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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Fri, 2 Oct 2020 10:27:50 -0700
Message-ID: <CABcZeBN6xfpSXqrZc6cXwjs-xwnBWsZY=LV1-0gqzoY8OD5+SQ@mail.gmail.com>
To: Jari Arkko <jari.arkko@piuha.net>
Cc: mark@mcfaddencentral.com, model-t@iab.org
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Subject: Re: [Model-t] Small sub-team for drafting - volunteers?
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On Tue, Sep 29, 2020 at 2:24 PM Jari Arkko <jari.arkko@piuha.net> wrote:

> I=E2=80=99m sitting here and scratching my head about possible ways to go=
 about
> this effort. Let me propose a straw man and see if people agree.
>
> First, off, re-stating goal of the exercise: work through example(s) to
> show a chain from (1) specific security threats to (2) general guidance
> that can be derived from them to (3) how such guidance would potentially =
be
> useful for protocol designs. In a way that they could take it into accoun=
t
> and design something better. Non goals include going through more than a
> single or a couple examples, or attempting to boil the entire space. Just
> an example so that we can show some of the work  can be useful.
>
> Everyone with me so far? If not, I should say that it is late here and
> that you should let me know what  the exercise was :-)
>

Not really. I don't understand what the objective is. To recap, the purpose
of this section of RFC 3552; Section 3 is to document the threat model that
people should be using to evaluate their protocols. The examples in that
document are intended to illuminate that threat model.



> But going on to examples. One might think for instance that you could
> derive example fairly simple examples of the chain. E.g.
> - specific threat: messaging systems where the system sees private
> messaging between people, which may lead to e.g., a government attempts t=
o
> get them to hand over the messaging, commercial surveillance, or accident=
al
> leaks
> - general guidance: apply end-to-end security, avoid involving third
> parties except for their specific role (e.g., message forwarding)
> - specific technologies that can be designed to improve past designs: MLS
>

> Or:
> - specific threat: mobile authentication systems being vulnerable to
> attacks against SIM card manufacturers or the transfer of SIM card keys t=
o
> operators
> - general guidance: limit the scope of compromise, and assume compromise
> may happen anywhere. See draft-arkko-farrell-model-t-3552-additions Secti=
on
> 5.1 (by Ekr and Chris). Or forcing active attack (S5.2)
> - specific technologies: apply perfect forward secrecy in relevant
> protocols.
>
> Or:
> - specific threat: tracking of users in web browsing, for various purpose=
s
> including advertising, and using various methods
> - general guidance: <various>
> - specific technologies: <various>
>

These seem like they might be reasonable recommendations, but they don't
seem to have much to do with the purpose of documenting the threat model.

-Ekr


> And so on.
>
> Are these the kinds of things that people had in mind? Or something else?
>
> Jari
>
> --
> Model-t mailing list
> Model-t@iab.org
> https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
<div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, Sep 29, 2020 at 2:24 PM Jari =
Arkko &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:jari.arkko@piuha.net">jari.arkko@piuha.net</a>&=
gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0=
px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">I=E2=
=80=99m sitting here and scratching my head about possible ways to go about=
 this effort. Let me propose a straw man and see if people agree.<br>
<br>
First, off, re-stating goal of the exercise: work through example(s) to sho=
w a chain from (1) specific security threats to (2) general guidance that c=
an be derived from them to (3) how such guidance would potentially be usefu=
l for protocol designs. In a way that they could take it into account and d=
esign something better. Non goals include going through more than a single =
or a couple examples, or attempting to boil the entire space. Just an examp=
le so that we can show some of the work=C2=A0 can be useful.<br>
<br>
Everyone with me so far? If not, I should say that it is late here and that=
 you should let me know what=C2=A0 the exercise was :-)<br></blockquote><di=
v><br></div><div>Not really. I don&#39;t understand what the objective is. =
To recap, the purpose of this section of RFC 3552; Section 3 is to document=
 the threat model that people should be using to evaluate their protocols. =
The examples in that document are intended to illuminate that threat model.=
<br></div><div><br></div><div> <br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" =
style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);pa=
dding-left:1ex">
<br>
But going on to examples. One might think for instance that you could deriv=
e example fairly simple examples of the chain. E.g.<br>
- specific threat: messaging systems where the system sees private messagin=
g between people, which may lead to e.g., a government attempts to get them=
 to hand over the messaging, commercial surveillance, or accidental leaks<b=
r>
- general guidance: apply end-to-end security, avoid involving third partie=
s except for their specific role (e.g., message forwarding)<br>
- specific technologies that can be designed to improve past designs: MLS<b=
r></blockquote><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0p=
x 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
Or:<br>
- specific threat: mobile authentication systems being vulnerable to attack=
s against SIM card manufacturers or the transfer of SIM card keys to operat=
ors<br>
- general guidance: limit the scope of compromise, and assume compromise ma=
y happen anywhere. See draft-arkko-farrell-model-t-3552-additions Section 5=
.1 (by Ekr and Chris). Or forcing active attack (S5.2)<br>
- specific technologies: apply perfect forward secrecy in relevant protocol=
s.<br>
<br>
Or:<br>
- specific threat: tracking of users in web browsing, for various purposes =
including advertising, and using various methods<br>
- general guidance: &lt;various&gt;<br>
- specific technologies: &lt;various&gt;<br></blockquote><div><br></div><di=
v>These seem like they might be reasonable recommendations, but they don&#3=
9;t seem to have much to do with the purpose of documenting the threat mode=
l.</div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"g=
mail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204=
,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
And so on.<br>
<br>
Are these the kinds of things that people had in mind? Or something else?<b=
r>
<br>
Jari<br>
<br>
-- <br>
Model-t mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Model-t@iab.org" target=3D"_blank">Model-t@iab.org</a><br=
>
<a href=3D"https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t" rel=3D"noreferrer"=
 target=3D"_blank">https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div>

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