
From gregory.ietf@gmail.com  Mon Feb  1 06:28:12 2010
Return-Path: <gregory.ietf@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: karp@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: karp@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id BC3E53A694F for <karp@core3.amsl.com>; Mon,  1 Feb 2010 06:28:12 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -100.273
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-100.273 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-2.175, BAYES_00=-2.599, FB_CIALIS_LEO3=3.899, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, J_CHICKENPOX_43=0.6, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 8BUotpiM6kSo for <karp@core3.amsl.com>; Mon,  1 Feb 2010 06:28:10 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail-bw0-f224.google.com (mail-bw0-f224.google.com [209.85.218.224]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 343EB3A6358 for <karp@ietf.org>; Mon,  1 Feb 2010 06:28:09 -0800 (PST)
Received: by bwz24 with SMTP id 24so510485bwz.29 for <karp@ietf.org>; Mon, 01 Feb 2010 06:28:39 -0800 (PST)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=domainkey-signature:mime-version:received:in-reply-to:references :date:message-id:subject:from:to:cc:content-type; bh=DvMMYLdT33vJpSN+3jax9m2YXxCID32nkfEB8hkZDzI=; b=D6PymGlB0TJBLZ90OiGA6alBeYw0rPAMxNOTiDSQSKbD2zsZRU6uHPrPPR1PekRucN Jmu3xhzVj+pj+fP+BDBUIoQIwYgKdjvsN0QRcMhLrb0pasYynMC5+m7YtrxOpg3QvIVQ 4vFsb6us5Fc2Di2IXPr9gznF38KM9WJGDx0QA=
DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; c=nofws; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; b=ZpJTVfPIDLV8qujW1Bi+S/9dKAgdwyZ775qR2zCIGy9ssPkm+KkKXxHCbdUYkFRuNB nF1FRJovvoBE9tRtdJXEyyj730UDolkMLrFXF/ADZijqyI1w/9C218a6FYHFb1u6FhLb pIjKw1n8XEAWZudTfh2KHnmsGYdxlhnFxwqio=
MIME-Version: 1.0
Received: by 10.204.151.91 with SMTP id b27mr254901bkw.110.1265034519335; Mon,  01 Feb 2010 06:28:39 -0800 (PST)
In-Reply-To: <C0A55352-17D5-4777-B0E4-473C7F5341A7@cisco.com>
References: <68CC90D8-38C9-416B-B256-95BC0822A9DE@cisco.com> <4b5111dd.0404c00a.5d06.7a43@mx.google.com> <C0A55352-17D5-4777-B0E4-473C7F5341A7@cisco.com>
Date: Mon, 1 Feb 2010 06:28:39 -0800
Message-ID: <f1548841002010628t766a44f0v5c4b63a625012095@mail.gmail.com>
From: Gregory Lebovitz <gregory.ietf@gmail.com>
To: Brian Weis <bew@cisco.com>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=00151761c7b4275546047e8acdec
Cc: Adrian Farrel <Adrian.Farrel@huawei.com>, karp@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [karp] KARP Proposed Charter (post BoF)
X-BeenThere: karp@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Discussion list for key management for routing and transport protocols <karp.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/karp>, <mailto:karp-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/karp>
List-Post: <mailto:karp@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:karp-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/karp>, <mailto:karp-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 01 Feb 2010 14:28:12 -0000

--00151761c7b4275546047e8acdec
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1

Brian,
Most of what I see in your responses is fine. I'll give some discussion
below, but please don't see my comments as blocking disagreement, accept for
this one point:

I believe we agreed that, in addition to the Routing AD(s), there would be a
Security AD explicitly listed as a governing AD for this WG, even though it
is a RTG WG, and a Security area person listed as an advisor. We said this
was very important because we wanted intentional/responsibility-tied
participation by SEC Area, and not just "security consultancy". As such,
could you please confirm that actual charter will look something like this,
so the commitment and relationship is clear to one and all:

Chair(s):

   - Joel Halpern
   - Brian Weiss

Routing Area Director(s):
   - Ross Callon
   - Adrian Farrell
Security Area Director(s):

   - Tim Polk <tim.polk@nist.gov> <tim.polk@nist.gov>
   - Pasi Eronen <pasi.eronen@nokia.com> <pasi.eronen@nokia.com>

Routing Area Advisor:   - Ross Callon    Security Area Advisor:

   - Tim Polk <tim.polk@nist.gov> <tim.polk@nist.gov>


For the remainder of the comments below, please take them as "explanation"
or "opinion" for you to consider in your final crafting of the charter, but
ones that need not be cleared with me before we finalize the charter. The
charter overall is in VERY good condition, and could ship as is (after
conclusion of the above). It is important to get the charter nailed asap so
we have a WG and not a BoF in Anaheim. Therefore, on these other topics,
this will be my last comment, they need not be resolved, and I trust the
chairs with the final text.



On Wed, Jan 27, 2010 at 11:00 AM, Brian Weis <bew@cisco.com> wrote:

> Hi Gregory,
>
> Thanks much for your comments. See replies inline, and let me know if you
> disagree with any of resolution proposals.
>
>
> On Jan 15, 2010, at 5:09 PM, Gregory M. Lebovitz wrote:
>
>  Great work guys. Inline...
>>
>>
>> At 07:01 PM 1/12/2010, Brian Weis wrote:
>>
>>> Folks,
>>>
>>> Joel & I have made a number of changes to the previously proposed
>>> charter. We've taken into account comments made during the BoF as well
>>> as edited it for brevity and reorganized it a bit. Please send your
>>> comments to the list.
>>>
>>> Thanks,
>>> Brian & Joel
>>>
>>> =========== Proposed Charter 1/12/10
>>>
>>> The KARP working group is tasked to work with the routing protocol
>>> working groups in order to improve the communication security of the
>>> packets on the wire used by the routing protocols. This working group is
>>> concerned with message authentication, packet integrity, and denial of
>>> service (DoS) protection.  At present, this charter explicitly excludes
>>> privacy and non-repudiation concerns.
>>>
>>> Authenticating the routing peer sending a message, and message integrity
>>> protection will be provided through the use of per-packet cryptographic
>>> message authentication. Peer authentication will protect against
>>> unrecognized peers, imposter peers, and some DoS attacks aimed at
>>> routers. Protecting against misbehavior of an otherwise allowed peer
>>> router is outside the scope of this working group.
>>>
>>> Many routing protocols (or groups of protocols) already have some method
>>> for accomplishing cryptographic message authentication.  In most cases
>>> the existing methods are vulnerable to known attack, and/or employ
>>> cryptographic algorithms that have been deprecated. Internet security
>>> practices have progressed in the last 10 years when many of the first
>>> generation routing authentication mechanisms were created. It is time to
>>> review and update those mechanisms to use modern security practices.
>>> Ensuring algorithm agility within routing protocols is of particular
>>> importance.  A goal of the working group is to add incremental security
>>> to existing mechanisms rather than replacing them.  Better deployable
>>> solutions that vendors and operators can migrate to is more important
>>>
>>
>> nit:
>> s/that vendors and operators can migrate to/to which vendors and operators
>> can migrate/
>>
>>  than getting a perfect security solution.
>>>
>>> Although there are many candidate routing protocols to evaluate, KARP
>>> must by necessity begin with a restricted focus. The initial set of
>>> routing protocols in scope include BGP, OSPFv2, OSPFv3, PCE, PIM, LDP,
>>> RSVP-TE, ISIS, BFD, LMP, and MSDP.
>>>
>>> The working group must coordinate very closely with other working
>>> groups, such as:
>>>
>>> -  Routing protocol working groups for any routing protocol being
>>> evaluated. This coordination will include cooperatively determining the
>>> current or already planned state of the security work in the protocol.
>>> It will also include ensuring that any proposed mechanisms are
>>> consistent with with architecture and use of the protocol.  And any
>>> specific proposal will be developed in cooperation with the concerned
>>> protocol working group.
>>>
>>
>> define more clearly where the work will be done?
>>
>
> It would be nice if we could define more clearly where the work will be
> done, but frankly I think this will end up being determined on a
> case-by-case basis, depending on the dynamics of the RP WG. Whenever
> possible we'd expect to do the work in KARP. I agree it would be good to
> clarify this in the charter.


After talking more with Ross, seeing yours and Joel's comments, and after
the document authoring kick-off meeting discussions on this topic, I now
agree that we need to work it out on a case by case basis.

Perhaps the only improvement to the text would be to be explicit about the
fact that it could happen wherever. Possible new text that could be added at
the end of the paragraph in question:

"The actual protocol specification work could either be done in the
protocol's working group, or in KARP. This will necessarily be decided on a
case-by-case basis by the relevant chairs and ADs."

again, take it or leave it; I'm not blocking.


>
>
>
>>
>>  -  Security area working groups for cryptographic advice, and/or key
>>> management protocol support. Cryptographic protocol support may be
>>> required in order to support certain KARP WG milestones. Coordination
>>> with an appropriate working group in the security area would be
>>> necessary in order to get the appropriate expertise in completing a
>>> milestone. This charter provides for preliminary work in this space,
>>> although it is expected that detailed work items will be added to the
>>> charter when the problem has been better analyzed.
>>>
>>
>> I like this paragraph. It clearly indicates that we will move in the
>> direction of defining a mechanism for KMP, but indicates that we are still
>> working on how. It also invites and sets the expectation of Security area
>> involvement. Well done.
>>
>>
>>  -  OPSEC working group for advice on best practices to create and use
>>> integrity keys used with routing protocol message authentication.
>>>
>>> Routing protocols use a range of transport mechanisms and communication
>>> relationships. There are also differences in details among the various
>>> protocols. The working group will attempt to describe the security
>>> relevant characteristics of routings protocols, such as the use or
>>> non-use of TCP, or the frequent use of group communication versus purely
>>> pairwise communication. Using these characteristics, the working group
>>> will then provide suitable common frameworks that can be applied, and
>>> tailored, to improve the communication security of the routing
>>> protocols.
>>>
>>
>> I'd like to see the following added, so that we set the long term vision
>> clearly that we want to get to KMPs:
>>
>> In a later phase, it is expected that a key management protocol (KMP) will
>> be defined for use by routing peers to automatically negotiate keys and
>> other connection parameters, and that this KMP could be used by many, if not
>> all, of the routing protocols. More about the use of a KMP will be captured
>> in the Framework document(s) described below.
>>
>
> That's fine. But in the interests of brevity I'd prefer to incorporate this
> thought into the paragraph mentioning coordination with the security area.


wfm


>
>
>  In later phases, it is expected that the working group will
>>> investigate the suitably of defining conceptual structures and APIs, so
>>> as to enable further work to be more effective.
>>>
>>> Work Items:
>>>
>>> - Determine current threats to the routing protocol operation, and
>>> define general requirements for cryptographic authentication of routing
>>> protocols. A primary source for these documents
>>>
>>
>> s/these documents/this document/
>>
>> (I think we've decided to roll these into one document with two major
>> sections. Justification:  most of the requirements derive from attempting to
>> cover the threat landscape, so they go well together.)
>>
>>  should be
>>> draft-lebovitz-kmart-roadmap, although RFC 4393 may also be useful.
>>>
>>
>> s/-kmart/karp/
>>
>>
>>  - Identify deficiencies of each routing protocol in scope, and specify
>>> mechanisms that bring them in line with the general requirements.
>>>
>>
>> can we create a name for these? How about "Protocol Gap Analysis". Thus,
>> the new text would be:
>>
>> These we will refer to as "Protocol Gap Analysis".
>>
>>
>>  - Define one or more frameworks describing the common elements for
>>> modern authentication in routing protocols.
>>>
>>
>> add:
>> This will be called the Framework document.
>>
>
> It may be that time we might have more than one framework document ("Define
> one or more frameworks"), so I'd prefer to not restrict this item to one
> named document in the charter.


Sensible. In several of my comments I was trying to give WG-relevant names
to different things so that we would have a shared vocabulary and know what
each other were talking about more precisely. I did so based on the
difficulty from experience that I've had trying to clarify the difference
between all these things with many parties. I don't really care what name we
give any one thing, it could be FOO, just as long as we decide a name, and a
definition, and we all use it consistently so that we know what each other
are talking about. Possible text that would match this desire:

"This document will be called Framework (over time there could be more than
one such framework document)."

Again, not blocking, and no need to resolve before shipping charter.


>
>
>
>>
>>  - Publish guidance on how to create and use integrity keys used with
>>> routing protocol message authentication.
>>>
>>
>> What I had in mind for the guidance document was more of a work list and
>> security tips/tricks for the teams doing the protocol gap analysis. So the
>> guidance is more like the charter for those papers, and how to move through
>> the process. Here is an outline I came up with, which should NOT be in this
>> charter text, but may help you to better craft this item:
>>
>
> Thanks for the additional information. I think there may be other guidance
> documents in scope too, so I'll change the charter to reflect that point.
>
>
>
>> Guidance - more template for what a protocol gap analysis and design team
>> for a specific category of Routing Protocols will do, i.e. the step by step
>> instructions. Current in sections 4.1, and 4.4 of
>> draft-lebovitz-kmart-roadmap. E.g.:
>> - Clearly list the category you are addressing, what protocols fall into
>> that category, and justify ea proto's existence in said category
>> - go present in each protocols WG that the proto falls into said category,
>> and that work is starting. Ask for volunteers. make sure we are cross
>> sync'ing with the proto WG well.
>> - Form a design team that includes protocol designers from protos in that
>> category + security guys.
>> - update to the related proto WG's
>> - Look at current security mechanisms of ea protocol and compare to
>> karp-threats-reqs document. Create a gap analysis
>> - using karp-framework, solve for the gaps, conceptually. This can include
>> requirements listing, suggested fixes
>> - update to the related proto WG's
>> - start a document for each protocol and apply the fixes needed for each
>> protocol
>> - section on proper care and feeding of the process:
>>     - define work split between KARP and actual rouint protocol WG's.
>>     - final protocol design changes get made in protocol WGs, not KARP,
>> but done based on docs coming out of KARP
>>     - cc the proto WG often
>>     - present in the proto WG often
>>     - don't DoS the proto WG with your security stuff, it creates
>> bitterness
>>
>>
>>  - Specify automated key management needs for routing protocols.
>>>
>>
>> add:  These we will call KARP Design Teams. These may well be very close
>> to the same teams that do the protocol gap analysis.
>>
>
> Specifying exactly *how* charter work items will be handled is probably
> more limiting than useful, so it might be better to omit details of forming
> design teams in the charter text.
>

Again, this was an attempt at clarification of a definition for shared
understanding. These are not routing-protocol-only people. Nor are these
security-only people. These are expected to be smallish teams of both
routing protocol and security experts working on the effort together. As
agreed above, the specification work may occur in either the rtg proto wg,
or in KARP, and will be decided on a case by case basis. I was hoping we
would give a name to all this, so that we don't have to keep typing this
entire paragraph over and over again each time we have this discussion.

again, not blocking. I leave it up to you.

Hth,
Gregory.



> Thanks!
> Brian
>
>
>
>>
>>  Goals and Milestones:
>>>
>>> Aug 2010 - Submit General Framework, General Requirements, and
>>> Priorities/Work-Plan documents to the IESG to be considered as
>>> Informational RFC
>>>
>>
>> seems agressive to me. I'd say Nov is a better bet.
>>
>>
>>  Aug 2010 - Submit a framework document describing protocol groups and
>>> the common techniques and interfaces that apply to them to the IESG to
>>> be considered as Informational RFC
>>>
>>
>> Very aggressive. I'd start with Nov.
>>
>>
>>  Dec 2010 - Submit a document describing best best practices for creating
>>> and using protocol message authentication integrity keys as a BCP
>>>
>>
>> Seems reasonable.
>>
>>
>>  TBD - Submit specification document for OSPFv2 to the IESG to be
>>> considered as as a Proposed Standard
>>>
>>> TBD - Submit specification document for OSPFv3 to the IESG to be
>>> considered as as a Proposed Standard
>>>
>>> TBD - Submit specification document for PIM to the IESG to be considered
>>> as as a Proposed Standard
>>>
>>> TBD - Submit specification document for RSVP-TE to the IESG to be
>>> considered as as a Proposed Standard
>>>
>>> TBD - Submit specification document for ISIS to the IESG to be
>>> considered as as a Proposed Standard
>>>
>>> TBD - Submit specification document for BGP to the IESG to be considered
>>> as as a Proposed Standard
>>>
>>> TBD - Submit specification document for LDP to the IESG to be considered
>>> as as a Proposed Standard
>>>
>>> TBD - Submit specification document for PCE to the IESG to be considered
>>> as as a Proposed Standard
>>>
>>> TBD - Submit specification document for MSDP to the IESG to be
>>> considered as as a Proposed Standard
>>>
>>> TBD - Submit specification document for BFD to the IESG to be considered
>>> as as a Proposed Standard
>>>
>>> TBD - Submit specification document for LMP to the IESG to be considered
>>> as as a Proposed Standard
>>>
>>> TBD - Specify automated key management needs for routing protocols using
>>> unicast techniques
>>>
>>> TBD - Specify automated key management needs for routing protocols using
>>> multicast techniques
>>>
>>
>>
>> All look good to me. Note that I think some of these will fall together in
>> groups, so we could do one document for the design for the group, and then
>> take that and go apply it specifically in each protocol's own WG, with the
>> commitment of the KARP people to go there and continue the work there.
>>
>> Those are my thoughts. Hth,
>> Gregory.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>  _______________________________________________
>>> karp mailing list
>>> karp@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/karp
>>>
>>
>>
>
> --
> Brian Weis
> Router/Switch Security Group, ARTG, Cisco Systems
> Telephone: +1 408 526 4796
> Email: bew@cisco.com
>
>
>
>


-- 
----
IETF related email from
Gregory M. Lebovitz
Juniper Networks

--00151761c7b4275546047e8acdec
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Brian,<div>Most of what I see in your responses is fine. I&#39;ll give some=
 discussion below, but please don&#39;t see my comments as blocking disagre=
ement, accept for this one point:</div><div><br></div><div>I believe we agr=
eed that, in addition to the Routing AD(s), there would be a Security AD ex=
plicitly listed as a governing AD for this WG, even though it is a RTG WG, =
and a Security area person listed as an advisor. We said this was very impo=
rtant because we wanted intentional/responsibility-tied participation by SE=
C Area, and not just &quot;security consultancy&quot;. As such, could you p=
lease confirm that actual charter will look something like this, so the com=
mitment and relationship is clear to one and all:</div>
<div><br></div><div><span class=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"font-family: =
Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 13px; "><h3>Chair(s):</h3=
><ul><li>Joel Halpern</li><li>Brian Weiss</li></ul><h3>Routing Area Directo=
r(s):</h3>
<div>=A0=A0 - Ross Callon</div><div>=A0=A0 - Adrian Farrell</div><h3>Securi=
ty Area Director(s):</h3><ul><li><a href=3D"mailto:tim.polk@nist.gov">Tim P=
olk &lt;tim.polk@nist.gov&gt;</a>=A0<br></li><li><a href=3D"mailto:pasi.ero=
nen@nokia.com">Pasi Eronen &lt;pasi.eronen@nokia.com&gt;</a>=A0<br>
</li></ul><h3>Routing Area Advisor:</h3><h3><span class=3D"Apple-style-span=
" style=3D"font-size: 13px; font-weight: normal; ">=A0=A0 - Ross Callon</sp=
an>=A0=A0 =A0</h3><h3>Security Area Advisor:</h3><ul><li><a href=3D"mailto:=
tim.polk@nist.gov">Tim Polk &lt;tim.polk@nist.gov&gt;</a>=A0</li>
</ul></span></div><div><br></div><div>For the remainder of the comments bel=
ow, please take them as &quot;explanation&quot; or &quot;opinion&quot; for =
you to consider in your final crafting of the charter, but ones that need n=
ot be cleared with me before we finalize the charter. The charter overall i=
s in VERY good condition, and could ship as is (after conclusion of the abo=
ve). It is important to get the charter nailed asap so we have a WG and not=
 a BoF in Anaheim. Therefore, on these other topics, this will be my last c=
omment, they need not be resolved, and I trust the chairs with the final te=
xt.</div>
<div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Wed, J=
an 27, 2010 at 11:00 AM, Brian Weis <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto=
:bew@cisco.com">bew@cisco.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D=
"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding=
-left:1ex;">
Hi Gregory,<br>
<br>
Thanks much for your comments. See replies inline, and let me know if you d=
isagree with any of resolution proposals.<div><div></div><div class=3D"h5">=
<br>
<br>
On Jan 15, 2010, at 5:09 PM, Gregory M. Lebovitz wrote:<br>
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
Great work guys. Inline...<br>
<br>
<br>
At 07:01 PM 1/12/2010, Brian Weis wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
Folks,<br>
<br>
Joel &amp; I have made a number of changes to the previously proposed<br>
charter. We&#39;ve taken into account comments made during the BoF as well<=
br>
as edited it for brevity and reorganized it a bit. Please send your<br>
comments to the list.<br>
<br>
Thanks,<br>
Brian &amp; Joel<br>
<br>
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D Proposed Charter 1/12/10<br>
<br>
The KARP working group is tasked to work with the routing protocol<br>
working groups in order to improve the communication security of the<br>
packets on the wire used by the routing protocols. This working group is<br=
>
concerned with message authentication, packet integrity, and denial of<br>
service (DoS) protection. =A0At present, this charter explicitly excludes<b=
r>
privacy and non-repudiation concerns.<br>
<br>
Authenticating the routing peer sending a message, and message integrity<br=
>
protection will be provided through the use of per-packet cryptographic<br>
message authentication. Peer authentication will protect against<br>
unrecognized peers, imposter peers, and some DoS attacks aimed at<br>
routers. Protecting against misbehavior of an otherwise allowed peer<br>
router is outside the scope of this working group.<br>
<br>
Many routing protocols (or groups of protocols) already have some method<br=
>
for accomplishing cryptographic message authentication. =A0In most cases<br=
>
the existing methods are vulnerable to known attack, and/or employ<br>
cryptographic algorithms that have been deprecated. Internet security<br>
practices have progressed in the last 10 years when many of the first<br>
generation routing authentication mechanisms were created. It is time to<br=
>
review and update those mechanisms to use modern security practices.<br>
Ensuring algorithm agility within routing protocols is of particular<br>
importance. =A0A goal of the working group is to add incremental security<b=
r>
to existing mechanisms rather than replacing them. =A0Better deployable<br>
solutions that vendors and operators can migrate to is more important<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
nit:<br>
s/that vendors and operators can migrate to/to which vendors and operators =
can migrate/<br>
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
than getting a perfect security solution.<br>
<br>
Although there are many candidate routing protocols to evaluate, KARP<br>
must by necessity begin with a restricted focus. The initial set of<br>
routing protocols in scope include BGP, OSPFv2, OSPFv3, PCE, PIM, LDP,<br>
RSVP-TE, ISIS, BFD, LMP, and MSDP.<br>
<br>
The working group must coordinate very closely with other working<br>
groups, such as:<br>
<br>
- =A0Routing protocol working groups for any routing protocol being<br>
evaluated. This coordination will include cooperatively determining the<br>
current or already planned state of the security work in the protocol.<br>
It will also include ensuring that any proposed mechanisms are<br>
consistent with with architecture and use of the protocol. =A0And any<br>
specific proposal will be developed in cooperation with the concerned<br>
protocol working group.<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
define more clearly where the work will be done?<br>
</blockquote>
<br></div></div>
It would be nice if we could define more clearly where the work will be don=
e, but frankly I think this will end up being determined on a case-by-case =
basis, depending on the dynamics of the RP WG. Whenever possible we&#39;d e=
xpect to do the work in KARP. I agree it would be good to clarify this in t=
he charter.</blockquote>
<div><br></div><div>After talking more with Ross, seeing yours and Joel&#39=
;s comments, and after the document authoring kick-off meeting discussions =
on this topic, I now agree that we need to work it out on a case by case ba=
sis.</div>
<div><br></div><div>Perhaps the only improvement to the text would be to be=
 explicit about the fact that it could happen wherever. Possible new text t=
hat could be added at the end of the paragraph in question:</div><div><br>
</div><div>&quot;The actual protocol specification work could either be don=
e in the protocol&#39;s working group, or in KARP. This will necessarily be=
 decided on a case-by-case basis by the relevant chairs and ADs.&quot;</div=
>
<div><br></div><div>again, take it or leave it; I&#39;m not blocking.</div>=
<div>=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;=
border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;"><div class=3D"im"><br>
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
- =A0Security area working groups for cryptographic advice, and/or key<br>
management protocol support. Cryptographic protocol support may be<br>
required in order to support certain KARP WG milestones. Coordination<br>
with an appropriate working group in the security area would be<br>
necessary in order to get the appropriate expertise in completing a<br>
milestone. This charter provides for preliminary work in this space,<br>
although it is expected that detailed work items will be added to the<br>
charter when the problem has been better analyzed.<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
I like this paragraph. It clearly indicates that we will move in the direct=
ion of defining a mechanism for KMP, but indicates that we are still workin=
g on how. It also invites and sets the expectation of Security area involve=
ment. Well done.<br>

<br>
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
- =A0OPSEC working group for advice on best practices to create and use<br>
integrity keys used with routing protocol message authentication.<br>
<br>
Routing protocols use a range of transport mechanisms and communication<br>
relationships. There are also differences in details among the various<br>
protocols. The working group will attempt to describe the security<br>
relevant characteristics of routings protocols, such as the use or<br>
non-use of TCP, or the frequent use of group communication versus purely<br=
>
pairwise communication. Using these characteristics, the working group<br>
will then provide suitable common frameworks that can be applied, and<br>
tailored, to improve the communication security of the routing<br>
protocols.<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
I&#39;d like to see the following added, so that we set the long term visio=
n clearly that we want to get to KMPs:<br>
<br>
In a later phase, it is expected that a key management protocol (KMP) will =
be defined for use by routing peers to automatically negotiate keys and oth=
er connection parameters, and that this KMP could be used by many, if not a=
ll, of the routing protocols. More about the use of a KMP will be captured =
in the Framework document(s) described below.<br>

</blockquote>
<br></div>
That&#39;s fine. But in the interests of brevity I&#39;d prefer to incorpor=
ate this thought into the paragraph mentioning coordination with the securi=
ty area.</blockquote><div><br></div><div>wfm</div><div>=A0</div><blockquote=
 class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc soli=
d;padding-left:1ex;">
<div class=3D"im"><br>
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"m=
argin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
In later phases, it is expected that the working group will<br>
investigate the suitably of defining conceptual structures and APIs, so<br>
as to enable further work to be more effective.<br>
<br>
Work Items:<br>
<br>
- Determine current threats to the routing protocol operation, and<br>
define general requirements for cryptographic authentication of routing<br>
protocols. A primary source for these documents<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
s/these documents/this document/<br>
<br>
(I think we&#39;ve decided to roll these into one document with two major s=
ections. Justification: =A0most of the requirements derive from attempting =
to cover the threat landscape, so they go well together.)<br>
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
should be<br>
draft-lebovitz-kmart-roadmap, although RFC 4393 may also be useful.<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
s/-kmart/karp/<br>
<br>
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
- Identify deficiencies of each routing protocol in scope, and specify<br>
mechanisms that bring them in line with the general requirements.<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
can we create a name for these? How about &quot;Protocol Gap Analysis&quot;=
. Thus, the new text would be:<br>
<br>
These we will refer to as &quot;Protocol Gap Analysis&quot;.<br>
<br>
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
- Define one or more frameworks describing the common elements for<br>
modern authentication in routing protocols.<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
add:<br>
This will be called the Framework document.<br>
</blockquote>
<br></div>
It may be that time we might have more than one framework document (&quot;D=
efine one or more frameworks&quot;), so I&#39;d prefer to not restrict this=
 item to one named document in the charter.</blockquote><div><br></div>
<div>Sensible. In several of my comments I was trying to give WG-relevant n=
ames to different things so that we would have a shared vocabulary and know=
 what each other were talking about more precisely. I did so based on the d=
ifficulty from experience that I&#39;ve had trying to clarify the differenc=
e between all these things with many parties. I don&#39;t really care what =
name we give any one thing, it could be FOO, just as long as we decide a na=
me, and a definition, and we all use it consistently so that we know what e=
ach other are talking about. Possible text that would match this desire:</d=
iv>
<div><br></div><div>&quot;This document will be called Framework (over time=
 there could be more than one such framework document).&quot;</div><div><br=
></div><div>Again, not blocking, and no need to resolve before shipping cha=
rter.</div>
<div>=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;=
border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;"><div class=3D"im"><br>
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
- Publish guidance on how to create and use integrity keys used with<br>
routing protocol message authentication.<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
What I had in mind for the guidance document was more of a work list and se=
curity tips/tricks for the teams doing the protocol gap analysis. So the gu=
idance is more like the charter for those papers, and how to move through t=
he process. Here is an outline I came up with, which should NOT be in this =
charter text, but may help you to better craft this item:<br>

</blockquote>
<br></div>
Thanks for the additional information. I think there may be other guidance =
documents in scope too, so I&#39;ll change the charter to reflect that poin=
t.<div class=3D"im"><br>
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
Guidance - more template for what a protocol gap analysis and design team f=
or a specific category of Routing Protocols will do, i.e. the step by step =
instructions. Current in sections 4.1, and 4.4 of draft-lebovitz-kmart-road=
map. E.g.:<br>

- Clearly list the category you are addressing, what protocols fall into th=
at category, and justify ea proto&#39;s existence in said category<br>
- go present in each protocols WG that the proto falls into said category, =
and that work is starting. Ask for volunteers. make sure we are cross sync&=
#39;ing with the proto WG well.<br>
- Form a design team that includes protocol designers from protos in that c=
ategory + security guys.<br>
- update to the related proto WG&#39;s<br>
- Look at current security mechanisms of ea protocol and compare to karp-th=
reats-reqs document. Create a gap analysis<br>
- using karp-framework, solve for the gaps, conceptually. This can include =
requirements listing, suggested fixes<br>
- update to the related proto WG&#39;s<br>
- start a document for each protocol and apply the fixes needed for each pr=
otocol<br>
- section on proper care and feeding of the process:<br>
 =A0 =A0 - define work split between KARP and actual rouint protocol WG&#39=
;s.<br>
 =A0 =A0 - final protocol design changes get made in protocol WGs, not KARP=
, but done based on docs coming out of KARP<br>
 =A0 =A0 - cc the proto WG often<br>
 =A0 =A0 - present in the proto WG often<br>
 =A0 =A0 - don&#39;t DoS the proto WG with your security stuff, it creates =
bitterness<br>
<br>
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
- Specify automated key management needs for routing protocols.<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
add: =A0These we will call KARP Design Teams. These may well be very close =
to the same teams that do the protocol gap analysis.<br>
</blockquote>
<br></div>
Specifying exactly *how* charter work items will be handled is probably mor=
e limiting than useful, so it might be better to omit details of forming de=
sign teams in the charter text.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Again, =
this was an attempt at clarification of a definition for shared understandi=
ng. These are not routing-protocol-only people. Nor are these security-only=
 people. These are expected to be smallish teams of both routing protocol a=
nd security experts working on the effort together. As agreed above, the sp=
ecification work may occur in either the rtg proto wg, or in KARP, and will=
 be decided on a case by case basis. I was hoping we would give a name to a=
ll this, so that we don&#39;t have to keep typing this entire paragraph ove=
r and over again each time we have this discussion.=A0</div>
<div><br></div><div>again, not blocking. I leave it up to you.=A0</div><div=
><br></div><div>Hth,</div><div>Gregory.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div>=
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">

<br>
Thanks!<br><font color=3D"#888888">
Brian</font><div><div></div><div class=3D"h5"><br>
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
Goals and Milestones:<br>
<br>
Aug 2010 - Submit General Framework, General Requirements, and<br>
Priorities/Work-Plan documents to the IESG to be considered as<br>
Informational RFC<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
seems agressive to me. I&#39;d say Nov is a better bet.<br>
<br>
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
Aug 2010 - Submit a framework document describing protocol groups and<br>
the common techniques and interfaces that apply to them to the IESG to<br>
be considered as Informational RFC<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
Very aggressive. I&#39;d start with Nov.<br>
<br>
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
Dec 2010 - Submit a document describing best best practices for creating<br=
>
and using protocol message authentication integrity keys as a BCP<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
Seems reasonable.<br>
<br>
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
TBD - Submit specification document for OSPFv2 to the IESG to be<br>
considered as as a Proposed Standard<br>
<br>
TBD - Submit specification document for OSPFv3 to the IESG to be<br>
considered as as a Proposed Standard<br>
<br>
TBD - Submit specification document for PIM to the IESG to be considered<br=
>
as as a Proposed Standard<br>
<br>
TBD - Submit specification document for RSVP-TE to the IESG to be<br>
considered as as a Proposed Standard<br>
<br>
TBD - Submit specification document for ISIS to the IESG to be<br>
considered as as a Proposed Standard<br>
<br>
TBD - Submit specification document for BGP to the IESG to be considered<br=
>
as as a Proposed Standard<br>
<br>
TBD - Submit specification document for LDP to the IESG to be considered<br=
>
as as a Proposed Standard<br>
<br>
TBD - Submit specification document for PCE to the IESG to be considered<br=
>
as as a Proposed Standard<br>
<br>
TBD - Submit specification document for MSDP to the IESG to be<br>
considered as as a Proposed Standard<br>
<br>
TBD - Submit specification document for BFD to the IESG to be considered<br=
>
as as a Proposed Standard<br>
<br>
TBD - Submit specification document for LMP to the IESG to be considered<br=
>
as as a Proposed Standard<br>
<br>
TBD - Specify automated key management needs for routing protocols using<br=
>
unicast techniques<br>
<br>
TBD - Specify automated key management needs for routing protocols using<br=
>
multicast techniques<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
<br>
All look good to me. Note that I think some of these will fall together in =
groups, so we could do one document for the design for the group, and then =
take that and go apply it specifically in each protocol&#39;s own WG, with =
the commitment of the KARP people to go there and continue the work there.<=
br>

<br>
Those are my thoughts. Hth,<br>
Gregory.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
_______________________________________________<br>
karp mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:karp@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">karp@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/karp" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/karp</a><br>
</blockquote>
<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
<br></div></div><div><div></div><div class=3D"h5">
-- <br>
Brian Weis<br>
Router/Switch Security Group, ARTG, Cisco Systems<br>
Telephone: +1 408 526 4796<br>
Email: <a href=3D"mailto:bew@cisco.com" target=3D"_blank">bew@cisco.com</a>=
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><br>-- <br>----<br>IET=
F related email from<br>Gregory M. Lebovitz<br>Juniper Networks<br>
</div>

--00151761c7b4275546047e8acdec--

From bew@cisco.com  Mon Feb  1 11:46:38 2010
Return-Path: <bew@cisco.com>
X-Original-To: karp@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: karp@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9AFDB3A6A51 for <karp@core3.amsl.com>; Mon,  1 Feb 2010 11:46:38 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -8.35
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.35 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-2.250,  BAYES_00=-2.599, FB_CIALIS_LEO3=3.899, J_CHICKENPOX_43=0.6, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-8]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 63NAkNZ8hUZs for <karp@core3.amsl.com>; Mon,  1 Feb 2010 11:46:36 -0800 (PST)
Received: from sj-iport-4.cisco.com (sj-iport-4.cisco.com [171.68.10.86]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A490C3A6A50 for <karp@ietf.org>; Mon,  1 Feb 2010 11:46:36 -0800 (PST)
Authentication-Results: sj-iport-4.cisco.com; dkim=neutral (message not signed) header.i=none
X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Filtered: true
X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Result: ApoEAPq+ZkurRN+K/2dsb2JhbADDXooRBwEIjHGCNhUHAYFyBA
X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.49,385,1262563200"; d="scan'208";a="82042403"
Received: from sj-core-4.cisco.com ([171.68.223.138]) by sj-iport-4.cisco.com with ESMTP; 01 Feb 2010 19:46:55 +0000
Received: from dhcp-128-107-163-125.cisco.com (dhcp-128-107-163-125.cisco.com [128.107.163.125]) by sj-core-4.cisco.com (8.13.8/8.14.3) with ESMTP id o11Jkttb015403; Mon, 1 Feb 2010 19:46:55 GMT
Message-Id: <E3F1E169-CE46-41C4-AAFE-4DDA01C839A6@cisco.com>
From: Brian Weis <bew@cisco.com>
To: Gregory Lebovitz <gregory.ietf@gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <f1548841002010628t766a44f0v5c4b63a625012095@mail.gmail.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=WINDOWS-1252; format=flowed; delsp=yes
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Mime-Version: 1.0 (Apple Message framework v936)
Date: Mon, 1 Feb 2010 11:46:53 -0800
References: <68CC90D8-38C9-416B-B256-95BC0822A9DE@cisco.com> <4b5111dd.0404c00a.5d06.7a43@mx.google.com> <C0A55352-17D5-4777-B0E4-473C7F5341A7@cisco.com> <f1548841002010628t766a44f0v5c4b63a625012095@mail.gmail.com>
X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.936)
Cc: Adrian Farrel <Adrian.Farrel@huawei.com>, karp@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [karp] KARP Proposed Charter (post BoF)
X-BeenThere: karp@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Discussion list for key management for routing and transport protocols <karp.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/karp>, <mailto:karp-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/karp>
List-Post: <mailto:karp@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:karp-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/karp>, <mailto:karp-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 01 Feb 2010 19:46:38 -0000

Hi Gregory,

On Feb 1, 2010, at 6:28 AM, Gregory Lebovitz wrote:

> Brian,
> Most of what I see in your responses is fine. I'll give some =20
> discussion below, but please don't see my comments as blocking =20
> disagreement, accept for this one point:
>
> I believe we agreed that, in addition to the Routing AD(s), there =20
> would be a Security AD explicitly listed as a governing AD for this =20=

> WG, even though it is a RTG WG, and a Security area person listed as =20=

> an advisor. We said this was very important because we wanted =20
> intentional/responsibility-tied participation by SEC Area, and not =20
> just "security consultancy". As such, could you please confirm that =20=

> actual charter will look something like this, so the commitment and =20=

> relationship is clear to one and all:

As the Routing Area Director for KARP, I believe Ross will own =20
choosing the "responsible portions" portion of the charter. In any =20
case, it would be very appropriate to have a Security Area Advisor. I =20=

expect that Ross will work with Tim & Pasi to identify someone willing =20=

to be that person.

Thanks,
Brian

>
> Chair(s):
> 	=95 Joel Halpern
> 	=95 Brian Weiss
> Routing Area Director(s):
>    - Ross Callon
>    - Adrian Farrell
> Security Area Director(s):
> 	=95 Tim Polk <tim.polk@nist.gov>
> 	=95 Pasi Eronen <pasi.eronen@nokia.com>
> Routing Area Advisor:   - Ross Callon    Security Area Advisor:
> 	=95 Tim Polk <tim.polk@nist.gov>
>
> For the remainder of the comments below, please take them as =20
> "explanation" or "opinion" for you to consider in your final =20
> crafting of the charter, but ones that need not be cleared with me =20
> before we finalize the charter. The charter overall is in VERY good =20=

> condition, and could ship as is (after conclusion of the above). It =20=

> is important to get the charter nailed asap so we have a WG and not =20=

> a BoF in Anaheim. Therefore, on these other topics, this will be my =20=

> last comment, they need not be resolved, and I trust the chairs with =20=

> the final text.
>
>
>
> On Wed, Jan 27, 2010 at 11:00 AM, Brian Weis <bew@cisco.com> wrote:
> Hi Gregory,
>
> Thanks much for your comments. See replies inline, and let me know =20
> if you disagree with any of resolution proposals.
>
>
> On Jan 15, 2010, at 5:09 PM, Gregory M. Lebovitz wrote:
>
> Great work guys. Inline...
>
>
> At 07:01 PM 1/12/2010, Brian Weis wrote:
> Folks,
>
> Joel & I have made a number of changes to the previously proposed
> charter. We've taken into account comments made during the BoF as well
> as edited it for brevity and reorganized it a bit. Please send your
> comments to the list.
>
> Thanks,
> Brian & Joel
>
> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D Proposed Charter 1/12/10
>
> The KARP working group is tasked to work with the routing protocol
> working groups in order to improve the communication security of the
> packets on the wire used by the routing protocols. This working =20
> group is
> concerned with message authentication, packet integrity, and denial of
> service (DoS) protection.  At present, this charter explicitly =20
> excludes
> privacy and non-repudiation concerns.
>
> Authenticating the routing peer sending a message, and message =20
> integrity
> protection will be provided through the use of per-packet =20
> cryptographic
> message authentication. Peer authentication will protect against
> unrecognized peers, imposter peers, and some DoS attacks aimed at
> routers. Protecting against misbehavior of an otherwise allowed peer
> router is outside the scope of this working group.
>
> Many routing protocols (or groups of protocols) already have some =20
> method
> for accomplishing cryptographic message authentication.  In most cases
> the existing methods are vulnerable to known attack, and/or employ
> cryptographic algorithms that have been deprecated. Internet security
> practices have progressed in the last 10 years when many of the first
> generation routing authentication mechanisms were created. It is =20
> time to
> review and update those mechanisms to use modern security practices.
> Ensuring algorithm agility within routing protocols is of particular
> importance.  A goal of the working group is to add incremental =20
> security
> to existing mechanisms rather than replacing them.  Better deployable
> solutions that vendors and operators can migrate to is more important
>
> nit:
> s/that vendors and operators can migrate to/to which vendors and =20
> operators can migrate/
>
> than getting a perfect security solution.
>
> Although there are many candidate routing protocols to evaluate, KARP
> must by necessity begin with a restricted focus. The initial set of
> routing protocols in scope include BGP, OSPFv2, OSPFv3, PCE, PIM, LDP,
> RSVP-TE, ISIS, BFD, LMP, and MSDP.
>
> The working group must coordinate very closely with other working
> groups, such as:
>
> -  Routing protocol working groups for any routing protocol being
> evaluated. This coordination will include cooperatively determining =20=

> the
> current or already planned state of the security work in the protocol.
> It will also include ensuring that any proposed mechanisms are
> consistent with with architecture and use of the protocol.  And any
> specific proposal will be developed in cooperation with the concerned
> protocol working group.
>
> define more clearly where the work will be done?
>
> It would be nice if we could define more clearly where the work will =20=

> be done, but frankly I think this will end up being determined on a =20=

> case-by-case basis, depending on the dynamics of the RP WG. Whenever =20=

> possible we'd expect to do the work in KARP. I agree it would be =20
> good to clarify this in the charter.
>
> After talking more with Ross, seeing yours and Joel's comments, and =20=

> after the document authoring kick-off meeting discussions on this =20
> topic, I now agree that we need to work it out on a case by case =20
> basis.
>
> Perhaps the only improvement to the text would be to be explicit =20
> about the fact that it could happen wherever. Possible new text that =20=

> could be added at the end of the paragraph in question:
>
> "The actual protocol specification work could either be done in the =20=

> protocol's working group, or in KARP. This will necessarily be =20
> decided on a case-by-case basis by the relevant chairs and ADs."
>
> again, take it or leave it; I'm not blocking.
>
>
>
>
>
> -  Security area working groups for cryptographic advice, and/or key
> management protocol support. Cryptographic protocol support may be
> required in order to support certain KARP WG milestones. Coordination
> with an appropriate working group in the security area would be
> necessary in order to get the appropriate expertise in completing a
> milestone. This charter provides for preliminary work in this space,
> although it is expected that detailed work items will be added to the
> charter when the problem has been better analyzed.
>
> I like this paragraph. It clearly indicates that we will move in the =20=

> direction of defining a mechanism for KMP, but indicates that we are =20=

> still working on how. It also invites and sets the expectation of =20
> Security area involvement. Well done.
>
>
> -  OPSEC working group for advice on best practices to create and use
> integrity keys used with routing protocol message authentication.
>
> Routing protocols use a range of transport mechanisms and =20
> communication
> relationships. There are also differences in details among the various
> protocols. The working group will attempt to describe the security
> relevant characteristics of routings protocols, such as the use or
> non-use of TCP, or the frequent use of group communication versus =20
> purely
> pairwise communication. Using these characteristics, the working group
> will then provide suitable common frameworks that can be applied, and
> tailored, to improve the communication security of the routing
> protocols.
>
> I'd like to see the following added, so that we set the long term =20
> vision clearly that we want to get to KMPs:
>
> In a later phase, it is expected that a key management protocol =20
> (KMP) will be defined for use by routing peers to automatically =20
> negotiate keys and other connection parameters, and that this KMP =20
> could be used by many, if not all, of the routing protocols. More =20
> about the use of a KMP will be captured in the Framework document(s) =20=

> described below.
>
> That's fine. But in the interests of brevity I'd prefer to =20
> incorporate this thought into the paragraph mentioning coordination =20=

> with the security area.
>
> wfm
>
>
>
> In later phases, it is expected that the working group will
> investigate the suitably of defining conceptual structures and APIs, =20=

> so
> as to enable further work to be more effective.
>
> Work Items:
>
> - Determine current threats to the routing protocol operation, and
> define general requirements for cryptographic authentication of =20
> routing
> protocols. A primary source for these documents
>
> s/these documents/this document/
>
> (I think we've decided to roll these into one document with two =20
> major sections. Justification:  most of the requirements derive from =20=

> attempting to cover the threat landscape, so they go well together.)
>
> should be
> draft-lebovitz-kmart-roadmap, although RFC 4393 may also be useful.
>
> s/-kmart/karp/
>
>
> - Identify deficiencies of each routing protocol in scope, and specify
> mechanisms that bring them in line with the general requirements.
>
> can we create a name for these? How about "Protocol Gap Analysis". =20
> Thus, the new text would be:
>
> These we will refer to as "Protocol Gap Analysis".
>
>
> - Define one or more frameworks describing the common elements for
> modern authentication in routing protocols.
>
> add:
> This will be called the Framework document.
>
> It may be that time we might have more than one framework document =20
> ("Define one or more frameworks"), so I'd prefer to not restrict =20
> this item to one named document in the charter.
>
> Sensible. In several of my comments I was trying to give WG-relevant =20=

> names to different things so that we would have a shared vocabulary =20=

> and know what each other were talking about more precisely. I did so =20=

> based on the difficulty from experience that I've had trying to =20
> clarify the difference between all these things with many parties. I =20=

> don't really care what name we give any one thing, it could be FOO, =20=

> just as long as we decide a name, and a definition, and we all use =20
> it consistently so that we know what each other are talking about. =20
> Possible text that would match this desire:
>
> "This document will be called Framework (over time there could be =20
> more than one such framework document)."
>
> Again, not blocking, and no need to resolve before shipping charter.
>
>
>
>
>
> - Publish guidance on how to create and use integrity keys used with
> routing protocol message authentication.
>
> What I had in mind for the guidance document was more of a work list =20=

> and security tips/tricks for the teams doing the protocol gap =20
> analysis. So the guidance is more like the charter for those papers, =20=

> and how to move through the process. Here is an outline I came up =20
> with, which should NOT be in this charter text, but may help you to =20=

> better craft this item:
>
> Thanks for the additional information. I think there may be other =20
> guidance documents in scope too, so I'll change the charter to =20
> reflect that point.
>
>
>
> Guidance - more template for what a protocol gap analysis and design =20=

> team for a specific category of Routing Protocols will do, i.e. the =20=

> step by step instructions. Current in sections 4.1, and 4.4 of draft-=20=

> lebovitz-kmart-roadmap. E.g.:
> - Clearly list the category you are addressing, what protocols fall =20=

> into that category, and justify ea proto's existence in said category
> - go present in each protocols WG that the proto falls into said =20
> category, and that work is starting. Ask for volunteers. make sure =20
> we are cross sync'ing with the proto WG well.
> - Form a design team that includes protocol designers from protos in =20=

> that category + security guys.
> - update to the related proto WG's
> - Look at current security mechanisms of ea protocol and compare to =20=

> karp-threats-reqs document. Create a gap analysis
> - using karp-framework, solve for the gaps, conceptually. This can =20
> include requirements listing, suggested fixes
> - update to the related proto WG's
> - start a document for each protocol and apply the fixes needed for =20=

> each protocol
> - section on proper care and feeding of the process:
>     - define work split between KARP and actual rouint protocol WG's.
>     - final protocol design changes get made in protocol WGs, not =20
> KARP, but done based on docs coming out of KARP
>     - cc the proto WG often
>     - present in the proto WG often
>     - don't DoS the proto WG with your security stuff, it creates =20
> bitterness
>
>
> - Specify automated key management needs for routing protocols.
>
> add:  These we will call KARP Design Teams. These may well be very =20
> close to the same teams that do the protocol gap analysis.
>
> Specifying exactly *how* charter work items will be handled is =20
> probably more limiting than useful, so it might be better to omit =20
> details of forming design teams in the charter text.
>
> Again, this was an attempt at clarification of a definition for =20
> shared understanding. These are not routing-protocol-only people. =20
> Nor are these security-only people. These are expected to be =20
> smallish teams of both routing protocol and security experts working =20=

> on the effort together. As agreed above, the specification work may =20=

> occur in either the rtg proto wg, or in KARP, and will be decided on =20=

> a case by case basis. I was hoping we would give a name to all this, =20=

> so that we don't have to keep typing this entire paragraph over and =20=

> over again each time we have this discussion.
>
> again, not blocking. I leave it up to you.
>
> Hth,
> Gregory.
>
>
>
> Thanks!
> Brian
>
>
>
>
> Goals and Milestones:
>
> Aug 2010 - Submit General Framework, General Requirements, and
> Priorities/Work-Plan documents to the IESG to be considered as
> Informational RFC
>
> seems agressive to me. I'd say Nov is a better bet.
>
>
> Aug 2010 - Submit a framework document describing protocol groups and
> the common techniques and interfaces that apply to them to the IESG to
> be considered as Informational RFC
>
> Very aggressive. I'd start with Nov.
>
>
> Dec 2010 - Submit a document describing best best practices for =20
> creating
> and using protocol message authentication integrity keys as a BCP
>
> Seems reasonable.
>
>
> TBD - Submit specification document for OSPFv2 to the IESG to be
> considered as as a Proposed Standard
>
> TBD - Submit specification document for OSPFv3 to the IESG to be
> considered as as a Proposed Standard
>
> TBD - Submit specification document for PIM to the IESG to be =20
> considered
> as as a Proposed Standard
>
> TBD - Submit specification document for RSVP-TE to the IESG to be
> considered as as a Proposed Standard
>
> TBD - Submit specification document for ISIS to the IESG to be
> considered as as a Proposed Standard
>
> TBD - Submit specification document for BGP to the IESG to be =20
> considered
> as as a Proposed Standard
>
> TBD - Submit specification document for LDP to the IESG to be =20
> considered
> as as a Proposed Standard
>
> TBD - Submit specification document for PCE to the IESG to be =20
> considered
> as as a Proposed Standard
>
> TBD - Submit specification document for MSDP to the IESG to be
> considered as as a Proposed Standard
>
> TBD - Submit specification document for BFD to the IESG to be =20
> considered
> as as a Proposed Standard
>
> TBD - Submit specification document for LMP to the IESG to be =20
> considered
> as as a Proposed Standard
>
> TBD - Specify automated key management needs for routing protocols =20
> using
> unicast techniques
>
> TBD - Specify automated key management needs for routing protocols =20
> using
> multicast techniques
>
>
> All look good to me. Note that I think some of these will fall =20
> together in groups, so we could do one document for the design for =20
> the group, and then take that and go apply it specifically in each =20
> protocol's own WG, with the commitment of the KARP people to go =20
> there and continue the work there.
>
> Those are my thoughts. Hth,
> Gregory.
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> karp mailing list
> karp@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/karp
>
>
>
> --=20
> Brian Weis
> Router/Switch Security Group, ARTG, Cisco Systems
> Telephone: +1 408 526 4796
> Email: bew@cisco.com
>
>
>
>
>
>
> --=20
> ----
> IETF related email from
> Gregory M. Lebovitz
> Juniper Networks


--=20
Brian Weis
Router/Switch Security Group, ARTG, Cisco Systems
Telephone: +1 408 526 4796
Email: bew@cisco.com




From root@core3.amsl.com  Tue Feb  9 11:15:01 2010
Return-Path: <root@core3.amsl.com>
X-Original-To: karp@ietf.org
Delivered-To: karp@core3.amsl.com
Received: by core3.amsl.com (Postfix, from userid 0) id 85C0B3A70CD; Tue,  9 Feb 2010 11:15:01 -0800 (PST)
From: IESG Secretary <iesg-secretary@ietf.org>
To: ietf-announce@ietf.org
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
Mime-Version: 1.0
Message-Id: <20100209191501.85C0B3A70CD@core3.amsl.com>
Date: Tue,  9 Feb 2010 11:15:01 -0800 (PST)
Cc: karp@ietf.org
Subject: [karp] WG Review: Keying and Authentication for Routing Protocols (karp)
X-BeenThere: karp@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
Reply-To: iesg@ietf.org
List-Id: Discussion list for key management for routing and transport protocols <karp.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/karp>, <mailto:karp-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/karp>
List-Post: <mailto:karp@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:karp-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/karp>, <mailto:karp-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 09 Feb 2010 19:15:01 -0000

A new IETF working group has been proposed in the Routing Area.  The IESG
has not made any determination as yet. The following draft charter was
submitted, and is provided for informational purposes only. Please send
your comments to the IESG mailing list (iesg@ietf.org) by Tuesday,
February 16, 2010.                           

Keying and Authentication for Routing Protocols (karp)
---------------------------------------------------
Current Status: Proposed Working Group

Last Modified: 2010-02-05

Chair(s): 
   - Joel Halpern
   - Brian Weis

Routing Area Director(s):
   - Ross Callon
   - Adrian Farrell

Routing Area Advisor:
   - Ross Callon 

Security Area Advisor:
   - Tim Polk  

Mailing Lists:
	karp@ietf.org

Description of Working Group:

The KARP working group is tasked to work with the routing protocol
working groups in order to improve the communication security of the
packets on the wire used by the routing protocols. This working group is
concerned with message authentication, packet integrity, and denial of
service (DoS) protection.  At present, this charter explicitly excludes
confidentiality and non-repudiation concerns.

Authenticating the routing peer sending a message, and message integrity
protection, will be provided through the use of per-packet cryptographic
message authentication. Peer authentication will protect against
unrecognized peers, imposter peers, and some DoS attacks aimed at
routers. Protecting against misbehavior of an otherwise allowed peer
router is outside the scope of this working group.

Many routing protocols (or groups of protocols) already have some
method for accomplishing cryptographic message authentication.
In many or most cases existing methods are vulnerable to known
attack, and some employ cryptographic algorithms that have been
deprecated. While much work has been done to update authentication
of routing protocols, current status is not consistently up to date.
It is important to review and update those mechanisms to use modern
security practices. Ensuring algorithm agility within routing
protocols is of particular importance.

A goal of the working group is to add incremental security
to existing mechanisms rather than replacing them.  Better deployable
solutions to which vendors and operators can migrate is more important
than getting a perfect security solution.

Although there are many candidate routing protocols to evaluate, KARP
must by necessity begin with a restricted focus. The initial set of
routing protocols in scope include BGP, OSPFv2, OSPFv3, PCE, PIM, LDP,
RSVP-TE, ISIS, BFD, LMP, and MSDP.

The working group must coordinate very closely with other working
groups, such as:

-  Routing protocol working groups for any routing protocol being
evaluated. This coordination will include cooperatively determining the
current or already planned state of the security work in the protocol.
It will also include ensuring that any proposed mechanisms are
consistent with the architecture and use of the protocol.  Also, any
specific proposal accepted as a KARP document will be developed in
cooperation with the concerned protocol working group.

-  Security area working groups for cryptographic advice, and/or key
management protocol support. Cryptographic protocol support may be
required in order to support certain KARP WG milestones. Coordination
with an appropriate working group in the security area would be
necessary in order to get the appropriate expertise in completing a
milestone. This charter provides for preliminary work in this space,
although it is expected that detailed work items will be added to the
charter when the problem has been better analyzed. For example, this may
include a key management protocol by which routing protcols  
automatically
negotiate keying material and policy. More about the use of a key
management protocol  will be captured in a framework document described
below.

-  OPSEC working group for advice on best practices to create and use
integrity keys used with routing protocol message authentication.

Routing protocols use a range of transport mechanisms and communication
relationships. There are also differences in details among the various
protocols. The working group will attempt to describe the security
relevant characteristics of routings protocols, such as the use or
non-use of TCP, or the frequent use of group communication versus purely
pairwise communication. Using these characteristics, the working group
will then provide suitable common frameworks that can be applied, and
tailored, to improve the communication security of the routing
protocols.  In later phases, it is expected that the working group will
investigate the suitably of defining conceptual structures and APIs, so
as to enable further work to be more effective.

Work Items:

- Determine current threats to the routing protocol operation, and
define general requirements for cryptographic authentication of routing
protocols. A primary source for this document should be
draft-lebovitz-karp-roadmap, although RFC 4393 may also be useful.

- Identify deficiencies of each routing protocol in scope, and specify
mechanisms that bring them in line with the general requirements.  These
are referred to as protocol gap analysis documents.

- Define one or more frameworks describing the common elements for
modern authentication in routing protocols.

- Publish guidance on how to create a gap analysis for routing  
protocols.

- Publish guidance on guidance to operators on how to create and use
integrity keys used with routing protocol message authentication.

- Specify automated key management needs for routing protocols.

Goals and Milestones:

Nov 2010 - Submit General Framework, General Requirements, and
Priorities/Work-Plan documents to the IESG to be considered as
Informational RFC

Nov 2010 - Submit a framework document describing protocol groups and
the common techniques and interfaces that apply to them to the IESG to
be considered as Informational RFC

Dec 2010 - Submit a document describing best practices for creating and
using protocol message authentication integrity keys as a BCP

Apr 2011 - Submit specification document for OSPFv2 to the IESG to be
considered as a Proposed Standard

Apr 2011 - Submit specification document for BGP to the IESG to be  
considered as a Proposed Standard

Jul 2011 - Submit specification document for OSPFv3 to the IESG to be
considered as a Proposed Standard

Jul 2011 - Submit specification document for LDP to the IESG to be  
considered as a Proposed Standard

Oct 2011 - Submit specification document for PIM to the IESG to be  
considered as a Proposed Standard

Oct 2011  - Submit specification document for RSVP-TE to the IESG to be
considered as a Proposed Standard

Nov 2011 - Specify automated key management needs for routing  
protocols using unicast techniques

Jan 2012 - Submit specification document for ISIS to the IESG to be
considered as a Proposed Standard

Jan 2012 - Submit specification document for PCE to the IESG to be  
considered as a Proposed Standard

Apr 2012 - Submit specification document for MSDP to the IESG to be
considered as a Proposed Standard

Apr 2012 - Specify automated key management needs for routing  
protocols using multicast techniques

Apr 2012 - Submit specification document for BFD to the IESG to be  
considered as a Proposed Standard

Jul 2012 - Submit specification document for LMP to the IESG to be  
considered as a Proposed Standard

From jmh@joelhalpern.com  Thu Feb 11 13:24:29 2010
Return-Path: <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
X-Original-To: karp@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: karp@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 25C3228C1B4 for <karp@core3.amsl.com>; Thu, 11 Feb 2010 13:24:29 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -0.809
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.809 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.211,  BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_BL_SPAMCOP_NET=1.96, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-1, RCVD_IN_SORBS_WEB=0.619]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id OKeP2WwVM19u for <karp@core3.amsl.com>; Thu, 11 Feb 2010 13:24:28 -0800 (PST)
Received: from hermes.mail.tigertech.net (hermes.mail.tigertech.net [64.62.209.72]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 739093A75F6 for <karp@ietf.org>; Thu, 11 Feb 2010 13:24:28 -0800 (PST)
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by hermes.tigertech.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8BD87430068 for <karp@ietf.org>; Thu, 11 Feb 2010 13:25:44 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at hermes.tigertech.net
Received: from [192.168.1.16] (unknown [96.245.81.69]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by hermes.tigertech.net (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 449A0430063 for <karp@ietf.org>; Thu, 11 Feb 2010 13:25:44 -0800 (PST)
Message-ID: <4B7475D6.9040607@joelhalpern.com>
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2010 16:25:42 -0500
From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.23 (Windows/20090812)
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: karp@ietf.org
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Subject: [karp] Relationship between RPs and Key management
X-BeenThere: karp@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Discussion list for key management for routing and transport protocols <karp.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/karp>, <mailto:karp-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/karp>
List-Post: <mailto:karp@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:karp-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/karp>, <mailto:karp-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2010 21:24:29 -0000

Several design teams have been tasked with getting starting documents 
put together for this working group.  (We hope that the WG status will 
become final next week.)

In the course of those discussions, issues arise.
In this, and some other messages over the next several days I am going 
to try to paraphrase an issue, so as to get input and discussion from 
the WG as a whole.  Apologies if I mangle the issue in translation.

The issue for this mail is the relationship between routing protocols 
and key management / generation / storage.

One of the long term goals of this working group is to enable automated 
key management, automated smooth rekeying, and clean key storage and 
handling.  One aspect of this is taht for many of the protocols there is 
likely to be a notion of a master key, and key generation.
The quesiton is how aware of this the routing protocols should be.  One 
can imagine several choices.  In the extremes:
1) The coordinated generation of new keys is negotiated and managed by 
the routing protocol itself
2) The routing protocol is completely oblivious to how keys get 
generated, and just managed a smooth transition from one key to another, 
completely unaware of any key generation mechanism.

This is related to the point, which I think is non-controversial, that 
to the degree we describe a key store, that key store should be agnostic 
to the mechanisms use to generate keys (up to and including manual 
provisioning.)

Rotten tomatoes are now invited.
(Even better would be useful comments.)
Joel

From bill@cse.concordia.ca  Thu Feb 11 13:53:20 2010
Return-Path: <bill@cse.concordia.ca>
X-Original-To: karp@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: karp@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6308028C240 for <karp@core3.amsl.com>; Thu, 11 Feb 2010 13:53:20 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id oqbZW6nnTlqk for <karp@core3.amsl.com>; Thu, 11 Feb 2010 13:53:19 -0800 (PST)
Received: from perseverance.services.encs.concordia.ca (perseverance-96.encs.concordia.ca [132.205.96.94]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1CEA228C23C for <karp@ietf.org>; Thu, 11 Feb 2010 13:53:19 -0800 (PST)
Received: from [IPv6:::1] (bill@grace.encs.concordia.ca [132.205.2.208]) by perseverance.services.encs.concordia.ca (envelope-from bill@cse.concordia.ca) (8.13.7/8.13.7) with ESMTP id o1BLsXkZ029673;  Thu, 11 Feb 2010 16:54:33 -0500
Message-ID: <4B747CA9.5000300@cse.concordia.ca>
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2010 16:54:49 -0500
From: Bill Atwood <bill@cse.concordia.ca>
Organization: Concordia University, Department of Computer Science and Software Engineering
User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.23 (Windows/20090812)
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
References: <4B7475D6.9040607@joelhalpern.com>
In-Reply-To: <4B7475D6.9040607@joelhalpern.com>
X-Enigmail-Version: 0.96.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.58 on perseverance.encs.concordia.ca at 2010/02/11 16:54:33 EST
Cc: karp@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [karp] Relationship between RPs and Key management
X-BeenThere: karp@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Discussion list for key management for routing and transport protocols <karp.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/karp>, <mailto:karp-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/karp>
List-Post: <mailto:karp@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:karp-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/karp>, <mailto:karp-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2010 21:53:20 -0000

My answer has to be, "all of the below".  To illustrate:

PIM-SM:
In our work on implementing link-local security for PIM-SM (based on
draft-ietf-pim-sm-linklocal, now in the RFC Editor queue), it has become
clear that PIM-SM has no need to know anything about IPsec, or Keys, or
Security Associations.  The two implementations that we have done (using
a software router on a Linux box, and using some hardware routers) have
been implemented by entering IPsec commands.  We have not had to touch
the routing code at all.  As a result, it is _possible_ for secure
PIM-SM to function with no knowledge of security issues such as key
generation.

OSPFv3:
In OSPFv3, certain virtual interfaces are created.  In RFC 4552
(link-local security for OSPF v3), the Security Associations
corresponding to these interfaces have to be established dynamically by
the routing protocol.  While this does not imply that OSPFv3 needs to
know anything about the keys themselves (or how they are _generated_),
it does imply that the creation of an SA, and the resulting keys,
certainly needs to be _triggered_ by the routing protocol.  While this
is not "coordinated generation of new keys", it is equally not "complete
oblivion" either.

  Bill

Joel M. Halpern wrote:
> Several design teams have been tasked with getting starting documents
> put together for this working group.  (We hope that the WG status will
> become final next week.)
>
> In the course of those discussions, issues arise.
> In this, and some other messages over the next several days I am going
> to try to paraphrase an issue, so as to get input and discussion from
> the WG as a whole.  Apologies if I mangle the issue in translation.
>
> The issue for this mail is the relationship between routing protocols
> and key management / generation / storage.
>
> One of the long term goals of this working group is to enable
> automated key management, automated smooth rekeying, and clean key
> storage and handling.  One aspect of this is taht for many of the
> protocols there is likely to be a notion of a master key, and key
> generation.
> The quesiton is how aware of this the routing protocols should be. 
> One can imagine several choices.  In the extremes:
> 1) The coordinated generation of new keys is negotiated and managed by
> the routing protocol itself
> 2) The routing protocol is completely oblivious to how keys get
> generated, and just managed a smooth transition from one key to
> another, completely unaware of any key generation mechanism.
>
> This is related to the point, which I think is non-controversial, that
> to the degree we describe a key store, that key store should be
> agnostic to the mechanisms use to generate keys (up to and including
> manual provisioning.)
>
> Rotten tomatoes are now invited.
> (Even better would be useful comments.)
> Joel
> _______________________________________________
> karp mailing list
> karp@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/karp

-- 

Dr. J.W. Atwood, Eng.             tel:   +1 (514) 848-2424 x3046
Distinguished Professor Emeritus  fax:   +1 (514) 848-2830
Department of Computer Science
   and Software Engineering
Concordia University EV 3.185     email: bill@cse.concordia.ca
1455 de Maisonneuve Blvd. West    http: //users.encs.concordia.ca/~bill
Montreal, Quebec Canada H3G 1M8


From ietf@hardjono.net  Thu Feb 11 14:06:46 2010
Return-Path: <ietf@hardjono.net>
X-Original-To: karp@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: karp@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 659C53A7613 for <karp@core3.amsl.com>; Thu, 11 Feb 2010 14:06:46 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.265
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.265 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, IP_NOT_FRIENDLY=0.334]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id IEFa8tOc0E4S for <karp@core3.amsl.com>; Thu, 11 Feb 2010 14:06:45 -0800 (PST)
Received: from outbound-mail-313.bluehost.com (outbound-mail-313.bluehost.com [67.222.54.6]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with SMTP id 4128D3A748B for <karp@ietf.org>; Thu, 11 Feb 2010 14:06:45 -0800 (PST)
Received: (qmail 10225 invoked by uid 0); 11 Feb 2010 22:08:01 -0000
Received: from unknown (HELO box251.bluehost.com) (69.89.31.51) by outboundproxy6.bluehost.com with SMTP; 11 Feb 2010 22:08:01 -0000
DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; q=dns; c=nofws; s=default; d=hardjono.net; h=Received:From:To:Cc:References:In-Reply-To:Subject:Date:Message-ID:MIME-Version:Content-Type:Content-Transfer-Encoding:X-Mailer:Thread-Index:Content-Language:X-Identified-User; b=my+Afcz3SIB3RWDDRi/jcMc46CCRlELeXqHSHyrmcS79KO6Gi8u/k1jYu6AYZ48ikpKkH/aY/cIVzFGdwlVU9EczGFtKC0W5lveRAETD+cqm++vUYHATBXNWb4wmOpML;
Received: from dhcp-18-111-113-209.dyn.mit.edu ([18.111.113.209] helo=WINCE7P9IL9EJ0) by box251.bluehost.com with esmtpsa (TLSv1:AES128-SHA:128) (Exim 4.69) (envelope-from <ietf@hardjono.net>) id 1NfhCL-00047W-Qt; Thu, 11 Feb 2010 15:08:01 -0700
From: "Thomas Hardjono" <ietf@hardjono.net>
To: "'Joel M. Halpern'" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>, <karp@ietf.org>
References: <4B7475D6.9040607@joelhalpern.com>
In-Reply-To: <4B7475D6.9040607@joelhalpern.com>
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2010 17:07:44 -0500
Message-ID: <000001caab66$accd73c0$06685b40$@net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Mailer: Microsoft Office Outlook 12.0
Thread-Index: AcqrYMX3YCBhg84dSImS7QxW2BEDtgABK0eQ
Content-Language: en-us
X-Identified-User: {727:box251.bluehost.com:hardjono:hardjono.net} {sentby:smtp auth 18.111.113.209 authed with ietf@hardjono.net}
Cc: Thomas Hardjono <hardjono@mit.edu>
Subject: Re: [karp] Relationship between RPs and Key management
X-BeenThere: karp@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Discussion list for key management for routing and transport protocols <karp.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/karp>, <mailto:karp-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/karp>
List-Post: <mailto:karp@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:karp-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/karp>, <mailto:karp-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2010 22:06:46 -0000

> -----Original Message-----
> From: karp-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:karp-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
Joel
> M. Halpern
> Sent: Thursday, February 11, 2010 4:26 PM
> To: karp@ietf.org
> Subject: [karp] Relationship between RPs and Key management
> 
> Several design teams have been tasked with getting starting documents
> put together for this working group.  (We hope that the WG status will
> become final next week.)
> 
> In the course of those discussions, issues arise.
> In this, and some other messages over the next several days I am going
> to try to paraphrase an issue, so as to get input and discussion from
> the WG as a whole.  Apologies if I mangle the issue in translation.
> 
> The issue for this mail is the relationship between routing protocols
> and key management / generation / storage.
> 
> One of the long term goals of this working group is to enable automated
> key management, automated smooth rekeying, and clean key storage and
> handling.  One aspect of this is taht for many of the protocols there is
> likely to be a notion of a master key, and key generation.
> The quesiton is how aware of this the routing protocols should be.  One
> can imagine several choices.  In the extremes:
> 1) The coordinated generation of new keys is negotiated and managed by
> the routing protocol itself
> 2) The routing protocol is completely oblivious to how keys get
> generated, and just managed a smooth transition from one key to another,
> completely unaware of any key generation mechanism.
> 
> This is related to the point, which I think is non-controversial, that
> to the degree we describe a key store, that key store should be agnostic
> to the mechanisms use to generate keys (up to and including manual
> provisioning.)
> 
> Rotten tomatoes are now invited.
> (Even better would be useful comments.)
> Joel
> _______________________________________________

Hi Joel,

I guess your question generally could be re-casted as asking whether
management traffic should be in-band or out-of-band (OOB).
My understanding is today manageability platforms
primarily favor in the OOB way where the management console
uses a separate IP traffic (eg. TCP, HTTP) to the device/router.

In option (1) above, my understanding is that routers
have to do one thing fast (and its processors must not
be burdened with key gen, etc).

One related question is how automated is "automated".
If a key expires (about to expire) on a device/router,
does it (a) flag the IT admin and wait, (b) does it simply
generate a replacement key and update the key server,
(c) does it notify the key server who then generates a new key
and updates the device/router, etc. etc.

/thomas/
hardjono[at]mit.edu












From bill@cse.concordia.ca  Thu Feb 11 14:30:24 2010
Return-Path: <bill@cse.concordia.ca>
X-Original-To: karp@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: karp@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1873728C0E0 for <karp@core3.amsl.com>; Thu, 11 Feb 2010 14:30:24 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id HqiNDjfJCLmv for <karp@core3.amsl.com>; Thu, 11 Feb 2010 14:30:21 -0800 (PST)
Received: from perseverance.services.encs.concordia.ca (perseverance-96.encs.concordia.ca [132.205.96.94]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2528F28C161 for <karp@ietf.org>; Thu, 11 Feb 2010 14:30:19 -0800 (PST)
Received: from [IPv6:::1] (bill@grace.encs.concordia.ca [132.205.2.208]) by perseverance.services.encs.concordia.ca (envelope-from bill@cse.concordia.ca) (8.13.7/8.13.7) with ESMTP id o1BMVVlN005291;  Thu, 11 Feb 2010 17:31:31 -0500
Message-ID: <4B748552.60701@cse.concordia.ca>
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2010 17:31:46 -0500
From: Bill Atwood <bill@cse.concordia.ca>
Organization: Concordia University, Department of Computer Science and Software Engineering
User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.23 (Windows/20090812)
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: Thomas Hardjono <ietf@hardjono.net>
References: <4B7475D6.9040607@joelhalpern.com> <000001caab66$accd73c0$06685b40$@net>
In-Reply-To: <000001caab66$accd73c0$06685b40$@net>
X-Enigmail-Version: 0.96.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.58 on perseverance.encs.concordia.ca at 2010/02/11 17:31:31 EST
Cc: Thomas Hardjono <hardjono@mit.edu>, karp@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [karp] Relationship between RPs and Key management
X-BeenThere: karp@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Discussion list for key management for routing and transport protocols <karp.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/karp>, <mailto:karp-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/karp>
List-Post: <mailto:karp@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:karp-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/karp>, <mailto:karp-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2010 22:30:24 -0000

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

Inline, marked with <bill>.


Thomas Hardjono wrote:
> 
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: karp-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:karp-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
> Joel
>> M. Halpern
>> Sent: Thursday, February 11, 2010 4:26 PM
>> To: karp@ietf.org
>> Subject: [karp] Relationship between RPs and Key management
>>
>> Several design teams have been tasked with getting starting documents
>> put together for this working group.  (We hope that the WG status will
>> become final next week.)
>>
>> In the course of those discussions, issues arise.
>> In this, and some other messages over the next several days I am going
>> to try to paraphrase an issue, so as to get input and discussion from
>> the WG as a whole.  Apologies if I mangle the issue in translation.
>>
>> The issue for this mail is the relationship between routing protocols
>> and key management / generation / storage.
>>
>> One of the long term goals of this working group is to enable automated
>> key management, automated smooth rekeying, and clean key storage and
>> handling.  One aspect of this is taht for many of the protocols there is
>> likely to be a notion of a master key, and key generation.
>> The quesiton is how aware of this the routing protocols should be.  One
>> can imagine several choices.  In the extremes:
>> 1) The coordinated generation of new keys is negotiated and managed by
>> the routing protocol itself
>> 2) The routing protocol is completely oblivious to how keys get
>> generated, and just managed a smooth transition from one key to another,
>> completely unaware of any key generation mechanism.
>>
>> This is related to the point, which I think is non-controversial, that
>> to the degree we describe a key store, that key store should be agnostic
>> to the mechanisms use to generate keys (up to and including manual
>> provisioning.)
>>
>> Rotten tomatoes are now invited.
>> (Even better would be useful comments.)
>> Joel
>> _______________________________________________
> 
> Hi Joel,
> 
> I guess your question generally could be re-casted as asking whether
> management traffic should be in-band or out-of-band (OOB).
> My understanding is today manageability platforms
> primarily favor in the OOB way where the management console
> uses a separate IP traffic (eg. TCP, HTTP) to the device/router.
> 
> In option (1) above, my understanding is that routers
> have to do one thing fast (and its processors must not
> be burdened with key gen, etc).

<bill>  I believe that this is very important---all of the AAA work
seems to live under this design requirement.

> 
> One related question is how automated is "automated".
> If a key expires (about to expire) on a device/router,
> does it (a) flag the IT admin and wait, (b) does it simply
> generate a replacement key and update the key server,
> (c) does it notify the key server who then generates a new key
> and updates the device/router, etc. etc.

<bill> There are some excellent opportunities for race conditions (and
deadlocks!) if we do not get this right.  Precise responsibilities will
have to be spelled out carefully.

  Bill

> 
> /thomas/
> hardjono[at]mit.edu
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> karp mailing list
> karp@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/karp

- --

Dr. J.W. Atwood, Eng.             tel:   +1 (514) 848-2424 x3046
Distinguished Professor Emeritus  fax:   +1 (514) 848-2830
Department of Computer Science
   and Software Engineering
Concordia University EV 3.185     email: bill@cse.concordia.ca
1455 de Maisonneuve Blvd. West    http: //users.encs.concordia.ca/~bill
Montreal, Quebec Canada H3G 1M8
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32)
Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/

iEYEARECAAYFAkt0hVIACgkQV5o4IdDwBVjSYQCfaCz/Bb5WkpnsaZCPgORVOxRF
CUwAn0yg+OiuAzHOCVa3zoyq9oHZsp1x
=FMbW
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

From jmh@joelhalpern.com  Fri Feb 19 13:37:27 2010
Return-Path: <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
X-Original-To: karp@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: karp@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 72F503A7F00 for <karp@core3.amsl.com>; Fri, 19 Feb 2010 13:37:27 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -3.503
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.503 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.096,  BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id crb6imHwjuuy for <karp@core3.amsl.com>; Fri, 19 Feb 2010 13:37:26 -0800 (PST)
Received: from hermes.mail.tigertech.net (hermes.mail.tigertech.net [64.62.209.72]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 71AAB3A7B77 for <karp@ietf.org>; Fri, 19 Feb 2010 13:37:25 -0800 (PST)
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by hermes.tigertech.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id C1F0743B314 for <karp@ietf.org>; Fri, 19 Feb 2010 13:39:13 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at hermes.tigertech.net
Received: from [10.10.10.102] (pool-71-161-51-31.clppva.btas.verizon.net [71.161.51.31]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by hermes.tigertech.net (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 5CFFD43B311 for <karp@ietf.org>; Fri, 19 Feb 2010 13:39:13 -0800 (PST)
Message-ID: <4B7F0500.8050707@joelhalpern.com>
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 2010 16:39:12 -0500
From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.23 (Windows/20090812)
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: karp@ietf.org
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Subject: [karp] Scheduling
X-BeenThere: karp@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Discussion list for key management for routing and transport protocols <karp.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/karp>, <mailto:karp-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/karp>
List-Post: <mailto:karp@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:karp-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/karp>, <mailto:karp-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 19 Feb 2010 21:37:27 -0000

We have been tenatively assigned one meeting slot in anaheim.  If you 
see any critical conflicts we missed, please say something.  (Some 
degree of schedule conflict is inevitable.)

Yours,
Joel M. Halpern

TUESDAY, March 23, 2010 0900-1130 Morning Session I
Redondo 	APP 	httpstate HTTP State Management Mechanism WG
California D 	INT 	intarea Internet Area Open Meeting
Palos Verdes 	IRTF 	iccrg 	Internet Congestion Control Research
                                 Group
Huntington 	OPS 	netmod 	NETCONF Data Modeling Language WG
California B 	RAI 	sipcore Session Initiation Protocol Core WG
California C 	RTG 	ccamp 	Common Control and Measurement Plane WG
California A 	RTG 	karp 	Keying and Authentication for Routing
                                 Protocols
Manhattan 	TSV 	nfsv4 	Network File System Version 4 WG

From root@core3.amsl.com  Tue Feb 23 13:00:02 2010
Return-Path: <root@core3.amsl.com>
X-Original-To: karp@ietf.org
Delivered-To: karp@core3.amsl.com
Received: by core3.amsl.com (Postfix, from userid 0) id 078713A84F2; Tue, 23 Feb 2010 13:00:01 -0800 (PST)
From: IESG Secretary <iesg-secretary@ietf.org>
To: ietf-announce@ietf.org
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
Mime-Version: 1.0
Message-Id: <20100223210002.078713A84F2@core3.amsl.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 2010 13:00:02 -0800 (PST)
Cc: karp@ietf.org
Subject: [karp] WG Action: Keying and Authentication for Routing Protocols (karp)
X-BeenThere: karp@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Discussion list for key management for routing and transport protocols <karp.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/karp>, <mailto:karp-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/karp>
List-Post: <mailto:karp@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:karp-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/karp>, <mailto:karp-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 23 Feb 2010 21:00:02 -0000

A new IETF working group has been formed in the Routing Area.  For
additional information, please contact the Area Directors or the WG
Chairs.

Keying and Authentication for Routing Protocols (karp)
-------------------------------------------

Current Status: Active Working Group

Last Modified: 2010-02-23 

Additional information is available at tools.ietf.org/wg/karp 

Chair(s):
Brian Weis <bew@cisco.com> 
Joel Halpern <jmh@joelhalpern.com> 

Routing Area Director(s):
Ross Callon <rcallon@juniper.net> 
Adrian Farrel <adrian.farrel@huawei.com> 

Routing Area Advisor:
Ross Callon <rcallon@juniper.net> 

Technical Advisor(s):
Tim Polk <tim.polk@nist.gov> 

Mailing Lists:

General Discussion: karp@ietf.org
To Subscribe: https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/karp
Archive: http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/karp/current/maillist.html

Description of Working Group:

The KARP working group is tasked to work with the routing protocol
working groups in order to improve the communication security of the
packets on the wire used by the routing protocols. This working group is
concerned with message authentication, packet integrity, and denial of
service (DoS) protection. At present, this charter explicitly excludes
confidentiality and non-repudiation concerns.

Authenticating the routing peer sending a message, and message integrity
protection, will be provided through the use of per-packet cryptographic
message authentication. Peer authentication will protect against
unrecognized peers, imposter peers, and some DoS attacks aimed at
routers. Protecting against misbehavior of an otherwise allowed peer
router is outside the scope of this working group.

Many routing protocols (or groups of protocols) already have some
method for accomplishing cryptographic message authentication.
In many or most cases existing methods are vulnerable to known
attack, and some employ cryptographic algorithms that have been
deprecated. While much work has been done to update authentication
of routing protocols, current status is not consistently up to date.
It is important to review and update those mechanisms to use modern
security practices. Ensuring algorithm agility within routing
protocols is of particular importance.

A goal of the working group is to add incremental security
to existing mechanisms rather than replacing them. Better deployable
solutions to which vendors and operators can migrate is more important
than getting a perfect security solution.

Although there are many candidate routing protocols to evaluate, KARP
must by necessity begin with a restricted focus. The initial set of
routing protocols in scope include BGP, OSPFv2, OSPFv3, PCE, PIM, LDP,
RSVP-TE, ISIS, BFD, LMP, and MSDP.

The working group must coordinate very closely with other working
groups, such as:

- Routing protocol working groups for any routing protocol being
evaluated. This coordination will include cooperatively determining the
current or already planned state of the security work in the protocol.
It will also include ensuring that any proposed mechanisms are
consistent with the architecture and use of the protocol. Also, any
specific proposal accepted as a KARP document will be developed in
cooperation with the concerned protocol working group.

- Security area working groups for cryptographic advice, and/or key
management protocol support. Cryptographic protocol support may be
required in order to support certain KARP WG milestones. Coordination
with an appropriate working group in the security area would be
necessary in order to get the appropriate expertise in completing a
milestone. This charter provides for preliminary work in this space,
although it is expected that detailed work items will be added to the
charter when the problem has been better analyzed. For example, this may
include a key management protocol by which routing protcols automatically
negotiate keying material and policy. More about the use of a key
management protocol will be captured in a framework document described
below.

- OPSEC working group for advice on best practices to create and use
integrity keys used with routing protocol message authentication. KARP
will also coordinate with other Operations and Management area WGs
and/or experts in order to identify operational impacts on existing
routing protocols and to identify any management extensions that may
be required.

Routing protocols use a range of transport mechanisms and communication
relationships. There are also differences in details among the various
protocols. The working group will attempt to describe the security
relevant characteristics of routings protocols, such as the use or
non-use of TCP, or the frequent use of group communication versus purely
pairwise communication. Using these characteristics, the working group
will then provide suitable common frameworks that can be applied, and
tailored, to improve the communication security of the routing
protocols. In later phases, it is expected that the working group will
investigate the suitably of defining conceptual structures and APIs, so
as to enable further work to be more effective.

Work Items:

- Determine current threats to the routing protocol operation, and
define general requirements for cryptographic authentication of routing
protocols. A primary source for this document should be
draft-lebovitz-karp-roadmap, although RFC 4393 may also be useful.

- Identify deficiencies of each routing protocol in scope, and specify
mechanisms that bring them in line with the general requirements. These
are referred to as protocol gap analysis documents.

- Define one or more frameworks describing the common elements for
modern authentication in routing protocols.

- Publish guidance on how to create a gap analysis for routing
protocols.

- Publish guidance on guidance to operators on how to create and use
integrity keys used with routing protocol message authentication.

- Specify automated key management needs for routing protocols.

Goals and Milestones:

Nov 2010 - Submit General Framework, General Requirements, and
Priorities/Work-Plan documents to the IESG to be considered as
Informational RFC

Nov 2010 - Submit a framework document describing protocol groups and
the common techniques and interfaces that apply to them to the IESG to
be considered as Informational RFC

Dec 2010 - Submit a document describing best practices for creating and
using protocol message authentication integrity keys as a BCP

Apr 2011 - Submit specification document for OSPFv2 to the IESG to be
considered as a Proposed Standard

Apr 2011 - Submit specification document for BGP to the IESG to be
considered as a Proposed Standard

Jul 2011 - Submit specification document for OSPFv3 to the IESG to be
considered as a Proposed Standard

Jul 2011 - Submit specification document for LDP to the IESG to be
considered as a Proposed Standard

Oct 2011 - Submit specification document for PIM to the IESG to be
considered as a Proposed Standard

Oct 2011 - Submit specification document for RSVP-TE to the IESG to be
considered as a Proposed Standard

Nov 2011 - Specify automated key management needs for routing
protocols using unicast techniques

Jan 2012 - Submit specification document for ISIS to the IESG to be
considered as a Proposed Standard

Jan 2012 - Submit specification document for PCE to the IESG to be
considered as a Proposed Standard

Apr 2012 - Submit specification document for MSDP to the IESG to be
considered as a Proposed Standard

Apr 2012 - Specify automated key management needs for routing
protocols using multicast techniques

Apr 2012 - Submit specification document for BFD to the IESG to be
considered as a Proposed Standard

Jul 2012 - Submit specification document for LMP to the IESG to be
considered as a Proposed Standard

From manav.bhatia@alcatel-lucent.com  Fri Feb 26 19:46:38 2010
Return-Path: <manav.bhatia@alcatel-lucent.com>
X-Original-To: karp@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: karp@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 333903A7904 for <karp@core3.amsl.com>; Fri, 26 Feb 2010 19:46:38 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id Dwn4Dx2BjrzB for <karp@core3.amsl.com>; Fri, 26 Feb 2010 19:46:36 -0800 (PST)
Received: from ihemail1.lucent.com (ihemail1.lucent.com [135.245.0.33]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6C45F28C2B6 for <karp@ietf.org>; Fri, 26 Feb 2010 19:46:35 -0800 (PST)
Received: from horh1.pdc.alcatel-lucent.com (h172-22-218-55.lucent.com [172.22.218.55]) by ihemail1.lucent.com (8.13.8/IER-o) with ESMTP id o1R3mpwT025074 for <karp@ietf.org>; Fri, 26 Feb 2010 21:48:51 -0600 (CST)
Received: from mail.apac.alcatel-lucent.com (h202-65-2-130.alcatel.com [202.65.2.130]) by horh1.pdc.alcatel-lucent.com (8.13.8/emsr) with ESMTP id o1R3mnV6001939 for <karp@ietf.org>; Fri, 26 Feb 2010 21:48:50 -0600 (CST)
Received: from INBANSXCHHUB02.in.alcatel-lucent.com (inbansxchhub02.in.alcatel-lucent.com [135.250.12.35]) by mail.apac.alcatel-lucent.com (8.13.7/8.13.7/Alcanet1.0) with ESMTP id o1R3dsrN008926 for <karp@ietf.org>; Sat, 27 Feb 2010 11:39:55 +0800
Received: from INBANSXCHMBSA1.in.alcatel-lucent.com ([135.250.12.56]) by INBANSXCHHUB02.in.alcatel-lucent.com ([135.250.12.35]) with mapi; Sat, 27 Feb 2010 09:18:44 +0530
From: "Bhatia, Manav (Manav)" <manav.bhatia@alcatel-lucent.com>
To: "karp@ietf.org" <karp@ietf.org>
Date: Sat, 27 Feb 2010 09:18:42 +0530
Thread-Topic: draft-ietf-karp-design-guide-00.txt
Thread-Index: Acq3X8DzHK3AwvjDTJ+qvkHLCX66hQ==
Message-ID: <7C362EEF9C7896468B36C9B79200D8350CC7CE52DC@INBANSXCHMBSA1.in.alcatel-lucent.com>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
acceptlanguage: en-US
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.57 on 135.245.2.33
X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.64 on 202.65.2.130
Subject: [karp] draft-ietf-karp-design-guide-00.txt
X-BeenThere: karp@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Discussion list for key management for routing and transport protocols <karp.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/karp>, <mailto:karp-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/karp>
List-Post: <mailto:karp@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:karp-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/karp>, <mailto:karp-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 27 Feb 2010 03:46:38 -0000

For some inexplicable reason this mail never reached the KARP list ..

The first version of the design guide has been announced!

---- Forwarded Message ----
From: "Internet-Drafts@ietf.org" <Internet-Drafts@ietf.org>
To: i-d-announce@ietf.org
Cc: karp@ietf.org
Sent: Fri, February 26, 2010 10:30:01 PM
Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-karp-design-guide-00.txt=20

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts=20
directories.
This draft is a work item of the Keying and Authentication for Routing Prot=
ocols Working Group of the IETF.

    Title       : Keying and Authentication for Routing Protocols (KARP) De=
sign Guidelines=20
    Author(s)   : G. Lebovitz, M. Bhatia
    Filename    : draft-ietf-karp-design-guide-00.txt
    Pages       : 25
    Date        : 2010-2-25
   =20
In the March of 2006 the IAB held a workshop on the topic of "Unwanted=20
Internet Traffic".  The report from that workshop is documented in RFC=20
4948 [RFC4948]. Section 8.2 of RFC 4948 calls for [t]ightening the=20
security of the core routing infrastructure."  Four main steps were=20
identified for improving the security of the routing infrastructure. =20
One of those steps was "securing the routing protocols' packets on the=20
wire."  One mechanism for securing routing protocol packets on the wire=20
is the use of per-packet cryptographic message authentication,=20
providing both peer authentication and message integrity.  Many=20
different routing protocols exist and they employ a range of different=20
transport subsystems.  Therefore there must necessarily be various=20
methods defined for applying cryptographic authentication to these=20
varying protocols.  Many routing protocols already have some method for=20
accomplishing cryptographic message authentication.  However, in many=20
cases the existing methods are dated, vulnerable to attack, and/or=20
employ cryptographic algorithms that have been deprecated.  This=20
document is one of a series concerned with defining a roadmap of=20
protocol specification work for the use of modern cryptographic=20
mechanisms and algorithms for message authentication in routing=20
protocols.  In particular, it defines the framework for a key=20
management protocol that may be used to create and manage session keys=20
for message authentication and integrity.  The overall roadmap reflects=20
the input of both the security area and routing area in order to form a=20
jointly agreed upon and prioritized work list for the effort.=20

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-karp-design-guide-00.txt

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/

Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant mail reader
implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version of the
Internet-Draft.

--
Manav Bhatia,
IP Division, Alcatel-Lucent,
Bangalore - India

 =

From mark.ietf@gmail.com  Sat Feb 27 16:37:38 2010
Return-Path: <mark.ietf@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: karp@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: karp@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6903728C0EA for <karp@core3.amsl.com>; Sat, 27 Feb 2010 16:37:38 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 0
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=0 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[none]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id uiXknlFeu-j9 for <karp@core3.amsl.com>; Sat, 27 Feb 2010 16:37:37 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail-px0-f185.google.com (mail-px0-f185.google.com [209.85.216.185]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 82AEF28C0D9 for <karp@ietf.org>; Sat, 27 Feb 2010 16:37:34 -0800 (PST)
Received: by pxi15 with SMTP id 15so487173pxi.20 for <karp@ietf.org>; Sat, 27 Feb 2010 16:37:31 -0800 (PST)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=domainkey-signature:mime-version:received:date:message-id:subject :from:to:cc:content-type:content-transfer-encoding; bh=mN7T3gHfG8/fJaiaR/YfnYvohbHb5NApp5f/ZMOLTzc=; b=g3rN6jm4Xu03Nleq0VXEmdDqWm7Ci/NkI3y3bQtb7vMB8eCOLkzDAG1xHyZGYmVwAN h/h0ZhvezLsHfwz0jKlIdO2S5CK+ct1DP06YNJVSQG0SfmIEbaSKzign+wUvmMGRKdRb 3LnOyI1N+2IEL5sU1EDn8LfvDlkR6yKJp2zz0=
DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; c=nofws; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=mime-version:date:message-id:subject:from:to:cc:content-type :content-transfer-encoding; b=q/RRR8B1QysZIWzOlcCIISr81OKvkv+Uwqz0+Z6saIH3fqKWm1Z50leFCH7WEB3oRi 2JegDWPYBBeunkP5JznU8XlCRKG18VLuLpfmL7eWgPTbiT/hgjkaC59F6DuIhqEgBpzK xl1TADtKdANFP2Clgl+1aPSJ/Hyybe4XQMAFU=
MIME-Version: 1.0
Received: by 10.141.124.15 with SMTP id b15mr1363591rvn.135.1267317451416;  Sat, 27 Feb 2010 16:37:31 -0800 (PST)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 2010 06:07:31 +0530
Message-ID: <ac5a16401002271637h41a4e1d8t614266dfceeb3b9f@mail.gmail.com>
From: mark Brown <mark.ietf@gmail.com>
To: manav.bhatia@alcatel-lucent.com
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Cc: karp@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [karp] draft-ietf-karp-design-guide-00.txt
X-BeenThere: karp@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Discussion list for key management for routing and transport protocols <karp.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/karp>, <mailto:karp-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/karp>
List-Post: <mailto:karp@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:karp-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/karp>, <mailto:karp-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 28 Feb 2010 00:39:12 -0000

Manav,

This draft makes a reference to=A0"[I-D.ietf-karp-threats-req]" in a
couple of places:

[I-D.ietf-karp-threats-req] Lebovitz, G., "KARP Threats and
Requirements", Work in Progress, February 2010.

I tried searching for this draft and couldnt find it in the IETF
repository. Is a correct reference given?

I could also not find [I-D.ietf-karp-framework] referred in the section 4.1

http://www.ietf.org/dyn/wg/charter/karp-charter.html also lists only
this particular draft. Am i missing something?

Mark

> -----Original Message-----
> From: karp-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:karp-bounces@ietf.org] On
> Behalf Of Bhatia, Manav (Manav)
> Sent: Saturday, February 27, 2010 9.19 AM
> To: karp@ietf.org
> Subject: [karp] draft-ietf-karp-design-guide-00.txt
>
> For some inexplicable reason this mail never reached the KARP list ..
>
> The first version of the design guide has been announced!
>
> ---- Forwarded Message ----
> From: "Internet-Drafts@ietf.org" <Internet-Drafts@ietf.org>
> To: i-d-announce@ietf.org
> Cc: karp@ietf.org
> Sent: Fri, February 26, 2010 10:30:01 PM
> Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-karp-design-guide-00.txt
>
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
> directories.
> This draft is a work item of the Keying and Authentication
> for Routing Protocols Working Group of the IETF.
>
> =A0 =A0 Title =A0 =A0 =A0 : Keying and Authentication for Routing
> Protocols (KARP) Design Guidelines
> =A0 =A0 Author(s) =A0 : G. Lebovitz, M. Bhatia
> =A0 =A0 Filename =A0 =A0: draft-ietf-karp-design-guide-00.txt
> =A0 =A0 Pages =A0 =A0 =A0 : 25
> =A0 =A0 Date =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0: 2010-2-25
>
> In the March of 2006 the IAB held a workshop on the topic of
> "Unwanted
> Internet Traffic". =A0The report from that workshop is
> documented in RFC
> 4948 [RFC4948]. Section 8.2 of RFC 4948 calls for [t]ightening the
> security of the core routing infrastructure." =A0Four main steps were
> identified for improving the security of the routing infrastructure.
> One of those steps was "securing the routing protocols'
> packets on the
> wire." =A0One mechanism for securing routing protocol packets
> on the wire
> is the use of per-packet cryptographic message authentication,
> providing both peer authentication and message integrity. =A0Many
> different routing protocols exist and they employ a range of
> different
> transport subsystems. =A0Therefore there must necessarily be various
> methods defined for applying cryptographic authentication to these
> varying protocols. =A0Many routing protocols already have some
> method for
> accomplishing cryptographic message authentication. =A0However, in many
> cases the existing methods are dated, vulnerable to attack, and/or
> employ cryptographic algorithms that have been deprecated. =A0This
> document is one of a series concerned with defining a roadmap of
> protocol specification work for the use of modern cryptographic
> mechanisms and algorithms for message authentication in routing
> protocols. =A0In particular, it defines the framework for a key
> management protocol that may be used to create and manage
> session keys
> for message authentication and integrity. =A0The overall
> roadmap reflects
> the input of both the security area and routing area in order
> to form a
> jointly agreed upon and prioritized work list for the effort.
>
> A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-karp-design-gui
> de-00.txt
>
> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>
> Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant mail reader
> implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version of the
> Internet-Draft.
>
> --
> Manav Bhatia,
> IP Division, Alcatel-Lucent,
> Bangalore - India
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> karp mailing list
> karp@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/karp
>

From manav.bhatia@alcatel-lucent.com  Sat Feb 27 18:25:01 2010
Return-Path: <manav.bhatia@alcatel-lucent.com>
X-Original-To: karp@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: karp@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5FC513A8A31 for <karp@core3.amsl.com>; Sat, 27 Feb 2010 18:25:01 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 2CPR-038T6gG for <karp@core3.amsl.com>; Sat, 27 Feb 2010 18:25:00 -0800 (PST)
Received: from ihemail4.lucent.com (ihemail4.lucent.com [135.245.0.39]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5F3283A88AE for <karp@ietf.org>; Sat, 27 Feb 2010 18:25:00 -0800 (PST)
Received: from inbansmailrelay2.in.alcatel-lucent.com (h135-250-11-33.lucent.com [135.250.11.33]) by ihemail4.lucent.com (8.13.8/IER-o) with ESMTP id o1S2OsQ7011074 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=FAIL); Sat, 27 Feb 2010 20:24:56 -0600 (CST)
Received: from INBANSXCHHUB01.in.alcatel-lucent.com (inbansxchhub01.in.alcatel-lucent.com [135.250.12.32]) by inbansmailrelay2.in.alcatel-lucent.com (8.14.3/8.14.3/GMO) with ESMTP id o1S2OrTI006907 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=RC4-MD5 bits=128 verify=NOT); Sun, 28 Feb 2010 07:54:53 +0530
Received: from INBANSXCHMBSA1.in.alcatel-lucent.com ([135.250.12.56]) by INBANSXCHHUB01.in.alcatel-lucent.com ([135.250.12.32]) with mapi; Sun, 28 Feb 2010 07:54:53 +0530
From: "Bhatia, Manav (Manav)" <manav.bhatia@alcatel-lucent.com>
To: mark Brown <mark.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 2010 07:54:51 +0530
Thread-Topic: [karp] draft-ietf-karp-design-guide-00.txt
Thread-Index: Acq4DjtEXntdaJcbQqqjIV3x4gqOjwADr8Lw
Message-ID: <7C362EEF9C7896468B36C9B79200D8350CC7CE537C@INBANSXCHMBSA1.in.alcatel-lucent.com>
References: <ac5a16401002271637h41a4e1d8t614266dfceeb3b9f@mail.gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <ac5a16401002271637h41a4e1d8t614266dfceeb3b9f@mail.gmail.com>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
acceptlanguage: en-US
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.57 on 135.245.2.39
X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.64 on 135.250.11.33
Cc: "karp@ietf.org" <karp@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [karp] draft-ietf-karp-design-guide-00.txt
X-BeenThere: karp@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Discussion list for key management for routing and transport protocols <karp.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/karp>, <mailto:karp-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/karp>
List-Post: <mailto:karp@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:karp-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/karp>, <mailto:karp-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 28 Feb 2010 02:25:01 -0000

Mark,

We were working on these three documents (design guide, threats and require=
ments and framework) in parallel and you should see the other two uploaded =
very soon!

Thanks, Manav

> -----Original Message-----
> From: mark Brown [mailto:mark.ietf@gmail.com]=20
> Sent: Sunday, February 28, 2010 6.08 AM
> To: Bhatia, Manav (Manav)
> Cc: karp@ietf.org
> Subject: RE: [karp] draft-ietf-karp-design-guide-00.txt
>=20
> Manav,
>=20
> This draft makes a reference to=A0"[I-D.ietf-karp-threats-req]" in a
> couple of places:
>=20
> [I-D.ietf-karp-threats-req] Lebovitz, G., "KARP Threats and
> Requirements", Work in Progress, February 2010.
>=20
> I tried searching for this draft and couldnt find it in the IETF
> repository. Is a correct reference given?
>=20
> I could also not find [I-D.ietf-karp-framework] referred in=20
> the section 4.1
>=20
> http://www.ietf.org/dyn/wg/charter/karp-charter.html also lists only
> this particular draft. Am i missing something?
>=20
> Mark
>=20
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: karp-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:karp-bounces@ietf.org] On
> > Behalf Of Bhatia, Manav (Manav)
> > Sent: Saturday, February 27, 2010 9.19 AM
> > To: karp@ietf.org
> > Subject: [karp] draft-ietf-karp-design-guide-00.txt
> >
> > For some inexplicable reason this mail never reached the=20
> KARP list ..
> >
> > The first version of the design guide has been announced!
> >
> > ---- Forwarded Message ----
> > From: "Internet-Drafts@ietf.org" <Internet-Drafts@ietf.org>
> > To: i-d-announce@ietf.org
> > Cc: karp@ietf.org
> > Sent: Fri, February 26, 2010 10:30:01 PM
> > Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-karp-design-guide-00.txt
> >
> > A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
> > directories.
> > This draft is a work item of the Keying and Authentication
> > for Routing Protocols Working Group of the IETF.
> >
> > =A0 =A0 Title =A0 =A0 =A0 : Keying and Authentication for Routing
> > Protocols (KARP) Design Guidelines
> > =A0 =A0 Author(s) =A0 : G. Lebovitz, M. Bhatia
> > =A0 =A0 Filename =A0 =A0: draft-ietf-karp-design-guide-00.txt
> > =A0 =A0 Pages =A0 =A0 =A0 : 25
> > =A0 =A0 Date =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0: 2010-2-25
> >
> > In the March of 2006 the IAB held a workshop on the topic of
> > "Unwanted
> > Internet Traffic". =A0The report from that workshop is
> > documented in RFC
> > 4948 [RFC4948]. Section 8.2 of RFC 4948 calls for [t]ightening the
> > security of the core routing infrastructure." =A0Four main steps were
> > identified for improving the security of the routing infrastructure.
> > One of those steps was "securing the routing protocols'
> > packets on the
> > wire." =A0One mechanism for securing routing protocol packets
> > on the wire
> > is the use of per-packet cryptographic message authentication,
> > providing both peer authentication and message integrity. =A0Many
> > different routing protocols exist and they employ a range of
> > different
> > transport subsystems. =A0Therefore there must necessarily be various
> > methods defined for applying cryptographic authentication to these
> > varying protocols. =A0Many routing protocols already have some
> > method for
> > accomplishing cryptographic message authentication. =A0
> However, in many
> > cases the existing methods are dated, vulnerable to attack, and/or
> > employ cryptographic algorithms that have been deprecated. =A0This
> > document is one of a series concerned with defining a roadmap of
> > protocol specification work for the use of modern cryptographic
> > mechanisms and algorithms for message authentication in routing
> > protocols. =A0In particular, it defines the framework for a key
> > management protocol that may be used to create and manage
> > session keys
> > for message authentication and integrity. =A0The overall
> > roadmap reflects
> > the input of both the security area and routing area in order
> > to form a
> > jointly agreed upon and prioritized work list for the effort.
> >
> > A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
> > http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-karp-design-gui
> > de-00.txt
> >
> > Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> > ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
> >
> > Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant mail reader
> > implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version of the
> > Internet-Draft.
> >
> > --
> > Manav Bhatia,
> > IP Division, Alcatel-Lucent,
> > Bangalore - India
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > karp mailing list
> > karp@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/karp
> >
> =

From bill@cse.concordia.ca  Sat Feb 27 20:02:13 2010
Return-Path: <bill@cse.concordia.ca>
X-Original-To: karp@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: karp@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6BD6128C125 for <karp@core3.amsl.com>; Sat, 27 Feb 2010 20:02:13 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id Fm0q-+JUXg-q for <karp@core3.amsl.com>; Sat, 27 Feb 2010 20:02:12 -0800 (PST)
Received: from perseverance.services.encs.concordia.ca (perseverance-96.encs.concordia.ca [132.205.96.94]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id F16343A85CD for <karp@ietf.org>; Sat, 27 Feb 2010 20:02:11 -0800 (PST)
Received: from [IPv6:::1] (bill@grace.encs.concordia.ca [132.205.2.208]) by perseverance.services.encs.concordia.ca (envelope-from bill@cse.concordia.ca) (8.13.7/8.13.7) with ESMTP id o1S429Fu025425 for <karp@ietf.org>; Sat, 27 Feb 2010 23:02:09 -0500
Message-ID: <4B89EAC6.1050706@cse.concordia.ca>
Date: Sat, 27 Feb 2010 23:02:14 -0500
From: Bill Atwood <bill@cse.concordia.ca>
Organization: Concordia University, Department of Computer Science and Software Engineering
User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.23 (Windows/20090812)
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: karp@ietf.org
X-Enigmail-Version: 0.96.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="------------010508010100010008000205"
X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.58 on perseverance.encs.concordia.ca at 2010/02/27 23:02:09 EST
Subject: [karp] [Fwd: I-D Action:draft-ietf-karp-framework-00.txt]
X-BeenThere: karp@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Discussion list for key management for routing and transport protocols <karp.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/karp>, <mailto:karp-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/karp>
List-Post: <mailto:karp@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:karp-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/karp>, <mailto:karp-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 28 Feb 2010 04:02:13 -0000

This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
--------------010508010100010008000205
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

I have posted draft-ietf-karp-framework-00.txt.  This is one of three
documents that will be issued together.  draft-ietf-karp-design-guide
was issued yesterday; draft-ietf-karp-threats-reqs will be posted soon.

The -00 version of the framework document contains a number of
references to "other sections" that are no longer in the document. 
(They were in the "roadmap" document, from which the framework document
was created.)  These will be replaced with real references to the
companion documents once these documents are all published and
xml.resource.org can resolve them.

  Bill

-- 

Dr. J.W. Atwood, Eng.             tel:   +1 (514) 848-2424 x3046
Distinguished Professor Emeritus  fax:   +1 (514) 848-2830
Department of Computer Science
   and Software Engineering
Concordia University EV 3.185     email: bill@cse.concordia.ca
1455 de Maisonneuve Blvd. West    http: //users.encs.concordia.ca/~bill
Montreal, Quebec Canada H3G 1M8


--------------010508010100010008000205
Content-Type: message/rfc822;
 name="I-D Action:draft-ietf-karp-framework-00.txt.eml"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Content-Disposition: inline;
 filename="I-D Action:draft-ietf-karp-framework-00.txt.eml"

Return-Path: <i-d-announce-bounces@ietf.org>
Received: from perseverance.services.encs.concordia.ca (root@perseverance-96.encs.concordia.ca [132.205.96.94])
	by newtact.encs.concordia.ca (8.13.7/8.13.7) with ESMTP id o1S3jGmA005071
	for <bill@cs.concordia.ca>; Sat, 27 Feb 2010 22:45:16 -0500
Received: from mail.ietf.org (mail.ietf.org [64.170.98.32])
	by perseverance.services.encs.concordia.ca (envelope-from i-d-announce-bounces@ietf.org) (8.13.7/8.13.7) with ESMTP id o1S3j3hW023815
	for <bill@cs.concordia.ca>; Sat, 27 Feb 2010 22:45:15 -0500
Received: from [127.0.0.1] (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D708628C140;
	Sat, 27 Feb 2010 19:45:02 -0800 (PST)
X-Original-To: i-d-announce@ietf.org
Delivered-To: i-d-announce@core3.amsl.com
Received: by core3.amsl.com (Postfix, from userid 0)
	id 6FBC828C140; Sat, 27 Feb 2010 19:45:01 -0800 (PST)
From: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org
To: i-d-announce@ietf.org
Subject: I-D Action:draft-ietf-karp-framework-00.txt 
Content-Type: Multipart/Mixed; Boundary="NextPart"
Mime-Version: 1.0
Message-Id: <20100228034501.6FBC828C140@core3.amsl.com>
Date: Sat, 27 Feb 2010 19:45:01 -0800 (PST)
Cc: karp@ietf.org
X-BeenThere: i-d-announce@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
Reply-To: internet-drafts@ietf.org
List-Id: Internet Draft Announcements only <i-d-announce.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i-d-announce>,
	<mailto:i-d-announce-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/i-d-announce>
List-Post: <mailto:i-d-announce@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:i-d-announce-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i-d-announce>,
	<mailto:i-d-announce-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
Sender: i-d-announce-bounces@ietf.org
Errors-To: i-d-announce-bounces@ietf.org
X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.58 on perseverance.encs.concordia.ca at 2010/02/27 22:45:15 EST
X-CS-Spam: 3 No explicit Concordia sender or recipient 
X-CS-Spam: summary 3 total 3

--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Keying and Authentication for Routing Protocols Working Group of the IETF.


	Title           : Framework for Cryptographic Authentication of Routing Protocol Packets on the Wire
	Author(s)       : W. Atwood, G. Lebovitz
	Filename        : draft-ietf-karp-framework-00.txt
	Pages           : 25
	Date            : 2010-02-27

In the March of 2006 the IAB held a workshop on the topic of
"Unwanted Internet Traffic".  The report from that workshop is
documented in RFC 4948 [RFC4948].  Section 8.2 of RFC 4948 calls for
"[t]ightening the security of the core routing infrastructure."  Four
main steps were identified for improving the security of the routing
infrastructure.  One of those steps was "securing the routing
protocols' packets on the wire."  One mechanism for securing routing
protocol packets on the wire is the use of per-packet cryptographic
message authentication, providing both peer authentication and
message integrity.  Many different routing protocols exist and they
employ a range of different transport subsystems.  Therefore there
must necessarily be various methods defined for applying
cryptographic authentication to these varying protocols.  Many
routing protocols already have some method for accomplishing
cryptographic message authentication.  However, in many cases the
existing methods are dated, vulnerable to attack, and/or employ
cryptographic algorithms that have been deprecated.  This document is
one of a series concerned with defining a roadmap of protocol
specification work for the use of modern cryptogrpahic mechanisms and
algorithms for message authentication in routing protocols.  In
particular, it defines the framework for a key management protocol
that may be used to create and manage session keys for message
authentication and integrity.  The overall roadmap reflects the input
of both the security area and routing area in order to form a jointly
agreed upon and prioritized work list for the effort.

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-karp-framework-00.txt

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/

Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant mail reader
implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version of the
Internet-Draft.

--NextPart
Content-Type: Message/External-body;
	name="draft-ietf-karp-framework-00.txt";
	site="ftp.ietf.org";
	access-type="anon-ftp";
	directory="internet-drafts"

Content-Type: text/plain
Content-ID: <2010-02-27193323.I-D@ietf.org>


--NextPart
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Content-Disposition: inline

_______________________________________________
I-D-Announce mailing list
I-D-Announce@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i-d-announce
Internet-Draft directories: http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html
or ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt

--NextPart--

--------------010508010100010008000205--

From gregory.ietf@gmail.com  Sat Feb 27 23:08:47 2010
Return-Path: <gregory.ietf@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: karp@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: karp@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E9A3C3A8914 for <karp@core3.amsl.com>; Sat, 27 Feb 2010 23:08:47 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -101.483
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-101.483 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=1.115, BAYES_00=-2.599, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id lpbvPPPHiXxM for <karp@core3.amsl.com>; Sat, 27 Feb 2010 23:08:46 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail-bw0-f211.google.com (mail-bw0-f211.google.com [209.85.218.211]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id EAF713A890F for <karp@ietf.org>; Sat, 27 Feb 2010 23:08:45 -0800 (PST)
Received: by bwz3 with SMTP id 3so1021108bwz.29 for <karp@ietf.org>; Sat, 27 Feb 2010 23:08:41 -0800 (PST)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=domainkey-signature:mime-version:received:in-reply-to:references :date:message-id:subject:from:to:cc:content-type; bh=TudkUHtz86PZ1uFBi/ugvLw0DM2uzqQ0JqNYYK6GY1M=; b=O3gdFB4Bez0sSygZ6Z52dmyqZok9yxSKmYhKtuZAsFRpcI85IAfkrF3PwVgO5Q0ew0 0ByZgj+41j0+3ojXv8XDam8giNTy8jkmiVGUA2YZJGat/7ALummxXsHQz4mqHwMk9UNt oZgnZf5Qa0y1s3obqy7MPcnFuIXCdiJC0mHy8=
DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; c=nofws; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; b=Iw1cjQhgmpuQ1N+qqs37MxGheZL+nHJdRBCJrViN/tMqurwaUUER2zW0Sh/MNfm1d7 U46ApM0ba0L4LJTwbPhLYmlOrWc+UfDXuNUD7JGK2nF9CY7mg2n9OUijpx4gbsZOHF1R 2CvERMRqlwoG9tKcGg4w2JY/I9460pseFklnQ=
MIME-Version: 1.0
Received: by 10.204.135.215 with SMTP id o23mr1877458bkt.140.1267340921555;  Sat, 27 Feb 2010 23:08:41 -0800 (PST)
In-Reply-To: <7C362EEF9C7896468B36C9B79200D8350CC7CE537C@INBANSXCHMBSA1.in.alcatel-lucent.com>
References: <ac5a16401002271637h41a4e1d8t614266dfceeb3b9f@mail.gmail.com> <7C362EEF9C7896468B36C9B79200D8350CC7CE537C@INBANSXCHMBSA1.in.alcatel-lucent.com>
Date: Sat, 27 Feb 2010 23:08:41 -0800
Message-ID: <f1548841002272308r249246a0t7825c64e147a8445@mail.gmail.com>
From: Gregory Lebovitz <gregory.ietf@gmail.com>
To: "Bhatia, Manav (Manav)" <manav.bhatia@alcatel-lucent.com>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=0015174feb5a704a650480a3cd15
Cc: "karp@ietf.org" <karp@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [karp] draft-ietf-karp-design-guide-00.txt
X-BeenThere: karp@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Discussion list for key management for routing and transport protocols <karp.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/karp>, <mailto:karp-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/karp>
List-Post: <mailto:karp@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:karp-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/karp>, <mailto:karp-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 28 Feb 2010 07:08:48 -0000

--0015174feb5a704a650480a3cd15
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1

I'm on lead for threats-reqs. It's in process, and will arrive by end of
weekend, barring any unforeseen issues (like kids barfing and such ;-)

Gregory (dad of 3 little ones)

On Sat, Feb 27, 2010 at 6:24 PM, Bhatia, Manav (Manav) <
manav.bhatia@alcatel-lucent.com> wrote:

> Mark,
>
> We were working on these three documents (design guide, threats and
> requirements and framework) in parallel and you should see the other two
> uploaded very soon!
>
> Thanks, Manav
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: mark Brown [mailto:mark.ietf@gmail.com]
> > Sent: Sunday, February 28, 2010 6.08 AM
> > To: Bhatia, Manav (Manav)
> > Cc: karp@ietf.org
> > Subject: RE: [karp] draft-ietf-karp-design-guide-00.txt
> >
> > Manav,
> >
> > This draft makes a reference to "[I-D.ietf-karp-threats-req]" in a
> > couple of places:
> >
> > [I-D.ietf-karp-threats-req] Lebovitz, G., "KARP Threats and
> > Requirements", Work in Progress, February 2010.
> >
> > I tried searching for this draft and couldnt find it in the IETF
> > repository. Is a correct reference given?
> >
> > I could also not find [I-D.ietf-karp-framework] referred in
> > the section 4.1
> >
> > http://www.ietf.org/dyn/wg/charter/karp-charter.html also lists only
> > this particular draft. Am i missing something?
> >
> > Mark
> >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: karp-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:karp-bounces@ietf.org] On
> > > Behalf Of Bhatia, Manav (Manav)
> > > Sent: Saturday, February 27, 2010 9.19 AM
> > > To: karp@ietf.org
> > > Subject: [karp] draft-ietf-karp-design-guide-00.txt
> > >
> > > For some inexplicable reason this mail never reached the
> > KARP list ..
> > >
> > > The first version of the design guide has been announced!
> > >
> > > ---- Forwarded Message ----
> > > From: "Internet-Drafts@ietf.org" <Internet-Drafts@ietf.org>
> > > To: i-d-announce@ietf.org
> > > Cc: karp@ietf.org
> > > Sent: Fri, February 26, 2010 10:30:01 PM
> > > Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-karp-design-guide-00.txt
> > >
> > > A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
> > > directories.
> > > This draft is a work item of the Keying and Authentication
> > > for Routing Protocols Working Group of the IETF.
> > >
> > >     Title       : Keying and Authentication for Routing
> > > Protocols (KARP) Design Guidelines
> > >     Author(s)   : G. Lebovitz, M. Bhatia
> > >     Filename    : draft-ietf-karp-design-guide-00.txt
> > >     Pages       : 25
> > >     Date        : 2010-2-25
> > >
> > > In the March of 2006 the IAB held a workshop on the topic of
> > > "Unwanted
> > > Internet Traffic".  The report from that workshop is
> > > documented in RFC
> > > 4948 [RFC4948]. Section 8.2 of RFC 4948 calls for [t]ightening the
> > > security of the core routing infrastructure."  Four main steps were
> > > identified for improving the security of the routing infrastructure.
> > > One of those steps was "securing the routing protocols'
> > > packets on the
> > > wire."  One mechanism for securing routing protocol packets
> > > on the wire
> > > is the use of per-packet cryptographic message authentication,
> > > providing both peer authentication and message integrity.  Many
> > > different routing protocols exist and they employ a range of
> > > different
> > > transport subsystems.  Therefore there must necessarily be various
> > > methods defined for applying cryptographic authentication to these
> > > varying protocols.  Many routing protocols already have some
> > > method for
> > > accomplishing cryptographic message authentication.
> > However, in many
> > > cases the existing methods are dated, vulnerable to attack, and/or
> > > employ cryptographic algorithms that have been deprecated.  This
> > > document is one of a series concerned with defining a roadmap of
> > > protocol specification work for the use of modern cryptographic
> > > mechanisms and algorithms for message authentication in routing
> > > protocols.  In particular, it defines the framework for a key
> > > management protocol that may be used to create and manage
> > > session keys
> > > for message authentication and integrity.  The overall
> > > roadmap reflects
> > > the input of both the security area and routing area in order
> > > to form a
> > > jointly agreed upon and prioritized work list for the effort.
> > >
> > > A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
> > > http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-karp-design-gui
> > > de-00.txt
> > >
> > > Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> > > ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
> > >
> > > Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant mail reader
> > > implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version of the
> > > Internet-Draft.
> > >
> > > --
> > > Manav Bhatia,
> > > IP Division, Alcatel-Lucent,
> > > Bangalore - India
> > >
> > >
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > karp mailing list
> > > karp@ietf.org
> > > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/karp
> > >
> >
> _______________________________________________
> karp mailing list
> karp@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/karp
>



-- 
----
IETF related email from
Gregory M. Lebovitz
Juniper Networks

--0015174feb5a704a650480a3cd15
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

I&#39;m on lead for threats-reqs. It&#39;s in process, and will arrive by e=
nd of weekend, barring any unforeseen issues (like kids barfing and such ;-=
)<div><br></div><div>Gregory (dad of 3 little ones)<br><br><div class=3D"gm=
ail_quote">
On Sat, Feb 27, 2010 at 6:24 PM, Bhatia, Manav (Manav) <span dir=3D"ltr">&l=
t;<a href=3D"mailto:manav.bhatia@alcatel-lucent.com">manav.bhatia@alcatel-l=
ucent.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
Mark,<br>
<br>
We were working on these three documents (design guide, threats and require=
ments and framework) in parallel and you should see the other two uploaded =
very soon!<br>
<br>
Thanks, Manav<br>
<div><div></div><div class=3D"h5"><br>
&gt; -----Original Message-----<br>
&gt; From: mark Brown [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:mark.ietf@gmail.com">mark.i=
etf@gmail.com</a>]<br>
&gt; Sent: Sunday, February 28, 2010 6.08 AM<br>
&gt; To: Bhatia, Manav (Manav)<br>
&gt; Cc: <a href=3D"mailto:karp@ietf.org">karp@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; Subject: RE: [karp] draft-ietf-karp-design-guide-00.txt<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Manav,<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; This draft makes a reference to=A0&quot;[I-D.ietf-karp-threats-req]&qu=
ot; in a<br>
&gt; couple of places:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; [I-D.ietf-karp-threats-req] Lebovitz, G., &quot;KARP Threats and<br>
&gt; Requirements&quot;, Work in Progress, February 2010.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I tried searching for this draft and couldnt find it in the IETF<br>
&gt; repository. Is a correct reference given?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I could also not find [I-D.ietf-karp-framework] referred in<br>
&gt; the section 4.1<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/dyn/wg/charter/karp-charter.html" targe=
t=3D"_blank">http://www.ietf.org/dyn/wg/charter/karp-charter.html</a> also =
lists only<br>
&gt; this particular draft. Am i missing something?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Mark<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; -----Original Message-----<br>
&gt; &gt; From: <a href=3D"mailto:karp-bounces@ietf.org">karp-bounces@ietf.=
org</a> [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:karp-bounces@ietf.org">karp-bounces@ietf.=
org</a>] On<br>
&gt; &gt; Behalf Of Bhatia, Manav (Manav)<br>
&gt; &gt; Sent: Saturday, February 27, 2010 9.19 AM<br>
&gt; &gt; To: <a href=3D"mailto:karp@ietf.org">karp@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; &gt; Subject: [karp] draft-ietf-karp-design-guide-00.txt<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; For some inexplicable reason this mail never reached the<br>
&gt; KARP list ..<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; The first version of the design guide has been announced!<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; ---- Forwarded Message ----<br>
&gt; &gt; From: &quot;<a href=3D"mailto:Internet-Drafts@ietf.org">Internet-=
Drafts@ietf.org</a>&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:Internet-Drafts@ietf.org">I=
nternet-Drafts@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; To: <a href=3D"mailto:i-d-announce@ietf.org">i-d-announce@ietf.or=
g</a><br>
&gt; &gt; Cc: <a href=3D"mailto:karp@ietf.org">karp@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; &gt; Sent: Fri, February 26, 2010 10:30:01 PM<br>
&gt; &gt; Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-karp-design-guide-00.txt<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Draft=
s<br>
&gt; &gt; directories.<br>
&gt; &gt; This draft is a work item of the Keying and Authentication<br>
&gt; &gt; for Routing Protocols Working Group of the IETF.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; =A0 =A0 Title =A0 =A0 =A0 : Keying and Authentication for Routing=
<br>
&gt; &gt; Protocols (KARP) Design Guidelines<br>
&gt; &gt; =A0 =A0 Author(s) =A0 : G. Lebovitz, M. Bhatia<br>
&gt; &gt; =A0 =A0 Filename =A0 =A0: draft-ietf-karp-design-guide-00.txt<br>
&gt; &gt; =A0 =A0 Pages =A0 =A0 =A0 : 25<br>
&gt; &gt; =A0 =A0 Date =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0: 2010-2-25<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; In the March of 2006 the IAB held a workshop on the topic of<br>
&gt; &gt; &quot;Unwanted<br>
&gt; &gt; Internet Traffic&quot;. =A0The report from that workshop is<br>
&gt; &gt; documented in RFC<br>
&gt; &gt; 4948 [RFC4948]. Section 8.2 of RFC 4948 calls for [t]ightening th=
e<br>
&gt; &gt; security of the core routing infrastructure.&quot; =A0Four main s=
teps were<br>
&gt; &gt; identified for improving the security of the routing infrastructu=
re.<br>
&gt; &gt; One of those steps was &quot;securing the routing protocols&#39;<=
br>
&gt; &gt; packets on the<br>
&gt; &gt; wire.&quot; =A0One mechanism for securing routing protocol packet=
s<br>
&gt; &gt; on the wire<br>
&gt; &gt; is the use of per-packet cryptographic message authentication,<br=
>
&gt; &gt; providing both peer authentication and message integrity. =A0Many=
<br>
&gt; &gt; different routing protocols exist and they employ a range of<br>
&gt; &gt; different<br>
&gt; &gt; transport subsystems. =A0Therefore there must necessarily be vari=
ous<br>
&gt; &gt; methods defined for applying cryptographic authentication to thes=
e<br>
&gt; &gt; varying protocols. =A0Many routing protocols already have some<br=
>
&gt; &gt; method for<br>
&gt; &gt; accomplishing cryptographic message authentication. =A0<br>
&gt; However, in many<br>
&gt; &gt; cases the existing methods are dated, vulnerable to attack, and/o=
r<br>
&gt; &gt; employ cryptographic algorithms that have been deprecated. =A0Thi=
s<br>
&gt; &gt; document is one of a series concerned with defining a roadmap of<=
br>
&gt; &gt; protocol specification work for the use of modern cryptographic<b=
r>
&gt; &gt; mechanisms and algorithms for message authentication in routing<b=
r>
&gt; &gt; protocols. =A0In particular, it defines the framework for a key<b=
r>
&gt; &gt; management protocol that may be used to create and manage<br>
&gt; &gt; session keys<br>
&gt; &gt; for message authentication and integrity. =A0The overall<br>
&gt; &gt; roadmap reflects<br>
&gt; &gt; the input of both the security area and routing area in order<br>
&gt; &gt; to form a<br>
&gt; &gt; jointly agreed upon and prioritized work list for the effort.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; A URL for this Internet-Draft is:<br>
&gt; &gt; <a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-karp-de=
sign-gui" target=3D"_blank">http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-=
karp-design-gui</a><br>
&gt; &gt; de-00.txt<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:<br>
&gt; &gt; <a href=3D"ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/" target=3D"_blank"=
>ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/</a><br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant mail reader<=
br>
&gt; &gt; implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version of the=
<br>
&gt; &gt; Internet-Draft.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; --<br>
&gt; &gt; Manav Bhatia,<br>
&gt; &gt; IP Division, Alcatel-Lucent,<br>
&gt; &gt; Bangalore - India<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; &gt; karp mailing list<br>
&gt; &gt; <a href=3D"mailto:karp@ietf.org">karp@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; &gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/karp" target=3D"=
_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/karp</a><br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
karp mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:karp@ietf.org">karp@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/karp" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/karp</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><br>-- <br>----<br>IET=
F related email from<br>Gregory M. Lebovitz<br>Juniper Networks<br>
</div>

--0015174feb5a704a650480a3cd15--
