
From simon@josefsson.org  Tue Jul  6 06:56:08 2010
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From: Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org>
To: kitten@ietf.org
Subject: OpenID+GSS-API and naming: GSS_C_NT_OPENID?
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Date: Tue, 06 Jul 2010 15:55:39 +0200
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I'm working on text for a OpenID GSS-API mechanism, and I'm thinking
about how OpenID naming should work in GSS-API calls.

Normally OpenID users present an OpenID URL like (hopefully)
'https://josefsson.org/' (string A) but sometimes
'http://josefsson.org/' (string B) or even 'josefsson.org' (string C),
and the final version leaves the protocol unspecified.

When doing the GSS_Init_sec_context call, we could use the
GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME name type to hold the strings A, B and C.  The
mechanism would then need to figure out how to translate string C into
the fully qualified URL string B or A which is used for the OpenID
process.

However, it strikes me as unaesthetic for the GSS-API implementation to
assume some semantic of the name string supplied and do processing of it
(i.e., if it is not a proper URL, prepend 'https://' or 'http://' to
it).  Do others share this concern?  How strongly?  One problem is that
GSS-API applications is left uncertain what the normalized OpenID URL
actually was after successful (or failed) authentication.

I see two solutions:

1) If people are happy with GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME for OpenID URLs, then
   just say that in the document, and make sure that it is well
   specified how unqualified URLs (like string C above) is handled by
   pointing at OpenID 2.0 specification section 7.2:
   http://openid.net/specs/openid-authentication-2_0.html#normalization

2) Specify a GSS_C_NT_OPENID name type to make sure the application and
   OpenID mechanism agree on the semantic meaning of the name string.

I have read the GSS-API name attribute draft, but I don't see
immediately how it applies here.  Possibly there could be one name
attribute to hold the normalized OpenID URL used by the mechanism?

Right now I am leaning towards 1) and re-using GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME for
OpenID URLs.  My main reason is just practical issues in deploying a new
name type in GSS-API.

If GSS-API people think a new name type is required for OpenID, it would
be useful to start work on this approach soon.

/Simon

From klaas@cisco.com  Tue Jul  6 07:12:08 2010
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Date: Tue, 06 Jul 2010 16:12:05 +0200
From: Klaas Wierenga <klaas@cisco.com>
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Subject: Re: OpenID+GSS-API and naming: GSS_C_NT_OPENID?
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On 7/6/10 3:55 PM, Simon Josefsson wrote:
> I'm working on text for a OpenID GSS-API mechanism, and I'm thinking
> about how OpenID naming should work in GSS-API calls.
>
> Normally OpenID users present an OpenID URL like (hopefully)
> 'https://josefsson.org/' (string A) but sometimes
> 'http://josefsson.org/' (string B) or even 'josefsson.org' (string C),
> and the final version leaves the protocol unspecified.

or =Klaas etc. if I am not mistaken

>
> When doing the GSS_Init_sec_context call, we could use the
> GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME name type to hold the strings A, B and C.  The
> mechanism would then need to figure out how to translate string C into
> the fully qualified URL string B or A which is used for the OpenID
> process.
>
> However, it strikes me as unaesthetic for the GSS-API implementation to
> assume some semantic of the name string supplied and do processing of it
> (i.e., if it is not a proper URL, prepend 'https://' or 'http://' to
> it).  Do others share this concern?  How strongly?  One problem is that
> GSS-API applications is left uncertain what the normalized OpenID URL
> actually was after successful (or failed) authentication.
>
> I see two solutions:
>
> 1) If people are happy with GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME for OpenID URLs, then
>     just say that in the document, and make sure that it is well
>     specified how unqualified URLs (like string C above) is handled by
>     pointing at OpenID 2.0 specification section 7.2:
>     http://openid.net/specs/openid-authentication-2_0.html#normalization
>
> 2) Specify a GSS_C_NT_OPENID name type to make sure the application and
>     OpenID mechanism agree on the semantic meaning of the name string.
>
> I have read the GSS-API name attribute draft, but I don't see
> immediately how it applies here.  Possibly there could be one name
> attribute to hold the normalized OpenID URL used by the mechanism?
>
> Right now I am leaning towards 1) and re-using GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME for
> OpenID URLs.  My main reason is just practical issues in deploying a new
> name type in GSS-API.
>
> If GSS-API people think a new name type is required for OpenID, it would
> be useful to start work on this approach soon.

I agree with your leaning to 1), also because in addition to 
GSS_C_NT_OPENID there may be GSS_C_NT_SAML, GSS_C_NT_OAUTH etc. etc.

Klaas

From simon@josefsson.org  Tue Jul  6 08:03:39 2010
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From: Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org>
To: Klaas Wierenga <klaas@cisco.com>
Subject: Re: OpenID+GSS-API and naming: GSS_C_NT_OPENID?
References: <878w5ozpd0.fsf@mocca.josefsson.org> <4C3339B5.60003@cisco.com>
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Klaas Wierenga <klaas@cisco.com> writes:

> I agree with your leaning to 1)

Great! :)

I currently have the following text, is there any feedback from GSS-API
people on it?

It seems useful to specify a GSS-API name attribute for the normalized
OpenID identifier, if that is an appropriate use of name attributes.
Thoughts?

/Simon

4.1.  GSS-API Principal Name Types for OpenID

   OpenID supports standard generic name syntaxes for acceptors such as
   GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE (see [RFC2743], Section 4.1).

   OpenID supports only a single name type for initiators:
   GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME.  GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME is the default name type for
   OpenID.

   OpenID name normalization is covered by the OpenID specification, see
   [OpenID] section 7.2.

   The query, display, and exported name syntaxes for OpenID principal
   names are all the same.  There are no OpenID-specific name syntaxes
   -- applications should use generic GSS-API name types such as
   GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME and GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE (see [RFC2743],
   Section 4).  The exported name token does, of course, conform to
   [RFC2743], Section 3.2, but the "NAME" part of the token should be
   treated as a potential input string to the OpenID name normalization
   rules.

   GSS-API name attributes may be defined in the future to hold the
   normalized OpenID Identifier.

From Nicolas.Williams@oracle.com  Tue Jul  6 08:43:48 2010
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Date: Tue, 6 Jul 2010 10:44:07 -0500
From: Nicolas Williams <Nicolas.Williams@oracle.com>
To: Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org>
Subject: Re: OpenID+GSS-API and naming: GSS_C_NT_OPENID?
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On Tue, Jul 06, 2010 at 03:55:39PM +0200, Simon Josefsson wrote:
> I'm working on text for a OpenID GSS-API mechanism, and I'm thinking
> about how OpenID naming should work in GSS-API calls.
> 
> Normally OpenID users present an OpenID URL like (hopefully)
> 'https://josefsson.org/' (string A) but sometimes
> 'http://josefsson.org/' (string B) or even 'josefsson.org' (string C),
> and the final version leaves the protocol unspecified.
> 
> When doing the GSS_Init_sec_context call, we could use the
> GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME name type to hold the strings A, B and C.  The
> mechanism would then need to figure out how to translate string C into
> the fully qualified URL string B or A which is used for the OpenID
> process.
> 
> However, it strikes me as unaesthetic for the GSS-API implementation to
> assume some semantic of the name string supplied and do processing of it
> (i.e., if it is not a proper URL, prepend 'https://' or 'http://' to
> it).  Do others share this concern?  How strongly?  One problem is that
> GSS-API applications is left uncertain what the normalized OpenID URL
> actually was after successful (or failed) authentication.

This is exactly how the GSS-API handles naming.  You feed in a string
and a name-type to GSS_Import_name(), which is later canonicalized,
either by GSS_Canonicalize_name() or by the mechanism when you pass the
non-MN to a function that needs an MN.

> I see two solutions:
> 
> 1) If people are happy with GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME for OpenID URLs, then
>    just say that in the document, and make sure that it is well
>    specified how unqualified URLs (like string C above) is handled by
>    pointing at OpenID 2.0 specification section 7.2:
>    http://openid.net/specs/openid-authentication-2_0.html#normalization

The convention is that if you pass GSS_C_NO_OID as name-type OID then
the name syntax will be mechanism-specific.

I'd be fine with GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME being interpreted similarly
liberally.

> 2) Specify a GSS_C_NT_OPENID name type to make sure the application and
>    OpenID mechanism agree on the semantic meaning of the name string.

Kerberos has GSS_KRB5_NT_PRINCIPAL_NAME.  This is fine.

> I have read the GSS-API name attribute draft, but I don't see
> immediately how it applies here.  Possibly there could be one name
> attribute to hold the normalized OpenID URL used by the mechanism?
> 
> Right now I am leaning towards 1) and re-using GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME for
> OpenID URLs.  My main reason is just practical issues in deploying a new
> name type in GSS-API.
> 
> If GSS-API people think a new name type is required for OpenID, it would
> be useful to start work on this approach soon.

You definitely need a new OID.  See also the mech-default syntax thing.

Nico
-- 

From root@core3.amsl.com  Thu Jul  8 14:00:01 2010
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Subject: WG Review: Recharter of Common Authentication Technology Next  Generation (kitten) 
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A modified charter has been submitted for the Common Authentication
Technology Next Generation (kitten) working group in the Security Area of
the IETF.  The IESG has not made any determination as yet.  The modified
charter is provided below for informational purposes only.  Please send
your comments to the IESG mailing list (iesg@ietf.org) by Thursday, July
15, 2010.

Common Authentication Technology Next Generation (kitten)
--------------------
Current Status: Active Working Group

Last modified: 2010-07-08

Personnel:

Chair(s):
	Tom Yu <tlyu@mit.edu>
	Shawn Emery <shawn.emery@oracle.com>

Security Area Director(s):
	Tim Polk <tim.polk@nist.gov>
	Sean Turner <turners@ieca.com>

Security Area Advisor:
	Tim Polk <tim.polk@nist.gov>

Mailing Lists:
	General Discussion: kitten@ietf.org
	To Suscribe: https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/kitten
	Archive:
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/kitten/current/maillist.html

Description of Working Group:

The Generic Security Services (GSS) API and Simple Authentication and 
Security Layer (SASL) provide various applications with a security 
framework for secure network communication.  The purpose of the Common 
Authentication Technology Next Generation (Kitten) working group (WG) is 
to develop extensions/improvements to the GSS-API, shepherd specific 
GSS-API security mechanisms, and provide guidance for any new SASL-
related submissions.
 
This working is chartered to specify the following extensions and 
improvements (draft-yu-kitten-api-wishlist-00) to the GSS-API:

* Provide new interfaces for credential management, which include the 
following:
	initializing credentials
	iterating credentials
	exporting/importing credentials

* Specify interface for asynchronous calls.

* Define interfaces for better error message reporting.

* Provide a more programmer friendly GSS-API for application developers.
 
This could include reducing the number of interface parameters, for 
example, by eliminating parameters which are commonly used with the 
default values.

This WG is also chartered to transition proposed SASL mechanisms as
GSS-API mechanisms:

* A SASL Mechanism for OpenID
	draft-lear-ietf-sasl-openid-00
* A SASL Mechanism for SAML
	draft-wierenga-ietf-sasl-saml-00

The transition from SASL to GSS-API mechanisms will allow a greater set 
of applications to utilize said mechanisms with SASL implementations 
that support the use of GSS-API mechanisms in SASL (draft-ietf-sasl-
gs2).

* Shepherd draft-ietf-sasl-digest-to-historic to publication.

This WG should review proposals for new SASL and GSS-API mechanisms, but
may take on work on such mechanisms only through a revision of this 
charter.  The WG should also review non-mechanism proposals related to 
SASL and the GSS-API. However, work that adds SASL or GSS-API support in 
application protocols should be handled by the application's WG.

Deliverables:

* GSS-API: initializing credentials
[editor: TBD]

* GSS-API: iterating credentials
[editor: TBD]

* GSS-API: exporting/importing credentials
[editor: TBD]

* GSS-API: specification for asynchronous calls
[editor: TBD]

* GSS-API: interfaces/improvements for better error message reporting
[editor: TBD]

* GSS-API: programmer friendly interfaces
[editor: TBD]

* GSS-API: transition SASL mechanism for OpenID
[editor: TBD]

* GSS-API: transition SASL mechanism for SAML
[editor: TBD]

* GSS-API: publish draft-ietf-kitten-gssapi-extensions-iana
[editor: Nicolas Williams]

* GSS-API: publish draft-ietf-kitten-gssapi-naming-exts
[editor: Leif Johansson]

* SASL: publish draft-melnikov-digest-to-historic
[editor: Alexey Melnikov]

Goals and Milestones:

June 2010	Submit naming-exts to the IESG as Proposed Standard
June 2010	WGLC on gssapi-extensions-iana
July 2010	Submit gssapi-extensions-iana to the IESG as Proposed Standard
TBD             Other Listed Work Items

From wwwrun@core3.amsl.com  Fri Jul  9 08:14:13 2010
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Subject: Last Call: draft-ietf-kitten-gssapi-naming-exts (GSS-API Naming Extensions) to Proposed Standard
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The IESG has received a request from the Kitten (GSS-API Next Generation) 
WG (kitten) to consider the following document:

- 'GSS-API Naming Extensions '
   <draft-ietf-kitten-gssapi-naming-exts-08.txt> as a Proposed Standard

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
final comments on this action.  Please send substantive comments to the
ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2010-07-23. Exceptionally, 
comments may be sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please 
retain the beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.

The file can be obtained via
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-kitten-gssapi-naming-exts-08.txt


IESG discussion can be tracked via
https://datatracker.ietf.org/public/pidtracker.cgi?command=view_id&dTag=13136&rfc_flag=0


From klaas@cisco.com  Mon Jul 12 05:45:49 2010
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Hi,

This version has GS2 stuff (thanks to Simon Josefsson!) and has the 
client specify the IdP to use for authentication.

Comments are welcome!

Klaas


-------- Original Message --------
Subject: New Version Notification for draft-wierenga-ietf-sasl-saml-01
Date: Mon, 12 Jul 2010 05:37:38 -0700 (PDT)
From: IETF I-D Submission Tool <idsubmission@ietf.org>
To: klaas@cisco.com
CC: lear@cisco.com


A new version of I-D, draft-wierenga-ietf-sasl-saml-01.txt has been 
successfully submitted by Klaas Wierenga and posted to the IETF repository.

Filename:	 draft-wierenga-ietf-sasl-saml
Revision:	 01
Title:		 A SASL Mechanism for SAML
Creation_date:	 2010-07-12
WG ID:		 Independent Submission
Number_of_pages: 22

Abstract:
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) has found its usage on the
Internet for Web Single Sign-On.  Simple Authentication and Security
Layer (SASL) and the Generic Security Service Application Program
Interface (GSS-API) are application frameworks to generalize
authentication.  This memo specifies a SASL mechanism and GSS-API
mechanism for SAML 2.0 that allows the integration of existing SAML
Identity Providers with applications using SASL and GSS-API.
 



The IETF Secretariat.



From tlyu@mit.edu  Mon Jul 12 09:25:24 2010
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Subject: Re: WG Review: Recharter of Common Authentication Technology Next Generation (kitten)
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FYI, I just refreshed the "wishlist" Internet-Draft.

From Nicolas.Williams@oracle.com  Mon Jul 12 11:36:44 2010
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From: Nicolas Williams <Nicolas.Williams@oracle.com>
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Subject: Re: WG Review: Recharter of Common Authentication Technology Next Generation (kitten)
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I would like to add a work item for KITTEN WG: a pair of TLS extensions
for optimizing SASL/GS2 authentication with channel binding to TLS.

The optimization is a round-trip optimization.

A TLS Hello extension would be used to optimize the SASL mechanism
negotiation: a client Hello extension requests a list of the server's
SASL mechanisms, while a server Hello extension provides that list.

The other round-trip optimization consists in allowing application data
to begin flowing sooner (immediately after the client's ChangeCipherSpec
and Finished messages) than TLS would normally allow, but only when that
"application data" consists of a SASL GS2 authentication message.

This means that a TLS and SASL GS2 with Kerberos handshake can happen in
two round-trips!

This is all described in draft-williams-tls-app-sasl-opt-03.  The I-D
needs some edits to be brought up to date with RFCs 5801, 5802 and 5929
(which are supposed to be issued today).

The TLS Hello extension for SASL mechanism negotiation should be
entirely non-controversial.  Even without the second extension (which is
not needed in the case of TLS session resumption) we'd get a 1-round-trip
optimization.

I believe the second extension should be agreeable to the TLS WG; with
it we get a total of two round-trips optimized (the first round-trip
always being a SASL mechanism negotiation).

I believe these round-trip optimizations are highly desirable.  The fact
that proposals have been made in the past to add GSS-API authentication
inside TLS is evidence of that proposition.  But we need a way to do
this that does not imply offensive changes to the TLS state machine; I
believe my proposal accomplishes this.

Nico
-- 

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I forgot to take off the ietf-announce list from the Cc list.

From hartmans@mit.edu  Mon Jul 12 14:23:26 2010
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To: ietf@ietf.org
Subject: Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-kitten-gssapi-naming-exts (GSS-API Naming Extensions) to Proposed Standard
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Date: Mon, 12 Jul 2010 17:23:16 -0400
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Recently I've tried to use draft-ietf-kitten-gssapi-naming-exts in the
design of a GSS-API mechanism.
I think this is a good start but is not quite done yet.

draft-hartman-gss-eap-naming-00 discusses a couple of problems with
naming extensions:

* The format of attribute names proposed in this specification is
  incompatible with several of the things you'd like to name, in my case
  including SAML attributes.
* The description of how to name SAML attributes currently in the
  document is inconsistent with the SAML base specification
* The approach of naming things like SAML attributes entirely with a
* The approach of letting a mechanism create authenticated attributes
  with an arbitrary URI  makes the application's life really hard

While not mentioned in my existing draft, I've noticed a number of other
problems:

* The document claims to name Kerberos entities such as authorization
  data elements but does not actually provide a name for them.
* The document does not discuss the encoding of subjectAlternativeName
  elements. I suspect application authors will assume human-readable
  text and PKI folks will assume DER.

In addition, there is no way to get the identity of the issuer of a name
attribute.

I've discussed these concerns with one of the authors, Nico Williams. I
have also requested time to present my concerns at the kitten meeting at
IETF 78.

I'm happy to help resolve these concerns up to and including becoming an
author of the document and writing significant text.

From alexey.melnikov@isode.com  Tue Jul 13 12:14:00 2010
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Date: Tue, 13 Jul 2010 20:13:43 +0100
From: Alexey Melnikov <alexey.melnikov@isode.com>
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To: kitten@ietf.org
Subject: Re: WG Review: Recharter of Common Authentication Technology Next Generation (kitten)
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<As an individual contributor>:

Nicolas Williams wrote:

>I would like to add a work item for KITTEN WG: a pair of TLS extensions
>for optimizing SASL/GS2 authentication with channel binding to TLS.
>
>The optimization is a round-trip optimization.
>
>A TLS Hello extension would be used to optimize the SASL mechanism
>negotiation: a client Hello extension requests a list of the server's
>SASL mechanisms, while a server Hello extension provides that list.
>
>The other round-trip optimization consists in allowing application data
>to begin flowing sooner (immediately after the client's ChangeCipherSpec
>and Finished messages) than TLS would normally allow, but only when that
>"application data" consists of a SASL GS2 authentication message.
>
>This means that a TLS and SASL GS2 with Kerberos handshake can happen in
>two round-trips!
>
>This is all described in draft-williams-tls-app-sasl-opt-03.  The I-D
>needs some edits to be brought up to date with RFCs 5801, 5802 and 5929
>(which are supposed to be issued today).
>
>The TLS Hello extension for SASL mechanism negotiation should be
>entirely non-controversial.  Even without the second extension (which is
>not needed in the case of TLS session resumption) we'd get a 1-round-trip
>optimization.
>
>I believe the second extension should be agreeable to the TLS WG; with
>it we get a total of two round-trips optimized (the first round-trip
>always being a SASL mechanism negotiation).
>
>I believe these round-trip optimizations are highly desirable.  The fact
>that proposals have been made in the past to add GSS-API authentication
>inside TLS is evidence of that proposition.  But we need a way to do
>this that does not imply offensive changes to the TLS state machine; I
>believe my proposal accomplishes this.
>  
>
I am happy for this topic to be a part of the charter. Similar ideas 
were proposed in other Apps areas (e.g. in Lemonade there was a proposal 
how to pipeline final leg of TLS exchange with some SMTP data). I am 
happy for this to be Experimental or Standard Track.

But I am hoping it is not just Nico and myself.


From stpeter@stpeter.im  Tue Jul 13 12:17:32 2010
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

On 7/13/10 1:13 PM, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
> <As an individual contributor>:
> 
> Nicolas Williams wrote:
> 
>> I would like to add a work item for KITTEN WG: a pair of TLS extensions
>> for optimizing SASL/GS2 authentication with channel binding to TLS.
>>
>> The optimization is a round-trip optimization.
>>
>> A TLS Hello extension would be used to optimize the SASL mechanism
>> negotiation: a client Hello extension requests a list of the server's
>> SASL mechanisms, while a server Hello extension provides that list.
>>
>> The other round-trip optimization consists in allowing application data
>> to begin flowing sooner (immediately after the client's ChangeCipherSpec
>> and Finished messages) than TLS would normally allow, but only when that
>> "application data" consists of a SASL GS2 authentication message.
>>
>> This means that a TLS and SASL GS2 with Kerberos handshake can happen in
>> two round-trips!
>>
>> This is all described in draft-williams-tls-app-sasl-opt-03.  The I-D
>> needs some edits to be brought up to date with RFCs 5801, 5802 and 5929
>> (which are supposed to be issued today).
>>
>> The TLS Hello extension for SASL mechanism negotiation should be
>> entirely non-controversial.  Even without the second extension (which is
>> not needed in the case of TLS session resumption) we'd get a 1-round-trip
>> optimization.
>>
>> I believe the second extension should be agreeable to the TLS WG; with
>> it we get a total of two round-trips optimized (the first round-trip
>> always being a SASL mechanism negotiation).
>>
>> I believe these round-trip optimizations are highly desirable.  The fact
>> that proposals have been made in the past to add GSS-API authentication
>> inside TLS is evidence of that proposition.  But we need a way to do
>> this that does not imply offensive changes to the TLS state machine; I
>> believe my proposal accomplishes this.
>>  
>>
> I am happy for this topic to be a part of the charter. Similar ideas
> were proposed in other Apps areas (e.g. in Lemonade there was a proposal
> how to pipeline final leg of TLS exchange with some SMTP data). I am
> happy for this to be Experimental or Standard Track.
> 
> But I am hoping it is not just Nico and myself.

I'd be in favor of round-trip optimizations -- we could make use of
those in XMPP for sure. :)

Peter

- -- 
Peter Saint-Andre
https://stpeter.im/


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From Nicolas.Williams@oracle.com  Tue Jul 13 12:37:30 2010
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From: Nicolas Williams <Nicolas.Williams@oracle.com>
To: Alexey Melnikov <alexey.melnikov@isode.com>
Subject: Re: WG Review: Recharter of Common Authentication Technology Next Generation (kitten)
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On Tue, Jul 13, 2010 at 08:13:43PM +0100, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
> Nicolas Williams wrote:
> > [...]
> 
> I am happy for this topic to be a part of the charter. Similar ideas
> were proposed in other Apps areas (e.g. in Lemonade there was a
> proposal how to pipeline final leg of TLS exchange with some SMTP
> data). I am happy for this to be Experimental or Standard Track.

Funny, my I-D has a description of how SMTP might use the extension
besides for SASL authentication: e.g., to do EHLO before authentication.
And LDAP clients could do a search for the root DSE.

> But I am hoping it is not just Nico and myself.

I know there's been plenty of interest in adding GSS-API support to TLS.
Surely there will be interest in this design, since it accomplishes
that.  However, we might not be reaching the right audience by proposing
this on the KITTEN WG list, even if we all agree that KITTEN is the best
home for this work item.

I'm updating the I-D to reflect the just-issued RFCs 5801 and 5929, and
to simplify some things (apparently I left some brokenness from -02 in
-03, and re-reading I find -03 confusing).

Nico
-- 

From hartmans@mit.edu  Wed Jul 14 09:10:28 2010
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From: Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu>
To: Nicolas Williams <Nicolas.Williams@oracle.com>
Subject: Re: OpenID+GSS-API and naming: GSS_C_NT_OPENID?
References: <878w5ozpd0.fsf@mocca.josefsson.org> <20100706154407.GL15407@oracle.com>
Date: Wed, 14 Jul 2010 12:10:16 -0400
In-Reply-To: <20100706154407.GL15407@oracle.com> (Nicolas Williams's message of "Tue, 6 Jul 2010 10:44:07 -0500")
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My preference would be to define a nem type specific to the OpenID
mechanism to use as a MN, but to also support nt_user_name, which would
be canonicalized as best as the mechanism is able to the MN.

--Sam

From Nicolas.Williams@Oracle.com  Wed Jul 14 14:56:33 2010
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From: Nicolas Williams <Nicolas.Williams@Oracle.com>
To: kitten@ietf.org
Subject: Re: WG Review: Recharter of Common Authentication Technology Next Generation (kitten)
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On Mon, Jul 12, 2010 at 01:40:07PM -0500, Nicolas Williams wrote:
> I would like to add a work item for KITTEN WG: a pair of TLS extensions
> for optimizing SASL/GS2 authentication with channel binding to TLS.
> 
> [...]
> 
> This is all described in draft-williams-tls-app-sasl-opt-03.  The I-D
> needs some edits to be brought up to date with RFCs 5801, 5802 and 5929
> (which are supposed to be issued today).

I've missed the I-D submission cut-off for -04.  I'm attaching -04.txt.
This version is much cleaned up and, I hope, much clearer than -03.

Nico
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Network Working Group                                        N. Williams
Internet-Draft                                                    Oracle
Intended status: Standards Track                           July 14, 2010
Expires: January 15, 2011


 TLS Extension for Optimizing Application Protocols, Specifically SASL
                        with GSS-API mechanisms
                 draft-williams-tls-app-sasl-opt-04.txt

Abstract

   This document specifies Hello extensions to Transport Layer Security
   (TLS).  One extension is used for carrying application data which is
   suitable for delayed integrity protection and does not require
   privacy protection.  Another extension is used to negotiate an early
   start to the application data protocol in the case of initial TLS
   connections (i.e., which do not resume sessions).

   We describe how to use these extensions to reduce the number of round
   trips needed for application-layer authentication, by piggy-backing
   Simple Authentication (SASL) mechanism negotiation on the first leg
   of a TLS handshake and the first round of SASL authentication
   messages on the second leg of the same TLS handshake.  Through SASL
   we get support for Generic Security Services (GSS-API) mechanisms.
   Channel binding is used from SASL authentication to the TLS channel.
   This results in a two round-trip optimization for applications that
   use SASL on top of TLS.

   We also provide generic framing for SASL authentication messages
   which, combined with the use of these extensions, will be referred to
   as "TLS/SA".  These extensions can also be used to optimize
   application protocols separately from SASL.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
   other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
   Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."



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   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.

   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 15, 2011.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the BSD License.





























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Table of Contents

   1.    Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   1.1.  Conventions used in this document  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   2.    TLS Extensions for Optimization of Application protocols . .  6
   3.    Sending Application Data in TLS Hello Messages . . . . . . .  9
   3.1.  Optimizing SASL Mechanism Negotiation  . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   4.    Application Data Protocol Early Start  . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   5.    Use with StartTLS-like Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   6.    Using TLS with the GSS-API . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   7.    Using these Extensions with Existing SASL Applications . . . 13
   8.    TLS/SA (TLS + SASL with generic framing of SASL
         authentication messages) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   8.1.  TLS/SA Exchanges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   9.    Channel Binding  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
   10.   Contrived Examples of Non-SASL Optimizations of Existing
         Application Protocols  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
   10.1. Contrived Example: LDAP  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
   10.2. Contrived Example: SMTP  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
   11.   Impact on TLS Concentrators  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
   12.   IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
   13.   Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
   14.   References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
   14.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
   14.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
         Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

























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1.  Introduction

   Many applications use TLS [RFC5246] and then Simple Authentication
   and Security Layers (SASL) [RFC4422] on top of TLS.  This requires at
   least two round trips for TLS, then one round trip for SASL mechanism
   negotiation, then as many round trips as the negotiated SASL
   mechanism requires.  The TLS Hello exchanges can can carry extensions
   bearing application data.  We could also define additional non-Hello
   Handshake extensions to carry application data, but it suffices to be
   able to start using TLS application records as soon as the client's
   Finished message is sent, without waiting for a server reply (in the
   new TLS session case).  Here we describe how to use such TLS
   extensions to reduce the number of round trips needed for SASL
   mechanism negotiation and authentication.

   We define a TLS extension for use in Hello messages.  This extension
   will carry typed application data.  We also define a TLS Hello
   extension for negotiating an early start for the TLS application
   record protocol.

   Through the new SASL to GSS-API mechanism bridge, GS2 [RFC5801], we
   obtain support for use of GSS-API [RFC2743] security mechanisms.
   Altogether we achieve up to a two round-trip reduction for
   applications using SASL over TLS.

   We use the first TLS round trip to optimize the SASL mechanism
   negotiation by piggybacking the mechanism negotiation on TLS Hello
   messages.  By negotiating an early start to the TLS application
   record protocol we can send the first authentication message of the
   selected SASL mechanism in the second leg of the TLS handshake,
   immediately after the client's Finished message is sent.  Note that
   the TLS channel binding [RFC5929] is available just in time to start
   the SASL authentication at that time, thus no special considerations
   apply to how channel binding is done.  Use of channel binding
   protects against man-in-the-middle attacks as well as downgrade
   attacks on mechanism negotiation.

   These extensions are motivated by:

   o  a desire to reduce the number of round trips needed by SASL and
      GSS-API applications running over TLS;

   o  a desire to replace an earlier proposal for "TLS/GSS" with one
      that passes muster at the TLS implementor community;

   o  a desire to provide a profile that new applications may use for
      TLS with SASL and/or GSS-API for user authentication.




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   The use of these extensions to optimize SASL/GSS-API authentication
   is hereby termed "Transport Layer Security with Simple
   Authentication", or "TLS/SA" for short.

1.1.  Conventions used in this document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].










































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2.  TLS Extensions for Optimization of Application protocols

   When a client application wishes to exchange one or more application
   messages prior to the conclusion of a TLS exchange it uses TLS client
   Hello message extensions to a) request permission to start the
   application record protocol early, and b) optionally send the first
   application message to the server.  Such application data MUST NOT
   require privacy or integrity protection, unless a the current TLS
   handshake is part of a renegotiation [RFC5746].

   When an application data bearing Hello message is received the server
   will either ignore the extension or pass it to the application, which
   then may respond to that application data via the server's Hello
   message.  If the server or server application ignores the client's
   Hello extension then the client will discover that the server does
   not support this extension when the client receives the server's
   Hello.

   The extension contents are defined by the application.  In order to
   save the application having to encode application "type" information
   we define application data extension types and we allow the Client
   Hello to carry one of each of these extensions:

   o  app_hello (<TBD>)

   o  sasl_sml (<TBD>)

   o  early_start (<TBD>)

   It is the application's responsibility to define the contents of the
   app_hello Hello extension.

   The sasl_sml Hello extension represents a SASL server mechanism list
   request.  The server returns this list, if it can, via the same Hello
   extension in its Hello.  The client's sasl_sml MUST be have an empty
   value.  The client will use this server's SASL mechanism list to pick
   a suitable SASL mechanism.  See Section 3.1 for details of the
   encoding of the server's SASL mechanism list.

   The early_start extension requests permission to start the
   application data record protocol on the client-side immediately after
   sending the client's Finished message (which, in the case of initial
   TLS connections, is sent before receiving the server's Finished
   message).  Servers that supports this extension MUST include the same
   extension in its Hello message with the same value.  The value of
   early_start consists of an encoded enum (EarlyStartProto) that
   indicates the kind of application data that will be sent early:




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         enum { app_protocol (0), generic_sasl(1), (255)
         } EarlyStartProto;

               Figure 1: EarlyStartProto TLS Hello extension

   If the value of early_start is app_protocol (0), then the contents of
   format of the early start application data is defined by the
   application; see Section 7 and Section 10.  If the value of
   early_start is generic_sasl(1) then the application is said to be a
   "TLS/SA" application, and SASL messages will be exchanged as
   application records, with generic framing described in Section 8,
   until authentication succeeds or fails, at which point the actual
   application protocol will take over the TLS application records.

   A generic application protocol using these TLS extensions might look
   like:


      Client                                               Server

      ClientHello w/ sasl_sml
                  early_start     -------->
                                                   ServerHello w/
                                                         sasl_sml
                                                      early_start
                                                     Certificate*
                                               ServerKeyExchange*
                                              CertificateRequest*
                                   <--------      ServerHelloDone
      Certificate*
      ClientKeyExchange
      CertificateVerify*
      [ChangeCipherSpec]
      Finished
      SASL auth message as data    -------->
                                               [ChangeCipherSpec]
                                                         Finished
                                   <--------    SASL auth message
      SASL auth messages           <------->   SASL auth messages
                                   <--------      Outcome of SASL
                                                   authentication
      Application Data             <------->     Application Data


       Figure 2: Message flow for initial TLS connections with SASL
               mechanism negotiation and SASL authentication





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      Client                                               Server

      ClientHello w/ sasl_sml
                  early_start     -------->
                                                   ServerHello w/
                                                         sasl_sml
                                                      early_start
                                               [ChangeCipherSpec]
                                   <--------             Finished
      [ChangeCipherSpec]
      Finished
      SASL auth message as data    -------->
                                   <--------    SASL auth message
      SASL auth messages           <------->   SASL auth messages
                                   <--------      Outcome of SASL
                                                   authentication
      Application Data             <------->     Application Data


       Figure 3: Message flow for resumed TLS connections with SASL
               mechanism negotiation and SASL authentication






























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3.  Sending Application Data in TLS Hello Messages

   The app_hello client Hello message extension can be used to send
   arbitrary application-specific messages in the client Hello.  The
   application MUST NOT use this extension unless both of these
   requirements are met: a) the application data being sent in the
   app_hello and the reply expected in the app_hello reply MUST NOT
   require privacy protection, b) the application on the server side
   knows unambiguously what data to expect in an app_hello.

   For example, SMTP could use the app_hello extension to send its EHLO
   before the TLS handshake completes.

   The app_hello extension data and early-start application records are
   ultimately integrity-protected once the TLS Finished message exchange
   completes, if the TLS connection uses a non-null TLS ciphersuite.

3.1.  Optimizing SASL Mechanism Negotiation

   A client wishing to optimize SASL mechanism negotiation MUST send a
   sasl_sml extension in the client's TLS Hello message.  The client
   MUST NOT send a payload in its sasl_sml client hello extension.

   If the server supports SASL mechanism negotiation optimization and
   the server's mechanism list is shorter than 2^16 - 1 bytes then the
   server MUST include a sasl_sml Hello extension in its reply to the
   client.  The payload of the server's sasl_sml MUST be a string of
   ASCII characters representing a comma-separated list of SASL
   mechanism names (note: servers SHOULD NOT send a NUL string
   terminator is needed, but if present the client MUST ignore the NUL).





















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4.  Application Data Protocol Early Start

   Applications may request that the TLS application data record
   protocol commence immediately after the client's Finished message is
   sent (which can be before the server's Finished message is received
   in the case of initial TLS connections).  To do this the client
   includes the client Hello extension 'early_start' in its Hello
   message.  If the server responds with the same extension and
   extension value in its server Hello message then the server will
   allow the early start of the TLS application data record protocol.

   This extension MUST NOT be used if the nature of the application data
   to be sent early is such that the server must be authenticated to the
   client before sending the data.  For example, passwords MUST NOT be
   sent early.

   Note that in the case of TLS session resumption the early_start
   feature has no effect as in that case the TLS handshake is already
   abbreviated.  Because the decision to abbreviate a TLS handshake
   depends on client and server choices, clients that want an early
   start of the application record protocol should use the early_start
   extension even when requesting TLS session resumption.





























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5.  Use with StartTLS-like Protocols

   These extensions can be used in "raw TLS" and "StartTLS" application
   protocols both.  This section gives INFORMATIVE guidance to
   application protocol developers regarding how to integrate TLS/SA
   into their applications.

   For example, the HyperText Transfer Protocol over TLS (HTTPS)
   [RFC2818] is a "raw TLS" application protocol: clients initiate TCP
   connections to servers, then they initiate TLS connections
   immediately, then they run the application protocol (HTTP in this
   case) over TLS.  Whereas the Secure HyperText Transfer Protocol
   (S-HTTP) [RFC2660] allows TLS to be "started" from within HTTP, at
   which point the application protocol (HTTP) is run over TLS-over-
   HTTP.  The latter is commonly known as the "StartTLS" pattern.  Other
   examples of application protocols using raw TLS and StartTLS include
   LDAP [RFC4511], IMAP4 [add ref], SMTP [add ref], etcetera.

   Raw TLS applications need only use these optimizations to negotiate
   and optimize SASL authentication, and as soon as SASL authentication
   is complete they can begin the application protocol.  We can call
   these "raw TLS/SA" applications.

   StartTLS applications might have performed SASL authentication before
   starting TLS, in which case they have to redo SASL authentication.

   StartTLS applications should treat the TLS handshake messages and any
   subsequent SASL authentication messages as a TLS handshake messages
   and frame them accordingly.  When the TLS/SA authentication completes
   the application should then consider the TLS handshake complete, and
   the application may then start using the TLS record protocol for the
   application protocol's needs.



















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6.  Using TLS with the GSS-API

   By using the SASL framework known as "GS2" [RFC5801], applications
   can use GSS-API mechanisms as SASL mechanisms.















































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7.  Using these Extensions with Existing SASL Applications

   Applications that already use TLS and SASL can be trivially updated
   to use the sasl_sml and early_start extensions as follows: a)
   optimize the SASL mechanism negotiation as described in Section 3.1,
   b) start the application data protocol early as described in
   Section 4.  Having listed the server's SASL mechanism list early the
   application can then immediately begin authentication using its
   preferred SASL mechanism.

   Application protocol designers SHOULD, however, opt for the "TLS/SA"
   profile of TLS and SASL described in Section 8.  The rationale for
   this SHOULD is that the fewer ways to combine TLS and SASL, the more
   likely it is that developer frameworks will be produced to abstract
   the combination for programmers.

   Non-TLS/SA applications MUST NOT use any SASL mechanism that might
   send credentials (passwords) in cleartext or cleartext-equivalent
   ways before the TLS handshake completes (i.e., before the server's
   Finished message is received and validated).  It is RECOMMENDED that
   applications use only SASL/GS2 [RFC5801] mechanisms using channel
   binding to TLS.  Channel binding to TLS is RECOMMENDED.





























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8.  TLS/SA (TLS + SASL with generic framing of SASL authentication
    messages)

   Application protocols can use the sasl_sml and early_start extensions
   to optimize SASL authentication.  Each application would have to
   provide the details of how to request SASL authentication start, how
   to frame SASL authentication messages, and how to convey the outcome
   of authentication to the client.  A generic profile of TLS and the
   sasl_sml and early_start extensions would allow many applications to
   share a single TLS + SASL sub-protocol.

   In this section we describe a generic profile of TLS and SASL
   [RFC4422], using GS2 [RFC5801] mechanisms in TLS applications in a
   round trip optimized manner.  We call this generic profile "TLS/SA",
   or "Transport Layer Security with Simple Authentication".  TLS/SA
   defines those parts of the SASL authentication process which SASL
   [RFC4422] leaves to applications.

   Existing SASL applications may, but need not use TLS/SA.  New
   application protocols that would otherwise use TLS and/or SASL SHOULD
   use TLS/SA.

   TLS/SA defines the framing of SASL authentication request, SASL
   mechanism and SASL outcome of authentication messages.

   SASL mechanism negotiation in TLS/SA is done as described in
   Section 3.1.  Channel binding to TLS is REQUIRED.  The channel
   binding type MUST be 'tls-unique'.  Note that as of today there exist
   no SASL mechanisms that support channel binding but which are not
   SASL/GS2 mechanisms.

8.1.  TLS/SA Exchanges

   A client wishing to optimize a SASL/GS2 mechanism MUST: a) negotiate
   a SASL mechanism to use using the method described in Section 3.1, b)
   begin the SASL mechanism authentication message exchange immediately
   after the client's Finished message as application data without
   waiting for the server's Finished message, and using the TLS
   connection's channel binding data for channel binding.

   The first SASL mechanism authentication message (always sent by the
   client in the case of SASL/GS2 mechanisms) MUST be prefixed with, and
   in the following order:

   1.  the SASL name of the mechanism, NUL-terminated;

   2.  a NUL-terminated, possibly-empty comma-separated list of language
       tags [RFC5646];



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   3.  a four octet, network byte order binary message length.

   Subsequent SASL mechanism authentication messages are sent prefixed
   with a four octet, network byte order binary message length.

   Authentication messages MUST NOT be longer than 2^24 octets (i.e.,
   the 8 most significant bits of the message length MUST be zeros); if
   SASL produces such messages then authentication MUST FAIL.

   The server's "outcome of authentication exchange" message MUST
   consist of a UTF-8 string containing supplementary information
   prefixed with a network byte order four byte unsigned binary length
   of of that string, with the most significant bit of the length set to
   1.  The next most significant bit MUST be 1 to indicate success, 0 to
   indicate failure.  The next most significant bit MUST be 1 to
   indicate that authentication can be re-tried, otherwise it must be
   set to 0, and MUST be 0 in the case of authentication success.  The
   supplementary information MUST NOT be longer than 2^16-1 bytes.  The
   supplementary information SHOULD be a human-readable message
   localized to a language selected from the client's language tags
   selected according to [RFC4647], or to one of the server's choice if
   the client sent no language tags or the server did not support
   localizations to any of them.  [Question: should this message also
   include the language tag chosen by the server?  That could be done
   using UTF-8 language tag codepoints, but IIRC those are deprecated
   and hard to use.]

   Where empty messages are required by SASL the application should send
   an empty message with correspondingly set length octets.

   If the last SASL mechanism authentication message is to be sent by
   the server then the server's outcome of authentication message MUST
   immediately follow the last mechanism message.  That is: there is no
   need for the client to send an empty message in response to the last
   mechanism message just to get the outcome of authentication message.
   This saves another round trip.

   If authentication fails then the client MAY retry authentication, and
   indicates this by sending four octets with all bits set, followed by
   the first SASL authentication message of the next exchange.
   Otherwise, the client MUST send four octets with all bits cleared
   prior to commencing the application protocol.  The server MAY abort
   the TLS connection on authentication failure and/or re-
   authentication.

   If authentication succeeds then the application protocol takes over
   the TLS record protocol contents.




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      Client                                               Server

      ClientHello w/ sasl_sml
                  early_start      -------->
                                                   ServerHello w/
                                                      early_start
                                                         sasl_sml
                                                     Certificate*
                                               ServerKeyExchange*
                                              CertificateRequest*
                                   <--------      ServerHelloDone
      Certificate*
      ClientKeyExchange
      CertificateVerify*
      [ChangeCipherSpec]
      Finished
      SASL auth message as data    -------->
                                               [ChangeCipherSpec]
                                                         Finished
                                                SASL auth message
                                   <--------      Outcome of SASL
                                                   authentication
      Application Data             <------->     Application Data


   Figure 4: Message flow for initial TLS connections with a one-round-
                  trip SASL mechanism for authentication
























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      Client                                               Server

      ClientHello w/ sasl_sml
                  early_start      -------->
                                                   ServerHello w/
                                                      early_start
                                                         sasl_sml
                                               [ChangeCipherSpec]
                                   <--------             Finished
      Certificate*
      ClientKeyExchange
      CertificateVerify*
      [ChangeCipherSpec]
      Finished
      SASL auth message as data    -------->
                                                SASL auth message
                                   <--------      Outcome of SASL
                                                   authentication
      Application Data             <------->     Application Data


   Figure 5: Message flow for session resumption TLS connections with a
             one-round-trip SASL mechanism for authentication




























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      Client                                               Server

      ClientHello w/ sasl_sml
                  early_start      -------->
                                                   ServerHello w/
                                                      early_start
                                                         sasl_sml
                                                     Certificate*
                                               ServerKeyExchange*
                                              CertificateRequest*
                                   <--------      ServerHelloDone
      Certificate*
      ClientKeyExchange
      CertificateVerify*
      [ChangeCipherSpec]
      Finished
      SASL auth message as data    -------->
                                               [ChangeCipherSpec]
                                                         Finished
                                   <--------    SASL auth message
      SASL auth message            -------->
                                   <--------      Outcome of SASL
                                                   authentication
      Application Data             <------->     Application Data


     Figure 6: Message flow for initial TLS connections with one and a
            half round-trip SASL mechanisms for authentication

   And with a two round trip mechanism the protocol looks like:





















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      Client                                               Server

      ClientHello w/ sasl_sml
                  early_start      -------->
                                                   ServerHello w/
                                                      early_start
                                                         sasl_sml
                                                     Certificate*
                                               ServerKeyExchange*
                                              CertificateRequest*
                                   <--------      ServerHelloDone
      Certificate*
      ClientKeyExchange
      CertificateVerify*
      [ChangeCipherSpec]
      Finished
      SASL auth message as data    -------->
                                               [ChangeCipherSpec]
                                                         Finished
                                   <--------    SASL auth message
      SASL auth message            -------->
                                                SASL auth message
                                   <--------      Outcome of SASL
                                                   authentication
      Application Data             <------->     Application Data


    Figure 7: Message flow for initial TLS connections with two round-
                  trip SASL mechanisms for authentication

   The reader can figure out what the protocol looks like for SASL
   mechanisms with more than two round trips from the above..



















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9.  Channel Binding

   Existing TLS channel binding types that are suitable for use with
   SASL in this facility are:

   o  tls-server-end-point [RFC5929]

   o  tls-unique [RFC5929]

   See [RFC5929] and the IANA channel binding type registry for more
   information about these channel binding types.  TLS/SA applications
   MUST use the 'tls-unique' channel binding type.







































Williams                Expires January 15, 2011               [Page 20]

Internet-Draft                   TLS/SA                        July 2010


10.  Contrived Examples of Non-SASL Optimizations of Existing
     Application Protocols

   In this section and its sub-sections we INFORMATIVELY describe how a
   number of existing TLS application protocols might be modified to
   take advantage of the application data extension for optimization of
   the application protocol.  Implementors MUST NOT implement anything
   described in this section, except for experimental purposes only.

   It is crucial that clients only use the app_hello Hello extension for
   operations that do not require that the user already be authenticated
   (the server application MUST reject such uses of app_hello) or that
   require privacy protection.  There are likely no operations in IMAP
   and POP3, for example, which are suitable for optimization via
   app_hello, but there are for SMTP and LDAP.  That's because IMAP and
   POP3 deal exclusively with user data, while SMTP and LDAP have some
   operations or objects which can be executed publicly and without user
   authentication (see below).

   By starting the application protocol early these applications can
   obtain a similar round-trip optimization as for SASL in the TLS/SA
   case.

10.1.  Contrived Example: LDAP

   In the case of LDAP the app_hello extension could be used to send a
   single LDAP message, typically a search for the root DSE object.  If
   the server supports this extension then the server's app_hello Hello
   extension can be used to return the result.  If the server does not
   support this extension then the client can repeat its search after
   the TLS handshake is completed.

   LDAP applications could also use an early_start request with value
   app_protocol and begin the LDAP protocol early.  If the first
   operation performed were an LDAP Bind then the application will
   obtain the same round-trip optimization that we get for SASL using
   TLS/SA.

10.2.  Contrived Example: SMTP

   Clients could use the app_hello Hello extension to send a EHLO SMTP
   command to the server, and the server may send the SMTP reply to it
   in a app_hello Hello extension.








Williams                Expires January 15, 2011               [Page 21]

Internet-Draft                   TLS/SA                        July 2010


11.  Impact on TLS Concentrators

   This protocol is designed to have minimal impact on TLS server-side
   proxies (a.k.a. concentrators).

   The minimal changes to make to TLS concentrators in order to support
   this protocol are:

   o  Add a configuration parameter through which the administrator may
      list the SASL mechanisms available to the application servers
      behind the concentrator;

   o  Add support for sasl_sml Hello extension, using the server SASL
      mechanism list from the configuration parameter mentioned in the
      previous item;

   o  Add a configuration parameter through which the administrator may
      indicate whether the application supports the 'generic-sasl'
      framing defined in Section 8.

   o  Add support for early_start, which means that the concentrator
      MUST NOT consider it an error to receive TLS application data
      record messages prior to sending the concentrator's Finished
      message.

   Implementors may also want to add support for unique channel binding
   types, such as the 'tls-unique' channel binding type.  This requires
   being able to communicate to the application server the tls-unique
   channel binding for each TLS connection, probably via an out of band
   mechanism (though if the application protocol is HTTP then perhaps
   the concentrator could use an HTTP request header to do this).

   Implementors may also add a way to communicate app_hello Hello
   extension to the application.

















Williams                Expires January 15, 2011               [Page 22]

Internet-Draft                   TLS/SA                        July 2010


12.  IANA Considerations

   By the time this document is published, the values for the 'sasl_sml'
   and 'early_start' TLS Hello extensions will be assined by the IANA.
   The ExtensionType registry will have to be updated to reflect these
   assignments.  (These registries require IETF Consensus.)













































Williams                Expires January 15, 2011               [Page 23]

Internet-Draft                   TLS/SA                        July 2010


13.  Security Considerations

   The security considerations of [RFC4422], [RFC5246] and [RFC5056]
   apply, as do those of [RFC2743] when used via the SASL/GS2 bridge
   [RFC5801].

   Needless to say, TLS applications that make use of TLS renegotiation
   should ensure that they use the TLS renegotiation indication
   extension [RFC5746].

   The initial SASL authentication message should not be considered
   protected by TLS until the TLS handshake completes.  If a TLS cipher
   suite is used that does not authenticate the server, but a SASL
   mechanism is used that does authenticate the server, then the SASL
   exchanges should not be considered protected until authentication
   completes and succeeds.  Channel binding MUST be used in the
   optimized authentication case (but then, channel binding should
   always be used when SASL is used over TLS).

   Non-SASL early_start application data should not be considered
   protected by TLS until the TLS handshake completes.

   The SASL mechanism negotiation and app_hello datashould not be
   considered protected by TLS until the TLS handshake completes, and,
   if the application uses SASL, should not be considered protected
   until SASL authentication completes successfully.

























Williams                Expires January 15, 2011               [Page 24]

Internet-Draft                   TLS/SA                        July 2010


14.  References

14.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC4422]  Melnikov, A. and K. Zeilenga, "Simple Authentication and
              Security Layer (SASL)", RFC 4422, June 2006.

   [RFC4647]  Phillips, A. and M. Davis, "Matching of Language Tags",
              BCP 47, RFC 4647, September 2006.

   [RFC5056]  Williams, N., "On the Use of Channel Bindings to Secure
              Channels", RFC 5056, November 2007.

   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.

   [RFC5646]  Phillips, A. and M. Davis, "Tags for Identifying
              Languages", BCP 47, RFC 5646, September 2009.

   [RFC5746]  Rescorla, E., Ray, M., Dispensa, S., and N. Oskov,
              "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Renegotiation Indication
              Extension", RFC 5746, February 2010.

   [RFC5801]  Josefsson, S. and N. Williams, "Using Generic Security
              Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API) Mechanisms
              in Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL): The
              GS2 Mechanism Family", RFC 5801, July 2010.

   [RFC5929]  Altman, J., Williams, N., and L. Zhu, "Channel Bindings
              for TLS", RFC 5929, July 2010.

14.2.  Informative References

   [RFC2660]  Rescorla, E. and A. Schiffman, "The Secure HyperText
              Transfer Protocol", RFC 2660, August 1999.

   [RFC2743]  Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program
              Interface Version 2, Update 1", RFC 2743, January 2000.

   [RFC2818]  Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, May 2000.

   [RFC4511]  Sermersheim, J., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
              (LDAP): The Protocol", RFC 4511, June 2006.





Williams                Expires January 15, 2011               [Page 25]

Internet-Draft                   TLS/SA                        July 2010


Author's Address

   Nicolas Williams
   Oracle
   5300 Riata Trace Ct
   Austin, TX  78727
   US

   Email: Nicolas.Williams@oracle.com










































Williams                Expires January 15, 2011               [Page 26]


--DBIVS5p969aUjpLe--

From shawn.emery@oracle.com  Wed Jul 14 15:18:25 2010
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Please review the draft meeting agenda for IETF 78:

http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/78/agenda/kitten.txt

Provide any feed-back by 7/19/10 (17:00 PDT) if you would like to add or 
change anything.

Shawn Emery
kitten co-chair
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    <font size="+1"><tt><br>
      </tt></font>Please review the draft meeting agenda for IETF 78:<br>
    <br>
    <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/78/agenda/kitten.txt">http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/78/agenda/kitten.txt</a><br>
    <br>
    Provide any feed-back by 7/19/10 (17:00 PDT) if you would like to
    add or change anything.<br>
    <br>
    Shawn Emery<br>
    kitten co-chair<br>
    <span class="moz-txt-tag">--</span><br>
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From shawn.emery@oracle.com  Wed Jul 14 15:57:35 2010
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The individual submission for the GSSAPI: Delegate if Approved by Policy 
has been published as RFC 5896.  Thanks to Sam and Love for their work.

Shawn.
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        The individual submission for the GSSAPI: Delegate if Approved
        by Policy has been published as RFC 5896.&nbsp; Thanks to Sam and
        Love for their work.<br>
        <br>
        Shawn.<br>
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        --<br>
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From Nicolas.Williams@oracle.com  Wed Jul 14 16:00:11 2010
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On Wed, Jul 14, 2010 at 04:57:11PM -0600, Shawn Emery wrote:
> The individual submission for the GSSAPI: Delegate if Approved by
> Policy has been published as RFC 5896.  Thanks to Sam and Love for
> their work.

Awesome!  This is badly needed.  I especially want SSHv2 clients to have
an option to use this flag.

Nico
-- 

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Martin Rex points out that what I call "early start" of the TLS
application record protocol is elsewhere called "false start".
Searching I found draft-bmoeller-tls-falsestart-00.

The upshot is, I think, that my proposal is likely uncontroversial.

Nico
-- 

From shawn.emery@oracle.com  Wed Jul 14 16:12:32 2010
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There has been push-back on the proposed Kitten recharter because of the 
following:

1. Milestones should be defined for each of the proposed work items
2. Editors should be assigned to each of these

We are imploring anyone who would like to solve some of these problems 
to volunteer.  Anyone that might not have prior IETF process experience 
should not hesitate to volunteer.  We will help in getting volunteers up 
to speed.

For reference I have included the list of work items below.  For those 
that already have an assignment and for any new volunteers, please 
provide proposed milestones for:

1. WGLC of the corresponding draft with month/year
2. Submission to the IESG of the corresponding draft with month/year

Proposed work items:

* GSS-API: initializing credentials
[editor: TBD]

* GSS-API: iterating credentials
[editor: TBD]

* GSS-API: exporting/importing credentials
[editor: TBD]

* GSS-API: specification for asynchronous calls
[editor: TBD]

* GSS-API: interfaces/improvements for better error message reporting
[editor: TBD]

* GSS-API: programmer friendly interfaces
[editor: TBD]

* GSS-API: transition SASL mechanism for OpenID
[editor: TBD]

* GSS-API: transition SASL mechanism for SAML
[editor: TBD]

* GSS-API: publish draft-ietf-kitten-gssapi-extensions-iana
[editor: Nicolas Williams]

* GSS-API: publish draft-ietf-kitten-gssapi-naming-exts
[editor: Leif Johansson]

* SASL: publish draft-melnikov-digest-to-historic
[editor: Alexey Melnikov]

* SASL: publish draft-williams-tls-app-sasl-opt
[editor: Nicolas Williams]

Shawn.
kitten co-chair
--

--------------060401010306090509040702
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    <meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1">
  </head>
  <body text="#000000" bgcolor="#ffffff">
    <font size="+1"><tt><br>
        There has been push-back on the proposed Kitten recharter
        because of the following:<br>
        <br>
        1. Milestones should be defined for each of the proposed work
        items<br>
        2. Editors should be assigned to each of these<br>
        <br>
        We are imploring anyone who would like to solve some of these
        problems to volunteer.&nbsp; Anyone that might not have prior IETF
        process experience should not hesitate to volunteer.&nbsp; We will
        help in getting volunteers up to speed.<br>
        <br>
        For reference I have included the list of work items below.&nbsp; For
        those that already have an assignment and for any new
        volunteers, please provide proposed milestones for:<br>
        <br>
        1. WGLC of the corresponding draft with month/year<br>
        2. Submission to the IESG of the corresponding draft with
        month/year<br>
        <br>
        Proposed work items:<br>
        <br>
        * GSS-API: initializing credentials<br>
        [editor: TBD]<br>
        <br>
        * GSS-API: iterating credentials<br>
        [editor: TBD]<br>
        <br>
        * GSS-API: exporting/importing credentials<br>
        [editor: TBD]<br>
        <br>
        * GSS-API: specification for asynchronous calls<br>
        [editor: TBD]<br>
        <br>
        * GSS-API: interfaces/improvements for better error message
        reporting<br>
        [editor: TBD]<br>
        <br>
        * GSS-API: programmer friendly interfaces<br>
        [editor: TBD]<br>
        <br>
        * GSS-API: transition SASL mechanism for OpenID<br>
        [editor: TBD]<br>
        <br>
        * GSS-API: transition SASL mechanism for SAML<br>
        [editor: TBD]<br>
        <br>
        * GSS-API: publish draft-ietf-kitten-gssapi-extensions-iana<br>
        [editor: Nicolas Williams]<br>
        <br>
        * GSS-API: publish draft-ietf-kitten-gssapi-naming-exts<br>
        [editor: Leif Johansson]<br>
        <br>
        * SASL: publish draft-melnikov-digest-to-historic<br>
        [editor: Alexey Melnikov]<br>
        <br>
      </tt></font><font size="+1"><tt>* SASL: publish </tt></font><tt><big>draft-williams-tls-app-sasl-opt</big><br>
      <big>[editor: Nicolas Williams]</big></tt><br>
    <font size="+1"><tt><br>
        Shawn.<br>
        kitten co-chair<br>
        --<br>
      </tt></font>
  </body>
</html>

--------------060401010306090509040702--

From alexey.melnikov@isode.com  Thu Jul 15 07:52:27 2010
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To: Shawn Emery <shawn.emery@oracle.com>
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Shawn Emery wrote:

> Please review the draft meeting agenda for IETF 78:
>
> http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/78/agenda/kitten.txt
>
> Provide any feed-back by 7/19/10 (17:00 PDT) if you would like to add 
> or change anything.

Hi Shawn,

Some quick comments:

>Active WG items (10 min)
>  We will briefly review the status of each document, and discuss any open
>  issues and/or recent comments on each.
>
>    IANA-reg    draft-ietf-kitten-gssapi-extensions-iana
>    Naming-ext  draft-ietf-kitten-gssapi-naming-exts
>    Digest	draft-ietf-kitten-digest-to-historic
>  
>
No issues, ready for WGLC ;-).

>    Delegate	draft-lha-gssapi-delegate-policy
>
>Naming Extensions Lessons and Security Implications (30 min)
>    Sam Hartman will present work on a naming extensions implementation and
>    security attack scenarios.  Reference:
>
>	http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hartman-gss-eap-naming-00
>
>Recharter Discussion (60 min)
>    Review merger of SASL and Kitten WGs into Kitten.
>  
>
With luck the new charter will be approved today (or shortly after), so 
I don't think we need to review charter text. Unless you meant something 
else here.

I also think that it would be good to spend some time discussing 
<http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-wierenga-ietf-sasl-saml-01>, 
considering it is one of the charter items.

>    Review proposed work items based on:
>
>	http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-yu-kitten-api-wishlist-01
>
>    Confirm volunteers for each of the work items.
>
>Review and Milestones (10 min)
>
>Open mic (5 min)
>


From cantor.2@osu.edu  Thu Jul 15 08:01:06 2010
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From: "Scott Cantor" <cantor.2@osu.edu>
To: "'Shawn Emery'" <shawn.emery@oracle.com>, <kitten@ietf.org>, <sasl@ietf.org>
References: <4C3E4406.8000906@oracle.com>
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Subject: RE: [sasl] Kitten Recharter (Volunteers Needed)
Date: Thu, 15 Jul 2010 11:01:15 -0400
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> We are imploring anyone who would like to solve some of these problems to
> volunteer.  Anyone that might not have prior IETF process experience
should
> not hesitate to volunteer.  We will help in getting volunteers up to
speed.

> * GSS-API: transition SASL mechanism for SAML
> [editor: TBD]

I'm happy to volunteer for the mechanism I drafted, obviously.

-- Scott



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 I volunteer for the SASL OpenID draft.

Eliot

On 7/15/10 1:11 AM, Shawn Emery wrote:
>
> There has been push-back on the proposed Kitten recharter because of
> the following:
>
> 1. Milestones should be defined for each of the proposed work items
> 2. Editors should be assigned to each of these
>
> We are imploring anyone who would like to solve some of these problems
> to volunteer.  Anyone that might not have prior IETF process
> experience should not hesitate to volunteer.  We will help in getting
> volunteers up to speed.
>
> For reference I have included the list of work items below.  For those
> that already have an assignment and for any new volunteers, please
> provide proposed milestones for:
>
> 1. WGLC of the corresponding draft with month/year
> 2. Submission to the IESG of the corresponding draft with month/year
>
> Proposed work items:
>
> * GSS-API: initializing credentials
> [editor: TBD]
>
> * GSS-API: iterating credentials
> [editor: TBD]
>
> * GSS-API: exporting/importing credentials
> [editor: TBD]
>
> * GSS-API: specification for asynchronous calls
> [editor: TBD]
>
> * GSS-API: interfaces/improvements for better error message reporting
> [editor: TBD]
>
> * GSS-API: programmer friendly interfaces
> [editor: TBD]
>
> * GSS-API: transition SASL mechanism for OpenID
> [editor: TBD]
>
> * GSS-API: transition SASL mechanism for SAML
> [editor: TBD]
>
> * GSS-API: publish draft-ietf-kitten-gssapi-extensions-iana
> [editor: Nicolas Williams]
>
> * GSS-API: publish draft-ietf-kitten-gssapi-naming-exts
> [editor: Leif Johansson]
>
> * SASL: publish draft-melnikov-digest-to-historic
> [editor: Alexey Melnikov]
>
> * SASL: publish draft-williams-tls-app-sasl-opt
> [editor: Nicolas Williams]
>
> Shawn.
> kitten co-chair
> --
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> sasl mailing list
> sasl@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sasl

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    I volunteer for the SASL OpenID draft.<br>
    <br>
    Eliot<br>
    <br>
    On 7/15/10 1:11 AM, Shawn Emery wrote:
    <blockquote cite="mid:4C3E4406.8000906@oracle.com" type="cite">
      <meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
      <font size="+1"><tt><br>
          There has been push-back on the proposed Kitten recharter
          because of the following:<br>
          <br>
          1. Milestones should be defined for each of the proposed work
          items<br>
          2. Editors should be assigned to each of these<br>
          <br>
          We are imploring anyone who would like to solve some of these
          problems to volunteer.  Anyone that might not have prior IETF
          process experience should not hesitate to volunteer.  We will
          help in getting volunteers up to speed.<br>
          <br>
          For reference I have included the list of work items below. 
          For those that already have an assignment and for any new
          volunteers, please provide proposed milestones for:<br>
          <br>
          1. WGLC of the corresponding draft with month/year<br>
          2. Submission to the IESG of the corresponding draft with
          month/year<br>
          <br>
          Proposed work items:<br>
          <br>
          * GSS-API: initializing credentials<br>
          [editor: TBD]<br>
          <br>
          * GSS-API: iterating credentials<br>
          [editor: TBD]<br>
          <br>
          * GSS-API: exporting/importing credentials<br>
          [editor: TBD]<br>
          <br>
          * GSS-API: specification for asynchronous calls<br>
          [editor: TBD]<br>
          <br>
          * GSS-API: interfaces/improvements for better error message
          reporting<br>
          [editor: TBD]<br>
          <br>
          * GSS-API: programmer friendly interfaces<br>
          [editor: TBD]<br>
          <br>
          * GSS-API: transition SASL mechanism for OpenID<br>
          [editor: TBD]<br>
          <br>
          * GSS-API: transition SASL mechanism for SAML<br>
          [editor: TBD]<br>
          <br>
          * GSS-API: publish draft-ietf-kitten-gssapi-extensions-iana<br>
          [editor: Nicolas Williams]<br>
          <br>
          * GSS-API: publish draft-ietf-kitten-gssapi-naming-exts<br>
          [editor: Leif Johansson]<br>
          <br>
          * SASL: publish draft-melnikov-digest-to-historic<br>
          [editor: Alexey Melnikov]<br>
          <br>
        </tt></font><font size="+1"><tt>* SASL: publish </tt></font><tt><big>draft-williams-tls-app-sasl-opt</big><br>
        <big>[editor: Nicolas Williams]</big></tt><br>
      <font size="+1"><tt><br>
          Shawn.<br>
          kitten co-chair<br>
          --<br>
        </tt></font>
      <pre wrap="">
<fieldset class="mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
_______________________________________________
sasl mailing list
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:sasl@ietf.org">sasl@ietf.org</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sasl">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sasl</a>
</pre>
    </blockquote>
  </body>
</html>

--------------010507040007030508060107--

From simon@josefsson.org  Thu Jul 15 11:26:56 2010
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From: Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org>
To: Shawn Emery <shawn.emery@oracle.com>
Subject: Re: Kitten Recharter (Volunteers Needed)
References: <4C3E4406.8000906@oracle.com>
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Date: Thu, 15 Jul 2010 20:26:45 +0200
In-Reply-To: <4C3E4406.8000906@oracle.com> (Shawn Emery's message of "Wed, 14 Jul 2010 17:11:02 -0600")
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I volunteer to work on GS2/GSS-API related aspects of the OpenID and
SAML documents.  And generally, I volunteer to work any SASL mechanism
that is interested to explore GS2/GSS-API compatibility.

/Simon

Shawn Emery <shawn.emery@oracle.com> writes:

> There has been push-back on the proposed Kitten recharter because of
> the following:
>
> 1. Milestones should be defined for each of the proposed work items
> 2. Editors should be assigned to each of these
>
> We are imploring anyone who would like to solve some of these problems
> to volunteer.  Anyone that might not have prior IETF process
> experience should not hesitate to volunteer.  We will help in getting
> volunteers up to speed.
>
> For reference I have included the list of work items below.  For those
> that already have an assignment and for any new volunteers, please
> provide proposed milestones for:
>
> 1. WGLC of the corresponding draft with month/year
> 2. Submission to the IESG of the corresponding draft with month/year
>
> Proposed work items:
>
> * GSS-API: initializing credentials
> [editor: TBD]
>
> * GSS-API: iterating credentials
> [editor: TBD]
>
> * GSS-API: exporting/importing credentials
> [editor: TBD]
>
> * GSS-API: specification for asynchronous calls
> [editor: TBD]
>
> * GSS-API: interfaces/improvements for better error message reporting
> [editor: TBD]
>
> * GSS-API: programmer friendly interfaces
> [editor: TBD]
>
> * GSS-API: transition SASL mechanism for OpenID
> [editor: TBD]
>
> * GSS-API: transition SASL mechanism for SAML
> [editor: TBD]
>
> * GSS-API: publish draft-ietf-kitten-gssapi-extensions-iana
> [editor: Nicolas Williams]
>
> * GSS-API: publish draft-ietf-kitten-gssapi-naming-exts
> [editor: Leif Johansson]
>
> * SASL: publish draft-melnikov-digest-to-historic
> [editor: Alexey Melnikov]
>
> * SASL: publish draft-williams-tls-app-sasl-opt
> [editor: Nicolas Williams]
>
> Shawn.
> kitten co-chair
> --
> _______________________________________________
> sasl mailing list
> sasl@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sasl

From Nicolas.Williams@oracle.com  Thu Jul 15 12:15:47 2010
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From: Nicolas Williams <Nicolas.Williams@oracle.com>
To: Shawn Emery <shawn.emery@oracle.com>
Subject: Re: Kitten Recharter (Volunteers Needed)
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On Wed, Jul 14, 2010 at 05:11:02PM -0600, Shawn Emery wrote:
> 1. WGLC of the corresponding draft with month/year
> 2. Submission to the IESG of the corresponding draft with month/year
> 
> Proposed work items:

I can contribute design work, and some text for all but:

> * GSS-API: transition SASL mechanism for OpenID
> [editor: TBD]
> 
> * GSS-API: transition SASL mechanism for SAML
> [editor: TBD]

I'll edit this:

> * SASL: publish draft-williams-tls-app-sasl-opt
> [editor: Nicolas Williams]

if we adopt it as a WG item, or, if we don't, I'll consider continuing
as an individual submission if there's enough interest.

Nico
-- 

From kwiereng@cisco.com  Thu Jul 15 12:12:37 2010
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Subject: Re: Kitten Recharter (Volunteers Needed)
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And I volunteer on the non-gs2/gss-api part of the saml document ;-)

Klaas

Sent from my iPad

On Jul 15, 2010, at 8:27 PM, "Simon Josefsson" <simon@josefsson.org> wrote:

> I volunteer to work on GS2/GSS-API related aspects of the OpenID and
> SAML documents.  And generally, I volunteer to work any SASL mechanism
> that is interested to explore GS2/GSS-API compatibility.
> 
> /Simon
> 
> Shawn Emery <shawn.emery@oracle.com> writes:
> 
>> There has been push-back on the proposed Kitten recharter because of
>> the following:
>> 
>> 1. Milestones should be defined for each of the proposed work items
>> 2. Editors should be assigned to each of these
>> 
>> We are imploring anyone who would like to solve some of these problems
>> to volunteer.  Anyone that might not have prior IETF process
>> experience should not hesitate to volunteer.  We will help in getting
>> volunteers up to speed.
>> 
>> For reference I have included the list of work items below.  For those
>> that already have an assignment and for any new volunteers, please
>> provide proposed milestones for:
>> 
>> 1. WGLC of the corresponding draft with month/year
>> 2. Submission to the IESG of the corresponding draft with month/year
>> 
>> Proposed work items:
>> 
>> * GSS-API: initializing credentials
>> [editor: TBD]
>> 
>> * GSS-API: iterating credentials
>> [editor: TBD]
>> 
>> * GSS-API: exporting/importing credentials
>> [editor: TBD]
>> 
>> * GSS-API: specification for asynchronous calls
>> [editor: TBD]
>> 
>> * GSS-API: interfaces/improvements for better error message reporting
>> [editor: TBD]
>> 
>> * GSS-API: programmer friendly interfaces
>> [editor: TBD]
>> 
>> * GSS-API: transition SASL mechanism for OpenID
>> [editor: TBD]
>> 
>> * GSS-API: transition SASL mechanism for SAML
>> [editor: TBD]
>> 
>> * GSS-API: publish draft-ietf-kitten-gssapi-extensions-iana
>> [editor: Nicolas Williams]
>> 
>> * GSS-API: publish draft-ietf-kitten-gssapi-naming-exts
>> [editor: Leif Johansson]
>> 
>> * SASL: publish draft-melnikov-digest-to-historic
>> [editor: Alexey Melnikov]
>> 
>> * SASL: publish draft-williams-tls-app-sasl-opt
>> [editor: Nicolas Williams]
>> 
>> Shawn.
>> kitten co-chair
>> --
>> _______________________________________________
>> sasl mailing list
>> sasl@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sasl
> _______________________________________________
> Kitten mailing list
> Kitten@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/kitten

From lear@cisco.com  Thu Jul 15 12:56:52 2010
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 Just to be more clear, I volunteer to be the editor for the WG version
of draft-lear-sasl-openid should it be accepted by the working group.

Eliot

On 7/15/10 5:17 PM, Eliot Lear wrote:
> I volunteer for the SASL OpenID draft.
>
> Eliot
>
> On 7/15/10 1:11 AM, Shawn Emery wrote:
>>
>> There has been push-back on the proposed Kitten recharter because of
>> the following:
>>
>> 1. Milestones should be defined for each of the proposed work items
>> 2. Editors should be assigned to each of these
>>
>> We are imploring anyone who would like to solve some of these
>> problems to volunteer.  Anyone that might not have prior IETF process
>> experience should not hesitate to volunteer.  We will help in getting
>> volunteers up to speed.
>>
>> For reference I have included the list of work items below.  For
>> those that already have an assignment and for any new volunteers,
>> please provide proposed milestones for:
>>
>> 1. WGLC of the corresponding draft with month/year
>> 2. Submission to the IESG of the corresponding draft with month/year
>>
>> Proposed work items:
>>
>> * GSS-API: initializing credentials
>> [editor: TBD]
>>
>> * GSS-API: iterating credentials
>> [editor: TBD]
>>
>> * GSS-API: exporting/importing credentials
>> [editor: TBD]
>>
>> * GSS-API: specification for asynchronous calls
>> [editor: TBD]
>>
>> * GSS-API: interfaces/improvements for better error message reporting
>> [editor: TBD]
>>
>> * GSS-API: programmer friendly interfaces
>> [editor: TBD]
>>
>> * GSS-API: transition SASL mechanism for OpenID
>> [editor: TBD]
>>
>> * GSS-API: transition SASL mechanism for SAML
>> [editor: TBD]
>>
>> * GSS-API: publish draft-ietf-kitten-gssapi-extensions-iana
>> [editor: Nicolas Williams]
>>
>> * GSS-API: publish draft-ietf-kitten-gssapi-naming-exts
>> [editor: Leif Johansson]
>>
>> * SASL: publish draft-melnikov-digest-to-historic
>> [editor: Alexey Melnikov]
>>
>> * SASL: publish draft-williams-tls-app-sasl-opt
>> [editor: Nicolas Williams]
>>
>> Shawn.
>> kitten co-chair
>> --
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> sasl mailing list
>> sasl@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sasl
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Kitten mailing list
> Kitten@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/kitten

--------------000900090008020406020206
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  <body bgcolor="#ffffff" text="#000000">
    Just to be more clear, I volunteer to be the editor for the WG
    version of draft-lear-sasl-openid should it be accepted by the
    working group.<br>
    <br>
    Eliot<br>
    <br>
    On 7/15/10 5:17 PM, Eliot Lear wrote:
    <blockquote cite="mid:4C3F2690.7090805@cisco.com" type="cite">
      <meta content="text/html; charset=UTF-8" http-equiv="Content-Type">
      I volunteer for the SASL OpenID draft.<br>
      <br>
      Eliot<br>
      <br>
      On 7/15/10 1:11 AM, Shawn Emery wrote:
      <blockquote cite="mid:4C3E4406.8000906@oracle.com" type="cite">
        <meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html;
          charset=UTF-8">
        <font size="+1"><tt><br>
            There has been push-back on the proposed Kitten recharter
            because of the following:<br>
            <br>
            1. Milestones should be defined for each of the proposed
            work items<br>
            2. Editors should be assigned to each of these<br>
            <br>
            We are imploring anyone who would like to solve some of
            these problems to volunteer.  Anyone that might not have
            prior IETF process experience should not hesitate to
            volunteer.  We will help in getting volunteers up to speed.<br>
            <br>
            For reference I have included the list of work items below. 
            For those that already have an assignment and for any new
            volunteers, please provide proposed milestones for:<br>
            <br>
            1. WGLC of the corresponding draft with month/year<br>
            2. Submission to the IESG of the corresponding draft with
            month/year<br>
            <br>
            Proposed work items:<br>
            <br>
            * GSS-API: initializing credentials<br>
            [editor: TBD]<br>
            <br>
            * GSS-API: iterating credentials<br>
            [editor: TBD]<br>
            <br>
            * GSS-API: exporting/importing credentials<br>
            [editor: TBD]<br>
            <br>
            * GSS-API: specification for asynchronous calls<br>
            [editor: TBD]<br>
            <br>
            * GSS-API: interfaces/improvements for better error message
            reporting<br>
            [editor: TBD]<br>
            <br>
            * GSS-API: programmer friendly interfaces<br>
            [editor: TBD]<br>
            <br>
            * GSS-API: transition SASL mechanism for OpenID<br>
            [editor: TBD]<br>
            <br>
            * GSS-API: transition SASL mechanism for SAML<br>
            [editor: TBD]<br>
            <br>
            * GSS-API: publish draft-ietf-kitten-gssapi-extensions-iana<br>
            [editor: Nicolas Williams]<br>
            <br>
            * GSS-API: publish draft-ietf-kitten-gssapi-naming-exts<br>
            [editor: Leif Johansson]<br>
            <br>
            * SASL: publish draft-melnikov-digest-to-historic<br>
            [editor: Alexey Melnikov]<br>
            <br>
          </tt></font><font size="+1"><tt>* SASL: publish </tt></font><tt><big>draft-williams-tls-app-sasl-opt</big><br>
          <big>[editor: Nicolas Williams]</big></tt><br>
        <font size="+1"><tt><br>
            Shawn.<br>
            kitten co-chair<br>
            --<br>
          </tt></font>
        <pre wrap=""><fieldset class="mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
_______________________________________________
sasl mailing list
<a moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:sasl@ietf.org">sasl@ietf.org</a>
<a moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sasl">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sasl</a>
</pre>
      </blockquote>
      <pre wrap="">
<fieldset class="mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
_______________________________________________
Kitten mailing list
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:Kitten@ietf.org">Kitten@ietf.org</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/kitten">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/kitten</a>
</pre>
    </blockquote>
  </body>
</html>

--------------000900090008020406020206--

From klaas@cisco.com  Fri Jul 16 01:35:18 2010
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Subject: Re: [sasl] Kitten Recharter (Volunteers Needed)
References: <4C3E4406.8000906@oracle.com> <4C3F2690.7090805@cisco.com> <4C3F680F.8070607@cisco.com>
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On 7/15/10 9:57 PM, Eliot Lear wrote:
>   Just to be more clear, I volunteer to be the editor for the WG version
> of draft-lear-sasl-openid should it be accepted by the working group.

ditto for the sasl-saml draft

Klaas

>
> Eliot
>
> On 7/15/10 5:17 PM, Eliot Lear wrote:
>> I volunteer for the SASL OpenID draft.
>>
>> Eliot
>>
>> On 7/15/10 1:11 AM, Shawn Emery wrote:
>>>
>>> There has been push-back on the proposed Kitten recharter because of
>>> the following:
>>>
>>> 1. Milestones should be defined for each of the proposed work items
>>> 2. Editors should be assigned to each of these
>>>
>>> We are imploring anyone who would like to solve some of these
>>> problems to volunteer.  Anyone that might not have prior IETF process
>>> experience should not hesitate to volunteer.  We will help in getting
>>> volunteers up to speed.
>>>
>>> For reference I have included the list of work items below.  For
>>> those that already have an assignment and for any new volunteers,
>>> please provide proposed milestones for:
>>>
>>> 1. WGLC of the corresponding draft with month/year
>>> 2. Submission to the IESG of the corresponding draft with month/year
>>>
>>> Proposed work items:
>>>
>>> * GSS-API: initializing credentials
>>> [editor: TBD]
>>>
>>> * GSS-API: iterating credentials
>>> [editor: TBD]
>>>
>>> * GSS-API: exporting/importing credentials
>>> [editor: TBD]
>>>
>>> * GSS-API: specification for asynchronous calls
>>> [editor: TBD]
>>>
>>> * GSS-API: interfaces/improvements for better error message reporting
>>> [editor: TBD]
>>>
>>> * GSS-API: programmer friendly interfaces
>>> [editor: TBD]
>>>
>>> * GSS-API: transition SASL mechanism for OpenID
>>> [editor: TBD]
>>>
>>> * GSS-API: transition SASL mechanism for SAML
>>> [editor: TBD]
>>>
>>> * GSS-API: publish draft-ietf-kitten-gssapi-extensions-iana
>>> [editor: Nicolas Williams]
>>>
>>> * GSS-API: publish draft-ietf-kitten-gssapi-naming-exts
>>> [editor: Leif Johansson]
>>>
>>> * SASL: publish draft-melnikov-digest-to-historic
>>> [editor: Alexey Melnikov]
>>>
>>> * SASL: publish draft-williams-tls-app-sasl-opt
>>> [editor: Nicolas Williams]
>>>
>>> Shawn.
>>> kitten co-chair
>>> --
>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> sasl mailing list
>>> sasl@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sasl
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Kitten mailing list
>> Kitten@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/kitten
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> sasl mailing list
> sasl@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sasl


From hartmans@mit.edu  Fri Jul 16 04:46:55 2010
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From: Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu>
To: Shawn Emery <shawn.emery@oracle.com>
Subject: Re: draft-lha-gssapi-delegate-policy
References: <4C3E40C7.4010704@oracle.com>
Date: Fri, 16 Jul 2010 07:46:46 -0400
In-Reply-To: <4C3E40C7.4010704@oracle.com> (Shawn Emery's message of "Wed, 14 Jul 2010 16:57:11 -0600")
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>>>>> "Shawn" == Shawn Emery <shawn.emery@oracle.com> writes:

    Shawn> The individual submission for the GSSAPI: Delegate if
    Shawn> Approved by Policy has been published as RFC 5896.  Thanks to
    Shawn> Sam and Love for their work.

I'd really like to thank Love for this: this is always something I think
we needed, but Love as always transcended the desirable and turned it
into the real.

From Nicolas.Williams@oracle.com  Thu Jul 22 16:15:30 2010
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Date: Thu, 22 Jul 2010 18:14:47 -0500
From: Nicolas Williams <Nicolas.Williams@oracle.com>
To: Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu>
Subject: Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-kitten-gssapi-naming-exts (GSS-API Naming Extensions) to Proposed Standard
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On Mon, Jul 12, 2010 at 05:23:16PM -0400, Sam Hartman wrote:
> Recently I've tried to use draft-ietf-kitten-gssapi-naming-exts in the
> design of a GSS-API mechanism.
> I think this is a good start but is not quite done yet.

I agree.  I'm not sure whether it's best to proceed to publication then
later publish another RFC, or if it'd be best to cancel the IETF LC and
improve this I-D.

> draft-hartman-gss-eap-naming-00 discusses a couple of problems with
> naming extensions:
> 
> * The format of attribute names proposed in this specification is
>   incompatible with several of the things you'd like to name, in my case
>   including SAML attributes.
> * The description of how to name SAML attributes currently in the
>   document is inconsistent with the SAML base specification
> * The approach of naming things like SAML attributes entirely with a
> * The approach of letting a mechanism create authenticated attributes
>   with an arbitrary URI  makes the application's life really hard

One or more of your bullet points is incomplete, Sam.

> In addition, there is no way to get the identity of the issuer of a name
> attribute.

This is a big deal, IMO.

> I've discussed these concerns with one of the authors, Nico Williams. I
> have also requested time to present my concerns at the kitten meeting at
> IETF 78.

We should definitely discuss this next week.

> I'm happy to help resolve these concerns up to and including becoming an
> author of the document and writing significant text.

I think that's a good idea, however I'll let my co-author comment on
this as well, given that he's the primary author now :)

Nico
-- 

From wwwrun@core3.amsl.com  Fri Jul 23 04:09:50 2010
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Subject: WG Action: RECHARTER: Common Authentication Technology Next  Generation (kitten) 
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The Common Authentication Technology Next Generation (kitten) working
group in the Security Area of the IETF has been rechartered.  For
additional information, please contact the Area Directors or the working
group Chairs.

Common Authentication Technology Next Generation (kitten)
---------------------------------------------------
Current Status: Active Working Group

Chair(s):
   Tom Yu <tlyu@mit.edu>
   Shawn Emery <shawn.emery@oracle.com>

Security Area Director(s):
   Tim Polk <tim.polk@nist.gov>
   Sean Turner <turners@ieca.com>

Security Area Advisor:
   Tim Polk <tim.polk@nist.gov>

Mailing Lists:
   General Discussion: kitten@ietf.org
   To Suscribe: https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/kitten
   Archive:
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/kitten/current/maillist.html

Description of Working Group:

The Generic Security Services (GSS) API and Simple Authentication and
Security Layer (SASL) provide various applications with a security
framework for secure network communication.  The purpose of the Common
Authentication Technology Next Generation (Kitten) working group (WG) is
to develop extensions/improvements to the GSS-API, shepherd specific
GSS-API security mechanisms, and provide guidance for any new SASL-
related submissions.

This working is chartered to specify the following extensions and
improvements (draft-yu-kitten-api-wishlist-00) to the GSS-API:

* Provide new interfaces for credential management, which include the
following:
   initializing credentials
   iterating credentials
   exporting/importing credentials

* Specify interface for asynchronous calls.

* Define interfaces for better error message reporting.

* Provide a more programmer friendly GSS-API for application developers.
This could include reducing the number of interface parameters, for
example, by eliminating parameters which are commonly used with the
default values.

This WG is also chartered to transition proposed SASL mechanisms as
GSS-API mechanisms:

* A SASL Mechanism for OpenID
   draft-lear-ietf-sasl-openid-00
* A SASL Mechanism for SAML
   draft-wierenga-ietf-sasl-saml-00

The transition from SASL to GSS-API mechanisms will allow a greater set
of applications to utilize said mechanisms with SASL implementations
that support the use of GSS-API mechanisms in SASL (draft-ietf-sasl-
gs2).

* Shepherd draft-ietf-sasl-digest-to-historic to publication.

This WG should review proposals for new SASL and GSS-API mechanisms, but
may take on work on such mechanisms only through a revision of this
charter.  The WG should also review non-mechanism proposals related to
SASL and the GSS-API. However, work that adds SASL or GSS-API support in
application protocols should be handled by the application's WG.

Deliverables:

* GSS-API: initializing credentials

* GSS-API: iterating credentials

* GSS-API: exporting/importing credentials

* GSS-API: specification for asynchronous calls

* GSS-API: interfaces/improvements for better error message reporting

* GSS-API: programmer friendly interfaces

* GSS-API: transition SASL mechanism for OpenID

* GSS-API: transition SASL mechanism for SAML

* GSS-API: publish draft-ietf-kitten-gssapi-extensions-iana

* GSS-API: publish draft-ietf-kitten-gssapi-naming-exts

* SASL: publish draft-melnikov-digest-to-historic

Goals and Milestones:

Done         Submit naming-exts to the IESG as Proposed Standard
August 2010  WGLC on gssapi-extensions-iana
August 2010  Submit gssapi-extensions-iana to the IESG as Proposed 
             Standard
TBD          Other Listed Work Items

From alexey.melnikov@isode.com  Sun Jul 25 07:16:10 2010
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Date: Sun, 25 Jul 2010 16:16:16 +0200
From: Alexey Melnikov <alexey.melnikov@isode.com>
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Subject: Review of draft-wierenga-ietf-sasl-saml-01.txt:
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The document mostly looks good to me. I have some major architectural 
issue and a couple of smaller ones.

1.  Introduction

   The Generic Security Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API)
   [RFC2743] provides a framework for applications to support multiple
   authentication mechanisms through a unified interface.  This document
   defines a pure SASL mechanism for OpenID, but it conforms to the new

s/OpenID/SAML

   bridge between SASL and the GSS-API called GS2 [I-D.ietf-sasl-gs2].
   This means that this document defines both a SASL mechanism and a
   GSS-API mechanism.  We want to point out that the GSS-API interface
   is optional for SASL implementers, and the GSS-API considerations can
   be avoided in environments that uses SASL directly without GSS-API.




3.  Applicability for non-HTTP Use Cases


   When considering this flow in the context of SASL, we note that while
   the RP and the client both must change their code to implement this
   SASL mechanism, the IdP must remain untouched.  The RP already has
   some sort of session (probably a TCP connection) established with the
   client.  However, it may be necessary to redirect a SASL client to
   another application or handler.  This will be discussed below.  The
   steps are shown from below:

   1.  The Relying Party or SASL server advertises support for the SASL
       SAML20 mechanism to the client

   2.  The client initiates a SASL authentication with SAML20 and sends
       an IdP identity

   3.  The Relying Party transmits an authentication request encoded
       using a Universal Resource Identifier (URI) as described in RFC
       3986 [RFC3986] and a redirect to the IdP

   4.  The SASL client now sends an empty response, as authentication
       continues via the normal SAML flow.

This might be eliminated (see below).

   5.  At this point the SASL client MUST construct a URL containing the
       content received in the previous message from the RP.  This URL
       is transmitted to the IdP either by the SASL client application
       or an appropriate handler, such as a browser.

   6.  Next the client authenticates to the IdP.  The manner in which
       the end user is authenticated to the IdP and any policies
       surrounding such authentication is out of scope for SAML and
       hence for this draft.  This step happens out of band from SASL.

   7.  The IdP will convey information about the success or failure of
       the authentication back to the the RP in the form of an
       Authentication Statement or failure, using a indirect response
       via the client browser or the handler.  This step happens out of
       band from SASL.

Why does IdP need to talk to RP (SASL server)? How would IdP identify 
the SASL session to the SASL server?
Can this be done through the client? The latter would be a natural data 
flow for SASL.

(This will also affect diagrams and examples, if changed.)

   8.  The SASL Server sends an appropriate SASL response to the client,
       along with an optional list of attributes


4.3.  Server Redirect

   The SASL Server transmits a redirect to the IdP that the user
   provided, with a SAML authentication request in the form of a SAML
   assertion as one of the parameters.

I assume that the redirect is an HTTP URI?
For interoperability this needs to be spelled out explicitly.


7.  Example

   The decoded challenge is:

  HTTP/1.1 302 Object Moved Date: 22 Oct 2009 07:00:49 GMT Location:
  https://saml.example.org/SAML/Browser?SAMLRequest=

Is line wrapping correct here?

  PHNhbWxwOkF1dGhuUmVxdWVzdCB4bWxuczpzYW1scD0idXJuOm9hc2lzOm5hbWVzOnRjOl
  NBTUw6Mi4wOnByb3RvY29sIg0KICAgIElEPSJfYmVjNDI0ZmE1MTAzNDI4OTA5YTMwZmYx
  ZTMxMTY4MzI3Zjc5NDc0OTg0IiBWZXJzaW9uPSIyLjAiDQogICAgSXNzdWVJbnN0YW50PS


From leifj@mnt.se  Sun Jul 25 07:53:19 2010
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On 07/12/2010 11:23 PM, Sam Hartman wrote:
> 
> 
> Recently I've tried to use draft-ietf-kitten-gssapi-naming-exts in the
> design of a GSS-API mechanism.
> I think this is a good start but is not quite done yet.
> 
> draft-hartman-gss-eap-naming-00 discusses a couple of problems with
> naming extensions:
> 
> * The format of attribute names proposed in this specification is
>   incompatible with several of the things you'd like to name, in my case
>   including SAML attributes.
> * The description of how to name SAML attributes currently in the
>   document is inconsistent with the SAML base specification

Are you referring to the fact that there is nothing that corresponds
to the SAML Attribute element attribute @NameFormat?

> * The approach of naming things like SAML attributes entirely with a
> * The approach of letting a mechanism create authenticated attributes
>   with an arbitrary URI  makes the application's life really hard
> 
> While not mentioned in my existing draft, I've noticed a number of other
> problems:
> 
> * The document claims to name Kerberos entities such as authorization
>   data elements but does not actually provide a name for them.

True. The document only states how the authenticated flag must be set
for that type of data.

> * The document does not discuss the encoding of subjectAlternativeName
>   elements. I suspect application authors will assume human-readable
>   text and PKI folks will assume DER.

Actually the last paragraph of section 6.2.1 clearly (at least it was my
intention to be clear) states that unique loss-less representations as
string values MUST be used.

	Cheers Leif
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From cantor.2@osu.edu  Sun Jul 25 12:53:21 2010
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Subject: RE: Review of draft-wierenga-ietf-sasl-saml-01.txt:
Date: Sun, 25 Jul 2010 15:53:43 -0400
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> Why does IdP need to talk to RP (SASL server)? How would IdP identify
> the SASL session to the SASL server?

The IdP/RP communication is a result of using a particular SAML binding. I
don't think this mechanism actually cares which binding is used between the
web client anf the RP. It could be artifact, which results in a callback, or
POST, which doesn't.

> Can this be done through the client? The latter would be a natural data
> flow for SASL.

That's why I submitted an alternative mechanism, because I prefer that to
using a web browser. The client can't do it here, because the SASL client
has passed control to the browser, and the SAML response is handled by the
browser, not the SASL client. That takes place via web, and the SASL server
has to coordinate that with the web server.

> 4.3.  Server Redirect
> 
>    The SASL Server transmits a redirect to the IdP that the user
>    provided, with a SAML authentication request in the form of a SAML
>    assertion as one of the parameters.
> 
> I assume that the redirect is an HTTP URI?
> For interoperability this needs to be spelled out explicitly.

The language is off. It's not a SAML assertion, it's a SAML AuthnRequest.
The formal specification is the HTTP-Redirect binding.

-- Scott



From Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net  Mon Jul 26 05:27:11 2010
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Hi folks, 

I mentioned in an earlier mail that we missed the submission deadline. Now, since the gate opened again I submitted our writeup for the SASL OAuth mechanism.

Ciao
Hannes

-------- Original-Nachricht --------
Datum: Mon, 26 Jul 2010 04:45:01 -0700 (PDT)
Von: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org
An: i-d-announce@ietf.org
Betreff: I-D Action:draft-mills-kitten-sasl-oauth-00.txt

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.

	Title           : A SASL Mechanism for OAuth
	Author(s)       : W. Mills, et al.
	Filename        : draft-mills-kitten-sasl-oauth-00.txt
	Pages           : 15
	Date            : 2010-07-26

Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) is a framework for
providing authentication and data security services in connection-
oriented protocols via replaceable mechanisms.  OAuth is a protocol
for delegated authentication and thereby provides a method for
clients to access a protected resource on behalf of a resource owner.

This document defines the use of OAuth over SASL.  Thereby, it
enables OAuth usage for non-HTTP-based application protocols.  A
future version of this document will describe the integration into
the Generic Security Services Application Program Interface (GSS-
APIO).

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-mills-kitten-sasl-oauth-00.txt

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/

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From Nicolas.Williams@oracle.com  Mon Jul 26 21:28:11 2010
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As promised at KITTEN WG today:

http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-williams-tls-app-sasl-opt-04.txt
http://datatracker.ietf.org/idst/status.cgi?submission_id=25574

Nico
-- 

From alexey.melnikov@isode.com  Mon Jul 26 22:52:02 2010
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Date: Mon, 26 Jul 2010 22:52:26 +0200
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To: William Mills <wmills@yahoo-inc.com>, Tim Showalter <timshow@yahoo-inc.com>, Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net>
Subject: Comments on draft-mills-kitten-sasl-oauth-00.txt
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Hi William/Tim/Hannes,
Thanks for doing this draft.
I am CCing my comments to the Kitten Working Group, where the document was discussed today during the Kitten Working Group meeting.


3.2.  Server's Response

   The server validates the response as per the OAuth specification.  If
   the protected resource requires a signed request (using one of the
   available signature method), the URL for the resource being
   authenticated is reconstructed per the OAuth specification from the
   HTTP style request passed by the client.

I think the document needs more details about how resources for 
something like IMAP are described. An example would be helpful.

3.5.  Formal Syntax of Messages


       user = 'User:' SPACE field-value CRLF

       host = 'Host:' SPACE field-value CRLF

       authorization = 'Authorization:' SPACE field-value CRLF


You need to replace <'> with <"> above, or otherwise it is not a valid ABNF.

The document needs to describe character set used for usernames and 
passwords. I think you meant UTF-8, but this is not clear from the document.


5.1.  Successful Bearer Token Exchange

   This example shows a successful OAuth 2.0 bearer token exchange with
   an initial client response.  Note that line breaks are inserted for
   readability.


   S: * IMAP4rev1 Server Ready
   C: t0 CAPABILITY
   S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 AUTH=OAUTH
   S: t0 OK Completed
   C: t1 AUTHENTICATE OAUTH R0VUIC8gSFRUUC8xLjENClVzZXI6IHNjb290ZXJAYWx0
         YXZpc3RhLmNvbQ0KSG9zdDogaW1hcC55YWhvby5jb20NCkF1dGhvcml6YXRpb24
         6IFRva2VuIHRva2VuPSJ2RjlkZnQ0cW1UYzJOdmIzUmxja0JoYkhSaGRtbHpkR0
         V1WTI5dENnPT0iDQoNCg==

This is not a valid IMAP protocol, because in the base IMAP the AUTHENTICATE command doesn't have the second parameter, unless the SASL-IR IMAP capability is also advertised.
You also need to add the reference to the document that defines the SASL-IR capability as an Informative reference.
(I don't remember the RFC number of the top of my head, but if you can't find it, I can find it for you.)

   S: +
   S: t1 OK SASL authentication succeeded


5.2.  Failed Exchange

   This example shows a failed exchange because of the empty
   Authorization header, which is how a client can query for discovery
   information.  Note that line breaks are inserted for readability.

   S: * IMAP4rev1 Server Ready
   C: t0 CAPABILITY&nbsp;

&nbsp; should be removed :-).

   S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 AUTH=OAUTH SASL-IR
   S: t0 OK Completed
   C: t1 AUTHENTICATE OAUTH R0VUIC8gSFRUUC8xLjENClVzZXI6IHNjb290ZXJAYW
      x0YXZpc3RhLmNvbQ0KSG9zdDogaW1hcC55YWhvby5jb20NCkF1dGhlbnRpY2F0ZT
      ogDQoNCg==
   S: + V1dXLUF1dGhlbnRpY2F0ZTogcmVhbG09ImltYXAueWFob28uY29tIiwgYXV0aH
      otdXJpPSJodHRwczovL2xvZ2luLnlhaG9vLmNvbS9vYXV0aCIsIHRva2VuLXVyaT
      0iaHR0cHM6Ly9sb2dpbi55YWhvby5jb20vb2F1dGgiLCBhbGdvcml0aG09ImhtYW
      Mtc2hhMjU2Ig0KDQo=

This is not a valid IMAP either, as the client needs to respond to the server challenge with an empty response or an abort.
("*"). This can't be combined with the final server response containing the tagged NO.

   S: t1 NO SASL authentication failed


In the Security Considerations section you are missing a Normative 
reference to the document that specifies TLS 1.2.


This SASL mechanism doesn't seem to allow for SASL authorization 
identity, i.e. when the client authenticates as one user, but then 
requests authorization to act as another user. This is pretty much a 
required feature for all modern SASL authentication mechanisms.


