From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:45 2006
From: "Scott Rose" <scottr@nist.gov>
Subject: comment on nsec+ draft
Date: Mon, 1 Dec 2003 10:09:34 -0500
Lines: 17
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain;
	charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Mon Dec 01 16:32:09 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 6.00.2800.1158
X-MIMEOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2800.1165
Precedence: bulk

Comment on section 2.1.1 in draft-ietf-dnsext-nsec-rdata-00:

The text suggests expanding compressed names in the RDATA of the NSEC RR,
but DNSSECbis Q22 mentions not wanting to specifically address compressed
names.  The text in Section 2.1.1 could be dropped as well.

Minor difference, but the draft would conflict with the statement in the
DNSSECbis docs, and it is text that would appear in the DNSSECbis doc set.

Scott


--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:45 2006
From: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org
Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-dnsext-mdns-25.txt
Date: Mon, 01 Dec 2003 15:27:52 -0500
Lines: 91
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Reply-To: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: Multipart/Mixed; Boundary="NextPart"
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Mon Dec 01 21:50:43 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: IETF-Announce: ;
Precedence: bulk

--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the DNS Extensions Working Group of the IETF.

	Title		: Linklocal Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR)
	Author(s)	: L. Esibov, B. Aboba, D. Thaler
	Filename	: draft-ietf-dnsext-mdns-25.txt
	Pages		: 22
	Date		: 2003-12-1
	
Today, with the rise of home networking, there are an increasing number
of ad-hoc networks operating without a Domain Name Service (DNS) server.
In order to allow name resolution in such environments, Link-Local
Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR) is proposed.  LLMNR supports all
current and future DNS formats, types and classes, while operating on a
separate port from DNS, and with a distinct resolver cache.

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-mdns-25.txt

To remove yourself from the IETF Announcement list, send a message to 
ietf-announce-request with the word unsubscribe in the body of the message.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP. Login with the username
"anonymous" and a password of your e-mail address. After logging in,
type "cd internet-drafts" and then
	"get draft-ietf-dnsext-mdns-25.txt".

A list of Internet-Drafts directories can be found in
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html 
or ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt


Internet-Drafts can also be obtained by e-mail.

Send a message to:
	mailserv@ietf.org.
In the body type:
	"FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-mdns-25.txt".
	
NOTE:	The mail server at ietf.org can return the document in
	MIME-encoded form by using the "mpack" utility.  To use this
	feature, insert the command "ENCODING mime" before the "FILE"
	command.  To decode the response(s), you will need "munpack" or
	a MIME-compliant mail reader.  Different MIME-compliant mail readers
	exhibit different behavior, especially when dealing with
	"multipart" MIME messages (i.e. documents which have been split
	up into multiple messages), so check your local documentation on
	how to manipulate these messages.
		
		
Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant mail reader
implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version of the
Internet-Draft.

--NextPart
Content-Type: Multipart/Alternative; Boundary="OtherAccess"

--OtherAccess
Content-Type: Message/External-body;
	access-type="mail-server";
	server="mailserv@ietf.org"

Content-Type: text/plain
Content-ID:	<2003-12-1151825.I-D@ietf.org>

ENCODING mime
FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-mdns-25.txt

--OtherAccess
Content-Type: Message/External-body;
	name="draft-ietf-dnsext-mdns-25.txt";
	site="ftp.ietf.org";
	access-type="anon-ftp";
	directory="internet-drafts"

Content-Type: text/plain
Content-ID:	<2003-12-1151825.I-D@ietf.org>

--OtherAccess--

--NextPart--



--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:45 2006
From: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org
Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-dnsext-nsec-rdata-00.txt
Date: Mon, 01 Dec 2003 15:27:45 -0500
Lines: 87
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Reply-To: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: Multipart/Mixed; Boundary="NextPart"
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Mon Dec 01 21:50:52 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: IETF-Announce: ;
Precedence: bulk

--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the DNS Extensions Working Group of the IETF.

	Title		: DNSSEC NSEC RDATA Format
	Author(s)	: J. Schlyter
	Filename	: draft-ietf-dnsext-nsec-rdata-00.txt
	Pages		: 9
	Date		: 2003-12-1
	
This document defines updates the NSEC resource record RDATA format
to cover all type codes.

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-nsec-rdata-00.txt

To remove yourself from the IETF Announcement list, send a message to 
ietf-announce-request with the word unsubscribe in the body of the message.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP. Login with the username
"anonymous" and a password of your e-mail address. After logging in,
type "cd internet-drafts" and then
	"get draft-ietf-dnsext-nsec-rdata-00.txt".

A list of Internet-Drafts directories can be found in
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html 
or ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt


Internet-Drafts can also be obtained by e-mail.

Send a message to:
	mailserv@ietf.org.
In the body type:
	"FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-nsec-rdata-00.txt".
	
NOTE:	The mail server at ietf.org can return the document in
	MIME-encoded form by using the "mpack" utility.  To use this
	feature, insert the command "ENCODING mime" before the "FILE"
	command.  To decode the response(s), you will need "munpack" or
	a MIME-compliant mail reader.  Different MIME-compliant mail readers
	exhibit different behavior, especially when dealing with
	"multipart" MIME messages (i.e. documents which have been split
	up into multiple messages), so check your local documentation on
	how to manipulate these messages.
		
		
Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant mail reader
implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version of the
Internet-Draft.

--NextPart
Content-Type: Multipart/Alternative; Boundary="OtherAccess"

--OtherAccess
Content-Type: Message/External-body;
	access-type="mail-server";
	server="mailserv@ietf.org"

Content-Type: text/plain
Content-ID:	<2003-12-1151814.I-D@ietf.org>

ENCODING mime
FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-nsec-rdata-00.txt

--OtherAccess
Content-Type: Message/External-body;
	name="draft-ietf-dnsext-nsec-rdata-00.txt";
	site="ftp.ietf.org";
	access-type="anon-ftp";
	directory="internet-drafts"

Content-Type: text/plain
Content-ID:	<2003-12-1151814.I-D@ietf.org>

--OtherAccess--

--NextPart--



--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:45 2006
From: Kevin Darcy <kcd@daimlerchrysler.com>
Subject: Fixing QTYPE=* Recursion (was Re: Issue: Add a new QTYPE)
Date: Tue, 02 Dec 2003 00:07:11 -0500
Lines: 128
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <3FC42517.4090404@daimlerchrysler.com>  <20031122163032.83E6013966@sa.vix.com> <3FC2CE40.8000002@daimlerchrysler.com> <6.0.0.22.2.20031125131911.02e3b810@localhost> <5523.1069838436@munnari.OZ.AU>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Tue Dec 02 06:24:37 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; SunOS sun4u; en-US; rv:1.4) Gecko/20030701
X-Accept-Language: en-us, en
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
In-Reply-To: <5523.1069838436@munnari.OZ.AU>
Precedence: bulk

Prior to the Thanksgiving break, I received a number of replies from 
various WG members in the "Add a new QTYPE" thread, going in different 
directions, and it occurs to me that the branching of the thread is 
largely due to insufficient specificity on my part. I apologize for 
that. I've been throwing around terms like "complete response" without 
really attempting any kind of definition for them. Truth be told, I'm 
still thinking QTYPE=* recursion through in my head. This message is an 
attempt to give some form to my current thinking on the subject, 
presented to see if my clarification proposal has any chance of gaining 
traction in the WG.

The behavior I'm trying to crystallize with the term "complete response" 
is that the results of a recursive QTYPE=* query should at all times be 
identical to the combined results of (theoretically) issuing separate 
but simultaneous recursive queries of each record type that is known to 
the querier.

Corollaries:

1) When I say "at all times", I mean that in the case of an intermediate 
caching server, not only should the *initial* QTYPE=* query yield the 
same results as if it were actually separate queries, but any 
*subsequent* QTYPE=* queries of the same name should yield the same 
results as if all previous QTYPE=* queries were actually composed of 
separate queries too, and take into consideration what lingering effects 
those separate queries would have had on the cache contents. When 
attempting to answer from cached data, this corollary naturally implies 
that both positive *and* negative caching must be factors in the overall 
result (for the nitpickers out there, consider that CNAMEs, at least, 
make it impossible for a name to own records of *all* known record 
types, even if an implementation only has "knowledge" of the 1034/1035 
RR definitions, so it is always the case that at least one queried 
record type for a given name will get a NODATA response, assuming that 
the responder is RFC 2308-aware).
2) If any of the RRsets for record types seen in the previous QTYPE=* 
query have expired, then a conforming responder cannot give a "complete" 
answer from cache and *must* recurse to answer the query, although it 
would be up to the responder whether it recurses the whole QTYPE=* 
query, or just one or more type-specific queries to fill in the missing 
RRset(s).
3) One of the necessary rules of this "combining" process is that if 
negative-caching records of differing expiration timestamps are 
encountered, the combined result will reflect the most proximate 
expiration timestamp. Admittedly, this devalues negative caching 
somewhat in this particular situation, but is necessary to maintain the 
integrity of the mechanism, much as minimizing TTLs within a 
positively-cached RRset was perceived (RFC 2181) as necessary to 
maintain cache integrity.

Ultimately, my thinking is that reconstructability of "complete" QTYPE=* 
responses from cache gives rise to a requirement that all QTYPE=* 
responses, whether from cache or authoritative data, include a 
"complementary" negative caching record (Authority Section SOA RR) in 
addition to any answers that are given in the Answer Section. I call 
this "complementary" because it implies a NODATA for all record types 
which are absent from the actual answer, e.g. if the answer to a 
particular QTYPE=* query consists of an A RRset and an MX RRset, then 
the "complementary" negative caching record would imply NODATA for all 
other potential RRsets (NS, PTR, SRV, CNAME and so forth). As long as 
the "complementary" negative caching record and all of the relevant 
"positively" cached RRsets are still unexpired, a "complete" answer -- 
which might include updated RDATAs and/or TTLs for the "positive" 
RRsets, but will not include any RRsets still precluded by the 
"complementary" negative caching record -- can be constructed from a 
cache for any subsequent QTYPE=* queries of the same name without having 
to resort to recursing the query. Particularly-clever resolvers may, 
under some low-TTL circumstances, still choose to pre-emptively recurse 
the QTYPE=* query or a type-specific query, in order to improve the 
quality of their cache and/or their response and therefore avoid 
unnecessary queries in the near future from downstream resolvers.

"Complementary" negative caching solves, I believe, the "completeness" 
issue, as defined, but raises the possibility of interoperability 
problems with modern-but-pre-clarification resolvers which will not be 
expecting negative-caching records to accompany answerful (ANCOUNT>0) 
responses. This lack-of-expectation could arise because RFC 2308 defined 
NODATA negative-caching responses quite narrowly as having "no relevant 
answers in the answer section". That definition would need to be 
loosened in order for "complementary" negative caching to become legal. 
The interoperability question this change raises is, do any 
implementations actually *ignore* or *reject* relevant contents of the 
Answer Section solely because there is also an SOA in the Authority 
Section? A quick code check of BIND 9 implies that the Answer Section 
RRs of a response to a recursed query are processed before it even looks 
at the Authority Section, and even if it subsequently finds an SOA 
record there, it will simply ignore it (in accordance with RFC 1034's 
"optional" negative caching pseudo-specification). So initial 
indications are that BIND 9 would not have a problem with this, and, 
although I am less sure about them, it would surprise me if any other 
implementations would have a problem either -- such a restrictive 
implementation would never have been able to interoperate with pre-2308 
forms of "optional" negative caching. Pre-clarification resolvers are 
more likely by far to simply ignore the "illegal" negative-caching 
record, than to choke on it. But the proof is in the pudding, of course; 
that's what interoperability testing is all about...

Requiring a "complementary" negative caching record should also have the 
beneficial effect of definitively (again, this would need to be 
confirmed in field interoperability tests) marking a QTYPE=* answer as 
coming from a conforming implementation or not -- if the response 
contains a "complementary" negative caching record, then the querier can 
be confident that the responder understands the newly-clarified 
semantics and either recursed for the answer or was able to properly 
construct it from cache or authoritative data; conversely, if the 
response is non-authoritative and lacks the "complementary" negative 
caching record, then the querier is put on notice that the answer may be 
incomplete and it should take appropriate backup measures, as 
configured, in a similar fashion to how it deals with malformed 
responses, e.g. trying other upstream forwarders, if configured, or 
bypassing forwarders altogether and trying to query authoritative 
servers directly. If all other measures of dealing with the backlevel 
response have failed, it could return the possibly-partial answer 
_as_is_ and hope that the client/caller is sophisticated enough to 
realize that the absence of the "complementary" negative caching record 
from the response implies that the answer may be incomplete. Perhaps 
there could even be a new flag in resolver APIs to indicate whether the 
caller would accept a possibly-incomplete answer to a QTYPE=* query...

                                                                         
                                                         - Kevin



--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:45 2006
From: Dean Anderson <dean@av8.com>
Subject: List administration
Date: Tue, 2 Dec 2003 19:47:12 -0500 (EST)
Lines: 66
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Wed Dec 03 02:13:10 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-X-Sender: dean@cirrus
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Precedence: bulk

I was following this message from Nanog, in which Randy Bush is 
complaining about Verizon spam filtering.   What is alarming, is the 
change that Mr. Bush put into the PSG mail system, which also handles 
namedroppers email.

I think that if PSG does not have the resources to handle the mail for 
namedroppers without capriciously deleted mail, then it should be handed 
to someone else who does have the resources.

I would like to volunteer Av8 Internet as a more suitable and resourceful 
host for the namedroppers site.

I need not remind anyone of the past administration problems with Dan
Bernstein and others which have resulted in censure and administrative
changes to the administration of Namedroppers by PSG and Mr. Bush. These
problems have been repeated, and it seems that we are at the start of yet
another administration "problem".  It seems to me that no matter what we
do, we will never rid ourselves of a constant stream of administrative
problems if we keep the hosting the list at PSG.

By contrast, Av8 Internet has no political axe to grind over whose email
to send and whose to interfere with.  Av8 does not interfere with anyone's
email, nor will it ever capriciously delete anyone's email, nor will it
ever abuse its administrative privileges for personal harrassment.


Dean Anderson
CEO 
Av8 Internet, Inc

---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Mon, 1 Dec 2003 11:10:16 -0800
From: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
To: Jared Mauch <jared@puck.nether.net>
Cc: Suresh Ramasubramanian <suresh@outblaze.com>, nanog@nanog.org
Subject: Re: incorrect spam setups cause spool messes on forwarders


> I think he's saying that they were unable to perform the
> validation hence the 450.  If the validation was successful,
> they'd return a 200 series code, if it was unsuccessful, they
> would return a 500 series code.

nice words, but crap.  due to needs to spool mail for sites in
countries with very poor connectivity, mail spool time here is
quite long.  if verizon and others seem unable to decide in weeks,
why should i pay the penalty?

but, i guess the problem is easily solved with exim config.  i have
set it so that if it can not deliver to verizon in say one hour, it
dumps the mail.

    verizon.net        *           F,1h,5m

life is simple, except for verizon users i guess.

randy




--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:45 2006
From: Miek Gieben <miekg@atoom.net>
Subject: Re: nsec++
Date: Wed, 3 Dec 2003 14:29:32 +0100
Lines: 71
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <Pine.OSX.4.58.0311271617180.7125@forastero.dynamic.schlyter.se>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Cc: IETF DNSEXT WG <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Wed Dec 03 14:55:04 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: Jakob Schlyter <jakob@rfc.se>
Mail-Followup-To: Jakob Schlyter <jakob@rfc.se>,
	IETF DNSEXT WG <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Content-Disposition: inline
In-Reply-To: <Pine.OSX.4.58.0311271617180.7125@forastero.dynamic.schlyter.se>
User-Agent: Vim/Mutt/Linux
X-Home: www.miek.nl
X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new
Precedence: bulk

[On 27 Nov, @16:21, Jakob wrote in "nsec++ ..."]
> my initial version of the draft respecifying the rdata format for nsec has
> been submitted to the drafts editor and can also be found at the following
> address:
> 
>   http://www.rfc.se/~jakob/ietf/draft-ietf-dnsext-nsec-rdata-00.txt

i'm looking at the draft from:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-nsec-rdata-00.txt

I have made the following observations:

1. Introduction:

   amount of space it uses for the common case of a few types with an
   owner name; that it can represent owner names with all possible type
   present in packets of approximately 8.5 kilobytes; that the
   representation is simple to implement. Efficient searching of the
 
I didn't closely follow the NSEC discussion...but where is this 8.5 kilobytes
coming from?


2.1.2 The List of Type Bit Map(s) Field:

   the bitmap MUST be removed. Blocks is presented in increasing
   numerical order.

   "|" denotes concatenation
   
   NSEC RDATA = ( Window Block # | Bitmap Length | Bitmap ) +

Shouldn't that be:

Type Bit Map = ( Window Block # | Bitmap Length | Bitmap )

or

Type Bit Maps = ( Window Block # | Bitmap Length | Bitmap ) +

Also I only now notice the '+', more that can be made more explicit.


I'm also missing some text on how to calculate the type from the
bitmap (although that would not be difficult).

I assume something like: Window Block # * 256 + Bit # (in Bitmap).


2.3 NSEC RR Example:

Maybe it is an idea to also include the NSEC RR with integers instead
of RRtypes, thus:

alfa.example.com. 86400 IN NSEC host.example.com. A MX RRSIG NSEC
or
alfa.example.com. 86400 IN NSEC host.example.com. 1 23 47 48 
(i'm too lazy to lookup the correct typecodes for the types)

This integer stuff, was that already in the NXT record? If not,
why is it here? (unknown RRs probably). Can I mix integers and
real types in a NSEC RR?

grtz Miek


--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:45 2006
From: Jakob Schlyter <jakob@rfc.se>
Subject: Re: nsec++
Date: Wed, 3 Dec 2003 14:52:37 +0100 (CET)
Lines: 78
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <Pine.OSX.4.58.0311271617180.7125@forastero.dynamic.schlyter.se>
 <20031203132932.GA25240@atoom.net>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
Cc: IETF DNSEXT WG <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Wed Dec 03 15:08:01 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: Miek Gieben <miekg@atoom.net>
In-Reply-To: <20031203132932.GA25240@atoom.net>
Precedence: bulk

On Wed, 3 Dec 2003, Miek Gieben wrote:

> 1. Introduction:
>
>    amount of space it uses for the common case of a few types with an
>    owner name; that it can represent owner names with all possible type
>    present in packets of approximately 8.5 kilobytes; that the
>    representation is simple to implement. Efficient searching of the
>
>  I didn't closely follow the NSEC discussion...but where is this 8.5
> kilobytes coming from?

worst case is 256 blocks, each represented using 34 bytes. this results in
about 8.5 kbytes.


> 2.1.2 The List of Type Bit Map(s) Field:
>
>    the bitmap MUST be removed. Blocks is presented in increasing
>    numerical order.
>
>    "|" denotes concatenation
>
>    NSEC RDATA = ( Window Block # | Bitmap Length | Bitmap ) +
>
> Shouldn't that be:
>
> Type Bit Map = ( Window Block # | Bitmap Length | Bitmap )
>
> or
>
> Type Bit Maps = ( Window Block # | Bitmap Length | Bitmap ) +
>
> Also I only now notice the '+', more that can be made more explicit.

I suggest the 2nd version since it is a list of bit maps. or should we
write something like:

NSEC RDATA = Next Domain Name |
             ( Window Block # | Bitmap Length | Bitmap ) +


> I'm also missing some text on how to calculate the type from the
> bitmap (although that would not be difficult).
>
> I assume something like: Window Block # * 256 + Bit # (in Bitmap).

please send text.


> 2.3 NSEC RR Example:
>
> Maybe it is an idea to also include the NSEC RR with integers instead
> of RRtypes, thus:
>
> alfa.example.com. 86400 IN NSEC host.example.com. A MX RRSIG NSEC
> or
> alfa.example.com. 86400 IN NSEC host.example.com. 1 23 47 48
> (i'm too lazy to lookup the correct typecodes for the types)
>
> This integer stuff, was that already in the NXT record? If not,
> why is it here? (unknown RRs probably).

unknown RRs can be represented either as integers or TYPE# notation.


> Can I mix integers and real types in a NSEC RR?

the current text does not allow mixing I think.


	jakob

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:45 2006
From: Miek Gieben <miekg@atoom.net>
Subject: Re: nsec++
Date: Wed, 3 Dec 2003 14:58:07 +0100
Lines: 41
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <Pine.OSX.4.58.0311271617180.7125@forastero.dynamic.schlyter.se> <20031203132932.GA25240@atoom.net> <Pine.OSX.4.58.0312031430310.1563@criollo.schlyter.se>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Cc: IETF DNSEXT WG <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Wed Dec 03 15:10:55 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: Jakob Schlyter <jakob@rfc.se>
Mail-Followup-To: Jakob Schlyter <jakob@rfc.se>,
	IETF DNSEXT WG <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Content-Disposition: inline
In-Reply-To: <Pine.OSX.4.58.0312031430310.1563@criollo.schlyter.se>
User-Agent: Vim/Mutt/Linux
X-Home: www.miek.nl
X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new
Precedence: bulk

[On 03 Dec, @14:52, Jakob wrote in "Re: nsec++ ..."]
> worst case is 256 blocks, each represented using 34 bytes. this results in
> about 8.5 kbytes.

ahh, so simple :)

> > Type Bit Maps = ( Window Block # | Bitmap Length | Bitmap ) +
> >
> > Also I only now notice the '+', more that can be made more explicit.
> 
> I suggest the 2nd version since it is a list of bit maps. or should we
> write something like:
> 
> NSEC RDATA = Next Domain Name |
>              ( Window Block # | Bitmap Length | Bitmap ) +

The paragraph is called "2.1.2 The List of Type Bit Map(s) Field", so 
I think my second suggestion is more consistent.

> > I'm also missing some text on how to calculate the type from the
> > bitmap (although that would not be difficult).
> >
> > I assume something like: Window Block # * 256 + Bit # (in Bitmap).
> 
> please send text.

will do,

> > Can I mix integers and real types in a NSEC RR?
> 
> the current text does not allow mixing I think.

maybe it should say that?

grtz Miek

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:45 2006
From: Jakob Schlyter <jakob@rfc.se>
Subject: Re: nsec++
Date: Wed, 3 Dec 2003 15:01:51 +0100 (CET)
Lines: 31
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <Pine.OSX.4.58.0311271617180.7125@forastero.dynamic.schlyter.se>
 <20031203132932.GA25240@atoom.net> <Pine.OSX.4.58.0312031430310.1563@criollo.schlyter.se>
 <20031203135807.GA25957@atoom.net>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
Cc: IETF DNSEXT WG <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Wed Dec 03 15:12:51 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: Miek Gieben <miekg@atoom.net>
In-Reply-To: <20031203135807.GA25957@atoom.net>
Precedence: bulk

On Wed, 3 Dec 2003, Miek Gieben wrote:

> > > Can I mix integers and real types in a NSEC RR?
> >
> > the current text does not allow mixing I think.
>
> maybe it should say that?

I think it already does:

"The Type Bit Map field is represented either as a sequence of RR type
mnemonics or as a sequence of unsigned decimal integers denoting the RR
type codes."

i.e., one type of sequence OR another type of sequence. if it allowed
mixing, it would probably say:

"The Type Bit Map field is represented as a sequence of RR type mnemonics
or unsigned decimal integers denoting the RR type codes."




	jakob


--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:45 2006
From: Miek Gieben <miekg@atoom.net>
Subject: Re: nsec++
Date: Wed, 3 Dec 2003 15:05:04 +0100
Lines: 22
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <Pine.OSX.4.58.0311271617180.7125@forastero.dynamic.schlyter.se> <20031203132932.GA25240@atoom.net> <Pine.OSX.4.58.0312031430310.1563@criollo.schlyter.se> <20031203135807.GA25957@atoom.net> <Pine.OSX.4.58.0312031459170.1563@criollo.schlyter.se>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Cc: IETF DNSEXT WG <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Wed Dec 03 15:14:16 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: Jakob Schlyter <jakob@rfc.se>
Mail-Followup-To: Jakob Schlyter <jakob@rfc.se>,
	IETF DNSEXT WG <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Content-Disposition: inline
In-Reply-To: <Pine.OSX.4.58.0312031459170.1563@criollo.schlyter.se>
User-Agent: Vim/Mutt/Linux
X-Home: www.miek.nl
X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new
Precedence: bulk

[On 03 Dec, @15:01, Jakob wrote in "Re: nsec++ ..."]
> I think it already does:
> 
> "The Type Bit Map field is represented either as a sequence of RR type
> mnemonics or as a sequence of unsigned decimal integers denoting the RR
> type codes."
> 
> i.e., one type of sequence OR another type of sequence. if it allowed
> mixing, it would probably say:
> 
> "The Type Bit Map field is represented as a sequence of RR type mnemonics
> or unsigned decimal integers denoting the RR type codes."

yep, you're right,

grtz Miek

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:45 2006
From: Erik Rozendaal <erik@NLnetLabs.nl>
Subject: Empty non-terminals and NSEC records
Date: Wed, 03 Dec 2003 15:49:07 +0100
Lines: 24
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Wed Dec 03 16:02:52 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US; rv:1.5) Gecko/20031007
X-Accept-Language: en-us, en
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Precedence: bulk

The example zone in the draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-protocol-03.txt document 
contains the following records (among others and excluding RRSIG records):

    ns2.example.   3600 IN A   192.0.2.2
                   3600 NSEC   *.w.example. A RRSIG NSEC
    *.w.example.   3600 IN MX  1 ai.example.
                   3600 NSEC   x.w.example. MX RRSIG NSEC

Notice there are no RRs for the w.example. domain, making it an empty 
non-terminal.  According to the original DNS RFCs empty non-terminals do 
exist (in other words, querying for w.example. will not result in NXDOMAIN 
but in NODATA).

However, the signed version does not include proper NSEC records for 
w.example.  Is this intentional and expected behaviour?

Erik


--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:45 2006
From: Josh Littlefield <joshl@cisco.com>
Subject: Re: nsec++
Date: Wed, 03 Dec 2003 13:52:23 -0500
Organization: Cisco Systems
Lines: 96
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <Pine.OSX.4.58.0311271617180.7125@forastero.dynamic.schlyter.se>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Cc: IETF DNSEXT WG <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Wed Dec 03 20:16:05 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.0; en-US; rv:1.4) Gecko/20030624 Netscape/7.1 (ax)
X-Accept-Language: en-us, en
To: Jakob Schlyter <jakob@rfc.se>
In-Reply-To: <Pine.OSX.4.58.0311271617180.7125@forastero.dynamic.schlyter.se>
Precedence: bulk

Jakob Schlyter wrote:

> my initial version of the draft respecifying the rdata format for nsec has
> been submitted to the drafts editor and can also be found at the following
> address:
> 
>   http://www.rfc.se/~jakob/ietf/draft-ietf-dnsext-nsec-rdata-00.txt
> 
> 
> please send comments to namedroppers,

I assume this will be folded into the dnssec-records draft, and this 
draft will die.  Assuming this is roughly to replace section 4 of that 
document, I think we've lost some good text about the composition of the 
bitmap(s).  From 4.1.2:

    Each bit in the Type Bit Map field corresponds to an RR type.  Bit 1
    corresponds to RR type 1 (A), bit 2 corresponds to RR type 2 (NS),
    and so forth. If a bit is set to 1, it indicates that an RRset of
    that type is present for the NSEC RR's owner name. If a bit is set to
    0, it indicates that no RRset of that type present for the NSEC RR's
    owner name.

That is, you've added description of block numbering and bitmap length, 
but lost all description of bitmap construction, and substituted a 
reference to RFC2535.  Moreover, the notion of "window blocks" is never 
explicitly described as corresponding to the upper 8 bits of an RR typecode.

I'd recommend changing para. 2 of 2.1.2, as follows:

    The RR type space is split into 256 window blocks, each
    representing the low-order 8 bits of the 16-bit RR type space.
    Each block that has at least one active RR type is encoded using a
    single octet window number (from 0 to 255), a single octet bitmap
    length (from 1 to 32) indicating the number of octets used for the
    window block's bitmap, and up to 32 octets (256 bits) of bitmap.

    Blocks are present in the NSEC RR data in increasing numerical
    order.

       "|" denotes concatenation

       Type Bit Map(s) Field =
                    ( Window Block # | Bitmap Length | Bitmap ) +

    Each bitmap encodes the low-order 8 bits of RR types within the
    window block, in network bit order.  The first bit is bit 0.  For
    window block 0, bit 1 corresponds to RR type 1 (A), bit 2
    corresponds to RR type 2 (NS), and so forth.  For window block 1,
    bit 1 corresponds to RR type 257, bit 2 to RR type 258.  If a bit is
    set to 1, it indicates that an RRset of that type is present for the
    NSEC RR's owner name.  If a bit is set to 0, it indicates that no
    RRset of that type is present for the NSEC RR's owner name.

    Bits representing pseudo-RR types MUST be set to 0, since they do
    not appear in zone data.  If encountered, they must be ignored
    upon reading.

    Blocks with no types present MUST NOT be included.  Trailing zero
    octets in the bitmap MUST be omitted.  The length of each block's
    bitmap is determined by the type code with the largest numerical
    value, within that block, among the set of RR types present at the
    NSEC RR's owner name.  Trailing zero octets not specified MUST be
    interpretted as zero octets.

This paragraph:

    A zone MUST NOT generate an NSEC RR for any domain name that only
    holds glue records.

Doesn't seem to belong the section describing the type bitmap field.  It 
belongs in Section 2.  It is not related to "wire-format", but to when 
an NSEC RR should exist.

Additional comments:

    - If the TYPE# notation can be used for unknown RR types in a 
symbolic list of RR types, then this should be explicitly mentioned. 
Otherwise, the presense of one unknown type would force the entire set 
to be printed using decimal notation.

    - An example of the actual binary data (octet by octet) for an NSEC 
RR using at least two non-sequential "window blocks" would be useful.

-- 
=====================================================================
Josh Littlefield                                  Cisco Systems, Inc.
joshl@cisco.com                             1414 Massachusetts Avenue
tel: 978-936-1379  fax: same               Boxborough, MA  01719-2205


--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:45 2006
From: Peter Koch <pk@TechFak.Uni-Bielefeld.DE>
Subject: Re: nsec++
Date: Wed, 03 Dec 2003 20:05:19 +0100
Lines: 60
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <Pine.OSX.4.58.0312031459170.1563@criollo.schlyter.se>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Cc: IETF DNSEXT WG <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Wed Dec 03 20:24:42 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-Authentication-Warning: grimsvotn.TechFak.Uni-Bielefeld.DE: pk owned process doing -bs
X-Authentication-Warning: grimsvotn.TechFak.Uni-Bielefeld.DE: pk@localhost didn't use HELO protocol
To: Jakob Schlyter <jakob@rfc.se>
In-reply-to: Your message of "Wed, 03 Dec 2003 15:01:51 +0100."
             <Pine.OSX.4.58.0312031459170.1563@criollo.schlyter.se> 
X-Organization: Uni Bielefeld, Technische Fakultaet
X-Phone: +49 521 106 2902
Content-ID: <8206.1070478318.1@grimsvotn.TechFak.Uni-Bielefeld.DE>
Precedence: bulk

> i.e., one type of sequence OR another type of sequence. if it allowed
> mixing, it would probably say:
> 
> "The Type Bit Map field is represented as a sequence of RR type mnemonics
> or unsigned decimal integers denoting the RR type codes."

For the sake of consistency with RFC 3597 I'd use the TYPEnnn convention
and don't see any reason not to allow "mixed" format.

"The Type Bit Map field is represented as a sequence of RR type mnemonics.
 When the mnemonic is not known, the TYPE representation as of section 5
 of [RFC 3597] MUST be used, otherwise it MAY {SHOULD NOT} be used."

Other comments:

2.0
     The NSEC RR is class independent.

   -> The NSEC RR RDATA format is class independent and defined for all
      classes.
     {The RR or the contents of the RR really is class dependent}

2.1.1

   Owner names of RRsets not authoritative for the given zone (such as
   glue records) MUST NOT be listed in the Next Domain Name unless at
   least one authoritative RRset exists at the same owner name.

Isn't this already covered by the reference to canonical sort order?
Anyway, owner names or RRSets are not "authoritative for" the zone
but are "in" the zone (or not). Section 4 of AXFR clarify, which still hasn't
made it to RFC, has some wording about this.

If a discussion is appropriate here, the "empty non-leaf node" problem
could be solved, too. (short: NSEC may point to siblings, children or
parents, but not to nephews).

2.1.2

   Bits representing pseudo-RR types MUST be set to 0, since they do not
   appear in zone data.  If encountered, they must be ignored upon
   reading.

The term "pseudo-RR" needs a definition. Again stealing from 3597 I'd say:

   Bits representing Meta-TYPEs or QTYPEs as specified in [RFC 2929]
   (section 3.1) or within the range reserved for assignment only to
   QTYPEs and Meta-TYPEs MUST be set to 0 ...

This may also change the maximum length calculation a bit (although 2929
doesn't explicitly say that the TYPE reservation is valid for classes
other than IN), which could be provided in an appendix.

-Peter

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:45 2006
From: Rob Austein <sra+namedroppers@hactrn.net>
Subject: Re: Empty non-terminals and NSEC records
Date: Wed, 03 Dec 2003 14:14:12 -0500
Lines: 32
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <3FCDF7E3.8070608@nlnetlabs.nl>
Mime-Version: 1.0 (generated by SEMI 1.14.5 - "Awara-Onsen")
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Wed Dec 03 20:32:55 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
In-Reply-To: <3FCDF7E3.8070608@nlnetlabs.nl>
User-Agent: Wanderlust/2.10.0 (Venus) Emacs/20.7 Mule/4.0 (HANANOEN)
Precedence: bulk

At Wed, 03 Dec 2003 15:49:07 +0100, Erik Rozendaal wrote:
> 
> The example zone in the draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-protocol-03.txt document 
> contains the following records (among others and excluding RRSIG records):
> 
>     ns2.example.   3600 IN A   192.0.2.2
>                    3600 NSEC   *.w.example. A RRSIG NSEC
>     *.w.example.   3600 IN MX  1 ai.example.
>                    3600 NSEC   x.w.example. MX RRSIG NSEC
> 
> Notice there are no RRs for the w.example. domain, making it an empty 
> non-terminal.  According to the original DNS RFCs empty non-terminals do 
> exist (in other words, querying for w.example. will not result in NXDOMAIN 
> but in NODATA).
> 
> However, the signed version does not include proper NSEC records for 
> w.example.  Is this intentional and expected behaviour?

Er, if empty non-terminal nodes had NSEC RRs, they wouldn't be empty.

The approach we took in the DNSSECbis docs was to talk about RRsets
and owner names of RRsets rather than name existance per se.

If you're asking what the form of a response should be for a query
w.example, it'd be the form covered in 3.1.3.2: note that section
3.1.3.2 deliberately does not specify the RCODE.

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:45 2006
From: "Scott Rose" <scottr@nist.gov>
Subject: Re: nsec++
Date: Wed, 3 Dec 2003 14:32:00 -0500
Lines: 48
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <Pine.OSX.4.58.0311271617180.7125@forastero.dynamic.schlyter.se> <3FCE30E7.6040505@cisco.com>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain;
	charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Wed Dec 03 20:44:37 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: "IETF DNSEXT WG" <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 6.00.2800.1158
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2800.1165
Precedence: bulk


----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Josh Littlefield" <joshl@cisco.com>
To: "Jakob Schlyter" <jakob@rfc.se>
Cc: "IETF DNSEXT WG" <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Sent: Wednesday, December 03, 2003 1:52 PM
Subject: Re: nsec++


> Jakob Schlyter wrote:
>
> > my initial version of the draft respecifying the rdata format for nsec
has
> > been submitted to the drafts editor and can also be found at the
following
> > address:
> >
> >   http://www.rfc.se/~jakob/ietf/draft-ietf-dnsext-nsec-rdata-00.txt
> >
> >
> > please send comments to namedroppers,
>
> I assume this will be folded into the dnssec-records draft, and this
> draft will die.  Assuming this is roughly to replace section 4 of that
> document, I think we've lost some good text about the composition of the
> bitmap(s).  From 4.1.2:
>

(DNSSICbis-editor)
It won't be a full replacement - just some of the RDATA field descriptions.
We'll try to keep much of the descriptive text that is already there (as
long as it is relevant).  That includes the examples.  If you think we need
better (or different) examples, please let the editors know.
(/DNSSECbis-editor)

I like the idea of having a binary format of an example as well.  May help
seeing how the bitmap field looks as "octet value"  "octet value"  "bit
string"  or something besides just the text example.  I could live without
it too.

Scott


--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:45 2006
From: gson@nominum.com (Andreas Gustafsson)
Subject: Re: nsec++
Date: Wed, 3 Dec 2003 11:52:37 -0800 (PST)
Lines: 40
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <Pine.OSX.4.58.0312031459170.1563@criollo.schlyter.se>
	<200312031905.hB3J5J708209@grimsvotn.TechFak.Uni-Bielefeld.DE>
Cc: IETF DNSEXT WG <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Wed Dec 03 21:05:16 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: Jakob Schlyter <jakob@rfc.se>
In-Reply-To: <200312031905.hB3J5J708209@grimsvotn.TechFak.Uni-Bielefeld.DE>
X-Mailer: VM 7.04 under Emacs 20.7.1
Precedence: bulk

Some comments on draft-ietf-dnsext-nsec-rdata-00.txt:

> Blocks is presented in increasing numerical order.

Should be "The blocks are...".

> Owner names of RRsets not authoritative for the given zone (such as
> glue records) MUST NOT be listed in the Next Domain Name unless at
> least one authoritative RRset exists at the same owner name.
> [...]
> zone MUST NOT generate an NSEC RR for any domain name that only
> holds glue records.

These statements are outside the scope of the draft.  The restrictions
described here are not properties of the "DNSSEC NSEC RDATA Format"
but of the DNSSEC protocol; they should be (and presumably already
are) stated in the base DNSSEC protocol specification.

> The Type Bit Map field is represented either as a sequence of RR type
> mnemonics or as a sequence of unsigned decimal integers denoting the
> RR type codes.

I strongly suggest either allowing mixing of mnemonics and integers,
or dropping the integers completely in favor of the TYPE# notation.

The current requirement that the list has to be either all mnemonics
or all integers serves no clear purpose and makes things needlessly
hard on implementations.  Suppose you are printing an NSEC record and
have already printed a couple of mnemonics, and then you come across
an unknown RR type - what should you do, go back and change the
mnemonics you already printed to integers just to satisfy this
requirement?
-- 
Andreas Gustafsson, gson@nominum.com

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:45 2006
From: Dean Anderson <dean@av8.com>
Subject: List administration (fwd)
Date: Wed, 3 Dec 2003 15:18:37 -0500 (EST)
Lines: 88
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Wed Dec 03 21:39:08 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-X-Sender: dean@cirrus
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Precedence: bulk

Did this actually go out to the list?

Or did it get subjected to some special "filtering" in further violation 
of IETF policies.

I would appreciate it if some verizon customers would send me an 'ack'.

		--Dean

---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Tue, 2 Dec 2003 19:47:12 -0500 (EST)
From: Dean Anderson <dean@av8.com>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: List administration

I was following this message from Nanog, in which Randy Bush is 
complaining about Verizon spam filtering.   What is alarming, is the 
change that Mr. Bush put into the PSG mail system, which also handles 
namedroppers email.

I think that if PSG does not have the resources to handle the mail for 
namedroppers without capriciously deleted mail, then it should be handed 
to someone else who does have the resources.

I would like to volunteer Av8 Internet as a more suitable and resourceful 
host for the namedroppers site.

I need not remind anyone of the past administration problems with Dan
Bernstein and others which have resulted in censure and administrative
changes to the administration of Namedroppers by PSG and Mr. Bush. These
problems have been repeated, and it seems that we are at the start of yet
another administration "problem".  It seems to me that no matter what we
do, we will never rid ourselves of a constant stream of administrative
problems if we keep the hosting the list at PSG.

By contrast, Av8 Internet has no political axe to grind over whose email
to send and whose to interfere with.  Av8 does not interfere with anyone's
email, nor will it ever capriciously delete anyone's email, nor will it
ever abuse its administrative privileges for personal harrassment.


Dean Anderson
CEO 
Av8 Internet, Inc

---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Mon, 1 Dec 2003 11:10:16 -0800
From: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
To: Jared Mauch <jared@puck.nether.net>
Cc: Suresh Ramasubramanian <suresh@outblaze.com>, nanog@nanog.org
Subject: Re: incorrect spam setups cause spool messes on forwarders


> I think he's saying that they were unable to perform the
> validation hence the 450.  If the validation was successful,
> they'd return a 200 series code, if it was unsuccessful, they
> would return a 500 series code.

nice words, but crap.  due to needs to spool mail for sites in
countries with very poor connectivity, mail spool time here is
quite long.  if verizon and others seem unable to decide in weeks,
why should i pay the penalty?

but, i guess the problem is easily solved with exim config.  i have
set it so that if it can not deliver to verizon in say one hour, it
dumps the mail.

    verizon.net        *           F,1h,5m

life is simple, except for verizon users i guess.

randy




--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:45 2006
From: =?iso-8859-1?Q?=D3lafur?= Gudmundsson/DNSEXT co-chair <ogud@ogud.com>
Subject: Re: List administration
Date: Wed, 03 Dec 2003 15:28:11 -0500
Lines: 41
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <Pine.LNX.4.44.0312021934320.1258-100000@cirrus>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Wed Dec 03 21:43:07 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-Sender: (Unverified)
X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 6.0.0.22
To: Dean Anderson <dean@av8.com>, namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.4.44.0312021934320.1258-100000@cirrus>
References: <Pine.LNX.4.44.0312021934320.1258-100000@cirrus>
Precedence: bulk

<chair>
At 19:47 2003-12-02, Dean Anderson wrote:

>I think that if PSG does not have the resources to handle the mail for
>namedroppers without capriciously deleted mail, then it should be handed
>to someone else who does have the resources.

There is a big difference between having resources and publicly
intimidating a random ISP. Take your pick on what Randy was saying.

>I would like to volunteer Av8 Internet as a more suitable and resourceful
>host for the namedroppers site.

Noted, please send me and my co-chair more details on your setup,
for future reference.

>I need not remind anyone of the past administration problems with Dan
>Bernstein and others which have resulted in censure and administrative
>changes to the administration of Namedroppers by PSG and Mr. Bush. These
>problems have been repeated, and it seems that we are at the start of yet
>another administration "problem".  It seems to me that no matter what we
>do, we will never rid ourselves of a constant stream of administrative
>problems if we keep the hosting the list at PSG.

This is all ancient history, there have NO problems raised to my (or my
co-chairs) attention in many months.
On the other hand there has not been a single SPAM, showing up on the
list, and only few late postings from non subscribers. Overall the
mailing list operation has been excellent.

Rather than chastising Randy, we should be thanking him for a great job
he has been doing.

         Olafur 


--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:45 2006
From: Miek Gieben <miekg@atoom.net>
Subject: Re: nsec++
Date: Wed, 3 Dec 2003 21:50:58 +0100
Lines: 17
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <Pine.OSX.4.58.0311271617180.7125@forastero.dynamic.schlyter.se> <3FCE30E7.6040505@cisco.com> <01f301c3b9d4$1f804090$b9370681@barnacle>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Cc: IETF DNSEXT WG <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Wed Dec 03 22:04:37 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: Scott Rose <scottr@nist.gov>
Mail-Followup-To: Scott Rose <scottr@nist.gov>,
	IETF DNSEXT WG <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Content-Disposition: inline
In-Reply-To: <01f301c3b9d4$1f804090$b9370681@barnacle>
User-Agent: Vim/Mutt/Linux
X-Home: www.miek.nl
X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new
Precedence: bulk

[On 03 Dec, @20:32, Scott wrote in "Re: nsec++ ..."]
> (DNSSICbis-editor)
> It won't be a full replacement - just some of the RDATA field descriptions.
> We'll try to keep much of the descriptive text that is already there (as
> long as it is relevant).  That includes the examples.  If you think we need
> better (or different) examples, please let the editors know.
> (/DNSSECbis-editor)

Will this be in protocol-04? 

grtz Miek

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:45 2006
From: "Scott Rose" <scottr@nist.gov>
Subject: Re: nsec++
Date: Wed, 3 Dec 2003 15:55:19 -0500
Lines: 35
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <Pine.OSX.4.58.0311271617180.7125@forastero.dynamic.schlyter.se> <3FCE30E7.6040505@cisco.com> <01f301c3b9d4$1f804090$b9370681@barnacle> <20031203205058.GA14189@atoom.net>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain;
	charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Wed Dec 03 22:10:23 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: "IETF DNSEXT WG" <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 6.00.2800.1158
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2800.1165
Precedence: bulk


----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Miek Gieben" <miekg@atoom.net>


> [On 03 Dec, @20:32, Scott wrote in "Re: nsec++ ..."]
> > (DNSSICbis-editor)
> > It won't be a full replacement - just some of the RDATA field
descriptions.
> > We'll try to keep much of the descriptive text that is already there (as
> > long as it is relevant).  That includes the examples.  If you think we
need
> > better (or different) examples, please let the editors know.
> > (/DNSSECbis-editor)
>
> Will this be in protocol-04?
>
The description of the RDATA would be in the Resoure Records draft.  An
example of what an NSEC RR looks like is in the records-05 (section 4.3).  I
would guess any example of a binary (or hex, or any other format) of a
general NSEC RR would go there.

Another example of a signed zone is in protocol-03, but that is for the
example query/responses.


> grtz Miek
>


--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:45 2006
From: Miek Gieben <miekg@atoom.net>
Subject: Re: nsec++
Date: Wed, 3 Dec 2003 21:53:48 +0100
Lines: 17
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <Pine.OSX.4.58.0312031459170.1563@criollo.schlyter.se> <200312031905.hB3J5J708209@grimsvotn.TechFak.Uni-Bielefeld.DE> <200312031952.hB3JqbE9007378@guava.araneus.fi>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Cc: Jakob Schlyter <jakob@rfc.se>, IETF DNSEXT WG <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Wed Dec 03 22:10:33 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: Andreas Gustafsson <gson@nominum.com>
Mail-Followup-To: Andreas Gustafsson <gson@nominum.com>,
	Jakob Schlyter <jakob@rfc.se>,
	IETF DNSEXT WG <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Content-Disposition: inline
In-Reply-To: <200312031952.hB3JqbE9007378@guava.araneus.fi>
User-Agent: Vim/Mutt/Linux
X-Home: www.miek.nl
X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new
Precedence: bulk

[On 03 Dec, @20:52, Andreas wrote in "Re: nsec++ ..."]
> > mnemonics or as a sequence of unsigned decimal integers denoting the
> > RR type codes.
> 
> I strongly suggest either allowing mixing of mnemonics and integers,
> or dropping the integers completely in favor of the TYPE# notation.

I second this, using TYPE# is more consistent with other places where unknown
RRs can exist.

grtz Miek

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:45 2006
From: Miek Gieben <miekg@atoom.net>
Subject: Re: nsec++
Date: Wed, 3 Dec 2003 22:22:56 +0100
Lines: 18
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <Pine.OSX.4.58.0311271617180.7125@forastero.dynamic.schlyter.se> <3FCE30E7.6040505@cisco.com> <01f301c3b9d4$1f804090$b9370681@barnacle> <20031203205058.GA14189@atoom.net> <029a01c3b9df$c2ddfec0$b9370681@barnacle>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Cc: IETF DNSEXT WG <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Wed Dec 03 22:34:42 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: Scott Rose <scottr@nist.gov>
Mail-Followup-To: Scott Rose <scottr@nist.gov>,
	IETF DNSEXT WG <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Content-Disposition: inline
In-Reply-To: <029a01c3b9df$c2ddfec0$b9370681@barnacle>
User-Agent: Vim/Mutt/Linux
X-Home: www.miek.nl
X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new
Precedence: bulk

[On 03 Dec, @21:55, Scott wrote in "Re: nsec++ ..."]
> >
> > Will this be in protocol-04?
> >
> The description of the RDATA would be in the Resoure Records draft.  An
> example of what an NSEC RR looks like is in the records-05 (section 4.3).  I
> would guess any example of a binary (or hex, or any other format) of a
> general NSEC RR would go there.

ok :) that's what I wanted to know,

grtz Miek

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:45 2006
From: Mark.Andrews@isc.org
Subject: Re: Empty non-terminals and NSEC records
Date: Thu, 04 Dec 2003 08:28:18 +1100
Lines: 60
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <3FCDF7E3.8070608@nlnetlabs.nl>
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Wed Dec 03 22:43:31 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: Erik Rozendaal <erik@NLnetLabs.nl>
In-reply-to: Your message of "Wed, 03 Dec 2003 15:49:07 BST."
             <3FCDF7E3.8070608@nlnetlabs.nl> 
Precedence: bulk


> The example zone in the draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-protocol-03.txt document 
> contains the following records (among others and excluding RRSIG records):
> 
>     ns2.example.   3600 IN A   192.0.2.2
>                    3600 NSEC   *.w.example. A RRSIG NSEC
>     *.w.example.   3600 IN MX  1 ai.example.
>                    3600 NSEC   x.w.example. MX RRSIG NSEC
> 
> Notice there are no RRs for the w.example. domain, making it an empty 
> non-terminal.  According to the original DNS RFCs empty non-terminals do 
> exist (in other words, querying for w.example. will not result in NXDOMAIN 
> but in NODATA).
> 
> However, the signed version does not include proper NSEC records for 
> w.example.  Is this intentional and expected behaviour?
> 
> Erik

	You don't need a NSEC record to know that w.example exists.
	You can prove that it exist with this NSEC record.

	ns2.example. NSEC *.w.example. A RRSIG NSEC

	The above record proves that "ns2.example.", "*.w.example.",
	"w.example.", "example." and "." exist.

	It also proves that "ns2.example." and "*.w.example." contain
	data.  It also proves what data exists at "ns2.example.".

	It also proves that "w.example." is empty.

	It does not say whether "example" or "."  contain data or not.

	Note "example." is the common subdomain of the two domains in
	the record.

	Note "w.example." is a interior domain between the common
	subdomain and the next domain name.  Interior domains between
	the common subdomain and the next domain name are always
	empty.

	Mark

> 
> 
> --
> to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
> the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
> archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>
--
Mark Andrews, Internet Software Consortium
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: Mark.Andrews@isc.org

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:45 2006
From: Dean Anderson <dean@av8.com>
Subject: Re: List administration
Date: Wed, 3 Dec 2003 16:47:00 -0500 (EST)
Lines: 62
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <6.0.0.22.2.20031203094837.01f68568@localhost>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8BIT
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Wed Dec 03 23:02:29 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-X-Sender: dean@cirrus
To: =?iso-8859-1?Q?=D3lafur?= Gudmundsson/DNSEXT co-chair <ogud@ogud.com>
In-Reply-To: <6.0.0.22.2.20031203094837.01f68568@localhost>
Precedence: bulk

On Wed, 3 Dec 2003, Ólafur Gudmundsson/DNSEXT co-chair wrote:

> <chair>
> At 19:47 2003-12-02, Dean Anderson wrote:
> 
> >I think that if PSG does not have the resources to handle the mail for
> >namedroppers without capriciously deleted mail, then it should be handed
> >to someone else who does have the resources.
> 
> There is a big difference between having resources and publicly
> intimidating a random ISP. Take your pick on what Randy was saying.


He said he was altering the operations of his mail servers to delete mail
that wasn't delivered in one hour.  This is unreasonable, regardless of
what Verizon does.  Sometimes mailservers or internet connections are down
for short periods.  I doubt all of the namedroppers subscribers have
redundant connections, or even redundant mail servers. Those subscribers
require queuing and one hour is certainly unreasonable.  IETF lists should
not be used as "intimidation" for apparently personal gain.  I would say
that IETF email lists should not be toyed with by the administrator.

I don't know whether he made up the story.  But obviously, he noticed the
problem in the first place, so something brought it to his attention.  He
didn't say that Verizon customers were complaining to him that their mail
was slow.  He just said he didn't have the queue space to save the
messages for more than one hour.  I'd have to take him at his word.  
Especially when he says he has changed his mailserver configuration.

This "one hour" change was inappropriate, and I would like some
confirmation that this is no longer the case. I would also like to know
whether he made up the story and never made any changes, or if he has
backed out the changes.

And while I can't really criticize him for being ineffective at
intimidation, there are certainly better ways of publicly intimidating an
ISP than making threats involving operations of IETF lists.

The last DJB "scandal" was last January, and Randy stepped down from the
chair in June.

In the months where he does a good job, a good job was done.  I
congratulate him for that. But it seems that every once in while there is
something that detracts from this.

Namedroppers does seem remarkably free from spam, despite the fact that
spammers could simply forge subscriber's addresses and post.  I wonder if
perhaps spammers don't want to spam namedroppers anymore.  Or perhaps they
just wanted the list administration to change, and after having made their
point, don't care to spam the list anymore.  Whatever the case, I guess we
don't want to look a gift horse in the mouth.  They stopped. We're glad.  
If Randy made them stop, I congratulate him on that, too.


		--Dean


--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:45 2006
From: Greg Black <gjb@gbch.net>
Subject: Re: List administration
Date: Thu, 4 Dec 2003 12:35:07 +1000
Lines: 35
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <6.0.0.22.2.20031203094837.01f68568@localhost>
    <Pine.LNX.4.44.0312031602530.2114-100000@cirrus>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Cc: =?iso-8859-1?Q?=D3lafur?= Gudmundsson/DNSEXT co-chair <ogud@ogud.com>,
  namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Thu Dec 04 04:03:22 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: Dean Anderson <dean@av8.com>
Content-Disposition: inline
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.4.44.0312031602530.2114-100000@cirrus>
User-Agent: Mutt/1.4.1i; gjb-muttsend.sh 1.5 2003-10-01
X-Uptime: 8 days
X-Operating-System: FreeBSD 4.2-RELEASE i386
X-Location: Brisbane, Australia; 27.49841S 152.98439E
X-URL: http://www.gbch.net/gjb.html
X-Image-URL: http://www.gbch.net/gjb/gjb-auug048.gif
X-PGP-Key-Fingerprint: EBB2 2A92 A79D 1533 AC00  3C46 5D83 B6FB 4B04 B7D6
X-Request-PGP: http://www.gbch.net/keys/4B04B7D6.asc
Precedence: bulk

On 2003-12-03, Dean Anderson wrote:
> On Wed, 3 Dec 2003, Ólafur Gudmundsson/DNSEXT co-chair wrote:
> 
> > <chair>
> > At 19:47 2003-12-02, Dean Anderson wrote:
> > 
> > >I think that if PSG does not have the resources to handle the mail for
> > >namedroppers without capriciously deleted mail, then it should be handed
> > >to someone else who does have the resources.
> > 
> > There is a big difference between having resources and publicly
> > intimidating a random ISP. Take your pick on what Randy was saying.
> 
> He said he was altering the operations of his mail servers to delete mail
> that wasn't delivered in one hour.  This is unreasonable, regardless of
> what Verizon does.

Yes, it utterly unreasonable.  Things go wrong in the real
world:  power utilities have disasters; fires, floods and solar
flares cause problems; computer hardware loses its magic smoke.
Many people have stopped using backup MX hosts, as these just
seem to collect extra spam.

Because of all these factors, mailing lists should be prepared
to queue mail to subscribers for at least a few days.  If some
mailing list server is unwilling or unable to manage that, it
needs to hand over the job to a competent organisation.

Greg

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:45 2006
From: =?iso-8859-1?Q?=D3lafur?= Gudmundsson/DNSEXT co-chair <ogud@ogud.com>
Subject: IETF-58 DNSEXT minutes
Date: Wed, 03 Dec 2003 23:20:23 -0500
Lines: 297
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Thu Dec 04 05:32:19 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-Sender: (Unverified)
X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 6.0.1.1
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org, minutes@ietf.org
Precedence: bulk



DNSEXT WG meeting, November 13, 2003.

Accompanying slide set is available in PDF at:
https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/03nov/slides/dnsext-1.pdf


Item 0: Agenda
         Administrivia                    5 min
         Working Group Docs               5 min
         Call for Interop Report          5 min
         Wild Card Clarify discussion    10 min
         DNSSECbis Doc discussion        90 min

Evidenced by the time allotted on the agenda, the predominate focus of
the meeting is on the latest round of DNSSEC definition document,
dnssec-intro, dnssec-records, and dnssec-protocol.  The other burning
issue to be discussed lies in the wcard-clarify draft, which, although
not discussing DNSSEC itself, has altered some of the work needed to
finish off DNSSEC.

Item 1: Administrivia

(Note all agenda items are accompanied by a slide set.)

Minutes from the Vienna meeting (July 2003) were posted
http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/namedroppers.2003/msg01541.html

An issue tracker has been introduced to manage comments and changes to
working group documents.  The purpose is to make sure all changes
corresponding to WG decisions are made and that all changes are because of
WG decisions (consensus).

One issue tracker instance is as
	https://roundup.machshav.com/dnsext/index
document editors can choose to use others.

Item 2: WG Documents

All of this is in slides.

Documents seeing recent activity (with the focus of the WG): wcard-clarify
and the three DNSSECbis documents.

Docs in final stages: mdns, tkey renewal, case insensitive clarifications
Docs stalled: 2536bis and 2539bis, DSA and Diff-Hellman KEY RR algorithms
At IESG: AXFR clarify, DS RR, type code roll, key signing bit, opt-in,
dhc-id, dns threats, discovery, others?

Item 3: Call for Interop Reports

In the past decade, many documents have made it to Proposed Standard,
but none have made it to Draft Standard.  An important ingredient for
draft standard is a demonstration and documentation of
interoperability.  The WG has many documents to promote from proposed
to draft standards, and this is an open call for work in this area.

One interoperability report is making it's way through the process.  I
think this is TSIG, no progress has been made recently.

Question from the floor: where should folks focus?

Answer: Milestones on the charter page list what's needed, sequencing can be
         adjusted.

Item 4: wcard-clarify Discussion

This document was begun in January, became a WG item during the March
2003 SF meetings, and made progress through the Vienna meeting in
July.  A change in editor was requested by the first editor and a new
one, Robert Elz, has been installed.

Remaining issues include:
a) Cache use of unexpanded wild card records
b) Use of the "*" label in the interior of a name
c) Handling of a CNAME RR at a wild card name
d) Handling of a NS RR at a wild card name
e) Procedural question - split document between clarify an fix

Discussion started with (e): room recommendation is to keep the document as
one.  (Originally the document treated pre and post DNSSEC, now it treats
only pre-DNSSEC.)  Even though it is "clarifications," adjustments to the
original definition are to be considered and included.  The rationale for
not splitting is that if it were done, we'd have too many documents in the
process.

Issue (4a): RFC 1034 says that a cache must not make use of a wild card
record.  (As opposed to a wild card record in the authoritative date.)
While it makes sense that a cache must not synthesize records from a
cached wild card record (because the cache doesn't have enough information),
there's little reason that a cache can't answer with the record if the
QNAME is for the wild card exactly.  (I.e., *.example. IN A 1.1.1.1 in
cache could be used for a query of [*.example. IN A].)

The room's proposal was to allow the cache to answer if the record was
an exact match for the data, leaving the restriction of not allowing
cache synthesis from the record.

Issue (4b): Whether or not "*" can be in the middle of a name.  There
was no discussion in the room on this one.  The basic issue is that
the draft goes to great length to talk about how this is handled.
Later on, someone noticed that 1034 discourages this.

Although there is no sentiment to allow these names, nor is there any common
use, if the names are barred as in 1034, then more rules are needed to
specify what happens when they are (mistakenly?) seen.  If the rules aren't
specified then behavior is unpredicatable - perhaps in ways that don't
matter very much.

An older mail list discussion leaned toward staying with 1034's definition.

Issue (4c): Whether CNAME's are "chase" has been the most significant
issue in this work.  As it stands now, a CNAME RR at a wild card means
that the wild card only comes into play when the query is for the wild
card name itself and for the type CNAME.  Implementers have suggested
letting a CNAME at a wild card play the same role as a CNAME at an exact
match, meaning that one step in the algorithm in 1034/4.3.2 would be altered.
(Noting that the algorithm is a suggestion and not a specification.)

This is the central issue on whether or not the document is merely a
clarification or an adjustment to 1034.

The sense seems to be to allow CNAMEs to be "chased" at a wild card,
regardless of whether this is a clarification or an adjustment.

One other suggestion was that DNAMEs ought to also be included in the
discussion.  Originally they were, and there still may be a blurb in the
draft, but the DNAME specification has been seen as too confusing to
clarify at this point.

Issue (4d): Whether a wild card NS is permitted.  For a while (since Vienna)
it seemed that this would be viable.  However, no one has cited a
concrete application for this.  In addition, there is a rule that only
the authoritative source can synthesize an answer to a query, when issuing
a referral, the answering party is inherently not authoritative.

The sense of the room seemed to be for banning NS RR from wild cards.

The downside to this is that enforcement should be defined.  E.g., what
happens on zone load, dynamic update addition, or records seen in an answer.
(Also, when it comes to DNSSEC, how the signer treats this.)

Other issues - one person asked about a restriction on SOA (a counter to the
NS record).  SOA's are already barred from being anywhere other than the apex.

Item #5: The DNSSECbis documents

The discussion centered around the dnssec-editor's list of 'official'
questions.  For convienence, the questions will be listed by number here
and not by content.  (Content is available in the slides.)

The discussion began by listing the following questions as haven been
recently settled: Q6, Q11, Q16, and Q17.  In addition, Q15 was moved from
open to settled during the week.

The rest of the dicussion was organized by the open questions, followed by
an issue concerning compression of names and the encoding of the NSEC RR.

The current list of open questions are Q18, Q19, Q20, and Q21.

Q18: conflicting rules between TTL settings on the RRSIG RR

According to RFC 2181 the RRSIG's at a name comprise a set, ergo all
should have the same TTL.  According to RFC 2535 the (RR)SIG's ought
to have the same TTL as their covering set.

The discussion came down to a choice between making signature records a
special case (RRSIG, SIG, or both) or adopting a means to make the dilemma
disappear.  E.g., adopting a bit in the RR type field to signify that
the record was a signature.

While there was a sentiment to "not break DNS to secure it" there was
a stronger opinion to just recognize that the signature was an
infrastructure record and therefore treat it as special. Hence it
should take up the TTL from the RRset it signes and it is allowed for
individual RRs in a SIG RRset to have different TTLs.

Q19: suppression of duplicates

The original specification leans toward but does not explicitly forbid the
transmission of duplicate RR's (same envelope and RDATA).  DNSSEC needs to
define a canonical form so that the signer and verifier can work
together.  If not, there would be crypto-level errors which are hard to
detect and isolate.

There wasn't a clear mandate to alter the base DNS state on this.  However,
it was clear that there needs to be a canonical form between signer and
verifier.  Besides suppression of duplicates, sequencing and downcasing also
have to be preserved.  This isn't necesarily an on-the-wire issue, as both
ends of the crypto process can repeat the same canonicalization process.

Q20: expansion of wild card in authority section

A wild card record would be appear in the authority section in a few cases.
One might be the expansion of an NS RR - but wild card NS RR's seem to be
on the road to elimination.  (See the discussion on them in the wcard doc.)

In the case of an NXDOMAIN, there would be a NSEC for the exact match and
for the wild card, and with allowing CNAME's at a wild card to have the
effect of continuing the lookup, possibly more.  But none of these would
involve expansion.

The remaining case is the inclusion of a wild card NSEC record in a
"no data" situation.  The query name does not have an answer, but a wild
card synthesis rule is in effect.  However, the desired type is not
represented.

The sense of the room was to leave this name in the wild card form. Using
the record for synthesis would appear to be confusing - first an NSEC claims
the name does not exist and then there's an NSEC (synthesized) for the name.
In either case, a resolver could figure this out given the label count, but
the expansion serves no purpose.

One other comment was that the result of this ought to be included in the
wcard clarify draft - cleansing the issue of DNSSEC.  IOW, under what
conditions are sythesized records places in the authority section.

Q21: (re)use of NSEC in cache

According to NCACHE (RFC 2038), a cached negative answer can only be used
by a cache to answer a newer query if the QNAME, QCLASS, and QTYPE match.
With the NSEC RR, it is possible to reuse the negative answer for a match
involving just the QNAME and QCLASS, if the QTYPE is absent from the bit
field.

The debate centered around if such a discussion was appropriate here
or in an update to NCACHE (RFC 2308).  On the other hand, the words in
the proposed text used MAY - as in the cache MAY take advantage of
this.  As opposed to a MUST or SHOULD which actively promote the
adoption of this "shortcut", MAY is neutral, encouraging
experimentation.  MUST NOT or SHOULD NOT are too strong in the other
direction.

Compression Guidelines:

New DNS records are not supposed to be compressed.  A discussion along
the lines of "conservative on send, liberal on receive" ensued.
Servers ought not compress, resolvers ought not have a fit over
compressed data.

The conversation was to be moved to the list over the wording of
enforcement.


NSEC encoding:

The NXT record defines the encoding of types 1-127 and leave the rest open
to future definition.  This needed to be solved for NSEC. Working group chairs
announced an appointment of a Document Editor for an Internet Draft processing
this change: Jakob Schlyter.

Five proposals were listed and briefly described.
a) Extend bitmap for all types (0-127 are coverd by a simple bitmap)
b) List types in sorted order
c) Approach optimized for the first 256 types
d) Approach optimized for the size of the record (skiplist of blocks)
e) Approach close to d, using bitmap within blocks

Comments:
b & c don't allow a name to have 64K types simultaneously, max around
half that.  'Course, a name with this is unlikely.

The goal was to decide on one approach to seek a further
definition.

What followed was a beauty contest.  In the first round, approaches
b,c and e were chosen (people humming for more than one).

In the second round, approach e was selected for further work.

Wrap-up

The three DNSSECbis documents are planned to be in WG last call by the
end of the year.  Following soon will be two authoritative
implementations - BIND 9 and NSD.  Two recursive servers will also be
available - BIND 9 and IDsA (http://www.idsa.prd.fr).



Acknowledgements

These minutes are based on the notes made by Ed Lewis and Jaap
Akkerhuis and the Jabber log by Andrew Newton. We would like to thank
them for their quick submission and precise record of the meeting.

Thanks to those who contributed to the constructive and productive
admosphere during the meeting.

Olafur and Olaf. 


--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:45 2006
From: Jakob Schlyter <jakob@rfc.se>
Subject: Re: nsec++
Date: Thu, 4 Dec 2003 11:50:00 +0100 (CET)
Lines: 78
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <200312031905.hB3J5J708209@grimsvotn.TechFak.Uni-Bielefeld.DE>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
Cc: IETF DNSEXT WG <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Thu Dec 04 12:10:22 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: Peter Koch <pk@TechFak.Uni-Bielefeld.DE>
In-Reply-To: <200312031905.hB3J5J708209@grimsvotn.TechFak.Uni-Bielefeld.DE>
Precedence: bulk

On Wed, 3 Dec 2003, Peter Koch wrote:

> > i.e., one type of sequence OR another type of sequence. if it allowed
> > mixing, it would probably say:
> >
> > "The Type Bit Map field is represented as a sequence of RR type mnemonics
> > or unsigned decimal integers denoting the RR type codes."
>
> For the sake of consistency with RFC 3597 I'd use the TYPEnnn convention
> and don't see any reason not to allow "mixed" format.
>
> "The Type Bit Map field is represented as a sequence of RR type mnemonics.
>  When the mnemonic is not known, the TYPE representation as of section 5
>  of [RFC 3597] MUST be used, otherwise it MAY {SHOULD NOT} be used."

I agree, but do not think we need that last part. suggestion:

     The List of Type Bit Map(s) Field is represented as a sequence of
     RR type mnemonics.  When the mnemonic is not known, the TYPE
     representation as described in RFC 3597 (section 5) MUST be used.


> 2.0
>      The NSEC RR is class independent.
>
>    -> The NSEC RR RDATA format is class independent and defined for all
>       classes.
>      {The RR or the contents of the RR really is class dependent}

updated.


> 2.1.1
>
>    Owner names of RRsets not authoritative for the given zone (such as
>    glue records) MUST NOT be listed in the Next Domain Name unless at
>    least one authoritative RRset exists at the same owner name.
>
> Isn't this already covered by the reference to canonical sort order?
> Anyway, owner names or RRSets are not "authoritative for" the zone
> but are "in" the zone (or not). Section 4 of AXFR clarify, which still hasn't
> made it to RFC, has some wording about this.
>
> If a discussion is appropriate here, the "empty non-leaf node" problem
> could be solved, too. (short: NSEC may point to siblings, children or
> parents, but not to nephews).

as this text was copied from draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-records-05.txt, I'd
like comments on this from the editors of that draft before changing
anything.


> 2.1.2
>
>    Bits representing pseudo-RR types MUST be set to 0, since they do not
>    appear in zone data.  If encountered, they must be ignored upon
>    reading.
>
> The term "pseudo-RR" needs a definition. Again stealing from 3597 I'd say:
>
>    Bits representing Meta-TYPEs or QTYPEs as specified in [RFC 2929]
>    (section 3.1) or within the range reserved for assignment only to
>    QTYPEs and Meta-TYPEs MUST be set to 0 ...
>
> This may also change the maximum length calculation a bit (although 2929
> doesn't explicitly say that the TYPE reservation is valid for classes
> other than IN), which could be provided in an appendix.

new text included.


	jakob

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:45 2006
From: Jakob Schlyter <jakob@rfc.se>
Subject: Re: nsec++
Date: Thu, 4 Dec 2003 11:57:14 +0100 (CET)
Lines: 32
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <Pine.OSX.4.58.0312031459170.1563@criollo.schlyter.se>
 <200312031905.hB3J5J708209@grimsvotn.TechFak.Uni-Bielefeld.DE>
 <200312031952.hB3JqbE9007378@guava.araneus.fi>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
Cc: IETF DNSEXT WG <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Thu Dec 04 12:11:46 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: Andreas Gustafsson <gson@nominum.com>
In-Reply-To: <200312031952.hB3JqbE9007378@guava.araneus.fi>
Precedence: bulk

On Wed, 3 Dec 2003, Andreas Gustafsson wrote:

> > Owner names of RRsets not authoritative for the given zone (such as
> > glue records) MUST NOT be listed in the Next Domain Name unless at
> > least one authoritative RRset exists at the same owner name.
> > [...]
> > zone MUST NOT generate an NSEC RR for any domain name that only
> > holds glue records.
>
> These statements are outside the scope of the draft.  The restrictions
> described here are not properties of the "DNSSEC NSEC RDATA Format"
> but of the DNSSEC protocol; they should be (and presumably already
> are) stated in the base DNSSEC protocol specification.

true, I'll remove this paragraph unless someone objects.

> I strongly suggest either allowing mixing of mnemonics and integers,
> or dropping the integers completely in favor of the TYPE# notation.

fixed (see my reply to peter koch).


	jakob

-- 
Jakob Schlyter <jakob@rfc.se> +46 70 595 07 94

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:45 2006
From: Jakob Schlyter <jakob@rfc.se>
Subject: Re: nsec++
Date: Thu, 4 Dec 2003 12:30:17 +0100 (CET)
Lines: 44
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <Pine.OSX.4.58.0311271617180.7125@forastero.dynamic.schlyter.se>
 <3FCE30E7.6040505@cisco.com>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
Cc: IETF DNSEXT WG <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Thu Dec 04 12:38:42 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: Josh Littlefield <joshl@cisco.com>
In-Reply-To: <3FCE30E7.6040505@cisco.com>
Precedence: bulk

On Wed, 3 Dec 2003, Josh Littlefield wrote:

> I'd recommend changing para. 2 of 2.1.2, as follows:
>
> [..]

thanks, I think your new text is much more clear - I've incorporated it
with only small changes based on other comments.

> This paragraph:
>
>     A zone MUST NOT generate an NSEC RR for any domain name that only
>     holds glue records.
>
> Doesn't seem to belong the section describing the type bitmap field.  It
> belongs in Section 2.  It is not related to "wire-format", but to when
> an NSEC RR should exist.

this paragraph has been removed as it describes protocol, not rdata
format.

> Additional comments:
>
>     - If the TYPE# notation can be used for unknown RR types in a
> symbolic list of RR types, then this should be explicitly mentioned.
> Otherwise, the presense of one unknown type would force the entire set
> to be printed using decimal notation.

as of RFC3597, there is nothing special about the TYPE# notation. this
paragraph has been updated, see my reply to peter koch.

>     - An example of the actual binary data (octet by octet) for an NSEC
> RR using at least two non-sequential "window blocks" would be useful.

I'll add this to the 'NSEC RR Example' section.


	jakob

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:45 2006
From: Erik Rozendaal <erik@NLnetLabs.nl>
Subject: Re: Q20: expanding wildcards in the authority section
Date: Thu, 04 Dec 2003 13:49:17 +0100
Lines: 37
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <265EC638-13FB-11D8-9A3D-000393C783A2@isi.edu> <20031127101627.667a2ad0.olaf@ripe.net>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Thu Dec 04 14:04:02 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US; rv:1.5) Gecko/20031007
X-Accept-Language: en-us, en
To: "Olaf M. Kolkman" <olaf@ripe.net>
In-Reply-To: <20031127101627.667a2ad0.olaf@ripe.net>
Precedence: bulk

Olaf M. Kolkman wrote:
> 
>   Q20: Expansion of wild cards in the authority section.
> 
>       Default action, based on sense of the room at IETF58, is to not
>       expand the owner names of e.g. wildcard  NSEC RRs.
>      
>       If there is no further prohibitive objections by December 8 this 
>       will be taken as consensus of the working group.

I find this rather inconsistent with the normal behavior of wildcards. 
Currently wildcard owner names are always expanded to match the SNAME.

The current NSD DNSSEC implementation expands the wildcard NSEC record. 
However, changing it to not expand the wildcard is not a big deal.  But I'd 
still prefer consistent wildcard behavior when the wildcard matches the SNAME.

So (in order of preference) I'd like:

1. The wildcard MUST always be expanded when it matches SNAME.
2. The wildcard MUST NOT be expanded for NSEC records in the authority 
section even if it matches SNAME.
3. The wildcard MAY/SHOULD/SHOULD NOT be expanded.

Option 3 has additional complications for the client/resolver and would not 
be a good idea in my opinion.

I prefer option 1 but do not mind option 2.

Erik


--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:45 2006
From: Mark.Andrews@isc.org
Subject: Re: Q20: expanding wildcards in the authority section
Date: Fri, 05 Dec 2003 00:41:00 +1100
Lines: 88
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <3FCF2D4D.9050506@nlnetlabs.nl>
Cc: "Olaf M. Kolkman" <olaf@ripe.net>, namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Thu Dec 04 14:51:32 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: Erik Rozendaal <erik@NLnetLabs.nl>
In-reply-to: Your message of "Thu, 04 Dec 2003 13:49:17 BST."
             <3FCF2D4D.9050506@nlnetlabs.nl> 
Precedence: bulk


> Olaf M. Kolkman wrote:
> > 
> >   Q20: Expansion of wild cards in the authority section.
> > 
> >       Default action, based on sense of the room at IETF58, is to not
> >       expand the owner names of e.g. wildcard  NSEC RRs.
> >      
> >       If there is no further prohibitive objections by December 8 this 
> >       will be taken as consensus of the working group.
> 
> I find this rather inconsistent with the normal behavior of wildcards. 
> Currently wildcard owner names are always expanded to match the SNAME.
> 
> The current NSD DNSSEC implementation expands the wildcard NSEC record. 
> However, changing it to not expand the wildcard is not a big deal.  But I'd 
> still prefer consistent wildcard behavior when the wildcard matches the SNAME
> .
> 
> So (in order of preference) I'd like:
> 
> 1. The wildcard MUST always be expanded when it matches SNAME.
> 2. The wildcard MUST NOT be expanded for NSEC records in the authority 
> section even if it matches SNAME.
> 3. The wildcard MAY/SHOULD/SHOULD NOT be expanded.
> 
> Option 3 has additional complications for the client/resolver and would not 
> be a good idea in my opinion.
> 
> I prefer option 1 but do not mind option 2.
> 
> Erik

	Say you have

	QNAME c.example.
	QTYPE A
	
	And you get the following back:

	(expanded *)
	RCODE=NOERROR Answer count=0
	c.example. NSEC b.example. TXT NSEC RRSIG
	c.example. RRSIG ...
	b.example. NSEC d.example. A NSEC RRSIG
	b.example. RRSIG ...

	(unexpanded *)
	RCODE=NOERROR Answer count=0
	*.example. NSEC b.example. TXT NSEC RRSIG
	*.example. RRSIG ...
	b.example. NSEC d.example. A NSEC RRSIG
	b.example. RRSIG ...

	The tests the validator has to go through for NOERROR NODATA
	are:

	Does QNAME exist? ****
	Yes: Is it a empty node
	     Yes: SUCCESS
	     No: Does the type exist at the node?
		 Yes: FAIL
		 No: SUCCESS
	No: Does a wildcard exist?  ****
	    Yes: Does the type exist in the wildcard? ****
		 Yes: FAIL
	         No: SUCCESS
	     No: FAIL
	
	Which of the above two answers makes it easier to answer the
	**** questions?

	Mark

> --
> to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
> the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
> archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>
--
Mark Andrews, Internet Software Consortium
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: Mark.Andrews@isc.org

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:45 2006
From: Chris Thompson <cet1@cus.cam.ac.uk>
Subject: Re: List administration
Date: Thu, 4 Dec 2003 14:01:28 +0000 (GMT)
Lines: 40
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <nospam-1070505308.40739@gw.gbch.net>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Thu Dec 04 15:13:41 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
In-Reply-To: <nospam-1070505308.40739@gw.gbch.net> from "Greg Black" at Dec 4, 3 12:35:07 pm
X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4 PL24]
Content-Length: 1492
Precedence: bulk

<delurk>

gjb@gbch.net (Greg Black) writes:
> 
> On 2003-12-03, Dean Anderson wrote:
[...]
> > He said he was altering the operations of his mail servers to delete mail
> > that wasn't delivered in one hour.  This is unreasonable, regardless of
> > what Verizon does.
> 
> Yes, it utterly unreasonable.  Things go wrong in the real
> world:  power utilities have disasters; fires, floods and solar
> flares cause problems; computer hardware loses its magic smoke.
> Many people have stopped using backup MX hosts, as these just
> seem to collect extra spam.
> 
> Because of all these factors, mailing lists should be prepared
> to queue mail to subscribers for at least a few days. 

Make that "mail servers in general" rather than just mailing lists,
and I have to agree, no argument. Locally the angels-on-a-pin contention 
has traditionally been whether 4 days or 5 days is the "right" timeout.

However, I can certainly sympathise with Randy about the highly
antisocial behaviour of servers that use 4xx codes unnecessarily to 
[not] reject suspected spam. We haven't heard his side of this yet, 
but often the right way to penalise such servers is not to shorten
the ultimate timeout, but to decrease the retry rate for transmission
attempts.

</delurk>

Chris Thompson
Email: cet1@cam.ac.uk

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:45 2006
From: "Andrew Draper" <ADRAPER@altera.com>
Subject: RE: nsec++
Date: Thu, 4 Dec 2003 14:16:24 -0000
Lines: 100
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain;
	charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Cc: "IETF DNSEXT WG" <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Thu Dec 04 15:27:47 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
content-class: urn:content-classes:message
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft Exchange V6.0.6249.0
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
Thread-Topic: nsec++ 
Thread-Index: AcO6VdnqrFAUErDJTBKsxvBcXqr7HgAGRdyA
To: "Jakob Schlyter" <jakob@rfc.se>
X-OriginalArrivalTime: 04 Dec 2003 14:16:26.0528 (UTC) FILETIME=[3422EA00:01C3BA71]
X-BigFish: v
Precedence: bulk

Hi,

While not wishing to reopen (too much) the debate about how to encode =
this efficiently, I have a suggestion which might make the encoding of =
sparse NSEC records a lot smaller, while being only slightly harder to =
understand and I think no harder to implement.

If the types encoded are sparse then the bitmaps will tend to have a lot =
of zeros at the start of them.  For example the RDATA for:

example.com. IN NSEC host.example.com. 385

will be encoded as, I think:

      04 'h' 'o' 's' 't'  06 'e' 'x' 'a' 'm' 'p' 'l' 'e'  03 'c' 'o' 'm' =
 00
      01 11  00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00  02
      (all numbers are in hex)

which has a lot of superfluous zeros.

There are three bits spare in the "bitmap length" byte (if you store =
bitmap_length-1 instead of just bitmap_length) so it would be much more =
efficient, for sparse bitmaps, if the block start was allowed to be on =
any boundary of 32.

The encoding of the same RR would then be:

      04 'h' 'o' 's' 't'  06 'e' 'x' 'a' 'm' 'p' 'l' 'e'  03 'c' 'o' 'm' =
 00
      0C 00  02


If you like this then suggested text is below (I wrote this yesterday so =
some of the alternative suggested descriptions of bitmap might be better =
than this one):


   The type space is represented using one or more blocks.  Each block
   starts at a location in type space which is a multiple of 32 and=20
   describes upto 256 active types.  Each block consists of a 13 bit
   start type number, a 5 bit length field (from 1 .. 32 octets) and
   a bitmap (covering upto 256 type codes) in network bit order
   (similar to NXT).

   Blocks with no types present MUST NOT be included.  Blocks MUST NOT
   overlap.  There MUST NOT be more than three leading zero octets in
   the bitmap.  Trailing zero octets in the bitmap MUST be removed. =20
   Blocks MUST be presented in increasing numerical order.

   Where two encodings are possible, the encoding which produces the
   smallest RRDATA size MUST be chosen.  If two encodings produce the
   same RRDATA size then the one which uses the smallest number of
   blocks MUST be chosen.

        [ This last rule is required to handle edge cases such as
            NSEC host.example.com. 256 511  =20
          or
            NSEC host.example.com. 264 288=20
          An alternative would be to say "The start type of a
          block MUST be 256 or more greater than the start
          address of the previous block" but this is less efficient ]

   The format of each block is as shown below:

                        1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   /     Start Type      | Length  |    Bitmap of active types     /
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   /             Bitmap of active types (continued) ...           =20
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   The Start Type field indicates the numeric value of the first bit
   represented in the bitmap.  The least significant 5 bits are always
   zero and are not stored in the RR.  A value of 1 in this field
   indicates that the first bit in the bitmap represents type 32, a
   value of 1024 indicates that the first bit represents type 32768.

   The Length field holds the number of octet in the bitmap of active
   types, minus 1.  A value of 0 in this field therefore indicates
   that the bitmap is one octet long, a value of 31 indicates that the
   bitmap is 32 octets.

   The Bitmap field is divided up into octets, one for each type.
   The presence of the first type is indicated by the least significant
   bit in the first octet, the next type by the second least significant
   bit etc.  The second octet (if present) indicates the presence of
   the 9th to 16th types etc.



Regards,
    Andy

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:45 2006
From: Erik Rozendaal <erik@NLnetLabs.nl>
Subject: Re: Q20: expanding wildcards in the authority section
Date: Thu, 04 Dec 2003 15:21:57 +0100
Lines: 75
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <200312041341.hB4Df03f008688@drugs.dv.isc.org>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Cc: "Olaf M. Kolkman" <olaf@ripe.net>, namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Thu Dec 04 15:31:53 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US; rv:1.5) Gecko/20031007
X-Accept-Language: en-us, en
To: Mark.Andrews@isc.org
In-Reply-To: <200312041341.hB4Df03f008688@drugs.dv.isc.org>
Precedence: bulk

Mark.Andrews@isc.org wrote:
> 
> 
> 	Say you have
> 
> 	QNAME c.example.
> 	QTYPE A
> 	
> 	And you get the following back:
> 
> 	(expanded *)
> 	RCODE=NOERROR Answer count=0
> 	c.example. NSEC b.example. TXT NSEC RRSIG
> 	c.example. RRSIG ...
> 	b.example. NSEC d.example. A NSEC RRSIG
> 	b.example. RRSIG ...

Although the c.example. NSEC record looks a little funny, checking the 
RRSIG will show that the "true" owner name of the NSEC record is *.example. 
  So the same information is present whether the * is expanded or not.  And 
because checking RRSIGs is required anyway there is no additional processing.

Also note that querying for

QNAME c.example.
QTYPE NSEC

will also return

c.example NSEC b.example. TXT NSEC RRSIG
c.example RRSIG ....

but this time in the answer section.  And again the client will know the 
record was generated from a wildcard record.

> 
> 	(unexpanded *)
> 	RCODE=NOERROR Answer count=0
> 	*.example. NSEC b.example. TXT NSEC RRSIG
> 	*.example. RRSIG ...
> 	b.example. NSEC d.example. A NSEC RRSIG
> 	b.example. RRSIG ...
> 
> 	The tests the validator has to go through for NOERROR NODATA
> 	are:
> 
> 	Does QNAME exist? ****
> 	Yes: Is it a empty node
> 	     Yes: SUCCESS
> 	     No: Does the type exist at the node?
> 		 Yes: FAIL
> 		 No: SUCCESS
> 	No: Does a wildcard exist?  ****
> 	    Yes: Does the type exist in the wildcard? ****
> 		 Yes: FAIL
> 	         No: SUCCESS
> 	     No: FAIL
> 	
> 	Which of the above two answers makes it easier to answer the
> 	**** questions?

Given that the client knows a name was generated from a wildcard I do not 
see any differences in the difficulties of answering the above questions.

But your explanation does make it clearer to me why unexpanded wildcards 
were chosen, even though I still slightly prefer expanded wildcards.

Erik


--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:45 2006
From: Miek Gieben <miekg@atoom.net>
Subject: Re: nsec++
Date: Thu, 4 Dec 2003 15:31:38 +0100
Lines: 21
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <45E39EE2E44FD443AEFAC07728BF3B50074A0F@uk-ismsg02.altera.priv.altera.com>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Cc: Jakob Schlyter <jakob@rfc.se>, IETF DNSEXT WG <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Thu Dec 04 15:39:41 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: Andrew Draper <ADRAPER@altera.com>
Mail-Followup-To: Andrew Draper <ADRAPER@altera.com>,
	Jakob Schlyter <jakob@rfc.se>,
	IETF DNSEXT WG <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Content-Disposition: inline
In-Reply-To: <45E39EE2E44FD443AEFAC07728BF3B50074A0F@uk-ismsg02.altera.priv.altera.com>
User-Agent: Vim/Mutt/Linux
X-Home: www.miek.nl
X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new
Precedence: bulk

[On 04 Dec, @15:16, Andrew wrote in "RE: nsec++ ..."]
> Hi,
> 
> While not wishing to reopen (too much) the debate about how to encode this
> efficiently, I have a suggestion which might make the encoding of sparse NSEC

Uhm.... I _just_ finished the parsing of the previous nsec definition...

I think we don't want to make the NSEC more difficult than it already is
(compared to the NXT definition). 

So I would vote to keep the current NSEC definition as it as and get used to 
the fact is takes up a few more bytes,

grtz Miek

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:45 2006
From: Jakob Schlyter <jakob@rfc.se>
Subject: Re: nsec++
Date: Thu, 4 Dec 2003 15:44:28 +0100 (CET)
Lines: 49
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <Pine.OSX.4.58.0311271617180.7125@forastero.dynamic.schlyter.se>
 <3FCE30E7.6040505@cisco.com> <Pine.OSX.4.58.0312041157230.1563@criollo.schlyter.se>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
Cc: IETF DNSEXT WG <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Thu Dec 04 15:53:29 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: Josh Littlefield <joshl@cisco.com>
In-Reply-To: <Pine.OSX.4.58.0312041157230.1563@criollo.schlyter.se>
Precedence: bulk

On Thu, 4 Dec 2003, Jakob Schlyter wrote:

> >     - An example of the actual binary data (octet by octet) for an NSEC
> > RR using at least two non-sequential "window blocks" would be useful.
>
> I'll add this to the 'NSEC RR Example' section.

2.3 NSEC RR Example

   The following NSEC RR identifies the RRsets associated with
   alfa.example.com. and identifies the next authoritative name after
   alfa.example.com.

   alfa.example.com. 86400 IN NSEC host.example.com. A MX RRSIG NSEC TYPE1234

   The first four text fields specify the name, TTL, Class, and RR type
   (NSEC).  The entry host.example.com. is the next authoritative name
   after alfa.example.com. in canonical order. The A, MX, RRSIG and NSEC
   mnemonics indicate there are A, MX, RRSIG, NSEC and TYPE1234 RRsets
   associated with the name alfa.example.com.

   The RDATA section of the NSEC RR above would be encoded as:

         0x04 'h'  'o'  's'  't'
         0x07 'e'  'x'  'a'  'm'  'p'  'l'  'e'
         0x03 'c'  'o'  'm'  0x00
         0x00 0x06 0x40 0x01 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x03
         0x04 0x1b 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
         0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
         0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
         0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x20

   Assuming that the resolver can authenticate this NSEC record, it
   could be used to prove that beta.example.com does not exist, or could
   be used to prove there is no AAAA record associated with
   alfa.example.com.  Authenticated denial of existence is discussed in
   RFC 2535 [2].


	jakob

-- 
Jakob Schlyter <jakob@rfc.se> +46 70 595 07 94

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:45 2006
From: Roy Arends <roy@logmess.com>
Subject: RE: nsec++
Date: Thu, 4 Dec 2003 16:01:56 +0100 (CET)
Lines: 55
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <45E39EE2E44FD443AEFAC07728BF3B50074A0F@uk-ismsg02.altera.priv.altera.com>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
Cc: Jakob Schlyter <jakob@rfc.se>, IETF DNSEXT WG <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Thu Dec 04 16:16:17 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-Authentication-Warning: elektron.atoom.net: roy owned process doing -bs
X-X-Sender: roy@elektron.atoom.net
To: Andrew Draper <ADRAPER@altera.com>
In-Reply-To: <45E39EE2E44FD443AEFAC07728BF3B50074A0F@uk-ismsg02.altera.priv.altera.com>
X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new
Precedence: bulk

On Thu, 4 Dec 2003, Andrew Draper wrote:

> Hi,
>
> While not wishing to reopen (too much) the debate about how to encode
> this efficiently, I have a suggestion which might make the encoding of
> sparse NSEC records a lot smaller, while being only slightly harder to
> understand and I think no harder to implement.
>
> If the types encoded are sparse then the bitmaps will tend to have a lot
> of zeros at the start of them.  For example the RDATA for:
>
> example.com. IN NSEC host.example.com. 385
>
> will be encoded as, I think:
>
>       04 'h' 'o' 's' 't'  06 'e' 'x' 'a' 'm' 'p' 'l' 'e'  03 'c' 'o' 'm'  00
>       01 11  00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00  02
>       (all numbers are in hex)
>
> which has a lot of superfluous zeros.
>
> There are three bits spare in the "bitmap length" byte (if you store bitmap_length-1 instead of just bitmap_length) so it would be much more efficient, for sparse bitmaps, if the block start was allowed to be on any boundary of 32.
>
> The encoding of the same RR would then be:
>
>       04 'h' 'o' 's' 't'  06 'e' 'x' 'a' 'm' 'p' 'l' 'e'  03 'c' 'o' 'm'  00
>       0C 00  02
>
>
> If you like this then suggested text is below (I wrote this yesterday so some of the alternative suggested descriptions of bitmap might be better than this one):
>
>
>    The type space is represented using one or more blocks.  Each block
>    starts at a location in type space which is a multiple of 32 and
>    describes upto 256 active types.  Each block consists of a 13 bit
>    start type number, a 5 bit length field (from 1 .. 32 octets) and
>    a bitmap (covering upto 256 type codes) in network bit order
>    (similar to NXT).

One of the design requirements, and therefor one of the reasons some
proposals did not make it is that the bit map must be able to respresent
every type in one bitmap.

Your encoding gives us a worst case length of 69632 which is >64K

Roy



--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:45 2006
From: "Andrew Draper" <ADRAPER@altera.com>
Subject: RE: nsec++
Date: Thu, 4 Dec 2003 15:06:16 -0000
Lines: 90
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain;
	charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Cc: "Jakob Schlyter" <jakob@rfc.se>,
	"IETF DNSEXT WG" <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Thu Dec 04 16:19:36 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
content-class: urn:content-classes:message
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft Exchange V6.0.6249.0
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
Thread-Topic: nsec++ 
Thread-Index: AcO6d2wYWcKyofKMR8adTmYhSupv+wAAEYyQ
To: "Roy Arends" <roy@logmess.com>
X-OriginalArrivalTime: 04 Dec 2003 15:06:19.0099 (UTC) FILETIME=[2BD902B0:01C3BA78]
X-BigFish: v
Precedence: bulk

Roy,

I think the maximum size of my encoding is the same as the one specified =
in version 0 of the draft.  Use 256 blocks, each 34 octets long, gives =
8704 octets total.

All I suggest changing is to allow the start value of each block to be =
on a multiple of 32 instead of a multiple of 256.

Regards,
    Andy


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Roy Arends [mailto:roy@logmess.com]
> Sent: 04 December 2003 15:02
> To: Andrew Draper
> Cc: Jakob Schlyter; IETF DNSEXT WG
> Subject: RE: nsec++=20
>=20
>=20
> On Thu, 4 Dec 2003, Andrew Draper wrote:
>=20
> > Hi,
> >
> > While not wishing to reopen (too much) the debate about how=20
> to encode
> > this efficiently, I have a suggestion which might make the=20
> encoding of
> > sparse NSEC records a lot smaller, while being only=20
> slightly harder to
> > understand and I think no harder to implement.
> >
> > If the types encoded are sparse then the bitmaps will tend=20
> to have a lot
> > of zeros at the start of them.  For example the RDATA for:
> >
> > example.com. IN NSEC host.example.com. 385
> >
> > will be encoded as, I think:
> >
> >       04 'h' 'o' 's' 't'  06 'e' 'x' 'a' 'm' 'p' 'l' 'e' =20
> 03 'c' 'o' 'm'  00
> >       01 11  00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00  02
> >       (all numbers are in hex)
> >
> > which has a lot of superfluous zeros.
> >
> > There are three bits spare in the "bitmap length" byte (if=20
> you store bitmap_length-1 instead of just bitmap_length) so=20
> it would be much more efficient, for sparse bitmaps, if the=20
> block start was allowed to be on any boundary of 32.
> >
> > The encoding of the same RR would then be:
> >
> >       04 'h' 'o' 's' 't'  06 'e' 'x' 'a' 'm' 'p' 'l' 'e' =20
> 03 'c' 'o' 'm'  00
> >       0C 00  02
> >
> >
> > If you like this then suggested text is below (I wrote this=20
> yesterday so some of the alternative suggested descriptions=20
> of bitmap might be better than this one):
> >
> >
> >    The type space is represented using one or more blocks. =20
> Each block
> >    starts at a location in type space which is a multiple of 32 and
> >    describes upto 256 active types.  Each block consists of a 13 bit
> >    start type number, a 5 bit length field (from 1 .. 32 octets) and
> >    a bitmap (covering upto 256 type codes) in network bit order
> >    (similar to NXT).
>=20
> One of the design requirements, and therefor one of the reasons some
> proposals did not make it is that the bit map must be able to=20
> respresent
> every type in one bitmap.
>=20
> Your encoding gives us a worst case length of 69632 which is >64K
>=20
> Roy
>=20
>=20
>=20

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:45 2006
From: Erik Rozendaal <erik@NLnetLabs.nl>
Subject: Re: Q20: expanding wildcards in the authority section
Date: Thu, 04 Dec 2003 16:55:25 +0100
Lines: 52
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <200312041341.hB4Df03f008688@drugs.dv.isc.org> <3FCF4305.7030602@nlnetlabs.nl>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Cc: Mark.Andrews@isc.org, "Olaf M. Kolkman" <olaf@ripe.net>,
   namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Thu Dec 04 17:11:44 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US; rv:1.5) Gecko/20031007
X-Accept-Language: en-us, en
To: Erik Rozendaal <erik@nlnetlabs.nl>
In-Reply-To: <3FCF4305.7030602@nlnetlabs.nl>
Precedence: bulk

Erik Rozendaal wrote:
> But your explanation does make it clearer to me why unexpanded wildcards 
> were chosen, even though I still slightly prefer expanded wildcards.

Actually, I think I've changed my mind and I prefer not expanding wildcards 
for NSEC records in the authority section.

Consider a zone with the following RRs:

*.wc. IN NSEC xx TXT NSEC RRSIG
*.wc. IN RRSIG ...
xx.   IN NSEC yy TXT NSEC RRSIG
xx.   IN RRSIG ...

and the query

QNAME: foo.wc
QTYPE: A

Answer with expanded wildcard:

*.wc IN NSEC xx. TXT NSEC RRSIG
*.wc IN RRSIG ...
foo.wc IN NSEC xx. TXT NSEC RRSIG
foo.wc IN RRSIG ...

In this case the same RRset is included twice: the first time to prove the 
non-existance of foo.wc (no expansion of wildcard because the wildcard is 
not used as a match for QNAME) and the second time to show the QTYPE does 
not exist at the matched wildcard.  Of course, only one of these is really 
necessary but then we need to decide whether to include the expanded or 
unexpanded version in this particular case.

Answer without expanded wildcard:

*.wc IN NSEC xx. TXT NSEC RRSIG
*.wc IN RRSIG ...

In this case the RRset only needs to be included once and there is no 
(potential) ambiguity.

So I'll go with the current draft specification as it is (not expanding 
wildcards).

Erik


--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:45 2006
From: Roy Arends <roy@logmess.com>
Subject: RE: nsec++
Date: Thu, 4 Dec 2003 17:01:37 +0100 (CET)
Lines: 31
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <45E39EE2E44FD443AEFAC07728BF3B5054B01D@uk-ismsg02.altera.priv.altera.com>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
Cc: Jakob Schlyter <jakob@rfc.se>, IETF DNSEXT WG <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Thu Dec 04 17:21:01 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-Authentication-Warning: elektron.atoom.net: roy owned process doing -bs
X-X-Sender: roy@elektron.atoom.net
To: Andrew Draper <ADRAPER@altera.com>
In-Reply-To: <45E39EE2E44FD443AEFAC07728BF3B5054B01D@uk-ismsg02.altera.priv.altera.com>
X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new
Precedence: bulk

On Thu, 4 Dec 2003, Andrew Draper wrote:

> Roy,
>
> I think the maximum size of my encoding is the same as the one specified
> in version 0 of the draft.  Use 256 blocks, each 34 octets long, gives
> 8704 octets total.
>
> All I suggest changing is to allow the start value of each block to be
> on a multiple of 32 instead of a multiple of 256.

So the worst case scenario would not be that different. The 'multiplier'
would now be 32 instead of 256, where you'd have a special graph-like
algortihm to determine the most optimized presentation.

You'd have to calculate all possible encodings to determine which one is
the shortest.

I don't think RDATA size is really that important to allow for discrete
mathematics to determine the shortest representation.

The current one (nsec++) satisfies all requirements. Yours adds
complexity.

Roy

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:45 2006
From: Jakob Schlyter <jakob@rfc.se>
Subject: nsec++ (-01)
Date: Thu, 4 Dec 2003 17:27:52 +0100 (CET)
Lines: 15
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <Pine.OSX.4.58.0311271617180.7125@forastero.dynamic.schlyter.se>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Thu Dec 04 17:40:53 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: IETF DNSEXT WG <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
In-Reply-To: <Pine.OSX.4.58.0311271617180.7125@forastero.dynamic.schlyter.se>
Precedence: bulk

an updated version of the draft respecifying the rdata format for nsec has
been submitted to the drafts editor and can also be found at the following
address:

    http://www.rfc.se/~jakob/ietf/draft-ietf-dnsext-nsec-rdata-01.txt

please send comments to namedroppers,

	jakob

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:45 2006
From: "Andrew Draper" <ADRAPER@altera.com>
Subject: RE: nsec++
Date: Thu, 4 Dec 2003 16:22:41 -0000
Lines: 90
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain;
	charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Cc: "Jakob Schlyter" <jakob@rfc.se>,
	"IETF DNSEXT WG" <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Thu Dec 04 17:42:01 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
content-class: urn:content-classes:message
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft Exchange V6.0.6249.0
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
Thread-Topic: nsec++ 
Thread-Index: AcO6f8VRKzRiKc3NQDK0lUbOq15LagAAJQFw
To: "Roy Arends" <roy@logmess.com>
X-OriginalArrivalTime: 04 Dec 2003 16:22:43.0619 (UTC) FILETIME=[D86F3F30:01C3BA82]
X-BigFish: v
Precedence: bulk

Roy,

The algorithm for calculating the smallest RR is very simple.  It's =
something like this:

next =3D 0;
while (there are types with a value >=3D next)
{
	start =3D first active type with a value of next or more
	start =3D start - (start % 32); // round down to multiple of 32

	Create a temporary bitmap containing all types from start to start + =
255
	length =3D 32

	Trim zero octets off the end of the bitmap, reducing length as you do

	Look for three consecutive zeros in the bitmap, at byte offsets 1, 5, 9 =
etc.
	If you find one then set the length of the bitmap to the address at =
which
      you found it.

	Output the bitmap, specifying the start address and the length.
	next =3D start + length * 8
}

I could write it in real C, but I'm sure you get the idea.  Of course =
the algorithm above could be optimised for processing time.

This looks like a trivial piece of code to me, it certainly isn't =
discrete mathematics.

If small RRDATA size isn't considered important then I'll shut up, but =
my experience is that one of the things holding DNSSEC back is that =
users think it causes enormous increases in packet size.  Putting a bit =
of thought into saving some bytes seems worth it to me.

Regards,
    Andy




> -----Original Message-----
> From: Roy Arends [mailto:roy@logmess.com]
> Sent: 04 December 2003 16:02
> To: Andrew Draper
> Cc: Jakob Schlyter; IETF DNSEXT WG
> Subject: RE: nsec++=20
>=20
>=20
> On Thu, 4 Dec 2003, Andrew Draper wrote:
>=20
> > Roy,
> >
> > I think the maximum size of my encoding is the same as the=20
> one specified
> > in version 0 of the draft.  Use 256 blocks, each 34 octets=20
> long, gives
> > 8704 octets total.
> >
> > All I suggest changing is to allow the start value of each=20
> block to be
> > on a multiple of 32 instead of a multiple of 256.
>=20
> So the worst case scenario would not be that different. The=20
> 'multiplier'
> would now be 32 instead of 256, where you'd have a special graph-like
> algortihm to determine the most optimized presentation.
>=20
> You'd have to calculate all possible encodings to determine=20
> which one is
> the shortest.
>=20
> I don't think RDATA size is really that important to allow=20
> for discrete
> mathematics to determine the shortest representation.
>=20
> The current one (nsec++) satisfies all requirements. Yours adds
> complexity.
>=20
> Roy
>=20

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:45 2006
From: Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com>
Subject: Re: nsec++
Date: Thu, 04 Dec 2003 16:39:45 +0000
Lines: 15
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <miekg@atoom.net>
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Thu Dec 04 17:54:18 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: IETF DNSEXT WG <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
In-Reply-To: Message from Miek Gieben <miekg@atoom.net> 
	of "Thu, 04 Dec 2003 15:31:38 +0100."
	<20031204143138.GA26856@atoom.net> 
X-Mailer: MH-E 7.4; nmh 1.0.4; GNU Emacs 21.3.1
Precedence: bulk

> ...
> I think we don't want to make the NSEC more difficult than it already is
> (compared to the NXT definition). 
> 
> So I would vote to keep the current NSEC definition as it as and get
> used to the fact is takes up a few more bytes,

it's all just fun and games until microsoft decides to sign zones containing
their private-allocation types (in the 65000 range.)

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:45 2006
From: Miek Gieben <miekg@atoom.net>
Subject: Re: nsec++
Date: Thu, 4 Dec 2003 18:33:09 +0100
Lines: 21
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <20031204143138.GA26856@atoom.net> <20031204163945.B52C513991@sa.vix.com>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Thu Dec 04 18:48:25 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: IETF DNSEXT WG <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Mail-Followup-To: IETF DNSEXT WG <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Content-Disposition: inline
In-Reply-To: <20031204163945.B52C513991@sa.vix.com>
User-Agent: Vim/Mutt/Linux
X-Home: www.miek.nl
X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new
Precedence: bulk

[On 04 Dec, @17:39, Paul wrote in "Re: nsec++ ..."]
> > ...
> > I think we don't want to make the NSEC more difficult than it already is
> > (compared to the NXT definition). 
> > 
> > So I would vote to keep the current NSEC definition as it as and get
> > used to the fact is takes up a few more bytes,
> 
> it's all just fun and games until microsoft decides to sign zones containing
> their private-allocation types (in the 65000 range.)

so with this definition of the NSEC record we will not see an 7 to 10 times
increase in zone sizes with DNSSEC? 

grtz Miek

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:45 2006
From: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org
Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-dnsext-nsec-rdata-01.txt
Date: Thu, 04 Dec 2003 15:32:53 -0500
Lines: 87
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Reply-To: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: Multipart/Mixed; Boundary="NextPart"
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Thu Dec 04 21:55:01 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: IETF-Announce: ;
Precedence: bulk

--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the DNS Extensions Working Group of the IETF.

	Title		: DNSSEC NSEC RDATA Format
	Author(s)	: J. Schlyter
	Filename	: draft-ietf-dnsext-nsec-rdata-01.txt
	Pages		: 9
	Date		: 2003-12-4
	
This document defines updates the NSEC resource record RDATA format
to cover all type codes.

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-nsec-rdata-01.txt

To remove yourself from the IETF Announcement list, send a message to 
ietf-announce-request with the word unsubscribe in the body of the message.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP. Login with the username
"anonymous" and a password of your e-mail address. After logging in,
type "cd internet-drafts" and then
	"get draft-ietf-dnsext-nsec-rdata-01.txt".

A list of Internet-Drafts directories can be found in
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html 
or ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt


Internet-Drafts can also be obtained by e-mail.

Send a message to:
	mailserv@ietf.org.
In the body type:
	"FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-nsec-rdata-01.txt".
	
NOTE:	The mail server at ietf.org can return the document in
	MIME-encoded form by using the "mpack" utility.  To use this
	feature, insert the command "ENCODING mime" before the "FILE"
	command.  To decode the response(s), you will need "munpack" or
	a MIME-compliant mail reader.  Different MIME-compliant mail readers
	exhibit different behavior, especially when dealing with
	"multipart" MIME messages (i.e. documents which have been split
	up into multiple messages), so check your local documentation on
	how to manipulate these messages.
		
		
Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant mail reader
implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version of the
Internet-Draft.

--NextPart
Content-Type: Multipart/Alternative; Boundary="OtherAccess"

--OtherAccess
Content-Type: Message/External-body;
	access-type="mail-server";
	server="mailserv@ietf.org"

Content-Type: text/plain
Content-ID:	<2003-12-4154208.I-D@ietf.org>

ENCODING mime
FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-nsec-rdata-01.txt

--OtherAccess
Content-Type: Message/External-body;
	name="draft-ietf-dnsext-nsec-rdata-01.txt";
	site="ftp.ietf.org";
	access-type="anon-ftp";
	directory="internet-drafts"

Content-Type: text/plain
Content-ID:	<2003-12-4154208.I-D@ietf.org>

--OtherAccess--

--NextPart--



--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:45 2006
From: Mark.Andrews@isc.org
Subject: Re: nsec++
Date: Fri, 05 Dec 2003 08:09:25 +1100
Lines: 119
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <45E39EE2E44FD443AEFAC07728BF3B50074A11@uk-ismsg02.altera.priv.altera.com>
Cc: "Roy Arends" <roy@logmess.com>, "Jakob Schlyter" <jakob@rfc.se>,
        "IETF DNSEXT WG" <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Thu Dec 04 22:26:01 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: "Andrew Draper" <ADRAPER@altera.com>
In-reply-to: Your message of "Thu, 04 Dec 2003 16:22:41 -0000."
             <45E39EE2E44FD443AEFAC07728BF3B50074A11@uk-ismsg02.altera.priv.altera.com> 
Precedence: bulk


	If you want to start at 32 bit boundraries you stop the
	current bitmap if you have a 32 bit subwindow that is all
	zeros.
	
	It takes 4 octets to represent a empty 32 bit subwindow.
	It takes 2 octets to start a new window.

	The algorithm would be:

	Find the first/next active 32 bit window.
	If the next the next 32 bit window is active include in in the
	current bitmap otherwise the current bitmap is complete.
	Repeat adding 32 bit windows until the bitmap is 256 bits long.
	
	Repeat until all types are accounted for.

	Mark

> Roy,
> 
> The algorithm for calculating the smallest RR is very simple.  It's something
>  like this:
> 
> next = 0;
> while (there are types with a value >= next)
> {
> 	start = first active type with a value of next or more
> 	start = start - (start % 32); // round down to multiple of 32
> 
> 	Create a temporary bitmap containing all types from start to start + 25
> 5
> 	length = 32
> 
> 	Trim zero octets off the end of the bitmap, reducing length as you do
> 
> 	Look for three consecutive zeros in the bitmap, at byte offsets 1, 5, 9
>  etc.
> 	If you find one then set the length of the bitmap to the address at whi
> ch
>       you found it.
> 
> 	Output the bitmap, specifying the start address and the length.
> 	next = start + length * 8
> }
> 
> I could write it in real C, but I'm sure you get the idea.  Of course the alg
> orithm above could be optimised for processing time.
> 
> This looks like a trivial piece of code to me, it certainly isn't discrete ma
> thematics.
> 
> If small RRDATA size isn't considered important then I'll shut up, but my exp
> erience is that one of the things holding DNSSEC back is that users think it 
> causes enormous increases in packet size.  Putting a bit of thought into savi
> ng some bytes seems worth it to me.
> 
> Regards,
>     Andy
> 
> 
> 
> 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Roy Arends [mailto:roy@logmess.com]
> > Sent: 04 December 2003 16:02
> > To: Andrew Draper
> > Cc: Jakob Schlyter; IETF DNSEXT WG
> > Subject: RE: nsec++ 
> > 
> > 
> > On Thu, 4 Dec 2003, Andrew Draper wrote:
> > 
> > > Roy,
> > >
> > > I think the maximum size of my encoding is the same as the 
> > one specified
> > > in version 0 of the draft.  Use 256 blocks, each 34 octets 
> > long, gives
> > > 8704 octets total.
> > >
> > > All I suggest changing is to allow the start value of each 
> > block to be
> > > on a multiple of 32 instead of a multiple of 256.
> > 
> > So the worst case scenario would not be that different. The 
> > 'multiplier'
> > would now be 32 instead of 256, where you'd have a special graph-like
> > algortihm to determine the most optimized presentation.
> > 
> > You'd have to calculate all possible encodings to determine 
> > which one is
> > the shortest.
> > 
> > I don't think RDATA size is really that important to allow 
> > for discrete
> > mathematics to determine the shortest representation.
> > 
> > The current one (nsec++) satisfies all requirements. Yours adds
> > complexity.
> > 
> > Roy
> > 
> 
> --
> to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
> the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
> archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>
> 
--
Mark Andrews, Internet Software Consortium
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: Mark.Andrews@isc.org

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Rob Austein <sra+namedroppers@hactrn.net>
Subject: Re: nsec++
Date: Thu, 04 Dec 2003 16:34:34 -0500
Lines: 10
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <45E39EE2E44FD443AEFAC07728BF3B50074A11@uk-ismsg02.altera.priv.altera.com>
	<200312042109.hB4L9P3f009847@drugs.dv.isc.org>
Mime-Version: 1.0 (generated by SEMI 1.14.5 - "Awara-Onsen")
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Thu Dec 04 22:52:05 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
In-Reply-To: <200312042109.hB4L9P3f009847@drugs.dv.isc.org>
User-Agent: Wanderlust/2.10.0 (Venus) Emacs/20.7 Mule/4.0 (HANANOEN)
Precedence: bulk

No offense to Andrew, but my unnecessary complexity meter was reading
yellowish green when the WG decided to go with windowed bitmaps, and
today's discussion of algorithms by which one might determine the most
compact among multiple possible encodings kicks it up into the orange.

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Mark.Andrews@isc.org
Subject: Re: nsec++
Date: Fri, 05 Dec 2003 08:36:19 +1100
Lines: 142
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Cc: "Andrew Draper" <ADRAPER@altera.com>, "Roy Arends" <roy@logmess.com>,
        "Jakob Schlyter" <jakob@rfc.se>,
        "IETF DNSEXT WG" <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Thu Dec 04 22:52:38 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
In-reply-to: Your message of "Fri, 05 Dec 2003 08:09:25 +1100."
Precedence: bulk


> 
> 	If you want to start at 32 bit boundraries you stop the
> 	current bitmap if you have a 32 bit subwindow that is all
> 	zeros.
> 	
> 	It takes 4 octets to represent a empty 32 bit subwindow.
> 	It takes 2 octets to start a new window.
> 
> 	The algorithm would be:
> 
	Find the first/next active 32 bit window.  If the last three
	octets of this 32 bit window are zero the bitmap is complete,
	remove trailing zero octets.  If the next the next 32 bit
	window is active include in in the current bitmap otherwise
	the current bitmap is complete, remove trailing zero octets.
	If the last three octets of this 32 bit window are zero the
	current bitmap is complete, remove trailing zero octets.
	Repeat adding 32 bit windows until the bitmap is 256 bits
	long.
 	
 	Repeat until all types are accounted for.

	In otherword start a new bitmap if you save more than the
	cost of introducing a new bitmap.

	If the last two octets of the current map are zero it is
	a break even situation so you include the next 32 bit
	window in the current map.
> 
> 	Mark
> 
> > Roy,
> > 
> > The algorithm for calculating the smallest RR is very simple.  It's somethi
> ng
> >  like this:
> > 
> > next = 0;
> > while (there are types with a value >= next)
> > {
> > 	start = first active type with a value of next or more
> > 	start = start - (start % 32); // round down to multiple of 32
> > 
> > 	Create a temporary bitmap containing all types from start to start + 25
> > 5
> > 	length = 32
> > 
> > 	Trim zero octets off the end of the bitmap, reducing length as you do
> > 
> > 	Look for three consecutive zeros in the bitmap, at byte offsets 1, 5, 9
> >  etc.
> > 	If you find one then set the length of the bitmap to the address at whi
> > ch
> >       you found it.
> > 
> > 	Output the bitmap, specifying the start address and the length.
> > 	next = start + length * 8
> > }
> > 
> > I could write it in real C, but I'm sure you get the idea.  Of course the a
> lg
> > orithm above could be optimised for processing time.
> > 
> > This looks like a trivial piece of code to me, it certainly isn't discrete 
> ma
> > thematics.
> > 
> > If small RRDATA size isn't considered important then I'll shut up, but my e
> xp
> > erience is that one of the things holding DNSSEC back is that users think i
> t 
> > causes enormous increases in packet size.  Putting a bit of thought into sa
> vi
> > ng some bytes seems worth it to me.
> > 
> > Regards,
> >     Andy
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: Roy Arends [mailto:roy@logmess.com]
> > > Sent: 04 December 2003 16:02
> > > To: Andrew Draper
> > > Cc: Jakob Schlyter; IETF DNSEXT WG
> > > Subject: RE: nsec++ 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > On Thu, 4 Dec 2003, Andrew Draper wrote:
> > > 
> > > > Roy,
> > > >
> > > > I think the maximum size of my encoding is the same as the 
> > > one specified
> > > > in version 0 of the draft.  Use 256 blocks, each 34 octets 
> > > long, gives
> > > > 8704 octets total.
> > > >
> > > > All I suggest changing is to allow the start value of each 
> > > block to be
> > > > on a multiple of 32 instead of a multiple of 256.
> > > 
> > > So the worst case scenario would not be that different. The 
> > > 'multiplier'
> > > would now be 32 instead of 256, where you'd have a special graph-like
> > > algortihm to determine the most optimized presentation.
> > > 
> > > You'd have to calculate all possible encodings to determine 
> > > which one is
> > > the shortest.
> > > 
> > > I don't think RDATA size is really that important to allow 
> > > for discrete
> > > mathematics to determine the shortest representation.
> > > 
> > > The current one (nsec++) satisfies all requirements. Yours adds
> > > complexity.
> > > 
> > > Roy
> > > 
> > 
> > --
> > to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
> > the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
> > archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>
> > 
> --
> Mark Andrews, Internet Software Consortium
> 1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
> PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: Mark.Andrews@isc.org
--
Mark Andrews, Internet Software Consortium
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: Mark.Andrews@isc.org

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Mark.Andrews@isc.org
Subject: Re: nsec++
Date: Fri, 05 Dec 2003 10:07:01 +1100
Lines: 31
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <20031204213434.3A1C918C1@thrintun.hactrn.net>
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Fri Dec 05 00:24:15 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: Rob Austein <sra+namedroppers@hactrn.net>
In-reply-to: Your message of "Thu, 04 Dec 2003 16:34:34 CDT."
             <20031204213434.3A1C918C1@thrintun.hactrn.net> 
Precedence: bulk


> No offense to Andrew, but my unnecessary complexity meter was reading
> yellowish green when the WG decided to go with windowed bitmaps, and
> today's discussion of algorithms by which one might determine the most
> compact among multiple possible encodings kicks it up into the orange.

	"Choose the most compact" was never going to fly without
	a differentiator between identically compact results.

	I do however thing that you can describe a algorithm which
	will alway produce the mimimal size and same encoding with
	sliding 256 bit windows.
 
	The second description I sent out is not much more difficult
	to encode / verify than the plain 256 bit window scheme.

	Mark
> --
> to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
> the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
> archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>
--
Mark Andrews, Internet Software Consortium
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: Mark.Andrews@isc.org

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Michael Milligan <milli@acmeps.com>
Subject: Re: Issue: Add a new QTYPE
Date: Thu, 04 Dec 2003 23:20:50 -0700
Lines: 34
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <20031119193138.1535B1396D@sa.vix.com>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Fri Dec 05 07:42:02 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US; rv:1.5) Gecko/20031107 Debian/1.5-3
X-Accept-Language: en
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
In-Reply-To: <20031119193138.1535B1396D@sa.vix.com>
Precedence: bulk

Paul Vixie wrote:
>>We actually discussed and rejected the additional processing suggestion
>>-- it was present in the original draft of 1886. The argument was pretty
>>much the one Robert just gave: we will have to remove the processing
>>requirement eventually. It was also not clear that it would be useful in
>>most cases.
> 
> 
> i believed i had shown during the debate over 1886, and i believe i have
> shown again here today, that the lifetime of the data will be the same
> as the lifetime of its usefulness.  this really is not a bad idea, folks.
> 

I agree.  This seems to solve the problem nicely and is in the same vein 
as adding A records to the additional data section when MX records are 
asked for.  Think of it as an optimization.  Resolvers only have to know 
to look for the A records and not start another query.  Once all A 
records go away, there's just an extra bit of code path taken that looks 
for records that won't be found.  And in the case of BIND, the execution 
of that extra code path can eventually go away like IQUERY did from a 
configuration standpoint.

Regards,
Mike

-- 
Michael Milligan                                   -> milli@acmeps.com


--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Jaap Akkerhuis <jaap@sidn.nl>
Subject: Re: List administration
Date: Fri, 05 Dec 2003 10:02:24 +0100
Lines: 13
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <6.0.0.22.2.20031203094837.01f68568@localhost>
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Fri Dec 05 10:14:47 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
In-reply-to: Your message of Wed, 03 Dec 2003 15:28:11 -0500.
             <6.0.0.22.2.20031203094837.01f68568@localhost> 
Precedence: bulk

    
    Rather than chastising Randy, we should be thanking him for a great job
    he has been doing.
    
Yes!

	jaap

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: "Andrew Draper" <ADRAPER@altera.com>
Subject: RE: nsec++
Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2003 10:45:39 -0000
Lines: 40
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain;
	charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Cc: "Roy Arends" <roy@logmess.com>, "Jakob Schlyter" <jakob@rfc.se>,
	"IETF DNSEXT WG" <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Fri Dec 05 12:04:28 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
content-class: urn:content-classes:message
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft Exchange V6.0.6249.0
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
Thread-Topic: nsec++ 
Thread-Index: AcO6rs1+wl8KkrqcQ0W7PHPH8tN3swAbW0xA
To: <Mark.Andrews@isc.org>
X-OriginalArrivalTime: 05 Dec 2003 10:45:42.0094 (UTC) FILETIME=[EDE126E0:01C3BB1C]
X-BigFish: v
Precedence: bulk

> > 	If you want to start at 32 bit boundraries you stop the
> > 	current bitmap if you have a 32 bit subwindow that is all
> > 	zeros.
> > =09
> > 	It takes 4 octets to represent a empty 32 bit subwindow.
> > 	It takes 2 octets to start a new window.
> >=20
> > 	The algorithm would be:
> >=20
> 	Find the first/next active 32 bit window.  If the last three
> 	octets of this 32 bit window are zero the bitmap is complete,
> 	remove trailing zero octets.  If the next the next 32 bit
> 	window is active include in in the current bitmap otherwise
> 	the current bitmap is complete, remove trailing zero octets.
> 	If the last three octets of this 32 bit window are zero the
> 	current bitmap is complete, remove trailing zero octets.
> 	Repeat adding 32 bit windows until the bitmap is 256 bits
> 	long.
>  =09
>  	Repeat until all types are accounted for.
>=20
> 	In otherword start a new bitmap if you save more than the
> 	cost of introducing a new bitmap.
>=20
> 	If the last two octets of the current map are zero it is
> 	a break even situation so you include the next 32 bit
> 	window in the current map.

This is exactly the algorithm I was intending to describe, both with my =
suggested set of MUSTs and with my pseudo-code.  Thanks for describing =
it in an easier to understand way.

    Andy


--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: =?iso-8859-1?Q?=D3lafur?= =?iso-8859-1?Q?_Gu=F0mundsson?=
  <ogud@ogud.com>
Subject: RE: nsec++
Date: Fri, 05 Dec 2003 11:36:55 -0500
Lines: 38
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <45E39EE2E44FD443AEFAC07728BF3B5054B026@uk-ismsg02.altera.priv.altera.com> <45E39EE2E44FD443AEFAC07728BF3B5054B026@uk-ismsg02.altera.p
 riv.altera.com>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Cc: "IETF DNSEXT WG" <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Fri Dec 05 17:59:32 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-Sender: post@localhost (Unverified)
X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 6.0.1.1
To: "Andrew Draper" <ADRAPER@altera.com>, <Mark.Andrews@isc.org>
In-Reply-To: <45E39EE2E44FD443AEFAC07728BF3B5054B026@uk-ismsg02.altera.p
 riv.altera.com>
References: <45E39EE2E44FD443AEFAC07728BF3B5054B026@uk-ismsg02.altera.priv.altera.com>
Precedence: bulk

At 05:45 2003-12-05, Andrew Draper wrote:

> >       In otherword start a new bitmap if you save more than the
> >       cost of introducing a new bitmap.
> >
> >       If the last two octets of the current map are zero it is
> >       a break even situation so you include the next 32 bit
> >       window in the current map.
>
>This is exactly the algorithm I was intending to describe, both with my=20
>suggested set of MUSTs and with my pseudo-code.  Thanks for describing it=
=20
>in an easier to understand way.
>
>     Andy
<chair hat off>

This algorithm only optimizes for space, it has serious penalty for
searching now I add every 64=B4th type and you need to search linearly
through 1024 blocs as you do not know before hand the size
of any block.
Is this tradeoff worth it?

<chair hat on>
Is this whole thread worth the effort when we have many
more pressing issues like comment on the protocol document, check
if the protocol documents reflect all the documents they are
obsoleting/updating correctly ?

         Olafur



--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Dean Anderson <dean@av8.com>
Subject: Re: List administration (fwd)
Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2003 11:53:02 -0500 (EST)
Lines: 33
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <Pine.LNX.4.44.0312031826220.2114-100000@cirrus>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Fri Dec 05 18:15:49 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-X-Sender: dean@cirrus
To: ogud@ogud.com, Olaf Kolkman <OKolkman@ripe.net>
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.4.44.0312031826220.2114-100000@cirrus>
Precedence: bulk


At least one person seems to think my view is pretty unique, so if you are
concerned about this, perhaps some "me-too"s would help demonstrate that I
am not the only person with this concern.

I would like to have some confirmation from the Chairs that one of the
following has occured:

1) Randy was just exaggerating his threat to configure his servers to
delete mail queued for one hour, and that he has been properly chastised
for making such threats with respect to IETF list operation.

or

2) That Randy has changed the server config back so that he is no longer 
deleting IETF email, and has been properly chastised for deleting this 
email in violation of IETF policies, and chastised for making such changes 
without notification or approval.

I think many people would like to have an assurance that namedropper's
email is not being deleted before delivery, and that the queue time is at
least 3 days.  

Thanks,

		--Dean


--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: "Al Costanzo" <al@akc.com>
Subject: Re: List administration (fwd)
Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2003 13:06:25 -0500
Lines: 69
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <Pine.LNX.4.44.0312051143420.3757-100000@cirrus>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain;
	charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Cc: <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Fri Dec 05 19:20:49 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: "Dean Anderson" <dean@av8.com>,
	<ogud@ogud.com>,
	"Olaf Kolkman" <OKolkman@ripe.net>
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 6.00.2800.1158
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2800.1165
Precedence: bulk

Dear IETF Chairs and members of the this mailing list:

I personally think Randy does a damn good job an unlike closed minded
indivuals he at listens to ideas.

If he has done something I am sure there is a good reason for it.  In the
years I have been associated with the IETF and this mailing list. I can name
at least one person that is fair and open minded and that is Randy.

IMHO Randy should not be chastised but applauded for all the work he has
done for the IETF.

Now these comments from me may come as a suprise to Randy since we have not
always seen eye to eye on a few things.

But if the IETF chairs want to do something to Randy, how about a pat on the
back and a thank you for a job well done!

Randy, believe or not. I always considered you helpful to me. Even when you
told me I couldn't do something or another.

Sincerely,

Al Costanzo
IETF contributor/member/sitter on the sidelines since 1979




>
> At least one person seems to think my view is pretty unique, so if you are
> concerned about this, perhaps some "me-too"s would help demonstrate that I
> am not the only person with this concern.
>
> I would like to have some confirmation from the Chairs that one of the
> following has occured:
>
> 1) Randy was just exaggerating his threat to configure his servers to
> delete mail queued for one hour, and that he has been properly chastised
> for making such threats with respect to IETF list operation.
>
> or
>
> 2) That Randy has changed the server config back so that he is no longer
> deleting IETF email, and has been properly chastised for deleting this
> email in violation of IETF policies, and chastised for making such changes
> without notification or approval.
>
> I think many people would like to have an assurance that namedropper's
> email is not being deleted before delivery, and that the queue time is at
> least 3 days.
>
> Thanks,
>
> --Dean
>
>
> --
> to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
> the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
> archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>
>


--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Paul Vixie <vixie@vix.com>
Subject: Re: nsec++
Date: 05 Dec 2003 18:22:49 +0000
Lines: 34
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <45E39EE2E44FD443AEFAC07728BF3B5054B026@uk-ismsg02.altera.priv.altera.com>
	<bqqdip$g7n$1@sf1.isc.org>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Fri Dec 05 19:42:06 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
In-Reply-To: <bqqdip$g7n$1@sf1.isc.org>
Lines: 28
User-Agent: Gnus/5.09 (Gnus v5.9.0) Emacs/21.3
Precedence: bulk

> <chair hat off> This algorithm only optimizes for space, it has serious
> penalty for searching now I add every 64=B4th type and you need to search
> linearly through 1024 blocs as you do not know before hand the size of
> any block.  Is this tradeoff worth it?

when i participated in the discussions with michael graff that led to his
draft on this topic, these other alternatives were considered and dropped.
i now realize that it was foolish of us to not document the roads untaken.

> <chair hat on> Is this whole thread worth the effort when we have many
> more pressing issues like comment on the protocol document, check if the
> protocol documents reflect all the documents they are obsoleting/updating
> correctly ?

the community now embodied by DNSEXT (but previously DNSIND et al) has a
rather poor record when it comes to measuring importance.  18 months ago we
made the decision not to complicate the NXT format with support for n>128
type codes since it would delay deployment.  16 months later we decided
that it wasn't reasonable to go to proposed standard without that support.

let's do this:  let the debate rage on.  let the people who are interested
in this topic discuss it.  let the draft author judge consensus for now.
when it's time to roll out the next -bis docset then the then-current draft
will be frozen and incorporated.

let's not do this:  let leadership mean deciding what (not) to discuss.
-- 
Paul Vixie

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: ted@NLnetLabs.nl (Ted Lindgreen)
Subject: Re: List administration (fwd)
Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2003 20:09:05 +0100
Lines: 17
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Fri Dec 05 20:23:41 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
In-Reply-To: "Dean Anderson's message as of Dec  5, 18:10"
X-Mailer: Mail User's Shell (7.2.6 beta(5) 10/07/98)
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Precedence: bulk

[Quoting Dean Anderson, on Dec  5, 18:10, in "Re: List administrat ..."]
> 
> At least one person seems to think my view is pretty unique, so if you are
> concerned about this, perhaps some "me-too"s would help demonstrate that I
> am not the only person with this concern.

I'm sorry, but I, and also a number of people I talked with the
past week, do NOT share your concern.  We all think Randy is doing
excellent job on the list administration and appreciate his work.

-- ted

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: lbudney@pobox.com
Subject: Re: List administration (fwd)
Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2003 14:07:44 -0500 (EST)
Lines: 17
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <001e01c3bb5a$7f3f2000$6401a8c0@akc.com>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Fri Dec 05 20:44:52 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Mail-Followup-To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
X-X-Sender: budney@budney.homeunix.net
To: "namedroppers@ops.ietf.org" <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
In-Reply-To: <001e01c3bb5a$7f3f2000$6401a8c0@akc.com>
Precedence: bulk

On Fri, 5 Dec 2003, Al Costanzo wrote:
> 
> IMHO Randy should not be chastised but applauded for all the work he has
> done for the IETF.

For work he has done, he should be applauded. If he is dropping mails 
after 1 hour, for that he should be chastised.

--Len.



--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Greg Black <gjb@gbch.net>
Subject: Re: List administration (fwd)
Date: Sat, 6 Dec 2003 07:11:56 +1000
Lines: 26
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <200312051909.hB5J95G6063832@open.nlnetlabs.nl>
Reply-To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Fri Dec 05 22:30:47 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Content-Disposition: inline
In-Reply-To: <200312051909.hB5J95G6063832@open.nlnetlabs.nl>
User-Agent: Mutt/1.4.1i; gjb-muttsend.sh 1.5 2003-10-01
X-Uptime: 10 days
X-Operating-System: FreeBSD 4.2-RELEASE i386
X-Location: Brisbane, Australia; 27.49841S 152.98439E
X-URL: http://www.gbch.net/gjb.html
X-Image-URL: http://www.gbch.net/gjb/gjb-auug048.gif
X-PGP-Key-Fingerprint: EBB2 2A92 A79D 1533 AC00  3C46 5D83 B6FB 4B04 B7D6
X-Request-PGP: http://www.gbch.net/keys/4B04B7D6.asc
Precedence: bulk

On 2003-12-05, Ted Lindgreen wrote:
> [Quoting Dean Anderson, on Dec  5, 18:10, in "Re: List administrat ..."]
> > 
> > At least one person seems to think my view is pretty unique, so if you are
> > concerned about this, perhaps some "me-too"s would help demonstrate that I
> > am not the only person with this concern.
> 
> I'm sorry, but I, and also a number of people I talked with the
> past week, do NOT share your concern.  We all think Randy is doing
> excellent job on the list administration and appreciate his work.

If Randy is dropping email that cannot be delivered after a mere
hour, then we do *not* all think he's doing an excellent job on
the list administration -- some of us think that he's doing a
really lousy job of it if that allegation is true.  Certainly,
it is time for some responsible person to assure us that email
is not being dropped on the floor as a result of such a decision
(by Randy or anybody else).

Greg

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: "Hallam-Baker, Phillip" <pbaker@verisign.com>
Subject: RE: List administration (fwd)
Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2003 13:33:38 -0800
Lines: 22
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain;
	charset="iso-8859-1"
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Fri Dec 05 22:46:45 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: "'Dean Anderson'" <dean@av8.com>, ogud@ogud.com,
        Olaf Kolkman
	 <OKolkman@ripe.net>
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)
Precedence: bulk

If the IETF wants to get into this type of discussion it should do what most
other standards organizations do and exclusively provide the mailing list
facilities itself. Policy and practice for mailing list management may be
thus perfectly aligned.

Given the astonishing sums paid by ISOC to the secretariat to support the
RFC editor function this should be well in scope. 

I am not a Randy Bush fan. But attacking him for what amounts to parking
fines merely cheapens the case against the damage he has caused this group
in particular and the IETF in general.

This whole discussion should probably be taken to another list, I suggest,
"why are we in this handbasket and why do the roadsigns point to Hades?"

		Phill

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Mark.Andrews@isc.org
Subject: Re: nsec++
Date: Sat, 06 Dec 2003 09:48:54 +1100
Lines: 99
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <6.0.1.1.2.20031205112443.02c20ec0@localhost>
Cc: "Andrew Draper" <ADRAPER@altera.com>, Mark_Andrews@isc.org,
        "IETF DNSEXT WG" <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Sat Dec 06 00:00:06 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: =?iso-8859-1?Q?=D3lafur?= =?iso-8859-1?Q?_Gu=F0mundsson?= <ogud@ogud.com>
In-reply-to: Your message of "Fri, 05 Dec 2003 11:36:55 CDT."
             <6.0.1.1.2.20031205112443.02c20ec0@localhost> 
Precedence: bulk


> At 05:45 2003-12-05, Andrew Draper wrote:
> 
> > >       In otherword start a new bitmap if you save more than the
> > >       cost of introducing a new bitmap.
> > >
> > >       If the last two octets of the current map are zero it is
> > >       a break even situation so you include the next 32 bit
> > >       window in the current map.
> >
> >This is exactly the algorithm I was intending to describe, both with my 
> >suggested set of MUSTs and with my pseudo-code.  Thanks for describing it 
> >in an easier to understand way.
> >
> >     Andy
> <chair hat off>
> 
> This algorithm only optimizes for space, it has serious penalty for
> searching now I add every 64´th type and you need to search linearly
> through 1024 blocs as you do not know before hand the size
> of any block.
> Is this tradeoff worth it?

	Worst case search has gone from 256 to 2048 blocks for a type
	in 65504-65535.  Bitmap size for worst number of blocks is 6144
	octets.

	You still have to perform a linear search as you need to find
	the right block.

	I suspect the optimisation however will pay off for the common
	cases.

	Zone APEX: 1 block/1 block
	A NS SOA MX RRSIG NSEC DNSKEY
	00 07 62 01 00 00 00 03 80
	00 07 62 01 00 00 00 03 80

	Typical host: 1 block/1 block
	A MX RRSIG NSEC
	00 06 40 01 00 00 00 03
	00 06 40 01 00 00 00 03

	Insecure delegation: 1 block/2 blocks
	A RRSIG NSEC
	00 06 20 00 00 00 00 03
	00 01 20 02 02 00 03

	Secure delegation: 1 block/2 block
	NS DS RRSIG NSEC
	00 06 20 00 00 00 00 13
	00 01 20 02 02 00 13
 
	IN-ADDR.ARPA/IP6.ARPA: 1 block/1 block
	PTR RRSIG NSEC
	00 06 00 08 00 00 00 03
	00 06 00 08 00 00 00 03

	SRV entry: 1 block/1 block
	SRV RRSIG NSEC
	00 06 00 00 00 00 40 03
	02 02 40 03

	TYPE1234: 2 blocks/2 blocks
	RRSIG NSEC TYPE1234
	00 06 00 00 00 00 00 03 04 1b 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 20

	02 02 00 03 04 c3 00 00 20

	TYPE65535: 2 blocks/2 blocks
	RRSIG NSEC TYPE65535
	00 06 00 00 00 00 00 03 ff 20 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
	00 01

	02 02 00 03 ff e4 00 00 00 01


> <chair hat on>
> Is this whole thread worth the effort when we have many
> more pressing issues like comment on the protocol document, check
> if the protocol documents reflect all the documents they are
> obsoleting/updating correctly ?
> 
>          Olafur
> 
> 
> 
--
Mark Andrews, Internet Software Consortium
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: Mark.Andrews@isc.org

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Olaf Kolkman <olaf@ripe.net>
Subject: Re: List administration (fwd)
Date: Sat, 06 Dec 2003 22:44:39 +0100
Lines: 43
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <pbaker@verisign.com>
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Sat Dec 06 23:04:37 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
In-Reply-To: Message from "Hallam-Baker, Phillip" <pbaker@verisign.com> 
   of "Fri, 05 Dec 2003 13:33:38 PST." <2A1D4C86842EE14CA9BC80474919782E01113283@mou1wnexm02.vcorp.ad.vrsn.com> 
X-RIPE-Spam-Level: 
X-RIPE-Spam-Status: N 0.212270
X-RIPE-Signature: c754c8b23c103ec7f31a165b7be8a42a
Precedence: bulk


 "Hallam-Baker, Phillip" <pbaker@verisign.com> writes:
 * 
 * This whole discussion should probably be taken to another list


Thanks Philip, exactly my thinking.

The mail-list is prudently managed. I have confirmed that there are no
special delivery settings. All recipients are treated the same. (So to
use Phillip's metaphore, there was a parking ticket being waved, not
handed out).

To repeat the list policy:

   Moderation is based on "subscriber-only with spam filter".

   Questions or concerns related to the acceptance or rejection of
   specific messages to the namedroppers mailing list should first be
   discussed with the wg chairs, with followup appeals using the normal
   appeals process of rfc 2026 (i.e., follup with area directors, then
   iesg, etc.).

If there are problems in delivery, i.e. differences of what is in your 
mailbox and in the archive, please notify the chairs. We will not
troubleshoot individual problems because they could be caused by all kind 
of problems at the recipient end, however if there are patterns we will 
follow up.

Randy is doing a good job, he is doing it professionally and prudently!

This is the last mail on this topic. We have work to do.

--Olaf Kolkman
  DNSEXT Co-Chair
 


--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: "D. J. Bernstein" <djb@cr.yp.to>
Subject: Re: List administration
Date: 7 Dec 2003 08:59:34 -0000
Lines: 20
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <nospam-1070505308.40739@gw.gbch.net> <E1ARu2q-0006rn-2V@draco.cus.cam.ac.uk>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Sun Dec 07 10:16:32 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Content-Disposition: inline
Precedence: bulk

Chris Thompson writes:
> Make that "mail servers in general" rather than just mailing lists,

Yup. RFC 1123 says ``the give-up time generally needs to be at least 4-5
days.'' RFC 2821 says the same thing.

I used a 7-day timeout in qmail, and I'm glad I did. A few months ago,
large chunks of the Internet were unreachable for several days straight;
naive 4-day timeouts led to widespread delivery failures.

Randy's 1-hour timeout is absurd.

---D. J. Bernstein, Associate Professor, Department of Mathematics,
Statistics, and Computer Science, University of Illinois at Chicago

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Miek Gieben <miekg@atoom.net>
Subject: section 3.2 of protocol draft
Date: Mon, 8 Dec 2003 14:10:59 +0100
Lines: 32
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Mon Dec 08 14:33:56 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Mail-Followup-To: namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Content-Disposition: inline
User-Agent: Vim/Mutt/Linux
X-Home: www.miek.nl
X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new
Precedence: bulk

Hello,

I'm rereading the protocol draft again, and I'm wondering about the following
paragraph.

In section 3.2: Recursive Name Servers
2nd paragraph:

   A security-aware recursive name server MUST NOT attempt to answer a
   query by piecing together cached data it received in response to
   previous queries that requested different QNAMEs, QTYPEs, or
   QCLASSes.  A security-aware recursive name server MUST NOT use NSEC
   RRs from one negative response to synthesize a response for a
   different query.  A security-aware recursive name server MUST NOT use
   a previous wildcard expansion to generate a response to a different
   query.

I don't "get" the first sentence. does that really say: "don't use the cache"?
If i'm a cache and i've just validated a DNSKEY in response to another query,
I cannot use that validated DNSKEY?

Further more, if this question is answered negatively (A cache can still be used),
i'm wondering why is this put in a protocol draft? Isn't this bordering implementation
details?

grtz Miek

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: "Scott Rose" <scottr@nist.gov>
Subject: Re: section 3.2 of protocol draft
Date: Mon, 8 Dec 2003 09:25:01 -0500
Lines: 74
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <20031208131059.GB20995@atoom.net>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain;
	charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Mon Dec 08 15:37:25 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: "namedroppers" <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 6.00.2800.1158
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2800.1165
Precedence: bulk

----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Miek Gieben" <miekg@atoom.net>


> Hello,
>
> I'm rereading the protocol draft again, and I'm wondering about the
following
> paragraph.
>
> In section 3.2: Recursive Name Servers
> 2nd paragraph:
>
>    A security-aware recursive name server MUST NOT attempt to answer a
>    query by piecing together cached data it received in response to
>    previous queries that requested different QNAMEs, QTYPEs, or
>    QCLASSes.  A security-aware recursive name server MUST NOT use NSEC
>    RRs from one negative response to synthesize a response for a
>    different query.  A security-aware recursive name server MUST NOT use
>    a previous wildcard expansion to generate a response to a different
>    query.
>
> I don't "get" the first sentence. does that really say: "don't use the
cache"?
> If i'm a cache and i've just validated a DNSKEY in response to another
query,
> I cannot use that validated DNSKEY?
>
I think the spec will be changed after Q-21 was resolved.  See Olaf's
previous email (Nov 27) about the proposed change.

Not quite - at least that is not what it is supposed to say.  The spirit of
the "MUST NOT" is that a caching server shouldn't try to format a response
out of RRsets from previous responses that were for different <QNAME,
QCLASS, QTYPE> combos.  It could, however use the previously cached
"www.example.com  A" RRset to answer another query for "www.example.com  A".
It shouldn't try to generate any new wildcard expanded responses if it has
cached a wildcard RR from a previous query.  Mostly because there is a
danger it could form an incorrect answer, or that two name servers could
generate different answers based on the contents of their individual caches.

Actually, this is mostly academic now - Q21 of the DNSSECbis questions was
resolved to use "MAY re-use NSEC RRs to format respnoses".  So the specs no
longer forbids it.

Using cached DNSKEYs to verify RRSIGs were always allowed, of course.

> Further more, if this question is answered negatively (A cache can still
be used),
> i'm wondering why is this put in a protocol draft? Isn't this bordering
implementation
> details?
>
I agree this is the grey area between protocol and implementation/operation.
But the restriction is on what liberty a cahce has in generating responses
to queries, so it falls more on protocol (sending responses) than operation.

Scott


> grtz Miek
>
> --
> to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
> the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
> archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>
>


--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Miek Gieben <miekg@atoom.net>
Subject: Re: section 3.2 of protocol draft
Date: Mon, 8 Dec 2003 15:44:19 +0100
Lines: 61
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <20031208131059.GB20995@atoom.net> <012101c3bd97$10f0be30$b9370681@barnacle>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Mon Dec 08 15:56:09 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Mail-Followup-To: namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Content-Disposition: inline
In-Reply-To: <012101c3bd97$10f0be30$b9370681@barnacle>
User-Agent: Vim/Mutt/Linux
X-Home: www.miek.nl
X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new
Precedence: bulk

[On 08 Dec, @15:25, Scott wrote in "Re: section 3.2 of protocol dr ..."]
> > If i'm a cache and i've just validated a DNSKEY in response to another
> query,
> > I cannot use that validated DNSKEY?
> >
> I think the spec will be changed after Q-21 was resolved.  See Olaf's
> previous email (Nov 27) about the proposed change.

I've read that, but that concerns NSEC records ie. negative caching.

> Not quite - at least that is not what it is supposed to say.  The spirit of
> the "MUST NOT" is that a caching server shouldn't try to format a response
> out of RRsets from previous responses that were for different <QNAME,
> QCLASS, QTYPE> combos.  It could, however use the previously cached
> "www.example.com  A" RRset to answer another query for "www.example.com  A".

Ok, I understand that, but makes the text from 3.2 the following illegal:
(i'm not sure of the following 2 replies actually will go to the same
nameserver, but suppose they do)

got query for nlnetlabs.nl -> cached (and verified!) key for .NL (while
                              following the chain of trust)
query for DS of some (other!) nl zone -> reply with DS + SIG, plus add the verified 
                                         key of NL in packet (and also the sig).

The question: can a recursive server add that key?

> It shouldn't try to generate any new wildcard expanded responses if it has
> cached a wildcard RR from a previous query.  Mostly because there is a
> danger it could form an incorrect answer, or that two name servers could
> generate different answers based on the contents of their individual caches.
> 
> Actually, this is mostly academic now - Q21 of the DNSSECbis questions was
> resolved to use "MAY re-use NSEC RRs to format respnoses".  So the specs no
> longer forbids it.

OK, I see, but that is negative caching.

> Using cached DNSKEYs to verify RRSIGs were always allowed, of course.

Also true, but either I don't understand the exact meaning of 3.2 or you
haven't understood the meaning of my email message :) Maybe the example
above makes it clearer?

> implementation
> > details?
> >
> I agree this is the grey area between protocol and implementation/operation.
> But the restriction is on what liberty a cahce has in generating responses
> to queries, so it falls more on protocol (sending responses) than operation.

ok, then I would like to see where this discussions leads, 'cause the text
wasn't entirely clear to me. Maybe something must be added,

grtz Miek

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com>
Subject: Re: section 3.2 of protocol draft
Date: Mon, 08 Dec 2003 15:22:45 +0000
Lines: 42
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <miekg@atoom.net>
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Mon Dec 08 16:35:24 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
In-Reply-To: Message from Miek Gieben <miekg@atoom.net> 
   of "Mon, 08 Dec 2003 14:10:59 +0100." <20031208131059.GB20995@atoom.net> 
Precedence: bulk

>>>>> "Miek" == Miek Gieben <miekg@atoom.net> writes:

    >>    A security-aware recursive name server MUST NOT attempt
    >> to answer a query by piecing together cached data it
    >> received in response to previous queries that requested
    >> different QNAMEs, QTYPEs, or QCLASSes.  A security-aware
    >> recursive name server MUST NOT use NSEC RRs from one
    >> negative response to synthesize a response for a different
    >> query.  A security-aware recursive name server MUST NOT use
    >> a previous wildcard expansion to generate a response to a
    >> different query.

    Miek> I don't "get" the first sentence. does that really say:
    Miek> "don't use the cache"?  If i'm a cache and i've just
    Miek> validated a DNSKEY in response to another query, I cannot
    Miek> use that validated DNSKEY?

No, it doesn't say "don't use the cache". Well, not to this
mother-tongue English speaker anyway. It says "don't use cached data
to compose or fill out an answer to a query you've not resolved". I
think the intention here is to cover things like glue or partial
responses from an authoritative server. If the resolving server has
previously resolved and validated the glue or other stuff that might
be missing from the authoritative server's response, the resolving
server MUST NOT add these things to the reply it returns to its end
client. That's my interpretation of this bit of the draft.

Perhaps the language could be made less opaque?

    Miek> Further more, if this question is answered negatively (A
    Miek> cache can still be used), i'm wondering why is this put in a
    Miek> protocol draft? Isn't this bordering implementation details?

Some clarification is needed on when and how cached data can and
cannot be used. This is an implementation detail that will be critical
to how the protocol gets implemented. :-)

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: "Scott Rose" <scottr@nist.gov>
Subject: Re: section 3.2 of protocol draft
Date: Mon, 8 Dec 2003 12:47:17 -0500
Lines: 100
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <20031208131059.GB20995@atoom.net> <012101c3bd97$10f0be30$b9370681@barnacle> <20031208144419.GA22600@atoom.net>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain;
	charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Mon Dec 08 19:08:08 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: "namedroppers" <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 6.00.2800.1158
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2800.1165
Precedence: bulk

That seems reasonable.  It might be a good idea to clarify that test
to take different cases into consideration.  There is little danger in
adding previously cached RR sets into the additional section of another
response - I haven't considered all the cases.  Or narrowing the
restrictions to what (from cache) can and cannot
be placed in the answer section of a response.

I believe it might be necessary to have stricter conditions on forming the
answer section of a response, but be more liberal about using cached RR sets
in the other sections.  Which I believe your example demonstrated.

Scott

----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Miek Gieben" <miekg@atoom.net>
To: "namedroppers" <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Sent: Monday, December 08, 2003 9:44 AM
Subject: Re: section 3.2 of protocol draft


> [On 08 Dec, @15:25, Scott wrote in "Re: section 3.2 of protocol dr ..."]
> > > If i'm a cache and i've just validated a DNSKEY in response to another
> > query,
> > > I cannot use that validated DNSKEY?
> > >
> > I think the spec will be changed after Q-21 was resolved.  See Olaf's
> > previous email (Nov 27) about the proposed change.
>
> I've read that, but that concerns NSEC records ie. negative caching.
>
> > Not quite - at least that is not what it is supposed to say.  The spirit
of
> > the "MUST NOT" is that a caching server shouldn't try to format a
response
> > out of RRsets from previous responses that were for different <QNAME,
> > QCLASS, QTYPE> combos.  It could, however use the previously cached
> > "www.example.com  A" RRset to answer another query for "www.example.com
A".
>
> Ok, I understand that, but makes the text from 3.2 the following illegal:
> (i'm not sure of the following 2 replies actually will go to the same
> nameserver, but suppose they do)
>
> got query for nlnetlabs.nl -> cached (and verified!) key for .NL (while
>                               following the chain of trust)
> query for DS of some (other!) nl zone -> reply with DS + SIG, plus add the
verified
>                                          key of NL in packet (and also the
sig).
>
> The question: can a recursive server add that key?
>
> > It shouldn't try to generate any new wildcard expanded responses if it
has
> > cached a wildcard RR from a previous query.  Mostly because there is a
> > danger it could form an incorrect answer, or that two name servers could
> > generate different answers based on the contents of their individual
caches.
> >
> > Actually, this is mostly academic now - Q21 of the DNSSECbis questions
was
> > resolved to use "MAY re-use NSEC RRs to format respnoses".  So the specs
no
> > longer forbids it.
>
> OK, I see, but that is negative caching.
>
> > Using cached DNSKEYs to verify RRSIGs were always allowed, of course.
>
> Also true, but either I don't understand the exact meaning of 3.2 or you
> haven't understood the meaning of my email message :) Maybe the example
> above makes it clearer?
>
> > implementation
> > > details?
> > >
> > I agree this is the grey area between protocol and
implementation/operation.
> > But the restriction is on what liberty a cahce has in generating
responses
> > to queries, so it falls more on protocol (sending responses) than
operation.
>
> ok, then I would like to see where this discussions leads, 'cause the text
> wasn't entirely clear to me. Maybe something must be added,
>
> grtz Miek
>
> --
> to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
> the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
> archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>
>


--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Miek Gieben <miekg@atoom.net>
Subject: Re: section 3.2 of protocol draft
Date: Mon, 8 Dec 2003 19:25:22 +0100
Lines: 27
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <20031208131059.GB20995@atoom.net> <012101c3bd97$10f0be30$b9370681@barnacle> <20031208144419.GA22600@atoom.net> <02aa01c3bdb3$52813160$b9370681@barnacle>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Cc: namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Mon Dec 08 19:37:56 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: Scott Rose <scottr@nist.gov>
Mail-Followup-To: Scott Rose <scottr@nist.gov>,
	namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Content-Disposition: inline
In-Reply-To: <02aa01c3bdb3$52813160$b9370681@barnacle>
User-Agent: Vim/Mutt/Linux
X-Home: www.miek.nl
X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new
Precedence: bulk

[On 08 Dec, @18:47, Scott wrote in "Re: section 3.2 of protocol dr ..."]
> That seems reasonable.  It might be a good idea to clarify that test
> to take different cases into consideration.  There is little danger in
> adding previously cached RR sets into the additional section of another

why is this dangerous? Isn't this the reason we have dnssec? If it is validated
I can cache it, if I can cache it, I can use it? With DNS this could be
potentially dangerous, with DNSSEC I cannot see why (if you only use validated
reponses).

> response - I haven't considered all the cases.  Or narrowing the
> restrictions to what (from cache) can and cannot
> be placed in the answer section of a response.
> 
> I believe it might be necessary to have stricter conditions on forming the
> answer section of a response, but be more liberal about using cached RR sets
> in the other sections.  Which I believe your example demonstrated.

ok,

grtz Miek

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: "Olaf M. Kolkman" <olaf@ripe.net>
Subject: DNSSEC editors Question list
Date: Tue, 9 Dec 2003 10:29:08 +0100
Organization: RIPE NCC
Lines: 134
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Tue Dec 09 10:47:17 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
X-Mailer: Sylpheed version 0.9.6 (GTK+ 1.2.10; i686-pc-linux-gnu)
X-RIPE-Spam-Level: 
X-RIPE-Spam-Status: N 0.498305
X-RIPE-Signature: cf28518af2ea90edf0e2210964135703
Precedence: bulk



Update on the state of the DNSSECbis questions/issues list.

All questions that where numbered are resolved. There are some open
ended discussions on the list once these are resolved the document
editors will roll the versions. We will probably do last call on those
versions.

Details of the questions and resolutions see below and
http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/namedroppers.2003/msg02183.html


Please send textual nits on the dnssec bis document set to the dnssec
editors (dnssec-editors@east.isi.edu) and 'content' to this list.


On a related note the records document and 'NSEC++' are
intertwined. Please review 'NSEC++' too. The text in that document
is intended to be cut-n-pasted into dnssecbis.


-- Olaf
   DNSEXT co-chair

---------------------------------| Olaf M. Kolkman
---------------------------------| RIPE NCC



This is the list of open questions I posted recently.

The following questions are now marked as resolved:



> Q18: RRsig TTL violating 2181
>
>      Default action, based on sense of the room at IETF58, is to permit
>      the TTL of SIG RRs with same ownername and CLASS to be different and
>      to have the TTL of the SIG RRs bound to the TTL of the TYPE of the
>      RR they sign.

      Resolved: No comments on the list, default action taken as consensus.


> Q19: Suppression of duplications
>
>      This issue is about the canonicalization process by the signer and
>      the verifier.
>
>      Duplicates are specifically forbidden. On the list there have been
>      several opinions with regards to how to deal with this issue.
>
>      We propose the following text as consensus position:
>
>      Duplicate RR records are not allowed exist according to
>      [RFC2181]. Implementations MUST therefore treat duplicate RR
>      records as protocol errors. Signers and verifiers MUST
>      canonicalize duplicate RR sets by removing duplicate RRs from
>      the set if the implementation is designed to be liberal in
>      handling protocol errors.

      Resolved: No comments on the list, default action taken as consensus.


>  Q20: Expansion of wild cards in the authority section.
>
>      Default action, based on sense of the room at IETF58, is to not
>      expand the owner names of e.g. wildcard  NSEC RRs.
>     
>      There was a little discussion on the list; a question that turned 
>      into support.

      Resolved: Default action taken as consensus.


>  Q21: Caching and reuse of NSEC RRs
>
>      Default action, based on sense of the room at IETF58, is to
>      change the text not to strongly prohibit any reuse of cached
>      NSEC RRs, but to allow, and not encourage, (MAY language) reuse
>      to synthesize negative answers for which QNAME, QLASS has an
>      NSEC RR of same ONAME and CLASS in cache that proves the non
>      existance of QTYPE.
>


Resolved:
      There is consensus on making this requirement less restrictive
      in the sense mentioned above.

      Note that there was an issue raised related to this question
      recently.
      (http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/namedroppers.2003/msg02257.html)
      That question essentially asks to make the language with respect
      to cache behaviour even less restrictive. We'll treat this issue
      independently.




> Q22: What should the failure mode be if compressed names are
>      encountered in RRs other than the "well-known" RRs; Should the
>      verifier be liberal or fail. (Remember compression is only
>      allowd for "well known RRs, RFC3597 section 4 and RFC1123)
>
>      The sense of the room at IETF58 that senders should not send RRs
>      with compressed data and receivers should "not throw a fit".
>
>      Since, in contrast to Q19, the canonicalization for the signer
>      and the verifier are specified (records section 6.2) so the
>      question is if the "robustness principle" should be specified at
>      all.
>
>      If you think that there should be language to specify how to
>      apply the robustness principle for when RRs other than the "well
>      known" RRs are compressed than please supply text to go into one
>      of the DNSSECbis draft.
>
>      Default action will be not to add recomendations about compression
>      and decompression before sending or after receiving. 


Resolved, no text was suppied, recomendations on compression and
decompression will be added and taken as consensus of the group.



--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Miek Gieben <miekg@atoom.net>
Subject: Re: section 3.2 of protocol draft
Date: Tue, 9 Dec 2003 10:40:12 +0100
Lines: 34
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <20031208131059.GB20995@atoom.net> <24031.1070896965@gromit.rfc1035.com>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Cc: namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Tue Dec 09 10:55:11 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com>
Mail-Followup-To: Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com>,
	namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Content-Disposition: inline
In-Reply-To: <24031.1070896965@gromit.rfc1035.com>
User-Agent: Vim/Mutt/Linux
X-Home: www.miek.nl
X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new
Precedence: bulk

[On 08 Dec, @16:22, Jim wrote in "Re: section 3.2 of protocol dr ..."]
> No, it doesn't say "don't use the cache". Well, not to this
> mother-tongue English speaker anyway. It says "don't use cached data
> to compose or fill out an answer to a query you've not resolved". I
> think the intention here is to cover things like glue or partial
> responses from an authoritative server. If the resolving server has
> previously resolved and validated the glue or other stuff that might
> be missing from the authoritative server's response, the resolving
> server MUST NOT add these things to the reply it returns to its end
> client. That's my interpretation of this bit of the draft.
> 
> Perhaps the language could be made less opaque?

Maybe the following is clearer:

A security-aware recursive name server MUST NOT attempt to answer a query by
piecing together non validated, cached data (i.e. glue) it received in response
to previous queries that requested different QNAMEs, QTYPEs, or QCLASSes.  A
security-aware recursive name server MUST NOT use NSEC RRs from one negative
response to synthesize a response for a different query.  A security-aware
recursive name server MUST NOT use a previous wildcard expansion to generate a
response to a different query.

grtz
      Miek
--
Serenity now!
-- Frank Costanza (Seinfeld)

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com>
Subject: Re: section 3.2 of protocol draft
Date: Tue, 09 Dec 2003 12:23:35 +0000
Lines: 36
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <miekg@atoom.net>
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Tue Dec 09 13:37:14 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
In-Reply-To: Message from Miek Gieben <miekg@atoom.net> 
   of "Tue, 09 Dec 2003 10:40:12 +0100." <20031209094012.GA3177@atoom.net> 
Precedence: bulk

>>>>> "Miek" == Miek Gieben <miekg@atoom.net> writes:

    Miek> A security-aware recursive name server MUST NOT attempt to
    Miek> answer a query by piecing together non validated, cached
    Miek> data (i.e. glue) it received in response to previous queries
    Miek> that requested different QNAMEs, QTYPEs, or QCLASSes. 

Yes, it is clearer IMO. But I think the security aware server should
do that for all cached data, not just non-validated data. Suppose the
resolver gets a signed answer that says the next name after a.foo is
z.foo. Is it right for the server to infer that no other names exist
between a.foo and z.foo for as long it it caches that answer? If it
then gets a lookup for b.foo, should it respond with the already
cached answer or should it resolve b.foo and return the answer to that
to the client? [Suppose the authoritative servers for foo add b.foo
while the resolving server is still caching that NXT record for a.foo
pointing at z.foo.] There are valid arguments that either of these
options is correct (or wrong). A statement of what's the correct
behaviour for this scenario would be preferable to leaving this
undefined and ambiguous.

How about the text below?

	A security-aware recursive name server MUST NOT synthesise or
	augment responses, for instance to populate the Additional
	Section, using cached data from earlier lookups. Cached data
	MUST NOT be used in a response unless it results from a
	response to an earlier query that exactly matches the QNAME, 
	QTYPE and QCLASS for the current query.


--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Mark.Andrews@isc.org
Subject: Re: section 3.2 of protocol draft
Date: Wed, 10 Dec 2003 00:03:08 +1100
Lines: 110
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <20031209094012.GA3177@atoom.net>
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Tue Dec 09 14:17:35 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com>, namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Mail-Followup-To: Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com>, namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org> 
In-reply-to: Your message of "Tue, 09 Dec 2003 10:40:12 BST."
             <20031209094012.GA3177@atoom.net> 
Precedence: bulk


> [On 08 Dec, @16:22, Jim wrote in "Re: section 3.2 of protocol dr ..."]
> > No, it doesn't say "don't use the cache". Well, not to this
> > mother-tongue English speaker anyway. It says "don't use cached data
> > to compose or fill out an answer to a query you've not resolved". I
> > think the intention here is to cover things like glue or partial
> > responses from an authoritative server. If the resolving server has
> > previously resolved and validated the glue or other stuff that might
> > be missing from the authoritative server's response, the resolving
> > server MUST NOT add these things to the reply it returns to its end
> > client. That's my interpretation of this bit of the draft.
> > 
> > Perhaps the language could be made less opaque?
> 
> Maybe the following is clearer:
> 
> A security-aware recursive name server MUST NOT attempt to answer a query by
> piecing together non validated, cached data (i.e. glue) it received in respon
> se
> to previous queries that requested different QNAMEs, QTYPEs, or QCLASSes.  A
> security-aware recursive name server MUST NOT use NSEC RRs from one negative
> response to synthesize a response for a different query.  A security-aware
> recursive name server MUST NOT use a previous wildcard expansion to generate 
> a
> response to a different query.

	Why are we arguing over what it currently says?  The current
	text is overly restrictive.  We should be trying to determine
	firstly what we are going recommend that every server SHOULD do.
	What they MAY do, what the SHOULD NOT and MUST NOT do.

	At a minimum negative answers against the same QNAME and QCLASS
	need to be allowed again "Name Error" to bring the draft into
	alignment with RFC 2308.  "Name Error" is independent of QTYPE.
	(SHOULD)

	Also at a minimum negative answers against the same QNAME and
	QCLASS need to be allowed against "NODATA".  This is a extention
	on RFC 2308.  The NSEC bitmap clearly allows a cache to determine
	which types do not exist when the query was made.  All of these
	would return the same authority section.
	(SHOULD)

	Both of these cases allow a internally consistant negative
	answer to be returned.

	NXDOMAIN requires the two proofs to be returned
	* QNAME does not exist
	* Wildcard does not exist
	
	NODATA require one or two proofs to be returned depending apon
	whether the answer is from a wildcard or not.
	non-wildcard:
	* QNAME exists but does not have type
	wildcard:
	* QNAME does not exist
	* wildcard exist but does not have type


	What get more interesting is should we allow a cache to to
	take the knowledge that a previous positive answer came
	from a wildcard and just query for the wildcard.  My feeling
	in this case is NO.  You still need to make a query to the
	server so we don't save anything there.  We would potentially
	save one proof (QNAME does not exist) in the answer, however
	you combining the two answers could give a internally
	inconsistant answer.
	(SHOULD NOT)

	Following a wildcard CNAME can also produce a internally
	inconsistant answer if the CNAME refers to the same zone.
	CNAME chains also have this problem if they go back to a
	previous zone.  I suspect that we just have to live with
	this one.

	Another case mention at MN is where the QNAME and QCLASS
	matches a existing NSEC and the type is not in the bitmap
	however the NSEC was not learnt via the NSEC ownername.
	e.g. as one of the proofs in a NXDOMAIN or QNAME does not
	exist for a wildcard.

	I think this case can also safely be returned.
	(MAY)

	Next comes names that are within a span of a NSEC record.
	Theoretically it is possible to constuct a response from 
	these provided you also have the answer to the corresponding
	wildcard (NXDOMAIN, NODATA and positive) answer.
	(SHOULD NOT, MUST NOT?)

> grtz
>       Miek
> --
> Serenity now!
> -- Frank Costanza (Seinfeld)
> 
> --
> to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
> the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
> archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>
--
Mark Andrews, Internet Software Consortium
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: Mark.Andrews@isc.org

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: "Olaf M. Kolkman" <olaf@ripe.net>
Subject: NSEC++ (Example code broken)
Date: Tue, 9 Dec 2003 16:13:58 +0100
Organization: RIPE NCC
Lines: 29
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Tue Dec 09 16:36:16 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
X-Mailer: Sylpheed version 0.9.6 (GTK+ 1.2.10; i686-pc-linux-gnu)
X-RIPE-Spam-Level: 
X-RIPE-Spam-Status: N 0.007587
X-RIPE-Signature: b70d843a44f5381fdafc238060441242
Precedence: bulk


WRT: draft-ietf-ndsext-nsec-rdata-01.

While testing some code; I think the example in section 3 should read:

0x04 'h'  'o'  's'  't'
0x07 'e'  'x'  'a'  'm'  'p'  'l'  'e'
0x03 'c'  'o'  'm'  0x00
0x00 0x07 0x40 0x01 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x03
0x00 0x04 0x1b 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x20 

Can somebody confirm that?


-- Olaf
   namedropper.

---------------------------------| Olaf M. Kolkman
---------------------------------| RIPE NCC


--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: "Scott Rose" <scottr@nist.gov>
Subject: Re: NSEC++ (Example code broken)
Date: Tue, 9 Dec 2003 13:27:01 -0500
Lines: 48
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <20031209161358.56fd591f.olaf@ripe.net>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain;
	charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Tue Dec 09 19:44:50 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 6.00.2800.1158
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2800.1165
Precedence: bulk

I thought it looked okay.  I noticed the trailing 0x00 octet after the 0x03
in the example below.  Isn't that a trailing null octet in the first window?
Is that necessary?

Scott
----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Olaf M. Kolkman" <olaf@ripe.net>
To: <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Sent: Tuesday, December 09, 2003 10:13 AM
Subject: NSEC++ (Example code broken)


>
> WRT: draft-ietf-ndsext-nsec-rdata-01.
>
> While testing some code; I think the example in section 3 should read:
>
> 0x04 'h'  'o'  's'  't'
> 0x07 'e'  'x'  'a'  'm'  'p'  'l'  'e'
> 0x03 'c'  'o'  'm'  0x00
> 0x00 0x07 0x40 0x01 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x03
> 0x00 0x04 0x1b 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
> 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
> 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
> 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x20
>
> Can somebody confirm that?
>
>
> -- Olaf
>    namedropper.
>
> ---------------------------------| Olaf M. Kolkman
> ---------------------------------| RIPE NCC
>
>
> --
> to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
> the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
> archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>
>


--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Olaf Kolkman <OKolkman@ripe.net>
Subject: Re: NSEC++ (Example code broken)
Date: Tue, 09 Dec 2003 21:40:57 +0100
Lines: 18
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <00a601c3be82$0a1b40d0$b9370681@barnacle>
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Tue Dec 09 21:59:14 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: "Scott Rose" <scottr@nist.gov>
In-reply-to: Your message of Tue, 09 Dec 2003 13:27:01 EST.
             <00a601c3be82$0a1b40d0$b9370681@barnacle> 
X-Organization: RIPE Network Coordination Centre
X-Phone: +31 20 535 4444
X-Fax: +31 20 535 4445
X-RIPE-Spam-Level: 
X-RIPE-Spam-Status: N 0.000446
X-RIPE-Signature: 6576dd35893e8e197e41aef7b4c49dd6
Precedence: bulk


 "Scott Rose" <scottr@nist.gov> writes:
 * I thought it looked okay.  I noticed the trailing 0x00 octet after the 0x03
 * in the example below.  Isn't that a trailing null octet in the first window?
 * Is that necessary?
 * 

No it is not... I do not understand why I did not catch that in the first place. Hex-diziness I am affraid.

--Olaf



--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Roy Arends <roy@logmess.com>
Subject: Fingerprinting DNS implementations.
Date: Tue, 9 Dec 2003 22:49:25 +0100 (CET)
Lines: 138
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
Cc: Jakob Schlyter <jakob@rfc.se>
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Tue Dec 09 23:05:01 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-Authentication-Warning: elektron.atoom.net: roy owned process doing -bs
X-X-Sender: roy@elektron.atoom.net
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new
Precedence: bulk

Hi,

Jakob and I spent the past few weeks hacking up a DNS implementation
fingerprint tool (where implementation == anything responding to a query).
This mail introduces the methodology of fingerprinting DNS
implementations.

A nameserver basically responds to a query.  Inter-operability is an
obvious requirement here, the standard protocol behaviour of different DNS
implementations is expected to be the same.

Protocol behaviour of a DNS implementation is widely documented in the
case of a 'common' query.  The DNS protocol is over 20 years old and since
its inception, there have been over 40 independant DNS implementations,
while some implementations have over 20 versions.

The methodology used to identify individual nameserver implementations is
based on "borderline" protocol behaviour.  The DNS protocol offers a
multitude of message bits, response types, opcodes, classes, query types
and label types in a fashion that makes some mutually exclusive while some
are not used in a query messages at all.  Not every implementation offers
the full set of features the DNS protocol set currently has. Some
implementations offer features outside the protocol set, and there are
implementations that do not comform to standards.

Also, new features added to - or bugs removed allow for differentiations
between versions of an implementation.

Methodology

We use a serie of "borderline" query-response messages to identify
implementations.  A serie of query-response messages form a sequence.
We call the interpretation of these series to form a conclusion "DNS
sequencing".

As mentioned, responses to a "borderline" query is used in this method.
To be somewhat efficient, a tree can be constructed which consists of
queries (nodes) and responses (branches), where the leave nodes identify
the implementation.

Every path, from the root node (initial query) to a leave node (final
query) is essentially a "strain".  The strains are used to distinguish
between, and as said, ultimatly identify implementations.

Parallel to this technique it is possible to identify some brands and
their versions by doing a specific query asking for the servers' version.
This technique does not satisfy our requirement since this has not been
implemented in all brands of nameservers (it is not part of any standard),
operators may have obscured the information and there are implementations
that try to resolve the query, essentially asking root-servers from a
different class for their version.

Implementation.

Our current software is written as a proof-of-concept. In field tests,
false positives were encountered when trying to identify a set of servers
residing behind a load-balancing apparatus where the servers itself are of
different implementations, or when a specific implementation behaves like
a forwarder.

We are actively looking for implementations not yet identified by this
tool to complement the set of strains.

The current set of strains identify the following implementations
and their versions:

ATLAS
BIND 4
            BIND 4.8 -- 4.8.3
            BIND 4.9.3 -- 4.9.11
BIND 8
            BIND 8.1 -- 8.2.1T4B
            BIND 8.2.1
            BIND 8.2.2P3 -- 8.4.1
            BIND 8.4.1P1
BIND 9
            BIND 9.0.0b5 -- 9.0.1
            BIND 9.1.0 -- 9.1.3
            BIND 9.2.0a1 -- 9.2.0rc3
            BIND 9.2.0rc4 -- 9.2.2P3
            BIND 9.2.3rc1 -- 9.4.0a0
eNom DNS
Incognito DNS Commander
MARADNS
Microsoft Windows
            Server 2003
	    Server 2000
            Server NT4
MyDNS
Nominum ANS
Nominum CNS
NonSequitur DNS
NSD
Oak DNS
Pliant DNS Server
Posadis
PowerDNS
	    2.8 -- 2.9.3
            2.9.4 -- 2.9.11
QuickDNS
Simple DNS plus
TinyDNS
UltraDNS

We are actively looking for volunteers who allow us to identify their
running code in some form or configuration of some version of:

chives
custom-dns
dents
dnrd
dnsmasq
gnudip-www
ibmdns
jeeves
lbdns
lbnamed
ldapdns
MacDNS
Microsoft Windows Server NT3.51
pdnsd
Stanford::DNSserver
yaku-ns

and/or

All other unidentified, unmentioned original code.

Thanks,

Roy Arends
Jakob Schlyter

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Dean Anderson <dean@av8.com>
Subject: Re: Fingerprinting DNS implementations.
Date: Tue, 9 Dec 2003 17:37:44 -0500 (EST)
Lines: 160
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <Pine.LNX.4.58.0312092248380.4290@elektron.atoom.net>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org, Jakob Schlyter <jakob@rfc.se>
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Tue Dec 09 23:58:06 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-X-Sender: dean@cirrus
To: Roy Arends <roy@logmess.com>
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.4.58.0312092248380.4290@elektron.atoom.net>
Precedence: bulk

I'm wondering why you are doing this.  This sort of tool could be abused 
by crackers.

I am particularly where is sounds like your are looking for fingerprints
for vendors that have obscured their responses in order to prevent
fingerprinting.

DNS is a critical piece of infrastructure, and fingerprints allow the 
cracker to use the right attack the first time, without revealing their 
attack.

		--Dean

On Tue, 9 Dec 2003, Roy Arends wrote:

> Hi,
> 
> Jakob and I spent the past few weeks hacking up a DNS implementation
> fingerprint tool (where implementation == anything responding to a query).
> This mail introduces the methodology of fingerprinting DNS
> implementations.
> 
> A nameserver basically responds to a query.  Inter-operability is an
> obvious requirement here, the standard protocol behaviour of different DNS
> implementations is expected to be the same.
> 
> Protocol behaviour of a DNS implementation is widely documented in the
> case of a 'common' query.  The DNS protocol is over 20 years old and since
> its inception, there have been over 40 independant DNS implementations,
> while some implementations have over 20 versions.
> 
> The methodology used to identify individual nameserver implementations is
> based on "borderline" protocol behaviour.  The DNS protocol offers a
> multitude of message bits, response types, opcodes, classes, query types
> and label types in a fashion that makes some mutually exclusive while some
> are not used in a query messages at all.  Not every implementation offers
> the full set of features the DNS protocol set currently has. Some
> implementations offer features outside the protocol set, and there are
> implementations that do not comform to standards.
> 
> Also, new features added to - or bugs removed allow for differentiations
> between versions of an implementation.
> 
> Methodology
> 
> We use a serie of "borderline" query-response messages to identify
> implementations.  A serie of query-response messages form a sequence.
> We call the interpretation of these series to form a conclusion "DNS
> sequencing".
> 
> As mentioned, responses to a "borderline" query is used in this method.
> To be somewhat efficient, a tree can be constructed which consists of
> queries (nodes) and responses (branches), where the leave nodes identify
> the implementation.
> 
> Every path, from the root node (initial query) to a leave node (final
> query) is essentially a "strain".  The strains are used to distinguish
> between, and as said, ultimatly identify implementations.
> 
> Parallel to this technique it is possible to identify some brands and
> their versions by doing a specific query asking for the servers' version.
> This technique does not satisfy our requirement since this has not been
> implemented in all brands of nameservers (it is not part of any standard),
> operators may have obscured the information and there are implementations
> that try to resolve the query, essentially asking root-servers from a
> different class for their version.
> 
> Implementation.
> 
> Our current software is written as a proof-of-concept. In field tests,
> false positives were encountered when trying to identify a set of servers
> residing behind a load-balancing apparatus where the servers itself are of
> different implementations, or when a specific implementation behaves like
> a forwarder.
> 
> We are actively looking for implementations not yet identified by this
> tool to complement the set of strains.
> 
> The current set of strains identify the following implementations
> and their versions:
> 
> ATLAS
> BIND 4
>             BIND 4.8 -- 4.8.3
>             BIND 4.9.3 -- 4.9.11
> BIND 8
>             BIND 8.1 -- 8.2.1T4B
>             BIND 8.2.1
>             BIND 8.2.2P3 -- 8.4.1
>             BIND 8.4.1P1
> BIND 9
>             BIND 9.0.0b5 -- 9.0.1
>             BIND 9.1.0 -- 9.1.3
>             BIND 9.2.0a1 -- 9.2.0rc3
>             BIND 9.2.0rc4 -- 9.2.2P3
>             BIND 9.2.3rc1 -- 9.4.0a0
> eNom DNS
> Incognito DNS Commander
> MARADNS
> Microsoft Windows
>             Server 2003
> 	    Server 2000
>             Server NT4
> MyDNS
> Nominum ANS
> Nominum CNS
> NonSequitur DNS
> NSD
> Oak DNS
> Pliant DNS Server
> Posadis
> PowerDNS
> 	    2.8 -- 2.9.3
>             2.9.4 -- 2.9.11
> QuickDNS
> Simple DNS plus
> TinyDNS
> UltraDNS
> 
> We are actively looking for volunteers who allow us to identify their
> running code in some form or configuration of some version of:
> 
> chives
> custom-dns
> dents
> dnrd
> dnsmasq
> gnudip-www
> ibmdns
> jeeves
> lbdns
> lbnamed
> ldapdns
> MacDNS
> Microsoft Windows Server NT3.51
> pdnsd
> Stanford::DNSserver
> yaku-ns
> 
> and/or
> 
> All other unidentified, unmentioned original code.
> 
> Thanks,
> 
> Roy Arends
> Jakob Schlyter
> 
> --
> to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
> the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
> archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>
> 


--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com>
Subject: Re: Fingerprinting DNS implementations.
Date: Tue, 09 Dec 2003 23:40:13 +0000
Lines: 30
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <dean@av8.com>
Cc: Roy Arends <roy@logmess.com>, namedroppers@ops.ietf.org,
        Jakob Schlyter <jakob@rfc.se>
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Wed Dec 10 00:58:13 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: Dean Anderson <dean@av8.com>
In-Reply-To: Message from Dean Anderson <dean@av8.com> 
   of "Tue, 09 Dec 2003 17:37:44 EST." <Pine.LNX.4.44.0312091732020.15519-100000@cirrus> 
Precedence: bulk

>>>>> "Dean" == Dean Anderson <dean@av8.com> writes:

    Dean> I'm wondering why you are doing this.  This sort of tool
    Dean> could be abused by crackers.

So could many other tools. Like compilers. Do you want to ban them too?

    Dean> I am particularly where is sounds like your are looking for
    Dean> fingerprints for vendors that have obscured their responses
    Dean> in order to prevent fingerprinting.

Well perhaps those vendors would then spend time fixing security bugs
in their code instead of investing in futile efforts to conceal them?

    Dean> DNS is a critical piece of infrastructure, and fingerprints
    Dean> allow the cracker to use the right attack the first time,
    Dean> without revealing their attack.

This presumes the crackers and script kiddies have that sort of
finesse. If they've got a bunch of attacks to penetrate name servers,
they'll more than likely try them all and go with the ones that
succeed against their victims. And anyway, if an attack succeeds, it's
too late. The damage has already been done. How the choice of attack
was made -- if there was a selection! -- is irrelevant.

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Chris Thompson <cet1@cus.cam.ac.uk>
Subject: Re: Fingerprinting DNS implementations.
Date: Tue, 9 Dec 2003 23:55:30 +0000 (GMT)
Lines: 15
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <Pine.LNX.4.44.0312091732020.15519-100000@cirrus>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Wed Dec 10 01:15:46 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.4.44.0312091732020.15519-100000@cirrus> from "Dean Anderson" at Dec 9, 3 05:37:44 pm
X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4 PL24]
Content-Length: 414
Precedence: bulk

Dean Anderson <dean@av8.com> writes
 
> I'm wondering why you are doing this. 

I'm not. I'm wondering why he thinks this is a DNS protocols issue
rather than a DNS operations one.

Chris Thompson
Email: cet1@cam.ac.uk

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Dean Anderson <dean@av8.com>
Subject: Re: Fingerprinting DNS implementations.
Date: Tue, 9 Dec 2003 20:08:05 -0500 (EST)
Lines: 56
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <26843.1071013213@gromit.rfc1035.com>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
Cc: Roy Arends <roy@logmess.com>, <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>,
        Jakob Schlyter <jakob@rfc.se>
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Wed Dec 10 02:32:55 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-X-Sender: dean@cirrus
To: Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com>
In-Reply-To: <26843.1071013213@gromit.rfc1035.com>
Precedence: bulk

On Tue, 9 Dec 2003, Jim Reid wrote:

> >>>>> "Dean" == Dean Anderson <dean@av8.com> writes:
> 
>     Dean> I'm wondering why you are doing this.  This sort of tool
>     Dean> could be abused by crackers.
> 
> So could many other tools. Like compilers. Do you want to ban them too?

Compilers are indispensable. Fingerprinting is not (I think) 
indispensable.

>     Dean> I am particularly where is sounds like your are looking for
>     Dean> fingerprints for vendors that have obscured their responses
>     Dean> in order to prevent fingerprinting.
> 
> Well perhaps those vendors would then spend time fixing security bugs
> in their code instead of investing in futile efforts to conceal them?

Much easier said than done. Wait. Clancy! Fire the security bug 
developers.

>     Dean> DNS is a critical piece of infrastructure, and fingerprints
>     Dean> allow the cracker to use the right attack the first time,
>     Dean> without revealing their attack.
> 
> This presumes the crackers and script kiddies have that sort of
> finesse. If they've got a bunch of attacks to penetrate name servers,
> they'll more than likely try them all and go with the ones that
> succeed against their victims. 

Well, now they can have that finesse, without even learning about DNS.

> And anyway, if an attack succeeds, it's too late. The damage has already
> been done. How the choice of attack was made -- if there was a
> selection! -- is irrelevant.

No, actually, it isn't.  The slightest irregularity can trigger discovery.  
The Debian crack was discovered because of an unexpected kernel Oops. If
they crackers had used better fingerprinting, they would have gotten in
undetected, and much more damage would have been done.  As it was, they
got in, but because of their lack of accurate fingerprinting, they were
detected (after the fact) but before they could cause great damage.

I guess we can't really prevent crackers from getting fingerprinting, if
they want to, but it seems smart people are making it easier than it has
to be.

		--Dean


--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Roy Arends <roy@logmess.com>
Subject: Re: Fingerprinting DNS implementations.
Date: Wed, 10 Dec 2003 15:19:45 +0100 (CET)
Lines: 36
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <Pine.LNX.4.44.0312091732020.15519-100000@cirrus>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org, Jakob Schlyter <jakob@rfc.se>
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Wed Dec 10 15:40:36 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-Authentication-Warning: elektron.atoom.net: roy owned process doing -bs
X-X-Sender: roy@elektron.atoom.net
To: Dean Anderson <dean@av8.com>
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.4.44.0312091732020.15519-100000@cirrus>
X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new
Precedence: bulk

On Tue, 9 Dec 2003, Dean Anderson wrote:

> I'm wondering why you are doing this.

I want to know how the DNS landscape looks like. A popularity contest.
Especially if the wg decides to clarify parts of the standards, or
standardise additions, I'd like to know the impact on the landscape,
therefor I need to know what it looks like.

Oh, and for fun as well.

> This sort of tool could be abused by crackers.

The tool does not discriminate on intend or mindset.

> I am particularly where is sounds like your are looking for fingerprints
> for vendors that have obscured their responses in order to prevent
> fingerprinting.

The tool does not discriminate in that area neither. Both implementations
that scream their version, including authors, and implementations
that do not can be identified.

Vendors do not obscure responses. How do you obscure responses ? Create
but not send ? Response-Sensorship ?

Instead of 'fingerprinting', would you like me to call it 'protocol
conformity, indexed by implementation' ?

Roy

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Miek Gieben <miekg@atoom.net>
Subject: nsec-01, bit 0
Date: Wed, 10 Dec 2003 15:45:37 +0100
Lines: 37
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha1;
	protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="6TrnltStXW4iwmi0"
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Wed Dec 10 16:00:39 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Mail-Followup-To: namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Content-Disposition: inline
User-Agent: Vim/Mutt/Linux
X-Home: www.miek.nl
X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new
Precedence: bulk


--6TrnltStXW4iwmi0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Disposition: inline
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Hello,

Bit 0 in the first bitmap in the first window does not encode for any=20
RR. Shouldn't this bit get a status of reserved in the draft? Or doesn't
it matter if it's 1 or 0.

grtz
      Miek
--
fingerprint =3D E1EB 29B8 8FA2 2923 62B8  0A2B 64B8 F15C 7764 AB4B
http://miek.nl/about.html

--6TrnltStXW4iwmi0
Content-Type: application/pgp-signature
Content-Disposition: inline

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.2.3 (GNU/Linux)

iD8DBQE/1zGRZLjxXHdkq0sRArA+AJ4kxuLvD3oUwfunVndckOhuqYPqZQCfZ2uQ
sC0kCAEYmQb9aQepM/grSq4=
=oACr
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

--6TrnltStXW4iwmi0--

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Olaf Kolkman <olaf@ripe.net>
Subject: Re: nsec-01, bit 0
Date: Wed, 10 Dec 2003 16:03:35 +0100
Lines: 20
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <miekg@atoom.net>
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Wed Dec 10 16:17:55 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
In-Reply-To: Message from Miek Gieben <miekg@atoom.net> 
   of "Wed, 10 Dec 2003 15:45:37 +0100." <20031210144537.GA29608@atoom.net> 
X-RIPE-Spam-Level: 
X-RIPE-Spam-Status: N 0.141243
X-RIPE-Signature: 69837d2fecf80db8ec56bfd5ecce0781
Precedence: bulk


 * Bit 0 in the first bitmap in the first window does not encode for any=20
 * RR. Shouldn't this bit get a status of reserved in the draft? Or doesn't
 * it matter if it's 1 or 0.


This is "Silly State" again :-) (that issue is closed)

See
http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/namedroppers.2003/msg01851.html


--Olaf
  DNSEXT Chair

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Miek Gieben <miekg@atoom.net>
Subject: Re: nsec-01, bit 0
Date: Wed, 10 Dec 2003 16:17:14 +0100
Lines: 19
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <20031210144537.GA29608@atoom.net> <200312101503.hBAF3Zwp017642@birch.ripe.net>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Cc: namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Wed Dec 10 16:32:07 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: Olaf Kolkman <olaf@ripe.net>
Mail-Followup-To: Olaf Kolkman <olaf@ripe.net>,
	namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Content-Disposition: inline
In-Reply-To: <200312101503.hBAF3Zwp017642@birch.ripe.net>
User-Agent: Vim/Mutt/Linux
X-Home: www.miek.nl
X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new
Precedence: bulk

[On 10 Dec, @16:03, Olaf wrote in "Re: nsec-01, bit 0 ..."]
> 
>  * Bit 0 in the first bitmap in the first window does not encode for any=20
>  * RR. Shouldn't this bit get a status of reserved in the draft? Or doesn't
>  * it matter if it's 1 or 0.
> 
> 
> This is "Silly State" again :-) (that issue is closed)

ah, *duh*

grtz
      Miek

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Roy Arends <roy@logmess.com>
Subject: Re: nsec-01, bit 0
Date: Wed, 10 Dec 2003 16:21:03 +0100 (CET)
Lines: 30
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <200312101503.hBAF3Zwp017642@birch.ripe.net>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
Cc: namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Wed Dec 10 16:33:51 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-Authentication-Warning: elektron.atoom.net: roy owned process doing -bs
X-X-Sender: roy@elektron.atoom.net
To: Olaf Kolkman <olaf@ripe.net>
In-Reply-To: <200312101503.hBAF3Zwp017642@birch.ripe.net>
X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new
Precedence: bulk

On Wed, 10 Dec 2003, Olaf Kolkman wrote:

>
>  * Bit 0 in the first bitmap in the first window does not encode for any=20
>  * RR. Shouldn't this bit get a status of reserved in the draft? Or doesn't
>  * it matter if it's 1 or 0.
>
>
> This is "Silly State" again :-) (that issue is closed)
>
> See
> http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/namedroppers.2003/msg01851.html

Nope,

Nothing to do with that.

In NXT bit 0 was reserved FFU, that future use is no more. Semantically,
it would refer to TYPE 0, which is 'an illegal type' according to 2535.

The nsec-01 needs to state something about it. (Bit 0 MUST be clear, clear
on send, ignore on receive)

Roy

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Olaf Kolkman <olaf@ripe.net>
Subject: Re: nsec-01, bit 0
Date: Wed, 10 Dec 2003 16:42:19 +0100
Lines: 20
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <roy@logmess.com>
Cc: Olaf Kolkman <olaf@ripe.net>,
	namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Wed Dec 10 16:54:56 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: Roy Arends <roy@logmess.com>
In-Reply-To: Message from Roy Arends <roy@logmess.com> 
   of "Wed, 10 Dec 2003 16:21:03 +0100." <Pine.LNX.4.58.0312101613540.21161@elektron.atoom.net> 
X-RIPE-Spam-Level: 
X-RIPE-Spam-Status: N 0.025824
X-RIPE-Signature: 8150fccf99d16519311156bc3446b6b4
Precedence: bulk


 * 
 * Nope,
 * 
(...)
 * The nsec-01 needs to state something about it. (Bit 0 MUST be clear, clear
 * on send, ignore on receive)


You are correct ("Te kort door de bocht" we say in Dutch). 

I like the suggested text.

--Olaf

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Dean Anderson <dean@av8.com>
Subject: Re: Fingerprinting DNS implementations.
Date: Wed, 10 Dec 2003 13:53:38 -0500 (EST)
Lines: 21
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <Pine.LNX.4.58.0312101454010.21161@elektron.atoom.net>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org, Jakob Schlyter <jakob@rfc.se>
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Wed Dec 10 20:19:42 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-X-Sender: dean@cirrus
To: Roy Arends <roy@logmess.com>
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.4.58.0312101454010.21161@elektron.atoom.net>
Precedence: bulk

On Wed, 10 Dec 2003, Roy Arends wrote:

> Vendors do not obscure responses. How do you obscure responses ? Create
> but not send ? Response-Sensorship ?

Nmap fingerprints OS's by TCP signatures, using much the same methods as
you described, in principle anyway.  There are tools for linux and I think
*BSD that will alter the responses so that this fingerprinting fails to
identify the true OS.

This could get into a sort of war of fingerprinting and obscuring changes,
which would seem to be destructive...

		--Dean


--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Ted Lemon <mellon@nominum.com>
Subject: Re: Fingerprinting DNS implementations.
Date: Wed, 10 Dec 2003 20:05:38 -0600
Lines: 15
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <Pine.LNX.4.44.0312101349210.16418-100000@cirrus>
Mime-Version: 1.0 (Apple Message framework v609)
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Cc: Roy Arends <roy@logmess.com>, namedroppers@ops.ietf.org,
	Jakob Schlyter <jakob@rfc.se>
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Thu Dec 11 03:30:49 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.4.44.0312101349210.16418-100000@cirrus>
To: Dean Anderson <dean@av8.com>
X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.609)
Precedence: bulk

On Dec 10, 2003, at 12:53 PM, Dean Anderson wrote:
> This could get into a sort of war of fingerprinting and obscuring 
> changes,
> which would seem to be destructive...

Or, it could turn into a war of bug fixing, which would be 
constructive, and would motivate people to move to less buggy versions 
of their name server software.


--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Dean Anderson <dean@av8.com>
Subject: Re: Fingerprinting DNS implementations.
Date: Wed, 10 Dec 2003 23:00:21 -0500 (EST)
Lines: 26
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <83DFCC5E-2B7E-11D8-BAC0-000A95D9C74C@nominum.com>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
Cc: Roy Arends <roy@logmess.com>, <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>,
        Jakob Schlyter <jakob@rfc.se>
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Thu Dec 11 05:25:49 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-X-Sender: dean@cirrus
To: Ted Lemon <mellon@nominum.com>
In-Reply-To: <83DFCC5E-2B7E-11D8-BAC0-000A95D9C74C@nominum.com>
Precedence: bulk

On Wed, 10 Dec 2003, Ted Lemon wrote:

> On Dec 10, 2003, at 12:53 PM, Dean Anderson wrote:
> > This could get into a sort of war of fingerprinting and obscuring 
> > changes,
> > which would seem to be destructive...
> 
> Or, it could turn into a war of bug fixing, which would be constructive,
> and would motivate people to move to less buggy versions of their name
> server software.

I'm Doubtful. The (linux) fingerprint changes seem (to me anyway--not an
expert on the exact changes), gratuitous changes that aren't expected to
actually break anything. This is a far cry from fixing bugs.  Its just
busy work created by the need for a response to fingerprinting.  Its also
not usaully done in the mainline, but as optional changes, basically
making it seem like there are more versions then there are.

		--Dean


--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: "Mathias Samuelson" <mathias.samuelson@dimension.se>
Subject: Re: Fingerprinting DNS implementations.
Date: Thu, 11 Dec 2003 09:34:47 +0100
Lines: 33
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <Pine.LNX.4.44.0312101349210.16418-100000@cirrus> <83DFCC5E-2B7E-11D8-BAC0-000A95D9C74C@nominum.com>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Cc: Dean Anderson <dean@av8.com>, Roy Arends <roy@logmess.com>,
	  namedroppers@ops.ietf.org, Jakob Schlyter <jakob@rfc.se>
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Thu Dec 11 09:56:39 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; FreeBSD i386; en-US; rv:1.5) Gecko/20031119 Thunderbird/0.3
X-Accept-Language: en-us, en
To: Ted Lemon <mellon@nominum.com>
In-Reply-To: <83DFCC5E-2B7E-11D8-BAC0-000A95D9C74C@nominum.com>
Precedence: bulk

> 
> Or, it could turn into a war of bug fixing, which would be constructive, 
> and would motivate people to move to less buggy versions of their name 
> server software.

Just my $0.02. It's, as you all know, surprisingly often the case that 
the network operators aren't even aware of what version of software they 
are running. I've heard some people argue that they shouldn't run 
anything else than whatever version of BIND Sun bundles with Solaris, no 
matter how many vulnerabilities there's in that software. Obscuring the 
fact that one is running such software doesn't seem to be a good 
security measure anyway.

So, for what it's worth, I agree with those who are pro what Dean and 
Jakob is doing.

All best
Mathias
-- 
    Mathias Samuelson
Phone: +46 (0)8 5058 3111
      Dimension AB

You can fetch my GnuPG key (CB6D9D85) with fingerprint
B98BB34ADAA91D4F2F47E6363EC2C8BDCB6D9D85
from (e.g.) blackhole.pca.dfn.de.


--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: "Olaf M. Kolkman" <olaf@ripe.net>
Subject: Re: Fingerprinting DNS implementations.
Date: Thu, 11 Dec 2003 10:01:13 +0100
Organization: RIPE NCC
Lines: 15
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <Pine.LNX.4.58.0312092248380.4290@elektron.atoom.net>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Thu Dec 11 10:12:35 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.4.58.0312092248380.4290@elektron.atoom.net>
X-Mailer: Sylpheed version 0.9.6 (GTK+ 1.2.10; i686-pc-linux-gnu)
X-RIPE-Spam-Level: 
X-RIPE-Spam-Status: N 0.010959
X-RIPE-Signature: 142d25df13f4e80e906c7493f92b5187
Precedence: bulk



Can we please move the discussion on operational impact of this tool
elsewhere; that discussion is clearly off-topic for this list.


-- Olaf
   DNSEXT Co-Chair.


--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: lbudney@pobox.com
Subject: Re: Fingerprinting DNS implementations.
Date: Thu, 11 Dec 2003 07:04:47 -0500 (EST)
Lines: 17
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <Pine.LNX.4.44.0312102253290.1420-100000@cirrus>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Thu Dec 11 13:21:41 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-X-Sender: budney@budney.homeunix.net
To: "namedroppers@ops.ietf.org" <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.4.44.0312102253290.1420-100000@cirrus>
Precedence: bulk

On Wed, 10 Dec 2003, Dean Anderson wrote:
>
> The (linux) fingerprint changes...Its just busy work created by the need
> for a response to fingerprinting.

It's just busywork, full stop. There is no "need for a response to
fingerprinting".

--Len.



--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: "Olaf M. Kolkman" <olaf@ripe.net>
Subject: Re: nsec++
Date: Thu, 11 Dec 2003 16:21:07 +0100
Organization: RIPE NCC
Lines: 27
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <45E39EE2E44FD443AEFAC07728BF3B5054B026@uk-ismsg02.altera.priv.altera.com>
	<bqqdip$g7n$1@sf1.isc.org>
	<g31xrjnmyu.fsf@sa.vix.com>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Thu Dec 11 16:45:40 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
In-Reply-To: <g31xrjnmyu.fsf@sa.vix.com>
X-Mailer: Sylpheed version 0.9.6 (GTK+ 1.2.10; i686-pc-linux-gnu)
X-RIPE-Spam-Level: 
X-RIPE-Spam-Status: N 0.214945
X-RIPE-Signature: ee5033924067c0fce56db9dd3c75d54e
Precedence: bulk



Paul wrote:
> let's not do this:  let leadership mean deciding what (not) to discuss.

Well eh... leadership... who me ?  ;-)

Given that I have not seen major support on the list in favour of
'more compression', few people worried about additional comlexity and
we really need to get this done I propose to keep the document with
the specification as is and go for last call early next week.

If you have editorial issues please mail them to Jakob ASAP, maybe 
we can do another document roll.


-- Olaf

---------------------------------| Olaf M. Kolkman
---------------------------------| RIPE NCC


--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Dean Anderson <dean@av8.com>
Subject: Re: Fingerprinting DNS implementations.
Date: Thu, 11 Dec 2003 14:12:45 -0500 (EST)
Lines: 33
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <3FD82C27.2050203@dimension.se>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
Cc: Ted Lemon <mellon@nominum.com>, Roy Arends <roy@logmess.com>,
        <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>, Jakob Schlyter <jakob@rfc.se>
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Thu Dec 11 20:35:17 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-X-Sender: dean@cirrus
To: Mathias Samuelson <mathias.samuelson@dimension.se>
In-Reply-To: <3FD82C27.2050203@dimension.se>
Precedence: bulk

On Thu, 11 Dec 2003, Mathias Samuelson wrote:

> I've heard some people argue that they shouldn't run 
> anything else than whatever version of BIND Sun bundles with Solaris, no 
> matter how many vulnerabilities there's in that software. 

Sun (like most vendors)  won't provide software support if you aren't
running what they bundled.  But they do provide their own updates. You 
have to take those updates.

But I don't run Bind at all for security reasons.  

> Obscuring the fact that one is running such software doesn't seem to be
> a good security measure anyway.

Certainly, in the more mature area of OS fingerprinting, quite a lot of
people disagree.  Hiding this kind of information is the first thing
security consultants recommend.  Security by obscurity is a valid and
effective form of security.  Call a bank, and ask them what kind of alarm
system they have.  Even the manuals for Airport security systems are
restricted.  This is security by obsurity.

Everything has weaknesses. Every software has an exploit.  Thinking
otherwise is unrealistic.

		--Dean


--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Phil Howard <phil-namedroppers@ipal.net>
Subject: Re: Fingerprinting DNS implementations.
Date: Thu, 11 Dec 2003 14:03:23 -0600
Lines: 25
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <Pine.LNX.4.58.0312092248380.4290@elektron.atoom.net> <20031211100113.7606a672.olaf@ripe.net>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Thu Dec 11 21:32:46 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Content-Disposition: inline
In-Reply-To: <20031211100113.7606a672.olaf@ripe.net>
User-Agent: Mutt/1.4.1i
Precedence: bulk

On Thu, Dec 11, 2003 at 10:01:13AM +0100, Olaf M. Kolkman wrote:

| Can we please move the discussion on operational impact of this tool
| elsewhere; that discussion is clearly off-topic for this list.
| 
| 
| -- Olaf
|    DNSEXT Co-Chair.

Right.  It shouldn't be here.

Can someone suggest a software-neutral mailing list or other forum for DNS
server operational discussions?

-- 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Phil Howard KA9WGN       | http://linuxhomepage.com/      http://ham.org/ |
| (first name) at ipal.net | http://phil.ipal.org/   http://ka9wgn.ham.org/ |
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: "D. J. Bernstein" <djb@cr.yp.to>
Subject: Re: Fingerprinting DNS implementations.
Date: 11 Dec 2003 20:32:55 -0000
Lines: 19
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <Pine.LNX.4.44.0312091732020.15519-100000@cirrus> <E1ATrhS-0007TE-9H@virgo.cus.cam.ac.uk>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Thu Dec 11 21:47:58 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Content-Disposition: inline
Precedence: bulk

I posted fingerprint data a year ago: http://cr.yp.to/surveys/dns1.html

Chris Thompson writes:
> I'm wondering why he thinks this is a DNS protocols issue
> rather than a DNS operations one.

The IETF often creates interoperability problems by extending protocols
in a way that breaks existing software. Today's ``borderline'' packets
could be tomorrow's protocol extensions; it's important to document how
those packets are handled.

---D. J. Bernstein, Associate Professor, Department of Mathematics,
Statistics, and Computer Science, University of Illinois at Chicago

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com>
Subject: Re: Fingerprinting DNS implementations.
Date: Fri, 12 Dec 2003 00:12:09 +0000
Lines: 13
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <phil-namedroppers@ipal.net>
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Fri Dec 12 01:25:29 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: Phil Howard <phil-namedroppers@ipal.net>
In-Reply-To: Message from Phil Howard <phil-namedroppers@ipal.net> 
   of "Thu, 11 Dec 2003 14:03:23 CST." <20031211200323.GA2287@altair.ipal.net> 
Precedence: bulk

>>>>> "Phil" == Phil Howard <phil-namedroppers@ipal.net> writes:

    Phil> Can someone suggest a software-neutral mailing list or other
    Phil> forum for DNS server operational discussions?

The IETF dnsop WG's mailing list would be an obvious choice.


--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: "Olaf M. Kolkman" <olaf@ripe.net>
Subject: Q22: mistake made.
Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2003 10:20:16 +0100
Organization: RIPE NCC
Lines: 39
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Mon Dec 15 10:45:56 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
X-Mailer: Sylpheed version 0.9.6 (GTK+ 1.2.10; i686-pc-linux-gnu)
X-RIPE-Spam-Level: 
X-RIPE-Spam-Status: N 0.028860
X-RIPE-Signature: 51f67b77638d688e783abb80d11739fc
Precedence: bulk


In both 
 http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/namedroppers.2003/msg02181.html
 http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/namedroppers.2003/msg02183.html

I wrote:
>      Default action will be not to add recomendations about compression
>      and decompression before sending or after receiving. 


In the wrapup
 http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/namedroppers.2003/msg02263.html

I wrote:
> Resolved, no text was suppied, recomendations on compression and
> decompression will be added and taken as consensus of the group.

I missed the negation in that sentence. As a logical concequence of the 
process followed it should have read:

> Resolved, no text was suppied. The concensus of the group is that
> text with recomendations on compression and decompression will not be
> added.

 
Sorry for the confusion.


-- Olaf

---------------------------------| Olaf M. Kolkman
---------------------------------| RIPE NCC


--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Ralph Droms <rdroms@cisco.com>
Subject: LLMNR Issue 52: LLMNR-25 review (Ralph Droms)
Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2003 13:29:59 -0500
Lines: 154
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Mon Dec 15 19:50:41 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-Sender: rdroms@flask.cisco.com
X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 4.3.2
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Precedence: bulk

See "RD>" for my comments on the responses to issue 52.

- Ralph

[BA]  1. LLMNR does indeed use the same packet format as DNS for both
requests and responses. This should be clarified.

   RD> OK; changes below look OK.

2. Names are used in LLMNR the same way that they are used in DNS,
and have the same structure. The matching rules are also identical,
including use of wildcards.

   RD> Practically speaking, because of text in section 2.2 like:

     Responders MUST NOT respond to LLMNR queries for names they are
     not authoritative for.

   I think the LLMNR names could be characterized as simple character
   strings, and that LLMNR name comparisons could be characterized as a
   simple equality check (with application of DNS case-folding rules).

LLMNR also does not change how hosts determine their names
or how they handle DHCP options 12 and 15. Some hosts accept
DHCP assignment of names, others do not.

   RD> I wasn't thinking so much of DHCP specifically, I just used
   the DHCP options as examples of how a host might be configured with
   various names that would be used in the synthesis of LLMNR names.

In terms of the examples, it is not possible to encode a query
for "foo" or "foo.example.com" or "foo.example" using the DNS
packet format; only queries for "foo.", "foo.example.com."
or "foo.example." are possible. An LLMNR responder
will only respond to a query if it is authoritative for
that name. Whether the responder is configured to respond to queries
for "foo." or "foo.example.com." is implementation dependent.

   RD> OK, so before I read your response to issue 56, I wrote the
   following text as a suggestion for a new section to be added to
   section 2.  The idea is to give a clear example of what RRs an LLMNR
   responder might own, and where those RRs might be synthesized from.

     2.1 Resource record model and naming

     Each LLMNR responder conceptually maintains a set of records for which
     it is authoritative in response to LLMNR queries.  These records are
     similar to 'nodes', as defined in DNS (RFC 1034).  Each record has a
     name that acts as a key for the record, and owns one or more resource
     records (RRs).  The RRs are typed like DNS RRs.

     The records for which an LLMNR is authoritative may be constructed
     from information configured in the responder, or may be explicitly
     configured.  For example, a Windows 2000 host configured through the
     "System Properties" control panel to have computer name "host1" and to
     be a member of the "example.com" domain, and with IPv4 address
     10.1.1.1 and IPv6 address 2001:0DB8::1:2:3:FF:FE:4:5:6 might be
     authoritative for the following records:

     host1.	                IN A       10.1.1.1
			    IN AAAA    2001:0DB8::1:2:3:FF:FE:4:5:6

     host1.example.com.	IN A       10.1.1.1
			    IN AAAA    2001:0DB8::1:2:3:FF:FE:4:5:6

     1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa.  IN PTR     host1.
			    IN PTR     host1.example.com.

     6.0.5.0.4.0.E.F.F.F.3.0.2.0.1.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.8.b.d.0.1.0.0.2.inv6.arpa
			    IN PTR     host1.
			    IN PTR     host1.example.com

     An LLMNR responder might be further manually configured with the name
     of a local mail server with an MX RR included in the "host1" and
     "host1.example.com" records.

     An LLMNR responder is only authoritative for records that are directly
     related to the responder itself.

     Names in LLMNR are treated as a character string, with no internal
     structure.  Thus, the LLMNR name host1 is completely unrelated to
     host1.example.com. Comparisons between LLMNR names are simple equality
     tests, with case-folding according to the rules in DNS (RFC ???).

3. The term "authoritative" is used to refer to whether a host
responds to a query for a name.  The term "owned" is used to refer to
whether an RR is present on the responder. These are different things,
so the same term cannot be used. The term "has" is used synonymously
with "owned" and so the term "owned" can be substituted to improve
clarity.

   RD> Thanks for the clarification...

Proposed fixes:

   RD> The fixes all look OK, except where noted...

In Section 1, change:

"This document discusses Link Local Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR),
which operates on a separate port from the Domain Name System (DNS),
with a distinct resolver cache, but does not change the format of DNS
packets.  LLMNR supports all current and future DNS formats, types and
classes."

To:

"This document discusses Link Local Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR),
which utilizes the DNS packet format for both requests and responses,
and supports all current and future DNS formats, types and classes.
LLMNR operates on a separate port from the Domain Name System (DNS),
with a distinct resolver cache."

Add to Section 2:

"This document does not specify how names are
chosen or configured. This may occur via any mechanism, including
DHCPv4 [RFC2131] or DHCPv6 [RFC3315]."

   RD> Perhaps also mention local synthesis and explicit configuration?
   "including synthesis from local configuration information such as
   the host name and default domain, configuration information obtained
   through DHCPv4 [RFC2131} or DHCPv6 [RFC3315], or explicit manual
   configuration."

Add to Section 2.1:

"An LLMNR query is composed in exactly the same manner
and with the same packet format as a
DNS query as specified in [RFC1035]."

Add to Section 2.2:

"A response to an LLMNR query is composed in exactly the same manner
and with the same packet format as a response to a
DNS query as specified in [RFC1035]."

Throughout the document: Change "has" to "owns" where the term refers to RRs.

Add the following definition to the terminology section:

"Owner

A host is said to be the owner of a Resource Record (RR) if it is configured
to respond to an LLMNR query for that RR."

Proposed resolution: Accept


--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Ralph Droms <rdroms@cisco.com>
Subject: LLMNR Issue 52: Miscellaneous NITs (Part 1)
Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2003 15:01:38 -0500
Lines: 17
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Mon Dec 15 21:20:37 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-Sender: rdroms@flask.cisco.com
X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 4.3.2
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Precedence: bulk

I agree with all of the fixes made in response to issues 53.

There doesn't seem to be an explicit response or change to this comment in
issue 53:

   Section 4, fifth paragraph: I think the host should perform the
   uniqueness test when the interface is connected to a link (in
   addition to the other events in the bullet list).

- Ralph


--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org
Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-dnsext-mdns-26.txt
Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2003 15:28:35 -0500
Lines: 96
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Reply-To: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: Multipart/Mixed; Boundary="NextPart"
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Mon Dec 15 21:45:02 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: IETF-Announce: ;
Precedence: bulk

--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the DNS Extensions Working Group of the IETF.

	Title		: Linklocal Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR)
	Author(s)	: L. Esibov, B. Aboba, D. Thaler
	Filename	: draft-ietf-dnsext-mdns-26.txt
	Pages		: 23
	Date		: 2003-12-15
	
Today, with the rise of home networking, there are an increasing number
of ad-hoc networks operating without a Domain Name System (DNS) server.
In order to allow name resolution in such environments, Link-Local
Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR) is proposed.  LLMNR supports all
current and future DNS formats, types and classes, while operating on a
separate port from DNS, and with a distinct resolver cache.

The goal of LLMNR is to enable name resolution in scenarios in which
conventional DNS name resolution is not possible.  Since LLMNR only
operates on the local link, it cannot be considered a substitute for
DNS.

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-mdns-26.txt

To remove yourself from the IETF Announcement list, send a message to 
ietf-announce-request with the word unsubscribe in the body of the message.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP. Login with the username
"anonymous" and a password of your e-mail address. After logging in,
type "cd internet-drafts" and then
	"get draft-ietf-dnsext-mdns-26.txt".

A list of Internet-Drafts directories can be found in
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html 
or ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt


Internet-Drafts can also be obtained by e-mail.

Send a message to:
	mailserv@ietf.org.
In the body type:
	"FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-mdns-26.txt".
	
NOTE:	The mail server at ietf.org can return the document in
	MIME-encoded form by using the "mpack" utility.  To use this
	feature, insert the command "ENCODING mime" before the "FILE"
	command.  To decode the response(s), you will need "munpack" or
	a MIME-compliant mail reader.  Different MIME-compliant mail readers
	exhibit different behavior, especially when dealing with
	"multipart" MIME messages (i.e. documents which have been split
	up into multiple messages), so check your local documentation on
	how to manipulate these messages.
		
		
Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant mail reader
implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version of the
Internet-Draft.

--NextPart
Content-Type: Multipart/Alternative; Boundary="OtherAccess"

--OtherAccess
Content-Type: Message/External-body;
	access-type="mail-server";
	server="mailserv@ietf.org"

Content-Type: text/plain
Content-ID:	<2003-12-15150205.I-D@ietf.org>

ENCODING mime
FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-mdns-26.txt

--OtherAccess
Content-Type: Message/External-body;
	name="draft-ietf-dnsext-mdns-26.txt";
	site="ftp.ietf.org";
	access-type="anon-ftp";
	directory="internet-drafts"

Content-Type: text/plain
Content-ID:	<2003-12-15150205.I-D@ietf.org>

--OtherAccess--

--NextPart--



--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Ralph Droms <rdroms@cisco.com>
Subject: LLMNR Issue 56: Miscellaneous NITs (Part 2)
Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2003 16:07:48 -0500
Lines: 57
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Mon Dec 15 22:26:13 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-Sender: rdroms@flask.cisco.com
X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 4.3.2
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Precedence: bulk

I'm OK with all of the responses except the changes to section 2.6
(noting that the comments about names, RRs and host configuration was
also addresses in issue 52).

I'm still not clear about the retransmission strategy described in
section 2.6.  Does this text describe it correctly?

2.6 Retransmission, collection of responses and transmission jitter

    An LLMNR sender uses the timeout interval LLMNR_TIMEOUT to
    determine when to retransmit an LLMNR query and how long to collect
    responses to an LLMNR query.

    If an LLMNR query sent over UDP is not resolved within
    LLMNR_TIMEOUT, then a sender MAY repeat the transmission of the
    query in order to assure that it was received by a host capable of
    responding to it.  Retransmission of UDP queries SHOULD NOT be
    attempted more than 3 times.  Where LLMNR queries are sent using
    TCP, retransmission is handled by the transport layer.

    Because an LLMNR sender cannot know in advance if a query sent
    using multicast will receive no response, one response, or more
    than one response, the sender SHOULD wait for LLMNR_TIMEOUT in
    order to collect all possible responses, rather than considering
    the multicast query answered after the first response is
    received. A unicast query sender considers the query answered after
    the first response is received, so that it only waits for
    LLMNR_TIMEOUT if no response has been received.

    An LLMNR sender SHOULD dynamically compute the value of
    LLMNR_TIMEOUT for each transmission.  It is suggested that the
    computation of LLMNR_TIMEOUT be based on the response times for
    earlier LLMNR queries sent on the same interface.  For example, the
    algorithms described in RFC 2988 [RFC2988] (including exponential
    backoff) to compute an RTO, which is used as the value of
    LLMNR_TIMEOUT.  Smaller values MAY be used for the initial RTO
    (discussed in Section 2 of [RFC2988], paragraph 2.1), the minimum
    RTO (discussed in Section 2 of [RFC2988], paragraph 2.4), and the
    maximum RTO (discussed in Section 2 of [RFC2988], paragraph 2.5).
    Recommended values are an initial RTO of 1 second, a minimum RTO of
    200ms, and a maximum RTO of 20 seconds.

    In order to avoid synchronization, the transmission of each LLMNR
    query and response MUST be delayed by a time randomly selected from
    the interval 0 to 200 ms.

- Ralph





--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: "Loebbert, Johannes" <loebbert@sony.de>
Subject: draft-ietf-dnsext-mdns-26.txt
Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2003 11:39:52 +0100
Lines: 89
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
	boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C3C3C0.F01D1200"
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Tue Dec 16 17:55:21 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: "'namedroppers@ops.ietf.org'" <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2657.72)
Precedence: bulk

[ post by non-subscriber.  with the massive amount of spam, it is easy to miss
  and therefore delete posts by non-subscribers.  if you wish to regularly
  post from an address that is not subscribed to this mailing list, send a
  message to <listname>-owner@ops.ietf.org and ask to have the alternate
  address added to the list of addresses from which submissions are
  automatically accepted. ]

------_=_NextPart_001_01C3C3C0.F01D1200
Content-Type: text/plain;
	charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Hi all,
=20
I'm member of a Bluetooth SIG working group, which defines IP over
Bluetooth. Since this Bluetooth profile mandates LLMNR it would be =
great, if
you could give me some information, when the RFC will be finished and
fundamental parameters like the port number will be fixed.
=20
Thanks,
Johannes L=F6bbert
=20
------------------------------------------------------
Johannes L=F6bbert
European Technology Center
Sony International (Europe) GmbH
Hedelfingerstra=DFe 61
D-70327 Stuttgart
phone: +49 (0) 711 / 5858-537
fax: +49 (0) 711 / 5858-740
------------------------------------------------------
=20

------_=_NextPart_001_01C3C3C0.F01D1200
Content-Type: text/html;
	charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN">
<HTML><HEAD>
<META HTTP-EQUIV=3D"Content-Type" CONTENT=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Diso-8859-1">
<TITLE>Message</TITLE>

<META content=3D"MSHTML 6.00.2800.1276" name=3DGENERATOR></HEAD>
<BODY>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2><SPAN class=3D816483210-16122003>Hi=20
all,</SPAN></FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2><SPAN=20
class=3D816483210-16122003></SPAN></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2><SPAN class=3D816483210-16122003>I'm =
member of a=20
Bluetooth SIG working group, which defines IP over Bluetooth. Since =
this=20
Bluetooth profile mandates LLMNR it would be great, if you could give =
me some=20
information, when the RFC will be finished and fundamental parameters =
like the=20
port number will be fixed.</SPAN></FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2><SPAN=20
class=3D816483210-16122003></SPAN></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2><SPAN=20
class=3D816483210-16122003>Thanks,</SPAN></FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2><SPAN =
class=3D816483210-16122003>Johannes=20
L=F6bbert</SPAN></FONT></DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV align=3Dleft><FONT face=3DArial=20
size=3D2>------------------------------------------------------<BR><STRO=
NG>Johannes=20
L=F6bbert</STRONG><BR>European Technology Center<BR>Sony International =
(Europe)=20
GmbH<BR>Hedelfingerstra=DFe 61<BR>D-70327 Stuttgart<BR>phone: +49 (0) =
711 /=20
5858-537<BR>fax: +49 (0) 711 /=20
5858-740<BR>------------------------------------------------------</FONT=
></DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV></BODY></HTML>

------_=_NextPart_001_01C3C3C0.F01D1200--



--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Masataka Ohta <mohta@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp>
Subject: Re: draft-ietf-dnsext-mdns-26.txt
Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2003 04:49:52 +0900
Lines: 24
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <46C6A213F79E1D4DA73AB018C2CF61580271E3C4@deatcsstrmsx03.wins.fb.sony.de>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Cc: "'namedroppers@ops.ietf.org'" <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Tue Dec 16 21:06:06 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.4) Gecko/20030624 Netscape/7.1 (ax)
X-Accept-Language: ja, en-us, en
To: "Loebbert, Johannes" <loebbert@sony.de>
In-Reply-To: <46C6A213F79E1D4DA73AB018C2CF61580271E3C4@deatcsstrmsx03.wins.fb.sony.de>
Precedence: bulk

Johannes;

> Hi all,

Hi.

> I'm member of a Bluetooth SIG working group, which defines IP over
> Bluetooth. Since this Bluetooth profile mandates LLMNR it would be great,

Mandate LLMNR for IP over Bluetooth?

Since not even DNS is mandated for IP over something and not all
the IP based devices are expected to use DNS, mandating LLMNR is
overkill.

							Masataka Ohta



--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org
Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-2535typecode-change-06.txt
Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2003 16:01:16 -0500
Lines: 95
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Reply-To: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: Multipart/Mixed; Boundary="NextPart"
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Tue Dec 16 22:23:28 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: IETF-Announce: ;
Precedence: bulk

--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the DNS Extensions Working Group of the IETF.

	Title		: Legacy Resolver Compatibility for Delegation Signer
	Author(s)	: S. Weiler
	Filename	: draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-2535typecode-change-06.txt
	Pages		: 5
	Date		: 2003-12-16
	
As the DNS Security (DNSSEC) specifications have evolved, the
syntax and semantics of the DNSSEC resource records (RRs) have
changed.  Many deployed nameservers understand variants of these
semantics.  Dangerous interactions can occur when a resolver that
understands an earlier version of these semantics queries an
authoritative server that understands the new delegation signer
semantics, including at least one failure scenario that will cause
an unsecured zone to be unresolvable.  This document changes the
type codes and mnemonics of the DNSSEC RRs (SIG, KEY, and NXT) to
avoid those interactions.

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-2535typecode-change-06.txt

To remove yourself from the IETF Announcement list, send a message to 
ietf-announce-request with the word unsubscribe in the body of the message.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP. Login with the username
"anonymous" and a password of your e-mail address. After logging in,
type "cd internet-drafts" and then
	"get draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-2535typecode-change-06.txt".

A list of Internet-Drafts directories can be found in
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html 
or ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt


Internet-Drafts can also be obtained by e-mail.

Send a message to:
	mailserv@ietf.org.
In the body type:
	"FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-2535typecode-change-06.txt".
	
NOTE:	The mail server at ietf.org can return the document in
	MIME-encoded form by using the "mpack" utility.  To use this
	feature, insert the command "ENCODING mime" before the "FILE"
	command.  To decode the response(s), you will need "munpack" or
	a MIME-compliant mail reader.  Different MIME-compliant mail readers
	exhibit different behavior, especially when dealing with
	"multipart" MIME messages (i.e. documents which have been split
	up into multiple messages), so check your local documentation on
	how to manipulate these messages.
		
		
Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant mail reader
implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version of the
Internet-Draft.

--NextPart
Content-Type: Multipart/Alternative; Boundary="OtherAccess"

--OtherAccess
Content-Type: Message/External-body;
	access-type="mail-server";
	server="mailserv@ietf.org"

Content-Type: text/plain
Content-ID:	<2003-12-16154016.I-D@ietf.org>

ENCODING mime
FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-2535typecode-change-06.txt

--OtherAccess
Content-Type: Message/External-body;
	name="draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-2535typecode-change-06.txt";
	site="ftp.ietf.org";
	access-type="anon-ftp";
	directory="internet-drafts"

Content-Type: text/plain
Content-ID:	<2003-12-16154016.I-D@ietf.org>

--OtherAccess--

--NextPart--



--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Rob Austein <sra+namedroppers@hactrn.net>
Subject: New versions of DNSSECbis docs posted
Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2003 11:48:46 -0500
Lines: 38
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Mime-Version: 1.0 (generated by SEMI 1.14.5 - "Awara-Onsen")
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Wed Dec 17 18:11:59 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
User-Agent: Wanderlust/2.10.1 (Watching The Wheels) Emacs/21.3 Mule/5.0 (SAKAKI)
Precedence: bulk

I just sent new revisions of the DNSSECbis docs off to the
Internet-Drafts administrator, they should pop out shortly.  I've also
placed copies of the new drafts at

  http://www.hactrn.net/ietf/dns/dnssec-editors/

along with htmlwdiff (thanks, fenner!) output showing changes since
the previous versions.

Please review.  Please review.  Please review.

We believe that we've integrated the WG's answers to all of the
outstanding questions.  Please check to see if we got them right.

This version of the docs also includes the new NSEC++ format (more
precisely, the NSEC++ du jour format, but the editors and WG chairs
concluded that this is close enough to stable that it makes sense for
the DNSSECbis docs to start tracking the new NSEC stuff).

This set of drafts didn't get quite as much internal proofreading by
the editing team as we usually try to do, because we wanted to get
this set out in time for you all to have something to read in the
corner of those boring holiday parties.  We may have missed some nits
in the process (in fact, I know we did, I already found one, sigh),
but no doubt this group can help us find more.

As always, please send minor comments to dnssec-editors@east.isi.edu,
substantive issues to namedroppers.

Thanks!

--Rob (on behalf of your friendly neighborhood DNSSEC editors)

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Rob Austein <sra+namedroppers@hactrn.net>
Subject: nsec++: type code zero again
Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2003 12:19:21 -0500
Lines: 32
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Mime-Version: 1.0 (generated by SEMI 1.14.5 - "Awara-Onsen")
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Wed Dec 17 18:36:06 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
User-Agent: Wanderlust/2.10.1 (Watching The Wheels) Emacs/21.3 Mule/5.0 (SAKAKI)
Precedence: bulk

Minor issue with the new text for handling of type code zero in
NSEC++.  draft-ietf-dnsext-nsec-rdata-02.txt (which may not have
popped out of the I-D queue yet) says:

   Since bit 0 in window block 0 refers to the non-existing RR type 0,
   it MUST be set to 0.  After verification, the validator SHOULD ignore
   the value of bit 0 in window block 0.

The SHOULD here seems wrong to me, I think it ought to be MUST, for
the usual Robustness Principle reason.

Since the reason that I happened to notice this is that I was
integrating the NSEC++ text into draft-ietf-dnssec-records-06 at the
time, and since I hadn't seen any namedroppers discussion that looked
like direction from the WG on this point, I went with what made sense
to me and put MUST into the new -records text on this point.  Final
answer on this point is of course up to the WG, but I had to put
something into -records and it seemed silly to include text that the
WG had not yet discussed and that I was pretty sure was wrong.

So the point of this message is twofold:

a) to ask the WG to decide what the right answer is on this point;

b) to warn the WG that the current NSEC++ and DNSSECbis drafts
   disagree on this point, so that nobody will be surprised.

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Mike StJohns <Mike.StJohns@nominum.com>
Subject: Re: nsec++: type code zero again
Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2003 12:37:26 -0500
Lines: 42
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <20031217171921.939A018E9@thrintun.hactrn.net>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Wed Dec 17 18:49:21 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-Sender: stjohns@localhost
X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 6.0.1.1
To: Rob Austein <sra+namedroppers@hactrn.net>,
	namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
In-Reply-To: <20031217171921.939A018E9@thrintun.hactrn.net>
References: <20031217171921.939A018E9@thrintun.hactrn.net>
Precedence: bulk

MUST is more correct than SHOULD.  The counter example is (What does it 
mean to not ignore the bit?)

At 12:19 PM 12/17/2003, Rob Austein wrote:
>Minor issue with the new text for handling of type code zero in
>NSEC++.  draft-ietf-dnsext-nsec-rdata-02.txt (which may not have
>popped out of the I-D queue yet) says:
>
>    Since bit 0 in window block 0 refers to the non-existing RR type 0,
>    it MUST be set to 0.  After verification, the validator SHOULD ignore
>    the value of bit 0 in window block 0.
>
>The SHOULD here seems wrong to me, I think it ought to be MUST, for
>the usual Robustness Principle reason.
>
>Since the reason that I happened to notice this is that I was
>integrating the NSEC++ text into draft-ietf-dnssec-records-06 at the
>time, and since I hadn't seen any namedroppers discussion that looked
>like direction from the WG on this point, I went with what made sense
>to me and put MUST into the new -records text on this point.  Final
>answer on this point is of course up to the WG, but I had to put
>something into -records and it seemed silly to include text that the
>WG had not yet discussed and that I was pretty sure was wrong.
>
>So the point of this message is twofold:
>
>a) to ask the WG to decide what the right answer is on this point;
>
>b) to warn the WG that the current NSEC++ and DNSSECbis drafts
>    disagree on this point, so that nobody will be surprised.
>
>--
>to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
>the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
>archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>


--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Bernard Aboba <aboba@internaut.com>
Subject: LLMNR Issue 58: DNS server usage of LLMNR
Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2003 12:39:37 -0800 (PST)
Lines: 26
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Wed Dec 17 21:38:47 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Precedence: bulk

Issue 58: DNS server usage of LLMNR
Submitter name: Bernard Aboba
Submitter email address: aboba@internaut.com
Date first submitted: December 13, 2003
Reference:
Document: LLMNR-26
Comment type: T
Priority: S
Section: 2.2
Rationale/Explanation of issue:

DNS servers are prohibited from responding to LLMNR queries except with
RRs they own. However, DNS servers are not prohibited from sending
LLMNR queries in order to resolve DNS queries. This seems like a very bad idea.

Add the following sentence to Section 2.2:

"DNS servers also MUST NOT send LLMNR queries in order to resolve DNS
queries."


--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Bernard Aboba <aboba@internaut.com>
Subject: LLMNR Issue 55: Sender Checks
Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2003 12:38:23 -0800 (PST)
Lines: 86
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Wed Dec 17 21:39:09 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Precedence: bulk

LLMNR Issue 55: Sender checks
Submitter name: Bernard Aboba
Submitter email address: aboba@internaut.com
Date first submitted: December 3, 2003
Reference:
Document: LLMNR-25
Comment type: T
Priority: S
Section: 2-2.8
Rationale/Explanation of issue:

Section 2 states:

[4] Upon the reception of the response, the sender performs the checks
described in Section 2.5. If these conditions are met, then the
sender uses and caches the returned response. If not, then the
sender ignores the response and continues waiting for the response.

It is not clear what sender checks this paragraph is referring to.
Possibilities include material in sections 2.3, 2.5, 2.8 and 3.1.

Section 2.3 does include some sender checks. For example:

"If the sender of a TCP query receives a response not
using TCP, the response MUST be silently discarded." There is also
discussion of handling of ICMP "time exceeded" messages.

Section 2.5 does not specify checks to be made by senders on reception of
a response. For example, there are recommendations on setting of TTL/hop
count by senders, but no TTL check specified for receivers. Since the
sender MUST set the TTL/Hop Count field to 1, it is not possible for a
receiver to see a TTL/Hop Count field of 2 or larger. Yet no sender action
is specified upon reception of such a packet.

Within Section 2.5, the following paragraph is present:

"A sender SHOULD prefer RRs including reachable addresses where RRs
involving both reachable and unreachable addresses are returned in
response to a query."

I do not believe that this sentence implies a reachability test be done on
received RRs.

Section 2.8 provides guidelines for sender processing of the authority and
additional section of responses.

Section 3.1 talks about responder responsibilities, but not sender checks.
It includes the sentence:

"Routable addresses MUST be included first in the response, if available.
This encourages use of routable address(es) for establishment of new
connections."

[Ralph Droms] Section 2.5, third paragraph: what is an "unreachable
address"; did you intend "unroutable address"?

[BA] Proposed fixes:

In Section 2, change:

"[4] Upon the reception of the response, the sender performs the checks
described in Section 2.5. If these conditions are met, then the
sender uses and caches the returned response. If not, then the
sender ignores the response and continues waiting for the response."

to:

"[4] Upon reception of the response, the sender processes it."

In Section 2.5, delete:

"A sender SHOULD prefer RRs including reachable addresses where RRs
involving both reachable and unreachable addresses are returned in
response to a query."

In Section 2.1, add:

"Since the responder may order the RRs in the response so as to
indicate preference, the sender SHOULD preserve ordering
in the response to the querying application."

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Bernard Aboba <aboba@internaut.com>
Subject: LLMNR Issue 59: Miscellaneous Issues
Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2003 12:41:09 -0800 (PST)
Lines: 82
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Wed Dec 17 21:41:54 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Precedence: bulk

LLMNR Issue 59: Miscellaneous Issues
Submitter name: Olafur Gudmundsson
Submitter email address: ogud@ogud.com
Date first submitted: December 17, 2003
Reference:
Document: LLMNR-27
Comment type: T
Priority: S
Section: Various
Rationale/Explanation of issue:

The draft could benefit from addition of a section gathering
in one place all the requirements relating to the use of the
DNS packet format for LLMNR. For example, use of the TR bit
is not defined and neither are the AD and CD bits (which I
assume are set to zero).

In Section 2.2, change:

"In conventional DNS terminology a DNS server authoritative for a zone is
authoritative for all the domain names under the zone root except for
the branches delegated into separate zones. Contrary to conventional
DNS terminology, an LLMNR responder is authoritative only for the zone
root."

To:

"In conventional DNS terminology a DNS server authoritative for a zone is
authoritative for all the domain names under the zone appex except for
the branches delegated into separate zones. Contrary to conventional
DNS terminology, an LLMNR responder is authoritative only for the zone
appex."

In Section 2.2, change:

"Responders SHOULD respond to LLMNR queries for names and addresses
they are authoritative for. This applies to both forward and
reverse lookups."

To:

"Responders MUST respond to LLMNR queries for names and addresses
they are authoritative for. This applies to both forward and
reverse lookups."

Add the following paragraph to Section 2.2:

"Upon configuring an IP address responders typically will
synthesize corresponding A, AAAA and PTR RRs so
as to be able to respond to LLMNR queries for these
RRs. An SOA RR is synthesized only when a responder
has another RR as well; the SOA RR MUST NOT be the only
RR that a responder has.
However, in general whether RRs are manually or
automatically created is an implementation decision."

Change Section 2.7 from:

"The responder should use a pre-configured TTL value in the records
returned in the LLMNR query response. A default value of 0 is
recommended in highly dynamic environments (such as mobile ad-hoc
networks). In less dynamic environments, LLMNR traffic can be reduced
by setting the TTL to a higher value.

Due to the TTL minimalization necessary when caching an RRset, all TTLs
in an RRset MUST be set to the same value."

To:

"The responder should use a pre-configured TTL value in the records
returned in the LLMNR query response. A default value of 30 seconds
is RECOMMENDED. In highly dynamic environments (such as mobile ad-hoc
networks), the TTL value may need to be reduced.

Due to the TTL minimalization necessary when caching an RRset, all TTLs
in an RRset MUST be set to the same value."

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org
Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-dnsext-nsec-rdata-02.txt
Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2003 15:33:28 -0500
Lines: 87
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Reply-To: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: Multipart/Mixed; Boundary="NextPart"
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Wed Dec 17 21:49:55 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: IETF-Announce: ;
Precedence: bulk

--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the DNS Extensions Working Group of the IETF.

	Title		: DNSSEC NSEC RDATA Format
	Author(s)	: J. Schlyter
	Filename	: draft-ietf-dnsext-nsec-rdata-02.txt
	Pages		: 9
	Date		: 2003-12-17
	
This document defines updates the NSEC resource record RDATA format
to cover all type codes.

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-nsec-rdata-02.txt

To remove yourself from the IETF Announcement list, send a message to 
ietf-announce-request with the word unsubscribe in the body of the message.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP. Login with the username
"anonymous" and a password of your e-mail address. After logging in,
type "cd internet-drafts" and then
	"get draft-ietf-dnsext-nsec-rdata-02.txt".

A list of Internet-Drafts directories can be found in
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html 
or ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt


Internet-Drafts can also be obtained by e-mail.

Send a message to:
	mailserv@ietf.org.
In the body type:
	"FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-nsec-rdata-02.txt".
	
NOTE:	The mail server at ietf.org can return the document in
	MIME-encoded form by using the "mpack" utility.  To use this
	feature, insert the command "ENCODING mime" before the "FILE"
	command.  To decode the response(s), you will need "munpack" or
	a MIME-compliant mail reader.  Different MIME-compliant mail readers
	exhibit different behavior, especially when dealing with
	"multipart" MIME messages (i.e. documents which have been split
	up into multiple messages), so check your local documentation on
	how to manipulate these messages.
		
		
Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant mail reader
implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version of the
Internet-Draft.

--NextPart
Content-Type: Multipart/Alternative; Boundary="OtherAccess"

--OtherAccess
Content-Type: Message/External-body;
	access-type="mail-server";
	server="mailserv@ietf.org"

Content-Type: text/plain
Content-ID:	<2003-12-17151834.I-D@ietf.org>

ENCODING mime
FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-nsec-rdata-02.txt

--OtherAccess
Content-Type: Message/External-body;
	name="draft-ietf-dnsext-nsec-rdata-02.txt";
	site="ftp.ietf.org";
	access-type="anon-ftp";
	directory="internet-drafts"

Content-Type: text/plain
Content-ID:	<2003-12-17151834.I-D@ietf.org>

--OtherAccess--

--NextPart--



--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Olaf Kolkman <olaf@ripe.net>
Subject: WGLC on DNSSEC bis document set
Date: Thu, 18 Dec 2003 07:54:24 +0100
Lines: 77
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Thu Dec 18 08:19:03 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
X-RIPE-Spam-Level: 
X-RIPE-Spam-Status: N 0.494764
X-RIPE-Signature: 3c3bec6459de0d0795ccd4854691f807
Precedence: bulk




Dear Working Group Colleagues,

This is a working group last call for the DNSSEC bis specification.

The document set consists out of 3 documents that are lined up for
the standards track:
     draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-intro-08
     draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-records-06
     draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-protocol-04

these documents update and replace the different RFCs related to
DNSSEC this working group has produced over the last 5 years.

We would like to urge you to review and comment on the document
set. This specification has significant impact on the DNS and it is
important that the specifications are unambiguous and implementable.

Please provide statements of support or non-supports. We would like a
clear technical motivation on why you support this document set, why
you have issues with it or why you consent with the content; is the
specification consistent, understandable, implementable, 
testable, &c, &c.

The working group last call will conclude Jan 15 2004, we hope that
that provides the WG with sufficient time to read the document
set.

We would like to acknowledge: Roy Arends, Rob Austein, Matt Larson,
Dan Massey and Scott Rose for putting in the enourmous effort to get
the spec WGLC ready in 2003!


  ---------------------   WGLC  Details  --------------------------

If new issues are brought up that cause significant changes to the
text a new WGLC will be issued. Minor issues will be processed based
on working group consensus on the individual issues; there will be no
WGLC if there are only minor issues that are solved easily and timely.

Please bring technical issues to the list. Please try to use the
format for bringing up issues as described in our monthly posting
(http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/namedroppers.2003/msg02045.html).
Also split issues in separate mails this will make them stand out and
easier to discuss.

Editorial nits can be mailed directly to the editors:
                        dnssec-editors@east.isi.edu.

The specification has been written by an editors team that was tasked
with documenting the protocol as specified in RFC's generated by this
group and Internet Drafts that have been passed on by the working
group to the IESG. For completeness we would like to mention that the
dnssec-editors communication has been archived at:
http://www.east.isi.edu/projects/DNSSEC The editing process has been
documented in e.g.
http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/namedroppers.2003/msg00165.html

As mentioned in an announcement list the document set follows the text
of the last DNSSEC document that still needs to be finalized
draft-ietf-dnsext-nsec-rdata-02.txt. Whatever will be decided on that
document will be reflected in this document set.

Happy reading, spend your holidays well.

--Olaf Kolkman
  Olafur Gudmundsson
  DNSEXT Chairs.


--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org
Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-protocol-04.txt
Date: Thu, 18 Dec 2003 15:29:14 -0500
Lines: 96
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Reply-To: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: Multipart/Mixed; Boundary="NextPart"
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Thu Dec 18 21:47:46 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: IETF-Announce: ;
Precedence: bulk

--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the DNS Extensions Working Group of the IETF.

	Title		: Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security Extensions
	Author(s)	: R. Arends
	Filename	: draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-protocol-04.txt
	Pages		: 55
	Date		: 2003-12-18
	
This document is part of a family of documents which describes the
DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC).  The DNS Security Extensions are a
collection of new resource records and protocol modifications which
add data origin authentication and data integrity to the DNS.  This
document describes the DNSSEC protocol modifications.  This document
defines the concept of a signed zone, along with the requirements for
serving and resolving using DNSSEC.  These techniques allow a
security-aware resolver to authenticate both DNS resource records and
authoritative DNS error indications.
This document obsoletes RFC 2535 and incorporates changes from all
updates to RFC 2535.

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-protocol-04.txt

To remove yourself from the IETF Announcement list, send a message to 
ietf-announce-request with the word unsubscribe in the body of the message.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP. Login with the username
"anonymous" and a password of your e-mail address. After logging in,
type "cd internet-drafts" and then
	"get draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-protocol-04.txt".

A list of Internet-Drafts directories can be found in
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html 
or ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt


Internet-Drafts can also be obtained by e-mail.

Send a message to:
	mailserv@ietf.org.
In the body type:
	"FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-protocol-04.txt".
	
NOTE:	The mail server at ietf.org can return the document in
	MIME-encoded form by using the "mpack" utility.  To use this
	feature, insert the command "ENCODING mime" before the "FILE"
	command.  To decode the response(s), you will need "munpack" or
	a MIME-compliant mail reader.  Different MIME-compliant mail readers
	exhibit different behavior, especially when dealing with
	"multipart" MIME messages (i.e. documents which have been split
	up into multiple messages), so check your local documentation on
	how to manipulate these messages.
		
		
Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant mail reader
implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version of the
Internet-Draft.

--NextPart
Content-Type: Multipart/Alternative; Boundary="OtherAccess"

--OtherAccess
Content-Type: Message/External-body;
	access-type="mail-server";
	server="mailserv@ietf.org"

Content-Type: text/plain
Content-ID:	<2003-12-18142541.I-D@ietf.org>

ENCODING mime
FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-protocol-04.txt

--OtherAccess
Content-Type: Message/External-body;
	name="draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-protocol-04.txt";
	site="ftp.ietf.org";
	access-type="anon-ftp";
	directory="internet-drafts"

Content-Type: text/plain
Content-ID:	<2003-12-18142541.I-D@ietf.org>

--OtherAccess--

--NextPart--



--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org
Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-dnsext-mdns-27.txt
Date: Thu, 18 Dec 2003 15:29:09 -0500
Lines: 96
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Reply-To: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: Multipart/Mixed; Boundary="NextPart"
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Thu Dec 18 21:48:03 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: IETF-Announce: ;
Precedence: bulk

--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the DNS Extensions Working Group of the IETF.

	Title		: Linklocal Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR)
	Author(s)	: L. Esibov, B. Aboba, D. Thaler
	Filename	: draft-ietf-dnsext-mdns-27.txt
	Pages		: 23
	Date		: 2003-12-18
	
Today, with the rise of home networking, there are an increasing number
of ad-hoc networks operating without a Domain Name System (DNS) server.
In order to allow name resolution in such environments, Link-Local
Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR) is proposed.  LLMNR supports all
current and future DNS formats, types and classes, while operating on a
separate port from DNS, and with a distinct resolver cache.

The goal of LLMNR is to enable name resolution in scenarios in which
conventional DNS name resolution is not possible.  Since LLMNR only
operates on the local link, it cannot be considered a substitute for
DNS.

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-mdns-27.txt

To remove yourself from the IETF Announcement list, send a message to 
ietf-announce-request with the word unsubscribe in the body of the message.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP. Login with the username
"anonymous" and a password of your e-mail address. After logging in,
type "cd internet-drafts" and then
	"get draft-ietf-dnsext-mdns-27.txt".

A list of Internet-Drafts directories can be found in
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html 
or ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt


Internet-Drafts can also be obtained by e-mail.

Send a message to:
	mailserv@ietf.org.
In the body type:
	"FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-mdns-27.txt".
	
NOTE:	The mail server at ietf.org can return the document in
	MIME-encoded form by using the "mpack" utility.  To use this
	feature, insert the command "ENCODING mime" before the "FILE"
	command.  To decode the response(s), you will need "munpack" or
	a MIME-compliant mail reader.  Different MIME-compliant mail readers
	exhibit different behavior, especially when dealing with
	"multipart" MIME messages (i.e. documents which have been split
	up into multiple messages), so check your local documentation on
	how to manipulate these messages.
		
		
Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant mail reader
implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version of the
Internet-Draft.

--NextPart
Content-Type: Multipart/Alternative; Boundary="OtherAccess"

--OtherAccess
Content-Type: Message/External-body;
	access-type="mail-server";
	server="mailserv@ietf.org"

Content-Type: text/plain
Content-ID:	<2003-12-18142532.I-D@ietf.org>

ENCODING mime
FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-mdns-27.txt

--OtherAccess
Content-Type: Message/External-body;
	name="draft-ietf-dnsext-mdns-27.txt";
	site="ftp.ietf.org";
	access-type="anon-ftp";
	directory="internet-drafts"

Content-Type: text/plain
Content-ID:	<2003-12-18142532.I-D@ietf.org>

--OtherAccess--

--NextPart--



--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org
Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-dnsext-keyrr-key-signing-flag-12.txt
Date: Thu, 18 Dec 2003 15:29:04 -0500
Lines: 95
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Reply-To: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: Multipart/Mixed; Boundary="NextPart"
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Thu Dec 18 21:49:03 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: IETF-Announce: ;
Precedence: bulk

--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the DNS Extensions Working Group of the IETF.

	Title		: KEY RR Secure Entry Point Flag
	Author(s)	: O. Kolkman, J. Schlyter, E. Lewis
	Filename	: draft-ietf-dnsext-keyrr-key-signing-flag-12.txt
	Pages		: 10
	Date		: 2003-12-18
	
With the Delegation Signer (DS) resource record the concept of a key
acting as a secure entry point has been introduced. During
key-exchanges with the parent there is a need to differentiate secure
entry point keys from other keys in the KEY resource record (RR) set.
A flag bit in the KEY RR is defined to indicate that KEY is to be
used as a secure entry point. The flag bit is intended to assist in
operational procedures to correctly generate DS resource records, or
to indicate what keys are intended for static configuration. The flag
bit is not to be used in the DNS verification protocol. This document
updates RFC 2535 and RFC 3445.

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-keyrr-key-signing-flag-12.txt

To remove yourself from the IETF Announcement list, send a message to 
ietf-announce-request with the word unsubscribe in the body of the message.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP. Login with the username
"anonymous" and a password of your e-mail address. After logging in,
type "cd internet-drafts" and then
	"get draft-ietf-dnsext-keyrr-key-signing-flag-12.txt".

A list of Internet-Drafts directories can be found in
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html 
or ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt


Internet-Drafts can also be obtained by e-mail.

Send a message to:
	mailserv@ietf.org.
In the body type:
	"FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-keyrr-key-signing-flag-12.txt".
	
NOTE:	The mail server at ietf.org can return the document in
	MIME-encoded form by using the "mpack" utility.  To use this
	feature, insert the command "ENCODING mime" before the "FILE"
	command.  To decode the response(s), you will need "munpack" or
	a MIME-compliant mail reader.  Different MIME-compliant mail readers
	exhibit different behavior, especially when dealing with
	"multipart" MIME messages (i.e. documents which have been split
	up into multiple messages), so check your local documentation on
	how to manipulate these messages.
		
		
Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant mail reader
implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version of the
Internet-Draft.

--NextPart
Content-Type: Multipart/Alternative; Boundary="OtherAccess"

--OtherAccess
Content-Type: Message/External-body;
	access-type="mail-server";
	server="mailserv@ietf.org"

Content-Type: text/plain
Content-ID:	<2003-12-18142523.I-D@ietf.org>

ENCODING mime
FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-keyrr-key-signing-flag-12.txt

--OtherAccess
Content-Type: Message/External-body;
	name="draft-ietf-dnsext-keyrr-key-signing-flag-12.txt";
	site="ftp.ietf.org";
	access-type="anon-ftp";
	directory="internet-drafts"

Content-Type: text/plain
Content-ID:	<2003-12-18142523.I-D@ietf.org>

--OtherAccess--

--NextPart--



--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org
Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-records-06.txt
Date: Thu, 18 Dec 2003 15:29:19 -0500
Lines: 95
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Reply-To: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: Multipart/Mixed; Boundary="NextPart"
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Thu Dec 18 21:49:24 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: IETF-Announce: ;
Precedence: bulk

--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the DNS Extensions Working Group of the IETF.

	Title		: Resource Records for DNS Security Extensions
	Author(s)	: R. Arends
	Filename	: draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-records-06.txt
	Pages		: 37
	Date		: 2003-12-18
	
This document is part of a family of documents that describes the DNS
Security Extensions (DNSSEC).  The DNS Security Extensions are a
collection of resource records and protocol modifications that
provide source authentication for the DNS. This document defines the
public key (DNSKEY), delegation signer (DS), resource record digital
signature (RRSIG), and authenticated denial of existance (NSEC)
resource records.  The purpose and format of each resource record is
described in detail, and an example of each resource record is given.
This document obsoletes RFC 2535 and incorporates changes from all
updates to RFC 2535.

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-records-06.txt

To remove yourself from the IETF Announcement list, send a message to 
ietf-announce-request with the word unsubscribe in the body of the message.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP. Login with the username
"anonymous" and a password of your e-mail address. After logging in,
type "cd internet-drafts" and then
	"get draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-records-06.txt".

A list of Internet-Drafts directories can be found in
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html 
or ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt


Internet-Drafts can also be obtained by e-mail.

Send a message to:
	mailserv@ietf.org.
In the body type:
	"FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-records-06.txt".
	
NOTE:	The mail server at ietf.org can return the document in
	MIME-encoded form by using the "mpack" utility.  To use this
	feature, insert the command "ENCODING mime" before the "FILE"
	command.  To decode the response(s), you will need "munpack" or
	a MIME-compliant mail reader.  Different MIME-compliant mail readers
	exhibit different behavior, especially when dealing with
	"multipart" MIME messages (i.e. documents which have been split
	up into multiple messages), so check your local documentation on
	how to manipulate these messages.
		
		
Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant mail reader
implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version of the
Internet-Draft.

--NextPart
Content-Type: Multipart/Alternative; Boundary="OtherAccess"

--OtherAccess
Content-Type: Message/External-body;
	access-type="mail-server";
	server="mailserv@ietf.org"

Content-Type: text/plain
Content-ID:	<2003-12-18142550.I-D@ietf.org>

ENCODING mime
FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-records-06.txt

--OtherAccess
Content-Type: Message/External-body;
	name="draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-records-06.txt";
	site="ftp.ietf.org";
	access-type="anon-ftp";
	directory="internet-drafts"

Content-Type: text/plain
Content-ID:	<2003-12-18142550.I-D@ietf.org>

--OtherAccess--

--NextPart--



--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org
Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-intro-08.txt
Date: Thu, 18 Dec 2003 15:28:59 -0500
Lines: 90
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Reply-To: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: Multipart/Mixed; Boundary="NextPart"
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Thu Dec 18 21:49:33 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: IETF-Announce: ;
Precedence: bulk

--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the DNS Extensions Working Group of the IETF.

	Title		: DNS Security Introduction and Requirements
	Author(s)	: R. Arends, R. Austein, D. Massey, M. Larson, S. Rose
	Filename	: draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-intro-08.txt
	Pages		: 26
	Date		: 2003-12-18
	
The Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) adds data origin
   authentication and data integrity to the Domain Name System.  This
   document introduces these extensions, and describes their
   capabilities and limitations.  This document also discusses the
   services that the DNS security extensions do and do not provide.

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-intro-08.txt

To remove yourself from the IETF Announcement list, send a message to 
ietf-announce-request with the word unsubscribe in the body of the message.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP. Login with the username
"anonymous" and a password of your e-mail address. After logging in,
type "cd internet-drafts" and then
	"get draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-intro-08.txt".

A list of Internet-Drafts directories can be found in
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html 
or ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt


Internet-Drafts can also be obtained by e-mail.

Send a message to:
	mailserv@ietf.org.
In the body type:
	"FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-intro-08.txt".
	
NOTE:	The mail server at ietf.org can return the document in
	MIME-encoded form by using the "mpack" utility.  To use this
	feature, insert the command "ENCODING mime" before the "FILE"
	command.  To decode the response(s), you will need "munpack" or
	a MIME-compliant mail reader.  Different MIME-compliant mail readers
	exhibit different behavior, especially when dealing with
	"multipart" MIME messages (i.e. documents which have been split
	up into multiple messages), so check your local documentation on
	how to manipulate these messages.
		
		
Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant mail reader
implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version of the
Internet-Draft.

--NextPart
Content-Type: Multipart/Alternative; Boundary="OtherAccess"

--OtherAccess
Content-Type: Message/External-body;
	access-type="mail-server";
	server="mailserv@ietf.org"

Content-Type: text/plain
Content-ID:	<2003-12-18142510.I-D@ietf.org>

ENCODING mime
FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-intro-08.txt

--OtherAccess
Content-Type: Message/External-body;
	name="draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-intro-08.txt";
	site="ftp.ietf.org";
	access-type="anon-ftp";
	directory="internet-drafts"

Content-Type: text/plain
Content-ID:	<2003-12-18142510.I-D@ietf.org>

--OtherAccess--

--NextPart--



--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org
Subject: RFC 3658 Delegation Signer (DS) Resource Record (RR)
Date: Thu, 18 Dec 2003 16:34:41 -0800
Lines: 114
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: Multipart/Mixed; Boundary=NextPart
Cc: rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org, namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Fri Dec 19 01:53:01 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: IETF-Announce: ;
Precedence: bulk


--NextPart


A new Request for Comments is now available in online RFC libraries.


        RFC 3658

        Title:      Delegation Signer (DS) Resource Record (RR)
        Author(s):  O. Gudmundsson
        Status:     Standards Track
        Date:       December 2003
        Mailbox:    ds-rfc@ogud.com
        Pages:      19
        Characters: 42120
        Updates:    3090, 3008, 2535, 1035

        I-D Tag:    draft-ietf-dnsext-delegation-signer-15.txt

        URL:        ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/rfc3658.txt


The delegation signer (DS) resource record (RR) is inserted at a zone
cut (i.e., a delegation point) to indicate that the delegated zone is
digitally signed and that the delegated zone recognizes the indicated
key as a valid zone key for the delegated zone.  The DS RR is a
modification to the DNS Security Extensions definition, motivated by
operational considerations.  The intent is to use this resource record
as an explicit statement about the delegation, rather than relying on
inference.

This document defines the DS RR, gives examples of how it is used and
describes the implications on resolvers.  This change is not backwards
compatible with RFC 2535.  This document updates RFC 1035, RFC 2535,
RFC 3008 and RFC 3090.

This document is a product of the DNS Extensions Working Group of the
IETF.

This is now a Proposed Standard Protocol.

This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for
the Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions
for improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the
"Internet Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the
standardization state and status of this protocol.  Distribution
of this memo is unlimited.

This announcement is sent to the IETF list and the RFC-DIST list.
Requests to be added to or deleted from the IETF distribution list
should be sent to IETF-REQUEST@IETF.ORG.  Requests to be
added to or deleted from the RFC-DIST distribution list should
be sent to RFC-DIST-REQUEST@RFC-EDITOR.ORG.

Details on obtaining RFCs via FTP or EMAIL may be obtained by sending
an EMAIL message to rfc-info@RFC-EDITOR.ORG with the message body 
help: ways_to_get_rfcs.  For example:

        To: rfc-info@RFC-EDITOR.ORG
        Subject: getting rfcs

        help: ways_to_get_rfcs

Requests for special distribution should be addressed to either the
author of the RFC in question, or to RFC-Manager@RFC-EDITOR.ORG.  Unless
specifically noted otherwise on the RFC itself, all RFCs are for
unlimited distribution.echo 
Submissions for Requests for Comments should be sent to
RFC-EDITOR@RFC-EDITOR.ORG.  Please consult RFC 2223, Instructions to RFC
Authors, for further information.


Joyce K. Reynolds and Sandy Ginoza
USC/Information Sciences Institute

...

Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant Mail Reader 
implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version
of the RFCs.

--NextPart
Content-Type: Multipart/Alternative; Boundary="OtherAccess"

--OtherAccess
Content-Type:  Message/External-body;
        access-type="mail-server";
        server="RFC-INFO@RFC-EDITOR.ORG"

Content-Type: text/plain
Content-ID: <031218163308.RFC@RFC-EDITOR.ORG>

RETRIEVE: rfc
DOC-ID: rfc3658

--OtherAccess
Content-Type:   Message/External-body;
        name="rfc3658.txt";
        site="ftp.isi.edu";
        access-type="anon-ftp";
        directory="in-notes"

Content-Type: text/plain
Content-ID: <031218163308.RFC@RFC-EDITOR.ORG>

--OtherAccess--
--NextPart--

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Miek Gieben <miekg@atoom.net>
Subject: DNSSEC workshop
Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2003 17:25:00 +0100
Lines: 31
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Fri Dec 19 17:46:18 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Mail-Followup-To: namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Content-Disposition: inline
User-Agent: Vim/Mutt/Linux
X-Home: www.miek.nl
X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new
Precedence: bulk

Namedroppers,

The RIPE NCC will be hosting a DNSSEC workshop organized by ISC and
NLnetLabs. The tests will focus on interoperability between BIND and
NSD. Other DNSSEC aware tools and code can be tested if available.

There is a set of volunteers that will participate in the workshop but
there are still a few seats (3 to 4) left for people who want to join.

Please let us know if you want to participate. There is a preference
for people who bring alternative DNSSEC implementations, but otherwise
it is first come first served. Please do arrange travel until you had
confirmation.

A report of the workshop will be posted to this list.

The workshop will be at the RIPE NCC offices in Amsterdam, the
Netherlands, Jan 20-22, 2004 (the week before the RIPE meeting)


grtz
      Miek
--
fingerprint = E1EB 29B8 8FA2 2923 62B8  0A2B 64B8 F15C 7764 AB4B
http://miek.nl/about.html

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: "Christian Huitema" <huitema@windows.microsoft.com>
Subject: RE: LLMNR Issue 58: DNS server usage of LLMNR
Date: Sat, 20 Dec 2003 23:17:25 -0800
Lines: 34
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain;
	charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Sun Dec 21 08:41:16 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft Exchange V6.5.7122.0
Content-class: urn:content-classes:message
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
Thread-Topic: LLMNR Issue 58: DNS server usage of LLMNR
Thread-Index: AcPE3YkBik6yNVLrTPyl1oEJU0IobACs3kQg
To: "Bernard Aboba" <aboba@internaut.com>,
	<namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-OriginalArrivalTime: 21 Dec 2003 07:17:10.0173 (UTC) FILETIME=[72CD84D0:01C3C792]
Precedence: bulk


> DNS servers are prohibited from responding to LLMNR queries except
with
> RRs they own. However, DNS servers are not prohibited from sending
> LLMNR queries in order to resolve DNS queries. This seems like a very
bad
> idea.
>=20
> Add the following sentence to Section 2.2:
>=20
> "DNS servers also MUST NOT send LLMNR queries in order to resolve DNS
> queries."

I am not sure this is such a "very bad idea". Take the example of an
IPv6 home network. The ISP explicitly delegates an IPv6 prefix to the
home router. The router advertises this prefix. Hosts configure
addresses from this prefix. Since there is explicit prefix delegation to
the router, we may expect the router to also receive delegation of the
reverse lookup tree. In these conditions, it makes a lot of sense to use
LLMNR to fulfill a DNS PTR request. If you look at it, the chain of
trust is exactly the same as what we have today in IPv4, when a router
fulfills a PTR request using whatever name the host asserted in a DHCP
request.

This is just one scenario. I am convinced there may be others. "MUST
NOT" is way too strong.

-- Christian Huitema

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Masataka Ohta <mohta@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp>
Subject: Re: LLMNR Issue 58: DNS server usage of LLMNR
Date: Sun, 21 Dec 2003 17:28:09 +0900
Lines: 54
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <DAC3FCB50E31C54987CD10797DA511BA06AC1850@WIN-MSG-10.wingroup.windeploy.ntdev.microsoft.com>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Cc: Bernard Aboba <aboba@internaut.com>,  namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Sun Dec 21 09:41:44 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.4) Gecko/20030624 Netscape/7.1 (ax)
X-Accept-Language: ja, en-us, en
To: Christian Huitema <huitema@windows.microsoft.com>
In-Reply-To: <DAC3FCB50E31C54987CD10797DA511BA06AC1850@WIN-MSG-10.wingroup.windeploy.ntdev.microsoft.com>
Precedence: bulk

Christian;

>>DNS servers are prohibited from responding to LLMNR queries except
> 
> with
> 
>>RRs they own. However, DNS servers are not prohibited from sending
>>LLMNR queries in order to resolve DNS queries. This seems like a very
> 
> bad
> 
>>idea.
>>
>>Add the following sentence to Section 2.2:
>>
>>"DNS servers also MUST NOT send LLMNR queries in order to resolve DNS
>>queries."
> 
> 
> I am not sure this is such a "very bad idea". Take the example of an
> IPv6 home network. The ISP explicitly delegates an IPv6 prefix to the
> home router. The router advertises this prefix. Hosts configure
> addresses from this prefix. Since there is explicit prefix delegation to
> the router, we may expect the router to also receive delegation of the
> reverse lookup tree.

Wrong.

We expect that there are multiple nameservers of a zone at
multiple locations.

We may expect that a router of a link corresponding to a PTR
act as the primary nameserver of a zone containg the PTR.
However, in this case, DHCP is the way for the router
maintain information of the reverse zone.

LLMNR MUST NOT be queried from DNS servers.

> This is just one scenario. I am convinced there may be others.

Your senario merely is an example that stateless autoconfiguration
and LLMNR is useless to the Internet. Unlike stateless
autoconfiguration, however, LLMNR may be useful to an isolated
IP network with a single link (with no routers).

							Masataka Ohta



--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Bernard Aboba <aboba@internaut.com>
Subject: RE: LLMNR Issue 58: DNS server usage of LLMNR
Date: Sun, 21 Dec 2003 08:05:29 -0800 (PST)
Lines: 52
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <DAC3FCB50E31C54987CD10797DA511BA06AC1850@WIN-MSG-10.wingroup.windeploy.ntdev.microsoft.com>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Sun Dec 21 17:09:00 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: Christian Huitema <huitema@windows.microsoft.com>
In-Reply-To: <DAC3FCB50E31C54987CD10797DA511BA06AC1850@WIN-MSG-10.wingroup.windeploy.ntdev.microsoft.com>
Precedence: bulk

> I am not sure this is such a "very bad idea". Take the example of an
> IPv6 home network. The ISP explicitly delegates an IPv6 prefix to the
> home router. The router advertises this prefix. Hosts configure
> addresses from this prefix. Since there is explicit prefix delegation to
> the router, we may expect the router to also receive delegation of the
> reverse lookup tree. In these conditions, it makes a lot of sense to use
> LLMNR to fulfill a DNS PTR request. If you look at it, the chain of
> trust is exactly the same as what we have today in IPv4, when a router
> fulfills a PTR request using whatever name the host asserted in a DHCP
> request.

The drafts currently discusses two scenarios:

a. Today with IPv4, home gateways typically act as both a DHCPv4 server
and DNS server, supporting dynamic DNS (via DHCP).  This allows them to answer
both A and PTR queries for the names of hosts on the local network.  Such
routers typically answer AAAA queries for local hosts they don't know with
RCODE=3 or, for hosts they do know, but for which there is no AAAA RR, with
RCODE=0 and no RRs.  This causes the querying host to send an LLMNR query
for the AAAA RR or corresponding PTR.

b. If the router supports IPv6, as well as acting as a DNS server, and
supports DHCPv6Lite, then it would also be able to support dynamic DNS
(via DHCPv6lite) and could answer AAAA and PTR queries without need of LLMNR.

Given that both a) and b) scenarios already work, I'm looking to come up
with a scenario in which DNS server usage of LLMNR queries helps.

One possible scenario would be where only some of the local IPv6 hosts are
LLMNR capable and support DHCPv6lite.  Hosts that do not support DHCPv6lite
might not be able to register their AAAA and corresponding PTR RRs with
the DNS server authoritative for the names of local hosts (e.g. the router).
Other hosts might support DHCPv6 lite, but might not be able to act as
either an LLMNR sender or responder.

In such a situation, an LLMNR-incapable host might send a DNS query for a
AAAA or PTR RR of a host that didn't support DHCPv6lite, but could act as
an LLMNR responder.  The DNS server would respond with RCODE=3, at which
point the querier would have no recourse, since it doesn't support LLMNR.
However, if the DNS server sent an LLMNR query for the name, it would get
an answer which it could relay back to the querier.

Is this a likely scenario? It seems quite likely to me that we will have
hosts that support DHCPv6lite but not LLMNR, but I'm not sure about hosts
that support LLMNR but not DHCPv6lite.  You need to posit both types of
hosts for scenario c) to apply.

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Masataka Ohta <mohta@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp>
Subject: Re: LLMNR Issue 58: DNS server usage of LLMNR
Date: Mon, 22 Dec 2003 05:23:24 +0900
Lines: 43
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <DAC3FCB50E31C54987CD10797DA511BA06AC1850@WIN-MSG-10.wingroup.windeploy.ntdev.microsoft.com> <Pine.LNX.4.56.0312210739260.23403@internaut.com>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Cc: Christian Huitema <huitema@windows.microsoft.com>, 
 namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Sun Dec 21 21:45:10 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.4) Gecko/20030624 Netscape/7.1 (ax)
X-Accept-Language: ja, en-us, en
To: Bernard Aboba <aboba@internaut.com>
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.4.56.0312210739260.23403@internaut.com>
Precedence: bulk

Bernard Aboba;

> One possible scenario would be where only some of the local IPv6 hosts are
> LLMNR capable and support DHCPv6lite.  Hosts that do not support DHCPv6lite
> might not be able to register their AAAA and corresponding PTR RRs with
> the DNS server authoritative for the names of local hosts (e.g. the router).
> Other hosts might support DHCPv6 lite, but might not be able to act as
> either an LLMNR sender or responder.
> 
> In such a situation, an LLMNR-incapable host might send a DNS query for a
> AAAA or PTR RR of a host that didn't support DHCPv6lite, but could act as
> an LLMNR responder.  The DNS server would respond with RCODE=3, at which
> point the querier would have no recourse, since it doesn't support LLMNR.
> However, if the DNS server sent an LLMNR query for the name, it would get
> an answer which it could relay back to the querier.

Your hidden assumption is that all the related hosts are on a
single link or that all the hosts on a link belong to a local
forward domain served by nameservers, all of which is on the
link.

Otherwise, we have no idea on where to ask the forward query,
even if you say LLMNR.

Given so much confusion on usefulness of LLMNR and an attempt
to mandate LLMNR for IP over BT, I'd like to suggest to
abandone LLMNR entirely, or, at least, add explicite explanation
stating its narrow scope, such as:

	LLMNR is expected to be useful for nodes on an isolated
	IP network with a single link, but not beyond that. LLMNR 
	MUST NOT be used by nodes connected to the Internet nor
	an isolated IP network with multiple links.

							Masataka Ohta



--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Bernard Aboba <aboba@internaut.com>
Subject: Re: LLMNR Issue 58: DNS server usage of LLMNR
Date: Sun, 21 Dec 2003 13:49:22 -0800 (PST)
Lines: 52
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <DAC3FCB50E31C54987CD10797DA511BA06AC1850@WIN-MSG-10.wingroup.windeploy.ntdev.microsoft.com>
 <Pine.LNX.4.56.0312210739260.23403@internaut.com> <3FE6013C.5030804@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
Cc: Christian Huitema <huitema@windows.microsoft.com>,
   namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Sun Dec 21 22:45:15 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: Masataka Ohta <mohta@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp>
In-Reply-To: <3FE6013C.5030804@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp>
Precedence: bulk

> 	LLMNR is expected to be useful for nodes on an isolated
> 	IP network with a single link, but not beyond that. LLMNR
> 	MUST NOT be used by nodes connected to the Internet nor
> 	an isolated IP network with multiple links.

Since LLMNR queries and responses are sent on the local link with TTL=1,
they will not propagate beyond the local link.  Therefore I would agree
that Link Local Name Resolution Protocol (LLMNR) should be restricted to
link local usage.

However, I do not think that the rest of this recommendation can be put
into practice.

Whether the network is "isolated" or "connected to the Internet" is
very hard to determine.  A host may be able to reach some Internet
prefixes, and not be able to reach others.  Similarly, the radius of the
network may also be hard to determine.

Furthermore, I would argue that the disction between "isolated" and
"connected" networks is not really relevant to deciding whether to use a
secondary name resolution protocol.  Issues that are relevant are:

a.  whether the primary protocol (DNS) can provide an answer or not.
b.  whether the rules governing usage of the secondary protocol are
    conservative enough to avoid unnecessary use of a secondary protocol
    when the primary protocol could be used successfully.

LLMNR use is restricted to situations in which DNS servers are not
configured, where DNS servers do not respond or where
DNS responds with RCODE=3 or RCODE=0 and no RRs.

However, the host is not obliged to dig deeper to  understand *why* these
situations occur, because there may be no easy way for a host to determine
*why* a DNS server did not respond to a query, or *why* the host was not
configured with a DNS server.

The only real issue is whether, based on these criteria, it is appropriate
for a host to conclude that it is unlikely to successfully resolve the
name using the primary name resolution protocol (DNS).

Whether that conclusion is justified depends in part on resolver behavior.
Hosts implementing RFC 1536 are advised to support DNS resolver failover,
to measure DNS RTTs, and to avoid unnecessary RCODE=3 errors.  All of
these fixes make it more likely that a DNS server, if available, will
respond to the query so that LLMNR is not needed.


--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Masataka Ohta <mohta@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp>
Subject: Re: LLMNR Issue 58: DNS server usage of LLMNR
Date: Mon, 22 Dec 2003 06:51:31 +0900
Lines: 39
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <DAC3FCB50E31C54987CD10797DA511BA06AC1850@WIN-MSG-10.wingroup.windeploy.ntdev.microsoft.com> <Pine.LNX.4.56.0312210739260.23403@internaut.com> <3FE6013C.5030804@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp> <Pine.LNX.4.56.0312211322380.10835@internaut.com>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Cc: Christian Huitema <huitema@windows.microsoft.com>, 
 namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Sun Dec 21 23:01:27 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.4) Gecko/20030624 Netscape/7.1 (ax)
X-Accept-Language: ja, en-us, en
To: Bernard Aboba <aboba@internaut.com>
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.4.56.0312211322380.10835@internaut.com>
Precedence: bulk

Bernard Aboba;

>>	LLMNR is expected to be useful for nodes on an isolated
>>	IP network with a single link, but not beyond that. LLMNR
>>	MUST NOT be used by nodes connected to the Internet nor
>>	an isolated IP network with multiple links.

> Whether the network is "isolated" or "connected to the Internet" is
> very hard to determine.  A host may be able to reach some Internet
> prefixes, and not be able to reach others.  Similarly, the radius of the
> network may also be hard to determine.

It is trivially easy for an administrator of the network.

> LLMNR use is restricted to situations in which DNS servers are not
> configured, where DNS servers do not respond or where
> DNS responds with RCODE=3 or RCODE=0 and no RRs.

The problem is that, LLMNR is still not useful unless the network
is an isolated single link that LLMNR should never be attempted
otherwise.

> However, the host is not obliged to dig deeper to  understand *why* these
> situations occur,

Agreed, but it is not my point.

Given the difficulty you mentioned, I think it is also necessary
to request that LLMNR functionality is, by default, turned off.

						Masataka Ohta



--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Bernard Aboba <aboba@internaut.com>
Subject: LLMNR Issue 60:  Uniqueness check on linkup
Date: Mon, 22 Dec 2003 00:06:44 -0800 (PST)
Lines: 46
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Mon Dec 22 16:07:23 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Precedence: bulk

Issue 60: Uniqueness check on linkup
Submitter name: Ralph Droms
Submitter email address: rdroms@cisco.com
Date first submitted: December 3, 2003
Reference:
Document: LLMNR-27
Comment type: T
Priority: S
Section: 4
Rationale/Explanation of issue:

Section 4, fifth paragraph: I think the host should perform the
uniqueness test when the interface is connected to a link (in addition
to the other events in the bullet list).

[BA] I think this is probably correct, since while the
host was disconnected, another host might have checked
for uniqueness of the name, and not gotten a response.
As a result, once the host connects to the network, it needs
to do a uniquenss check.

In order to avoid an impact on roaming latency, it
probably makes sense for this check to be done
optimistically -- the host does not respond to
LLMNR queries until it verifies uniqueness of the
name, but it should be able to do other things,
such as initiate TCP connections, etc. As a
result, the LLMNR name uniqueness test is not
in the critical path for roaming.

Proposed fix is as follows:

In Section 4, add to the list of events on which uniqueness checking is
triggered:
"- detects that an interface is connected and is usable
(e.g. an IEEE 802 hardware link-state change indicating
that a cable was attached or that an association has occurred
with a wireless base station and that any required authentication
has completed)"


--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: "Olaf M. Kolkman" <olaf@ripe.net>
Subject: WGLC for draft-ietf-dnsext-nsec-rdata-03.txt
Date: Mon, 22 Dec 2003 14:17:30 +0100
Organization: RIPE NCC
Lines: 37
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Mon Dec 22 16:11:31 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
X-Mailer: Sylpheed version 0.9.6 (GTK+ 1.2.10; i686-pc-linux-gnu)
X-RIPE-Spam-Level: 
X-RIPE-Spam-Status: N 0.095843
X-RIPE-Signature: e481a41dc83588a84c52714903fd5dd2
Precedence: bulk


Dear Working Group Colleagues,

This is a working group last call for draft-ietf-dnsext-nsec-rdata-03.txt.

    This document introduces a new format for the type bit map so that
    it can cover the full range of typecodes without the need of being
    extended.

    The document does not change the semantics of the NSEC RR (as they
    where inherited from the NXT RR).


This is to become a standard track RFC, the specification as
documented herein will end up in the DNSSEC bis document set.

To be able to forward this document we, the chairs, will need your
comments of support and statements concerning the ability to implement
this spec.

The WGLC concludes January 15, at the same time as the DNSSEC bis
document set. If the WG remains silent the default action will be to
forward the document.



-- Olaf

---------------------------------| Olaf M. Kolkman
---------------------------------| RIPE NCC


--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: David Blacka <davidb@verisignlabs.com>
Subject: question about dnssec-protocol-04
Date: Mon, 22 Dec 2003 14:45:36 -0500
Organization: Verisign, Inc.
Lines: 29
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain;
  charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Mon Dec 22 21:06:05 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
User-Agent: KMail/1.5.3
Content-Disposition: inline
Precedence: bulk

draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-protocol-04, section 2.3 has the following 
paragraph:

   An NSEC record (and its associated RRSIG RRset) MUST NOT be the only
   RRsets at any particular owner name.  That is, the signing process
   MUST NOT create (or RRSIG) RRs for owner names nodes which were not
   the owner name of any RRset before the zone was signed.

[There is an editing nit here, too: s/MUST NOT create (or/MUST NOT create 
NSEC (or/, I think.]

I feel sure that I have just forgotten the discussion about this, but why 
does this restriction exist?  What harm would NSEC records of this sort 
cause?

It is true that I cannot think of any useful reason to do this, but 
forbidding such NSEC records should have some real problem associated with 
it.

-- 
David Blacka    <davidb@verisignlabs.com> 
Sr. Engineer    Verisign Applied Research


--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Rob Austein <sra+namedroppers@hactrn.net>
Subject: Re: question about dnssec-protocol-04
Date: Mon, 22 Dec 2003 15:17:08 -0500
Lines: 28
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <200312221445.36740.davidb@verisignlabs.com>
Mime-Version: 1.0 (generated by SEMI 1.14.5 - "Awara-Onsen")
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Mon Dec 22 21:27:44 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
In-Reply-To: <200312221445.36740.davidb@verisignlabs.com>
User-Agent: Wanderlust/2.10.1 (Watching The Wheels) Emacs/21.3 Mule/5.0 (SAKAKI)
Precedence: bulk

At Mon, 22 Dec 2003 14:45:36 -0500, David Blacka wrote:
> 
> draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-protocol-04, section 2.3 has the following 
> paragraph:
> 
>    An NSEC record (and its associated RRSIG RRset) MUST NOT be the only
>    RRsets at any particular owner name.  That is, the signing process
>    MUST NOT create (or RRSIG) RRs for owner names nodes which were not
>    the owner name of any RRset before the zone was signed.
> 
> [There is an editing nit here, too: s/MUST NOT create (or/MUST NOT create 
> NSEC (or/, I think.]
> 
> I feel sure that I have just forgotten the discussion about this, but why 
> does this restriction exist?  What harm would NSEC records of this sort 
> cause?
> 
> It is true that I cannot think of any useful reason to do this, but 
> forbidding such NSEC records should have some real problem associated with 
> it.

Empty non-terminals.

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org
Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-dnsext-nsec-rdata-03.txt
Date: Mon, 22 Dec 2003 15:32:02 -0500
Lines: 87
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Reply-To: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: Multipart/Mixed; Boundary="NextPart"
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Mon Dec 22 21:42:07 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: IETF-Announce: ;
Precedence: bulk

--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the DNS Extensions Working Group of the IETF.

	Title		: DNSSEC NSEC RDATA Format
	Author(s)	: J. Schlyter
	Filename	: draft-ietf-dnsext-nsec-rdata-03.txt
	Pages		: 9
	Date		: 2003-12-22
	
This document defines updates the NSEC resource record RDATA format
to cover all type codes.

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-nsec-rdata-03.txt

To remove yourself from the IETF Announcement list, send a message to 
ietf-announce-request with the word unsubscribe in the body of the message.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP. Login with the username
"anonymous" and a password of your e-mail address. After logging in,
type "cd internet-drafts" and then
	"get draft-ietf-dnsext-nsec-rdata-03.txt".

A list of Internet-Drafts directories can be found in
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html 
or ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt


Internet-Drafts can also be obtained by e-mail.

Send a message to:
	mailserv@ietf.org.
In the body type:
	"FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-nsec-rdata-03.txt".
	
NOTE:	The mail server at ietf.org can return the document in
	MIME-encoded form by using the "mpack" utility.  To use this
	feature, insert the command "ENCODING mime" before the "FILE"
	command.  To decode the response(s), you will need "munpack" or
	a MIME-compliant mail reader.  Different MIME-compliant mail readers
	exhibit different behavior, especially when dealing with
	"multipart" MIME messages (i.e. documents which have been split
	up into multiple messages), so check your local documentation on
	how to manipulate these messages.
		
		
Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant mail reader
implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version of the
Internet-Draft.

--NextPart
Content-Type: Multipart/Alternative; Boundary="OtherAccess"

--OtherAccess
Content-Type: Message/External-body;
	access-type="mail-server";
	server="mailserv@ietf.org"

Content-Type: text/plain
Content-ID:	<2003-12-22143255.I-D@ietf.org>

ENCODING mime
FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-nsec-rdata-03.txt

--OtherAccess
Content-Type: Message/External-body;
	name="draft-ietf-dnsext-nsec-rdata-03.txt";
	site="ftp.ietf.org";
	access-type="anon-ftp";
	directory="internet-drafts"

Content-Type: text/plain
Content-ID:	<2003-12-22143255.I-D@ietf.org>

--OtherAccess--

--NextPart--



--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Mark.Andrews@isc.org
Subject: Re: question about dnssec-protocol-04
Date: Tue, 23 Dec 2003 07:41:09 +1100
Lines: 48
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <200312221445.36740.davidb@verisignlabs.com>
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Mon Dec 22 21:53:29 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: David Blacka <davidb@verisignlabs.com>
In-reply-to: Your message of "Mon, 22 Dec 2003 14:45:36 CDT."
             <200312221445.36740.davidb@verisignlabs.com> 
Precedence: bulk


> draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-protocol-04, section 2.3 has the following 
> paragraph:
> 
>    An NSEC record (and its associated RRSIG RRset) MUST NOT be the only
>    RRsets at any particular owner name.  That is, the signing process
>    MUST NOT create (or RRSIG) RRs for owner names nodes which were not
>    the owner name of any RRset before the zone was signed.
> 
> [There is an editing nit here, too: s/MUST NOT create (or/MUST NOT create 
> NSEC (or/, I think.]
> 
> I feel sure that I have just forgotten the discussion about this, but why 
> does this restriction exist?  What harm would NSEC records of this sort 
> cause?

	A signed zone should return the same answers as a unsigned
	zone modulo DNSSEC records.
 
> It is true that I cannot think of any useful reason to do this, but 
> forbidding such NSEC records should have some real problem associated with 
> it.

	Without the rule it also means that a UPDATE client needs
	to know to delete NSEC when the last regular record is
	deleted.  This introduces race conditions between the client
	and the server which don't exist if the server is left to
	manage the creation and deletion of NSEC.
 
> -- 
> David Blacka    <davidb@verisignlabs.com> 
> Sr. Engineer    Verisign Applied Research
> 
> 
> --
> to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
> the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
> archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>
--
Mark Andrews, Internet Software Consortium
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: Mark.Andrews@isc.org

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: David Blacka <davidb@verisignlabs.com>
Subject: Re: question about dnssec-protocol-04
Date: Mon, 22 Dec 2003 22:19:04 -0500
Organization: Verisign, Inc.
Lines: 27
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <200312221445.36740.davidb@verisignlabs.com> <20031222201708.CFA6C18B7@thrintun.hactrn.net>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain;
  charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Tue Dec 23 04:42:52 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
User-Agent: KMail/1.5.3
In-Reply-To: <20031222201708.CFA6C18B7@thrintun.hactrn.net>
Content-Disposition: inline
Precedence: bulk

On Monday 22 December 2003 3:17 pm, Rob Austein wrote:

> > I feel sure that I have just forgotten the discussion about this, but why
> > does this restriction exist?  What harm would NSEC records of this sort
> > cause?
> >
> > It is true that I cannot think of any useful reason to do this, but
> > forbidding such NSEC records should have some real problem associated
> > with it.
>
> Empty non-terminals.

Huh?

I know what empty non-terminals are, but I have know idea what you are talking 
about.

-- 
David Blacka    <davidb@verisignlabs.com> 
Sr. Engineer    Verisign Applied Research


--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: David Blacka <davidb@verisignlabs.com>
Subject: Re: question about dnssec-protocol-04
Date: Mon, 22 Dec 2003 22:33:22 -0500
Organization: Verisign, Inc.
Lines: 40
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <200312222042.hBMKf9Dl010358@drugs.dv.isc.org>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain;
  charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Tue Dec 23 04:50:27 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
User-Agent: KMail/1.5.3
In-Reply-To: <200312222042.hBMKf9Dl010358@drugs.dv.isc.org>
Content-Disposition: inline
Precedence: bulk

On Monday 22 December 2003 3:41 pm, Mark.Andrews@isc.org wrote:

> 	A signed zone should return the same answers as a unsigned
> 	zone modulo DNSSEC records.

Where does this requirement come from? 

> > It is true that I cannot think of any useful reason to do this, but
> > forbidding such NSEC records should have some real problem associated
> > with it.
>
> 	Without the rule it also means that a UPDATE client needs
> 	to know to delete NSEC when the last regular record is
> 	deleted.  This introduces race conditions between the client
> 	and the server which don't exist if the server is left to
> 	manage the creation and deletion of NSEC.

I don't see how allowing solo NSEC records is incompatible with the server 
manging the NSEC records.  That seems like a policy issue to me.  I will 
agree that UPDATE clients shouldn't deal with NSEC records directly.

I'll be clear here:  I am not bothered by this restriction per se.  While I 
haven't seen the light as to why solo NSEC records are bad, I also think that 
they are useless.  What bothers me is that a) if they are harmless, then they 
shouldn't be forbidden, and b) if they aren't, then the "why" of the rule 
needs to be in the document as well.  If I'm confused by this now, then 
someone two years from now will probably be confused by this as well, and 
telling them to search the namedroppers archives for a explanation is 
not...good.

-- 
David Blacka    <davidb@verisignlabs.com> 
Sr. Engineer    Verisign Applied Research


--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Rob Austein <sra+namedroppers@hactrn.net>
Subject: Re: question about dnssec-protocol-04
Date: Mon, 22 Dec 2003 22:59:41 -0500
Lines: 26
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <200312221445.36740.davidb@verisignlabs.com>
	<20031222201708.CFA6C18B7@thrintun.hactrn.net>
	<200312222219.05031.davidb@verisignlabs.com>
Mime-Version: 1.0 (generated by SEMI 1.14.5 - "Awara-Onsen")
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Tue Dec 23 05:14:47 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
In-Reply-To: <200312222219.05031.davidb@verisignlabs.com>
User-Agent: Wanderlust/2.10.1 (Watching The Wheels) Emacs/21.3 Mule/5.0 (SAKAKI)
Precedence: bulk

At Mon, 22 Dec 2003 22:19:04 -0500, David Blacka wrote:
> 
> On Monday 22 December 2003 3:17 pm, Rob Austein wrote:
> 
> > > I feel sure that I have just forgotten the discussion about this, but why
> > > does this restriction exist?  What harm would NSEC records of this sort
> > > cause?
> > >
> > > It is true that I cannot think of any useful reason to do this, but
> > > forbidding such NSEC records should have some real problem associated
> > > with it.
> >
> > Empty non-terminals.
> 
> I know what empty non-terminals are, but I have know idea what you are talking 
> about.

The restriction is there to make sure that signer and verifier agree
on whether or not empty non-terminal nodes are supposed to have signed
NSEC RRs.

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: roy@dnss.ec
Subject: Re: question about dnssec-protocol-04
Date: Tue, 23 Dec 2003 17:29:01 +0100 (CET)
Lines: 41
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <200312221445.36740.davidb@verisignlabs.com>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Tue Dec 23 17:50:04 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-Authentication-Warning: elektron.atoom.net: roy owned process doing -bs
X-X-Sender: roy@elektron.atoom.net
To: David Blacka <davidb@verisignlabs.com>
In-Reply-To: <200312221445.36740.davidb@verisignlabs.com>
X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new
Precedence: bulk

On Mon, 22 Dec 2003, David Blacka wrote:

> draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-protocol-04, section 2.3 has the following
> paragraph:
>
>    An NSEC record (and its associated RRSIG RRset) MUST NOT be the only
>    RRsets at any particular owner name.  That is, the signing process
>    MUST NOT create (or RRSIG) RRs for owner names nodes which were not
>    the owner name of any RRset before the zone was signed.
>
> [There is an editing nit here, too: s/MUST NOT create (or/MUST NOT create
> NSEC (or/, I think.]
>
> I feel sure that I have just forgotten the discussion about this, but why
> does this restriction exist?  What harm would NSEC records of this sort
> cause?

The current thinking is that empty non-terminals in the non-dnssec realm
become non-empty non-terminals when one starts to associate (dnssec)
records with them. That introduces different meaning from different
perspectives (secure and non-secure) over a single dataset. I'm not happy
with the difference. I don't know the impact of that difference, though
its likely to be small, even benign (but it _is_ a difference).

I'd rather not allow it so we don't have to deal with weird cornercases in
the future.

> It is true that I cannot think of any useful reason to do this, but
> forbidding such NSEC records should have some real problem associated with
> it.

Allowing such NSEC records should have some useful reason associated with
it, is the way I think.

Roy.

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: =?iso-8859-1?Q?=D3lafur?= =?iso-8859-1?Q?_Gu=F0mundsson?=
  <ogud@ogud.com>
Subject: Re: question about dnssec-protocol-04
Date: Tue, 23 Dec 2003 11:56:55 -0500
Lines: 86
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <200312222042.hBMKf9Dl010358@drugs.dv.isc.org>
 <200312222233.22368.davidb@verisignlabs.com>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Tue Dec 23 18:14:05 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-Sender: post@localhost (Unverified)
X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 6.0.1.1
To: David Blacka <davidb@verisignlabs.com>, namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
In-Reply-To: <200312222233.22368.davidb@verisignlabs.com>
References: <200312222042.hBMKf9Dl010358@drugs.dv.isc.org>
 <200312222233.22368.davidb@verisignlabs.com>
Precedence: bulk

</chair>

At 22:33 2003-12-22, David Blacka wrote:
>On Monday 22 December 2003 3:41 pm, Mark.Andrews@isc.org wrote:
>
> >       A signed zone should return the same answers as a unsigned
> >       zone modulo DNSSEC records.
>
>Where does this requirement come from?

This requirement was placed on the work that lead to RFC2065
thus it has been there for about 10 years in both RFC2065 and RFC2535
this was viewed as backwards compatibility.

> > > It is true that I cannot think of any useful reason to do this, but
> > > forbidding such NSEC records should have some real problem associated
> > > with it.
> >
> >       Without the rule it also means that a UPDATE client needs
> >       to know to delete NSEC when the last regular record is
> >       deleted.  This introduces race conditions between the client
> >       and the server which don't exist if the server is left to
> >       manage the creation and deletion of NSEC.
>
>I don't see how allowing solo NSEC records is incompatible with the server
>manging the NSEC records.  That seems like a policy issue to me.  I will
>agree that UPDATE clients shouldn't deal with NSEC records directly.

With the requirement this is a snip of a "random" large delegation zone
(RRsig's omitted for clarity>

ogud.com        NS      <ns set with 3 servers>
                 NSEC    ogue.com NS DS NSEC RRSIG
                 DS

ogue.com        NS      <ns set with 2 servers>
                 NSEC    <points somewhere>


Without the restriction following is a valid zone snip

ogud.com        NS      <ns set with 3 servers>
                 NSEC    ogud1.com NS DS NSEC RRSIG
                 DS

ogud1.com       NSEC    ogud2.com NSEC RRSIG
ogud2.com       NSEC    ogud3.com NSEC RRSIG
....
ogud99999.com   NSEC    ogude.com NSEC RRSIG

ogue.com        NS      <ns set with 2 servers>
                 NSEC    <points somewhere>

but what is the value of this ?
The zone is larger (not a good thing) and to a non DNSSEC aware resolver
it looks like there is wild card in the zone when there is none.

Second point, without this rule a dynamic update nameserver may elect
not to delete NSEC records when the other records at the name are deleted
as it is looks like less work, but it is not.
In either case one NSEC record needs to be updated either the one
at the name or the one of the name preceding the updated.

>I'll be clear here:  I am not bothered by this restriction per se.  While I
>haven't seen the light as to why solo NSEC records are bad, I also think that
>they are useless.  What bothers me is that a) if they are harmless, then they
>shouldn't be forbidden, and b) if they aren't, then the "why" of the rule
>needs to be in the document as well.  If I'm confused by this now, then
>someone two years from now will probably be confused by this as well, and
>telling them to search the namedroppers archives for a explanation is
>not...good.

The records are almost harmless.

<chair>
I think this is a good point, if David is confused someone else will be
thus we should add text to the document explaining the reasons.

         Olafur


--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Bernard Aboba <aboba@internaut.com>
Subject: Proposed Resolution to LLMNR Issue 59: Miscellaneous Issues
Date: Wed, 24 Dec 2003 12:58:23 -0800 (PST)
Lines: 180
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Wed Dec 24 22:02:54 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Precedence: bulk

The text of Issue 59 is enclosed below.  The proposed resolution is as
follows:

Accept the proposed changes.

Insert the following section:

"2.8. LLMNR packet format

LLMNR utilizes the DNS packet format defined in [RFC1035] and [RFC2535],
as illustrated below:

                                1  1  1  1  1  1
  0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  0  1  2  3  4  5
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
|                      ID                       |
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
|QR|   Opcode  |AA|TC|RD|RA| Z|AD|CD|   RCODE   |
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
|                   QDCOUNT                     |
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
|                   ANCOUNT                     |
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
|                   NSCOUNT                     |
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
|                   ARCOUNT                     |
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+

where:

ID A 16 bit identifier assigned by the program that generates any kind
of query. This identifier is copied the corresponding reply and
can be used by the requester to match up replies to outstanding
queries.

QR A one bit field that specifies whether this message is an LLMNR
query (0), or an LLMNR response (1).

OPCODE
A four bit field that specifies kind of query in this message.
This value is set by the originator of a query and copied into the
response. The values are defined in [RFC1035].

AA Authoritative Answer. The AA bit MUST be set in LLMNR responses.
If a sender receives a response with the header containing the AA
bit set, the responder MUST ignore the AA bit.

TC TrunCation - specifies that this message was truncated due to
length greater than that permitted on the transmission channel.
Use of the TC bit is described in Section 2.3.

RD Recursion Desired. The RD bit MUST NOT be set in an LLMNR query.
If a responder receives a query with the header containing the RD
bit set, the responder MUST ignore the RD bit.

RA Recursion Available. The RA bit in an LLMNR response MUST NOT be
set. If the RA bit is set in an LLMNR response, the sender MUST
ignore the RA bit.

Z Reserved for future use. MUST be zero in all LLMNR queries and
responses. If these bits are set in an LLMNR query or response,
they MUST be ignored.

AD Authentic Data. The AD bit, defined in [RFC2535], MUST NOT be set
in an LLMNR response. If the AD bit is set in an LLMNR query or
response, it MUST be ignored.

CD Checking Disabled. The CD bit, defined in [RFC2535], MUST NOT be
set in an LLMNR query. If a responder receives a query with the CD
bit set, the responder MUST ignore the CD bit.

RCODE
Response code - this 4 bit field is set as part of LLMNR responses.
A response to an LLMNR query MUST have RCODE set to zero. A sender
receiving an LLMNR response with RCODE not set to zero MUST ignore
the RCODE value.

QDCOUNT
An unsigned 16 bit integer specifying the number of entries in the
question section.

ANCOUNT
An unsigned 16 bit integer specifying the number of resource
records in the answer section.

NSCOUNT
An unsigned 16 bit integer specifying the number of name server
resource records in the authority records section. Authority
record section processing is described in Section 2.9.

ARCOUNT
An unsigned 16 bit integer specifying the number of resource
records in the additional records section. Additional record
section processing is described in Section 2.9."

-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Issue 59: Miscellaneous Issues
Submitter name: Olafur Gudmundsson
Submitter email address: ogud@ogud.com
Date first submitted: December 17, 2003
Reference:
http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/namedroppers.2003/msg02305.html
Document: LLMNR-27
Comment type: T
Priority: S
Section: Various
Rationale/Explanation of issue:

The draft could benefit from addition of a section gathering
in one place all the requirements relating to the use of the
DNS packet format for LLMNR. For example, use of the TC bit
is not defined and neither are the AD and CD bits (which I
assume are set to zero).

In Section 2.2, change:

"In conventional DNS terminology a DNS server authoritative for a zone is
authoritative for all the domain names under the zone root except for
the branches delegated into separate zones. Contrary to conventional
DNS terminology, an LLMNR responder is authoritative only for the zone
root."

To:

"In conventional DNS terminology a DNS server authoritative for a zone is
authoritative for all the domain names under the zone appex except for
the branches delegated into separate zones. Contrary to conventional
DNS terminology, an LLMNR responder is authoritative only for the zone
appex."

In Section 2.2, change:

"Responders SHOULD respond to LLMNR queries for names and addresses
they are authoritative for. This applies to both forward and
reverse lookups."

To:

"Responders MUST respond to LLMNR queries for names and addresses
they are authoritative for. This applies to both forward and
reverse lookups."

Add the following paragraph to Section 2.2:

"Upon configuring an IP address responders typically will
synthesize corresponding A, AAAA and PTR RRs so
as to be able to respond to LLMNR queries for these
RRs. An SOA RR is synthesized only when a responder
has another RR as well; the SOA RR MUST NOT be the only
RR that a responder has.
However, in general whether RRs are manually or
automatically created is an implementation decision."

Change Section 2.7 from:

"The responder should use a pre-configured TTL value in the records
returned in the LLMNR query response. A default value of 0 is
recommended in highly dynamic environments (such as mobile ad-hoc
networks). In less dynamic environments, LLMNR traffic can be reduced
by setting the TTL to a higher value.

Due to the TTL minimalization necessary when caching an RRset, all TTLs
in an RRset MUST be set to the same value."

To:

"The responder should use a pre-configured TTL value in the records
returned in the LLMNR query response. A default value of 30 seconds
is RECOMMENDED. In highly dynamic environments (such as mobile ad-hoc
networks), the TTL value may need to be reduced.

Due to the TTL minimalization necessary when caching an RRset, all TTLs
in an RRset MUST be set to the same value."


--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Bernard Aboba <aboba@internaut.com>
Subject: Proposed Resolution of LLMNR Issue 60: Uniqueness check on linkup
Date: Wed, 24 Dec 2003 13:07:10 -0800 (PST)
Lines: 50
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Wed Dec 24 22:09:00 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Precedence: bulk

The text of Issue 60 is enclosed below.  The proposed resolution is to
accept the proposed change.

--------------------------------------------------------------------
Issue 60: Uniqueness check on linkup
Submitter name: Ralph Droms
Submitter email address: rdroms@cisco.com
Date first submitted: December 3, 2003
Reference:
Document: LLMNR-27
Comment type: T
Priority: S
Section: 4
Rationale/Explanation of issue:

Section 4, fifth paragraph: I think the host should perform the
uniqueness test when the interface is connected to a link (in addition
to the other events in the bullet list).

[BA] I think this is probably correct, since while the
host was disconnected, another host might have checked
for uniqueness of the name, and not gotten a response.
As a result, once the host connects to the network, it needs
to do a uniquenss check.

In order to avoid an impact on roaming latency, it
probably makes sense for this check to be done
optimistically -- the host does not respond to
LLMNR queries until it verifies uniqueness of the
name, but it should be able to do other things,
such as initiate TCP connections, etc. As a
result, the LLMNR name uniqueness test is not
in the critical path for roaming.

Proposed fix is as follows:

In Section 4, add to the list of events on which uniqueness checking is
triggered:

"- detects that an interface is connected and is usable
(e.g. an IEEE 802 hardware link-state change indicating
that a cable was attached or that an association has occurred
with a wireless base station and that any required authentication
has completed)"

--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Bernard Aboba <aboba@internaut.com>
Subject: Proposed Resolution to LLMNR Issue 55: Sender checks
Date: Wed, 24 Dec 2003 13:12:31 -0800 (PST)
Lines: 90
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Wed Dec 24 22:12:07 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Precedence: bulk

The text of Issue 55 is enclosed below.  The proposed resolution is as
follows:

In Section 2, change:

"[4] Upon the reception of the response, the sender performs the checks
described in Section 2.5. If these conditions are met, then the
sender uses and caches the returned response. If not, then the
sender ignores the response and continues waiting for the response."

to:

"[4] Upon reception of the response, the sender processes it."

In Section 2.5, delete:

"A sender SHOULD prefer RRs including reachable addresses where RRs
involving both reachable and unreachable addresses are returned in
response to a query."

In Section 2.1, add:

"Since the responder may order the RRs in the response so as to
indicate preference, the sender SHOULD preserve ordering
in the response to the querying application."

-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Issue 55: Sender checks
Submitter name: Bernard Aboba
Submitter email address: aboba@internaut.com
Date first submitted: December 3, 2003
Reference:
http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/namedroppers.2003/msg02303.html
Document: LLMNR-25
Comment type: T
Priority: S
Section: 2-2.8
Rationale/Explanation of issue:
Section 2 states:

[4] Upon the reception of the response, the sender performs the checks
described in Section 2.5. If these conditions are met, then the
sender uses and caches the returned response. If not, then the
sender ignores the response and continues waiting for the response.

It is not clear what sender checks this paragraph is referring to.
Possibilities include material in sections 2.3, 2.5, 2.8 and 3.1.

Section 2.3 does include some sender checks. For example:
"If the sender of a TCP query receives a response not
using TCP, the response MUST be silently discarded." There is also
discussion of handling of ICMP "time exceeded" messages.

Section 2.5 does not specify checks to be made by senders on reception of
a response. For example, there are recommendations on setting of TTL/hop
count by senders, but no TTL check specified for receivers. Since the
sender MUST set the TTL/Hop Count field to 1, it is not possible for a
receiver to see a TTL/Hop Count field of 2 or larger. Yet no sender action
is specified upon reception of such a packet.

Within Section 2.5, the following paragraph is present:

"A sender SHOULD prefer RRs including reachable addresses where RRs
involving both reachable and unreachable addresses are returned in
response to a query."

I do not believe that this sentence implies a reachability test be done on
received RRs.

Section 2.8 provides guidelines for sender processing of the authority and
additional section
of responses.

Section 3.1 talks about responder responsibilities, but not sender checks.
It includes the sentence:

"Routable addresses MUST be included first in the response, if available.
This encourages use of routable address(es) for establishment of new
connections."

[Ralph Droms] Section 2.5, third paragraph: what is an "unreachable
address"; did you intend "unroutable address"?



--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:46 2006
From: Bernard Aboba <aboba@internaut.com>
Subject: LLMNR Issue 61: Miscellaneous clarifications
Date: Sat, 27 Dec 2003 18:30:28 -0800 (PST)
Lines: 35
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Sun Dec 28 03:32:41 2003
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Precedence: bulk

Issue 61: Miscellaneous clarifications
Submitter name: Bernard Aboba
Submitter email address: aboba@internaut.com
Date first submitted: December 27, 2003
Reference:
Document: LLMNR-27
Comment type: T
Priority: S
Section: Various
Rationale/Explanation of issue:

The specification does not discuss the required behavior with respect to
destination address and ports.

In Section 2.3, add:

"[b] Responders MUST direct responses to the port from which the query
was sent. When queries are received via TCP this is an inherent
part of the transport protocol. For queries received by UDP the
responder MUST take note of the source port and use that as the
destination port in the response. Responses SHOULD always be sent
from the port to which they were directed."

In Section 2.4, add:

"A responder receiving a unicast query MUST send the response with a
source address set to the destination address field of the IP header of
the query causing the response."


--
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>



