From nobody Thu Aug 1 08:29:04 2019 Return-Path: X-Original-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7EA3C1200F3 for ; Thu, 1 Aug 2019 08:29:01 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -4.199 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.199 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id vvt_3G8GimiI for ; Thu, 1 Aug 2019 08:28:59 -0700 (PDT) Received: from tuna.sandelman.ca (tuna.sandelman.ca [209.87.249.19]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C87541200CC for ; Thu, 1 Aug 2019 08:28:59 -0700 (PDT) Received: from sandelman.ca (unknown [IPv6:2607:f0b0:f:2:56b2:3ff:fe0b:d84]) by tuna.sandelman.ca (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0E423380BE; Thu, 1 Aug 2019 11:28:30 -0400 (EDT) Received: from [IPv6:::1] (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by sandelman.ca (Postfix) with ESMTP id 707B58EF; Thu, 1 Aug 2019 11:28:57 -0400 (EDT) To: Stephen Farrell , model-t@iab.org References: From: Michael Richardson Message-ID: <29756028-95f1-e6e5-b3ea-562cbc635df0@sandelman.ca> Date: Thu, 1 Aug 2019 11:28:57 -0400 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/60.6.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Model-t] model-t@iab.org list description X-BeenThere: model-t@iab.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussions of changes in Internet deployment patterns and their impact on the Internet threat model List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 01 Aug 2019 15:29:02 -0000 On 2019-07-29 4:44 p.m., Stephen Farrell wrote: > > Hiya, > > This is mostly to start to populate the archive but the list > description for this list is: > > "The model-t list is for discussions of changes in Internet I notice the repeated capital-I Internet. There are often different situations for LLNs, Data-Centers, and the like. Is the point of this list to talk about threats on the Internet, or about better explaining threat models assumed in documents, such that we have better Security Considerations? The tasks are not mutually exclusive. Being better able to say, "mechanism X deals with the Internet Threat model situation Y" is a great win for Security Considerations. At first reading, I thought it was more about articulating threat models better, but upon further reading, I think this list is more about specific threats. From nobody Thu Aug 1 08:52:21 2019 Return-Path: X-Original-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8EDE4120103 for ; Thu, 1 Aug 2019 08:52:19 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -4.299 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.299 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=cs.tcd.ie Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id TBVG12M_Eh1B for ; Thu, 1 Aug 2019 08:52:18 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mercury.scss.tcd.ie (mercury.scss.tcd.ie [134.226.56.6]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id AB9B3120058 for ; Thu, 1 Aug 2019 08:52:17 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mercury.scss.tcd.ie (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5ED48BE2F; Thu, 1 Aug 2019 16:52:16 +0100 (IST) X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at scss.tcd.ie Received: from mercury.scss.tcd.ie ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mercury.scss.tcd.ie [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id FaKL4Xg7BelC; Thu, 1 Aug 2019 16:52:14 +0100 (IST) Received: from [10.244.2.138] (95-45-153-252-dynamic.agg2.phb.bdt-fng.eircom.net [95.45.153.252]) by mercury.scss.tcd.ie (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 0E589BE2E; Thu, 1 Aug 2019 16:52:14 +0100 (IST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=cs.tcd.ie; s=mail; t=1564674734; bh=gNy6PTN6PcxvoTKkI+lY9zrnkU3Q6ZiuSBqojegSJI0=; h=Subject:To:References:From:Date:In-Reply-To:From; b=FH3yT5tltuybaoZZPyGyAglSK/rTkwriG2HmkZ8k/SDQV1UIHgah+h8NVIbY1HzjI +PKPifWzW3noQdTVQclHo7ZmqL96dwNoS5K7xOPh9kzB0vsH3m8+T/v5cjo3BUj5eY bYIHWUdhegYcUT+k/fZkcEk1ZpctagOADG7a5ul0= To: Michael Richardson , model-t@iab.org References: <29756028-95f1-e6e5-b3ea-562cbc635df0@sandelman.ca> From: Stephen Farrell Openpgp: id=5BB5A6EA5765D2C5863CAE275AB2FAF17B172BEA; 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Linux x86_64; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/60.8.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <29756028-95f1-e6e5-b3ea-562cbc635df0@sandelman.ca> Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha512; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="ViGSEbqRx1WCpwUB68ZtlzwVa67ZM5Z8m" Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Model-t] model-t@iab.org list description X-BeenThere: model-t@iab.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussions of changes in Internet deployment patterns and their impact on the Internet threat model List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 01 Aug 2019 15:52:20 -0000 This is an OpenPGP/MIME signed message (RFC 4880 and 3156) --ViGSEbqRx1WCpwUB68ZtlzwVa67ZM5Z8m Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="VQGI3kcDreT8cezQff5gd1ymm1SoGryAo"; protected-headers="v1" From: Stephen Farrell To: Michael Richardson , model-t@iab.org Message-ID: <556ea6cd-2ea8-6ab4-ddb3-80be95b17a0b@cs.tcd.ie> Subject: Re: [Model-t] model-t@iab.org list description References: <29756028-95f1-e6e5-b3ea-562cbc635df0@sandelman.ca> In-Reply-To: <29756028-95f1-e6e5-b3ea-562cbc635df0@sandelman.ca> --VQGI3kcDreT8cezQff5gd1ymm1SoGryAo Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="------------A304E223BD02D405357640CE" Content-Language: en-GB This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------A304E223BD02D405357640CE Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Hiya, Could you hold and re-tx that question in a few days? I'd like to leave some time for folks to get subscribed to the list so's we don't end up having to re-do things or get too far ahead of people who mightn't have had a chance to join the list immediately. As I said on the saag list, when I see enough of the folks I recall commenting in the mic lines (and other usual suspects:-) have subscribed, I'll send an "off we go" mail to the list, at which point please re-tx. Ta, S. On 01/08/2019 16:28, Michael Richardson wrote: > On 2019-07-29 4:44 p.m., Stephen Farrell wrote: >> >> Hiya, >> >> This is mostly to start to populate the archive but the list >> description for this list is: >> >> "The model-t list is for discussions of changes in Internet >=20 > I notice the repeated capital-I Internet. > There are often different situations for LLNs, Data-Centers, and the li= ke. >=20 > Is the point of this list to talk about threats on the Internet, > or about better explaining threat models assumed in documents, > such that we have better Security Considerations? > The tasks are not mutually exclusive.=C2=A0 Being better able to say, > "mechanism X deals with the Internet Threat model situation Y" > is a great win for Security Considerations. >=20 > At first reading, I thought it was more about articulating threat model= s > better, but upon further reading, I think this list is more about > specific threats. >=20 --------------A304E223BD02D405357640CE 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multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha512; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="hnta2htCkBcO3uHEUjNSzWEzdEVG3aQtJ" Archived-At: Subject: [Model-t] off we go X-BeenThere: model-t@iab.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussions of changes in Internet deployment patterns and their impact on the Internet threat model List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 02 Aug 2019 14:26:07 -0000 This is an OpenPGP/MIME signed message (RFC 4880 and 3156) --hnta2htCkBcO3uHEUjNSzWEzdEVG3aQtJ Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="tuDKYKEMqSYuMB9edsH9ygQpcLuR41C3a"; protected-headers="v1" From: Stephen Farrell To: model-t@iab.org Message-ID: <9191f51c-f6bb-3369-3bf6-81529b3bf352@cs.tcd.ie> Subject: off we go --tuDKYKEMqSYuMB9edsH9ygQpcLuR41C3a Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="------------EB98B01380E26DE740A41A1D" Content-Language: en-GB This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------EB98B01380E26DE740A41A1D Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Hiya, We've now got 50+ folks subscribed to the list so it's probably ok to start the ball rolling now. Coupla notes on that: - It's still holiday-time for lots of people (incl. me next week) so we should assume a certain amount of repetition may be inevitable for a few more weeks as people tune in and out and then back in again. - My guess is that we'll start discussion and that'll quickly become pretty wide ranging as people throw in ideas about this, that and the other. I think that's just fine - there's no mega-rush (3552 having been around since 2003 and the sky not having fallen:-) and we can try winnow things down later, maybe in a couple of months or so. IOW, if you've ideas or possibly-crazy proposals in this space, now's the time... - This isn't an IETF WG so there's no chair, no specific work-items, drafts or milestones and no IETF processes that we need slavishly follow:-) OTOH, if discussion here is to produce outputs that are useful, those'll need to be things that are likely to garner consensus in the IETF and that can be useful to IETF participants across the full range of backgrounds and interests we see in IETF participants. So while we're not process-constrained, the range of useful outputs here is nonetheless constrained by the IETF in at least the two ways I mentioned there. Other than that, usual mailing list etiquette: do be nice, try be succinct, and change the subject line at least once a month:-) Cheers, S. --------------EB98B01380E26DE740A41A1D Content-Type: application/pgp-keys; name="0x5AB2FAF17B172BEA.asc" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="0x5AB2FAF17B172BEA.asc" -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- mQINBFo9UDIBEADUH4ZPcUnX5WWRWO4kEkHea5Y5eEvZjSwe/YA+G0nrTuOU9nem CP5PMvmh5Cg8gBTyWyN4Z2+O25p9Tja5zUb+vPMWYvOtokRrp46yhFZOmiS5b6kT q0IqYzsEv5HI58S+QtaFq978CRa4xH9Gi9u4yzUmT03QNIGDXE37honcAM4MOEtE gvw4fVhVWJuyy3w//0F2tzKrEMjmL5VGuD/Q9+G/7abuXiYNNd9ZFjv4625AUWwy +pAh4EKzS1FE7BOZp9daMu9MUQmDqtZUbUv0Q+DnQAB/4tNncejJPz0p2z3MWCp5 iSwHiQvytYgatMp34a50l6CWqa13n6vY8VcPlIqOVz+7L+WiVfxLbeVqBwV+4uL9 to9zLF9IyUvl94lCxpscR2kgRgpM6A5LylRDkR6E0oudFnJgb097ZaNyuY1ETghV B5Uir1GCYChs8NUNumTHXiOkuzk+Gs4DAHx/a78YxBolKHi+esLH8r2k4LyM2lp5 FmBKjG7cGcpBGmWavACYEa7rwAadg4uBx9SHMV5i33vDXQUZcmW0vslQ2Is02NMK 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ZLzL3pvV14dcsoajdeIH45i8DxnVm64BvEFHtLNlnliMrLOrk4shfmWyUqNlzilXN2BTFVFH 4MrnagFdcFnWYp1JPh96ZKjiqBwMv/H0kw== Message-ID: <5ef15ad2-5b20-e871-0d01-17cf906051c1@cs.tcd.ie> Date: Fri, 2 Aug 2019 15:33:52 +0100 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/60.8.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <29756028-95f1-e6e5-b3ea-562cbc635df0@sandelman.ca> Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha512; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="RIRIopvCAly0xJyUH6vLy0UhcRVzXdN8B" Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Model-t] model-t@iab.org list description X-BeenThere: model-t@iab.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussions of changes in Internet deployment patterns and their impact on the Internet threat model List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 02 Aug 2019 14:34:00 -0000 This is an OpenPGP/MIME signed message (RFC 4880 and 3156) --RIRIopvCAly0xJyUH6vLy0UhcRVzXdN8B Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="qeHVSPGJxSrAqmbBXywattP79GqTK5MNw"; protected-headers="v1" From: Stephen Farrell To: Michael Richardson , model-t@iab.org Message-ID: <5ef15ad2-5b20-e871-0d01-17cf906051c1@cs.tcd.ie> Subject: Re: [Model-t] model-t@iab.org list description References: <29756028-95f1-e6e5-b3ea-562cbc635df0@sandelman.ca> In-Reply-To: <29756028-95f1-e6e5-b3ea-562cbc635df0@sandelman.ca> --qeHVSPGJxSrAqmbBXywattP79GqTK5MNw Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="------------7091A085848FAFD67007AC2B" Content-Language: en-GB This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------7091A085848FAFD67007AC2B Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Hiya, On 01/08/2019 16:28, Michael Richardson wrote: > On 2019-07-29 4:44 p.m., Stephen Farrell wrote: >> >> Hiya, >> >> This is mostly to start to populate the archive but the list >> description for this list is: >> >> "The model-t list is for discussions of changes in Internet >=20 > I notice the repeated capital-I Internet. Habit more than anything in my case at least. I wouldn't read too much into it. > There are often different situations for LLNs, Data-Centers, and the li= ke. Sure. Those are not IMO out of scope at all. But neither is any one of those the full scope - I think the scope we ought consider here is basically any network technology that the IETF does/controls/specifies and even a bit more than that, as IETF-defined things can of course be attacked from lower layers or physically etc. > Is the point of this list to talk about threats on the Internet, > or about better explaining threat models assumed in documents, > such that we have better Security Considerations? > The tasks are not mutually exclusive.=C2=A0 Being better able to say, > "mechanism X deals with the Internet Threat model situation Y" > is a great win for Security Considerations. >=20 > At first reading, I thought it was more about articulating threat model= s > better, but upon further reading, I think this list is more about > specific threats. I'm not sure I'm quite getting what you mean exactly. FWIW, I do think we'll be discussing threats on this list, but a useful output will be a distillation of that discussion that gives us the kind of win for security considerations you have in quotes above. 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p16mr11324542iog.118.1564756762958; Fri, 02 Aug 2019 07:39:22 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <29756028-95f1-e6e5-b3ea-562cbc635df0@sandelman.ca> <5ef15ad2-5b20-e871-0d01-17cf906051c1@cs.tcd.ie> In-Reply-To: <5ef15ad2-5b20-e871-0d01-17cf906051c1@cs.tcd.ie> From: Joseph Lorenzo Hall Date: Fri, 2 Aug 2019 10:39:12 -0400 Message-ID: To: Stephen Farrell Cc: Michael Richardson , model-t@iab.org Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="000000000000043529058f2353d6" Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Model-t] model-t@iab.org list description X-BeenThere: model-t@iab.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussions of changes in Internet deployment patterns and their impact on the Internet threat model List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 02 Aug 2019 14:39:26 -0000 --000000000000043529058f2353d6 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" On Fri, Aug 2, 2019 at 10:34 Stephen Farrell wrote: > > Hiya, > > On 01/08/2019 16:28, Michael Richardson wrote: > > On 2019-07-29 4:44 p.m., Stephen Farrell wrote: > >> > >> Hiya, > >> > >> This is mostly to start to populate the archive but the list > >> description for this list is: > >> > >> "The model-t list is for discussions of changes in Internet > > > > I notice the repeated capital-I Internet. > > Habit more than anything in my case at least. I wouldn't read > too much into it. I remember recently writing "internet" into a draft and was taught that RFC 4949 says the following (while emphasizing that it's not official IETF position or anything)... I realize this is a small thing but would love to know if there are other authorities here: $ internet, Internet 1. (I) /not capitalized/ Abbreviation of "internetwork". 2. (I) /capitalized/ The Internet is the single, interconnected, worldwide system of commercial, governmental, educational, and other computer networks that share (a) the protocol suite specified by the IAB (RFC 2026 ) and (b) the name and address spaces managed by the ICANN. (See: Internet Layer, Internet Protocol Suite.) Usage: Use with definite article ("the") when using as a noun. For example, say "My LAN is small, but the Internet is large." Don't say "My LAN is small, but Internet is large." https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4949 -- Joseph Lorenzo Hall Chief Technologist, Center for Democracy & Technology [https://www.cdt.org] 1401 K ST NW STE 200, Washington DC 20005-3497 e: joe@cdt.org, p: 202.407.8825, pgp: https://josephhall.org/gpg-key Fingerprint: 3CA2 8D7B 9F6D DBD3 4B10 1607 5F86 6987 40A9 A871 --000000000000043529058f2353d6 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable


On Fri, Aug 2, 2019 at 10:34 Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:=

Hiya,

On 01/08/2019 16:28, Michael Richardson wrote:
> On 2019-07-29 4:44 p.m., Stephen Farrell wrote:
>>
>> Hiya,
>>
>> This is mostly to start to populate the archive but the list
>> description for this list is:
>>
>> "The model-t list is for discussions of changes in Internet >
> I notice the repeated capital-I Internet.

Habit more than anything in my case at least. I wouldn't read
too much into it.

I remember recently writing "internet" into a draft and was taug= ht that RFC 4949 says the following (while emphasizing that it's not of= ficial IETF position or anything)... I realize this is a small thing but wo= uld love to know if there are other authorities here:

   $ internet, Interne=
t
      1. (I) /not capitalized/ Abbreviation of "internetwork".

      2. (I) /capitalized/ The Internet is the single, interconnected,
      worldwide system of commercial, governmental, educational, and
      other computer networks that share (a) the protocol suite
      specified by the IAB (RFC 2026) and (b) the name and address
      spaces managed by the ICANN. (See: Internet Layer, Internet
      Protocol Suite.)

      Usage: Use with definite article ("the") when using as a no=
un. For
      example, say "My LAN is small, but the Internet is large." =
Don't
      say "My LAN is small, but Internet is large."

--
Joseph Lorenzo Hall
Chief Technologist, Center for Democra= cy & Technology [https://www.cdt.org]
1401 K ST NW STE 200, Washington DC 20005-3497
e: joe@cdt.org, p: 202.407.8825, pgp: https://josephhall.org/gpg-key
Fingerprint: 3C= A2 8D7B 9F6D DBD3 4B10=C2=A0 1607 5F86 6987 40A9 A871
--000000000000043529058f2353d6-- From nobody Fri Aug 2 10:58:31 2019 Return-Path: X-Original-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 96514120777 for ; Fri, 2 Aug 2019 10:58:29 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -4.2 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.2 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id m-JfLN3WCK_7 for ; Fri, 2 Aug 2019 10:58:27 -0700 (PDT) Received: from tuna.sandelman.ca (tuna.sandelman.ca [209.87.249.19]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7C3B8120776 for ; Fri, 2 Aug 2019 10:58:27 -0700 (PDT) Received: from sandelman.ca (obiwan.sandelman.ca [209.87.249.21]) by tuna.sandelman.ca (Postfix) with ESMTP id 831B6380BE; Fri, 2 Aug 2019 13:57:56 -0400 (EDT) Received: from localhost (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by sandelman.ca (Postfix) with ESMTP id 97049983; Fri, 2 Aug 2019 13:58:25 -0400 (EDT) From: Michael Richardson To: Stephen Farrell cc: model-t@iab.org In-Reply-To: <5ef15ad2-5b20-e871-0d01-17cf906051c1@cs.tcd.ie> References: <29756028-95f1-e6e5-b3ea-562cbc635df0@sandelman.ca> <5ef15ad2-5b20-e871-0d01-17cf906051c1@cs.tcd.ie> X-Mailer: MH-E 8.6; nmh 1.7+dev; GNU Emacs 24.5.1 X-Face: $\n1pF)h^`}$H>Hk{L"x@)JS7<%Az}5RyS@k9X%29-lHB$Ti.V>2bi.~ehC0; <'$9xN5Ub# z!G,p`nR&p7Fz@^UXIn156S8.~^@MJ*mMsD7=QFeq%AL4m Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Model-t] model-t@iab.org list description X-BeenThere: model-t@iab.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussions of changes in Internet deployment patterns and their impact on the Internet threat model List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 02 Aug 2019 17:58:30 -0000 --=-=-= Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Stephen Farrell wrote: >> There are often different situations for LLNs, Data-Centers, and the >> like. > Sure. Those are not IMO out of scope at all. But neither is any one of > those the full scope - I think the scope we ought consider here is > basically any network technology that the IETF does/controls/specifies > and even a bit more than that, as IETF-defined things can of course be > attacked from lower layers or physically etc. What I'm trying to say is that there are some threats that we deal with on the Capital-Internet that are far more manageable in the small. We then get into trouble when someone takes a DC technology and uses it across the Internet, or when the DC becomes multi-tenant, etc. >> Is the point of this list to talk about threats on the Internet, or >> about better explaining threat models assumed in documents, such that >> we have better Security Considerations? The tasks are not mutually >> exclusive.=C2=A0 Being better able to say, "mechanism X deals with t= he >> Internet Threat model situation Y" is a great win for Security >> Considerations. >> >> At first reading, I thought it was more about articulating threat >> models better, but upon further reading, I think this list is more >> about specific threats. > I'm not sure I'm quite getting what you mean exactly. FWIW, I do think > we'll be discussing threats on this list, but a useful output will be= a > distillation of that discussion that gives us the kind of win for > security considerations you have in quotes above. For instance, https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc7416/ provides a list of threats to LLNs. Having named them, I don't have to repeat them in other documents. That's really useful. AFAIK, we don't (yet?) have an IETF document that details the problem with predictable/guesstable IDs, such as DNS query IDs or TCP SYN numbers. {yes, Fernando has a document that goes that way}. Does that threat have a= name? Does the name change based upon whether the attacker is on-path (able to observe traffic), or off-path? Naming such things would be useful. =2D- ] Never tell me the odds! | ipv6 mesh network= s [ ] Michael Richardson, Sandelman Software Works | IoT architect = [ ] mcr@sandelman.ca http://www.sandelman.ca/ | ruby on rails = [ =2D- Michael Richardson , Sandelman Software Works -=3D IPv6 IoT consulting =3D- --=-=-= Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name="signature.asc" -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQEzBAEBCAAdFiEEbsyLEzg/qUTA43uogItw+93Q3WUFAl1EecEACgkQgItw+93Q 3WVocAf+NTC9wEmYQGjOu6/xV4411bfcEL+znviHD6NeArFO93g3k2inPBvvSkjP 1kmjPxAv9xLeM1lr+oo1n2dvhZnppGZ7CWo+Ek1t7j1y1WLhzDz0QsgyqCme3rqT qGR62xiriBJvUBl6Bw/xPbyAe+flv5PY1ORJdouiVlizc8iuLVYqZg90f6yhiIXL X2zc03Nc/p7zNykmzwCZ1X4h1v00aJZa3Jrb9AdtLX/fT1ylzD6eEdIR1raPgkhf tSf0x67zKdvaiSCha7ywN1Jkpw6eZFR7wpaRU6pON8+qB+c6PgeYg0Q8bqrcnjv8 Bu3prM8CxNHq+QVPteeNIWmY+qvYiw== =ypFr -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --=-=-=-- From nobody Fri Aug 2 20:18:21 2019 Return-Path: X-Original-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5CCF5120059 for ; 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Fri, 2 Aug 2019 23:18:15 -0400 (EDT) X-Mailer: MessagingEngine.com Webmail Interface User-Agent: Cyrus-JMAP/3.1.6-799-g925e343-fmstable-20190729v1 Mime-Version: 1.0 Message-Id: In-Reply-To: <22633.1564768705@localhost> References: <29756028-95f1-e6e5-b3ea-562cbc635df0@sandelman.ca> <5ef15ad2-5b20-e871-0d01-17cf906051c1@cs.tcd.ie> <22633.1564768705@localhost> Date: Sat, 03 Aug 2019 13:18:16 +1000 From: "Martin Thomson" To: model-t@iab.org Content-Type: text/plain Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Model-t] model-t@iab.org list description X-BeenThere: model-t@iab.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussions of changes in Internet deployment patterns and their impact on the Internet threat model List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 03 Aug 2019 03:18:19 -0000 On Sat, Aug 3, 2019, at 03:58, Michael Richardson wrote: > What I'm trying to say is that there are some threats that we deal with > on the Capital-Internet that are far more manageable in the small. Like a red rag to a bull... I don't think that this is a sustainable attitude. If we are going to take security seriously, we have to consider every networked device to be exposed to a hostile environment. Now that doesn't mean that you can't take steps to limit hostility in networks, and there might be sound reasons to believe that the degree to which you have to expend resources in defense of certain attacks is different as a result. But the notion of a gooey middle remains a big part of the problem statement. This isn't really on-topic for this list as I understand it, and I wasn't planning to say much here until someone said this. Sorry Michael :) From nobody Fri Aug 2 21:24:38 2019 Return-Path: X-Original-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6675B12006D for ; Fri, 2 Aug 2019 21:24:36 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.997 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.997 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id ZgWkztAWUroE for ; Fri, 2 Aug 2019 21:24:34 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail-pl1-x629.google.com (mail-pl1-x629.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::629]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2772212001A for ; Fri, 2 Aug 2019 21:24:34 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-pl1-x629.google.com with SMTP id az7so34341476plb.5 for ; Fri, 02 Aug 2019 21:24:34 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=from:mime-version:subject:date:references:to:in-reply-to:message-id; bh=SpuipgL9e46E5LV0raFaqsvEZwF7oxt+2MWbnTvxLVc=; b=f1fACzZkDqhEN5arCd9wEGrmbAEQVPto2OzQlHjKeoHQcun5TzafSATftTKnOYR59D +yHp8kY39PlKwTWw3opP3pz2bCLMTlydpFEqg7Cohmm7L7QqT6pFEZrOmUUdu2QETmYQ QhQK7BYmJKEIWnMxkeC2l5KPkUhjFcle4BnGeqae6vHWZEGlP+sBDKhb+4pcDlyhJ4T3 hL57iV2OFqLTeXUKfcEypy/HEuto0aipErFeCgdGs/nopJt3cdavp19yo6kaTl9sOJ1g nSR5FxOpH5mZdvQa1oxXYiajRoSyP1yJiOdbr6EIXuK2TmRU8ioQmEhpGANBlv5QkeK7 AKaA== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:from:mime-version:subject:date:references:to :in-reply-to:message-id; bh=SpuipgL9e46E5LV0raFaqsvEZwF7oxt+2MWbnTvxLVc=; b=miR+UnpstVaH+HoU7hXi51enVAG2Iy7u+blqaDAoMZZdoQoLJPyWfptRRb2XCcM4Hu 9oWOpKnMJT8xL6NCVBKFrJTX4ZjKbqgNoQFoIa777cbY2k9KNCMqf/Q/cuku4pQJDrPg QbwCBMTawMhPk98dShYtAzLrkk2eHghDpz630ZZNVdiVyl9PBQtKEbhxWLm+uo2jrRLK 5lxWu3diRtQzUTXIsgGKeMHJ5K9BtkZa1oUGjhTSU4MyqDh0HCivzlifALs3g742eKQx gFaJlt1ESwVsuqH253+lOORVm2XDs/e0vR+MrSe6f2Yn7udW7Cs738aCy2BAD9gaR9MC 2yxQ== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAVuG1Hqc5SZ3zccR5aEtKzKAPZbPrl8J6UDU8ODQvHggZIF/tdR Kf9Pu0798bLeHHSS2rcRLksUFpzy X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqw0zgGqigtC7evb+EsZzjRsxyJRCrernDbHGnT+GGUHusN+59NZ2T+D7+LfFtKopj/2X7JGiQ== X-Received: by 2002:a17:902:b944:: with SMTP id h4mr57759971pls.179.1564806273587; Fri, 02 Aug 2019 21:24:33 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [10.128.64.149] ([136.60.227.81]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id 11sm76808969pfw.33.2019.08.02.21.24.32 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Fri, 02 Aug 2019 21:24:32 -0700 (PDT) From: Bret Jordan Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="Apple-Mail=_B609EC99-7039-48AD-959E-69B4670CFAFD" Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 12.4 \(3445.104.11\)) Date: Fri, 2 Aug 2019 22:24:29 -0600 References: <29756028-95f1-e6e5-b3ea-562cbc635df0@sandelman.ca> <5ef15ad2-5b20-e871-0d01-17cf906051c1@cs.tcd.ie> <22633.1564768705@localhost> To: Martin Thomson , model-t@iab.org In-Reply-To: Message-Id: <5879878A-7CEA-4030-BB72-108CC4122719@gmail.com> X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.3445.104.11) Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Model-t] model-t@iab.org list description X-BeenThere: model-t@iab.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussions of changes in Internet deployment patterns and their impact on the Internet threat model List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 03 Aug 2019 04:24:36 -0000 --Apple-Mail=_B609EC99-7039-48AD-959E-69B4670CFAFD Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 To borrow your words=E2=80=A6 =E2=80=9CIf we are going to take security = seriously=E2=80=9D=E2=80=A6 we need to understand and document the full = attack surface. So let us start listing them out. Here are four. Attack: Active remote attack Exposure: Full compromise of system and data Client Knowledge: Potential indicators may be visible Protection Possibilities: Deploy both client and network level = protections Headwinds: Client based protections are usually inadequate Severity: High Kill-Chain Phase: Lateral Movement=20 Attack: Active in-band attack Exposure; Full compromise of system and data Client Knowledge: Potential indicators may be visible Protection Possibilities: Deploy both client and network level = protections, user awareness training, content and DNS filtering Headwinds: Client based protections are usually inadequate Severity: High Kill-Chain Phase: Delivery and Exploitation=20 Attack: Passive monitoring of traffic Exposure: Information about where traffic is going and potentially = details of the content being shared=20 Client Knowledge: No, it is very hard to detect passive monitoring tools Protection Possibilities: Encrypt traffic=20 Headwinds: Global adoption of better encryption Severity: Low Kill-Chain Phase: Reconnaissance Attack: Active in-band monitoring and tracking=20 Exposure: Information about what the user is doing and where they are = going=20 Client Knowledge: Generally no=20 Protection Possibilities: Client and network level protections Headwinds: Some clients are making it hard to deploy client side = protections=20 Severity: Low Kill-Chain Phase: Reconnaissance Thanks, Bret PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447 F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that = can not be unscrambled is an egg." > On Aug 2, 2019, at 9:18 PM, Martin Thomson wrote: >=20 > On Sat, Aug 3, 2019, at 03:58, Michael Richardson wrote: >> What I'm trying to say is that there are some threats that we deal = with >> on the Capital-Internet that are far more manageable in the small. >=20 > Like a red rag to a bull... >=20 > I don't think that this is a sustainable attitude. If we are going to = take security seriously, we have to consider every networked device to = be exposed to a hostile environment. Now that doesn't mean that you = can't take steps to limit hostility in networks, and there might be = sound reasons to believe that the degree to which you have to expend = resources in defense of certain attacks is different as a result. But = the notion of a gooey middle remains a big part of the problem = statement. >=20 > This isn't really on-topic for this list as I understand it, and I = wasn't planning to say much here until someone said this. Sorry Michael = :) >=20 > --=20 > Model-t mailing list > Model-t@iab.org > https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t --Apple-Mail=_B609EC99-7039-48AD-959E-69B4670CFAFD Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 To = borrow your words=E2=80=A6  =E2=80=9CIf we are going to take = security seriously=E2=80=9D=E2=80=A6  we need to understand and = document the full attack surface.  So let us start listing them = out.  Here are four.


Attack: = Active remote attack
Exposure: Full compromise of = system and data
Client Knowledge: Potential = indicators may be visible
Protection Possibilities: = Deploy both client and network level protections
Headwinds: Client based protections are usually = inadequate
Severity: High
Kill-Chain Phase: Lateral Movement 

Attack: Active in-band = attack
Exposure; Full compromise of system and = data
Client Knowledge: Potential indicators may be = visible
Protection Possibilities: Deploy both = client and network level protections, user awareness training, content = and DNS filtering
Headwinds: Client based = protections are usually inadequate
Severity: = High
Kill-Chain Phase: Delivery and = Exploitation 

Attack: Passive monitoring of traffic
Exposure: Information about where traffic is going and = potentially details of the content being shared 
Client Knowledge: No, it is very hard to detect passive = monitoring tools
Protection Possibilities: Encrypt = traffic 
Headwinds: Global adoption of better = encryption
Severity: Low
Kill-Chain Phase: Reconnaissance

Attack: Active in-band monitoring and = tracking 
Exposure: = Information about what the user is doing and where they are = going 
Client Knowledge: Generally = no 
Protection Possibilities: Client and = network level protections
Headwinds: Some clients = are making it hard to deploy client side protections 
Severity: Low
Kill-Chain = Phase: Reconnaissance



Thanks,
Bret
PGP = Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 = 0050
"Without = cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that can not = be unscrambled is an = egg."

On Aug 2, 2019, at 9:18 PM, Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net> = wrote:

On Sat, Aug 3, 2019, at 03:58, Michael Richardson wrote:
What I'm trying to say = is that there are some threats that we deal with
on the = Capital-Internet that are far more manageable in the small.

Like a red rag to a bull...

I don't think that this is a sustainable = attitude.  If we are going to take security seriously, we have to = consider every networked device to be exposed to a hostile environment. =  Now that doesn't mean that you can't take steps to limit hostility = in networks, and there might be sound reasons to believe that the degree = to which you have to expend resources in defense of certain attacks is = different as a result.  But the notion of a gooey middle remains a = big part of the problem statement.

This = isn't really on-topic for this list as I understand it, and I wasn't = planning to say much here until someone said this.  Sorry Michael = :)

--
Model-t mailing = list
Model-t@iab.org
https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t

= --Apple-Mail=_B609EC99-7039-48AD-959E-69B4670CFAFD-- From nobody Sat Aug 3 06:22:39 2019 Return-Path: X-Original-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8DCDF1201E6 for ; Sat, 3 Aug 2019 06:22:37 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -4.299 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.299 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=cs.tcd.ie Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id VyBLMYc4okaA for ; Sat, 3 Aug 2019 06:22:35 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mercury.scss.tcd.ie (mercury.scss.tcd.ie [134.226.56.6]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5E14212003F for ; Sat, 3 Aug 2019 06:22:34 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mercury.scss.tcd.ie (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1D6DBBE4D; Sat, 3 Aug 2019 14:22:33 +0100 (IST) X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at scss.tcd.ie Received: from mercury.scss.tcd.ie ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mercury.scss.tcd.ie [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id J91hOq9NZr6p; Sat, 3 Aug 2019 14:22:31 +0100 (IST) Received: from [10.244.2.138] (95-45-153-252-dynamic.agg2.phb.bdt-fng.eircom.net [95.45.153.252]) by mercury.scss.tcd.ie (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 8A960BE3E; Sat, 3 Aug 2019 14:22:31 +0100 (IST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=cs.tcd.ie; s=mail; t=1564838551; bh=L2OEKg96p2k+Jn4mSoqAFkScpSTypDnCFLXg85kXZ5c=; h=Subject:To:References:From:Date:In-Reply-To:From; b=r1CVVXKJkdd/w+y32uNkitjfgd1r2or7RK+6bEJpD2zVYjEk+DQ2Yf8JcZTbJe12C KGVUg/uynXo/2PQq8fargSnD52BmYB+VxuQJWzw0gzy3kVDfbfe2LtEZBGudBbjSdT lm30qulkE/+6i86ivLFm/MKsDxy5oDasW+A004Jo= To: Martin Thomson , model-t@iab.org References: <29756028-95f1-e6e5-b3ea-562cbc635df0@sandelman.ca> <5ef15ad2-5b20-e871-0d01-17cf906051c1@cs.tcd.ie> <22633.1564768705@localhost> From: Stephen Farrell Openpgp: id=5BB5A6EA5765D2C5863CAE275AB2FAF17B172BEA; 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Linux x86_64; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/60.8.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha512; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="ZvjPcMVTOZMjYkPwJ4F0ITNgszfyqcWNe" Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Model-t] model-t@iab.org list description X-BeenThere: model-t@iab.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussions of changes in Internet deployment patterns and their impact on the Internet threat model List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 03 Aug 2019 13:22:38 -0000 This is an OpenPGP/MIME signed message (RFC 4880 and 3156) --ZvjPcMVTOZMjYkPwJ4F0ITNgszfyqcWNe Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="h69uADh7L5ddWnPecf4NMqfnDgVdQ1ZuM"; protected-headers="v1" From: Stephen Farrell To: Martin Thomson , model-t@iab.org Message-ID: Subject: Re: [Model-t] model-t@iab.org list description References: <29756028-95f1-e6e5-b3ea-562cbc635df0@sandelman.ca> <5ef15ad2-5b20-e871-0d01-17cf906051c1@cs.tcd.ie> <22633.1564768705@localhost> In-Reply-To: --h69uADh7L5ddWnPecf4NMqfnDgVdQ1ZuM Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="------------264A58A8F013FD1BBC7D32EC" Content-Language: en-GB This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------264A58A8F013FD1BBC7D32EC Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On 03/08/2019 04:18, Martin Thomson wrote: > This isn't really on-topic for this list as I understand it, Why? FWIW, I think we'll be better off if the discussion roams a lot at first so I'd argue that the discussion of the historical approach of hard boundary/goey middle is defo in scope as is how one might do better. (I'm not claiming that in the end we can "fix" that but trying is in scope I'd say.) 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(95-45-153-252-dynamic.agg2.phb.bdt-fng.eircom.net [95.45.153.252]) by mercury.scss.tcd.ie (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 7D091BE3E; Sat, 3 Aug 2019 14:33:28 +0100 (IST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=cs.tcd.ie; s=mail; t=1564839208; bh=xKlimGXla9VFckWe/37mQFKfNBByft1CowEdjXGJsRU=; h=Subject:To:References:From:Date:In-Reply-To:From; b=zZkbsMJ4Ri6DCy7A+vIq9ZyU4yG43TvD7Z3ZlX8kC3dtQpu03vitydaknzAFEE7RX HgD1lbQIkaxk70i/MP8XFQzgOLlcWx7AlyVtzQ01dMu/ZbyoOGqXZFT9rmTkS5UJhT a9iwVhR+ak8Prk/3LYVRo5fwp/sA9Xf+oGqymFZI= To: Bret Jordan , Martin Thomson , model-t@iab.org References: <29756028-95f1-e6e5-b3ea-562cbc635df0@sandelman.ca> <5ef15ad2-5b20-e871-0d01-17cf906051c1@cs.tcd.ie> <22633.1564768705@localhost> <5879878A-7CEA-4030-BB72-108CC4122719@gmail.com> From: Stephen Farrell Openpgp: id=5BB5A6EA5765D2C5863CAE275AB2FAF17B172BEA; url= Autocrypt: addr=stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie; prefer-encrypt=mutual; keydata= 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6OUXUv6plMlwSHquiOc/MQXHfgUP5//Ra5JuiuyCj954FD+MBKIj8eWROfnzyEnBplVHGSDI ZLzL3pvV14dcsoajdeIH45i8DxnVm64BvEFHtLNlnliMrLOrk4shfmWyUqNlzilXN2BTFVFH 4MrnagFdcFnWYp1JPh96ZKjiqBwMv/H0kw== Message-ID: <56f78164-7205-0cb8-eaaf-3bdae25a7c67@cs.tcd.ie> Date: Sat, 3 Aug 2019 14:33:26 +0100 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/60.8.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <5879878A-7CEA-4030-BB72-108CC4122719@gmail.com> Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha512; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="peDnzIigyCjDvUB2ILNLg3naGIeEEFKiU" Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Model-t] model-t@iab.org list description X-BeenThere: model-t@iab.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussions of changes in Internet deployment patterns and their impact on the Internet threat model List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 03 Aug 2019 13:33:34 -0000 This is an OpenPGP/MIME signed message (RFC 4880 and 3156) --peDnzIigyCjDvUB2ILNLg3naGIeEEFKiU Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="4dukjBUFZTlPlcNoq3GV1ZaQpwZO5Ja8y"; protected-headers="v1" From: Stephen Farrell To: Bret Jordan , Martin Thomson , model-t@iab.org Message-ID: <56f78164-7205-0cb8-eaaf-3bdae25a7c67@cs.tcd.ie> Subject: Re: [Model-t] model-t@iab.org list description References: <29756028-95f1-e6e5-b3ea-562cbc635df0@sandelman.ca> <5ef15ad2-5b20-e871-0d01-17cf906051c1@cs.tcd.ie> <22633.1564768705@localhost> <5879878A-7CEA-4030-BB72-108CC4122719@gmail.com> In-Reply-To: <5879878A-7CEA-4030-BB72-108CC4122719@gmail.com> --4dukjBUFZTlPlcNoq3GV1ZaQpwZO5Ja8y Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="------------A84F953F407680B7B39F663A" Content-Language: en-GB This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------A84F953F407680B7B39F663A Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Hiya, Two things: - I'm not sure how applicable stix and other information model type approaches might be for addressing an Internet threat model, but that seems like a topic that'd deserve a thread or two... - I generally like the attack surface metaphor and find it useful in thinking about security when making changes to a specific system or network. So that metaphor could certainly be useful. I'm not sure though that there is such a thing as "the full attack surface" that can be usefully enumerated. Thanks, S. On 03/08/2019 05:24, Bret Jordan wrote: > To borrow your words=E2=80=A6 =E2=80=9CIf we are going to take securit= y seriously=E2=80=9D=E2=80=A6 we need to understand and document the ful= l attack surface. So let us start listing them out. Here are four. >=20 >=20 > Attack: Active remote attack > Exposure: Full compromise of system and data > Client Knowledge: Potential indicators may be visible > Protection Possibilities: Deploy both client and network level protecti= ons > Headwinds: Client based protections are usually inadequate > Severity: High > Kill-Chain Phase: Lateral Movement=20 >=20 > Attack: Active in-band attack > Exposure; Full compromise of system and data > Client Knowledge: Potential indicators may be visible > Protection Possibilities: Deploy both client and network level protecti= ons, user awareness training, content and DNS filtering > Headwinds: Client based protections are usually inadequate > Severity: High > Kill-Chain Phase: Delivery and Exploitation=20 >=20 > Attack: Passive monitoring of traffic > Exposure: Information about where traffic is going and potentially deta= ils of the content being shared=20 > Client Knowledge: No, it is very hard to detect passive monitoring tool= s > Protection Possibilities: Encrypt traffic=20 > Headwinds: Global adoption of better encryption > Severity: Low > Kill-Chain Phase: Reconnaissance >=20 > Attack: Active in-band monitoring and tracking=20 > Exposure: Information about what the user is doing and where they are g= oing=20 > Client Knowledge: Generally no=20 > Protection Possibilities: Client and network level protections > Headwinds: Some clients are making it hard to deploy client side protec= tions=20 > Severity: Low > Kill-Chain Phase: Reconnaissance >=20 >=20 >=20 > Thanks, > Bret > PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447 F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 > "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that= can not be unscrambled is an egg." >=20 >> On Aug 2, 2019, at 9:18 PM, Martin Thomson wrote: >> >> On Sat, Aug 3, 2019, at 03:58, Michael Richardson wrote: >>> What I'm trying to say is that there are some threats that we deal wi= th >>> on the Capital-Internet that are far more manageable in the small. >> >> Like a red rag to a bull... >> >> I don't think that this is a sustainable attitude. If we are going to= take security seriously, we have to consider every networked device to b= e exposed to a hostile environment. Now that doesn't mean that you can't= take steps to limit hostility in networks, and there might be sound reas= ons to believe that the degree to which you have to expend resources in d= efense of certain attacks is different as a result. But the notion of a = gooey middle remains a big part of the problem statement. >> >> This isn't really on-topic for this list as I understand it, and I was= n't planning to say much here until someone said this. Sorry Michael :) >> >> --=20 >> Model-t mailing list >> Model-t@iab.org >> https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t >=20 >=20 >=20 --------------A84F953F407680B7B39F663A Content-Type: application/pgp-keys; name="0x5AB2FAF17B172BEA.asc" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="0x5AB2FAF17B172BEA.asc" -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- mQINBFo9UDIBEADUH4ZPcUnX5WWRWO4kEkHea5Y5eEvZjSwe/YA+G0nrTuOU9nem CP5PMvmh5Cg8gBTyWyN4Z2+O25p9Tja5zUb+vPMWYvOtokRrp46yhFZOmiS5b6kT q0IqYzsEv5HI58S+QtaFq978CRa4xH9Gi9u4yzUmT03QNIGDXE37honcAM4MOEtE gvw4fVhVWJuyy3w//0F2tzKrEMjmL5VGuD/Q9+G/7abuXiYNNd9ZFjv4625AUWwy +pAh4EKzS1FE7BOZp9daMu9MUQmDqtZUbUv0Q+DnQAB/4tNncejJPz0p2z3MWCp5 iSwHiQvytYgatMp34a50l6CWqa13n6vY8VcPlIqOVz+7L+WiVfxLbeVqBwV+4uL9 to9zLF9IyUvl94lCxpscR2kgRgpM6A5LylRDkR6E0oudFnJgb097ZaNyuY1ETghV B5Uir1GCYChs8NUNumTHXiOkuzk+Gs4DAHx/a78YxBolKHi+esLH8r2k4LyM2lp5 FmBKjG7cGcpBGmWavACYEa7rwAadg4uBx9SHMV5i33vDXQUZcmW0vslQ2Is02NMK 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HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_NONE=0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=rtfm-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id hjgFjHb01xbk for ; Sat, 3 Aug 2019 07:26:30 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail-lj1-x235.google.com (mail-lj1-x235.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::235]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3BBEF120088 for ; Sat, 3 Aug 2019 07:26:30 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-lj1-x235.google.com with SMTP id m8so41869918lji.7 for ; Sat, 03 Aug 2019 07:26:30 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=rtfm-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com; s=20150623; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=3G8a9DgpddPIy5PkUTQsBbwtCpDotVaHMg2GY/mICC0=; b=vslFPvEQu7J3OOIxGvhoDZEsXhS68+uYnLVj3hDB8dz3BnvAI7Yd0A/gIT4uRBv4Pb Av2dO7GLD1or+ore+DjXj95iYeUpmq2gLOVN+ACXZukpcdhYEdJEIgLJKoAFVpOb/Ezv 2PyQ1uRWFzHu9P3MnFTyxnqzpseeJQpNW3bq+D0/OfjCuq5ao3aTAxpuPkEClrNvb24g Jz9+feAUAftZylesrOJZPf5mlf0A4dL64Uqh1l5vS/iwbXsgjyCZKPNIlP7Cm8m3w+2E igP1CgE2Y4vorxKKJfXgYqL84a0kQCJ3R+jpjl5uzTZPkymS1SKk14JUC288r/DRBTuX 1kyg== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=3G8a9DgpddPIy5PkUTQsBbwtCpDotVaHMg2GY/mICC0=; b=Sv/kr/bTTCpqd/YGpIGiAzQljTFK++rWpB0v7st3KT32ZLG7JEOTbsynZs4wFOgwt/ DiLF7ETyw83rzDd2fR8qb6W7CCXD4/Tm72YGCeQEtCaa5TvTGi0862kiNc72zXdU9Ehs xiSNaoCaGn1IIlp1oPCyJBkl9yFNZdbAWXmHr0M0PJBcZHBI1YTbwqtSQhkkpQQUxSmN IGPqkef6wc1zJ58PZH+hgEQ1vq16YgO3DnNxmy9Czo9ycCnCCdHgyxdE34EMDWt8Gw2n C78yAzBJxj2mrxjFBeZJ6s2+MvGF9B5vC0raHSr0PJ94+q61rMgJouDDUzIJWwrH1LIY w1oQ== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAUSjBoGcKcEEBUTfmresnFty+W1w5jJLjuKGLxETKIc512ch4UH bH4fmTvyX1j/znSzWyZJtM0+TIUq9cq8wPp/0AA= X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqxKP92BnA+3yphsR7vJeU3rF9zJWcfrHbKhTXMluDFmK1PcpDs3u3rkLGYiRNekYa+VQG3NXd4XdY49pJasn2g= X-Received: by 2002:a2e:9cd4:: with SMTP id g20mr49547533ljj.205.1564842388488; Sat, 03 Aug 2019 07:26:28 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <29756028-95f1-e6e5-b3ea-562cbc635df0@sandelman.ca> <5ef15ad2-5b20-e871-0d01-17cf906051c1@cs.tcd.ie> <22633.1564768705@localhost> <5879878A-7CEA-4030-BB72-108CC4122719@gmail.com> In-Reply-To: <5879878A-7CEA-4030-BB72-108CC4122719@gmail.com> From: Eric Rescorla Date: Sat, 3 Aug 2019 07:25:52 -0700 Message-ID: To: Bret Jordan Cc: Martin Thomson , model-t@iab.org Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="000000000000b2143f058f374214" Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Model-t] model-t@iab.org list description X-BeenThere: model-t@iab.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussions of changes in Internet deployment patterns and their impact on the Internet threat model List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 03 Aug 2019 14:26:33 -0000 --000000000000b2143f058f374214 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Bret, I'm having a fair amount of trouble understanding what these attacks you are referring to mean. Perhaps you could lay them out in more detail? -Ekr On Fri, Aug 2, 2019 at 9:24 PM Bret Jordan wrote: > To borrow your words=E2=80=A6 =E2=80=9CIf we are going to take security = seriously=E2=80=9D=E2=80=A6 we > need to understand and document the full attack surface. So let us start > listing them out. Here are four. > > > Attack: Active remote attack > Exposure: Full compromise of system and data > Client Knowledge: Potential indicators may be visible > Protection Possibilities: Deploy both client and network level protection= s > Headwinds: Client based protections are usually inadequate > Severity: High > Kill-Chain Phase: Lateral Movement > > Attack: Active in-band attack > Exposure; Full compromise of system and data > Client Knowledge: Potential indicators may be visible > Protection Possibilities: Deploy both client and network level > protections, user awareness training, content and DNS filtering > Headwinds: Client based protections are usually inadequate > Severity: High > Kill-Chain Phase: Delivery and Exploitation > > Attack: Passive monitoring of traffic > Exposure: Information about where traffic is going and potentially detail= s > of the content being shared > Client Knowledge: No, it is very hard to detect passive monitoring tools > Protection Possibilities: Encrypt traffic > Headwinds: Global adoption of better encryption > Severity: Low > Kill-Chain Phase: Reconnaissance > > Attack: Active in-band monitoring and tracking > Exposure: Information about what the user is doing and where they are > going > Client Knowledge: Generally no > Protection Possibilities: Client and network level protections > Headwinds: Some clients are making it hard to deploy client side > protections > Severity: Low > Kill-Chain Phase: Reconnaissance > > > > Thanks, > Bret > PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447 F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 > "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that > can not be unscrambled is an egg." > > On Aug 2, 2019, at 9:18 PM, Martin Thomson wrote: > > On Sat, Aug 3, 2019, at 03:58, Michael Richardson wrote: > > What I'm trying to say is that there are some threats that we deal with > on the Capital-Internet that are far more manageable in the small. > > > Like a red rag to a bull... > > I don't think that this is a sustainable attitude. If we are going to > take security seriously, we have to consider every networked device to be > exposed to a hostile environment. Now that doesn't mean that you can't > take steps to limit hostility in networks, and there might be sound reaso= ns > to believe that the degree to which you have to expend resources in defen= se > of certain attacks is different as a result. But the notion of a gooey > middle remains a big part of the problem statement. > > This isn't really on-topic for this list as I understand it, and I wasn't > planning to say much here until someone said this. Sorry Michael :) > > -- > Model-t mailing list > Model-t@iab.org > https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t > > > -- > Model-t mailing list > Model-t@iab.org > https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t > --000000000000b2143f058f374214 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Bret,

I'm having a fair = amount of trouble understanding what these attacks you are referring to mea= n. Perhaps you could lay them out in more detail?

<= div>-Ekr


On Fri, Aug 2, 2019 at 9:24 PM Bret Jordan &l= t;jordan.ietf@gmail.com> wr= ote:
To borrow your words=E2=80=A6 =C2=A0=E2=80= =9CIf we are going to take security seriously=E2=80=9D=E2=80=A6 =C2=A0we ne= ed to understand and document the full attack surface.=C2=A0 So let us star= t listing them out.=C2=A0 Here are four.


=
Attack: Active remote attack
Exposure: Full compromise of sy= stem and data
Client Knowledge: Potential indicators may be visib= le
Protection Possibilities: Deploy both client and network level= protections
Headwinds: Client based protections are usually inad= equate
Severity: High
Kill-Chain Phase: Lateral Movemen= t=C2=A0

Attack: Active in-band attack
Ex= posure; Full compromise of system and data
Client Knowledge: Pote= ntial indicators may be visible
Protection Possibilities: Deploy = both client and network level protections, user awareness training, content= and DNS filtering
Headwinds: Client based protections are usuall= y inadequate
Severity: High
Kill-Chain Phase: Del= ivery and Exploitation=C2=A0

Attack: Passive monit= oring of traffic
Exposure: Information about where traffic i= s going and potentially details of the content being shared=C2=A0
Client Knowledge: No, it is very hard to detect passive monitoring tools
Protection Possibilities: Encrypt traffic=C2=A0
Headwind= s: Global adoption of better encryption
Severity: Low
K= ill-Chain Phase:=C2=A0Reconnaissance

Attack: Activ= e in-band monitoring and tracking=C2=A0
Exposure: Informatio= n about what the user is doing and where they are going=C2=A0
Cli= ent Knowledge: Generally no=C2=A0
Protection Possibilities: Clien= t and network level protections
Headwinds: Some clients are makin= g it hard to deploy client side protections=C2=A0
Severity: Low
Kill-Chain Phase:=C2=A0Reconnaissance



Thanks,
Bret
PGP Fingerprint:=C2=A063B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447 =C2=A0F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050
"Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnr= w, however, the only thing that can not be unscrambled is an egg."

On Aug 2, 2019, at 9:18 PM, Martin = Thomson <mt@lowen= tropy.net> wrote:

On Sat, Aug 3, 2019, at 03:58, Michael Ric= hardson wrote:
What I'm trying to say is t= hat there are some threats that we deal with
on the Capital-Internet tha= t are far more manageable in the small.

Like a red rag = to a bull...

I don't think that this is a sustainable attitude.= =C2=A0 If we are going to take security seriously, we have to consider ever= y networked device to be exposed to a hostile environment.=C2=A0 Now that d= oesn't mean that you can't take steps to limit hostility in network= s, and there might be sound reasons to believe that the degree to which you= have to expend resources in defense of certain attacks is different as a r= esult.=C2=A0 But the notion of a gooey middle remains a big part of the pro= blem statement.

This isn't really on-topic for this list as I un= derstand it, and I wasn't planning to say much here until someone said = this.=C2=A0 Sorry Michael :)

--
Model-t mailing list
Model-t@iab.org
https:= //www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t

--
Model-t mailing list
Model-t@iab.org https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t
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Are you referring to the use of kill chain= phase?=20 Bret=20 Sent from my Commodore 64 PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447 F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 > On Aug 3, 2019, at 7:33 AM, Stephen Farrell wr= ote: >=20 >=20 > Hiya, >=20 > Two things: >=20 > - I'm not sure how applicable stix and other information model > type approaches might be for addressing an Internet threat model, > but that seems like a topic that'd deserve a thread or two... >=20 > - I generally like the attack surface metaphor and find it useful > in thinking about security when making changes to a specific > system or network. So that metaphor could certainly be useful. > I'm not sure though that there is such a thing as "the full > attack surface" that can be usefully enumerated. >=20 > Thanks, > S. >=20 >> On 03/08/2019 05:24, Bret Jordan wrote: >> To borrow your words=E2=80=A6 =E2=80=9CIf we are going to take security s= eriously=E2=80=9D=E2=80=A6 we need to understand and document the full atta= ck surface. So let us start listing them out. Here are four. >>=20 >>=20 >> Attack: Active remote attack >> Exposure: Full compromise of system and data >> Client Knowledge: Potential indicators may be visible >> Protection Possibilities: Deploy both client and network level protection= s >> Headwinds: Client based protections are usually inadequate >> Severity: High >> Kill-Chain Phase: Lateral Movement=20 >>=20 >> Attack: Active in-band attack >> Exposure; Full compromise of system and data >> Client Knowledge: Potential indicators may be visible >> Protection Possibilities: Deploy both client and network level protection= s, user awareness training, content and DNS filtering >> Headwinds: Client based protections are usually inadequate >> Severity: High >> Kill-Chain Phase: Delivery and Exploitation=20 >>=20 >> Attack: Passive monitoring of traffic >> Exposure: Information about where traffic is going and potentially detail= s of the content being shared=20 >> Client Knowledge: No, it is very hard to detect passive monitoring tools >> Protection Possibilities: Encrypt traffic=20 >> Headwinds: Global adoption of better encryption >> Severity: Low >> Kill-Chain Phase: Reconnaissance >>=20 >> Attack: Active in-band monitoring and tracking=20 >> Exposure: Information about what the user is doing and where they are goi= ng=20 >> Client Knowledge: Generally no=20 >> Protection Possibilities: Client and network level protections >> Headwinds: Some clients are making it hard to deploy client side protecti= ons=20 >> Severity: Low >> Kill-Chain Phase: Reconnaissance >>=20 >>=20 >>=20 >> Thanks, >> Bret >> PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447 F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 >> "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that c= an not be unscrambled is an egg." >>=20 >>> On Aug 2, 2019, at 9:18 PM, Martin Thomson wrote: >>>=20 >>> On Sat, Aug 3, 2019, at 03:58, Michael Richardson wrote: >>>> What I'm trying to say is that there are some threats that we deal with= >>>> on the Capital-Internet that are far more manageable in the small. >>>=20 >>> Like a red rag to a bull... >>>=20 >>> I don't think that this is a sustainable attitude. If we are going to t= ake security seriously, we have to consider every networked device to be exp= osed to a hostile environment. Now that doesn't mean that you can't take st= eps to limit hostility in networks, and there might be sound reasons to beli= eve that the degree to which you have to expend resources in defense of cert= ain attacks is different as a result. But the notion of a gooey middle rema= ins a big part of the problem statement. >>>=20 >>> This isn't really on-topic for this list as I understand it, and I wasn'= t planning to say much here until someone said this. Sorry Michael :) >>>=20 >>> --=20 >>> Model-t mailing list >>> Model-t@iab.org >>> https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t >>=20 >>=20 >>=20 > <0x5AB2FAF17B172BEA.asc> --Apple-Mail-8B2C3B17-B38D-4EA2-BEC0-632587B7659D Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable I did not use anything from STIX. Are you r= eferring to the use of kill chain phase? 

Bret =

Sent from my Commodore 64=

PGP Fingerprint:&nb= sp;63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050

On Aug 3, 2019, at 7:33 AM, Stephen Farr= ell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.= ie> wrote:


Hiya,

Two things:

- I'm not sure how applicable stix and other in= formation model
type approaches might be for addressing an I= nternet threat model,
but that seems like a topic that'd des= erve a thread or two...

- I generally like t= he attack surface metaphor and find it useful
in thinking ab= out security when making changes to a specific
system or net= work. So that metaphor could certainly be useful.
I'm not su= re though that there is such a thing as "the full
attack sur= face" that can be usefully enumerated.

Than= ks,
S.

On 03/08/2019 05:24,= Bret Jordan wrote:
To borrow your= words=E2=80=A6  =E2=80=9CIf we are going to take security seriously=E2= =80=9D=E2=80=A6  we need to understand and document the full attack sur= face.  So let us start listing them out.  Here are four.


= Attack: Active remote attack
Exposure: Full compromise of system and data
Client Knowledge: Potential indicators m= ay be visible
Protect= ion Possibilities: Deploy both client and network level protections
Headwinds: Client based prote= ctions are usually inadequate
Severity: High
Kill-Chain Phase: Lateral Movement

At= tack: Active in-band attack
Exposure; Full compromise of system and data
<= blockquote type=3D"cite">Client Knowledge: Potential indicators may be= visible
Protection P= ossibilities: Deploy both client and network level protections, user awarene= ss training, content and DNS filtering
Headwinds: Client based protections are usually inadequate=
Severity: High
Kill-Chain Phase: Delivery= and Exploitation

Attack: Passive monito= ring of traffic
Expos= ure: Information about where traffic is going and potentially details of the= content being shared
Client Knowledge: No, it is very hard to detect passive monitoring tools
Protection Possibiliti= es: Encrypt traffic
= Headwinds: Global adoption of better encryption
Severity: Low
Kill-Chain Phase: Reconnaissance
<= blockquote type=3D"cite">
Attack: Active in-band monitoring and tracking
Exposure: Information about what the u= ser is doing and where they are going
Client Knowledge: Generally no
Protection Possibilities: Client and network le= vel protections
Headw= inds: Some clients are making it hard to deploy client side protections
Severity: Low
=
Kill-Chain Phase: Reconnaissanc= e



Tha= nks,
Bret
<= /blockquote>
PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6= B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050
"Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the o= nly thing that can not be unscrambled is an egg."

On Aug 2, 2019, at 9:18 PM, Martin Thomso= n <mt@lowentropy.net> wrote:<= /span>

On Sat, Aug 3, 2019, at 03:58, Michael R= ichardson wrote:
What I'm trying= to say is that there are some threats that we deal with
on the Capital-Internet that are far m= ore manageable in the small.

Like a red rag to a bull...

I don't t= hink that this is a sustainable attitude.  If we are going to take secu= rity seriously, we have to consider every networked device to be exposed to a= hostile environment.  Now that doesn't mean that you can't take steps t= o limit hostility in networks, and there might be sound reasons to believe t= hat the degree to which you have to expend resources in defense of certain a= ttacks is different as a result.  But the notion of a gooey middle rema= ins a big part of the problem statement.

This isn't really on-topic for this list as I understand it, and I wasn't p= lanning to say much here until someone said this.  Sorry Michael :)

=
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Model-t mailing list
Model-t@iab.org
https:= //www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t


=
<0x5AB2FAF17B172BEA.asc>
= --Apple-Mail-8B2C3B17-B38D-4EA2-BEC0-632587B7659D-- From nobody Sat Aug 3 07:40:31 2019 Return-Path: X-Original-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9319412009C for ; Sat, 3 Aug 2019 07:40:29 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -4.299 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.299 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=cs.tcd.ie Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 1NprUJc9vxUW for ; Sat, 3 Aug 2019 07:40:27 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mercury.scss.tcd.ie (mercury.scss.tcd.ie [134.226.56.6]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 27D7512008C for ; Sat, 3 Aug 2019 07:40:26 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mercury.scss.tcd.ie (Postfix) with ESMTP id A5A5EBE4D; Sat, 3 Aug 2019 15:40:24 +0100 (IST) X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at scss.tcd.ie Received: from mercury.scss.tcd.ie ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mercury.scss.tcd.ie [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id R3q0_4xRsVDd; Sat, 3 Aug 2019 15:40:23 +0100 (IST) Received: from [10.244.2.138] (95-45-153-252-dynamic.agg2.phb.bdt-fng.eircom.net [95.45.153.252]) by mercury.scss.tcd.ie (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 13218BE47; Sat, 3 Aug 2019 15:40:23 +0100 (IST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=cs.tcd.ie; s=mail; t=1564843223; bh=dz3/XdVIf1pzAyOy2YUIxZ9Qumkldp+MMllhytOlpLU=; h=Subject:To:Cc:References:From:Date:In-Reply-To:From; b=18iJUKoDUs6Cw8dAd3rEZsJc6P+u+NVnKDvdVeJuWmkqIElj3sDxpjP80KDq/GbzE 1eV4tMliCwKEAh7D02DtKPh2TWVV6xjeoIaybjKyMEq6ORdC+5HmxgQs67L6cDHfOt av4P6ITk8JbC9SjbnPbqFme7PDhZTb9dBiqmOVyg= To: Bret Jordan Cc: Martin Thomson , model-t@iab.org References: <29756028-95f1-e6e5-b3ea-562cbc635df0@sandelman.ca> <5ef15ad2-5b20-e871-0d01-17cf906051c1@cs.tcd.ie> <22633.1564768705@localhost> <5879878A-7CEA-4030-BB72-108CC4122719@gmail.com> <56f78164-7205-0cb8-eaaf-3bdae25a7c67@cs.tcd.ie> <34296538-559C-45B0-8D44-E35BCA47DD35@gmail.com> From: Stephen Farrell Openpgp: id=5BB5A6EA5765D2C5863CAE275AB2FAF17B172BEA; 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Linux x86_64; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/60.8.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <34296538-559C-45B0-8D44-E35BCA47DD35@gmail.com> Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha512; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="aSfAGzmrOsYHBB5Tlz5etFbNZ1Y0L5cE0" Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Model-t] model-t@iab.org list description X-BeenThere: model-t@iab.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussions of changes in Internet deployment patterns and their impact on the Internet threat model List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 03 Aug 2019 14:40:30 -0000 This is an OpenPGP/MIME signed message (RFC 4880 and 3156) --aSfAGzmrOsYHBB5Tlz5etFbNZ1Y0L5cE0 Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="gfTsrM24WYwkiDG776iNr0C0klgyVsc7L"; protected-headers="v1" From: Stephen Farrell To: Bret Jordan Cc: Martin Thomson , model-t@iab.org Message-ID: <9e9c4580-acbc-16fe-1af0-4be1ea33e700@cs.tcd.ie> Subject: Re: [Model-t] model-t@iab.org list description References: <29756028-95f1-e6e5-b3ea-562cbc635df0@sandelman.ca> <5ef15ad2-5b20-e871-0d01-17cf906051c1@cs.tcd.ie> <22633.1564768705@localhost> <5879878A-7CEA-4030-BB72-108CC4122719@gmail.com> <56f78164-7205-0cb8-eaaf-3bdae25a7c67@cs.tcd.ie> <34296538-559C-45B0-8D44-E35BCA47DD35@gmail.com> In-Reply-To: <34296538-559C-45B0-8D44-E35BCA47DD35@gmail.com> --gfTsrM24WYwkiDG776iNr0C0klgyVsc7L Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="------------C5D1D66E167D4A08B4031635" Content-Language: en-GB This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------C5D1D66E167D4A08B4031635 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On 03/08/2019 15:37, Bret Jordan wrote: > I did not use anything from STIX. Are you referring to the use of > kill chain phase? I was. If you're using some other methodology be interested in which. (Those information model based approaches to describing threats/incidents aren't something I follow in detail.) 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ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=bluepopcorn.net Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id c7rLhHUypIDD for ; Sat, 3 Aug 2019 09:52:51 -0700 (PDT) Received: from v2.bluepopcorn.net (v2.bluepopcorn.net [IPv6:2607:f2f8:a994::2]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D7E7F120020 for ; Sat, 3 Aug 2019 09:52:51 -0700 (PDT) Received: from steel.local ([IPv6:2601:647:4300:2290:124:b44:547:d3db]) (authenticated bits=0) by v2.bluepopcorn.net (8.14.4/8.14.4/Debian-8+deb8u2) with ESMTP id x73Gqmkf021992 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128 verify=NO); Sat, 3 Aug 2019 09:52:49 -0700 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=bluepopcorn.net; s=supersize; t=1564851169; bh=lfB8CDqLfT/aRqVVkv2f5YXe5J/q9hDv3ssp9jI69OU=; h=Subject:To:References:From:Date:In-Reply-To; b=KnSMV2MbAw85R/d2z9SfYJzEzT47zlZl5SMAfat6B0ylYCK8aIVybQw07KZf8Eo2x zQd6cjy2OK65ztXxTq2W+Os62DNM2jJp0uSp2gs5OiuKi8ZV1HkUlFFVsydf6lVjyh a86EOtVHInuVUkdi1G6vJJQpzHZ1sE3+GNikGkY8= To: Bret Jordan , model-t@iab.org References: <29756028-95f1-e6e5-b3ea-562cbc635df0@sandelman.ca> <5ef15ad2-5b20-e871-0d01-17cf906051c1@cs.tcd.ie> <22633.1564768705@localhost> <5879878A-7CEA-4030-BB72-108CC4122719@gmail.com> From: Jim Fenton Openpgp: preference=signencrypt Autocrypt: addr=fenton@bluepopcorn.net; prefer-encrypt=mutual; keydata= mQINBFJNz0MBEADME6UoNSsTvSDJOdzL4yWfH4HTTOOZZPUcM/at38j4joeBb2PdatlwCBtk 9ZjupxFK+Qh5NZC19Oa6CHo0vlqw7V1hx1MUhmSPbzKRcNFhJu0KcQdniI8qmsqoG50IELXN BPI5OEZ3chYHpoXXi2+VCkjXJyeoqRNwNdv6QPGg6O1FMbB+AcIZj3x5U18LnJnXv1i+1vBq CxbMP43VmryPf8BLufcEciXpMEHydHbrEBZb/r7SBkUhdQXjxRNcWOLeYvOVUOOrr1c+jvqm DEbTWUJVRnUro/WpZQBffFnymR0jjkdAa8eOVl/nF2oMLbaBsOMvxCRSSEcGhuqwbEappNVT 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<5879878A-7CEA-4030-BB72-108CC4122719@gmail.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Language: en-US Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Model-t] model-t@iab.org list description X-BeenThere: model-t@iab.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussions of changes in Internet deployment patterns and their impact on the Internet threat model List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 03 Aug 2019 16:52:53 -0000 On 8/2/19 9:24 PM, Bret Jordan wrote: > To borrow your words=E2=80=A6 =C2=A0=E2=80=9CIf we are going to take se= curity seriously=E2=80=9D=E2=80=A6 > =C2=A0we need to understand and document the full attack surface. =C2=A0= So let > us start listing them out. =C2=A0Here are four. > > > Attack: Active remote attack > Exposure: Full compromise of system and data > Client Knowledge: Potential indicators may be visible > Protection Possibilities: Deploy both client and network level protecti= ons > Headwinds: Client based protections are usually inadequate > Severity: High > Kill-Chain Phase: Lateral Movement [etc.] Perhaps we need to decide what we consider a threat model to be. I see Bret's list as a collection of specific attacks (tactics), while I consider a threat model to be at a higher level than that, e.g., whether nation-states, or supply chain threats, should be part of that model. When I was working on the draft that became RFC 4686 (DKIM Threat Analysis), Russ Housley gave me some very good coaching about how to structure that. He suggested that it should describe: - The nature and location of the bad actors - What the bad actors' capabilities are - What they intend to accomplish via their attacks How do we want to define threat model? -Jim From nobody Sat Aug 3 10:12:09 2019 Return-Path: X-Original-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 14F2F12011F for ; Sat, 3 Aug 2019 10:12:08 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.899 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.899 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=fugue-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id ouXm_nU-_fY0 for ; Sat, 3 Aug 2019 10:12:06 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail-qk1-x729.google.com (mail-qk1-x729.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::729]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D092F12011E for ; Sat, 3 Aug 2019 10:12:05 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-qk1-x729.google.com with SMTP id t8so57236114qkt.1 for ; Sat, 03 Aug 2019 10:12:05 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=fugue-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com; s=20150623; h=mime-version:subject:from:in-reply-to:date:cc :content-transfer-encoding:message-id:references:to; bh=TGyP3s3f6nGDG2p+FIa7SX7RBXJtuHabTIu4Ni+7t24=; b=PQfjwj/3jTzfSRS2k/lD8EYyBQZx24nPYA9RK6rsx5hh5GsgdgwUpZNKX608xxsStO RAZt8b3rWCtl6vai8OvqLptrojw2G/uDUyaXfDSTvJPHu2afKa0PBy80EwcVRe809VoS kKQNOpF9AerS0ebm8StFJy+ZuZX4Dz67Y+oG6HwCYzvIYHKSMP/pzQWb/FdxJk7ojGXp nCgRSw6Nrr34vWrhCZy5FjJbcvsW0BbfQxaFNV/LuNBmPBBSTZeH2fiGy0GWQFfiVycK r//ZcxL4xRY5wHfak33ryrIjVo589ECiDVs8tnwnJUO9QCE+W8yCx9n55hwBuLNh5j3Q cNqQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:subject:from:in-reply-to:date:cc :content-transfer-encoding:message-id:references:to; bh=TGyP3s3f6nGDG2p+FIa7SX7RBXJtuHabTIu4Ni+7t24=; b=rt8TafP1L7ukdsN1Ijw8vliZoKors+Uh6r5FWvHMgD/IwZ4BHFGaQLmIJr1SoUVESc J+6uQhdDsffPFZcCL0JftprHH75KX1/IJ15DzM993YldDagWujpZocVaJaRrFz52Vdvz dgabdVX4xS3qW1WREWeQ/pySILsTbULjangzjO/67aSxQaf23hSmglEoIRcspmwQ8qv7 ea8f57vILSAfwn1l6Abd5rzY6X4dOvkdAUpt5VLi1/RWEjN3ZxKqPGiVDr7IyNjm+gv5 S0vwwtlzpVokiKldumspgw0UXzesFfCfwHs/8X2z/OOCPmHX7nhYrNT9Rw6RWSn1PWLj zhAA== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAWj58Nvs4x/d4tc+lEBJM2UrfCHp7LmEMor40VpuLZSnu395rGM WgLMrwd2NjPL29hmeT+YAaW1wvF20m8+bQ== X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqwJ9BJgVf9jxQBaHCXbYLZDvTtZfhXPKebtqbXuuFtKVLmvK8jaNiqYSAhqs0HoMj/bcHqu7A== X-Received: by 2002:a37:9a0b:: with SMTP id c11mr98106157qke.204.1564852324286; Sat, 03 Aug 2019 10:12:04 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [10.0.30.11] (c-73-186-137-119.hsd1.ma.comcast.net. [73.186.137.119]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id h19sm30787866qto.3.2019.08.03.10.12.03 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Sat, 03 Aug 2019 10:12:03 -0700 (PDT) Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Mime-Version: 1.0 (1.0) From: Ted Lemon X-Mailer: iPhone Mail (16G77) In-Reply-To: Date: Sat, 3 Aug 2019 13:12:03 -0400 Cc: Bret Jordan , model-t@iab.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Message-Id: <06F0AE14-4413-4022-A804-C1B58E2702CE@fugue.com> References: <29756028-95f1-e6e5-b3ea-562cbc635df0@sandelman.ca> <5ef15ad2-5b20-e871-0d01-17cf906051c1@cs.tcd.ie> <22633.1564768705@localhost> <5879878A-7CEA-4030-BB72-108CC4122719@gmail.com> To: Jim Fenton Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Model-t] model-t@iab.org list description X-BeenThere: model-t@iab.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussions of changes in Internet deployment patterns and their impact on the Internet threat model List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 03 Aug 2019 17:12:08 -0000 Yes. It would also be good to avoid domain-specific jargon. Presumably the g= oal here is to provide something of value to the whole community, not someth= ing that only people who are familiar with a very specific vernacular can us= e.=20 Of course, I might be mistaken about the intended scope of this work, so if t= his sounds wrong it would be good to get consensus on that.=20 Sent from my iPhone > On Aug 3, 2019, at 12:52 PM, Jim Fenton wrote: >=20 >> On 8/2/19 9:24 PM, Bret Jordan wrote: >>=20 >> To borrow your words=E2=80=A6 =E2=80=9CIf we are going to take security s= eriously=E2=80=9D=E2=80=A6 >> we need to understand and document the full attack surface. So let >> us start listing them out. Here are four. >>=20 >>=20 >> Attack: Active remote attack >> Exposure: Full compromise of system and data >> Client Knowledge: Potential indicators may be visible >> Protection Possibilities: Deploy both client and network level protection= s >> Headwinds: Client based protections are usually inadequate >> Severity: High >> Kill-Chain Phase: Lateral Movement >=20 > [etc.] >=20 > Perhaps we need to decide what we consider a threat model to be. I see > Bret's list as a collection of specific attacks (tactics), while I > consider a threat model to be at a higher level than that, e.g., whether > nation-states, or supply chain threats, should be part of that model. >=20 > When I was working on the draft that became RFC 4686 (DKIM Threat > Analysis), Russ Housley gave me some very good coaching about how to > structure that. He suggested that it should describe: >=20 > - The nature and location of the bad actors > - What the bad actors' capabilities are > - What they intend to accomplish via their attacks >=20 > How do we want to define threat model? >=20 > -Jim >=20 >=20 >=20 > --=20 > Model-t mailing list > Model-t@iab.org > https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t From nobody Sat Aug 3 10:26:18 2019 Return-Path: X-Original-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 36747120188 for ; Sat, 3 Aug 2019 10:26:10 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.997 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.997 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 6BDxoLoLMbnO for ; Sat, 3 Aug 2019 10:26:07 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail-pl1-x634.google.com (mail-pl1-x634.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::634]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 954CB120155 for ; Sat, 3 Aug 2019 10:26:07 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-pl1-x634.google.com with SMTP id az7so34814910plb.5 for ; Sat, 03 Aug 2019 10:26:07 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=from:message-id:mime-version:subject:date:in-reply-to:cc:to :references; bh=2xVsULGGdol4ou7EPOA+lXoRrFi2brefgMnv6LYXq9Q=; b=NCAgL6N0k891AebJIr3Y8vSN0PVyRZN5JdxxUffQratKiadPy4sk1eTqetETrulOWS GH4nZDozN08NAS+pLqkEw8adhlWGQDMNqhOPgrVuKFRdBEnPmKF4LA3gz0OmWmzM56wp SBPCzTDABYBv9woXZx34e3qQkuV6vwmSk2AlGzqImgz82N7/4FOkQgblevPa7xa+eqMd SvAK3Ykiyo87205EA395K0RU2WCBJDkqsxAz0oycc9mZAfYmyq3NY95o14qh8Xcbpiv/ jK+fXLxoY0RhUNNCoTO7oUzy5QTz4JdOcviUheHk4OU0Mutz2iWxS/ioP3rIWRxYuX6U 4SyQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:from:message-id:mime-version:subject:date :in-reply-to:cc:to:references; bh=2xVsULGGdol4ou7EPOA+lXoRrFi2brefgMnv6LYXq9Q=; b=jjGYPWVSbaHaQE4nfNaJs2sHcsplB6SCLplsktk5ZgkMGJJbnKHB7nuA6aT26aSY2+ ee1fAueGoEYmM/Xkn5yRjvLruxuNtWjZolYbGnPyBwZaIZtTCLUw5SrXRdUnqBV57hpV xPM7LmBzIv/PF+WlNq47SaTA+QzaCGMUaoJRb0thE2tyXKm4aPLb3hNhUXm83C5Tb8VS EmUgqQqhoWQMbFn9B2qpuc3od1ak2xC2DKZmJUya5kiTv7WV0Xrbb4IOQoaiyTxJf8tt ZxMFGtb6EI59tC1MT74sNj0/NW//ZSdVr180Kvzj8h8t6mBuedBSzBwC+kx5OpSlwwzh 9B7Q== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAUv6/UBCGyga6brpMlG4/Eq/9KgR+vZDHt3Mfx1Bk4T6T0UantO wrT/DgDX8pjuf6GEgEW/rQ15uyM+ X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqytr6Ht1AklhqubFsDXL4IqfqH6vBqGj7wiw5kRYb4ce8s5fE2aHEHcLj1f0DMwgttzELGNLw== X-Received: by 2002:a17:902:7288:: with SMTP id d8mr53210756pll.133.1564853167149; Sat, 03 Aug 2019 10:26:07 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [10.128.64.149] ([136.60.227.81]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id p68sm91665920pfb.80.2019.08.03.10.26.05 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Sat, 03 Aug 2019 10:26:06 -0700 (PDT) From: Bret Jordan Message-Id: Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="Apple-Mail=_630DB989-9349-426E-956B-094B58E42DEB" Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 12.4 \(3445.104.11\)) Date: Sat, 3 Aug 2019 11:26:04 -0600 In-Reply-To: <9e9c4580-acbc-16fe-1af0-4be1ea33e700@cs.tcd.ie> Cc: Martin Thomson , model-t@iab.org To: Stephen Farrell References: <29756028-95f1-e6e5-b3ea-562cbc635df0@sandelman.ca> <5ef15ad2-5b20-e871-0d01-17cf906051c1@cs.tcd.ie> <22633.1564768705@localhost> <5879878A-7CEA-4030-BB72-108CC4122719@gmail.com> <56f78164-7205-0cb8-eaaf-3bdae25a7c67@cs.tcd.ie> <34296538-559C-45B0-8D44-E35BCA47DD35@gmail.com> <9e9c4580-acbc-16fe-1af0-4be1ea33e700@cs.tcd.ie> X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.3445.104.11) Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Model-t] model-t@iab.org list description X-BeenThere: model-t@iab.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussions of changes in Internet deployment patterns and their impact on the Internet threat model List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 03 Aug 2019 17:26:17 -0000 --Apple-Mail=_630DB989-9349-426E-956B-094B58E42DEB Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Stephen, While there are several minor variations on the =E2=80=9CKill Chain=E2=80=9D= as defined originally by Lockheed Martin in the following paper back in = 2011 I think = (https://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed-martin/rms/documents/= cyber/LM-White-Paper-Intel-Driven-Defense.pdf = ). In addition, MITRE has recently produced an ATT&CK framework to help = identify and characterize threat actor behavior. NIST has already = produced a Cyber Security Framework that is commonly used when talking = about these sorts of things.=20 STIX on the other hand is a taxonomy for sharing threat intelligence. = Things like threat actors, campaigns, intrusion sets, attack patterns, = malware information, indicators of compromise, etc etc. Thanks, Bret PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447 F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that = can not be unscrambled is an egg." > On Aug 3, 2019, at 8:40 AM, Stephen Farrell = wrote: >=20 >=20 >=20 > On 03/08/2019 15:37, Bret Jordan wrote: >> I did not use anything from STIX. Are you referring to the use of >> kill chain phase? > I was. If you're using some other methodology be interested > in which. (Those information model based approaches to > describing threats/incidents aren't something I follow in > detail.) >=20 > Cheers, > S. > <0x5AB2FAF17B172BEA.asc> --Apple-Mail=_630DB989-9349-426E-956B-094B58E42DEB Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Stephen,

While there are several minor variations on the =E2=80=9CKill = Chain=E2=80=9D as defined originally by Lockheed Martin in the following = paper back in 2011 I think (https://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed-martin/rms/= documents/cyber/LM-White-Paper-Intel-Driven-Defense.pdf).

In addition, MITRE has = recently produced an ATT&CK framework to help identify and = characterize threat actor behavior.  NIST has already produced a = Cyber Security Framework that is commonly used when talking about these = sorts of things. 

STIX on the other hand is a taxonomy for sharing threat = intelligence.  Things like threat actors, campaigns, intrusion = sets, attack patterns, malware information, indicators of compromise, = etc etc.


Thanks,
Bret
PGP = Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 = 0050
"Without = cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that can not = be unscrambled is an = egg."

On Aug 3, 2019, at 8:40 AM, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:



On 03/08/2019 15:37, Bret Jordan wrote:
I did not use anything = from STIX. Are you referring to the use of
kill chain = phase?
I was. If you're using some other = methodology be interested
in which. (Those information = model based approaches to
describing threats/incidents = aren't something I follow in
detail.)

Cheers,
S.
<0x5AB2FAF17B172BEA.asc= >

= --Apple-Mail=_630DB989-9349-426E-956B-094B58E42DEB-- From nobody Sat Aug 3 10:28:21 2019 Return-Path: X-Original-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 19C681200CC for ; Sat, 3 Aug 2019 10:28:19 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.997 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.997 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 9CWJMovIlAyu for ; Sat, 3 Aug 2019 10:28:17 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail-pf1-x431.google.com (mail-pf1-x431.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::431]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 071E7120058 for ; Sat, 3 Aug 2019 10:28:17 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-pf1-x431.google.com with SMTP id r7so37576126pfl.3 for ; Sat, 03 Aug 2019 10:28:17 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=from:message-id:mime-version:subject:date:in-reply-to:cc:to :references; bh=VqIkvhPCUPotpeuI/ujkdltBfBzROL7ROW5aRY80Vh4=; b=Tin+5IjmUI0AczSb36jwPqSx86g3VPYroKVM3ZoDJontEvb0rMnc+Gjb31txxHxeG+ ebczFBi834SGro5IVdKSzn38vj5q58hVAgokcK/z5TTK8hcpWSPWUYV7eMxUfxkfcukY 5CytQkV2SIt5VDn501mbGLgIRQ3X44hqp0Cy0qS4JgfDmTWDEaf4JLMaUAINO8Y/Vdjb n6deRNokKfwJ24GT0g+PpFsQlGn8YVvCGGu2QuH/6Z7HYeuDqYVqazMoBe8wxBnE/TP2 ek3RnGQCq2btyR2QfxuttphdhxeqTJX1mUjv6sou7Z2sd+cVy+XXGdfuSVK1gssxbFy7 Oatw== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:from:message-id:mime-version:subject:date :in-reply-to:cc:to:references; bh=VqIkvhPCUPotpeuI/ujkdltBfBzROL7ROW5aRY80Vh4=; b=ELeoNRmpX1KNB2A0whgBpEPV2eou+DDyEjfBT02IM2RPRd6Hplh3uqFBS9UDQY3s49 0Zb28vOL7wawPcyv7jB7eFIFZu2XBzMC2QkvuMMJaFQr2MKYslGrdH/fahpRFwnb/2Ju vBIFNya5t2YZI+13QriYJeUZgAhNfX4nU/8E07DN1JJtiDgFn6MNR1cR7Kodue58eDry jL5CilxUoX4UEEwVZf6fwMQEApoEcXTlVuKWZHZeJ7CLXJQzasyVIvHhTiidJr9M8pZN ubA4mq0FnMWt8qhSSPGT3K0P4pBPLvP/rLwj/fQrrw+r4IUtxGWYYGNQlI/njWV0iomY dwKQ== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAWKYFc5+EccKzjiaOH1HzmtxAukb/5R7smVSDCtjW9d60TUPALI C3uM9a/CwE+5JQjsU4aB+T/M8sRf X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqxdlKbRTmrboUJEStWRUOLl9QkVkDkvTLR0dwU1W7wR56xivh34FbVKyYq/pe4Dfp6uwyD4hg== X-Received: by 2002:a17:90a:214e:: with SMTP id a72mr10525982pje.0.1564853296524; Sat, 03 Aug 2019 10:28:16 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [10.128.64.149] ([136.60.227.81]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id h9sm72381635pgh.51.2019.08.03.10.28.15 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Sat, 03 Aug 2019 10:28:15 -0700 (PDT) From: Bret Jordan Message-Id: <69E0FEA7-5B7A-4382-B01F-5A2B9A526BBA@gmail.com> Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="Apple-Mail=_8F23C831-8093-4E18-8253-22D6A4519548" Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 12.4 \(3445.104.11\)) Date: Sat, 3 Aug 2019 11:28:13 -0600 In-Reply-To: Cc: model-t@iab.org To: Jim Fenton References: <29756028-95f1-e6e5-b3ea-562cbc635df0@sandelman.ca> <5ef15ad2-5b20-e871-0d01-17cf906051c1@cs.tcd.ie> <22633.1564768705@localhost> <5879878A-7CEA-4030-BB72-108CC4122719@gmail.com> X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.3445.104.11) Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Model-t] model-t@iab.org list description X-BeenThere: model-t@iab.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussions of changes in Internet deployment patterns and their impact on the Internet threat model List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 03 Aug 2019 17:28:19 -0000 --Apple-Mail=_8F23C831-8093-4E18-8253-22D6A4519548 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Jim, They are not specific attacks, but rather categories of attacks that = could be executed by any number of threat actors. Some threat actors = may have different capabilities or different levels of sophistication, = but in general, these types of attacks are not specific to a certain = classification of threat actor.=20 Thanks, Bret PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447 F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that = can not be unscrambled is an egg." > On Aug 3, 2019, at 10:52 AM, Jim Fenton = wrote: >=20 > On 8/2/19 9:24 PM, Bret Jordan wrote: >=20 >> To borrow your words=E2=80=A6 =E2=80=9CIf we are going to take = security seriously=E2=80=9D=E2=80=A6 >> we need to understand and document the full attack surface. So let >> us start listing them out. Here are four. >>=20 >>=20 >> Attack: Active remote attack >> Exposure: Full compromise of system and data >> Client Knowledge: Potential indicators may be visible >> Protection Possibilities: Deploy both client and network level = protections >> Headwinds: Client based protections are usually inadequate >> Severity: High >> Kill-Chain Phase: Lateral Movement >=20 > [etc.] >=20 > Perhaps we need to decide what we consider a threat model to be. I see > Bret's list as a collection of specific attacks (tactics), while I > consider a threat model to be at a higher level than that, e.g., = whether > nation-states, or supply chain threats, should be part of that model. >=20 > When I was working on the draft that became RFC 4686 (DKIM Threat > Analysis), Russ Housley gave me some very good coaching about how to > structure that. He suggested that it should describe: >=20 > - The nature and location of the bad actors > - What the bad actors' capabilities are > - What they intend to accomplish via their attacks >=20 > How do we want to define threat model? >=20 > -Jim >=20 >=20 >=20 --Apple-Mail=_8F23C831-8093-4E18-8253-22D6A4519548 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Jim,

They = are not specific attacks, but rather categories of attacks that could be = executed by any number of threat actors.  Some threat actors may = have different capabilities or different levels of sophistication, but = in general, these types of attacks are not specific to a certain = classification of threat actor. 

Thanks,
Bret
PGP = Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 = 0050
"Without = cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that can not = be unscrambled is an = egg."

On Aug 3, 2019, at 10:52 AM, Jim Fenton <fenton@bluepopcorn.net> wrote:

On = 8/2/19 9:24 PM, Bret Jordan wrote:

To borrow your words=E2=80= =A6  =E2=80=9CIf we are going to take security seriously=E2=80=9D=E2=80= =A6
 we need to understand and document the full = attack surface.  So let
us start listing them out. =  Here are four.


Attack: = Active remote attack
Exposure: Full compromise of system = and data
Client Knowledge: Potential indicators may be = visible
Protection Possibilities: Deploy both client and = network level protections
Headwinds: Client based = protections are usually inadequate
Severity: High
Kill-Chain Phase: Lateral Movement

[etc.]

Perhaps we need to decide what we consider a threat model to = be. I see
Bret's list as a collection of specific attacks = (tactics), while I
consider a threat model to be at a = higher level than that, e.g., whether
nation-states, or = supply chain threats, should be part of that model.

When I was working on the draft that became RFC 4686 (DKIM = Threat
Analysis), Russ Housley gave me some very good = coaching about how to
structure that. He suggested that it = should describe:

- The nature and location = of the bad actors
- What the bad actors' capabilities = are
- What they intend to accomplish via their attacks

How do we want to define threat model?

-Jim




= --Apple-Mail=_8F23C831-8093-4E18-8253-22D6A4519548-- From nobody Sat Aug 3 10:39:51 2019 Return-Path: X-Original-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7AA0A120058 for ; Sat, 3 Aug 2019 10:39:49 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.997 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.997 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id d04j58Hqa3UZ for ; Sat, 3 Aug 2019 10:39:47 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail-pf1-x435.google.com (mail-pf1-x435.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::435]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6E51D12000E for ; Sat, 3 Aug 2019 10:39:47 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-pf1-x435.google.com with SMTP id y15so37590869pfn.5 for ; Sat, 03 Aug 2019 10:39:47 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=from:message-id:mime-version:subject:date:in-reply-to:cc:to :references; bh=/MOeg0PpkhEd6klNdSUHV9nUxj4YU8jl8FAxk4WqWLY=; b=tkbCWXAtZOAaLdSyVHlvpwzO6QgyY8GhmoBnhfD1e31YRfpmdMV2dixM17o/r8sy4Y +KVxfXFI0PRzqMHV2Zga/XMOg/q0SRFmS0zhecvIt5lGPy0xuRly79JrQJ9vJWdVmKui iuywDLxlbsEe1znfPCvcVqTsy/yr6+Vp9QDEw7tNDwB5XgLxrrp0LIXhEw28Svk5S6Mq hAzqMd37CNLHFMVVWleM8f6DlsttZSJun/OJ6VXwSxIKiZBm7VRqPRy6VmEGdZ0oFibK zmF43mh+6DCpvni9X/TPXkfrQFSbLf/gfMhIdOgHBZhaaNV383UMDaPUeBqIfabET+eN p8Iw== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:from:message-id:mime-version:subject:date :in-reply-to:cc:to:references; bh=/MOeg0PpkhEd6klNdSUHV9nUxj4YU8jl8FAxk4WqWLY=; b=hiEypOX5aDLXo3rKgGaAYXu01VvgytFGOnNRLmDe0UIGZUOtOOvo4YWLqs16UQzJeq HWmtGValf7TanzhBd6zrnP3H56Xz8KG7xQsyyDZXM7xiT9LSYdZPJyeKBuoQcsLCYHHr ap/H2atr2u62grHvk50P+PgppFGiFxHS2ykgxh2gAw87lat3uwhpwAm/Xwaz02PPVeJY Dn9biEiHGMl3L4hkbr/D0SxGxSSxltkQTQ9cCZBtp+0Dsz4kPHKeKJcB+fOLuiRHSQMo MEu7M7FTmA86hpJRywqobnmgzfwnVuo1zPRiJDsD9NBtHo4Z43pMy1k/OyYoW16fojeu Rj6A== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAVlKS6pzaM4BxUhFhEJ6DghftfcvKwqa9EsJ2SGPPRxlsleiugG vCpE43YDQUHt7OQofLfiTOq/WoEf X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqycJxQXvmL2mInvQZojoAV+HPXbTK9iVMMilAMZjiZTQ4cm63ceKWZpIra0GvYTk3lctsaKPA== X-Received: by 2002:a63:d04e:: with SMTP id s14mr123395013pgi.189.1564853986922; Sat, 03 Aug 2019 10:39:46 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [10.128.64.149] ([136.60.227.81]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id b30sm110744251pfr.117.2019.08.03.10.39.45 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Sat, 03 Aug 2019 10:39:46 -0700 (PDT) From: Bret Jordan Message-Id: <52BAC141-CB25-4072-B556-6325912F1ADD@gmail.com> Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="Apple-Mail=_F6756757-AC73-4141-B9B2-12AD9A0D12E2" Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 12.4 \(3445.104.11\)) Date: Sat, 3 Aug 2019 11:39:43 -0600 In-Reply-To: <06F0AE14-4413-4022-A804-C1B58E2702CE@fugue.com> Cc: Jim Fenton , model-t@iab.org To: Ted Lemon References: <29756028-95f1-e6e5-b3ea-562cbc635df0@sandelman.ca> <5ef15ad2-5b20-e871-0d01-17cf906051c1@cs.tcd.ie> <22633.1564768705@localhost> <5879878A-7CEA-4030-BB72-108CC4122719@gmail.com> <06F0AE14-4413-4022-A804-C1B58E2702CE@fugue.com> X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.3445.104.11) Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Model-t] model-t@iab.org list description X-BeenThere: model-t@iab.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussions of changes in Internet deployment patterns and their impact on the Internet threat model List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 03 Aug 2019 17:39:49 -0000 --Apple-Mail=_F6756757-AC73-4141-B9B2-12AD9A0D12E2 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Ted, This is not jargon, this is the language that is used in this space. If = we are going to write a document or come up with text to help improve a = document that deals with this domain, then we should probably know and = understand the domain. Attacks against network connected devices = (endpoints, network equipment, IoT devices, etc) are all in scope. So = when we work on designing solutions for interconnected systems, we need = to understand this space. Designing technologies without taking this = space into consideration is very problematic. =20 We have many in this group that work in this space and have very = detailed knowledge of it. If you have specific questions, I am sure = many of us would be willing to help fill in the gaps. =20 IMO, the key to our work is to help improve the IETF=E2=80=99s = understanding of risks, threat actor TTPs, attack surface, etc. This = space has evolved a lot recently, and has definitely changed since 3552 = was first written. Further, given the upcoming market shift to 5G = enabled devices and its changing attack surface, this work is prudent at = this time. Gone are the days of =E2=80=9CEscargot Model=E2=80=9D (a = term I started using back in the late 80s / early 90s) of security.=20 Thanks, Bret PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447 F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that = can not be unscrambled is an egg." > On Aug 3, 2019, at 11:12 AM, Ted Lemon wrote: >=20 > Yes. It would also be good to avoid domain-specific jargon. Presumably = the goal here is to provide something of value to the whole community, = not something that only people who are familiar with a very specific = vernacular can use.=20 >=20 > Of course, I might be mistaken about the intended scope of this work, = so if this sounds wrong it would be good to get consensus on that.=20 >=20 > Sent from my iPhone >=20 >> On Aug 3, 2019, at 12:52 PM, Jim Fenton = wrote: >>=20 >>> On 8/2/19 9:24 PM, Bret Jordan wrote: >>>=20 >>> To borrow your words=E2=80=A6 =E2=80=9CIf we are going to take = security seriously=E2=80=9D=E2=80=A6 >>> we need to understand and document the full attack surface. So let >>> us start listing them out. Here are four. >>>=20 >>>=20 >>> Attack: Active remote attack >>> Exposure: Full compromise of system and data >>> Client Knowledge: Potential indicators may be visible >>> Protection Possibilities: Deploy both client and network level = protections >>> Headwinds: Client based protections are usually inadequate >>> Severity: High >>> Kill-Chain Phase: Lateral Movement >>=20 >> [etc.] >>=20 >> Perhaps we need to decide what we consider a threat model to be. I = see >> Bret's list as a collection of specific attacks (tactics), while I >> consider a threat model to be at a higher level than that, e.g., = whether >> nation-states, or supply chain threats, should be part of that model. >>=20 >> When I was working on the draft that became RFC 4686 (DKIM Threat >> Analysis), Russ Housley gave me some very good coaching about how to >> structure that. He suggested that it should describe: >>=20 >> - The nature and location of the bad actors >> - What the bad actors' capabilities are >> - What they intend to accomplish via their attacks >>=20 >> How do we want to define threat model? >>=20 >> -Jim >>=20 >>=20 >>=20 >> --=20 >> Model-t mailing list >> Model-t@iab.org >> https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t --Apple-Mail=_F6756757-AC73-4141-B9B2-12AD9A0D12E2 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Ted,

This is not jargon, this is the language that is used in this = space. If we are going to write a document or come up with text to help = improve a document that deals with this domain, then we should probably = know and understand the domain. Attacks against network connected = devices (endpoints, network equipment, IoT devices, etc) are all in = scope.  So when we work on designing solutions for interconnected = systems, we need to understand this space.  Designing technologies = without taking this space into consideration is very problematic. =  

We have = many in this group that work in this space and have very detailed = knowledge of it.  If you have specific questions, I am sure many of = us would be willing to help fill in the gaps.  

IMO, the key to our work = is to help improve the IETF=E2=80=99s understanding of risks, threat = actor TTPs, attack surface, etc.  This space has evolved a lot = recently, and has definitely changed since 3552 was first written. =  Further, given the upcoming market shift to 5G enabled devices and = its changing attack surface, this work is prudent at this time. =  Gone are the days of =E2=80=9CEscargot Model=E2=80=9D (a term I = started using back in the late 80s / early 90s) of = security. 

Thanks,
Bret
PGP = Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 = 0050
"Without = cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that can not = be unscrambled is an = egg."

On Aug 3, 2019, at 11:12 AM, Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com> = wrote:

Yes. It would also be good to avoid domain-specific jargon. = Presumably the goal here is to provide something of value to the whole = community, not something that only people who are familiar with a very = specific vernacular can use.

Of course, I = might be mistaken about the intended scope of this work, so if this = sounds wrong it would be good to get consensus on that.
Sent from my iPhone

On Aug 3, 2019, at 12:52 PM, Jim Fenton <fenton@bluepopcorn.net> wrote:

On 8/2/19 9:24 PM, Bret = Jordan wrote:

To borrow your words=E2=80=A6 =  =E2=80=9CIf we are going to take security seriously=E2=80=9D=E2=80=A6=
we need to understand and document the full attack = surface.  So let
us start listing them out. =  Here are four.


Attack: = Active remote attack
Exposure: Full compromise of system = and data
Client Knowledge: Potential indicators may be = visible
Protection Possibilities: Deploy both client and = network level protections
Headwinds: Client based = protections are usually inadequate
Severity: High
Kill-Chain Phase: Lateral Movement

[etc.]

Perhaps we need to decide what we consider a threat model to = be. I see
Bret's list as a collection of specific attacks = (tactics), while I
consider a threat model to be at a = higher level than that, e.g., whether
nation-states, or = supply chain threats, should be part of that model.

When I was working on the draft that became RFC 4686 (DKIM = Threat
Analysis), Russ Housley gave me some very good = coaching about how to
structure that. He suggested that it = should describe:

- The nature and location = of the bad actors
- What the bad actors' capabilities = are
- What they intend to accomplish via their attacks

How do we want to define threat model?

-Jim



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https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t

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Linux x86_64; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/60.8.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <52BAC141-CB25-4072-B556-6325912F1ADD@gmail.com> Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha512; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="jtCIV4Uo2Xh7ycFgu2vqVcGRKbfnN9THL" Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Model-t] model-t@iab.org list description X-BeenThere: model-t@iab.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussions of changes in Internet deployment patterns and their impact on the Internet threat model List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 03 Aug 2019 17:47:58 -0000 This is an OpenPGP/MIME signed message (RFC 4880 and 3156) --jtCIV4Uo2Xh7ycFgu2vqVcGRKbfnN9THL Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="r7EcSMSzcEmjU8g9IHLaYjD8WUQbzb9cY"; protected-headers="v1" From: Stephen Farrell To: Bret Jordan , Ted Lemon Cc: Jim Fenton , model-t@iab.org Message-ID: <9a1555ca-6699-75f1-683e-2a3a2a539a11@cs.tcd.ie> Subject: Re: [Model-t] model-t@iab.org list description References: <29756028-95f1-e6e5-b3ea-562cbc635df0@sandelman.ca> <5ef15ad2-5b20-e871-0d01-17cf906051c1@cs.tcd.ie> <22633.1564768705@localhost> <5879878A-7CEA-4030-BB72-108CC4122719@gmail.com> <06F0AE14-4413-4022-A804-C1B58E2702CE@fugue.com> <52BAC141-CB25-4072-B556-6325912F1ADD@gmail.com> In-Reply-To: <52BAC141-CB25-4072-B556-6325912F1ADD@gmail.com> --r7EcSMSzcEmjU8g9IHLaYjD8WUQbzb9cY Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="------------113389386E30C08987CDB562" Content-Language: en-GB This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------113389386E30C08987CDB562 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Hiya, On 03/08/2019 18:39, Bret Jordan wrote: > This is not jargon, this is the language that is used in this space. I agree that these kinds of information model based approaches are fairly widely used by those dealing with specific incidents and products/services that in some way deal with specific incidents. But it's less clear if or how those approaches apply at protocol design time, which is what's more relevant here. I think the applicability may be even less clear for protocols that are used in widely different contexts. It's also unclear (to me anyway) how or if privacy issues could be addressed with such approaches. However, I can imagine a case for approaches like these could well be made, and I'd be interested in seeing that attempted as part of this discussion. Hopefully someone'll start a new thread for that with some kind of overview/proposal like that, Cheers, S. --------------113389386E30C08987CDB562 Content-Type: application/pgp-keys; name="0x5AB2FAF17B172BEA.asc" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="0x5AB2FAF17B172BEA.asc" -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- mQINBFo9UDIBEADUH4ZPcUnX5WWRWO4kEkHea5Y5eEvZjSwe/YA+G0nrTuOU9nem CP5PMvmh5Cg8gBTyWyN4Z2+O25p9Tja5zUb+vPMWYvOtokRrp46yhFZOmiS5b6kT q0IqYzsEv5HI58S+QtaFq978CRa4xH9Gi9u4yzUmT03QNIGDXE37honcAM4MOEtE gvw4fVhVWJuyy3w//0F2tzKrEMjmL5VGuD/Q9+G/7abuXiYNNd9ZFjv4625AUWwy +pAh4EKzS1FE7BOZp9daMu9MUQmDqtZUbUv0Q+DnQAB/4tNncejJPz0p2z3MWCp5 iSwHiQvytYgatMp34a50l6CWqa13n6vY8VcPlIqOVz+7L+WiVfxLbeVqBwV+4uL9 to9zLF9IyUvl94lCxpscR2kgRgpM6A5LylRDkR6E0oudFnJgb097ZaNyuY1ETghV B5Uir1GCYChs8NUNumTHXiOkuzk+Gs4DAHx/a78YxBolKHi+esLH8r2k4LyM2lp5 FmBKjG7cGcpBGmWavACYEa7rwAadg4uBx9SHMV5i33vDXQUZcmW0vslQ2Is02NMK 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RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H2=-0.001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 7UwIth5hQW4H for ; Sat, 3 Aug 2019 11:09:41 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mx43-out1.antispamcloud.com (mx43-out1.antispamcloud.com [138.201.61.189]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0F1D512000E for ; Sat, 3 Aug 2019 11:09:41 -0700 (PDT) Received: from xse12.mail2web.com ([66.113.196.12] helo=xse.mail2web.com) by mx148.antispamcloud.com with esmtp (Exim 4.89) (envelope-from ) id 1htyTJ-000Ba5-1B for model-t@iab.org; Sat, 03 Aug 2019 20:09:38 +0200 Received: from xsmtp22.mail2web.com (unknown [10.100.68.61]) by xse.mail2web.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 461BrH3qNszLwN for ; Sat, 3 Aug 2019 11:09:35 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [10.5.2.49] (helo=xmail11.myhosting.com) by xsmtp22.mail2web.com with esmtps (TLS1.0:DHE_RSA_AES_256_CBC_SHA1:256) (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1htyTH-0001G6-DV for model-t@iab.org; Sat, 03 Aug 2019 11:09:35 -0700 Received: (qmail 25030 invoked from network); 3 Aug 2019 18:09:34 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO [192.168.1.103]) (Authenticated-user:_huitema@huitema.net@[172.56.38.95]) (envelope-sender ) by xmail11.myhosting.com (qmail-ldap-1.03) with ESMTPA for ; 3 Aug 2019 18:09:34 -0000 To: model-t@iab.org References: <29756028-95f1-e6e5-b3ea-562cbc635df0@sandelman.ca> <5ef15ad2-5b20-e871-0d01-17cf906051c1@cs.tcd.ie> <22633.1564768705@localhost> <5879878A-7CEA-4030-BB72-108CC4122719@gmail.com> <06F0AE14-4413-4022-A804-C1B58E2702CE@fugue.com> <52BAC141-CB25-4072-B556-6325912F1ADD@gmail.com> <9a1555ca-6699-75f1-683e-2a3a2a539a11@cs.tcd.ie> From: Christian Huitema Openpgp: preference=signencrypt Autocrypt: addr=huitema@huitema.net; prefer-encrypt=mutual; keydata= mQENBFIRX8gBCAC26usy/Ya38IqaLBSu33vKD6hP5Yw390XsWLaAZTeQR64OJEkoOdXpvcOS HWfMIlD5s5+oHfLe8jjmErFAXYJ8yytPj1fD2OdSKAe1TccUBiOXT8wdVxSr5d0alExVv/LO I/vA2aU1TwOkVHKSapD7j8/HZBrqIWRrXUSj2f5n9tY2nJzG9KRzSG0giaJWBfUFiGb4lvsy IaCaIU0YpfkDDk6PtK5YYzuCeF0B+O7N9LhDu/foUUc4MNq4K3EKDPb2FL1Hrv0XHpkXeMRZ olpH8SUFUJbmi+zYRuUgcXgMZRmZFL1tu6z9h6gY4/KPyF9aYot6zG28Qk/BFQRtj7V1ABEB AAG0J0NocmlzdGlhbiBIdWl0ZW1hIDxodWl0ZW1hQGh1aXRlbWEubmV0PokBOQQTAQIAIwUC UhFfyAIbLwcLCQgHAwIBBhUIAgkKCwQWAgMBAh4BAheAAAoJEJNDCbJVyA1yhbYH/1ud6x6m VqGIp0JcZUfSQO8w+TjugqxCyGNn+w/6Qb5O/xENxNQ4HaMQ5uSRK9n8WKKDDRSzwZ4syKKf wbkfj05vgFxrjCynVbm1zs2X2aGXh+PxPL/WHUaxzEP7KjYbLtCUZDRzOOrm+0LMktngT/k3 6+EZoLEM52hwwpIAzJoscyEz7QfqMOZtFm6xQnlvDQeIrHx0KUvwo/vgDLK3SuruG1CSHcR0 D24kEEUa044AIUKBS3b0b8AR7f6mP2NcnLpdsibtpabi9BzqAidcY/EjTaoea46HXALk/eJd 6OLkLE6UQe1PPzQC4jB7rErX2BxnSkHDw50xMgLRcl5/b1a5AQ0EUhFfyAEIAKp7Cp8lqKTV CC9QiAf6QTIjW+lie5J44Ad++0k8gRgANZVWubQuCQ71gxDWLtxYfFkEXjG4TXV/MUtnOliG 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Subject: Re: [Model-t] model-t@iab.org list description X-BeenThere: model-t@iab.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussions of changes in Internet deployment patterns and their impact on the Internet threat model List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 03 Aug 2019 18:09:43 -0000 This is an OpenPGP/MIME signed message (RFC 4880 and 3156) --qlKiBiEFFN9pZXdRRTpiWXcD0pkxSVQ3t Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="fmKlinVhBz9JTX8abtwXO7ElaC3JMaLzj"; protected-headers="v1" From: Christian Huitema To: model-t@iab.org Message-ID: Subject: Re: [Model-t] model-t@iab.org list description References: <29756028-95f1-e6e5-b3ea-562cbc635df0@sandelman.ca> <5ef15ad2-5b20-e871-0d01-17cf906051c1@cs.tcd.ie> <22633.1564768705@localhost> <5879878A-7CEA-4030-BB72-108CC4122719@gmail.com> <06F0AE14-4413-4022-A804-C1B58E2702CE@fugue.com> <52BAC141-CB25-4072-B556-6325912F1ADD@gmail.com> <9a1555ca-6699-75f1-683e-2a3a2a539a11@cs.tcd.ie> In-Reply-To: <9a1555ca-6699-75f1-683e-2a3a2a539a11@cs.tcd.ie> --fmKlinVhBz9JTX8abtwXO7ElaC3JMaLzj Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Language: en-US On 8/3/2019 10:47 AM, Stephen Farrell wrote: > Hiya, > > On 03/08/2019 18:39, Bret Jordan wrote: >> This is not jargon, this is the language that is used in this space. > I agree that these kinds of information model based approaches > are fairly widely used by those dealing with specific incidents > and products/services that in some way deal with specific incidents. > > But it's less clear if or how those approaches apply at protocol > design time, which is what's more relevant here. I think the > applicability may be even less clear for protocols that are used > in widely different contexts. It's also unclear (to me anyway) > how or if privacy issues could be addressed with such approaches Reading this thread, I think that we are missing a step. We cannot define attacks without defining first the assets that need to be protected. Different actors probably have different views on that, such a= s: 1) Continuous operation of the Internet 2) Continuous operation of a specific Internet provider 3) Continuous availability of an Internet Service 4) Continuous connectivity for a given user 5) Protection of databases used by services and enterprises 6) Protection of the personal data of users Do we have agreement on what we are trying to protect? -- Christian Huitema --fmKlinVhBz9JTX8abtwXO7ElaC3JMaLzj-- --qlKiBiEFFN9pZXdRRTpiWXcD0pkxSVQ3t Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name="signature.asc" Content-Description: OpenPGP digital signature Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="signature.asc" -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2 iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJdRc3dAAoJELba05IUOHVQjfgH/0tLJmfZ677K/u9bUhtV2ZRA MV2U4tFiKO5t3GqX9zvsRRVztodDmEmv3WPLrlpehJ4r/5ASdf45Eqj/MRicKtO1 rAeDvqNhNpG6VoC2mk8ouwFjAIuIeVckVpf43fxfwiVecR86jiR+CKzg01yEuDo5 SuDJ4Il11fYgBHfiq1YfBdFgM+LPsGqaWvPeLaJVI0hcM7gH+YXUUPxZz5Mx/hGK 4IWrNg4VBhlg/WmMhkoexb94+EQ+jb/08y6+ySEnqbuUxGrIviL+wQXBuuvLmGXz tj3voFOvKUbHJlCCq77f1hcaYFXOt060iIbtPqePipNN0v9G59Dmy1//NZCCtTU= =c38M -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --qlKiBiEFFN9pZXdRRTpiWXcD0pkxSVQ3t-- From nobody Sat Aug 3 11:21:31 2019 Return-Path: X-Original-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 89AAE1200D6 for ; 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Sat, 03 Aug 2019 11:21:27 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc:content-transfer-encoding; bh=RtQ33k3TgUTq5m+iXX/okwJl0jJIhEmLCome+IIS2bk=; b=fxKk5HSDdVuUyp7oFXCnQJUKRveuL1ygqYiqkhhvNJg7ySjtZPpV88UqzMAnZCdxJb LyPRbNo3Nv+bgS1DSw5qoyazXdGQ/MbYdUXhAK/8N0S/3GPPAlCCe6RsXHJVddZeSw1a 63pGoz3V2OjVJwYI+rJM4MQXNM3fb7gtRxzw5nNLFJ/vnMXMgxE1qlxIiM3YxC2X8S5Q ViFjC/yMGsXNBMCrZeO+qLlBxRyFHoxhnXYeswUuCYkdU5DhX9FWCMTSpMauYpjgQpSo SrpH3Cb44sAVBYLOfNxHwyiwFQ8erk39/qDsEHPk846GTX6dOzv4vm4zI/oFOo9K8fmw peNg== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc:content-transfer-encoding; bh=RtQ33k3TgUTq5m+iXX/okwJl0jJIhEmLCome+IIS2bk=; b=rmt+i9PoEGGzZAnBwU9g8iGM2LJGJYdMODmFs7mTNEAxMk7Tr0ERBZymVaCE3+EIK2 PK2m5Vu3j3yH+x0zB07wN4XWKaeASxrs/VJ0+USJ3eK0m+KoydArZEPWd2snjUll8NWt /jB949IKTWqaSUdVUOsqHpEn08kw02T+APE6n2vQsKDT+1OGStv8AXmf796j6D6sTnGv frSUo9zO0e+laTE/jI///seEgyupr3V+JKJCw56U0WyQ+qYnKH8BbeQu6aAW0O73QV1N 9ssfLGEtzsu63ez/pCNb6MOcgOeXkUfiEoQzEdYHHXxx9+GztCU6Qxjkar/yTpesYUxL oZkw== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAU9NFF3s978B2DAHKc5KQ/QV5TQUEeLLgI5G4LN4CmF1VZO3w/y F4iznN10M7Owl4du8SRDFYvOX0U8o4yc333+Ao4= X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqxPEIJ1IEoqNMDIiEeeNAHzZ7JZFGc/8mM4+voyhnWhqDBJC6U6TwJX9SK2MvWUz5oF7/Zk5/zIMouw9zskHto= X-Received: by 2002:a19:2297:: with SMTP id i145mr66461815lfi.97.1564856485961; Sat, 03 Aug 2019 11:21:25 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <29756028-95f1-e6e5-b3ea-562cbc635df0@sandelman.ca> <5ef15ad2-5b20-e871-0d01-17cf906051c1@cs.tcd.ie> <22633.1564768705@localhost> <5879878A-7CEA-4030-BB72-108CC4122719@gmail.com> <56f78164-7205-0cb8-eaaf-3bdae25a7c67@cs.tcd.ie> <34296538-559C-45B0-8D44-E35BCA47DD35@gmail.com> <9e9c4580-acbc-16fe-1af0-4be1ea33e700@cs.tcd.ie> In-Reply-To: From: Watson Ladd Date: Sat, 3 Aug 2019 11:21:14 -0700 Message-ID: To: Bret Jordan Cc: Stephen Farrell , Martin Thomson , model-t@iab.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Model-t] model-t@iab.org list description X-BeenThere: model-t@iab.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussions of changes in Internet deployment patterns and their impact on the Internet threat model List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 03 Aug 2019 18:21:31 -0000 How on earth do I write a Security Consideration section that addresses that sort of high level thing? What does this methodology produce? When we look at actual vulnerabilities with CVE numbers attached, and go back we don't see "active remote attack". We see using C is a bad idea. Look at programs doing what the users didn't want, and the answer isn't DNS filtering, it's sandboxing. Where is that in your list of answers? Attacks like "Johnny You're Fired" have a cause: overly complicated file formats with lots of edge cases. These are problems that some of which the IETF can't solve but some where a better threat model and understanding of security would have solved. At the same time we see problems like Amazon's architecture around VM authentication not respecting traditional Unix permission models because it makes credentials available over HTTP from the machine. So if you take a standard sort of setup and move it to the cloud, you now can have a problem sometimes called SSRF, but really just another Confused Deputy. I believe this was discovered on MULTICS. We need to have a model that gets people answering the right question, not the wrong one. And a threat taxonomy at the high level just says there are bad people online. We know that. That's the problem. How do we stop them from doing what they want? Well, that's where computer security comes in, and the goal has to be to recognize the security properties we want, and ensure the systems we have have those properties. And the threat model informs what the properties are. It doesn't matter how big the system. It doesn't matter if it's accessed by pigeon, phone, microwave link, or 5G. It doesn't even need to be made of silicon: HFDF was an anonymity attack resulting in location detection at the PHY layer, as was identifying telegraph operators by their fist. On Sat, Aug 3, 2019 at 10:26 AM Bret Jordan wrote: > > Stephen, > > While there are several minor variations on the =E2=80=9CKill Chain=E2=80= =9D as defined originally by Lockheed Martin in the following paper back in= 2011 I think (https://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed-martin/r= ms/documents/cyber/LM-White-Paper-Intel-Driven-Defense.pdf). > > In addition, MITRE has recently produced an ATT&CK framework to help iden= tify and characterize threat actor behavior. NIST has already produced a C= yber Security Framework that is commonly used when talking about these sort= s of things. > > STIX on the other hand is a taxonomy for sharing threat intelligence. Th= ings like threat actors, campaigns, intrusion sets, attack patterns, malwar= e information, indicators of compromise, etc etc. > > > Thanks, > Bret > PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447 F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 > "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that c= an not be unscrambled is an egg." > > On Aug 3, 2019, at 8:40 AM, Stephen Farrell w= rote: > > > > On 03/08/2019 15:37, Bret Jordan wrote: > > I did not use anything from STIX. Are you referring to the use of > kill chain phase? > > I was. If you're using some other methodology be interested > in which. (Those information model based approaches to > describing threats/incidents aren't something I follow in > detail.) > > Cheers, > S. > <0x5AB2FAF17B172BEA.asc> > > > -- > Model-t mailing list > Model-t@iab.org > https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t --=20 "Man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains". --Rousseau. From nobody Sat Aug 3 11:23:09 2019 Return-Path: X-Original-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C16461200CC for ; Sat, 3 Aug 2019 11:23:07 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -4.197 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.197 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_NONE=0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id nI451NmIXxzG for ; Sat, 3 Aug 2019 11:23:06 -0700 (PDT) Received: from gabriel-vm-2.zfn.uni-bremen.de (gabriel-vm-2.zfn.uni-bremen.de [134.102.50.17]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 16AFA12000E for ; Sat, 3 Aug 2019 11:23:06 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [192.168.217.120] (p548DCCB9.dip0.t-ipconnect.de [84.141.204.185]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by gabriel-vm-2.zfn.uni-bremen.de (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 461C7r0kF8zyhP; Sat, 3 Aug 2019 20:23:04 +0200 (CEST) Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 11.5 \(3445.9.1\)) From: Carsten Bormann In-Reply-To: Date: Sat, 3 Aug 2019 20:23:03 +0200 Cc: model-t@iab.org X-Mao-Original-Outgoing-Id: 586549381.6408941-447617a89e0d879a9b6cd1ea4b25e1b6 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Message-Id: References: <29756028-95f1-e6e5-b3ea-562cbc635df0@sandelman.ca> <5ef15ad2-5b20-e871-0d01-17cf906051c1@cs.tcd.ie> <22633.1564768705@localhost> <5879878A-7CEA-4030-BB72-108CC4122719@gmail.com> <06F0AE14-4413-4022-A804-C1B58E2702CE@fugue.com> <52BAC141-CB25-4072-B556-6325912F1ADD@gmail.com> <9a1555ca-6699-75f1-683e-2a3a2a539a11@cs.tcd.ie> To: Christian Huitema X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.3445.9.1) Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Model-t] model-t@iab.org list description X-BeenThere: model-t@iab.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussions of changes in Internet deployment patterns and their impact on the Internet threat model List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 03 Aug 2019 18:23:08 -0000 > 1) Continuous operation of the Internet >=20 > 2) Continuous operation of a specific Internet provider >=20 > 3) Continuous availability of an Internet Service >=20 > 4) Continuous connectivity for a given user These all appear to be availability objectives. > 5) Protection of databases used by services and enterprises This could be integrity or confidentiality or both. > 6) Protection of the personal data of users This appears to be a confidentiality objective. (The actual data protection objective is only partially a security = objective.) > Do we have agreement on what we are trying to protect? There also other kinds of objectives, such as accountability, third = party verifiability (=E2=80=9Cnon-reputation=E2=80=9D), anonymity, etc. Essentially you need to build a cross-product of the objects (assets) = and the kinds of objectives you have for them to really know what needs = to be protected. There also are derived (secondary) objectives, e.g. to = maintain the integrity of a password-protected system you need to = confidentiality-protect the passwords. And then there are the motivations and capabilities of the attackers. = These tend to shift very dynamically to the weakest point in the = defense, so the landscape of capabilities is hard to describe in a = lasting way. The underlying motivations are a bit more stable. 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[73.186.137.119]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id x2sm33358801qkc.92.2019.08.03.11.37.38 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Sat, 03 Aug 2019 11:37:38 -0700 (PDT) Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=Apple-Mail-CBE7DDF5-B9C0-4B4C-8978-5143C8E769FE Mime-Version: 1.0 (1.0) From: Ted Lemon X-Mailer: iPhone Mail (16G77) In-Reply-To: <52BAC141-CB25-4072-B556-6325912F1ADD@gmail.com> Date: Sat, 3 Aug 2019 14:37:38 -0400 Cc: Jim Fenton , model-t@iab.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message-Id: <40A8E8F0-ACF7-40DA-BE78-58483751FBB4@fugue.com> References: <29756028-95f1-e6e5-b3ea-562cbc635df0@sandelman.ca> <5ef15ad2-5b20-e871-0d01-17cf906051c1@cs.tcd.ie> <22633.1564768705@localhost> <5879878A-7CEA-4030-BB72-108CC4122719@gmail.com> <06F0AE14-4413-4022-A804-C1B58E2702CE@fugue.com> <52BAC141-CB25-4072-B556-6325912F1ADD@gmail.com> To: Bret Jordan Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Model-t] model-t@iab.org list description X-BeenThere: model-t@iab.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussions of changes in Internet deployment patterns and their impact on the Internet threat model List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 03 Aug 2019 18:37:44 -0000 --Apple-Mail-CBE7DDF5-B9C0-4B4C-8978-5143C8E769FE Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Bret, I appreciate that this is a special area of technical expertise and th= at it has a domain-specific vocabulary. That is what the word =E2=80=9Cjargo= n=E2=80=9D means.=20 The reason I raised this concern is not that I can=E2=80=99t go out and lear= n this jargon. It=E2=80=99s that if the goal of this effort is to help the I= ETF to do a better job of reasoning about threats, the IETF has to be able t= o understand the output.=20 There is already great work going on in this space amongst the experts. If t= his is to just be another such effort, I don=E2=80=99t think it will accompl= ish your stated goals. So I=E2=80=99m being deliberately pedantic here beca= use I would like to see the output of this effort actually change how the IE= TF reasons about threats. That=E2=80=99s going to require some foundational d= ocuments. The fact that you didn=E2=80=99t point me at an RFC or draft to an= swer my question tells me that I=E2=80=99m not wrong to be concerned.=20 Sent from my iPhone > On Aug 3, 2019, at 1:39 PM, Bret Jordan wrote: >=20 > Ted, >=20 > This is not jargon, this is the language that is used in this space. If we= are going to write a document or come up with text to help improve a docume= nt that deals with this domain, then we should probably know and understand t= he domain. Attacks against network connected devices (endpoints, network equ= ipment, IoT devices, etc) are all in scope. So when we work on designing so= lutions for interconnected systems, we need to understand this space. Desig= ning technologies without taking this space into consideration is very probl= ematic. =20 >=20 > We have many in this group that work in this space and have very detailed k= nowledge of it. If you have specific questions, I am sure many of us would b= e willing to help fill in the gaps. =20 >=20 > IMO, the key to our work is to help improve the IETF=E2=80=99s understandi= ng of risks, threat actor TTPs, attack surface, etc. This space has evolved= a lot recently, and has definitely changed since 3552 was first written. Fu= rther, given the upcoming market shift to 5G enabled devices and its changin= g attack surface, this work is prudent at this time. Gone are the days of =E2= =80=9CEscargot Model=E2=80=9D (a term I started using back in the late 80s /= early 90s) of security.=20 >=20 > Thanks, > Bret > PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447 F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 > "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that ca= n not be unscrambled is an egg." >=20 >> On Aug 3, 2019, at 11:12 AM, Ted Lemon wrote: >>=20 >> Yes. It would also be good to avoid domain-specific jargon. Presumably th= e goal here is to provide something of value to the whole community, not som= ething that only people who are familiar with a very specific vernacular can= use.=20 >>=20 >> Of course, I might be mistaken about the intended scope of this work, so i= f this sounds wrong it would be good to get consensus on that.=20 >>=20 >> Sent from my iPhone >>=20 >>>> On Aug 3, 2019, at 12:52 PM, Jim Fenton wrote:= >>>>=20 >>>> On 8/2/19 9:24 PM, Bret Jordan wrote: >>>>=20 >>>> To borrow your words=E2=80=A6 =E2=80=9CIf we are going to take securit= y seriously=E2=80=9D=E2=80=A6 >>>> we need to understand and document the full attack surface. So let >>>> us start listing them out. Here are four. >>>>=20 >>>>=20 >>>> Attack: Active remote attack >>>> Exposure: Full compromise of system and data >>>> Client Knowledge: Potential indicators may be visible >>>> Protection Possibilities: Deploy both client and network level protecti= ons >>>> Headwinds: Client based protections are usually inadequate >>>> Severity: High >>>> Kill-Chain Phase: Lateral Movement >>>=20 >>> [etc.] >>>=20 >>> Perhaps we need to decide what we consider a threat model to be. I see >>> Bret's list as a collection of specific attacks (tactics), while I >>> consider a threat model to be at a higher level than that, e.g., whether= >>> nation-states, or supply chain threats, should be part of that model. >>>=20 >>> When I was working on the draft that became RFC 4686 (DKIM Threat >>> Analysis), Russ Housley gave me some very good coaching about how to >>> structure that. He suggested that it should describe: >>>=20 >>> - The nature and location of the bad actors >>> - What the bad actors' capabilities are >>> - What they intend to accomplish via their attacks >>>=20 >>> How do we want to define threat model? >>>=20 >>> -Jim >>>=20 >>>=20 >>>=20 >>> --=20 >>> Model-t mailing list >>> Model-t@iab.org >>> https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t >=20 --Apple-Mail-CBE7DDF5-B9C0-4B4C-8978-5143C8E769FE Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Bret, I appreciate that this is a special area of technical expert= ise and that it has a domain-specific vocabulary. That is what the word =E2=80= =9Cjargon=E2=80=9D means. 

The reason I raised this c= oncern is not that I can=E2=80=99t go out and learn this jargon. It=E2=80=99= s that if the goal of this effort is to help the IETF to do a better job of r= easoning about threats, the IETF has to be able to understand the output.&nb= sp;

There is already great work going on in this sp= ace amongst the experts. If this is to just be another such effort, I don=E2= =80=99t think it will accomplish your stated goals.  So I=E2=80=99m bei= ng deliberately pedantic here because I would like to see the output of this= effort actually change how the IETF reasons about threats. That=E2=80=99s g= oing to require some foundational documents. The fact that you didn=E2=80=99= t point me at an RFC or draft to answer my question tells me that I=E2=80=99= m not wrong to be concerned. 

Sent from my iPhone

On Aug 3, 2019= , at 1:39 PM, Bret Jordan <jorda= n.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:

Ted,

This is not jargon, this is the language that is used in this spac= e. If we are going to write a document or come up with text to help improve a= document that deals with this domain, then we should probably know and unde= rstand the domain. Attacks against network connected devices (endpoints, net= work equipment, IoT devices, etc) are all in scope.  So when we work on= designing solutions for interconnected systems, we need to understand this s= pace.  Designing technologies without taking this space into considerat= ion is very problematic.  

We have many in this group that work in this space and have ve= ry detailed knowledge of it.  If you have specific questions, I am sure= many of us would be willing to help fill in the gaps.  

IMO, the key to our work is to h= elp improve the IETF=E2=80=99s understanding of risks, threat actor TTPs, at= tack surface, etc.  This space has evolved a lot recently, and has defi= nitely changed since 3552 was first written.  Further, given the upcomi= ng market shift to 5G enabled devices and its changing attack surface, this w= ork is prudent at this time.  Gone are the days of =E2=80=9CEscargot Mo= del=E2=80=9D (a term I started using back in the late 80s / early 90s) of se= curity. 

Thanks,
Bret
<= div class=3D"" style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; lin= e-break: after-white-space;">
<= span class=3D"" style=3D"font-size: 11px;">PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7= D 1447  F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050
"Without cr= yptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that can not be unsc= rambled is an egg."

On A= ug 3, 2019, at 11:12 AM, Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com> wrote:

Yes. It would also be good to avo= id domain-specific jargon. Presumably the goal here is to provide something o= f value to the whole community, not something that only people who are famil= iar with a very specific vernacular can use.

O= f course, I might be mistaken about the intended scope of this work, so if t= his sounds wrong it would be good to get consensus on that.
<= br class=3D"">Sent from my iPhone

On Aug 3, 2019, at 12:52 PM, Jim Fenton <fenton@bluepopcorn.net> wr= ote:

On 8/= 2/19 9:24 PM, Bret Jordan wrote:

To borrow your= words=E2=80=A6  =E2=80=9CIf we are going to take security seriously=E2= =80=9D=E2=80=A6
we need to understand and document the full a= ttack surface.  So let
us start listing them out.  H= ere are four.


Attack: Active rem= ote attack
Exposure: Full compromise of system and data
Client Knowledge: Potential indicators may be visible
= Protection Possibilities: Deploy both client and network level protectionsHeadwinds: Client based protections are usually inadequate
Severity: High
Kill-Chain Phase: Lateral Movement

[etc.]

= Perhaps we need to decide what we consider a threat model to be. I see
Bret's list as a collection of specific attacks (tactics), while I<= br class=3D"">consider a threat model to be at a higher level than that, e.g= ., whether
nation-states, or supply chain threats, should be p= art of that model.

When I was working on the dr= aft that became RFC 4686 (DKIM Threat
Analysis), Russ Housley g= ave me some very good coaching about how to
structure that. He= suggested that it should describe:

- The natur= e and location of the bad actors
- What the bad actors' capabi= lities are
- What they intend to accomplish via their attacks<= br class=3D"">
How do we want to define threat model?

-Jim



--
Model-t mailing list
Model-t@iab.org
https://www.iab.org/mailman/l= istinfo/model-t

= --Apple-Mail-CBE7DDF5-B9C0-4B4C-8978-5143C8E769FE-- From nobody Sat Aug 3 14:47:20 2019 Return-Path: X-Original-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E081E120144 for ; Sat, 3 Aug 2019 14:47:19 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.997 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.997 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id t-KIJBP_-RwG for ; Sat, 3 Aug 2019 14:47:18 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail-pf1-x429.google.com (mail-pf1-x429.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::429]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D7575120143 for ; 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Sat, 03 Aug 2019 14:47:17 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [10.128.64.149] ([136.60.227.81]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id q63sm103051269pfb.81.2019.08.03.14.47.15 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Sat, 03 Aug 2019 14:47:16 -0700 (PDT) From: Bret Jordan Message-Id: Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="Apple-Mail=_942A8948-8254-4534-B6EB-2AE2677EBF4D" Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 12.4 \(3445.104.11\)) Date: Sat, 3 Aug 2019 15:47:13 -0600 In-Reply-To: Cc: model-t@iab.org To: Christian Huitema References: <29756028-95f1-e6e5-b3ea-562cbc635df0@sandelman.ca> <5ef15ad2-5b20-e871-0d01-17cf906051c1@cs.tcd.ie> <22633.1564768705@localhost> <5879878A-7CEA-4030-BB72-108CC4122719@gmail.com> <06F0AE14-4413-4022-A804-C1B58E2702CE@fugue.com> <52BAC141-CB25-4072-B556-6325912F1ADD@gmail.com> <9a1555ca-6699-75f1-683e-2a3a2a539a11@cs.tcd.ie> X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.3445.104.11) Archived-At: Subject: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect X-BeenThere: model-t@iab.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussions of changes in Internet deployment patterns and their impact on the Internet threat model List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 03 Aug 2019 21:47:20 -0000 --Apple-Mail=_942A8948-8254-4534-B6EB-2AE2677EBF4D Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Protection of end users=E2=80=99 data Protection of an organization=E2=80=99s data Protection of devices owned by an end user or an organization=20 Protection of network equipment=20 Protection of SCADA system Protection of critical infrastructure=20 Protection of IoT and soon to be released 5G devices=20 Protection of cost optimized controllers The problem we have had in the past is we want to call this one of the = following, but each one does not encompass the full picture. 1) Computer security 2) Data security=20 3) Information security=20 4) Communication security=20 5) Network security=20 6) Application security=20 Etc, etc,=20 So if you way we are just dealing with communication security or = information security we are missing a significant piece of the pie.=20 Thanks, Bret PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447 F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that = can not be unscrambled is an egg." >>=20 > Reading this thread, I think that we are missing a step. We cannot > define attacks without defining first the assets that need to be > protected. Different actors probably have different views on that, = such as: >=20 > 1) Continuous operation of the Internet >=20 > 2) Continuous operation of a specific Internet provider >=20 > 3) Continuous availability of an Internet Service >=20 > 4) Continuous connectivity for a given user >=20 > 5) Protection of databases used by services and enterprises >=20 > 6) Protection of the personal data of users >=20 > Do we have agreement on what we are trying to protect? >=20 > -- Christian Huitema >=20 >=20 > --=20 > Model-t mailing list > Model-t@iab.org > https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t --Apple-Mail=_942A8948-8254-4534-B6EB-2AE2677EBF4D Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Protection of end users=E2=80=99 data

Protection of an organization=E2=80=99s = data

Protection = of devices owned by an end user or an organization 

Protection of network = equipment 

Protection of SCADA system

Protection of critical = infrastructure 

Protection of IoT and soon to be released 5G = devices 

Protection of cost optimized controllers


The problem we have had in the past is we want to call this = one of the following, but each one does not encompass the full = picture.
1) Computer security
2)= Data security 
3) Information = security 
4) Communication = security 
5) Network security 
6) Application security 
Etc, = etc, 

So = if you way we are just dealing with communication security or = information security we are missing a significant piece of the = pie. 


Thanks,
Bret
PGP = Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 = 0050
"Without = cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that can not = be unscrambled is an = egg."


Reading this = thread, I think that we are missing a step. We cannot
define= attacks without defining first the assets that need to be
protected. Different actors probably have different views on = that, such as:

1) Continuous operation of = the Internet

2) Continuous operation of a = specific Internet provider

3) Continuous = availability of an Internet Service

4) = Continuous connectivity for a given user

5) = Protection of databases used by services and enterprises
6) Protection of the personal data of users

Do we have agreement on what we are trying to protect?

-- Christian Huitema


--
Model-t mailing list
Model-t@iab.org
https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t

= --Apple-Mail=_942A8948-8254-4534-B6EB-2AE2677EBF4D-- From nobody Sat Aug 3 14:58:11 2019 Return-Path: X-Original-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4C13F120143 for ; Sat, 3 Aug 2019 14:58:10 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.997 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.997 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id oNH45geYWsbl for ; Sat, 3 Aug 2019 14:58:06 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail-pf1-x42e.google.com (mail-pf1-x42e.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::42e]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BD133120134 for ; Sat, 3 Aug 2019 14:58:06 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-pf1-x42e.google.com with SMTP id g2so37739788pfq.0 for ; Sat, 03 Aug 2019 14:58:06 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=from:message-id:mime-version:subject:date:in-reply-to:cc:to :references; bh=5G2oUu0tI28ePYKasq/uiXhU+/RuyDomqekNloCimGk=; b=vUnoTbZWULzQM51KJLnWAUlwMIAK+JebZDftxJY1BFLrHV3cazhKESvqsru2fUFAxX MCiQnWmBNGrosGqC0EXaIDvw/kmK2fh2HrpbRm5nMyrxx82lsXzW1XRgAwK8blCyppaC ucysW8Wba/uGlI/fu+AD36LAvihGguvQZfNvd5FHJjyVbFZw9WqIP+xfuIjK0apMvY5M 5eJkTQcfWnpg62ZB1OO6IaefjtRyfdPntv6nNk0DJtpr76HFz3JbJjjYHOYZzfZL/FEm jplUW5AUe3v2acUjc27a/QMWMCVp9WbwPEEVquTJ7z/feUpScAIXsFx6rNjcYKjRzP87 W1pQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:from:message-id:mime-version:subject:date :in-reply-to:cc:to:references; bh=5G2oUu0tI28ePYKasq/uiXhU+/RuyDomqekNloCimGk=; b=jq+u3JlJmUXyL0qe7RirP2lL95O98vZWk9gkUBsRyVEj3g32z1+enFK51WiMkhGaVN gI6TGyxrJBiOlbaqPRGlwWoZR+xhpkPPH7uoyrBa46OtnZjXuvSy6XYQqJpDTb8nqSAp fPQAqFjl/yh8X/rhv2mmLjfz03+vkIvovnrPE9aGZl2p6Kghll39fb8Pzpe61zxBFAti S+EI2JelMOFhPl3RGOEqsOO5p1YKXcsLp/OFLc/VgSW3K7YmOHEl/QSQ02aF+IVsxPPr 2Ha7YyhDGruW4cIOoj+27gQjc6FXfKnLLpA4kbmUB9xGgbT+2Ljlev1O2OUEhIe2ch0V WFww== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAVx2fhtjdcrD/a3cEQT+oYAuzTXeozO6oWzqTSuwrVJkwSVwXrL WiHgy3zPbRUfZJnKfS40QCJHKd33 X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqwx7EtgsE/VxGSOn/S/bemafMHIuxs7pUlkmNd8ax2/e37pIHxT8P3hGTJPFpshA5M0n3HQGg== X-Received: by 2002:aa7:8705:: with SMTP id b5mr13885312pfo.27.1564869486313; Sat, 03 Aug 2019 14:58:06 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [10.128.64.149] ([136.60.227.81]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id s24sm80007135pfh.133.2019.08.03.14.58.04 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Sat, 03 Aug 2019 14:58:05 -0700 (PDT) From: Bret Jordan Message-Id: <426B77F6-89AF-4D53-9324-B7D89392B723@gmail.com> Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="Apple-Mail=_4DC36165-3535-4A6C-B2CA-47AD19D77832" Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 12.4 \(3445.104.11\)) Date: Sat, 3 Aug 2019 15:58:03 -0600 In-Reply-To: <40A8E8F0-ACF7-40DA-BE78-58483751FBB4@fugue.com> Cc: Jim Fenton , model-t@iab.org To: Ted Lemon References: <29756028-95f1-e6e5-b3ea-562cbc635df0@sandelman.ca> <5ef15ad2-5b20-e871-0d01-17cf906051c1@cs.tcd.ie> <22633.1564768705@localhost> <5879878A-7CEA-4030-BB72-108CC4122719@gmail.com> <06F0AE14-4413-4022-A804-C1B58E2702CE@fugue.com> <52BAC141-CB25-4072-B556-6325912F1ADD@gmail.com> <40A8E8F0-ACF7-40DA-BE78-58483751FBB4@fugue.com> X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.3445.104.11) Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Model-t] model-t@iab.org list description X-BeenThere: model-t@iab.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussions of changes in Internet deployment patterns and their impact on the Internet threat model List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 03 Aug 2019 21:58:10 -0000 --Apple-Mail=_4DC36165-3535-4A6C-B2CA-47AD19D77832 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 I fully agree that there will need to be some foundational documents = written to help the IETF as a whole come up to speed. =20 We are basically in the same boat with cyber in the IETF as we are with = crypto. If you do not know what key material, or a Nonce, or how = asymmetric differs from symmetric algorithms, or how the discrete = logarithm problem compares to prime factorization, you will be lost. So = the crypto side of the IETF uses a lot of jargon, as well. But it is = domain specific vernacular. This cyber side also has a lost of very well = known and understood terms. I am sure ENISA, NIST, and even the ITU = have great resources. ISC^2 and SANS also have a lot of material about = this space.=20 What we are trying to do now is help the IETF realize that it is more = than just communication security and information security. The market = just happens to call this bigger umbrella "cyber security". But I know = many here do not like that term, even if the industry does use it. = Trying to break the problem down to just one of the sub parts is where = we fall over and where we get in trouble.=20 =20 Thanks, Bret PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447 F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that = can not be unscrambled is an egg." > On Aug 3, 2019, at 12:37 PM, Ted Lemon wrote: >=20 > Bret, I appreciate that this is a special area of technical expertise = and that it has a domain-specific vocabulary. That is what the word = =E2=80=9Cjargon=E2=80=9D means.=20 >=20 > The reason I raised this concern is not that I can=E2=80=99t go out = and learn this jargon. It=E2=80=99s that if the goal of this effort is = to help the IETF to do a better job of reasoning about threats, the IETF = has to be able to understand the output.=20 >=20 > There is already great work going on in this space amongst the = experts. If this is to just be another such effort, I don=E2=80=99t = think it will accomplish your stated goals. So I=E2=80=99m being = deliberately pedantic here because I would like to see the output of = this effort actually change how the IETF reasons about threats. That=E2=80= =99s going to require some foundational documents. The fact that you = didn=E2=80=99t point me at an RFC or draft to answer my question tells = me that I=E2=80=99m not wrong to be concerned.=20 >=20 > Sent from my iPhone >=20 > On Aug 3, 2019, at 1:39 PM, Bret Jordan > wrote: >=20 >> Ted, >>=20 >> This is not jargon, this is the language that is used in this space. = If we are going to write a document or come up with text to help improve = a document that deals with this domain, then we should probably know and = understand the domain. Attacks against network connected devices = (endpoints, network equipment, IoT devices, etc) are all in scope. So = when we work on designing solutions for interconnected systems, we need = to understand this space. Designing technologies without taking this = space into consideration is very problematic. =20 >>=20 >> We have many in this group that work in this space and have very = detailed knowledge of it. If you have specific questions, I am sure = many of us would be willing to help fill in the gaps. =20 >>=20 >> IMO, the key to our work is to help improve the IETF=E2=80=99s = understanding of risks, threat actor TTPs, attack surface, etc. This = space has evolved a lot recently, and has definitely changed since 3552 = was first written. Further, given the upcoming market shift to 5G = enabled devices and its changing attack surface, this work is prudent at = this time. Gone are the days of =E2=80=9CEscargot Model=E2=80=9D (a = term I started using back in the late 80s / early 90s) of security.=20 >>=20 >> Thanks, >> Bret >> PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447 F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 >> "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing = that can not be unscrambled is an egg." >>=20 >>> On Aug 3, 2019, at 11:12 AM, Ted Lemon > wrote: >>>=20 >>> Yes. It would also be good to avoid domain-specific jargon. = Presumably the goal here is to provide something of value to the whole = community, not something that only people who are familiar with a very = specific vernacular can use.=20 >>>=20 >>> Of course, I might be mistaken about the intended scope of this = work, so if this sounds wrong it would be good to get consensus on that.=20= >>>=20 >>> Sent from my iPhone >>>=20 >>>> On Aug 3, 2019, at 12:52 PM, Jim Fenton > wrote: >>>>=20 >>>>> On 8/2/19 9:24 PM, Bret Jordan wrote: >>>>>=20 >>>>> To borrow your words=E2=80=A6 =E2=80=9CIf we are going to take = security seriously=E2=80=9D=E2=80=A6 >>>>> we need to understand and document the full attack surface. So = let >>>>> us start listing them out. Here are four. >>>>>=20 >>>>>=20 >>>>> Attack: Active remote attack >>>>> Exposure: Full compromise of system and data >>>>> Client Knowledge: Potential indicators may be visible >>>>> Protection Possibilities: Deploy both client and network level = protections >>>>> Headwinds: Client based protections are usually inadequate >>>>> Severity: High >>>>> Kill-Chain Phase: Lateral Movement >>>>=20 >>>> [etc.] >>>>=20 >>>> Perhaps we need to decide what we consider a threat model to be. I = see >>>> Bret's list as a collection of specific attacks (tactics), while I >>>> consider a threat model to be at a higher level than that, e.g., = whether >>>> nation-states, or supply chain threats, should be part of that = model. >>>>=20 >>>> When I was working on the draft that became RFC 4686 (DKIM Threat >>>> Analysis), Russ Housley gave me some very good coaching about how = to >>>> structure that. He suggested that it should describe: >>>>=20 >>>> - The nature and location of the bad actors >>>> - What the bad actors' capabilities are >>>> - What they intend to accomplish via their attacks >>>>=20 >>>> How do we want to define threat model? >>>>=20 >>>> -Jim >>>>=20 >>>>=20 >>>>=20 >>>> --=20 >>>> Model-t mailing list >>>> Model-t@iab.org >>>> https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t = >>=20 --Apple-Mail=_4DC36165-3535-4A6C-B2CA-47AD19D77832 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 I = fully agree that there will need to be some foundational documents = written to help the IETF as a whole come up to speed.  

We are basically in the = same boat with cyber in the IETF as we are with crypto. If you do not = know what key material, or a Nonce, or how asymmetric differs from = symmetric algorithms, or how the discrete logarithm problem compares to = prime factorization, you will be lost.  So the crypto side of the = IETF uses a lot of jargon, as well.  But it is domain specific = vernacular. This cyber side also has a lost of very well known and = understood terms.  I am sure ENISA, NIST, and even the ITU have = great resources.  ISC^2 and SANS also have a lot of material about = this space. 

What we are trying to do now is help the IETF realize that it = is more than just communication security and information security. =  The market just happens to call this bigger umbrella "cyber = security".  But I know many here do not like that term, even if the = industry does use it.  Trying to break the problem down to just one = of the sub parts is where we fall over and where we get in = trouble. 

  
Thanks,
Bret
PGP = Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 = 0050
"Without = cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that can not = be unscrambled is an = egg."

On Aug 3, 2019, at 12:37 PM, Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com> = wrote:

Bret, I appreciate = that this is a special area of technical expertise and that it has a = domain-specific vocabulary. That is what the word =E2=80=9Cjargon=E2=80=9D= means. 

The = reason I raised this concern is not that I can=E2=80=99t go out and = learn this jargon. It=E2=80=99s that if the goal of this effort is to = help the IETF to do a better job of reasoning about threats, the IETF = has to be able to understand the output. 

There is already great work going on in = this space amongst the experts. If this is to just be another such = effort, I don=E2=80=99t think it will accomplish your stated goals. =  So I=E2=80=99m being deliberately pedantic here because I would = like to see the output of this effort actually change how the IETF = reasons about threats. That=E2=80=99s going to require some foundational = documents. The fact that you didn=E2=80=99t point me at an RFC or draft = to answer my question tells me that I=E2=80=99m not wrong to be = concerned. 

Sent from my iPhone

On Aug 3, 2019, at 1:39 PM, Bret Jordan <jordan.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:

Ted,

This is not jargon, this is the = language that is used in this space. If we are going to write a document = or come up with text to help improve a document that deals with this = domain, then we should probably know and understand the domain. Attacks = against network connected devices (endpoints, network equipment, IoT = devices, etc) are all in scope.  So when we work on designing = solutions for interconnected systems, we need to understand this space. =  Designing technologies without taking this space into = consideration is very problematic.  

We have many in this group that work in = this space and have very detailed knowledge of it.  If you have = specific questions, I am sure many of us would be willing to help fill = in the gaps.  

IMO, the key to our work is to help improve the IETF=E2=80=99s = understanding of risks, threat actor TTPs, attack surface, etc. =  This space has evolved a lot recently, and has definitely changed = since 3552 was first written.  Further, given the upcoming market = shift to 5G enabled devices and its changing attack surface, this work = is prudent at this time.  Gone are the days of =E2=80=9CEscargot = Model=E2=80=9D (a term I started using back in the late 80s / early 90s) = of security. 

Thanks,
Bret
PGP = Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 = 0050
"Without = cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that can not = be unscrambled is an = egg."

On Aug 3, 2019, at 11:12 AM, Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com> = wrote:

Yes. It would also be good to avoid domain-specific jargon. = Presumably the goal here is to provide something of value to the whole = community, not something that only people who are familiar with a very = specific vernacular can use.

Of course, I = might be mistaken about the intended scope of this work, so if this = sounds wrong it would be good to get consensus on that.
Sent from my iPhone

On Aug 3, 2019, at 12:52 PM, Jim Fenton <fenton@bluepopcorn.net> wrote:

On 8/2/19 9:24 PM, Bret = Jordan wrote:

To borrow your words=E2=80=A6 =  =E2=80=9CIf we are going to take security seriously=E2=80=9D=E2=80=A6=
we need to understand and document the full attack = surface.  So let
us start listing them out. =  Here are four.


Attack: = Active remote attack
Exposure: Full compromise of system = and data
Client Knowledge: Potential indicators may be = visible
Protection Possibilities: Deploy both client and = network level protections
Headwinds: Client based = protections are usually inadequate
Severity: High
Kill-Chain Phase: Lateral Movement

[etc.]

Perhaps we need to decide what we consider a threat model to = be. I see
Bret's list as a collection of specific attacks = (tactics), while I
consider a threat model to be at a = higher level than that, e.g., whether
nation-states, or = supply chain threats, should be part of that model.

When I was working on the draft that became RFC 4686 (DKIM = Threat
Analysis), Russ Housley gave me some very good = coaching about how to
structure that. He suggested that it = should describe:

- The nature and location = of the bad actors
- What the bad actors' capabilities = are
- What they intend to accomplish via their attacks

How do we want to define threat model?

-Jim



--
Model-t mailing list
Model-t@iab.org
https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t

<= br class=3D"">
= --Apple-Mail=_4DC36165-3535-4A6C-B2CA-47AD19D77832-- From nobody Sat Aug 3 15:14:51 2019 Return-Path: X-Original-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D5C5B120146 for ; Sat, 3 Aug 2019 15:14:49 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.998 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.998 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 1KjbrYJQbDfw for ; Sat, 3 Aug 2019 15:14:47 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail-lj1-x241.google.com (mail-lj1-x241.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::241]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 257E9120148 for ; Sat, 3 Aug 2019 15:14:47 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-lj1-x241.google.com with SMTP id t28so76025328lje.9 for ; Sat, 03 Aug 2019 15:14:47 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc:content-transfer-encoding; bh=QOxrwI73Y9dc9Wuwn6hLwDnMbv2IbazyyAK5SckUU5M=; b=KaLtEwIBgkNuvOCRigQpZj59EAs/9Oe4rWgGiHxFeBirmqC8iUgOoseFU7KY4FyoZ7 F2FrNDPhnlcZbGG/lrZOcuWnHgb2Wpm0H+EjRiEoW63WbCSE+0L/6I8vrdevgpPPX++K w3LdjY6c+hHLy7MaplOz5P2mekGrC4at+Dew+MEMr2YUsUeq9WBEUS3ZbWyUmaD8B9Gm 5Y5YZEbvYwdPhs6D1yr1K9XPrldGn5CbnEOG0sis3+b/T51jsMHf4DicK3/fkHlVkJSj lSHHLGIRliucnyheuMPre5yQKtKuDdQbrWdHTrMeCsaRNoyoyp1/4HRZsjSVUELswbq/ ffhA== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc:content-transfer-encoding; bh=QOxrwI73Y9dc9Wuwn6hLwDnMbv2IbazyyAK5SckUU5M=; b=cSVR8Lj9cssJfyAtkTjeLXxkaH5prlTYkyqjC8nsq4HVslMLeW/PGejn7Qi2xLFO0s HmyQywuLYSnr3TayazuBnehJMqo7KEYl55rrb848cgeaSZ9ulBIw6eor8e019MYhqTsb VLAhiGSE2sb993J4KCcNSNzgv03pV36quQi57oHUsNu+FaDlfXqwY+UdrCu6DR78Uq5K ktG8+pfMv1XfpM2C9P4OeXkDasnKNg9pfjP4pPB6BZkTiyFhRh6dWgb8IZDPrSjW4MJw N3fDoixVJqBBpBPdjTAXwH/Uu7EbvPWzA7mEQrF8wPLZlLYWrkW3qY6cFxXOs3xMKaZU s6Yg== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAVVCg7kRQKs+q6U/PQV5N+htX327O7DP2+YN7Gsgqexid7INmrl PARoo9L/JUO5wynhQ+kVBc/uRF3h4q3aUd1b86Y= X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqy6JSbWTCKCuIMFWamRJEPIR6sarkbcfSRDSNQJqr7u6MddZN1KI10Z0fxwBHZ7dN1uuo2fG6sobOfkO3/2Rrc= X-Received: by 2002:a2e:890a:: with SMTP id d10mr74971905lji.145.1564870485268; Sat, 03 Aug 2019 15:14:45 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <29756028-95f1-e6e5-b3ea-562cbc635df0@sandelman.ca> <5ef15ad2-5b20-e871-0d01-17cf906051c1@cs.tcd.ie> <22633.1564768705@localhost> <5879878A-7CEA-4030-BB72-108CC4122719@gmail.com> <06F0AE14-4413-4022-A804-C1B58E2702CE@fugue.com> <52BAC141-CB25-4072-B556-6325912F1ADD@gmail.com> <40A8E8F0-ACF7-40DA-BE78-58483751FBB4@fugue.com> <426B77F6-89AF-4D53-9324-B7D89392B723@gmail.com> In-Reply-To: <426B77F6-89AF-4D53-9324-B7D89392B723@gmail.com> From: Watson Ladd Date: Sat, 3 Aug 2019 15:14:33 -0700 Message-ID: To: Bret Jordan Cc: Ted Lemon , Jim Fenton , model-t@iab.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Model-t] model-t@iab.org list description X-BeenThere: model-t@iab.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussions of changes in Internet deployment patterns and their impact on the Internet threat model List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 03 Aug 2019 22:14:50 -0000 Could you point to an issue with IETF work where this "cyber" language is useful and would have lead to insights that would have avoided the issue? That might help illuminate why it is actually productive. On Sat, Aug 3, 2019 at 2:58 PM Bret Jordan wrote: > > I fully agree that there will need to be some foundational documents writ= ten to help the IETF as a whole come up to speed. > > We are basically in the same boat with cyber in the IETF as we are with c= rypto. If you do not know what key material, or a Nonce, or how asymmetric = differs from symmetric algorithms, or how the discrete logarithm problem co= mpares to prime factorization, you will be lost. So the crypto side of the= IETF uses a lot of jargon, as well. But it is domain specific vernacular.= This cyber side also has a lost of very well known and understood terms. = I am sure ENISA, NIST, and even the ITU have great resources. ISC^2 and SA= NS also have a lot of material about this space. > > What we are trying to do now is help the IETF realize that it is more tha= n just communication security and information security. The market just ha= ppens to call this bigger umbrella "cyber security". But I know many here = do not like that term, even if the industry does use it. Trying to break t= he problem down to just one of the sub parts is where we fall over and wher= e we get in trouble. > > > Thanks, > Bret > PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447 F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 > "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that c= an not be unscrambled is an egg." > > On Aug 3, 2019, at 12:37 PM, Ted Lemon wrote: > > Bret, I appreciate that this is a special area of technical expertise and= that it has a domain-specific vocabulary. That is what the word =E2=80=9Cj= argon=E2=80=9D means. > > The reason I raised this concern is not that I can=E2=80=99t go out and l= earn this jargon. It=E2=80=99s that if the goal of this effort is to help t= he IETF to do a better job of reasoning about threats, the IETF has to be a= ble to understand the output. > > There is already great work going on in this space amongst the experts. I= f this is to just be another such effort, I don=E2=80=99t think it will acc= omplish your stated goals. So I=E2=80=99m being deliberately pedantic here= because I would like to see the output of this effort actually change how = the IETF reasons about threats. That=E2=80=99s going to require some founda= tional documents. The fact that you didn=E2=80=99t point me at an RFC or dr= aft to answer my question tells me that I=E2=80=99m not wrong to be concern= ed. > > Sent from my iPhone > > On Aug 3, 2019, at 1:39 PM, Bret Jordan wrote: > > Ted, > > This is not jargon, this is the language that is used in this space. If w= e are going to write a document or come up with text to help improve a docu= ment that deals with this domain, then we should probably know and understa= nd the domain. Attacks against network connected devices (endpoints, networ= k equipment, IoT devices, etc) are all in scope. So when we work on design= ing solutions for interconnected systems, we need to understand this space.= Designing technologies without taking this space into consideration is ve= ry problematic. > > We have many in this group that work in this space and have very detailed= knowledge of it. If you have specific questions, I am sure many of us wou= ld be willing to help fill in the gaps. > > IMO, the key to our work is to help improve the IETF=E2=80=99s understand= ing of risks, threat actor TTPs, attack surface, etc. This space has evolv= ed a lot recently, and has definitely changed since 3552 was first written.= Further, given the upcoming market shift to 5G enabled devices and its ch= anging attack surface, this work is prudent at this time. Gone are the day= s of =E2=80=9CEscargot Model=E2=80=9D (a term I started using back in the l= ate 80s / early 90s) of security. > > Thanks, > Bret > PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447 F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 > "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that c= an not be unscrambled is an egg." > > On Aug 3, 2019, at 11:12 AM, Ted Lemon wrote: > > Yes. It would also be good to avoid domain-specific jargon. Presumably th= e goal here is to provide something of value to the whole community, not so= mething that only people who are familiar with a very specific vernacular c= an use. > > Of course, I might be mistaken about the intended scope of this work, so = if this sounds wrong it would be good to get consensus on that. > > Sent from my iPhone > > On Aug 3, 2019, at 12:52 PM, Jim Fenton wrote: > > On 8/2/19 9:24 PM, Bret Jordan wrote: > > To borrow your words=E2=80=A6 =E2=80=9CIf we are going to take security = seriously=E2=80=9D=E2=80=A6 > we need to understand and document the full attack surface. So let > us start listing them out. Here are four. > > > Attack: Active remote attack > Exposure: Full compromise of system and data > Client Knowledge: Potential indicators may be visible > Protection Possibilities: Deploy both client and network level protection= s > Headwinds: Client based protections are usually inadequate > Severity: High > Kill-Chain Phase: Lateral Movement > > > [etc.] > > Perhaps we need to decide what we consider a threat model to be. I see > Bret's list as a collection of specific attacks (tactics), while I > consider a threat model to be at a higher level than that, e.g., whether > nation-states, or supply chain threats, should be part of that model. > > When I was working on the draft that became RFC 4686 (DKIM Threat > Analysis), Russ Housley gave me some very good coaching about how to > structure that. He suggested that it should describe: > > - The nature and location of the bad actors > - What the bad actors' capabilities are > - What they intend to accomplish via their attacks > > How do we want to define threat model? > > -Jim > > > > -- > Model-t mailing list > Model-t@iab.org > https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t > > > > -- > Model-t mailing list > Model-t@iab.org > https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t --=20 "Man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains". --Rousseau. From nobody Sat Aug 3 22:08:48 2019 Return-Path: X-Original-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id CFB89120059 for ; Sat, 3 Aug 2019 22:08:46 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.897 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.897 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_NONE=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=rtfm-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id wrE4hdmcPE2b for ; Sat, 3 Aug 2019 22:08:45 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail-lj1-x232.google.com (mail-lj1-x232.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::232]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9B86A12004F for ; Sat, 3 Aug 2019 22:08:44 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-lj1-x232.google.com with SMTP id d24so76389779ljg.8 for ; Sat, 03 Aug 2019 22:08:44 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=rtfm-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com; s=20150623; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=OAtOeTslkbHsqcEXWL2dGwl2DdmI6tyquiVz74FfUbU=; b=eClMFqk+3JqEhdqkfEuE39R5z6j2FY+lmsbRBnpyHa4gopXQGRRGjFnwAxWumMm325 +Wh/65iIEhdzrbenfAQsCI0X7t13wo7FlAihjTX/x+xiVGTcq6GiNpJAj8Bzx9RHSvfW LxrtFiqn5vuXIu9R0+V/vs2w6huBwSF2FkD8Uu/kB2Xwti82BVOnh4Zy0dbaCs5hF74e GgOxe7ufPqVZnGxUNLaALRhBgbyACt8gmbrAJ8bSz9NLik3UZKQrTazwWNCphVcFZuK4 Ff6yS7Fb2Cb/oGWfdBLGYuPi39Hof67orsvgl/jRiBdLqxX8+MX9FkEZ0UogaHwW4FSs N2Dw== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=OAtOeTslkbHsqcEXWL2dGwl2DdmI6tyquiVz74FfUbU=; b=N6OCBUV7noVr5ZIQ2LWjGboGF5u2asRynj5hZ2QnKlV31eb1LaQLmjsScl5hE1Cg/v n4fxwoPbIXUowoDdcqBP4M7q+Xih/sDFnZZWFD4B8tbwsBznoUkNg9/ePxBe2sPWtxpp KAQB5G0XQ4fuOHoa3XN5qX1/+zWLKmIUJy6WqAIf0KcLbH2UskvknImXwPncijDLOhFY 4algYwsWfr06jkrvNuRmMDt0l5ZOmn/MYU6WosJPDuh/PIz5lDVI60iyrREpDak0e/GX X1hN3SW/KG63SY9QtK5xN8HxcrEYLEQoOiH0/wgdvAjTputjbQDR8p+mWFImnSQfiuMk eEKA== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAWrcLFfsTNGcrCxxBaSdJXaYskoqVH50ECS3bXvO5KgYmWC/0FK ek8/SKrwcBXv9crEnl2STOuFd/ZPgq5ZDM47fNI= X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqzrPI7UIWrl++n/k5fWKQWYJk+/FSWr9lOymTlp+elF5rxe3tRPPcXpLU8Ra5SJRyQVMfy5AyAMRZH4WtcKujY= X-Received: by 2002:a2e:8892:: with SMTP id k18mr4631060lji.239.1564895322714; Sat, 03 Aug 2019 22:08:42 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <29756028-95f1-e6e5-b3ea-562cbc635df0@sandelman.ca> <5ef15ad2-5b20-e871-0d01-17cf906051c1@cs.tcd.ie> <22633.1564768705@localhost> <5879878A-7CEA-4030-BB72-108CC4122719@gmail.com> <06F0AE14-4413-4022-A804-C1B58E2702CE@fugue.com> <52BAC141-CB25-4072-B556-6325912F1ADD@gmail.com> <9a1555ca-6699-75f1-683e-2a3a2a539a11@cs.tcd.ie> In-Reply-To: From: Eric Rescorla Date: Sat, 3 Aug 2019 22:08:04 -0700 Message-ID: To: Bret Jordan Cc: Christian Huitema , model-t@iab.org Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="000000000000d247a4058f43952c" Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect X-BeenThere: model-t@iab.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussions of changes in Internet deployment patterns and their impact on the Internet threat model List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 04 Aug 2019 05:08:47 -0000 --000000000000d247a4058f43952c Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable his seems like a reasonable problem statement for the overall problem of computer security, but not really for IETF. To take a concrete example memory reading attacks like Spectre are a threat to user data and something that browser vendors spend a fair amount of energy working on, but they're mostly not in scope for IETF [0]. There's nothing wrong with that, it's just division of labor. -Ekr [0] I say "mostly" because (a) we need to take the security implications of these kinds of attacks in our protocol designs and (b) there might be some small pieces of IETF work like CORB, though that seems to be mostly being done elsewhere. On Sat, Aug 3, 2019 at 2:47 PM Bret Jordan wrote: > Protection of end users=E2=80=99 data > > Protection of an organization=E2=80=99s data > > Protection of devices owned by an end user or an organization > > Protection of network equipment > > Protection of SCADA system > > Protection of critical infrastructure > > Protection of IoT and soon to be released 5G devices > > Protection of cost optimized controllers > > > The problem we have had in the past is we want to call this one of the > following, but each one does not encompass the full picture. > 1) Computer security > 2) Data security > 3) Information security > 4) Communication security > 5) Network security > 6) Application security > Etc, etc, > > So if you way we are just dealing with communication security or > information security we are missing a significant piece of the pie. > > > Thanks, > Bret > PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447 F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 > "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that > can not be unscrambled is an egg." > > > Reading this thread, I think that we are missing a step. We cannot > define attacks without defining first the assets that need to be > protected. Different actors probably have different views on that, such a= s: > > 1) Continuous operation of the Internet > > 2) Continuous operation of a specific Internet provider > > 3) Continuous availability of an Internet Service > > 4) Continuous connectivity for a given user > > 5) Protection of databases used by services and enterprises > > 6) Protection of the personal data of users > > Do we have agreement on what we are trying to protect? > > -- Christian Huitema > > > -- > Model-t mailing list > Model-t@iab.org > https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t > > > -- > Model-t mailing list > Model-t@iab.org > https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t > --000000000000d247a4058f43952c Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
his seems like a reasonable problem statement for the over= all problem of computer security, but not really for IETF.
To take a concrete example memory reading attacks like Spectre are a=20 threat to user data and something that browser vendors spend a fair=20 amount of energy working on, but they're mostly not in scope for IETF [= 0]. There's nothing wrong with that, it's just division of labor.

-Ekr

[0] I say "m= ostly" because (a) we need to take the security implications of these = kinds of attacks in our protocol designs and (b) there might be some small = pieces of IETF work like CORB, though that seems to be mostly being done el= sewhere.

On Sat, Aug 3, 2019 at 2:47 PM Bret Jordan <jordan.ietf@gmail.co= m> wrote:
Protection of end users=E2=80=99 data

P= rotection of an organization=E2=80=99s data

Protec= tion of devices owned by an end user or an organization=C2=A0
Protection of network equipment=C2=A0

= Protection of SCADA system

Protection of critical = infrastructure=C2=A0

Protection of IoT and soon to= be released 5G devices=C2=A0

Protection of cost o= ptimized controllers


The problem we= have had in the past is we want to call this one of the following, but eac= h one does not encompass the full picture.
1) Computer security
2) Data security=C2=A0
3) Information security=C2=A0
4) Communication security=C2=A0
5) Network security=C2=A0<= /div>
6) Application security=C2=A0
Etc, etc,=C2=A0

So if you way we are just dealing with communication securi= ty or information security we are missing a significant piece of the pie.= =C2=A0


Thanks,
<= div style=3D"font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;l= ine-height:normal">Bret
PGP Fingerprint:=C2=A0= 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447 =C2=A0F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050
=
"Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, h= owever, the only thing that can not be unscrambled is an egg."<= /div>


Reading this thread, I think that we are missing a step. We cannot
de= fine attacks without defining first the assets that need to be
protected= . Different actors probably have different views on that, such as:

1= ) Continuous operation of the Internet

2) Continuous operation of a = specific Internet provider

3) Continuous availability of an Internet= Service

4) Continuous connectivity for a given user

5) Prote= ction of databases used by services and enterprises

6) Protection of= the personal data of users

Do we have agreement on what we are tryi= ng to protect?

-- Christian Huitema


--
Model-t mailin= g list
Model-t@iab.= org
https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t

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[92.28.250.246]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id z1sm83027558wrp.51.2019.08.04.00.14.23 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Sun, 04 Aug 2019 00:14:27 -0700 (PDT) Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=Apple-Mail-D737FFC7-6278-4659-85D5-AABF54F796C2 Mime-Version: 1.0 (1.0) From: Dominique Lazanski X-Mailer: iPhone Mail (16F203) In-Reply-To: Date: Sun, 4 Aug 2019 08:14:14 +0100 Cc: Bret Jordan , Christian Huitema , model-t@iab.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message-Id: <86157132-D401-4033-A72B-AD4859DB6696@lastpresslabel.com> References: <29756028-95f1-e6e5-b3ea-562cbc635df0@sandelman.ca> <5ef15ad2-5b20-e871-0d01-17cf906051c1@cs.tcd.ie> <22633.1564768705@localhost> <5879878A-7CEA-4030-BB72-108CC4122719@gmail.com> <06F0AE14-4413-4022-A804-C1B58E2702CE@fugue.com> <52BAC141-CB25-4072-B556-6325912F1ADD@gmail.com> <9a1555ca-6699-75f1-683e-2a3a2a539a11@cs.tcd.ie> To: Eric Rescorla Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect X-BeenThere: model-t@iab.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussions of changes in Internet deployment patterns and their impact on the Internet threat model List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 04 Aug 2019 07:14:33 -0000 --Apple-Mail-D737FFC7-6278-4659-85D5-AABF54F796C2 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable > On 4 Aug 2019, at 06:08, Eric Rescorla wrote: >=20 > his seems like a reasonable problem statement for the overall problem of c= omputer security, but not really for IETF. >=20 But computer security is Internet security. It is rare that =E2=80=98things=E2= =80=99 are not connected to the Internet (with the exception of intranets h= owever the same type of devices are connected to both).=20 If some attacks are initiated at the pint of =E2=80=98things=E2=80=99 in ord= er to compromise the Internet I don=E2=80=99t see why this shouldn=E2=80=99t= be in scope? FWIW I think Christian and Bret=E2=80=99s emails outline issues that should b= e included in scope.=20 > To take a concrete example memory reading attacks like Spectre are a threa= t to user data and something that browser vendors spend a fair amount of ene= rgy working on, but they're mostly not in scope for IETF [0]. There's nothin= g wrong with that, it's just division of labor. >=20 > -Ekr >=20 > [0] I say "mostly" because (a) we need to take the security implications o= f these kinds of attacks in our protocol designs and (b) there might be some= small pieces of IETF work like CORB, though that seems to be mostly being d= one elsewhere. >=20 >> On Sat, Aug 3, 2019 at 2:47 PM Bret Jordan wrote:= >> Protection of end users=E2=80=99 data >>=20 >> Protection of an organization=E2=80=99s data >>=20 >> Protection of devices owned by an end user or an organization=20 >>=20 >> Protection of network equipment=20 >>=20 >> Protection of SCADA system >>=20 >> Protection of critical infrastructure=20 >>=20 >> Protection of IoT and soon to be released 5G devices=20 >>=20 >> Protection of cost optimized controllers >>=20 >>=20 >> The problem we have had in the past is we want to call this one of the fo= llowing, but each one does not encompass the full picture. >> 1) Computer security >> 2) Data security=20 >> 3) Information security=20 >> 4) Communication security=20 >> 5) Network security=20 >> 6) Application security=20 >> Etc, etc,=20 >>=20 >> So if you way we are just dealing with communication security or informat= ion security we are missing a significant piece of the pie.=20 >>=20 >>=20 >> Thanks, >> Bret >> PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447 F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 >> "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that c= an not be unscrambled is an egg." >>=20 >>>>=20 >>> Reading this thread, I think that we are missing a step. We cannot >>> define attacks without defining first the assets that need to be >>> protected.. Different actors probably have different views on that, such= as: >>>=20 >>> 1) Continuous operation of the Internet >>>=20 >>> 2) Continuous operation of a specific Internet provider >>>=20 >>> 3) Continuous availability of an Internet Service >>>=20 >>> 4) Continuous connectivity for a given user >>>=20 >>> 5) Protection of databases used by services and enterprises >>>=20 >>> 6) Protection of the personal data of users >>>=20 >>> Do we have agreement on what we are trying to protect? >>>=20 >>> -- Christian Huitema >>>=20 >>>=20 >>> --=20 >>> Model-t mailing list >>> Model-t@iab.org >>> https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t >>=20 >> --=20 >> Model-t mailing list >> Model-t@iab.org >> https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t > --=20 > Model-t mailing list > Model-t@iab.org > https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t --Apple-Mail-D737FFC7-6278-4659-85D5-AABF54F796C2 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

On 4 Aug 2019, at 0= 6:08, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>= wrote:

his seems like a reasonable problem statement for the overall problem o= f computer security, but not really for IETF.

<= /div>

But computer security is Interne= t security. It is rare that =E2=80=98things=E2=80=99 are not connected to th= e Internet  (with the exception of intranets however the same type of d= evices are connected to both). 

If some attack= s are initiated at the pint of =E2=80=98things=E2=80=99 in order to compromi= se the Internet I don=E2=80=99t see why this shouldn=E2=80=99t be in scope?<= /div>

FWIW I think Christian and Bret=E2=80=99s emails ou= tline issues that should be included in scope. 

To take a concrete example memory reading attacks like Spectre are a=20 threat to user data and something that browser vendors spend a fair=20 amount of energy working on, but they're mostly not in scope for IETF [0]. T= here's nothing wrong with that, it's just division of labor.
<= br>
-Ekr

[0] I say "mostly" because (a) w= e need to take the security implications of these kinds of attacks in our pr= otocol designs and (b) there might be some small pieces of IETF work like CO= RB, though that seems to be mostly being done elsewhere.

On Sa= t, Aug 3, 2019 at 2:47 PM Bret Jordan <jordan.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
Protection of end user= s=E2=80=99 data

Protection of an organization=E2=80= =99s data

Protection of devices owned by an end use= r or an organization 

Protection of network eq= uipment 

Protection of SCADA system
=
Protection of critical infrastructure 

Protection of IoT and soon to be released 5G devices 

Protection of cost optimized controllers


The problem we have had in the past is we want to call t= his one of the following, but each one does not encompass the full picture.<= /div>
1) Computer security
2) Data security 
3)= Information security 
4) Communication security 
<= div>5) Network security 
6) Application security 
<= div>Etc, etc, 

So if you way we are just deali= ng with communication security or information security we are missing a sign= ificant piece of the pie. 


Thanks,
Bret
PGP Fingerprint: = 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447 &= nbsp;F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050
"Wi= thout cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that can not= be unscrambled is an egg."


Reading this thread, I think that we are missing a step. We cannot
defi= ne attacks without defining first the assets that need to be
protected.. D= ifferent actors probably have different views on that, such as:

1) Co= ntinuous operation of the Internet

2) Continuous operation of a speci= fic Internet provider

3) Continuous availability of an Internet Servi= ce

4) Continuous connectivity for a given user

5) Protection o= f databases used by services and enterprises

6) Protection of the per= sonal data of users

Do we have agreement on what we are trying to pro= tect?

-- Christian Huitema


--
Model-t mailing list
= Model-t@iab.org
= h= ttps://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t

--
Model-t mailing list
Model-t@iab.org
= https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t
= --Apple-Mail-D737FFC7-6278-4659-85D5-AABF54F796C2-- From nobody Sun Aug 4 02:10:33 2019 Return-Path: X-Original-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C72A112004F for ; Sun, 4 Aug 2019 02:10:30 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.897 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.897 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_NONE=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=rtfm-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id L5iCJ8gsYOx1 for ; Sun, 4 Aug 2019 02:10:28 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail-lf1-x12d.google.com (mail-lf1-x12d.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::12d]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 52AF712002E for ; Sun, 4 Aug 2019 02:10:28 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-lf1-x12d.google.com with SMTP id z15so51508648lfh.13 for ; Sun, 04 Aug 2019 02:10:28 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=rtfm-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com; s=20150623; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=WFNDsFaO4QfIFDb8tSPAf4dTD4CjVhzacZ+FqKSAdns=; b=OMaJnHOAQzlmtnJdYTXz4kPg728Dt1A/yoH5RiYdsdL9tcxfukNGH/IL8hbXrE4b4n 04SY4PEqfp3g64zBtsYa82uOhL22hjVFemqsmLte0q3DuzgYHC7QeAi12sLeB4EjwUBQ 23cRus7DMsDmF8R4SIsHS+drYo2gtivvxys2NFHFujzrxuCkaT1LObRzGedo6L1JUw7k LRLJTJcdK55LtmjThYa0ZiUOYLyKHWjML+z88KVBgDWcgK8x46phhrmA17VXQgn86gw2 vn9pkGNZy/5H87tZ09l1PamWGYCurNnXDBzfVoQRk4puBADAuQ0MNHfB3AUCXREAntHp cAOg== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=WFNDsFaO4QfIFDb8tSPAf4dTD4CjVhzacZ+FqKSAdns=; b=dIRkW3shFEZ34EcdWtaAi/Rlxqj85ZMOFBRzFftf13NQH7fgl1rJzFe7XbzLgnGgAd u/+AEqbaa1VdhPRMiIzvCDDGIppgYr5V9LkdHaxdFNLqpSNPmE0Cb6kMZ+Ywzs0nFgBB LJhaWw6yHt6DzS8aHSWO9L2Uno5OpYtRTCdPtX6UWRFfO8nxDuwhjOAM97J7tgklDez+ KwqjpPfJIG5qJ2vqv2CkJJsT+Iipat67S7IOx5Q5cOpPGFrgYzghj0GInLKhhygReuuv hXRp1wcSay0ySm2KWsos5eD54NOZmcbNrkYjLOrNR0urORBZJDI66SZ1mLQnNIifCb6a 5jbA== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAV1/MPRwS+Muxy0ywON4lpcLKDLbWirvY1sgo3vRWnXZIJVxV+c NDyiOIX3UEIhpZmx4nlC1mbKNyIlv459Ia5Wt1I= X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqyHJ3CUGhNIksaBCyRFDEhJSYPbmQCD49jsdot2PFEqalf2zO276u9HKOMglFAVOA4idK2uAlSryIv8pUMoCU0= X-Received: by 2002:a19:4a50:: with SMTP id x77mr23842377lfa.91.1564909826530; Sun, 04 Aug 2019 02:10:26 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <29756028-95f1-e6e5-b3ea-562cbc635df0@sandelman.ca> <5ef15ad2-5b20-e871-0d01-17cf906051c1@cs.tcd.ie> <22633.1564768705@localhost> <5879878A-7CEA-4030-BB72-108CC4122719@gmail.com> <06F0AE14-4413-4022-A804-C1B58E2702CE@fugue.com> <52BAC141-CB25-4072-B556-6325912F1ADD@gmail.com> <9a1555ca-6699-75f1-683e-2a3a2a539a11@cs.tcd.ie> <86157132-D401-4033-A72B-AD4859DB6696@lastpresslabel.com> In-Reply-To: <86157132-D401-4033-A72B-AD4859DB6696@lastpresslabel.com> From: Eric Rescorla Date: Sun, 4 Aug 2019 02:09:50 -0700 Message-ID: To: Dominique Lazanski Cc: Bret Jordan , Christian Huitema , model-t@iab.org Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="00000000000050f2c1058f46f635" Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect X-BeenThere: model-t@iab.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussions of changes in Internet deployment patterns and their impact on the Internet threat model List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 04 Aug 2019 09:10:31 -0000 --00000000000050f2c1058f46f635 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On Sun, Aug 4, 2019 at 12:14 AM Dominique Lazanski wrote: > > > On 4 Aug 2019, at 06:08, Eric Rescorla wrote: > > his seems like a reasonable problem statement for the overall problem of > computer security, but not really for IETF. > > > But computer security is Internet security. It is rare that =E2=80=98thin= gs=E2=80=99 are > not connected to the Internet (with the exception of intranets however t= he > same type of devices are connected to both). > > If some attacks are initiated at the pint of =E2=80=98things=E2=80=99 in = order to > compromise the Internet I don=E2=80=99t see why this shouldn=E2=80=99t be= in scope? > Well, I didn't say anything about "things" one way or the other. However, my point is that while compromise of endpoints necessarily negatively affects the Internet, actually protecting those endpoints against compromise is outside the scope of the IETF. That's not to say it's not important, it's just not IETF work. To provide two examples perhaps closer to home: - Even though compromise of the Web is bad for the Internet, the IETF has largely punted the security of the Web itself to W3C and WHATWG. - Compromise of the WebPKI would obviously be very bad for many protocols the IETF has designed, but the management of the WebPKI is done by CABF, not IETF. -Ekr > FWIW I think Christian and Bret=E2=80=99s emails outline issues that shou= ld be > included in scope. > > To take a concrete example memory reading attacks like Spectre are a > threat to user data and something that browser vendors spend a fair amoun= t > of energy working on, but they're mostly not in scope for IETF [0]. There= 's > nothing wrong with that, it's just division of labor. > > -Ekr > > [0] I say "mostly" because (a) we need to take the security implications > of these kinds of attacks in our protocol designs and (b) there might be > some small pieces of IETF work like CORB, though that seems to be mostly > being done elsewhere. > > On Sat, Aug 3, 2019 at 2:47 PM Bret Jordan wrote: > >> Protection of end users=E2=80=99 data >> >> Protection of an organization=E2=80=99s data >> >> Protection of devices owned by an end user or an organization >> >> Protection of network equipment >> >> Protection of SCADA system >> >> Protection of critical infrastructure >> >> Protection of IoT and soon to be released 5G devices >> >> Protection of cost optimized controllers >> >> >> The problem we have had in the past is we want to call this one of the >> following, but each one does not encompass the full picture. >> 1) Computer security >> 2) Data security >> 3) Information security >> 4) Communication security >> 5) Network security >> 6) Application security >> Etc, etc, >> >> So if you way we are just dealing with communication security or >> information security we are missing a significant piece of the pie. >> >> >> Thanks, >> Bret >> PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447 F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 >> "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that >> can not be unscrambled is an egg." >> >> >> Reading this thread, I think that we are missing a step. We cannot >> define attacks without defining first the assets that need to be >> protected.. Different actors probably have different views on that, such >> as: >> >> 1) Continuous operation of the Internet >> >> 2) Continuous operation of a specific Internet provider >> >> 3) Continuous availability of an Internet Service >> >> 4) Continuous connectivity for a given user >> >> 5) Protection of databases used by services and enterprises >> >> 6) Protection of the personal data of users >> >> Do we have agreement on what we are trying to protect? >> >> -- Christian Huitema >> >> >> -- >> Model-t mailing list >> Model-t@iab.org >> https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t >> >> >> -- >> Model-t mailing list >> Model-t@iab.org >> https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t >> > -- > Model-t mailing list > Model-t@iab.org > https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t > > --00000000000050f2c1058f46f635 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable


=
On Sun, Aug 4, 2019 at 12:14 AM Domin= ique Lazanski <dml@lastpresslabel.com> wrote:


On 4 Au= g 2019, at 06:08, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:

his seems like a reasonable problem s= tatement for the overall problem of computer security, but not really for I= ETF.


<= div>But computer security is Internet security. It is rare that =E2=80=98th= ings=E2=80=99 are not connected to the Internet =C2=A0(with the exception o= f intranets however the same type of devices are connected to both).=C2=A0<= /div>

If some attacks are initiated at the pint of =E2= =80=98things=E2=80=99 in order to compromise the Internet I don=E2=80=99t s= ee why this shouldn=E2=80=99t be in scope?
Well, I didn't say anything about "things" one wa= y or the other.

However, my point is that while c= ompromise of endpoints necessarily negatively affects the Internet, actuall= y protecting those endpoints against compromise is outside the scope of the= IETF. That's not to say it's not important, it's just not IETF= work. To provide two examples perhaps closer to home:

=
- Even though compromise of the Web is bad for the Internet, the IETF = has largely punted the security of the Web itself to W3C and WHATWG.
<= div>- Compromise of the WebPKI would obviously be very bad for many protoco= ls the IETF has designed, but the management of the WebPKI is done by CABF,= not IETF.

-Ekr


<= /div>

FWIW I think Christian and Bret=E2=80=99s emails outline = issues that should be included in scope.=C2=A0

To take a concrete example memory reading attacks like Spectre are a=20 threat to user data and something that browser vendors spend a fair=20 amount of energy working on, but they're mostly not in scope for IETF [= 0]. There's nothing wrong with that, it's just division of labor.

-Ekr

[0] I say "m= ostly" because (a) we need to take the security implications of these = kinds of attacks in our protocol designs and (b) there might be some small = pieces of IETF work like CORB, though that seems to be mostly being done el= sewhere.

On Sat, Aug 3, 2019 at 2:47 PM Bret Jordan <jordan.ietf@gmail.co= m> wrote:
Protection of end users=E2=80=99 data

P= rotection of an organization=E2=80=99s data

Protec= tion of devices owned by an end user or an organization=C2=A0
Protection of network equipment=C2=A0

= Protection of SCADA system

Protection of critical = infrastructure=C2=A0

Protection of IoT and soon to= be released 5G devices=C2=A0

Protection of cost o= ptimized controllers


The problem we= have had in the past is we want to call this one of the following, but eac= h one does not encompass the full picture.
1) Computer security
2) Data security=C2=A0
3) Information security=C2=A0
4) Communication security=C2=A0
5) Network security=C2=A0<= /div>
6) Application security=C2=A0
Etc, etc,=C2=A0

So if you way we are just dealing with communication securi= ty or information security we are missing a significant piece of the pie.= =C2=A0


Thanks,
Bret
PGP Fingerprint:=C2=A063B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 144= 7 =C2=A0F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050
"Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing = that can not be unscrambled is an egg."


Reading this thread, I think that we are missing a step. We cannot
de= fine attacks without defining first the assets that need to be
protected= .. Different actors probably have different views on that, such as:

= 1) Continuous operation of the Internet

2) Continuous operation of a= specific Internet provider

3) Continuous availability of an Interne= t Service

4) Continuous connectivity for a given user

5) Prot= ection of databases used by services and enterprises

6) Protection o= f the personal data of users

Do we have agreement on what we are try= ing to protect?

-- Christian Huitema


--
Model-t maili= ng list
Model-t@iab= .org
https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t

--
Model-t mailing list
Model-t@iab.org https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t
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[92.28.250.246]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id b2sm108426500wrp.72.2019.08.04.02.49.08 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Sun, 04 Aug 2019 02:49:09 -0700 (PDT) Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=Apple-Mail-347735F6-6033-401A-99BF-E270BD26EA2D Mime-Version: 1.0 (1.0) From: Dominique Lazanski X-Mailer: iPhone Mail (16F203) In-Reply-To: Date: Sun, 4 Aug 2019 10:49:07 +0100 Cc: Bret Jordan , Christian Huitema , model-t@iab.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message-Id: <5281A343-35C0-4F4D-949D-02C46FA07801@lastpresslabel.com> References: <29756028-95f1-e6e5-b3ea-562cbc635df0@sandelman.ca> <5ef15ad2-5b20-e871-0d01-17cf906051c1@cs.tcd.ie> <22633.1564768705@localhost> <5879878A-7CEA-4030-BB72-108CC4122719@gmail.com> <06F0AE14-4413-4022-A804-C1B58E2702CE@fugue.com> <52BAC141-CB25-4072-B556-6325912F1ADD@gmail.com> <9a1555ca-6699-75f1-683e-2a3a2a539a11@cs.tcd.ie> <86157132-D401-4033-A72B-AD4859DB6696@lastpresslabel.com> To: Eric Rescorla Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect X-BeenThere: model-t@iab.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussions of changes in Internet deployment patterns and their impact on the Internet threat model List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 04 Aug 2019 09:49:16 -0000 --Apple-Mail-347735F6-6033-401A-99BF-E270BD26EA2D Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable > On 4 Aug 2019, at 10:09, Eric Rescorla wrote: >=20 >=20 >=20 >> On Sun, Aug 4, 2019 at 12:14 AM Dominique Lazanski wrote: >>=20 >>=20 >>> On 4 Aug 2019, at 06:08, Eric Rescorla wrote: >>>=20 >>> his seems like a reasonable problem statement for the overall problem of= computer security, but not really for IETF. >>>=20 >>=20 >> But computer security is Internet security. It is rare that =E2=80=98thin= gs=E2=80=99 are not connected to the Internet (with the exception of intran= ets however the same type of devices are connected to both).=20 >>=20 >> If some attacks are initiated at the pint of =E2=80=98things=E2=80=99 in o= rder to compromise the Internet I don=E2=80=99t see why this shouldn=E2=80=99= t be in scope? >=20 > Well, I didn't say anything about "things" one way or the other. >=20 > However, my point is that while compromise of endpoints necessarily negati= vely affects the Internet, actually protecting those endpoints against compr= omise is outside the scope of the IETF. That's not to say it's not important= , it's just not IETF work. To provide two examples perhaps closer to home: I disagree. Any issue that impacts the Internet should be considered.=20 >=20 > - Even though compromise of the Web is bad for the Internet, the IETF has l= argely punted the security of the Web itself to W3C and WHATWG. Times are changing!=20 > - Compromise of the WebPKI would obviously be very bad for many protocols t= he IETF has designed, but the management of the WebPKI is done by CABF, not I= ETF. But that=E2=80=99s the whole point of this group and discussion is to think a= bout all the issues and the changes and the wider problems that are happenin= g. I=E2=80=99d rather look at everything and narrow the scope of and when ne= cessary. All three Internet drafts on this subject so far even acknowledge t= hat.=20 >=20 > -Ekr >=20 -dml >=20 >>=20 >> FWIW I think Christian and Bret=E2=80=99s emails outline issues that shou= ld be included in scope.=20 >>=20 >>> To take a concrete example memory reading attacks like Spectre are a thr= eat to user data and something that browser vendors spend a fair amount of e= nergy working on, but they're mostly not in scope for IETF [0]. There's noth= ing wrong with that, it's just division of labor. >>>=20 >>> -Ekr >>>=20 >>> [0] I say "mostly" because (a) we need to take the security implications= of these kinds of attacks in our protocol designs and (b) there might be so= me small pieces of IETF work like CORB, though that seems to be mostly being= done elsewhere. >>>=20 >>>> On Sat, Aug 3, 2019 at 2:47 PM Bret Jordan wrot= e: >>>> Protection of end users=E2=80=99 data >>>>=20 >>>> Protection of an organization=E2=80=99s data >>>>=20 >>>> Protection of devices owned by an end user or an organization=20 >>>>=20 >>>> Protection of network equipment=20 >>>>=20 >>>> Protection of SCADA system >>>>=20 >>>> Protection of critical infrastructure=20 >>>>=20 >>>> Protection of IoT and soon to be released 5G devices=20 >>>>=20 >>>> Protection of cost optimized controllers >>>>=20 >>>>=20 >>>> The problem we have had in the past is we want to call this one of the f= ollowing, but each one does not encompass the full picture. >>>> 1) Computer security >>>> 2) Data security=20 >>>> 3) Information security=20 >>>> 4) Communication security=20 >>>> 5) Network security=20 >>>> 6) Application security=20 >>>> Etc, etc,=20 >>>>=20 >>>> So if you way we are just dealing with communication security or inform= ation security we are missing a significant piece of the pie.=20 >>>>=20 >>>>=20 >>>> Thanks, >>>> Bret >>>> PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447 F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 >>>> "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that= can not be unscrambled is an egg." >>>>=20 >>>>>>=20 >>>>> Reading this thread, I think that we are missing a step. We cannot >>>>> define attacks without defining first the assets that need to be >>>>> protected.. Different actors probably have different views on that, su= ch as: >>>>>=20 >>>>> 1) Continuous operation of the Internet >>>>>=20 >>>>> 2) Continuous operation of a specific Internet provider >>>>>=20 >>>>> 3) Continuous availability of an Internet Service >>>>>=20 >>>>> 4) Continuous connectivity for a given user >>>>>=20 >>>>> 5) Protection of databases used by services and enterprises >>>>>=20 >>>>> 6) Protection of the personal data of users >>>>>=20 >>>>> Do we have agreement on what we are trying to protect? >>>>>=20 >>>>> -- Christian Huitema >>>>>=20 >>>>>=20 >>>>> --=20 >>>>> Model-t mailing list >>>>> Model-t@iab.org >>>>> https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t >>>>=20 >>>> --=20 >>>> Model-t mailing list >>>> Model-t@iab.org >>>> https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t >>> --=20 >>> Model-t mailing list >>> Model-t@iab.org >>> https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t --Apple-Mail-347735F6-6033-401A-99BF-E270BD26EA2D Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

On 4 Aug 2019, at 1= 0:09, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>= wrote:



On Sun, Aug 4, 2019 at 12:14 AM Dominique Lazanski &= lt;dml@lastpress= label.com> wrote:


On 4 Aug 2019, at 06:08, E= ric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.= com> wrote:

<= div dir=3D"ltr">his seems like a reasonable problem statement for the overal= l problem of computer security, but not really for IETF.


But computer security= is Internet security. It is rare that =E2=80=98things=E2=80=99 are not conn= ected to the Internet  (with the exception of intranets however the sam= e type of devices are connected to both). 

If s= ome attacks are initiated at the pint of =E2=80=98things=E2=80=99 in order t= o compromise the Internet I don=E2=80=99t see why this shouldn=E2=80=99t be i= n scope?

Well, I didn't say anyt= hing about "things" one way or the other.

However,= my point is that while compromise of endpoints necessarily negatively affec= ts the Internet, actually protecting those endpoints against compromise is o= utside the scope of the IETF. That's not to say it's not important, it's jus= t not IETF work. To provide two examples perhaps closer to home:
=

I disagree. Any issue that impa= cts the Internet should be considered. 


- Even though compromise of the Web is bad for the Internet, the IE= TF has largely punted the security of the Web itself to W3C and WHATWG.

Times are changing! = ;

- Compromise of the WebPKI would obviously be very= bad for many protocols the IETF has designed, but the management of the Web= PKI is done by CABF, not IETF.
=
But that=E2=80=99s the whole point of this group and discussi= on is to think about all the issues and the changes and the wider problems t= hat are happening. I=E2=80=99d rather look at everything and narrow the scop= e of and when necessary. All three Internet drafts on this subject so far ev= en acknowledge that. 



-Ekr

-dml


FWIW I think Christian and Bret=E2=80= =99s emails outline issues that should be included in scope. 

=
To take a concrete example memory reading attacks like Spectre are a=20 threat to user data and something that browser vendors spend a fair=20 amount of energy working on, but they're mostly not in scope for IETF [0]. T= here's nothing wrong with that, it's just division of labor.
<= br>
-Ekr

[0] I say "mostly" because (a) w= e need to take the security implications of these kinds of attacks in our pr= otocol designs and (b) there might be some small pieces of IETF work like CO= RB, though that seems to be mostly being done elsewhere.

On Sa= t, Aug 3, 2019 at 2:47 PM Bret Jordan <jordan.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
Protection of end user= s=E2=80=99 data

Protection of an organization=E2=80= =99s data

Protection of devices owned by an end use= r or an organization 

Protection of network eq= uipment 

Protection of SCADA system
=
Protection of critical infrastructure 

Protection of IoT and soon to be released 5G devices 

Protection of cost optimized controllers


The problem we have had in the past is we want to call t= his one of the following, but each one does not encompass the full picture.<= /div>
1) Computer security
2) Data security 
3)= Information security 
4) Communication security 
<= div>5) Network security 
6) Application security 
<= div>Etc, etc, 

So if you way we are just deali= ng with communication security or information security we are missing a sign= ificant piece of the pie. 


Thanks,
Bret
PGP Fingerprint: = ;63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050<= /font>
"Without cryptography vihv vivc c= e xhrnrw, however, the only thing that can not be unscrambled is an egg."


Reading this thread, I think that we are missing a step. We cannot
defi= ne attacks without defining first the assets that need to be
protected.. D= ifferent actors probably have different views on that, such as:

1) Co= ntinuous operation of the Internet

2) Continuous operation of a speci= fic Internet provider

3) Continuous availability of an Internet Servi= ce

4) Continuous connectivity for a given user

5) Protection o= f databases used by services and enterprises

6) Protection of the per= sonal data of users

Do we have agreement on what we are trying to pro= tect?

-- Christian Huitema


--
Model-t mailing list
= Model-t@iab.org
= h= ttps://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t

--
Model-t mailing list
Model-t@iab.org
= https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t
= --Apple-Mail-347735F6-6033-401A-99BF-E270BD26EA2D-- From nobody Sun Aug 4 03:37:16 2019 Return-Path: X-Original-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C49C6120025 for ; Sun, 4 Aug 2019 03:37:14 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -4.3 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.3 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=cs.tcd.ie Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id qI3q3AKBqSFr for ; Sun, 4 Aug 2019 03:37:12 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mercury.scss.tcd.ie (mercury.scss.tcd.ie [134.226.56.6]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5EFEF12001B for ; Sun, 4 Aug 2019 03:37:11 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mercury.scss.tcd.ie (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3A602BE51; Sun, 4 Aug 2019 11:37:09 +0100 (IST) X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at scss.tcd.ie Received: from mercury.scss.tcd.ie ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mercury.scss.tcd.ie [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 8dwGISEQqFZ4; Sun, 4 Aug 2019 11:37:07 +0100 (IST) Received: from [10.244.2.138] (95-45-153-252-dynamic.agg2.phb.bdt-fng.eircom.net [95.45.153.252]) by mercury.scss.tcd.ie (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 8EC2CBE47; Sun, 4 Aug 2019 11:37:07 +0100 (IST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=cs.tcd.ie; s=mail; t=1564915027; bh=QtlHZZi5p7Vju89/+6nfURS4V9Zq9TRXpdXg7yOfky4=; h=To:Cc:References:From:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:From; b=gE6dK8GEDwK37AYpa/HgdsOpyfLR1OjbrSCow6uT5wPsXqa/9mEO2PH0QtFvvYXF0 fO4grOXuf4l7ZRvyh3f3jWUmscuuvzlsayw9gn9c7i3RWmOR90g2Mj9Gq9Y9bGgYf0 GghiWaDcXkt5BhD1voKVaYUPU8+p9eFo7eSh34g8= To: Eric Rescorla , Bret Jordan Cc: Christian Huitema , model-t@iab.org References: <29756028-95f1-e6e5-b3ea-562cbc635df0@sandelman.ca> <5ef15ad2-5b20-e871-0d01-17cf906051c1@cs.tcd.ie> <22633.1564768705@localhost> <5879878A-7CEA-4030-BB72-108CC4122719@gmail.com> <06F0AE14-4413-4022-A804-C1B58E2702CE@fugue.com> <52BAC141-CB25-4072-B556-6325912F1ADD@gmail.com> <9a1555ca-6699-75f1-683e-2a3a2a539a11@cs.tcd.ie> From: Stephen Farrell Openpgp: id=5BB5A6EA5765D2C5863CAE275AB2FAF17B172BEA; 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Linux x86_64; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/60.8.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha512; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="NzLa3tN95l4q0LDTpZ69iTm3ylXrxCt6e" Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect X-BeenThere: model-t@iab.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussions of changes in Internet deployment patterns and their impact on the Internet threat model List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 04 Aug 2019 10:37:15 -0000 This is an OpenPGP/MIME signed message (RFC 4880 and 3156) --NzLa3tN95l4q0LDTpZ69iTm3ylXrxCt6e Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="9jttdtPmqQ7ZbGyVKHesP649yyMGqb1o9"; protected-headers="v1" From: Stephen Farrell To: Eric Rescorla , Bret Jordan Cc: Christian Huitema , model-t@iab.org Message-ID: <749d5645-f134-13ac-595e-fc8360b050fa@cs.tcd.ie> Subject: Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect References: <29756028-95f1-e6e5-b3ea-562cbc635df0@sandelman.ca> <5ef15ad2-5b20-e871-0d01-17cf906051c1@cs.tcd.ie> <22633.1564768705@localhost> <5879878A-7CEA-4030-BB72-108CC4122719@gmail.com> <06F0AE14-4413-4022-A804-C1B58E2702CE@fugue.com> <52BAC141-CB25-4072-B556-6325912F1ADD@gmail.com> <9a1555ca-6699-75f1-683e-2a3a2a539a11@cs.tcd.ie> In-Reply-To: --9jttdtPmqQ7ZbGyVKHesP649yyMGqb1o9 Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="------------6AC86A4F093A2211B236BA39" Content-Language: en-GB This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------6AC86A4F093A2211B236BA39 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Hiya, On 04/08/2019 06:08, Eric Rescorla wrote: > his seems like a reasonable problem statement for the overall problem o= f > computer security, but not really for IETF. >=20 > To take a concrete example memory reading attacks like Spectre are a th= reat > to user data and something that browser vendors spend a fair amount of > energy working on, but they're mostly not in scope for IETF [0]. There'= s > nothing wrong with that, it's just division of labor. I tend to agree. OTOH, one might also wonder if such attacks are or ought be considered in NFV and similar things. Such wonderings could I think be useful, even if the answer is maybe that without the flexibility of JS a successful attack in such a scenario seems unlikely enough to not have to (currently) bother with. (That said, I've not really considered it in any detail so maybe these attacks are more relevant for NFV and co than I might think - anyone know?) A bit later... On 04/08/2019 10:09, Eric Rescorla wrote: > - Compromise of the WebPKI would obviously be very bad > for many protocols the IETF has designed, but the management > of the WebPKI is done by CABF, not IETF. That's also true, but nonetheless the IETF did document CT as a direct result of the WebPKI CAs doing a bad job wrt mis-issuance risks. So while "replace CABF, because " would not be a sensible outcome of this discussion, it's reasonable to not consider the current WebPKI as a fixed unchangeable thing, for the purposes of this discussion. Now, as it happens, I don't think we're likely to need to delve much into CABF's space (or the RPKI operators similarly) in this discussion, except maybe if we're considering when or how new PKIs might or might not be a good idea. 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APjAAAUrQIU2DCXkDMc9hsYZyC/iKWsxr4vjbbWeOU5bBJd+q4yRna8O 2eq7gTIcqQdbvodk6eTawQLZkyk/XsuzWNsDT2s= X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqwGFcZ75XH6RhDJrQpfznzEV3cA4tofrDPJZy/e5MdJkWQNFGOs050e5vbloInGm7Y7ZppwLNmTABqwvxpi1KA= X-Received: by 2002:ac2:5336:: with SMTP id f22mr66444770lfh.180.1564917312763; Sun, 04 Aug 2019 04:15:12 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <29756028-95f1-e6e5-b3ea-562cbc635df0@sandelman.ca> <5ef15ad2-5b20-e871-0d01-17cf906051c1@cs.tcd.ie> <22633.1564768705@localhost> <5879878A-7CEA-4030-BB72-108CC4122719@gmail.com> <06F0AE14-4413-4022-A804-C1B58E2702CE@fugue.com> <52BAC141-CB25-4072-B556-6325912F1ADD@gmail.com> <9a1555ca-6699-75f1-683e-2a3a2a539a11@cs.tcd.ie> <749d5645-f134-13ac-595e-fc8360b050fa@cs.tcd.ie> In-Reply-To: <749d5645-f134-13ac-595e-fc8360b050fa@cs.tcd.ie> From: Eric Rescorla Date: Sun, 4 Aug 2019 04:14:35 -0700 Message-ID: To: Stephen Farrell Cc: Bret Jordan , Christian Huitema , model-t@iab.org Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="00000000000087cff8058f48b4a2" Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect X-BeenThere: model-t@iab.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussions of changes in Internet deployment patterns and their impact on the Internet threat model List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 04 Aug 2019 11:15:17 -0000 --00000000000087cff8058f48b4a2 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" On Sun, Aug 4, 2019 at 3:37 AM Stephen Farrell wrote: > > Hiya, > > On 04/08/2019 06:08, Eric Rescorla wrote: > > his seems like a reasonable problem statement for the overall problem of > > computer security, but not really for IETF. > > > > To take a concrete example memory reading attacks like Spectre are a > threat > > to user data and something that browser vendors spend a fair amount of > > energy working on, but they're mostly not in scope for IETF [0]. There's > > nothing wrong with that, it's just division of labor. > > I tend to agree. > > OTOH, one might also wonder if such attacks are or ought be > considered in NFV and similar things. Such wonderings could > I think be useful, even if the answer is maybe that without > the flexibility of JS a successful attack in such a scenario > seems unlikely enough to not have to (currently) bother with. > That's true in the Web context, but not in other contexts, such as virtual hosting. Indeed, cross-VM attacks go back even before Spectre, at least to, Ristenpart et al. 2009 https://hovav.net/ucsd/papers/rtss09.html. On 04/08/2019 10:09, Eric Rescorla wrote: > > - Compromise of the WebPKI would obviously be very bad > > for many protocols the IETF has designed, but the management > > of the WebPKI is done by CABF, not IETF. > > That's also true, but nonetheless the IETF did document CT > as a direct result of the WebPKI CAs doing a bad job wrt > mis-issuance risks. So while "replace CABF, because " > would not be a sensible outcome of this discussion, it's > reasonable to not consider the current WebPKI as a fixed > unchangeable thing, for the purposes of this discussion. > i don't disagree with this. My point was merely that this is an example of deciding that certain technical work was out of scope. -Ekr --00000000000087cff8058f48b4a2 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable


=
On Sun, Aug 4, 2019 at 3:37 AM Stephe= n Farrell <stephen.farrell@= cs.tcd.ie> wrote:

Hiya,

On 04/08/2019 06:08, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> his seems like a reasonable problem statement for the overall problem = of
> computer security, but not really for IETF.
>
> To take a concrete example memory reading attacks like Spectre are a t= hreat
> to user data and something that browser vendors spend a fair amount of=
> energy working on, but they're mostly not in scope for IETF [0]. T= here's
> nothing wrong with that, it's just division of labor.

I tend to agree.

OTOH, one might also wonder if such attacks are or ought be
considered in NFV and similar things. Such wonderings could
I think be useful, even if the answer is maybe that without
the flexibility of JS a successful attack in such a scenario
seems unlikely enough to not have to (currently) bother with.

That's true in the Web context, but not in other= contexts, such as virtual hosting. Indeed, cross-VM attacks go back even b= efore Spectre, at least to, Ristenpart et al. 2009


On 04/08/2019 10:09, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> - Compromise of the WebPKI would obviously be very bad
> for many protocols the IETF has designed, but the management
> of the WebPKI is done by CABF, not IETF.

That's also true, but nonetheless the IETF did document CT
as a direct result of the WebPKI CAs doing a bad job wrt
mis-issuance risks. So while "replace CABF, because <X>" would not be a sensible outcome of this discussion, it's
reasonable to not consider the current WebPKI as a fixed
unchangeable thing, for the purposes of this discussion.

i don't disagree with this. My point was merely that = this is an example of deciding that certain technical work was out of scope= .

-Ekr
--00000000000087cff8058f48b4a2-- From nobody Sun Aug 4 08:40:17 2019 Return-Path: X-Original-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id BEA3112003F for ; Sun, 4 Aug 2019 08:40:15 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.998 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.998 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 4fQrLWlGVPT7 for ; Sun, 4 Aug 2019 08:40:13 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail-pf1-x434.google.com (mail-pf1-x434.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::434]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5751A120025 for ; Sun, 4 Aug 2019 08:40:13 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-pf1-x434.google.com with SMTP id 19so38328728pfa.4 for ; Sun, 04 Aug 2019 08:40:13 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=from:message-id:mime-version:subject:date:in-reply-to:cc:to :references; bh=KzvsXHo9a7TUTQq59szlMB4L+q4yq/C5E631fXQCTsU=; b=tdUVdERaXEvJuiP0fFpc97YEkoLhWp931IiGJcjJSGdrkGbmvvDik3SBHDAj0LhQ4I EzkKwkGhtsNIjq9cR/a/xMl4F3jIlHB/fUAC3NV6uwrswHVpfdMn4rg1pvRi7wwoPP1I Nf2TkyCWXRKncNHUVedcV7jv6S30LOpeqnWCucFR+6dlY6MTxcnBJjR8U04k9C8adHDQ sZ3JOqMNQytnpIhEYhKtPVYg7L2zaszZI5hLxoz3NtWXa/22YnTlCa3NsvkF6gtu9xip 82KtAQ3qh4wxLT2JVVwVmtwKzamFdeSZRIHsMJLmn7Y+V7j5LP4+8obAlFx1K+p7HNnA JICw== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:from:message-id:mime-version:subject:date :in-reply-to:cc:to:references; bh=KzvsXHo9a7TUTQq59szlMB4L+q4yq/C5E631fXQCTsU=; b=dw1zEKav/zbyPeH1hn+J5Bg1WGw35IRKvDJHRVR+6VEI52kxIXd6hennNNmow2xIoK 51psXl7f6MSMxrvBKka5Jd3Q5D5+G7XhBqHdd2A5cbmv1cLHU+gRD7f32MCy3gfem3IX o42a4PncqRS8iD/Ww9PFiTp63DNCiDbS/nfs2ZWhte0kwMOuxAXq9VKvm1Kn3cs0m9bv GDdcTTYL3X4biIhkNocT67h9wpq6hZ6JRknPmjqDx+lZLUCkRK0tr4B643UM30Vof1ff amlQseFHjlRzNfkzQW8jMJRGq+8ZdDGaWggarfCIPN2AKEV0eMQWNhLiIDP7CiSJH6xE V9NQ== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAVt5NIr0Ulp29wmzQJgAUN0DUqhGGa08jl67TzwxWCe5niAR/2E Q9R2YD1kY2Tk3AyaGximU9M= X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqzklCnAJ2pXicD+xAyntTEKRsLAqr7r00Vo022g/pG+6/OMAM1n5xmmX8dnurZ75Q3atUTvog== X-Received: by 2002:a17:90a:8d09:: with SMTP id c9mr14137557pjo.131.1564933212770; Sun, 04 Aug 2019 08:40:12 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [10.128.64.149] ([136.60.227.81]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id 135sm86397393pfb.137.2019.08.04.08.40.10 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Sun, 04 Aug 2019 08:40:11 -0700 (PDT) From: Bret Jordan Message-Id: <86639B71-F616-48CC-96AB-719F7168F087@gmail.com> Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="Apple-Mail=_423E99DA-613F-4467-93F7-BAE7A630BA8B" Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 12.4 \(3445.104.11\)) Date: Sun, 4 Aug 2019 09:40:09 -0600 In-Reply-To: <5281A343-35C0-4F4D-949D-02C46FA07801@lastpresslabel.com> Cc: Eric Rescorla , Christian Huitema , model-t@iab.org To: Dominique Lazanski References: <29756028-95f1-e6e5-b3ea-562cbc635df0@sandelman.ca> <5ef15ad2-5b20-e871-0d01-17cf906051c1@cs.tcd.ie> <22633.1564768705@localhost> <5879878A-7CEA-4030-BB72-108CC4122719@gmail.com> <06F0AE14-4413-4022-A804-C1B58E2702CE@fugue.com> <52BAC141-CB25-4072-B556-6325912F1ADD@gmail.com> <9a1555ca-6699-75f1-683e-2a3a2a539a11@cs.tcd.ie> <86157132-D401-4033-A72B-AD4859DB6696@lastpresslabel.com> <5281A343-35C0-4F4D-949D-02C46FA07801@lastpresslabel.com> X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.3445.104.11) Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect X-BeenThere: model-t@iab.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussions of changes in Internet deployment patterns and their impact on the Internet threat model List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 04 Aug 2019 15:40:16 -0000 --Apple-Mail=_423E99DA-613F-4467-93F7-BAE7A630BA8B Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 I agree here with Dominique.=20 More specifically, we need to understand that types of attacks that = impact clients and how those attacks take advantage of the overall = weakness of clients. Doing this will help us better design protocols. = We need to stop saying that clients are secure or even worse, kicking = the can down the road and not worrying about it.=20 In a previous email I called out 4 high level types of attacks that = impact users data, users privacy, and the overall integrity of = endpoints.=20 Thanks, Bret PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447 F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that = can not be unscrambled is an egg." > On Aug 4, 2019, at 3:49 AM, Dominique Lazanski = wrote: >=20 >=20 >=20 > On 4 Aug 2019, at 10:09, Eric Rescorla > wrote: >=20 >>=20 >>=20 >> On Sun, Aug 4, 2019 at 12:14 AM Dominique Lazanski = > wrote: >>=20 >>=20 >> On 4 Aug 2019, at 06:08, Eric Rescorla > wrote: >>=20 >>> his seems like a reasonable problem statement for the overall = problem of computer security, but not really for IETF. >>>=20 >>=20 >> But computer security is Internet security. It is rare that = =E2=80=98things=E2=80=99 are not connected to the Internet (with the = exception of intranets however the same type of devices are connected to = both).=20 >>=20 >> If some attacks are initiated at the pint of =E2=80=98things=E2=80=99 = in order to compromise the Internet I don=E2=80=99t see why this = shouldn=E2=80=99t be in scope? >>=20 >> Well, I didn't say anything about "things" one way or the other. >>=20 >> However, my point is that while compromise of endpoints necessarily = negatively affects the Internet, actually protecting those endpoints = against compromise is outside the scope of the IETF. That's not to say = it's not important, it's just not IETF work. To provide two examples = perhaps closer to home: >=20 > I disagree. Any issue that impacts the Internet should be considered.=20= >=20 >>=20 >> - Even though compromise of the Web is bad for the Internet, the IETF = has largely punted the security of the Web itself to W3C and WHATWG. >=20 > Times are changing!=20 >=20 >> - Compromise of the WebPKI would obviously be very bad for many = protocols the IETF has designed, but the management of the WebPKI is = done by CABF, not IETF. >=20 > But that=E2=80=99s the whole point of this group and discussion is to = think about all the issues and the changes and the wider problems that = are happening. I=E2=80=99d rather look at everything and narrow the = scope of and when necessary. All three Internet drafts on this subject = so far even acknowledge that.=20 >=20 >=20 >>=20 >> -Ekr >>=20 > -dml >=20 >>=20 >>=20 >> FWIW I think Christian and Bret=E2=80=99s emails outline issues that = should be included in scope.=20 >>=20 >>> To take a concrete example memory reading attacks like Spectre are a = threat to user data and something that browser vendors spend a fair = amount of energy working on, but they're mostly not in scope for IETF = [0]. There's nothing wrong with that, it's just division of labor. >>>=20 >>> -Ekr >>>=20 >>> [0] I say "mostly" because (a) we need to take the security = implications of these kinds of attacks in our protocol designs and (b) = there might be some small pieces of IETF work like CORB, though that = seems to be mostly being done elsewhere. >>>=20 >>> On Sat, Aug 3, 2019 at 2:47 PM Bret Jordan > wrote: >>> Protection of end users=E2=80=99 data >>>=20 >>> Protection of an organization=E2=80=99s data >>>=20 >>> Protection of devices owned by an end user or an organization=20 >>>=20 >>> Protection of network equipment=20 >>>=20 >>> Protection of SCADA system >>>=20 >>> Protection of critical infrastructure=20 >>>=20 >>> Protection of IoT and soon to be released 5G devices=20 >>>=20 >>> Protection of cost optimized controllers >>>=20 >>>=20 >>> The problem we have had in the past is we want to call this one of = the following, but each one does not encompass the full picture. >>> 1) Computer security >>> 2) Data security=20 >>> 3) Information security=20 >>> 4) Communication security=20 >>> 5) Network security=20 >>> 6) Application security=20 >>> Etc, etc,=20 >>>=20 >>> So if you way we are just dealing with communication security or = information security we are missing a significant piece of the pie.=20 >>>=20 >>>=20 >>> Thanks, >>> Bret >>> PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447 F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 >>> "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing = that can not be unscrambled is an egg." >>>=20 >>>>>=20 >>>> Reading this thread, I think that we are missing a step. We cannot >>>> define attacks without defining first the assets that need to be >>>> protected.. Different actors probably have different views on that, = such as: >>>>=20 >>>> 1) Continuous operation of the Internet >>>>=20 >>>> 2) Continuous operation of a specific Internet provider >>>>=20 >>>> 3) Continuous availability of an Internet Service >>>>=20 >>>> 4) Continuous connectivity for a given user >>>>=20 >>>> 5) Protection of databases used by services and enterprises >>>>=20 >>>> 6) Protection of the personal data of users >>>>=20 >>>> Do we have agreement on what we are trying to protect? >>>>=20 >>>> -- Christian Huitema >>>>=20 >>>>=20 >>>> --=20 >>>> Model-t mailing list >>>> Model-t@iab.org >>>> https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t = >>>=20 >>> --=20 >>> Model-t mailing list >>> Model-t@iab.org >>> https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t = >>> --=20 >>> Model-t mailing list >>> Model-t@iab.org >>> https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t = --Apple-Mail=_423E99DA-613F-4467-93F7-BAE7A630BA8B Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 I = agree here with Dominique. 

More specifically, we need to understand that types of = attacks that impact clients and how those attacks take advantage of the = overall weakness of clients. Doing this will help us better design = protocols.  We need to stop saying that clients are secure or even = worse, kicking the can down the road and not worrying about = it. 

In a = previous email I called out 4 high level types of attacks that impact = users data, users privacy, and the overall integrity of = endpoints. 

Thanks,
Bret
PGP = Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 = 0050
"Without = cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that can not = be unscrambled is an = egg."

On Aug 4, 2019, at 3:49 AM, Dominique Lazanski <dml@lastpresslabel.com> wrote:



On 4 Aug 2019, at 10:09, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:



On Sun, Aug = 4, 2019 at 12:14 AM Dominique Lazanski <dml@lastpresslabel.com> wrote:


On 4 Aug 2019, at = 06:08, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:

his seems like a reasonable = problem statement for the overall problem of computer security, but not = really for IETF.


But computer security is Internet = security. It is rare that =E2=80=98things=E2=80=99 are not connected to = the Internet  (with the exception of intranets however the same = type of devices are connected to both). 

If some attacks are initiated at the = pint of =E2=80=98things=E2=80=99 in order to compromise the Internet I = don=E2=80=99t see why this shouldn=E2=80=99t be in = scope?

Well, I didn't say anything about "things" one way or the = other.

= However, my point is that while compromise of endpoints necessarily = negatively affects the Internet, actually protecting those endpoints = against compromise is outside the scope of the IETF. That's not to say = it's not important, it's just not IETF work. To provide two examples = perhaps closer to home:

I disagree. Any issue = that impacts the Internet should be considered. 


- Even though compromise = of the Web is bad for the Internet, the IETF has largely punted the = security of the Web itself to W3C and = WHATWG.

Times are changing! 

- Compromise of the WebPKI would obviously be very bad for = many protocols the IETF has designed, but the management of the WebPKI = is done by CABF, not IETF.

But that=E2=80=99s the whole point of = this group and discussion is to think about all the issues and the = changes and the wider problems that are happening. I=E2=80=99d rather = look at everything and narrow the scope of and when necessary. All three = Internet drafts on this subject so far even acknowledge = that. 



-Ekr

-dml



FWIW I think Christian = and Bret=E2=80=99s emails outline issues that should be included in = scope. 

To take a concrete example memory reading attacks like Spectre are a=20 threat to user data and something that browser vendors spend a fair=20 amount of energy working on, but they're mostly not in scope for IETF = [0]. There's nothing wrong with that, it's just division of labor.

-Ekr

[0] I say "mostly" because (a) we need to take the security = implications of these kinds of attacks in our protocol designs and (b) = there might be some small pieces of IETF work like CORB, though that = seems to be mostly being done elsewhere.

On Sat, Aug = 3, 2019 at 2:47 PM Bret Jordan <jordan.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
Protection of end users=E2=80=99 data

Protection of an organization=E2=80=99s = data

Protection = of devices owned by an end user or an organization 

Protection of network = equipment 

Protection of SCADA system

Protection of critical = infrastructure 

Protection of IoT and soon to be released 5G = devices 

Protection of cost optimized controllers


The problem we have had in the past is we want to call this = one of the following, but each one does not encompass the full = picture.
1) Computer security
2)= Data security 
3) Information = security 
4) Communication = security 
5) Network security 
6) Application security 
Etc, = etc, 

So = if you way we are just dealing with communication security or = information security we are missing a significant piece of the = pie. 


Thanks,=
Bret
PGP = Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 = 0050
"Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only = thing that can not be unscrambled is an = egg."


Reading this thread, I think that we are missing = a step. We cannot
define attacks without defining first = the assets that need to be
protected.. Different actors = probably have different views on that, such as:

1) Continuous operation of the Internet

2) Continuous operation of a specific Internet provider

3) Continuous availability of an Internet = Service

4) Continuous connectivity for a = given user

5) Protection of databases used = by services and enterprises

6) Protection = of the personal data of users

Do we have = agreement on what we are trying to protect?

-- Christian Huitema


--
Model-t mailing list
Model-t@iab.org
https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t

--
Model-t mailing list
Model-t@iab.org
https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t
=
--
Model-t mailing list
Model-t@iab.org
https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t

= --Apple-Mail=_423E99DA-613F-4467-93F7-BAE7A630BA8B-- From nobody Sun Aug 4 08:53:47 2019 Return-Path: X-Original-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D648B120033 for ; Sun, 4 Aug 2019 08:53:44 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.999 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.999 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 2Y0dNwvQjr9f for ; Sun, 4 Aug 2019 08:53:42 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail-lj1-x243.google.com (mail-lj1-x243.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::243]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D54E9120025 for ; Sun, 4 Aug 2019 08:53:41 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-lj1-x243.google.com with SMTP id m23so77042019lje.12 for ; Sun, 04 Aug 2019 08:53:41 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc:content-transfer-encoding; bh=W79AYXuEiaeiLmETPgYJqrWfn9zfqslg7A+P30LHpiQ=; b=SEjvemkvnz66W07XW+QcWotzoNYL6XasgejEWirjLE1cvm3O/VeHs5E62BytruP1UH +2GSqCSTxOXeOMulfdkIFuLJ1as7NzOz7xryp8TK4pt+oIWqCm7Zm5nkcFsDzMnHh3FL bz801NO7FgRmLpNVwCAHuXGz7NO3OrTyhBqcnNAOjKldjfKGKT77FwbGSqHjPiRfwsFO hqLG0htWC04WHxkE7CqgDGPSf9gzEZJE2G5okiXtjziqL2P4XgYTepEHtx56T2cvhxK3 cMGSQShfropO8dEF8gWZsS3HrdvEocm48HxXxwOBtsGf5eyoiOwPr38rxdMfjE+R2wbR Ve2g== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc:content-transfer-encoding; bh=W79AYXuEiaeiLmETPgYJqrWfn9zfqslg7A+P30LHpiQ=; b=pU5vvqxSkuZ9qNOH8DNvvKS4l/y062t0aaoOIm54HswyMbkBcZA9hCP9Y1eFLZu7zi 8ZpSeLEeKdNQ1D+zMTi9ATcTQybxUoZdi0R1Mh4B+gqXKueDWHRvwWwBeqgbGiaxYZe5 +CrZmCOp8plux5fKdU/ySG2PR08CbuP6gNgJmRWkhAtxUdwNb8Pe/iGxRkMjo+Gu9vKg PWvLr9Ilpr2ymgqNmwFkqUnwb+u+yfXavdFEcSFHywYsKidX/4fcfgzwzT+FjlNMIvX5 /GwWib4e69VgOZS3S2OH+Pvw0Vhe9YJhyfjyI5Y+hR91fqXMcVT7Dmagd0mQPtBZO2kX fe2w== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAU5R9rvyMNiaJUxuVvUw+a9mjbrkLq464os6qTmsKlrNCCnZzS1 EQj9iwYZ7iB3yChAIUkcGCDoKI5QKfavtSpVoqY= X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqyeEXQZRe2XmlvAJNGnaB3VSsYo33Oajdsx3jwZdU0wPV/SSa40Ssk6bc+UW2puLdTgGc0DbYSbV2/f9ak+j7I= X-Received: by 2002:a2e:8892:: with SMTP id k18mr5624637lji.239.1564934019969; Sun, 04 Aug 2019 08:53:39 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <29756028-95f1-e6e5-b3ea-562cbc635df0@sandelman.ca> <5ef15ad2-5b20-e871-0d01-17cf906051c1@cs.tcd.ie> <22633.1564768705@localhost> <5879878A-7CEA-4030-BB72-108CC4122719@gmail.com> <06F0AE14-4413-4022-A804-C1B58E2702CE@fugue.com> <52BAC141-CB25-4072-B556-6325912F1ADD@gmail.com> <9a1555ca-6699-75f1-683e-2a3a2a539a11@cs.tcd.ie> <86157132-D401-4033-A72B-AD4859DB6696@lastpresslabel.com> <5281A343-35C0-4F4D-949D-02C46FA07801@lastpresslabel.com> <86639B71-F616-48CC-96AB-719F7168F087@gmail.com> In-Reply-To: <86639B71-F616-48CC-96AB-719F7168F087@gmail.com> From: Watson Ladd Date: Sun, 4 Aug 2019 08:53:28 -0700 Message-ID: To: Bret Jordan Cc: Dominique Lazanski , Eric Rescorla , Christian Huitema , model-t@iab.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect X-BeenThere: model-t@iab.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussions of changes in Internet deployment patterns and their impact on the Internet threat model List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 04 Aug 2019 15:53:45 -0000 But we design protocol, we don't design clients. Ultimately any product has to be useful for the IETF, and should result in changes to how people think. Efforts to end the use of bearer tokens, forward secrecy, etc. are very much motivated by a model where a client system can be compromised. I don't think that model is unknown, although perhaps it should be added explicitly. I can definitely think of issues that are "endpoint" issues where protocols have fallen short (my Amazon and Johnny examples) due to the mismatch between the Internet and Unix, and these are threats that generally have fallen out of scope. (NFS permissions issues are another example of this) On Sun, Aug 4, 2019 at 8:40 AM Bret Jordan wrote: > > I agree here with Dominique. > > More specifically, we need to understand that types of attacks that impac= t clients and how those attacks take advantage of the overall weakness of c= lients. Doing this will help us better design protocols. We need to stop s= aying that clients are secure or even worse, kicking the can down the road = and not worrying about it. > > In a previous email I called out 4 high level types of attacks that impac= t users data, users privacy, and the overall integrity of endpoints. > > Thanks, > Bret > PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447 F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 > "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that c= an not be unscrambled is an egg." > > On Aug 4, 2019, at 3:49 AM, Dominique Lazanski w= rote: > > > > On 4 Aug 2019, at 10:09, Eric Rescorla wrote: > > > > On Sun, Aug 4, 2019 at 12:14 AM Dominique Lazanski wrote: >> >> >> >> On 4 Aug 2019, at 06:08, Eric Rescorla wrote: >> >> his seems like a reasonable problem statement for the overall problem of= computer security, but not really for IETF. >> >> >> But computer security is Internet security. It is rare that =E2=80=98thi= ngs=E2=80=99 are not connected to the Internet (with the exception of intr= anets however the same type of devices are connected to both). >> >> If some attacks are initiated at the pint of =E2=80=98things=E2=80=99 in= order to compromise the Internet I don=E2=80=99t see why this shouldn=E2= =80=99t be in scope? > > > Well, I didn't say anything about "things" one way or the other. > > However, my point is that while compromise of endpoints necessarily negat= ively affects the Internet, actually protecting those endpoints against com= promise is outside the scope of the IETF. That's not to say it's not import= ant, it's just not IETF work. To provide two examples perhaps closer to hom= e: > > > I disagree. Any issue that impacts the Internet should be considered. > > > - Even though compromise of the Web is bad for the Internet, the IETF has= largely punted the security of the Web itself to W3C and WHATWG. > > > Times are changing! > > - Compromise of the WebPKI would obviously be very bad for many protocols= the IETF has designed, but the management of the WebPKI is done by CABF, n= ot IETF. > > > But that=E2=80=99s the whole point of this group and discussion is to thi= nk about all the issues and the changes and the wider problems that are hap= pening. I=E2=80=99d rather look at everything and narrow the scope of and w= hen necessary. All three Internet drafts on this subject so far even acknow= ledge that. > > > > -Ekr > > -dml > > >> >> FWIW I think Christian and Bret=E2=80=99s emails outline issues that sho= uld be included in scope. >> >> To take a concrete example memory reading attacks like Spectre are a thr= eat to user data and something that browser vendors spend a fair amount of = energy working on, but they're mostly not in scope for IETF [0]. There's no= thing wrong with that, it's just division of labor. >> >> -Ekr >> >> [0] I say "mostly" because (a) we need to take the security implications= of these kinds of attacks in our protocol designs and (b) there might be s= ome small pieces of IETF work like CORB, though that seems to be mostly bei= ng done elsewhere. >> >> On Sat, Aug 3, 2019 at 2:47 PM Bret Jordan wrote= : >>> >>> Protection of end users=E2=80=99 data >>> >>> Protection of an organization=E2=80=99s data >>> >>> Protection of devices owned by an end user or an organization >>> >>> Protection of network equipment >>> >>> Protection of SCADA system >>> >>> Protection of critical infrastructure >>> >>> Protection of IoT and soon to be released 5G devices >>> >>> Protection of cost optimized controllers >>> >>> >>> The problem we have had in the past is we want to call this one of the = following, but each one does not encompass the full picture. >>> 1) Computer security >>> 2) Data security >>> 3) Information security >>> 4) Communication security >>> 5) Network security >>> 6) Application security >>> Etc, etc, >>> >>> So if you way we are just dealing with communication security or inform= ation security we are missing a significant piece of the pie. >>> >>> >>> Thanks, >>> Bret >>> PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447 F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 >>> "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that= can not be unscrambled is an egg." >>> >>> >>> Reading this thread, I think that we are missing a step. We cannot >>> define attacks without defining first the assets that need to be >>> protected.. Different actors probably have different views on that, suc= h as: >>> >>> 1) Continuous operation of the Internet >>> >>> 2) Continuous operation of a specific Internet provider >>> >>> 3) Continuous availability of an Internet Service >>> >>> 4) Continuous connectivity for a given user >>> >>> 5) Protection of databases used by services and enterprises >>> >>> 6) Protection of the personal data of users >>> >>> Do we have agreement on what we are trying to protect? >>> >>> -- Christian Huitema >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Model-t mailing list >>> Model-t@iab.org >>> https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Model-t mailing list >>> Model-t@iab.org >>> https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t >> >> -- >> Model-t mailing list >> Model-t@iab.org >> https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t > > > -- > Model-t mailing list > Model-t@iab.org > https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t --=20 "Man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains". --Rousseau. From nobody Sun Aug 4 09:00:10 2019 Return-Path: X-Original-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A9D39120075 for ; Sun, 4 Aug 2019 09:00:07 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.898 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.898 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, MIME_QP_LONG_LINE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=fugue-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 1Wy4jewk34v1 for ; Sun, 4 Aug 2019 09:00:03 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail-ot1-x32e.google.com (mail-ot1-x32e.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::32e]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B0461120033 for ; Sun, 4 Aug 2019 09:00:03 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-ot1-x32e.google.com with SMTP id l15so25691089oth.7 for ; Sun, 04 Aug 2019 09:00:03 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=fugue-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com; s=20150623; h=mime-version:subject:from:in-reply-to:date:cc :content-transfer-encoding:message-id:references:to; bh=/FZTYc5T2XEkbCM6r4KhgfwR7ml+tJ+i/oS100jWgvI=; b=GV6velxAqZGXKPOUaOVMhklT9gb0SOcyQcSQYjJ8zrhanWlPxZi1yWpa1/g8Qtyysy klJRcMKb45/GHEpIcLFOjfNZiSBLSzrhLFdSF4MjtzRgJffeKSpOGjcSF3xtwduqrMEL EFEZoIXgxVmiq7m82QzkH2Ay+w4PSBFQ47MaNSj49akbaJv6hMVP9MAxWw2HauNNr+O3 rVLn7GU8As0tZwUKhE2+Q64tsRfpofeUiGPsK0YDTypNee7xjKMKD/2Bv6W78+SpXtBO ek5w7vNFOPaaG6erlImyyWU6O74ltQS09JRnZNFVAtIyyUnerhCUAlw0qUZSUmhTylOI pGJA== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:subject:from:in-reply-to:date:cc :content-transfer-encoding:message-id:references:to; bh=/FZTYc5T2XEkbCM6r4KhgfwR7ml+tJ+i/oS100jWgvI=; b=EjZ1RaSXD0BLsprh9IlGQ7svT8JmrEJo/qpZCBRz6lxWA0QY5hLQ7PWoH0/gC9fJnz jqGtS+3f6FoxQO6iZsXBkj2FB1hqfDqQEHvRUGgds/hASpD1Z8plVt5GU6pKX35nwXSa XRbKlrD8bokRybYGS8CTMrrYmvDyFTE+2UOf2y5ItwHRA6XN1cdd3V1YWJM1YP39k7Rh 7AFw6nsxLN7HfVVCZjbjylunvzbeTHnq8m4E5ZWcjWq7PX+rDecfBFyB6+HYtlHUYUm4 b20HgU40oVFykQEtqaobnq0Zn/YrD+Ze+o0esqtFYCv1N6QJ75IzOZebCXbiJm1KmQ2v 4f1w== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAWAfoyGJK37nXDgEz+TsiXdUaSx467tBEKMETn5t6bGtrx/r4IS cDn2oDqNXGUci1FqEzFMhP/EPw== X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqy0d1GUrUF++I5jcnw4ma3Msw4gwkM9EtSI10XOM5GTtqVWTOoLyRppy2bIuZXQRiw53y93VQ== X-Received: by 2002:a9d:6a92:: with SMTP id l18mr15851584otq.294.1564934402923; Sun, 04 Aug 2019 09:00:02 -0700 (PDT) Received: from ?IPv6:2600:380:9a1f:add7:17e:aeda:5165:82cb? ([2600:380:9a1f:add7:17e:aeda:5165:82cb]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id q17sm27355446otf.54.2019.08.04.09.00.02 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Sun, 04 Aug 2019 09:00:02 -0700 (PDT) Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=Apple-Mail-82425979-3854-4A27-8AFD-98B1507EE689 Mime-Version: 1.0 (1.0) From: Ted Lemon X-Mailer: iPhone Mail (16G77) In-Reply-To: Date: Sun, 4 Aug 2019 11:00:01 -0500 Cc: Bret Jordan , Eric Rescorla , Dominique Lazanski , Christian Huitema , model-t@iab.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message-Id: References: <29756028-95f1-e6e5-b3ea-562cbc635df0@sandelman.ca> <5ef15ad2-5b20-e871-0d01-17cf906051c1@cs.tcd.ie> <22633.1564768705@localhost> <5879878A-7CEA-4030-BB72-108CC4122719@gmail.com> <06F0AE14-4413-4022-A804-C1B58E2702CE@fugue.com> <52BAC141-CB25-4072-B556-6325912F1ADD@gmail.com> <9a1555ca-6699-75f1-683e-2a3a2a539a11@cs.tcd.ie> <86157132-D401-4033-A72B-AD4859DB6696@lastpresslabel.com> <5281A343-35C0-4F4D-949D-02C46FA07801@lastpresslabel.com> <86639B71-F616-48CC-96AB-719F7168F087@gmail.com> To: Watson Ladd Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect X-BeenThere: model-t@iab.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussions of changes in Internet deployment patterns and their impact on the Internet threat model List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 04 Aug 2019 16:00:08 -0000 --Apple-Mail-82425979-3854-4A27-8AFD-98B1507EE689 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable If the point of this effort is to document threat models, then we aren=E2=80= =99t writing protocols at least here. It=E2=80=99s probably useful if the th= reat models we produce describe things we don=E2=80=99t built, because they i= nteract with things we do build.=20 Sent from my iPhone > On Aug 4, 2019, at 10:53 AM, Watson Ladd wrote: >=20 > But we design protocol, we don't design clients. Ultimately any > product has to be useful for the IETF, and should result in changes to > how people think. >=20 > Efforts to end the use of bearer tokens, forward secrecy, etc. are > very much motivated by a model where a client system can be > compromised. I don't think that model is unknown, although perhaps it > should be added explicitly. >=20 > I can definitely think of issues that are "endpoint" issues where > protocols have fallen short (my Amazon and Johnny examples) due to the > mismatch between the Internet and Unix, and these are threats that > generally have fallen out of scope. (NFS permissions issues are > another example of this) >=20 >> On Sun, Aug 4, 2019 at 8:40 AM Bret Jordan wrote:= >>=20 >> I agree here with Dominique. >>=20 >> More specifically, we need to understand that types of attacks that impac= t clients and how those attacks take advantage of the overall weakness of cl= ients. Doing this will help us better design protocols. We need to stop say= ing that clients are secure or even worse, kicking the can down the road and= not worrying about it. >>=20 >> In a previous email I called out 4 high level types of attacks that impac= t users data, users privacy, and the overall integrity of endpoints. >>=20 >> Thanks, >> Bret >> PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447 F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 >> "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that c= an not be unscrambled is an egg." >>=20 >> On Aug 4, 2019, at 3:49 AM, Dominique Lazanski w= rote: >>=20 >>=20 >>=20 >> On 4 Aug 2019, at 10:09, Eric Rescorla wrote: >>=20 >>=20 >>=20 >>> On Sun, Aug 4, 2019 at 12:14 AM Dominique Lazanski wrote: >>>=20 >>>=20 >>>=20 >>> On 4 Aug 2019, at 06:08, Eric Rescorla wrote: >>>=20 >>> his seems like a reasonable problem statement for the overall problem of= computer security, but not really for IETF. >>>=20 >>>=20 >>> But computer security is Internet security. It is rare that =E2=80=98thi= ngs=E2=80=99 are not connected to the Internet (with the exception of intra= nets however the same type of devices are connected to both). >>>=20 >>> If some attacks are initiated at the pint of =E2=80=98things=E2=80=99 in= order to compromise the Internet I don=E2=80=99t see why this shouldn=E2=80= =99t be in scope? >>=20 >>=20 >> Well, I didn't say anything about "things" one way or the other. >>=20 >> However, my point is that while compromise of endpoints necessarily negat= ively affects the Internet, actually protecting those endpoints against comp= romise is outside the scope of the IETF. That's not to say it's not importan= t, it's just not IETF work. To provide two examples perhaps closer to home: >>=20 >>=20 >> I disagree. Any issue that impacts the Internet should be considered. >>=20 >>=20 >> - Even though compromise of the Web is bad for the Internet, the IETF has= largely punted the security of the Web itself to W3C and WHATWG. >>=20 >>=20 >> Times are changing! >>=20 >> - Compromise of the WebPKI would obviously be very bad for many protocols= the IETF has designed, but the management of the WebPKI is done by CABF, no= t IETF. >>=20 >>=20 >> But that=E2=80=99s the whole point of this group and discussion is to thi= nk about all the issues and the changes and the wider problems that are happ= ening. I=E2=80=99d rather look at everything and narrow the scope of and whe= n necessary. All three Internet drafts on this subject so far even acknowled= ge that. >>=20 >>=20 >>=20 >> -Ekr >>=20 >> -dml >>=20 >>=20 >>>=20 >>> FWIW I think Christian and Bret=E2=80=99s emails outline issues that sho= uld be included in scope. >>>=20 >>> To take a concrete example memory reading attacks like Spectre are a thr= eat to user data and something that browser vendors spend a fair amount of e= nergy working on, but they're mostly not in scope for IETF [0]. There's noth= ing wrong with that, it's just division of labor. >>>=20 >>> -Ekr >>>=20 >>> [0] I say "mostly" because (a) we need to take the security implications= of these kinds of attacks in our protocol designs and (b) there might be so= me small pieces of IETF work like CORB, though that seems to be mostly being= done elsewhere. >>>=20 >>>> On Sat, Aug 3, 2019 at 2:47 PM Bret Jordan wrot= e: >>>>=20 >>>> Protection of end users=E2=80=99 data >>>>=20 >>>> Protection of an organization=E2=80=99s data >>>>=20 >>>> Protection of devices owned by an end user or an organization >>>>=20 >>>> Protection of network equipment >>>>=20 >>>> Protection of SCADA system >>>>=20 >>>> Protection of critical infrastructure >>>>=20 >>>> Protection of IoT and soon to be released 5G devices >>>>=20 >>>> Protection of cost optimized controllers >>>>=20 >>>>=20 >>>> The problem we have had in the past is we want to call this one of the f= ollowing, but each one does not encompass the full picture. >>>> 1) Computer security >>>> 2) Data security >>>> 3) Information security >>>> 4) Communication security >>>> 5) Network security >>>> 6) Application security >>>> Etc, etc, >>>>=20 >>>> So if you way we are just dealing with communication security or inform= ation security we are missing a significant piece of the pie. >>>>=20 >>>>=20 >>>> Thanks, >>>> Bret >>>> PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447 F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 >>>> "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that= can not be unscrambled is an egg." >>>>=20 >>>>=20 >>>> Reading this thread, I think that we are missing a step. We cannot >>>> define attacks without defining first the assets that need to be >>>> protected.. Different actors probably have different views on that, suc= h as: >>>>=20 >>>> 1) Continuous operation of the Internet >>>>=20 >>>> 2) Continuous operation of a specific Internet provider >>>>=20 >>>> 3) Continuous availability of an Internet Service >>>>=20 >>>> 4) Continuous connectivity for a given user >>>>=20 >>>> 5) Protection of databases used by services and enterprises >>>>=20 >>>> 6) Protection of the personal data of users >>>>=20 >>>> Do we have agreement on what we are trying to protect? >>>>=20 >>>> -- Christian Huitema >>>>=20 >>>>=20 >>>> -- >>>> Model-t mailing list >>>> Model-t@iab.org >>>> https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t >>>>=20 >>>>=20 >>>> -- >>>> Model-t mailing list >>>> Model-t@iab.org >>>> https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t >>>=20 >>> -- >>> Model-t mailing list >>> Model-t@iab.org >>> https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t >>=20 >>=20 >> -- >> Model-t mailing list >> Model-t@iab.org >> https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t >=20 >=20 >=20 > --=20 > "Man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains". > --Rousseau. >=20 > --=20 > Model-t mailing list > Model-t@iab.org > https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t --Apple-Mail-82425979-3854-4A27-8AFD-98B1507EE689 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable If the point of this effort is to document t= hreat models, then we aren=E2=80=99t writing protocols at least here. It=E2=80= =99s probably useful if the threat models we produce describe things we d= on=E2=80=99t built, because they interact with things we do build= . 

Sent from my iPho= ne

On Aug 4, 2019, at 10:53 AM, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:<= br>
But we design p= rotocol, we don't design clients. Ultimately any
product has= to be useful for the IETF, and should result in changes to
= how people think.

Efforts to end the use of= bearer tokens, forward secrecy, etc. are
very much motivate= d by a model where a client system can be
compromised. I don= 't think that model is unknown, although perhaps it
should b= e added explicitly.

I can definitely think o= f issues that are "endpoint" issues where
protocols have fal= len short (my Amazon and Johnny examples) due to the
mismatc= h between the Internet and Unix, and these are threats that
= generally have fallen out of scope. (NFS permissions issues are
another example of this)

On Sun, Aug 4,= 2019 at 8:40 AM Bret Jordan <jo= rdan.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:

I agree here with D= ominique.

=
More specifically, we need to u= nderstand that types of attacks that impact clients and how those attacks ta= ke advantage of the overall weakness of clients. Doing this will help us bet= ter design protocols.  We need to stop saying that clients are secure o= r even worse, kicking the can down the road and not worrying about it.

In a previous email I called out 4 high level t= ypes of attacks that impact users data, users privacy, and the overall integ= rity of endpoints.

Thanks,
Bret
PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C= 0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050
"Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that can= not be unscrambled is an egg."

On Aug 4,= 2019, at 3:49 AM, Dominique Lazanski <dml@lastpresslabel.com> wrote:

<= span>

On 4 Aug 2019, at 10:09, Eric Resco= rla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:



On Sun, Aug 4= , 2019 at 12:14 AM Dominique Lazanski <dml@lastpresslabel.com> wrote:

<= /blockquote>


=
On 4 Aug 2019, at 06:08, Eric Rescorla <<= a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com">ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:

his seems like a reasonable problem statement for the ove= rall problem of computer security, but not really for IETF.


But computer security is Internet sec= urity. It is rare that =E2=80=98things=E2=80=99 are not connected to the Int= ernet  (with the exception of intranets however the same type of device= s are connected to both).

If some attac= ks are initiated at the pint of =E2=80=98things=E2=80=99 in order to comprom= ise the Internet I don=E2=80=99t see why this shouldn=E2=80=99t be in scope?=
=

Well, I didn't say anything about "things" one w= ay or the other.

However, my point is tha= t while compromise of endpoints necessarily negatively affects the Internet,= actually protecting those endpoints against compromise is outside the scope= of the IETF. That's not to say it's not important, it's just not IETF work.= To provide two examples perhaps closer to home:


I disagree. A= ny issue that impacts the Internet should be considered.


- Ev= en though compromise of the Web is bad for the Internet, the IETF has largel= y punted the security of the Web itself to W3C and WHATWG.


Ti= mes are changing!

- Compromise of the Web= PKI would obviously be very bad for many protocols the IETF has designed, bu= t the management of the WebPKI is done by CABF, not IETF.


But= that=E2=80=99s the whole point of this group and discussion is to think abo= ut all the issues and the changes and the wider problems that are happening.= I=E2=80=99d rather look at everything and narrow the scope of and when nece= ssary. All three Internet drafts on this subject so far even acknowledge tha= t.



-E= kr

-dml



FWIW I think Christian and Bret=E2=80=99s emails o= utline issues that should be included in scope.
To take a concrete example memory reading attacks like Spectre are a= threat to user data and something that browser vendors spend a fair amount o= f energy working on, but they're mostly not in scope for IETF [0]. There's n= othing wrong with that, it's just division of labor.
=

-Ekr

[0] I say "mostly" be= cause (a) we need to take the security implications of these kinds of attack= s in our protocol designs and (b) there might be some small pieces of IETF w= ork like CORB, though that seems to be mostly being done elsewhere.

On Sat, Aug 3, 2019 at 2:47 PM Bret Jordan <= jordan.ietf@gmail.com> wrote= :

Protection of end users=E2=80=99 data
<= /blockquote>

Protection of an organization=E2=80=99s data

Protection of devices owned by an end use= r or an organization

Protection of ne= twork equipment

Protection of SCADA s= ystem

Protection of critical infrastr= ucture

<= /blockquote>
Protection of IoT and soon to b= e released 5G devices

Protection of c= ost optimized controllers
<= blockquote type=3D"cite">


=
The problem we have had in th= e past is we want to call this one of the following, but each one does not e= ncompass the full picture.
=
1) Computer security
2) Data security
=
3) Information security
4) Communication security
<= /blockquote>
5) Network security
<= /blockquote>
6) Application security
Etc, etc,

So if= you way we are just dealing with communication security or information secu= rity we are missing a significant piece of the pie.
<= /blockquote>


Thank= s,
Bret
<= /blockquote>
PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A= 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050
"Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, t= he only thing that can not be unscrambled is an egg."


R= eading this thread, I think that we are missing a step. We cannot
=
define attacks without defini= ng first the assets that need to be
protected.. Different actors probably have different views o= n that, such as:

1) Continuous operat= ion of the Internet

2) Continuous ope= ration of a specific Internet provider
<= /blockquote>

3) Continuous availability of an Internet Service
=

4) Continuous connectivity for a given user

<= /blockquote>
5) Protection of databases used by services and enterpris= es

6) Protection of the personal data= of users

=
Do we have agreement on what w= e are trying to protect?
=
-- Christian= Huitema

=

--
Model-t mailing list
Model-t@iab.org
https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t


--
=
Model-t mailing list
Model-t@iab.org
<= /blockquote>
https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t

--
<= /blockquote>
Model-= t mailing list
Model-t@= iab.org
https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t

=

--
Model-= t mailing list
Model-t@iab.org
https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t



--
= "Man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains".
--= Rousseau.

--
Model-t maili= ng list
Model-t@iab.org
= https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t
= --Apple-Mail-82425979-3854-4A27-8AFD-98B1507EE689-- From nobody Sun Aug 4 09:12:55 2019 Return-Path: X-Original-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id EB6E8120033 for ; Sun, 4 Aug 2019 09:12:52 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.896 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.896 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, MIME_QP_LONG_LINE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_NONE=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=lastpresslabel-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id GluXfzz9cBz0 for ; Sun, 4 Aug 2019 09:12:50 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail-wm1-x32c.google.com (mail-wm1-x32c.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::32c]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BB38D120025 for ; Sun, 4 Aug 2019 09:12:49 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-wm1-x32c.google.com with SMTP id s3so72501453wms.2 for ; Sun, 04 Aug 2019 09:12:49 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=lastpresslabel-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com; s=20150623; h=mime-version:subject:from:in-reply-to:date:cc :content-transfer-encoding:message-id:references:to; bh=eQ94azV1RuuyfFQhzaL3RXlqpkVMwLLA6RTQYAvuYok=; b=WWDrMT1utx5eVcdIBpME9rznTm5o8uCLeAh3bIYC7qJGbmZVnjS/MpIXqJXRjXHTvJ WqBEZR7L4L0UFqZyG1ImnPWu7IOiGuKSH7tPU6uWuvR6TOn1514B8UxjQ9C/8ykoZhvt xggE/iMmDaDMqKNNbkklGhlbimSR7XP28x7UH+OX87Av2ocDpfJtif+yqub7J1UsvzBY oHMVN4dVmFu9kEFAF4vUsbARu05uQkei9bTPBD35u1y6pJK2EZgJYC1FQbsO0b39Zzn+ i7oVGu6bboAkwxv6uCIzWPktFcUm0HjqIsUz+KH2RPoOlRr9zkZ87Gb+rrFUngh7EcIN 39rg== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:subject:from:in-reply-to:date:cc :content-transfer-encoding:message-id:references:to; bh=eQ94azV1RuuyfFQhzaL3RXlqpkVMwLLA6RTQYAvuYok=; b=KaQfZPbzGBVnTlaCQaQ9y2pzC7zFNIoCjk4BkD42y/3vV6TVsHbyCrRtGLW+/wbhFD 68hdYmYEk5pKKPrm4D7YXAVxL/YuaDwb96ZsHoCQbPs3g/uCZZbpv6p899IX2sghbtVd bEsFPvK3rSrxMAjzMr/prl0WeG4UC9mehAq/SCtCFcyaXsQ028BCjB8bn5ovUxDPJPYH K/8IZ+saqInpPROauEI7J5WhL5LT4oAyG4819AFoG+W2iloQL8gHxqI8Mw1qrRmMpDkj jg7jK9XfidrZ96l3q1oTpX5f1oN6BV0H6/9LtW6lfsIxWpzGBQjuv6thvelObGn29WEA c7BQ== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAW0C6/P/wyLO+iaYb9zIhIB9+r3Szm5+6p5tHMf8Nr5FqobR9+g 8aKxdYaaXqAeudXozhifYU7I/n+defo= X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqz/znKl8tgbQ9xjAghySc0WCYMxWfocQD6zqRJmkCNO11dAZQSEcxohP3Yxd6vmxFUvYvdW0Q== X-Received: by 2002:a1c:e341:: with SMTP id a62mr14750871wmh.165.1564935167916; Sun, 04 Aug 2019 09:12:47 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [10.235.3.192] ([85.255.234.86]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id h16sm94127157wrv.88.2019.08.04.09.12.46 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Sun, 04 Aug 2019 09:12:47 -0700 (PDT) Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=Apple-Mail-F5ECD853-EEA8-423E-9294-89E82FBAD6A3 Mime-Version: 1.0 (1.0) From: Dominique Lazanski X-Mailer: iPhone Mail (16F203) In-Reply-To: Date: Sun, 4 Aug 2019 17:12:45 +0100 Cc: Watson Ladd , Bret Jordan , Eric Rescorla , Christian Huitema , model-t@iab.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message-Id: <25D36609-FD10-4DF7-8142-6F183A3EBD16@lastpresslabel.com> References: <29756028-95f1-e6e5-b3ea-562cbc635df0@sandelman.ca> <5ef15ad2-5b20-e871-0d01-17cf906051c1@cs.tcd.ie> <22633.1564768705@localhost> <5879878A-7CEA-4030-BB72-108CC4122719@gmail.com> <06F0AE14-4413-4022-A804-C1B58E2702CE@fugue.com> <52BAC141-CB25-4072-B556-6325912F1ADD@gmail.com> <9a1555ca-6699-75f1-683e-2a3a2a539a11@cs.tcd.ie> <86157132-D401-4033-A72B-AD4859DB6696@lastpresslabel.com> <5281A343-35C0-4F4D-949D-02C46FA07801@lastpresslabel.com> <86639B71-F616-48CC-96AB-719F7168F087@gmail.com> To: Ted Lemon Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect X-BeenThere: model-t@iab.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussions of changes in Internet deployment patterns and their impact on the Internet threat model List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 04 Aug 2019 16:12:53 -0000 --Apple-Mail-F5ECD853-EEA8-423E-9294-89E82FBAD6A3 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable I agree with Ted and Brett.=20 Worse case scenario is that we document too much and decide later that we ar= e going to narrow the scope. But to start let=E2=80=99s include everything.=20= -dml > On 4 Aug 2019, at 17:00, Ted Lemon wrote: >=20 > If the point of this effort is to document threat models, then we aren=E2=80= =99t writing protocols at least here. It=E2=80=99s probably useful if the th= reat models we produce describe things we don=E2=80=99t built, because they i= nteract with things we do build.=20 >=20 > Sent from my iPhone >=20 >> On Aug 4, 2019, at 10:53 AM, Watson Ladd wrote: >>=20 >> But we design protocol, we don't design clients. Ultimately any >> product has to be useful for the IETF, and should result in changes to >> how people think. >>=20 >> Efforts to end the use of bearer tokens, forward secrecy, etc. are >> very much motivated by a model where a client system can be >> compromised. I don't think that model is unknown, although perhaps it >> should be added explicitly. >>=20 >> I can definitely think of issues that are "endpoint" issues where >> protocols have fallen short (my Amazon and Johnny examples) due to the >> mismatch between the Internet and Unix, and these are threats that >> generally have fallen out of scope. (NFS permissions issues are >> another example of this) >>=20 >>> On Sun, Aug 4, 2019 at 8:40 AM Bret Jordan wrote= : >>>=20 >>> I agree here with Dominique. >>>=20 >>> More specifically, we need to understand that types of attacks that impa= ct clients and how those attacks take advantage of the overall weakness of c= lients. Doing this will help us better design protocols. We need to stop sa= ying that clients are secure or even worse, kicking the can down the road an= d not worrying about it. >>>=20 >>> In a previous email I called out 4 high level types of attacks that impa= ct users data, users privacy, and the overall integrity of endpoints. >>>=20 >>> Thanks, >>> Bret >>> PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447 F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 >>> "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that c= an not be unscrambled is an egg." >>>=20 >>> On Aug 4, 2019, at 3:49 AM, Dominique Lazanski w= rote: >>>=20 >>>=20 >>>=20 >>> On 4 Aug 2019, at 10:09, Eric Rescorla wrote: >>>=20 >>>=20 >>>=20 >>>> On Sun, Aug 4, 2019 at 12:14 AM Dominique Lazanski wrote: >>>>=20 >>>>=20 >>>>=20 >>>> On 4 Aug 2019, at 06:08, Eric Rescorla wrote: >>>>=20 >>>> his seems like a reasonable problem statement for the overall problem o= f computer security, but not really for IETF. >>>>=20 >>>>=20 >>>> But computer security is Internet security. It is rare that =E2=80=98th= ings=E2=80=99 are not connected to the Internet (with the exception of intr= anets however the same type of devices are connected to both). >>>>=20 >>>> If some attacks are initiated at the pint of =E2=80=98things=E2=80=99 i= n order to compromise the Internet I don=E2=80=99t see why this shouldn=E2=80= =99t be in scope? >>>=20 >>>=20 >>> Well, I didn't say anything about "things" one way or the other. >>>=20 >>> However, my point is that while compromise of endpoints necessarily nega= tively affects the Internet, actually protecting those endpoints against com= promise is outside the scope of the IETF. That's not to say it's not importa= nt, it's just not IETF work. To provide two examples perhaps closer to home:= >>>=20 >>>=20 >>> I disagree. Any issue that impacts the Internet should be considered. >>>=20 >>>=20 >>> - Even though compromise of the Web is bad for the Internet, the IETF ha= s largely punted the security of the Web itself to W3C and WHATWG. >>>=20 >>>=20 >>> Times are changing! >>>=20 >>> - Compromise of the WebPKI would obviously be very bad for many protocol= s the IETF has designed, but the management of the WebPKI is done by CABF, n= ot IETF. >>>=20 >>>=20 >>> But that=E2=80=99s the whole point of this group and discussion is to th= ink about all the issues and the changes and the wider problems that are hap= pening. I=E2=80=99d rather look at everything and narrow the scope of and wh= en necessary. All three Internet drafts on this subject so far even acknowle= dge that. >>>=20 >>>=20 >>>=20 >>> -Ekr >>>=20 >>> -dml >>>=20 >>>=20 >>>>=20 >>>> FWIW I think Christian and Bret=E2=80=99s emails outline issues that sh= ould be included in scope. >>>>=20 >>>> To take a concrete example memory reading attacks like Spectre are a th= reat to user data and something that browser vendors spend a fair amount of e= nergy working on, but they're mostly not in scope for IETF [0]. There's noth= ing wrong with that, it's just division of labor. >>>>=20 >>>> -Ekr >>>>=20 >>>> [0] I say "mostly" because (a) we need to take the security implication= s of these kinds of attacks in our protocol designs and (b) there might be s= ome small pieces of IETF work like CORB, though that seems to be mostly bein= g done elsewhere. >>>>=20 >>>>> On Sat, Aug 3, 2019 at 2:47 PM Bret Jordan wro= te: >>>>>=20 >>>>> Protection of end users=E2=80=99 data >>>>>=20 >>>>> Protection of an organization=E2=80=99s data >>>>>=20 >>>>> Protection of devices owned by an end user or an organization >>>>>=20 >>>>> Protection of network equipment >>>>>=20 >>>>> Protection of SCADA system >>>>>=20 >>>>> Protection of critical infrastructure >>>>>=20 >>>>> Protection of IoT and soon to be released 5G devices >>>>>=20 >>>>> Protection of cost optimized controllers >>>>>=20 >>>>>=20 >>>>> The problem we have had in the past is we want to call this one of the= following, but each one does not encompass the full picture. >>>>> 1) Computer security >>>>> 2) Data security >>>>> 3) Information security >>>>> 4) Communication security >>>>> 5) Network security >>>>> 6) Application security >>>>> Etc, etc, >>>>>=20 >>>>> So if you way we are just dealing with communication security or infor= mation security we are missing a significant piece of the pie. >>>>>=20 >>>>>=20 >>>>> Thanks, >>>>> Bret >>>>> PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447 F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 >>>>> "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing tha= t can not be unscrambled is an egg." >>>>>=20 >>>>>=20 >>>>> Reading this thread, I think that we are missing a step. We cannot >>>>> define attacks without defining first the assets that need to be >>>>> protected.. Different actors probably have different views on that, su= ch as: >>>>>=20 >>>>> 1) Continuous operation of the Internet >>>>>=20 >>>>> 2) Continuous operation of a specific Internet provider >>>>>=20 >>>>> 3) Continuous availability of an Internet Service >>>>>=20 >>>>> 4) Continuous connectivity for a given user >>>>>=20 >>>>> 5) Protection of databases used by services and enterprises >>>>>=20 >>>>> 6) Protection of the personal data of users >>>>>=20 >>>>> Do we have agreement on what we are trying to protect? >>>>>=20 >>>>> -- Christian Huitema >>>>>=20 >>>>>=20 >>>>> -- >>>>> Model-t mailing list >>>>> Model-t@iab.org >>>>> https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t >>>>>=20 >>>>>=20 >>>>> -- >>>>> Model-t mailing list >>>>> Model-t@iab.org >>>>> https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t >>>>=20 >>>> -- >>>> Model-t mailing list >>>> Model-t@iab.org >>>> https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t >>>=20 >>>=20 >>> -- >>> Model-t mailing list >>> Model-t@iab.org >>> https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t >>=20 >>=20 >>=20 >> --=20 >> "Man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains". >> --Rousseau. >>=20 >> --=20 >> Model-t mailing list >> Model-t@iab.org >> https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t --Apple-Mail-F5ECD853-EEA8-423E-9294-89E82FBAD6A3 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable I agree with Ted and Brett. 

<= /div>
Worse case scenario is that we document too much and decide later t= hat we are going to narrow the scope. But to start let=E2=80=99s include eve= rything. 

-dml

On 4 Au= g 2019, at 17:00, Ted Lemon <mellon@f= ugue.com> wrote:

If the point of this effort is to document threat models, then we aren=E2=80= =99t writing protocols at least here. It=E2=80=99s probably useful if the th= reat models we produce describe things we don=E2=80=99t built, becaus= e they interact with things we do build. 

Sent from my iPhone

O= n Aug 4, 2019, at 10:53 AM, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:

But we design protocol, we don't design client= s. Ultimately any
product has to be useful for the IETF, and= should result in changes to
how people think.

Efforts to end the use of bearer tokens, forward secrecy= , etc. are
very much motivated by a model where a client sys= tem can be
compromised. I don't think that model is unknown,= although perhaps it
should be added explicitly.
<= span>
I can definitely think of issues that are "endpoint" i= ssues where
protocols have fallen short (my Amazon and Johnn= y examples) due to the
mismatch between the Internet and Uni= x, and these are threats that
generally have fallen out of s= cope. (NFS permissions issues are
another example of this)

On Sun, Aug 4, 2019 at 8:40 AM Bret Jordan &= lt;jordan.ietf@gmail.com> wr= ote:

I agree here with Dominique.

More specifically, we need to understand that types of attacks t= hat impact clients and how those attacks take advantage of the overall weakn= ess of clients. Doing this will help us better design protocols.  We ne= ed to stop saying that clients are secure or even worse, kicking the can dow= n the road and not worrying about it.

In a= previous email I called out 4 high level types of attacks that impact users= data, users privacy, and the overall integrity of endpoints.

Thanks,
Bret
PGP Fing= erprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050
<= /blockquote>
"Without cryptography vihv vivc c= e xhrnrw, however, the only thing that can not be unscrambled is an egg."

On Aug 4, 2019, at 3:49 AM, Dominique Lazan= ski <dml@lastpresslabel.com= > wrote:


On 4 Aug 2019, at 10:09, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:

=

On Sun, Aug 4, 2019 at 12:14 AM Dominique Lazan= ski <dml@lastpresslabel.com= > wrote:



On= 4 Aug 2019, at 06:08, Eric Rescorla <ekr= @rtfm.com> wrote:

his seems like= a reasonable problem statement for the overall problem of computer security= , but not really for IETF.


<= /blockquote>
But computer security is Internet security. It is rare that =E2=80=98= things=E2=80=99 are not connected to the Internet  (with the exception o= f intranets however the same type of devices are connected to both).<= br>

If some attacks are initiated at the pint of =E2= =80=98things=E2=80=99 in order to compromise the Internet I don=E2=80=99t se= e why this shouldn=E2=80=99t be in scope?


Well, I= didn't say anything about "things" one way or the other.

However, my point is that while compromise of endpoints nec= essarily negatively affects the Internet, actually protecting those endpoint= s against compromise is outside the scope of the IETF. That's not to say it'= s not important, it's just not IETF work. To provide two examples perhaps cl= oser to home:
=

I disagree. Any issue that impacts the Internet= should be considered.


- Even though compromise of the Web is= bad for the Internet, the IETF has largely punted the security of the Web i= tself to W3C and WHATWG.


Times are changing!

- Compromise of the WebPKI would obviously be very bad fo= r many protocols the IETF has designed, but the management of the WebPKI is d= one by CABF, not IETF.


But that=E2=80=99s the whole point of t= his group and discussion is to think about all the issues and the changes an= d the wider problems that are happening. I=E2=80=99d rather look at everythi= ng and narrow the scope of and when necessary. All three Internet drafts on t= his subject so far even acknowledge that.



-Ekr

-dml



FWIW I thi= nk Christian and Bret=E2=80=99s emails outline issues that should be include= d in scope.

To take a concrete example m= emory reading attacks like Spectre are a threat to user data and something t= hat browser vendors spend a fair amount of energy working on, but they're mo= stly not in scope for IETF [0]. There's nothing wrong with that, it's just d= ivision of labor.

-Ekr

[0] I say "mostly" because (a) we need to take the secu= rity implications of these kinds of attacks in our protocol designs and (b) t= here might be some small pieces of IETF work like CORB, though that seems to= be mostly being done elsewhere.

<= /blockquote>
On Sat= , Aug 3, 2019 at 2:47 PM Bret Jordan <jordan.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:

Protect= ion of end users=E2=80=99 data

Protec= tion of an organization=E2=80=99s data
<= /blockquote>

Protection of devices owned by an end user or an organization

Protection of network equipment

=
Protection of SCADA system

Protection of critical infrastructure

Protection of IoT and soon to be released 5G devices
<= /blockquote>

Protection of cost optimized controllers

<= blockquote type=3D"cite">
The problem we have had in the past is we want to call this one= of the following, but each one does not encompass the full picture.<= br>
1) Computer security
2) Data security<= br>
3) Information security
4) Communication secu= rity
5) Network sec= urity
6) Applicatio= n security
Etc, etc= ,

So if you way we are just dealing wit= h communication security or information security we are missing a significan= t piece of the pie.


Thanks,
Bret
PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7= 415 0050
"Without cr= yptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that can not be unsc= rambled is an egg."


Reading this thread, I think that we a= re missing a step. We cannot
define attacks without defining first the assets that need to be
protected.. Differen= t actors probably have different views on that, such as:

<= /blockquote>
1) Continuous operation of the Internet

=
2) Continuous operation of a specific Internet provider=
=

3) Continuous availability of an Inte= rnet Service

4) Continuous connectivi= ty for a given user

5) Protection of d= atabases used by services and enterprises

<= span>6) Protection of the personal data of users

Do we have agreement on what we are trying to protect?

-- Christian Huitema
=


--
Model-t mailing list<= /span>
<= blockquote type=3D"cite">
Model-t@iab.org
ht= tps://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t


--
Model-t mailing list
Model-t@iab.org
https:= //www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t

--
Model-t mailing list
Model-t@iab.org
https://www.iab.org/m= ailman/listinfo/model-t

<= /span>
--
Model-t mailing list
Mode= l-t@iab.org
https://www.iab.org/mail= man/listinfo/model-t



--
"Man is born free, but ever= ywhere he is in chains".
--Rousseau.
=
--
Model-t mailing list
Model-t@iab.org
https://www.iab.org/mailman/listin= fo/model-t
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We need to ensure everyone here in the IETF = understands the bigger problem, the larger risk, and larger attack = surface. When we design protocols and only consider a small handful of = threats, then we inevitably hurt the market. =20 The more of these things we can document and the more we can bring them = to light, the better everything will be in the end.=20 Thanks, Bret PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447 F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that = can not be unscrambled is an egg." > On Aug 4, 2019, at 10:00 AM, Ted Lemon wrote: >=20 > If the point of this effort is to document threat models, then we = aren=E2=80=99t writing protocols at least here. It=E2=80=99s probably = useful if the threat models we produce describe things we don=E2=80=99t = built, because they interact with things we do build.=20 >=20 > Sent from my iPhone >=20 > On Aug 4, 2019, at 10:53 AM, Watson Ladd > wrote: >=20 >> But we design protocol, we don't design clients. Ultimately any >> product has to be useful for the IETF, and should result in changes = to >> how people think. >>=20 >> Efforts to end the use of bearer tokens, forward secrecy, etc. are >> very much motivated by a model where a client system can be >> compromised. I don't think that model is unknown, although perhaps it >> should be added explicitly. >>=20 >> I can definitely think of issues that are "endpoint" issues where >> protocols have fallen short (my Amazon and Johnny examples) due to = the >> mismatch between the Internet and Unix, and these are threats that >> generally have fallen out of scope. (NFS permissions issues are >> another example of this) >>=20 >> On Sun, Aug 4, 2019 at 8:40 AM Bret Jordan > wrote: >>>=20 >>> I agree here with Dominique. >>>=20 >>> More specifically, we need to understand that types of attacks that = impact clients and how those attacks take advantage of the overall = weakness of clients. Doing this will help us better design protocols. = We need to stop saying that clients are secure or even worse, kicking = the can down the road and not worrying about it. >>>=20 >>> In a previous email I called out 4 high level types of attacks that = impact users data, users privacy, and the overall integrity of = endpoints. >>>=20 >>> Thanks, >>> Bret >>> PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447 F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 >>> "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing = that can not be unscrambled is an egg." >>>=20 >>> On Aug 4, 2019, at 3:49 AM, Dominique Lazanski = > wrote: >>>=20 >>>=20 >>>=20 >>> On 4 Aug 2019, at 10:09, Eric Rescorla > wrote: >>>=20 >>>=20 >>>=20 >>> On Sun, Aug 4, 2019 at 12:14 AM Dominique Lazanski = > wrote: >>>>=20 >>>>=20 >>>>=20 >>>> On 4 Aug 2019, at 06:08, Eric Rescorla > wrote: >>>>=20 >>>> his seems like a reasonable problem statement for the overall = problem of computer security, but not really for IETF. >>>>=20 >>>>=20 >>>> But computer security is Internet security. It is rare that = =E2=80=98things=E2=80=99 are not connected to the Internet (with the = exception of intranets however the same type of devices are connected to = both). >>>>=20 >>>> If some attacks are initiated at the pint of =E2=80=98things=E2=80=99= in order to compromise the Internet I don=E2=80=99t see why this = shouldn=E2=80=99t be in scope? >>>=20 >>>=20 >>> Well, I didn't say anything about "things" one way or the other. >>>=20 >>> However, my point is that while compromise of endpoints necessarily = negatively affects the Internet, actually protecting those endpoints = against compromise is outside the scope of the IETF. That's not to say = it's not important, it's just not IETF work. To provide two examples = perhaps closer to home: >>>=20 >>>=20 >>> I disagree. Any issue that impacts the Internet should be = considered. >>>=20 >>>=20 >>> - Even though compromise of the Web is bad for the Internet, the = IETF has largely punted the security of the Web itself to W3C and = WHATWG. >>>=20 >>>=20 >>> Times are changing! >>>=20 >>> - Compromise of the WebPKI would obviously be very bad for many = protocols the IETF has designed, but the management of the WebPKI is = done by CABF, not IETF. >>>=20 >>>=20 >>> But that=E2=80=99s the whole point of this group and discussion is = to think about all the issues and the changes and the wider problems = that are happening. I=E2=80=99d rather look at everything and narrow the = scope of and when necessary. All three Internet drafts on this subject = so far even acknowledge that. >>>=20 >>>=20 >>>=20 >>> -Ekr >>>=20 >>> -dml >>>=20 >>>=20 >>>>=20 >>>> FWIW I think Christian and Bret=E2=80=99s emails outline issues = that should be included in scope. >>>>=20 >>>> To take a concrete example memory reading attacks like Spectre are = a threat to user data and something that browser vendors spend a fair = amount of energy working on, but they're mostly not in scope for IETF = [0]. There's nothing wrong with that, it's just division of labor. >>>>=20 >>>> -Ekr >>>>=20 >>>> [0] I say "mostly" because (a) we need to take the security = implications of these kinds of attacks in our protocol designs and (b) = there might be some small pieces of IETF work like CORB, though that = seems to be mostly being done elsewhere. >>>>=20 >>>> On Sat, Aug 3, 2019 at 2:47 PM Bret Jordan > wrote: >>>>>=20 >>>>> Protection of end users=E2=80=99 data >>>>>=20 >>>>> Protection of an organization=E2=80=99s data >>>>>=20 >>>>> Protection of devices owned by an end user or an organization >>>>>=20 >>>>> Protection of network equipment >>>>>=20 >>>>> Protection of SCADA system >>>>>=20 >>>>> Protection of critical infrastructure >>>>>=20 >>>>> Protection of IoT and soon to be released 5G devices >>>>>=20 >>>>> Protection of cost optimized controllers >>>>>=20 >>>>>=20 >>>>> The problem we have had in the past is we want to call this one of = the following, but each one does not encompass the full picture. >>>>> 1) Computer security >>>>> 2) Data security >>>>> 3) Information security >>>>> 4) Communication security >>>>> 5) Network security >>>>> 6) Application security >>>>> Etc, etc, >>>>>=20 >>>>> So if you way we are just dealing with communication security or = information security we are missing a significant piece of the pie. >>>>>=20 >>>>>=20 >>>>> Thanks, >>>>> Bret >>>>> PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447 F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 = 0050 >>>>> "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing = that can not be unscrambled is an egg." >>>>>=20 >>>>>=20 >>>>> Reading this thread, I think that we are missing a step. We cannot >>>>> define attacks without defining first the assets that need to be >>>>> protected.. Different actors probably have different views on = that, such as: >>>>>=20 >>>>> 1) Continuous operation of the Internet >>>>>=20 >>>>> 2) Continuous operation of a specific Internet provider >>>>>=20 >>>>> 3) Continuous availability of an Internet Service >>>>>=20 >>>>> 4) Continuous connectivity for a given user >>>>>=20 >>>>> 5) Protection of databases used by services and enterprises >>>>>=20 >>>>> 6) Protection of the personal data of users >>>>>=20 >>>>> Do we have agreement on what we are trying to protect? >>>>>=20 >>>>> -- Christian Huitema >>>>>=20 >>>>>=20 >>>>> -- >>>>> Model-t mailing list >>>>> Model-t@iab.org >>>>> https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t = >>>>>=20 >>>>>=20 >>>>> -- >>>>> Model-t mailing list >>>>> Model-t@iab.org >>>>> https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t = >>>>=20 >>>> -- >>>> Model-t mailing list >>>> Model-t@iab.org >>>> https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t = >>>=20 >>>=20 >>> -- >>> Model-t mailing list >>> Model-t@iab.org >>> https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t = >>=20 >>=20 >>=20 >> --=20 >> "Man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains". >> --Rousseau. >>=20 >> --=20 >> Model-t mailing list >> Model-t@iab.org >> https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t = --Apple-Mail=_E940B6DC-6CE1-44B6-BFEF-B7672770D8BE Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 I = full agree Ted.  We need to ensure everyone here in the IETF = understands the bigger problem, the larger risk, and larger attack = surface.  When we design protocols and only consider a small = handful of threats, then we inevitably hurt the market.  

The more of these things = we can document and the more we can bring them to light, the better = everything will be in the end. 


Thanks,
Bret
PGP = Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 = 0050
"Without = cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that can not = be unscrambled is an = egg."

On Aug 4, 2019, at 10:00 AM, Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com> = wrote:

If the point of this effort is = to document threat models, then we aren=E2=80=99t writing protocols at = least here. It=E2=80=99s probably useful if the threat models we produce = describe things we don=E2=80=99t built, because they = interact with things we do build. 

Sent from my = iPhone

On Aug 4, 2019, = at 10:53 AM, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:

But we design protocol, we don't design = clients. Ultimately any
product = has to be useful for the IETF, and should result in changes to
how people think.

Efforts to end the use = of bearer tokens, forward secrecy, etc. are
very much motivated by a model where a client system can = be
compromised. I don't think that = model is unknown, although perhaps it
should be added explicitly.

I can definitely think = of issues that are "endpoint" issues where
protocols have fallen short (my Amazon and Johnny examples) = due to the
mismatch between the = Internet and Unix, and these are threats that
generally have fallen out of scope. (NFS permissions issues = are
another example of = this)

On Sun, Aug 4, 2019 at 8:40 AM Bret Jordan <jordan.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:

I agree here with Dominique.

More specifically, we need to understand = that types of attacks that impact clients and how those attacks take = advantage of the overall weakness of clients. Doing this will help us = better design protocols.  We need to stop saying that clients are = secure or even worse, kicking the can down the road and not worrying = about it.

In a previous email I called = out 4 high level types of attacks that impact users data, users privacy, = and the overall integrity of endpoints.

Thanks,
Bret
PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 = 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050
"Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only = thing that can not be unscrambled is an egg."

On Aug 4, 2019, at 3:49 AM, Dominique = Lazanski <dml@lastpresslabel.com> wrote:



On 4 Aug 2019, at 10:09, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> = wrote:



On Sun, Aug 4, 2019 at 12:14 AM Dominique = Lazanski <dml@lastpresslabel.com> wrote:



On 4 Aug 2019, at 06:08, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> = wrote:

his seems like a reasonable problem statement for the overall = problem of computer security, but not really for IETF.


But computer security is Internet security. It is rare that = =E2=80=98things=E2=80=99 are not connected to the Internet  (with = the exception of intranets however the same type of devices are = connected to both).

If some attacks are initiated at the pint of =E2=80=98things=E2= =80=99 in order to compromise the Internet I don=E2=80=99t see why this = shouldn=E2=80=99t be in scope?


Well, I didn't say anything about "things" one way or the = other.

However, my point is that = while compromise of endpoints necessarily negatively affects the = Internet, actually protecting those endpoints against compromise is = outside the scope of the IETF. That's not to say it's not important, = it's just not IETF work. To provide two examples perhaps closer to = home:


I disagree. Any issue that impacts the Internet should be = considered.


- Even though compromise of the Web is bad for the Internet, = the IETF has largely punted the security of the Web itself to W3C and = WHATWG.


Times are changing!

- Compromise of the WebPKI would obviously = be very bad for many protocols the IETF has designed, but the management = of the WebPKI is done by CABF, not IETF.


But that=E2=80=99s the whole = point of this group and discussion is to think about all the issues and = the changes and the wider problems that are happening. I=E2=80=99d = rather look at everything and narrow the scope of and when necessary. = All three Internet drafts on this subject so far even acknowledge = that.



-Ekr

-dml



FWIW I think Christian and Bret=E2=80=99s emails outline = issues that should be included in scope.

To take a concrete example memory reading attacks like = Spectre are a threat to user data and something that browser vendors = spend a fair amount of energy working on, but they're mostly not in = scope for IETF [0]. There's nothing wrong with that, it's just division = of labor.

-Ekr

[0] I say "mostly" because (a) we need to take the security = implications of these kinds of attacks in our protocol designs and (b) = there might be some small pieces of IETF work like CORB, though that = seems to be mostly being done elsewhere.

On Sat, Aug 3, 2019 at 2:47 PM Bret Jordan <jordan.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:

Protection of end users=E2=80=99= data

Protection of an = organization=E2=80=99s data

Protection of devices owned by = an end user or an organization

Protection of network = equipment

Protection of SCADA = system

Protection of critical = infrastructure

Protection of IoT and soon to = be released 5G devices

Protection of cost optimized = controllers


The problem we have had in the = past is we want to call this one of the following, but each one does not = encompass the full picture.
1) Computer security
2) Data security
3) Information = security
4) Communication = security
5) Network security
6) Application = security
Etc, etc,

So if you way we are just = dealing with communication security or information security we are = missing a significant piece of the pie.


Thanks,
Bret
PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 = 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050
"Without cryptography vihv = vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that can not be unscrambled is = an egg."


Reading this thread, I think = that we are missing a step. We cannot
define attacks without = defining first the assets that need to be
protected.. Different actors = probably have different views on that, such as:

1) Continuous operation of the = Internet

2) Continuous operation of a = specific Internet provider

3) Continuous availability of = an Internet Service

4) Continuous connectivity for = a given user

5) Protection of databases = used by services and enterprises

6) Protection of the personal = data of users

Do we have agreement on what = we are trying to protect?

-- Christian Huitema


--
Model-t mailing list
Model-t@iab.org
https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t


--
Model-t mailing list
Model-t@iab.org
https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t

--
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Model-t@iab.org
https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t


--
Model-t mailing list
Model-t@iab.org
https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t



--
"Man= is born free, but everywhere he is in chains".
--Rousseau.

--
Model-t mailing list
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Then later on, we can group = and categorize ideas and concepts together.=20 Thanks, Bret PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447 F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that = can not be unscrambled is an egg." > On Aug 4, 2019, at 10:12 AM, Dominique Lazanski = wrote: >=20 > I agree with Ted and Brett.=20 >=20 > Worse case scenario is that we document too much and decide later that = we are going to narrow the scope. But to start let=E2=80=99s include = everything.=20 >=20 > -dml >=20 > On 4 Aug 2019, at 17:00, Ted Lemon > wrote: >=20 >> If the point of this effort is to document threat models, then we = aren=E2=80=99t writing protocols at least here. It=E2=80=99s probably = useful if the threat models we produce describe things we don=E2=80=99t = built, because they interact with things we do build.=20 >>=20 >> Sent from my iPhone >>=20 >> On Aug 4, 2019, at 10:53 AM, Watson Ladd > wrote: >>=20 >>> But we design protocol, we don't design clients. Ultimately any >>> product has to be useful for the IETF, and should result in changes = to >>> how people think. >>>=20 >>> Efforts to end the use of bearer tokens, forward secrecy, etc. are >>> very much motivated by a model where a client system can be >>> compromised. I don't think that model is unknown, although perhaps = it >>> should be added explicitly. >>>=20 >>> I can definitely think of issues that are "endpoint" issues where >>> protocols have fallen short (my Amazon and Johnny examples) due to = the >>> mismatch between the Internet and Unix, and these are threats that >>> generally have fallen out of scope. (NFS permissions issues are >>> another example of this) >>>=20 >>> On Sun, Aug 4, 2019 at 8:40 AM Bret Jordan > wrote: >>>>=20 >>>> I agree here with Dominique. >>>>=20 >>>> More specifically, we need to understand that types of attacks that = impact clients and how those attacks take advantage of the overall = weakness of clients. Doing this will help us better design protocols. = We need to stop saying that clients are secure or even worse, kicking = the can down the road and not worrying about it. >>>>=20 >>>> In a previous email I called out 4 high level types of attacks that = impact users data, users privacy, and the overall integrity of = endpoints. >>>>=20 >>>> Thanks, >>>> Bret >>>> PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447 F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 >>>> "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing = that can not be unscrambled is an egg." >>>>=20 >>>> On Aug 4, 2019, at 3:49 AM, Dominique Lazanski = > wrote: >>>>=20 >>>>=20 >>>>=20 >>>> On 4 Aug 2019, at 10:09, Eric Rescorla > wrote: >>>>=20 >>>>=20 >>>>=20 >>>> On Sun, Aug 4, 2019 at 12:14 AM Dominique Lazanski = > wrote: >>>>>=20 >>>>>=20 >>>>>=20 >>>>> On 4 Aug 2019, at 06:08, Eric Rescorla > wrote: >>>>>=20 >>>>> his seems like a reasonable problem statement for the overall = problem of computer security, but not really for IETF. >>>>>=20 >>>>>=20 >>>>> But computer security is Internet security. It is rare that = =E2=80=98things=E2=80=99 are not connected to the Internet (with the = exception of intranets however the same type of devices are connected to = both). >>>>>=20 >>>>> If some attacks are initiated at the pint of =E2=80=98things=E2=80=99= in order to compromise the Internet I don=E2=80=99t see why this = shouldn=E2=80=99t be in scope? >>>>=20 >>>>=20 >>>> Well, I didn't say anything about "things" one way or the other. >>>>=20 >>>> However, my point is that while compromise of endpoints necessarily = negatively affects the Internet, actually protecting those endpoints = against compromise is outside the scope of the IETF. That's not to say = it's not important, it's just not IETF work. To provide two examples = perhaps closer to home: >>>>=20 >>>>=20 >>>> I disagree. Any issue that impacts the Internet should be = considered. >>>>=20 >>>>=20 >>>> - Even though compromise of the Web is bad for the Internet, the = IETF has largely punted the security of the Web itself to W3C and = WHATWG. >>>>=20 >>>>=20 >>>> Times are changing! >>>>=20 >>>> - Compromise of the WebPKI would obviously be very bad for many = protocols the IETF has designed, but the management of the WebPKI is = done by CABF, not IETF. >>>>=20 >>>>=20 >>>> But that=E2=80=99s the whole point of this group and discussion is = to think about all the issues and the changes and the wider problems = that are happening. I=E2=80=99d rather look at everything and narrow the = scope of and when necessary. All three Internet drafts on this subject = so far even acknowledge that. >>>>=20 >>>>=20 >>>>=20 >>>> -Ekr >>>>=20 >>>> -dml >>>>=20 >>>>=20 >>>>>=20 >>>>> FWIW I think Christian and Bret=E2=80=99s emails outline issues = that should be included in scope. >>>>>=20 >>>>> To take a concrete example memory reading attacks like Spectre are = a threat to user data and something that browser vendors spend a fair = amount of energy working on, but they're mostly not in scope for IETF = [0]. There's nothing wrong with that, it's just division of labor. >>>>>=20 >>>>> -Ekr >>>>>=20 >>>>> [0] I say "mostly" because (a) we need to take the security = implications of these kinds of attacks in our protocol designs and (b) = there might be some small pieces of IETF work like CORB, though that = seems to be mostly being done elsewhere. >>>>>=20 >>>>> On Sat, Aug 3, 2019 at 2:47 PM Bret Jordan > wrote: >>>>>>=20 >>>>>> Protection of end users=E2=80=99 data >>>>>>=20 >>>>>> Protection of an organization=E2=80=99s data >>>>>>=20 >>>>>> Protection of devices owned by an end user or an organization >>>>>>=20 >>>>>> Protection of network equipment >>>>>>=20 >>>>>> Protection of SCADA system >>>>>>=20 >>>>>> Protection of critical infrastructure >>>>>>=20 >>>>>> Protection of IoT and soon to be released 5G devices >>>>>>=20 >>>>>> Protection of cost optimized controllers >>>>>>=20 >>>>>>=20 >>>>>> The problem we have had in the past is we want to call this one = of the following, but each one does not encompass the full picture. >>>>>> 1) Computer security >>>>>> 2) Data security >>>>>> 3) Information security >>>>>> 4) Communication security >>>>>> 5) Network security >>>>>> 6) Application security >>>>>> Etc, etc, >>>>>>=20 >>>>>> So if you way we are just dealing with communication security or = information security we are missing a significant piece of the pie. >>>>>>=20 >>>>>>=20 >>>>>> Thanks, >>>>>> Bret >>>>>> PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447 F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 = 0050 >>>>>> "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only = thing that can not be unscrambled is an egg." >>>>>>=20 >>>>>>=20 >>>>>> Reading this thread, I think that we are missing a step. We = cannot >>>>>> define attacks without defining first the assets that need to be >>>>>> protected.. Different actors probably have different views on = that, such as: >>>>>>=20 >>>>>> 1) Continuous operation of the Internet >>>>>>=20 >>>>>> 2) Continuous operation of a specific Internet provider >>>>>>=20 >>>>>> 3) Continuous availability of an Internet Service >>>>>>=20 >>>>>> 4) Continuous connectivity for a given user >>>>>>=20 >>>>>> 5) Protection of databases used by services and enterprises >>>>>>=20 >>>>>> 6) Protection of the personal data of users >>>>>>=20 >>>>>> Do we have agreement on what we are trying to protect? >>>>>>=20 >>>>>> -- Christian Huitema >>>>>>=20 >>>>>>=20 >>>>>> -- >>>>>> Model-t mailing list >>>>>> Model-t@iab.org >>>>>> https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t = >>>>>>=20 >>>>>>=20 >>>>>> -- >>>>>> Model-t mailing list >>>>>> Model-t@iab.org >>>>>> https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t = >>>>>=20 >>>>> -- >>>>> Model-t mailing list >>>>> Model-t@iab.org >>>>> https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t = >>>>=20 >>>>=20 >>>> -- >>>> Model-t mailing list >>>> Model-t@iab.org >>>> https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t = >>>=20 >>>=20 >>>=20 >>> --=20 >>> "Man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains". >>> --Rousseau. >>>=20 >>> --=20 >>> Model-t mailing list >>> Model-t@iab.org >>> https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t = --Apple-Mail=_1FB84C6B-67E2-4A82-86C8-9F834F339058 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Yes, = we should include everything up front.  Then later on, we can group = and categorize ideas and concepts together. 


Thanks,
Bret
PGP = Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 = 0050
"Without = cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that can not = be unscrambled is an = egg."

On Aug 4, 2019, at 10:12 AM, Dominique Lazanski <dml@lastpresslabel.com> wrote:

I agree with Ted and = Brett. 

Worse = case scenario is that we document too much and decide later that we are = going to narrow the scope. But to start let=E2=80=99s include = everything. 

-dml

On 4 Aug 2019, at 17:00, Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com> = wrote:

If the point of this = effort is to document threat models, then we aren=E2=80=99t writing = protocols at least here. It=E2=80=99s probably useful if the threat = models we produce describe things we don=E2=80=99t = built, because they interact with things we do = build. 

Sent from my iPhone

On Aug 4, 2019, at 10:53 AM, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:

But we design protocol, we don't design = clients. Ultimately any
product = has to be useful for the IETF, and should result in changes to
how people think.

Efforts to end the use = of bearer tokens, forward secrecy, etc. are
very much motivated by a model where a client system can = be
compromised. I don't think that = model is unknown, although perhaps it
should be added explicitly.

I can definitely think = of issues that are "endpoint" issues where
protocols have fallen short (my Amazon and Johnny examples) = due to the
mismatch between the = Internet and Unix, and these are threats that
generally have fallen out of scope. (NFS permissions issues = are
another example of = this)

On Sun, Aug 4, 2019 at 8:40 AM Bret Jordan <jordan.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:

I agree here with Dominique.

More specifically, we need to understand = that types of attacks that impact clients and how those attacks take = advantage of the overall weakness of clients. Doing this will help us = better design protocols.  We need to stop saying that clients are = secure or even worse, kicking the can down the road and not worrying = about it.

In a previous email I called = out 4 high level types of attacks that impact users data, users privacy, = and the overall integrity of endpoints.

Thanks,
Bret
PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 = 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050
"Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only = thing that can not be unscrambled is an egg."

On Aug 4, 2019, at 3:49 AM, Dominique = Lazanski <dml@lastpresslabel.com> wrote:



On 4 Aug 2019, at 10:09, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> = wrote:



On Sun, Aug 4, 2019 at 12:14 AM Dominique = Lazanski <dml@lastpresslabel.com> wrote:



On 4 Aug 2019, at 06:08, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> = wrote:

his seems like a reasonable problem statement for the overall = problem of computer security, but not really for IETF.


But computer security is Internet security. It is rare that = =E2=80=98things=E2=80=99 are not connected to the Internet  (with = the exception of intranets however the same type of devices are = connected to both).

If some attacks are initiated at the pint of =E2=80=98things=E2= =80=99 in order to compromise the Internet I don=E2=80=99t see why this = shouldn=E2=80=99t be in scope?


Well, I didn't say anything about "things" one way or the = other.

However, my point is that = while compromise of endpoints necessarily negatively affects the = Internet, actually protecting those endpoints against compromise is = outside the scope of the IETF. That's not to say it's not important, = it's just not IETF work. To provide two examples perhaps closer to = home:


I disagree. Any issue that impacts the Internet should be = considered.


- Even though compromise of the Web is bad for the Internet, = the IETF has largely punted the security of the Web itself to W3C and = WHATWG.


Times are changing!

- Compromise of the WebPKI would obviously = be very bad for many protocols the IETF has designed, but the management = of the WebPKI is done by CABF, not IETF.


But that=E2=80=99s the whole = point of this group and discussion is to think about all the issues and = the changes and the wider problems that are happening. I=E2=80=99d = rather look at everything and narrow the scope of and when necessary. = All three Internet drafts on this subject so far even acknowledge = that.



-Ekr

-dml



FWIW I think Christian and Bret=E2=80=99s emails outline = issues that should be included in scope.

To take a concrete example memory reading attacks like = Spectre are a threat to user data and something that browser vendors = spend a fair amount of energy working on, but they're mostly not in = scope for IETF [0]. There's nothing wrong with that, it's just division = of labor.

-Ekr

[0] I say "mostly" because (a) we need to take the security = implications of these kinds of attacks in our protocol designs and (b) = there might be some small pieces of IETF work like CORB, though that = seems to be mostly being done elsewhere.

On Sat, Aug 3, 2019 at 2:47 PM Bret Jordan <jordan.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:

Protection of end users=E2=80=99= data

Protection of an = organization=E2=80=99s data

Protection of devices owned by = an end user or an organization

Protection of network = equipment

Protection of SCADA = system

Protection of critical = infrastructure

Protection of IoT and soon to = be released 5G devices

Protection of cost optimized = controllers


The problem we have had in the = past is we want to call this one of the following, but each one does not = encompass the full picture.
1) Computer security
2) Data security
3) Information = security
4) Communication = security
5) Network security
6) Application = security
Etc, etc,

So if you way we are just = dealing with communication security or information security we are = missing a significant piece of the pie.


Thanks,
Bret
PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 = 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050
"Without cryptography vihv = vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that can not be unscrambled is = an egg."


Reading this thread, I think = that we are missing a step. We cannot
define attacks without = defining first the assets that need to be
protected.. Different actors = probably have different views on that, such as:

1) Continuous operation of the = Internet

2) Continuous operation of a = specific Internet provider

3) Continuous availability of = an Internet Service

4) Continuous connectivity for = a given user

5) Protection of databases = used by services and enterprises

6) Protection of the personal = data of users

Do we have agreement on what = we are trying to protect?

-- Christian Huitema


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--
"Man= is born free, but everywhere he is in chains".
--Rousseau.

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https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t
<= /blockquote>
= --Apple-Mail=_1FB84C6B-67E2-4A82-86C8-9F834F339058-- From nobody Sun Aug 4 10:12:04 2019 Return-Path: X-Original-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id AE881120033 for ; Sun, 4 Aug 2019 10:12:02 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.899 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.899 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=fugue-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 2Dh-LH-Ei46z for ; Sun, 4 Aug 2019 10:12:00 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail-io1-xd41.google.com (mail-io1-xd41.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::d41]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7171C12003E for ; Sun, 4 Aug 2019 10:12:00 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-io1-xd41.google.com with SMTP id m24so162687027ioo.2 for ; Sun, 04 Aug 2019 10:12:00 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=fugue-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com; s=20150623; h=from:message-id:mime-version:subject:date:in-reply-to:cc:to :references; bh=a8DJooWQi7wtKn8iMCaSQ+X4BRkPoK7AT6HG7LaluNk=; b=S5iFem1Lzozd4XZZz7QC4Rtn0YZDQv4iyIPlQTVc4Dv0yM48hcpA+AFNMCcuZ6fn8p OBR5/yeCx3MekQIHOUTUTyDHeidwAcZiACi5W2FiaXTI8ixcdxRMr7edts7odGYkCS6Y S/gNXg1E43m5wQtugoLNxzGR1hYO23er8CnzvKw3bSo9PRxmhM/hD4K5e4habtd0DKuy hwUZFGs1+iKvcHj37VLhxUIylGORycaJF/M3mhXkKAumwRrpzIysTJpAsJPMrt7JP42X 1GoZ1Ly6lAABQeJEoYdNDZi54NrDh5Uek4MmNLl6IjGBIKpkHW6YrxIZ26H4GgCM9Dkn 3EMw== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:from:message-id:mime-version:subject:date :in-reply-to:cc:to:references; bh=a8DJooWQi7wtKn8iMCaSQ+X4BRkPoK7AT6HG7LaluNk=; b=k+wOLAMGVmMPli/nb7hvnsA0kQ+bfziraAHV8ollEq9WycbPqvKDk//dAX8O0I21F+ ZUoz+IuVbM94Zxr5Xqh5nwOVc4xqGUG7PycFn+eYfc1RsfQN1S5BoYKsBCOz7xMZGhy2 XV7dO0+nXrE+l6msNPvEJ4b3cRfumWVGRVjdixD9zdTthDQ83zez861it83gw04DCKVh wgrXqUOT/YUR6a8S2tG0jZm2d7v4TXqIm/FQ02/Fj4eyRfVQi/qsBd5ualyEd+fIVtGR 6FJJnFvhpe3KePL0bi5gU4da/cbzUz5B9+mTtGmUmNyzNtKhDUv7l0/r/o6VQOzdtrlc KiMw== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAVbATRuUKgR4c6v2A7k2gAgYYF7vPQoob9VGDFB5+BT8enCt4kL +naN6eNA5OdcXDl3rLFwIWxsRg== X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqwqcE1t3kGbs72Z0qwUm/t7WJAgGm+XMczvDRt4Mfmum1oNftNimji24PpfUu3x9noaQ3Aovw== X-Received: by 2002:a5d:9942:: with SMTP id v2mr8744619ios.177.1564938719750; Sun, 04 Aug 2019 10:11:59 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [172.19.1.204] ([75.104.90.233]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id c23sm68704107iod.11.2019.08.04.10.11.54 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Sun, 04 Aug 2019 10:11:59 -0700 (PDT) From: Ted Lemon Message-Id: Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="Apple-Mail=_B4AB5071-FA9A-4A67-A371-F1114638C465" Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 12.4 \(3445.104.11\)) Date: Sun, 4 Aug 2019 12:11:49 -0500 In-Reply-To: Cc: Watson Ladd , Eric Rescorla , Dominique Lazanski , Christian Huitema , model-t@iab.org To: Bret Jordan References: <29756028-95f1-e6e5-b3ea-562cbc635df0@sandelman.ca> <5ef15ad2-5b20-e871-0d01-17cf906051c1@cs.tcd.ie> <22633.1564768705@localhost> <5879878A-7CEA-4030-BB72-108CC4122719@gmail.com> <06F0AE14-4413-4022-A804-C1B58E2702CE@fugue.com> <52BAC141-CB25-4072-B556-6325912F1ADD@gmail.com> <9a1555ca-6699-75f1-683e-2a3a2a539a11@cs.tcd.ie> <86157132-D401-4033-A72B-AD4859DB6696@lastpresslabel.com> <5281A343-35C0-4F4D-949D-02C46FA07801@lastpresslabel.com> <86639B71-F616-48CC-96AB-719F7168F087@gmail.com> X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.3445.104.11) Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect X-BeenThere: model-t@iab.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussions of changes in Internet deployment patterns and their impact on the Internet threat model List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 04 Aug 2019 17:12:03 -0000 --Apple-Mail=_B4AB5071-FA9A-4A67-A371-F1114638C465 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii On Aug 4, 2019, at 11:37 AM, Bret Jordan wrote: > The more of these things we can document and the more we can bring = them to light, the better everything will be in the end.=20 Of course, wearing my IETF pedant hat, we do need to be careful not to = try to boil the ocean. --Apple-Mail=_B4AB5071-FA9A-4A67-A371-F1114638C465 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/html; charset=us-ascii On = Aug 4, 2019, at 11:37 AM, Bret Jordan <jordan.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
The more of these things we can document and the more we can = bring them to light, the better everything will be in the = end. 

Of course, wearing my IETF pedant hat, we do need to be = careful not to try to boil the ocean.

= --Apple-Mail=_B4AB5071-FA9A-4A67-A371-F1114638C465-- From nobody Sun Aug 4 14:23:11 2019 Return-Path: X-Original-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2A26D1200EF for ; Sun, 4 Aug 2019 14:23:09 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -4.3 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.3 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=cs.tcd.ie Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id p1AvtvL0hJXa for ; Sun, 4 Aug 2019 14:23:07 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mercury.scss.tcd.ie (mercury.scss.tcd.ie [134.226.56.6]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1FFEB1200EB for ; 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url= Autocrypt: addr=stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie; prefer-encrypt=mutual; keydata= mQINBFo9UDIBEADUH4ZPcUnX5WWRWO4kEkHea5Y5eEvZjSwe/YA+G0nrTuOU9nemCP5PMvmh 5Cg8gBTyWyN4Z2+O25p9Tja5zUb+vPMWYvOtokRrp46yhFZOmiS5b6kTq0IqYzsEv5HI58S+ QtaFq978CRa4xH9Gi9u4yzUmT03QNIGDXE37honcAM4MOEtEgvw4fVhVWJuyy3w//0F2tzKr EMjmL5VGuD/Q9+G/7abuXiYNNd9ZFjv4625AUWwy+pAh4EKzS1FE7BOZp9daMu9MUQmDqtZU bUv0Q+DnQAB/4tNncejJPz0p2z3MWCp5iSwHiQvytYgatMp34a50l6CWqa13n6vY8VcPlIqO Vz+7L+WiVfxLbeVqBwV+4uL9to9zLF9IyUvl94lCxpscR2kgRgpM6A5LylRDkR6E0oudFnJg b097ZaNyuY1ETghVB5Uir1GCYChs8NUNumTHXiOkuzk+Gs4DAHx/a78YxBolKHi+esLH8r2k 4LyM2lp5FmBKjG7cGcpBGmWavACYEa7rwAadg4uBx9SHMV5i33vDXQUZcmW0vslQ2Is02NMK 7uB7E7HlVE1IM1zNkVTYYGkKreU8DVQu8qNOtPVE/CdaCJ/pbXoYeHz2B1Nvbl9tlyWxn5Xi HzFPJleXc0ksb9SkJokAfwTSZzTxeQPER8la5lsEEPbU/cDTcwARAQABtDJTdGVwaGVuIEZh cnJlbGwgKDIwMTcpIDxzdGVwaGVuLmZhcnJlbGxAY3MudGNkLmllPokCQAQTAQgAKgIbAwUJ CZQmAAULCQgHAgYVCAkKCwIEFgIDAQIeAQIXgAUCWj6jdwIZAQAKCRBasvrxexcr6o7QD/9m x9DPJetmW794RXmNTrbTJ44zc/tJbcLdRBh0KBn9OW/EaAqjDmgNJeCMyJTKr1ywaps8HGUN hLEVkc14NUpgi4/Zkrbi3DmTp25OHj6wXBS5qVMyVynTMEIjOfeFFyxG+48od+Xn7qg6LT7G rHeNf+z/r0v9+8eZ1Ip63kshQDGhhpmRMKu4Ws9ZvTW2ACXkkTFaSGYJj3yIP4R6IgwBYGMz DXFX6nS4LA1s3pcPNxOgrvCyb60AiJZTLcOk/rRrpZtXB1XQc23ZZmrlTkl2HaThL6w3YKdi Ti1NbuMeOxZqtXcUshII45sANm4HuWNTiRh93Bn5bN6ddjgsaXEZBKUBuUaPBl7gQiQJcAlS 3MmGgVS4ZoX8+VaPGpXdQVFyBMRFlOKOC5XJESt7wY0RE2C8PFm+5eywSO/P1fkl9whkMgml 3OEuIQiP2ehRt/HVLMHkoM9CPQ7t6UwdrXrvX+vBZykav8x9U9M6KTgfsXytxUl6Vx5lPMLi 2/Jrsz6Mzh/IVZa3xjhq1OLFSI/tT2ji4FkJDQbO+yYUDhcuqfakDmtWLMxecZsY6O58A/95 8Qni6Xeq+Nh7zJ7wNcQOMoDGj+24di2TX1cKLzdDMWFaWzlNP5dB5VMwS9Wqj1Z6TzKjGjru q8soqohwb2CK9B3wzFg0Bs1iBI+2RuFnxLkCDQRaPVAyARAA+g3R0HzGr/Dl34Y07XqGqzq5 SU0nXIu9u8Ynsxj7gR5qb3HgUWYEWrHW2jHOByXnvkffucf5yzwrsvw8Q8iI8CFHiTYHPpey 4yPVn6R0w/FOMcY70eTIu/k6EEFDlDbs09DtKcrsT9bmN0XoRxITlXwWTufYqUnmS+YkAuk+ TLCtUin7OdaS2uU6Ata3PLQSeM2ZsUQMmYmHPwB9rmf+q2I005AJ9Q1SPQ2KNg/8xOGxo13S VuaSqYRQdpV93RuCOzg4vuXtR+gP0KQrus/P2ZCEPvU9cXF/2MIhXgOz207lv3iE2zGyNXld /n8spvWk+0bH5Zqd9Wcba/rGcBhmX9NKKDARZqjkv/zVEP1X97w1HsNYeUFNcg2lk9zQKb4v l1jx/Uz8ukzH2QNhU4R39dbF/4AwWuSVkGW6bTxHJqGs6YimbfdQqxTzmqFwz3JP0OtXX5q/ 6D4pHwcmJwEiDNzsBLl6skPSQ0Xyq3pua/qAP8MVm+YxCxJQITqZ8qjDLzoe7s9X6FLLC/DA L9kxl5saVSfDbuI3usH/emdtn0NA9/M7nfgih92zD92sl1yQXHT6BDa8xW1j+RU4P+E0wyd7 zgB2UeYgrp2IIcfG+xX2uFG5MJQ/nYfBoiALb0+dQHNHDtFnNGY3Oe8z1M9c5aDG3/s29QbJ +w7hEKKo9YMAEQEAAYkCJQQYAQgADwUCWj1QMgIbDAUJCZQmAAAKCRBasvrxexcr6qwvD/9b Rek3kfN8Q+jGrKl8qwY8HC5s4mhdDJZI/JP2FImf5J2+d5/e8UJ4fcsT79E0/FqX3Z9wZr6h sofPqLh1/YzDsYkZDHTYSGrlWGP/I5kXwUmFnBZHzM3WGrL3S7ZmCYMdudhykxXXjq7M6Do1 oxM8JofrXGtwBTLv5wfvvygJouVCVe87Ge7mCeY5vey1eUi4zSSF1zPpR6gg64w2g4TXM5qt SwkZVOv1g475LsGlYWRuJV8TA67yp1zJI7HkNqCo8KyHX0DPOh9c+Sd9ZX4aqKfqH9HIpnCL AYEgj7vofeix7gM3kQQmwynqq32bQGQBrKJEYp2vfeO30VsVx4dzuuiC5lyjUccVmw5D72J0 FlGrfEm0kw6D1qwyBg0SAMqamKN6XDdjhNAtXIaoA2UMZK/vZGGUKbqTgDdk0fnzOyb2zvXK CiPFKqIPAqKaDHg0JHdGI3KpQdRNLLzgx083EqEc6IAwWA6jSz+6lZDV6XDgF0lYqAYIkg3+ 6OUXUv6plMlwSHquiOc/MQXHfgUP5//Ra5JuiuyCj954FD+MBKIj8eWROfnzyEnBplVHGSDI ZLzL3pvV14dcsoajdeIH45i8DxnVm64BvEFHtLNlnliMrLOrk4shfmWyUqNlzilXN2BTFVFH 4MrnagFdcFnWYp1JPh96ZKjiqBwMv/H0kw== Message-ID: <1c506954-47ba-dc40-f6e5-c19bd17624c2@cs.tcd.ie> Date: Sun, 4 Aug 2019 22:23:01 +0100 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/60.8.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha512; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="2mSfYxOvNInA3qa2Y8xxzwpdaCxazfF5c" Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect X-BeenThere: model-t@iab.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussions of changes in Internet deployment patterns and their impact on the Internet threat model List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 04 Aug 2019 21:23:09 -0000 This is an OpenPGP/MIME signed message (RFC 4880 and 3156) --2mSfYxOvNInA3qa2Y8xxzwpdaCxazfF5c Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="rHvyIyEmXzDBBUzDH2XG8bwXe3oKvp3RD"; protected-headers="v1" From: Stephen Farrell To: Bret Jordan , Ted Lemon Cc: Watson Ladd , Eric Rescorla , Dominique Lazanski , Christian Huitema , model-t@iab.org Message-ID: <1c506954-47ba-dc40-f6e5-c19bd17624c2@cs.tcd.ie> Subject: Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect References: <29756028-95f1-e6e5-b3ea-562cbc635df0@sandelman.ca> <5ef15ad2-5b20-e871-0d01-17cf906051c1@cs.tcd.ie> <22633.1564768705@localhost> <5879878A-7CEA-4030-BB72-108CC4122719@gmail.com> <06F0AE14-4413-4022-A804-C1B58E2702CE@fugue.com> <52BAC141-CB25-4072-B556-6325912F1ADD@gmail.com> <9a1555ca-6699-75f1-683e-2a3a2a539a11@cs.tcd.ie> <86157132-D401-4033-A72B-AD4859DB6696@lastpresslabel.com> <5281A343-35C0-4F4D-949D-02C46FA07801@lastpresslabel.com> <86639B71-F616-48CC-96AB-719F7168F087@gmail.com> In-Reply-To: --rHvyIyEmXzDBBUzDH2XG8bwXe3oKvp3RD Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="------------90D94C19F4D2869D522D25F2" Content-Language: en-GB This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------90D94C19F4D2869D522D25F2 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Partly agreeing, partly quibbling:-) On 04/08/2019 17:37, Bret Jordan wrote: > We need to ensure everyone here in the IETF understands the bigger > problem,=20 It is certain that not every IETF participant will care about understanding every detail of every possible threat. They do have other things do be doing:-) > the larger risk, and larger attack surface. When we design > protocols and only consider a small handful of threats, then we > inevitably hurt the market. IMO we ought not only think in terms of "the market" - I'd hope rather that everyone sometimes thinks of more than commerce as the Internet impacts on people in other ways that are relevant in this discussion. > The more of these things we can document and the more we can bring > them to light, the better everything will be in the end. Yes, but it's important to document things in a way that can lead up to then winnowing things down to something that ends up useful to that population of IETFers who are not security or privacy specialists. 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autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id rOYVWfgDIaln for ; Sun, 4 Aug 2019 15:33:03 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail-pg1-x52e.google.com (mail-pg1-x52e.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::52e]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C3C0B12010E for ; Sun, 4 Aug 2019 15:33:03 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-pg1-x52e.google.com with SMTP id o13so38634727pgp.12 for ; Sun, 04 Aug 2019 15:33:03 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=from:message-id:mime-version:subject:date:in-reply-to:cc:to :references; bh=4O/J6/oS9UGvjqfiF0p5KBvqjJ7xvjMUqD2IQ9eLyFc=; b=cUjTbSBpUgJ3UJUjryU+NREAgiKOCcYCgPiiWl89Vbjz6zksb4GTgJbIb7b827yqsS 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APXvYqysJP104Opixx2hpB95bSuz619IGeZv4Etuh3PcXNCgIlPnJGP7BJ3/mcefksCdH5hXDW3/yA== X-Received: by 2002:a63:67c6:: with SMTP id b189mr43023892pgc.163.1564957983314; Sun, 04 Aug 2019 15:33:03 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [10.128.64.149] ([136.60.227.81]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id b126sm119349397pfa.126.2019.08.04.15.33.01 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Sun, 04 Aug 2019 15:33:02 -0700 (PDT) From: Bret Jordan Message-Id: <4DCC4BA0-8A4E-4A82-9C83-8E2FBB437B9D@gmail.com> Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="Apple-Mail=_E3204480-A2B8-4274-B9B4-535D9A6CC97E" Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 12.4 \(3445.104.11\)) Date: Sun, 4 Aug 2019 16:32:59 -0600 In-Reply-To: Cc: Watson Ladd , Eric Rescorla , Dominique Lazanski , Christian Huitema , model-t@iab.org To: Ted Lemon References: <29756028-95f1-e6e5-b3ea-562cbc635df0@sandelman.ca> <5ef15ad2-5b20-e871-0d01-17cf906051c1@cs.tcd.ie> <22633.1564768705@localhost> <5879878A-7CEA-4030-BB72-108CC4122719@gmail.com> <06F0AE14-4413-4022-A804-C1B58E2702CE@fugue.com> <52BAC141-CB25-4072-B556-6325912F1ADD@gmail.com> <9a1555ca-6699-75f1-683e-2a3a2a539a11@cs.tcd.ie> <86157132-D401-4033-A72B-AD4859DB6696@lastpresslabel.com> <5281A343-35C0-4F4D-949D-02C46FA07801@lastpresslabel.com> <86639B71-F616-48CC-96AB-719F7168F087@gmail.com> X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.3445.104.11) Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect X-BeenThere: model-t@iab.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussions of changes in Internet deployment patterns and their impact on the Internet threat model List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 04 Aug 2019 22:33:06 -0000 --Apple-Mail=_E3204480-A2B8-4274-B9B4-535D9A6CC97E Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii I do not want to boil the ocean. As we work through this, we can figure = out the right balance for this community and other communities that will = need to look at and reference our work. Thanks, Bret PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447 F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that = can not be unscrambled is an egg." > On Aug 4, 2019, at 11:11 AM, Ted Lemon wrote: >=20 > On Aug 4, 2019, at 11:37 AM, Bret Jordan > wrote: >> The more of these things we can document and the more we can bring = them to light, the better everything will be in the end.=20 >=20 > Of course, wearing my IETF pedant hat, we do need to be careful not to = try to boil the ocean. >=20 --Apple-Mail=_E3204480-A2B8-4274-B9B4-535D9A6CC97E Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/html; charset=us-ascii I = do not want to boil the ocean.  As we work through this, we can = figure out the right balance for this community and other communities = that will need to look at and reference our work.


Thanks,
Bret
PGP = Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 = 0050
"Without = cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that can not = be unscrambled is an = egg."

On Aug 4, 2019, at 11:11 AM, Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com> = wrote:

On Aug 4, 2019, at = 11:37 AM, Bret Jordan <jordan.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
The more of these things we can document and the more we can = bring them to light, the better everything will be in the = end. 

Of course, wearing my IETF pedant hat, we do need to be = careful not to try to boil the ocean.


= --Apple-Mail=_E3204480-A2B8-4274-B9B4-535D9A6CC97E-- From nobody Sun Aug 4 15:38:31 2019 Return-Path: X-Original-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B8FB8120112 for ; Sun, 4 Aug 2019 15:38:29 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.998 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.998 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id OUTVsyMz1yRq for ; Sun, 4 Aug 2019 15:38:27 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail-pl1-x635.google.com (mail-pl1-x635.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::635]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 873D8120111 for ; 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Sun, 04 Aug 2019 15:38:27 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [10.128.64.149] ([136.60.227.81]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id f88sm14942526pjg.5.2019.08.04.15.38.25 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Sun, 04 Aug 2019 15:38:26 -0700 (PDT) From: Bret Jordan Message-Id: <73B68598-2F9B-44B7-8FA9-D8EE61C88AAD@gmail.com> Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="Apple-Mail=_C3A24D70-6B82-4B19-9144-D949A3682D38" Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 12.4 \(3445.104.11\)) Date: Sun, 4 Aug 2019 16:38:23 -0600 In-Reply-To: <1c506954-47ba-dc40-f6e5-c19bd17624c2@cs.tcd.ie> Cc: Ted Lemon , Watson Ladd , Eric Rescorla , Dominique Lazanski , Christian Huitema , model-t@iab.org To: Stephen Farrell References: <22633.1564768705@localhost> <5879878A-7CEA-4030-BB72-108CC4122719@gmail.com> <06F0AE14-4413-4022-A804-C1B58E2702CE@fugue.com> <52BAC141-CB25-4072-B556-6325912F1ADD@gmail.com> <9a1555ca-6699-75f1-683e-2a3a2a539a11@cs.tcd.ie> <86157132-D401-4033-A72B-AD4859DB6696@lastpresslabel.com> <5281A343-35C0-4F4D-949D-02C46FA07801@lastpresslabel.com> <86639B71-F616-48CC-96AB-719F7168F087@gmail.com> <1c506954-47ba-dc40-f6e5-c19bd17624c2@cs.tcd.ie> X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.3445.104.11) Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect X-BeenThere: model-t@iab.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussions of changes in Internet deployment patterns and their impact on the Internet threat model List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 04 Aug 2019 22:38:30 -0000 --Apple-Mail=_C3A24D70-6B82-4B19-9144-D949A3682D38 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 A few comments inline=E2=80=A6 Sorry, I try not to do that.=20 Thanks, Bret PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447 F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that = can not be unscrambled is an egg." > On Aug 4, 2019, at 3:23 PM, Stephen Farrell = wrote: >=20 >=20 > Partly agreeing, partly quibbling:-) >=20 > On 04/08/2019 17:37, Bret Jordan wrote: >> We need to ensure everyone here in the IETF understands the bigger >> problem,=20 >=20 > It is certain that not every IETF participant will care about > understanding every detail of every possible threat. They do > have other things do be doing:-) I fully agree. We need to make sure the documentation we come up with = is super easy to understand, is easily digestible, but yet covers enough = of the problem space, that it is really meaningful.=20 >=20 >> the larger risk, and larger attack surface. When we design >> protocols and only consider a small handful of threats, then we >> inevitably hurt the market. >=20 > IMO we ought not only think in terms of "the market" - I'd > hope rather that everyone sometimes thinks of more than commerce > as the Internet impacts on people in other ways that are > relevant in this discussion. Sorry bad word choice. =3D~s/market/industry/g; When I refer to =E2=80=9C= the market=E2=80=9D I am not talking about the vendor space, commercial = space, or the sell stuff over the web space. I am simply referring to = the way end users, organizations, enterprises, and governments need to = use the connectedness of computers and IP address ranges to do what ever = it is they are doing. So I should have said =E2=80=9Cindustry=E2=80=9D = or if you have a better term, let me know. =20 >=20 >> The more of these things we can document and the more we can bring >> them to light, the better everything will be in the end. > Yes, but it's important to document things in a way that can > lead up to then winnowing things down to something that ends > up useful to that population of IETFers who are not security > or privacy specialists. Once again, I fully agree. But we need to start somewhere. The = Stanford D-School has a great set of classes on how to effectively = brainstorm. And I think that is what we are trying to do now. We are = trying to get the discussion going and get everything out there, so we = can start to better understand how big the elephant is that we need to = work on.=20 Bret >=20 > Cheers, > S. > <0x5AB2FAF17B172BEA.asc> --Apple-Mail=_C3A24D70-6B82-4B19-9144-D949A3682D38 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 A = few comments inline=E2=80=A6 Sorry, I try not to do that. 

Thanks,
Bret
PGP = Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 = 0050
"Without = cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that can not = be unscrambled is an = egg."

On Aug 4, 2019, at 3:23 PM, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:


Partly agreeing, partly quibbling:-)

On 04/08/2019 17:37, Bret Jordan wrote:
We need to ensure = everyone here in the IETF understands the bigger
problem, =

It is certain that not every = IETF participant will care about
understanding every = detail of every possible threat. They do
have other things = do be doing:-)

I fully agree.  We need to make sure the = documentation we come up with is super easy to understand, is easily = digestible, but yet covers enough of the problem space, that it is = really meaningful. 




the larger risk, and larger attack surface.  When we = design
protocols and only consider a small handful of = threats, then we
inevitably hurt the market.

IMO we ought not only think in = terms of "the market" - I'd
hope rather that everyone = sometimes thinks of more than commerce
as the Internet = impacts on people in other ways that are
relevant in this = discussion.

Sorry bad word choice. =  =3D~s/market/industry/g;  When I refer to =E2=80=9Cthe = market=E2=80=9D I am not talking about the vendor space, commercial = space, or the sell stuff over the web space.  I am simply referring = to the way end users, organizations, enterprises, and governments need = to use the connectedness of computers and IP address ranges to do what = ever it is they are doing. So I should have said =E2=80=9Cindustry=E2=80=9D= or if you have a better term, let me know.  




The more of these things = we can document and the more we can bring
them to light, = the better everything will be in the end.
Yes, = but it's important to document things in a way that can
lead= up to then winnowing things down to something that ends
up = useful to that population of IETFers who are not security
or= privacy specialists.

Once again, I fully agree.  But we need to = start somewhere.  The Stanford D-School has a great set of classes = on how to effectively brainstorm.  And I think that is what we are = trying to do now.  We are trying to get the discussion going and = get everything out there, so we can start to better understand how big = the elephant is that we need to work on. 

Bret



Cheers,
S.
<0x5AB2FAF17B172BEA.asc= >

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Linux x86_64; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/60.8.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <73B68598-2F9B-44B7-8FA9-D8EE61C88AAD@gmail.com> Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha512; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="hX723OqClX7HqeeLkQ4Pv3revZZGs7wLg" Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect X-BeenThere: model-t@iab.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussions of changes in Internet deployment patterns and their impact on the Internet threat model List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 04 Aug 2019 23:00:13 -0000 This is an OpenPGP/MIME signed message (RFC 4880 and 3156) --hX723OqClX7HqeeLkQ4Pv3revZZGs7wLg Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="QLviQ44rhblJmhgrZLfAeu5V6lGsFiTEi"; protected-headers="v1" From: Stephen Farrell To: Bret Jordan Cc: Eric Rescorla , Dominique Lazanski , Watson Ladd , Ted Lemon , model-t@iab.org, Christian Huitema Message-ID: <17d230a0-49ce-079e-a081-f00e66f2f512@cs.tcd.ie> Subject: Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect References: <22633.1564768705@localhost> <5879878A-7CEA-4030-BB72-108CC4122719@gmail.com> <06F0AE14-4413-4022-A804-C1B58E2702CE@fugue.com> <52BAC141-CB25-4072-B556-6325912F1ADD@gmail.com> <9a1555ca-6699-75f1-683e-2a3a2a539a11@cs.tcd.ie> <86157132-D401-4033-A72B-AD4859DB6696@lastpresslabel.com> <5281A343-35C0-4F4D-949D-02C46FA07801@lastpresslabel.com> <86639B71-F616-48CC-96AB-719F7168F087@gmail.com> <1c506954-47ba-dc40-f6e5-c19bd17624c2@cs.tcd.ie> <73B68598-2F9B-44B7-8FA9-D8EE61C88AAD@gmail.com> In-Reply-To: <73B68598-2F9B-44B7-8FA9-D8EE61C88AAD@gmail.com> --QLviQ44rhblJmhgrZLfAeu5V6lGsFiTEi Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="------------C653B77E4FF548762AB79318" Content-Language: en-GB This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------C653B77E4FF548762AB79318 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Hiya, On 04/08/2019 23:38, Bret Jordan wrote: > A few comments inline=E2=80=A6 Sorry, I try not to do that. Why not? It's fine. (And easier to follow in mail I believe.) >>> the larger risk, and larger attack surface. When we design=20 >>> protocols and only consider a small handful of threats, then we=20 >>> inevitably hurt the market. >>=20 >> IMO we ought not only think in terms of "the market" - I'd hope >> rather that everyone sometimes thinks of more than commerce as the >> Internet impacts on people in other ways that are relevant in this >> discussion. >=20 > Sorry bad word choice. =3D~s/market/industry/g; When I refer to =E2=80= =9Cthe > market=E2=80=9D I am not talking about the vendor space, commercial spa= ce, or > the sell stuff over the web space. I am simply referring to the way > end users, organizations, enterprises, and governments need to use > the connectedness of computers and IP address ranges to do what ever > it is they are doing. So I should have said =E2=80=9Cindustry=E2=80=9D = or if you have > a better term, let me know. I suspect this is one where we're better to recognise that nobody's fav term is correct;-) It's entirely legit to consider how security/privacy analyses affect the market, and how they affect society, and how they affect specific communities, and how they affect the set of people who use or care about the Internet. Those are all valid, as would be other sets of interested parties, and I suspect we'd never reach consensus as to the relative importance of each. I think if we each accept that other folks rate those differently for reasons that are possibly as valid as our own, that might be good enough. >>> The more of these things we can document and the more we can >>> bring them to light, the better everything will be in the end. >> Yes, but it's important to document things in a way that can lead >> up to then winnowing things down to something that ends up useful >> to that population of IETFers who are not security or privacy >> specialists. >=20 > Once again, I fully agree. But we need to start somewhere. The > Stanford D-School has a great set of classes on how to effectively > brainstorm. And I think that is what we are trying to do now. We > are trying to get the discussion going and get everything out there, > so we can start to better understand how big the elephant is that we > need to work on The elephant metaphor isn't my favourite. Even if we're each scrambling around in the dark, there might not be exactly one elephant. In this case, I think there definitely is more than one. For example, we have the enterprise n/w vs big-I security differences, and we also have the commercial/govt surveillance vs. human rights/freedom differences. It may be my lack of imagination but I can't see how those are part of one elephant. (And I think that's true regardless of one's opinions as to any of the locally-perceived potential elephant parts:-) Cheers, S. >=20 > Bret >=20 >=20 >>=20 >> Cheers, S. <0x5AB2FAF17B172BEA.asc> >=20 >=20 >=20 --------------C653B77E4FF548762AB79318 Content-Type: application/pgp-keys; name="0x5AB2FAF17B172BEA.asc" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="0x5AB2FAF17B172BEA.asc" -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- mQINBFo9UDIBEADUH4ZPcUnX5WWRWO4kEkHea5Y5eEvZjSwe/YA+G0nrTuOU9nem CP5PMvmh5Cg8gBTyWyN4Z2+O25p9Tja5zUb+vPMWYvOtokRrp46yhFZOmiS5b6kT q0IqYzsEv5HI58S+QtaFq978CRa4xH9Gi9u4yzUmT03QNIGDXE37honcAM4MOEtE gvw4fVhVWJuyy3w//0F2tzKrEMjmL5VGuD/Q9+G/7abuXiYNNd9ZFjv4625AUWwy +pAh4EKzS1FE7BOZp9daMu9MUQmDqtZUbUv0Q+DnQAB/4tNncejJPz0p2z3MWCp5 iSwHiQvytYgatMp34a50l6CWqa13n6vY8VcPlIqOVz+7L+WiVfxLbeVqBwV+4uL9 to9zLF9IyUvl94lCxpscR2kgRgpM6A5LylRDkR6E0oudFnJgb097ZaNyuY1ETghV B5Uir1GCYChs8NUNumTHXiOkuzk+Gs4DAHx/a78YxBolKHi+esLH8r2k4LyM2lp5 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Christian Huitema To: Stephen Farrell References: <5879878A-7CEA-4030-BB72-108CC4122719@gmail.com> <06F0AE14-4413-4022-A804-C1B58E2702CE@fugue.com> <52BAC141-CB25-4072-B556-6325912F1ADD@gmail.com> <9a1555ca-6699-75f1-683e-2a3a2a539a11@cs.tcd.ie> <86157132-D401-4033-A72B-AD4859DB6696@lastpresslabel.com> <5281A343-35C0-4F4D-949D-02C46FA07801@lastpresslabel.com> <86639B71-F616-48CC-96AB-719F7168F087@gmail.com> <1c506954-47ba-dc40-f6e5-c19bd17624c2@cs.tcd.ie> <73B68598-2F9B-44B7-8FA9-D8EE61C88AAD@gmail.com> <17d230a0-49ce-079e-a081-f00e66f2f512@cs.tcd.ie> X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.3445.104.11) Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect X-BeenThere: model-t@iab.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussions of changes in Internet deployment patterns and their impact on the Internet threat model List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 04 Aug 2019 23:25:37 -0000 --Apple-Mail=_235652D4-E897-4BBB-BA03-5BC433728B75 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 This is why I listed four types of attacks and what is at risk with = them. We have to start somewhere. Recopying here: Attack: Active remote attack Exposure: Full compromise of system and data Client Knowledge: Potential indicators may be visible Protection Possibilities: Deploy both client and network level = protections Headwinds: Client based protections are usually inadequate Severity: High Kill-Chain Phase: Lateral Movement=20 Attack: Active in-band attack Exposure; Full compromise of system and data Client Knowledge: Potential indicators may be visible Protection Possibilities: Deploy both client and network level = protections, user awareness training, content and DNS filtering Headwinds: Client based protections are usually inadequate Severity: High Kill-Chain Phase: Delivery and Exploitation=20 Attack: Passive monitoring of traffic Exposure: Information about where traffic is going and potentially = details of the content being shared=20 Client Knowledge: No, it is very hard to detect passive monitoring tools Protection Possibilities: Encrypt traffic=20 Headwinds: Global adoption of better encryption Severity: Low Kill-Chain Phase: Reconnaissance Attack: Active in-band monitoring and tracking=20 Exposure: Information about what the user is doing and where they are = going=20 Client Knowledge: Generally no=20 Protection Possibilities: Client and network level protections Headwinds: Some clients are making it hard to deploy client side = protections=20 Severity: Low Kill-Chain Phase: Reconnaissance Thanks, Bret PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447 F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that = can not be unscrambled is an egg." > On Aug 4, 2019, at 5:00 PM, Stephen Farrell = wrote: >=20 >=20 > Hiya, >=20 > On 04/08/2019 23:38, Bret Jordan wrote: >> A few comments inline=E2=80=A6 Sorry, I try not to do that. >=20 > Why not? It's fine. (And easier to follow in mail I believe.) >=20 >>>> the larger risk, and larger attack surface. When we design=20 >>>> protocols and only consider a small handful of threats, then we=20 >>>> inevitably hurt the market. >>>=20 >>> IMO we ought not only think in terms of "the market" - I'd hope >>> rather that everyone sometimes thinks of more than commerce as the >>> Internet impacts on people in other ways that are relevant in this >>> discussion. >>=20 >> Sorry bad word choice. =3D~s/market/industry/g; When I refer to = =E2=80=9Cthe >> market=E2=80=9D I am not talking about the vendor space, commercial = space, or >> the sell stuff over the web space. I am simply referring to the way >> end users, organizations, enterprises, and governments need to use >> the connectedness of computers and IP address ranges to do what ever >> it is they are doing. So I should have said =E2=80=9Cindustry=E2=80=9D = or if you have >> a better term, let me know. >=20 > I suspect this is one where we're better to recognise that > nobody's fav term is correct;-) It's entirely legit to consider > how security/privacy analyses affect the market, and how they > affect society, and how they affect specific communities, and how > they affect the set of people who use or care about the Internet. > Those are all valid, as would be other sets of interested parties, > and I suspect we'd never reach consensus as to the relative > importance of each. I think if we each accept that other folks > rate those differently for reasons that are possibly as valid as > our own, that might be good enough. >=20 >>>> The more of these things we can document and the more we can >>>> bring them to light, the better everything will be in the end. >>> Yes, but it's important to document things in a way that can lead >>> up to then winnowing things down to something that ends up useful >>> to that population of IETFers who are not security or privacy >>> specialists. >>=20 >> Once again, I fully agree. But we need to start somewhere. The >> Stanford D-School has a great set of classes on how to effectively >> brainstorm. And I think that is what we are trying to do now. We >> are trying to get the discussion going and get everything out there, >> so we can start to better understand how big the elephant is that we >> need to work on >=20 > The elephant metaphor isn't my favourite. Even if we're each > scrambling around in the dark, there might not be exactly one > elephant. In this case, I think there definitely is more than > one. For example, we have the enterprise n/w vs big-I security > differences, and we also have the commercial/govt surveillance > vs. human rights/freedom differences. It may be my lack of > imagination but I can't see how those are part of one elephant. > (And I think that's true regardless of one's opinions as to any > of the locally-perceived potential elephant parts:-) >=20 > Cheers, > S. >=20 >=20 >>=20 >> Bret >>=20 >>=20 >>>=20 >>> Cheers, S. <0x5AB2FAF17B172BEA.asc> >>=20 >>=20 >>=20 > <0x5AB2FAF17B172BEA.asc> --Apple-Mail=_235652D4-E897-4BBB-BA03-5BC433728B75 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 This = is why I listed four types of attacks and what is at risk with them. =  We have to start somewhere.

Recopying here:

Attack: Active remote = attack
Exposure: Full compromise of system and = data
Client Knowledge: Potential indicators may be = visible
Protection Possibilities: Deploy both = client and network level protections
Headwinds: = Client based protections are usually inadequate
Severity: High
Kill-Chain Phase: Lateral = Movement 

Attack: Active in-band attack
Exposure; = Full compromise of system and data
Client = Knowledge: Potential indicators may be visible
Protection Possibilities: Deploy both client and network = level protections, user awareness training, content and DNS = filtering
Headwinds: Client based protections are = usually inadequate
Severity: High
Kill-Chain Phase: Delivery and Exploitation 

Attack: Passive = monitoring of traffic
Exposure: = Information about where traffic is going and potentially details of the = content being shared 
Client Knowledge: No, it = is very hard to detect passive monitoring tools
Protection Possibilities: Encrypt traffic 
Headwinds: Global adoption of better encryption
Severity: Low
Kill-Chain = Phase: Reconnaissance

Attack: Active in-band monitoring and = tracking 
Exposure: = Information about what the user is doing and where they are = going 
Client Knowledge: Generally = no 
Protection Possibilities: Client and = network level protections
Headwinds: Some clients = are making it hard to deploy client side protections 
Severity: Low
Kill-Chain = Phase: Reconnaissance



Thanks,
Bret
PGP = Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 = 0050
"Without = cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that can not = be unscrambled is an = egg."

On Aug 4, 2019, at 5:00 PM, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:


Hiya,

On 04/08/2019 23:38, Bret = Jordan wrote:
A few = comments inline=E2=80=A6 Sorry, I try not to do that.

Why not? It's fine. (And easier = to follow in mail I believe.)

the larger risk, and larger attack surface. =  When we design
protocols and only consider a small = handful of threats, then we
inevitably hurt the = market.

IMO we ought not only = think in terms of "the market" - I'd hope
rather that = everyone sometimes thinks of more than commerce as the
Internet impacts on people in other ways that are relevant in = this
discussion.

Sorry bad word choice.  =3D~s/market/industry/g; =  When I refer to =E2=80=9Cthe
market=E2=80=9D I am = not talking about the vendor space, commercial space, or
the= sell stuff over the web space.  I am simply referring to the = way
end users, organizations, enterprises, and governments = need to use
the connectedness of computers and IP address = ranges to do what ever
it is they are doing. So I should = have said =E2=80=9Cindustry=E2=80=9D or if you have
a = better term, let me know.

I = suspect this is one where we're better to recognise that
nobody's fav term is correct;-) It's entirely legit to = consider
how security/privacy analyses affect the market, = and how they
affect society, and how they affect specific = communities, and how
they affect the set of people who use = or care about the Internet.
Those are all valid, as would = be other sets of interested parties,
and I suspect we'd = never reach consensus as to the relative
importance of = each. I think if we each accept that other folks
rate = those differently for reasons that are possibly as valid as
our own, that might be good enough.

The more of these things = we can document and the more we can
bring them to light, = the better everything will be in the end.
Yes, = but it's important to document things in a way that can lead
up to then winnowing things down to something that ends up = useful
to that population of IETFers who are not security = or privacy
specialists.

Once again, I fully agree.  But we need to start = somewhere.  The
Stanford D-School has a great set of = classes on how to effectively
brainstorm.  And I = think that is what we are trying to do now.  We
are = trying to get the discussion going and get everything out there,
so we can start to better understand how big the elephant is = that we
need to work on

The elephant metaphor isn't my favourite. Even if we're = each
scrambling around in the dark, there might not be = exactly one
elephant. In this case, I think there = definitely is more than
one. For example, we have the = enterprise n/w vs big-I security
differences, and we also = have the commercial/govt surveillance
vs. human = rights/freedom differences. It may be my lack of
imagination= but I can't see how those are part of one elephant.
(And = I think that's true regardless of one's opinions as to any
of the locally-perceived potential elephant parts:-)

Cheers,
S.



Bret



Cheers, S. = <0x5AB2FAF17B172BEA.asc>



<0x5AB2FAF17B172BEA.asc= >

= --Apple-Mail=_235652D4-E897-4BBB-BA03-5BC433728B75-- From nobody Sun Aug 4 16:31:35 2019 Return-Path: X-Original-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id ADB77120125 for ; Sun, 4 Aug 2019 16:31:33 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -4.3 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.3 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=cs.tcd.ie Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id lB6RWN2u0BNR for ; Sun, 4 Aug 2019 16:31:31 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mercury.scss.tcd.ie (mercury.scss.tcd.ie [134.226.56.6]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6174A120120 for ; Sun, 4 Aug 2019 16:31:30 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mercury.scss.tcd.ie (Postfix) with ESMTP id 02473BE2F; Mon, 5 Aug 2019 00:31:29 +0100 (IST) X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at scss.tcd.ie Received: from mercury.scss.tcd.ie ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mercury.scss.tcd.ie [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id ft_3Tx563aIG; Mon, 5 Aug 2019 00:31:27 +0100 (IST) Received: from [10.244.2.138] (95-45-153-252-dynamic.agg2.phb.bdt-fng.eircom.net [95.45.153.252]) by mercury.scss.tcd.ie (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 0AD7ABE2C; Mon, 5 Aug 2019 00:31:27 +0100 (IST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=cs.tcd.ie; s=mail; t=1564961487; bh=uSSCzDTn1ThQ1ozeTk2L6XWeR94h6qP7L+y7RuTMtoc=; h=Subject:To:Cc:References:From:Date:In-Reply-To:From; b=RYff2fs7k5QRdp59WWKlZt/k2pHdEXeXtpnPtvYKCLN1MWKxk6g7ccpqe5sdPJbZA md2hDL1kshsuFZ6LZBGTKmjbbl0xqJfW9eGZx5/mH5Ly47LmOlP7X03ONX85qAFUlK bRUBQLyw/54+qSxD5SCEouxJatTswid5jl3UwRK0= To: Bret Jordan Cc: Eric Rescorla , Dominique Lazanski , Watson Ladd , Ted Lemon , model-t@iab.org, Christian Huitema References: <06F0AE14-4413-4022-A804-C1B58E2702CE@fugue.com> <52BAC141-CB25-4072-B556-6325912F1ADD@gmail.com> <9a1555ca-6699-75f1-683e-2a3a2a539a11@cs.tcd.ie> <86157132-D401-4033-A72B-AD4859DB6696@lastpresslabel.com> <5281A343-35C0-4F4D-949D-02C46FA07801@lastpresslabel.com> <86639B71-F616-48CC-96AB-719F7168F087@gmail.com> <1c506954-47ba-dc40-f6e5-c19bd17624c2@cs.tcd.ie> <73B68598-2F9B-44B7-8FA9-D8EE61C88AAD@gmail.com> <17d230a0-49ce-079e-a081-f00e66f2f512@cs.tcd.ie> From: Stephen Farrell Openpgp: id=5BB5A6EA5765D2C5863CAE275AB2FAF17B172BEA; 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Linux x86_64; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/60.8.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha512; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="mLfysHQK3NxeAyQhuO8TrRxf1FZyKJL0w" Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect X-BeenThere: model-t@iab.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussions of changes in Internet deployment patterns and their impact on the Internet threat model List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 04 Aug 2019 23:31:34 -0000 This is an OpenPGP/MIME signed message (RFC 4880 and 3156) --mLfysHQK3NxeAyQhuO8TrRxf1FZyKJL0w Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="kR48YlH8c3qqeXQZlkfIfgq9yMKtm5jpo"; protected-headers="v1" From: Stephen Farrell To: Bret Jordan Cc: Eric Rescorla , Dominique Lazanski , Watson Ladd , Ted Lemon , model-t@iab.org, Christian Huitema Message-ID: <4144357d-2ab0-af53-caeb-38017ecde418@cs.tcd.ie> Subject: Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect References: <5879878A-7CEA-4030-BB72-108CC4122719@gmail.com> <06F0AE14-4413-4022-A804-C1B58E2702CE@fugue.com> <52BAC141-CB25-4072-B556-6325912F1ADD@gmail.com> <9a1555ca-6699-75f1-683e-2a3a2a539a11@cs.tcd.ie> <86157132-D401-4033-A72B-AD4859DB6696@lastpresslabel.com> <5281A343-35C0-4F4D-949D-02C46FA07801@lastpresslabel.com> <86639B71-F616-48CC-96AB-719F7168F087@gmail.com> <1c506954-47ba-dc40-f6e5-c19bd17624c2@cs.tcd.ie> <73B68598-2F9B-44B7-8FA9-D8EE61C88AAD@gmail.com> <17d230a0-49ce-079e-a081-f00e66f2f512@cs.tcd.ie> In-Reply-To: --kR48YlH8c3qqeXQZlkfIfgq9yMKtm5jpo Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="------------69E8CFC1224256D9CA0EB55D" Content-Language: en-GB This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------69E8CFC1224256D9CA0EB55D Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Hiya, On 05/08/2019 00:25, Bret Jordan wrote: > This is why I listed four types of attacks and what is at risk with > them. =20 I gotta admit I do not get your argument there. It could be one of many. Maybe if you could be patient and spell it out =2E.. TIA, S. > We have to start somewhere.> > Recopying here: >=20 > Attack: Active remote attack Exposure: Full compromise of system and > data Client Knowledge: Potential indicators may be visible Protection > Possibilities: Deploy both client and network level protections=20 > Headwinds: Client based protections are usually inadequate Severity: > High Kill-Chain Phase: Lateral Movement >=20 > Attack: Active in-band attack Exposure; Full compromise of system and > data Client Knowledge: Potential indicators may be visible Protection > Possibilities: Deploy both client and network level protections, user > awareness training, content and DNS filtering Headwinds: Client based > protections are usually inadequate Severity: High Kill-Chain Phase: > Delivery and Exploitation >=20 > Attack: Passive monitoring of traffic Exposure: Information about > where traffic is going and potentially details of the content being > shared Client Knowledge: No, it is very hard to detect passive > monitoring tools Protection Possibilities: Encrypt traffic Headwinds: > Global adoption of better encryption Severity: Low Kill-Chain Phase: > Reconnaissance >=20 > Attack: Active in-band monitoring and tracking Exposure: Information > about what the user is doing and where they are going Client > Knowledge: Generally no Protection Possibilities: Client and network > level protections Headwinds: Some clients are making it hard to > deploy client side protections Severity: Low Kill-Chain Phase: > Reconnaissance >=20 >=20 >=20 > Thanks, Bret PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447 F2C0 74F8 > ACAE 7415 0050 "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, > the only thing that can not be unscrambled is an egg." >=20 >> On Aug 4, 2019, at 5:00 PM, Stephen Farrell >> wrote: >>=20 >>=20 >> Hiya, >>=20 >> On 04/08/2019 23:38, Bret Jordan wrote: >>> A few comments inline=E2=80=A6 Sorry, I try not to do that. >>=20 >> Why not? It's fine. (And easier to follow in mail I believe.) >>=20 >>>>> the larger risk, and larger attack surface. When we design=20 >>>>> protocols and only consider a small handful of threats, then >>>>> we inevitably hurt the market. >>>>=20 >>>> IMO we ought not only think in terms of "the market" - I'd >>>> hope rather that everyone sometimes thinks of more than >>>> commerce as the Internet impacts on people in other ways that >>>> are relevant in this discussion. >>>=20 >>> Sorry bad word choice. =3D~s/market/industry/g; When I refer to >>> =E2=80=9Cthe market=E2=80=9D I am not talking about the vendor space,= commercial >>> space, or the sell stuff over the web space. I am simply >>> referring to the way end users, organizations, enterprises, and >>> governments need to use the connectedness of computers and IP >>> address ranges to do what ever it is they are doing. So I should >>> have said =E2=80=9Cindustry=E2=80=9D or if you have a better term, le= t me know. >>=20 >> I suspect this is one where we're better to recognise that nobody's >> fav term is correct;-) It's entirely legit to consider how >> security/privacy analyses affect the market, and how they affect >> society, and how they affect specific communities, and how they >> affect the set of people who use or care about the Internet. Those >> are all valid, as would be other sets of interested parties, and I >> suspect we'd never reach consensus as to the relative importance of >> each. I think if we each accept that other folks rate those >> differently for reasons that are possibly as valid as our own, that >> might be good enough. >>=20 >>>>> The more of these things we can document and the more we can=20 >>>>> bring them to light, the better everything will be in the >>>>> end. >>>> Yes, but it's important to document things in a way that can >>>> lead up to then winnowing things down to something that ends up >>>> useful to that population of IETFers who are not security or >>>> privacy specialists. >>>=20 >>> Once again, I fully agree. But we need to start somewhere. The=20 >>> Stanford D-School has a great set of classes on how to >>> effectively brainstorm. And I think that is what we are trying >>> to do now. We are trying to get the discussion going and get >>> everything out there, so we can start to better understand how >>> big the elephant is that we need to work on >>=20 >> The elephant metaphor isn't my favourite. Even if we're each=20 >> scrambling around in the dark, there might not be exactly one=20 >> elephant. In this case, I think there definitely is more than one. >> For example, we have the enterprise n/w vs big-I security=20 >> differences, and we also have the commercial/govt surveillance vs. >> human rights/freedom differences. It may be my lack of imagination >> but I can't see how those are part of one elephant. (And I think >> that's true regardless of one's opinions as to any of the >> locally-perceived potential elephant parts:-) >>=20 >> Cheers, S. >>=20 >>=20 >>>=20 >>> Bret >>>=20 >>>=20 >>>>=20 >>>> Cheers, S. <0x5AB2FAF17B172BEA.asc> >>>=20 >>>=20 >>>=20 >> <0x5AB2FAF17B172BEA.asc> >=20 >=20 >=20 --------------69E8CFC1224256D9CA0EB55D Content-Type: application/pgp-keys; name="0x5AB2FAF17B172BEA.asc" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="0x5AB2FAF17B172BEA.asc" -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- mQINBFo9UDIBEADUH4ZPcUnX5WWRWO4kEkHea5Y5eEvZjSwe/YA+G0nrTuOU9nem CP5PMvmh5Cg8gBTyWyN4Z2+O25p9Tja5zUb+vPMWYvOtokRrp46yhFZOmiS5b6kT q0IqYzsEv5HI58S+QtaFq978CRa4xH9Gi9u4yzUmT03QNIGDXE37honcAM4MOEtE gvw4fVhVWJuyy3w//0F2tzKrEMjmL5VGuD/Q9+G/7abuXiYNNd9ZFjv4625AUWwy +pAh4EKzS1FE7BOZp9daMu9MUQmDqtZUbUv0Q+DnQAB/4tNncejJPz0p2z3MWCp5 iSwHiQvytYgatMp34a50l6CWqa13n6vY8VcPlIqOVz+7L+WiVfxLbeVqBwV+4uL9 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from xsmtp21.mail2web.com (unknown [10.100.68.60]) by xse.mail2web.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4626Nj6WZVz2h3y for ; Sun, 4 Aug 2019 22:52:21 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [10.5.2.17] (helo=xmail07.myhosting.com) by xsmtp21.mail2web.com with esmtps (TLS1.0:DHE_RSA_AES_256_CBC_SHA1:256) (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1huVuv-0004GA-Pl for model-t@iab.org; Sun, 04 Aug 2019 22:52:21 -0700 Received: (qmail 28546 invoked from network); 5 Aug 2019 05:52:21 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO [192.168.1.103]) (Authenticated-user:_huitema@huitema.net@[172.58.46.251]) (envelope-sender ) by xmail07.myhosting.com (qmail-ldap-1.03) with ESMTPA for ; 5 Aug 2019 05:52:21 -0000 To: Eric Rescorla , Dominique Lazanski Cc: Bret Jordan , model-t@iab.org References: <29756028-95f1-e6e5-b3ea-562cbc635df0@sandelman.ca> <5ef15ad2-5b20-e871-0d01-17cf906051c1@cs.tcd.ie> <22633.1564768705@localhost> <5879878A-7CEA-4030-BB72-108CC4122719@gmail.com> <06F0AE14-4413-4022-A804-C1B58E2702CE@fugue.com> 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accept X-Filter-ID: Mvzo4OR0dZXEDF/gcnlw0QR3kh8pms4IGrDTloUGIkypSDasLI4SayDByyq9LIhVUZbR67CQ7/vm /hHDJU4RXkTNWdUk1Ol2OGx3IfrIJKywOmJyM1qr8uRnWBrbSAGDXz6Yli32IJdAuJ3ivsC2SsRX qYbtEQV1z/L435ZRxFQCa0LOvdOFtO2Z/KHFaYV++rYZvu7UEJiU3s27VgKHO7lwS3dBJTnTxDoD vBGGxpgwWbxrOZCJSMpTl/yE2fo2JEfuJ9gSFfTKKwEFu+5zXgZ6weYgSzquK2hxskqXvy8woCTx LKweTbuJ+19zsyHVGVmhMAaQ/AfCRwRe7yHm5oY+NYmsSGn+svMubxnbgm1cr18FZBEPC2/c16Xd 7sC9aC4xteE1WLqGS9YoqrsZ2DyteN0e+ECCv9/f+GPymkgDVo7QBKA4MctKq4ifYPcXFRL2K3LA EfDXVOdt7wDbuhdxf5Dwg9wMBX5ckCo48ayVGvgdM/14NhEhsQ0jllqEE9ykbJ7I9co1MAEE3ruN Xsm8UJsAPvDcVSKtDCYkioPY5Qx4fJOk03R5fJtf/Dv/dkIzS7m4GUpXCY1Y3j3ilf/1/CIOWq29 UgEgDh1b6yeWVWdV2W7hq7U7UWTh8BhYKFm0DUyZgqQosPMTO+6tlmd/2OQ9AkFsCsUY9+pkOFsM 7OYFXYdC3tRq275m/U3VdWUm2m6mst+P8CxH8HAlP7dCp3Zd9clP8wSiJZWbJCj+xRrjVmRxpGtS cvUmgj1Lr01izUyD8wjVNGx1nPmAyl2jZAOanSBpz6Rja2u/0jIF0vKKEbSiCs8bR9dBdwfMGKWH 9GPtOJAg3m9xzvVGh/ysta6u1iHEyuS7GD1uvcoc+Nxrih3bPtw6kmziz7oqJOYIJd4MvQ0Nf4Ec bvHO1diDanHV9KirFAIIecsyj+YNTo81GR+jDXFsz/ZQnbbTizvwlZsrbltGiZoUh+c+5pFVgpT1 b21uZVckGp0ccOa2XhkGbmsUNPNkere1WheNsVXmhO8BzADiszcWR9bz/SDtF09JpSbuuCeiIDK0 C/0= X-Report-Abuse-To: spam@quarantine9.antispamcloud.com Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect X-BeenThere: model-t@iab.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussions of changes in Internet deployment patterns and their impact on the Internet threat model List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 05 Aug 2019 05:52:32 -0000 This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------45800DA9E1445904AA33E28E Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On 8/4/2019 2:09 AM, Eric Rescorla wrote: > On Sun, Aug 4, 2019 at 12:14 AM Dominique Lazanski > > wrote: > > > > On 4 Aug 2019, at 06:08, Eric Rescorla > wrote: > >> his seems like a reasonable problem statement for the overall >> problem of computer security, but not really for IETF. >> > > But computer security is Internet security. It is rare that > =E2=80=98things=E2=80=99 are not connected to the Internet =C2=A0(w= ith the exception of > intranets however the same type of devices are connected to both).=C2= =A0 > > If some attacks are initiated at the pint of =E2=80=98things=E2=80=99= in order to > compromise the Internet I don=E2=80=99t see why this shouldn=E2=80=99= t be in scope? > > > Well, I didn't say anything about "things" one way or the other. > > However, my point is that while compromise of endpoints necessarily > negatively affects the Internet, actually protecting those endpoints > against compromise is outside the scope of the IETF. That's not to say > it's not important, it's just not IETF work. To provide two examples > perhaps closer to home: > > - Even though compromise of the Web is bad for the Internet, the IETF > has largely punted the security of the Web itself to W3C and WHATWG. > - Compromise of the WebPKI would obviously be very bad for many > protocols the IETF has designed, but the management of the WebPKI is > done by CABF, not IETF. In my previous job, we were routinely doing lots of threat modelling. (I you think of smart-ass comments about target rich environments you should rather consider the rich target that we have in front of us.) The main lesson is that you should be organized, and not just rush to listing a bunch of attacks. The steps we pretty much agreed on were relatively simple: 1) List the assets that you do want to protect. 2) Get an architecture diagram of the system, and from that look at the interfaces that could be used for attacks 3) Brainstorm a list of the attacks you can think of on these interfaces 4) Check whether these attacks can be reasonably mitigated, and if they cannot think harder. Or at least document known vulnerabilities. Eric, I get your point about the limited scope of the IETF. There are obviously attacks that are out of scope for us, such as identifying users by the radio signatures of their mobile devices or creatively using JavaScript in a web page for fun and profit. The IEEE or the 3GPP might do something on the first one, the W3C may do something about the other, and still other organizations may address other problems. But it does not follow that we should not start by listing the assets that we want to protect. For example, mobile user location privacy or generally Internet user privacy are assets in our model, even if we cannot possibly be the sole keepers of the fortress. So we need pruning at some point. But I think that pruning should come at the second stage: identify the interfaces through which the assets can be attacked. In my example, we should not consider the radio level interface or even the JavaScript API as interfaces that we worry about. With one caveat, though. We know by experience that clients, servers and routers can be pwned. This is an avenue of attack against other Internet access, as shown in recent attacks that use penetration of a DNS provider server to attack clients of that server. We may want to look at these kind of "network based dependencies" when we enumerate the interfac= es. -- Christian Huitema --------------45800DA9E1445904AA33E28E Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

On 8/4/2019 2:09 AM, Eric Rescorla wrote:

On Sun, Aug 4, 2019 at 12:14 AM Dominique Lazanski <dml@lastpresslabel.com> wrote:


On 4 Aug 2019, at 06:08, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:

his seems like a reasonable problem statement for the overall problem of computer security, but not really for IETF.


But computer security is Internet security. It is rare that ‘things’ are not connected to the Internet  (with the exception of intranets however the same type of devices are connected to both). 

If some attacks are initiated at the pint of ‘things’ in order to compromise the Internet I don’t see why this shouldn’t be in scope?

Well, I didn't say anything about "things" one way or the other.

However, my point is that while compromise of endpoints necessarily negatively affects the Internet, actually protecting those endpoints against compromise is outside the scope of the IETF. That's not to say it's not important, it's just not IETF work. To provide two examples perhaps closer to home:

- Even though compromise of the Web is bad for the Internet, the IETF has largely punted the security of the Web itself to W3C and WHATWG.
- Compromise of the WebPKI would obviously be very bad for many protocols the IETF has designed, but the management of the WebPKI is done by CABF, not IETF.

In my previous job, we were routinely doing lots of threat modelling. (I you think of smart-ass comments about target rich environments you should rather consider the rich target that we have in front of us.) The main lesson is that you should be organized, and not just rush to listing a bunch of attacks. The steps we pretty much agreed on were relatively simple:

1) List the assets that you do want to protect.

2) Get an architecture diagram of the system, and from that look at the interfaces that could be used for attacks

3) Brainstorm a list of the attacks you can think of on these interfaces

4) Check whether these attacks can be reasonably mitigated, and if they cannot think harder. Or at least document known vulnerabilities.

Eric, I get your point about the limited scope of the IETF. There are obviously attacks that are out of scope for us, such as identifying users by the radio signatures of their mobile devices or creatively using JavaScript in a web page for fun and profit. The IEEE or the 3GPP might do something on the first one, the W3C may do something about the other, and still other organizations may address other problems. But it does not follow that we should not start by listing the assets that we want to protect. For example, mobile user location privacy or generally Internet user privacy are assets in our model, even if we cannot possibly be the sole keepers of the fortress.

So we need pruning at some point. But I think that pruning should come at the second stage: identify the interfaces through which the assets can be attacked. In my example, we should not consider the radio level interface or even the JavaScript API as interfaces that we worry about. With one caveat, though. We know by experience that clients, servers and routers can be pwned. This is an avenue of attack against other Internet access, as shown in recent attacks that use penetration of a DNS provider server to attack clients of that server. We may want to look at these kind of "network based dependencies" when we enumerate the interfaces.

-- Christian Huitema






--------------45800DA9E1445904AA33E28E-- From nobody Mon Aug 5 06:50:48 2019 Return-Path: X-Original-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6AE421201EC for ; Mon, 5 Aug 2019 06:50:45 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.9 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.9 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=fugue-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id nqEQYrfw73Aw for ; Mon, 5 Aug 2019 06:50:42 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail-pf1-x441.google.com (mail-pf1-x441.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::441]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BC489120228 for ; Mon, 5 Aug 2019 06:50:40 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-pf1-x441.google.com with SMTP id p184so39683379pfp.7 for ; Mon, 05 Aug 2019 06:50:40 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=fugue-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com; s=20150623; h=mime-version:subject:from:in-reply-to:date:cc :content-transfer-encoding:message-id:references:to; bh=yfpywPsNcQbOt6qtGAmXWkT2qYPWL+DsP9enEkOEXYY=; b=wmyHcNwsTK/Dp6h8EnYnJPRqJ2l2F1EC2B9Nl3unbcZst9IrAB1Ks4u9fATvLMZIS0 cGRIiKlPFhYLw2kMzfQ/LMNixsahF7ETeQpipZmSWg/J//fUijnq/DOL9OJsEECq5fqh T4Wi7em2SyHqApXTujBYzEFiHq003qNoyUIlhuA3bNnAvXM43URF39+eS/eTy2CYRGfb qyHQHP2kbyD3BA7vOy/3mCnO63hqnBULljUG/JSiO6TmZaCd/UmH6CMu12CEJCey7eaI yfuOdG2zoxcKlRGIXob0KmOwEZ9q5ZZyNbaCPki9adTshP95Rg6ZBMG3C7L/f4Rzu4tr 2Mlw== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:subject:from:in-reply-to:date:cc :content-transfer-encoding:message-id:references:to; bh=yfpywPsNcQbOt6qtGAmXWkT2qYPWL+DsP9enEkOEXYY=; b=dJ68jiDGyLWLd1RrrAYrq6sLPCRgb24gvtuZlwIlVH4wPauroyrOPZgsIpiO7BNtfU j1IrAl6KbhP7L3uxVBpoJX2IM0Gl7ssuEQg0tfV2EBJ9F4942jMRpbdHKctnRVuZ7oaE rbqSsOn3NexmRHWtlOiV8VEL3V/bLl9RPkHQ4alk0nHAV5w2SDN+DNz03/nFOJKHSNOE uMExj06xNwL+tRqAAerJ2J2Z5Kqe8vCBvqRbwHwQahdy+BIrfYOywUAdLLBkZS/npgVa TW9IzxBreXKOsX+eKbltWCwtX0W8tGAdEOtJ9uoDShY9QNdBxJby+O++jfqdqgIIE7zu 9sBw== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAVrZ5IYyUyhKuJcqoNt8EgHIFoxVUrlmn1B7FrPuWWL1X5rWOs1 xfEZar0v/xyBrbTCTZNdphHFtxXaVUU6kg== X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqzlFWi6+1yraGiMRmqPhboHbJ5pYbo5LUeq9Eh+R4r3heTL+UT3InwOLHWrr4uJaDXzEdql7g== X-Received: by 2002:a63:2807:: with SMTP id o7mr107800957pgo.131.1565013040107; Mon, 05 Aug 2019 06:50:40 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [10.20.10.78] ([12.217.162.130]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id l44sm15245472pje.29.2019.08.05.06.50.39 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Mon, 05 Aug 2019 06:50:39 -0700 (PDT) Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 12.4 \(3445.104.11\)) From: Ted Lemon In-Reply-To: Date: Mon, 5 Aug 2019 06:50:38 -0700 Cc: Eric Rescorla , Dominique Lazanski , Bret Jordan , model-t@iab.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Message-Id: References: <29756028-95f1-e6e5-b3ea-562cbc635df0@sandelman.ca> <5ef15ad2-5b20-e871-0d01-17cf906051c1@cs.tcd.ie> <22633.1564768705@localhost> <5879878A-7CEA-4030-BB72-108CC4122719@gmail.com> <06F0AE14-4413-4022-A804-C1B58E2702CE@fugue.com> <52BAC141-CB25-4072-B556-6325912F1ADD@gmail.com> <9a1555ca-6699-75f1-683e-2a3a2a539a11@cs.tcd.ie> <86157132-D401-4033-A72B-AD4859DB6696@lastpresslabel.com> To: Christian Huitema X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.3445.104.11) Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect X-BeenThere: model-t@iab.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussions of changes in Internet deployment patterns and their impact on the Internet threat model List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 05 Aug 2019 13:50:46 -0000 I think this is a great approach, Christian. If we follow your model = we should be able to start from what we know and avoid boiling the = ocean, without inappropriately skipping some modeling that we actually = need to do because it borders on our space, even though it is not itself = our space. There are a few other things I think we should do. First, you may have noticed that I don=E2=80=99t actually show a clear = understanding of what the goals of this effort are in my comments. = This is because I=E2=80=99m a security area consumer more than a = security area producer, so I wasn=E2=80=99t in the saag meeting. I saw = Stephen=E2=80=99s mail go by about =E2=80=9Csecurity models=E2=80=9D and = thought to myself =E2=80=9Cexcellent, we need that.=E2=80=9D That=E2=80=99= s literally all I know about what the plan is for this discussion. It = would be good to actually write down what our goals are. Second, I don=E2=80=99t think we all agree on how we want to describe = threat models. If there is to be an abbreviated form for describing = threats (as opposed to natural English) we need to document what that = form is in sufficient detail that IETF participants who are not SMEs can = understand it, and hopefully even contribute. I=E2=80=99m not saying = we have to write an RFC, but at a minimum there should be a wiki that = has the needed information. I also don=E2=80=99t think we even agree on what we mean by threat = models. Of course we mean models of threats, but at what level of = detail? How close to the code are these models? How general, or how = specific? This may all be obvious to people on this list who are SMEs, = but I=E2=80=99m not, so for me it would help to describe what we mean by = =E2=80=9Cthreat model,=E2=80=9D not because anybody here is unclear on = the basic concept, but because I suspect we don=E2=80=99t agree on the = particulars. As an example, the models that Bret has described don=E2=80=99t seem as = if they would be helpful to me. This doesn=E2=80=99t mean that they = aren=E2=80=99t right=E2=80=94it either means that I don=E2=80=99t = understand them clearly, or that we simply have different requirements. = It may be that what I want is not what should be produced here=E2=80=94I=E2= =80=99m not claiming otherwise. But it would be good to get some = clarity on that. From nobody Mon Aug 5 06:58:47 2019 Return-Path: X-Original-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 95CF412022A for ; Mon, 5 Aug 2019 06:58:45 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.997 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.997 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id mwFmKARb6tB5 for ; Mon, 5 Aug 2019 06:58:43 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail-pf1-x42b.google.com (mail-pf1-x42b.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::42b]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 338CC120225 for ; Mon, 5 Aug 2019 06:58:43 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-pf1-x42b.google.com with SMTP id i189so39700594pfg.10 for ; Mon, 05 Aug 2019 06:58:43 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=from:mime-version:subject:date:references:to:in-reply-to:message-id; bh=e+GUthlj3Ct52u1+uFCcazz967y2HahHX+fPQ7S7g+s=; b=BdHqR6TVqbe6cpOojRxUL0ki5Dm30uxoLelpjKfiJqjbcJ+HF4ZshdqtLz1kjfHJs+ hbNIFzrkJ4Mg7qVfePtaadnwW5rmC1QdNj8cTzaCGsyHKYVviRt1D8VDAY3OFj5YdOML l7sJ5C5b/86XbGVXPHxsc7O2IwAA5VRhcFXTImWP2HPyU9vcGsYK1JtBmrXR30mm38Hy vju0CtfESutfleJjW8zlQVDJvTnvga/gSTzKvZih8j4ldKPhhYUT41+Kc/+Oh7qgtZFA 9Fi5BnF+yA4quiT1eg1c19acRQO+IhjZEIac/9Cr2/sV+YUtKeawyBWEWjy6QLZA9Blv B1Ag== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:from:mime-version:subject:date:references:to :in-reply-to:message-id; bh=e+GUthlj3Ct52u1+uFCcazz967y2HahHX+fPQ7S7g+s=; b=Bu408kbLyALzRcGO5xeiVdg7BRIILc6Zij30hngYZxCGfEDfQeV7PMzOOH535I3N95 Aq1qQUdqEoC/0xYr3mHCn6GEGmd0HqjltU321eaWRcVcV9RKHqKNgyukUjzNrwWHTEEQ hlol+zr2PugApn/nczxxCiUkv60DCYgdrR+RK0R+qjQzJEJ0vdFD14Cvwy7aNwpGFYmp ahOWzg+RSHmKiDw9DR1cBOzLTPUPOsPCrn44vfcSRPzrzIabX/Qqo3Or7AIVbPEnsJAg h+B0Vw16cplrDWkNqkb69NviXy1UUE2ifAlacxRImM3soaupGZ6NKPjCki77/YZjxP5T 6WAg== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAU2d2BkIDTPyUVYpQ11n59SsK8Xt6ppL7Vfrj0DtR9UJNhFtzSP tIi6VZ40bzozDpGFnkuqYROnIta1 X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqy4xlsUnspJzOKvvKE1AUcTH8fjtXddH6sDpavYGerwD+6fDixKI/ky0FnsibkxBxmQeQGmKA== X-Received: by 2002:a63:f357:: with SMTP id t23mr29115103pgj.421.1565013521804; Mon, 05 Aug 2019 06:58:41 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [10.128.64.149] ([136.60.227.81]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id e6sm97746431pfn.71.2019.08.05.06.58.40 for (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Mon, 05 Aug 2019 06:58:41 -0700 (PDT) From: Bret Jordan Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="Apple-Mail=_BD012693-0BA7-4BAB-AA06-C61B2F3E65A3" Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 12.4 \(3445.104.11\)) Date: Mon, 5 Aug 2019 07:58:39 -0600 References: <29756028-95f1-e6e5-b3ea-562cbc635df0@sandelman.ca> <5ef15ad2-5b20-e871-0d01-17cf906051c1@cs.tcd.ie> <22633.1564768705@localhost> <5879878A-7CEA-4030-BB72-108CC4122719@gmail.com> <06F0AE14-4413-4022-A804-C1B58E2702CE@fugue.com> <52BAC141-CB25-4072-B556-6325912F1ADD@gmail.com> <9a1555ca-6699-75f1-683e-2a3a2a539a11@cs.tcd.ie> <86157132-D401-4033-A72B-AD4859DB6696@lastpresslabel.com> To: model-t@iab.org In-Reply-To: Message-Id: <6300FA8C-F4BC-468E-B81E-36D281229C1E@gmail.com> X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.3445.104.11) Archived-At: Subject: [Model-t] Primer X-BeenThere: model-t@iab.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussions of changes in Internet deployment patterns and their impact on the Internet threat model List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 05 Aug 2019 13:58:46 -0000 --Apple-Mail=_BD012693-0BA7-4BAB-AA06-C61B2F3E65A3 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Here is an I-D that some might find helpful as we talk about this = problem and how we best solve it. = https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-taddei-smart-cless-introduction-00 = =20 Thanks, Bret PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447 F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that = can not be unscrambled is an egg." --Apple-Mail=_BD012693-0BA7-4BAB-AA06-C61B2F3E65A3 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/html; charset=us-ascii Here = is an I-D that some might find helpful as we talk about this problem and = how we best solve it.  https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-taddei-smart-cless-introducti= on-00

 
Thanks,
Bret
PGP = Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 = 0050
"Without = cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that can not = be unscrambled is an = egg."

= --Apple-Mail=_BD012693-0BA7-4BAB-AA06-C61B2F3E65A3-- From nobody Mon Aug 5 07:07:52 2019 Return-Path: X-Original-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id EC4D71201EC for ; Mon, 5 Aug 2019 07:07:50 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.997 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.997 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id iMkIJQLajPDL for ; Mon, 5 Aug 2019 07:07:49 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail-pl1-x636.google.com (mail-pl1-x636.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::636]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 358CA12018A for ; Mon, 5 Aug 2019 07:07:49 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-pl1-x636.google.com with SMTP id y8so36539688plr.12 for ; Mon, 05 Aug 2019 07:07:49 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=from:message-id:mime-version:subject:date:in-reply-to:cc:to :references; bh=imoYpn+ZiEGfOLUX1BYhU4lxWPPelLuc6+yk5gjzgZ4=; b=M8IH1WI7oKvjdmstwLNXJFH2KblilKmknxhlDRhfcGie1Qax3EjeoeGZv1qvfkSYIT 6Ewqx+x25BzaPj13xsiE7VN75eBvVpKO1wPTf31zIe9bguk2HlZwzZEJkl/U1QQP24lr j9V26os+tAOyRNAlGQMxT4XJohzmTanpKA/RdkIMwYOp6tzdh2uoQk886kLtTp/664+A IvxiXZTGfLErRrs9P4JDk3C9cqLRCEqYcCAM5QsU2yhb+wksxqYSuuUmzWdL5hRu+LTA fOod5oQX8AbVi+khQIycEaEbyIyfmlj/dj2I37ieGpVlUN2T6Dw/dwNX9uEYIvYKMu6M IrMQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:from:message-id:mime-version:subject:date :in-reply-to:cc:to:references; bh=imoYpn+ZiEGfOLUX1BYhU4lxWPPelLuc6+yk5gjzgZ4=; b=fw/CJrHHJ4gwjQW8W67ISYRNayugdvDOvEAFWtGghSyuV12FJsXvbBFz1XrdCMZZcd T3GAdDTgj+Kftxy2cEH4BhL01PWyIKYN25seSm7ygm1OkmQC/bUnvNpsQj/x4RpXBmsy 03Ur/9qoHCeJir4+Yu0HLUgwEw97cD59Q93SQoTbm/H10+0AIwtFNnTQSYHCI2BE7FB7 vFbaC4oFX6VZ6h3NdGkONxrR8e7nkmTUBFERUHi3sRG1nlYjkBM3zZAsyKhQf6adsUdS +mRzp7MdNZG15kB9jrpw0xF+XvDCgVVltx/VGEHNsUOoG0/Vp/TOka4snWdJKC6qDXmE zN0A== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAUrhgBP8D6M9W6p1uMQgoZtGAuBQ31xBOJTRpRaU1nEoYUI/iOz lzJivUkXc740RGNX3FFX9oU= X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqyJIaUd9uwQ1dp46m65Xl1Q03eoJ7v51+0PrhTJM7ZtUQNL8ghZf1ginLi/a2WS+PQGMykyCg== X-Received: by 2002:a17:902:20b:: with SMTP id 11mr146517352plc.78.1565014068767; Mon, 05 Aug 2019 07:07:48 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [10.128.64.149] ([136.60.227.81]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id l26sm96944402pgb.90.2019.08.05.07.07.47 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Mon, 05 Aug 2019 07:07:48 -0700 (PDT) From: Bret Jordan Message-Id: Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="Apple-Mail=_448F04D9-ACEF-4A2A-86AE-10E6EBA1B813" Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 12.4 \(3445.104.11\)) Date: Mon, 5 Aug 2019 08:07:46 -0600 In-Reply-To: Cc: Christian Huitema , Eric Rescorla , Dominique Lazanski , model-t@iab.org To: Ted Lemon References: <29756028-95f1-e6e5-b3ea-562cbc635df0@sandelman.ca> <5ef15ad2-5b20-e871-0d01-17cf906051c1@cs.tcd.ie> <22633.1564768705@localhost> <5879878A-7CEA-4030-BB72-108CC4122719@gmail.com> <06F0AE14-4413-4022-A804-C1B58E2702CE@fugue.com> <52BAC141-CB25-4072-B556-6325912F1ADD@gmail.com> <9a1555ca-6699-75f1-683e-2a3a2a539a11@cs.tcd.ie> <86157132-D401-4033-A72B-AD4859DB6696@lastpresslabel.com> X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.3445.104.11) Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect X-BeenThere: model-t@iab.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussions of changes in Internet deployment patterns and their impact on the Internet threat model List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 05 Aug 2019 14:07:51 -0000 --Apple-Mail=_448F04D9-ACEF-4A2A-86AE-10E6EBA1B813 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 I agree with you Ted, this is something we need. We just need to work = through the details to help make sure everyone understands this problem. = We also need to figure out a way to document this material in a way = that everyone can understand, but does not cut the information off at = the knees. Too often I feel like we have historically narrowed this = information down to statisfy our own confirmation bias.=20 I fully get that many here do not understand the attack lifecycle at the = same level or understand what an intrusion set is and how that relates = to threat actor techniques, tactics, and procedures (or their modus = operandi). I also know that most here probably do not track threat actor = activity. But some of us do. We need to bring some of this knowledge = and expertise in to the IETF to help insure that we design things that = improve overall security for end users on the internet. Thanks, Bret PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447 F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that = can not be unscrambled is an egg." > On Aug 5, 2019, at 7:50 AM, Ted Lemon wrote: >=20 > I think this is a great approach, Christian. If we follow your model = we should be able to start from what we know and avoid boiling the = ocean, without inappropriately skipping some modeling that we actually = need to do because it borders on our space, even though it is not itself = our space. >=20 > There are a few other things I think we should do. >=20 > First, you may have noticed that I don=E2=80=99t actually show a clear = understanding of what the goals of this effort are in my comments. = This is because I=E2=80=99m a security area consumer more than a = security area producer, so I wasn=E2=80=99t in the saag meeting. I saw = Stephen=E2=80=99s mail go by about =E2=80=9Csecurity models=E2=80=9D and = thought to myself =E2=80=9Cexcellent, we need that.=E2=80=9D That=E2=80=99= s literally all I know about what the plan is for this discussion. It = would be good to actually write down what our goals are. >=20 > Second, I don=E2=80=99t think we all agree on how we want to describe = threat models. If there is to be an abbreviated form for describing = threats (as opposed to natural English) we need to document what that = form is in sufficient detail that IETF participants who are not SMEs can = understand it, and hopefully even contribute. I=E2=80=99m not saying = we have to write an RFC, but at a minimum there should be a wiki that = has the needed information. >=20 > I also don=E2=80=99t think we even agree on what we mean by threat = models. Of course we mean models of threats, but at what level of = detail? How close to the code are these models? How general, or how = specific? This may all be obvious to people on this list who are SMEs, = but I=E2=80=99m not, so for me it would help to describe what we mean by = =E2=80=9Cthreat model,=E2=80=9D not because anybody here is unclear on = the basic concept, but because I suspect we don=E2=80=99t agree on the = particulars. >=20 > As an example, the models that Bret has described don=E2=80=99t seem = as if they would be helpful to me. This doesn=E2=80=99t mean that they = aren=E2=80=99t right=E2=80=94it either means that I don=E2=80=99t = understand them clearly, or that we simply have different requirements. = It may be that what I want is not what should be produced here=E2=80=94I=E2= =80=99m not claiming otherwise. But it would be good to get some = clarity on that. >=20 --Apple-Mail=_448F04D9-ACEF-4A2A-86AE-10E6EBA1B813 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 I = agree with you Ted, this is something we need.  We just need to = work through the details to help make sure everyone understands this = problem.  We also need to figure out a way to document this = material in a way that everyone can understand, but does not cut the = information off at the knees.  Too often I feel like we have = historically narrowed this information down to statisfy our own = confirmation bias. 

I fully get that many here do not understand the attack = lifecycle at the same level or understand what an intrusion set is and = how that relates to threat actor techniques, tactics, and procedures (or = their modus operandi). I also know that most here probably do not track = threat actor activity.  But some of us do.  We need to bring = some of this knowledge and expertise in to the IETF to help insure that = we design things that improve overall security for end users on the = internet.

Thanks,
Bret
PGP = Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 = 0050
"Without = cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that can not = be unscrambled is an = egg."

On Aug 5, 2019, at 7:50 AM, Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com> = wrote:

I think this is a great approach, Christian.   If = we follow your model we should be able to start from what we know and = avoid boiling the ocean, without inappropriately skipping some modeling = that we actually need to do because it borders on our space, even though = it is not itself our space.

There are a few = other things I think we should do.

First, = you may have noticed that I don=E2=80=99t actually show a clear = understanding of what the goals of this effort are in my comments. =   This is because I=E2=80=99m a security area consumer more = than a security area producer, so I wasn=E2=80=99t in the saag meeting. =  I saw Stephen=E2=80=99s mail go by about =E2=80=9Csecurity = models=E2=80=9D and thought to myself =E2=80=9Cexcellent, we need = that.=E2=80=9D   That=E2=80=99s literally all I know about = what the plan is for this discussion.   It would be good to = actually write down what our goals are.

Second, I don=E2=80=99t think we all agree on how we want to = describe threat models.   If there is to be an abbreviated = form for describing threats (as opposed to natural English) we need to = document what that form is in sufficient detail that IETF participants = who are not SMEs can understand it, and hopefully even contribute. =   I=E2=80=99m not saying we have to write an RFC, but at a = minimum there should be a wiki that has the needed information.

I also don=E2=80=99t think we even agree on = what we mean by threat models.   Of course we mean models of = threats, but at what level of detail?   How close to the code = are these models?  How general, or how specific?   This = may all be obvious to people on this list who are SMEs, but I=E2=80=99m = not, so for me it would help to describe what we mean by =E2=80=9Cthreat = model,=E2=80=9D not because anybody here is unclear on the basic = concept, but because I suspect we don=E2=80=99t agree on the = particulars.

As an example, the models that = Bret has described don=E2=80=99t seem as if they would be helpful to me. =  This doesn=E2=80=99t mean that they aren=E2=80=99t right=E2=80=94it = either means that I don=E2=80=99t understand them clearly, or that we = simply have different requirements.   It may be that what I = want is not what should be produced here=E2=80=94I=E2=80=99m not = claiming otherwise.   But it would be good to get some clarity = on that.


= --Apple-Mail=_448F04D9-ACEF-4A2A-86AE-10E6EBA1B813-- From nobody Mon Aug 5 08:12:08 2019 Return-Path: X-Original-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 08499120098 for ; Mon, 5 Aug 2019 08:12:07 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -2.6 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.6 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-0.7, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id Yn2qYa5MND8X for ; Mon, 5 Aug 2019 08:12:05 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mx36-out10.antispamcloud.com (mx36-out10.antispamcloud.com [209.126.121.30]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1D19F12004A for ; Mon, 5 Aug 2019 08:12:05 -0700 (PDT) Received: from xse402.mail2web.com ([66.113.197.148] helo=xse.mail2web.com) by mx65.antispamcloud.com with esmtp (Exim 4.89) (envelope-from ) id 1hueeY-000AYq-Pa for model-t@iab.org; Mon, 05 Aug 2019 17:12:03 +0200 Received: from xsmtp21.mail2web.com (unknown [10.100.68.60]) by xse.mail2web.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 462Lmb45xGz2j5L for ; Mon, 5 Aug 2019 08:10:23 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [10.5.2.13] (helo=xmail03.myhosting.com) by xsmtp21.mail2web.com with esmtps (TLS1.0:DHE_RSA_AES_256_CBC_SHA1:256) (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1huecx-0005C3-F4 for model-t@iab.org; Mon, 05 Aug 2019 08:10:23 -0700 Received: (qmail 30567 invoked from network); 5 Aug 2019 15:10:22 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO [192.168.1.101]) (Authenticated-user:_huitema@huitema.net@[172.58.46.251]) (envelope-sender ) by xmail03.myhosting.com (qmail-ldap-1.03) with ESMTPA for ; 5 Aug 2019 15:10:22 -0000 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Mime-Version: 1.0 (1.0) From: Christian Huitema X-Mailer: iPhone Mail (16F203) In-Reply-To: Date: Mon, 5 Aug 2019 08:10:21 -0700 Cc: Ted Lemon , Eric Rescorla , Dominique Lazanski , model-t@iab.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Message-Id: <3A58A1E0-83E9-4FD2-8317-FB60E4A05B84@huitema.net> References: <29756028-95f1-e6e5-b3ea-562cbc635df0@sandelman.ca> <5ef15ad2-5b20-e871-0d01-17cf906051c1@cs.tcd.ie> <22633.1564768705@localhost> <5879878A-7CEA-4030-BB72-108CC4122719@gmail.com> <06F0AE14-4413-4022-A804-C1B58E2702CE@fugue.com> <52BAC141-CB25-4072-B556-6325912F1ADD@gmail.com> <9a1555ca-6699-75f1-683e-2a3a2a539a11@cs.tcd.ie> <86157132-D401-4033-A72B-AD4859DB6696@lastpresslabel.com> To: Bret Jordan X-Originating-IP: 66.113.197.148 X-Spampanel-Domain: xsmtpout.mail2web.com X-Spampanel-Username: 66.113.197.0/24 Authentication-Results: antispamcloud.com; auth=pass smtp.auth=66.113.197.0/24@xsmtpout.mail2web.com X-Spampanel-Outgoing-Class: unsure X-Spampanel-Outgoing-Evidence: Combined (0.15) X-Recommended-Action: accept X-Filter-ID: Mvzo4OR0dZXEDF/gcnlw0YiRRkpbHZ8F3zevhEShTfypSDasLI4SayDByyq9LIhVUZbR67CQ7/vm /hHDJU4RXkTNWdUk1Ol2OGx3IfrIJKywOmJyM1qr8uRnWBrbSAGDXz6Yli32IJdAuJ3ivsC2SsRX qYbtEQV1z/L435ZRxFSGPbOAkJzPQL7lzlsgQJSJ+rYZvu7UEJiU3s27VgKHO7lwS3dBJTnTxDoD vBGGxpgwWbxrOZCJSMpTl/yE2fo2Jw5EvNm+2xR8sCqhXMfwqgZ6weYgSzquK2hxskqXvy8woCTx LKweTbuJ+19zsyHVGVmhMAaQ/AfCRwRe7yHm5oY+NYmsSGn+svMubxnbgm1cr18FZBEPC2/c16Xd 7sC9aC4xteE1WLqGS9YoqrsZ2DyteN0e+ECCv9/f+GPymkgDVo7QBKA4MctKq4ifYPcXFRL2K3LA EfDXVOdt7wDbuhdxf5Dwg9wMBX5ckCo48ayVGvgdM/14NhEhsQ0jllqEE9ykbJ7I9co1MAEE3ruN Xsm8UJsAPvDcVSKtDCYkioPY5Qx4fJOk03R5fJtf/Dv/dkIzS7m4GUpXCY1Y3j3ildfnW8v9hNbj nl3Rzjvd6/g70giG2SKIQNipfk0emfOGJGh1dm1fOh0OcDMnDRpT8JfFStnqj/XcQ5JbCI+5QJ8x iMxSpkvqIEtRL3s4ePxvne6Agjui5gKB/Byw/yqfyPKY2AXNZGS5G93aGyH8MqMlOQRMVMd0HCeT skOZ5TL8m8VlCxerdgGKSHen2A2nRjXg724gFzhHYUe+7aKm0vWEjknX/vI93kPGLC3VzLvjTi+J 2sBvM/O0p+zizleC4va6FPcpDHjXMKZJK8+chibBwAq7uVhOIJwxHQ4Ejy497cTs80/2FnZg/IMs IAdedSzLrjsyfTPCYbMCLdmf5h2vfxw3Qvb2Glio5Cia/9Kfg4kJ0WtAYbrpe3OOAtQNb87OBHCz Hbokiue7PjVB1S6AQRz4SqXhOP5fdiQt7lu5Jm5nk4BSgYHOJJgUtm67rBRli6kULE5BQDZnPvvF VsQ= X-Report-Abuse-To: spam@quarantine9.antispamcloud.com Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect X-BeenThere: model-t@iab.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussions of changes in Internet deployment patterns and their impact on the Internet threat model List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 05 Aug 2019 15:12:07 -0000 =20 > On Aug 5, 2019, at 7:07 AM, Bret Jordan wrote: >=20 > I fully get that many here do not understand the attack lifecycle at the s= ame level or understand what an intrusion set is and how that relates to thr= eat actor techniques, tactics, and procedures (or their modus operandi). I a= lso know that most here probably do not track threat actor activity. But so= me of us do. We need to bring some of this knowledge and expertise in to th= e IETF to help insure that we design things that improve overall security fo= r end users on the internet. I am sure that some of us do understand the struggle against progressive pen= etration of organizations networks and eventual looting of customer data and= corporate secrets. On the other hand, the IETF is not going to opine on spe= cific techniques like isolation of credentials or monitoring active director= y servers, or on the signal to noise ratio of intrusion detection systems. I= want to wait until we have an actual list of goals and assets, but I suspec= t that we will need limits. Some things might be in scope, though. Many of the penetration attacks start= with phishing campaigns, using either web access or email. And SMTP is prob= ably in scope. But phishing through social networks would not be. -- Christian Huitema=20= From nobody Mon Aug 5 08:33:06 2019 Return-Path: X-Original-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E3A4F12016B for ; Mon, 5 Aug 2019 08:33:04 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.997 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.997 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id KwCOsoOLbtTu for ; Mon, 5 Aug 2019 08:33:03 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail-pg1-x52a.google.com (mail-pg1-x52a.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::52a]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1EF9B120192 for ; 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Mon, 05 Aug 2019 08:33:02 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [10.128.64.149] ([136.60.227.81]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id z4sm131567800pfg.166.2019.08.05.08.33.01 for (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Mon, 05 Aug 2019 08:33:01 -0700 (PDT) From: Bret Jordan Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="Apple-Mail=_EEECCB9D-6267-4EEC-A9EB-B8E5A1B92431" Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 12.4 \(3445.104.11\)) Date: Mon, 5 Aug 2019 09:32:59 -0600 References: <29756028-95f1-e6e5-b3ea-562cbc635df0@sandelman.ca> <5ef15ad2-5b20-e871-0d01-17cf906051c1@cs.tcd.ie> <22633.1564768705@localhost> <5879878A-7CEA-4030-BB72-108CC4122719@gmail.com> <06F0AE14-4413-4022-A804-C1B58E2702CE@fugue.com> <52BAC141-CB25-4072-B556-6325912F1ADD@gmail.com> <9a1555ca-6699-75f1-683e-2a3a2a539a11@cs.tcd.ie> <86157132-D401-4033-A72B-AD4859DB6696@lastpresslabel.com> <6300FA8C-F4BC-468E-B81E-36D281229C1E@gmail.com> To: model-t@iab.org In-Reply-To: <6300FA8C-F4BC-468E-B81E-36D281229C1E@gmail.com> Message-Id: <26B3EEF4-6DA5-4A28-A151-3A89013DC0FE@gmail.com> X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.3445.104.11) Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Model-t] Primer X-BeenThere: model-t@iab.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussions of changes in Internet deployment patterns and their impact on the Internet threat model List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 05 Aug 2019 15:33:05 -0000 --Apple-Mail=_EEECCB9D-6267-4EEC-A9EB-B8E5A1B92431 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Here is another good document that was written by a friend of mine. https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-lazanski-smart-users-internet-00 = Thanks, Bret PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447 F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that = can not be unscrambled is an egg." > On Aug 5, 2019, at 7:58 AM, Bret Jordan wrote: >=20 > Here is an I-D that some might find helpful as we talk about this = problem and how we best solve it. = https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-taddei-smart-cless-introduction-00 = >=20 > =20 > Thanks, > Bret > PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447 F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 > "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing = that can not be unscrambled is an egg." >=20 --Apple-Mail=_EEECCB9D-6267-4EEC-A9EB-B8E5A1B92431 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/html; charset=us-ascii Here = is another good document that was written by a friend of mine.

https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-lazanski-smart-users-internet= -00


Thanks,
Bret
PGP = Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 = 0050
"Without = cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that can not = be unscrambled is an = egg."

On Aug 5, 2019, at 7:58 AM, Bret Jordan <jordan.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:

Here is an I-D that = some might find helpful as we talk about this problem and how we best = solve it.  https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-taddei-smart-cless-introducti= on-00

 
Thanks,
Bret
PGP = Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 = 0050
"Without = cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that can not = be unscrambled is an = egg."


= --Apple-Mail=_EEECCB9D-6267-4EEC-A9EB-B8E5A1B92431-- From nobody Mon Aug 5 08:41:38 2019 Return-Path: X-Original-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 28A13120162 for ; Mon, 5 Aug 2019 08:41:37 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.997 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.997 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id AWmeRECZDf9X for ; Mon, 5 Aug 2019 08:41:34 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail-pf1-x42c.google.com (mail-pf1-x42c.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::42c]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id CB9E712004E for ; Mon, 5 Aug 2019 08:41:34 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-pf1-x42c.google.com with SMTP id 19so39839801pfa.4 for ; Mon, 05 Aug 2019 08:41:34 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=from:message-id:mime-version:subject:date:in-reply-to:cc:to :references; bh=4QAL1x946yboI35FNbC/O4xuaF3yhPm/RHV3JIlme6o=; b=fUDwUIgDbrv5VRVG+XV3yS1TPUvWB1qjOcSmOfMggQ5i16Tyt0Trz4Hje6EJF5SkaF u+gDm4f4XU1ZvA70RV9S0CzX4wwuZSNvayxS7RiBkao09kbtmnK0DGTKlyN01fCWtkyw rNAlGgUYQ9pNX15WnZRTHOw7mbpEC891KVIra+L3ZJ75b+aztMlhsYbZKQSZl421rinz jeIiCcTewFQAyUVW+9Wz27c9FQkvFutcaHJjoWyjC98yFgayJtRGWHnfyoJprZxLfaUn +ymjKLPQy+4Xn3DGOC0Tr+ptR6tjyWH801C4z7d6vXvavUPWzh4TEaWOvEVYW/1TT7H3 356w== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:from:message-id:mime-version:subject:date :in-reply-to:cc:to:references; bh=4QAL1x946yboI35FNbC/O4xuaF3yhPm/RHV3JIlme6o=; b=iiRP3QiqaIhhazicAueLlT5esVHOwI/f3A67TEwO1CFeSkWwZOp/xxdklHOsMCgDk5 8uEDEcmA2MYemxybK2auIQDM/AeJDlN45evJNYNppSc775nFY7xS3xnvyR8Yv6SeCCvP GyBbfDvX3DRD5YGuOc4wxpMGzqd/sBXTkKOOxvExJ70c098XIDOXRqxoUb7/qydMjidK PnmgRSLQpV7fsD1MFjZjJs5NooTH68e/TTaEGF3RaXPuALeqlB67is7Cgy81R01i1rnv lXX7Foy363NWvjcSRakY9ExYGH6YNaAbIDYB9qpudm6BjPgmXOdibjrgLqCfErb32xPV Jh6w== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAWnefJuf/Aa24yt+ozNh+5WqO65s2gFhfwWjFFvtTrQ2aYsNtoY BOnpczPX1A++ouRbAS4dFjs= X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqwoqkr+cSZ/Jpuj6fdTS2NLA1IOiUSG1y0tXU1WZACkjW2k0yc04WRVKeznYo+8AeXroxlyIQ== X-Received: by 2002:a17:90a:8591:: with SMTP id m17mr19113463pjn.100.1565019694288; Mon, 05 Aug 2019 08:41:34 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [10.128.64.149] ([136.60.227.81]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id u24sm26802689pgk.31.2019.08.05.08.41.32 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Mon, 05 Aug 2019 08:41:33 -0700 (PDT) From: Bret Jordan Message-Id: <1EE9B058-48A1-4118-950B-FA324397FBE5@gmail.com> Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="Apple-Mail=_8100F5B4-2561-4CB7-9820-29A698E919C0" Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 12.4 \(3445.104.11\)) Date: Mon, 5 Aug 2019 09:41:31 -0600 In-Reply-To: <3A58A1E0-83E9-4FD2-8317-FB60E4A05B84@huitema.net> Cc: Eric Rescorla , Dominique Lazanski , Ted Lemon , model-t@iab.org To: Christian Huitema References: <29756028-95f1-e6e5-b3ea-562cbc635df0@sandelman.ca> <5ef15ad2-5b20-e871-0d01-17cf906051c1@cs.tcd.ie> <22633.1564768705@localhost> <5879878A-7CEA-4030-BB72-108CC4122719@gmail.com> <06F0AE14-4413-4022-A804-C1B58E2702CE@fugue.com> <52BAC141-CB25-4072-B556-6325912F1ADD@gmail.com> <9a1555ca-6699-75f1-683e-2a3a2a539a11@cs.tcd.ie> <86157132-D401-4033-A72B-AD4859DB6696@lastpresslabel.com> <3A58A1E0-83E9-4FD2-8317-FB60E4A05B84@huitema.net> X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.3445.104.11) Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect X-BeenThere: model-t@iab.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussions of changes in Internet deployment patterns and their impact on the Internet threat model List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 05 Aug 2019 15:41:37 -0000 --Apple-Mail=_8100F5B4-2561-4CB7-9820-29A698E919C0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 As I have illustrated, the 4 attack groups cover these general high = level attacks that everyone on the internet faces. These are things that = I think we CAN do something about.=20 I am not suggesting that we should talk about specific instances or = specific types of attacks. Those would be things like how threat actor = FOO compromises layer 2 cache on the CPU to jump between virtual = machines in cloud provider. Or how threat actor bar attacks specific = IoT devices from a compromised data center in some geo-center to finally = launch an attack against a nation=E2=80=99s power grid. While some of = these attacks are interesting and very elaborate in nature. They are = not in scope.=20 1) Attacking the system directly. 2) Delivering an attack through a user initiated session or exfiltrating = data through said session 4) Passive monitoring of all traffic 5) Monitoring and tracking all user's traffic inside their session.=20 Thanks, Bret PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447 F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that = can not be unscrambled is an egg." > On Aug 5, 2019, at 9:10 AM, Christian Huitema = wrote: >=20 >=20 >=20 >=20 >> On Aug 5, 2019, at 7:07 AM, Bret Jordan = wrote: >>=20 >> I fully get that many here do not understand the attack lifecycle at = the same level or understand what an intrusion set is and how that = relates to threat actor techniques, tactics, and procedures (or their = modus operandi). I also know that most here probably do not track threat = actor activity. But some of us do. We need to bring some of this = knowledge and expertise in to the IETF to help insure that we design = things that improve overall security for end users on the internet. >=20 > I am sure that some of us do understand the struggle against = progressive penetration of organizations networks and eventual looting = of customer data and corporate secrets. On the other hand, the IETF is = not going to opine on specific techniques like isolation of credentials = or monitoring active directory servers, or on the signal to noise ratio = of intrusion detection systems. I want to wait until we have an actual = list of goals and assets, but I suspect that we will need limits. >=20 > Some things might be in scope, though. Many of the penetration attacks = start with phishing campaigns, using either web access or email. And = SMTP is probably in scope. But phishing through social networks would = not be. >=20 > -- Christian Huitema=20 > --=20 > Model-t mailing list > Model-t@iab.org > https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t --Apple-Mail=_8100F5B4-2561-4CB7-9820-29A698E919C0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 As = I have illustrated, the 4 attack groups cover these general high level = attacks that everyone on the internet faces. These are things that I = think we CAN do something about. 

I am not suggesting that we should talk = about specific instances or specific types of attacks.  Those would = be things like how threat actor FOO compromises layer 2 cache on the CPU = to jump between virtual machines in cloud provider.  Or how threat = actor bar attacks specific IoT devices from a compromised data center in = some geo-center to finally launch an attack against a nation=E2=80=99s = power grid.  While some of these attacks are interesting and very = elaborate in nature.  They are not in scope. 
1) Attacking the system = directly.

2) Delivering an attack through a user = initiated session or exfiltrating data through said session

4) Passive monitoring of = all traffic

5) = Monitoring and tracking all user's traffic inside their = session. 


Thanks,
Bret
PGP = Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 = 0050
"Without = cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that can not = be unscrambled is an = egg."

On Aug 5, 2019, at 9:10 AM, Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net>= wrote:




On Aug 5, 2019, at 7:07 AM, Bret Jordan <jordan.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:

I fully get that many here do not understand the attack = lifecycle at the same level or understand what an intrusion set is and = how that relates to threat actor techniques, tactics, and procedures (or = their modus operandi). I also know that most here probably do not track = threat actor activity.  But some of us do.  We need to bring = some of this knowledge and expertise in to the IETF to help insure that = we design things that improve overall security for end users on the = internet.

I am sure that some = of us do understand the struggle against progressive penetration of = organizations networks and eventual looting of customer data and = corporate secrets. On the other hand, the IETF is not going to opine on = specific techniques like isolation of credentials or monitoring active = directory servers, or on the signal to noise ratio of intrusion = detection systems. I want to wait until we have an actual list of goals = and assets, but I suspect that we will need limits.

Some things might be in scope, though. Many of the = penetration attacks start with phishing campaigns, using either web = access or email. And SMTP is probably in scope. But phishing through = social networks would not be.

-- Christian = Huitema
--
Model-t mailing list
Model-t@iab.org
https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t

= --Apple-Mail=_8100F5B4-2561-4CB7-9820-29A698E919C0-- From nobody Mon Aug 5 08:58:40 2019 Return-Path: X-Original-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2387D120232 for ; Mon, 5 Aug 2019 08:58:38 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.997 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.997 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id YLrP6BV3Fx9c for ; Mon, 5 Aug 2019 08:58:35 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail-lj1-x241.google.com (mail-lj1-x241.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::241]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B537A12018F for ; Mon, 5 Aug 2019 08:58:34 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-lj1-x241.google.com with SMTP id y17so55173711ljk.10 for ; Mon, 05 Aug 2019 08:58:34 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=YkGk5yDn7Xy3c0bIKkkXjHfCLs7XRExIC1SVflyWZ98=; b=WrNGjfO8B9lOSn6HkVdwjmk9gapyPnFdUGbuSDrQ38rfKplVH6e7Hq1Jzf/nA6p3LR x2C/jLi9vZ/F89h9+XE/QlQoD9hCN+0APlOKIQXtdgC6JFBOBivUoTv8H8smnY1yxZ3a gIhtlo4te6BNQ794gAM/S3eYlH0mvi5DnZPANsRpcBwrUtslcFusXp6CmNwcUK4ETMQQ UtlXaVbJZhe0HALZWeLWyLSfjgUTQSnWZgWBh7ArwVLduSMoZRHtfGZzCpVSDtKr9hkn K9i5RoxdwFxTA52Q0od4pRXO4wM00bvxrGcWQ9Con9Y+lYE/U+VpfzjBzRuB6l8w7MH9 WUdg== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=YkGk5yDn7Xy3c0bIKkkXjHfCLs7XRExIC1SVflyWZ98=; b=Wl8N8UMWhSpbDDUXG2rRE0DRjGEtklSbcwDoGa7QpKmYa6Vz6th+sRWram/suBsgB8 aQeamkuIJIh6S/KE6T9OcNe3Zz/kFJtPw0VxTzPpjQI6WU1+z5NBTz0MkaHwJWfNP4Wg ze4i4tkDgbwkVNNe+EZNRT8oum9m+q3eQWGK3FHT4FPtDgZQDwif3CqZfp8b3dMB1Ogt IkT9KtMzEP8xeTcFLoQPINi4yuYyL56Yby1bHr5r4ycODClQBkCS9k0l3m87CLGomayx 1YBCQ8p9LPALvLZdK3HthFybAODkvjTHygYbABZ9MzltP0EbUI9+9Gkfl9aSheFl09Ic jK+Q== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAVZd5pU8RAfTZcSPltGXVMDP7uFbxE/8HeTUGzJJ6JIzTTp8Qrw MLMLf1VNr5BjxxR0OVgVV6m+B7CRNVCxn8eTXeE= X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqyk3qS2RsnKsiSoZLW7jk/4aRIf1cY4HA1596epD1pFTRyJu7jVdwenIC6AzdqZbuq7oyKB6Eo0Y2rymhSsWYc= X-Received: by 2002:a2e:9f0d:: with SMTP id u13mr32618775ljk.186.1565020712578; Mon, 05 Aug 2019 08:58:32 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <29756028-95f1-e6e5-b3ea-562cbc635df0@sandelman.ca> <5ef15ad2-5b20-e871-0d01-17cf906051c1@cs.tcd.ie> <22633.1564768705@localhost> <5879878A-7CEA-4030-BB72-108CC4122719@gmail.com> <06F0AE14-4413-4022-A804-C1B58E2702CE@fugue.com> <52BAC141-CB25-4072-B556-6325912F1ADD@gmail.com> <9a1555ca-6699-75f1-683e-2a3a2a539a11@cs.tcd.ie> <86157132-D401-4033-A72B-AD4859DB6696@lastpresslabel.com> <3A58A1E0-83E9-4FD2-8317-FB60E4A05B84@huitema.net> <1EE9B058-48A1-4118-950B-FA324397FBE5@gmail.com> In-Reply-To: <1EE9B058-48A1-4118-950B-FA324397FBE5@gmail.com> From: Watson Ladd Date: Mon, 5 Aug 2019 08:58:20 -0700 Message-ID: To: Bret Jordan Cc: Christian Huitema , Eric Rescorla , Dominique Lazanski , Ted Lemon , model-t@iab.org Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="000000000000a3b358058f60c7a1" Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect X-BeenThere: model-t@iab.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussions of changes in Internet deployment patterns and their impact on the Internet threat model List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 05 Aug 2019 15:58:38 -0000 --000000000000a3b358058f60c7a1 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On Mon, Aug 5, 2019, 8:41 AM Bret Jordan wrote: > As I have illustrated, the 4 attack groups cover these general high level > attacks that everyone on the internet faces. These are things that I thin= k > we CAN do something about. > What do you concretely propose we change in an existing protocol to deal with them and how does the threat model lead to that? Can this threat model do that? > I am not suggesting that we should talk about specific instances or > specific types of attacks. Those would be things like how threat actor F= OO > compromises layer 2 cache on the CPU to jump between virtual machines in > cloud provider. Or how threat actor bar attacks specific IoT devices fro= m > a compromised data center in some geo-center to finally launch an attack > against a nation=E2=80=99s power grid. While some of these attacks are i= nteresting > and very elaborate in nature. They are not in scope. > They are in scope insofar as capabilities they have derive from failures of systems to provide security properties. > 1) Attacking the system directly. > What can the IETF do against this one? > 2) Delivering an attack through a user initiated session or exfiltrating > data through said session > What's an attack? How do we e.g. stop the latest UAF against $BROWSER? Some of these bugs are real fun, but I don't know what any standards body can do about them. > 4) Passive monitoring of all traffic > > 5) Monitoring and tracking all user's traffic inside their session. > What happened to confused deputies etc? This is so high level I don't see how to get security properties out. Fundamentally the bolt on security model is kaput. I don't disagree we should expand the threat model but it needs to be a model of attacker capabilities, not behavior, and goals that we want systems to meet. I think it's realistic to have a model where U2F looks like a good idea to stop phishing because users are not good at password management. I think it's also reasonable to have a model where privacy risks of third party cookies/other similar models are discussed. But "attacks"? I don't know how to think about "attacks". > > Thanks, > Bret > PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447 F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 > "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that > can not be unscrambled is an egg." > > On Aug 5, 2019, at 9:10 AM, Christian Huitema wrote= : > > > > > On Aug 5, 2019, at 7:07 AM, Bret Jordan wrote: > > I fully get that many here do not understand the attack lifecycle at the > same level or understand what an intrusion set is and how that relates to > threat actor techniques, tactics, and procedures (or their modus operandi= ). > I also know that most here probably do not track threat actor activity. > But some of us do. We need to bring some of this knowledge and expertise > in to the IETF to help insure that we design things that improve overall > security for end users on the internet. > > > I am sure that some of us do understand the struggle against progressive > penetration of organizations networks and eventual looting of customer da= ta > and corporate secrets. On the other hand, the IETF is not going to opine = on > specific techniques like isolation of credentials or monitoring active > directory servers, or on the signal to noise ratio of intrusion detection > systems. I want to wait until we have an actual list of goals and assets, > but I suspect that we will need limits. > > Some things might be in scope, though. Many of the penetration attacks > start with phishing campaigns, using either web access or email. And SMTP > is probably in scope. But phishing through social networks would not be. > > -- Christian Huitema > -- > Model-t mailing list > Model-t@iab.org > https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t > > > -- > Model-t mailing list > Model-t@iab.org > https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t > --000000000000a3b358058f60c7a1 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable


On Mon, Aug 5, 2019, 8:41 AM Bret Jordan <jordan.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
<= /div>
As I have illustrated, the 4 attack groups cover = these general high level attacks that everyone on the internet faces. These= are things that I think we CAN do something about.=C2=A0

What do you conc= retely propose we change in an existing protocol to deal with them and how = does the threat model lead to that? Can this threat model do that?


I am not suggesting that we should talk= about specific instances or specific types of attacks.=C2=A0 Those would b= e things like how threat actor FOO compromises layer 2 cache on the CPU to = jump between virtual machines in cloud provider.=C2=A0 Or how threat actor = bar attacks specific IoT devices from a compromised data center in some geo= -center to finally launch an attack against a nation=E2=80=99s power grid.= =C2=A0 While some of these attacks are interesting and very elaborate in na= ture.=C2=A0 They are not in scope.=C2=A0

They are in scope insofar a= s capabilities they have derive from failures of systems to provide securit= y properties.


1) Attacking= the system directly.

What can the IETF do against this one?


2) Delivering an = attack through a user initiated session or exfiltrating data through said s= ession

What's an attack? How do we e.g. stop t= he latest UAF against $BROWSER? Some of these bugs are real fun, but I don&= #39;t know what any standards body can do about them.


4) Passive monitoring of all traffic=

5) Monitoring and tracking all user's traffic= inside their session.=C2=A0

What happened to conf= used deputies etc? This is so high level I don't see how to get securit= y properties out.

Fundam= entally the bolt on security model is kaput. I don't disagree we should= expand the threat model but it needs to be a model of attacker capabilitie= s, not behavior, and goals that we want systems to meet.

I think it's realistic to have a model= where U2F looks like a good idea to stop phishing because users are not go= od at password management. I think it's also reasonable to have a model= where privacy risks of third party cookies/other similar models are discus= sed. But "attacks"? I don't know how to think about "att= acks".


Thanks,
Bret
PGP Fingerprint:=C2=A063B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447 =C2=A0F2= C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050
"Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however,= the only thing that can not be unscrambled is an egg."

On Aug 5, 2019, at 9:10 AM, Christi= an Huitema <huitema@huitema.net> wrote:




On Aug 5, 2019, at 7:07 AM, Bret Jordan <jordan.ietf@g= mail.com> wrote:

I fully get that many here do not understand= the attack lifecycle at the same level or understand what an intrusion set= is and how that relates to threat actor techniques, tactics, and procedure= s (or their modus operandi). I also know that most here probably do not tra= ck threat actor activity.=C2=A0 But some of us do.=C2=A0 We need to bring s= ome of this knowledge and expertise in to the IETF to help insure that we d= esign things that improve overall security for end users on the internet.

I am sure that some of us do understand the struggle aga= inst progressive penetration of organizations networks and eventual looting= of customer data and corporate secrets. On the other hand, the IETF is not= going to opine on specific techniques like isolation of credentials or mon= itoring active directory servers, or on the signal to noise ratio of intrus= ion detection systems. I want to wait until we have an actual list of goals= and assets, but I suspect that we will need limits.

Some things mig= ht be in scope, though. Many of the penetration attacks start with phishing= campaigns, using either web access or email. And SMTP is probably in scope= . But phishing through social networks would not be.

-- Christian Hu= itema
--
Model-t mailing list
Model-t@iab.org
https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t

--
Model-t mailing list
Mod= el-t@iab.org
https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t<= /a>
--000000000000a3b358058f60c7a1-- From nobody Mon Aug 5 10:49:31 2019 Return-Path: X-Original-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 65B6F120253 for ; Mon, 5 Aug 2019 10:49:30 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.747 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.747 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, FREEMAIL_ENVFROM_END_DIGIT=0.25, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=no autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id cRVc6M1mH9Qg for ; Mon, 5 Aug 2019 10:49:28 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail-pl1-x631.google.com (mail-pl1-x631.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::631]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E0285120256 for ; Mon, 5 Aug 2019 10:49:28 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-pl1-x631.google.com with SMTP id c2so36729455plz.13 for ; Mon, 05 Aug 2019 10:49:28 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:from:date:message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=yzY7HyuEg3o4DjKdwarjddAJkn9mzp22JIzKclOn4YU=; b=GkQD0a96TlczI4r5dmQLArxFs1b2pj58tZEKX42iueMI4qV3bPiTndUJcLSOwSOreh /ZAGxsP4Xkww5YuZ2If0SeztaI51WNFT8RZwATjoA/N8ymLhni/3+q7hjtODiHZUTTcL uCobMXjFDbIfbkl7tg3fbvYwQtCicSLZhsxxVeoJvxN4NHvUegKD34KulpPMOrWZq5O5 n6djuenfrSTnyAhxgfswsX9YLU7zBuE/aIkaXwEzHE/3Qlt/WhB40e6qukTfPVN5Fpdf d932UmH5bl7VlSbci49bt2SWdbjZwCxrQpG6Wei9CANdJnafPywYn7wZFCAoqqcAouN1 my8A== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:from:date:message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=yzY7HyuEg3o4DjKdwarjddAJkn9mzp22JIzKclOn4YU=; b=W47a/drWHiM4iniALh04EYHY0v5OVH2kz4/ttGKSll4SNzNmpNN/fjnho/FZw2sKEk Tm8+d8ObqLBewsvOLev4SA1e3/X6uxUOR2q+67wefUudXpNg0kbq+4fjS4R9OJMjxCyA AB3WDX2+jpEEPtuUf3hxxIvkXtouMEKU2wdYafxu1j1BaBp3lHGRo7J5xKXWnP/8ipeK qUd2b5OknfRCAh5bYsdOIyeRsET+Sz1/qurslih/3hvX56TCiMlcGLBcFjpLQ9WS70dM 49QBAy3E0NLUW1NJkx4vgndp4FS49TEmNnCdQDeM+ZxnPtCzyvuszvr9aFA4lh0Urj+y SPqw== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAWdlHphB/Y1ojiYyCYA/nXcmrFKL1RP+3DBRfNt9ikBZx2nAtTX e15SooHjuJoaB+AoDc8T9KPgSCJD3gipP34LOMYFTtw= X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqwI+uZ4vZhMbeIpBpL4lpMlH7xCfozueoqvkbIEEEgLZYJbZdb6wxVV8jV5JpAbPf3yWcty4LocUNgu9Qqsyoo= X-Received: by 2002:a17:902:a514:: with SMTP id s20mr137652821plq.162.1565027368225; Mon, 05 Aug 2019 10:49:28 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 From: Deb Cooley Date: Mon, 5 Aug 2019 13:49:17 -0400 Message-ID: To: model-t@iab.org Cc: "Cooley, Dorothy E" Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="00000000000058d241058f62547d" Archived-At: Subject: [Model-t] definitions? X-BeenThere: model-t@iab.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussions of changes in Internet deployment patterns and their impact on the Internet threat model List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 05 Aug 2019 17:49:30 -0000 --00000000000058d241058f62547d Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Can we define 'threat'? RFC3552 states: "A THREAT MODEL describes the capabilities that an attacker is assumed to be able to deploy against a resource." This aligns pretty closely to the way I'd define threat (or threat model). Where I'm from, we say vulnerability+threat = risk, where vulnerability is an unmitigated attack vector. The use of the word 'threat' on this list to date seems different? Deb Cooley decoole@nsa.gov --00000000000058d241058f62547d Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Can we define 'threat'? RFC3552 states:=C2=A0 &quo= t;A THREAT MODEL describes the capabilities that an attacker is assumed to be able to deploy against a resource."=C2=A0 This aligns pretty cl= osely to the way I'd define threat (or threat model).=C2=A0 Where I'= ;m from, we say vulnerability+threat =3D risk, where vulnerability is an un= mitigated attack vector.=C2=A0=C2=A0

The use of the word= 'threat' on this list to date seems different?
 --00000000000058d241058f62547d-- From nobody Tue Aug 6 14:45:35 2019 Return-Path: X-Original-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B0845120033 for ; Tue, 6 Aug 2019 14:45:32 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -4.2 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.2 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id uaOd8-jyLf2g for ; Tue, 6 Aug 2019 14:45:31 -0700 (PDT) Received: from outgoing-exchange-1.mit.edu (outgoing-exchange-1.mit.edu [18.9.28.15]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 150DB120025 for ; Tue, 6 Aug 2019 14:45:30 -0700 (PDT) Received: from oc11exedge2.exchange.mit.edu (OC11EXEDGE2.EXCHANGE.MIT.EDU [18.9.3.18]) by outgoing-exchange-1.mit.edu (8.14.7/8.12.4) with ESMTP id x76Ljkjk004709 for ; Tue, 6 Aug 2019 17:45:51 -0400 Received: from w92expo23.exchange.mit.edu (18.7.74.77) by oc11exedge2.exchange.mit.edu (18.9.3.18) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 15.0.1293.2; Tue, 6 Aug 2019 17:45:35 -0400 Received: from oc11expo23.exchange.mit.edu (18.9.4.88) by w92expo23.exchange.mit.edu (18.7.74.77) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 15.0.1365.1; Tue, 6 Aug 2019 17:45:23 -0400 Received: from oc11expo23.exchange.mit.edu ([18.9.4.88]) by oc11expo23.exchange.mit.edu ([18.9.4.88]) with mapi id 15.00.1365.000; Tue, 6 Aug 2019 17:45:23 -0400 From: Thomas Hardjono To: "model-t@iab.org" Thread-Topic: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect Thread-Index: AQHVTKARMPvYR1mv10m+AYM7i0MFwg== Date: Tue, 6 Aug 2019 21:45:23 +0000 Message-ID: <4a2324dfd4ba4780a18bcb3f3db7f7de@oc11expo23.exchange.mit.edu> Accept-Language: en-US Content-Language: en-US X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: x-ms-exchange-transport-fromentityheader: Hosted x-originating-ip: [73.167.220.69] Content-Type: text/plain; charset="Windows-1252" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable MIME-Version: 1.0 Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect X-BeenThere: model-t@iab.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussions of changes in Internet deployment patterns and their impact on the Internet threat model List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 06 Aug 2019 21:45:33 -0000 >>> 1) Attacking the system directly. >>> 2) Delivering an attack through a user-initiated session or exfiltratin= g data through said session >>> 4) Passive monitoring of all traffic >>> 5) Monitoring and tracking all user's traffic inside their session.=20 Historically the IETF has focused on protocols and communications security.= This was an explicit choice/decision of the IETF community in the mid-1990= s. So, all the protocols we have (ISAKMP, IKE, IPsec, TLS, etc.) have addre= ssed a threat model that was focused on the communications channel. The sec= urity of the end-point, such as a Client or device, was out of scope (until= now, I guess, depending). If the IETF=92s scope is going to be expanded, I=92d suggest the IETF devel= oping an abstraction model and terminology that helps discussion. Otherwise= we end up boiling the ocean with too many words, use-cases and scenarios. At the Montreal SAAG meeting I mentioned the term end-point =93state=94. O= ne way to map the above list of threats would be to express it abstractly i= n terms of state and the protection of state information/data. So, the abov= e list could be mapped to something like this: (i) Unauthorized modification of end-point state. (i.e. attacking a client = OS.). (ii) Unauthorized exfiltration of end-point state information (i.e. exfiltr= ation of data, both system-data and user-data, from a machine). (iii) Malicious substitution of state in transit (i.e. hi-jacking a connect= ion and doing a MITM). (iv) Unhindered reporting of end-point state information (i.e. authentic re= porting from a MIB in a device). You get my point. It=92s no longer just about protection of the communicati= on channel and transport protocol resiliency. It=92s now about the =93stuf= f=94 at the end of the channel. =97 thomas =97 From nobody Tue Aug 6 17:24:47 2019 Return-Path: X-Original-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 904071200B2 for ; Tue, 6 Aug 2019 17:24:46 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.997 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.997 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id kdIs4VpVNSqm for ; Tue, 6 Aug 2019 17:24:43 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail-yw1-xc34.google.com (mail-yw1-xc34.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::c34]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 89AA91200B1 for ; Tue, 6 Aug 2019 17:24:43 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-yw1-xc34.google.com with SMTP id q128so31568219ywc.1 for ; Tue, 06 Aug 2019 17:24:43 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=1c/rDqnIkgYGzY3mG6NTrscPysWA8n0W4ZcfLbr6k/o=; b=nHySiKKpmiJha7rfxClc3wNio9Y+msgUYrO1x3N8i3x2EYOSdgwv38kbhHpKOjzsG4 JoUqmQUF4/hHWTT55JG4mDJXMGAsYTbpoo/I+L8yUeHboliiQifpAkLN2RVuVQ66I1cb foG8IZY3H/oCAuJMv95WE26IYvmH/5MZkVt8DA7GYI7z/5CKazBxvEKkJddh8IobNgF8 IYuheQPWG6rIvDSsUYxIYEM7qubSPigdbezJ8+87OWUgWC2oLhXNeH3e6uhjlMM4B8MQ zjRONzOYm1/tZugtKn8d3yrC3b22D77rSKsKYxmbMonI+cf5bC0bMi56egidOKzUAM66 2eVA== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=1c/rDqnIkgYGzY3mG6NTrscPysWA8n0W4ZcfLbr6k/o=; b=GDuxvNGbdsIfmmXtkjZxRZGpxGRX9OUK0X4UAdUnTGMSOEv52D+RwYXvwiL579YSKe ehBudVcYcUvSoXvQHL3uF72J89673fmiUgYxNQwONrJ+K2xQRegJxZ/vSpdFbsLSa9Xf pIY4LLkeaVUR2VnFYeNlgti54NkyLJru2A5DzIzd/XDzejzhJp0YxGCRwOQGbfqVL53O BLe08H2f31RuEFZoqBUlLSn13kwh+hDg5kYC65CoG0F1MYJxd40OHzj4aT9nxN4c14C8 Lh91fJ1cia93xRhUHw9qiPmvNUFf+qAi/vsWjHurtQOej0TGeujDb1zWTYUkqQFjB2yK U5Vw== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAU3UbM97FkntB+BzjMLSX0bNEC5Turj2plqn0j8lrrhgyr6nZMN JVpe2wSUIJn+UtToNuwEcmK/m2nDKoP04qR3FBg= X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqypoAD+ScYdosXoayyFnJ00cWJK9+FegLLooSzJeyILsf/xCK3yrFCCMcMpHstttTDIMLoQIfWT2QKAQsng7sY= X-Received: by 2002:a81:1a4c:: with SMTP id a73mr3934692ywa.352.1565137482767; Tue, 06 Aug 2019 17:24:42 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <4a2324dfd4ba4780a18bcb3f3db7f7de@oc11expo23.exchange.mit.edu> In-Reply-To: <4a2324dfd4ba4780a18bcb3f3db7f7de@oc11expo23.exchange.mit.edu> From: Ira McDonald Date: Tue, 6 Aug 2019 20:27:38 -0400 Message-ID: To: Thomas Hardjono , Ira McDonald Cc: "model-t@iab.org" Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="000000000000af6355058f7bf790" Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect X-BeenThere: model-t@iab.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussions of changes in Internet deployment patterns and their impact on the Internet threat model List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 07 Aug 2019 00:24:47 -0000 --000000000000af6355058f7bf790 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Hi, I disagree with this characterization of the IETF's historic interest. IETF NEA (built on contributed TCG TNC protocols) is *all* about the security and health of endpoints. And IETF NEA is now being leveraged heavily in IETF SACM for that very reason. SACM is of course *mostly* about the security and health of endpoints and only incidentally about middleboxes. Cheers, - Ira Ira McDonald (Musician / Software Architect) Co-Chair - TCG Trusted Mobility Solutions WG Co-Chair - TCG Metadata Access Protocol SG Chair - Linux Foundation Open Printing WG Secretary - IEEE-ISTO Printer Working Group Co-Chair - IEEE-ISTO PWG Internet Printing Protocol WG IETF Designated Expert - IPP & Printer MIB Blue Roof Music / High North Inc http://sites.google.com/site/blueroofmusic http://sites.google.com/site/highnorthinc mailto: blueroofmusic@gmail.com PO Box 221 Grand Marais, MI 49839 906-494-2434 On Tue, Aug 6, 2019 at 5:45 PM Thomas Hardjono wrote: > > >>> 1) Attacking the system directly. > > >>> 2) Delivering an attack through a user-initiated session or > exfiltrating data through said session > > >>> 4) Passive monitoring of all traffic > > >>> 5) Monitoring and tracking all user's traffic inside their session. > > > Historically the IETF has focused on protocols and communications > security. This was an explicit choice/decision of the IETF community in t= he > mid-1990s. So, all the protocols we have (ISAKMP, IKE, IPsec, TLS, etc.) > have addressed a threat model that was focused on the communications > channel. The security of the end-point, such as a Client or device, was o= ut > of scope (until now, I guess, depending). > > If the IETF=E2=80=99s scope is going to be expanded, I=E2=80=99d suggest = the IETF > developing an abstraction model and terminology that helps discussion. > Otherwise we end up boiling the ocean with too many words, use-cases and > scenarios. > > At the Montreal SAAG meeting I mentioned the term end-point =E2=80=9Cstat= e=E2=80=9D. One > way to map the above list of threats would be to express it abstractly in > terms of state and the protection of state information/data. So, the abov= e > list could be mapped to something like this: > > (i) Unauthorized modification of end-point state. (i.e. attacking a clien= t > OS.). > > (ii) Unauthorized exfiltration of end-point state information (i.e. > exfiltration of data, both system-data and user-data, from a machine). > > (iii) Malicious substitution of state in transit (i.e. hi-jacking a > connection and doing a MITM). > > (iv) Unhindered reporting of end-point state information (i.e. authentic > reporting from a MIB in a device). > > > You get my point. It=E2=80=99s no longer just about protection of the > communication channel and transport protocol resiliency. It=E2=80=99s no= w about > the =E2=80=9Cstuff=E2=80=9D at the end of the channel. > > > =E2=80=94 thomas =E2=80=94 > > -- > Model-t mailing list > Model-t@iab.org > https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t > --000000000000af6355058f7bf790 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Hi,

I disagree with this cha= racterization of the IETF's historic interest.

IETF NEA (built on contributed TCG TNC protocols) is *all* about
the security and health of endpoints.=C2=A0 And IETF NEA is now being
leveraged heavily in IETF SACM for that very reason.=C2=A0 SACM is
of course *mostly* about the security and health of endpoints and
only incidentally about middleboxes.

Chee= rs,
- Ira

=
Ira McDonald (= Musician / Software Architect)
Co-Chair - TCG Trusted Mobility Solutions= WG
Co-Chair - TCG Metadata Access Protocol SG
Chair - Linux Foundation Open Printing WG
Secretary - IEEE-ISTO= Printer Working Group
Co-Chair - IEEE-ISTO PWG Internet Printing Protoc= ol WG
IETF Designated Expert - IPP & Printer MIB
Blue Roof Music = / High North Inc
http://sites.google.com/si= te/blueroofmusic
http://sites.google.com= /site/highnorthinc
mailto: blueroofmusic@gmail.com
PO Box 221=C2=A0 Grand M= arais, MI 49839=C2=A0 906-494-2434

=
<= /div>


On Tue, Aug 6, 2019 at 5:45 PM Thomas Hard= jono <hardjono@mit.edu> wrote= :

>>> 1) Attacking the system directly.

>>> 2) Delivering an attack through a user-initiated session or ex= filtrating data through said session

>>> 4) Passive monitoring of all traffic

>>> 5) Monitoring and tracking all user's traffic inside their= session.


Historically the IETF has focused on protocols and communications security.= This was an explicit choice/decision of the IETF community in the mid-1990= s. So, all the protocols we have (ISAKMP, IKE, IPsec, TLS, etc.) have addre= ssed a threat model that was focused on the communications channel. The sec= urity of the end-point, such as a Client or device, was out of scope (until= now, I guess, depending).

If the IETF=E2=80=99s scope is going to be expanded, I=E2=80=99d suggest th= e IETF developing an abstraction model and terminology that helps discussio= n. Otherwise we end up boiling the ocean with too many words, use-cases and= scenarios.

At the Montreal SAAG meeting I mentioned the term end-point =E2=80=9Cstate= =E2=80=9D.=C2=A0 One way to map the above list of threats would be to expre= ss it abstractly in terms of state and the protection of state information/= data. So, the above list could be mapped to something like this:

(i) Unauthorized modification of end-point state. (i.e. attacking a client = OS.).

(ii) Unauthorized exfiltration of end-point state information (i.e. exfiltr= ation of data, both system-data and user-data, from a machine).

(iii) Malicious substitution of state in transit (i.e. hi-jacking a connect= ion and doing a MITM).

(iv) Unhindered reporting of end-point state information (i.e. authentic re= porting from a MIB in a device).


You get my point. It=E2=80=99s no longer just about protection of the commu= nication channel and transport protocol resiliency.=C2=A0 It=E2=80=99s now = about the =E2=80=9Cstuff=E2=80=9D at the end of the channel.


=E2=80=94 thomas =E2=80=94

--
Model-t mailing list
Model-t@iab.org https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t
--000000000000af6355058f7bf790-- From nobody Tue Aug 6 17:38:18 2019 Return-Path: X-Original-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 059971200B3 for ; Tue, 6 Aug 2019 17:38:16 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -4.198 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.198 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id OQ1GDDyVN6X8 for ; Tue, 6 Aug 2019 17:38:12 -0700 (PDT) Received: from outgoing-exchange-3.mit.edu (outgoing-exchange-3.mit.edu [18.9.28.13]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2C65C1200BA for ; Tue, 6 Aug 2019 17:38:12 -0700 (PDT) Received: from oc11exedge2.exchange.mit.edu (OC11EXEDGE2.EXCHANGE.MIT.EDU [18.9.3.18]) by outgoing-exchange-3.mit.edu (8.14.7/8.12.4) with ESMTP id x770cqiv010485; Tue, 6 Aug 2019 20:38:53 -0400 Received: from oc11expo23.exchange.mit.edu (18.9.4.88) by oc11exedge2.exchange.mit.edu (18.9.3.18) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 15.0.1293.2; Tue, 6 Aug 2019 20:38:21 -0400 Received: from oc11expo23.exchange.mit.edu (18.9.4.88) by oc11expo23.exchange.mit.edu (18.9.4.88) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 15.0.1365.1; Tue, 6 Aug 2019 20:38:09 -0400 Received: from oc11expo23.exchange.mit.edu ([18.9.4.88]) by oc11expo23.exchange.mit.edu ([18.9.4.88]) with mapi id 15.00.1365.000; Tue, 6 Aug 2019 20:38:09 -0400 From: Thomas Hardjono To: Ira McDonald CC: "model-t@iab.org" Thread-Topic: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect Thread-Index: AQHVTKARMPvYR1mv10m+AYM7i0MFwqbvF6MAgAACjIA= Date: Wed, 7 Aug 2019 00:38:09 +0000 Message-ID: <061F959D-CA86-46BD-BFE1-4CF8024E7F8D@mit.edu> References: <4a2324dfd4ba4780a18bcb3f3db7f7de@oc11expo23.exchange.mit.edu> In-Reply-To: Accept-Language: en-US Content-Language: en-US X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: x-ms-exchange-transport-fromentityheader: Hosted Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="_000_061F959DCA8646BDBFE14CF8024E7F8Dmitedu_" MIME-Version: 1.0 Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect X-BeenThere: model-t@iab.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussions of changes in Internet deployment patterns and their impact on the Internet threat model List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 07 Aug 2019 00:38:16 -0000 --_000_061F959DCA8646BDBFE14CF8024E7F8Dmitedu_ Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 SGkgSXJhLA0KDQpJ4oCZbSBmYW1pbGlhciB3aXRoIE5FQSDigJQgTkVBICYgVE5DIChhbmQgTkFQ 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from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id AheEj3rLJF_p for ; Tue, 6 Aug 2019 20:33:22 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail-lf1-x132.google.com (mail-lf1-x132.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::132]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B664912004A for ; Tue, 6 Aug 2019 20:33:21 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-lf1-x132.google.com with SMTP id z15so58610319lfh.13 for ; Tue, 06 Aug 2019 20:33:21 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc:content-transfer-encoding; bh=ZHuFYFYPiMo8Y/xFXSppnwF4jlJtDC4oVLvknggxmi8=; b=bf/h1mC0swc7ng8/9qvEVEj5o/5Cb/IxGVsB6Tyvubvym+EPnRwLR3pU4+DUwe00mT xQTztoQaxhXhZfo5l+4mnGim7HwMSYyHcdqxIz8o474mfRIXiKydZN29kmqSTloWyzT6 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APXvYqxwYYou89vj5BCzONVe3wxMVodVjzXS2eRFHl7j4Xwi6V9kgfaLG72+UP2R9o7u3/RRVZGMB4FQwgcr0LybShk= X-Received: by 2002:a19:2297:: with SMTP id i145mr4461021lfi.97.1565148799777; Tue, 06 Aug 2019 20:33:19 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <4a2324dfd4ba4780a18bcb3f3db7f7de@oc11expo23.exchange.mit.edu> <061F959D-CA86-46BD-BFE1-4CF8024E7F8D@mit.edu> In-Reply-To: <061F959D-CA86-46BD-BFE1-4CF8024E7F8D@mit.edu> From: Watson Ladd Date: Tue, 6 Aug 2019 20:33:07 -0700 Message-ID: To: Thomas Hardjono Cc: Ira McDonald , "model-t@iab.org" Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect X-BeenThere: model-t@iab.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussions of changes in Internet deployment patterns and their impact on the Internet threat model List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 07 Aug 2019 03:33:24 -0000 Kerberos and NFS are two notable exceptions. On Tue, Aug 6, 2019 at 5:38 PM Thomas Hardjono wrote: > > Hi Ira, > > I=E2=80=99m familiar with NEA =E2=80=94 NEA & TNC (and NAP & NAC) are rel= atively recent. I=E2=80=99m talking about the majority of RFCs coming out = of the Security Area since the mid-1990s. > > This was a core part of the End-to-End Principle (e.g. key management and= handling of keys at the edges, out side the scope of the IETF). > > > > /thomas/ > > ___________________________________ > > On Aug 6, 2019, at 8:24 PM, Ira McDonald wrote: > > Hi, > > I disagree with this characterization of the IETF's historic interest. > > IETF NEA (built on contributed TCG TNC protocols) is *all* about > the security and health of endpoints. And IETF NEA is now being > leveraged heavily in IETF SACM for that very reason. SACM is > of course *mostly* about the security and health of endpoints and > only incidentally about middleboxes. > > Cheers, > - Ira > > Ira McDonald (Musician / Software Architect) > Co-Chair - TCG Trusted Mobility Solutions WG > Co-Chair - TCG Metadata Access Protocol SG > Chair - Linux Foundation Open Printing WG > Secretary - IEEE-ISTO Printer Working Group > Co-Chair - IEEE-ISTO PWG Internet Printing Protocol WG > IETF Designated Expert - IPP & Printer MIB > Blue Roof Music / High North Inc > http://sites.google.com/site/blueroofmusic > http://sites.google.com/site/highnorthinc > mailto: blueroofmusic@gmail.com > PO Box 221 Grand Marais, MI 49839 906-494-2434 > > > > On Tue, Aug 6, 2019 at 5:45 PM Thomas Hardjono wrote: >> >> >> >>> 1) Attacking the system directly. >> >> >>> 2) Delivering an attack through a user-initiated session or exfiltra= ting data through said session >> >> >>> 4) Passive monitoring of all traffic >> >> >>> 5) Monitoring and tracking all user's traffic inside their session. >> >> >> Historically the IETF has focused on protocols and communications securi= ty. This was an explicit choice/decision of the IETF community in the mid-1= 990s. So, all the protocols we have (ISAKMP, IKE, IPsec, TLS, etc.) have ad= dressed a threat model that was focused on the communications channel. The = security of the end-point, such as a Client or device, was out of scope (un= til now, I guess, depending). >> >> If the IETF=E2=80=99s scope is going to be expanded, I=E2=80=99d suggest= the IETF developing an abstraction model and terminology that helps discus= sion. Otherwise we end up boiling the ocean with too many words, use-cases = and scenarios. >> >> At the Montreal SAAG meeting I mentioned the term end-point =E2=80=9Csta= te=E2=80=9D. One way to map the above list of threats would be to express = it abstractly in terms of state and the protection of state information/dat= a. So, the above list could be mapped to something like this: >> >> (i) Unauthorized modification of end-point state. (i.e. attacking a clie= nt OS.). >> >> (ii) Unauthorized exfiltration of end-point state information (i.e. exfi= ltration of data, both system-data and user-data, from a machine). >> >> (iii) Malicious substitution of state in transit (i.e. hi-jacking a conn= ection and doing a MITM). >> >> (iv) Unhindered reporting of end-point state information (i.e. authentic= reporting from a MIB in a device). >> >> >> You get my point. It=E2=80=99s no longer just about protection of the co= mmunication channel and transport protocol resiliency. It=E2=80=99s now ab= out the =E2=80=9Cstuff=E2=80=9D at the end of the channel. >> >> >> =E2=80=94 thomas =E2=80=94 >> >> -- >> Model-t mailing list >> Model-t@iab.org >> https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t > > -- > Model-t mailing list > Model-t@iab.org > https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t -- "Man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains". --Rousseau. From nobody Tue Aug 6 23:05:13 2019 Return-Path: X-Original-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C96AA1200E3 for ; Tue, 6 Aug 2019 23:05:12 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.999 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.999 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 97O6k2K9_VXz for ; Tue, 6 Aug 2019 23:05:11 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail-lj1-x233.google.com (mail-lj1-x233.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::233]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B1C4C1200DB for ; Tue, 6 Aug 2019 23:05:10 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-lj1-x233.google.com with SMTP id v18so84247385ljh.6 for ; Tue, 06 Aug 2019 23:05:10 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:from:date:message-id:subject:to; bh=jLRiRhRK42fFJNHNx+8rxOXp9Bsq7AJj7oiyfdzCr9I=; b=oJm1o/5yLJ4TabFpqfEvfrbT6RJQ1c15XWpexvDAO1yZAZc0l/lhPAScxLytYmkeaq 6v9ANInCzxqGcXYYT5/cAr7FdSDFlmzBkbtW5qUIAuggy1AN3tv717WzA+e5DYNjoUDc A48h9nJGZqTI/B6CPc7RwFWgCDjLNXyUXOG1e6fY20GVO6QQKFv2BkPEanOwRAUoo23f orhc9JVFwljDBvg2W4YkC3gsj3KggV3wRP2amESu5g07s3ehw9ZsAnjAGlB+ZkySshv8 FPRLdsY/1ONqtklEMIpgDFgqZViM+FAnAGZjKz2wvNKH+pbqxMhxGBuiYiU5Bd5k2VQn dvbg== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:from:date:message-id:subject:to; bh=jLRiRhRK42fFJNHNx+8rxOXp9Bsq7AJj7oiyfdzCr9I=; b=SsSEICSSNWdWv6rx8CqFqAKUtslqt6PYJAJSZIBOXqs+02k9UVFIX2ga97UU1C6UyY mk5DtcGnAvNXFxoCE59SW4ITLWdDcuCVXtSjM+avlE3xMa2SMM2qNFKbbCBvRw2+0OW2 mDCqgbXVIWq42LGI5Km9Qbm+GQXSuxAH9RBQVg3Y70Pzit7AYsnTiUK/sZnrDX41tmk6 2jFyXxyGdwYrHDd6AHqIUdlHj5eu7zmH4yDgkeyXQJDNtcIy3v72YJJ9+ZSdHuFuiU5w qm5N4dXO+XZpwks7bm3gRMTDpnuDgKei1q7M6ShkNA93nwFNQQr048JGMbYJW3UUNrdU lgZw== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAUH8O/3n9BiI8EEEDSUoa7J9Q//syPTcjGOcKl5LSbrHK34oW7a zNDhpJi6LVVulxCYDGI+F7h+mvG68guGseTo242qhnYr X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqzDFodCvcQ6IzwYGcmvkU92nLaOUFt2LAtOl50KLQpcOQv16nbpp1DVnWwbM9TtE9bvx5TpLNVDEDpK/BA1pmM= X-Received: by 2002:a2e:b0e6:: with SMTP id h6mr3576164ljl.18.1565157908411; Tue, 06 Aug 2019 23:05:08 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 From: Watson Ladd Date: Tue, 6 Aug 2019 23:04:56 -0700 Message-ID: To: model-t@iab.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Archived-At: Subject: [Model-t] My thoughts on a substantive threat model X-BeenThere: model-t@iab.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussions of changes in Internet deployment patterns and their impact on the Internet threat model List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 07 Aug 2019 06:05:13 -0000 Dear all, Below are my typically uniformed and overly indulgent musings. Since we are talking about threat models I decided to go back to read one of the great examples, the Ware report. While from a time before networking it manages to anticipate a great many of the threats that we discuss on end user systems, and the great difficulty of security in an open environment. However, now we have the ratio of computers to users being greater then one and the challenge is protecting users from "themselves" but really the programs they run, something for which traditional OS models are very unsuited. (I assume of course that one can implement a security policy and enforce it: absent this assumption which only seL4 meets, all is hopeless) But we live in a networked world, and the fundamental gap between endpoint security and network security has always since the days of NFS been the general non-representation of principals on the network. A browser has a very nontrivial task of enforcing a very complex security policy, and a web application has all sorts of ambient authority both in the browser and when making requests to other services from its server that can lead to problems, recapitulating the ontology of the kernel. The only two systems I know of that really tried to address this are Plan 9 and Ethos. Athena and AD on Windows can come half-way, but they aren't very universal: most Windows machines aren't part of AD in any way, and websites certainly don't use it mostly. I'm certain there are other attempts, and I am not as familiar with Athena and Windows as I should be. If we want to make an adequate threat model including endpoint security, it's hopeless. Endpoint compromise leaves one with nothing, likewise host compromise (even ignoring that these are traditionally differentiated on budget) You need an enclave ala U2F security keys, but that needs to be done correctly, and even then helps marginally. (They get to read your email when logged in, but don't retain access. A win? Yes, but they still got your email) But what I think we can do is pay attention to principals and the sadly distributed nature of security policy enforcement, and try as much as possible to make mechanisms that are in one place and easy to use to enforce security. This unfortunately is research and involves APIs. By contrast I'm very uninterested in just how big the latest default public S3 bucket is or what's in it. We've established the principle, the rest is just haggling, and it isn't clear what a threat model that say "you might have very valuable resources with bad permissions due to configuration errors" does to inform protocol designers. It does seem we have quite a few perspectives on what's missing, and hopefully we can come to some sort of idea about commonalities/scoping. I've found the conversations rather illuminating as to the diversity of perspectives. Sincerely, Watson Ladd From nobody Wed Aug 7 13:22:01 2019 Return-Path: X-Original-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9276A120103 for ; Wed, 7 Aug 2019 13:21:59 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -4.199 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.199 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id EHeEMrObVn5x for ; Wed, 7 Aug 2019 13:21:57 -0700 (PDT) Received: from outgoing-exchange-3.mit.edu (outgoing-exchange-3.mit.edu [18.9.28.13]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2E52C120059 for ; Wed, 7 Aug 2019 13:21:56 -0700 (PDT) Received: from w92exedge3.exchange.mit.edu (W92EXEDGE3.EXCHANGE.MIT.EDU [18.7.73.15]) by outgoing-exchange-3.mit.edu (8.14.7/8.12.4) with ESMTP id x77KMS0h020209; Wed, 7 Aug 2019 16:22:37 -0400 Received: from w92expo23.exchange.mit.edu (18.7.74.77) by w92exedge3.exchange.mit.edu (18.7.73.15) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 15.0.1293.2; Wed, 7 Aug 2019 16:21:36 -0400 Received: from oc11expo23.exchange.mit.edu (18.9.4.88) by w92expo23.exchange.mit.edu (18.7.74.77) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 15.0.1365.1; Wed, 7 Aug 2019 16:21:53 -0400 Received: from oc11expo23.exchange.mit.edu ([18.9.4.88]) by oc11expo23.exchange.mit.edu ([18.9.4.88]) with mapi id 15.00.1365.000; Wed, 7 Aug 2019 16:21:53 -0400 From: Thomas Hardjono To: Watson Ladd CC: Ira McDonald , "model-t@iab.org" Thread-Topic: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect Thread-Index: AQHVTKARMPvYR1mv10m+AYM7i0MFwqbvF6MAgAACjICAADFGgIAA0Z7h Date: Wed, 7 Aug 2019 20:21:53 +0000 Message-ID: <380339469241445691fd9caf0d761992@oc11expo23.exchange.mit.edu> References: <4a2324dfd4ba4780a18bcb3f3db7f7de@oc11expo23.exchange.mit.edu> <061F959D-CA86-46BD-BFE1-4CF8024E7F8D@mit.edu>, In-Reply-To: Accept-Language: en-US Content-Language: en-US X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: x-ms-exchange-transport-fromentityheader: Hosted x-originating-ip: [73.167.220.69] Content-Type: text/plain; charset="Windows-1252" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable MIME-Version: 1.0 Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect X-BeenThere: model-t@iab.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussions of changes in Internet deployment patterns and their impact on the Internet threat model List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 07 Aug 2019 20:22:00 -0000 As far as know, RFC 1520, 4120 and 2743/44 does not support the reporting o= f the *state* of keys in the KDC, the software-stack of the KDC, etc. etc. I think my point is non-contentional: the End to End argument in the late 8= 0s and into the 1990s made the inquiry of (reporting of) endpoint security = state information out-of-scope for the IETF's work. Its corollary of the en= d to end principle. -- thomas -- ________________________________________ From: Watson Ladd [watsonbladd@gmail.com] Sent: Tuesday, August 6, 2019 11:33 PM To: Thomas Hardjono Cc: Ira McDonald; model-t@iab.org Subject: Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect Kerberos and NFS are two notable exceptions. On Tue, Aug 6, 2019 at 5:38 PM Thomas Hardjono wrote: > > Hi Ira, > > I=92m familiar with NEA =97 NEA & TNC (and NAP & NAC) are relatively rece= nt. I=92m talking about the majority of RFCs coming out of the Security Ar= ea since the mid-1990s. > > This was a core part of the End-to-End Principle (e.g. key management and= handling of keys at the edges, out side the scope of the IETF). > > > > /thomas/ > > ___________________________________ > > On Aug 6, 2019, at 8:24 PM, Ira McDonald wrote: > > Hi, > > I disagree with this characterization of the IETF's historic interest. > > IETF NEA (built on contributed TCG TNC protocols) is *all* about > the security and health of endpoints. And IETF NEA is now being > leveraged heavily in IETF SACM for that very reason. SACM is > of course *mostly* about the security and health of endpoints and > only incidentally about middleboxes. > > Cheers, > - Ira > > Ira McDonald (Musician / Software Architect) > Co-Chair - TCG Trusted Mobility Solutions WG > Co-Chair - TCG Metadata Access Protocol SG > Chair - Linux Foundation Open Printing WG > Secretary - IEEE-ISTO Printer Working Group > Co-Chair - IEEE-ISTO PWG Internet Printing Protocol WG > IETF Designated Expert - IPP & Printer MIB > Blue Roof Music / High North Inc > http://sites.google.com/site/blueroofmusic > http://sites.google.com/site/highnorthinc > mailto: blueroofmusic@gmail.com > PO Box 221 Grand Marais, MI 49839 906-494-2434 > > > > On Tue, Aug 6, 2019 at 5:45 PM Thomas Hardjono wrote: >> >> >> >>> 1) Attacking the system directly. >> >> >>> 2) Delivering an attack through a user-initiated session or exfiltra= ting data through said session >> >> >>> 4) Passive monitoring of all traffic >> >> >>> 5) Monitoring and tracking all user's traffic inside their session. >> >> >> Historically the IETF has focused on protocols and communications securi= ty. This was an explicit choice/decision of the IETF community in the mid-1= 990s. So, all the protocols we have (ISAKMP, IKE, IPsec, TLS, etc.) have ad= dressed a threat model that was focused on the communications channel. The = security of the end-point, such as a Client or device, was out of scope (un= til now, I guess, depending). >> >> If the IETF=92s scope is going to be expanded, I=92d suggest the IETF de= veloping an abstraction model and terminology that helps discussion. Otherw= ise we end up boiling the ocean with too many words, use-cases and scenario= s. >> >> At the Montreal SAAG meeting I mentioned the term end-point =93state=94.= One way to map the above list of threats would be to express it abstractl= y in terms of state and the protection of state information/data. So, the a= bove list could be mapped to something like this: >> >> (i) Unauthorized modification of end-point state. (i.e. attacking a clie= nt OS.). >> >> (ii) Unauthorized exfiltration of end-point state information (i.e. exfi= ltration of data, both system-data and user-data, from a machine). >> >> (iii) Malicious substitution of state in transit (i.e. hi-jacking a conn= ection and doing a MITM). >> >> (iv) Unhindered reporting of end-point state information (i.e. authentic= reporting from a MIB in a device). >> >> >> You get my point. It=92s no longer just about protection of the communic= ation channel and transport protocol resiliency. It=92s now about the =93s= tuff=94 at the end of the channel. >> >> >> =97 thomas =97 >> >> -- >> Model-t mailing list >> Model-t@iab.org >> https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t > > -- > Model-t mailing list > Model-t@iab.org > https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t -- "Man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains". --Rousseau.= From nobody Wed Aug 7 13:28:19 2019 Return-Path: X-Original-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 68576120103 for ; Wed, 7 Aug 2019 13:28:17 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -4.2 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.2 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id oKPAIgpdpFyR for ; Wed, 7 Aug 2019 13:28:16 -0700 (PDT) Received: from outgoing-exchange-1.mit.edu (outgoing-exchange-1.mit.edu [18.9.28.15]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id DA332120059 for ; Wed, 7 Aug 2019 13:28:15 -0700 (PDT) Received: from oc11exedge1.exchange.mit.edu (OC11EXEDGE1.EXCHANGE.MIT.EDU [18.9.3.17]) by outgoing-exchange-1.mit.edu (8.14.7/8.12.4) with ESMTP id x77KSaO7023700; Wed, 7 Aug 2019 16:28:36 -0400 Received: from oc11expo23.exchange.mit.edu (18.9.4.88) by oc11exedge1.exchange.mit.edu (18.9.3.17) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 15.0.1293.2; Wed, 7 Aug 2019 16:27:39 -0400 Received: from oc11expo23.exchange.mit.edu (18.9.4.88) by oc11expo23.exchange.mit.edu (18.9.4.88) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 15.0.1365.1; Wed, 7 Aug 2019 16:28:13 -0400 Received: from oc11expo23.exchange.mit.edu ([18.9.4.88]) by oc11expo23.exchange.mit.edu ([18.9.4.88]) with mapi id 15.00.1365.000; Wed, 7 Aug 2019 16:28:13 -0400 From: Thomas Hardjono To: "model-t@iab.org" CC: "jari.arkko@piuha.net" Thread-Topic: What is "real ends" Thread-Index: AQHVTV3PAaWx5xtUG0u6n42mTHxlYA== Date: Wed, 7 Aug 2019 20:28:13 +0000 Message-ID: <7df25e784f7f49d0868b43b29a860443@oc11expo23.exchange.mit.edu> Accept-Language: en-US Content-Language: en-US X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: x-ms-exchange-transport-fromentityheader: Hosted x-originating-ip: [73.167.220.69] Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable MIME-Version: 1.0 Archived-At: Subject: [Model-t] What is "real ends" X-BeenThere: model-t@iab.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussions of changes in Internet deployment patterns and their impact on the Internet threat model List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 07 Aug 2019 20:28:17 -0000 Jari, Section 4 of draft-arkko-arch-internet-threat-model-01 talks about "real en= ds": But the details matter. What is considered an endpoint? What characteristics of Internet are we trying to optimize? This memo makes the argument that, for security purposes, there is a significant distinction between actual endpoints from a user's interaction perspective (e.g., another user) and from a system perspective (e.g., a third party relaying a message). This memo proposes to focus on the distinction between "real ends" and other endpoints to guide the development of protocols. A conversation between one "real end" to another "real end" has necessarily different security needs than a conversation between, say, one of the "real ends" and a component in a larger system. The end-to-end argument is used primarily for the design of one protocol. The security of the system, however, depends on the entire system and potentially multiple storage, compute, and communication protocol aspects. All have to work properly together to obtain security. Can you explain further or give some examples of "real ends" ? Thanks. -- thomas -- From nobody Thu Aug 8 10:40:28 2019 Return-Path: X-Original-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D456C12017C for ; Thu, 8 Aug 2019 10:40:26 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -2.001 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.001 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIMWL_WL_HIGH=-0.001, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=ncsc.gov.uk Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id eCPHTdUkTa45 for ; Thu, 8 Aug 2019 10:40:24 -0700 (PDT) Received: from GBR01-CWL-obe.outbound.protection.outlook.com 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X-Original-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 35E591207FF for ; Wed, 14 Aug 2019 07:05:44 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -4.199 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.199 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id cJhns_WXdsFi for ; Wed, 14 Aug 2019 07:05:42 -0700 (PDT) Received: from outgoing-exchange-5.mit.edu (outgoing-exchange-5.mit.edu [18.9.28.59]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 81A5812081F for ; Wed, 14 Aug 2019 07:05:42 -0700 (PDT) Received: from oc11exedge2.exchange.mit.edu (OC11EXEDGE2.EXCHANGE.MIT.EDU [18.9.3.18]) by outgoing-exchange-5.mit.edu (8.14.7/8.12.4) with ESMTP id x7EE7BDY004532; Wed, 14 Aug 2019 10:07:22 -0400 Received: from oc11expo23.exchange.mit.edu (18.9.4.88) by oc11exedge2.exchange.mit.edu (18.9.3.18) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 15.0.1293.2; Wed, 14 Aug 2019 10:05:38 -0400 Received: from oc11expo23.exchange.mit.edu (18.9.4.88) by oc11expo23.exchange.mit.edu (18.9.4.88) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 15.0.1365.1; Wed, 14 Aug 2019 10:05:38 -0400 Received: from oc11expo23.exchange.mit.edu ([18.9.4.88]) by oc11expo23.exchange.mit.edu ([18.9.4.88]) with mapi id 15.00.1365.000; Wed, 14 Aug 2019 10:05:38 -0400 From: Thomas Hardjono To: Mark O , "model-t@iab.org" Thread-Topic: Re: [Model-t] What is "real ends" Thread-Index: AdVOD8uTRKu8QzrwSYe4zxe4V1DKNAEmYj0f Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2019 14:05:38 +0000 Message-ID: <89f8ef8f237e4b14a3f9d50a9a154e32@oc11expo23.exchange.mit.edu> References: In-Reply-To: Accept-Language: en-US Content-Language: en-US X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: x-ms-exchange-transport-fromentityheader: Hosted x-originating-ip: [192.54.222.157] Content-Type: text/plain; charset="Windows-1252" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable MIME-Version: 1.0 Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Model-t] What is "real ends" X-BeenThere: model-t@iab.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussions of changes in Internet deployment patterns and their impact on the Internet threat model List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2019 14:05:44 -0000 Thanks Mark =97 let me read that draft first. =97 thomas =97 ________________________________________ From: Model-t [model-t-bounces@iab.org] on behalf of Mark O [Mark.O=3D40ncs= c.gov.uk@dmarc.ietf.org] Sent: Thursday, August 8, 2019 1:40 PM To: model-t@iab.org Subject: Re: [Model-t] What is "real ends" > Can you explain further or give some examples of "real ends" ? Thomas, There is a recent draft, draft-mcfadden-smart-endpoint-taxonomy-for-cless-0= 0, that attempts to categorise different types of endpoints. Different clas= ses of endpoint may have very different threat landscapes - a server or a P= C has a very different attack surface than an industrial sensor or a person= al fitness tracker, but all could be consider to be "real ends". The endpoint taxonomy draft is related to draft-taddei-smart-cless-introduc= tion-01, which seeks to define the Capabilities and Limitations of Endpoint= -only Security Solutions. There are sections in this draft which describe v= arious actual attacks and how they have been detected. Some of this content= would be highly relevant to the discussion of a revised Internet threat mo= del. -- Mark Thomas Hardjono wrote: Jari, Section 4 of draft-arkko-arch-internet-threat-model-01 talks about "real en= ds": But the details matter. What is considered an endpoint? What characteristics of Internet are we trying to optimize? This memo makes the argument that, for security purposes, there is a significant distinction between actual endpoints from a user's interaction perspective (e.g., another user) and from a system perspective (e.g., a third party relaying a message). This memo proposes to focus on the distinction between "real ends" and other endpoints to guide the development of protocols. A conversation between one "real end" to another "real end" has necessarily different security needs than a conversation between, say, one of the "real ends" and a component in a larger system. The end-to-end argument is used primarily for the design of one protocol. The security of the system, however, depends on the entire system and potentially multiple storage, compute, and communication protocol aspects. All have to work properly together to obtain security. Can you explain further or give some examples of "real ends" ? Thanks. -- thomas -- This information is exempt under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA)= and may be exempt under other UK information legislation. Refer any FOIA q= ueries to ncscinfoleg@ncsc.gov.uk. All material is UK Crown Copyright =A9 -- Model-t mailing list Model-t@iab.org https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t=