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Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2015 10:35:54 +0200
From: Rick van Rein <rick@openfortress.nl>
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Subject: [kitten] Finding Kerberos Realm Descriptors in secure DNS
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Hello,

On DNSEXT, I’m discussing a new DNS record named “KREALM”, proposed here
before, to resolve things in secure DNS that the Kerberos specs didn’t
trust to put into DNS in the past. The thread can be found at
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/dnsext/current/threads.html#13822
and the I-D itself is located at
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-vanrein-dnstxt-krb1

Where SRV records to kerberos’ own services are secure because they rely
on sharing a secret, and the mapping of DNS-style realm names to
case-insensitive DNS names has been standardised (ignore case, don’t
define two realms that only differ in case), there is no good option yet
to come from a DNS name to a realm name; not form a realm's DNS name
back to the realm name and not from a service's hostname to a realm
name. This is what KREALM tries to establish, using DNSSEC to provide
authenticity.

Think of service descriptions to find the realm for
HTTP/www.example.com, like

_http.www.example.com. IN KREALM “realm” “EXAMPLE.COM”
_http.www.example.com. IN KREALM "service" "HTTP"

(when not found, searches move upward in the DNS tree but not beyond the
zone apex; the I-D specifies an efficient, DNS-folk-agreeable way of
doing this)

but also think of realm descriptive information like

example.com. IN KREALM "realm" "EXAMPLE.COM"
example.com. IN KREALM "admin" "john/admin@EXAMPLE.COM"
example.com. IN KREALM "admin.uri" "http://www.example.com/contact.html"
example.com. IN KREALM "admin.uri"
"ldap://ldap.example.com/?cn=John+Smith,dc=example,dc=com"
example.com. IN KREALM "admin.cert" "admcert.example.com."
admcert.example.com. IN CERT ...

Now, the question surfaces what use cases of KREALM records could exist.
I’ve identified three or four:

 1.

    Kerberos client (or his KDC) knows service name + hostname, and
    wants to find a realm name

 2.

    Kerberos node wants to find the case-sensitive realm name for a DNS
    name, in a secure manner

 3. Kerberos node wants to find automatic validation information for a
    realm administrator (principal name)
 4. Kerberos node wants to find manual contact information for a realm
    administrator (perhaps through a URI and/or CERT record with an
    X.509 or PGP certificate)
 5. (optional) Kerberos client wants to perform service discovery under
    a realm and/or at a DNS name

Based on these, I should be able to formulate the keys and search
patterns for the data. I am aware that the keys will be vital for trust
in the information found!

If you have anything to add (or remove) then please let me know!
Everything will be setup to be extensible, and there should be non
reason why an admin would be forced to comply to a use case for their
services if they don’t want to, of course.

-Rick

​


From nobody Mon Sep 14 08:11:22 2015
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Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2015 10:11:16 -0500
From: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
To: Rick van Rein <rick@openfortress.nl>
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Subject: Re: [kitten] Finding Kerberos Realm Descriptors in secure DNS
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On Mon, Sep 14, 2015 at 10:35:54AM +0200, Rick van Rein wrote:
> Think of service descriptions to find the realm for
> HTTP/www.example.com, like
>=20
> _http.www.example.com. IN KREALM =E2=80=9Crealm=E2=80=9D =E2=80=9CEXAMP=
LE.COM=E2=80=9D
> _http.www.example.com. IN KREALM "service" "HTTP"

Why call it KREALM if it can be used to find things other than Kerberos
realm names?

Why use this to find service names?  The app knows the service name.  (I
know of no app that doesn't.  Further, I don't know how one would say "I
don't know the service name, figure it out" in GSS (though we could
define "@foo.example" to mean that for GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE), and
finally, expecting "http@foo.example" in GSS to become
HTTP/foo.example@EXAMPLE in Kerberos would fail on older
implementations, thus why would one?

(For better or worse, GSS apps are now stuck using "HTTP" as the service
name for HTTP.)

(For things like MSFT SQL Server, a discoverable service name could
have been useful had the service name discovery process included the
service's port number as an input, but that's a very odd thing.  Putting
the port number into the service name would have been plenty good enough
in actuality.)

> (when not found, searches move upward in the DNS tree but not beyond
> the zone apex; the I-D specifies an efficient, DNS-folk-agreeable way
> of doing this)

I'll have to look.

> but also think of realm descriptive information like

See my first question above.

> example.com. IN KREALM "realm" "EXAMPLE.COM"
> example.com. IN KREALM "admin" "john/admin@EXAMPLE.COM"
> example.com. IN KREALM "admin.uri" "http://www.example.com/contact.html=
"
> example.com. IN KREALM "admin.uri"
> "ldap://ldap.example.com/?cn=3DJohn+Smith,dc=3Dexample,dc=3Dcom"
> example.com. IN KREALM "admin.cert" "admcert.example.com."
> admcert.example.com. IN CERT ...

I guess you meant TLSA?

Is this really Kerberos-specific?  The realm names are.  The admin
principal names are (but would you list them all?)  The rest doesn't
seem Kerberos-specific.  If we think of realm names are "issuers" then
in a sense a new TLSA RR usage would fit the bill (though that might not
be useful for other reasons).

> Now, the question surfaces what use cases of KREALM records could
> exist.  I've identified three or four:
>=20
>  1. Kerberos client (or his KDC) knows service name + hostname, and
>     wants to find a realm name

Sure.

>  2. Kerberos node wants to find the case-sensitive realm name for a
>     DNS name, in a secure manner

I guess the difference between 1 and 2 is that the domainname in 2 might
not be a hostname?

>  3. Kerberos node wants to find automatic validation information for a
>     realm administrator (principal name)

Can you be more specific?  Usually the node will just know this (e.g.,
because the admin is providing their name at a prompt).

>  4. Kerberos node wants to find manual contact information for a realm
>     administrator (perhaps through a URI and/or CERT record with an
>     X.509 or PGP certificate)

This seems utterly generic, not Kerberos-specific.  There might be many
contacts for different sub-systems (storage, cloud, this, that,
Kerberos).

>  5. (optional) Kerberos client wants to perform service discovery
>     under a realm and/or at a DNS name

But why not discover the service, then its realm (i.e., use-case 1).  If
you know the realm a priori then there's no need to discover the realm
(unless it's to make sure the two match before going any further).

=3D=3D=3D=3D

What if there are multiple realms/whatever defined?

> Based on these, I should be able to formulate the keys and search
> patterns for the data. I am aware that the keys will be vital for
> trust in the information found!
>=20
> If you have anything to add (or remove) then please let me know!

If we drop the Kerberos-specificity, what then happens politically with
this proposal?  Does this become a TXT replacement swiss knife that
suddenly requires more work to obtain consensus?

Nico
--=20


From nobody Mon Sep 14 08:28:52 2015
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Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2015 10:28:33 -0500
From: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
To: Rick van Rein <rick@openfortress.nl>
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Subject: Re: [kitten] Finding Kerberos Realm Descriptors in secure DNS
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On Mon, Sep 14, 2015 at 10:11:16AM -0500, Nico Williams wrote:
> On Mon, Sep 14, 2015 at 10:35:54AM +0200, Rick van Rein wrote:
> > (when not found, searches move upward in the DNS tree but not beyond
> > the zone apex; the I-D specifies an efficient, DNS-folk-agreeable way
> > of doing this)
> 
> I'll have to look.

I don't think that the zone apex is necessarily a good place to stop.
DNS delegation does not imply as much as you make it out to.  I'm not
sure what the best thing to do here is.  I'll think about it.  But I'm
quite certain that DNS zone cuts are not the right thing to use.

Also, your method is:

|  5.  When the type bit map in the secure denial indicates the presence
|      of a SOA record under the current name, then no further
|      iterations are possible, and the algorithm ends in failure.

which fails if there are KREALM RRs for some things but not realm.

I think the "key" part of the KREALM RR RDATA may be best as an
_-prefixed label in the qname (not least as it reduces response size, at
the expense of increasing the number of queries when the client needs
more than one key's RDATA, but this is fine I think).

Then there'd not be much difference between a KREALM RR and a TXT RR...

Nico
-- 


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On 09/14/2015 04:35 AM, Rick van Rein wrote:
> On DNSEXT, I’m discussing a new DNS record named “KREALM”, proposed here
> before, to resolve things in secure DNS that the Kerberos specs didn’t
> trust to put into DNS in the past.

My reactions are similar to Nico's.

I would advise reducing the problem statement.  We know we have a
problem with hostname-to-realmname mappings; none of the other use cases
strike me as real problems.  If we reduce the problem to "I have a
hostname and I want the realm," then most of the complexity goes away.


From nobody Mon Sep 14 08:41:57 2015
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Subject: Re: [kitten] Finding Kerberos Realm Descriptors in secure DNS
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Hi Nico,

Thanks!
> Why call it KREALM if it can be used to find things other than Kerberos
> realm names?

It's realm descriptive information -- but if you have a better
suggestion I'm listening.  It's just what I came up with back then.

> Why use this to find service names?  The app knows the service name.

Yes, in the particular use case of an app.   I'm also playing around
with use cases that involve service discovery.

By the way, the app may lookup the service name as part of the DNS name
that it queries, but that will then be case insensitive, so it may want
to distinguish One from ONE and oNe.  No, we don't do that yet, but for
completeness sake, I think the ability to define a service name is a
logical mirror image of what a realm name does.

> and
> finally, expecting "http@foo.example" in GSS to become
> HTTP/foo.example@EXAMPLE in Kerberos would fail on older
> implementations, thus why would one?

I don't know what you are saying here; but can I assume the above dealt
with it?
> (For better or worse, GSS apps are now stuck using "HTTP" as the service
> name for HTTP.)

I would love to approach a realm and iterate over services, and discover
that "imap" and "smtp" and "afs" were all there.  Think of a blanc
deskop, on which you login with kinit, only to have your mail and file
storage automatically mounted :)

And yes, that's all highly optional for the DNS admin... it's a use case
that he may or may not want to support as far as I'm concerned.
> (For things like MSFT SQL Server, a discoverable service name could
> have been useful had the service name discovery process included the
> service's port number as an input, but that's a very odd thing.  Putting
> the port number into the service name would have been plenty good enough
> in actuality.)

Hmm, ports and such are transport level issues... with KREALM I'm aiming
at the level of authentication and principal names.
>
>> example.com. IN KREALM "realm" "EXAMPLE.COM"
>> example.com. IN KREALM "admin" "john/admin@EXAMPLE.COM"
>> example.com. IN KREALM "admin.uri" "http://www.example.com/contact.html"
>> example.com. IN KREALM "admin.uri"
>> "ldap://ldap.example.com/?cn=John+Smith,dc=example,dc=com"
>> example.com. IN KREALM "admin.cert" "admcert.example.com."
>> admcert.example.com. IN CERT ...
>
> I guess you meant TLSA?
>
No, CERT.  If I want to contact a realm admin in person (yet another
usecase) I want to have his credentials validated by DNSSEC under the
DNS-mapped realm name.

TLSA is wonderful stuff for KDC and mates, I'll grant you that! because
those are protocols running on ports over some transport.

> Is this really Kerberos-specific?  The realm names are.  The admin
> principal names are (but would you list them all?)  The rest doesn't
> seem Kerberos-specific.  If we think of realm names are "issuers" then
> in a sense a new TLSA RR usage would fit the bill (though that might not
> be useful for other reasons).

Indeed, it's a bit more "soft soap" perhaps -- I want to contact a realm
administrator (to talk about realm crossover, say) and would like to
find contact information including security hints.  That is a use case
we can decide to like or dislike.
>> Now, the question surfaces what use cases of KREALM records could
>> exist.  I've identified three or four:
>>
>>  1. Kerberos client (or his KDC) knows service name + hostname, and
>>     wants to find a realm name
>
> Sure.
>
>>  2. Kerberos node wants to find the case-sensitive realm name for a
>>     DNS name, in a secure manner
>
> I guess the difference between 1 and 2 is that the domainname in 2 might
> not be a hostname?

No, this is reversing the DNS-mapping for a DNS-styled realm name (i.e.
ignoring its case and hereby getting it back).  We could never do that
in a secure manner and so it was never formalised.
>>  3. Kerberos node wants to find automatic validation information for a
>>     realm administrator (principal name)
>
> Can you be more specific?  Usually the node will just know this (e.g.,
> because the admin is providing their name at a prompt).

I'm working on more extensive use cases.  This one might help to get a
remote service setup for under your realm, based on that fact that you
are in charge as an admin.
>>  4. Kerberos node wants to find manual contact information for a realm
>>     administrator (perhaps through a URI and/or CERT record with an
>>     X.509 or PGP certificate)
>
> This seems utterly generic, not Kerberos-specific.  There might be many
> contacts for different sub-systems (storage, cloud, this, that,
> Kerberos).

It is generic, and I think it should be and can be because manual
handling is involved.  Someone wants to email the admin and although
general ideas are posted they have never been linked into use cases,
which is what I am hereby proposing to do.  Because I believe it is
valuable to have mechanisms to find one another online in a secure manner.
>>  5. (optional) Kerberos client wants to perform service discovery
>>     under a realm and/or at a DNS name
>
> But why not discover the service, then its realm (i.e., use-case 1).  If
> you know the realm a priori then there's no need to discover the realm
> (unless it's to make sure the two match before going any further).
>
You may not know all the server names that you would need to discover. 
But yes, if you define those under your realm's DNS entry then this
works.  It's actually what I've also been moving towards.

> ====
>
> What if there are multiple realms/whatever defined?

Either will do, as specified.  If an app needs a realm, it has a few to
try in this case.
>> Based on these, I should be able to formulate the keys and search
>> patterns for the data. I am aware that the keys will be vital for
>> trust in the information found!
>>
>> If you have anything to add (or remove) then please let me know!
>
> If we drop the Kerberos-specificity, what then happens politically with
> this proposal?  Does this become a TXT replacement swiss knife that
> suddenly requires more work to obtain consensus?

It will be more difficult to make security assumptions from it.  And it
will be practically impossible to pass as a proposal I fear.  Doing this
for Kerberos alone is difficult enough as it stands.  Unless Kitten
wants to pick it up in that more general form, then things would be
different.  But Kerberos is the most obvious usecase that needs to learn
realm names for (remote) services, especially when realm crossover is
available and can reach a large number of realms.


-Rick


From nobody Mon Sep 14 08:53:45 2015
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Hi Nico,

> Nico Williams <mailto:nico@cryptonector.com>
> 14 September 2015 17:28
>

> I don't think that the zone apex is necessarily a good place to stop.

I've seen  lots of these cautious remarks.  The alternative might to not
iterate, but other than that I see no clear point.

I picked the zone apex, marked by the "start of authority" RR, because
it is a known breaking point for DNSSEC security because it's where
DNSKEYs get changed, and control over them.

We've been talking about this before, and it always seems to end up in
not having a conceptually clear, and query'able place where to stop
upward iteration on security grounds.  What this proposal is saying is
that in case your parent domain contains proper realm records, you will
have to copy them in the lower one, thereby stating that the owner of
the child zone agrees.

> DNS delegation does not imply as much as you make it out to.

Wait -- I'm talking of DNSSEC delegation.  The change of DNSKEYs and
thereby of the control over a zone's security.

> I'm not
> sure what the best thing to do here is. I'll think about it. But I'm
> quite certain that DNS zone cuts are not the right thing to use.
>
If you know a better place then I'm listening.  If it's going to be a
philosophical debate that stops us getting this important facility then
I'm really interested in (relatively clean) short cuts, including a
construct for DNS zones that may not be part of the original DNS design,
that was strengthened by the DNSSEC design but that was nevertheless
ever fully spelled out.

> Also, your method is:
>
> | 5. When the type bit map in the secure denial indicates the presence
> | of a SOA record under the current name, then no further
> | iterations are possible, and the algorithm ends in failure.
>
> which fails if there are KREALM RRs for some things but not realm.
>
Yes, and that's deliberately, although we could discuss advantages of
changing it.

If you start defining KREALM RRs you should put all those in place that
belong there, so you don't need to continue iterating after you found
the first KREALM RRset.

> I think the "key" part of the KREALM RR RDATA may be best as an
> _-prefixed label in the qname (not least as it reduces response size, at
> the expense of increasing the number of queries when the client needs
> more than one key's RDATA, but this is fine I think).
>
I completely agree, and am indeed formulating that now in -05.

> Then there'd not be much difference between a KREALM RR and a TXT RR...

There's an incredible difference in semantics, that have been defined
for KREALM and not for TXT.  Also, the DNS folk really don't like
overloading TXT with structured / meaningful / interpreted data, they
were the ones who drove me to define a new RRtype.

Cheers,
 -Rick


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Hi Greg,

> I would advise reducing the problem statement.  We know we have a
> problem with hostname-to-realmname mappings; none of the other use cases
> strike me as real problems.  If we reduce the problem to "I have a
> hostname and I want the realm," then most of the complexity goes away.
I agree that the spec would get much simpler; I'm now trying to solve multiple things in one stroke and that might be going over the top.

When we step back to 1 or 2 use cases, we might still consider to use to KREALM construct that I'm now working on and that could support the more luxureous features in the feature, how does that idea strike you if the actual resolution got really straightforward for the defined use cases?  I mean, if we limit the number of use cases supported that doesn't necessarily mean that we should also define the least extensible KREALM RR around it?

-Rick

 


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Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2015 11:11:01 -0500
From: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
To: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
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On Mon, Sep 14, 2015 at 11:40:44AM -0400, Greg Hudson wrote:
> I would advise reducing the problem statement.  We know we have a
> problem with hostname-to-realmname mappings; none of the other use
> cases strike me as real problems.  If we reduce the problem to "I have
> a hostname and I want the realm," then most of the complexity goes
> away.

+1.

I would also drop the zone apex business.

Nico
-- 


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Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2015 11:26:28 -0500
From: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
To: Rick van Rein <rick@openfortress.nl>
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Subject: Re: [kitten] Finding Kerberos Realm Descriptors in secure DNS
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On Mon, Sep 14, 2015 at 05:41:45PM +0200, Rick van Rein wrote:
> > Why call it KREALM if it can be used to find things other than Kerberos
> > realm names?
> 
> It's realm descriptive information -- but if you have a better
> suggestion I'm listening.  It's just what I came up with back then.

If you wanted to stick to a swiss army knife then the first question to
answer is whether the "key" belongs in the RDATA or in the domainname.
Either way it's not Kerberos-specific so drop the "K" and the "REALM"
from the RR type name and call it something generic.  If the key moves
to the domainname then this is basically a TXT RR but not for arbitrary
text.

> > Why use this to find service names?  The app knows the service name.
> 
> Yes, in the particular use case of an app.   I'm also playing around
> with use cases that involve service discovery.

Hosts tend to offer many services.  Discovering one does no good.
Listing them isn't necessarily a useful thing from a security
perspective.

Service name canonicalization is not something that we've ever needed
before, and I don't think it's a good idea to start providing that now.

> > and
> > finally, expecting "http@foo.example" in GSS to become
> > HTTP/foo.example@EXAMPLE in Kerberos would fail on older
> > implementations, thus why would one?
> 
> I don't know what you are saying here; but can I assume the above dealt
> with it?

No.  You really need to have familiarity with the GSS-API and GSS-API
application code to understand this comment, and the comment remains on
point.  (It's the same comment as the above about service name
canonicalizetion.)

> > (For better or worse, GSS apps are now stuck using "HTTP" as the service
> > name for HTTP.)
> 
> I would love to approach a realm and iterate over services, and discover
> that "imap" and "smtp" and "afs" were all there.  Think of a blanc

Why?

> deskop, on which you login with kinit, only to have your mail and file
> storage automatically mounted :)

But my desktop would be a client for these services, not a server.

> > (For things like MSFT SQL Server, a discoverable service name could
> > have been useful had the service name discovery process included the
> > service's port number as an input, but that's a very odd thing.  Putting
> > the port number into the service name would have been plenty good enough
> > in actuality.)
> 
> Hmm, ports and such are transport level issues... with KREALM I'm aiming
> at the level of authentication and principal names.

This is about MSSQL using service principal names of the form
<service>@<hostname.fqdn>:<port-number>@<REALM>, which has been very
problematic for interop.  The port number should have been in the
service name.  (MSFT needed to put the port number in the name because
many instances of SQL Server can be running as different users, and so
there's a need to distinguish them as service names.)

> >> example.com. IN KREALM "admin.uri"
> >> "ldap://ldap.example.com/?cn=John+Smith,dc=example,dc=com"
> >> example.com. IN KREALM "admin.cert" "admcert.example.com."
> >> admcert.example.com. IN CERT ...
> >
> > I guess you meant TLSA?
> >
> No, CERT.  If I want to contact a realm admin in person (yet another
> usecase) I want to have his credentials validated by DNSSEC under the
> DNS-mapped realm name.

I still don't understand why not TLSA.

> >> Now, the question surfaces what use cases of KREALM records could
> >> exist.  I've identified three or four:
> >>
> >>  1. Kerberos client (or his KDC) knows service name + hostname, and
> >>     wants to find a realm name
> >
> > Sure.
> >
> >>  2. Kerberos node wants to find the case-sensitive realm name for a
> >>     DNS name, in a secure manner
> >
> > I guess the difference between 1 and 2 is that the domainname in 2 might
> > not be a hostname?
> 
> No, this is reversing the DNS-mapping for a DNS-styled realm name (i.e.
> ignoring its case and hereby getting it back).  We could never do that
> in a secure manner and so it was never formalised.

I don't understand this at all.

> >>  3. Kerberos node wants to find automatic validation information for a
> >>     realm administrator (principal name)
> >
> > Can you be more specific?  Usually the node will just know this (e.g.,
> > because the admin is providing their name at a prompt).
> 
> I'm working on more extensive use cases.  This one might help to get a
> remote service setup for under your realm, based on that fact that you
> are in charge as an admin.

I don't think you need more use cases.

> It is generic, and I think it should be and can be because manual
> handling is involved.  Someone wants to email the admin and although
> general ideas are posted they have never been linked into use cases,
> which is what I am hereby proposing to do.  Because I believe it is
> valuable to have mechanisms to find one another online in a secure manner.

If it's generic then make it so.

> > What if there are multiple realms/whatever defined?
> 
> Either will do, as specified.  If an app needs a realm, it has a few to
> try in this case.

Existing implementations don't do that even though their configuration
language supports it.  And anyways, we need a limit to the number of
attempts a client will make.

> > If we drop the Kerberos-specificity, what then happens politically with
> > this proposal?  Does this become a TXT replacement swiss knife that
> > suddenly requires more work to obtain consensus?
> 
> It will be more difficult to make security assumptions from it.  And it

Eh?  Why?

> will be practically impossible to pass as a proposal I fear.  Doing this

It will be much harder to pass a trojan horse generic proposal.

> for Kerberos alone is difficult enough as it stands.  Unless Kitten

Not if you limit yourself to just the one use case you need (determining
a host's realm).

Nico
-- 


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Subject: [kitten] call for topics for IETF 94
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Hi all,

Taking advantage of today's energy on the list, a reminder that IETF 94 is
coming up at the beginning of November, and schedule requests are due by
the end of this week.

If you have topics that you would like to be discussed in Yokohoma, please
send them to the list or the chairs, so that we can determine what length
timeslot to request.

Thanks,

Ben


From nobody Tue Sep 15 00:08:52 2015
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Date: Tue, 15 Sep 2015 09:08:42 +0200
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Subject: Re: [kitten] Finding Kerberos Realm Descriptors in secure DNS
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Interesting :)

While talking on DNSEXT, the complexity of KREALM started to explode, and that's why I came up with use cases as a guideline.  What you're now telling me is that there is only one real problem for Kerberos (to which I agree) and that the rest is not specific to Kerberos (which I hadn't realised yet, but agree with too).

So, time to simplify.  What we're now looking it is a very simple KREALM record that says stuff like

www.example.org.  IN KREALM  "EXAMPLE.ORG"
                  IN KREALM "EXAMPLE.COM"

if it wants to state the Kerberos realms to consider for the DNS name www.example.com.  As a freebe, we're also getting the possibility to say

example.org.  IN KREALM "EXAMPLE.ORG"

so we now how to spell the DNS-name's realm in proper case.  But although that's defined (somewhere) as missing-because-not-secure, it is not actually necessary for Kerberos to function.  Which is true.

I'm also pulling back my thought on permitting the more complicated use cases, because you've convinced me that this is not Kerberos-specific stuff.

I want to rethink offline how I got to the current proposal, because I think I originally started with precisely this...

> I would also drop the zone apex business.

I definately won't define iteration that passes through the zone apex because the DNSKEY switch makes that a security problem, but I can agree to not iterating at all.  In that case, we'd simply have to specify a KREALM record next to each server name.  Still, that's quite acceptable I think, even if it replicates data in multiple places of a zone; by now I'm convinced that the alternative adds too much complexity.  And at least the records got simple again :)

FWIW, wildcards won't work to define KREALM for all servers in a zone -- a server will have an AAAA or A or SRV record for the server's hostname, which interferes with a matching wildcard.

If you guys are happy with this, I will redraft and post it here and return to DNSEXT.

Thanks for the fireworks ;-)
 -Rick


From nobody Tue Sep 15 00:30:34 2015
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Subject: Re: [kitten] Finding Kerberos Realm Descriptors in secure DNS
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On Tue, Sep 15, 2015 at 09:08:42AM +0200, Rick van Rein wrote:

> So, time to simplify.  What we're now looking it is a very simple KREALM
> record that says stuff like
> 
> www.example.org.  IN KREALM  "EXAMPLE.ORG"
>                   IN KREALM "EXAMPLE.COM"

Text strings used to be handy for realm names in DNS when associated
SRV records were plausibly optional.  These days, the REALM *should*
be a DNS name.  Therefore, a simpler design would be:

    ; Realm mapping per-host reduces lookup latency
    ;
    _kerberos.host.name.example.com. IN PTR EXAMPLE.COM.

    ; "Fallback" realm mapping at ancestor domain
    ;
    _kerberos.example.com. IN PTR EXAMPLE.COM.

    ; Associated SRV records
    ;
    _kerberos._udp.example.com. IN SRV 0 100 88 kdc.example.com.
    _kerberos._tcp.example.com. IN SRV 0 100 88 kdc.example.com.

This does not require a new RR type, PTR will do.

-- 
	Viktor.


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Subject: Re: [kitten] Finding Kerberos Realm Descriptors in secure DNS
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Hi Viktor,

> Text strings used to be handy for realm names in DNS when associated
> SRV records were plausibly optional.  These days, the REALM *should*
> be a DNS name.

If that's not MUST then I don't think it's a safe assumption to make.

> Therefore, a simpler design would be:
>
>     ; Realm mapping per-host reduces lookup latency
>     ;
>     _kerberos.host.name.example.com. IN PTR EXAMPLE.COM.

The value of PTR is a <domain-name> rather than a binary <character-string>, which makes it case-insensitive and I wouldn't be surprised if some name server mangled the case of PTR records to all-lowercase.

Also, the trailing dot is not the only form that may be used; there can be relative names.

And, you are using PTR in forward DNS, which may upset people.

Finally, the PTR record already has its meaning, and that is not the one we have in mind.  The new RRtype can be hard and clear about its meaning for Kerberos, and avoid security questions relating to the use of certain records.

I've initially proposed overloading TXT and that gave strong responses to instead register a new RRtype, and nobody on DNSEXT is questioning that change.  I therefore propose to not follow your idea.  It made me smile though, because it is an interesting find.


Thanks!
 -Rick


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From nobody Tue Sep 15 07:39:44 2015
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Friends,

I have posted a new version of the KREALM record definition,
incorporating the feedback on uses that were not Kerberos-specific.  It
is now very simple and straightforward.

If you guys are happy with this, I will jump back to DNSEXT and propose
it there, and push it forward to get an RRTYPE assigned.

I'm not sure how to proceed re. Kitten with this -- would you guys like
me to continue this document as an Individual Submission, or is it
better as a Kitten WG document?

Cheers,
 -Rick
> *From:* internet-drafts@ietf.org
> *Date:* 15 September 2015 16:36
> *To:* "Rick van Rein" <rick@openfortress.nl>, "Rick van Rein"
> <rick@openfortress.nl>
> *Subject:* New Version Notification for draft-vanrein-dnstxt-krb1-05.txt
> A new version of I-D, draft-vanrein-dnstxt-krb1-05.txt
> has been successfully submitted by Rick van Rein and posted to the
> IETF repository.
>
> Name:		draft-vanrein-dnstxt-krb1
> Revision:	05
> Title:		Declaring Kerberos Realm Names in DNS (KREALM)
> Document date:	2015-09-15
> Group:		Individual Submission
> Pages:		10
> URL:            https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-vanrein-dnstxt-krb1-05.txt
> Status:         https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-vanrein-dnstxt-krb1/
> Htmlized:       https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-vanrein-dnstxt-krb1-05
> Diff:           https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-vanrein-dnstxt-krb1-05
>
> Abstract:
>    This specification defines a method to determine Kerberos realm names
>    for services that are known by their DNS name.  Currently, such
>    information can only be found in static mappings or through educated
>    guesswork.  DNS can make this process more flexible, provided that
>    DNSSEC is used to ensure authenticity of resource records.
>
>                                                                                   
>
>
> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>
> The IETF Secretariat
>


From nobody Tue Sep 15 07:47:29 2015
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Subject: Re: [kitten] Finding Kerberos Realm Descriptors in secure DNS
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On Tue, Sep 15, 2015 at 09:41:12AM +0200, Rick van Rein wrote:

> Hi Viktor,
> 
> > Text strings used to be handy for realm names in DNS when associated
> > SRV records were plausibly optional.  These days, the REALM *should*
> > be a DNS name.
> 
> If that's not MUST then I don't think it's a safe assumption to make.

The proposal need not support all legacy options.  Folks who want
non-DNS name realms can manage the mapping outside DNS.

> > Therefore, a simpler design would be:
> >
> >     ; Realm mapping per-host reduces lookup latency
> >     ;
> >     _kerberos.host.name.example.com. IN PTR EXAMPLE.COM.
> 
> The value of PTR is a <domain-name> rather than a binary <character-string>,
> which makes it case-insensitive and I wouldn't be surprised if some name
> server mangled the case of PTR records to all-lowercase.

No, it is not "case-insensitive".  The value of PTR records is
returned verbatim by nameservers.  What's case insensitive is
lookups derived from that name when you use it in a query string.

> Also, the trailing dot is not the only form that may be used;
> there can be relative names.

You're confused.  DNS wire format carries fqdns, as a sequence of
length-encoded labels, with the last length set to 0 (there is no
trailing ".", there's an empty label).  There might be "relative"
names in zone files, but none will appear on the wire.

> And, you are using PTR in forward DNS, which may upset people.

There's no such thing as "forward" vs. "reverse" DNS.  All zones
are just zones.  There's nothing magic about in-addr.arpa or
ip6.arpa.  Plus there are frequently CNAMEs from these into other
zones allowing users to manage their own PTRs.

> Finally, the PTR record already has its meaning, and that is not the one
> we have in mind.

It it *exactly* the meaning you have in mind.  A DNS name that is
not an alias.  A pointer to another place in the DNS.

> I've initially proposed overloading TXT and that gave strong responses to
> instead register a new RRtype, and nobody on DNSEXT is questioning that
> change.  I therefore propose to not follow your idea.  It made me smile
> though, because it is an interesting find.

You haven't seen my battle scars fighting broken nameservers that
block TLSA queries.

Try the following experiment:

    $ dig +short -t mx disa.mil | sort -n
    0 pico.disa.mil.
    5 indal.disa.mil.
    10 dnipro.disa.mil.

    $ dig +short -t a pico.disa.mil
    214.36.3.4

Now the fun bits, first a PTR lookup, which works as expected:

    $ dig +noedns +noall +comment +ans +nocl +nottl -t ptr pico.disa.mil
    ;; Got answer:
    ;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 37990
    ;; flags: qr rd ra ad; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 0, AUTHORITY: 1, ADDITIONAL: 0

Now a TLSA lookup:

    $ dig +noedns +noall +comment +ans +nocl +nottl -t tlsa pico.disa.mil
    ... long delay ...
    ;; connection timed out; no servers could be reached

Now some brand new RRtype:

    $ dig +noedns +noall +comment +ans +nocl +nottl -t TYPE12345 pico.disa.mil
    ... long delay ...
    ;; connection timed out; no servers could be reached

Many firewalls mistakenly filter "exotic" DNS queries.  The KREALM
RRtype will encounter unnecessary friction.

With the PTR record, UTF-8 labels in Kerberos realms can be converted
to A-labels in zone files and on the wire, with the client mapping
them back to U-labels to reconstruct the realm name, and using the
A-labels directly to locate SRV records, ...

Kerberos realms in DNS should be DNS names, the PTR record will
work much better, is supported by existing zone management tools,
and is not blocked by firewalls.

-- 
	Viktor.


From nobody Tue Sep 15 08:01:55 2015
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Subject: Re: [kitten] Finding Kerberos Realm Descriptors in secure DNS
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Hey,

>> www.example.org.  IN KREALM  "EXAMPLE.ORG"
>>                   IN KREALM "EXAMPLE.COM"
> I think we might want to add a priority number in the RDATA, especially
> for implementations that currently don't handle more than one realm
> per-host.  Otherwise those implementations either will show
> non-deterministic behavior or their implementors will have that much
> more work to do to implement this.

A full-blown priority scheme (and the need to sort on it) is perhaps a bit much for just that; a flag that signals "this record is (among) the most likely to work for you" seems to be all you need, and is much simpler to implement, especially for such contrived clients.

But... would it be fair to assume that KREALM-supporting hosts must implement some new functionality anyway to support this stuff in DNS, and should be willing to iterate over realms until they get a ticket for one they can stick with?

See... we're requiring DNSSEC to validate the KREALM record, and it is going to be difficult in general to rely on clients to accomadate that; they may be subjected to crummy NAT routers that interfere with, and break DNSSEC.  So, we will probably be dependent on KDCs for practical deployment of KREALM, and a KDC could use KREALM records to inspire a Server Referral in the style of RFC 6806.

So... it may be reasonable to assume that any KREALM client could work with multiple realms, because they will normally be KDCs.  And that'd mean we wouldn't need this priority or go-for-this-one flag.  Agreed?

-Rick


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Hi Vik,

>> The value of PTR is a <domain-name> rather than a binary <character-string>,
>> which makes it case-insensitive and I wouldn't be surprised if some name
>> server mangled the case of PTR records to all-lowercase.
>
> No, it is not "case-insensitive".  The value of PTR records is
> returned verbatim by nameservers.  What's case insensitive is
> lookups derived from that name when you use it in a query string.

RFC 4343 states that DNS compression of domain names can lead to
conversion of case for RRtypes defined in RFC 1035.

There is another reason to prefer a binary format, and that is to leave
the door ajar for future i18n attempts of Kerberos realm names.  That is
hard enough as it is now, without having to deal with DNS i18n as well.
>
>> Finally, the PTR record already has its meaning, and that is not the one
>> we have in mind.
>
> It it *exactly* the meaning you have in mind.  A DNS name that is
> not an alias.  A pointer to another place in the DNS.

Assuming a Kerberos realm from a DNS name is not automatically safe
because it may not be intended as such by the DNS zone operator /
signer.  Because not all DNS names are intended to be, or have Kerberos
realms.  That is the problem with overloaded / mind-read types that also
have anohter life.
> Many firewalls mistakenly filter "exotic" DNS queries.  The KREALM
> RRtype will encounter unnecessary friction.

I know that, the same can happen to DNSSEC queries.  It is why I expect
this to be easier to implement on a KDC located in a customised
networking context than on a Kerberos client in an undefined
environment.  Still, that is quite acceptable, as long as
canonicalisation will allow the KDC to respond with Cross-Realm Routing
hints as in Section 9 of RFC 6806.
> With the PTR record, UTF-8 labels in Kerberos realms can be converted
> to A-labels in zone files and on the wire, with the client mapping
> them back to U-labels to reconstruct the realm name, and using the
> A-labels directly to locate SRV records, ...

I would like to hear if i18n experts agree to such mappings.  And
especially in the context of Kerberos, where we are dealing with older
applications that were a bit too liberal with what they put into their
realm name fields.
> Kerberos realms in DNS should be DNS names,

I've found that people in the Kerberos community treat old habits as
things that die hard.  What you are saying probably applies to 99% of
the users, but I see no point to forbid other forms of realm name in
DNS.  If others agree with Vik, then a +1 note may help, because without
more of those I simply fear making a dramatic choice that will make
people dislike this proposal.


Thanks,
 -Rick


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Subject: Re: [kitten] Finding Kerberos Realm Descriptors in secure DNS
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On Tue, Sep 15, 2015 at 07:30:30AM +0000, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
> Text strings used to be handy for realm names in DNS when associated
> SRV records were plausibly optional.  These days, the REALM *should*
> be a DNS name.  Therefore, a simpler design would be:
> 
>     ; Realm mapping per-host reduces lookup latency
>     ;
>     _kerberos.host.name.example.com. IN PTR EXAMPLE.COM.

Clever.  I like this a lot.  For ASCII labels we even get the correct
case, whatever the server returns.  For IDNs, well, we haven't crossed
that river yet for Kerberos.

>     ; "Fallback" realm mapping at ancestor domain
>     ;
>     _kerberos.example.com. IN PTR EXAMPLE.COM.

The problem with the fallback thing is that we don't know how many
labels up to go, if any.  Should example.com. have an A RR but no
_kerberos.example.com., should we go ask com. what example.com.'s realm
should be?  Clearly not, but now try constructing a general rule...

>     ; Associated SRV records
>     ;
>     _kerberos._udp.example.com. IN SRV 0 100 88 kdc.example.com.
>     _kerberos._tcp.example.com. IN SRV 0 100 88 kdc.example.com.
> 
> This does not require a new RR type, PTR will do.

+1

Nico
-- 


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Date: Tue, 15 Sep 2015 10:47:30 -0500
From: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
To: Rick van Rein <rick@openfortress.nl>
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Subject: Re: [kitten] Finding Kerberos Realm Descriptors in secure DNS
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On Tue, Sep 15, 2015 at 09:41:12AM +0200, Rick van Rein wrote:
> > Text strings used to be handy for realm names in DNS when associated
> > SRV records were plausibly optional.  These days, the REALM *should*
> > be a DNS name.
> 
> If that's not MUST then I don't think it's a safe assumption to make.

If you want to use DNS then you must be using DOMAIN-style realm names.
That's a fair requirement to make.

> > Therefore, a simpler design would be:
> >
> >     ; Realm mapping per-host reduces lookup latency
> >     ;
> >     _kerberos.host.name.example.com. IN PTR EXAMPLE.COM.
> 
> The value of PTR is a <domain-name> rather than a binary
> <character-string>, which makes it case-insensitive and I wouldn't be
> surprised if some name server mangled the case of PTR records to
> all-lowercase.

DNS is case-insensitive for QNames, and preserves their case in the
answer section, but not in any RDATAs in the response.

> Also, the trailing dot is not the only form that may be used; there
> can be relative names.

Relative to what?  The QName?  Wouldn't that be a form of compression?
DNS already knows how to compress domainnames in PTR RDATAs, (there
won't be so many answers and additional RRs that compression will be
meaningful, so relative realm names could be potentially useful, but
probably not enough to be something we should drop Viktor's proposal
for).

> And, you are using PTR in forward DNS, which may upset people.

"Meh".  I don't think it will be a problem.

> Finally, the PTR record already has its meaning, and that is not the
> one we have in mind.  The new RRtype can be hard and clear about its
> meaning for Kerberos, and avoid security questions relating to the use
> of certain records.

STD 13 doesn't restrict PTR as you think.  It doesn't even limit the
number of PTR RRs in an answer to one (though all getnameinfo()/similar
implementations always expect only one answer and use only the first).

> I've initially proposed overloading TXT and that gave strong responses

Yes, that was predictable :)

> to instead register a new RRtype, and nobody on DNSEXT is questioning
> that change.  I therefore propose to not follow your idea.  It made me
> smile though, because it is an interesting find.

Lack of objection doesn't mean they reviewed and approved.  And KITTEN
WG's consensus is still needed, and we're free to have objections that
DNSEXT didn't.

Nico
-- 


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Subject: Re: [kitten] Finding Kerberos Realm Descriptors in secure DNS
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On Tue, Sep 15, 2015 at 05:11:07PM +0200, Rick van Rein wrote:

> Hi Vik,

That's not my name.

> There is another reason to prefer a binary format, and that is to leave
> the door ajar for future i18n attempts of Kerberos realm names.  That is
> hard enough as it is now, without having to deal with DNS i18n as well.

Well, names that are i18n, but don't map into DNS are not going to
do anyone much good.  They need to be avoided.  It is precisely
*because* PTR constrains you to valid A-labels, that it is the right
way to map realms into DNS.

> > It it *exactly* the meaning you have in mind.  A DNS name that is
> > not an alias.  A pointer to another place in the DNS.
> 
> Assuming a Kerberos realm from a DNS name is not automatically safe
> because it may not be intended as such by the DNS zone operator /
> signer.  Because not all DNS names are intended to be, or have Kerberos
> realms.  That is the problem with overloaded / mind-read types that also
> have anohter life.

I'm not assuming anything.  I proposing that:

	_kerberos.host.example.com. IN PTR EXAMPLE.COM.

mean that the realm of "host.example.com" is "EXAMPLE.COM".  If
this mapping sometimes loses case, it may well be time to consider
defining the realm portion of Kerberos principals to be case-insensitive
for A-labels, and for non-ASCII names (as with IDNA 2008) *required*
to be effectively lower-case for U-labels.

The realm is going to be used for SRV lookups, and needs to be
valid DNS name.  Also the realm should be case-insensitive anyway,
time to bite that bullet.


> I would like to hear if i18n experts agree to such mappings.  And
> especially in the context of Kerberos, where we are dealing with older
> applications that were a bit too liberal with what they put into their
> realm name fields.

They don't all have to use DNS for realm mappings, they've gotten
by without so far.

> > Kerberos realms in DNS should be DNS names,
> 
> I've found that people in the Kerberos community treat old habits as
> things that die hard.  What you are saying probably applies to 99% of
> the users, but I see no point to forbid other forms of realm name in
> DNS.

I am proposing leaving legacy behind here, because we don't break
anything by not carrying it forward into DNS.

Of course you could simply standardize the current informal

    _kerberos.host.example.com. IN TXT "EXAMPLE.COM"

that'd be even more backwards compatible.  I already have a large
install-base of those.  And yet I think that PTR makes more sense
in the long run.  I see no compelling reason for KREALM.

-- 
	Viktor.


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Subject: Re: [kitten] Finding Kerberos Realm Descriptors in secure DNS
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On Tue, Sep 15, 2015 at 04:20:22PM +0000, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 15, 2015 at 05:11:07PM +0200, Rick van Rein wrote:
> 
> I'm not assuming anything.  I proposing that:
> 
> 	_kerberos.host.example.com. IN PTR EXAMPLE.COM.
> 
> mean that the realm of "host.example.com" is "EXAMPLE.COM".  If
> this mapping sometimes loses case, it may well be time to consider
> defining the realm portion of Kerberos principals to be case-insensitive
> for A-labels, and for non-ASCII names (as with IDNA 2008) *required*
> to be effectively lower-case for U-labels.

Windows and AD are already case-insensitive/preserving for realm names
now.  I think it'd be a good idea to do the same in other
implementations.  For KDB lookups they may need to internally
canonicalize realm name case.  For name-based authorization services may
need to canonicalize realm name case as well.  But this isn't hard
because KDCs and services usually have sources of canonical realm case
already (in krb5.conf, in the KDB, in keytabs).

> The realm is going to be used for SRV lookups, and needs to be
> valid DNS name.  Also the realm should be case-insensitive anyway,
> time to bite that bullet.

It's going to be some work (see above), but I agree.

> > I would like to hear if i18n experts agree to such mappings.  And
> > especially in the context of Kerberos, where we are dealing with older
> > applications that were a bit too liberal with what they put into their
> > realm name fields.
> 
> They don't all have to use DNS for realm mappings, they've gotten
> by without so far.

Indeed, between referrals and just... not having out-of-zone realms for
hosts we've not needed this.

> Of course you could simply standardize the current informal
> 
>     _kerberos.host.example.com. IN TXT "EXAMPLE.COM"

Informative will do.

Nico
-- 


From nobody Tue Sep 15 11:36:45 2015
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Subject: Re: [kitten] Finding Kerberos Realm Descriptors in secure DNS
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On 09/15/2015 03:09 AM, Rick van Rein wrote:
> See... we're requiring DNSSEC to validate the KREALM record, and it is going to be difficult in general to rely on clients to accomadate that; they may be subjected to crummy NAT routers that interfere with, and break DNSSEC.  So, we will probably be dependent on KDCs for practical deployment of KREALM, and a KDC could use KREALM records to inspire a Server Referral in the style of RFC 6806.
> 
> So... it may be reasonable to assume that any KREALM client could work with multiple realms, because they will normally be KDCs.  And that'd mean we wouldn't need this priority or go-for-this-one flag.  Agreed?

A KDC can only return one referral, so I'm not sure what it would do
with multiple realms, with or without priorities.  Perhaps I'm missing
something.



From nobody Tue Sep 15 11:57:25 2015
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Date: Tue, 15 Sep 2015 13:57:01 -0500
From: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
To: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
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Subject: Re: [kitten] Finding Kerberos Realm Descriptors in secure DNS
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On Tue, Sep 15, 2015 at 02:36:36PM -0400, Greg Hudson wrote:
> On 09/15/2015 03:09 AM, Rick van Rein wrote:
> > See... we're requiring DNSSEC to validate the KREALM record, and it
> > is going to be difficult in general to rely on clients to accomadate
> > that; they may be subjected to crummy NAT routers that interfere
> > with, and break DNSSEC.  So, we will probably be dependent on KDCs
> > for practical deployment of KREALM, and a KDC could use KREALM
> > records to inspire a Server Referral in the style of RFC 6806.
> > 
> > So... it may be reasonable to assume that any KREALM client could
> > work with multiple realms, because they will normally be KDCs.  And
> > that'd mean we wouldn't need this priority or go-for-this-one flag.
> > Agreed?
> 
> A KDC can only return one referral, so I'm not sure what it would do
> with multiple realms, with or without priorities.  Perhaps I'm missing
> something.

Er, do we really want KDCs doing DNS queries for processing TGS-REQs?

I believe it could be done, and certainly LDAP and other things add
pressure to implement async evented KDCs, so that adding DNS queries
into the mix wouldn't be a big deal, but I suspect implementors are not
ready to bite that bullet.

Would this proposal (or variants discussed) really solve a _pressing_
problem?  Or a problem we believe will be pressing?

Nico
-- 


From nobody Tue Sep 15 12:00:58 2015
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From: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor1dane@dukhovni.org>
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On Tue, Sep 15, 2015 at 02:36:36PM -0400, Greg Hudson wrote:

> A KDC can only return one referral, so I'm not sure what it would do
> with multiple realms, with or without priorities.  Perhaps I'm missing
> something.

I for one don't see any reason to support multiple realms in the response.

-- 
	Viktor.


From nobody Tue Sep 15 12:52:21 2015
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From: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
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Subject: Re: [kitten] Finding Kerberos Realm Descriptors in secure DNS
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On Tue, Sep 15, 2015 at 07:00:36PM +0000, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
> I for one don't see any reason to support multiple realms in the
> response.

Some services have the same name in multiple realms...  If there's a
more preferred transit path (or not every path is available) then in
principle a client (or referral issuer) might need to know about the
service's multiple realms.  A KDC issuing referrals can certainly pick
the better realm based on the transit path that will be required (though
this need not be the optimal path from the service's point of view) to
reach it given the capaths information available to the KDC.

So multiple PTR RRs can be meaningfully supported, but I agree that by
and large only one should be published, and that supporting more than
one will impose a significant additional burden for implementors.

Nico
-- 


From nobody Tue Sep 15 17:24:44 2015
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On Tue, 15 Sep 2015, Cantor, Scott wrote:

> On 9/14/15, 11:01 PM, "Kitten on behalf of Benjamin Kaduk" <kitten-bounces@ietf.org on behalf of kaduk@MIT.EDU> wrote:
>
> >Taking advantage of today's energy on the list, a reminder that IETF 94 is
> >coming up at the beginning of November, and schedule requests are due by
> >the end of this week.
> >
> >If you have topics that you would like to be discussed in Yokohoma, please
> >send them to the list or the chairs, so that we can determine what length
> >timeslot to request.
>
> I need to try and get the SAML-EC draft moving again because I had some
> inquiries from some research groups about getting it finalized. I don't
> believe there are any outstanding comments pending on it right now, but
> the draft is expired, so I can give it a once over and publish an update
> if that's necessary (which seems like it would be).

I'd have to check the archives to remember if there were pending changes
other than the general polishing you wanted to do.  Please do publish the
updated when you can.

> But as far as moving it forward, I don't know the process.

Once we think it's ready to progress, it goes into the queue for WGLC;
I'll be starting a WGLC for the new CAMMAC security considerations soon,
which gives you time to finish up the update :)

Thanks,

Ben


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Subject: Re: [kitten] Finding Kerberos Realm Descriptors in secure DNS
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Hi,

> I believe it could be done, and certainly LDAP and other things add
> pressure to implement async evented KDCs, so that adding DNS queries
> into the mix wouldn't be a big deal, but I suspect implementors are not
> ready to bite that bullet.
>
> Would this proposal (or variants discussed) really solve a _pressing_
> problem?  Or a problem we believe will be pressing?

Realm crossover outside a fixed KDC set or federation needs KREALM or a variation on that theme; and could then be used to connect arbitrary domains using something like PKCROSS -- which is my hope and intention.

A KDC-side implementation of this mechanism would require DNS queries in the KDC.  It would be the place where an admin can manage this mechanism in a central place, without having to deal with various clients in various contexts.

-Rick


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Subject: Re: [kitten] Finding Kerberos Realm Descriptors in secure DNS
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> The value of PTR records is
> returned verbatim by nameservers.  What's case insensitive is
> lookups derived from that name when you use it in a query string.

Below is why I believe that PTR can mangle the case of letters; both
from the specs and a practical demonstration.


Section 4.1 of RFC 4343:

No "case conversion" or "case folding" is done
during such output operations, thus "preserving" case.  However, to
optimize output, indirect labels may be used to point to names
elsewhere in the DNS answer.  In determining whether the name to be
pointed to (for example, the QNAME) is the "same" as the remainder of
the name being optimized, the case insensitive comparison specified
above is done.  Thus, such optimization may easily destroy the output
preservation of case.

Section 3.3 of RFC 1035:

The following RR definitions are expected to occur, at least
potentially, in all classes.  In particular, NS, SOA, CNAME, and PTR
will be used in all classes, and have the same format in all classes.
Because their RDATA format is known, all domain names in the RDATA
section of these RRs may be compressed.

<domain-name> is a domain name represented as a series of labels, and
terminated by a label with zero length.  <character-string> is a single
length octet followed by that number of characters.  <character-string>
is treated as binary information, and can be up to 256 characters in
length (including the length octet).

[...]

3.3.12. PTR RDATA format

    +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
    /                   PTRDNAME                    /
    +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+

where:

PTRDNAME        A <domain-name> which points to some location in the
                domain name space.


I've put this to the test, which turned out even more liberal; I defined
under $ORIGIN vanrein.org:

$ORIGIN vanrein.org.
_kerberos.mixedcase.ptrdemo     3600    IN      PTR    
MiXeDcAsE.VaNrEiN.OrG.
_kerberos.uppercase.ptrdemo     3600    IN      PTR    
UPPERCASE.VANREIN.ORG.
_kerberos.lowercase.ptrdemo     3600    IN      PTR    
lowercase.vanrein.org.

Passing this through ods-signer (from OpenDNSSEC) already maps the PTR
values to lowercase, probably as part of name canonicalisation in
preparation of signing.  Manually editing the ods-signer output to mixed
and uppercase again, reloaded it into the NSD name server... and again,
the PTR values are mapped to lowercase.

-Rick

P.S. If you want to query this for yourself, then note that the DNSSEC
chain isn't complete for this zone, so you won't get AD set in responses.


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>> So... it may be reasonable to assume that any KREALM client could work with multiple realms, because they will normally be KDCs.  And that'd mean we wouldn't need this priority or go-for-this-one flag.  Agreed?
> A KDC can only return one referral, so I'm not sure what it would do
> with multiple realms, with or without priorities.  Perhaps I'm missing
> something.
The referral that the KDC returns is one for which it succeeded to construct a TGT.  Having multiple realms gives an opportunity to try multiple paths in constructing that TGT.  I wouldn't be surprised if there are use cases that want to exploit this, even if it puts a strain on the client's KDC.

-Rick


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Subject: Re: [kitten] Finding Kerberos Realm Descriptors in secure DNS
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Greg Hudson wrote:
> On 09/15/2015 03:09 AM, Rick van Rein wrote:
>> 
>> So... it may be reasonable to assume that any KREALM client could
>> work with multiple realms, because they will normally be KDCs.
>> And that'd mean we wouldn't need this priority or go-for-this-one flag.
>> Agreed?
> 
> A KDC can only return one referral, so I'm not sure what it would do
> with multiple realms, with or without priorities.  Perhaps I'm missing
> something.

KDCs and client may have substantially different requirements/purposes.

With traditional Kerberos, a service can only have one unique
Kerberos principal name (in exactly one Kerberos Realm).

So for users from different locations, which locally authenticate
via Kerberos, accessing a central (cross-location or cross-organization)
service traditionally requires Kerberos realm to trust each other
and transparent cross-location / cross-organization access for some
very dangerous network protocols.

(dns: upd/53, ldap: udp/389, kerberos: udp/88 and tcp/88)

Conceptually, setting up a central service with seperate/distinct
service principals from each remote location/organization totally
obviates creating long-distance kerberos realm trust relationships
along with the dangerous network protocols.


In our own Single Sign-On solution, with our own implementation of the
relevant server-side AP_REQ processing we currently support the concurrent
use of kerberos service principals from seperate/independent Kerberos Realms,
and it is actively being used by customers.


-Martin


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Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2015 11:11:16 -0400
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Subject: Re: [kitten] Finding Kerberos Realm Descriptors in secure DNS
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On Sep 16, 2015 10:43 AM, "Martin Rex" <mrex@sap.com> wrote:
>
> Greg Hudson wrote:
> > On 09/15/2015 03:09 AM, Rick van Rein wrote:
> >>
> >> So... it may be reasonable to assume that any KREALM client could
> >> work with multiple realms, because they will normally be KDCs.
> >> And that'd mean we wouldn't need this priority or go-for-this-one flag.
> >> Agreed?
> >
> > A KDC can only return one referral, so I'm not sure what it would do
> > with multiple realms, with or without priorities.  Perhaps I'm missing
> > something.
>
> KDCs and client may have substantially different requirements/purposes.
>
> With traditional Kerberos, a service can only have one unique
> Kerberos principal name (in exactly one Kerberos Realm).
>
> So for users from different locations, which locally authenticate
> via Kerberos, accessing a central (cross-location or cross-organization)
> service traditionally requires Kerberos realm to trust each other
> and transparent cross-location / cross-organization access for some
> very dangerous network protocols.
>
> (dns: upd/53, ldap: udp/389, kerberos: udp/88 and tcp/88)

And these are dangerous because what? Certainly Kerberos is ment to deal
with untrusted hostile things on the network.

>
> Conceptually, setting up a central service with seperate/distinct
> service principals from each remote location/organization totally
> obviates creating long-distance kerberos realm trust relationships
> along with the dangerous network protocols.

This is not a good idea. Suppose I have users with multiple principals from
different realms and server principals from different realms. How do I know
what the access policy applied actually is? That's the advantage of cross
realm trust, if I understand it correctly.

>
>
> In our own Single Sign-On solution, with our own implementation of the
> relevant server-side AP_REQ processing we currently support the concurrent
> use of kerberos service principals from seperate/independent Kerberos
Realms,
> and it is actively being used by customers.
>
>
> -Martin
>
> _______________________________________________
> Kitten mailing list
> Kitten@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/kitten

--001a11c328ccd6801c051fdeb595
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<p dir=3D"ltr"><br>
On Sep 16, 2015 10:43 AM, &quot;Martin Rex&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mrex=
@sap.com">mrex@sap.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Greg Hudson wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt; On 09/15/2015 03:09 AM, Rick van Rein wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; So... it may be reasonable to assume that any KREALM client c=
ould<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; work with multiple realms, because they will normally be KDCs=
.<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; And that&#39;d mean we wouldn&#39;t need this priority or go-=
for-this-one flag.<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; Agreed?<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; A KDC can only return one referral, so I&#39;m not sure what it w=
ould do<br>
&gt; &gt; with multiple realms, with or without priorities.=C2=A0 Perhaps I=
&#39;m missing<br>
&gt; &gt; something.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; KDCs and client may have substantially different requirements/purposes=
.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; With traditional Kerberos, a service can only have one unique<br>
&gt; Kerberos principal name (in exactly one Kerberos Realm).<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; So for users from different locations, which locally authenticate<br>
&gt; via Kerberos, accessing a central (cross-location or cross-organizatio=
n)<br>
&gt; service traditionally requires Kerberos realm to trust each other<br>
&gt; and transparent cross-location / cross-organization access for some<br=
>
&gt; very dangerous network protocols.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; (dns: upd/53, ldap: udp/389, kerberos: udp/88 and tcp/88)</p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">And these are dangerous because what? Certainly Kerberos is =
ment to deal with untrusted hostile things on the network.</p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">&gt;<br>
&gt; Conceptually, setting up a central service with seperate/distinct<br>
&gt; service principals from each remote location/organization totally<br>
&gt; obviates creating long-distance kerberos realm trust relationships<br>
&gt; along with the dangerous network protocols.</p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">This is not a good idea. Suppose I have users with multiple =
principals from different realms and server principals from different realm=
s. How do I know what the access policy applied actually is? That&#39;s the=
 advantage of cross realm trust, if I understand it correctly.</p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; In our own Single Sign-On solution, with our own implementation of the=
<br>
&gt; relevant server-side AP_REQ processing we currently support the concur=
rent<br>
&gt; use of kerberos service principals from seperate/independent Kerberos =
Realms,<br>
&gt; and it is actively being used by customers.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; -Martin<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; Kitten mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:Kitten@ietf.org">Kitten@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/kitten">https://www.i=
etf.org/mailman/listinfo/kitten</a><br>
</p>

--001a11c328ccd6801c051fdeb595--


From nobody Wed Sep 16 11:08:48 2015
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From: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor1dane@dukhovni.org>
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Subject: Re: [kitten] Finding Kerberos Realm Descriptors in secure DNS
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On Wed, Sep 16, 2015 at 08:51:56AM +0200, Rick van Rein wrote:

> Passing this through ods-signer (from OpenDNSSEC) already maps the PTR
> values to lowercase, probably as part of name canonicalisation in
> preparation of signing.  

That's unnecessary.  The actual records need not be in canonical
form, just the input to the signatures needs to be canonicalized.

> Manually editing the ods-signer output to mixed
> and uppercase again, reloaded it into the NSD name server... and again,
> the PTR values are mapped to lowercase.

They are not generally mapped to lower-case at zone contstruction time:

    $ dig +noall +nocl +nottl +ans -t ptr -x 169.229.218.207
    207.218.229.169.in-addr.arpa. PTR ees-ppworker-prod-01.IST.Berkeley.EDU.

However, "compression" means that the case of domains in the query
influences the output:

  $ dig +noall +ans +nocl +nottl -t ptr \
      _kerberos.uppercase.ptrdemo.VanReiN.org
  _kerberos.UPPERCASE.ptrdemo.VanReiN.org. PTR uppercase.VanReiN.org.

so indeed PTR is not case-preserving.  The choice is to use "TXT"
which is already supported by both MIT and Heimdal, or to bite the
bullet and define realms as being domain names, and if two strings
are the same valid domain name, then they are the same realm.

I still see no advantage in introducing KREALM.  Just needlessly
less usable than TXT.

-- 
	Viktor.


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On Wed, Sep 16, 2015 at 08:14:51AM +0200, Rick van Rein wrote:
> > Would this proposal (or variants discussed) really solve a _pressing_
> > problem?  Or a problem we believe will be pressing?
> 
> Realm crossover outside a fixed KDC set or federation needs KREALM or
> a variation on that theme; and could then be used to connect arbitrary
> domains using something like PKCROSS -- which is my hope and
> intention.

The default host->realm mapping (strip left-most label, upcase the rest)
works well enough for 99% of cases, no?

Nico
-- 


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Subject: Re: [kitten] Finding Kerberos Realm Descriptors in secure DNS
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On Wed, Sep 16, 2015 at 06:08:43PM +0000, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
> so indeed PTR is not case-preserving.  The choice is to use "TXT"
> which is already supported by both MIT and Heimdal, or to bite the
> bullet and define realms as being domain names, and if two strings
> are the same valid domain name, then they are the same realm.

Certainly there's no harm in describing the TXT RR approach (as
implemented) in an Informative RFC.

I do think we should define domain-style realm names as being
domainnames, which means they must be treated case-insensitively by KDCs
and services.  That's not new: WIndows and AD do this.  Since it can be
a breaking change for apps that do name-based authorization, it's useful
to "canonicalize" realm names at the service (acceptors), and preferably
where possible at the client (kinit, pam_krb5, alike).

> I still see no advantage in introducing KREALM.  Just needlessly
> less usable than TXT.

Because of the middle-box problems, right?  Agreed.

Nico
-- 


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Subject: Re: [kitten] Finding Kerberos Realm Descriptors in secure DNS
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Hey,

I'm also moving over to the TXT-or-PTR side of things.  The middle boxes
are a concern and I'm hoping that one day clients will be able to do all
this; middle boxes will be quicker to pass DNSSEC than to pass KREALM.

1. In essence, the value added by my proposal is the use of DNSSEC, not
the KREALM RRtype per se.  The _kerberos prefix takes away my anxiety
over accidental interpretation of a PTR record as a Kerberos pointer and
potential security threats that this might have caused.

2. TXT can hold multiple <character-string> entries, but each has a
length of up to 255 characters for the infix-dot notation, and DNS names
in "length, label, ... zerolength" notation can reach up to 255 bytes. 
As far as I can see, this leads to infix-dot domains of up to 254
characters, so we can constrain our use of TXT to one such
<character-string> of up to 254 chars without constraining the size of a
stored domain name, thus avoiding interpretation / comparison /
buffer-overflow problems.

3. PTR limits our use cases to domain-style realm names.  This is not a
problem to me, as I'm mainly interested in DNS-based realm crossover for
which the other / older forms are not going to work anyway.  But I do
see that TXT will support the older / other domain styles as well.

4. PTR can mangle case, although it doesn't always do it.  Since we are
limiting to domain-style realm names, there can be two ways out exist,
and their benefits can be stacked up to achieve benefits for the
flexible party:
   4a. Permit the KDC to use case-insensitive comparisons; more
generally, let it use the name-style to figure out what to do; X.509
attributes have their own case comparison and DNS does, too.  The latter
would give us case-insensitive comparisons.  If AD already does this,
then so much the better.  (I never considered to propose such major
changes!)
   4b. Permit the client to map the PTR outcome to uppercase, and
thereby match with 99% of the realms, even if the KDC is not supportive
of case mapping.

5. The current implementation of TXT does not take DNSSEC into account,
meaning that its existence is not going to be of as much use as we'd
like to think.  IOW, we'd still be imposing restrictions on KDCs,
probably in terms of their default settings.

6. As for i18n, we might use DNS' approach for it and let Kerberos
simply use the xn-- names internally.  I cannot imagine that this would
lead to different treatment of the names in the KDC.  As for end-user
tools, we could modify them to understand DNS i18n and print these names
in UTF-8.  Mindful of the potential problem of foreign-alphabet
lookalikes as we've also seen in URLs, we may not always be able to cope
with it by printing in multiple colours as was done for URLs, but in
case of mixed language subsets we might fall back to printing the xn--
style of names, clearly signalling to our users that something is the
matter.  In that notation, everyone can tell the difference between two
names.  This DNS-style use of i18n would be possible immediately and it
is easier to use with PTR than with TXT, since tools will interpret the
<domain-name> in PTR and not the <character-string> in TXT.

7. Something I don't know is whether and how the KDC distinguishes realm
name styles.  In the above I've assumed that it is tagged, and that end
user tools also get to see these tags.  If not, there might be a few
more problems lurking, and things to configure manually, with sane defaults.

I suppose KREALM is hereby history, so we would be making a choice
between TXT and PTR.  My vote is now on PTR, with the aforementioned
implications of i18n and making the KDC look at the realm's naming style
before it decides how to compare (or have per-realm configurable
comparison rules).  The break with implemented but never-standardised
TXT records is IMHO warranted because we are relying on DNSSEC which is
an extra responsibility for the KDC that goes beyond TXT anyway.

-Rick


From nobody Thu Sep 17 12:40:56 2015
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Date: Thu, 17 Sep 2015 14:40:51 -0500
From: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
To: Rick van Rein <rick@openfortress.nl>
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Subject: Re: [kitten] Finding Kerberos Realm Descriptors in secure DNS
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On Thu, Sep 17, 2015 at 09:45:56AM +0200, Rick van Rein wrote:
> 5. The current implementation of TXT does not take DNSSEC into account,
> meaning that its existence is not going to be of as much use as we'd
> like to think.  IOW, we'd still be imposing restrictions on KDCs,
> probably in terms of their default settings.

Well, no, the client can and should onlye use TXT RRs for this that have
been validated.  One could use TLSA RRs without DNSSEC -- it makes
little sense, but the point is that the same is true for TXT RRs for
host-to-realm lookups.

> 6. As for i18n, we might use DNS' approach for it and let Kerberos
> simply use the xn-- names internally.  I cannot imagine that this would

This... is a large subject that we should not broach in this context.

That said (heh) I think the right answer is to consider DOMAIN-style
realm names as having multiple alias forms such that a) they are
case-insensitive (at least as to ASCII labels), b) A-labels are aliases
of the corresponding U-labels.  Clients and services should internally
canonicalize to up-cased Unicode forms wherever possible (with
configurable exceptions, as there are ASCII lower-case realm names in
production use) for name-based authorization compatibility reasons.
Finally, we can then either bite the KerberosString bullet or leave it
for later by using A-labels in KerberosString domainname slots.

> 7. Something I don't know is whether and how the KDC distinguishes realm
> name styles.  In the above I've assumed that it is tagged, and that end

By the presence/absence of ':' in the name.  No realm-type value is
explicitly encoded in any Kerberos PDU.

> user tools also get to see these tags.  If not, there might be a few
> more problems lurking, and things to configure manually, with sane defaults.

No problems lurk here, thankfully.

> I suppose KREALM is hereby history, so we would be making a choice
> between TXT and PTR.  My vote is now on PTR, with the aforementioned
> implications of i18n and making the KDC look at the realm's naming style
> before it decides how to compare (or have per-realm configurable
> comparison rules).  The break with implemented but never-standardised
> TXT records is IMHO warranted because we are relying on DNSSEC which is
> an extra responsibility for the KDC that goes beyond TXT anyway.

TXT to Informational.  PTR to Proposed Standard.  That's my preference.

Nico
-- 


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Date: Thu, 17 Sep 2015 22:59:46 -0400 (EDT)
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@MIT.EDU>
To: Rick van Rein <rick@openfortress.nl>
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Subject: Re: [kitten] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-vanrein-dnstxt-krb1-05.txt
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Hi Rick,

On Tue, 15 Sep 2015, Rick van Rein wrote:

> Friends,
>
> I have posted a new version of the KREALM record definition,
> incorporating the feedback on uses that were not Kerberos-specific.  It
> is now very simple and straightforward.
>
> If you guys are happy with this, I will jump back to DNSEXT and propose
> it there, and push it forward to get an RRTYPE assigned.
>
> I'm not sure how to proceed re. Kitten with this -- would you guys like
> me to continue this document as an Individual Submission, or is it
> better as a Kitten WG document?

I'm sorry this question didn't get answered sooner.

There seems to be some level of consensus settling around using PTR for
_kerberos.fqdn to point to a realm name, with the concordant implications
for the case of the realm name.  Since that is using a existing DNS record
type and making backward-incompatible changes to the Kerberos standard, it
seems to fit best as a kitten WG document.  (It is not really appropriate
for individual submissions to make changes to Proposed Standards with
still-extant working groups.)  As was noted a couple times, it would be
fine to do an Informational document describing the currently-in-use TXT
records as an individual submission, since there is less of a restriction
on that case.  It could also be done in kitten, if there is energy for it,
but since there hasn't been energy for the past 10 (?) years, it seems
unlikely there will be any now.

-Ben


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Date: Fri, 18 Sep 2015 01:10:42 -0400 (EDT)
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@MIT.EDU>
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Subject: Re: [kitten] call for topics for IETF 94
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Given the dearth of suggestions, it looks like we will not be requesting a
time slot in Yokohama.

-Ben

On Mon, 14 Sep 2015, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:

> Hi all,
>
> Taking advantage of today's energy on the list, a reminder that IETF 94 is
> coming up at the beginning of November, and schedule requests are due by
> the end of this week.
>
> If you have topics that you would like to be discussed in Yokohoma, please
> send them to the list or the chairs, so that we can determine what length
> timeslot to request.
>
> Thanks,
>
> Ben
>


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Hello Benjamin,

> I'm sorry this question didn't get answered sooner.

Well timed actually, now we're getting somewhere :)

> There seems to be some level of consensus settling around using PTR for
> _kerberos.fqdn to point to a realm name, with the concordant implications
> for the case of the realm name.

Yes, and I would really like to move forward on that :)

> Since that is using a existing DNS record
> type and making backward-incompatible changes to the Kerberos standard, it
> seems to fit best as a kitten WG document.  (It is not really appropriate
> for individual submissions to make changes to Proposed Standards with
> still-extant working groups.)

Yes, anything else would be silly.

> As was noted a couple times, it would be
> fine to do an Informational document describing the currently-in-use TXT
> records as an individual submission, since there is less of a restriction
> on that case.

For TXT, the friction comes with DNS people.  I've been trying that before.

> It could also be done in kitten, if there is energy for it,
> but since there hasn't been energy for the past 10 (?) years, it seems
> unlikely there will be any now.

Please explain what energy is needed; I am willing to describe the PTR in a new document, and have a student ready to implement it.  Clearly, the list is willing to discuss proposals.  Is there more needed?

The one thing that I would find devastating is when we all want something to be done, but then it doesn't get done.  I currently have some resources to make changes towards broader realm crossover, as long as I understand what needs to be done.

This is assuming that the fact that I'm on the list equals being "in Kitten", which may in fact be another class of thing altogether.   But at the very least I could be the editor of a Kitten document, even if others have more field knowledge about Kerberos than I do.

Thanks,
 -Rick


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Hello,

> There seems to be some level of consensus settling around using PTR for
> _kerberos.fqdn to point to a realm name, with the concordant implications
> for the case of the realm name.  Since that is using a existing DNS record
> type and making backward-incompatible changes to the Kerberos standard,

Or, we could simply say

   "All retrieved _kerberos PTR data MUST be cast to all-uppercase characters
   before processing with Kerberos and/or GSS-API.  This compensates for the
   uncertainty of case mappings in DNS.  Kerberos realms that want to be
   reachable through these PTR records MUST accept requests with the
   realm name in all-uppercase form."

This does not change the semantics of Kerberos AFAIK, and it remains open to
future changes in case handling in the KDC.  The mapping to uppercase is not
a compensation for a temporary condition, but for the permanent uncertainty
around case handling of PTR record data.

> (It is not really appropriate
> for individual submissions to make changes to Proposed Standards with
> still-extant working groups.)

Shall I formulate the above in an individual submission and leave it to Kitten
whether they want to lift it up the a WG spec?  That way we'd at least be out
of the current impasse on this matter.

Thanks,
 -Rick


From nobody Fri Sep 18 07:02:58 2015
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Date: Fri, 18 Sep 2015 09:02:48 -0500
From: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
To: Rick van Rein <rick@openfortress.nl>
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On Fri, Sep 18, 2015 at 01:08:56PM +0200, Rick van Rein wrote:
> Or, we could simply say
> 
>    "All retrieved _kerberos PTR data MUST be cast to all-uppercase characters
>    before processing with Kerberos and/or GSS-API.  This compensates for the
>    uncertainty of case mappings in DNS.  Kerberos realms that want to be
>    reachable through these PTR records MUST accept requests with the
>    realm name in all-uppercase form."

I'm very reluctant to agree to that, but I'd agree to saying that a TGS
client should first try the realm as it appears in the PTR RR and then
as up-cased if the first failed.

> This does not change the semantics of Kerberos AFAIK, and it remains open to

To be clear, there isn't and never has been a requirement that realm
names be upper-case.  Therefore your proposal would be in conflict with
Kerberos semantics, and the only saving grace is that sites with
non-all-upper-case realm names could simply not use PTR RRs this way.

> future changes in case handling in the KDC.  The mapping to uppercase is not
> a compensation for a temporary condition, but for the permanent uncertainty
> around case handling of PTR record data.

I realize that asking implementors to support realm aliasing is probably
a lot, but maybe not that much.  KDCs already have a list of realms
served.

The only thing that concerns me is how to canonicalize realm names for
name-based authorization.  This is the case where an AS client used an
alias realm name and now cannot get authorized to access some resources.
A service could canonicalize the client's realm name, but without a hint
from the KDC this won't scale.  The simplest thing to do is to reject
such AS-REQs and require that the client know the user's canonical
realm.  The next simplest thing to do would be to extend the AS protocol
to allow the AS to tell the client its canonical realm.  The next
simplest (and, really, hardest) thing to do would be to include
authz-data in tickets telling services the canonical form of the
client's realm.

> Shall I formulate the above in an individual submission and leave it to Kitten
> whether they want to lift it up the a WG spec?  That way we'd at least be out
> of the current impasse on this matter.

Sure.

Nico
-- 


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To: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>, Rick van Rein <rick@openfortress.nl>
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On 09/18/2015 10:02 AM, Nico Williams wrote:
> I'm very reluctant to agree to that, but I'd agree to saying that a TGS
> client should first try the realm as it appears in the PTR RR and then
> as up-cased if the first failed.

That is a non-starter for me.  The case of the realm as it appears in
the PTR RR is influenced by the case used in the query; it cannot be
treated as canonical.  Fallback KDC queries complicate security and
performance analysis, and I prefer to avoid them whenever possible.

I am provisionally okay with Rick's proposal that the record must either
refer to an uppercase realm or a realm with KDCs that can canonicalize
the uppercase realm to the correct realm.  I am also okay with using TXT.

> The only thing that concerns me is how to canonicalize realm names for
> name-based authorization.  This is the case where an AS client used an
> alias realm name and now cannot get authorized to access some resources.

I assume that if you use the wrong realm name with an AD KDC, you get
back a WRONG_REALM response, and the client tries again with the correct
case of the realm.  This only works when the client uses the
CANONICALIZE flag, which MIT krb5 clients don't do by default, and the
WRONG_REALM response isn't authenticated.  I am not sure what should
change there, but simply issuing a ticket for the non-canonical realm
seems out of the question.

These DNS records are more likely to be used for service principal names
than client principal names anyway.  I am not really fond of our
aliasing story for service names (I never understood why we chose to lie
to clients instead of correcting them), but it does work by default, up
until the point where application servers can't reliably use the sname
and realm in the Ticket for diagnostic purposes.

Rick wrote:
> If you guys are happy with this, I will jump back to DNSEXT and propose
> it there, and push it forward to get an RRTYPE assigned.

Rick, in
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/kitten/current/msg05840.html
it seemed like you agreed to use an existing RR type.  So I am confused
why this draft update still defines a KREALM RR type and why you are
talking about getting an assignment.


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From: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor1dane@dukhovni.org>
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Subject: Re: [kitten] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-vanrein-dnstxt-krb1-05.txt
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On Fri, Sep 18, 2015 at 09:02:48AM -0500, Nico Williams wrote:

> I'm very reluctant to agree to that, but I'd agree to saying that a TGS
> client should first try the realm as it appears in the PTR RR and then
> as up-cased if the first failed.

What does it mean to "try the realm"?

    * If it is a case variant of the local realm, just use the local realm.

    * If it is a case variant of a realm for which you already have
      cross-realm TGT or a service ticket for the desired service,
      use that.

    * If capaths are configured, for a case-variant of the realm,
      use that.

    * Otherwise, referrals with the KDC locating a suitable next
      realm based on capaths or a direct "trust" relationship.

The only time that determining the canonical form of the remote
realm becomes plausibly difficult, is when trust is constructed on
the fly via public keys in DNSSEC.  When such a protocol is designed,
the canonical realm suffix can be communicated as part of the
authenticated cross-realm key exchange.

So I don't see any need for "guessing" the realm name, rather all
that's required is that KDCs be able to locate cross-realm keys in
a "case-insensitive" manner (more precisely, if two realm names
represent the same valid DNS name, then each matches the other)
and that clients accept KDC responses in which the KDC has
canonicalized the requested realm name.

> The only thing that concerns me is how to canonicalize realm names for
> name-based authorization.  This is the case where an AS client used an
> alias realm name and now cannot get authorized to access some resources.

I don't expect that AS clients will be getting the realm name for
"kinit" from DNS.  If you want to "kinit" to a realm other than
the realm of the local host, I expect you need to know its name.

In any case the realm is (generally) part of the salt in string-to-key,
so it would seem that AS is not possible with a variant realm.

-- 
	Viktor.


From nobody Fri Sep 18 10:30:39 2015
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Hi,
>> I'm very reluctant to agree to that, but I'd agree to saying that a TGS
>> client should first try the realm as it appears in the PTR RR and then
>> as up-cased if the first failed.
>
> What does it mean to "try the realm"?

In all but the local-realm case, the client may need its KDC to learn
about the proper case for the service's realm name.  But, as you've
shown, the KDC should now if the client doesn't.
> The only time that determining the canonical form of the remote
> realm becomes plausibly difficult, is when trust is constructed on
> the fly via public keys in DNSSEC.  When such a protocol is designed,
> the canonical realm suffix can be communicated as part of the
> authenticated cross-realm key exchange.

The ways for doing this that Nico and I are brooding on, are based on
PKINIT, and use certificates that hold the realm name in its proper
case.  DNSSEC/DANE in turn can validate those certificates.  So even in
that case the mapping to a known case is possible.

-Rick


From nobody Sat Sep 19 06:13:59 2015
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Hey,

I was trying to steer clear from KDC discussions, but it now seems
helpful to at least look at it when describing the client behaviour.  So
below is a KDC case-mapping description, followed by how I think this
resolves the issues that were raised yesterday.


First, we already have the following rules:

   Though domain names themselves are case
   insensitive, in order for realms to match, the case must match as
   well.  When establishing a new realm name based on an internet domain
   name it is recommended by convention that the characters be converted
   to uppercase.
   [Section 6.1 of RFC 4120]

   Because the realm names "MYREALM",
   "myrealm", and "MyRealm" are all different, but resolve the same in
   the domain name system, it is necessary that only one of the possible
   combinations of upper- and lowercase characters be used in realm
   names.
   [Section 7.2.3.1 of RFC 4120]

The latter is certainly not going to be weakened if we decide to
overrule the former based on case sensitivity.  The last sentence does
make me believe that treating case-modified realm names as aliases is
necessary to avoid under RFC 4120.  But we can still look ahead at what
a future KDC could do in the area.

One possible implementation choice for a KDC is to use an explicit flag
(that'd be setup in default config files as soon as it became
standardised) for the entire KDC or for a single realm:

   # Set this flag to "yes" to indicate that domain-style realm names, if
   # they contain lowercase letters, may be recognised if requests with the
   # canonicalization flag comes in for the same realm name mapped
   # to all-uppercase.  This is useful for any such realm names to be
   # treated correctly when published in DNS PTR records with DNSSEC
   # protection.
  
   domain_realms_have_implicit_uppercase_aliases = yes

This has less impact than stating that case doesn't matter for
domain-style realm names; for configurations that already use
all-uppercase realms, this flag has no impact at all.  For
configurations with lowercase letters in their realm names, this
introduces an alias that should not already be defined explicitly.

I second Greg's suggestion to use canonicalization for changes to the
realm name, by treating the all-uppercase name variant as an automated
alias.  First and most importantly, TGS:

   RFC 4120 permits a KDC to return a closer referral ticket when a
   cross-realm TGT is requested.  This specification extends this
   behavior when the canonicalize flag is set.  When this flag is set, a
   KDC MAY return a TGT for a realm closer to the service for any
   service as discussed in the previous section.  When a client follows
   such a referral, it includes the realm of the referred-to realm in
   the generated request.
   [Section 9 of RFC6806]

This can be used to change a request with a different case that is
considered an alias to one that has the case that we want to.  Clients
would need to treat this as a change to another realm, due to their
case-insensitive treatment of realm names.  Effectively, the case would
be changed to the case as known to the KDC.

Then, let's be sure that AS is also covered if we relied on the PTR info
at the realm's DNS-mapped name:

   If the "canonicalize" KDC option is set, then the KDC MAY change the
   client and server principal names and types in the AS response and
   ticket returned from those in the request.
   [Section 6 of RFC 6806]

   If the "canonicalize" flag in the KDC options is set and the KDC
   doesn't find the principal locally, either as a regular principal or
   as an alias for another local principal, the KDC MAY return a cross-
   realm ticket-granting ticket to the next hop on the trust path
   towards a realm that may be able to resolve the principal name.
   [Section 8 of RFC 6806]

This offers two mechanisms for AS / login to change case, implying that
PTR is good enough for posting a realm name under the DNS-mapped realm
name, and have our future case-mapping KDC setup whatever case it
prefers.  The client would then get hold of a TGT with a realm with
corrected case, regardless of an all-uppercase alias case that may have
made it findable.


Now, returning to yesterday's discussion.

Rick> "All retrieved _kerberos PTR data MUST be cast to all-uppercase characters
Rick> before processing with Kerberos and/or GSS-API.  This compensates for the
Rick> uncertainty of case mappings in DNS.  Kerberos realms that want to be
Rick> reachable through these PTR records MUST accept requests with the
Rick> realm name in all-uppercase form."

This needs an additional MUST on setting the canonicalize flag so we can have a future case-aware KDC treat all-uppercase names as an alias of mixed-case realm names.

The terms "all-uppercase" and "mixed-case" need refinement when it comes to spec time.

The proposed KDC flag "domain_realms_have_implicit_uppercase_aliases" for a realm or the whole KDC could then instruct the KDC to use strncmp() instead of strcmp() when looking for all-uppercase domain-style realm names.  It would also know that the internally held spelling is the canonical one.

To me, this sounds like a really low-profile manner of introducing case mapping?


Nico> I'm very reluctant to agree to that, but I'd agree to saying that a TGS
Nico> client should first try the realm as it appears in the PTR RR and then
Nico> as up-cased if the first failed.
Nico>
Nico> To be clear, there isn't and never has been a requirement that realm
Nico> names be upper-case.  Therefore your proposal would be in conflict with
Nico> Kerberos semantics, and the only saving grace is that sites with
Nico> non-all-upper-case realm names could simply not use PTR RRs this way. 

Your intention seems to be to support other realm forms than all-uppercase.  The proposal to map to the KDC-stored canonical spelling would do that, even if the initial inquiry is all-uppercase.  With that in mind, do you agree that the initial attempt with DNS' case is no longer needed?

Nico> A service could canonicalize the client's realm name, but without a hint
Nico> from the KDC this won't scale.  The simplest thing to do is to reject
Nico> such AS-REQs and require that the client know the user's canonical
Nico> realm.  The next simplest thing to do would be to extend the AS protocol
Nico> to allow the AS to tell the client its canonical realm.

The proposal above includes canonicalization during the AS exchange, so the
client has a canonical name, that is, using KDC-spelling of case rather than
DNS-spelling.  This would provide the service with a representation that is
always the same, and not necessarily just all-uppercase.

Greg> The case of the realm as it appears in
Greg> the PTR RR is influenced by the case used in the query; it cannot be
Greg> treated as canonical.

That was what I had in mind, which I started to chase Nico's intentions in
the KDC.

Greg> Fallback KDC queries complicate security and
Greg> performance analysis, and I prefer to avoid them whenever possible.

Am I correct to assume that the canonicalization tasks stated above are not a concern in that respect?


Greg> I am provisionally okay with Rick's proposal that the record must either
Greg> refer to an uppercase realm or a realm with KDCs that can canonicalize
Greg> the uppercase realm to the correct realm.

As worked out above :) and we can require canonicalization in this case.


Viktor> I don't see any need for "guessing" the realm name, rather all
Viktor> that's required is that KDCs be able to locate cross-realm keys in
Viktor> a "case-insensitive" manner (more precisely, if two realm names
Viktor> represent the same valid DNS name, then each matches the other)
Viktor> and that clients accept KDC responses in which the KDC has
Viktor> canonicalized the requested realm name.

Agreed, and even possible with DNSSEC/DANE as described yesterday.  The
thing I did is even a bit weaker than being case-insensitive; it states
that an all-uppercase alias of a realm name may exist.  I don't mind
which of these two turns it takes, both seem possible and plausible
configurations for KDC.

Viktor> I don't expect that AS clients will be getting the realm name for
Viktor> "kinit" from DNS.  If you want to "kinit" to a realm other than
Viktor> the realm of the local host, I expect you need to know its name.

I can see practical use for the ability to lookup an email address and
rely on canonicalization to complete the mapping, as described in RFC 6806.
In this case too, the PTR record could supply a realm name with a
possibly case-mangled realm name that would be rewritten to all-uppercase.
But, if we assume canonicalization during AS, I do agree that it may make
more sense to such uses to just send an AS-REQ with an NT-SMTP-NAME and
have it translated to any other form.

Viktor> In any case the realm is (generally) part of the salt in string-to-key,
Viktor> so it would seem that AS is not possible with a variant realm.

This modified proposal is just a specialised form of canonicalization, for
which this does not seem to be a problem, so this concern should not apply
anymore.  I say that from general reasoning though, without having read
RFC 3961.

-Rick


From nobody Sat Sep 19 09:06:38 2015
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Subject: Re: [kitten] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-vanrein-dnstxt-krb1-05.txt
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On 09/19/2015 09:13 AM, Rick van Rein wrote:
>    RFC 4120 permits a KDC to return a closer referral ticket when a
>    cross-realm TGT is requested.  This specification extends this
>    behavior when the canonicalize flag is set.  When this flag is set, a
>    KDC MAY return a TGT for a realm closer to the service for any
>    service as discussed in the previous section.  When a client follows
>    such a referral, it includes the realm of the referred-to realm in
>    the generated request.
>    [Section 9 of RFC6806]
> 
> This can be used to change a request with a different case that is
> considered an alias to one that has the case that we want to.  Clients
> would need to treat this as a change to another realm, due to their
> case-insensitive treatment of realm names.  Effectively, the case would
> be changed to the case as known to the KDC.

This reasoning isn't correct.  There are two scenarios:

1. The client can't determine the service realm name with confidence (it
doesn't implement PTR lookups, or can't do secure DNS resolution because
of a restrictive network element, or whatever).  In this case, it asks
its local KDC for a service ticket (making a TGS query to
serviceprinc@LOCALREALM) with no conception of what the target realm
should be.  The KDC can issue an RFC 6806 referral to whatever realm it
wants.  Case correction doesn't even enter the picture from the Kerberos
protocol perspective, since the client has no realm name to correct.

2. The client does determine the service realm name with confidence, but
with the wrong case.  In this case its asks its KDC for
krbtgt/wrong-case-realm@LOCALREALM, and RFC 6806 does not apply.  RFC
4120 section 9 allows the local realm KDC to issue a
krbtgt/right-case-realm@LOCALREALM ticket as a "closer TGT", but a
current client will not take that as a case correction; instead, it will
stubbornly ask right-case-realm for a krbtgt/wrong-case-realm Ticket.

We can certainly require that clients which implement PTR realm lookup
also treat krbtgt/case-variant-realm replies as case corrections rather
than referrals.  But that needs to be treated as a protocol extension
and an update to RFC 4120.  In MIT krb5 there are some API and caching
considerations for this new client behavior, though they may be manageable.


From nobody Tue Sep 22 04:09:48 2015
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From: Rick van Rein <rick@openfortress.nl>
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Subject: Re: [kitten] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-vanrein-dnstxt-krb1-05.txt
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Hi Greg,

> This reasoning isn't correct.  There are two scenarios:
>
> 1. The client can't determine the service realm name with confidence (it
> doesn't implement PTR lookups, or can't do secure DNS resolution because
> of a restrictive network element, or whatever).  In this case, it asks
> its local KDC for a service ticket (making a TGS query to
> serviceprinc@LOCALREALM) with no conception of what the target realm
> should be.  The KDC can issue an RFC 6806 referral to whatever realm it
> wants.  Case correction doesn't even enter the picture from the Kerberos
> protocol perspective, since the client has no realm name to correct.
Agreed.  In this case we cannot speak of case correction because the KDC
may be the party that does the PTR lookups with confidence.  I was not
describing this case (and may have been unclear about that).

> 2. The client does determine the service realm name with confidence, but
> with the wrong case.  In this case its asks its KDC for
> krbtgt/wrong-case-realm@LOCALREALM, and RFC 6806 does not apply.
Ah.  My reasoning was that it would ask directly for
imap/imap.example.com@WRONG-CASE-REALM
and that RFC 6806 would then be applied.  I've seen such guessing,
presumably under the hoping that the KDC will know how to link the client
to the requested service; I've seen this behaviour on Mac OS X, which
uses Heimdal.  I haven't checked if MIT krb5 does this too.

> RFC 4120 section 9 allows the local realm KDC to issue a
> krbtgt/right-case-realm@LOCALREALM ticket as a "closer TGT", but a
> current client will not take that as a case correction; instead, it will
> stubbornly ask right-case-realm for a krbtgt/wrong-case-realm Ticket.
You mean because it sees wrong-case-realm as different from right-case-realm
and thinks it hasn't reached its destination, right?

The client however, "knows" that the case might be off, because it went
through the (new) activity of pursuing a PTR RR.  That means that it
might also handle the case differently.  Conceptually, I am thinking of the
client as interpreting the PTR as a set of possible realms to ask for, with
all the case variations included.  In theory it might try each in turn, but
in practice it is more efficient to interpret the response as saying "but we
have a direct route for another option you're considering".  What this
means in practice is that the client who does PTR lookups can cut short
the iteration over many cases by requesting a standardised version from
the set and treating the response as a case correction.  And it is the newly
introduced PTR behaviour that would make all the difference -- because
PTR cannot provide reliable character case.

> We can certainly require that clients which implement PTR realm lookup
> also treat krbtgt/case-variant-realm replies as case corrections rather
> than referrals.  But that needs to be treated as a protocol extension
> and an update to RFC 4120.  In MIT krb5 there are some API and caching
> considerations for this new client behavior, though they may be manageable.
Do you agree that the conceptual model and inefficient theoretic implementation
is in line with what RFC 4120 prescribes, and that the case-correction is
merely a more efficient manner of getting to the right answer?  (That would
need some explaining in the I-D of course.)

Cheers,
 -Rick


From nobody Tue Sep 22 07:58:25 2015
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References: <20150915143628.21162.89108.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com> <55F82DA5.10504@openfortress.nl> <alpine.GSO.1.10.1509172254390.26829@multics.mit.edu> <55FBF0C8.6090904@openfortress.nl> <20150918140247.GB13294@localhost> <20150918153219.GP21942@mournblade.imrryr.org> <55FC4A37.9020305@openfortress.nl> <55FD5F8B.8050807@openfortress.nl> <55FD8806.5070909@mit.edu> <560136F2.3010509@openfortress.nl>
From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
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Subject: Re: [kitten] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-vanrein-dnstxt-krb1-05.txt
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On 09/22/2015 07:09 AM, Rick van Rein wrote:
>> 2. The client does determine the service realm name with confidence, but
>> with the wrong case.  In this case its asks its KDC for
>> krbtgt/wrong-case-realm@LOCALREALM, and RFC 6806 does not apply.
> Ah.  My reasoning was that it would ask directly for
> imap/imap.example.com@WRONG-CASE-REALM
> and that RFC 6806 would then be applied.  I've seen such guessing,
> presumably under the hoping that the KDC will know how to link the client
> to the requested service; I've seen this behaviour on Mac OS X, which
> uses Heimdal.

Can you elaborate on the request behavior you have seen?  Specifically,
these fields:

1. The realm of the KDC-REQ-BODY
2. The sname of the Ticket inside the PA-TGS-REQ

In my experience with the Kerberos protocol, when (2) is krbtgt/X, X
always matches (1).  The MIT krb5 KDC implementation requires this, and
will reject the request with a KRB_AP_ERR_NOT_US error if they don't match.

In summary, a client never asks realm X for a service ticket in realm Y.
 If it knows it wants a service ticket in realm Y, it asks realm X for a
krbtgt/Y ticket and then asks realm Y for the service ticket.

>> RFC 4120 section 9 allows the local realm KDC to issue a
>> krbtgt/right-case-realm@LOCALREALM ticket as a "closer TGT", but a
>> current client will not take that as a case correction; instead, it will
>> stubbornly ask right-case-realm for a krbtgt/wrong-case-realm Ticket.
> You mean because it sees wrong-case-realm as different from right-case-realm
> and thinks it hasn't reached its destination, right?

Yes.

> Do you agree that the conceptual model and inefficient theoretic implementation
> is in line with what RFC 4120 prescribes, and that the case-correction is
> merely a more efficient manner of getting to the right answer?  (That would
> need some explaining in the I-D of course.)

I do not agree.  RFC 4120 says, "Before sending a request to the
ticket-granting service, the client MUST determine in which realm the
application server is believed to be registered."  It doesn't talk about
determining a set of possible realms--certainly not a combinatoric set
of 2^N possible realms where N is the number of case-varying characters.
 What you are talking about is unquestionably an extension to RFC 4120.


From nobody Fri Sep 25 05:44:00 2015
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Hi,

Greg> I do not agree.  RFC 4120 says, "Before sending a request to the
Greg> ticket-granting service, the client MUST determine in which realm the
Greg> application server is believed to be registered."


Yes, this is clear enough.  Although "believed" leaves some room for
wiggling, I agree that this text should not be taken as far as I was
hoping to get.  So then, we cannot handle undeterministic names (such as
potentially case-mangled names) when we "believe" in the realm for the
application server.

There are now two ways out; one is to continue with PTR and then fixate
one realm casing (presumably uppercase) and live with this forevermore. 
The other is to go back to TXT or KREALM RR, of which TXT is widely
preferred.  Given that it is acceptable to the DNS community, TXT is my
(light) preference too.  The historic use of the _kerberos prefix should
distinguish it well enough from other uses of TXT.  Perhaps we should
give it another try in that form, and fallback to KREALM if that is
rejected by DNS people.

If nobody objects, I will soon update my draft text to the TXT form,
limiting to only one <character-string> in the TXT field, and not
constraining it to be domain-style.  I will continue to be strong in
requiring DNSSEC, of course.

-Rick


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On 09/25/2015 08:43 AM, Rick van Rein wrote:
> Greg> I do not agree.  RFC 4120 says, "Before sending a request to the
> Greg> ticket-granting service, the client MUST determine in which realm the
> Greg> application server is believed to be registered."
[...]
> There are now two ways out; one is to continue with PTR and then fixate
> one realm casing (presumably uppercase) and live with this forevermore. 
> The other is to go back to TXT or KREALM RR, of which TXT is widely
> preferred.

To be clear, I wasn't arguing that we can't do case correction of realm
names.  I was arguing that we would need to extend RFC 4120 to allow
case correction TGT responses, and require that clients implement this
extension if they implement PTR realm lookups.

I have no strong opinion on whether the extra work of extending RFC 4120
is worth it.


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Hello Greg,

> To be clear, I wasn't arguing that we can't do case correction of realm
> names.  I was arguing that we would need to extend RFC 4120 to allow
> case correction TGT responses, and require that clients implement this
> extension if they implement PTR realm lookups.

Yes, you were clear and quite helpful, in pointing out both a practical solution and explaining where precisely it clashes with current RFC 4120 practice.  Thank you!

> I have no strong opinion on whether the extra work of extending RFC 4120
> is worth it.

I have no idea of the extra work involved; or the time delays?  Its only benefit would be that we would use PTR instead of TXT.  I am willing to put some effort in either way, but also feel this relatively simple first step shouldn't drag on for too long; there are others things I would like to put my energy in, such as KRB5-KDH, TLS-KDH and DANE-based realm crossover.

Benjamin said that anything that overrides RFC 4120 ought to be a WG effort, but if it is limited to just this than we could also consider that path, if others prefer that over documenting _kerberos TXT under DNSSEC.  From what I've sampled so far, everyone considers TXT to be a suitable alternative.

Meanwhile, I found in RFC 4846 that the intention of an Independent Submission is to propose alternatives to IETF work, which is okay as long as it is perfectly clear that it is an alternative.  But a WG document, or a solution that doesn't interfere with existing WG documents, is still preferred I think, in light of getting things actually used in software.

Cheers,
 -Rick


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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
 This draft is a work item of the Common Authentication Technology Next Generation Working Group of the IETF.

        Title           : SAML Enhanced Client SASL and GSS-API Mechanisms
        Authors         : Scott Cantor
                          Simon Josefsson
	Filename        : draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-saml-ec-13.txt
	Pages           : 39
	Date            : 2015-09-25

Abstract:
   Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 2.0 is a generalized
   framework for the exchange of security-related information between
   asserting and relying parties.  Simple Authentication and Security
   Layer (SASL) and the Generic Security Service Application Program
   Interface (GSS-API) are application frameworks to facilitate an
   extensible authentication model.  This document specifies a SASL and
   GSS-API mechanism for SAML 2.0 that leverages the capabilities of a
   SAML-aware "enhanced client" to address significant barriers to
   federated authentication in a manner that encourages reuse of
   existing SAML bindings and profiles designed for non-browser
   scenarios.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-saml-ec/

There's also a htmlized version available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-saml-ec-13

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-saml-ec-13


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
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Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
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Hi Greg / others,

I'm rereading the canonicalization RFC, and it does seem to already provide the "case correction extension" that we said we'd need.

Greg, does this make you see things differently?  If not, I will continue with TXT instead of PTR.

>> Do you agree that the conceptual model and inefficient theoretic implementation
>> is in line with what RFC 4120 prescribes, and that the case-correction is
>> merely a more efficient manner of getting to the right answer?  (That would
>> need some explaining in the I-D of course.)
>
> I do not agree.  RFC 4120 says, "Before sending a request to the
> ticket-granting service, the client MUST determine in which realm the
> application server is believed to be registered."  It doesn't talk about
> determining a set of possible realms--certainly not a combinatoric set
> of 2^N possible realms where N is the number of case-varying characters.
>  What you are talking about is unquestionably an extension to RFC 4120.

RFC 6806 section 9 adds

   RFC 4120 permits a KDC to return a closer referral ticket when a
   cross-realm TGT is requested.  This specification extends this
   behavior when the canonicalize flag is set.  When this flag is set, a
   KDC MAY return a TGT for a realm closer to the service for any
   service as discussed in the previous section.  When a client follows
   such a referral, it includes the realm of the referred-to realm in
   the generated request.

The case-corrected realm in the krbtgt reply could be considered
"a realm closer to the service" and it would be followed instead of
the original one.  That is, when canonicalization is requested.  That
could be used for case correction -- if you agree to what I'm reading
in this text.

So we are back to our choice, and it's arbitrary to me which we choose.

We might still decide on TXT on grounds of
 1. it's been implemented, and informally documented
 2. it completely evades case-dependent problems
 3. it's more efficient (for mixed-case realm names)
 4. the _kerberos prefix bypasses overloading of TXT

Whereas PTR has advantages
 1. More akin to the domain-style names
 2. Initial mapping to all-uppercase works for the majority of cases
 3. Case correction by the KDC works for the few other cases
 4. It offers a future path for case-insensitive realm names in KDCs

Opinions, anyone?  To me it feels that everything that works according to the standards is acceptable to this group now?

Cheers,
 -Rick


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To: Rick van Rein <rick@openfortress.nl>
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From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
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Subject: Re: [kitten] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-vanrein-dnstxt-krb1-05.txt
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On 09/30/2015 09:21 AM, Rick van Rein wrote:
> RFC 6806 section 9 adds
> 
>    RFC 4120 permits a KDC to return a closer referral ticket when a
>    cross-realm TGT is requested.  This specification extends this
>    behavior when the canonicalize flag is set.  When this flag is set, a
>    KDC MAY return a TGT for a realm closer to the service for any
>    service as discussed in the previous section.  When a client follows
>    such a referral, it includes the realm of the referred-to realm in
>    the generated request.
> 
> The case-corrected realm in the krbtgt reply could be considered
> "a realm closer to the service" and it would be followed instead of
> the original one.  That is, when canonicalization is requested.  That
> could be used for case correction -- if you agree to what I'm reading
> in this text.

Please refer back to
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/kitten/current/msg05852.html
where I responded to almost exactly the same reasoning.  The quoted RFC
6086 text does not change the behavior of requests for krbtgt/X
principals; it applies similar (but not identical) behavior to requests
for other principals.  You could make an argument that "for any service"
means that requests for krbtgt/X principals are also affected, but no
implementor interpreted the text in that way (because it would have
broken many existing multi-hop cross-realm scenarios), so that wouldn't
be helpful.

If the client makes a request for krbtgt/X and the KDC responds with a
ticket for krbtgt/x, the currently expected client behavior is to ask
realm x for krbtgt/X, not to decide it wanted realm x instead.

