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Date: Thu, 01 Apr 2021 17:02:48 -0400
From: "Sam Whited" <sam@samwhited.com>
To: "Jim Fenton" <fenton@bluepopcorn.net>
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Subject: Re: [kitten] Comments on draft-ietf-kitten-password-storage-04
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Thank you for your feedback! I think I have addressed all of these
issues (and will upload a new version soon) except for:

On Sat, Mar 20, 2021, at 20:31, Jim Fenton wrote:
> 4.1: I=E2=80=99m concerned that the MUST NOT here conflicts with the S=
HOULD
>      NOT regarding OBSOLETE and LIMITED mechanisms in Section 2. Of
>      course, MD5 is not an SASL mechanism per se, and =E2=80=9Csupport=
 any
>      mechanism=E2=80=9D in this context may not necessarily mean an SA=
SL
>      mechanism, but I still found this vaguely confusing.

I thought of this as just further refining the guidance from section 2.
You SHOULD NOT use anything from a specific list, and MUST NOT use
anything that meets these criteria (which may include things that are on=

the list and things that aren't). However, perhapse the SHOULD NOT in
section 2 should become a MUST NOT? Re-reading it I'm not sure why I put=

SHOULD NOT there.

> 5.2: Bcrypt is no longer the current (top) OWASP recommendation.

Interestingly, I had argon2id as the top recommendation in an
earlier draft of this document then they changed it back to bcrypt.
I'll swap it back.

> 7: Suggest saying something about Unicode characters and password
>    length

Good idea. I updated this to suggest counting grapheme clusters,
which I believe is going to be better than counting scalar values,
but I'm not sure that it's ideal either. Many languages probably
don't have an implementation of the segmentation algorithm, and it
adds a lot of complexity to calculating password lengths. Other
suggestions welcome. Because of the uncertainty I did not use any
normative language here for now.

I also couldn't find an existing reference for Unicode Standard Annex
reports. Is there a bibliography somewhere that includes these which I
could reference instead of making up a new ref?

=E2=80=94Sam


--=20
Sam Whited


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Date: Thu, 01 Apr 2021 18:57:25 -0400
From: "Sam Whited" <sam@samwhited.com>
To: "KITTEN Working Group" <kitten@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [kitten] Comments on draft-ietf-kitten-password-storage-04
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Thanks for your feedback!

Out of curiosity, why the lower memory size and a single lane, as
opposed to the m=3D2GiB, t=3D1, p=3D4 from
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-argon2-13#section-7.3

=E2=80=94Sam

On Sat, Mar 20, 2021, at 21:35, steve@tobtu.com wrote:
> Note on OWASP, it is going through massive changes and should not be
> looked at for about a week. Also settings are now based on benchmarks
> or theoretical speeds, except bcrypt because "9 feels low".
>
> Argon2id: m=3D37 MiB, t=3D1, p=3D1 m=3D15 MiB, t=3D2, p=3D1
>
> bcrypt: cost 12
>
> PBKDF2: HMAC-SHA1: 720,000 iterations HMAC-SHA256: 310,000 iterations
> HMAC-SHA512: 120,000 iterations


From nobody Thu Apr  1 16:05:41 2021
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Subject: [kitten] I-D Action: draft-ietf-kitten-password-storage-05.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Common Authentication Technology Next Generation WG of the IETF.

        Title           : Best practices for password hashing and storage
        Author          : Sam Whited
	Filename        : draft-ietf-kitten-password-storage-05.txt
	Pages           : 13
	Date            : 2021-04-01

Abstract:
   This document outlines best practices for handling user passwords and
   other authenticator secrets in client-server systems making use of
   SASL.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-kitten-password-storage/

There is also an HTML version available at:
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-kitten-password-storage-05.html

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-kitten-password-storage-05


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

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ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/



From nobody Fri Apr  2 13:17:03 2021
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Subject: Re: [kitten] Comments on draft-ietf-kitten-password-storage-04
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> On 04/01/2021 5:57 PM Sam Whited <sam@samwhited.com> wrote:
>=20
>=20
> Out of curiosity, why the lower memory size and a single lane, as
> opposed to the m=3D2GiB, t=3D1, p=3D4 from
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-argon2-13#section-7.3
>=20

My suggestion of "Argon2id m=3D37 MiB, t=3D1, p=3D1 or m=3D15 MiB, t=3D2, p=
=3D1" is based on facts. "Argon2id m=3D2 GiB, t=3D1, p=3D4" is based on fee=
lings. Also I think I gave like 4 or 5 and OWASP went with the first two. T=
he third one "m=3D10 MiB, t=3D3, p=3D1" is important since those settings c=
an be used with Argon2i (because t=E2=89=A53).

https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-argon2-13#section-7.4:
"The Argon2id variant with t=3D1 and 2GiB memory is FIRST RECOMMENDED optio=
n and is suggested as a default setting for all environments. This setting =
is secure against side-channel attacks and maximizes adversarial costs on d=
edicated bruteforce hardware.  The Argon2id variant with t=3D3 and 64 MiB m=
emory is SECOND RECOMMENDED option and is suggested as a default setting fo=
r memory-constrained environments."

Let's break that down. (Note section 4 states p=3D4 for both)

FIRST RECOMMENDED option: Argon2id m=3D2 GiB, t=3D1, p=3D4
SECOND RECOMMENDED option: Argon2id m=3D64 MiB, t=3D3, p=3D4

For an attacker with enough memory, these settings should be similarly hard=
. In reality the one with lower memory usage should be harder for an attack=
er with enough memory. *BUT* "m=3D2 GiB, t=3D1" reads/writes 4 GiB of memor=
y and "m=3D64 MiB, t=3D3" reads/writes 0.5 GiB of memory. So "m=3D2 GiB, t=
=3D1" is 8x harder than "m=3D64 MiB, t=3D3" given an attacker with enough m=
emory. To match memory reads/writes you need "m=3D64 MiB, t=3D22".

So their two recommended options don't match in quality.

"[Argon2id m=3D2 GiB, t=3D1, p=3D4] is suggested as a default setting for a=
ll environments." Looking at VPS services with 4 GiB and both sites I check=
ed have 4 GiB, 2 CPU cores (yes there are 8 GiB, 4 CPU cores, but I'm going=
 with just enough memory to run it). Which means you should have p=3D2. Als=
o unless you implement a queuing system you should not run "m=3D2 GiB, t=3D=
1, p=3D4". Since an attacker can easily DoS by exceeding memory usage with =
only a few request per second. P.S. This takes 1.4 seconds on my computer w=
hich is a very long time for authentication.

Now "This setting is secure against side-channel attacks..." [citation need=
ed]. Do side-channel attacks stop working when 4 threads are randomly readi=
ng in 1 GiB of memory? I'd say no. Argon2id with side-channel attacks drops=
 it to Argon2i m=3Dm'/4*(1+x/p), t=3D1 where x is 1 or 2. x is 2 with proba=
bility of ((p-1)/p)^p. Also you'll never need to keep more than m/p/2 amoun=
t of memory. The actual amount is less and based on probabilities. So "Argo=
n2id m=3D2 GiB, t=3D1, p=3D4" with a side-channel attack turns into "Argon2=
i m=3D640 MiB, t=3D1" with 68.4% probability or "Argon2i m=3D768 MiB, t=3D1=
" with 31.6% probability. I'm not aware of Argon2i t=3D1 attacks that just =
disappear when m is large-ish like 640 MiB or 768 MiB.

----

OK now why is "Argon2id m=3D37 MiB, t=3D1, p=3D1; m=3D15 MiB, t=3D2, p=3D1;=
 or m=3D10 MiB, t=3D3, p=3D1" based on facts? Also these are minimum good s=
ettings. You can go higher.

After searching for CPUs, GPUs, and FPGAs, the best attacker is GPUs. FPGAs=
 have 1/2 to 1/3 the memory bandwidth as GPUs. CPUs have 1/4 to 1/20 the me=
mory bandwidth as GPUs.

GPUs:
RTX 3080: 10 GiB, 760.0 GB/s
RTX 3090: 24 GiB, 935.8 GB/s (takes 3 "PCI slots" vs 2)
Radeon VII: 16 GiB, 1028 GB/s

There are these GPUs. Cost is unknown but a system with 8 A100 cards is $20=
0k:
A100 80GB=E2=80=8B: 80 GiB, 2039 GB/s
A100: 40 GiB, 1555 GB/s

Since the current best cost/performance GPU for password cracking is the RT=
X 3080, I'll go with that. Memory hard algorithms cracking speed is based o=
n memory bandwidth if there's enough computing power. At low memory usage w=
e can assume it gets near max bandwidth. The goal for a good password hash/=
KDF for auth is <10 kH/s/GPU. Basically <10 kH/s/GPU is good and =E2=89=A51=
0 kH/s/GPU is not good. Therefore a memory hard algorithm needs to read/wri=
te at least 72.5 MiB (760,000,000,000/10,000/1024/1024). "m=3D37 MiB, t=3D1=
" does 74 MiB, "m=3D15 MiB, t=3D2" does 75 MiB, and "m=3D10 MiB, t=3D3" doe=
s 80 MiB. These are just higher than 72.5 MiB which means the theoretical m=
ax is <10 kH/s/GPU. You could argue that an attacker could buy Radeon VII's=
 which would push those to read/write at least 98.1 MiB. I'd argue that peo=
ple aren't building password cracking rigs specifically for memory hard alg=
orithms, but let's say you win:
m=3D50 MiB, t=3D1: does 100 MiB
m=3D20 MiB, t=3D2: does 100 MiB
m=3D13 MiB, t=3D3: does 104 MiB


Now p=3D1, I've made this argument in a few places here's the latest with a=
 few minor edits:

Stealing a quote from myself "For authentication you should use p=3D1 becau=
se a lot of people are running a VPS with a single CPU core. Even if not, o=
ne could benchmark this and think they can go higher on settings than they =
should because they are not thinking about throughput. Also with memory har=
d algorithms, it would be wise to limit the number of simultaneous instance=
s. An attacker can likely send more requests per second than a server to do=
. Which will make the server exhaust all memory if there isn't a limit." Th=
ere's another place I mention that with scrypt even though you can run it w=
ith multiple threads, don't. You can think of it as t in Argon2. But if you=
 do set up a queue or mutex, you can use multiple threads (if you are mindf=
ul of throughput). This actually makes it a better experience since it's ju=
st as strong but during off-peak times latency is faster. Using a queue is =
better than a mutex. Also have a max queue length and serve a 503 error if =
queue is too long. Otherwise the connection could timeout and you'll probab=
ly still end up doing the work.

That's only for when the server is running the password hash. If the client=
 is running a password KDF for a PAKE or some other auth scheme then yes in=
crease p.


From nobody Fri Apr  2 13:30:20 2021
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Date: Fri, 02 Apr 2021 16:29:52 -0400
From: "Sam Whited" <sam@samwhited.com>
To: "KITTEN Working Group" <kitten@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [kitten] Comments on draft-ietf-kitten-password-storage-04
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Thank you. Have you sent that to the IRTF list (I'm not on there, so
apologies if you have)? I feel pretty strongly that this document should=

just link to and mirror what draft-irtf-cfrg-argon2 says, so we should
probably fix it there if their numbers aren't great.

Thanks again for the feedback.

=E2=80=94Sam

On Fri, Apr 2, 2021, at 16:16, steve@tobtu.com wrote:
> > On 04/01/2021 5:57 PM Sam Whited <sam@samwhited.com> wrote:
> >
> >
> > Out of curiosity, why the lower memory size and a single lane, as
> > opposed to the m=3D2GiB, t=3D1, p=3D4 from
> > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-argon2-13#section-7.3
> >
>
> My suggestion of "Argon2id m=3D37 MiB, t=3D1, p=3D1 or m=3D15 MiB, t=3D=
2, p=3D1"
> is based on facts. "Argon2id m=3D2 GiB, t=3D1, p=3D4" is based on feel=
ings.
> Also I think I gave like 4 or 5 and OWASP went with the first two. The=

> third one "m=3D10 MiB, t=3D3, p=3D1" is important since those settings=
 can
> be used with Argon2i (because t=E2=89=A53).
>
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-argon2-13#section-7.4:
> "The Argon2id variant with t=3D1 and 2GiB memory is FIRST RECOMMENDED
> option and is suggested as a default setting for all environments.
> This setting is secure against side-channel attacks and maximizes
> adversarial costs on dedicated bruteforce hardware.  The Argon2id
> variant with t=3D3 and 64 MiB memory is SECOND RECOMMENDED option and =
is
> suggested as a default setting for memory-constrained environments."
>
> Let's break that down. (Note section 4 states p=3D4 for both)
>
> FIRST RECOMMENDED option: Argon2id m=3D2 GiB, t=3D1, p=3D4 SECOND
> RECOMMENDED option: Argon2id m=3D64 MiB, t=3D3, p=3D4
>
> For an attacker with enough memory, these settings should be
> similarly hard. In reality the one with lower memory usage should be
> harder for an attacker with enough memory. *BUT* "m=3D2 GiB, t=3D1"
> reads/writes 4 GiB of memory and "m=3D64 MiB, t=3D3" reads/writes 0.5 =
GiB
> of memory. So "m=3D2 GiB, t=3D1" is 8x harder than "m=3D64 MiB, t=3D3"=
 given
> an attacker with enough memory. To match memory reads/writes you need
> "m=3D64 MiB, t=3D22".
>
> So their two recommended options don't match in quality.
>
> "[Argon2id m=3D2 GiB, t=3D1, p=3D4] is suggested as a default setting =
for
> all environments." Looking at VPS services with 4 GiB and both sites I=

> checked have 4 GiB, 2 CPU cores (yes there are 8 GiB, 4 CPU cores, but=

> I'm going with just enough memory to run it). Which means you should
> have p=3D2. Also unless you implement a queuing system you should not
> run "m=3D2 GiB, t=3D1, p=3D4". Since an attacker can easily DoS by exc=
eeding
> memory usage with only a few request per second. P.S. This takes 1.4
> seconds on my computer which is a very long time for authentication.
>
> Now "This setting is secure against side-channel attacks..." [citation=

> needed]. Do side-channel attacks stop working when 4 threads are
> randomly reading in 1 GiB of memory? I'd say no. Argon2id with side-
> channel attacks drops it to Argon2i m=3Dm'/4*(1+x/p), t=3D1 where x is=
 1
> or 2. x is 2 with probability of ((p-1)/p)^p. Also you'll never need
> to keep more than m/p/2 amount of memory. The actual amount is less
> and based on probabilities. So "Argon2id m=3D2 GiB, t=3D1, p=3D4" with=
 a side-
> channel attack turns into "Argon2i m=3D640 MiB, t=3D1" with 68.4%
> probability or "Argon2i m=3D768 MiB, t=3D1" with 31.6% probability. I'=
m
> not aware of Argon2i t=3D1 attacks that just disappear when m is large=
-
> ish like 640 MiB or 768 MiB.
>
> ----
>
> OK now why is "Argon2id m=3D37 MiB, t=3D1, p=3D1; m=3D15 MiB, t=3D2, p=
=3D1; or
> m=3D10 MiB, t=3D3, p=3D1" based on facts? Also these are minimum good
> settings. You can go higher.
>
> After searching for CPUs, GPUs, and FPGAs, the best attacker is GPUs.
> FPGAs have 1/2 to 1/3 the memory bandwidth as GPUs. CPUs have 1/4 to
> 1/20 the memory bandwidth as GPUs.
>
> GPUs: RTX 3080: 10 GiB, 760.0 GB/s RTX 3090: 24 GiB, 935.8 GB/s (takes=

> 3 "PCI slots" vs 2) Radeon VII: 16 GiB, 1028 GB/s
>
> There are these GPUs. Cost is unknown but a system with 8 A100 cards
> is $200k: A100 80GB=E2=80=8B: 80 GiB, 2039 GB/s
> A100: 40 GiB, 1555 GB/s
>
> Since the current best cost/performance GPU for password cracking is
> the RTX 3080, I'll go with that. Memory hard algorithms cracking speed=

> is based on memory bandwidth if there's enough computing power. At low=

> memory usage we can assume it gets near max bandwidth. The goal for a
> good password hash/KDF for auth is <10 kH/s/GPU. Basically <10
> kH/s/GPU is good and =E2=89=A510 kH/s/GPU is not good. Therefore a mem=
ory hard
> algorithm needs to read/write at least 72.5 MiB
> (760,000,000,000/10,000/1024/1024). "m=3D37 MiB, t=3D1" does 74 MiB, "=
m=3D15
> MiB, t=3D2" does 75 MiB, and "m=3D10 MiB, t=3D3" does 80 MiB. These ar=
e just
> higher than 72.5 MiB which means the theoretical max is <10 kH/s/GPU.
> You could argue that an attacker could buy Radeon VII's which would
> push those to read/write at least 98.1 MiB. I'd argue that people
> aren't building password cracking rigs specifically for memory hard
> algorithms, but let's say you win: m=3D50 MiB, t=3D1: does 100 MiB m=3D=
20
> MiB, t=3D2: does 100 MiB m=3D13 MiB, t=3D3: does 104 MiB
>
>
> Now p=3D1, I've made this argument in a few places here's the latest
> with a few minor edits:
>
> Stealing a quote from myself "For authentication you should use p=3D1
> because a lot of people are running a VPS with a single CPU core. Even=

> if not, one could benchmark this and think they can go higher on
> settings than they should because they are not thinking about
> throughput. Also with memory hard algorithms, it would be wise to
> limit the number of simultaneous instances. An attacker can likely
> send more requests per second than a server to do. Which will make the=

> server exhaust all memory if there isn't a limit." There's another
> place I mention that with scrypt even though you can run it with
> multiple threads, don't. You can think of it as t in Argon2. But if
> you do set up a queue or mutex, you can use multiple threads (if you
> are mindful of throughput). This actually makes it a better experience=

> since it's just as strong but during off-peak times latency is faster.=

> Using a queue is better than a mutex. Also have a max queue length and=

> serve a 503 error if queue is too long. Otherwise the connection could=

> timeout and you'll probably still end up doing the work.
>
> That's only for when the server is running the password hash. If the
> client is running a password KDF for a PAKE or some other auth scheme
> then yes increase p.
>
> _______________________________________________
> Kitten mailing list Kitten@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/kitten
>

--=20
Sam Whited


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Subject: Re: [kitten] Comments on draft-ietf-kitten-password-storage-04
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I haven't sent it yet. I should probably read through their message history=
, but I was considering just forwarding that.

> On 04/02/2021 3:29 PM Sam Whited <sam@samwhited.com> wrote:
>=20
> =20
> Thank you. Have you sent that to the IRTF list (I'm not on there, so
> apologies if you have)? I feel pretty strongly that this document should
> just link to and mirror what draft-irtf-cfrg-argon2 says, so we should
> probably fix it there if their numbers aren't great.
>=20
> Thanks again for the feedback.
>=20
> =E2=80=94Sam
>=20
> On Fri, Apr 2, 2021, at 16:16, steve@tobtu.com wrote:
> > > On 04/01/2021 5:57 PM Sam Whited <sam@samwhited.com> wrote:
> > >
> > >
> > > Out of curiosity, why the lower memory size and a single lane, as
> > > opposed to the m=3D2GiB, t=3D1, p=3D4 from
> > > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-argon2-13#section-7.3
> > >
> >
> > My suggestion of "Argon2id m=3D37 MiB, t=3D1, p=3D1 or m=3D15 MiB, t=3D=
2, p=3D1"
> > is based on facts. "Argon2id m=3D2 GiB, t=3D1, p=3D4" is based on feeli=
ngs.
> > Also I think I gave like 4 or 5 and OWASP went with the first two. The
> > third one "m=3D10 MiB, t=3D3, p=3D1" is important since those settings =
can
> > be used with Argon2i (because t=E2=89=A53).
> >
> > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-argon2-13#section-7.4:
> > "The Argon2id variant with t=3D1 and 2GiB memory is FIRST RECOMMENDED
> > option and is suggested as a default setting for all environments.
> > This setting is secure against side-channel attacks and maximizes
> > adversarial costs on dedicated bruteforce hardware.  The Argon2id
> > variant with t=3D3 and 64 MiB memory is SECOND RECOMMENDED option and i=
s
> > suggested as a default setting for memory-constrained environments."
> >
> > Let's break that down. (Note section 4 states p=3D4 for both)
> >
> > FIRST RECOMMENDED option: Argon2id m=3D2 GiB, t=3D1, p=3D4 SECOND
> > RECOMMENDED option: Argon2id m=3D64 MiB, t=3D3, p=3D4
> >
> > For an attacker with enough memory, these settings should be
> > similarly hard. In reality the one with lower memory usage should be
> > harder for an attacker with enough memory. *BUT* "m=3D2 GiB, t=3D1"
> > reads/writes 4 GiB of memory and "m=3D64 MiB, t=3D3" reads/writes 0.5 G=
iB
> > of memory. So "m=3D2 GiB, t=3D1" is 8x harder than "m=3D64 MiB, t=3D3" =
given
> > an attacker with enough memory. To match memory reads/writes you need
> > "m=3D64 MiB, t=3D22".
> >
> > So their two recommended options don't match in quality.
> >
> > "[Argon2id m=3D2 GiB, t=3D1, p=3D4] is suggested as a default setting f=
or
> > all environments." Looking at VPS services with 4 GiB and both sites I
> > checked have 4 GiB, 2 CPU cores (yes there are 8 GiB, 4 CPU cores, but
> > I'm going with just enough memory to run it). Which means you should
> > have p=3D2. Also unless you implement a queuing system you should not
> > run "m=3D2 GiB, t=3D1, p=3D4". Since an attacker can easily DoS by exce=
eding
> > memory usage with only a few request per second. P.S. This takes 1.4
> > seconds on my computer which is a very long time for authentication.
> >
> > Now "This setting is secure against side-channel attacks..." [citation
> > needed]. Do side-channel attacks stop working when 4 threads are
> > randomly reading in 1 GiB of memory? I'd say no. Argon2id with side-
> > channel attacks drops it to Argon2i m=3Dm'/4*(1+x/p), t=3D1 where x is =
1
> > or 2. x is 2 with probability of ((p-1)/p)^p. Also you'll never need
> > to keep more than m/p/2 amount of memory. The actual amount is less
> > and based on probabilities. So "Argon2id m=3D2 GiB, t=3D1, p=3D4" with =
a side-
> > channel attack turns into "Argon2i m=3D640 MiB, t=3D1" with 68.4%
> > probability or "Argon2i m=3D768 MiB, t=3D1" with 31.6% probability. I'm
> > not aware of Argon2i t=3D1 attacks that just disappear when m is large-
> > ish like 640 MiB or 768 MiB.
> >
> > ----
> >
> > OK now why is "Argon2id m=3D37 MiB, t=3D1, p=3D1; m=3D15 MiB, t=3D2, p=
=3D1; or
> > m=3D10 MiB, t=3D3, p=3D1" based on facts? Also these are minimum good
> > settings. You can go higher.
> >
> > After searching for CPUs, GPUs, and FPGAs, the best attacker is GPUs.
> > FPGAs have 1/2 to 1/3 the memory bandwidth as GPUs. CPUs have 1/4 to
> > 1/20 the memory bandwidth as GPUs.
> >
> > GPUs: RTX 3080: 10 GiB, 760.0 GB/s RTX 3090: 24 GiB, 935.8 GB/s (takes
> > 3 "PCI slots" vs 2) Radeon VII: 16 GiB, 1028 GB/s
> >
> > There are these GPUs. Cost is unknown but a system with 8 A100 cards
> > is $200k: A100 80GB=E2=80=8B: 80 GiB, 2039 GB/s
> > A100: 40 GiB, 1555 GB/s
> >
> > Since the current best cost/performance GPU for password cracking is
> > the RTX 3080, I'll go with that. Memory hard algorithms cracking speed
> > is based on memory bandwidth if there's enough computing power. At low
> > memory usage we can assume it gets near max bandwidth. The goal for a
> > good password hash/KDF for auth is <10 kH/s/GPU. Basically <10
> > kH/s/GPU is good and =E2=89=A510 kH/s/GPU is not good. Therefore a memo=
ry hard
> > algorithm needs to read/write at least 72.5 MiB
> > (760,000,000,000/10,000/1024/1024). "m=3D37 MiB, t=3D1" does 74 MiB, "m=
=3D15
> > MiB, t=3D2" does 75 MiB, and "m=3D10 MiB, t=3D3" does 80 MiB. These are=
 just
> > higher than 72.5 MiB which means the theoretical max is <10 kH/s/GPU.
> > You could argue that an attacker could buy Radeon VII's which would
> > push those to read/write at least 98.1 MiB. I'd argue that people
> > aren't building password cracking rigs specifically for memory hard
> > algorithms, but let's say you win: m=3D50 MiB, t=3D1: does 100 MiB m=3D=
20
> > MiB, t=3D2: does 100 MiB m=3D13 MiB, t=3D3: does 104 MiB
> >
> >
> > Now p=3D1, I've made this argument in a few places here's the latest
> > with a few minor edits:
> >
> > Stealing a quote from myself "For authentication you should use p=3D1
> > because a lot of people are running a VPS with a single CPU core. Even
> > if not, one could benchmark this and think they can go higher on
> > settings than they should because they are not thinking about
> > throughput. Also with memory hard algorithms, it would be wise to
> > limit the number of simultaneous instances. An attacker can likely
> > send more requests per second than a server to do. Which will make the
> > server exhaust all memory if there isn't a limit." There's another
> > place I mention that with scrypt even though you can run it with
> > multiple threads, don't. You can think of it as t in Argon2. But if
> > you do set up a queue or mutex, you can use multiple threads (if you
> > are mindful of throughput). This actually makes it a better experience
> > since it's just as strong but during off-peak times latency is faster.
> > Using a queue is better than a mutex. Also have a max queue length and
> > serve a 503 error if queue is too long. Otherwise the connection could
> > timeout and you'll probably still end up doing the work.
> >
> > That's only for when the server is running the password hash. If the
> > client is running a password KDF for a PAKE or some other auth scheme
> > then yes increase p.
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Kitten mailing list Kitten@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/kitten
> >
>=20
> --=20
> Sam Whited
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> Kitten mailing list
> Kitten@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/kitten


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From: "Jim Fenton" <fenton@bluepopcorn.net>
To: "Sam Whited" <sam@samwhited.com>
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Subject: Re: [kitten] Comments on draft-ietf-kitten-password-storage-04
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On 1 Apr 2021, at 14:02, Sam Whited wrote:

> Thank you for your feedback! I think I have addressed all of these
> issues (and will upload a new version soon) except for:
>
> On Sat, Mar 20, 2021, at 20:31, Jim Fenton wrote:
>> 4.1: I’m concerned that the MUST NOT here conflicts with the SHOULD
>>      NOT regarding OBSOLETE and LIMITED mechanisms in Section 2. Of
>>      course, MD5 is not an SASL mechanism per se, and “support any
>>      mechanism” in this context may not necessarily mean an SASL
>>      mechanism, but I still found this vaguely confusing.
>
> I thought of this as just further refining the guidance from section 
> 2.
> You SHOULD NOT use anything from a specific list, and MUST NOT use
> anything that meets these criteria (which may include things that are 
> on
> the list and things that aren't). However, perhapse the SHOULD NOT in
> section 2 should become a MUST NOT? Re-reading it I'm not sure why I 
> put
> SHOULD NOT there.

I haven’t looked at the specific mechanisms that might be marked 
OBSOLETE or LIMITED, but making that a MUST NOT would ensure that there 
aren’t conflicting requirements. If you do want to have one 
requirement refine the other, it would be better put them together and 
connect them with an “and”.

>> 5.2: Bcrypt is no longer the current (top) OWASP recommendation.
>
> Interestingly, I had argon2id as the top recommendation in an
> earlier draft of this document then they changed it back to bcrypt.
> I'll swap it back.

More generally, it’s probably not a good idea to cite the “current 
OWASP recommendation”, because that will probably change over time, 
while the RFC resulting from this draft won’t.

>> 7: Suggest saying something about Unicode characters and password
>>    length
>
> Good idea. I updated this to suggest counting grapheme clusters,
> which I believe is going to be better than counting scalar values,
> but I'm not sure that it's ideal either. Many languages probably
> don't have an implementation of the segmentation algorithm, and it
> adds a lot of complexity to calculating password lengths. Other
> suggestions welcome. Because of the uncertainty I did not use any
> normative language here for now.
>
> I also couldn't find an existing reference for Unicode Standard Annex
> reports. Is there a bibliography somewhere that includes these which I
> could reference instead of making up a new ref?

There’s a reference at 
https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-3/sp800-63b.html#ISOIEC10646 but I see 
that it no longer works. I’ll look around for a better one.

-Jim


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Subject: [kitten] I-D Action: draft-ietf-kitten-password-storage-06.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Common Authentication Technology Next Generation WG of the IETF.

        Title           : Best practices for password hashing and storage
        Author          : Sam Whited
	Filename        : draft-ietf-kitten-password-storage-06.txt
	Pages           : 13
	Date            : 2021-04-06

Abstract:
   This document outlines best practices for handling user passwords and
   other authenticator secrets in client-server systems making use of
   SASL.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-kitten-password-storage/

There is also an HTML version available at:
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https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-kitten-password-storage-06


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Date: Tue, 06 Apr 2021 07:54:36 -0400
From: "Sam Whited" <sam@samwhited.com>
To: "Jim Fenton" <fenton@bluepopcorn.net>
Cc: "KITTEN Working Group" <kitten@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [kitten] Comments on draft-ietf-kitten-password-storage-04
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I've gone ahead and fixed this as suggested. I set this as a "SHOULD" in=

case someone needed backwards compatibility I think, but if it's in this=

category a MUST seems appropriate. These are not safe mechanisms.

=E2=80=94Sam

On Mon, Apr 5, 2021, at 23:01, Jim Fenton wrote:
> I haven=E2=80=99t looked at the specific mechanisms that might be mark=
ed
> OBSOLETE or LIMITED, but making that a MUST NOT would ensure that
> there aren=E2=80=99t conflicting requirements. If you do want to have =
one
> requirement refine the other, it would be better put them together and=

> connect them with an =E2=80=9Cand=E2=80=9D.

