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Subject: Re: [OPSEC] New I-D: Security Assessment of the Internet Protocol
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At 08:39 a.m. 25/08/2008, George M Jones wrote:

>>You mean the introduction, and protocol description, or what?
>The "this is an IP header" , "these are the fields" bits.   I guess 
>it's got to be there
>if the document is going to be self contained, but in the context of the IETF
>a lot of this is/should be common knowledge.

FWIW, the reason for including that "introductory material" is to 
avoid requiring readers to have to go to other documents for have a 
look a the IP header format, the ECN fields format, etc. IMHO, I 
would keep that stuff in the document. But wouldn't mind removing it 
if the wg feels so.

There's is other "more introductory" stuff such as that in Section 2. 
But that's just some high-level information about the protocol that's 
going to be assessed in the rest of the document. However, as with 
the figures, I wouldn't mind removing them if the wg feels so.

For the most part, I think that removing the figures (header syntax, 
etc) will mean that the reader will have to have a t hand a copy of 
the documents in which those figures were originally included, 
though. (and that's what I tried to avoid by including them in this document).

Thanks!

Kind regards,

--
Fernando Gont
e-mail: fernando@gont.com.ar || fgont@acm.org
PGP Fingerprint: 7809 84F5 322E 45C7 F1C9 3945 96EE A9EF D076 FFF1




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Bhatia, Manav (Manav) wrote:
>  
> I support draft-manral-rpsec-existing-crypto-05 and I think OPSEC is the
> right home for this draft.


Regarding:

http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-bhatia-manral-igp-crypto-requirements-00

I have concerns about this document making protocol requirements within
the scope of our charter. Making this a set of protocol best practices I
think hews more closely to our charter (and doesn't belong in routing).

any thoughts on that?

problems with manual keying seems straight up our alley.

http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-manral-rpsec-existing-crypto-05

and i have no reservations for taking that one to our ADs.

joelja

> Cheers,
> Manav
> 
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: opsec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:opsec-bounces@ietf.org] 
>> On Behalf Of Vishwas Manral
>> Sent: Wednesday, October 01, 2008 8.44 AM
>> To: Glen Kent
>> Cc: opsec@ietf.org
>> Subject: Re: [OPSEC] additional documents needing a home...
>>
>> Hi Joel,
>>
>> I wanted to know your opinion of the consensus, and it was for
>> allowing the work in the OPSEC WG?
>>
>> Thanks,
>> Vishwas
>>
>> On 8/25/08, Glen Kent <glen.kent@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> I strongly believe that drafts draft-ietf-rpsec-bgp-session-sec-req
>>> and draft-manral-rpsec-existing-crypto-05 very much belong here in
>>> OPSEC.
>>>
>>> Glen
>>>
>>> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
>>> From: Joel Jaeggli <joelja@bogus.com>
>>> Date: Thu, Aug 21, 2008 at 6:43 AM
>>> Subject: [OPSEC] additional documents needing a home...
>>> To: opsec wg mailing list <opsec@ietf.org>
>>>
>>>
>>> Folks,
>>>
>>> Dave Ward has proposed adding:
>>>
>>> Michael Behringer's rpsec draft
>>>
>>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-rpsec-bgp-session-sec-req-01
>>>
>>>   Abstract
>>>
>>>   The document "BGP security requirements" 
>> (draft-ietf-rpsec-bgpsecrec)
>>>   specifies general security requirements for BGP.  
>> However, specific
>>>   security requirements for single BGP sessions, i.e., the 
>> connection
>>>   between two BGP peers, are only touched on briefly in the section
>>>   "transport layer protection".  This document expands on this
>>>   particular aspect of BGP security, defining the security 
>> requirements
>>>   between two BGP peers.
>>>
>>> which as was presented in opsec in ireland
>>>
>>> and
>>>
>>>
>>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-manral-rpsec-existing-crypto-05
>>>
>>>   Abstract
>>>
>>>   Routing protocols are designed to use cryptographic mechanisms to
>>>   authenticate data being received from a neighboring 
>> router to ensure
>>>   that it has not been modified in transit, and actually originated
>>>   from the neighboring router purporting to have 
>> originating the data.
>>>   Most of the cryptographic mechanisms defined to date rely on hash
>>>   algorithms applied to the data in the routing protocol 
>> packet, which
>>>   means the data is transported, in the clear, along with a 
>> signature
>>>   based on the data itself.  These mechanisms rely on the manual
>>>   configuration of the keys used to seed, or build, these hash based
>>>   signatures.  This document outlines some of the problems 
>> with manual
>>>   keying of these cryptographic algorithms.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-bhatia-manral-igp-crypto-requ
>> irements-00
>>>   Abstract
>>>
>>>   The interior gateway routing protocols OSPFv2 [RFC2328], 
>> IS-IS [ISO]
>>>   [RFC1195] and RIP [RFC2453] currently define clear text and MD5
>>>   [RFC1321] algorithms for authenticating their protocol 
>> packets. There
>>>   have recently been documents adding support of the SHA 
>> family of hash
>>>   algorithms for authenticating routing protocol packets 
>> for RIP, IS-IS
>>>   and OSPF.
>>>
>>>   To ensure interoperability between disparate 
>> implementations, it is
>>>   imperative that we specify a set of 
>> mandatory-to-implement algorithms
>>>   thereby ensuring that there is at least one algorithm that all
>>>   implementations will have available.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> which were not...
>>>
>>> As these document existing practice or problems with 
>> existing protocols
>>> I think it is conceivable that this work would fall within 
>> our proposed
>>> and soon to be official charter.
>>>
>>> I would like to hear some opinions on the subject. there was some
>>> discussion of the first document during the opsec wg meeting and I
>>> believe that the record shows some support for and against 
>> housing it in
>>> opsec.
>>>
>>> thanks
>>> joelja
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> OPSEC mailing list
>>> OPSEC@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/opsec
>>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OPSEC mailing list
>> OPSEC@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/opsec
>>
> _______________________________________________
> OPSEC mailing list
> OPSEC@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/opsec
> 

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Date: Sat, 4 Oct 2008 10:01:37 +0530
From: "Vishwas Manral" <vishwas.ietf@gmail.com>
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Hi Joel,

I agree with you on this!!!

Thanks,
Vishwas

On 10/4/08, Joel Jaeggli <joelja@bogus.com> wrote:
> Bhatia, Manav (Manav) wrote:
>>
>> I support draft-manral-rpsec-existing-crypto-05 and I think OPSEC is the
>> right home for this draft.
>
>
> Regarding:
>
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-bhatia-manral-igp-crypto-requirements-00
>
> I have concerns about this document making protocol requirements within
> the scope of our charter. Making this a set of protocol best practices I
> think hews more closely to our charter (and doesn't belong in routing).
>
> any thoughts on that?
>
> problems with manual keying seems straight up our alley.
>
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-manral-rpsec-existing-crypto-05
>
> and i have no reservations for taking that one to our ADs.
>
> joelja
>
>> Cheers,
>> Manav
>>
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: opsec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:opsec-bounces@ietf.org]
>>> On Behalf Of Vishwas Manral
>>> Sent: Wednesday, October 01, 2008 8.44 AM
>>> To: Glen Kent
>>> Cc: opsec@ietf.org
>>> Subject: Re: [OPSEC] additional documents needing a home...
>>>
>>> Hi Joel,
>>>
>>> I wanted to know your opinion of the consensus, and it was for
>>> allowing the work in the OPSEC WG?
>>>
>>> Thanks,
>>> Vishwas
>>>
>>> On 8/25/08, Glen Kent <glen.kent@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>> I strongly believe that drafts draft-ietf-rpsec-bgp-session-sec-req
>>>> and draft-manral-rpsec-existing-crypto-05 very much belong here in
>>>> OPSEC.
>>>>
>>>> Glen
>>>>
>>>> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
>>>> From: Joel Jaeggli <joelja@bogus.com>
>>>> Date: Thu, Aug 21, 2008 at 6:43 AM
>>>> Subject: [OPSEC] additional documents needing a home...
>>>> To: opsec wg mailing list <opsec@ietf.org>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Folks,
>>>>
>>>> Dave Ward has proposed adding:
>>>>
>>>> Michael Behringer's rpsec draft
>>>>
>>>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-rpsec-bgp-session-sec-req-01
>>>>
>>>>   Abstract
>>>>
>>>>   The document "BGP security requirements"
>>> (draft-ietf-rpsec-bgpsecrec)
>>>>   specifies general security requirements for BGP.
>>> However, specific
>>>>   security requirements for single BGP sessions, i.e., the
>>> connection
>>>>   between two BGP peers, are only touched on briefly in the section
>>>>   "transport layer protection".  This document expands on this
>>>>   particular aspect of BGP security, defining the security
>>> requirements
>>>>   between two BGP peers.
>>>>
>>>> which as was presented in opsec in ireland
>>>>
>>>> and
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-manral-rpsec-existing-crypto-05
>>>>
>>>>   Abstract
>>>>
>>>>   Routing protocols are designed to use cryptographic mechanisms to
>>>>   authenticate data being received from a neighboring
>>> router to ensure
>>>>   that it has not been modified in transit, and actually originated
>>>>   from the neighboring router purporting to have
>>> originating the data.
>>>>   Most of the cryptographic mechanisms defined to date rely on hash
>>>>   algorithms applied to the data in the routing protocol
>>> packet, which
>>>>   means the data is transported, in the clear, along with a
>>> signature
>>>>   based on the data itself.  These mechanisms rely on the manual
>>>>   configuration of the keys used to seed, or build, these hash based
>>>>   signatures.  This document outlines some of the problems
>>> with manual
>>>>   keying of these cryptographic algorithms.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-bhatia-manral-igp-crypto-requ
>>> irements-00
>>>>   Abstract
>>>>
>>>>   The interior gateway routing protocols OSPFv2 [RFC2328],
>>> IS-IS [ISO]
>>>>   [RFC1195] and RIP [RFC2453] currently define clear text and MD5
>>>>   [RFC1321] algorithms for authenticating their protocol
>>> packets. There
>>>>   have recently been documents adding support of the SHA
>>> family of hash
>>>>   algorithms for authenticating routing protocol packets
>>> for RIP, IS-IS
>>>>   and OSPF.
>>>>
>>>>   To ensure interoperability between disparate
>>> implementations, it is
>>>>   imperative that we specify a set of
>>> mandatory-to-implement algorithms
>>>>   thereby ensuring that there is at least one algorithm that all
>>>>   implementations will have available.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> which were not...
>>>>
>>>> As these document existing practice or problems with
>>> existing protocols
>>>> I think it is conceivable that this work would fall within
>>> our proposed
>>>> and soon to be official charter.
>>>>
>>>> I would like to hear some opinions on the subject. there was some
>>>> discussion of the first document during the opsec wg meeting and I
>>>> believe that the record shows some support for and against
>>> housing it in
>>>> opsec.
>>>>
>>>> thanks
>>>> joelja
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> OPSEC mailing list
>>>> OPSEC@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/opsec
>>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> OPSEC mailing list
>>> OPSEC@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/opsec
>>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OPSEC mailing list
>> OPSEC@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/opsec
>>
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I wonder if it's not worth attempting to treat ospfv3 to some attention
in this document as well...

rfc 4552 covers rather a lot of ground.

joelja
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Hi Joel,

OSPFv3 unlike the protocols mentioned in the draft uses IPsec. The
algorithm requirements for IPsec are mentioned in RFC4835, that is one
of the reasons we have not included it in the draft.

We will clarify the same in the draft as well as looking at RIPng.

Thanks,
Vishwas

On Mon, Oct 6, 2008 at 5:15 AM, Joel Jaeggli <joelja@bogus.com> wrote:
> I wonder if it's not worth attempting to treat ospfv3 to some attention
> in this document as well...
>
> rfc 4552 covers rather a lot of ground.
>
> joelja
>
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Hi,

See below for comments:

> Regarding:
> 
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-bhatia-manral-igp-crypto-requ
irements-00
> 
> I have concerns about this document making protocol 
> requirements within the scope of our charter. Making this a 
> set of protocol best practices I think hews more closely to 
> our charter (and doesn't belong in routing).
> 
> any thoughts on that?
> 
I see the benefit in having a document which recommends which routing
protocol authentication schemes to use.  Having such a document
available, will automatically put pressure on the routing protocol
developers to implement what's missing (in case there are still some
implementations out there which still do not support this).

So, I suggest this document should be adopted by the WG but with a more
"recommend/best practice" focus.

> problems with manual keying seems straight up our alley.
> 
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-manral-rpsec-existing-crypto-05
> 
> and I have no reservations for taking that one to our ADs.
> 
Agree 100%

Regards
  Steinthor
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On Sep 29, 2008, at 5:04 PM, Smith, Donald wrote:

>
>
> (coffee != sleep) & (!coffee == sleep)
> Donald.Smith@qwest.com gcia
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Warren Kumari [mailto:warren@kumari.net]
>> Sent: Friday, September 26, 2008 10:39 PM
>> To: Smith, Donald
>> Cc: Joel Jaeggli; opsec wg mailing list
>> Subject: Re: [OPSEC]
>> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-kumari-blackhole- 
>> urpf-00.txt
>>
>> On Sep 11, 2008, at 3:00 PM, Smith, Donald wrote:
>>
>>> First let me say this is valuable work and it is well done.
>>> It should be accepted as a WG document.
>>
>>
>> Cool, thanks...
> Minor grammer issue:
>
> 3: A BGP policy is configured on all routers that have the discard
>   route so that routes announced with with the community [IANA -  
> INSERT
>   REGISTERED COMMUNITY HERE] will have their next hop set to the
>   discard address.
>
> Too many "with"s.

Thanks, fixed!

>
>
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>> It suffers from inconsistent use of the following teams
>> which appear
>>> to
>>> mean the same thing I recommend Remote Triggered Black Hole
>> filtering
>>> but which ever term is used should be used consistently.
>>
>> I *think* that I have caught all occurrences of this -- the term
>> "Remote Triggered Black Hole filtering" made the document feel very
>> long, so I am using  the acronym "RTBH filtering".  Please
>> let me know
>> if I missed any (other than where I define it in the Abstract and
>> Introduction.)
> This is nearly impossible and removes some of the resilency of the
> internet.
> Most Peers can not filter announcements from other peers to a specific
> set of cidr blocks.
> If we started filtering, lost a link, had a customer come up on their
> backup link with another carrier we would allow them to advertise that
> to us. Most dual homed customers would be affected in a situation like
> this. So peers don't filter peers announcments (much).
>
> "While administrators may choose to drop any prefixes they wish, it is
>   recommended when employing source-based RTBH inter-domain that
>   explicit policy be defined that enables peers to only announce
>   source-based RTBH routes for prefixes which they originate."

Doh! I meant customers --- providers should already be filtering their  
customers so that they can only announce space that "belongs" to them.  
As I often (incorrectly) use the word "peer" to refer to any sort of  
BGP session where routes are exchanged, I will go check If I have made  
this mistake anywhere else (I must admit that I also use the phrase  
"class C" to refer to any network with a mask of /24, call the screen  
on an digital watch an "LCD display" and ask for "Coke" when I want a  
soda...)

>
>
>
>>>
>>>
>>> Triggered black-hole routing, Remote triggered black hole
>> routing and
>>> RTBH filtering.
>>>
>>>
>>> If "As a matter of policy, operators SHOULD NOT accept
>> source-based
>>> RTBH
>>> announcements from their peers or customers" then why
>> bother asking
>>> for
>>> a registered community from IANA?
>>
>>
>> I realized that I was not very clear here -- I have tried to reword
>> bits so that it is more clear that the IANA community should only be
>> used for destination RTBH filtering and that communities with the AS
>> number as the first 2 octets (RFC1997-style?!) should be used and
>> carefully filtered....
> I reread it. It is much better now.

Cool, thanks!

>
>
>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> The cisco and juniper examples only covers destination based RTBH
>>> filtering no urpf statements are included and therefore source based
>>> RTBH is not provided by the example configs. That may have been the
>>> intention of the authors but it wasn't what I expected.
>>>
>>
>> I have included uRPF in the examples (actually I do not have
>> access to
>> any lab devices at the moment, so I have not pasted the configs to
>> make sure that they are correct... )
>>
>>
>>> Does this imply that strict mode urpf can't be used for source based
>>> RTBH?
>>>
>>> "In loose mode some vendors also verify that the destination route
>>>  does not point to a discard interface."
>>> If so going from strict mode to loose to support source
>> based RTBH has
>>> some serious security implications.
>>
>> After having a bit more time to digest your comment, I realized that
>> once again I was unclear -- if you already have strict (or feasible
>> path) uRPF deployed, you are fine -- unfortunately some ASes are
>> unable to deploy uRPF in this manner, but can at least deploy loose
>> mode uRPF. If these ASes use a vendor that "also verify that the
>> destination route does not point to a discard interface" they can
>> still get the source-based RTBH benefits... I *think* hat I have now
>> done a better job of wording this...
>
> This is how you have it now.
> "By combining traditional RTBH filtering with unicast Reverse Path
>   Forwarding (uRPF [RFC3704]) a network operator can filter based upon
>   source address. uRPF performs a route lookup of the source address  
> of
>   the packet and  checks to see if the ingress interface of the packet
>   is a valid egress interface for the packet source address (strict
>   mode) or if any route or the source address of the packet exists
>   (loose mode).  If the check fails, the packet is (generally)  
> dropped.
>   In loose mode some vendors also verify that the destination route
>   does not point to a discard interface - this allows source based  
> RTBH
>   filtering to be deployed in networks that cannot implement strict  
> (or
>   feasible path) mode uRPF."
>
>
> I think this is more correct, you appear to be mixxing up feasible  
> path
> and loose mode.
> "By combining traditional RTBH filtering with unicast Reverse Path
>   Forwarding (uRPF [RFC3704]) a network operator can filter based upon
>   source address. uRPF performs a route lookup of the source address  
> of
>   the packet and  checks to see if the ingress interface of the packet
>   is a valid egress interface for the packet source address (strict
>   mode, feasible path), or is THE valid egress interface (strict mode,
> active path)
>   or if any route to the source address of the packet exists
>   (loose mode).  If the check fails, the packet is (generally)  
> dropped.
>   In strick or loose mode some vendors also verify that the  
> destination
> route
>   does not point to a discard interface. This allows source based RTBH
>   filtering to be deployed in networks that cannot implement strict
> mode uRPF but can implement loose mode."
>
>
> You might even want to drop the entire feasible-paths vs active-paths
> and just stick to strict and loose modes. I am not sure the active- 
> paths
> | feasible-paths comes into play.

Great, thank you for your text, it does a MUCH better job of  
explaining what I intended... I think that leaving in some mention of  
active / feasible / loose, etc is a good idea so that people are aware  
that it can be deployed even if the provider is currently running mode  
X... Thoughts?


>
>
>
>>
>> Unfortunately some networks are unable to deploy even loose
>> mode uRPF
>> (due to interesting peering arrangements / scaling tricks (and / or
>> during convergence) it is possible for a router to receive a packet
>> and have no route for the  source address of that packet) -- I have
>> spoken to one vendor requesting that they implement yet another uRPF
>> mode (let's call it "dos-mitigation" mode for now[0]) where the uRPF
>> check is relaxed even further. The logic basically becomes:
>>
>> If ((route_exists_for_source) && (next_hop_for_source == DISCARD)) {
>>   (increment uRPF drop counter, drop packet)
>>    } else {
>>    (increment uRPF accept counter, accept packet, normal processing
>> here...)
>>   }
>
> Interesting.
> How about:
>> If ((next_hop_for_source == DISCARD)) {
>>   (increment uRPF drop counter, drop packet)
>>    } else {
>>    (increment uRPF accept counter, accept packet, normal processing
>> here...)
>>   }
> That would eliminate the route check which I don't think you really  
> want
> in this case.

Hmmm... Fair enough... (the "next_hop_for_source" lookup includes the  
"route exists" check :-))



I will get around to posting -02 sometime soon (with your  
suggestions), or maybe just wait till this is officially accepted as a  
WG doc....

W


>
>>
>>
>> Thank you for all of your comments -- hopefully I have managed to
>> integrate them into the doc (I have just posted -01) --
>> please have a
>> look and let me know.
>>
>> Also, apologies again to everyone for taking so long to respond to
>> emails, the random disjointedness of my replies, etc... My
>> parents are
>> visiting from South Africa and are staying with my wife and I for a
>> month or so -- I have taken time off work to show them
>> around, etc --
>> this has completely destroyed my routine and productivity....
>>
>>
>> W
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Security through obscurity WORKS against some worms and ssh
>> attacks:)
>>> Donald.Smith@qwest.com giac
>>>
>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>> From: opsec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:opsec-bounces@ietf.org]
>>>> On Behalf Of Joel Jaeggli
>>>> Sent: Thursday, September 11, 2008 11:58 AM
>>>> To: opsec wg mailing list
>>>> Subject:
>>>> [OPSEC]http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-kumari-blackh
>>>> ole-urpf-00.txt
>>>>
>>>> Was one of the upcoming documents mentioned in the dublin meeting.
>>>>
>>>> this document expands on the method in RFC3882 and I think
>> much more
>>>> accurately represents current operational practice.
>>>>
>>>> some review on it's current form and consensus as to whether we
>>>> should
>>>> accept it as a working group document would be appreciated.
>>>>
>>>> Thanks
>>>> joelja
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> OPSEC mailing list
>>>> OPSEC@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/opsec
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> This communication is the property of Qwest and may contain
>>> confidential or
>>> privileged information. Unauthorized use of this communication is
>>> strictly
>>> prohibited and may be unlawful.  If you have received this
>>> communication
>>> in error, please immediately notify the sender by reply e-mail and
>>> destroy
>>> all copies of the communication and any attachments.
>>> _______________________________________________
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>>>
>>
>>
>

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From opsec-bounces@ietf.org  Thu Oct  9 00:59:03 2008
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From: "Bhatia, Manav \(Manav\)" <manav@alcatel-lucent.com>
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Hi,

> > 
> > http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-bhatia-manral-igp-crypto-requ
> irements-00
> > 
> > I have concerns about this document making protocol 
> > requirements within the scope of our charter. Making this a 
> > set of protocol best practices I think hews more closely to 
> > our charter (and doesn't belong in routing).
> > 
> > any thoughts on that?
> > 
> I see the benefit in having a document which recommends which routing
> protocol authentication schemes to use.  Having such a document
> available, will automatically put pressure on the routing protocol
> developers to implement what's missing (in case there are still some
> implementations out there which still do not support this).

Agree. 

I think this document too falls in the purview of OPSEC as this would
ensure interop between disparate router implementations where at least
one strong crypto algorithm is available that's implemented by all
vendors.

For example, we need to move folks using OSPF away from keyed MD5 and
there should be some document that suggests that. It should also be
noted that an algorithm that's considered strong today can be broken
tomorrow and may have vulnerabilities that can be exploited. In such
cases, we must have a document that vendors/operators can look up
against, before implementing/using a routing protocol security scheme.

This document does exactly that - it, to cite the same example,
discourages people running OSPF from using keyed MD5 (it's a MUST-) and
encourages the use of HMAC-SHA-1 [x] and other stronger algorithms. 

> 
> So, I suggest this document should be adopted by the WG but 
> with a more
> "recommend/best practice" focus.

It should be a standards track document. Please look at RFC 4307, 4835,
etc. 

> 
> > problems with manual keying seems straight up our alley.
> > 
> > http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-manral-rpsec-existing-crypto-05
> > 
> > and I have no reservations for taking that one to our ADs.
> > 
> Agree 100%

True.

Cheers,
Manav

[x] http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ospf-hmac-sha-02
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If you'd like to getting an early start on the agenda for the next
meeting and have an item you'd like to present on please drop me a
line... I've already heard from Fernando.
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Subject: [OPSEC] consensus on draft-manral-rpsec-existing-crypto-05
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Based on input I think we have consensus to accept this document as a
working group document.

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We have at least some supporting opinion that this work should not be
pursued in opsec if it defines requirements. With a recommendations or
best practices focus it would be an appropriate addition. We should be
willing to entertain alternative views but I think that's the current sense.

joelja
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From opsec-bounces@ietf.org  Wed Oct 22 14:15:04 2008
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 ACTION:draft-ietf-opsec-routing-protocols-crypto-issues-00.txt
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--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts 
directories.
This draft is a work item of the Operational Security Capabilities for IP Network Infrastructure Working Group of the IETF.

	Title		: Issues with existing Cryptographic Protection Methods for Routing Protocols 
	Author(s)	: S. Hares, M. Bhatia, V. Manral, R. White
	Filename	: draft-ietf-opsec-routing-protocols-crypto-issues-00.txt
	Pages		: 16
	Date		: 2008-10-21
	
 Routing protocols are designed to use cryptographic mechanisms to 
   authenticate data being received from a neighboring router to ensure 
   that it has not been modified in transit, and actually originated 
   from the neighboring router purporting to have originating the data.  
   Most of the cryptographic mechanisms defined to date rely on hash 
   algorithms applied to the data in the routing protocol packet, which 
   means the data is transported, in the clear, along with a signature 
   based on the data itself.  These mechanisms rely on the manual 
   configuration of the keys used to seed, or build, these hash based 
   signatures.  This document outlines some of the problems with manual 
   keying of these cryptographic algorithms. 

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-opsec-routing-protocols-crypto-issues-00.txt

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From opsec-bounces@ietf.org  Sat Oct 25 21:38:20 2008
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Note that October 27, Monday  is the Internet Draft Cut-off for initial
document (-00) submission by 17:00 PDT (24:00 UTC/GMT).

The deadline for draft revisions is November 3, Monday, Internet Draft
final submission cut-off by 17:00 PT (01:00 Tuesday, November 4 UTC/GMT).

thanks
joel
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From opsec-bounces@ietf.org  Thu Oct 30 13:28:34 2008
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Subject: [OPSEC] http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-kumari-blackhole-urpf-02
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Made it into the tool recently. This version addresses some of the
commentary on previous versions. I except that we'll ask for consesus on
accepting this as a working group document at Minneapolis. Any
commentary on the revised draft would be appreciated.

diffs are here:

http://tools.ietf.org/rfcdiff?difftype=--hwdiff&url2=http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-kumari-blackhole-urpf-02.txt

thanks

joel
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From opsec-bounces@ietf.org  Thu Oct 30 14:08:50 2008
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Fernando wants time for:

draft-gont-opsec-ip-security

draft-gont-opsec-icmp-filtering

I'm presuming we'll want to dicuss:

draft-bhatia-manral-igp-crypto-requirements

draft-ietf-opsec-routing-protocols-crypto-issues

and

draft-kumari-blackhole-urpf-02

anything else that should be on the agenda let me know...

thanks
joelja
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Subject: [OPSEC] FYI: OPSEC - Requested session has been scheduled for IETF
	73
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Dear Joel Jaeggli,

The sessions that you have requested have been scheduled.
Below is the scheduled session information followed by 
the information of sessions that you have requested.

OPSEC Session 1 (1 hour)
Tuesday, Afternoon Session II 1520-1700
Room Name: Meeting Room
----------------------------------------------



Requested Information:


---------------------------------------------------------
Working Group Name: opsec
Area Name: Operations and Management Area
Session Requester: Joel Jaeggli

Number of Sessions: 1
Length of Session(s):  1 hour
                       
                       
Number of Attendees: 30
Conflicts to Avoid:
  First Priority:  opsarea
  Second Priority:  6lowpan opsawg
  Third Priority:  sidr

Special Requests:
  
---------------------------------------------------------



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--------------050702020806000304080003--


