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Subject: [MBONED] Last Call: <draft-ietf-mboned-auto-multicast-14.txt> (Automatic	Multicast Tunneling) to Proposed Standard
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The IESG has received a request from the MBONE Deployment WG (mboned) to
consider the following document:
- 'Automatic Multicast Tunneling'
  <draft-ietf-mboned-auto-multicast-14.txt> as Proposed Standard

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2012-12-19. Exceptionally, comments may be
sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the
beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.

Abstract


   This document describes Automatic Multicast Tunneling (AMT), a
   protocol for delivering multicast traffic from sources in a
   multicast-enabled network to receivers that lack multicast
   connectivity to the source network.  The protocol uses UDP
   encapsulation and unicast replication to provide this functionality.

   The AMT protocol is specifically designed to support rapid deployment
   by requiring minimal changes to existing network infrastructure.




The file can be obtained via
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-mboned-auto-multicast/

IESG discussion can be tracked via
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-mboned-auto-multicast/ballot/


No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.



From magnus.westerlund@ericsson.com  Wed Dec 26 05:01:42 2012
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From: Magnus Westerlund <magnus.westerlund@ericsson.com>
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Thread-Topic: Last Call: <draft-ietf-mboned-auto-multicast-14.txt> (Automatic Multicast Tunneling) to Proposed Standard
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Hi,

Sorry for being late with this IETF last call comments. I will partly blame=
 the ADs requesting this Transport Directorate review a bit late, the other=
 part is all mine and the holidays. Anyway, I do hope you will consider the=
se issues and comments as I believe I found some serious ones in addition t=
o a number of clarifications that should be made.


Significant Issues:

1. Congestion Control
This is clearly a tunnel establishment protocol of something that is IP tra=
ffic. Thus normally the responsibility for congestion control is with the t=
unnelled traffic. However, I would like argue that this does not apply in t=
his case due to the nature of the tunnelled traffic, i.e. multicast traffic=
 and secondary due to limitations in the tunnel protocol.

Lets start with the second part. This protocol claims to support ASM still =
don't provide a upstream delivery mechanism, i.e. an ASM receiver is not ca=
pable of sending as it should. This prevents several existing mechanism for=
 congestion control that exist in protocols supporting multicast. The first=
 is using RTCP for congestion control in ASM [RFC3550], the second is TCP-F=
riendly Multicast Congestion Control [RFC4654] that can be used in the RMT =
suite of protocols, and I know has been implemented in some NORM implementa=
tion. Thus only strictly receiver based mechanisms, such as Wave and Equati=
on Based Rate Control [RFC3738] are available in this context.

Secondly, many multicast usages are in fact deployed without any congestion=
 control. This based on that the deploying entity controls the scope and au=
thorization for requesting multicast delivery. However, does restrictions d=
oes not apply to AMT delivery of multicast. If the gateway can reach using =
unicast the relay it can be delivered the multicast group from the domain t=
he relay is attached to. Thus, this protocol changes the deployment restric=
tions of multicast which many non-congestion controlled delivery is based o=
n. Instead the non-congestion controlled traffic can now sent over an IP/UD=
P tunnel over Internet where neither relay nor gateway may have any knowled=
ge about the path the traffic may take.

Based on this I would like to see two changes to this protocol specificatio=
n. First a section discussing the issue of congestion control. Secondly, I =
think this protocol should have an applicability statement limiting its dep=
loyment to restricted environments where the relay and gateway deployers ca=
n provide certain resource provisions between the entities to avoid the mul=
ticast traffic affecting other traffic sharing the same bottlenecks in ways=
 not allowed by the network provider.

2. Security

This protocols is frank with it having limited security features and says t=
his is similar to the IGMP and MLD protocols being used. However, I think t=
his is a failure to propoerly consider the threat model. If one uses AMT ov=
er general Internet it will run in a network where the one deploying the mu=
lticast and the relays no longer control requirements on source address ver=
ification or possibilities for traffic separation as they can do within the=
 domains where multicast currently are deployed. The security vulnerabiliti=
es in IGMP and MLD are much more contained and controllable in a LAN enviro=
nment where one has chosen to deploy multicast compared to an Relay exposin=
g this to the whole Internet. Once more I think there is only two choices h=
ere.

A) Beef up the security to general Internet threat model, i.e. at a minimal=
 provide a real model for gateway authentication using identities, not only=
 return routability based verifications.

B) Limit the applicability of AMT to managed environments and make it clear=
 that the relay will need to limit which gateways are allowed to access the=
 relay based on addressing.

Based on the first significant issue with congestion control I expect that =
there is little meaning to do A) unless also one is willing to beef up AMT =
to provide congestion control. Which I think is not according to the design=
 wishes for the protocol designers.

3. Use of Zero Checksum

The AMT specification enables the use of Zero UDP checksum with IPv6, i.e.
draft-ietf-6man-udpchecksums-06<http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-=
6man-udpchecksums/> and draft-ietf-6man-udpzero-08<http://datatracker.ietf.=
org/doc/draft-ietf-6man-udpzero/>. Nothing against this in principal. Howev=
er, I have noticed that AMT fails to properly address the failure modes of =
using a zero-checksum. AMT is a typical example of a protocol that actually=
 need active verification of each tunnel that zero-checksum functions. This=
 as AMT is clearly intended to be deployed with its Gateway part in end-hos=
ts and residential network devices or routers. This means the tunnel will p=
ass through both firewalls and NATs on its path between the relay and the g=
ateway. Unless these devices are not upgraded to support zero-checksum in U=
DP for IPv6 the traffic may actually become black holed. The most likely is=
 a simple firewall that has a rule for IPv6/UDP which doesn't allow zero ch=
ecksum as it is against RFC 2460. Thus all the Multicast data packets will =
disappear on route in the tunnel. There is no mechanism in the AMT protocol=
 to detect this and negotiate with the relay so that it will not use the ze=
ro-checksum for this tunnel.

This must be addressed as I see it. If not the AMT will be so brittle that =
it can't be used in a large number of its intended deployments.

4) MTU issues

This document total fails to discuss the issues of MTU blackholing. As the =
IP multicast datagrams as well as the encapsulated IGMP/MLD messages can wi=
th the added tunnel-overhead result in that the sent packet exceeds the MTU=
 of the path, these packets could be black holed. This can potentially resu=
lt in very intermittent transport behavior for the tunnel. Thus, some discu=
ssion of how do handle the MTU issues in this context should be introduced.

I am willing to discuss methods here, but I guess several alternatives exis=
ts and thus which is most appropriate and the level of AMT support for them=
 varies I would like the protocol designers to do a first stab at resolving=
 this.

Other Issues
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D

A) The table of content on page 2 should include more levels of headings. M=
ost likely down to 4 is needed to make the TOC usable for finding content i=
n the document.

B) The claimed ASM support
I would like to better understand how one can claim to support ASM when one=
 has no up stream path to inject the ASM group participants traffic. When o=
ne uses ASM one normally does this for a reason and needing the possibility=
 to inject packets into the group. These limitations needs to be clarified.

C) Section 4:

This section indicates is its figures, the ones in Section 4.1.1 and Sectio=
n 4.1.3.1 that the Router Mode IGMP/MLD functions are outside of AMT. Which=
 based on the requirements in Section 5.3.3.4 is not accurate. That impleme=
ntation must be AMT specific to maintain the AMT tunnel to group membership=
 handling

D) Not all figures have handles that can be used to reference.

E) Section 4.1.5.1:


   Similarly, the selection of a unicast Relay address may be source-
   dependent, as a relay contacted by a gateway to supply multicast
   traffic must have native multicast connectivity to the traffic source


I find this statement confusing. There is no support in the protocol for in=
cluding the multicast group(s) which the gateway like to get in the discove=
ry phase of the protocol.

F) AMT Gateway in home router.
One deployment scenario is that the AMT gateway is deployed in the home net=
work router to provide access to multicast groups provided by the ISP. Howe=
ver, the startup procedures in this deployment is unclear. The text appears=
 to indicate that one can both have a gateway implementation that as soon a=
s the router boots it starts doing discovery and requests to have Queries t=
o send to its internal local network. Other suggestions appears to be to wa=
it until some host actually request to join a group. The protocol specifica=
tion appears to do its best to leave very much flexibility and thus produce=
 huge variance in the market.

G) Figure 3:
I find no discussion of Membership Updates to rejoin the groups after the t=
unnel has changed its source address as seen by the relay. This I think sho=
uld have some discussion. Yes, it reasonably clear that you will get traffi=
c just by sending new membership updates over the new tunnel. However, some=
 discussion of the timing between teardown and this membership update shoul=
d be considered. Figure 3 implies it should be sent after the teardown, whi=
ch I think is correct due to the traffic volumes to the NAT most likely cau=
sing the path change.

H) Figure in Section 4.2.2.2
Propose that the external side of the NAT should be marked as the one havin=
g the "e" addresses.

I) Seeing the figure in Section 4.2.2.3 I definitely commented on the Addre=
ss Collision issues. It is made somewhat clearer later on this. But, maybe =
an clearer section 4 sub-section to discuss this general issue that multipl=
e left side host can have the same address as other behind other tunnel-end=
-points and thus there is need in the Relay to hide this from upstream and =
accept it and use the tunnel context to track the different hosts.

J) Section 4.2.2.3:


 To avoid placing an undue burden on the relay platform, the protocol
   specifically allows zero-valued UDP checksums on the multicast data
   messages.  This is not an issue in UDP over IPv4 as the UDP checksum
   field may be set to zero.  However, this is a problem for UDP over
   IPv6 as that protocol requires a valid, non-zero checksum in UDP
   datagrams [RFC2460].  Messages sent over IPv6 with a UDP checksum of
   zero may fail to reach the gateway.  This is a well known issue for
   UDP-based tunneling protocols that is described
   [I-D.ietf-6man-udpzero].  A recommended solution is described in
   [I-D.ietf-6man-udpchecksums].

I think this needs reformulating and I don't understand what is intended
with the last sentence.

K) Section 5.1.1.
"Destination UDP Port -  The IANA-assigned AMT port number."

I find it strange that the protocol is mandating that all traffic is sent
to the IANA assigned port. Why can't the protocol not allow more flexible h=
andling
of the destination port? I find one single thing in the protocol which prev=
ents
usage of an other relay listener port. That is that the Relay Advertisement=
 would
need a port field in addition to the address.

L) Section 5.1.1.4
A 32-bit random value generated by the gateway and echoed by the
   relay in a Relay Advertisement message.

Should the above value make it clear that it preferably should be a
cryptographically random value as defined in RFC 4086?

M) There is lack of specification in Section 5.1.1 of what one does if vers=
ion
is different from 0. This is mentioned in Section 5.3.3.1 but not for gatew=
ays
and not all messages types.

N) Section 5.1.4.8:

   The Querier's Query Interval Code (QQIC) field in the general query
   is used by a relay to specify the time offset a gateway should use to
   schedule a new three-way handshake to refresh the group membership
   state within the relay (current time + Query Interval).

In several places the QQIC and QRV are not made clear that this is defined =
in
the external references for MLD and IGMP.

O) Section 5:
When specifying the bit-fields, please indicate the length of each field in=
 the
text. This is an accessibility question. If you have impaired vision interp=
reting
the figures field length correctly can be different.

P) Section 5.2.2.4:

This section defined what retransmission parameters that one can potentiall=
y
configure. However, the section fails to define what the max or min values =
that
are acceptable are. Wrongly configured retransmission parameters can have s=
ignificant
negative impact on the network by causing bursts or unnecessary traffic.

Q) Section 5.2.3.3:
The gateway may continue to receive Multicast Data messages long
   after the gateway sends a Membership Update message that deletes
   existing group subscriptions.

What is "long" in the above sentence. Are we talking some known number of s=
econds,
a TCP MSL, i.e. 2 min?

R) Section 5.2.3.4.3
   A gateway MAY retransmit a Relay Discovery message if it does not
   receive a matching Relay Advertisement message within some timeout
   period.  If the gateway retransmits the message multiple times, the
   timeout period SHOULD be adjusted to provide an random exponential
   back-off.  The RECOMMENDED timeout is a random value in the range
   [initial_timeout, MIN(initial_timeout * 2^retry_count,
   maximum_timeout)], with a RECOMMENDED initial_timeout of 1 second and
   a RECOMMENDED maximum_timeout of 120 seconds (which is the
   recommended minimum NAT mapping timeout described in [RFC4787]).

I wonder if the above exponential backof is really what is desired. As it r=
andomly
picks the timeout between initial timout value and the 2^retry_count*initia=
l_timeout it
will be both lower biased and also capable of producing timing intervals th=
at doesn't
grow. If one desire to have random timeout to avoid some clock synchronizat=
ion effects
I think an algorithm that is Td =3D MIN(initial_timeout * 2^retry_count,
   maximum_timeout) and where the actual timeout is random*Td and where ran=
dom is a
random value from the uniform distribution in the interval [0.5,1.5]. Will =
both ensure
that the timout between two retransmissions never is less and on average gr=
ows with
a factor two.

This section is also not defining a minimal initial timout value, or any me=
thod for
safely determine a more performant value from a safe initial value. To do a=
 RTT
measurement using the AMT control messages would require some extensions bu=
t
could be a good way of deterimining a better initial value than 0.5 seconds=
 which
would be my recommendation for a default value.

S) Section 5.2.3.4.4

   If a gateway executes the relay discovery procedure at the start of
   each membership update cycle and the relay address returned in the
   latest Relay Advertisement message differs from the address returned
   in a previous Relay Advertisement message, then the gateway SHOULD
   send a Teardown message (if supported) to the old relay address,
   using information from the last Membership Query message received
   from that relay, as described in Section 5.2.3.7.  This behavior is
   illustrated in the following diagram.

This text and the figure after it does not appear to be consistent.
The figure implies a timer that isn't present in the above. The textual
description appears sensitive to flapping anycast routing. I think
the figures indication of some higher timeout before redoing Relay discover=
y
appears much more robust.

T) Section 5.2.3.5.3
See R)
Also this text appears redundant to previous text. Maybe generalize this
into its own section being used in general for all messages needing retrans=
mission

U) Section 5.2.3.5.4
   Querier's Query Interval Code carried by the general-query.  A
   gateway MAY use a smaller timer duration if required to refresh a NAT
   mapping that would otherwise timeout.

Maybe the protocol would rather need a NAT keep-alive message to be sent
from the gateway to the relay. But maybe the Request, Query cycle is light =
weight
enough that this works fine.

V) Section 5.2.3.6.1

o  Insert IGMP or MLD datagrams into a queue for transmission after
      it receives a Membership Query message.

What assumptions of queue depth exist in the above. Clearly the messages in=
 this
queue should expire if they become to old.

X) Section 5.2.3.7
Gateway support for the Teardown message is OPTIONAL but RECOMMENDED.

The above is a very strange usage of RFC 2119 keywords. IF you use the syno=
nyms
then maybe the error of writing it this way is clear.
Gateway MAY support for the Teardown message but SHOULD.

Y) The usage of retransmission versus repetitions are not always clear.
Some of the messages appears to simply need to be repeated QRV number of ti=
mes with
some interval. Others should really be matched with an answer and if not re=
ceived within
timeout retransmitted. Can these two cases be made more clear?

Z) Section 5.3.5
   The hash function RECOMMENDED for use in computing the Response MAC
   is the MD5 hash digest [RFC1321], though hash functions or keyed-hash
   functions of greater cryptographic strength may be used.

I think this points to a security vulnerability. I think it needs to be mad=
e clear
that the MAC MUST be keyed. If it is just a digest, then an attacker can ca=
lculate the
MAC and perform an off-path attack.

This should be made clear also in Section 6.1 to be a requirement.

AA) Section A.1:

Altough this proposals has its advantages I think it might also illustrate =
a
short-coming. First of all 48-bits is quite short for a MAC. I would prefer=
 a
variable length field.

Secondly, doesn't this actually create more material for an attacker to det=
ermine
the key used by the relay?

That was all I have found.

Cheers

Magnus


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<div style=3D"direction: ltr;font-family: Tahoma;color: #000000;font-size: =
10pt;"><font face=3D"Courier New">Hi,<br>
<br>
Sorry for being late with this IETF last call comments. I will partly blame=
 the ADs requesting this Transport Directorate review a bit late, the other=
 part is all mine and the holidays. Anyway, I do hope you will consider the=
se issues and comments as I believe
 I found some serious ones in addition to a number of clarifications that s=
hould be made.<br>
<br>
<br>
Significant Issues:<br>
<br>
1. Congestion Control<br>
This is clearly a tunnel establishment protocol of something that is IP tra=
ffic. Thus normally the responsibility for congestion control is with the t=
unnelled traffic. However, I would like argue that this does not apply in t=
his case due to the nature of the
 tunnelled traffic, i.e. multicast traffic and secondary due to limitations=
 in the tunnel protocol.
<br>
<br>
Lets start with the second part. This protocol claims to support ASM still =
don't provide a upstream delivery mechanism, i.e. an ASM receiver is not ca=
pable of sending as it should. This prevents several existing mechanism for=
 congestion control that exist in
 protocols supporting multicast. The first is using RTCP for congestion con=
trol in ASM [RFC3550], the second is</font><font face=3D"Courier New" size=
=3D"2"><font size=3D"3">
</font>TCP-Friendly Multicast Congestion Control [RFC4654] that can be used=
 in <font size=3D"2">
the RMT s<font size=3D"2">uite of protocols, and I know <font size=3D"2">ha=
s been implemented in some NORM implementation. Thus only<font size=3D"2"> =
strictly receiver based
<font size=3D"2">mechanisms, such as </font></font></font></font></font></f=
ont><font face=3D"Courier New" size=3D"2"><font size=3D"2"><font size=3D"2"=
><font size=3D"2"><font size=3D"2"><font size=3D"2">Wave and Equation Based=
 Rate Control [RFC3738]</font> are available in
 this context. <br>
<br>
<font size=3D"2">Secondly, <font size=3D"2">many multicast <font size=3D"2"=
>usages are in fact deployed
<font size=3D"2">without any congestion control. This based on that the dep=
loy<font size=3D"2">ing entity controls
<font size=3D"2">the scope <font size=3D"2">and <font size=3D"2"><font size=
=3D"2">authorization</font> for
<font size=3D"2">requesting multicast d<font size=3D"2">elivery. However, <=
font size=3D"2">
does <font size=3D"2">restrictions d<font size=3D"2">oes not apply to AMT d=
elivery of mu<font size=3D"2">lticast. I<font size=3D"2">f the gat<font siz=
e=3D"2">e<font size=3D"2">way can reach
<font size=3D"2">using unicast the relay it can be delivered the multicast =
group from the domain the relay is attached to. Thus<font size=3D"2">, th<f=
ont size=3D"2">is protocol changes the deployment restrictions
<font size=3D"2">of multic<font size=3D"2">ast which many non-congestion co=
ntrolled delivery is based on. Instead the
<font size=3D"2">non-congestion controlled traffic<font size=3D"2"> can</fo=
nt> now sen<font size=3D"2">t over an IP/UDP tunnel over Internet</font></f=
ont></font></font></font></font></font></font></font></font></font></font><=
/font></font></font></font></font></font></font></font></font></font></font=
></font>
 w<font size=3D"2">here neither r<font size=3D"2">elay nor gateway may have=
 any knowledge about the pat<font size=3D"2">h the traffic may take.
<br>
<br>
<font size=3D"2"><font size=3D"2"><font size=3D"2">Based on this I would <f=
ont size=3D"2">
like to see two <font size=3D"2">changes</font> to this protocol specificat=
ion. First a section discussing the issue of congestion control.
<font size=3D"2">Secondly, I think this protocol shou<font size=3D"2">ld ha=
ve an applicability statement limiting its deployment
<font size=3D"2">to restricted <font size=3D"2">environments</font> where t=
he relay and gateway deploy<font size=3D"2">ers can provide
<font size=3D"2">certain resource provisions between the <font size=3D"2">e=
ntiti<font size=3D"2">es to avoid the m<font size=3D"2">ulticast traffic af=
fecting other traffic sharing the same bottlenecks<font size=3D"2"> in ways=
 not allowed by the network
<font size=3D"2">provider. </font></font></font></font></font></font></font=
></font></font></font></font></font></font></font><br>
</font></font></font></font></font></font></font></font><font face=3D"Couri=
er New"><br>
2. Security<br>
<br>
This protocols is frank with it having limited security features and says t=
his is similar to the IGMP and MLD protocols being used. However, I think t=
his is a failure to propoerly consider the threat model. If one uses AMT ov=
er general Internet it will run
 in a network where the one deploying the multicast and the relays no longe=
r control requirements on source address verification or possibilities for =
traffic separation as they can do within the domains where multicast curren=
tly are deployed. The security vulnerabilities
 in IGMP and MLD are much more contained and controllable in a LAN environm=
ent where one has chosen to deploy multicast compared to an Relay exposing =
this to the whole Internet. Once more I think there is only two choices her=
e.<br>
<br>
A) Beef up the security to general Internet threat model, i.e. at a minimal=
 provide a real model for gateway authentication using identities, not only=
 return routability based verifications.
<br>
<br>
B) Limit the applicability of AMT to managed environments and make it clear=
 that the relay will need to limit which gateways are allowed to access the=
 relay based on addressing.
<br>
<br>
Based on the first significant issue with congestion control I expect that =
there is little meaning to do A) unless also one is willing to beef up AMT =
to provide congestion control. Which I think is not according to the design=
 wishes for the protocol designers.<br>
<br>
3. Use of Zero Checksum <br>
<br>
The AMT specification enables the use of Zero UDP checksum with IPv6, i.e. =
</font>
<br>
<font face=3D"Courier New"><a href=3D"http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft=
-ietf-6man-udpchecksums/">draft-ietf-6man-udpchecksums-06</a> and
</font><font face=3D"Courier New"><a href=3D"http://datatracker.ietf.org/do=
c/draft-ietf-6man-udpzero/">draft-ietf-6man-udpzero-08</a>. Nothing against=
 this in principal. However, I have noticed that AMT fails to properly addr=
ess the failure modes of using a zero-checksum.
 AMT is a typical example of a protocol that actually need active verificat=
ion of each tunnel that zero-checksum functions. This as AMT is clearly int=
ended to be deployed with its Gateway part in end-hosts and residential net=
work devices or routers. This means
 the tunnel will pass through both firewalls and NATs on its path between t=
he relay and the gateway. Unless these devices are not upgraded to support =
zero-checksum in UDP for IPv6 the traffic may actually become black holed. =
The most likely is a simple firewall
 that has a rule for IPv6/UDP which doesn't allow zero checksum as it is ag=
ainst RFC 2460. Thus all the Multicast data packets will disappear on route=
 in the tunnel. There is no mechanism in the AMT protocol to detect this an=
d negotiate with the relay so that
 it will not use the zero-checksum for this tunnel. <br>
<br>
This must be addressed as I see it. If not the AMT will be so brittle that =
it can't be used in a large number of its intended deployments.
<br>
<br>
4) MTU issues<br>
<br>
This document total fails to discuss the issues of MTU blackholing. As the =
IP multicast datagrams as well as the encapsulated IGMP/MLD messages can wi=
th the added tunnel-overhead result in that the sent packet exceeds the MTU=
 of the path, these packets could
 be black holed. This can potentially result in very intermittent transport=
 behavior for the tunnel. Thus, some discussion of how do handle the MTU is=
sues in this context should be introduced.
<br>
<br>
I am willing to discuss methods here, but I guess several alternatives exis=
ts and thus which is most appropriate and the level of AMT support for them=
 varies I would like the protocol designers to do a first stab at resolving=
 this.
<br>
<br>
Other Issues<br>
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D<br>
<br>
A) The table of content on page 2 should include more levels of headings. M=
ost likely down to 4 is needed to make the TOC usable for finding content i=
n the document.<br>
<br>
B) </font><font face=3D"Courier New"><font face=3D"Courier New">The claimed=
 ASM support<br>
I would like to better understand how one can claim to support ASM when one=
 has no up stream path to inject the ASM group participants traffic. When o=
ne uses ASM one normally does this for a reason and needing the possibility=
 to inject packets into the group.
 These limitations needs to be clarified. </font><br>
<br>
C) Section 4:<br>
<br>
This section indicates is its figures, the ones in Section 4.1.1 and Sectio=
n 4.1.3.1 that the Router Mode IGMP/MLD functions are outside of AMT. Which=
 based on the requirements in Section 5.3.3.4 is not accurate. That impleme=
ntation must be AMT specific to
 maintain the AMT tunnel to group membership handling<br>
<br>
D) Not all figures have handles that can be used to reference.<br>
<br>
E) Section 4.1.5.1: <br>
</font><br>
<pre>   Similarly, the selection of a unicast Relay address may be source-=
=0A=
   dependent, as a relay contacted by a gateway to supply multicast=0A=
   traffic must have native multicast connectivity to the traffic source=0A=
</pre>
<font face=3D"Courier New">I find this statement confusing. There is no sup=
port in the protocol for including the multicast group(s) which the gateway=
 like to get in the discovery phase of the protocol.<br>
<br>
F) AMT Gateway in home router.<br>
One deployment scenario is that the AMT gateway is deployed in the home net=
work router to provide access to multicast groups provided by the ISP. Howe=
ver, the startup procedures in this deployment is unclear. The text appears=
 to indicate that one can both have
 a gateway implementation that as soon as the router boots it starts doing =
discovery and requests to have Queries to send to its internal local networ=
k. Other suggestions appears to be to wait until some host actually request=
 to join a group. The protocol specification
 appears to do its best to leave very much flexibility and thus produce hug=
e variance in the market.
<br>
<br>
G) Figure 3:<br>
I find no discussion of Membership Updates to rejoin the groups after the t=
unnel has changed its source address as seen by the relay. This I think sho=
uld have some discussion. Yes, it reasonably clear that you will get traffi=
c just by sending new membership
 updates over the new tunnel. However, some discussion of the timing betwee=
n teardown and this membership update should be considered. Figure 3 implie=
s it should be sent after the teardown, which I think is correct due to the=
 traffic volumes to the NAT most
 likely causing the path change. <br>
<br>
H) Figure in Section 4.2.2.2<br>
Propose that the external side of the NAT should be marked as the one havin=
g the &quot;e&quot; addresses.<br>
<br>
I) Seeing the figure in Section 4.2.2.3 I definitely commented on the Addre=
ss Collision issues. It is made somewhat clearer later on this. But, maybe =
an clearer section 4 sub-section to discuss this general issue that multipl=
e left side host can have the same
 address as other behind other tunnel-end-points and thus there is need in =
the Relay to hide this from upstream and accept it and use the tunnel conte=
xt to track the different hosts.
<br>
<br>
J) Section 4.2.2.3:<br>
</font><br>
<pre> To avoid placing an undue burden on the relay platform, the protocol=
=0A=
   specifically allows zero-valued UDP checksums on the multicast data=0A=
   messages.  This is not an issue in UDP over IPv4 as the UDP checksum=0A=
   field may be set to zero.  However, this is a problem for UDP over=0A=
   IPv6 as that protocol requires a valid, non-zero checksum in UDP=0A=
   datagrams [RFC2460].  Messages sent over IPv6 with a UDP checksum of=0A=
   zero may fail to reach the gateway.  This is a well known issue for=0A=
   UDP-based tunneling protocols that is described=0A=
   [I-D.ietf-6man-udpzero].  A recommended solution is described in=0A=
   [I-D.ietf-6man-udpchecksums].=0A=
<br>I think this needs reformulating and I don't understand what is intende=
d <br>with the last sentence. <br><br>K) Section 5.1.1.<br>&quot;Destinatio=
n UDP Port -  The IANA-assigned AMT port number.&quot;<br><br>I find it str=
ange that the protocol is mandating that all traffic is sent<br>to the IANA=
 assigned port. Why can't the protocol not allow more flexible handling<br>=
of the destination port? I find one single thing in the protocol which prev=
ents <br>usage of an other relay listener port. That is that the Relay Adve=
rtisement would <br>need a port field in addition to the address.<br><br>L)=
 Section 5.1.1.4<br>A 32-bit random value generated by the gateway and echo=
ed by the=0A=
   relay in a Relay Advertisement message. <br><br>Should the above value m=
ake it clear that it preferably should be a <br>cryptographically random va=
lue as defined in RFC 4086?<br><br>M) There is lack of specification in Sec=
tion 5.1.1 of what one does if version <br>is different from 0. This is men=
tioned in Section 5.3.3.1 but not for gateways <br>and not all messages typ=
es. <br><br>N) Section 5.1.4.8:<br><br>   The Querier's Query Interval Code=
 (QQIC) field in the general query=0A=
   is used by a relay to specify the time offset a gateway should use to=0A=
   schedule a new three-way handshake to refresh the group membership=0A=
   state within the relay (current time &#43; Query Interval).=0A=
<br>In several places the QQIC and QRV are not made clear that this is defi=
ned in <br>the external references for MLD and IGMP. <br><br>O) Section 5:<=
br>When specifying the bit-fields, please indicate the length of each field=
 in the <br>text. This is an accessibility question. If you have impaired v=
ision interpreting<br>the figures field length correctly can be different. =
<br><br>P) Section 5.2.2.4:<br><br>This section defined what retransmission=
 parameters that one can potentially <br>configure. However, the section fa=
ils to define what the max or min values that <br>are acceptable are. Wrong=
ly configured retransmission parameters can have significant<br>negative im=
pact on the network by causing bursts or unnecessary traffic. <br><br>Q) Se=
ction 5.2.3.3:<br>The gateway may continue to receive Multicast Data messag=
es long=0A=
   after the gateway sends a Membership Update message that deletes=0A=
   existing group subscriptions.<br><br>What is &quot;long&quot; in the abo=
ve sentence. Are we talking some known number of seconds, <br>a TCP MSL, i.=
e. 2 min?<br><br>R) Section 5.2.3.4.3<br>   A gateway MAY retransmit a Rela=
y Discovery message if it does not=0A=
   receive a matching Relay Advertisement message within some timeout=0A=
   period.  If the gateway retransmits the message multiple times, the=0A=
   timeout period SHOULD be adjusted to provide an random exponential=0A=
   back-off.  The RECOMMENDED timeout is a random value in the range=0A=
   [initial_timeout, MIN(initial_timeout * 2^retry_count,=0A=
   maximum_timeout)], with a RECOMMENDED initial_timeout of 1 second and=0A=
   a RECOMMENDED maximum_timeout of 120 seconds (which is the=0A=
   recommended minimum NAT mapping timeout described in [RFC4787]).<br><br>=
I wonder if the above exponential backof is really what is desired. As it r=
andomly<br>picks the timeout between initial timout value and the 2^retry_c=
ount*initial_timeout it <br>will be both lower biased and also capable of p=
roducing timing intervals that doesn't <br>grow. If one desire to have rand=
om timeout to avoid some clock synchronization effects<br>I think an algori=
thm that is Td =3D MIN(initial_timeout * 2^retry_count,=0A=
   maximum_timeout) and where the actual timeout is random*Td and where ran=
dom is a <br>random value from the uniform distribution in the interval [0.=
5,1.5]. Will both ensure<br>that the timout between two retransmissions nev=
er is less and on average grows with <br>a factor two. <br><br>This section=
 is also not defining a minimal initial timout value, or any method for <br=
>safely determine a more performant value from a safe initial value. To do =
a RTT <br>measurement using the AMT control messages would require some ext=
ensions but<br>could be a good way of deterimining a better initial value t=
han 0.5 seconds which <br>would be my recommendation for a default value. <=
br><br>S) Section 5.2.3.4.4<br><br>   If a gateway executes the relay disco=
very procedure at the start of=0A=
   each membership update cycle and the relay address returned in the=0A=
   latest Relay Advertisement message differs from the address returned=0A=
   in a previous Relay Advertisement message, then the gateway SHOULD=0A=
   send a Teardown message (if supported) to the old relay address,=0A=
   using information from the last Membership Query message received=0A=
   from that relay, as described in Section 5.2.3.7.  This behavior is=0A=
   illustrated in the following diagram. <br><br>This text and the figure a=
fter it does not appear to be consistent.<br>The figure implies a timer tha=
t isn't present in the above. The textual <br>description appears sensitive=
 to flapping anycast routing. I think<br>the figures indication of some hig=
her timeout before redoing Relay discovery <br>appears much more robust. <b=
r><br>T) Section 5.2.3.5.3<br>See R)<br>Also this text appears redundant to=
 previous text. Maybe generalize this<br>into its own section being used in=
 general for all messages needing retransmission<br><br>U) Section 5.2.3.5.=
4<br>   Querier's Query Interval Code carried by the general-query.  A=0A=
   gateway MAY use a smaller timer duration if required to refresh a NAT=0A=
   mapping that would otherwise timeout. <br><br>Maybe the protocol would r=
ather need a NAT keep-alive message to be sent<br>from the gateway to the r=
elay. But maybe the Request, Query cycle is light weight <br>enough that th=
is works fine. <br><br>V) Section 5.2.3.6.1<br><br>o  Insert IGMP or MLD da=
tagrams into a queue for transmission after=0A=
      it receives a Membership Query message.<br><br>What assumptions of qu=
eue depth exist in the above. Clearly the messages in this <br>queue should=
 expire if they become to old. <br><br>X) Section 5.2.3.7<br>Gateway suppor=
t for the Teardown message is OPTIONAL but RECOMMENDED.<br><br>The above is=
 a very strange usage of RFC 2119 keywords. IF you use the synonyms<br>then=
 maybe the error of writing it this way is clear. <br>Gateway MAY support f=
or the Teardown message but SHOULD. <br><br>Y) The usage of retransmission =
versus repetitions are not always clear.<br>Some of the messages appears to=
 simply need to be repeated QRV number of times with <br>some interval. Oth=
ers should really be matched with an answer and if not received within<br>t=
imeout retransmitted. Can these two cases be made more clear?<br><br>Z) Sec=
tion 5.3.5<br>   The hash function RECOMMENDED for use in computing the Res=
ponse MAC=0A=
   is the MD5 hash digest [RFC1321], though hash functions or keyed-hash=0A=
   functions of greater cryptographic strength may be used.<br>&nbsp;<br>I =
think this points to a security vulnerability. I think it needs to be made =
clear <br>that the MAC MUST be keyed. If it is just a digest, then an attac=
ker can calculate the <br>MAC and perform an off-path attack. <br><br>This =
should be made clear also in Section 6.1 to be a requirement.<br><br>AA) Se=
ction A.1:<br><br>Altough this proposals has its advantages I think it migh=
t also illustrate a <br>short-coming. First of all 48-bits is quite short f=
or a MAC. I would prefer a <br>variable length field.<br><br>Secondly, does=
n't this actually create more material for an attacker to determine<br>the =
key used by the relay?<br><br>That was all I have found. <br><br>Cheers<br>=
<br>Magnus<br><br></pre>
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