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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Insecure Delegation Proofs
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You wrote:
> Since the insecure NS records are not signed (at all!), they can be spoofed.
> (IMHO, the lack of signature on NS (without DS) is uncool in the
> extreme. Having NS RRSIGs, even though they are not authoritative,
> would still have been compatible with opt-out. But that ship has
> sailed, as they say.)

Glue is never signed, because it's impossible to distinguish algorithmically
between an answer from the zone or its parent zone. It is possible to copy
the glue records from the authoritive servers and include those (deeper)
signed records as glue, but the validator can't really make benefit from.

That's why the key material is distributed in two record types:
 DNSKEY contained by the zone
 DS containted by the parent zone

A zone is not allowed to sign or respond with its own DS records and a
parent zone is not allowed to sign or respond with the child DNSKEY records.

Moving a special record of the zone into the parent allows the resolver to
distinguish the various delegation levels and complete the delegation chain
by asking for DS records explicitly (to overcome the grandparent problem).

Consequently the RRSIG of a response from the parent zone can only cover the
DS (because it's authoritive) and not the NS (because it's glue). OTOH the
RRSIG of a response from the child zone has to cover at least the DNSKEY,
NS, and SOA records (because they are authoritive and needed for a correct
setup) and never DS (because it's not in scope).

For the usual historical remarks, let me point out, that the early DNSSEC
idea was to put the whole key material into the parent zone (KEY with SEP
bit) and the client zone (KEY without SEP bit).

> The attack is, to over-write a *signed* NS (with DS), by an unsigned
> NS (with no DS or any other DNSSEC record).

Sorry, I do not get it. Why should an unsigned NS record be accepted at all?
If the zone y.z is signed, there is either an signed DS for x.y.z or an
NSEC(3) record covering x.y.z. Only in this case the response from the
parent is correct. And even in this case the attacker can simply modify the
NS (glue) entries on the fly.

> The defense is, to check the hash of any unsigned NS, and if it
> matches an NSEC3 with opt-out, it clearly is a forgery and should be
> discarded.

Why? That's a legitim response from a parent zone.

> To prevent this NS hijacking, the NS has to be hashed.

There is no way to prevent glue modifications at all.

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From: "Blacka, David" <davidb@verisign.com>
To: Sean Wells <snwells82@gmail.com>
Thread-Topic: [dnsext] Insecure Delegation Proofs
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Date: Fri, 1 Jul 2011 13:28:35 +0000
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On Jun 30, 2011, at 3:18 PM, Sean Wells wrote:

> Hi,
>=20
> DNSSEC bis updates document states:
>=20
> [RFC4035] Section
> =
5.2<http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-bis-updates-12#sec=
tion-5.2>specifies
> that a validator, when proving a
>=20
>   delegation is not secure, needs to check for the absence of the DS
>   and SOA bits in the NSEC (or NSEC3) type bitmap.  The validator also
>   needs to check for the presence of the NS bit in the matching NSEC
>   (or NSEC3) RR (proving that there is, indeed, a delegation), or
>   alternately make sure that the delegation is covered by an NSEC3 RR
>   with the Opt-Out flag set.  If this is not checked, spoofed unsigned
>   delegations might be used to claim that an existing signed record is
>   not signed.
>=20
>=20
> The last sentence is confusing: what is a "spoofed unsigned
> delegation" ? Let us say that there are two delegations one of which
> is secure.

A spoofed unsigned delegation is a spoofed response in the form of a =
referral ("delegation" basically means referral here) without a DS =
RRset.

> a.com is secure, so there is a DS record in com
>=20
> b.com is insecure, so there is a NSEC record for b.com in com with DS,
> SOA bits not set but the NS bit set.
>=20
>=20
> I am looking up the DS record for "a.com". The attacker is responding
> the NSEC record for b.com (or it was already in my cache). In this
> case, the owner name does not match the SNAME (a.com). I thought we
> checked the bitmap of the NSEC only if the owner name matches. This
> NSEC record might still be accepted depending on what is there in the
> "Next domain field". Is this the attack that is being described ?

No.  This attack is about obscuring non-delegation names (i.e., and =
"existing signed record") with the spoofed delegation.  So, imagine you =
have a signed zone, foo.example.  In that zone, you have an RRset that =
an attacker wants to change: secure.foo.example/A.  Now, there exists an =
NSEC record for secure.foo.example: =20

  secure.foo.example NSEC secure2.foo.example A NSEC RRSIG

So, when a client asks for secure.foo.example/A, the attacker spoofs a =
response that looks like this:

  secure.foo.example NS bad-ns1.attacker.example.
  secure.foo.example NS bad-ns2.attacker.example.
  secure.foo.example NSEC secure2.foo.example A NSEC RRSIG
  secure.foo.example RRSIG NSEC ...

That is, the attacker uses the existing NSEC for secure.foo.example.  =
Note however, that this NSEC record's type map does not have the DS bit =
set.  So, if you are a naive validator, you might just follow the =
referral, noting it is insecure (because the DS bit isn't set), but fail =
to notice that it shouldn't have been a delegation at all.  Hence the =
advice.

--
David Blacka                          <davidb@verisign.com>=20
Principal Engineer      Verisign Infrastructure Engineering


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To: "Jon F." <pikel.m95@gmail.com>
Cc: Timothe Litt <litt@acm.org>, bind-users@isc.org
From: Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org>
References: <45336A86FEAC4E029843F665D31B588A@sb.litts.net> <BANLkTim=MAAu1y+XH7yziBMRZNvx30zzFQ@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: DNAME?
In-reply-to: Your message of "Thu, 30 Jun 2011 15:10:38 EST."
             <BANLkTim=MAAu1y+XH7yziBMRZNvx30zzFQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 01 Jul 2011 10:58:29 +1000


In message <BANLkTim=MAAu1y+XH7yziBMRZNvx30zzFQ@mail.gmail.com>, "Jon F." write
s:
> I have a similar set up to that and it works. Have you checked the logs to
> make sure the zone properly loaded? I'm assuming the zone data you posted
> below is from the example.us zone but your first question makes it sound
> like you put it in a seperate zone. That would explain the SERVFAIL if the
> zone data never loaded but the server was authoritative. It does need to be
> in the .us.
> 
> 
> ;; ANSWER SECTION:
> example.com.           60      IN      DNAME   example.net.
> test.example.com.     60      IN      CNAME   test.example.net.
> test.example.net.       60      IN      A       127.0.0.1
> 
> 
> 
> And that's with zone data like this:
> example.com.  IN NS ns1.example.net.
> example.com.   IN NS ns2.example.net.
> example.com.  IN A 10.0.0.1
> example.com. IN DNAME example.net.
> 
> 
> Truthfully I haven't looked at DNAME's in a long time so I'm unsure how to
> do it fully for a domain without adding an A record as well. But what your
> doing works, it's just not very pretty. Someone may have a better way.

There is an outstanding proposals for BNAME.  This would be added
to the parent zone instead of NS records and would synthesis CNAMEs
records for the domain and its children.

This has got bogged down in IETF politics over how to fix idn rather
that be allowed to stand on its own merits.

Mark
- -- 
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: marka@isc.org

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Date: Fri, 1 Jul 2011 09:49:19 -0700
Message-ID: <BANLkTi=OnJGEnH9nMLb3AndrSG-RNgR7CQ@mail.gmail.com>
From: Sean Wells <snwells82@gmail.com>
To: "Blacka, David" <davidb@verisign.com>
Cc: "<dnsext@ietf.org>" <dnsext@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [dnsext] Insecure Delegation Proofs
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On Fri, Jul 1, 2011 at 6:28 AM, Blacka, David <davidb@verisign.com> wrote:

>
> On Jun 30, 2011, at 3:18 PM, Sean Wells wrote:
>
> > Hi,
> >
> > DNSSEC bis updates document states:
> >
> > [RFC4035] Section
> > 5.2<
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-bis-updates-12#section-5.2
> >specifies
> > that a validator, when proving a
> >
> >   delegation is not secure, needs to check for the absence of the DS
> >   and SOA bits in the NSEC (or NSEC3) type bitmap.  The validator also
> >   needs to check for the presence of the NS bit in the matching NSEC
> >   (or NSEC3) RR (proving that there is, indeed, a delegation), or
> >   alternately make sure that the delegation is covered by an NSEC3 RR
> >   with the Opt-Out flag set.  If this is not checked, spoofed unsigned
> >   delegations might be used to claim that an existing signed record is
> >   not signed.
> >
> >
> > The last sentence is confusing: what is a "spoofed unsigned
> > delegation" ? Let us say that there are two delegations one of which
> > is secure.
>
> A spoofed unsigned delegation is a spoofed response in the form of a
> referral ("delegation" basically means referral here) without a DS RRset.
>
> > a.com is secure, so there is a DS record in com
> >
> > b.com is insecure, so there is a NSEC record for b.com in com with DS,
> > SOA bits not set but the NS bit set.
> >
> >
> > I am looking up the DS record for "a.com". The attacker is responding
> > the NSEC record for b.com (or it was already in my cache). In this
> > case, the owner name does not match the SNAME (a.com). I thought we
> > checked the bitmap of the NSEC only if the owner name matches. This
> > NSEC record might still be accepted depending on what is there in the
> > "Next domain field". Is this the attack that is being described ?
>
> No.  This attack is about obscuring non-delegation names (i.e., and
> "existing signed record") with the spoofed delegation.  So, imagine you have
> a signed zone, foo.example.  In that zone, you have an RRset that an
> attacker wants to change: secure.foo.example/A.  Now, there exists an NSEC
> record for secure.foo.example:
>
>  secure.foo.example NSEC secure2.foo.example A NSEC RRSIG
>
> So, when a client asks for secure.foo.example/A, the attacker spoofs a
> response that looks like this:
>
>  secure.foo.example NS bad-ns1.attacker.example.
>  secure.foo.example NS bad-ns2.attacker.example.
>  secure.foo.example NSEC secure2.foo.example A NSEC RRSIG
>  secure.foo.example RRSIG NSEC ...
>
> That is, the attacker uses the existing NSEC for secure.foo.example.  Note
> however, that this NSEC record's type map does not have the DS bit set.  So,
> if you are a naive validator, you might just follow the referral, noting it
> is insecure (because the DS bit isn't set), but fail to notice that it
> shouldn't have been a delegation at all.  Hence the advice.
>
> Ah! got it. An example always makes it much clearer. This is not even an
attack. I could have looked up a name (that does not exist) earlier that
resulted in the NSEC record in my cache and later when I look up the DS
record, this would answer it.  I suggest we reword the last sentence to make
it clearer.  Something like:

       As every authoritative name in the zone has a valid NSEC record, it
could potentially answer a question
       that is looking for a DS record for any such name. Checking the NS
bit makes sure that this NSEC record
       will not be mistaken for a unsigned delegation.

does that sound right ? I wouldn't even call it an attack. The best way is
to show the above example in the appendix.

thanks
Sean

--
> David Blacka                          <davidb@verisign.com>
> Principal Engineer      Verisign Infrastructure Engineering
>
>


-- 
Sean

--bcaec54eef9a86f4e404a704cce8
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
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<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Fri, Jul 1, 2011 at 6:28 AM, Blacka, =
David <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:davidb@verisign.com">davidb@v=
erisign.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" styl=
e=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
<div class=3D"im"><br>
On Jun 30, 2011, at 3:18 PM, Sean Wells wrote:<br>
<br>
&gt; Hi,<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; DNSSEC bis updates document states:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; [RFC4035] Section<br>
</div>&gt; 5.2&lt;<a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dnsext-d=
nssec-bis-updates-12#section-5.2" target=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/h=
tml/draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-bis-updates-12#section-5.2</a>&gt;specifies<br=
>

<div class=3D"im">&gt; that a validator, when proving a<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; =A0 delegation is not secure, needs to check for the absence of the DS=
<br>
&gt; =A0 and SOA bits in the NSEC (or NSEC3) type bitmap. =A0The validator =
also<br>
&gt; =A0 needs to check for the presence of the NS bit in the matching NSEC=
<br>
&gt; =A0 (or NSEC3) RR (proving that there is, indeed, a delegation), or<br=
>
&gt; =A0 alternately make sure that the delegation is covered by an NSEC3 R=
R<br>
&gt; =A0 with the Opt-Out flag set. =A0If this is not checked, spoofed unsi=
gned<br>
&gt; =A0 delegations might be used to claim that an existing signed record =
is<br>
&gt; =A0 not signed.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; The last sentence is confusing: what is a &quot;spoofed unsigned<br>
&gt; delegation&quot; ? Let us say that there are two delegations one of wh=
ich<br>
&gt; is secure.<br>
<br>
</div>A spoofed unsigned delegation is a spoofed response in the form of a =
referral (&quot;delegation&quot; basically means referral here) without a D=
S RRset.<br>
<div class=3D"im"><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"http://a.com" target=3D"_blank">a.com</a> is secure, so the=
re is a DS record in com<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"http://b.com" target=3D"_blank">b.com</a> is insecure, so t=
here is a NSEC record for <a href=3D"http://b.com" target=3D"_blank">b.com<=
/a> in com with DS,<br>
&gt; SOA bits not set but the NS bit set.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I am looking up the DS record for &quot;<a href=3D"http://a.com" targe=
t=3D"_blank">a.com</a>&quot;. The attacker is responding<br>
&gt; the NSEC record for <a href=3D"http://b.com" target=3D"_blank">b.com</=
a> (or it was already in my cache). In this<br>
&gt; case, the owner name does not match the SNAME (<a href=3D"http://a.com=
" target=3D"_blank">a.com</a>). I thought we<br>
&gt; checked the bitmap of the NSEC only if the owner name matches. This<br=
>
&gt; NSEC record might still be accepted depending on what is there in the<=
br>
&gt; &quot;Next domain field&quot;. Is this the attack that is being descri=
bed ?<br>
<br>
</div>No. =A0This attack is about obscuring non-delegation names (i.e., and=
 &quot;existing signed record&quot;) with the spoofed delegation. =A0So, im=
agine you have a signed zone, foo.example. =A0In that zone, you have an RRs=
et that an attacker wants to change: secure.foo.example/A. =A0Now, there ex=
ists an NSEC record for secure.foo.example:<br>

<br>
 =A0secure.foo.example NSEC secure2.foo.example A NSEC RRSIG<br>
<br>
So, when a client asks for secure.foo.example/A, the attacker spoofs a resp=
onse that looks like this:<br>
<br>
 =A0secure.foo.example NS bad-ns1.attacker.example.<br>
 =A0secure.foo.example NS bad-ns2.attacker.example.<br>
 =A0secure.foo.example NSEC secure2.foo.example A NSEC RRSIG<br>
 =A0secure.foo.example RRSIG NSEC ...<br>
<br>
That is, the attacker uses the existing NSEC for secure.foo.example. =A0Not=
e however, that this NSEC record&#39;s type map does not have the DS bit se=
t. =A0So, if you are a naive validator, you might just follow the referral,=
 noting it is insecure (because the DS bit isn&#39;t set), but fail to noti=
ce that it shouldn&#39;t have been a delegation at all. =A0Hence the advice=
.<br>

<font color=3D"#888888"><br></font></blockquote><div>Ah! got it. An example=
 always makes it much clearer. This is not even an attack. I could have loo=
ked up a name (that does not exist) earlier that resulted in the NSEC recor=
d in my cache and later when I look up the DS record, this would answer it.=
 =A0I suggest we reword the last sentence to make it clearer. =A0Something =
like:</div>
<div><br></div><div>=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0As every authoritative name in the zone =
has a valid NSEC record, it could potentially answer a question</div><div>=
=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0that is looking for a DS record for any such name.=A0Checkin=
g the NS bit makes sure=A0that this NSEC record</div>
<div>=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0will not be mistaken for a unsigned delegation.</div><d=
iv><br></div><div>does that sound right ? I wouldn&#39;t even call it an at=
tack. The best way is to show the above example in the appendix.=A0</div><d=
iv><br>
</div><div>thanks</div><div>Sean</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"g=
mail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-l=
eft:1ex;"><font color=3D"#888888">
--<br>
David Blacka =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0&lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:davidb@verisign.com">davidb@verisign.com</a>&gt;<br>
Principal Engineer =A0 =A0 =A0Verisign Infrastructure Engineering<br>
<br>
</font></blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><br>-- <br>Sean<br>

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From: "Blacka, David" <davidb@verisign.com>
To: Sean Wells <snwells82@gmail.com>
Thread-Topic: [dnsext] Insecure Delegation Proofs
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Insecure Delegation Proofs
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On Jul 1, 2011, at 12:49 PM, Sean Wells wrote:

> On Fri, Jul 1, 2011 at 6:28 AM, Blacka, David <davidb@verisign.com> =
wrote:
>=20
>>=20
>> On Jun 30, 2011, at 3:18 PM, Sean Wells wrote:
>>=20
>>> Hi,
>>>=20
>>> DNSSEC bis updates document states:
>>>=20
>>> [RFC4035] Section
>>> 5.2<
>> =
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-bis-updates-12#section=
-5.2
>>> specifies
>>> that a validator, when proving a
>>>=20
>>>  delegation is not secure, needs to check for the absence of the DS
>>>  and SOA bits in the NSEC (or NSEC3) type bitmap.  The validator =
also
>>>  needs to check for the presence of the NS bit in the matching NSEC
>>>  (or NSEC3) RR (proving that there is, indeed, a delegation), or
>>>  alternately make sure that the delegation is covered by an NSEC3 RR
>>>  with the Opt-Out flag set.  If this is not checked, spoofed =
unsigned
>>>  delegations might be used to claim that an existing signed record =
is
>>>  not signed.
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> The last sentence is confusing: what is a "spoofed unsigned
>>> delegation" ? Let us say that there are two delegations one of which
>>> is secure.
>>=20
>> A spoofed unsigned delegation is a spoofed response in the form of a
>> referral ("delegation" basically means referral here) without a DS =
RRset.
>>=20
>>> a.com is secure, so there is a DS record in com
>>>=20
>>> b.com is insecure, so there is a NSEC record for b.com in com with =
DS,
>>> SOA bits not set but the NS bit set.
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> I am looking up the DS record for "a.com". The attacker is =
responding
>>> the NSEC record for b.com (or it was already in my cache). In this
>>> case, the owner name does not match the SNAME (a.com). I thought we
>>> checked the bitmap of the NSEC only if the owner name matches. This
>>> NSEC record might still be accepted depending on what is there in =
the
>>> "Next domain field". Is this the attack that is being described ?
>>=20
>> No.  This attack is about obscuring non-delegation names (i.e., and
>> "existing signed record") with the spoofed delegation.  So, imagine =
you have
>> a signed zone, foo.example.  In that zone, you have an RRset that an
>> attacker wants to change: secure.foo.example/A.  Now, there exists an =
NSEC
>> record for secure.foo.example:
>>=20
>> secure.foo.example NSEC secure2.foo.example A NSEC RRSIG
>>=20
>> So, when a client asks for secure.foo.example/A, the attacker spoofs =
a
>> response that looks like this:
>>=20
>> secure.foo.example NS bad-ns1.attacker.example.
>> secure.foo.example NS bad-ns2.attacker.example.
>> secure.foo.example NSEC secure2.foo.example A NSEC RRSIG
>> secure.foo.example RRSIG NSEC ...
>>=20
>> That is, the attacker uses the existing NSEC for secure.foo.example.  =
Note
>> however, that this NSEC record's type map does not have the DS bit =
set.  So,
>> if you are a naive validator, you might just follow the referral, =
noting it
>> is insecure (because the DS bit isn't set), but fail to notice that =
it
>> shouldn't have been a delegation at all.  Hence the advice.


>> Ah! got it. An example always makes it much clearer. This is not even =
an
> attack. I could have looked up a name (that does not exist) earlier =
that
> resulted in the NSEC record in my cache and later when I look up the =
DS
> record, this would answer it. =20

This is an attack.  The attack is where the bogus NS records come from.

> I suggest we reword the last sentence to make
> it clearer.  Something like:
>=20
>       As every authoritative name in the zone has a valid NSEC record, =
it
> could potentially answer a question
>       that is looking for a DS record for any such name. Checking the =
NS
> bit makes sure that this NSEC record
>       will not be mistaken for a unsigned delegation.
>=20
> does that sound right ? I wouldn't even call it an attack. The best =
way is
> to show the above example in the appendix.

No, it doesn't sound quite correct.  "it could potentially answer a =
question that is looking for a DS..." is true, but irrelevant to this =
case.  The case that this advice is guarding against isn't that specific =
to qtype.  I'm not going to claim that the current language is as clear =
as it could be, but this replacement text doesn't quite work, either.

--
David Blacka                          <davidb@verisign.com>=20
Principal Engineer      Verisign Infrastructure Engineering


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References: <BANLkTinRXEmhC_5ikFfoXczat6+4UPJ1pA@mail.gmail.com> <DB8097F2-72B0-448F-9607-7BA3F7473315@verisign.com> <BANLkTi=OnJGEnH9nMLb3AndrSG-RNgR7CQ@mail.gmail.com> <3294DE6F-0618-4083-8AE8-254EF8618087@verisign.com>
Date: Fri, 1 Jul 2011 11:33:05 -0700
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From: Sean Wells <snwells82@gmail.com>
To: "Blacka, David" <davidb@verisign.com>
Cc: "<dnsext@ietf.org>" <dnsext@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [dnsext] Insecure Delegation Proofs
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On Fri, Jul 1, 2011 at 10:53 AM, Blacka, David <davidb@verisign.com> wrote:

>
> On Jul 1, 2011, at 12:49 PM, Sean Wells wrote:
>
> > On Fri, Jul 1, 2011 at 6:28 AM, Blacka, David <davidb@verisign.com>
> wrote:
> >
> >>
> >> On Jun 30, 2011, at 3:18 PM, Sean Wells wrote:
> >>
> >>> Hi,
> >>>
> >>> DNSSEC bis updates document states:
> >>>
> >>> [RFC4035] Section
> >>> 5.2<
> >>
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-bis-updates-12#section-5.2
> >>> specifies
> >>> that a validator, when proving a
> >>>
> >>>  delegation is not secure, needs to check for the absence of the DS
> >>>  and SOA bits in the NSEC (or NSEC3) type bitmap.  The validator also
> >>>  needs to check for the presence of the NS bit in the matching NSEC
> >>>  (or NSEC3) RR (proving that there is, indeed, a delegation), or
> >>>  alternately make sure that the delegation is covered by an NSEC3 RR
> >>>  with the Opt-Out flag set.  If this is not checked, spoofed unsigned
> >>>  delegations might be used to claim that an existing signed record is
> >>>  not signed.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> The last sentence is confusing: what is a "spoofed unsigned
> >>> delegation" ? Let us say that there are two delegations one of which
> >>> is secure.
> >>
> >> A spoofed unsigned delegation is a spoofed response in the form of a
> >> referral ("delegation" basically means referral here) without a DS
> RRset.
> >>
> >>> a.com is secure, so there is a DS record in com
> >>>
> >>> b.com is insecure, so there is a NSEC record for b.com in com with DS,
> >>> SOA bits not set but the NS bit set.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> I am looking up the DS record for "a.com". The attacker is responding
> >>> the NSEC record for b.com (or it was already in my cache). In this
> >>> case, the owner name does not match the SNAME (a.com). I thought we
> >>> checked the bitmap of the NSEC only if the owner name matches. This
> >>> NSEC record might still be accepted depending on what is there in the
> >>> "Next domain field". Is this the attack that is being described ?
> >>
> >> No.  This attack is about obscuring non-delegation names (i.e., and
> >> "existing signed record") with the spoofed delegation.  So, imagine you
> have
> >> a signed zone, foo.example.  In that zone, you have an RRset that an
> >> attacker wants to change: secure.foo.example/A.  Now, there exists an
> NSEC
> >> record for secure.foo.example:
> >>
> >> secure.foo.example NSEC secure2.foo.example A NSEC RRSIG
> >>
> >> So, when a client asks for secure.foo.example/A, the attacker spoofs a
> >> response that looks like this:
> >>
> >> secure.foo.example NS bad-ns1.attacker.example.
> >> secure.foo.example NS bad-ns2.attacker.example.
> >> secure.foo.example NSEC secure2.foo.example A NSEC RRSIG
> >> secure.foo.example RRSIG NSEC ...
> >>
> >> That is, the attacker uses the existing NSEC for secure.foo.example.
>  Note
> >> however, that this NSEC record's type map does not have the DS bit set.
>  So,
> >> if you are a naive validator, you might just follow the referral, noting
> it
> >> is insecure (because the DS bit isn't set), but fail to notice that it
> >> shouldn't have been a delegation at all.  Hence the advice.
>
>
> >> Ah! got it. An example always makes it much clearer. This is not even an
> > attack. I could have looked up a name (that does not exist) earlier that
> > resulted in the NSEC record in my cache and later when I look up the DS
> > record, this would answer it.
>
> This is an attack.  The attack is where the bogus NS records come from.
>
> Hmm.. perhaps i am misunderstanding something then. Is it possible for this
to happen even without an attack ? Just by merely using the NSEC record to
answer the question (wrongly) ?


> > I suggest we reword the last sentence to make
> > it clearer.  Something like:
> >
> >       As every authoritative name in the zone has a valid NSEC record, it
> > could potentially answer a question
> >       that is looking for a DS record for any such name. Checking the NS
> > bit makes sure that this NSEC record
> >       will not be mistaken for a unsigned delegation.
> >
> > does that sound right ? I wouldn't even call it an attack. The best way
> is
> > to show the above example in the appendix.
>
> No, it doesn't sound quite correct.  "it could potentially answer a
> question that is looking for a DS..." is true, but irrelevant to this case.
>  The case that this advice is guarding against isn't that specific to qtype.
>  I'm not going to claim that the current language is as clear as it could
> be, but this replacement text doesn't quite work, either.
>
> Section 5.2 in RFC 4035 is about authenticating referrals where the DS
RRSets are being looked up. Why is this irrelevant to this case ? Perhaps,
this section is more than 5.2 and i am not reading it properly.




> --
> David Blacka                          <davidb@verisign.com>
> Principal Engineer      Verisign Infrastructure Engineering
>
>
Sean

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<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Fri, Jul 1, 2011 at 10:53 AM, Blacka,=
 David <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:davidb@verisign.com">davidb@=
verisign.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" sty=
le=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
<div><div></div><div class=3D"h5"><br>
On Jul 1, 2011, at 12:49 PM, Sean Wells wrote:<br>
<br>
&gt; On Fri, Jul 1, 2011 at 6:28 AM, Blacka, David &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:da=
vidb@verisign.com">davidb@verisign.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; On Jun 30, 2011, at 3:18 PM, Sean Wells wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Hi,<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; DNSSEC bis updates document states:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; [RFC4035] Section<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; 5.2&lt;<br>
&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-bis=
-updates-12#section-5.2" target=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft=
-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-bis-updates-12#section-5.2</a><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; specifies<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; that a validator, when proving a<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; =A0delegation is not secure, needs to check for the absence of=
 the DS<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; =A0and SOA bits in the NSEC (or NSEC3) type bitmap. =A0The val=
idator also<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; =A0needs to check for the presence of the NS bit in the matchi=
ng NSEC<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; =A0(or NSEC3) RR (proving that there is, indeed, a delegation)=
, or<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; =A0alternately make sure that the delegation is covered by an =
NSEC3 RR<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; =A0with the Opt-Out flag set. =A0If this is not checked, spoof=
ed unsigned<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; =A0delegations might be used to claim that an existing signed =
record is<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; =A0not signed.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; The last sentence is confusing: what is a &quot;spoofed unsign=
ed<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; delegation&quot; ? Let us say that there are two delegations o=
ne of which<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; is secure.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; A spoofed unsigned delegation is a spoofed response in the form of=
 a<br>
&gt;&gt; referral (&quot;delegation&quot; basically means referral here) wi=
thout a DS RRset.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"http://a.com" target=3D"_blank">a.com</a> is secure=
, so there is a DS record in com<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"http://b.com" target=3D"_blank">b.com</a> is insecu=
re, so there is a NSEC record for <a href=3D"http://b.com" target=3D"_blank=
">b.com</a> in com with DS,<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; SOA bits not set but the NS bit set.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; I am looking up the DS record for &quot;<a href=3D"http://a.co=
m" target=3D"_blank">a.com</a>&quot;. The attacker is responding<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; the NSEC record for <a href=3D"http://b.com" target=3D"_blank"=
>b.com</a> (or it was already in my cache). In this<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; case, the owner name does not match the SNAME (<a href=3D"http=
://a.com" target=3D"_blank">a.com</a>). I thought we<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; checked the bitmap of the NSEC only if the owner name matches.=
 This<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; NSEC record might still be accepted depending on what is there=
 in the<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; &quot;Next domain field&quot;. Is this the attack that is bein=
g described ?<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; No. =A0This attack is about obscuring non-delegation names (i.e., =
and<br>
&gt;&gt; &quot;existing signed record&quot;) with the spoofed delegation. =
=A0So, imagine you have<br>
&gt;&gt; a signed zone, foo.example. =A0In that zone, you have an RRset tha=
t an<br>
&gt;&gt; attacker wants to change: secure.foo.example/A. =A0Now, there exis=
ts an NSEC<br>
&gt;&gt; record for secure.foo.example:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; secure.foo.example NSEC secure2.foo.example A NSEC RRSIG<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; So, when a client asks for secure.foo.example/A, the attacker spoo=
fs a<br>
&gt;&gt; response that looks like this:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; secure.foo.example NS bad-ns1.attacker.example.<br>
&gt;&gt; secure.foo.example NS bad-ns2.attacker.example.<br>
&gt;&gt; secure.foo.example NSEC secure2.foo.example A NSEC RRSIG<br>
&gt;&gt; secure.foo.example RRSIG NSEC ...<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; That is, the attacker uses the existing NSEC for secure.foo.exampl=
e. =A0Note<br>
&gt;&gt; however, that this NSEC record&#39;s type map does not have the DS=
 bit set. =A0So,<br>
&gt;&gt; if you are a naive validator, you might just follow the referral, =
noting it<br>
&gt;&gt; is insecure (because the DS bit isn&#39;t set), but fail to notice=
 that it<br>
&gt;&gt; shouldn&#39;t have been a delegation at all. =A0Hence the advice.<=
br>
<br>
<br>
&gt;&gt; Ah! got it. An example always makes it much clearer. This is not e=
ven an<br>
&gt; attack. I could have looked up a name (that does not exist) earlier th=
at<br>
&gt; resulted in the NSEC record in my cache and later when I look up the D=
S<br>
&gt; record, this would answer it.<br>
<br>
</div></div>This is an attack. =A0The attack is where the bogus NS records =
come from.<br>
<div class=3D"im"><br></div></blockquote><div>Hmm.. perhaps i am misunderst=
anding something then. Is it possible for this to happen even without an at=
tack ? Just by merely using the NSEC record to answer the question (wrongly=
) ?</div>
<div>=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;=
border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;"><div class=3D"im">
&gt; I suggest we reword the last sentence to make<br>
&gt; it clearer. =A0Something like:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0 As every authoritative name in the zone has a valid NSEC r=
ecord, it<br>
&gt; could potentially answer a question<br>
&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0 that is looking for a DS record for any such name. Checkin=
g the NS<br>
&gt; bit makes sure that this NSEC record<br>
&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0 will not be mistaken for a unsigned delegation.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; does that sound right ? I wouldn&#39;t even call it an attack. The bes=
t way is<br>
&gt; to show the above example in the appendix.<br>
<br>
</div>No, it doesn&#39;t sound quite correct. =A0&quot;it could potentially=
 answer a question that is looking for a DS...&quot; is true, but irrelevan=
t to this case. =A0The case that this advice is guarding against isn&#39;t =
that specific to qtype. =A0I&#39;m not going to claim that the current lang=
uage is as clear as it could be, but this replacement text doesn&#39;t quit=
e work, either.<br>

<div><div></div><div class=3D"h5"><br></div></div></blockquote><div>Section=
 5.2 in RFC 4035 is about authenticating referrals where the DS RRSets are =
being looked up. Why is this irrelevant to this case ? Perhaps, this sectio=
n is more than 5.2 and i am not reading it properly.</div>
<div><br></div><div><br></div><div>=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quot=
e" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;"=
><div><div class=3D"h5">
--<br>
David Blacka =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0&lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:davidb@verisign.com">davidb@verisign.com</a>&gt;<br>
Principal Engineer =A0 =A0 =A0Verisign Infrastructure Engineering<br>
<br></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Sean=A0</div></div><br><br=
>

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Subject: [dnsext] I-D Action: draft-ietf-dnsext-ecdsa-01.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. This draft is a work item of the DNS Extensions Working Group of the IETF.

	Title           : Elliptic Curve DSA for DNSSEC
	Author(s)       : Paul Hoffman
                          Wouter Wijngaards
	Filename        : draft-ietf-dnsext-ecdsa-01.txt
	Pages           : 8
	Date            : 2011-07-05

   This document describes how to specify Elliptic Curve DSA keys and
   signatures in DNSSEC.  It lists curves of different sizes, and uses
   the SHA-2 family of hashes for signatures.


A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-ecdsa-01.txt

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/

This Internet-Draft can be retrieved at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-ecdsa-01.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. This draft is a work item of the DNS Extensions Working Group of the IETF.

	Title           : Signaling Cryptographic Algorithm Understanding in DNSSEC
	Author(s)       : Steve Crocker
                          Scott Rose
	Filename        : draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-algo-signal-02.txt
	Pages           : 8
	Date            : 2011-07-06

   The DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) were developed to provide origin
   authentication and integrity protection for DNS data by using digital
   signatures.  These digital signatures can be generated using
   different algorithms.  This draft sets out to specify a way for
   validating end-system resolvers to signal to a server which
   cryptographic algorithms they support.



A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-algo-signal-02.txt

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/

This Internet-Draft can be retrieved at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-algo-signal-02.txt
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From: Scott Rose <scottr.nist@gmail.com>
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An updated version of the algo-signal draft to address the issues in WGLC.  Specific changes:

1.  Changed the wording in 3.4.1 to remove the RFC2119 wording on setting the DO bit.  

2. Changed section 4 wording to indicate DNS proxy systems and added a ref to RFC 5625.

3. fixed some typos and minor wording changes to stress that the DAU option is for signaling only and does not specify any change to how servers construct a response.

Scott

Begin forwarded message:

> From: internet-drafts@ietf.org
> Date: July 6, 2011 9:50:12 AM EDT
> To: i-d-announce@ietf.org
> Cc: dnsext@ietf.org
> Subject: [dnsext] I-D Action: draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-algo-signal-02.txt
> 
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. This draft is a work item of the DNS Extensions Working Group of the IETF.
> 
> 	Title           : Signaling Cryptographic Algorithm Understanding in DNSSEC
> 	Author(s)       : Steve Crocker
>                          Scott Rose
> 	Filename        : draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-algo-signal-02.txt
> 	Pages           : 8
> 	Date            : 2011-07-06
> 
>   The DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) were developed to provide origin
>   authentication and integrity protection for DNS data by using digital
>   signatures.  These digital signatures can be generated using
>   different algorithms.  This draft sets out to specify a way for
>   validating end-system resolvers to signal to a server which
>   cryptographic algorithms they support.
> 
> 
> 
> A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-algo-signal-02.txt
> 
> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
> 
> This Internet-Draft can be retrieved at:
> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-algo-signal-02.txt
> _______________________________________________
> dnsext mailing list
> dnsext@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext

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Dear Colleagues

This message starts a Working Group Last Call for
"Elliptic Curve DSA for DNSSEC" located at
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-ecdsa-01.txt
This document is on Standards track.

This WGLC will conclude on midnight on July 21'th UTC.

Please review the document and sent a statement that you reviewed the
document.  If the review raises any issues, please note what they are.
Remember that we need a minimum of 5 reviewers.


     Olafur & Andrew
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At 17:17 -0400 7/6/11, Olafur Gudmundsson wrote:

>This message starts a Working Group Last Call for
>"Elliptic Curve DSA for DNSSEC" located at
>http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-ecdsa-01.txt
>This document is on Standards track.

I have some minor comments and some questions.

First, and this may fall into "style", "ECDSA" is not expanded in the 
Introduction (but it is in the abstract).  My preference has been to 
expand letters the first use in the main body of the document.

A more significant comment is that there is no reference defining 
ECDSA.  In particular, this paragraph:

#   This document defines the DNSKEY and RRSIG resource records (RRs) of
#   two new signing algorithms: ECDSA with curve P-256 and SHA-256, and
#   ECDSA with curve P-384 and SHA-384.  This document also defines the
#   DS RR for the SHA-384 one-way hash algorithm; the associated DS RR
#   for SHA-256 is already defined in RFC 4509 [RFC4509].

Lacks any document defining ECDSA.  In the references there are two 
FIPS listed.

(Mind you, I am not well read in cryptography.  For the most part I 
don't care for the details.  I'm just asking for a pointer where I 
could go read more if I cared.)

And my question.

When I saw the dreaded "DSA" I immediately harked back to the fact 
that is slower where it matters - verfication - than RSA.  And the 
draft does address this:

#  However, validating RSA signatures is significantly faster than validating
#  ECDSA signatures (about 5 times faster in some implementations).

 From what I gather, the case for ECDSA is that the keys and 
signatures is that they are shorter.

#  ECDSA keys are much shorter than RSA keys; at this size, the 
difference is 256
#  versus 3072 bits.  Similarly, ECDSA signatures are much shorter 
than RSA signatures.

Caveats I cut out here, because I'm no cryptogeek, is that the 
"shorter" is within the same "strengths" (whatever "strength" means) 
of protection.  I'm taking for granted, this is a pound of oranges 
vs. a pound of apples comparison.

What is set up here is the classic - "Space vs. Time" tradeoff.

So here's the question to the authors/experts on this.  Is the 
tradeoff worth it?  Is the extra slowness in validation worth the 
savings in bytes?  I haven't seen much evidence that larger DNSSEC 
responses are killing us - and I don't mean to say that there isn't a 
problem looming, but I don't see any evidence.  So I wonder about the 
value of the lost time (which is something DNS gets hammered with by 
web site operators).

This isn't a situation in which I can contribute text, but I would 
like to see a paragraph or two at least hypothesizing on the tradeoff 
and why ECDSA might be better than the current state of operations. 
Switching to ECDSA for the current 60+ signed TLDs and root would 
take some effort, would it be worth it?

(Yeah, the latter question is one for operators.  I'm asking for the 
experts prognostication if they are willing.)

-- 
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Edward Lewis             
NeuStar                    You can leave a voice message at +1-571-434-5468

I'm overly entertained.
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On Jul 7, 2011, at 8:13 AM, Edward Lewis wrote:

> At 17:17 -0400 7/6/11, Olafur Gudmundsson wrote:
> 
>> This message starts a Working Group Last Call for
>> "Elliptic Curve DSA for DNSSEC" located at
>> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-ecdsa-01.txt
>> This document is on Standards track.
> 
> I have some minor comments and some questions.
> 
> First, and this may fall into "style", "ECDSA" is not expanded in the Introduction (but it is in the abstract).  My preference has been to expand letters the first use in the main body of the document.

Good catch, will do.

> A more significant comment is that there is no reference defining ECDSA.  In particular, this paragraph:
> 
> #   This document defines the DNSKEY and RRSIG resource records (RRs) of
> #   two new signing algorithms: ECDSA with curve P-256 and SHA-256, and
> #   ECDSA with curve P-384 and SHA-384.  This document also defines the
> #   DS RR for the SHA-384 one-way hash algorithm; the associated DS RR
> #   for SHA-256 is already defined in RFC 4509 [RFC4509].
> 
> Lacks any document defining ECDSA.  In the references there are two FIPS listed.

It is not just in the references: Section 3 points directly to the FIPS document that defines the curves used in ECDSA.

> (Mind you, I am not well read in cryptography.  For the most part I don't care for the details.  I'm just asking for a pointer where I could go read more if I cared.)

FIPS 186-3, as listed in Section 3. Not that I'm recommending it, mind you.

> And my question.
> 
> When I saw the dreaded "DSA" I immediately harked back to the fact that is slower where it matters - verfication - than RSA.  And the draft does address this:
> 
> #  However, validating RSA signatures is significantly faster than validating
> #  ECDSA signatures (about 5 times faster in some implementations).
> 
> From what I gather, the case for ECDSA is that the keys and signatures is that they are shorter.
> 
> #  ECDSA keys are much shorter than RSA keys; at this size, the difference is 256
> #  versus 3072 bits.  Similarly, ECDSA signatures are much shorter than RSA signatures.
> 
> Caveats I cut out here, because I'm no cryptogeek, is that the "shorter" is within the same "strengths" (whatever "strength" means) of protection.  I'm taking for granted, this is a pound of oranges vs. a pound of apples comparison.
> 
> What is set up here is the classic - "Space vs. Time" tradeoff.
> 
> So here's the question to the authors/experts on this.  Is the tradeoff worth it?  

Yes.

> Is the extra slowness in validation worth the savings in bytes?  

That is not the only tradeoff. The strength of RSA keys goes down year after year, but the strength of ECDSA keys hasn't declined at all. For sites that require a certain strength and want that strength year after year, they have to increase the length of their RSA keys.

> I haven't seen much evidence that larger DNSSEC responses are killing us - and I don't mean to say that there isn't a problem looming, but I don't see any evidence.  So I wonder about the value of the lost time (which is something DNS gets hammered with by web site operators).

That is going to depend on the preferences of who is doing the measurements. ECDSA allows the hosts who have a particular set of priorities to use smaller keys that don't degrade; RSA allows hosts who don't feel the need for as much security to use keys that will validate somewhat faster.

> This isn't a situation in which I can contribute text, but I would like to see a paragraph or two at least hypothesizing on the tradeoff and why ECDSA might be better than the current state of operations. Switching to ECDSA for the current 60+ signed TLDs and root would take some effort, would it be worth it?

Please, no. That kind of pie-in-the-sky speculation does not belong in a technical document such as this. If you feel like writing such a document in DNSOP, great, but it really doesn't belong here. 

> (Yeah, the latter question is one for operators.  I'm asking for the experts prognostication if they are willing.)


Not willing.

--Paul Hoffman

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At 8:47 -0700 7/7/11, Paul Hoffman wrote:
>It is not just in the references: Section 3 points directly to the 
>FIPS document that defines the curves used in ECDSA.

Then the nit - please add the refernce earlier.

>>  Is the extra slowness in validation worth the savings in bytes?

>That is not the only tradeoff. The strength of RSA keys goes down year
>after year, but the strength of ECDSA keys hasn't declined at all. For
>sites that require a certain strength and want that strength year after
>year, they have to increase the length of their RSA keys.

>That is going to depend on the preferences of who is doing the measurements.
>ECDSA allows the hosts who have a particular set of priorities to use
>smaller keys that don't degrade; RSA allows hosts who don't feel the need
>for as much security to use keys that will validate somewhat faster.

I'd like to see those words in the doc.

>Please, no. That kind of pie-in-the-sky speculation does not belong
>in a technical document such as this.

Ok, I get that.

>>   asking for the experts prognostication if they are willing.
>Not willing.

Chicken ;)
-- 
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NeuStar                    You can leave a voice message at +1-571-434-5468

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On Jul 7, 2011, at 10:32 AM, Edward Lewis wrote:

> At 8:47 -0700 7/7/11, Paul Hoffman wrote:
>> It is not just in the references: Section 3 points directly to the FIPS document that defines the curves used in ECDSA.
> 
> Then the nit - please add the refernce earlier.

Will do.

>>> Is the extra slowness in validation worth the savings in bytes?
> 
>> That is not the only tradeoff. The strength of RSA keys goes down year
>> after year, but the strength of ECDSA keys hasn't declined at all. For
>> sites that require a certain strength and want that strength year after
>> year, they have to increase the length of their RSA keys.
> 
>> That is going to depend on the preferences of who is doing the measurements.
>> ECDSA allows the hosts who have a particular set of priorities to use
>> smaller keys that don't degrade; RSA allows hosts who don't feel the need
>> for as much security to use keys that will validate somewhat faster.
> 
> I'd like to see those words in the doc.

Not unless others in the WG really want this. Other docs that have described different crypto algorithms (such as different hash functions) haven't had such descriptions, and I think that's a good thing. Crypto protocol descriptions should not be telling people how to consider them.

--Paul Hoffman

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At 10:54 -0700 7/7/11, Paul Hoffman wrote:

>Not unless others in the WG really want this. Other docs that have
>described different crypto algorithms (such as different hash functions)
>haven't had such descriptions, and I think that's a good thing. Crypto
>protocol descriptions should not be telling people how to consider them.

But this is a DNS document and we need all the help we can get when 
it comes to understanding crypto, at least as far as it's role in 
DNSSEC deployments.
-- 
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Edward Lewis
NeuStar                    You can leave a voice message at +1-571-434-5468

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On 07/07/2011 2:05 PM, Edward Lewis wrote:
> At 10:54 -0700 7/7/11, Paul Hoffman wrote:
>
>> Not unless others in the WG really want this. Other docs that have
>> described different crypto algorithms (such as different hash functions)
>> haven't had such descriptions, and I think that's a good thing. Crypto
>> protocol descriptions should not be telling people how to consider them.
>
> But this is a DNS document and we need all the help we can get when it
> comes to understanding crypto, at least as far as it's role in DNSSEC
> deployments.


<chair-hat=on>

I tend to agree with Paul on this one, this is not appropriate content 
for a code allocation document.

I think something like this might be published as BCP in a separate 
document.

	Olafur
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On Jul 7, 2011, at 1:54 PM, Paul Hoffman wrote:

>>>> Is the extra slowness in validation worth the savings in bytes?
>> 
>>> That is not the only tradeoff. The strength of RSA keys goes down year
>>> after year, but the strength of ECDSA keys hasn't declined at all. For
>>> sites that require a certain strength and want that strength year after
>>> year, they have to increase the length of their RSA keys.
>> 
>>> That is going to depend on the preferences of who is doing the measurements.
>>> ECDSA allows the hosts who have a particular set of priorities to use
>>> smaller keys that don't degrade; RSA allows hosts who don't feel the need
>>> for as much security to use keys that will validate somewhat faster.
>> 
>> I'd like to see those words in the doc.
> 
> Not unless others in the WG really want this. Other docs that have described different crypto algorithms (such as different hash functions) haven't had such descriptions, and I think that's a good thing. Crypto protocol descriptions should not be telling people how to consider them.
> 

I don't think it is needed in this doc, since it was never considered to be needed in any other algorithm spec doc.  Sounds like something like that would belong in a larger DNSSEC crypto considerations document since similar text would be desired for other algorithms and not just ECDSA.

Scott


> --Paul Hoffman
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From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
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Section 8:

"The cryptographic strength of ECDSA with curve P-256 or P-384 is
   generally considered to be equivalent to half the size of the key, or
   128 bits and 192 bits, respectively. "


This should be 'Work Factor'

Whit Diffie corrected me on this while I was speaking at a conference. Work
factor is the way to think about it. 128 bits does not in itself imply a
difficulty, the difficulty of 128 bit RSA being rather different to 128 bit
AES.


On Wed, Jul 6, 2011 at 5:17 PM, Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@ogud.com> wrote:

> Dear Colleagues
>
> This message starts a Working Group Last Call for
> "Elliptic Curve DSA for DNSSEC" located at
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-**drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-**ecdsa-01.txt<http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-ecdsa-01.txt>
> This document is on Standards track.
>
> This WGLC will conclude on midnight on July 21'th UTC.
>
> Please review the document and sent a statement that you reviewed the
> document.  If the review raises any issues, please note what they are.
> Remember that we need a minimum of 5 reviewers.
>
>
>    Olafur & Andrew
> ______________________________**_________________
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<div><div>Section 8:</div><div><br></div><div>&quot;The cryptographic stren=
gth of ECDSA with curve P-256 or P-384 is</div><div>=A0 =A0generally consid=
ered to be equivalent to half the size of the key, or</div><div>=A0 =A0128 =
bits and 192 bits, respectively. &quot;</div>
<div><br></div><div><br></div><div>This should be &#39;Work Factor&#39;</di=
v></div><div><br></div><div>Whit Diffie corrected me on this while I was sp=
eaking at a conference. Work factor is the way to think about it. 128 bits =
does not in itself imply a difficulty, the difficulty of 128 bit RSA being =
rather different to 128 bit AES.</div>
<div><br></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Wed, Jul 6, 2011 at 5:17 P=
M, Olafur Gudmundsson <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ogud@ogud.com=
">ogud@ogud.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" =
style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
Dear Colleagues<br>
<br>
This message starts a Working Group Last Call for<br>
&quot;Elliptic Curve DSA for DNSSEC&quot; located at<br>
<a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-ecdsa-01.t=
xt" target=3D"_blank">http://www.ietf.org/internet-<u></u>drafts/draft-ietf=
-dnsext-<u></u>ecdsa-01.txt</a><br>
This document is on Standards track.<br>
<br>
This WGLC will conclude on midnight on July 21&#39;th UTC.<br>
<br>
Please review the document and sent a statement that you reviewed the<br>
document. =A0If the review raises any issues, please note what they are.<br=
>
Remember that we need a minimum of 5 reviewers.<br>
<br>
<br>
 =A0 =A0Olafur &amp; Andrew<br>
______________________________<u></u>_________________<br>
dnsext mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:dnsext@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">dnsext@ietf.org</a><br=
>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext" target=3D"_blank">=
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<u></u>listinfo/dnsext</a><br>
</blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><br>-- <br>Website: <a href=3D"htt=
p://hallambaker.com/">http://hallambaker.com/</a><br><br>

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On Jul 7, 2011, at 4:36 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:

> Section 8:
> 
> "The cryptographic strength of ECDSA with curve P-256 or P-384 is
>    generally considered to be equivalent to half the size of the key, or
>    128 bits and 192 bits, respectively. "
> 
> 
> This should be 'Work Factor'

Sounds fine.

--Paul Hoffman

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>But this is a DNS document and we need all the help we can get when 
>it comes to understanding crypto, at least as far as it's role in 
>DNSSEC deployments.

I'd rather keep the documents that describe the bits on the wire
separate from the documents that opine about how one should choose
what bits to send.  The former should be highly stable, the latter can
evolve somewhat as we understand better what the deployment issues
are.

It's not exactly a BCP, since I gather there isn't a whole lot of
practice with new algs in DNSSEC.  It's more of a BHP or BPP
(Hypothetical or Proposed).

R's,
John
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I have read this document and have no further comments.

Best regards,
  Matthijs

On 07/06/2011 11:17 PM, Olafur Gudmundsson wrote:
> Dear Colleagues
> 
> This message starts a Working Group Last Call for
> "Elliptic Curve DSA for DNSSEC" located at
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-ecdsa-01.txt
> This document is on Standards track.
> 
> This WGLC will conclude on midnight on July 21'th UTC.
> 
> Please review the document and sent a statement that you reviewed the
> document.  If the review raises any issues, please note what they are.
> Remember that we need a minimum of 5 reviewers.
> 
> 
>     Olafur & Andrew
> _______________________________________________
> dnsext mailing list
> dnsext@ietf.org
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Date: Fri, 8 Jul 2011 12:56:40 +0200
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Cc: dnsext@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [dnsext] WGLC: Elliptic Curve DSA
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On Wed, Jul 6, 2011 at 11:17 PM, Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@ogud.com> wrote:
> Please review the document and sent a statement that you reviewed the
> document. =A0If the review raises any issues, please note what they are.
> Remember that we need a minimum of 5 reviewers.

I have read this document and also the other reviews. I think this
document should go ahead, with two clarifications, one of which is
new.
The first clarification is moving up the definition of ECDSA, but this
has been noted already and Paul is going to fix it.

The second one is that the document describes a signature as 'r|s'. In
such cases, an implementor is always left wondering where r ends and s
begins. In the case of 'r' and 's' both needing their full amount of
bits, this is easy - the '|' goes exactly down the middle.

But it is possible that either r or s fits in one octet less (or more
even!). The same goes for x and y.

It is helpful therefore to add a sentence that r and s are both
left-padded to their full length or, alternatively, that r and s
occupy the same number of octets in an answer (and the same goes for x
and y).

PowerDNS already includes support for ECDSA in the 3.0 prereleases,
and we use the 'cut down the middle' rule.
http://wiki.powerdns.com/trac/browser/trunk/pdns/pdns/cryptoppsigners.cc#L1=
19

But I'd love to see some text that makes it official. A suggestion
might be as the new third paragraph of section 4:
"Implementations will ensure that when concatenating the halves of a
coordinate, each half takes up the same amount of octets, allowing for
the unambiguous reconstruction of the coordinate on reception".

   Bert
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On Wed, Jul 6, 2011 at 11:17 PM, Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@ogud.com> wrote:
> Please review the document and sent a statement that you reviewed the
> document. =A0If the review raises any issues, please note what they are.
> Remember that we need a minimum of 5 reviewers.

I have read this document and also the other reviews. I think this
document should go ahead, with two clarifications, one of which is
new.
The first clarification is moving up the definition of ECDSA, but this
has been noted already and Paul is going to fix it.

The second one is that the document describes a signature as 'r|s'. In
such cases, an implementor is always left wondering where r ends and s
begins. In the case of 'r' and 's' both needing their full amount of
bits, this is easy - the '|' goes exactly down the middle.

But it is possible that either r or s fits in one octet less (or more
even!). The same goes for x and y.

It is helpful therefore to add a sentence that r and s are both
left-padded to their full length or, alternatively, that r and s
occupy the same number of octets in an answer (and the same goes for x
and y).

PowerDNS already includes support for ECDSA in the 3.0 prereleases,
and we use the 'cut down the middle' rule.
http://wiki.powerdns.com/trac/browser/trunk/pdns/pdns/cryptoppsigners.cc#L1=
19

But I'd love to see some text that makes it official. A suggestion
might be as the new third paragraph of section 4:
"Implementations will ensure that when concatenating the halves of a
coordinate, each half takes up the same amount of octets, allowing for
the unambiguous reconstruction of the coordinate on reception".

   Bert
_______________________________________________
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From dnsext-bounces@ietf.org  Fri Jul  8 05:26:47 2011
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I have read the draft and have no additional comments.  I support it going forward.

Scott

On Jul 6, 2011, at 5:17 PM, Olafur Gudmundsson wrote:

> Dear Colleagues
> 
> This message starts a Working Group Last Call for
> "Elliptic Curve DSA for DNSSEC" located at
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-ecdsa-01.txt
> This document is on Standards track.
> 
> This WGLC will conclude on midnight on July 21'th UTC.
> 
> Please review the document and sent a statement that you reviewed the
> document.  If the review raises any issues, please note what they are.
> Remember that we need a minimum of 5 reviewers.
> 
> 
>    Olafur & Andrew
> _______________________________________________
> dnsext mailing list
> dnsext@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext

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[ Quoting bert hubert at 13:08 on July  8 in "Re: [dnsext] WGLC: Elliptic Curve D"... ]
> On Wed, Jul 6, 2011 at 11:17 PM, Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@ogud.com> wrote:
> > Please review the document and sent a statement that you reviewed the
> > document. =A0If the review raises any issues, please note what they are.
> > Remember that we need a minimum of 5 reviewers.

> But I'd love to see some text that makes it official. A suggestion
> might be as the new third paragraph of section 4:
> "Implementations will ensure that when concatenating the halves of a
> coordinate, each half takes up the same amount of octets, allowing for
> the unambiguous reconstruction of the coordinate on reception".

I've read the draft and support its publication, but I also like to
see the text propposed by Bert to be included.

Regards,
    Miek

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On 07/08/2011 02:27 PM, Miek Gieben wrote:
> [ Quoting bert hubert at 13:08 on July  8 in "Re: [dnsext] WGLC: Elliptic Curve D"... ]
>> On Wed, Jul 6, 2011 at 11:17 PM, Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@ogud.com> wrote:
>>> Please review the document and sent a statement that you reviewed the
>>> document. =A0If the review raises any issues, please note what they are.
>>> Remember that we need a minimum of 5 reviewers.
> 
>> But I'd love to see some text that makes it official. A suggestion
>> might be as the new third paragraph of section 4:
>> "Implementations will ensure that when concatenating the halves of a
>> coordinate, each half takes up the same amount of octets, allowing for
>> the unambiguous reconstruction of the coordinate on reception".
> 
> I've read the draft and support its publication, but I also like to
> see the text propposed by Bert to be included.

I have not actually checked this, but the bit length of P256 and P384
are divisible by 8 (divisible by 64 even).  Hence the width of these
variables in octets is a whole number of octets?

Are you proposing some sort of variable length encoding?  I would prefer
simplicity.

Best regards,
   Wouter
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Note below.

At 06:34 AM 7/9/2011, W.C.A. Wijngaards wrote:
>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>Hash: SHA1
>>> But I'd love to see some text that makes it official. A suggestion
>>> might be as the new third paragraph of section 4:
>>> "Implementations will ensure that when concatenating the halves of a
>>> coordinate, each half takes up the same amount of octets, allowing for
>>> the unambiguous reconstruction of the coordinate on reception".
>> 
>> I've read the draft and support its publication, but I also like to
>> see the text propposed by Bert to be included.
>
>I have not actually checked this, but the bit length of P256 and P384
>are divisible by 8 (divisible by 64 even).  Hence the width of these
>variables in octets is a whole number of octets?
>
>Are you proposing some sort of variable length encoding?  I would prefer
>simplicity.


I'm pretty sure what Olafur is saying is that one possible encoding for an integer is no leading zeros, or additional leading zeros if the high bit is set.    e.g. 00000056abcd1234.... 56abcd1234).  You want to be clear that the point is encoded as 2N octets, where N is 16 for P256 and 24 for P384.

I'm coming to this late, otherwise I would have strongly recommended using the well-defined point encoding from X9.6 - of 2N+1 where the first octet is 04 to indicate uncompressed.  The saving of one byte seems to be short-sighted as this is yet another form of public key that tools will have to understand - pretty much every tool/library I know of will require the "04" be prepended to the key bytes before the key can be loaded for verification.  (See RFC 5480, section 2.2 for better text on how to do the encoding)

Mike




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[ Quoting Michael StJohns at 11:01 on July  9 in "Re: [dnsext] WGLC: Elliptic Curve D"... ]
> I'm coming to this late, otherwise I would have strongly recommended
> using the well-defined point encoding from X9.6 - of 2N+1 where the
> first octet is 04 to indicate uncompressed.  The saving of one byte
> seems to be short-sighted as this is yet another form of public key
> that tools will have to understand - pretty much every tool/library
> I know of will require the "04" be prepended to the key bytes before
> the key can be loaded for verification.  (See RFC 5480, section 2.2
> for better text on how to do the encoding)

+1

I now understand why my ecdsa library has Marshal/Unmarshal functions,
and why I could not use them in this case.

Regards,
    Miek

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Subject: [dnsext] I-D Action: draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-bis-updates-13.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. This draft is a work item of the DNS Extensions Working Group of the IETF.

	Title           : Clarifications and Implementation Notes for DNSSECbis
	Author(s)       : Samuel Weiler
                          David Blacka
	Filename        : draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-bis-updates-13.txt
	Pages           : 15
	Date            : 2011-07-11

   This document is a collection of technical clarifications to the
   DNSSECbis document set.  It is meant to serve as a resource to
   implementors as well as a repository of DNSSECbis errata.


A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-bis-updates-13.txt

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/

This Internet-Draft can be retrieved at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-bis-updates-13.txt
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Cc: Edward Lewis <Ed.Lewis@neustar.biz>, dnsext@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [dnsext] Clarifying the mandatory algorithm rules
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On Wed, 30 Mar 2011, Matthijs Mekking wrote:

> Ok, so let's try to come to a reasonable clarifying text:

Many thanks to both Matthijs and Ed for proposing clarifying text.  I just 
added this to dnssec-bis-updates, using a mix of text from Matthijs, Ed, 
and myself.

-- Sam
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While this dicussion (on this list) seemed to conclude that most of these 
changes belong in other docs, I did add one piece from it to 
dnssec-bis-updates:

> In dnssecbis-updates, ...a zone MAY contain RRSIG's for an DNSKEY
> that does not exist in the DNSKEY RRset.

-- Sam
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To: Scott Rose <scottr.nist@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Fwd: I-D Action: draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-algo-signal-02.txt
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On Jul 6, 2011, at 10:00 AM, Scott Rose wrote:

> An updated version of the algo-signal draft to address the issues in WGLC.  Specific changes:
> 
> 1.  Changed the wording in 3.4.1 to remove the RFC2119 wording on setting the DO bit.  
> 
> 2. Changed section 4 wording to indicate DNS proxy systems and added a ref to RFC 5625.
> 
> 3. fixed some typos and minor wording changes to stress that the DAU option is for signaling only and does not specify any change to how servers construct a response.
> 
> Scott

Oooh, I like this version....

Some simple nits:

Section1: Introduction:

O: "for use with DNSSEC (see . "
C: Somethings missing here :-P

O: "by which a client query can signal a set of algorithms it implements."
P: "by which a client query can signal a set of algorithms which it implements.
C: or "that" or something ?

Section 2
O: "for the DNSSEC Algorithm Understood (DAU)"
P: for the DNSSEC Algorithms Understood (DAU)"
C: Plural?

O: "DNSSEC algorithm codes are 1 octet long so this value is the number of octets."
P: ""
C: Is this sentence needed? I don't have proposed text, but I found it broke the flow of the text...

Section 3.1:
O: "So optimal setting of the DAU"
P: "Optimal setting of the DAU"

Section 3.2:
O: "This way thee validating stub resolver"
P: "This way the validating stub resolver"
C: 'thee" is *so* last century...

Section 3.4.1:
O: "A validating recursive resolver sets..."
C: It *might* be interesting to somewhere also include a flag saying if the DAU was included because the client did so, or if the recursive did so because of local policy... 

Section 6:
O: "Zone administrators that are planning"
P: "Zone administrators who are planning"
C: Just sounds better (IMO).


W

> 
> Begin forwarded message:
> 
>> From: internet-drafts@ietf.org
>> Date: July 6, 2011 9:50:12 AM EDT
>> To: i-d-announce@ietf.org
>> Cc: dnsext@ietf.org
>> Subject: [dnsext] I-D Action: draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-algo-signal-02.txt
>> 
>> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. This draft is a work item of the DNS Extensions Working Group of the IETF.
>> 
>> 	Title           : Signaling Cryptographic Algorithm Understanding in DNSSEC
>> 	Author(s)       : Steve Crocker
>>                         Scott Rose
>> 	Filename        : draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-algo-signal-02.txt
>> 	Pages           : 8
>> 	Date            : 2011-07-06
>> 
>>  The DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) were developed to provide origin
>>  authentication and integrity protection for DNS data by using digital
>>  signatures.  These digital signatures can be generated using
>>  different algorithms.  This draft sets out to specify a way for
>>  validating end-system resolvers to signal to a server which
>>  cryptographic algorithms they support.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
>> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-algo-signal-02.txt
>> 
>> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
>> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>> 
>> This Internet-Draft can be retrieved at:
>> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-algo-signal-02.txt
>> _______________________________________________
>> dnsext mailing list
>> dnsext@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext
> 
> _______________________________________________
> dnsext mailing list
> dnsext@ietf.org
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> 

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From dnsext-bounces@ietf.org  Fri Jul 15 11:48:37 2011
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Thanks for the comment.  I will have to double check and fix the example as necessary.

Scott

On Jul 14, 2011, at 2:59 PM, Dick Franks wrote:

> Scott, Patrik,
> 
> I find myself roused from dnsext lurking mode by what  appears to be a
> conflict between draft02 of this proposal and the requirements of
> RFC2671, which has somehow slipped through review.
> 
> RFC2671 defines OPT record wire-format <rdata> to be a list of
> elements of the form:
> 
>    <option-code><option-length>[<option data>]
> 
> This permits an uncomprehending implementation to parse a list
> containing options it does not recognise. For this to work,
> implementations must regard <option-data> as opaque.
> 
> Using the following example based on the text of section 2 of draft02,
> 
>    DAU  2  [ RSASHA256 RSASHA1 ]  1  [RSASH1]
> 
> 
> The uncomprehending implementation in my brain parses this as:
> 
>    <option-code> = DAU
> 
>    <option-length> = 2
> 
>    <option-data> = ( RSHASHA256 RSASHA1 )
> 
> 
>    <option-code> = 1
> 
>    <option-length> = RSASHA1
> 
> game over!
> 
> 
> Either, the internal structure of DAU will need to be changed to
> conform to RFC2671,
> 
>    DAU  5  2  [ RSASHA256 RSASHA1 ]  1  [RSASH1]
> 
> 
> or the proposal reworked to define two new options:
> 
> 
>    ALGU  2  [ RSASHA256 RSASHA1 ]
> 
> 
>    HASHU  1  [RSASH1]
> 
> 
> which, separated, may also find applications beyond DNSSEC.
> 
> 
> I apologise for raining on your parade.
> 
> --Dick
> 
> 
> 
> On 6 July 2011 15:00, Scott Rose <scottr.nist@gmail.com> wrote:
>> An updated version of the algo-signal draft to address the issues in WGLC.  Specific changes:
>> 
>> 1.  Changed the wording in 3.4.1 to remove the RFC2119 wording on setting the DO bit.
>> 
>> 2. Changed section 4 wording to indicate DNS proxy systems and added a ref to RFC 5625.
>> 
>> 3. fixed some typos and minor wording changes to stress that the DAU option is for signaling only and does not specify any change to how servers construct a response.
>> 
>> Scott
>> 
>> Begin forwarded message:
>> 
>>> From: internet-drafts@ietf.org
>>> Date: July 6, 2011 9:50:12 AM EDT
>>> To: i-d-announce@ietf.org
>>> Cc: dnsext@ietf.org
>>> Subject: [dnsext] I-D Action: draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-algo-signal-02.txt
>>> 
>>> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. This draft is a work item of the DNS Extensions Working Group of the IETF.
>>> 
>>>       Title           : Signaling Cryptographic Algorithm Understanding in DNSSEC
>>>       Author(s)       : Steve Crocker
>>>                          Scott Rose
>>>       Filename        : draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-algo-signal-02.txt
>>>       Pages           : 8
>>>       Date            : 2011-07-06
>>> 

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Sorry for not responding earlier, but I have been on PTO... Scott, thanks f=
or having a look at this.

   Patrik F=E4ltstr=F6m
   Distinguished Consulting Engineer
   Office of the CTO

   For corporate legal information go to:
   http://www.cisco.com/web/about/doing_business/legal/cri/index.html


On 15 jul 2011, at 20.47, Scott Rose wrote:

> Thanks for the comment.  I will have to double check and fix the example =
as necessary.
> =

> Scott
> =

> On Jul 14, 2011, at 2:59 PM, Dick Franks wrote:
> =

>> Scott, Patrik,
>> =

>> I find myself roused from dnsext lurking mode by what  appears to be a
>> conflict between draft02 of this proposal and the requirements of
>> RFC2671, which has somehow slipped through review.
>> =

>> RFC2671 defines OPT record wire-format <rdata> to be a list of
>> elements of the form:
>> =

>>   <option-code><option-length>[<option data>]
>> =

>> This permits an uncomprehending implementation to parse a list
>> containing options it does not recognise. For this to work,
>> implementations must regard <option-data> as opaque.
>> =

>> Using the following example based on the text of section 2 of draft02,
>> =

>>   DAU  2  [ RSASHA256 RSASHA1 ]  1  [RSASH1]
>> =

>> =

>> The uncomprehending implementation in my brain parses this as:
>> =

>>   <option-code> =3D DAU
>> =

>>   <option-length> =3D 2
>> =

>>   <option-data> =3D ( RSHASHA256 RSASHA1 )
>> =

>> =

>>   <option-code> =3D 1
>> =

>>   <option-length> =3D RSASHA1
>> =

>> game over!
>> =

>> =

>> Either, the internal structure of DAU will need to be changed to
>> conform to RFC2671,
>> =

>>   DAU  5  2  [ RSASHA256 RSASHA1 ]  1  [RSASH1]
>> =

>> =

>> or the proposal reworked to define two new options:
>> =

>> =

>>   ALGU  2  [ RSASHA256 RSASHA1 ]
>> =

>> =

>>   HASHU  1  [RSASH1]
>> =

>> =

>> which, separated, may also find applications beyond DNSSEC.
>> =

>> =

>> I apologise for raining on your parade.
>> =

>> --Dick
>> =

>> =

>> =

>> On 6 July 2011 15:00, Scott Rose <scottr.nist@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> An updated version of the algo-signal draft to address the issues in WG=
LC.  Specific changes:
>>> =

>>> 1.  Changed the wording in 3.4.1 to remove the RFC2119 wording on setti=
ng the DO bit.
>>> =

>>> 2. Changed section 4 wording to indicate DNS proxy systems and added a =
ref to RFC 5625.
>>> =

>>> 3. fixed some typos and minor wording changes to stress that the DAU op=
tion is for signaling only and does not specify any change to how servers c=
onstruct a response.
>>> =

>>> Scott
>>> =

>>> Begin forwarded message:
>>> =

>>>> From: internet-drafts@ietf.org
>>>> Date: July 6, 2011 9:50:12 AM EDT
>>>> To: i-d-announce@ietf.org
>>>> Cc: dnsext@ietf.org
>>>> Subject: [dnsext] I-D Action: draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-algo-signal-02.=
txt
>>>> =

>>>> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts dir=
ectories. This draft is a work item of the DNS Extensions Working Group of =
the IETF.
>>>> =

>>>>      Title           : Signaling Cryptographic Algorithm Understanding=
 in DNSSEC
>>>>      Author(s)       : Steve Crocker
>>>>                         Scott Rose
>>>>      Filename        : draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-algo-signal-02.txt
>>>>      Pages           : 8
>>>>      Date            : 2011-07-06
>>>> =

> =


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Date: Mon, 18 Jul 2011 18:20:04 -0400
From: Andrew Sullivan <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com>
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Subject: [dnsext] ICANN Variant Issues Project initial definitions document
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No hat.

Dear colleagues,

Apologies if you see this note elsewhere.  The ICANN Variant Issues
Project has previously drawn attention to its activities on this list.
I wanted to draw people's attention to some definitions that were
offered to the teams as part of their work.  They're available from
https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/16842765/initial_definitions_2011-07-15-clean.pdf?version=1&modificationDate=1310760720000.

The project is publishing these definitions in an effort to ensure
they get as wide review as possible.  If you wish to make comments, it
would be ideal if you were to do so on the vip mailing list
(https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/vip).  If that doesn't suit
your fancy, feel free to send your comments to me and I'll see that
they get passed along.  Please do not use the DNS Extensions mailing
list for discussion.

I should note, as a matter of full disclosure, that ICANN has me
consulting on the vip work.

Best regards,

Andrew

-- 
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@anvilwalrusden.com
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Subject: [dnsext] IPR Disclosure: Certicom Corp's Statement of IPR Related to	draft-ietf-dnsext-ecdsa-00
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Dear Paul Hoffman, Wouter Wijngaards:

 An IPR disclosure that pertains to your Internet-Draft entitled "Elliptic Curve
DSA for DNSSEC" (draft-ietf-dnsext-ecdsa) was submitted to the IETF Secretariat
on 2011-07-21 and has been posted on the "IETF Page of Intellectual Property
Rights Disclosures" (https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/1597/). The title of the
IPR disclosure is "Certicom Corp's Statement of IPR Related to draft-ietf-
dnsext-ecdsa-00."");

The IETF Secretariat

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From: Sean Wells <snwells82@gmail.com>
To: "<dnsext@ietf.org>" <dnsext@ietf.org>
Subject: [dnsext] CNAME response to DS
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--bcaec54b45345fb29604a89bbf14
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Hi,

I was unable to find anything in RFC 4035 regarding this. If I lookup a DS
and receive a CNAME response back, how should this be treated ?

- Ignore
- validate the CNAME response and assume that DS does not exist ?
- follow the CNAME and continue to look for a DS ?

What do implementations do today ?

thanks
Sean

--bcaec54b45345fb29604a89bbf14
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
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Hi,<div><br></div><div>I was unable to find anything in RFC 4035 regarding =
this. If I lookup a DS and receive a CNAME response back, how should this b=
e treated ?</div><div><br></div><div>- Ignore</div><div>- validate the CNAM=
E response and assume that DS does not exist ?</div>
<div>- follow the CNAME and continue to look for a DS ?<br clear=3D"all"><b=
r></div><div>What do implementations do today ?</div><div><br></div><div>th=
anks<br>Sean<br>
</div>

--bcaec54b45345fb29604a89bbf14--

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In message <CANokk3JSeOkXUsQ7HFFcDiUcbNTd5jqJOhRNqp13r4YEE3T7UQ@mail.gmail.com>
, Sean Wells writes:
> Hi,
> 
> I was unable to find anything in RFC 4035 regarding this. If I lookup a DS
> and receive a CNAME response back, how should this be treated ?
> 
> - Ignore
> - validate the CNAME response and assume that DS does not exist ?
> - follow the CNAME and continue to look for a DS ?

Since a CNAME + NS can't exist at the same node and DS only exists where
NS records exist you treat it as DS not existing at QNAME.
 
> What do implementations do today ?

Treat it as indicating the DS does not exist.

That said it would be clearer and safer if there were specs to say that
CNAME records MUST NOT be followed when processing DS queries.

Mark
> thanks
> Sean
-- 
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: marka@isc.org
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Dear colleagues:

Please find below my editorial and technical comments on draft-ietf-dnsext-ecdsa-01.

Best regards, Rene

==

Summary of the draft:
The draft specifies two two elliptic curve signature algorithms for use with DNSSEC that were heretoforth not defined,
viz. ECDSA with suite B curves and hash functions at 128-bit and 192-bit crypto bit strength). As pointed out, the main 
rationale for doing so are that use of ECDSA and ECDSA public keys (a) allows smaller size data fields; (b) may allow
computational savings; (c) introduces algorithms with crypto primitives of equivalent cryptographic bit strength.

==

Summary of comments:

1) Editorial:
The draft would benefit from tightening up some of the language, especially since this may lower the chance of confusing 
noncryptographic people.

2) Technical:
The draft results in data fields of size 4n octets, where n is the octet-length of the underlying curve. In fact, one can 
do better and use data fields of size 3n octets, without loss of functionality.

==

Detailed comments:

--

I. Editorial and semi-editorial comments:

(E-a) p.2, Clause 1, first para: 
With RSA, "key" should read "modulus" (e.g., "using 1024 or 2048 bit moduli"). The same remark applies to interchanges 
of keys and moduli with RSA, e.g., third para ("3072-bit keys").

(E-b) p.2, Clause 1, second para:
I suggest adding the following references: 
(1) for P-256 and P-384, xref FIPS Pub 186-3; 
(2) for ECDSA, xref FIPS Pub 186-3 (esp. necessary, so as to specify how to map hash output (bit string) to an integer in Zn); 
(3) SHA-256 and SHA-384, xref FIPS Pub 180-3.
{Note RS: With the availability of RFC 6090 "Fundamentals of ECC", should one refer that RFC as well, besides FIPS Pub 186-3?}

(E-c) p.2, Clause 1, second para:
Replace DS RR by delegating signer resource record (DS RR).

(E-d) p.2, Clause 1, third para:
This para suggests that public keys on the curve P-256 have size 256 bits, but this conflicts the representation in Clause 4, 
first para, where their (affine) representation is 512 bits.
{BTW - I strongly suggest using "octet" units, rather than "bits", since this seems to better align with other crypto-related 
IETF documents, and non-IETF documents (ANSI, SECG, etc.).}

(E-e) p.2, Clause 1, third para:
This para attemts to quantify comparisons of the size of RSA and ECDSA public keys, but does omit this for RSA signatures and ECDSA
signatures. Suggest to correct (for 128-bit crypto bit strength).

(E-f) p.2, Clause 1, fourth para, l.2:
The term "matching" is somewhat unfortunate: why not state that the curve and the hash function are picked with the same cryptographic
bit design strength?

(E-g) p.2, Clause 1, fourth para, l.6:
Unkeyed hash functions do not have a key, so please replace "...is half the length of the key" by "... is half the output size (in bits)".
{Note RS: please note the "(in bits)" phrase, which should also be added to the corresponding statement on cryptographic bit strength for 
public keys (cf. same para, l.4-5: change to "...is half the bit-length of the key"). 

(E-h) p.2, Clause 1, fourth para, l.6:
Replace "using matched strength" by "using the same cryptographic bit strength".

(E-i) p.2, Clause 1, fourth para, l.7:
The notion of "weaker half" of a signature algorithm is somewhat confusing, since, e.g., with ECDSA, while the strength is not entirely 
proven (to my knowledge), it depends on at least three factors, including (1) underlying hash function; (2) underlying ECDHP; 
(3) ECDSA peculiarities. Changing "choosing the weaker half of" by "choosing the weaker cryptographic primitive [or: component] of the 
signature algorithm.

(E-j) p.2, Clause 1, fourth para, l.7-10:
The RSA example would be clearer if one would state that RSA with 2048 modulus is believed to have 112 bit cryptographic bit strength,
since then the discussion about equivalent bit strength becomes simply an exercise in comparing this with the presumed strength of
SHA-256 (half the output size or 128-256/2).

(E-k) p.2, Clause 1, fifth para:
Performance of cryptographic operations is highly platform-dependent, so absolute numbers should be avoided at almost all cost. Moreover, it
is (of course) dependent on the crypto primitive in question -- something that is not mentioned (e.g., is the factor 5x computational advantage
ECDSA signing compared to RSA signing for P-256 vs. RSA-3072, or for something else?). I would suggest to replace "Signing with ECDSA is" by 
"signing with ECDSA may be" and adopt the corresponding absolute language for the verification numbers accordingly as well. Moreover, please 
pick a curve for which these numbers apply. 
{Note RS: as a side note: to illustrate that one has to be careful here, please cf. to Slide 48 of
http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/78/slides/saag-7.pdf, which suggests that for some platforms, both signing and verification for ECDSA is faster
than with RSA (and not just signing, as in this draft).}

(E-l) p.3, Clause 1, sixth para, l.4:
Perhaps, replace "is copied liberally from" by "borrows heavily from"?

(E-m) p.3, Clause 2, l.2:
Replace "the implementation of SHA-384 in DNSSEC" by "the use of SHA-256 in DNSSEC" (after all, now it seems one discusses the implementations 
of SHA-256 and SHA-384 themselves [at least, to me, as nonnative speaker]).

(E-n) p.3, Clause 3:
This clause discusses the need for corresponding parties to have access to the same system-wide parameters, in casu for ECDSA. 
However, the remainder of this clause only talks about the elliptic curve domain parameters (P-256, resp. P-384), but does not mention the 
hash function (SHA-x, etc.) underlying ECDSA, the encoding rules (bit/octet order, etc.) for messages to be signed, etc. This is confusing.

(E-o) p.3, Clause 4, first para:
The x- and y-coordinates of public key Q should be properly introduced. Of course, crypto people know that this corresponds to the affine
representation of points on the corresponding prime curve, but this should be left less as guess work.
In fact, I would strongly urge to use the same representation convention for public keys as used elsewhere, such as, e.g., wiht RFC 3279 
(Clause 2.3.5, ECPoint), with ANSI X9.62-1999 (4.3.6), or with SEC1 or RFC5480. This format nicely allows unique representation of the point
of infinity (0x00), affine points (0x04 | x | y), and compressed points (PC=0x02 or 0x03 | x). Thus, one can represent Q as (0x04 | x | y).

(E-p) p.3, Clause 4, second para:
The signature components r and s are integers, but r | s is an octet string. Please add the following text a the end of the paragraph:
"where "r" and "s" are represented each as octet string, with size the octet size of the (prime) order of the underlying prime curve.

(E-q) p.4, Clause 4, third para:
The two bulletized items should also refer to the underlying ECDSA specification (FIPS Pub 186-3) as well.

(E-r) p.4, Clause 4, fourth para, l.1:
It seems that one cannot state "MUST support" and then offer an "and/or" option. Suggest to change this to support for both signing *and* 
verification (so as to avoid ambiguities here).

(E-s) p.4, Clause 5, second para, l.3:
Not sure why one would not just refer to SHA-1 (which is Algorithm 1, as defined in Clause 11 of RFC 5155). If one somehow does not wish
to admit to using SHA-1, it would really help to add clause numbers, so as to help the reader find all this (some IETF specifications are 
extremely large and making life easier should be explicit goal of writing).

(E-t) p.4, Clause 6, second para:
The picks for TBA-1, TBA-2, and TBA-3 are really obscure; this is much clearer once one disects the examples in Clause 6.1 ff. Also here, 
why not make life easier on the reader and change the last sentence to "The examples use the following algorithm codes:
Code 4 for ECDSAP256SHA256 (TBA-1), ...", etc?

(E-u) p.6, Clause 8, l.2:
Again, please change "half the size of the key" to "half the bit-size of the underlying curve". (Considering the pick in Clause 4 for Q, half 
of the key would be the bit-size of the curve, rather than half the bit-size).

(E-v) pp.3-4, Clause 4 (or, perhaps, more general remark):
Currently, the clause does not make for easy reading, since it just defines the signature format and the public key format and does not
even hint at the clauses in the corresponding base line documentation (RFC 4033,4034, 4035) where all this "falls into place".
I would strongly suggest adding more clues, so as to make this for less esoteric reading. Why not include some text that captures the following
(here, mentioned for 128-bit crypto strength):
The DNSKEY Resource Record is defined in RFC 4034, Clause 2.1.
-the algorithm field (RFC4034, 2.1.3) is set to ECDSAP256SHA256 {TBA-1};
-the public key is set to the representation for the public key introduced in Clause 4;
etc.
Note RS: RFC 4034 already includes Algorithm Type 4 for ECC (cf. Annex A.1), but currently this is undefined.

--

II. Technical comments:

(T-a) p.3, Clause 4, first para:
In this para, the ECDSA signature is 2n octet field, as is the public key Q, where n is the octet size of the order of the underlying curve.
Since the size of the public key Q is important (cf., also Clause 1, third para, last sentence), why not be somewhat more economical here and
represent Q by its x-coordinate only? This does not seem to lead to any loss of functionality, whereas shaving off 25% of the data field 
overhead, from 4n octets to 3n octets. Some details follow:

Underlying motivation:
(1) The point of sending the public key Q along seems to be that one has an identifier for the public signature verification key that one also has
in a white list on the verifier's machine? (If one does not have a white list check on the verifier, the authentication procedure is completely
broken, since then anyone can produce valid signatures.) This assertion seems to be validated by Clause 5.3.1 of RFC 4035 (which discusses 
authentication).
(2) To identify a public key Q residing on a verifier's machine, one does not need the entire public key; the x-coordinate suffices: after all,
no two public signature verification keys belonging to valid signers will have the same x-coordinate (for otherwise, one knows the private key 
of the other).

Suggested improvement:
The above assertions lead to the following 33% size improvement, with following (very modest) changes required:

1) Signing side:
-Clause 4, first para:
Represent the public key Q by its x-coordinate, rather than by the pair x-coordinate and y-coordinate (here, we denote the result by Q');
-Data to be signed: hash data with Q' included, rather than Q (this has no security implications at all, as one can easily see).

2) When verifying an ECDSA signature, "decompress" first:
- Use Q' as index to recover the key Q at verifier's machine;
- Use Q to veerify the ECDSA signature by computing R'=(1/s) (eG +rQ), where e= h(m,Q') and checking that f(R')=r (mathematical short-cut 
notation for ECDSA signature verification).

Final notes RS:
1) If one wishes, one could send either Q'=x-coordinate of Q or Q itself (in case one somehow feels that one needs options (should not be 
necessary, though)). In that case, the "normal" representation of elliptic curve points -- affine representation of Q = (0x04, x, y); new 
x-coordinate only representation Q' = (0x01, x) would do. This does (a) not conflict any ECPoint representations already in use; (b) this does 
allow different representations of the public key in the DNSKEY RR (RFC 4034, Clause 2.1.4), so doing away with need to define new algorithm id 
(RFC 4034, Clause 2.1.3).
2) RFC 4035, Clause 5.1.3 (authentication procedure) already caters for the scenario that one may have "more than one match", so - if one really 
wishes one could compute both Q and -Q from Q' (i.e., compute both (x,y) and (x,-y) given x-coordinate Q') and run the authentication algorithm 
as already specified. 
2) Security is exactly the same as with original construct.
3) There are no nontechnical considerations to be concerned about (note that Q' does not provide any insight on the y-coordinate of Q).

Best regards, Rene




On 06/07/2011 5:17 PM, Olafur Gudmundsson wrote:
> Dear Colleagues
>
> This message starts a Working Group Last Call for
> "Elliptic Curve DSA for DNSSEC" located at
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-ecdsa-01.txt
> This document is on Standards track.
>
> This WGLC will conclude on midnight on July 21'th UTC.
>
> Please review the document and sent a statement that you reviewed the
> document.  If the review raises any issues, please note what they are.
> Remember that we need a minimum of 5 reviewers.
>
>
>     Olafur & Andrew
> _______________________________________________
> dnsext mailing list
> dnsext@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext


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On Fri, 22 Jul 2011, Mark Andrews wrote:

>> - validate the CNAME response and assume that DS does not exist ?
>> - follow the CNAME and continue to look for a DS ?
>
> Since a CNAME + NS can't exist at the same node and DS only exists where
> NS records exist you treat it as DS not existing at QNAME.
>
>> What do implementations do today ?
>
> Treat it as indicating the DS does not exist.
>
> That said it would be clearer and safer if there were specs to say that
> CNAME records MUST NOT be followed when processing DS queries.

I've seen these too. Usually these are broken setups where a wildcard for
any RRTYPE is returned with the CNAME, eg using dig -t TYPE666 would also
return a CNAME.

I don't think people mean these domains to go down with a broken DS chain :)

Paul
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On 22 jul 2011, at 01.42, Paul Wouters wrote:

> Usually these are broken setups where a wildcard for
> any RRTYPE is returned with the CNAME, eg using dig -t TYPE666 would also
> return a CNAME.

Broken?

If one have the following:

$ORIGIN example.com.

@ IN SOA ...
@ IN NS ...
foo.example.com. IN A 192.168.1.1
bar IN CNAME foo.example.com.

Then it will return the CNAME for the a query for TYPE666 and owner bar.example.com.

Or what part of your statement do I not understand before morning coffee...

   Patrik

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Date: Fri, 22 Jul 2011 08:31:43 -0400
To: Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org>
From: Edward Lewis <Ed.Lewis@neustar.biz>
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] CNAME response to DS
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At 8:35 +1000 7/22/11, Mark Andrews wrote:

>Since a CNAME + NS can't exist at the same node and DS only exists where
>NS records exist you treat it as DS not existing at QNAME.

Yes, but, what if we have three zones?

FIRST ZONE has these plus more records

$ORIGIN zone.example.

www.example.   CNAME  www.place.tld.
                RRSIG  CNAME

and SECOND ZONE has these plus more records

$ORIGIN place.tld.

www            NS     ns1.server.tld.
www            DS     keyid=123
                RRSIG  DS

and THIRD ZONE has these records

$ORIGIN www.place.tld.
@              SOA    soa-params
                RRSIG  SOA
                NS     ns1.server.tld.
                RRSIG  NS
                DNSKEY keyid=123
                RRSIG  DNSKEY
                AAAA   ::1
                RRSIG  AAAA
                NSEC   www.place.tld. SOA NS DNSKEY AAAA NSEC RRSIG
                RRSIG  NSEC

And the query begins : dig www.example. AAAA?

The answer would be

www.example.     CNAME  www.place.tld.
www.place.tld.   AAAA   ::1.

Adding in DNSSEC, I can see how this all would work out and why the 
DS query that would be needed would still make sense and work in the 
specification.

Of course, a smart verifier would just verify the original CNAME and 
then realize it has to work down a different path to validate the 
AAAA.  But when a cut point is used as a the terminal point, you can 
work it out like it's just another CNAME.

The deal is - when a domain name appears in a lookup as a result of 
being in a CNAME RDATA, it ceases to be useful as a cut point.  But 
since the DS is not in the usual place, you just have to know where 
to get it.

-- 
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Edward Lewis
NeuStar                    You can leave a voice message at +1-571-434-5468

I'm overly entertained.
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From: Paul Wouters <paul@xelerance.com>
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On Fri, 22 Jul 2011, Patrik F=E4ltstr=F6m wrote:

>> Usually these are broken setups where a wildcard for
>> any RRTYPE is returned with the CNAME, eg using dig -t TYPE666 would also
>> return a CNAME.
>
> Broken?
>
> If one have the following:
>
> $ORIGIN example.com.
>
> @ IN SOA ...
> @ IN NS ...
> foo.example.com. IN A 192.168.1.1
> bar IN CNAME foo.example.com.
>
> Then it will return the CNAME for the a query for TYPE666 and owner bar.e=
xample.com.
>
> Or what part of your statement do I not understand before morning coffee.=
..

I saw the following

$ORIGIN example.com

@ IN SOA ...
@ IN NS ...
* IN * CNAME foo.other.com.

So every RRTYPE including DS would point to foo.other.com, but no DS
record exists at foo.other.com, only an A recor. Turned out this was
some hacked up perl-Net-DNS based nameserver (and some very questioable
domain names being used that are now dead)

Paul
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Subject: [dnsext] I-D Action: draft-ietf-dnsext-rfc2672bis-dname-24.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. This draft is a work item of the DNS Extensions Working Group of the IETF.

	Title           : DNAME Redirection in the DNS
	Author(s)       : Scott Rose
                          Wouter Wijngaards
	Filename        : draft-ietf-dnsext-rfc2672bis-dname-24.txt
	Pages           : 20
	Date            : 2011-07-26

   The DNAME record provides redirection for a sub-tree of the domain
   name tree in the DNS system.  That is, all names that end with a
   particular suffix are redirected to another part of the DNS.  This is
   a revision to the original specification in RFC 2672 as well as
   updating RFC 3363 and RFC 4294 to align with this revision.



A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-rfc2672bis-dname-24.txt

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/

This Internet-Draft can be retrieved at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-rfc2672bis-dname-24.txt
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This version only contains 2 wording changes brought up during last call from the AD's.  The wording was changed in the title and intro to stress that this is a revision and not just an update.

Scott

On Jul 26, 2011, at 7:33 AM, Internet-Drafts@ietf.org wrote:

> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. This draft is a work item of the DNS Extensions Working Group of the IETF.
> 
> 	Title           : DNAME Redirection in the DNS
> 	Author(s)       : Scott Rose
>                          Wouter Wijngaards
> 	Filename        : draft-ietf-dnsext-rfc2672bis-dname-24.txt
> 	Pages           : 20
> 	Date            : 2011-07-26
> 
>   The DNAME record provides redirection for a sub-tree of the domain
>   name tree in the DNS system.  That is, all names that end with a
>   particular suffix are redirected to another part of the DNS.  This is
>   a revision to the original specification in RFC 2672 as well as
>   updating RFC 3363 and RFC 4294 to align with this revision.
> 
> 
> 
> A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-rfc2672bis-dname-24.txt
> 
> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
> 
> This Internet-Draft can be retrieved at:
> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-rfc2672bis-dname-24.txt
> _______________________________________________
> dnsext mailing list
> dnsext@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext

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Subject: [dnsext] I-D Action: draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-bis-updates-14.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. This draft is a work item of the DNS Extensions Working Group of the IETF.

	Title           : Clarifications and Implementation Notes for DNSSECbis
	Author(s)       : Samuel Weiler
                          David Blacka
	Filename        : draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-bis-updates-14.txt
	Pages           : 16
	Date            : 2011-07-26

   This document is a collection of technical clarifications to the
   DNSSECbis document set.  It is meant to serve as a resource to
   implementors as well as a repository of DNSSECbis errata.


A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-bis-updates-14.txt

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/

This Internet-Draft can be retrieved at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-bis-updates-14.txt
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From: Samuel Weiler <weiler@watson.org>
To: Florian Weimer <fweimer@bfk.de>
cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: [dnsext] dnssec-bis-updates and the CD bit
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On Mon, 1 Nov 2010, Florian Weimer wrote:

> Anyway, I have no problems with the text as-is (in -11, don't know if
> that's current).  Note however that the more or less explicit
> recommendation to set CD by default has security implications: you no
> longer profit from more stringent validation at an upstream validator.
> This should be mentioned in the Security Considerations.

I missed this when preparing -13.  I'm submitting a new version now 
that incorporates this suggestion.

> I think this is a very minor issue because even with the CD fixes, the
> protocol more or less requires that your forwarder has a superset of
> your own trust anchors.  Therefore, the situation that the forwarders
> perform more stringent checks is not a relevant scenario.

I don't understond why a forwarder must have "a superset of your own 
trust anchors", but I don't think that understanding is key to the 
point in the first paragraph I quoted above.

-- Sam


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From: "Blacka, David" <davidb@verisign.com>
To: Samuel Weiler <weiler@watson.org>
CC: Florian Weimer <fweimer@bfk.de>, "<namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>" <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [dnsext] dnssec-bis-updates and the CD bit
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On Jul 26, 2011, at 1:28 PM, Samuel Weiler wrote:

> On Mon, 1 Nov 2010, Florian Weimer wrote:
>=20
>> Anyway, I have no problems with the text as-is (in -11, don't know if
>> that's current).  Note however that the more or less explicit
>> recommendation to set CD by default has security implications: you no
>> longer profit from more stringent validation at an upstream validator.
>> This should be mentioned in the Security Considerations.
>=20
> I missed this when preparing -13.  I'm submitting a new version now that =
incorporates this suggestion.
>=20
>> I think this is a very minor issue because even with the CD fixes, the
>> protocol more or less requires that your forwarder has a superset of
>> your own trust anchors.  Therefore, the situation that the forwarders
>> perform more stringent checks is not a relevant scenario.
>=20
> I don't understond why a forwarder must have "a superset of your own trus=
t anchors", but I don't think that understanding is key to the point in the=
 first paragraph I quoted above.

I don't think it is a "must", actually.  What Florian is likely getting at =
is that if your forwarder does not have a superset of your trust anchors (w=
ell, a superset of your validation policy as a whole), then it is possible =
that you can fail a response when the forwarder does not, and thus get stuc=
k.  If the forwarder does have a superset, then presumably querying without=
 a CD bit will cause the bad answer to get removed from the forwarder's cac=
he.


>=20
> -- Sam
>=20

--
David Blacka                          <davidb@verisign.com>=20
Principal Engineer      Verisign Infrastructure Engineering



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CC: Samuel Weiler <weiler@watson.org>, Florian Weimer <fweimer@bfk.de>,  "<namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>" <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [dnsext] dnssec-bis-updates and the CD bit
References: <20101027203218.GW45134@shinkuro.com> <82vd4hw288.fsf@mid.bfk.de> <alpine.BSF.2.00.1107261324590.99357@fledge.watson.org> <194A7872-1AC8-4AB6-8A10-E61DD6333C05@verisign.com>
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On 27.07.11 11:13, Blacka, David wrote:
>
> On Jul 26, 2011, at 1:28 PM, Samuel Weiler wrote:
>
>> On Mon, 1 Nov 2010, Florian Weimer wrote:
>>
>>> Anyway, I have no problems with the text as-is (in -11, don't know if
>>> that's current).  Note however that the more or less explicit
>>> recommendation to set CD by default has security implications: you no
>>> longer profit from more stringent validation at an upstream validator.
>>> This should be mentioned in the Security Considerations.
>>
>> I missed this when preparing -13.  I'm submitting a new version now that incorporates this suggestion.
>>
>>> I think this is a very minor issue because even with the CD fixes, the
>>> protocol more or less requires that your forwarder has a superset of
>>> your own trust anchors.  Therefore, the situation that the forwarders
>>> perform more stringent checks is not a relevant scenario.
>>
>> I don't understond why a forwarder must have "a superset of your own trust anchors", but I don't think that understanding is key to the point in the first paragraph I quoted above.
>
> I don't think it is a "must", actually.  What Florian is likely getting at is that if your forwarder does not have a superset of your trust anchors (well, a superset of your validation policy as a whole), then it is possible that you can fail a response when the forwarder does not, and thus get stuck.  If the forwarder does have a superset, then presumably querying without a CD bit will cause the bad answer to get removed from the forwarder's cache.

Just a note...  Are you sure that "namedroppers" is the right list?

(Strange that you can post there at all...)

O.
-- 
  Ondřej Surý
  vedoucí výzkumu/Head of R&D department
  -------------------------------------------
  CZ.NIC, z.s.p.o.    --    Laboratoře CZ.NIC
  Americka 23, 120 00 Praha 2, Czech Republic
  mailto:ondrej.sury@nic.cz    http://nic.cz/
  tel:+420.222745110       fax:+420.222745112
  -------------------------------------------


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On Wed, 27 Jul 2011, Ond?ej Sur? wrote:

> Just a note...  Are you sure that "namedroppers" is the right list?

Not at all.  I (and we) presumably just hit "reply all" or the 
equivalent.  Florian had originally posted to namedroppers, back in 
the good old days.

> (Strange that you can post there at all...)

Yes.

-- Sam


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From: Sean Wells <snwells82@gmail.com>
To: "<dnsext@ietf.org>" <dnsext@ietf.org>
Subject: [dnsext] DNSSEC Response caching
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Hi,

In RFC 4035, section 4.5, Response Caching:

   A security-aware resolver SHOULD cache each response as a single
   atomic entry containing the entire answer, including the named RRset
   and any associated DNSSEC RRs.  The resolver SHOULD discard the
   entire atomic entry when any of the RRs contained in it expire.



DNSSEC  RRs here includes NSECs also. For example, when processing a
wildcard answer response, NSEC also should be taken into consideration when
determining the TTL of the "atomic" entry. In section 5.3.3, the discussion
about setting the TTL does not explicitly mention this case (or other cases
where the response contains NSEC). I guess this is just a trivial omission.
Can someone clarify ?

-regards
Sean

--bcaec54ee67c96d2ba04a9670906
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Hi,<div><br></div><div>In RFC 4035, section 4.5, Response Caching:</div><di=
v><br></div><div><span class=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"font-size: 16px;=
 font-family: Times; "><pre class=3D"newpage" style=3D"font-size: 1em; marg=
in-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; page-break-before: always; ">
   A security-aware resolver SHOULD cache each response as a single
   atomic entry containing the entire answer, including the named RRset
   and any associated DNSSEC RRs.  The resolver SHOULD discard the
   entire atomic entry when any of the RRs contained in it expire.</pre><pr=
e class=3D"newpage" style=3D"font-size: 1em; margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom=
: 0px; page-break-before: always; "><br></pre><pre class=3D"newpage" style=
=3D"font-size: 1em; margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; page-break-before:=
 always; ">
<br></pre></span>DNSSEC =A0RRs here includes NSECs also. For example, when =
processing a wildcard answer response, NSEC also should be taken into consi=
deration when determining the TTL of the &quot;atomic&quot; entry. In secti=
on 5.3.3, the discussion about setting the TTL does not explicitly mention =
this case (or other cases where the response contains NSEC). I guess this i=
s just a trivial omission. Can someone clarify ?</div>
<div><br></div><div>-regards=A0<br>Sean<br>
</div>

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