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From: "Turner, Sean P." <turners@ieca.com>
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Subject: Re: [KEYPROV] Interim Meeting Next Week
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I've been holding out trying to make sure I can go, but unfortunately I will
be unable to attend. I am still willing to work on the ID though.

spt 

>-----Original Message-----
>From: andrea.doherty@rsa.com [mailto:andrea.doherty@rsa.com] 
>Sent: Wednesday, January 30, 2008 3:22 PM
>To: keyprov@ietf.org
>Subject: [KEYPROV] Interim Meeting Next Week
>
>The interim meeting is coming soon - next Wednesday and 
>Thursday (Feb 6/7)!  As host of the meeting, I plan to provide 
>some breakfast and lunch, and so it would helpful if I could 
>get an idea of how many will attend in person.  I'd also like 
>to know whether anybody is interested in participating 
>remotely (by phone).
>
>Please respond to this email if you plan to attend in person, 
>or if you are interesting in participating by phone.
>
>Thank you,
>Andrea
>
>_______________________________________________
>KEYPROV mailing list
>KEYPROV@ietf.org
>https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/keyprov

_______________________________________________
KEYPROV mailing list
KEYPROV@ietf.org
http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/keyprov



From keyprov-bounces@ietf.org  Sun Feb 10 11:23:11 2008
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From: "Rundgren, Anders" <anders.rundgren@rsa.com>
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Subject: [KEYPROV] Default values in PSKC & XML Signatures
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I don't know what the use-case for PSKC is outside of DSKPP but my
experience is that constructs like

  <xs:attribute name="Sign" type="xs:boolean" default="false"/>

are incompatible with embedding XML Signatures because canonicalization
requires schema-aware validation which appear to be uncommon.

I have in recent XML designs reverted to the following slightly boring
model to eliminate at least this potential problem:

  <!-- Default: false -->
  <xs:attribute name="Sign" type="xs:boolean" use"optional"/>


The added use="optional" is not [at all] necessary it was just for being
a bit more declarative since elements and attributes are treated
surprisingly different in XML Schemas.

Regards
Anders Rundgren
_______________________________________________
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KEYPROV@ietf.org
http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/keyprov


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Hi all, 

last week we had our IETF KEYPROV interim meeting and among many
security related issue we also ran into XML design questions. Hence, I
would like to solicit feedback from XML experts. In short, there seem to
be (at least two) ways to construct the XML schema to express that a key
contains of a secret and has a couple of meta data associated with it.
We would like to utilize XML encryption to selectively protect some of
the elements. 

Here are snippets from the two instance files:

* VARIANT A
===========

<Key ....> 

    <Secret>
        <EncryptedValue>
            <xenc:EncryptionMethod
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-aes128"/>
            <xenc:CipherData>
 
<xenc:CipherValue>rf4dx3rvEPO0vKtKL14NbeVu8nk=</xenc:CipherValue>
            </xenc:CipherData>
        </EncryptedValue>
    </Secret>
    <Counter>
        <PlainValue>1234</PlainValue>
    </Counter>

</Key>


* VARIANT B
===========

<Key ...>

    <Data Name="SECRET">
        <EncryptedValue>
            <xenc:EncryptionMethod
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-aes128"/>
            <xenc:CipherData>
 
<xenc:CipherValue>rf4dx3rvEPO0vKtKL14NbeVu8nk=</xenc:CipherValue>
            </xenc:CipherData>
        </EncryptedValue>
    </Data>
    <Data Name="COUNTER">
        <PlainValue>1234</PlainValue>
    </Data>
</Key>


I have put the schema/instance documents here:  
http://www.tschofenig.priv.at/xml/

The KEYPROV working group would appreciate your input. Please let us
know which variant we should pick. 

Ciao
Hannes

PS: I have simplified the schema to make it more convenient for you to
focus on the relevant parts. 
_______________________________________________
KEYPROV mailing list
KEYPROV@ietf.org
http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/keyprov


From keyprov-bounces@ietf.org  Mon Feb 11 12:53:38 2008
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Hi all,

last week the KEYPROV interim meeting took place. The meeting went 
pretty well and we crafted a few proposals for moving forward with our 
documents.

We are going to publish the meeting minutes soon. I will ask the group 
to take a look at the proposals and to state their opinion.
I have updated the Wiki page with the slides and the open issue lists.

To Andrea, Ming, Philip, Sean, Salah (and myself): Please keep your 
action items in mind and start your work as soon as possible (given the 
upcoming deadline).

Ciao
Hannes

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From keyprov-bounces@ietf.org  Thu Feb 14 11:28:08 2008
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I just had a chat with Donald Eastlake about his draft:

" Additional XML Security Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs)"
             <draft-eastlake-additional-xmlsec-uris-00.txt>

He told me that he is still working on the document and he received 
several requests for URIs to be added.
He would be happy to also receive requests from us.

He also said that he would request publication of the document (as RFC) 
sooner if we would see an urgent need for it.
I am not sure whether we would require a normative reference to that 
document. Need to think about it.

Anyway, we should discuss what URIs need to be added.

Ciao
Hannes

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From keyprov-bounces@ietf.org  Mon Feb 18 10:50:15 2008
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Might be interesting in context of our algorithm discussions.

-------- Original Message --------
Subject: 	[saag] Algorithms/modes requested by users/customers
Date: 	Sat, 16 Feb 2008 15:42:57 -0800
From: 	Randall Atkinson <rja@extremenetworks.com>
To: 	saag@mit.edu <saag@mit.edu>



Earlier, someone said:
% I think it would help enormously if we had some sort of
% cross IETF statement of the set of algorithms that are
% currently the consensus recommendations for support.

I will answer a slightly different question.  For the question:
     "What algorithms/modes are most paying customers asking for ?"
the answers turn out to be:

1) NIST FIPS-140 conforming algorithms/modes.
and
2) Suite-B conforming algorithms/modes.

Approximately speaking, (2) above is a subset of (1) above.

The IETF might make some different decision than those,
but equipment vendors will have to implement (1) or (2)
to please most commercial users (e.g. banks, insurance firms,
stock brokerages/markets, top international commercial
firms in other areas).  So whether or not these are specified
by IETF on the standards-track, there is interoperability value
in having open specifications (e.g. Informational RFC would
do quite nicely) for (1) and (2) for nearly any Internet-related
protocol using cryptography.

This seems to be driven externally by insurance firms that tell
their customers to only use equipment whose cryptographic
subsystems/modules have been (or are going to be) evaluated
formally under FIPS-140.

And I'll note that this are not really driven particularly by US firms.
European, Asia/Pacific, and Latin American firms are making the
exact same requests for FIPS-140 of their equipment vendors.

Yours,

Ran
rja@extremenetworks.com



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Andrea Doherty <adoherty@rsa.com> added the comment:

Per Interim meeting, DSKPP will rely on key container formats for the Key 
Protection Profiles, rather than duplicating that work (i.e., action is to 
remove Key Protection Profiles, Section 3.2.2, from the DSKPP document, and 
make sure that the profiles are completely covered in the PSKC and ASN.1 
documents.

----------
status: chatting -> done-cbb

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	base64Binary or string?
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Andrea Doherty <adoherty@rsa.com> added the comment:

Per Interim meeting of 6-7 February 2008, decision is to define serial number 
as a string.

----------
status: need-eg -> done-cbb

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Andrea Doherty <adoherty@rsa.com> added the comment:

During Interim meeting on 6-7 February 2008, and based on feedback during IETF-
71 (Vancouver), decision is to not maintain a separate document.  Rather, the 
DSKPP and PSKC document should reference D. Eastlake document (draft-eastlake-
additional-xmlsec-uris-00.txt), and register additional URIs (e.g., OTP 
algorithms).  The PSKC and ASN.1 documents should define requirements for 
mandatory to implement algorithms.  

Note that D. Eastlake received several requests from others for URI's to be 
added, and is ok with including KEYPROV requests.  After he finishes next 
draft, he plans on requesting publication of the draft as an RFC.

----------
status: chatting -> done-cbb

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Andrea Doherty <adoherty@rsa.com> added the comment:

See update to the -02 draft regarding the usage scenario for TLS (Section 
1.1.8, "End-to-End Prtoection of Key Material").  Decision was to recommend use 
of TLS.

----------
status: unread -> done-cbb

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Andrea Doherty <adoherty@rsa.com> added the comment:

During interim meeting (6-7 Feb 2008), decision was to generally adopt the 
changes mentioned below except that the specific format (e.g., TLV) will not be 
mentioned.  The checksum will be optional, and checksum algorithm will be 
specified.  The wording will be like this:

"The AC MUST contain a client identifier and a password. The checksum 
element is optional and is generated by the issuing server and sent to the 
user as part of the AC. When the user enters the AC 
the typed password is verified with the checksum to ensure it is correctly 
entered by the user.

TBD: Checksum algo"

----------
status: chatting -> done-cbb

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Andrea Doherty <adoherty@rsa.com> added the comment:

Decision (as discussed at KEYPROV meeting at IETF-71 (Vancouver) and Interim 
meeting 6/7 Feb 2008) is to leave the description as is based on discussions 
with the apps-area review.

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Andrea Doherty <adoherty@rsa.com> added the comment:

Decision as per discussion at IETF-71 (Vancouver) was to remove 1-pass protocol 
variant.

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Andrea Doherty <adoherty@rsa.com> added the comment:

Agreed at IETF-71 (Vancouver) and during interim meeting to change 
elementDefault to qualified, and remove use of schemaLocation in instance 
documents.  These changes were made in the -02 draft.

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Andrea Doherty <adoherty@rsa.com> added the comment:

The User Authentication section was updated per comments logged in this issue 
beginning with the -01 version.

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Attached please find minutes from the KEYPROV Interim Meeting held in
Bedford 6-7 February.  Accompanying the minutes is an action item list.
Andrea <<KEYPROV Interim Meeting 6-7Feb2008 Minutes.doc>>  <<Actions
from Interim Meeting.xls>>=20

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From keyprov-bounces@ietf.org  Tue Feb 19 10:27:31 2008
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Subject: Re: [KEYPROV] Minutes from the KEYPROV Interim Meeting
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Thanks to Andrea for organizing the meeting, taking notes and collecting 
all the action items.

Please look at the open issue list and let us know if you have questions 
or suggestions. The issue tracker and the Word document contain proposed 
resolutions. Please let us know if you have objections or if you would 
like to see something clarified.

Ciao
Hannes

andrea.doherty@rsa.com wrote:
> Attached please find minutes from the KEYPROV Interim Meeting held in
> Bedford 6-7 February.  Accompanying the minutes is an action item list.
> Andrea <<KEYPROV Interim Meeting 6-7Feb2008 Minutes.doc>>  <<Actions
> from Interim Meeting.xls>> 
>   
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> _______________________________________________
> KEYPROV mailing list
> KEYPROV@ietf.org
> http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/keyprov
>   

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From keyprov-bounces@ietf.org  Thu Feb 21 03:33:15 2008
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Subject: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question
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Hi all,

after our interim meeting I posted the mail below to the XML directorate 
mailing list. I got three responses for variant A so far, namely:

* Tim Bray: 
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/xml-dir/current/msg00174.html

* Phil Shafer: 
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/xml-dir/current/msg00176.html

* Andrew Newton (offlist):

-----

Without much background on the trade-offs and why each is being 
proposed, it is hard to tell which is better.

I do prefer variant A just because it seems simpler.

-andy

-----

Ciao
Hannes


hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com wrote:
> Hi all, 
>
> last week we had our IETF KEYPROV interim meeting and among many
> security related issue we also ran into XML design questions. Hence, I
> would like to solicit feedback from XML experts. In short, there seem to
> be (at least two) ways to construct the XML schema to express that a key
> contains of a secret and has a couple of meta data associated with it.
> We would like to utilize XML encryption to selectively protect some of
> the elements. 
>
> Here are snippets from the two instance files:
>
> * VARIANT A
> ===========
>
> <Key ....> 
>
>     <Secret>
>         <EncryptedValue>
>             <xenc:EncryptionMethod
> Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-aes128"/>
>             <xenc:CipherData>
>  
> <xenc:CipherValue>rf4dx3rvEPO0vKtKL14NbeVu8nk=</xenc:CipherValue>
>             </xenc:CipherData>
>         </EncryptedValue>
>     </Secret>
>     <Counter>
>         <PlainValue>1234</PlainValue>
>     </Counter>
>
> </Key>
>
>
> * VARIANT B
> ===========
>
> <Key ...>
>
>     <Data Name="SECRET">
>         <EncryptedValue>
>             <xenc:EncryptionMethod
> Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-aes128"/>
>             <xenc:CipherData>
>  
> <xenc:CipherValue>rf4dx3rvEPO0vKtKL14NbeVu8nk=</xenc:CipherValue>
>             </xenc:CipherData>
>         </EncryptedValue>
>     </Data>
>     <Data Name="COUNTER">
>         <PlainValue>1234</PlainValue>
>     </Data>
> </Key>
>
>
> I have put the schema/instance documents here:  
> http://www.tschofenig.priv.at/xml/
>
> The KEYPROV working group would appreciate your input. Please let us
> know which variant we should pick. 
>
> Ciao
> Hannes
>
> PS: I have simplified the schema to make it more convenient for you to
> focus on the relevant parts. 
> _______________________________________________
> KEYPROV mailing list
> KEYPROV@ietf.org
> http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/keyprov
>   

_______________________________________________
KEYPROV mailing list
KEYPROV@ietf.org
http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/keyprov


From keyprov-bounces@ietf.org  Thu Feb 21 03:41:01 2008
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Hannes,
We can go with Variant A but still will need an element catalogue in the
spec since we do not want people to introduce elements that have the
same meaning eg <Counter> and <EventCounter>

Could you send the xsd snippet for the type definition to me for
inclusion.  
Also the plainvalue in the example is misleading since I believe in the
xsd it is base64 or did you envisage it to be String?
I am happy to use string and in the element catalogue describe how it is
serialised in the string. (eg for the secret it will be a string that
contains the base64 encoded binary of the value)

Philip


-----Original Message-----
From: keyprov-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:keyprov-bounces@ietf.org] On
Behalf Of Hannes Tschofenig
Sent: Thursday, February 21, 2008 11:32 AM
To: hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com
Cc: ietf-xml-use@imc.org; keyprov@ietf.org; xml-dir@ietf.org
Subject: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question

Hi all,

after our interim meeting I posted the mail below to the XML directorate

mailing list. I got three responses for variant A so far, namely:

* Tim Bray: 
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/xml-dir/current/msg00174.html

* Phil Shafer: 
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/xml-dir/current/msg00176.html

* Andrew Newton (offlist):

-----

Without much background on the trade-offs and why each is being 
proposed, it is hard to tell which is better.

I do prefer variant A just because it seems simpler.

-andy

-----

Ciao
Hannes


hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com wrote:
> Hi all, 
>
> last week we had our IETF KEYPROV interim meeting and among many
> security related issue we also ran into XML design questions. Hence, I
> would like to solicit feedback from XML experts. In short, there seem
to
> be (at least two) ways to construct the XML schema to express that a
key
> contains of a secret and has a couple of meta data associated with it.
> We would like to utilize XML encryption to selectively protect some of
> the elements. 
>
> Here are snippets from the two instance files:
>
> * VARIANT A
> ===========
>
> <Key ....> 
>
>     <Secret>
>         <EncryptedValue>
>             <xenc:EncryptionMethod
> Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-aes128"/>
>             <xenc:CipherData>
>  
> <xenc:CipherValue>rf4dx3rvEPO0vKtKL14NbeVu8nk=</xenc:CipherValue>
>             </xenc:CipherData>
>         </EncryptedValue>
>     </Secret>
>     <Counter>
>         <PlainValue>1234</PlainValue>
>     </Counter>
>
> </Key>
>
>
> * VARIANT B
> ===========
>
> <Key ...>
>
>     <Data Name="SECRET">
>         <EncryptedValue>
>             <xenc:EncryptionMethod
> Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-aes128"/>
>             <xenc:CipherData>
>  
> <xenc:CipherValue>rf4dx3rvEPO0vKtKL14NbeVu8nk=</xenc:CipherValue>
>             </xenc:CipherData>
>         </EncryptedValue>
>     </Data>
>     <Data Name="COUNTER">
>         <PlainValue>1234</PlainValue>
>     </Data>
> </Key>
>
>
> I have put the schema/instance documents here:  
> http://www.tschofenig.priv.at/xml/
>
> The KEYPROV working group would appreciate your input. Please let us
> know which variant we should pick. 
>
> Ciao
> Hannes
>
> PS: I have simplified the schema to make it more convenient for you to
> focus on the relevant parts. 
> _______________________________________________
> KEYPROV mailing list
> KEYPROV@ietf.org
> http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/keyprov
>   

_______________________________________________
KEYPROV mailing list
KEYPROV@ietf.org
http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/keyprov

_______________________________________________
KEYPROV mailing list
KEYPROV@ietf.org
http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/keyprov


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Hi Philip, =


The schema files are here: =

http://www.tschofenig.priv.at/xml/ =


PlainValue: What element name would you prefer? =


You need to check whether the data type for the element reflects what you h=
ad in mind for that element. =

If the <Secret> element has to use the data type "string" then that's fine. =


Ciao
Hannes

> -----Urspr=FCngliche Nachricht-----
> Von: keyprov-bounces@ietf.org =

> [mailto:keyprov-bounces@ietf.org] Im Auftrag von ext Philip Hoyer
> Gesendet: Donnerstag, 21. Februar 2008 13:41
> An: Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net; Tschofenig, Hannes (NSN - FI/Espoo)
> Cc: ietf-xml-use@imc.org; keyprov@ietf.org; xml-dir@ietf.org
> Betreff: Re: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question
> =

> Hannes,
> We can go with Variant A but still will need an element =

> catalogue in the
> spec since we do not want people to introduce elements that have the
> same meaning eg <Counter> and <EventCounter>
> =

> Could you send the xsd snippet for the type definition to me for
> inclusion.  =

> Also the plainvalue in the example is misleading since I =

> believe in the
> xsd it is base64 or did you envisage it to be String?
> I am happy to use string and in the element catalogue =

> describe how it is
> serialised in the string. (eg for the secret it will be a string that
> contains the base64 encoded binary of the value)
> =

> Philip
> =

> =

> -----Original Message-----
> From: keyprov-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:keyprov-bounces@ietf.org] On
> Behalf Of Hannes Tschofenig
> Sent: Thursday, February 21, 2008 11:32 AM
> To: hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com
> Cc: ietf-xml-use@imc.org; keyprov@ietf.org; xml-dir@ietf.org
> Subject: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question
> =

> Hi all,
> =

> after our interim meeting I posted the mail below to the XML =

> directorate
> =

> mailing list. I got three responses for variant A so far, namely:
> =

> * Tim Bray: =

> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/xml-dir/current/msg00174.html
> =

> * Phil Shafer: =

> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/xml-dir/current/msg00176.html
> =

> * Andrew Newton (offlist):
> =

> -----
> =

> Without much background on the trade-offs and why each is being =

> proposed, it is hard to tell which is better.
> =

> I do prefer variant A just because it seems simpler.
> =

> -andy
> =

> -----
> =

> Ciao
> Hannes
> =

> =

> hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com wrote:
> > Hi all, =

> >
> > last week we had our IETF KEYPROV interim meeting and among many
> > security related issue we also ran into XML design =

> questions. Hence, I
> > would like to solicit feedback from XML experts. In short, =

> there seem
> to
> > be (at least two) ways to construct the XML schema to express that a
> key
> > contains of a secret and has a couple of meta data =

> associated with it.
> > We would like to utilize XML encryption to selectively =

> protect some of
> > the elements. =

> >
> > Here are snippets from the two instance files:
> >
> > * VARIANT A
> > =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
> >
> > <Key ....> =

> >
> >     <Secret>
> >         <EncryptedValue>
> >             <xenc:EncryptionMethod
> > Algorithm=3D"http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-aes128"/>
> >             <xenc:CipherData>
> >  =

> > <xenc:CipherValue>rf4dx3rvEPO0vKtKL14NbeVu8nk=3D</xenc:CipherValue>
> >             </xenc:CipherData>
> >         </EncryptedValue>
> >     </Secret>
> >     <Counter>
> >         <PlainValue>1234</PlainValue>
> >     </Counter>
> >
> > </Key>
> >
> >
> > * VARIANT B
> > =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
> >
> > <Key ...>
> >
> >     <Data Name=3D"SECRET">
> >         <EncryptedValue>
> >             <xenc:EncryptionMethod
> > Algorithm=3D"http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-aes128"/>
> >             <xenc:CipherData>
> >  =

> > <xenc:CipherValue>rf4dx3rvEPO0vKtKL14NbeVu8nk=3D</xenc:CipherValue>
> >             </xenc:CipherData>
> >         </EncryptedValue>
> >     </Data>
> >     <Data Name=3D"COUNTER">
> >         <PlainValue>1234</PlainValue>
> >     </Data>
> > </Key>
> >
> >
> > I have put the schema/instance documents here:  =

> > http://www.tschofenig.priv.at/xml/
> >
> > The KEYPROV working group would appreciate your input. Please let us
> > know which variant we should pick. =

> >
> > Ciao
> > Hannes
> >
> > PS: I have simplified the schema to make it more convenient =

> for you to
> > focus on the relevant parts. =

> > _______________________________________________
> > KEYPROV mailing list
> > KEYPROV@ietf.org
> > http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/keyprov
> >   =

> =

> _______________________________________________
> KEYPROV mailing list
> KEYPROV@ietf.org
> http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/keyprov
> =

> _______________________________________________
> KEYPROV mailing list
> KEYPROV@ietf.org
> http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/keyprov
> =

_______________________________________________
KEYPROV mailing list
KEYPROV@ietf.org
http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/keyprov


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Thread-Topic: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question
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From: "Philip Hoyer" <philip.hoyer@actividentity.com>
To: "Tschofenig, Hannes \(NSN - FI/Espoo\)" <hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com>,
	<Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net>
Cc: keyprov@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question
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Hannes,
I think your proposal has a major drawback.
For any extension you will have to update the schema, whereas being able =
to put as many Data elements as we can will leave the PSKC schema intact =
even if people add key attribute value that we have not foreseen.

I enclose the schemas of your proposal for better understanding my =
point:

    <xs:element name=3D"Key">
        <xs:complexType>
        <xs:sequence>
            <xs:element name=3D"Secret" type=3D"pskc:base64BinaryType" =
minOccurs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
            <!-- <xs:element name=3D"Time" type=3D"xs:dateTime" =
minOccurs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
            <xs:element name=3D"TimeInterval" type=3D"xs:double" =
minOccurs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
            <xs:element name=3D"TimeDrift" type=3D"pskc:integerType" =
minOccurs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
            -->
            <xs:element name=3D"Counter" type=3D"pskc:integerType" =
minOccurs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
        </xs:sequence>
        </xs:complexType>
    </xs:element>

So to add a new attribute you would have to change the schema above to =
add:

<xs:element name=3D"TimeDrift" type=3D"pskc:integerType" minOccurs=3D"0" =
maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
   =20
Whereas with method B the schema is:

    <xs:complexType name=3D"KeyType">
        <xs:sequence>
            <xs:element name=3D"Data" type=3D"pskc:DataType" =
minOccurs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"unbounded"/>
        </xs:sequence>
    </xs:complexType>

Hence you can add as many 'Data' elements without changing the schema.


Philip

-----Original Message-----
From: Tschofenig, Hannes (NSN - FI/Espoo) =
[mailto:hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com]=20
Sent: Thursday, February 21, 2008 12:10 PM
To: Philip Hoyer; Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net
Cc: keyprov@ietf.org
Subject: AW: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question

Hi Philip,=20

The schema files are here:=20
http://www.tschofenig.priv.at/xml/=20

PlainValue: What element name would you prefer?=20

You need to check whether the data type for the element reflects what =
you had in mind for that element.=20
If the <Secret> element has to use the data type "string" then that's =
fine.=20

Ciao
Hannes

> -----Urspr=FCngliche Nachricht-----
> Von: keyprov-bounces@ietf.org=20
> [mailto:keyprov-bounces@ietf.org] Im Auftrag von ext Philip Hoyer
> Gesendet: Donnerstag, 21. Februar 2008 13:41
> An: Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net; Tschofenig, Hannes (NSN - FI/Espoo)
> Cc: ietf-xml-use@imc.org; keyprov@ietf.org; xml-dir@ietf.org
> Betreff: Re: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question
>=20
> Hannes,
> We can go with Variant A but still will need an element=20
> catalogue in the
> spec since we do not want people to introduce elements that have the
> same meaning eg <Counter> and <EventCounter>
>=20
> Could you send the xsd snippet for the type definition to me for
> inclusion. =20
> Also the plainvalue in the example is misleading since I=20
> believe in the
> xsd it is base64 or did you envisage it to be String?
> I am happy to use string and in the element catalogue=20
> describe how it is
> serialised in the string. (eg for the secret it will be a string that
> contains the base64 encoded binary of the value)
>=20
> Philip
>=20
>=20
> -----Original Message-----
> From: keyprov-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:keyprov-bounces@ietf.org] On
> Behalf Of Hannes Tschofenig
> Sent: Thursday, February 21, 2008 11:32 AM
> To: hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com
> Cc: ietf-xml-use@imc.org; keyprov@ietf.org; xml-dir@ietf.org
> Subject: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question
>=20
> Hi all,
>=20
> after our interim meeting I posted the mail below to the XML=20
> directorate
>=20
> mailing list. I got three responses for variant A so far, namely:
>=20
> * Tim Bray:=20
> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/xml-dir/current/msg00174.html
>=20
> * Phil Shafer:=20
> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/xml-dir/current/msg00176.html
>=20
> * Andrew Newton (offlist):
>=20
> -----
>=20
> Without much background on the trade-offs and why each is being=20
> proposed, it is hard to tell which is better.
>=20
> I do prefer variant A just because it seems simpler.
>=20
> -andy
>=20
> -----
>=20
> Ciao
> Hannes
>=20
>=20
> hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com wrote:
> > Hi all,=20
> >
> > last week we had our IETF KEYPROV interim meeting and among many
> > security related issue we also ran into XML design=20
> questions. Hence, I
> > would like to solicit feedback from XML experts. In short,=20
> there seem
> to
> > be (at least two) ways to construct the XML schema to express that a
> key
> > contains of a secret and has a couple of meta data=20
> associated with it.
> > We would like to utilize XML encryption to selectively=20
> protect some of
> > the elements.=20
> >
> > Here are snippets from the two instance files:
> >
> > * VARIANT A
> > =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
> >
> > <Key ....>=20
> >
> >     <Secret>
> >         <EncryptedValue>
> >             <xenc:EncryptionMethod
> > Algorithm=3D"http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-aes128"/>
> >             <xenc:CipherData>
> > =20
> > <xenc:CipherValue>rf4dx3rvEPO0vKtKL14NbeVu8nk=3D</xenc:CipherValue>
> >             </xenc:CipherData>
> >         </EncryptedValue>
> >     </Secret>
> >     <Counter>
> >         <PlainValue>1234</PlainValue>
> >     </Counter>
> >
> > </Key>
> >
> >
> > * VARIANT B
> > =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
> >
> > <Key ...>
> >
> >     <Data Name=3D"SECRET">
> >         <EncryptedValue>
> >             <xenc:EncryptionMethod
> > Algorithm=3D"http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-aes128"/>
> >             <xenc:CipherData>
> > =20
> > <xenc:CipherValue>rf4dx3rvEPO0vKtKL14NbeVu8nk=3D</xenc:CipherValue>
> >             </xenc:CipherData>
> >         </EncryptedValue>
> >     </Data>
> >     <Data Name=3D"COUNTER">
> >         <PlainValue>1234</PlainValue>
> >     </Data>
> > </Key>
> >
> >
> > I have put the schema/instance documents here: =20
> > http://www.tschofenig.priv.at/xml/
> >
> > The KEYPROV working group would appreciate your input. Please let us
> > know which variant we should pick.=20
> >
> > Ciao
> > Hannes
> >
> > PS: I have simplified the schema to make it more convenient=20
> for you to
> > focus on the relevant parts.=20
> > _______________________________________________
> > KEYPROV mailing list
> > KEYPROV@ietf.org
> > http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/keyprov
> >  =20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> KEYPROV mailing list
> KEYPROV@ietf.org
> http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/keyprov
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> KEYPROV mailing list
> KEYPROV@ietf.org
> http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/keyprov
>=20


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<TITLE>RE: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question</TITLE>
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<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">Hannes,</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">I =
think your</FONT></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"> <FONT SIZE=3D2 =
FACE=3D"Courier New">proposal</FONT></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT =
SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New"> has a major drawback.</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">For any extension you will have to update the schema, whereas being =
able to put as many Data elements as we can will leave the PSKC schema =
intact even if people add key attribute value that we have not =
foreseen.</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">I =
enclose the schemas of your proposal for better understanding my =
point:</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;xs:element =
name=3D&quot;Key&quot;&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&lt;xs:complexType&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&lt;xs:sequence&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&lt;xs:element name=3D&quot;Secret&quot; =
type=3D&quot;pskc:base64BinaryType&quot; minOccurs=3D&quot;0&quot; =
maxOccurs=3D&quot;1&quot;/&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&lt;!-- &lt;xs:element name=3D&quot;Time&quot; =
type=3D&quot;xs:dateTime&quot; minOccurs=3D&quot;0&quot; =
maxOccurs=3D&quot;1&quot;/&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</=
FONT></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"fr"> <FONT =
SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">&lt;xs:element =
name=3D&quot;TimeInterval&quot; type=3D&quot;xs:double&quot; =
minOccurs=3D&quot;0&quot; =
maxOccurs=3D&quot;1&quot;/&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"fr"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&lt;xs:element name=3D&quot;TimeDrift&quot; =
type=3D&quot;pskc:integerType&quot; minOccurs=3D&quot;0&quot; =
maxOccurs=3D&quot;1&quot;/&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"fr"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
--&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"fr"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&lt;xs:element name=3D&quot;Counter&quot; =
type=3D&quot;pskc:integerType&quot; minOccurs=3D&quot;0&quot; =
maxOccurs=3D&quot;1&quot;/&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"fr"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&lt;/xs:sequence&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"fr"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&lt;/xs:complexType&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"fr"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;/xs:element&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"fr"></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en-us"><FONT =
SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">So to add a new attribute you would have =
to change the schema above to add:</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"></SPAN><SPAN =
LANG=3D"en-us"></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"fr"><FONT =
SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">&lt;xs:element =
name=3D&quot;TimeDrift&quot; type=3D&quot;pskc:integerType&quot; =
minOccurs=3D&quot;0&quot; =
maxOccurs=3D&quot;1&quot;/&gt;</FONT></SPAN><SPAN =
LANG=3D"en-gb"></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en-us"></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en-us"><FONT =
SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</FONT></SPAN><SPAN =
LANG=3D"en-gb"></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en-us"> </SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-us"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">Whereas with method</FONT></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"></SPAN><SPAN =
LANG=3D"en-us"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New"> B the schema =
is</FONT></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en-us"><FONT =
SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">:</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"></SPAN><SPAN =
LANG=3D"en-us"></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en-us"><FONT =
SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;xs:complexType =
name=3D&quot;KeyType&quot;&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-us"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&lt;xs:sequence&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-us"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&lt;xs:element name=3D&quot;Data&quot; type=3D&quot;pskc:DataType&quot; =
minOccurs=3D&quot;0&quot; =
maxOccurs=3D&quot;unbounded&quot;/&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-us"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&lt;/xs:sequence&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-us"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;/xs:complexType&gt;</FONT></SPAN><SPAN =
LANG=3D"en-gb"></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en-us"></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"></SPAN><SPAN =
LANG=3D"en-us"></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en-us"><FONT =
SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">Hence you can add as many 'Data' elements =
without changing the schema.</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">Philip</FONT></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en-us"><FONT =
SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">-----Original Message-----<BR>
From: Tschofenig, Hannes (NSN - FI/Espoo) [<A =
HREF=3D"mailto:hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com">mailto:hannes.tschofenig@nsn.co=
m</A>]<BR>
Sent: Thursday, February 21, 2008 12:10 PM<BR>
To: Philip Hoyer; Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net<BR>
Cc: keyprov@ietf.org<BR>
Subject: AW: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design =
Question</FONT></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">Hi =
Philip, </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">The schema files are here: </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New"><A =
HREF=3D"http://www.tschofenig.priv.at/xml/">http://www.tschofenig.priv.at/xml/</A=
> </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">PlainValue: What element name would you prefer? </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">You need to check whether the data type for the element reflects =
what you had in mind for that element. </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">If =
the &lt;Secret&gt; element has to use the data type &quot;string&quot; =
then that's fine. </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">Ciao</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">Hannes</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; -----Urspr=FCngliche Nachricht-----</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; Von: keyprov-bounces@ietf.org </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; [<A =
HREF=3D"mailto:keyprov-bounces@ietf.org">mailto:keyprov-bounces@ietf.org<=
/A>] Im Auftrag von ext Philip Hoyer</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; Gesendet: Donnerstag, 21. Februar 2008 13:41</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; An: Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net; Tschofenig, Hannes (NSN - =
FI/Espoo)</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; Cc: ietf-xml-use@imc.org; keyprov@ietf.org; =
xml-dir@ietf.org</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; Betreff: Re: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design =
Question</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; Hannes,</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; We can go with Variant A but still will need an element =
</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; catalogue in the</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; spec since we do not want people to introduce elements that =
have the</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; same meaning eg &lt;Counter&gt; and =
&lt;EventCounter&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; Could you send the xsd snippet for the type definition to me =
for</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; inclusion.&nbsp; </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; Also the plainvalue in the example is misleading since I =
</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; believe in the</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; xsd it is base64 or did you envisage it to be =
String?</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; I am happy to use string and in the element catalogue =
</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; describe how it is</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; serialised in the string. (eg for the secret it will be a =
string that</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; contains the base64 encoded binary of the =
value)</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; Philip</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; -----Original Message-----</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; From: keyprov-bounces@ietf.org [<A =
HREF=3D"mailto:keyprov-bounces@ietf.org">mailto:keyprov-bounces@ietf.org<=
/A>] On</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; Behalf Of Hannes Tschofenig</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; Sent: Thursday, February 21, 2008 11:32 AM</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; To: hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; Cc: ietf-xml-use@imc.org; keyprov@ietf.org; =
xml-dir@ietf.org</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; Subject: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design =
Question</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; Hi all,</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; after our interim meeting I posted the mail below to the XML =
</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; directorate</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; mailing list. I got three responses for variant A so far, =
namely:</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; * Tim Bray: </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; <A =
HREF=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/xml-dir/current/msg00174.htm=
l">http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/xml-dir/current/msg00174.html</A>=
</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; * Phil Shafer: </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; <A =
HREF=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/xml-dir/current/msg00176.htm=
l">http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/xml-dir/current/msg00176.html</A>=
</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; * Andrew Newton (offlist):</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; -----</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; Without much background on the trade-offs and why each is =
being </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; proposed, it is hard to tell which is =
better.</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; I do prefer variant A just because it seems =
simpler.</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; -andy</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; -----</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; Ciao</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; Hannes</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com wrote:</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt; Hi all, </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt; last week we had our IETF KEYPROV interim meeting and =
among many</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt; security related issue we also ran into XML design =
</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; questions. Hence, I</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt; would like to solicit feedback from XML experts. In =
short, </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; there seem</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; to</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt; be (at least two) ways to construct the XML schema to =
express that a</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; key</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt; contains of a secret and has a couple of meta data =
</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; associated with it.</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt; We would like to utilize XML encryption to selectively =
</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; protect some of</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt; the elements. </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt; Here are snippets from the two instance =
files:</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt; * VARIANT A</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt; =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt; &lt;Key ....&gt; </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;Secret&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&lt;EncryptedValue&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; =
&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp; &lt;xenc:EncryptionMethod</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt; Algorithm=3D&quot;<A =
HREF=3D"http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-aes128">http://www.w3.org/200=
1/04/xmlenc#kw-aes128</A>&quot;/&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; =
&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp; &lt;xenc:CipherData&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt;&nbsp; </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt; =
&lt;xenc:CipherValue&gt;rf4dx3rvEPO0vKtKL14NbeVu8nk=3D&lt;/xenc:CipherVal=
ue&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; =
&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp; &lt;/xenc:CipherData&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&lt;/EncryptedValue&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;/Secret&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;Counter&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&lt;PlainValue&gt;1234&lt;/PlainValue&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&lt;/Counter&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt; &lt;/Key&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt; * VARIANT B</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt; =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt; &lt;Key ...&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;Data =
Name=3D&quot;SECRET&quot;&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&lt;EncryptedValue&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; =
&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp; &lt;xenc:EncryptionMethod</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt; Algorithm=3D&quot;<A =
HREF=3D"http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-aes128">http://www.w3.org/200=
1/04/xmlenc#kw-aes128</A>&quot;/&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; =
&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp; &lt;xenc:CipherData&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt;&nbsp; </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt; =
&lt;xenc:CipherValue&gt;rf4dx3rvEPO0vKtKL14NbeVu8nk=3D&lt;/xenc:CipherVal=
ue&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; =
&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp; &lt;/xenc:CipherData&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&lt;/EncryptedValue&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;/Data&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;Data =
Name=3D&quot;COUNTER&quot;&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&lt;PlainValue&gt;1234&lt;/PlainValue&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;/Data&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt; &lt;/Key&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt; I have put the schema/instance documents here:&nbsp; =
</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt; <A =
HREF=3D"http://www.tschofenig.priv.at/xml/">http://www.tschofenig.priv.at/xml/</A=
></FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt; The KEYPROV working group would appreciate your input. =
Please let us</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt; know which variant we should pick. </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt; Ciao</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt; Hannes</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt; PS: I have simplified the schema to make it more =
convenient </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; for you to</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt; focus on the relevant parts. </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt; =
_______________________________________________</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt; KEYPROV mailing list</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt; KEYPROV@ietf.org</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt; <A =
HREF=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/keyprov">http://www.ietf.org=
/mailman/listinfo/keyprov</A></FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; =
_______________________________________________</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; KEYPROV mailing list</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; KEYPROV@ietf.org</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
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<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; =
_______________________________________________</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
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<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
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<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
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--===============1879897003==--


From keyprov-bounces@ietf.org  Thu Feb 21 10:38:22 2008
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Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2008 20:38:06 +0200
From: Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net>
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To: Philip Hoyer <philip.hoyer@actividentity.com>
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	Hannes \(NSN - FI/Espoo\)" <hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com>
Subject: Re: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question
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Hi Philip

there is no difference regarding extensibility with the two proposals.

Let me describe how the extensibility works for both approaches.

VARIANT 1

Assumption:
The XML schema in PSKC contains an extension point
For example, it contains something like:
<xs:any namespace=3D"##other" processContents=3D"lax"/>

How to extend it:

One extends it by defining a new schema (with the new element or =

whatever you want todo).
You would also describe what the new elements actually mean.

In essence, you would extend it an the same way as you extend the rest =

of the PSKC schema. This is the way how one extends XML.
There is no need to change the existing schema.


VARIANT 2

Assumption
The IANA consideration sections explains how these tokens and their =

semantic is registered.
I assume something like informational RFC with expert review for adding =

new tokens


How to extend it:

You write a document that defines the new token + the semantic. This is =

the same approach as extensions work for protocols like RADIUS or Diameter


What you want to ensure is that
* extensions are well described
* there is a way to deal with conflicts (e.g., I define the same =

extension as you but with a different semantic).

Does this make sense to you?

Ciao
Hannes


Philip Hoyer wrote:
> Hannes,
> I think your proposal has a major drawback.
> For any extension you will have to update the schema, whereas being able =
to put as many Data elements as we can will leave the PSKC schema intact ev=
en if people add key attribute value that we have not foreseen.
>
> I enclose the schemas of your proposal for better understanding my point:
>
>     <xs:element name=3D"Key">
>         <xs:complexType>
>         <xs:sequence>
>             <xs:element name=3D"Secret" type=3D"pskc:base64BinaryType" mi=
nOccurs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
>             <!-- <xs:element name=3D"Time" type=3D"xs:dateTime" minOccurs=
=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
>             <xs:element name=3D"TimeInterval" type=3D"xs:double" minOccur=
s=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
>             <xs:element name=3D"TimeDrift" type=3D"pskc:integerType" minO=
ccurs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
>             -->
>             <xs:element name=3D"Counter" type=3D"pskc:integerType" minOcc=
urs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
>         </xs:sequence>
>         </xs:complexType>
>     </xs:element>
>
> So to add a new attribute you would have to change the schema above to ad=
d:
>
> <xs:element name=3D"TimeDrift" type=3D"pskc:integerType" minOccurs=3D"0" =
maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
>     =

> Whereas with method B the schema is:
>
>     <xs:complexType name=3D"KeyType">
>         <xs:sequence>
>             <xs:element name=3D"Data" type=3D"pskc:DataType" minOccurs=3D=
"0" maxOccurs=3D"unbounded"/>
>         </xs:sequence>
>     </xs:complexType>
>
> Hence you can add as many 'Data' elements without changing the schema.
>
>
> Philip
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Tschofenig, Hannes (NSN - FI/Espoo) [mailto:hannes.tschofenig@nsn.c=
om] =

> Sent: Thursday, February 21, 2008 12:10 PM
> To: Philip Hoyer; Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net
> Cc: keyprov@ietf.org
> Subject: AW: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question
>
> Hi Philip, =

>
> The schema files are here: =

> http://www.tschofenig.priv.at/xml/ =

>
> PlainValue: What element name would you prefer? =

>
> You need to check whether the data type for the element reflects what you=
 had in mind for that element. =

> If the <Secret> element has to use the data type "string" then that's fin=
e. =

>
> Ciao
> Hannes
>
>   =

>> -----Urspr=FCngliche Nachricht-----
>> Von: keyprov-bounces@ietf.org =

>> [mailto:keyprov-bounces@ietf.org] Im Auftrag von ext Philip Hoyer
>> Gesendet: Donnerstag, 21. Februar 2008 13:41
>> An: Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net; Tschofenig, Hannes (NSN - FI/Espoo)
>> Cc: ietf-xml-use@imc.org; keyprov@ietf.org; xml-dir@ietf.org
>> Betreff: Re: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question
>>
>> Hannes,
>> We can go with Variant A but still will need an element =

>> catalogue in the
>> spec since we do not want people to introduce elements that have the
>> same meaning eg <Counter> and <EventCounter>
>>
>> Could you send the xsd snippet for the type definition to me for
>> inclusion.  =

>> Also the plainvalue in the example is misleading since I =

>> believe in the
>> xsd it is base64 or did you envisage it to be String?
>> I am happy to use string and in the element catalogue =

>> describe how it is
>> serialised in the string. (eg for the secret it will be a string that
>> contains the base64 encoded binary of the value)
>>
>> Philip
>>
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: keyprov-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:keyprov-bounces@ietf.org] On
>> Behalf Of Hannes Tschofenig
>> Sent: Thursday, February 21, 2008 11:32 AM
>> To: hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com
>> Cc: ietf-xml-use@imc.org; keyprov@ietf.org; xml-dir@ietf.org
>> Subject: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question
>>
>> Hi all,
>>
>> after our interim meeting I posted the mail below to the XML =

>> directorate
>>
>> mailing list. I got three responses for variant A so far, namely:
>>
>> * Tim Bray: =

>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/xml-dir/current/msg00174.html
>>
>> * Phil Shafer: =

>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/xml-dir/current/msg00176.html
>>
>> * Andrew Newton (offlist):
>>
>> -----
>>
>> Without much background on the trade-offs and why each is being =

>> proposed, it is hard to tell which is better.
>>
>> I do prefer variant A just because it seems simpler.
>>
>> -andy
>>
>> -----
>>
>> Ciao
>> Hannes
>>
>>
>> hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com wrote:
>>     =

>>> Hi all, =

>>>
>>> last week we had our IETF KEYPROV interim meeting and among many
>>> security related issue we also ran into XML design =

>>>       =

>> questions. Hence, I
>>     =

>>> would like to solicit feedback from XML experts. In short, =

>>>       =

>> there seem
>> to
>>     =

>>> be (at least two) ways to construct the XML schema to express that a
>>>       =

>> key
>>     =

>>> contains of a secret and has a couple of meta data =

>>>       =

>> associated with it.
>>     =

>>> We would like to utilize XML encryption to selectively =

>>>       =

>> protect some of
>>     =

>>> the elements. =

>>>
>>> Here are snippets from the two instance files:
>>>
>>> * VARIANT A
>>> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
>>>
>>> <Key ....> =

>>>
>>>     <Secret>
>>>         <EncryptedValue>
>>>             <xenc:EncryptionMethod
>>> Algorithm=3D"http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-aes128"/>
>>>             <xenc:CipherData>
>>>  =

>>> <xenc:CipherValue>rf4dx3rvEPO0vKtKL14NbeVu8nk=3D</xenc:CipherValue>
>>>             </xenc:CipherData>
>>>         </EncryptedValue>
>>>     </Secret>
>>>     <Counter>
>>>         <PlainValue>1234</PlainValue>
>>>     </Counter>
>>>
>>> </Key>
>>>
>>>
>>> * VARIANT B
>>> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
>>>
>>> <Key ...>
>>>
>>>     <Data Name=3D"SECRET">
>>>         <EncryptedValue>
>>>             <xenc:EncryptionMethod
>>> Algorithm=3D"http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-aes128"/>
>>>             <xenc:CipherData>
>>>  =

>>> <xenc:CipherValue>rf4dx3rvEPO0vKtKL14NbeVu8nk=3D</xenc:CipherValue>
>>>             </xenc:CipherData>
>>>         </EncryptedValue>
>>>     </Data>
>>>     <Data Name=3D"COUNTER">
>>>         <PlainValue>1234</PlainValue>
>>>     </Data>
>>> </Key>
>>>
>>>
>>> I have put the schema/instance documents here:  =

>>> http://www.tschofenig.priv.at/xml/
>>>
>>> The KEYPROV working group would appreciate your input. Please let us
>>> know which variant we should pick. =

>>>
>>> Ciao
>>> Hannes
>>>
>>> PS: I have simplified the schema to make it more convenient =

>>>       =

>> for you to
>>     =

>>> focus on the relevant parts. =

>>> _______________________________________________
>>> KEYPROV mailing list
>>> KEYPROV@ietf.org
>>> http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/keyprov
>>>   =

>>>       =

>> _______________________________________________
>> KEYPROV mailing list
>> KEYPROV@ietf.org
>> http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/keyprov
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> KEYPROV mailing list
>> KEYPROV@ietf.org
>> http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/keyprov
>>
>>     =

>
>
>   =


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Thread-Topic: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question
Thread-Index: Ach0uOzYnpsosNKaRgasfLVZmGSe8wAhEeSg
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From: "Philip Hoyer" <philip.hoyer@actividentity.com>
To: <Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net>
Cc: keyprov@ietf.org, "Tschofenig,
	Hannes \(NSN - FI/Espoo\)" <hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com>
Subject: Re: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question
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Hannes,
The schema that is on your server did not contain the extension point.

I am not a big fan of such extension points because of the more intricate p=
arsing requirements they put on programmers. =


How should a parser distinguish between the existing defined elements withi=
n the Key entity and the extended ones?

Maybe we could come to a compromise whereby we have defined elements within=
 key (such as the usage etc) and then have a sub element called KeyData whi=
ch can only ever contain elements of the various DataTypes:

	<xs:complexType name=3D"KeyType">
		<xs:sequence>
			<xs:element name=3D"Issuer" type=3D"xs:string" minOccurs=3D"0"/>
			<xs:element name=3D"Usage" type=3D"pskc:UsageType"/>
			<xs:element name=3D"CardAppPersoProfileId" type=3D"xs:string" minOccurs=
=3D"0"/>
			<xs:element name=3D"FriendlyName" type=3D"xs:string" minOccurs=3D"0"/>
			<xs:element name=3D"Data" type=3D"pskc:KeyDataType" minOccurs=3D"0"/>
			<xs:element name=3D"PINPolicy" type=3D"pskc:PINPolicyType" minOccurs=3D"=
0"/>
			<xs:element name=3D"ExpiryDate" type=3D"xs:dateTime" minOccurs=3D"0"/>
			<xs:element name=3D"StartDate" type=3D"xs:dateTime" minOccurs=3D"0"/>
		</xs:sequence>
		<xs:attribute name=3D"KeyId" type=3D"xs:string" use=3D"required"/>
		<xs:attribute name=3D"KeyAlgorithm" type=3D"pskc:KeyAlgorithmType" use=3D=
"required"/>
	</xs:complexType>
	<xs:complexType name=3D"KeyDataType">
		<xs:sequence>
             <xs:element name=3D"Secret" type=3D"pskc:base64BinaryType" min=
Occurs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
             <!-- <xs:element name=3D"Time" type=3D"xs:dateTime" minOccurs=
=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
             <xs:element name=3D"TimeInterval" type=3D"xs:double" minOccurs=
=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
             <xs:element name=3D"TimeDrift" type=3D"pskc:integerType" minOc=
curs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
             -->
             <xs:element name=3D"Counter" type=3D"pskc:integerType" minOccu=
rs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
		</xs:sequence>
	</xs:complexType>

    <xs:complexType name=3D"base64BinaryType">
        <xs:sequence>
            <xs:choice>
                <xs:element name=3D"PlainValue" type=3D"xs:base64Binary"/>
                <xs:element name=3D"EncryptedValue" type=3D"xenc:EncryptedD=
ataType"/>
            </xs:choice>
			<xs:element name=3D"ValueMAC" type=3D"xs:base64Binary" minOccurs=3D"0"/>
        </xs:sequence>
    </xs:complexType>
    <xs:complexType name=3D"integerType">
        <xs:sequence>
            <xs:choice>
                <xs:element name=3D"PlainValue" type=3D"xs:integer"/>
                <xs:element name=3D"EncryptedValue" type=3D"xenc:EncryptedD=
ataType"/>
            </xs:choice>
			<xs:element name=3D"ValueMAC" type=3D"xs:base64Binary" minOccurs=3D"0"/>
        </xs:sequence>
    </xs:complexType>


 This way the parsers will know that ONLY inside the KeyData element there =
can be extensions and we can specify in the spec that any extension MUST ha=
ve the subelements of PlainValue, EncryptedValue and ValueMAC.

As you can see though this is starting to make the schema more complex but =
I am ok with accepting a compromise.

What do you think?


-----Original Message-----
From: Hannes Tschofenig [mailto:Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net] =

Sent: Thursday, February 21, 2008 6:38 PM
To: Philip Hoyer
Cc: Tschofenig, Hannes (NSN - FI/Espoo); keyprov@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question

Hi Philip

there is no difference regarding extensibility with the two proposals.

Let me describe how the extensibility works for both approaches.

VARIANT 1

Assumption:
The XML schema in PSKC contains an extension point
For example, it contains something like:
<xs:any namespace=3D"##other" processContents=3D"lax"/>

How to extend it:

One extends it by defining a new schema (with the new element or =

whatever you want todo).
You would also describe what the new elements actually mean.

In essence, you would extend it an the same way as you extend the rest =

of the PSKC schema. This is the way how one extends XML.
There is no need to change the existing schema.


VARIANT 2

Assumption
The IANA consideration sections explains how these tokens and their =

semantic is registered.
I assume something like informational RFC with expert review for adding =

new tokens


How to extend it:

You write a document that defines the new token + the semantic. This is =

the same approach as extensions work for protocols like RADIUS or Diameter


What you want to ensure is that
* extensions are well described
* there is a way to deal with conflicts (e.g., I define the same =

extension as you but with a different semantic).

Does this make sense to you?

Ciao
Hannes


Philip Hoyer wrote:
> Hannes,
> I think your proposal has a major drawback.
> For any extension you will have to update the schema, whereas being able =
to put as many Data elements as we can will leave the PSKC schema intact ev=
en if people add key attribute value that we have not foreseen.
>
> I enclose the schemas of your proposal for better understanding my point:
>
>     <xs:element name=3D"Key">
>         <xs:complexType>
>         <xs:sequence>
>             <xs:element name=3D"Secret" type=3D"pskc:base64BinaryType" mi=
nOccurs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
>             <!-- <xs:element name=3D"Time" type=3D"xs:dateTime" minOccurs=
=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
>             <xs:element name=3D"TimeInterval" type=3D"xs:double" minOccur=
s=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
>             <xs:element name=3D"TimeDrift" type=3D"pskc:integerType" minO=
ccurs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
>             -->
>             <xs:element name=3D"Counter" type=3D"pskc:integerType" minOcc=
urs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
>         </xs:sequence>
>         </xs:complexType>
>     </xs:element>
>
> So to add a new attribute you would have to change the schema above to ad=
d:
>
> <xs:element name=3D"TimeDrift" type=3D"pskc:integerType" minOccurs=3D"0" =
maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
>     =

> Whereas with method B the schema is:
>
>     <xs:complexType name=3D"KeyType">
>         <xs:sequence>
>             <xs:element name=3D"Data" type=3D"pskc:DataType" minOccurs=3D=
"0" maxOccurs=3D"unbounded"/>
>         </xs:sequence>
>     </xs:complexType>
>
> Hence you can add as many 'Data' elements without changing the schema.
>
>
> Philip
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Tschofenig, Hannes (NSN - FI/Espoo) [mailto:hannes.tschofenig@nsn.c=
om] =

> Sent: Thursday, February 21, 2008 12:10 PM
> To: Philip Hoyer; Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net
> Cc: keyprov@ietf.org
> Subject: AW: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question
>
> Hi Philip, =

>
> The schema files are here: =

> http://www.tschofenig.priv.at/xml/ =

>
> PlainValue: What element name would you prefer? =

>
> You need to check whether the data type for the element reflects what you=
 had in mind for that element. =

> If the <Secret> element has to use the data type "string" then that's fin=
e. =

>
> Ciao
> Hannes
>
>   =

>> -----Urspr=FCngliche Nachricht-----
>> Von: keyprov-bounces@ietf.org =

>> [mailto:keyprov-bounces@ietf.org] Im Auftrag von ext Philip Hoyer
>> Gesendet: Donnerstag, 21. Februar 2008 13:41
>> An: Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net; Tschofenig, Hannes (NSN - FI/Espoo)
>> Cc: ietf-xml-use@imc.org; keyprov@ietf.org; xml-dir@ietf.org
>> Betreff: Re: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question
>>
>> Hannes,
>> We can go with Variant A but still will need an element =

>> catalogue in the
>> spec since we do not want people to introduce elements that have the
>> same meaning eg <Counter> and <EventCounter>
>>
>> Could you send the xsd snippet for the type definition to me for
>> inclusion.  =

>> Also the plainvalue in the example is misleading since I =

>> believe in the
>> xsd it is base64 or did you envisage it to be String?
>> I am happy to use string and in the element catalogue =

>> describe how it is
>> serialised in the string. (eg for the secret it will be a string that
>> contains the base64 encoded binary of the value)
>>
>> Philip
>>
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: keyprov-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:keyprov-bounces@ietf.org] On
>> Behalf Of Hannes Tschofenig
>> Sent: Thursday, February 21, 2008 11:32 AM
>> To: hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com
>> Cc: ietf-xml-use@imc.org; keyprov@ietf.org; xml-dir@ietf.org
>> Subject: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question
>>
>> Hi all,
>>
>> after our interim meeting I posted the mail below to the XML =

>> directorate
>>
>> mailing list. I got three responses for variant A so far, namely:
>>
>> * Tim Bray: =

>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/xml-dir/current/msg00174.html
>>
>> * Phil Shafer: =

>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/xml-dir/current/msg00176.html
>>
>> * Andrew Newton (offlist):
>>
>> -----
>>
>> Without much background on the trade-offs and why each is being =

>> proposed, it is hard to tell which is better.
>>
>> I do prefer variant A just because it seems simpler.
>>
>> -andy
>>
>> -----
>>
>> Ciao
>> Hannes
>>
>>
>> hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com wrote:
>>     =

>>> Hi all, =

>>>
>>> last week we had our IETF KEYPROV interim meeting and among many
>>> security related issue we also ran into XML design =

>>>       =

>> questions. Hence, I
>>     =

>>> would like to solicit feedback from XML experts. In short, =

>>>       =

>> there seem
>> to
>>     =

>>> be (at least two) ways to construct the XML schema to express that a
>>>       =

>> key
>>     =

>>> contains of a secret and has a couple of meta data =

>>>       =

>> associated with it.
>>     =

>>> We would like to utilize XML encryption to selectively =

>>>       =

>> protect some of
>>     =

>>> the elements. =

>>>
>>> Here are snippets from the two instance files:
>>>
>>> * VARIANT A
>>> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
>>>
>>> <Key ....> =

>>>
>>>     <Secret>
>>>         <EncryptedValue>
>>>             <xenc:EncryptionMethod
>>> Algorithm=3D"http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-aes128"/>
>>>             <xenc:CipherData>
>>>  =

>>> <xenc:CipherValue>rf4dx3rvEPO0vKtKL14NbeVu8nk=3D</xenc:CipherValue>
>>>             </xenc:CipherData>
>>>         </EncryptedValue>
>>>     </Secret>
>>>     <Counter>
>>>         <PlainValue>1234</PlainValue>
>>>     </Counter>
>>>
>>> </Key>
>>>
>>>
>>> * VARIANT B
>>> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
>>>
>>> <Key ...>
>>>
>>>     <Data Name=3D"SECRET">
>>>         <EncryptedValue>
>>>             <xenc:EncryptionMethod
>>> Algorithm=3D"http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-aes128"/>
>>>             <xenc:CipherData>
>>>  =

>>> <xenc:CipherValue>rf4dx3rvEPO0vKtKL14NbeVu8nk=3D</xenc:CipherValue>
>>>             </xenc:CipherData>
>>>         </EncryptedValue>
>>>     </Data>
>>>     <Data Name=3D"COUNTER">
>>>         <PlainValue>1234</PlainValue>
>>>     </Data>
>>> </Key>
>>>
>>>
>>> I have put the schema/instance documents here:  =

>>> http://www.tschofenig.priv.at/xml/
>>>
>>> The KEYPROV working group would appreciate your input. Please let us
>>> know which variant we should pick. =

>>>
>>> Ciao
>>> Hannes
>>>
>>> PS: I have simplified the schema to make it more convenient =

>>>       =

>> for you to
>>     =

>>> focus on the relevant parts. =

>>> _______________________________________________
>>> KEYPROV mailing list
>>> KEYPROV@ietf.org
>>> http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/keyprov
>>>   =

>>>       =

>> _______________________________________________
>> KEYPROV mailing list
>> KEYPROV@ietf.org
>> http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/keyprov
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> KEYPROV mailing list
>> KEYPROV@ietf.org
>> http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/keyprov
>>
>>     =

>
>
>   =



_______________________________________________
KEYPROV mailing list
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http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/keyprov


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Hi Philip,


Philip Hoyer wrote:
> Hannes,
> The schema that is on your server did not contain the extension point.
>   =

I thought that this was a mistake.
Without extension points we would turn the "EXTENSIBLE Markup Language" =

into the "Non-Extensible Markup Language".

> I am not a big fan of such extension points because of the more intricate=
 parsing requirements they put on programmers. =

>   =

I have never heard about that given how widely XML is being used.

> How should a parser distinguish between the existing defined elements wit=
hin the Key entity and the extended ones?
>
>   =

There are various ways to ensure extensibility in a protocol. Note that =

they have nothing todo with the XML schema itself but are rather =

fundamental principles of protocol design.

For extensibility, you need to consider where extensions are possible =

and how you want the other party to react on them (ignore if not =

understood, abort if not understood, negotiate or discover new =

extensions, etc.).

Different protocols have different strategy depending on the desire of =

the protocol designers.

> Maybe we could come to a compromise whereby we have defined elements with=
in key (such as the usage etc) and then have a sub element called KeyData w=
hich can only ever contain elements of the various DataTypes:
>
> 	<xs:complexType name=3D"KeyType">
> 		<xs:sequence>
> 			<xs:element name=3D"Issuer" type=3D"xs:string" minOccurs=3D"0"/>
> 			<xs:element name=3D"Usage" type=3D"pskc:UsageType"/>
> 			<xs:element name=3D"CardAppPersoProfileId" type=3D"xs:string" minOccur=
s=3D"0"/>
> 			<xs:element name=3D"FriendlyName" type=3D"xs:string" minOccurs=3D"0"/>
> 			<xs:element name=3D"Data" type=3D"pskc:KeyDataType" minOccurs=3D"0"/>
> 			<xs:element name=3D"PINPolicy" type=3D"pskc:PINPolicyType" minOccurs=
=3D"0"/>
> 			<xs:element name=3D"ExpiryDate" type=3D"xs:dateTime" minOccurs=3D"0"/>
> 			<xs:element name=3D"StartDate" type=3D"xs:dateTime" minOccurs=3D"0"/>
> 		</xs:sequence>
> 		<xs:attribute name=3D"KeyId" type=3D"xs:string" use=3D"required"/>
> 		<xs:attribute name=3D"KeyAlgorithm" type=3D"pskc:KeyAlgorithmType" use=
=3D"required"/>
> 	</xs:complexType>
> 	<xs:complexType name=3D"KeyDataType">
> 		<xs:sequence>
>              <xs:element name=3D"Secret" type=3D"pskc:base64BinaryType" m=
inOccurs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
>              <!-- <xs:element name=3D"Time" type=3D"xs:dateTime" minOccur=
s=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
>              <xs:element name=3D"TimeInterval" type=3D"xs:double" minOccu=
rs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
>              <xs:element name=3D"TimeDrift" type=3D"pskc:integerType" min=
Occurs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
>              -->
>              <xs:element name=3D"Counter" type=3D"pskc:integerType" minOc=
curs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
> 		</xs:sequence>
> 	</xs:complexType>
>
>     <xs:complexType name=3D"base64BinaryType">
>         <xs:sequence>
>             <xs:choice>
>                 <xs:element name=3D"PlainValue" type=3D"xs:base64Binary"/>
>                 <xs:element name=3D"EncryptedValue" type=3D"xenc:Encrypte=
dDataType"/>
>             </xs:choice>
> 			<xs:element name=3D"ValueMAC" type=3D"xs:base64Binary" minOccurs=3D"0"=
/>
>         </xs:sequence>
>     </xs:complexType>
>     <xs:complexType name=3D"integerType">
>         <xs:sequence>
>             <xs:choice>
>                 <xs:element name=3D"PlainValue" type=3D"xs:integer"/>
>                 <xs:element name=3D"EncryptedValue" type=3D"xenc:Encrypte=
dDataType"/>
>             </xs:choice>
> 			<xs:element name=3D"ValueMAC" type=3D"xs:base64Binary" minOccurs=3D"0"=
/>
>         </xs:sequence>
>     </xs:complexType>
>
>
>  This way the parsers will know that ONLY inside the KeyData element ther=
e can be extensions and we can specify in the spec that any extension MUST =
have the subelements of PlainValue, EncryptedValue and ValueMAC.
>
> As you can see though this is starting to make the schema more complex bu=
t I am ok with accepting a compromise.
>
> What do you think?
>
>   =

I am fine with everything -- I just want to make sure that we understand =

the tradeoffs and implications.
Your initial schema is also fine  -- it did not, however, provide an =

answer on how to extend it. Without such a story we will (a) most likely =

not get the document through the IESG and (b) we will encounter interop =

problems later.

Btw, the above schema does not contain an extension point -- is this =

intentional?

Ciao
Hannes


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Hannes Tschofenig [mailto:Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net] =

> Sent: Thursday, February 21, 2008 6:38 PM
> To: Philip Hoyer
> Cc: Tschofenig, Hannes (NSN - FI/Espoo); keyprov@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question
>
> Hi Philip
>
> there is no difference regarding extensibility with the two proposals.
>
> Let me describe how the extensibility works for both approaches.
>
> VARIANT 1
>
> Assumption:
> The XML schema in PSKC contains an extension point
> For example, it contains something like:
> <xs:any namespace=3D"##other" processContents=3D"lax"/>
>
> How to extend it:
>
> One extends it by defining a new schema (with the new element or =

> whatever you want todo).
> You would also describe what the new elements actually mean.
>
> In essence, you would extend it an the same way as you extend the rest =

> of the PSKC schema. This is the way how one extends XML.
> There is no need to change the existing schema.
>
>
> VARIANT 2
>
> Assumption
> The IANA consideration sections explains how these tokens and their =

> semantic is registered.
> I assume something like informational RFC with expert review for adding =

> new tokens
>
>
> How to extend it:
>
> You write a document that defines the new token + the semantic. This is =

> the same approach as extensions work for protocols like RADIUS or Diameter
>
>
> What you want to ensure is that
> * extensions are well described
> * there is a way to deal with conflicts (e.g., I define the same =

> extension as you but with a different semantic).
>
> Does this make sense to you?
>
> Ciao
> Hannes
>
>
> Philip Hoyer wrote:
>   =

>> Hannes,
>> I think your proposal has a major drawback.
>> For any extension you will have to update the schema, whereas being able=
 to put as many Data elements as we can will leave the PSKC schema intact e=
ven if people add key attribute value that we have not foreseen.
>>
>> I enclose the schemas of your proposal for better understanding my point:
>>
>>     <xs:element name=3D"Key">
>>         <xs:complexType>
>>         <xs:sequence>
>>             <xs:element name=3D"Secret" type=3D"pskc:base64BinaryType" m=
inOccurs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
>>             <!-- <xs:element name=3D"Time" type=3D"xs:dateTime" minOccur=
s=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
>>             <xs:element name=3D"TimeInterval" type=3D"xs:double" minOccu=
rs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
>>             <xs:element name=3D"TimeDrift" type=3D"pskc:integerType" min=
Occurs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
>>             -->
>>             <xs:element name=3D"Counter" type=3D"pskc:integerType" minOc=
curs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
>>         </xs:sequence>
>>         </xs:complexType>
>>     </xs:element>
>>
>> So to add a new attribute you would have to change the schema above to a=
dd:
>>
>> <xs:element name=3D"TimeDrift" type=3D"pskc:integerType" minOccurs=3D"0"=
 maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
>>     =

>> Whereas with method B the schema is:
>>
>>     <xs:complexType name=3D"KeyType">
>>         <xs:sequence>
>>             <xs:element name=3D"Data" type=3D"pskc:DataType" minOccurs=
=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"unbounded"/>
>>         </xs:sequence>
>>     </xs:complexType>
>>
>> Hence you can add as many 'Data' elements without changing the schema.
>>
>>
>> Philip
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Tschofenig, Hannes (NSN - FI/Espoo) [mailto:hannes.tschofenig@nsn.=
com] =

>> Sent: Thursday, February 21, 2008 12:10 PM
>> To: Philip Hoyer; Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net
>> Cc: keyprov@ietf.org
>> Subject: AW: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question
>>
>> Hi Philip, =

>>
>> The schema files are here: =

>> http://www.tschofenig.priv.at/xml/ =

>>
>> PlainValue: What element name would you prefer? =

>>
>> You need to check whether the data type for the element reflects what yo=
u had in mind for that element. =

>> If the <Secret> element has to use the data type "string" then that's fi=
ne. =

>>
>> Ciao
>> Hannes
>>
>>   =

>>     =

>>> -----Urspr=FCngliche Nachricht-----
>>> Von: keyprov-bounces@ietf.org =

>>> [mailto:keyprov-bounces@ietf.org] Im Auftrag von ext Philip Hoyer
>>> Gesendet: Donnerstag, 21. Februar 2008 13:41
>>> An: Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net; Tschofenig, Hannes (NSN - FI/Espoo)
>>> Cc: ietf-xml-use@imc.org; keyprov@ietf.org; xml-dir@ietf.org
>>> Betreff: Re: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question
>>>
>>> Hannes,
>>> We can go with Variant A but still will need an element =

>>> catalogue in the
>>> spec since we do not want people to introduce elements that have the
>>> same meaning eg <Counter> and <EventCounter>
>>>
>>> Could you send the xsd snippet for the type definition to me for
>>> inclusion.  =

>>> Also the plainvalue in the example is misleading since I =

>>> believe in the
>>> xsd it is base64 or did you envisage it to be String?
>>> I am happy to use string and in the element catalogue =

>>> describe how it is
>>> serialised in the string. (eg for the secret it will be a string that
>>> contains the base64 encoded binary of the value)
>>>
>>> Philip
>>>
>>>
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: keyprov-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:keyprov-bounces@ietf.org] On
>>> Behalf Of Hannes Tschofenig
>>> Sent: Thursday, February 21, 2008 11:32 AM
>>> To: hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com
>>> Cc: ietf-xml-use@imc.org; keyprov@ietf.org; xml-dir@ietf.org
>>> Subject: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question
>>>
>>> Hi all,
>>>
>>> after our interim meeting I posted the mail below to the XML =

>>> directorate
>>>
>>> mailing list. I got three responses for variant A so far, namely:
>>>
>>> * Tim Bray: =

>>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/xml-dir/current/msg00174.html
>>>
>>> * Phil Shafer: =

>>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/xml-dir/current/msg00176.html
>>>
>>> * Andrew Newton (offlist):
>>>
>>> -----
>>>
>>> Without much background on the trade-offs and why each is being =

>>> proposed, it is hard to tell which is better.
>>>
>>> I do prefer variant A just because it seems simpler.
>>>
>>> -andy
>>>
>>> -----
>>>
>>> Ciao
>>> Hannes
>>>
>>>
>>> hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com wrote:
>>>     =

>>>       =

>>>> Hi all, =

>>>>
>>>> last week we had our IETF KEYPROV interim meeting and among many
>>>> security related issue we also ran into XML design =

>>>>       =

>>>>         =

>>> questions. Hence, I
>>>     =

>>>       =

>>>> would like to solicit feedback from XML experts. In short, =

>>>>       =

>>>>         =

>>> there seem
>>> to
>>>     =

>>>       =

>>>> be (at least two) ways to construct the XML schema to express that a
>>>>       =

>>>>         =

>>> key
>>>     =

>>>       =

>>>> contains of a secret and has a couple of meta data =

>>>>       =

>>>>         =

>>> associated with it.
>>>     =

>>>       =

>>>> We would like to utilize XML encryption to selectively =

>>>>       =

>>>>         =

>>> protect some of
>>>     =

>>>       =

>>>> the elements. =

>>>>
>>>> Here are snippets from the two instance files:
>>>>
>>>> * VARIANT A
>>>> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
>>>>
>>>> <Key ....> =

>>>>
>>>>     <Secret>
>>>>         <EncryptedValue>
>>>>             <xenc:EncryptionMethod
>>>> Algorithm=3D"http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-aes128"/>
>>>>             <xenc:CipherData>
>>>>  =

>>>> <xenc:CipherValue>rf4dx3rvEPO0vKtKL14NbeVu8nk=3D</xenc:CipherValue>
>>>>             </xenc:CipherData>
>>>>         </EncryptedValue>
>>>>     </Secret>
>>>>     <Counter>
>>>>         <PlainValue>1234</PlainValue>
>>>>     </Counter>
>>>>
>>>> </Key>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> * VARIANT B
>>>> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
>>>>
>>>> <Key ...>
>>>>
>>>>     <Data Name=3D"SECRET">
>>>>         <EncryptedValue>
>>>>             <xenc:EncryptionMethod
>>>> Algorithm=3D"http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-aes128"/>
>>>>             <xenc:CipherData>
>>>>  =

>>>> <xenc:CipherValue>rf4dx3rvEPO0vKtKL14NbeVu8nk=3D</xenc:CipherValue>
>>>>             </xenc:CipherData>
>>>>         </EncryptedValue>
>>>>     </Data>
>>>>     <Data Name=3D"COUNTER">
>>>>         <PlainValue>1234</PlainValue>
>>>>     </Data>
>>>> </Key>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I have put the schema/instance documents here:  =

>>>> http://www.tschofenig.priv.at/xml/
>>>>
>>>> The KEYPROV working group would appreciate your input. Please let us
>>>> know which variant we should pick. =

>>>>
>>>> Ciao
>>>> Hannes
>>>>
>>>> PS: I have simplified the schema to make it more convenient =

>>>>       =

>>>>         =

>>> for you to
>>>     =

>>>       =

>>>> focus on the relevant parts. =

>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> KEYPROV mailing list
>>>> KEYPROV@ietf.org
>>>> http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/keyprov
>>>>   =

>>>>       =

>>>>         =

>>> _______________________________________________
>>> KEYPROV mailing list
>>> KEYPROV@ietf.org
>>> http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/keyprov
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> KEYPROV mailing list
>>> KEYPROV@ietf.org
>>> http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/keyprov
>>>
>>>     =

>>>       =

>>   =

>>     =

>
>   =


_______________________________________________
KEYPROV mailing list
KEYPROV@ietf.org
http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/keyprov


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From: "Philip Hoyer" <philip.hoyer@actividentity.com>
To: <Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net>
Cc: keyprov@ietf.org, "Tschofenig,
	Hannes \(NSN - FI/Espoo\)" <hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com>
Subject: Re: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question
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Hannes,
Have a look at the following please that indicates my problem with the =
proposed extension point (this is from section 3.1 of the xmlenc spec):

EncryptedType is the abstract type from which EncryptedData and =
EncryptedKey are derived. While these two latter element types are very =
similar with respect to their content models, a syntactical distinction =
is useful to processing. Implementation MUST generate laxly schema valid =
[XML-schema <http://www.w3.org/TR/xmlenc-core/> ] EncryptedData or =
EncryptedKey as specified by the subsequent schema declarations. (Note =
the laxly schema valid generation means that the content permitted by =
xsd:ANY need not be valid.) Implementations SHOULD create these XML =
structures (EncryptedType elements and their descendents/content) in =
Normalization Form C [NFC <http://www.w3.org/TR/xmlenc-core/> , =
NFC-Corrigendum <http://www.w3.org/TR/xmlenc-core/> ].
This is the biggest differences of the approaches.

By having
>>     <xs:complexType name=3D"KeyType">
>>         <xs:sequence>
>>             <xs:element name=3D"Data" type=3D"pskc:DataType" =
minOccurs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"unbounded"/>
>>         </xs:sequence>
>>     </xs:complexType>

You can make sure that any data element will comply and can be validated =
against the current schema.

With <xs:any namespace=3D"##other" processContents=3D"lax"/>
You loose this.

I think we are getting confused here between extension of the schema, =
being able to transmit data values currently not envisaged, technical =
extensions and your concept of extending within the realms of IETF/IANA =
and specs.

When you say that I do not define how to extend it you refer to a =
mechanism by which new Key Data elements will be communicated and =
registered.

This problem though is independent of the two approaches.

If I am reading you right you want us to create an informational RFC =
that holds the Data Attribute semantic definition? So basically create a =
separate document for section 7 of the current spec?

I was more thinking that by putting it in a separate section we could =
extend it in future versions of the spec and Yes I agree that there is a =
risk of others introducing new names and definitions that will create =
interoperability problems. But this is only one of the aspects that will =
create interoperability problems and we will not get it 'right' the =
first time around.
The use of the xmlenc concepts in the spec will create more =
interoperability problems than this approach, unless we tie down the =
exact allowed ways to use those elements (currently missing from the =
spec but trying to sort this out by introducing a more detailed section =
6 on which I would gratefully receive some comments).

Philip


-----Original Message-----
From: Hannes Tschofenig [mailto:Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net]=20
Sent: Friday, February 22, 2008 11:45 AM
To: Philip Hoyer
Cc: Tschofenig, Hannes (NSN - FI/Espoo); keyprov@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question

Hi Philip,


Philip Hoyer wrote:
> Hannes,
> The schema that is on your server did not contain the extension point.
>  =20
I thought that this was a mistake.
Without extension points we would turn the "EXTENSIBLE Markup Language"=20
into the "Non-Extensible Markup Language".

> I am not a big fan of such extension points because of the more =
intricate parsing requirements they put on programmers.=20
>  =20
I have never heard about that given how widely XML is being used.

> How should a parser distinguish between the existing defined elements =
within the Key entity and the extended ones?
>
>  =20
There are various ways to ensure extensibility in a protocol. Note that=20
they have nothing todo with the XML schema itself but are rather=20
fundamental principles of protocol design.

For extensibility, you need to consider where extensions are possible=20
and how you want the other party to react on them (ignore if not=20
understood, abort if not understood, negotiate or discover new=20
extensions, etc.).

Different protocols have different strategy depending on the desire of=20
the protocol designers.

> Maybe we could come to a compromise whereby we have defined elements =
within key (such as the usage etc) and then have a sub element called =
KeyData which can only ever contain elements of the various DataTypes:
>
> 	<xs:complexType name=3D"KeyType">
> 		<xs:sequence>
> 			<xs:element name=3D"Issuer" type=3D"xs:string" minOccurs=3D"0"/>
> 			<xs:element name=3D"Usage" type=3D"pskc:UsageType"/>
> 			<xs:element name=3D"CardAppPersoProfileId" type=3D"xs:string" =
minOccurs=3D"0"/>
> 			<xs:element name=3D"FriendlyName" type=3D"xs:string" =
minOccurs=3D"0"/>
> 			<xs:element name=3D"Data" type=3D"pskc:KeyDataType" =
minOccurs=3D"0"/>
> 			<xs:element name=3D"PINPolicy" type=3D"pskc:PINPolicyType" =
minOccurs=3D"0"/>
> 			<xs:element name=3D"ExpiryDate" type=3D"xs:dateTime" =
minOccurs=3D"0"/>
> 			<xs:element name=3D"StartDate" type=3D"xs:dateTime" =
minOccurs=3D"0"/>
> 		</xs:sequence>
> 		<xs:attribute name=3D"KeyId" type=3D"xs:string" use=3D"required"/>
> 		<xs:attribute name=3D"KeyAlgorithm" type=3D"pskc:KeyAlgorithmType" =
use=3D"required"/>
> 	</xs:complexType>
> 	<xs:complexType name=3D"KeyDataType">
> 		<xs:sequence>
>              <xs:element name=3D"Secret" =
type=3D"pskc:base64BinaryType" minOccurs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
>              <!-- <xs:element name=3D"Time" type=3D"xs:dateTime" =
minOccurs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
>              <xs:element name=3D"TimeInterval" type=3D"xs:double" =
minOccurs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
>              <xs:element name=3D"TimeDrift" type=3D"pskc:integerType" =
minOccurs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
>              -->
>              <xs:element name=3D"Counter" type=3D"pskc:integerType" =
minOccurs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
> 		</xs:sequence>
> 	</xs:complexType>
>
>     <xs:complexType name=3D"base64BinaryType">
>         <xs:sequence>
>             <xs:choice>
>                 <xs:element name=3D"PlainValue" =
type=3D"xs:base64Binary"/>
>                 <xs:element name=3D"EncryptedValue" =
type=3D"xenc:EncryptedDataType"/>
>             </xs:choice>
> 			<xs:element name=3D"ValueMAC" type=3D"xs:base64Binary" =
minOccurs=3D"0"/>
>         </xs:sequence>
>     </xs:complexType>
>     <xs:complexType name=3D"integerType">
>         <xs:sequence>
>             <xs:choice>
>                 <xs:element name=3D"PlainValue" type=3D"xs:integer"/>
>                 <xs:element name=3D"EncryptedValue" =
type=3D"xenc:EncryptedDataType"/>
>             </xs:choice>
> 			<xs:element name=3D"ValueMAC" type=3D"xs:base64Binary" =
minOccurs=3D"0"/>
>         </xs:sequence>
>     </xs:complexType>
>
>
>  This way the parsers will know that ONLY inside the KeyData element =
there can be extensions and we can specify in the spec that any =
extension MUST have the subelements of PlainValue, EncryptedValue and =
ValueMAC.
>
> As you can see though this is starting to make the schema more complex =
but I am ok with accepting a compromise.
>
> What do you think?
>
>  =20
I am fine with everything -- I just want to make sure that we understand =

the tradeoffs and implications.
Your initial schema is also fine  -- it did not, however, provide an=20
answer on how to extend it. Without such a story we will (a) most likely =

not get the document through the IESG and (b) we will encounter interop=20
problems later.

Btw, the above schema does not contain an extension point -- is this=20
intentional?

Ciao
Hannes


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Hannes Tschofenig [mailto:Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net]=20
> Sent: Thursday, February 21, 2008 6:38 PM
> To: Philip Hoyer
> Cc: Tschofenig, Hannes (NSN - FI/Espoo); keyprov@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question
>
> Hi Philip
>
> there is no difference regarding extensibility with the two proposals.
>
> Let me describe how the extensibility works for both approaches.
>
> VARIANT 1
>
> Assumption:
> The XML schema in PSKC contains an extension point
> For example, it contains something like:
> <xs:any namespace=3D"##other" processContents=3D"lax"/>
>
> How to extend it:
>
> One extends it by defining a new schema (with the new element or=20
> whatever you want todo).
> You would also describe what the new elements actually mean.
>
> In essence, you would extend it an the same way as you extend the rest =

> of the PSKC schema. This is the way how one extends XML.
> There is no need to change the existing schema.
>
>
> VARIANT 2
>
> Assumption
> The IANA consideration sections explains how these tokens and their=20
> semantic is registered.
> I assume something like informational RFC with expert review for =
adding=20
> new tokens
>
>
> How to extend it:
>
> You write a document that defines the new token + the semantic. This =
is=20
> the same approach as extensions work for protocols like RADIUS or =
Diameter
>
>
> What you want to ensure is that
> * extensions are well described
> * there is a way to deal with conflicts (e.g., I define the same=20
> extension as you but with a different semantic).
>
> Does this make sense to you?
>
> Ciao
> Hannes
>
>
> Philip Hoyer wrote:
>  =20
>> Hannes,
>> I think your proposal has a major drawback.
>> For any extension you will have to update the schema, whereas being =
able to put as many Data elements as we can will leave the PSKC schema =
intact even if people add key attribute value that we have not foreseen.
>>
>> I enclose the schemas of your proposal for better understanding my =
point:
>>
>>     <xs:element name=3D"Key">
>>         <xs:complexType>
>>         <xs:sequence>
>>             <xs:element name=3D"Secret" =
type=3D"pskc:base64BinaryType" minOccurs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
>>             <!-- <xs:element name=3D"Time" type=3D"xs:dateTime" =
minOccurs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
>>             <xs:element name=3D"TimeInterval" type=3D"xs:double" =
minOccurs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
>>             <xs:element name=3D"TimeDrift" type=3D"pskc:integerType" =
minOccurs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
>>             -->
>>             <xs:element name=3D"Counter" type=3D"pskc:integerType" =
minOccurs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
>>         </xs:sequence>
>>         </xs:complexType>
>>     </xs:element>
>>
>> So to add a new attribute you would have to change the schema above =
to add:
>>
>> <xs:element name=3D"TimeDrift" type=3D"pskc:integerType" =
minOccurs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
>>    =20
>> Whereas with method B the schema is:
>>
>>     <xs:complexType name=3D"KeyType">
>>         <xs:sequence>
>>             <xs:element name=3D"Data" type=3D"pskc:DataType" =
minOccurs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"unbounded"/>
>>         </xs:sequence>
>>     </xs:complexType>
>>
>> Hence you can add as many 'Data' elements without changing the =
schema.
>>
>>
>> Philip
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Tschofenig, Hannes (NSN - FI/Espoo) =
[mailto:hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com]=20
>> Sent: Thursday, February 21, 2008 12:10 PM
>> To: Philip Hoyer; Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net
>> Cc: keyprov@ietf.org
>> Subject: AW: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question
>>
>> Hi Philip,=20
>>
>> The schema files are here:=20
>> http://www.tschofenig.priv.at/xml/=20
>>
>> PlainValue: What element name would you prefer?=20
>>
>> You need to check whether the data type for the element reflects what =
you had in mind for that element.=20
>> If the <Secret> element has to use the data type "string" then that's =
fine.=20
>>
>> Ciao
>> Hannes
>>
>>  =20
>>    =20
>>> -----Urspr=FCngliche Nachricht-----
>>> Von: keyprov-bounces@ietf.org=20
>>> [mailto:keyprov-bounces@ietf.org] Im Auftrag von ext Philip Hoyer
>>> Gesendet: Donnerstag, 21. Februar 2008 13:41
>>> An: Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net; Tschofenig, Hannes (NSN - FI/Espoo)
>>> Cc: ietf-xml-use@imc.org; keyprov@ietf.org; xml-dir@ietf.org
>>> Betreff: Re: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question
>>>
>>> Hannes,
>>> We can go with Variant A but still will need an element=20
>>> catalogue in the
>>> spec since we do not want people to introduce elements that have the
>>> same meaning eg <Counter> and <EventCounter>
>>>
>>> Could you send the xsd snippet for the type definition to me for
>>> inclusion. =20
>>> Also the plainvalue in the example is misleading since I=20
>>> believe in the
>>> xsd it is base64 or did you envisage it to be String?
>>> I am happy to use string and in the element catalogue=20
>>> describe how it is
>>> serialised in the string. (eg for the secret it will be a string =
that
>>> contains the base64 encoded binary of the value)
>>>
>>> Philip
>>>
>>>
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: keyprov-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:keyprov-bounces@ietf.org] On
>>> Behalf Of Hannes Tschofenig
>>> Sent: Thursday, February 21, 2008 11:32 AM
>>> To: hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com
>>> Cc: ietf-xml-use@imc.org; keyprov@ietf.org; xml-dir@ietf.org
>>> Subject: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question
>>>
>>> Hi all,
>>>
>>> after our interim meeting I posted the mail below to the XML=20
>>> directorate
>>>
>>> mailing list. I got three responses for variant A so far, namely:
>>>
>>> * Tim Bray:=20
>>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/xml-dir/current/msg00174.html
>>>
>>> * Phil Shafer:=20
>>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/xml-dir/current/msg00176.html
>>>
>>> * Andrew Newton (offlist):
>>>
>>> -----
>>>
>>> Without much background on the trade-offs and why each is being=20
>>> proposed, it is hard to tell which is better.
>>>
>>> I do prefer variant A just because it seems simpler.
>>>
>>> -andy
>>>
>>> -----
>>>
>>> Ciao
>>> Hannes
>>>
>>>
>>> hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com wrote:
>>>    =20
>>>      =20
>>>> Hi all,=20
>>>>
>>>> last week we had our IETF KEYPROV interim meeting and among many
>>>> security related issue we also ran into XML design=20
>>>>      =20
>>>>        =20
>>> questions. Hence, I
>>>    =20
>>>      =20
>>>> would like to solicit feedback from XML experts. In short,=20
>>>>      =20
>>>>        =20
>>> there seem
>>> to
>>>    =20
>>>      =20
>>>> be (at least two) ways to construct the XML schema to express that =
a
>>>>      =20
>>>>        =20
>>> key
>>>    =20
>>>      =20
>>>> contains of a secret and has a couple of meta data=20
>>>>      =20
>>>>        =20
>>> associated with it.
>>>    =20
>>>      =20
>>>> We would like to utilize XML encryption to selectively=20
>>>>      =20
>>>>        =20
>>> protect some of
>>>    =20
>>>      =20
>>>> the elements.=20
>>>>
>>>> Here are snippets from the two instance files:
>>>>
>>>> * VARIANT A
>>>> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
>>>>
>>>> <Key ....>=20
>>>>
>>>>     <Secret>
>>>>         <EncryptedValue>
>>>>             <xenc:EncryptionMethod
>>>> Algorithm=3D"http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-aes128"/>
>>>>             <xenc:CipherData>
>>>> =20
>>>> <xenc:CipherValue>rf4dx3rvEPO0vKtKL14NbeVu8nk=3D</xenc:CipherValue>
>>>>             </xenc:CipherData>
>>>>         </EncryptedValue>
>>>>     </Secret>
>>>>     <Counter>
>>>>         <PlainValue>1234</PlainValue>
>>>>     </Counter>
>>>>
>>>> </Key>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> * VARIANT B
>>>> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
>>>>
>>>> <Key ...>
>>>>
>>>>     <Data Name=3D"SECRET">
>>>>         <EncryptedValue>
>>>>             <xenc:EncryptionMethod
>>>> Algorithm=3D"http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-aes128"/>
>>>>             <xenc:CipherData>
>>>> =20
>>>> <xenc:CipherValue>rf4dx3rvEPO0vKtKL14NbeVu8nk=3D</xenc:CipherValue>
>>>>             </xenc:CipherData>
>>>>         </EncryptedValue>
>>>>     </Data>
>>>>     <Data Name=3D"COUNTER">
>>>>         <PlainValue>1234</PlainValue>
>>>>     </Data>
>>>> </Key>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I have put the schema/instance documents here: =20
>>>> http://www.tschofenig.priv.at/xml/
>>>>
>>>> The KEYPROV working group would appreciate your input. Please let =
us
>>>> know which variant we should pick.=20
>>>>
>>>> Ciao
>>>> Hannes
>>>>
>>>> PS: I have simplified the schema to make it more convenient=20
>>>>      =20
>>>>        =20
>>> for you to
>>>    =20
>>>      =20
>>>> focus on the relevant parts.=20
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> KEYPROV mailing list
>>>> KEYPROV@ietf.org
>>>> http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/keyprov
>>>>  =20
>>>>      =20
>>>>        =20
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> KEYPROV mailing list
>>> KEYPROV@ietf.org
>>> http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/keyprov
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> KEYPROV mailing list
>>> KEYPROV@ietf.org
>>> http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/keyprov
>>>
>>>    =20
>>>      =20
>>  =20
>>    =20
>
>  =20



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<TITLE>RE: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question</TITLE>
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<!-- Converted from text/rtf format -->

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">Hannes,</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">Have a look at the following please that indicates my problem with =
the proposed extension point (this is from section 3.1 of the xmlenc =
spec):</FONT></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"></SPAN><SPAN =
LANG=3D"en-us"></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en-us"></SPAN><SPAN =
LANG=3D"en"><FONT COLOR=3D"#000000" SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">EncryptedType</FONT></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en-us"></SPAN><SPAN =
LANG=3D"en"><FONT COLOR=3D"#000000" FACE=3D"Arial"> is the abstract type =
from which</FONT></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en-us"></SPAN><SPAN =
LANG=3D"en-us"></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en"> <FONT COLOR=3D"#000000" =
SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">EncryptedData</FONT></SPAN><SPAN =
LANG=3D"en-us"></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en"><FONT COLOR=3D"#000000" =
FACE=3D"Arial"> and</FONT></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en-us"></SPAN><SPAN =
LANG=3D"en-us"></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en"> <FONT COLOR=3D"#000000" =
SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">EncryptedKey</FONT></SPAN><SPAN =
LANG=3D"en-us"></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en"><FONT COLOR=3D"#000000" =
FACE=3D"Arial"> are derived. While these two latter element types are =
very similar with respect to their content models, a syntactical =
distinction is useful to processing. Implementation MUST generate laxly =
schema valid [</FONT></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en-us"></SPAN><A =
HREF=3D"http://www.w3.org/TR/xmlenc-core/"><SPAN =
LANG=3D"en-us"><U></U></SPAN><U><SPAN LANG=3D"en"><FONT =
COLOR=3D"#0000FF" FACE=3D"Arial">XML-schema</FONT></SPAN></U><SPAN =
LANG=3D"en-us"></SPAN></A><SPAN LANG=3D"en-us"></SPAN><SPAN =
LANG=3D"en"><FONT COLOR=3D"#000000" FACE=3D"Arial">]</FONT></SPAN><SPAN =
LANG=3D"en-us"></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en-us"></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en"> =
<FONT COLOR=3D"#000000" SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">EncryptedData</FONT></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en-us"></SPAN><SPAN =
LANG=3D"en"><FONT COLOR=3D"#000000" FACE=3D"Arial"> =
or</FONT></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en-us"></SPAN><SPAN =
LANG=3D"en-us"></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en"> <FONT COLOR=3D"#000000" =
SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">EncryptedKey</FONT></SPAN><SPAN =
LANG=3D"en-us"></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en"><FONT COLOR=3D"#000000" =
FACE=3D"Arial"> as specified by the subsequent schema declarations. =
(</FONT></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en-us"></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en"><FONT =
COLOR=3D"#000000" FACE=3D"Arial">Note the laxly schema valid generation =
means that the content permitted by</FONT></SPAN><SPAN =
LANG=3D"en-us"></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en-us"></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en"> =
<FONT COLOR=3D"#000000" SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">xsd:ANY</FONT></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en-us"></SPAN><SPAN =
LANG=3D"en"><FONT COLOR=3D"#000000" FACE=3D"Arial"> need not be =
valid.)</FONT></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en-us"></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en"><FONT =
COLOR=3D"#000000" FACE=3D"Arial"> Implementations SHOULD create these =
XML structures (</FONT></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en-us"></SPAN><SPAN =
LANG=3D"en-us"></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en"><FONT COLOR=3D"#000000" SIZE=3D2 =
FACE=3D"Courier New">EncryptedType</FONT></SPAN><SPAN =
LANG=3D"en-us"></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en"><FONT COLOR=3D"#000000" =
FACE=3D"Arial"> elements and their descendents/content) in Normalization =
Form C [</FONT></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en-us"></SPAN><A =
HREF=3D"http://www.w3.org/TR/xmlenc-core/"><SPAN =
LANG=3D"en-us"><U></U></SPAN><U><SPAN LANG=3D"en"><FONT =
COLOR=3D"#0000FF" FACE=3D"Arial">NFC</FONT></SPAN></U><SPAN =
LANG=3D"en-us"></SPAN></A><SPAN LANG=3D"en-us"></SPAN><SPAN =
LANG=3D"en"><FONT COLOR=3D"#000000" FACE=3D"Arial">,</FONT></SPAN><SPAN =
LANG=3D"en-us"> </SPAN><A =
HREF=3D"http://www.w3.org/TR/xmlenc-core/"><SPAN =
LANG=3D"en-us"><U></U></SPAN><U><SPAN LANG=3D"en"><FONT =
COLOR=3D"#0000FF" FACE=3D"Arial">NFC-Corrigendum</FONT></SPAN></U><SPAN =
LANG=3D"en-us"></SPAN></A><SPAN LANG=3D"en-us"></SPAN><SPAN =
LANG=3D"en"><FONT COLOR=3D"#000000" FACE=3D"Arial">].</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-us"></SPAN><SPAN =
LANG=3D"en-gb"></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">This is the biggest differences of the =
approaches.</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">By =
having</FONT></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"></SPAN><SPAN =
LANG=3D"en"></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;xs:complexType =
name=3D&quot;KeyType&quot;&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&lt;xs:sequence&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;xs:element name=3D&quot;Data&quot; =
type=3D&quot;pskc:DataType&quot; minOccurs=3D&quot;0&quot; =
maxOccurs=3D&quot;unbounded&quot;/&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&lt;/xs:sequence&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&lt;/xs:complexType&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en"></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">You =
can make sure that any data</FONT></SPAN><SPAN =
LANG=3D"en-gb"></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en"> <FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">e</FONT></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en"><FONT =
SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">lement will comply and can be validated =
against the current schema.</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">With</FONT></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"> <FONT SIZE=3D2 =
FACE=3D"Courier New">&lt;xs:any namespace=3D&quot;##other&quot; =
processContents=3D&quot;lax&quot;/&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">You loose this.</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">I =
think we are getting confused here between extension of the =
schema</FONT></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">, being able to transmit data values currently not =
envisaged,</FONT></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"> <FONT SIZE=3D2 =
FACE=3D"Courier New">technical extension</FONT></SPAN><SPAN =
LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">s</FONT></SPAN><SPAN =
LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New"> and your =
co</FONT></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">n</FONT></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">cept of extending within the realms of IETF/IANA and =
specs.</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">When you say that I do not define how to extend it you refer to a =
mechanism by which new Key Data elements will be communicated and =
registered.</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">This problem though is</FONT></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"> <FONT =
SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">independent</FONT></SPAN><SPAN =
LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New"> of the two =
approaches.</FONT></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">If =
I am</FONT></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"> <FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">reading</FONT></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 =
FACE=3D"Courier New"> you right you want us to create an informational =
RFC that holds the Data Attribute semantic =
definition?</FONT></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 =
FACE=3D"Courier New"> So basically create a</FONT></SPAN><SPAN =
LANG=3D"en-gb"> <FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">separate</FONT></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 =
FACE=3D"Courier New"> document for section 7</FONT></SPAN><SPAN =
LANG=3D"en-gb"> <FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">o</FONT></SPAN><SPAN =
LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">f the =
current</FONT></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"> <FONT SIZE=3D2 =
FACE=3D"Courier New">spec</FONT></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT =
SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">?</FONT></SPAN><SPAN =
LANG=3D"en-gb"></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en"><FONT =
SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">I was more thinking that by putting it in =
a</FONT></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en"> <FONT =
SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">separate</FONT></SPAN><SPAN =
LANG=3D"en-gb"></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New"> section we could extend it in future ver</FONT></SPAN><SPAN =
LANG=3D"en-gb"></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">sions of the spec and Yes I agree that there is a risk of =
other</FONT></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en"><FONT =
SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">s</FONT></SPAN><SPAN =
LANG=3D"en-gb"></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New"> introducing new names and definitions that will create =
interoperability problems. But this is only one of the aspects that will =
create i</FONT></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"></SPAN><SPAN =
LANG=3D"en"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">n</FONT></SPAN><SPAN =
LANG=3D"en-gb"></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">teroperability problems and</FONT></SPAN><SPAN =
LANG=3D"en-gb"></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en"> <FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">we will not get it 'right' the first time around.</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">The =
use of the xmlenc concepts in the spec will create more interoperability =
problems than this approach</FONT></SPAN><SPAN =
LANG=3D"en-gb"></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">, unless we tie down the exact allowed ways to use those elements =
(currently missing</FONT></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"></SPAN><SPAN =
LANG=3D"en"> <FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">from</FONT></SPAN><SPAN =
LANG=3D"en-gb"></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New"> the spec but trying to sort this out by introducing a more =
detailed section</FONT></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"></SPAN><SPAN =
LANG=3D"en"> <FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">6 on which I would =
gratefully receive some comments).</FONT></SPAN><SPAN =
LANG=3D"en-gb"></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en"></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en"></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">Philip</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en"></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en-us"><FONT =
SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">-----Original Message-----<BR>
From: Hannes Tschofenig [mailto:Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net]<BR>
Sent: Friday, February 22, 2008 11:45 AM<BR>
To: Philip Hoyer<BR>
Cc: Tschofenig, Hannes (NSN - FI/Espoo); keyprov@ietf.org<BR>
Subject: Re: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design =
Question</FONT></SPAN><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">Hi =
Philip,</FONT></SPAN></P>
<BR>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">Philip Hoyer wrote:</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; Hannes,</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; The schema that is on your server did not contain the =
extension point.</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">I =
thought that this was a mistake.</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">Without extension points we would turn the &quot;EXTENSIBLE Markup =
Language&quot; </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">into the &quot;Non-Extensible Markup =
Language&quot;.</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; I am not a big fan of such extension points because of the =
more intricate parsing requirements they put on programmers. =
</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">I =
have never heard about that given how widely XML is being =
used.</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; How should a parser distinguish between the existing defined =
elements within the Key entity and the extended ones?</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">There are various ways to ensure extensibility in a protocol. Note =
that </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">they have nothing todo with the XML schema itself but are rather =
</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">fundamental principles of protocol design.</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">For extensibility, you need to consider where extensions are =
possible </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">and how you want the other party to react on them (ignore if not =
</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">understood, abort if not understood, negotiate or discover new =
</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">extensions, etc.).</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">Different protocols have different strategy depending on the desire =
of </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">the protocol designers.</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; Maybe we could come to a compromise whereby we have defined =
elements within key (such as the usage etc) and then have a sub element =
called KeyData which can only ever contain elements of the various =
DataTypes:</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;xs:complexType =
name=3D&quot;KeyType&quot;&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&lt;xs:sequence&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;xs:element =
name=3D&quot;Issuer&quot; type=3D&quot;xs:string&quot; =
minOccurs=3D&quot;0&quot;/&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;xs:element =
name=3D&quot;Usage&quot; =
type=3D&quot;pskc:UsageType&quot;/&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;xs:element =
name=3D&quot;CardAppPersoProfileId&quot; type=3D&quot;xs:string&quot; =
minOccurs=3D&quot;0&quot;/&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;xs:element =
name=3D&quot;FriendlyName&quot; type=3D&quot;xs:string&quot; =
minOccurs=3D&quot;0&quot;/&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;xs:element =
name=3D&quot;Data&quot; type=3D&quot;pskc:KeyDataType&quot; =
minOccurs=3D&quot;0&quot;/&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;xs:element =
name=3D&quot;PINPolicy&quot; type=3D&quot;pskc:PINPolicyType&quot; =
minOccurs=3D&quot;0&quot;/&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;xs:element =
name=3D&quot;ExpiryDate&quot; type=3D&quot;xs:dateTime&quot; =
minOccurs=3D&quot;0&quot;/&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;xs:element =
name=3D&quot;StartDate&quot; type=3D&quot;xs:dateTime&quot; =
minOccurs=3D&quot;0&quot;/&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&lt;/xs:sequence&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;xs:attribute =
name=3D&quot;KeyId&quot; type=3D&quot;xs:string&quot; =
use=3D&quot;required&quot;/&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;xs:attribute =
name=3D&quot;KeyAlgorithm&quot; type=3D&quot;pskc:KeyAlgorithmType&quot; =
use=3D&quot;required&quot;/&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&lt;/xs:complexType&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;xs:complexType =
name=3D&quot;KeyDataType&quot;&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&lt;xs:sequence&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;xs:element name=3D&quot;Secret&quot; =
type=3D&quot;pskc:base64BinaryType&quot; minOccurs=3D&quot;0&quot; =
maxOccurs=3D&quot;1&quot;/&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;!-- &lt;xs:element name=3D&quot;Time&quot; =
type=3D&quot;xs:dateTime&quot; minOccurs=3D&quot;0&quot; =
maxOccurs=3D&quot;1&quot;/&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;xs:element name=3D&quot;TimeInterval&quot; =
type=3D&quot;xs:double&quot; minOccurs=3D&quot;0&quot; =
maxOccurs=3D&quot;1&quot;/&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;xs:element name=3D&quot;TimeDrift&quot; =
type=3D&quot;pskc:integerType&quot; minOccurs=3D&quot;0&quot; =
maxOccurs=3D&quot;1&quot;/&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp; --&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;xs:element name=3D&quot;Counter&quot; =
type=3D&quot;pskc:integerType&quot; minOccurs=3D&quot;0&quot; =
maxOccurs=3D&quot;1&quot;/&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&lt;/xs:sequence&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&lt;/xs:complexType&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;xs:complexType =
name=3D&quot;base64BinaryType&quot;&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&lt;xs:sequence&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp; &lt;xs:choice&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;xs:element =
name=3D&quot;PlainValue&quot; =
type=3D&quot;xs:base64Binary&quot;/&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;xs:element =
name=3D&quot;EncryptedValue&quot; =
type=3D&quot;xenc:EncryptedDataType&quot;/&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp; &lt;/xs:choice&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;xs:element =
name=3D&quot;ValueMAC&quot; type=3D&quot;xs:base64Binary&quot; =
minOccurs=3D&quot;0&quot;/&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&lt;/xs:sequence&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&lt;/xs:complexType&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;xs:complexType =
name=3D&quot;integerType&quot;&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&lt;xs:sequence&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp; &lt;xs:choice&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;xs:element =
name=3D&quot;PlainValue&quot; =
type=3D&quot;xs:integer&quot;/&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;xs:element =
name=3D&quot;EncryptedValue&quot; =
type=3D&quot;xenc:EncryptedDataType&quot;/&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp; &lt;/xs:choice&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;xs:element =
name=3D&quot;ValueMAC&quot; type=3D&quot;xs:base64Binary&quot; =
minOccurs=3D&quot;0&quot;/&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&lt;/xs:sequence&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&lt;/xs:complexType&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&nbsp; This way the parsers will know that ONLY inside the =
KeyData element there can be extensions and we can specify in the spec =
that any extension MUST have the subelements of PlainValue, =
EncryptedValue and ValueMAC.</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; As you can see though this is starting to make the schema more =
complex but I am ok with accepting a compromise.</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; What do you think?</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">I =
am fine with everything -- I just want to make sure that we understand =
</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">the tradeoffs and implications.</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">Your initial schema is also fine&nbsp; -- it did not, however, =
provide an </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">answer on how to extend it. Without such a story we will (a) most =
likely </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">not get the document through the IESG and (b) we will encounter =
interop </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">problems later.</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">Btw, the above schema does not contain an extension point -- is =
this </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">intentional?</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">Ciao</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">Hannes</FONT></SPAN></P>
<BR>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; -----Original Message-----</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; From: Hannes Tschofenig [mailto:Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net] =
</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; Sent: Thursday, February 21, 2008 6:38 PM</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; To: Philip Hoyer</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; Cc: Tschofenig, Hannes (NSN - FI/Espoo); =
keyprov@ietf.org</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; Subject: Re: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design =
Question</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; Hi Philip</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; there is no difference regarding extensibility with the two =
proposals.</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; Let me describe how the extensibility works for both =
approaches.</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; VARIANT 1</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; Assumption:</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; The XML schema in PSKC contains an extension =
point</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; For example, it contains something like:</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; &lt;xs:any namespace=3D&quot;##other&quot; =
processContents=3D&quot;lax&quot;/&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; How to extend it:</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; One extends it by defining a new schema (with the new element =
or </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; whatever you want todo).</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; You would also describe what the new elements actually =
mean.</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; In essence, you would extend it an the same way as you extend =
the rest </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; of the PSKC schema. This is the way how one extends =
XML.</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; There is no need to change the existing =
schema.</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; VARIANT 2</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; Assumption</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; The IANA consideration sections explains how these tokens and =
their </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; semantic is registered.</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; I assume something like informational RFC with expert review =
for adding </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; new tokens</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; How to extend it:</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; You write a document that defines the new token + the =
semantic. This is </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; the same approach as extensions work for protocols like RADIUS =
or Diameter</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; What you want to ensure is that</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; * extensions are well described</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; * there is a way to deal with conflicts (e.g., I define the =
same </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; extension as you but with a different =
semantic).</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; Does this make sense to you?</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; Ciao</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; Hannes</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt; Philip Hoyer wrote:</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt; Hannes,</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt; I think your proposal has a major =
drawback.</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt; For any extension you will have to update the schema, =
whereas being able to put as many Data elements as we can will leave the =
PSKC schema intact even if people add key attribute value that we have =
not foreseen.</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt; I enclose the schemas of your proposal for better =
understanding my point:</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;xs:element =
name=3D&quot;Key&quot;&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&lt;xs:complexType&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&lt;xs:sequence&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;xs:element name=3D&quot;Secret&quot; =
type=3D&quot;pskc:base64BinaryType&quot; minOccurs=3D&quot;0&quot; =
maxOccurs=3D&quot;1&quot;/&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;!-- &lt;xs:element name=3D&quot;Time&quot; =
type=3D&quot;xs:dateTime&quot; minOccurs=3D&quot;0&quot; =
maxOccurs=3D&quot;1&quot;/&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;xs:element name=3D&quot;TimeInterval&quot; =
type=3D&quot;xs:double&quot; minOccurs=3D&quot;0&quot; =
maxOccurs=3D&quot;1&quot;/&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;xs:element name=3D&quot;TimeDrift&quot; =
type=3D&quot;pskc:integerType&quot; minOccurs=3D&quot;0&quot; =
maxOccurs=3D&quot;1&quot;/&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp; --&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;xs:element name=3D&quot;Counter&quot; =
type=3D&quot;pskc:integerType&quot; minOccurs=3D&quot;0&quot; =
maxOccurs=3D&quot;1&quot;/&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&lt;/xs:sequence&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&lt;/xs:complexType&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&lt;/xs:element&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt; So to add a new attribute you would have to change the =
schema above to add:</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt; &lt;xs:element name=3D&quot;TimeDrift&quot; =
type=3D&quot;pskc:integerType&quot; minOccurs=3D&quot;0&quot; =
maxOccurs=3D&quot;1&quot;/&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt; Whereas with method B the schema is:</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;xs:complexType =
name=3D&quot;KeyType&quot;&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&lt;xs:sequence&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;xs:element name=3D&quot;Data&quot; =
type=3D&quot;pskc:DataType&quot; minOccurs=3D&quot;0&quot; =
maxOccurs=3D&quot;unbounded&quot;/&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&lt;/xs:sequence&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&lt;/xs:complexType&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt; Hence you can add as many 'Data' elements without changing =
the schema.</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt; Philip</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt; -----Original Message-----</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt; From: Tschofenig, Hannes (NSN - FI/Espoo) [<A =
HREF=3D"mailto:hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com">mailto:hannes.tschofenig@nsn.co=
m</A>] </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt; Sent: Thursday, February 21, 2008 12:10 =
PM</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt; To: Philip Hoyer; =
Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt; Cc: keyprov@ietf.org</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt; Subject: AW: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design =
Question</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt; Hi Philip, </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt; The schema files are here: </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt; <A =
HREF=3D"http://www.tschofenig.priv.at/xml/">http://www.tschofenig.priv.at/xml/</A=
> </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt; PlainValue: What element name would you prefer? =
</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt; You need to check whether the data type for the element =
reflects what you had in mind for that element. </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt; If the &lt;Secret&gt; element has to use the data type =
&quot;string&quot; then that's fine. </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt; Ciao</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt; Hannes</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt; -----Urspr=FCngliche Nachricht-----</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt; Von: keyprov-bounces@ietf.org </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt; [<A =
HREF=3D"mailto:keyprov-bounces@ietf.org">mailto:keyprov-bounces@ietf.org<=
/A>] Im Auftrag von ext Philip Hoyer</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt; Gesendet: Donnerstag, 21. Februar 2008 =
13:41</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt; An: Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net; Tschofenig, Hannes (NSN =
- FI/Espoo)</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt; Cc: ietf-xml-use@imc.org; keyprov@ietf.org; =
xml-dir@ietf.org</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt; Betreff: Re: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML =
Design Question</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt; Hannes,</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt; We can go with Variant A but still will need an =
element </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt; catalogue in the</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt; spec since we do not want people to introduce elements =
that have the</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt; same meaning eg &lt;Counter&gt; and =
&lt;EventCounter&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt; Could you send the xsd snippet for the type definition =
to me for</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt; inclusion.&nbsp; </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt; Also the plainvalue in the example is misleading since =
I </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt; believe in the</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt; xsd it is base64 or did you envisage it to be =
String?</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt; I am happy to use string and in the element catalogue =
</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt; describe how it is</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt; serialised in the string. (eg for the secret it will =
be a string that</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt; contains the base64 encoded binary of the =
value)</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt; Philip</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt; -----Original Message-----</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt; From: keyprov-bounces@ietf.org [<A =
HREF=3D"mailto:keyprov-bounces@ietf.org">mailto:keyprov-bounces@ietf.org<=
/A>] On</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt; Behalf Of Hannes Tschofenig</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt; Sent: Thursday, February 21, 2008 11:32 =
AM</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt; To: hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt; Cc: ietf-xml-use@imc.org; keyprov@ietf.org; =
xml-dir@ietf.org</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt; Subject: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design =
Question</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt; Hi all,</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt; after our interim meeting I posted the mail below to =
the XML </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt; directorate</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt; mailing list. I got three responses for variant A so =
far, namely:</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt; * Tim Bray: </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt; <A =
HREF=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/xml-dir/current/msg00174.htm=
l">http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/xml-dir/current/msg00174.html</A>=
</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt; * Phil Shafer: </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt; <A =
HREF=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/xml-dir/current/msg00176.htm=
l">http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/xml-dir/current/msg00176.html</A>=
</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt; * Andrew Newton (offlist):</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt; -----</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt; Without much background on the trade-offs and why each =
is being </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt; proposed, it is hard to tell which is =
better.</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt; I do prefer variant A just because it seems =
simpler.</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt; -andy</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt; -----</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt; Ciao</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt; Hannes</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt; hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com wrote:</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Hi all, </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; last week we had our IETF KEYPROV interim meeting =
and among many</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; security related issue we also ran into XML design =
</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt; questions. Hence, I</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; would like to solicit feedback from XML experts. =
In short, </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt; there seem</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt; to</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; be (at least two) ways to construct the XML schema =
to express that a</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt; key</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; contains of a secret and has a couple of meta data =
</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt; associated with it.</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; We would like to utilize XML encryption to =
selectively </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt; protect some of</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; the elements. </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Here are snippets from the two instance =
files:</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; * VARIANT A</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &lt;Key ....&gt; </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&lt;Secret&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&lt;EncryptedValue&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;xenc:EncryptionMethod</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Algorithm=3D&quot;<A =
HREF=3D"http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-aes128">http://www.w3.org/200=
1/04/xmlenc#kw-aes128</A>&quot;/&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;xenc:CipherData&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&nbsp; </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
&lt;xenc:CipherValue&gt;rf4dx3rvEPO0vKtKL14NbeVu8nk=3D&lt;/xenc:CipherVal=
ue&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;/xenc:CipherData&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&lt;/EncryptedValue&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&lt;/Secret&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&lt;Counter&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&lt;PlainValue&gt;1234&lt;/PlainValue&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&lt;/Counter&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &lt;/Key&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; * VARIANT B</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &lt;Key ...&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;Data =
Name=3D&quot;SECRET&quot;&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&lt;EncryptedValue&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;xenc:EncryptionMethod</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Algorithm=3D&quot;<A =
HREF=3D"http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-aes128">http://www.w3.org/200=
1/04/xmlenc#kw-aes128</A>&quot;/&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;xenc:CipherData&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&nbsp; </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
&lt;xenc:CipherValue&gt;rf4dx3rvEPO0vKtKL14NbeVu8nk=3D&lt;/xenc:CipherVal=
ue&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;/xenc:CipherData&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&lt;/EncryptedValue&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&lt;/Data&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;Data =
Name=3D&quot;COUNTER&quot;&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&lt;PlainValue&gt;1234&lt;/PlainValue&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
&lt;/Data&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &lt;/Key&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; I have put the schema/instance documents =
here:&nbsp; </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <A =
HREF=3D"http://www.tschofenig.priv.at/xml/">http://www.tschofenig.priv.at/xml/</A=
></FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; The KEYPROV working group would appreciate your =
input. Please let us</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; know which variant we should pick. =
</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Ciao</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Hannes</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; PS: I have simplified the schema to make it more =
convenient </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt; for you to</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; focus on the relevant parts. </FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
_______________________________________________</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; KEYPROV mailing list</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; KEYPROV@ietf.org</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <A =
HREF=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/keyprov">http://www.ietf.org=
/mailman/listinfo/keyprov</A></FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
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<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
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</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
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_______________________________________________</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
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<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt; =
_______________________________________________</FONT></SPAN></P>

<P DIR=3DLTR><SPAN LANG=3D"en-gb"><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&gt;&gt;&gt; KEYPROV mailing list</FONT></SPAN></P>

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New">&gt;&gt;&gt; KEYPROV@ietf.org</FONT></SPAN></P>

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_______________________________________________
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--===============0915698316==--


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Date: Fri, 22 Feb 2008 15:39:46 +0200
From: Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net>
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To: Philip Hoyer <philip.hoyer@actividentity.com>
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Cc: keyprov@ietf.org, "Tschofenig,
	Hannes \(NSN - FI/Espoo\)" <hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com>
Subject: Re: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question
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Hi Philip,

thanks for your response. Please find my comments inline:

Philip Hoyer wrote:
> Hannes,
> Have a look at the following please that indicates my problem with the pr=
oposed extension point (this is from section 3.1 of the xmlenc spec):
>
> EncryptedType is the abstract type from which EncryptedData and Encrypted=
Key are derived. While these two latter element types are very similar with=
 respect to their content models, a syntactical distinction is useful to pr=
ocessing. Implementation MUST generate laxly schema valid [XML-schema <http=
://www.w3.org/TR/xmlenc-core/> ] EncryptedData or EncryptedKey as specified=
 by the subsequent schema declarations. (Note the laxly schema valid genera=
tion means that the content permitted by xsd:ANY need not be valid.) Implem=
entations SHOULD create these XML structures (EncryptedType elements and th=
eir descendents/content) in Normalization Form C [NFC <http://www.w3.org/TR=
/xmlenc-core/> , NFC-Corrigendum <http://www.w3.org/TR/xmlenc-core/> ].
> This is the biggest differences of the approaches.
>
>   =

This limitation exists with the way how XML works. With Relax NG that =

would be different.

However, this is only a limition on paper: Nobody uses validation in =

protocols. It would just take too long and you have to parse the message =

anyway.


> By having
>   =

>>>     <xs:complexType name=3D"KeyType">
>>>         <xs:sequence>
>>>             <xs:element name=3D"Data" type=3D"pskc:DataType" minOccurs=
=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"unbounded"/>
>>>         </xs:sequence>
>>>     </xs:complexType>
>>>       =

>
> You can make sure that any data element will comply and can be validated =
against the current schema.
>
> With <xs:any namespace=3D"##other" processContents=3D"lax"/>
> You loose this.
>
>   =

See above.
Not an issue in the real world.

> I think we are getting confused here between extension of the schema, bei=
ng able to transmit data values currently not envisaged, technical extensio=
ns and your concept of extending within the realms of IETF/IANA and specs.
>
> When you say that I do not define how to extend it you refer to a mechani=
sm by which new Key Data elements will be communicated and registered.
>   =

Yep; see
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-keyprov-portable-symmetric-k=
ey-container-02.txt

The document does not even have an IANA consideration section.


> This problem though is independent of the two approaches.
>   =

Unfortunately, it isn't. The details of the extensibility story is =

different for both mechanisms.

> If I am reading you right you want us to create an informational RFC that=
 holds the Data Attribute semantic definition? So basically create a separa=
te document for section 7 of the current spec?
>   =

No.

When you in the future want to define new elements that belong inside =

the Data attribute then you need to describe them somewhere.
How did you envision that is going to happen?

> I was more thinking that by putting it in a separate section we could ext=
end it in future versions of the spec and Yes I agree that there is a risk =
of others introducing new names and definitions that will create interopera=
bility problems. =

The later issue goes away if you do the following:

* Registration is only possible via a single authority (e.g., IANA)
They would resolve conflicts.
* Put a namespace in front of the attribute
Then, you accomplish uniqueness by ensuring that the name / semantic =

relationship works within a specific body.

> But this is only one of the aspects that will create interoperability pro=
blems and we will not get it 'right' the first time around.
>   =

Why do you think we will not get it right? This is a basic protocol =

extensibility question. This has been done many, many times in the IETF =

before.


> The use of the xmlenc concepts in the spec will create more interoperabil=
ity problems than this approach, =


That may be true. That's, however, a totally different aspect that has =

nothing todo with this question.

> unless we tie down the exact allowed ways to use those elements (currentl=
y missing from the spec but trying to sort this out by introducing a more d=
etailed section 6 on which I would gratefully receive some comments).
>   =

I am, unfortunately, not the xmlenc expert. I can, however, find one so =

that we can ensure that everything is OK. Do you want me todo that?


> Philip
>
>
>   =

Ciao
Hannes

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Hannes Tschofenig [mailto:Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net] =

> Sent: Friday, February 22, 2008 11:45 AM
> To: Philip Hoyer
> Cc: Tschofenig, Hannes (NSN - FI/Espoo); keyprov@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question
>
> Hi Philip,
>
>
> Philip Hoyer wrote:
>   =

>> Hannes,
>> The schema that is on your server did not contain the extension point.
>>   =

>>     =

> I thought that this was a mistake.
> Without extension points we would turn the "EXTENSIBLE Markup Language" =

> into the "Non-Extensible Markup Language".
>
>   =

>> I am not a big fan of such extension points because of the more intricat=
e parsing requirements they put on programmers. =

>>   =

>>     =

> I have never heard about that given how widely XML is being used.
>
>   =

>> How should a parser distinguish between the existing defined elements wi=
thin the Key entity and the extended ones?
>>
>>   =

>>     =

> There are various ways to ensure extensibility in a protocol. Note that =

> they have nothing todo with the XML schema itself but are rather =

> fundamental principles of protocol design.
>
> For extensibility, you need to consider where extensions are possible =

> and how you want the other party to react on them (ignore if not =

> understood, abort if not understood, negotiate or discover new =

> extensions, etc.).
>
> Different protocols have different strategy depending on the desire of =

> the protocol designers.
>
>   =

>> Maybe we could come to a compromise whereby we have defined elements wit=
hin key (such as the usage etc) and then have a sub element called KeyData =
which can only ever contain elements of the various DataTypes:
>>
>> 	<xs:complexType name=3D"KeyType">
>> 		<xs:sequence>
>> 			<xs:element name=3D"Issuer" type=3D"xs:string" minOccurs=3D"0"/>
>> 			<xs:element name=3D"Usage" type=3D"pskc:UsageType"/>
>> 			<xs:element name=3D"CardAppPersoProfileId" type=3D"xs:string" minOccu=
rs=3D"0"/>
>> 			<xs:element name=3D"FriendlyName" type=3D"xs:string" minOccurs=3D"0"/>
>> 			<xs:element name=3D"Data" type=3D"pskc:KeyDataType" minOccurs=3D"0"/>
>> 			<xs:element name=3D"PINPolicy" type=3D"pskc:PINPolicyType" minOccurs=
=3D"0"/>
>> 			<xs:element name=3D"ExpiryDate" type=3D"xs:dateTime" minOccurs=3D"0"/>
>> 			<xs:element name=3D"StartDate" type=3D"xs:dateTime" minOccurs=3D"0"/>
>> 		</xs:sequence>
>> 		<xs:attribute name=3D"KeyId" type=3D"xs:string" use=3D"required"/>
>> 		<xs:attribute name=3D"KeyAlgorithm" type=3D"pskc:KeyAlgorithmType" use=
=3D"required"/>
>> 	</xs:complexType>
>> 	<xs:complexType name=3D"KeyDataType">
>> 		<xs:sequence>
>>              <xs:element name=3D"Secret" type=3D"pskc:base64BinaryType" =
minOccurs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
>>              <!-- <xs:element name=3D"Time" type=3D"xs:dateTime" minOccu=
rs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
>>              <xs:element name=3D"TimeInterval" type=3D"xs:double" minOcc=
urs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
>>              <xs:element name=3D"TimeDrift" type=3D"pskc:integerType" mi=
nOccurs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
>>              -->
>>              <xs:element name=3D"Counter" type=3D"pskc:integerType" minO=
ccurs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
>> 		</xs:sequence>
>> 	</xs:complexType>
>>
>>     <xs:complexType name=3D"base64BinaryType">
>>         <xs:sequence>
>>             <xs:choice>
>>                 <xs:element name=3D"PlainValue" type=3D"xs:base64Binary"=
/>
>>                 <xs:element name=3D"EncryptedValue" type=3D"xenc:Encrypt=
edDataType"/>
>>             </xs:choice>
>> 			<xs:element name=3D"ValueMAC" type=3D"xs:base64Binary" minOccurs=3D"0=
"/>
>>         </xs:sequence>
>>     </xs:complexType>
>>     <xs:complexType name=3D"integerType">
>>         <xs:sequence>
>>             <xs:choice>
>>                 <xs:element name=3D"PlainValue" type=3D"xs:integer"/>
>>                 <xs:element name=3D"EncryptedValue" type=3D"xenc:Encrypt=
edDataType"/>
>>             </xs:choice>
>> 			<xs:element name=3D"ValueMAC" type=3D"xs:base64Binary" minOccurs=3D"0=
"/>
>>         </xs:sequence>
>>     </xs:complexType>
>>
>>
>>  This way the parsers will know that ONLY inside the KeyData element the=
re can be extensions and we can specify in the spec that any extension MUST=
 have the subelements of PlainValue, EncryptedValue and ValueMAC.
>>
>> As you can see though this is starting to make the schema more complex b=
ut I am ok with accepting a compromise.
>>
>> What do you think?
>>
>>   =

>>     =

> I am fine with everything -- I just want to make sure that we understand =

> the tradeoffs and implications.
> Your initial schema is also fine  -- it did not, however, provide an =

> answer on how to extend it. Without such a story we will (a) most likely =

> not get the document through the IESG and (b) we will encounter interop =

> problems later.
>
> Btw, the above schema does not contain an extension point -- is this =

> intentional?
>
> Ciao
> Hannes
>
>
>   =

>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Hannes Tschofenig [mailto:Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net] =

>> Sent: Thursday, February 21, 2008 6:38 PM
>> To: Philip Hoyer
>> Cc: Tschofenig, Hannes (NSN - FI/Espoo); keyprov@ietf.org
>> Subject: Re: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question
>>
>> Hi Philip
>>
>> there is no difference regarding extensibility with the two proposals.
>>
>> Let me describe how the extensibility works for both approaches.
>>
>> VARIANT 1
>>
>> Assumption:
>> The XML schema in PSKC contains an extension point
>> For example, it contains something like:
>> <xs:any namespace=3D"##other" processContents=3D"lax"/>
>>
>> How to extend it:
>>
>> One extends it by defining a new schema (with the new element or =

>> whatever you want todo).
>> You would also describe what the new elements actually mean.
>>
>> In essence, you would extend it an the same way as you extend the rest =

>> of the PSKC schema. This is the way how one extends XML.
>> There is no need to change the existing schema.
>>
>>
>> VARIANT 2
>>
>> Assumption
>> The IANA consideration sections explains how these tokens and their =

>> semantic is registered.
>> I assume something like informational RFC with expert review for adding =

>> new tokens
>>
>>
>> How to extend it:
>>
>> You write a document that defines the new token + the semantic. This is =

>> the same approach as extensions work for protocols like RADIUS or Diamet=
er
>>
>>
>> What you want to ensure is that
>> * extensions are well described
>> * there is a way to deal with conflicts (e.g., I define the same =

>> extension as you but with a different semantic).
>>
>> Does this make sense to you?
>>
>> Ciao
>> Hannes
>>
>>
>> Philip Hoyer wrote:
>>   =

>>     =

>>> Hannes,
>>> I think your proposal has a major drawback.
>>> For any extension you will have to update the schema, whereas being abl=
e to put as many Data elements as we can will leave the PSKC schema intact =
even if people add key attribute value that we have not foreseen.
>>>
>>> I enclose the schemas of your proposal for better understanding my poin=
t:
>>>
>>>     <xs:element name=3D"Key">
>>>         <xs:complexType>
>>>         <xs:sequence>
>>>             <xs:element name=3D"Secret" type=3D"pskc:base64BinaryType" =
minOccurs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
>>>             <!-- <xs:element name=3D"Time" type=3D"xs:dateTime" minOccu=
rs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
>>>             <xs:element name=3D"TimeInterval" type=3D"xs:double" minOcc=
urs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
>>>             <xs:element name=3D"TimeDrift" type=3D"pskc:integerType" mi=
nOccurs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
>>>             -->
>>>             <xs:element name=3D"Counter" type=3D"pskc:integerType" minO=
ccurs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
>>>         </xs:sequence>
>>>         </xs:complexType>
>>>     </xs:element>
>>>
>>> So to add a new attribute you would have to change the schema above to =
add:
>>>
>>> <xs:element name=3D"TimeDrift" type=3D"pskc:integerType" minOccurs=3D"0=
" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
>>>     =

>>> Whereas with method B the schema is:
>>>
>>>     <xs:complexType name=3D"KeyType">
>>>         <xs:sequence>
>>>             <xs:element name=3D"Data" type=3D"pskc:DataType" minOccurs=
=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"unbounded"/>
>>>         </xs:sequence>
>>>     </xs:complexType>
>>>
>>> Hence you can add as many 'Data' elements without changing the schema.
>>>
>>>
>>> Philip
>>>
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: Tschofenig, Hannes (NSN - FI/Espoo) [mailto:hannes.tschofenig@nsn=
.com] =

>>> Sent: Thursday, February 21, 2008 12:10 PM
>>> To: Philip Hoyer; Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net
>>> Cc: keyprov@ietf.org
>>> Subject: AW: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question
>>>
>>> Hi Philip, =

>>>
>>> The schema files are here: =

>>> http://www.tschofenig.priv.at/xml/ =

>>>
>>> PlainValue: What element name would you prefer? =

>>>
>>> You need to check whether the data type for the element reflects what y=
ou had in mind for that element. =

>>> If the <Secret> element has to use the data type "string" then that's f=
ine. =

>>>
>>> Ciao
>>> Hannes
>>>
>>>   =

>>>     =

>>>       =

>>>> -----Urspr=FCngliche Nachricht-----
>>>> Von: keyprov-bounces@ietf.org =

>>>> [mailto:keyprov-bounces@ietf.org] Im Auftrag von ext Philip Hoyer
>>>> Gesendet: Donnerstag, 21. Februar 2008 13:41
>>>> An: Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net; Tschofenig, Hannes (NSN - FI/Espoo)
>>>> Cc: ietf-xml-use@imc.org; keyprov@ietf.org; xml-dir@ietf.org
>>>> Betreff: Re: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question
>>>>
>>>> Hannes,
>>>> We can go with Variant A but still will need an element =

>>>> catalogue in the
>>>> spec since we do not want people to introduce elements that have the
>>>> same meaning eg <Counter> and <EventCounter>
>>>>
>>>> Could you send the xsd snippet for the type definition to me for
>>>> inclusion.  =

>>>> Also the plainvalue in the example is misleading since I =

>>>> believe in the
>>>> xsd it is base64 or did you envisage it to be String?
>>>> I am happy to use string and in the element catalogue =

>>>> describe how it is
>>>> serialised in the string. (eg for the secret it will be a string that
>>>> contains the base64 encoded binary of the value)
>>>>
>>>> Philip
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>> From: keyprov-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:keyprov-bounces@ietf.org] On
>>>> Behalf Of Hannes Tschofenig
>>>> Sent: Thursday, February 21, 2008 11:32 AM
>>>> To: hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com
>>>> Cc: ietf-xml-use@imc.org; keyprov@ietf.org; xml-dir@ietf.org
>>>> Subject: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question
>>>>
>>>> Hi all,
>>>>
>>>> after our interim meeting I posted the mail below to the XML =

>>>> directorate
>>>>
>>>> mailing list. I got three responses for variant A so far, namely:
>>>>
>>>> * Tim Bray: =

>>>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/xml-dir/current/msg00174.html
>>>>
>>>> * Phil Shafer: =

>>>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/xml-dir/current/msg00176.html
>>>>
>>>> * Andrew Newton (offlist):
>>>>
>>>> -----
>>>>
>>>> Without much background on the trade-offs and why each is being =

>>>> proposed, it is hard to tell which is better.
>>>>
>>>> I do prefer variant A just because it seems simpler.
>>>>
>>>> -andy
>>>>
>>>> -----
>>>>
>>>> Ciao
>>>> Hannes
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com wrote:
>>>>     =

>>>>       =

>>>>         =

>>>>> Hi all, =

>>>>>
>>>>> last week we had our IETF KEYPROV interim meeting and among many
>>>>> security related issue we also ran into XML design =

>>>>>       =

>>>>>         =

>>>>>           =

>>>> questions. Hence, I
>>>>     =

>>>>       =

>>>>         =

>>>>> would like to solicit feedback from XML experts. In short, =

>>>>>       =

>>>>>         =

>>>>>           =

>>>> there seem
>>>> to
>>>>     =

>>>>       =

>>>>         =

>>>>> be (at least two) ways to construct the XML schema to express that a
>>>>>       =

>>>>>         =

>>>>>           =

>>>> key
>>>>     =

>>>>       =

>>>>         =

>>>>> contains of a secret and has a couple of meta data =

>>>>>       =

>>>>>         =

>>>>>           =

>>>> associated with it.
>>>>     =

>>>>       =

>>>>         =

>>>>> We would like to utilize XML encryption to selectively =

>>>>>       =

>>>>>         =

>>>>>           =

>>>> protect some of
>>>>     =

>>>>       =

>>>>         =

>>>>> the elements. =

>>>>>
>>>>> Here are snippets from the two instance files:
>>>>>
>>>>> * VARIANT A
>>>>> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
>>>>>
>>>>> <Key ....> =

>>>>>
>>>>>     <Secret>
>>>>>         <EncryptedValue>
>>>>>             <xenc:EncryptionMethod
>>>>> Algorithm=3D"http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-aes128"/>
>>>>>             <xenc:CipherData>
>>>>>  =

>>>>> <xenc:CipherValue>rf4dx3rvEPO0vKtKL14NbeVu8nk=3D</xenc:CipherValue>
>>>>>             </xenc:CipherData>
>>>>>         </EncryptedValue>
>>>>>     </Secret>
>>>>>     <Counter>
>>>>>         <PlainValue>1234</PlainValue>
>>>>>     </Counter>
>>>>>
>>>>> </Key>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> * VARIANT B
>>>>> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
>>>>>
>>>>> <Key ...>
>>>>>
>>>>>     <Data Name=3D"SECRET">
>>>>>         <EncryptedValue>
>>>>>             <xenc:EncryptionMethod
>>>>> Algorithm=3D"http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-aes128"/>
>>>>>             <xenc:CipherData>
>>>>>  =

>>>>> <xenc:CipherValue>rf4dx3rvEPO0vKtKL14NbeVu8nk=3D</xenc:CipherValue>
>>>>>             </xenc:CipherData>
>>>>>         </EncryptedValue>
>>>>>     </Data>
>>>>>     <Data Name=3D"COUNTER">
>>>>>         <PlainValue>1234</PlainValue>
>>>>>     </Data>
>>>>> </Key>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I have put the schema/instance documents here:  =

>>>>> http://www.tschofenig.priv.at/xml/
>>>>>
>>>>> The KEYPROV working group would appreciate your input. Please let us
>>>>> know which variant we should pick. =

>>>>>
>>>>> Ciao
>>>>> Hannes
>>>>>
>>>>> PS: I have simplified the schema to make it more convenient =

>>>>>       =

>>>>>         =

>>>>>           =

>>>> for you to
>>>>     =

>>>>       =

>>>>         =

>>>>> focus on the relevant parts. =

>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> KEYPROV mailing list
>>>>> KEYPROV@ietf.org
>>>>> http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/keyprov
>>>>>   =

>>>>>       =

>>>>>         =

>>>>>           =

>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> KEYPROV mailing list
>>>> KEYPROV@ietf.org
>>>> http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/keyprov
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> KEYPROV mailing list
>>>> KEYPROV@ietf.org
>>>> http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/keyprov
>>>>
>>>>     =

>>>>       =

>>>>         =

>>>   =

>>>     =

>>>       =

>>   =

>>     =

>
>
>
>   =


_______________________________________________
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From: "Philip Hoyer" <philip.hoyer@actividentity.com>
To: <robert.philpott@rsa.com>,
	<Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net>
Cc: hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com, keyprov@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question
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Robert and all,
I think the discussion veered off track a bit.

I am completely in line with what you are saying I think we lost focus on t=
he real point of the discussion.

I try to recap.

PSKC allows to transfer symmetric keys and associated attributes.

Since we will not be able to know all of these attributes and model them ex=
plicitly we need a way to carry any number of attributes.

My approach was to have a set of name-value pair attributes that can be tra=
nsmitted in clear or in encrypted form and then have a section of the spec =
defining already reserved names and semantics for the values.

This is almost exactly what SAML does in an attribute assertion. Matter of =
fact looking at the SAML assertion schema we could almost import it:


	<element name=3D"AttributeStatement" type=3D"saml:AttributeStatementType"/>
	<complexType name=3D"AttributeStatementType">
		<complexContent>
			<extension base=3D"saml:StatementAbstractType">
				<choice maxOccurs=3D"unbounded">
					<element ref=3D"saml:Attribute"/>
					<element ref=3D"saml:EncryptedAttribute"/>
				</choice>
			</extension>
		</complexContent>
	</complexType>
	<element name=3D"Attribute" type=3D"saml:AttributeType"/>
	<complexType name=3D"AttributeType">
		<sequence>
			<element ref=3D"saml:AttributeValue" minOccurs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"unboun=
ded"/>
		</sequence>
		<attribute name=3D"Name" type=3D"string" use=3D"required"/>
		<attribute name=3D"NameFormat" type=3D"anyURI" use=3D"optional"/>
		<attribute name=3D"FriendlyName" type=3D"string" use=3D"optional"/>
		<anyAttribute namespace=3D"##other" processContents=3D"lax"/>
	</complexType>
	<element name=3D"AttributeValue" type=3D"anyType" nillable=3D"true"/>
	<element name=3D"EncryptedAttribute" type=3D"saml:EncryptedElementType"/>

What Hannes is advocating is that instead of having a generic way to transf=
er attributes (as in SAML) we use explicit XML modelling via the < xs:any/x=
s:anyAttribute> extension.

I advocate against this and rather use an approach as the one in SAML.

I hope that this clarifies a bit what exactly we were discussing under the =
generic term of extension.

I look forward to your thoughts on the above,

Philip




-----Original Message-----
From: robert.philpott@rsa.com [mailto:robert.philpott@rsa.com] =

Sent: Friday, February 22, 2008 3:43 PM
To: Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net; Philip Hoyer
Cc: keyprov@ietf.org; hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com
Subject: RE: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question

I've been lurking for some time and have usually fed my comments on DSKPP t=
hrough my co-worker, Andrea Dougherty.  In this instance she suggested that=
 I go ahead and send my comments directly to the list. By way of introducti=
on, like some of you, I've spent a fair amount of time on schema design for=
 security-based protocols, having co-chaired the OASIS SSTC for SAML 1.1 an=
d 2.0 and having collaborated on a number of the WS-* specs both before and=
 after they were submitted to standards bodies.

First, forgive me if you guys have heavily debated this in f2f meetings, bu=
t I haven't seen much discussion of this point on the list. But the approac=
h of establishing extension points via the <xs:any ...> construct has been =
fairly well established as a precedence in other security-related XML-based=
 protocols.  This approach is used in SAML, the WS-* protocols, Liberty All=
iance protocols, etc. These standards also ALL make heavy use of XMLSIG and=
 XMLENC. There are numerous implementations of these specs that have proven=
 to be quite interoperable and that deal with custom extensions quite well.=
  So an argument I think I'm hearing that using one form of schema extensio=
n over another impedes interoperability is, IMO, not really true. Like Hann=
es, I also am not familiar with the argument that the use of such extension=
 points makes it a lot harder on the programmers. Given the fairly wide use=
 of these specs today, I don't see that there's a strong case to be made fo=
r choosing an extension mechanism that deviates from the accepted industry =
norm.

Obviously, building in extensibility is a necessary evil for these types of=
 specs. We all know that. No matter which of the 2 debated approaches is ch=
osen, dealing with them in practice will always be tricky.  But the hard wo=
rk is not in processing the XML structures in one of the 2 forms; it's in t=
he extension profiling that is necessary to ensure the integrity and securi=
ty of the spec is maintained.  As an aside, I'm not all that enamored with =
making it too easy to add custom extensions to security protocols, but that=
's not really germane to the discussion.

By the way, I haven't seen this mentioned on the list, but where appropriat=
e, it is also quite useful to add XML attribute extension points to certain=
 schema elements as well.  The generally accepted form for this is to use t=
he <xs:anyAttribute namespace=3D"##other" processContents=3D"lax"/> constru=
ct. How would one propose doing this with a alternative approach that is co=
nsistent with the alternative element extension?

Next, IMO, extension points in schemas can certainly be overused.  There ar=
e some WS-* examples where just about every complexType definition includes=
 an element extension and almost every element includes an attribute extens=
ion.  I think this was overkill. I think it is far more prudent to identify=
 only the central constructs where extensibility would be desirable and add=
 them there. I consider the SAML specs to be a good example of this approac=
h.  It makes the job of profiling and negotiating acceptable extensions con=
siderably easier.

As you can tell, I advocate the use of the xs:any/xs:anyAttribute extension=
 mechanism.  It's not ideal, but it is widely used today, programmers and m=
ost tools do know how to deal with them, and I guess I just haven't seen su=
fficient strength in the counter-argument to justify that approach.

BTW - I will also point out that it is not true that "nobody uses validatio=
n in protocols".  While it isn't always done, I am aware of several SAML im=
plementations that perform schema validation and also handle custom schema =
extensions without a problem.

Cheers,

Rob Philpott =

RSA, the Security Division of EMC
Senior Technologist  |  e-Mail: robert.philpott@rsa.com  |  Office: +1 781-=
515-7115  |  Mobile: +1 617-510-0893


> -----Original Message-----
> From: keyprov-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:keyprov-bounces@ietf.org] On Behal=
f Of
> Hannes Tschofenig
> Sent: Friday, February 22, 2008 8:40 AM
> To: Philip Hoyer
> Cc: keyprov@ietf.org; Tschofenig,Hannes (NSN - FI/Espoo)
> Subject: Re: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question
> =

> Hi Philip,
> =

> thanks for your response. Please find my comments inline:
> =

> Philip Hoyer wrote:
> > Hannes,
> > Have a look at the following please that indicates my problem with the
> proposed extension point (this is from section 3.1 of the xmlenc spec):
> >
> > EncryptedType is the abstract type from which EncryptedData and Encrypt=
edKey
> are derived. While these two latter element types are very similar with
> respect to their content models, a syntactical distinction is useful to
> processing. Implementation MUST generate laxly schema valid [XML-schema
> <http://www.w3.org/TR/xmlenc-core/> ] EncryptedData or EncryptedKey as
> specified by the subsequent schema declarations. (Note the laxly schema v=
alid
> generation means that the content permitted by xsd:ANY need not be valid.)
> Implementations SHOULD create these XML structures (EncryptedType element=
s and
> their descendents/content) in Normalization Form C [NFC
> <http://www.w3.org/TR/xmlenc-core/> , NFC-Corrigendum
> <http://www.w3.org/TR/xmlenc-core/> ].
> > This is the biggest differences of the approaches.
> >
> >
> This limitation exists with the way how XML works. With Relax NG that
> would be different.
> =

> However, this is only a limition on paper: Nobody uses validation in
> protocols. It would just take too long and you have to parse the message
> anyway.
> =

> =

> > By having
> >
> >>>     <xs:complexType name=3D"KeyType">
> >>>         <xs:sequence>
> >>>             <xs:element name=3D"Data" type=3D"pskc:DataType" minOccur=
s=3D"0"
> maxOccurs=3D"unbounded"/>
> >>>         </xs:sequence>
> >>>     </xs:complexType>
> >>>
> >
> > You can make sure that any data element will comply and can be validated
> against the current schema.
> >
> > With <xs:any namespace=3D"##other" processContents=3D"lax"/>
> > You loose this.
> >
> >
> See above.
> Not an issue in the real world.
> =

> > I think we are getting confused here between extension of the schema, b=
eing
> able to transmit data values currently not envisaged, technical extension=
s and
> your concept of extending within the realms of IETF/IANA and specs.
> >
> > When you say that I do not define how to extend it you refer to a mecha=
nism
> by which new Key Data elements will be communicated and registered.
> >
> Yep; see
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-keyprov-portable-symmetric=
-key-
> container-02.txt
> =

> The document does not even have an IANA consideration section.
> =

> =

> > This problem though is independent of the two approaches.
> >
> Unfortunately, it isn't. The details of the extensibility story is
> different for both mechanisms.
> =

> > If I am reading you right you want us to create an informational RFC th=
at
> holds the Data Attribute semantic definition? So basically create a separ=
ate
> document for section 7 of the current spec?
> >
> No.
> =

> When you in the future want to define new elements that belong inside
> the Data attribute then you need to describe them somewhere.
> How did you envision that is going to happen?
> =

> > I was more thinking that by putting it in a separate section we could e=
xtend
> it in future versions of the spec and Yes I agree that there is a risk of
> others introducing new names and definitions that will create interoperab=
ility
> problems.
> The later issue goes away if you do the following:
> =

> * Registration is only possible via a single authority (e.g., IANA)
> They would resolve conflicts.
> * Put a namespace in front of the attribute
> Then, you accomplish uniqueness by ensuring that the name / semantic
> relationship works within a specific body.
> =

> > But this is only one of the aspects that will create interoperability
> problems and we will not get it 'right' the first time around.
> >
> Why do you think we will not get it right? This is a basic protocol
> extensibility question. This has been done many, many times in the IETF
> before.
> =

> =

> > The use of the xmlenc concepts in the spec will create more interoperab=
ility
> problems than this approach,
> =

> That may be true. That's, however, a totally different aspect that has
> nothing todo with this question.
> =

> > unless we tie down the exact allowed ways to use those elements (curren=
tly
> missing from the spec but trying to sort this out by introducing a more
> detailed section 6 on which I would gratefully receive some comments).
> >
> I am, unfortunately, not the xmlenc expert. I can, however, find one so
> that we can ensure that everything is OK. Do you want me todo that?
> =

> =

> > Philip
> >
> >
> >
> Ciao
> Hannes
> =

> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Hannes Tschofenig [mailto:Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net]
> > Sent: Friday, February 22, 2008 11:45 AM
> > To: Philip Hoyer
> > Cc: Tschofenig, Hannes (NSN - FI/Espoo); keyprov@ietf.org
> > Subject: Re: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question
> >
> > Hi Philip,
> >
> >
> > Philip Hoyer wrote:
> >
> >> Hannes,
> >> The schema that is on your server did not contain the extension point.
> >>
> >>
> > I thought that this was a mistake.
> > Without extension points we would turn the "EXTENSIBLE Markup Language"
> > into the "Non-Extensible Markup Language".
> >
> >
> >> I am not a big fan of such extension points because of the more intric=
ate
> parsing requirements they put on programmers.
> >>
> >>
> > I have never heard about that given how widely XML is being used.
> >
> >
> >> How should a parser distinguish between the existing defined elements
> within the Key entity and the extended ones?
> >>
> >>
> >>
> > There are various ways to ensure extensibility in a protocol. Note that
> > they have nothing todo with the XML schema itself but are rather
> > fundamental principles of protocol design.
> >
> > For extensibility, you need to consider where extensions are possible
> > and how you want the other party to react on them (ignore if not
> > understood, abort if not understood, negotiate or discover new
> > extensions, etc.).
> >
> > Different protocols have different strategy depending on the desire of
> > the protocol designers.
> >
> >
> >> Maybe we could come to a compromise whereby we have defined elements w=
ithin
> key (such as the usage etc) and then have a sub element called KeyData wh=
ich
> can only ever contain elements of the various DataTypes:
> >>
> >> 	<xs:complexType name=3D"KeyType">
> >> 		<xs:sequence>
> >> 			<xs:element name=3D"Issuer" type=3D"xs:string" minOccurs=3D"0"/>
> >> 			<xs:element name=3D"Usage" type=3D"pskc:UsageType"/>
> >> 			<xs:element name=3D"CardAppPersoProfileId" type=3D"xs:string"
> minOccurs=3D"0"/>
> >> 			<xs:element name=3D"FriendlyName" type=3D"xs:string"
> minOccurs=3D"0"/>
> >> 			<xs:element name=3D"Data" type=3D"pskc:KeyDataType"
> minOccurs=3D"0"/>
> >> 			<xs:element name=3D"PINPolicy" type=3D"pskc:PINPolicyType"
> minOccurs=3D"0"/>
> >> 			<xs:element name=3D"ExpiryDate" type=3D"xs:dateTime"
> minOccurs=3D"0"/>
> >> 			<xs:element name=3D"StartDate" type=3D"xs:dateTime"
> minOccurs=3D"0"/>
> >> 		</xs:sequence>
> >> 		<xs:attribute name=3D"KeyId" type=3D"xs:string" use=3D"required"/>
> >> 		<xs:attribute name=3D"KeyAlgorithm" type=3D"pskc:KeyAlgorithmType"
> use=3D"required"/>
> >> 	</xs:complexType>
> >> 	<xs:complexType name=3D"KeyDataType">
> >> 		<xs:sequence>
> >>              <xs:element name=3D"Secret" type=3D"pskc:base64BinaryType"
> minOccurs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
> >>              <!-- <xs:element name=3D"Time" type=3D"xs:dateTime" minOc=
curs=3D"0"
> maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
> >>              <xs:element name=3D"TimeInterval" type=3D"xs:double" minO=
ccurs=3D"0"
> maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
> >>              <xs:element name=3D"TimeDrift" type=3D"pskc:integerType"
> minOccurs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
> >>              -->
> >>              <xs:element name=3D"Counter" type=3D"pskc:integerType"
> minOccurs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
> >> 		</xs:sequence>
> >> 	</xs:complexType>
> >>
> >>     <xs:complexType name=3D"base64BinaryType">
> >>         <xs:sequence>
> >>             <xs:choice>
> >>                 <xs:element name=3D"PlainValue" type=3D"xs:base64Binar=
y"/>
> >>                 <xs:element name=3D"EncryptedValue"
> type=3D"xenc:EncryptedDataType"/>
> >>             </xs:choice>
> >> 			<xs:element name=3D"ValueMAC" type=3D"xs:base64Binary"
> minOccurs=3D"0"/>
> >>         </xs:sequence>
> >>     </xs:complexType>
> >>     <xs:complexType name=3D"integerType">
> >>         <xs:sequence>
> >>             <xs:choice>
> >>                 <xs:element name=3D"PlainValue" type=3D"xs:integer"/>
> >>                 <xs:element name=3D"EncryptedValue"
> type=3D"xenc:EncryptedDataType"/>
> >>             </xs:choice>
> >> 			<xs:element name=3D"ValueMAC" type=3D"xs:base64Binary"
> minOccurs=3D"0"/>
> >>         </xs:sequence>
> >>     </xs:complexType>
> >>
> >>
> >>  This way the parsers will know that ONLY inside the KeyData element t=
here
> can be extensions and we can specify in the spec that any extension MUST =
have
> the subelements of PlainValue, EncryptedValue and ValueMAC.
> >>
> >> As you can see though this is starting to make the schema more complex=
 but
> I am ok with accepting a compromise.
> >>
> >> What do you think?
> >>
> >>
> >>
> > I am fine with everything -- I just want to make sure that we understand
> > the tradeoffs and implications.
> > Your initial schema is also fine  -- it did not, however, provide an
> > answer on how to extend it. Without such a story we will (a) most likely
> > not get the document through the IESG and (b) we will encounter interop
> > problems later.
> >
> > Btw, the above schema does not contain an extension point -- is this
> > intentional?
> >
> > Ciao
> > Hannes
> >
> >
> >
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: Hannes Tschofenig [mailto:Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net]
> >> Sent: Thursday, February 21, 2008 6:38 PM
> >> To: Philip Hoyer
> >> Cc: Tschofenig, Hannes (NSN - FI/Espoo); keyprov@ietf.org
> >> Subject: Re: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question
> >>
> >> Hi Philip
> >>
> >> there is no difference regarding extensibility with the two proposals.
> >>
> >> Let me describe how the extensibility works for both approaches.
> >>
> >> VARIANT 1
> >>
> >> Assumption:
> >> The XML schema in PSKC contains an extension point
> >> For example, it contains something like:
> >> <xs:any namespace=3D"##other" processContents=3D"lax"/>
> >>
> >> How to extend it:
> >>
> >> One extends it by defining a new schema (with the new element or
> >> whatever you want todo).
> >> You would also describe what the new elements actually mean.
> >>
> >> In essence, you would extend it an the same way as you extend the rest
> >> of the PSKC schema. This is the way how one extends XML.
> >> There is no need to change the existing schema.
> >>
> >>
> >> VARIANT 2
> >>
> >> Assumption
> >> The IANA consideration sections explains how these tokens and their
> >> semantic is registered.
> >> I assume something like informational RFC with expert review for adding
> >> new tokens
> >>
> >>
> >> How to extend it:
> >>
> >> You write a document that defines the new token + the semantic. This is
> >> the same approach as extensions work for protocols like RADIUS or Diam=
eter
> >>
> >>
> >> What you want to ensure is that
> >> * extensions are well described
> >> * there is a way to deal with conflicts (e.g., I define the same
> >> extension as you but with a different semantic).
> >>
> >> Does this make sense to you?
> >>
> >> Ciao
> >> Hannes
> >>
> >>
> >> Philip Hoyer wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >>> Hannes,
> >>> I think your proposal has a major drawback.
> >>> For any extension you will have to update the schema, whereas being a=
ble
> to put as many Data elements as we can will leave the PSKC schema intact =
even
> if people add key attribute value that we have not foreseen.
> >>>
> >>> I enclose the schemas of your proposal for better understanding my po=
int:
> >>>
> >>>     <xs:element name=3D"Key">
> >>>         <xs:complexType>
> >>>         <xs:sequence>
> >>>             <xs:element name=3D"Secret" type=3D"pskc:base64BinaryType"
> minOccurs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
> >>>             <!-- <xs:element name=3D"Time" type=3D"xs:dateTime" minOc=
curs=3D"0"
> maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
> >>>             <xs:element name=3D"TimeInterval" type=3D"xs:double" minO=
ccurs=3D"0"
> maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
> >>>             <xs:element name=3D"TimeDrift" type=3D"pskc:integerType"
> minOccurs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
> >>>             -->
> >>>             <xs:element name=3D"Counter" type=3D"pskc:integerType"
> minOccurs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
> >>>         </xs:sequence>
> >>>         </xs:complexType>
> >>>     </xs:element>
> >>>
> >>> So to add a new attribute you would have to change the schema above to
> add:
> >>>
> >>> <xs:element name=3D"TimeDrift" type=3D"pskc:integerType" minOccurs=3D=
"0"
> maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
> >>>
> >>> Whereas with method B the schema is:
> >>>
> >>>     <xs:complexType name=3D"KeyType">
> >>>         <xs:sequence>
> >>>             <xs:element name=3D"Data" type=3D"pskc:DataType" minOccur=
s=3D"0"
> maxOccurs=3D"unbounded"/>
> >>>         </xs:sequence>
> >>>     </xs:complexType>
> >>>
> >>> Hence you can add as many 'Data' elements without changing the schema.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Philip
> >>>
> >>> -----Original Message-----
> >>> From: Tschofenig, Hannes (NSN - FI/Espoo)
> [mailto:hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com]
> >>> Sent: Thursday, February 21, 2008 12:10 PM
> >>> To: Philip Hoyer; Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net
> >>> Cc: keyprov@ietf.org
> >>> Subject: AW: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question
> >>>
> >>> Hi Philip,
> >>>
> >>> The schema files are here:
> >>> http://www.tschofenig.priv.at/xml/
> >>>
> >>> PlainValue: What element name would you prefer?
> >>>
> >>> You need to check whether the data type for the element reflects what=
 you
> had in mind for that element.
> >>> If the <Secret> element has to use the data type "string" then that's
> fine.
> >>>
> >>> Ciao
> >>> Hannes
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> -----Urspr=FCngliche Nachricht-----
> >>>> Von: keyprov-bounces@ietf.org
> >>>> [mailto:keyprov-bounces@ietf.org] Im Auftrag von ext Philip Hoyer
> >>>> Gesendet: Donnerstag, 21. Februar 2008 13:41
> >>>> An: Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net; Tschofenig, Hannes (NSN - FI/Espoo)
> >>>> Cc: ietf-xml-use@imc.org; keyprov@ietf.org; xml-dir@ietf.org
> >>>> Betreff: Re: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question
> >>>>
> >>>> Hannes,
> >>>> We can go with Variant A but still will need an element
> >>>> catalogue in the
> >>>> spec since we do not want people to introduce elements that have the
> >>>> same meaning eg <Counter> and <EventCounter>
> >>>>
> >>>> Could you send the xsd snippet for the type definition to me for
> >>>> inclusion.
> >>>> Also the plainvalue in the example is misleading since I
> >>>> believe in the
> >>>> xsd it is base64 or did you envisage it to be String?
> >>>> I am happy to use string and in the element catalogue
> >>>> describe how it is
> >>>> serialised in the string. (eg for the secret it will be a string that
> >>>> contains the base64 encoded binary of the value)
> >>>>
> >>>> Philip
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> -----Original Message-----
> >>>> From: keyprov-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:keyprov-bounces@ietf.org] On
> >>>> Behalf Of Hannes Tschofenig
> >>>> Sent: Thursday, February 21, 2008 11:32 AM
> >>>> To: hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com
> >>>> Cc: ietf-xml-use@imc.org; keyprov@ietf.org; xml-dir@ietf.org
> >>>> Subject: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question
> >>>>
> >>>> Hi all,
> >>>>
> >>>> after our interim meeting I posted the mail below to the XML
> >>>> directorate
> >>>>
> >>>> mailing list. I got three responses for variant A so far, namely:
> >>>>
> >>>> * Tim Bray:
> >>>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/xml-dir/current/msg00174.html
> >>>>
> >>>> * Phil Shafer:
> >>>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/xml-dir/current/msg00176.html
> >>>>
> >>>> * Andrew Newton (offlist):
> >>>>
> >>>> -----
> >>>>
> >>>> Without much background on the trade-offs and why each is being
> >>>> proposed, it is hard to tell which is better.
> >>>>
> >>>> I do prefer variant A just because it seems simpler.
> >>>>
> >>>> -andy
> >>>>
> >>>> -----
> >>>>
> >>>> Ciao
> >>>> Hannes
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> Hi all,
> >>>>>
> >>>>> last week we had our IETF KEYPROV interim meeting and among many
> >>>>> security related issue we also ran into XML design
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> questions. Hence, I
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> would like to solicit feedback from XML experts. In short,
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> there seem
> >>>> to
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> be (at least two) ways to construct the XML schema to express that a
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> key
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> contains of a secret and has a couple of meta data
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> associated with it.
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> We would like to utilize XML encryption to selectively
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> protect some of
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> the elements.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Here are snippets from the two instance files:
> >>>>>
> >>>>> * VARIANT A
> >>>>> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
> >>>>>
> >>>>> <Key ....>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>     <Secret>
> >>>>>         <EncryptedValue>
> >>>>>             <xenc:EncryptionMethod
> >>>>> Algorithm=3D"http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-aes128"/>
> >>>>>             <xenc:CipherData>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> <xenc:CipherValue>rf4dx3rvEPO0vKtKL14NbeVu8nk=3D</xenc:CipherValue>
> >>>>>             </xenc:CipherData>
> >>>>>         </EncryptedValue>
> >>>>>     </Secret>
> >>>>>     <Counter>
> >>>>>         <PlainValue>1234</PlainValue>
> >>>>>     </Counter>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> </Key>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> * VARIANT B
> >>>>> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
> >>>>>
> >>>>> <Key ...>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>     <Data Name=3D"SECRET">
> >>>>>         <EncryptedValue>
> >>>>>             <xenc:EncryptionMethod
> >>>>> Algorithm=3D"http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-aes128"/>
> >>>>>             <xenc:CipherData>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> <xenc:CipherValue>rf4dx3rvEPO0vKtKL14NbeVu8nk=3D</xenc:CipherValue>
> >>>>>             </xenc:CipherData>
> >>>>>         </EncryptedValue>
> >>>>>     </Data>
> >>>>>     <Data Name=3D"COUNTER">
> >>>>>         <PlainValue>1234</PlainValue>
> >>>>>     </Data>
> >>>>> </Key>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> I have put the schema/instance documents here:
> >>>>> http://www.tschofenig.priv.at/xml/
> >>>>>
> >>>>> The KEYPROV working group would appreciate your input. Please let us
> >>>>> know which variant we should pick.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Ciao
> >>>>> Hannes
> >>>>>
> >>>>> PS: I have simplified the schema to make it more convenient
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> for you to
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> focus on the relevant parts.
> >>>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>>> KEYPROV mailing list
> >>>>> KEYPROV@ietf.org
> >>>>> http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/keyprov
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>> KEYPROV mailing list
> >>>> KEYPROV@ietf.org
> >>>> http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/keyprov
> >>>>
> >>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>> KEYPROV mailing list
> >>>> KEYPROV@ietf.org
> >>>> http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/keyprov
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>
> >>
> >
> >
> >
> >
> =

> _______________________________________________
> KEYPROV mailing list
> KEYPROV@ietf.org
> http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/keyprov


_______________________________________________
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From: "Larry Masinter" <LMM@acm.org>
To: <Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net>, <hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com>
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Subject: Re: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question
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I prefer using XML namespace qualified names for extensible enumerated
sets of values, much more than using either attributes with string values
or content.

So I much prefer <secret> to <Data Name="SECRET"> because (presumably)
"secret" is one of an enumerated set.

One "test" is that if you take a fragment of the resulting XML and
translate it (from English, presumably) to another language, words
in attributes and content would translate, but namespace-qualified
names would not. (Of course, base64-encoded data in element values
don't count.)

Larry


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Subject: Re: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question
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I've been lurking for some time and have usually fed my comments on DSKPP t=
hrough my co-worker, Andrea Dougherty.  In this instance she suggested that=
 I go ahead and send my comments directly to the list. By way of introducti=
on, like some of you, I've spent a fair amount of time on schema design for=
 security-based protocols, having co-chaired the OASIS SSTC for SAML 1.1 an=
d 2.0 and having collaborated on a number of the WS-* specs both before and=
 after they were submitted to standards bodies.

First, forgive me if you guys have heavily debated this in f2f meetings, bu=
t I haven't seen much discussion of this point on the list. But the approac=
h of establishing extension points via the <xs:any ...> construct has been =
fairly well established as a precedence in other security-related XML-based=
 protocols.  This approach is used in SAML, the WS-* protocols, Liberty All=
iance protocols, etc. These standards also ALL make heavy use of XMLSIG and=
 XMLENC. There are numerous implementations of these specs that have proven=
 to be quite interoperable and that deal with custom extensions quite well.=
  So an argument I think I'm hearing that using one form of schema extensio=
n over another impedes interoperability is, IMO, not really true. Like Hann=
es, I also am not familiar with the argument that the use of such extension=
 points makes it a lot harder on the programmers. Given the fairly wide use=
 of these specs today, I don't see that there's a strong case to be made fo=
r choosing an extension mechanism that deviates from the accepted industry =
norm.

Obviously, building in extensibility is a necessary evil for these types of=
 specs. We all know that. No matter which of the 2 debated approaches is ch=
osen, dealing with them in practice will always be tricky.  But the hard wo=
rk is not in processing the XML structures in one of the 2 forms; it's in t=
he extension profiling that is necessary to ensure the integrity and securi=
ty of the spec is maintained.  As an aside, I'm not all that enamored with =
making it too easy to add custom extensions to security protocols, but that=
's not really germane to the discussion.

By the way, I haven't seen this mentioned on the list, but where appropriat=
e, it is also quite useful to add XML attribute extension points to certain=
 schema elements as well.  The generally accepted form for this is to use t=
he <xs:anyAttribute namespace=3D"##other" processContents=3D"lax"/> constru=
ct. How would one propose doing this with a alternative approach that is co=
nsistent with the alternative element extension?

Next, IMO, extension points in schemas can certainly be overused.  There ar=
e some WS-* examples where just about every complexType definition includes=
 an element extension and almost every element includes an attribute extens=
ion.  I think this was overkill. I think it is far more prudent to identify=
 only the central constructs where extensibility would be desirable and add=
 them there. I consider the SAML specs to be a good example of this approac=
h.  It makes the job of profiling and negotiating acceptable extensions con=
siderably easier.

As you can tell, I advocate the use of the xs:any/xs:anyAttribute extension=
 mechanism.  It's not ideal, but it is widely used today, programmers and m=
ost tools do know how to deal with them, and I guess I just haven't seen su=
fficient strength in the counter-argument to justify that approach.

BTW - I will also point out that it is not true that "nobody uses validatio=
n in protocols".  While it isn't always done, I am aware of several SAML im=
plementations that perform schema validation and also handle custom schema =
extensions without a problem.

Cheers,

Rob Philpott =

RSA, the Security Division of EMC
Senior Technologist  |  e-Mail: robert.philpott@rsa.com  |  Office: +1 781-=
515-7115  |  Mobile: +1 617-510-0893


> -----Original Message-----
> From: keyprov-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:keyprov-bounces@ietf.org] On Behal=
f Of
> Hannes Tschofenig
> Sent: Friday, February 22, 2008 8:40 AM
> To: Philip Hoyer
> Cc: keyprov@ietf.org; Tschofenig,Hannes (NSN - FI/Espoo)
> Subject: Re: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question
> =

> Hi Philip,
> =

> thanks for your response. Please find my comments inline:
> =

> Philip Hoyer wrote:
> > Hannes,
> > Have a look at the following please that indicates my problem with the
> proposed extension point (this is from section 3.1 of the xmlenc spec):
> >
> > EncryptedType is the abstract type from which EncryptedData and Encrypt=
edKey
> are derived. While these two latter element types are very similar with
> respect to their content models, a syntactical distinction is useful to
> processing. Implementation MUST generate laxly schema valid [XML-schema
> <http://www.w3.org/TR/xmlenc-core/> ] EncryptedData or EncryptedKey as
> specified by the subsequent schema declarations. (Note the laxly schema v=
alid
> generation means that the content permitted by xsd:ANY need not be valid.)
> Implementations SHOULD create these XML structures (EncryptedType element=
s and
> their descendents/content) in Normalization Form C [NFC
> <http://www.w3.org/TR/xmlenc-core/> , NFC-Corrigendum
> <http://www.w3.org/TR/xmlenc-core/> ].
> > This is the biggest differences of the approaches.
> >
> >
> This limitation exists with the way how XML works. With Relax NG that
> would be different.
> =

> However, this is only a limition on paper: Nobody uses validation in
> protocols. It would just take too long and you have to parse the message
> anyway.
> =

> =

> > By having
> >
> >>>     <xs:complexType name=3D"KeyType">
> >>>         <xs:sequence>
> >>>             <xs:element name=3D"Data" type=3D"pskc:DataType" minOccur=
s=3D"0"
> maxOccurs=3D"unbounded"/>
> >>>         </xs:sequence>
> >>>     </xs:complexType>
> >>>
> >
> > You can make sure that any data element will comply and can be validated
> against the current schema.
> >
> > With <xs:any namespace=3D"##other" processContents=3D"lax"/>
> > You loose this.
> >
> >
> See above.
> Not an issue in the real world.
> =

> > I think we are getting confused here between extension of the schema, b=
eing
> able to transmit data values currently not envisaged, technical extension=
s and
> your concept of extending within the realms of IETF/IANA and specs.
> >
> > When you say that I do not define how to extend it you refer to a mecha=
nism
> by which new Key Data elements will be communicated and registered.
> >
> Yep; see
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-keyprov-portable-symmetric=
-key-
> container-02.txt
> =

> The document does not even have an IANA consideration section.
> =

> =

> > This problem though is independent of the two approaches.
> >
> Unfortunately, it isn't. The details of the extensibility story is
> different for both mechanisms.
> =

> > If I am reading you right you want us to create an informational RFC th=
at
> holds the Data Attribute semantic definition? So basically create a separ=
ate
> document for section 7 of the current spec?
> >
> No.
> =

> When you in the future want to define new elements that belong inside
> the Data attribute then you need to describe them somewhere.
> How did you envision that is going to happen?
> =

> > I was more thinking that by putting it in a separate section we could e=
xtend
> it in future versions of the spec and Yes I agree that there is a risk of
> others introducing new names and definitions that will create interoperab=
ility
> problems.
> The later issue goes away if you do the following:
> =

> * Registration is only possible via a single authority (e.g., IANA)
> They would resolve conflicts.
> * Put a namespace in front of the attribute
> Then, you accomplish uniqueness by ensuring that the name / semantic
> relationship works within a specific body.
> =

> > But this is only one of the aspects that will create interoperability
> problems and we will not get it 'right' the first time around.
> >
> Why do you think we will not get it right? This is a basic protocol
> extensibility question. This has been done many, many times in the IETF
> before.
> =

> =

> > The use of the xmlenc concepts in the spec will create more interoperab=
ility
> problems than this approach,
> =

> That may be true. That's, however, a totally different aspect that has
> nothing todo with this question.
> =

> > unless we tie down the exact allowed ways to use those elements (curren=
tly
> missing from the spec but trying to sort this out by introducing a more
> detailed section 6 on which I would gratefully receive some comments).
> >
> I am, unfortunately, not the xmlenc expert. I can, however, find one so
> that we can ensure that everything is OK. Do you want me todo that?
> =

> =

> > Philip
> >
> >
> >
> Ciao
> Hannes
> =

> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Hannes Tschofenig [mailto:Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net]
> > Sent: Friday, February 22, 2008 11:45 AM
> > To: Philip Hoyer
> > Cc: Tschofenig, Hannes (NSN - FI/Espoo); keyprov@ietf.org
> > Subject: Re: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question
> >
> > Hi Philip,
> >
> >
> > Philip Hoyer wrote:
> >
> >> Hannes,
> >> The schema that is on your server did not contain the extension point.
> >>
> >>
> > I thought that this was a mistake.
> > Without extension points we would turn the "EXTENSIBLE Markup Language"
> > into the "Non-Extensible Markup Language".
> >
> >
> >> I am not a big fan of such extension points because of the more intric=
ate
> parsing requirements they put on programmers.
> >>
> >>
> > I have never heard about that given how widely XML is being used.
> >
> >
> >> How should a parser distinguish between the existing defined elements
> within the Key entity and the extended ones?
> >>
> >>
> >>
> > There are various ways to ensure extensibility in a protocol. Note that
> > they have nothing todo with the XML schema itself but are rather
> > fundamental principles of protocol design.
> >
> > For extensibility, you need to consider where extensions are possible
> > and how you want the other party to react on them (ignore if not
> > understood, abort if not understood, negotiate or discover new
> > extensions, etc.).
> >
> > Different protocols have different strategy depending on the desire of
> > the protocol designers.
> >
> >
> >> Maybe we could come to a compromise whereby we have defined elements w=
ithin
> key (such as the usage etc) and then have a sub element called KeyData wh=
ich
> can only ever contain elements of the various DataTypes:
> >>
> >> 	<xs:complexType name=3D"KeyType">
> >> 		<xs:sequence>
> >> 			<xs:element name=3D"Issuer" type=3D"xs:string" minOccurs=3D"0"/>
> >> 			<xs:element name=3D"Usage" type=3D"pskc:UsageType"/>
> >> 			<xs:element name=3D"CardAppPersoProfileId" type=3D"xs:string"
> minOccurs=3D"0"/>
> >> 			<xs:element name=3D"FriendlyName" type=3D"xs:string"
> minOccurs=3D"0"/>
> >> 			<xs:element name=3D"Data" type=3D"pskc:KeyDataType"
> minOccurs=3D"0"/>
> >> 			<xs:element name=3D"PINPolicy" type=3D"pskc:PINPolicyType"
> minOccurs=3D"0"/>
> >> 			<xs:element name=3D"ExpiryDate" type=3D"xs:dateTime"
> minOccurs=3D"0"/>
> >> 			<xs:element name=3D"StartDate" type=3D"xs:dateTime"
> minOccurs=3D"0"/>
> >> 		</xs:sequence>
> >> 		<xs:attribute name=3D"KeyId" type=3D"xs:string" use=3D"required"/>
> >> 		<xs:attribute name=3D"KeyAlgorithm" type=3D"pskc:KeyAlgorithmType"
> use=3D"required"/>
> >> 	</xs:complexType>
> >> 	<xs:complexType name=3D"KeyDataType">
> >> 		<xs:sequence>
> >>              <xs:element name=3D"Secret" type=3D"pskc:base64BinaryType"
> minOccurs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
> >>              <!-- <xs:element name=3D"Time" type=3D"xs:dateTime" minOc=
curs=3D"0"
> maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
> >>              <xs:element name=3D"TimeInterval" type=3D"xs:double" minO=
ccurs=3D"0"
> maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
> >>              <xs:element name=3D"TimeDrift" type=3D"pskc:integerType"
> minOccurs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
> >>              -->
> >>              <xs:element name=3D"Counter" type=3D"pskc:integerType"
> minOccurs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
> >> 		</xs:sequence>
> >> 	</xs:complexType>
> >>
> >>     <xs:complexType name=3D"base64BinaryType">
> >>         <xs:sequence>
> >>             <xs:choice>
> >>                 <xs:element name=3D"PlainValue" type=3D"xs:base64Binar=
y"/>
> >>                 <xs:element name=3D"EncryptedValue"
> type=3D"xenc:EncryptedDataType"/>
> >>             </xs:choice>
> >> 			<xs:element name=3D"ValueMAC" type=3D"xs:base64Binary"
> minOccurs=3D"0"/>
> >>         </xs:sequence>
> >>     </xs:complexType>
> >>     <xs:complexType name=3D"integerType">
> >>         <xs:sequence>
> >>             <xs:choice>
> >>                 <xs:element name=3D"PlainValue" type=3D"xs:integer"/>
> >>                 <xs:element name=3D"EncryptedValue"
> type=3D"xenc:EncryptedDataType"/>
> >>             </xs:choice>
> >> 			<xs:element name=3D"ValueMAC" type=3D"xs:base64Binary"
> minOccurs=3D"0"/>
> >>         </xs:sequence>
> >>     </xs:complexType>
> >>
> >>
> >>  This way the parsers will know that ONLY inside the KeyData element t=
here
> can be extensions and we can specify in the spec that any extension MUST =
have
> the subelements of PlainValue, EncryptedValue and ValueMAC.
> >>
> >> As you can see though this is starting to make the schema more complex=
 but
> I am ok with accepting a compromise.
> >>
> >> What do you think?
> >>
> >>
> >>
> > I am fine with everything -- I just want to make sure that we understand
> > the tradeoffs and implications.
> > Your initial schema is also fine  -- it did not, however, provide an
> > answer on how to extend it. Without such a story we will (a) most likely
> > not get the document through the IESG and (b) we will encounter interop
> > problems later.
> >
> > Btw, the above schema does not contain an extension point -- is this
> > intentional?
> >
> > Ciao
> > Hannes
> >
> >
> >
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: Hannes Tschofenig [mailto:Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net]
> >> Sent: Thursday, February 21, 2008 6:38 PM
> >> To: Philip Hoyer
> >> Cc: Tschofenig, Hannes (NSN - FI/Espoo); keyprov@ietf.org
> >> Subject: Re: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question
> >>
> >> Hi Philip
> >>
> >> there is no difference regarding extensibility with the two proposals.
> >>
> >> Let me describe how the extensibility works for both approaches.
> >>
> >> VARIANT 1
> >>
> >> Assumption:
> >> The XML schema in PSKC contains an extension point
> >> For example, it contains something like:
> >> <xs:any namespace=3D"##other" processContents=3D"lax"/>
> >>
> >> How to extend it:
> >>
> >> One extends it by defining a new schema (with the new element or
> >> whatever you want todo).
> >> You would also describe what the new elements actually mean.
> >>
> >> In essence, you would extend it an the same way as you extend the rest
> >> of the PSKC schema. This is the way how one extends XML.
> >> There is no need to change the existing schema.
> >>
> >>
> >> VARIANT 2
> >>
> >> Assumption
> >> The IANA consideration sections explains how these tokens and their
> >> semantic is registered.
> >> I assume something like informational RFC with expert review for adding
> >> new tokens
> >>
> >>
> >> How to extend it:
> >>
> >> You write a document that defines the new token + the semantic. This is
> >> the same approach as extensions work for protocols like RADIUS or Diam=
eter
> >>
> >>
> >> What you want to ensure is that
> >> * extensions are well described
> >> * there is a way to deal with conflicts (e.g., I define the same
> >> extension as you but with a different semantic).
> >>
> >> Does this make sense to you?
> >>
> >> Ciao
> >> Hannes
> >>
> >>
> >> Philip Hoyer wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >>> Hannes,
> >>> I think your proposal has a major drawback.
> >>> For any extension you will have to update the schema, whereas being a=
ble
> to put as many Data elements as we can will leave the PSKC schema intact =
even
> if people add key attribute value that we have not foreseen.
> >>>
> >>> I enclose the schemas of your proposal for better understanding my po=
int:
> >>>
> >>>     <xs:element name=3D"Key">
> >>>         <xs:complexType>
> >>>         <xs:sequence>
> >>>             <xs:element name=3D"Secret" type=3D"pskc:base64BinaryType"
> minOccurs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
> >>>             <!-- <xs:element name=3D"Time" type=3D"xs:dateTime" minOc=
curs=3D"0"
> maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
> >>>             <xs:element name=3D"TimeInterval" type=3D"xs:double" minO=
ccurs=3D"0"
> maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
> >>>             <xs:element name=3D"TimeDrift" type=3D"pskc:integerType"
> minOccurs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
> >>>             -->
> >>>             <xs:element name=3D"Counter" type=3D"pskc:integerType"
> minOccurs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
> >>>         </xs:sequence>
> >>>         </xs:complexType>
> >>>     </xs:element>
> >>>
> >>> So to add a new attribute you would have to change the schema above to
> add:
> >>>
> >>> <xs:element name=3D"TimeDrift" type=3D"pskc:integerType" minOccurs=3D=
"0"
> maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
> >>>
> >>> Whereas with method B the schema is:
> >>>
> >>>     <xs:complexType name=3D"KeyType">
> >>>         <xs:sequence>
> >>>             <xs:element name=3D"Data" type=3D"pskc:DataType" minOccur=
s=3D"0"
> maxOccurs=3D"unbounded"/>
> >>>         </xs:sequence>
> >>>     </xs:complexType>
> >>>
> >>> Hence you can add as many 'Data' elements without changing the schema.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Philip
> >>>
> >>> -----Original Message-----
> >>> From: Tschofenig, Hannes (NSN - FI/Espoo)
> [mailto:hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com]
> >>> Sent: Thursday, February 21, 2008 12:10 PM
> >>> To: Philip Hoyer; Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net
> >>> Cc: keyprov@ietf.org
> >>> Subject: AW: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question
> >>>
> >>> Hi Philip,
> >>>
> >>> The schema files are here:
> >>> http://www.tschofenig.priv.at/xml/
> >>>
> >>> PlainValue: What element name would you prefer?
> >>>
> >>> You need to check whether the data type for the element reflects what=
 you
> had in mind for that element.
> >>> If the <Secret> element has to use the data type "string" then that's
> fine.
> >>>
> >>> Ciao
> >>> Hannes
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> -----Urspr=FCngliche Nachricht-----
> >>>> Von: keyprov-bounces@ietf.org
> >>>> [mailto:keyprov-bounces@ietf.org] Im Auftrag von ext Philip Hoyer
> >>>> Gesendet: Donnerstag, 21. Februar 2008 13:41
> >>>> An: Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net; Tschofenig, Hannes (NSN - FI/Espoo)
> >>>> Cc: ietf-xml-use@imc.org; keyprov@ietf.org; xml-dir@ietf.org
> >>>> Betreff: Re: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question
> >>>>
> >>>> Hannes,
> >>>> We can go with Variant A but still will need an element
> >>>> catalogue in the
> >>>> spec since we do not want people to introduce elements that have the
> >>>> same meaning eg <Counter> and <EventCounter>
> >>>>
> >>>> Could you send the xsd snippet for the type definition to me for
> >>>> inclusion.
> >>>> Also the plainvalue in the example is misleading since I
> >>>> believe in the
> >>>> xsd it is base64 or did you envisage it to be String?
> >>>> I am happy to use string and in the element catalogue
> >>>> describe how it is
> >>>> serialised in the string. (eg for the secret it will be a string that
> >>>> contains the base64 encoded binary of the value)
> >>>>
> >>>> Philip
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> -----Original Message-----
> >>>> From: keyprov-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:keyprov-bounces@ietf.org] On
> >>>> Behalf Of Hannes Tschofenig
> >>>> Sent: Thursday, February 21, 2008 11:32 AM
> >>>> To: hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com
> >>>> Cc: ietf-xml-use@imc.org; keyprov@ietf.org; xml-dir@ietf.org
> >>>> Subject: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question
> >>>>
> >>>> Hi all,
> >>>>
> >>>> after our interim meeting I posted the mail below to the XML
> >>>> directorate
> >>>>
> >>>> mailing list. I got three responses for variant A so far, namely:
> >>>>
> >>>> * Tim Bray:
> >>>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/xml-dir/current/msg00174.html
> >>>>
> >>>> * Phil Shafer:
> >>>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/xml-dir/current/msg00176.html
> >>>>
> >>>> * Andrew Newton (offlist):
> >>>>
> >>>> -----
> >>>>
> >>>> Without much background on the trade-offs and why each is being
> >>>> proposed, it is hard to tell which is better.
> >>>>
> >>>> I do prefer variant A just because it seems simpler.
> >>>>
> >>>> -andy
> >>>>
> >>>> -----
> >>>>
> >>>> Ciao
> >>>> Hannes
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> Hi all,
> >>>>>
> >>>>> last week we had our IETF KEYPROV interim meeting and among many
> >>>>> security related issue we also ran into XML design
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> questions. Hence, I
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> would like to solicit feedback from XML experts. In short,
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> there seem
> >>>> to
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> be (at least two) ways to construct the XML schema to express that a
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> key
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> contains of a secret and has a couple of meta data
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> associated with it.
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> We would like to utilize XML encryption to selectively
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> protect some of
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> the elements.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Here are snippets from the two instance files:
> >>>>>
> >>>>> * VARIANT A
> >>>>> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
> >>>>>
> >>>>> <Key ....>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>     <Secret>
> >>>>>         <EncryptedValue>
> >>>>>             <xenc:EncryptionMethod
> >>>>> Algorithm=3D"http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-aes128"/>
> >>>>>             <xenc:CipherData>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> <xenc:CipherValue>rf4dx3rvEPO0vKtKL14NbeVu8nk=3D</xenc:CipherValue>
> >>>>>             </xenc:CipherData>
> >>>>>         </EncryptedValue>
> >>>>>     </Secret>
> >>>>>     <Counter>
> >>>>>         <PlainValue>1234</PlainValue>
> >>>>>     </Counter>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> </Key>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> * VARIANT B
> >>>>> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
> >>>>>
> >>>>> <Key ...>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>     <Data Name=3D"SECRET">
> >>>>>         <EncryptedValue>
> >>>>>             <xenc:EncryptionMethod
> >>>>> Algorithm=3D"http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-aes128"/>
> >>>>>             <xenc:CipherData>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> <xenc:CipherValue>rf4dx3rvEPO0vKtKL14NbeVu8nk=3D</xenc:CipherValue>
> >>>>>             </xenc:CipherData>
> >>>>>         </EncryptedValue>
> >>>>>     </Data>
> >>>>>     <Data Name=3D"COUNTER">
> >>>>>         <PlainValue>1234</PlainValue>
> >>>>>     </Data>
> >>>>> </Key>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> I have put the schema/instance documents here:
> >>>>> http://www.tschofenig.priv.at/xml/
> >>>>>
> >>>>> The KEYPROV working group would appreciate your input. Please let us
> >>>>> know which variant we should pick.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Ciao
> >>>>> Hannes
> >>>>>
> >>>>> PS: I have simplified the schema to make it more convenient
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> for you to
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> focus on the relevant parts.
> >>>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>>> KEYPROV mailing list
> >>>>> KEYPROV@ietf.org
> >>>>> http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/keyprov
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>> KEYPROV mailing list
> >>>> KEYPROV@ietf.org
> >>>> http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/keyprov
> >>>>
> >>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>> KEYPROV mailing list
> >>>> KEYPROV@ietf.org
> >>>> http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/keyprov
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>
> >>
> >
> >
> >
> >
> =

> _______________________________________________
> KEYPROV mailing list
> KEYPROV@ietf.org
> http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/keyprov

_______________________________________________
KEYPROV mailing list
KEYPROV@ietf.org
http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/keyprov


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Subject: Re: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question
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The extension methodology used in KEYPROV depends on that clients and serve=
rs are in perfect harmony.  Converted to real-world lingo this means that t=
he client and server software in most cases needs to be delivered by the sa=
me entity.  That is, KEYPROV cannot realistically be shipped as an integral=
 part of computing platforms like Windows, Symbian, or Java.  =


This limitation may be completely satisfactory for the current KEYPROV stak=
e-holders, so there is no real problem to solve.  Both proposals would AFAI=
CT work fine given the mentioned constraint.

Anders Rundgren


-----Original Message-----
From: keyprov-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:keyprov-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf =
Of Philip Hoyer
Sent: Friday, February 22, 2008 10:57
To: Philpott, Robert; Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net
Cc: hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com; keyprov@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question

Robert and all,
I think the discussion veered off track a bit.

I am completely in line with what you are saying I think we lost focus on t=
he real point of the discussion.

I try to recap.

PSKC allows to transfer symmetric keys and associated attributes.

Since we will not be able to know all of these attributes and model them ex=
plicitly we need a way to carry any number of attributes.

My approach was to have a set of name-value pair attributes that can be tra=
nsmitted in clear or in encrypted form and then have a section of the spec =
defining already reserved names and semantics for the values.

This is almost exactly what SAML does in an attribute assertion. Matter of =
fact looking at the SAML assertion schema we could almost import it:


	<element name=3D"AttributeStatement" type=3D"saml:AttributeStatementType"/>
	<complexType name=3D"AttributeStatementType">
		<complexContent>
			<extension base=3D"saml:StatementAbstractType">
				<choice maxOccurs=3D"unbounded">
					<element ref=3D"saml:Attribute"/>
					<element ref=3D"saml:EncryptedAttribute"/>
				</choice>
			</extension>
		</complexContent>
	</complexType>
	<element name=3D"Attribute" type=3D"saml:AttributeType"/>
	<complexType name=3D"AttributeType">
		<sequence>
			<element ref=3D"saml:AttributeValue" minOccurs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"unboun=
ded"/>
		</sequence>
		<attribute name=3D"Name" type=3D"string" use=3D"required"/>
		<attribute name=3D"NameFormat" type=3D"anyURI" use=3D"optional"/>
		<attribute name=3D"FriendlyName" type=3D"string" use=3D"optional"/>
		<anyAttribute namespace=3D"##other" processContents=3D"lax"/>
	</complexType>
	<element name=3D"AttributeValue" type=3D"anyType" nillable=3D"true"/>
	<element name=3D"EncryptedAttribute" type=3D"saml:EncryptedElementType"/>

What Hannes is advocating is that instead of having a generic way to transf=
er attributes (as in SAML) we use explicit XML modelling via the < xs:any/x=
s:anyAttribute> extension.

I advocate against this and rather use an approach as the one in SAML.

I hope that this clarifies a bit what exactly we were discussing under the =
generic term of extension.

I look forward to your thoughts on the above,

Philip




-----Original Message-----
From: robert.philpott@rsa.com [mailto:robert.philpott@rsa.com] =

Sent: Friday, February 22, 2008 3:43 PM
To: Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net; Philip Hoyer
Cc: keyprov@ietf.org; hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com
Subject: RE: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question

I've been lurking for some time and have usually fed my comments on DSKPP t=
hrough my co-worker, Andrea Dougherty.  In this instance she suggested that=
 I go ahead and send my comments directly to the list. By way of introducti=
on, like some of you, I've spent a fair amount of time on schema design for=
 security-based protocols, having co-chaired the OASIS SSTC for SAML 1.1 an=
d 2.0 and having collaborated on a number of the WS-* specs both before and=
 after they were submitted to standards bodies.

First, forgive me if you guys have heavily debated this in f2f meetings, bu=
t I haven't seen much discussion of this point on the list. But the approac=
h of establishing extension points via the <xs:any ...> construct has been =
fairly well established as a precedence in other security-related XML-based=
 protocols.  This approach is used in SAML, the WS-* protocols, Liberty All=
iance protocols, etc. These standards also ALL make heavy use of XMLSIG and=
 XMLENC. There are numerous implementations of these specs that have proven=
 to be quite interoperable and that deal with custom extensions quite well.=
  So an argument I think I'm hearing that using one form of schema extensio=
n over another impedes interoperability is, IMO, not really true. Like Hann=
es, I also am not familiar with the argument that the use of such extension=
 points makes it a lot harder on the programmers. Given the fairly wide use=
 of these specs today, I don't see that there's a strong case to be made fo=
r choosing an extension mechanism that deviates from the accepted industry =
norm.

Obviously, building in extensibility is a necessary evil for these types of=
 specs. We all know that. No matter which of the 2 debated approaches is ch=
osen, dealing with them in practice will always be tricky.  But the hard wo=
rk is not in processing the XML structures in one of the 2 forms; it's in t=
he extension profiling that is necessary to ensure the integrity and securi=
ty of the spec is maintained.  As an aside, I'm not all that enamored with =
making it too easy to add custom extensions to security protocols, but that=
's not really germane to the discussion.

By the way, I haven't seen this mentioned on the list, but where appropriat=
e, it is also quite useful to add XML attribute extension points to certain=
 schema elements as well.  The generally accepted form for this is to use t=
he <xs:anyAttribute namespace=3D"##other" processContents=3D"lax"/> constru=
ct. How would one propose doing this with a alternative approach that is co=
nsistent with the alternative element extension?

Next, IMO, extension points in schemas can certainly be overused.  There ar=
e some WS-* examples where just about every complexType definition includes=
 an element extension and almost every element includes an attribute extens=
ion.  I think this was overkill. I think it is far more prudent to identify=
 only the central constructs where extensibility would be desirable and add=
 them there. I consider the SAML specs to be a good example of this approac=
h.  It makes the job of profiling and negotiating acceptable extensions con=
siderably easier.

As you can tell, I advocate the use of the xs:any/xs:anyAttribute extension=
 mechanism.  It's not ideal, but it is widely used today, programmers and m=
ost tools do know how to deal with them, and I guess I just haven't seen su=
fficient strength in the counter-argument to justify that approach.

BTW - I will also point out that it is not true that "nobody uses validatio=
n in protocols".  While it isn't always done, I am aware of several SAML im=
plementations that perform schema validation and also handle custom schema =
extensions without a problem.

Cheers,

Rob Philpott =

RSA, the Security Division of EMC
Senior Technologist  |  e-Mail: robert.philpott@rsa.com  |  Office: +1 781-=
515-7115  |  Mobile: +1 617-510-0893


> -----Original Message-----
> From: keyprov-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:keyprov-bounces@ietf.org] On Behal=
f Of
> Hannes Tschofenig
> Sent: Friday, February 22, 2008 8:40 AM
> To: Philip Hoyer
> Cc: keyprov@ietf.org; Tschofenig,Hannes (NSN - FI/Espoo)
> Subject: Re: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question
> =

> Hi Philip,
> =

> thanks for your response. Please find my comments inline:
> =

> Philip Hoyer wrote:
> > Hannes,
> > Have a look at the following please that indicates my problem with the
> proposed extension point (this is from section 3.1 of the xmlenc spec):
> >
> > EncryptedType is the abstract type from which EncryptedData and Encrypt=
edKey
> are derived. While these two latter element types are very similar with
> respect to their content models, a syntactical distinction is useful to
> processing. Implementation MUST generate laxly schema valid [XML-schema
> <http://www.w3.org/TR/xmlenc-core/> ] EncryptedData or EncryptedKey as
> specified by the subsequent schema declarations. (Note the laxly schema v=
alid
> generation means that the content permitted by xsd:ANY need not be valid.)
> Implementations SHOULD create these XML structures (EncryptedType element=
s and
> their descendents/content) in Normalization Form C [NFC
> <http://www.w3.org/TR/xmlenc-core/> , NFC-Corrigendum
> <http://www.w3.org/TR/xmlenc-core/> ].
> > This is the biggest differences of the approaches.
> >
> >
> This limitation exists with the way how XML works. With Relax NG that
> would be different.
> =

> However, this is only a limition on paper: Nobody uses validation in
> protocols. It would just take too long and you have to parse the message
> anyway.
> =

> =

> > By having
> >
> >>>     <xs:complexType name=3D"KeyType">
> >>>         <xs:sequence>
> >>>             <xs:element name=3D"Data" type=3D"pskc:DataType" minOccur=
s=3D"0"
> maxOccurs=3D"unbounded"/>
> >>>         </xs:sequence>
> >>>     </xs:complexType>
> >>>
> >
> > You can make sure that any data element will comply and can be validated
> against the current schema.
> >
> > With <xs:any namespace=3D"##other" processContents=3D"lax"/>
> > You loose this.
> >
> >
> See above.
> Not an issue in the real world.
> =

> > I think we are getting confused here between extension of the schema, b=
eing
> able to transmit data values currently not envisaged, technical extension=
s and
> your concept of extending within the realms of IETF/IANA and specs.
> >
> > When you say that I do not define how to extend it you refer to a mecha=
nism
> by which new Key Data elements will be communicated and registered.
> >
> Yep; see
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-keyprov-portable-symmetric=
-key-
> container-02.txt
> =

> The document does not even have an IANA consideration section.
> =

> =

> > This problem though is independent of the two approaches.
> >
> Unfortunately, it isn't. The details of the extensibility story is
> different for both mechanisms.
> =

> > If I am reading you right you want us to create an informational RFC th=
at
> holds the Data Attribute semantic definition? So basically create a separ=
ate
> document for section 7 of the current spec?
> >
> No.
> =

> When you in the future want to define new elements that belong inside
> the Data attribute then you need to describe them somewhere.
> How did you envision that is going to happen?
> =

> > I was more thinking that by putting it in a separate section we could e=
xtend
> it in future versions of the spec and Yes I agree that there is a risk of
> others introducing new names and definitions that will create interoperab=
ility
> problems.
> The later issue goes away if you do the following:
> =

> * Registration is only possible via a single authority (e.g., IANA)
> They would resolve conflicts.
> * Put a namespace in front of the attribute
> Then, you accomplish uniqueness by ensuring that the name / semantic
> relationship works within a specific body.
> =

> > But this is only one of the aspects that will create interoperability
> problems and we will not get it 'right' the first time around.
> >
> Why do you think we will not get it right? This is a basic protocol
> extensibility question. This has been done many, many times in the IETF
> before.
> =

> =

> > The use of the xmlenc concepts in the spec will create more interoperab=
ility
> problems than this approach,
> =

> That may be true. That's, however, a totally different aspect that has
> nothing todo with this question.
> =

> > unless we tie down the exact allowed ways to use those elements (curren=
tly
> missing from the spec but trying to sort this out by introducing a more
> detailed section 6 on which I would gratefully receive some comments).
> >
> I am, unfortunately, not the xmlenc expert. I can, however, find one so
> that we can ensure that everything is OK. Do you want me todo that?
> =

> =

> > Philip
> >
> >
> >
> Ciao
> Hannes
> =

> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Hannes Tschofenig [mailto:Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net]
> > Sent: Friday, February 22, 2008 11:45 AM
> > To: Philip Hoyer
> > Cc: Tschofenig, Hannes (NSN - FI/Espoo); keyprov@ietf.org
> > Subject: Re: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question
> >
> > Hi Philip,
> >
> >
> > Philip Hoyer wrote:
> >
> >> Hannes,
> >> The schema that is on your server did not contain the extension point.
> >>
> >>
> > I thought that this was a mistake.
> > Without extension points we would turn the "EXTENSIBLE Markup Language"
> > into the "Non-Extensible Markup Language".
> >
> >
> >> I am not a big fan of such extension points because of the more intric=
ate
> parsing requirements they put on programmers.
> >>
> >>
> > I have never heard about that given how widely XML is being used.
> >
> >
> >> How should a parser distinguish between the existing defined elements
> within the Key entity and the extended ones?
> >>
> >>
> >>
> > There are various ways to ensure extensibility in a protocol. Note that
> > they have nothing todo with the XML schema itself but are rather
> > fundamental principles of protocol design.
> >
> > For extensibility, you need to consider where extensions are possible
> > and how you want the other party to react on them (ignore if not
> > understood, abort if not understood, negotiate or discover new
> > extensions, etc.).
> >
> > Different protocols have different strategy depending on the desire of
> > the protocol designers.
> >
> >
> >> Maybe we could come to a compromise whereby we have defined elements w=
ithin
> key (such as the usage etc) and then have a sub element called KeyData wh=
ich
> can only ever contain elements of the various DataTypes:
> >>
> >> 	<xs:complexType name=3D"KeyType">
> >> 		<xs:sequence>
> >> 			<xs:element name=3D"Issuer" type=3D"xs:string" minOccurs=3D"0"/>
> >> 			<xs:element name=3D"Usage" type=3D"pskc:UsageType"/>
> >> 			<xs:element name=3D"CardAppPersoProfileId" type=3D"xs:string"
> minOccurs=3D"0"/>
> >> 			<xs:element name=3D"FriendlyName" type=3D"xs:string"
> minOccurs=3D"0"/>
> >> 			<xs:element name=3D"Data" type=3D"pskc:KeyDataType"
> minOccurs=3D"0"/>
> >> 			<xs:element name=3D"PINPolicy" type=3D"pskc:PINPolicyType"
> minOccurs=3D"0"/>
> >> 			<xs:element name=3D"ExpiryDate" type=3D"xs:dateTime"
> minOccurs=3D"0"/>
> >> 			<xs:element name=3D"StartDate" type=3D"xs:dateTime"
> minOccurs=3D"0"/>
> >> 		</xs:sequence>
> >> 		<xs:attribute name=3D"KeyId" type=3D"xs:string" use=3D"required"/>
> >> 		<xs:attribute name=3D"KeyAlgorithm" type=3D"pskc:KeyAlgorithmType"
> use=3D"required"/>
> >> 	</xs:complexType>
> >> 	<xs:complexType name=3D"KeyDataType">
> >> 		<xs:sequence>
> >>              <xs:element name=3D"Secret" type=3D"pskc:base64BinaryType"
> minOccurs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
> >>              <!-- <xs:element name=3D"Time" type=3D"xs:dateTime" minOc=
curs=3D"0"
> maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
> >>              <xs:element name=3D"TimeInterval" type=3D"xs:double" minO=
ccurs=3D"0"
> maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
> >>              <xs:element name=3D"TimeDrift" type=3D"pskc:integerType"
> minOccurs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
> >>              -->
> >>              <xs:element name=3D"Counter" type=3D"pskc:integerType"
> minOccurs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
> >> 		</xs:sequence>
> >> 	</xs:complexType>
> >>
> >>     <xs:complexType name=3D"base64BinaryType">
> >>         <xs:sequence>
> >>             <xs:choice>
> >>                 <xs:element name=3D"PlainValue" type=3D"xs:base64Binar=
y"/>
> >>                 <xs:element name=3D"EncryptedValue"
> type=3D"xenc:EncryptedDataType"/>
> >>             </xs:choice>
> >> 			<xs:element name=3D"ValueMAC" type=3D"xs:base64Binary"
> minOccurs=3D"0"/>
> >>         </xs:sequence>
> >>     </xs:complexType>
> >>     <xs:complexType name=3D"integerType">
> >>         <xs:sequence>
> >>             <xs:choice>
> >>                 <xs:element name=3D"PlainValue" type=3D"xs:integer"/>
> >>                 <xs:element name=3D"EncryptedValue"
> type=3D"xenc:EncryptedDataType"/>
> >>             </xs:choice>
> >> 			<xs:element name=3D"ValueMAC" type=3D"xs:base64Binary"
> minOccurs=3D"0"/>
> >>         </xs:sequence>
> >>     </xs:complexType>
> >>
> >>
> >>  This way the parsers will know that ONLY inside the KeyData element t=
here
> can be extensions and we can specify in the spec that any extension MUST =
have
> the subelements of PlainValue, EncryptedValue and ValueMAC.
> >>
> >> As you can see though this is starting to make the schema more complex=
 but
> I am ok with accepting a compromise.
> >>
> >> What do you think?
> >>
> >>
> >>
> > I am fine with everything -- I just want to make sure that we understand
> > the tradeoffs and implications.
> > Your initial schema is also fine  -- it did not, however, provide an
> > answer on how to extend it. Without such a story we will (a) most likely
> > not get the document through the IESG and (b) we will encounter interop
> > problems later.
> >
> > Btw, the above schema does not contain an extension point -- is this
> > intentional?
> >
> > Ciao
> > Hannes
> >
> >
> >
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: Hannes Tschofenig [mailto:Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net]
> >> Sent: Thursday, February 21, 2008 6:38 PM
> >> To: Philip Hoyer
> >> Cc: Tschofenig, Hannes (NSN - FI/Espoo); keyprov@ietf.org
> >> Subject: Re: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question
> >>
> >> Hi Philip
> >>
> >> there is no difference regarding extensibility with the two proposals.
> >>
> >> Let me describe how the extensibility works for both approaches.
> >>
> >> VARIANT 1
> >>
> >> Assumption:
> >> The XML schema in PSKC contains an extension point
> >> For example, it contains something like:
> >> <xs:any namespace=3D"##other" processContents=3D"lax"/>
> >>
> >> How to extend it:
> >>
> >> One extends it by defining a new schema (with the new element or
> >> whatever you want todo).
> >> You would also describe what the new elements actually mean.
> >>
> >> In essence, you would extend it an the same way as you extend the rest
> >> of the PSKC schema. This is the way how one extends XML.
> >> There is no need to change the existing schema.
> >>
> >>
> >> VARIANT 2
> >>
> >> Assumption
> >> The IANA consideration sections explains how these tokens and their
> >> semantic is registered.
> >> I assume something like informational RFC with expert review for adding
> >> new tokens
> >>
> >>
> >> How to extend it:
> >>
> >> You write a document that defines the new token + the semantic. This is
> >> the same approach as extensions work for protocols like RADIUS or Diam=
eter
> >>
> >>
> >> What you want to ensure is that
> >> * extensions are well described
> >> * there is a way to deal with conflicts (e.g., I define the same
> >> extension as you but with a different semantic).
> >>
> >> Does this make sense to you?
> >>
> >> Ciao
> >> Hannes
> >>
> >>
> >> Philip Hoyer wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >>> Hannes,
> >>> I think your proposal has a major drawback.
> >>> For any extension you will have to update the schema, whereas being a=
ble
> to put as many Data elements as we can will leave the PSKC schema intact =
even
> if people add key attribute value that we have not foreseen.
> >>>
> >>> I enclose the schemas of your proposal for better understanding my po=
int:
> >>>
> >>>     <xs:element name=3D"Key">
> >>>         <xs:complexType>
> >>>         <xs:sequence>
> >>>             <xs:element name=3D"Secret" type=3D"pskc:base64BinaryType"
> minOccurs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
> >>>             <!-- <xs:element name=3D"Time" type=3D"xs:dateTime" minOc=
curs=3D"0"
> maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
> >>>             <xs:element name=3D"TimeInterval" type=3D"xs:double" minO=
ccurs=3D"0"
> maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
> >>>             <xs:element name=3D"TimeDrift" type=3D"pskc:integerType"
> minOccurs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
> >>>             -->
> >>>             <xs:element name=3D"Counter" type=3D"pskc:integerType"
> minOccurs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
> >>>         </xs:sequence>
> >>>         </xs:complexType>
> >>>     </xs:element>
> >>>
> >>> So to add a new attribute you would have to change the schema above to
> add:
> >>>
> >>> <xs:element name=3D"TimeDrift" type=3D"pskc:integerType" minOccurs=3D=
"0"
> maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
> >>>
> >>> Whereas with method B the schema is:
> >>>
> >>>     <xs:complexType name=3D"KeyType">
> >>>         <xs:sequence>
> >>>             <xs:element name=3D"Data" type=3D"pskc:DataType" minOccur=
s=3D"0"
> maxOccurs=3D"unbounded"/>
> >>>         </xs:sequence>
> >>>     </xs:complexType>
> >>>
> >>> Hence you can add as many 'Data' elements without changing the schema.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Philip
> >>>
> >>> -----Original Message-----
> >>> From: Tschofenig, Hannes (NSN - FI/Espoo)
> [mailto:hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com]
> >>> Sent: Thursday, February 21, 2008 12:10 PM
> >>> To: Philip Hoyer; Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net
> >>> Cc: keyprov@ietf.org
> >>> Subject: AW: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question
> >>>
> >>> Hi Philip,
> >>>
> >>> The schema files are here:
> >>> http://www.tschofenig.priv.at/xml/
> >>>
> >>> PlainValue: What element name would you prefer?
> >>>
> >>> You need to check whether the data type for the element reflects what=
 you
> had in mind for that element.
> >>> If the <Secret> element has to use the data type "string" then that's
> fine.
> >>>
> >>> Ciao
> >>> Hannes
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> -----Urspr=FCngliche Nachricht-----
> >>>> Von: keyprov-bounces@ietf.org
> >>>> [mailto:keyprov-bounces@ietf.org] Im Auftrag von ext Philip Hoyer
> >>>> Gesendet: Donnerstag, 21. Februar 2008 13:41
> >>>> An: Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net; Tschofenig, Hannes (NSN - FI/Espoo)
> >>>> Cc: ietf-xml-use@imc.org; keyprov@ietf.org; xml-dir@ietf.org
> >>>> Betreff: Re: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question
> >>>>
> >>>> Hannes,
> >>>> We can go with Variant A but still will need an element
> >>>> catalogue in the
> >>>> spec since we do not want people to introduce elements that have the
> >>>> same meaning eg <Counter> and <EventCounter>
> >>>>
> >>>> Could you send the xsd snippet for the type definition to me for
> >>>> inclusion.
> >>>> Also the plainvalue in the example is misleading since I
> >>>> believe in the
> >>>> xsd it is base64 or did you envisage it to be String?
> >>>> I am happy to use string and in the element catalogue
> >>>> describe how it is
> >>>> serialised in the string. (eg for the secret it will be a string that
> >>>> contains the base64 encoded binary of the value)
> >>>>
> >>>> Philip
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> -----Original Message-----
> >>>> From: keyprov-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:keyprov-bounces@ietf.org] On
> >>>> Behalf Of Hannes Tschofenig
> >>>> Sent: Thursday, February 21, 2008 11:32 AM
> >>>> To: hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com
> >>>> Cc: ietf-xml-use@imc.org; keyprov@ietf.org; xml-dir@ietf.org
> >>>> Subject: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question
> >>>>
> >>>> Hi all,
> >>>>
> >>>> after our interim meeting I posted the mail below to the XML
> >>>> directorate
> >>>>
> >>>> mailing list. I got three responses for variant A so far, namely:
> >>>>
> >>>> * Tim Bray:
> >>>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/xml-dir/current/msg00174.html
> >>>>
> >>>> * Phil Shafer:
> >>>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/xml-dir/current/msg00176.html
> >>>>
> >>>> * Andrew Newton (offlist):
> >>>>
> >>>> -----
> >>>>
> >>>> Without much background on the trade-offs and why each is being
> >>>> proposed, it is hard to tell which is better.
> >>>>
> >>>> I do prefer variant A just because it seems simpler.
> >>>>
> >>>> -andy
> >>>>
> >>>> -----
> >>>>
> >>>> Ciao
> >>>> Hannes
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> Hi all,
> >>>>>
> >>>>> last week we had our IETF KEYPROV interim meeting and among many
> >>>>> security related issue we also ran into XML design
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> questions. Hence, I
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> would like to solicit feedback from XML experts. In short,
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> there seem
> >>>> to
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> be (at least two) ways to construct the XML schema to express that a
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> key
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> contains of a secret and has a couple of meta data
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> associated with it.
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> We would like to utilize XML encryption to selectively
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> protect some of
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> the elements.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Here are snippets from the two instance files:
> >>>>>
> >>>>> * VARIANT A
> >>>>> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
> >>>>>
> >>>>> <Key ....>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>     <Secret>
> >>>>>         <EncryptedValue>
> >>>>>             <xenc:EncryptionMethod
> >>>>> Algorithm=3D"http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-aes128"/>
> >>>>>             <xenc:CipherData>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> <xenc:CipherValue>rf4dx3rvEPO0vKtKL14NbeVu8nk=3D</xenc:CipherValue>
> >>>>>             </xenc:CipherData>
> >>>>>         </EncryptedValue>
> >>>>>     </Secret>
> >>>>>     <Counter>
> >>>>>         <PlainValue>1234</PlainValue>
> >>>>>     </Counter>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> </Key>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> * VARIANT B
> >>>>> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
> >>>>>
> >>>>> <Key ...>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>     <Data Name=3D"SECRET">
> >>>>>         <EncryptedValue>
> >>>>>             <xenc:EncryptionMethod
> >>>>> Algorithm=3D"http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-aes128"/>
> >>>>>             <xenc:CipherData>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> <xenc:CipherValue>rf4dx3rvEPO0vKtKL14NbeVu8nk=3D</xenc:CipherValue>
> >>>>>             </xenc:CipherData>
> >>>>>         </EncryptedValue>
> >>>>>     </Data>
> >>>>>     <Data Name=3D"COUNTER">
> >>>>>         <PlainValue>1234</PlainValue>
> >>>>>     </Data>
> >>>>> </Key>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> I have put the schema/instance documents here:
> >>>>> http://www.tschofenig.priv.at/xml/
> >>>>>
> >>>>> The KEYPROV working group would appreciate your input. Please let us
> >>>>> know which variant we should pick.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Ciao
> >>>>> Hannes
> >>>>>
> >>>>> PS: I have simplified the schema to make it more convenient
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> for you to
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> focus on the relevant parts.
> >>>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>>> KEYPROV mailing list
> >>>>> KEYPROV@ietf.org
> >>>>> http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/keyprov
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>> KEYPROV mailing list
> >>>> KEYPROV@ietf.org
> >>>> http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/keyprov
> >>>>
> >>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>> KEYPROV mailing list
> >>>> KEYPROV@ietf.org
> >>>> http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/keyprov
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>
> >>
> >
> >
> >
> >
> =

> _______________________________________________
> KEYPROV mailing list
> KEYPROV@ietf.org
> http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/keyprov


_______________________________________________
KEYPROV mailing list
KEYPROV@ietf.org
http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/keyprov

_______________________________________________
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KEYPROV@ietf.org
http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/keyprov


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Pasi,
Thanks for your comments.  Please see responses below.
Andrea

________________________________

From: Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com [mailto:Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com]
Sent: Thu 12/13/2007 8:01 AM
To: keyprov@ietf.org
Subject: [KEYPROV] Comments about dkspp-01



Some random comments about the dskpp-01 draft (not a review in 
any sense): 

1) Is there a difference between URL_S and ID_S? And between 
ID_C (mentioned only once in whole document) and ClientID? 

adoherty>>This was fixed in the latest draft.


2) There doesn't seem to be MACs covering all messages/payloads? 
Although the most critical elements seem to be included in some MACs, 
this certainly limits the future extensibility quite a bit. 
(Typically, in key exchange protocols the first messages don't have 
MACs, but once a key has been agreed on, it's used to MAC all the 
preceeding messages -- e.g. Finished messages in TLS and AUTH 
payloads in IKEv2.) 

adoherty>>I ping'd Magnus on this one and here was his reply:

*	
	mnystrom>>The MAC was only intended for key confirmation and fullfills this need. I
	agree however that it probably would be (would have been) better if the
	final MAC included all components sent and received by the server. This
	way one would get integrity protection of other protocol elements even
	outside of a tunnel, like in EAP-POTP. There's no MAC in the client's
	second message (in 4-pass) either but there could be altough I don't see a
	similar strong need for it.

3) Section 5.3.3: "The Authentication Data, AUTHDATA, may be derived 
from the AUTHCODE..." Is the intent to say "is derived", or are other 
ways of deriving AUTHDATA from AUTHCODE allowed?  Similarly, earlier 
in same section, is "The Issuer may generate the Authentication Code 
as follows"; does this mean "is generated", or are other formats 
of authentication code allowed? 

(If these are example, it's hard to see how interoperability is 
achieved. If these are not examples, I have some more comments...) 

adoherty>>"is derived" is more correct; text was fixed in the -02 version of the draft.   Originally, the AUTHCODE generation description was an example.  We found problems with this as you did.  In the soon to be submitted -03 version, the AuthCode format has been relaxed.  The only MUST is that the Authenticaiton Code contains a client identifier and a password.  A checksum element is optional.  

4) Section 4.4, in KeyProvClientHello, is R_S optional? (If not, 
how it is known when Trigger is not used?) 

adoherty>>This was an error in the -01 version of the draft.  Please refer to the -02 (or -03) version.


5) At least the following references look normative to me: FIPS180-SHA, 
PKCS-1, PKCS-5, RFC2104, RFC2119. 

adoherty>>Here is our take:

FIPS180-SHA: No, it is just in an informative appendix
PKCS-1: Agree
PKCS-5: This is most likely normative even though it is only used in an
optional alternative.
RFC2104: Informative as FIPS180-SHA
RFC2119: Normative, yes.

6) Reference FSE2003 should probably be replaced by NIST SP 800-38B 
(although FSE2003 OMAC1 is "equivalent" to 800-38B CMAC from 
cryptography point-of-view, it looks like FSE2003 actually doesn't 
specify all the constants required to get interoperable 
implementations). 

adoherty>>Agree.  Will make the change in the -03 draft.


7) Appendix B.2, is this AES with 128-bit keys, or is the key length 
determined somehow from other context? 

adoherty>>Right, willidentify this in the urn, e.g....#dskpp-prf-aes-128


8) The message flows in Section 4 would be more readable if it was 
explicitly stated what information/state the parties are expected 
to have before the first message is sent. (This might include 
stuff needed by TLS as well.) 

adoherty>>The message flows were updated to be more readable.

Best regards, 
Pasi 

_______________________________________________ 
KEYPROV mailing list 
KEYPROV@ietf.org 
https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/keyprov 

_______________________________________________
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Thread-Topic: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question
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References: <B1E0D83E059A1D4FB52A93E488D7AD8F46ED8D@vaebe101.NOE.Nokia.com><47BD612D.2040503@gmx.net><5BFE9E473DBFC24CA87F18F29B3F0AC4FA2753@sur-corp-ex-02.corp.ad.activcard.com><5FB585F183235B42A9E70095055136FB798B6C@DEMUEXC012.nsn-intra.net><5BFE9E473DBFC24CA87F18F29B3F0AC4FA2757@sur-corp-ex-02.corp.ad.activcard.com><47BDC50E.4080602@gmx.net><5BFE9E473DBFC24CA87F18F29B3F0AC40203ECED@sur-corp-ex-02.corp.ad.activcard.com><47BEB5CB.2020600@gmx.net><5BFE9E473DBFC24CA87F18F29B3F0AC40203ECF4@sur-corp-ex-02.corp.ad.activcard.com><47BED0A2.7070301@gmx.net><90D74C992F518348B048CBDF97793520C37D2D@CORPUSMX40B.corp.emc.com><5BFE9E473DBFC24CA87F18F29B3F0AC40203ECFA@sur-corp-ex-02.corp.ad.activcard.com>
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From: "Philip Hoyer" <philip.hoyer@actividentity.com>
To: "Rundgren, Anders" <anders.rundgren@rsa.com>,
	<keyprov@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question
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Anders,
Do you think we need to make a distinction here between DSKPP and the PSKC =
payload?

I mean agreeing on what the two parties can understand should be part of th=
e protocol (hence DSKPP) once they have agreed the ability to exchange the =
payload with an arbitrary set of attributes (PSKC) is surely a good feature.

Do you have a suggestion for the transmission of key-related attributes tha=
t we should take into consideration?

Philip


-----Original Message-----
From: keyprov-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:keyprov-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf =
Of Rundgren, Anders
Sent: Friday, February 22, 2008 7:06 PM
To: keyprov@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question

The extension methodology used in KEYPROV depends on that clients and serve=
rs are in perfect harmony.  Converted to real-world lingo this means that t=
he client and server software in most cases needs to be delivered by the sa=
me entity.  That is, KEYPROV cannot realistically be shipped as an integral=
 part of computing platforms like Windows, Symbian, or Java.  =


This limitation may be completely satisfactory for the current KEYPROV stak=
e-holders, so there is no real problem to solve.  Both proposals would AFAI=
CT work fine given the mentioned constraint.

Anders Rundgren


-----Original Message-----
From: keyprov-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:keyprov-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf =
Of Philip Hoyer
Sent: Friday, February 22, 2008 10:57
To: Philpott, Robert; Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net
Cc: hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com; keyprov@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question

Robert and all,
I think the discussion veered off track a bit.

I am completely in line with what you are saying I think we lost focus on t=
he real point of the discussion.

I try to recap.

PSKC allows to transfer symmetric keys and associated attributes.

Since we will not be able to know all of these attributes and model them ex=
plicitly we need a way to carry any number of attributes.

My approach was to have a set of name-value pair attributes that can be tra=
nsmitted in clear or in encrypted form and then have a section of the spec =
defining already reserved names and semantics for the values.

This is almost exactly what SAML does in an attribute assertion. Matter of =
fact looking at the SAML assertion schema we could almost import it:


	<element name=3D"AttributeStatement" type=3D"saml:AttributeStatementType"/>
	<complexType name=3D"AttributeStatementType">
		<complexContent>
			<extension base=3D"saml:StatementAbstractType">
				<choice maxOccurs=3D"unbounded">
					<element ref=3D"saml:Attribute"/>
					<element ref=3D"saml:EncryptedAttribute"/>
				</choice>
			</extension>
		</complexContent>
	</complexType>
	<element name=3D"Attribute" type=3D"saml:AttributeType"/>
	<complexType name=3D"AttributeType">
		<sequence>
			<element ref=3D"saml:AttributeValue" minOccurs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"unboun=
ded"/>
		</sequence>
		<attribute name=3D"Name" type=3D"string" use=3D"required"/>
		<attribute name=3D"NameFormat" type=3D"anyURI" use=3D"optional"/>
		<attribute name=3D"FriendlyName" type=3D"string" use=3D"optional"/>
		<anyAttribute namespace=3D"##other" processContents=3D"lax"/>
	</complexType>
	<element name=3D"AttributeValue" type=3D"anyType" nillable=3D"true"/>
	<element name=3D"EncryptedAttribute" type=3D"saml:EncryptedElementType"/>

What Hannes is advocating is that instead of having a generic way to transf=
er attributes (as in SAML) we use explicit XML modelling via the < xs:any/x=
s:anyAttribute> extension.

I advocate against this and rather use an approach as the one in SAML.

I hope that this clarifies a bit what exactly we were discussing under the =
generic term of extension.

I look forward to your thoughts on the above,

Philip




-----Original Message-----
From: robert.philpott@rsa.com [mailto:robert.philpott@rsa.com] =

Sent: Friday, February 22, 2008 3:43 PM
To: Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net; Philip Hoyer
Cc: keyprov@ietf.org; hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com
Subject: RE: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question

I've been lurking for some time and have usually fed my comments on DSKPP t=
hrough my co-worker, Andrea Dougherty.  In this instance she suggested that=
 I go ahead and send my comments directly to the list. By way of introducti=
on, like some of you, I've spent a fair amount of time on schema design for=
 security-based protocols, having co-chaired the OASIS SSTC for SAML 1.1 an=
d 2.0 and having collaborated on a number of the WS-* specs both before and=
 after they were submitted to standards bodies.

First, forgive me if you guys have heavily debated this in f2f meetings, bu=
t I haven't seen much discussion of this point on the list. But the approac=
h of establishing extension points via the <xs:any ...> construct has been =
fairly well established as a precedence in other security-related XML-based=
 protocols.  This approach is used in SAML, the WS-* protocols, Liberty All=
iance protocols, etc. These standards also ALL make heavy use of XMLSIG and=
 XMLENC. There are numerous implementations of these specs that have proven=
 to be quite interoperable and that deal with custom extensions quite well.=
  So an argument I think I'm hearing that using one form of schema extensio=
n over another impedes interoperability is, IMO, not really true. Like Hann=
es, I also am not familiar with the argument that the use of such extension=
 points makes it a lot harder on the programmers. Given the fairly wide use=
 of these specs today, I don't see that there's a strong case to be made fo=
r choosing an extension mechanism that deviates from the accepted industry =
norm.

Obviously, building in extensibility is a necessary evil for these types of=
 specs. We all know that. No matter which of the 2 debated approaches is ch=
osen, dealing with them in practice will always be tricky.  But the hard wo=
rk is not in processing the XML structures in one of the 2 forms; it's in t=
he extension profiling that is necessary to ensure the integrity and securi=
ty of the spec is maintained.  As an aside, I'm not all that enamored with =
making it too easy to add custom extensions to security protocols, but that=
's not really germane to the discussion.

By the way, I haven't seen this mentioned on the list, but where appropriat=
e, it is also quite useful to add XML attribute extension points to certain=
 schema elements as well.  The generally accepted form for this is to use t=
he <xs:anyAttribute namespace=3D"##other" processContents=3D"lax"/> constru=
ct. How would one propose doing this with a alternative approach that is co=
nsistent with the alternative element extension?

Next, IMO, extension points in schemas can certainly be overused.  There ar=
e some WS-* examples where just about every complexType definition includes=
 an element extension and almost every element includes an attribute extens=
ion.  I think this was overkill. I think it is far more prudent to identify=
 only the central constructs where extensibility would be desirable and add=
 them there. I consider the SAML specs to be a good example of this approac=
h.  It makes the job of profiling and negotiating acceptable extensions con=
siderably easier.

As you can tell, I advocate the use of the xs:any/xs:anyAttribute extension=
 mechanism.  It's not ideal, but it is widely used today, programmers and m=
ost tools do know how to deal with them, and I guess I just haven't seen su=
fficient strength in the counter-argument to justify that approach.

BTW - I will also point out that it is not true that "nobody uses validatio=
n in protocols".  While it isn't always done, I am aware of several SAML im=
plementations that perform schema validation and also handle custom schema =
extensions without a problem.

Cheers,

Rob Philpott =

RSA, the Security Division of EMC
Senior Technologist  |  e-Mail: robert.philpott@rsa.com  |  Office: +1 781-=
515-7115  |  Mobile: +1 617-510-0893


> -----Original Message-----
> From: keyprov-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:keyprov-bounces@ietf.org] On Behal=
f Of
> Hannes Tschofenig
> Sent: Friday, February 22, 2008 8:40 AM
> To: Philip Hoyer
> Cc: keyprov@ietf.org; Tschofenig,Hannes (NSN - FI/Espoo)
> Subject: Re: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question
> =

> Hi Philip,
> =

> thanks for your response. Please find my comments inline:
> =

> Philip Hoyer wrote:
> > Hannes,
> > Have a look at the following please that indicates my problem with the
> proposed extension point (this is from section 3.1 of the xmlenc spec):
> >
> > EncryptedType is the abstract type from which EncryptedData and Encrypt=
edKey
> are derived. While these two latter element types are very similar with
> respect to their content models, a syntactical distinction is useful to
> processing. Implementation MUST generate laxly schema valid [XML-schema
> <http://www.w3.org/TR/xmlenc-core/> ] EncryptedData or EncryptedKey as
> specified by the subsequent schema declarations. (Note the laxly schema v=
alid
> generation means that the content permitted by xsd:ANY need not be valid.)
> Implementations SHOULD create these XML structures (EncryptedType element=
s and
> their descendents/content) in Normalization Form C [NFC
> <http://www.w3.org/TR/xmlenc-core/> , NFC-Corrigendum
> <http://www.w3.org/TR/xmlenc-core/> ].
> > This is the biggest differences of the approaches.
> >
> >
> This limitation exists with the way how XML works. With Relax NG that
> would be different.
> =

> However, this is only a limition on paper: Nobody uses validation in
> protocols. It would just take too long and you have to parse the message
> anyway.
> =

> =

> > By having
> >
> >>>     <xs:complexType name=3D"KeyType">
> >>>         <xs:sequence>
> >>>             <xs:element name=3D"Data" type=3D"pskc:DataType" minOccur=
s=3D"0"
> maxOccurs=3D"unbounded"/>
> >>>         </xs:sequence>
> >>>     </xs:complexType>
> >>>
> >
> > You can make sure that any data element will comply and can be validated
> against the current schema.
> >
> > With <xs:any namespace=3D"##other" processContents=3D"lax"/>
> > You loose this.
> >
> >
> See above.
> Not an issue in the real world.
> =

> > I think we are getting confused here between extension of the schema, b=
eing
> able to transmit data values currently not envisaged, technical extension=
s and
> your concept of extending within the realms of IETF/IANA and specs.
> >
> > When you say that I do not define how to extend it you refer to a mecha=
nism
> by which new Key Data elements will be communicated and registered.
> >
> Yep; see
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-keyprov-portable-symmetric=
-key-
> container-02.txt
> =

> The document does not even have an IANA consideration section.
> =

> =

> > This problem though is independent of the two approaches.
> >
> Unfortunately, it isn't. The details of the extensibility story is
> different for both mechanisms.
> =

> > If I am reading you right you want us to create an informational RFC th=
at
> holds the Data Attribute semantic definition? So basically create a separ=
ate
> document for section 7 of the current spec?
> >
> No.
> =

> When you in the future want to define new elements that belong inside
> the Data attribute then you need to describe them somewhere.
> How did you envision that is going to happen?
> =

> > I was more thinking that by putting it in a separate section we could e=
xtend
> it in future versions of the spec and Yes I agree that there is a risk of
> others introducing new names and definitions that will create interoperab=
ility
> problems.
> The later issue goes away if you do the following:
> =

> * Registration is only possible via a single authority (e.g., IANA)
> They would resolve conflicts.
> * Put a namespace in front of the attribute
> Then, you accomplish uniqueness by ensuring that the name / semantic
> relationship works within a specific body.
> =

> > But this is only one of the aspects that will create interoperability
> problems and we will not get it 'right' the first time around.
> >
> Why do you think we will not get it right? This is a basic protocol
> extensibility question. This has been done many, many times in the IETF
> before.
> =

> =

> > The use of the xmlenc concepts in the spec will create more interoperab=
ility
> problems than this approach,
> =

> That may be true. That's, however, a totally different aspect that has
> nothing todo with this question.
> =

> > unless we tie down the exact allowed ways to use those elements (curren=
tly
> missing from the spec but trying to sort this out by introducing a more
> detailed section 6 on which I would gratefully receive some comments).
> >
> I am, unfortunately, not the xmlenc expert. I can, however, find one so
> that we can ensure that everything is OK. Do you want me todo that?
> =

> =

> > Philip
> >
> >
> >
> Ciao
> Hannes
> =

> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Hannes Tschofenig [mailto:Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net]
> > Sent: Friday, February 22, 2008 11:45 AM
> > To: Philip Hoyer
> > Cc: Tschofenig, Hannes (NSN - FI/Espoo); keyprov@ietf.org
> > Subject: Re: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question
> >
> > Hi Philip,
> >
> >
> > Philip Hoyer wrote:
> >
> >> Hannes,
> >> The schema that is on your server did not contain the extension point.
> >>
> >>
> > I thought that this was a mistake.
> > Without extension points we would turn the "EXTENSIBLE Markup Language"
> > into the "Non-Extensible Markup Language".
> >
> >
> >> I am not a big fan of such extension points because of the more intric=
ate
> parsing requirements they put on programmers.
> >>
> >>
> > I have never heard about that given how widely XML is being used.
> >
> >
> >> How should a parser distinguish between the existing defined elements
> within the Key entity and the extended ones?
> >>
> >>
> >>
> > There are various ways to ensure extensibility in a protocol. Note that
> > they have nothing todo with the XML schema itself but are rather
> > fundamental principles of protocol design.
> >
> > For extensibility, you need to consider where extensions are possible
> > and how you want the other party to react on them (ignore if not
> > understood, abort if not understood, negotiate or discover new
> > extensions, etc.).
> >
> > Different protocols have different strategy depending on the desire of
> > the protocol designers.
> >
> >
> >> Maybe we could come to a compromise whereby we have defined elements w=
ithin
> key (such as the usage etc) and then have a sub element called KeyData wh=
ich
> can only ever contain elements of the various DataTypes:
> >>
> >> 	<xs:complexType name=3D"KeyType">
> >> 		<xs:sequence>
> >> 			<xs:element name=3D"Issuer" type=3D"xs:string" minOccurs=3D"0"/>
> >> 			<xs:element name=3D"Usage" type=3D"pskc:UsageType"/>
> >> 			<xs:element name=3D"CardAppPersoProfileId" type=3D"xs:string"
> minOccurs=3D"0"/>
> >> 			<xs:element name=3D"FriendlyName" type=3D"xs:string"
> minOccurs=3D"0"/>
> >> 			<xs:element name=3D"Data" type=3D"pskc:KeyDataType"
> minOccurs=3D"0"/>
> >> 			<xs:element name=3D"PINPolicy" type=3D"pskc:PINPolicyType"
> minOccurs=3D"0"/>
> >> 			<xs:element name=3D"ExpiryDate" type=3D"xs:dateTime"
> minOccurs=3D"0"/>
> >> 			<xs:element name=3D"StartDate" type=3D"xs:dateTime"
> minOccurs=3D"0"/>
> >> 		</xs:sequence>
> >> 		<xs:attribute name=3D"KeyId" type=3D"xs:string" use=3D"required"/>
> >> 		<xs:attribute name=3D"KeyAlgorithm" type=3D"pskc:KeyAlgorithmType"
> use=3D"required"/>
> >> 	</xs:complexType>
> >> 	<xs:complexType name=3D"KeyDataType">
> >> 		<xs:sequence>
> >>              <xs:element name=3D"Secret" type=3D"pskc:base64BinaryType"
> minOccurs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
> >>              <!-- <xs:element name=3D"Time" type=3D"xs:dateTime" minOc=
curs=3D"0"
> maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
> >>              <xs:element name=3D"TimeInterval" type=3D"xs:double" minO=
ccurs=3D"0"
> maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
> >>              <xs:element name=3D"TimeDrift" type=3D"pskc:integerType"
> minOccurs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
> >>              -->
> >>              <xs:element name=3D"Counter" type=3D"pskc:integerType"
> minOccurs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
> >> 		</xs:sequence>
> >> 	</xs:complexType>
> >>
> >>     <xs:complexType name=3D"base64BinaryType">
> >>         <xs:sequence>
> >>             <xs:choice>
> >>                 <xs:element name=3D"PlainValue" type=3D"xs:base64Binar=
y"/>
> >>                 <xs:element name=3D"EncryptedValue"
> type=3D"xenc:EncryptedDataType"/>
> >>             </xs:choice>
> >> 			<xs:element name=3D"ValueMAC" type=3D"xs:base64Binary"
> minOccurs=3D"0"/>
> >>         </xs:sequence>
> >>     </xs:complexType>
> >>     <xs:complexType name=3D"integerType">
> >>         <xs:sequence>
> >>             <xs:choice>
> >>                 <xs:element name=3D"PlainValue" type=3D"xs:integer"/>
> >>                 <xs:element name=3D"EncryptedValue"
> type=3D"xenc:EncryptedDataType"/>
> >>             </xs:choice>
> >> 			<xs:element name=3D"ValueMAC" type=3D"xs:base64Binary"
> minOccurs=3D"0"/>
> >>         </xs:sequence>
> >>     </xs:complexType>
> >>
> >>
> >>  This way the parsers will know that ONLY inside the KeyData element t=
here
> can be extensions and we can specify in the spec that any extension MUST =
have
> the subelements of PlainValue, EncryptedValue and ValueMAC.
> >>
> >> As you can see though this is starting to make the schema more complex=
 but
> I am ok with accepting a compromise.
> >>
> >> What do you think?
> >>
> >>
> >>
> > I am fine with everything -- I just want to make sure that we understand
> > the tradeoffs and implications.
> > Your initial schema is also fine  -- it did not, however, provide an
> > answer on how to extend it. Without such a story we will (a) most likely
> > not get the document through the IESG and (b) we will encounter interop
> > problems later.
> >
> > Btw, the above schema does not contain an extension point -- is this
> > intentional?
> >
> > Ciao
> > Hannes
> >
> >
> >
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: Hannes Tschofenig [mailto:Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net]
> >> Sent: Thursday, February 21, 2008 6:38 PM
> >> To: Philip Hoyer
> >> Cc: Tschofenig, Hannes (NSN - FI/Espoo); keyprov@ietf.org
> >> Subject: Re: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question
> >>
> >> Hi Philip
> >>
> >> there is no difference regarding extensibility with the two proposals.
> >>
> >> Let me describe how the extensibility works for both approaches.
> >>
> >> VARIANT 1
> >>
> >> Assumption:
> >> The XML schema in PSKC contains an extension point
> >> For example, it contains something like:
> >> <xs:any namespace=3D"##other" processContents=3D"lax"/>
> >>
> >> How to extend it:
> >>
> >> One extends it by defining a new schema (with the new element or
> >> whatever you want todo).
> >> You would also describe what the new elements actually mean.
> >>
> >> In essence, you would extend it an the same way as you extend the rest
> >> of the PSKC schema. This is the way how one extends XML.
> >> There is no need to change the existing schema.
> >>
> >>
> >> VARIANT 2
> >>
> >> Assumption
> >> The IANA consideration sections explains how these tokens and their
> >> semantic is registered.
> >> I assume something like informational RFC with expert review for adding
> >> new tokens
> >>
> >>
> >> How to extend it:
> >>
> >> You write a document that defines the new token + the semantic. This is
> >> the same approach as extensions work for protocols like RADIUS or Diam=
eter
> >>
> >>
> >> What you want to ensure is that
> >> * extensions are well described
> >> * there is a way to deal with conflicts (e.g., I define the same
> >> extension as you but with a different semantic).
> >>
> >> Does this make sense to you?
> >>
> >> Ciao
> >> Hannes
> >>
> >>
> >> Philip Hoyer wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >>> Hannes,
> >>> I think your proposal has a major drawback.
> >>> For any extension you will have to update the schema, whereas being a=
ble
> to put as many Data elements as we can will leave the PSKC schema intact =
even
> if people add key attribute value that we have not foreseen.
> >>>
> >>> I enclose the schemas of your proposal for better understanding my po=
int:
> >>>
> >>>     <xs:element name=3D"Key">
> >>>         <xs:complexType>
> >>>         <xs:sequence>
> >>>             <xs:element name=3D"Secret" type=3D"pskc:base64BinaryType"
> minOccurs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
> >>>             <!-- <xs:element name=3D"Time" type=3D"xs:dateTime" minOc=
curs=3D"0"
> maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
> >>>             <xs:element name=3D"TimeInterval" type=3D"xs:double" minO=
ccurs=3D"0"
> maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
> >>>             <xs:element name=3D"TimeDrift" type=3D"pskc:integerType"
> minOccurs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
> >>>             -->
> >>>             <xs:element name=3D"Counter" type=3D"pskc:integerType"
> minOccurs=3D"0" maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
> >>>         </xs:sequence>
> >>>         </xs:complexType>
> >>>     </xs:element>
> >>>
> >>> So to add a new attribute you would have to change the schema above to
> add:
> >>>
> >>> <xs:element name=3D"TimeDrift" type=3D"pskc:integerType" minOccurs=3D=
"0"
> maxOccurs=3D"1"/>
> >>>
> >>> Whereas with method B the schema is:
> >>>
> >>>     <xs:complexType name=3D"KeyType">
> >>>         <xs:sequence>
> >>>             <xs:element name=3D"Data" type=3D"pskc:DataType" minOccur=
s=3D"0"
> maxOccurs=3D"unbounded"/>
> >>>         </xs:sequence>
> >>>     </xs:complexType>
> >>>
> >>> Hence you can add as many 'Data' elements without changing the schema.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Philip
> >>>
> >>> -----Original Message-----
> >>> From: Tschofenig, Hannes (NSN - FI/Espoo)
> [mailto:hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com]
> >>> Sent: Thursday, February 21, 2008 12:10 PM
> >>> To: Philip Hoyer; Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net
> >>> Cc: keyprov@ietf.org
> >>> Subject: AW: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question
> >>>
> >>> Hi Philip,
> >>>
> >>> The schema files are here:
> >>> http://www.tschofenig.priv.at/xml/
> >>>
> >>> PlainValue: What element name would you prefer?
> >>>
> >>> You need to check whether the data type for the element reflects what=
 you
> had in mind for that element.
> >>> If the <Secret> element has to use the data type "string" then that's
> fine.
> >>>
> >>> Ciao
> >>> Hannes
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> -----Urspr=FCngliche Nachricht-----
> >>>> Von: keyprov-bounces@ietf.org
> >>>> [mailto:keyprov-bounces@ietf.org] Im Auftrag von ext Philip Hoyer
> >>>> Gesendet: Donnerstag, 21. Februar 2008 13:41
> >>>> An: Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net; Tschofenig, Hannes (NSN - FI/Espoo)
> >>>> Cc: ietf-xml-use@imc.org; keyprov@ietf.org; xml-dir@ietf.org
> >>>> Betreff: Re: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question
> >>>>
> >>>> Hannes,
> >>>> We can go with Variant A but still will need an element
> >>>> catalogue in the
> >>>> spec since we do not want people to introduce elements that have the
> >>>> same meaning eg <Counter> and <EventCounter>
> >>>>
> >>>> Could you send the xsd snippet for the type definition to me for
> >>>> inclusion.
> >>>> Also the plainvalue in the example is misleading since I
> >>>> believe in the
> >>>> xsd it is base64 or did you envisage it to be String?
> >>>> I am happy to use string and in the element catalogue
> >>>> describe how it is
> >>>> serialised in the string. (eg for the secret it will be a string that
> >>>> contains the base64 encoded binary of the value)
> >>>>
> >>>> Philip
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> -----Original Message-----
> >>>> From: keyprov-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:keyprov-bounces@ietf.org] On
> >>>> Behalf Of Hannes Tschofenig
> >>>> Sent: Thursday, February 21, 2008 11:32 AM
> >>>> To: hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com
> >>>> Cc: ietf-xml-use@imc.org; keyprov@ietf.org; xml-dir@ietf.org
> >>>> Subject: [KEYPROV] Tentative Conclusion on XML Design Question
> >>>>
> >>>> Hi all,
> >>>>
> >>>> after our interim meeting I posted the mail below to the XML
> >>>> directorate
> >>>>
> >>>> mailing list. I got three responses for variant A so far, namely:
> >>>>
> >>>> * Tim Bray:
> >>>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/xml-dir/current/msg00174.html
> >>>>
> >>>> * Phil Shafer:
> >>>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/xml-dir/current/msg00176.html
> >>>>
> >>>> * Andrew Newton (offlist):
> >>>>
> >>>> -----
> >>>>
> >>>> Without much background on the trade-offs and why each is being
> >>>> proposed, it is hard to tell which is better.
> >>>>
> >>>> I do prefer variant A just because it seems simpler.
> >>>>
> >>>> -andy
> >>>>
> >>>> -----
> >>>>
> >>>> Ciao
> >>>> Hannes
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> Hi all,
> >>>>>
> >>>>> last week we had our IETF KEYPROV interim meeting and among many
> >>>>> security related issue we also ran into XML design
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> questions. Hence, I
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> would like to solicit feedback from XML experts. In short,
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> there seem
> >>>> to
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> be (at least two) ways to construct the XML schema to express that a
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> key
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> contains of a secret and has a couple of meta data
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> associated with it.
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> We would like to utilize XML encryption to selectively
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> protect some of
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> the elements.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Here are snippets from the two instance files:
> >>>>>
> >>>>> * VARIANT A
> >>>>> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
> >>>>>
> >>>>> <Key ....>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>     <Secret>
> >>>>>         <EncryptedValue>
> >>>>>             <xenc:EncryptionMethod
> >>>>> Algorithm=3D"http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-aes128"/>
> >>>>>             <xenc:CipherData>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> <xenc:CipherValue>rf4dx3rvEPO0vKtKL14NbeVu8nk=3D</xenc:CipherValue>
> >>>>>             </xenc:CipherData>
> >>>>>         </EncryptedValue>
> >>>>>     </Secret>
> >>>>>     <Counter>
> >>>>>         <PlainValue>1234</PlainValue>
> >>>>>     </Counter>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> </Key>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> * VARIANT B
> >>>>> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
> >>>>>
> >>>>> <Key ...>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>     <Data Name=3D"SECRET">
> >>>>>         <EncryptedValue>
> >>>>>             <xenc:EncryptionMethod
> >>>>> Algorithm=3D"http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-aes128"/>
> >>>>>             <xenc:CipherData>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> <xenc:CipherValue>rf4dx3rvEPO0vKtKL14NbeVu8nk=3D</xenc:CipherValue>
> >>>>>             </xenc:CipherData>
> >>>>>         </EncryptedValue>
> >>>>>     </Data>
> >>>>>     <Data Name=3D"COUNTER">
> >>>>>         <PlainValue>1234</PlainValue>
> >>>>>     </Data>
> >>>>> </Key>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> I have put the schema/instance documents here:
> >>>>> http://www.tschofenig.priv.at/xml/
> >>>>>
> >>>>> The KEYPROV working group would appreciate your input. Please let us
> >>>>> know which variant we should pick.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Ciao
> >>>>> Hannes
> >>>>>
> >>>>> PS: I have simplified the schema to make it more convenient
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> for you to
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> focus on the relevant parts.
> >>>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>>> KEYPROV mailing list
> >>>>> KEYPROV@ietf.org
> >>>>> http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/keyprov
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>> KEYPROV mailing list
> >>>> KEYPROV@ietf.org
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Thomas,
 =

Thanks again for your comments and suggested text.  Please see (long overdu=
e) responses below.  Note that changes made will be in next draft (-03) due=
 25 Feb. By "TBS" is meant more consideration needs to be given to the poin=
ts that you raised.
 =

One question regarding your comment on Content Negotiation: I added your su=
ggested text to the section entitled "HTTP Headers" (now 6.2.3).  However, =
the phrase "SHOULD have the value application/vnd.ietf.keyp.dskpp+xml" is i=
nconsistent with the MUST from the section entitled "Identification of DSKP=
P Message" (Section 6.2.2 in the newest draft).  Is MUST appropriate in Sec=
tion 6.2.2?  (The text for Section 6.2.2 reads:"The MIME-type for all DSKPP=
 messages MUST be application/vnd.ietf.keyprov.dskpp+xml".

Best Regards,
Andrea

________________________________

From: Thomas Roessler [mailto:tlr@w3.org]
Sent: Fri 11/16/2007 10:30 AM
To: Doherty, Andrea; smachani@diversinet.com; mpei@verisign.com; Nystr=F6m,=
 Magnus; pbaker@verisign.com; Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net
Cc: apps-review@ietf.org; keyprov@ietf.org
Subject: Review of draft-ietf-keyprov-dskpp-01



This is a review of draft-ietf-keyprov-dskpp-01.  It occasionally =

strays into the PSKC draft; however, I haven't fully read that =

document. =


Specific observations on the HTTP binding: =


- In 12.2.4, the spec says "Persistent connections as defined in =

  HTTP/1.1 are assumed, but not required." Taken literally, I don't =

  know what "assumed, but not required" means. =


adoherty>>Rephrased this to "are OPTIONAL".

- The HTTP binding does not indicate whether it fully defines the =

  behavior of the HTTP server that is appearing as part of the =

  transactions, or whether the DSKPP server is identified by either =

  a specific URI and/or Host.  Please clarify that in the HTTP =

  binding part.  (4.3 -- and other places -- suggest that the DSKPP =

  server is indeed identified by a specific URI, which would be just =

  fine.) =


adoherty>>The DSKPP server is identified by a specific URL.  I added the fo=
llowing sentence to the end of the Introduction to the HTTP binding: "The D=
SKPP server will be identified by a specific URL, which may be pre-configur=
ed, or provided to the client during initialization."  I also added the fol=
lowing to Initialization of DSKPP: "The initialization message MAY carry da=
ta in its body, such as the URL for the DSKPP client to use when contacting=
 the DSKPP server."

- In 12.2.4, instead of talking about "POST operations", maybe say =

  "DSKPP requests are mapped to HTTP requests with the POST method". =


adoherty>>Good point; change made.

- For the 4-step protocol, it's probably worth calling out here how =

  the different messages are bound together, as they may be =

  transported through different connections.  In particular, =

  KeyProvServerHello is bound to the preceding KeyProvClientHello by =

  being transmitted in the corresponding HTTP response; =

  KeyProvServerHello MUST have a sessionId attribute, and the =

  sesionId on the subsequent KeyProvClientNonce MUST be identical. =

  KeyProServerFinished is then once again bound to the rest through =

  HTTP (and possibly through a sessionID). =


adoherty>>Change made.

- The HTTP binding does not cover content negotiation.  I'd suggest: =

  "HTTP requests MAY include an HTTP Accept header field. This =

  header field SHOULD have the value =

  application/vnd.ietf.keyprov.dskpp+xml.  The Accept header MAY =

  include additional content types defined by future versions of =

  this protocol." =

  =

  (The server is allowed to downgrade [6.2.3], so if a future =

  version uses a different content type, that should be in the =

  client's request, along with the current one, *if* the client is =

  willing to downgrade.) =


adoherty>>Added suggested text to HTTP Headers section.  The "SHOULD have t=
he value application/vnd.ietf.keyp.dskpp+xml" is inconsistent with the MUST=
 from the section entitled "Identification of DSKPP Message" (Section 6.2.2=
 in the newest draft).  Is MUST appropriate in Section 6.2.2?

- The examples in 12.2.8 don't match the requirements from 12.2.3. =


adoherty>>Good catch; fixed.

- 12.2.7 is extremely fuzzy as to when the server-side =

  initialization message may be sent.  As long as that's indeed in =

  response to a specific user request with the appropriate Accept =

  header (e.g., to a specific DSKPP server URL), the use of the 200 =

  code seems fine.  However, please clarify that using a 200 code =

  combined with the DSKPP content type is *not* an appropriate means =

  to trigger protocol initialization during a browsing session where =

  the user's request was directed to some other resource.  (In that =

  case, some 40x code might be much more appropriate.) =


adoherty>>Text was clarified.  In addition, the following note was added: "=
Note that if the user's request was directed to some other resource, the DS=
KPP server MUST NOT respond by combining the DSKPP content type with respon=
se code 200.  In that case, the DSKPP server SHOULD respond by sending a DS=
KPP initialization message in an HTTP response with Content-Type set accord=
ing to Section 6.2.2 and response code set to 406 (Not Acceptable)."

- It's not clear how one-step DSKPP would work over HTTP.  What kind =

  of request does the client send to trigger that?  If that isn't =

  intended to run over HTTP, please clarify. =


adoherty>>It would have required a request, and so would have behaved like =
two-pass. In any event, the one-pass DSKPP was removed as of the -02 versio=
n.

- In 12.2.3, the spec says: "HTTP proxies MUST NOT cache responses =

  carrying DSKPP messages. For this reason, the following holds:" =

  That's a conformance requirement on HTTP proxies; don't do that. =

  Instead: "In order to avoid caching of responses carrying DSKPP =

  messages by proxies, the following holds:" (Also, note that POST =

  invalidates cached entities.) =


adoherty>>Text added; thanks.

- In 12.2.5, "If the type of a DSKPP request cannot be determined, =

  the DSKPP responder MUST return a 400 response." What precisely is =

  meant by "type cannot be determined"?  (Example?) =


adoherty>>Reworded to say, "If a request is received that is not a DSKPP cl=
ient message, the DSKPP responder MUST return a 400 (Bad request) response."

Reviewing BCP56, I would suspect that there might be slight =

differences of opinion on whether DSKPP should have a port and URI =

scheme of its own. However, given that the protocol binding (with =

the above clarifications) will be layered rather cleanly on HTTP, =

and won't confuse URI-based addressing, I fail to see the benefit of =

allocating a separate port and/or URI scheme. This binding looks =

like it is implementable on top of a conventional Web server, which =

would suggest sticking to port 80 and http (or port 443 and https). =


Beyond that point, I do not see any significant disagreements =

between the guidance in BCP56 and this draft. =




Various other observations while going through the document... =


- -00 included schema fragments in section 4.9.  These are gone in =

  the corresponding sections in -01, making review of the schema for =

  consistency with the human-readable text significantly harder. I'd =

  recommend resurrecting the schema fragements in future iterations =

  of the draft for ease of review. =


  While dropping the schema fragments, *any* human-readable =

  documentation for types such as AbstractRequestType type has been =

  lost. =


adoherty>>Agree; the schema fragments have been returned to the rightful pl=
ace and examples are back in Appendix A.

- Please say early on in the spec what name space prefixes are used =

  in XML snippets throughout the document, and what they mean. =


adoherty>>TBS

- What's the order relation for the various Version attributes?  Are =

  they treated as decimal numbers, as strings, as a dot-separated =

  pairs of two integers?  Is "01.00" the same as "1.0"? =


adoherty>>Major and Minor releases defined by VersionType in the schema:

   <xs:simpleType name=3D"VersionType">
     <xs:restriction base=3D"xs:string">
       <xs:pattern value=3D"\d{1,2}\.\d{1,3}"/>
     </xs:restriction>
   </xs:simpleType>

Not sure that this needs to be called out explicitly in the text.

- Trying to assemble the overall XML schema to validate some of the =

  examples... =


  * DSKPP imports the schema from PSKC, which in turn imports a =

    schema for the urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:logo namespace, =

    which apparently isn't available anywhere. =


adoherty>>"Logo" has been removed from the latest PSKC draft.
  =

  * The DSKPP and PSKC drafts use inconsistent namespaces for PSKC, =

    urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:container vs =

    urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:1.0:container =


adoherty>>Fixed as of -02 version of both documents.

  * The DSKPP schema uses an extension construct like this one =

    repeatedly (DeviceIdentifierDataType, KeyContainerType, =

    PayloadType, KeyProvTriggerType): =

  =

    <xs:complexType name=3D"DeviceIdentifierDataType"> =

      <xs:choice> =

        <xs:element name=3D"DeviceId" type=3D"pskc:DeviceIdType"/> =

        <xs:any namespace=3D"##other" processContents=3D"strict"/> =

      </xs:choice> =

    </xs:complexType> =

    =

    In conjunction with use of elementFormDefault=3D"unqualified", =

    that unfortunately leads to a non-deterministic content model, =

    as DeviceId is not actually in the target namespace. =


    One possible fix is to move away from =

    elementFormDefault=3D"unqualified".  (PSKC uses "qualified" =

    anyway.) =


adoherty>>We now rely on elementFormDefault=3D"qualified".

- StatusCode is one out of a closed list of strings. For =

  extensibility, it might be worth using URIs/URNs instead of text =

  strings here, and defining StatusCode to be of type anyURI. =


adoherty>>We decided on a closed list for interoperability purposes.

- Same for PlatformType. =


adoherty>>Same as for StatusCode

- ProtocolVariantsType uses elements to identify supported protocol =

  variants.  I wonder if having an extension point in the schema for =

  future variants might be useful.  Also, why not use an URI-based =

  extensibility pattern? =


adoherty>>Future variants are unlikely.  In any case, we chose not to do th=
is for interoperability purposes.

- In 11.3.3, ds:KeyInfoType is used for Payloads, and "only those =

  choices of the ds:KeyInfoType that identify a symmetric key are =

  allowed".  Does a ds:RetrievalMethod that points to a ds:KeyName =

  elsewhere possibly identify a symmetric key?  Please be clearer =

  about which parts of ds:KeyInfo you use here. =


adoherty>>TBS
  =

- Same in 11.2.3 for public keys. =


adoherty>>TBS

- IdentifierType is limited to a maximum 128 characters in the =

  schema, yet that limitation is nowhere found in the normative =

  text. =


adoherty>>Maximum length added to text.

- PSKC uses strings for algorithm identifiers, DSKPP uses URIs.  Why =

  the inconsistency?  (I'd prefer URIs, for consistency with XML =

  Signature, XML Encryption, and neighboring specs.) =


adoherty>>This was resolved in latest draft. At IETF-70 KEYPROV meeting, gr=
oup decided to go with URL's instead of URI's.

- In section 6.2.2, the normative text defines <SupportedKeyTypes>, =

  <SupportedEncryptionAlgorithms>, <SupportedMacAlgorithms>, =

  <Supported KeyContainers> as "a series of URIs..." -- that's =

  actually not true, as each of these elements includes a sequence =

  of container elements that in turn contain the URIs.  Please be =

  precise when describing XML structures. =


adoherty>>Change made.

- In section 6.2.2.2, the text about 4 and 2 pass DSKPP seems =

  confused: =

  =

        If the ProtocolVariantsType is not used, then the DSKPP =

        server will proceed with ordinary 4-pass DSKPP.  However, =

        it does not support 4-pass DSKPP, then the server MUST =

        find a suitable two-pass variant or else the protocol run =

        will fail. =

               =

  I believe it's supposed to say "if no protocol variants are =

  indicated, then the server will proceed with ordinary 4 pass, or =

  maybe with 2 pass", or something like that.  Please phrase this =

  more clearly. =


  (Incidentally, what does it mean that the *type* is not used?) =


adoherty>>Good catch! Change made.

- In 6.2.2.4, "An AuthenticationCode MAY or MAY NOT contain =

  alphanumeric characters.." -- excuse me? =


- same section, "A DSKPP client MAY contain Authentication Data =

  consisting of signed data of client Nonce with a client =

  certificate's private key." I believe this is supposed to describe =

  a public key signature of the client Nonce. =


adoherty>>This option was removed.

- same section, "The element of ... have the following meaning" -- =

  make that "elements" =


adoherty>>Done

- same section, a lot of discussion that "certificate itself is =

  typically sufficient"; "DeviceID, KeyID, and/or nonce provided in =

  the <InitializationTriggerType> element ougth to be sufficient to =

  identify the requester".  What's probably meant is that ClientID =

  can be omitted if the requester can be identified otherwise.  If =

  so, please say that. =


adoherty>>Change made; affected the section on AuthenticationDataType Type.

- The security considerations are somewhat inconsistent in their =

  attacker model.  In some cases, a man in the middle is assumed to =

  have the capability to bypass TLS protection (e.g., 14.2.2); in =

  other sections transport security is presented as a solution to =

  concerns about the integrity of protocol exchanges (e.g., 14.2.4). =


  It would contribute to the clarity of the security considerations =

  if there was a clear discussion of the assumptions beforehand, and =

  a consistent use of attacker models later on. =


adoherty>>TBS

- While I've not worked this through fully, it appears that an =

  active attacker can manipulate the SupportedKeyTypes and KeyType =

  elements in the ClientHello and KeyProvServerHello messages, =

  without the protocol failing, if both device and server support =

  multiple key types with mutually interchangeable key material. =

  That might lead to an inconsistent state, or possibly to the use =

  of weak keys.  It might be useful to use the negotiated algorithm =

  value as input into the MAC derivation mechanism. =


adoherty>>TBS

- Finally, on yet another editorial note, the namespace in the =

  schema and the one in the IANA considerations section are =

  inconsistent. =


adoherty>>This was fixed.

Regards, =

-- =

Thomas Roessler, W3C  <tlr@w3.org> =


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--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Provisioning of Symmetric Keys Working Group of the IETF.


	Title           : Dynamic Symmetric Key Provisioning Protocol (DSKPP)
	Author(s)       : A. Doherty, et al.
	Filename        : draft-ietf-keyprov-dskpp-03.txt
	Pages           : 98
	Date            : 2008-02-25

DSKPP is a client-server protocol for initialization (and
configuration) of symmetric keys to locally and remotely accessible
cryptographic modules.  The protocol can be run with or without
private-key capabilities in the cryptographic modules, and with or
without an established public-key infrastructure.

Two variations of the protocol support multiple usage scenarios.
With the four-pass variant, keys are mutually generated by the
provisioning server and cryptographic module; provisioned keys are
not transferred over-the-wire or over-the-air.  The two-pass variant
enables secure and efficient download and installation of pre-
generated symmetric keys to a cryptographic module.

This document builds on information contained in [RFC4758], adding
specific enhancements in response to implementation experience and
liaison requests.  It is intended that this document or a successor
version thereto will become the basis for subsequent progression of a
symmetric key provisioning protocol specification on the standards
track.

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-keyprov-dskpp-03.txt

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We have just submitted the updated PSKC v03 draft to IETF. Here is the
copy that Hannes helped to put in keyprov server for you to review
before it is available in IETF site tomorrow.

http://www.tschofenig.priv.at/svn/keyprov/stable/draft-ietf-keyprov-portable
-symmetric-key-container-03.txt

or the short version:

http://tinyurl.com/2ysycr

- Ming

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From keyprov-bounces@ietf.org  Mon Feb 25 17:21:39 2008
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts 
directories.
This draft is a work item of the Provisioning of Symmetric Keys Working Group of the IETF.

	Title		: Symmetric Key Package Content Type
	Author(s)	: S. Turner, R. Housley
	Filename	: draft-ietf-keyprov-symmetrickeyformat-02.txt
	Pages		: 9
	Date		: 2008-2-25
	
This document defines the symmetric key format content type.  It is 
   transport independent. The Cryptographic Message Syntax can be used 
   to digitally sign, digest, authenticate, or encrypt this content 
   type.

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-keyprov-symmetrickeyformat-02.txt

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From keyprov-bounces@ietf.org  Tue Feb 26 03:52:09 2008
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Here is the agenda proposal
http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/08mar/agenda/keyprov.txt

Anything you would like to see on the agenda as well? 

Feedback is welcome!


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From keyprov-bounces@ietf.org  Tue Feb 26 09:31:40 2008
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 Updated	draft-ietf-keyprov-portable-symmetric-key-container-03.txt
 available
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Server problems.....

Updated PSKC draft can be found here:

*http://tinyurl.com/2zshfn

*Ciao
Hannes

Pei, Mingliang wrote:
> We have just submitted the updated PSKC v03 draft to IETF. Here is the
> copy that Hannes helped to put in keyprov server for you to review
> before it is available in IETF site tomorrow.
>
> http://www.tschofenig.priv.at/svn/keyprov/stable/draft-ietf-keyprov-portable
> -symmetric-key-container-03.txt
>
> or the short version:
>
> http://tinyurl.com/2ysycr
>
> - Ming
>
> _______________________________________________
> KEYPROV mailing list
> KEYPROV@ietf.org
> http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/keyprov
>   

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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts 
directories.
This draft is a work item of the Provisioning of Symmetric Keys Working Group of the IETF.

	Title		: Portable Symmetric Key Container
	Author(s)	: P. Hoyer
	Filename	: draft-ietf-keyprov-portable-symmetric-key-container-03.txt
	Pages		: 47
	Date		: 2008-2-26
	
This document specifies a symmetric key format for transport and
   provisioning of symmetric keys (One Time Password (OTP) shared
   secrets or symmetric cryptographic keys) to different types of strong
   authentication devices.  The standard token format enables
   enterprises to deploy best-of-breed solutions combining components
   from different vendors into the same infrastructure.

   This work is a joint effort by the members of OATH (Initiative for
   Open AuTHentication) to specify a format that can be freely
   distributed to the technical community.  The authors believe that a
   common and shared specification will facilitate adoption of two-
   factor authentication on the Internet by enabling interoperability
   between commercial and open-source implementations.

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-keyprov-portable-symmetric-key-container-03.txt

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From keyprov-bounces@ietf.org  Thu Feb 28 14:03:31 2008
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The issue tracker now can be found at:
http://www.shingou.info:8080/keyprov/index


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From keyprov-bounces@ietf.org  Thu Feb 28 14:05:28 2008
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I wanted to let you know that I moved the Wiki about the recent interim 
meeting to
http://www.shingou.info/twiki/bin/view/KeyProv/KeyprovInterim2008

It contains a lot of information about the issues we discussed at the 
interim meeting and the resolution proposals.
The recently submitted drafts should reflect the proposed resolutions.

Ciao
Hannes

PS: I still plan to upload a podcast of the IEEE  P1619.3 presentation 
by Matt Ball.  
<http://www.shingou.info/twiki/pub/KeyProv/KeyprovInterim2008/Key_Management_Using_P1619.3_%282008-02-06%29.ppt> 

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