From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:51 2006
From: Olaf Kolkman <olaf@ripe.net>
Subject: DNSEXT list policy
Date: Sat, 1 May 2004 08:35:01 +0200
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- List Purpose

  namedroppers@ops.ietf.org is the mailing list for the IETF DNSEXT
  working group.  

  See <http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/dnsext-charter.html> for the
  wg charter.  Messages should be on topics appropriate to the dnsext
  wg, which are various discussion of the DNS protocols or
  administrivia of the WG itself.

- Specific items that are not not appropriate for posting

  Calls for papers, announcements of events not directly relevant to
  the DNS protocols, etc. are not appropriate.  

  Discussion of problems with particular implementations,
  announcements of releases, sites' misconfigurations, pleas for help
  with specific implementations, etc.  should be done on mailing lists
  for the particular implementations.

  There is a working group for dns operational practice, DNSOP, whose
  charter can be found at
  <http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/dnsop-charter.html>. Items
  relevant to the DNSOP charter are to be discussed on the DNSOP
  mailinglist.

  Discussion about the quality of implementations is outside the scope
  of this list.

- Moderation

  Moderation is based on "subscriber-only with spam filter".

  Questions or concerns related to the acceptance or rejection of
  specific messages to the namedroppers mailing list should first be
  discussed with the wg chairs, with followup appeals using the normal
  appeals process of rfc 2026 (i.e., follup with area directors, then
  iesg, etc.).

  There is a mailing list for the discussion of ietf processes, which
  includes any general discussion of the moderation of ietf mailing
  lists.  it is poised@lists.tislabs.com

- Issue Tracker

  As of October 2003 this group will use an issue tracker. This is to
  better organize the work-flow, maintain overview over, and focus the
  discussions to the working group documents. 

  Please stick to the following procedure when discussing working
  group work documents.

  == The system

  The issue tracker can be found at: 
  
  https://roundup.machshav.com/dnsext/index 

  The chairs are responsible for maintaining the data in the issue
  tracker. That task may be delegated to document editors. If a
  document editor prefers other tracking systems they are free to
  coordinate that with the chairs.

  == Creating a new issue.

  New Issue tickets are only created for working group document.

  If you have an issue a document please sent in a mail with a subject
  header of the following format

  <NAME> ISSUE: <title>

  Where <NAME> is taken from the I-D's file name
  draft-ietf-dnsext-<name>-<version> and the <title> is a short
  description of the issue presented.


  Please use the following template to submit an issue:


    To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
    Cc: document-editor@foo.example
    Subject: FOO-RR-PROCESSING ISSUE: BLA-bit vs FOO-flag interop problem

    
    One line description of issue

    name: Your_Name_Here
    email: Your_Email_Address_Here
    Date: Insert_Date_Here
    Reference: URL to e-mail describing problem, if available
    Type: ['T'echnical | 'E'ditorial]
    Priority: ['C'ritical | 'U'rgent | 'B'ug | 'F'eature | 'W'ish ]

    Document: draft-ietf-dnsext-<name>-<version>
    Section: Insert_Section_Number_Here

    Rationale/Explanation of issue:
         Length description of problem


    Requested change:
         Proposal
  

  The proposal for the requested change is the most important bit of
  the issue. Providing a proposed text will focus discussion and
  relieves the document-editors. A new issue MUST therefore contain a
  text in the 'requested change' field.

  Once a new "ISSUE" message is received on the list the chairs or
  document editors will add the issue to the document tracker and
  reply to the list providing a URL and a relevant issue identifier.

  
  == Discussion of issues.  

  Discussion of issues takes place on the list.  Please reply
  'in-thread' when discussing an issue and try to stay within scope of
  the issue at hand.


  The chairs or the document editors will copy relevant messages, or
  abstracts thereof to the issue tracker so that the gist of the
  discussion can be followed using the tracker. There may be a few
  days lag between the list and the tracker. The archive remains the
  authoritative log for the discussion.


  == Bouncing of issues

  The chairs may decide not to create a entry in the issue tracker if
  an issue does not relate to a working group document; the issue has
  already been discussed and the issue has been closed; if there is
  no proposed change or; if the issue is irrelevant to any of the
  working group documents. 


  == Discussion of matters not in the issue tracker.

  Feel free to bring up matters that are not related to working group
  documents (but appropriate to the group); they do not need an issue
  tracking number. 


  == Closing of issues.

  Chairs or document editors will close issues once resolved. In the
  tracking system a note will be made in which document version the
  issue was resolved.




---

NOTE WELL:

All statements related to the activities of the IETF and addressed to the 
IETF are subject to all provisions of Section 10 of RFC 2026, which grants 
to the IETF and its participants certain licenses and rights in such 
statements.

Such statements include verbal statements in IETF meetings, as well as 
written and electronic communications made at any time or place, which are 
addressed to

    - the IETF plenary session,
    - any IETF working group or portion thereof,
    - the IESG, or any member thereof on behalf of the IESG,
    - the IAB or any member thereof on behalf of the IAB,
    - any IETF mailing list, including the IETF list itself,
      any working group or design team list, or any other list
      functioning under IETF auspices,
    - the RFC Editor or the Internet-Drafts function

Statements made outside of an IETF meeting, mailing list or other function, 
that are clearly not intended to be input to an IETF activity, group or 
function, are not subject to these provisions.


----------------------------------------------------------------------
$Id: dnsext-list-policy.txt,v 1.4 2003/09/25 08:26:13 olaf Exp $

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:51 2006
From: =?iso-8859-1?Q?=D3lafur?= Gudmundsson/DNSEXT co-chair <ogud@ogud.com>
Subject: Namedroppers Moderation policy change
Date: Mon, 03 May 2004 13:53:49 -0400
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   "Margaret Wasserman" <margaret@thingmagic.com>
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At 02:35 2004-05-01, Olaf Kolkman wrote:

>- Moderation
>
>   Moderation is based on "subscriber-only with spam filter".

Effective now:
Posts over 20000 characters by subscribers will be moderated.

This is done to combat more intelligent virus mailers that forge
subscriber postings to the mailing list .
I apologize for the viruses that have made it out to the mailing
list over the weekend.

Effects on posting: since 2002/01/01 4915 messages have been posted,
a maximum[1] of 22 messages would have been affected by this policy
12 of them legitimate ones, 10 malware.

Send comments to chairs.
         thanks
         =D3lafur (DNSEXT co-chair) (current Namedroppers moderator)

[1] Depends on how server counts size with or without headers.
  =20


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:51 2006
From: scott.seligman@eng.sun.com
Subject: Mail Delivery (failure namedroppers@ops.ietf.org)
Date: Mon, 3 May 2004 12:14:25 -0500
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This is a multi-part message in MIME format.

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**********************************************************
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WARNING: Panda Antivirus GateDefender has detected a virus in file
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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:51 2006
From: Pekka Savola <pekkas@netcore.fi>
Subject: handling of additional data (fwd)
Date: Wed, 5 May 2004 08:00:58 +0300 (EEST)
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 [ Moderators note: Post by non-subscriber.  With the massive amount of
   spam, it is easy to miss and therefore delete relevant posts 
   by non-subsrcibers. Please fix your subscription addresses. ]

FYI,

This issue was raised in DNSOP, but I was advised to also solicit 
opinions from here.

(I'm not subscribed so please keep in Cc:)

---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Tue, 4 May 2004 12:24:15 +0300 (EEST)
From: Pekka Savola <pekkas@netcore.fi>
To: dnsop@lists.uoregon.edu
Subject: handling of additional data [Re: [dnsop] WGLC for
    draft-ietf-dnsop-ipv6-dns-issues-06.txt]

Hi,

Let's take an issue separately from the rest.  Me and Jinmei discussed
this, but were OK with as it is.  However, if WG has clear opinions,
now might be time for modifying the text and/or recommiding changes to
the additional data processing.

As described by ipv6-dns-issues, section 4.4, there are two kinds of 
additional data:

   1.  "critical" additional data; this must be included (all the
       possible RRsets) in all scenarios, and
                                                                                             
   2.  "courtesy" additional data; this could be sent in full, with only
       a few RRsets, or with no RRsets, and can be fetched separately as
       well, but which could lead to non-optimal results.

[[ see examples of each in the draft.]]

Imagine the event where the additional data section would include both
A and AAAA RRsets and would be too large, but omitting one RRset would 
make it small enough.

Now, the questions are:

A)  Is there consensus that it's better to set TC bit than to return 
    only some RRsets of critical additional data?

B)  Is it better to omit all the courtesy addional data, rather than 
    omit some RRsets?

C)  (This is relevant if you answered "no" to B) Is it better to set
    TC bit rather than return only some RRsets with courtesy 
    additional data?

Opinions?  Discussion? Etc.?

As for my personal preference:
 A) probably yes (not sure).
 B) yes, omit everything.
 C) possibly yes, not sure. (Doesn't matter if "yes" to B)

-- 
Pekka Savola                 "You each name yourselves king, yet the
Netcore Oy                    kingdom bleeds."
Systems. Networks. Security. -- George R.R. Martin: A Clash of Kings


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:51 2006
From: Robert Elz <kre@munnari.OZ.AU>
Subject: Re: handling of additional data (fwd)
Date: Thu, 06 May 2004 18:57:10 +0700
Lines: 44
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Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
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To: Pekka Savola <pekkas@netcore.fi>
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.4.44.0405050758170.15828-100000@netcore.fi> 
Precedence: bulk

    Date:        Wed, 5 May 2004 08:00:58 +0300 (EEST)
    From:        Pekka Savola <pekkas@netcore.fi>
    Message-ID:  <Pine.LNX.4.44.0405050758170.15828-100000@netcore.fi>

  | A)  Is there consensus that it's better to set TC bit than to return 
  |     only some RRsets of critical additional data?

I have no idea if there's consensus or not (consensus among whom?), but
assuming the question intended there was really "Is it better..." (as in
questions B & C) then I think the answer is probably yes, but I am not
certain that is necessarily true - it is certainly better to set TC than
to send no "critical" additional data, but if some is sent, and even better,
if which of it is sent can vary from one response to another, then I am
not certain that just sending it, without TC isn't the better solution
(I'd really like to see some performance measurements with things done both
ways).

  | B)  Is it better to omit all the courtesy addional data, rather than 
  |     omit some RRsets?

No.   Provided that only complete RRsets are omitted, not just parts of
RRsets, if a complete "courtesy" RRset will fit, and the server wants to
send it (ie: my answer isn't a demand upon servers to include such data),
include it, regardless of how many others won't fit (again, better if the
implementation doesn't have a fixation on which of the available RRsets
it should include when they won't all fit, but allows that to vary).

  | C)  (This is relevant if you answered "no" to B) Is it better to set
  |     TC bit rather than return only some RRsets with courtesy 
  |     additional data?

No.

You should also be asking those who said yes to B whether it is better to
set TC rather than dropping all the RRsets.

kre


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:51 2006
From: Masataka Ohta <mohta@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp>
Subject: Re: handling of additional data (fwd)
Date: Fri, 07 May 2004 06:11:29 +0900
Lines: 24
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Cc: Pekka Savola <pekkas@netcore.fi>,  namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
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To: Robert Elz <kre@munnari.OZ.AU>
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Kre;

> then I am
> not certain that just sending it, without TC isn't the better solution

The problem is that glues can be provided only with referral
and there is no way to separately ask glues.

By definition, glues are things which can not be asked without
the glues itself.

Worse, there is no way for the resolver know that some glues
are missing, unless glues are under the zone cut, which is
not always the case, even in which case, separate asking
causes the same referral still with missing glues.

						Masataka Ohta


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:51 2006
From: Robert Elz <kre@munnari.OZ.AU>
Subject: Re: handling of additional data (fwd)
Date: Fri, 07 May 2004 06:20:51 +0700
Lines: 51
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <409AAA01.5000607@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp>  <Pine.LNX.4.44.0405050758170.15828-100000@netcore.fi> <10945.1083844630@munnari.OZ.AU>
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X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Fri May 07 01:32:18 2004
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: Masataka Ohta <mohta@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp>
In-Reply-To: <409AAA01.5000607@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp> 
Precedence: bulk

    Date:        Fri, 07 May 2004 06:11:29 +0900
    From:        Masataka Ohta <mohta@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp>
    Message-ID:  <409AAA01.5000607@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp>

  | The problem is that glues can be provided only with referral
  | and there is no way to separately ask glues.

Yes, true, but there should never be a need to ask specifically for glue,
asking for the data should return the same thing - if the glue has been
made different than the authoritative data, and something is depending upon
that, then I don't much care what happens.

  | By definition, glues are things which can not be asked without
  | the glues itself.

I'm not sure I quite agree with that definition, but nothing depends upon
it here, so it doesn't matter.

  | Worse, there is no way for the resolver know that some glues
  | are missing,

True, but does it really matter?

If all the glue is omitted, then, of course, there's a problem - that's
why I said ...

	it is certainly better to set TC than
	to send no "critical" additional data,

but if some glue is included, then the resolver has a path to the next set
of servers.   It doesn't have all the information, and may not be able to
reach all of the servers, but it should be able to reach at least one.
If it desires it can start A/AAAA queries to look for any missing data
that may exist.

Now I'm not saying this is necessarily better than having the resolver try
again with TCP after receiving a TC reply - what I'm saying is that I don't
know, and I don't know (perhaps just due to my ignorance) of anyone who has
done any kind of experimentation to find out which is the better approach.

I'd be hesitant about claiming that one is necessarily better than the other
based upon no more than superstition and guesswork.

kre


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:51 2006
From: Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com>
Subject: Re: handling of additional data (fwd)
Date: Fri, 07 May 2004 00:47:15 +0000
Lines: 12
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <kre@munnari.OZ.AU>
Cc: Masataka Ohta <mohta@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp>,
	Pekka Savola <pekkas@netcore.fi>, namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Fri May 07 03:00:18 2004
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: Robert Elz <kre@munnari.OZ.AU>
In-Reply-To: Message from Robert Elz <kre@munnari.OZ.AU> 
	of "Fri, 07 May 2004 06:20:51 +0700."
	<21729.1083885651@munnari.OZ.AU> 
X-Mailer: MH-E 7.4; nmh 1.0.4; GNU Emacs 21.3.1
Precedence: bulk

> I'd be hesitant about claiming that one is necessarily better than the other
> based upon no more than superstition and guesswork.

same here.  the definition of "helpful" vs. "necessary" glue is at best
subjective.  please just set TC if anything does not fit, and that you
truncate on rrset boundaries, just like 1035 recommends.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:51 2006
From: Masataka Ohta <mohta@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp>
Subject: Re: handling of additional data (fwd)
Date: Fri, 07 May 2004 10:14:57 +0900
Lines: 18
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <20040507004715.6D64C139A3@sa.vix.com>
Mime-Version: 1.0
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Cc: Robert Elz <kre@munnari.OZ.AU>, Pekka Savola <pekkas@netcore.fi>, 
 namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Fri May 07 03:24:10 2004
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
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To: Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com>
In-Reply-To: <20040507004715.6D64C139A3@sa.vix.com>
Precedence: bulk

Paul;

> the definition of "helpful" vs. "necessary" glue is at best
> subjective.

It is a problem of the definition of the draft.

However, "glue" is necessary while other additionals are
merely helpful.

						Masataka Ohta


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:51 2006
From: gson@nominum.com (Andreas Gustafsson)
Subject: Re: handling of additional data (fwd)
Date: Thu, 6 May 2004 18:29:17 -0700 (PDT)
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	<20040507004715.6D64C139A3@sa.vix.com>
Cc: Robert Elz <kre@munnari.OZ.AU>,
        Masataka Ohta <mohta@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp>,
        Pekka Savola <pekkas@netcore.fi>, namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
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Paul Vixie writes:
> same here.  the definition of "helpful" vs. "necessary" glue is at best
> subjective.  please just set TC if anything does not fit, and that you
> truncate on rrset boundaries, just like 1035 recommends.

While do I agree with your recommendation (for the specific case of
glue), I'm unable to find the RFC1035 text you refer to.  There's also
the following text in RFC2181 section 9 which seems to contradict it:

   Where TC is set, the partial RRSet that would not completely
   fit may be left in the response.

-- 
Andreas Gustafsson, gson@nominum.com

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:51 2006
From: Masataka Ohta <mohta@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp>
Subject: Re: handling of additional data (fwd)
Date: Fri, 07 May 2004 10:34:26 +0900
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kre;

>   | Worse, there is no way for the resolver know that some glues
>   | are missing,
> 
> True, but does it really matter?
> 
> If all the glue is omitted, then, of course, there's a problem - that's
> why I said ...
> 
> 	it is certainly better to set TC than
> 	to send no "critical" additional data,
> 
> but if some glue is included, then the resolver has a path to the next set
> of servers.   It doesn't have all the information, and may not be able to
> reach all of the servers, but it should be able to reach at least one.

Say "fault tolerance".

It is required that each zone has at least two name servers.

Moreover, administrators of a zone with more than three name
servers are doing so with *REASONS* that addresses of all of
them should be tried by the client.

So, it is still OK if a reply includes "at least one" address
of name servers chosen randomly for every query and clients
retry original query.

However, they are new requirements. Worse, because of cached referral,
clients will continue to receive the same answer and are helpless if
the received addresses are not useful.

> If it desires it can start A/AAAA queries to look for any missing data
> that may exist.

As we agreed:

>   | The problem is that glues can be provided only with referral
>   | and there is no way to separately ask glues.
>
> Yes, true,

it is impossible to separately ask glue informaion unless
you have glue information.

> Now I'm not saying this is necessarily better than having the resolver try
> again with TCP after receiving a TC reply - what I'm saying is that I don't
> know, and I don't know (perhaps just due to my ignorance) of anyone who has
> done any kind of experimentation to find out which is the better approach.

I'm saying I do know larger message size (over UDP or TCP) is
the only way, if glues cause message size overflow.

						Masataka Ohta



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:51 2006
From: Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com>
Subject: Re: handling of additional data (fwd)
Date: Fri, 07 May 2004 01:49:24 +0000
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Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <200405070129.i471THJj015893@guava.araneus.fi>
Cc: Robert Elz <kre@munnari.OZ.AU>,
	Masataka Ohta <mohta@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp>,
	Pekka Savola <pekkas@netcore.fi>, namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
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	of "Thu, 06 May 2004 18:29:17 MST."
	<200405070129.i471THJj015893@guava.araneus.fi> 
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> While do I agree with your recommendation (for the specific case of
> glue), I'm unable to find the RFC1035 text you refer to.  There's also
> the following text in RFC2181 section 9 which seems to contradict it:

oops.  you're right.

>    Where TC is set, the partial RRSet that would not completely
>    fit may be left in the response.

which is why, if TC was set, BIND assumes that the last nonempty section
has a partial rrset inside it therefore doesn't cache it.  sorry to confuse.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:51 2006
From: Matt Larson <mlarson@verisign.com>
Subject: Re: handling of additional data (fwd)
Date: Fri, 7 May 2004 14:18:47 -0400
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        Masataka Ohta <mohta@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp>,
        Pekka Savola <pekkas@netcore.fi>, namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
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On Fri, 07 May 2004, Paul Vixie wrote:
> the definition of "helpful" vs. "necessary" glue is at best
> subjective.

There are two issues lurking here.  The first is the definition of
"glue".  The second is whether there is any ambiguity surrounding
including a name server's A record in the additional section of a
response.

First, to the definition of glue.  The end of Section 4.2.1 of RFC
1034 appears to make it clear that glue RRs are always A records
corresponding the RDATA of an NS record, and that these records are
required to solve the circular dependency problem when the name of the
name server is at or below the zone cut created by the NS record.
Here's the exact text:

  To fix this problem, a zone contains "glue" RRs which are not part of
  the authoritative data, and are address RRs for the servers.  These
  RRs are only necessary if the name server's name is "below" the cut,
  and are only used as part of a referral response.

Using this definition, not all A records in the additional section of
a message corresponding to NS RDATA are glue: only those meeting the
at-or-below-a-zone-cut criterion above.

But lest terminology disagreements get in the way of the second issue,
I don't understand the subjectivity you refer to, Paul.  A name
server's A record would appear to be able to be classified as
"helpful" or "necessary" simply by its name relative to the zone in
question using the RFC 1034 definition of glue.

Matt

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:51 2006
From: Rob Austein <sra@isc.org>
Subject: Re: handling of additional data (fwd)
Date: Fri, 07 May 2004 15:05:57 -0400
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At Fri, 7 May 2004 14:18:47 -0400, Matt Larson wrote:
> ...
> Using this definition, not all A records in the additional section of
> a message corresponding to NS RDATA are glue: only those meeting the
> at-or-below-a-zone-cut criterion above.

Right, with the obvious change that these days we'd be talking about
all of the address types (AAAA and A), not just A.

> But lest terminology disagreements get in the way of the second issue,
> I don't understand the subjectivity you refer to, Paul.  A name
> server's A record would appear to be able to be classified as
> "helpful" or "necessary" simply by its name relative to the zone in
> question using the RFC 1034 definition of glue.

Paul can of course speak for himself, but one way of looking at this
is that if all addresses were equally useful, we wouldn't need so many
addresses.  That is: part of the point of providing redundant servers
(and the whole point of providing redundant addresses) is that stuff
happens (routing problems, backhoe induced deep fade, whatever), and
when stuff happens, some addresses may be better than others.

So, completely punting on additional data that's just an optimization
and concentrating on glue as defined above: if there's more glue than
will fit in the response message, the name server doesn't really know
which glue will be most useful to the resolver.  It can, in theory,
attempt to guess, using arbitrarily complex (and fragile) criteria,
but it can't know.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:51 2006
From: Robert Elz <kre@munnari.OZ.AU>
Subject: Re: handling of additional data (fwd)
Date: Sat, 08 May 2004 02:00:23 +0700
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Precedence: bulk

    Date:        Fri, 07 May 2004 10:34:26 +0900
    From:        Masataka Ohta <mohta@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp>
    Message-ID:  <409AE7A2.2030504@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp>

  | Say "fault tolerance".

Otha-san - consider the context here please.   We're not concerned with
zones with 2 (or 3) nameservers, each with a couple of addresses -  those
things just don't cause packet overflow (even with AAAA records, SIG
records, and the 512 byte limit) in a referral or NS query (perhaps when
the NS is just in the auth or additional section as extra info, but
those cases don't matter).

To overflow the limits there are either going to be a large number of
NS records or the servers are going to have lots of addresses.
Even with some of the data missing, there is going to be plenty of
fault tolerance - maybe not all the zone admin had hoped for, but
perhaps enough (once again, all I am saying here is that I don't know,
and I haven't seen any data that would convince me one way or the other).

  | Moreover, administrators of a zone with more than three name
  | servers are doing so with *REASONS* that addresses of all of
  | them should be tried by the client.

The admin also knows how big a referral packet containing their NS
list can get - they can plan to avoid the problem in the first place.
The question is how best for the software to deal with cases where
the admin has no idea what is good, and makes a mess.


After all this, I still don't know which practice will result in the
optimal behaviour for any of the server, the resolver, or the net as a
whole - nor do I know that the practices optimising those three are
necessarily all the same, and if they're not, I also have no idea just
which one someone is attempting to specify, or why that one rather than
the others.

But that may be because I haven't been following the dnsops WG for a
while now, all might be quite clear over there.

kre


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:51 2006
From: Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com>
Subject: Re: handling of additional data (fwd)
Date: Fri, 07 May 2004 19:57:43 +0000
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References: <mlarson@verisign.com>
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In-Reply-To: Message from Matt Larson <mlarson@verisign.com> 
	of "Fri, 07 May 2004 14:18:47 -0400."
	<20040507181847.GT31336@chinook.corppc.vrsn.com> 
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> But lest terminology disagreements get in the way of the second issue,
> I don't understand the subjectivity you refer to, Paul.  A name
> server's A record would appear to be able to be classified as
> "helpful" or "necessary" simply by its name relative to the zone in
> question using the RFC 1034 definition of glue.

by that definition, i agree, and if the rule change being considered is
just "if necessary glue won't fit, truncate; if helpful glue won't fit,
omit it" then i'd agree with that also.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:51 2006
From: Masataka Ohta <mohta@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp>
Subject: Re: handling of additional data (fwd)
Date: Sat, 08 May 2004 05:57:55 +0900
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  namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
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Matt Larson;

> Using this definition, not all A records in the additional section of
> a message corresponding to NS RDATA are glue: only those meeting the
> at-or-below-a-zone-cut criterion above.

A problem is that " at-or-below-a-zone-cut" is wrong that
circular dependency occurs, for example, by a "org" zone served
by a server in a "edu" zone and the "edu" zone served by a server
in the "org" zone.

That is, 1034 is not self-consistent.

However, the problem above does not affect the current problem as
authoritative servers have full knowledge on what is "glue".

Paul's confusion is to have assumed "helpful glue".

There is no such thing as "helpful glue" that name servers should
simply put all the "glue" in response, even if it causes
truncation.

Resolvers may try addresses in truncated referral. But, it should
never be cached and if all of them fails, it should get untruncated
referral with longer messages.

							Masataka Ohta



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:51 2006
From: Masataka Ohta <mohta@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp>
Subject: Re: handling of additional data (fwd)
Date: Sat, 08 May 2004 06:19:26 +0900
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kre;

Things can get a little more complicated.

Consider, for example, scalable (w.r.t. global routing table
size) multihoming where sites receives multiple prefixes each
from its upstream ISPs, whichi is considered in multi6 WG.

Then, a name server connected to three LANs of a triply
homed site has 9 addresses.

If there are three such servers, there will be 27 addresses,
which is too many to fit in 512B with AAAA.

> Even with some of the data missing, there is going to be plenty of
> fault tolerance - maybe not all the zone admin had hoped for, but
> perhaps enough (once again, all I am saying here is that I don't know,
> and I haven't seen any data that would convince me one way or the other).

As "enough" is primarily judged by the zone admin, if the admin hoped
for more, it is not "enough" or the admin is too greedy.

See above for an example how difficult to say an admin is "greedy"
as merely 3 servers can cause overflow.

Things can get even more complicated if some of the servers are
in other sites (it is important for fault tolerance) operated by
other admins.

>   | Moreover, administrators of a zone with more than three name
>   | servers are doing so with *REASONS* that addresses of all of
>   | them should be tried by the client.
> 
> The admin also knows how big a referral packet containing their NS
> list can get - they can plan to avoid the problem in the first place.
> The question is how best for the software to deal with cases where
> the admin has no idea what is good, and makes a mess.

If we have a broken protocol and fix is impossible, then, let
admins avoid the problem.

If we are designing a protocol or revising it in backward
compatible way, never assume admins are intelligent.

Admins already have a lot of things to consider.

						Masataka Ohta


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:51 2006
From: Robert Elz <kre@munnari.OZ.AU>
Subject: Re: handling of additional data (fwd)
Date: Sat, 08 May 2004 06:05:34 +0700
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    Date:        Sat, 08 May 2004 06:19:26 +0900
    From:        Masataka Ohta <mohta@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp>
    Message-ID:  <409BFD5E.8090707@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp>

  | Then, a name server connected to three LANs of a triply
  | homed site has 9 addresses.

Yes, it would.   But that the addresses exist doesn't mean they have to
all be listed in the AAAA records of the name that is listed in the NS
record.   Listing one address (perhaps one from a different LAN) from
each ISP's prefix is sufficient, more than that just adds more useless
retries in the common failure case where the problem is that the nameserver
(or its host) is down.

We should be encouraging better use of resources, not just "stick it
all in because that's the thoughtless way" - especially in docs from
dnsops.

  | Things can get even more complicated if some of the servers are
  | in other sites (it is important for fault tolerance) operated by
  | other admins.

The server can be in another site, in my NS records however, I decide
what I will call it, and if I give it a name from my space, I also
decide what addresses it will have.

kre


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:51 2006
From: Mark Andrews <Mark_Andrews@isc.org>
Subject: Re: handling of additional data (fwd)
Date: Sat, 08 May 2004 08:50:30 +1000
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Cc: Matt Larson <mlarson@verisign.com>, Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com>,
   Robert Elz <kre@munnari.OZ.AU>, Pekka Savola <pekkas@netcore.fi>,
   namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
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To: Masataka Ohta <mohta@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp>
In-reply-to: Your message of "Sat, 08 May 2004 05:57:55 +0900."
             <409BF853.7010908@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp> 
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> Matt Larson;
> 
> > Using this definition, not all A records in the additional section of
> > a message corresponding to NS RDATA are glue: only those meeting the
> > at-or-below-a-zone-cut criterion above.
> 
> A problem is that " at-or-below-a-zone-cut" is wrong that
> circular dependency occurs, for example, by a "org" zone served
> by a server in a "edu" zone and the "edu" zone served by a server
> in the "org" zone.
> 
> That is, 1034 is not self-consistent.

	Sure there can be circular dependancies.  We don't however
	have to support them if it makes management of the DNS in
	the whole impossible.  We tried it and is was a failure.
	Stricter rules were needed.

	Can anyone else here remember when NS.UU.NET has 26 different
	addresses for it floating around in the DNS?  In reality
	it only had one address and it had been changed since it
	was initially assigned.  Only accepting glue when it was below
	the top of zone when loading/transfering zones and rejecting
	additional data when it was not below the currrent query domain
	basically fixed the problem.  It took a few years for nameservers
	which did this to get to be deployed on all the servers which
	served zones that were also served by NS.UU.NET but in the
	end the bogus records were removed.

	We don't have that problem today because nameservers actually
	enforce a heirachical glue acceptance rules.  Yes they
	prevent configurations with circular dependancies but they
	make the DNS managable.
	
 
> However, the problem above does not affect the current problem as
> authoritative servers have full knowledge on what is "glue".
> 
> Paul's confusion is to have assumed "helpful glue".
> 
> There is no such thing as "helpful glue" that name servers should
> simply put all the "glue" in response, even if it causes
> truncation.
> 
> Resolvers may try addresses in truncated referral. But, it should
> never be cached and if all of them fails, it should get untruncated
> referral with longer messages.
> 
> 							Masataka Ohta
> 
> 
> 
> --
> to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
> the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
> archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>
--
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: Mark_Andrews@isc.org



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:51 2006
From: Masataka Ohta <mohta@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp>
Subject: Re: handling of additional data (fwd)
Date: Tue, 11 May 2004 04:44:29 +0900
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In-Reply-To: <11924.1083971134@munnari.OZ.AU>
Precedence: bulk

kre;

>   | Then, a name server connected to three LANs of a triply
>   | homed site has 9 addresses.
> 
> Yes, it would.   But that the addresses exist doesn't mean they have to
> all be listed in the AAAA records of the name that is listed in the NS
> record.   Listing one address (perhaps one from a different LAN) from
> each ISP's prefix is sufficient, more than that just adds more useless
> retries in the common failure case where the problem is that the nameserver
> (or its host) is down.

The problem is that the situation will be common that you can't
expect much on operators there.

> The server can be in another site, in my NS records however, I decide
> what I will call it, and if I give it a name from my space, I also
> decide what addresses it will have.

Not all the operators are like you.

							Masataka Ohta



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:51 2006
From: Masataka Ohta <mohta@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp>
Subject: Re: handling of additional data (fwd)
Date: Tue, 11 May 2004 05:00:00 +0900
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Cc: Matt Larson <mlarson@verisign.com>, Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com>, 
 Robert Elz <kre@munnari.OZ.AU>,
 Pekka Savola <pekkas@netcore.fi>,  namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
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Mark Andrews;

> 	Sure there can be circular dependancies.  We don't however
> 	have to support them if it makes management of the DNS in
> 	the whole impossible.  We tried it and is was a failure.

That "we tried" means others will try.

> 	Stricter rules were needed.

It certainly is a solution.

> 	Can anyone else here remember when NS.UU.NET has 26 different
> 	addresses for it floating around in the DNS? In reality
> 	it only had one address and it had been changed since it
> 	was initially assigned.  Only accepting glue when it was below
> 	the top of zone when loading/transfering zones and rejecting
> 	additional data when it was not below the currrent query domain
> 	basically fixed the problem.

What is the problem? Those who buy service from UUNET and their
peers suffer that it is a problem of UUNET, doesn't it?

>  It took a few years for nameservers
> 	which did this to get to be deployed on all the servers which
> 	served zones that were also served by NS.UU.NET but in the
> 	end the bogus records were removed.

Are you saying we should modify protocols/operations, merely
because of a stupid act of an ISP harming its own business?

							Masataka Ohta



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:51 2006
From: Mark Andrews <Mark_Andrews@isc.org>
Subject: Re: handling of additional data (fwd)
Date: Tue, 11 May 2004 11:15:02 +1000
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> Mark Andrews;
> 
> > 	Sure there can be circular dependancies.  We don't however
> > 	have to support them if it makes management of the DNS in
> > 	the whole impossible.  We tried it and is was a failure.
> 
> That "we tried" means others will try.

	It means that older nameservers didn't have restrictions
	and it ended up being a management nightmare.  Been there,
	done that, don't want to go there again.

 
> > 	Stricter rules were needed.
> 
> It certainly is a solution.
> 
> > 	Can anyone else here remember when NS.UU.NET has 26 different
> > 	addresses for it floating around in the DNS? In reality
> > 	it only had one address and it had been changed since it
> > 	was initially assigned.  Only accepting glue when it was below
> > 	the top of zone when loading/transfering zones and rejecting
> > 	additional data when it was not below the currrent query domain
> > 	basically fixed the problem.
> 
> What is the problem? Those who buy service from UUNET and their
> peers suffer that it is a problem of UUNET, doesn't it?

	No *everyone* suffered.  It wasn't just UUNET.  UUNET was
	a example of what when wrong.  It happened to lots of ISP's,
	basically anyone who wasn't serving their own zones.  UUNET
	was just a prime example of the problem.

	It was a matter of "there is bad data out there, where is
	it coming from".   The answer to that used to be "anyone
	of several thousand servers for NS.UU.NET" and the servers
	could "learn" the bad addresses after or as a side of
	checking them.  Today you look at the parent servers for
	the zone.  We can do this because modern servers reject
	"out of zone" glue.
 
> >  It took a few years for nameservers
> > 	which did this to get to be deployed on all the servers which
> > 	served zones that were also served by NS.UU.NET but in the
> > 	end the bogus records were removed.
> 
> Are you saying we should modify protocols/operations, merely
> because of a stupid act of an ISP harming its own business?

	No.  The protocol didn't scale on the management side.
	Placing constraints on glue restored the ability to manage
	the DNS.
 
> 							Masataka Ohta
> 
> 
> 
> --
> to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
> the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
> archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>
--
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: Mark_Andrews@isc.org

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:51 2006
From: Masataka Ohta <mohta@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp>
Subject: Re: handling of additional data (fwd)
Date: Tue, 11 May 2004 11:50:22 +0900
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Mark Andrews;

> 	It means that older nameservers didn't have restrictions
> 	and it ended up being a management nightmare.  Been there,
> 	done that, don't want to go there again.

That is a wrong analysis.

>>What is the problem? Those who buy service from UUNET and their
>>peers suffer that it is a problem of UUNET, doesn't it?
 
> 	No *everyone* suffered.  It wasn't just UUNET.  UUNET was
> 	a example of what when wrong.  It happened to lots of ISP's,
> 	basically anyone who wasn't serving their own zones.  UUNET
> 	was just a prime example of the problem.

So, only those who buy service from stuppid ISPs and
their peers suffered that it is a problem of stupid
ISPs.

It is not a problem for the rest of the world and to
be solved automatically as bankrupcies of stupid ISPs.

> 	No.  The protocol didn't scale on the management side.

It is merely a problem of mismanagements.

						Masataka Ohta



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From owner-dnsop@lists.uoregon.edu  Fri Dec 29 10:45:51 2006
From: Pekka Savola <pekkas@netcore.fi>
Subject: handling of additional data [Re: WGLC for
 draft-ietf-dnsop-ipv6-dns-issues-06.txt] (fwd)
Date: Tue, 11 May 2004 10:36:31 +0300 (EEST)
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Hi,

DNSOP WGLC on draft-ietf-dnsop-ipv6-dns-issues-06.txt is ending in a
day or two, and I hope to be able to submit the revision then.

With my draft-ietf-dnsop-ipv6-dns-issues editor hat on, I haven't seen
much convergence on this issue (and this isn't a show-stopper for this
document), so unless there are specific suggestions for changing the
section 4.4 of the document, I'll only try to clarify the terminology
a bit.

See:

http://www.netcore.fi/pekkas/ietf/temp/draft-ietf-dnsop-ipv6-dns-issues-07pre.txt
http://www.netcore.fi/pekkas/ietf/temp/draft-ietf-dnsop-ipv6-dns-issues-07pre-diff.html

Suggestions, etc. of course welcome..

---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Tue, 4 May 2004 12:24:15 +0300 (EEST)
From: Pekka Savola <pekkas@netcore.fi>
To: dnsop@lists.uoregon.edu
Subject: handling of additional data [Re: [dnsop] WGLC for
    draft-ietf-dnsop-ipv6-dns-issues-06.txt]

Hi,

Let's take an issue separately from the rest.  Me and Jinmei discussed
this, but were OK with as it is.  However, if WG has clear opinions,
now might be time for modifying the text and/or recommiding changes to
the additional data processing.

As described by ipv6-dns-issues, section 4.4, there are two kinds of 
additional data:

   1.  "critical" additional data; this must be included (all the
       possible RRsets) in all scenarios, and
                                                                                             
   2.  "courtesy" additional data; this could be sent in full, with only
       a few RRsets, or with no RRsets, and can be fetched separately as
       well, but which could lead to non-optimal results.

[[ see examples of each in the draft.]]

Imagine the event where the additional data section would include both
A and AAAA RRsets and would be too large, but omitting one RRset would 
make it small enough.

Now, the questions are:

A)  Is there consensus that it's better to set TC bit than to return 
    only some RRsets of critical additional data?

B)  Is it better to omit all the courtesy addional data, rather than 
    omit some RRsets?

C)  (This is relevant if you answered "no" to B) Is it better to set
    TC bit rather than return only some RRsets with courtesy 
    additional data?

Opinions?  Discussion? Etc.?

As for my personal preference:
 A) probably yes (not sure).
 B) yes, omit everything.
 C) possibly yes, not sure. (Doesn't matter if "yes" to B)

-- 
Pekka Savola                 "You each name yourselves king, yet the
Netcore Oy                    kingdom bleeds."
Systems. Networks. Security. -- George R.R. Martin: A Clash of Kings

.
dnsop resources:_____________________________________________________
web user interface: http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/~llynch/dnsop.html
mhonarc archive: http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/~llynch/dnsop/index.html


.
dnsop resources:_____________________________________________________
web user interface: http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/~llynch/dnsop.html
mhonarc archive: http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/~llynch/dnsop/index.html



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:51 2006
From: Michael StJohns <mstjohns@mindspring.com>
Subject: Fwd: I-D ACTION:draft-stjohns-dnssec-trustupdate-00.txt
Date: Wed, 12 May 2004 10:56:48 -0400
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 [ Moderators note: Post by non-subscriber.  With the massive amount of
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FYI.



>A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts 
>directories.
>
>
>         Title           : Automated Updates of DNSSEC Trust Anchors
>         Author(s)       : M. StJohns
>         Filename        : draft-stjohns-dnssec-trustupdate-00.txt
>         Pages           : 13
>         Date            : 2004-5-11
>
>This document describes a means for automated, authenticated and
>    authorized updating of DNSSEC "trust anchors".  The method provides
>    protection against single key compromise of a key in the trust point
>    key set.  Based on the trust established by the presence of a current
>    anchor, other anchors may be added at the same place in the
>    hierarchy, and, ultimately, supplant the existing anchor.
>
>    This mechanism, if adopted, will require changes to resolver
>    management behavior (but not resolver resolution behavior), and the
>    addition of a single flag bit to the DNSKEY record.
>
>A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
>http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-stjohns-dnssec-trustupdate-00.txt
>
>To remove yourself from the I-D Announcement list, send a message to
>i-d-announce-request@ietf.org with the word unsubscribe in the body of the 
>message.
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>
>
>Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP. Login with the username
>"anonymous" and a password of your e-mail address. After logging in,
>type "cd internet-drafts" and then
>         "get draft-stjohns-dnssec-trustupdate-00.txt".
>
>A list of Internet-Drafts directories can be found in
>http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html
>or ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt
>
>
>Internet-Drafts can also be obtained by e-mail.
>
>Send a message to:
>         mailserv@ietf.org.
>In the body type:
>         "FILE /internet-drafts/draft-stjohns-dnssec-trustupdate-00.txt".
>
>NOTE:   The mail server at ietf.org can return the document in
>         MIME-encoded form by using the "mpack" utility.  To use this
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>FILE /internet-drafts/draft-stjohns-dnssec-trustupdate-00.txt
>
><ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-stjohns-dnssec-trustupdate-00.txt>





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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:51 2006
From: Edward Lewis <edlewis@arin.net>
Subject: Re: handling of additional data (fwd)
Date: Thu, 13 May 2004 14:14:48 -0400
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At 11:15 +1000 5/11/04, Mark Andrews wrote:
>>  > 	Sure there can be circular dependancies.  We don't however
>>  > 	have to support them if it makes management of the DNS in
>>  > 	the whole impossible.  We tried it and is was a failure.
...
>	It means that older nameservers didn't have restrictions
>	and it ended up being a management nightmare.  Been there,
>	done that, don't want to go there again.

Was there ever documentation of that?

>>  > 	Stricter rules were needed.

Did any of these ever get put into a document?

I don't doubt your words, I just want to know if the lessons have 
been recorded.
-- 
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Edward Lewis                                            +1-703-227-9854
ARIN Research Engineer

Even the voices inside my head are refusing to talk to me anymore.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:51 2006
From: Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com>
Subject: Re: handling of additional data (fwd)
Date: Thu, 13 May 2004 19:36:30 +0000
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	of "Thu, 13 May 2004 14:14:48 -0400."
	<a06020415bcc96a689f5f@[192.136.136.83]> 
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> >	It means that older nameservers didn't have restrictions
> >	and it ended up being a management nightmare.  Been there,
> >	done that, don't want to go there again.
> 
> Was there ever documentation of that?

not in the form of an FYI or BCP, and it appears to have been left out
of 2181/2182 as well, but it was discussed on the old dns-security@TIS
mailing list back in april of 1994.

> >>  > 	Stricter rules were needed.
> 
> Did any of these ever get put into a document?
> 
> I don't doubt your words, I just want to know if the lessons have been
> recorded.

here you go:

--------

From: vixie@vix.com (Paul A Vixie)
Newsgroups: local.mail.dns.security
Subject: Re: DNS security draft
Date: 20 Apr 94 14:47:20
Organization: Vixie Enterprises
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In-reply-to: crawdad@munin.fnal.gov's message of 20 Apr 1994 10:03:42 -0700

>What it boils down to seems to be this.  Any resolver or server which
>preserves the distinction between authoritative and non-authoritative
>(example: glue) data better than BIND does will break the proposed
>scheme of cross-authentication of zones.
>
>[...]

BIND as of 4.9 preserves the distinction between authoritative and
nonauthoritative data; a future (post-4.9.3) version will probably answer
with a NOERROR/referral if a query arrives without RD for a name with
non-authoritative matching RR's.  as of 4.9 we are already deleting
all previous data in a node when more-authoritative info comes in.

credibility levels are, in increasing order:

        additional or authority data
        nonauthoritative answer
        authoritative answer
        authoritative local zone (pri or sec)

more details wouldn't be relevant to this thread.  i just wanted to keep
everybody from believing the BIND is still as brain-dead as it used to be.
--
Paul Vixie
Redwood City, CA
decwrl!vixie!paul
<paul@vix.com>

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:51 2006
From: Gilles Guette <gguette@irisa.fr>
Subject: Comments on draft-stjohns-dnssec-trustupdate-00.txt
Date: Fri, 14 May 2004 09:57:37 +0200
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Hello,
in your draft you say that when a key has the REVOKED bit sets, this key 
MUST NOT be use as a trust anchor except validating the RRSIG for 
revocation. And revocation is immediate.

In the section 2.2 you say that "The resolver MUST NOT treat a new key 
as a trust anchor until the hold-down time expires AND it has retrieved 
the..."


So consider the following scenario:

A zone with one SEP (SEP1) decides to add a new SEP (SEP2) and revoked 
the old one.

The zone owner sets the revoked bit on SEP1.
Your resolver revoked immediatly SEP1 but must not use SEP2 as trust 
anchor. At this time your resolver has not trust anchor anymore for this 
zone.

Did I miss something?

In the last paragraph of section 2.2, you say that "an attacker who 
holds one compromised key could keep a single resolver from realizing 
that a key had been compromised by intercepting real data..."

But when you compromise a key, you can generate "cryptographically 
valid" data and pollute caching servers with it. Then there is no need 
to intercept real trafic. But maybe it is out of scope here.


In section 2.4.3 you say that a resolver MUST be able to manage at least 
five SEP per trust point. Is there a particular reason for this ?
I am not sure that many zones have more than two or three SEP.

Regards

Michael StJohns wrote:
> 
> [ Moderators note: Post by non-subscriber.  With the massive amount of
>   spam, it is easy to miss and therefore delete relevant posts   by 
> non-subsrcibers. Please fix your subscription addresses. ]
> 
> FYI.
> 
> 
> 
>> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts 
>> directories.
>>
>>
>>         Title           : Automated Updates of DNSSEC Trust Anchors
>>         Author(s)       : M. StJohns
>>         Filename        : draft-stjohns-dnssec-trustupdate-00.txt
>>         Pages           : 13
>>         Date            : 2004-5-11
>>
>> This document describes a means for automated, authenticated and
>>    authorized updating of DNSSEC "trust anchors".  The method provides
>>    protection against single key compromise of a key in the trust point
>>    key set.  Based on the trust established by the presence of a current
>>    anchor, other anchors may be added at the same place in the
>>    hierarchy, and, ultimately, supplant the existing anchor.
>>
>>    This mechanism, if adopted, will require changes to resolver
>>    management behavior (but not resolver resolution behavior), and the
>>    addition of a single flag bit to the DNSKEY record.
>>
>> A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
>> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-stjohns-dnssec-trustupdate-00.txt 
--
Gilles Guette
ARMOR team
IRISA/INRIA Rennes
France


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:51 2006
From: "Scott Rose" <scottr@nist.gov>
Subject: RE: Comments on draft-stjohns-dnssec-trustupdate-00.txt
Date: Fri, 14 May 2004 08:32:21 -0400
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> -----Original Message-----
> From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
> [mailto:owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org]On Behalf Of Gilles Guette
> So consider the following scenario:
>
> A zone with one SEP (SEP1) decides to add a new SEP (SEP2) and revoked
> the old one.
>
> The zone owner sets the revoked bit on SEP1.
> Your resolver revoked immediatly SEP1 but must not use SEP2 as trust
> anchor. At this time your resolver has not trust anchor anymore for this
> zone.
>
> Did I miss something?
>

I believe both the SEP1 and SEP2 keys are supposed to be active for a time.
The overlap allows resolvers (validators) to learn and validate the new SEP
key before installing it as a trust anchor.  That is the impression I got.

I have some comments of my own:

meta comment - The DNSSECbis docs have seperated the "resolver" and
"validator" roles.  Adding some complexity to avoid confusion :)  The
resolver would learn of the new SEP key, but the validator would be the one
that would rollover the trust anchor.

Section 2.4.2
"This ensures that at least two DNSKEY RRSets MUST be seen by the
resolver..."  2 RRsets?  Isn't it one set, with some keys having different
flags set?

Section 5.1
Should the zone signing key be set at generation time as well?  Or is there
a specific time that is set?  Is there a time when the REVOKE bit is set and
the ZSK is cleared (and RRSIGs removed)?

Section 6.1
"...decision whether to accept a replacement trust anchor key based on trust
for a current trust anchor key..."  Sounds confusing, but don't know how to
rephrase to make it sound more clear.

second para:
Why only manual updates?  Could that include some automatic method out of
band for DNS?


I think this is a good draft for consideration on key rollover.  It does
require allocation of a new bit in the DNSKEY flag field, but that is easy
since there is plenty of room.

Scott


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:51 2006
From: Gilles Guette <gguette@irisa.fr>
Subject: Re: Comments on draft-stjohns-dnssec-trustupdate-00.txt
Date: Fri, 14 May 2004 15:30:35 +0200
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Scott Rose wrote:
> 
>>-----Original Message-----
>>From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
>>[mailto:owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org]On Behalf Of Gilles Guette
>>So consider the following scenario:
>>
>>A zone with one SEP (SEP1) decides to add a new SEP (SEP2) and revoked
>>the old one.
>>
>>The zone owner sets the revoked bit on SEP1.
>>Your resolver revoked immediatly SEP1 but must not use SEP2 as trust
>>anchor. At this time your resolver has not trust anchor anymore for this
>>zone.
>>
>>Did I miss something?
>>
> 
> 
> I believe both the SEP1 and SEP2 keys are supposed to be active for a time.
> The overlap allows resolvers (validators) to learn and validate the new SEP
> key before installing it as a trust anchor.  That is the impression I got.


In this case, I think that this model is not suitable for zone files 
having only one SEP, because if a zone has one SEP and want to change 
it, the owner of the zone must first create a new SEP and wait 30 days 
and after revoke the old SEP.

In the same way if a zone has 2 SEP (SEP1 and SEP2) and want to change 
one. The zone owner revoked SEP1 and create SEP3, it is OK but during 
the next 30 days this zone can not change SEP2 because of the same problem.



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:51 2006
From: Mike StJohns <Mike.StJohns@nominum.com>
Subject: Re: Comments on draft-stjohns-dnssec-trustupdate-00.txt
Date: Fri, 14 May 2004 10:51:57 -0400
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At 03:57 AM 5/14/2004, Gilles Guette wrote:
>Hello,
>in your draft you say that when a key has the REVOKED bit sets, this key 
>MUST NOT be use as a trust anchor except validating the RRSIG for 
>revocation. And revocation is immediate.
>
>In the section 2.2 you say that "The resolver MUST NOT treat a new key as 
>a trust anchor until the hold-down time expires AND it has retrieved the..."
>
>
>So consider the following scenario:
>
>A zone with one SEP (SEP1) decides to add a new SEP (SEP2) and revoked the 
>old one.
>
>The zone owner sets the revoked bit on SEP1.
>Your resolver revoked immediatly SEP1 but must not use SEP2 as trust 
>anchor. At this time your resolver has not trust anchor anymore for this zone.
>
>Did I miss something?

Nope.  You've just wiped out the trust anchors for the zone.  That's why 
the recommendation is for one active, one stand by key.


>In the last paragraph of section 2.2, you say that "an attacker who holds 
>one compromised key could keep a single resolver from realizing that a key 
>had been compromised by intercepting real data..."
>
>But when you compromise a key, you can generate "cryptographically valid" 
>data and pollute caching servers with it. Then there is no need to 
>intercept real trafic. But maybe it is out of scope here.

I think I understand what you're saying.  My assumption is that the data in 
the zone can normally get to the resolvers, but a determined attacker who 
has managed to compromise a trust anchor key can block and replace traffic 
headed for only a small set of resolvers (obviously this assumes the 
attacker hasn't ALSO broken into the zone servers).  The design of this 
mechanism is such that the attacker would need to do this for EVERY 
transaction during the hold-down time (30 days) to permanently corrupt the 
one specific server.  The moment the resolver sees the revoked key all of 
that cryptographically valid data goes away.


>In section 2.4.3 you say that a resolver MUST be able to manage at least 
>five SEP per trust point. Is there a particular reason for this ?
>I am not sure that many zones have more than two or three SEP.

There needed to be some minimum, this one seemed to be reasonable.  There 
needs to be at least three - (revoked, active, standby), having 5 gives you 
some leeway.



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:51 2006
From: Mike StJohns <Mike.StJohns@nominum.com>
Subject: RE: Comments on draft-stjohns-dnssec-trustupdate-00.txt
Date: Fri, 14 May 2004 11:19:20 -0400
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Resending from a subscribed email address...

At 08:32 AM 5/14/2004, Scott Rose wrote:
>I have some comments of my own:
>
>meta comment - The DNSSECbis docs have seperated the "resolver" and
>"validator" roles.  Adding some complexity to avoid confusion :)  The
>resolver would learn of the new SEP key, but the validator would be the one
>that would rollover the trust anchor.

I think that's implementation detail.  The validator can still get data 
from the resolver.  Is there something specific that should be said?


>Section 2.4.2
>"This ensures that at least two DNSKEY RRSets MUST be seen by the
>resolver..."  2 RRsets?  Isn't it one set, with some keys having different
>flags set?

Hmm... badly worded.  What I meant was that the resolver has to see the new 
DNSKEY in the RRSet twice - and at least one of those had to be after the 
expiration of the TTL in which the DNSKEY first appeared.  E.g. the 
resolver has to fetch the DNSKEY RRSet at least twice at different times 
from the zone servers.


>Section 5.1
>Should the zone signing key be set at generation time as well?  Or is there
>a specific time that is set?  Is there a time when the REVOKE bit is set and
>the ZSK is cleared (and RRSIGs removed)?

My reading of the documents may be confused, but I thought the ZSK was 
necessary to validate a signature, but there's no requirement that there be 
associated signatures for any key  In any event if the ZSK needs to be set 
for the SEP bit to be set then I can note that here.


>Section 6.1
>"...decision whether to accept a replacement trust anchor key based on trust
>for a current trust anchor key..."  Sounds confusing, but don't know how to
>rephrase to make it sound more clear.

I'll look at it again.


>second para:
>Why only manual updates?  Could that include some automatic method out of
>band for DNS?

Let me change "manual" to "out of band" to correct this.

>I think this is a good draft for consideration on key rollover.  It does
>require allocation of a new bit in the DNSKEY flag field, but that is easy
>since there is plenty of room.

Thanks.  And thanks for the excellent on-the-point comments.

Mike


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:51 2006
From: Mike StJohns <Mike.StJohns@nominum.com>
Subject: Re: Comments on draft-stjohns-dnssec-trustupdate-00.txt
Date: Fri, 14 May 2004 11:20:00 -0400
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Resending from a subscribed address..

At 09:30 AM 5/14/2004, Gilles Guette wrote:

>>>Did I miss something?
>>
>>I believe both the SEP1 and SEP2 keys are supposed to be active for a time.
>>The overlap allows resolvers (validators) to learn and validate the new SEP
>>key before installing it as a trust anchor.  That is the impression I got.

Yes.  Without the add hold down, there's an interesting attack if one of 
the keys is compromised..  So the zone owner needs to do some preparation 
by having multiple trust anchors.

>In this case, I think that this model is not suitable for zone files 
>having only one SEP, because if a zone has one SEP and want to change it, 
>the owner of the zone must first create a new SEP and wait 30 days and 
>after revoke the old SEP.
>
>In the same way if a zone has 2 SEP (SEP1 and SEP2) and want to change 
>one. The zone owner revoked SEP1 and create SEP3, it is OK but during the 
>next 30 days this zone can not change SEP2 because of the same problem.

Correct.  Again, the zone owner has to do some prep.

You asked in a previous email about the number of keys.  For critical zones 
you may want to have three trust anchors - an active and two stand by  (A, 
B, C).  Say C is compromised you can do (A, B, REVOKE(C), D) 
sign(A,C).   The new key set will be A, B, D with A continuing to be the 
active signer.  If A is then compromised before the hold down expires, you 
do (REVOKE(A), B, REVOKE(C), D, E) sign (A,B,C).  At that point you're 
stuck for at least 30 days until D and E are accepted as trust anchors, but 
you were able to manage the multiple compromises.  (Note that the timer on 
accepting D was reset once the resolver saw the (REVOKE(A))sign(a)).

Later, Mike


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:51 2006
From: Mike StJohns <Mike.StJohns@nominum.com>
Subject: Re: Fwd: I-D ACTION:draft-stjohns-dnssec-trustupdate-00.txt
Date: Fri, 14 May 2004 11:39:23 -0400
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At 04:20 AM 5/14/2004, Gilles Guette wrote:
>I think another point should be explain in the draft (maybe only few lines):
>
>If a zone changes its trusted anchor and your resolver does not querried 
>this zone during the change. After the change, your resolver is unable to 
>validate a new trusted anchor and the change must be made manually.

Not exactly. Assume two anchors, an active anchor A and a standby anchor 
B.  Assume you're doing a normal rollover (e.g. out with the old, in with 
the new).  At time T you do (A, B, C) sign(A,B).  At time T+30 days you do 
(REVOKE(A),B,C)sign(A,B), at time T+60 or more days you do 
(B,C)sign(B).  At time T+1year its time to rollover B.  As long as the 
resolver has queried the zone at least once during the year its been able 
to install C as a standby anchor.   That actual worry is that you don't 
query the zone during the time the REVOKE(A) is present and leave A around 
as an anchor.

For zones like the root, it shouldn't be a problem - if you don't query the 
root in a month you may have other problems.  For zones like 
wildostriches.com it will be more of a problem.  OTOH - if you really need 
wildostriches.com validated you're probably connecting to them fairly often.

I'll expand the security consideration section to cover more of this 
discussion.

Thanks - Mike


It is possible for a zone owner to totally and completely screw up the 
trust anchors, but its also as possible for him/her to screw up the signatures. 


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:51 2006
From: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org
Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-dnsext-nsec-rdata-06.txt
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--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the DNS Extensions Working Group of the IETF.

	Title		: DNSSEC NSEC RDATA Format
	Author(s)	: J. Schlyter
	Filename	: draft-ietf-dnsext-nsec-rdata-06.txt
	Pages		: 9
	Date		: 2004-5-14
	
This document redefines the wire format of the 'Type Bit Map' field
   in the NSEC resource record RDATA format to cover the full RR type
   space.

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-nsec-rdata-06.txt

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:51 2006
From: Michael StJohns <mstjohns@mindspring.com>
Subject: RE: Comments on draft-stjohns-dnssec-trustupdate-00.txt
Date: Fri, 14 May 2004 11:06:02 -0400
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At 08:32 AM 5/14/2004, Scott Rose wrote:
>I have some comments of my own:
>
>meta comment - The DNSSECbis docs have seperated the "resolver" and
>"validator" roles.  Adding some complexity to avoid confusion :)  The
>resolver would learn of the new SEP key, but the validator would be the one
>that would rollover the trust anchor.

I think that's implementation detail.  The validator can still get data 
from the resolver.  Is there something specific that should be said?


>Section 2.4.2
>"This ensures that at least two DNSKEY RRSets MUST be seen by the
>resolver..."  2 RRsets?  Isn't it one set, with some keys having different
>flags set?

Hmm... badly worded.  What I meant was that the resolver has to see the new 
DNSKEY in the RRSet twice - and at least one of those had to be after the 
expiration of the TTL in which the DNSKEY first appeared.  E.g. the 
resolver has to fetch the DNSKEY RRSet at least twice at different times 
from the zone servers.


>Section 5.1
>Should the zone signing key be set at generation time as well?  Or is there
>a specific time that is set?  Is there a time when the REVOKE bit is set and
>the ZSK is cleared (and RRSIGs removed)?

My reading of the documents may be confused, but I thought the ZSK was 
necessary to validate a signature, but there's no requirement that there be 
associated signatures for any key  In any event if the ZSK needs to be set 
for the SEP bit to be set then I can note that here.


>Section 6.1
>"...decision whether to accept a replacement trust anchor key based on trust
>for a current trust anchor key..."  Sounds confusing, but don't know how to
>rephrase to make it sound more clear.

I'll look at it again.


>second para:
>Why only manual updates?  Could that include some automatic method out of
>band for DNS?

Let me change "manual" to "out of band" to correct this.

>I think this is a good draft for consideration on key rollover.  It does
>require allocation of a new bit in the DNSKEY flag field, but that is easy
>since there is plenty of room.

Thanks.  And thanks for the excellent on-the-point comments.

Mike





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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:51 2006
From: Rob Austein <sra@isc.org>
Subject: New versions of DNSSECbis drafts posted
Date: Mon, 17 May 2004 03:12:23 -0400
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New versions of the DNSSECbis drafts have just been sent off to the
Internet-Drafts coordinator.  Copies (and htmlwdiff output) are also
available on the web at:

  http://www.hactrn.net/ietf/dns/dnssec-editors/

We (the editors) -think- we've dealt with all the outstanding
substantive issues, including the extensive comments we received from
the RIPE "Last Call Workshop" several months ago.  Special thanks to
Sam Weiler and Jakob Schlyter for helping the editors decypher the
portions of the RIPE workshop notes that Mark Andrews hadn't already
sorted out for us.

As always, please send minor comments to dnssec-editors@east.isi.edu,
substantive issues to namedroppers.

--Rob (on behalf of your friendly neighborhood DNSSEC editors)

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:51 2006
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Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-protocol-06.txt
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--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the DNS Extensions Working Group of the IETF.

	Title		: Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security Extensions
	Author(s)	: R. Arends, et al.
	Filename	: draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-protocol-06.txt
	Pages		: 58
	Date		: 2004-5-17
	
   This document is part of a family of documents which describe the DNS
   Security Extensions (DNSSEC).  The DNS Security Extensions are a
   collection of new resource records and protocol modifications which
   add data origin authentication and data integrity to the DNS.  This
   document describes the DNSSEC protocol modifications.  This document
   defines the concept of a signed zone, along with the requirements for
   serving and resolving using DNSSEC.  These techniques allow a
   security-aware resolver to authenticate both DNS resource records and
   authoritative DNS error indications.

   This document obsoletes RFC 2535 and incorporates changes from all
   updates to RFC 2535.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:51 2006
From: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org
Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-records-08.txt
Date: Mon, 17 May 2004 15:37:59 -0400
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--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the DNS Extensions Working Group of the IETF.

	Title		: Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions
	Author(s)	: R. Arends, et al.
	Filename	: draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-records-08.txt
	Pages		: 35
	Date		: 2004-5-17
	
   This document is part of a family of documents that describes the DNS
   Security Extensions (DNSSEC).  The DNS Security Extensions are a
   collection of resource records and protocol modifications that
   provide source authentication for the DNS. This document defines the
   public key (DNSKEY), delegation signer (DS), resource record digital
   signature (RRSIG), and authenticated denial of existence (NSEC)
   resource records.  The purpose and format of each resource record is
   described in detail, and an example of each resource record is given.

   This document obsoletes RFC 2535 and incorporates changes from all
   updates to RFC 2535.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:51 2006
From: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org
Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-intro-10.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the DNS Extensions Working Group of the IETF.

	Title		: DNS Security Introduction and Requirements
	Author(s)	: R. Arends, et al.
	Filename	: draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-intro-10.txt
	Pages		: 27
	Date		: 2004-5-17
	
   The Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) adds data origin
   authentication and data integrity to the Domain Name System.  This
   document introduces these extensions, and describes their
   capabilities and limitations.  This document also discusses the
   services that the DNS security extensions do and do not provide.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:51 2006
From: "Olaf M. Kolkman" <olaf@ripe.net>
Subject: WG Last Call: DNSSEC bis documents
Date: Tue, 18 May 2004 08:48:24 +0200
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Dear Colleagues,

This message starts the WG last call for the DNSSEC-bis document set.

   draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-intro-10.txt 
   draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-proto-06.txt 
   and
   draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-records-08.txt


The WG last call will complete June 1 2004. silence will be interpreted
as support for forwarding this document set, explicit support of the
document set is appreciated.

Please report editorial nits directly to <dnssec-editors@east.isi.edu>.

Any protocol issues, not previously addressed, should be brought to
the list. 

Issues that where previously addressed and concluded are out of scope.

If this last call does not open new protocol issues we plan to do - if
needed - a last round of pure editorial corrections and push the
document set to the IESG shortly after.


The "html-wdiff" between these and the previous versions of the
documents are available on: 
    http://www.hactrn.net/ietf/dns/dnssec-editors/


We would like to extend our gratitude to all those that contributed
and to the editors team for doing the thorough job of compiling and
introducing the WG input into the docs.


Olaf and Olafur
DNSEXT WG chairs

                ------------------------------

Differences from last version and open issues

This release covers all 'formal' questions raised on the mailing list
and a number of editorial comments that where received both on and off
list.

At the risk of not being complete we would like to draw your attention
to the most significant changes with respect to the previous versions
of the documents. The changes are paraphrased, please refer to the
text in the I-Ds for the details.

Intro:

The term 'trust-anchor' has been defined in section 2. It is used
throughout the document set, it leaves the choice of a trust anchor
being a key or the hash of the key to implementors.


A section called "Scope of the DNSSEC Document Set and Last Hop
Issues" is introduced (section 5). It explains that the current
specifications has its limits in communicating results of the
validation process, that further work needs to be done, and that that
further work is out of the scope of the document set.

Records:

The requirements for setting the bitmap for the NSEC RR above a
delegation point were not specified. This has been fixed (section
4.1.2 and in proto see above)


Proto:

The requirements for setting the bitmap for the NSEC RR above a
delegation point were not specified. This has been fixed in section
2.3 last paragraph.

It has been made explicit that there are no special requirements on
servers that receive queries for security RR types which match the
content of more than one zone that it serves (section 3)

The purpose and use of AD and CD has been clarified (CD bit is in
section 3.2.2 and AD is in 3.2.3)


It is required that security aware servers and resolvers that
implement DNSSEC also implement DNAME processing (section 3.1, 3.2.4
and 4.8).

Determining security status was updated to reflect the different
states. (section 4.4 matches section 5 of intro)

The concept of "Bad Cache" to counter DOS attacks was expanded
(section 4.7)


-------------------------- message end --------------------------

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:51 2006
From: Simon Josefsson <jas@extundo.com>
Subject: Re: WG Last Call: DNSSEC bis documents
Date: Tue, 18 May 2004 15:54:17 +0000 (UTC)
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Olaf M. Kolkman <olaf <at> ripe.net> writes:

> This message starts the WG last call for the DNSSEC-bis document set.
> 
>    draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-intro-10.txt 

Quoting the security considerations:

   DNSSEC introduces the ability for a hostile party to enumerate all
   the names in a zone by following the NSEC chain. NSEC RRs assert
   which names do not exist in a zone by linking from existing name to
   existing name along a canonical ordering of all the names within a
   zone. Thus, an attacker can query these NSEC RRs in sequence to
   obtain all the names in a zone. While not an attack on the DNS
   itself, this could allow an attacker to map network hosts or other
   resources by enumerating the contents of a zone. There are non-DNS
   protocol means of detecting and limiting this attack beyond the scope
   of this document set.

What are those "non-DNS protocol means of detecting and limiting the attack"?

I believe there are no viable means to prevent the attack in reasonable
scenarios where DNSSEC is used on the public Internet.  If my assessment is
correct, I don't think there should be text implying the problem can be taken
care of by non-DNS means.

If the statement refer to rate limiting and/or counting the number of queries
from a certain IP, that is so trivially defeated that I doubt that anyone will
go thru the trouble of implementing those precautions for NSEC abuse alone.  It
may generate more problems than it solve: false positives in the detection logic
may disable DNSSEC functionality at end nodes.  If the text refer to those
precautions, and the text is kept, in fairness a warning that the precaution may
cause failures should be added.

I believe it would be more honest to simply state that DNSSEC introduce this
security vulnerability, full stop.  I.e., drop the last sentence.

Thanks,
Simon


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:51 2006
From: Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com>
Subject: Re: WG Last Call: DNSSEC bis documents
Date: Tue, 18 May 2004 19:07:44 +0100
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To: Simon Josefsson <jas@extundo.com>
In-Reply-To: Message from Simon Josefsson <jas@extundo.com> 
   of "Tue, 18 May 2004 15:54:17 -0000." <loom.20040518T173746-1@post.gmane.org> 
Precedence: bulk

>>>>> "Simon" == Simon Josefsson <jas@extundo.com> writes:

    >>    DNSSEC introduces the ability for a hostile party to
    >> enumerate all the names in a zone by following the NSEC
    >> chain. NSEC RRs assert which names do not exist in a zone
    >> by linking from existing name to existing name along a
    >> canonical ordering of all the names within a zone. Thus, an
    >> attacker can query these NSEC RRs in sequence to obtain all
    >> the names in a zone. While not an attack on the DNS itself,
    >> this could allow an attacker to map network hosts or other
    >> resources by enumerating the contents of a zone. There are
    >> non-DNS protocol means of detecting and limiting this
    >> attack beyond the scope of this document set.

    Simon> I believe there are no viable means to prevent the attack
    Simon> in reasonable scenarios where DNSSEC is used on the public
    Simon> Internet.  If my assessment is correct, I don't think there
    Simon> should be text implying the problem can be taken care of by
    Simon> non-DNS means.

The original text should stand IMO.

Rate limiting and intelligent firewall filtering can reduce the
exposure to NSEC traversal. It should be fairly straightforward to
train a name server implementation to detect these attacks too. Sure,
these defences might not be much help against a well-disguised
attack. But they do provide some level of protection. So there are
some non-DNS means of detecting and limiting NSEC traversals that are
outwith the scope of the draft.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:51 2006
From: Ben Laurie <ben@algroup.co.uk>
Subject: Re: WG Last Call: DNSSEC bis documents
Date: Tue, 18 May 2004 19:38:23 +0100
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Jim Reid wrote:

>>>>>>"Simon" == Simon Josefsson <jas@extundo.com> writes:
> 
> 
>     >>    DNSSEC introduces the ability for a hostile party to
>     >> enumerate all the names in a zone by following the NSEC
>     >> chain. NSEC RRs assert which names do not exist in a zone
>     >> by linking from existing name to existing name along a
>     >> canonical ordering of all the names within a zone. Thus, an
>     >> attacker can query these NSEC RRs in sequence to obtain all
>     >> the names in a zone. While not an attack on the DNS itself,
>     >> this could allow an attacker to map network hosts or other
>     >> resources by enumerating the contents of a zone. There are
>     >> non-DNS protocol means of detecting and limiting this
>     >> attack beyond the scope of this document set.
> 
>     Simon> I believe there are no viable means to prevent the attack
>     Simon> in reasonable scenarios where DNSSEC is used on the public
>     Simon> Internet.  If my assessment is correct, I don't think there
>     Simon> should be text implying the problem can be taken care of by
>     Simon> non-DNS means.
> 
> The original text should stand IMO.
> 
> Rate limiting and intelligent firewall filtering can reduce the
> exposure to NSEC traversal. It should be fairly straightforward to
> train a name server implementation to detect these attacks too. Sure,
> these defences might not be much help against a well-disguised
> attack. But they do provide some level of protection. So there are
> some non-DNS means of detecting and limiting NSEC traversals that are
> outwith the scope of the draft.

I believe experience tells us that the people interested in these 
attacks are highly capable of disguising them well.

Cheers,

Ben.

-- 
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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:51 2006
From: Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com>
Subject: Re: WG Last Call: DNSSEC bis documents
Date: Tue, 18 May 2004 20:08:24 +0100
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   of "Tue, 18 May 2004 19:38:23 BST." <40AA581F.6070201@algroup.co.uk> 
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>>>>> "Ben" == Ben Laurie <ben@algroup.co.uk> writes:

    >> Rate limiting and intelligent firewall filtering can reduce the
    >> exposure to NSEC traversal. It should be fairly straightforward
    >> to train a name server implementation to detect these attacks
    >> too. Sure, these defences might not be much help against a
    >> well-disguised attack. But they do provide some level of
    >> protection. So there are some non-DNS means of detecting and
    >> limiting NSEC traversals that are outwith the scope of the
    >> draft.

    Ben> I believe experience tells us that the people interested in
    Ben> these attacks are highly capable of disguising them well.

So what? That doesn't make the original text any less valid.

It shouldn't come as a surprise to anyone that there are Bad People on
the internet and some of them are remarkably good at covering their
tracks.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:51 2006
From: "Christian Huitema" <huitema@windows.microsoft.com>
Subject: RE: WG Last Call: DNSSEC bis documents
Date: Tue, 18 May 2004 13:21:01 -0700
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	"Ben Laurie" <ben@algroup.co.uk>
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>     >> Rate limiting and intelligent firewall filtering can reduce the
>     >> exposure to NSEC traversal. It should be fairly straightforward
>     >> to train a name server implementation to detect these attacks
>     >> too. Sure, these defences might not be much help against a
>     >> well-disguised attack. But they do provide some level of
>     >> protection. So there are some non-DNS means of detecting and
>     >> limiting NSEC traversals that are outwith the scope of the
>     >> draft.
>=20
>     Ben> I believe experience tells us that the people interested in
>     Ben> these attacks are highly capable of disguising them well.
>=20
> So what? That doesn't make the original text any less valid.

Ben is right. Rate limiting is trivially defeated by exploring the
domain slowly. The slow-down can be easily compensated by performing
several searches in parallel, or by distributing the load among several
machines. These techniques are commonly used to scan subnets and ports
today.=20

Similarly, firewall filtering is hard to apply if the server intends to
publish the information in the first place.

-- Christian Huitema

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:51 2006
From: Marcos Sanz/Denic <sanz@denic.de>
Subject: RE: WG Last Call: DNSSEC bis documents
Date: Wed, 19 May 2004 09:46:32 +0200
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To: "Ben Laurie" <ben@algroup.co.uk>,
	"Simon Josefsson" <jas@extundo.com>
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I concur with Simon and would feel more confortable when dropping the 
statement "there are non-DNS protocol means [...]".

Why "are"? Have we seen some implementation of it? Do we know how 
practicable it is or how well the problem gets addressed? One could say 
"there could be non-DNS protocol means..", but that is a non-statement.

The problem is there. There is no real solution today. Let's face it.

Regards,
Marcos

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:51 2006
From: ted@NLnetLabs.nl (Ted Lindgreen)
Subject: RE: WG Last Call: DNSSEC bis documents
Date: Wed, 19 May 2004 10:10:05 +0200
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[Quoting Marcos Sanz/Denic, on May 19,  9:53, in "RE: WG Last Call: DN ..."]
> I concur with Simon and would feel more confortable when dropping the 
> statement "there are non-DNS protocol means [...]".
> 
> Why "are"? Have we seen some implementation of it? Do we know how 
> practicable it is or how well the problem gets addressed? One could say 
> "there could be non-DNS protocol means..", but that is a non-statement.

There _are_ implementations to reduce the (privacy-) problems that
are aggrevated by zone walking, and there are people actively working
on this issue, both from the legal and technical perspective.

I think the current text is as good as it gets and propose to keep
it as it is now.

Regards,
-- ted

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:51 2006
From: Marcos Sanz/Denic <sanz@denic.de>
Subject: RE: WG Last Call: DNSSEC bis documents
Date: Wed, 19 May 2004 10:35:57 +0200
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> There _are_ implementations to reduce the (privacy-) problems that
> are aggrevated by zone walking, 

Then I am sorry for divulging FUD. Can somebody send a pointer to these 
existing solutions?

Regards,
Marcos

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: ted@NLnetLabs.nl (Ted Lindgreen)
Subject: RE: WG Last Call: DNSSEC bis documents
Date: Wed, 19 May 2004 10:45:43 +0200
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[Quoting Marcos Sanz/Denic, on May 19, 10:39, in "RE: WG Last Call: DN ..."]
> > There _are_ implementations to reduce the (privacy-) problems that
> > are aggrevated by zone walking, 
> 
> Then I am sorry for divulging FUD. Can somebody send a pointer to these 
> existing solutions?

You must have missed my answer to you directly, so I'll repeat it
on the list.

--- Forwarded mail from ted@NLnetLabs.nl (Ted Lindgreen)

>From ted@open.nlnetlabs.nl Wed May 19 10:41:29 2004
Date: Wed, 19 May 2004 10:41:27 +0200
In-Reply-To: "Marcos Sanz/Denic's message as of May 19, 10:19"
To: Marcos Sanz/Denic <sanz@denic.de>, ted@NLnetLabs.nl (Ted Lindgreen)
Subject: RE: WG Last Call: DNSSEC bis documents

[Quoting Marcos Sanz/Denic, on May 19, 10:19, in "RE: WG Last Call: DN ..."]
> > There _are_ implementations to reduce the (privacy-) problems that
> > are aggrevated by zone walking, 
> 
> Excuse my ignorance, Ted: can you send me a pointer? I haven't read about 
> that anytime in namedroppers.

Probably right: I don't think it is a protocol issue anyway.

As for a pointer, see f.i. the presentation from Bart Boswinkel
(CEO of SIDN/.nl) in:
 http://www.sdl.sri.com/other/dnssec/DNSSEC04MayNL-Info.html

As for work done: the main problem is that zonewalking facilitates
extracting whois info (zonewalking as such can not be expected to
have big legal implications, as DNS-info is intentionally made
public; however, whois-info is sensitive in terms of the European
privacy legislation, therefore the combination is dangerous).

SIDN has put significant effort to make the internet community
(in the broad sense) aware of the problem and to work to consensus
how to deal with it.

Regards,
-- ted

--- End of forwarded message from ted@NLnetLabs.nl (Ted Lindgreen)


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Marcos Sanz/Denic <sanz@denic.de>
Subject: RE: WG Last Call: DNSSEC bis documents
Date: Wed, 19 May 2004 11:04:23 +0200
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Ted,

> As for a pointer, see f.i. the presentation from Bart Boswinkel
> (CEO of SIDN/.nl) in:
> http://www.sdl.sri.com/other/dnssec/DNSSEC04MayNL-Info.html

The presentation is interesting, but I couldn't find any existing 
technical solution to the NSEC traversal problem there. This was what I 
was looking for when I asked for a pointer of "non-DNS protocol means of 
detecting and limitting this attack".

> As for work done: the main problem is that zonewalking facilitates
> extracting whois info

If there is a problem with whois, whois should be fixed. I personally 
agree with you. But the problem is "a zone can be traversed" and the 
policy of many registries doesn't allow zone transfer. There, I was 
looking for a solution.

> SIDN has put significant effort to make the internet community
> (in the broad sense) aware of the problem and to work to consensus
> how to deal with it.

No criticism at all on SIDN's work.

I am for dropping the sentence.

Regards,
Marcos

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: "Simon Josefsson" <jas@extundo.com>
Subject: Re: WG Last Call: DNSSEC bis documents
Date: Wed, 19 May 2004 11:50:47 +0200 (CEST)
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> Rate limiting and intelligent firewall filtering can reduce the
> exposure to NSEC traversal. It should be fairly straightforward to
> train a name server implementation to detect these attacks too. Sure,
> these defences might not be much help against a well-disguised
> attack. But they do provide some level of protection. So there are
> some non-DNS means of detecting and limiting NSEC traversals that are
> outwith the scope of the draft.

Then inform the reader that any precautions do not remove the need to
worry about the issue, and any such precautions introduce new
denial-of-service considerations.  Just consider sending spoofed DNS
requests from a certain IP address, to trigger the NSEC traversal
detection logic, to disable DNSSEC functionality for a specific host.  The
host could be a DNS cache for a big ISP, thereby disabling DNSSEC
functionality for many users.

The last sentence of the current paragraph imply the problem can be
sufficiently solved by non-DNS means, and I have seen no indication that
this is true in general.

Until a solution has been fleshed out, I continue to believe that removing
the last sentence, that refer to experimental and incomplete precautions,
would be preferrable.  Second to that, I'd suggest appending the following
text, to give the reader some perspective on the effectiveness of those
non-DNS means:

   Note that these non-DNS means do not remove the need to worry about
   this issue, as at least the currently proposed precautions are trivially
   defeated.  Further, they may introduce new denial of service
   considerations, where an attacker may disable DNSSEC functionality
   for a specific host, or a set of hosts behind a specific DNS cache.

Thanks,
Simon


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Ben Laurie <ben@algroup.co.uk>
Subject: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Wed, 19 May 2004 12:35:44 +0100
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I understand this draft comes very late in the day, but it is also my 
understanding that it addresses a very crucial issue for registries in 
the EU and possibly other regions: their obligation to protect 
registrant data.

I am sure that this will cause discussions of both a technical and 
political nature. I would like to make it clear from the outset that my 
comments on technical matters are on behalf of Nominet, but political 
comments are my own - I am not empowered by Nominet to discuss policy 
issues on their behalf.

I know that many of you will be at the DNSSEC deployment workshop in SF 
on Sunday - both Geoffrey and I will be there and will be happy to 
discuss this draft with anyone who is interested.

http://www.links.org/dnssec/draft-laurie-dnsext-nsec2-00.txt

I will, of course, be submitting this to the I-D editor, but because of 
the nearness of Sunday I thought it best to post it now.

Cheers,

Ben.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Ben Laurie <ben@algroup.co.uk>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Wed, 19 May 2004 13:52:40 +0100
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bmanning@vacation.karoshi.com wrote:

> On Wed, May 19, 2004 at 12:35:44PM +0100, Ben Laurie wrote:
> 
>>I understand this draft comes very late in the day, but it is also my 
>>understanding that it addresses a very crucial issue for registries in 
>>the EU and possibly other regions: their obligation to protect 
>>registrant data.
> 
> 
> 	I guess that I remain unconvinced.
> 	What -registrant- data is stored in the DNS?
> 	In most cases, -registrant- data is stored in
> 	some whois-like database.

NSEC provides an index to whois.

Cheers,

Ben.

-- 
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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: ted@NLnetLabs.nl (Ted Lindgreen)
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Wed, 19 May 2004 15:16:09 +0200
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[Quoting Ben Laurie, on May 19, 15:02, in "Re: Proposal to fix  ..."]

> bmanning@vacation.karoshi.com wrote:
...
> > 	I guess that I remain unconvinced.
> > 	What -registrant- data is stored in the DNS?
> > 	In most cases, -registrant- data is stored in
> > 	some whois-like database.
> 
> NSEC provides an index to whois.

That is correct: the whois data is the (privacy legislation) problem,
and being able to walk the tree exposes this problem even more, and
certainly makes it more visible.

However, "fixing NSEC" will not fix the real (whois) problem.

-- teds

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: roy@dnss.ec
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Wed, 19 May 2004 15:40:01 +0200 (CEST)
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<hat EDITOR=off>

You're basically bringing back the NO record, with some added jazz:
http://josefsson.org/draft-ietf-dnsext-not-existing-rr.txt

We've already done this 3 years ago and I see no reason in bringing this
back. It does not solve a problem (see below). It does not bring anything
new.

A few notes on the spec:

1) You propose an either/or architectural design. No provisioning for bw
   compatibility with nsec, nor signalling that a
   zone/server/resolver/validator/stub supports either/both. You need
   signalling since the nsec and nsec2 are mutually exclusive.
   Unless your NSEC2 proposal absoletes NSEC (bring out the flags for
   flagday), but then its not an 'alternate scheme' like the proposal
   claims. If you're thinking of signalling, there is no room for
   signals in NSEC records (been there done that).

2) The wildcard/closest encounter text is broken. The assumption is that
   even empty (but existing) nodes need a record (EXIST). Which makes them
   NOT EMPTY (since the type EXIST exists). Not to mention the extra
   records you have to put up with: every EXIST type needs a sig plus an
   nsec[2] plus a sig. This assumption is false. Handling wildcards in
   dnssec is complex.

3) The NSECINFO spec is broken. You can't proof the NSEC type exist, since
   you need the NSECINFO record to verify NSEC that proofs NSECINFO
   exist. Thats a circular dependency.

In case you're trying to solve zone walking: Zone walking is still
possible, hash by hash. An offline dictionary attack (remember that the
NSECINFO trick does not work) does the rest. To speed things up, you could
brute-force labels with length up to 5 or 6 characters.

Cheers,

Roy

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: "Scott Rose" <scottr@nist.gov>
Subject: RE: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Wed, 19 May 2004 09:35:54 -0400
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Just did a quick first read -

Is the NSECINFO RR really necessary?  It seems redundant to me and just
another RR/RRSIG combo to be placed in the additional section for a negative
response.  The hash ID could be the first field in the NSEC2 RDATA (just
like in DS, RRSIG, etc) - no need for another record to store that.  The
iterations could be stored there as well, but I don't know how useful it is
to begin with.  Why is it 3 octets long (odd number btw)?  Couldn't it
become a DoS attack vector by a malicious or silly admin setting the number
arbitrarily high?

I also fail to see the use of the salt value in the NSECINFO.  The draft
states it is there to prevent dictionary attacks.  Couldn't an attacker
could just get the salt, and then perform the attack?

I would recommend dropping the NSECINFO RR altogether and move the digest
code and the iterations (though shortening the field to 2 octets) into the
NSEC2 RDATA.  Although I wouldn't mind dropping the iterations field as
well.

Please correct me if I am misreading the NSECINFO RR spec.
Scott


> -----Original Message-----
> From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
> [mailto:owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org]On Behalf Of Ben Laurie
> Sent: Wednesday, May 19, 2004 7:36 AM
> To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
> Subject: Proposal to fix NSEC
>
>
> I understand this draft comes very late in the day, but it is also my
> understanding that it addresses a very crucial issue for registries in
> the EU and possibly other regions: their obligation to protect
> registrant data.
>
> I am sure that this will cause discussions of both a technical and
> political nature. I would like to make it clear from the outset that my
> comments on technical matters are on behalf of Nominet, but political
> comments are my own - I am not empowered by Nominet to discuss policy
> issues on their behalf.
>
> I know that many of you will be at the DNSSEC deployment workshop in SF
> on Sunday - both Geoffrey and I will be there and will be happy to
> discuss this draft with anyone who is interested.
>
> http://www.links.org/dnssec/draft-laurie-dnsext-nsec2-00.txt
>
> I will, of course, be submitting this to the I-D editor, but because of
> the nearness of Sunday I thought it best to post it now.
>
> Cheers,
>
> Ben.
>
> --
> http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html       http://www.thebunker.net/
>
> "There is no limit to what a man can do or how far he can go if he
> doesn't mind who gets the credit." - Robert Woodruff
>
>
> --
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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: ted@NLnetLabs.nl (Ted Lindgreen)
Subject: Re: WG Last Call: DNSSEC bis documents
Date: Wed, 19 May 2004 15:42:03 +0200
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[Quoting "Olaf M. Kolkman", on May 18, 8:55, in "WG Last Call: DNSSEC ..."]
> 
> Dear Colleagues,
> 
> This message starts the WG last call for the DNSSEC-bis document set.
> 
>    draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-intro-10.txt 
>    draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-proto-06.txt 
>    and
>    draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-records-08.txt

I have carefully read the three documents. On a number of issues,
we (NLnet Labs) had some violant discussions, but in all cases we
concluded that the solutions and wordings as chosen by the authors
were the best possible.

I would like to state that I support the document set as is, and
thank the authors for the tremendous amount of work they have done.

Regards,
-- ted


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Wed, 19 May 2004 14:50:50 +0100
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   of "Wed, 19 May 2004 13:52:40 BST." <40AB5898.9070104@algroup.co.uk> 
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>>>>> "Ben" == Ben Laurie <ben@algroup.co.uk> writes:

    >> I guess that I remain unconvinced.  What -registrant- data is
    >> stored in the DNS?  In most cases, -registrant- data is stored
    >> in some whois-like database.

    Ben> NSEC provides an index to whois.

If there's a problem with disclosure of whois data, fix whois. [There's
already a WG doing precisely that.] Redesigning the DNSSEC protocol to
fix a whois problem does not seem to be sensible.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Ben Laurie <ben@algroup.co.uk>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Wed, 19 May 2004 14:48:36 +0100
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Scott Rose wrote:
> Just did a quick first read -
> 
> Is the NSECINFO RR really necessary?  It seems redundant to me and just
> another RR/RRSIG combo to be placed in the additional section for a negative
> response.  The hash ID could be the first field in the NSEC2 RDATA (just
> like in DS, RRSIG, etc) - no need for another record to store that.  The
> iterations could be stored there as well, but I don't know how useful it is
> to begin with.

Sure, the reason I stored it as a separate record was because of 
redundancy, since it has to be the same for the whole zone, but it might 
indeed make more sense to include it in NSEC2.

> Why is it 3 octets long (odd number btw)?

2 was too few, in my view.

> Couldn't it
> become a DoS attack vector by a malicious or silly admin setting the number
> arbitrarily high?

Yes, I noted that somewhere, implementations should probably just fail 
for values locally considered to be too high.

> I also fail to see the use of the salt value in the NSECINFO.  The draft
> states it is there to prevent dictionary attacks.  Couldn't an attacker
> could just get the salt, and then perform the attack?

Its to prevent precomputed dictionary attacks (this is explained in the 
security considerations). This matters if your zone is worth rescanning 
frequently.

> I would recommend dropping the NSECINFO RR altogether and move the digest
> code and the iterations (though shortening the field to 2 octets) into the
> NSEC2 RDATA.  Although I wouldn't mind dropping the iterations field as
> well.

I would have no strong objection to moving it. I'm not sure I believe 2 
octets is sufficient for iterations, and I don't think dropping 
iterations is a good idea, since that is how you choose the cost of 
dictionary attacks.

Cheers,

Ben.

-- 
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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: geoff@nominet.org.uk (Geoffrey Sisson)
Subject: Re: WG Last Call: DNSSEC bis documents
Date: Wed, 19 May 2004 15:01:34 +0100 (BST)
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Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com> writes:

> Rate limiting and intelligent firewall filtering can reduce the
> exposure to NSEC traversal. It should be fairly straightforward to
> train a name server implementation to detect these attacks too. Sure,
> these defences might not be much help against a well-disguised
> attack. But they do provide some level of protection. So there are
> some non-DNS means of detecting and limiting NSEC traversals that are
> outwith the scope of the draft.

FWIW we've in the last two years weve observed an increase in WHOIS
elaboration attempts against whois.nic.uk which employ pools of
unsecured WHOIS (and web) proxies, as well as what are probably
`botnets'.  I suspect that unsecured DNS resolvers are considerably
more numerous, and that no suitable rate-limiting mechanisms -- even
intelligent ones which might employ advanced pattern analysis -- will
be practicable againt NSEC RR enumeration.

Regards

Geoff

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Mark Andrews <Mark_Andrews@isc.org>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Thu, 20 May 2004 00:15:15 +1000
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	This sort of thing has already been looked at and rejected.
	
	The existing NSEC names also have a useful property in that
	they provide the wildcard name that would otherwise match
	the query name.
--
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: Mark_Andrews@isc.org

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Marcos Sanz/Denic <sanz@denic.de>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Wed, 19 May 2004 16:20:53 +0200
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Roy,

> We've already done this 3 years ago and I see no reason in bringing this
> back.

With all my respects, the reason is on the table:
the NSEC traversal problem to be fixed within DNS.

Obviously, the notes on the spec you've just submitted have to be 
addressed.

Regards,
Marcos

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: David Blacka <davidb@verisignlabs.com>
Subject: Re: WG Last Call: DNSSEC bis documents
Date: Wed, 19 May 2004 10:22:55 -0400
Organization: VeriSign, Inc.
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On Tuesday 18 May 2004 11:54 am, Simon Josefsson wrote:

> What are those "non-DNS protocol means of detecting and limiting the
> attack"?
...
> I believe it would be more honest to simply state that DNSSEC introduce
> this security vulnerability, full stop.  I.e., drop the last sentence.

I, too, would like to see this last sentence dropped, because this sentence 
provides no useful information.

There may or may not be non-DNS means of limiting NSEC walking, but simply 
stating that they exist somewhere out there in the wide, wide world without 
providing a pointer to any of them is not helpful to the reader.

-- 
David Blacka    <davidb@verisignlabs.com> 
Sr. Engineer    VeriSign Applied Research

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: roy@dnss.ec
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Wed, 19 May 2004 16:39:18 +0200 (CEST)
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On Wed, 19 May 2004, Marcos Sanz/Denic wrote:

> Roy,
>
> > We've already done this 3 years ago and I see no reason in bringing this
> > back.
>
> With all my respects, the reason is on the table:
> the NSEC traversal problem to be fixed within DNS.

NSEC traversal will still exist. hash by hash. Using NSEC2 the attack
vector is shifted. From an online dictionary to DNS attack, to an offline,
dictionary to NSEC2-hash attack.

An obscured circular list is still a circular list. Getting rid of the
circular list is a better solution imho, but that has other issues like on
the fly signing. private-key stored on an online-box, etc.

Roy

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Ben Laurie <ben@algroup.co.uk>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Wed, 19 May 2004 15:40:38 +0100
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roy@dnss.ec wrote:
> <hat EDITOR=off>
> 
> You're basically bringing back the NO record, with some added jazz:
> http://josefsson.org/draft-ietf-dnsext-not-existing-rr.txt

Correct, though I did reinvent it all on my own :-)

> We've already done this 3 years ago and I see no reason in bringing this
> back. It does not solve a problem (see below). It does not bring anything
> new.
> 
> A few notes on the spec:
> 
> 1) You propose an either/or architectural design. No provisioning for bw
>    compatibility with nsec, nor signalling that a
>    zone/server/resolver/validator/stub supports either/both. You need
>    signalling since the nsec and nsec2 are mutually exclusive.
>    Unless your NSEC2 proposal absoletes NSEC (bring out the flags for
>    flagday), but then its not an 'alternate scheme' like the proposal
>    claims. If you're thinking of signalling, there is no room for
>    signals in NSEC records (been there done that).

Surely the returned RRs could simply be either NSEC or NSEC2, and the 
resolver chews whichever it gets?

> 2) The wildcard/closest encounter text is broken. The assumption is that
>    even empty (but existing) nodes need a record (EXIST). Which makes them
>    NOT EMPTY (since the type EXIST exists). Not to mention the extra
>    records you have to put up with: every EXIST type needs a sig plus an
>    nsec[2] plus a sig. This assumption is false. Handling wildcards in
>    dnssec is complex.

Why is the assumption false?

> 3) The NSECINFO spec is broken. You can't proof the NSEC type exist, since
>    you need the NSECINFO record to verify NSEC that proofs NSECINFO
>    exist. Thats a circular dependency.

I'm not sure I understand this, but in any case, it has been proposed 
that the NSECINFO record is rolled into NSEC2, which would certainly 
remove circularity, if any exists.

> In case you're trying to solve zone walking: Zone walking is still
> possible, hash by hash. An offline dictionary attack (remember that the
> NSECINFO trick does not work) does the rest. To speed things up, you could
> brute-force labels with length up to 5 or 6 characters.

If we made hashes take, say, 10 ms to compute, then this attack would 
take nearly a year. This is the point, surely? I'd note that simply 
querying for a 6 character domain name only takes that kind of CPU time 
without any attempt to optimise it (i.e. I used dig).

Cheers,

Ben.

-- 
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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Ben Laurie <ben@algroup.co.uk>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Wed, 19 May 2004 15:43:41 +0100
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Jim Reid wrote:

>>>>>>"Ben" == Ben Laurie <ben@algroup.co.uk> writes:
> 
> 
>     >> I guess that I remain unconvinced.  What -registrant- data is
>     >> stored in the DNS?  In most cases, -registrant- data is stored
>     >> in some whois-like database.
> 
>     Ben> NSEC provides an index to whois.
> 
> If there's a problem with disclosure of whois data, fix whois. [There's
> already a WG doing precisely that.] Redesigning the DNSSEC protocol to
> fix a whois problem does not seem to be sensible.

The problem is the _combination_ of NSEC and whois.

Cheers,

Ben.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com>
Subject: Re: WG Last Call: DNSSEC bis documents
Date: Wed, 19 May 2004 15:37:39 +0100
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   of "Wed, 19 May 2004 15:42:03 +0200." <200405191342.i4JDg3dB013789@open.nlnetlabs.nl> 
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>>>>> "Ted" == Ted Lindgreen <ted@NLnetLabs.nl> writes:

    Ted> I would like to state that I support the document set as is,
    Ted> and thank the authors for the tremendous amount of work they
    Ted> have done.

I heartily agree. Gentlemen, please take a bow. We should all shake
you warmly by the hand and buy you a drink. Perhaps in San Diego?

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: roy@dnss.ec
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Wed, 19 May 2004 16:53:49 +0200 (CEST)
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On Wed, 19 May 2004, Ben Laurie wrote:

> roy@dnss.ec wrote:
> > <hat EDITOR=off>
> >
> > You're basically bringing back the NO record, with some added jazz:
> > http://josefsson.org/draft-ietf-dnsext-not-existing-rr.txt
>
> Correct, though I did reinvent it all on my own :-)
>
> > We've already done this 3 years ago and I see no reason in bringing this
> > back. It does not solve a problem (see below). It does not bring anything
> > new.
> >
> > A few notes on the spec:
> >
> > 1) You propose an either/or architectural design. No provisioning for bw
> >    compatibility with nsec, nor signalling that a
> >    zone/server/resolver/validator/stub supports either/both. You need
> >    signalling since the nsec and nsec2 are mutually exclusive.
> >    Unless your NSEC2 proposal absoletes NSEC (bring out the flags for
> >    flagday), but then its not an 'alternate scheme' like the proposal
> >    claims. If you're thinking of signalling, there is no room for
> >    signals in NSEC records (been there done that).
>
> Surely the returned RRs could simply be either NSEC or NSEC2, and the
> resolver chews whichever it gets?

That means a requirement to implement both. If I just implement either
NSEC or NSEC2 in my resolver, one can be used to downgrade the other.

> > 2) The wildcard/closest encounter text is broken. The assumption is that
> >    even empty (but existing) nodes need a record (EXIST). Which makes them
> >    NOT EMPTY (since the type EXIST exists). Not to mention the extra
> >    records you have to put up with: every EXIST type needs a sig plus an
> >    nsec[2] plus a sig. This assumption is false. Handling wildcards in
> >    dnssec is complex.
>
> Why is the assumption false?

That would be in the dnssec-protocol draft. Empty non-terminals are not
special in DNSSEC.

> > 3) The NSECINFO spec is broken. You can't proof the NSEC type exist, since
> >    you need the NSECINFO record to verify NSEC that proofs NSECINFO
> >    exist. Thats a circular dependency.
>
> I'm not sure I understand this, but in any case, it has been proposed
> that the NSECINFO record is rolled into NSEC2, which would certainly
> remove circularity, if any exists.
>
> > In case you're trying to solve zone walking: Zone walking is still
> > possible, hash by hash. An offline dictionary attack (remember that the
> > NSECINFO trick does not work) does the rest. To speed things up, you could
> > brute-force labels with length up to 5 or 6 characters.
>
> If we made hashes take, say, 10 ms to compute, then this attack would
> take nearly a year. This is the point, surely? I'd note that simply
> querying for a 6 character domain name only takes that kind of CPU time
> without any attempt to optimise it (i.e. I used dig).

I would prefer an offline dictionary attack over a online querying attack
if I did not want to leave to much trails.

Roy

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Wed, 19 May 2004 14:33:42 +0000
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> > NSEC provides an index to whois.
> ...
> However, "fixing NSEC" will not fix the real (whois) problem.
> 
> -- teds

i agree with ted.  dns is a publication mechanism, and if you don't want
something published you probably shouldn't be putting it into dns at all.
and, if your only way to keep whois safe is to hide its index, then you
have probably got other troubles.  parts of the "index" are exposed every
day in server logs or in-addr.arpa/ip6.arpa walks.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Wed, 19 May 2004 15:56:42 +0100
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>>>>> "Ben" == Ben Laurie <ben@algroup.co.uk> writes:

    >> still possible, hash by hash. An offline dictionary attack
    >> (remember that the NSECINFO trick does not work) does the
    >> rest. To speed things up, you could brute-force labels with
    >> length up to 5 or 6 characters.

    Ben> If we made hashes take, say, 10 ms to compute, then this
    Ben> attack would take nearly a year. This is the point, surely?

Ever heard of Moore's law? Or how about writing an M$ worm that can
harness most of the world's Windows boxes for a dictionary attack? 

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Simon Josefsson <jas@extundo.com>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Wed, 19 May 2004 16:19:48 +0000 (UTC)
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Jim Reid <jim <at> rfc1035.com> writes:

> 
> >>>>> "Ben" == Ben Laurie <ben <at> algroup.co.uk> writes:
> 
>     >> I guess that I remain unconvinced.  What -registrant- data is
>     >> stored in the DNS?  In most cases, -registrant- data is stored
>     >> in some whois-like database.
> 
>     Ben> NSEC provides an index to whois.
> 
> If there's a problem with disclosure of whois data, fix whois. [There's
> already a WG doing precisely that.] Redesigning the DNSSEC protocol to
> fix a whois problem does not seem to be sensible.

Right.  But designing DNSSEC to not introduce new realistic attack vectors,
compared to vanilla DNS, has always appeared sensible to me.  Whois is one
example of where the new attack vector can be utilized.  Improving the whois
protocol will remove whois as an example for our discussions, but it will not
remove the traversal problem.

The alternatives to NSEC do reduce the attack vector into an offline dictionary
attack, which I believe is an acceptable risk. Especially considering that
online dictionary attacks cannot be prevented fully either.  And nobody claims
online dictionary attacks is a problem today.  Keep in mind that online
dictionary attacks are cheaper than offline dictionary attacks.

Thanks,
Simon


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: "Scott Rose" <scottr@nist.gov>
Subject: RE: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Wed, 19 May 2004 12:20:28 -0400
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I'm trying to fit the EXIST RR into the NSEC response cases in
draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-proto.  I think I understand how the NSEC2 and
EXIST combos would work.

Only case 2 (no name, no wildcard) would be affected.  However, could it be
possible to do a EXIST walk of a zone?  If EXIST RRs exist at every
authoritative name in the zone, it is possible for an attacker to do the
same sort of walk just in reverse.

For example:  in the response in the draft, what if an attacker then queries
for "a.b.b.d.e IN A" or similar?  assuming they they get a negative answer
again, a new closest encloser is given (and another point in the namespace).

Scott


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Ben Laurie <ben@algroup.co.uk>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Wed, 19 May 2004 17:12:11 +0100
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roy@dnss.ec wrote:

> On Wed, 19 May 2004, Ben Laurie wrote:
> 
> 
>>roy@dnss.ec wrote:
>>
>>><hat EDITOR=off>
>>>
>>>You're basically bringing back the NO record, with some added jazz:
>>>http://josefsson.org/draft-ietf-dnsext-not-existing-rr.txt
>>
>>Correct, though I did reinvent it all on my own :-)
>>
>>
>>>We've already done this 3 years ago and I see no reason in bringing this
>>>back. It does not solve a problem (see below). It does not bring anything
>>>new.
>>>
>>>A few notes on the spec:
>>>
>>>1) You propose an either/or architectural design. No provisioning for bw
>>>   compatibility with nsec, nor signalling that a
>>>   zone/server/resolver/validator/stub supports either/both. You need
>>>   signalling since the nsec and nsec2 are mutually exclusive.
>>>   Unless your NSEC2 proposal absoletes NSEC (bring out the flags for
>>>   flagday), but then its not an 'alternate scheme' like the proposal
>>>   claims. If you're thinking of signalling, there is no room for
>>>   signals in NSEC records (been there done that).
>>
>>Surely the returned RRs could simply be either NSEC or NSEC2, and the
>>resolver chews whichever it gets?
> 
> 
> That means a requirement to implement both.

Yes. Or we could deprecate NSEC.

> If I just implement either
> NSEC or NSEC2 in my resolver, one can be used to downgrade the other.
> 
> 
>>>2) The wildcard/closest encounter text is broken. The assumption is that
>>>   even empty (but existing) nodes need a record (EXIST). Which makes them
>>>   NOT EMPTY (since the type EXIST exists). Not to mention the extra
>>>   records you have to put up with: every EXIST type needs a sig plus an
>>>   nsec[2] plus a sig. This assumption is false. Handling wildcards in
>>>   dnssec is complex.
>>
>>Why is the assumption false?
> 
> 
> That would be in the dnssec-protocol draft. Empty non-terminals are not
> special in DNSSEC.

I'll come back to this when I've thought about it more.

>>>3) The NSECINFO spec is broken. You can't proof the NSEC type exist, since
>>>   you need the NSECINFO record to verify NSEC that proofs NSECINFO
>>>   exist. Thats a circular dependency.
>>
>>I'm not sure I understand this, but in any case, it has been proposed
>>that the NSECINFO record is rolled into NSEC2, which would certainly
>>remove circularity, if any exists.
>>
>>
>>>In case you're trying to solve zone walking: Zone walking is still
>>>possible, hash by hash. An offline dictionary attack (remember that the
>>>NSECINFO trick does not work) does the rest. To speed things up, you could
>>>brute-force labels with length up to 5 or 6 characters.
>>
>>If we made hashes take, say, 10 ms to compute, then this attack would
>>take nearly a year. This is the point, surely? I'd note that simply
>>querying for a 6 character domain name only takes that kind of CPU time
>>without any attempt to optimise it (i.e. I used dig).
> 
> 
> I would prefer an offline dictionary attack over a online querying attack
> if I did not want to leave to much trails.

NSEC makes this equally easy, of course, so I don't really see how this 
is relevant?

Cheers,

Ben.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Ben Laurie <ben@algroup.co.uk>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Wed, 19 May 2004 17:13:01 +0100
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Jim Reid wrote:

>>>>>>"Ben" == Ben Laurie <ben@algroup.co.uk> writes:
> 
> 
>     >> still possible, hash by hash. An offline dictionary attack
>     >> (remember that the NSECINFO trick does not work) does the
>     >> rest. To speed things up, you could brute-force labels with
>     >> length up to 5 or 6 characters.
> 
>     Ben> If we made hashes take, say, 10 ms to compute, then this
>     Ben> attack would take nearly a year. This is the point, surely?
> 
> Ever heard of Moore's law? 

Indeed I have, which is why iterations is a tunable parameter.

Cheers,

Ben.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Ben Laurie <ben@algroup.co.uk>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Wed, 19 May 2004 17:23:52 +0100
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bmanning@vacation.karoshi.com wrote:
> On Wed, May 19, 2004 at 03:43:41PM +0100, Ben Laurie wrote:
>>The problem is the _combination_ of NSEC and whois.
> 
> 	again, what registrant data is stored in the DNS?
> 	Its clearly -NOT- in the NSEC RR, based on the spec.
> 
> 	if your concern is the binding of registrant data to
> 	some lable stuck in the DNS, then the problem is not
> 	the DNS or its attendent lables, neither is it the
> 	registrant data.  The problem is the -BINDING- between
> 	these two datasets.  And that binding is not DNS related.

Then clearly it is not whois related either - so what do we fix?

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Ben Laurie <ben@algroup.co.uk>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Wed, 19 May 2004 17:59:01 +0100
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Scott Rose wrote:
> I'm trying to fit the EXIST RR into the NSEC response cases in
> draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-proto.  I think I understand how the NSEC2 and
> EXIST combos would work.
> 
> Only case 2 (no name, no wildcard) would be affected.  However, could it be
> possible to do a EXIST walk of a zone?  If EXIST RRs exist at every
> authoritative name in the zone, it is possible for an attacker to do the
> same sort of walk just in reverse.

To be clear, EXISTs only exist where no other RR exists, but I don't 
think that changes your point.

> For example:  in the response in the draft, what if an attacker then queries
> for "a.b.b.d.e IN A" or similar?  assuming they they get a negative answer
> again, a new closest encloser is given (and another point in the namespace).

Clearly, if they want to know whether one of b.b.d.e, b.d.e, d.e or e 
exists, it is only a little more expensive to just ask than to discover 
it by being handed the EXIST record. Paricularly since in practice it is 
almost always true that the closest encloser will be the name with the 
first element removed, and will already be known to the attacker.

Cheers,

Ben.

-- 
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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Wed, 19 May 2004 19:01:04 +0100
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To: Simon Josefsson <jas@extundo.com>
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   of "Wed, 19 May 2004 16:19:48 -0000." <loom.20040519T180905-62@post.gmane.org> 
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>>>>> "Simon" == Simon Josefsson <jas@extundo.com> writes:

    Simon> Right.  But designing DNSSEC to not introduce new realistic
    Simon> attack vectors, compared to vanilla DNS, has always
    Simon> appeared sensible to me.  Whois is one example of where the
    Simon> new attack vector can be utilized.  Improving the whois
    Simon> protocol will remove whois as an example for our
    Simon> discussions, but it will not remove the traversal problem.

While this is true, I'm not convinced that there really is a traversal
problem. The DNS is a public database after all. Of course some people
restrict zone transfers for operational and policy reasons, notably
TLDs. But these are not protocol issues. And while it would be nice if
DNSSEC didn't make zone traversal easy -- like your now dead NO record
draft tried to do -- it's so far been too hard to find a way of doing
that which works for all possibilities for authenticated proof of
non-existence. If there weren't so many tricky corner cases,
especially with wildcards, no doubt something like your NO record
would have been incorporated into the current drafts.

I think we're at a point with DNSSEC where an engineering decision
needs to be made. The question shouldn't be whether DNSSEC is perfect
or not but if DNSSEC is "good enough".

    Simon> The alternatives to NSEC do reduce the attack vector into
    Simon> an offline dictionary attack, which I believe is an
    Simon> acceptable risk.

If the rewards for a successful attack are high enough, this isn't an
acceptable risk. How much would it cost to implement SHA-1 in
hardware, assuming there aren't chips that can do this already?

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Wed, 19 May 2004 19:06:06 +0100
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>>>>> "Ben" == Ben Laurie <ben@algroup.co.uk> writes:

    >> if your concern is the binding of registrant data to some lable
    >> stuck in the DNS, then the problem is not the DNS or its
    >> attendent lables, neither is it the registrant data.  The
    >> problem is the -BINDING- between these two datasets.  And that
    >> binding is not DNS related.

    Ben> Then clearly it is not whois related either - so what do we fix?

The BINDING. Though replacing whois is also attractive.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Peter Koch <pk@TechFak.Uni-Bielefeld.DE>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Wed, 19 May 2004 20:28:00 +0200
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Jim reid wrote:

> While this is true, I'm not convinced that there really is a traversal
> problem. The DNS is a public database after all. Of course some people

Jim, you know I'm all with you here and I've been arguing for years that AXFR
restrictions are not a security but an obscurity measure.

> restrict zone transfers for operational and policy reasons, notably

They've done it due to BIND (and other products) introducing the ability
and due to "security consultants" recommending it and for other non-reasons.
If it were only for those I'd say: go, do your homework.
But as always, some animals are more equal than others and in this case
they have a point. Being able to list all registered/delegated names is
different from serving a name upon request. And while we seem to agree that
the data is public, the compilation may not.

> TLDs. But these are not protocol issues. And while it would be nice if

Well, you're right, the DNS wasn't built to keep things secret but instead
to publish data. But now we have a "feature" that has been an (unspoken)
part of the system for years, which has a value for a limited but important
set of zones and it's going to go away.

> I think we're at a point with DNSSEC where an engineering decision
> needs to be made. The question shouldn't be whether DNSSEC is perfect
> or not but if DNSSEC is "good enough".

The problem is that the engineering question is closely coupled to an
operational or maybe even policy question for a key part of the infrastructure.
If DNSSEC isn't "good enough" for TLD zones (or a significant subset of those),
that's a show stopper. Yes, we could have had this discussion earlier.

>     Simon> The alternatives to NSEC do reduce the attack vector into
>     Simon> an offline dictionary attack, which I believe is an
>     Simon> acceptable risk.
> 
> If the rewards for a successful attack are high enough, this isn't an
> acceptable risk. How much would it cost to implement SHA-1 in
> hardware, assuming there aren't chips that can do this already?

There are other alternatives, including online signing, maybe with a
different key. The zones in question have some special properties (almost
"NS only"), which may also be exploited to find a solution.

-Peter

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: "Scott Rose" <scottr@nist.gov>
Subject: RE: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Wed, 19 May 2004 14:56:53 -0400
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> -----Original Message-----
> From: Ben Laurie [mailto:ben@algroup.co.uk]
> >
> > Only case 2 (no name, no wildcard) would be affected.  However,
> could it be
> > possible to do a EXIST walk of a zone?  If EXIST RRs exist at every
> > authoritative name in the zone, it is possible for an attacker to do the
> > same sort of walk just in reverse.
>
> To be clear, EXISTs only exist where no other RR exists, but I don't
> think that changes your point.
>

Then I don't believe I understand where the EXIST RR would be in a zone.
For example, in a flat zone (all authoritative names in the zone are
"<some_label>.example.com." and no wildcards.  Is there only one EXIST RR
(saying "example.com  IN EXIST"), or multiple?  Or is generated and signed
on the fly?

Bringing back Roy's comment on the wildcard clarification and the DNSSECbis
protocol draft, I think Sections 4 and 5 would need to be updated.
Specifically, the response in the example in section 5 would not need NSEC2
RRset (b).

Scott




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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Ben Laurie <ben@algroup.co.uk>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Wed, 19 May 2004 20:45:16 +0100
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Peter Koch wrote:
> Jim reid wrote:
>>If the rewards for a successful attack are high enough, this isn't an
>>acceptable risk. How much would it cost to implement SHA-1 in
>>hardware, assuming there aren't chips that can do this already?
> 
> 
> There are other alternatives, including online signing, maybe with a
> different key. The zones in question have some special properties (almost
> "NS only"), which may also be exploited to find a solution.

I have hesitated to suggest alternatives that include online signing, 
because of the principle that private keys should not be exposed by 
putting them on connected machines. However, it is definitely worth 
saying that online signing would completely eliminate traversal.

Cheers,

Ben.

-- 
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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Ben Laurie <ben@algroup.co.uk>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Wed, 19 May 2004 20:47:10 +0100
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Scott Rose wrote:

> 
>>-----Original Message-----
>>From: Ben Laurie [mailto:ben@algroup.co.uk]
>>
>>>Only case 2 (no name, no wildcard) would be affected.  However,
>>
>>could it be
>>
>>>possible to do a EXIST walk of a zone?  If EXIST RRs exist at every
>>>authoritative name in the zone, it is possible for an attacker to do the
>>>same sort of walk just in reverse.
>>
>>To be clear, EXISTs only exist where no other RR exists, but I don't
>>think that changes your point.
>>
> 
> 
> Then I don't believe I understand where the EXIST RR would be in a zone.
> For example, in a flat zone (all authoritative names in the zone are
> "<some_label>.example.com." and no wildcards.  Is there only one EXIST RR
> (saying "example.com  IN EXIST"), or multiple?  Or is generated and signed
> on the fly?

There would be none, since, presumably, there would be at least one 
other RR for example.com (e.g. SOA).

It is absolutely not generated and signed on the fly.

> Bringing back Roy's comment on the wildcard clarification and the DNSSECbis
> protocol draft, I think Sections 4 and 5 would need to be updated.
> Specifically, the response in the example in section 5 would not need NSEC2
> RRset (b).

Are you referring to sections 4 and 5 of DNSSECbis? Or of NSEC2?

Cheers,

Ben.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: "Scott Rose" <scottr@nist.gov>
Subject: RE: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Wed, 19 May 2004 15:54:08 -0400
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> -----Original Message-----
> From: Ben Laurie [mailto:ben@algroup.co.uk]
>
> > Bringing back Roy's comment on the wildcard clarification and
> the DNSSECbis
> > protocol draft, I think Sections 4 and 5 would need to be updated.
> > Specifically, the response in the example in section 5 would
> not need NSEC2
> > RRset (b).
>
> Are you referring to sections 4 and 5 of DNSSECbis? Or of NSEC2?
>

Sections 4 and 5 in the NSEC2 draft first, the eventually the DNSSECbis
docset if NSEC2 is adopted.   With the wildcard clarification work Ed Lewis
started a while back, it makes it easier to understand wildcards and denial
of existance responses.

Scott


> Cheers,
>
> Ben.
>
> --
> http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html       http://www.thebunker.net/
>
> "There is no limit to what a man can do or how far he can go if he
> doesn't mind who gets the credit." - Robert Woodruff
>


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: roy@dnss.ec
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Wed, 19 May 2004 21:58:00 +0200 (CEST)
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On Wed, 19 May 2004, Ben Laurie wrote:

> Peter Koch wrote:
> >
> > There are other alternatives, including online signing, maybe with a
> > different key. The zones in question have some special properties (almost
> > "NS only"), which may also be exploited to find a solution.
>
> I have hesitated to suggest alternatives that include online signing,
> because of the principle that private keys should not be exposed by
> putting them on connected machines.

A ssh/tls/ipsec capable machines have a private key on connected
machines.

> However, it is definitely worth saying that online signing would
> completely eliminate traversal.

Definitly.

Roy

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Bob Halley <Bob.Halley@nominum.com>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: 19 May 2004 15:44:26 -0700
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Ben Laurie <ben@algroup.co.uk> writes:

> I have hesitated to suggest alternatives that include online signing,
> because of the principle that private keys should not be exposed by
> putting them on connected machines. However, it is definitely worth
> saying that online signing would completely eliminate traversal.

The problems with online signing are:

        It's a CPU burden for the authoritative nameserver.

        You must trust your slaves enough to give them the right
        to make signatures.  In the standard DNSSEC model, a
        rogue slave can deny service, but it cannot generate
        authenticated zone content.

        You have to have some kind of security relationship with
        all of your slaves, either to give them the online signing
        private key or to otherwise authenticate the key they are
        using for online signatures.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Robert Elz <kre@munnari.OZ.AU>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Thu, 20 May 2004 06:32:44 +0700
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    Date:        Wed, 19 May 2004 20:28:00 +0200
    From:        Peter Koch <pk@TechFak.Uni-Bielefeld.DE>
    Message-ID:  <200405191828.i4JIS0703040@grimsvotn.TechFak.Uni-Bielefeld.DE>

  | But as always, some animals are more equal than others and in this case
  | they have a point. Being able to list all registered/delegated names is
  | different from serving a name upon request. And while we seem to agree that
  | the data is public, the compilation may not.

Both are public data.

Remember the history of the DNS please.   The DNS is just a more
scalable and manageable (and flexible) replacement for the HOSTS.TXT file,
a single file, listing everything, available to everyone.

If the data aren't meant to be public, they simply should not be in the DNS.
[I truly hate that "data" is plural.]

Playing around with the protocols to attempt to make it harder to
find this public data is just plain crazy.

If there is data in whois that shouldn't be public, it ought be removed
from whois - or whois ought to be secured.   Neither the DNS, nor DNSSEC is
in any way related to that.

kre

ps: the section in question in the security considerations shouldn't be
there at all - not just the final sentence of it, the whole thing.   There
is no security implication in being able to find out the names in a DNS
zone file.   That's the point of the DNS.


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: George Michaelson <ggm@apnic.net>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Thu, 20 May 2004 09:58:19 +1000
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On Thu, 20 May 2004 06:32:44 +0700 Robert Elz <kre@munnari.OZ.AU> wrote:
 
>If there is data in whois that shouldn't be public, it ought be removed
>from whois - or whois ought to be secured.   Neither the DNS, nor DNSSEC is
>in any way related to that.
>
>kre
 

Both ARIN and APNIC have recently passed policy changes to support higher
levels of data 'hiding' in whois, because of various national privacy laws. In
APNIC, we intend implementing this via our portal services, with minimal
schema changes to WHOIS: data will just stop appearing under the resource holders
control (the one who gets it from us, that is: downstreams may not have direct
control over this)

There is a dynamic tension between an ISP/LIR's desire to expose their
downstream allocations (eg to direct abuse complaints to the nearest responsible
party) and to meet some classes of users legitimate request not to have their
personal contact details published.

Its likely that CRISP is going to provide similar features, to selectively
mask or opaque parts of the dataset which currently comes from WHOIS or like
services.

cheers

-George

-- 
George Michaelson       |  APNIC
Email: ggm@apnic.net    |  PO Box 2131 Milton QLD 4064
Phone: +61 7 3858 3150  |  Australia
  Fax: +61 7 3858 3199  |  http://www.apnic.net

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Ben Laurie <ben@algroup.co.uk>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Thu, 20 May 2004 09:14:41 +0100
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roy@dnss.ec wrote:

> On Wed, 19 May 2004, Ben Laurie wrote:
> 
> 
>>Peter Koch wrote:
>>
>>>There are other alternatives, including online signing, maybe with a
>>>different key. The zones in question have some special properties (almost
>>>"NS only"), which may also be exploited to find a solution.
>>
>>I have hesitated to suggest alternatives that include online signing,
>>because of the principle that private keys should not be exposed by
>>putting them on connected machines.
> 
> 
> A ssh/tls/ipsec capable machines have a private key on connected
> machines.

I didn't intend to suggest it was a general principle, more that it was 
a DNSSEC principle. It seems to me that DNSSEC is fortunate in that it 
is possible to do its job without online keys, and it makes sense to try 
to preserve that good fortune.

Cheers,

Ben.

-- 
http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html       http://www.thebunker.net/

"There is no limit to what a man can do or how far he can go if he
doesn't mind who gets the credit." - Robert Woodruff

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Marcos Sanz/Denic <sanz@denic.de>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Thu, 20 May 2004 10:43:58 +0200
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	Peter Koch <pk@TechFak.Uni-Bielefeld.DE>
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> | different from serving a name upon request. And while we seem to agree 
that
> | the data is public, the compilation may not.
> 
> Both are public data.

Again, the compilation may not be public. That is an *actual fact* in the 
case of many TLDs. Could we stop declaring this as a non-problem? We'd 
have two ways to go:
a) We face it's a problem, live with it and *say so* in the actual drafts.
b) We invest our discussing energy in the NSEC2 proposal (or NO, or any 
other) to fix whatever is broken.

> If there is data in whois that shouldn't be public, it ought be removed
> from whois - or whois ought to be secured.   Neither the DNS, nor DNSSEC 
is
> in any way related to that.

Simon just said it: fixing whois will remove whois from the examples, but 
won't remove the traversal problem.

Regards,
Marcos

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Thu, 20 May 2004 10:41:30 +0100
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To: Marcos Sanz/Denic <sanz@denic.de>
In-Reply-To: Message from Marcos Sanz/Denic <sanz@denic.de> 
   of "Thu, 20 May 2004 10:43:58 +0200." <OF4D74BF2F.A2610872-ONC1256E9A.002ECDC2-C1256E9A.002FF88F@denic.de> 
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>>>>> "Marcos" == Marcos Sanz/Denic <sanz@denic.de> writes:

    Marcos> a) We face it's a problem, live with it and *say so* in
    Marcos> the actual drafts.  b) We invest our discussing energy in
    Marcos> the NSEC2 proposal (or NO, or any other) to fix whatever
    Marcos> is broken.

There's also (c) provide a clear definition of the "problem" and get
consensus that it really is a problem. Once that's been done, we can
have a discussion about (a) or (b).

As far as I can see, the case that there are technical problems with
zone traversal has still to be made. All we've had so far are fluffy
layer 9 things about compilation copyright or indexes into whois that
might cause disclosure of personal data in the whois database. These
are nothing to do with the DNS protocol and can't be solved there IMO.
So could somebody please tell us -- or me at any rate -- what are the
technical DNS protocol problems with zone traversal? I'd really like
to know what problem we're being asked to solve. It would be good to
get this established before there is any analysis of the possible
solutions.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Roy Badami <roy@gnomon.org.uk>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Thu, 20 May 2004 11:27:03 +0100
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>>>>> "Jim" == Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com> writes:

    Jim> There's also (c) provide a clear definition of the "problem"

I thought this had already been stated in this thread.  Currently, the
DNS allows the operator of an authoritative nameserver to permit
unauthenticated queries, but to deny enumeration of the zone to
unauthenticated parties.

With DNSSEC, this is not possible.  If you allow queries then you
allow enumeration.

This is a technical change: specifically, the authentication model is
now less fine-grained than it used to be.

Whether this technical change constitutes a problem would seem to
depend on the legal and policy framework in which the nameserver is
operating, but it would appear that at least some ccTLDs in EU states
are concerned that this technical change _might_ raise legal or policy
issues that _might_ be a barrier to deployment...

    -roy


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Thu, 20 May 2004 12:07:00 +0100
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To: Roy Badami <roy@gnomon.org.uk>
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   of "Thu, 20 May 2004 11:27:03 BST." <16556.34807.204862.570446@giles.gnomon.org.uk> 
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>>>>> "Roy" == Roy Badami <roy@gnomon.org.uk> writes:

    Roy> I thought this had already been stated in this thread.

Well I think it hasn't. :-)

    Roy> Currently, the DNS allows the operator of an authoritative
    Roy> nameserver to permit unauthenticated queries, but to deny
    Roy> enumeration of the zone to unauthenticated parties.

    Roy> With DNSSEC, this is not possible.  If you allow queries then
    Roy> you allow enumeration.

This is already known. Now why do some people believe that this
enumeration is a *technical* problem? What, specifically, are the
technical protocol problems that arise from this?

If there's a layer-9 problem about compilation copyright or whatever,
that needs to be solved at layer-9, not here. In fact it can't be
solved here.

BTW, enumeration of an unsigned zone by unauthorised parties is
theoretically possible. DNSSEC just makes this theoretical concern
a practical possibility.


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Thu, 20 May 2004 12:20:33 +0100
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>>>>> "Roy" == Roy Badami <roy@gnomon.org.uk> writes:

    Roy> Whether this technical change constitutes a problem would
    Roy> seem to depend on the legal and policy framework in which the
    Roy> nameserver is operating, but it would appear that at least
    Roy> some ccTLDs in EU states are concerned that this technical
    Roy> change _might_ raise legal or policy issues that _might_ be a
    Roy> barrier to deployment...

I must have taken extra stupid pills this morning. I don't understand
this. Data in the DNS is public. That's why it's there. So if some
jurisdiction says public data shouldn't be disclosed, then that data
shouldn't be in the DNS. End of story.

I'm confused. Earlier on this thread, somebody said NSEC records could
be used as an index into a TLD's whois database. Fine. But how could
the legal and policy framework where a name server operates have
anything to do with that?

Concerns about hypothetical legal and policy issues that might be a
barrier to deployment are far beyond the scope of this list.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Roy Badami <roy@gnomon.org.uk>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Thu, 20 May 2004 12:45:39 +0100
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>>>>> "Jim" == Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com> writes:

    Jim> This is already known. Now why do some people believe that
    Jim> this enumeration is a *technical* problem? 

Well, DNSSEC removes a piece of functionality from the DNS, namely the
ability to apply different access control to enumeration from that
this is applied to queries.  Since DNSSEC never had a functional spec,
it is of course rather difficult to claim that this is a technical
problem.

Since this is a piece of functionality that some people find useful
and others don't, it is hardly surprising that whether its absence
from the spec constitutes a problem is the subject of debate.

    Jim> specifically, are the technical protocol problems that arise
    Jim> from this?

Specifically, I suspect that the technical problem some people see is
that the DNSSEC protocol doesn't meet the functional spec that they
have in their minds.  It does meet the functional spec that other
people have in their minds.  Since to my knowledge there has never
been a formal functional spec for DNSSEC, both sides are in some sense
correct.

    Jim> If there's a layer-9 problem about compilation copyright or
    Jim> whatever, that needs to be solved at layer-9, not here. In
    Jim> fact it can't be solved here.

I suspect that most of the concerns relate to the EU Data Protection
Directive (and the transposed legislation of the member states),
rather than anything to do with copyright.

It's not at all clear to me that zone file enumeration does in itself
create data protection issues, but this is by no means a simple area
of legislation.  But if there _is_ an issue, then suggesting that EU
law should be changed in order to fit in with the decisions of the
IETF is not likely to be a productive approach...

    Jim> BTW, enumeration of an unsigned zone by unauthorised parties
    Jim> is theoretically possible. DNSSEC just makes this theoretical
    Jim> concern a practical possibility.

Yes, and the law is very good at coping with distinctions like
that... :-)

Essentially the question is, do the benefits of DNSSEC outweigh the
costs of no longer being able to prohibit enumeration?

If some domains have a serious issue with this, is it worth delaying
DNSSEC in order to try and enhance it to include the functionality
those domains desire?

Which decision is likely to give me a signed .co.uk zone sooner?  Only
the ccTLD operators concerned can attempt to answer that question.

    -roy


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Peter Koch <pk@TechFak.Uni-Bielefeld.DE>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Thu, 20 May 2004 15:06:53 +0200
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Bob Halley <Bob.Halley@nominum.com> wrote:

> The problems with online signing are:
> 
>         It's a CPU burden for the authoritative nameserver.

Yes, but the operators in question (TLD registries) should be able to deal
with this.

>         You must trust your slaves enough to give them the right
>         to make signatures.  In the standard DNSSEC model, a
>         rogue slave can deny service, but it cannot generate
>         authenticated zone content.

Most TLDs already have all their nameservers under their very own control
(although not necessarily on a physical level). So betrayal by 2ndary isn't
a problem. For cases where one of the servers is compromised, DoS is possible
even with DNSSEC because an attacker would be able to provide for forged
signatures. The risk of forged entries can be reduced by using different
keys. The offline key would be used to sign RRSets, securing positive responses
(mostly DS RRs). The online key could be used to sign online NSEC RRs to
be generated on the fly (and pointing at some uncritical, maybe not even
existing name). It's just that I don't see an opportunity to signal this
distinction at the moment.

-Peter

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Thu, 20 May 2004 14:04:36 +0100
Lines: 52
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <roy@gnomon.org.uk>
Cc: Marcos Sanz/Denic <sanz@denic.de>, namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Thu May 20 15:14:30 2004
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To: Roy Badami <roy@gnomon.org.uk>
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   of "Thu, 20 May 2004 12:45:39 BST." <16556.39523.357152.92612@giles.gnomon.org.uk> 
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>>>>> "Roy" == Roy Badami <roy@gnomon.org.uk> writes:

    Jim> This is already known. Now why do some people believe that
    Jim> this enumeration is a *technical* problem?

    Roy> Well, DNSSEC removes a piece of functionality from the DNS,
    Roy> namely the ability to apply different access control to
    Roy> enumeration from that this is applied to queries. 

Access control has never been part of the DNS protocol. So DNSSEC
can't possibly remove something that was never there. :-) Most DNS
implementations provide access controls. But you shouldn't confuse
these with the DNS protocol. Though admittedly many people mistakenly
believe that the DNS protocol is "whatever BIND does".

    Roy> Specifically, I suspect that the technical problem some
    Roy> people see is that the DNSSEC protocol doesn't meet the
    Roy> functional spec that they have in their minds. 

This isn't a DNS protocol issue.

    Roy> It's not at all clear to me that zone file enumeration does
    Roy> in itself create data protection issues, but this is by no
    Roy> means a simple area of legislation.  But if there _is_ an
    Roy> issue, then suggesting that EU law should be changed in order
    Roy> to fit in with the decisions of the IETF is not likely to be
    Roy> a productive approach...

I wasn't suggesting that. And to turn it around, expecting the IETF to
solve abstract, hypothetical issues about an EU directive by
redesigning a DNS protocol isn't going to be productive either. The
DNSSEC protocol is legislature-neutral. It has to be. Now how that
protocol is used may well have legal considerations. But that's an
issue for each deployer to make a judgement about.

    Roy> If some domains have a serious issue with this, is it worth
    Roy> delaying DNSSEC in order to try and enhance it to include the
    Roy> functionality those domains desire?

Not if it means another couple of years wrangling over drafts and
re-opening old wounds. Especially if there's no-one left standing
after yet another protracted holy war.

If some domains have concerns about policy issues relating to protocol
deployment, they should address those policy issues in whatever is the
appropriate policy forum: ICANN perhaps.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Derek Atkins <derek@ihtfp.com>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Thu, 20 May 2004 10:45:16 -0400
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Peter,

Peter Koch <pk@TechFak.Uni-Bielefeld.DE> writes:

> Bob Halley <Bob.Halley@nominum.com> wrote:
>
>> The problems with online signing are:
>> 
>>         It's a CPU burden for the authoritative nameserver.
>
> Yes, but the operators in question (TLD registries) should be able to deal
> with this.

I don't think you understand what level of CPU burden online signing
can be in the face of unauthenticatd queries.  It's a DoS attack
waiting to happen.  Turn this "feature" on in your DNS servers and I
can bring your server to its knees without even trying.  It's very
simple: I send a string of random requests to your server for random
(non-existant) hosts in your authoritative zone.  To make sure you
can't block this easily at your firewall I spoof the sender address (I
don't care about the responses anyways).

Even if modern TLD CPUs can handle 10,000 RSA encryptions per second
(my laptop tops out at around 2,000 with full-bore CPU usage), that
just means I need to send you 10,000 requests per second.  That's
about 10mbps (probably even less).  Not too hard to achieve.  Note
that my 2000/s is full-CPU.  You need a good deal of CPU to actually
perform the DNS query/response, so that reduces the number of actual
RSA operations possible.

The problem is that it's just too prone to DoS attacks....  Which is BAD.

-derek

-- 
       Derek Atkins                 617-623-3745
       derek@ihtfp.com             www.ihtfp.com
       Computer and Internet Security Consultant

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: "Sal Mangiapane" <salm@servanttechnology.com>
Subject: RE: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Thu, 20 May 2004 12:08:07 -0400
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> On Wed, 19 May 2004, Ben Laurie wrote:
>
> > Peter Koch wrote:
> > >
> > > There are other alternatives, including online signing, maybe with a
> > > different key. The zones in question have some special properties (almost
> > > "NS only"), which may also be exploited to find a solution.
> >
> > I have hesitated to suggest alternatives that include online signing,
> > because of the principle that private keys should not be exposed by
> > putting them on connected machines.
>
> A ssh/tls/ipsec capable machines have a private key on connected
> machines.
>
> > However, it is definitely worth saying that online signing would
> > completely eliminate traversal.
>
> Definitly.
>

first posting to any IETF list.  Please forgive me if this has been discussed.  I would appreciate references that I may read.

How will signing completely eliminate traversal?

Has anyone suggested a parallel internet standard similar to DNS that would be used for authorizing digital signatures?  Then, DNS
(and E-mail, VoIP, etc) could each define their specific required information for using digital signatures.  DNS would not be
burdened with implementing (and supporting) it's own PKI infrastructure.

Best Regards,


Sal

Salvatore Mangiapane


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: "Sal Mangiapane" <salm@servanttechnology.com>
Subject: RE: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Thu, 20 May 2004 12:36:51 -0400
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> Peter Koch <pk@TechFak.Uni-Bielefeld.DE> writes:
>
> > Bob Halley <Bob.Halley@nominum.com> wrote:
> >
> >> The problems with online signing are:
> >>
> >>         It's a CPU burden for the authoritative nameserver.
> >
> > Yes, but the operators in question (TLD registries) should be able to deal
> > with this.
>
> I don't think you understand what level of CPU burden online signing
> can be in the face of unauthenticated queries.  It's a DoS attack
> waiting to happen.  Turn this "feature" on in your DNS servers and I
> can bring your server to its knees without even trying.  It's very
> simple: I send a string of random requests to your server for random
> (non-existent) hosts in your authoritative zone.  To make sure you
> can't block this easily at your firewall I spoof the sender address (I
> don't care about the responses anyways).
>
> Even if modern TLD CPUs can handle 10,000 RSA encryptions per second
> (my laptop tops out at around 2,000 with full-bore CPU usage), that
> just means I need to send you 10,000 requests per second.  That's
> about 10mbps (probably even less).  Not too hard to achieve.  Note
> that my 2000/s is full-CPU.  You need a good deal of CPU to actually
> perform the DNS query/response, so that reduces the number of actual
> RSA operations possible.
>
> The problem is that it's just too prone to DoS attacks....  Which is BAD.

A standard could be established to help thwart DoS attack.

1) Only use signatures for queries from named name servers (ns record exists).
2) Only use signatures when the named name server uses signatures (it signed the request).
3) When your server load exceeds a predefined limit (like 30% CPU) drop all query requests from unknown name servers (such as
caching name servers).
4) When your server load exceeds some next higher limit (like 50% CPU) drop all query requests except when signed from a named name
server.

This methodology will also encourage adoption of the new standard for obvious reasons.

Of course,
1) could easily be spoofed.
2) could not, but may tie up your DNS server verifying signatures.


Best Regards,

Sal

Salvatore Mangiapane


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: "Loomis, Rip" <GILBERT.R.LOOMIS@saic.com>
Subject: RE: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Thu, 20 May 2004 12:49:00 -0400
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> > The problem is that [online signing is] just too prone to
> > DoS attacks....   Which is BAD.
> 
> A standard could be established to help thwart DoS attack.
> 
> 1) Only use signatures for queries from named name servers 
> (ns record exists).

This blatantly ignores the completely common case where
the set of recursive/caching/resolving nameservers for an
organization are separate from the set of authoritative
nameservers (with NS records for the zone delegation)
for that organization.  As a result, your notional standard
is not likely to work.

  --Rip

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: "Sal Mangiapane" <salm@servanttechnology.com>
Subject: RE: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Thu, 20 May 2004 13:09:44 -0400
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> > > The problem is that [online signing is] just too prone to
> > > DoS attacks....   Which is BAD.
> > 
> > A standard could be established to help thwart DoS attack.
> > 
> > 1) Only use signatures for queries from named name servers 
> > (ns record exists).
> 
> This blatantly ignores the completely common case where
> the set of recursive/caching/resolving nameservers for an
> organization are separate from the set of authoritative
> nameservers (with NS records for the zone delegation)
> for that organization.  As a result, your notional standard
> is not likely to work.
> 
>   --Rip
> 

This is exactly what each group would need to establish.  In this case, what the criteria for DNS would be.

The Internet benefits from the ubiquity of DNS.  Couldn't the same be true for a single system of digital signatures?

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Thu, 20 May 2004 18:31:35 +0000
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> ... Currently, the DNS allows the operator of an authoritative
> nameserver to permit unauthenticated queries, but to deny enumeration
> of the zone to unauthenticated parties.

actually, it doesn't.  no rfc specifies this behaviour.  it's a BINDism
that other implementors have added because users think it's a useful
feature.  RFC 1034 and RFC 1035 say how to answer AXFR, but no RFC says
how to block it.

> With DNSSEC, this is not possible.  If you allow queries then you
> allow enumeration.

if you want the ability to block enumeration to be part of the standard,
then you should try to write it up and get it done.  i suspect that IETF
will not agree that this is a necessary or "pure enough" feature.  but if
you can get it done, then you might be able to get IETF to think that
DNSSEC should preserve this functionality.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Andras Salamon <andras@dns.net>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Thu, 20 May 2004 20:51:58 +0200
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On Thu, May 20, 2004 at 11:27:03AM +0100, Roy Badami wrote:
> Currently, the
> DNS allows the operator of an authoritative nameserver to permit
> unauthenticated queries, but to deny enumeration of the zone to
> unauthenticated parties.

As Jim stated, some _implementations_ of DNS servers allow this kind
of control.

> This is a technical change: specifically, the authentication model is
> now less fine-grained than it used to be.

More accurately, a previously possible hack would no longer be possible.

> Whether this technical change constitutes a problem would seem to
> depend on the legal and policy framework in which the nameserver is
> operating,

As stated by Jim, if a DNS operator is concerned about publishing
sensitive data, they should remove that data from the set of DNS records
accessible over a public network, by any means, including enumeration.

If, to comply with data protection legislation, an operator is relying
on enumeration of records not being possible, then that operator is
asking for trouble and is possibly already in breach (depending on the
jurisdiction).

First, don't put private data in a public database.  Second, the DNS
servers accessible over the Internet constitute a public database.
Conclusion: don't put private data onto DNS servers accessible over
the Internet.

How many times does this need to be repeated?

-- Andras Salamon                   andras@dns.net

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Roy Badami <roy@gnomon.org.uk>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Thu, 20 May 2004 20:26:24 +0100
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>>>>> "Paul" == Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com> writes:

    Paul> if you want the ability to block enumeration to be part of
    Paul> the standard, then you should try to write it up and get it
    Paul> done.  i suspect that IETF will not agree that this is a
    Paul> necessary or "pure enough" feature.  but if you can get it
    Paul> done, then you might be able to get IETF to think that
    Paul> DNSSEC should preserve this functionality.

I have neither the motivation nor the inspiration to do that.  I'm
happy to leave that to those who feel a desperate need to use this
feature... :-)

I was just trying to counter what I perceived to be a possible sense
of "there's no possible reason why this issue should botther you" in
some of the comments in this thread.

There is a clear real-world difference between allowing queries and
allowing a wholesale download of the zone file.  There is most
definitely a difference in the real world between a theortical attack
and a practical attack.

These differences may well affect what a registry feels comfortable
doing in terms of European data protection legislation.

If ccTLD operators suggest that this might be an issue for them, then
it is IMHO unreasonable for anyone (other than a lawyer versed in this
area) to tell them they are wrong.

I realize that Ben Laurie has made it clear that he doesn't speak for
Nominet in terms of policy, and has not explicitly stated Nominet's
concerns, but it's clear from the URL below that the Nominet PAB does
have concerns (although not exacly what they are).

http://www.nominet.org.uk/Pab/PabMeetingPapers/ZoneFileEnumerationInDnssec.html

I'm assuming that the DNSSECbis document set is not going to be
derailed at this late stage -- it's hardly as if the NXT record is
some new idea which has been pushed through with little discussion,
and the world has been waiting long enough for deployable DNSSEC.

But if at a later date a significant number of ccTLD registries decide
that the issue is a showstopper for them, then I would hope that the
IETF will provide a suitable forum for these issues to be explored
further.

     -roy



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Peter Koch <pk@TechFak.Uni-Bielefeld.DE>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Thu, 20 May 2004 22:00:19 +0200
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Andras Salamon wrote:

> How many times does this need to be repeated?

try until it's true. I'd really appreciate if people wouldn't generally
neglect any difference between every single record of data (or a set of data)
being public (i.e. accessible anonymously without any further authorization)
and all of the data being accessible at once. There is a difference and
we have several examples, whois itself being one of it. Another are "public"
phone directories allowing for name to number mappings but not for bulk
transfer or "reverse mapping". (Commercial) databases of other kinds come to
mind. So, just repeating over and over again that "public" is "public"
doesn't lead us anywhere.

Now, back to DNS, it may well be that it wasn't designed to protect the
zone(s) from being XFRed, but there are other things it wasn't designed for,
too (like being a flat keyword index). Again, AXFR doesn't constitute a
technical or security problem per se. Of course that's a layer 9 problem,
but so what? Isn't DNSSEC as a whole there to solve layer 9 problems?
If the world weren't so bad, we wouldn't need any security protocols.

Now, for AXFR blocks not being standardized: REFUSED does exist. There's
no (longer a) DNS way to communicate between master and slaves the necessary
authorization info, but that doesn't prove anything more than you cannot rely
upon it (unless you have out of band communication).

I believe DNSSEC is necessary and I want it deployed - without a major
protocol redesign which would cost more time than available - given that
there are other protocols in the queue which kind of need a secured DNS.
But here's a deployment obstacle which has come up really late (well, NO
was worked on a few years ago, but the problem wasn't emphasized back then)
and which needs an engineering solution. Can we work on one?

-Peter

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Olaf Kolkman <olaf@ripe.net>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Thu, 20 May 2004 22:36:45 +0200
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Dear Colleagues,

Let me try and sumarise what I've seen so far and suggest a way
forward.

Ben proposed a mechanism to fix "NSEC zone traversal" that apparently
hinders TLDs in the deployment of DNSSEC. Although the discussion on
the validity of this reason is interesting it is not a protocol issue. 
We
will not be able to change TLD policies.

The proposed mechanism, I'll refer to is as NSEC2, may have technical 
merit.
I think it is fair to say that the working group is still digesting the 
technical
details of the proposal. Please continue to do so, having documented 
why a
technology will or will not work is a good thing.

As far as I understand the security properties of the proposed
technology are such that changes are needed to the protocol as in
DNSSEC-bis. This means that we have to introduce a flag day. That flag
day either is "now" or after the DNSSEC-bis protocol is out in the
field.

We as a working group have a choice.

- We take up this NSEC2 proposal as a working item.

   If we do so we will have to merge the technology into the current
   DNSSEC-bis document set. Having a flag day, after introducing
   DNSSEC-bis just does not make sense.

   Realize that taking up this as a working item would result in an
   unknown delay of getting the DNSSEC specifications done. Not only
   will the WG need time to assess the quality of the proposed
   solution but people currently funded to work on the effort may see
   that funding stop and walk away. Realisticly we are looking at
   significantly more than 6 months [*] delay. (We'll have to assess
   interaction with wildcards and other DNS elements. We'll have to
   test for corner cases, &c, &c). There are more pessimistic scenarios
   than the 6 months scenario.

- We do not take up NSEC2 as a working item

   This would not imply that the "NSEC zone traversal" is a non-issue.
   It may actually hinder deployment of DNSSEC some TLD zones.

   If we go this route we may have a proposed standard and start of
   deployment in some zones this year in less than 6 months [*].

   The DNSSEC-bis document set is clear on the fact that DNSSEC does
   not offer privacy. We just have to live with that.


I'll be tracking the discussion with the following in mind.

If I do not see rough consensus on taking up NSEC2 as a work item by 
June 1
I'll reject this as a work item.

If, after June 1, there is consensus on taking up NSEC2 as a work item
I'll try to make an inventory on how many participants of the working
group can commit resources to make this work. If it turns out we
cannot produce standards, documents and code on a reasonable time or
we alienate a significant fraction of the people that are now
committed on working on this we'll also not take NSEC2 up as a work 
item.

If we'll take NSEC2 as a work item then - in order to avoid a flag day -
the current DNSSEC-bis doc set will be put on hold until NSEC2 is cooked
enough to be merged into the DNSSEC-bis documents.


Olaf Kolkman
DNSEXT Co-Chair

(Olafur is away from keyboard for a week or two.)

[*] I've been telling people that DNSSEC will be ready in 6 months
    over the last 3 years. As a result the combination of "6 months"
    and DNSSEC in one sentence rises suspicion.


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Ben Laurie <ben@algroup.co.uk>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Thu, 20 May 2004 21:51:08 +0100
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Peter Koch wrote:

> Bob Halley <Bob.Halley@nominum.com> wrote:
> 
> 
>>The problems with online signing are:
>>
>>        It's a CPU burden for the authoritative nameserver.
> 
> 
> Yes, but the operators in question (TLD registries) should be able to deal
> with this.
> 
> 
>>        You must trust your slaves enough to give them the right
>>        to make signatures.  In the standard DNSSEC model, a
>>        rogue slave can deny service, but it cannot generate
>>        authenticated zone content.
> 
> 
> Most TLDs already have all their nameservers under their very own control
> (although not necessarily on a physical level). So betrayal by 2ndary isn't
> a problem. For cases where one of the servers is compromised, DoS is possible
> even with DNSSEC because an attacker would be able to provide for forged
> signatures. The risk of forged entries can be reduced by using different
> keys. The offline key would be used to sign RRSets, securing positive responses
> (mostly DS RRs). The online key could be used to sign online NSEC RRs to
> be generated on the fly (and pointing at some uncritical, maybe not even
> existing name). It's just that I don't see an opportunity to signal this
> distinction at the moment.

If you were going to do this, it would make more sense to simply sign a 
denial of the existence of the particular domain, rather than messing 
with NSEC records. If you had a signed denial, then the easy way to 
signal it is to have an RR that is specifically for that purpose (that 
is, when you receive a NOTHISDOESNTEXIST RR you expect it to be signed 
with the special key used for that purpose alone).

This is another solution I didn't dare suggest!

Cheers,

Ben.

-- 
http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html       http://www.thebunker.net/

"There is no limit to what a man can do or how far he can go if he
doesn't mind who gets the credit." - Robert Woodruff

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Roy Badami <roy@gnomon.org.uk>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Thu, 20 May 2004 22:16:36 +0100
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>>>>> "Olaf" == Olaf Kolkman <olaf@ripe.net> writes:

    Olaf> Ben proposed a mechanism to fix "NSEC zone traversal" that
    Olaf> apparently hinders TLDs in the deployment of
    Olaf> DNSSEC.

I had been intending to avoid making any further on-list comments,
given I haven't been a WG participant, and that much of this thread
has been discussing issues which are both outside the scope of this WG
and outside the expertese of this WG.

But I just want to make one further point.

Contrary to what you suggest, I don't believe anyone with authority to
do so has clearly stated that that zone file traversal is a serious
barrier to deployment in certain registries.  Ben very specifically
stated that he speaks for Nominet only on technical matters, not on
policy matters and, I believe, has avoided commenting in this thread
other than on the technical issues relating to his proposal.  There
may be other people who have expressed this view whose afiliations I
am unware of, of course.

I don't have a strong opinion as to whether zone file traversal is a
serious issue for adoption or not.  I'm just trying to suggest that
the answer to this question isn't as obvious as some particpants seem
to believe.

Nor am I expressing an opinion as to whether it would be appropriate
to consider modifying the DNSSECbis document set at this late stage.

However unless it is possible to get relevent input from those TLDs
that currently have a policy of not making their zone files available
to the public, then I suggest it would not be productive to persue
this issue at this stage, but that it should simply be noted as an
item for possible future study.

	-roy


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Olaf Kolkman <olaf@ripe.net>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Thu, 20 May 2004 23:19:43 +0200
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On May 20, 2004, at 3:06 PM, Peter Koch wrote:

> The offline key would be used to sign RRSets, securing positive 
> responses
> (mostly DS RRs). The online key could be used to sign online NSEC RRs 
> to
> be generated on the fly (and pointing at some uncritical, maybe not 
> even
> existing name). It's just that I don't see an opportunity to signal 
> this
> distinction at the moment.

Good idea...

There is no reason why one part of a zone cannot be signed with zone 
signing key 1 and another
signed with zone signing key 2. There is no need for signaling.

This is an essential property to be remembered during key rollovers 
when there may be several RRsets from a zone living somewhere in a 
cache that have signatures made with valid keys. The zone operator 
needs to provide the public key material of both the keys during the 
rollover.

Note also that if you minimize the signature validity time on the apex 
keyset you reduce the useful lifetime of the a compromised key.

--Olaf
  (no hats)


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Olaf Kolkman <olaf@ripe.net>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Thu, 20 May 2004 23:23:40 +0200
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> From: Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com>
> Date: May 19, 2004 4:33:42 PM CEST
> To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
> Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
>
>
>>> NSEC provides an index to whois.
>> ...
>> However, "fixing NSEC" will not fix the real (whois) problem.
>>
>> -- teds
>
> i agree with ted.  dns is a publication mechanism, and if you don't 
> want
> something published you probably shouldn't be putting it into dns at 
> all.
> and, if your only way to keep whois safe is to hide its index, then you
> have probably got other troubles.  parts of the "index" are exposed 
> every
> day in server logs or in-addr.arpa/ip6.arpa walks.
>
>

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<excerpt><bold><color><param>0000,0000,0000</param>From:
</color></bold>Paul Vixie <<paul@vix.com>

<bold><color><param>0000,0000,0000</param>Date: </color></bold>May 19,
2004 4:33:42 PM CEST

<bold><color><param>0000,0000,0000</param>To:
</color></bold>namedroppers@ops.ietf.org

<bold><color><param>0000,0000,0000</param>Subject: </color>Re:
Proposal to fix NSEC 

</bold>


<excerpt><excerpt>NSEC provides an index to whois.

</excerpt>...

However, "fixing NSEC" will not fix the real (whois) problem.


-- teds

</excerpt>

i agree with ted.  dns is a publication mechanism, and if you don't
want

something published you probably shouldn't be putting it into dns at
all.

and, if your only way to keep whois safe is to hide its index, then you

have probably got other troubles.  parts of the "index" are exposed
every

day in server logs or in-addr.arpa/ip6.arpa walks.



</excerpt>
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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Olaf Kolkman <olaf@ripe.net>
Subject: this week in dnssec, 10 years ago.
Date: Thu, 20 May 2004 23:24:29 +0200
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> From: Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com>
> Date: May 19, 2004 6:49:40 PM CEST
> To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
> Subject: this week in dnssec, 10 years ago.
>
>
>> ...  But designing DNSSEC to not introduce new realistic attack=20
>> vectors,
>> compared to vanilla DNS, has always appeared sensible to me.  ...
>
> simon picked an interesting point in time to make his concerns widely=20=

> known
> and propose a significant protocol/system design change to address=20
> them.  do
> we have some kind of carrier wave / harmonic underlying this whole=20
> project?
>
>> The alternatives to NSEC do reduce the attack vector into an offline
>> dictionary attack, which I believe is an acceptable risk. ...
>
> this week in dnssec, 10 years ago, donald eastlake proposed "NX" which=20=

> became
> "NXT" and then "NSEC".  see below.  how much longer do we want to work=20=

> on
> this?  i was thinking we'd begin early deployment work this month or=20=

> next...
>
> re:
>
> --------
>
> To: dns-security@tis.com
> Subject: Thought on non-existant and wildcarded names
> Date: Mon, 09 May 94 14:55:42 -0400
> From: "Donald E. Eastlake 3rd (Beast)" <dee@skidrow.lkg.dec.com>
> X-Mts: smtp
>
> This is what I came up with and am thinking of merging into the next=20=

> draft:
> =0C
> INTERNET-DRAFT                          DNS Protocol Security=20
> Extensions
>
>
>
>
>
>
>                 Domain Name Protocol Security Extensions
>
>
>
> W. Special Handling of Wildcard Matches and Non-existence
>
> DNS security provides the means for establishing integrity and data
> origin authenticity.  However, this applies only to actual RRs in a
> secured zone.  There are two places where would be insufficient
> without some additional steps.  The first case is securely indicating
> the absence of data.  The other is the that of wildcard RRs.  Wildcard
> RRs have node names whose first label is an asterisk ("*").  These act
> as instructions for synthesizing RRs not actually present.
>
> Since there are an enormous number of possible DNS names, it is
> impossible to create and sign separate existence RRs for all possible
> wildcard matches or denial RRs for all possible queries for
> non-existent data.  These are handled securely as described below.
>
> The following example zone is used in this section:
>
>      FOO. IN     SOA  QQ.FOO.  admin.QQ.FOO.
>                       (   60   ; serial
>                           7200  ; refresh
>                           600  ; retry
>                           1000000  ; expire
>                           60  ; minimum
>                       )
>                  NS      QQ
>                  NS      X.BAR
>                  MX  10  A1
>                  MX  99  QQ
>
>      A1          A       192.0.2.252
>                  A       192.245.52.250
>                  MX  10  A1
>                  MX  99  QQ
>
>      X.BAR       A       192.0.2.253
>                  A       192.245.52.249
>                  MX  10  X.BAR
>                  MX  80  Y.Z.BAR
>
>      Y.Z.BAR     A       192.245.52.248
>                  MX  10  Y.Z.BAR
>                  MX  80  Z.BAR
>
>
> Donald E. Eastlake 3rd & Charles W. Kaufman                     [Page=20=

> 1]
> =0C
>
> INTERNET-DRAFT                          DNS Protocol Security=20
> Extensions
>
>
>      *.BAR       MX  10  Y.Z.BAR
>                  MX  80  X.BAR
>
>      QQ          A       192.0.2.254
>                  MX  10  QQ
>                  MX  50  A1
>
>
>
> W.1 Wildcard RR Matches
>
> The Domain Name System contains a provision for RRs that match any =
name
> below a point in the name tree unless a more specific name matches.
> (See section 4.3.3 in RFC 1034.)  For example, in zone FOO, there is =
an
> RRs named *.BAR.FOO and also more specifiec RRs with names X.BAR.FOO=20=

> and
> Y.Z.BAR.FOO.  The wildcard RRs with name *.BAR.FOO can be though of as
> instructions for synthesizing RRs with matching names and the same
> class, type, TTL, and RDATA, when a matching query arrives.
>
> If a type MX query is made to zone FOO as above for Z.BAR.FOO, it will
> match the wildcard RR and not any of the more specific RRs. So a
> response will be made with the queried name (Z.BAR.FOO) substituted =
for
> the wildcard name (*.BAR.FOO).  On the other hand, a query for=20
> X.BAR.FOO
> or Z.BAR.FOO or anything below them will ignore the wildcard and =
either
> respond with the specific RR or a non-existent name response.  Queries
> for xx.FOO, where xx is any label but BAR, will be unaffected by the
> wildcard.
>
> A wildcard is frequently used for such purposes as causing mail to a
> large class of name to be sent to a particular set of mail gateways by
> using wildcard MX RRs.
>
> Wildcard RRs are signed by SIG RRs with the same wildcard name and the
> signature is based on the wildcard name.  To make it possible to =
verify
> the signature, the SIG RR has a LABELS field which gives the number of
> actual labels in its name, above the wildcard *, if there is one, not
> counting the null label for root.  If the actual number of labels
> present in the RR name equals the LABELS field, then no wildcard is
> involved.  If the actual number of labels present is larger, then an *
> can be temporarily substituted for the synthesized part of the name to
> verify the signature.
>
> If a wildcard RR has been supressed because it appears inside a SIG on=20=

> a
> request for a security aware resolver to a security aware server, the
> resolver has to do the wildcard expansion.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Donald E. Eastlake 3rd & Charles W. Kaufman                     [Page=20=

> 2]
> =0C
>
> INTERNET-DRAFT                          DNS Protocol Security=20
> Extensions
>
>
> W.2 Non-existent Types
>
> When a secure query is made for a name and class that exist is a zone,
> but for an RR type that does not exist, there needs to be a secure way
> to know that the type does not exist.  This can be determined by
> retrieving and examining all the SIG RRs.  All types will be indicated
> within the SIGs and the partial RR set signets in the SIGs can be used
> to assure that a complete set of SIGs has been retrieved.
>
> Thus a query from a security aware resolver for a name that exists for
> some RR in a zone but not as the owner of any RR of the requested type
> should be answered by a security aware server with the usual error but
> with all the SIGs for that name as additional information.
>
>
>
> W.3 Nonexistent Names
>
> The nonexistence of a name in a zone is indicates by the NX resource =
RR
> for a name interval containing the nonexistent name.  An NX RR is
> returned in the additional information section, along with the error,=20=

> if
> the client is security aware.  NX RRs can also be returned if an
> explicit query is made for the NX type.
>
> The existence of NX records means that any query for any name to a
> security aware server serving a secure zone should result in an reply
> containing at least one signed RR.
>
>
>
> W.3.1 The NX Resource Record
>
> The NX resource record is used to securely indicate that no RRs with =
an
> owner name in a certain name interval exist in a domain (or that any
> specific names in that interval are masked by a wildcard).
>
> The owner name of the NX RR is an existing name in the zone.  It's=20
> RDATA
> is another existing name in the zone.  The presence of the NX RR means
> that no name between its owner name and the name in its RDATA area
> exists.  This implies a canonical ordering of all domain names in a
> zone.
>
> The ordering is to sort labels as unsigned left justified octet =
strings
> where the absence of a byte sorts before a zero byte.  Names are then
> sorted by sorting on the highest level label and then, within those
> names with the same highest level label by the next lower label, etc.
> Since we are talking about a zone, the zone name itself always exists
> and all other names are the zone name with some prefix of lower level
> labels.  Thus the zone name itself always sorts first.
>
>
>
> Donald E. Eastlake 3rd & Charles W. Kaufman                     [Page=20=

> 3]
> =0C
>
> INTERNET-DRAFT                          DNS Protocol Security=20
> Extensions
>
>
> There is a slight problem with the last NX in a zone as it wants to=20
> have
> an owner name which is the last existing name is sort order, which is
> easy, but it is not obvious what name to put in its RDATA to indicate
> the entire remainder of the name space.  This is handled by treating=20=

> the
> name space as circular and putting the zone name in the RDATA of the
> last NX.
>
> There are additional complexities due to interaction with wildcards as
> explained below.
>
> The NX RRs for a zone can be automatically calculated and added to the
> zone by the same recommended off-line process that signs the zone.  =
The
> NX RRs TTL should not exceed the zone minimum TTL.
>
> The type number for the NX RR is xxx.
>
>
>
> W.3.2 NX RDATA format
>
> The RDATA for an NX RR consists simply of a domain name.
>
>
>                      1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3
>  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> |     next domain name                                          /
> /                                                               /
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
>
>
>
> W.3.3 Interaction of NX RRs and Wildcard RRs
>
> As a wildcard RR causes all possible names in an interval to exist,
> there should not be an NX record that would cover any part of this
> interval.  Thus if *.X.ZONE exists you would expect an NX RR that ends
> at X.ZONE and one that starts with the last name covered by *.X.ZONE.
> However, this "last name covered" is something very ugly and long like
> \255\255\255....X.zone.  So the NX for the interval following is =
simply
> given the owner name *.X.zone.  This "*" type name is not expanded =
when
> the NX is returned as additional information in connection with a =
query
> for a non-existent name.
>
> If there could be any wildcard RRs in a zone and thus wildcard NXs,=20
> care
> must be taken in interpreting the results of explicit NX retrievals as
> the owner name may be a wildcard expansion.
>
> The existence of one or more wildcard RRs covering a name interval=20
> makes
> it possible for a malicious server to hide any more specificly named=20=

> RRs
>
>
> Donald E. Eastlake 3rd & Charles W. Kaufman                     [Page=20=

> 4]
> =0C
>
> INTERNET-DRAFT                          DNS Protocol Security=20
> Extensions
>
>
> in the internal.  The server can just falsely return the wildcard =
match
> instead of the more specificly named RRs.  If there is a zone wide
> wildcard, there will be only one NX RR whose owner name and RDATA are
> both the zone name.  In this case a server could conceal the existence
> of any more specific RRs in the zone.  It would be possible to make a
> more complex NX feature, taking into account the types of RRs that did
> not exist in a name interval, and the like, which would eliminate this
> possibility.  But it would be more complex and would be so =
constraining
> as to make any future dynamic update feature very difficult.  See
> Section xxx.
>
> Below is the sample zone given above with NX RRs added.
>
>      FOO. IN     SOA  QQ.FOO.  admin.QQ.FOO.
>                       (   60   ; serial
>                           7200  ; refresh
>                           600  ; retry
>                           1000000  ; expire
>                           60  ; minimum
>                       )
>                  NS      QQ
>                  NS      X.BAR
>                  MX  10  A1
>                  MX  99  QQ
>                  NX      A1
>
>      A1          A       192.0.2.252
>                  A       192.245.52.250
>                  MX  10  A1
>                  MX  99  QQ
>                  NX      BAR
>
>      X.BAR       A       192.0.2.253
>                  A       192.245.52.249
>                  MX  10  X.BAR
>                  MX  80  Y.Z.BAR
>                          ; no NX, covered by *.BAR
>
>      Y.Z.BAR     A       192.245.52.248
>                  MX  10  Y.Z.BAR
>                  MX  80  Z.BAR
>                          ; no NX, covered by *.BAR
>
>      *.BAR       MX  10  Y.Z.BAR
>                  MX  80  X.BAR
>                  NX      QQ
>
>      QQ          A       192.0.2.254
>                  MX  10  QQ
>                  MX  50  A1
>
>
> Donald E. Eastlake 3rd & Charles W. Kaufman                     [Page=20=

> 5]
> =0C
>
> INTERNET-DRAFT                          DNS Protocol Security=20
> Extensions
>
>
>                  NX      FOO.
>
>
>
> W.3.4 Blocking NX Pseudo-Zone Transfers
>
> In a secure zone, a resolver can query for the initial NX associated
> with the zone name.  Using the RDATA field from that RR, it can query
> for the next NX RR.  By repeating this, it can walk through all the =
NXs
> in the zone.  If there are no wildcards, it can use this technique to
> find all names in a zone. If it does type ANY queries, it can
> incrementally get all information in the zone and perhaps defeat
> attempts to administratively block zone transfers.
>
> If there are any wildcards, this NX walking technique will not find =
any
> more specific RR names in the part of the name space the wildcard
> covers.  By doing explicit retrievals for wildcard names, a resolver
> could determine what intervals are covered by wildcards but still =
could
> not, with these techniques, find any names inside such intervals.
>
> If it is desired to block NX walking, the recommended method is to add=20=

> a
> zone wide wildcard of the KEY type which asserts the nonexistence of=20=

> any
> keys.  This will cause there to be only one NX RR in the zone for the
> zone name and leak no information about what real names exist in the
> zone.  This protection from pseudo-zone transfers is bought at the
> expense of eliminating the data origin authentication of the non-
> existence of names that NX RRs can provide.  If an entire zone is
> covered by a wildcard, a malicious server can return an RR produced by
> matching that wildcard and can thus hide all the real data and
> delegations with more specific names in the zone.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Donald E. Eastlake 3rd & Charles W. Kaufman                     [Page=20=

> 6]
> =0C
>
> --------
>
>

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Forwarded message 2 out of 2 (there where problems posting)


<excerpt><bold><color><param>0000,0000,0000</param>From:
</color></bold>Paul Vixie <<paul@vix.com>

<bold><color><param>0000,0000,0000</param>Date: </color></bold>May 19,
2004 6:49:40 PM CEST

<bold><color><param>0000,0000,0000</param>To:
</color></bold>namedroppers@ops.ietf.org

<bold><color><param>0000,0000,0000</param>Subject: </color>this week
in dnssec, 10 years ago.

</bold>


<excerpt>...  But designing DNSSEC to not introduce new realistic
attack vectors,

compared to vanilla DNS, has always appeared sensible to me.  ...

</excerpt>

simon picked an interesting point in time to make his concerns widely
known

and propose a significant protocol/system design change to address
them.  do

we have some kind of carrier wave / harmonic underlying this whole
project?


<excerpt>The alternatives to NSEC do reduce the attack vector into an
offline

dictionary attack, which I believe is an acceptable risk. ...

</excerpt>

this week in dnssec, 10 years ago, donald eastlake proposed "NX" which
became

"NXT" and then "NSEC".  see below.  how much longer do we want to work
on

this?  i was thinking we'd begin early deployment work this month or
next...


re:


--------


To: dns-security@tis.com

Subject: Thought on non-existant and wildcarded names

Date: Mon, 09 May 94 14:55:42 -0400

From: "Donald E. Eastlake 3rd (Beast)" <<dee@skidrow.lkg.dec.com>

X-Mts: smtp


This is what I came up with and am thinking of merging into the next
draft:

=0C

INTERNET-DRAFT                          DNS Protocol Security
Extensions







                Domain Name Protocol Security Extensions




W. Special Handling of Wildcard Matches and Non-existence


DNS security provides the means for establishing integrity and data

origin authenticity.  However, this applies only to actual RRs in a

secured zone.  There are two places where would be insufficient

without some additional steps.  The first case is securely indicating

the absence of data.  The other is the that of wildcard RRs.  Wildcard

RRs have node names whose first label is an asterisk ("*").  These act

as instructions for synthesizing RRs not actually present.


Since there are an enormous number of possible DNS names, it is

impossible to create and sign separate existence RRs for all possible

wildcard matches or denial RRs for all possible queries for

non-existent data.  These are handled securely as described below.


The following example zone is used in this section:


     FOO. IN     SOA  QQ.FOO.  admin.QQ.FOO.

                      (   60   ; serial

                          7200  ; refresh

                          600  ; retry

                          1000000  ; expire

                          60  ; minimum

                      )

                 NS      QQ

                 NS      X.BAR

                 MX  10  A1

                 MX  99  QQ


     A1          A       192.0.2.252

                 A       192.245.52.250

                 MX  10  A1

                 MX  99  QQ


     X.BAR       A       192.0.2.253

                 A       192.245.52.249

                 MX  10  X.BAR

                 MX  80  Y.Z.BAR


     Y.Z.BAR     A       192.245.52.248

                 MX  10  Y.Z.BAR

                 MX  80  Z.BAR



Donald E. Eastlake 3rd & Charles W. Kaufman                     [Page
1]

=0C


INTERNET-DRAFT                          DNS Protocol Security
Extensions



     *.BAR       MX  10  Y.Z.BAR

                 MX  80  X.BAR


     QQ          A       192.0.2.254

                 MX  10  QQ

                 MX  50  A1




W.1 Wildcard RR Matches


The Domain Name System contains a provision for RRs that match any name

below a point in the name tree unless a more specific name matches.

(See section 4.3.3 in RFC 1034.)  For example, in zone FOO, there is an

RRs named *.BAR.FOO and also more specifiec RRs with names X.BAR.FOO
and

Y.Z.BAR.FOO.  The wildcard RRs with name *.BAR.FOO can be though of as

instructions for synthesizing RRs with matching names and the same

class, type, TTL, and RDATA, when a matching query arrives.


If a type MX query is made to zone FOO as above for Z.BAR.FOO, it will

match the wildcard RR and not any of the more specific RRs. So a

response will be made with the queried name (Z.BAR.FOO) substituted for

the wildcard name (*.BAR.FOO).  On the other hand, a query for
X.BAR.FOO

or Z.BAR.FOO or anything below them will ignore the wildcard and either

respond with the specific RR or a non-existent name response.  Queries

for xx.FOO, where xx is any label but BAR, will be unaffected by the

wildcard.


A wildcard is frequently used for such purposes as causing mail to a

large class of name to be sent to a particular set of mail gateways by

using wildcard MX RRs.


Wildcard RRs are signed by SIG RRs with the same wildcard name and the

signature is based on the wildcard name.  To make it possible to verify

the signature, the SIG RR has a LABELS field which gives the number of

actual labels in its name, above the wildcard *, if there is one, not

counting the null label for root.  If the actual number of labels

present in the RR name equals the LABELS field, then no wildcard is

involved.  If the actual number of labels present is larger, then an *

can be temporarily substituted for the synthesized part of the name to

verify the signature.


If a wildcard RR has been supressed because it appears inside a SIG on a

request for a security aware resolver to a security aware server, the

resolver has to do the wildcard expansion.








Donald E. Eastlake 3rd & Charles W. Kaufman                     [Page
2]

=0C


INTERNET-DRAFT                          DNS Protocol Security
Extensions



W.2 Non-existent Types


When a secure query is made for a name and class that exist is a zone,

but for an RR type that does not exist, there needs to be a secure way

to know that the type does not exist.  This can be determined by

retrieving and examining all the SIG RRs.  All types will be indicated

within the SIGs and the partial RR set signets in the SIGs can be used

to assure that a complete set of SIGs has been retrieved.


Thus a query from a security aware resolver for a name that exists for

some RR in a zone but not as the owner of any RR of the requested type

should be answered by a security aware server with the usual error but

with all the SIGs for that name as additional information.




W.3 Nonexistent Names


The nonexistence of a name in a zone is indicates by the NX resource RR

for a name interval containing the nonexistent name.  An NX RR is

returned in the additional information section, along with the error,
if

the client is security aware.  NX RRs can also be returned if an

explicit query is made for the NX type.


The existence of NX records means that any query for any name to a

security aware server serving a secure zone should result in an reply

containing at least one signed RR.




W.3.1 The NX Resource Record


The NX resource record is used to securely indicate that no RRs with an

owner name in a certain name interval exist in a domain (or that any

specific names in that interval are masked by a wildcard).


The owner name of the NX RR is an existing name in the zone.  It's
RDATA

is another existing name in the zone.  The presence of the NX RR means

that no name between its owner name and the name in its RDATA area

exists.  This implies a canonical ordering of all domain names in a

zone.


The ordering is to sort labels as unsigned left justified octet strings

where the absence of a byte sorts before a zero byte.  Names are then

sorted by sorting on the highest level label and then, within those

names with the same highest level label by the next lower label, etc.

Since we are talking about a zone, the zone name itself always exists

and all other names are the zone name with some prefix of lower level

labels.  Thus the zone name itself always sorts first.




Donald E. Eastlake 3rd & Charles W. Kaufman                     [Page
3]

=0C


INTERNET-DRAFT                          DNS Protocol Security
Extensions



There is a slight problem with the last NX in a zone as it wants to
have

an owner name which is the last existing name is sort order, which is

easy, but it is not obvious what name to put in its RDATA to indicate

the entire remainder of the name space.  This is handled by treating
the

name space as circular and putting the zone name in the RDATA of the

last NX.


There are additional complexities due to interaction with wildcards as

explained below.


The NX RRs for a zone can be automatically calculated and added to the

zone by the same recommended off-line process that signs the zone.  The

NX RRs TTL should not exceed the zone minimum TTL.


The type number for the NX RR is xxx.




W.3.2 NX RDATA format


The RDATA for an NX RR consists simply of a domain name.



                     1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3

 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1

+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

|     next domain name                                          /

/                                                               /

+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+




W.3.3 Interaction of NX RRs and Wildcard RRs


As a wildcard RR causes all possible names in an interval to exist,

there should not be an NX record that would cover any part of this

interval.  Thus if *.X.ZONE exists you would expect an NX RR that ends

at X.ZONE and one that starts with the last name covered by *.X.ZONE.

However, this "last name covered" is something very ugly and long like

\255\255\255....X.zone.  So the NX for the interval following is simply

given the owner name *.X.zone.  This "*" type name is not expanded when

the NX is returned as additional information in connection with a query

for a non-existent name.


If there could be any wildcard RRs in a zone and thus wildcard NXs,
care

must be taken in interpreting the results of explicit NX retrievals as

the owner name may be a wildcard expansion.


The existence of one or more wildcard RRs covering a name interval
makes

it possible for a malicious server to hide any more specificly named
RRs



Donald E. Eastlake 3rd & Charles W. Kaufman                     [Page
4]

=0C


INTERNET-DRAFT                          DNS Protocol Security
Extensions



in the internal.  The server can just falsely return the wildcard match

instead of the more specificly named RRs.  If there is a zone wide

wildcard, there will be only one NX RR whose owner name and RDATA are

both the zone name.  In this case a server could conceal the existence

of any more specific RRs in the zone.  It would be possible to make a

more complex NX feature, taking into account the types of RRs that did

not exist in a name interval, and the like, which would eliminate this

possibility.  But it would be more complex and would be so constraining

as to make any future dynamic update feature very difficult.  See

Section xxx.


Below is the sample zone given above with NX RRs added.


     FOO. IN     SOA  QQ.FOO.  admin.QQ.FOO.

                      (   60   ; serial

                          7200  ; refresh

                          600  ; retry

                          1000000  ; expire

                          60  ; minimum

                      )

                 NS      QQ

                 NS      X.BAR

                 MX  10  A1

                 MX  99  QQ

                 NX      A1


     A1          A       192.0.2.252

                 A       192.245.52.250

                 MX  10  A1

                 MX  99  QQ

                 NX      BAR


     X.BAR       A       192.0.2.253

                 A       192.245.52.249

                 MX  10  X.BAR

                 MX  80  Y.Z.BAR

                         ; no NX, covered by *.BAR


     Y.Z.BAR     A       192.245.52.248

                 MX  10  Y.Z.BAR

                 MX  80  Z.BAR

                         ; no NX, covered by *.BAR


     *.BAR       MX  10  Y.Z.BAR

                 MX  80  X.BAR

                 NX      QQ


     QQ          A       192.0.2.254

                 MX  10  QQ

                 MX  50  A1



Donald E. Eastlake 3rd & Charles W. Kaufman                     [Page
5]

=0C


INTERNET-DRAFT                          DNS Protocol Security
Extensions



                 NX      FOO.




W.3.4 Blocking NX Pseudo-Zone Transfers


In a secure zone, a resolver can query for the initial NX associated

with the zone name.  Using the RDATA field from that RR, it can query

for the next NX RR.  By repeating this, it can walk through all the NXs

in the zone.  If there are no wildcards, it can use this technique to

find all names in a zone. If it does type ANY queries, it can

incrementally get all information in the zone and perhaps defeat

attempts to administratively block zone transfers.


If there are any wildcards, this NX walking technique will not find any

more specific RR names in the part of the name space the wildcard

covers.  By doing explicit retrievals for wildcard names, a resolver

could determine what intervals are covered by wildcards but still could

not, with these techniques, find any names inside such intervals.


If it is desired to block NX walking, the recommended method is to add a

zone wide wildcard of the KEY type which asserts the nonexistence of
any

keys.  This will cause there to be only one NX RR in the zone for the

zone name and leak no information about what real names exist in the

zone.  This protection from pseudo-zone transfers is bought at the

expense of eliminating the data origin authentication of the non-

existence of names that NX RRs can provide.  If an entire zone is

covered by a wildcard, a malicious server can return an RR produced by

matching that wildcard and can thus hide all the real data and

delegations with more specific names in the zone.























Donald E. Eastlake 3rd & Charles W. Kaufman                     [Page
6]

=0C


--------



</excerpt>=

--Apple-Mail-2--593113137--



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Thu, 20 May 2004 21:45:00 +0000
Lines: 61
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <roy@gnomon.org.uk>
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Thu May 20 23:51:15 2004
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
In-Reply-To: Message from Roy Badami <roy@gnomon.org.uk> 
	of "Thu, 20 May 2004 20:26:24 +0100."
	<16557.1632.918749.103466@giles.gnomon.org.uk> 
X-Mailer: MH-E 7.4; nmh 1.0.4; GNU Emacs 21.3.1
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> I was just trying to counter what I perceived to be a possible sense
> of "there's no possible reason why this issue should botther you" in
> some of the comments in this thread.

there's no possible reason why this issue should bother you.

if someone wants to enumerate the secondlevel names in a tld, they will
do it using well understood data mining techniques including watching
log files from busy mail and web and proxy servers, surfing the PTR's,
spidering the web itself, or buying the ISC Domain Survey four times a
year, or perhaps all of the above.

a tld operator's lack of desire for such enumeration cannot prevent it.
and dnssec's lack of compatibility with the well known BINDist hack of
turning off AXFR access or limiting it to well known addresses or TSIGs,
does not mean that dnssec has something wrong with it.

> There is a clear real-world difference between allowing queries and
> allowing a wholesale download of the zone file.  There is most
> definitely a difference in the real world between a theortical attack
> and a practical attack.

but there is no real-world difference in enumerability between a tld
that allows open AXFR, a tld that does not allow AXFR, a tld that uses
dnssec (with NSEC chains), or a tld that does not use dnssec (or uses
it without NSEC chains, as in the NSEC2 proposal).

if you don't believe this, then tell me a tld and i'll enumerate it for
you, without using NSEC chains or AXFR.  it could take me a few months
depending on how many sites therein are linked from other sites, and how
many PTRs have target names under that tld, but sooner or later i'll get
it, either all of it, or enough to cover the part of your "whois" data
that you think preventing AXFR (and not using NSEC) is keeping others
from having an index to.

> These differences may well affect what a registry feels comfortable
> doing in terms of European data protection legislation.

if you'll give me the phone numbers of the legislators in question, i'll
be happy to call them and tell them that because the names are exposed
in other contexts, that the internet is already in violation of their
data protection standards.  perhaps they'll decide to disconnect europe
from the internet in order to keep this data safe.

> I'm assuming that the DNSSECbis document set is not going to be
> derailed at this late stage -- it's hardly as if the NXT record is
> some new idea which has been pushed through with little discussion,
> and the world has been waiting long enough for deployable DNSSEC.
> 
> But if at a later date a significant number of ccTLD registries decide
> that the issue is a showstopper for them, then I would hope that the
> IETF will provide a suitable forum for these issues to be explored
> further.

that's a reasonable middle ground, in my opinion.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Robert Elz <kre@munnari.OZ.AU>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Fri, 21 May 2004 04:50:02 +0700
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    Date:        Thu, 20 May 2004 12:45:39 +0100
    From:        Roy Badami <roy@gnomon.org.uk>
    Message-ID:  <16556.39523.357152.92612@giles.gnomon.org.uk>

  | I suspect that most of the concerns relate to the EU Data Protection
  | Directive (and the transposed legislation of the member states),
  | rather than anything to do with copyright.

No, that's clearly not the case.   There's nothing at all in the DNS
which can in any way violate any data protection acts - nor would it
make sense for anyone to attempt to legislate in that direction (and
even if you're one who assumes that legislatures have no sense at all,
this would be even further away than that).   What's in the DNS is
exactly what the owners of the data desire to advertise - it's put there
at their request.    This is just like a business directory, or the
phone book - except the DNS contains (unless someone of their own volition
adds the little used LOC, RP, etc records) even less personal type data
than those other directories do.   There doesn't need to be any way at
all to go from anything in the DNS to any kind of data that identifies
in any way the owner of the domain, or provides any information about
that entity (whether there should be a way to do that is a different
issue - the DNS itself mandates nothing like that - of course, organisations
are free to ad that kind of info if they desire, either directly in
RP, LOT, TXT etc, or indirectly, via www.domain web pages).

This isn't a case of someone collecting various personal data, and then
making it all available to anyone who asks (whois might be, but that's
not the issue here, not in any way at all - and irrespective of whether
or not whois is being "fixed").

The issue here is that some domains, typically domains which sell sub-domains,
like to believe that the data they have - ie: the list of names registered,
is their personal property, and no-one else should be able to get near it.

That's nonsense, and we shouldn't be doing anything to pander to that
opinion - if anything, being very explicit that there is no desire at all
to attempt to enforce any such notions is exactly what should be being
said.

kre



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Peter Koch <pk@TechFak.Uni-Bielefeld.DE>
Subject: Re: this week in dnssec, 10 years ago.
Date: Thu, 20 May 2004 23:59:25 +0200
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Surely someone would have come up with the following "solution" sooner or
later, I just didn't know it was as soon as 10 years back :-)

> > Subject: Thought on non-existant and wildcarded names
> > Date: Mon, 09 May 94 14:55:42 -0400

> > If it is desired to block NX walking, the recommended method is to add a
> > zone wide wildcard of the KEY type which asserts the nonexistence of

Obviously a wildcard in the "registry zone" eliminates the need for any
NXDOMAIN response and thus any "link" information coming from NSEC RRs, so
that the "pointer" part may carry bogus information. Now, that's replacing the
devil with ... and I can't believe me writing this.

-Peter

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Ben Laurie <ben@algroup.co.uk>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Thu, 20 May 2004 23:30:39 +0100
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Paul Vixie wrote:
>>I was just trying to counter what I perceived to be a possible sense
>>of "there's no possible reason why this issue should botther you" in
>>some of the comments in this thread.
> 
> 
> there's no possible reason why this issue should bother you.
> 
> if someone wants to enumerate the secondlevel names in a tld, they will
> do it using well understood data mining techniques including watching
> log files from busy mail and web and proxy servers, surfing the PTR's,
> spidering the web itself, or buying the ISC Domain Survey four times a
> year, or perhaps all of the above.
> 
> a tld operator's lack of desire for such enumeration cannot prevent it.
> and dnssec's lack of compatibility with the well known BINDist hack of
> turning off AXFR access or limiting it to well known addresses or TSIGs,
> does not mean that dnssec has something wrong with it.

It is my understanding that what NSEC2 tries to achieve is to make 
enumeration no easier than it is with plain DNS. Clearly there is no 
point in doing more than this.

Cheers,

Ben.

-- 
http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html       http://www.thebunker.net/

"There is no limit to what a man can do or how far he can go if he
doesn't mind who gets the credit." - Robert Woodruff

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Simon Josefsson <jas@extundo.com>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Thu, 20 May 2004 22:52:22 +0000 (UTC)
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Jim Reid <jim <at> rfc1035.com> writes:

> And while it would be nice if DNSSEC didn't make zone traversal
> easy -- like your now dead NO record draft tried to do -- it's
> so far been too hard to find a way of doing that which works for
> all possibilities for authenticated proof of non-existence. If
> there weren't so many tricky corner cases, especially with
> wildcards, no doubt something like your NO record would have
> been incorporated into the current drafts.

What was wrong with the wildcard handling in the expired NO draft?  I
don't recall pending technical issues last time.  Anyway, solving
wildcard handling is a simple technical matter, despite its
complexities.  I haven't seen anyone seriously suggesting it is
strictly impossible to solve it.

>     Simon> The alternatives to NSEC do reduce the attack vector into
>     Simon> an offline dictionary attack, which I believe is an
>     Simon> acceptable risk.
> 
> If the rewards for a successful attack are high enough, this isn't an
> acceptable risk. How much would it cost to implement SHA-1 in
> hardware, assuming there aren't chips that can do this already?

My point was that nobody would bother to do dictionary attacks on
SHA-1 hashes when they can do online dictionary attacks more easily.
And online dictionary attacks cannot be prevented currently.  So the
attack has been mitigated beyond other currently acceptably attack
vectors.

Regards,
Simon



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Simon Josefsson <jas@extundo.com>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Thu, 20 May 2004 23:21:14 +0000 (UTC)
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Robert Elz <kre <at> munnari.OZ.AU> writes:

> ps: the section in question in the security considerations shouldn't be
> there at all - not just the final sentence of it, the whole thing.   There
> is no security implication in being able to find out the names in a DNS
> zone file.   That's the point of the DNS.

There can be security implications in finding out names of hosts in a domain,
without knowing the names in advance.  See for instance:

  Steven M. Bellovin, "Using the Domain Name System for System Break-Ins", in
  Proceedings of the Fifth Usenix UNIX Security Symposium, Salt Lake City, UT,
  June, 1995. http://www.research.att.com/~smb/papers/dnshack.pdf

Yes, the attack requires weaknesses in other applications, but the point is that
access to the information about names in a domain, acquired via zone transfers,
helped an attacker.  This still holds, for new not yet public weaknesses in
various applications.

Perhaps core of the problem is to realize that public data, handled in some
ways, can become a privacy or security issue, however paradoxical it may sound
at first.  A nice write-up that expand on this theme is:

  http://www.cs.uwyo.edu/~rex/privacy.html

Regards,
Simon



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: "Hallam-Baker, Phillip" <pbaker@verisign.com>
Subject: RE: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Thu, 20 May 2004 16:57:54 -0700
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Interesting.

I am trying to work out the reason for the hash iterations.


Let us call the set of names in the zone 
	D = {d0, d1, d2, d3 ... dn}

The problem is to be able to enumerate the inverse of the set
	D' = { ]d0-d1[, ]d1-d2[ ... ]dn-d0[ }

It suffices to present one member of D' to prove that any given domain is
not a member of D.

To describe a member of D we simply specify dx, dx+1


So what you are saying is that we do not need to deal with D, we can apply a
one way function...

	HD = {H(d0), H(d1), ... H(dn) }

	HD' = { { ]H(d0)-H(d1)[, ]H(d1)-H(d2)[ ... ]H(dn)-H(d0)[ }

So why do we need to specify more than H(dx), (H(dx+1)) ???




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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Roy Badami <roy@gnomon.org.uk>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Fri, 21 May 2004 01:41:13 +0100
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>>>>> "Olaf" == Olaf Kolkman <olaf@ripe.net> writes:

    Olaf> As far as I understand the security properties of the
    Olaf> proposed technology are such that changes are needed to the
    Olaf> protocol as in DNSSEC-bis. This means that we have to
    Olaf> introduce a flag day.

It's not obviously (to me) an incredibly nasty flag day.  If there is
a real desire to do this subsequently, zones can be given a choice of
publishing NSEC or NSEC2 records or both.  The flag day is then the
day on which publishing NSEC records ceases to be mandatory.  On this
day, old resolvers which don't understand the NSEC2 RR will start
getting resolution failures for non-existent domains, rather than
getting a clean NXDOMAIN answer.

Whilst not entirely ideal behaviour, this is potentially a manageable
scenario...

	-roy

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Mark Andrews <Mark_Andrews@isc.org>
Subject: Re: this week in dnssec, 10 years ago.
Date: Fri, 21 May 2004 10:05:31 +1000
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> Surely someone would have come up with the following "solution" sooner or
> later, I just didn't know it was as soon as 10 years back :-)
> 
> > > Subject: Thought on non-existant and wildcarded names
> > > Date: Mon, 09 May 94 14:55:42 -0400
> 
> > > If it is desired to block NX walking, the recommended method is to add a
> > > zone wide wildcard of the KEY type which asserts the nonexistence of
> 
> Obviously a wildcard in the "registry zone" eliminates the need for any
> NXDOMAIN response and thus any "link" information coming from NSEC RRs, so
> that the "pointer" part may carry bogus information. Now, that's replacing th
> e
> devil with ... and I can't believe me writing this.
> 
> -Peter

	Actually it doesn't "registry zones" are treated like any
	other zone for validation.

	The wildcard response still need the NOQNAME proof to be
	sent to prove that the wildcard is actually the correct
	response and not a forged the response.  The NOQNAME proof
	will also prove if it is the correct wildcard answering the
	query or not. 

	NSEC2 does not supply the information to determine if the
	correct wildcard has been presented.  This is in the owner
	and next names of the NOQNAME NSEC proof.
 
	NXDOMAIN needs two proofs to be sent NOQNAME and NOWILDCARD
	(these may be the same NSEC record).  A wildcard response
	remove the need for the NOWILDCARD proof.

	For NSEC2 to work you would also have to send additional records.

	If the qname was a.b.c.d.e.f.example the NOQNAME proof becomes.
	one of:

	f.example does not exist.
	or
	a proof that f.example exist and a proof that e.f.example does not
	exist.
	or
	a proof that e.f.example exists and a proof that d.e.f.example does
	not exist.
	or
	a proof that d.e.f.example exists and a proof that c.d.e.f.example
	does not exist.
	or
	a proof that c.d.e.f.example exist and a proof that b.d.e.f.example
	does not exist.
	or
	a.b.c.d.e.f.example does not exist and a proof that b.d.e.f.example
	exist.

	The additional proof is to prove that there is no delegation,
	empty non-terminal.  From the above you can determine the
	correct wildcard that should be matched or the correct
	NOWILDCARD proof to look for.

	NSEC2 would also require a NSEC record for every empty
	non-terminal node.  ENUM will love this:-).

	Under NSEC there is implicit information buried in the
	names.  This has to be made explicit under NSEC2.

	Note: This is *just* a technical analysis of the proposal.

	Mark

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1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: Mark_Andrews@isc.org

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Paul Vixie <vixie@vix.com>
Subject: Re: New versions of DNSSECbis drafts posted
Date: 21 May 2004 01:22:13 +0000
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erik@zoneedit.com (Erik Aronesty) writes:

> Quick question:  if ip-spoofing were impossible, would DNSSEC be obsolete?

no.  dnssec creates end to end trust between a zone owner/editor/publisher
and a resolver.  attacks it guards against include not only ip spoofing, but
corrupting forwarders like NAT boxes, and corrupt authority servers.
-- 
Paul Vixie

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Masataka Ohta <mohta@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp>
Subject: Re: New versions of DNSSECbis drafts posted
Date: Fri, 21 May 2004 11:05:59 +0900
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Paul Vixie wrote:

> erik@zoneedit.com (Erik Aronesty) writes:
> 
> 
>>Quick question:  if ip-spoofing were impossible, would DNSSEC be obsolete?

Yes.

> no.  dnssec creates end to end trust between a zone owner/editor/publisher
> and a resolver.  attacks it guards against include not only ip spoofing, but
> corrupting forwarders like NAT boxes, and corrupt authority servers.

Anything behind NAT does not worth considering.

Corrupt authority servers are just as harmful and likely as
corrupt resolvers.

Moreover, complexity of DNSSEC increases the possibility of
resolver corrupts, a lot.

							Masataka Ohta


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Mark Andrews <Mark_Andrews@isc.org>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Fri, 21 May 2004 12:34:35 +1000
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> Robert Elz <kre <at> munnari.OZ.AU> writes:
> 
> > ps: the section in question in the security considerations shouldn't be
> > there at all - not just the final sentence of it, the whole thing.   There
> > is no security implication in being able to find out the names in a DNS
> > zone file.   That's the point of the DNS.
> 
> There can be security implications in finding out names of hosts in a domain,
> without knowing the names in advance.  See for instance:
> 
>   Steven M. Bellovin, "Using the Domain Name System for System Break-Ins", in
>   Proceedings of the Fifth Usenix UNIX Security Symposium, Salt Lake City, UT
> ,
>   June, 1995. http://www.research.att.com/~smb/papers/dnshack.pdf
> 
> Yes, the attack requires weaknesses in other applications, but the point is t
> hat
> access to the information about names in a domain, acquired via zone transfer
> s,
> helped an attacker.  This still holds, for new not yet public weaknesses in
> various applications.

	It also demonstrates that there are security implications for
	*not* knowing all the names and attached data in advance.

	If you want to allow rlogins from a namespace you have to have
	a local copy of that namespace.  This was a case were allowing
	AXFR *fixed* part of the security issues as it allowed you to
	get the local copy.

> Perhaps core of the problem is to realize that public data, handled in some
> ways, can become a privacy or security issue, however paradoxical it may soun
> d
> at first.  A nice write-up that expand on this theme is:
> 
>   http://www.cs.uwyo.edu/~rex/privacy.html
> 
> Regards,
> Simon
> 
> --
> to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
> the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
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1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: Mark_Andrews@isc.org

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: "Sal Mangiapane" <salm@servanttechnology.com>
Subject: RE: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Thu, 20 May 2004 22:47:25 -0400
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> > This blatantly ignores the completely common case where
> > the set of recursive/caching/resolving nameservers for an
> > organization are separate from the set of authoritative
> > nameservers 


These DNS servers can receive a trusted response but could not respond
to the originating request with a trusted (signed) answer.
They can't because they are unknown by authoritative nameservers.
I'm thinking they are outside the chain of trust.
What am I missing?  Will these become obsolete?


Regards,

Sal

Salvatore Mangiapane

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Ben Laurie <ben@algroup.co.uk>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Fri, 21 May 2004 06:02:56 +0100
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Hallam-Baker, Phillip wrote:

> Interesting.
> 
> I am trying to work out the reason for the hash iterations.
> 
> 
> Let us call the set of names in the zone 
> 	D = {d0, d1, d2, d3 ... dn}
> 
> The problem is to be able to enumerate the inverse of the set
> 	D' = { ]d0-d1[, ]d1-d2[ ... ]dn-d0[ }
> 
> It suffices to present one member of D' to prove that any given domain is
> not a member of D.
> 
> To describe a member of D we simply specify dx, dx+1
> 
> 
> So what you are saying is that we do not need to deal with D, we can apply a
> one way function...
> 
> 	HD = {H(d0), H(d1), ... H(dn) }
> 
> 	HD' = { { ]H(d0)-H(d1)[, ]H(d1)-H(d2)[ ... ]H(dn)-H(d0)[ }
> 
> So why do we need to specify more than H(dx), (H(dx+1)) ???

To increase the cost of dictionary attacks.

Cheers,

Ben.

-- 
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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Simon Josefsson <jas@extundo.com>
Subject: Re: this week in dnssec, 10 years ago.
Date: Fri, 21 May 2004 10:33:02 +0200
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Mark Andrews <Mark_Andrews@isc.org> writes:

>> Surely someone would have come up with the following "solution" sooner or
>> later, I just didn't know it was as soon as 10 years back :-)
>> 
>> > > Subject: Thought on non-existant and wildcarded names
>> > > Date: Mon, 09 May 94 14:55:42 -0400
>> 
>> > > If it is desired to block NX walking, the recommended method is to add a
>> > > zone wide wildcard of the KEY type which asserts the nonexistence of
>> 
>> Obviously a wildcard in the "registry zone" eliminates the need for any
>> NXDOMAIN response and thus any "link" information coming from NSEC RRs, so
>> that the "pointer" part may carry bogus information. Now, that's replacing th
>> e
>> devil with ... and I can't believe me writing this.
>> 
>> -Peter
>
> 	Actually it doesn't "registry zones" are treated like any
> 	other zone for validation.
>
> 	The wildcard response still need the NOQNAME proof to be
> 	sent to prove that the wildcard is actually the correct
> 	response and not a forged the response.  The NOQNAME proof
> 	will also prove if it is the correct wildcard answering the
> 	query or not. 
>
> 	NSEC2 does not supply the information to determine if the
> 	correct wildcard has been presented.  This is in the owner
> 	and next names of the NOQNAME NSEC proof.

No, I believe sufficient information is present.  To verify that any
wildcard RR doesn't cover the queried name, you compute a few SHA-1
hashes on the only possible wildcard owner names that can be relevant,
and compare with the additional NO records returned.  This logic was
described in the NO draft.

Regards,
Simon


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Marcos Sanz/Denic <sanz@denic.de>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Fri, 21 May 2004 10:45:47 +0200
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Olaf,

> If I do not see rough consensus on taking up NSEC2 as a work item by
> June 1 I'll reject this as a work item.

Thanks to the chairs for hearing the voices of those stating they have a 
deployment problem with the specification in its current form.

While it is true that DNSSec has a long and painful story tracking back to 
10 years ago, that's plainly because the protocol itself isn't so easy as 
thought in the beginning. I wouldn't like to see these kind of 
retrospective arguments bound to the future of proposals to solve the NSEC 
traversal.

Regards,
Marcos

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Fri, 21 May 2004 09:54:37 +0100
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>>>>> "Roy" == Roy Badami <roy@gnomon.org.uk> writes:

    Roy> If ccTLD operators suggest that this might be an issue for
    Roy> them, then it is IMHO unreasonable for anyone (other than a
    Roy> lawyer versed in this area) to tell them they are wrong.

I don't believe anyone here is claiming they are wrong or that their
concerns about EU directives are invalid. As you say only a clueful
lawyer can make that determination. I do think it's wrong however to
attempt to solve layer 9 problems by redesigning a protocol.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Ben Laurie <ben@algroup.co.uk>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Fri, 21 May 2004 10:27:25 +0100
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Ben Laurie wrote:

> Paul Vixie wrote:
> 
>>> I was just trying to counter what I perceived to be a possible sense
>>> of "there's no possible reason why this issue should botther you" in
>>> some of the comments in this thread.
>>
>>
>>
>> there's no possible reason why this issue should bother you.
>>
>> if someone wants to enumerate the secondlevel names in a tld, they will
>> do it using well understood data mining techniques including watching
>> log files from busy mail and web and proxy servers, surfing the PTR's,
>> spidering the web itself, or buying the ISC Domain Survey four times a
>> year, or perhaps all of the above.
>>
>> a tld operator's lack of desire for such enumeration cannot prevent it.
>> and dnssec's lack of compatibility with the well known BINDist hack of
>> turning off AXFR access or limiting it to well known addresses or TSIGs,
>> does not mean that dnssec has something wrong with it.
> 
> 
> It is my understanding that what NSEC2 tries to achieve is to make 
> enumeration no easier than it is with plain DNS. Clearly there is no 
> point in doing more than this.

Actually, I'll take that back, there may be a point in doing more, but 
there's certainly an argument that suggests that its reasonable to 
expect not to be in a worse position by virtue of switching from DNS to 
DNSSEC.

Cheers,

Ben.

-- 
http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html       http://www.thebunker.net/

"There is no limit to what a man can do or how far he can go if he
doesn't mind who gets the credit." - Robert Woodruff

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Alex Bligh <alex@alex.org.uk>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Fri, 21 May 2004 13:26:56 +0100
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Paul Vixie wrote:
> i agree with ted.  dns is a publication mechanism, and if you don't want
> something published you probably shouldn't be putting it into dns at all.
> and, if your only way to keep whois safe is to hide its index, then you
> have probably got other troubles.  parts of the "index" are exposed every
> day in server logs or in-addr.arpa/ip6.arpa walks.

With respect Paul, I think you are handwaving. The wish to have data
published in response to a specific query is not necessarily commensurate
with the wish to have it published under any circumstances whatsoever.
Many people write emails, and thus publish their email addresses. This
does not necessarily mean they want them compiled into lists of email
addresses, associated with other data, and sold as a database.

Current DNS protocol and servers allow a granularity of policy decision on
what gets published, when, and to whom. The currently proposals for DNSSEC
would remove the ability of DNSSEC users to take advantage of that
granularity (i.e. they reduce current functionality that is in use, and
wanted, at least by a significant subset of users)

Whether or not making use of a function that prevents publication of entire
zone files is desirable is a policy question, and not a protocol question.
However, given that the current DNSSEC proposals remove functionality that
is in use (prevention of publication of entire zone files), it's worth a
few of lines describing why removal of that functionality is important.

The problem has been described as simply a legal problem. Whilst indeed
there are EU law considerations, I am aware that the IETF's approach to
legal problems in the past has often been "fix the law"; and indeed, often
rightly so.

However, the problem goes beyond that. In this instance, in my opinion, the
law is merely a symptom of what people want. RFC1591 talks about the local
internet community. In the UK, and the rest of the EU, people are perhaps
more sensitive to privacy issues than they seem to be in the US. Hence, if
you sign up for a phone here, you have the (legal) right to have your
number listed in directory enquiries, but not to have your name included in
a database of names and phone numbers sold to others by the phone company,
and indeed the phone company has an obligation not to distribute the data
for purposes other than those for which it collected it. That legal right
is based on widely held beliefs about privacy. I picked the phone book
example because it's the closest I could find to DNS. And there is a
strongly held local internet community (in an RFC1591 sense) views that
such privacy should continue to apply. See for instance item 8 at:
  http://tinyurl.com/2l59u

I'm posting this rest of this message in a personal capacity, but as a
director of Nominet since it started, and a member of its policy advisory
board, I'll submit the following: the issue of zonefile protection has been
a very significant issue for stakeholders, and an issue on which we
(Nominet) have spent a considerable amount of time and money. And the
reason we've done this is not for narrow commercial advantage, but because
over the past years we've come to realize it's an important matter to the
local community. That's why we are concerned about protocol changes which
remove our ability to do protect zonefiles. My understanding is that
several other ccTLDs have the same concerns for similar reason.

Alex

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Roy Badami <roy@gnomon.org.uk>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Fri, 21 May 2004 14:15:20 +0100
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>>>>> "Alex" == Alex Bligh <alex@alex.org.uk> writes:

    Alex> See for instance item 8 at: http://tinyurl.com/2l59u

And although Alex doesn't state this explicitly, the PAB minutes
available at the URL above seem to indicate that it is Nominet's
stated policy that zone file protection takes precedence over DNSSEC
deployment.

Which means for me (as an end user) that I won't be getting a secure
delegation of my .org.uk domain in the foreseeable future...

	   -roy


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Alex Bligh <alex@alex.org.uk>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Fri, 21 May 2004 14:44:17 +0100
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	Alex Bligh <alex@alex.org.uk>
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--On 21 May 2004 14:15 +0100 Roy Badami <roy@gnomon.org.uk> wrote:

> And although Alex doesn't state this explicitly, the PAB minutes
> available at the URL above seem to indicate that it is Nominet's
> stated policy that zone file protection takes precedence over DNSSEC
> deployment.

We are constrained by what is legal, and guided by what our stakeholders
want. Enumerable zonefiles seem to have problems on both grounds.
My assessment is that there is (perhaps wrongly) rather more stakeholder
interest in privacy aspects than DNSsec (to which the normal answer
is "what?").

> Which means for me (as an end user) that I won't be getting a secure
> delegation of my .org.uk domain in the foreseeable future...

This would depend in part on whether or not the problem is fixable or
workroundable via NSEC2 or some other way. Nominet would love to deploy it,
indeed it's been a strategic objective for over a year:
 http://tinyurl.com/2mk8f

Alex

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Fri, 21 May 2004 15:11:37 +0100
Lines: 59
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
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   of "Fri, 21 May 2004 13:26:56 BST." <261518784.1085146016@[192.168.100.5]> 
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>>>>> "Alex" == Alex Bligh <alex@alex.org.uk> writes:

This discussion is getting off-topic for this list which is supposed
to be about DNS protocol issues.

    Alex> With respect Paul, I think you are handwaving. The wish to
    Alex> have data published in response to a specific query is not
    Alex> necessarily commensurate with the wish to have it published
    Alex> under any circumstances whatsoever.  Many people write
    Alex> emails, and thus publish their email addresses. This does
    Alex> not necessarily mean they want them compiled into lists of
    Alex> email addresses, associated with other data, and sold as a
    Alex> database.

With all respect, I think this is hand waving too. Anyone with half a
clue will realise that by publishing their email address, they have no
control over what others may do with that data. Even when there are
supposedly the safeguards of data protection and anti-spam legislation.
For instance, by responding to this mail I accept the risk that
someone may harvest my address and send me spam even though I don't
want them to do that. Going back to DNS, I doubt very much if anyone
registering a domain name in a TLD cares or even realises that the
whole TLD zone file might be available. Or not as the case may be.
They just want their domain name visible through the DNS protocol.

    Alex> However, the problem goes beyond that. In this instance, in
    Alex> my opinion, the law is merely a symptom of what people want.

A discussion about "what people want" is well off-topic for this list.

    Alex> That's why we are concerned about protocol
    Alex> changes which remove our ability to do protect zonefiles.

It's still not clear to me what those concerns actually are and why
traversing the zone file is such a worry. Maybe I'm just being more
stupid than usual. As Paul has pointed out, there are plenty of ways
of enumerating a TLD zone today, with or without some flavour of
DNSSEC, irrespective of whether zone transfers are possible. If the
concern is NSEC records makes whois disclosure easier, then fix whois:
that's where the personal data lives after all. That data isn't in the
DNS. If it's about copyright, the copyright holder's rights should
still apply. Just like record companies sell copyrighted material on
(copy-protected) CDs but are able to pursue anyone who illegally
duplicates that material.

In some respects, zone traversal might actually alleviate the concerns
of these TLDs. Suppose you put a delegation into the zone that doesn't
have a genuine whois entry or a registrar or end user. The delegated
zone has no web server or MX records so nothing other than the domain
name itself is ever published. And that's found by walking the NSEC
list. If this name pops up in your query logs, voila! The honey trap
has found someone who's up to no good and you can set your lawyers on
them.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Simon Josefsson <jas@extundo.com>
Subject: Re: relevent?
Date: Fri, 21 May 2004 16:13:40 +0200
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	<20040521122333.GA20885@vacation.karoshi.com.>
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bmanning@vacation.karoshi.com writes:

>> No, I believe sufficient information is present.  To verify that any
>> wildcard RR doesn't cover the queried name, you compute a few SHA-1
>> hashes on the only possible wildcard owner names that can be relevant,
>
> 	thats a bit presumptious, don't you think?  how can you 
> 	possibly determine relevant, possible owner names?

I may have misunderstood something.  Here is how I perceive things.

Consider any query for a non-existing name a.b.c.d.e.f.com in the zone
f.com.  To prove that a.b.c.d.e.f.com doesn't exist, the server has to
return records proving that the following names do not exist:

a.b.c.d.e.f.com
*.b.c.d.e.f.com
*.c.d.e.f.com
*.d.e.f.com
*.e.f.com
*.f.com

This is the same for NXT, NSEC and presumably all alternatives as
well.

With NXT/NSEC, the verifier can read the "next owner name" field of
the RRs, and make sure all above names are included in the range of
some of the returned RRs.

Since alternative solution doesn't have a "next owner name" field,
this technique doesn't work.  But the above set of possibly relevant
owner names is always a small number, so the verifier can compute the
hash of each of the above strings and verify that all are included in
the range of all NO RRs returned.

The only difference in processing is that during each wildcard
iteration, you compare the hash of the name instead of the name, with
what is stored in the returned RRs.

The second complication due to wildcard names is that when the
response exists and is a wildcard name, you must also prove that no
more specific owner name exists.  The logic is a bit different, but I
believe there is no problem implementing it with hashed names.

Were you thinking of some other problem?  Or is my reasoning flawed?

Regards,
Simon

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@MIT.EDU>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Fri, 21 May 2004 10:24:43 -0400
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On Fri, 2004-05-21 at 04:54, Jim Reid wrote:
> I don't believe anyone here is claiming they are wrong or that their
> concerns about EU directives are invalid. As you say only a clueful
> lawyer can make that determination. I do think it's wrong however to
> attempt to solve layer 9 problems by redesigning a protocol.

So, I don't support modifying NSEC, but this attitude that legal
requirements should never have any impact whatsoever on an IETF protocol
is weird.  You can't "solve" all layer 9 problems at the layer 9 level.

IETF protocols exist to meet people's needs.  People have needs for a
variety of reasons, including the presence of legal requirements.  We
certainly have the right to say "we think this need is bogus, or too
hard to meet, so we're going to punt on it," but to categorically
declare the need out of scope because it's "not technical" is sophistry.


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Fri, 21 May 2004 14:33:53 +0000
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References: <ben@algroup.co.uk>
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	of "Fri, 21 May 2004 10:27:25 +0100."
	<40ADCB7D.3030001@algroup.co.uk> 
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> > It is my understanding that what NSEC2 tries to achieve is to make
> > enumeration no easier than it is with plain DNS. Clearly there is no
> > point in doing more than this.
> 
> Actually, I'll take that back, there may be a point in doing more, but
> there's certainly an argument that suggests that its reasonable to expect
> not to be in a worse position by virtue of switching from DNS to DNSSEC.

So, "What Once Were Vices Are Now Habits" hits it fairly close, I guess.

I hereby renew my call that someone write a BCP describing the BINDism of
rejecting AXFR based on source address or lack-of-TSIG so that this can be
called a DNS protocol feature so that DNSSEC can be called incomplete
without it.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Alex Bligh <alex@alex.org.uk>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Fri, 21 May 2004 16:22:06 +0100
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Jim,

--On 21 May 2004 15:11 +0100 Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com> wrote:

(with apologies for reodering)

>>>>>> "Alex" == Alex Bligh <alex@alex.org.uk> writes:
>
> This discussion is getting off-topic for this list which is supposed
> to be about DNS protocol issues.
...
> A discussion about "what people want" is well off-topic for this list.

The protocol issue at stake is the removal of a piece of functionality
(granularity in zonefile protection). I think you agree that much. Whether
or not removal of functionality is acceptable depends on the value of that
functionality. AIUI Your view (and Paul's) is that it is valueless, and
thus removing it doesn't matter. I find it hard to see how you can on the
one hand assert this, and on the other describe as off-topic those
attempting to explain to you the value they have. Functionality does not
exist in an abstract space. What people want from their protocols (what is
useful vs. useless functionality) surely drives what gets included and what
doesn't.

> For instance, by responding to this mail I accept the risk that
> someone may harvest my address and send me spam even though I don't
> want them to do that.

Yep. But I am guessing you wouldn't want psg.com as list operator
to be complicit in it.

> Going back to DNS, I doubt very much if anyone
> registering a domain name in a TLD cares or even realises that the
> whole TLD zone file might be available.

That isn't what they tell us.

>     Alex> That's why we are concerned about protocol
>     Alex> changes which remove our ability to do protect zonefiles.
>
> It's still not clear to me what those concerns actually are and why
> traversing the zone file is such a worry. Maybe I'm just being more
> stupid than usual. As Paul has pointed out, there are plenty of ways
> of enumerating a TLD zone today, with or without some flavour of
> DNSSEC, irrespective of whether zone transfers are possible.

Paul has asserted out that a third party can make a partial, non-shapshot,
list of TLD zonefile contents over months. I don't dispute that. If
I spent three months on it, I bet I could work out a way to steal
a substantial proportion of your possessions. That doesn't make it
either right, or legal, or desirable, for your landlord to decide that
there is thus little point in putting a lock on your door. Despite
the fact that "bad things happen", the zonefile operator does not need
to be complicit in it or make it easier.

> If the
> concern is NSEC records makes whois disclosure easier, then fix whois:
> that's where the personal data lives after all.

> If it's about copyright, the copyright holder's rights should
> still apply.

IANAL but the difference AIUI is that under the proposed protocol, one
would be publishing the compilation (in which separate copyright exists)
oneself.

However, I don't want to reduce this to a legal argument as for me, at
least, that's only one portion of the argument. The fact is (see
references) stateholders in certain ccTLDs do not wish the zonefile to be
published by the ccTLD operator.

> honey trap

Easy enough without DNSSEC.

Alex

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:52 2006
From: Peter Koch <pk@TechFak.Uni-Bielefeld.DE>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Fri, 21 May 2004 17:32:13 +0200
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Derek Atkins wrote:

> Even if modern TLD CPUs can handle 10,000 RSA encryptions per second
> (my laptop tops out at around 2,000 with full-bore CPU usage), that
> just means I need to send you 10,000 requests per second.  That's

you're right that expensive responses ease DoS, but the potential is there
already. Even without malicious intent one would want to evaluate the
current NXDOMAIN/referral ratio to estimate the resources needed under
"normal" operations. Shouldn't be as bad as for the root servers.
For reaction to DoS it was already suggested to start dropping answers
if the number of NXDOMAIN responses grow over a certain threshold.

> The problem is that it's just too prone to DoS attacks....  Which is BAD.

I'm not saying it's easy.

-Peter

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: Peter Koch <pk@TechFak.Uni-Bielefeld.DE>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Fri, 21 May 2004 17:39:59 +0200
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{responding to Olaf and Ben in one message}

Olaf Kolkman wrote:

> There is no reason why one part of a zone cannot be signed with zone 
> signing key 1 and another
> signed with zone signing key 2. There is no need for signaling.

right, but if both keys are equally applicable a compromised "negative"
key (the one used for online signing) could be used to sign not only fake
negative responses but also fake DS RRs. The first can ``only'' be used
for DoS (leaving aside corner cases of DNS tree walking).
Whether this matters depends on whether one is willing to accept the risk.


Ben Laurie wrote:

> denial of the existence of the particular domain, rather than messing
> with NSEC records. If you had a signed denial, then the easy way to 
> signal it is to have an RR that is specifically for that purpose (that 
> is, when you receive a NOTHISDOESNTEXIST RR you expect it to be signed 
> with the special key used for that purpose alone).

the advantage of "messing with NSEC" is that it's there while any new RR type
needs more work.

-Peter

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: Alex Bligh <alex@alex.org.uk>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Fri, 21 May 2004 16:57:26 +0100
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Paul,

--On 21 May 2004 14:33 +0000 Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com> wrote:

>> Actually, I'll take that back, there may be a point in doing more, but
>> there's certainly an argument that suggests that its reasonable to expect
>> not to be in a worse position by virtue of switching from DNS to DNSSEC.
>
> So, "What Once Were Vices Are Now Habits" hits it fairly close, I guess.

I think the issue is that RFC1034 did not mandate, but equally did not
prohibit making zonefiles not enumerable (whether or not that prohibition
is BCP), whereas current DNSSEC does (effectively) prohibit it as NSEC
(which allows the behavior) is mandatory.

>From RFC1034:

	The secondary server must request a zone transfer via an AXFR
	request for the zone.  ** The AXFR may cause an error, such as
	refused **, but normally is answered by a sequence of response
	messages.

Alex

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: Jaap Akkerhuis <jaap@sidn.nl>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Fri, 21 May 2004 20:38:49 +0200
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I see a some of arguments being made about EU concerns over privacy.
The subject whether DNSSEC would be run into EU privacy concerns
pops up on a regular base in various places.

Therefore, SIDN, the Dutch registry, asked for an opinion of the
faculty of law of the University of Brabant. These people, all
lawyers, are specialized in privacy and the influence of crypto
technology on the law (and vice versa). They don't have no specialist
knowledge of the DNS, but know the role it has in the proper working
of the Internet.

I explained them the situation:

	Lots of ccTLDs are preventing zone transfers to be done by
	the public in general often using privacy concerns as the
	primary motif. I also explained that DNSSEC has this back
	door where you can get the names out of the zone by walking
	the NXT records. So the basic question was, is there really
	a concern that this backdoor might prevent the deployment
	of DNSSEC in Europe because of privacy regulation?

Note, this was before NSEC records existed. I'm sticking here to
the term NXT records to stay close to the original conversation.

They were willing to do an small study, and, if they thought that
there might be any problems, they would raise that and then we would
decide whether a larger study was necessary.

It resulted in:
	Tilburg University (B.J. Koops & E. Schreuders), Quickscan
	DNSsec/NXT and privacy, March 2003 (unpublished).

It is not really big, I give here a translation from the Dutch,
leaving out some of the details.

	We don't think that there is a special privacy problem with
	the deployment of DNSSEC caused by the NXT walking which
	would give you a list of names which might be used to query
	the whois service.  The privacy rules are already in force
	by the Wbp (Dutch privacy law, fully implementing the EU
	directives --j) and the regulation of the registry.  (I'm
	skipping the details they quote from court cases and articles
	in our regulations --j).

	DNSsec only offers something new by the capability to get
	a list of domain names. This list is irrelevant from a
	privacy point of view, only the combination with the whois
	database gives the list personal sensitive information (with
	the exception that of domain names such as michaeljfox.com,
	vix.com and jaap-akkerhuis.nl).  Possible problems occur
	when the list is used for interrogating the whois database.
	But for that, there are already existing rules so DNSsec
	doesn't add any problems.

        In short, the back door can give personal data but only
        in combination with whois for which is existing regulation.

Although they don't claim that they didn't do "fundamental research",
We (SIDN) would have been happy to pay for such a study as well,
but they refused, since they thought that such a study would have
a very similar outcome.

So, we concluded that the NXT walking (now NSEC) and (EU) privacy
concerns would not be a show stopper for introducing DNSSEC in the
NL zone.

On this list in this context I noticed that also concernsabout the
IP-rights (Intellectual Property rights) popped up, like one had
on a telephone directory. (There the data is also meant to be public,
but on how it is organized there are IP rights). You cannot just
copy a directory because of that. For a zone file you can claim
this probably as well. That gives you a handle to whack people
making copies. We discussed this internally somewhat.  We think
that IP-rights on a zone file is an interesting idea, but doesn't
prevent zone enumeration. It has more juridical aspects then
technical.

Back to (EU and other) pivacy concerns. Given the fact that there
are multiple ways to do data mining for domain names in a zone as
pointed out by Paul Vixie and Robert Elz, one really must take steps
to limit access to "whois data".

	jaap

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: Mark Kosters <markk@verisignlabs.com>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Fri, 21 May 2004 15:34:41 -0400
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On Fri, May 21, 2004 at 10:45:47AM +0200, Marcos Sanz/Denic wrote:
> Olaf,
> 
> > If I do not see rough consensus on taking up NSEC2 as a work item by
> > June 1 I'll reject this as a work item.
> 
> Thanks to the chairs for hearing the voices of those stating they have a 
> deployment problem with the specification in its current form.
> 
> While it is true that DNSSec has a long and painful story tracking back to 
> 10 years ago, that's plainly because the protocol itself isn't so easy as 
> thought in the beginning. I wouldn't like to see these kind of 
> retrospective arguments bound to the future of proposals to solve the NSEC 
> traversal.

I have mixed feelings about this. 

Despite us having zones available to download (after signing an agreement
not to use this data in a harmful way), NSEC walking is going happen.
They will do this out of ignorance or malfeasance.  Rate limiting will 
be of some limited benefit but will not solve the issue.* What it does for us 
is increase load on systems serving up responses that serve no purpose. Thus,
I would like to see some sort of way of reducing this behavior from occuring.

Also, registries have the convergence of protocol improvements, operational
realities, and political pressures. To that end, I sympathize with
other registries as they think about how to deploy this monster.
I hope that some of you who stomped your feet at Roy, Dave, and I over 
opt-in would open your minds, listen and help solve this issue.

On the flip side, I too like to see dnssec deployed in the near future.
Unfortunately, it will not happen if the pain is worse than the gain.

Thanks,
Mark

* I think that the rate-limiting sentence should be taken out of the
intro draft - it will not work except in the most trivial cases.

-- 

Mark Kosters            markk@verisignlabs.com       Verisign Applied Research

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: Alex Bligh <alex@alex.org.uk>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Fri, 21 May 2004 20:42:46 +0100
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--On 21 May 2004 20:38 +0200 Jaap Akkerhuis <jaap@sidn.nl> wrote:

> For a zone file you can claim
> this probably as well. That gives you a handle to whack people
> making copies.

The (expensive, uncertain) legal "handle to whack people" doing something
unlawful is no substitute for stopping them doing it in the first place.
That's the same reason you have a lock on your front door despite laws
against theft, and (bring this back to a protocol level) the same reason we
promote strong encryption in protocols such as DNSSEC despite computer
crime and fraud laws. If we said in a more general case "we'll leave this
out the protocol and let them sort out the consequences in court" we might
as well not do DNSSEC, and just pay investigators and lawyers to go verify
whether DNS records are accurate and sue if not.

Whilst the legal point is interesting, my main argument is from a
functionality point of view.

Alex

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: Mark Andrews <Mark_Andrews@isc.org>
Subject: Re: relevent?
Date: Sat, 22 May 2004 09:11:31 +1000
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> bmanning@vacation.karoshi.com writes:
> 
> >> No, I believe sufficient information is present.  To verify that any
> >> wildcard RR doesn't cover the queried name, you compute a few SHA-1
> >> hashes on the only possible wildcard owner names that can be relevant,
> >
> > 	thats a bit presumptious, don't you think?  how can you 
> > 	possibly determine relevant, possible owner names?
> 
> I may have misunderstood something.  Here is how I perceive things.
> 
> Consider any query for a non-existing name a.b.c.d.e.f.com in the zone
> f.com.  To prove that a.b.c.d.e.f.com doesn't exist, the server has to
> return records proving that the following names do not exist:
> 
> a.b.c.d.e.f.com
> *.b.c.d.e.f.com
> *.c.d.e.f.com
> *.d.e.f.com
> *.e.f.com
> *.f.com
> 
> This is the same for NXT, NSEC and presumably all alternatives as
> well.

	You obviously don't understand the "closest encloser"
	restrictions.  ONLY ONE AND EXACTLY ONE of those wildcards
	is relevent.

	You need to know what names exist to determine which wildcard
	to use.  NSEC provides this information in the owner and next
	names (yes both of these are required not just the next name).

	For NO/NSEC2 the information required to determine this has
	to be explicitly provided.

	The actual set of proofs reqired are

		!f.com + !*.com 
	or
		!e.f.com + !*.f.com + %f.com
	or
		!d.e.f.com + !*.e.f.com + %e.f.com
	or
		!c.d.e.f.com + !*.d.e.f.com + %d.e.f.com
	or
		!b.c.d.e.f.com + !*.c.d.e.f.com + %c.d.e.f.com
	or
		!a.b.c.d.e.f.com + !*.b.c.d.e.f.com + %b.c.d.e.f.com

	! == not exist
	% == exist

	I don't believe NO had this as general DNSSEC did not have this
	specified at the time.
	
	Mark
 
> With NXT/NSEC, the verifier can read the "next owner name" field of
> the RRs, and make sure all above names are included in the range of
> some of the returned RRs.
> 
> Since alternative solution doesn't have a "next owner name" field,
> this technique doesn't work.  But the above set of possibly relevant
> owner names is always a small number, so the verifier can compute the
> hash of each of the above strings and verify that all are included in
> the range of all NO RRs returned.
> 
> The only difference in processing is that during each wildcard
> iteration, you compare the hash of the name instead of the name, with
> what is stored in the returned RRs.
> 
> The second complication due to wildcard names is that when the
> response exists and is a wildcard name, you must also prove that no
> more specific owner name exists.  The logic is a bit different, but I
> believe there is no problem implementing it with hashed names.
> 
> Were you thinking of some other problem?  Or is my reasoning flawed?
> 
> Regards,
> Simon
> 
> --
> to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
> the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
> archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>
--
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: Mark_Andrews@isc.org

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: Mark Andrews <Mark_Andrews@isc.org>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Sat, 22 May 2004 09:40:23 +1000
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> I see a some of arguments being made about EU concerns over privacy.
> The subject whether DNSSEC would be run into EU privacy concerns
> pops up on a regular base in various places.
> 
> Therefore, SIDN, the Dutch registry, asked for an opinion of the
> faculty of law of the University of Brabant. These people, all
> lawyers, are specialized in privacy and the influence of crypto
> technology on the law (and vice versa). They don't have no specialist
> knowledge of the DNS, but know the role it has in the proper working
> of the Internet.
> 
> I explained them the situation:
> 
> 	Lots of ccTLDs are preventing zone transfers to be done by
> 	the public in general often using privacy concerns as the
> 	primary motif. I also explained that DNSSEC has this back
> 	door where you can get the names out of the zone by walking
> 	the NXT records. So the basic question was, is there really
> 	a concern that this backdoor might prevent the deployment
> 	of DNSSEC in Europe because of privacy regulation?
> 
> Note, this was before NSEC records existed. I'm sticking here to
> the term NXT records to stay close to the original conversation.
> 
> They were willing to do an small study, and, if they thought that
> there might be any problems, they would raise that and then we would
> decide whether a larger study was necessary.
> 
> It resulted in:
> 	Tilburg University (B.J. Koops & E. Schreuders), Quickscan
> 	DNSsec/NXT and privacy, March 2003 (unpublished).
> 
> It is not really big, I give here a translation from the Dutch,
> leaving out some of the details.
> 
> 	We don't think that there is a special privacy problem with
> 	the deployment of DNSSEC caused by the NXT walking which
> 	would give you a list of names which might be used to query
> 	the whois service.  The privacy rules are already in force
> 	by the Wbp (Dutch privacy law, fully implementing the EU
> 	directives --j) and the regulation of the registry.  (I'm
> 	skipping the details they quote from court cases and articles
> 	in our regulations --j).
> 
> 	DNSsec only offers something new by the capability to get
> 	a list of domain names. This list is irrelevant from a
> 	privacy point of view, only the combination with the whois
> 	database gives the list personal sensitive information (with
> 	the exception that of domain names such as michaeljfox.com,
> 	vix.com and jaap-akkerhuis.nl).  Possible problems occur
> 	when the list is used for interrogating the whois database.
> 	But for that, there are already existing rules so DNSsec
> 	doesn't add any problems.
> 
>         In short, the back door can give personal data but only
>         in combination with whois for which is existing regulation.
> 
> Although they don't claim that they didn't do "fundamental research",
> We (SIDN) would have been happy to pay for such a study as well,
> but they refused, since they thought that such a study would have
> a very similar outcome.
> 
> So, we concluded that the NXT walking (now NSEC) and (EU) privacy
> concerns would not be a show stopper for introducing DNSSEC in the
> NL zone.
> 
> On this list in this context I noticed that also concernsabout the
> IP-rights (Intellectual Property rights) popped up, like one had
> on a telephone directory. (There the data is also meant to be public,
> but on how it is organized there are IP rights). You cannot just
> copy a directory because of that.

	But you can compile your own.  I seem to remember a court case
	here where OCR scanning of a existing directory was illegal but
	getting a team of typists to re-enter all the data in a
	existing directory was legal.

> For a zone file you can claim
> this probably as well. That gives you a handle to whack people
> making copies. We discussed this internally somewhat.  We think
> that IP-rights on a zone file is an interesting idea, but doesn't
> prevent zone enumeration. It has more juridical aspects then
> technical.
> 
> Back to (EU and other) pivacy concerns. Given the fact that there
> are multiple ways to do data mining for domain names in a zone as
> pointed out by Paul Vixie and Robert Elz, one really must take steps
> to limit access to "whois data".
> 
> 	jaap
> 
> --
> to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
> the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
> archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>
--
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: Mark_Andrews@isc.org

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: Simon Josefsson <jas@extundo.com>
Subject: Re: relevent?
Date: Sat, 22 May 2004 01:55:06 +0200
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Mark Andrews <Mark_Andrews@isc.org> writes:

> 	You need to know what names exist to determine which wildcard
> 	to use.  NSEC provides this information in the owner and next
> 	names (yes both of these are required not just the next name).
>
> 	For NO/NSEC2 the information required to determine this has
> 	to be explicitly provided.
>
> 	The actual set of proofs reqired are
>
> 		!f.com + !*.com 
> 	or
> 		!e.f.com + !*.f.com + %f.com
> 	or
> 		!d.e.f.com + !*.e.f.com + %e.f.com
> 	or
> 		!c.d.e.f.com + !*.d.e.f.com + %d.e.f.com
> 	or
> 		!b.c.d.e.f.com + !*.c.d.e.f.com + %c.d.e.f.com
> 	or
> 		!a.b.c.d.e.f.com + !*.b.c.d.e.f.com + %b.c.d.e.f.com
>
> 	! == not exist
> 	% == exist

And how is it impossible for NO/NSEC2 to support this?  How I see it
is that the verifier would compute a hash of all the following
strings:

 a.b.c.d.e.f.com
 *.b.c.d.e.f.com
 *.c.d.e.f.com
 *.d.e.f.com
 *.e.f.com
 *.f.com

The hashes for the positive proofs are also needed, i.e.:

f.com
e.f.com
d.e.f.com
c.d.e.f.com
b.c.d.e.f.com

Using those hash values, together with the returned records, the
client can discover which of your clauses hold (if any).  For example,
let's say we have the following (abbreviated hash values to simplify
reading, imagine they are full length SHA-1 hashes):

H(a.b.c.d.e.f.com) =  181
H(*.b.c.d.e.f.com) =  38383
H(*.c.d.e.f.com)   =  3292
H(*.d.e.f.com)     =  4959
H(*.e.f.com)       =  606
H(*.f.com)         =  1194

H(f.com)           =  5271
H(e.f.com)         =  14
H(d.e.f.com)       =  596
H(c.d.e.f.com)     =  94984
H(b.c.d.e.f.com)   =  903

Now let's assume the query is a.b.c.d.e.f.com and the returned NO
records are:

$ORIGIN _no.f.com
150 IN NO A 200  ;; the main proof that a.b.c.d.e.f.com (181) does not exist
;; Additional proofs:
550 IN NO A 650  ;; proves d.e.f.com (596) does not exist
550 IN NO A 650  ;; proves *.e.f.com (606) does not exist  (by chance, same record)
14  IN NO A 50   ;; proves e.f.com (14) exists

The verifier is able to discover that one out of all relevant wildcard
situations apply, in this case the third of your clause.  To do this
it simply iterates over all possible candidates (a small number).  The
client can now trust that a specific a.b.c.d.e.f.com do not exist, and
that e.f.com do exists but there is no d.e.f.com nor *.e.f.com.  So it
is able to authenticate denial of existence for ab.c.d.e.f.com.

If I'm going to understand why NO/NSEC2 doesn't work, please give more
details.

Thanks,
Simon

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: Roy Badami <roy@gnomon.org.uk>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Sat, 22 May 2004 01:00:16 +0100
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>>>>> "Mark" == Mark Andrews <Mark_Andrews@isc.org> writes:

    Mark> 	But you can compile your own.  I seem to remember a
    Mark> court case here where OCR scanning of a existing directory
    Mark> was illegal but getting a team of typists to re-enter all
    Mark> the data in a existing directory was legal.

Hmm, I'm kind of surprised that even OCR was illegal in the US.  But
there is a significant difference between UK and US copyright law in
this area.  AIUI in US copyright law there is an exclusion from
copyright for a unique, canonical representation of a set of data.  A
consistently formatted alphabeticised list of names and phone numbers
of all telephone users would hence fall into this category, since it
is not regarded as a creative work.

Many other jurisditions (certainly the UK) do not draw this
distinction.

	-roy

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: "Hallam-Baker, Phillip" <pbaker@verisign.com>
Subject: RE: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Fri, 21 May 2004 20:31:23 -0700
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> >>>>> "Roy" == Roy Badami <roy@gnomon.org.uk> writes:
> 
>     Roy> If ccTLD operators suggest that this might be an issue for
>     Roy> them, then it is IMHO unreasonable for anyone (other than a
>     Roy> lawyer versed in this area) to tell them they are wrong.
> 
> I don't believe anyone here is claiming they are wrong or that their
> concerns about EU directives are invalid. As you say only a clueful
> lawyer can make that determination. I do think it's wrong however to
> attempt to solve layer 9 problems by redesigning a protocol.

I disagree. The ONLY purpose of the protocols is to solve layer 9 
problems. Layer 9 is PEOPLE. 

Roy is stating that this issue is a showstopper for him. Your proposal
is in effect saying that the IETF, an organization with zero internal
democracy and zero accountability should override European Union law
decided by the democratically appointed European parliament and the
council of ministers appointed by the democratically elected European
governments.

Please consider the fact that the IETF claim to be above international
law might just possibly be the result of a ridiculous degree of 
arrogance.

It is a valid point to say that the IETF may not have competence in 
this area, but that may well mean that the IETF does not have competence 
to write any specs whatsoever. if the legal interpretation is an issue 
I suggest that we ask Michael Froomkin or some other DNS savy lawyer
their opinion rather than saying, "I do not understand this issue, 
therefore I will not allow it to be raised."


It seems somewhat strange that people are arguing that the effects
of DNS zone walking are so well understood that no change could
possibly be required. The same people were arguing a little while 
ago that a minor change that would introduce the risk of severe
DNS operational instability should be rejected for the sole reason
that the implication of the change could not possibly be understood.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: "Hallam-Baker, Phillip" <pbaker@verisign.com>
Subject: RE: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Fri, 21 May 2004 20:31:22 -0700
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> > So why do we need to specify more than H(dx), (H(dx+1)) ???
> 
> To increase the cost of dictionary attacks.


Ben,

	I think that this risks turning a good proposal into one with a
questionable feature that will distract from the main value. Essentially all
you are arguing for here is an expensive hash function.

	The valud of crypto is that you can introduce asymmetric attack
costs. It is much harder for an attacker to break DES than it is for the
defender to encrypt their message - 2^55.5 times as hard in fact. That is a
real benefit.

	Here you just make the problem harder by an equal factor for
attacker and defender. That is not a core value here.


	Leaving aside that nit, the proposal has real value and adds real
security. The comparative attack analysis that has been offered is totally
bogus:

	The DNS system without DNSSEC provides a lookup function that
returns an answer to the question "is x a member of S" and returns a binary
response.

	With DNSSEC and NSEC you get a response "there are NO members of x
in the range a,b AND a,b are both members of S"


	Sorry, but anyone who claims that there is no security issue raised
here is speaking through their hat. The fact that I publish a binary
response function returning set membership does not mean that I am willing
to reveal the set. That is simply untrue. 

	The number of real world attacks that are made possible by revealing
S is very, very large and very, very significant. I know that there are folk
who dispute this in the IETF, remember however that there are people in the
IETF who have actively discouraged the deployment of firewalls in the past,
and some still do. Regardless of where you stand on that debate please
understand that the fact that if you want to deploy a security protocol it
had better meet the security requirements set by the security establishment.


	In the real world the fact that there is an easy way for an attacker
to discover the names of all my public facing machines is a really really
significant issue. In the real world 95% of attacks are made by people who
are clueless. In the real world security is risk management, not risk
elimination. If you do not believe me on this go talk to Bruce S. or read
Secrets and Lies. 

	In the real world every security incident costs real money. Filters
that catch 95% of the bozos save real money.


	The current NSEC record is bogus. It insists on addressing a
security issue that simply does not exist (securing insecure zones) while
refusing to address a real security issue which is rightly considered by
many to be a showstopper for adoption.

	If there was a logic to the IETF process we would ask people two
questions, first what are the showstoppers that would cause you not to
deploy? second why should we care? I know the IETF lives in a
crypto-communist la-la land where it is impolite to ask such questions but
the failure to do so is the reason that DNSSEC is still a failed spec ten
years on. The canonical texts for my company are Jim Collins, built to last
where facing the brutal facts is considered one key to success.

	My showstoppers are 1) the spec must be incrementally deployable in
large zones and 2) it must address the zone walking issue.

	The reason you should care is that I am one of the very few members
of the security field who has an interest in this group. I am Principal
Scientist of the security division of company that has major influence in
the Security field. I also have personal influence, as the author of XKMS,
and co-editor of SAML and WS-Security I can help convince key constituencies
that they should buy in to DNSSEC.

	The security community is not going to support a spec that
introduces a new security vulnerability that was not previously present and
introduces operational demands that threaten the stability of core DNS. As
the spec stands I cannot recommend it to my colleagues and in fact would
have to recommend that they do NOT deploy.

	With an updated NSEC record that meets the showstopper objections I
describe I will be in a position to recommend DNSSEC. I believe that it is
even possible that with a small amount of appropriate preparation work it
might be possible that MARID and MARID accreditations could serve as a
'killer-app' for DNSSEC. One important political point here is that a MARID
accreditation service would be outside the control of ICANN. Remember that
killer-app means, the app which motivates building the infrastructure, not
necessarily the most important app the infrastructure will serve. Email was
not the Internet killer app, everyone had to be online before it had value,
but now everyone is online email is more important than the web.


			Phill

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com>
Subject: Re: relevent?
Date: Sat, 22 May 2004 06:38:39 +0000
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> ...
> The verifier is able to discover that one out of all relevant wildcard
> situations apply, in this case the third of your clause.  To do this
> it simply iterates over all possible candidates (a small number). ...

it is not reasonable to ask a verifier to iterate in this additional way.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: Robert Elz <kre@munnari.OZ.AU>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Sat, 22 May 2004 13:53:05 +0700
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    Date:        Fri, 21 May 2004 20:31:23 -0700
    From:        "Hallam-Baker, Phillip" <pbaker@verisign.com>
    Message-ID:  <C6DDA43B91BFDA49AA2F1E473732113EAA7755@mou1wnexm05.vcorp.ad.vrsn.com>

  | Roy is stating that this issue is a showstopper for him. Your proposal
  | is in effect saying that the IETF, an organization with zero internal
  | democracy and zero accountability should override European Union law

Don't be totally absurd.    As Jaap already showed (after more research
than the topic deserved), the European laws have nothing whatever to do
with this.   They're designed to protect the privacy of the individual,
who in this case, has given their domain name to the DNS operator to
publish - by request (or more likely, by contract, if the data weren't
published, there might be legal action involved).

Incidentally, nor does copyright, which has also been mentioned - in order
to get copyright protection, the item to be protected has to have been
published, which is exactly what the organisations that are objecting don't
want to do, they're trying to keep their list of names secret, which is
really the anthises of the whole purpose of the DNS.

If they were to publish it, they could get copyright protection, but as
they don't want that, they're resorting to all kinds of avenues to try
to keep the secret - which is, without doubt, difficult, or impossible.

kre


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: Simon Josefsson <jas@extundo.com>
Subject: Re: relevent?
Date: Sat, 22 May 2004 09:30:46 +0200
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Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com> writes:

>> ...
>> The verifier is able to discover that one out of all relevant wildcard
>> situations apply, in this case the third of your clause.  To do this
>> it simply iterates over all possible candidates (a small number). ...
>
> it is not reasonable to ask a verifier to iterate in this additional way.

Why not?

Are you worried about CPU efficiency?  The most computationally
expensive operation of the iteration is likely the hashing.  I don't
see anything else in the verification process that would take time;
the iteration over possible relevant names is over a small number,
typically <<100, and each loop compute a hash and can directly compare
the hash against the received NO/NSEC2 records.  You could cache some
of the hash computations to improve performance, but given the below I
doubt you would need that for performance reasons alone.

My box does ~1.000.000 SHA1 ops/second, compared to ~1.000 RSA 512 bit
verify ops/second, and ~200 RSA 1024 bit verify ops/second.

So it doesn't appear as CPU efficiency would be a valid concern.

Code complexity?  The logic is straight forward.  You can modularize
the NO/NSEC2 wildcard verify logic into a separate module.  It is just
a Small Matter Of Programming.  Compared to other warts in NXT/NSEC,
it doesn't have any consequences on the basic DNS model.  Take the
zone cut issue with NXT/NSEC, where you have two records with the same
name/type/class, but must not confuse the two as one comes from the
parent zone and one from the child zone.  Catering for this wart may
require changes to the backend of a DNS cache.  Recall that NO (and
likely also NSEC2, but I haven't read it) fixes the zone cut issue.

Regards,
Simon


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: Alex Bligh <alex@alex.org.uk>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Sat, 22 May 2004 09:55:58 +0100
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Paul,

--On 22 May 2004 13:53 +0700 Robert Elz <kre@munnari.OZ.AU> wrote:

>   | Roy is stating that this issue is a showstopper for him. Your proposal
>   | is in effect saying that the IETF, an organization with zero internal
>   | democracy and zero accountability should override European Union law
>
> Don't be totally absurd.    As Jaap already showed (after more research
> than the topic deserved), the European laws have nothing whatever to do
> with this ... Incidentally, nor does copyright, which has also
> been mentioned - in order

I'm not going to put privileged legal advice on list (drop me a note
off-list if you like) but suffice to say the old saw about ask two
different lawyers, get two different answers is all the more true in two
different jurisdictions.

For me the point, however, isn't wholly about the law. It's about what
stakeholders want. They do not want ccTLD operators publishing zonefiles.
And ccTLD operators do not want to publish zonefiles. It appears the same
might be true of VRSN. Current RFCs permit non-publication. The current
DNSsec proposal prohibits this. Whether or not all these people are unduly
worried is to an extent a moot question, though personally I agree with
Phillip Hallam-Baker's analysis that more information is revealed.

Alex

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: Roy Badami <roy@gnomon.org.uk>
Subject: RE: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Sat, 22 May 2004 10:03:56 +0100
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>>>>> "Hallam-Baker," == Hallam-Baker, Phillip <pbaker@verisign.com> writes:

    Hallam-Baker,> Roy is stating that this issue is a showstopper for
    Hallam-Baker,> him. 

For the record, all I actually said that was that ccTLDs have raised
some concerns, and I disgreed with some of the sweeping arguments that
were being used against such possible concerns...

Though it appears now that Nominet have pretty much stated that this
is a showstopper for them...

   -roy

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: "Hallam-Baker, Phillip" <pbaker@verisign.com>
Subject: RE: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Sat, 22 May 2004 06:55:05 -0700
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Cc: Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com>, Roy Badami <roy@gnomon.org.uk>,
        namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Sat May 22 16:08:36 2004
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        "Hallam-Baker, Phillip"
	 <pbaker@verisign.com>
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> Don't be totally absurd.    As Jaap already showed (after 
> more research
> than the topic deserved), 

What I was objecting to was the assertion that regardless of
whether the law was applicable or not that 'layer 9' is out
of scope.

> the European laws have nothing 
> whatever to do
> with this.   They're designed to protect the privacy of the 
> individual,
> who in this case, has given their domain name to the DNS operator to
> publish - by request (or more likely, by contract, if the data weren't
> published, there might be legal action involved).

The domain name is in many cases a personal identifier. The use 
that the owner has authorized is publication of that data in 
isolation. Privacy law has volumes of case law where a distinction
is made between isolated publication and publication of compilations.

> Incidentally, nor does copyright, which has also been 
> mentioned - in order
> to get copyright protection, the item to be protected has to have been
> published, which is exactly what the organisations that are 
> objecting don't
> want to do, they're trying to keep their list of names 
> secret, which is
> really the anthises of the whole purpose of the DNS.

You are clearly not a lawyer, copyright has not required 
publication since the ratification of the Berne convention
several decades ago. 
 

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: Ben Laurie <ben@algroup.co.uk>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Sat, 22 May 2004 16:15:47 +0100
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Hallam-Baker, Phillip wrote:
>>>So why do we need to specify more than H(dx), (H(dx+1)) ???
>>
>>To increase the cost of dictionary attacks.
> 
> 	I think that this risks turning a good proposal into one with a
> questionable feature that will distract from the main value. Essentially all
> you are arguing for here is an expensive hash function.
> 
> 	The valud of crypto is that you can introduce asymmetric attack
> costs. It is much harder for an attacker to break DES than it is for the
> defender to encrypt their message - 2^55.5 times as hard in fact. That is a
> real benefit.
> 
> 	Here you just make the problem harder by an equal factor for
> attacker and defender. That is not a core value here.

This is true, but neglects the fact that the attacker has to hash far 
more things than the defender. However, an asymmetric solution would be 
even nicer, I'll agree.

Cheers,

Ben.


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: "Hallam-Baker, Phillip" <pbaker@verisign.com>
Subject: RE: relevent?
Date: Sat, 22 May 2004 07:41:36 -0700
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> Consider any query for a non-existing name a.b.c.d.e.f.com in the zone
> f.com.  To prove that a.b.c.d.e.f.com doesn't exist, the server has to
> return records proving that the following names do not exist:
> 
> a.b.c.d.e.f.com
> *.b.c.d.e.f.com
> *.c.d.e.f.com
> *.d.e.f.com
> *.e.f.com
> *.f.com
> 
> This is the same for NXT, NSEC and presumably all alternatives as
> well.

Meng did some analysis in MARID on this. I think he might have the answer.

The first point that has to be understood is that wildcards are not
really a DNS protocol feature, they are exclusively the result of
server action. The only reason that wildcards exist in the original 
DNS spec at all is that it is desirable to communicate wildcards
in zone transfers and the like. 


Since wildcards are the result of server synthesis there is in fact
only one server whose wildcard synthesis is relevant, that is the
server holding the enclosing SOA record, what Meng refers to as 
the zone cut.

In other words it is critical to observe the fact that there are 
delegations:

In other words structure matters, a better example would be:

a.b.][c.d.][e.f.][com][.]

We do not, repeat DO NOT need to consider the existence of 
c.d.e.f.com in the context of wildcarding since WE WOULD NOT HAVE
GOT THERE WITHOUT PROOF THEY EXISTED.

In fact all we need to know is that:
	The zone c.d.e.f.com does not contain a wildcard
	b.c.d.e.f.com does not exist.

This statement can be proven in a single statement that is attached
to the zone node c.d.e.f.com:
	This zone does not contain a wildcard
	This zone does not contain any nodes x such that
		s < H(x) < e where s < SHA1(b), e > SHA1 (b)


Since we are at it we might as well fix wildcarding for SRV and like records
at the same time. There is no logical reason why it should be imposible to
deal with wildcards in the middle of a name, so called 'synthetic' but a
more accurate description would be 'non-transferable' and that only because
the protocol neglects to realize the need for them.

All that is necessary here is to add a wildcard NODE which can have
descendents. Let us use _* as the wildcard node. The same principle and
proof can be applied to the wildcard node descendents.

i.e. to prove that a.b.c.d.e.f.com does not exist when the zone contains
wildcard records such as x.*.c.d.e.f.com, y.*, z.* etc it is merely
necessary to list the intervals x-y, y-z, z-x.


By fixing this deficiency in DNS we also eliminate all engineering (i.e. not
layer 9) objections to use of SRV style name differentiation in the DNS as a
substitute for defining new resource records, a strategy that has as Dave
Crocker rightly points out a track record of over a decade of failure.

		Phill

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: "Hallam-Baker, Phillip" <pbaker@verisign.com>
Subject: RE: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Sat, 22 May 2004 08:09:15 -0700
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> > 
> > 	Here you just make the problem harder by an equal factor for
> > attacker and defender. That is not a core value here.
> 
> This is true, but neglects the fact that the attacker has to hash far 
> more things than the defender. However, an asymmetric 
> solution would be even nicer, I'll agree.

We have a dictionary corpus of n values and perform r iterations.

You are saing that the attacker has to perform n*r work units rather than
only n units and that this is sufficient value to justify increasing the per
lookup work function of client and server from 1 unit to r units.


I still don't see the value. We usually assume that an attacker is likely
to use hardware. 

A dictionary attack is going to work in any situation where you can
perform individual lookups without restriction. That is not the attack
that causes real concern here. What I am concerned with is dictionary
discovery. 


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Sat, 22 May 2004 15:07:16 +0000
Lines: 59
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <alex@alex.org.uk>
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In-Reply-To: Message from Alex Bligh <alex@alex.org.uk> 
	of "Sat, 22 May 2004 09:55:58 +0100."
	<335260799.1085219758@[192.168.100.5]> 
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> Paul,

I'm Paul.  He's Robert.

> --On 22 May 2004 13:53 +0700 Robert Elz <kre@munnari.OZ.AU> wrote:
> > ...
> > Don't be totally absurd.    As Jaap already showed (after more research
> > than the topic deserved), the European laws have nothing whatever to do
> > with this ... Incidentally, nor does copyright, which has also
> > been mentioned - in order
> 
> ...
> For me the point, however, isn't wholly about the law. It's about what
> stakeholders want. They do not want ccTLD operators publishing zonefiles.
> And ccTLD operators do not want to publish zonefiles. It appears the same
> might be true of VRSN. Current RFCs permit non-publication. ...

Have any of you here looked at <http://www.isc.org/ops/ds/>, perchance?

The thing that's boggling my mind at the moment is that the stakeholders,
or ccTLD operators, or VRSN, believes that by prohibiting zone transfers
they are preventing enumeration.  It just ain't so, and while I'm still
Paul and he's still Robert and I can't authoritatively speak for him, I
suspect that Robert's use of the word "absurd" has to do with the general
misconception that preventing direct enumeration at the DNS protocol level
is actually buying anything for anybody.

> ... Whether or not all these people are unduly worried is to an extent
> a moot question, ...

No, it's not moot, not yet anyway.  DNSSECbis as documented in the current
set of drafts and as implemented in BIND 9.3.0-beta4 has undergone
significant review and lab testing and appears ready for deployment.  If
the DNS protocol development community is going to back away and redesign
it again, then two questions have to be answered first:

   1. what exactly is it that you think you're going to get by making
      the enumeration of your zones an indirect activity rather than
      a direct one, noting that anyone who wants the enumeration can
      get it by indirect data mining techniques...?

   2. why are we doing this in May, when every other time that we've
      pulled DNSSEC back for yet another redesign that's added one or
      two years to the schedule, we've done it in December...?

> ... though personally I agree with Phillip Hallam-Baker's analysis
> that more information is revealed.

If he said that, he was wrong.  More likely you misunderstood him.  The
same information is revealed, it just happens slightly later and is an
indirect activity.  Take a look at <http://www.isc.org/ops/ds/> before
you try to decide what's "finally and actually" revealed, no matter what.
(Noting that the ISC Domain Survey does not use or depend upon AXFR.)

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com>
Subject: Re: relevent?
Date: Sat, 22 May 2004 15:13:25 +0000
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	of "Sat, 22 May 2004 09:30:46 +0200."
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> >> ...
> >> The verifier is able to discover that one out of all relevant wildcard
> >> situations apply, in this case the third of your clause.  To do this
> >> it simply iterates over all possible candidates (a small number). ...
> >
> > it is not reasonable to ask a verifier to iterate in this additional way.
> 
> Why not?

because it's already iterating in several other ways, and this is basically
a new innermost-loop, and the span of the iteration can be controlled by an
attacker.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: sthaug@nethelp.no
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Sat, 22 May 2004 17:26:53 +0200
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> > For me the point, however, isn't wholly about the law. It's about what
> > stakeholders want. They do not want ccTLD operators publishing zonefiles.
> > And ccTLD operators do not want to publish zonefiles. It appears the same
> > might be true of VRSN. Current RFCs permit non-publication. ...
> 
> Have any of you here looked at <http://www.isc.org/ops/ds/>, perchance?
> 
> The thing that's boggling my mind at the moment is that the stakeholders,
> or ccTLD operators, or VRSN, believes that by prohibiting zone transfers
> they are preventing enumeration.  It just ain't so, and while I'm still
> Paul and he's still Robert and I can't authoritatively speak for him, I
> suspect that Robert's use of the word "absurd" has to do with the general
> misconception that preventing direct enumeration at the DNS protocol level
> is actually buying anything for anybody.

With some knowledge of how the .no domain operates, I think it is fair
to say:

At least some stakeholders are fully aware of the fact that prohibiting
zone transfers does not prevent enumeration. However, they still find
it valuable to prevent zone transfers - the important point here being
the amount of work (and time) it takes to perform the enumeration: If a
domain can be enumerated in a month today, and could be enumerated in a
minute with NSEC (just to take an example), this is a dramatic reduction
in the amount of work needed - and a correspondingly lower barrier to
at least some undesirable uses of the domain data.

Steinar Haug, Nethelp consulting, sthaug@nethelp.no

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: Alex Bligh <alex@alex.org.uk>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Sat, 22 May 2004 16:38:36 +0100
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Paul,

> I'm Paul.  He's Robert.

Apologies

> Have any of you here looked at <http://www.isc.org/ops/ds/>, perchance?

Yes - it works by PTR query. That does not give a complete and
accurate enumeration, nor does it give a single snapshot in time.
Nor does is it published BY the ccTLD operator. That is like saying
there is no point in protecting my streetmap of SF because you and
everyone else have a streetmap of SF that's "quite like it". For the
sake of completeness awk ... | fgrep co.uk | uniq on AOL's mailserver
logs is also going to produce another similar but inaccurate database.

Just to illustrate the point, can you tell me what the domain is in
Nominet's zonefile right now, alphabetically immediately following
alex.org.uk. The 10 next ones? No, you can't, without access to a secondary.

> The thing that's boggling my mind at the moment is that the stakeholders,
> or ccTLD operators, or VRSN, believes that by prohibiting zone transfers
> they are preventing enumeration.

They are preventing enumeration (i.e. provision of a 100% accurate
copy by the ccTLD publishing the information). They are not preventing
you or anyone else from compiling their own, incomplete and inaccurate
work from information not derived from the ccTLD operator.


>> ... though personally I agree with Phillip Hallam-Baker's analysis
>> that more information is revealed.
>
> If he said that, he was wrong.  More likely you misunderstood him.

I am not sure which part of the following I am meant to have misunderstood
before I agreed with it:

--On 21 May 2004 20:31 -0700 "Hallam-Baker, Phillip" <pbaker@verisign.com> 
wrote:
> The comparative attack analysis that has been offered is totally
> bogus:
>
> 	The DNS system without DNSSEC provides a lookup function that
> returns an answer to the question "is x a member of S" and returns a
> binary response.
>
> 	With DNSSEC and NSEC you get a response "there are NO members of x
> in the range a,b AND a,b are both members of S"
>
> 	Sorry, but anyone who claims that there is no security issue raised
> here is speaking through their hat. The fact that I publish a binary
> response function returning set membership does not mean that I am willing
> to reveal the set. That is simply untrue.

Alex

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: Alex Bligh <alex@alex.org.uk>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Sat, 22 May 2004 16:53:57 +0100
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--On 22 May 2004 15:07 +0000 Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com> wrote:

> No, it's not moot, not yet anyway

It is perhaps an interest reflection on the workings of the IETF that the
requirements of those deploying the protocol (ignoring, for a minute, why
they have those requirements) appear occasionally to be only a secondary
consideration in protocol design. I would suggest there is perhaps a
positive correlation between on the one hand to the IETF listening to to
the requirements of those who want to deploy a protocol on the one hand,
and the protocol actually getting deployed on the other. In the context of
a requirement to preserve existing functionlity, the fact that *you* think
requirements are misplaced (I don't, but who knows, in the final analysis
you might well be right) doesn't cut much mustard when the requirement
comes from the internet community, as communicated to those who are going
to make the deployment decision.

Alex

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Sat, 22 May 2004 16:34:39 +0000
Lines: 51
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	of "Sat, 22 May 2004 16:53:57 +0100."
	<360339881.1085244837@[192.168.100.5]> 
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> It is perhaps an interest reflection on the workings of the IETF that the
> requirements of those deploying the protocol (ignoring, for a minute, why
> they have those requirements) appear occasionally to be only a secondary
> consideration in protocol design.

I apologize for the apparent truth of that reflection, but it's inaccurate.

SLD holders outnumber TLD holders by a factor of many millions.  As an SLD
holder I can tell you that I do not fear enumeration as much as I fear
spoofing.  There are a few SLD holders who hold the opposite view, just as
among TLD holders you will find both views.

When the "NO RR" was evaluated by the dnsext working group, these opposing
requirements were taken into account, and anti-enumeration lost out.  I had
no dog in that race so this was only of academic interest to me -- "what 
does BIND have to implement?" and "how can we get DNSSEC done in a decade?"
where my only concerns.

If the WG made the wrong choice and if DNSSEC is unimplementable because TLD
holders fear enumeration and so SLD holders will have secure path to the
root zone, then it appears that there's really no choice except to declare
failure.  Perhaps Ohta or Bernstein would like to take a shot at the problem.

> I would suggest there is perhaps a positive correlation between on the
> one hand to the IETF listening to to the requirements of those who
> want to deploy a protocol on the one hand, and the protocol actually
> getting deployed on the other.

Many voices were heard.  Primary among them were SLD holders, who either
don't care about enumeration, or who fear a two-decade approach to
DNSSEC even more, or who fear spoofing even more.

> In the context of a requirement to preserve existing functionlity, the
> fact that *you* think requirements are misplaced (I don't, but who
> knows, in the final analysis you might well be right) doesn't cut much
> mustard when the requirement comes from the internet community, as
> communicated to those who are going to make the deployment decision.

What *I* think, since you mentioned it, is that TLD holders who fear
enumeration think that restricting AXFR is actually preventing
enumeration, and that if they'd spend a few years in the trenches
against spammers and data miners they would come to the conclusion that
"all useful malevolent forms of enumeration are already possible and are
already being done" and would then conclude that a one-decade DNSSEC is
better than a two-decade DNSSEC, given that all other things are equal.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: David Blacka <davidb@verisignlabs.com>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Sat, 22 May 2004 16:47:11 -0400
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On May 22, 2004, at 11:07 AM, Paul Vixie wrote:

> The thing that's boggling my mind at the moment is that the 
> stakeholders,
> or ccTLD operators, or VRSN, believes that by prohibiting zone 
> transfers
> they are preventing enumeration.  It just ain't so, and while I'm still
> Paul and he's still Robert and I can't authoritatively speak for him, I
> suspect that Robert's use of the word "absurd" has to do with the 
> general
> misconception that preventing direct enumeration at the DNS protocol 
> level
> is actually buying anything for anybody.

While I am in no way empowered to speak officially for VRSN, I will say 
that VeriSign probably doesn't care terribly much about "preventing 
enumeration", as you can download the zones yourself, if you care to.

 From my point of view (speaking as an individual), I am more worried 
about the operational impact of a bunch of knuckle-heads who decided to 
suck down COM via a NSEC chain walk because either a) they don't know 
they can just ftp the zone, b) they are too lazy to go through the 
moderate hoops in order to do so, or c) the want to use the information 
for something bad.

On the other hand, it is hard to say if this activity will result in 
operational problems at all without a crystal ball.

--
David Blacka    <davidb@verisignlabs.com>
Sr. Engineer    Verisign Applied Research


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: Simon Josefsson <jas@extundo.com>
Subject: Re: relevent?
Date: Sun, 23 May 2004 02:06:52 +0200
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Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com> writes:

>> >> ...
>> >> The verifier is able to discover that one out of all relevant wildcard
>> >> situations apply, in this case the third of your clause.  To do this
>> >> it simply iterates over all possible candidates (a small number). ...
>> >
>> > it is not reasonable to ask a verifier to iterate in this additional way.
>> 
>> Why not?
>
> because it's already iterating in several other ways, and this is basically
> a new innermost-loop, and the span of the iteration can be controlled by an
> attacker.

The maximum iteration count needed can be computed from the domain
name used in the query (e.g., a.b.c.d.e.f.com), so the attacker cannot
influence the iteration count by returning special data.

An attacker may cause clients to look up a name chosen by the
attacker, perhaps as the worst case a.b.c.d.e.f.g.h.....z.com or
similar.  But the attacker is limited by the limits in the DNS
protocol -- owner names cannot be longer than 255 octets.  So the
attacker can cause the client to compute a few hundred SHA-1 hashes,
in the worst case.

A few hundred SHA-1 hashes is fast compared to a 2048 bit RSA verify.
And making a client perform a 2048 bit RSA verify is possible today,
just send it an bogus KEY/SIG pair.

Regards,
Simon


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: "Christian Huitema" <huitema@windows.microsoft.com>
Subject: RE: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Sat, 22 May 2004 22:09:38 -0700
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>  From my point of view (speaking as an individual), I am more worried
> about the operational impact of a bunch of knuckle-heads who decided
to
> suck down COM via a NSEC chain walk ...

Basic rate limiting may not prevent enumeration, but it can certainly
mitigate the denial-of-service side-effect of such bone-headed behavior.

-- Christian Huitema

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com>
Subject: Re: relevent?
Date: Sun, 23 May 2004 10:27:02 +0100
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>>>>> "Simon" == Simon Josefsson <jas@extundo.com> writes:

    Simon> Take the zone cut
    Simon> issue with NXT/NSEC, where you have two records with the
    Simon> same name/type/class, but must not confuse the two as one
    Simon> comes from the parent zone and one from the child zone.
    Simon> Catering for this wart may require changes to the backend
    Simon> of a DNS cache.  Recall that NO (and likely also NSEC2, but
    Simon> I haven't read it) fixes the zone cut issue.

To "fix the zone cut issue", a delegation's NS and any glue records
would need to be in exactly one place: the child or parent, probably
the parent. AFAIK, the NO and NSEC2 drafts don't suggest that.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Sun, 23 May 2004 13:54:00 +0100
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To: Alex Bligh <alex@alex.org.uk>
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   of "Sat, 22 May 2004 09:55:58 BST." <335260799.1085219758@[192.168.100.5]> 
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>>>>> "Alex" == Alex Bligh <alex@alex.org.uk> writes:

    Alex> I'm not going to put privileged legal advice on list (drop
    Alex> me a note off-list if you like) but suffice to say the old
    Alex> saw about ask two different lawyers, get two different
    Alex> answers is all the more true in two different jurisdictions.

But the EU directive in question applies in both jurisdictions. And
anyway the answer a lawyer gives can depend on the question asked.

    Alex> For me the point, however, isn't wholly about the law. It's
    Alex> about what stakeholders want.

Even when they're misguided? Or if they want the impossible?

Note too that this DNS stakeholder wants his zones secured from
spoofing. And he wants that now. Though perhaps that's also a
misguided demand for the impossible. :-)

    Alex> Current RFCs permit non-publication. 

No they don't, though I suspect this depends on your definition of
"publication". No DNS RFC says anything about access controls. Apart
from saying servers can sometimes return REFUSED -- which may or may
not be for reasons to do with access controls -- the RFCs are silent
on this matter. So the current RFCs neither prohibit or allow
non-publication, for your definition of this term. In purely DNS
terms, entering names into a public zone file constitutes
publication. If something isn't to be published, it shouldn't go in
the DNS.

    Alex> The current DNSsec proposal prohibits this. 

Wrong again. The current drafts just make it more explicit that
attempts to conceal a zone's contents by restricting zone transfers --
ie security through obscurity -- are futile. This should not come as a
surprise to anyone. As has already been pointed out, there are many
techniques that are currently in use to enumerate a zone. It seems
some of us haven't yet got over that. Sigh.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: "Hallam-Baker, Phillip" <pbaker@verisign.com>
Subject: RE: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Sun, 23 May 2004 07:26:19 -0700
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> > ... though personally I agree with Phillip Hallam-Baker's analysis
> > that more information is revealed.
> 
> If he said that, he was wrong.  More likely you misunderstood 
> him.  The same information is revealed, it just happens slightly 
> later and is an indirect activity. 

This shows why DNSEXT should transfer work on DNSSEC to the security
area. 

>From a security point of view more information IS revealled. The
computational difficulty of arriving at an enumeration is significantly
reduced with the DNSEXT. The alternative attack routes suggested
as equivalent are not.

Comparative security analysis is a VERY weak form of argument. 
A huge number of security vulnerabilities result from faulty
comparative argument, in fact it is one of the most common causes 
of security flaws. The errors in WEP were due to that type
of reasoning. 

The IETF has a reputation for designing security mechanisms that
are so completely over-designed that they are undeployable, while
failing to meet security requirements considered critical by end
users. IPSEC refused to address NAT but created a negotiation 
mechanism for key negotiation.

If you want anyone to use DNSSEC then you had better address the
requirements of the security community.

		Phill

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: "Hallam-Baker, Phillip" <pbaker@verisign.com>
Subject: RE: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Sun, 23 May 2004 08:04:13 -0700
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> From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
> [mailto:owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org]On Behalf Of David Blacka
> While I am in no way empowered to speak officially for VRSN, 
> I will say 
> that VeriSign probably doesn't care terribly much about "preventing 
> enumeration", as you can download the zones yourself, if you care to.

I am not speaking for VRSN here officially either.

Registry services may not have a position here. 

Security Services is very likely to form one. Several proposed 
anti-spam and anti-phishing measures use the DNS in a fashion
that could benefit from DNSSEC but not if doing so opened up 
zone enumeration.


		Phill


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: "Hallam-Baker, Phillip" <pbaker@verisign.com>
Subject: RE: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Sun, 23 May 2004 08:32:13 -0700
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> SLD holders outnumber TLD holders by a factor of many 
> millions.  As an SLD
> holder I can tell you that I do not fear enumeration as much as I fear
> spoofing.  There are a few SLD holders who hold the opposite 
> view, just as
> among TLD holders you will find both views.

You are not typical of an SLD holder.

The community that has to be convinced here are the people who
operate corporate firewalls. If you do not have a firewall yet
you are not going to be interested in DNSSEC.

I speak to that communiuty on a regular basis. We actually operate
a lot of firewalls on an outsourced basis. 

That community does not want to have people walk their domain
for very good reason. Dealling with attacks costs real money.
Allowing domain enumeration will cost these people real money
as it will mean that systems will be attacked which the attacker
would not otherwise have discovered.


> When the "NO RR" was evaluated by the dnsext working group, 
> these opposing
> requirements were taken into account, and anti-enumeration 
> lost out.  

So did reality. 

Agenda denial is not a very credible tactic. Demand for DNSSEC
is negligible. Give me the names of ten supporters of DNSSEC in
its current form who are influential in the security community.

Not only is the community of potential DNSSEC users not represented
in this group, any time someone does drop by to make a request
they get met with hostility and patronizing remarks.


> If the WG made the wrong choice and if DNSSEC is 
> unimplementable because TLD
> holders fear enumeration and so SLD holders will have secure 
> path to the
> root zone, then it appears that there's really no choice 
> except to declare failure.  

Ah my way or the high way eh?


> > I would suggest there is perhaps a positive correlation 
> between on the
> > one hand to the IETF listening to to the requirements of those who
> > want to deploy a protocol on the one hand, and the protocol actually
> > getting deployed on the other.
> 
> Many voices were heard.  Primary among them were SLD holders, 
> who either
> don't care about enumeration, or who fear a two-decade approach to
> DNSSEC even more, or who fear spoofing even more.

The requirement denial approach seems to be the main reason
for delay. DNSSEC would have been deployed already if OPTIN
had been accepted.


> What *I* think, since you mentioned it, is that TLD holders who fear
> enumeration think that restricting AXFR is actually preventing

The enumeration issue is going to be a much bigger issue at
the SLD level. In fact that is what the NSA guy said in a 
DNSEXT meeting four years ago, for him enumeration is a real
issue.

The only reason this is taking so long is institutional. Over
a century of use has proved Roberts Rules of order to be a
much more effective way to run a meeting than the IETF has
devised. In OASIS we regularly complete specs much more 
complex than DNSSEC within two years.


I suggest that the solution to this problem is to submit
a new draft that describes an OPT-IN and OBFUSCATED NXT
record as 'experimental'. The spam and phishing groups do
not care a jot over spec level issues but they do care
about deployability, the enumeration issue and who is 
prepared to endorse the spec. It is also much more likely
that this application area will be a killer app for
DNSSEC than preventing spoofing. It has taken ten years
and a major spam crisis for people to realize that email 
spoofing was a sufficiently bad thing that something should
be done about it.


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: Peter Koch <pk@TechFak.Uni-Bielefeld.DE>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Sun, 23 May 2004 17:52:05 +0200
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"Hallam-Baker, Phillip" wrote:

> That community does not want to have people walk their domain
> for very good reason. Dealling with attacks costs real money.
> Allowing domain enumeration will cost these people real money
> as it will mean that systems will be attacked which the attacker
> would not otherwise have discovered.

this "ostrich approach" is the one reason why I'd really like to see NSEC in
its current form. Zone walking/AXFR has nothing to do with end system security
and "hiding" potential attack targets by AXFR blocks is dangerous at best.
What do these people do to make their IP adresses less guessable? Deploy IPv6?
This is not what the thread was started for and this kind of "security" will
distract from the real deployment issue here. The "registry type" zones are
special and it's them we need a solution for.

-Peter

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: Alex Bligh <alex@alex.org.uk>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Sun, 23 May 2004 19:05:12 +0100
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Jim,

--On 23 May 2004 13:54 +0100 Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com> wrote:

> But the EU directive in question applies in both jurisdictions. And
> anyway the answer a lawyer gives can depend on the question asked.

As I am sure you know, EU directives (as opposed to regulations and treaty
articles) are implemented by national law, and the implementation can vary.
Further, they are implemented in the context of existing national law,
which varies. But heh, let's not make this alt.lawyers.barrackroom.

>     Alex> For me the point, however, isn't wholly about the law. It's
>     Alex> about what stakeholders want.
>
> Even when they're misguided? Or if they want the impossible?

It isn't impossible. We have supplied an example demonstrating making
zonefiles not enumerable via DNSSEC. Noone yet has suggested NSEC2 is
fatally flawed. The consequent effects on delay of implementation may be
undesirable, but that is a different point. Nor, in my view, is
it misguided.

Note people are not asking that it ccTLDs should make it impossible
to discover the contents of their zones to any extent. They are simply
asking that ccTLDs should not themselves publish them in toto.

> Note too that this DNS stakeholder wants his zones secured from
> spoofing. And he wants that now. Though perhaps that's also a
> misguided demand for the impossible. :-)
>
>     Alex> Current RFCs permit non-publication.
>
> No they don't, though I suspect this depends on your definition of
> "publication". No DNS RFC says anything about access controls. Apart
> from saying servers can sometimes return REFUSED -- which may or may
> not be for reasons to do with access controls -- the RFCs are silent
> on this matter.

They permit a refused answer. They do not specify how that can be
generated. Where RFCs permit behavior (refused) and do not constain
when that behavior may or may not be used, it is up to local policy.
And, indeed, that administrative (policy) refusal appears to be
utilized by every DNS server codebase in non-minimal deployment,
many of whom claim RFC compatibility.

>     Alex> The current DNSsec proposal prohibits this.
>
> Wrong again. The current drafts just make it more explicit that
> attempts to conceal a zone's contents by restricting zone transfers --

All it seems to me they say is that NSEC is mandatory, and zone enumeration
is a consequence of NSEC.

> ie security through obscurity -- are futile.

Your view is that it is futile. That view appears not to be shared by
everyone. I would suggest it is not shared by those who bother to lock down
AFXR either. I am surprised if you wouldn't go so far as to allow that
it was a matter of opinion.

And in the end, the view that matters is the view of those who want to
deploy it (and, in registry cases, their stakeholders). Otherwise you will
have designed a protocol which is perceived as flawed, and no matter how
much you say that the perception is wrong (whether you are right or wrong),
it's deployment will be significantly hindered. I can tell you that the
interest in zonefile enumeration and spam, exceeds interest in DNSSEC
deployment by a couple of orders of magnitude in terms of the people I talk
to. Many see the security issues in DNS fixed by the little padlock that
appears on their web browser. Many of the more enlightened ones see DNSSEC
as an undeployable nightmare. Please bear in mind I am making the foregoing
statements as a DNSSEC supporter, and in the context of an organization for
whom deployment of DNSSEC is a key strategic aim. The point is that if you
want better stakeholder acceptance, and hence greater deployment, listening
to people's concerns is important.



To me it seems a fair view of the argument goes like this:

1. Current DNSSEC permits enumerability. Previous DNS did not prohibit
   disallowing enumerability through AXFR, and as such that became a
   feature in all significant nameserver deployments, that has been
   utilized by many people.

2. Some people view preventing enumerability as important from a
   local policy point of view. Amongst those are ccTLD operators who
   are concerned for reasons of data protection, copyright, spam and
   local internet community driven policy. Also amongst those are
   certain members of the security community who fear leakage of
   information.

3. A further number of people believe the policy of those in (2) to
   be futile, for various non-DNSSEC related reasons.

4. Fixing the concerns in (2), via NSEC2 or otherwise, can only delay
   DNSSEC being ready for deployment. Everyone wants DNSSEC to be
   deployable quickly. It is possible there is a fix or workaround
   less likely to delay than NSEC2, but if there is, it hasn't been
   published here.

5. Fixing (2) is likely increase the speed and scope of deployment
   once the protocol is ready for deployment, on the basis those holding
   view (2) above are less likely to deploy, and less likely to deploy
   quickly, if their concerns are not addressed. Further, fixing (2)
   after significant deployment is likely to be problematic.


I believe (3) is a red-herring for this group: it seems to me a local
policy issue, and however ill-advised you might feel people to be to take
that policy, the case is at least arguable and new revisions of protocols
should not break existing functionality.

What I believe we are talking about is a simple trade-off between (2) and
(5) on the one hand, and (4) on the other.

Alex

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: "D. J. Bernstein" <djb@cr.yp.to>
Subject: Magical enumeration techniques
Date: 23 May 2004 19:27:50 -0000
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Jim Reid writes:
> The current drafts just make it more explicit that
> attempts to conceal a zone's contents by restricting zone transfers --
> ie security through obscurity -- are futile.

I have two TXT records for names of the form k.cr.yp.to, where k is a
hex MD5 hash of some cryptographic data. One of them is

   '762fa7ce541bf0817b4f913a2b51a5cd.cr.yp.to:0d32ae8d1ef36e9c71fef18c9a603299

in tinydns format. Please tell us the other one.

---D. J. Bernstein, Associate Professor, Department of Mathematics,
Statistics, and Computer Science, University of Illinois at Chicago

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: Ted Hardie <hardie@qualcomm.com>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Sun, 23 May 2004 12:46:13 -0700
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At 7:05 PM +0100 05/23/2004, Alex Bligh wrote:
>And in the end, the view that matters is the view of those who want to
>deploy it (and, in registry cases, their stakeholders). Otherwise you will
>have designed a protocol which is perceived as flawed, and no matter how
>much you say that the perception is wrong (whether you are right or wrong),
>it's deployment will be significantly hindered. I can tell you that the
>interest in zonefile enumeration and spam, exceeds interest in DNSSEC
>deployment by a couple of orders of magnitude in terms of the people I talk
>to.

First, to mention something that is in no way Alex's fault, I have to say
that I find the use of the term "stakeholder" makes my teeth hurt.
Different individuals have different interests, and lumping them together
such that "regulatory powers with guns", "captive customers", and
"end users" are all in the same bucket just makes no sense to me.
Not all that salient, really, so forgive the digression.

Second, we're here to make engineering decisions.  We're not trying
to make those in ignorance of regulatory realities or operational
desires, but we have to recognize that it only makes sense for
us to discuss them here in terms of the engineering effects (we're
not going to change regulations in any jurisdiction, get people to
be "more interested" in one thing than another, or otherwise change
the political or economic landscape).  We also need to recognize
that the DNS is used in many jurisdictions for many different purposes.
At this very late stage, taking in a last minute change to this set of
specs both doesn't serve the long-unslaked thirst for deployment
and would appear (note that verb, please) to privilege one set of
interests after long discussion had come to other conclusions.

Put bluntly, we're at the "find technical errors stage", not the design
stage.  The behavior folks are trying to adjust is a known element of
the design and has been for a long time.  It is not a technical error
and a last minute attempt to adjust it doesn't make sense.

Speaking personally, and with regards for all concerned,
						Ted Hardie


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: Simon Josefsson <jas@extundo.com>
Subject: Re: relevent?
Date: Sun, 23 May 2004 21:54:27 +0200
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Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com> writes:

>>>>>> "Simon" == Simon Josefsson <jas@extundo.com> writes:
>
>     Simon> Take the zone cut
>     Simon> issue with NXT/NSEC, where you have two records with the
>     Simon> same name/type/class, but must not confuse the two as one
>     Simon> comes from the parent zone and one from the child zone.
>     Simon> Catering for this wart may require changes to the backend
>     Simon> of a DNS cache.  Recall that NO (and likely also NSEC2, but
>     Simon> I haven't read it) fixes the zone cut issue.
>
> To "fix the zone cut issue", a delegation's NS and any glue records
> would need to be in exactly one place: the child or parent, probably
> the parent. AFAIK, the NO and NSEC2 drafts don't suggest that.

Right.  I meant the additional zone cut issue introduced by DNSSEC.
To fix the issue completely would require more drastic measures, but
I'm not sure anyone has been suggesting this.

Regards,
Simon


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: "Hallam-Baker, Phillip" <pbaker@verisign.com>
Subject: RE: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Sun, 23 May 2004 13:15:00 -0700
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Peter writes:
> this "ostrich approach" is the one reason why I'd really like 
> to see NSEC in its current form. 

Nobody has yet specified an attack that has anything like the 
effectiveness of zone walking. 


> Zone walking/AXFR has nothing to do with end system security
> and "hiding" potential attack targets by AXFR blocks is 
> dangerous at best.

You argument amounts to 'security through plain sight' which 
is as discredited as security through obscurity. 

The application of design arguments such as security through
obscurity and end-to-end to operations is a bad mistake. It
is even worse to turn that argument into an ideology and
attempt to ridicule those who say the ideology is false.

Please do not attempt to claim superior expertise in this area
again.


> What do these people do to make their IP adresses less 
> guessable? Deploy IPv6?

Deployment of NAT for this purpose is near universal. The IETF
tried to fight that for years as well. I am aware of the 
paper by Steve Bellovin on guessing IP addresses behind NAT,
as with your proposed dictionary attack it is orders of magnitude
harder and less reliable than direct observation.


> This is not what the thread was started for and this kind of 
> "security" will
> distract from the real deployment issue here. The "registry 
> type" zones are
> special and it's them we need a solution for.

Actually the same issue is true at the second level. Allowing
zone walking is not considered good security practice at any
level.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Sun, 23 May 2004 21:25:48 +0100
Lines: 16
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References: <alex@alex.org.uk>
Cc: Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com>, namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Sun May 23 22:32:41 2004
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To: Alex Bligh <alex@alex.org.uk>
In-Reply-To: Message from Alex Bligh <alex@alex.org.uk> 
   of "Sat, 22 May 2004 16:38:36 BST." <359418887.1085243916@[192.168.100.5]> 
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>>>>> "Alex" == Alex Bligh <alex@alex.org.uk> writes:

    Alex> Just to illustrate the point, can you tell me what the
    Alex> domain is in Nominet's zonefile right now, alphabetically
    Alex> immediately following alex.org.uk. The 10 next ones? No, you
    Alex> can't, without access to a secondary.

Why do you think this information is of any value? Why is it worth
trying to conceal it, even though it's not that hard to find? More
to the point, why do these stakeholders you keep banging on about?

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: "Hallam-Baker, Phillip" <pbaker@verisign.com>
Subject: RE: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Sun, 23 May 2004 13:38:14 -0700
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X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Sun May 23 22:49:36 2004
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: "'Ted Hardie'" <hardie@qualcomm.com>, Alex Bligh <alex@alex.org.uk>,
        Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com>
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> First, to mention something that is in no way Alex's fault, I 
> have to say
> that I find the use of the term "stakeholder" makes my teeth hurt.
> Different individuals have different interests, and lumping 
> them together
> such that "regulatory powers with guns", "captive customers", and
> "end users" are all in the same bucket just makes no sense to me.

How else can we address deployment other than by looking at the
people who might deploy but have refused to and asking them why
they did not?

I agree that it would be much better to address the fact that there 
are many stakeholders and that their interests may conflict. But
your argument seems to be that because there might be some
stakeholders that are not represented that they should all be ignored.


>  We also need to recognize
> that the DNS is used in many jurisdictions for many different 
> purposes.

The many jurisdicitions argument does not mean that we should ignore
all of them. In practice the type of legislation that has an 
effect on engineering work tends to be remarkably consistent
across jurisdictions.


> At this very late stage, taking in a last minute change to this set of
> specs both doesn't serve the long-unslaked thirst for deployment
> and would appear (note that verb, please) to privilege one set of
> interests after long discussion had come to other conclusions.

Nobody has yet stated an opposed interest here, there has been a
lot of 'protect the spec from change at all costs' and some
'lets force people to accept our security ideology' but no
real assertion of a valid opposition.

Having watched the previous discussions I did not see any real
debate over opposed interests then either. In fact all I have seen
for five years is the argument, 'we cannot fix the spec to make
it deployable, it will be deployed so very soon'.

> Put bluntly, we're at the "find technical errors stage", not 
> the design
> stage.  The behavior folks are trying to adjust is a known element of
> the design and has been for a long time.  It is not a technical error
> and a last minute attempt to adjust it doesn't make sense.

If this argument wins I predict that we will be debating the same 
exact argument in three years time.


I don't think the merits of this issue have ever been debated, 
I think we got fobbed off with the same agenda denial tactics
three and five years ago. Then we had some fillibustering to
make real sure that some people got their way even if the 
majority disagreed.

I suggest that the way forward here is for a small group to 
design an NXT that works, that we submit it as experimental 
and we let the market decide who is right.

The only reason the market is going to make a choice for 
experimental over an approved standard is if there is a 
genuine issue with the approved version.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: Alex Bligh <alex@alex.org.uk>
Subject: RE: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Sun, 23 May 2004 21:59:44 +0100
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--On 23 May 2004 13:38 -0700 "Hallam-Baker, Phillip" <pbaker@verisign.com> 
wrote:

>> First, to mention something that is in no way Alex's fault, I
>> have to say
>> that I find the use of the term "stakeholder" makes my teeth hurt.
>> Different individuals have different interests, and lumping
>> them together
>> such that "regulatory powers with guns", "captive customers", and
>> "end users" are all in the same bucket just makes no sense to me.
>
> How else can we address deployment other than by looking at the
> people who might deploy but have refused to and asking them why
> they did not?

To be fair I was talking about Nominet's stakeholders. And for various
reasons, mostly internal but given the issue was a surprise to certain
other ccTLDs too not entirely, we (Nominet) were perhaps less involved in
this process earlier on than we might have been - which we are now seeking
to correct: not by whinging from the sidelines, but by contributing.

Alex

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: Alex Bligh <alex@alex.org.uk>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Sun, 23 May 2004 21:55:20 +0100
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	Alex Bligh <alex@alex.org.uk>
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--On 23 May 2004 21:25 +0100 Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com> wrote:

>     Alex> Just to illustrate the point, can you tell me what the
>     Alex> domain is in Nominet's zonefile right now, alphabetically
>     Alex> immediately following alex.org.uk. The 10 next ones? No, you
>     Alex> can't, without access to a secondary.
>
> Why do you think this information is of any value?

I am illustrating that Paul cannot enumerate the zone either accurately or
completely.

Or did you mean why is the zone as a whole of any value? Because people
(stakeholders) care about to what purpose ccTLDs data is put to, hence the
operators care for the same reason. For some but not all values of "care"
this is reflected in the law. I would suggest the facts (i) that many if
not every ccTLD operator has been the targets of attacks by various groups
attempting to extract data, and several have, with varying degrees of
success and at considerable expense, tried to sue such people, (ii) a
considerable of ICANN/GAC/ccTLD debate is spent on the intellectual
property of the zonefile suggests that the information is valuable to
someone.

> Why is it worth
> trying to conceal it, even though it's not that hard to find?

If it's not that hard to find, Paul would be able to answer my question.
Perhaps you can.

> More
> to the point, why do these stakeholders you keep banging on about?

See above. They do not want ccTLD operators publishing lists of domain
names registered, as they fear (accurately) those lists will be
misused. Just because there are other ways to get partial, inaccurate
lists of some of the domain names concerned, they do not see why the
ccTLD operator should be complicit in this. As I said before, just
because someone can break into your flat, it doesn't mean the landlord
should help them.

I believe the view has a good foundation in logic, but in the final
analysis it doesn't much matter to me if they believe the reason not to
have enumerable zonefiles is it increases the prevalence of bluebirds
flying over rainbows; at least in Nominet's case, the obligation is
to implement policy in the interests of, and in consultation with
stakeholders, which (to avoid people's teeth being put on edge) is
the old RFC1591 "in the interests of the local internet community". I am
not sufficiently paternalistic to tell them what is in their interests
and what is not.

Alex

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: Jaap Akkerhuis <jaap@sidn.nl>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Sun, 23 May 2004 23:07:41 +0200
Lines: 26
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
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Cc: Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com>, namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
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To: David Blacka <davidb@verisignlabs.com>
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     From my point of view (speaking as an individual), I am more worried 
    about the operational impact of a bunch of knuckle-heads who decided to 
    suck down COM via a NSEC chain walk.
(s/COM/a zone/)

That is my personal worry as well. I really don't want throw a lot
of resources to nameservers to accomodate script kiddies.

    On the other hand, it is hard to say if this activity will
    result in operational problems at all without a crystal ball.

We had a secured nl zone up for a year. This was published overhere.
When the zone came up, we noticed a lot of AXFR attempts. The only
zone walking activities noticed were our own attempts.

But of course, this doesn't mean that such thong won't happen when
it will be more common.

	jaap

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Sun, 23 May 2004 21:28:02 +0000
Lines: 20
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <alex@alex.org.uk>
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Sun May 23 23:35:32 2004
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To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
In-Reply-To: Message from Alex Bligh <alex@alex.org.uk> 
	of "Sun, 23 May 2004 21:55:20 +0100."
	<464823040.1085349320@[192.168.100.5]> 
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> >     Alex> Just to illustrate the point, can you tell me what the
> >     Alex> domain is in Nominet's zonefile right now, alphabetically
> >     Alex> immediately following alex.org.uk. The 10 next ones? No, you
> >     Alex> can't, without access to a secondary.
> >
> > Why do you think this information is of any value?
> 
> I am illustrating that Paul cannot enumerate the zone either accurately or
> completely.

i never said i could.  what i said was that i could get a complete useful
enumeration, containing everything a spammer or marketroid would need in
order to make "the bad use" of whois that ccTLD's supposedly don't want
made.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Sun, 23 May 2004 21:29:21 +0000
Lines: 10
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <jaap@sidn.nl>
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Sun May 23 23:35:41 2004
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In-Reply-To: Message from Jaap Akkerhuis <jaap@sidn.nl> 
	of "Sun, 23 May 2004 23:07:41 +0200."
	<200405232107.i4NL7fTU039868@bartok.sidn.nl> 
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> ...  I really don't want throw a lot of resources to nameservers to
> accomodate script kiddies.

as if any of us had a choice about that any more.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: Olaf Kolkman <olaf@ripe.net>
Subject: Scope of discussion (was Re: Proposal to fix NSEC)
Date: Sun, 23 May 2004 16:07:47 -0700
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Dear Colleagues,

I would like to narrow the discussion.

With reference to an earlier message [1].

I think it is clear at this point that the current DNSSEC-bis protocol 
spec eases content enumeration; I think it is clear that this causes a 
number of TLDs (and other players) to believe that they cannot deploy 
DNSSEC in its current form.

Please refrain from further discussion of these two points; this is a 
real issue.

The question on the table is what this WG needs to do.

In my previous mail I have listed two possibilities. Taking up work to 
prevent zone enumeration while holding the DNSSEC bis document-set or 
shipping DNSSEC bis and forgetting about solving the enumeration 
problem. Off course there are other options. Ship the document 
DNSSEC-bis document set and work out the enumeration problem later (but 
commit on finding a solution).

The 3rd option may not be that bad given that DNSSEC-bis conforms to 
the requirements of a Proposed standard and that it is (should be) 
clear that Proposed Standards are subject to change (RFC2026, 4.1.1). 
If we go this route we have to realize that we have to field new 
technology that _may_ not interoperate with DNSSEC bis.

There may be other ways of going forward, stalling development of NSEC2 
but introduce a mechanism into DNSSEC-bis that introduces versioning of 
NSEC, if you see the signal you should expect the new features (say 
NSEC2) or treat the zone as unsecured. That would delay too, but maybe 
not that long.

Rough consensus is difficult to read from the current thread. It would 
help if you make your (motivated) position clearer and provide your 
arguments for taking one of the options. Do so before June 1.

Two additional remarks:

+ PLEASE REVIEW THE DNSSEC-bis DOCUMENT SET, review is orthogonal to 
this discussion.

+ Please remain courteous and discuss arguments on the quality of the 
arguments, qualities of the author are out of scope.


Thanks,

--Olaf Kolkman
    DNSEXT co-chair
    (Olafur is still away from keyboard)

[1] 
http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/namedroppers.2004/msg00489.html


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: "Hallam-Baker, Phillip" <pbaker@verisign.com>
Subject: RE: Scope of discussion (was Re: Proposal to fix NSEC)
Date: Sun, 23 May 2004 17:25:11 -0700
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> In my previous mail I have listed two possibilities. Taking 
> up work to 
> prevent zone enumeration while holding the DNSSEC bis document-set or 
> shipping DNSSEC bis and forgetting about solving the enumeration 
> problem. Off course there are other options. Ship the document 
> DNSSEC-bis document set and work out the enumeration problem 
> later (but 
> commit on finding a solution).

I strongly suggest option 3 with one proviso:

Where the docs say MUST use NSEC say "MUST use a mechanism that
provides proof of non-existence"


> There may be other ways of going forward, stalling 
> development of NSEC2 
> but introduce a mechanism into DNSSEC-bis that introduces 
> versioning of 
> NSEC, if you see the signal you should expect the new features (say 
> NSEC2) or treat the zone as unsecured. That would delay too, 
> but maybe not that long.

Better than trying to go forward with deployment and discovering
that there is a protocol deficiency that cannot be fixed after
the fact.

People get paranoid about crypto specs, I used to. Then I started
an essay where I tried to prove this, only when I started to look
at the evidence SSL is in much better shape than anything else
despite being a disaster in original form, likewise with WEP.

Throw the stuff over the fence and see what sticks. Empirically
that is the best way to get to security.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com>
Subject: Re: Scope of discussion (was Re: Proposal to fix NSEC)
Date: Mon, 24 May 2004 01:07:42 +0000
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	of "Sun, 23 May 2004 16:07:47 MST."
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> The question on the table is what this WG needs to do.
> ...
> The 3rd option may not be that bad given that DNSSEC-bis conforms to the
> requirements of a Proposed standard and that it is (should be) clear that
> Proposed Standards are subject to change (RFC2026, 4.1.1). If we go this
> route we have to realize that we have to field new technology that _may_
> not interoperate with DNSSEC bis.

that's not realistic.  if dnssec-bis takes off and creates an installed base,
then there will be no incompatible changes to it between PS/DS/FS, and those
stages will just be used to refine the documents based on implementation and
deployment experience.  if dnssec-bis fails to take off for ANY reason, then
getting more funding or development, or being taken seriously when saying "we
really think we've got it right this time," has a likelihood approaching zero.

> There may be other ways of going forward, stalling development of NSEC2 but
> introduce a mechanism into DNSSEC-bis that introduces versioning of NSEC,
> if you see the signal you should expect the new features (say NSEC2) or
> treat the zone as unsecured. That would delay too, but maybe not that long.
> 
> Rough consensus is difficult to read from the current thread. It would help
> if you make your (motivated) position clearer and provide your arguments
> for taking one of the options. Do so before June 1.

i like "advance dnssec-bis as it is, and if someone wants to work on stopping
enumeration, let them commit to it and let them figure out how to sell it and
let them figure out whether selling it is made harder if it's not backward
compatible."

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: geoff@nominet.org.uk (Geoffrey Sisson)
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Mon, 24 May 2004 12:37:43 +0100 (BST)
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Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com> writes:

> When the "NO RR" was evaluated by the dnsext working group, these opposing
> requirements were taken into account, and anti-enumeration lost out.  I had
> no dog in that race so this was only of academic interest to me -- "what 
> does BIND have to implement?" and "how can we get DNSSEC done in a decade?"
> where my only concerns.
> 
> If the WG made the wrong choice and if DNSSEC is unimplementable because TLD
> holders fear enumeration and so SLD holders will have secure path to the
> root zone, then it appears that there's really no choice except to declare
> failure.

Four years ago, when Simon's NO draft was considered by the WG, it
appeared entirely plausible that implementation-based rate limiting
mechanisms would be sufficent to offset any threat of elaboration.
With the subsequent increase of the
sophistication/size/duration/untraceablity/scope of such of distributed
abuse -- especially including zombie networks "for hire" -- we believe
this is no longer the case, and that protocol-level modifictions again
have to be considered by the WG as a possible "palliative" strategy.

The old anwer isn't the new answer, but I don't believe this the same
as declaring failure . . .

Regards

Geoff

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: roy@dnss.ec
Subject: nsec2 large label pain
Date: Mon, 24 May 2004 14:12:02 +0200 (CEST)
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I'd like to address an issue due to large labels in NSEC2.

SHA1 output is 160 bits. Represented in hexadecimal thats 40 bytes for the
owner name and the next domain name as well. The signature of the NSEC2
has the same owner name. Thats 120 Bytes extra per NSEC2 compared to nsec
(minus 3 times the original label length). This has negative implications
for packet-size, zone-size and truncation. I'd like to see that reflected
in the draft.

Roy


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: geoff@nominet.org.uk (Geoffrey Sisson)
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Mon, 24 May 2004 13:50:22 +0100 (BST)
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FWIW I don't believe we've made clear the following point: Nominet is
prepared to commit our own resources to develop patch code to implement
draft-laurie-dnsext-nsec2 for, at a minimum, BIND 9.3, NSD 2.x and
Net::DNS::SEC.  The intent is to facilitate the evaluation of the
efficaciousness, environmental impact and interoperability of the use
of NSEC2 RRs.  We expect to make these patches available under the same
licenses as the corresponding source distributions, and to continue to
maintain and distribute the patches until either the draft expires
"with finality", or, perhaps, the patches or protocol become integrated
into the distributions themselves.

It's never been Nominet's intention to simply toss I-Ds over the fence
as a cynical exercise in FUD propagation, especially while the core
DNSSECbis docs are in WGLC.

Hope this helps . . .

Regards

Geoff

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: Simon Josefsson <jas@extundo.com>
Subject: Re: nsec2 large label pain
Date: Mon, 24 May 2004 15:05:26 +0200
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roy@dnss.ec writes:

> I'd like to address an issue due to large labels in NSEC2.
>
> SHA1 output is 160 bits. Represented in hexadecimal thats 40 bytes for the
> owner name and the next domain name as well. The signature of the NSEC2
> has the same owner name. Thats 120 Bytes extra per NSEC2 compared to nsec
> (minus 3 times the original label length). This has negative implications
> for packet-size, zone-size and truncation. I'd like to see that reflected
> in the draft.

Can't you use standard DNS name compression techniques on the SIG
owner name?  If so, it is more like 80 bytes, minus the original label
length, extra.  If this size increase is a major obstacle for people,
it may be possible to explore hash truncation.

Regards,
Simon


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: Marcos Sanz/Denic <sanz@denic.de>
Subject: Re: nsec2 large label pain
Date: Mon, 24 May 2004 15:23:58 +0200
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> length, extra.  If this size increase is a major obstacle for people,
> it may be possible to explore hash truncation.

Rather to explore an alternative representation to hexadecimal?

Regards,
Marcos

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: roy@dnss.ec
Subject: Re: nsec2 large label pain
Date: Mon, 24 May 2004 16:09:36 +0200 (CEST)
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On Mon, 24 May 2004, Simon Josefsson wrote:

> roy@dnss.ec writes:
>
> > I'd like to address an issue due to large labels in NSEC2.
> >
> > SHA1 output is 160 bits. Represented in hexadecimal thats 40 bytes for the
> > owner name and the next domain name as well. The signature of the NSEC2
> > has the same owner name. Thats 120 Bytes extra per NSEC2 compared to nsec
> > (minus 3 times the original label length). This has negative implications
> > for packet-size, zone-size and truncation. I'd like to see that reflected
> > in the draft.
>
> Can't you use standard DNS name compression techniques on the SIG
> owner name?

Absolutely. You can.

> If so, it is more like 80 bytes, minus the original label
> length, extra.

<nit> plus the compression-pointer.

> If this size increase is a major obstacle for people,
> it may be possible to explore hash truncation.

There are several ways to 'fix this', including a new label type (type
HASH or something evil) if you like.

There are other obstacles as well. Current label length restricts the
message digest size (if represented in hex) to 248 bits. This excludes
functions like sha-256/384/512.

Roy

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Mon, 24 May 2004 14:16:17 +0000
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> Four years ago, when Simon's NO draft was considered by the WG, it
> appeared entirely plausible that implementation-based rate limiting
> mechanisms would be sufficent to offset any threat of elaboration.

wow.  that was the wrong view, both on the facts and on principle.

> ... we believe this is no longer the case, and that protocol-level
> modifictions again have to be considered by the WG as a possible
> "palliative" strategy.
> 
> The old anwer isn't the new answer, but I don't believe this the same
> as declaring failure . . .

you're using different words than declaring failure, but if adopted,
this position would have the same result as declaring failure.  

nothing we can do in dns will ever prevent useful enumerations by bad 
people who will use the data to index your whois and spam your customers.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: Marcos Sanz/Denic <sanz@denic.de>
Subject: Re: nsec2 large label pain
Date: Mon, 24 May 2004 16:28:48 +0200
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> There are other obstacles as well. Current label length restricts the
> message digest size (if represented in hex) to 248 bits. This excludes
> functions like sha-256/384/512.

If we forget hex (with a byte-utilization rate of 50%) and do kind of 
base64 (75%), then sha-256 can still be used.

Regards,
Marcos

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com>
Subject: ruminations on late-game design changes
Date: Mon, 24 May 2004 14:35:06 +0000
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it is widely agreed that ipv6 fails to resolve some of ipv4's longstanding
problems, such as the tension between the size of the routing table and
the size of a globally routeable address block, or address portability,
or address mobility, or automatic renumbering.  tony li once complained
about the speed of the ipv6 design cycle by saying that the delta between
ipv4 and ipv6 was "too little, too soon."  work continues to try to improve
the things that can be improved without new flag days -- but the point is,
the protocol design was frozen some years ago and some things were left out.

and so, in the 11th hour, when someone made a reasonable-sounding request
which was to change the ipv6 packet header format to put destination address
first, thus improving by 8 octet-times the earliest moment when a packet
level forwarding device could do cut-through routing/switching -- by starting
its CAM lookup earlier or whatever -- someone in the ipv6 working group had
what i'll call "the wisdom" to say, eternal microoptimization is a bad idea
and even if this particular idea is good, it would be part of something
larger than itself that would be bad, so, let's not do it.

i'd like to restate that case, but this time, against eternal redesign.  to
be sure, making enumeration more difficult isn't a microoptimization, it's
a redesign.  but the eternal redesign that has characterized the last ten
years of dnssec's "redesign cycle" is clearly no better a thing than eternal
microoptimization would have been.

once when praising the designers of Modula-3, niklaus wirth wrote that the
most difficult thing about programming language design was knowing what to
leave out.  i think this reasoning may apply to network protocol design also.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: Peter Koch <pk@TechFak.Uni-Bielefeld.DE>
Subject: Re: nsec2 large label pain
Date: Mon, 24 May 2004 16:33:49 +0200
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roy@dnss.ec wrote:

> There are several ways to 'fix this', including a new label type (type
> HASH or something evil) if you like.

this rings the complexity bell, but see below[*].

> There are other obstacles as well. Current label length restricts the
> message digest size (if represented in hex) to 248 bits. This excludes
252?

> functions like sha-256/384/512.

First of all, is it really necessary to have so "wide" fingerprints or isn't
the goal better achieved otherwise? Even with a more efficient encoding
(now's time again for the 8 bit debate ...) you'd end up with no more than
504 bits in a label. Practical considerations might lead to a 5/8 encoding,
using e.g. A-Z0-5, large enough for 256 bit. But then, why should the hash
be restricted to one label only, other than that longer hashes restrict
the overall available length of the zone name?

[*] The "new" label type could be bitstring (RFC 2673) or something similar.
This would solve one anomaly of the current proposal: owner names of NSEC2
RRs are names that exist in the zone, but their non-existence is proven
by those NSEC2 RRS, too (not necessarily by the one they own, but by others).
If bitstring labels were used this would open up a "shadow namespace", so
hash owners wouldn't conflict with what they're trying to prove.
For similar reasons the NO draft moved the hashes to a subdomain, IIRC.

-Peter

PS: The draft doesn't yet specify exactly how the hash is calculated and
    how to apply the seed. I'd guess that the seed - if any - needs to be
    used twice, like in HMAC.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: roy@dnss.ec
Subject: Re: nsec2 large label pain
Date: Mon, 24 May 2004 16:38:09 +0200 (CEST)
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On Mon, 24 May 2004, Marcos Sanz/Denic wrote:

> > There are other obstacles as well. Current label length restricts the
> > message digest size (if represented in hex) to 248 bits. This excludes
> > functions like sha-256/384/512.
>
> If we forget hex (with a byte-utilization rate of 50%) and do kind of
> base64 (75%), then sha-256 can still be used.

Base64 encoding is not possible for a label due to canonicalizing. The
best one can do is base32 encoding (62.5%).

Roy

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: Ben Laurie <ben@algroup.co.uk>
Subject: Re: relevent?
Date: Mon, 24 May 2004 16:19:06 +0100
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Cc: Mark Andrews <Mark_Andrews@isc.org>, bmanning@vacation.karoshi.com,
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To: Simon Josefsson <jas@extundo.com>
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Simon Josefsson wrote:
> Mark Andrews <Mark_Andrews@isc.org> writes:
> 
> 
>>	You need to know what names exist to determine which wildcard
>>	to use.  NSEC provides this information in the owner and next
>>	names (yes both of these are required not just the next name).
>>
>>	For NO/NSEC2 the information required to determine this has
>>	to be explicitly provided.
>>
>>	The actual set of proofs reqired are
>>
>>		!f.com + !*.com 
>>	or
>>		!e.f.com + !*.f.com + %f.com
>>	or
>>		!d.e.f.com + !*.e.f.com + %e.f.com
>>	or
>>		!c.d.e.f.com + !*.d.e.f.com + %d.e.f.com
>>	or
>>		!b.c.d.e.f.com + !*.c.d.e.f.com + %c.d.e.f.com
>>	or
>>		!a.b.c.d.e.f.com + !*.b.c.d.e.f.com + %b.c.d.e.f.com
>>
>>	! == not exist
>>	% == exist
> 
> 
> And how is it impossible for NO/NSEC2 to support this?  How I see it
> is that the verifier would compute a hash of all the following
> strings:
> 
>  a.b.c.d.e.f.com
>  *.b.c.d.e.f.com
>  *.c.d.e.f.com
>  *.d.e.f.com
>  *.e.f.com
>  *.f.com
> 
> The hashes for the positive proofs are also needed, i.e.:
> 
> f.com
> e.f.com
> d.e.f.com
> c.d.e.f.com
> b.c.d.e.f.com
> 
> Using those hash values, together with the returned records, the
> client can discover which of your clauses hold (if any).  For example,
> let's say we have the following (abbreviated hash values to simplify
> reading, imagine they are full length SHA-1 hashes):
> 
> H(a.b.c.d.e.f.com) =  181
> H(*.b.c.d.e.f.com) =  38383
> H(*.c.d.e.f.com)   =  3292
> H(*.d.e.f.com)     =  4959
> H(*.e.f.com)       =  606
> H(*.f.com)         =  1194
> 
> H(f.com)           =  5271
> H(e.f.com)         =  14
> H(d.e.f.com)       =  596
> H(c.d.e.f.com)     =  94984
> H(b.c.d.e.f.com)   =  903
> 
> Now let's assume the query is a.b.c.d.e.f.com and the returned NO
> records are:
> 
> $ORIGIN _no.f.com
> 150 IN NO A 200  ;; the main proof that a.b.c.d.e.f.com (181) does not exist
> ;; Additional proofs:
> 550 IN NO A 650  ;; proves d.e.f.com (596) does not exist
> 550 IN NO A 650  ;; proves *.e.f.com (606) does not exist  (by chance, same record)
> 14  IN NO A 50   ;; proves e.f.com (14) exists
> 
> The verifier is able to discover that one out of all relevant wildcard
> situations apply, in this case the third of your clause.  To do this
> it simply iterates over all possible candidates (a small number).  The
> client can now trust that a specific a.b.c.d.e.f.com do not exist, and
> that e.f.com do exists but there is no d.e.f.com nor *.e.f.com.  So it
> is able to authenticate denial of existence for ab.c.d.e.f.com.
> 
> If I'm going to understand why NO/NSEC2 doesn't work, please give more
> details.

NSEC2 does work (at least in this respect), but NO didn't. The 
difference is the EXISTS record, and the problem it solves is that 
(despite terminology) the closest encloser may not actually exist (that 
is, there may not be an RR with that exact name, just one with a longer 
name - or, to put it another way, the closest encloser can be an empty 
non-terminal).

We could demonstrate this, I guess, with hashes rather than EXISTS 
records by not _actually_ having an EXISTS record, just claiming it in 
the RR types field of NSEC2 - or even claiming no RR types at all. 
However, whilst this might be neater, it does nothing to hide the 
closest encloser (clearly, since a resolver needs to know exactly what 
it is), so its just another way of expressing the same thing. It also 
makes the logic for NSEC2 rather different from NSEC and, since it seems 
clear that the future is not likely to replace NSEC with NSEC2, but 
rather to offer them as alternatives, this would seem (to me) to be an 
unnecessary burden on implementers.

I suppose it is also worth saying that it wouldn't reduce the size of 
the zone, either, since you'd be swapping an EXISTS record for an NSEC2 
record.

Cheers,

Ben.


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: Marcos Sanz/Denic <sanz@denic.de>
Subject: Re: nsec2 large label pain
Date: Mon, 24 May 2004 16:43:40 +0200
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> Base64 encoding is not possible for a label due to canonicalizing. The
> best one can do is base32 encoding (62.5%).

SHA-256 still works, though. Do we need something bigger?

Regards,
Marcos

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: Ben Laurie <ben@algroup.co.uk>
Subject: Re: nsec2 large label pain
Date: Mon, 24 May 2004 16:43:47 +0100
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roy@dnss.ec wrote:
> I'd like to address an issue due to large labels in NSEC2.
> 
> SHA1 output is 160 bits. Represented in hexadecimal thats 40 bytes for the
> owner name and the next domain name as well. The signature of the NSEC2
> has the same owner name. Thats 120 Bytes extra per NSEC2 compared to nsec
> (minus 3 times the original label length). This has negative implications
> for packet-size, zone-size and truncation. I'd like to see that reflected
> in the draft.

I did put a note about it. Do you have a particular suggestion for what 
we should say where? Or shall I invent some words myself?

Can we do base 64 to reduce size? I realise this (theoretically at 
least) introduces character set issues. If we respect those, can we do 
base 37 - this reduces 160 bits to 31 bytes (i.e. an overhead of 93 
bytes minus three times the original label length)? Is that worth the 
ugliness?

Incidentally, someone said yesterday that the average label length in 
some TLD (.com?) was 15 characters, IIRC, so this would give an average 
overhead of 48 bytes. Given that DNSSEC (according to Olaf) introduces a 
350 byte overhead already, that doesn't sound _too_ bad to me.

Cheers,

Ben.


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: Simon Josefsson <jas@extundo.com>
Subject: Re: nsec2 large label pain
Date: Mon, 24 May 2004 16:54:30 +0200
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Marcos Sanz/Denic <sanz@denic.de> writes:

> SHA-256 still works, though. Do we need something bigger?

Considering that the strongest signature algorithm specified uses
SHA-1 today, I suspect it is not an immediate concern, at least.

Also, I don't know whether the attacks that are enabled if you even
truncate the hash values are serious.  That is, answer this question:
if you truncate the hash to, say, 64 bits, what can an attacker do?
Truncate to 32 bits?  It seems non-obvious that this can be abused in
any useful way, but I may be missing something.

Regards,
Simon

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: Marcos Sanz/Denic <sanz@denic.de>
Subject: Re: nsec2 large label pain
Date: Mon, 24 May 2004 17:07:07 +0200
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Simon,

> Also, I don't know whether the attacks that are enabled if you even
> truncate the hash values are serious.

The security properties of hashes are known to me. I am sorry to say I 
cannot make the same statement about *truncated* hashes.

Before taking such a step I would like to see some competent 
crypto-advisor giving his "urbi et orbi"..

Best,
Marcos

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com>
Subject: Re: nsec2 large label pain
Date: Mon, 24 May 2004 16:11:26 +0100
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To: Marcos Sanz/Denic <sanz@denic.de>
In-Reply-To: Message from Marcos Sanz/Denic <sanz@denic.de> 
   of "Mon, 24 May 2004 16:43:40 +0200." <OF1A340758.F75D436C-ONC1256E9E.0050BBCC-C1256E9E.0050E725@denic.de> 
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>>>>> "Marcos" == Marcos Sanz/Denic <sanz@denic.de> writes:

    >> Base64 encoding is not possible for a label due to
    >> canonicalizing. The best one can do is base32 encoding (62.5%).

    Marcos> SHA-256 still works, though. Do we need something bigger?

Yes. Perhaps not today, but one day we might. It would be prudent to
plan for that now. Or else we'll have a flag day at some point in the
future when a longer hash string becomes essential. Remember it wasn't
long ago that MD5 was the flavour-of-the-month hash function. Who's to
say if SHA-N won't suffer the same fate in a couple of years?

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: Marcos Sanz/Denic <sanz@denic.de>
Subject: Re: nsec2 large label pain
Date: Mon, 24 May 2004 17:25:23 +0200
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Jim,

> future when a longer hash string becomes essential. Remember it wasn't
> long ago that MD5 was the flavour-of-the-month hash function. Who's to
> say if SHA-N won't suffer the same fate in a couple of years?

In the worst case, SHA would be flawed and its output size would play no 
role...
NSEC2 already offers provisioning for alternative hash types.

Best,
Marcos

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: Ben Laurie <ben@algroup.co.uk>
Subject: Re: nsec2 large label pain
Date: Mon, 24 May 2004 17:59:07 +0100
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Peter Koch wrote:
> PS: The draft doesn't yet specify exactly how the hash is calculated and
>     how to apply the seed. I'd guess that the seed - if any - needs to be
>     used twice, like in HMAC.

Indeed the draft does need to nail down the exact calculation - I was 
intending to do that in the next iteration.

HMAC uses the seed twice to avoid extension attacks, which are not 
relevant to the problem in hand. I'd suggest not using HMACs simply on 
the grounds that its another thing for implementers to worry about (and 
there is an overhead in terms of memory consumption for HMAC 
calculation), but I don't feel all that strongly about it. That said, I 
was planning to use the salt in each iteration of the hash.

What I had in mind was this:

Let H(x) be the hash of x and || denote concatenation. Define:

H_0(salt,x)=H(x || salt)

H_k(salt,x)=H(H_{k-1}(salt,x) || salt)

Then the calculated hash is H_{iterations}(salt,name). BTW, I append the 
salt for technical correctness (it prevents precalculation when the salt 
is at least as long as the hash function block size).

Cheers,

Ben.


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: Ben Laurie <ben@algroup.co.uk>
Subject: Re: nsec2 large label pain
Date: Mon, 24 May 2004 18:14:40 +0100
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Marcos Sanz/Denic wrote:
> Simon,
> 
> 
>>Also, I don't know whether the attacks that are enabled if you even
>>truncate the hash values are serious.
> 
> 
> The security properties of hashes are known to me. I am sorry to say I 
> cannot make the same statement about *truncated* hashes.
> 
> Before taking such a step I would like to see some competent 
> crypto-advisor giving his "urbi et orbi"..

Although some crypto advisors want to get wobbly about truncated hashes, 
this one says that if they didn't work well, they'd constitute an attack 
on the untruncated hash.

My concern about truncation would be more mundane: reduced utility for 
the purpose in hand, since collisions would prevent proving nonexistence.

That said, we could add to our risk by including a bitlength as another 
option in NSECINFO (or NSEC2 if we move options there).

Cheers,

Ben.


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: "Hallam-Baker, Phillip" <pbaker@verisign.com>
Subject: RE: Scope of discussion (was Re: Proposal to fix NSEC)
Date: Mon, 24 May 2004 09:30:27 -0700
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> that's not realistic.  if dnssec-bis takes off and creates an 
> installed base,
> then there will be no incompatible changes to it between 
> PS/DS/FS, and those
> stages will just be used to refine the documents based on 
> implementation and
> deployment experience.  

What is the killer app that would cause it to take off?

> if dnssec-bis fails to take off for 
> ANY reason, then
> getting more funding or development, or being taken seriously 
> when saying "we
> really think we've got it right this time," has a likelihood 
> approaching zero.

That is defeatist thinking. I think that DNSSEC needs a 
killer-app. I don't think that protecting the DNS infrastructure
itself is likely to serve until there is a massive DNS attack
that changes the way the infrastructure is viewed.

But a killer app need not be the intended purpose of even
the main purpose after the system is deployed. The Internet
killer app was the Web, not email. The Web allowed the Internet
to expand rapidly outside academia, but today email is the
app that is most valuable for most people. The killer app for the
microcomputer was the spreadsheet - an app that hardly any PC
user would rate as their most critical today. At that time you
bought a PC for your secretary to do word processing on, no
manager would admit doing that. 


I think that the most likely killer app for DNSSEC is email
accreditation services for anti-spam mechanisms. Of course this
could easily be served by a separate protocol. But reusing
DNS means that it can pull DNS extensions and DNSSEC along
in its wake. Needless to say, stopping trivial enumeration
is critical for this application.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: geoff@nominet.org.uk (Geoffrey Sisson)
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Mon, 24 May 2004 17:46:32 +0100 (BST)
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Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com> writes:

> > Four years ago, when Simon's NO draft was considered by the WG, it
> > appeared entirely plausible that implementation-based rate limiting
> > mechanisms would be sufficent to offset any threat of elaboration.
> 
> wow.  that was the wrong view, both on the facts and on principle.

Perhaps, but, FWIW, that was the message being delivered by several
participants in the DNSSEC "educational outreach" process at the time . . .

Regards

Geoff

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: "Hallam-Baker, Phillip" <pbaker@verisign.com>
Subject: RE: ruminations on late-game design changes
Date: Mon, 24 May 2004 10:06:52 -0700
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> once when praising the designers of Modula-3, niklaus wirth 
> wrote that the
> most difficult thing about programming language design was 
> knowing what to
> leave out.  i think this reasoning may apply to network 
> protocol design also.

Bad example. Pascal was an abject failure because it contained
a major design flaw, it was impossible to implement I/O libraries
as character strings of different lengths were considered 
incompatible types.

This flaw was pointed out repeatedly during the design phase,
treated to similar filibustering, rejected by the standards
committee and every compiler devised a separate work arround.


Most of the flaws of C that demanded correction in Java and 
C# were solved long before in Pascal. C++ could have corrected 
them if total backwards compatibility had not crippled the 
design. Instead we had nearly fifteen years of wasted effort
in that field until Gosling worked out the right marketting
strategy to get the field back on track.

Tony Hoare was an advocate of simpler programming languages
long before Wirth, and he also pointed out (repeatedly) that
it could be overdone. 

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: "Scott Rose" <scottr@nist.gov>
Subject: peaceful co-existance of NSEC and NSEC2
Date: Mon, 24 May 2004 10:07:02 -0400
Organization: NIST
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While talking about some stuff regarding the NSEC and NSEC2.   Is there a
way to proceed with DNSSEC deployment with the option of having NSEC2 coming
later - and have both systems co-exist?

I do not know the answer now, but the first option was to use different
values in the DNSKEY protocol field to indicate status of non-existance
responses in the zone.

3 - uses NSEC as in DNSSECbis docset
4 - uses NSEC2 or something else
5 - etc...

However, the problem here is interoperability with signalling unsigned
delegations.  If a NSEC-DNSSEC sec-aware resolver gets a unsigned delegation
with a NSEC2 RR (proving no DS RR exists), will the resolver could exit with
servfail (protocol error) instead of proceeding with knowledge that the zone
is unsigned.  If the resolver continues, it will see the DNSKEY RR in the
zone having a protocol field of 4 (or whatever) and declare that as invalid.
This could be bad since postive responses could be verified as normal, only
negative response are different.

This is just a possibility.  There might be others, or we could drop the
idea of co-existance of NSEC with NSEC2 (or some other option).  Just
something to keep in mind as a possibilty to allow early adopters to start
using DNSSEC (those that do not believe they have to fear zone enumeration).

Scott


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: bmanning@vacation.karoshi.com
Subject: DNSSEC docset last call
Date: Sun, 23 May 2004 23:32:22 +0000
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I'm in favor of shipping out the docs as currently written.

This does not imply that there are areas of the spec that don't 
need work. There are. But what we have now is "good enough" for
what is needed for those who are waiting for deployment.

To paraphrase Moses, "Let my docset go".

--bill

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: bmanning@vacation.karoshi.com
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Sun, 23 May 2004 14:56:45 +0000
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On Sun, May 23, 2004 at 07:26:19AM -0700, Hallam-Baker, Phillip wrote:
> > > ... though personally I agree with Phillip Hallam-Baker's analysis
> > > that more information is revealed.
> > 
> > If he said that, he was wrong.  More likely you misunderstood 
> > him.  The same information is revealed, it just happens slightly 
> > later and is an indirect activity. 
> 
> This shows why DNSEXT should transfer work on DNSSEC to the security
> area. 

	Again?  The last time the security area had DNSSEC, we 
	got stuff that could not be deployed due to excessive
	"chatter" btwwn parent and child.  There are more good	
	security people on the DNS lists than DNS people of any sort
	on the security lists.  

> The IETF has a reputation for designing security mechanisms that
> are so completely over-designed that they are undeployable, while
> failing to meet security requirements considered critical by end
> users. IPSEC refused to address NAT but created a negotiation 
> mechanism for key negotiation.
> 
> If you want anyone to use DNSSEC then you had better address the
> requirements of the security community.

	Philip, why do you presume that the "security" community speaks
	with a single voice? 


> Phill

--bill

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: Ben Laurie <ben@algroup.co.uk>
Subject: Re: nsec2 large label pain
Date: Mon, 24 May 2004 18:07:39 +0100
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Marcos Sanz/Denic wrote:
>>Base64 encoding is not possible for a label due to canonicalizing. The
>>best one can do is base32 encoding (62.5%).
> 
> 
> SHA-256 still works, though. Do we need something bigger?

SHA-1 means that for a 1 in 2 chance of a single collision, you need 
around 10^24 names. I imagine that makes it sufficient for now?

I could add SHA-256 as an option. Fine by me.


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: bmanning@vacation.karoshi.com
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Sun, 23 May 2004 05:41:11 +0000
Lines: 26
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> you might well be right) doesn't cut much mustard when the requirement
> comes from the internet community, as communicated to those who are going
> to make the deployment decision.
> 
> Alex

	Hum... one might argue that the folks who have been putting
	up money for development and have indicated why they want certain
	features in DNSSEC are prepared to deploy based on the current
	material.  If there are folks whos requirements for features differ
	from the currently funded activities, then they are free to back
	their requirements with monies to cover development and integration
	costs. Its not like this is the end-all for DNSSEC. One should 
	retain the perspective that this is the -third- iteration of the
	spec, with associated code and attempts at deployment.  There
	is no reason to beleive that further, iterative refinement would
	not be forthcoming.  Lets just get this stuff out the door and then 
	look at what should be in DNSSECv5.

--bill

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: Simon Josefsson <jas@extundo.com>
Subject: Re: relevent?
Date: Mon, 24 May 2004 19:15:21 +0200
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Ben Laurie <ben@algroup.co.uk> writes:

>> The verifier is able to discover that one out of all relevant
>> wildcard situations apply, in this case the third of your clause.
>> To do this it simply iterates over all possible candidates (a small
>> number).  The client can now trust that a specific a.b.c.d.e.f.com
>> do not exist, and that e.f.com do exists but there is no d.e.f.com
>> nor *.e.f.com.  So it is able to authenticate denial of existence
>> for ab.c.d.e.f.com.  If I'm going to understand why NO/NSEC2
>> doesn't work, please give more details.
>
> NSEC2 does work (at least in this respect), but NO didn't. The
> difference is the EXISTS record, and the problem it solves is that
> (despite terminology) the closest encloser may not actually exist
> (that is, there may not be an RR with that exact name, just one with a
> longer name - or, to put it another way, the closest encloser can be
> an empty non-terminal).

I'm sorry to be dense, but I don't follow how NO didn't work.  What
was wrong in the algorithm verifiers can follow to prove non-existence
using NO records in my previous message?

Don't get me wrong, I'm not trying to push a NO solution (all I have
proposed is to drop one sentence in the security considerations of the
current specifications), but since we're discussing it, I'd might as
well try to learn something.

Thanks,
Simon


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: bmanning@vacation.karoshi.com
Subject: relevent?
Date: Fri, 21 May 2004 12:23:33 +0000
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> No, I believe sufficient information is present.  To verify that any
> wildcard RR doesn't cover the queried name, you compute a few SHA-1
> hashes on the only possible wildcard owner names that can be relevant,

	thats a bit presumptious, don't you think?  how can you 
	possibly determine relevant, possible owner names?

> Regards,
> Simon

--bill

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:53 2006
From: bmanning@vacation.karoshi.com
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Fri, 21 May 2004 19:18:23 +0000
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> On this list in this context I noticed that also concernsabout the
> IP-rights (Intellectual Property rights) popped up, like one had
> on a telephone directory. (There the data is also meant to be public,
> but on how it is organized there are IP rights). You cannot just
> copy a directory because of that. For a zone file you can claim
> this probably as well. That gives you a handle to whack people
> making copies. We discussed this internally somewhat.  We think
> that IP-rights on a zone file is an interesting idea, but doesn't
> prevent zone enumeration. It has more juridical aspects then
> technical.

	the one concern here is that the process of signing the
	data sorts the zone into a "normal" form.  this is a two-edged
	sword :)  in the singed case, I can unambigiously prove
	that the zone contents were sorted and signed by me. e.g.
	the compilation is mine.

> 
> Back to (EU and other) pivacy concerns. Given the fact that there
> are multiple ways to do data mining for domain names in a zone as
> pointed out by Paul Vixie and Robert Elz, one really must take steps
> to limit access to "whois data".

	There are otheres that called out the ability to either
	"slow-scan" the replies & build up a copy of the DB over time,
	or "brute-force" the effort. Both take time, both are known
	tools (and some of us have used them!)  

> 	jaap

--bill

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: bmanning@vacation.karoshi.com
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Thu, 20 May 2004 14:20:55 +0000
Lines: 35
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Cc: Robert Elz <kre@munnari.OZ.AU>, namedroppers@ops.ietf.org,
   Peter Koch <pk@TechFak.Uni-Bielefeld.DE>
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Mon May 24 19:34:12 2004
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> Again, the compilation may not be public. That is an *actual fact* in the 
> case of many TLDs. Could we stop declaring this as a non-problem? We'd 
> have two ways to go:
> a) We face it's a problem, live with it and *say so* in the actual drafts.

	it seems that the origin of this "problem" is a contractual
	obligation TLDs assume when they sign the ICANN agreement.
	if this is the case, then it really is a non-problem from
	a protocol perspective.

> b) We invest our discussing energy in the NSEC2 proposal (or NO, or any 
> other) to fix whatever is broken.

	not worth the effort.
	
> Simon just said it: fixing whois will remove whois from the examples, but 
> won't remove the traversal problem.

	traversing data that by its nature is public seems a reasonable
	thing to want to do.  why is this a problem?
	
> 
> Regards,
> Marcos
> 
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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: "Hallam-Baker, Phillip" <pbaker@verisign.com>
Subject: RE: nsec2 large label pain
Date: Mon, 24 May 2004 10:39:00 -0700
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> > There are other obstacles as well. Current label length 
> restricts the
> > message digest size (if represented in hex) to 248 bits. 
> This excludes
> > functions like sha-256/384/512.
> 
> If we forget hex (with a byte-utilization rate of 50%) and do kind of 
> base64 (75%), then sha-256 can still be used.

There are two issues, strength of algorithm and the risk of attack.

It may well be better to use SHA-256 and truncate to some length than to use
SHA-1. From a purely cryptographic point of view SHA-256 is a much better
scheme, it is also likely to be supported better in future hardware
acceleration etc.

Rather than use hex I would use BASE32 encoding, several people have
proposed schemes that use ten numbers and 22 characters as a case-proof
symbol set. This means that you get five bits per character rather than
four. So a 160 bit digest is only 32 characters.

How long should the digest be? Since we are using it to mask a label 
that is itself bound in size we don't need very many bits at all. 

In fact the size of the range of the hash need only be the square of
the size of the domain.

I don't think it very likely that we will have individual zones with more
than 2^64 different labels. So the probability of collision will be
negligible if have a hash with 2^128 bits.

If label size is an issue we could argue over likely domain sizes etc.

		Phill

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: "Hallam-Baker, Phillip" <pbaker@verisign.com>
Subject: RE: nsec2 large label pain
Date: Mon, 24 May 2004 10:48:58 -0700
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> > future when a longer hash string becomes essential. 
> Remember it wasn't
> > long ago that MD5 was the flavour-of-the-month hash 
> function. Who's to
> > say if SHA-N won't suffer the same fate in a couple of years?
> 
> In the worst case, SHA would be flawed and its output size 
> would play no 
> role...
> NSEC2 already offers provisioning for alternative hash types.

>From a pure algorithm perspective the concern here is that MD4 is
broken, MD5 is deeply compromised and both MD5 and SHA-1 are both
incremental advances on MD4.

I have no reason to doubt the security of SHA-1 at this time,
but we are past the point where it is appropriate to use it
in a NEW specification environment. The whole point of AES was
to address these issues industry wide.


The length of the algorithm output is not an issue, both SHA-1 and 
SHA-256 provide more than sufficient bits. We should probably 
truncate in either case.



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com>
Subject: Re: relevent?
Date: Mon, 24 May 2004 17:52:29 +0000
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References: <jas@extundo.com>
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In-Reply-To: Message from Simon Josefsson <jas@extundo.com> 
	of "Mon, 24 May 2004 19:15:21 +0200."
	<ilur7t9rbkm.fsf@latte.josefsson.org> 
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> I'm sorry to be dense, but I don't follow how NO didn't work.  ...
> Don't get me wrong, I'm not trying to push a NO solution ...

and yet, you must.  perhaps that's the component i'm seeing that others
here are not.  if we're going to reopen the dnssec design, then we have
to re-evaluate NO, opt-in, as well as NSEC2, and anything else lurking
in the shadows.  anything we don't evaluate fully enough, will clearly
just become an 11th hour showstopped 18 months from now when we next feel
ready to start deployment.  therefore, if this WG decides to adopt NSEC2,
we have to broaden the net to include competing proposals, some of whom
were shot down just because of the lateness of the hour rather than for
functional reasons.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: "Hallam-Baker, Phillip" <pbaker@verisign.com>
Subject: RE: relevent?
Date: Mon, 24 May 2004 11:29:29 -0700
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Paul,

	This is not what is being asked for.

	I don't think anyone wants to delay DNSSEC bis. I certainly do not
want to do 11th hour design. You are completely right about opening cans of
worms. I don't want to end up with yet another half-baked fix up that only
solves half the problems.

	All that is needed at this stage to meet everyone's immediate needs
is to change the DNSSEC docs so that a zone can say that it does not support
NSEC. It would be good if it could also state what it does support. There
would be a stiff Security Considerations item that says that this creates
serious vulnerabilities.

	All that is really needed at this stage is a versioning mechanism
for the NSEC record. I do not think that any reasonable person could state
that there is a consensus here that there is absolutely no possibility that
NSEC needs to be revised. That has already happened several times.

	Basically its just a signed return that says 'NSEC not supported,
see the X,Y or Z records instead'.

	
	We all understand that there will be deployment issues and that any
proposal comming out of the gate late will be at a disadvantage. This does
not matter, if DNSSEC is so successfull that it does not need fixing then
great!

		Phill


> > I'm sorry to be dense, but I don't follow how NO didn't work.  ...
> > Don't get me wrong, I'm not trying to push a NO solution ...
> 
> and yet, you must.  perhaps that's the component i'm seeing 
> that others
> here are not.  if we're going to reopen the dnssec design, 
> then we have
> to re-evaluate NO, opt-in, as well as NSEC2, and anything else lurking
> in the shadows.  anything we don't evaluate fully enough, will clearly
> just become an 11th hour showstopped 18 months from now when 
> we next feel
> ready to start deployment.  therefore, if this WG decides to 
> adopt NSEC2,
> we have to broaden the net to include competing proposals, 
> some of whom
> were shot down just because of the lateness of the hour 
> rather than for
> functional reasons.
> 
> --
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> namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
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> 

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: Edward Lewis <edlewis@arin.net>
Subject: nsec2 example
Date: Mon, 24 May 2004 11:40:10 -0700
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(Apparently there's been a thread on NSEC2 on namedroppers.  I 
haven't read it.)

I was asked to look at the NSEC2 proposal.  It's hard to give a 
theoretical analysis of this, so I plucked one example to run against 
it.  I picked an example that I think would present a problem.  I'll 
list the example as well as a few thoughts.

Here's the sample zone I am using:

@       SOA, other stuff; @ is the name of the zone (="example.org.")
*.f     some stuff
d.e.f   some stuff
z.e.f   some stuff

For the purposes of the example, assume every name above has AAAA 
records, as well as all queries, and is in class IN.

I'll also make these assumptions.  I'm going to assume the hash of 
each name is:

hash (@) = 98
hash (*.f) = 17
hash (z.e.f) = 138
hash (d.e.f) = 347

So, the full zone has:

@       SOA, other stuff
*.f     some stuff
d.e.f   some stuff
z.e.f   some stuff
17      NSEC2
98      NSEC2
138     NSEC2
347     NSEC2

(Hopefully I have this correct.  Ben?)

Let's look at a query for a.b.c.d.e.f(.@) AAAA, IN.  Obviously, it 
doesn't exist and is not subject to the wild card synthesis. 
Graphically I see:

                @
                |
                f
               / \
               * e
                / \
                d z
               .
               c
               .
               b
               .
               a

"|,\,/" are links in the tree.  "." is a non-existent link, e.g., 
something below any leaf of the tree. (BTW, because of this, I can't 
imagine that the EXIST RR is needed.  The only nodes that can be 
closest enclosers in a negative answers have to "be there." 
Otherwise, I'd have fallen off the tree earlier.  DNS does not have 
terminal non-empty nodes.)

So, to prove that there is no data to return to my answer, 
specifically that a name error has occurred, the following has to be 
demonstrated:

1) a.b.c.d.e.f does not exist.  (Let's call the hash of it "217")
2) b.c.d.e.f does not exist.  (Let's call the hash of it "130")
3) c.d.e.f does not exist.  (Let's call the hash of it "87")
4) d.e.f does exist
5) *.d.e.f does not exist.  (Let's call the hash of it "112")

To demonstrate this, the response to the name error has to contain 
the following NSEC2 RR's:

1) 138 NSEC2    (because 138 < 217 < 347)
2) 98 NSEC2     ( 98 < 130 < 138 )
3) 17 NSEC2     ( 17 < 87 < 98 )
4) 347 NSEC2    ( 347 = 347 ) - demonstrating that this exists
5) optimized out 98 NSEC2 ( 98 < 112 < 138 )

(At this point, I should ask - is the above example and understanding 
of the NSEC2 RR draft correct?  If not, then the rest of this isn't 
worth reading at this point.)

It seems that this approach does convey the needed information for 
this example.  I suspect that if there was a wild card synthesis 
involved, then #5 is replaced by the results of the synthesis.

My initial concern was that the client can't be sure that an 
inappropriate NSEC2 RR was inserted, possibly via a replay attack (of 
valid data).  Well, it seems unlikely, because both the client and 
server will need to agree on "what needs provin'" and are just 
exchanging evidence for the proof.

What is lost in hashing is the structure of the tree.  Hashing is a 
mapping that flattens an "object".  Because of the flattening (it 
could also be attributed to lossy compression) more information is 
needed to show the structure.  This is manifested in the difference 
between needing just one or two NSEC RR's (or NXT's) and the need for 
extra NSEC2 RR's.  An NSEC RR showing there is no name from d.e.f to 
z.e.f would be all that is needed to prove points 1-5.  In this 
example, we need 4 distinct NSEC2 RR's.

The upper limit of NSEC2 records is linearly proportional to the 
number of labels from the closest encloser to the QNAME.  I am a bit 
worried that this is determined by the querier - I mean it is, but 
that it is worries me.  Hypothesis: this is a potential DOS 
vulnerability.  E.g., let's say there is no arin.net.  If you ask the 
.net servers for a.b.c.d.e.f.g.h.arin.net, then the .net server has 
to perform 8 - 10 hash calculations and include about that many 
records in the reply.

As an aside unrelated to the previous, the use of hashed names 
"changes the shape of the tree" involuntarily from the point of view 
of the administrator.  I'm not sure that this is a problem, but 
thought it should be mentioned.  In the above example, 17.@ is 
introduced into the zone.  Granted, 17 is a lot prettier than a real 
20 byte SHA-1 hash, but what happens is that wild card synthesis may 
be altered because of these hash names.  E.g., if there was a "*.@" 
in the zone, then the answer to "a.17.@, IN , AAAA" is altered.  The 
synthesis isn't applied because of the blocking (hash) name.
-- 
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Edward Lewis                                            +1-703-227-9854
ARIN Research Engineer

Even the voices inside my head are refusing to talk to me anymore.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: Simon Josefsson <jas@extundo.com>
Subject: Re: relevent?
Date: Mon, 24 May 2004 21:00:58 +0200
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Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com> writes:

>> I'm sorry to be dense, but I don't follow how NO didn't work.  ...
>> Don't get me wrong, I'm not trying to push a NO solution ...
>
> and yet, you must.  perhaps that's the component i'm seeing that others
> here are not.  if we're going to reopen the dnssec design, then we have
> to re-evaluate NO, opt-in, as well as NSEC2, and anything else lurking
> in the shadows.  anything we don't evaluate fully enough, will clearly
> just become an 11th hour showstopped 18 months from now when we next feel
> ready to start deployment.  therefore, if this WG decides to adopt NSEC2,
> we have to broaden the net to include competing proposals, some of whom
> were shot down just because of the lateness of the hour rather than for
> functional reasons.

I agree with all that.  I don't mind of others wants to reconsider the
NO proposal, and time permitting I can try to assist.  But my only
goal now has been to improve the current specifications, so they can
be shipped (if that is the consensus), by dropping a misleading
statement in the security consideration.  Those two matters are
orthogonal, and quite different in proportions.  I haven't asked for a
redesign, and I'm indifferent to whether one is needed.

Regards,
Simon


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: Edward Lewis <edlewis@arin.net>
Subject: another nsec2 example
Date: Mon, 24 May 2004 14:14:17 -0700
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After the previous example, I thought a bit more about the EXIST RR. 
Here is an example that shows the need for it (in the NSEC2 proposal).

I'll use the same beginning data as the other message I sent, but 
with a different query.

So, starting with:
@       SOA, other stuff
*.f     some stuff
d.e.f   some stuff
z.e.f   some stuff
17      NSEC2
98      NSEC2
138     NSEC2
347     NSEC2

This time I'll query for (one.two.three.e.f.@, IN, AAAA).  In this 
case, the closest encloser is the empty non-terminal e.f.@.  (What 
was I thinking last time?)

In this case, the following has to be determined:

1) That one.two.three.e.f does not exist
2) That two.three.e.f does not exist
3) That three.e.f does not exist
4) That e.f does exist
5) That *.e.f does not exist

The only difference from the previous example is that the proof that 
e.f exists has to prove the existence of the empty node there.  The 
proposal postulates that the EXIST name is needed there.

Faced with that, there is another choice - why not just insert 
NSEC2's at all existing nodes (as shown in the tree)?  We forbade 
empty non-terminals owning NXT's in the past just to cut down the 
need to represent them.  This is merely a suggestive question - 
predicated by the potential need for EXIST RR.

-- 
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Edward Lewis                                            +1-703-227-9854
ARIN Research Engineer

Even the voices inside my head are refusing to talk to me anymore.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: Simon Josefsson <jas@extundo.com>
Subject: Re: relevent?
Date: Mon, 24 May 2004 23:42:15 +0200
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	<ilulljlbajp.fsf@latte.josefsson.org> <40B2126A.7020306@algroup.co.uk>
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Ben Laurie <ben@algroup.co.uk> writes:

> The problem is that if (say), in your example, e.f.com only exists by
> virtue of an RR for x.e.f.com, then there will be no NO record for
> e.f.com. This is why I had to invent the EXISTS record.

Ah, I see.  Thanks for explaining!  Edward Lewis' suggestion to (in
this example) populate the otherwise empty node e.f.com with a NSEC2
RR sounds like something that might be simpler.

Thanks,
Simon

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: Michael Richardson <mcr@sandelman.ottawa.on.ca>
Subject: Re: Scope of discussion (was Re: Proposal to fix NSEC)
Date: Mon, 24 May 2004 20:24:34 -0400
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


>>>>> "Olaf" == Olaf Kolkman <olaf@ripe.net> writes:
    Olaf> The question on the table is what this WG needs to do.

    Olaf> In my previous mail I have listed two possibilities. Taking up
    Olaf> work to prevent zone enumeration while holding the DNSSEC bis
    Olaf> document-set or shipping DNSSEC bis and forgetting about

  Sigh.
  I hate to say this... if we are going to do this, let's do it *now*

  I suggest that some may want to go ahead with DNSSEC deployment
without NSEC.  If doing so, they should not have any NSEC records at all,
nor should their resolvers know what to do with them at this point.

  I think that the chairs should establish a firm time table for doing
this work. It should take no more than 5 weeks.

- --
]     "Elmo went to the wrong fundraiser" - The Simpson         |  firewalls  [
]   Michael Richardson,    Xelerance Corporation, Ottawa, ON    |net architect[
] mcr@xelerance.com      http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/mcr/ |device driver[
] panic("Just another Debian GNU/Linux using, kernel hacking, security guy"); [


  

  
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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com>
Subject: Re: Scope of discussion (was Re: Proposal to fix NSEC)
Date: Tue, 25 May 2004 01:03:08 +0000
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In-Reply-To: Message from Michael Richardson <mcr@sandelman.ottawa.on.ca> 
	of "Mon, 24 May 2004 20:24:34 -0400."
	<18639.1085444674@marajade.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca> 
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>   I hate to say this... if we are going to do this, let's do it *now*

technically i agree with this statement.  but if we were going to do this,
we should never have even considered standardizing NXT (ne NSEC), and i'm
concerned about vision creep... so concerned in fact that if we decide to
re-debate NO/opt-in/NSEC2, i'll wonder how we'll *ever* know that DNSSEC
is cooked-enough to stop tinkering with it.  (until last week, i thought
we knew.)

>   I suggest that some may want to go ahead with DNSSEC deployment
> without NSEC.  If doing so, they should not have any NSEC records at all,
> nor should their resolvers know what to do with them at this point.

this is not realistic.  just as many people don't read drafts until WGLC,
many implementors and operators will not invest any effort in a standard
that's known to be an incomplete shadow of its future self.  i'm sure, for
example, that isc would have a hard time getting funding to develop code
that doesn't generate or look at NSEC, since authoritative denial of
existence was made a WG-level showstopper nine years ago.

>   I think that the chairs should establish a firm time table for doing
> this work. It should take no more than 5 weeks.

this is also not realistic.  with dnssec, we can't call it "done" until
it's been extensively reviewed, modelled, and beer&pizza-tested, and for
something at the level of NSEC2 that will take six to 12 months.  that's
how we found "the grandparent problem" and that's how long it takes to
find, or be sure you're not able to find, problems of that subtle nature.

this debate is making it sound as if we don't know what dnssec is supposed
to do, or who it's going to do it for, or what are the concerns of the people
dnssec is supposed to do stuff for.  i just don't think that's all true.
but if i'm wrong, and dnssec is now a solution in search of a problem, then
i'd like to question the wisdom of spending any more time on it until the
problem is clearly known and explicitly agreed to by all possible stakeholders.
(which in other words means, until hell freezes over.)

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: =?iso-8859-1?Q?=D3lafur?= =?iso-8859-1?Q?_Gu=F0mundsson?=
  <ogud@ogud.com>
Subject: NSEC+ and NO
Date: Tue, 25 May 2004 01:12:55 -0400
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<Not as co-chair>

Having read the discussions on namedroppers about this
topic here are my "grumpy old man" personal reactions/responses.
Please take a moment to send me or the list answers to the questions
at the end.

0. It is real frustrating when a bunch of late new comers suddenly say they
	can not deploy DNSSEC for some reason that has nothing
	to do with DNS, just some obsolete whois stuff and some legal mumbo
	jumbo that only applies to about 25 countries.
	
1. I was strongly in favour of exploring NO record and it's implications
    when Simon started that work.
    NO failed to catch on for a combination of reasons including:
	- There was no explicit need to stop zone walking.
	- It was MUCH more expensive than NXT,
		2x names (the real one and hash name)
		2x lookups in authoritative server to answer negative answer
			first the name then the nearest hash
		More expensive to sign a zone as all hash names had to
			generated and sorted.
	- Later on we discovered that NO did not work with empty 
non-terminals		and wildcards.  (more later) (NO complied with
		at-the-time understanding of the issues).

2. MarkK is too much of an gentleman to say this, so I will:
	- opt-in addresses your publicly stated issue with NSEC.
		only by securing a domain does become it trivial to
		find whois info.

3. Someone said that we can not deploy a protocol that a single TLD's is
	unable to support for local legal reasons.
	Answer: Get over it,  IF you want DNSSEC security, change
		to a name in a different TLD and put a DNAME at the old one.

4. We have known since day ONE that root and TLD's are special and taken
	that into consideration, otherwise the opt-in proposal would have
	not been considered for this long.
	We have known about EU privacy issues but been told publicly
	it was a non issue.	
	Thus any statements of the type:
		"I can not share with you privileged legal opinion"
	must be considered FUD. So unless the position paper (or at
	least relevant sections) is made public, the working group
	MUST ignore the issue.

	Also what is the implication if some EU citizen registers a domain
	in say 	.cn domain does that mean .cn has to follow EU rules?
	Answer: .cn sovereignty tops EU rules.

5. What in DNS makes something like NO++ difficult?
	5.1 Zones with Multiple label names.
	5.2 Zones with wild cards.
	outlaw both and the problem becomes much simpler for any NO-- proposal
	Moral: When there is a DNS problem do not patch it up, address the
		underlying issue.
	If Zone walking is limited to TLD's then restrict the what the
	zones look like to simplify life.
	W/O restrictions on zone depth and wildcards, the number of
	NO++ records server needs/should/may include in an negative
	answer will depend on the query.
	If the burden of discovering this is placed on the resolver
	by requiring label stripping, then time to assert validity of
	an answer is to great.

5.5 On-line signing of negative answers, who signs it
		a master server ?
		a authoritative server ?
			and with what key.
	In any case these servers can now be DoS'ed as the work they need to
	perform is much greater than the effort of the attackers.
	
6. Current NSEC2 proposal does not address the issue of name conflict between
	a valid name and a digest, NO addressed this by moving all NO records
	into a separate name space.
	There is lots of hot air about the encoding, size of, obfuscating of
	NSEC2 names, these are minor details lets address the first order
	problem:

	For who is zone walking a problem and why?

	I assert: root zone has no problem.

6.1
	Are any TLD's willing to go on the record to say NSEC zone
		walking is a
			non-issue
			show-stopper

6.2			
	For leaf zones same questions ?

6.3
	For enterprise zones same questions ?

	Unless the WG gets some hard facts presented to these questions
	this whole issue should be dropped.

7. Should the co-chair have asked question #4?
	Lets just kill DNSSEC it is to difficult and expensive.

	Olafur (just some bozo who has followed DNSSEC for 9.5 years)


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: Masataka Ohta <mohta@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp>
Subject: Re: NSEC+ and NO
Date: Tue, 25 May 2004 17:18:17 +0900
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Olafur;

>     Answer: Get over it,  IF you want DNSSEC security, change
>         to a name in a different TLD and put a DNAME at the old one.

DNAME?

I'm afraid you are merely making a external problem internal.

>     Olafur (just some bozo who has followed DNSSEC for 9.5 years)

As a person who followed it more than 9.5y, I think it is merely
that DNSSEC was a bad idea good for no real purpose.

						Masataka Ohta



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: Marcos Sanz/Denic <sanz@denic.de>
Subject: Re: NSEC+ and NO
Date: Tue, 25 May 2004 10:27:08 +0200
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> 0. It is real frustrating when a bunch of late new comers suddenly say 
they
> can not deploy DNSSEC for some reason that has nothing
> to do with DNS, just some obsolete whois stuff and some legal mumbo
> jumbo that only applies to about 25 countries.

I don't know who are you labeling as a "newcomer", exactly what part of 
the whole is "mumbo jumbo" and whether saying "only 25 countries" isn't an 
oxymoron itself. Paraphrasing an authority person: please remain courteous 
and discuss arguments on the quality of the arguments, qualities of the 
author are out of scope.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: Masataka Ohta <mohta@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp>
Subject: Re: ruminations on late-game design changes
Date: Tue, 25 May 2004 17:40:01 +0900
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Paul Vixie;

> it is widely agreed that ipv6 fails to resolve some of ipv4's longstanding
> problems, such as the tension between the size of the routing table and
> the size of a globally routeable address block, or address portability,
> or address mobility, or automatic renumbering.

No.

IPv6 failed because it tries to solve a lot of problems most of
which are useless and impossible to solve. The only real problem
was routing table size one, which was seemingly too hard to solve
and ignored.

Packet format is a minor issue.

So is DNSSEC. In this case, real world operation is the real
problem and, unlike IPv6 one, is not solvable.

						Masataka Ohta


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com>
Subject: Re: NSEC+ and NO
Date: Tue, 25 May 2004 11:52:13 +0100
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   of "Tue, 25 May 2004 10:27:08 +0200." <OF0CAD6877.DE22903B-ONC1256E9F.002D489A-C1256E9F.002E6DEA@denic.de> 
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>>>>> "Marcos" == Marcos Sanz/Denic <sanz@denic.de> writes:

    Marcos> I don't know who are you labeling as a "newcomer", exactly
    Marcos> what part of the whole is "mumbo jumbo" and whether saying
    Marcos> "only 25 countries" isn't an oxymoron itself. 

Olafur's reference to "legal mumbo jumbo" is well made IMO. The lawyers
for Nominet and SIDN appear to be giving conflicting advice about the
imapct of an EU directive on NSEC. We're not lawyers, let alone
lawyers who understand this field. So unless the legal issues can be
explained to namedroppers by an expert, what we have is to all intents
and purposes legal mumbo-jumbo.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: Edward Lewis <edlewis@arin.net>
Subject: Re: NSEC+ and NO
Date: Tue, 25 May 2004 09:04:51 -0700
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At 1:12 -0400 5/25/04, =D3lafur Gu=F0mundsson wrote:
>0. It is real frustrating when a bunch of late new comers suddenly say they
>	can not deploy DNSSEC for some reason that has nothing
>	to do with DNS, just some obsolete whois stuff and some legal mumbo
>	jumbo that only applies to about 25 countries.

Yes it is frustrating, when you've chased what=20
you understood to be a goal, near it, and then=20
find the outcome not to be what you expected.=20
It's even worse if you find out the goal is=20
actually somewhere else, a place you could have=20
been if you had made a different decision years=20
back.

I can not lay blame at the feet of those who=20
raise last minute objections.  The waterfall=20
model of engineering (requirements,=20
implementations, test, deploy) rarely works in=20
that order with some feedback loops.  Things=20
change, conditions change as time progresses.=20
That and attention to a topic changes over time -=20
a lot of folks with limited resources may have=20
decided years ago to ignore a research project,=20
but now the project draws more attention, a=20
broader range of opinion.

I think that we all do get smarter from this broader range of opinion.

=46or those who have been working on the project=20
for years encounter new comments from new=20
sources, there are two outcomes.  One is to=20
repeat the rationale of why a similar comment in=20
the past did not fly, e.g., why there are=20
problems with the NO RR proposal.  The other=20
outcome is to generate a reaction to the new=20
proposal - positively or negatively.

In the case of the NSEC2, we have some past=20
experience with the such a proposal, and that's=20
been discussed.  (I'm not claiming closure on the=20
topic.)

Today, though, the question isn't really whether=20
NSEC2 is a good thing or bad thing.  The issue is=20
what does the WG do.  That is more determined=20
with what the WG is constituted and prepared to=20
do.

One way to look at the issue is the WG is=20
composed of engineers.  Do the current specs=20
represent sound, workable engineering?  If so, we=20
should publish them and see what happens.  Maybe=20
the current specs will be the next Betamax, but=20
they work.

The other way is to expand our roles to being=20
"problem solvers in the large."  I.e., that we=20
sit down and consider legal opinions as part of=20
our input.  IOW, we should hold up all output=20
until we have the perfect solution - defined by=20
one that makes everyone happy.

If I were to make a decision right now - right=20
now because many know I easily change so-called=20
sides in a discussion - I would say that we=20
should release the documents regardless of=20
(perceived, anticipated) legal hassles.  I don't=20
think that we are capable of negotiating between=20
different legal environments - we are just=20
engineers.

Yesterday I made the comment to Rob that I feel=20
the documents ought not go forward.  That's=20
because I don't see that there's a clean way to=20
migrate from NSEC to NSEC2, assuming there's a=20
need to.  There are a lot of versions of BIND=20
with experimental (and disabled) DNSSEC code in=20
them, but hey, that's the cost of doing business=20
I guess.

We should continue to listen for more input from=20
the external community.  Perhaps there is a need=20
to develop NSEC2.  In other messages I concluded=20
(personally) that it can express negative=20
answers, but at a cost that makes me wonder if it=20
is workable (the linear growth of work as=20
determined by the client).

>
>1. I was strongly in favour of exploring NO record and it's implications
>    when Simon started that work.
>    NO failed to catch on for a combination of reasons including:
>	- There was no explicit need to stop zone walking.
>	- It was MUCH more expensive than NXT,
>		2x names (the real one and hash name)
>		2x lookups in authoritative server to answer negative answer
>			first the name then the nearest hash
>		More expensive to sign a zone as all hash names had to
>			generated and sorted.
>	- Later on we discovered that NO did not=20
>work with empty non-terminals		and=20
>wildcards.  (more later) (NO complied with
>		at-the-time understanding of the issues).
>
>2. MarkK is too much of an gentleman to say this, so I will:
>	- opt-in addresses your publicly stated issue with NSEC.
>		only by securing a domain does become it trivial to
>		find whois info.
>
>3. Someone said that we can not deploy a protocol that a single TLD's is
>	unable to support for local legal reasons.
>	Answer: Get over it,  IF you want DNSSEC security, change
>		to a name in a different TLD and put a DNAME at the old one.
>
>4. We have known since day ONE that root and TLD's are special and taken
>	that into consideration, otherwise the opt-in proposal would have
>	not been considered for this long.
>	We have known about EU privacy issues but been told publicly
>	it was a non issue.
>	Thus any statements of the type:
>		"I can not share with you privileged legal opinion"
>	must be considered FUD. So unless the position paper (or at
>	least relevant sections) is made public, the working group
>	MUST ignore the issue.
>
>	Also what is the implication if some EU citizen registers a domain
>	in say 	.cn domain does that mean .cn has to follow EU rules?
>	Answer: .cn sovereignty tops EU rules.
>
>5. What in DNS makes something like NO++ difficult?
>	5.1 Zones with Multiple label names.
>	5.2 Zones with wild cards.
>	outlaw both and the problem becomes much simpler for any NO-- proposal
>	Moral: When there is a DNS problem do not patch it up, address the
>		underlying issue.
>	If Zone walking is limited to TLD's then restrict the what the
>	zones look like to simplify life.
>	W/O restrictions on zone depth and wildcards, the number of
>	NO++ records server needs/should/may include in an negative
>	answer will depend on the query.
>	If the burden of discovering this is placed on the resolver
>	by requiring label stripping, then time to assert validity of
>	an answer is to great.
>
>5.5 On-line signing of negative answers, who signs it
>		a master server ?
>		a authoritative server ?
>			and with what key.
>	In any case these servers can now be DoS'ed as the work they need to
>	perform is much greater than the effort of the attackers.
>
>6. Current NSEC2 proposal does not address the issue of name conflict betwe=
en
>	a valid name and a digest, NO addressed this by moving all NO records
>	into a separate name space.
>	There is lots of hot air about the encoding, size of, obfuscating of
>	NSEC2 names, these are minor details lets address the first order
>	problem:
>
>	For who is zone walking a problem and why?
>
>	I assert: root zone has no problem.
>
>6.1
>	Are any TLD's willing to go on the record to say NSEC zone
>		walking is a
>			non-issue
>			show-stopper
>
>6.2
>	For leaf zones same questions ?
>
>6.3
>	For enterprise zones same questions ?
>
>	Unless the WG gets some hard facts presented to these questions
>	this whole issue should be dropped.
>
>7. Should the co-chair have asked question #4?
>	Lets just kill DNSSEC it is to difficult and expensive.
>
>	Olafur (just some bozo who has followed DNSSEC for 9.5 years)
>
>
>--
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Edward Lewis                                            +1-703-227-9854
ARIN Research Engineer

Even the voices inside my head are refusing to talk to me anymore.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: "Hallam-Baker, Phillip" <pbaker@verisign.com>
Subject: RE: NSEC+ and NO
Date: Tue, 25 May 2004 10:06:04 -0700
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> 0. It is real frustrating when a bunch of late new comers 
> suddenly say they
> 	can not deploy DNSSEC for some reason that has nothing
> 	to do with DNS, just some obsolete whois stuff and some 
> legal mumbo
> 	jumbo that only applies to about 25 countries.

Hold it right there. This issue has been raised repeatedly, but I
have yet to hear a substantive answer. All I have seen or heard is
pointers to claims that it has been answered before.

This is a classic agenda denial tactic. Don't address the substance
of the argument, attack the standing of the person making it.

The reason that this process is taking so long is that instead of
facing the real challenges for deployment these are mau-maued off
the table, then when they inevitably return the process is repeated.


It would hardly be surprising if people had been slow comming forward
with issues. The treatment they have received in this group has
hardly been wellcoming. I get hissed by the then AD and future chair
the first time I try to say a word in a DNSEXT meeting. The mode of
argument is always 'your experience, knowledge and business interests
are irrelevant to this group', followed by 'my understanding of 
the complexities of DNS means that my statements cannot be disputed'.

The fact is however that every issue that has come out at the "last 
minute" has been raised repeatedly and ignored. Now we are told that
the only options are between doing it according to the current specs
and abandoning DNSSEC entirely. This is a false choice, we do not
need to delay or abandon the DNSSEC specs, we do not need to define a
new NSEC record. All we need to do is to make NSEC optional.

Making NSEC optional reduces but does not eliminate the security
benefit of DNSSEC. Since we are talking about an infrastructure that
is currently insecure and will take many years to deploy a security
infrastructure for there it makes no sense to make NSEC a show stopper.

IF DNSSEC is deployed you will discover FAR more problems than just
NSEC.


I don't think that at the time proving non-existence of domains was
accepted as a showstopper 9 years ago that the implications for 
the present day Internet could have been understood. Over that time
the number of users has gone from a few million college students to 
a billion.

There has also been a radical change in the understanding of the 
security problem over that time. When I started doing Web security 
in 1992 the security field was still centered on the problem of
securing multiple user access to a single, non networked computer.
The role cryptography might play in a network environment was
poorly understood.

Since then there has been a radical reassesment of the appropriate 
application of cryptography in the field. Much of this is the 
result of extensive and painful experience trying to deploy
cryptographic systems.


>From a pure security perspective NSEC buys you very little of value.
This is because DNS is not just a protocol, it is a component in
a system. In a system there is no useful distinction between
a subsystem that replies 'It does not exist' and one that says 
'I cannot find it'.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: Ted Hardie <hardie@qualcomm.com>
Subject: RE: NSEC+ and NO
Date: Tue, 25 May 2004 10:52:41 -0700
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        =?iso-8859-1?Q?=27=D3lafur?= =?iso-8859-1?Q?_?=
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At 10:06 AM -0700 05/25/2004, Hallam-Baker, Phillip wrote:
>
>>From a pure security perspective NSEC buys you very little of value.
>This is because DNS is not just a protocol, it is a component in
>a system. In a system there is no useful distinction between
>a subsystem that replies 'It does not exist' and one that says
>'I cannot find it'.

I strongly disagree with this.  From an application designer's perspective,
getting back a *trustable* "this does not exist" is very different from getting
"I cannot find it".  You may be thinking in terms of human driven activities
like browsing, in which there is a human to apply heuristics to an error
code; in some of those the human tends to apply the same guesses
to what to do next in response to both.  But this is not the only class
of applications, and for many of the discovery elements of those,
I believe reliable data for non-existence is required.

Speaking personally,
			regards,
				Ted Hardie

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: Edward Lewis <edlewis@arin.net>
Subject: RE: NSEC+ and NO
Date: Tue, 25 May 2004 13:50:00 -0700
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At 10:06 -0700 5/25/04, Hallam-Baker, Phillip wrote:
>Hold it right there. This issue has been raised repeatedly, but I
>have yet to hear a substantive answer. All I have seen or heard is
>pointers to claims that it has been answered before.

First a plea for civility.

I've yet to see any response (on-line, I did get one verbal response) 
to my NSEC2 examples.  In my mind they listed the issues I perceive - 
"in my mind."  If what I have written is unclear or misinformed as 
far as premise, I'd appreciate comments on the examples.

The messages are:

   http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/namedroppers.2004/msg00608.html
and
   http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/namedroppers.2004/msg00610.html

(To keep threading clean, if you have comments on the messages, reply 
to those, not this message.)
-- 
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Edward Lewis                                            +1-703-227-9854
ARIN Research Engineer

Even the voices inside my head are refusing to talk to me anymore.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: Suresh Krishnaswamy <suresh@tislabs.com>
Subject: -proto -records ambiguity?
Date: Tue, 25 May 2004 15:47:42 -0400 (EDT)
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In -records section 3 (last para):
"The TTL value of an RRSIG RR SHOULD match the TTL value of the RRset it
covers."

And in -proto section 2.2:
"For each authoritative RRset in a signed zone there MUST be at least one
RRSIG record that meets all of the following requirements:
...
o The RRSIG RR's TTL is equal to the TTL of the RRset"

I feel that the "SHOULD" in -records and "MUST" in -proto must somehow be
reconciled. If the expectation is to be able to have an RRset and its
corresponding RRSIG coexist with differing TTLs, does the above
referenced bulleted item in -proto really hold?

Suresh

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: Michael Richardson <mcr@sandelman.ottawa.on.ca>
Subject: Re: Scope of discussion
Date: Tue, 25 May 2004 17:57:03 -0400
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


>>>>> "Olaf" == Olaf Kolkman <olaf@ripe.net> writes:
     Olaf> I think it is clear at this point that the current DNSSEC-bis
     Olaf> protocol spec eases content enumeration; I think it is clear
     Olaf> that this causes a number of TLDs (and other players) to
     Olaf> believe that they cannot deploy DNSSEC in its current form.

  I disagree.
  Only bind ever gave them the feeling that content enumeration wasn't
trivial to begin with.

  If limiting things is desired, then someone needs to write those
requirements clearly, and then say that DNSSEC fails at them.

- --
]     "Elmo went to the wrong fundraiser" - The Simpson         |  firewalls  [
]   Michael Richardson,    Xelerance Corporation, Ottawa, ON    |net architect[
] mcr@xelerance.com      http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/mcr/ |device driver[
] panic("Just another Debian GNU/Linux using, kernel hacking, security guy"); [
  
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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: Roy Badami <roy@gnomon.org.uk>
Subject: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial Mechanism Flag (was: NSEC+ and NO)
Date: Tue, 25 May 2004 23:00:42 +0100
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>>>>> "Edward" == Edward Lewis <edlewis@arin.net> writes:

    Edward> I've yet to see any response (on-line, I did get one
    Edward> verbal response) to my NSEC2 examples.  In my mind they
    Edward> listed the issues I perceive - "in my mind."  If what I
    Edward> have written is unclear or misinformed as far as premise,
    Edward> I'd appreciate comments on the examples.

Of course, the Nominet zones (at least) have no wild cards, and this
is true of most TLDs.  And the immediate example that springs to mind
of a TLD that currently uses wildcards is .museum, which uses the
wildcards to take a browser to an index page listing names in the
museum gTLD -- so they presumably would have no concerns about
enumeration.

So a simplified NSEC2 that prohibited wild cards in the zone might
well satisfy the concerns of the vast majority of TLD operators, and
perhaps others, too.

I'm sure someone elsewhere in this thread implied in passing the idea
that zones might be given a choice of mechanisms for authenticated
denial: one with the properties of NXT/NSEC, or an alternative that
lacked the perceived enumeration problem but constrained the zone to
contain no wildcards.

However I think I concur with something that I think someone else in
this thread (sorry, I forget who) had in mind a while back: _if_ any
changes are going to be made to the spec at this stage, the one change
that should seriously be contemplated is introducing a mechanism
allowing a zone to declare (on a per-zone basis) what authenticated
denial mechanism they use.

I'm inclined to believe that authenticated denial should remain a
mandatory feature for secure zones, but a flag indicating what
mechanism the zone uses would make any future introduction of an
alternative to NSEC much more painless.

If an alternative authenticated denial proposal gains support
subsequent to DNSSEC deployment, then such a flag would allow
resolvers not supporting the new mechanism to (correctly) return an
unauthenticated NXDOMAIN response (or a null answer in the case of an
empty non-terminal) rather than returning SERVFAIL.

	-roy

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: Michael Richardson <mcr@sandelman.ottawa.on.ca>
Subject: Re: Scope of discussion (was Re: Proposal to fix NSEC)
Date: Tue, 25 May 2004 17:59:18 -0400
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


>>>>> "Paul" == Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com> writes:
    >> I hate to say this... if we are going to do this, let's do it
    >> *now*

    Paul> technically i agree with this statement.  but if we were going
    Paul> to do this, we should never have even considered

    >> I think that the chairs should establish a firm time table for
    >> doing this work. It should take no more than 5 weeks.

    Paul> this is also not realistic.  with dnssec, we can't call it
    Paul> "done" until it's been extensively reviewed, modelled, and
    Paul> beer&pizza-tested, and for something at the level of NSEC2
    Paul> that will take six to 12 months.  that's how we found "the

  Yeah, I agree.

  I don't want to pick up the NSEC2 work. I don't care about enumeration.
  But, if we have to do it, then we have to it now, and we have to
figure out how to do it quickly.  
  Yes, it requires beer, pizza and additional workshops. 

  Yes, that requires resources. If the NSEC2 proponents have the resources 
then perhaps they would step up to the plate on this.

- --
]     "Elmo went to the wrong fundraiser" - The Simpson         |  firewalls  [
]   Michael Richardson,    Xelerance Corporation, Ottawa, ON    |net architect[
] mcr@xelerance.com      http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/mcr/ |device driver[
] panic("Just another Debian GNU/Linux using, kernel hacking, security guy"); [
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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: "Scott Rose" <scottr@nist.gov>
Subject: Re: -proto -records ambiguity?
Date: Tue, 25 May 2004 14:34:21 -0400
Organization: NIST
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<speaking as non-editor>

I believe the MUST in the proto document is the correct way.  The TTL
statement in the Record draft should be changed to reflect that.

<speaking as editor>
D'oh.  Thanks for catching that.


----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Suresh Krishnaswamy" <suresh@tislabs.com>
To: <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Sent: Tuesday, May 25, 2004 3:47 PM
Subject: -proto -records ambiguity?


>
> In -records section 3 (last para):
> "The TTL value of an RRSIG RR SHOULD match the TTL value of the RRset it
> covers."
>
> And in -proto section 2.2:
> "For each authoritative RRset in a signed zone there MUST be at least one
> RRSIG record that meets all of the following requirements:
> ....
> o The RRSIG RR's TTL is equal to the TTL of the RRset"
>
> I feel that the "SHOULD" in -records and "MUST" in -proto must somehow be
> reconciled. If the expectation is to be able to have an RRset and its
> corresponding RRSIG coexist with differing TTLs, does the above
> referenced bulleted item in -proto really hold?
>
> Suresh
>
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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: Andrew Newton <andy@hxr.us>
Subject: Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial Mechanism Flag (was: NSEC+ and NO)
Date: Tue, 25 May 2004 19:09:28 -0400
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  namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
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On May 25, 2004, at 6:00 PM, Roy Badami wrote:
>
> However I think I concur with something that I think someone else in
> this thread (sorry, I forget who) had in mind a while back: _if_ any
> changes are going to be made to the spec at this stage, the one change
> that should seriously be contemplated is introducing a mechanism
> allowing a zone to declare (on a per-zone basis) what authenticated
> denial mechanism they use.
>
> I'm inclined to believe that authenticated denial should remain a
> mandatory feature for secure zones, but a flag indicating what
> mechanism the zone uses would make any future introduction of an
> alternative to NSEC much more painless.
>

If possible, this pick-your-poison approach sounds good to me.

-andy


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: =?iso-8859-1?Q?=D3lafur?= =?iso-8859-1?Q?_Gu=F0mundsson?=
  <ogud@ogud.com>
Subject: Re: NSEC+ and NO
Date: Tue, 25 May 2004 23:16:00 -0400
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<chair-hat off>
Thanks Ben for sticking to technical issues.

At 11:01 25/05/2004, Ben Laurie wrote:
>=D3lafur Gu=F0mundsson wrote:
>>2. MarkK is too much of an gentleman to say this, so I will:
>>     - opt-in addresses your publicly stated issue with NSEC.
>>         only by securing a domain does become it trivial to
>>         find whois info.
>
>Security or privacy, choose one, you mean?
>
>Another problem with this coould be that you are now publishing a list of=
=20
>high-value targets.

But it is the "targets" choice, not the registries.

>>6. Current NSEC2 proposal does not address the issue of name conflict=
 between
>>     a valid name and a digest, NO addressed this by moving all NO records
>>     into a separate name space.
>
>I haven't understood why this is needed - why do name conflicts matter?=20
>Since NSEC2 records are special, they can be treated as being in a=20
>separate namespace anyway. Explicitly adding one just wastes space. Or am=
=20
>I missing something?

Ok let me demonstrate, for the sake of argument we hash with md5 once
and the hashed name is encoded in hex.
         MD5("amazon.co.uk") =3D beb32a6851b0317502d5a40ce5146e43.co.uk.

Now, what if I have already registered that name and even gone as
far as trademarking it.
         what happens ?
         how will resolvers react seeing both NS and NSEC-bis at the same=20
note?
         what does the denial for my name look like ?

The current proposal addresses this partially by having multiple rounds
of hash, and salt. But these parameters can only be changed once in a while.
Moving the rounds into the NSEC2 record allows the zone signer to keep=
 trying
until there is no conflict, but there is no way for resolver to query=
 directly
for the NSEC2 record as the resolver does not know how many rounds there=
 are.

These are just some of the complications that needs to be thought out
documented, coded and tested a few times, before DNSSEC v4 will be ready
in 2006.

First lets get the requirements on the table, not the solutions.

As far as I can tell there is only one requirement on the table:
         NO ZONE walking of TLD's via negative answer records.

As for constraints
         size (number of names)
         wildcards
         label depth.

Add requirements and constraints as you see fit.
Think about both TLD's and leaf zones.
Then think about ENUM, a sparse but deep zone, what are the implications
there.

We can not keep on solving just one party's problem we need to think=
 forward.
Once we have the requirements we can think about how to best address the
issue, either by protocol changes, document changes or (maybe) ignore.

Example: Opt-in was viewed by some as a solution to a "Verisign only"=
 problem,
in hindsight it might provide what you want/need.

         Olafur=20


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com>
Subject: Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial Mechanism Flag
Date: Wed, 26 May 2004 01:20:22 +0100
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References: <roy@gnomon.org.uk>
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Wed May 26 06:43:06 2004
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: Roy Badami <roy@gnomon.org.uk>
In-Reply-To: Message from Roy Badami <roy@gnomon.org.uk> 
   of "Tue, 25 May 2004 23:00:42 BST." <16563.49674.412883.793394@giles.gnomon.org.uk> 
Precedence: bulk

>>>>> "Roy" == Roy Badami <roy@gnomon.org.uk> writes:

    Roy> So a simplified NSEC2 that prohibited wild cards in the zone
    Roy> might well satisfy the concerns of the vast majority of TLD
    Roy> operators, and perhaps others, too.

This is not an option, even though I'd *love* to exterminate wildcards
from the DNS protocol. Suppose some form of NSEC2-style DNSSEC was
deployed by a TLD. It later decides it must have a wildcard in the
zone. So it has to drop this suggested NSEC2 flavour DNSSEC and either
becomes insecure or else presumably adopts NSEC flavour DNSSEC and
lives with enumeration and so forth. Icky.

It would be even worse for implementers and security-aware resolvers
as they'd need to keep track of which zone used which flavour of
DNSSEC. That could be very, very unpleasant. So if there's going to be
a Secure DNS protocol, it must be something that can work for every
and any zone.

Oh, and did I hear anyone say "Sitefinder"? :-)

BTW, remarkably few TLD operators have said anything here about the
concerns that have motivated this NSEC2 draft. Where's this "vast
majority"?

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: don@plugh.daedalus.co.nz
Subject: Re: NSEC+ and NO
Date: Wed, 26 May 2004 16:37:48 +1200
Lines: 73
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To: Olafur Omundsson <ogud@ogud.com>
In-Reply-To: Your message of "Tue, 25 May 2004 01:12:55 -0400."
             <c8ulc9$2t77$1@sf1.isc.org> 
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Olafur Omundsson?= <ogud@ogud.com> wrote:
>6.1
>	Are any TLD's willing to go on the record to say NSEC zone
>		walking is a
>			non-issue
>			show-stopper

I'm not the policy guru for NZ, just the guy who gets asked DNS stuff.
However, it's very clear to me that there would need to be a major
change in view among NZ registry stakeholders for NSEC to be accepted
because of the zone walking problem.

The ability to walk the zone would have to viewed in the same light as
for zone downloads, given that the for the most part, the same policy
issues are exposed.  It's possible that the rate of such walking could
be restricted in the simple cases, but I don't think I could put my hand
on my heart and say that such throttling would stop those even mildly
determined to get a copy of a zone, nor that it would not potentially
negatively impact the performance of the name servers in responding to
legitimate queries.

Current zone transfer policy[1] is basically "no zone transfers unless
authorised and conditions met". The new draft policy[2], likely to be
accepted very shortly, is more restrictive, basically denies access to
zone files unless an "exceptional reason" for access to the zone can be
demonstrated.  

There is a clear trend towards becoming more protective of the registry
database, and the index to the WHOIS data it represents.  

That said, DNSSEC is quite clearly on the NZ registry radar; we would
very much like to be on the leading (but perhaps not bleeding) edge of
DNSSEC deployment.  


Getting a little more pragmatic, I think the real question is, can we
have our cake and eat it too?  Or, can we break NSEC walking without
breaking NSEC?

Consider...

Authenticated denial relies on there being am authenticatable "space"
between each record, thus if I have:

	a.example.	NSEC	c.example. ...
	c.example.	...

then I know that there are no records between a.example and c.example. 

But if I instead inserted:

	a.example.	NSEC	a_.example.  ...	
	a_.example.	NSEC	a__.example. ... ; booby-trap
	a__.example.	NSEC	c.example.   ...
	c.example.	...

What if an explicit query to a_.example. triggered some kind of
defensive response, such as a complete refusal to return the NSEC
record?  In this example, because of the third NSEC, you would never get
the booby-trap record except as the result of an attempt to walk the
NSEC chain.

-- don

[1] http://www.dnc.org.nz/content/zone_transfer.pdf
[2] http://www.dnc.org.nz/content/proposed_new_zone_transfer_policy.pdf

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com>
Subject: Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial Mechanism Flag
Date: Wed, 26 May 2004 05:13:00 +0000
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References: <jim@rfc1035.com>
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	of "Wed, 26 May 2004 01:20:22 +0100."
	<1486.1085530822@gromit.rfc1035.com> 
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>     Roy> So a simplified NSEC2 that prohibited wild cards in the zone
>     Roy> might well satisfy the concerns of the vast majority of TLD
>     Roy> operators, and perhaps others, too.

last time this was proposed, i wondered whether use of such signalling
on a zone that actually did have a wildcard would be "invalid," and who
would be hurt by it if a zone was published that "invalid" way, and
whether validators, if among those hurt, could even detect the condition.

in other words, would we be providing a way to turn on both the heat and
air conditioning at the same time, or is there an interlock preventing this?
and if there's no interlock, who pays the cost of all the wasted energy,
or does the house just blow up, and are my children in it at the time?

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: sthaug@nethelp.no
Subject: Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial Mechanism Flag
Date: Wed, 26 May 2004 09:03:09 +0200
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> BTW, remarkably few TLD operators have said anything here about the
> concerns that have motivated this NSEC2 draft. Where's this "vast
> majority"?

One ccTLD operator I've talked to has said that their views are pretty
well covered by what Nominet people on this list have expressed so far.
I agree that it would be good to have explicit reactions from the TLD
operators.

Steinar Haug, Nethelp consulting, sthaug@nethelp.no

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: roy@dnss.ec
Subject: More on NSEC2 label size and DoS
Date: Wed, 26 May 2004 10:11:11 +0200 (CEST)
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Hi,

I still see a technical limit with NSEC2:

1) multiple hashed labels.

I assume that every label needs to be hashed individually (Ben ?). Due to
the SHA-1 digest size in base32, (32 characters), plus 1 byte label
length+type, and a maximum owner name length of 255 bytes, there is a
maximum of 7 hashed labels, i.e., there are issues for names like:

1.1.1.1.1.2.2.2.2.3.3.1.2.3.4.in-addr.arpa. and
5.4.1.4.1.1.0.1.6.3.1.e164.arpa.

2) DoS issue with multiple labels.

Since a hash(label) needs to be performed by the server to look up
(internally) the proper NSEC for proof, the effort for creating a response
would be higher then the effort for sending a query, compared to NSEC or
non-DNS.

Roy

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: Peter Koch <pk@TechFak.Uni-Bielefeld.DE>
Subject: Re: NSEC+ and NO
Date: Wed, 26 May 2004 09:42:49 +0200
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In-reply-to: Your message of "Wed, 26 May 2004 16:37:48 +1200."
             <76468.1085546268@toybsd.zl2tnm.gen.nz> 
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don@plugh.daedalus.co.nz wrote:

> But if I instead inserted:
> 
> 	a.example.	NSEC	a_.example.  ...	
> 	a_.example.	NSEC	a__.example. ... ; booby-trap
> 	a__.example.	NSEC	c.example.   ...
> 	c.example.	...
> 
> What if an explicit query to a_.example. triggered some kind of
> defensive response, such as a complete refusal to return the NSEC
> record?  In this example, because of the third NSEC, you would never get
> the booby-trap record except as the result of an attempt to walk the
> NSEC chain.

"NSEC" walking would usually not be done with explicit queries for NSEC RRs
(because that's too easy to answer with REFUSED, since there's probably no
need for those queries) but by asking for "random" names and interpreting
the NXDOMAIN responses (and the NSEC RRs therein). So, one wouldn't ask for
"a_.example." anyway but for e.g. the next name after "a_", say "a__".
Now you could protect this name by the booby-trap, but then I'd ask for "a___"
and the more traps you have the lesser NXDOMAIN responses you can really
support with NSEC, which sooner or later would hit an innocent requestor
who's not walking but just mistyped a domain name.

-Peter

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: roy@dnss.ec
Subject: Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial Mechanism Flag (was: NSEC+
 and NO)
Date: Wed, 26 May 2004 10:25:54 +0200 (CEST)
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On Tue, 25 May 2004, Roy Badami wrote:

> However I think I concur with something that I think someone else in
> this thread (sorry, I forget who) had in mind a while back: _if_ any
> changes are going to be made to the spec at this stage, the one change
> that should seriously be contemplated is introducing a mechanism
> allowing a zone to declare (on a per-zone basis) what authenticated
> denial mechanism they use.

You can't declare anything 'by zone'. A resolver is _completely_clueless_
about zone concept. A zone in merely space delegate to an entity minus
subspace delegated by that entity.

If, big if, anything can be declared by zone (similar like SOA), how would
you proof that record exist ? or not exist ?

Roy


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: Alex Bligh <alex@alex.org.uk>
Subject: Re: NSEC+ and NO
Date: Wed, 26 May 2004 09:57:44 +0100
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--On 26 May 2004 16:37 +1200 don@plugh.daedalus.co.nz wrote:

> But if I instead inserted:
>
> 	a.example.	NSEC	a_.example.  ...	
> 	a_.example.	NSEC	a__.example. ... ; booby-trap
> 	a__.example.	NSEC	c.example.   ...
> 	c.example.	...
>
> What if an explicit query to a_.example. triggered some kind of
> defensive response, such as a complete refusal to return the NSEC
> record?  In this example, because of the third NSEC, you would never get
> the booby-trap record except as the result of an attempt to walk the
> NSEC chain.

This only works if the querying person cannot distinguish the booby-trap
records (or those leading to them) from the real records. But you have
to (as you have illustrated) put your booby-trap records as close
as possible to the records themselves. For example if the records are:
	string.example	NSEC	string_.example
	string_.example	NSEC	string__.example ; booby trap
	string__.example	NSEC	struth.example
	struth.example...

then when you get the boobytrap result (for string_.example) you
just look up string_zzzzzzzzzzzzz.example instead, which will give you
a non-exist pointing to struth.example.

On a more theoretical level, what you are trying to do is introduce
small segments of the space "between" names that do not return useful
non-existence proof. You want to make that space as small as possible
in order that non-existence proof works elsewhere. But that makes it
trivially easy to ask instead for a name outside that small space but
in the larger space before the next "real" name.

Alex

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: "Hallam-Baker, Phillip" <pbaker@verisign.com>
Subject: RE: NSEC+ and NO
Date: Tue, 25 May 2004 11:25:56 -0700
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        "Hallam-Baker, Phillip"
	 <pbaker@verisign.com>,
        =?iso-8859-1?Q?=27=D3lafur_Gu=F0mundsson=27?=
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> I strongly disagree with this.  From an application 
> designer's perspective,
> getting back a *trustable* "this does not exist" is very 
> different from getting
> "I cannot find it".  You may be thinking in terms of human 
> driven activities
> like browsing, in which there is a human to apply heuristics 
> to an error
> code; in some of those the human tends to apply the same guesses
> to what to do next in response to both.  But this is not the 
> only class
> of applications, and for many of the discovery elements of those,
> I believe reliable data for non-existence is required.

Your argument would only support the statement "reliable data 
for non-existence is required FOR CERTAIN APPLICATIONS".


Given that the choice being asserted is between a DNSSEC as
is, and no DNSSEC at all, ever I think it is reasonable to
point out that there is a wide range of Internet USE that is
addressed without NSEC.

If DNSSEC v1 is only sufficient to provide security for
Web browsing that is more than enough to justify the effort.

It is exactly the same as in MARID, don't insist on solving
the entire problem in the first go. MARID will not provide the 
solution to spam, but it does provide me with one of the tools 
I need.


The big fallacy we fell into ten years ago was beleiving that
imperfect security was worse than no security at all. SSL
disproved that, SSL v1 was so bad I broke it fifteen minutes
into Marc A's presentation, and not in a small way either.
SSL v2 was a bit better but has plenty of holes. Yet these did
not stop SSL v3 being the most successful cryptographic protocol
of all time.

In the WiFi area WEP was a disaster, but fixes soon appeared.
If it wasn't for the fact that WiFi systems tend to be in hardware
it would not have been such a serious problem.

We can make as much fun of the SSL and WEP groups as we like, but
the fact is that they deployed a real solution that is now both
secure and widely used. This group has not, despite having tried
for longer.


Delivering a cryptographic system that delivers real security
for an important class of applications is a very worthwhile
project, even if a limitation in the protocol means that it
does not protect other applications. In this case we are far
better off than with SSL or WEP because we know what the problem
is and there is even a fix for the problem.

All that is being said is that the fix should not be mandatory,
nor should inability to come up with an acceptable fix in the
next few days mean that the entire scheme is scrapped.


Some people are saying delay the specs, I am not. I am saying publish
the @&$*@!! things and start deployment today. Just do not force
anyone to use a part of the specs that many believe to be broken.

All my experience of deploying real world cryptographic protocols
tells me that we are nowhere close to having a legacy issue here.
There will be more than enough time to fix this. The only question
is whether we leave ourselves an acceptable way to deploy a new
NSEC without having to revise all the existing RRs and clobber
the deployed base yet again.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: roy@dnss.ec
Subject: Re: More on NSEC2 label size and DoS
Date: Wed, 26 May 2004 10:20:37 +0200 (CEST)
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btw, if hashes are per owner name instead of per label, then other size
issues are at hand, since for every intermediate label level (empty non
terminal) a new NSEC+SIG (or EXIST) needs to be created.

That hurts in zones under ip6.arpa and e164.arpa.

Roy

On Wed, 26 May 2004 roy@dnss.ec wrote:

> Hi,
>
> I still see a technical limit with NSEC2:
>
> 1) multiple hashed labels.
>
> I assume that every label needs to be hashed individually (Ben ?). Due to
> the SHA-1 digest size in base32, (32 characters), plus 1 byte label
> length+type, and a maximum owner name length of 255 bytes, there is a
> maximum of 7 hashed labels, i.e., there are issues for names like:
>
> 1.1.1.1.1.2.2.2.2.3.3.1.2.3.4.in-addr.arpa. and
> 5.4.1.4.1.1.0.1.6.3.1.e164.arpa.
>
> 2) DoS issue with multiple labels.
>
> Since a hash(label) needs to be performed by the server to look up
> (internally) the proper NSEC for proof, the effort for creating a response
> would be higher then the effort for sending a query, compared to NSEC or
> non-DNS.
>
> Roy
>
> --
> to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
> the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
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>

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: Alex Bligh <alex@alex.org.uk>
Subject: Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial Mechanism Flag
Date: Wed, 26 May 2004 09:48:53 +0100
Lines: 26
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <1486.1085530822@gromit.rfc1035.com>
 <9984.1085554989@bizet.nethelp.no>
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--On 26 May 2004 09:03 +0200 sthaug@nethelp.no wrote:

>> BTW, remarkably few TLD operators have said anything here about the
>> concerns that have motivated this NSEC2 draft. Where's this "vast
>> majority"?
>
> One ccTLD operator I've talked to has said that their views are pretty
> well covered by what Nominet people on this list have expressed so far.
> I agree that it would be good to have explicit reactions from the TLD
> operators.

In terms of European (by which I really mean RIPE area) ccTLDs, you
are probably best asking this at some CENTR event. I am not sure a
large number of ccTLD people are on this list, and even to the extent
they are, they are probably technical people rather than technical plus
policy people.

Alex

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: Jakob Schlyter <jakob@rfc.se>
Subject: Re: NSEC+ and NO
Date: Wed, 26 May 2004 11:34:17 +0200 (CEST)
Lines: 26
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	namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
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On Wed, 26 May 2004, Alex Bligh wrote:

> This only works if the querying person cannot distinguish the booby-trap
> records (or those leading to them) from the real records.

note that the "person" will most probably be some sort of program.


> then when you get the boobytrap result (for string_.example) you
> just look up string_zzzzzzzzzzzzz.example instead, which will give you
> a non-exist pointing to struth.example.

you do not know if there are zero or more boobytraps in between.

this is in no way failsafe, but could probably be used to stop simple 
walking and plain enumeration by guessing labels. I think it should be 
explored further by those who might need it.


 	jakob

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: Roy Badami <roy@gnomon.org.uk>
Subject: Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial Mechanism Flag (was: NSEC+
	and NO)
Date: Wed, 26 May 2004 11:19:38 +0100
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        namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
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>>>>> "roy" == roy  <roy@dnss.ec> writes:

    roy> You can't declare anything 'by zone'. A resolver is
    roy> _completely_clueless_ about zone concept.

We may be talking at cross purposes, but surely DNSSEC declares keys
on a per-zone basis, with DNSKEY records stored at the zone apex?  How
would this be different?

      -roy

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: Marcos Sanz/Denic <sanz@denic.de>
Subject: Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial Mechanism Flag
Date: Wed, 26 May 2004 11:48:10 +0200
Lines: 24
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Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
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To: Alex Bligh <alex@alex.org.uk>
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> > One ccTLD operator I've talked to has said that their views are pretty
> > well covered by what Nominet people on this list have expressed so 
far.
> > I agree that it would be good to have explicit reactions from the TLD
> > operators.
>
> In terms of European (by which I really mean RIPE area) ccTLDs, you
> are probably best asking this at some CENTR event. I am not sure a
> large number of ccTLD people are on this list, and even to the extent
> they are, they are probably technical people rather than technical plus
> policy people.

Perhaps this link might illustrate the magnitude of the issue within CENTR 
area:
http://www.centr.org/technical/zone-access.html

Regards,
Marcos

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: Marcos Sanz/Denic <sanz@denic.de>
Subject: Re: NSEC+ and NO
Date: Wed, 26 May 2004 11:40:12 +0200
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> Ok let me demonstrate, for the sake of argument we hash with md5 once
> and the hashed name is encoded in hex.
> MD5("amazon.co.uk") = beb32a6851b0317502d5a40ce5146e43.co.uk.
>
> Now, what if I have already registered that name and even gone as
> far as trademarking it.
> what happens ?

RFC2782, for instance, prepended "_" to avoid collisions with natural 
names..

> First lets get the requirements on the table, not the solutions.
>
> As far as I can tell there is only one requirement on the table:
> NO ZONE walking of TLD's via negative answer records.

It's actually not a requirement only applying to TLDs.

Best,
Marcos

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: Marcos Sanz/Denic <sanz@denic.de>
Subject: Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial Mechanism Flag (was: NSEC+ and NO)
Date: Wed, 26 May 2004 11:18:15 +0200
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Roy,

> So a simplified NSEC2 that prohibited wild cards in the zone might
> well satisfy the concerns of the vast majority of TLD operators, and
> perhaps others, too.

Dispatching wildcards from NSEC2 would not be an option.

The DE-zone has entries of the form

*.abc.de   some stuff

Ed's analysis (which I've collated and regard as sound) applies for these 
cases, too. However, the linear growth of server work and answer size in 
hands of the client doesn't seem that dangerous to me.

Regards,
Marcos

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: roy@dnss.ec
Subject: Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial Mechanism Flag (was: NSEC+
 and NO)
Date: Wed, 26 May 2004 12:27:26 +0200 (CEST)
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On Wed, 26 May 2004, Roy Badami wrote:

> >>>>> "roy" == roy  <roy@dnss.ec> writes:
>
>     roy> You can't declare anything 'by zone'. A resolver is
>     roy> _completely_clueless_ about zone concept.
>
> We may be talking at cross purposes, but surely DNSSEC declares keys
> on a per-zone basis, with DNSKEY records stored at the zone apex?  How
> would this be different?

I can deploy a test.dnss.ec zone where silly.test.dnss.ec is signed by the
dnss.ec DNSKEY.

Roy

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: Peter Koch <pk@TechFak.Uni-Bielefeld.DE>
Subject: Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial Mechanism Flag (was: NSEC+ and NO)
Date: Wed, 26 May 2004 12:36:14 +0200
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Marcos Sanz/Denic <sanz@denic.de> wrote:

> Dispatching wildcards from NSEC2 would not be an option.
> 
> The DE-zone has entries of the form
> 
> *.abc.de   some stuff

a workaround would be to simply move those into separate zones  - even without
necessarily having to change your registration policy.  That would cause
some, maybe even some more, overhead on the side of server maintenance,
but if getting rid of wildcards eases a solution it's worth exploring this path.

-Peter

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: roy@dnss.ec
Subject: Re: More on NSEC2 label size and DoS
Date: Wed, 26 May 2004 12:22:10 +0200 (CEST)
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On Wed, 26 May 2004, Jim Reid wrote:

> >>>>> "roy" == roy  <roy@dnss.ec> writes:
>
>     roy> btw, if hashes are per owner name instead of per label, then
>     roy> other size issues are at hand, since for every intermediate
>     roy> label level (empty non terminal) a new NSEC+SIG (or EXIST)
>     roy> needs to be created.
>
>     roy> That hurts in zones under ip6.arpa and e164.arpa.
>
> Something similar to NSEC2 would be pointless for e164.arpa because
> the name space is regular and well-known: eg all North American E.164
> numbers are exactly 10 digits long after the +1. Enumeration of this
> name space using DNS lookups is a no-brainer irrespective of how or if
> the zones get signed.

True, but irrelevant. If NSEC2 is adopted, deprecating NSEC, it does not
discriminate between reverse and forward zones. If ip6.arpa is signed, it
is signed with NSEC2. No choice, no way out.

Roy

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com>
Subject: Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial Mechanism Flag
Date: Wed, 26 May 2004 11:40:22 +0100
Lines: 18
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References: <sanz@denic.de>
Cc: Alex Bligh <alex@alex.org.uk>, namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
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To: Marcos Sanz/Denic <sanz@denic.de>
In-Reply-To: Message from Marcos Sanz/Denic <sanz@denic.de> 
   of "Wed, 26 May 2004 11:48:10 +0200." <OF6EBFE743.E73EC482-ONC1256EA0.0035A7D3-C1256EA0.0035D93A@denic.de> 
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>>>>> "Marcos" == Marcos Sanz/Denic <sanz@denic.de> writes:

    Marcos> Perhaps this link might illustrate the magnitude of the
    Marcos> issue within CENTR area:
    Marcos> http://www.centr.org/technical/zone-access.html

This doesn't really help. It just shows that a bunch of TLDs restrict
AXFR to their slave servers and sometimes to trusted third parties. It
doesn't say why they do this. For instance, I can understand why DeNIC
wouldn't want random users to be able to slurp the 1GB or so of the
.de zone, guzzling bandwidth and needlessly loading the TLD's name
servers.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: Roy Badami <roy@gnomon.org.uk>
Subject: Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial Mechanism Flag (was: NSEC+
	and NO)
Date: Wed, 26 May 2004 11:48:51 +0100
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>>>>> "roy" == roy  <roy@dnss.ec> writes:

    roy> I can deploy a test.dnss.ec zone where silly.test.dnss.ec is
    roy> signed by the dnss.ec DNSKEY.

You can?  

-proto 2.1 requires a delegated secure zone to contain a DNSKEY record
at the apex.  And 2.2 requires RRsets to be signed with at least one
RRSIG where the Signer's Name equals the name of the zone containing
the RRset. -records 3.1.7 requires the Signer's Name in an RRSIG to
match the name of the zone containing the RRset.

      -roy

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com>
Subject: Re: More on NSEC2 label size and DoS
Date: Wed, 26 May 2004 11:13:38 +0100
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>>>>> "roy" == roy  <roy@dnss.ec> writes:

    roy> btw, if hashes are per owner name instead of per label, then
    roy> other size issues are at hand, since for every intermediate
    roy> label level (empty non terminal) a new NSEC+SIG (or EXIST)
    roy> needs to be created.

    roy> That hurts in zones under ip6.arpa and e164.arpa.

Something similar to NSEC2 would be pointless for e164.arpa because
the name space is regular and well-known: eg all North American E.164
numbers are exactly 10 digits long after the +1. Enumeration of this
name space using DNS lookups is a no-brainer irrespective of how or if
the zones get signed.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: roy@dnss.ec
Subject: Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial Mechanism Flag (was: NSEC+
 and NO)
Date: Wed, 26 May 2004 13:35:11 +0200 (CEST)
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On Wed, 26 May 2004, Roy Badami wrote:

> >>>>> "roy" == roy  <roy@dnss.ec> writes:
>
>     roy> I can deploy a test.dnss.ec zone where silly.test.dnss.ec is
>     roy> signed by the dnss.ec DNSKEY.
>
> You can?

Yes, you can.

> -proto 2.1 requires a delegated secure zone to contain a DNSKEY record
> at the apex.  And 2.2 requires RRsets to be signed with at least one
> RRSIG where the Signer's Name equals the name of the zone containing
> the RRset. -records 3.1.7 requires the Signer's Name in an RRSIG to
> match the name of the zone containing the RRset.

I know, I've heard of those docs. The problem is that a validator has no
way to check that.

Roy

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: Marcos Sanz/Denic <sanz@denic.de>
Subject: Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial Mechanism Flag (was: NSEC+ and NO)
Date: Wed, 26 May 2004 13:14:35 +0200
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> That would cause
> some, maybe even some more, overhead on the side of server maintenance,
> but if getting rid of wildcards eases a solution it's worth 
> exploring this path.

Agreed.

Regards,
Marcos

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: Marcos Sanz/Denic <sanz@denic.de>
Subject: Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial Mechanism Flag
Date: Wed, 26 May 2004 13:08:13 +0200
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Jim,

> Marcos> http://www.centr.org/technical/zone-access.html
> 
> This doesn't really help. It just shows that a bunch of TLDs restrict
> AXFR to their slave servers and sometimes to trusted third parties.

Point taken. However, I think these TLDs aren't placing the zipped zone at 
everyone's disposal via anonymous FTP either.

Regards,
Marcos

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: Roy Badami <roy@gnomon.org.uk>
Subject: Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial Mechanism Flag (was: NSEC+
	and NO)
Date: Wed, 26 May 2004 13:00:21 +0100
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>>>>> "roy" == roy  <roy@dnss.ec> writes:

    roy> If, big if, anything can be declared by zone (similar like
    roy> SOA), how would you proof that record exist ? or not exist ?

Place a new RR at the zone apex, that specifies the authenticated
denial algorithm(s) used by the zone. You can validate it by its
RRSIG.  Make the RR mandatory for all zones that use something else
instead of (or in addition to) NSEC.  By definition, therefore, the
only secure zones that lack this RR will be able to deny its existence
using NSEC.

Require that any zone that doesn't support NSEC MUST return this new
RR as part of its authenticated denial proof.

   -roy


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: roy@dnss.ec
Subject: NSEC version field (Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial Mechanism
 Flag)
Date: Wed, 26 May 2004 14:02:52 +0200 (CEST)
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Lets stop this sillyness, and get back to Authenticated Denial Flags.

The point is, something about authenticated denial mechanism needs to be
signalled. It cannot be done by a record per_zone, since that would
introduce a circular probem. (The NSECINFO in the NSEC2 draft has this
problem).

Another way to go is to subtype this into the NSEC2 record. A version
field. Where and 8 bit version field holds either:

0 ffu
1 clear label (plain old DNSSEC)
2 reserved (later:hashed labels)
3 reserved (later:hashed ownernames)
4 reserved (later:opt-in)

etc.

And we simply document version 0, clear label. With the restriction that
version !1 MUST be discarded as being proof if version is not implemented
(AND signature verifies) and all NSEC records in a zone have the same
version.

Ofcourse future versions are not backwards compatible, so the
need-to-denial-check-aggression-cost of not compatible resolvers is placed
at those who deploy future versions.

How does that sound ?

Roy

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: sthaug@nethelp.no
Subject: Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial Mechanism Flag
Date: Wed, 26 May 2004 13:36:36 +0200
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> This doesn't really help. It just shows that a bunch of TLDs restrict
> AXFR to their slave servers and sometimes to trusted third parties. It
> doesn't say why they do this. For instance, I can understand why DeNIC
> wouldn't want random users to be able to slurp the 1GB or so of the
> .de zone, guzzling bandwidth and needlessly loading the TLD's name
> servers.

But it's okay to let random users enumerate the zone by following
NSEC RRs?

Steinar Haug, Nethelp consulting, sthaug@nethelp.no

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com>
Subject: Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial Mechanism Flag
Date: Wed, 26 May 2004 12:46:18 +0100
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   of "Wed, 26 May 2004 13:36:36 +0200." <23519.1085571396@bizet.nethelp.no> 
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>>>>> "sthaug" == sthaug  <sthaug@nethelp.no> writes:

    >> This doesn't really help. It just shows that a bunch of TLDs
    >> restrict AXFR to their slave servers and sometimes to trusted
    >> third parties. It doesn't say why they do this. For instance, I
    >> can understand why DeNIC wouldn't want random users to be able
    >> to slurp the 1GB or so of the .de zone, guzzling bandwidth and
    >> needlessly loading the TLD's name servers.

    sthaug> But it's okay to let random users enumerate the zone by
    sthaug> following NSEC RRs?

IMO, yes. UDP traffic to an already active socket has to be better for
the name server and underlying OS than carrying the same traffic over
freshly-created TCP connections, all other things being equal. Not
that I care about enumeration anyway, however it's done.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: Ted Hardie <hardie@qualcomm.com>
Subject: RE: NSEC+ and NO
Date: Wed, 26 May 2004 06:15:26 -0700
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To: "Hallam-Baker, Phillip" <pbaker@verisign.com>,
        =?iso-8859-1?Q?=27=D3lafur?= =?iso-8859-1?Q?_?=
 =?iso-8859-1?Q?Gu=F0mundsson=27?= 	 <ogud@ogud.com>,
        namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
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At 11:25 AM -0700 05/25/2004, Hallam-Baker, Phillip wrote:
>  > I strongly disagree with this.  From an application
>>  designer's perspective,
>>  getting back a *trustable* "this does not exist" is very
>>  different from getting
>>  "I cannot find it".  You may be thinking in terms of human
>>  driven activities
>>  like browsing, in which there is a human to apply heuristics
>>  to an error
>>  code; in some of those the human tends to apply the same guesses
>>  to what to do next in response to both.  But this is not the
>>  only class
>>  of applications, and for many of the discovery elements of those,
>>  I believe reliable data for non-existence is required.
>
>Your argument would only support the statement "reliable data
>for non-existence is required FOR CERTAIN APPLICATIONS".

How do you propose to let the DNS resolver know what application
has requested a record?

<snip>

>
>Some people are saying delay the specs, I am not. I am saying publish
>the @&$*@!! things and start deployment today. Just do not force
>anyone to use a part of the specs that many believe to be broken.

To quote one of my colleagues, "The mailing list has no guns".


>All my experience of deploying real world cryptographic protocols
>tells me that we are nowhere close to having a legacy issue here.
>There will be more than enough time to fix this. The only question
>is whether we leave ourselves an acceptable way to deploy a new
>NSEC without having to revise all the existing RRs and clobber
>the deployed base yet again.

I do not have the same experience with cryptographic protocols,
but I fairly sure that we have to aim at the target we
want to hit.  Even if it takes several iterations to get it right,
if we are not aiming at a protocol that allows for reliable
data for non-existence, I believe we are aiming at the wrong target.
			regards,
				Ted Hardie

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: Roy Badami <roy@gnomon.org.uk>
Subject: NSEC version field (Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial Mechanism
	Flag)
Date: Wed, 26 May 2004 14:24:46 +0100
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>>>>> "roy" == roy  <roy@dnss.ec> writes:

    roy> Lets stop this sillyness, and get back to Authenticated
    roy> Denial Flags.  The point is, something about authenticated
    roy> denial mechanism needs to be signalled. It cannot be done by
    roy> a record per_zone, since that would introduce a circular
    roy> probem. (The NSECINFO in the NSEC2 draft has this problem).

Hmmm, I think I've just spotted a bigger problem with any
authenticated denial flag.

If a zone (.org.uk, say) decides not to use NSEC, then (obviously) old
resolvers that don't understand the authenticated denial mechanism
chosen by .org.uk won't be able to verify non-existence proofs
presented for .org.uk, and will have to treat them much as NXDOMAIN
responses from insecure zones.  I'd been assuming that this isn't
necessarily a Very Bad Thing.

Unfortunately,  with   DS,  provably  insecure   delegations  rely  on
authenticated denial to prove the non-existence of a DS record.

So in this scenario, assuming that gnomon.org.uk is a secure zone,
someone could spoof data in my zone by spoofing an insecure delegation
from .org.uk and old resolvers would be unaware that anything untoward
had happened.

    -roy


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com>
Subject: Re: NSEC+ and NO
Date: Wed, 26 May 2004 14:03:41 +0000
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	of "Wed, 26 May 2004 09:42:49 +0200."
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> "NSEC" walking would usually not be done with explicit queries for NSEC RRs
> (because that's too easy to answer with REFUSED, since there's probably no
> need for those queries) ...

actually i was planning on using ANY queries starting at @, the answers to
which would include NSEC.  that way i can gather all the data in the same
pass where i gather all the names.

in the scenario, booby traps would be quite effective.

the trouble with booby traps is, since udp source addresses are spoofworthy,
it would possible to make an authority server generate and hold a huge amount
of state just by forging a boobytrap-o-gram from a zillion different addresses.
if there's a quota, you can make them overrun it, thus making room for your
real zonewalk queries.  if there's no quota, you can make them run out of
state-memory.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com>
Subject: Re: NSEC+ and NO
Date: Wed, 26 May 2004 14:34:17 +0000
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	of "Wed, 26 May 2004 11:40:12 +0200."
	<OF28761E77.EF4010B7-ONC1256EA0.0034C2C1-C1256EA0.00351E66@denic.de> 
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> > As far as I can tell there is only one requirement on the table:
> > NO ZONE walking of TLD's via negative answer records.
> 
> It's actually not a requirement only applying to TLDs.

in my day job, i'm in touch with a lot of enterprise dns users, and they
universally tell me that the data and/or names they consider sensitive
enough to worry about axfr or zonewalking, would also be dangerous for
queries, and so they run "split dns" so that only internal hosts can see
the data.  they've turned off external axfr because it's unnecessary, not
because it would expose data they care deeply about keeping private.  the
data they care deeply about keeping private is only available "internally."

i guess we'll need some kind of formal survey of the user base to get a
handle on exactly who cares about what.  i'm willing to retune the survey
software i wrote for "sitefinder" last year, or we can ask ben edelman if
he'd be interested.  things i'd like to know are:

1. are you concerned about external axfr? for privacy reasons, or resources?
2. are you concerned about zone walking? for privacy reasons, or resources?
3. do you use split-dns to keep sensitive data from being accessed by query?
4. are your axfr/zonewalk concerns based on carefully researched law opinions?
5. are your axfr/zonewalk concerns based on competitive/marketing worries?
6. are you only planning dnssec so your childzones can secure themselves?
7. how many tld's, sld's, 3ld's do these concerns pertain to?

there may be more.  but we can't do engineering without knowing the customer's
requirements, and we can't sit here and make up those requirements, or guess
them, or listen to the subset of customers who subscribe to this mailing list.
if we really want to say that we care about these concerns, we have to find
out what they are, exhaustively and objectively, and then publish the results.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: Jakob Schlyter <jakob@rfc.se>
Subject: NIC-SE statement regarding NSEC zone walking
Date: Wed, 26 May 2004 16:52:56 +0200 (CEST)
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FYI,

 	jakob

-- cut --
Date: Wed, 26 May 2004 16:17:59 +0200
From: Per-Olof Josefsson <Per-Olof.Josefsson@nic.se>

NIC-SE does not consider NXT zone-walking a problem for DNSSEC deployment 
within the .se-zone.  We consider all data in the DNS to be public 
information, both as single records and as a collection.  The data we 
actually need to protect is served by WHOIS and protecting this data 
should be done by the protocol serving it, not by DNS itself.

Misuse of DNS data is a problem as it is already, but it will not be 
solved by stopping deployment of DNSSEC which by other means will make the 
DNS more secure.

We believe that DNSSEC can be deployed in its current form, and are 
planning to do so. The changes proposed by NSEC2 will, if accepted by the 
DNSEXT working group, delay the standards process (again) for another 
12-18 months time we rather spend on real world deployment.

NIC-SE will give an presentation of our current DNSSEC pilot including 
various aspects such as the zone walking issue at the CENTR meeting in 
Stockholm at Tuesday 22 june at 09:00. The presentation will be given by 
either or both Johan Ihren member of the ICANN security group and Jakob 
Schlyter one of the DNSSEC RFC writers

Regards
P-O Josefsson
NIC-SE

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: "Jay Daley" <td@nominet.org.uk>
Subject: Confirming the Nominet position
Date: Wed, 26 May 2004 16:24:03 +0100
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 04:24:04 PM,
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Here is a proper explanation of the Nominet position.

1.  Showstopper
Zone file enumeration is a show-stopper for us that will prevent us from=20
fully implementing DNSSEC. So if DNSSEC stays in its current form then we=20
will have to make a local determination about how/what we implement, which =

is still to be decided.  Our reason for this is our view of what is the=20
appropriate policy to act in the best interests of our local community,=20
which for some time has been to deny access to our zone files.=20

=20
2.  Late new comers
The criticism levelled about "late new comers" is well founded and I'm=20
sorry that is the case.  This is something we should have raised some time =

ago.  Recognising that we were late with this we did try to avoid just=20
unproductive foot stamping by the development of the NSEC2 draft as a=20
positive alternative.  We are now committed to the process and we will be=20
here to stay.  As evidence of this I should make clear that our next steps =

will be to get NSEC2 patches written for BIND and if possible NSD to allow =

proper interoperability testing.


3.  Way ahead
Ideally we would like NSEC2 to go forward properly, but I understand very=20
well that this causes significant problems for many in this WG.  So we=20
would be quite happy with a mechanism that allowed NSEC2 to be introduced=20
later in a backwards compatible fashion, such as the previously suggested=20
version field for NSEC.


3. Legal mumbo jumbo
I'm sorry if we appear to have been hiding behind legal mumbo jumbo, this=20
was not our intention.  So I need to be clear that our legal advice is=20
ancillary to our view in (1) above, not the determining factor.=20

However, for those of you that have asked, this is the gist of our legal=20
advice...

As compilations, zone file databases are protected under EU law by=20
?Database Right?. As a derivative work of the main register from which=20
they are sourced, they are likely also to attract copyright protection in=20
addition to or in place of database right.

Both database right and copyright are negative rights in that they=20
prohibit certain acts (primarily, copying the whole or a substantial part=20
of the materials) but do not grant positive rights (unlike, for example, a =

patent, which grants a monopoly on the material involved). Database right=20
is unique to countries which implement European Community law, but=20
copyright is more universal.=20

If legal rights would be infringed with copying, then is it not better to=20
allow the copying, and then rely on the law to assist against any=20
infringers?  The short answer is ?no?, and here the analogy of locking=20
one?s house or car despite laws against burglary and theft may be helpful. =

 Prevention is not always better than cure, if one is led to make an=20
overly restrictive solution in order to prevent a minor risk.  However, if =

the risk of harm is major, and is highly likely to take place, and will be =

expensive and difficult to put right after the event, then in those=20
circumstances, prevention is very definitely better than cure.

The problem with both copyright and database right arises with=20
enforcement, particularly in respect of electronic data such as a zone=20
file.  Firstly it can be hard to identify whether a data mining event has=20
taken place, in the context of the high volume of traffic affecting the=20
nameservers on a day to day basis. If a technical department cannot show=20
this, there is nothing that a legal department can do. Even if it is clear =

that it is happening, the technical department may not be able to trace=20
who has done it, because the use of multiple proxies can make it=20
impossible (or prohibitively expensive) to find it. Even if this can be=20
done, the person(s) involved may be abroad. If they are in a difficult=20
jurisdiction (even including eastern Europe, which is part of the EU) the=20
differences in language and legal systems add to the expense and=20
complexity of pursuing legal proceedings.=20

Jay Daley
Director of IT
Nomient UK

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: Ted Hardie <hardie@qualcomm.com>
Subject: OT:  Concordances was Re: Confirming the Nominet position
Date: Wed, 26 May 2004 08:52:08 -0700
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Note the Off topic pointer.  There is no protocol or engineering
in this message.  Hit D now.  This is a personal opinion.  I
am not a lawyer.  If you are still listening, I can't imagine why.

At 4:24 PM +0100 05/26/2004, Jay Daley wrote:
>
>As compilations, zone file databases are protected under EU law by
>?Database Right?. As a derivative work of the main register from which
>they are sourced, they are likely also to attract copyright protection in
>addition to or in place of database right.

There is a great deal of very detailed law on the subject of how
concordances relate to rights in the resources for which the
concordances were created.  Effectively, you have published the
entries which allow the creation of a concordance of the database/resource
all along; anyone with a recursive resolver could in turn use that concordance
data to  reconstruct as much of the original resource as they cared to it.
The change you are seeing now is that a new mechanism for iterating
through the published entries makes the construction of the concordance
easier.

Deployment of that mechanism or failure to deploy that mechanism has *no
effect* on the rights of the users to create or use concordances of the
data.  Write that down.

You have always published this data; that's the point of the DNS. 
Write that down.

The real threat in all of this is not in the DNS itself, but in the 
use of the concordance
data as a key into a different database of other resources.  That is being
addressed in a different working group (CRISP), and your engineering talent
and resources put there might be better spent. (Just an opinion).

In short, spending your time and effort to deploying a real solution (IRIS) to
the core problem (accessible user data in administrative databases), makes
sense.  Educating your government that whether or not you use DNSSEC
will make *no difference* to whether or not you publish the actual data
and will make *no difference* to the rights individuals have to make 
concordances
may also make sense.  You may not have the stomach for it, and I certainly
would understand that.

Did I mention that this was off topic, that I am not a lawyer, and that I
can't imagine why you are listening?  Good.
					regards,
						Ted Hardie

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: roy@dnss.ec
Subject: Re: More on NSEC2 label size and DoS
Date: Wed, 26 May 2004 18:59:39 +0200 (CEST)
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On Wed, 26 May 2004, Ben Laurie wrote:

> roy@dnss.ec wrote:
> > btw, if hashes are per owner name instead of per label, then other size
> > issues are at hand, since for every intermediate label level (empty non
> > terminal) a new NSEC+SIG (or EXIST) needs to be created.
> >
> > That hurts in zones under ip6.arpa and e164.arpa.
>
> This is true. I have not calculated how much it hurts. It is related to
> the sparseness of the domains. Are there figures for those?
>
> A back of the envelope calculation I did on the plane says that for e164
> in dense domains, the hit is 10-100% extra. For sparse domains it can be
> much higher, but presumably sparse domains are small.

Okay, the problem is not e164 but ip6.arpa:

9.1.1.0.6.0.1.0.7.8.0.0.2.9.1.0.a.0.0.8.1.0.0.0.0.1.6.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa.

Remember, at _each_ intermediate label level including empty non-terminals
(in the above example there are 35 labels) a NSEC (or EXIST) is needed for
every occuring value at that label.

Roy

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: geoff@nominet.org.uk (Geoffrey Sisson)
Subject: Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial Mechanism Flag
Date: Wed, 26 May 2004 18:24:32 +0100 (BST)
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Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com> writes:

>                               For instance, I can understand why DeNIC
> wouldn't want random users to be able to slurp the 1GB or so of the
> .de zone, guzzling bandwidth and needlessly loading the TLD's name
> servers.

The same `random users' which might be interested in `guzzling
bandwidth' with zone transfers will probably also be interested in
using scripts which effect NSEC RR elaboration, with even more
deleterious impact on resource utilisation.  This is of course also
possible with NSEC2 RRs, but will probably be interesting only to a
significantly smaller audience.

Regards

Geoff

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: roy@dnss.ec
Subject: Re: More on NSEC2 label size and DoS
Date: Wed, 26 May 2004 19:33:57 +0200 (CEST)
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On Wed, 26 May 2004, Ben Laurie wrote:

> roy@dnss.ec wrote:
> > On Wed, 26 May 2004, Jim Reid wrote:
> >
> >
> >>>>>>>"roy" == roy  <roy@dnss.ec> writes:
> >>
> >>    roy> btw, if hashes are per owner name instead of per label, then
> >>    roy> other size issues are at hand, since for every intermediate
> >>    roy> label level (empty non terminal) a new NSEC+SIG (or EXIST)
> >>    roy> needs to be created.
> >>
> >>    roy> That hurts in zones under ip6.arpa and e164.arpa.
> >>
> >>Something similar to NSEC2 would be pointless for e164.arpa because
> >>the name space is regular and well-known: eg all North American E.164
> >>numbers are exactly 10 digits long after the +1. Enumeration of this
> >>name space using DNS lookups is a no-brainer irrespective of how or if
> >>the zones get signed.
> >
> >
> > True, but irrelevant. If NSEC2 is adopted, deprecating NSEC, it does not
> > discriminate between reverse and forward zones. If ip6.arpa is signed, it
> > is signed with NSEC2. No choice, no way out.
>
> My intention (I cannot speak for the WG, of course) was to make it
> possible to choose NSEC or NSEC2, since if you don't mind zonewalking,
> you shouldn't have to incur the overhead of NSEC2.

ack

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: roy@dnss.ec
Subject: Re: NSEC version field (Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial
 Mechanism Flag)
Date: Wed, 26 May 2004 21:36:39 +0200 (CEST)
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On Wed, 26 May 2004, Roy Badami wrote:

> >>>>> "roy" == roy  <roy@dnss.ec> writes:
>
>     roy> Lets stop this sillyness, and get back to Authenticated
>     roy> Denial Flags.  The point is, something about authenticated
>     roy> denial mechanism needs to be signalled. It cannot be done by
>     roy> a record per_zone, since that would introduce a circular
>     roy> probem. (The NSECINFO in the NSEC2 draft has this problem).
>
> Hmmm, I think I've just spotted a bigger problem with any
> authenticated denial flag.
>
> If a zone (.org.uk, say) decides not to use NSEC, then (obviously) old
> resolvers that don't understand the authenticated denial mechanism
> chosen by .org.uk won't be able to verify non-existence proofs
> presented for .org.uk, and will have to treat them much as NXDOMAIN
> responses from insecure zones.  I'd been assuming that this isn't
> necessarily a Very Bad Thing.
>
> Unfortunately,  with   DS,  provably  insecure   delegations  rely  on
> authenticated denial to prove the non-existence of a DS record.
>
> So in this scenario, assuming that gnomon.org.uk is a secure zone,
> someone could spoof data in my zone by spoofing an insecure delegation
> from .org.uk and old resolvers would be unaware that anything untoward
> had happened.

Yes. So it would fall back to vanilla DNS. That is what org.uk is now.

In fact, there is nothing lost.

Lets say example.com is required to use NSEC2 by their
constituency/lawyer/etc.

2 scenarios:

1) DNSSEC deployment is heldup until NSEC2 is done. "example.com" can
   deploy DNSSEC in 24-36 months. until then, vanilla DNS only for world.

or

2) DNSSEC deployment continues. NSEC2 development continues. "example.com"
   can deploy DNSSEC in 24-36 months, while world can adopt DNSSEC with
   NSEC in (say) 6 months.

My pick would be scenario number 2.

Note: this only works with a version field in NSEC. We simply state V1 is
NSEC as we know it. !V1 must then be interpreted as plain DNS (verify the
NSEC SIG, so the resolver knows the NSEC is legit, treat the delegation or
denial as unsecured).

Roy

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com>
Subject: Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial Mechanism Flag
Date: Wed, 26 May 2004 22:07:57 +0000
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	of "Wed, 26 May 2004 13:08:13 +0200."
	<OF637F95AF.A3B7F989-ONC1256EA0.003CBC08-C1256EA0.003D2D94@denic.de> 
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> > This doesn't really help. It just shows that a bunch of TLDs restrict
> > AXFR to their slave servers and sometimes to trusted third parties.
> 
> Point taken. However, I think these TLDs aren't placing the zipped
> zone at everyone's disposal via anonymous FTP either.

well, they ought to.

but i guess every generation wants to learn that security through obscurity
is an illusion, the hard way.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: Roy Badami <roy@gnomon.org.uk>
Subject: Re: NSEC version field (Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial
	Mechanism Flag)
Date: Wed, 26 May 2004 23:30:56 +0100
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>>>>> "roy" == roy  <roy@dnss.ec> writes:

    roy> 2) DNSSEC deployment continues. NSEC2 development
    roy> continues. "example.com" can deploy DNSSEC in 24-36 months,
    roy> while world can adopt DNSSEC with NSEC in (say) 6 months.

The problem is that a signed (NSEC2) zone can have a secure delegation
to another zone (NSEC1 or NSEC2).  People will naturally expect that
delegated zone to be safe; they need to be made aware that the subzone
is not secure as far as NSEC1 resolvers go, unless it is configured as
a trust anchor.

Note that this problem is new to DS; in RFC2535 provably insecure
delegations did not depend on authenticated denial.

Maybe this is an acceptable state of affairs, but it makes me nervous.

      -=roy

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: Roy Badami <roy@gnomon.org.uk>
Subject: Re: NSEC version field (Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial
	Mechanism Flag)
Date: Thu, 27 May 2004 01:15:44 +0100
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To be more specific, here is what I'm talking about.

Alice is an authoritive nameserver for tld.  She uses NSEC2.

Bob in an authoritive nameserver for sld.tld delegated from tld by
means of a DS record.  (It doesn't matter whether he uses NSEC1 or
NSEC2.)

Charlie is a security-aware resolver.  However, he only understands NSEC1.

Charlie has a secure entry point into tld (either as a trust anchor,
or delegated from a signed root).  He does not have sld.tld configured
as a trust anchor, but uses the DS record as his secure entry point.

Mallory wishes to tamper with the contents of sld.tld, as seen by
Charlie.  He therefore tampers with the DNS response from Alice
refering Charlie to Bob.  In particular, he removes the DS record, and
inserts a randomly chosen NSEC2 record from tld, together with its
RRSIG.

Charlie sees the lack of a DS record as indicating an insecure
delegation.  He can see an NSEC2 record, and he can verify that it is
signed by tld's ZSK, but he can't tell whether it proves the lack of a
DS record.  He simply has to assume that sld.tld is insecure.  At his
point Mallory can tamper with responses from Bob to Charlie with
impunity.

One fix would be to introduce a null DS record, which is semantically
identical to having no DS record, and to require NSEC2 zones to
include null DS recods for all insecure delegations.

An NSEC1 resolver then can always verify a claim of an insecure
delegation: either there will be an NSEC1 record proving the lack of
DS record, or there will be a null DS record.

   -roy

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: David Blacka <davidb@verisignlabs.com>
Subject: Re: NSEC version field (Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial Mechanism Flag)
Date: Wed, 26 May 2004 21:00:56 -0400
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On May 26, 2004, at 8:15 PM, Roy Badami wrote:

> To be more specific, here is what I'm talking about.
>
> Alice is an authoritive nameserver for tld.  She uses NSEC2.
>
> Bob in an authoritive nameserver for sld.tld delegated from tld by
> means of a DS record.  (It doesn't matter whether he uses NSEC1 or
> NSEC2.)
>
> Charlie is a security-aware resolver.  However, he only understands 
> NSEC1.

Then, to Charlie, tld is, for all intents and purposes, not secure.

You can repeat this exercise with algorithms instead of different NSEC 
types: tld is signed by algorithm A, sld.tld is signed with B, Charlie 
only understands B...

Except with NSEC2, it is possible that Charlie will be able to 
establish a chain of trust to sld.tld, if no one tampers with anything.

Versioning DNSSEC, by its very nature, will fragment DNSSEC islands of 
security.

That is not much of an issue if the fragmentation happens towards the 
leaf nodes, but, at the TLD level, it will force all clients to 
understand all of the versions in order to be useful.

--
David Blacka    <davidb@verisignlabs.com>
Sr. Engineer    Verisign Applied Research


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: Roy Badami <roy@gnomon.org.uk>
Subject: Re: NSEC version field (Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial
	Mechanism Flag)
Date: Thu, 27 May 2004 02:19:01 +0100
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>>>>> "David" == David Blacka <davidb@verisignlabs.com> writes:

    David> Then, to Charlie, tld is, for all intents and purposes, not
    David> secure.

Not quite.  All records in tld can be verified by Charlie, so tld is
secure for some purposes.  Obviously, authenticated denial is not
available for RRsets in tld.  But less obviously, all delegations from
tld are insecure.  This last point is fixable.

    David> You can repeat this exercise with algorithms instead of
    David> different NSEC types: tld is signed by algorithm A, sld.tld
    David> is signed with B, Charlie only understands B...

    David> Except with NSEC2, it is possible that Charlie will be able
    David> to establish a chain of trust to sld.tld, if no one tampers
    David> with anything.

If the purpose of versioning is to allow later deployment of NSEC2,
then it would be good to consider the implications of such a
deployment strategy, and to consider fixing things that are fixable.

As a domain holder in a ccTLD that will probably choose to deploy
NSEC2 rather than NSEC, I don't much like the prospect that my
delegation will not be secure for the installed base of DNSSEC
resolvers.  If that's the case, the cost of NSEC2 is too high...

    -roy

    

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: don@plugh.daedalus.co.nz
Subject: Re: NSEC+ and NO
Date: Thu, 27 May 2004 14:05:18 +1200
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Alex Bligh <alex@alex.org.uk> wrote:
>On a more theoretical level, what you are trying to do is introduce
>small segments of the space "between" names that do not return useful
>non-existence proof. 

That's exactly what I'm suggesting.

>                      You want to make that space as small as possible
>in order that non-existence proof works elsewhere. But that makes it
>trivially easy to ask instead for a name outside that small space but
>in the larger space before the next "real" name.

Is that actually the case?  Do we care about queries for domains that
don't exist?  Is there a problem with the following:

	a.example.	NS	ns1.isp.com.
			NS	ns2.isp.com.
			DS	...
			RRSIG	DS ...
			NSEC	a_.example. NS DS RRSIG NSEC
			RRSIG	NSEC ..
	b.example.	NS	ns1.isp.net.
			NS	ns2.isp.net.
			NSEC	b_.example. NS RRSIG NSEC
			RRSIG	NSEC ...
	d.example.	...

That is, if someone asks for foo.a.example with DNSSEC, they'll get a
referral with a signed DS record; if they ask for foo.b.example, they'll
get an referral with a signed NSEC record that securely marks the
delegation as insecure.

If they ask for foo.c.example, they'll get an NXDOMAIN.  Which is what
they'd have gut if DNSSEC wasn't in the picture.

In essence, only the parts of the zone containing the live domains
support authenticated denial; that is, from a registry's point of view,
we don't really care about what happens to a domain that doesn't exist
anyway, as long as we can give an authenticated "here is the DS record
for this delegation", or an authenticated "this domain doesn't have a DS
record".

Is this a compromise that will work for TLD registries?  Note that I'm
really focusing on registry domains; these have fairly specific
requirements (.museum notwithstanding).

-- don

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: Edward Lewis <edlewis@arin.net>
Subject: Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial Mechanism Flag (was: NSEC+
 and NO)
Date: Wed, 26 May 2004 22:48:10 -0400
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When I think on this topic there are a few assumptions I make.

One is that record synthesis (aka wild cards) is an integral part of 
the protocol.  It doesn't matter to me if a proposed solution has a 
problem domain that doesn't use record synthesis, the proposed 
solution must be compatible with the synthesis process.

Two is that the DNS is a very constrained lookup service.  Queries 
consist of three factors and three factors only as far as the data 
space is concerned.  Flags can be used to turn on/request processing 
at the server, but the answers returned with special processing must 
be coherent at any DNS moment.

Three is that the DNS is simple, a non-negotiated protocol.  The 
client can't indicate that it understands certain processing schemes 
and the server can't tailor an answer to the querier's dialect.

Because of these assumptions, when I see proposals that say "well, we 
don't want to use wild cards" I react negatively.  Abstractly, this 
is like defining "A and !B" operations and "!A and B" operations. 
What happens when someone in the future tries to do "A and B" 
operations?  Either we have to apply a lot of epoxy to define what 
happens when the erroneous "A and B" operations occur or we will have 
to be willing to see divergent implementations.  I.e., corner cases 
will ensue.

In the past I have tried to add a security options record to a zone, 
this proposal came out in summer 1999, just before the IETF in Oslo 
(to help fix the era in the memory of folks).  One of the pitfalls of 
this is that the record becomes one more issue for inclusion in the 
non-answer section of a reply.  I am off-line now so I can't find the 
dns-security archives, but I recall a message from John Gilmore 
rejecting the proposal "with prejudice" for another reason.  (I 
recall because I had to ask him what that meant.)

Here's the problem with having multiple approaches to negative 
answers, especially if they are not introduced simultaneously. 
NSEC-era resolvers will panic when seeing NSEC2 records - they will 
have no chance understanding the semantics.  For example, let's say 
"com." uses NSEC2 and not NSEC.  At all delegations to non-secured 
zones, a NSEC2 record will be used to prove the absence of a DS 
record.  The proper response by a NSEC-era verifier to the lack of 
either a DS set or a NSEC demonstrating no DS set is an error, 
resulting in a service failure (SERVFAIL).  It doesn't matter if we 
play a trick with key algorithms.  The older NSEC-era resolvers will 
panic, unless we retool the error handling for that state.

If we were able to include both NSEC and NSEC2 as workable solutions 
in one step, I think that would also be unwise.  DNS isn't about 
choices, it's supposed to be a lightweight system.  (Look at the 
relatively slow adoption of IPsec - too many knobs to turn and align 
right.)  DNS isn't supposed to be a feature-rich service.  (Remember 
the lessons from the A6 deprecation.)  I'd rather see just one 
defined and the other forgotten.

The WG has a technically sound set of documents pending promotion. 
The WG has also heard some concerns about new requirements that the 
current document set does not meet.  The dilemma is that the WG 
represents the collective wisdom of DNS oriented engineers and that 
the new requirements are still seemingly incompletely defined in the 
WG's realm of expertise.  (Meaning that TLD's in different legal 
jurisdictions have different requirement sets.)

A solution to the question "how do we proceed" is for the WG to 
deliver the documents to the IETF and IESG.  The broader community of 
the IETF, with guidance and expertise contacted by the IESG, will 
then have in their hands a sound approach to securing DNS within a 
given set of assumptions and requirements made by the WG.  With a 
broader base of review, the perceived new requirements can be 
evaluated and judged and a determination can then be made the WG's 
documented solution is good enough or that the WG must go back to the 
chalk board and update the design.

-- 
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Edward Lewis                                            +1-703-227-9854
ARIN Research Engineer

Even the voices inside my head are refusing to talk to me anymore.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com>
Subject: Re: NSEC+ and NO
Date: Thu, 27 May 2004 04:04:20 +0000
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	of "Thu, 27 May 2004 14:05:18 +1200."
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> ...
> In essence, only the parts of the zone containing the live domains
> support authenticated denial; that is, from a registry's point of view,
> we don't really care about what happens to a domain that doesn't exist
> anyway, as long as we can give an authenticated "here is the DS record
> for this delegation", or an authenticated "this domain doesn't have a DS
> record".

this isn't practical.  if the .org people did this, then isc.org would be
subject to downgrade attacks wherein an attacker could insert unsecured
responses into the transaction stream making folks believe that isc.org
did not exist, and the querier would not be able to tell that it had been
spoofed.  i want both positive and negative responses about my parent domain
to be signed and verifiable.

> Is this a compromise that will work for TLD registries?  

i hope not.  not for any registry of which i'd like to be a customer, anyway.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com>
Subject: Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial Mechanism Flag (was: NSEC+ and NO)
Date: Thu, 27 May 2004 04:01:13 +0000
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	of "Wed, 26 May 2004 22:48:10 -0400."
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--=-=-=

> From: Edward Lewis <edlewis@arin.net>
> ...
> In the past I have tried to add a security options record to a zone, this
> proposal came out in summer 1999, just before the IETF in Oslo (to help fix
> the era in the memory of folks).  One of the pitfalls of this is that the
> record becomes one more issue for inclusion in the non-answer section of a
> reply.  I am off-line now so I can't find the dns-security archives, but I
> recall a message from John Gilmore rejecting the proposal "with prejudice"
> for another reason.  (I recall because I had to ask him what that meant.)

see attached.


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To: Paul A Vixie <paul@vix.com>
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Subject: Re: (Almost final) Agenda for dnsind/dnssec in Oslo 
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> > 11. SECure-RR			(5 minutes)		Edward Lewis
> > 	<draft-ietf-dnsind-sec-rr-00.txt>
> i very much hope that john gilmore will be at the oslo meeting to defend his
> point of view (that we can't deploy a new RR at this time if we're expecting
> to use dnssec widely this year.)

I won't be in Oslo, unfortunately.  Hugh Daniel will be there, but
he doesn't have the history.

Deploying an RR type that only exists in superzones is not quite as
bad as deploying one that exists everywhere.  The number of superzones
is smaller than the number of zones, and the most critical superzones
(. and .com and etc) are running on machines that "nominally" always
upgrade to the latest BIND anyway, so they'll be able to serve new RR
types.

Having scanned the draft once:

Summary: REJECT WITH PREJUDICE.  Poorly defined, unnecessarily complex,
doesn't solve the problem it claims to, doesn't even address the
real problems of DNSSEC.

The biggest problem with DNSSEC appears to be paper designs that do
not benefit from operational evolution.  In other words, DNSSEC is not
going through the winning part of the IETF process (draft, implement,
try, redraft, implement, try, ... standardize).  Instead we go through
a series of paper specs trying to standardize them with no operational
experience.  Note I said operational, not programming.

I suggest that we operate with the specs we have and learn from 'em.
THEN change 'em.

This paper design continues many of the problems of prior DNSSEC
drafts; it lays out grand schemes without considering the operational
details.  The open-ended "Security parameters of a zone" is one
example (including things like "Signature policy.  This is an untested
issue.").

The draft goes to even more ridiculous lengths than NXT to secure
negative answers.  (NXT more than doubles the size of your zone, to
give definitive "NO"s for names that aren't in the zone.)  In addition
to NXT, we now have a bitmap in the parent zone (!!!) that gives five
options on how the child zone might handle negative answers.  These
options can be used in combination.  (At least if the WG thinks this
level of abomination is needed, it should be expressed in the child
zone rather than in the parent.  Such a record in the child would be
signed by the zone key, so it can't be spoofed.  Though I suppose its
*absence* could be spoofed, hmm...)

Then we get to the meat.  The SEC record doesn't really have fields
that specify security parameters.  Instead it holds little
sub-packets, each of which has to be parsed, each of which specifies
security parameters.  These sub-packets have option specifier bytes,
optional lengths, and data.  The length of most of the options is
defined in the spec, so that when new options are added, all existing
implementations will be unable to parse them.  The draft specifies
various combinations of options that are not permitted together.  I
don't see why we don't just go straight to X.509 and ASN.1 instead --
it's simpler and easier.

The text file format is highly readable, consisting of a series of hex
numbers.  (At least the numbers are in hex; the DNSSEC KEY record has
bit-flags expressed in decimal.)  The parsing of the hex is screwy;
some fields have 0x, some do not, and this difference appears to have
some meaning, though it's not clear what meaning.

The draft claims it's a successor to Zone Key Referral by me and Jerry
Scharf.  Did I really do that?   It doesn't actually include the name of
the Zone Key Referral draft, but elsewhere it says it's "by the same
authors" (as itself, presumably).

	John



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: David Blacka <davidb@verisignlabs.com>
Subject: Re: NSEC version field (Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial Mechanism Flag)
Date: Thu, 27 May 2004 01:02:41 -0400
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References: <C6DDA43B91BFDA49AA2F1E473732113E5DBCF7@mou1wnexm05.vcorp.ad.vrsn.com> <a06020411bcd9609d5aa9@[192.35.166.53]> <16563.49674.412883.793394@giles.gnomon.org.uk> <Pine.LNX.4.58.0405261022160.28239@elektron.atoom.net> <16564.28474.714383.372054@giles.gnomon.org.uk> <Pine.LNX.4.58.0405261222390.28239@elektron.atoom.net> <16564.30227.3445.173997@giles.gnomon.org.uk> <Pine.LNX.4.58.0405261333150.28239@elektron.atoom.net> <Pine.LNX.4.58.0405261342250.28239@elektron.atoom.net> <16564.39582.570457.670964@giles.gnomon.org.uk> <Pine.LNX.4.58.0405262056570.28239@elektron.atoom.net> <16565.6816.203820.50021@giles.gnomon.org.uk> <16565.13104.363074.585875@giles.gnomon.org.uk> <4FA765FC-AF79-11D8-966F-000A95CC77E2@verisignlabs.com> <16565.16901.386808.336979@giles.gnomon.org.uk>
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On May 26, 2004, at 9:19 PM, Roy Badami wrote:

>>>>>> "David" == David Blacka <davidb@verisignlabs.com> writes:
>
>     David> Then, to Charlie, tld is, for all intents and purposes, not
>     David> secure.
>
> Not quite.  All records in tld can be verified by Charlie, so tld is
> secure for some purposes.  Obviously, authenticated denial is not
> available for RRsets in tld.  But less obviously, all delegations from
> tld are insecure.  This last point is fixable.

It is possible that you are using a different set of assumptions than I 
am.  I'm assuming that Charlie, when it doesn't understand NSEC2, 
operates under the current DNSSECbis specs.

That assumption sort of rules out null DS records, I think.  I make 
this assumption because if, for instance, Charlie would have to 
understand both NSEC and null DS, then it might as well understand 
NSEC2 as well.

>     David> You can repeat this exercise with algorithms instead of
>     David> different NSEC types: tld is signed by algorithm A, sld.tld
>     David> is signed with B, Charlie only understands B...
>
>     David> Except with NSEC2, it is possible that Charlie will be able
>     David> to establish a chain of trust to sld.tld, if no one tampers
>     David> with anything.
>
> If the purpose of versioning is to allow later deployment of NSEC2,
> then it would be good to consider the implications of such a
> deployment strategy, and to consider fixing things that are fixable.

I absolutely agree with this.  However, even though we may now think we 
know what NSEC2 looks like, if we pursue this versioning path, we will 
have to assume that we do not actually know what future NSEC-like 
records will look like.  That makes it pretty difficult to figure out 
how to compensate for it, I think.

--
David Blacka    <davidb@verisignlabs.com>
Sr. Engineer    Verisign Applied Research


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:54 2006
From: don@plugh.daedalus.co.nz
Subject: Re: NSEC+ and NO
Date: Thu, 27 May 2004 19:49:54 +1200
Lines: 29
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Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com> wrote:
>this isn't practical.  if the .org people did this, then isc.org would be
>subject to downgrade attacks wherein an attacker could insert unsecured
>responses into the transaction stream making folks believe that isc.org
>did not exist, and the querier would not be able to tell that it had been
>spoofed.  i want both positive and negative responses about my parent domain
>to be signed and verifiable.

Can you explain to me the difference, from a security enabled resolver's
point of view, between the following three cases:

(1) A non security enabled name server returning NXDOMAIN for a name
that doesn't exist;

(2) A security enabled name server returning NXDOMAIN for a name that
doesn't exist (but which would return signed data or an appropriately
signed NSEC if the name did exist), as per my previous post; and

(3) A man in the middle intercepting a request and responding to it with
NXDOMAIN.

-- don

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: Roy Badami <roy@gnomon.org.uk>
Subject: Re: NSEC version field (Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial
	Mechanism Flag)
Date: Thu, 27 May 2004 10:23:16 +0100
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>>>>> "David" == David Blacka <davidb@verisignlabs.com> writes:

    David> It is possible that you are using a different set of
    David> assumptions than I am.  I'm assuming that Charlie, when it
    David> doesn't understand NSEC2, operates under the current
    David> DNSSECbis specs.

Possibly.  I am assuming that DNSSECbis is modified so NSEC RRs
contain a version field, which is set to 1 (say).  I am also assuming
that when a DNSSECbis resolver sees a response in which all the NSEC
RRs have a version greater than 1 (and those RRs are correctly
signed), it treats the response as insecure, rather than bogus.

The question is, would this allow the subsequent introduction of a
version 2 NSEC record in a relatively painless manner?

I assert that the null DS record would make such introduction more
painless.  The main cost (increased zone size) is borne by those who
want to use later versions of NSEC, though it does of course add a
(small) additional complexity to DNSSECbis resolvers.

    David> I absolutely agree with this.  However, even though we may
    David> now think we know what NSEC2 looks like, if we pursue this
    David> versioning path, we will have to assume that we do not
    David> actually know what future NSEC-like records will look like.
    David> That makes it pretty difficult to figure out how to
    David> compensate for it, I think.

That's true.  But null DS records don't rely on having any NSEC-like
records at all.  So it would seem to me that they can complensate for
_any_ change to NSEC.

      -roy


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: Marcos Sanz/Denic <sanz@denic.de>
Subject: Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial Mechanism Flag
Date: Thu, 27 May 2004 11:30:11 +0200
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> > Point taken. However, I think these TLDs aren't placing the zipped
> > zone at everyone's disposal via anonymous FTP either.
>
> well, they ought to.

In virtue of what?

Regards,
Marcos

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: geoff@nominet.org.uk (Geoffrey Sisson)
Subject: Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial Mechanism Flag
Date: Thu, 27 May 2004 10:52:01 +0100 (BST)
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Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com> writes:

> but i guess every generation wants to learn that security through obscurity
> is an illusion, the hard way.

NSEC2 RRs are intended to prevent the zone from being _trivially_
elaborated.

It's one thing to park a car unlocked with the keys in the ignition;
it's another to park it in a garage, lock the doors, and remove the
key.

Also, NSEC2 uses strong encryption, so it isn't entirely justifiable to
charactarise it as security through obscurity.

Regards

Geoff

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: "Jay Daley" <td@nominet.org.uk>
Subject: Confirming the Nominet position
Date: Wed, 26 May 2004 09:48:34 +0100
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Two things
=20
1.  Late new comers

The criticism levelled about "late new comers" is well founded and I'm=20
sorry that is the case.  This is something we should have raised some time =

ago.  Recognising that we were late with this we did try to avoid just=20
unproductive foot stamping by the development of the NSEC2 draft as a=20
positive alternative.  We are now committed to the process and we will be=20
here to stay.  As evidence of this I should make clear that our next steps =

will be to write NSEC2 patches for BIND and if possible NSD to allow=20
proper interoperability testing.

Ideally we would like NSEC2 to go forward properly now but I understand=20
very well that this causes significant problems for many in this WG.  So=20
we would be quite happy with a mechanism that allowed NSEC2 to be=20
introduced later in a backwards compatible fashion, such as the previosuly =

suggestion version field for NSEC.


2. Legal mumbo jumbo

I'm sorry if we appear to have been hiding behind legal mumbo jumbo, this=20
was not our intention.  So I need to be clear that zone file enumeration=20
is a show-stopper for us that will prevent us from fully implementing=20
DNSSEC and our legal advice is ancillary to that not the determining=20
factor.  So if DNSSEC stays in its current form then we will have to make=20
a local determination about how/what we implement, which is still to be=20
decided.

However, for those of you that have asked, this is the gist of our legal=20
advice...

As compilations, zone file databases are protected under EU law by=20
?Database Right?. As a derivative work of the main register from which=20
they are sourced, they are likely also to attract copyright protection in=20
addition to or in place of database right.

Both database right and copyright are negative rights in that they=20
prohibit certain acts (primarily, copying the whole or a substantial part=20
of the materials) but do not grant positive rights (unlike, for example, a =

patent, which grants a monopoly on the material involved). Database right=20
is unique to countries which implement European Community law, but=20
copyright is more universal.=20

If legal rights would be infringed with copying, then is it not better to=20
allow the copying, and then rely on the law to assist against any=20
infringers.  The short answer is ?no?, and here the analogy of locking=20
one?s house or car despite laws against burglary and theft may be helpful. =

 Prevention is not always better than cure, if one is led to make an=20
overly restrictive solution in order to prevent a minor risk.  However, if =

the risk of harm is major, and is highly likely to take place, and will be =

expensive and difficult to put right after the event, then in those=20
circumstances, prevention is very definitely better than cure.

The problem with both copyright and database right arises with=20
enforcement, particularly in respect of electronic data such as a zone=20
file.  Firstly it can be hard to identify whether a data mining event has=20
taken place, in the context of the high volume of traffic affecting the=20
nameservers on a day to day basis. If a technical department cannot show=20
this, there is nothing that a legal department can do. Even if it is clear =

that it is happening, the technical department may not be able to trace=20
who has done it, because the use of multiple proxies can make it=20
impossible (or prohibitively expensive) to find it. Even if this can be=20
done, the person(s) involved may be abroad. If they are in a difficult=20
jurisdiction (even including eastern Europe, which is part of the EU) the=20
differences in language and legal systems add to the expense and=20
complexity of pursuing legal proceedings.=20

Jay

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: Jaap Akkerhuis <jaap@sidn.nl>
Subject: Re: NIC-SE statement regarding NSEC zone walking
Date: Thu, 27 May 2004 13:39:25 +0200
Lines: 20
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Cc: Jakob Schlyter <jakob@rfc.se>
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             <Pine.OSX.4.60.0405261650410.23259@criollo.schlyter.se> 
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    -- cut --
    Date: Wed, 26 May 2004 16:17:59 +0200
    From: Per-Olof Josefsson <Per-Olof.Josefsson@nic.se>
    
    NIC-SE does not consider NXT zone-walking a problem for DNSSEC deployment 
    within the .se-zone.  We consider all data in the DNS to be public 
    information, both as single records and as a collection.  The data we 
    actually need to protect is served by WHOIS and protecting this data 
    should be done by the protocol serving it, not by DNS itself.
    
Just in case that it wasn't clear from my earlier mai. This is the
position of SIDN as well for the nl-zone.

	jaap

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: Peter Koch <pk@TechFak.Uni-Bielefeld.DE>
Subject: Re: NSEC+ and NO
Date: Thu, 27 May 2004 13:56:55 +0200
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In-reply-to: Your message of "Thu, 27 May 2004 14:05:18 +1200."
             <68157.1085623518@toybsd.zl2tnm.gen.nz> 
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don@plugh.daedalus.co.nz wrote:

> That is, if someone asks for foo.a.example with DNSSEC, they'll get a
> referral with a signed DS record; if they ask for foo.b.example, they'll
> get an referral with a signed NSEC record that securely marks the
> delegation as insecure.
> 
> If they ask for foo.c.example, they'll get an NXDOMAIN.  Which is what
> they'd have gut if DNSSEC wasn't in the picture.

If I got that right you're in essence suggesting that the "pointer part"
of the NSEC RR be optional. Instead of having it point "somewhere", I'd use
the target for explicit signalling of this feature, e.g. let it point to
the root domain (yes, that would make a problem in ".") or the owner name
itself (which makes problems in "empty" zones) or abuse the NSEC 'bit' in
the RR list.

However, this would open *all* delegated domains, whether secure or not,
to a DoS because someone could intercept an answer and substitute the
referral by an NXDOMAIN response. Since those are unprotected under this
scheme, there's no way to tell whether or not the delegation really exists
(the answer would have to carry some witnessing of the "NSEC doesn't use
pointer" feature, e.g. per the NSEC of the zone [*])

But, since SERVFAIL or REFUSED could always be spoofed (although usually
not cached), there is already a risk of DoS even with authenticated denial.
The quality of both attacks is different (I just cannot reach, say, a webserver
or I may be made to believe a whole organisation ceased to exist - or at least
lost their domain name) but the quality of this difference could be and even
may have been discussed.
The 'threats' draft and the DNSSEC docset don't discuss this kind of "negative"
response (and I'm not sure they should).

-Peter

[*] As was said earlier in this thread, these "per zone" features have
    their own difficulties because you don't necessarily know the enclosing
    zone, so a delegation could be deeper inside a zone than one level,
    e.g. "sub.sub.example" in "example", but per this feature it could be
    required to use one-sublevel-only delegations.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: "Jay Daley" <jay@nominet.org.uk>
Subject: Confirming the Nominet position
Date: Wed, 26 May 2004 16:21:02 +0100
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Here is a proper explanation of the Nominet position.

1.  Showstopper
Zone file enumeration is a show-stopper for us that will prevent us from=20
fully implementing DNSSEC. So if DNSSEC stays in its current form then we=20
will have to make a local determination about how/what we implement, which =

is still to be decided.  Our reason for this is our view of what is the=20
appropriate policy to act in the best interests of our local community,=20
which for some time has been to deny access to our zone files.=20

=20
2.  Late new comers
The criticism levelled about "late new comers" is well founded and I'm=20
sorry that is the case.  This is something we should have raised some time =

ago.  Recognising that we were late with this we did try to avoid just=20
unproductive foot stamping by the development of the NSEC2 draft as a=20
positive alternative.  We are now committed to the process and we will be=20
here to stay.  As evidence of this I should make clear that our next steps =

will be to get NSEC2 patches written for BIND and if possible NSD to allow =

proper interoperability testing.


3.  Way ahead
Ideally we would like NSEC2 to go forward properly, but I understand very=20
well that this causes significant problems for many in this WG.  So we=20
would be quite happy with a mechanism that allowed NSEC2 to be introduced=20
later in a backwards compatible fashion, such as the previously suggested=20
version field for NSEC.


3. Legal mumbo jumbo
I'm sorry if we appear to have been hiding behind legal mumbo jumbo, this=20
was not our intention.  So I need to be clear that our legal advice is=20
ancillary to our view in (1) above, not the determining factor.=20

However, for those of you that have asked, this is the gist of our legal=20
advice...

As compilations, zone file databases are protected under EU law by=20
?Database Right?. As a derivative work of the main register from which=20
they are sourced, they are likely also to attract copyright protection in=20
addition to or in place of database right.

Both database right and copyright are negative rights in that they=20
prohibit certain acts (primarily, copying the whole or a substantial part=20
of the materials) but do not grant positive rights (unlike, for example, a =

patent, which grants a monopoly on the material involved). Database right=20
is unique to countries which implement European Community law, but=20
copyright is more universal.=20

If legal rights would be infringed with copying, then is it not better to=20
allow the copying, and then rely on the law to assist against any=20
infringers?  The short answer is ?no?, and here the analogy of locking=20
one?s house or car despite laws against burglary and theft may be helpful. =

 Prevention is not always better than cure, if one is led to make an=20
overly restrictive solution in order to prevent a minor risk.  However, if =

the risk of harm is major, and is highly likely to take place, and will be =

expensive and difficult to put right after the event, then in those=20
circumstances, prevention is very definitely better than cure.

The problem with both copyright and database right arises with=20
enforcement, particularly in respect of electronic data such as a zone=20
file.  Firstly it can be hard to identify whether a data mining event has=20
taken place, in the context of the high volume of traffic affecting the=20
nameservers on a day to day basis. If a technical department cannot show=20
this, there is nothing that a legal department can do. Even if it is clear =

that it is happening, the technical department may not be able to trace=20
who has done it, because the use of multiple proxies can make it=20
impossible (or prohibitively expensive) to find it. Even if this can be=20
done, the person(s) involved may be abroad. If they are in a difficult=20
jurisdiction (even including eastern Europe, which is part of the EU) the=20
differences in language and legal systems add to the expense and=20
complexity of pursuing legal proceedings.=20

Jay

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: geoff@nominet.org.uk (Geoffrey Sisson)
Subject: Re: More on NSEC2 label size and DoS
Date: Thu, 27 May 2004 14:50:20 +0100 (BST)
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roy@dnss.ec writes:

> Okay, the problem is not e164 but ip6.arpa:
> 
> 9.1.1.0.6.0.1.0.7.8.0.0.2.9.1.0.a.0.0.8.1.0.0.0.0.1.6.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa.
> 
> Remember, at _each_ intermediate label level including empty non-terminals
> (in the above example there are 35 labels) a NSEC (or EXIST) is needed for
> every occuring value at that label.

This is a good argument for NSEC2 as an _alternative_ to NSEC rather
than as a replacement.  It's probably undesirable to secure zones in
{in-addr,ip6,e164}.arpa using NSEC2 RRs, especially as the namespace of
domains in these zones is dramatically smaller.

Regards

Geoff

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: bmanning@vacation.karoshi.com
Subject: Re: Confirming the Nominet position
Date: Thu, 27 May 2004 13:54:25 +0000
Lines: 26
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> The problem with both copyright and database right arises with 
> enforcement, particularly in respect of electronic data such as a zone 
> file.  Firstly it can be hard to identify whether a data mining event has 
> taken place, in the context of the high volume of traffic affecting the 
> nameservers on a day to day basis. If a technical department cannot show 
> this, there is nothing that a legal department can do. Even if it is clear 
> that it is happening, the technical department may not be able to trace 
> who has done it, because the use of multiple proxies can make it 
> impossible (or prohibitively expensive) to find it. Even if this can be 
> done, the person(s) involved may be abroad. If they are in a difficult 
> jurisdiction (even including eastern Europe, which is part of the EU) the 
> differences in language and legal systems add to the expense and 
> complexity of pursuing legal proceedings. 

	to make it easier to track, would "watermarking" the
	database be helpful?

> Jay

--bill

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: bmanning@vacation.karoshi.com
Subject: Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial Mechanism Flag
Date: Thu, 27 May 2004 14:02:00 +0000
Lines: 20
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> Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com> writes:
> > but i guess every generation wants to learn that security through obscurity
> > is an illusion, the hard way.
> 
> Also, NSEC2 uses strong encryption, so it isn't entirely justifiable to
> charactarise it as security through obscurity.
> 
> Geoff

	DNS use of "strong encryption" is not to provide
	confidentiality.  We're not hiding anything here.
	We're providing integrity.

--bill

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com>
Subject: Re: NSEC+ and NO
Date: Thu, 27 May 2004 14:06:11 +0000
Lines: 38
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
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In-Reply-To: Message from don@plugh.daedalus.co.nz 
	of "Thu, 27 May 2004 19:49:54 +1200."
	<79570.1085644194@toybsd.zl2tnm.gen.nz> 
X-Mailer: MH-E 7.4; nmh 1.0.4; GNU Emacs 21.3.1
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> Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com> wrote:
> > ...
> 
> Can you explain to me the difference, from a security enabled resolver's
> point of view, between the following three cases:
> 
> (1) A non security enabled name server returning NXDOMAIN for a name
> that doesn't exist;
> 
> (2) A security enabled name server returning NXDOMAIN for a name that
> doesn't exist (but which would return signed data or an appropriately
> signed NSEC if the name did exist), as per my previous post; and
> 
> (3) A man in the middle intercepting a request and responding to it with
> NXDOMAIN.

assuming that case (2) does not include an NSEC covering the query name,
then among those three there is no visible difference from a validator's
point of view.  however, there's a fourth case, which i'm interested in:

  (4) A secure negative response including a covering NSEC, signed with the
  zone's key, indicating the nonexistence of the name.

if a validator has a reason to expect security, such as a static trusted-key
for the zone or a parent DS learned during delegation, then cases (1), (2)
and (3) would all be treated as a possible instance of (3), and only case
(4) would be taken seriously or considered to be useful for subsequent
processing (such as giving up on the forwarding of email to that domain, or
giving up on contacting a jabber server at that domain, or whatever.)

in your previous post you proposed a signalling method that would make us
treat all negative responses as temporary failures.  that's not a value add.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com>
Subject: Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial Mechanism Flag
Date: Thu, 27 May 2004 14:17:52 +0000
Lines: 33
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References: <sanz@denic.de>
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In-Reply-To: Message from Marcos Sanz/Denic <sanz@denic.de> 
	of "Thu, 27 May 2004 11:30:11 +0200."
	<OFAFDBBCC1.9A7DB881-ONC1256EA1.00342692-C1256EA1.003433D2@denic.de> 
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> > > Point taken. However, I think these TLDs aren't placing the zipped
> > > zone at everyone's disposal via anonymous FTP either.
> >
> > well, they ought to.
> 
> In virtue of what?

having NS RRs in the root zone which give rise to a top level domain is
a public benefit activity.  not just the subset of the public who wants
to register SLDs there, but the entire public -- everybody everywhere.
all of the people who decide to respect the trust deed.  everyone who
recognizes the property lines.

and these people have a right to know what you're doing with the property
that is only under your control because of their good will.  maybe they
want to count the names, maybe they want to run a web crawler over them,
maybe they want to be able to complain if their trademarks are being used
by other people.  specific motives don't matter.

anyone who wants secrecy for thirdlevel names can have it.  and anyone
whose business requirements include name secrecy can use a thirdlevel name.

but asking for SLD naming secrecy (by preventing TLD enumeration) is like
saying "i want you to give my container ship safe passage through international
waters, but it may or may not be loaded with drugs, plutonium, or whatever."
you can have one, or you can have the other, but the public should not have
to grant -- and historically, will not grant -- both.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: Simon Josefsson <jas@extundo.com>
Subject: Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial Mechanism Flag
Date: Thu, 27 May 2004 16:49:58 +0200
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Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com> writes:

>> > > Point taken. However, I think these TLDs aren't placing the zipped
>> > > zone at everyone's disposal via anonymous FTP either.
>> >
>> > well, they ought to.
>> 
>> In virtue of what?
>
> having NS RRs in the root zone which give rise to a top level domain is
> a public benefit activity.  not just the subset of the public who wants
> to register SLDs there, but the entire public -- everybody everywhere.
> all of the people who decide to respect the trust deed.  everyone who
> recognizes the property lines.
>
> and these people have a right to know what you're doing with the property
> that is only under your control because of their good will.  maybe they
> want to count the names, maybe they want to run a web crawler over them,
> maybe they want to be able to complain if their trademarks are being used
> by other people.  specific motives don't matter.

Well spoken, I couldn't agree more.  I find it puzzling that some
TLDs, even those stating they have no problem with NXT/NSEC walking,
have been restricting zone access.

Perhaps this WG should simply acknowledge that organizations running
TLDs will never agree on policy issues.

Regards,
Simon


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: Edward Lewis <edlewis@arin.net>
Subject: Re: Confirming the Nominet position
Date: Thu, 27 May 2004 10:59:59 -0400
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At 16:24 +0100 5/26/04, Jay Daley wrote:
>Here is a proper explanation of the Nominet position.
>
>3. Legal mumbo jumbo
>I'm sorry if we appear to have been hiding behind legal mumbo jumbo, this
>was not our intention.  So I need to be clear that our legal advice is
>ancillary to our view in (1) above, not the determining factor.

In preparing this response I didn't see in #1 a reason that was 
*clearly* technically based.  I.e., I suspect that "appropriate 
policy...best interests" is based in issues that are not technical. 
So perhaps what I have to say here isn't the "right" answer.

I'm at sea the moment someone brings up anything relating to legal 
issues.  Given the conflicting statements about legal opinions on 
this list, I'd ask for the lawyers to get together and come to some 
common understanding first.  After that - it can become a technical 
problem again.
-- 
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Edward Lewis                                            +1-703-227-9854
ARIN Research Engineer

Even the voices inside my head are refusing to talk to me anymore.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: geoff@nominet.org.uk (Geoffrey Sisson)
Subject: Re: Confirming the Nominet position
Date: Thu, 27 May 2004 16:24:32 +0100 (BST)
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Edward Lewis <edlewis@arin.net> writes:

>          Given the conflicting statements about legal opinions on 
> this list, I'd ask for the lawyers to get together and come to some 
> common understanding first.  After that - it can become a technical 
> problem again.

A common legal understanding covering all potential DNSSEC users is
unlikely.  It seems almost certain that there will be operators that
will deploy DNSSECbis regardless of impact of NSEC RR traversal, and
operators that cannot deploy because of it.  These divergent
requirements deliniate the scope of the technical problem.

Regards

Geoff

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com>
Subject: Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial Mechanism Flag
Date: Thu, 27 May 2004 16:37:10 +0100
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   of "Thu, 27 May 2004 16:49:58 +0200." <iluacztkjqh.fsf@latte.josefsson.org> 
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>>>>> "Simon" == Simon Josefsson <jas@extundo.com> writes:

    Simon> Well spoken, I couldn't agree more.  I find it puzzling
    Simon> that some TLDs, even those stating they have no problem
    Simon> with NXT/NSEC walking, have been restricting zone access.

Why? There are perfectly good operational reasons for that. Like not
wanting their name servers burdened with large numbers of long-lived
TCP connections. Some may even be running DNS software that doesn't
*implement* AXFR.

    Simon> Perhaps this WG should simply acknowledge that
    Simon> organizations running TLDs will never agree on policy
    Simon> issues.

Apart from the obvious universal truths, that's a given. Around the
world there are too many different (mutually exclusive?) laws on stuff
like data protection, privacy, crypto, consumer protection, monopolies
and so on. Reconciling these is impossible. It would be foolish to
even try.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com>
Subject: Re: Confirming the Nominet position
Date: Thu, 27 May 2004 16:43:00 +0100
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   of "Thu, 27 May 2004 16:24:32 BST." <20040527152432.5E0DDE7EF2@mx1.nominet.org.uk> 
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>>>>> "Geoffrey" == Geoffrey Sisson <geoff@nominet.org.uk> writes:

    Geoffrey> A common legal understanding covering all potential
    Geoffrey> DNSSEC users is unlikely.  It seems almost certain that
    Geoffrey> there will be operators that will deploy DNSSECbis
    Geoffrey> regardless of impact of NSEC RR traversal, and operators
    Geoffrey> that cannot deploy because of it.  These divergent
    Geoffrey> requirements deliniate the scope of the technical
    Geoffrey> problem.

If an operator's reasons for not deploying DNSSECbis are policy ones,
how can this be a technical problem?

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: Edward Lewis <edlewis@arin.net>
Subject: Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial Mechanism Flag
Date: Thu, 27 May 2004 11:54:41 -0400
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At 16:49 +0200 5/27/04, Simon Josefsson wrote:
>Perhaps this WG should simply acknowledge that organizations running
>TLDs will never agree on policy issues.

This WG is supposed to be focusing on the protocol issues of the DNS 
and not on operational policy choices.  The goal is inter-operable 
specifications.

For the sake of the protocol and the applications relying on it we 
need to have just one approach to authenticated denial of existence. 
(The approach may be "not at all", NXT, NSEC, NSEC2, signing the 
responses.)  Allowing for alternate approaches means that 
applications will have to bear the burden of understanding how the 
DNS went about it's business.

The IETF way has been to engineer without regard to legal 
restrictions - that was the mantra in the says when cryptography was 
a large concern.  We do want the specs to be as widely usable as 
possible, but technical soundness is more important to compliance 
with legal opinions.

The last sounds absurd - but what good is a legally compliant 
specification that does not work?

-- 
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Edward Lewis                                            +1-703-227-9854
ARIN Research Engineer

Even the voices inside my head are refusing to talk to me anymore.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: "Jay Daley" <td@nominet.org.uk>
Subject: Re: Confirming the Nominet position
Date: Thu, 27 May 2004 17:00:28 +0100
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Jim

> If an operator's reasons for not deploying DNSSECbis are policy ones,
> how can this be a technical problem?

How does it sit with you if a technical change forces an operator into 
changing their policy? Are you saying that by default the policy must have 
been wrong in the first place?

Jay


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com>
Subject: Re: Confirming the Nominet position
Date: Thu, 27 May 2004 16:39:04 +0000
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	of "Thu, 27 May 2004 17:00:28 +0100."
	<OF8070BEE1.DF9830AB-ON80256EA1.005787D7-80256EA1.00580E1B@nominet.org.uk> 
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> > If an operator's reasons for not deploying DNSSECbis are policy ones,
> > how can this be a technical problem?
> 
> How does it sit with you if a technical change forces an operator into 
> changing their policy? Are you saying that by default the policy must have 
> been wrong in the first place?

"wrong" is such a strong word.  "not the way dns was intended to work" and
"placing new requirements on dns, without standardization" are more to the
point.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: bmanning@vacation.karoshi.com
Subject: Re: Confirming the Nominet position
Date: Thu, 27 May 2004 16:52:30 +0000
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On Thu, May 27, 2004 at 05:00:28PM +0100, Jay Daley wrote:
> Jim
> > If an operator's reasons for not deploying DNSSECbis are policy ones,
> > how can this be a technical problem?
> 
> How does it sit with you if a technical change forces an operator into 
> changing their policy? Are you saying that by default the policy must have 
> been wrong in the first place?
> 
> Jay

	Jay, w/o getting into the merits of any given policy, it seems 
	that the crux of the debate seems to be a tussle between what it
	technically possible and politically desirable.

	This particular tussle has occured many times in the past. One
	of my favorites is:  http://www.straightdope.com/classics/a3_341.html
	
	That aside, I suspect that -IF- one were to waive some of the 
	fundamental design principles of the DNS and DNSSEC, it would be
	possible to design a technical solution to your particular policy
	drivers.  I would not expect that technical solution to be useful
	to many/most others. As such, it would seem to inhibit broad use
	in an Internet-wide context.  But I could be wrong.

--bill

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com>
Subject: Re: Confirming the Nominet position
Date: Thu, 27 May 2004 17:53:40 +0100
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Cc: geoff@nominet.org.uk (Geoffrey Sisson), namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
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   of "Thu, 27 May 2004 17:00:28 BST." <OF8070BEE1.DF9830AB-ON80256EA1.005787D7-80256EA1.00580E1B@nominet.org.uk> 
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>>>>> "Jay" == Jay Daley <td@nominet.org.uk> writes:

    Jay> How does it sit with you if a technical change forces an
    Jay> operator into changing their policy?

It depends on the technical change and the policy. If we're talking
specifically about a policy which sets out to prevent or thwart zone
enumeration, yes, I do think that policy needs to be reviewed.

Lots of other technical changes to the DNS -- IDN, IPv6, ENUM, etc --
are likely to mean policy changes for operators. In some cases, these
changes will mean policies have to be created. The deployment of
DNSSEC will be no different in that respect. As the saying goes, you
can't make an omelette without breaking eggs. If anything DNSSEC is
going to demand new and/or changed operator policies because of stuff
like key handling and so on.

    Jay> Are you saying that by default the policy must have been
    Jay> wrong in the first place? 

Not necessarily. The policy may well have been right for its time.
But when circumstances change, policies might have to change too.
Even if those policies were right. Or wrong as the case may be.

This thread is getting somewhat off-topic for namedroppers.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: Simon Josefsson <jas@extundo.com>
Subject: Re: Confirming the Nominet position
Date: Thu, 27 May 2004 19:15:34 +0200
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Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com> writes:

>>>>>> "Geoffrey" == Geoffrey Sisson <geoff@nominet.org.uk> writes:
>
>     Geoffrey> A common legal understanding covering all potential
>     Geoffrey> DNSSEC users is unlikely.  It seems almost certain that
>     Geoffrey> there will be operators that will deploy DNSSECbis
>     Geoffrey> regardless of impact of NSEC RR traversal, and operators
>     Geoffrey> that cannot deploy because of it.  These divergent
>     Geoffrey> requirements deliniate the scope of the technical
>     Geoffrey> problem.
>
> If an operator's reasons for not deploying DNSSECbis are policy ones,
> how can this be a technical problem?

The technical problem is to find a solution that fit with the policy.
If the WG is not here to change the policy, it should not attempt to.

Regards,
Simon


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: Tim Chown <tjc@ecs.soton.ac.uk>
Subject: Re: Confirming the Nominet position
Date: Thu, 27 May 2004 18:44:10 +0100
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On Thu, May 27, 2004 at 05:00:28PM +0100, Jay Daley wrote:
> Jim
> 
> > If an operator's reasons for not deploying DNSSECbis are policy ones,
> > how can this be a technical problem?
> 
> How does it sit with you if a technical change forces an operator into 
> changing their policy? Are you saying that by default the policy must have 
> been wrong in the first place?

Hmm, don't policies continuously get rewritten in the light of the emergence
of new technologies (e.g. IPv6 or ENUM as Jim suggested) or changes or
evolutions to existing technologies (or their usage or abuse patterns)?

A policy is generally just best practice for the current technical environment
(within the confines of the law :).   Best practice changes, but that doesn't
mean what went before it was wrong.

Tim

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com>
Subject: Re: NSEC version field (Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial Mechanism Flag)
Date: Thu, 27 May 2004 18:19:20 +0000
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References: <roy@gnomon.org.uk>
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In-Reply-To: Message from Roy Badami <roy@gnomon.org.uk> 
	of "Thu, 27 May 2004 10:23:16 +0100."
	<16565.45956.205803.87821@giles.gnomon.org.uk> 
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> ...  I am assuming that DNSSECbis is modified so NSEC RRs
> contain a version field, which is set to 1 (say).

please don't do this.  find a signalling method, such as a dnskey
algorythm id or some existing MBZ field, that will allow new negative
signatures in the future (such as the one we're calling NSEC2) but
that will not require the dnssec-bis docset to be recut yet again.

changes to the dnssec-bis docset at this stage should be because of
document or protocol quality issues, not because of design changes
in the protocol itself.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: Roy Badami <roy@gnomon.org.uk>
Subject: Re: NSEC version field (Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial
	Mechanism Flag)
Date: Thu, 27 May 2004 19:59:03 +0100
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>>>>> "Paul" == Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com> writes:

    >> ...  I am assuming that DNSSECbis is modified so NSEC RRs
    >> contain a version field, which is set to 1 (say).

    Paul> please don't do this.

Sorry, perhaps I should have said:

    "I am assuming, for sake of discussion of the proposal, that the
    NSEC record is versioned, as proposed in this thread"

I didn't mean to imply anything in a wider context.

  -roy

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: Edward Lewis <edlewis@arin.net>
Subject: Re: NSEC version field (Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial
 Mechanism Flag)
Date: Thu, 27 May 2004 16:09:42 -0400
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At 19:59 +0100 5/27/04, Roy Badami wrote:
>>>>>>  "Paul" == Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com> writes:
>
>     >> ...  I am assuming that DNSSECbis is modified so NSEC RRs
>     >> contain a version field, which is set to 1 (say).
>
>     Paul> please don't do this.
>
>Sorry, perhaps I should have said:
>
>     "I am assuming, for sake of discussion of the proposal, that the
>     NSEC record is versioned, as proposed in this thread"
>
>I didn't mean to imply anything in a wider context.
>
>   -roy

I have my doubts that versioning NSEC is possible.

Let's say that we put in the current documents:

"When descending from a parent to a child, assume a verifier sees 
neither a DS RR nor a NSEC(v1) RR denying a DS RR and instead sees an 
NSEC(v2) in the authority section.  In this case the verifier is to 
assume that a new style of authenticated denial is in use and 
therefore assume the child is unsigned."

Assuming that the NSEC(v2) passes signature validation, how does the 
NSEC(v1)-era validator confirm that the right NSEC(v2) is there?  How 
do you detect an insertion error - that an eavesdropper didn't replay 
a non-material NSEC(v2) to deny secure access to that zone?

Assume a signed child, with such a clause I can reply with an 
alternate set of name servers and a non-material (but still signed) 
NSEC(v2) record.  I can make it look like the child is unsigned while 
still passing all of the security checks.

It seems to me that you'd have to turn off DNSSEC processing and 
restart for the next version once everyone has cleared out the old 
verifiers.

-- 
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Edward Lewis                                            +1-703-227-9854
ARIN Research Engineer

Even the voices inside my head are refusing to talk to me anymore.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: "Jay Daley" <td@nominet.org.uk>
Subject: Re: Confirming the Nominet position
Date: Thu, 27 May 2004 21:15:22 +0100
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Bill

bmanning@vacation.karoshi.com wrote on 27/05/2004 17:52:30:

>    That aside, I suspect that -IF- one were to waive some of the 
>    fundamental design principles of the DNS and DNSSEC, it would be
>    possible to design a technical solution to your particular policy
>    drivers. 

This is the crux of it.  With DNS no fundamental principles are waived. We 
enforce our policy by controlling AXFR.  With DNSSECbis that is no longer 
possible.

Jay

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: bmanning@vacation.karoshi.com
Subject: Re: Confirming the Nominet position
Date: Thu, 27 May 2004 20:35:29 +0000
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> bmanning@vacation.karoshi.com wrote on 27/05/2004 17:52:30:
> 
> >    That aside, I suspect that -IF- one were to waive some of the 
> >    fundamental design principles of the DNS and DNSSEC, it would be
> >    possible to design a technical solution to your particular policy
> >    drivers. 
> 
> This is the crux of it.  With DNS no fundamental principles are waived. We 
> enforce our policy by controlling AXFR.  With DNSSECbis that is no longer 
> possible.
> 
> Jay

	Er... yes it is.  Leave your AXFR blocks in place.  You still 
	prevent zone transfers.  DNSSEC has nothing to do w/ AXFR support.
	AXFR gives an -exact- copy of the zone, at a point in time.
	
	If you wish to prevent entities from getting the data, block 
	queries as well.  If you enable queries, then entities may build
	a NEAR copy of your data - in fact this is exactly what happens
	with caching nameservers. If I wish to build a highly accuate
	copy, without DNSSEC, I must generate large numbers of queries
	in a fairly short period, guessing at lable contents.  DNSSEC 
	allows me to reduce the number of queries, but they are still
	queries for individual records.  No AXFR involved. :)  

--bill

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: "Loomis, Rip" <GILBERT.R.LOOMIS@saic.com>
Subject: RE: Confirming the Nominet position
Date: Thu, 27 May 2004 16:40:02 -0400
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> >    That aside, I suspect that -IF- one were to waive some of the 
> >    fundamental design principles of the DNS and DNSSEC, it would be
> >    possible to design a technical solution to your particular policy
> >    drivers. 
> 
> This is the crux of it.  With DNS no fundamental principles 
> are waived. We enforce our policy by controlling AXFR.
> With DNSSECbis that is no longer possible.

With all due respect, I believe that your policy is based
on a capability that is implementation-specific, not part
of the protocol, and was therefore specifically not a
requirement when DNSSEC was being designed.  I would
further state that in a reasonably-size TLD with which I
have some familiarity, we believe that even zone enumeration
down to the level of each individual host is acceptable if
it's what's necessary to make DNSSEC work (and I do still
believe that signed proof of non-existence is necessary,
although someone's working hard to convince me otherwise).
Yes, the TLD I mention currently has requirements for the
use of split DNS and restriction of AXFR--but those are
policy items based on the capabilities and tradeoffs
at the time the policy was created.  The policy details
and implementation will likely change.

The fact that someone can more easily enumerate a zone
does not make the individual records within that zone any
more "vulnerable" or less "private".  This applies whether
those records are individual hosts, or delegations.  If
someone does not want their information to be made public,
then do not place it in the public DNS.  Even in the
aggregate, the total list of hosts in any DNS zone does not
represent a vulnerability or a loss of privacy--because
there was a conscious choice to put the information in DNS
in the first doggone place.  Or is your statement that
it's okay for a notional bad guy to obtain 10% of the
.org.uk zone and abuse that information, but the other
90% will really get you angry?

I believe that you are, in fact, going against a fundamental
principle of DNS right now.  The fact that "it always worked
that way" (not strictly true, but close enough) doesn't mean
that the capability will always work in the exact same
way in the future.

My $0.019.

  --Rip



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: "Jay Daley" <td@nominet.org.uk>
Subject: Re: Confirming the Nominet position
Date: Thu, 27 May 2004 21:24:24 +0100
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Bill

bmanning@vacation.karoshi.com wrote on 27/05/2004 14:54:25:

>    to make it easier to track, would "watermarking" the
>    database be helpful?

Possibly, but we would need to decide whether to do this by IP address, by 
zone etc. (which may not be as trivial as it seems).  Whatever the way 
this is still an after-the-fact control mechanism and those are arduous 
and expensive to pursue.  This is something we unfortunately have a lot of 
experience of ... http://www.vnunet.com/news/1154488

Jay

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com>
Subject: Re: Confirming the Nominet position
Date: Thu, 27 May 2004 21:21:59 +0000
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> >    That aside, I suspect that -IF- one were to waive some of the 
> >    fundamental design principles of the DNS and DNSSEC, it would be
> >    possible to design a technical solution to your particular policy
> >    drivers. 
> 
> This is the crux of it.  With DNS no fundamental principles are waived. We 
> enforce our policy by controlling AXFR.  With DNSSECbis that is no longer 
> possible.

i disagree.  when i put the first AXFR-blocking code into BIND 4 in ~1988,
i considered it a protocol violation and i made my apologies to the gods.

it appears that those gods have a long memory, and a grand scale of vengeance.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: Roy Badami <roy@gnomon.org.uk>
Subject: Re: NSEC version field (Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial
	Mechanism Flag)
Date: Thu, 27 May 2004 22:54:18 +0100
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>>>>> "Edward" == Edward Lewis <edlewis@arin.net> writes:

    Edward> Assume a signed child, with such a clause I can reply with
    Edward> an alternate set of name servers and a non-material (but
    Edward> still signed) NSEC(v2) record.  I can make it look like
    Edward> the child is unsigned while still passing all of the
    Edward> security checks.

I'm not sure you can reply with an alternate set of name servers,
since the NS RRset still won't have the right signature.  But you can
certainly respond without a DS record, and with an irrelevent NSEC(v2)
record, and fool an NSEC(v1) resolver into believing the child zone is
unsigned.

I did propose a solution to that; namely a null DS record.  I'm not
sure a versioned NSEC record is much use without a solution to this
problem.

      -roy

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org
Subject: RFC 3757 on Domain Name System KEY (DNSKEY) Resource Record (RR) Secure Entry Point (SEP) Flag
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A new Request for Comments is now available in online RFC libraries.


        RFC 3757

        Title:      Domain Name System KEY (DNSKEY) Resource Record
                    (RR) Secure Entry Point (SEP) Flag
        Author(s):  O. Kolkman, J. Schlyter, E. Lewis
        Status:     Standards Track
        Date:       May 2004
        Mailbox:    olaf@ripe.net, jakob@nic.se, edlewis@arin.net
        Pages:      8
        Characters: 16868
        Updates:    3755, 2535

        I-D Tag:    draft-ietf-dnsext-keyrr-key-signing-flag-12.txt

        URL:        ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/rfc3757.txt


With the Delegation Signer (DS) resource record (RR), the concept of a
public key acting as a secure entry point (SEP) has been introduced.
During exchanges of public keys with the parent there is a need to
differentiate SEP keys from other public keys in the Domain Name
System KEY (DNSKEY) resource record set.  A flag bit in the
DNSKEY RR is defined to indicate that DNSKEY is to be used as a SEP.
The flag bit is intended to assist in operational procedures to
correctly generate DS resource records, or to indicate what DNSKEYs
are intended for static configuration.  The flag bit is not to be used
in the DNS verification protocol.  This document updates RFC 2535 and
RFC 3755.

This document is a product of the DNS Extensions Working Group of the
IETF.

This is now a Proposed Standard Protocol.

This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for
the Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions
for improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the
"Internet Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the
standardization state and status of this protocol.  Distribution
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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org
Subject: RFC 3755 on Legacy Resolver Compatibility for Delegation Signer (DS)
Date: Thu, 27 May 2004 16:02:55 -0700
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A new Request for Comments is now available in online RFC libraries.


        RFC 3755

        Title:      Legacy Resolver Compatibility for Delegation
                    Signer (DS)
        Author(s):  S. Weiler
        Status:     Standards Track
        Date:       May 2004
        Mailbox:    weiler@tislabs.com
        Pages:      9
        Characters: 19812
        Updates:    3658, 2535

        I-D Tag:    draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-2535typecode-change-06.txt

        URL:        ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/rfc3755.txt


As the DNS Security (DNSSEC) specifications have evolved, the
syntax and semantics of the DNSSEC resource records (RRs) have
changed.  Many deployed nameservers understand variants of these
semantics.  Dangerous interactions can occur when a resolver that
understands an earlier version of these semantics queries an
authoritative server that understands the new delegation signer
semantics, including at least one failure scenario that will cause
an unsecured zone to be unresolvable.  This document changes the
type codes and mnemonics of the DNSSEC RRs (SIG, KEY, and NXT) to
avoid those interactions.

This document a product of the DNS Extensions Working Group of the
IETF.

This is now a Proposed Standard Protocol.

This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for
the Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions
for improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the
"Internet Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the
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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: Edward Lewis <edlewis@arin.net>
Subject: Re: NSEC version field (Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial 
 Mechanism Flag)
Date: Thu, 27 May 2004 21:49:29 -0400
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At 22:54 +0100 5/27/04, Roy Badami wrote:
>>>>>>  "Edward" == Edward Lewis <edlewis@arin.net> writes:
>
>     Edward> Assume a signed child, with such a clause I can reply with
>     Edward> an alternate set of name servers and a non-material (but
>     Edward> still signed) NSEC(v2) record.  I can make it look like
>     Edward> the child is unsigned while still passing all of the
>     Edward> security checks.
>
>I'm not sure you can reply with an alternate set of name servers,
>since the NS RRset still won't have the right signature.  But you can
>certainly respond without a DS record, and with an irrelevent NSEC(v2)
>record, and fool an NSEC(v1) resolver into believing the child zone is
>unsigned.

NS sets are not signed in referrals.  They are signed in the 
authoritative zone, which you may not reach if you have only the 
substituted servers.

>I did propose a solution to that; namely a null DS record.  I'm not
>sure a versioned NSEC record is much use without a solution to this
>problem.

See RFC 3658, section 1, in particular the 4th paragraph which states 
why the NULL KEY RR was dropped.  Part of that argument transfers to 
the idea of a null DS RRset.

With authenticated denials, you should not have to hold negative 
statements.  If the positive statement isn't there, you assume the 
negative statement.  This will hold for applications, it should hold 
for DNS if just to be consistent.

If adopted, another change for DNSSECbis, another incompatibility for 
NSEC(v1)-era validators or a guaranteed delay.

-- 
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Edward Lewis                                            +1-703-227-9854
ARIN Research Engineer

Even the voices inside my head are refusing to talk to me anymore.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: geoff@nominet.org.uk (Geoffrey Sisson)
Subject: Re: Confirming the Nominet position
Date: Fri, 28 May 2004 09:18:15 +0100 (BST)
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Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com> writes:

> i disagree.  when i put the first AXFR-blocking code into BIND 4 in ~1988,
> i considered it a protocol violation and i made my apologies to the gods.
> 
> it appears that those gods have a long memory, and a grand scale of vengeance.

RFC 821 specifies SMTP as a protocol which permits any host to connect
to an `SMTP-receiver' and deliver messages.  Unanticipated developments
in the use of SMTP have resulted in this any <-> any principle being
challanged, in particular in the work of the marid WG.  There have
certainly been comparable developments in the (ab)use of DNS; perhaps
behaviour that was introduced via implementation rather than
specification should now be `ratified' via a standards-track document?

Regards

Geoff

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: roy@dnss.ec
Subject: Re: NSEC version field (Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial
 Mechanism Flag)
Date: Fri, 28 May 2004 10:47:51 +0200 (CEST)
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        namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
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Ed, Paul,

This 'downgrade attack' is FUD (technically its there, but its a
non-issue). How would we EVER use a new signing algorithm, currently not
in use, if the downgrade attack would be a problem ?

Unless folk upgrade V1 (nsec) resolvers to V2 (nsec2), they see V2 zones
as unsigned.

My point is:

V2 zones do not yet exist. Would-be V2 zones are unsigned now. When V2
zones exist, they will still be unsigned to V1 resolvers. Eventually V1
resolvers will upgrade to V2 resolvers.

Part of the upgrade curve.

What exactly is the problem ?

As an analogy.

DNSSEC zones do not yet exist. Would-be DNSSEC zones are unsigned now.
When DNSSEC zones exist, they will still be unsigned to LEGACY resolvers.
Eventually LEGACY resolvers will upgrade to DNSSEC resolvers.

Part of the upgrade curve.

Roy

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: Robert Elz <kre@munnari.OZ.AU>
Subject: Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial Mechanism Flag
Date: Fri, 28 May 2004 17:51:16 +0700
Lines: 64
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <23519.1085571396@bizet.nethelp.no>  <2389.1085568022@gromit.rfc1035.com>
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Precedence: bulk

    Date:        Wed, 26 May 2004 13:36:36 +0200
    From:        sthaug@nethelp.no
    Message-ID:  <23519.1085571396@bizet.nethelp.no>

[quoting someone...]
  | > For instance, I can understand why DeNIC
  | > wouldn't want random users to be able to slurp the 1GB or so of the
  | > .de zone, guzzling bandwidth and needlessly loading the TLD's name
  | > servers.
  | 
  | But it's okay to let random users enumerate the zone by following
  | NSEC RRs?

There's a big difference (and Jim, it isn't TCP vs UDP, for a zone
transfer, the extra overhead of TCP is in the noise).

The "problem" of AXFR is that it requires a stable zone image to transfer,
and so the server must (somehow) create that stable zone, when the AXFR
request is made, and then transfer the zone as it was at the instant the
initial SOA of the response was sent - regardless of any later changes that
are made to the zone.

Since the server has no idea whether or not any changes may be made to the
zone while the transfer is in progress, it has to do something to prepare for
the possibility that they may occur (as it also has no way to know how long
the zone transfer will take to complete, it also can't just delay updates
until after that has happened - that could be hours, or more, into the future).

This is what makes AXFR costly, and is certainly why I disabled it for
non-secondaries when I was running zones for which it made a difference.

The extra load of some number of random people doing zone slurps
(especially using an NSEC type technique, where each subsequent query has
to wait till the reply to the former is received, as that's where the
qname for the next query comes from) when compared to the normal load on
a busy server of handling "normal" queries (the ones that succeed, and
even more, the ones that end up failing) is barely going to be noticeable.
You'd need to postulate hundreds, or more likely, thousands, of people
all deciding to walk the chain at the same time before the query rate would
really start to be noticeable.  [Yes, I know, the really busy servers don't
want any unnecessary queries, but there are better things to try and stop
than this I suspect].

It is also worth noting that the oft made claim that NSEC allows pristine
zone copies to be made is false - it improves the chances of that happening
over some other methods, but it is certainly not a technique that will
guarantee the successful transfer of a zone.

kre

ps: apologies for the bogus copyright law noise I sent in an earlier
message, it has been a long time since I needed to look at that stuff.
Copyright was created initially as a means to encourage publication,
so that was a requirement to get the protection - beats me why that
requirement was dropped, but apparently it has been.




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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: Robert Elz <kre@munnari.OZ.AU>
Subject: Re: Confirming the Nominet position
Date: Fri, 28 May 2004 18:13:25 +0700
Lines: 80
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Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org, geoff@nominet.org.uk
X-From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org Fri May 28 13:30:08 2004
Return-path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
To: "Jay Daley" <jay@nominet.org.uk>
In-Reply-To: <OF5FFD6E1A.CB26AC0B-ON80256EA0.002E76FF-80256EA0.005471E3@nominet.org.uk> 
Precedence: bulk

    Date:        Wed, 26 May 2004 16:21:02 +0100
    From:        "Jay Daley" <jay@nominet.org.uk>
    Message-ID:  <OF5FFD6E1A.CB26AC0B-ON80256EA0.002E76FF-80256EA0.005471E3@nominet.org.uk>

  | 1.  Showstopper
  | Zone file enumeration is a show-stopper for us that will prevent us from 
  | fully implementing DNSSEC. So if DNSSEC stays in its current form then we 
  | will have to make a local determination about how/what we implement, which 
  | is still to be decided.  Our reason for this is our view of what is the 
  | appropriate policy to act in the best interests of our local community, 
  | which for some time has been to deny access to our zone files. 

Actually, that's fine.   No-one (here anyway) can force anyone to
implement anything.   If you don't implement DNSSEC, or just partially
implement it (somehow), that's your choice.   Sometime in the future, if
UK users wonder why their DNS security isn't up to the standard of everyone
else's, you can explain to them why that is in their best interests.  If
they agree with your explanation, and justification (you can blame this
WG for forcing NSEC on DNSSEC if you want) then no problems.   If they
don't agree with you, then as I understand how nominet works (which I very
well might not), you'd eventually end up replaced by someone who would
implement DNSSEC.

  | 3. Legal mumbo jumbo
[...]
  | However, for those of you that have asked, this is the gist of our legal 
  | advice...
  | 
  | As compilations, zone file databases are protected under EU law by 
  | ?Database Right?. As a derivative work of the main register from which 
  | they are sourced, they are likely also to attract copyright protection in 
  | addition to or in place of database right.

Leaving aside the question of whether or not those rights actually
exist in the DNS zone files (a topic that can be debated, but namedroppers
is not the correct forum for that), what needs explaining is not what
those are, but why you'd want to enforce them.   That copyright exists
in some work (like perhaps this e-mail) doesn't mean that the holder of
the right is required to enforce it against anyone else.   Go ahead, copy
this message as much as you like without my permission - I won't be coming
after you.

The laws here aren't ones that are forcing anyone into any action wrt
the DNS zone files (unlike perhaps whois data), nothing in them is
compelling you to restrict access to the zone file.

The rationale for this can't rationally be to protect the domain name
owners from having their data found - the DNS data (particularly this
kind of DNS data - delegations in upper level domains) is publicly
available, it has to be to work.  The data can be found anyway.

The only thing that NSEC is making easier is extracting a more complete
list of what is in the domain (if not necessarily a perfect one), more
quickly than without NSEC.    That difference cannot really make any
difference to anyone who is registering a name - whether they get "found"
in an hour, or a week, cannot be of any material difference.

What's left is the desires of the TLD (or similar) operator themselves,
and how they want to handle this data.

Is there any compelling reason that can be offered as to just why it is
so important to you as a TLD operator to prevent zone enumeration?
Anything compelling enough that this WG should go back and start making
changes (and perhaps even worse, adding options - just about the last thing
the DNS needs now are even more different ways to do things).

Please don't tell me "our stakeholders demand it" - like Ted Hardie,
mention of "stakeholders" in a context like that drives me insane.   If
your stakeholders (whatever that means) have good reasons, just tell me
the reasons.   If they don't, then they're irrelevant to me, and should be
to you as well.

kre


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: Stephane Bortzmeyer <bortzmeyer@nic.fr>
Subject: Re: NIC-SE statement regarding NSEC zone walking
Date: Fri, 28 May 2004 13:33:54 +0200
Organization: NIC France
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       Per-Olof Josefsson <Per-Olof.Josefsson@nic.se>
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On Thu, May 27, 2004 at 01:39:25PM +0200,
 Jaap Akkerhuis <jaap@sidn.nl> wrote 
 a message of 19 lines which said:

>     NIC-SE does not consider NXT zone-walking a problem for DNSSEC deployment 
>     within the .se-zone.  We consider all data in the DNS to be public 
>     information, both as single records and as a collection. 
...
> Just in case that it wasn't clear from my earlier mai. This is the
> position of SIDN as well for the nl-zone.

Just by curiosity: why all name servers for ".se" or ".nl" prevent
AXFR, then?

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: geoff@nominet.org.uk (Geoffrey Sisson)
Subject: Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial Mechanism Flag
Date: Fri, 28 May 2004 12:48:43 +0100 (BST)
Lines: 32
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Robert Elz <kre@munnari.OZ.AU> writes:

> The extra load of some number of random people doing zone slurps
> (especially using an NSEC type technique, where each subsequent query has
> to wait till the reply to the former is received, as that's where the
> qname for the next query comes from) when compared to the normal load on
> a busy server of handling "normal" queries (the ones that succeed, and
> even more, the ones that end up failing) is barely going to be noticeable.

It would be surprising if NSEC RR elaboration techniques didn't
incorporate considerable parallelism, especially for large zones.  This
could impose arbitrarily high loads on a busy nameserver.  For example,
multiple simultaneous elaborations could be run, one starting at
'aaa.co.uk', another starting at 'aab.co.uk', and so on.

This isn't idle speculation: prior to incorporating token bucket into
the WHOIS server at whois.nic.uk [note: reference to WHOIS for
illustrative purposes only!] we used to have a one-second sleep to
limit the impact of scripts.  Impatient data miners designed tools
which sent queries in parallel -- sometimes hundreds per second -- in
order to collect data at higher rates.  The consequences to server
performance were, well, predictable . . .

Regards

Geoff

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: bmanning@vacation.karoshi.com
Subject: Re: Confirming the Nominet position
Date: Fri, 28 May 2004 13:03:03 +0000
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References: <20040527135425.GA10971@vacation.karoshi.com.> <OFCBB87463.D9ECD53E-ON80256EA1.006FAD30-80256EA1.007037EF@nominet.org.uk>
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On Thu, May 27, 2004 at 09:24:24PM +0100, Jay Daley wrote:
> Bill
> 
> bmanning@vacation.karoshi.com wrote on 27/05/2004 14:54:25:
> 
> >    to make it easier to track, would "watermarking" the
> >    database be helpful?
> 
> Possibly, but we would need to decide whether to do this by IP address, by 
> zone etc. (which may not be as trivial as it seems).  Whatever the way 
> this is still an after-the-fact control mechanism and those are arduous 
> and expensive to pursue.  This is something we unfortunately have a lot of 
> experience of ... http://www.vnunet.com/news/1154488
> 
> Jay

	Beating this dead mule...  Digitally signing the data provides an
	un-ambigious, hard to forge, proof that the zone and each RR in the
	zone was signed by a unique source. This "watermark" technique is being 
	considered by some to dis-abmbigious potential conflicts.
	YMMV.

--bill

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: geoff@nominet.org.uk (Geoffrey Sisson)
Subject: Re: Confirming the Nominet position
Date: Fri, 28 May 2004 14:42:57 +0100 (BST)
Lines: 23
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References: <20040527135425.GA10971@vacation.karoshi.com.> <OFCBB87463.D9ECD53E-ON80256EA1.006FAD30-80256EA1.007037EF@nominet.org.uk> <20040528130303.GB13713@vacation.karoshi.com.>
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bmanning@vacation.karoshi.com writes:

> 	Beating this dead mule...  Digitally signing the data provides an
> 	un-ambigious, hard to forge, proof that the zone and each RR in the
> 	zone was signed by a unique source. This "watermark" technique is being 
> 	considered by some to dis-abmbigious potential conflicts.

Hi Bill

Are you suggesting the use of steganography to somehow uniquely
identify RRs, or set of RRs, by whomever retrieved them?  Or are you
suggesting the use of the RRSIGs as legal evidence of the unambiguous
origin of the zone data?  Or something else?

Regards

Geoff

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: Ben Laurie <ben@algroup.co.uk>
Subject: Re: Confirming the Nominet position
Date: Fri, 28 May 2004 16:01:15 +0100
Lines: 43
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bmanning@vacation.karoshi.com wrote:
> On Thu, May 27, 2004 at 09:24:24PM +0100, Jay Daley wrote:
> 
>>Bill
>>
>>bmanning@vacation.karoshi.com wrote on 27/05/2004 14:54:25:
>>
>>
>>>   to make it easier to track, would "watermarking" the
>>>   database be helpful?
>>
>>Possibly, but we would need to decide whether to do this by IP address, by 
>>zone etc. (which may not be as trivial as it seems).  Whatever the way 
>>this is still an after-the-fact control mechanism and those are arduous 
>>and expensive to pursue.  This is something we unfortunately have a lot of 
>>experience of ... http://www.vnunet.com/news/1154488
>>
>>Jay
> 
> 
> 	Beating this dead mule...  Digitally signing the data provides an
> 	un-ambigious, hard to forge, proof that the zone and each RR in the
> 	zone was signed by a unique source.

I don't see how that helps Nominet, since, by definition, if it ends .uk 
it'll be on their servers and the signatures would surely not be 
preserved in a list of .uk domains.

> This "watermark" technique is being 
> 	considered by some to dis-abmbigious potential conflicts.

I don't understand what this means?

Cheers,

Ben.


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: Edward Lewis <edlewis@arin.net>
Subject: Re: NSEC version field (Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial 
 Mechanism Flag)
Date: Fri, 28 May 2004 10:06:25 -0400
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At 10:47 +0200 5/28/04, roy@dnss.ec wrote:
>V2 zones do not yet exist. Would-be V2 zones are unsigned now. When V2
>zones exist, they will still be unsigned to V1 resolvers. Eventually V1
>resolvers will upgrade to V2 resolvers.

Why would they appear unsigned to v1 resolvers?

>
>Part of the upgrade curve.
>
>What exactly is the problem ?

Whether meeting the *perceived* new requirement is worth the cost of 
what is likely to be an architectural hack (in design) and 
potentially a great processing cost (in operations).

It's not clear to me that the premise of this debate is valid - that 
DNSSEC needs to answer to privacy concerns.  There is in evidence a a 
strong vocal component, but from just one effort.  There is also a 
counter argument being offered, that this is a non-issue. 
Additionally, there seems to be a lot of folks sitting on the side 
lines on the issue.

If we do move ahead and try to solve the problem, we have to figure 
out how.  Using an alternate key algorithm to signal what version of 
authenticated denial is in use?  Sounds hacky to me - what does the 
cryptographic algorithm have to do with the version of authenticated 
denial?  If it's not clear to a teenager, it's a hack.

Null DS or defining melt-down scenarios mean more protocol design 
work.  Quick hits like these can't be taken lightly, lest we engender 
corner cases later on.  There is the perceived need to get DNSSEC 
specs out now, and reasons for delay had better be well founded. 
(And we are still at "perceived new requirement.")

In operations, the cost of accomplishing obfuscation in authenticate 
denial will be greater than what we see planned now.  When I walked 
through an example I mentioned a performance vulnerability.  The best 
analogy to it is - there was once a TV game show called "Password" in 
which one person had a word in front of them and tried to get their 
partner to guess the word.  The one with the word couldn't use it and 
could only say one word at a time to guide the partner.  Often times 
it would take a number of other words to guide the partner into the 
needed word - if at all.

I think that is the problem.
-- 
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Edward Lewis                                            +1-703-227-9854
ARIN Research Engineer

Even the voices inside my head are refusing to talk to me anymore.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com>
Subject: Re: NSEC version field (Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial Mechanism Flag)
Date: Fri, 28 May 2004 14:14:15 +0000
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	of "Fri, 28 May 2004 10:47:51 +0200."
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roy asked "Ed, Paul" to comment on the following:

> This 'downgrade attack' is FUD (technically its there, but its a
> non-issue). How would we EVER use a new signing algorithm, currently not
> in use, if the downgrade attack would be a problem ?

by adding new ones without removing old ones, and signing with both
during an extended overlap period.  (did you think dnssec could be at
its third unreleased version after a ten year period without solving
something so simple?)

> What exactly is the problem ?

the people who proposed to use bis2 with NSEC2-like functionality will
not also be using NSEC, they propose to do an upgrade without an overlap
period.  if they instead follow a timeline where the new NSEC2-like
functionality is introduced, and existing NSEC users do the "use both"
trick for an extended period while the validator population churns over,
and when these existing users stop using pre-NSEC2 data because it's not
needed, then and only then can new users (of NSEC2-only) deploy, then
all will be well.

paul, of "ed, paul".

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: Marcos Sanz/Denic <sanz@denic.de>
Subject: Re: Scope of discussion
Date: Fri, 28 May 2004 16:12:33 +0200
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Dear chairs, dear all,

> It would
> help if you make your (motivated) position clearer and provide your
> arguments for taking one of the options. Do so before June 1.

DENIC (7,6 million DE-domains) is looking forward DNSSEC deployment, and 
that rather happening before secure islands appearing under DE may 
endanger the common namespace. However, DENIC will not be able to carry 
this deployment out with the form of the specification as it is today 
(because of a clashing of the NSEC traversal with [*]).

We would be willing to give green light to the current spec if the working 
group could commit to solving the NSEC traversal problem afterwards. Then, 
at that point, the form of the problem should be formalized and well 
defined, with our commitment to contribute to the process. The form of the 
solution (whether NO/NSEC2, or online signing of NXDOMAIN-answers, or 
optional use of NSEC or something else) probably can't be decided at the 
moment. We are aware that providing an open door to the future solution 
might require slight modifications of the current drafts.

Best,
Marcos Sanz
DENIC eG

[*] http://www.denic.de/en/faqs/allgemeine_faqs/index.html#section_185

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com>
Subject: Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial Mechanism Flag
Date: Fri, 28 May 2004 14:24:50 +0000
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	of "Fri, 28 May 2004 17:51:16 +0700."
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robert wrote:

> The "problem" of AXFR is that it requires a stable zone image to
> transfer, and so the server must (somehow) create that stable zone,
> when the AXFR request is made, and then transfer the zone as it was at
> the instant the initial SOA of the response was sent - regardless of
> any later changes that are made to the zone.
> 
> Since the server has no idea whether or not any changes may be made to
> the zone while the transfer is in progress, it has to do something to
> prepare for the possibility that they may occur (as it also has no way
> to know how long the zone transfer will take to complete, it also
> can't just delay updates until after that has happened - that could be
> hours, or more, into the future).
> 
> This is what makes AXFR costly, [...]

RFC 1035 makes a provision for killing in-progress AXFR if the zone changes
while it's being transferred, and BIND4/BIND8 work that way.  this causes
problems for extremely-dynamic zones, like when UPDATE is used by dhcp in
an enterprise or wireless context, and so BIND9 has extensive (and expensive)
internal versioning and refcounting so that a zone at a certain serial number
can continue its AXFR even though newer zones (with different serial numbers)
are being used for subsequent queries (or even subsequent AXFR).  robert is
quite right, this is the biggest reason why a TLD registry (or anyone else)
would find AXFR expensive.

however, back in the days when f-root served COM, we were alone among the
root servers in supporting AXFR for it.  network solutions hated this
practice, and ultimately had someone in USGov send us a letter asking us
to turn it off, which we did.  but while it was on, our puny little 8GB
4x500MHz alphas handled a hell of a lot of outbound AXFR traffic for what
was, even then, the largest zone on the planet.  we did it on BIND8 and we
did it on BIND9.  the load, while expensive in exactly the ways that robert
suggests above, was never a noticable problem for a little nonprofit without
a hardware budget who was totally dependent on the kindness of our friends.

in these days when a dual or quad Opteron with 16GB and 2x2GHz or 4x2GHz
can be had from reputable vendors like sun, ibm, hp, or a hundred whitebox
vendors for a couple thousand USD, no serious commercial entity can complain
that any zone, even one the size of COM, cannot support AXFR.

> ...
> 
> It is also worth noting that the oft made claim that NSEC allows pristine
> zone copies to be made is false - it improves the chances of that happening
> over some other methods, but it is certainly not a technique that will
> guarantee the successful transfer of a zone.

agreed.  an NSEC chainwalk would have none of AXFR's guaranteed stability.
if the zone changes during a chainwalk, then you get part of the old and
part of the new.  not that this makes much difference to the zone operators,
who are clearly more concerned with competition and abuse than with copyright
or resources.

paul

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: roy@dnss.ec
Subject: Re: NSEC version field (Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial 
 Mechanism Flag)
Date: Fri, 28 May 2004 16:37:45 +0200 (CEST)
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On Fri, 28 May 2004, Edward Lewis wrote:

> At 10:47 +0200 5/28/04, roy@dnss.ec wrote:
> >V2 zones do not yet exist. Would-be V2 zones are unsigned now. When V2
> >zones exist, they will still be unsigned to V1 resolvers. Eventually V1
> >resolvers will upgrade to V2 resolvers.
>
> Why would they appear unsigned to v1 resolvers?

The authenticated denial V2 can not be used by V1 resolvers. Therefor
secure delegations in V2 zones, in worst case, are seen as unsigned since
the existence of a DS record can't be proven.

> >
> >Part of the upgrade curve.
> >
> >What exactly is the problem ?
>
> Whether meeting the *perceived* new requirement is worth the cost of
> what is likely to be an architectural hack (in design) and
> potentially a great processing cost (in operations).

I really don't care about NSEC2, I care about being able to extend the
spec later on, giving those who do care an opporunity to do so.

I leave the politic bs of this specific alternative of NSEC to those who
care.

> It's not clear to me that the premise of this debate is valid - that
> DNSSEC needs to answer to privacy concerns.  There is in evidence a a
> strong vocal component, but from just one effort.  There is also a
> counter argument being offered, that this is a non-issue.
> Additionally, there seems to be a lot of folks sitting on the side
> lines on the issue.
>
> If we do move ahead and try to solve the problem, we have to figure
> out how.  Using an alternate key algorithm to signal what version of
> authenticated denial is in use?  Sounds hacky to me - what does the
> cryptographic algorithm have to do with the version of authenticated
> denial?  If it's not clear to a teenager, it's a hack.

I agree. The alternate key alg is hacky. That would be a desperate thing
to do. It works ofcourse, especially when there is no alternative offered.

> Null DS or defining melt-down scenarios mean more protocol design
> work.  Quick hits like these can't be taken lightly, lest we engender
> corner cases later on.  There is the perceived need to get DNSSEC
> specs out now, and reasons for delay had better be well founded.
> (And we are still at "perceived new requirement.")

Bringing back NULL DS is a showstopper, I agree.

> In operations, the cost of accomplishing obfuscation in authenticate
> denial will be greater than what we see planned now.  When I walked
> through an example I mentioned a performance vulnerability.  The best
> analogy to it is - there was once a TV game show called "Password" in
> which one person had a word in front of them and tried to get their
> partner to guess the word.  The one with the word couldn't use it and
> could only say one word at a time to guide the partner.  Often times
> it would take a number of other words to guide the partner into the
> needed word - if at all.
>
> I think that is the problem.

So how about those mets.

Roy

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: roy@dnss.ec
Subject: Re: NSEC version field (Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial
 Mechanism Flag)
Date: Fri, 28 May 2004 16:49:49 +0200 (CEST)
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On Fri, 28 May 2004, Paul Vixie wrote:

> roy asked "Ed, Paul" to comment on the following:
>
> > This 'downgrade attack' is FUD (technically its there, but its a
> > non-issue). How would we EVER use a new signing algorithm, currently not
> > in use, if the downgrade attack would be a problem ?
>
> by adding new ones without removing old ones, and signing with both
> during an extended overlap period.

Okay, if I sign dnss.ec with TRUDY algorithm only, would your resolver,
incapable of understanding TRUDY treat that zone as signed ? unsigned ?
Bad ?

If you'd follow spec, you should treat is as unsigned. WHOA there is your
downgrade attack.

> (did you think dnssec could be at its third unreleased version after a
> ten year period without solving something so simple?)
>
> > What exactly is the problem ?
>
> the people who proposed to use bis2 with NSEC2-like functionality will
> not also be using NSEC, they propose to do an upgrade without an overlap
> period.  if they instead follow a timeline where the new NSEC2-like
> functionality is introduced, and existing NSEC users do the "use both"
> trick for an extended period while the validator population churns over,
> and when these existing users stop using pre-NSEC2 data because it's not
> needed, then and only then can new users (of NSEC2-only) deploy, then
> all will be well.

Then we better well spec your upgrade path. Its not the alternative
signing algorithm hack, right ?

Roy

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: Edward Lewis <edlewis@arin.net>
Subject: Re: NSEC version field (Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial  
 Mechanism Flag)
Date: Fri, 28 May 2004 10:47:20 -0400
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At 16:37 +0200 5/28/04, roy@dnss.ec wrote:
>On Fri, 28 May 2004, Edward Lewis wrote:
>
>>  At 10:47 +0200 5/28/04, roy@dnss.ec wrote:
>>  Why would they appear unsigned to v1 resolvers?
>
>The authenticated denial V2 can not be used by V1 resolvers. Therefor
>secure delegations in V2 zones, in worst case, are seen as unsigned since
>the existence of a DS record can't be proven.

I'm assuming failure to prove or disprove something is a service 
failure (SERVFAIL).  So, instead of being unsigned, they look broken 
- far worse.

>I really don't care about NSEC2, I care about being able to extend the
>spec later on, giving those who do care an opporunity to do so.

I said the same thing about "sane NXTs" in the wake of the opt-in 
discussion.  To do that, you need to define the failure semantics 
(see above).  Because I was called away from the group, I don't know 
what happened to the thoughts about defining error reactions to 
"insane NXTs."  (I.e., an NXT that claims that it doesn't exist.)

>So how about those mets.

Back to .500!  I'll see 'em Monday. ;)
-- 
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Edward Lewis                                            +1-703-227-9854
ARIN Research Engineer

Even the voices inside my head are refusing to talk to me anymore.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: Roy Badami <roy@gnomon.org.uk>
Subject: Re: NSEC version field (Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial
	Mechanism Flag)
Date: Fri, 28 May 2004 15:48:58 +0100
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>>>>> "roy" == roy  <roy@dnss.ec> writes:

    roy> Ed, Paul, This 'downgrade attack' is FUD (technically its
    roy> there, but its a non-issue). How would we EVER use a new
    roy> signing algorithm, currently not in use, if the downgrade
    roy> attack would be a problem ?

    roy> Unless folk upgrade V1 (nsec) resolvers to V2 (nsec2), they
    roy> see V2 zones as unsigned.

That I'm happy with.  Changing the algorithm id would achieve this.

What makes me nervous is a scenario where a V1 resolver can check
signatures on V2 records, and in particular can follow secure
delegations from a V2 zone, but can't do so in a secure manner.

If people aren't getting the security they believe they're getting,
then that is dangerous.

Note that I'm not arguing that DNSSEC needs to be modified (either now
or later) to prevent enumeration.

Nor am I arguing that ccTLDs need to change their policies to allow
enumeration.

However this impasse does need to be resolved one way or another
otherwise I (as a user) won't get to see the benefits of DNSSEC.

	  -roy


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: bmanning@vacation.karoshi.com
Subject: Re: Confirming the Nominet position
Date: Fri, 28 May 2004 15:16:21 +0000
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On Fri, May 28, 2004 at 02:42:57PM +0100, Geoffrey Sisson wrote:
> bmanning@vacation.karoshi.com writes:
> 
> > 	Beating this dead mule...  Digitally signing the data provides an
> > 	un-ambigious, hard to forge, proof that the zone and each RR in the
> > 	zone was signed by a unique source. This "watermark" technique is being 
> > 	considered by some to dis-abmbigious potential conflicts.
> 
> Hi Bill
> 
> Are you suggesting the use of steganography to somehow uniquely
> identify RRs, or set of RRs, by whomever retrieved them?  Or are you
> suggesting the use of the RRSIGs as legal evidence of the unambiguous
> origin of the zone data?  Or something else?
> 
> Regards
> Geoff

	i've been told that digital signatures can be used as
	legal evidence in some jurisdictions. if true, it is 
	conceivable that by my holding signed data indicates,
	if not the path by which i received said data, who signed the
	data.  

-- bill

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: roy@dnss.ec
Subject: Re: NSEC version field (Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial  
 Mechanism Flag)
Date: Fri, 28 May 2004 17:03:02 +0200 (CEST)
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On Fri, 28 May 2004, Edward Lewis wrote:

> At 16:37 +0200 5/28/04, roy@dnss.ec wrote:
> >On Fri, 28 May 2004, Edward Lewis wrote:
> >
> >>  At 10:47 +0200 5/28/04, roy@dnss.ec wrote:
> >>  Why would they appear unsigned to v1 resolvers?
> >
> >The authenticated denial V2 can not be used by V1 resolvers. Therefor
> >secure delegations in V2 zones, in worst case, are seen as unsigned since
> >the existence of a DS record can't be proven.
>
> I'm assuming failure to prove or disprove something is a service
> failure (SERVFAIL).  So, instead of being unsigned, they look broken
> - far worse.

I understand. But I assumed versioning, where, if you can't cope with the
version, you fall back to default (dns).

> >I really don't care about NSEC2, I care about being able to extend the
> >spec later on, giving those who do care an opporunity to do so.
>
> I said the same thing about "sane NXTs" in the wake of the opt-in
> discussion.  To do that, you need to define the failure semantics
> (see above).  Because I was called away from the group, I don't know
> what happened to the thoughts about defining error reactions to
> "insane NXTs."  (I.e., an NXT that claims that it doesn't exist.)

Ask chair, dunno, wasn't me, but you know that.

> >So how about those mets.
>
> Back to .500!  I'll see 'em Monday. ;)

Have fun :)

Roy

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: bmanning@vacation.karoshi.com
Subject: Re: Confirming the Nominet position
Date: Fri, 28 May 2004 15:39:46 +0000
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References: <20040527135425.GA10971@vacation.karoshi.com.> <OFCBB87463.D9ECD53E-ON80256EA1.006FAD30-80256EA1.007037EF@nominet.org.uk> <20040528130303.GB13713@vacation.karoshi.com.> <40B7543B.4050609@algroup.co.uk>
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> >	Beating this dead mule...  Digitally signing the data provides an
> >	un-ambigious, hard to forge, proof that the zone and each RR in the
> >	zone was signed by a unique source.
> 
> I don't see how that helps Nominet, since, by definition, if it ends .uk 
> it'll be on their servers and the signatures would surely not be 
> preserved in a list of .uk domains.

	er... not at all.  the server @ 198.32.2.10 has had 100,000s
	of RRs that end in uk. locally stored.  - I could slurp them into 
	zone file format and publish it as uk. for the server users.  Not 
	a Nominet server(s) and not Nominet data.  QED.

> >This "watermark" technique is being 
> >	considered by some to dis-abmbigious potential conflicts.
> 
> I don't understand what this means?

	How does one distinguish the Nominet collection of data that
	ends in uk. and the Msrs Bill, Ben & Geoffs collection of data 
	that ends in uk.?

	The simple way is to "watermark" the dataset and it elements
	with digital signatures.  ergo the database entry  "co.uk."
	with a Nominet signature is clearly signed by Nominet and 
	presumably they acknowledge that the data so signed is 
	authentic to Nominet.

	One might presume that a careful application might be able
	to distinguish a "co.uk." signed by Msrs Bill, Ben & Geoff and 
	a "co.uk." signed by Nominet.  

	And it might even be reasonable to consider the possiblity of
	Nominet being grumpy about finding the unauthorized republication
	of signed Nominet data by Msrs Bill, Ben & Geoff... don't you think?

	One should be careful to mind the huge gaps in thinking here, but
	it is a plausable argument to digitally sign your zones & data.

> Cheers,
> Ben.

--bill	

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: geoff@nominet.org.uk (Geoffrey Sisson)
Subject: Re: Confirming the Nominet position
Date: Fri, 28 May 2004 17:08:59 +0100 (BST)
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bmanning@vacation.karoshi.com writes:

> 	i've been told that digital signatures can be used as
> 	legal evidence in some jurisdictions. if true, it is 
> 	conceivable that by my holding signed data indicates,
> 	if not the path by which i received said data, who signed the
> 	data.  

Hi Bill

Thanks for the clarification.  As you say, it's possible that RRSIGs
could be used to show unambigiously that the data originated from a
particular source, but it's unlikely that RRSIG data would be left in
unauthorised copies of zones, if for no other reason than they would
likely to be seen to consume storage unneccessarily.  (I expect
elaboration tools will summarily discard them!)

Regards

Geoff

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: Edward Lewis <edlewis@arin.net>
Subject: Re: Confirming the Nominet position
Date: Fri, 28 May 2004 14:03:49 -0400
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At 15:16 +0000 5/28/04, bmanning@vacation.karoshi.com wrote:
>	i've been told that digital signatures can be used as
>	legal evidence in some jurisdictions. if true, it is
>	conceivable that by my holding signed data indicates,
>	if not the path by which i received said data, who signed the
>	data.

Evidence != conclusion.  I'm sure a digital signature is worthless if 
the private key needed to generate it is "widely" known.  Much like 
having the keys to a car that caused the accident doesn't mean you 
were driving it at the time.

Sorry, I think I've strayed into a legal discussion...
-- 
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Edward Lewis                                            +1-703-227-9854
ARIN Research Engineer

Even the voices inside my head are refusing to talk to me anymore.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: Edward Lewis <edlewis@arin.net>
Subject: Re: NSEC version field (Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial 
 Mechanism Flag)
Date: Fri, 28 May 2004 14:01:11 -0400
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Cc: roy@dnss.ec, Edward Lewis <edlewis@arin.net>,
	Roy Badami <roy@gnomon.org.uk>, Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com>,
	namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
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At 15:48 +0100 5/28/04, Roy Badami wrote:
>What makes me nervous is a scenario where a V1 resolver can check
>signatures on V2 records, and in particular can follow secure
>delegations from a V2 zone, but can't do so in a secure manner.

Ahh, this is a problem.  In order for a v1-era verifier to validate 
that a potentially valid v2 denial exists, the v2 record has to be 
signed by at least two keys (of each crypto system) - the old and the 
new.

What happens if a v2 denial record arrives with only a v1 signature? 
The assumption is that the v2 denial and the v1 denial have the same 
RR type.  If they differ only by the substitution of the hash, then 
the v1-era verifier will treat it as v1.

Recall that the notion of an RRset (always together, verifiable) is 
broken when if comes to the RRSIG set.  It is possible that via a 
replay, I can remove the v2-indicating RRSIG without detection.

As an aside - zones signers have multiple key algorithms to use now. 
When we talk about a new algorithm, a new algotithm per crypto system 
is assumed, right?  E.g., RSA/SHA-1, v1 and RSA/SHA-1, v2; DSA v1 and 
DSA v2, etc.

(Imagine introducing elliptic curve, do we have to add 2 algorithm 
numbers for it, v1 and v2.  And what if we rev something again - v3? 
It's ugly.)

-- 
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Edward Lewis                                            +1-703-227-9854
ARIN Research Engineer

Even the voices inside my head are refusing to talk to me anymore.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: bmanning@vacation.karoshi.com
Subject: Re: Confirming the Nominet position
Date: Fri, 28 May 2004 18:11:13 +0000
Lines: 33
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
References: <20040527135425.GA10971@vacation.karoshi.com.> <OFCBB87463.D9ECD53E-ON80256EA1.006FAD30-80256EA1.007037EF@nominet.org.uk> <20040528130303.GB13713@vacation.karoshi.com.> <20040528134257.A42ABE7E72@mx1.nominet.org.uk> <20040528151621.GA13996@vacation.karoshi.com.> <sjmsmdkwhtw.fsf@dogbert.ihtfp.org>
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On Fri, May 28, 2004 at 02:02:35PM -0400, Derek Atkins wrote:
> bmanning@vacation.karoshi.com writes:
> 
> > 	i've been told that digital signatures can be used as
> > 	legal evidence in some jurisdictions. if true, it is 
> > 	conceivable that by my holding signed data indicates,
> > 	if not the path by which i received said data, who signed the
> > 	data.  
> 
> Except signatures can be removed.

	see above.  in the example, I end up holding signed 
	data.

> I could remove it in my copy, so you
> couldn't verify the origin of the document.

	and -you- are smarter than the average bear. :)

> Watermarking needs to be performed _IN_ the document, not by a
> signature.  And all watermarking techniques have been shown to be
> breakable via collusion of multiple recipients of the data.

	yes... note again (earlier in thread) that watermark was
	quoted. that was intentional.

> -derek

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: David Blacka <davidb@verisignlabs.com>
Subject: Re: NSEC version field (Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial  Mechanism Flag)
Date: Fri, 28 May 2004 14:41:46 -0400
Organization: VeriSign, Inc.
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On Friday 28 May 2004 2:01 pm, Edward Lewis wrote:
> At 15:48 +0100 5/28/04, Roy Badami wrote:
> >What makes me nervous is a scenario where a V1 resolver can check
> >signatures on V2 records, and in particular can follow secure
> >delegations from a V2 zone, but can't do so in a secure manner.
>
> Ahh, this is a problem.  In order for a v1-era verifier to validate
> that a potentially valid v2 denial exists, the v2 record has to be
> signed by at least two keys (of each crypto system) - the old and the
> new.

Y'all are confusing me.

There are two ways of introducing non-backwards changes to DNSSEC being 
discussed at once here, I think.  One way is to use "unknown" algorithm 
numbers.  The behavior for DNSSECbis resolvers in this case has already been 
defined.

If this method is being used, then, v2 using zones will appear to be unsigned 
to v2 unaware resolvers.  There would be no way for a "V1 resolver" to check 
a "V2 zone".  Signing with both known and "unknown" algorithms would cause 
the zone to just be broken.

Another way would be to do something like add a version field to the NSEC 
record.  This would require thought and DNSSECbis changes to specify what the 
DNSSECbis compliant behavior is in the face of an unknown NSEC version.  
Presumably, however, since this signalling would be done through the NSEC 
record and not RRSIG, it *would* be possible for chain of trust to be 
established by a v1 resolver through a v2 zone.


> As an aside - zones signers have multiple key algorithms to use now.
> When we talk about a new algorithm, a new algotithm per crypto system
> is assumed, right?  E.g., RSA/SHA-1, v1 and RSA/SHA-1, v2; DSA v1 and
> DSA v2, etc.
>
> (Imagine introducing elliptic curve, do we have to add 2 algorithm
> numbers for it, v1 and v2.  And what if we rev something again - v3?
> It's ugly.)

Indeed.

-- 
David Blacka    <davidb@verisignlabs.com> 
Sr. Engineer    VeriSign Applied Research

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: Roy Badami <roy@gnomon.org.uk>
Subject: Re: NSEC version field (Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial 
	Mechanism Flag)
Date: Fri, 28 May 2004 19:58:35 +0100
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>>>>> "Edward" == Edward Lewis <edlewis@arin.net> writes:

    Edward> Ahh, this is a problem.  In order for a v1-era verifier to
    Edward> validate that a potentially valid v2 denial exists, the v2
    Edward> record has to be signed by at least two keys (of each
    Edward> crypto system) - the old and the new.

I'm not sure I follow.  The v1-era verifier will presumably never be
able to tell whether the v2 denial is valid, so I'm not sure this
solves the problem.

Given a malfeasor can always fool a v1-era verifier into believing a
delegation from a v2 zone is insecure (by providing a denial of the
existence of a DS record -- that the v1-era resolver can't verify), I
think it is desirably that a v1-verifier *always* regards a delegation
from a v2-zone as insecure.  This avoids a false expectation of
security.

	    -roy

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: Edward Lewis <edlewis@arin.net>
Subject: Re: NSEC version field (Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial  
 Mechanism Flag)
Date: Fri, 28 May 2004 15:28:41 -0400
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At 19:58 +0100 5/28/04, Roy Badami wrote:
>existence of a DS record -- that the v1-era resolver can't verify), I
>think it is desirably that a v1-verifier *always* regards a delegation
>from a v2-zone as insecure.  This avoids a false expectation of

If when you are confused you fail "open" you are very vulnerable. 
Ever try to just confuse a security guard to gain access to a 
building?  When it works, it's usually bad for the building (owner).

-- 
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Edward Lewis                                            +1-703-227-9854
ARIN Research Engineer

Even the voices inside my head are refusing to talk to me anymore.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: "Hallam-Baker, Phillip" <pbaker@verisign.com>
Subject: RE: NSEC version field (Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial  M
	echanism Flag)
Date: Fri, 28 May 2004 12:41:11 -0700
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> If this method is being used, then, v2 using zones will 
> appear to be unsigned 
> to v2 unaware resolvers.  There would be no way for a "V1 
> resolver" to check 
> a "V2 zone".  Signing with both known and "unknown" 
> algorithms would cause 
> the zone to just be broken.

Could we maybe as a compromise agree now that the only difference
between v1 and v2 will be that in v2 a new versioned NSEC 
record would be used?

We do not make any changes to the DNSSECbis document set at all.

We write a new short note that says that the V2 identifier is
reserved for servers that support NSEC-V, the versioned variant
of NSEC.

At that point it is possible to start deployment of DNSSEC
aware 'stuff' even though we do not have the new NSEC record
defined. That 'stuff' can also make partial use of information
from a V2 zone, even though there will be certain attacks that
are still possible.


This compromise would mean that we can go ahead and start 
deployment on the original schedule. The only difference 
would be that .uk and .de would start deployment using the 
V2 identifier and they would have to wait until we define
NSECV before they can publish any form of NXT.

Worst case this would mean that we burn a version identifier.
I think we can live with that.

We also get early experience of transitioning the system
and code has to be written with this in mind. So far I have
avoided comment on the NSEC2 proposal itself. I cannot believe 
that is going to be the final answer either.


		Phill

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: Edward Lewis <edlewis@arin.net>
Subject: RE: NSEC version field (Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial  M
 	echanism Flag)
Date: Fri, 28 May 2004 18:06:34 -0400
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At 12:41 -0700 5/28/04, Hallam-Baker, Phillip wrote:
>Could we maybe as a compromise agree now that the only difference
>between v1 and v2 will be that in v2 a new versioned NSEC
>record would be used?

I don't think there's been an agreement that there ought to be an 
answer to zone enumeration.  I've been analyzing the possibility of 
1) allowing there to be a way forward and 2) adoption of the NSEC2 
proposal in case we decided this is to be pursued.

I'm not convinced that we need to defend against zone enumeration. 
I'm all for providing this if it were easy to accomplish.

I have yet to see a way to provide a seamless way to convert from 
NSEC to another approach to authenticated denial (for any purpose). 
(Hmmm, perhaps detailing what happens if the NSEC claims that it 
itself doesn't exist - but that's been tried before and failed.)

I think that the NSEC2 is capable of obfuscating the zone's contents, 
but can do so only at a greater cost.  This cost can be gamed by the 
client and has the potential to be rather high.

I'd put my opinions this way - if providing a way forward were easy 
and/or if providing obfuscation was cheap to do, I'd be for it.  But 
from the work I've done, the costs to do either seem to be rather 
high, meaning that there has to be a lot of need to provide them.

>We write a new short note that says that the V2 identifier is
>reserved for servers that support NSEC-V, the versioned variant
>of NSEC.

What is the V2 identifier?

>Worst case this would mean that we burn a version identifier.

There's no version identifier in the current definition of DNSSECbis, 
one of the  premises was to this proposal was that there would be no 
need to change the documents.

-- 
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Edward Lewis                                            +1-703-227-9854
ARIN Research Engineer

Even the voices inside my head are refusing to talk to me anymore.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: "Hallam-Baker, Phillip" <pbaker@verisign.com>
Subject: RE: NSEC version field (Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial  M
	 echanism Flag)
Date: Fri, 28 May 2004 16:48:41 -0700
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> At 12:41 -0700 5/28/04, Hallam-Baker, Phillip wrote:
> >Could we maybe as a compromise agree now that the only difference
> >between v1 and v2 will be that in v2 a new versioned NSEC
> >record would be used?
> 
> I don't think there's been an agreement that there ought to be an 
> answer to zone enumeration.  

I think you are missing the point that I and Olafur have been making.

What the requirements may be is not the subject under discussion.
The issue under discussion is whether we have to fix DNSSECbis.

The quickest way to arrive at a consensus that we do not have to
change DNSSECbis is to convince the Europeans that deployment of
DNSSECbis as it stands will not preclude a future ammendment to 
address an issue they consider a deployment showstopper.


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: don@plugh.daedalus.co.nz
Subject: Re: Confirming the Nominet position
Date: Sat, 29 May 2004 15:16:11 +1200
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Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com> wrote:
>i disagree.  when i put the first AXFR-blocking code into BIND 4 in ~1988,
>i considered it a protocol violation and i made my apologies to the gods.

Unfortunately, protocols designed in a kinder, gentler age have had to
be modified or "broken" to accommodate policy and security requirements
brought on by the somewhat nastier world that the Internet has become.

Every firewall on the planet basically represents a set of protocol
violations.  Some of them better considered than others.

It seems to me somewhat ironic that in attempting to deal with some of
the nastiness, DNSSECbis deployment itself faces problems because of
another facet of that very same nastiness.

>it appears that those gods have a long memory, and a grand scale of
>vengeance.

-- don

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com>
Subject: planned obsolescence, and another TCR
Date: Sat, 29 May 2004 06:10:33 +0000
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	of "Fri, 28 May 2004 18:06:34 -0400."
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> ...
> I'd put my opinions this way - if providing a way forward were easy
> and/or if providing obfuscation was cheap to do, I'd be for it.  But
> from the work I've done, the costs to do either seem to be rather
> high, meaning that there has to be a lot of need to provide them.

i have a similar conclusion, which is that if we want NSEC to be
upgradeable then it's going to take (at least) some period of time to
find out whether it already is, which will take some modelling.  if it's
not already upgradeable, then it'll take some additional period to
decide how to make it so, which should include competing alternatives,
independent modelling/analysis/review, prototyping, and testing.

i'm calling the first period six weeks, since i know how namedroppers
works.  it could be longer, since it's coming up on summer in a lot of
places, and a lot of namedroppers children will be out of school, and
there will be some vacations.

if there is a second period (see above) then NSD 2.0 will become
out-of-date, and BIND 9.3.0 (now in beta testing but maybe in release
candidacy or actual release by that time) will become out-of-date, and
then the second period is probably around four months, maybe longer
since it will overlap with end-of-year holidays.

since we know that we can push out replacement dnssec technology by
using different type codes for it and changing the time scale from
months to years, it is my hope that on june 1 when WGLC ends, the
chairs will recognize that the dnssec-bis docset appears to meet its
design goals and appears to have adequate document quality and adequate
protocol quality, and forward the documents to IESG for publication.

and then, depending on funding and other resources, this WG can start
work on a DNSSECv2 that uses different type codes to operate "like ships
in the night" with DNSSECv1 and can take a year or even longer to ensure
that its design matches the community's then-current requirements and
that it is implemented straightforwardly and that deployment considerations
are known and handled from day 1.  it can even share/reuse keys, and could
have a gateway back to DNSSECv1.  but it would not be "DNSSECv1 with
versions", since the time between now and when we'll know whether that's
possible is longer than many of us want to wait.  and because DNSSECv1
appears to have achieved its design goals, which did not include 
confidentiality.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: don@plugh.daedalus.co.nz
Subject: Re: NSEC+ and NO
Date: Sat, 29 May 2004 23:06:22 +1200
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Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com> wrote:
>in your previous post you proposed a signalling method that would make us
>treat all negative responses as temporary failures.  that's not a value add.

No, it isn't.  But it still leaves us with a problem.  

It will be difficult to sell DNSSECbis to registries, especially ones
such as NZ and UK that have wide, largely non-technical stakeholder
bases, for reasons that are wider than the immediate technical validity
of DNSSECbis, but are nevertheless neither invalid nor entirely
non-technical, if the zone walking problem is not addressed.

I see a number of ways forward with this from a registry point of view:

(1) Deploy DNSSECbis regardless.  Don't care about the stakeholders.

(2) Wait for DNSSECter to come along (be it NSEC2 or some kind of NO).

(3) Deploy DNSSECbis with some level of degradation to either disable
zone walking or make it sufficiently difficult (and therefore uncommon)
that registry managers can reasonably go after perpetrators by other
means.  Maintain that level of degradation until DNSSECter is available,
and switch at the first opportunity.

Option (1) is not going to fly in NZ at least, and from what I've seen
on this list, not in UK or DE either.

Option (2) is the safest choice.  But it's not going to help advance
DNSSEC.  I can't speak for other registries, but in NZ, there is a
stated desire to move forward with DNSSEC as far as it is compatible
with other policies and requirements.

Which leaves option (3).  To which the question is: how far does DNSSEC,
or at least NSEC, need to be "broken" to prevent zone walking.  I put
two options to the list in earlier posts; (a) one where the links
between names are broken just a little, the other (b) where the NSEC
links are completely broken.

(a) retains authenticated denial for all but a few highly pathological
cases, but appears trivial to defeat.  (b) loses authenticated denial
for all non-existent domains, but will reliably prevent zone walking.

Is there a variation on (a) that can't be trivially defeated (my
preferred option); or do I have to deploy (b), which still buys us
secure delegation and authenticated denial of secure delegation for
domains that do exist.

Or should I just throw my hands up in despair, say, "it's too big, too
slow, and we can just use end-to-end authentication & encryption
anyway", as I'm sure the folks peddling PKI & CA services would just
love me to?

-- don

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: Roy Badami <roy@gnomon.org.uk>
Subject: Re: NSEC+ and NO
Date: Sat, 29 May 2004 14:20:12 +0100
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>>>>> "don" == don  <don@plugh.daedalus.co.nz> writes:

    don> Which leaves option (3).  To which the question is: how far
    don> does DNSSEC, or at least NSEC, need to be "broken" to prevent
    don> zone walking.  I put two options to the list in earlier
    don> posts; (a) one where the links between names are broken just
    don> a little, the other (b) where the NSEC links are completely
    don> broken.

If you don't mind online signing, you could synthesize a zone in which
every possible name exists and has, say, a TXT record saying
"non-existent domain".

This might make you unpopular with people who use domain-existence
checks as an anti-spam measure, though...

       -roy




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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com>
Subject: Re: NSEC+ and NO
Date: Sat, 29 May 2004 15:09:35 +0000
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	of "Sat, 29 May 2004 23:06:22 +1200."
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> >in your previous post you proposed a signalling method that would make us
> >treat all negative responses as temporary failures.  that's not a value add.
> 
> No, it isn't.  But it still leaves us with a problem.  

yes, and let's give that problem a name.  "dnssec-bis's design does not
include certain confidentiality features which a number of domainholders
appear to want or need."  in other words let's call this a design change
rather than a quality problem with either the current docset or current
protocol.  this distinction matters to our WG chairs for administrative
reasons, whereas the design change will only matter to IESG.  we may in
fact have hit the target we were aiming at, but some say it was the wrong
target.

> ...
> I see a number of ways forward with this from a registry point of view:
> ...
> (2) Wait for DNSSECter to come along (be it NSEC2 or some kind of NO).
> ...
> Option (2) is the safest choice.  But it's not going to help advance
> DNSSEC.

yes, it will.  dnssec can still be deployed in a lot of places, including
the root zone and many TLDs including SE and NL.  there are four different
"islands of trust" models floating around in various research camps that
could cause a lot of dnssec deployment to occur even excluding NZ, UK, DE,
and probably COM and NET who all object to the enumerability of subdomain
names under dnssec-bis.

> ...
> (3) Deploy DNSSECbis with some level of degradation to either disable
> zone walking or make it sufficiently difficult (and therefore uncommon)
> that registry managers can reasonably go after perpetrators by other
> means.  Maintain that level of degradation until DNSSECter is available,
> and switch at the first opportunity.
> ...
> Which leaves option (3).  To which the question is: how far does DNSSEC,
> or at least NSEC, need to be "broken" to prevent zone walking.  ...

i consider option (2) to be quite viable.  i've also spoken (on the "new
TCR" thread i began 12 hours ago) of the dangers of trying to change the
dnssec-bis design at this late date.  those of us who are itching to begin
deployment during 2004, which is the tenth year since dnssec was first
spoken of, are shaking with fear of any form of option (3).

> ...
> Or should I just throw my hands up in despair, say, "it's too big, too
> slow, and we can just use end-to-end authentication & encryption
> anyway", as I'm sure the folks peddling PKI & CA services would just
> love me to?

i think you should read the "new TCR" thread, and i think that all of the
domainholders who can't tolerate enumeration should contact jim reid to
talk about joining dns-moda and making DNSSEC-ter a first year priority.

and that you should study auto-msj, auto-johani, dlv, and any possible
other island-of-trust brokerage mechanism that could be used for early
deployment by your subdomainholders.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: Roy Badami <roy@gnomon.org.uk>
Subject: Re: NSEC+ and NO
Date: Sun, 30 May 2004 00:13:59 +0100
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>>>>> "Paul" == Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com> writes:
    Paul> yes, and let's give that problem a name.  "dnssec-bis's
    Paul> design does not include certain confidentiality features
    Paul> which a number of domainholders appear to want or need."  in
    Paul> other words let's call this a design change rather than a
    Paul> quality problem with either the current docset or current
    Paul> protocol.  this distinction matters to our WG chairs for
    Paul> administrative reasons, whereas the design change will only
    Paul> matter to IESG.  we may in fact have hit the target we were
    Paul> aiming at, but some say it was the wrong target.

Was there ever a well-specified target?  Though I tend to agree that
the specs have met the target that the WG felt it was working towards
(not that I've followed the WG closely).

    Paul> i consider option (2) to be quite viable.  i've also spoken
    Paul> (on the "new TCR" thread i began 12 hours ago) of the
    Paul> dangers of trying to change the dnssec-bis design at this
    Paul> late date.  those of us who are itching to begin deployment
    Paul> during 2004, which is the tenth year since dnssec was first
    Paul> spoken of, are shaking with fear of any form of option (3).

I'm one of the many people you mentioned in passing in a previous
thread who had been waiting until the docs are declared 'finished'
before paying close attention to them.  I share your fear of option
(3) even if that might not be obvious from some of my recent posts.

Although my ideal scenario would be for Nominet and the IETF to reach
a consensus, new specs (if necesary) be drafted, and DNSSEC be
depolyed both in the root and in .uk all within 2004, this clearly
isn't goint to happen... 

Islands of trust would seem to be inevitable during the early stages
of deployment, and I thank you for the references on this subject...

    -roy






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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@MIT.EDU>
Subject: Re: planned obsolescence, and another TCR
Date: Sat, 29 May 2004 20:50:15 -0400
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On Sat, 2004-05-29 at 02:10, Paul Vixie wrote:
> i have a similar conclusion, which is that if we want NSEC to be
> upgradeable then it's going to take (at least) some period of time to
> find out whether it already is, which will take some modelling.

It seems like, at the very least, it should be possible to rev all the
DNSSEC record types, such that zones signed with DNSSECtre (which
somehow magically solves the enumeration "problem" with compromising
something equally important) appear unsigned to DNSSECbis-only
resolvers.

This plan might present an upgrade impediment to zones signed with
DNSSECbis; they might have to choose between providing twice as much
data or appearing unsigned to DNSSECbis-only resolvers.  But if the only
reason to upgrade to DNSSECtre is enumeration, then that choice has to
be made anyway (either you didn't deploy DNSSECbis, or you did deploy it
in spite of the enumeration concern, and you won't solve the enumeration
concern without leaving behind DNSSECbis-only resolvers).


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com>
Subject: Re: planned obsolescence, and another TCR
Date: Sun, 30 May 2004 02:10:41 +0000
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> It seems like, at the very least, it should be possible to rev all the
> DNSSEC record types, such that zones signed with DNSSECtre (which
> somehow magically solves the enumeration "problem" with compromising
> something equally important) appear unsigned to DNSSECbis-only
> resolvers.

yes.  this is what we did in TCR to invalidate the universe of RFC2535.

> This plan might present an upgrade impediment to zones signed with
> DNSSECbis; they might have to choose between providing twice as much
> data or appearing unsigned to DNSSECbis-only resolvers.

it won't be twice as much data.  another EDNS0 option bit will have to
be allocated to say "when i set the i-want-dnssec option, i really mean
dnssec-ter".  middleboxes who havn't cached an answer that was fetched
using this option will go upstream (forward, using this option) and only
data that was fetched using this option will be returned from a middlebox
who is queried using this option.  (that's what RRD and QDCOUNT>0 did in
the original EDNS specification, it was a way of upgrading a hop-by-hop
signalling method to end-to-end, and it would have worked, but we were a
weary and wary group of folks by that point in the EDNS adventure...)

> But if the only reason to upgrade to DNSSECtre is enumeration, then
> that choice has to be made anyway (either you didn't deploy DNSSECbis,
> or you did deploy it in spite of the enumeration concern, and you
> won't solve the enumeration concern without leaving behind
> DNSSECbis-only resolvers).

speaking for bind, i think it would be necessary to support both -bis and
-ter when signing (if that's what the zone operator asks for) and serving.
DNSKEY wouldn't have to rev this time, only RRSIG and/or NSEC.

it's even dimly possible that NSEC2 or RRSIG2 could be generated from NSEC
or RRSIG, assuming that the new ones are subsets of the old, so that a -ter
middlebox could synthesize -ter style responses if it had cached something
from a -bis style response.

the sky's the limit.  as long as, that is, we don't try to do it before -bis.
if we try to do it before -bis, then either -bis is late, or we have some
unfortunate compromises whose sideeffects take a long time to become known,
or more likely, both.  -bis must go as is.  TCR++ is the way to -ter.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: Alex Bligh <alex@alex.org.uk>
Subject: Re: NSEC+ and NO
Date: Sun, 30 May 2004 12:51:24 +0100
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--On 29 May 2004 14:20 +0100 Roy Badami <roy@gnomon.org.uk> wrote:

> If you don't mind online signing, you could synthesize a zone in which
> every possible name exists and has, say, a TXT record saying
> "non-existent domain".
>
> This might make you unpopular with people who use domain-existence
> checks as an anti-spam measure, though...

I seem to remember a recent experience where a wildcard was put
in one such zone did not meet with universal approbation.

Alex

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: Alex Bligh <alex@alex.org.uk>
Subject: Re: NSEC+ and NO
Date: Sun, 30 May 2004 12:49:32 +0100
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--On 29 May 2004 23:06 +1200 don@plugh.daedalus.co.nz wrote:

> (a) retains authenticated denial for all but a few highly pathological
> cases, but appears trivial to defeat.  (b) loses authenticated denial
> for all non-existent domains, but will reliably prevent zone walking.

Two questions:

1. Is there a situation where lack of authenticated denial can result
   in returning the wrong data in response to a query (meaning as opposed
   to returning no data when there isn't one)? - i.e. if NSEC were optional,
   does one leave oneself open to more than a denial of service attack
   where non-existence is spoofed? (I am asking here to what extent
   whether temporarily dropping authenticated denial in those zone operators
   with problems with enumerability is likely to be a fair price to pay).

2. Do people agree that, if lack of authenticated denial is itself an
   insuperable problem in zones for which NSEC enumerability is problematic,
   then, **IF** one is going to fix the problem at all, one might as well
   fix the enumerability problem in the general case (via NSEC2 or
   elsewise) rather than (say) provide an alternative mechanism of
   authenticated denial just for those not wishing to deploy NSEC, as
   the latter would involve just as much interoperability testing,
   development, specification etc. as the former. (I am asking here
   whether, if the problem is going to be addressed at all, whether
   NSEC2 or some similar NSEC replacement approach is in fact the best
   approach).

Alex

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: Alex Bligh <alex@alex.org.uk>
Subject: Re: NSEC+ and NO
Date: Sun, 30 May 2004 12:54:58 +0100
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--On 30 May 2004 00:13 +0100 Roy Badami <roy@gnomon.org.uk> wrote:

> Although my ideal scenario would be for Nominet and the IETF to reach
> a consensus, new specs (if necessary) be drafted, and DNSSEC be
> depolyed both in the root and in .uk all within 2004, this clearly
> isn't goint to happen...

If you replace the word deployed with deployable (*) I think that is
a realistic target. As Jay indicated, we are happy to provide concrete
assistance in getting there.

(*) = production software ready to go.

Alex

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com>
Subject: Re: NSEC+ and NO
Date: Sun, 30 May 2004 17:16:19 +0000
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	of "Sun, 30 May 2004 12:54:58 +0100."
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> > Although my ideal scenario would be for Nominet and the IETF to reach
> > a consensus, new specs (if necessary) be drafted, and DNSSEC be
> > depolyed both in the root and in .uk all within 2004, this clearly
> > isn't goint to happen...
> 
> If you replace the word deployed with deployable (*) I think that is
> a realistic target. As Jay indicated, we are happy to provide concrete
> assistance in getting there.
> 
> (*) = production software ready to go.

it's now the end of june.  unless the change to dnssec-bis were as simple as
"add an MBZ octet to DS, DNSKEY, RRSIG, and require current implementations
to ignore RRs where this octet has a nonzero value" then we're not going to
see "production software ready to go" again in 2004.  patches are fine, but
maturity has been a challenging issue for dnssec.  in NSD 2.0 and BIND 9.3.0
we have production dnssec-bis software ready to go.  change dnssec-bis more
than the tiny amount described above, and we're into 2005 before we have
enough maturity to again call it production ready, no matter what patches
are developed or how good those patches are.

i don't think the average person on namedroppers@ realizes how much pizza and
late nights and whiteboards and "operability testing" went into stabilizing
dnssec-bis and getting confidence that it would work.  that's how "the
grandparent problem" was found.  that's how "TCR" was first proposed (and how
"the middlebox problem" was found, which drove "TCR").

patch-and-publish is fine when the torchbearing mob is at the castle walls
demanding a workaround for sitefinder.  it's not fine when reworking dnssec.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com>
Subject: Re: NSEC+ and NO
Date: Sun, 30 May 2004 17:30:44 +0000
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I mean of course..

> it's now the end of june.

...that it's now the end of may.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: Don Stokes <don@plugh.daedalus.co.nz>
Subject: Re: NSEC+ and NO
Date: Mon, 31 May 2004 11:32:52 +1200
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Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com> wrote:
>yes, it will.  dnssec can still be deployed in a lot of places, including
>the root zone and many TLDs including SE and NL.  there are four different
>"islands of trust" models floating around in various research camps that
>could cause a lot of dnssec deployment to occur even excluding NZ, UK, DE,
>and probably COM and NET who all object to the enumerability of subdomain
>names under dnssec-bis.

>From where I sit, the signing of the root zone is the real key to what
we do.  As far as the Internet at large is concerned, without the root
and the majority of registries signing their zones, DNSSEC is just a
toy.

So the real question in my mind is, will DNSSECbis be deployed on the
root?  Or will it have to wait for DNSSECter.


If the root zone is going to be signed using DNSSECbis, then NZ
will want to be doing *something* with DNSSECbis.  Which means some form
of option (3).

I know it gives you the shivers, but providing authenticated chains of
trust for DNSSEC-enabled domains that do exist seems to me a heck of a
lot more productive than futzing around with IoT brokerage schemes. 
Especially if we can do some type of option 3a rather than 3b and retain
authenticated denial. 


>and that you should study auto-msj, auto-johani, dlv, and any possible
>other island-of-trust brokerage mechanism that could be used for early
>deployment by your subdomainholders.

Islands of trust is not DNSSEC deployment as far as a TLD is concerned.
Sub-domain holders can do what they like; that's why we call it delegation.


In terms of specifications, I agree that trying to change DNSSECbis at
this stage is probably pointless.  We might as well get -bis out now, so
that enterprise deployment can occur -- for the most part, enterprises
don't have the same privacy concerns as registries for their internal
networks and DNS, yet could still benefit from DNSSEC. 

Meanwhile, lets get on with DNSSECter for deployment on the public
Internet.

-- don

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: Paul Vixie <paul@vix.com>
Subject: Re: NSEC+ and NO
Date: Mon, 31 May 2004 02:18:56 +0000
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	of "Mon, 31 May 2004 11:32:52 +1200."
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> So the real question in my mind is, will DNSSECbis be deployed on the
> root?  Or will it have to wait for DNSSECter.

the root zone is ftp'able, axfr'able, and otherwise not considered a matter
of confidential record.  therefore i don't think enumerability will be an
obstacle to signing the root.  all of the rootops can now support dnssec-bis.
therefore, it's down to the political problems like "who will know the signing
key" and none of those depend on the presumed delta between -bis and -ter.

> If the root zone is going to be signed using DNSSECbis, then NZ
> will want to be doing *something* with DNSSECbis.  Which means some form
> of option (3).

if you're willing to tolerate another type code roll ("TCR++" for short) then
option 3 is on the table.  if you think, for some reason, that some other
form of extensibilty is necessary, then "option (3)" means "dnssec after 2004"
which would seem like a really painful last minute course change after all
the compromises and hard work that have gone into the "dnssec in 2004" effort.

> > ... you should study auto-msj, auto-johani, dlv, and any possible
> > other island-of-trust brokerage mechanism that could be used for
> > early deployment by your subdomainholders.
> 
> Islands of trust is not DNSSEC deployment as far as a TLD is concerned.
> Sub-domain holders can do what they like; that's why we call it delegation.

i think you need to study it more closely.  your conclusions don't match the
facts as i know them.  i'm always willing to take this up 1x1, even by phone,
if that seems palatable.

> In terms of specifications, I agree that trying to change DNSSECbis at
> this stage is probably pointless.  We might as well get -bis out now, so
> that enterprise deployment can occur -- for the most part, enterprises
> don't have the same privacy concerns as registries for their internal
> networks and DNS, yet could still benefit from DNSSEC. 

as the prime mover between one of the early deployment aids ("dlv") that
creates islands of trust, i can tell you that my scope is far beyond my own
local "enterprise".  i think that msj and johani would say the same.  so,
please study these alternatives more closely before you conclude about them.

> Meanwhile, lets get on with DNSSECter for deployment on the public
> Internet.

agreed.  and hopefully, because you said that, you'll be hearing from
jim reid about dns-moda.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: don%plugh@daedalus.co.nz
Subject: Re: Confirming the Nominet position
Date: Sat, 29 May 2004 22:18:42 +1200
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 [ Moderators note: Post by non-subscriber.  With the massive amount of
   spam, it is easy to miss and therefore delete relevant posts 
   by non-subsrcibers. Please fix your subscription addresses. ]


Robert Elz <kre@munnari.OZ.AU> wrote:
>Please don't tell me "our stakeholders demand it" - like Ted Hardie,
>mention of "stakeholders" in a context like that drives me insane.   If
>your stakeholders (whatever that means) have good reasons, just tell me
>the reasons.   If they don't, then they're irrelevant to me, and should be
>to you as well.

The reason in NZ is basically abuse.  If a registry provided a full list
of domains (or a means of obtaining one without strict conditions), one
can pretty much guarantee that within a short space of time that list
will be used (at a minimum) to construct a spam list either using
harvested whois data and/or guessed mailbox names.  

Such behaviour in the past has caused astonishing amounts of outrage,
hence NZ's current policy.  

For NZ, the immediate positive impact of implementing DNSSECbis is, in
the absence of wide-scale awareness and deployment, and the absence of a
signed root, is basically nothing, beyond the feel-good factor of being
on the leading edge.  That "nothing" should become "something"
eventually, but over a timescale of years.

The negative impact is the immediate availability of a full list of
current names for spam and other forms of abuse, something that is
likely to be highly unpopular among those with an interest in NZ DNS
policy.

That makes being an early adopter of DNSSEC a difficult sell unless the
zone walking issue is addressed.  That's on top of more technical issues
such as the additional time and resources required to sign large registry
zones.

I can't say I like the word "stakeholder" very much either, but in this
case the "stakeholders" are the ones paying the piper, and a registry
ignores them at its peril.  I speak from bitter experience on this.

-- don



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:55 2006
From: roy@dnss.ec
Subject: Re: planned obsolescence, and another TCR
Date: Mon, 31 May 2004 12:38:46 +0200 (CEST)
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On Sat, 29 May 2004, Paul Vixie wrote:

> > I'd put my opinions this way - if providing a way forward were easy
> > and/or if providing obfuscation was cheap to do, I'd be for it.  But
> > from the work I've done, the costs to do either seem to be rather
> > high, meaning that there has to be a lot of need to provide them.
>
> i have a similar conclusion, which is that if we want NSEC to be
> upgradeable then it's going to take (at least) some period of time to
> find out whether it already is, which will take some modelling.  if it's
> not already upgradeable, then it'll take some additional period to
> decide how to make it so, which should include competing alternatives,
> independent modelling/analysis/review, prototyping, and testing.

There are many possibilities to start an upgrade path, versioning and
such. The REAL problem is specifying resolver behaviour when it encounters
an unknown vesion of NSEC. It will introduce numerous cornercases since
NSEC is used in both negative and positive proofs (this is not FUD, there
were some cornercases in the past when we're trying to model opt-in). It
also needs to be tested very well. CAIDA has recently done some modelling
http://www.caida.org/outreach/papers/2004/dnspam/ and one of the
conclusions is that resolvers tend to become aggressive when denied
certain data. Ignoring incompatible NSEC versions is exactly what that is.

Being one of the authors of the docset and knowing how much effort it took
to get here from where we were 4 to 5 years ago, it will be another year
_atleast_ before something as little as an MBZ will make it through. Going
over the docset again, there are many hooks that needs eyes and text in
case the wg decides on versioning. I'm not saying we shouldn't, but before
we get to where we are now with rough consensus and running code,it will
be another two years.

To my frustration, I think we've REALLY missed the bus on NSEC, since
everything from label types to packetsize, from header bits to transaction
signatures _is_ extendable, while a few of the big namedroppers mud-fights
were due to lack of NSEC versioning.

Having said that, my conclusion is to ship the docset now and get some
real experience in userland. A TCR++ degauss of DNSKEY/NSEC in the near
future can introduce a version scheme for NSEC. That would probably also
take some time, and is bw compatible with DNSSECbis, but at least we can
move forward now.

Roy

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:56 2006
From: Roy Badami <roy@gnomon.org.uk>
Subject: RE: NSEC version field (Re: NSEC2- and an Authenticated Denial  M
	echanism Flag)
Date: Mon, 31 May 2004 13:02:36 +0100
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>>>>> "Edward" == Edward Lewis <edlewis@arin.net> writes:

    Edward> (Hmmm, perhaps detailing what happens if the NSEC claims
    Edward> that it itself doesn't exist - but that's been tried
    Edward> before and failed.)

As far as I can see the current document set _does_ detail what
happens in this case.

-protocol 5.4:

   Since a validated NSEC RR proves the existence of both itself and
   its corresponding RRSIG RR, a validator MUST ignore the settings of
   the NSEC and RRSIG bits in an NSEC RR.

   -roy

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:56 2006
From: ted@NLnetLabs.nl (Ted Lindgreen)
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Mon, 31 May 2004 14:58:19 +0200
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[Quoting Olaf Kolkman, on May 20, 22:42, in "Re: Proposal to fix  ..."]
> 
> Dear Colleagues,
....
> If I do not see rough consensus on taking up NSEC2 as a work item by 
> June 1 I'll reject this as a work item.
> 
> If, after June 1, there is consensus on taking up NSEC2 as a work item
> I'll try to make an inventory on how many participants of the working
> group can commit resources to make this work. If it turns out we
> cannot produce standards, documents and code on a reasonable time or
> we alienate a significant fraction of the people that are now
> committed on working on this we'll also not take NSEC2 up as a work 
> item.

After following the discussion with great interest, I think that:

1. The virtues of making NSEC-walking difficult seem to be largely
   overestimated by some people. For all devious purposes (spamlist
   building, whois lurking, etc), there are already numerous ways
   to build a close enough list of domainnames with or without NSEC.
   I really think that the problems at hand will hardly be
   influenced by having NSEC or NSEC2 in practice.

2. The time, the work, and the funding needed to redo DNSSEC once
   again seems largely underestimated. Having been involved in the
   work to go from 2535 to the current docset, I don't believe
   anyone who says that we can stamp out a DNSSECter docset before
   2006 or perhaps even 2007.
   As for funding such work, I will have a large problem to defend
   further funding for NLnet Labs on DNSSEC if we go back to the
   basic design. NLnet Labs must then most likely drop their work
   on DNSSEC on the floor.

So, I think that the working group should NOT delay DNSSECbis by
trying to fold in NSEC2 this late in the process. If NSEC2 needs
to be worked out it should be done in a separate track.

Regards,
-- ted

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:56 2006
From: Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Mon, 31 May 2004 15:27:23 +0100
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To: ted@NLnetLabs.nl (Ted Lindgreen)
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   of "Mon, 31 May 2004 14:58:19 +0200." <200405311258.i4VCwJSh043071@open.nlnetlabs.nl> 
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>>>>> "Ted" == Ted Lindgreen <ted@NLnetLabs.nl> writes:

    Ted> So, I think that the working group should NOT delay DNSSECbis
    Ted> by trying to fold in NSEC2 this late in the process. If NSEC2
    Ted> needs to be worked out it should be done in a separate track.

I agree wholeheartedly with Ted.

Folding NSEC2 into DNSSECbis will delay a DNSSEC standard for at least
a year, more likely two. This would represent a design change, not
just a few tweaks of the current document set. The 11th hour arguments
of the NSEC2 people and their stakeholders notwithstanding, the WG has
a document set today that has rough consensus, working code and has
benefitted from a lot of work and detailed analysis. We have something
that works and is deployable. Apart of course from layer-9 issues in
some quarters that IMO should not concern this WG. I think the WG
should go with the DNSSECbis drafts and the immediate priority should
be to review these while they are in Last Call.

If NSEC2 is to be worked on, this can be considered after DNSSECbis
has gone to IESG. I'd like the NSEC2 supporters to come back with 
completed, well worked out drafts that not only defined the new
protocol but also showed how this will interwork with DNSSECbis, any
migration strategy and so on.

For now, the WG needs to focus on a technical review of the current
document set. To some extent this appears to have been overshadowed by
a debate on the layer-9 issues that motivated NSEC2.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:56 2006
From: geoff@nominet.org.uk (Geoffrey Sisson)
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Mon, 31 May 2004 15:29:34 +0100 (BST)
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ted@NLnetLabs.nl (Ted Lindgreen) writes:

> 1. The virtues of making NSEC-walking difficult seem to be largely
>    overestimated by some people. For all devious purposes (spamlist
>    building, whois lurking, etc), there are already numerous ways
>    to build a close enough list of domainnames with or without NSEC.
>    I really think that the problems at hand will hardly be
>    influenced by having NSEC or NSEC2 in practice.

Please note that information leakage is not the only issue attributable
to NSEC RR elaboration: resource depletion due to possibly frequent,
multiple simultaneous chains of elaboration could also be significant.
Making zone files available via some other mechanism, e.g. FTP or HTTP,
without restriction, seems to be the only way to make NSEC RR
elaboration less rewarding than other methods of spammer/scammer list
construction.  Even ICANN TLDs which have a policy of making their
register database available to requestors may find that a
non-negligible number of users would prefer to use NSEC RR elaboration
tools, perhaps to avoid bureaucracy or to conceal their identities.

In other words, I don't believe this is strictly a European ccTLD
problem.  It may be a problem for any nameserver administrator --
especially of large registries -- who is unwilling or unable to make
zone file information trivially available via alternate means.

Regards

Geoff

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:56 2006
From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@MIT.EDU>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Mon, 31 May 2004 11:00:12 -0400
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(I agree with Ted.)

On Mon, 2004-05-31 at 10:29, Geoffrey Sisson wrote:
> Please note that information leakage is not the only issue attributable
> to NSEC RR elaboration: resource depletion due to possibly frequent,
> multiple simultaneous chains of elaboration could also be significant.

Two answers:

(1) The normal load on most of these servers is pretty high.  An awful
lot of spammers would have to be doing simultaneous nsec walks (which
are rate-limited to some extent by needing to wait an RTT for each
request) before it would become a noticeable factor.

(2) An nsec walk is an awful lot more efficient than a PTR walk.


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:56 2006
From: geoff@nominet.org.uk (Geoffrey Sisson)
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Mon, 31 May 2004 16:25:58 +0100 (BST)
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Greg Hudson <ghudson@MIT.EDU> writes:

> On Mon, 2004-05-31 at 10:29, Geoffrey Sisson wrote:
> > Please note that information leakage is not the only issue attributable
> > to NSEC RR elaboration: resource depletion due to possibly frequent,
> > multiple simultaneous chains of elaboration could also be significant.
> 
> Two answers:
> 
> (1) The normal load on most of these servers is pretty high.  An awful
> lot of spammers would have to be doing simultaneous nsec walks (which
> are rate-limited to some extent by needing to wait an RTT for each
> request) before it would become a noticeable factor.

Except . . . (Copy of my reply to kre on Friday)

------------------------ Begin included text ------------------------
It would be surprising if NSEC RR elaboration techniques didn't
incorporate considerable parallelism, especially for large zones.  This
could impose arbitrarily high loads on a busy nameserver.  For example,
multiple simultaneous elaborations could be run, one starting at
'aaa.co.uk', another starting at 'aab.co.uk', and so on.

This isn't idle speculation: prior to incorporating token bucket into
the WHOIS server at whois.nic.uk [note: reference to WHOIS for
illustrative purposes only!] we used to have a one-second sleep to
limit the impact of scripts.  Impatient data miners designed tools
which sent queries in parallel -- sometimes hundreds per second -- in
order to collect data at higher rates.  The consequences to server
performance were, well, predictable . . .
------------------------- End included text -------------------------

> (2) An nsec walk is an awful lot more efficient than a PTR walk.

True, though PTR walks are probably more distributed (i.e. involve
traversing many different servers, not just RIR servers), though
perhaps Daniel or Ed may have more insight into this phenomenon.  Also,
I suspect that PTR walks are much less rewarding (require much more
effort for more lossy results) so would not be as ubiquitous.

Regards

Geoff

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:56 2006
From: "Loomis, Rip" <GILBERT.R.LOOMIS@saic.com>
Subject: Re: Scope of discussion (was Re: Proposal to fix NSEC)
Date: Mon, 31 May 2004 11:42:44 -0400
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Previously, the WG chairs asked for input  by 01 June
on WGLC and related issues, given the concerns raised
about NSEC and zone enumeration.  Since I'm going to
be out-of-pocket for two weeks and the chairs never
rescinded that request, here's my input.

Olaf wrote:
> I think it is clear at this point that the current
> DNSSEC-bis protocol spec eases content enumeration;
> I think it is clear that this causes a number of TLDs
> (and other players) to believe that they cannot deploy 
> DNSSEC in its current form.

I think that a capability that was not part of the DNS
protocol, but which many folks have made use of (and
may believe they rely on) is going to be undermined by
(most realistic schemes for) signed proof of non-
existence.  However, I would state that the "content
enumeration" bugaboo is to me just that--a bugaboo.

> Please refrain from further discussion of these two
> points; this is a real issue.

Sorry that I can't follow instructions, but I did want
to clarify the extent to which this is a "real issue"
in my mind.

> The question on the table is what this WG needs to do.
> 
> [slight editing follows to clearly state Olaf's options]
> Option 1. Taking up work to prevent zone enumeration
>    while holding the DNSSEC bis document-set
> Option 2.  shipping DNSSEC bis and forgetting for now
>    about solving the enumeration  problem.
> Option 3. Ship the DNSSEC-bis document set and work out
>    the enumeration problem later (but commit on finding
>    a solution).

I would prefer Option 2.  Option 2 doesn't mean that
issues with zone enumeration can never be addressed, but
it does make it less likely that major changes will be
made (because it makes the changes more painful to
implement).

I can live with Option 3, particularly if Opt-In (or
whatever a better name for it) is added back into the
mix of possible solutions.

I absolutely can't live with Option 1.  If I ever want
to have a prayer of having DNSSEC signed zones supported
in some fairly major software, we have *got* to get
DNSSECbis wrapped up and out the door.  It is deployable
today and I have no interest in waiting another 18
months for DNSSECbis-TNG (A/K/A DNSSECter).

Or, to put it more succinctly, I agree with recent messages
from Ted Lindgreen and Jim Reid that included the statement:

    Ted> So, I think that the working group should NOT delay DNSSECbis
    Ted> by trying to fold in NSEC2 this late in the process. If NSEC2
    Ted> needs to be worked out it should be done in a separate track.


  --Rip

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:56 2006
From: roy@dnss.ec
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Mon, 31 May 2004 19:08:28 +0200 (CEST)
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On Mon, 31 May 2004, Ted Lindgreen wrote:

> So, I think that the working group should NOT delay DNSSECbis by
> trying to fold in NSEC2 this late in the process. If NSEC2 needs
> to be worked out it should be done in a separate track.

I agree with this conclusion. 'fixing' DNSSECbis for NSEC2 means delay.
The fix is not trivial. Ship the docset and start work on NSEC2 in a
seperate track.

Roy

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:56 2006
From: "Jay Daley" <td@nominet.org.uk>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Mon, 31 May 2004 22:26:01 +0100
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Greg

> (1) The normal load on most of these servers is pretty high.  An awful
> lot of spammers would have to be doing simultaneous nsec walks (which
> are rate-limited to some extent by needing to wait an RTT for each
> request) before it would become a noticeable factor.

Let me just put this one in perspective.  Each of our nameservers has an 
average load of 100 million queries per day with about 4 million records 
in our zone files.  That means it will take only 25 spammers doing a full 
walk in one day to double the load on that server (this is on top of the 
huge increase in traffic that DNSSEC means).  As we have on average 3,000 
new domains registered per day we can safely expect these spammers to do 
this every day.  Once the script kiddie tools are out then we can expect 
many, many more than just 25.

Jay

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:56 2006
From: Ted Hardie <hardie@qualcomm.com>
Subject: Re: Proposal to fix NSEC
Date: Mon, 31 May 2004 16:51:23 -0700
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At 7:08 PM +0200 05/31/2004, roy@dnss.ec wrote:
>On Mon, 31 May 2004, Ted Lindgreen wrote:
>
>>  So, I think that the working group should NOT delay DNSSECbis by
>>  trying to fold in NSEC2 this late in the process. If NSEC2 needs
>>  to be worked out it should be done in a separate track.
>
>I agree with this conclusion. 'fixing' DNSSECbis for NSEC2 means delay.
>The fix is not trivial. Ship the docset and start work on NSEC2 in a
>seperate track.

I also agree with this conclusion.
			regards,
				Ted Hardie

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Dec 29 10:45:56 2006
From: Derek Atkins <derek@ihtfp.com>
Subject: Re: Confirming the Nominet position
Date: Fri, 28 May 2004 14:02:35 -0400
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	<OFCBB87463.D9ECD53E-ON80256EA1.006FAD30-80256EA1.007037EF@nominet.org.uk>
	<20040528130303.GB13713@vacation.karoshi.com.>
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bmanning@vacation.karoshi.com writes:

> 	i've been told that digital signatures can be used as
> 	legal evidence in some jurisdictions. if true, it is 
> 	conceivable that by my holding signed data indicates,
> 	if not the path by which i received said data, who signed the
> 	data.  

Except signatures can be removed.  For example, if I were to
(theoretically) illictly obtain a signed document, I could use
the signature to prove to someone that W went to war in Iraq
without proof of WMD.  However I don't have to reproduce that
signature in all cases, I could remove it in my copy, so you
couldn't verify the origin of the document.

Watermarking needs to be performed _IN_ the document, not by a
signature.  And all watermarking techniques have been shown to be
breakable via collusion of multiple recipients of the data.

-derek
-- 
       Derek Atkins                 617-623-3745
       derek@ihtfp.com             www.ihtfp.com
       Computer and Internet Security Consultant

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