication method is implemented, the
    following recommendations are applied for hash functions:

                +--------+-------------+----------+---------+
                | Number | Description | Status   | Comment |
                +--------+-------------+----------+---------+
                | 1      | SHA1        | MUST NOT |         |
                | 2      | SHA2-256    | MUST     |         |
                | 3      | SHA2-384    | MAY      |         |
                | 4      | SHA2-512    | SHOULD   |         |
                +--------+-------------+----------+---------+

    When the Digital Signature authentication method is used with RSA
    signature algorithm, RSASSA-PSS MUST be supported and RSASSA-
    PKCS1-v1.5 MAY be supported.

The problem is receiving RSA-v1.5-SHA1 or RSA-PSS-SHA1 in Digital
Signatures. These are MUST NOT. I am not sure this document would
help here, as our implementation still will refuse these, even
if we are notified of this earlier.

I also still believe that "supported" is the wrong concept here. We are
really looking for "accepted".

As I said in the meeting, it becomes really tricky for the responder. It
can select a better configuration in IKE_SA_INIT based on the initiator's
information, but it is not really helping the initiator choose between
which algorithms to use as it can't really get information from the
responder in time to make a decision in IKE_AUTH unless it sent its ID
in IKE_SA_INIT in which case the responder might be able to switch to
a better configuration profile in time and share accepted authentication
methods. But I guess it won't hurt trying to get more information
across.

Paul


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From: <mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>
To: Paul Wouters <paul.wouters@aiven.io>
CC: "ipsec@ietf.org" <ipsec@ietf.org>, "draft-btw-add-ipsecme-ike@ietf.org" <draft-btw-add-ipsecme-ike@ietf.org>, Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>
Thread-Topic: [IPsec] WG Adoption call for draft-btw-add-ipsecme-ike
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] WG Adoption call for draft-btw-add-ipsecme-ike
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Hi Paul,=20

Please see inline.=20

Cheers,
Med

> -----Message d'origine-----
> De=A0: Paul Wouters <paul.wouters@aiven.io>
> Envoy=E9=A0: mercredi 10 novembre 2021 01:20
> =C0=A0: BOUCADAIR Mohamed INNOV/NET <mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>
> Cc=A0: ipsec@ietf.org; draft-btw-add-ipsecme-ike@ietf.org; Tero Kivinen
> <kivinen@iki.fi>
> Objet=A0: Re: [IPsec] WG Adoption call for draft-btw-add-ipsecme-ike
>=20
> On Tue, 9 Nov 2021, mohamed.boucadair@orange.com wrote:
>=20
> >> Note that what I said there was that you should not update the
> >> _mechanism_ of how CFG requests/responds are done. You should use the
> >> existing mechanism with a new value, but use the same negotation
> mechanism.
> >>
> >> So the client sends FOO(x) and the server respones with FOO(y)
> >>
> >> x can be empty (eg the client has no previous notion or preference
> >> for FOO. Or if it has one, it can suggest it. The server takes that
> >> value only as a preference of the client, but the server is the one
> >> making the ultimate decsion if it returns "x" or "y".
> >>
> >> So your draft should not say the initiator MUST send a zero size
> >> request for FOO.
> >
> > [Med] We are not saying that in the draft.
>=20
> Section 3.1 states:
>=20
> o  Length (2 octets, unsigned integer) - Length of the data in
>        octets.  In particular, this field is set to:
>=20
>        *  0 if the Configuration payload has types CFG_REQUEST or
>           CFG_ACK.
>=20
>=20
> So it says for a CFG_REQUEST the length is 0.

[Med] This is the length of the ENCDNS_IP* attribute. This is used in reque=
sts to indicate that the client is requesting this attribute.=20

>=20
> > That is changing the mechanism.
> >>
> >> What I was saying in my last email was that making a protocol update
> >> where a server receiving a INTERNAL_IP4_DNS may choose not to return
> >> any INTERNAL_IP4_DNS is an update to the protocol that would require
> >> the
> >> Updates: clause to warn implementers to read this document too, as it
> >> updates older RFC text.
> >
> > [Med] OK.
>=20
> But note that I rather that the responder just responds to the received
> CFG requests with CFG replies it supports and has data for. So if the
> client asks for INTERNAL_IP4_DNS and ENCDNS_IP4, the responder should
> return both with values. I also think that in case the encrypted DNS
> fails, it would be good for the IKEv2 client to have the INTERNAL_IP4_DNS
> as fallback option. Say if the TLS fails for some reason (incompatible
> algorithms, expired TLS certificate, DoH server down, etc)

[Med] The current version allows somehow for this as the behavior is policy=
-based. However, I understand that you prefer to systematically return both=
 and leave the client decide. I can live with this as well.



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Date: Wed, 10 Nov 2021 09:10:48 +0100
From: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
To: "Bottorff, Paul" <paul.bottorff@hpe.com>
CC: Paul Wouters <paul.wouters=40aiven.io@dmarc.ietf.org>, "Panwei (William)" <william.panwei@huawei.com>, "ipsec@ietf.org" <ipsec@ietf.org>, "draft-pwouters-ipsecme-multi-sa-performance@ietf.org" <draft-pwouters-ipsecme-multi-sa-performance@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] Comments on draft-pwouters-multi-sa-performance
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Hi Paul, 

I think our draft is a better solution for the network multipath problem too, definitely for a few per Path SAs. Larger number of paths, say 32 or more paths, may cause scaling issues in SPD or/and SAD lookup; the data path lookup. However, data path lookup speed would depend on the implementation. Creating a SA per path would decrease chance out of order delivery, ESP sequence number issues will be minimal.

To create per path SA the IKE negotiations would be like the current draft, perCPU. The SAD/SPD lookup code path will differ from the prototype code we have for Linux/XFRM. The multi path will be a property of SPD. Use the multip path attribute to lookup in SAD.  Each SA can be created dynamically based on traffic; actually path. First, create the Fallback SA and install the policy with the new flag, perPath SADB_ACQUIRE flag. And when there is traffic and no SA matching packet's path, the policy should trigger an SADB_ACQUIRE and IKE negotiation follows.  After a successful IKE negotiation install the new per Path SA. While IKE negotiates the path SA, use the Fallback SA. So there won’t be any packet drop.

I am working on a draft, how to deal with UDP encapsulation. Each SA with a different UDP port. My idea is to make UDP encapsulated IPsec SA a pair of SAs. IKE negotiator will choose source port. In one direction source port will change and in the other direction destination port will change, based on path entropy. This solution is generic and will work with the common NAT gateways. With a limitation, IKE peer which is not behind NAT must initiate new SA. 

RSS/ntuple would use UDP source port plus destination port for entropy. Would this work for network switches/routers along the path? My guess it will!

Are you seeing out of order delivery because ESP packets take of multiple paths or at the sender? I noticed multiple CPU ESP sender can send the packets out of order. I think if you install an SA per path, out-of-order issues due paths will be resolved. There may be corner cases when there are multiple CPUs and multiple paths. In those cases, you may need CPU x paths SAs. CPU x Paths SAs will add lookup complexity. Out of order sending and delivery seems to be a problem with multiple CPUs on the sender. Even with IPsec offload NICs in Linux out of order sending could be an issue. Using per-CPU would reduce it considerably.

 

On Wed, Nov 10, 2021 at 08:32:13AM +0100, Antony Antony wrote:
> Hi Paul,
> 
> I think our draft is a better solution for the network multipath problem, definitely for small number of per Path SAs. Larger number of paths, say 16 or more paths, may cause scaling issues in SPD or/and SAD lookup; the data path. However, data path lookup speed would depend on the implementation.
> Creating an SA per path would increase chance in order delivery, ESP sequence number issues will be minimal.
> 
> To create per path SA the IKE negotiations would be similar to current draft, perCPU. The SAD/SPD code path will be different from the prototype we have for Linux/XFRM. The path will be a property of SPD. When looking up SAD use the path attribute and the correct SA will be used.
> 
> Each SA can be created dynamically if and when necessary. First create
> the Fallback SA and install the policy with new flag, per-Path SADB_ACQUIRE flag.
> And when there is traffic and no SA matching per path SAD  entry, the
> policy should trigger IKE negotiations and install a new per Path SA.
> While per path SA is negotiated use the Fallback SA. So there won't be
> any packet drop.
> 
> I am working a draft, how to deal with UDP encapsulation.  Each SA with different UDP port.
> My idea is make UDP encapsulated IPsec SA a pair of SAs. In one direction source port will change and in the other direction destination port will change based on path entropy. This solution is generic and will work with the common NAT gateways too.
> RSS/ntuple would use source port plus destination port for entropy.
> Would this work for network switches/routers along the path?
> 
> Are you seeing out of order delivery because ESP packets take of multiple paths or multiple CPUs on the ESP sender? 
> I think if you install an SA per path, out of order issues due to path
> will mostly solved. There may be corner cases when there are multiple CPUs
> and multiple paths. In those cases you may need CPU x paths SAs.
> CPU x Paths SAs will add lookup complexity. I have no operational experience yet.
> Out of order delivery/sending seems to be a problem when there are multiple CPUs on the sender.  Even when using IPsec offload NICs in Linux. Using per-CPU would reduce it considerably.
> 
> 
> -antony
> 
> On Fri, Nov 05, 2021 at 21:39:05 +0000, Bottorff, Paul wrote:
> > Hi Paul:
> > 
> > I've reviewed your draft to determine if it is viable as a solution to the network multi-pathing problems I've been investigation. Though I have no objection to your solution for multi-cpu balancing, it does not seem to provide a reasonable alternative to draft-xu-ipsecme-esp-in-udp-lb-08 for network multi-pathing. Hopefully, we can move forward with draft-xu-ipsecme-esp-in-udp-lb-08 for network multi-pathing. We currently have it implemented and working quite successfully in our smart NICs.
> > 
> > For network multi-pathing within a highly meshed data center we want to be able to create an identifier for every flow to allow the network to perform load balancing algorithms which measure the load on links and dynamically shift flows to achieve balance (rather than balancing the number of flows on links). For a typical big server we would expect 100s of flows and for a network middle box we would expect 1000s. The amount of state required to carry independent SA state for each of these is troublesome.
> > 
> > Further, to use the additional SAs we would need to dynamically generate new identical SAs based on a current flow table which will result in startup delays for new flows as we establish the new SA.
> > 
> > Finally, even though some of the switches some of the time could add the SPI into their hash for IPsec packets (and use a different hash for other packets), this feature is not available universally across all data center switches and router. Also the standard procedure for existing data center switches, even those that could generate a special hash for SPI, is to use 5 tuple hash as the flow identifier across all packets.
> > 
> > It is true that for network multi-pathing delivery order is only guaranteed per flow, and therefore replay detection must either be disabled or would needed to take this into account re-ordering between flows.
> > 
> > Cheers,
> > 
> > Paul  
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: IPsec [mailto:ipsec-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Paul Wouters
> > Sent: Monday, November 1, 2021 8:27 PM
> > To: Panwei (William) <william.panwei@huawei.com>
> > Cc: ipsec@ietf.org; draft-pwouters-ipsecme-multi-sa-performance@ietf.org
> > Subject: Re: [IPsec] Comments on draft-pwouters-multi-sa-performance
> > 
> > On Fri, 29 Oct 2021, Panwei (William) wrote:
> > 
> > Hi William,
> > 
> > > Subject: [IPsec] Comments on draft-pwouters-multi-sa-performance
> > 
> > > I’ve read the recent version. This is an interesting solution. I think it should be adopted. Below are some comments.
> > 
> > Thnks for reading the draft and giving us feedback!
> > 
> > > 1.
> > > 
> > > The CPU_QUEUES notification value refers to the number of additional
> > > 
> > > resource-specific Child SAs that may be installed for this particular
> > > 
> > > TSi/TSr combination excluding the Fallback Child SA.
> > > 
> > > Is it necessary to limit the amount of additional SAs at the beginning 
> > > while TS_MAX_QUEUE can be used to reject the request of creating 
> > > additional SA at any time? In the virtualization scenario, the new VMs can be launched on-demand, in other words, it may be seen as the number of CPUs isn’t fixed, so maybe limiting the addition SAs at the beginning will damage the flexibility.
> > 
> > The limit is really a very high maximum number and not a very low number exactly matching CPUs. We had that at first, to try and optimize it but there were too many race conditions, eg with rekeying. So if you have a peer with 4 CPUs and a peer with 2 CPUs, you might just want to set the max to 8 or even 12. It is mostly meant to try and avoid doing CREATE_CHILD_SA's that are just doomed to failure anyway. So see it more as a resource cap that a strict physical limitation.
> > 
> > > 2.
> > > 
> > > The CPU_QUEUES notification payload is sent in the IKE_AUTH or
> > > 
> > > CREATE_CHILD_SA Exchange indicating the negotiated Child SA is a
> > > 
> > > Fallback SA.
> > > 
> > > Before additional SAs are created, is there any difference between 
> > > using this first/Fallback SA and using other normal SA? I think there is no difference. So maybe we don’t need to add this notification payload when creating the first SA.
> > 
> > the problem right now is that implementations often will discard an an older identical Child SA for the newest one. So one of the key intentions of the document is for the initiator/responder to clearly negotiate from the start they are going to be using Child SA's with identical Traffic Selectors and they want the older ones to stick around. Also, it is important that there is always 1 fallback Child SA that can be used on any CPU resource. So we really wanted to mark that one very clearly. For instance, if it becomes idle, it should NOT be deleted.
> > 
> > > When the initiator wants
> > > to create an additional SA, it can directly send the request with CPU_QUEUE_INFO notification payload.
> > 
> > It would be good to know from the responder if they support this and if they are willing to do this before doing the CREATE_CHILD_SA. And as I said above, to ensure both parties agree on which Child SA is the "always be present" fallback SA to ensure things like adding a new CPU always results in encrypted packets via the fallback SA.
> > 
> > > There are 3 ways that the
> > > responder may reply: 1) The responder doesn’t support/recognize this 
> > > notification, it will ignore this notification and reply as usual.
> > 
> > But there is no "as usual" for what happens to the older Child SA. Some implementations will allow it, some will only allow it if it has its own IKE SA, and some will just delete the old one. This is the ambiguity we are trying to address with the draft.
> > 
> > > 2) It supports this function and is willing to create the additional 
> > > SA, so it will reply with CPU_QUEUE_INFO notification too. 3) It supports this function, but it isn’t willing to create more additional SAs, so it will reply with TS_MAX_QUEUE.
> > > Therefore, it seems like that CPU_QUEUE_INFO and TS_MAX_QUEUE these 2 
> > > notifications are enough to use, and the draft can be simplified to only use these 2 notifications.
> > 
> > I hope I explained why we think some clear signal has its use. If you take your assumptions to the max, one would need no document at all, as the IKEv2 specification states there can be Child SAs that are duplicates or with overlapping IP ranges, so in theory, nothing is needed.
> > 
> > > 3.
> > > 
> > > Both peers send
> > > 
> > > the preferred minimum number of additional Child SAs to install.
> > > 
> > > First, I think sending the number of additional Child SAs is 
> > > unnecessary. Second, when using “minimum” here my first impression is 
> > > that it means 0, so in order to remove ambiguity I suggest just saying “the preferred number” (if you think sending the number is necessary).
> > 
> > The use of minimum is indicating what the peer needs. A peer with 4 CPUs does not prefer 4, it really prefers as many as the highest number of CPUs of the two peers - within reason. The preference is really a combination of what works best for the combination of the two peers.
> > 
> > Note the minimum is not about the minimum number required for functioning, but the minimum number to get optimum performance.
> > 
> > By indicating the minimum, both sides can pick the highest minimum and then allow a few more (for race conditions during rekeying).
> > 
> > > 4.
> > > 
> > > If a CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange request containing both a CPU_QUEUE_INFO 
> > > and a CPU_QUEUES notification is received, the responder MUST ignore 
> > > the CPU_QUEUE_INFO payload. If a CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange reply is 
> > > received with both CPU_QUEUE_INFO and CPU_QUEUES notifications, the 
> > > initiator MUST ignore the notification that it did not send in the 
> > > request.
> > > 
> > > I think there is ambiguity here. When the initiator sends the 
> > > CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange request containing both a CPU_QUEUE_INFO and 
> > > a CPU_QUEUES notification, and the responder also adds CPU_QUEUE_INFO 
> > > and CPU_QUEUES notifications in the reply, the initiator doesn’t know how to process with this situation, should the initiator ignore the CPU_QUEUE_INFO payload or notify an error to the responder?
> > 
> > We went back and forth on this a couple of times with the authors. We really wanted to keep it as simple as possible but also not be too pedantic. From a protocol point of view, we could say to just return an error like SYNTAX_ERROR, but that would cause the IKE SA and all its working Child SAs to also be torn down, and we wanted to avoid that so bugs in the performance implementation does not result in completely tunnel failures. Hence our phrasing of "just ignore X"
> > on both the initiator and responder.
> > 
> > We agree that a broken initiator with a broken responder leads to something broken. I think specifying how a broken initiator should respond to a broken responder is taking the Postel Principle a step too far? :)
> > 
> > Paul

On Fri, Nov 05, 2021 at 21:39:05 +0000, Bottorff, Paul wrote:
> Hi Paul:
> 
> I've reviewed your draft to determine if it is viable as a solution to the network multi-pathing problems I've been investigation. Though I have no objection to your solution for multi-cpu balancing, it does not seem to provide a reasonable alternative to draft-xu-ipsecme-esp-in-udp-lb-08 for network multi-pathing. Hopefully, we can move forward with draft-xu-ipsecme-esp-in-udp-lb-08 for network multi-pathing. We currently have it implemented and working quite successfully in our smart NICs.
> 
> For network multi-pathing within a highly meshed data center we want to be able to create an identifier for every flow to allow the network to perform load balancing algorithms which measure the load on links and dynamically shift flows to achieve balance (rather than balancing the number of flows on links). For a typical big server we would expect 100s of flows and for a network middle box we would expect 1000s. The amount of state required to carry independent SA state for each of these is troublesome.
> 
> Further, to use the additional SAs we would need to dynamically generate new identical SAs based on a current flow table which will result in startup delays for new flows as we establish the new SA.
> 
> Finally, even though some of the switches some of the time could add the SPI into their hash for IPsec packets (and use a different hash for other packets), this feature is not available universally across all data center switches and router. Also the standard procedure for existing data center switches, even those that could generate a special hash for SPI, is to use 5 tuple hash as the flow identifier across all packets.
> 
> It is true that for network multi-pathing delivery order is only guaranteed per flow, and therefore replay detection must either be disabled or would needed to take this into account re-ordering between flows.
> 
> Cheers,
> 
> Paul  
> 
> 
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: IPsec [mailto:ipsec-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Paul Wouters
> Sent: Monday, November 1, 2021 8:27 PM
> To: Panwei (William) <william.panwei@huawei.com>
> Cc: ipsec@ietf.org; draft-pwouters-ipsecme-multi-sa-performance@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [IPsec] Comments on draft-pwouters-multi-sa-performance
> 
> On Fri, 29 Oct 2021, Panwei (William) wrote:
> 
> Hi William,
> 
> > Subject: [IPsec] Comments on draft-pwouters-multi-sa-performance
> 
> > I’ve read the recent version. This is an interesting solution. I think it should be adopted. Below are some comments.
> 
> Thnks for reading the draft and giving us feedback!
> 
> > 1.
> > 
> > The CPU_QUEUES notification value refers to the number of additional
> > 
> > resource-specific Child SAs that may be installed for this particular
> > 
> > TSi/TSr combination excluding the Fallback Child SA.
> > 
> > Is it necessary to limit the amount of additional SAs at the beginning 
> > while TS_MAX_QUEUE can be used to reject the request of creating 
> > additional SA at any time? In the virtualization scenario, the new VMs can be launched on-demand, in other words, it may be seen as the number of CPUs isn’t fixed, so maybe limiting the addition SAs at the beginning will damage the flexibility.
> 
> The limit is really a very high maximum number and not a very low number exactly matching CPUs. We had that at first, to try and optimize it but there were too many race conditions, eg with rekeying. So if you have a peer with 4 CPUs and a peer with 2 CPUs, you might just want to set the max to 8 or even 12. It is mostly meant to try and avoid doing CREATE_CHILD_SA's that are just doomed to failure anyway. So see it more as a resource cap that a strict physical limitation.
> 
> > 2.
> > 
> > The CPU_QUEUES notification payload is sent in the IKE_AUTH or
> > 
> > CREATE_CHILD_SA Exchange indicating the negotiated Child SA is a
> > 
> > Fallback SA.
> > 
> > Before additional SAs are created, is there any difference between 
> > using this first/Fallback SA and using other normal SA? I think there is no difference. So maybe we don’t need to add this notification payload when creating the first SA.
> 
> the problem right now is that implementations often will discard an an older identical Child SA for the newest one. So one of the key intentions of the document is for the initiator/responder to clearly negotiate from the start they are going to be using Child SA's with identical Traffic Selectors and they want the older ones to stick around. Also, it is important that there is always 1 fallback Child SA that can be used on any CPU resource. So we really wanted to mark that one very clearly. For instance, if it becomes idle, it should NOT be deleted.
> 
> > When the initiator wants
> > to create an additional SA, it can directly send the request with CPU_QUEUE_INFO notification payload.
> 
> It would be good to know from the responder if they support this and if they are willing to do this before doing the CREATE_CHILD_SA. And as I said above, to ensure both parties agree on which Child SA is the "always be present" fallback SA to ensure things like adding a new CPU always results in encrypted packets via the fallback SA.
> 
> > There are 3 ways that the
> > responder may reply: 1) The responder doesn’t support/recognize this 
> > notification, it will ignore this notification and reply as usual.
> 
> But there is no "as usual" for what happens to the older Child SA. Some implementations will allow it, some will only allow it if it has its own IKE SA, and some will just delete the old one. This is the ambiguity we are trying to address with the draft.
> 
> > 2) It supports this function and is willing to create the additional 
> > SA, so it will reply with CPU_QUEUE_INFO notification too. 3) It supports this function, but it isn’t willing to create more additional SAs, so it will reply with TS_MAX_QUEUE.
> > Therefore, it seems like that CPU_QUEUE_INFO and TS_MAX_QUEUE these 2 
> > notifications are enough to use, and the draft can be simplified to only use these 2 notifications.
> 
> I hope I explained why we think some clear signal has its use. If you take your assumptions to the max, one would need no document at all, as the IKEv2 specification states there can be Child SAs that are duplicates or with overlapping IP ranges, so in theory, nothing is needed.
> 
> > 3.
> > 
> > Both peers send
> > 
> > the preferred minimum number of additional Child SAs to install.
> > 
> > First, I think sending the number of additional Child SAs is 
> > unnecessary. Second, when using “minimum” here my first impression is 
> > that it means 0, so in order to remove ambiguity I suggest just saying “the preferred number” (if you think sending the number is necessary).
> 
> The use of minimum is indicating what the peer needs. A peer with 4 CPUs does not prefer 4, it really prefers as many as the highest number of CPUs of the two peers - within reason. The preference is really a combination of what works best for the combination of the two peers.
> 
> Note the minimum is not about the minimum number required for functioning, but the minimum number to get optimum performance.
> 
> By indicating the minimum, both sides can pick the highest minimum and then allow a few more (for race conditions during rekeying).
> 
> > 4.
> > 
> > If a CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange request containing both a CPU_QUEUE_INFO 
> > and a CPU_QUEUES notification is received, the responder MUST ignore 
> > the CPU_QUEUE_INFO payload. If a CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange reply is 
> > received with both CPU_QUEUE_INFO and CPU_QUEUES notifications, the 
> > initiator MUST ignore the notification that it did not send in the 
> > request.
> > 
> > I think there is ambiguity here. When the initiator sends the 
> > CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange request containing both a CPU_QUEUE_INFO and 
> > a CPU_QUEUES notification, and the responder also adds CPU_QUEUE_INFO 
> > and CPU_QUEUES notifications in the reply, the initiator doesn’t know how to process with this situation, should the initiator ignore the CPU_QUEUE_INFO payload or notify an error to the responder?
> 
> We went back and forth on this a couple of times with the authors. We really wanted to keep it as simple as possible but also not be too pedantic. From a protocol point of view, we could say to just return an error like SYNTAX_ERROR, but that would cause the IKE SA and all its working Child SAs to also be torn down, and we wanted to avoid that so bugs in the performance implementation does not result in completely tunnel failures. Hence our phrasing of "just ignore X"
> on both the initiator and responder.
> 
> We agree that a broken initiator with a broken responder leads to something broken. I think specifying how a broken initiator should respond to a broken responder is taking the Postel Principle a step too far? :)
> 
> Paul


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From: tirumal reddy <kondtir@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 2021 15:10:49 +0530
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] WG Adoption call for draft-btw-add-ipsecme-ike
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I support adoption of the draft.


-Tiru


On Mon, 8 Nov 2021 at 19:58, <mohamed.boucadair@orange.com> wrote:

> Hi Tero, all,
>
> I support adoption.
>
> FWIW, I'm not aware of any IPR related to this I-D.
>
> Cheers,
> Med
>
> > -----Message d'origine-----
> > De : IPsec <ipsec-bounces@ietf.org> De la part de Tero Kivinen
> > Envoy=C3=A9 : lundi 8 novembre 2021 15:17
> > =C3=80 : ipsec@ietf.org
> > Objet : [IPsec] WG Adoption call for draft-btw-add-ipsecme-ike
> >
> > This is the start of 2 week WG adoption call for this document, ending
> > 2021-11-22. Please send your reply about whether you support adopting
> this
> > document as WG document or not.
> > --
> > kivinen@iki.fi
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > IPsec mailing list
> > IPsec@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec
>
>
> _________________________________________________________________________=
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><p class=3D"gmail-MsoPlainText" style=3D"=
margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif">I support adoptio=
n of the draft.</p><p class=3D"gmail-MsoPlainText" style=3D"margin:0in;font=
-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><br></p><p class=3D"gmail-MsoPla=
inText" style=3D"margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif">=
-Tiru</p><p class=3D"gmail-MsoPlainText" style=3D"margin:0in;font-size:11pt=
;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><br></p></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><=
div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, 8 Nov 2021 at 19:58, &lt;<a hr=
ef=3D"mailto:mohamed.boucadair@orange.com">mohamed.boucadair@orange.com</a>=
&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px =
0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Hi T=
ero, all, <br>
<br>
I support adoption. <br>
<br>
FWIW, I&#39;m not aware of any IPR related to this I-D.<br>
<br>
Cheers,<br>
Med<br>
<br>
&gt; -----Message d&#39;origine-----<br>
&gt; De=C2=A0: IPsec &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ipsec-bounces@ietf.org" target=
=3D"_blank">ipsec-bounces@ietf.org</a>&gt; De la part de Tero Kivinen<br>
&gt; Envoy=C3=A9=C2=A0: lundi 8 novembre 2021 15:17<br>
&gt; =C3=80=C2=A0: <a href=3D"mailto:ipsec@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">ipse=
c@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; Objet=C2=A0: [IPsec] WG Adoption call for draft-btw-add-ipsecme-ike<br=
>
&gt; <br>
&gt; This is the start of 2 week WG adoption call for this document, ending=
<br>
&gt; 2021-11-22. Please send your reply about whether you support adopting =
this<br>
&gt; document as WG document or not.<br>
&gt; --<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:kivinen@iki.fi" target=3D"_blank">kivinen@iki.fi</a>=
<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; IPsec mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:IPsec@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">IPsec@ietf.org</a>=
<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec" rel=3D"norefer=
rer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec</a><br>
<br>
___________________________________________________________________________=
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From: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
To: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>, Valery Smyslov <smyslov.ietf@gmail.com>, ipsec@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] Cost-efficient quantum-resistant DoS protection
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Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
    >>> Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi> wrote:
    >>>>> Even without surpassing the 64KB limit, this must be a concern.
    >>>>> IKEv2's cookie mechanism and puzzles try to increase the cost of =
the
    >>>>> attacker per each connection. Now, an attacker must still accept
    >>>>> these costs but can use one connection to trigger several key
    >>>>> exchanges, all significantly larger than what we had with DH, mak=
ing
    >>>>> the trade-off way better for them compared to non-pqc IKEv2.
    >>>
    >>>> No it cannot. Attacker can use cookie only once, and will only get=
 one
    >>>> exchange created by each cookie exchange, thus it needs to do puzz=
les
    >>>> and cookies again for every single attack packet it wants to send.
    >>>
    >>> I wonder if anyone has any stats on how often cookie challenge is u=
sed, how
    >>> often puzzles are invoked.
    >>
    >> I've implemented puzzles, but I'm not aware of any other implementat=
ion.
    >>
    >> What about cookies - in stress tests they are used very intensively.
    >> But I don't have any real life stats for them.
    >>
    >> Regards,
    >> Valery.

    > I also implemented puzzles. So that makes two of us.

Did you ever interop?

What is your criteria for enabling them?  Do you do this automatically, or =
is
it an operator configuation to demand them?

=2D-
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>   . o O ( IPv6 I=C3=B8T consulti=
ng )
           Sandelman Software Works Inc, Ottawa and Worldwide

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Valery Smyslov <smyslov.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
    >> I wonder about keeping more of the original authors on the new
    >> document, since it is substantively the same document.  I can not
    >> judge what their contribution was to the original document, nor do I
    >> know if they were asked.  If the design team has gone through this
    >> consideration, then that's enough for me.

    > All three original authors were asked to co-author the draft.  Tommy
    > agreed, but no reply was received from Samy and Ravi.  I cannot judge
    > their contribution to the original rfc, but I think that it's a good
    > idea to add them to acknowledgement section anyway. Will do this.

Glad to hear you had that discussion. My issue is closed :-)

Please consider using the xml-v3 contributor mechanism.
If you are using Kramdown, then it's just like the author: section, but you
say "contributor:"

--
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works
 -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-




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To: mohamed.boucadair@orange.com
cc: Paul Wouters <paul.wouters@aiven.io>, "ipsec@ietf.org" <ipsec@ietf.org>,  "draft-btw-add-ipsecme-ike@ietf.org" <draft-btw-add-ipsecme-ike@ietf.org>,  Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] WG Adoption call for draft-btw-add-ipsecme-ike
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On Wed, 10 Nov 2021, mohamed.boucadair@orange.com wrote:

>>>> So the client sends FOO(x) and the server respones with FOO(y)
>>>>
>>>> x can be empty (eg the client has no previous notion or preference
>>>> for FOO. Or if it has one, it can suggest it. The server takes that
>>>> value only as a preference of the client, but the server is the one
>>>> making the ultimate decsion if it returns "x" or "y".
>>>>
>>>> So your draft should not say the initiator MUST send a zero size
>>>> request for FOO.
>>>
>>> [Med] We are not saying that in the draft.
>>
>> Section 3.1 states:
>>
>> o  Length (2 octets, unsigned integer) - Length of the data in
>>        octets.  In particular, this field is set to:
>>
>>        *  0 if the Configuration payload has types CFG_REQUEST or
>>           CFG_ACK.
>>
>>
>> So it says for a CFG_REQUEST the length is 0.
>
> [Med] This is the length of the ENCDNS_IP* attribute. This is used in requests to indicate that the client is requesting this attribute.

https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7296#section-3.15.1

    The CFG_REQUEST and CFG_REPLY pair allows an IKE endpoint to request
    information from its peer.  If an attribute in the CFG_REQUEST
    Configuration payload is not zero-length, it is taken as a suggestion
    for that attribute.  The CFG_REPLY Configuration payload MAY return
    that value, or a new one.  It MAY also add new attributes and not
    include some requested ones.  Unrecognized or unsupported attributes
    MUST be ignored in both requests and responses.

I see no reason why ENCDNS_IP* should do this differently from all the
other CFG attributes, especially INTERNAL_IP*_DNS.


>> But note that I rather that the responder just responds to the received
>> CFG requests with CFG replies it supports and has data for. So if the
>> client asks for INTERNAL_IP4_DNS and ENCDNS_IP4, the responder should
>> return both with values. I also think that in case the encrypted DNS
>> fails, it would be good for the IKEv2 client to have the INTERNAL_IP4_DNS
>> as fallback option. Say if the TLS fails for some reason (incompatible
>> algorithms, expired TLS certificate, DoH server down, etc)
>
> [Med] The current version allows somehow for this as the behavior is policy-based. However, I understand that you prefer to systematically return both and leave the client decide. I can live with this as well.

The policy can be enforced by not returning INTERNAL_IP*_DNS payloads in
the CFG_REPLY. Although if the client did not ask for ENCDNS_IP* and the
server does not return INTERNAL_IP*_DNS, the client would not be able
to get functional DNS.

I still believe the CFG mechanism is to exchange network topology
information, and not network policy. But you can (ab)use it for that
if you want. The protocol allows it without requiring the change
that you suggest that the sender MUST use 0 length. And this requirement
would force your policy onto everyone else who would be happy to let
the client suggest something (eg 8.8.8.8 or 9.9.9.9) and have the
responder maybe accept those as trustworthy.

In short, if this document just defines standard CFG REQUEST/REPLY for
ENCDNS_IP* with no additional restrictions, everyone's use case is
supported AND you don't have to Update: RFC 7296 because no existing
behaviour is changed.

Paul


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    > This is the start of 2 week WG adoption call for this document, ending
    > 2021-11-22. Please send your reply about whether you support adopting
    > this document as WG document or not.

I have browsed through the document.

I don't know if the mechanism is correct or not.
I think that Paul Wouters' email seems correct to me.

I think that there is an interaction with provisioning domains (PvD) which =
is
not spelled out.=20=20
The remote access "VPN" is usually a provisioning domain these days.

In general, I don't think that split-DNS is a good thing.
I don't think that sending all traffic through the VPN is a good thing.
Almost everyone that I know, that has any kind of VPN, has more than one
potentially active at the same time. (but my friends are mostly consultants
like me).

So I object to the entire notion that we need to do anything at all: there
are way better solutions than split-dns, and I think we should stop panderi=
ng
to enterprises that live in the dark-ages of 1992 IPv4.  Do any of them
actually pay to upgrade/replace their VPN gateway boxes such that they'd ac=
tually get
this new code?   Are the split-dns or die enthusiasts running IKEv1 w/3DES+=
MD5?

Having said this, I do not object to the WG doing this work, but I won't be
taking time to review it.

=2D-=20
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works
 -=3D IPv6 IoT consulting =3D-




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From: "Valery Smyslov" <smyslov.ietf@gmail.com>
To: "'Michael Richardson'" <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>, <ipsec@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] WGLC for draft-ietf-ipsecme-rfc8229bis
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Hi Michael,

>     > All three original authors were asked to co-author the draft.  Tommy
>     > agreed, but no reply was received from Samy and Ravi.  I cannot judge
>     > their contribution to the original rfc, but I think that it's a good
>     > idea to add them to acknowledgement section anyway. Will do this.
> 
> Glad to hear you had that discussion. My issue is closed :-)
> 
> Please consider using the xml-v3 contributor mechanism.
> If you are using Kramdown, then it's just like the author: section, but you
> say "contributor:"

We don't use neither xml-v3 (yet) nor Kramdown. The text Tommy and I have added
to the document is placed in Acknowledgements Section:

https://github.com/smyslov/rfc8229bis/pull/6/files

Let us know if the text is insufficient from your opinion.

Thank you,
Valery.

> --
> Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works
>  -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-
> 
> 



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From: "Valery Smyslov" <smyslov.ietf@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] WG adoption call for draft-smyslov-ipsecme-ikev2-auth-announce
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Hi,

FWIW, as an author I (obviously) support adoption.

Regards,
Valery.

> This is the start of 2 week WG adoption call for this document, ending
> 2021-11-22. Please send your reply about whether you support adopting
> this document as WG document or not.
> --
> kivinen@iki.fi
> 
> _______________________________________________
> IPsec mailing list
> IPsec@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec


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From: "Valery Smyslov" <smyslov.ietf@gmail.com>
To: "'Tero Kivinen'" <kivinen@iki.fi>, <ipsec@ietf.org>
References: <24969.12660.103330.619294@fireball.acr.fi>
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Date: Thu, 11 Nov 2021 09:15:26 +0300
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] WG Adoption call for draft-btw-add-ipsecme-ike
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HI,

Just for the record: as a co-author I (obviously) support adoption or this document.

Regards,
Valery.

> This is the start of 2 week WG adoption call for this document, ending
> 2021-11-22. Please send your reply about whether you support adopting
> this document as WG document or not.
> --
> kivinen@iki.fi
> 
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From: "Valery Smyslov" <smyslov.ietf@gmail.com>
To: "IPsecME WG" <ipsec@ietf.org>
Cc: "'Tobias Brunner'" <tobias@strongswan.org>
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 2021 10:36:55 +0300
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Subject: [IPsec] Potential issue with draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-intermediate
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Hi,

I have had off the list discussion with Tobias Brunner and he has pointed out to one potential issue
with draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-intermediate. Currently the authentication of IKE_INTERMEDIATE 
exchanges is performed as follows:

   InitiatorSignedOctets = RealMsg1 | NonceRData | MACedIDForI | IntAuth
   ResponderSignedOctets = RealMsg2 | NonceIData | MACedIDForR | IntAuth

   IntAuth =  IntAuth_1 [| IntAuth_2 [| IntAuth_3 ... ]]

   IntAuth_1 = IntAuth_1_I | IntAuth_1_R
   IntAuth_2 = IntAuth_2_I | IntAuth_2_R
   IntAuth_3 = IntAuth_3_I | IntAuth_3_R
   ...

   IntAuth_1_I = prf(SK_pi_1, IntAuth_1_I_A [| IntAuth_1_I_P])
   IntAuth_2_I = prf(SK_pi_2, IntAuth_2_I_A [| IntAuth_2_I_P])
   IntAuth_3_I = prf(SK_pi_3, IntAuth_3_I_A [| IntAuth_3_I_P])
   ...

   IntAuth_1_R = prf(SK_pr_1, IntAuth_1_R_A [| IntAuth_1_R_P])
   IntAuth_2_R = prf(SK_pr_2, IntAuth_2_R_A [| IntAuth_2_R_P])
   IntAuth_3_R = prf(SK_pr_3, IntAuth_3_R_A [| IntAuth_3_R_P])
   ...

So, a new blob IntAuth is added to signature or MAC calculation.
Note, that the size of IntAuth blob depends on the number of IKE_INTERMEDIATE 
exchanges that took place: each IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange increases it by the 
2x <size of prf>. 

The potential problem with this scheme that Tobias pointed out to is that
if the number of IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchanges is controlled by the initiator
(this is not true for draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-multiple-ke, but may be true for 
other applications of IKE_INTERMEDIATE), then malicious initiator
may mount a memory exhaustion attack on responder by performing a large number
of IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchanges. 

Besides this attack (which is more a theoretical concern, since the size of prf is pretty 
small and the number of IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchanges will not be counted by 
thousands or even hundreds in any case), the inconvenience of the current scheme for 
the responder is that in case it uses some HSM with limited internal storage 
for storing intermediate IntAuth_* and it doesn't know beforehand the number 
of IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchanges (again, this is not true for draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-multiple-ke, 
but may be true for other applications of IKE_INTERMEDIATE), then the internal resources
of this HSM will be wasted. Again, this is more a theoretical concern, since 
IntAuth_* are not secret and can pe pulled from HSM and stored in main memory.

The bottom line. The problem that IntAuth is growing with each IKE_INTERMEDIATE
exchange do exist, but in my opinion, the potential bad consequences from it 
are mostly theoretical. That said, we can fix this problem by re-defining the
IntAuth calculation as follows (the scheme suggested by Tobias):

 InitiatorSignedOctets = RealMsg1 | NonceRData | MACedIDForI | IntAuth
ResponderSignedOctets = RealMsg2 | NonceIData | MACedIDForR | IntAuth
 
IntAuth =  IntAuth_N_I | IntAuth_N_R
 
IntAuth_1_I = prf(SK_pi_1, IntAuth_1_I_A [| IntAuth_1_I_P])
IntAuth_2_I = prf(SK_pi_2, IntAuth_1_I | IntAuth_2_I_A [| IntAuth_2_I_P])
IntAuth_3_I = prf(SK_pi_3, IntAuth_2_I | IntAuth_3_I_A [| IntAuth_3_I_P])
...
IntAuth_N_I = prf(SK_pi_N, IntAuth_N-1_I | IntAuth_N_I_A [| IntAuth_N_I_P])
 
IntAuth_1_R = prf(SK_pr_1, IntAuth_1_R_A [| IntAuth_1_R_P])
IntAuth_2_R = prf(SK_pr_2, IntAuth_1_R | IntAuth_2_R_A [| IntAuth_2_R_P])
IntAuth_3_R = prf(SK_pr_3, IntAuth_2_R | IntAuth_3_R_A [| IntAuth_3_R_P])
...
IntAuth_N_R = prf(SK_pr_N, IntAuth_N-1_R | IntAuth_N_R_A [| IntAuth_N_R_P])

This will make the size of IntAuth blob constant regardless of the number of 
performed IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchanges.

The draft draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-intermediate has passed WGLC and is now 
waiting for AD review. There are few interoperable implementations,
but none are used in production yet (to my best knowledge).

So, the question to the WG is - what should we do with this:

1. Re-define calculation of IntAuth to make it constant in size.
     This will most probably require another WGLC and will break
     interoperablity of existing products. The latter seems not so 
     important (no product has been released yet), but the former 
     may delay publication process.

2. Leave calculation of IntAuth as is and add some text to the
    Security Considerations section that describes potential 
    problems and makes advise to the responder (e.g.
    limit the number of accepted IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchanges).
    This will not change bits on the wire and hopefully 
    will not require another WGLC.

3. Ignore this issue (do nothing).

Opinions?

Regards,
Valery.


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From: <mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>
To: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
CC: Paul Wouters <paul.wouters@aiven.io>, "ipsec@ietf.org" <ipsec@ietf.org>, "draft-btw-add-ipsecme-ike@ietf.org" <draft-btw-add-ipsecme-ike@ietf.org>, Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>
Thread-Topic: [IPsec] WG Adoption call for draft-btw-add-ipsecme-ike
Thread-Index: AQHX1oGZi4Q33A1l1EiWwu9gm8dljKv+B2Bg
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 2021 09:12:00 +0000
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References: <24969.12660.103330.619294@fireball.acr.fi> <ccdfdc-634-5989-839b-3cbd17e86d99@nohats.ca> <3996_1636386534_618946E6_3996_297_6_787AE7BB302AE849A7480A190F8B93303544BD42@OPEXCAUBMA2.corporate.adroot.infra.ftgroup> <88f8206a-6c2-5816-ada3-e8666ec05e38@nohats.ca> <23906_1636459418_618A639A_23906_93_6_787AE7BB302AE849A7480A190F8B93303544C625@OPEXCAUBMA2.corporate.adroot.infra.ftgroup> <ee27dc52-b8a4-c926-ec0-d8479b3a285@nohats.ca> <19332_1636529432_618B7518_19332_252_1_787AE7BB302AE849A7480A190F8B93303544E768@OPEXCAUBMA2.corporate.adroot.infra.ftgroup> <67dbbdea-5110-90d0-4f6d-df6147a2cf38@nohats.ca>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] WG Adoption call for draft-btw-add-ipsecme-ike
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Hi Paul,

Please see inline.=20

Cheers,
Med


Orange Restricted

> -----Message d'origine-----
> De=A0: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
> Envoy=E9=A0: mercredi 10 novembre 2021 23:24
> =C0=A0: BOUCADAIR Mohamed INNOV/NET <mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>
> Cc=A0: Paul Wouters <paul.wouters@aiven.io>; ipsec@ietf.org; draft-btw-ad=
d-
> ipsecme-ike@ietf.org; Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>
> Objet=A0: Re: [IPsec] WG Adoption call for draft-btw-add-ipsecme-ike
>=20
> On Wed, 10 Nov 2021, mohamed.boucadair@orange.com wrote:
>=20
> >>>> So the client sends FOO(x) and the server respones with FOO(y)
> >>>>
> >>>> x can be empty (eg the client has no previous notion or preference
> >>>> for FOO. Or if it has one, it can suggest it. The server takes that
> >>>> value only as a preference of the client, but the server is the one
> >>>> making the ultimate decsion if it returns "x" or "y".
> >>>>
> >>>> So your draft should not say the initiator MUST send a zero size
> >>>> request for FOO.
> >>>
> >>> [Med] We are not saying that in the draft.
> >>
> >> Section 3.1 states:
> >>
> >> o  Length (2 octets, unsigned integer) - Length of the data in
> >>        octets.  In particular, this field is set to:
> >>
> >>        *  0 if the Configuration payload has types CFG_REQUEST or
> >>           CFG_ACK.
> >>
> >>
> >> So it says for a CFG_REQUEST the length is 0.
> >
> > [Med] This is the length of the ENCDNS_IP* attribute. This is used in
> requests to indicate that the client is requesting this attribute.
>=20
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7296#section-3.15.1
>=20
>     The CFG_REQUEST and CFG_REPLY pair allows an IKE endpoint to request
>     information from its peer.  If an attribute in the CFG_REQUEST
>     Configuration payload is not zero-length, it is taken as a suggestion
>     for that attribute.  The CFG_REPLY Configuration payload MAY return
>     that value, or a new one.  It MAY also add new attributes and not
>     include some requested ones.  Unrecognized or unsupported attributes
>     MUST be ignored in both requests and responses.
>=20
> I see no reason why ENCDNS_IP* should do this differently from all the
> other CFG attributes, especially INTERNAL_IP*_DNS.
>=20

[Med] Zero-length is allowed for other configuration attributes, e.g.,=20

   o  SUPPORTED_ATTRIBUTES - When used within a Request, this attribute
      MUST be zero-length and specifies a query to the responder to
      ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
      reply back with all of the attributes that it supports.

It is also allowed for INTERNAL_IP*_DNS:=20=20

   o  INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS, INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS - An address on the
      internal network, sometimes called a red node address or private
      address, and it MAY be a private address on the Internet.  In a
      request message, the address specified is a requested address (or
      a zero-length address if no specific address is requested).
      ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

We didn't include a suggested ADN/@ in the proposed ENCDNS_IP* for the sake=
 of simplicity. We are open to relax this if the WG sees so.=20

>=20
> >> But note that I rather that the responder just responds to the
> >> received CFG requests with CFG replies it supports and has data for.
> >> So if the client asks for INTERNAL_IP4_DNS and ENCDNS_IP4, the
> >> responder should return both with values. I also think that in case
> >> the encrypted DNS fails, it would be good for the IKEv2 client to
> >> have the INTERNAL_IP4_DNS as fallback option. Say if the TLS fails
> >> for some reason (incompatible algorithms, expired TLS certificate,
> >> DoH server down, etc)
> >
> > [Med] The current version allows somehow for this as the behavior is
> policy-based. However, I understand that you prefer to systematically
> return both and leave the client decide. I can live with this as well.
>=20
> The policy can be enforced by not returning INTERNAL_IP*_DNS payloads in
> the CFG_REPLY. Although if the client did not ask for ENCDNS_IP* and the
> server does not return INTERNAL_IP*_DNS, the client would not be able to
> get functional DNS.
>=20
> I still believe the CFG mechanism is to exchange network topology
> information, and not network policy. But you can (ab)use it for that if
> you want. The protocol allows it without requiring the change that you
> suggest that the sender MUST use 0 length. And this requirement would
> force your policy onto everyone else who would be happy to let the client
> suggest something (eg 8.8.8.8 or 9.9.9.9) and have the responder maybe
> accept those as trustworthy.
>=20
> In short, if this document just defines standard CFG REQUEST/REPLY for
> ENCDNS_IP* with no additional restrictions, everyone's use case is
> supported AND you don't have to Update: RFC 7296 because no existing
> behaviour is changed.

[Med] I still don't see why you think the document updates RFC 7296.=20=20

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From: Tommy Pauly <tpauly@apple.com>
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Date: Thu, 11 Nov 2021 06:07:44 -0800
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To: Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>, ipsec@ietf.org
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ipsec/TJtDkBOQ68q4xoF17bq0UCOveVM>
Subject: Re: [IPsec] WG Adoption call for draft-btw-add-ipsecme-ike
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I support adoption of this work. The mechanism of specifying the =
authentication domain name and service parameters is sound, and the =
right direction.

I do agree with Paul Wouter=E2=80=99s comments, and I think the parts of =
the document that deal with requirements for config requests need work. =
Ideally, this doesn=E2=80=99t need to update split-DNS, but instead just =
reference the fact that the encrypted resolvers MUST always be preferred =
when present.

The text also needs to be careful about not over-mandating behavior. For =
example, the text currently says the following:

   If the IPsec connection is a split-tunnel configuration and the
   initiator negotiated INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN as per [
RFC8598
], the DNS
   client MUST resolve the internal names using ENCDNS_IP* DNS servers.

RFC 8598 has a bit more leeway, explaining that there may be some =
domains that are prohibited by local policy from being claimed by the =
IKE tunnel. This needs to be maintained.

For each INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN entry in a CFG_REPLY payload that is not
   prohibited by local policy, the client MUST use the provided
   INTERNAL_IP4_DNS or INTERNAL_IP6_DNS DNS servers as the only
   resolvers for the listed domains and its subdomains, and it MUST NOT
   attempt to resolve the provided DNS domains using its external DNS
   servers.

Best,
Tommy

> On Nov 8, 2021, at 6:17 AM, Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi> wrote:
>=20
> This is the start of 2 week WG adoption call for this document, ending
> 2021-11-22. Please send your reply about whether you support adopting
> this document as WG document or not.
> --=20
> kivinen@iki.fi
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> IPsec mailing list
> IPsec@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec


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Subject: [IPsec] Potential issue with draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-intermediate
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Valery Smyslov writes:
> So, the question to the WG is - what should we do with this:
> 
> 1. Re-define calculation of IntAuth to make it constant in size.
>      This will most probably require another WGLC and will break
>      interoperablity of existing products. The latter seems not so 
>      important (no product has been released yet), but the former 
>      may delay publication process.
> 
> 2. Leave calculation of IntAuth as is and add some text to the
>     Security Considerations section that describes potential 
>     problems and makes advise to the responder (e.g.
>     limit the number of accepted IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchanges).
>     This will not change bits on the wire and hopefully 
>     will not require another WGLC.

My suggestion (as an individual not as a chair) is to add text to
security considerations section where we point out that
implementations should limit the number of IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchanges
they allow to something sensible, like 10 or so.

These are exchanges we are doing before authentication so limiting the
number of them is something we want to do anyways.
-- 
kivinen@iki.fi


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Thread-Topic: [IPsec] WG Adoption call for draft-btw-add-ipsecme-ike
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Date: Thu, 11 Nov 2021 13:03:18 -0500 (EST)
From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
To: Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>
cc: Valery Smyslov <smyslov.ietf@gmail.com>, IPsecME WG <ipsec@ietf.org>,  'Tobias Brunner' <tobias@strongswan.org>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] Potential issue with draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-intermediate
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On Thu, 11 Nov 2021, Tero Kivinen wrote:

> My suggestion (as an individual not as a chair) is to add text to
> security considerations section where we point out that
> implementations should limit the number of IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchanges
> they allow to something sensible, like 10 or so.
>
> These are exchanges we are doing before authentication so limiting the
> number of them is something we want to do anyways.

I agree.

Note, currently our implementation supports a maximum of 1 :)

Paul


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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the IP Security Maintenance and Extensions WG of the IETF.

        Title           : A YANG Data Model for IP Traffic Flow Security
        Authors         : Don Fedyk
                          Christian Hopps
	Filename        : draft-ietf-ipsecme-yang-iptfs-03.txt
	Pages           : 28
	Date            : 2021-11-11

Abstract:
   This document describes a yang module for the management of IP
   Traffic Flow Security additions to IKEv2 and IPsec.


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        Title           : Definitions of Managed Objects for IP Traffic Flow Security
        Authors         : Don Fedyk
                          Eric Kinzie
	Filename        : draft-ietf-ipsecme-mib-iptfs-01.txt
	Pages           : 20
	Date            : 2021-11-11

Abstract:
   This document describes managed objects for the the management of IP
   Traffic Flow Security additions to IKEv2 and IPsec.  This document
   provides a read only version of the objects defined in the YANG
   module for the same purpose.

   This is an unpublished work in progress.


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From: "Valery Smyslov" <smyslov.ietf@gmail.com>
To: "'Michael Richardson'" <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>, "'Yoav Nir'" <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>, <ipsec@ietf.org>
References: <935923623769463b80caf7b64bfe430a@genua.de> <07a701d7c500$5c3fdcc0$14bf9640$@gmail.com> <994547d5af7a47b2b4819136af4b29fd@EX13D01ANC003.ant.amazon.com> <CANs=h-XU98=XVZ-1YNsp3_W1_Y3p5UgHnOgH-DPXgAQP7GuBmw@mail.gmail.com> <4d3d0181b23048bb9b57f1c97672c1ea@genua.de> <24956.19843.441109.862288@fireball.acr.fi> <27139.1635707097@localhost> <06fe01d7cf10$b966d6f0$2c3484d0$@gmail.com> <969A6112-B9E4-4D29-9077-094E56AEBD1D@gmail.com> <17699.1636555288@localhost>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] Cost-efficient quantum-resistant DoS protection
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Hi Michael,

>     >> I've implemented puzzles, but I'm not aware of any other =
implementation.
>     >>
>     >> What about cookies - in stress tests they are used very =
intensively.
>     >> But I don't have any real life stats for them.
>     >>
>     >> Regards,
>     >> Valery.
>=20
>     > I also implemented puzzles. So that makes two of us.
>=20
> Did you ever interop?

We didn't try, but I think we can do it eventually.

> What is your criteria for enabling them?  Do you do this =
automatically, or is
> it an operator configuation to demand them?

I can only speak for my code. There is a configuration option, that  =
controls the using puzzles. You have the following options:
- turn them off
- always use them in both IKE_SA_INIT and IKE_AUTH when cookie is =
requested=20
  (which happens if the number of half-open SAs exceeds some =
configurable threshold)
- always use them, but only in IKE_SA_INIT, when cookie is requested
- use them only when cookie is requested and some other conditions are =
met=20
   (e.g. you may set a higher threshold for puzzles, than for cookies)

You can also set a difficulty of puzzles. It is statically configured.
>From my experiments there is a really small interval of complexity when =
puzzles
are useful (so that they do require noticeable efforts from initiators =
and still are solved
within reasonable time, e.g. a few seconds). From my recollection
it is between 16-18 bits of complexity.

Regards,
Valery.

> --
> Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>   . o O ( IPv6 I=C3=B8T =
consulting )
>            Sandelman Software Works Inc, Ottawa and Worldwide


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To: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] Cost-efficient quantum-resistant DoS protection
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> On 10 Nov 2021, at 16:41, Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> =
wrote:
>=20
>=20
> Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>> Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi> wrote:
>>>>>> Even without surpassing the 64KB limit, this must be a concern.
>>>>>> IKEv2's cookie mechanism and puzzles try to increase the cost of =
the
>>>>>> attacker per each connection. Now, an attacker must still accept
>>>>>> these costs but can use one connection to trigger several key
>>>>>> exchanges, all significantly larger than what we had with DH, =
making
>>>>>> the trade-off way better for them compared to non-pqc IKEv2.
>>>>=20
>>>>> No it cannot. Attacker can use cookie only once, and will only get =
one
>>>>> exchange created by each cookie exchange, thus it needs to do =
puzzles
>>>>> and cookies again for every single attack packet it wants to send.
>>>>=20
>>>> I wonder if anyone has any stats on how often cookie challenge is =
used, how
>>>> often puzzles are invoked.
>>>=20
>>> I've implemented puzzles, but I'm not aware of any other =
implementation.
>>>=20
>>> What about cookies - in stress tests they are used very intensively.
>>> But I don't have any real life stats for them.
>>>=20
>>> Regards,
>>> Valery.
>=20
>> I also implemented puzzles. So that makes two of us.
>=20
> Did you ever interop?

No. Never got to it.

> What is your criteria for enabling them?  Do you do this =
automatically, or is
> it an operator configuation to demand them?

GUI had three settings: off, cookies, puzzles.  In case of cookies or =
puzzles, they would activate with a certain number of simultaneous IKE =
negotiations in progress.

Because of GUI constraints, that setting had to apply to both IKEv1 and =
IKEv2 (that was s separate set of radio buttons)

Yoav=


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From: Don Fedyk <dfedyk@labn.net>
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ipsec/8OUr84OTNtI3mBok4nqfGDMn_kE>
Subject: [IPsec] IP-TFS YANG and MIB Updated
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Hi

We have updated the IP Traffic Flow Security YANG and MIB drafts to add man=
agement controls that reflect the IP-TFS discussions and changes from the m=
eeting this week.  The updated drafts and the diffs are available at the us=
ual place:

https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-ipsecme-yang-iptfs-03.txt

https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-ipsecme-mib-iptfs-01.txt

As always, comments welcome
Thanks
Don & Authors


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<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Hi<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">We have updated the IP Traffic Flow Security YANG an=
d MIB drafts to add management controls that reflect the IP-TFS discussions=
 and changes from the meeting this week. &nbsp;The updated drafts and the d=
iffs are available at the usual place:
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft=
-ietf-ipsecme-yang-iptfs-03.txt">https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-=
ietf-ipsecme-yang-iptfs-03.txt</a><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft=
-ietf-ipsecme-mib-iptfs-01.txt">https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-i=
etf-ipsecme-mib-iptfs-01.txt</a><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">As always, comments welcome<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Thanks<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Don &amp; Authors<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
</body>
</html>

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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ipsec/knktrxVHOrArB4dQ4OhKgq13KK4>
Subject: Re: [IPsec] I-D Action: draft-ietf-ipsecme-iptfs-12.txt
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Hi Tero,

You said:

On 11/9/2021 5:11 AM, Tero Kivinen wrote:
> I think there is still bit of tweaking that can be done,

Is this tweak being made as a blocking comment by the document Shepherd 
or a non-blocking comment as a contributor?

If it's a blocking comment -- Sure let's make whatever change you want 
(as long as long as the rest of the WG can live with the change/doesn't 
break anything)  so we can get this document out of the WG.

If as contributor -- can you live with the current text?  It would be 
great to get the document set to the IESG as discussed this week.

Thank you!

Lou


From nobody Fri Nov 12 07:21:13 2021
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Date: Fri, 12 Nov 2021 07:20:53 -0800
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: Lou Berger <lberger@labn.net>
Cc: Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>, ipsec@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] I-D Action: draft-ietf-ipsecme-iptfs-12.txt
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On Fri, Nov 12, 2021 at 10:05:05AM -0500, Lou Berger wrote:
> Hi Tero,
> 
> You said:
> 
> On 11/9/2021 5:11 AM, Tero Kivinen wrote:
> > I think there is still bit of tweaking that can be done,
> 
> Is this tweak being made as a blocking comment by the document Shepherd 
> or a non-blocking comment as a contributor?
> 
> If it's a blocking comment -- Sure let's make whatever change you want 
> (as long as long as the rest of the WG can live with the change/doesn't 
> break anything)  so we can get this document out of the WG.

And to follow up, "out of the WG" doesn't mean "done and finalized" --
these are topics that I mostly expect to get more feedback on during the
IETF last call.  So we may want to go forward with what we have and polish
the text with involvement from the broader (e.g., transport) community.

> If as contributor -- can you live with the current text?  It would be 
> great to get the document set to the IESG as discussed this week.

Full disclosure: my queue is a little backed up at the moment, and if I go
in FIFO order it is likely to take a few weeks to clear that.  But that's
not a reason to wait, as there are a couple other documents from other WGs
that are about to enter the queue as well.

-Ben


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From: Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>
To: Don Fedyk <dfedyk@labn.net>
Cc: "ipsec\@ietf.org" <ipsec@ietf.org>
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Subject: [IPsec] IP-TFS YANG and MIB Updated
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Don Fedyk writes:
> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-ipsecme-yang-iptfs-03.txt

While answering the shepherd writeup question "Briefly describe the
review of this document that was perfmed by the Document Shepherd", I
had to read this document too, so here are some of my comments to this
document: 

----------------------------------------------------------------------

         leaf dont-fragment {
           type boolean;
           default "false";
           description
             "Disable packet fragmentation across consecutive iptfs
              tunnel packets";

My understanding this only disables small packet fragmentation between
two outer fragments, i.e., does not disable it when the inner packet
is so big it does not fit on the outer packet?

If so adding text "Inner packets that does not fit to outer packets
will always be fragmented regardless of this setting, but if
dont-fragment is true those fragments do not include any other inner
packets".

Or if it is other way then add text saying "If this is true then inner
packets that are larger than what can be tranmitted in outer packets
will be dropped.".

----------------------------------------------------------------------

I would suggest adding text to some settings telling whether they
affect transmission or receive.

My understanding is that outer-packet-size, tunnel-rate,
dont-fragment, and max-aggregation-time are for transmission end.

window-size, send-immediately and lost-packet-timer-interval are for
the receiver end.

Some of those do have the text that explains this clearly, but some of
them do not. And then there are settings which affect both, i.e., I
think congestion-control is such.

Having clear text whether it affects transmission, reception or both
in description would make things easier to understand.

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Add comment to the lost-packet-timer-interval to say that "If not
using send-immediately then each lost packet will be delayed until
this expires", or something like that.

It is important that adminstrators understand that this will affect
delay visibile through the system.

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Add text to the security considerations section that as IPTFS tries to
hide the traffic flows through the network, then of course to be able
to read yang/mib statistics of the traffic flows is bad idea...

I.e., even read only access to the IPTFS statistics can be used to
find out traffic patterns.

> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-ipsecme-mib-iptfs-01.txt

Same changes than in Yang document is needed here too.

Also remove the last sentence of the abstract, i.e. I do not think
there is no need to say "This is an unpublished work in progress.",
in internet drafts, as they are working documents anyways... 
-- 
kivinen@iki.fi


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Date: Fri, 12 Nov 2021 22:31:07 +0200
From: Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>
To: Lou Berger <lberger@labn.net>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] I-D Action: draft-ietf-ipsecme-iptfs-12.txt
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Lou Berger writes:
> Hi Tero,
>=20
> You said:
>=20
> On 11/9/2021 5:11 AM, Tero Kivinen wrote:
> > I think there is still bit of tweaking that can be done,
>=20
> Is this tweak being made as a blocking comment by the document Shephe=
rd=20
> or a non-blocking comment as a contributor=3F

No. It is just a comment.

> If it's a blocking comment -- Sure let's make whatever change you wan=
t=20
> (as long as long as the rest of the WG can live with the change/doesn=
't=20
> break anything)=A0 so we can get this document out of the WG.

The new version was posted on Monday, I will wait for at least a week t=
o
allow people to read the document and send their comments to list
before I send document forward.

During that time I hope to get the yang and mib documents also in a
shape where they can be put forward at the same time (both of those
documents do have some issues that I noticed during my shepherd
review, and at least the MIB document missing IANA considerations
section is blocking).

> If as contributor -- can you live with the current text=3F=A0 It woul=
d be=20
> great to get the document set to the IESG as discussed this week.

I can live with the current text, I will assume there will be more
comments to this during the IETF last call or IESG review time, but I
will not be sending it to IESG this week, I will do it next week (most
likely on Thursday as I have full schedule (16:00-04:00) on
Monday-Wednesday as IEEE still continues until that).
--=20
kivinen@iki.fi


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Thank you for the summaries.

=2D-
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>   . o O ( IPv6 I=C3=B8T consulti=
ng )
           Sandelman Software Works Inc, Ottawa and Worldwide





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Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi> writes:

> Don Fedyk writes:
>> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-ipsecme-yang-iptfs-03.txt
>
> While answering the shepherd writeup question "Briefly describe the
> review of this document that was perfmed by the Document Shepherd", I
> had to read this document too, so here are some of my comments to this
> document:
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>          leaf dont-fragment {
>            type boolean;
>            default "false";
>            description
>              "Disable packet fragmentation across consecutive iptfs
>               tunnel packets";
>
> My understanding this only disables small packet fragmentation between
> two outer fragments, i.e., does not disable it when the inner packet
> is so big it does not fit on the outer packet?

It means what the description says, which is dont fragment. This option was added early on based on comments from Valery indicating that some simple implementations would not want to support reassembly.

> If so adding text "Inner packets that does not fit to outer packets
> will always be fragmented regardless of this setting, but if
> dont-fragment is true those fragments do not include any other inner
> packets".
>
> Or if it is other way then add text saying "If this is true then inner
> packets that are larger than what can be tranmitted in outer packets
> will be dropped.".

"Disable packet fragmentation across consecutive iptfs tunnel packets; inner packets larger than what can be transmitted in outer packets will be dropped.";

> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> I would suggest adding text to some settings telling whether they
> affect transmission or receive.
>
> My understanding is that outer-packet-size, tunnel-rate,
> dont-fragment, and max-aggregation-time are for transmission end.

Yes.


> window-size, send-immediately and lost-packet-timer-interval are for
> the receiver end.

Right.

> Some of those do have the text that explains this clearly, but some of
> them do not. And then there are settings which affect both, i.e., I
> think congestion-control is such.
>
> Having clear text whether it affects transmission, reception or both
> in description would make things easier to understand.

Seems reasonable to me.

> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Add comment to the lost-packet-timer-interval to say that "If not
> using send-immediately then each lost packet will be delayed until
> this expires", or something like that.
>
> It is important that adminstrators understand that this will affect
> delay visibile through the system.

OK.

> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Add text to the security considerations section that as IPTFS tries to
> hide the traffic flows through the network, then of course to be able
> to read yang/mib statistics of the traffic flows is bad idea...
>
> I.e., even read only access to the IPTFS statistics can be used to
> find out traffic patterns.

Good point.

>> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-ipsecme-mib-iptfs-01.txt
>
> Same changes than in Yang document is needed here too.
>
> Also remove the last sentence of the abstract, i.e. I do not think
> there is no need to say "This is an unpublished work in progress.",
> in internet drafts, as they are working documents anyways...

Thanks,
Chris.

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Date: Sun, 14 Nov 2021 16:31:32 +0200
From: Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>
To: Christian Hopps <chopps@chopps.org>
Cc: Don Fedyk <dfedyk@labn.net>, ipsec@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] IP-TFS YANG and MIB Updated
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Christian Hopps writes:
> > Or if it is other way then add text saying "If this is true then inner
> > packets that are larger than what can be tranmitted in outer packets
> > will be dropped.".
> 
> "Disable packet fragmentation across consecutive iptfs tunnel
> packets; inner packets larger than what can be transmitted in outer
> packets will be dropped.";

That is good. 

> >> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-ipsecme-mib-iptfs-01.txt
> >
> > Same changes than in Yang document is needed here too.
> >
> > Also remove the last sentence of the abstract, i.e. I do not think
> > there is no need to say "This is an unpublished work in progress.",
> > in internet drafts, as they are working documents anyways...

As I sent already in my private email the mib document also needs the
IANA considerations section and splitting references to normative and
informative.

And the Security Considerations section of MIB document needs to use
the MIB security considerations boilerplate as described in
https://trac.ietf.org/trac/ops/wiki/mib-security page.

(Just repeating these important points here so they do not get lost,
as I earlier only sent them to authors).
-- 
kivinen@iki.fi


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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ipsec/ZhEFdvuQ_kE68XuKPNEB5K1fLEA>
Subject: Re: [IPsec] Comments on draft-pwouters-multi-sa-performance
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Thread-Topic: [IPsec] WG adoption call for draft-smyslov-ipsecme-ikev2-auth-announce
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From: "Kampanakis, Panos" <kpanos@amazon.com>
To: Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>, "ipsec@ietf.org" <ipsec@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] WG adoption call for draft-smyslov-ipsecme-ikev2-auth-announce
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I support adoption of this draft.=20



-----Original Message-----
From: IPsec <ipsec-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Tero Kivinen
Sent: Monday, November 8, 2021 9:18 AM
To: ipsec@ietf.org
Subject: [EXTERNAL] [IPsec] WG adoption call for draft-smyslov-ipsecme-ikev=
2-auth-announce

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not cli=
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This is the start of 2 week WG adoption call for this document, ending 2021=
-11-22. Please send your reply about whether you support adopting this docu=
ment as WG document or not.
--
kivinen@iki.fi

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Subject: Re: [IPsec] Comments on draft-pwouters-multi-sa-performance
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Hi Paul,

Let me try once more to explain how to use draft-pwouters-multi-sa-performance for load balancing paths.
At the moment, the draft and Linux XFRM code only cover per CPU queuing. So forget the CPU use case for now! Let’s focus on network path diversity.

Just like you said, the IPsec peers must be configured with the number of paths. Let’s say there are 4 paths. Configure that in the IKE daemon.

IKE daemon will add 4 paths to the policy, SP. The IKE initiator will send perPath Child SAs, 4(4 + 1 the fallback SA). And negotiate 4 perPath Child SA. IKE initiator should force UDP encapsulation for the load balancing switches to work.

First the IKE initiator setup a Fallback SA. The fallback SA will be using UDP port 4500 to 4500, with an additional attribute 4 perPath SAs.

The data plane, SAD, will hash the clear text traffic using ntuple. The clear text ntuple for TCP and UDP are using source IP + source port + destination IP + destination port. All other traffic, think of ICMP..., hash using source IP + destination IP. This hashing is an example. Any other hash based on clear text flows to choose IPsec SA paths would work too.

When traffic arrives, IPsec gateway compute the hash. If there is no SA for that hash index, use the Fallback SA and send a SADB_ACQUIE to IKE daemon. IKE daemon will negotiate a new perPath SA for that index. Once a perPath SA is installed, the traffic will use that SA. The perPath SA use UDP encapsulation, a unique src port + destination port. The IKE initiator initiates with source port other than 4500, and the IKE responder should respond to the new source port(and not to port 4500) Since the perPath SA has different UDP source port + destination port the switches or load balancers should find enough entropy. Can the load balancers forward the IPsec traffic via different paths based 4 tuple? When rekeying keep the same source port + destination port.

This will also support NATs and also sending DPD using per Path SA UDP ports, using NON-ESP-UDP encapsulation.

I can imagine you feel this solution is complex, and changes to IKE negotiations, however, I think the result is more flexible and clean design. The UDP flows behave as symmetric UDP flow. It is friendly to RSS as well.

Thanks for your feedback. I hope, I didn't waste your time with another long e-mail:)

Cheers,
-antony

On Mon, Nov 15, 2021 at 08:10:25PM +0000, Bottorff, Paul wrote:
> Hi Antony:
> 
> Per path SA is completely inadequate for load balanced systems especially within the data center. Load balanced systems are being used to separate mice from elephant flows and to dynamically re-arrange flows on paths based on load measures. The number of flows on any particular path is selected by the network and may change both hop-by-hop and on the fly. For the network to operate properly we want to identify every flow allowing the network to allocate those flow to paths. For load balance to work properly we need many more flows than paths. Current data center encapsulations support these operations by loading the source port with a flow identifier. Saying that IPsec will provide an inferior and cumbersome solution becomes a barrier to a wider deployment of IPsec in these environments.
> 
> Even for cases where the network is doing simple hash distribution switches don't normally distribute based on SPI, instead they typically identify flows based on the outer 5-tuple. Some of the switches could parse the IPsec packets and build a special hash for them, however some of the switches some of the time is not a satisfying solution. Identifying the flow in source port is a perfect solution since it works for all the switches all the time, supports all the advanced modes of load balancing, and is an already well established technique. 
> 
> Further the server interfaces where IKE would run don't know how many paths exist deep in the network and so don't know how to build for particular paths. If SA was used the only reasonable solution is to build and SA per flow (not per path) which is information available to IKE. There are many flows for each CPU. 
> 
> Cheers,
> 
> Paul
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Antony Antony [mailto:antony.antony@secunet.com] 
> Sent: Wednesday, November 10, 2021 12:11 AM
> To: Bottorff, Paul <paul.bottorff@hpe.com>
> Cc: Paul Wouters <paul.wouters=40aiven.io@dmarc.ietf.org>; Panwei (William) <william.panwei@huawei.com>; ipsec@ietf.org; draft-pwouters-ipsecme-multi-sa-performance@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [IPsec] Comments on draft-pwouters-multi-sa-performance
> 
> Hi Paul, 
> 
> I think our draft is a better solution for the network multipath problem too, definitely for a few per Path SAs. Larger number of paths, say 32 or more paths, may cause scaling issues in SPD or/and SAD lookup; the data path lookup. However, data path lookup speed would depend on the implementation. Creating a SA per path would decrease chance out of order delivery, ESP sequence number issues will be minimal.
> 
> To create per path SA the IKE negotiations would be like the current draft, perCPU. The SAD/SPD lookup code path will differ from the prototype code we have for Linux/XFRM. The multi path will be a property of SPD. Use the multip path attribute to lookup in SAD.  Each SA can be created dynamically based on traffic; actually path. First, create the Fallback SA and install the policy with the new flag, perPath SADB_ACQUIRE flag. And when there is traffic and no SA matching packet's path, the policy should trigger an SADB_ACQUIRE and IKE negotiation follows.  After a successful IKE negotiation install the new per Path SA. While IKE negotiates the path SA, use the Fallback SA. So there won’t be any packet drop.
> 
> I am working on a draft, how to deal with UDP encapsulation. Each SA with a different UDP port. My idea is to make UDP encapsulated IPsec SA a pair of SAs. IKE negotiator will choose source port. In one direction source port will change and in the other direction destination port will change, based on path entropy. This solution is generic and will work with the common NAT gateways. With a limitation, IKE peer which is not behind NAT must initiate new SA. 
> 
> RSS/ntuple would use UDP source port plus destination port for entropy. Would this work for network switches/routers along the path? My guess it will!
> 
> Are you seeing out of order delivery because ESP packets take of multiple paths or at the sender? I noticed multiple CPU ESP sender can send the packets out of order. I think if you install an SA per path, out-of-order issues due paths will be resolved. There may be corner cases when there are multiple CPUs and multiple paths. In those cases, you may need CPU x paths SAs. CPU x Paths SAs will add lookup complexity. Out of order sending and delivery seems to be a problem with multiple CPUs on the sender. Even with IPsec offload NICs in Linux out of order sending could be an issue. Using per-CPU would reduce it considerably.
> 
>  
> 
> On Wed, Nov 10, 2021 at 08:32:13AM +0100, Antony Antony wrote:
> > Hi Paul,
> > 
> > I think our draft is a better solution for the network multipath problem, definitely for small number of per Path SAs. Larger number of paths, say 16 or more paths, may cause scaling issues in SPD or/and SAD lookup; the data path. However, data path lookup speed would depend on the implementation.
> > Creating an SA per path would increase chance in order delivery, ESP sequence number issues will be minimal.
> > 
> > To create per path SA the IKE negotiations would be similar to current draft, perCPU. The SAD/SPD code path will be different from the prototype we have for Linux/XFRM. The path will be a property of SPD. When looking up SAD use the path attribute and the correct SA will be used.
> > 
> > Each SA can be created dynamically if and when necessary. First create 
> > the Fallback SA and install the policy with new flag, per-Path SADB_ACQUIRE flag.
> > And when there is traffic and no SA matching per path SAD  entry, the 
> > policy should trigger IKE negotiations and install a new per Path SA.
> > While per path SA is negotiated use the Fallback SA. So there won't be 
> > any packet drop.
> > 
> > I am working a draft, how to deal with UDP encapsulation.  Each SA with different UDP port.
> > My idea is make UDP encapsulated IPsec SA a pair of SAs. In one direction source port will change and in the other direction destination port will change based on path entropy. This solution is generic and will work with the common NAT gateways too.
> > RSS/ntuple would use source port plus destination port for entropy.
> > Would this work for network switches/routers along the path?
> > 
> > Are you seeing out of order delivery because ESP packets take of multiple paths or multiple CPUs on the ESP sender? 
> > I think if you install an SA per path, out of order issues due to path 
> > will mostly solved. There may be corner cases when there are multiple 
> > CPUs and multiple paths. In those cases you may need CPU x paths SAs.
> > CPU x Paths SAs will add lookup complexity. I have no operational experience yet.
> > Out of order delivery/sending seems to be a problem when there are multiple CPUs on the sender.  Even when using IPsec offload NICs in Linux. Using per-CPU would reduce it considerably.
> > 
> > 
> > -antony
> > 
> > On Fri, Nov 05, 2021 at 21:39:05 +0000, Bottorff, Paul wrote:
> > > Hi Paul:
> > > 
> > > I've reviewed your draft to determine if it is viable as a solution to the network multi-pathing problems I've been investigation. Though I have no objection to your solution for multi-cpu balancing, it does not seem to provide a reasonable alternative to draft-xu-ipsecme-esp-in-udp-lb-08 for network multi-pathing. Hopefully, we can move forward with draft-xu-ipsecme-esp-in-udp-lb-08 for network multi-pathing. We currently have it implemented and working quite successfully in our smart NICs.
> > > 
> > > For network multi-pathing within a highly meshed data center we want to be able to create an identifier for every flow to allow the network to perform load balancing algorithms which measure the load on links and dynamically shift flows to achieve balance (rather than balancing the number of flows on links). For a typical big server we would expect 100s of flows and for a network middle box we would expect 1000s. The amount of state required to carry independent SA state for each of these is troublesome.
> > > 
> > > Further, to use the additional SAs we would need to dynamically generate new identical SAs based on a current flow table which will result in startup delays for new flows as we establish the new SA.
> > > 
> > > Finally, even though some of the switches some of the time could add the SPI into their hash for IPsec packets (and use a different hash for other packets), this feature is not available universally across all data center switches and router. Also the standard procedure for existing data center switches, even those that could generate a special hash for SPI, is to use 5 tuple hash as the flow identifier across all packets.
> > > 
> > > It is true that for network multi-pathing delivery order is only guaranteed per flow, and therefore replay detection must either be disabled or would needed to take this into account re-ordering between flows.
> > > 
> > > Cheers,
> > > 
> > > Paul
> > > 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: IPsec [mailto:ipsec-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Paul 
> > > Wouters
> > > Sent: Monday, November 1, 2021 8:27 PM
> > > To: Panwei (William) <william.panwei@huawei.com>
> > > Cc: ipsec@ietf.org; 
> > > draft-pwouters-ipsecme-multi-sa-performance@ietf.org
> > > Subject: Re: [IPsec] Comments on draft-pwouters-multi-sa-performance
> > > 
> > > On Fri, 29 Oct 2021, Panwei (William) wrote:
> > > 
> > > Hi William,
> > > 
> > > > Subject: [IPsec] Comments on draft-pwouters-multi-sa-performance
> > > 
> > > > I’ve read the recent version. This is an interesting solution. I think it should be adopted. Below are some comments.
> > > 
> > > Thnks for reading the draft and giving us feedback!
> > > 
> > > > 1.
> > > > 
> > > > The CPU_QUEUES notification value refers to the number of 
> > > > additional
> > > > 
> > > > resource-specific Child SAs that may be installed for this 
> > > > particular
> > > > 
> > > > TSi/TSr combination excluding the Fallback Child SA.
> > > > 
> > > > Is it necessary to limit the amount of additional SAs at the 
> > > > beginning while TS_MAX_QUEUE can be used to reject the request of 
> > > > creating additional SA at any time? In the virtualization scenario, the new VMs can be launched on-demand, in other words, it may be seen as the number of CPUs isn’t fixed, so maybe limiting the addition SAs at the beginning will damage the flexibility.
> > > 
> > > The limit is really a very high maximum number and not a very low number exactly matching CPUs. We had that at first, to try and optimize it but there were too many race conditions, eg with rekeying. So if you have a peer with 4 CPUs and a peer with 2 CPUs, you might just want to set the max to 8 or even 12. It is mostly meant to try and avoid doing CREATE_CHILD_SA's that are just doomed to failure anyway. So see it more as a resource cap that a strict physical limitation.
> > > 
> > > > 2.
> > > > 
> > > > The CPU_QUEUES notification payload is sent in the IKE_AUTH or
> > > > 
> > > > CREATE_CHILD_SA Exchange indicating the negotiated Child SA is a
> > > > 
> > > > Fallback SA.
> > > > 
> > > > Before additional SAs are created, is there any difference between 
> > > > using this first/Fallback SA and using other normal SA? I think there is no difference. So maybe we don’t need to add this notification payload when creating the first SA.
> > > 
> > > the problem right now is that implementations often will discard an an older identical Child SA for the newest one. So one of the key intentions of the document is for the initiator/responder to clearly negotiate from the start they are going to be using Child SA's with identical Traffic Selectors and they want the older ones to stick around. Also, it is important that there is always 1 fallback Child SA that can be used on any CPU resource. So we really wanted to mark that one very clearly. For instance, if it becomes idle, it should NOT be deleted.
> > > 
> > > > When the initiator wants
> > > > to create an additional SA, it can directly send the request with CPU_QUEUE_INFO notification payload.
> > > 
> > > It would be good to know from the responder if they support this and if they are willing to do this before doing the CREATE_CHILD_SA. And as I said above, to ensure both parties agree on which Child SA is the "always be present" fallback SA to ensure things like adding a new CPU always results in encrypted packets via the fallback SA.
> > > 
> > > > There are 3 ways that the
> > > > responder may reply: 1) The responder doesn’t support/recognize 
> > > > this notification, it will ignore this notification and reply as usual.
> > > 
> > > But there is no "as usual" for what happens to the older Child SA. Some implementations will allow it, some will only allow it if it has its own IKE SA, and some will just delete the old one. This is the ambiguity we are trying to address with the draft.
> > > 
> > > > 2) It supports this function and is willing to create the 
> > > > additional SA, so it will reply with CPU_QUEUE_INFO notification too. 3) It supports this function, but it isn’t willing to create more additional SAs, so it will reply with TS_MAX_QUEUE.
> > > > Therefore, it seems like that CPU_QUEUE_INFO and TS_MAX_QUEUE 
> > > > these 2 notifications are enough to use, and the draft can be simplified to only use these 2 notifications.
> > > 
> > > I hope I explained why we think some clear signal has its use. If you take your assumptions to the max, one would need no document at all, as the IKEv2 specification states there can be Child SAs that are duplicates or with overlapping IP ranges, so in theory, nothing is needed.
> > > 
> > > > 3.
> > > > 
> > > > Both peers send
> > > > 
> > > > the preferred minimum number of additional Child SAs to install.
> > > > 
> > > > First, I think sending the number of additional Child SAs is 
> > > > unnecessary. Second, when using “minimum” here my first impression 
> > > > is that it means 0, so in order to remove ambiguity I suggest just saying “the preferred number” (if you think sending the number is necessary).
> > > 
> > > The use of minimum is indicating what the peer needs. A peer with 4 CPUs does not prefer 4, it really prefers as many as the highest number of CPUs of the two peers - within reason. The preference is really a combination of what works best for the combination of the two peers.
> > > 
> > > Note the minimum is not about the minimum number required for functioning, but the minimum number to get optimum performance.
> > > 
> > > By indicating the minimum, both sides can pick the highest minimum and then allow a few more (for race conditions during rekeying).
> > > 
> > > > 4.
> > > > 
> > > > If a CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange request containing both a 
> > > > CPU_QUEUE_INFO and a CPU_QUEUES notification is received, the 
> > > > responder MUST ignore the CPU_QUEUE_INFO payload. If a 
> > > > CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange reply is received with both 
> > > > CPU_QUEUE_INFO and CPU_QUEUES notifications, the initiator MUST 
> > > > ignore the notification that it did not send in the request.
> > > > 
> > > > I think there is ambiguity here. When the initiator sends the 
> > > > CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange request containing both a CPU_QUEUE_INFO 
> > > > and a CPU_QUEUES notification, and the responder also adds 
> > > > CPU_QUEUE_INFO and CPU_QUEUES notifications in the reply, the initiator doesn’t know how to process with this situation, should the initiator ignore the CPU_QUEUE_INFO payload or notify an error to the responder?
> > > 
> > > We went back and forth on this a couple of times with the authors. We really wanted to keep it as simple as possible but also not be too pedantic. From a protocol point of view, we could say to just return an error like SYNTAX_ERROR, but that would cause the IKE SA and all its working Child SAs to also be torn down, and we wanted to avoid that so bugs in the performance implementation does not result in completely tunnel failures. Hence our phrasing of "just ignore X"
> > > on both the initiator and responder.
> > > 
> > > We agree that a broken initiator with a broken responder leads to 
> > > something broken. I think specifying how a broken initiator should 
> > > respond to a broken responder is taking the Postel Principle a step 
> > > too far? :)
> > > 
> > > Paul
> 
> On Fri, Nov 05, 2021 at 21:39:05 +0000, Bottorff, Paul wrote:
> > Hi Paul:
> > 
> > I've reviewed your draft to determine if it is viable as a solution to the network multi-pathing problems I've been investigation. Though I have no objection to your solution for multi-cpu balancing, it does not seem to provide a reasonable alternative to draft-xu-ipsecme-esp-in-udp-lb-08 for network multi-pathing. Hopefully, we can move forward with draft-xu-ipsecme-esp-in-udp-lb-08 for network multi-pathing. We currently have it implemented and working quite successfully in our smart NICs.
> > 
> > For network multi-pathing within a highly meshed data center we want to be able to create an identifier for every flow to allow the network to perform load balancing algorithms which measure the load on links and dynamically shift flows to achieve balance (rather than balancing the number of flows on links). For a typical big server we would expect 100s of flows and for a network middle box we would expect 1000s. The amount of state required to carry independent SA state for each of these is troublesome.
> > 
> > Further, to use the additional SAs we would need to dynamically generate new identical SAs based on a current flow table which will result in startup delays for new flows as we establish the new SA.
> > 
> > Finally, even though some of the switches some of the time could add the SPI into their hash for IPsec packets (and use a different hash for other packets), this feature is not available universally across all data center switches and router. Also the standard procedure for existing data center switches, even those that could generate a special hash for SPI, is to use 5 tuple hash as the flow identifier across all packets.
> > 
> > It is true that for network multi-pathing delivery order is only guaranteed per flow, and therefore replay detection must either be disabled or would needed to take this into account re-ordering between flows.
> > 
> > Cheers,
> > 
> > Paul
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: IPsec [mailto:ipsec-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Paul Wouters
> > Sent: Monday, November 1, 2021 8:27 PM
> > To: Panwei (William) <william.panwei@huawei.com>
> > Cc: ipsec@ietf.org; 
> > draft-pwouters-ipsecme-multi-sa-performance@ietf.org
> > Subject: Re: [IPsec] Comments on draft-pwouters-multi-sa-performance
> > 
> > On Fri, 29 Oct 2021, Panwei (William) wrote:
> > 
> > Hi William,
> > 
> > > Subject: [IPsec] Comments on draft-pwouters-multi-sa-performance
> > 
> > > I’ve read the recent version. This is an interesting solution. I think it should be adopted. Below are some comments.
> > 
> > Thnks for reading the draft and giving us feedback!
> > 
> > > 1.
> > > 
> > > The CPU_QUEUES notification value refers to the number of additional
> > > 
> > > resource-specific Child SAs that may be installed for this 
> > > particular
> > > 
> > > TSi/TSr combination excluding the Fallback Child SA.
> > > 
> > > Is it necessary to limit the amount of additional SAs at the 
> > > beginning while TS_MAX_QUEUE can be used to reject the request of 
> > > creating additional SA at any time? In the virtualization scenario, the new VMs can be launched on-demand, in other words, it may be seen as the number of CPUs isn’t fixed, so maybe limiting the addition SAs at the beginning will damage the flexibility.
> > 
> > The limit is really a very high maximum number and not a very low number exactly matching CPUs. We had that at first, to try and optimize it but there were too many race conditions, eg with rekeying. So if you have a peer with 4 CPUs and a peer with 2 CPUs, you might just want to set the max to 8 or even 12. It is mostly meant to try and avoid doing CREATE_CHILD_SA's that are just doomed to failure anyway. So see it more as a resource cap that a strict physical limitation.
> > 
> > > 2.
> > > 
> > > The CPU_QUEUES notification payload is sent in the IKE_AUTH or
> > > 
> > > CREATE_CHILD_SA Exchange indicating the negotiated Child SA is a
> > > 
> > > Fallback SA.
> > > 
> > > Before additional SAs are created, is there any difference between 
> > > using this first/Fallback SA and using other normal SA? I think there is no difference. So maybe we don’t need to add this notification payload when creating the first SA.
> > 
> > the problem right now is that implementations often will discard an an older identical Child SA for the newest one. So one of the key intentions of the document is for the initiator/responder to clearly negotiate from the start they are going to be using Child SA's with identical Traffic Selectors and they want the older ones to stick around. Also, it is important that there is always 1 fallback Child SA that can be used on any CPU resource. So we really wanted to mark that one very clearly. For instance, if it becomes idle, it should NOT be deleted.
> > 
> > > When the initiator wants
> > > to create an additional SA, it can directly send the request with CPU_QUEUE_INFO notification payload.
> > 
> > It would be good to know from the responder if they support this and if they are willing to do this before doing the CREATE_CHILD_SA. And as I said above, to ensure both parties agree on which Child SA is the "always be present" fallback SA to ensure things like adding a new CPU always results in encrypted packets via the fallback SA.
> > 
> > > There are 3 ways that the
> > > responder may reply: 1) The responder doesn’t support/recognize this 
> > > notification, it will ignore this notification and reply as usual.
> > 
> > But there is no "as usual" for what happens to the older Child SA. Some implementations will allow it, some will only allow it if it has its own IKE SA, and some will just delete the old one. This is the ambiguity we are trying to address with the draft.
> > 
> > > 2) It supports this function and is willing to create the additional 
> > > SA, so it will reply with CPU_QUEUE_INFO notification too. 3) It supports this function, but it isn’t willing to create more additional SAs, so it will reply with TS_MAX_QUEUE.
> > > Therefore, it seems like that CPU_QUEUE_INFO and TS_MAX_QUEUE these 
> > > 2 notifications are enough to use, and the draft can be simplified to only use these 2 notifications.
> > 
> > I hope I explained why we think some clear signal has its use. If you take your assumptions to the max, one would need no document at all, as the IKEv2 specification states there can be Child SAs that are duplicates or with overlapping IP ranges, so in theory, nothing is needed.
> > 
> > > 3.
> > > 
> > > Both peers send
> > > 
> > > the preferred minimum number of additional Child SAs to install.
> > > 
> > > First, I think sending the number of additional Child SAs is 
> > > unnecessary. Second, when using “minimum” here my first impression 
> > > is that it means 0, so in order to remove ambiguity I suggest just saying “the preferred number” (if you think sending the number is necessary).
> > 
> > The use of minimum is indicating what the peer needs. A peer with 4 CPUs does not prefer 4, it really prefers as many as the highest number of CPUs of the two peers - within reason. The preference is really a combination of what works best for the combination of the two peers.
> > 
> > Note the minimum is not about the minimum number required for functioning, but the minimum number to get optimum performance.
> > 
> > By indicating the minimum, both sides can pick the highest minimum and then allow a few more (for race conditions during rekeying).
> > 
> > > 4.
> > > 
> > > If a CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange request containing both a 
> > > CPU_QUEUE_INFO and a CPU_QUEUES notification is received, the 
> > > responder MUST ignore the CPU_QUEUE_INFO payload. If a 
> > > CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange reply is received with both CPU_QUEUE_INFO 
> > > and CPU_QUEUES notifications, the initiator MUST ignore the 
> > > notification that it did not send in the request.
> > > 
> > > I think there is ambiguity here. When the initiator sends the 
> > > CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange request containing both a CPU_QUEUE_INFO 
> > > and a CPU_QUEUES notification, and the responder also adds 
> > > CPU_QUEUE_INFO and CPU_QUEUES notifications in the reply, the initiator doesn’t know how to process with this situation, should the initiator ignore the CPU_QUEUE_INFO payload or notify an error to the responder?
> > 
> > We went back and forth on this a couple of times with the authors. We really wanted to keep it as simple as possible but also not be too pedantic. From a protocol point of view, we could say to just return an error like SYNTAX_ERROR, but that would cause the IKE SA and all its working Child SAs to also be torn down, and we wanted to avoid that so bugs in the performance implementation does not result in completely tunnel failures. Hence our phrasing of "just ignore X"
> > on both the initiator and responder.
> > 
> > We agree that a broken initiator with a broken responder leads to 
> > something broken. I think specifying how a broken initiator should 
> > respond to a broken responder is taking the Postel Principle a step 
> > too far? :)
> > 
> > Paul
> _______________________________________________
> IPsec mailing list
> IPsec@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec

On Mon, Nov 15, 2021 at 20:10:25 +0000, Bottorff, Paul wrote:
> Hi Antony:
> 
> Per path SA is completely inadequate for load balanced systems especially within the data center. Load balanced systems are being used to separate mice from elephant flows and to dynamically re-arrange flows on paths based on load measures. The number of flows on any particular path is selected by the network and may change both hop-by-hop and on the fly. For the network to operate properly we want to identify every flow allowing the network to allocate those flow to paths. For load balance to work properly we need many more flows than paths. Current data center encapsulations support these operations by loading the source port with a flow identifier. Saying that IPsec will provide an inferior and cumbersome solution becomes a barrier to a wider deployment of IPsec in these environments.
> 
> Even for cases where the network is doing simple hash distribution switches don't normally distribute based on SPI, instead they typically identify flows based on the outer 5-tuple. Some of the switches could parse the IPsec packets and build a special hash for them, however some of the switches some of the time is not a satisfying solution. Identifying the flow in source port is a perfect solution since it works for all the switches all the time, supports all the advanced modes of load balancing, and is an already well established technique. 
> 
> Further the server interfaces where IKE would run don't know how many paths exist deep in the network and so don't know how to build for particular paths. If SA was used the only reasonable solution is to build and SA per flow (not per path) which is information available to IKE. There are many flows for each CPU. 
> 
> Cheers,
> 
> Paul
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Antony Antony [mailto:antony.antony@secunet.com] 
> Sent: Wednesday, November 10, 2021 12:11 AM
> To: Bottorff, Paul <paul.bottorff@hpe.com>
> Cc: Paul Wouters <paul.wouters=40aiven.io@dmarc.ietf.org>; Panwei (William) <william.panwei@huawei.com>; ipsec@ietf.org; draft-pwouters-ipsecme-multi-sa-performance@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [IPsec] Comments on draft-pwouters-multi-sa-performance
> 
> Hi Paul, 
> 
> I think our draft is a better solution for the network multipath problem too, definitely for a few per Path SAs. Larger number of paths, say 32 or more paths, may cause scaling issues in SPD or/and SAD lookup; the data path lookup. However, data path lookup speed would depend on the implementation. Creating a SA per path would decrease chance out of order delivery, ESP sequence number issues will be minimal.
> 
> To create per path SA the IKE negotiations would be like the current draft, perCPU. The SAD/SPD lookup code path will differ from the prototype code we have for Linux/XFRM. The multi path will be a property of SPD. Use the multip path attribute to lookup in SAD.  Each SA can be created dynamically based on traffic; actually path. First, create the Fallback SA and install the policy with the new flag, perPath SADB_ACQUIRE flag. And when there is traffic and no SA matching packet's path, the policy should trigger an SADB_ACQUIRE and IKE negotiation follows.  After a successful IKE negotiation install the new per Path SA. While IKE negotiates the path SA, use the Fallback SA. So there won’t be any packet drop.
> 
> I am working on a draft, how to deal with UDP encapsulation. Each SA with a different UDP port. My idea is to make UDP encapsulated IPsec SA a pair of SAs. IKE negotiator will choose source port. In one direction source port will change and in the other direction destination port will change, based on path entropy. This solution is generic and will work with the common NAT gateways. With a limitation, IKE peer which is not behind NAT must initiate new SA. 
> 
> RSS/ntuple would use UDP source port plus destination port for entropy. Would this work for network switches/routers along the path? My guess it will!
> 
> Are you seeing out of order delivery because ESP packets take of multiple paths or at the sender? I noticed multiple CPU ESP sender can send the packets out of order. I think if you install an SA per path, out-of-order issues due paths will be resolved. There may be corner cases when there are multiple CPUs and multiple paths. In those cases, you may need CPU x paths SAs. CPU x Paths SAs will add lookup complexity. Out of order sending and delivery seems to be a problem with multiple CPUs on the sender. Even with IPsec offload NICs in Linux out of order sending could be an issue. Using per-CPU would reduce it considerably.
> 
>  
> 
> On Wed, Nov 10, 2021 at 08:32:13AM +0100, Antony Antony wrote:
> > Hi Paul,
> > 
> > I think our draft is a better solution for the network multipath problem, definitely for small number of per Path SAs. Larger number of paths, say 16 or more paths, may cause scaling issues in SPD or/and SAD lookup; the data path. However, data path lookup speed would depend on the implementation.
> > Creating an SA per path would increase chance in order delivery, ESP sequence number issues will be minimal.
> > 
> > To create per path SA the IKE negotiations would be similar to current draft, perCPU. The SAD/SPD code path will be different from the prototype we have for Linux/XFRM. The path will be a property of SPD. When looking up SAD use the path attribute and the correct SA will be used.
> > 
> > Each SA can be created dynamically if and when necessary. First create 
> > the Fallback SA and install the policy with new flag, per-Path SADB_ACQUIRE flag.
> > And when there is traffic and no SA matching per path SAD  entry, the 
> > policy should trigger IKE negotiations and install a new per Path SA.
> > While per path SA is negotiated use the Fallback SA. So there won't be 
> > any packet drop.
> > 
> > I am working a draft, how to deal with UDP encapsulation.  Each SA with different UDP port.
> > My idea is make UDP encapsulated IPsec SA a pair of SAs. In one direction source port will change and in the other direction destination port will change based on path entropy. This solution is generic and will work with the common NAT gateways too.
> > RSS/ntuple would use source port plus destination port for entropy.
> > Would this work for network switches/routers along the path?
> > 
> > Are you seeing out of order delivery because ESP packets take of multiple paths or multiple CPUs on the ESP sender? 
> > I think if you install an SA per path, out of order issues due to path 
> > will mostly solved. There may be corner cases when there are multiple 
> > CPUs and multiple paths. In those cases you may need CPU x paths SAs.
> > CPU x Paths SAs will add lookup complexity. I have no operational experience yet.
> > Out of order delivery/sending seems to be a problem when there are multiple CPUs on the sender.  Even when using IPsec offload NICs in Linux. Using per-CPU would reduce it considerably.
> > 
> > 
> > -antony
> > 
> > On Fri, Nov 05, 2021 at 21:39:05 +0000, Bottorff, Paul wrote:
> > > Hi Paul:
> > > 
> > > I've reviewed your draft to determine if it is viable as a solution to the network multi-pathing problems I've been investigation. Though I have no objection to your solution for multi-cpu balancing, it does not seem to provide a reasonable alternative to draft-xu-ipsecme-esp-in-udp-lb-08 for network multi-pathing. Hopefully, we can move forward with draft-xu-ipsecme-esp-in-udp-lb-08 for network multi-pathing. We currently have it implemented and working quite successfully in our smart NICs.
> > > 
> > > For network multi-pathing within a highly meshed data center we want to be able to create an identifier for every flow to allow the network to perform load balancing algorithms which measure the load on links and dynamically shift flows to achieve balance (rather than balancing the number of flows on links). For a typical big server we would expect 100s of flows and for a network middle box we would expect 1000s. The amount of state required to carry independent SA state for each of these is troublesome.
> > > 
> > > Further, to use the additional SAs we would need to dynamically generate new identical SAs based on a current flow table which will result in startup delays for new flows as we establish the new SA.
> > > 
> > > Finally, even though some of the switches some of the time could add the SPI into their hash for IPsec packets (and use a different hash for other packets), this feature is not available universally across all data center switches and router. Also the standard procedure for existing data center switches, even those that could generate a special hash for SPI, is to use 5 tuple hash as the flow identifier across all packets.
> > > 
> > > It is true that for network multi-pathing delivery order is only guaranteed per flow, and therefore replay detection must either be disabled or would needed to take this into account re-ordering between flows.
> > > 
> > > Cheers,
> > > 
> > > Paul
> > > 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: IPsec [mailto:ipsec-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Paul 
> > > Wouters
> > > Sent: Monday, November 1, 2021 8:27 PM
> > > To: Panwei (William) <william.panwei@huawei.com>
> > > Cc: ipsec@ietf.org; 
> > > draft-pwouters-ipsecme-multi-sa-performance@ietf.org
> > > Subject: Re: [IPsec] Comments on draft-pwouters-multi-sa-performance
> > > 
> > > On Fri, 29 Oct 2021, Panwei (William) wrote:
> > > 
> > > Hi William,
> > > 
> > > > Subject: [IPsec] Comments on draft-pwouters-multi-sa-performance
> > > 
> > > > I’ve read the recent version. This is an interesting solution. I think it should be adopted. Below are some comments.
> > > 
> > > Thnks for reading the draft and giving us feedback!
> > > 
> > > > 1.
> > > > 
> > > > The CPU_QUEUES notification value refers to the number of 
> > > > additional
> > > > 
> > > > resource-specific Child SAs that may be installed for this 
> > > > particular
> > > > 
> > > > TSi/TSr combination excluding the Fallback Child SA.
> > > > 
> > > > Is it necessary to limit the amount of additional SAs at the 
> > > > beginning while TS_MAX_QUEUE can be used to reject the request of 
> > > > creating additional SA at any time? In the virtualization scenario, the new VMs can be launched on-demand, in other words, it may be seen as the number of CPUs isn’t fixed, so maybe limiting the addition SAs at the beginning will damage the flexibility.
> > > 
> > > The limit is really a very high maximum number and not a very low number exactly matching CPUs. We had that at first, to try and optimize it but there were too many race conditions, eg with rekeying. So if you have a peer with 4 CPUs and a peer with 2 CPUs, you might just want to set the max to 8 or even 12. It is mostly meant to try and avoid doing CREATE_CHILD_SA's that are just doomed to failure anyway. So see it more as a resource cap that a strict physical limitation.
> > > 
> > > > 2.
> > > > 
> > > > The CPU_QUEUES notification payload is sent in the IKE_AUTH or
> > > > 
> > > > CREATE_CHILD_SA Exchange indicating the negotiated Child SA is a
> > > > 
> > > > Fallback SA.
> > > > 
> > > > Before additional SAs are created, is there any difference between 
> > > > using this first/Fallback SA and using other normal SA? I think there is no difference. So maybe we don’t need to add this notification payload when creating the first SA.
> > > 
> > > the problem right now is that implementations often will discard an an older identical Child SA for the newest one. So one of the key intentions of the document is for the initiator/responder to clearly negotiate from the start they are going to be using Child SA's with identical Traffic Selectors and they want the older ones to stick around. Also, it is important that there is always 1 fallback Child SA that can be used on any CPU resource. So we really wanted to mark that one very clearly. For instance, if it becomes idle, it should NOT be deleted.
> > > 
> > > > When the initiator wants
> > > > to create an additional SA, it can directly send the request with CPU_QUEUE_INFO notification payload.
> > > 
> > > It would be good to know from the responder if they support this and if they are willing to do this before doing the CREATE_CHILD_SA. And as I said above, to ensure both parties agree on which Child SA is the "always be present" fallback SA to ensure things like adding a new CPU always results in encrypted packets via the fallback SA.
> > > 
> > > > There are 3 ways that the
> > > > responder may reply: 1) The responder doesn’t support/recognize 
> > > > this notification, it will ignore this notification and reply as usual.
> > > 
> > > But there is no "as usual" for what happens to the older Child SA. Some implementations will allow it, some will only allow it if it has its own IKE SA, and some will just delete the old one. This is the ambiguity we are trying to address with the draft.
> > > 
> > > > 2) It supports this function and is willing to create the 
> > > > additional SA, so it will reply with CPU_QUEUE_INFO notification too. 3) It supports this function, but it isn’t willing to create more additional SAs, so it will reply with TS_MAX_QUEUE.
> > > > Therefore, it seems like that CPU_QUEUE_INFO and TS_MAX_QUEUE 
> > > > these 2 notifications are enough to use, and the draft can be simplified to only use these 2 notifications.
> > > 
> > > I hope I explained why we think some clear signal has its use. If you take your assumptions to the max, one would need no document at all, as the IKEv2 specification states there can be Child SAs that are duplicates or with overlapping IP ranges, so in theory, nothing is needed.
> > > 
> > > > 3.
> > > > 
> > > > Both peers send
> > > > 
> > > > the preferred minimum number of additional Child SAs to install.
> > > > 
> > > > First, I think sending the number of additional Child SAs is 
> > > > unnecessary. Second, when using “minimum” here my first impression 
> > > > is that it means 0, so in order to remove ambiguity I suggest just saying “the preferred number” (if you think sending the number is necessary).
> > > 
> > > The use of minimum is indicating what the peer needs. A peer with 4 CPUs does not prefer 4, it really prefers as many as the highest number of CPUs of the two peers - within reason. The preference is really a combination of what works best for the combination of the two peers.
> > > 
> > > Note the minimum is not about the minimum number required for functioning, but the minimum number to get optimum performance.
> > > 
> > > By indicating the minimum, both sides can pick the highest minimum and then allow a few more (for race conditions during rekeying).
> > > 
> > > > 4.
> > > > 
> > > > If a CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange request containing both a 
> > > > CPU_QUEUE_INFO and a CPU_QUEUES notification is received, the 
> > > > responder MUST ignore the CPU_QUEUE_INFO payload. If a 
> > > > CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange reply is received with both 
> > > > CPU_QUEUE_INFO and CPU_QUEUES notifications, the initiator MUST 
> > > > ignore the notification that it did not send in the request.
> > > > 
> > > > I think there is ambiguity here. When the initiator sends the 
> > > > CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange request containing both a CPU_QUEUE_INFO 
> > > > and a CPU_QUEUES notification, and the responder also adds 
> > > > CPU_QUEUE_INFO and CPU_QUEUES notifications in the reply, the initiator doesn’t know how to process with this situation, should the initiator ignore the CPU_QUEUE_INFO payload or notify an error to the responder?
> > > 
> > > We went back and forth on this a couple of times with the authors. We really wanted to keep it as simple as possible but also not be too pedantic. From a protocol point of view, we could say to just return an error like SYNTAX_ERROR, but that would cause the IKE SA and all its working Child SAs to also be torn down, and we wanted to avoid that so bugs in the performance implementation does not result in completely tunnel failures. Hence our phrasing of "just ignore X"
> > > on both the initiator and responder.
> > > 
> > > We agree that a broken initiator with a broken responder leads to 
> > > something broken. I think specifying how a broken initiator should 
> > > respond to a broken responder is taking the Postel Principle a step 
> > > too far? :)
> > > 
> > > Paul
> 
> On Fri, Nov 05, 2021 at 21:39:05 +0000, Bottorff, Paul wrote:
> > Hi Paul:
> > 
> > I've reviewed your draft to determine if it is viable as a solution to the network multi-pathing problems I've been investigation. Though I have no objection to your solution for multi-cpu balancing, it does not seem to provide a reasonable alternative to draft-xu-ipsecme-esp-in-udp-lb-08 for network multi-pathing. Hopefully, we can move forward with draft-xu-ipsecme-esp-in-udp-lb-08 for network multi-pathing. We currently have it implemented and working quite successfully in our smart NICs.
> > 
> > For network multi-pathing within a highly meshed data center we want to be able to create an identifier for every flow to allow the network to perform load balancing algorithms which measure the load on links and dynamically shift flows to achieve balance (rather than balancing the number of flows on links). For a typical big server we would expect 100s of flows and for a network middle box we would expect 1000s. The amount of state required to carry independent SA state for each of these is troublesome.
> > 
> > Further, to use the additional SAs we would need to dynamically generate new identical SAs based on a current flow table which will result in startup delays for new flows as we establish the new SA.
> > 
> > Finally, even though some of the switches some of the time could add the SPI into their hash for IPsec packets (and use a different hash for other packets), this feature is not available universally across all data center switches and router. Also the standard procedure for existing data center switches, even those that could generate a special hash for SPI, is to use 5 tuple hash as the flow identifier across all packets.
> > 
> > It is true that for network multi-pathing delivery order is only guaranteed per flow, and therefore replay detection must either be disabled or would needed to take this into account re-ordering between flows.
> > 
> > Cheers,
> > 
> > Paul
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: IPsec [mailto:ipsec-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Paul Wouters
> > Sent: Monday, November 1, 2021 8:27 PM
> > To: Panwei (William) <william.panwei@huawei.com>
> > Cc: ipsec@ietf.org; 
> > draft-pwouters-ipsecme-multi-sa-performance@ietf.org
> > Subject: Re: [IPsec] Comments on draft-pwouters-multi-sa-performance
> > 
> > On Fri, 29 Oct 2021, Panwei (William) wrote:
> > 
> > Hi William,
> > 
> > > Subject: [IPsec] Comments on draft-pwouters-multi-sa-performance
> > 
> > > I’ve read the recent version. This is an interesting solution. I think it should be adopted. Below are some comments.
> > 
> > Thnks for reading the draft and giving us feedback!
> > 
> > > 1.
> > > 
> > > The CPU_QUEUES notification value refers to the number of additional
> > > 
> > > resource-specific Child SAs that may be installed for this 
> > > particular
> > > 
> > > TSi/TSr combination excluding the Fallback Child SA.
> > > 
> > > Is it necessary to limit the amount of additional SAs at the 
> > > beginning while TS_MAX_QUEUE can be used to reject the request of 
> > > creating additional SA at any time? In the virtualization scenario, the new VMs can be launched on-demand, in other words, it may be seen as the number of CPUs isn’t fixed, so maybe limiting the addition SAs at the beginning will damage the flexibility.
> > 
> > The limit is really a very high maximum number and not a very low number exactly matching CPUs. We had that at first, to try and optimize it but there were too many race conditions, eg with rekeying. So if you have a peer with 4 CPUs and a peer with 2 CPUs, you might just want to set the max to 8 or even 12. It is mostly meant to try and avoid doing CREATE_CHILD_SA's that are just doomed to failure anyway. So see it more as a resource cap that a strict physical limitation.
> > 
> > > 2.
> > > 
> > > The CPU_QUEUES notification payload is sent in the IKE_AUTH or
> > > 
> > > CREATE_CHILD_SA Exchange indicating the negotiated Child SA is a
> > > 
> > > Fallback SA.
> > > 
> > > Before additional SAs are created, is there any difference between 
> > > using this first/Fallback SA and using other normal SA? I think there is no difference. So maybe we don’t need to add this notification payload when creating the first SA.
> > 
> > the problem right now is that implementations often will discard an an older identical Child SA for the newest one. So one of the key intentions of the document is for the initiator/responder to clearly negotiate from the start they are going to be using Child SA's with identical Traffic Selectors and they want the older ones to stick around. Also, it is important that there is always 1 fallback Child SA that can be used on any CPU resource. So we really wanted to mark that one very clearly. For instance, if it becomes idle, it should NOT be deleted.
> > 
> > > When the initiator wants
> > > to create an additional SA, it can directly send the request with CPU_QUEUE_INFO notification payload.
> > 
> > It would be good to know from the responder if they support this and if they are willing to do this before doing the CREATE_CHILD_SA. And as I said above, to ensure both parties agree on which Child SA is the "always be present" fallback SA to ensure things like adding a new CPU always results in encrypted packets via the fallback SA.
> > 
> > > There are 3 ways that the
> > > responder may reply: 1) The responder doesn’t support/recognize this 
> > > notification, it will ignore this notification and reply as usual.
> > 
> > But there is no "as usual" for what happens to the older Child SA. Some implementations will allow it, some will only allow it if it has its own IKE SA, and some will just delete the old one. This is the ambiguity we are trying to address with the draft.
> > 
> > > 2) It supports this function and is willing to create the additional 
> > > SA, so it will reply with CPU_QUEUE_INFO notification too. 3) It supports this function, but it isn’t willing to create more additional SAs, so it will reply with TS_MAX_QUEUE.
> > > Therefore, it seems like that CPU_QUEUE_INFO and TS_MAX_QUEUE these 
> > > 2 notifications are enough to use, and the draft can be simplified to only use these 2 notifications.
> > 
> > I hope I explained why we think some clear signal has its use. If you take your assumptions to the max, one would need no document at all, as the IKEv2 specification states there can be Child SAs that are duplicates or with overlapping IP ranges, so in theory, nothing is needed.
> > 
> > > 3.
> > > 
> > > Both peers send
> > > 
> > > the preferred minimum number of additional Child SAs to install.
> > > 
> > > First, I think sending the number of additional Child SAs is 
> > > unnecessary. Second, when using “minimum” here my first impression 
> > > is that it means 0, so in order to remove ambiguity I suggest just saying “the preferred number” (if you think sending the number is necessary).
> > 
> > The use of minimum is indicating what the peer needs. A peer with 4 CPUs does not prefer 4, it really prefers as many as the highest number of CPUs of the two peers - within reason. The preference is really a combination of what works best for the combination of the two peers.
> > 
> > Note the minimum is not about the minimum number required for functioning, but the minimum number to get optimum performance.
> > 
> > By indicating the minimum, both sides can pick the highest minimum and then allow a few more (for race conditions during rekeying).
> > 
> > > 4.
> > > 
> > > If a CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange request containing both a 
> > > CPU_QUEUE_INFO and a CPU_QUEUES notification is received, the 
> > > responder MUST ignore the CPU_QUEUE_INFO payload. If a 
> > > CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange reply is received with both CPU_QUEUE_INFO 
> > > and CPU_QUEUES notifications, the initiator MUST ignore the 
> > > notification that it did not send in the request.
> > > 
> > > I think there is ambiguity here. When the initiator sends the 
> > > CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange request containing both a CPU_QUEUE_INFO 
> > > and a CPU_QUEUES notification, and the responder also adds 
> > > CPU_QUEUE_INFO and CPU_QUEUES notifications in the reply, the initiator doesn’t know how to process with this situation, should the initiator ignore the CPU_QUEUE_INFO payload or notify an error to the responder?
> > 
> > We went back and forth on this a couple of times with the authors. We really wanted to keep it as simple as possible but also not be too pedantic. From a protocol point of view, we could say to just return an error like SYNTAX_ERROR, but that would cause the IKE SA and all its working Child SAs to also be torn down, and we wanted to avoid that so bugs in the performance implementation does not result in completely tunnel failures. Hence our phrasing of "just ignore X"
> > on both the initiator and responder.
> > 
> > We agree that a broken initiator with a broken responder leads to 
> > something broken. I think specifying how a broken initiator should 
> > respond to a broken responder is taking the Postel Principle a step 
> > too far? :)
> > 
> > Paul


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Date: Tue, 16 Nov 2021 13:11:18 -0500 (EST)
From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
To: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
cc: "Bottorff, Paul" <paul.bottorff@hpe.com>,  "ipsec@ietf.org" <ipsec@ietf.org>,  Paul Wouters <paul.wouters=40aiven.io@dmarc.ietf.org>,  "draft-pwouters-ipsecme-multi-sa-performance@ietf.org" <draft-pwouters-ipsecme-multi-sa-performance@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] Comments on draft-pwouters-multi-sa-performance
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On Tue, 16 Nov 2021, Antony Antony wrote:

> When traffic arrives, IPsec gateway compute the hash. If there is no SA for that hash index, use the Fallback SA and send a SADB_ACQUIE to IKE daemon. IKE daemon will negotiate a new perPath SA for that index. Once a perPath SA is installed, the traffic will use that SA. The perPath SA use UDP encapsulation, a unique src port + destination port.

Just to clarify further on to what Antony said. You can imagine the
first fallback SA to use regular IKE and ending up using 4500 <-> 4500,
although a NAT might change the source port of course. For the perPath
SA, the IKE daemon picks a new source port to negotiate the
CREATE_CHILD_SA, and will use UDP ENCAPS on this new port. It of course
could also end up being NAT'ed but it would be NAT'ed to a unique free
port. The IKE traffic goes over this source port to confirm the network
path is clean for this. And IPsec flows embedded in UDP so all the
"flow" acting mechanism can work for you.

We could keep the IKE on its normal 4500 port, but then when we pick a
new source port for the new perPath SA, we are not guaranteed that path
can actually send UDP ENCAP traffic.

The changes to the spec is mostly to use/retain the new port and avoid
these new port based packets from "updating" the NAT port mistakenly.

Paul


From nobody Tue Nov 16 12:03:25 2021
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Subject: [IPsec] I-D Action: draft-ietf-ipsecme-yang-iptfs-04.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the IP Security Maintenance and Extensions WG of the IETF.

        Title           : A YANG Data Model for IP Traffic Flow Security
        Authors         : Don Fedyk
                          Christian Hopps
	Filename        : draft-ietf-ipsecme-yang-iptfs-04.txt
	Pages           : 28
	Date            : 2021-11-16

Abstract:
   This document describes a yang module for the management of IP
   Traffic Flow Security additions to IKEv2 and IPsec.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ipsecme-yang-iptfs/

There is also an htmlized version available at:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-ipsecme-yang-iptfs-04

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-ipsecme-yang-iptfs-04


Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/



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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the IP Security Maintenance and Extensions WG of the IETF.

        Title           : Definitions of Managed Objects for IP Traffic Flow Security
        Authors         : Don Fedyk
                          Eric Kinzie
	Filename        : draft-ietf-ipsecme-mib-iptfs-02.txt
	Pages           : 22
	Date            : 2021-11-16

Abstract:
   This document describes managed objects for the the management of IP
   Traffic Flow Security additions to IKEv2 and IPsec.  This document
   provides a read only version of the objects defined in the YANG
   module for the same purpose.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ipsecme-mib-iptfs/

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https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-ipsecme-mib-iptfs-02

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-ipsecme-mib-iptfs-02


Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ipsec/aigen12kxAQBKvVfHXOlxp4nSIg>
Subject: Re: [IPsec] IP-TFS YANG and MIB Updated
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Hi=20

Thanks for the comments and feedback.  I have uploaded versions to address =
the comments on both the YANG and corresponding MIB document. =20

Don


-----Original Message-----
From: Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>=20
Sent: Sunday, November 14, 2021 9:32 AM
To: Christian Hopps <chopps@chopps.org>
Cc: Don Fedyk <dfedyk@labn.net>; ipsec@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [IPsec] IP-TFS YANG and MIB Updated

Christian Hopps writes:
> > Or if it is other way then add text saying "If this is true then=20
> > inner packets that are larger than what can be tranmitted in outer=20
> > packets will be dropped.".
>=20
> "Disable packet fragmentation across consecutive iptfs tunnel packets;=20
> inner packets larger than what can be transmitted in outer packets=20
> will be dropped.";

That is good.=20

> >> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-ipsecme-mib-iptfs-01.t
> >> xt
> >
> > Same changes than in Yang document is needed here too.
> >
> > Also remove the last sentence of the abstract, i.e. I do not think=20
> > there is no need to say "This is an unpublished work in progress.",=20
> > in internet drafts, as they are working documents anyways...

As I sent already in my private email the mib document also needs the IANA =
considerations section and splitting references to normative and informativ=
e.

And the Security Considerations section of MIB document needs to use the MI=
B security considerations boilerplate as described in https://trac.ietf.org=
/trac/ops/wiki/mib-security page.

(Just repeating these important points here so they do not get lost, as I e=
arlier only sent them to authors).
--
kivinen@iki.fi


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CC: Paul Wouters <paul.wouters=40aiven.io@dmarc.ietf.org>, "ipsec@ietf.org" <ipsec@ietf.org>, "draft-pwouters-ipsecme-multi-sa-performance@ietf.org" <draft-pwouters-ipsecme-multi-sa-performance@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] Comments on draft-pwouters-multi-sa-performance & draft-xu-ipsecme-esp-in-udp-lb
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Date: Thu, 18 Nov 2021 19:07:37 +0200
From: Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>
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Subject: [IPsec] Typo in yang module text
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For send-immiately there is text:

             "On reception, end inner packets as soon as possible, do
              not wait for lost or misordered outer packets.
              Selecting this option reduces the inner (user) packet
              delay but can amplify out-of-order delivery of the
              inner packet stream in the presence of packet
              aggregation and any reordering.";

which should say:

             "On reception, send inner packets as soon as possible, do
	     	 	    ^----

Same typo on the mib document.

I will submit the base draft to the publication now, but will wait
until the yang and mib documents are fixed before asking publication
for them.
-- 
kivinen@iki.fi


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Subject: [IPsec] Publication has been requested for draft-ietf-ipsecme-iptfs-12
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Tero Kivinen has requested publication of draft-ietf-ipsecme-iptfs-12 as Proposed Standard on behalf of the IPSECME working group.

Please verify the document's state at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ipsecme-iptfs/



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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the IP Security Maintenance and Extensions WG of the IETF.

        Title           : A YANG Data Model for IP Traffic Flow Security
        Authors         : Don Fedyk
                          Christian Hopps
	Filename        : draft-ietf-ipsecme-yang-iptfs-05.txt
	Pages           : 28
	Date            : 2021-11-18

Abstract:
   This document describes a yang module for the management of IP
   Traffic Flow Security additions to IKEv2 and IPsec.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ipsecme-yang-iptfs/

There is also an htmlized version available at:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-ipsecme-yang-iptfs-05

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-ipsecme-yang-iptfs-05


Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/



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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the IP Security Maintenance and Extensions WG of the IETF.

        Title           : Definitions of Managed Objects for IP Traffic Flow Security
        Authors         : Don Fedyk
                          Eric Kinzie
	Filename        : draft-ietf-ipsecme-mib-iptfs-03.txt
	Pages           : 22
	Date            : 2021-11-18

Abstract:
   This document describes managed objects for the the management of IP
   Traffic Flow Security additions to IKEv2 and IPsec.  This document
   provides a read only version of the objects defined in the YANG
   module for the same purpose.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
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From: Don Fedyk <dfedyk@labn.net>
To: Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>, "ipsec@ietf.org" <ipsec@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [IPsec] Typo in yang module text
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ipsec/euN3QcWUwGEhPDNHzENflrx9ZSY>
Subject: Re: [IPsec] Typo in yang module text
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Hi Tero

Thanks for spotting that, I posted replacements.=20

Don=20

-----Original Message-----
From: IPsec <ipsec-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Tero Kivinen
Sent: Thursday, November 18, 2021 12:08 PM
To: ipsec@ietf.org
Subject: [IPsec] Typo in yang module text


For send-immiately there is text:

             "On reception, end inner packets as soon as possible, do
              not wait for lost or misordered outer packets.
              Selecting this option reduces the inner (user) packet
              delay but can amplify out-of-order delivery of the
              inner packet stream in the presence of packet
              aggregation and any reordering.";

which should say:

             "On reception, send inner packets as soon as possible, do
	     	 	    ^----

Same typo on the mib document.

I will submit the base draft to the publication now, but will wait until th=
e yang and mib documents are fixed before asking publication for them.
--
kivinen@iki.fi

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Tero Kivinen has requested publication of draft-ietf-ipsecme-yang-iptfs-05 as Proposed Standard on behalf of the IPSECME working group.

Please verify the document's state at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ipsecme-yang-iptfs/



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Tero Kivinen has requested publication of draft-ietf-ipsecme-mib-iptfs-03 as Proposed Standard on behalf of the IPSECME working group.

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Don Fedyk writes:
> Thanks for spotting that, I posted replacements. 

Thanks, submitted now to IESG for publication...
-- 
kivinen@iki.fi


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Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2021 09:49:22 -0500 (EST)
From: Paul Wouters <paul.wouters@aiven.io>
To: Harold Liu <harold.liu=40ericsson.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] FW: New Version Notification for draft-liu-ipsecme-ikev2-rekey-redundant-sas-00.txt
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On Mon, 22 Nov 2021, Harold Liu wrote:

> Recently we ran into a real problem in some IPsec use case - IKEv2 protocol supports rekey mechanism for IKE Security Association (SA) and Child SA, but may result in redundant SAs ([RFC7296], section 2.8.1) when both peers start rekeying at the same time.
> Although in such case IKEv2 selects the SA created with the lowest of the four nonces and the redundant SA SHOULD be deleted by the endpoint that created it, but it is not enough.
> Because among the standards, frequent rekeying is highly recommended, but such an approach can be non-optimal when SA are frequently rekeys as SAs are unnecessary computed and adds an additional IKEv2 exchange.

Is your implementation not using a rekey fuzz of say 1 to 5 % ? In that
way, two endpoints are extremely unlikely to rekey at the exact same
time.

> So this document defines the Rekeying Priority in IKEv2 extension which enables to agree roles for rekeying of child SAs and optimize IKEv2 rekey negotiation.

I don't think the role of Initiator or Responder should be changed based
on a random value. It is really based on which end has the shortest
lifetime, which is not negotiated, presuming both ends want the
connection to stay up.

In a classic, client to server IPsec connection, it should really be the
client that initiates the rekey, and the server is just there to
facilitate the client's needs.

> The below announcement is that draft. We would like to work with the community to improve and clarify tech draft.

I don't think this document is needed if "fuzz" is used. Can you clarify
why you think using random fuzz on the keylife is not good enough?

Paul


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From: Harold Liu <harold.liu@ericsson.com>
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Thread-Topic: [IPsec] FW: New Version Notification for draft-liu-ipsecme-ikev2-rekey-redundant-sas-00.txt
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] FW: New Version Notification for draft-liu-ipsecme-ikev2-rekey-redundant-sas-00.txt
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Hi Paul, thank you very much for your pertinent feedback, please check out =
my reply inline.

-----Original Message-----
From: Paul Wouters <paul.wouters=3D40aiven.io@dmarc.ietf.org>=20
Sent: Monday, November 22, 2021 10:49 PM
To: Harold Liu <harold.liu@ericsson.com>
Cc: ipsec@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [IPsec] FW: New Version Notification for draft-liu-ipsecme-ike=
v2-rekey-redundant-sas-00.txt

On Mon, 22 Nov 2021, Harold Liu wrote:

> Recently we ran into a real problem in some IPsec use case - IKEv2 protoc=
ol supports rekey mechanism for IKE Security Association (SA) and Child SA,=
 but may result in redundant SAs ([RFC7296], section 2.8.1) when both peers=
 start rekeying at the same time.
> Although in such case IKEv2 selects the SA created with the lowest of the=
 four nonces and the redundant SA SHOULD be deleted by the endpoint that cr=
eated it, but it is not enough.
> Because among the standards, frequent rekeying is highly recommended, but=
 such an approach can be non-optimal when SA are frequently rekeys as SAs a=
re unnecessary computed and adds an additional IKEv2 exchange.

Is your implementation not using a rekey fuzz of say 1 to 5 % ? In that way=
, two endpoints are extremely unlikely to rekey at the exact same time.

<Harold>
       1) We do use randomize the SA life time. Thanks for the feedback.
       2) Currently the typical lifetime is 300s (shortest).
       3) In the case of gateway to gateway, there is no client or server.
       4) In gateway to gateway case, randomizing the SA lifetime is not su=
fficient as we do not want to rely on a probabilistic model that depends on=
 the life time of the child SA, but rather ensure we do not run into such d=
uplications. At the same time, even though initiator and responder both hav=
e randomize lifetime the lifetime is a completely local value (not negotiat=
ed), and even the initiator and responder can use different values. So ther=
e's still a probability of rekey happening at both ends simultaneously.
       5) Due to the arrival of 5G the number of radio access increases gre=
atly meanwhile IKE sessions are established between GATEWAY and GATEWAY bas=
ed on cloud-RAN. At the same time, Cloud-ran causes IKE sessions to be conc=
entrated on the gateway and gateway so as to the scale of Child SAs is huge=
, usually more than thousands.  So even a few percent of simultaneous rekey=
ing is unacceptable because it will bring too many redundant packets and oc=
cupy bandwidth.
</Harold>

> So this document defines the Rekeying Priority in IKEv2 extension which e=
nables to agree roles for rekeying of child SAs and optimize IKEv2 rekey ne=
gotiation.

I don't think the role of Initiator or Responder should be changed based on=
 a random value. It is really based on which end has the shortest lifetime,=
 which is not negotiated, presuming both ends want the connection to stay u=
p.

<Harold>
       IKEv2 does not consider fix roles, that is the initiator of one exch=
ange can be the responder of the next.  I am wondering if that is something=
 you are willing to change. I also have the impression you are considering =
a scenario that is different from ours. In our scenario (gateway-to-gateway=
) the roles of the peers are really symmetric, and there does not seem to h=
ave any reasons at all to keep each peer with a fixed role. Of course, when=
 SA lifetime are different this does not occurs - I think the document is p=
retty clear on that - so the heuristic you propose based on the shortest li=
fe time does not seems applicable - at least in the situation we are consid=
ering.
</Harold>

In a classic, client to server IPsec connection, it should really be the cl=
ient that initiates the rekey, and the server is just there to facilitate t=
he client's needs.

> The below announcement is that draft. We would like to work with the comm=
unity to improve and clarify tech draft.

I don't think this document is needed if "fuzz" is used. Can you clarify wh=
y you think using random fuzz on the keylife is not good enough?

<Harold>
       We are looking for a deterministic mechanism. We are happy to change=
 the one we proposed, but we cannot rely on SA random SA lifetime.
</Harold>

Paul


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Date: Tue, 23 Nov 2021 22:06:45 -0500 (EST)
From: Paul Wouters <paul.wouters@aiven.io>
To: Harold Liu <harold.liu=40ericsson.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] FW: New Version Notification for draft-liu-ipsecme-ikev2-rekey-redundant-sas-00.txt
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On Wed, 24 Nov 2021, Harold Liu wrote:

> Is your implementation not using a rekey fuzz of say 1 to 5 % ? In that way, two endpoints are extremely unlikely to rekey at the exact same time.
>
> <Harold>
>       1) We do use randomize the SA life time. Thanks for the feedback.
>       2) Currently the typical lifetime is 300s (shortest).
>       3) In the case of gateway to gateway, there is no client or server.
>       4) In gateway to gateway case, randomizing the SA lifetime is not sufficient as we do not want to rely on a probabilistic model that depends on the life time of the child SA, but rather ensure we do not run into such duplications. At the same time, even though initiator and responder both have randomize lifetime the lifetime is a completely local value (not negotiated), and even the initiator and responder can use different values. So there's still a probability of rekey happening at both ends simultaneously.
>       5) Due to the arrival of 5G the number of radio access increases greatly meanwhile IKE sessions are established between GATEWAY and GATEWAY based on cloud-RAN. At the same time, Cloud-ran causes IKE sessions to be concentrated on the gateway and gateway so as to the scale of Child SAs is huge, usually more than thousands.  So even a few percent of simultaneous rekeying is unacceptable because it will bring too many redundant packets and occupy bandwidth.
> </Harold>

Okay that is fair. Please add it to the Introduction of the draft somehow :)

> <Harold>
>       We are looking for a deterministic mechanism. We are happy to change the one we proposed, but we cannot rely on SA random SA lifetime.
> </Harold>

So since lifetime is not negotiated, both endpoints have a need to
rekey. Even if they agree via some other mechanism that one end
should initiate the rekey, what should happen when that rekey is
not happening? At some point the endpoint not initiating will have
to tear down or start a rekey anyway.

So why not, instead of a random process, exchange the maximum Child SA
lifetime accepted before rekey? If the numbers are identical, prefer the
current exchange initiator.

That way, it is deterministic and both endpoints inform the other end
when (plus or minus some fuzz) a rekey is required.

Paul


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From: Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] FW: New Version Notification for draft-liu-ipsecme-ikev2-rekey-redundant-sas-00.txt
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Paul Wouters writes:
> So why not, instead of a random process, exchange the maximum Child S=
A
> lifetime accepted before rekey=3F If the numbers are identical, prefe=
r the
> current exchange initiator.
>=20
> That way, it is deterministic and both endpoints inform the other end=

> when (plus or minus some fuzz) a rekey is required.

I think the normal way to do that is to make it so that the original
initiator stays initiator. This is usually smart thing anyway as it
keeps statistics etc more stable, and in case there is asymmetricy
between the nodes, it keeps the asymmetry same.

Easiest way to do that is to use shorter lifetime for the initiator,
i.e., if your configured lifetime is 3600 seconds, on original
initiator you use n * (0.85 =B1 0.05), and on the original responder yo=
u
use n * (1.00 =B1 0.05), i.e., your original initiator will start rekey=

between 2880 and 3240 seconds, and the original responder is only
trying rekey after 3420-3780 seconds, so original initiator should be
able to finish rekey before original responder even starts thinking
about it.

Btw, I think 300 seconds is way too short rekey interval and would
considere anything less than 10 minutes, or half an hour as an DoS
attack against the gateway. Doing Diffie-Hellman that often is
consuming lots of resources, and I have no idea what your trust model
is to require that frequent rekeying, but similar method should work
there too, but at some point you will need to add some fixed modifiers
too.

I think the implementation I am familiar with did substract fixed 30
seconds from the initiator value always, just to make sure there was
time to finish the rekey before other started it. And I think there
was lower limit of rekey interval of two minutes or so, and that was
mostly because QA wanted to have short rekeying interval for testing
(so tests do not run too long), not for real operational use...

I.e., the rekeying interval on the original initiator was set to n *
(0.85 =B1 0.05) - 30 seconds, and on the responder it was set to n *
(1.00 =B1 0.05). On the responder you would not normally need
randomization but I think it was there just in case we talked to some
other implementation than our own and having it there might help then.

Also it does not really matter if this happens every now and then,
i.e., once per 100 rekeys or something like that, it usually is only
issue when it happens almost every time. If you follow the rules in
RFC you should recover from the duplicate SAs on the next rekey. On
the other hand if you are doing Diffie-Hellmans that often you clearly
are not concerned about resource use :-)
--=20
kivinen@iki.fi


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From: "Valery Smyslov" <smyslov.ietf@gmail.com>
To: "'Paul Wouters'" <paul.wouters=40aiven.io@dmarc.ietf.org>, "'Harold Liu'" <harold.liu=40ericsson.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] FW: New Version Notification for draft-liu-ipsecme-ikev2-rekey-redundant-sas-00.txt
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Hi Harold,

I failed to understand one thing. The situation you are trying to avoid
in most cases happens if peers are configured with equal SA lifetime.
Why you don't just configure your gateways with different lifetimes?
It seems to me that in scenarios you describe you have a total control over gateways?

> > Is your implementation not using a rekey fuzz of say 1 to 5 % ? In that way, two endpoints are extremely
> unlikely to rekey at the exact same time.
> >
> > <Harold>
> >       1) We do use randomize the SA life time. Thanks for the feedback.
> >       2) Currently the typical lifetime is 300s (shortest).
> >       3) In the case of gateway to gateway, there is no client or server.
> >       4) In gateway to gateway case, randomizing the SA lifetime is not sufficient as we do not want to rely on
> a probabilistic model that depends on the life time of the child SA, but rather ensure we do not run into such
> duplications. At the same time, even though initiator and responder both have randomize lifetime the lifetime
> is a completely local value (not negotiated), and even the initiator and responder can use different values. So
> there's still a probability of rekey happening at both ends simultaneously.

In our tests we emulated ~3000 SAs between two hosts with lifetime ~300 secs.
With SA lifetimes randomization collisions were very rare (don't remember exact data, I believe few percent of total rekeys).

> >       5) Due to the arrival of 5G the number of radio access increases greatly meanwhile IKE sessions are
> established between GATEWAY and GATEWAY based on cloud-RAN. At the same time, Cloud-ran causes IKE
> sessions to be concentrated on the gateway and gateway so as to the scale of Child SAs is huge, usually more
> than thousands.  So even a few percent of simultaneous rekeying is unacceptable because it will bring too
> many redundant packets and occupy bandwidth.
> > </Harold>

I can't buy the last argument. Rekey consumes two ~100 bytes messages and little CPU cycles
(unless you do PFS). If you can handle 5G traffic, then couple of hundreds extra bytes happened
in approximately 1% of all rekeys (which in turn are very small fraction of data traffic) 
cannot saturate 5G network, IMHO.

> Okay that is fair. Please add it to the Introduction of the draft somehow :)
> 
> > <Harold>
> >       We are looking for a deterministic mechanism. We are happy to change the one we proposed, but we
> cannot rely on SA random SA lifetime.
> > </Harold>
> 
> So since lifetime is not negotiated, both endpoints have a need to
> rekey. Even if they agree via some other mechanism that one end
> should initiate the rekey, what should happen when that rekey is
> not happening? At some point the endpoint not initiating will have
> to tear down or start a rekey anyway.

Exactly. For this reason I don't think the proposed solution is workable.

> So why not, instead of a random process, exchange the maximum Child SA
> lifetime accepted before rekey? If the numbers are identical, prefer the
> current exchange initiator.

> That way, it is deterministic and both endpoints inform the other end
> when (plus or minus some fuzz) a rekey is required.

It's not enough. There are many cases when rekey is caused not because
of time expiration, but due to other reasons. For example, peer
may count number of bytes sent and rekey after some amount is reached
(when it is critical to limit the number of bytes processed with the same key).
Or the number of messages sent (when you want to limit the number of 
times a key was used for crypto operations). Or just because peer
receives too many packets with invalid ICV and decides that he/she is
under attack trying to break the current key.

I only mentioned those reasons that we implemented...

So, there are a lot of reasons for rekey. I think that the ability for any
peer to rekey at any time it thinks it is needed is a fundamental
property of IKEv2 and I think we should not break it.

Regards,
Valery.

> Paul
> 
> _______________________________________________
> IPsec mailing list
> IPsec@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec


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From: Daniel Migault <mglt.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 2021 08:21:14 -0500
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To: Valery Smyslov <smyslov.ietf@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Wouters <paul.wouters=40aiven.io@dmarc.ietf.org>,  Harold Liu <harold.liu=40ericsson.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, IPsecME WG <ipsec@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] FW: New Version Notification for draft-liu-ipsecme-ikev2-rekey-redundant-sas-00.txt
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--0000000000002b2a9e05d2016fa3
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Hi,

Thank you all for the comments. I believe there is a misunderstanding of
the resource issue we are facing, so please find below a more detailed
description.

The resource in question is neither related to the CPU nor the memory, nor
the bandwidth as comments seem to suggest but instead related to the number
of table entries that perform the IPsec processing that varies between 720
to 4000 depending on the hardware chip.
When gateways rekey at the same time, ephemeral  SAs are created in the
table entry and are filling the entries of the table which means, if we
consider the worst case scenario, only half of the table entries can be
used. In our cases, using the 4000 entry table, leaving 400 unused entries
is not sufficient to prevent legitimate SA from being created and so the
hardware is not used at its full capacity.

We are proposing a determinist mechanism to address this issue. The general
idea is that peers agree that one of the peers will handle the rekey to
renew the SA when that SA expires during a given time slot. To take Tero's
numbers the rekey time slot could be  (0.85 =C2=B1 0.05) leaving the future
responder the time to realize the commitment has not been respected and
take over the rekey.
The mechanism is not expected to interfere with any other reasons that
would lead to a rekey.

The mechanism currently does not provide the SA life time as we thought the
mechanism would be mostly useful between gateway that are known to have the
same configuration. We are fine extending the mechanism and including the
SA life time if we can agree that this does not generate any security /
privacy consideration.
Randomizing the SA lifetime is a probabilistic approach we - and our
customers - do not want to rely on even if the probability of collision
decreases with the SA lifetime. Similarly considering different SA lifetime
on every device would require some changes in the way the gateways are
provisioned our customers would like to avoid.

Yours,
Daniel

On Wed, Nov 24, 2021 at 10:55 AM Valery Smyslov <smyslov.ietf@gmail.com>
wrote:

> Hi Harold,
>
> I failed to understand one thing. The situation you are trying to avoid
> in most cases happens if peers are configured with equal SA lifetime.
> Why you don't just configure your gateways with different lifetimes?
> It seems to me that in scenarios you describe you have a total control
> over gateways?
>
> > > Is your implementation not using a rekey fuzz of say 1 to 5 % ? In
> that way, two endpoints are extremely
> > unlikely to rekey at the exact same time.
> > >
> > > <Harold>
> > >       1) We do use randomize the SA life time. Thanks for the feedbac=
k.
> > >       2) Currently the typical lifetime is 300s (shortest).
> > >       3) In the case of gateway to gateway, there is no client or
> server.
> > >       4) In gateway to gateway case, randomizing the SA lifetime is
> not sufficient as we do not want to rely on
> > a probabilistic model that depends on the life time of the child SA, bu=
t
> rather ensure we do not run into such
> > duplications. At the same time, even though initiator and responder bot=
h
> have randomize lifetime the lifetime
> > is a completely local value (not negotiated), and even the initiator an=
d
> responder can use different values. So
> > there's still a probability of rekey happening at both ends
> simultaneously.
>
> In our tests we emulated ~3000 SAs between two hosts with lifetime ~300
> secs.
> With SA lifetimes randomization collisions were very rare (don't remember
> exact data, I believe few percent of total rekeys).
>
> > >       5) Due to the arrival of 5G the number of radio access increase=
s
> greatly meanwhile IKE sessions are
> > established between GATEWAY and GATEWAY based on cloud-RAN. At the same
> time, Cloud-ran causes IKE
> > sessions to be concentrated on the gateway and gateway so as to the
> scale of Child SAs is huge, usually more
> > than thousands.  So even a few percent of simultaneous rekeying is
> unacceptable because it will bring too
> > many redundant packets and occupy bandwidth.
> > > </Harold>
>
> I can't buy the last argument. Rekey consumes two ~100 bytes messages and
> little CPU cycles
> (unless you do PFS). If you can handle 5G traffic, then couple of hundred=
s
> extra bytes happened
> in approximately 1% of all rekeys (which in turn are very small fraction
> of data traffic)
> cannot saturate 5G network, IMHO.
>
> > Okay that is fair. Please add it to the Introduction of the draft
> somehow :)
> >
> > > <Harold>
> > >       We are looking for a deterministic mechanism. We are happy to
> change the one we proposed, but we
> > cannot rely on SA random SA lifetime.
> > > </Harold>
> >
> > So since lifetime is not negotiated, both endpoints have a need to
> > rekey. Even if they agree via some other mechanism that one end
> > should initiate the rekey, what should happen when that rekey is
> > not happening? At some point the endpoint not initiating will have
> > to tear down or start a rekey anyway.
>
> Exactly. For this reason I don't think the proposed solution is workable.
>
> > So why not, instead of a random process, exchange the maximum Child SA
> > lifetime accepted before rekey? If the numbers are identical, prefer th=
e
> > current exchange initiator.
>
> > That way, it is deterministic and both endpoints inform the other end
> > when (plus or minus some fuzz) a rekey is required.
>
> It's not enough. There are many cases when rekey is caused not because
> of time expiration, but due to other reasons. For example, peer
> may count number of bytes sent and rekey after some amount is reached
> (when it is critical to limit the number of bytes processed with the same
> key).
> Or the number of messages sent (when you want to limit the number of
> times a key was used for crypto operations). Or just because peer
> receives too many packets with invalid ICV and decides that he/she is
> under attack trying to break the current key.
>
> I only mentioned those reasons that we implemented...
>
> So, there are a lot of reasons for rekey. I think that the ability for an=
y
> peer to rekey at any time it thinks it is needed is a fundamental
> property of IKEv2 and I think we should not break it.
>
> Regards,
> Valery.
>
> > Paul
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > IPsec mailing list
> > IPsec@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec
>
> _______________________________________________
> IPsec mailing list
> IPsec@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec
>


--=20
Daniel Migault
Ericsson

--0000000000002b2a9e05d2016fa3
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">Hi,<br><br>Thank you all for the comments. I believe there=
 is a misunderstanding of the resource issue we are facing, so please find =
below a more detailed description.<br><br>The resource in question is neith=
er related to the CPU nor the memory, nor the bandwidth as comments seem to=
 suggest but instead related to the number of table entries that perform th=
e IPsec processing that varies between 720 to 4000 depending on the hardwar=
e chip.<br>When gateways rekey at the same time, ephemeral =C2=A0SAs are cr=
eated in the table entry and are filling the entries of the table which mea=
ns, if we consider the worst case scenario, only half of the table entries =
can be used. In our cases, using the 4000 entry table, leaving 400 unused e=
ntries is not sufficient to prevent legitimate SA from being created and so=
 the hardware is not used at its full capacity.<div><br>We are proposing a =
determinist mechanism to address this issue. The general idea is that peers=
 agree that one of the peers will handle the rekey to renew the SA when tha=
t SA expires during a given time slot. To take Tero&#39;s numbers the rekey=
 time slot could be =C2=A0(0.85 =C2=B1 0.05) leaving the future responder t=
he time to realize the commitment has not been respected and take over the =
rekey.<br>The mechanism is not expected to interfere with any other reasons=
 that would lead to a rekey.<br><br>The mechanism currently does not provid=
e the SA life time as we thought the mechanism would be mostly useful betwe=
en gateway that are known to have the same configuration. We are fine exten=
ding the mechanism and including the SA life time=C2=A0if we can agree that=
 this does not generate any security / privacy consideration.=C2=A0<br>Rand=
omizing the SA lifetime is a probabilistic approach we - and our customers =
- do not want to rely on even if the probability of collision decreases wit=
h the SA lifetime. Similarly considering different SA lifetime on every dev=
ice would require some changes in the way the gateways are provisioned our =
customers would like to avoid.<br><br>Yours,<br>Daniel<br></div></div><br><=
div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Wed, Nov=
 24, 2021 at 10:55 AM Valery Smyslov &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:smyslov.ietf@gma=
il.com">smyslov.ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D=
"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(2=
04,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Hi Harold,<br>
<br>
I failed to understand one thing. The situation you are trying to avoid<br>
in most cases happens if peers are configured with equal SA lifetime.<br>
Why you don&#39;t just configure your gateways with different lifetimes?<br=
>
It seems to me that in scenarios you describe you have a total control over=
 gateways?<br>
<br>
&gt; &gt; Is your implementation not using a rekey fuzz of say 1 to 5 % ? I=
n that way, two endpoints are extremely<br>
&gt; unlikely to rekey at the exact same time.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; &lt;Harold&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A01) We do use randomize the SA life time=
. Thanks for the feedback.<br>
&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A02) Currently the typical lifetime is 30=
0s (shortest).<br>
&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A03) In the case of gateway to gateway, t=
here is no client or server.<br>
&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A04) In gateway to gateway case, randomiz=
ing the SA lifetime is not sufficient as we do not want to rely on<br>
&gt; a probabilistic model that depends on the life time of the child SA, b=
ut rather ensure we do not run into such<br>
&gt; duplications. At the same time, even though initiator and responder bo=
th have randomize lifetime the lifetime<br>
&gt; is a completely local value (not negotiated), and even the initiator a=
nd responder can use different values. So<br>
&gt; there&#39;s still a probability of rekey happening at both ends simult=
aneously.<br>
<br>
In our tests we emulated ~3000 SAs between two hosts with lifetime ~300 sec=
s.<br>
With SA lifetimes randomization collisions were very rare (don&#39;t rememb=
er exact data, I believe few percent of total rekeys).<br>
<br>
&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A05) Due to the arrival of 5G the number =
of radio access increases greatly meanwhile IKE sessions are<br>
&gt; established between GATEWAY and GATEWAY based on cloud-RAN. At the sam=
e time, Cloud-ran causes IKE<br>
&gt; sessions to be concentrated on the gateway and gateway so as to the sc=
ale of Child SAs is huge, usually more<br>
&gt; than thousands.=C2=A0 So even a few percent of simultaneous rekeying i=
s unacceptable because it will bring too<br>
&gt; many redundant packets and occupy bandwidth.<br>
&gt; &gt; &lt;/Harold&gt;<br>
<br>
I can&#39;t buy the last argument. Rekey consumes two ~100 bytes messages a=
nd little CPU cycles<br>
(unless you do PFS). If you can handle 5G traffic, then couple of hundreds =
extra bytes happened<br>
in approximately 1% of all rekeys (which in turn are very small fraction of=
 data traffic) <br>
cannot saturate 5G network, IMHO.<br>
<br>
&gt; Okay that is fair. Please add it to the Introduction of the draft some=
how :)<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; &gt; &lt;Harold&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0We are looking for a deterministic mech=
anism. We are happy to change the one we proposed, but we<br>
&gt; cannot rely on SA random SA lifetime.<br>
&gt; &gt; &lt;/Harold&gt;<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; So since lifetime is not negotiated, both endpoints have a need to<br>
&gt; rekey. Even if they agree via some other mechanism that one end<br>
&gt; should initiate the rekey, what should happen when that rekey is<br>
&gt; not happening? At some point the endpoint not initiating will have<br>
&gt; to tear down or start a rekey anyway.<br>
<br>
Exactly. For this reason I don&#39;t think the proposed solution is workabl=
e.<br>
<br>
&gt; So why not, instead of a random process, exchange the maximum Child SA=
<br>
&gt; lifetime accepted before rekey? If the numbers are identical, prefer t=
he<br>
&gt; current exchange initiator.<br>
<br>
&gt; That way, it is deterministic and both endpoints inform the other end<=
br>
&gt; when (plus or minus some fuzz) a rekey is required.<br>
<br>
It&#39;s not enough. There are many cases when rekey is caused not because<=
br>
of time expiration, but due to other reasons. For example, peer<br>
may count number of bytes sent and rekey after some amount is reached<br>
(when it is critical to limit the number of bytes processed with the same k=
ey).<br>
Or the number of messages sent (when you want to limit the number of <br>
times a key was used for crypto operations). Or just because peer<br>
receives too many packets with invalid ICV and decides that he/she is<br>
under attack trying to break the current key.<br>
<br>
I only mentioned those reasons that we implemented...<br>
<br>
So, there are a lot of reasons for rekey. I think that the ability for any<=
br>
peer to rekey at any time it thinks it is needed is a fundamental<br>
property of IKEv2 and I think we should not break it.<br>
<br>
Regards,<br>
Valery.<br>
<br>
&gt; Paul<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; IPsec mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:IPsec@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">IPsec@ietf.org</a>=
<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec" rel=3D"norefer=
rer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec</a><br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
IPsec mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:IPsec@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">IPsec@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec</a><br>
</blockquote></div><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div dir=3D"ltr"=
 class=3D"gmail_signature"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Daniel Migault<br></div><d=
iv>Ericsson</div></div></div>

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From: Paul Wouters <paul.wouters@aiven.io>
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 2021 14:42:00 -0500
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On Tue, Nov 30, 2021 at 8:21 AM Daniel Migault <mglt.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:

>
> Thank you all for the comments. I believe there is a misunderstanding of
> the resource issue we are facing, so please find below a more detailed
> description.
>
> The resource in question is neither related to the CPU nor the memory, nor
> the bandwidth as comments seem to suggest but instead related to the number
> of table entries that perform the IPsec processing that varies between 720
> to 4000 depending on the hardware chip.
>

Okay.


Randomizing the SA lifetime is a probabilistic approach we - and our
customers - do not want to rely on even if the probability of collision
decreases with the SA lifetime.

So now I am a bit confused. If you are mostly concerned able table length,
then 1 double IPsec SA won't hurt you, but 4000 will. So removing a random
percentage amount of seconds from the initiator would actually
probabilistic fix your issue. 4000 connections with a lifetime of 3600s,
that all start at the same time with a 20% fuzz on initiator would cause
you an extra 5 or 6 SAs. If your code recognises the new SA traffic, and
there is frequent traffic, these double SAs would go away in seconds. So on
a unit that can do 4000 SAs, you can now do only 3994 SAs.

Am I making a mistake here ?

Paul

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Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div=
 dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, Nov 30, 2021 at 8:21 AM Daniel Mi=
gault &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mglt.ietf@gmail.com">mglt.ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt=
; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px=
 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div di=
r=3D"ltr"><br>Thank you all for the comments. I believe there is a misunder=
standing of the resource issue we are facing, so please find below a more d=
etailed description.<br><br>The resource in question is neither related to =
the CPU nor the memory, nor the bandwidth as comments seem to suggest but i=
nstead related to the number of table entries that perform the IPsec proces=
sing that varies between 720 to 4000 depending on the hardware chip.<br></d=
iv></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Okay.<br></div><div><br></div><div>=C2=
=A0</div><div>Randomizing the SA lifetime is a probabilistic approach we - =
and our customers - do not want to rely on even if the probability of colli=
sion decreases with the SA lifetime.</div><div><br></div><div>So now I am a=
 bit confused. If you are mostly concerned able table length, then 1 double=
 IPsec SA won&#39;t hurt you, but 4000 will. So removing a random percentag=
e amount of seconds from the initiator would actually probabilistic fix you=
r issue. 4000 connections with a lifetime of 3600s, that all start at the s=
ame time with a 20% fuzz on initiator would cause you an extra 5 or 6 SAs. =
If your code recognises the new SA traffic, and there is frequent traffic, =
these double SAs would go away in seconds. So on a unit that can do 4000 SA=
s, you can now do only 3994 SAs.</div><div><br></div><div>Am I making a mis=
take here ?</div><div><br></div><div>Paul</div><div><br></div><div><br></di=
v><br></div></div>

--000000000000e386dc05d206c0e9--

