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Subject: [OPSEC] I-D Action:draft-ietf-opsec-icmp-filtering-00.txt
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--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Operational Security Capabilities for IP Network Infrastructure Working Group of the IETF.


	Title           : Recommendations for filtering ICMP messages
	Author(s)       : F. Gont, G. Gont
	Filename        : draft-ietf-opsec-icmp-filtering-00.txt
	Pages           : 41
	Date            : 2008-08-31

This document document provides advice on the filtering of ICMPv4 and
ICMPv6 messages.  Additionaly, it discusses the operational and
interoperability implications of such filtering.

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-opsec-icmp-filtering-00.txt

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_______________________________________________
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From opsec-bounces@ietf.org  Tue Sep  2 11:18:16 2008
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Subject: [OPSEC] WG Review: Recharter of Operational Security Capabilities
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A modified charter has been submitted for the Operational Security
Capabilities for IP Network Infrastructure (opsec) working group in the
Operations and Management Area of the IETF.  The IESG has not made any
determination as yet.  The modified charter is provided below for
informational purposes only.  Please send your comments to the IESG
mailing list (iesg@ietf.org) by Tuesday, September 9, 2008.

Operational Security Capabilities for IP Network Infrastructure (opsec) 
=======================================================================

Last Modified: 2008-08-28

Current Status: Active Working Group

Chair(s):
Joe Abley <jabley@ca.afilias.info>
Joel Jaeggli <joelja@bogus.com>

Operations and Management Area Director(s):
Dan Romascanu <dromasca@avaya.com>
Ronald Bonica <rbonica@juniper.net>

Operations and Management Area Advisor:
Ronald Bonica <rbonica@juniper.net>

Mailing Lists:
General Discussion: opsec@ietf.org
To Subscribe: https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/opsec
In Body: In Body: subscribe
Archive: 2008 and later:
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/opsec/current/maillist.html 2007
and prior: http://ops.ietf.org/lists/opsec/

Description of Working Group:
Goals:

The OPSEC WG will document best current practices with regard to network
security. In particular an effort will be made to clarify the rationale
supporting current operational practice, address gaps in currently
understood best practices for forwarding, control plane, and management
plane security and make clear the liabilities inherent in security
practices where they exist.

Scope:

The scope of the OPSEC WG is intended to include the protection and
secure operation of the forwarding, control and management planes.

Documentation of best common practices, revision of existing operational
security practices documents and proposals for new approaches to
operational challenges are in scope.

Method:

It is expected that the work product of the working group will fall into
the category of best current practices documents. Taxonomy or problem
statement documents may provide a basis for best current practices
documents.

Best Current Practices Document

For each topic addressed, a document will be produced that attempts to
capture current practices related to secure operation. This will be
primarily based on operational experience. Each entry will list:

* threats addressed,
* current practices for addressing the threat,
* protocols, tools and technologies extant at the time of writing that
are used to address the threat,
* the possibility that a solution does not exist within existing tools
or technologies.

Taxonomy and Problem Statement Documents

A document which attempts to describe the scope of particular
operational security challenge or problem space without necessarily
coming to a conclusion or proposing a solution. Such a document might be
a precursor to a best common practices document.

While the principal input of the Working Group are operational
experience and needs, the output should be directed both to provide
guidance to the operators community as well as to Working Groups that
develop protocols or the community of protocol developers at large, as
well as to the implementers of these protocols.

Non-Goals:

The Operations security working group is not the place to do new
protocols.

New protocol work should be addressed in a working group chartered in
the appropriate area or as individual submissions. The OPSEC WG may take
on documents related to the practices of using such work.

Goals and Milestones:

Nov 08 - Submit a draft to the IESG regarding filtering of ICMP messages
in the backbone

Mar 09 - Submit a draft to the IESG regarding backbone threats and
mitigations

Mar 09 - Submit a draft to the IESG regarding BGP Session Security
_______________________________________________
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From opsec-bounces@ietf.org  Wed Sep 10 08:58:41 2008
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Colleagues,

Joel and I have been asked to consider the following draft for an  
opsec working group document:

   https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/draft-kumari-blackhole-urpf/

We would like to hear comments from the working group specifically on  
whether that draft might be adopted as a work item (not on the  
detailed content of the draft; feedback like that would come later, if  
we adopted it). Such comments would ideally be sent to the list.

Many thanks,


Joe
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From opsec-bounces@ietf.org  Thu Sep 11 10:57:57 2008
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Was one of the upcoming documents mentioned in the dublin meeting.

this document expands on the method in RFC3882 and I think much more
accurately represents current operational practice.

some review on it's current form and consensus as to whether we should
accept it as a working group document would be appreciated.

Thanks
joelja
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From opsec-bounces@ietf.org  Thu Sep 11 12:02:44 2008
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From: "Smith, Donald" <Donald.Smith@qwest.com>
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First let me say this is valuable work and it is well done.
It should be accepted as a WG document.



It suffers from inconsistent use of the following teams which appear to
mean the same thing I recommend Remote Triggered Black Hole filtering
but which ever term is used should be used consistently.

Triggered black-hole routing, Remote triggered black hole routing and
RTBH filtering.


If "As a matter of policy, operators SHOULD NOT accept source-based RTBH
announcements from their peers or customers" then why bother asking for
a registered community from IANA?

The cisco and juniper examples only covers destination based RTBH
filtering no urpf statements are included and therefore source based
RTBH is not provided by the example configs. That may have been the
intention of the authors but it wasn't what I expected.

Does this imply that strict mode urpf can't be used for source based
RTBH?

"In loose mode some vendors also verify that the destination route
   does not point to a discard interface."
If so going from strict mode to loose to support source based RTBH has
some serious security implications.

Security through obscurity WORKS against some worms and ssh attacks:)
Donald.Smith@qwest.com giac 

> -----Original Message-----
> From: opsec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:opsec-bounces@ietf.org] 
> On Behalf Of Joel Jaeggli
> Sent: Thursday, September 11, 2008 11:58 AM
> To: opsec wg mailing list
> Subject: 
> [OPSEC]http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-kumari-blackh
> ole-urpf-00.txt
> 
> Was one of the upcoming documents mentioned in the dublin meeting.
> 
> this document expands on the method in RFC3882 and I think much more
> accurately represents current operational practice.
> 
> some review on it's current form and consensus as to whether we should
> accept it as a working group document would be appreciated.
> 
> Thanks
> joelja
> _______________________________________________
> OPSEC mailing list
> OPSEC@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/opsec
> 


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Begin forwarded message:

> From: NomCom Chair <nomcom-chair@ietf.org>
> Date: 12 September 2008 12:48:11 GMT-04:00
> To: Working Group Chairs <wgchairs@ietf.org>
> Subject: Nomcom call for candidates
> List-Id: Working Group Chairs <wgchairs.ietf.org>
>
> The message below was just sent to the IETF-Annoucne list.
> However, it order to get to as many people as possible, I am asking WG
> chairs a favor.  Please forward the message to your working groups.
>
> Thank you,
> Joel M. Halpern
>
> The 2008-9 IETF Nominating Committee needs your help.
> We have started getting candidates.
> If we are going to do our job in time, we have only 3 more weeks to  
> get
> enough candidates to have a reasonable pool for all the jobs.
> At the moment, we do not have a reasonable pool for any jobs.
>
> If you are willing to serve, please nominate yourself.
> If there is someone you think would do a good job, please nominate  
> them.
>
> The web site at:
>    http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/group/nomcom/08
> Has the list of positions we are seeking people for, as well as  
> tools for
> providing both nominations and feedback.
>
> Alternatively, you can submit nominations by sending email to me.
>
> Please help us.
>
> Thank you,
> Joel M. Halpern
> jmh@joelhalpern.com
> nomcom-chair@ietf.org
>

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On Thu, Sep 11, 2008 at 3:00 PM, Smith, Donald <Donald.Smith@qwest.com> wrote:
> First let me say this is valuable work and it is well done.
> It should be accepted as a WG document.
>
>

I agree.

-chris
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Hi all,

I am feeling a little bad that I received this a while ago and haven't  
responded yet -- I have visitors at the moment and things have been  
hectic keeping them amused, etc...

Anyway, thank you very much for your comments -- I haven't had time to  
fully digest them, so these are incomplete thoughts...


On Sep 11, 2008, at 3:00 PM, Smith, Donald wrote:

> First let me say this is valuable work and it is well done.
> It should be accepted as a WG document.
>
>

Yay! Thank you :-)

>
> It suffers from inconsistent use of the following teams which appear  
> to
> mean the same thing I recommend Remote Triggered Black Hole filtering
> but which ever term is used should be used consistently.

Thank you, will search and replace...


>
>
> Triggered black-hole routing, Remote triggered black hole routing and
> RTBH filtering.
>
>
> If "As a matter of policy, operators SHOULD NOT accept source-based  
> RTBH
> announcements from their peers or customers" then why bother asking  
> for
> a registered community from IANA?

Bah... I was hoping no-one would notice this :-P. I started off  
writing this because there was a (perceived) need for standard  
community so that customers can signal their provider that they would  
like DESTINATION based RTBH applied (I have often run into the "OMG,  
I'm being attacked, what was $PROVIDERs community for this again? 666?  
37? something? Help!" issues. Usually people start calling their  
provider at this point, then realize that the first tier support has  
no idea, etc..). This document then morphed into a source based RTBH  
document...

I do still believe that it would be beneficial if there was a  
standardized community to signal your provider that you want  
DESTINATION based RTBH applied, but probably not SOURCE RTBH. How does  
this sound? I DID try figuring out how to word this in the doc, but,  
well...


>
>
> The cisco and juniper examples only covers destination based RTBH
> filtering no urpf statements are included and therefore source based
> RTBH is not provided by the example configs. That may have been the
> intention of the authors but it wasn't what I expected.

Yeah, I was going to put in multiple examples, one for destination,  
then one for source, but apparently got sidetracked  -- I'll try fix  
this...

>
>
> Does this imply that strict mode urpf can't be used for source based
> RTBH?
>

Nope, not at all... I was a little wary of suggesting strict mode  
because, all to often I have seen the "Oooh, a config snippet, let me  
paste it onto all of our routers without understanding it..." syndrome  
-- I didn't want to get grumpy emails asking why I suggested that :-)

> "In loose mode some vendors also verify that the destination route
>   does not point to a discard interface."
> If so going from strict mode to loose to support source based RTBH has
> some serious security implications.
>


Nope, if you have strict mode, thats fine, but if you have no URPF,  
you need to be a little more careful turning on strict than loose...

> Security through obscurity WORKS against some worms and ssh attacks:)
> Donald.Smith@qwest.com giac


Once again, thank you for you comments, I will try and update the  
draft ti include them soon...

W

>
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: opsec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:opsec-bounces@ietf.org]
>> On Behalf Of Joel Jaeggli
>> Sent: Thursday, September 11, 2008 11:58 AM
>> To: opsec wg mailing list
>> Subject:
>> [OPSEC]http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-kumari-blackh
>> ole-urpf-00.txt
>>
>> Was one of the upcoming documents mentioned in the dublin meeting.
>>
>> this document expands on the method in RFC3882 and I think much more
>> accurately represents current operational practice.
>>
>> some review on it's current form and consensus as to whether we  
>> should
>> accept it as a working group document would be appreciated.
>>
>> Thanks
>> joelja
>> _______________________________________________
>> OPSEC mailing list
>> OPSEC@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/opsec
>>
>
>
> This communication is the property of Qwest and may contain  
> confidential or
> privileged information. Unauthorized use of this communication is  
> strictly
> prohibited and may be unlawful.  If you have received this  
> communication
> in error, please immediately notify the sender by reply e-mail and  
> destroy
> all copies of the communication and any attachments.
> _______________________________________________
> OPSEC mailing list
> OPSEC@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/opsec
>

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Warren Kumari wrote:
> Hi all,
> 
> I am feeling a little bad that I received this a while ago and haven't
> responded yet -- I have visitors at the moment and things have been
> hectic keeping them amused, etc...
> 
> Anyway, thank you very much for your comments -- I haven't had time to
> fully digest them, so these are incomplete thoughts...

i think there's significant interest in this work. And I think someone
should discuss it at the ietf security bof at the upcoming nanog and
solicit feedback there as well.
> 
> On Sep 11, 2008, at 3:00 PM, Smith, Donald wrote:
> 
>> First let me say this is valuable work and it is well done.
>> It should be accepted as a WG document.
>>
>>
> 
> Yay! Thank you :-)
> 
>>
>> It suffers from inconsistent use of the following teams which appear to
>> mean the same thing I recommend Remote Triggered Black Hole filtering
>> but which ever term is used should be used consistently.
> 
> Thank you, will search and replace...
> 
> 
>>
>>
>> Triggered black-hole routing, Remote triggered black hole routing and
>> RTBH filtering.
>>
>>
>> If "As a matter of policy, operators SHOULD NOT accept source-based RTBH
>> announcements from their peers or customers" then why bother asking for
>> a registered community from IANA?
> 
> Bah... I was hoping no-one would notice this :-P. I started off writing
> this because there was a (perceived) need for standard community so that
> customers can signal their provider that they would like DESTINATION
> based RTBH applied (I have often run into the "OMG, I'm being attacked,
> what was $PROVIDERs community for this again? 666? 37? something? Help!"
> issues. Usually people start calling their provider at this point, then
> realize that the first tier support has no idea, etc..). This document
> then morphed into a source based RTBH document...
> 
> I do still believe that it would be beneficial if there was a
> standardized community to signal your provider that you want DESTINATION
> based RTBH applied, but probably not SOURCE RTBH. How does this sound? I
> DID try figuring out how to word this in the doc, but, well...
> 
> 
>>
>>
>> The cisco and juniper examples only covers destination based RTBH
>> filtering no urpf statements are included and therefore source based
>> RTBH is not provided by the example configs. That may have been the
>> intention of the authors but it wasn't what I expected.
> 
> Yeah, I was going to put in multiple examples, one for destination, then
> one for source, but apparently got sidetracked  -- I'll try fix this...
> 
>>
>>
>> Does this imply that strict mode urpf can't be used for source based
>> RTBH?
>>
> 
> Nope, not at all... I was a little wary of suggesting strict mode
> because, all to often I have seen the "Oooh, a config snippet, let me
> paste it onto all of our routers without understanding it..." syndrome
> -- I didn't want to get grumpy emails asking why I suggested that :-)
> 
>> "In loose mode some vendors also verify that the destination route
>>   does not point to a discard interface."
>> If so going from strict mode to loose to support source based RTBH has
>> some serious security implications.
>>
> 
> 
> Nope, if you have strict mode, thats fine, but if you have no URPF, you
> need to be a little more careful turning on strict than loose...
> 
>> Security through obscurity WORKS against some worms and ssh attacks:)
>> Donald.Smith@qwest.com giac
> 
> 
> Once again, thank you for you comments, I will try and update the draft
> ti include them soon...
> 
> W
> 
>>
>>
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: opsec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:opsec-bounces@ietf.org]
>>> On Behalf Of Joel Jaeggli
>>> Sent: Thursday, September 11, 2008 11:58 AM
>>> To: opsec wg mailing list
>>> Subject:
>>> [OPSEC]http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-kumari-blackh
>>> ole-urpf-00.txt
>>>
>>> Was one of the upcoming documents mentioned in the dublin meeting.
>>>
>>> this document expands on the method in RFC3882 and I think much more
>>> accurately represents current operational practice.
>>>
>>> some review on it's current form and consensus as to whether we should
>>> accept it as a working group document would be appreciated.
>>>
>>> Thanks
>>> joelja
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> OPSEC mailing list
>>> OPSEC@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/opsec
>>>
>>
>>
>> This communication is the property of Qwest and may contain
>> confidential or
>> privileged information. Unauthorized use of this communication is
>> strictly
>> prohibited and may be unlawful.  If you have received this communication
>> in error, please immediately notify the sender by reply e-mail and
>> destroy
>> all copies of the communication and any attachments.
>> _______________________________________________
>> OPSEC mailing list
>> OPSEC@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/opsec
>>
> 

_______________________________________________
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Security through obscurity WORKS against some worms and ssh attacks:)
Donald.Smith@qwest.com giac 

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Warren Kumari [mailto:warren@kumari.net] 
> Sent: Wednesday, September 17, 2008 4:47 PM
> To: Smith, Donald
> Cc: Joel Jaeggli; opsec wg mailing list
> Subject: Re: [OPSEC] 
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-kumari-blackhole-urpf-00.txt
> 
> Hi all,
> 
> I am feeling a little bad that I received this a while ago 
> and haven't  
> responded yet -- I have visitors at the moment and things have been  
> hectic keeping them amused, etc...
> 
> Anyway, thank you very much for your comments -- I haven't 
> had time to  
> fully digest them, so these are incomplete thoughts...
> 
> 
> On Sep 11, 2008, at 3:00 PM, Smith, Donald wrote:
> 
> > First let me say this is valuable work and it is well done.
> > It should be accepted as a WG document.
> >
> >
> 
> Yay! Thank you :-)
> 
> >
> > It suffers from inconsistent use of the following teams 
> which appear  
> > to
> > mean the same thing I recommend Remote Triggered Black Hole 
> filtering
> > but which ever term is used should be used consistently.
> 
> Thank you, will search and replace...
> 
> 
> >
> >
> > Triggered black-hole routing, Remote triggered black hole 
> routing and
> > RTBH filtering.
> >
> >
> > If "As a matter of policy, operators SHOULD NOT accept 
> source-based  
> > RTBH
> > announcements from their peers or customers" then why 
> bother asking  
> > for
> > a registered community from IANA?
> 
> Bah... I was hoping no-one would notice this :-P. I started off  
> writing this because there was a (perceived) need for standard  
> community so that customers can signal their provider that 
> they would  
> like DESTINATION based RTBH applied (I have often run into the "OMG,  
> I'm being attacked, what was $PROVIDERs community for this 
> again? 666?  
> 37? something? Help!" issues. Usually people start calling their  
> provider at this point, then realize that the first tier support has  
> no idea, etc..). This document then morphed into a source based RTBH  
> document...
> 
> I do still believe that it would be beneficial if there was a  
> standardized community to signal your provider that you want  
> DESTINATION based RTBH applied, but probably not SOURCE RTBH. 
> How does  
> this sound? 
That sounds good. 666 is a fairly commonly used community for that.


>I DID try figuring out how to word this in the doc, but,  
> well...
> 
> 
> >
> >
> > The cisco and juniper examples only covers destination based RTBH
> > filtering no urpf statements are included and therefore source based
> > RTBH is not provided by the example configs. That may have been the
> > intention of the authors but it wasn't what I expected.
> 
> Yeah, I was going to put in multiple examples, one for destination,  
> then one for source, but apparently got sidetracked  -- I'll try fix  
> this...

If you just add the loose mode (and feasible vs active paths for junos
maybe?) that should be enough. 

> 
> >
> >
> > Does this imply that strict mode urpf can't be used for source based
> > RTBH?
> >
> 
> Nope, not at all... I was a little wary of suggesting strict mode  
> because, all to often I have seen the "Oooh, a config 
> snippet, let me  
> paste it onto all of our routers without understanding it..." 
> syndrome  
> -- I didn't want to get grumpy emails asking why I suggested that :-)
> 
> > "In loose mode some vendors also verify that the destination route
> >   does not point to a discard interface."
> > If so going from strict mode to loose to support source 
> based RTBH has
> > some serious security implications.

How about:
"In strict or loose mode some vendors also verify that the destination
route does
not point to a discard interface."

That way you can leave strict mode out of the config sample but others
won't wonder if strict mode would work with uppf for src based RTBHF.



> >
> 
> 
> Nope, if you have strict mode, thats fine, but if you have no URPF,  
> you need to be a little more careful turning on strict than loose...
> 
> > Security through obscurity WORKS against some worms and ssh 
> attacks:)
> > Donald.Smith@qwest.com giac
> 
> 
> Once again, thank you for you comments, I will try and update the  
> draft ti include them soon...
> 
> W
> 
> >
> >
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: opsec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:opsec-bounces@ietf.org]
> >> On Behalf Of Joel Jaeggli
> >> Sent: Thursday, September 11, 2008 11:58 AM
> >> To: opsec wg mailing list
> >> Subject:
> >> [OPSEC]http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-kumari-blackh
> >> ole-urpf-00.txt
> >>
> >> Was one of the upcoming documents mentioned in the dublin meeting.
> >>
> >> this document expands on the method in RFC3882 and I think 
> much more
> >> accurately represents current operational practice.
> >>
> >> some review on it's current form and consensus as to whether we  
> >> should
> >> accept it as a working group document would be appreciated.
> >>
> >> Thanks
> >> joelja
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> OPSEC mailing list
> >> OPSEC@ietf.org
> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/opsec
> >>
> >
> >
> > This communication is the property of Qwest and may contain  
> > confidential or
> > privileged information. Unauthorized use of this communication is  
> > strictly
> > prohibited and may be unlawful.  If you have received this  
> > communication
> > in error, please immediately notify the sender by reply e-mail and  
> > destroy
> > all copies of the communication and any attachments.
> > _______________________________________________
> > OPSEC mailing list
> > OPSEC@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/opsec
> >
> 
> 
_______________________________________________
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From: "J. Gill" <james.gill@verizonbusiness.com>
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On Thu, 2008-09-18 at 13:46 -0600, Smith, Donald wrote:
> > like DESTINATION based RTBH applied (I have often run into the
> "OMG,  
> > I'm being attacked, what was $PROVIDERs community for this 
> > again? 666?  
> > 37? something? Help!" issues. Usually people start calling their  
> > provider at this point, then realize that the first tier support
> has  
> > no idea, etc..). This document then morphed into a source based
> RTBH  
> > document...

...

> That sounds good. 666 is a fairly commonly used community for that.


For what it is worth (a chuckle at least) ...  AS701 initially used 666
for RTBH.  But when "this new, great idea" was being explained to People
In Pinstripes, they blanched at the possible media relations problems
that could arise if the public found out about it.  Yeah.

So for you 701 neighbors, use 9990.  Thanks.

--gill




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On Sep 18, 2008, at 4:00 PM, J. Gill wrote:

> On Thu, 2008-09-18 at 13:46 -0600, Smith, Donald wrote:
>>> like DESTINATION based RTBH applied (I have often run into the
>> "OMG,
>>> I'm being attacked, what was $PROVIDERs community for this
>>> again? 666?
>>> 37? something? Help!" issues. Usually people start calling their
>>> provider at this point, then realize that the first tier support
>> has
>>> no idea, etc..). This document then morphed into a source based
>> RTBH
>>> document...
>
> ...
>
>> That sounds good. 666 is a fairly commonly used community for that.
>
>
> For what it is worth (a chuckle at least) ...  AS701 initially used  
> 666
> for RTBH.  But when "this new, great idea" was being explained to  
> People
> In Pinstripes, they blanched at the possible media relations problems
> that could arise if the public found out about it.  Yeah.

I suspect that the dye that is used to color the pinstripes releases  
some chemical that suppresses both the humor and adrenal glands....


>
>
> So for you 701 neighbors, use 9990.  Thanks.

Thank you -- as I am not very organized, I will scribble this number  
down on a (slightly soiled) napkin which will get buried in one the  
piles on my desk, then eventually used to mop up yet another coffee  
spill and thrown out -- this means that I will be completely unable to  
signal you when the need arises[0]. My lack of organization / desk  
cleaning ability is the reason I am asking for a registered community.

Warren

[0]: OK, not really -- I will remember 9990, especially because I now  
know where it comes from  -- a registered community will mean that I  
don't need to spend multiple hours on the phone with all of my peers  
trying to pry the same information out of them...


>
> --gill
>
>
>
>

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From: Warren Kumari <warren@kumari.net>
To: "Smith, Donald" <Donald.Smith@qwest.com>
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On Sep 11, 2008, at 3:00 PM, Smith, Donald wrote:

> First let me say this is valuable work and it is well done.
> It should be accepted as a WG document.


Cool, thanks...



>
> It suffers from inconsistent use of the following teams which appear  
> to
> mean the same thing I recommend Remote Triggered Black Hole filtering
> but which ever term is used should be used consistently.

I *think* that I have caught all occurrences of this -- the term  
"Remote Triggered Black Hole filtering" made the document feel very  
long, so I am using  the acronym "RTBH filtering".  Please let me know  
if I missed any (other than where I define it in the Abstract and  
Introduction.)
>
>
> Triggered black-hole routing, Remote triggered black hole routing and
> RTBH filtering.
>
>
> If "As a matter of policy, operators SHOULD NOT accept source-based  
> RTBH
> announcements from their peers or customers" then why bother asking  
> for
> a registered community from IANA?


I realized that I was not very clear here -- I have tried to reword  
bits so that it is more clear that the IANA community should only be  
used for destination RTBH filtering and that communities with the AS  
number as the first 2 octets (RFC1997-style?!) should be used and  
carefully filtered....

>
>
> The cisco and juniper examples only covers destination based RTBH
> filtering no urpf statements are included and therefore source based
> RTBH is not provided by the example configs. That may have been the
> intention of the authors but it wasn't what I expected.
>

I have included uRPF in the examples (actually I do not have access to  
any lab devices at the moment, so I have not pasted the configs to  
make sure that they are correct... )


> Does this imply that strict mode urpf can't be used for source based
> RTBH?
>
> "In loose mode some vendors also verify that the destination route
>   does not point to a discard interface."
> If so going from strict mode to loose to support source based RTBH has
> some serious security implications.

After having a bit more time to digest your comment, I realized that  
once again I was unclear -- if you already have strict (or feasible  
path) uRPF deployed, you are fine -- unfortunately some ASes are  
unable to deploy uRPF in this manner, but can at least deploy loose  
mode uRPF. If these ASes use a vendor that "also verify that the  
destination route does not point to a discard interface" they can  
still get the source-based RTBH benefits... I *think* hat I have now  
done a better job of wording this...

Unfortunately some networks are unable to deploy even loose mode uRPF  
(due to interesting peering arrangements / scaling tricks (and / or  
during convergence) it is possible for a router to receive a packet  
and have no route for the  source address of that packet) -- I have  
spoken to one vendor requesting that they implement yet another uRPF  
mode (let's call it "dos-mitigation" mode for now[0]) where the uRPF  
check is relaxed even further. The logic basically becomes:

If ((route_exists_for_source) && (next_hop_for_source == DISCARD)) {
   (increment uRPF drop counter, drop packet)
    } else {
    (increment uRPF accept counter, accept packet, normal processing  
here...)
   }


Thank you for all of your comments -- hopefully I have managed to  
integrate them into the doc (I have just posted -01) -- please have a  
look and let me know.

Also, apologies again to everyone for taking so long to respond to  
emails, the random disjointedness of my replies, etc... My parents are  
visiting from South Africa and are staying with my wife and I for a  
month or so -- I have taken time off work to show them around, etc --  
this has completely destroyed my routine and productivity....


W


>
>
> Security through obscurity WORKS against some worms and ssh attacks:)
> Donald.Smith@qwest.com giac
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: opsec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:opsec-bounces@ietf.org]
>> On Behalf Of Joel Jaeggli
>> Sent: Thursday, September 11, 2008 11:58 AM
>> To: opsec wg mailing list
>> Subject:
>> [OPSEC]http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-kumari-blackh
>> ole-urpf-00.txt
>>
>> Was one of the upcoming documents mentioned in the dublin meeting.
>>
>> this document expands on the method in RFC3882 and I think much more
>> accurately represents current operational practice.
>>
>> some review on it's current form and consensus as to whether we  
>> should
>> accept it as a working group document would be appreciated.
>>
>> Thanks
>> joelja
>> _______________________________________________
>> OPSEC mailing list
>> OPSEC@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/opsec
>>
>
>
> This communication is the property of Qwest and may contain  
> confidential or
> privileged information. Unauthorized use of this communication is  
> strictly
> prohibited and may be unlawful.  If you have received this  
> communication
> in error, please immediately notify the sender by reply e-mail and  
> destroy
> all copies of the communication and any attachments.
> _______________________________________________
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>

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(coffee != sleep) & (!coffee == sleep)
Donald.Smith@qwest.com gcia   

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Warren Kumari [mailto:warren@kumari.net] 
> Sent: Friday, September 26, 2008 10:39 PM
> To: Smith, Donald
> Cc: Joel Jaeggli; opsec wg mailing list
> Subject: Re: [OPSEC] 
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-kumari-blackhole-urpf-00.txt
> 
> On Sep 11, 2008, at 3:00 PM, Smith, Donald wrote:
> 
> > First let me say this is valuable work and it is well done.
> > It should be accepted as a WG document.
> 
> 
> Cool, thanks...
Minor grammer issue:

3: A BGP policy is configured on all routers that have the discard
   route so that routes announced with with the community [IANA - INSERT
   REGISTERED COMMUNITY HERE] will have their next hop set to the
   discard address. 

Too many "with"s.

> 
> 
> 
> >
> > It suffers from inconsistent use of the following teams 
> which appear  
> > to
> > mean the same thing I recommend Remote Triggered Black Hole 
> filtering
> > but which ever term is used should be used consistently.
> 
> I *think* that I have caught all occurrences of this -- the term  
> "Remote Triggered Black Hole filtering" made the document feel very  
> long, so I am using  the acronym "RTBH filtering".  Please 
> let me know  
> if I missed any (other than where I define it in the Abstract and  
> Introduction.)
This is nearly impossible and removes some of the resilency of the
internet.
Most Peers can not filter announcements from other peers to a specific
set of cidr blocks.
If we started filtering, lost a link, had a customer come up on their
backup link with another carrier we would allow them to advertise that
to us. Most dual homed customers would be affected in a situation like
this. So peers don't filter peers announcments (much).

"While administrators may choose to drop any prefixes they wish, it is
   recommended when employing source-based RTBH inter-domain that
   explicit policy be defined that enables peers to only announce
   source-based RTBH routes for prefixes which they originate."


> >
> >
> > Triggered black-hole routing, Remote triggered black hole 
> routing and
> > RTBH filtering.
> >
> >
> > If "As a matter of policy, operators SHOULD NOT accept 
> source-based  
> > RTBH
> > announcements from their peers or customers" then why 
> bother asking  
> > for
> > a registered community from IANA?
> 
> 
> I realized that I was not very clear here -- I have tried to reword  
> bits so that it is more clear that the IANA community should only be  
> used for destination RTBH filtering and that communities with the AS  
> number as the first 2 octets (RFC1997-style?!) should be used and  
> carefully filtered....
I reread it. It is much better now.


> 
> >
> >
> > The cisco and juniper examples only covers destination based RTBH
> > filtering no urpf statements are included and therefore source based
> > RTBH is not provided by the example configs. That may have been the
> > intention of the authors but it wasn't what I expected.
> >
> 
> I have included uRPF in the examples (actually I do not have 
> access to  
> any lab devices at the moment, so I have not pasted the configs to  
> make sure that they are correct... )
> 
> 
> > Does this imply that strict mode urpf can't be used for source based
> > RTBH?
> >
> > "In loose mode some vendors also verify that the destination route
> >   does not point to a discard interface."
> > If so going from strict mode to loose to support source 
> based RTBH has
> > some serious security implications.
> 
> After having a bit more time to digest your comment, I realized that  
> once again I was unclear -- if you already have strict (or feasible  
> path) uRPF deployed, you are fine -- unfortunately some ASes are  
> unable to deploy uRPF in this manner, but can at least deploy loose  
> mode uRPF. If these ASes use a vendor that "also verify that the  
> destination route does not point to a discard interface" they can  
> still get the source-based RTBH benefits... I *think* hat I have now  
> done a better job of wording this...

This is how you have it now.
"By combining traditional RTBH filtering with unicast Reverse Path
   Forwarding (uRPF [RFC3704]) a network operator can filter based upon
   source address. uRPF performs a route lookup of the source address of
   the packet and  checks to see if the ingress interface of the packet
   is a valid egress interface for the packet source address (strict
   mode) or if any route or the source address of the packet exists
   (loose mode).  If the check fails, the packet is (generally) dropped.
   In loose mode some vendors also verify that the destination route
   does not point to a discard interface - this allows source based RTBH
   filtering to be deployed in networks that cannot implement strict (or
   feasible path) mode uRPF."


I think this is more correct, you appear to be mixxing up feasible path
and loose mode.
"By combining traditional RTBH filtering with unicast Reverse Path
   Forwarding (uRPF [RFC3704]) a network operator can filter based upon
   source address. uRPF performs a route lookup of the source address of
   the packet and  checks to see if the ingress interface of the packet
   is a valid egress interface for the packet source address (strict
   mode, feasible path), or is THE valid egress interface (strict mode,
active path)
   or if any route to the source address of the packet exists
   (loose mode).  If the check fails, the packet is (generally) dropped.
   In strick or loose mode some vendors also verify that the destination
route
   does not point to a discard interface. This allows source based RTBH
   filtering to be deployed in networks that cannot implement strict
mode uRPF but can implement loose mode."


You might even want to drop the entire feasible-paths vs active-paths
and just stick to strict and loose modes. I am not sure the active-paths
| feasible-paths comes into play.


> 
> Unfortunately some networks are unable to deploy even loose 
> mode uRPF  
> (due to interesting peering arrangements / scaling tricks (and / or  
> during convergence) it is possible for a router to receive a packet  
> and have no route for the  source address of that packet) -- I have  
> spoken to one vendor requesting that they implement yet another uRPF  
> mode (let's call it "dos-mitigation" mode for now[0]) where the uRPF  
> check is relaxed even further. The logic basically becomes:
> 
> If ((route_exists_for_source) && (next_hop_for_source == DISCARD)) {
>    (increment uRPF drop counter, drop packet)
>     } else {
>     (increment uRPF accept counter, accept packet, normal processing  
> here...)
>    }

Interesting.
How about:
> If ((next_hop_for_source == DISCARD)) {
>    (increment uRPF drop counter, drop packet)
>     } else {
>     (increment uRPF accept counter, accept packet, normal processing  
> here...)
>    }
That would eliminate the route check which I don't think you really want
in this case.
> 
> 
> Thank you for all of your comments -- hopefully I have managed to  
> integrate them into the doc (I have just posted -01) -- 
> please have a  
> look and let me know.
> 
> Also, apologies again to everyone for taking so long to respond to  
> emails, the random disjointedness of my replies, etc... My 
> parents are  
> visiting from South Africa and are staying with my wife and I for a  
> month or so -- I have taken time off work to show them 
> around, etc --  
> this has completely destroyed my routine and productivity....
> 
> 
> W
> 
> 
> >
> >
> > Security through obscurity WORKS against some worms and ssh 
> attacks:)
> > Donald.Smith@qwest.com giac
> >
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: opsec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:opsec-bounces@ietf.org]
> >> On Behalf Of Joel Jaeggli
> >> Sent: Thursday, September 11, 2008 11:58 AM
> >> To: opsec wg mailing list
> >> Subject:
> >> [OPSEC]http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-kumari-blackh
> >> ole-urpf-00.txt
> >>
> >> Was one of the upcoming documents mentioned in the dublin meeting.
> >>
> >> this document expands on the method in RFC3882 and I think 
> much more
> >> accurately represents current operational practice.
> >>
> >> some review on it's current form and consensus as to whether we  
> >> should
> >> accept it as a working group document would be appreciated.
> >>
> >> Thanks
> >> joelja
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> OPSEC mailing list
> >> OPSEC@ietf.org
> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/opsec
> >>
> >
> >
> > This communication is the property of Qwest and may contain  
> > confidential or
> > privileged information. Unauthorized use of this communication is  
> > strictly
> > prohibited and may be unlawful.  If you have received this  
> > communication
> > in error, please immediately notify the sender by reply e-mail and  
> > destroy
> > all copies of the communication and any attachments.
> > _______________________________________________
> > OPSEC mailing list
> > OPSEC@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/opsec
> >
> 
> 
_______________________________________________
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Date: Wed, 1 Oct 2008 08:44:02 +0530
From: "Vishwas Manral" <vishwas.ietf@gmail.com>
To: "Glen Kent" <glen.kent@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [OPSEC] additional documents needing a home...
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Hi Joel,

I wanted to know your opinion of the consensus, and it was for
allowing the work in the OPSEC WG?

Thanks,
Vishwas

On 8/25/08, Glen Kent <glen.kent@gmail.com> wrote:
> I strongly believe that drafts draft-ietf-rpsec-bgp-session-sec-req
> and draft-manral-rpsec-existing-crypto-05 very much belong here in
> OPSEC.
>
> Glen
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: Joel Jaeggli <joelja@bogus.com>
> Date: Thu, Aug 21, 2008 at 6:43 AM
> Subject: [OPSEC] additional documents needing a home...
> To: opsec wg mailing list <opsec@ietf.org>
>
>
> Folks,
>
> Dave Ward has proposed adding:
>
> Michael Behringer's rpsec draft
>
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-rpsec-bgp-session-sec-req-01
>
>   Abstract
>
>   The document "BGP security requirements" (draft-ietf-rpsec-bgpsecrec)
>   specifies general security requirements for BGP.  However, specific
>   security requirements for single BGP sessions, i.e., the connection
>   between two BGP peers, are only touched on briefly in the section
>   "transport layer protection".  This document expands on this
>   particular aspect of BGP security, defining the security requirements
>   between two BGP peers.
>
> which as was presented in opsec in ireland
>
> and
>
>
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-manral-rpsec-existing-crypto-05
>
>   Abstract
>
>   Routing protocols are designed to use cryptographic mechanisms to
>   authenticate data being received from a neighboring router to ensure
>   that it has not been modified in transit, and actually originated
>   from the neighboring router purporting to have originating the data.
>   Most of the cryptographic mechanisms defined to date rely on hash
>   algorithms applied to the data in the routing protocol packet, which
>   means the data is transported, in the clear, along with a signature
>   based on the data itself.  These mechanisms rely on the manual
>   configuration of the keys used to seed, or build, these hash based
>   signatures.  This document outlines some of the problems with manual
>   keying of these cryptographic algorithms.
>
>
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-bhatia-manral-igp-crypto-requirements-00
>
>   Abstract
>
>   The interior gateway routing protocols OSPFv2 [RFC2328], IS-IS [ISO]
>   [RFC1195] and RIP [RFC2453] currently define clear text and MD5
>   [RFC1321] algorithms for authenticating their protocol packets. There
>   have recently been documents adding support of the SHA family of hash
>   algorithms for authenticating routing protocol packets for RIP, IS-IS
>   and OSPF.
>
>   To ensure interoperability between disparate implementations, it is
>   imperative that we specify a set of mandatory-to-implement algorithms
>   thereby ensuring that there is at least one algorithm that all
>   implementations will have available.
>
>
>
> which were not...
>
> As these document existing practice or problems with existing protocols
> I think it is conceivable that this work would fall within our proposed
> and soon to be official charter.
>
> I would like to hear some opinions on the subject. there was some
> discussion of the first document during the opsec wg meeting and I
> believe that the record shows some support for and against housing it in
> opsec.
>
> thanks
> joelja
> _______________________________________________
> OPSEC mailing list
> OPSEC@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/opsec
>
_______________________________________________
OPSEC mailing list
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https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/opsec


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Date: Wed, 1 Oct 2008 09:01:21 +0530
From: "Vishwas Manral" <vishwas.ietf@gmail.com>
To: "Joel Jaeggli" <joelja@bogus.com>
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Subject: [OPSEC] Fwd: [sidr] [RPSEC] Authentication for OSPFv3
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Hi Joel/ Group,

The following is what I heard from the Routing AD's regarding the draft.

I also had a draft "Filtering and Rate limiting Capabilities of IP
Network Infrastructure" which was an OPSEC WG document (went on till
version 9) and we had been given quite a few comments by the IESG. I
was wondering if I should just revive the same.

Thanks,
Vishwas

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: David Ward <dward@cisco.com>
Date: Tue, Sep 30, 2008 at 8:27 PM
Subject: Re: [sidr] [RPSEC] Authentication for OSPFv3
To: Vishwas Manral <vishwas.ietf@gmail.com>
Cc: David Ward <dward@cisco.com>, msec@ietf.org, OSPF List
<ospf@ietf.org>, Ross Callon <rcallon@juniper.net>, rpsec@ietf.org,
secdir@mit.edu, sidr@ietf.org, tsvwg@ietf.org, Ronald Bonica
<rbonica@juniper.net>


Directions are to send your draft to opsec WG. To get it on their
charter, you have to request the doc to become a WG item and then
discussion will follow

-DWard

On Sep 29, 2008, at 8:53 PM, Vishwas Manral wrote:

> Hi Sandy,
>
> Thanks for refering to my draft in your mail. The same was presented
> by Dave (Ward) in the last IETF. Regarding the state of the draft,
> because the RPSEC is closing down, we have been trying to find a home
> for the draft.
>
> We can also solve the problem similarly by something like
> BTNS(ofcourse Multicast part needs to be thought further) which does
> not necessarily require any certificate verification - so we may have
> unauthenticated IKE SA's but then all keys for the CHILD_SA from there
> are automatically generated.
>
> Thanks,
> Vishwas
>
>
_______________________________________________
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From: "Bhatia, Manav \(Manav\)" <manav@alcatel-lucent.com>
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I support draft-manral-rpsec-existing-crypto-05 and I think OPSEC is the
right home for this draft.

Cheers,
Manav

> -----Original Message-----
> From: opsec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:opsec-bounces@ietf.org] 
> On Behalf Of Vishwas Manral
> Sent: Wednesday, October 01, 2008 8.44 AM
> To: Glen Kent
> Cc: opsec@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [OPSEC] additional documents needing a home...
> 
> Hi Joel,
> 
> I wanted to know your opinion of the consensus, and it was for
> allowing the work in the OPSEC WG?
> 
> Thanks,
> Vishwas
> 
> On 8/25/08, Glen Kent <glen.kent@gmail.com> wrote:
> > I strongly believe that drafts draft-ietf-rpsec-bgp-session-sec-req
> > and draft-manral-rpsec-existing-crypto-05 very much belong here in
> > OPSEC.
> >
> > Glen
> >
> > ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> > From: Joel Jaeggli <joelja@bogus.com>
> > Date: Thu, Aug 21, 2008 at 6:43 AM
> > Subject: [OPSEC] additional documents needing a home...
> > To: opsec wg mailing list <opsec@ietf.org>
> >
> >
> > Folks,
> >
> > Dave Ward has proposed adding:
> >
> > Michael Behringer's rpsec draft
> >
> > http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-rpsec-bgp-session-sec-req-01
> >
> >   Abstract
> >
> >   The document "BGP security requirements" 
> (draft-ietf-rpsec-bgpsecrec)
> >   specifies general security requirements for BGP.  
> However, specific
> >   security requirements for single BGP sessions, i.e., the 
> connection
> >   between two BGP peers, are only touched on briefly in the section
> >   "transport layer protection".  This document expands on this
> >   particular aspect of BGP security, defining the security 
> requirements
> >   between two BGP peers.
> >
> > which as was presented in opsec in ireland
> >
> > and
> >
> >
> > http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-manral-rpsec-existing-crypto-05
> >
> >   Abstract
> >
> >   Routing protocols are designed to use cryptographic mechanisms to
> >   authenticate data being received from a neighboring 
> router to ensure
> >   that it has not been modified in transit, and actually originated
> >   from the neighboring router purporting to have 
> originating the data.
> >   Most of the cryptographic mechanisms defined to date rely on hash
> >   algorithms applied to the data in the routing protocol 
> packet, which
> >   means the data is transported, in the clear, along with a 
> signature
> >   based on the data itself.  These mechanisms rely on the manual
> >   configuration of the keys used to seed, or build, these hash based
> >   signatures.  This document outlines some of the problems 
> with manual
> >   keying of these cryptographic algorithms.
> >
> >
> > 
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-bhatia-manral-igp-crypto-requ
> irements-00
> >
> >   Abstract
> >
> >   The interior gateway routing protocols OSPFv2 [RFC2328], 
> IS-IS [ISO]
> >   [RFC1195] and RIP [RFC2453] currently define clear text and MD5
> >   [RFC1321] algorithms for authenticating their protocol 
> packets. There
> >   have recently been documents adding support of the SHA 
> family of hash
> >   algorithms for authenticating routing protocol packets 
> for RIP, IS-IS
> >   and OSPF.
> >
> >   To ensure interoperability between disparate 
> implementations, it is
> >   imperative that we specify a set of 
> mandatory-to-implement algorithms
> >   thereby ensuring that there is at least one algorithm that all
> >   implementations will have available.
> >
> >
> >
> > which were not...
> >
> > As these document existing practice or problems with 
> existing protocols
> > I think it is conceivable that this work would fall within 
> our proposed
> > and soon to be official charter.
> >
> > I would like to hear some opinions on the subject. there was some
> > discussion of the first document during the opsec wg meeting and I
> > believe that the record shows some support for and against 
> housing it in
> > opsec.
> >
> > thanks
> > joelja
> > _______________________________________________
> > OPSEC mailing list
> > OPSEC@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/opsec
> >
> _______________________________________________
> OPSEC mailing list
> OPSEC@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/opsec
> 
_______________________________________________
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From: "Bhatia, Manav \(Manav\)" <manav@alcatel-lucent.com>
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I support draft-manral-rpsec-existing-crypto-05 and I think OPSEC is the
right home for this draft.

Cheers,
Manav

> -----Original Message-----
> From: opsec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:opsec-bounces@ietf.org] 
> On Behalf Of Vishwas Manral
> Sent: Wednesday, October 01, 2008 8.44 AM
> To: Glen Kent
> Cc: opsec@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [OPSEC] additional documents needing a home...
> 
> Hi Joel,
> 
> I wanted to know your opinion of the consensus, and it was for
> allowing the work in the OPSEC WG?
> 
> Thanks,
> Vishwas
> 
> On 8/25/08, Glen Kent <glen.kent@gmail.com> wrote:
> > I strongly believe that drafts draft-ietf-rpsec-bgp-session-sec-req
> > and draft-manral-rpsec-existing-crypto-05 very much belong here in
> > OPSEC.
> >
> > Glen
> >
> > ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> > From: Joel Jaeggli <joelja@bogus.com>
> > Date: Thu, Aug 21, 2008 at 6:43 AM
> > Subject: [OPSEC] additional documents needing a home...
> > To: opsec wg mailing list <opsec@ietf.org>
> >
> >
> > Folks,
> >
> > Dave Ward has proposed adding:
> >
> > Michael Behringer's rpsec draft
> >
> > http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-rpsec-bgp-session-sec-req-01
> >
> >   Abstract
> >
> >   The document "BGP security requirements" 
> (draft-ietf-rpsec-bgpsecrec)
> >   specifies general security requirements for BGP.  
> However, specific
> >   security requirements for single BGP sessions, i.e., the 
> connection
> >   between two BGP peers, are only touched on briefly in the section
> >   "transport layer protection".  This document expands on this
> >   particular aspect of BGP security, defining the security 
> requirements
> >   between two BGP peers.
> >
> > which as was presented in opsec in ireland
> >
> > and
> >
> >
> > http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-manral-rpsec-existing-crypto-05
> >
> >   Abstract
> >
> >   Routing protocols are designed to use cryptographic mechanisms to
> >   authenticate data being received from a neighboring 
> router to ensure
> >   that it has not been modified in transit, and actually originated
> >   from the neighboring router purporting to have 
> originating the data.
> >   Most of the cryptographic mechanisms defined to date rely on hash
> >   algorithms applied to the data in the routing protocol 
> packet, which
> >   means the data is transported, in the clear, along with a 
> signature
> >   based on the data itself.  These mechanisms rely on the manual
> >   configuration of the keys used to seed, or build, these hash based
> >   signatures.  This document outlines some of the problems 
> with manual
> >   keying of these cryptographic algorithms.
> >
> >
> > 
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-bhatia-manral-igp-crypto-requ
> irements-00
> >
> >   Abstract
> >
> >   The interior gateway routing protocols OSPFv2 [RFC2328], 
> IS-IS [ISO]
> >   [RFC1195] and RIP [RFC2453] currently define clear text and MD5
> >   [RFC1321] algorithms for authenticating their protocol 
> packets. There
> >   have recently been documents adding support of the SHA 
> family of hash
> >   algorithms for authenticating routing protocol packets 
> for RIP, IS-IS
> >   and OSPF.
> >
> >   To ensure interoperability between disparate 
> implementations, it is
> >   imperative that we specify a set of 
> mandatory-to-implement algorithms
> >   thereby ensuring that there is at least one algorithm that all
> >   implementations will have available.
> >
> >
> >
> > which were not...
> >
> > As these document existing practice or problems with 
> existing protocols
> > I think it is conceivable that this work would fall within 
> our proposed
> > and soon to be official charter.
> >
> > I would like to hear some opinions on the subject. there was some
> > discussion of the first document during the opsec wg meeting and I
> > believe that the record shows some support for and against 
> housing it in
> > opsec.
> >
> > thanks
> > joelja
> > _______________________________________________
> > OPSEC mailing list
> > OPSEC@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/opsec
> >
> _______________________________________________
> OPSEC mailing list
> OPSEC@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/opsec
> 
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