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From: Daniel Migault <mglt.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 2 Dec 2021 08:33:48 -0500
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To: Paul Wouters <paul.wouters@aiven.io>
Cc: Valery Smyslov <smyslov.ietf@gmail.com>, Harold Liu <harold.liu@ericsson.com>, IPsecME WG <ipsec@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] FW: New Version Notification for draft-liu-ipsecme-ikev2-rekey-redundant-sas-00.txt
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--000000000000d1028e05d229d756
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Hi Paul,

That is correct and this is what we are doing with a 10% over each side
when time base SA life time is used. The number I gave was measured using
byte base SA life time.
We tried the same approach for the byte base SA lifetime but the same
strategy does not work -- unless we consider very high values up to 40% of
the SA life time.

In our case, the traffic is symmetric, that is the same amount of bytes is
carried into both directions, SA life times are randomized +/- 10% and each
gateway checks the SA used for decryption. Such randomization (or
difference between the SAs) is not sufficient as that the counter is
checked approximately every 2 s to determine if a rekey needs to be
performed and any traffic burst cancels differences introduced by the
randomization.
In our current configuration initiator and responder are really
interchangeable, and this mostly results from the fact that they look at
different SAs AND that the traffic is relatively symmetric.
The ability to agree which of the peers is handling the rekey is expected
to prevent such simultaneous rekey as the behavior becomes predictable
between two peers and between different implementations.
There is still a need to introduce some randomness to prevent multiple
rekeys to happen at the same time. Assigning a rekey responsibility
requires one peer to look at both (unidirectional SAs) as opposed to one,
but over the number of SA the necessary resource associated to this
responsibility will remain the same as the one considered.
What we need to make sure is that a rekey occurs even if the peer
designated to rekey does not fulfill its commitment.

If we extend the case to traffic that is asymmetric (with our
implementation) the asymmetry of the traffic competes with the difference
of the SA lifetime which results for a given SA in randomness increasing or
decreasing the probability of simultaneous rekey. So here also, we believe
that being able to specify a behavior will prevent or at least limit the
simultaneous rekey.

Yours,
Daniel

On Tue, Nov 30, 2021 at 2:42 PM Paul Wouters <paul.wouters@aiven.io> wrote:

>
> On Tue, Nov 30, 2021 at 8:21 AM Daniel Migault <mglt.ietf@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>>
>> Thank you all for the comments. I believe there is a misunderstanding of
>> the resource issue we are facing, so please find below a more detailed
>> description.
>>
>> The resource in question is neither related to the CPU nor the memory,
>> nor the bandwidth as comments seem to suggest but instead related to the
>> number of table entries that perform the IPsec processing that varies
>> between 720 to 4000 depending on the hardware chip.
>>
>
> Okay.
>
>
> Randomizing the SA lifetime is a probabilistic approach we - and our
> customers - do not want to rely on even if the probability of collision
> decreases with the SA lifetime.
>
> So now I am a bit confused. If you are mostly concerned able table length,
> then 1 double IPsec SA won't hurt you, but 4000 will. So removing a random
> percentage amount of seconds from the initiator would actually
> probabilistic fix your issue. 4000 connections with a lifetime of 3600s,
> that all start at the same time with a 20% fuzz on initiator would cause
> you an extra 5 or 6 SAs. If your code recognises the new SA traffic, and
> there is frequent traffic, these double SAs would go away in seconds. So on
> a unit that can do 4000 SAs, you can now do only 3994 SAs.
>
> Am I making a mistake here ?
>
> Paul
>
>
>
>

-- 
Daniel Migault
Ericsson

--000000000000d1028e05d229d756
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">Hi Paul,<br><br>That is correct and this is what we are do=
ing with a 10% over each side when time base SA life time is used. The numb=
er I gave was measured using byte base SA life time.<br>We tried the same a=
pproach for the byte base SA lifetime but the same strategy does not work -=
- unless we consider very high values up to 40% of the SA life time.<br><br=
>In our case, the traffic is symmetric, that is the same amount of bytes is=
 carried into both directions, SA life times are randomized +/- 10% and eac=
h gateway checks the SA used for decryption. Such randomization (or differe=
nce between the SAs) is not sufficient as that the counter is checked appro=
ximately every 2 s to determine if a rekey needs to be performed and any tr=
affic burst cancels differences introduced by the randomization.<br>In our =
current configuration initiator and responder are really interchangeable, a=
nd this mostly results from the fact that they look at different SAs AND th=
at the traffic is relatively symmetric.<br>The ability to agree which of th=
e peers is handling the rekey is expected to prevent such simultaneous reke=
y as the behavior becomes predictable between two peers and between differe=
nt implementations.<br>There is still a need to introduce some randomness t=
o prevent multiple rekeys to happen at the same time. Assigning a rekey res=
ponsibility requires one peer to look at both (unidirectional SAs) as oppos=
ed to one, but over the number of SA the necessary resource associated to t=
his responsibility will remain the same as the one considered.<br>What we n=
eed to make sure is that a rekey occurs even if the peer designated to reke=
y does not fulfill its commitment.<br><br>If we extend the case to traffic =
that is asymmetric (with our implementation) the asymmetry of the traffic c=
ompetes with the difference of the SA lifetime which results for a given SA=
 in randomness increasing or decreasing the probability of simultaneous rek=
ey. So here also, we believe that being able to specify a behavior will pre=
vent or at least limit the simultaneous rekey.=C2=A0=C2=A0<br><div><br></di=
v><div>Yours,=C2=A0<br>Daniel</div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><di=
v dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, Nov 30, 2021 at 2:42 PM Paul Wou=
ters &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:paul.wouters@aiven.io">paul.wouters@aiven.io</a>=
&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px =
0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div=
 dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=
=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, Nov 30, 2021 at 8:21 AM Daniel Migaul=
t &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mglt.ietf@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">mglt.ietf@gm=
ail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"=
margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-lef=
t:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br>Thank you all for the comments. I believe there=
 is a misunderstanding of the resource issue we are facing, so please find =
below a more detailed description.<br><br>The resource in question is neith=
er related to the CPU nor the memory, nor the bandwidth as comments seem to=
 suggest but instead related to the number of table entries that perform th=
e IPsec processing that varies between 720 to 4000 depending on the hardwar=
e chip.<br></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Okay.<br></div><div><br><=
/div><div>=C2=A0</div><div>Randomizing the SA lifetime is a probabilistic a=
pproach we - and our customers - do not want to rely on even if the probabi=
lity of collision decreases with the SA lifetime.</div><div><br></div><div>=
So now I am a bit confused. If you are mostly concerned able table length, =
then 1 double IPsec SA won&#39;t hurt you, but 4000 will. So removing a ran=
dom percentage amount of seconds from the initiator would actually probabil=
istic fix your issue. 4000 connections with a lifetime of 3600s, that all s=
tart at the same time with a 20% fuzz on initiator would cause you an extra=
 5 or 6 SAs. If your code recognises the new SA traffic, and there is frequ=
ent traffic, these double SAs would go away in seconds. So on a unit that c=
an do 4000 SAs, you can now do only 3994 SAs.</div><div><br></div><div>Am I=
 making a mistake here ?</div><div><br></div><div>Paul</div><div><br></div>=
<div><br></div><br></div></div>
</blockquote></div><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div dir=3D"ltr"=
 class=3D"gmail_signature"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Daniel Migault<br></div><d=
iv>Ericsson</div></div></div>

--000000000000d1028e05d229d756--


From nobody Tue Dec  7 17:07:11 2021
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From: Joseph Touch via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org>
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Subject: [IPsec] Tsvart early review of draft-ietf-ipsecme-iptfs-12
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Reviewer: Joseph Touch
Review result: Ready

The current version has addressed my previous comments. 



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From: RFC Errata System <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org>
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Subject: [IPsec] [Editorial Errata Reported] RFC7296 (6779)
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The following errata report has been submitted for RFC7296,
"Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)".

--------------------------------------
You may review the report below and at:
https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6779

--------------------------------------
Type: Editorial
Reported by: warren.wang <648936027@qq.com>

Section: 1.1.1

Original Text
-------------
Each endpoint would announce the set of addresses
   "behind" it, and packets would be sent in tunnel mode where the inner
   IP header would contain the IP addresses of the actual endpoints.

Corrected Text
--------------
Each tunnel endpoint would announce the set of addresses
   "behind" it, and packets would be sent in tunnel mode where the inner
   IP header would contain the IP addresses of the actual endpoints.

Notes
-----
"Each tunnel endpoint" will make it easy to understand.

Instructions:
-------------
This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please
use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or
rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party  
can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary. 

--------------------------------------
RFC7296 (draft-kivinen-ipsecme-ikev2-rfc5996bis-04)
--------------------------------------
Title               : Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)
Publication Date    : October 2014
Author(s)           : C. Kaufman, P. Hoffman, Y. Nir, P. Eronen, T. Kivinen
Category            : INTERNET STANDARD
Source              : IP Security Maintenance and Extensions
Area                : Security
Stream              : IETF
Verifying Party     : IESG


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Hi Paul,

>> 8. Section 3.2:
>>    It would be unlikely that the traffic for TSi and TSr would have a
>>    different Security Label, but this specification does allow this to
>>    be specified.
>>
>> Can you please provide some examples of possible semantics of
>> different TS_SECLABELs in TSi and TSr? Sending different
>> security labels in different directions? Just for curiosity.
> 
> I cannot, but I wanted to ensure not to accidentally forbid it. What
> we do see with our implementation though, that we end up with two
> IPsec Sa's where each is only used in one direction. For example,
> image you have an SElinux context for nfs-server and nfs-client. What
> happens is that the NFS client triggers one label on the outgoing
> connection, triggers ACQUIRE, sets up an IPsec SA with a label
> "nfs-client". The first packet hits the NFS server, which to reply
> hits a different SElinux context of "nfs-server". So it will trigger
> an ACQUIRE and setup a second IPsec SA with a label "nfs-server". Both
> IPsec SA's will only be used in one direction. I did not add any
> of this into the document, as it is very SElinux specific, where as
> the draft is agnostic on the meaning of SEC_LABEL and allows for
> other mechanisms that might not have this complexity.

In the SELinux case, and using your example, could the client actually 
propose "nfs-client in TSi and "nfs-server" in TSr?  So the server could 
set "nfs-client" on the inbound SA/policy and "nfs-server" on the 
corresponding outbound SA/policy of the CHILD_SA (and vice-versa on the 
client)?  Or won't that work?  If it's a valid use case, should the 
document specify which of the two labels is to be applied to what 
SA/policy?  Or is that an implementation aspect that you explicitly want 
to keep out of it?

Also, I don't fully get the multiple label in TSi part.  If multiple 
labels are allowed/supported per SA by the implementation (not sure how 
that would work inbound, but let's assume there is a way to mark packets 
with some kind of meta label that covers multiple negotiated ones), why 
would any narrowing take place for TSr?

On the other hand, if multiple labels are not supported, in what 
situation could proposing multiple labels be useful?  Wouldn't traffic 
with the omitted labels just get dropped afterwards?  Or is the 
assumption that this triggers a new acquire/SA?  If so, would the 
request not contain multiple labels again and, if that's the case, what 
prevents the peer from selecting the same label as before?  Is it to 
keep track of what label it selected previously and that the intention 
of the initiator now might be that another should get selected?  Or is 
it up to the initiator not to propose multiple labels the second time 
around (or just omit the ones it already has an SA for)?  If so, why 
would it send multiple the first time (in particular if the SA was 
triggered by an acquire)?

I think either the narrowing to a single label should be optional, or 
sending multiple labels in TSi should be prohibited in the first place.

Regards,
Tobias


From nobody Fri Dec 10 19:07:34 2021
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From: RFC Errata System <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org>
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Subject: [IPsec] [Errata Held for Document Update] RFC7296 (6779)
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The following errata report has been held for document update 
for RFC7296, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)". 

--------------------------------------
You may review the report below and at:
https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6779

--------------------------------------
Status: Held for Document Update
Type: Editorial

Reported by: warren.wang <648936027@qq.com>
Date Reported: 2021-12-08
Held by: Benjamin Kaduk (IESG)

Section: 1.1.1

Original Text
-------------
   In this scenario, neither endpoint of the IP connection implements
   IPsec, but network nodes between them protect traffic for part of the
   way.  Protection is transparent to the endpoints, and depends on
   ordinary routing to send packets through the tunnel endpoints for
   processing.  Each endpoint would announce the set of addresses
   "behind" it, and packets would be sent in tunnel mode where the inner
   IP header would contain the IP addresses of the actual endpoints.


Corrected Text
--------------
   In this scenario, neither endpoint of the IP connection implements
   IPsec, but network nodes between them protect traffic for part of the
   way.  Protection is transparent to the endpoints, and depends on
   ordinary routing to send packets through the tunnel endpoints for
   processing.  Each tunnel endpoint would announce the set of addresses
   "behind" it, and packets would be sent in tunnel mode where the inner
   IP header would contain the IP addresses of the actual endpoints.


Notes
-----
"Each tunnel endpoint" will make it easy to understand which entity is announcing the set of addresses.

--------------------------------------
RFC7296 (draft-kivinen-ipsecme-ikev2-rfc5996bis-04)
--------------------------------------
Title               : Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)
Publication Date    : October 2014
Author(s)           : C. Kaufman, P. Hoffman, Y. Nir, P. Eronen, T. Kivinen
Category            : INTERNET STANDARD
Source              : IP Security Maintenance and Extensions
Area                : Security
Stream              : IETF
Verifying Party     : IESG


From nobody Wed Dec 15 09:16:35 2021
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Date: Wed, 15 Dec 2021 12:16:19 -0500 (EST)
From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
To: Tobias Brunner <tobias@strongswan.org>
cc: Valery Smyslov <smyslov.ietf@gmail.com>, ipsec@ietf.org,  'Tero Kivinen' <kivinen@iki.fi>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] WGLC of draft-ietf-ipsecme-labeled-ipsec
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On Thu, 9 Dec 2021, Tobias Brunner wrote:

> In the SELinux case, and using your example, could the client actually 
> propose "nfs-client in TSi and "nfs-server" in TSr?  So the server could set 
> "nfs-client" on the inbound SA/policy and "nfs-server" on the corresponding 
> outbound SA/policy of the CHILD_SA (and vice-versa on the client)?  Or won't 
> that work?  If it's a valid use case, should the document specify which of 
> the two labels is to be applied to what SA/policy?  Or is that an 
> implementation aspect that you explicitly want to keep out of it?

I was trying to keep that out of the draft. Because for example if the
label is TOP_SECRET vs SECRET, then you might not want to allow this.
Also, IKE daemons might not know how to interpret the label at all.

> Also, I don't fully get the multiple label in TSi part.  If multiple labels 
> are allowed/supported per SA by the implementation (not sure how that would 
> work inbound, but let's assume there is a way to mark packets with some kind 
> of meta label that covers multiple negotiated ones), why would any narrowing 
> take place for TSr?

Whether or not a label could be narrowed is something that is outside of
the scope of IKE. We don't want to require labels properties that might not
be compatible with a labeling structure we haven't thought or (or aren't
allowed to know about :)

I wanted to leave the option open of being able to suggest multiple
labels to support potential migrations or 'narrowing' or 'widening'.
I also assumed that if the labeling system supports label A and B,
i could also support a different label with the meaning of A|B or A&B.

I guess we could extend the mechanism to allow selecting multiple
labels, but it just seemed a complexity that was likely not to be used
in practise (AFAWK). In fact, I'd much rather remove allowing multiple
labels to be selected, than add complexity to allow multiple labels to
be negotiated.

> On the other hand, if multiple labels are not supported, in what situation 
> could proposing multiple labels be useful?

One reason could be to try and get the most secure label we both support
(or are allowed to use) in place. Eg if the information is SECRET, but
perhaps you and I have TOP_SECRET, by sending both we could end up on
the more secure TOP_SECRET. But if you only have SECRET, I might be
willing to allow SECRET for this as well.

Another example is migration. Perhaps we introduce a new TOPPEST_SECRET,
and I don't know if you upgraded to support this level yet, so I can
send TOPPEST_SECRET and TOP_SECRET and you pick TOP_SECRET when nog yet
upgraded and TOPPEST_SECRET when already upgraded.

>  Wouldn't traffic with the omitted 
> labels just get dropped afterwards?  Or is the assumption that this triggers 
> a new acquire/SA?

Not all labeling systems might be assigned labels based on IP trafic
properties. We would want to avoid things just "not working". Eg if
you don't support TOPPEST_SECRET, we wouldn't want to get stuck with
not being able to exchange traffic at all.

> If so, would the request not contain multiple labels again 
> and, if that's the case, what prevents the peer from selecting the same label 
> as before?  Is it to keep track of what label it selected previously and that 
> the intention of the initiator now might be that another should get selected?

I dont have expectations that using the wrong label or omitting a label
would result in a new working SA. It might or it might not.

> Or is it up to the initiator not to propose multiple labels the second time 
> around (or just omit the ones it already has an SA for)?  If so, why would it 
> send multiple the first time (in particular if the SA was triggered by an 
> acquire)?

I think you are thinking too much about actual packet properties, and
not take organizational / administratie labels into account ?

> I think either the narrowing to a single label should be optional, or sending 
> multiple labels in TSi should be prohibited in the first place.

That would complicate the migration example I explained above. A labeling
system might not accept multiple labels?

Although I am okay with making narrowing to a single label optional.

Note again that for our use case of SElinux, this does not matter as we
do not support more than one label in the IKE negotiation ever at this
point.

Paul


From nobody Wed Dec 15 16:26:12 2021
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Subject: [IPsec] WG Adoption call for draft-btw-add-ipsecme-ike
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Tero Kivinen writes:
> This is the start of 2 week WG adoption call for this document, ending
> 2021-11-22. Please send your reply about whether you support adopting
> this document as WG document or not.

We had some discussion on the mechanims defined in this draft, but
there was also lots of support for including this draft as working
group item, so the WG adoption call passed.
-- 
kivinen@iki.fi


From nobody Wed Dec 15 16:28:42 2021
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Date: Thu, 16 Dec 2021 02:28:32 +0200
From: Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>
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Subject: [IPsec] WG adoption call for draft-smyslov-ipsecme-ikev2-auth-announce
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Tero Kivinen writes:
> This is the start of 2 week WG adoption call for this document, ending
> 2021-11-22. Please send your reply about whether you support adopting
> this document as WG document or not.

There was much less support for this, but I think there is enough
interest in the WG to at least work on this, whether we get it out as
WG document in the end depends whether we have bit more interested
people for this document... Anyways the WG adoption call passed.
-- 
kivinen@iki.fi


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From: Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>
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Subject: [IPsec] IPsecME WGLC documents
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We currently have two documents in the WGLC:

draft-ietf-ipsecme-g-ikev2: Group Key Management using IKEv2

and

draft-ietf-ipsecme-rfc8229bis: TCP Encapsulation of IKE and IPsec Packets

Both of those documents have very little reviews or comments during
the WGLC, and I would like to get at least few reviews out of the
documents before we go forward with those documents.

So I will extend the WGLC for those until January, and if we have not
received more reviews by then, then I am not sure there is enough
interest to go forward with these documents. 
-- 
kivinen@iki.fi


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To: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
Cc: Valery Smyslov <smyslov.ietf@gmail.com>, ipsec@ietf.org, 'Tero Kivinen' <kivinen@iki.fi>
References: <24831.15082.263253.443690@fireball.acr.fi> <2d1501d799ba$af76bc40$0e6434c0$@gmail.com> <ed3d346-8f66-620-1914-d55e0dd9f2c@nohats.ca> <1a61d1fa-9b4e-effd-3819-3b735c077ac2@strongswan.org> <fcd8e69-384c-588a-a2f6-2a155eb1a15a@nohats.ca>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] WGLC of draft-ietf-ipsecme-labeled-ipsec
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>> In the SELinux case, and using your example, could the client actually
>> propose "nfs-client in TSi and "nfs-server" in TSr?  So the server could set
>> "nfs-client" on the inbound SA/policy and "nfs-server" on the corresponding
>> outbound SA/policy of the CHILD_SA (and vice-versa on the client)?  Or won't
>> that work?  If it's a valid use case, should the document specify which of
>> the two labels is to be applied to what SA/policy?  Or is that an
>> implementation aspect that you explicitly want to keep out of it?
> 
> I was trying to keep that out of the draft. Because for example if the
> label is TOP_SECRET vs SECRET, then you might not want to allow this.
> Also, IKE daemons might not know how to interpret the label at all.

Not sure I get your argument because if the local configuration allows 
what's proposed in TSi and TSr, why wouldn't we define on what 
SAs/policies the labels should get applied?  That doesn't require 
knowing anything about the labels.  Or maybe it's just obvious that the 
label in TSi is applied on the inbound SA/policy and the one in TSr on 
the outbound SA/policy on the responder of the CHILD_SA (and vice-versa 
on the initiator)?

>> Also, I don't fully get the multiple label in TSi part.  If multiple labels
>> are allowed/supported per SA by the implementation (not sure how that would
>> work inbound, but let's assume there is a way to mark packets with some kind
>> of meta label that covers multiple negotiated ones), why would any narrowing
>> take place for TSr?
> 
> Whether or not a label could be narrowed is something that is outside of
> the scope of IKE. We don't want to require labels properties that might not
> be compatible with a labeling structure we haven't thought or (or aren't
> allowed to know about :)

Not sure about that as for instance with SELinux, the IKE daemon, as 
responder, doesn't seem to be able to avoid interpreting labels to some 
degree as it usually won't have configurations for all possible labels 
that could get negotiated.  So it might have to do an SELinux policy 
check with the received label (I guess you could say the interpretation 
happens in the SELinux subsystem, but it has to at least interpret or 
convert the label to a null-terminated string).

> I wanted to leave the option open of being able to suggest multiple
> labels to support potential migrations or 'narrowing' or 'widening'.
> I also assumed that if the labeling system supports label A and B,
> i could also support a different label with the meaning of A|B or A&B.
> 
> I guess we could extend the mechanism to allow selecting multiple
> labels, but it just seemed a complexity that was likely not to be used
> in practise (AFAWK). In fact, I'd much rather remove allowing multiple
> labels to be selected, than add complexity to allow multiple labels to
> be negotiated.

Did you mean "remove allowing multiple labels to be *proposed*" (not 
"selected")?  Otherwise, I'm not sure what you mean.

>> On the other hand, if multiple labels are not supported, in what situation
>> could proposing multiple labels be useful?
> 
> One reason could be to try and get the most secure label we both support
> (or are allowed to use) in place. Eg if the information is SECRET, but
> perhaps you and I have TOP_SECRET, by sending both we could end up on
> the more secure TOP_SECRET. But if you only have SECRET, I might be
> willing to allow SECRET for this as well.
> 
> Another example is migration. Perhaps we introduce a new TOPPEST_SECRET,
> and I don't know if you upgraded to support this level yet, so I can
> send TOPPEST_SECRET and TOP_SECRET and you pick TOP_SECRET when nog yet
> upgraded and TOPPEST_SECRET when already upgraded.

It might help if those examples are documented as possible uses of the 
extension and as rationale for the design decisions.

>>   Wouldn't traffic with the omitted
>> labels just get dropped afterwards?  Or is the assumption that this triggers
>> a new acquire/SA?
> 
> Not all labeling systems might be assigned labels based on IP trafic
> properties. We would want to avoid things just "not working". Eg if
> you don't support TOPPEST_SECRET, we wouldn't want to get stuck with
> not being able to exchange traffic at all.
> 
>> If so, would the request not contain multiple labels again
>> and, if that's the case, what prevents the peer from selecting the same label
>> as before?  Is it to keep track of what label it selected previously and that
>> the intention of the initiator now might be that another should get selected?
> 
> I dont have expectations that using the wrong label or omitting a label
> would result in a new working SA. It might or it might not.
> 
>> Or is it up to the initiator not to propose multiple labels the second time
>> around (or just omit the ones it already has an SA for)?  If so, why would it
>> send multiple the first time (in particular if the SA was triggered by an
>> acquire)?
> 
> I think you are thinking too much about actual packet properties, and
> not take organizational / administratie labels into account ?

I guess I am, but they are negotiated as traffic selectors after all :)

If that's not really what they are, it might make more sense to 
negotiate the label (or labels) e.g. via notify that the responder could 
send back or ignore (in which case it's up to the initiator to delete 
the SA if it requires a label).

One aspect that makes negotiating labels via TS weird is that the TS of 
type TS_SECLABEL is merged with the other TS, which isn't the case with 
regular traffic selectors (it's like an outsourced property of all the 
other selectors).  This seems to violate section 3.13. of RFC 7296, 
which states:

   a packet matches a given TSi/TSr if it matches at least one of the
   individual selectors in TSi, and at least one of the individual
   selectors in TSr.

And the interpretation of asymmetric labels is again unclear.

Also, the draft currently sates that the label is applied as opaque 
value to the SPD.  However, the negotiated label might actually be more 
of a property of the SAD than the SPD.

Probably depends on the implementation, but for instance, with SELinux, 
I learned that the label on the triggering trap policy usually won't 
match the label on the packet that's included in the acquire and will be 
negotiated for the CHILD_SA.  So any IPsec policies derived from the 
traffic selectors with the negotiated label would usually not get used 
by the kernel i.e. their installation could just be avoided.  On the 
other hand, the label has to be applied to the SAs so only matching 
outbound traffic will use the outbound SA and it's applied to inbound 
traffic after decryption.  (I guess other implementations could handle 
this only via SPD, though.)

So again, negotiating labels as property of the CHILD_SA (like e.g. use 
of transport mode or compression) might make more sense.  It's then up 
to the implementation where/how they apply it.  That would also avoid 
issues with asymmetric labels as well as complicating traffic selector 
negotiation, because selectors of this type really can't be treated 
anything at all like the regular ones.

>> I think either the narrowing to a single label should be optional, or sending
>> multiple labels in TSi should be prohibited in the first place.
> 
> That would complicate the migration example I explained above. A labeling
> system might not accept multiple labels?
> 
> Although I am okay with making narrowing to a single label optional.
> 
> Note again that for our use case of SElinux, this does not matter as we
> do not support more than one label in the IKE negotiation ever at this
> point.

It would definitely be helpful to document the application of the 
extension in the context of SELinux as an example and guidance for 
developers.

Regards,
Tobias


From nobody Fri Dec 17 00:16:42 2021
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Subject: [IPsec] I-D Action: draft-ietf-ipsecme-add-ike-00.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the IP Security Maintenance and Extensions WG of the IETF.

        Title           : Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) Configuration for Encrypted DNS
        Authors         : Mohamed Boucadair
                          Tirumaleswar Reddy
                          Dan Wing
                          Valery Smyslov
	Filename        : draft-ietf-ipsecme-add-ike-00.txt
	Pages           : 13
	Date            : 2021-12-16

Abstract:
   This document specifies a new Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version
   2 (IKEv2) Configuration Payload Attribute Types for encrypted DNS
   protocols such as DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH), DNS-over-TLS (DoT), and DNS-
   over-QUIC (DoQ).


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ipsecme-add-ike/

There is also an htmlized version available at:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-ipsecme-add-ike-00


Internet-Drafts are also available by rsync at rsync.ietf.org::internet-drafts


