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From: tom petch <ietfc@btconnect.com>
To: Kenneth Vaughn <kvaughn@trevilon.com>
CC: Wes Hardaker <wjhns1@hardakers.net>, Juergen Schoenwaelder <j.schoenwaelder@jacobs-university.de>, "isms@ietf.org" <isms@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: Question regarding RFC 6353
Thread-Index: AQHWX7DXfWLA5tI62EqxNR3OP8lxTqkTVhkbgAB9EoCBgRSneA==
Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2021 17:40:22 +0000
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References: <840CBD97-1D31-48EB-A210-65CC0B43FFDC@trevilon.com> <20200717161145.zytufnzyhizpyc5p@anna.jacobs.jacobs-university.de> <AM6PR07MB52222429E1B317A012AF5033A07C0@AM6PR07MB5222.eurprd07.prod.outlook.com> <ybleep47ag9.fsf@w7.hardakers.net> <AM7PR07MB6248ABA492D5E1E4C45EE559A0790@AM7PR07MB6248.eurprd07.prod.outlook.com>, <F71201C2-9DAD-4BE9-9296-F89632F435CF@trevilon.com>
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/isms/M26tVZQE4FH10pkfAGvgRx_KtZY>
Subject: Re: [Isms] Question regarding RFC 6353
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From: Kenneth Vaughn <kvaughn@trevilon.com>=0A=
Sent: 22 July 2020 17:58=0A=
=0A=
Tom et al.=0A=
=0A=
Thank you for this great information. We will continue to study this topic =
and will present the information to the corresponding transportation WGs to=
 decide on our future direction.=0A=
=0A=
Kenneth=0A=
=0A=
RFC 8996 has now been published and this deprecates TLS and DTLS before 1.2=
 and so updates RFC5953 and RFC6353 but does not do anything to add 1.3 to =
SNMP:-( something I cannot see the IETF undertaking - it is all YANG these =
days=0A=
=0A=
Tom Petch=0A=
=0A=
=0A=
To give you some background, within the US, the Intelligent Transportation =
Systems (ITS) industry adopted the use of SNMPv1 in the late 1990s for mana=
ging an array of field devices (signal controllers, ramp meters, message si=
gns, etc.). We have standardized the data for these devices (and some other=
 issues) under the National Transportation Communications for ITS Protocol =
(NTCIP), which is a joint effort among the American Association of State Hi=
ghway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO), the Institute of Transportatio=
n Engineers (ITE), and the National Electrical Manufacturers Association (N=
EMA).=0A=
=0A=
Around the same time, the UK adopted SNMP (v2) to manage some of their fiel=
d devices using a separate set of MIBs (under their UTMC project).=0A=
=0A=
Over the years, the US and UK solutions have been almost universally adopte=
d within those two countries while also being widely deployed in other coun=
tries.=0A=
=0A=
>From the beginning, I have been complaining about the lack of security in t=
hese standards, but SNMPv3 was not released until the early 2000=92s after =
deployments had already started and there was little interest within the in=
dustry to revisit a decision when most networks at the time were private ne=
tworks and many of the links were extremely slow (e.g., 1200 bps to the fie=
ld - this even led to the development of a much more bandwidth friendly ver=
sion of SNMP that is specific to ITS). However, there is now increased inte=
rest in securing the protocol due to:=0A=
- Higher speed communication networks - often shared=0A=
- Higher speed processors in field equipment that run modern operating syst=
ems (e.g., Linux)=0A=
- Increased cybersecurity threats - and a few attacks that have impacted op=
erations in specific areas=0A=
- The need to prepare for connected vehicles in the relatively near future.=
=0A=
=0A=
Within the last decade, I have been involved in the development of two ISO =
TC 204 standards to address this issue (ISO 15784-2 defining how to use SNM=
P - including SNMPv3 - within ITS and ISO 20684 (all parts), which defines =
standardized data for devices).=0A=
=0A=
After twenty years, the US is now accepting that we need to secure our prot=
ocol and is undertaking the current study to investigate the best way to ac=
hieve this. My best guess at this point is that the WG will decide to maint=
ain the path towards using SNMPv3. It seems to me that the way in which we =
use the protocol is somewhat different than traditional network management.=
 Based on my review of various articles, it seems as if the network managem=
ent industry was (and still is) happy to use SNMP for network monitoring po=
tentially with very basic security - but migrated to NETCONF for the purpos=
es of device configuration, which tends to be a very manual process.  Withi=
n ITS, we use SNMP for both of these purposes but also use it for automated=
 command and control on a fairly regular basis (e.g., altering signal timin=
g, changing a message on a sign, etc). And the majority of our configuratio=
n commands are often just minor tweaks to a rather massive amount of inform=
ation in the device. Thus, my impression of NETCONF and even RESTCONF with =
JSON is that they would entail a significant change in logic within our sys=
tems coupled with an increase in bandwidth and processing utilization while=
 not providing any real practical benefit for our industry - except for the=
 odd case of the complete (or substantial) controller re-configuration proc=
ess - which is fairly rare. If you think I have somehow mis-characterized t=
he impacts of NETCONF/RESTCONF, I am happy to be corrected, but assuming th=
at my analysis is correct, I think our industry would prefer to continue th=
e use of SNMP - or perhaps migrate to a completely different solution, in p=
articular there would be some advantages to using data distribution technol=
ogies such as AMQP, MQTT, Kafka, or DDS but these obviously have very diffe=
rent trade-offs offering much better monitoring and data sharing while not =
handling the command and control as well.=0A=
=0A=
I will keep you posted as the project progresses, but I suspect that there =
will likely be real interest within our industry to make sure that the secu=
rity for SNMPv3 is maintained and updated to work with TLSv1.3. While I und=
erstand that the efforts to produce this type of documentation might have t=
o depend heavily on ITS support, I would certainly hope that any such maint=
enance can be performed under the auspices of IETF so that other users of S=
NMPv3 can directly benefit from these efforts (e.g., rather than developing=
 this update as an ISO or NTCIP standard where most of my involvement has b=
een to date on this topic).=0A=
=0A=
NOTE: As an aside, there might also be interest within the ITS community to=
 add support for SNMPv3 using IEEE 1609.2 certs rather than just X.509 cert=
s (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-msahli-ise-ieee1609/), but this i=
s likely a longer-term issue and obviously has to await feedback from the r=
elevant ITS committees.=0A=
=0A=
Regards,=0A=
Ken Vaughn=0A=
=0A=
Trevilon LLC=0A=
6606 FM 1488 RD #148-503=0A=
Magnolia, TX 77354=0A=
+1-936-647-1910=0A=
+1-571-331-5670 cell=0A=
www.trevilon.com<http://www.trevilon.com>=0A=
=0A=
On Jul 22, 2020, at 4:40 AM, tom petch <ietfc@btconnect.com<mailto:ietfc@bt=
connect.com>> wrote:=0A=
=0A=
From: Wes Hardaker <wjhns1@hardakers.net<mailto:wjhns1@hardakers.net>>=0A=
Sent: 21 July 2020 23:46=0A=
tom petch <ietfc@btconnect.com<mailto:ietfc@btconnect.com>> writes:=0A=
=0A=
I think that it may be more complicated than that.  TLS 1.3 is a=0A=
radical restructuring of TLS so that e.g. the concept of a ciphersuite=0A=
changes, digital signatures are specified separately and while=0A=
renegotiation has gone, TLS has never been much of a fan of client=0A=
authentication which SNMP is fussy about and prohibited renegotiation=0A=
as a result.=0A=
=0A=
I think client-based certificate authentication is the only thing that=0A=
would prevent RFC6353 from working over TLS 1.3, and I doubt it'll be a=0A=
problem (but haven't done the work to prove it).  RFC6353 was explicitly=0A=
written to not specify one specific version of TLS to use.  The only=0A=
thing it states authoritatively is in 9.2.1:=0A=
=0A=
  Because of known security vulnerabilities,=0A=
  TLSTM clients and servers MUST NOT request, offer, or use SSL 2.0.=0A=
  See Appendix E.2 of [RFC5246] for further details.=0A=
=0A=
The reference to TLS 1.2 via RFC5246 is in the document because we had=0A=
to normatively reference *some* version of TLS, and that's what was=0A=
available then.  No where in the document does it say "that's the only=0A=
version you should use".=0A=
=0A=
<tp>=0A=
Yes, my concern is more one of Fear, Uncertainty and Doubt as opposed to ha=
rd engineering, but this is security so it behoves us to be cautious.  I se=
e many strands=0A=
=0A=
Security is about operational practices and=0A=
draft-ietf-opsec-ns-impact=0A=
looks at what may be difficult or impractical with TLS 1.3 compared to=0A=
TLS 1.2.  Note that it is an I-D and it might be a year or two before=0A=
the IETF gets to decide whether or not to publish it as an RFC by which=0A=
time all sorts of things might have happened.  The issues in the I-D have=
=0A=
appeared on the TLS WG list and been rejected.  The I-D was proposed for=0A=
adoption by the TLS WG and was rejected although it did get some review=0A=
and constructive feedback, that is, its description of the behaviour of TLS=
1.3 has been reviewed.=0A=
I commend that I-D to anyone looking to migrate to TLS1.3 who has anything =
more than=0A=
an HTTP web server.=0A=
=0A=
Part of the ethos of the TLS WG is that where there is a conflict=0A=
between the security of an individual and that of an organisation then=0A=
the former takes precedence which I see as relevant here.=0A=
=0A=
TLS, like SSL before it, has little concern with the authentication of=0A=
the user, that often being done with renegotiation.  For OAM in general,=0A=
and SNMP in particular, user authentication is paramount; the protocol=0A=
must yield an authenticated identity.  Given the major reconstruction of=0A=
TLS with 1.3, I would not assume that the user identity is ok without a=0A=
careful study.  SNMP prohibited renegotiation as TLS1.3 has done for=0A=
different reasons.  The TLS WG has just approved an I-D=0A=
draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticator=0A=
which offers a replacement for renegotiation; is that ok for SNMP?=0A=
probably not. The approach to signature schemes has changed in TLS 1.3;=0A=
is there any impact on user certificate chains?  Much of the work on=0A=
TLS1.3 was on facilitating 0-RTT; is that ok?  I think that given=0A=
security is involved, then TLS 1.3 and all the TLS1.3 extensions need=0A=
careful examination from the perspective of delivering an authenticated=0A=
user identity before I would regard it as... well, not safe, because I=0A=
never say anything is safe but rather without any risk that I can see.=0A=
=0A=
My background is operations, not security, so I have a 101 understanding=0A=
of security and TLS (but will never be a cryptographer:-)=0A=
=0A=
HTH=0A=
=0A=
Tom Petch=0A=
--=0A=
Wes Hardaker=0A=
USC/ISI=0A=
=0A=
=0A=

