From nobody Mon Jul 6 09:46:06 2015 Return-Path: X-Original-To: kitten@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: kitten@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4CE4E1B2FCF for ; Mon, 6 Jul 2015 09:46:04 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.511 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.511 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_50=0.8, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, SPF_PASS=-0.001, T_RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.01] autolearn=ham Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 9XfqpfQt07zd for ; Mon, 6 Jul 2015 09:46:03 -0700 (PDT) Received: from dmz-mailsec-scanner-4.mit.edu (dmz-mailsec-scanner-4.mit.edu [18.9.25.15]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0821A1B2FC9 for ; Mon, 6 Jul 2015 09:46:02 -0700 (PDT) X-AuditID: 1209190f-f79716d000002ea2-71-559ab0c90482 Received: from mailhub-auth-4.mit.edu ( [18.7.62.39]) (using TLS with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (Client did not present a certificate) by dmz-mailsec-scanner-4.mit.edu (Symantec Messaging Gateway) with SMTP id 09.D7.11938.9C0BA955; Mon, 6 Jul 2015 12:46:01 -0400 (EDT) Received: from outgoing.mit.edu (outgoing-auth-1.mit.edu [18.9.28.11]) by mailhub-auth-4.mit.edu (8.13.8/8.9.2) with ESMTP id t66Gk1E6025063 for ; Mon, 6 Jul 2015 12:46:01 -0400 Received: from localhost (sarnath.mit.edu [18.18.1.190]) (authenticated bits=0) (User authenticated as tlyu@ATHENA.MIT.EDU) by outgoing.mit.edu (8.13.8/8.12.4) with ESMTP id t66Gjxi5027373 for ; Mon, 6 Jul 2015 12:46:01 -0400 From: Tom Yu To: kitten@ietf.org Date: Mon, 06 Jul 2015 12:45:59 -0400 Message-ID: Lines: 11 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii X-Brightmail-Tracker: H4sIAAAAAAAAA+NgFtrHIsWRmVeSWpSXmKPExsUixG6nrntyw6xQg9vTzC2Obl7F4sDosWTJ T6YAxigum5TUnMyy1CJ9uwSujBs7VrMUbGGq6Nl3iL2B8R9jFyMnh4SAicSGzf/YIGwxiQv3 1gPZXBxCAouZJOY87mWHcI4xSixq6YByGpkknm/7CNbOJiAtcfzyLiYQW0RAWGL31nfMILaw gKZE9/xDYGNZBFQlNjY+A6vnFdCVmLRpDmsXIwcHjwCnxIkplRBhQYmTM5+wgNjMAloSN/69 ZJrAyDsLSWoWktQCRqZVjLIpuVW6uYmZOcWpybrFyYl5ealFuiZ6uZkleqkppZsYQUHDKcm/ g/HbQaVDjAIcjEo8vBE1M0OFWBPLiitzDzFKcjApifIarpkVKsSXlJ9SmZFYnBFfVJqTWnyI UYKDWUmE999SoBxvSmJlVWpRPkxKmoNFSZx30w++ECGB9MSS1OzU1ILUIpisDAeHkgQvBzA6 hASLUtNTK9Iyc0oQ0kwcnCDDeYCGe4PU8BYXJOYWZ6ZD5E8x6nIs+HF7LZMQS15+XqqUOG8w SJEASFFGaR7cHFi0v2IUB3pLmLd1PVAVDzBRwE16BbSECWjJcl2wJSWJCCmpBkaOQ9O++5lH uTYF3Jkno8h0RHJr79YX76zeLNoklqry8fjr0EsT01fNa25S2f27nMHGeOX/V4fvP3nZpG+w MdPi+BaWDd3Va/4xKIu3nVpgtIPx9uZDfyonP8zw2l0VmHFt5v3/MVlzMvb9XlYitnmHccEh xbk/9v/vz3s+SWb3luZFjwucsibsVWIpzkg01GIuKk4EAO5z2SzRAgAA Archived-At: Subject: [kitten] auth-indicator number assignment X-BeenThere: kitten@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Common Authentication Technologies - Next Generation List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 06 Jul 2015 16:46:04 -0000 Are there any objections to making the following assignment for the authentication indicator Kerberos authorization data type? ad-authentication-indicator Int32 ::= 97 If not, the document authors of draft-ietf-kitten-krb-auth-indicator should update their draft accordingly. Thanks. -Tom From nobody Mon Jul 20 01:54:56 2015 Return-Path: X-Original-To: kitten@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: kitten@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id EDF241A1A8B for ; Mon, 20 Jul 2015 01:54:55 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -4.209 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.209 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, T_RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.01] autolearn=ham Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id KmCXNHJgF6w7 for ; Mon, 20 Jul 2015 01:54:54 -0700 (PDT) Received: from nbfkord-smmo06.seg.att.com (nbfkord-smmo06.seg.att.com [209.65.160.94]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0CC881A1A8F for ; Mon, 20 Jul 2015 01:54:53 -0700 (PDT) Received: from unknown [144.160.229.23] (EHLO alpi154.enaf.aldc.att.com) by nbfkord-smmo06.seg.att.com(mxl_mta-7.2.4-5) over TLS secured channel with ESMTP id d57bca55.0.1558097.00-2116.4362615.nbfkord-smmo06.seg.att.com (envelope-from ); Mon, 20 Jul 2015 08:54:54 +0000 (UTC) X-MXL-Hash: 55acb75e773643d7-14353bc1975b7e00eba2f0b3755b8ff898c1c8d1 Received: from enaf.aldc.att.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by alpi154.enaf.aldc.att.com (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id t6K8sqPN030922 for ; Mon, 20 Jul 2015 04:54:53 -0400 Received: from alpi133.aldc.att.com (alpi133.aldc.att.com [130.8.217.3]) by alpi154.enaf.aldc.att.com (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id t6K8snhn030905 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NO) for ; Mon, 20 Jul 2015 04:54:49 -0400 Received: from alpi153.aldc.att.com (alpi153.aldc.att.com [130.8.42.31]) by alpi133.aldc.att.com (RSA Interceptor) for ; Mon, 20 Jul 2015 08:54:40 GMT Received: from aldc.att.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by alpi153.aldc.att.com (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id t6K8seJQ002672 for ; Mon, 20 Jul 2015 04:54:40 -0400 Received: from mailgw1.maillennium.att.com (maillennium.att.com [135.25.114.99]) by alpi153.aldc.att.com (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id t6K8sbSY002585 for ; Mon, 20 Jul 2015 04:54:37 -0400 Received: from tonys-macbook-pro.local (unknown[135.110.240.53](untrusted sender)) by maillennium.att.com (mailgw1) with ESMTP id <20150720085433gw1000cepne>; Mon, 20 Jul 2015 08:54:36 +0000 X-Originating-IP: [135.110.240.53] Message-ID: <55ACB747.5050006@att.com> Date: Mon, 20 Jul 2015 04:54:31 -0400 From: Tony Hansen User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.10; rv:31.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/31.7.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 To: "kitten@ietf.org" , Stephen Farrell References: <20150720084611.5447.46804.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com> In-Reply-To: <20150720084611.5447.46804.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com> Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="------------020708090503050804040606" X-RSA-Inspected: yes X-RSA-Classifications: public X-AnalysisOut: [v=2.0 cv=JfoLWz2V c=1 sm=1 a=VXHOiMMwGAwA+y4G3/O+aw==:17 a] X-AnalysisOut: [=zQP7CpKOAAAA:8 a=tHvJy1wsfNMA:10 a=NuBgnL04QxkA:10 a=zOBT] X-AnalysisOut: [XjUuO1YA:10 a=48vgC7mUAAAA:8 a=RehFWjLUiUovX4E7yc0A:9 a=pI] X-AnalysisOut: [LNOxqGKmIA:10 a=jGqiy6jZAAAA:8 a=0U2gllSsINnU5zlDVbwA:9 a=] X-AnalysisOut: [_W_S_7VecoQA:10] X-Spam: [F=0.2000000000; CM=0.500; S=0.200(2014051901)] X-MAIL-FROM: X-SOURCE-IP: [144.160.229.23] Archived-At: Subject: Re: [kitten] I-D Action: draft-hansen-scram-sha256-03.txt X-BeenThere: kitten@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Common Authentication Technologies - Next Generation List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 20 Jul 2015 08:54:56 -0000 This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------020708090503050804040606 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable The SCRAM-SHA-256 I-D has been updated. Changed from Informational document to Standards Track. Beefed up the Security Considerations (Section 4) section. At the request of IANA, reworked the IANA Considerations (Section 5) section. Note: I have NOT done anything about incorporating session hashing for channel binding, as I remain unconvinced that this is the right document to do anything about the topic. If you feel otherwise about having >this document< mention something about channel binding, >please< suggest specific text. Tony Hansen On 7/20/15 4:46 AM, internet-drafts@ietf.org wrote: > A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts dire= ctories. > > > Title : SCRAM-SHA-256 and SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS SASL Mec= hanisms > Author : Tony Hansen > Filename : draft-hansen-scram-sha256-03.txt > Pages : 8 > Date : 2015-07-20 > > Abstract: > This document registers the SASL mechanisms SCRAM-SHA-256 and SCRAM-= > SHA-256-PLUS. It also updates the SCRAM registration procedures of > RFC 5802. > > > The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is: > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-hansen-scram-sha256/ > > There's also a htmlized version available at: > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hansen-scram-sha256-03 > > A diff from the previous version is available at: > https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-hansen-scram-sha256-03 > > > Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submi= ssion > until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org. > > Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at: > ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/ --------------020708090503050804040606 Content-Type: text/html; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The SCRAM-SHA-256 I-D has been updated.

   Changed from Informational document to Standards Track.

   Beefed up the Security Considerations (Section 4) section.

   At the request of IANA, reworked the IANA Considerations (Section 5)
   section.

Note: I have NOT done anything about incorporating session hashing for channel binding, as I remain unconvinced that this is the right document to do anything about the topic. If you feel otherwise about having >this document< mention something about channel binding, >please< suggest specific text.

    Tony Hansen

On 7/20/15 4:46 AM, internet-drafts@ietf.org wrote:
A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.


        Title           : SCRAM-SHA-256 and SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS SASL Mechanisms
        Author          : Tony Hansen
	Filename        : draft-hansen-scram-sha256-03.txt
	Pages           : 8
	Date            : 2015-07-20

Abstract:
   This document registers the SASL mechanisms SCRAM-SHA-256 and SCRAM-
   SHA-256-PLUS.  It also updates the SCRAM registration procedures of
   RFC 5802.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-hansen-scram-sha256/

There's also a htmlized version available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hansen-scram-sha256-03

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-hansen-scram-sha256-03


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
--------------020708090503050804040606-- From nobody Mon Jul 20 12:33:59 2015 Return-Path: X-Original-To: kitten@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: kitten@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A81E41B30DE for ; Mon, 20 Jul 2015 12:33:57 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.551 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.551 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, HELO_EQ_SE=0.35, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=no Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id BxoXzZKVh9vc for ; Mon, 20 Jul 2015 12:33:56 -0700 (PDT) Received: from duva.sjd.se (duva.sjd.se [IPv6:2001:9b0:1:1702::100]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A6F0B1B30C6 for ; Mon, 20 Jul 2015 12:33:55 -0700 (PDT) Received: from latte.josefsson.org ([155.4.17.3]) (authenticated bits=0) by duva.sjd.se (8.14.4/8.14.4/Debian-4) with ESMTP id t6KJXVbg016465 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128 verify=NOT); Mon, 20 Jul 2015 21:33:32 +0200 From: Simon Josefsson To: Tony Hansen References: <20150720084611.5447.46804.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com> <55ACB747.5050006@att.com> OpenPGP: id=54265E8C; url=http://josefsson.org/54265e8c.txt X-Hashcash: 1:22:150720:tony@att.com::OmjmtBBXWY+KciS8:gVb X-Hashcash: 1:22:150720:kitten@ietf.org::b3BZN37E4kNCHC9l:ElDT X-Hashcash: 1:22:150720:stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie::uY0Js8dBjdK88vB9:9XON Date: Mon, 20 Jul 2015 21:33:30 +0200 In-Reply-To: <55ACB747.5050006@att.com> (Tony Hansen's message of "Mon, 20 Jul 2015 04:54:31 -0400") Message-ID: <871tg239px.fsf@latte.josefsson.org> User-Agent: Gnus/5.130014 (Ma Gnus v0.14) Emacs/24.4 (gnu/linux) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/signed; boundary="=-=-="; micalg=pgp-sha256; protocol="application/pgp-signature" X-Virus-Scanned: clamav-milter 0.98.7 at duva.sjd.se X-Virus-Status: Clean Archived-At: Cc: "kitten@ietf.org" Subject: Re: [kitten] I-D Action: draft-hansen-scram-sha256-03.txt X-BeenThere: kitten@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Common Authentication Technologies - Next Generation List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 20 Jul 2015 19:33:57 -0000 --=-=-= Content-Type: text/plain Tony Hansen writes: > Note: I have NOT done anything about incorporating session hashing for > channel binding, as I remain unconvinced that this is the right document > to do anything about the topic. If you feel otherwise about having >this > document< mention something about channel binding, >please< suggest > specific text. You may use: To be secure, SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS has to be used over a TLS channel that MUST have [TLS-SESSION-HASH] negotiated, or session resumption MUST NOT have been used. [TLS-SESSION-HASH] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-session-hash-06 If this (or some other text) is not added, we would publish a known insecure protocol without any discussion of the problem. /Simon --=-=-= Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name="signature.asc" -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJVrU0KAAoJEIYLf7sy+BGdK3UH/3vUcCBMerupkIDOiIsbJdA+ 48sbrtS/ujZbwJ5gJH8jcd0lQ4j3sFnGxm0myAyID7yuEctpGN8wrm1vzZxoQ3FH 5qkERjDzT3n4uO+jfJo+6hVuaAqzr1/qPrXDJcwztzakxTnILzK5mSbQwAfm6oL2 H1eOCFDoROl6PtCGqZ3vEz0TedOQZyI+e5cffjpqtfqdlKcHx2sea0mS3K/6wwDz RCTSBB3ixBW+DZsmQRO8CG8V9ntILev/5oFpuyrJXJQKRYwMfeSeuGwPb+SKHs31 9RaSZEqTu4dx+FsR9ZBOgb+tOf2R2czd3dMLkhV0oB+8chdz4Z1dZZ8ve/jLg2w= =ptOS -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --=-=-=-- From nobody Sun Jul 26 06:34:20 2015 Return-Path: X-Original-To: kitten@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: kitten@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5A3571A872D for ; Sun, 26 Jul 2015 06:34:19 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -2.011 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.011 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, SPF_PASS=-0.001, T_RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.01] autolearn=ham Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id XxbbHNMkg36j for ; Sun, 26 Jul 2015 06:34:18 -0700 (PDT) Received: from statler.isode.com (statler.isode.com [217.34.220.151]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id DC7931A8716 for ; Sun, 26 Jul 2015 06:34:17 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1437917657; d=isode.com; s=selector; i=@isode.com; bh=XnGYY2EcPGbogWQ0dsHysP2VZOWTwOsSpXplJM5BbbU=; h=From:Sender:Reply-To:Subject:Date:Message-ID:To:Cc:MIME-Version: In-Reply-To:References:Content-Type:Content-Transfer-Encoding: Content-ID:Content-Description; b=HCtfCJCs2LLYygaCgoZHVhxpqvnF1y+wXVMVmO3iXzEh9QhwAUDeiH8Ji7h7/N3er0+m8q 0pkj+dSCUx2iDqudxAw8smoKILQs5e2oPYcP0CsiBoEkFkMZVh67jxkcCvIIv418XWecov Z/TCf2d2u7qet74B7fxEZ0/gWyFxNVg=; Received: from [192.168.0.5] (cpc5-nmal20-2-0-cust24.19-2.cable.virginm.net [92.234.84.25]) by statler.isode.com (submission channel) via TCP with ESMTPSA id ; Sun, 26 Jul 2015 14:34:16 +0100 To: Simon Josefsson , Tony Hansen References: <20150720084611.5447.46804.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com> <55ACB747.5050006@att.com> <871tg239px.fsf@latte.josefsson.org> From: Alexey Melnikov Message-ID: <55B4E1D0.7000108@isode.com> Date: Sun, 26 Jul 2015 14:34:08 +0100 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:38.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/38.0.1 In-Reply-To: <871tg239px.fsf@latte.josefsson.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Archived-At: Cc: "kitten@ietf.org" Subject: Re: [kitten] I-D Action: draft-hansen-scram-sha256-03.txt X-BeenThere: kitten@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Common Authentication Technologies - Next Generation List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 26 Jul 2015 13:34:19 -0000 On 20/07/2015 20:33, Simon Josefsson wrote: > Tony Hansen writes: > >> Note: I have NOT done anything about incorporating session >> hashing for channel binding, as I remain unconvinced that this is >> the right document to do anything about the topic. If you feel >> otherwise about having >this document< mention something about >> channel binding, >please< suggest specific text. > > You may use: > > To be secure, SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS has to be used over a TLS channel > that MUST have [TLS-SESSION-HASH] negotiated, or session resumption > MUST NOT have been used. > > [TLS-SESSION-HASH] > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-session-hash-06 > > If this (or some other text) is not added, we would publish a > known insecure protocol without any discussion of the problem. I agree that this should be added. While the preferred way would be to update the base SCRAM specification, I think this note is still preferable to saying nothing. From nobody Mon Jul 27 07:53:42 2015 Return-Path: X-Original-To: kitten@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: kitten@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 732991B2E5B for ; Mon, 27 Jul 2015 07:53:40 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -2.002 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.002 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, SPF_HELO_PASS=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id KXS7j150yoeg for ; Mon, 27 Jul 2015 07:53:38 -0700 (PDT) Received: from na01-bn1-obe.outbound.protection.outlook.com (mail-bn1on0787.outbound.protection.outlook.com [IPv6:2a01:111:f400:fc10::787]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 08C331A8A7A for ; Mon, 27 Jul 2015 07:53:38 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=microsoft.com; s=selector1; h=From:To:Date:Subject:Message-ID:Content-Type:MIME-Version; bh=fqAFjRi/qFFSwMRFHlnwG5XkBjy3/bnfkquowXc6aNY=; b=iNvKc0vXROHxZZPYA7w6sr30/4hz7ZIp6D5GYFKuNri4lNk3vu7NXUZ53Bra/7E/ZVCQLzswtIBCWA+C+MFCHlv6cZPmtYN5HGA3ooCEnduBd4Vij0Tme0kbwjSo4Ueb0/TDddHhxd72BAfloYXZIfAvQVRYwhgrNroA+NFSOnU= Received: from BLUPR03MB213.namprd03.prod.outlook.com (10.255.212.145) by BLUPR03MB214.namprd03.prod.outlook.com (10.255.212.151) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 15.1.225.13; Mon, 27 Jul 2015 14:53:15 +0000 Received: from BLUPR03MB213.namprd03.prod.outlook.com ([169.254.16.214]) by BLUPR03MB213.namprd03.prod.outlook.com ([169.254.16.214]) with mapi id 15.01.0231.011; Mon, 27 Jul 2015 14:53:16 +0000 From: Michiko Short To: Benjamin Kaduk Thread-Topic: draft-ietf-kitten-pkinit-freshness-01.txt Thread-Index: AdCqycf8CTWMbKMGSLe5aGfFVJT4ngD/T7WABm01dlA= Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2015 14:53:16 +0000 Message-ID: References: In-Reply-To: Accept-Language: en-US Content-Language: en-US X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: authentication-results: MIT.EDU; dkim=none (message not signed) header.d=none; x-originating-ip: [2001:4898:80e8:7::1d3] x-microsoft-exchange-diagnostics: 1; BLUPR03MB214; 5:shn3SPWiHGS44oJa2UCR06YEkaassp4WE/n9nMrhis6A5DD0of4R95FIamd9Ddx5Iik+088h/WadXCoIz3le8g4AbqcqHl77HZafGpVmcgsx78W5IR3ALHBBz/3ZvlGsD5OKlNNU2QLgL19GL1l9Uw==; 24:epaMuwQzIPpv7QP86FPFaztiyikHhGNI4h40Marzk+hndL4D9ei/xVhNpfL/2bBuNxAxJ4nKMHIWgLK/eE+/hUHQPisBuNy49ObImPatnsg=; 20:R2B974dnXYjlp33o+MtLY9kUxxCbBcMJfwQihxCO9pjvDyDiCbPlO+tqN0+NR2+zS7Y/V9pKCA5IGZ5O/5XuyQ== x-microsoft-antispam: UriScan:;BCL:0;PCL:0;RULEID:;SRVR:BLUPR03MB214; blupr03mb214: X-MS-Exchange-Organization-RulesExecuted x-microsoft-antispam-prvs: x-exchange-antispam-report-test: UriScan:(108003899814671); x-exchange-antispam-report-cfa-test: BCL:0; PCL:0; RULEID:(601004)(2401001)(5005006)(3002001); SRVR:BLUPR03MB214; BCL:0; PCL:0; RULEID:; SRVR:BLUPR03MB214; x-forefront-prvs: 0650714AAA x-forefront-antispam-report: SFV:NSPM; SFS:(10019020)(6009001)(13464003)(377454003)(87936001)(99286002)(92566002)(50986999)(19580395003)(2656002)(54356999)(2171001)(76576001)(86612001)(74316001)(86362001)(33656002)(10090500001)(19580405001)(189998001)(76176999)(5002640100001)(40100003)(77156002)(230783001)(102836002)(46102003)(2950100001)(62966003)(15975445007)(5003600100002)(110136002)(3826002); DIR:OUT; SFP:1102; SCL:1; SRVR:BLUPR03MB214; H:BLUPR03MB213.namprd03.prod.outlook.com; FPR:; SPF:None; MLV:sfv; LANG:en; Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable MIME-Version: 1.0 X-OriginatorOrg: microsoft.com X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-originalarrivaltime: 27 Jul 2015 14:53:16.3428 (UTC) X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-fromentityheader: Hosted X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-id: 72f988bf-86f1-41af-91ab-2d7cd011db47 X-MS-Exchange-Transport-CrossTenantHeadersStamped: BLUPR03MB214 Archived-At: Cc: "kitten@ietf.org" Subject: Re: [kitten] draft-ietf-kitten-pkinit-freshness-01.txt X-BeenThere: kitten@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Common Authentication Technologies - Next Generation List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2015 14:53:40 -0000 Following up since it would be great to get an IANA number. -----Original Message----- From: Benjamin Kaduk [mailto:kaduk@MIT.EDU]=20 Sent: Wednesday, June 24, 2015 2:45 PM To: Michiko Short Cc: kitten@ietf.org Subject: Re: draft-ietf-kitten-pkinit-freshness-01.txt On Fri, 19 Jun 2015, Michiko Short wrote: > I believe we have answered Ben's question about client requesting the=20 > new feature. Ben, can you confirm? Sorry for the delay; it took me longer than I expected to reconstruct the h= istory of the discussion. For the curious: I raised the question in http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/= web/kitten/current/msg05630.html of whether we are okay requiring all clien= ts implementing freshness token support to implement the behavior of sendin= g an empty PA_AS_FRESHNESS padata in order to request a freshness token. M= ichiko acknowledged this in http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/kitten/cur= rent/msg05645.html and also mentioned two other options for ways for client= s to get freshness tokens, though I don't think either got much discussion.= (As described, neither seems particularly appealing, so that seems fine.) There was some follow-up discussion starting at http://www.ietf.org/mail-ar= chive/web/kitten/current/msg05665.html , where Sam and Greg seem to agree t= hat the proposed behavior (requiring the clients to explicitly request a fr= eshness token) is acceptable, with varying degrees of enthusiasm. There is= still disagreement about whether this sort of negotiation is required, but= it seems clear that it is permitted, and no one is raising blocking object= ions. > If so, then I would like to see if we can put this in the queue for WGLC. I agree. I was hoping to get out a poll on what potential new work the WG = is interested in undertaking (and in what order) before starting the next W= GLC, but that seems to be taking much longer than I expected. Stay tuned f= or more... -Ben From nobody Tue Jul 28 06:16:58 2015 Return-Path: X-Original-To: kitten@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: kitten@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1B6CC1A8AE9; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 06:16:57 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -4.311 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.311 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, SPF_PASS=-0.001, T_RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.01] autolearn=ham Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id po3g8-XpZ2gv; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 06:16:55 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mercury.scss.tcd.ie (mercury.scss.tcd.ie [134.226.56.6]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D04651A1AA8; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 06:16:54 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mercury.scss.tcd.ie (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3A86BBE5D; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 14:16:53 +0100 (IST) Received: from mercury.scss.tcd.ie ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mercury.scss.tcd.ie [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id h4x2PhF9_h6r; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 14:16:53 +0100 (IST) Received: from [134.226.36.180] (stephen-think.dsg.cs.tcd.ie [134.226.36.180]) by mercury.scss.tcd.ie (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 0F721BE58; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 14:16:53 +0100 (IST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=cs.tcd.ie; s=mail; t=1438089413; bh=aJZu9QA9R3M1WG1wi2Z/bKwdhl1fLp3EoiuxCwWaJEo=; h=Date:From:Reply-To:To:CC:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=z5tUjD1rBwsTAdfJ9TMCmOdFT0mO3+OORn2zCizwx7nFGJHB92j6KzfUF9joP3uV9 bmF+7hhKppcqespZpVpIGPzIMLa4NAHwWDEskBqHN9TX9n7p7APjJ4Nmg3rtX31JWt py7FbgNZ48xqk5X/ahbLeDJcPErphOigzPw7po48= Message-ID: <55B780C4.5020006@cs.tcd.ie> Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2015 14:16:52 +0100 From: Stephen Farrell User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:31.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/31.8.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 To: "kitten@ietf.org" , "http-auth@ietf.org" References: <20150728131206.27668.27380.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com> In-Reply-To: <20150728131206.27668.27380.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com> OpenPGP: id=D66EA7906F0B897FB2E97D582F3C8736805F8DA2; url= X-Forwarded-Message-Id: <20150728131206.27668.27380.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Archived-At: Cc: Sparks Robert Subject: [kitten] Fwd: Last Call: (SCRAM-SHA-256 and SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS SASL Mechanisms) to Proposed Standard X-BeenThere: kitten@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list Reply-To: IETF-Discussion List-Id: Common Authentication Technologies - Next Generation List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2015 13:16:57 -0000 Hiya, We're re-doing the IETF last call for this due to the change of target from informational to PS. I hope it has addressed all other earlier comments, but please do say if not. Thanks, S. -------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: Last Call: (SCRAM-SHA-256 and SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS SASL Mechanisms) to Proposed Standard Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2015 06:12:06 -0700 From: The IESG Reply-To: ietf@ietf.org To: IETF-Announce The IESG has received a request from an individual submitter to consider the following document: - 'SCRAM-SHA-256 and SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS SASL Mechanisms' as Proposed Standard The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2015-08-25. Exceptionally, comments may be sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting. Abstract This document registers the SASL mechanisms SCRAM-SHA-256 and SCRAM- SHA-256-PLUS. It also updates the SCRAM registration procedures of RFC 5802. The file can be obtained via https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-hansen-scram-sha256/ IESG discussion can be tracked via https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-hansen-scram-sha256/ballot/ No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D. This is a second IETF last call. The first time this was aiming for informational but as a result of that proposed standard was deemed necessary. From nobody Tue Jul 28 06:32:10 2015 Return-Path: X-Original-To: kitten@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: kitten@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B54101A8BB1 for ; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 06:32:09 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -3.189 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.189 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, MISSING_HEADERS=1.021, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, T_RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.01] autolearn=ham Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id PTluXfxBiLxa for ; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 06:32:08 -0700 (PDT) Received: from nbfkord-smmo06.seg.att.com (nbfkord-smmo06.seg.att.com [209.65.160.94]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 59A501A8BBE for ; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 06:32:00 -0700 (PDT) Received: from unknown [144.160.229.23] (EHLO alpi154.enaf.aldc.att.com) by nbfkord-smmo06.seg.att.com(mxl_mta-7.2.4-5) over TLS secured channel with ESMTP id f4487b55.0.3048215.00-2300.8620872.nbfkord-smmo06.seg.att.com (envelope-from ); Tue, 28 Jul 2015 13:32:00 +0000 (UTC) X-MXL-Hash: 55b784507dd264ef-7f4b5ddd0c103af17c26083cbc09b76715c7aad9 Received: from enaf.aldc.att.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by alpi154.enaf.aldc.att.com (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id t6SDVx0C027744 for ; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 09:31:59 -0400 Received: from alpi132.aldc.att.com (alpi132.aldc.att.com [130.8.217.2]) by alpi154.enaf.aldc.att.com (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id t6SDVjZ0027474 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NO) for ; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 09:31:55 -0400 Received: from alpi153.aldc.att.com (alpi153.aldc.att.com [130.8.42.31]) by alpi132.aldc.att.com (RSA Interceptor) for ; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 13:31:31 GMT Received: from aldc.att.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by alpi153.aldc.att.com (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id t6SDVVMa021267 for ; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 09:31:31 -0400 Received: from mailgw1.maillennium.att.com (maillennium.att.com [135.25.114.99]) by alpi153.aldc.att.com (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id t6SDVSRX020861 for ; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 09:31:28 -0400 Received: from tonys-macbook-pro.local (unknown[135.110.241.159](untrusted sender)) by maillennium.att.com (mailgw1) with ESMTP id <20150728133123gw1000cet3e>; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 13:31:27 +0000 X-Originating-IP: [135.110.241.159] Message-ID: <55B78429.2060408@att.com> Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2015 09:31:21 -0400 From: Tony Hansen User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.10; rv:31.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/31.7.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 CC: "kitten@ietf.org" References: <20150720084611.5447.46804.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com> <55ACB747.5050006@att.com> <871tg239px.fsf@latte.josefsson.org> <55B4E1D0.7000108@isode.com> In-Reply-To: <55B4E1D0.7000108@isode.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-RSA-Inspected: yes X-RSA-Classifications: public X-AnalysisOut: [v=2.0 cv=OuH4PVDt c=1 sm=1 a=VXHOiMMwGAwA+y4G3/O+aw==:17 a] X-AnalysisOut: [=9cW_t1CCXrUA:10 a=zQP7CpKOAAAA:8 a=tHvJy1wsfNMA:10 a=DDc-] X-AnalysisOut: [57e7AI0A:10 a=zOBTXjUuO1YA:10 a=48vgC7mUAAAA:8 a=BbNlpFTdx] X-AnalysisOut: [qHTDABVqPoA:9 a=pILNOxqGKmIA:10] X-Spam: [F=0.2000000000; CM=0.500; S=0.200(2015072401)] X-MAIL-FROM: X-SOURCE-IP: [144.160.229.23] Archived-At: Subject: Re: [kitten] I-D Action: draft-hansen-scram-sha256-03.txt X-BeenThere: kitten@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Common Authentication Technologies - Next Generation List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2015 13:32:09 -0000 I will add this text to the security considerations section. This doc >is< updating RFC 5802 (the base SCRAM spec), so what do you think of stating that this also applies to scram-sha-1? Tony On 7/26/15 9:34 AM, Alexey Melnikov wrote: > On 20/07/2015 20:33, Simon Josefsson wrote: >> Tony Hansen writes: >> >>> Note: I have NOT done anything about incorporating session >>> hashing for channel binding, as I remain unconvinced that this is >>> the right document to do anything about the topic. If you feel >>> otherwise about having >this document< mention something about >>> channel binding, >please< suggest specific text. >> You may use: >> >> To be secure, SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS has to be used over a TLS channel >> that MUST have [TLS-SESSION-HASH] negotiated, or session resumption >> MUST NOT have been used. >> >> [TLS-SESSION-HASH] >> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-session-hash-06 >> >> If this (or some other text) is not added, we would publish a >> known insecure protocol without any discussion of the problem. > I agree that this should be added. While the preferred way would be to > update the base SCRAM specification, I think this note is still > preferable to saying nothing. > From nobody Tue Jul 28 06:40:57 2015 Return-Path: X-Original-To: kitten@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: kitten@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 053C11A8F42 for ; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 06:40:55 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -3.189 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.189 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, MISSING_HEADERS=1.021, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, T_RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.01] autolearn=ham Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id RVpBV2z6OKsO for ; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 06:40:50 -0700 (PDT) Received: from nbfkord-smmo07.seg.att.com (nbfkord-smmo07.seg.att.com [209.65.160.93]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D67671A8AF0 for ; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 06:40:49 -0700 (PDT) Received: from unknown [144.160.229.23] (EHLO alpi154.enaf.aldc.att.com) by nbfkord-smmo07.seg.att.com(mxl_mta-7.2.4-5) over TLS secured channel with ESMTP id 06687b55.0.404266.00-2323.1149613.nbfkord-smmo07.seg.att.com (envelope-from ); Tue, 28 Jul 2015 13:40:49 +0000 (UTC) X-MXL-Hash: 55b786611f07ac03-f8f271782acf82666a01d0f33e56556700d3caba Received: from enaf.aldc.att.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by alpi154.enaf.aldc.att.com (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id t6SDelCY004401 for ; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 09:40:47 -0400 Received: from alpi133.aldc.att.com (alpi133.aldc.att.com [130.8.217.3]) by alpi154.enaf.aldc.att.com (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id t6SDekbG004385 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NO) for ; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 09:40:46 -0400 Received: from alpi153.aldc.att.com (alpi153.aldc.att.com [130.8.42.31]) by alpi133.aldc.att.com (RSA Interceptor) for ; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 13:40:39 GMT Received: from aldc.att.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by alpi153.aldc.att.com (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id t6SDedEt026077 for ; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 09:40:39 -0400 Received: from dns.maillennium.att.com (maillennium.att.com [135.25.114.99]) by alpi153.aldc.att.com (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id t6SDeWMc024950 for ; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 09:40:34 -0400 Received: from tonys-macbook-pro.local (unknown[135.110.241.159](untrusted sender)) by maillennium.att.com (mailgw1) with ESMTP id <20150728134032gw1000cet4e>; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 13:40:32 +0000 X-Originating-IP: [135.110.241.159] Message-ID: <55B7864F.4000802@att.com> Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2015 09:40:31 -0400 From: Tony Hansen User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.10; rv:31.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/31.7.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 CC: "kitten@ietf.org" References: <20150720084611.5447.46804.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com> <55ACB747.5050006@att.com> <871tg239px.fsf@latte.josefsson.org> <55B4E1D0.7000108@isode.com> <55B78429.2060408@att.com> In-Reply-To: <55B78429.2060408@att.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-RSA-Inspected: yes X-RSA-Classifications: public X-AnalysisOut: [v=2.0 cv=ONaQK1mB c=1 sm=1 a=VXHOiMMwGAwA+y4G3/O+aw==:17 a] X-AnalysisOut: [=9cW_t1CCXrUA:10 a=zQP7CpKOAAAA:8 a=tHvJy1wsfNMA:10 a=DDc-] X-AnalysisOut: [57e7AI0A:10 a=zOBTXjUuO1YA:10 a=48vgC7mUAAAA:8 a=gXD-sCvqZ] X-AnalysisOut: [39jah_0G0MA:9 a=pILNOxqGKmIA:10 a=2TSDkfqdCjIA:10] X-Spam: [F=0.2000000000; CM=0.500; S=0.200(2015072401)] X-MAIL-FROM: X-SOURCE-IP: [144.160.229.23] Archived-At: Subject: Re: [kitten] I-D Action: draft-hansen-scram-sha256-03.txt X-BeenThere: kitten@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Common Authentication Technologies - Next Generation List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2015 13:40:55 -0000 Make that "applies to scram-sha-1-plus". Here is my proposed text: To be secure, SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS and SCRAM-SHA-1-PLUS MUST either be used over a TLS channel that has had [ID.ietf-tls-session-hash] negotiated, or session resumption MUST NOT have been used. - Tony Hansen On 7/28/15 9:31 AM, Tony Hansen wrote: > *** Security Advisory: This Message Originated Outside of AT&T ***. > Reference http://cso.att.com/EmailSecurity/IDSP.html for more information. > > I will add this text to the security considerations section. > > This doc >is< updating RFC 5802 (the base SCRAM spec), so what do you > think of stating that this also applies to scram-sha-1? > > Tony > > On 7/26/15 9:34 AM, Alexey Melnikov wrote: >> On 20/07/2015 20:33, Simon Josefsson wrote: >>> Tony Hansen writes: >>> >>>> Note: I have NOT done anything about incorporating session >>>> hashing for channel binding, as I remain unconvinced that this is >>>> the right document to do anything about the topic. If you feel >>>> otherwise about having >this document< mention something about >>>> channel binding, >please< suggest specific text. >>> You may use: >>> >>> To be secure, SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS has to be used over a TLS channel >>> that MUST have [TLS-SESSION-HASH] negotiated, or session resumption >>> MUST NOT have been used. >>> >>> [TLS-SESSION-HASH] >>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-session-hash-06 >>> >>> If this (or some other text) is not added, we would publish a >>> known insecure protocol without any discussion of the problem. >> I agree that this should be added. While the preferred way would be to >> update the base SCRAM specification, I think this note is still >> preferable to saying nothing. >> > _______________________________________________ > Kitten mailing list > Kitten@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/kitten From nobody Tue Jul 28 06:49:01 2015 Return-Path: X-Original-To: kitten@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: kitten@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C3E221A9086 for ; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 06:48:54 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -2.011 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.011 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, SPF_PASS=-0.001, T_RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.01] autolearn=ham Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id mqY_lgCR2BBv for ; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 06:48:53 -0700 (PDT) Received: from waldorf.isode.com (waldorf.isode.com [217.34.220.150]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D67271A9074 for ; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 06:48:52 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1438091331; d=isode.com; s=selector; i=@isode.com; bh=bn8Rh8ViNcCk7SBAL4FRp+UecUQjWtznHF+PVGran+Q=; h=From:Sender:Reply-To:Subject:Date:Message-ID:To:Cc:MIME-Version: In-Reply-To:References:Content-Type:Content-Transfer-Encoding: Content-ID:Content-Description; b=WhqvNnNGa0NH6jq7P9RQP8TobYP6bIv+o+g8/G3OUUKG/dnFRKgYsShvUdrzevWqIGj+36 RhCS+TyTLXbalt2swqbH+MejZpD0u4g8UehRIaYnRNGTyrwCHmoyAGekz0dTgIAWSA6D2g oVhV17uTOFcnt1ASB+YOXxlJI2BHPD8=; Received: from [172.20.1.215] (dhcp-215.isode.net [172.20.1.215]) by waldorf.isode.com (submission channel) via TCP with ESMTPSA id ; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 14:48:51 +0100 Message-ID: <55B78838.2020808@isode.com> Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2015 14:48:40 +0100 From: Alexey Melnikov User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:31.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/31.7.0 To: Tony Hansen References: <20150720084611.5447.46804.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com> <55ACB747.5050006@att.com> <871tg239px.fsf@latte.josefsson.org> <55B4E1D0.7000108@isode.com> <55B78429.2060408@att.com> In-Reply-To: <55B78429.2060408@att.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Archived-At: Cc: "kitten@ietf.org" Subject: Re: [kitten] I-D Action: draft-hansen-scram-sha256-03.txt X-BeenThere: kitten@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Common Authentication Technologies - Next Generation List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2015 13:48:54 -0000 Hi Tony, On 28/07/2015 14:31, Tony Hansen wrote: > I will add this text to the security considerations section. > > This doc >is< updating RFC 5802 (the base SCRAM spec), so what do you > think of stating that this also applies to scram-sha-1? I am Ok with that. Although I suspect that most implementors are not going to look for this advice in your document. > Tony > > On 7/26/15 9:34 AM, Alexey Melnikov wrote: >> On 20/07/2015 20:33, Simon Josefsson wrote: >>> Tony Hansen writes: >>> >>>> Note: I have NOT done anything about incorporating session >>>> hashing for channel binding, as I remain unconvinced that this is >>>> the right document to do anything about the topic. If you feel >>>> otherwise about having >this document< mention something about >>>> channel binding, >please< suggest specific text. >>> You may use: >>> >>> To be secure, SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS has to be used over a TLS channel >>> that MUST have [TLS-SESSION-HASH] negotiated, or session resumption >>> MUST NOT have been used. >>> >>> [TLS-SESSION-HASH] >>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-session-hash-06 >>> >>> If this (or some other text) is not added, we would publish a >>> known insecure protocol without any discussion of the problem. >> I agree that this should be added. While the preferred way would be to >> update the base SCRAM specification, I think this note is still >> preferable to saying nothing. >> > _______________________________________________ > Kitten mailing list > Kitten@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/kitten From nobody Tue Jul 28 06:54:25 2015 Return-Path: X-Original-To: kitten@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: kitten@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D60F51A8FD3 for ; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 06:54:22 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -4.21 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.21 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, T_RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.01] autolearn=ham Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 7TYy9l1xDc75 for ; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 06:54:16 -0700 (PDT) Received: from nbfkord-smmo05.seg.att.com (nbfkord-smmo05.seg.att.com [209.65.160.92]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 727031A8BBE for ; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 06:54:16 -0700 (PDT) Received: from unknown [144.160.229.23] (EHLO alpi154.enaf.aldc.att.com) by nbfkord-smmo05.seg.att.com(mxl_mta-7.2.4-5) over TLS secured channel with ESMTP id 78987b55.0.2725129.00-2236.7688459.nbfkord-smmo05.seg.att.com (envelope-from ); Tue, 28 Jul 2015 13:54:16 +0000 (UTC) X-MXL-Hash: 55b789886e32793c-e3b58a34469314a379ee7761033be0dcfe5d9e6e Received: from enaf.aldc.att.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by alpi154.enaf.aldc.att.com (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id t6SDsF51019105 for ; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 09:54:15 -0400 Received: from alpi131.aldc.att.com (alpi131.aldc.att.com [130.8.218.69]) by alpi154.enaf.aldc.att.com (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id t6SDs54x018946 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NO) for ; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 09:54:09 -0400 Received: from alpi153.aldc.att.com (alpi153.aldc.att.com [130.8.42.31]) by alpi131.aldc.att.com (RSA Interceptor) for ; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 13:53:55 GMT Received: from aldc.att.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by alpi153.aldc.att.com (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id t6SDrsVw020063 for ; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 09:53:55 -0400 Received: from mailgw1.maillennium.att.com (maillennium.att.com [135.25.114.99]) by alpi153.aldc.att.com (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id t6SDrnPN019870 for ; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 09:53:49 -0400 Received: from tonys-macbook-pro.local (unknown[135.110.241.159](untrusted sender)) by maillennium.att.com (mailgw1) with ESMTP id <20150728135349gw1000cet5e>; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 13:53:49 +0000 X-Originating-IP: [135.110.241.159] Message-ID: <55B7896C.6060008@att.com> Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2015 09:53:48 -0400 From: Tony Hansen User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.10; rv:31.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/31.7.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Alexey Melnikov References: <20150720084611.5447.46804.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com> <55ACB747.5050006@att.com> <871tg239px.fsf@latte.josefsson.org> <55B4E1D0.7000108@isode.com> <55B78429.2060408@att.com> <55B78838.2020808@isode.com> In-Reply-To: <55B78838.2020808@isode.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-RSA-Inspected: yes X-RSA-Classifications: public X-AnalysisOut: [v=2.0 cv=eoxoOPVX c=1 sm=1 a=VXHOiMMwGAwA+y4G3/O+aw==:17 a] X-AnalysisOut: [=zQP7CpKOAAAA:8 a=tHvJy1wsfNMA:10 a=DDc-57e7AI0A:10 a=zOBT] X-AnalysisOut: [XjUuO1YA:10 a=48vgC7mUAAAA:8 a=5NE4ydofy5RKKfhJX9gA:9 a=pI] X-AnalysisOut: [LNOxqGKmIA:10] X-Spam: [F=0.2000000000; CM=0.500; S=0.200(2015072401)] X-MAIL-FROM: X-SOURCE-IP: [144.160.229.23] Archived-At: Cc: "kitten@ietf.org" Subject: Re: [kitten] I-D Action: draft-hansen-scram-sha256-03.txt X-BeenThere: kitten@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Common Authentication Technologies - Next Generation List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2015 13:54:23 -0000 I agree. However, it's the best mechanism we have. Tony On 7/28/15 9:48 AM, Alexey Melnikov wrote: > Hi Tony, > > On 28/07/2015 14:31, Tony Hansen wrote: >> I will add this text to the security considerations section. >> >> This doc >is< updating RFC 5802 (the base SCRAM spec), so what do you >> think of stating that this also applies to scram-sha-1? > I am Ok with that. Although I suspect that most implementors are not > going to look for this advice in your document. >> Tony >> >> On 7/26/15 9:34 AM, Alexey Melnikov wrote: >>> On 20/07/2015 20:33, Simon Josefsson wrote: >>>> Tony Hansen writes: >>>> >>>>> Note: I have NOT done anything about incorporating session >>>>> hashing for channel binding, as I remain unconvinced that this is >>>>> the right document to do anything about the topic. If you feel >>>>> otherwise about having >this document< mention something about >>>>> channel binding, >please< suggest specific text. >>>> You may use: >>>> >>>> To be secure, SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS has to be used over a TLS channel >>>> that MUST have [TLS-SESSION-HASH] negotiated, or session resumption >>>> MUST NOT have been used. >>>> >>>> [TLS-SESSION-HASH] >>>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-session-hash-06 >>>> >>>> If this (or some other text) is not added, we would publish a >>>> known insecure protocol without any discussion of the problem. >>> I agree that this should be added. While the preferred way would be to >>> update the base SCRAM specification, I think this note is still >>> preferable to saying nothing. >>> >> _______________________________________________ >> Kitten mailing list >> Kitten@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/kitten > From nobody Tue Jul 28 13:49:28 2015 Return-Path: X-Original-To: kitten@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: kitten@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 447881B30AE for ; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 13:49:27 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.551 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.551 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, HELO_EQ_SE=0.35, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=no Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id XfKcA0Och1Mc for ; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 13:49:26 -0700 (PDT) Received: from duva.sjd.se (duva.sjd.se [IPv6:2001:9b0:1:1702::100]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B124F1B3080 for ; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 13:49:25 -0700 (PDT) Received: from latte.josefsson.org ([155.4.17.3]) (authenticated bits=0) by duva.sjd.se (8.14.4/8.14.4/Debian-4) with ESMTP id t6SKn4sT012541 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128 verify=NOT); Tue, 28 Jul 2015 22:49:05 +0200 From: Simon Josefsson To: Alexey Melnikov References: <20150720084611.5447.46804.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com> <55ACB747.5050006@att.com> <871tg239px.fsf@latte.josefsson.org> <55B4E1D0.7000108@isode.com> <55B78429.2060408@att.com> <55B78838.2020808@isode.com> OpenPGP: id=54265E8C; url=http://josefsson.org/54265e8c.txt X-Hashcash: 1:22:150728:tony@att.com::+tFW1czvLzXeuq70:2MJY X-Hashcash: 1:22:150728:kitten@ietf.org::3u86AevPgH205cXg:1vfe X-Hashcash: 1:22:150728:alexey.melnikov@isode.com::UPAeo7ftePKIBecS:87iJ Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2015 22:49:02 +0200 In-Reply-To: <55B78838.2020808@isode.com> (Alexey Melnikov's message of "Tue, 28 Jul 2015 14:48:40 +0100") Message-ID: <87io94vwht.fsf@latte.josefsson.org> User-Agent: Gnus/5.130014 (Ma Gnus v0.14) Emacs/24.4 (gnu/linux) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/signed; boundary="=-=-="; micalg=pgp-sha256; protocol="application/pgp-signature" X-Virus-Scanned: clamav-milter 0.98.7 at duva.sjd.se X-Virus-Status: Clean Archived-At: Cc: "kitten@ietf.org" Subject: Re: [kitten] I-D Action: draft-hansen-scram-sha256-03.txt X-BeenThere: kitten@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Common Authentication Technologies - Next Generation List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2015 20:49:27 -0000 --=-=-= Content-Type: text/plain Alexey Melnikov writes: > Hi Tony, > > On 28/07/2015 14:31, Tony Hansen wrote: >> I will add this text to the security considerations section. >> >> This doc >is< updating RFC 5802 (the base SCRAM spec), so what do you >> think of stating that this also applies to scram-sha-1? > I am Ok with that. Although I suspect that most implementors are not > going to look for this advice in your document. I agree, so there is a problem. To adress it, can we make the abstract and introduction of scram-sha256 say that the document is ALSO adressing a security problem in the base RFC 5802 specification? Perhaps going as far as modifying the title. To me, this normative language related to TLS-SESSION-HASH have importance to RFC 5802 implementers. How about modifying the abstract from: This document registers the SASL mechanisms SCRAM-SHA-256 and SCRAM- SHA-256-PLUS. It also updates the SCRAM registration procedures of RFC 5802. into This document registers the SASL mechanisms SCRAM-SHA-256 and SCRAM- SHA-256-PLUS, and provide guidance for secure implementation of the original SCRAM-SHA-1-PLUS mechanism. It also updates the SCRAM registration procedures of RFC 5802. And add to the Introduction section the following paragraph: After publication of RFC 5802, it was discovered that TLS does not have the expected properties for the tls-unique channel binding to be secure [TLS-SESSION-HASH]. Therefor, this document contain normative text that applies to both the original SCRAM-SHA-1-PLUS and the newly introduced SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS mechanism. I can't help but finish this repeating my rant that I don't think any of this will be effective, and that we will face a long time of insecure SCRAM-PLUS adoption. Application writers in general cannot sufficiently guarantee that their TLS stack always uses TLS-SESSION-HASH. Alas, it seems this approach is the most likely to reach consensus, and that stalling this document further is not productive. /Simon >> Tony >> >> On 7/26/15 9:34 AM, Alexey Melnikov wrote: >>> On 20/07/2015 20:33, Simon Josefsson wrote: >>>> Tony Hansen writes: >>>> >>>>> Note: I have NOT done anything about incorporating session >>>>> hashing for channel binding, as I remain unconvinced that this is >>>>> the right document to do anything about the topic. If you feel >>>>> otherwise about having >this document< mention something about >>>>> channel binding, >please< suggest specific text. >>>> You may use: >>>> >>>> To be secure, SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS has to be used over a TLS channel >>>> that MUST have [TLS-SESSION-HASH] negotiated, or session resumption >>>> MUST NOT have been used. >>>> >>>> [TLS-SESSION-HASH] >>>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-session-hash-06 >>>> >>>> If this (or some other text) is not added, we would publish a >>>> known insecure protocol without any discussion of the problem. >>> I agree that this should be added. While the preferred way would be to >>> update the base SCRAM specification, I think this note is still >>> preferable to saying nothing. >>> >> _______________________________________________ >> Kitten mailing list >> Kitten@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/kitten > > _______________________________________________ > Kitten mailing list > Kitten@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/kitten > --=-=-= Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name="signature.asc" -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJVt+q/AAoJEIYLf7sy+BGdkUcIAKDNtlA92eYd5/LYM3Ic3w8T EzpPcEam3A5TB+NgDw/YV2LYxUkQzl1+zAmidLlJ4jjnqiP18acz2/FHXF1kUo2t KTtUd9LJ9F0lVT8xwSdbwnb28rZMlW3yOYzXDJpsUnAeUngbB7UetF3iXkUCN3Gp yFcuH7NxlHsmebA7m0Gv+2cs54jMFKUSUX19KwuZ5fE0VznE5MigcM4Vbfgveviq d2YRyWtzAzDqeDnL2b1H3jIMYDxAUoCeDxTm6Ri7KSHOu2J/V1/KC5/N26081OTR QW2xkm7g9RczJ414K0yUnoPFw4yYusDpig7OK97zkfdMkLPPl70CPDK0FkvoUQ8= =+cWa -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --=-=-=-- From nobody Tue Jul 28 14:12:02 2015 Return-Path: X-Original-To: kitten@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: kitten@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 148E81B3170 for ; 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Tue, 28 Jul 2015 17:11:35 -0400 Received: from tonys-macbook-pro.local (unknown[135.110.241.113](untrusted sender)) by maillennium.att.com (mailgw1) with ESMTP id <20150728211133gw1000cetie>; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 21:11:34 +0000 X-Originating-IP: [135.110.241.113] Message-ID: <55B7F002.3040308@att.com> Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2015 17:11:30 -0400 From: Tony Hansen User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.10; rv:31.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/31.7.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 CC: "kitten@ietf.org" References: <20150720084611.5447.46804.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com> <55ACB747.5050006@att.com> <871tg239px.fsf@latte.josefsson.org> <55B4E1D0.7000108@isode.com> <55B78429.2060408@att.com> <55B78838.2020808@isode.com> <87io94vwht.fsf@latte.josefsson.org> In-Reply-To: <87io94vwht.fsf@latte.josefsson.org> Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha512; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="XG0fj7f8gqmTtWTDOuEks5GhGXqBUp1uQ" X-RSA-Inspected: yes X-RSA-Classifications: public X-AnalysisOut: [v=2.0 cv=ONaQK1mB c=1 sm=1 a=VXHOiMMwGAwA+y4G3/O+aw==:17 a] X-AnalysisOut: [=9cW_t1CCXrUA:10 a=zQP7CpKOAAAA:8 a=tHvJy1wsfNMA:10 a=fjmG] X-AnalysisOut: [L9QUOUMA:10 a=zOBTXjUuO1YA:10 a=APQWWo9-AAAA:8 a=48vgC7mUA] X-AnalysisOut: [AAA:8 a=9LoniOPvh0CJvIPNUVkA:9 a=QEXdDO2ut3YA:10 a=j4nzMFr] X-AnalysisOut: [pAAAA:8 a=olx6N89HGPSic43StBkA:9] X-Spam: [F=0.4667075049; CM=0.500; S=0.466(2015072801)] X-MAIL-FROM: X-SOURCE-IP: [144.160.229.23] Archived-At: Subject: Re: [kitten] I-D Action: draft-hansen-scram-sha256-03.txt X-BeenThere: kitten@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Common Authentication Technologies - Next Generation List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2015 21:12:01 -0000 This is an OpenPGP/MIME signed message (RFC 4880 and 3156) --XG0fj7f8gqmTtWTDOuEks5GhGXqBUp1uQ Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable I'll work something in along these lines. Thanks for continuing to bang on this. Tony On 7/28/15 4:49 PM, Simon Josefsson wrote: > Alexey Melnikov writes: > >> Hi Tony, >> >> On 28/07/2015 14:31, Tony Hansen wrote: >>> I will add this text to the security considerations section. >>> >>> This doc >is< updating RFC 5802 (the base SCRAM spec), so what do you= >>> think of stating that this also applies to scram-sha-1? >> I am Ok with that. Although I suspect that most implementors are not >> going to look for this advice in your document. > I agree, so there is a problem. To adress it, can we make the abstract= > and introduction of scram-sha256 say that the document is ALSO adressin= g > a security problem in the base RFC 5802 specification? Perhaps going a= s > far as modifying the title. To me, this normative language related to > TLS-SESSION-HASH have importance to RFC 5802 implementers. > > How about modifying the abstract from: > > This document registers the SASL mechanisms SCRAM-SHA-256 and SCRAM-= > SHA-256-PLUS. It also updates the SCRAM registration procedures of > RFC 5802. > > into > > This document registers the SASL mechanisms SCRAM-SHA-256 and SCRAM-= > SHA-256-PLUS, and provide guidance for secure implementation of the > original SCRAM-SHA-1-PLUS mechanism. It also updates the SCRAM > registration procedures of RFC 5802. > > And add to the Introduction section the following paragraph: > > After publication of RFC 5802, it was discovered that TLS does not > have the expected properties for the tls-unique channel binding to be= > secure [TLS-SESSION-HASH]. Therefor, this document contain normative= > text that applies to both the original SCRAM-SHA-1-PLUS and the newly= > introduced SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS mechanism. > > I can't help but finish this repeating my rant that I don't think any o= f > this will be effective, and that we will face a long time of insecure > SCRAM-PLUS adoption. Application writers in general cannot sufficientl= y > guarantee that their TLS stack always uses TLS-SESSION-HASH. Alas, it > seems this approach is the most likely to reach consensus, and that > stalling this document further is not productive. > > /Simon > >>> Tony >>> >>> On 7/26/15 9:34 AM, Alexey Melnikov wrote: >>>> On 20/07/2015 20:33, Simon Josefsson wrote: >>>>> Tony Hansen writes: >>>>> >>>>>> Note: I have NOT done anything about incorporating session >>>>>> hashing for channel binding, as I remain unconvinced that this is >>>>>> the right document to do anything about the topic. If you feel >>>>>> otherwise about having >this document< mention something about >>>>>> channel binding, >please< suggest specific text. >>>>> You may use: >>>>> >>>>> To be secure, SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS has to be used over a TLS channel >>>>> that MUST have [TLS-SESSION-HASH] negotiated, or session resumption= >>>>> MUST NOT have been used. >>>>> >>>>> [TLS-SESSION-HASH] >>>>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-session-hash-06 >>>>> >>>>> If this (or some other text) is not added, we would publish a >>>>> known insecure protocol without any discussion of the problem. >>>> I agree that this should be added. While the preferred way would be = to >>>> update the base SCRAM specification, I think this note is still >>>> preferable to saying nothing. >>>> >>>> --XG0fj7f8gqmTtWTDOuEks5GhGXqBUp1uQ Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name="signature.asc" Content-Description: OpenPGP digital signature Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="signature.asc" -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Comment: GPGTools - https://gpgtools.org iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJVt/ADAAoJEKd93u989/UtvYAP/2Lmc54BcpGPjDUG7xxYNa9i xrK4LeESXzIp/gbmKH0g76Ev/S6ERvH4t6liZXye4/uuKhb5RGgmMQwbYHy9fjGW 6cLxwmriNm5+LQ/wYK7dIFTgsJLLUfKQoUqMwffc3gz1nbBjESteO/onzccjL8i3 AUsuW8s8K2bS568raeQukQ/ShvKO2Bg0PMkDfKBEU4qKfINjNMpzwRPfzZrL1Tw5 z7diBgQRrGZxSfI9J9IKLMG03VX/VcrRg/GZRitUpNGlop1kYKN+TXwIBghqcdSh gkMSYaSbI8BBG7vIwpMOQSCo5Qa6EM0Uwq1rm9uFRCfq8R1QEvX0k5IANJI0B59S RnRQGdIRBdruzMsGPrY784bOTZlkpONUuh5rtknc6zg7kAFFmKVLhFQrjEhVAN8L 65/pj+rY+BWvt2e46KXcf9l1Qq/cgwxmgIdAhbbTmrIX3pwva9SiC1urZeavJsFQ ZZnEbu14gtlJo56G4d3LXZDA8+FzFENV3EJMOcl0XOfd6mRm+m1SBf0sGglU7gMD HU1RMSgqVm/knk34SPEScisHtIx7RhR2xdHlNVDPF8zBhW8uP0oIvS683at1AVy8 cp/lN7fpD4V43KlNEon02Ni62HA3MIQttcCPw5nwZ7LcacKz9f3B7cs2ROKcIYqX jzUPCuaPnVBwhZ4y4yEo =GcDw -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --XG0fj7f8gqmTtWTDOuEks5GhGXqBUp1uQ--