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Subject: Re: Subsession keys (Re: KINK issue list)
From: Michael Thomas <mat@cisco.com>
To: Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu>
Cc: "KAMADA Ken'ichi" <kamada@nanohz.org>, ietf-kink@vpnc.org
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References: <20050120102450Q.sakane@kame.net>
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On Mon, 2005-01-31 at 17:41, Sam Hartman wrote:
> >>>>> "Michael" =3D=3D Michael Thomas <mat@cisco.com> writes:

> My reason for bringing up the issue is that you are behaving
> differently than all other Kerberos applications.  Kerberos libraries
> are actually flexible enough to do what your spec currently asks but
> it requires implementers to specifically handle subkeys that way.
>=20
> If you don't have a reason for being different then please be the same
> as everyone else.  If you do have a reason, explain it and I'll be
> happy.

I'm sorry, but I'm having a real problem with this guilty
until proven innocent stance. This document was through
several iterations of review from the IESG and just got
dropped on the floor by the IESG. I think it's incumbent=20
on those who are throwing darts here to say if there are
REAL PROBLEMS, not just harmonization with the universe.
In this particular case, I had *zero* problem coding this
up. Is there an _actual_ cryptographical problem here, or
is this another trip to the beauty shop? There are people
who have been writing to *this* spec for several years now --
why should we force them to change just because the
aesthetics seem better to people who have no stake in=20
that code and work?

And FWIW, the key generation was discussed at long, long length
before last call. I doubt that Jeff remembers it, but he
was part of the discussion as I recall.

		Mike

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From owner-ietf-kink@mail.vpnc.org  Tue Feb  1 17:10:10 2005
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To: "KAMADA Ken'ichi" <kamada@nanohz.org>
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Subject: Re: AD review: draft-ietf-kink-kink [section 1-4]
References: <tslzmz65pzn.fsf@cz.mit.edu> <20050201115400MZ%kamada@nanohz.org>
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>>>>> "KAMADA" == KAMADA Ken'ichi <kamada@nanohz.org> writes:

    KAMADA> At Tue, 18 Jan 2005 17:31:08 -0500,
    KAMADA> Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu> wrote:
    >>  Section 4.3:
    >> 
    >> [**] I need explicit review from the IPsec reviewer of this
    >> section to make sure it is compatible with 2401bis.  IN
    >> addition, any differences between how this works and how IKE
    >> would set up the same SA need to be called out.  It is fine for
    >> there to be differences, but I want to make sure the working
    >> group explicitly decided the differences are a good thing.
    >> 
    >> I'm somewhat concerned that 4.3 is not specific enough to
    >> describe exactly what key gets set up.  I.E. I'm concerned it
    >> may not be detailed enough for interoperable implementations.

    KAMADA> Section 4.3 describes the message flow and section 7.3
    KAMADA> describes the message structure.  Differences between KINK
    KAMADA> and IKE is described in section 7.3 (and also in section
    KAMADA> 4.4.1, 5.1.7, and 6).  I think they are enough to be
    KAMADA> interoperable (at least regarding SA setup).  Is your
    KAMADA> concern resolved if section 4 referes to section 7?

I think everything is clear except for what key ends up getting used
for the resulting SA.  I think that needs specific text.

--Sam



From owner-ietf-kink@mail.vpnc.org  Tue Feb  1 17:12:14 2005
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>>>>> "KAMADA" == KAMADA Ken'ichi <kamada@nanohz.org> writes:

    KAMADA> issue #13 Replay protection (section 5)

    KAMADA> At Fri, 28 Jan 2005 21:19:39 -0500 (EST),
    KAMADA> Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu> wrote:
    >>  [**] The document claims that the transaction id is not used
    >> for replay detection because Kerberos provides that.  How is
    >> that true?  The authenticator is protected against replays but
    >> how is the rest of the message bound to that specific
    >> authenticator instead of to a session key of a ticket?

    KAMADA> The KINK checksum do it.  It is calculated from the whole
    KAMADA> message including the authenticator, so replaying a part
    KAMADA> of a old message with a newly captured authenticator will
    KAMADA> not succeed.

Thanks, this issue can be closed.



From owner-ietf-kink@mail.vpnc.org  Tue Feb  1 20:59:29 2005
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> #1 [**] Versioning
> 
> 	what happens when a receiver receives a major or
> 	minor version of the kink or qm that is inconsistent with this
> 	document?  What about unknown payload types?  (Sam Hartman)
> 
> 	QM version is discussed in section 12 (Forward Compatibility
> 	Considerations).
> 
> 	- KINK version
> 		return error (KINK_INVMAJ, KINK_INVMIN)

it would be better for me that the document described:

	- an implementation should return a KINK error
	  with KINK_INVMAJ (or KINK_INVMIN), when an implementation
	  receives an unsupported kink version number in the header.
	- in the security consideration section, an implementation
	  MUST consider to trust unauthorised messages.

> 	- QM versoin
> 		already specified in section 12.

it is clearly described in the section 12.

> 	- KINK payload type
> 		return error (KINK_PROTOERR)

it is enough for me that an implementation return a kink error message
with this error type.  however it would be better that the document
had the description of behavior when an implementation received
unsupported payload.

> 	- ISAKMP payload type
> 		return error (ISAKMP INVALID-PAYLOAD-TYPE)
> 		(describe each Notify type usage like ikev2 spec.)

it is described in RFC2408 when an implementation receives a message
contained unsupported ISAKMP payload type.  so it may be unneccesary
to describe here explicitly.  however there are few description in
the IKEv1 specification when other errors happen.  that will bring
an interoperability problem for KINK.  so i think the document should
have detail descriptions like the IKEv2 specification.

> 	Specify the behavior when the error is not authenticated
> 	in the Security Consideration section.

for example, in the draft-ietf-ipsec-ikev2-17.txt:

2.21 Error Handling

   Errors that occur before a cryptographically protected IKE_SA is
   established must be handled very carefully. There is a trade-off
   between wanting to be helpful in diagnosing a problem and responding
   to it and wanting to avoid being a dupe in a denial of service attack
   based on forged messages.

i am not sure why the description is not in the security consideration.



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Subject: Re: KINK should referenece to IKEv2?
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> Somebody will need to help me (us) here: can
> IKEv1 successfully establish 2401bis SA's? Can
> IKEv2 successfully establish 2401 SA's? I'm _guessing_
> that the answer to both is "yes", but the big question
> is whether there's anything in IKEv2 what is exchanged
> across the wire to inform the other side whether it's
> 2401 or 2401bis. If so, we may need a similar mechanism.

Stephan Kent who is 2401bis author answered to my question
in the ipsec mailing list:

	2401bis implicitly establishes requirements for certain features for
	a key/SA management protocol to enable systems to make full use of
	the IPsec features defined in 2401bis. IKEv2 satisfies these
	requirements; IKE v1 does not. It's way too late to suggest that we
	degrade requirements in 2401bis to be backwards compatible with IKE
	v1.

it seems that IKEv1 does not work on 2401bis.



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Speaking as an individual, normally when there is a major version and
a minor version the intent is that using a greater minor version than
one side expects is acceptable.

--Sam



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Subject: Re: AD review: draft-ietf-kink-kink [section 1-4]
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> Section 4.3:
> 
> [**] I need explicit review from the IPsec reviewer of this section to
> make sure it is compatible with 2401bis.  IN addition, any differences
> between how this works and how IKE would set up the same SA need to be
> called out.  It is fine for there to be differences, but I want to
> make sure the working group explicitly decided the differences are a
> good thing.

i dont think there are differneces between them.  because KINK just
carries IKEv1 quick mode.  KINK can establish the same SA that IKEv1
do so.
note that i am supposing that KINK complies to 2401 at the first step.
if we choice 2401bis, my saying is wrong.

> I'm somewhat concerned that 4.3 is not specific enough to describe
> exactly what key gets set up.  I.E. I'm concerned it may not be
> detailed enough for interoperable implementations.

could you tell me lack of things for interoperability in this document.
i think that there is detail description in the section 7 how KINK
establish SAs.  IKEv1 specification does not describe the deatils.
that was undoubted problem for interoperability.

if the description of the section 7 is enough, then this is editorial
issue.  we need to improve the text.



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> Speaking as an individual, normally when there is a major version and
> a minor version the intent is that using a greater minor version than
> one side expects is acceptable.

correct.  do you comment that the document does not touch a minor version ?



From owner-ietf-kink@mail.vpnc.org  Tue Feb  1 22:11:51 2005
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>>>>> "Shoichi" == Shoichi Sakane <sakane@kame.net> writes:

    Shoichi> the same SA that IKEv1 do so.  

    Shoichi> note that i am supposing
    Shoichi> that KINK complies to 2401 at the first step.  if we
    Shoichi> choice 2401bis, my saying is wrong.
I'm confused why 2401/2401bis matters for this.



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> >>>>> "Shoichi" == Shoichi Sakane <sakane@kame.net> writes:
> 
>     Shoichi> the same SA that IKEv1 do so.  
> 
>     Shoichi> note that i am supposing
>     Shoichi> that KINK complies to 2401 at the first step.  if we
>     Shoichi> choice 2401bis, my saying is wrong.
> I'm confused why 2401/2401bis matters for this.

i should say that i did not consider 2401bis manner.
if we choice 2401bis, then there might be difference between them or no.



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>>>>> "Shoichi" == Shoichi Sakane <sakane@kame.net> writes:

    >> Section 4.3:
    >> 
    >> [**] I need explicit review from the IPsec reviewer of this
    >> section to make sure it is compatible with 2401bis.  IN
    >> addition, any differences between how this works and how IKE
    >> would set up the same SA need to be called out.  It is fine for
    >> there to be differences, but I want to make sure the working
    >> group explicitly decided the differences are a good thing.

    Shoichi> i dont think there are differneces between them.  because
    Shoichi> KINK just carries IKEv1 quick mode.  KINK can establish
    Shoichi> the same SA that IKEv1 do so.  

Section 4.3 calls out a lot of explicit detail.  For example it says
exactly when to add SAs to the SPD, etc.  This detail is presented as
Kink specific.

I am asking for review to confirm that this detail did not conflict
with anything in the IKE spec.  If section 4.3 said to just do what
IKE does, I would not have called it out.

I think section 4.3 is well written and it is good to have.  I just
want to make sure there is not an inconsistency.



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>>>>> "Shoichi" == Shoichi Sakane <sakane@kame.net> writes:

    >> Speaking as an individual, normally when there is a major
    >> version and a minor version the intent is that using a greater
    >> minor version than one side expects is acceptable.

    Shoichi> correct.  do you comment that the document does not touch
    Shoichi> a minor version ?

Correct.  The only thing I find is an invalid minor version error and
a requirement that implementations MUST use version 1.0.  It doesn't
say what happens if a recipient receives a greater minor version.

Again, if the WG wants to use minor versions the same as major
versions, that's OK but needs to be called out because it is not what
people expect.

--Sam



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Subject: Re: KINK should referenece to IKEv2?
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[Adding Steve to make sure I'm not misrepresenting what he means.]

>>>>> "Shoichi" == Shoichi Sakane <sakane@kame.net> writes:

    >> Somebody will need to help me (us) here: can IKEv1 successfully
    >> establish 2401bis SA's? Can IKEv2 successfully establish 2401
    >> SA's? I'm _guessing_ that the answer to both is "yes", but the
    >> big question is whether there's anything in IKEv2 what is
    >> exchanged across the wire to inform the other side whether it's
    >> 2401 or 2401bis. If so, we may need a similar mechanism.

    Shoichi> Stephan Kent who is 2401bis author answered to my
    Shoichi> question in the ipsec mailing list:

    Shoichi> 	2401bis implicitly establishes requirements for
    Shoichi> certain features for a key/SA management protocol to
    Shoichi> enable systems to make full use of the IPsec features
    Shoichi> defined in 2401bis. IKEv2 satisfies these requirements;
    Shoichi> IKE v1 does not. It's way too late to suggest that we
    Shoichi> degrade requirements in 2401bis to be backwards
    Shoichi> compatible with IKE v1.

    Shoichi> it seems that IKEv1 does not work on 2401bis.

That's not how I read what Steve is saying.  A 2401bissystem can
support IKEv1.  However the 2401bis SPD can require the system to do
things that IKEv1 cannot do.

Put another way, a 2401bis system can have multiple key management
protocols.  At least one of these protocols needs to support all the
attributes of a 2401bis SPD.  For this reason and because it is
explicitly required, 2401bis systems MUST support ikev2.

I'm not trying to require Kink to support all features that 2401bis
requires from a key management protocol.  It's fine if on a 2401bis
system sometimes the IPsec architecture requests Kink to set up a SA
but Kink fails because it does not support something about the SA.

What I am requiring is that Kink work with a 2401bis system.  That is,
the Kink specification needs to use the same terminology and model as
2401bis.  Similarly it needs to be possible to implement Kink on a
2401bis system and the only problem should be that some features
2401bis would like to have from an automated key management protocol
are not available.

--Sam



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Date: Wed, 2 Feb 2005 14:47:21 -0500
To: Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu>
From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
Subject: Re: KINK should referenece to IKEv2?
Cc: Shoichi Sakane <sakane@kame.net>, mat@cisco.com, ietf-kink@vpnc.org,
        Stephen  Kent <kent@bbn.com>
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At 2:19 PM -0500 2/2/05, Sam Hartman wrote:
>[Adding Steve to make sure I'm not misrepresenting what he means.]
>

Sam,

Your characterization of 2401bis is correct, i.e., if one chooses to 
use IKEv1 with a 2401bis implementation, then it may not be possible 
to instantiate some SAs, i.e., ones that make use of new SPD features.

Steve



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Subject: Re: KINK should referenece to IKEv2?
From: Michael Thomas <mat@cisco.com>
To: Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu>
Cc: Shoichi Sakane <sakane@kame.net>, ietf-kink@vpnc.org, kent@bbn.com
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On Wed, 2005-02-02 at 11:19, Sam Hartman wrote:
> I'm not trying to require Kink to support all features that 2401bis
> requires from a key management protocol.  It's fine if on a 2401bis
> system sometimes the IPsec architecture requests Kink to set up a SA
> but Kink fails because it does not support something about the SA.
>=20
> What I am requiring is that Kink work with a 2401bis system.  That is,
> the Kink specification needs to use the same terminology and model as
> 2401bis.  Similarly it needs to be possible to implement Kink on a
> 2401bis system and the only problem should be that some features
> 2401bis would like to have from an automated key management protocol
> are not available.

So from Steve's last email, I read it as our having met
your requirement since IKEv1 can still do its job on
2401bis as well as it did for 2401. A more interesting=20
question is whether there's a way for KINK to easily
inherit the new/changed IKEv2 payloads that support the
2401bis features. Without having read what exactly ikev2
did to do this, it strikes me as a non-trivial issue since
it requires dragging in all kinds of "what if's" of negotiation,
downgrading, etc, but like I said I haven't looked at what
they did to the phase 2 payloads. If they did a good job
and the new "phase 2" proposals can gracefully downgrade
in the same message to ikev1 compatible proposals, it may=20
be relatively straightfoward, but I'm dubious since ikev2=20
doesn't even have a "phase 1" so the protocol drivers are fundamentally
different. For example: does v1/v2 they even=20
run on the same port?

		Mike

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Subject: Re: KINK should referenece to IKEv2?
References: <1106238787.2951.51.camel@thomasm-lnx.cisco.com>
	<20050202111406N.sakane@kame.net> <tsld5vipy60.fsf@cz.mit.edu>
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Date: Wed, 02 Feb 2005 15:22:38 -0500
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>>>>> "Michael" == Michael Thomas <mat@cisco.com> writes:

    Michael> So from Steve's last email, I read it as our having met
    Michael> your requirement since IKEv1 can still do its job on
    Michael> 2401bis as well as it did for 2401. 

More or less.  There are issues like the SPD PAD split that need to be
addressed in the document.  Similarly, we need to confirm that the
text added about rekey timeouts does not conflict with kink.  But I do
expect the answer to this question to be yes.

    Michael> A more interesting
    Michael> question is whether there's a way for KINK to easily
    Michael> inherit the new/changed IKEv2 payloads that support the
    Michael> 2401bis features. 

Or whether there is an easy way to get this functionality.  Note this
is not a requirement I have, but I do agree as an individual that it
is at least worth thinking about.

I think the main 2401bis feature is multiple SAs between two
destinations.  Kink actually already has this capability.  It may be
that by changing the text slightly and removing the requirement on
selecting which SA to use if multiple SAs exist, we can get most
2401bis functionality.

--Sam



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Subject: Re: KINK issue list rev.2
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On Wed, 2005-02-02 at 11:06, Sam Hartman wrote:
> >>>>> "Shoichi" =3D=3D Shoichi Sakane <sakane@kame.net> writes:
>=20
>     >> Speaking as an individual, normally when there is a major
>     >> version and a minor version the intent is that using a greater
>     >> minor version than one side expects is acceptable.
>=20
>     Shoichi> correct.  do you comment that the document does not touch
>     Shoichi> a minor version ?
>=20
> Correct.  The only thing I find is an invalid minor version error and
> a requirement that implementations MUST use version 1.0.  It doesn't
> say what happens if a recipient receives a greater minor version.
>=20
> Again, if the WG wants to use minor versions the same as major
> versions, that's OK but needs to be called out because it is not what
> people expect.

=46rom a jaded perspective: when is the last time a minor
version on a protocol has actually helped? Or for that
matter a major version?

Usually the semantics of major/minor or non-backward
compatible vs. backward compatible. That is, a receiver
MUST be able to deal with a higher minor version and
just ignore things it doesn't understand. But as I say,
in practice things get a lot messier. Maybe this would
be a way to deal with new IKEv2 stuff, but it's all
rather dependent on what morphed with phase 2 payloads.

So I'm rather ambivalent. The current phrasing will certainly
do it's main job: stopping a receiver from incorrectly parsing
future versions and the potential exploits that could result.
Maybe we really should leave it at that if for no other
reason from a security/system analysis standpoint.

		Mike

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Subject: Re: KINK issue list rev.2
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>>>>> "Michael" == Michael Thomas <mat@cisco.com> writes:

    Michael> So I'm rather ambivalent. The current phrasing will
    Michael> certainly do it's main job: stopping a receiver from
    Michael> incorrectly parsing future versions and the potential
    Michael> exploits that could result.  Maybe we really should leave
    Michael> it at that if for no other reason from a security/system
    Michael> analysis standpoint.

If you want to leave it please at least say that the receiver must
send back the appropriate bad version error.



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Subject: Re: KINK issue list rev.2
From: Michael Thomas <mat@cisco.com>
To: Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@MIT.EDU>
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On Wed, 2005-02-02 at 12:32, Sam Hartman wrote:
> >>>>> "Michael" =3D=3D Michael Thomas <mat@cisco.com> writes:
>=20
>     Michael> So I'm rather ambivalent. The current phrasing will
>     Michael> certainly do it's main job: stopping a receiver from
>     Michael> incorrectly parsing future versions and the potential
>     Michael> exploits that could result.  Maybe we really should leave
>     Michael> it at that if for no other reason from a security/system
>     Michael> analysis standpoint.
>=20
> If you want to leave it please at least say that the receiver must
> send back the appropriate bad version error.

Well, I'm actually asking what others want here. I sort
of tend toward this, but it's not just my call here...

		Mike

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From owner-ietf-kink@mail.vpnc.org  Wed Feb  2 17:14:13 2005
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Date: Wed, 2 Feb 2005 17:03:36 -0500
To: Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu>
From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
Subject: Re: KINK should referenece to IKEv2?
Cc: Michael Thomas <mat@cisco.com>, Shoichi Sakane <sakane@kame.net>,
        ietf-kink@vpnc.org, Stephen  Kent <kent@bbn.com>
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Sam,

>
>I think the main 2401bis feature is multiple SAs between two
>destinations.  Kink actually already has this capability.  It may be
>that by changing the text slightly and removing the requirement on
>selecting which SA to use if multiple SAs exist, we can get most
>2401bis functionality.

2401 already requires support for multiple SAs between a pair of 
peers. What 2401bis adds is a requirement to support these multiple 
SAs to have identical selectors, and where we are not just replacing 
one SA with a successor.

Steve



From owner-ietf-kink@mail.vpnc.org  Wed Feb  2 18:29:46 2005
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Subject: Re: KINK should referenece to IKEv2?
From: Michael Thomas <mat@cisco.com>
To: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
Cc: Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu>, Shoichi Sakane <sakane@kame.net>,
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On Wed, 2005-02-02 at 14:03, Stephen Kent wrote:
> 2401 already requires support for multiple SAs between a pair of=20
> peers. What 2401bis adds is a requirement to support these multiple=20
> SAs to have identical selectors, and where we are not just replacing=20
> one SA with a successor.

We're somewhat far afield of KINK, but what was this
for? Load balancing? QoS treatment?=20

		Mike

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From owner-ietf-kink@mail.vpnc.org  Wed Feb  2 18:40:02 2005
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To: Michael Thomas <mat@cisco.com>
From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
Subject: Re: KINK should referenece to IKEv2?
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At 3:25 PM -0800 2/2/05, Michael Thomas wrote:
>On Wed, 2005-02-02 at 14:03, Stephen Kent wrote:
>>  2401 already requires support for multiple SAs between a pair of
>>  peers. What 2401bis adds is a requirement to support these multiple
>>  SAs to have identical selectors, and where we are not just replacing
>>  one SA with a successor.
>
>We're somewhat far afield of KINK, but what was this
>for? Load balancing? QoS treatment?
>
>		Mike

QoS.

Steve



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>>>>> On Wed, 2 Feb 2005 14:47:21 -0500, Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> said:
 > 
 > Your characterization of 2401bis is correct, i.e., if one chooses to 
 > use IKEv1 with a 2401bis implementation, then it may not be possible 
 > to instantiate some SAs, i.e., ones that make use of new SPD features.

	I'm getting a little bit confused. If I understand correctly,
	we can implement KINK that works with 2041bis-based IPsec
	stack, using IKEv1 payload. So how about the opposite side? I
	mean, can we implement KINK that works both 2041-based and
	2041bis-based IPsec stack? As some people mentioned before,
	there are already so many 2041-based IPsec stacks in the
	market. Basically I want a KINK daemon/application/whatever
	that works on existing 2041-based systems, but I wish that
	code conforms the KINK-RFC-specification.

masahiro



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From: "KAMADA Ken'ichi" <kamada@nanohz.org>
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Subject: Re: KINK issue list rev.2
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At Wed, 02 Feb 2005 12:43:48 -0800,
Michael Thomas <mat@cisco.com> wrote:
> 
> On Wed, 2005-02-02 at 12:32, Sam Hartman wrote:
> > >>>>> "Michael" == Michael Thomas <mat@cisco.com> writes:
> > 
> >     Michael> So I'm rather ambivalent. The current phrasing will
> >     Michael> certainly do it's main job: stopping a receiver from
> >     Michael> incorrectly parsing future versions and the potential
> >     Michael> exploits that could result.  Maybe we really should leave
> >     Michael> it at that if for no other reason from a security/system
> >     Michael> analysis standpoint.
> > 
> > If you want to leave it please at least say that the receiver must
> > send back the appropriate bad version error.
> 
> Well, I'm actually asking what others want here. I sort
> of tend toward this, but it's not just my call here...

I have no problem on returning KINK_INVMIN.
If we would accept unknown minor version, we were likely to come up
against unknown payload type, and result to return an error.
If we want to address this, we might need a flag like the "critical"
bit of IKEv2, but I think KINK doesn't need such complexity.

# If the initator would like to establish SAs at any cost,
# it can fallback to KINK version X.0 anyway.

-- 
KAMADA Ken'ichi <kamada@nanohz.org>



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Subject: Re: KINK should referenece to IKEv2?
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> >I think the main 2401bis feature is multiple SAs between two
> >destinations.  Kink actually already has this capability.  It may be
> >that by changing the text slightly and removing the requirement on
> >selecting which SA to use if multiple SAs exist, we can get most
> >2401bis functionality.
> 
> 2401 already requires support for multiple SAs between a pair of 
> peers. What 2401bis adds is a requirement to support these multiple 
> SAs to have identical selectors, and where we are not just replacing 
> one SA with a successor.

2401bis requires a system complies 2401bis to handle multiple SAs
with same selector, but different "classifier" between same two nodes.
it means that it requires a key management protocol to establish
multiple SAs somehow.  i think that current kink specification can do that.



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My point was that I would not be happy that KINK based on 2401bis did not
work on an 2401 base platform due to market issue.  So I suggested that
it would be better to fix the specification based on 2401 first.

But, I change my mind.  I probably confused.  KINK can be based on
2401bis and can support its all feature like IKEv2.  In this case when
KINK runs on 2401, KINK doesn't use of its feature related to 2401bis,
that is all.  In fact, our IKEv2 pre-implementation based works fine
on a 2401 platform.  But it must be too much for KINK requirement
to support all feature of 2401bis.

So As I read Sam's last mail, my current opinion is that:

	- we have to describe the document complying with 2401bis wording
	  and its model.
	- we don't need to make KINK which supports all feature of 2401bis.
	- if above two are true, we don't need to take IKEv2 format by force.
	  just use almost current payloads.
	- however we have to describe how KINK works on 2401bis.
	- we have to also describe what KINK dosen't support the features
	  although it may be unnecessary.

Here is Sam's assumptions:
	1. Making Kink based on 2401bis will not require significant change.
	2. Making Kink based on 2401bis will not create significant
	   confusion for 2401 implementers.
	3. Making kink based on 2401bis will not require significant work
	   for people who have mostly complete kink implementations.

#1 is almost true.  I believe that we don't need significant change of
KINK specification, but we need to work improving the text a lot.
#2 is true.  because we don't need significant change of KINK
specification from #1.
#3 is true. because from #2.

Well, at least for me, there is no reason that we are sticking
to current specification related to 2401.



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not yet analyzed:	 3
open:			28
solution proposed:	 7
waiting revised i-d:	 2
closed:			 1
---------------------------
total:			41

[**] Indicates an issue considered substantive.
[-] Indicates an editorial issue.
(2401bis) Indicates it depends on 2401 vs 2401bis.


#1 [**] Versioning

	what happens when a receiver receives a major or
	minor version of the kink or qm that is inconsistent with this
	document?  What about unknown payload types?  (Sam Hartman)

	QM version is discussed in section 12 (Forward Compatibility
	Considerations).

	- KINK version
		return error (KINK_INVMAJ, KINK_INVMIN)
	- QM versoin
		already specified in section 12.
	- KINK payload type
		return error (KINK_PROTOERR)
	- ISAKMP payload type
		return error (ISAKMP INVALID-PAYLOAD-TYPE)
		(describe each Notify type usage like ikev2 spec.)

	Specify the behavior when the error is not authenticated
	in the Security Consideration section.


#2 [**] U2U
(not yet analyzed)

	I think we need to look at how u2u works at various parts of
	the protocol.  In particular I'm concerned about choosing the right
	u2u principal, dealing with cross-realm u2u and dealing with
	recovering from reboots.  We should confirm all these work out.
	(Sam Hartman)


#3 [**] user-to-user (section 3, 4.2, and 5.1.2)
(not yet analyzed)

	It seems like the
	server tells the client what principal to authenticate to, but this
	principal is not properly authorized.  (Sam Hartman)

	More examination of user-to-user case, especially situations where 
	it might *not* be two PKINIT clients, which section 3 says is possible. 
	(BTW, in the Kerberos docs, it's "user-to-user", not "user-user".)
	(Ken Raeburn)

	Verifying remotely supplied identity, as Sam raised earlier.
	(Ken Raeburn)

	In the user-to-user case with TGTs, I think the KINK draft may be 
	over-specifying things that should be dealt with at the Kerberos level. 
	If things are underspecified in Kerberos Clarifications, let's deal 
	with that.  (Ken Raeburn)

	Section 4.2:
	[**] How will the initiator determine whether it will be able to get a
	TGT?  I think policy considerations of when to use u2u and
	authorization considerations of what u2u principals are authorized are
	underspecified in the draft.
	(Sam Hartman)

	[**] Make sure the descriptions of u2u work correctly in the
	cross-realm case.
	(Sam Hartman)

	Section 5.1.2:
	[**] How do I authorize which service I'm talking to in the u2u case.
	I.E. how do I know what principals are authorized for a particular SPD
	entry?  (Sam Hartman)


#4 [**](2401bis) CREATE command from the aspect of 2401bis (section 4.3)

	I need explicit review from the IPsec reviewer of this section to
	make sure it is compatible with 2401bis.


#37 [**] Difference between IKE and KINK on CREATE command (section 4.3)

	IN addition, any differences
	between how this works and how IKE would set up the same SA need to be
	called out.  It is fine for there to be differences, but I want to
	make sure the working group explicitly decided the differences are a
	good thing.

	I'm somewhat concerned that 4.3 is not specific enough to describe
	exactly what key gets set up.  I.E. I'm concerned it may not be
	detailed enough for interoperable implementations.
	(Sam Hartman)

	- What keys are used for the resulting SA on the each side?
	  (Sam Hartman, Message-ID: <tslbrb4aqae.fsf@cz.mit.edu>)
	- Doesn't the timing when to add in/out SAs conflict with IKE?
	  (Sam Hartman, Message-ID: <tsllla6pz7t.fsf@cz.mit.edu>)


#5 [*] When 3-way, is responder's nonce MUST or SHOULD? (section 4.3 and 7.3)
(solution proposed)

	Sec 4.3 and 7.3 use SHOULD and MUST respectively regarding when the 
	nonce should be used.  If the circumstances they're describing are 
	different, that's okay, but if so, I missed it on first reading.
	(Ken Raeburn)

	They are talking the same situation and the requirement levels should
	be aligned.  I think SHOULD is appropriate because non-returning
	responder's nonce does not break interoperabilities.
	(Message-ID: <20050127171441FF%kamada@nanohz.org>)

	If the initiator receives a responder's nonce, she MUST use
	it in the KEYMAT calculation.



#6 [*] Half open (section 4.4)
(solution proposed)

	IPsec does not allow half-open security associations any more as far
	as I can tell in 2401bis.  So it's not just for simplicity, but for
	model conformance.  (Sam Hartman)

	Proposed solution:
	remove the phrase "for simplicity".
	(Message-ID: <tslu0pbc3h9.fsf@cz.mit.edu>)


#7 [**] DPD & STATUS (section 4.4.2 and 4.5)

	[**] Discuss status message, rebooting peers and u2u.  This looks a
	lot like the IKE case where you lose all cryptographic context to me.
	(Sam Hartman)

	I don't understand what you want here. Are you saying
	that this doesn't work in the u-u case? I don't
	understand what u-u has to do with anything here.  (Michael Thomas)

	OK.  I was unclear .  When sending a status message, what happens if
	the peer has gotten a new TGT?  How do I realize I need to use this
	TGT rather than the one I have?  (Sam Hartman)


#8 [*] CksumLen (section 5)
(solution proposed)

	Diagram indicates one octet for cksumlen, but the text (and 
	kcrypto specifications) say it should be two.

	Clarify that you mean the padding discussed in 5.1 (KINK Padding
	Rules), not crypto-system padding.  (Sam Hartman)

	Use 2 octets for CksumLen field in accordance with kcrypto.

	See also: #9


#9 [**] etype does not directly indicate checksum type (section 5)
(solution proposed)

	a key's encryption type does not directly indicate 
	a checksum type, it indicates an encryption(-with-integrity-protection) 
	scheme, which does include a required-to-implement checksum type
	(Ken Raeburn)

	Proposed solutions are:
	- Use required-to-implement checksum type determined by the etype.
	- Use get_mic or verify_mic function to generate or verify the checksum.
	- Omit the checksum field before calculation.
	- The Length field is filled with the packet length without checksum and
	  the CksumLen field is zeroed out before the calculation.
	- Move the Cksum field to the end of the message.
	  (maybe without padding between the last payload and checksum?)
	(Message-ID: <20050131093509FD%kamada@nanohz.org>)


#10 [**] Kerberos allows variable length checksum (section 5)
(solution proposed)

	I'd have to go back and check, but I don't think we require that 
	a given checksum type have a fixed output size, so "leave X amount of 
	space and fill it with zero for computing the checksum" is questionable 
	too.  (Ken Raeburn)

	Proposed solution: look at #9


#11 [*] Kerberos checksum is not deterministic (section 5)
(solution proposed)

	The Kink description of how to verify a checksum assumes that
	Kerberos checksums are deterministic; this is not strictly required.
	(Sam Hartman)

	let kcrypto specify how 
	to verify a checksum, as they're not required to be deterministic, so 
	the "compute it again and compare" approach specified in section 5 is 
	wrong  (Ken Raeburn)

	Proposed solution: look at #9


#12 [**] Subsession keys (section 5 and 8)

	Are subsession keys ignored?  (Ken Raeburn)

	The description of the checksum says that the session key of the
	ticket is used.  That's a way to do it, but the working group should
	explain why it has chosen to ignore the subsession key.
	(Sam Hartman)


#13 [**] Replay protection (section 5)
(closed)

	The document claims that the transaction id is not used for
	replay detection because Kerberos provides that.  How is that true?
	The authenticator is protected against replays but how is the rest of
	the message bound to that specific authenticator instead of to a
	session key of a ticket?
	(Sam Hartman)

	Closed: (Message-ID: <tslfz0gaqbz.fsf@cz.mit.edu>)


#14 [-] Reserved (15 bits) --  Reserved and must be zero (section 5)

	must be zero on send, must be ignored by receiver.


#15 [**] Principal name of KINK service (section 5.1.2)

	How do I discover the FQDN of my remote peer?   SPD
	entries are configured in terms of  IP addresses.  If you  want to
	store an identity in the PAD, why not store a principal instead of a
	hostname.


#16 [*] EPOCH (section 5.1.2)

	Perhaps you need a description of the time stamp?  I recall there
	being such a description in draft-housley-binarytime-xx.
	(Sam Hartman)

	The text is describing a 4-octet field in the KINK message header
	instead of ASN.1 field, so the description is not so needless.


#17 [**] Checksum when KRB-ERROR occured (section 5.1.4 and 7.1)

	Section 7.1 says the checksum in the KRB-ERROR message is not used,
	but section 5.1.4 says that KINK implementation MUST make use of
	keyed Kerberos errors.  But KRB-ERROR does not have checksum in it (at
	least with RFC 1510 or kerberos-clarifications).
	I think a correct phrase here is "KINK implementations MUST make use of
	a KINK Cksum field when returning KINK_KRB_ERROR and the appropriate
	service key is available."

	Remove following paragraph from section 5.1.4.  (Sam Hartman)
	  KINK implementations MUST make use of keyed Kerberos errors when  the
	  appropriate  service  key  is available as specified in [KRBREVS]. In
	  particular, clock  skew  errors  MUST  be  integrity  protected.  For
	  unauthenticated  Kerberos  errors,  the receiver MAY choose to act on
	  them, but SHOULD take precautions against make-work kinds of attacks.

	Drop reference to krb-error checksum from section 7.1.  (Sam Hartman)
	  defined in the following sections.  The checksum in the KRB-ERROR
	  message is not used, since the KINK header already contains a check-
	  sum field.


#18 [**] Kerberos error type limitations (section 5.1.4)

	Why should a sender send only those errors?  I'm mostly asking
	for an explanation to be given to me or to be added to the document
	rather than liberalization of the requirement.  (Sam Hartman)


#19 [**] Cross-realm and U2U (section 5.1.5)
(not yet analyzed)

	Please Consider how this works in the cross-realm case.
	I.E. make sure you end up with the right ticket on the right side.  I
	believe this text assumes that you need a ticket in a realm close to
	the client; I think that for things to work you actually need a realm
	close to the server.  Work through the message flows and make sure the
	KDC doing the decryption actually has the necessary keys and then
	adjust the document if necessary so the right KDC is used.

	The document needs to clearly indicate what error code is used in the
	case when the responder cannot get a ticket because some cross-realm
	key is missing.  In general we want it to be possible for an initiator
	to try several identities until the initiator finds the right one that
	has a shared key.  (Sam Hartman)


#20 [**] KINK_ENCRYPT format (section 5.1.8)

	The format of the encrypted part of KINK_ENCRYPT (section 5.1.8) is
	vague.  I think of using the output of raw encryption algorithms
	(i.e. E(confounder | plaintext | pad)) or using EncryptedData.

	treat "encryption with 
	integrity protection" output as a whole, don't peek under the covers to 
	find a "checksum" part you can throw away  (Ken Raeburn)

	drop references to the initialization vector  (Ken Raeburn)

	Please use the output of the kcrypto encrypt
	operation directly.  Of most importance is to make sure that all
	kcrypto enctypes will work even if it is not possible to decompose the
	kcrypto checksum from the encrypted data.  This probably means that in
	some cases you will have double checksums.
	You also need to deal with making sure you can determine the length of
	the plaintext.  (Sam Hartman)


#21 [*] Next Payload in KINK_ENCRYPT (section 5.1.8)

	Text should probably indacte that next payload must be none.


#22 [*] Kerberos PFS (section 6.8)

	Sec 6.8: "Kerberos in general does not provide PFS so it is somewhat 
	questionable whether a system which is heavily relying on Kerberos 
	benefits from PFS."  First, that sounds like it might be Security 
	Considerations material.  Second, I don't follow; explain please?
	(Ken Raeburn)


#23 [*] KE interoperability (section 6.8)

	What happens if a peer that implements the KE payloads communicates
	with a peer that does not.  Specify the behavior in sufficient detail
	to guarantee interoperability.  (Sam Hartman)


#24 [*] MUST/SHOULD in clock skew (section 7.1)

	The time difference MUST be computed and SHOULD be stored 
	and used?  Why the different requirement levels?  (And is this sort of 
	thing in the domain of KINK or Kerberos?)  (Ken Raeburn)


#25 [**] prf (section 8)

	Section 8 says "prf is the same hash algorithm found in the session
	ticket's etype", but krb-wg-crypto-07 defines hash as unkeyed.
	Fortunately krb-wg-crypto-07 defines a PRF for each etype, so KINK
	should use this PRF.

	Use a prf 
	from kcrypto, don't assume the checksum operations are deterministic 
	hash functions  (Ken Raeburn)

	Section 6.1 (the description of hash algorithm):
	This checksum may not be deterministic and is probably not
	appropriate for use in setting up a key.  A PRF is provided, although
	depending on how the hash is used the PRF may or may not be a suitable
	replacement.  There has been significant discussion within krb-wg on
	when the PRF is appropriate and when it is not.  This discussion
	centered around key determination in pkinit.  (Sam Hartman)


#26 [*] Key derivation (section 8)

	The key derivation seems inconsistent with the crypto framework
	document.  (Sam Hartman)

	I don't understand what this section says well enough to determine
	whether it works with kcrypto.  (Sam Hartman)


#27 [*](2401bis) SPD Considerations (section 10.1)

	This should not go in the security considartions section.  It is
	really more about IPsec architectural considerations than security
	considerations.

	This text needs to take into account 2401bis.  In particular it needs
	to be properly split between SPD considerations and PAD
	considerations.  (Sam Hartman)


#28 [*] Key usage

	Usage of  kink should specify the key usage numbers for kerberos
	encryption.  (Sam Hartman)


#29 [*](2401bis) Rekeying (section 4.4.1)

	section 4.4.1:
	Please make sure this discussion is aligned with 2401bis.  I think it
	may change small details but they seem to have adopted much of the
	same strategy kink uses.  The area wher I believe they speak to this
	issue is when you should rekey (timers etc).  (Sam Hartman)


#30 [*](2401bis) IKEv2

	Should we adopt IKEv2?

	If we should...
	- IKEv2 does not have DOI, so how to handle the DOI field in the KINK
	  packet header should be described.
	- Use TS (Traffic Selector) instead of ID (Identification).
	- KEYMAT calculation is changed.
	- How to handle REKEY_SA Notify type.


#31 [*] behavior on KINK_ERROR

	In implementor's point of view, I'd like to see initiator's
	behavior in receiving KINK_ERROR to be defined.
	For example:
	- When KINK_OK is received, initiator MAY act as if the KINK_ERROR
	  payload was not included in the messaged.
	- When KINK_BADQMVERS is received and the Cksum is verified,
	  initiator MAY retry in other Quick Mode version.
	- When one of other error codes is received and the Cksum is verified,
	  initiator SHOULD abort the negotiation.

	when does the responder generate these errors?


#32 [-] I-D nits

	Review the I-D nits and RFC authors docs.  I spotted a lot of 
	mechanical things (number of lines per page; avoid hyphenation; use 
	ragged right margin; need two spaces after sentence-ending period; fix 
	page numbers in table of contents; add section numbers to TOC) most of 
	which I think are specified in one of those documents.
	(Ken Raeburn)

	the document needs to meet all the ID nits when it is
	submitted.  (Sam Hartman)


#33 [-] IANA considerations (section 11)

	I think the correct terminology is "port 
	number", not "port", and they're "assigned", not "created".  This 
	section says no new registries are required in the first paragraph, and 
	the third one specifies that IANA must create one (but without the 
	associated procedural data that is required nowadays).  Are the KINK 
	payload types and ISAKMP payload types actually ever used in the same 
	field?  If not, I don't think they need to come out of the same 
	registry.  (Ken Raeburn)

	Needs work.  You may want to stop by tthe IANA office hours and ask
	them for advice.  They are generally quite good at working with
	authors to figure out how things need to be specified.
	(Sam Hartman)


#38 [-] Terminology

	Section 2 and 10.1.
	Kerberos is now using the term user-user rather than user-to-user.
	(Sam Hartman)

	Section 2.
	Principals are not either client or service principals;
	they can and often do fill both roles.  (Sam Hartman)


#40 [-] Wording
(waiting revised i-d)

	Section 2, last paragraph.  "Between" is generally non-directional, 
	but in this case, a direction seems to be intended to be inferred; try 
	"from...to" instead.  (Ken Raeburn)


#41 [-] Wording in section 3, Protocol Overview

	Section 3, English usage/grammar problems with the first two paragraphs.
	(Sam Hartman)

	Section 3.
	   which allows a final acknowledgment message when the respondent needs
	   a full three-way handshake. This is only needed when the optimistic
	   keying route is not taken, though it is expected that that will not
	   be the norm. KINK also provides rekeying and dead peer detection as
	What is expected not to be the norm?  Please reword.
	(Sam Hartman)


#42 [-] Wording

	Section 4.3, discussing attributes, mixes singular and plural 
	indications.  The word "lone" appears to be popular with the author, 
	too. :-)  (Ken Raeburn)


#43 [-] Wording

	Sec 8: "By optional, it is meant..." is badly worded.  (Ken Raeburn)


#35 [-] References
(solution proposed)

	The reference to [PKCROSS] is unnecessary, and only happens once, in 
	the introduction.  I'd suggest dropping it.  That's one less 
	unpublished I-D in the references section.  (Ken Raeburn)

	[KRBREVS] is referenced but not listed in the references section.
	(Ken Raeburn)

	Sec 5.1.7, next to last paragraph on page 21, is "IKE" (the 
	protocol) fuzzy about use of different SAs, or is it "[IKE]" (the 
	document)?  (Ken Raeburn)

	Section 1:
	Remove the reference to pkcross or cite something outside the IETF.
	It's an expired ID without and active editor.  (Sam Hartman)

	Section 1:
	Add an informative reference to IKE.  (Sam Hartman)

	Section 2:
	Cite a reference for DER.  (Sam Hartman)

	Section 5: DOI
	Cite a specific registry please.  IANA registries are typically
	named, and a URL reference would probably be appropriate.


#36 [-] Typos
(waiting revised i-d)

	4.4.2. Dead Peer Detection
	In the fourth paragraph, "loose" is to be "lose".

	5.1 KINK Payloads
	In the first item, the length of the Next Payload should be
	one octet instead of two.

	5.1.1. KINK Padding Rules
	In the second item, "other other" is to be "other".

	5.1.1. KINK Padding Rules
	The first item in the list should end with a period like 
	the others.  (Ken Raeburn)

	5.1.5. KINK_TGT_REQ Payload
	In the third item, "krbtgt/REALM/@REALM" is to be "krbtgt/REALM@REALM".

	5.1.6. KINK_TGT_REP Payload
	In the caption of Figure 13, "KINK_TGT_REQ" is to be "KINK_TGT_REP".

	7.3. CREATE
	"IPspec" is to be "IPsec".

	7.5. STATUS
	In the last paragraph, "REPLY KINK Header" should be in one line.
	In the last paragraph, "[KRB_ERROR]" is to be "[KINK_ERROR]".

	overall:
	"'s" is used in some places where I'd use "s" for a plural form.



From owner-ietf-kink@mail.vpnc.org  Thu Feb  3 23:39:39 2005
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Hello,

#24 [*] MUST/SHOULD in clock skew (section 7.1)

	The time difference MUST be computed and SHOULD be stored
	and used?  Why the different requirement levels?  (And is this sort of
	thing in the domain of KINK or Kerberos?)  (Ken Raeburn)

I considered this issue.

The clarifications does not mention clock skew processing in the client/server
authentication exchange. The way to process the skew is left to an application.

I think the clock skew processing is an implementation and/or operational issue
in KINK. However the server must provide the ctime because the client may want
to continue the process though there is skew.

I propose that KINK filling out ctime is MUST but KINK should not decide the
processing.

--
Kazunori Miyazawa




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From: "KAMADA Ken'ichi" <kamada@nanohz.org>
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At Tue, 01 Feb 2005 17:06:33 -0500,
Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu> wrote:
> 
> >>>>> "KAMADA" == KAMADA Ken'ichi <kamada@nanohz.org> writes:
> 
>     >>  Section 4.3:
>     >> 
>     >> [**] I need explicit review from the IPsec reviewer of this
>     >> section to make sure it is compatible with 2401bis.  IN
>     >> addition, any differences between how this works and how IKE
>     >> would set up the same SA need to be called out.  It is fine for
>     >> there to be differences, but I want to make sure the working
>     >> group explicitly decided the differences are a good thing.
>     >> 
>     >> I'm somewhat concerned that 4.3 is not specific enough to
>     >> describe exactly what key gets set up.  I.E. I'm concerned it
>     >> may not be detailed enough for interoperable implementations.
> 
>     KAMADA> Section 4.3 describes the message flow and section 7.3
>     KAMADA> describes the message structure.  Differences between KINK
>     KAMADA> and IKE is described in section 7.3 (and also in section
>     KAMADA> 4.4.1, 5.1.7, and 6).  I think they are enough to be
>     KAMADA> interoperable (at least regarding SA setup).  Is your
>     KAMADA> concern resolved if section 4 referes to section 7?
> 
> I think everything is clear except for what key ends up getting used
> for the resulting SA.  I think that needs specific text.

The key used for IPsec SAs is defined in section 8, "Key Derivation".
Its definition follows IKEv1.

-- 
KAMADA Ken'ichi <kamada@nanohz.org>



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At Wed, 02 Feb 2005 13:56:54 -0500,
Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu> wrote:
> 
> >>>>> "Shoichi" == Shoichi Sakane <sakane@kame.net> writes:
> 
>     >> Section 4.3:
>     >> 
>     >> [**] I need explicit review from the IPsec reviewer of this
>     >> section to make sure it is compatible with 2401bis.  IN
>     >> addition, any differences between how this works and how IKE
>     >> would set up the same SA need to be called out.  It is fine for
>     >> there to be differences, but I want to make sure the working
>     >> group explicitly decided the differences are a good thing.
> 
>     Shoichi> i dont think there are differneces between them.  because
>     Shoichi> KINK just carries IKEv1 quick mode.  KINK can establish
>     Shoichi> the same SA that IKEv1 do so.  
> 
> Section 4.3 calls out a lot of explicit detail.  For example it says
> exactly when to add SAs to the SPD, etc.  This detail is presented as
> Kink specific.
> 
> I am asking for review to confirm that this detail did not conflict
> with anything in the IKE spec.  If section 4.3 said to just do what
> IKE does, I would not have called it out.

IKE does not unfortunately specify when an implementation adds SAs
to the SAD.  And KINK's optimistic approach (2-way handshake) is
new to IKEv1.  Therefore KINK specifies it in detail.
I think the detailed description in section 4.3 is necessary.

I think SA setup sequence in 3-way handshake should also be written,
in addition to the current descriptions.

-- 
KAMADA Ken'ichi <kamada@nanohz.org>



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To: mat@cisco.com
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Subject: Re: KINK issue list rev.2
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> On Wed, 2005-02-02 at 12:32, Sam Hartman wrote:
> > >>>>> "Michael" == Michael Thomas <mat@cisco.com> writes:
> > 
> >     Michael> So I'm rather ambivalent. The current phrasing will
> >     Michael> certainly do it's main job: stopping a receiver from
> >     Michael> incorrectly parsing future versions and the potential
> >     Michael> exploits that could result.  Maybe we really should leave
> >     Michael> it at that if for no other reason from a security/system
> >     Michael> analysis standpoint.
> > 
> > If you want to leave it please at least say that the receiver must
> > send back the appropriate bad version error.
> 
> Well, I'm actually asking what others want here. I sort
> of tend toward this, but it's not just my call here...

I don't think KINK will have minor change often, and I don't think the
minor version will bring worth things to KINK.  so I feel that I want
to remove the minor version from KINK specification.

However, if we will leave it, it is policy matter to process a message
with a higher minor version.  so we have to describe like below:
	if a endpoint receives a message with a higher major version
	number, it MUST drop the message and SHOULD send a KINK_ERROR
	with KINK_INVMIN.



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Subject: #23 [*] KE interoperability (section 6.8)
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> #23 [*] KE interoperability (section 6.8)
> 
> 	What happens if a peer that implements the KE payloads communicates
> 	with a peer that does not.  Specify the behavior in sufficient detail
> 	to guarantee interoperability.  (Sam Hartman)

my understanding is correct, there is no description in the IKEv1
specifications though it defines the error code which can be used
in this case.  IKEv2 defines clearly.  so if KINK specification
complies to IKEv1 manner, we have to define the behavior and describe
it for interoperability.  if KINK complies to IKEv2 manner, we can
probably leave it.

another problem comes up.  there is no way to negotiate a DH group
to use in a quick mode.  so in IKEv1, they have to define the DH group
before they negotiate.  current KINK specification does not touch it.
this is no matter in IKEv2.

and an initiator can not install the inbound SA when the initiator
choices to send KE because KEYMAT is not calculated before the initiator
receives KE from the responder.  the document has to touch this situation.



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> #22 [*] Kerberos PFS (section 6.8)
> 
> 	Sec 6.8: "Kerberos in general does not provide PFS so it is somewhat 
> 	questionable whether a system which is heavily relying on Kerberos 
> 	benefits from PFS."  First, that sounds like it might be Security 
> 	Considerations material.  Second, I don't follow; explain please?
> 	(Ken Raeburn)

I agree with Ken about the first.  the document has to describe this
issue in the security consideration even if the thing is not issue,
at least, the document says that is questionable.

I don't understand what Ken meant.  what don't you follow ?



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Subject: #18 [**] Kerberos error type limitations (section 5.1.4)
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> #18 [**] Kerberos error type limitations (section 5.1.4)
> 
>	Why should a sender send only those errors?  I'm mostly asking
>	for an explanation to be given to me or to be added to the document
>	rather than liberalization of the requirement.  (Sam Hartman)

I am not sure why the document describes such limitations.
If we don't have any reason, remove the limitations, and remove the text:

	but the sender SHOULD send only the  following errors:

	    KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY
	    KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED
	    KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW
	    KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_NOKEY
	    KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADKEYVER



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Subject: #5 [*] When 3-way, is responder's nonce MUST or SHOULD?
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> #5 [*] When 3-way, is responder's nonce MUST or SHOULD? (section 4.3 and 7.3)
> (solution proposed)
> 
> 	Sec 4.3 and 7.3 use SHOULD and MUST respectively regarding when the 
> 	nonce should be used.  If the circumstances they're describing are 
> 	different, that's okay, but if so, I missed it on first reading.
> 	(Ken Raeburn)
> 
> 	They are talking the same situation and the requirement levels should
> 	be aligned.  I think SHOULD is appropriate because non-returning
> 	responder's nonce does not break interoperabilities.
> 	(Message-ID: <20050127171441FF%kamada@nanohz.org>)
> 
> 	If the initiator receives a responder's nonce, she MUST use
> 	it in the KEYMAT calculation.

I think it is also editorial issue.  anyway, the behavior depends on
condition.  if a responder does not agree with the initiator's proposal,
AND if the responder wants to continue the transaction, then the responder
MUST send back a message with ACK request bit, and MAY contain a nonce.
There is a case when the responder wants to use same KEYMAT of the
initiator, but just doesn't want to use the initiator's proposal.
It is not always required to add a nonce.

When the initiator receives a nonce as the reply from the responder,
AND the initiator wants to continue the transaction, then the initiator
MUST reculculates KEYMAT with the nonce, and MUST send back a ACK message.



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Subject: #21 [*] Next Payload in KINK_ENCRYPT (section 5.1.8)
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> #21 [*] Next Payload in KINK_ENCRYPT (section 5.1.8)
> 
> 	Text should probably indacte that next payload must be none.

the section 5.1 describes:
      NextPayload type KINK_DONE denotes that the current payload is the
      final payload in the message.

however it would be better to describe explicitly so.
reader does not has trouble even if the text is described repeatedly.



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Subject: #20 [**] KINK_ENCRYPT format (section 5.1.8)
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i agree that KINK uses the output of the kcrypto function.
it will make a calculation cost slightly high.  but as my experience
of implementing KINK, i can say that it will be fine to use the library
directly.  and Ken's comment is important.  we can not say that
such crypto algorithm will not published.

> #20 [**] KINK_ENCRYPT format (section 5.1.8)
> 
> 	The format of the encrypted part of KINK_ENCRYPT (section 5.1.8) is
> 	vague.  I think of using the output of raw encryption algorithms
> 	(i.e. E(confounder | plaintext | pad)) or using EncryptedData.
> 
> 	treat "encryption with 
> 	integrity protection" output as a whole, don't peek under the covers to 
> 	find a "checksum" part you can throw away  (Ken Raeburn)
> 
> 	drop references to the initialization vector  (Ken Raeburn)
> 
> 	Please use the output of the kcrypto encrypt
> 	operation directly.  Of most importance is to make sure that all
> 	kcrypto enctypes will work even if it is not possible to decompose the
> 	kcrypto checksum from the encrypted data.  This probably means that in
> 	some cases you will have double checksums.
> 	You also need to deal with making sure you can determine the length of
> 	the plaintext.  (Sam Hartman)



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On Fri, 2005-02-04 at 04:11, Shoichi Sakane wrote:
> > #22 [*] Kerberos PFS (section 6.8)
> >=20
> > 	Sec 6.8: "Kerberos in general does not provide PFS so it is somewhat=20
> > 	questionable whether a system which is heavily relying on Kerberos=20
> > 	benefits from PFS."  First, that sounds like it might be Security=20
> > 	Considerations material.  Second, I don't follow; explain please?
> > 	(Ken Raeburn)
>=20
> I agree with Ken about the first.  the document has to describe this
> issue in the security consideration even if the thing is not issue,
> at least, the document says that is questionable.
>=20
> I don't understand what Ken meant.  what don't you follow ?

Well, it's pretty simple really: when you get tickets from
the KDC, they aren't protected by PFS so using PFS later
is pretty questionable. It's not useless, but it's not any
huge win either. Until Kerberos itself supports PFS, people
deploying KINK really ought not get worked up into a lather
about turning on PFS to improve security since it's doesn't
to any great degree.

		Mike

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Subject: Re: #23 [*] KE interoperability (section 6.8)
From: Michael Thomas <mat@cisco.com>
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I haven't looked it up in the draft, but my feeling is
that the Receiver MUST implement KE payloads, though
I suppose that it may be administratively rejected with
an error message if it doesn't want to participate.=20

IKEv1 doesn't define it because it always expects that
the initial DH is performed; KINK doesn't require this
since there's already a shared key in the ticket.

		Mike

On Fri, 2005-02-04 at 04:35, Shoichi Sakane wrote:
> > #23 [*] KE interoperability (section 6.8)
> >=20
> > 	What happens if a peer that implements the KE payloads communicates
> > 	with a peer that does not.  Specify the behavior in sufficient detail
> > 	to guarantee interoperability.  (Sam Hartman)
>=20
> my understanding is correct, there is no description in the IKEv1
> specifications though it defines the error code which can be used
> in this case.  IKEv2 defines clearly.  so if KINK specification
> complies to IKEv1 manner, we have to define the behavior and describe
> it for interoperability.  if KINK complies to IKEv2 manner, we can
> probably leave it.
>=20
> another problem comes up.  there is no way to negotiate a DH group
> to use in a quick mode.  so in IKEv1, they have to define the DH group
> before they negotiate.  current KINK specification does not touch it.
> this is no matter in IKEv2.
>=20
> and an initiator can not install the inbound SA when the initiator
> choices to send KE because KEYMAT is not calculated before the initiator
> receives KE from the responder.  the document has to touch this situation=
.

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On Fri, 2005-02-04 at 00:04, KAMADA Ken'ichi wrote:

> IKE does not unfortunately specify when an implementation adds SAs
> to the SAD.  And KINK's optimistic approach (2-way handshake) is
> new to IKEv1.  Therefore KINK specifies it in detail.
> I think the detailed description in section 4.3 is necessary.
>=20
> I think SA setup sequence in 3-way handshake should also be written,
> in addition to the current descriptions.


Right -- this was one of the huge deficiencies of IKE
which we were very intent to deal with. KINK is actually
has a *lot* of things corrected -- things that we hopefully
also corrected in IKEv2. Which is why it's so annoying when
it is suggested that KINK do it the IKEv2 way -- KINK
led the way here, not the other way around. KINK should
have been an RFC way before IKEv2 was issued.

		Mike

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Subject: Re: KINK issue list rev.2
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On Fri, 2005-02-04 at 02:22, Shoichi Sakane wrote:

> I don't think KINK will have minor change often, and I don't think the
> minor version will bring worth things to KINK.  so I feel that I want
> to remove the minor version from KINK specification.

I fine with this is others are fine with this too.

		Mike

>=20
> However, if we will leave it, it is policy matter to process a message
> with a higher minor version.  so we have to describe like below:
> 	if a endpoint receives a message with a higher major version
> 	number, it MUST drop the message and SHOULD send a KINK_ERROR
> 	with KINK_INVMIN.

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	<tsllla6pz7t.fsf@cz.mit.edu> <20050204170454BO%kamada@nanohz.org>
From: Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu>
Date: Fri, 04 Feb 2005 16:23:47 -0500
In-Reply-To: <20050204170454BO%kamada@nanohz.org> (KAMADA Ken'ichi's message
 of "Fri, 04 Feb 2005 17:04:54 +0900")
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>>>>> "KAMADA" == KAMADA Ken'ichi <kamada@nanohz.org> writes:


    KAMADA> I think the detailed description
    KAMADA> in section 4.3 is necessary.

I like the descriptive text in 4.3 too.  I just want the person the
chairs and I select as an IPsec reviewer to confirm that nothing
conflicts with IKEv1.

--Sam



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Subject: Re: KINK issue list
From: Michael Thomas <mat@cisco.com>
To: Kazunori Miyazawa <kazunori@miyazawa.org>
Cc: "KAMADA Ken'ichi" <kamada@nanohz.org>, ietf-kink@vpnc.org
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On Mon, 2005-01-31 at 17:54, Kazunori Miyazawa wrote:
> Hello,
>=20
> I have read the mails and I think these issues could be closed.
>=20
> Kamada-san described the checksum calculation and verification in
> this mail.
> http://www.vpnc.org/ietf-kink/mail-archive/msg00336.html
>=20
> If KINK adopts this, check sum length in KINK header will be two
> octets because kcrypto specifies that the output of get_mic is
> no longer than 65535 octets in the section 4.

Yes, there is an inconsistency in the draft in this
regard... the diagram which shows it as being one
octet actually more closely reflects reality (unfortunately).
I haven't thought very hard about how to resolve this.

> BTW, if there are no strong reason, I like to move the check sum
> field from the header to the end of message, because we could
> be easy to access KINK_AP_REQ/REP payload and forget it after
> verification.

Am I understanding you as saying that you'd like this
to not be in the KINK header at all? And instead be,=20
like, in one of the payloads following the header? That
might be problematic given the KINK_ENCRYPT payload and
some other odd things that might surface.

		Mike

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Hello,

I considered the issue and got questions.

The issue is
#28 [*] Key usage

	Usage of  kink should specify the key usage numbers for kerberos
	encryption.

If KINK uses kcrypto, we can find key usage numbers in
draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarificaiton.

However in section 4 of the clarifications

   There might exist other documents which define protocols in terms of
   the RFC1510 encryption types or checksum types. Such documents would
   not know about key usages. In order that these specifications
   continue to be meaningful until they are updated, if no key usage
   values are specified then key usages 1024 and 1025 must be used to
   derive keys for encryption and checksums, respectively (this does not
   apply to protocols that do their own encryption independent of this
   framework, directly using the key resulting from the Kerberos
   authentication exchange.) New protocols defined in terms of the
   Kerberos encryption and checksum types SHOULD use their own key usage
   values.

The questions are:

1. Does KINK correspond to whether protocol in terms of the RFC1510
   or new protocol?

2. If KINK is protocol in terms of the RFC1510, is KINK able to use
   1024 and 1025?

3. Otherwise, I think we should assign the numbers.
   How will we assign the numbers? Does it raise IANA issue?

--
Kazunori Miyazawa




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#27 [*](2401bis) SPD Considerations (section 10.1)

	This should not go in the security considartions section.  It is
	really more about IPsec architectural considerations than security
	considerations.

I agree. I don't think they are security issues.

	This text needs to take into account 2401bis.  In particular it needs
	to be properly split between SPD considerations and PAD
	considerations.  (Sam Hartman)

I think the first paragraph may be kind of message flow or over view of protocol
because it specifies condition under which we should use GETTGT or normal key
exchange.

If KINK refers to 2401bis, I think that almost of section 10.1 is related to PAD
rather than SPD, because SPD specifies filtering rules and the way to process in
2401bis.

Second paragraph of section 10.1 requires these parameters in SPD
1 KDC to contact
2 principal name for respondent
3 AP-REQ/AP-REP or u2u to CREATE/DELETE

However I think only the principal name should be held by PAD, and others (1,3)
should be left to implementation, because IPsec stack is not concerned with
how to exchange the key.

2401bis says PAD stores shared secret if peer authenticated by the secret.
When we apply this to KINK, we might store the ticket into PAD.

--
Kazunori Miyazawa












From owner-ietf-kink@mail.vpnc.org  Tue Feb  8 16:26:25 2005
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Subject: Re: #28 [*] Key usage
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From: Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu>
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 "Tue, 08 Feb 2005 13:38:04 +0900")
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You can assign the numbers out of the space reserved for applications
if principals used for kink will not be used for other purposes.  If
principals used for kink will be used for other purposes it is
probably desirable to talk to Tom Yu and get a key usage number added
to 1510ter.  You'll also want to add the same key usage number to Kink
to avoid a normative reference to 1510ter.

IANA is not currently involved.  The 1510ter document turns key usage
and a bunch of other things over to IANA.

--Sam



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>>>>> "Michael" == Michael Thomas <mat@cisco.com> writes:

    Michael> Well, it's pretty simple really: when you get tickets
    Michael> from the KDC, they aren't protected by PFS so using PFS
    Michael> later is pretty questionable. It's not useless, but it's
    Michael> not any huge win either. Until Kerberos itself supports
    Michael> PFS, people deploying KINK really ought not get worked up
    Michael> into a lather about turning on PFS to improve security
    Michael> since it's doesn't to any great degree.

I'm confused.  I thought the point of PFS was to make it impossible to
recover session data .  How does the fact that the KDC does not do PFS
decrease the value of PFS for Kink?



From owner-ietf-kink@mail.vpnc.org  Tue Feb  8 16:34:43 2005
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In early January I asked what the status of Kink was and whether there
is sufficient energy to finish the protocol.  The answer appears to be
that there is clearly sufficient energy and there has been an active
discussion moving towards resolution of issues.  We've received at
least three document reviews with significant overlap in issues and
have been working towards resolving those issues.


As such I am not planning to close down the Kink working group and
look forward to working with everyone to quickly finish the
specification and get it approved by the IESG.

However I did establish a deadline in early January.  The working
group chairs needed to propose new milestones and propose
IPsec/Kerberos reviewers by February 7.  That day has past and I have
not heard from the chairs on this issue.  There was some discussion of
milestones but it was never formalized.

I'd appreciate reasonably quick resolution from the chairs on this
issue.

Thanks,

--Sam



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Subject: Re: #22
From: Bill Sommerfeld <sommerfeld@sun.com>
To: Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu>
Cc: Michael Thomas <mat@cisco.com>, Shoichi Sakane <sakane@kame.net>,
        ietf-kink@vpnc.org
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On Tue, 2005-02-08 at 16:24, Sam Hartman wrote:
> >>>>> "Michael" == Michael Thomas <mat@cisco.com> writes:
> 
>     Michael> Well, it's pretty simple really: when you get tickets
>     Michael> from the KDC, they aren't protected by PFS so using PFS
>     Michael> later is pretty questionable. It's not useless, but it's
>     Michael> not any huge win either. Until Kerberos itself supports
>     Michael> PFS, people deploying KINK really ought not get worked up
>     Michael> into a lather about turning on PFS to improve security
>     Michael> since it's doesn't to any great degree.
> 
> I'm confused.  I thought the point of PFS was to make it impossible to
> recover session data .  How does the fact that the KDC does not do PFS
> decrease the value of PFS for Kink?

I'm also confused by Michael's remarks, but, as I recall, one of the 
motivations for KINK was to do IPsec SA setup with lower CPU overhead
by avoiding public key operations.   If you add in a D-H exchange for PFS, 
you blow away that motivation and this winds up looking like a strange
way to build a GSS-authenticated IKE..

						- Bill



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Subject: Re: #22
From: Michael Thomas <mat@cisco.com>
To: Bill Sommerfeld <sommerfeld@sun.com>
Cc: Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu>, Shoichi Sakane <sakane@kame.net>,
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On Tue, 2005-02-08 at 13:48, Bill Sommerfeld wrote:
> On Tue, 2005-02-08 at 16:24, Sam Hartman wrote:
> > >>>>> "Michael" =3D=3D Michael Thomas <mat@cisco.com> writes:
> >=20
> >     Michael> Well, it's pretty simple really: when you get tickets
> >     Michael> from the KDC, they aren't protected by PFS so using PFS
> >     Michael> later is pretty questionable. It's not useless, but it's
> >     Michael> not any huge win either. Until Kerberos itself supports
> >     Michael> PFS, people deploying KINK really ought not get worked up
> >     Michael> into a lather about turning on PFS to improve security
> >     Michael> since it's doesn't to any great degree.
> >=20
> > I'm confused.  I thought the point of PFS was to make it impossible to
> > recover session data .  How does the fact that the KDC does not do PFS
> > decrease the value of PFS for Kink?
>=20
> I'm also confused by Michael's remarks, but, as I recall, one of the=20
> motivations for KINK was to do IPsec SA setup with lower CPU overhead
> by avoiding public key operations.   If you add in a D-H exchange for PFS=
,=20
> you blow away that motivation and this winds up looking like a strange
> way to build a GSS-authenticated IKE..

This all comes down to what constitutes a "session". I'd
argue that it would be a lot better if Kerberos "sessions" (ie, tickets
and their lifetimes) provided the notion of PFS since=20
that would cover every protocol that implements kerberos
authentication instead of the piecemeal approach that=20
each kerberos application needs to deal with PFS itself.=20
That and the place that I'd think you _really_ want PFS
is for the AS-REQ/AS-REP since that's where the most
vulnerable piece of information is exchanged (ie, the
password).=20

In fact, I'd be willing to wager that KINK is the _only_=20
Kerberized application that has any notion of PFS right now
which really illustrates why if people think that PFS is
important, it ought to be done up a level.

But.. we are where we are. If the editorial comment is=20
really causing mass hysteria, then we should just take
it out because it doesn't affect anything about KINK.

		Mike

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From owner-ietf-kink@mail.vpnc.org  Tue Feb  8 18:54:05 2005
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On Feb 8, 2005, at 18:17, Michael Thomas wrote:
> This all comes down to what constitutes a "session". I'd
> argue that it would be a lot better if Kerberos "sessions" (ie, tickets
> and their lifetimes) provided the notion of PFS since
> that would cover every protocol that implements kerberos
> authentication instead of the piecemeal approach that
> each kerberos application needs to deal with PFS itself.

There's been talk occasionally about doing this.  We've had to fix up 
some problems in the basic protocol spec first, though, and that's been 
taking too long.

> That and the place that I'd think you _really_ want PFS
> is for the AS-REQ/AS-REP since that's where the most
> vulnerable piece of information is exchanged (ie, the
> password).

Well, the password is not sent, but yes, the AS exchange is the obvious 
place to start.  Various preauthentication schemes should be able to 
add PFS easily, if desired, and at least one has been proposed.

Ken



From owner-ietf-kink@mail.vpnc.org  Tue Feb  8 20:01:08 2005
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chairs,

It is just information.

I can find in the ML that the following people volunteered
for the reviewers.

    Ken Raeburn <raeburn@MIT.EDU>        (Mon, 3 Jan 2005)
    KAMADA Ken'ichi <kamada@nanohz.org>  (Wed, 12 Jan 2005)
    Shoichi Sakane <sakane@kame.net>     (Thu, 20 Jan 2005)

In the ML, there is no objection against proposed milestones
which chairs showed 19 Jan.
# There are may issues though....

From: Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu>
Subject: Kink Working Group
Date: Tue, 08 Feb 2005 16:32:11 -0500

> However I did establish a deadline in early January.  The working
> group chairs needed to propose new milestones and propose
> IPsec/Kerberos reviewers by February 7.  That day has past and I have
> not heard from the chairs on this issue.  There was some discussion of
> milestones but it was never formalized.

----- nobuo



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Hello,

I'd like to be a reviewer of the document. I have implemented IPsec stack
in Linux as a core member of USAGI project. And I'm implementing current
KINK spec into embedded device.
I can review the document from IPsec architecture point of view.

Sam Hartman wrote:
> 
> In early January I asked what the status of Kink was and whether there
> is sufficient energy to finish the protocol.  The answer appears to be
> that there is clearly sufficient energy and there has been an active
> discussion moving towards resolution of issues.  We've received at
> least three document reviews with significant overlap in issues and
> have been working towards resolving those issues.
> 

--
Kazunori Miyazawa



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To: Michael Thomas <mat@cisco.com>
Cc: Bill Sommerfeld <sommerfeld@sun.com>, Shoichi Sakane <sakane@kame.net>,
        ietf-kink@vpnc.org
Subject: Re: #22
References: <20050204211105O.sakane@kame.net>
	<1107526530.8247.29.camel@thomasm-lnx.cisco.com>
	<tslpszaoicb.fsf@cz.mit.edu> <1107899336.25726.120.camel@thunk>
	<1107904649.3305.14.camel@thomasm-lnx.cisco.com>
From: Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu>
Date: Tue, 08 Feb 2005 22:57:46 -0500
In-Reply-To: <1107904649.3305.14.camel@thomasm-lnx.cisco.com> (Michael
 Thomas's message of "Tue, 08 Feb 2005 15:17:29 -0800")
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>>>>> "Michael" == Michael Thomas <mat@cisco.com> writes:

    Michael> In fact, I'd be willing to wager that KINK is the _only_
    Michael> Kerberized application that has any notion of PFS right
    Michael> now which really illustrates why if people think that PFS
    Michael> is important, it ought to be done up a level.


You'd lose the wager; the GSSAPI support for ssh does PFS.


I do agree PFS should be supported at a higher level in Kerberos
though; that is on krb-wg's agenda to enable.

--Sam



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From: "KAMADA Ken'ichi" <kamada@nanohz.org>
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Subject: Re: #22
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At Tue, 08 Feb 2005 16:48:57 -0500,
Bill Sommerfeld <sommerfeld@sun.com> wrote:
> 
> On Tue, 2005-02-08 at 16:24, Sam Hartman wrote:
> > >>>>> "Michael" == Michael Thomas <mat@cisco.com> writes:
> > 
> >     Michael> Well, it's pretty simple really: when you get tickets
> >     Michael> from the KDC, they aren't protected by PFS so using PFS
> >     Michael> later is pretty questionable. It's not useless, but it's
> >     Michael> not any huge win either. Until Kerberos itself supports
> >     Michael> PFS, people deploying KINK really ought not get worked up
> >     Michael> into a lather about turning on PFS to improve security
> >     Michael> since it's doesn't to any great degree.
> > 
> > I'm confused.  I thought the point of PFS was to make it impossible to
> > recover session data .  How does the fact that the KDC does not do PFS
> > decrease the value of PFS for Kink?
> 
> I'm also confused by Michael's remarks, but, as I recall, one of the 
> motivations for KINK was to do IPsec SA setup with lower CPU overhead
> by avoiding public key operations.   If you add in a D-H exchange for PFS, 
> you blow away that motivation and this winds up looking like a strange
> way to build a GSS-authenticated IKE..

I agree with Michael that PFS should be provided by Kerberos.
On the other hand, I also agree with Sam and Bill that PFS provided
by KINK has more-than-nominal values.

The issue here is the tradeoff between PFS and low computational cost.
Thinking on the motivation of KINK, which reduce computational cost
to exchange SAs, taking low CPU power at the cost of PFS is
reasonable to me.
So I'd propose an editorial change to the phrase
"it is somewhat questionable whether a system which is heavily
relying on Kerberos benefits from PFS."

-- 
KAMADA Ken'ichi <kamada@nanohz.org>



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Date: Wed, 09 Feb 2005 14:01:39 +0900
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From: "KAMADA Ken'ichi" <kamada@nanohz.org>
To: ietf-kink@vpnc.org
Subject: Re: #23 [*] KE interoperability (section 6.8)
In-Reply-To: <1107528333.8249.33.camel@thomasm-lnx.cisco.com>
References: <20050204213547M.sakane@kame.net>
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At Fri, 04 Feb 2005 06:45:33 -0800,
Michael Thomas <mat@cisco.com> wrote:
> 
> I haven't looked it up in the draft, but my feeling is
> that the Receiver MUST implement KE payloads, though
> I suppose that it may be administratively rejected with
> an error message if it doesn't want to participate. 

I feel that MUST is too strong.
It makes a comformant implementation impossible on small devices
without hardware MODP (or something) accelerator.


> IKEv1 doesn't define it because it always expects that
> the initial DH is performed; KINK doesn't require this
> since there's already a shared key in the ticket.

Do you mean that KINK doesn't require KE payloads?
(Sorry if this is my misunderstanding.)

Sakane-san's point (as far as I can read) is that
if KINK allows using KE payloads, the following 3 issues
should be considered.  I think only the 3rd item needs additional
text to the KINK spec.

- Which error code is returned when the responder doesn't support KE,
  if we go with IKEv1.
  (I think INVALID-PAYLOAD-TYPE is enough.)

- KINK (nor IKEv1) doesn't negotiate DH group,
  so the operators must agree the group in advance.
  (I don't know whether KINK spec needs to describe this though.)

- KINK initiators usually set inbound SAs before CREATE command,
  but it's not possible when using KE payloads.


> On Fri, 2005-02-04 at 04:35, Shoichi Sakane wrote:
> > > #23 [*] KE interoperability (section 6.8)
> > > 
> > > 	What happens if a peer that implements the KE payloads communicates
> > > 	with a peer that does not.  Specify the behavior in sufficient detail
> > > 	to guarantee interoperability.  (Sam Hartman)
> > 
> > my understanding is correct, there is no description in the IKEv1
> > specifications though it defines the error code which can be used
> > in this case.  IKEv2 defines clearly.  so if KINK specification
> > complies to IKEv1 manner, we have to define the behavior and describe
> > it for interoperability.  if KINK complies to IKEv2 manner, we can
> > probably leave it.
> > 
> > another problem comes up.  there is no way to negotiate a DH group
> > to use in a quick mode.  so in IKEv1, they have to define the DH group
> > before they negotiate.  current KINK specification does not touch it.
> > this is no matter in IKEv2.
> > 
> > and an initiator can not install the inbound SA when the initiator
> > choices to send KE because KEYMAT is not calculated before the initiator
> > receives KE from the responder.  the document has to touch this situation.

-- 
KAMADA Ken'ichi <kamada@nanohz.org>



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To: ietf-kink@vpnc.org
Subject: Re: #23 [*] KE interoperability (section 6.8)
In-Reply-To: Your message of "Wed, 09 Feb 2005 14:01:39 +0900"
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> > I haven't looked it up in the draft, but my feeling is
> > that the Receiver MUST implement KE payloads, though
> > I suppose that it may be administratively rejected with
> > an error message if it doesn't want to participate. 

I disagree.  it must reduce the value of using KINK.

> > IKEv1 doesn't define it because it always expects that
> > the initial DH is performed; KINK doesn't require this
> > since there's already a shared key in the ticket.

I am assuming that "the initial DH" means the group number used
in phase 1.  If so, there is no description in RFC2409 to use
the same group in phase 2 when the negotiation uses KE payload.
actually, it brought an interoperability problem at the test event.
so we have to describe what KINK do that.

> Sakane-san's point (as far as I can read) is that
> if KINK allows using KE payloads, the following 3 issues
> should be considered.  I think only the 3rd item needs additional
> text to the KINK spec.
> 
> - Which error code is returned when the responder doesn't support KE,
>   if we go with IKEv1.
>   (I think INVALID-PAYLOAD-TYPE is enough.)
> 
> - KINK (nor IKEv1) doesn't negotiate DH group,
>   so the operators must agree the group in advance.
>   (I don't know whether KINK spec needs to describe this though.)
> 
> - KINK initiators usually set inbound SAs before CREATE command,
>   but it's not possible when using KE payloads.

Thank you for the clarification.

> > > and an initiator can not install the inbound SA when the initiator
> > > choices to send KE because KEYMAT is not calculated before the initiator
> > > receives KE from the responder.  the document has to touch this situation.

I noticed what the document probably does not touch.  When a responder
accepts the KE from the initiator, it would be better that the responder
SHOULD(or MUST) add ACKREQ bit to the response message in order to be
less packet loss.



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Subject: Re: #23 [*] KE interoperability (section 6.8)
From: Michael Thomas <mat@cisco.com>
To: Shoichi Sakane <sakane@kame.net>
Cc: ietf-kink@vpnc.org
In-Reply-To: <20050209182217P.sakane@kame.net>
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On Wed, 2005-02-09 at 01:22, Shoichi Sakane wrote:
> > > I haven't looked it up in the draft, but my feeling is
> > > that the Receiver MUST implement KE payloads, though
> > > I suppose that it may be administratively rejected with
> > > an error message if it doesn't want to participate.=20
>=20
> I disagree.  it must reduce the value of using KINK.

I don't understand: if the receiver has a way of=20
rejecting the use of PFS, where is the harm here?
The sender at worst would have to retry without the
KE payload it seems to me.

>=20
> > > IKEv1 doesn't define it because it always expects that
> > > the initial DH is performed; KINK doesn't require this
> > > since there's already a shared key in the ticket.
>=20
> I am assuming that "the initial DH" means the group number used
> in phase 1. =20

No, I meant that IKE always performs an initial
Diffie Hellman exchange, so the KE payload is=20
mandatory.


> > Sakane-san's point (as far as I can read) is that
> > if KINK allows using KE payloads, the following 3 issues
> > should be considered.  I think only the 3rd item needs additional
> > text to the KINK spec.
> >=20
> > - Which error code is returned when the responder doesn't support KE,
> >   if we go with IKEv1.
> >   (I think INVALID-PAYLOAD-TYPE is enough.)

Maybe it should be more specific so that a sender
can know that it's really the KE payload that's
causing problems? Another possibility that I haven't
looked at yet is for the receiver to _not_ send its
KE payload back in which case the sender would realize
that the receiver didn't perform the DH and it could
proceed as if the sender KE wasn't present at all?

> > - KINK initiators usually set inbound SAs before CREATE command,
> >   but it's not possible when using KE payloads.

I believe the appropriate behavior is specified here...

> > > > and an initiator can not install the inbound SA when the initiator
> > > > choices to send KE because KEYMAT is not calculated before the init=
iator
> > > > receives KE from the responder.  the document has to touch this sit=
uation.
>=20
> I noticed what the document probably does not touch.  When a responder
> accepts the KE from the initiator, it would be better that the responder
> SHOULD(or MUST) add ACKREQ bit to the response message in order to be
> less packet loss.

Hmm, I thought that that was actually in the draft. If
not, then I think that you're right...

		Mike

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Subject: Re: #23 [*] KE interoperability (section 6.8)
From: Michael Thomas <mat@cisco.com>
To: "KAMADA Ken'ichi" <kamada@nanohz.org>
Cc: ietf-kink@vpnc.org
In-Reply-To: <20050209140139XE%kamada@nanohz.org>
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Let me clarify my position: I think that a KINK implementation
MUST deal properly with receiving a KE payload from a sender.
I'm perfectly happy if the receiver somehow rejects the KE
payload and proceeds from there (either by sending an error,
or not performing the DH and not returning its KE payload).=20

I believe this gives you what you're asking for: the ability
to not have to run the big number arithmetic... But even
if we required implementation (and I'm not recommending this),
nobody says that the DH arithmetic has to be _fast_ :)

		Mike

On Tue, 2005-02-08 at 21:01, KAMADA Ken'ichi wrote:
> At Fri, 04 Feb 2005 06:45:33 -0800,
> Michael Thomas <mat@cisco.com> wrote:
> >=20
> > I haven't looked it up in the draft, but my feeling is
> > that the Receiver MUST implement KE payloads, though
> > I suppose that it may be administratively rejected with
> > an error message if it doesn't want to participate.=20
>=20
> I feel that MUST is too strong.
> It makes a comformant implementation impossible on small devices
> without hardware MODP (or something) accelerator.
>=20
>=20
> > IKEv1 doesn't define it because it always expects that
> > the initial DH is performed; KINK doesn't require this
> > since there's already a shared key in the ticket.
>=20
> Do you mean that KINK doesn't require KE payloads?
> (Sorry if this is my misunderstanding.)
>=20
> Sakane-san's point (as far as I can read) is that
> if KINK allows using KE payloads, the following 3 issues
> should be considered.  I think only the 3rd item needs additional
> text to the KINK spec.
>=20
> - Which error code is returned when the responder doesn't support KE,
>   if we go with IKEv1.
>   (I think INVALID-PAYLOAD-TYPE is enough.)
>=20
> - KINK (nor IKEv1) doesn't negotiate DH group,
>   so the operators must agree the group in advance.
>   (I don't know whether KINK spec needs to describe this though.)
>=20
> - KINK initiators usually set inbound SAs before CREATE command,
>   but it's not possible when using KE payloads.
>=20
>=20
> > On Fri, 2005-02-04 at 04:35, Shoichi Sakane wrote:
> > > > #23 [*] KE interoperability (section 6.8)
> > > >=20
> > > > 	What happens if a peer that implements the KE payloads communicate=
s
> > > > 	with a peer that does not.  Specify the behavior in sufficient det=
ail
> > > > 	to guarantee interoperability.  (Sam Hartman)
> > >=20
> > > my understanding is correct, there is no description in the IKEv1
> > > specifications though it defines the error code which can be used
> > > in this case.  IKEv2 defines clearly.  so if KINK specification
> > > complies to IKEv1 manner, we have to define the behavior and describe
> > > it for interoperability.  if KINK complies to IKEv2 manner, we can
> > > probably leave it.
> > >=20
> > > another problem comes up.  there is no way to negotiate a DH group
> > > to use in a quick mode.  so in IKEv1, they have to define the DH grou=
p
> > > before they negotiate.  current KINK specification does not touch it.
> > > this is no matter in IKEv2.
> > >=20
> > > and an initiator can not install the inbound SA when the initiator
> > > choices to send KE because KEYMAT is not calculated before the initia=
tor
> > > receives KE from the responder.  the document has to touch this situa=
tion.

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From owner-ietf-kink@mail.vpnc.org  Wed Feb  9 21:29:10 2005
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To: "KAMADA Ken'ichi" <kamada@nanohz.org>
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Subject: Re: #22
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	<1107526530.8247.29.camel@thomasm-lnx.cisco.com>
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From: Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu>
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As I understand it, currently Kink provides PFS as an optional
feature.

That seems fine to me.  Not providing PFS also seems fine if the WG
wants to go that route.

I was just trying to understand what the text meant.

--Sam



From owner-ietf-kink@mail.vpnc.org  Thu Feb 10 01:46:51 2005
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Subject: #16 [*] EPOCH (section 5.1.2)
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> #16 [*] EPOCH (section 5.1.2)
> 
> 	Perhaps you need a description of the time stamp?  I recall there
> 	being such a description in draft-housley-binarytime-xx.
> 	(Sam Hartman)

The current draft specifies it as "the standard posix four octet
time stamp".  Is describing in KINK preferred to referring POSIX?

FWIW, the EPOCH field is only used for DPD and the format of it
is not important, as far as the same value is not reused within a
short period.

-- 
KAMADA Ken'ichi <kamada@nanohz.org>



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From: "KAMADA Ken'ichi" <kamada@nanohz.org>
To: ietf-kink@vpnc.org
Subject: Re: #23 [*] KE interoperability (section 6.8)
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At Wed, 09 Feb 2005 08:43:07 -0800,
Michael Thomas <mat@cisco.com> wrote:
> 
> Let me clarify my position: I think that a KINK implementation
> MUST deal properly with receiving a KE payload from a sender.
> I'm perfectly happy if the receiver somehow rejects the KE
> payload and proceeds from there (either by sending an error,
> or not performing the DH and not returning its KE payload).

I understand, thank you.  If "rejecting" is allowed, I'm
happy with it.
Regarding how to reject, I like the idea of the absense of KE.


> I believe this gives you what you're asking for: the ability
> to not have to run the big number arithmetic... But even
> if we required implementation (and I'm not recommending this),
> nobody says that the DH arithmetic has to be _fast_ :)

Indeed.  :-D

-- 
KAMADA Ken'ichi <kamada@nanohz.org>



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From: "KAMADA Ken'ichi" <kamada@nanohz.org>
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Subject: #25 [**] prf (section 8)
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At Fri, 28 Jan 2005 21:19:39 -0500 (EST),
Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu> wrote:
> 
> Section 6.1:
> 
>    o    IKE Quick Mode (phase 2) uses the hash algorithm used in main
>         mode (phase 1) to generate the keying material. KINK MUST use
>         the hashing algorithm specified in the session ticket's etype.
> 
> [**] This checksum may not be deterministic and is probably not
> appropriate for use in setting up a key.  A PRF is provided, although
> depending on how the hash is used the PRF may or may not be a suitable
> replacement.  There has been significant discussion within krb-wg on
> when the PRF is appropriate and when it is not.  This discussion
> centered around key determination in pkinit.

IKE requires the very PRF to generate IPsec keys, so using PRFs
provided by kcrypto is appropriate here.
kcrypto also says "The PRF output string should be suitable for use
in key generation,..."

Does anyone object to using the kcrypto PRF?

-- 
KAMADA Ken'ichi <kamada@nanohz.org>



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From: "KAMADA Ken'ichi" <kamada@nanohz.org>
To: ietf-kink@vpnc.org
Subject: KINK issue list rev.4
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not yet analyzed:	 3
open:			17
solution proposed:	12
waiting revised i-d:	 7
closed:			 2
---------------------------
total:			41

[**] Indicates an issue considered substantive.
[-] Indicates an editorial issue.
(2401bis) Indicates it depends on 2401 vs 2401bis.


#1 [**] Versioning
(solution proposed)

	what happens when a receiver receives a major or
	minor version of the kink or qm that is inconsistent with this
	document?  What about unknown payload types?  (Sam Hartman)

	QM version is discussed in section 12 (Forward Compatibility
	Considerations).

	Proposed solution:
	- KINK version
		return error KINK_INVMAJ when major version mismatch.
		WRT minor version,
		a) remove the minor version, or
		b) return KINK_INVMIN when mismatch (both lower and higher)
	- QM versoin
		already specified in section 12.
	- KINK payload type
		return error (KINK_PROTOERR)
	- ISAKMP payload type
		return error (ISAKMP INVALID-PAYLOAD-TYPE)
		(describe each Notify type usage like ikev2 spec.)

	Specify the behavior when the error is not authenticated
	in the Security Consideration section.

	Related thread: Message-Id: <20050202105420R.sakane@kame.net>


#2 [**] U2U
(not yet analyzed)

	I think we need to look at how u2u works at various parts of
	the protocol.  In particular I'm concerned about choosing the right
	u2u principal, dealing with cross-realm u2u and dealing with
	recovering from reboots.  We should confirm all these work out.
	(Sam Hartman)


#3 [**] user-to-user (section 3, 4.2, and 5.1.2)
(not yet analyzed)

	It seems like the
	server tells the client what principal to authenticate to, but this
	principal is not properly authorized.  (Sam Hartman)

	More examination of user-to-user case, especially situations where 
	it might *not* be two PKINIT clients, which section 3 says is possible. 
	(BTW, in the Kerberos docs, it's "user-to-user", not "user-user".)
	(Ken Raeburn)

	Verifying remotely supplied identity, as Sam raised earlier.
	(Ken Raeburn)

	In the user-to-user case with TGTs, I think the KINK draft may be 
	over-specifying things that should be dealt with at the Kerberos level. 
	If things are underspecified in Kerberos Clarifications, let's deal 
	with that.  (Ken Raeburn)

	Section 4.2:
	[**] How will the initiator determine whether it will be able to get a
	TGT?  I think policy considerations of when to use u2u and
	authorization considerations of what u2u principals are authorized are
	underspecified in the draft.
	(Sam Hartman)

	[**] Make sure the descriptions of u2u work correctly in the
	cross-realm case.
	(Sam Hartman)

	Section 5.1.2:
	[**] How do I authorize which service I'm talking to in the u2u case.
	I.E. how do I know what principals are authorized for a particular SPD
	entry?  (Sam Hartman)


#4 [**](2401bis) CREATE command from the aspect of 2401bis (section 4.3)
(closed)

	I need explicit review from the IPsec reviewer of this section to
	make sure it is compatible with 2401bis.

	Closed: being discussed with #37


#37 [**] Difference between IKE and KINK on CREATE command (section 4.3)

	IN addition, any differences
	between how this works and how IKE would set up the same SA need to be
	called out.  It is fine for there to be differences, but I want to
	make sure the working group explicitly decided the differences are a
	good thing.

	I'm somewhat concerned that 4.3 is not specific enough to describe
	exactly what key gets set up.  I.E. I'm concerned it may not be
	detailed enough for interoperable implementations.
	(Sam Hartman)

	- What keys are used for the resulting SA on the each side?
	  (Sam Hartman, Message-ID: <tslbrb4aqae.fsf@cz.mit.edu>)

		Answer: Message-ID: <20050204170451BM%kamada@nanohz.org>

	- Doesn't the timing when to add in/out SAs conflict with IKE?
	  (Sam Hartman, Message-ID: <tsllla6pz7t.fsf@cz.mit.edu>)

		Related thread: Message-ID: <20050204170454BO%kamada@nanohz.org>

	- How about when to add SAs and which SAs to add when 3-way.
	  (Message-ID: <20050204170454BO%kamada@nanohz.org>)


#5 [*] When 3-way, is responder's nonce MUST or SHOULD? (section 4.3 and 7.3)
(solution proposed)

	Sec 4.3 and 7.3 use SHOULD and MUST respectively regarding when the 
	nonce should be used.  If the circumstances they're describing are 
	different, that's okay, but if so, I missed it on first reading.
	(Ken Raeburn)

	They are talking the same situation and the requirement levels should
	be aligned.  I think SHOULD is appropriate because non-returning
	responder's nonce does not break interoperabilities.
	(Message-ID: <20050127171441FF%kamada@nanohz.org>)

	If the initiator receives a responder's nonce, she MUST use
	it in the KEYMAT calculation.

	I think it is also editorial issue.  anyway, the behavior depends on
	condition.  if a responder does not agree with the initiator's proposal,
	AND if the responder wants to continue the transaction, then the responder
	MUST send back a message with ACK request bit, and MAY contain a nonce.
	There is a case when the responder wants to use same KEYMAT of the
	initiator, but just doesn't want to use the initiator's proposal.
	It is not always required to add a nonce.
	(Message-Id: <20050204200406K.sakane@kame.net>)


#6 [*] Half open (section 4.4)
(solution proposed)

	IPsec does not allow half-open security associations any more as far
	as I can tell in 2401bis.  So it's not just for simplicity, but for
	model conformance.  (Sam Hartman)

	Proposed solution:
	remove the phrase "for simplicity".
	(Message-ID: <tslu0pbc3h9.fsf@cz.mit.edu>)


#7 [**] DPD & STATUS (section 4.4.2 and 4.5)

	[**] Discuss status message, rebooting peers and u2u.  This looks a
	lot like the IKE case where you lose all cryptographic context to me.
	(Sam Hartman)

	I don't understand what you want here. Are you saying
	that this doesn't work in the u-u case? I don't
	understand what u-u has to do with anything here.  (Michael Thomas)

	OK.  I was unclear .  When sending a status message, what happens if
	the peer has gotten a new TGT?  How do I realize I need to use this
	TGT rather than the one I have?  (Sam Hartman)


#8 [*] CksumLen (section 5)
(solution proposed)

	Diagram indicates one octet for cksumlen, but the text (and 
	kcrypto specifications) say it should be two.

	Clarify that you mean the padding discussed in 5.1 (KINK Padding
	Rules), not crypto-system padding.  (Sam Hartman)

	Use 2 octets for CksumLen field in accordance with kcrypto.

	See also: #9


#9 [**] etype does not directly indicate checksum type (section 5)
(solution proposed)

	a key's encryption type does not directly indicate 
	a checksum type, it indicates an encryption(-with-integrity-protection) 
	scheme, which does include a required-to-implement checksum type
	(Ken Raeburn)

	Proposed solutions are:
	- Use required-to-implement checksum type determined by the etype.
	- Use get_mic or verify_mic function to generate or verify the checksum.
	- Omit the checksum field before calculation.
	- The Length field is filled with the packet length without checksum and
	  the CksumLen field is zeroed out before the calculation.
	- Move the Cksum field to the end of the message.
	  (maybe without padding between the last payload and checksum?)
	(Message-ID: <20050131093509FD%kamada@nanohz.org>)


#10 [**] Kerberos allows variable length checksum (section 5)
(solution proposed)

	I'd have to go back and check, but I don't think we require that 
	a given checksum type have a fixed output size, so "leave X amount of 
	space and fill it with zero for computing the checksum" is questionable 
	too.  (Ken Raeburn)

	Proposed solution: look at #9


#11 [*] Kerberos checksum is not deterministic (section 5)
(solution proposed)

	The Kink description of how to verify a checksum assumes that
	Kerberos checksums are deterministic; this is not strictly required.
	(Sam Hartman)

	let kcrypto specify how 
	to verify a checksum, as they're not required to be deterministic, so 
	the "compute it again and compare" approach specified in section 5 is 
	wrong  (Ken Raeburn)

	Proposed solution: look at #9


#12 [**] Subsession keys (section 5 and 8)

	Are subsession keys ignored?  (Ken Raeburn)

	The description of the checksum says that the session key of the
	ticket is used.  That's a way to do it, but the working group should
	explain why it has chosen to ignore the subsession key.
	(Sam Hartman)

	Related thread: Message-ID: <20050127171703FZ%kamada@nanohz.org>


#13 [**] Replay protection (section 5)
(closed)

	The document claims that the transaction id is not used for
	replay detection because Kerberos provides that.  How is that true?
	The authenticator is protected against replays but how is the rest of
	the message bound to that specific authenticator instead of to a
	session key of a ticket?
	(Sam Hartman)

	Closed: (Message-ID: <tslfz0gaqbz.fsf@cz.mit.edu>)


#14 [-] Reserved (15 bits) --  Reserved and must be zero (section 5)
(waiting revised i-d)

	must be zero on send, must be ignored by receiver.


#15 [**] Principal name of KINK service (section 5.1.2)

	How do I discover the FQDN of my remote peer?   SPD
	entries are configured in terms of  IP addresses.  If you  want to
	store an identity in the PAD, why not store a principal instead of a
	hostname.

	I interpreted the text as a naming convention, not how a implementation
	get a peer's principal name.  So I think it is an implementation issue
	whether a principal name is generated from a FQDN or got directly from
	the PAD.
	(KAMADA Ken'ichi, <20050131095154FY%kamada@nanohz.org>)


#16 [*] EPOCH (section 5.1.2)

	Perhaps you need a description of the time stamp?  I recall there
	being such a description in draft-housley-binarytime-xx.
	(Sam Hartman)

	Related thread: Message-ID: <20050210154348XQ%kamada@nanohz.org>


#17 [**] Checksum when KRB-ERROR occured (section 5.1.4 and 7.1)
(solution proposed)

	Section 7.1 says the checksum in the KRB-ERROR message is not used,
	but section 5.1.4 says that KINK implementation MUST make use of
	keyed Kerberos errors.  But KRB-ERROR does not have checksum in it (at
	least with RFC 1510 or kerberos-clarifications).

	Remove following paragraph from section 5.1.4.  (Sam Hartman)
	  KINK implementations MUST make use of keyed Kerberos errors when  the
	  appropriate  service  key  is available as specified in [KRBREVS]. In
	  particular, clock  skew  errors  MUST  be  integrity  protected.  For
	  unauthenticated  Kerberos  errors,  the receiver MAY choose to act on
	  them, but SHOULD take precautions against make-work kinds of attacks.

	Replace the above paragraph with the following:  (kamada)
	  KINK implementations MUST make use of
	  a KINK Cksum field when returning KINK_KRB_ERROR and the appropriate
	  service key is available.

	Drop reference to krb-error checksum from section 7.1.  (Sam Hartman)
	  defined in the following sections.  The checksum in the KRB-ERROR
	  message is not used, since the KINK header already contains a check-
	  sum field.


#18 [**] Kerberos error type limitations (section 5.1.4)

	Why should a sender send only those errors?  I'm mostly asking
	for an explanation to be given to me or to be added to the document
	rather than liberalization of the requirement.  (Sam Hartman)

	Related thread: Message-Id: <20050204202941G.sakane@kame.net>


#19 [**] Cross-realm and U2U (section 5.1.5)
(not yet analyzed)

	Please Consider how this works in the cross-realm case.
	I.E. make sure you end up with the right ticket on the right side.  I
	believe this text assumes that you need a ticket in a realm close to
	the client; I think that for things to work you actually need a realm
	close to the server.  Work through the message flows and make sure the
	KDC doing the decryption actually has the necessary keys and then
	adjust the document if necessary so the right KDC is used.

	The document needs to clearly indicate what error code is used in the
	case when the responder cannot get a ticket because some cross-realm
	key is missing.  In general we want it to be possible for an initiator
	to try several identities until the initiator finds the right one that
	has a shared key.  (Sam Hartman)


#20 [**] KINK_ENCRYPT format (section 5.1.8)
(solution proposed)

	The format of the encrypted part of KINK_ENCRYPT (section 5.1.8) is
	vague.  I think of using the output of raw encryption algorithms
	(i.e. E(confounder | plaintext | pad)) or using EncryptedData.

	treat "encryption with 
	integrity protection" output as a whole, don't peek under the covers to 
	find a "checksum" part you can throw away  (Ken Raeburn)

	drop references to the initialization vector  (Ken Raeburn)

	Please use the output of the kcrypto encrypt
	operation directly.  Of most importance is to make sure that all
	kcrypto enctypes will work even if it is not possible to decompose the
	kcrypto checksum from the encrypted data.  This probably means that in
	some cases you will have double checksums.
	You also need to deal with making sure you can determine the length of
	the plaintext.  (Sam Hartman)

	Related thread: Message-Id: <20050204205737C.sakane@kame.net>

	Proposed solution:
	Use the output of the kcrypto encryption.


#21 [*] Next Payload in KINK_ENCRYPT (section 5.1.8)
(solution proposed)

	Text should probably indacte that next payload must be none.

	Proposed solution:
	The section 5.1 describes it,
	however it would be better to describe explicitly so.
	reader does not has trouble even if the text is described repeatedly.
	(Message-Id: <20050204210401T.sakane@kame.net>)


#22 [*] Kerberos PFS (section 6.8)
(solution proposed)

	Sec 6.8: "Kerberos in general does not provide PFS so it is somewhat 
	questionable whether a system which is heavily relying on Kerberos 
	benefits from PFS."  First, that sounds like it might be Security 
	Considerations material.  Second, I don't follow; explain please?
	(Ken Raeburn)

	Related thread: Message-Id: <20050204211105O.sakane@kame.net>

	- (Current) Kerberos doesn't provide PFS.
	- KINK optionally provides PFS.
	- KINK PFS has benefits but is not mandatory because of the
	  computational cost.
	so editorial fix (or even removing this sentence) would be
	enough.


#23 [*] KE interoperability (section 6.8)

	What happens if a peer that implements the KE payloads communicates
	with a peer that does not.  Specify the behavior in sufficient detail
	to guarantee interoperability.  (Sam Hartman)

	Releated thread: Message-Id: <20050204213547M.sakane@kame.net>


#24 [*] MUST/SHOULD in clock skew (section 7.1)

	The time difference MUST be computed and SHOULD be stored 
	and used?  Why the different requirement levels?  (And is this sort of 
	thing in the domain of KINK or Kerberos?)  (Ken Raeburn)

	Related thread: Message-ID: <4202FB85.6080406@miyazawa.org>


#25 [**] prf (section 8)

	Section 8 says "prf is the same hash algorithm found in the session
	ticket's etype", but krb-wg-crypto-07 defines hash as unkeyed.
	Fortunately krb-wg-crypto-07 defines a PRF for each etype, so KINK
	should use this PRF.

	Use a prf 
	from kcrypto, don't assume the checksum operations are deterministic 
	hash functions  (Ken Raeburn)

	Section 6.1 (the description of hash algorithm):
	This checksum may not be deterministic and is probably not
	appropriate for use in setting up a key.  A PRF is provided, although
	depending on how the hash is used the PRF may or may not be a suitable
	replacement.  There has been significant discussion within krb-wg on
	when the PRF is appropriate and when it is not.  This discussion
	centered around key determination in pkinit.  (Sam Hartman)

	Message-ID: <20050210161443XN%kamada@nanohz.org>


#26 [*] Key derivation (section 8)

	The key derivation seems inconsistent with the crypto framework
	document.  (Sam Hartman)

	I don't understand what this section says well enough to determine
	whether it works with kcrypto.  (Sam Hartman)


#27 [*](2401bis) SPD Considerations (section 10.1)

	This should not go in the security considartions section.  It is
	really more about IPsec architectural considerations than security
	considerations.

	This text needs to take into account 2401bis.  In particular it needs
	to be properly split between SPD considerations and PAD
	considerations.  (Sam Hartman)

	Related thread: Message-ID: <420865DD.1040507@miyazawa.org>


#28 [*] Key usage

	Usage of  kink should specify the key usage numbers for kerberos
	encryption.  (Sam Hartman)

	You can assign the numbers out of the space reserved for applications
	if principals used for kink will not be used for other purposes.  If
	principals used for kink will be used for other purposes it is
	probably desirable to talk to Tom Yu and get a key usage number added
	to 1510ter.  You'll also want to add the same key usage number to Kink
	to avoid a normative reference to 1510ter.
	(Sam Hartman, Message-ID: <tslu0omoigd.fsf@cz.mit.edu>)


#29 [*](2401bis) Rekeying (section 4.4.1)

	section 4.4.1:
	Please make sure this discussion is aligned with 2401bis.  I think it
	may change small details but they seem to have adopted much of the
	same strategy kink uses.  The area wher I believe they speak to this
	issue is when you should rekey (timers etc).  (Sam Hartman)


#30 [*](2401bis) IKEv2

	Should we adopt IKEv2?

	If we should...
	- IKEv2 does not have DOI, so how to handle the DOI field in the KINK
	  packet header should be described.
	- Use TS (Traffic Selector) instead of ID (Identification).
	- KEYMAT calculation is changed.
	- How to handle REKEY_SA Notify type.


#31 [*] behavior on KINK_ERROR

	In implementor's point of view, I'd like to see initiator's
	behavior in receiving KINK_ERROR to be defined.
	For example:
	- When KINK_OK is received, initiator MAY act as if the KINK_ERROR
	  payload was not included in the messaged.
	- When KINK_BADQMVERS is received and the Cksum is verified,
	  initiator MAY retry in other Quick Mode version.
	- When one of other error codes is received and the Cksum is verified,
	  initiator SHOULD abort the negotiation.

	when does the responder generate these errors?


#32 [-] I-D nits
(waiting revised i-d)

	Review the I-D nits and RFC authors docs.  I spotted a lot of 
	mechanical things (number of lines per page; avoid hyphenation; use 
	ragged right margin; need two spaces after sentence-ending period; fix 
	page numbers in table of contents; add section numbers to TOC) most of 
	which I think are specified in one of those documents.
	(Ken Raeburn)

	the document needs to meet all the ID nits when it is
	submitted.  (Sam Hartman)


#33 [-] IANA considerations (section 11)

	I think the correct terminology is "port 
	number", not "port", and they're "assigned", not "created".  This 
	section says no new registries are required in the first paragraph, and 
	the third one specifies that IANA must create one (but without the 
	associated procedural data that is required nowadays).  Are the KINK 
	payload types and ISAKMP payload types actually ever used in the same 
	field?  If not, I don't think they need to come out of the same 
	registry.  (Ken Raeburn)

	Needs work.  You may want to stop by tthe IANA office hours and ask
	them for advice.  They are generally quite good at working with
	authors to figure out how things need to be specified.
	(Sam Hartman)


#38 [-] Terminology
(waiting revised i-d)

	Section 2 and 10.1.
	Kerberos is now using the term user-user rather than user-to-user.
	(Sam Hartman)

	Section 2.
	Principals are not either client or service principals;
	they can and often do fill both roles.  (Sam Hartman)


#40 [-] Wording
(waiting revised i-d)

	Section 2, last paragraph.  "Between" is generally non-directional, 
	but in this case, a direction seems to be intended to be inferred; try 
	"from...to" instead.  (Ken Raeburn)


#41 [-] Wording in section 3, Protocol Overview

	Section 3, English usage/grammar problems with the first two paragraphs.
	(Sam Hartman)

	Section 3.
	   which allows a final acknowledgment message when the respondent needs
	   a full three-way handshake. This is only needed when the optimistic
	   keying route is not taken, though it is expected that that will not
	   be the norm. KINK also provides rekeying and dead peer detection as
	What is expected not to be the norm?  Please reword.
	(Sam Hartman)


#42 [-] Wording
(waiting revised i-d)

	Section 4.3, discussing attributes, mixes singular and plural 
	indications.  The word "lone" appears to be popular with the author, 
	too. :-)  (Ken Raeburn)


#43 [-] Wording
(waiting revised i-d)

	Sec 8: "By optional, it is meant..." is badly worded.  (Ken Raeburn)


#35 [-] References
(solution proposed)

	The reference to [PKCROSS] is unnecessary, and only happens once, in 
	the introduction.  I'd suggest dropping it.  That's one less 
	unpublished I-D in the references section.  (Ken Raeburn)

	[KRBREVS] is referenced but not listed in the references section.
	(Ken Raeburn)

	Sec 5.1.7, next to last paragraph on page 21, is "IKE" (the 
	protocol) fuzzy about use of different SAs, or is it "[IKE]" (the 
	document)?  (Ken Raeburn)

	Section 1:
	Remove the reference to pkcross or cite something outside the IETF.
	It's an expired ID without and active editor.  (Sam Hartman)

	Section 1:
	Add an informative reference to IKE.  (Sam Hartman)

	Section 2:
	Cite a reference for DER.  (Sam Hartman)

	Section 5: DOI
	Cite a specific registry please.  IANA registries are typically
	named, and a URL reference would probably be appropriate.


#36 [-] Typos
(waiting revised i-d)

	4.4.2. Dead Peer Detection
	In the fourth paragraph, "loose" is to be "lose".

	5.1 KINK Payloads
	In the first item, the length of the Next Payload should be
	one octet instead of two.

	5.1.1. KINK Padding Rules
	In the second item, "other other" is to be "other".

	5.1.1. KINK Padding Rules
	The first item in the list should end with a period like 
	the others.  (Ken Raeburn)

	5.1.5. KINK_TGT_REQ Payload
	In the third item, "krbtgt/REALM/@REALM" is to be "krbtgt/REALM@REALM".

	5.1.6. KINK_TGT_REP Payload
	In the caption of Figure 13, "KINK_TGT_REQ" is to be "KINK_TGT_REP".

	7.3. CREATE
	"IPspec" is to be "IPsec".

	7.5. STATUS
	In the last paragraph, "REPLY KINK Header" should be in one line.
	In the last paragraph, "[KRB_ERROR]" is to be "[KINK_ERROR]".

	overall:
	"'s" is used in some places where I'd use "s" for a plural form.


-- 
KAMADA Ken'ichi <kamada@nanohz.org>



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To: Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@MIT.EDU>
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Subject: Re: #28 [*] Key usage
References: <4208422C.5020905@miyazawa.org> <tslu0omoigd.fsf@cz.mit.edu>
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Sam Hartman wrote:
> You can assign the numbers out of the space reserved for applications
> if principals used for kink will not be used for other purposes.  If
> principals used for kink will be used for other purposes it is
> probably desirable to talk to Tom Yu and get a key usage number added
> to 1510ter.  You'll also want to add the same key usage number to Kink
> to avoid a normative reference to 1510ter.
> 
> IANA is not currently involved.  The 1510ter document turns key usage
> and a bunch of other things over to IANA.
> 

Thank you, Sam.
BTW, will the 1510ter obsolete the clarifications?

--
Kazunori Miyazawa



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>>>>> "Kazunori" == Kazunori Miyazawa <kazunori@miyazawa.org> writes:

    Kazunori> Thank you, Sam.  BTW, will the 1510ter obsolete the
    Kazunori> clarifications?

Yes, although it is my hope that clarifications will be at draft
standard while the new document is at proposed.



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Subject: #29 [*](2401bis) Rekeying (section 4.4.1)
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#29 [*](2401bis) Rekeying (section 4.4.1)

	section 4.4.1:
	Please make sure this discussion is aligned with 2401bis.  I think it
	may change small details but they seem to have adopted much of the
	same strategy kink uses.  The area wher I believe they speak to this
	issue is when you should rekey (timers etc).  (Sam Hartman)

About issue #29, I could not completely understand what is an isssue in seciton
4.4.1.

However I guess there is an issue, which is a possibility of difference between
Treky and soft lifetime. Instead both Trekey and soft lifetime specify time of
starting rekey.

At "4.4.2.1 Data Items in the SAD" in rfc2401bis, there is a description about
lifetime

     (b) There SHOULD be two kinds of lifetime -- a soft lifetime that
         warns the implementation to initiate action such as setting up
         a replacement SA; and a hard lifetime when the current SA ends
         and is destroyed.

If we will be able to replace Trekey by "soft lifetime", it will be editorial
issue. Unless, we need to understand the reason why KINK introduced Trekey.

How about this as the third paragraph?

Normally a KINK implementation which rekeys existing security associations will
start to rekey the security association at the soft lifetime. In order to avoid
synchronization with similar implementations, KINK initiators MUST randomly pick
a rekeying time between the soft lifetime and the hard lifetime minus the amount
of time it would take to go through a full retransmission time cycle, Tretrans.
The soft lifetime SHOULD be set at least twice Tretrans before the hard lifetime.

#The last sentence would not be needed.

BTW KINK specifies the initiator is responsible for rekeying but it introduces
randomizing rekey time to avoid synchronization. What is the synchronization?

--
Kazunori Miyazawa



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To: ietf-kink@vpnc.org
Subject: Re: #23 [*] KE interoperability (section 6.8)
In-Reply-To: Your message of "Wed, 09 Feb 2005 08:26:02 -0800"
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> On Wed, 2005-02-09 at 01:22, Shoichi Sakane wrote:
> > > > I haven't looked it up in the draft, but my feeling is
> > > > that the Receiver MUST implement KE payloads, though
> > > > I suppose that it may be administratively rejected with
> > > > an error message if it doesn't want to participate. 
> > 
> > I disagree.  it must reduce the value of using KINK.

> I don't understand: if the receiver has a way of 
> rejecting the use of PFS, where is the harm here?
> The sender at worst would have to retry without the
> KE payload it seems to me.

I probably did not understand "MUST implement KE payloads" you said.
I am fine if the receiver can reject KE payloads by its policy, and
SHOULD send an error to the sender.

> > > > IKEv1 doesn't define it because it always expects that
> > > > the initial DH is performed; KINK doesn't require this
> > > > since there's already a shared key in the ticket.
> > 
> > I am assuming that "the initial DH" means the group number used
> > in phase 1.  
> 
> No, I meant that IKE always performs an initial
> Diffie Hellman exchange, so the KE payload is 
> mandatory.

I don't understand what you mean.  what is the initial DH exchange ?
there are 2 phases in IKEv1.  DH exchange can be used in each phases. 
there is no description of the group number of phase 2's DH exchange.
that is the problem i said.
in IKEv2, both IKE_SA_INIT and CREATE_CHILD_SA can be used DH exchange.
the group number to be used in each exchange can be specified in each
SA payload.  so if we choice IKEv2 manner, there is no problem what i said.

what do you mean "the KE payload is mandatory." ?  KE payload in phase 2
of IKEv1, or in CREATE_CHILD_SA of IKEv2 is optional.

> > > Sakane-san's point (as far as I can read) is that
> > > if KINK allows using KE payloads, the following 3 issues
> > > should be considered.  I think only the 3rd item needs additional
> > > text to the KINK spec.
> > > 
> > > - Which error code is returned when the responder doesn't support KE,
> > >   if we go with IKEv1.
> > >   (I think INVALID-PAYLOAD-TYPE is enough.)
> 
> Maybe it should be more specific so that a sender
> can know that it's really the KE payload that's
> causing problems?

I agree with you, however there is no suitable error type in both RFC2408
and the IKEv2 specification.  INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD would be better, but the
meaning is slightly different from this context.  do you have any idea ?

> Another possibility that I haven't
> looked at yet is for the receiver to _not_ send its
> KE payload back in which case the sender would realize
> that the receiver didn't perform the DH and it could
> proceed as if the sender KE wasn't present at all?

could you explain me with another word ?  i could not understand what
you said.  probably language issue. i am sorry.

> > > - KINK initiators usually set inbound SAs before CREATE command,
> > >   but it's not possible when using KE payloads.
> 
> I believe the appropriate behavior is specified here...

could you specify the place in the draft ?  i didnt find it.



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Subject: Re: #23 [*] KE interoperability (section 6.8)
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> On Wed, 2005-02-09 at 01:22, Shoichi Sakane wrote:
> > > > I haven't looked it up in the draft, but my feeling is
> > > > that the Receiver MUST implement KE payloads, though
> > > > I suppose that it may be administratively rejected with
> > > > an error message if it doesn't want to participate. 
> > 
> > I disagree.  it must reduce the value of using KINK.

> I don't understand: if the receiver has a way of 
> rejecting the use of PFS, where is the harm here?
> The sender at worst would have to retry without the
> KE payload it seems to me.

I probably did not understand "MUST implement KE payloads" you said.
I am fine if the receiver can reject KE payloads by its policy, and
SHOULD send an error to the sender.

> > > > IKEv1 doesn't define it because it always expects that
> > > > the initial DH is performed; KINK doesn't require this
> > > > since there's already a shared key in the ticket.
> > 
> > I am assuming that "the initial DH" means the group number used
> > in phase 1.  
> 
> No, I meant that IKE always performs an initial
> Diffie Hellman exchange, so the KE payload is 
> mandatory.

I don't understand what you mean.  what is the initial DH exchange ?
there are 2 phases in IKEv1.  DH exchange can be used in each phases. 
there is no description of the group number of phase 2's DH exchange.
that is the problem i said.
in IKEv2, both IKE_SA_INIT and CREATE_CHILD_SA can be used DH exchange.
the group number to be used in each exchange can be specified in each
SA payload.  so if we choice IKEv2 manner, there is no problem what i said.

what do you mean "the KE payload is mandatory." ?  KE payload in phase 2
of IKEv1, or in CREATE_CHILD_SA of IKEv2 is optional.

> > > Sakane-san's point (as far as I can read) is that
> > > if KINK allows using KE payloads, the following 3 issues
> > > should be considered.  I think only the 3rd item needs additional
> > > text to the KINK spec.
> > > 
> > > - Which error code is returned when the responder doesn't support KE,
> > >   if we go with IKEv1.
> > >   (I think INVALID-PAYLOAD-TYPE is enough.)
> 
> Maybe it should be more specific so that a sender
> can know that it's really the KE payload that's
> causing problems?

I agree with you, however there is no suitable error type in both RFC2408
and the IKEv2 specification.  INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD would be better, but the
meaning is slightly different from this context.  do you have any idea ?

> Another possibility that I haven't
> looked at yet is for the receiver to _not_ send its
> KE payload back in which case the sender would realize
> that the receiver didn't perform the DH and it could
> proceed as if the sender KE wasn't present at all?

could you explain me with another word ?  i could not understand what
you said.  probably language issue. i am sorry.

> > > - KINK initiators usually set inbound SAs before CREATE command,
> > >   but it's not possible when using KE payloads.
> 
> I believe the appropriate behavior is specified here...

could you specify the place in the draft ?  i didnt find it.



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Subject: Re: #16 [*] EPOCH (section 5.1.2)
References: <20050210154348XQ%kamada@nanohz.org>
From: Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu>
Date: Thu, 17 Feb 2005 20:12:11 -0500
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>>>>> "KAMADA" == KAMADA Ken'ichi <kamada@nanohz.org> writes:

    >> #16 [*] EPOCH (section 5.1.2)
    >> 
    >> Perhaps you need a description of the time stamp?  I recall
    >> there being such a description in draft-housley-binarytime-xx.
    >> (Sam Hartman)

    KAMADA> The current draft specifies it as "the standard posix four
    KAMADA> octet time stamp".  Is describing in KINK preferred to
    KAMADA> referring POSIX?

Probably.  At least I don't think Russ's draft ended up referring to
Posix.


I actually don't care either wy so long as the format is clearly
specified.  Doing that by reference or by value is fine.




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To: "KAMADA Ken'ichi" <kamada@nanohz.org>
Cc: ietf-kink@vpnc.org
Subject: Re: #25 [**] prf (section 8)
References: <20050210161443XN%kamada@nanohz.org>
From: Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu>
Date: Thu, 17 Feb 2005 20:10:25 -0500
In-Reply-To: <20050210161443XN%kamada@nanohz.org> (KAMADA Ken'ichi's message
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>>>>> "KAMADA" == KAMADA Ken'ichi <kamada@nanohz.org> writes:

    KAMADA> IKE requires the very PRF to generate IPsec keys, so using
    KAMADA> PRFs provided by kcrypto is appropriate here.  kcrypto
    KAMADA> also says "The PRF output string should be suitable for
    KAMADA> use in key generation,..."

The kcrypto PNRF is certainly usable for generating keys; that's its
point.  The working group was concerned about the PRF for kcrypto
mainly because they needed to take a DH output and get a random bit
string.  The kcrypto PRF requires a key.

The only problem I can see with using the kcrypto PRF in kink is
details of the PFS if Kink ends up supporting PFS.  If you don't ever
run into a situation where you want to use the PRF but there is no
appropriate key to feed into it, then everything is fine.

--Sam



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Subject: Re: #29 [*](2401bis) Rekeying (section 4.4.1)
From: Bill Sommerfeld <sommerfeld@sun.com>
To: Kazunori Miyazawa <kazunori@miyazawa.org>
Cc: ietf-kink@vpnc.org
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On Tue, 2005-02-15 at 02:07, Kazunori Miyazawa wrote:

> Normally a KINK implementation which rekeys existing security associations will
> start to rekey the security association at the soft lifetime. In order to avoid
> synchronization with similar implementations, KINK initiators MUST randomly pick
> a rekeying time between the soft lifetime and the hard lifetime minus the amount
> of time it would take to go through a full retransmission time cycle, Tretrans.
> The soft lifetime SHOULD be set at least twice Tretrans before the hard lifetime.

Another way to phrase this: "the soft lifetime must be randomized to avoid synchronization.."

						- Bill







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Subject: Re: #29 [*](2401bis) Rekeying (section 4.4.1)
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Bill Sommerfeld wrote:
> On Tue, 2005-02-15 at 02:07, Kazunori Miyazawa wrote:
> 
> 
>>Normally a KINK implementation which rekeys existing security associations will
>>start to rekey the security association at the soft lifetime. In order to avoid
>>synchronization with similar implementations, KINK initiators MUST randomly pick
>>a rekeying time between the soft lifetime and the hard lifetime minus the amount
>>of time it would take to go through a full retransmission time cycle, Tretrans.
>>The soft lifetime SHOULD be set at least twice Tretrans before the hard lifetime.
> 
> 
> Another way to phrase this: "the soft lifetime must be randomized to avoid synchronization.."
> 


At first, I assumed that a soft lifetime of a SA might be sat by an administrator.

But the lifetime negotiation affects only the hard lifetime and an entity which 
supports KINK protocol probably has rights to determine the soft lifetime.
I think your phrase is better because of simplicity.

Should we describe a limits of the randomization?
I think it may be an implementation issue.

--
Kazunori Miyazawa



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From: "KAMADA Ken'ichi" <kamada@nanohz.org>
To: ietf-kink@vpnc.org
Subject: Re: #25 [**] prf (section 8)
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At Thu, 17 Feb 2005 20:10:25 -0500,
Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu> wrote:
> 
>     KAMADA> IKE requires the very PRF to generate IPsec keys, so using
>     KAMADA> PRFs provided by kcrypto is appropriate here.  kcrypto
>     KAMADA> also says "The PRF output string should be suitable for
>     KAMADA> use in key generation,..."
> 
> The kcrypto PNRF is certainly usable for generating keys; that's its
> point.  The working group was concerned about the PRF for kcrypto
> mainly because they needed to take a DH output and get a random bit
> string.  The kcrypto PRF requires a key.
> 
> The only problem I can see with using the kcrypto PRF in kink is
> details of the PFS if Kink ends up supporting PFS.  If you don't ever
> run into a situation where you want to use the PRF but there is no
> appropriate key to feed into it, then everything is fine.

I'm now clear on the issue you raised.
On that regard, KINK uses a DH output in the octet-string of the PRF.
The protocol-key of the PRF is always a key provided in the AP
exchange, so I think there is no situation you concerns.

I skimmed the recent ietf-krb-wg ML and found some issues discussed.
I think KINK has no problem with them.

1. PRF needs a key as its input.
	In KINK, there is a key even when taking PFS.
	(as described above)

2. Is kcrypto PRF cryptographically strong?
	This is kcrypto issue, and the answer seems to be "yes"
	according to the ietf-krb-wg ML.

3. The output size of PRF is not the same with the key (nor the seed).
	Yes, it is the way of PRF and KINK doesn't have any
	problem with it.

-- 
KAMADA Ken'ichi <kamada@nanohz.org>



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From: "KAMADA Ken'ichi" <kamada@nanohz.org>
To: ietf-kink@vpnc.org
Subject: clean #37 and #5 and introduce #45
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At Thu, 10 Feb 2005 17:41:10 +0900,
"KAMADA Ken'ichi" <kamada@nanohz.org> wrote:
> 
> #37 [**] Difference between IKE and KINK on CREATE command (section 4.3)
> 
> 	IN addition, any differences
> 	between how this works and how IKE would set up the same SA need to be
> 	called out.  It is fine for there to be differences, but I want to
> 	make sure the working group explicitly decided the differences are a
> 	good thing.
> 
> 	I'm somewhat concerned that 4.3 is not specific enough to describe
> 	exactly what key gets set up.  I.E. I'm concerned it may not be
> 	detailed enough for interoperable implementations.
> 	(Sam Hartman)
> 
> 	- What keys are used for the resulting SA on the each side?
> 	  (Sam Hartman, Message-ID: <tslbrb4aqae.fsf@cz.mit.edu>)
> 
> 		Answer: Message-ID: <20050204170451BM%kamada@nanohz.org>
> 
> 	- Doesn't the timing when to add in/out SAs conflict with IKE?
> 	  (Sam Hartman, Message-ID: <tsllla6pz7t.fsf@cz.mit.edu>)
> 
> 		Related thread: Message-ID: <20050204170454BO%kamada@nanohz.org>
> 
> 	- How about when to add SAs and which SAs to add when 3-way.
> 	  (Message-ID: <20050204170454BO%kamada@nanohz.org>)
> 
> 
> #5 [*] When 3-way, is responder's nonce MUST or SHOULD? (section 4.3 and 7.3)
> (solution proposed)
> 
> 	Sec 4.3 and 7.3 use SHOULD and MUST respectively regarding when the 
> 	nonce should be used.  If the circumstances they're describing are 
> 	different, that's okay, but if so, I missed it on first reading.
> 	(Ken Raeburn)
> 
> 	They are talking the same situation and the requirement levels should
> 	be aligned.  I think SHOULD is appropriate because non-returning
> 	responder's nonce does not break interoperabilities.
> 	(Message-ID: <20050127171441FF%kamada@nanohz.org>)
> 
> 	If the initiator receives a responder's nonce, she MUST use
> 	it in the KEYMAT calculation.
> 
> 	I think it is also editorial issue.  anyway, the behavior depends on
> 	condition.  if a responder does not agree with the initiator's proposal,
> 	AND if the responder wants to continue the transaction, then the responder
> 	MUST send back a message with ACK request bit, and MAY contain a nonce.
> 	There is a case when the responder wants to use same KEYMAT of the
> 	initiator, but just doesn't want to use the initiator's proposal.
> 	It is not always required to add a nonce.
> 	(Message-Id: <20050204200406K.sakane@kame.net>)

#37 and #5 seems to have some overlapping discussion.
Can I clean them up as follows?

#37
	Following two issues are answered and seems to have no problem.
	- What keys are used for the resulting SA on the each side?
	- Doesn't the timing when to add in/out SAs conflict with IKE?

	This one seems overlap with #5, so seperate from #37 and moved
	into #45 (described below).
	- How about when to add SAs and which SAs to add when 3-way.

	We have no issue left in #37, so we can close it.


#5
	The original issue that the responder's nonce is MUST or SHOULD,
	is answered.  It should be SHOULD.

	Sakane-san's issue is seperated from #5 and moved into #45

	We can just fix #5 editorially.


and introduce #45.
#45 [*] When to add SAs and which SAs to add in 3-way handshake

	derived from #5 and #37, and related to #23.

	When does the responder require ACK?
	- disagreeing on the proposal
	- doing KE (dispite accepting or rejecting?)
	- agreeing with the parameters but want to add NONCE
	  (Is this allowed in KINK?)

	When to add (and remove if necessary) SAs?
	- usual optimistic approach
		This is already described in the current draft.
	- (non-KE) 3-way
	- KE 3-way

-- 
KAMADA Ken'ichi <kamada@nanohz.org>



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Subject: Re: clean #37 and #5 and introduce #45
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Hi.  I don't believe that <20050204170451BM%kamada@nanohz.org>
actually gives a good answer to which key is used on each side.

I understand section 8's purpose is to answer this issue, but I did
not find it clear.  I believe that section 8 is going to need to
change to specify use of the kcrypto prf.

I think that once this change is made I should either say that the
result is clear or explain exactly what I think is missing.  I suspect
I may want some text copied in from the IKE RFC.



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Subject: Re: #16 [*] EPOCH (section 5.1.2)
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KAMADA Ken'ichi wrote:
>>#16 [*] EPOCH (section 5.1.2)
>>
>>	Perhaps you need a description of the time stamp?  I recall there
>>	being such a description in draft-housley-binarytime-xx.
>>	(Sam Hartman)
> 
> 
> The current draft specifies it as "the standard posix four octet
> time stamp".  Is describing in KINK preferred to referring POSIX?
> 
> FWIW, the EPOCH field is only used for DPD and the format of it
> is not important, as far as the same value is not reused within a
> short period.
> 

I agree with Kamada-san.

I think it is important for EPOCH to have an implementation determine peer's 
rebooting. DPD is done by detecting the change of a EPOCH in a received message.
Therefore implementation just has to compare a new EPOCHwith old one as a 32bit
binary, so that the format is not important.

Even if we adopt the format which counts up a second from a base time, it is not
useful for a KINK implementation which can reboot in one tenth second.

As Kamda-san said, it is important the value for EPOCH must not reused within a
short period for the purpose.

Anyway I think the formant is not important and it dpends on a system in which a
KINK implementation runs.

I think EPOCH is a value under these conditions.
1. It is 32bit binary.
2. It MUST NOT reused within a short period.

--
Kazunori Miyazawa



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Hello,

I agree. We need the behaviors of #31 in the issue list.

But please let me confirm.

Does the first item mean that the initiator which receives a message
with KINK_OK can ignore KINK_ERROR payload when the message includes it?

What are other error codes in the third item? Does it mean the error coeds
except for KINK_OK and KINK_BADQMVERS?

--
Kazunori Miyazawa



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From: "KAMADA Ken'ichi" <kamada@nanohz.org>
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Subject: revising section 8, Key Derivation
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Section 8 seems to be blocking #37, #25, and #26, so I'll try to
revise it first.  How about this for section 8.
# Sorry if my poor English broke some sentenses.


8.  Key Derivation

   KINK uses the same key derivation mechanisms that [IKE] uses in
   section 5.5, which is:

   KEYMAT = prf(SKEYID_d, [g(qm)^xy |] protocol | SPI | Ni_b [| Nr_b])

   The following differences apply:

   o  prf is the pseudo-random function corresponding to the session
      key's etype.  They are defined in [KCRYPTO].

   o  SKEYID_d is the session key in the Kerberos service ticket from
      the AP-REQ.

   o  Nr_b is optional.

      When the responder's nonce does not exist, Nr_b is treated as if
      a zero length value was supplied.

   Note that g(qm)^xy refers to the keying material generated when KE
   payloads are supplied using Diffie Hellman key agreement. This is
   explained in section 5.5 of [IKE].

   The rest of the key derivation (e.g. how to expand KEYMAT)
   follows IKE.  How to use derived keying materials is up to each
   service (e.g. section 4.6.2 of [IPSEC]).


# add a reference [KCRYPTO] to RFC 3961.
# "section 4.6.2 of [IPSEC]" may be "section 4.5.2 of [2401bis]".


-- 
KAMADA Ken'ichi <kamada@nanohz.org>



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At Mon, 21 Feb 2005 16:06:16 +0900,
Kazunori Miyazawa <kazunori@miyazawa.org> wrote:
> 
> But please let me confirm.
> 
> Does the first item mean that the initiator which receives a message
> with KINK_OK can ignore KINK_ERROR payload when the message includes it?

I meant _the_ KINK_ERROR whose value is KINK_OK.
If another KINK_ERROR were included (I think it is not allowed),
it should not be ignored.
# BTW, KINK_OK should not be allowed to be sent in the first place...

> What are other error codes in the third item? Does it mean the error coeds
> except for KINK_OK and KINK_BADQMVERS?

Yes.

-- 
KAMADA Ken'ichi <kamada@nanohz.org>



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At Fri, 04 Feb 2005 13:35:17 +0900,
Kazunori Miyazawa <kazunori@miyazawa.org> wrote:
> 
> #24 [*] MUST/SHOULD in clock skew (section 7.1)
> 
> 	The time difference MUST be computed and SHOULD be stored
> 	and used?  Why the different requirement levels?  (And is this sort of
> 	thing in the domain of KINK or Kerberos?)  (Ken Raeburn)
> 
> I think the clock skew processing is an implementation and/or operational issue
> in KINK. However the server must provide the ctime because the client may want
> to continue the process though there is skew.
> 
> I propose that KINK filling out ctime is MUST but KINK should not decide the
> processing.

I agree that the server MUST fill out ctime (and the current draft
also says so).

Regarding clients, do you mean KINK should not describe the
processing, or should not use capital letters?
I like SHOULD, or have no problem with describing small letters if the
WG prefers it.  But I think "not describing the processing" is not
appropriate because it is not specified by Kerberos (as far as I know)
and clients don't know how to process ctime without it.

-- 
KAMADA Ken'ichi <kamada@nanohz.org>



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> [**] Indicates an issue considered substantive.
> [-] Indicates an editorial issue.
> (2401bis) Indicates it depends on 2401 vs 2401bis.

what is [*] ?  is this a typo of [**] ?

for example, like the following:

> #5 [*] When 3-way, is responder's nonce MUST or SHOULD? (section 4.3 and 7.3)
> (solution proposed)



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From: Shoichi Sakane <sakane@kame.net>
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I would like to close this issue #18 if anybody has objection.

> > #18 [**] Kerberos error type limitations (section 5.1.4)
> > 
> >	Why should a sender send only those errors?  I'm mostly asking
> >	for an explanation to be given to me or to be added to the document
> >	rather than liberalization of the requirement.  (Sam Hartman)
> 
> I am not sure why the document describes such limitations.
> If we don't have any reason, remove the limitations, and remove the text:
> 
> 	but the sender SHOULD send only the  following errors:
> 
> 	    KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY
> 	    KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED
> 	    KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW
> 	    KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_NOKEY
> 	    KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADKEYVER
> 



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Subject: Re: #23 [*] KE interoperability (section 6.8)
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> 
> > On Wed, 2005-02-09 at 01:22, Shoichi Sakane wrote:
> > > > > I haven't looked it up in the draft, but my feeling is
> > > > > that the Receiver MUST implement KE payloads, though
> > > > > I suppose that it may be administratively rejected with
> > > > > an error message if it doesn't want to participate. 
> > > 
> > > I disagree.  it must reduce the value of using KINK.
> 
> > I don't understand: if the receiver has a way of 
> > rejecting the use of PFS, where is the harm here?
> > The sender at worst would have to retry without the
> > KE payload it seems to me.
> 
> I probably did not understand "MUST implement KE payloads" you said.
> I am fine if the receiver can reject KE payloads by its policy, and
> SHOULD send an error to the sender.
> 
> > > > > IKEv1 doesn't define it because it always expects that
> > > > > the initial DH is performed; KINK doesn't require this
> > > > > since there's already a shared key in the ticket.
> > > 
> > > I am assuming that "the initial DH" means the group number used
> > > in phase 1.  
> > 
> > No, I meant that IKE always performs an initial
> > Diffie Hellman exchange, so the KE payload is 
> > mandatory.
> 
> I don't understand what you mean.  what is the initial DH exchange ?
> there are 2 phases in IKEv1.  DH exchange can be used in each phases. 
> there is no description of the group number of phase 2's DH exchange.
> that is the problem i said.
> in IKEv2, both IKE_SA_INIT and CREATE_CHILD_SA can be used DH exchange.
> the group number to be used in each exchange can be specified in each
> SA payload.  so if we choice IKEv2 manner, there is no problem what i said.
> 
> what do you mean "the KE payload is mandatory." ?  KE payload in phase 2
> of IKEv1, or in CREATE_CHILD_SA of IKEv2 is optional.
> 
> > > > Sakane-san's point (as far as I can read) is that
> > > > if KINK allows using KE payloads, the following 3 issues
> > > > should be considered.  I think only the 3rd item needs additional
> > > > text to the KINK spec.
> > > > 
> > > > - Which error code is returned when the responder doesn't support KE,
> > > >   if we go with IKEv1.
> > > >   (I think INVALID-PAYLOAD-TYPE is enough.)
> > 
> > Maybe it should be more specific so that a sender
> > can know that it's really the KE payload that's
> > causing problems?
> 
> I agree with you, however there is no suitable error type in both RFC2408
> and the IKEv2 specification.  INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD would be better, but the
> meaning is slightly different from this context.  do you have any idea ?
> 
> > Another possibility that I haven't
> > looked at yet is for the receiver to _not_ send its
> > KE payload back in which case the sender would realize
> > that the receiver didn't perform the DH and it could
> > proceed as if the sender KE wasn't present at all?
> 
> could you explain me with another word ?  i could not understand what
> you said.  probably language issue. i am sorry.
> 
> > > > - KINK initiators usually set inbound SAs before CREATE command,
> > > >   but it's not possible when using KE payloads.
> > 
> > I believe the appropriate behavior is specified here...
> 
> could you specify the place in the draft ?  i didnt find it.
> 



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At Tue, 22 Feb 2005 09:36:13 +0900,
Shoichi Sakane <sakane@kame.net> wrote:
> 
> > [**] Indicates an issue considered substantive.
> > [-] Indicates an editorial issue.
> > (2401bis) Indicates it depends on 2401 vs 2401bis.
> 
> what is [*] ?  is this a typo of [**] ?

It was meaning "no special meaning" just in order to highlight
the heading lines (in old days where there is no issue number).

-- 
KAMADA Ken'ichi <kamada@nanohz.org>



From owner-ietf-kink@mail.vpnc.org  Mon Feb 21 22:55:43 2005
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Subject: Re: #23 [*] KE interoperability (section 6.8)
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# sorry, i sent a garbage by my misoperation.

> > On Wed, 2005-02-09 at 01:22, Shoichi Sakane wrote:
> > > > > I haven't looked it up in the draft, but my feeling is
> > > > > that the Receiver MUST implement KE payloads, though
> > > > > I suppose that it may be administratively rejected with
> > > > > an error message if it doesn't want to participate. 
> > > 
> > > I disagree.  it must reduce the value of using KINK.
> 
> > I don't understand: if the receiver has a way of 
> > rejecting the use of PFS, where is the harm here?
> > The sender at worst would have to retry without the
> > KE payload it seems to me.
> 
> I probably did not understand "MUST implement KE payloads" you said.
> I am fine if the receiver can reject KE payloads by its policy, and
> SHOULD send an error to the sender.

no objection here ?  I propose the text below discussion.

> > > > > IKEv1 doesn't define it because it always expects that
> > > > > the initial DH is performed; KINK doesn't require this
> > > > > since there's already a shared key in the ticket.
> > > 
> > > I am assuming that "the initial DH" means the group number used
> > > in phase 1.  
> > 
> > No, I meant that IKE always performs an initial
> > Diffie Hellman exchange, so the KE payload is 
> > mandatory.
> 
> I don't understand what you mean.  what is the initial DH exchange ?
> there are 2 phases in IKEv1.  DH exchange can be used in each phases. 
> there is no description of the group number of phase 2's DH exchange.
> that is the problem i said.
> in IKEv2, both IKE_SA_INIT and CREATE_CHILD_SA can be used DH exchange.
> the group number to be used in each exchange can be specified in each
> SA payload.  so if we choice IKEv2 manner, there is no problem what i said.
> 
> what do you mean "the KE payload is mandatory." ?  KE payload in phase 2
> of IKEv1, or in CREATE_CHILD_SA of IKEv2 is optional.

There was my fault.  I have told a strange thing here.  the fact is
that there is no chance to negotiate the DH group in phase 2 of IKEv1.
so the negotiators have to make an agreement of the group in use
before the negotiation begins, otherwise the negotiation will fail.

in ether case, the document has to describe it like the IKEv2 document.

   section 1.3:
   If the SA offers include
   different Diffie-Hellman groups, KEi MUST be an element of the group
   the initiator expects the responder to accept. If it guesses wrong,
   the CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange will fail and it will have to retry with
   a different KEi.

> > > > Sakane-san's point (as far as I can read) is that
> > > > if KINK allows using KE payloads, the following 3 issues
> > > > should be considered.  I think only the 3rd item needs additional
> > > > text to the KINK spec.
> > > > 
> > > > - Which error code is returned when the responder doesn't support KE,
> > > >   if we go with IKEv1.
> > > >   (I think INVALID-PAYLOAD-TYPE is enough.)
> > 
> > Maybe it should be more specific so that a sender
> > can know that it's really the KE payload that's
> > causing problems?
> 
> I agree with you, however there is no suitable error type in both RFC2408
> and the IKEv2 specification.  INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD would be better, but the
> meaning is slightly different from this context.  do you have any idea ?

> > Another possibility that I haven't
> > looked at yet is for the receiver to _not_ send its
> > KE payload back in which case the sender would realize
> > that the receiver didn't perform the DH and it could
> > proceed as if the sender KE wasn't present at all?
> 
> could you explain me with another word ?  i could not understand what
> you said.  probably language issue. i am sorry.

I have understood what you mean.  so the responder has three choices
when it receives a KE payload.  that is:

	- return a notify payload with INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD.
	- return a notify payload with NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN.
	- reply without KE payload.

so I would like to propose the following process.  any idea ?

   All node conformed to the document MAY implement the KE payload
   handling.  If a node receives a KE payload, and the receiver does not
   support the KE handling, and does not want to proceed the negotiation,
   then the receiver SHOULD send a Notify payload of the type
   NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN to the sender.  If the receiver wants to keep the
   negotiation without the KE payload handling, then the receiver sends
   a response witout a KE payload.  the sender MAY reject it by its policy
   in this case.
   If the receiver does not want to process the KE payload by its policy,
   the receiver SHOULD send a Notify payload of tye type INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD
   to the sender.
   Notification Data MUST contain the KE payload in both case.  the Protocol
   ID MUST be 1, and the SPI Size MUST be zero.

> > > > - KINK initiators usually set inbound SAs before CREATE command,
> > > >   but it's not possible when using KE payloads.
> > 
> > I believe the appropriate behavior is specified here...
> 
> could you specify the place in the draft ?  i didnt find it.



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From: "KAMADA Ken'ichi" <kamada@nanohz.org>
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Subject: Re: #23 [*] KE interoperability (section 6.8)
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At Tue, 22 Feb 2005 12:53:29 +0900,
Shoichi Sakane <sakane@kame.net> wrote:
> 
> > > Maybe it should be more specific so that a sender
> > > can know that it's really the KE payload that's
> > > causing problems?
> > 
> > I agree with you, however there is no suitable error type in both RFC2408
> > and the IKEv2 specification.  INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD would be better, but the
> > meaning is slightly different from this context.  do you have any idea ?
> 
> > > Another possibility that I haven't
> > > looked at yet is for the receiver to _not_ send its
> > > KE payload back in which case the sender would realize
> > > that the receiver didn't perform the DH and it could
> > > proceed as if the sender KE wasn't present at all?
> > 
> > could you explain me with another word ?  i could not understand what
> > you said.  probably language issue. i am sorry.
> 
> I have understood what you mean.  so the responder has three choices
> when it receives a KE payload.  that is:
> 
> 	- return a notify payload with INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD.
> 	- return a notify payload with NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN.
> 	- reply without KE payload.
> 
> so I would like to propose the following process.  any idea ?
> 
>    All node conformed to the document MAY implement the KE payload
>    handling.  If a node receives a KE payload, and the receiver does not
>    support the KE handling, and does not want to proceed the negotiation,
>    then the receiver SHOULD send a Notify payload of the type
>    NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN to the sender.  If the receiver wants to keep the
>    negotiation without the KE payload handling, then the receiver sends
>    a response witout a KE payload.  the sender MAY reject it by its policy
>    in this case.

The sender (I assume you meant the initiator) can't reject it
because the ACK message can't carry it.


>    If the receiver does not want to process the KE payload by its policy,
>    the receiver SHOULD send a Notify payload of tye type INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD
>    to the sender.
>    Notification Data MUST contain the KE payload in both case.  the Protocol
>    ID MUST be 1, and the SPI Size MUST be zero.

What is the difference between NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN and
INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD?  "Not supported" and "Rejected by policy"?

-- 
KAMADA Ken'ichi <kamada@nanohz.org>



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Subject: #15 [**] Principal name of KINK service (section 5.1.2)
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Hello,

As someone said, I think the sentence just specifies a name convention.

I think the way of discovering a remote's principal identifier is an
implementation issue. When KINK refering rfc2401bis, PAD would contains a
remote's principal ID. But PAD is ambigous. Anyway it is finally an
implementation issue.

We can care the U2U case in this section with the issue #3.

I think we can close this issue.

--
Kazunori Miyazawa




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To: ietf-kink@vpnc.org
Subject: Re: #23 [*] KE interoperability (section 6.8)
In-Reply-To: Your message of "Tue, 22 Feb 2005 13:39:19 +0900"
	<20050222133919IC%kamada@nanohz.org>
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From: Shoichi Sakane <sakane@kame.net>
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> > so I would like to propose the following process.  any idea ?
> > 
> >    All node conformed to the document MAY implement the KE payload
> >    handling.  If a node receives a KE payload, and the receiver does not
> >    support the KE handling, and does not want to proceed the negotiation,
> >    then the receiver SHOULD send a Notify payload of the type
> >    NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN to the sender.  If the receiver wants to keep the
> >    negotiation without the KE payload handling, then the receiver sends
> >    a response witout a KE payload.  the sender MAY reject it by its policy
> >    in this case.

I meant the sender was the initiator.

> The sender (I assume you meant the initiator) can't reject it
> because the ACK message can't carry it.

the one does not need to proceed the ACK handling.  as referencing to
the section 7.2, when the initiator reject it, then the initiator
SHOULD re-send a CREATE message without KE payload.

> >    If the receiver does not want to process the KE payload by its policy,
> >    the receiver SHOULD send a Notify payload of tye type INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD
> >    to the sender.
> >    Notification Data MUST contain the KE payload in both case.  the Protocol
> >    ID MUST be 1, and the SPI Size MUST be zero.
> 
> What is the difference between NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN and
> INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD?  "Not supported" and "Rejected by policy"?

yes, correct.



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From: "KAMADA Ken'ichi" <kamada@nanohz.org>
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Subject: Re: #23 [*] KE interoperability (section 6.8)
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At Tue, 22 Feb 2005 14:30:38 +0900,
Shoichi Sakane <sakane@kame.net> wrote:
> 
> > > so I would like to propose the following process.  any idea ?
> > > 
> > >    All node conformed to the document MAY implement the KE payload
> > >    handling.  If a node receives a KE payload, and the receiver does not
> > >    support the KE handling, and does not want to proceed the negotiation,
> > >    then the receiver SHOULD send a Notify payload of the type
> > >    NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN to the sender.  If the receiver wants to keep the
> > >    negotiation without the KE payload handling, then the receiver sends
> > >    a response witout a KE payload.  the sender MAY reject it by its policy
> > >    in this case.
> 
> I meant the sender was the initiator.
> 
> > The sender (I assume you meant the initiator) can't reject it
> > because the ACK message can't carry it.
> 
> the one does not need to proceed the ACK handling.  as referencing to
> the section 7.2, when the initiator reject it, then the initiator
> SHOULD re-send a CREATE message without KE payload.

How the responder distinguish it from a brand new CREATE?
Without distinction, the responder can't know whether the
first CREATE succeeded or not.

-- 
KAMADA Ken'ichi <kamada@nanohz.org>



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Subject: Re: #23 [*] KE interoperability (section 6.8)
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	<20050222151212IS%kamada@nanohz.org>
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> At Tue, 22 Feb 2005 14:30:38 +0900,
> Shoichi Sakane <sakane@kame.net> wrote:
> > 
> > > > so I would like to propose the following process.  any idea ?
> > > > 
> > > >    All node conformed to the document MAY implement the KE payload
> > > >    handling.  If a node receives a KE payload, and the receiver does not
> > > >    support the KE handling, and does not want to proceed the negotiation,
> > > >    then the receiver SHOULD send a Notify payload of the type
> > > >    NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN to the sender.  If the receiver wants to keep the
> > > >    negotiation without the KE payload handling, then the receiver sends
> > > >    a response witout a KE payload.  the sender MAY reject it by its policy
> > > >    in this case.
> > 
> > I meant the sender was the initiator.
> > 
> > > The sender (I assume you meant the initiator) can't reject it
> > > because the ACK message can't carry it.
> > 
> > the one does not need to proceed the ACK handling.  as referencing to
> > the section 7.2, when the initiator reject it, then the initiator
> > SHOULD re-send a CREATE message without KE payload.
> 
> How the responder distinguish it from a brand new CREATE?
> Without distinction, the responder can't know whether the
> first CREATE succeeded or not.

can the Transaction ID be used for this purpose ?
otherwise, the section 7.2 description won't work, will it ?



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open:			20
solution proposed:	14
waiting revised i-d:	 7
closed:			 2
---------------------------
total:			43

[**] Indicates an issue considered substantive.
[-] Indicates an editorial issue.
(2401bis) Indicates it depends on 2401 vs 2401bis.


#1 [**] Versioning
(solution proposed)

	what happens when a receiver receives a major or
	minor version of the kink or qm that is inconsistent with this
	document?  What about unknown payload types?  (Sam Hartman)

	QM version is discussed in section 12 (Forward Compatibility
	Considerations).

	Proposed solution:
	- KINK version
		return error KINK_INVMAJ when major version mismatch.
		WRT minor version,
		a) remove the minor version, or
		b) return KINK_INVMIN when mismatch (both lower and higher)
	- QM versoin
		already specified in section 12.
	- KINK payload type
		return error (KINK_PROTOERR)
	- ISAKMP payload type
		return error (ISAKMP INVALID-PAYLOAD-TYPE)
		(describe each Notify type usage like ikev2 spec.)

	Specify the behavior when the error is not authenticated
	in the Security Consideration section.

	Related thread: Message-Id: <20050202105420R.sakane@kame.net>


#2 [*] U2U (section 3, 4.2, and 5.1.2)
(not yet analyzed)

	I think we need to look at how u2u works at various parts of
	the protocol.  In particular I'm concerned about choosing the right
	u2u principal, dealing with cross-realm u2u and dealing with
	recovering from reboots.  We should confirm all these work out.
	(Sam Hartman)

	# choosing the right u2u is discuessed in #3.
	# cross-realm u2u is discussed in #19.

	More examination of user-to-user case, especially situations where 
	it might *not* be two PKINIT clients, which section 3 says is possible. 
	(Ken Raeburn)

	In the user-to-user case with TGTs, I think the KINK draft may be 
	over-specifying things that should be dealt with at the Kerberos level. 
	If things are underspecified in Kerberos Clarifications, let's deal 
	with that.  (Ken Raeburn)

	See also: #3, #19, and #44


#3 [**] Choosing the right principal when U2U

	It seems like the
	server tells the client what principal to authenticate to, but this
	principal is not properly authorized.  (Sam Hartman)

	Section 5.1.2:
	How do I authorize which service I'm talking to in the u2u case.
	I.E. how do I know what principals are authorized for a particular SPD
	entry?  (Sam Hartman)


#19 [**] Cross-realm and U2U (section 4.2 and 5.1.5)

	Please Consider how this works in the cross-realm case.
	I.E. make sure you end up with the right ticket on the right side.  I
	believe this text assumes that you need a ticket in a realm close to
	the client; I think that for things to work you actually need a realm
	close to the server.  Work through the message flows and make sure the
	KDC doing the decryption actually has the necessary keys and then
	adjust the document if necessary so the right KDC is used.

	The document needs to clearly indicate what error code is used in the
	case when the responder cannot get a ticket because some cross-realm
	key is missing.  In general we want it to be possible for an initiator
	to try several identities until the initiator finds the right one that
	has a shared key.
	(Sam Hartman, <20050129021939.1963F76C87@luminous.mit.edu>)


#44 [**] How to determine whether GETTGT is used

	Section 4.2:
	How will the initiator determine whether it will be able to get a
	TGT?  I think policy considerations of when to use u2u and
	authorization considerations of what u2u principals are authorized are
	underspecified in the draft.
	(Sam Hartman)


#4 [**](2401bis) CREATE command from the aspect of 2401bis (section 4.3)
(closed)

	I need explicit review from the IPsec reviewer of this section to
	make sure it is compatible with 2401bis.

	Closed: being discussed with #37


#37 [**] Difference between IKE and KINK on CREATE command (section 4.3)

	IN addition, any differences
	between how this works and how IKE would set up the same SA need to be
	called out.  It is fine for there to be differences, but I want to
	make sure the working group explicitly decided the differences are a
	good thing.

	I'm somewhat concerned that 4.3 is not specific enough to describe
	exactly what key gets set up.  I.E. I'm concerned it may not be
	detailed enough for interoperable implementations.
	(Sam Hartman)

	- What keys are used for the resulting SA on the each side?
	  (Sam Hartman, Message-ID: <tslbrb4aqae.fsf@cz.mit.edu>)

		Answer: Message-ID: <20050204170451BM%kamada@nanohz.org>

	- Doesn't the timing when to add in/out SAs conflict with IKE?
	  (Sam Hartman, Message-ID: <tsllla6pz7t.fsf@cz.mit.edu>)

		Related thread: Message-ID: <20050204170454BO%kamada@nanohz.org>

	- How about when to add SAs and which SAs to add when 3-way.
	  (Message-ID: <20050204170454BO%kamada@nanohz.org>)
	  --> moved to #45


#5 [*] When 3-way, is responder's nonce MUST or SHOULD? (section 4.3 and 7.3)
(solution proposed)

	Sec 4.3 and 7.3 use SHOULD and MUST respectively regarding when the 
	nonce should be used.  If the circumstances they're describing are 
	different, that's okay, but if so, I missed it on first reading.
	(Ken Raeburn)

	They are talking the same situation and the requirement levels should
	be aligned.  I think SHOULD is appropriate because non-returning
	responder's nonce does not break interoperabilities.
	(Message-ID: <20050127171441FF%kamada@nanohz.org>)

	If the initiator receives a responder's nonce, she MUST use
	it in the KEYMAT calculation.

	I think it is also editorial issue.  anyway, the behavior depends on
	condition.  if a responder does not agree with the initiator's proposal,
	AND if the responder wants to continue the transaction, then the responder
	MUST send back a message with ACK request bit, and MAY contain a nonce.
	There is a case when the responder wants to use same KEYMAT of the
	initiator, but just doesn't want to use the initiator's proposal.
	It is not always required to add a nonce.
	(Message-Id: <20050204200406K.sakane@kame.net>)


#45 [*] When to add SAs and which SAs to add in 3-way handshake

	derived from #5 and #37, and related to #23.

	When does the responder require ACK?
	- disagreeing on the proposal
	- doing KE (dispite accepting or rejecting?)
	- agreeing with the parameters but want to add NONCE
	  (Is this allowed in KINK?)

	When to add (and remove if necessary) SAs?
	- usual optimistic approach
		This is already described in the current draft.
	- (non-KE) 3-way
	- KE 3-way


#6 [*] Half open (section 4.4)
(solution proposed)

	IPsec does not allow half-open security associations any more as far
	as I can tell in 2401bis.  So it's not just for simplicity, but for
	model conformance.  (Sam Hartman)

	Proposed solution:
	remove the phrase "for simplicity".
	(Message-ID: <tslu0pbc3h9.fsf@cz.mit.edu>)


#7 [**] DPD & STATUS (section 4.4.2 and 4.5)

	[**] Discuss status message, rebooting peers and u2u.  This looks a
	lot like the IKE case where you lose all cryptographic context to me.
	(Sam Hartman)

	I don't understand what you want here. Are you saying
	that this doesn't work in the u-u case? I don't
	understand what u-u has to do with anything here.  (Michael Thomas)

	OK.  I was unclear .  When sending a status message, what happens if
	the peer has gotten a new TGT?  How do I realize I need to use this
	TGT rather than the one I have?  (Sam Hartman)


#8 [*] CksumLen (section 5)
(solution proposed)

	Diagram indicates one octet for cksumlen, but the text (and 
	kcrypto specifications) say it should be two.

	Proposed solutions:
	- Clarify that you mean the padding discussed in 5.1 (KINK Padding
	  rules), not crypto-system padding.  (Sam Hartman)

	- Use 2 octets for CksumLen field in accordance with kcrypto.

	See also: #9


#9 [**] etype does not directly indicate checksum type (section 5)
(solution proposed)

	a key's encryption type does not directly indicate 
	a checksum type, it indicates an encryption(-with-integrity-protection) 
	scheme, which does include a required-to-implement checksum type
	(Ken Raeburn)

	Proposed solutions are:
	- Use required-to-implement checksum type determined by the etype.
	- Use get_mic or verify_mic function to generate or verify the checksum.
	- Omit the checksum field before calculation.
	- The Length field is filled with the packet length without checksum and
	  the CksumLen field is zeroed out before the calculation.
	- Move the Cksum field to the end of the message.
	  (maybe without padding between the last payload and checksum?)
	(Message-ID: <20050131093509FD%kamada@nanohz.org>)


#10 [**] Kerberos allows variable length checksum (section 5)
(solution proposed)

	I'd have to go back and check, but I don't think we require that 
	a given checksum type have a fixed output size, so "leave X amount of 
	space and fill it with zero for computing the checksum" is questionable 
	too.  (Ken Raeburn)

	Proposed solution: look at #9


#11 [*] Kerberos checksum is not deterministic (section 5)
(solution proposed)

	The Kink description of how to verify a checksum assumes that
	Kerberos checksums are deterministic; this is not strictly required.
	(Sam Hartman)

	let kcrypto specify how 
	to verify a checksum, as they're not required to be deterministic, so 
	the "compute it again and compare" approach specified in section 5 is 
	wrong  (Ken Raeburn)

	Proposed solution: look at #9


#12 [**] Subsession keys (section 5 and 8)

	Are subsession keys ignored?  (Ken Raeburn)

	The description of the checksum says that the session key of the
	ticket is used.  That's a way to do it, but the working group should
	explain why it has chosen to ignore the subsession key.
	(Sam Hartman)

	Related thread: Message-ID: <20050127171703FZ%kamada@nanohz.org>

	Michael> more entropy from subsession keys buy us almost nothing
		 (ISAKMP NONCE is enough)
		 And old mail: <15190.63952.167857.646848@thomasm-u1.cisco.com>
	Bill> The session key is long-lived.
	      (but it's not really all that different from a
	      per-exchange nonce.)
	Sam> Being the same as everyone else is preferred if we have
	     no reason.


#13 [**] Replay protection (section 5)
(closed)

	The document claims that the transaction id is not used for
	replay detection because Kerberos provides that.  How is that true?
	The authenticator is protected against replays but how is the rest of
	the message bound to that specific authenticator instead of to a
	session key of a ticket?
	(Sam Hartman)

	Closed: (Message-ID: <tslfz0gaqbz.fsf@cz.mit.edu>)


#14 [-] Reserved (15 bits) --  Reserved and must be zero (section 5)
(waiting revised i-d)

	must be zero on send, must be ignored by receiver.


#15 [**] Principal name of KINK service (section 5.1.2)

	How do I discover the FQDN of my remote peer?   SPD
	entries are configured in terms of  IP addresses.  If you  want to
	store an identity in the PAD, why not store a principal instead of a
	hostname.

	I interpreted the text as a naming convention, not how a implementation
	get a peer's principal name.  So I think it is an implementation issue
	whether a principal name is generated from a FQDN or got directly from
	the PAD.
	(KAMADA Ken'ichi, <20050131095154FY%kamada@nanohz.org>)


#16 [*] EPOCH (section 5.1.2)

	Perhaps you need a description of the time stamp?  I recall there
	being such a description in draft-housley-binarytime-xx.
	(Sam Hartman)

	Related thread: Message-ID: <20050210154348XQ%kamada@nanohz.org>


#17 [**] Checksum when KRB-ERROR occured (section 5.1.4 and 7.1)
(solution proposed)

	Section 7.1 says the checksum in the KRB-ERROR message is not used,
	but section 5.1.4 says that KINK implementation MUST make use of
	keyed Kerberos errors.  But KRB-ERROR does not have checksum in it (at
	least with RFC 1510 or kerberos-clarifications).

	Remove following paragraph from section 5.1.4.  (Sam Hartman)
	  KINK implementations MUST make use of keyed Kerberos errors when  the
	  appropriate  service  key  is available as specified in [KRBREVS]. In
	  particular, clock  skew  errors  MUST  be  integrity  protected.  For
	  unauthenticated  Kerberos  errors,  the receiver MAY choose to act on
	  them, but SHOULD take precautions against make-work kinds of attacks.

	Replace the above paragraph with the following:  (kamada)
	  KINK implementations MUST make use of
	  a KINK Cksum field when returning KINK_KRB_ERROR and the appropriate
	  service key is available.

	Drop reference to krb-error checksum from section 7.1.  (Sam Hartman)
	  defined in the following sections.  The checksum in the KRB-ERROR
	  message is not used, since the KINK header already contains a check-
	  sum field.


#18 [**] Kerberos error type limitations (section 5.1.4)

	Why should a sender send only those errors?  I'm mostly asking
	for an explanation to be given to me or to be added to the document
	rather than liberalization of the requirement.  (Sam Hartman)

	Related thread: Message-Id: <20050204202941G.sakane@kame.net>


#20 [**] KINK_ENCRYPT format (section 5.1.8)
(solution proposed)

	The format of the encrypted part of KINK_ENCRYPT (section 5.1.8) is
	vague.  I think of using the output of raw encryption algorithms
	(i.e. E(confounder | plaintext | pad)) or using EncryptedData.

	treat "encryption with 
	integrity protection" output as a whole, don't peek under the covers to 
	find a "checksum" part you can throw away  (Ken Raeburn)

	drop references to the initialization vector  (Ken Raeburn)

	Please use the output of the kcrypto encrypt
	operation directly.  Of most importance is to make sure that all
	kcrypto enctypes will work even if it is not possible to decompose the
	kcrypto checksum from the encrypted data.  This probably means that in
	some cases you will have double checksums.
	You also need to deal with making sure you can determine the length of
	the plaintext.  (Sam Hartman)

	Related thread: Message-Id: <20050204205737C.sakane@kame.net>

	Proposed solution:
	Use the output of the kcrypto encryption.


#21 [*] Next Payload in KINK_ENCRYPT (section 5.1.8)
(solution proposed)

	Text should probably indacte that next payload must be none.

	Proposed solution:
	The section 5.1 describes it,
	however it would be better to describe explicitly so.
	reader does not has trouble even if the text is described repeatedly.
	(Message-Id: <20050204210401T.sakane@kame.net>)


#22 [*] Kerberos PFS (section 6.8)
(solution proposed)

	Sec 6.8: "Kerberos in general does not provide PFS so it is somewhat 
	questionable whether a system which is heavily relying on Kerberos 
	benefits from PFS."  First, that sounds like it might be Security 
	Considerations material.  Second, I don't follow; explain please?
	(Ken Raeburn)

	Related thread: Message-Id: <20050204211105O.sakane@kame.net>

	- (Current) Kerberos doesn't provide PFS.
	- KINK optionally provides PFS.
	- KINK PFS has benefits but is not mandatory because of the
	  computational cost.
	so editorial fix (or even removing this sentence) would be
	enough.


#23 [*] KE interoperability (section 6.8)

	What happens if a peer that implements the KE payloads communicates
	with a peer that does not.  Specify the behavior in sufficient detail
	to guarantee interoperability.  (Sam Hartman)

	Releated thread: Message-Id: <20050204213547M.sakane@kame.net>


#24 [*] MUST/SHOULD in clock skew (section 7.1)

	The time difference MUST be computed and SHOULD be stored 
	and used?  Why the different requirement levels?  (And is this sort of 
	thing in the domain of KINK or Kerberos?)  (Ken Raeburn)

	Related thread: Message-ID: <4202FB85.6080406@miyazawa.org>


#25 [**] prf (section 8)
(solution proposed)

	Section 8 says "prf is the same hash algorithm found in the session
	ticket's etype", but krb-wg-crypto-07 defines hash as unkeyed.
	Fortunately krb-wg-crypto-07 defines a PRF for each etype, so KINK
	should use this PRF.

	Use a prf 
	from kcrypto, don't assume the checksum operations are deterministic 
	hash functions  (Ken Raeburn)

	Section 6.1 (the description of hash algorithm):
	This checksum may not be deterministic and is probably not
	appropriate for use in setting up a key.  A PRF is provided, although
	depending on how the hash is used the PRF may or may not be a suitable
	replacement.  There has been significant discussion within krb-wg on
	when the PRF is appropriate and when it is not.  This discussion
	centered around key determination in pkinit.  (Sam Hartman)

	Related thread: <20050210161443XN%kamada@nanohz.org>

	Proposed solution:
	- use RFC 3961 PRF (instead of "hash") to generate KEYMAT.
	  (PRF is suitable for key generation for KINK.)


#26 [*] Key derivation (section 8)

	The key derivation seems inconsistent with the crypto framework
	document.  (Sam Hartman)

	I don't understand what this section says well enough to determine
	whether it works with kcrypto.  (Sam Hartman)


#27 [*](2401bis) SPD Considerations (section 10.1)

	This should not go in the security considartions section.  It is
	really more about IPsec architectural considerations than security
	considerations.

	This text needs to take into account 2401bis.  In particular it needs
	to be properly split between SPD considerations and PAD
	considerations.  (Sam Hartman)

	Related thread: Message-ID: <420865DD.1040507@miyazawa.org>


#28 [*] Key usage

	Usage of  kink should specify the key usage numbers for kerberos
	encryption.  (Sam Hartman)

	You can assign the numbers out of the space reserved for applications
	if principals used for kink will not be used for other purposes.  If
	principals used for kink will be used for other purposes it is
	probably desirable to talk to Tom Yu and get a key usage number added
	to 1510ter.  You'll also want to add the same key usage number to Kink
	to avoid a normative reference to 1510ter.
	(Sam Hartman, Message-ID: <tslu0omoigd.fsf@cz.mit.edu>)


#29 [*](2401bis) Rekeying (section 4.4.1)
(solution proposed)

	section 4.4.1:
	Please make sure this discussion is aligned with 2401bis.  I think it
	may change small details but they seem to have adopted much of the
	same strategy kink uses.  The area wher I believe they speak to this
	issue is when you should rekey (timers etc).  (Sam Hartman)

	Related thread: <42119FC4.8020607@miyazawa.org>

	Proposed solution:
	- hard lifetime minus rekey margin --> soft lifetime.
	- randomize soft lifetime.


#30 [*](2401bis) IKEv2

	Should we adopt IKEv2?

	If we should...
	- IKEv2 does not have DOI, so how to handle the DOI field in the KINK
	  packet header should be described.
	- Use TS (Traffic Selector) instead of ID (Identification).
	- KEYMAT calculation is changed.
	- How to handle REKEY_SA Notify type.
	- IKEv2 doesn't negotiate the SA lifetime.  Rekeying in KINK is
	  up to the initiator.  Therefore, the lifetime of the responder
	  can happen to be shorter, and the responder has no way to rekey.

	Related threads:
		Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.4.61.0501192022390.8184@mediapc.goinhome.com>
		Message-ID: <20050120111553S.sakane@kame.net>


#31 [*] behavior on KINK_ERROR

	In implementor's point of view, I'd like to see initiator's
	behavior in receiving KINK_ERROR to be defined.
	For example:
	- When KINK_OK is received, initiator MAY act as if the KINK_ERROR
	  payload was not included in the messaged.
	- When KINK_BADQMVERS is received and the Cksum is verified,
	  initiator MAY retry in other Quick Mode version.
	- When one of other error codes is received and the Cksum is verified,
	  initiator SHOULD abort the negotiation.

	when does the responder generate these errors?

	Related thread: <42198868.7080309@miyazawa.org>


#32 [-] I-D nits
(waiting revised i-d)

	Review the I-D nits and RFC authors docs.  I spotted a lot of 
	mechanical things (number of lines per page; avoid hyphenation; use 
	ragged right margin; need two spaces after sentence-ending period; fix 
	page numbers in table of contents; add section numbers to TOC) most of 
	which I think are specified in one of those documents.
	(Ken Raeburn)

	the document needs to meet all the ID nits when it is
	submitted.  (Sam Hartman)


#33 [-] IANA considerations (section 11)

	I think the correct terminology is "port 
	number", not "port", and they're "assigned", not "created".  This 
	section says no new registries are required in the first paragraph, and 
	the third one specifies that IANA must create one (but without the 
	associated procedural data that is required nowadays).  Are the KINK 
	payload types and ISAKMP payload types actually ever used in the same 
	field?  If not, I don't think they need to come out of the same 
	registry.  (Ken Raeburn)

	Needs work.  You may want to stop by tthe IANA office hours and ask
	them for advice.  They are generally quite good at working with
	authors to figure out how things need to be specified.
	(Sam Hartman)

	See BCP 26 (RFC 2434).


#38 [-] Terminology
(waiting revised i-d)

	Section 2 and 10.1.
	Kerberos is now using the term user-user rather than user-to-user.
	(Sam Hartman)

	Section 2.
	Principals are not either client or service principals;
	they can and often do fill both roles.  (Sam Hartman)


#40 [-] Wording
(waiting revised i-d)

	Section 2, last paragraph.  "Between" is generally non-directional, 
	but in this case, a direction seems to be intended to be inferred; try 
	"from...to" instead.  (Ken Raeburn)


#41 [-] Wording in section 3, Protocol Overview

	Section 3, English usage/grammar problems with the first two paragraphs.
	(Sam Hartman)

	Section 3.
	   which allows a final acknowledgment message when the respondent needs
	   a full three-way handshake. This is only needed when the optimistic
	   keying route is not taken, though it is expected that that will not
	   be the norm. KINK also provides rekeying and dead peer detection as
	What is expected not to be the norm?  Please reword.
	(Sam Hartman)


#42 [-] Wording
(waiting revised i-d)

	Section 4.3, discussing attributes, mixes singular and plural 
	indications.  The word "lone" appears to be popular with the author, 
	too. :-)  (Ken Raeburn)


#43 [-] Wording
(waiting revised i-d)

	Sec 8: "By optional, it is meant..." is badly worded.  (Ken Raeburn)


#35 [-] References
(solution proposed)

	The reference to [PKCROSS] is unnecessary, and only happens once, in 
	the introduction.  I'd suggest dropping it.  That's one less 
	unpublished I-D in the references section.  (Ken Raeburn)

	[KRBREVS] is referenced but not listed in the references section.
	(Ken Raeburn)

	Sec 5.1.7, next to last paragraph on page 21, is "IKE" (the 
	protocol) fuzzy about use of different SAs, or is it "[IKE]" (the 
	document)?  (Ken Raeburn)

	Section 1:
	Remove the reference to pkcross or cite something outside the IETF.
	It's an expired ID without and active editor.  (Sam Hartman)

	Section 1:
	Add an informative reference to IKE.  (Sam Hartman)

	Section 2:
	Cite a reference for DER.  (Sam Hartman)

	Section 5: DOI
	Cite a specific registry please.  IANA registries are typically
	named, and a URL reference would probably be appropriate.


#36 [-] Typos
(waiting revised i-d)

	4.4.2. Dead Peer Detection
	In the fourth paragraph, "loose" is to be "lose".

	5.1 KINK Payloads
	In the first item, the length of the Next Payload should be
	one octet instead of two.

	5.1.1. KINK Padding Rules
	In the second item, "other other" is to be "other".

	5.1.1. KINK Padding Rules
	The first item in the list should end with a period like 
	the others.  (Ken Raeburn)

	5.1.5. KINK_TGT_REQ Payload
	In the third item, "krbtgt/REALM/@REALM" is to be "krbtgt/REALM@REALM".

	5.1.6. KINK_TGT_REP Payload
	In the caption of Figure 13, "KINK_TGT_REQ" is to be "KINK_TGT_REP".

	7.3. CREATE
	"IPspec" is to be "IPsec".

	7.5. STATUS
	In the last paragraph, "REPLY KINK Header" should be in one line.
	In the last paragraph, "[KRB_ERROR]" is to be "[KINK_ERROR]".

	overall:
	"'s" is used in some places where I'd use "s" for a plural form.



-- 
KAMADA Ken'ichi <kamada@nanohz.org>



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Subject: #30 [*](2401bis) IKEv2
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As the previous discussion in this mailing list, I understand
that it is not important thing where KINK comform to IKEv2
specification.  That was likely to misunderstand.

So I would like to close #30 if anybody does not have any objection.
However we don't forget to describe 2401bis things clearly.



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From: "KAMADA Ken'ichi" <kamada@nanohz.org>
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Subject: Re: #23 [*] KE interoperability (section 6.8)
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At Tue, 22 Feb 2005 15:29:34 +0900,
Shoichi Sakane <sakane@kame.net> wrote:
> 
> > > > > so I would like to propose the following process.  any idea ?
> > > > > 
> > > > >    All node conformed to the document MAY implement the KE payload
> > > > >    handling.  If a node receives a KE payload, and the receiver does not
> > > > >    support the KE handling, and does not want to proceed the negotiation,
> > > > >    then the receiver SHOULD send a Notify payload of the type
> > > > >    NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN to the sender.  If the receiver wants to keep the
> > > > >    negotiation without the KE payload handling, then the receiver sends
> > > > >    a response witout a KE payload.  the sender MAY reject it by its policy
> > > > >    in this case.
> > > 
> > > I meant the sender was the initiator.
> > > 
> > > > The sender (I assume you meant the initiator) can't reject it
> > > > because the ACK message can't carry it.
> > > 
> > > the one does not need to proceed the ACK handling.  as referencing to
> > > the section 7.2, when the initiator reject it, then the initiator
> > > SHOULD re-send a CREATE message without KE payload.
> > 
> > How the responder distinguish it from a brand new CREATE?
> > Without distinction, the responder can't know whether the
> > first CREATE succeeded or not.
> 
> can the Transaction ID be used for this purpose ?
> otherwise, the section 7.2 description won't work, will it ?

I don't like sending multiple (different in parameters) commands
in a transaction.
- It makes things complex when packets are dropped, retransmitted,
  reordered, etc.
- The current spec says "A transaction is defined as a command,
  a reply, and an optional acknowledgment."

I interpreted the word "reinitiate" in section 7.2 that
we can take another transaction(s).

-- 
KAMADA Ken'ichi <kamada@nanohz.org>



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From: "KAMADA Ken'ichi" <kamada@nanohz.org>
To: ietf-kink@vpnc.org
Subject: Kerberos U2U and KINK GETTGT (#3, #44,...)
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The designer of GETTGT and/or Kerberos people,

The current KINK_TGT_REQ carries only a realm name, but
why does it have been specified in that way?

That is, sending the responder's full principal name seems
reasonable to me.

- In non-U2U case, the initiator is expected to know the responder's
  principal name.  I think it is also true in U2U case.  (Here, I
  don't care where it is from; PAD, generated form FQDN, etc.)

- If the initiator specifies the responder's principal (instead of the
  realm), the U2U sequence seems to work well as follows.

  1) The initiator somehow decide to use U2U mode.  (I think this is
  a Kerberos issue and not to be specified in KINK.)
     a) manually preconfigured.
     b) KDC_ERR_MUST_USE_USER2USER in the reply to TGS-REQ.
     c) KRB_AP_ERR_USER_TO_USER_REQUIRED in the reply to AP-REQ.

  2) The initiator send KINK_TGT_REQ with the responder's principal
  name.

  3) The responder's returns its TGT.
  The cname field of the TGT must be the same with the specified
  principal.  (Regarding the sname field, I will write another mail
  with the consideration of cross-realm issues.)

  4) The initiator do TGS-REQ; with the ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option,
  with the TGT as the additional-ticket field, and with the responder's
  principal as the sname field.

  5) The KDC makes a service ticket and returns it.
  At this time, the KDC compares the sname field in the TGS-REQ and
  the cname field in the TGT, so the responder's principal name
  is authenticated.

  6) The initiator uses the service ticket with the USE-SESSION-KEY
  flag.

  7) continue as usual

thanks,
-- 
KAMADA Ken'ichi <kamada@nanohz.org>



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From: "KAMADA Ken'ichi" <kamada@nanohz.org>
To: ietf-kink@vpnc.org
Subject: Cross-realm and U2U (#19,...)
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# I've not been familier with cross-realm nor U2U, so pointing
# out mistakes are truely appreciated.

Based on this and previous (<20050225114411XP%kamada@nanohz.org>)
mails, I would propose:

- change the KINK_TGT_REQ payload to carry the responder's principal
  name.
- change the KINK_TGT_REP payload to carry only the TGT.
- when the resonder is requested a TGT, it returns an initial TGT in
  the same realm with the reqested responder's principal in the
  KINK_TGT_REQ.


----------------------------------------------------------------
In this mail (from here), I discuss which TGT should be returned to
the GETTGT command and how it works

Let's say:
A, B, and C is a realm.
initiator@A is a KINK initiator principal.
responder@C is a KINK responder principal.
responder@C is a user (or PKINIT) principal.
There is a trust relationship between A and B, and also between B and C.

When initiator@A wants to authenticate itself to responder@C,
there seems to be 2 ways:
1) initiator@A transit to the realm C and do an U2U authentication
   at the KDC in C.  The responder's TGT used here is the initial TGT
   of realm C.
2) responder@C transit to the realm A and do an U2U authentication
   at the KDC in A.  The responder's TGT used here is the cross-realm
   TGT for realm A.

While I'm not confident that I completely understand the concept of
the "trust relationship" represented as a inter-realm key, I think 1)
is the right way.  Reasons are below.

- If the trust relationship is unidirectional, 2) allows a
  "reverse-direction" authentication.
- initiator@A doesn't know whether responder@C can transit to the
  realm A, while it knows whether it can transit to the realm C, or at
  least can try it.

So my conclusion is the responder should return its initial TGT.
When the cross-realm and U2U case, the initiator should transit
to the responder's realm and do an U2U authentication there.

-- 
KAMADA Ken'ichi <kamada@nanohz.org>



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To: ietf-kink@vpnc.org
Subject: Re: #23 [*] KE interoperability (section 6.8)
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> > can the Transaction ID be used for this purpose ?
> > otherwise, the section 7.2 description won't work, will it ?
> 
> I don't like sending multiple (different in parameters) commands
> in a transaction.
> - It makes things complex when packets are dropped, retransmitted,
>   reordered, etc.
> - The current spec says "A transaction is defined as a command,
>   a reply, and an optional acknowledgment."
> 
> I interpreted the word "reinitiate" in section 7.2 that
> we can take another transaction(s).

Okey, It is bad thing to reinitiate with identical transaction identifier.
It would be better to improve the text about the reinitiation and
the usage of the transaction ID.

I think that this issue is not only related to the KE payload handling,
but also the case when the responder does not choice the optimistic
proposal from the intiator.

for keeping the consistency of the protocol design, we have three choices.

1. the KE handling is an implicit proposal.
   When the initiator send a KE payload, but the responder will not reply
   with a KE payload, that means the responder does not want to choice the
   KE handling, or does not support it.  The initiator must proceed the
   session as if the KE handling was not present at all.

2. the KE handling is an explicit proposal.
   When the initiator gives choices of the KE handling to the responder,
   then the initiator must send two proposals.

3. the KE payload handling can not be negotiated.
   When the responder does not like the KE handling, the responder just
   reply an error.  The initiator must proceed the next step properly.

#3 is easy, isn't it ?



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From: Derek Atkins <derek@ihtfp.com>
To: agenda@ietf.org
Cc: ietf-kink@vpnc.org
Subject: KINK Agenda for IETF-62
Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2005 11:25:15 -0500
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KINK is meeting at IETF-62 in Minneapolis on Friday.

FRIDAY, March 11, 2005
0900-1130 Morning Sessions	
SEC  kink       Kerberized Internet Negotiation of Keys WG

The agenda for this meeting is:

:00-:05    Agenda bashing
           Find a Secretary / Jabber Scribe
:05-:25    2401 v. 2401bis (Steve Kent?)
:25-:45    1510 v. clarifications / kcrypto (Ken Raeburn?)
:45-:05    draft-ietf-kink-kink editorial status (Mike Thomas?)
:05-??     Discussion of Open Issues (KAMADA Ken'ichi?)

The named people are proposed presenters.

-derek

-- 
       Derek Atkins                 617-623-3745
       derek@ihtfp.com             www.ihtfp.com
       Computer and Internet Security Consultant



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Hi, thank you for the arrangement.

I am just afraid that both Ken and Mike are not listed on
the attendees list.  I hope they will attend there.

Almost solutions are proposed on the mailing list, so I would like
to just confirm the solutions at the discussion of open issues.
if you have any objection, please speak up here.

no one has touched #2, #3 and #44.  anybody has any solution ?

> KINK is meeting at IETF-62 in Minneapolis on Friday.
> 
> FRIDAY, March 11, 2005
> 0900-1130 Morning Sessions	
> SEC  kink       Kerberized Internet Negotiation of Keys WG
> 
> The agenda for this meeting is:
> 
> :00-:05    Agenda bashing
>            Find a Secretary / Jabber Scribe
> :05-:25    2401 v. 2401bis (Steve Kent?)
> :25-:45    1510 v. clarifications / kcrypto (Ken Raeburn?)
> :45-:05    draft-ietf-kink-kink editorial status (Mike Thomas?)
> :05-??     Discussion of Open Issues (KAMADA Ken'ichi?)
> 
> The named people are proposed presenters.
> 
> -derek
> 
> -- 
>        Derek Atkins                 617-623-3745
>        derek@ihtfp.com             www.ihtfp.com
>        Computer and Internet Security Consultant
> 



