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Subject: RE: pana-threats WG LC comments
Date: Thu, 1 May 2003 14:56:13 -0700
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From: "Mohan Parthasarathy" <mohanp@tahoenetworks.com>
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Asokan,

Thanks for the review. Comments below.
> 
> Review of draft-ietf-pana-threats-eval-03.txt
> April 30, 2003
> 
> Section 4
> - para 1: this text is unclear in a couple of places
>   - "trust operators .. to provide THE service"
>     What service is it?  Network access?  Some other services?
>     Which nodes?  Client nodes only, or other network nodes too?

It is the network access that I was referring to here. And the nodes
being referred to are the PaCs.

>   - "not trust other nodes.. e.g., ... Hotel, Airport"
>     These are not nodes. Was the idea that the access points in these
>     places may not be trusted?

The nodes here refer to PaCs. 

I have been mostly biased by the discussions in the SEND WG
(draft-ietf-send-psreq-03.txt). 

Could you tell me what you meant above when you used the word "trusted"
?
I was trying to somehow differentiate this from a ad-hoc
network, where none of the nodes trust each other. Here at least,
the PaC's belief about a PAA and other PaCs are different.
I am really wondering how useful this distinction is as any PaC could
spoof like a PAA.

>   - "not trust relationship.. [but] belief about how the nodes ...
>      behave in the future"
> 
>     This text is contradictory.  If the relationship is not about
>     trust, it cannot be called "trust relationship".

"Trust relationship" really meant pre-configured authentication
information i.e none of the nodes have any pre-configured authentication
information about each other.
  
> 
>   Suggestions
>   - since you have already defined your terminology, it would be good
>     to use those defined terms like PaC and AS, rather than a generic
>     term like "nodes"
> 
>   - Perhaps the intended message of this paragraph is something like
>     this: 
>     - PANA is intended to be used in an environment where there is no
>       priori trust relationship or security association between PaC
>       and nodes in the access zone like PAA and EP.
> 
This one sounds good to me. Perhaps less confusing than my text.


> - para 2: bullet 2
>   change
>     "access network at layer 2 (3GPP2 CDMA network)"
>   to
>       "access network at layer 2 (e.g., 3GPP2 CDMA network)"
> 
Ok.

> Section 5
> - The title says "Trust relationships", but the only 
> reference to trust
>   relationships is in the last para (about PaC and EP).  I think you
>   should
>   - list the pairs of nodes between which a priori trust relationship
>     is assumed (i.e., trust assumption)
>     e.g., PaC and AS, PAA and EP, PAA and AS
>   - list the initial security associations required to exist before
>     PANA begins.
>     e.g., PaC and AS, PAA and EP (maybe), PAA and AS (either static or
>           derived using the AAA infrastructure)
> 
Ok.

> - last para
>   change
>     key derivation
>   to
>     key establishment
>   key may be derived, or transported (chosen by one party and sent to
>   the other)
> 
Ok.

> - PANA also MUST result in key establishment between PaC and PAA
>   (Requirement 2)
> 
Ok.

> Section 6.1
> - Threat 6.1.1 is ok.  But it is not clear how that implies
>   "information exchange .. SHOULD be limited".  For e.g., discovery
>   process may list 100s of potential PAA addresses.  If they are all
>   equal, there is no _security_ reason to limit the number of
>   candidate PAAs.
> 
>   Suggestions for requirement:
>   - security-criticical choices (e.g., authentication methods to be
>     agreed between PaC and PAA) SHOULD be limited.

This is what I was trying to say. This brings the point more clearly.

> 
> Section 6.2.1
> - Protecting Success or Failure indications
>   If this requirement is motivated by EAP, maybe it should be
>   mentioned.  Better still, generalize the requirement so that it
>   is not specific to one authentication framework.
> 
>   In a more general sense, the requirement is not just about
>   success/failure indications, but about any "control" message
>   (success/failure, disconnect/revoke, reauthentication requests etc.)
> 
I think I mentioned this in replay attacks but it never came out
in the requirements.

> - change "methods that can derive keys" to "methods that result in
>   keys"?
> 
ok.

> - question: is it really the intent to protect failure messages, too?
>   (they can't be protected using session keys resulting from
>    authentication methods)
There was quite a bit of discussion in the EAP working group sometime
back. If there is a EAP method specific failure, wouldn't that override
the EAP failure itself. Again, this document itself does not talk about
which failure it is. When I read the latest EAP document, it is still
not clear to me. I will let others comment on this.
> 
> - first paragraph on page 7: if the link is not shared then either you
>      assume that the link is physically secure, or it is not necessary
>      to differentiate it from a shared link.
>   In this case, this whole paragraph can be replaced by the sentence
>      that you use in pretty much every other threat "If the link is
>      not a shared medium, then this threat is absent"
> 
Yeah, that would make it more consistent.

> Section 6.2.2
> 
> - You have to clarify when MitM vulnerability exists.  Just using a
>   compound authentication method doesn't automatically lead to the
>   vulnerability. For example, PANA may use a tunnel to protect an

Correct. But the text does not seem to say that. It only says that
"MiTM attack exists if compound methods (which is defined as either the
sequence of methods one after another or methods are tunneled
inside a one-way authenticated tunnel) are not cryptographically
bound". Do you think it captures the basic idea ?

>   eavesdropper in the PaC-PAA path from listening in on information
>   exchanged by the inner authentication method.  This doesn't lead to
>   a MitM attack.  MitM shows up only when the tunnel keys are used as
>   session keys between PaC and some other entity (PAA or EP)
>   
I am not sure I understood all of the last sentence. Could you elaborate
?

> - So, before you talk about MitM, you should first decide whether it
>   is a PANA security requirement to use a tunneling method for the
>   purpose of deriving session keys between PaC and PAA.
> 
We have had some discussions in the past regarding this. It was decided
that PANA will not limit any specific EAP methods.

> Section 6.2.4
> - "protect the device identifier" is too general:  What you mean here
>   is something like "protect the integrity of the binding of the
>   device identifier to the authenticated session"
> 
Correct.

> Section 6.3
> - See comment on Section 6.2.1.  Requirements 2 and 6 are related.
> 
Agreed. But it is also possible that when you leave the network, you
can do another auth like exchange that says "I am disconnecting".

> Section 6.4
> - See comment on Section 6.2.4.  Requirements 5 and 7 are related (5
>   is a special case of 7)
> 
Do you think it is still useful to state them separately ?

> - The basic requirement is not really about "generating access control
>   information" but that PANA must make sure that the credentials to be
>   used in authorizing packets through the EP (device identifier, IPsec
>   AH key etc.) are securely bound to the authenticated session.  In
>   the case of device identifier, the binding is integrity protection.
>   In the case of IPsec AH key, the binding is to ensure that PANA
>   results in a secret session key to be used between PaC and EP.
> 
Agreed. This section has been modified quite a few times :-) I can
adopt your text above.

> Section 6.5
> - point 2: reference to "public key computation" also seems to presume
>   specific solution techniques.  Suggestion: replace "public key
>   computation" by "computationally intensive operations"

okay.

> 
> Section 6.6
> - change "should not" to "SHOULD NOT"
>   
okay.

thanks
mohan

> 
> 



From pana-request@research.telcordia.com  Fri May  2 18:38:34 2003
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Subject: Bootstraping RFC3118 using PANA
From: Alper Yegin <alper@docomolabs-usa.com>
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Hello,

[sorry about possible duplicates as this message is cross-posted on two
mailing lists..]

Assuming the major (or, one of the) problem of RFC3118 is lack of roaming
and bootstraping support, we thought PANA could be useful here.

http://ietf.org/html.charters/pana-charter.html

One idea is to use PANA prior to DHCP to bootstrap a trust relation between
the host and the network. Note that PANA can be used even when the host does
not have an IP address. Client and network can use any authentication method
to authenticate each other. Assuming they use one that generates keying
material, this would result in a newly generated trust relation (i.e., PANA
SA) between the host and an access network entity (PANA authentication agent
- PAA). This would be a by-product of "network access authentication."

PANA SA can be used to derive a DHCP SA to be used with RFC3118. This can be
accomplished by a mutually-agreed PRF.

In its simplest form, DHCP server/agent/proxy can be co-located with PAA,
hence keying material  is internally made available to DHCP module.

This way, RFC3118 can be used as is (unless there are some other problems
with it..)

Comments?

Alper



From pana-request@research.telcordia.com  Fri May  2 21:11:18 2003
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As a result of discussion with Mohan in the thread "Choice of
ciphering", I have the following comment on the threats draft.

Add a new threat in section 6.4 Service theft:

"T6.4.2: An authorized PaC device may intentionally allow other
devices that have direct connections to the access network to share
the same authorized device identifier in a time-sharing fashion, which
network operators may not want to allow under their service policies."


Yoshihiro Ohba



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Subject: EP's role
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Hello,


     Enforcement Point (EP)

        A node on the access network where per-packet
        enforcement policies (i.e., filters) are applied on the inbound
        and outbound traffic of client devices. Information such as DI
        and (optionally) cryptographic keys are provided by PAA per
        client for constructing filters on the EP.

EP's role is to prevent service theft i.e it wants to prevent
unauthorized
access  and also prevent one node spoofing as another and getting free
service.
 
Does this mean whether EP is used to protect the traffic sent between
PaCs ? From the definition, it looks like each and every packet sent out
by the PaC is looked at by the EP. Does it really care about traffic
sent
between the PaCs i.e local traffic ?

thanks
mohan



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Subject: PANA security threats LC comments
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Here are Pete McCann's review comments on the PANA security threats I-D.
Thanks Pete!

Alper

-------------------8<-----------------------------




Comments on draft-ietf-pana-threats-eval-03.txt


In the abstract, (which is repeated in the introduction, which is itself bad
style):
  This document discusses the threats in general without referring to a
  specific authentication protocol.
Threats to what?  Should at least say "security threats to PANA
operation" or some such.


In Section 4.0:
  Note that the usage of word trust above does not mean trust
  relationship. It just denotes the belief about how the nodes involved
  in PANA behave in the future.
I'm not sure what these two sentences mean or why they are here in the
document.

Here and in later text, the term "non shared medium" is used when I
think you really mean a stronger concept: that of a non-shared medium
with good physical security.  Suggest you be explicit about this.


In Section 5.0:

Path 3 is said to be outside the scope, as it can be secured through
operator configured security association.  However, I think we need to
worry about more than just eavesdropping on this link.  One threat
might be from a poorly specified or underspecified interface on Path
3; e.g., if the EP relies on some form of encryption or message
integrity checks to guarantee against theft-of-service, then a
protocol is likely needed to distribute keys from PAA to EP.  I think
there is a real danger that such protocols may not exist for a
particular variety of EP or that an operator may disable or improperly
configure such functionality even if it is available.  This would lead
to unsafe operation.  This problem space is touched on briefly in the
final paragraph of section 5 and in Section 6.4, although the specific
threats I outlined are not mentioned.  I suggest explicitly adding
Path 3 to the scope of the document.

penultimate paragraph of section 5:
   As it is beyond 
   the scope of PANA to address these threats, this document does not
   discuss this further.
Should use a semicolon here, not a comma.

Section 6.0:
   "discusses about" should just be "discusses".

Section 6.1:
   "The agents like PAA " should be "The PAA".

  Suggest deleting:
   ", without which the network operator will not make any profit"

  Suggest re-wording:
   "Since in this  
   environment, nodes in the network cannot directly communicate with
   each other and may assume that the other end of the point-to-point
   link is the PAA, spoofing attacks are not present."
  To:
   "Spoofing attacks are not present because in this environment, the PaC
   may assume that the other end of the link is the PAA."

   "resembles" should be "resemble".

  Change "Since" to "Because" and drop following comma:
   "Since,  
   it is difficult to protect the discovery process,"

Section 6.2.1:
   "An attacker can send false authentication success or failure to the
   PaC."
  Should be:
   "An attacker can send false authentication success or failure message to
the  
   PaC."
  Be consistent in the rest of the section.

  Change "because" to "if" in the following sentence:
   "This attack is possible because the success or failure indication is
   not protected using a security association between PaC and PAA. "

Section 6.2.2:
  Remove comma from this sentence:
   "It is not possible
   to do such verification, if compound methods are used without being
   able to create cryptographic binding among them."

Section 6.3:
   "When the PaC leaves the network, it needs to inform the PAA before
   disconnecting from the network so that the resources used by PaC can
   be accounted properly."
  This statement seems to be making assumptions about the protocol which has
  yet to be specified (this is true of several other statements in the
document
  as well).  Also, I don't think it's always possible for a PaC to
anticipate
  disconnection.  Suggest re-wording this.

Section 6.4:
  Here is an example of some text that says "non-shared" when it
  really means "non-shared with good physical security."  Also, it is
  important that the physical security be interlocked with the upper layer
  identifiers; i.e., consider a booth at an Internet cafe that is usable by
  only one person at a time.  We need to make sure that the ingress filter
is
  changed whenever one person leaves and a new person enters.
   "These threats are absent in links that are not shared as simple
   ingress filtering can prevent one node from impersonating as another
   node."

Section 6.5:
  "AS" should be, "As" below:
   "AS it is hard to protect against, there is no specific requirement
   on DoS attack. Protocol should be designed carefully to mitigate or
   prevent such attacks."
  Does this mean you are giving up on protecting against DoS because
  it is too hard?  That doesn't seem reasonable.

Section 7.0:
  Make sure these are aligned with whatever changes you make above.




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Subject: RE: PANA security threats LC comments
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From: "Mohan Parthasarathy" <mohanp@tahoenetworks.com>
To: <mccap@lucent.com>
Cc: "Alper Yegin" <alper@docomolabs-usa.com>,
        "pana" <pana@research.telcordia.com>
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Pete,

Thanks for your review. Comments below.


> 
> 
> 
> Comments on draft-ietf-pana-threats-eval-03.txt
> 
> 
> In the abstract, (which is repeated in the introduction, 
> which is itself bad
> style):

I thought repeat + addition is okay :-)

>   This document discusses the threats in general without 
> referring to a
>   specific authentication protocol.
> Threats to what?  Should at least say "security threats to 
> PANA operation" or some such.
> 
Okay.

> 
> In Section 4.0:
>   Note that the usage of word trust above does not mean trust
>   relationship. It just denotes the belief about how the 
> nodes involved
>   in PANA behave in the future.
> I'm not sure what these two sentences mean or why they are 
> here in the document.

It is going to go.

> 
> Here and in later text, the term "non shared medium" is used 
> when I think you really mean a stronger concept: that of a 
> non-shared medium with good physical security.  Suggest you 
> be explicit about this.
> 
Okay. I will state it explicitly.

> In Section 5.0:
> 
> Path 3 is said to be outside the scope, as it can be secured 
> through operator configured security association.  However, I 
> think we need to worry about more than just eavesdropping on 
> this link.  One threat might be from a poorly specified or 
> underspecified interface on Path 3; e.g., if the EP relies on 
> some form of encryption or message integrity checks to 
> guarantee against theft-of-service, then a protocol is likely 
> needed to distribute keys from PAA to EP.  I think there is a 
> real danger that such protocols may not exist for a 
> particular variety of EP or that an operator may disable or 
> improperly configure such functionality even if it is 
> available.  This would lead to unsafe operation.  This 
> problem space is touched on briefly in the final paragraph of 
> section 5 and in Section 6.4, although the specific threats I 
> outlined are not mentioned.  I suggest explicitly adding Path 
> 3 to the scope of the document.
> 
We had some discussions recently on this. We are thinking of using
the midcom working group's results on this. I have still not
read their requirements. I do see your point. I will think about
this.

> penultimate paragraph of section 5:
>    As it is beyond 
>    the scope of PANA to address these threats, this document does not
>    discuss this further.
> Should use a semicolon here, not a comma.
> 
Okay.

> Section 6.0:
>    "discusses about" should just be "discusses".
> 
> Section 6.1:
>    "The agents like PAA " should be "The PAA".
> 
>   Suggest deleting:
>    ", without which the network operator will not make any profit"
> 
>   Suggest re-wording:
>    "Since in this  
>    environment, nodes in the network cannot directly communicate with
>    each other and may assume that the other end of the point-to-point
>    link is the PAA, spoofing attacks are not present."
>   To:
>    "Spoofing attacks are not present because in this 
> environment, the PaC
>    may assume that the other end of the link is the PAA."
> 
>    "resembles" should be "resemble".
> 
>   Change "Since" to "Because" and drop following comma:
>    "Since,  
>    it is difficult to protect the discovery process,"
> 
> Section 6.2.1:
>    "An attacker can send false authentication success or 
> failure to the
>    PaC."
>   Should be:
>    "An attacker can send false authentication success or 
> failure message to the  
>    PaC."
>   Be consistent in the rest of the section.
> 
>   Change "because" to "if" in the following sentence:
>    "This attack is possible because the success or failure 
> indication is
>    not protected using a security association between PaC and PAA. "
> 
> Section 6.2.2:
>   Remove comma from this sentence:
>    "It is not possible
>    to do such verification, if compound methods are used without being
>    able to create cryptographic binding among them."
> 
Okay.

> Section 6.3:
>    "When the PaC leaves the network, it needs to inform the PAA before
>    disconnecting from the network so that the resources used 
> by PaC can
>    be accounted properly."
>   This statement seems to be making assumptions about the 
> protocol which has
>   yet to be specified (this is true of several other 
> statements in the document
>   as well).  Also, I don't think it's always possible for a 
> PaC to anticipate
>   disconnection.  Suggest re-wording this.
> 
Okay. 

> Section 6.4:
>   Here is an example of some text that says "non-shared" when it
>   really means "non-shared with good physical security."  Also, it is
>   important that the physical security be interlocked with 
> the upper layer
>   identifiers; i.e., consider a booth at an Internet cafe 
> that is usable by
>   only one person at a time.  We need to make sure that the 
> ingress filter is
>   changed whenever one person leaves and a new person enters.

I am not sure I understood this completely. When the person leaves,
if he unplugs the cable, the disconnect notification should clear
the filter out. Could you elaborate ?

>    "These threats are absent in links that are not shared as simple
>    ingress filtering can prevent one node from impersonating 
> as another
>    node."
> 
> Section 6.5:
>   "AS" should be, "As" below:
>    "AS it is hard to protect against, there is no specific requirement
>    on DoS attack. Protocol should be designed carefully to mitigate or
>    prevent such attacks."
>   Does this mean you are giving up on protecting against DoS because
>   it is too hard?  That doesn't seem reasonable.
> 
How do you prevent the dos attack on CPU cycles where I keep bombarding
requests at PAA. The protocol itself cannot do much. On the other
hand, some form of cookie exchange is generally to prevent resource
exhaustion attack. So, I am not sure I understood you completely here.

> Section 7.0:
>   Make sure these are aligned with whatever changes you make above.
> 
Okay.

thanks
mohan

> 



From pana-request@research.telcordia.com  Tue May  6 15:11:51 2003
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PaC-to-PaC traffic can be enforced at EP only when the traffic passes
through the EP.  If this is not the case, i.e., the traffic sent from
a PaC can directly reach the other PaC without passing through any EP
(this can happen at least in wireless access networks), it might be
the responsibility of PaC to do its own access control for such direct
traffic.

If the access network is operating in an infrastructure mode in which
all traffic needs to pass through an access point, the access control 
at PaC might be fairly easy, by using per-packet protection between 
the PaC and access point and accepting protected traffic only.

If the access network is operating in an ad-hoc mode, the access
control at PaC might need per-packet protection between the
communicating PaCs, which might require a security association between
the PaCs.  If pre-established SA is assumed between the PaCs, just use
it for deriving the required per-packet protection keys.  If this is
not the case, Kerberos could be used for establising an SA between the
PaCs (like KINK does).  But Kerberos requires an authentication server
as a trusted 3rd party to the PaCs.  In roaming environments, it might
be difficult to assume pre-established security association between
the Kerberos authentication server and the PaCs.  In this case, PANA
could be used for bootstraping Kerberos in the access network (I'm not
recommending it, I'm just mentioning possibility).

The above categorization in terms of modes of operation (i.e.,
infrastructure or ad-hoc) might be for layer-2 security only.  When we
consider layer-3 security aspect of PaC-to-PaC traffic, the "ad-hoc
mode" discussion in the above would always apply to layer-3.

So, my unswer would be that it does not really care about traffic sent
between the PaCs.

Yoshihiro Ohba




On Fri, May 02, 2003 at 06:40:21PM -0700, Mohan Parthasarathy wrote:
> Hello,
> 
> 
>      Enforcement Point (EP)
> 
>         A node on the access network where per-packet
>         enforcement policies (i.e., filters) are applied on the inbound
>         and outbound traffic of client devices. Information such as DI
>         and (optionally) cryptographic keys are provided by PAA per
>         client for constructing filters on the EP.
> 
> EP's role is to prevent service theft i.e it wants to prevent
> unauthorized
> access  and also prevent one node spoofing as another and getting free
> service.
>  
> Does this mean whether EP is used to protect the traffic sent between
> PaCs ? From the definition, it looks like each and every packet sent out
> by the PaC is looked at by the EP. Does it really care about traffic
> sent
> between the PaCs i.e local traffic ?
> 
> thanks
> mohan
> 
> 



From pana-request@research.telcordia.com  Tue May  6 15:43:54 2003
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Subject: RE: A comment on draft-ietf-pana-threats-eval-03.txt
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Yoshihiro,

Sorry for the delayed response.
 
> 
> As a result of discussion with Mohan in the thread "Choice of
> ciphering", I have the following comment on the threats draft.
> 
I just re-read the discussion that we had and checked what is given in the draft.
Let me list them here for better understanding.

1) Draft talks about someone getting a free service. This is really in the interest
   of the network operators to prevent this ( so that the subscribers will sign up
   for the service).

2) You brought up the point about a mix of clients where some of them use per-packet
   protection and some others don't use per-packet protection. In this case, clients
   using per-packet protection are safe because no one can steal their service. This
   is in the interest of the clients to prevent this so that they don't have to
   pay for somebody else's usage (assuming non-fixed pricing).

Essentially it is about service theft, but from different points of view i.e
it is still the same threat. Should we mention about (2) ?

> Add a new threat in section 6.4 Service theft:
> 
> "T6.4.2: An authorized PaC device may intentionally allow other
> devices that have direct connections to the access network to share

What do you mean by direct connections ?

> the same authorized device identifier in a time-sharing fashion, which
> network operators may not want to allow under their service policies."
> 

By "time-sharing" fashion, you meant either one of them is accessing at one
time but not both. Is that correct ? The network operator policy is strict that
it does not allow such things. But i am not sure i understand why and to whom
it is a threat ? Could you clarify ?

thanks
mohan

> Yoshihiro Ohba
> 
> 



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Subject: RE: PANA security threats LC comments
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Pete,
 
>  > >   Here is an example of some text that says "non-shared" when it
>  > >   really means "non-shared with good physical security." 
>  Also, it is
>  > >   important that the physical security be interlocked with 
>  > > the upper layer
>  > >   identifiers; i.e., consider a booth at an Internet cafe 
>  > > that is usable by
>  > >   only one person at a time.  We need to make sure that the 
>  > > ingress filter is
>  > >   changed whenever one person leaves and a new person enters.
>  > 
>  > I am not sure I understood this completely. When the person leaves,
>  > if he unplugs the cable, the disconnect notification should clear
>  > the filter out. Could you elaborate ?
> 
> Can you guarantee that a disconnect notification will be sent?  Are
> you relying on carrier detect mechanisms in a wired network?  Can you
> guarantee that they can't be spoofed?
> 
> To be really secure, it seems like some administrator has to clear the
> filter when the person in the booth changes.  Or, the latch on the
> door should trigger clearing the filter.  This is essentially
> interlocking physical security with the ingress filter.
> 
Ok, i will clarify a bit more what non-shared means.

>  > >    "These threats are absent in links that are not 
> shared as simple
>  > >    ingress filtering can prevent one node from impersonating 
>  > > as another
>  > >    node."
>  > > 
>  > > Section 6.5:
>  > >   "AS" should be, "As" below:
>  > >    "AS it is hard to protect against, there is no 
> specific requirement
>  > >    on DoS attack. Protocol should be designed carefully 
> to mitigate or
>  > >    prevent such attacks."
>  > >   Does this mean you are giving up on protecting against 
> DoS because
>  > >   it is too hard?  That doesn't seem reasonable.
>  > > 
>  > How do you prevent the dos attack on CPU cycles where I 
> keep bombarding
>  > requests at PAA. The protocol itself cannot do much. On the other
>  > hand, some form of cookie exchange is generally to prevent resource
>  > exhaustion attack. So, I am not sure I understood you 
> completely here.
> 
> I guess my confusion comes from the statement, "there is no specific
> requirement on DoS attack."  I agree that a cookie exchange mechanism

Ok, i will try to modify this or remove it.

> of some type will probably be necessary, and I hope that this
> statement doesn't rule it out.  I like the second sentence, "Protocol
> should be designed carefully to mitigate or prevent such attacks."
> 

thanks
mohan

> -Pete
> 
> 



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Subject: RE: EP's role
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Yoshihiro,

> 
> PaC-to-PaC traffic can be enforced at EP only when the traffic passes
> through the EP.  If this is not the case, i.e., the traffic sent from
> a PaC can directly reach the other PaC without passing through any EP
> (this can happen at least in wireless access networks), it might be
> the responsibility of PaC to do its own access control for such direct
> traffic.
> 
> If the access network is operating in an infrastructure mode in which
> all traffic needs to pass through an access point, the access control 
> at PaC might be fairly easy, by using per-packet protection between 
> the PaC and access point and accepting protected traffic only.
> 
Yes.

> If the access network is operating in an ad-hoc mode, the access
> control at PaC might need per-packet protection between the
> communicating PaCs, which might require a security association between

Who is the PAA in this case ?

> the PaCs.  If pre-established SA is assumed between the PaCs, just use
> it for deriving the required per-packet protection keys.  If this is
> not the case, Kerberos could be used for establising an SA between the
> PaCs (like KINK does).  But Kerberos requires an authentication server
> as a trusted 3rd party to the PaCs.  In roaming environments, it might
> be difficult to assume pre-established security association between
> the Kerberos authentication server and the PaCs.  In this case, PANA
> could be used for bootstraping Kerberos in the access network (I'm not
> recommending it, I'm just mentioning possibility).
> 
Do we really envision PANA for ad-hoc usage ? At least none of the usage
scenarios fit in this last time i read it.

> The above categorization in terms of modes of operation (i.e.,
> infrastructure or ad-hoc) might be for layer-2 security only.  When we
> consider layer-3 security aspect of PaC-to-PaC traffic, the "ad-hoc
> mode" discussion in the above would always apply to layer-3.
> 
> So, my unswer would be that it does not really care about traffic sent
> between the PaCs.
> 
Ok. Do you think there is a need where it will be useful to control the
traffic sent between PaCs i.e what do you lose by not controlling or gain
by controlling the traffic between PaCs ? 

The definition of EP just talks about such an entity exists for doing
access control. Should it be specified about what it is controlling ? or
leave the details unspecified and leave it to the network operator/
mechanism used to protect the link etc. ?

thanks
mohan

> Yoshihiro Ohba
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On Fri, May 02, 2003 at 06:40:21PM -0700, Mohan Parthasarathy wrote:
> > Hello,
> > 
> > 
> >      Enforcement Point (EP)
> > 
> >         A node on the access network where per-packet
> >         enforcement policies (i.e., filters) are applied on 
> the inbound
> >         and outbound traffic of client devices. Information 
> such as DI
> >         and (optionally) cryptographic keys are provided by PAA per
> >         client for constructing filters on the EP.
> > 
> > EP's role is to prevent service theft i.e it wants to prevent
> > unauthorized
> > access  and also prevent one node spoofing as another and 
> getting free
> > service.
> >  
> > Does this mean whether EP is used to protect the traffic 
> sent between
> > PaCs ? From the definition, it looks like each and every 
> packet sent out
> > by the PaC is looked at by the EP. Does it really care about traffic
> > sent
> > between the PaCs i.e local traffic ?
> > 
> > thanks
> > mohan
> > 
> > 
> 



From pana-request@research.telcordia.com  Tue May  6 16:59:59 2003
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Subject: Re: A comment on draft-ietf-pana-threats-eval-03.txt
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On Tue, May 06, 2003 at 12:44:40PM -0700, Mohan Parthasarathy wrote:
> Yoshihiro,
> 
> Sorry for the delayed response.
>  
> > 
> > As a result of discussion with Mohan in the thread "Choice of
> > ciphering", I have the following comment on the threats draft.
> > 
> I just re-read the discussion that we had and checked what is given in the draft.
> Let me list them here for better understanding.
> 
> 1) Draft talks about someone getting a free service. This is really in the interest
>    of the network operators to prevent this ( so that the subscribers will sign up
>    for the service).
> 
> 2) You brought up the point about a mix of clients where some of them use per-packet
>    protection and some others don't use per-packet protection. In this case, clients
>    using per-packet protection are safe because no one can steal their service. This
>    is in the interest of the clients to prevent this so that they don't have to
>    pay for somebody else's usage (assuming non-fixed pricing).
> 
> Essentially it is about service theft, but from different points of view i.e
> it is still the same threat. Should we mention about (2) ?

The only difference would be that (1) is independent of the billing
scheme while (2) is dependent.  So now I think (1) well covers the
threat and we might not need to mention (2).

Thanks,
Yoshihiro Ohba




From pana-request@research.telcordia.com  Tue May  6 21:12:43 2003
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Subject: Re: EP's role
From: Alper Yegin <alper@docomolabs-usa.com>
To: Mohan Parthasarathy <mohanp@tahoenetworks.com>,
        Yoshihiro Ohba <yohba@tari.toshiba.com>
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>> So, my unswer would be that it does not really care about traffic sent
>> between the PaCs.
>> 
> Ok. Do you think there is a need where it will be useful to control the
> traffic sent between PaCs i.e what do you lose by not controlling or gain
> by controlling the traffic between PaCs ?
> 
> The definition of EP just talks about such an entity exists for doing
> access control. Should it be specified about what it is controlling ? or
> leave the details unspecified and leave it to the network operator/
> mechanism used to protect the link etc. ?

I think a well secured access network should prevent unauthorized clients
sending and receiving IP packets. Hence, the EP should be placed where it
can police the traffic sent between clients. This way the network resources
are well protected, and the legitimate clients have less vulnerability
against malicious nodes.

There may be networks where EP cannot really enforce anything on the
inter-client traffic, but I think this would not be an intentional choice of
the operator. I cannot think of why one would prefer this unless there are
some deployment difficulties with placing EP between clients.

Alper



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Subject: Second shot on message formatting.
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Hi,

Since there is not much progress, let me give you the second shot for =
the message formatting :).

Changes:
 - Removed Application-Id field from the header for=20
   now (not enough support for this or Diameter compatibility).
 - Added PANA-Failure-Request/Answer messages (was missing=20
   in the previous version).
 - Merged PANA-Disconnect-Request/Answer and=20
   PANA-Revocation-Request/Answer messages to=20
   PANA-Termination-Request/Answer messages. This is because
   the messages were similar to each other and contain the=20
   Result-Code AVP, which can be used to differentiate=20
   disconnect and revocation.
=20

Br,
- Dan
 <<draft-ietf-pana-pana-00-sec9b.txt>>=20

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------_=_NextPart_001_01C3147B.840609E0--



From pana-request@research.telcordia.com  Wed May  7 05:37:23 2003
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Subject: Issue6: Session Identifier or SPIs
Date: Wed, 7 May 2003 12:38:13 +0300
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Thread-Topic: Issue6: Session Identifier or SPIs
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From: <Dan.Forsberg@nokia.com>
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Hi,

The message format (Issue9) contains Session-Id AVP [Issue6]. Have we reached consensus about the Session-Id?

http://danforsberg.info:8080/pana-issues/issue6


- Dan



From pana-request@research.telcordia.com  Wed May  7 13:17:10 2003
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Subject: RE: Issue6: Session Identifier or SPIs
Date: Wed, 7 May 2003 10:14:52 -0700
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Thread-Topic: Issue6: Session Identifier or SPIs
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From: "Mohan Parthasarathy" <mohanp@tahoenetworks.com>
To: <Dan.Forsberg@nokia.com>, <pana@research.telcordia.com>
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> -----Original Message-----
> From: Dan.Forsberg@nokia.com [mailto:Dan.Forsberg@nokia.com] 
> Sent: Wednesday, May 07, 2003 2:38 AM
> To: pana@research.telcordia.com
> Subject: Issue6: Session Identifier or SPIs
> 
> 
> Hi,
> 
> The message format (Issue9) contains Session-Id AVP [Issue6]. 
> Have we reached consensus about the Session-Id?
> 
I thought the discussion leaned itself towards using a separate
session-Id
And you suggested using something what Diameter uses. It looked okay to 
me at least.

http://danforsberg.info:8080/pana-issues/issue6

-mohan

- Dan



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Subject: RE: "new" issue / Event Notification
Date: Thu, 8 May 2003 08:56:38 +0300
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Hi,

This is issue11 (http://danforsberg.info:8080/pana-issues/issue11) and text has been proposed. Is this text acceptable or not? Alper?

- Dan

-----Original Message-----
From: ext Yoshihiro Ohba [mailto:yohba@tari.toshiba.com]
Sent: 23 April, 2003 09:39
To: Yacine.El_Mghazli@alcatel.fr
Cc: Patil Basavaraj (NET/Dallas); Forsberg Dan (NRC/Helsinki); pana@research.telcordia.com
Subject: Re: "new" issue / Event Notification


Hi Yacine,

On Wed, Apr 23, 2003 at 02:50:16PM +0200, Yacine.El_Mghazli@alcatel.fr wrote:
> hi Basavaraj,
> 
> Basavaraj.Patil@nokia.com wrote:
> 
> >It helps if replacement text is suggested as well. 
> 
> 
> Bellow is the current text in the current version of the pana protocol 
> draft:
> 
>     Upon detecting the need to authenticate a client, EP can send a
>     PAC_discovery message to the PAA on behalf of the PaC. This
>     message carries a device identifier of the PaC in a Device-Id AVP.
> 
> If there is a consensus for using PAA-EP protocol here, one can replace 
> the lattest paragraph in the pana draft by a similar one stating that 
> the PAA-EP protocol will deal with this explicit message:
> 
> "Upon detecting the need to authenticate a client, EP can prompt the PAA 
> using the PAA-EP protocol. This message should carry a device identifier 
> of the PaC."

I tend to agree on the proposed text, which makes the PAA-EP protocol
more independent of the PaC-PAA protocol.  I admit that the current
design requires EPs to manufacture a specific PANA message PDU (i.e.,
PAA_discovery) in its payload while it does not speak PANA.
Specifying the required functionality instead of specifying both
functionality and message format might be sufficient for the EP-PAA
protocol to satisfy the PANA requirement.  Of course the actual 
design of the EP-PAA protocol may choose to carry PANA_discovery
message based on their design criteria.

Yoshihiro Ohba


> 
> Moreover, the PAA-EP protocol requirements in the requirements draft 
> should state clearly that the PAA-EP protocol must support 
> 'event-notification' (it's the case of most of the candidates, namely 
> SNMP, COPS, etc.).
> 
> >However it is
> >still useful to have the issue listed and discussed by WG members
> >before arriving at any consensus on the text/conclusion.
> 
> >
> >-Basavaraj
> >
> 
> 
> thanks,
> yacine
> 
> 
> >
> >>I've created a new issue (Issue11) about this. In general I 
> >>think that text replacement should be provided. But, let's 
> >>see what chairs think about this issue system..
> >>- Dan
> >>
> >>
> >>>
> >>>hi all,
> >>>
> >>>the following is about the discovery phase in the pana draft:
> >>>
> >>>   PaC may also choose to start sending packets before getting
> >>>   authenticated.  In that case, the network should detect this and
> >>>   send an unsolicited PANA_start message to PaC.  EP is the 
> >>>node that
> >>>   can detect such activity.  If EP and PAA are co-located, then an
> >>>   internal mechanism (e.g. API) between the EP module and the PAA
> >>>   module on the same host can prompt PAA to start PANA.  In 
> >>>case they
> >>>   are separate, there needs to [be] an explicit message to prompt
> >>>   PAA.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>1/ on the one hand, the current version of the pana 
> >>>
> >>protocol quickly 
> >>
> >>>states [discovery section] that, in case of 'traffic-driven' 
> >>>authentication, the EP must send a PANA_start message to the PAA:
> >>>
> >>>   Upon detecting the need to authenticate a client, EP can send a
> >>>   PAC_discovery message to the PAA on behalf of the PaC. This
> >>>   message carries a device identifier of the PaC in a 
> >>>
> >>Device-Id AVP.
> >>
> >>>2/ on the other hand, the requirements draft [EP-PAA protocol 
> >>>section] 
> >>>states that the PAA-EP protocol should support 
> >>>event-notification also:
> >>>
> >>>   Depending on the PANA protocol design, support for either 
> >>>of the push
> >>>   model (i.e., EP initiating the PAA-EP protocol exchange 
> >>>per PaC) or
> >>>   the pull model (i.e., PAA initiating the PAA-EP protocol 
> >>>exchange per
> >>>   PaC), or both might be required.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>--> the working group should fix this (not listed on the web 
> >>>site) issue 
> >>>also (the PANA protocol OR the PAA-EP protocol supports the 
> >>>EP-triggering)
> >>>
> >>>my personal feeling on this is that the PANA protocol should be 
> >>>restricted to PaC-PAA communication and the PAA-EP protocol 
> >>>(whichever 
> >>>you finaly choose) should take it as a requirement.
> >>>
> >>>thanks,
> >>>yacine
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>
> >
> >
> 
> 
> 



From pana-request@research.telcordia.com  Thu May  8 02:08:09 2003
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Subject: RE: Second shot on message formatting.
Date: Thu, 8 May 2003 09:05:40 +0300
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Issue10 is related to message formatting. 
http://danforsberg.info:8080/pana-issues/issue10
- Dan

-----Original Message-----
From: ext [mailto:Dan.Forsberg@nokia.com]
Sent: 07 May, 2003 12:32
To: pana@research.telcordia.com
Subject: Second shot on message formatting.


Hi,

Since there is not much progress, let me give you the second shot for the message formatting :).

Changes:
 - Removed Application-Id field from the header for 
   now (not enough support for this or Diameter compatibility).
 - Added PANA-Failure-Request/Answer messages (was missing 
   in the previous version).
 - Merged PANA-Disconnect-Request/Answer and 
   PANA-Revocation-Request/Answer messages to 
   PANA-Termination-Request/Answer messages. This is because
   the messages were similar to each other and contain the 
   Result-Code AVP, which can be used to differentiate 
   disconnect and revocation.
 

Br,
- Dan
 <<draft-ietf-pana-pana-00-sec9b.txt>> 



From pana-request@research.telcordia.com  Thu May  8 14:32:05 2003
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Subject: Protection of success/failure indication.
Date: Thu, 8 May 2003 11:31:57 -0700
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Thread-Topic: Protection of success/failure indication.
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From: "Mohan Parthasarathy" <mohanp@tahoenetworks.com>
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Hello,

draft-ietf-pana-threats-eval draft requires that success/failure packets
MUST
be protected.

In the context of EAP, the above could be interpreted to be either the 
EAP success/failure or it could even be the EAP method success/failure.
In my
understadning, rfc2284-bis itself does not talk about method specific
success/failure. With a recent clarification in the EAP working group,
it was
decided that only in re-authentication, the EAP success/failure packet
can be
protected.

It might be a bit odd to write down the requirements based on what EAP
does
as the draft was supposed to be more general in nature. If you think
about
this in general, it is not possible to protect the success/failure
packet
always as it requires some key derivation beforehand and it can always
fail before the key derivation happens.

So, the requirement can be modified to say that "The success/failure
messages
SHOULD be protected where possible" with some explanatory text as
described
above.

Comments ?

-mohan



From pana-request@research.telcordia.com  Thu May  8 16:47:54 2003
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Subject: Re: Second shot on message formatting.
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Hi Dan,

Removing Application-Id works fine with me.

Please see my further comments in line.


On Wed, May 07, 2003 at 12:32:02PM +0300, Dan.Forsberg@nokia.com wrote:
> Hi,
> 
> Since there is not much progress, let me give you the second shot for the message formatting :).
> 
> Changes:
>  - Removed Application-Id field from the header for 
>    now (not enough support for this or Diameter compatibility).
>  - Added PANA-Failure-Request/Answer messages (was missing 
>    in the previous version).
>  - Merged PANA-Disconnect-Request/Answer and 
>    PANA-Revocation-Request/Answer messages to 
>    PANA-Termination-Request/Answer messages. This is because
>    the messages were similar to each other and contain the 
>    Result-Code AVP, which can be used to differentiate 
>    disconnect and revocation.
>  
> 
> Br,
> - Dan
>  <<draft-ietf-pana-pana-00-sec9b.txt>> 

Content-Description: draft-ietf-pana-pana-00-sec9b.txt
> 9  Message Format
> 
>    This section defines message formats for PANA protocol.  
> 
> 
> 9.1  PANA Header
> 
>    A summary of the PANA header format is shown below.  The fields are
>    transmitted in network byte order.
> 
>        0                   1                   2                   3
>        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
>       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
>       |    Version    |                 Message Length                |
>       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
>       |    Flags      |                 Message Type                  |
>       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
>       |                 Transmitted Sequence Number                   |
>       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
>       |                 Received Sequence Number                      |
>       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
>       |  AVPs ...
>       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
> 
>    Version
> 
>       This Version field MUST be set to 1 to indicate PANA Version 1.
> 
>    Message Length
> 
>       The Message Length field is three octets and indicates the
>       length of the PANA message including the header fields.
> 
>    Flags
> 
>       The Flags field is eight bits.  The following bits are assigned:
> 
>        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
>       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
>       |R r r r F r r r|
>       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

As we are going to deviate from using the exact Diameter message format, 
there might be no reason to reserve  bits 1-3.  So I'd suggest:

        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |R F r r r r r r|
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


> 
>          R(equest)   
> 
>                      - If set, the message is a request. If cleared,
>                        the message is an answer.
> 
>          F(inish)    
>                      - F-flag in the PANA header indicates if this was
>                        the final authentication from sender's
>                        perspective.  If PAA enables two separate
>                        authentication, it should not set F-flag in the
>                        PANA_success or PANA_failure message after the
>                        first EAP method.
> 
>          r(eserved)  
> 
>                      - these flag bits are reserved for future use,
>                        and MUST be set to zero, and ignored by the
>                        receiver.
> 
> 
>    Message Type
> 
>       The Message Type field is three octets, and is used in order to
>       communicate the message type with the message.  The 24-bit
>       address space is managed by IANA.
> 
>    Transmitted Sequence Number
> 
>       The Transmitted Sequence Number field contains the monotonically
>       increasing 32 bit sequence number that the message sender
>       increments every time a new packet is sent.
> 
>    Received Sequence Number
> 
>       The Received Sequence Number field contains the 32 bit
>       transmitted sequence number that the peer has last received.
> 
>    AVPs
> 
>       AVPs are a method of encapsulating information relevant to the
>       PANA message.  See section <TBD> for more information on AVPs.
> 
> 
> 9.2  AVP Header
> 
>        0                   1                   2                   3
>        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
>       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
>       |                           AVP Code                            |
>       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
>       |   AVP Flags   |                  AVP Length                   |
>       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
>       |                         Vendor-Id (opt)                       |
>       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
>       |    Data ...
>       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> 
> 
>    AVP Code
> 
>       The AVP Code, combined with the Vendor-Id field, identifies the
>       attribute uniquely. AVP numbers are allocated by IANA.
> 
>    AVP Flags
> 
>       The AVP Flags field is eight bits.  The following bits are
>       assigned:
> 
>        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
>       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
>       |V M r r r r r r|
>       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> 
>          M(andatory) 
> 
>                      - The 'M' Bit, known as the Mandatory bit,
> 	               indicates whether support of the AVP is
> 	               required.
> 
>          V(endor)    
> 
>                      - The 'V' bit, known as the Vendor-Specific bit,
>                        indicates whether the optional Vendor-ID field
>                        is present in the AVP header.
> 
>          r(eserved)  
> 
>                      - these flag bits are reserved for future use,
>                        and MUST be set to zero, and ignored by the
>                        receiver.
> 
>    AVP Length
> 
>       The AVP Length field is three octets, and indicates the number
>       of octets in this AVP including the AVP Code, AVP Length, AVP
>       Flags, and the AVP data.
> 
>    Vendor-Id
> 
>       The Vendor-ID field is present if the 'V' bit is set in the AVP
>       Flags field. The optional four-octet Vendor-ID field contains
>       the uniquely assigned <TBD> id value, encoded in network byte
>       order.  Any vendor wishing to implement a vendor-specific PANA
>       AVP MUST use their own Vendor-ID along with their privately
>       managed AVP address space, guaranteeing that they will not
>       collide with any other vendor's vendor-specific AVP(s), nor with
>       future IETF applications.
> 
>    Data
> 
>       The Data field is zero or more octets and contains information
>       specific to the Attribute. The format and length of the Data
>       field is determined by the AVP Code and AVP Length fields.
> 
> 
> 9.3  PANA Messages
> 
>    The following figure X lists all PANA messages defined in this
>    draft with the sender and receiver illustrated.
> 
>       Message       Direction: PaC---PAA
>       ----------------------------------
>       PANA-Discover            -------->  
> 
>       PANA-Start-Request       <--------
>       PANA-Start-Answer        -------->
> 
>       PANA-Auth-Request        <--------
>       PANA-Auth-Answer         -------->
> 
>       PANA-Success-Request     <--------
>       PANA-Success-Answer      -------->
> 
>       PANA-Failure-Request     <--------
>       PANA-Failure-Answer      -------->
> 
>       PANA-Reauth-Request      <------->
>       PANA-Reauth-Answer       <------->
> 
>       PANA-Termination-Request <------->
>       PANA-Termination-Answer  <------->
>   
>             Figure X.
> 
> 
> 9.3.1  Message specifications
> 
>    Every PANA Message defined MUST include a corresponding ABNF
>    [RFC2234] specification found in the [DIAMETER] spec.  PANA
>    Messages have different header format compared to Diameter.
>    Explain.. <TBD>.
> 
>    Example_message ::= < PANA-Header: <Message type>, 
>                                       [ACK], [FIN] >
>                   * [ AVP ]
> 
> 
> 9.3.2  PANA-Discover
> 
>    PANA-Discover message is used to discover the address of
>    PAA(s). Both sequence numbers in this message are set to zero
>    (0). If EP detects a new PaC and sends the PANA-Discover to PAA, it
>    MUST include the Device-ID of the PaC.
> 
>       PANA-PAA-Discover ::= < PANA-Header: <TBD> >
>                 0*1 < Device-ID >	
>                   * [ AVP ]

I'm not sure what the consensus on EP-PAA messaging in PANA draft.  If
PANA just specifies the required functionality for EP-PAA message
exchange instead of mandating the specific message format for the
exchange, specifying the use of PANA-Discover messages sent from PaC
to PAA is enough and the format can be:

        PANA-PAA-Discover ::= < PANA-Header: <TBD> >
                  * [ AVP ]

> 
> 
> 9.3.3  PANA-Start-Request
> 
>    PANA-Start-Request is sent by PAA to PaC.  PAA sets the
>    transmission sequence number to an initial random value.  The
>    received sequence number is set to zero (0).
> 
>       PANA-Start-Request ::= < PANA-Header: <TBD> >
>                     < Session-ID >
>                     < Cookie >
>                   * [ AVP ]
> 
> 
> 9.3.4  PANA-Start-Answer
> 
>    PANA-Start-Answer (PSA) is sent by PaC to PAA in response to
>    PANA_start message.  The PANA_start message transmission sequence
>    number field is copied to the received sequence number field.  The
>    transmission sequence number is set to initial random value.
> 
>       PANA-Start-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: <TBD> >
>                     < Session-ID >
>                     < Cookie >
>                   * [ AVP ]
> 
> 
> 9.3.5  PANA-Auth-Request
> 
>    PANA-Auth-Request is sent by PAA to PaC.
> 
>       PANA-Auth-Request ::= < PANA-Header: <TBD> >
>                     < Session-ID >
>                     < EAP-Payload >
>                   * [ AVP ]
>                 0*1 < MAC >
> 
> 
> 9.3.6  PANA-Auth-Answer
> 
>    PANA-Auth-Answer is sent by PaC to PAA in response to
>    PANA-Auth-Request.
> 
>       PANA-Auth-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: <TBD> >
>                     < Session-ID >
>                     < EAP-Payload >
>                   * [ AVP ]
>                 0*1 < MAC >
> 
> 
> 9.3.7  PANA-Success-Request
> 
>    PANA-Success-Request is sent by PAA to PaC when PAA receives EAP
>    Success.
> 
>       PANA-Success-Request ::= < PANA-Header: <TBD>, [FIN] >
>                     < Session-ID >
>                     < Device-ID >
>                     < EAP-Payload >
>                     < Protection-Capability >
>                   * [ AVP ]
>                 0*1 < MAC >

Device-ID can be omitted when PANA runs over physically secure link.
On the oher hand, it is possible to use both L2 and L3 addresses as
device identifier when both L2 and L3 ciphers are required.  So I'd
suggest:

       PANA-Success-Request ::= < PANA-Header: <TBD>, ACK, [FIN] >
                     < Session-ID >
                 0*2 < Device-ID >
                   * [ AVP ]
                 0*1 < MAC >

> 
> 
> 9.3.8  PANA-Success-Answer
> 
>    PANA-Success-Answer is sent by PaC to PAA in response to
>    PANA-Success-Request.
> 
>       PANA-Success-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: <TBD>, ACK, [FIN] >
>                     < Session-ID >
>                     < Device-ID >
>                   * [ AVP ]
>                 0*1 < MAC >

For the same reason as for Success-Request, I'd suggest:

       PANA-Success-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: <TBD>, ACK, [FIN] >
                     < Session-ID >
                 0*2 < Device-ID >
                   * [ AVP ]
                 0*1 < MAC >


> 
> 
> 9.3.9  PANA-Failure-Request
> 
>    PANA-Failure-Request is sent by PAA to PaC when PAA receives EAP
>    Failure.
> 
>       PANA-Failure-Request ::= < PANA-Header: <TBD> >
>                     < Session-ID >
>                     < Device-ID >
>                     < EAP-Payload >
>                   * [ AVP ]
>                 0*1 < MAC >

I'm not sure why Device-ID is needed for this message.

> 
> 
> 9.3.10  PANA-Failure-Answer
> 
>    PANA-Failure-Answer is sent by PaC to PAA in response to
>    PANA-Failure-Request.
> 
>       PANA-Failure-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: <TBD>, ACK >
>                     < Session-ID >
>                     < Device-ID >
>                   * [ AVP ]
>                 0*1 < MAC >
> 

I'm not sure why Device-ID is needed for this message.

> 
> 9.3.11  PANA-Reauth-Request
> 
>    PANA-Reauth-Request can be send both by PaC and PAA.
> 
>       PANA-Reauth-Request ::= < PANA-Header: <TBD> >
>                     < Session-ID >
>                 0*1 [ Add-Device-ID ]
>                 0*1 [ Remove-Device-ID ]
>                   * [ AVP ]
>                 0*1 < MAC >
> 
> 
> 9.3.12  PANA-Reauth-Answer
> 
>    PANA-Reauth-Answer is sent in response to PANA-Reauth-Request.
> 
>       PANA-Reauth-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: <TBD>, ACK >
>                     < Session-ID >
>                     < Device-ID >
>                   * [ AVP ]
>                 0*1 < MAC >
> 

I'm not sure why Device-ID is needed for this message.

> 
> 9.3.13  PANA-Termination-Request
> 
>    PANA-Termination-Request is sent by PaC to PAA.
> 
>       PANA-Disconnect-Request ::= < PANA-Header: <TBD> >
>                     < Session-ID >
>                     < Termination-Cause >
>                   * [ AVP ]
>                 0*1 < MAC >
> 
> 
> 9.3.14  PANA-Termination-Answer
> 
>    PANA-Termination-Answer is sent by PAA to PaC in response to
>    PANA-Termination-Request.
> 
>       PANA-Disconnect-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: <TBD>, ACK >
>                     < Session-ID >
>                   * [ AVP ]
>                 0*1 < MAC >
> 
> 
> 9.4  AVPs in PANA
> 
>    Some of the used AVPs are defined in this document and some of them
>    are defined in other documents like [DIAMETER].
> 
> 
> 9.4.1  Cookie-AVP
> 
>    The Cookie AVP (Code <TBD>) is of type OctetString.
> 
> 
> 9.4.2  MAC AVP
> 
>    The MAC AVP (Code <TBD>) is of type OctetString.
> 
> 
> 9.4.3  Device-ID AVP  
> 
>    The Device-ID AVP (Code <TBD>) is of type Grouped.
> 
>       Device-ID ::= < AVP Header: <TBD> >
>                     < Device-Iype >
>                     < Device-Data >

"Iype" -> "Type".

> 
> 
> 9.4.3.1  Device-Type AVP
> 
>    The Device-Type AVP (Code <TBD>) is of type Unsigned32. Below is a
>    list of specified Device-Types:
> 
>       IPV6_ADDRESS                      1
>       IPV4_ADDRESS                      2
>       ETHERNET_ADDRESS                  3
> 
> 
> 9.4.3.2  Device-Data AVP
> 
>    The Device-Data AVP (Code <TBD>) is of type OctetString.  The
>    length depends on the Device-Type AVP.  Below is a list of lengths
>    in octets for specified (See Device-Type AVP definition)
>    Device-Types:
> 
>       IPV6_ADDRESS                      16
>       IPV4_ADDRESS                      4
>       ETHERNET_ADDRESS                  6
> 
> 
> 9.4.4  Protection-Capability AVP
> 
>    The Protection-Capability AVP (Code <TBD>) is of type Unsigned32.
>    The AVP data is used as a collection of flags for different data
>    protection capability indications.  Below is a list of specified
>    data protection capabilities:
> 
>       L2_PROTECTION                     1
>       IPSEC_PROTECTION                  2
> 
> 
> 9.4.5  EAP-Payload AVP
> 
>    The EAP-Payload AVP is defined in [XXX].
> 
> 
> 9.4.6  Termination-Cause AVP
> 
>    The Termination-Cause AVP is defined in [DIAMETER].
> 
> 
> 9.4.7  Add-Device-ID
> 
>    The Add-Device-ID AVP (Code <TBD>) is of type Grouped.
> 
>       Add-Device-ID ::= < AVP Header: <TBD> >
>                  1* [ Device-ID ]
> 
> 
> 9.4.8  Remove-Device-ID
> 
>    The Remove-Device-ID AVP (Code <TBD>) is of type Grouped.
> 
>       Remove-Device-ID ::= < AVP Header: <TBD> >
>                  1* [ Device-ID ]
> 
> 
> 9.4.9  Session-ID
> 
>    The Session-ID AVP is defined in [DIAMETER].

I agree that re-using Diameter Session-ID for PANA Session-ID a good
idea.

Thanks,
Yoshihiro Ohba



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Subject: Re: Protection of success/failure indication.
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        <pana@research.telcordia.com>
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On 5/8/03 11:31 AM, "Mohan Parthasarathy" <mohanp@tahoenetworks.com> wrote:

> Hello,
> 
> draft-ietf-pana-threats-eval draft requires that success/failure packets
> MUST
> be protected.
> 
> In the context of EAP, the above could be interpreted to be either the
> EAP success/failure or it could even be the EAP method success/failure.
> In my
> understadning, rfc2284-bis itself does not talk about method specific
> success/failure. With a recent clarification in the EAP working group,
> it was
> decided that only in re-authentication, the EAP success/failure packet
> can be
> protected.
> 
> It might be a bit odd to write down the requirements based on what EAP
> does
> as the draft was supposed to be more general in nature. If you think
> about
> this in general, it is not possible to protect the success/failure
> packet
> always as it requires some key derivation beforehand and it can always
> fail before the key derivation happens.
> 
> So, the requirement can be modified to say that "The success/failure
> messages
> SHOULD be protected where possible" with some explanatory text as
> described
> above.

I agree. Not all authentication methods can produce crypto keys, hence
saying "result MUST be protected" is too strong. Not all environments need
this kind of security anyways....

Alper



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Subject: Re: "new" issue / Event Notification
From: Alper Yegin <alper@docomolabs-usa.com>
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> This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.

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Hi Dan,

Please see the attached e-mail for my latest response on this thread.

Here is my suggestion:

For now we can keep the EP's ability to send PANA_discover message.
We can mark it as an optional feature which can be replaced by a PAA-EP
protocol message in any deployment. That way, even if a specific PAA-EP
protocol does not know how to trigger the PAA, the deployment can rely on
this message as a substitute.

When we look at the PAA-EP protocols, if we realize that this message is not
useful, then we can drop it.

How does this sound?

Alper




On 5/7/03 10:56 PM, "Dan.Forsberg@nokia.com" <Dan.Forsberg@nokia.com> wrote:

> Hi,
> 
> This is issue11 (http://danforsberg.info:8080/pana-issues/issue11) and text
> has been proposed. Is this text acceptable or not? Alper?
> 
> - Dan
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: ext Yoshihiro Ohba [mailto:yohba@tari.toshiba.com]
> Sent: 23 April, 2003 09:39
> To: Yacine.El_Mghazli@alcatel.fr
> Cc: Patil Basavaraj (NET/Dallas); Forsberg Dan (NRC/Helsinki);
> pana@research.telcordia.com
> Subject: Re: "new" issue / Event Notification
> 
> 
> Hi Yacine,
> 
> On Wed, Apr 23, 2003 at 02:50:16PM +0200, Yacine.El_Mghazli@alcatel.fr wrote:
>> hi Basavaraj,
>> 
>> Basavaraj.Patil@nokia.com wrote:
>> 
>>> It helps if replacement text is suggested as well.
>> 
>> 
>> Bellow is the current text in the current version of the pana protocol
>> draft:
>> 
>>     Upon detecting the need to authenticate a client, EP can send a
>>     PAC_discovery message to the PAA on behalf of the PaC. This
>>     message carries a device identifier of the PaC in a Device-Id AVP.
>> 
>> If there is a consensus for using PAA-EP protocol here, one can replace
>> the lattest paragraph in the pana draft by a similar one stating that
>> the PAA-EP protocol will deal with this explicit message:
>> 
>> "Upon detecting the need to authenticate a client, EP can prompt the PAA
>> using the PAA-EP protocol. This message should carry a device identifier
>> of the PaC."
> 
> I tend to agree on the proposed text, which makes the PAA-EP protocol
> more independent of the PaC-PAA protocol.  I admit that the current
> design requires EPs to manufacture a specific PANA message PDU (i.e.,
> PAA_discovery) in its payload while it does not speak PANA.
> Specifying the required functionality instead of specifying both
> functionality and message format might be sufficient for the EP-PAA
> protocol to satisfy the PANA requirement.  Of course the actual
> design of the EP-PAA protocol may choose to carry PANA_discovery
> message based on their design criteria.
> 
> Yoshihiro Ohba
> 
> 
>> 
>> Moreover, the PAA-EP protocol requirements in the requirements draft
>> should state clearly that the PAA-EP protocol must support
>> 'event-notification' (it's the case of most of the candidates, namely
>> SNMP, COPS, etc.).
>> 
>>> However it is
>>> still useful to have the issue listed and discussed by WG members
>>> before arriving at any consensus on the text/conclusion.
>> 
>>> 
>>> -Basavaraj
>>> 
>> 
>> 
>> thanks,
>> yacine
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>>> I've created a new issue (Issue11) about this. In general I
>>>> think that text replacement should be provided. But, let's
>>>> see what chairs think about this issue system..
>>>> - Dan
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> hi all,
>>>>> 
>>>>> the following is about the discovery phase in the pana draft:
>>>>> 
>>>>>   PaC may also choose to start sending packets before getting
>>>>>   authenticated.  In that case, the network should detect this and
>>>>>   send an unsolicited PANA_start message to PaC.  EP is the
>>>>> node that
>>>>>   can detect such activity.  If EP and PAA are co-located, then an
>>>>>   internal mechanism (e.g. API) between the EP module and the PAA
>>>>>   module on the same host can prompt PAA to start PANA.  In
>>>>> case they
>>>>>   are separate, there needs to [be] an explicit message to prompt
>>>>>   PAA.
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 1/ on the one hand, the current version of the pana
>>>>> 
>>>> protocol quickly
>>>> 
>>>>> states [discovery section] that, in case of 'traffic-driven'
>>>>> authentication, the EP must send a PANA_start message to the PAA:
>>>>> 
>>>>>   Upon detecting the need to authenticate a client, EP can send a
>>>>>   PAC_discovery message to the PAA on behalf of the PaC. This
>>>>>   message carries a device identifier of the PaC in a
>>>>> 
>>>> Device-Id AVP.
>>>> 
>>>>> 2/ on the other hand, the requirements draft [EP-PAA protocol
>>>>> section] 
>>>>> states that the PAA-EP protocol should support
>>>>> event-notification also:
>>>>> 
>>>>>   Depending on the PANA protocol design, support for either
>>>>> of the push
>>>>>   model (i.e., EP initiating the PAA-EP protocol exchange
>>>>> per PaC) or
>>>>>   the pull model (i.e., PAA initiating the PAA-EP protocol
>>>>> exchange per
>>>>>   PaC), or both might be required.
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> --> the working group should fix this (not listed on the web
>>>>> site) issue 
>>>>> also (the PANA protocol OR the PAA-EP protocol supports the
>>>>> EP-triggering)
>>>>> 
>>>>> my personal feeling on this is that the PANA protocol should be
>>>>> restricted to PaC-PAA communication and the PAA-EP protocol
>>>>> (whichever 
>>>>> you finaly choose) should take it as a requirement.
>>>>> 
>>>>> thanks,
>>>>> yacine
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
> 
> 


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Date: Wed, 23 Apr 2003 11:08:43 -0700
Subject: Re: "new" issue / Event Notification
From: Alper Yegin <alper@docomolabs-usa.com>
To: <Yacine.El_Mghazli@alcatel.fr>
Cc: <pana@research.telcordia.com>
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>> I couldn't see an inconsistency here.
>> 
>> The requirements draft says the PAA-EP protocol should support either push
>> model, or pull model, or both depending on the PANA protocol design.
>> And the current PANA protocol design lets EP notify the PAA about
>> unauthenticated PaCs. Hence the only requirement on the PAA-EP protocol is
>> the support for the "pull model" (as defined below).
>> 
>> Does this make sense?
> 
> 
> yes, this is the current view. did the PANA WG reached a consensus on
> this subject ? I'm curious about the technical motivations of the design
> team for such a choice in the PANA protocol design.

Just like any other part of the draft, this is also subject to the WG
discussions. There was no discussion on this after the publication of the
version 00, so it is hard to say whether the WG has reached a consensus or
not. 

I can only speak for myself, as I don't remember detailed discussion on this
matter during its design. We could expect the PAA-EP protocol to provide
this notification, but I don't see why not do it in PANA, and have less
requirements on the PAA-EP protocol.

> NB: terminology question for the req-draft authors:
> 
> the PUSH model is defined as follows:
> - "EP initiating the PAA-EP protocol exchange per PaC"
> and the PULL model corresponds to:
> - "PAA initiating the PAA-EP protocol exchange per PaC"
> 
> 
> is that really what you meant ? isn't it the contrary ?
> 
> usually, the 'PULL model' better corresponds to bottom-up (EP->PAA)
> initiated communication.


Yes, I caught that too, and this is fixed in the latest version:

http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pana-requirements-05.txt

Alper



> 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> hi all,
>>> 
>>> the following is about the discovery phase in the pana draft:
>>> 
>>>  PaC may also choose to start sending packets before getting
>>>  authenticated.  In that case, the network should detect this and
>>>  send an unsolicited PANA_start message to PaC.  EP is the node that
>>>  can detect such activity.  If EP and PAA are co-located, then an
>>>  internal mechanism (e.g. API) between the EP module and the PAA
>>>  module on the same host can prompt PAA to start PANA.  In case they
>>>  are separate, there needs to [be] an explicit message to prompt
>>>  PAA.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 1/ on the one hand, the current version of the pana protocol quickly
>>> states [discovery section] that, in case of 'traffic-driven'
>>> authentication, the EP must send a PANA_start message to the PAA:
>>> 
>>>  Upon detecting the need to authenticate a client, EP can send a
>>>  PAC_discovery message to the PAA on behalf of the PaC. This
>>>  message carries a device identifier of the PaC in a Device-Id AVP.
>>> 
>>> 2/ on the other hand, the requirements draft [EP-PAA protocol section]
>>> states that the PAA-EP protocol should support event-notification also:
>>> 
>>>  Depending on the PANA protocol design, support for either of the push
>>>  model (i.e., EP initiating the PAA-EP protocol exchange per PaC) or
>>>  the pull model (i.e., PAA initiating the PAA-EP protocol exchange per
>>>  PaC), or both might be required.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> --> the working group should fix this (not listed on the web site) issue
>>> also (the PANA protocol OR the PAA-EP protocol supports the EP-triggering)
>>> 
>>> my personal feeling on this is that the PANA protocol should be
>>> restricted to PaC-PAA communication and the PAA-EP protocol (whichever
>>> you finaly choose) should take it as a requirement.
>>> 
>>> thanks,
>>> yacine
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>> 
>> 
> 
> 
> 



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> Hi,
> 
> The message format (Issue9) contains Session-Id AVP [Issue6]. Have we reached
> consensus about the Session-Id?
> 
> http://danforsberg.info:8080/pana-issues/issue6

Currently there is no objection to introducing a session identifier in PANA
protocol. So, we can go ahead with that.

But we still need to work out details.

- Format: I think we can keep the format of the identifier unspecified. We
can recommend Diamater format, but give the freedom of choice to deployment.
This should be OK as this is a transient with local-scope indetifier.

- Usage: IMO, it should be generated by the PAA. For a fresh PaC,
PANA_success can deliver it to the PaC. If PaC has a still valid session
identifier, it can present it along with PANA_start. Both PaC and PAA should
include the session identifier in PANA-reauth, PANA_disconnect,
PANA_revocation. 

Hopefully we won't need something like "change identifier." If the PaC does
not present it during PANA_start, it gets a new one with PANA_success. Even
if PaC present one during PANA_start, PAA can ignore it and assign a new
one.

I don't know if these make sense, but at least would start a discussion....

Alper



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Subject: Re: Second shot on message formatting.
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I have one additional comment.

Sending Session-ID and Cookie together would break the stateless 
nature of PAA when sending cookie.  I'd suggest removing Session-ID 
from PANA-Start-{Request,Answer}.

Yoshihiro Ohba

On Wed, May 07, 2003 at 12:32:02PM +0300, Dan.Forsberg@nokia.com wrote:
> 9.3.3  PANA-Start-Request
> 
>    PANA-Start-Request is sent by PAA to PaC.  PAA sets the
>    transmission sequence number to an initial random value.  The
>    received sequence number is set to zero (0).
> 
>       PANA-Start-Request ::= < PANA-Header: <TBD> >
>                     < Session-ID >
>                     < Cookie >
>                   * [ AVP ]
> 
> 
> 9.3.4  PANA-Start-Answer
> 
>    PANA-Start-Answer (PSA) is sent by PaC to PAA in response to
>    PANA_start message.  The PANA_start message transmission sequence
>    number field is copied to the received sequence number field.  The
>    transmission sequence number is set to initial random value.
> 
>       PANA-Start-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: <TBD> >
>                     < Session-ID >
>                     < Cookie >
>                   * [ AVP ]



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Subject: Re: Second shot on message formatting.
From: Alper Yegin <alper@docomolabs-usa.com>
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> I have one additional comment.
> 
> Sending Session-ID and Cookie together would break the stateless
> nature of PAA when sending cookie.  I'd suggest removing Session-ID
> from PANA-Start-{Request,Answer}.

I'd say remove it from PANA_start_request but not from PANA-start_answer.
PaC should be able to present it if it wants to use an existing one. This
won't break the stateless nature of this exchange.

Alper


> 
> Yoshihiro Ohba
> 
> On Wed, May 07, 2003 at 12:32:02PM +0300, Dan.Forsberg@nokia.com wrote:
>> 9.3.3  PANA-Start-Request
>> 
>>    PANA-Start-Request is sent by PAA to PaC.  PAA sets the
>>    transmission sequence number to an initial random value.  The
>>    received sequence number is set to zero (0).
>> 
>>       PANA-Start-Request ::= < PANA-Header: <TBD> >
>>                     < Session-ID >
>>                     < Cookie >
>>                   * [ AVP ]
>> 
>> 
>> 9.3.4  PANA-Start-Answer
>> 
>>    PANA-Start-Answer (PSA) is sent by PaC to PAA in response to
>>    PANA_start message.  The PANA_start message transmission sequence
>>    number field is copied to the received sequence number field.  The
>>    transmission sequence number is set to initial random value.
>> 
>>       PANA-Start-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: <TBD> >
>>                     < Session-ID >
>>                     < Cookie >
>>                   * [ AVP ]
> 
> 



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and do we want to support multiple "sessions" at the same time, or assume
there is only one active session at a time. Latter means that we don't have
to carry session id in  every message to differentiate among several. A
newly issued session id by PAA invalidates the previous one.

Alper



> 
>> Hi,
>> 
>> The message format (Issue9) contains Session-Id AVP [Issue6]. Have we reached
>> consensus about the Session-Id?
>> 
>> http://danforsberg.info:8080/pana-issues/issue6
> 
> Currently there is no objection to introducing a session identifier in PANA
> protocol. So, we can go ahead with that.
> 
> But we still need to work out details.
> 
> - Format: I think we can keep the format of the identifier unspecified. We
> can recommend Diamater format, but give the freedom of choice to deployment.
> This should be OK as this is a transient with local-scope indetifier.
> 
> - Usage: IMO, it should be generated by the PAA. For a fresh PaC,
> PANA_success can deliver it to the PaC. If PaC has a still valid session
> identifier, it can present it along with PANA_start. Both PaC and PAA should
> include the session identifier in PANA-reauth, PANA_disconnect,
> PANA_revocation. 
> 
> Hopefully we won't need something like "change identifier." If the PaC does
> not present it during PANA_start, it gets a new one with PANA_success. Even
> if PaC present one during PANA_start, PAA can ignore it and assign a new
> one.
> 
> I don't know if these make sense, but at least would start a discussion....
> 
> Alper
> 
> 



From pana-request@research.telcordia.com  Thu May  8 19:25:37 2003
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Subject: Re: Second shot on message formatting.
From: Alper Yegin <alper@docomolabs-usa.com>
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Hi Dan,


Here are my comments:

- inclusion of session id is discussed on another thread. Once we figure out
how it will be used, we can come back and adjust the message formats.

-add/remove device id: what are the scenarios we'll use these AVPs? We
should discuss them on another thread, and come back and design the message
format. We should identify what we want to do, and what we don't want/mean
to do with these extensions...

-  can we fold device-type and device-data type AVPs into one? This
particular AVP's data part can have a field "address type" which can be: 1-
IPv6 address, 2- IPv4 address, 3- Link-layer address. This is followed by
"address" field. I think we can get away without having to enumerate every
link-layer. Please see section 4.6.1 of rfc2461.

- I'd say we should not mandate DIAMETER style session IDs.
We can recommend it though.

Alper


On 5/7/03 2:32 AM, "Dan.Forsberg@nokia.com" <Dan.Forsberg@nokia.com> wrote:

> Hi,
> 
> Since there is not much progress, let me give you the second shot for the
> message formatting :).
> 
> Changes:
> - Removed Application-Id field from the header for
>  now (not enough support for this or Diameter compatibility).
> - Added PANA-Failure-Request/Answer messages (was missing
>  in the previous version).
> - Merged PANA-Disconnect-Request/Answer and
>  PANA-Revocation-Request/Answer messages to
>  PANA-Termination-Request/Answer messages. This is because
>  the messages were similar to each other and contain the
>  Result-Code AVP, which can be used to differentiate
>  disconnect and revocation.
> 
> 
> Br,
> - Dan
> <<draft-ietf-pana-pana-00-sec9b.txt>>
> 



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Subject: RE: Protection of success/failure indication.
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> > So, the requirement can be modified to say that "The success/failure
> > messages
> > SHOULD be protected where possible" with some explanatory text as
> > described
> > above.
> 
> I agree. Not all authentication methods can produce crypto keys, hence
> saying "result MUST be protected" is too strong. Not all 
> environments need
> this kind of security anyways....
> 

Even if the methods can produce crypto keys, EAP success itself may not
be protected always. Please see my discussion in the EAP mailing list.
You may derive keys at the end of successful authentication in which case
EAP success was already transmitted unprotected. It is possible that
the EAP method derives keys first, eap exchanges happen, success is sent
out protected using the keys derived first. I think both these flavors
are possible. Is that right ?

-mohan


> Alper
> 
> 



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> 
>>> So, the requirement can be modified to say that "The success/failure
>>> messages
>>> SHOULD be protected where possible" with some explanatory text as
>>> described
>>> above.
>> 
>> I agree. Not all authentication methods can produce crypto keys, hence
>> saying "result MUST be protected" is too strong. Not all
>> environments need
>> this kind of security anyways....
>> 
> 
> Even if the methods can produce crypto keys, EAP success itself may not
> be protected always. Please see my discussion in the EAP mailing list.
> You may derive keys at the end of successful authentication in which case
> EAP success was already transmitted unprotected. It is possible that
> the EAP method derives keys first, eap exchanges happen, success is sent
> out protected using the keys derived first. I think both these flavors
> are possible. Is that right ?

Yes, the former model is when the protection comes from turning on
lower-layer ciphering (link-layer or IPsec). The latter model is when the
last exchange of EAP can be MIC'ed by EAP transport. This is what we can do
with the current PANA design.

Alper



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Subject: RE: "new" issue / Event Notification
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Alper,
Sounds ok for me. 
- Dan

-----Original Message-----
From: ext Alper Yegin [mailto:alper@docomolabs-usa.com]
Sent: 09 May, 2003 01:18
To: Forsberg Dan (NRC/Helsinki); pana@research.telcordia.com
Subject: Re: "new" issue / Event Notification


Hi Dan,

Please see the attached e-mail for my latest response on this thread.

Here is my suggestion:

For now we can keep the EP's ability to send PANA_discover message.
We can mark it as an optional feature which can be replaced by a PAA-EP
protocol message in any deployment. That way, even if a specific PAA-EP
protocol does not know how to trigger the PAA, the deployment can rely on
this message as a substitute.

When we look at the PAA-EP protocols, if we realize that this message is not
useful, then we can drop it.

How does this sound?

Alper




On 5/7/03 10:56 PM, "Dan.Forsberg@nokia.com" <Dan.Forsberg@nokia.com> wrote:

> Hi,
> 
> This is issue11 (http://danforsberg.info:8080/pana-issues/issue11) and text
> has been proposed. Is this text acceptable or not? Alper?
> 
> - Dan
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: ext Yoshihiro Ohba [mailto:yohba@tari.toshiba.com]
> Sent: 23 April, 2003 09:39
> To: Yacine.El_Mghazli@alcatel.fr
> Cc: Patil Basavaraj (NET/Dallas); Forsberg Dan (NRC/Helsinki);
> pana@research.telcordia.com
> Subject: Re: "new" issue / Event Notification
> 
> 
> Hi Yacine,
> 
> On Wed, Apr 23, 2003 at 02:50:16PM +0200, Yacine.El_Mghazli@alcatel.fr wrote:
>> hi Basavaraj,
>> 
>> Basavaraj.Patil@nokia.com wrote:
>> 
>>> It helps if replacement text is suggested as well.
>> 
>> 
>> Bellow is the current text in the current version of the pana protocol
>> draft:
>> 
>>     Upon detecting the need to authenticate a client, EP can send a
>>     PAC_discovery message to the PAA on behalf of the PaC. This
>>     message carries a device identifier of the PaC in a Device-Id AVP.
>> 
>> If there is a consensus for using PAA-EP protocol here, one can replace
>> the lattest paragraph in the pana draft by a similar one stating that
>> the PAA-EP protocol will deal with this explicit message:
>> 
>> "Upon detecting the need to authenticate a client, EP can prompt the PAA
>> using the PAA-EP protocol. This message should carry a device identifier
>> of the PaC."
> 
> I tend to agree on the proposed text, which makes the PAA-EP protocol
> more independent of the PaC-PAA protocol.  I admit that the current
> design requires EPs to manufacture a specific PANA message PDU (i.e.,
> PAA_discovery) in its payload while it does not speak PANA.
> Specifying the required functionality instead of specifying both
> functionality and message format might be sufficient for the EP-PAA
> protocol to satisfy the PANA requirement.  Of course the actual
> design of the EP-PAA protocol may choose to carry PANA_discovery
> message based on their design criteria.
> 
> Yoshihiro Ohba
> 
> 
>> 
>> Moreover, the PAA-EP protocol requirements in the requirements draft
>> should state clearly that the PAA-EP protocol must support
>> 'event-notification' (it's the case of most of the candidates, namely
>> SNMP, COPS, etc.).
>> 
>>> However it is
>>> still useful to have the issue listed and discussed by WG members
>>> before arriving at any consensus on the text/conclusion.
>> 
>>> 
>>> -Basavaraj
>>> 
>> 
>> 
>> thanks,
>> yacine
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>>> I've created a new issue (Issue11) about this. In general I
>>>> think that text replacement should be provided. But, let's
>>>> see what chairs think about this issue system..
>>>> - Dan
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> hi all,
>>>>> 
>>>>> the following is about the discovery phase in the pana draft:
>>>>> 
>>>>>   PaC may also choose to start sending packets before getting
>>>>>   authenticated.  In that case, the network should detect this and
>>>>>   send an unsolicited PANA_start message to PaC.  EP is the
>>>>> node that
>>>>>   can detect such activity.  If EP and PAA are co-located, then an
>>>>>   internal mechanism (e.g. API) between the EP module and the PAA
>>>>>   module on the same host can prompt PAA to start PANA.  In
>>>>> case they
>>>>>   are separate, there needs to [be] an explicit message to prompt
>>>>>   PAA.
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 1/ on the one hand, the current version of the pana
>>>>> 
>>>> protocol quickly
>>>> 
>>>>> states [discovery section] that, in case of 'traffic-driven'
>>>>> authentication, the EP must send a PANA_start message to the PAA:
>>>>> 
>>>>>   Upon detecting the need to authenticate a client, EP can send a
>>>>>   PAC_discovery message to the PAA on behalf of the PaC. This
>>>>>   message carries a device identifier of the PaC in a
>>>>> 
>>>> Device-Id AVP.
>>>> 
>>>>> 2/ on the other hand, the requirements draft [EP-PAA protocol
>>>>> section] 
>>>>> states that the PAA-EP protocol should support
>>>>> event-notification also:
>>>>> 
>>>>>   Depending on the PANA protocol design, support for either
>>>>> of the push
>>>>>   model (i.e., EP initiating the PAA-EP protocol exchange
>>>>> per PaC) or
>>>>>   the pull model (i.e., PAA initiating the PAA-EP protocol
>>>>> exchange per
>>>>>   PaC), or both might be required.
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> --> the working group should fix this (not listed on the web
>>>>> site) issue 
>>>>> also (the PANA protocol OR the PAA-EP protocol supports the
>>>>> EP-triggering)
>>>>> 
>>>>> my personal feeling on this is that the PANA protocol should be
>>>>> restricted to PaC-PAA communication and the PAA-EP protocol
>>>>> (whichever 
>>>>> you finaly choose) should take it as a requirement.
>>>>> 
>>>>> thanks,
>>>>> yacine
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
> 
> 



From pana-request@research.telcordia.com  Fri May  9 04:31:04 2003
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Subject: Re: EP's role 
In-reply-to: Your message of Tue, 06 May 2003 12:12:00 PDT.
             <20030506191107.GA1172@steelhead> 
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 In your previous mail you wrote:

   If the access network is operating in an infrastructure mode in which

=> PANA is about IP which is in the network layer. Wireless
infrastructure/ad-hoc modes are irrelevant.

   When we consider layer-3 security aspect of PaC-to-PaC traffic,

=> this should be always the case: the layer-2 doesn't belong to our scope.

   the "ad-hoc mode" discussion in the above would always apply to layer-3.
   
Regards

Francis.Dupont@enst-bretagne.fr



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Alper,

Comments inline.

> -----Original Message-----
> From: ext Alper Yegin [mailto:alper@docomolabs-usa.com]
> Sent: 09 May, 2003 02:28
> To: Forsberg Dan (NRC/Helsinki); pana@research.telcordia.com
> Subject: Re: Second shot on message formatting.
> 
> 
> Hi Dan,
> 
> 
> Here are my comments:
> 
> - inclusion of session id is discussed on another thread. 
> Once we figure out
> how it will be used, we can come back and adjust the message formats.
> 

Ok.

> -add/remove device id: what are the scenarios we'll use these AVPs? We
> should discuss them on another thread, and come back and 
> design the message
> format. We should identify what we want to do, and what we 
> don't want/mean
> to do with these extensions...
> 

This is issue5: 
http://danforsberg.info:8080/pana-issues/issue5

> -  can we fold device-type and device-data type AVPs into one? This
> particular AVP's data part can have a field "address type" 
> which can be: 1-
> IPv6 address, 2- IPv4 address, 3- Link-layer address. This is 
> followed by
> "address" field. I think we can get away without having to 
> enumerate every
> link-layer. Please see section 4.6.1 of rfc2461.
> 

Yep. I'll fix that.

> - I'd say we should not mandate DIAMETER style session IDs.
> We can recommend it though.

I reopened the issue6:
http://danforsberg.info:8080/pana-issues/issue6

> 
> Alper
> 
> 
> On 5/7/03 2:32 AM, "Dan.Forsberg@nokia.com" 
> <Dan.Forsberg@nokia.com> wrote:
> 
> > Hi,
> > 
> > Since there is not much progress, let me give you the 
> second shot for the
> > message formatting :).
> > 
> > Changes:
> > - Removed Application-Id field from the header for
> >  now (not enough support for this or Diameter compatibility).
> > - Added PANA-Failure-Request/Answer messages (was missing
> >  in the previous version).
> > - Merged PANA-Disconnect-Request/Answer and
> >  PANA-Revocation-Request/Answer messages to
> >  PANA-Termination-Request/Answer messages. This is because
> >  the messages were similar to each other and contain the
> >  Result-Code AVP, which can be used to differentiate
> >  disconnect and revocation.
> > 
> > 
> > Br,
> > - Dan
> > <<draft-ietf-pana-pana-00-sec9b.txt>>
> > 
> 
> 



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Subject: Using methods that derive keys
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Hello,

One of the requirements stated in the threats evaluation draft is :

PaC and PAA MUST mutually authenticate each other using methods that can =
derive
keys which in turn can protect success and failure indications.

In the light of the recent discussion and comments, it will be relaxed =
about when
success/failure can be protected. But there are other messages e.g. =
transmitting
the device identifier securely. This is done at the end and hence can be =
protected
if keys are derived.

The issue is that it assumes that a certain EAP method is used. Not all =
methods
can derive keys. So, we are indirectly mandating methods that derive =
keys. Is
that okay ? In the past discussions, we wanted to avoid this sort of =
thing. But
without extra protection, some of the attacks become possible now.

Comments ?

-mohan


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<HEAD>
<META HTTP-EQUIV=3D"Content-Type" CONTENT=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Diso-8859-1">
<META NAME=3D"Generator" CONTENT=3D"MS Exchange Server version =
6.0.6249.1">
<TITLE>Using methods that derive keys</TITLE>
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<!-- Converted from text/rtf format -->

<P><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Arial">Hello,</FONT>
</P>

<P><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Arial">One of the requirements stated in the =
threats evaluation draft is :</FONT>
</P>

<P><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Arial">PaC and PAA MUST mutually authenticate =
each other using methods that can derive</FONT>

<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Arial">keys which in turn can protect success =
and failure indications.</FONT>
</P>

<P><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Arial">In the light of the recent discussion =
and comments, it will be relaxed about when</FONT>

<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Arial">success/failure can be protected. But =
there are other messages e.g. transmitting</FONT>

<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Arial">the device identifier securely. This =
is done at the end and hence can be protected</FONT>

<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Arial">if keys are derived.</FONT>
</P>

<P><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Arial">The issue is that it assumes that a =
certain EAP method is used. Not all methods</FONT>

<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Arial">can derive keys. So, we are indirectly =
mandating methods that derive keys. Is</FONT>

<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Arial">that okay ? In the past discussions, =
we wanted to avoid this sort of thing. But</FONT>

<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Arial">without extra protection, some of the =
attacks become possible now.</FONT>
</P>

<P><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Arial">Comments ?</FONT>
</P>

<P><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Arial">-mohan</FONT>
</P>

</BODY>
</HTML>
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From pana-request@research.telcordia.com  Fri May  9 21:00:28 2003
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To: Mohan Parthasarathy <mohanp@tahoenetworks.com>,
        <pana@research.telcordia.com>
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On 5/9/03 2:18 PM, "Mohan Parthasarathy" <mohanp@tahoenetworks.com> wrote:

> Hello, 
> 
> One of the requirements stated in the threats evaluation draft is :
> 
> PaC and PAA MUST mutually authenticate each other using methods that can
> derive 
> keys which in turn can protect success and failure indications.
> 
> In the light of the recent discussion and comments, it will be relaxed about
> when 
> success/failure can be protected. But there are other messages e.g.
> transmitting 
> the device identifier securely. This is done at the end and hence can be
> protected 
> if keys are derived.
> 
> The issue is that it assumes that a certain EAP method is used. Not all
> methods 
> can derive keys. So, we are indirectly mandating methods that derive keys. Is
> that okay ? In the past discussions, we wanted to avoid this sort of thing.
> But 
> without extra protection, some of the attacks become possible now.

Key derivation, hence these type of EAP methods, are necessary only in some
environments, not all. So, we cannot generalize as PANA MUST be used only
when such methods are carried. Choice of authentication method is a
deployment issue. As long as PANA knows how to carry those methods, which it
already does as these are just EAP methods, it satisfies the requirement.


Those attacks which requires methods that generates keys are concern in
shared wireless scenarios. Not in physically secured, or already ciphered
link-layers (e.g., cdma2000).

Alper




> 
> Comments ? 
> 
> -mohan 
> 




From pana-request@research.telcordia.com  Sat May 10 21:57:03 2003
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 :
> 
> > Hello, 
> > 
> > One of the requirements stated in the threats evaluation draft is :
> > 
> > PaC and PAA MUST mutually authenticate each other using 
> methods that can
> > derive 
> > keys which in turn can protect success and failure indications.
> > 
> > In the light of the recent discussion and comments, it will 
> be relaxed about
> > when 
> > success/failure can be protected. But there are other messages e.g.
> > transmitting 
> > the device identifier securely. This is done at the end and 
> hence can be
> > protected 
> > if keys are derived.
> > 
> > The issue is that it assumes that a certain EAP method is 
> used. Not all
> > methods 
> > can derive keys. So, we are indirectly mandating methods 
> that derive keys. Is
> > that okay ? In the past discussions, we wanted to avoid 
> this sort of thing.
> > But 
> > without extra protection, some of the attacks become possible now.
> 
> Key derivation, hence these type of EAP methods, are 
> necessary only in some
> environments, not all. So, we cannot generalize as PANA MUST 
> be used only
> when such methods are carried. Choice of authentication method is a
> deployment issue. As long as PANA knows how to carry those 
> methods, which it
> already does as these are just EAP methods, it satisfies the 
> requirement.
> 
> 
> Those attacks which requires methods that generates keys are 
> concern in
> shared wireless scenarios. Not in physically secured, or 
> already ciphered
> link-layers (e.g., cdma2000).
> 
We can't have two sets of requirements for the protocol. And
if shared wireless will be the most common scenario in the future,
PANA should be able to address it. Yes, being able to carry both
EAP methods will address it. But, the real difficulty i am having
here is coming up with requirements. Hmm.. may be all the requirements
should say

"PANA MUST be able to protect the device identifier"

"PANA MUST be able to prevent replay attacks".

And clarify what these requirements are trying to address in
the beginning. 

I think this is what i tried a few revisions back. But somehow
forgot about it :-) Can folks think of a better way to do this ?

-mohan


> 
> 
> 
> 
> > 
> > Comments ? 
> > 
> > -mohan 
> > 
> 
> 
> 



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Subject: Re: Using methods that derive keys
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        <pana@research.telcordia.com>
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>> Key derivation, hence these type of EAP methods, are
>> necessary only in some
>> environments, not all. So, we cannot generalize as PANA MUST
>> be used only
>> when such methods are carried. Choice of authentication method is a
>> deployment issue. As long as PANA knows how to carry those
>> methods, which it
>> already does as these are just EAP methods, it satisfies the
>> requirement.
>> 
>> 
>> Those attacks which requires methods that generates keys are
>> concern in
>> shared wireless scenarios. Not in physically secured, or
>> already ciphered
>> link-layers (e.g., cdma2000).
>> 
> We can't have two sets of requirements for the protocol. And
> if shared wireless will be the most common scenario in the future,
> PANA should be able to address it. Yes, being able to carry both
> EAP methods will address it. But, the real difficulty i am having
> here is coming up with requirements. Hmm.. may be all the requirements
> should say
> 
> "PANA MUST be able to protect the device identifier"

Some additional text:

...This protection is required in shared links. In such networks,
authentication methods that are capable of generating cryptographic keys
must be used. PANA must be able to carry such authentication methods and use
the keys to protect the device identifier exchange.


Alper

> 
> "PANA MUST be able to prevent replay attacks".
> 
> And clarify what these requirements are trying to address in
> the beginning. 
> 
> I think this is what i tried a few revisions back. But somehow
> forgot about it :-) Can folks think of a better way to do this ?
> 
> -mohan
> 
> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> Comments ? 
>>> 
>>> -mohan 
>>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
> 
> 



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Date: Sun, 11 May 2003 00:47:17 -0700
Subject: Sec. threats comments
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CC: Derek Atkins <derek@ihtfp.com>
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You can find Derek Atkins' comments on the PANA security threats draft.
Thank you Derek for the review.

Alper


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From pana-request@research.telcordia.com  Sun May 11 04:36:06 2003
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.. and these are Derek Atkins' comments on the PANA requirements draft.

Alper


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From pana-request@research.telcordia.com  Mon May 12 07:43:56 2003
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Subject: CFP:: First International Conference on Mobile Computing and Ubiquitous Networking (ICMU 2004) 
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         (Apologies if you receive multiple copies)

                    CALL FOR PAPERS
                    ===============
           First International Conference 
   on Mobile Computing and Ubiquitous Networking (ICMU 2004) 

        January 8 and 9, 2004
        NTT DoCoMo R&D Center, Yokosuka Rsearch Park, Yokosuka, JAPAN
        http://www.ipsj.or.jp/sig/mbl/icmu2004/

	Deadline for submissions: August 1 2003
	~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
	Co-sponsored by IPSJ SIG-MBL (Informaiton Processing Society
	of Japan, Special Interest Group of Mobile Computing and
	Ubiquitous Networking) and IPSJ SG-BCC (Study Group of
	Broadcast Communicaiton and Computing) 

Scope:
~~~~~~
Mobile computing aims at ubiquitous user access to computer
application. To make it possible, networking technology which enables
Internet access anytime and everywhere, i.e. ubiquitous networking is
necessary. It is obvious that with the accelerating trends towards
mobile networks, ad-hoc networks, and wireless networks, mobile
computing and ubiquitous networking will play an important role in
future network. This conference is aimed at providing researchers and
practitioners in this hot research area a forum for discussion and
collaboration. Authors are invited to submit papers addressing, but
not limited to, the following topics: 

- Applications and services for mobile computing 
- Network architectures, protocols, or service models for ubiquitous
  networking  
- Network management for ubiquitous networking 
- Data management for mobile computing 
- Security in mobile computing and ubiquitous networking 
- Wireless and mobile communications 
- Nomadic computing 
- Ad-hoc networks 
- Mobile Internetworking 
- Performance evaluation for mobile computing and ubiquitous
  networking systems  
- Broadcast communication

Submission Instructions:
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Papers are solicited as full papers of no more than 6 pages, each of
which will be subject to a full review process. Submission should
already follow the author guidelines as specified in the web site
below. An electronic, PDF-based submission of papers is mandatory.  

Please check Submission Guideline
(http://www.ipsj.or.jp/sig/mbl/icmu2004/guide.html) for further
submission instructions.   

Important Dates:
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- Deadline for submissions August 1, 2003 
- Notification of acceptance October 1, 2003 
- Camera ready due November 1, 2003 
- Conference January 8-9, 2004 


Location and Date:
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The location of the NTT DoCoMo R&D Center is in the heart of Yokosuka
Research Park(YRP) where a lot of wireless communication related
research institutes are established. YRP is really the heart of
wireless communications research in Japan. Japanese old city Kamakura,
a famous historic city, is 30 minutes by train. Beginning of the year
is one of the best seasons for visiting Japan.  

You can also get PDF version of Call for Papers
from http://www.ipsj.or.jp/sig/mbl/icmu2004/cfp-icmu2004.pdf


-- inoue@toshiba

Atsushi Inoue                 # Phone: +81-44-549-2065
Communication Platform Lab.   # Fax:   +81-44-520-1806
TOSHIBA  R&D Center           # inoue@isl.rdc.toshiba.co.jp





From pana-request@research.telcordia.com  Mon May 12 08:44:43 2003
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Subject: Usage scenarios draft and PANA-Start-Request
Date: Mon, 12 May 2003 15:46:02 +0300
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Hi,

The usage scenarios draft should include possibility to have 
multiple PAAs from different ISPs and the PANA-Start-Request 
should include some sort of network access id to aid PaC to 
choose between different PAAs if needed.

- Dan




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Subject: About PANA requirements draft
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Thread-Topic: About PANA requirements draft
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From: <Dan.Forsberg@nokia.com>
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Hi,

The appendix A in requirements draft should go into the usage scenarios draft.

- Dan



From pana-request@research.telcordia.com  Mon May 12 12:21:56 2003
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Subject: RE: Sec. threats comments
Date: Mon, 12 May 2003 09:20:57 -0700
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Thread-Topic: Sec. threats comments
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From: "Mohan Parthasarathy" <mohanp@tahoenetworks.com>
To: <derek@ihtfp.com>
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Derek,

>6.3 PaC leaving the network

>Another threat not mentioned is what happens if the PaC leaves
>the network prematurely without notifying the PAA or EP.  Depending
>on the link layer, it may be possible for an attacker to subsume
>the PaC's leaving, or the user may continue to be billed due
>to a system crash.  Think about it this way, the user of the PaC
>may leave the network by just unplugging an Ethernet cable.

>Suggested addition:  PANA must not depend on a PaC sending a
>disconnect message.

Okay. I will add this to the list.

>6.5 Miscellaneous attacks  
>Editorial: capitalization problem:
> on the PAA or AS. A few are mentioned below. AS it is hard to protect

>should be:
>on the PAA or AS. A few are mentioned below. As it is hard to protect  
>(the "AS" should be "As")

fixed.

thanks
mohan



From pana-request@research.telcordia.com  Mon May 12 13:37:12 2003
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Date: Mon, 12 May 2003 10:38:40 -0700
Subject: Re: Usage scenarios draft and PANA-Start-Request
From: Alper Yegin <alper@docomolabs-usa.com>
To: <Dan.Forsberg@nokia.com>, <pana@research.telcordia.com>
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Hi Dan,

> The usage scenarios draft should include possibility to have
> multiple PAAs from different ISPs and the PANA-Start-Request
> should include some sort of network access id to aid PaC to
> choose between different PAAs if needed.

We discussed "multiple PAAs from different ISPs" earlier on the mailing
list, but I don't remember a consensus on that discussion. My personal view,
as a member of the WG, is that this scenario is not needed as one PAA can
serve many ISPs. PAA is owned by the NAP to serve multiple ISPs today, I
think this is a sufficient model.

Btw, the WG last call on the usage scenarios has completed and the draft is
with the IESG now.

Alper



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Date: Mon, 12 May 2003 10:42:10 -0700
Subject: Re: About PANA requirements draft
From: Alper Yegin <alper@docomolabs-usa.com>
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> Hi,
> 
> The appendix A in requirements draft should go into the usage scenarios draft.

Actually, it was part of the usage scenarios draft originally and later
moved to the requirements draft. I don't have strong preferance one way or
the other, but I think these simple topologies show what kind of setups PANA
should support. In that sense, it is more like a requirements material.

Alper



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Date: Mon, 12 May 2003 16:05:55 -0700
Subject: Re: requirements comments
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> Abstract
> 
> You do realize that PPP uses EAP, which is also the basis for
> 802.1x?  That means that the authentication method (EAP)
> is already agnostic to the link layer in use.  This implies
> that your basic assumption about the problem is flawed.  Could
> you please explain how PANA is different?

You are right that EAP is link-layer agnostic. But there needs to be a
transport for EAP to be used on a network. The current EAP transports are
link-layer specific. PANA is developing a link-layer agnostic transport for
EAP.


> 1. Introduction
> 
> You specifically state in the introduction that:
> 
>  The Working Group will not invent new security protocols and
>  mechanisms but instead it will use the existing mechanisms. In
>  particular, the Working Group will not define authentication
>  protocols, key distribution or key agreement protocols, or key
>  derivation.
> 
> So I'm wondering why EAP is not sufficient?  You do not answer this
> question.  Why can't you just use EAP?  What is missing from EAP that
> you need something different (or in addition)?  If nothing else, could
> you please add at least one paragraph (or better, at least a couple
> paragraphs) that answer these questions?

EAP is already part of the protocol here. PANA carries EAP. PANA is the
transport for EAP, which makes EAP available on any IP network.

This is covered more on the Problem Statement and Usage Scenarios draft
draft-ietf-pana-usage-scenarios-06.txt which we referenced from this
requirements draft.

> 4.1.2. Authorization, Accounting and Access Control
> 
> The requirements seriously limit what you're doing.  How is
> requiring a boolean access-control decision different than what
> RADIUS provides?

Good point. We need to elaborate on this. What is outside scope is
developing an extensive protocol that allows negotiation of authorization
parameters between the client and the network. But, today when your client
is authenticated, the AAA backend can send a long list of authorization
parameters to the access network. That is fine. To the client this looks
like a boolean result (either authorized or not), but to the access network
there are many more parameters supplied by the AAA backend.

> 4.1.4. Identifiers
> 
> You state:
> 
>  The DI MUST be carried
>  either explicitly as part of the PANA payload, or implicitly as the
>  source of the PANA message, or both.
> 
> A word of caution.. If you carry the id in the payload you MUST
> verify the correctness of that identity.  You cannot just believe it;
> the id must be authenticated, not asserted.  Also, if you have a
> multi-step protocol and the identity is authenticated in one step,
> you must not assume that an identity provided in a later step is
> also authenticated; you must re-check any explicit identity against
> one that was already authenticated.
> 
> Case in point is the recent M$ passport flaw: the identity of the user
> was explicit, but it was not checked by the system.

OK.

> 
> 
> 4.5.2. Disconnect Indication
> 
> This section is inconsistent with the PANA Threats document.  I like
> this version better :)

OK.

> 
> 
> 4.9.3. Location Privacy
> 
> Can you define Location Privacy?  I realize it's out of scope, but
> what is it?

Hmmm... I think what we should cover here is "identity protection", not
"location privacy". I'd re-write this section as:

4.9.3. Identity Protection

Some clients might prefer hiding their identity from visited access networks
for privacy reasons. Providing identity protection for clients is outside
the scope of PANA. Note that some authentication methods may already have
this capability. Where necessary, identity protection can be achieved by
letting PANA carry such authentication methods.


Alper



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Hi Derek,

>>> Abstract
>>> 
>>> You do realize that PPP uses EAP, which is also the basis for
>>> 802.1x?  That means that the authentication method (EAP)
>>> is already agnostic to the link layer in use.  This implies
>>> that your basic assumption about the problem is flawed.  Could
>>> you please explain how PANA is different?
>> 
>> You are right that EAP is link-layer agnostic. But there needs to be a
>> transport for EAP to be used on a network. The current EAP transports are
>> link-layer specific. PANA is developing a link-layer agnostic transport for
>> EAP.
> 
> I'm sure this has been discussed before, and I appologize for
> bringing it up yet again, but could you please enumerate the

Please see the Problem Statement and Usage Scenarios draft.
These questions are not in the scope of the requirements draft.
The examples you gave below are valid. Few of these examples, such as DSL
and cdma2000, can be found in the aforementioned draft.

Alper

> access networks where this would actually be useful?  I can
> think of:
> 
>       Ethernet, WiFi  both are 802 networks and support 802.1x
>       Dialup/PPP      already has EAP support
>       PPPoE           again, supports EAP or 802.1x
> 
> I think this covers the vast majority of current technologies.  So,
> most of the network technolgoies already support EAP or 802.1x.  So
> what else is in use?
> 
>       Bluetooth       I admit that I don't know what access technology
>                       Bluetooth has, so perhaps PANA is useful here.
>       Cellular        This already has an acceess technology,
>                       although I admit that it doesn't necessarily use
>                       EAP.  So maybe PANA is useful here.
>       ATM?            I don't think this is really is used as
>                       an access type.  I suppose some DSL devices
>                       use ATM at a low layer, but I've never really
>                       seen ATM used to an end node.
>       SONET?          Again, this is a core network technology, not
>                       one for end users.
>       FDDI?           I have seen FDDI to the workstation, but I've never
>                       seen it used for mobile hosts, only fixed workstations.
> 
> So, perhaps a PANA protocol would be useful for bluetooth or cellular
> networks.  Are there other network technologies in use here?
> 
> In particular could you provide some real examples of situations where
> PANA would be useful and the underlying technology does not already
> have a way to carry EAP frames?  These real-world examples should make
> it into the draft.
> 
> [snip]
>> This is covered more on the Problem Statement and Usage Scenarios draft
>> draft-ietf-pana-usage-scenarios-06.txt which we referenced from this
>> requirements draft.
> 
> Thanks, I'll go take a look at this document.  I admittedly didn't
> follow the references.
> 
> -derek



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Date: Mon, 12 May 2003 17:33:19 -0700
Subject: Issue 5: Updating device identifier
From: Alper Yegin <alper@docomolabs-usa.com>
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http://danforsberg.info:8080/pana-issues/issue5

So, when does the PaC need to update its device identifier?

I don't think it ever needs to update its device identifier if DI is its
link-layer address. Generally an IP node should not have to change its
link-layer address.

If it is using RFC3041 - Privacy Extensions, this should not effect the IPv6
address used either. When IP address is used as the DI, it'd be the
link-local IPv6 address. Changing the global IPv6 addresses which are
tunneled inside packets whose src/dst is the link-local address won't
require a change in DI.

I'm not sure what is meant by "mobility management". What form of mobility
will require change in DI in the context of a PANA session?

One scenario we have identified so far which potentially requires a DI
modification:
    
    Imagine a network which uses IPsec for access control but does not
    assign any IP address to PaC before they are authenticated.
    
    PaC successfully authenticates with the PAA without acquiring an IP
    address initially. At this point, DI is the IP address, but its value is
    0.0.0.0 or 0::0. Using the PANA SA and the PANA session identifier, PaC
    can securely obtain an IP address from DHCP. Now PaC can re-auth in
    order to notify the PAA (and, in turn EPs) about its IP address. When
    the EP learns the new IP address, it can engage in IKE, etc. to
    kick-start IPsec-based access control.

I don't know of this really requires DI change, but here is something else
to consider:

    When a PaC moves within the same access domain, instead of
    requiring a full authentication, network might be able to
    re-authenticate it using its ongoing PANA session with another PAA of
    the domain (if it hasn't expired already).

    PaC can send its PANA session ID along with PANA_start message sent to
    PAA. If the PAA has means to obtain a still valid PANA SA from the
    previous PAA, it can respond with a PANA_reauth, instead initiating a
    full authentication. Now PaC can respond with PANA-reauth, and tag along
    the new DI.

    The mechanisms needed to transfer PANA SA from one PAA to another would
    be outside the scope of PANA. Context transfer protocol (see Seamoby WG)
    might be used here.

Comments?

Alper



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On Mon, May 12, 2003 at 05:33:19PM -0700, Alper Yegin wrote:
> 
> http://danforsberg.info:8080/pana-issues/issue5
> 
> So, when does the PaC need to update its device identifier?
> 
> I don't think it ever needs to update its device identifier if DI is its
> link-layer address. Generally an IP node should not have to change its
> link-layer address.
> 
> If it is using RFC3041 - Privacy Extensions, this should not effect the IPv6
> address used either. When IP address is used as the DI, it'd be the
> link-local IPv6 address. Changing the global IPv6 addresses which are
> tunneled inside packets whose src/dst is the link-local address won't
> require a change in DI.
> 
> I'm not sure what is meant by "mobility management". What form of mobility
> will require change in DI in the context of a PANA session?
> 
> One scenario we have identified so far which potentially requires a DI
> modification:
>     
>     Imagine a network which uses IPsec for access control but does not
>     assign any IP address to PaC before they are authenticated.
>     
>     PaC successfully authenticates with the PAA without acquiring an IP
>     address initially. At this point, DI is the IP address, but its value is
>     0.0.0.0 or 0::0. Using the PANA SA and the PANA session identifier, PaC
>     can securely obtain an IP address from DHCP. Now PaC can re-auth in
>     order to notify the PAA (and, in turn EPs) about its IP address. When
>     the EP learns the new IP address, it can engage in IKE, etc. to
>     kick-start IPsec-based access control.
> 
> I don't know of this really requires DI change, but here is something else
> to consider:

The above PANA-DHCP-IKE scenario requires DI change, if IKE operates in 
pre-shared key authentication in Main Mode.  RFC 2409 says:

  "When using pre-shared key authentication with Main Mode the key can 
   only be identified by the IP address of the peers since HASH_I must 
   be computed before the initiator has processed IDir."

So, without notifying the PAA of the obtained IP address, it is not
possible for IKE to bind pre-shared key with the IP address.  

IKE pre-shared key authentication with Quick Mode allows more Identity
types, but IPsec DOI does not define link-layer address to be used for
IKE Identification Type.

> 
>     When a PaC moves within the same access domain, instead of
>     requiring a full authentication, network might be able to
>     re-authenticate it using its ongoing PANA session with another PAA of
>     the domain (if it hasn't expired already).
> 
>     PaC can send its PANA session ID along with PANA_start message sent to
>     PAA. If the PAA has means to obtain a still valid PANA SA from the
>     previous PAA, it can respond with a PANA_reauth, instead initiating a
>     full authentication. Now PaC can respond with PANA-reauth, and tag along
>     the new DI.

What is the new DI?  If the DI used for mobility management is
link-layer address, it will not change unless inter-technology handoff
occurs.  So do you imply inter-technology handoff?

> 
>     The mechanisms needed to transfer PANA SA from one PAA to another would
>     be outside the scope of PANA. Context transfer protocol (see Seamoby WG)
>     might be used here.
> 
> Comments?
> 
> Alper
> 
> 

Yoshihiro Ohba



From pana-request@research.telcordia.com  Tue May 13 01:51:36 2003
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Subject: RE: Usage scenarios draft and PANA-Start-Request
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Ok. My concern was that how can different ISPs advertise 
themselves through the NAP. With current usage scenarios 
it doesn't seem to be possible. So, in my opinion a potential
usage scenario is missed. This doesn't mean it has to be 
missed in the protocol, but it seems likely. I hope IESG 
finds out this usage scenario.
- Dan

> -----Original Message-----
> From: ext Alper Yegin [mailto:alper@docomolabs-usa.com]
> Sent: 12 May, 2003 20:39
> To: Forsberg Dan (NRC/Helsinki); pana@research.telcordia.com
> Subject: Re: Usage scenarios draft and PANA-Start-Request
> 
> 
> Hi Dan,
> 
> > The usage scenarios draft should include possibility to have
> > multiple PAAs from different ISPs and the PANA-Start-Request
> > should include some sort of network access id to aid PaC to
> > choose between different PAAs if needed.
> 
> We discussed "multiple PAAs from different ISPs" earlier on 
> the mailing
> list, but I don't remember a consensus on that discussion. My 
> personal view,
> as a member of the WG, is that this scenario is not needed as 
> one PAA can
> serve many ISPs. PAA is owned by the NAP to serve multiple 
> ISPs today, I
> think this is a sufficient model.
> 
> Btw, the WG last call on the usage scenarios has completed 
> and the draft is
> with the IESG now.
> 
> Alper
> 
> 



From pana-request@research.telcordia.com  Tue May 13 02:27:56 2003
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Subject: RE: Issue 5: Updating device identifier
Date: Tue, 13 May 2003 09:29:00 +0300
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Alper,

MIPv6 is an example of mobility management, where the basic 
movement detection is based on the subnet prefix of the router 
advertisement. This means that client changes it's CoA address 
(even inside one domain). 

- Dan

> -----Original Message-----
> From: ext Alper Yegin [mailto:alper@docomolabs-usa.com]
> Sent: 13 May, 2003 03:33
> To: pana
> Subject: Issue 5: Updating device identifier
> 
> 
> 
> http://danforsberg.info:8080/pana-issues/issue5
> 
> So, when does the PaC need to update its device identifier?
> 
> I don't think it ever needs to update its device identifier 
> if DI is its
> link-layer address. Generally an IP node should not have to change its
> link-layer address.
> 
> If it is using RFC3041 - Privacy Extensions, this should not 
> effect the IPv6
> address used either. When IP address is used as the DI, it'd be the
> link-local IPv6 address. Changing the global IPv6 addresses which are
> tunneled inside packets whose src/dst is the link-local address won't
> require a change in DI.
> 
> I'm not sure what is meant by "mobility management". What 
> form of mobility
> will require change in DI in the context of a PANA session?
> 
> One scenario we have identified so far which potentially requires a DI
> modification:
>     
>     Imagine a network which uses IPsec for access control but does not
>     assign any IP address to PaC before they are authenticated.
>     
>     PaC successfully authenticates with the PAA without 
> acquiring an IP
>     address initially. At this point, DI is the IP address, 
> but its value is
>     0.0.0.0 or 0::0. Using the PANA SA and the PANA session 
> identifier, PaC
>     can securely obtain an IP address from DHCP. Now PaC can 
> re-auth in
>     order to notify the PAA (and, in turn EPs) about its IP 
> address. When
>     the EP learns the new IP address, it can engage in IKE, etc. to
>     kick-start IPsec-based access control.
> 
> I don't know of this really requires DI change, but here is 
> something else
> to consider:
> 
>     When a PaC moves within the same access domain, instead of
>     requiring a full authentication, network might be able to
>     re-authenticate it using its ongoing PANA session with 
> another PAA of
>     the domain (if it hasn't expired already).
> 
>     PaC can send its PANA session ID along with PANA_start 
> message sent to
>     PAA. If the PAA has means to obtain a still valid PANA SA from the
>     previous PAA, it can respond with a PANA_reauth, instead 
> initiating a
>     full authentication. Now PaC can respond with 
> PANA-reauth, and tag along
>     the new DI.
> 
>     The mechanisms needed to transfer PANA SA from one PAA to 
> another would
>     be outside the scope of PANA. Context transfer protocol 
> (see Seamoby WG)
>     might be used here.
> 
> Comments?
> 
> Alper
> 
> 



From pana-request@research.telcordia.com  Tue May 13 14:09:25 2003
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Date: Tue, 13 May 2003 11:09:31 -0700
Subject: Re: Issue 5: Updating device identifier
From: Alper Yegin <alper@docomolabs-usa.com>
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Dan,

> MIPv6 is an example of mobility management, where the basic
> movement detection is based on the subnet prefix of the router
> advertisement. This means that client changes it's CoA address
> (even inside one domain).

OK, that'd not be changing DI in the "same PANA session" in my mind.
So far a PANA session is tied to a link. We have not defined how they a PANA
session survives when PaC changes its attachment. [actually, I don't think
we need to either].

But please see the last part of my message below. I think this maps to what
you are referring to. PANA session is not migrated from one link to another,
but instead some bits of PANA SA is transferred, PaC inserts the new DI, and
a new PANA session is established at the new link.

Alper


> 
> - Dan
> 
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: ext Alper Yegin [mailto:alper@docomolabs-usa.com]
>> Sent: 13 May, 2003 03:33
>> To: pana
>> Subject: Issue 5: Updating device identifier
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> http://danforsberg.info:8080/pana-issues/issue5
>> 
>> So, when does the PaC need to update its device identifier?
>> 
>> I don't think it ever needs to update its device identifier
>> if DI is its
>> link-layer address. Generally an IP node should not have to change its
>> link-layer address.
>> 
>> If it is using RFC3041 - Privacy Extensions, this should not
>> effect the IPv6
>> address used either. When IP address is used as the DI, it'd be the
>> link-local IPv6 address. Changing the global IPv6 addresses which are
>> tunneled inside packets whose src/dst is the link-local address won't
>> require a change in DI.
>> 
>> I'm not sure what is meant by "mobility management". What
>> form of mobility
>> will require change in DI in the context of a PANA session?
>> 
>> One scenario we have identified so far which potentially requires a DI
>> modification:
>>     
>>     Imagine a network which uses IPsec for access control but does not
>>     assign any IP address to PaC before they are authenticated.
>>     
>>     PaC successfully authenticates with the PAA without
>> acquiring an IP
>>     address initially. At this point, DI is the IP address,
>> but its value is
>>     0.0.0.0 or 0::0. Using the PANA SA and the PANA session
>> identifier, PaC
>>     can securely obtain an IP address from DHCP. Now PaC can
>> re-auth in
>>     order to notify the PAA (and, in turn EPs) about its IP
>> address. When
>>     the EP learns the new IP address, it can engage in IKE, etc. to
>>     kick-start IPsec-based access control.
>> 
>> I don't know of this really requires DI change, but here is
>> something else
>> to consider:
>> 
>>     When a PaC moves within the same access domain, instead of
>>     requiring a full authentication, network might be able to
>>     re-authenticate it using its ongoing PANA session with
>> another PAA of
>>     the domain (if it hasn't expired already).
>> 
>>     PaC can send its PANA session ID along with PANA_start
>> message sent to
>>     PAA. If the PAA has means to obtain a still valid PANA SA from the
>>     previous PAA, it can respond with a PANA_reauth, instead
>> initiating a
>>     full authentication. Now PaC can respond with
>> PANA-reauth, and tag along
>>     the new DI.
>> 
>>     The mechanisms needed to transfer PANA SA from one PAA to
>> another would
>>     be outside the scope of PANA. Context transfer protocol
>> (see Seamoby WG)
>>     might be used here.
>> 
>> Comments?
>> 
>> Alper
>> 
>> 
> 
> 
> 



From pana-request@research.telcordia.com  Tue May 13 14:17:52 2003
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If you look at the DSL networks, you'd see there is a NAP which runs a BAS
(broadband access server - like our PAA) and a number of ISPs are behind it.
A subscriber from anyone of these ISP can use this access network by getting
authenticated through BAS. Subscriber can indicate its choice of ISP by
presenting the right NAI (myid@thisISP.com). So, there is no need to put one
PAA per ISP to enable this multi-ISP environment.

If you are talking about informing PaC about which ISPs are available, that
wouldn't require one PAA per ISP either. If this is something necessary,
list of ISPs can be provided as part of initial PANA messaging.

Alper






> Ok. My concern was that how can different ISPs advertise
> themselves through the NAP. With current usage scenarios
> it doesn't seem to be possible. So, in my opinion a potential
> usage scenario is missed. This doesn't mean it has to be
> missed in the protocol, but it seems likely. I hope IESG
> finds out this usage scenario.
> - Dan
> 
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: ext Alper Yegin [mailto:alper@docomolabs-usa.com]
>> Sent: 12 May, 2003 20:39
>> To: Forsberg Dan (NRC/Helsinki); pana@research.telcordia.com
>> Subject: Re: Usage scenarios draft and PANA-Start-Request
>> 
>> 
>> Hi Dan,
>> 
>>> The usage scenarios draft should include possibility to have
>>> multiple PAAs from different ISPs and the PANA-Start-Request
>>> should include some sort of network access id to aid PaC to
>>> choose between different PAAs if needed.
>> 
>> We discussed "multiple PAAs from different ISPs" earlier on
>> the mailing
>> list, but I don't remember a consensus on that discussion. My
>> personal view,
>> as a member of the WG, is that this scenario is not needed as
>> one PAA can
>> serve many ISPs. PAA is owned by the NAP to serve multiple
>> ISPs today, I
>> think this is a sufficient model.
>> 
>> Btw, the WG last call on the usage scenarios has completed
>> and the draft is
>> with the IESG now.
>> 
>> Alper
>> 
>> 
> 
> 
> 



From pana-request@research.telcordia.com  Tue May 13 14:21:42 2003
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Subject: Re: Issue 5: Updating device identifier
From: Alper Yegin <alper@docomolabs-usa.com>
To: Yoshihiro Ohba <yohba@tari.toshiba.com>
CC: pana <pana@research.telcordia.com>
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>>     When a PaC moves within the same access domain, instead of
>>     requiring a full authentication, network might be able to
>>     re-authenticate it using its ongoing PANA session with another PAA of
>>     the domain (if it hasn't expired already).
>> 
>>     PaC can send its PANA session ID along with PANA_start message sent to
>>     PAA. If the PAA has means to obtain a still valid PANA SA from the
>>     previous PAA, it can respond with a PANA_reauth, instead initiating a
>>     full authentication. Now PaC can respond with PANA-reauth, and tag along
>>     the new DI.
> 
> What is the new DI?  If the DI used for mobility management is
> link-layer address, it will not change unless inter-technology handoff
> occurs.  So do you imply inter-technology handoff?

I wasn't really thinking in terms of inter-technology handover, but surely,
this is a valid scenario too.

Even if the device stays in the same access technology domain, crossing the
border of a subnet will change the IP address of the PaC. If IPsec is used
for access control, then this would mean a new DI in the context of PANA.

Alper



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Subject: RE: Issue 5: Updating device identifier
Date: Tue, 13 May 2003 12:19:21 -0700
Message-ID: <416B5AF360DED54088DAD3CA8BFBEA6E0134A46C@TNEXVS02.tahoenetworks.com>
Thread-Topic: Issue 5: Updating device identifier
Thread-Index: AcMY/aikugiyCZqDR6CuZBsi9Yr1BQAhYNDQ
From: "Mohan Parthasarathy" <mohanp@tahoenetworks.com>
To: "Yoshihiro Ohba" <yohba@tari.toshiba.com>,
        "Alper Yegin" <alper@docomolabs-usa.com>
Cc: "pana" <pana@research.telcordia.com>
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> 
> On Mon, May 12, 2003 at 05:33:19PM -0700, Alper Yegin wrote:
> > 
> > http://danforsberg.info:8080/pana-issues/issue5
> > 
> > So, when does the PaC need to update its device identifier?
> > 
> > I don't think it ever needs to update its device identifier 
> if DI is 
> > its link-layer address. Generally an IP node should not 
> have to change 
> > its link-layer address.
> > 
> > If it is using RFC3041 - Privacy Extensions, this should not effect 
> > the IPv6 address used either. When IP address is used as 
> the DI, it'd 
> > be the link-local IPv6 address. Changing the global IPv6 addresses 
> > which are tunneled inside packets whose src/dst is the link-local 
> > address won't require a change in DI.
> > 
> > I'm not sure what is meant by "mobility management". What form of 
> > mobility will require change in DI in the context of a PANA session?
> > 
> > One scenario we have identified so far which potentially 
> requires a DI
> > modification:
> >     
> >     Imagine a network which uses IPsec for access control 
> but does not
> >     assign any IP address to PaC before they are authenticated.
> >     
> >     PaC successfully authenticates with the PAA without 
> acquiring an IP
> >     address initially. At this point, DI is the IP address, 
> but its value is
> >     0.0.0.0 or 0::0. Using the PANA SA and the PANA session 
> identifier, PaC
> >     can securely obtain an IP address from DHCP. Now PaC 
> can re-auth in
> >     order to notify the PAA (and, in turn EPs) about its IP 
> address. When
> >     the EP learns the new IP address, it can engage in IKE, etc. to
> >     kick-start IPsec-based access control.
> > 
> > I don't know of this really requires DI change, but here is 
> something 
> > else to consider:
> 
> The above PANA-DHCP-IKE scenario requires DI change, if IKE 
> operates in 
> pre-shared key authentication in Main Mode.  RFC 2409 says:
> 
>   "When using pre-shared key authentication with Main Mode 
> the key can 
>    only be identified by the IP address of the peers since 
> HASH_I must 
>    be computed before the initiator has processed IDir."
> 
> So, without notifying the PAA of the obtained IP address, it 
> is not possible for IKE to bind pre-shared key with the IP address.  
> 
> IKE pre-shared key authentication with Quick Mode allows more 
> Identity types, but IPsec DOI does not define link-layer 
> address to be used for IKE Identification Type.
> 
The scenario above requires a change from link layer address
as the DI (during DHCP) to IP address as the DI after Ipsec
is used for access control. So, this justifies the need to update DI.

-mohan

> > 
> >     When a PaC moves within the same access domain, instead of
> >     requiring a full authentication, network might be able to
> >     re-authenticate it using its ongoing PANA session with 
> another PAA of
> >     the domain (if it hasn't expired already).
> > 
> >     PaC can send its PANA session ID along with PANA_start 
> message sent to
> >     PAA. If the PAA has means to obtain a still valid PANA 
> SA from the
> >     previous PAA, it can respond with a PANA_reauth, 
> instead initiating a
> >     full authentication. Now PaC can respond with 
> PANA-reauth, and tag along
> >     the new DI.
> 
> What is the new DI?  If the DI used for mobility management 
> is link-layer address, it will not change unless 
> inter-technology handoff occurs.  So do you imply 
> inter-technology handoff?
> 
> > 
> >     The mechanisms needed to transfer PANA SA from one PAA 
> to another would
> >     be outside the scope of PANA. Context transfer protocol 
> (see Seamoby WG)
> >     might be used here.
> > 
> > Comments?
> > 
> > Alper
> > 
> > 
> 
> Yoshihiro Ohba
> 
> 



From pana-request@research.telcordia.com  Tue May 13 21:14:42 2003
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From: Alper Yegin <alper@docomolabs-usa.com>
To: Mohan Parthasarathy <mohanp@tahoenetworks.com>,
        <pana@research.telcordia.com>
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> 1)  This one might be a real nit. In the Introduction, the first para
> has four lines.
> 
>     Providing secure network access service requires access control
>     based on the authentication and authorization of the clients and
> the
>     access networks.
> 
>     Initial and subsequent client-to-network authentication provides
>     parameters that are needed to police the traffic flow through the
>     enforcement points.
> 
>     A protocol is needed to carry authentication methods between the
> client and 
>     the access network.
> 
> First line talks about authentication. Second line talks about the
> results of the authentication. Third line talks about the
> need for a protocol. And the second paragraph talks about the need
> for a link layer agnostic protocol. I am wondering something can
> be re-arranged here. I think after the second line above, the second
> paragraph can be merged e.g. "Currently, there are several link layer
> authentication protocols for providing secure network access....[rest
> mohanp> of the second para]
> 
>      IETF PANA Working Group has been chartered with the goal of
>       designing a network-layer access authentication protocol.
> 
> Do we really need this line ?

Hmm, I'll think about these. I'm not 100% sure we need these fixes.

> 
> 2) In section 4.1,
> 
> A PaC can be identified by the credentials (e.g., identifier,
> authenticator)
> 
>  This usage of the word identifier is confusing. It is not talking
> about device
>  identifier but about the identity of the device here. I think it
> would be better to use
>  identity to mean "authenticating the identity" and identifier to mean
> the "device
>  identifier".

I see. How about this:

PANA MUST enable authentication of  PaCs for network access. A PaC's
identity can be authenticated by verifying the credentials (e.g.,
identifier, authenticator) supplied by one of the users of the device or the
device itself. PANA MUST only grant network access service to the device
identified by the DI, rather than granting separate access to multiple
simultaneous users of the device. Once the network access is granted to the
device, the methods used by the device on arbitrating which one of its users
can access the network is outside the scope of PANA.


> 
> 3) In section 4.1,
> 
>  Both the PaC and the PAA MUST be able to authenticate each other for
>  network access. Providing capability of only PAA authenticating the
>  PaC is not sufficient.
> 
>  I guess the above the same issue we were discussing  yesterday i.e it
> depends
>  on which environment PANA is being used. So, you may need to clarify
> "MUST be able to".

New text added:

Both the PaC and the PAA MUST be able to authenticate each other for network
access. Providing capability of only PAA authenticating the PaC is not
sufficient. Mutual authentication capability is necessary in some
environments but not in all of them. For example, clients might not need to
authenticate the access network when physical security is available (e.g.,
dial-up networks).

> 
> 4) In section 4.1.4, identity and identifier can be used to clearly
> distinguish the
>  things that are used in authentication and authorization.

I didn't quite get what I should be doing here.

> 
> 5) In section 4.1.4,
> 
>      PAA MUST be able to create a binding between the PaC and the
>      associated DI upon successful PANA exchange. The DI MUST be
> carried
>      either explicitly as part of the PANA payload, or implicitly as
> the
>      source of the PANA message, or both.
> 
>  Isn't the second line related to the first line i.e The DI MUST be
> carried
>  for ...creating such a binding. It might help clarifying it.

Some new text here:

PAA MUST be able to create a binding between the PaC and the associated DI
upon successful PANA exchange. This can be achieved by PANA communicating
the PaC identifier and DI to the PAA during the protocol exchange. The DI
can be carried either explicitly as part of the PANA payload, or implicitly
as the source of the PANA message, or both.


Actually second and third sentences don't add much, but just for clarity...

> 
> 6) In section 4.2, I suggest we remove this sentence :
> 
> This threat may not be an issue for IPv6 because of the large
>      address space, but it can affect IPv4 networks.

If you can explain why we should remove it.... maybe we just need to fix it.

> 
> 7) In section 4.4,
> 
>  This transport is needed to create access
>  control lists to allow authenticated and authorized clients' traffic
> 
> 
> ^non-ascii
> 
>       This task is similar to what MIDCOM Working Group is trying to
>  achieve, therefore some of that WG's output might be useful here.
> 
>                                   ^ another non-ascii

ok.

> 8) In section 4.8, it is not clear what congestion control is referring
> to ?
>  It might be worth clarifying. Is it because the clients are just
> bombarding
>  PANA messages and causing congestion at the access router or
> somewhere
>  in the internet .. ? Does EAP over PPP/802.1x have this feature ? In
> IKE,
>  I have not seen this specifically.

I think what we are concerned is something like clients sending their
requests at the same time. This can happen when the power comes back up
after a shortage and the clients are somewhat synchronized. In the context
of PANA, this is concerned with the last hop, that is, the link between PaC
and PAA. 

Since the problem is similar for both, I suspect the solution would be
similar to router discovery's mechanisms for congestion-avoidance.

Maybe we can give some examples where congestion can occur:

   PANA MUST provide ordered-delivery for messages that carry EAP PDUs
   as described in [EAP].

   PANA MUST provide congestion control for the protocol messaging
   Under certain conditions PaCs might unintentionally get
    synchronized when sending their requests (e.g., upon recovering from a
   power outage on the access network). The network congestion generated
    from such events can be avoided by using techniques  like delayed
    initialization and exponential back off.


Thanks for the review.

Alper



From pana-request@research.telcordia.com  Wed May 14 12:26:16 2003
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From: "Mohan Parthasarathy" <mohanp@tahoenetworks.com>
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> 
> > 
> > 2) In section 4.1,
> > 
> > A PaC can be identified by the credentials (e.g., identifier,
> > authenticator)
> > 
> >  This usage of the word identifier is confusing. It is not talking 
> > about device  identifier but about the identity of the 
> device here. I 
> > think it would be better to use
> >  identity to mean "authenticating the identity" and 
> identifier to mean
> > the "device
> >  identifier".
> 
> I see. How about this:
> 
> PANA MUST enable authentication of  PaCs for network access. 
> A PaC's identity can be authenticated by verifying the 
> credentials (e.g., identifier, authenticator) supplied by one 
> of the users of the device or the device itself. PANA MUST 
> only grant network access service to the device identified by 
> the DI, rather than granting separate access to multiple 
> simultaneous users of the device. Once the network access is 
> granted to the device, the methods used by the device on 
> arbitrating which one of its users can access the network is 
> outside the scope of PANA.
> 

Sounds good to me.

> 
> > 
> > 3) In section 4.1,
> > 
> >  Both the PaC and the PAA MUST be able to authenticate each 
> other for  
> > network access. Providing capability of only PAA 
> authenticating the  
> > PaC is not sufficient.
> > 
> >  I guess the above the same issue we were discussing  
> yesterday i.e it 
> > depends  on which environment PANA is being used. So, you 
> may need to 
> > clarify "MUST be able to".
> 
> New text added:
> 
> Both the PaC and the PAA MUST be able to authenticate each 
> other for network access. Providing capability of only PAA 
> authenticating the PaC is not sufficient. 

The last sentence can be reworded to "It may not be sufficient
for just the PAA to authenticate the PaC" (or something better). 

> Mutual authentication capability is necessary in some environments 
> but not in all of them. For example, clients might not need 
> to authenticate the access network when physical security is 
> available (e.g., dial-up networks).
> 

ok.

> > 
> > 4) In section 4.1.4, identity and identifier can be used to clearly 
> > distinguish the  things that are used in authentication and 
> > authorization.
> 
> I didn't quite get what I should be doing here.

Same as (2) above. During the authentication phase, you verify
the identity of some one. This is the most common usage. And
access control is based on identifier/device identifier. I am
mostly biased by IKE/Ipsec usage.

> 
> > 
> > 5) In section 4.1.4,
> > 
> >      PAA MUST be able to create a binding between the PaC and the
> >      associated DI upon successful PANA exchange. The DI MUST be 
> > carried
> >      either explicitly as part of the PANA payload, or 
> implicitly as 
> > the
> >      source of the PANA message, or both.
> > 
> >  Isn't the second line related to the first line i.e The DI MUST be 
> > carried  for ...creating such a binding. It might help 
> clarifying it.
> 
> Some new text here:
> 
> PAA MUST be able to create a binding between the PaC and the 
> associated DI upon successful PANA exchange. This can be 
> achieved by PANA communicating the PaC identifier and DI to 
> the PAA during the protocol exchange. The DI can be carried 
> either explicitly as part of the PANA payload, or implicitly 
> as the source of the PANA message, or both.
> 
That sounds better.

> 
> Actually second and third sentences don't add much, but just 
> for clarity...
> 
> > 
> > 6) In section 4.2, I suggest we remove this sentence :
> > 
> > This threat may not be an issue for IPv6 because of the large
> >      address space, but it can affect IPv4 networks.
> 
> If you can explain why we should remove it.... maybe we just 
> need to fix it.
> 
It provides a wrong idea that this threat need not be
addressed for IPv6. It is just not the address alone that
is being depleted, but CPU,network, memory resources.

> > 
> > 7) In section 4.4,
> > 
> >  This transport is needed to create access
> >  control lists to allow authenticated and authorized 
> clients' traffic
> > 
> > 
> > ^non-ascii
> > 
> >       This task is similar to what MIDCOM Working Group is 
> trying to  
> > achieve, therefore some of that WG's output might be useful here.
> > 
> >                                   ^ another non-ascii
> 
> ok.
> 
> > 8) In section 4.8, it is not clear what congestion control is 
> > referring to ?  It might be worth clarifying. Is it because the 
> > clients are just bombarding
> >  PANA messages and causing congestion at the access router or
> > somewhere
> >  in the internet .. ? Does EAP over PPP/802.1x have this 
> feature ? In
> > IKE,
> >  I have not seen this specifically.
> 
> I think what we are concerned is something like clients 
> sending their requests at the same time. This can happen when 
> the power comes back up after a shortage and the clients are 
> somewhat synchronized. In the context of PANA, this is 
> concerned with the last hop, that is, the link between PaC and PAA. 
> 
> Since the problem is similar for both, I suspect the solution 
> would be similar to router discovery's mechanisms for 
> congestion-avoidance.
> 
> Maybe we can give some examples where congestion can occur:
> 
>    PANA MUST provide ordered-delivery for messages that carry EAP PDUs
>    as described in [EAP].
> 
>    PANA MUST provide congestion control for the protocol messaging
>    Under certain conditions PaCs might unintentionally get
>     synchronized when sending their requests (e.g., upon 
> recovering from a
>    power outage on the access network). The network 
> congestion generated
>     from such events can be avoided by using techniques  like delayed
>     initialization and exponential back off.
> 

Okay, the word synchronized helps capture it better.

-mohan

> 
> Thanks for the review.
> 
> Alper
> 
> 



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        <pana@research.telcordia.com>
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>>> 6) In section 4.2, I suggest we remove this sentence :
>>> 
>>> This threat may not be an issue for IPv6 because of the large
>>>      address space, but it can affect IPv4 networks.
>> 
>> If you can explain why we should remove it.... maybe we just
>> need to fix it.
>> 
> It provides a wrong idea that this threat need not be
> addressed for IPv6. It is just not the address alone that
> is being depleted, but CPU,network, memory resources.

   Providing address assignment functionality is outside the scope of
   PANA. PANA protocol design MAY require the PaC to configure an IP
   address before using this protocol. Allocating an IP address to
   unauthenticated PaCs may create security vulnerabilities, such as IP
   address depletion attacks on the access network [SECTHREAT]. This
   threat may not be an issue for IPv6 because of the large address
   space, but it can affect IPv4 networks.

Yes, even if we have infinitely many IP addresses, IP address allocation
process costs other resources. In the case of IPv4, though, the most
important resource to be consumed is the IP address space. So this is why it
takes the center attention.

We can say this instead of the last sentence above:

  IPv4 networks with limited address space are the main targets of such
  attacks. Launching a successful attack that can deplete the addresses in
  an IPv6 network is relatively harder.


Alper



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On Tue, May 13, 2003 at 11:23:50AM -0700, Alper Yegin wrote:
> > What is the new DI?  If the DI used for mobility management is
> > link-layer address, it will not change unless inter-technology handoff
> > occurs.  So do you imply inter-technology handoff?
> 
> I wasn't really thinking in terms of inter-technology handover, but surely,
> this is a valid scenario too.

If this is a valid scenario, a short note in the PANA specification on
the possibility of link-layer address change might be useful.

> 
> Even if the device stays in the same access technology domain, crossing the
> border of a subnet will change the IP address of the PaC. If IPsec is used
> for access control, then this would mean a new DI in the context of PANA.

Yes.

Yoshihiro Ohba



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Subject: Securing the first hop in PANA using IPsec
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Please read and comment.

Alper


------ Forwarded Message
From: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org
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Date: Wed, 14 May 2003 07:20:32 -0400
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Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-mohanp-pana-ipsec-00.txt

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
directories.


    Title        : Securing the first hop in PANA using IPsec
    Author(s)    : M. Parthasarathy
    Filename    : draft-mohanp-pana-ipsec-00.txt
    Pages        : 12
    Date        : 2003-5-13
    
The PANA (Protocol for carrying Authentication for Network Access)
working group is developing protocol for authenticating clients to
the access network using IP based protocols.  The PANA protocol
authenticates the client and also establishes a PANA security
association between the PANA client and PANA authentication agent at
the end of a successful authentication. But it does not specify any
mechanism for preventing service theft. This document discusses the
details for establishing an IPsec security association for securing
the link between PANA client and the enforcement point, which can be
used to prevent service theft.

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-mohanp-pana-ipsec-00.txt

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From pana-request@research.telcordia.com  Thu May 15 04:16:05 2003
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Subject: RE: Please review
Date: Thu, 15 May 2003 11:10:37 +0300
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Some comments and questions below.

> -----Original Message-----
> From: ext Mohan Parthasarathy [mailto:mohanp@tahoenetworks.com]
> Sent: 14 May, 2003 19:26
> To: Alper Yegin; pana@research.telcordia.com
> Subject: RE: Please review
> 
> 
>  
> > 
> > > 
> > > 2) In section 4.1,
> > > 
> > > A PaC can be identified by the credentials (e.g., identifier,
> > > authenticator)
> > > 
> > >  This usage of the word identifier is confusing. It is 
> not talking 
> > > about device  identifier but about the identity of the 
> > device here. I 
> > > think it would be better to use
> > >  identity to mean "authenticating the identity" and 
> > identifier to mean
> > > the "device
> > >  identifier".
> > 
> > I see. How about this:
> > 
> > PANA MUST enable authentication of  PaCs for network access. 
> > A PaC's identity can be authenticated by verifying the 
> > credentials (e.g., identifier, authenticator) supplied by one 
> > of the users of the device or the device itself. PANA MUST 
> > only grant network access service to the device identified by 
> > the DI, rather than granting separate access to multiple 
> > simultaneous users of the device. Once the network access is 
> > granted to the device, the methods used by the device on 
> > arbitrating which one of its users can access the network is 
> > outside the scope of PANA.
> > 
> 
> Sounds good to me.

The confusion lies in the words "PaC's identity". What is PaC's 
identity? Aren't we talking about identity of the user or an account 
that can be charged [identity can be a temporary id or encrypted in 
some ways so that PAA can't trace the identities]. Session id is the
only one that doesn't change during the PANA session. The identity 
is specific to the EAP method and thus we can't rely on that too much
but on the authentication result.

I think the process goes like this: if authentication is succesfull, 
bind the session id to the DI. If security associations are created 
they must be bound to the session id too. 

> 
> > 
> > > 
> > > 3) In section 4.1,
> > > 
> > >  Both the PaC and the PAA MUST be able to authenticate each 
> > other for  
> > > network access. Providing capability of only PAA 
> > authenticating the  
> > > PaC is not sufficient.
> > > 
> > >  I guess the above the same issue we were discussing  
> > yesterday i.e it 
> > > depends  on which environment PANA is being used. So, you 
> > may need to 
> > > clarify "MUST be able to".
> > 
> > New text added:
> > 
> > Both the PaC and the PAA MUST be able to authenticate each 
> > other for network access. Providing capability of only PAA 
> > authenticating the PaC is not sufficient. 
> 
> The last sentence can be reworded to "It may not be sufficient
> for just the PAA to authenticate the PaC" (or something better). 

How does PANA enable mutual authentication between PaC and PAA? Does 
the PAA have an identity that is authenticated? By whom?

Does this mean that the EAP Server must be in the same domain as 
the PAA, if mutual authentication is required?

> 
> > Mutual authentication capability is necessary in some environments 
> > but not in all of them. For example, clients might not need 
> > to authenticate the access network when physical security is 
> > available (e.g., dial-up networks).
> > 
> 
> ok.
> 
> > > 
> > > 4) In section 4.1.4, identity and identifier can be used 
> to clearly 
> > > distinguish the  things that are used in authentication and 
> > > authorization.
> > 
> > I didn't quite get what I should be doing here.
> 
> Same as (2) above. During the authentication phase, you verify
> the identity of some one. This is the most common usage. And
> access control is based on identifier/device identifier. I am
> mostly biased by IKE/Ipsec usage.

Yep, and the identifier is bound to the SA.

> 
> > 
> > > 
> > > 5) In section 4.1.4,
> > > 
> > >      PAA MUST be able to create a binding between the PaC and the
> > >      associated DI upon successful PANA exchange. The DI MUST be 
> > > carried
> > >      either explicitly as part of the PANA payload, or 
> > implicitly as 
> > > the
> > >      source of the PANA message, or both.
> > > 
> > >  Isn't the second line related to the first line i.e The 
> DI MUST be 
> > > carried  for ...creating such a binding. It might help 
> > clarifying it.
> > 
> > Some new text here:
> > 
> > PAA MUST be able to create a binding between the PaC and the 
> > associated DI upon successful PANA exchange. This can be 
> > achieved by PANA communicating the PaC identifier and DI to 
> > the PAA during the protocol exchange. The DI can be carried 
> > either explicitly as part of the PANA payload, or implicitly 
> > as the source of the PANA message, or both.
> > 
> That sounds better.

What's the difference between PaC identifier and DI? Maybe it is
"between PaC identity and DI". But see my comment about identity
above.

What about this:

  PAA MUST be able to create a binding between the PaC and the
  associated DI upon successful PANA exchange. This binding is 
  identified with a session id, which doesn't change during the 
  PANA session. For each session PaC's DI is delivered for PAA 
  and bound to the session. The DI can be carried either explicitly 
  as part of the PANA payload, or implicitly as the source of the 
  PANA message, or both. If PANA SA is created, it MUST be bound
  to the session.



- Dan



From pana-request@research.telcordia.com  Thu May 15 09:54:48 2003
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Subject: New Issue12: Supporting network access authentication for ad-hoc networks 
Date: Thu, 15 May 2003 16:55:26 +0300
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New PANA issue submitted (by Hannes Tschofenig):
http://danforsberg.info:8080/pana-issues/issue12

- Dan



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> For now we can keep the EP's ability to send PANA_discover message.
> We can mark it as an optional feature which can be replaced by a PAA-EP
> protocol message in any deployment. That way, even if a specific PAA-EP
> protocol does not know how to trigger the PAA, the deployment can rely on
> this message as a substitute.

from this standpoint, is 'event notification' (pull model) still a 
requirement for the PAA-EP protocol ?

thanks,
yacine



From pana-request@research.telcordia.com  Thu May 15 11:39:46 2003
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From: "Jean-Michel COMBES" <jeanmichel.combes@francetelecom.com>
To: "Alper Yegin" <alper@docomolabs-usa.com>,
        "pana" <pana@research.telcordia.com>
Subject: RE: Securing the first hop in PANA using IPsec
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Hi,

just one comment : why use ESP/transport mode and not ESP/tunnel mode ?

BTW, in RFC 2401, it is said :
"Whenever either end of a security association is a security gateway, the SA
MUST be tunnel mode.  Thus an SA between two security gateways is always a
tunnel mode SA, as is an SA between a host and a security gateway."

and in the draft 'draft-mohanp-pana-ipsec-00.txt':
"In IPsec terms, EP is a security gateway (therefore a router) ..."

So logically, we MUST use ESP/tunnel mode ...

... comments ?

Best regards.

JMC.

France Telecom R&D - DTL/SSR
Jean-Michel COMBES, Internet/Intranet Security
E-Mail : jeanmichel.combes@francetelecom.com
Phone +33 (0)1 45 29 45 94, Fax +33 (0)1 45 29 65 19

> -----Message d'origine-----
> De : Alper Yegin [mailto:alper@docomolabs-usa.com]
> Envoye : jeudi 15 mai 2003 02:34
> A : pana
> Objet : Securing the first hop in PANA using IPsec
>
>
>
> Please read and comment.
>
> Alper
>
>
> ------ Forwarded Message
> From: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org
> Reply-To: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org
> Date: Wed, 14 May 2003 07:20:32 -0400
> To: IETF-Announce: ;
> Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-mohanp-pana-ipsec-00.txt
>
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
> directories.
>
>
>     Title        : Securing the first hop in PANA using IPsec
>     Author(s)    : M. Parthasarathy
>     Filename    : draft-mohanp-pana-ipsec-00.txt
>     Pages        : 12
>     Date        : 2003-5-13
>
> The PANA (Protocol for carrying Authentication for Network Access)
> working group is developing protocol for authenticating clients to
> the access network using IP based protocols.  The PANA protocol
> authenticates the client and also establishes a PANA security
> association between the PANA client and PANA authentication agent at
> the end of a successful authentication. But it does not specify any
> mechanism for preventing service theft. This document discusses the
> details for establishing an IPsec security association for securing
> the link between PANA client and the enforcement point, which can be
> used to prevent service theft.
>
> A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-mohanp-pana-ipsec-00.txt
>
> To remove yourself from the IETF Announcement list, send a message to
> ietf-announce-request with the word unsubscribe in the body of
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>
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From pana-request@research.telcordia.com  Thu May 15 14:30:02 2003
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Subject: Re: "new" issue / Event Notification
From: Alper Yegin <alper@docomolabs-usa.com>
To: <Yacine.El_Mghazli@alcatel.fr>, <Dan.Forsberg@nokia.com>
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>> For now we can keep the EP's ability to send PANA_discover message.
>> We can mark it as an optional feature which can be replaced by a PAA-EP
>> protocol message in any deployment. That way, even if a specific PAA-EP
>> protocol does not know how to trigger the PAA, the deployment can rely on
>> this message as a substitute.
> 
> from this standpoint, is 'event notification' (pull model) still a
> requirement for the PAA-EP protocol ?

No, it is not, because PANA protocol offers a substitute for that.

Alper




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> How does PANA enable mutual authentication between PaC and PAA?

By carrying EAP methods that can authenticate peer to authentication server
and vice versa.

> Does 
> the PAA have an identity that is authenticated? By whom?

Generally it is the authentication server (AS) that is being
"authenticated." If the AS is co-located wiht PAA, this is like
authenticating the PAA. When they are separated, it is the responsibility of
the AS to authenticate PAA (via IPsec, TLS) before returning a positive
result to the PaC. Anyways, at the end, PaC knows PAA is trustworthy.

Note: So far what I explained has nothing to do with PANA. This is EAP and
AAA design.

> 
> Does this mean that the EAP Server must be in the same domain as
> the PAA, if mutual authentication is required?

No, please see above.

>>> Some new text here:
>>> 
>>> PAA MUST be able to create a binding between the PaC and the
>>> associated DI upon successful PANA exchange. This can be
>>> achieved by PANA communicating the PaC identifier and DI to
>>> the PAA during the protocol exchange. The DI can be carried
>>> either explicitly as part of the PANA payload, or implicitly
>>> as the source of the PANA message, or both.
>>> 
>> That sounds better.
> 
> What's the difference between PaC identifier and DI?

PaC ID gets authenticated and authorized for network access.
For example: your NAI.

Once the PaC with PaC ID is authorized, the network must know how to
recognize the packets of this particular PaC. This is when device ID comes
into play. Examples of device ID are: mac address, IP address.

[when simple filters are not sufficient, crypto keys are also bound to the
PaC. We can see them as attributes of device ID]

> Maybe it is
> "between PaC identity and DI". But see my comment about identity
> above.
> 
> What about this:
> 
> PAA MUST be able to create a binding between the PaC and the
> associated DI upon successful PANA exchange. This binding is
> identified with a session id, which doesn't change during the
> PANA session. For each session PaC's DI is delivered for PAA
> and bound to the session. The DI can be carried either explicitly
> as part of the PANA payload, or implicitly as the source of the
> PANA message, or both. If PANA SA is created, it MUST be bound
> to the session.

I'd not get into session id in the requirements draft.
We don't have to have a session id for this protocol. We now have it in the
design, but.... it's a bit of a syntethic abstraction (which of course have
many uses......)

All the protocol needs is to know what is authenticated: PaC.
Once the authentication is successful, what is used for access control:
device ID.
As long as we know how to bind a PaC to a device ID, we are done.

Alper



> 
> 
> 
> - Dan
> 
> 
> 



From pana-request@research.telcordia.com  Fri May 16 03:11:29 2003
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Subject: RE: "new" issue / Event Notification
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This is a tradeoff in deployment point of view. If the 
PAA-EP protocol doesn't implement it, then the EP has to 
be extended to support PANA-Discover message. In the end
PAA-EP communication must support PaC notification. So, 
there is a requirement for the notification but not for
the protocol. Makes things complicated. Anyway, with a
PAA-EP protocol that support PaC notification, there has
to be an interface between PAA and the protocol.
- Dan

> -----Original Message-----
> From: ext Alper Yegin [mailto:alper@docomolabs-usa.com]
> Sent: 15 May, 2003 21:31
> To: Yacine.El_Mghazli@alcatel.fr; Forsberg Dan (NRC/Helsinki)
> Cc: pana@research.telcordia.com
> Subject: Re: "new" issue / Event Notification
> 
> 
> >> For now we can keep the EP's ability to send PANA_discover message.
> >> We can mark it as an optional feature which can be 
> replaced by a PAA-EP
> >> protocol message in any deployment. That way, even if a 
> specific PAA-EP
> >> protocol does not know how to trigger the PAA, the 
> deployment can rely on
> >> this message as a substitute.
> > 
> > from this standpoint, is 'event notification' (pull model) still a
> > requirement for the PAA-EP protocol ?
> 
> No, it is not, because PANA protocol offers a substitute for that.
> 
> Alper
> 
> 
> 



From pana-request@research.telcordia.com  Fri May 16 03:42:44 2003
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Alper Yegin wrote:

>>>For now we can keep the EP's ability to send PANA_discover message.
>>>We can mark it as an optional feature which can be replaced by a PAA-EP
>>>protocol message in any deployment. That way, even if a specific PAA-EP
>>>protocol does not know how to trigger the PAA, the deployment can rely on
>>>this message as a substitute.
>>>
>>from this standpoint, is 'event notification' (pull model) still a
>>requirement for the PAA-EP protocol ?
>>
> 
> No, it is not, because PANA protocol offers a substitute for that.


surprising !... and why not designing the PANA protocol so that it 
enables the PAA to provision EPs with filter-rules as well ?... just in 
case the PAA-EP protocol cannot :-)

> 
> Alper


yacine


> 
> 
> 




From pana-request@research.telcordia.com  Fri May 16 04:07:24 2003
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Subject: Re: Securing the first hop in PANA using IPsec 
In-reply-to: Your message of Thu, 15 May 2003 17:37:18 +0200.
             <GLENJHPGCMHKCEMBJDPLAELKEHAA.jeanmichel.combes@francetelecom.com> 
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 In your previous mail you wrote:

   just one comment : why use ESP/transport mode and not ESP/tunnel mode ?
   
=> this is far easier/simpler in the case of double IPsec, a case which
is assumed to be common.

   BTW, in RFC 2401, it is said :

=> look at draft-touch-ipsec-vpn-05.txt for other reasons to use
ESP transport mode over an IP-IP tunnel.
   
Regards

Francis.Dupont@enst-bretagne.fr



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Subject: [issue14] PANA session term
Date: Fri, 16 May 2003 11:31:39 +0300
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New submission from Dan Forsberg <dan.forsberg@nokia.com>:

Eventually we are talking about sessions, since we have
reauth messages and a PANA SA.. so there should be a term
that clarifies this (PANA session). Then we should clarify
also the lifetime of the session and lifetime of the SA.

See issue6 about session-id.

PANA session

  PANA session starts when PaC identity is authenticated
  and network access is granted. PANA session ends
  when PaC explicitly signals PAA to stop the session, or
  when PAA stops the session and informs PaC about it, or
  when timeout occurs for the session.


----------
category: Technical
document: draft-ietf-pana-requirements-xx.txt
messages: 28
nosy: dforsber
priority: Should Fix
status: Text Proposed
title: PANA session term
________________________________________________
PANA Issues <pana_issues@danforsberg.info>
http://danforsberg.info:8080/pana-issues/issue14
________________________________________________



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Alper, 

Some comments.

> -----Original Message-----
> From: ext Alper Yegin [mailto:alper@docomolabs-usa.com]
> Sent: 15 May, 2003 21:29
> To: Forsberg Dan (NRC/Helsinki); mohanp@tahoenetworks.com;
> pana@research.telcordia.com
> Subject: Re: Please review
> 
> 
> 
> > How does PANA enable mutual authentication between PaC and PAA?
> 
> By carrying EAP methods that can authenticate peer to 
> authentication server
> and vice versa.

Mutual authentication between PaC and AS is different than 
between PaC and PAA.

This creates an implicit requirement for the relationship 
between PAA and AS (_two way_ SA between PAA and AS), which 
is out of the scope of PANA.

> 
> > Does 
> > the PAA have an identity that is authenticated? By whom?
> 
> Generally it is the authentication server (AS) that is being
> "authenticated." If the AS is co-located wiht PAA, this is like
> authenticating the PAA. When they are separated, it is the 
> responsibility of
> the AS to authenticate PAA (via IPsec, TLS) before returning 
> a positive
> result to the PaC. Anyways, at the end, PaC knows PAA is trustworthy.
> 
> Note: So far what I explained has nothing to do with PANA. 
> This is EAP and
> AAA design.

There is a difference between one way (PAA<--AS) SA and two way SA 
(PAA<-->AS) as I tried to explain above. Maybe it would be a good
idea to clarify this in the requirements draft, or at least the 
requirement itself (what is really wanted?!).

I created an open issue about this (clarifying text required):
http://danforsberg.info:8080/pana-issues/issue13

> 
> > 
> > Does this mean that the EAP Server must be in the same domain as
> > the PAA, if mutual authentication is required?
> 
> No, please see above.
> 
> >>> Some new text here:
> >>> 
> >>> PAA MUST be able to create a binding between the PaC and the
> >>> associated DI upon successful PANA exchange. This can be
> >>> achieved by PANA communicating the PaC identifier and DI to
> >>> the PAA during the protocol exchange. The DI can be carried
> >>> either explicitly as part of the PANA payload, or implicitly
> >>> as the source of the PANA message, or both.
> >>> 
> >> That sounds better.
> > 
> > What's the difference between PaC identifier and DI?
> 
> PaC ID gets authenticated and authorized for network access.
> For example: your NAI.
> 
> Once the PaC with PaC ID is authorized, the network must know how to
> recognize the packets of this particular PaC. This is when 
> device ID comes
> into play. Examples of device ID are: mac address, IP address.

Ok. I was 'afraid' that PaC ID would actually mean something static 
and specific for the device itself :). Anyway, PaC ID is not in the
current terminology. The PANA Client definition talks about identity
not about PaC ID. So, we can't use PaC ID, if we don't clarify it!
And eventually we are talking about the same issue here: identity.

Just a clarification in the device point of view. Identity can change. 
The same device can be used with different identities (over time). 
So, the nature is dynamic.

I think PANA Client itself is too vaguely identified ("entity").
This creates confusion, because there are users and devices. None 
of these is a PaC directly. User identities and device identifiers
are dynamic, but is PANA assuming that one or both of these is 
static for the PANA _session_? If it is the user identity, it 
must be the same all the time (during the session), which again 
is an implicit requirement for the protocol. If we are assuming 
static DI, we are restricting too much.

> 
> [when simple filters are not sufficient, crypto keys are also 
> bound to the
> PaC. We can see them as attributes of device ID]
> 
> > Maybe it is
> > "between PaC identity and DI". But see my comment about identity
> > above.
> > 
> > What about this:
> > 
> > PAA MUST be able to create a binding between the PaC and the
> > associated DI upon successful PANA exchange. This binding is
> > identified with a session id, which doesn't change during the
> > PANA session. For each session PaC's DI is delivered for PAA
> > and bound to the session. The DI can be carried either explicitly
> > as part of the PANA payload, or implicitly as the source of the
> > PANA message, or both. If PANA SA is created, it MUST be bound
> > to the session.
> 
> I'd not get into session id in the requirements draft.

"Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA)
Requirements and _Terminology_".

> We don't have to have a session id for this protocol. We now 
> have it in the
> design, but.... it's a bit of a syntethic abstraction (which 
> of course have
> many uses......)

Didn't we already agree about the session-id AVP. See Issue6:
http://danforsberg.info:8080/pana-issues/issue6

OK, here goes another suggestion:

  PAA MUST be able to create a binding between the PaC identity 
  and the associated DI upon successful PANA exchange. For each 
  session PaC's DI is delivered for PAA and bound to the PANA 
  session. The DI can be carried either explicitly as part of 
  the PANA payload, or implicitly as the source of the PANA 
  message, or both. If PANA SA is created, it MUST be bound to 
  the PANA session.

Eventually we are talking about sessions, since we have reauth 
messages and a PANA SA.. so there should be a term that clarifies 
this, "PANA session". Then we should clarify also the lifetime 
of the session and lifetime of the SA.. and how to identify the
session.

I created an issue about this too:
http://danforsberg.info:8080/pana-issues/issue13

> 
> All the protocol needs is to know what is authenticated: PaC.
> Once the authentication is successful, what is used for 
> access control:
> device ID.
> As long as we know how to bind a PaC to a device ID, we are done.

I assume you mean PaC identity and device ID (DI).

How do you create this binding if both are changing? What is the 
relationship between the session then.. and session-id.. and where
do you bind the SA and session lifetime..

- Dan

> 
> Alper
> 
> 
> 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > - Dan
> > 
> > 
> > 
> 
> 



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Subject: [issue13] Mutual authentication requirement
Date: Fri, 16 May 2003 11:35:27 +0300
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New submission from Dan Forsberg <dan.forsberg@nokia.com>:

Mutual authentication between PaC and AS is different than
between PaC and PAA.

The requirement about mutual authentication between PaC and
 PAA creates an implicit requirement for the relationship
between PAA and AS (_two way_ SA between PAA and AS), which 
is out of the scope of PANA.


----------
category: Technical
document: draft-ietf-pana-requirements-xx.txt
messages: 27
nosy: dforsber
priority: Should Fix
status: Clarifying Text Required
title: Mutual authentication requirement
________________________________________________
PANA Issues <pana_issues@danforsberg.info>
http://danforsberg.info:8080/pana-issues/issue13
________________________________________________



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Dan.Forsberg@nokia.com wrote:

> This is a tradeoff in deployment point of view. If the 
> PAA-EP protocol doesn't implement it, then the EP has to 
> be extended to support PANA-Discover message. In the end
> PAA-EP communication must support PaC notification. So, 
> there is a requirement for the notification but not for
> the protocol. Makes things complicated. 


I must admit that I feel confused here. traditionally the needs for a 
given interface communication are the requirements for the protocol on 
this interface.

> Anyway, with a
> PAA-EP protocol that support PaC notification, there has
> to be an interface between PAA and the protocol.


my naive personal opinion on this subject is:
since there will finally be a distinct protocol for the PAA-EP 
communication, it would be much better if it supports the pull model, 
otherwise the EP will have to support both PANA and 'PAA-EP' protocol 
stacks (I agree it's possible). hence, it should be a requirement.

btw, this requirement concerning the 'pull model' is not crucial since 
most of the candidate protocols for the PAA-EP interface support this 
feature.


> - Dan


thanks,
yacine





> 
>>-----Original Message-----
>>From: ext Alper Yegin [mailto:alper@docomolabs-usa.com]
>>Sent: 15 May, 2003 21:31
>>To: Yacine.El_Mghazli@alcatel.fr; Forsberg Dan (NRC/Helsinki)
>>Cc: pana@research.telcordia.com
>>Subject: Re: "new" issue / Event Notification
>>
>>
>>
>>>>For now we can keep the EP's ability to send PANA_discover message.
>>>>We can mark it as an optional feature which can be 
>>>>
>>replaced by a PAA-EP
>>
>>>>protocol message in any deployment. That way, even if a 
>>>>
>>specific PAA-EP
>>
>>>>protocol does not know how to trigger the PAA, the 
>>>>
>>deployment can rely on
>>
>>>>this message as a substitute.
>>>>
>>>from this standpoint, is 'event notification' (pull model) still a
>>>requirement for the PAA-EP protocol ?
>>>
>>No, it is not, because PANA protocol offers a substitute for that.
>>
>>Alper
>>
>>
>>
>>
> 
> 




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>>> How does PANA enable mutual authentication between PaC and PAA?
>> 
>> By carrying EAP methods that can authenticate peer to
>> authentication server
>> and vice versa.
> 
> Mutual authentication between PaC and AS is different than
> between PaC and PAA.

Either PaC has a direct trust relation with the PAA, or an indirect one
(such as PaC trusts AS which trusts PAA). Either way, at the end PaC and PAA
are mutually authenticated to each other.

> 
> This creates an implicit requirement for the relationship
> between PAA and AS (_two way_ SA between PAA and AS), which
> is out of the scope of PANA.

Yes, and this implicit requirement is for AAA to deal with. It is already
there, this is how PPP and 802.1X, and Mobile IPv4 all work today. PANA is
not doing anything new or fundamentally different in this respect (and this
is a feature not a bug :)

>>> Does 
>>> the PAA have an identity that is authenticated? By whom?
>> 
>> Generally it is the authentication server (AS) that is being
>> "authenticated." If the AS is co-located wiht PAA, this is like
>> authenticating the PAA. When they are separated, it is the
>> responsibility of
>> the AS to authenticate PAA (via IPsec, TLS) before returning
>> a positive
>> result to the PaC. Anyways, at the end, PaC knows PAA is trustworthy.
>> 
>> Note: So far what I explained has nothing to do with PANA.
>> This is EAP and
>> AAA design.
> 
> There is a difference between one way (PAA<--AS) SA and two way SA
> (PAA<-->AS) as I tried to explain above. Maybe it would be a good
> idea to clarify this in the requirements draft, or at least the
> requirement itself (what is really wanted?!).
> 
> I created an open issue about this (clarifying text required):
> http://danforsberg.info:8080/pana-issues/issue13

Please see my above response.

> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> Does this mean that the EAP Server must be in the same domain as
>>> the PAA, if mutual authentication is required?
>> 
>> No, please see above.
>> 
>>>>> Some new text here:
>>>>> 
>>>>> PAA MUST be able to create a binding between the PaC and the
>>>>> associated DI upon successful PANA exchange. This can be
>>>>> achieved by PANA communicating the PaC identifier and DI to
>>>>> the PAA during the protocol exchange. The DI can be carried
>>>>> either explicitly as part of the PANA payload, or implicitly
>>>>> as the source of the PANA message, or both.
>>>>> 
>>>> That sounds better.
>>> 
>>> What's the difference between PaC identifier and DI?
>> 
>> PaC ID gets authenticated and authorized for network access.
>> For example: your NAI.
>> 
>> Once the PaC with PaC ID is authorized, the network must know how to
>> recognize the packets of this particular PaC. This is when
>> device ID comes
>> into play. Examples of device ID are: mac address, IP address.
> 
> Ok. I was 'afraid' that PaC ID would actually mean something static
> and specific for the device itself :).  Anyway, PaC ID is not in the
> current terminology. The PANA Client definition talks about identity
> not about PaC ID. So, we can't use PaC ID, if we don't clarify it!
> And eventually we are talking about the same issue here: identity.

OK, I see we should add PAC ID in the terminology. Do you have suggested
text?

> 
> Just a clarification in the device point of view. Identity can change.
> The same device can be used with different identities (over time).
> So, the nature is dynamic.
> 
> I think PANA Client itself is too vaguely identified ("entity").
> This creates confusion, because there are users and devices. None
> of these is a PaC directly. User identities and device identifiers
> are dynamic, but is PANA assuming that one or both of these is
> static for the PANA _session_?

At least PAC ID is static. Is device ID static? Well, we are discussing this
on another thread. But does this matter for the requirements draft?

> If it is the user identity, it
> must be the same all the time (during the session), which again
> is an implicit requirement for the protocol. If we are assuming
> static DI, we are restricting too much.
> 
>> 
>> [when simple filters are not sufficient, crypto keys are also
>> bound to the
>> PaC. We can see them as attributes of device ID]
>> 
>>> Maybe it is
>>> "between PaC identity and DI". But see my comment about identity
>>> above.
>>> 
>>> What about this:
>>> 
>>> PAA MUST be able to create a binding between the PaC and the
>>> associated DI upon successful PANA exchange. This binding is
>>> identified with a session id, which doesn't change during the
>>> PANA session. For each session PaC's DI is delivered for PAA
>>> and bound to the session. The DI can be carried either explicitly
>>> as part of the PANA payload, or implicitly as the source of the
>>> PANA message, or both. If PANA SA is created, it MUST be bound
>>> to the session.
>> 
>> I'd not get into session id in the requirements draft.
> 
> "Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA)
> Requirements and _Terminology_".

That does not mean we'll fold every terminology we run into in the solutions
draft back into the requirements draft. Requirements draft states what the
protocol should do, and in order to do that it provides guidelines. It is
not meant to be a mirror image of the solution at hand.... Actually,
evolving the requirements draft based on the solution is not a good idea.

> 
>> We don't have to have a session id for this protocol. We now
>> have it in the
>> design, but.... it's a bit of a syntethic abstraction (which
>> of course have
>> many uses......)
> 
> Didn't we already agree about the session-id AVP. See Issue6:
> http://danforsberg.info:8080/pana-issues/issue6

Again, agreeing that we'll have X in the solution does not mean that we'll
go back and update the requirements draft accordingly.

> 
> OK, here goes another suggestion:
> 
> PAA MUST be able to create a binding between the PaC identity
> and the associated DI upon successful PANA exchange. For each
> session PaC's DI is delivered for PAA and bound to the PANA
> session. The DI can be carried either explicitly as part of
> the PANA payload, or implicitly as the source of the PANA
> message, or both. If PANA SA is created, it MUST be bound to
> the PANA session.
> 
> Eventually we are talking about sessions, since we have reauth
> messages and a PANA SA.. so there should be a term that clarifies
> this, "PANA session". Then we should clarify also the lifetime
> of the session and lifetime of the SA.. and how to identify the
> session.
> 
> I created an issue about this too:
> http://danforsberg.info:8080/pana-issues/issue13

PANA SA and pana session ID might be the results of following the
requirements, but that does not mean that they have to be stated in the
requirements. Again, I see this as backwards pulling them into the
requirements draft.

The important point is: people can develop the PANA protocol without the
requirements draft stating what is session ID and PANA SA. That means,
requirements draft is sufficient. Do you think we are missing anything if we
don't mentioned these abstractions in the requirements draft?

> 
>> 
>> All the protocol needs is to know what is authenticated: PaC.
>> Once the authentication is successful, what is used for
>> access control:
>> device ID.
>> As long as we know how to bind a PaC to a device ID, we are done.
> 
> I assume you mean PaC identity and device ID (DI).
> 
> How do you create this binding if both are changing? What is the
> relationship between the session then.. and session-id.. and where
> do you bind the SA and session lifetime..

Good questions but these should be discussed in the "solutions" draft, not
the requirements draft.

Alper


> 
> - Dan
> 
>> 
>> Alper
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> - Dan
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>> 
>> 
> 
> 
> 



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Subject: RE: comments to your pana/ipsec draft
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Hannes,

Thanks for your comments. Here are my responses with "mohanp"

1) 
      The PANA protocol itself stops  

   here and does not discuss any methods for preventing service theft in  
   the access network. The service theft can be prevented by simple IP  
   address and MAC address filters, if the link between PANA client and  
   PANA agent is a n
# actually it does not "stop" since you have the refresh/reauthentication messageson-shared medium.
# With this sentence i would argue that PANA still discusses methods for preventing theft
# service. We "discuss" these mechanisms (such as IPsec) in the PANA draft itself. 
# Furthermore, we have also spoken about link layer security establishment which also 
# prevents threft of service. The PANA draft does not go beyond saying that IPsec SA should
# be established based on a derived key and the IP address of the IPsec end point has to 
# be known.

mohanp> Ok, i will reword it. 

2) 

 Please refer to [PANAREQ] for terminology and definitions of terms  
   used in this document. The following picture illustrates what is  
   being protected with IPsec. In Figure 1, it is assumed that PAA and  
   EP are co-located. It is also possible that they are not co-located. 

# if it does not really matter whether they are co-located or not then the figure 
# might not be too useful. 

mohanp> It is still useful to have a picture for folks not following
mohanp> PANA closely.

3)

4.0  Communication between PAA and EP  
     
   If the network chooses IPsec to secure the link between PaC and EP,  
   PAA should communicate the IKE pre-shared key, the IP address of the  
   PaC and the PANA session ID to EP before the IKE exchange begins.  

# i assume that the pana session id is used for the purpose of accounting and state maintainance

mohanp> The pana session id here is used in agressive mode. 

4) 

 established when PaC and PAA successfully authenticate to each other.  
   Pre-shared key is derived from the PANA SA using a prf (e.g. SHA-1).   

# in a future version of the draft we need to be more concrete about the key derivation. 
# reading [EAP_KEY] i got the impression that pana needs to use its own key derivation function to produce additional keying 
#    material.      
# i would, however, be good to have a unified approach to address key derivation in pana. 
  
mohanp> Agreed.

5) 

.0 IKE and IPsec details  
     
   IKE [IKE] MUST be used for establishing the IPsec SA.

# why ike only? why not ikev2?

mohanp> Not any specific reason. I will mention it in the next revision.

6) 
 Manual keying  
   may not be possible, as the network does not know all the PaCs that  
   will be authenticating to the network, a priori.

# this is actually not the true reason. manually establishing an ipsec security 
# association requires that you agree on the parameters (algorithms, algorithm parameters), 
# SPI and on the Traffic Selector attributes. 
# this would require an additional exchange within pana. 
# the details :http://www.isrc.rhul.ac.uk/shaman/docs/d13a1v1.pdf
# (annex b) 

mohanp> I am not sure i understood the comment. When you start exchanging, things
mohanp> are not manual anymore. And, are you exchanging keys also above ? All
mohanp> i am saying is that it is not possible to pre-configure SAs (which contains
mohanp> keys, algorithms to use, lifetimes, etc.) on EP without knowing the
mohanp> PaC's a priori. Why is this not a true reason ?

7)  


# typically specifications mandate main mode and not aggressive mode. 
# i assume you changed this due to performance reasons.

mohanp> This is really flexible at this stage. We can change it in the
mohanp> next revision.

8)
 PaC and EP  
   SHOULD use its IP address as the client identifier in main mode and  
   PANA session ID [PANA-PROT] as the payload of ID_KEY_ID in aggressive  
   mode for establishing the Phase I SA.  
# why is this necessary? couldn't the ip address also be used as a selector for the key?

mohanp> Sure. Francis had a comment about link-local collision. Not sure i understood
mohanp> about it.

   After Phase I SA is established, quick mode exchange is performed to  
   establish an ESP transport mode IPsec SA for protecting the traffic  
   between PaC and EP. The packets are still tunneled between PaC and EP  
   as described later. But there is just one SA on the PaC for all the  
   traffic flow between PaC and EP.

# there are always two ipsec sas - one for each direction. 

mohanp> Yeah, that was meant to say there are no more SAs.

9) 

In case of IPv6, the outer IP header's addresses SHOULD be the link- 
   local address of PaC and EP.  

# i might not have captured the reason for this. could you explain?

The way it is specified, the only on-link prefix is link-local address.

10)

EP's SPD IN:  
            IF source = PAC-ADDR & destination = EP-ADDR &  
             protocol = IP-in-IP  
             THEN USE ESP TRANSPORT SA  

# isn't this is fairly complicated way to say that you use ipsec in tunnel mode?

No. The real reason is Double IPsec. Please see my other response.

11) I will read the useipsec by S. Bellovin later on to see how it can be applied here.

12)


# i guess that the problem is that ike does not allow identity payloads to contain 
# traffic selectors with such a granularity. 

Even the SPD as defined in RFC2401 does not allow it.

13)

This may  
   be a problem in some cases.

# in which cases is this a problem?

It is a extra hole in EP. An unauthorized PaC can still exchange link-local traffic
on the network using the resources of the network.

-mohan

 



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Subject: New [issue15] enhanced dos protection based on client puzzles
Date: Mon, 19 May 2003 09:54:17 +0300
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New submission from Hannes Tschofenig <hannes@tschofenig.com>:

the proposed dos protection mechanism in [1] (i.e. based on 
cookies) provides the following protection: 
1) prevents against off-path adversaries (based on return-
routability)
2) prevents the paa from state creation based on an initial 
messae

particularly in environments where the adversary and the 
paa are on the same link it is difficult to provide proper 
dos protection with the help of cookies. issue (1) does not 
help since the adversary is able to see the request and the 
response. an adversary is therefore able to create a second 
message quite easily. hence the protection targeted with 
(2) might not be too helpful. 

the client puzzle concept provides a different degree of 
protection by forcing the adversary to solve a 
cryptographic puzzle. 
the concept of client puzzles is described in [2]. hip [3] 
is a protocol which uses the client puzzles to protect 
against denial of service attacks. the following text 
paragraph is taken from section 5.3.1 of [3] and describes 
the basic procedure:

"
  Responder    Generates 2 Random Numbers, I and J
                Challenge = Ltrunc(SHA1(I|J),K)
                Send I, K, and Challenge in HIP Cookie in R1
                Saves I, K, and Challenge for Delta time

   Initiator    Do Until Challenge-response = Challenge
                Challenge-response = Ltrunc(SHA1(I|Rand),K)
                EndDo
                Send I, Rand, and Challenge-response in HIP 
Cookie
                        in I2

   Responder    Match Response with Challenge based on I
                Reject if Challenge-response = Challenge
                Challenge-proof = Ltrunc(SHA1(I|Challenge-
response),K)
                Accept if Challenge-proof = Challenge

"

in pana the term paa represents the responder and the term 
pac equals the initiator of the above description.

pana can use the same concept to achieve better dos 
protection. 

according to robert moskowitz there no ipr problems with 
client puzzles (see [4]). 

- References

[1]	D. Forsberg, Y. Ohba, B. Patil, H. Tschofenig, A. 
Yegin: "Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network 
Access (PANA)", Internet Draft, Internet Engineering Task 
Force, March, 2003.  Work in progress. 

[2] 	A. Juels and J. Brainard. Client Puzzles: A 
Cryptographic Defense Against Connection Depletion Attacks. 
In S. Kent, editor, Proceedings of NDSS '99 (Networks and 
Distributed Security Systems), pages 151-165, 1999. 

[3]	R. Moskowitz: "Host Identity Payload And Protocol", 
Internet Draft, Internet Engineering Task Force, Nov. 
2001.  Work in progress. 

[4]	HIPsec mailing list, 
http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/hipsec/2003-
April/000562.html, 21. April, 2003


----------
category: Technical
document: draft-ietf-pana-pana-xx.txt
messages: 29
nosy: hannes
priority: May Fix
status: No Discussion
title: enhanced dos protection based on client puzzles
________________________________________________
PANA Issues <pana_issues@danforsberg.info>
http://danforsberg.info:8080/pana-issues/issue15
________________________________________________



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Subject: RE: Please review
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> -----Original Message-----
> From: ext Alper Yegin [mailto:alper@docomolabs-usa.com]
> Sent: 16 May, 2003 21:31
> To: Forsberg Dan (NRC/Helsinki); mohanp@tahoenetworks.com;
> pana@research.telcordia.com
> Subject: Re: Please review
> 
> 
> >>> How does PANA enable mutual authentication between PaC and PAA?
> >> 
> >> By carrying EAP methods that can authenticate peer to
> >> authentication server
> >> and vice versa.
> > 
> > Mutual authentication between PaC and AS is different than
> > between PaC and PAA.
> 
> Either PaC has a direct trust relation with the PAA, or an 
> indirect one
> (such as PaC trusts AS which trusts PAA). Either way, at the 
> end PaC and PAA
> are mutually authenticated to each other.
> 
> > 
> > This creates an implicit requirement for the relationship
> > between PAA and AS (_two way_ SA between PAA and AS), which
> > is out of the scope of PANA.
> 
> Yes, and this implicit requirement is for AAA to deal with. 
> It is already
> there, this is how PPP and 802.1X, and Mobile IPv4 all work 
> today. PANA is
> not doing anything new or fundamentally different in this 
> respect (and this
> is a feature not a bug :)
> 
> >>> Does 
> >>> the PAA have an identity that is authenticated? By whom?
> >> 
> >> Generally it is the authentication server (AS) that is being
> >> "authenticated." If the AS is co-located wiht PAA, this is like
> >> authenticating the PAA. When they are separated, it is the
> >> responsibility of
> >> the AS to authenticate PAA (via IPsec, TLS) before returning
> >> a positive
> >> result to the PaC. Anyways, at the end, PaC knows PAA is 
> trustworthy.
> >> 
> >> Note: So far what I explained has nothing to do with PANA.
> >> This is EAP and
> >> AAA design.
> > 
> > There is a difference between one way (PAA<--AS) SA and two way SA
> > (PAA<-->AS) as I tried to explain above. Maybe it would be a good
> > idea to clarify this in the requirements draft, or at least the
> > requirement itself (what is really wanted?!).
> > 
> > I created an open issue about this (clarifying text required):
> > http://danforsberg.info:8080/pana-issues/issue13
> 
> Please see my above response.

Actually this issue is related to security threats document, so I 
changed the document in the issue, huh.

You're making assumptions about the backend that fulfill the requirments
for the protocol that doesn't contain the backend?!... At least we should 
say what are the assumptions (features needed). It's not a good reason to
say that existing protocols do like this or like that or that there are 
features.

I'm not saying that we should do mutual auth. between PaC and PAA without
any backend support. But it's possible that PaC mutually authenticates AS 
and PAA authenticates AS, but AS doesn't authenticate PAA. For example 
think about the scenario with NAP and ISP.

> 
> > 
> >> 
> >>> 
> >>> Does this mean that the EAP Server must be in the same domain as
> >>> the PAA, if mutual authentication is required?
> >> 
> >> No, please see above.
> >> 
> >>>>> Some new text here:
> >>>>> 
> >>>>> PAA MUST be able to create a binding between the PaC and the
> >>>>> associated DI upon successful PANA exchange. This can be
> >>>>> achieved by PANA communicating the PaC identifier and DI to
> >>>>> the PAA during the protocol exchange. The DI can be carried
> >>>>> either explicitly as part of the PANA payload, or implicitly
> >>>>> as the source of the PANA message, or both.
> >>>>> 
> >>>> That sounds better.
> >>> 
> >>> What's the difference between PaC identifier and DI?
> >> 
> >> PaC ID gets authenticated and authorized for network access.
> >> For example: your NAI.
> >> 
> >> Once the PaC with PaC ID is authorized, the network must 
> know how to
> >> recognize the packets of this particular PaC. This is when
> >> device ID comes
> >> into play. Examples of device ID are: mac address, IP address.
> > 
> > Ok. I was 'afraid' that PaC ID would actually mean something static
> > and specific for the device itself :).  Anyway, PaC ID is not in the
> > current terminology. The PANA Client definition talks about identity
> > not about PaC ID. So, we can't use PaC ID, if we don't clarify it!
> > And eventually we are talking about the same issue here: identity.
> 
> OK, I see we should add PAC ID in the terminology. Do you 
> have suggested
> text?

Maybe you have, since you used the term in the first place? I don't know
what it is. EAP uses term identity, though.

> 
> > 
> > Just a clarification in the device point of view. Identity 
> can change.
> > The same device can be used with different identities (over time).
> > So, the nature is dynamic.
> > 
> > I think PANA Client itself is too vaguely identified ("entity").
> > This creates confusion, because there are users and devices. None
> > of these is a PaC directly. User identities and device identifiers
> > are dynamic, but is PANA assuming that one or both of these is
> > static for the PANA _session_?
> 
> At least PAC ID is static. Is device ID static? Well, we are 
> discussing this
> on another thread. But does this matter for the requirements draft?

Relates to the term "session". But I'll change the document type for 
this issue, so that the requirements draft gets through..

> > If it is the user identity, it
> > must be the same all the time (during the session), which again
> > is an implicit requirement for the protocol. If we are assuming
> > static DI, we are restricting too much.
> > 
> >> 
> >> [when simple filters are not sufficient, crypto keys are also
> >> bound to the
> >> PaC. We can see them as attributes of device ID]
> >> 
> >>> Maybe it is
> >>> "between PaC identity and DI". But see my comment about identity
> >>> above.
> >>> 
> >>> What about this:
> >>> 
> >>> PAA MUST be able to create a binding between the PaC and the
> >>> associated DI upon successful PANA exchange. This binding is
> >>> identified with a session id, which doesn't change during the
> >>> PANA session. For each session PaC's DI is delivered for PAA
> >>> and bound to the session. The DI can be carried either explicitly
> >>> as part of the PANA payload, or implicitly as the source of the
> >>> PANA message, or both. If PANA SA is created, it MUST be bound
> >>> to the session.
> >> 
> >> I'd not get into session id in the requirements draft.
> > 
> > "Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA)
> > Requirements and _Terminology_".
> 
> That does not mean we'll fold every terminology we run into 
> in the solutions
> draft back into the requirements draft. Requirements draft 
> states what the
> protocol should do, and in order to do that it provides 
> guidelines. It is
> not meant to be a mirror image of the solution at hand.... Actually,
> evolving the requirements draft based on the solution is not 
> a good idea.

It would have been better not to use the "Terminology" word in 
the title, though. Almost every draft has a terminology section, 
but it's not mentioned in the title..

> 
> > 
> >> We don't have to have a session id for this protocol. We now
> >> have it in the
> >> design, but.... it's a bit of a syntethic abstraction (which
> >> of course have
> >> many uses......)
> > 
> > Didn't we already agree about the session-id AVP. See Issue6:
> > http://danforsberg.info:8080/pana-issues/issue6
> 
> Again, agreeing that we'll have X in the solution does not 
> mean that we'll
> go back and update the requirements draft accordingly.

I didn't say that.

> 
> > 
> > OK, here goes another suggestion:
> > 
> > PAA MUST be able to create a binding between the PaC identity
> > and the associated DI upon successful PANA exchange. For each
> > session PaC's DI is delivered for PAA and bound to the PANA
> > session. The DI can be carried either explicitly as part of
> > the PANA payload, or implicitly as the source of the PANA
> > message, or both. If PANA SA is created, it MUST be bound to
> > the PANA session.
> > 
> > Eventually we are talking about sessions, since we have reauth
> > messages and a PANA SA.. so there should be a term that clarifies
> > this, "PANA session". Then we should clarify also the lifetime
> > of the session and lifetime of the SA.. and how to identify the
> > session.
> > 
> > I created an issue about this too:
> > http://danforsberg.info:8080/pana-issues/issue13
> 
> PANA SA and pana session ID might be the results of following the
> requirements, but that does not mean that they have to be 
> stated in the
> requirements. Again, I see this as backwards pulling them into the
> requirements draft.
> 
> The important point is: people can develop the PANA protocol 
> without the
> requirements draft stating what is session ID and PANA SA. That means,
> requirements draft is sufficient. Do you think we are missing 
> anything if we
> don't mentioned these abstractions in the requirements draft?
> 

I changed the document type for the issue.

> > 
> >> 
> >> All the protocol needs is to know what is authenticated: PaC.
> >> Once the authentication is successful, what is used for
> >> access control:
> >> device ID.
> >> As long as we know how to bind a PaC to a device ID, we are done.
> > 
> > I assume you mean PaC identity and device ID (DI).
> > 
> > How do you create this binding if both are changing? What is the
> > relationship between the session then.. and session-id.. and where
> > do you bind the SA and session lifetime..
> 
> Good questions but these should be discussed in the 
> "solutions" draft, not
> the requirements draft.

How about saying something about the dynamicity of the identity or 
device ID in the requirements.. or better using the term session..

- Dan

> 
> Alper
> 
> 
> > 
> > - Dan
> > 
> >> 
> >> Alper
> >> 
> >> 
> >> 
> >>> 
> >>> 
> >>> 
> >>> - Dan
> >>> 
> >>> 
> >>> 
> >> 
> >> 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> 
> 



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Subject: Change  [issue14] PANA session term
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Dan Forsberg <dan.forsberg@nokia.com> added the comment:

Changed document.


----------
document: draft-ietf-pana-requirements-xx.txt -> draft-ietf-pana-pana-xx.txt
________________________________________________
PANA Issues <pana_issues@danforsberg.info>
http://danforsberg.info:8080/pana-issues/issue14
________________________________________________



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Subject: Change  [issue13] Mutual authentication requirement
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Dan Forsberg <dan.forsberg@nokia.com> added the comment:

Changed document.


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________________________________________________
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http://danforsberg.info:8080/pana-issues/issue13
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From: Francis Dupont <Francis.Dupont@enst-bretagne.fr>
To: "Mohan Parthasarathy" <mohanp@tahoenetworks.com>
cc: "Hannes Tschofenig" <Hannes.Tschofenig@siemens.com>,
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Subject: Re: comments to your pana/ipsec draft 
In-reply-to: Your message of Sun, 18 May 2003 21:22:19 PDT.
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 In your previous mail you wrote:

      IKE [IKE] MUST be used for establishing the IPsec SA.
   
   # why ike only? why not ikev2?
   
   mohanp> Not any specific reason. I will mention it in the next revision.
   
=> IKEv2 doesn't exist yet. If your argument is about s/MUST/SHOULD/,
I agree.

   6)  Manual keying  
      may not be possible, as the network does not know all the PaCs that  
      will be authenticating to the network, a priori.
   
   # this would require an additional exchange within pana. 

=> the pana/ipsec document doesn't discuss about the usage of PANA
itself to establish the SAs. Perhaps a comment should put this kind
of solutions outside its scope?
   
   8) PaC and EP  
      SHOULD use its IP address as the client identifier in main mode and  
      PANA session ID [PANA-PROT] as the payload of ID_KEY_ID in aggressive  
      mode for establishing the Phase I SA.  

   # why is this necessary? couldn't the ip address also be used as a
   # selector for the key?
   
   mohanp> Sure. Francis had a comment about link-local collision. Not
           sure i understood about it.
   
=> link-local addresses are not good unique identifiers, so instance
if the EP has multiple interfaces it is possible to get the same
link-local address for more than one PaC which gives hard implementation
problems. In main mode we have no choice because the ID is available
very late, but in aggressive mode we can use the best ID to point to
the right shared secret, and obviously the ID_KEY_ID is this best ID type.

   # there are always two ipsec sas - one for each direction. 
   
=> there is a trade-off: to be very accurate (i.e., talk about SA pairs)
or to be readable (i.e., assume that expert readers know SAs come by pairs).
   
Regards

Francis.Dupont@enst-bretagne.fr



From pana-request@research.telcordia.com  Mon May 19 13:23:36 2003
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Subject: RE: Change  [issue13] Mutual authentication requirement
Date: Mon, 19 May 2003 10:23:43 -0700
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Thread-Topic: Change  [issue13] Mutual authentication requirement
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From: "Mohan Parthasarathy" <mohanp@tahoenetworks.com>
To: <Dan.Forsberg@nokia.com>, <pana@research.telcordia.com>
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Dan,

I think the requirement in the threats draft states that the PANA
protocol should be capable of mutually authenticating PaC and PAA. The
backend
communication is not directly part of PANA protocol. If there are
vulnerabilities
in the PAA-AS path, go fix the protocol responsible for that. I am still
not
clear on what the issue is.

See draft-aboba-pppext-key-problem-06.txt section 4.2

AAA protocols suitable for use in transporting EAP MUST provide the
following facilities:

Mutual authentication
     AAA protocols used for transport of EAP MUST support mutual
     authentication between the authenticator and backend authentication
     server. These requirements are met by Diameter EAP [DiamEAP] as
     well as by RADIUS [RFC2865].

Are you concerned that there would be a different one in the future
that won't satisfy this criteria ?  

-mohan



> -----Original Message-----
> From: Dan.Forsberg@nokia.com [mailto:Dan.Forsberg@nokia.com] 
> Sent: Monday, May 19, 2003 12:42 AM
> To: pana@research.telcordia.com
> Subject: Change [issue13] Mutual authentication requirement

> Dan Forsberg <dan.forsberg@nokia.com> added the comment:
> 
> Changed document.
> 
> 
> ----------
> document: draft-ietf-pana-requirements-xx.txt -> 
> draft-ietf-pana-threats-eval-xx.txt
> ________________________________________________
> PANA Issues <pana_issues@danforsberg.info> 
> http://danforsberg.info:8080/pana-> issues/issue13
> 
> ________________________________________________
> 
> 



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From: Alper Yegin <alper@docomolabs-usa.com>
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        <pana@research.telcordia.com>
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> Actually this issue is related to security threats document, so I
> changed the document in the issue, huh.
> 
> You're making assumptions about the backend that fulfill the requirments
> for the protocol that doesn't contain the backend?!... At least we should
> say what are the assumptions (features needed). It's not a good reason to
> say that existing protocols do like this or like that or that there are
> features.
> 
> I'm not saying that we should do mutual auth. between PaC and PAA without
> any backend support. But it's possible that PaC mutually authenticates AS
> and PAA authenticates AS, but AS doesn't authenticate PAA. For example
> think about the scenario with NAP and ISP.


PAA and AS must be able to authenticate each other. Otherwise, a rogue PAA
can insert itself in the communication. This is a simple AAA requirement.
But, this is not coming from PANA, it is not PANA specific. We don't have to
describe or lay out the requirements of what AAA does. These are well-known.
We need to identify new ones if PANA expects additional features (I hope it
does not, I'm not aware of any).

I don't see how NAP/ISP makes a difference.


>> That does not mean we'll fold every terminology we run into
>> in the solutions
>> draft back into the requirements draft. Requirements draft
>> states what the
>> protocol should do, and in order to do that it provides
>> guidelines. It is
>> not meant to be a mirror image of the solution at hand.... Actually,
>> evolving the requirements draft based on the solution is not
>> a good idea.
> 
> It would have been better not to use the "Terminology" word in
> the title, though. Almost every draft has a terminology section,
> but it's not mentioned in the title..

Good point. I think this is the source of confusion. I should be able to
remove it from the title.

>>> I assume you mean PaC identity and device ID (DI).
>>> 
>>> How do you create this binding if both are changing? What is the
>>> relationship between the session then.. and session-id.. and where
>>> do you bind the SA and session lifetime..
>> 
>> Good questions but these should be discussed in the
>> "solutions" draft, not
>> the requirements draft.
> 
> How about saying something about the dynamicity of the identity or
> device ID in the requirements.. or better using the term session..

I don't think we need to have these as formal requirements.

Alper




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Subject: Re: comments to your pana/ipsec draft
From: Alper Yegin <alper@docomolabs-usa.com>
To: Mohan Parthasarathy <mohanp@tahoenetworks.com>,
        Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@siemens.com>,
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> 13)
> 
> This may  
>  be a problem in some cases.
> 
> # in which cases is this a problem?
> 
> It is a extra hole in EP. An unauthorized PaC can still exchange link-local
> traffic
> on the network using the resources of the network.

Can we not force the link-local traffic to use the IPsec tunnel?

Alper



From pana-request@research.telcordia.com  Mon May 19 17:25:34 2003
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 In your previous mail you wrote:

   Can we not force the link-local traffic to use the IPsec tunnel?
   
=> by definition link-local traffic can't be forwarded... So
we can't assume this kind of capability from the IPsec implementation.
Note that the IP over IP interface makes this even more impossible
(link-locals are local to a link, the IP over IP is a different link
than the link it runs over).

Regards

Francis.Dupont@enst-bretagne.fr



From pana-request@research.telcordia.com  Tue May 20 03:10:59 2003
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Subject: RE: Change  [issue13] Mutual authentication requirement
Date: Tue, 20 May 2003 10:09:14 +0300
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Thread-Topic: Change  [issue13] Mutual authentication requirement
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Mohan,

Thank you for your reference. Maybe a comment about the role 
of PAA-AS SA in this mutual authentication requirement would be
good, because when we say PANA protocol, the scope is between
PaC and PAA. I found the comment about SA between AS and PAA in 
the document, so I guess this is nifty picking. I'll reject 
this issue.

- Dan

> -----Original Message-----
> From: ext Mohan Parthasarathy [mailto:mohanp@tahoenetworks.com]
> Sent: 19 May, 2003 20:24
> To: Forsberg Dan (NRC/Helsinki); pana@research.telcordia.com
> Subject: RE: Change [issue13] Mutual authentication requirement
> 
> 
> Dan,
> 
> I think the requirement in the threats draft states that the PANA
> protocol should be capable of mutually authenticating PaC and PAA. The
> backend
> communication is not directly part of PANA protocol. If there are
> vulnerabilities
> in the PAA-AS path, go fix the protocol responsible for that. 
> I am still
> not
> clear on what the issue is.
> 
> See draft-aboba-pppext-key-problem-06.txt section 4.2
> 
> AAA protocols suitable for use in transporting EAP MUST provide the
> following facilities:
> 
> Mutual authentication
>      AAA protocols used for transport of EAP MUST support mutual
>      authentication between the authenticator and backend 
> authentication
>      server. These requirements are met by Diameter EAP [DiamEAP] as
>      well as by RADIUS [RFC2865].
> 
> Are you concerned that there would be a different one in the future
> that won't satisfy this criteria ?  
> 
> -mohan
> 
> 
> 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Dan.Forsberg@nokia.com [mailto:Dan.Forsberg@nokia.com] 
> > Sent: Monday, May 19, 2003 12:42 AM
> > To: pana@research.telcordia.com
> > Subject: Change [issue13] Mutual authentication requirement
> 
> > Dan Forsberg <dan.forsberg@nokia.com> added the comment:
> > 
> > Changed document.
> > 
> > 
> > ----------
> > document: draft-ietf-pana-requirements-xx.txt -> 
> > draft-ietf-pana-threats-eval-xx.txt
> > ________________________________________________
> > PANA Issues <pana_issues@danforsberg.info> 
> > http://danforsberg.info:8080/pana-> issues/issue13
> > 
> > ________________________________________________
> > 
> > 
> 



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Test



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Both the usage scenarios and security threats drafts completed WG last calls
and they are forwarded to IESG. You can track their status from
https://datatracker.ietf.org/public/pidtracker.cgi

FYI...

Alper



From pana-request@research.telcordia.com  Thu May 22 15:10:38 2003
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Date: Thu, 22 May 2003 12:07:27 -0700
Subject: Re: PANA requirements draft
From: Alper Yegin <alper@docomolabs-usa.com>
To: Pete McCann <mccap@lucent.com>, <pana@research.telcordia.com>
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Hello Pete,

Thank you for the review comments, and especially for the text!

I'll be updating the requirements drafts with these comments and the earlier
ones. It will be ready for the WG last call very soon.

Alper



On 5/22/03 9:36 AM, "Pete McCann" <mccap@lucent.com> wrote:

> 
> Hi,
> 
> Here are my comments on the PANA requirements draft.  They are mainly
> editorial; I think this document is in pretty good shape.
> 
> -Pete
> 
> 
> Intoduction:
> 
>  IETF PANA Working Group has been chartered
> Should be:
>  The IETF PANA Working Group has been chartered
> 
> 
>  A higher-layer authentication is deemed necessary
>  when link-layer authentication mechanisms are either not available
>  for lack of technology or deployment difficulties, or not able to
>  meet the overall requirements, or when multi-layer (e.g., link-layer
>  and network-layer) authentication is needed.
> Should be:
>  A higher-layer authentication is deemed necessary
>  when link-layer authentication mechanisms are either not available
>  for lack of technology or deployment difficulties; when link-layer
>  authentication mechanisms are not able to meet the overall requirements;
>  or when multi-layer (e.g., link-layer and network-layer) authentication is
> needed. 
> 
> 
>  [USAGE] Internet-Draft describes the problem statement in detail.
> Should be:
>  The usage Internet-Draft [USAGE] describes the problem statement in detail.
> References in brackets should be used as parentheticals, not
> adjectives or nouns in the sentence.
> 
> 
>  As an example, Mobile IP Working Group has already defined such a
>  carrier for Mobile IPv4 [MIPV4]. Mobile IPv4 registration request
>  message is used as the carrier for authentication extensions (MN-FA
>  [MIPV4], or MN-AAA [MNAAA]) to receive forwarding service from the
>  foreign agents. In that sense, designing the equivalent of Mobile
>  IPv4 registration request messages for general network access is the
>  goal of this work, but not defining the equivalent of MN-FA or MN-
>  AAA extensions.
> Should be:
>  As an example, the Mobile IP Working Group has already defined such
>  a carrier for Mobile IPv4 [MIPV4].  A Mobile IPv4 registration request
>  message is used as a carrier for authentication extensions (MN-FA [MIPv4]
>  or MN-AAA [MNAAA]) that allow an FA to authenticate MNs before providing
>  forwarding service.  The goal of PANA is similar in that it aims to
>  define a network-layer transport for authentication information; however,
>  PANA will be decoupled from mobility management and it will rely on other
>  specifications for the definition of authentication payloads.
> 
> 
> Section 3 Terminology
> 
> 
>  Depending on the access
>  technology, identifier might contain any of IP address, link-
>  layer address, switch port number, etc. of a connected device.
>  PANA authentication agent keeps a table for binding device
>  identifiers to the PANA clients. At most one PANA client
>  should be associated with a DI on a PANA authentication agent.
> Should be:
>  Depending on the access
>  technology, the Device Identifier might contain any of IP address, link-
>  layer address, switch port number, etc. of a connected device.
>  A PANA authentication agent keeps a table for binding device
>  identifiers to the PANA clients. At most one PANA client
>  should be associated with a DI on a PANA authentication agent.
> 
> 
> Section 4 Requirements
> 
> 
> Section 4.1.1
> 
>  If PANA WG decides
>  that extensions to EAP are needed, it will define requirements for
>  the EAP WG instead of designing such extensions.
> Should be:
>  If the PANA WG decides
>  that extensions to EAP are needed, it will define requirements for
>  the EAP WG instead of designing such extensions.
> 
> 
>  are within the scope of IETF SEND Working Group.
> Should be:
>  are within the scope of the IETF SEND Working Group.
> 
> 
>  Providing capability of only PAA authenticating the
>  PaC is not sufficient.
> Should be:
>  Providing only the capability of a PAA authenticating the
>  PaC is not sufficient.
> 
> 
>  Certain type of service theft is possible when the DI is not
> Should be:
>  Certain types of service theft are possible when the DI is not
> 
> 
> Section 4.1.2
> 
> 
>  In addition to carrying authentication information, PANA MUST also
>  provide only a binary authorization to indicate whether the PaC is
>  allowed to access full IP services on the network (i.e., able to
>  send and receive any IP packets). Providing finer granularity
>  authorization, such as negotiating QoS parameters, authorizing
>  individual services (e.g., http vs. ssh), individual users sharing
>  the same device, etc. are outside the scope of PANA.
> The first sentence of this paragraph is awkwardly worded.  I think I
> see what you are trying to accomplish, but it might be too much to
> express in a single requirement.
> How about:
>  After a device is authenticated using PANA, it MUST be authorized
>  for Internet access.  That is, the core requirement of PANA is to
>  verify the identity of a device so that it may send and receive any
>  IP packets.  It may also be possible to provide finer granularity
>  authorization, such as authorization for QoS, individual services
>  (e.g., http vs. ssh), or individual users sharing the same device.
>  However, while a backend authorization infrastructure might provide
>  such indications to the PAA, explicit support for them is outside
>  the scope of PANA.  For instance, PANA is not required to carry any
>  indication of which services are authorized to the device.
> 
> 
> Section 4.1.3
> 
>  PAA MAY interact with backend
> Should be:
>  A PAA MAY interact with backend
> 
> 
> Section 4.1.4
> 
>  PAA MUST be able to create a binding between the PaC and the
>  associated DI upon successful PANA exchange.
> Should be:
>  A PAA MUST be able to create a binding between the PaC client
>  identifier and the associated DI upon successful PANA exchange.
> 
>  The keying material
>  required by the cryptographic methods needs to be stored as an
>  attribute of DI.
> Should be:
>  The keying material
>  required by the cryptographic methods needs to be indexed by
>  the DI. 
> 
> 
> 
> Section 4.3
> 
> 
>  EAP protocol itself imposes various requirements on its transport
>  protocols. 
> Should be:
>  The EAP protocol itself imposes various requirements on its transport
>  protocols. 
> 
>  These requirements are based on the nature of the EAP
>  protocol, and needs to be satisfied for correct operation.
> Should be:
>  These requirements are based on the nature of the EAP
>  protocol, and need to be satisfied for correct operation.
> 
> 
> Section 4.4
> 
>  Possible candidates include but not limited to COPS, SNMP, DIAMETER.
> Should be:
>  Possible candidates include but are not limited to COPS, SNMP, and DIAMETER.
> 
> 
>  This task is similar to what MIDCOM Working Group is trying to
>  achieve, 
> Should be:
>  This task is similar to what the MIDCOM Working Group is trying to
>  achieve, 
> 
>  The objective of using this protocol is to provide
> Should be:
>  The objective of using a PAA-to-EP protocol is to provide
> 
>  For example, if the
>  design is such that the EP allows the PANA traffic to bypass even
>  for unauthenticated PaCs, it should also allow and expect the PAA to
>  send the filtering information at the end of successful PANA without
>  EP ever sending a request.
> Should be:
>  For example, if the
>  design is such that the EP allows the PANA traffic to pass through even
>  for unauthenticated PaCs, the EP should also allow and expect the PAA to
>  send the filtering information at the end of a successful PANA exchange
> without
>  the EP ever sending a request.
> 
> 
> Section 4.5.1
> 
>  Protocol MUST support PaCs with multiple interfaces, and
> Should be:
>  PANA MUST support PaCs with multiple interfaces and
> 
>  In other words, PANA MUST not assume PaC
> Should be:
>  In other words, PANA MUST NOT assume the PaC
> 
> 
> Section 4.5.2
> 
>  Links MAY or MAY NOT provide disconnect indication.
> No need to capitalize MAY; this is not a requirement on PANA:
>  Links may or may not provide disconnect indication.
> 
> 
> Section 4.5.3
> 
>  That means, there must be no IP routers between two.
> Should be:
>  That is, there must be no IP routers between the two.
> 
>  Note that, this
>  does not mean they are on the same physical link.
> Unnecessary comma, should be:
>  Note that this
>  does not mean they are on the same physical link.
> 
>  Furthermore, two nodes on the same IP subnet does not
>  necessarily satisfy this requirement, as they can be more than one
>  hop away from each other [MULTILINK].
> Should be:
>  Furthermore, two nodes on the same IP subnet do not
>  necessarily satisfy this requirement, as they can be more than one
>  hop away from each other [MULTILINK].
> 
>  PAA can be on the NAS
> Should be:
>  A PAA can be on the NAS
> 
>  A PaC MAY not be pre-configured
> Should be:
>  A PaC MAY NOT be pre-configured
> 
>  Therefore PANA protocol
> Should be:
>  Therefore the PANA protocol
> 
> 
> Section 4.5.4
> 
>  PANA MUST not assume
> Should be:
>  PANA MUST NOT assume
> 
> 
>  PANA MAY provide a secure channel by
>  deploying a two-phase authentication. First phase can be used for
>  creation of the secure channel, and the second phase is for client
>  and network authentication.
> Is this pair of sentences really a requirement?  It sounds like
> protocol design.  Suggest removing them.  If you keep them, be sure to
> fix the missing article:
>  First phase can be used for
> Should be:
>  The first phase can be used for
> 
> 
> Section 4.6
> 
>  Though, PANA MUST
>  be able to co-exist
> Should be:
>  However, PANA MUST
>  be able to co-exist
> 
> 
> Section 4.7
> 
>  efficient handling of
>  authentication process.
> Should be:
>  efficient handling of
>  the authentication process.
> 
> 
> Section 4.9.2
> 
>  PANA MUST be robust against a class of DoS attacks such as blind
>  masquerade attacks through IP spoofing that swamp the PAA in
>  spending much resources and/or prevent legitimate clients' attempts
>  of network access.
> Should be:
>  PANA MUST be robust against a class of DoS attacks such as blind
>  masquerade attacks through IP spoofing that would swamp the PAA,
>  causing it to spend resources and prevent network access by legitimate
>  clients.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 



From pana-request@research.telcordia.com  Thu May 22 21:14:54 2003
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Subject: Re: Securing the first hop in PANA using IPsec
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I think there is some logical leap on excluding the use of ESP/tunnel
mode between PaC and EP, since section 3.0 "Pre-requisites for IPsec
SA establishment" of draft-mohanp-pana-ipsec-00.txt does not mandate
the use of IP-in-IP (RFC 2003).  

And I think ESP/tunnel mode is not bad as long as it is well
implemented to avoid the problems described in
draft-touch-ipsec-vpn-05.txt.

IMHO, a better approach is to mention the possibility of the two modes
(i.e., ESP/tunnel mode and ESP/transport mode w/IP-in-IP) for
protecting traffic PaC and EP with IPsec, and to describe how the
mode(s) supported by the EP should be indicated to the PaC by using
PANA and/or one mode is chosen during IKE negotiation.

On Fri, May 16, 2003 at 10:07:49AM +0200, Francis Dupont wrote:
>  In your previous mail you wrote:
> 
>    just one comment : why use ESP/transport mode and not ESP/tunnel mode ?
>    
> => this is far easier/simpler in the case of double IPsec, a case which
> is assumed to be common.

It seems that the issue of double IPsec is all about implementation
details.  If so, we could remove it from the draft or move it to an
appendix.

> 
>    BTW, in RFC 2401, it is said :
> 
> => look at draft-touch-ipsec-vpn-05.txt for other reasons to use
> ESP transport mode over an IP-IP tunnel.
>    
> Regards
> 
> Francis.Dupont@enst-bretagne.fr
> 

Yoshihiro Ohba



From pana-request@research.telcordia.com  Fri May 23 04:15:04 2003
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From: Tschofenig Hannes <hannes.tschofenig@siemens.com>
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hi all, 

i have posted two issues to dan's issues list. although i did it some time
ago my mails to the pana list somehow got lost.

please take a look at: 
Supporting network access authentication for ad-hoc networks 
http://danforsberg.info:8080/pana-issues/issue12

enhanced dos protection based on client puzzles 
http://danforsberg.info:8080/pana-issues/issue15

ciao
hannes



From pana-request@research.telcordia.com  Fri May 23 11:59:29 2003
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Subject: Re: Securing the first hop in PANA using IPsec 
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 In your previous mail you wrote:

   I think there is some logical leap on excluding the use of ESP/tunnel
   mode between PaC and EP, since section 3.0 "Pre-requisites for IPsec
   SA establishment" of draft-mohanp-pana-ipsec-00.txt does not mandate
   the use of IP-in-IP (RFC 2003).  
   
=> I don't understand your argument about "pre-requisites"...

   And I think ESP/tunnel mode is not bad as long as it is well
   implemented to avoid the problems described in
   draft-touch-ipsec-vpn-05.txt.
   
=> it is not bad but ESP/transport over an IP-in-IP tunnel is better.

   IMHO, a better approach is to mention the possibility of the two modes
   (i.e., ESP/tunnel mode and ESP/transport mode w/IP-in-IP) for
   protecting traffic PaC and EP with IPsec, and to describe how the
   mode(s) supported by the EP should be indicated to the PaC by using
   PANA and/or one mode is chosen during IKE negotiation.
   
=> to leave the choice is more complex. Simplicity was a design goal.

   > => this is far easier/simpler in the case of double IPsec, a case which
   > is assumed to be common.
   
   It seems that the issue of double IPsec is all about implementation
   details.  If so, we could remove it from the draft or move it to an
   appendix.
   
=> it was considered important to have the best support for this case,
so it should not be throw away or to an appendix without strong arguments
showing that this case (double IPsec) will be marginal.

Regards

Francis.Dupont@enst-bretagne.fr



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Subject: Re: Securing the first hop in PANA using IPsec
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On Fri, May 23, 2003 at 05:55:45PM +0200, Francis Dupont wrote:
> 
>  In your previous mail you wrote:
> 
>    I think there is some logical leap on excluding the use of ESP/tunnel
>    mode between PaC and EP, since section 3.0 "Pre-requisites for IPsec
>    SA establishment" of draft-mohanp-pana-ipsec-00.txt does not mandate
>    the use of IP-in-IP (RFC 2003).  
>    
> => I don't understand your argument about "pre-requisites"...

If IP-in-IP (RFC 2003) is inevitable to apply IPsec between PaC and
EP, it should be described in the pre-requisites section with
justification.


> 
>    And I think ESP/tunnel mode is not bad as long as it is well
>    implemented to avoid the problems described in
>    draft-touch-ipsec-vpn-05.txt.
>    
> => it is not bad but ESP/transport over an IP-in-IP tunnel is better.
> 

I have one basic question.  Why draft-touch-ipsec-vpn-05.txt is not an
IPsec WG document if ESP/transport over an IP-in-IP tunnel is better?


>    IMHO, a better approach is to mention the possibility of the two modes
>    (i.e., ESP/tunnel mode and ESP/transport mode w/IP-in-IP) for
>    protecting traffic PaC and EP with IPsec, and to describe how the
>    mode(s) supported by the EP should be indicated to the PaC by using
>    PANA and/or one mode is chosen during IKE negotiation.
>    
> => to leave the choice is more complex. Simplicity was a design goal.

But is draft-touch-ipsec-vpn-05.txt a standard method?  If it is not a
standard method, how can we maintain interoperability if we mandate 
the method only.

> 
>    > => this is far easier/simpler in the case of double IPsec, a case which
>    > is assumed to be common.
>    
>    It seems that the issue of double IPsec is all about implementation
>    details.  If so, we could remove it from the draft or move it to an
>    appendix.
>    
> => it was considered important to have the best support for this case,
> so it should not be throw away or to an appendix without strong arguments
> showing that this case (double IPsec) will be marginal.

I don't understand why the described approach is best because the draft 
does not give enough information or references on why it is considered
to be best.  I'd rather think that the best place to discuss double
IPsec is the IPsec WG, not the PANA WG.

> 
> Regards
> 
> Francis.Dupont@enst-bretagne.fr
> 

Yoshihiro Ohba



From pana-request@research.telcordia.com  Fri May 23 13:34:49 2003
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This is my rough comparison between the cookie mechanism and the
puzzle mechanism.

Cookie:

Pros - PAA does not hold any per-session state in the initial
exchange.

Cons - On-link attacker can sniff the initial exchange and generate a
cookie reply to be accepted by PAA, without performing cryptographic
computation.

Puzzle:

Pros - Attacker needs not only to sniff the initial exchange and but also 
to do cryptographic computation to generate a reply to be accepted by PAA.

Cons - PAA holds per-session state I, K, and Challenge in the initial
exchange.  So memory consumption attack is still possible.

Cons - If the length of the puzzle is too short (i.e., the puzzle is
easy to solve), the vulnerability might be as same as the cookie
mechanism.  On the other hand, if the length of the puzzle is too long
(i.e., the puzzle is difficult to solve), legitimate PaCs will also
experience signaling delay.


Yoshihiro Ohba



From pana-request@research.telcordia.com  Sun May 25 10:02:45 2003
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Subject: Re: Securing the first hop in PANA using IPsec 
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 In your previous mail you wrote:

   > => I don't understand your argument about "pre-requisites"...
   
   If IP-in-IP (RFC 2003) is inevitable to apply IPsec between PaC and
   EP, it should be described in the pre-requisites section with
   justification.
   
=> I still don't understand: the IP-in-IP is part of the solution,
this is not something which has to exist independently.

   > => it is not bad but ESP/transport over an IP-in-IP tunnel is better.
   
   I have one basic question.  Why draft-touch-ipsec-vpn-05.txt is not an
   IPsec WG document if ESP/transport over an IP-in-IP tunnel is better?
   
=> better in this case. IMHO Touch's draft should be an IPsec WG document
and it is not because nobody asked for and it is not for standard track.
   
   > => to leave the choice is more complex. Simplicity was a design goal.
   
   But is draft-touch-ipsec-vpn-05.txt a standard method?

=> what do you mean here by "standard"? It is a conformant method but
Touch's draft is not for the standard track, it is more a BCP (Best
Current Practice).

   If it is not a standard method, how can we maintain
   interoperability if we mandate the method only.
   
=> so your usage of "standard" is conformant, isn't it? Transport mode
for an IP-over-IP tunnel is conformant.

   I don't understand why the described approach is best because the draft 
   does not give enough information or references on why it is considered
   to be best.

=> so you ask for a rationale?

   I'd rather think that the best place to discuss double
   IPsec is the IPsec WG, not the PANA WG.
   
=> double IPsec is in the IPsec architecture (RFC 2401 and its successor).
There is nothing to discuss today...

 Regards

Francis.Dupont@enst-bretagne.fr



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Francis,

On Sun, May 25, 2003 at 03:54:03PM +0200, Francis Dupont wrote:
>  In your previous mail you wrote:
> 
>    > => I don't understand your argument about "pre-requisites"...
>    
>    If IP-in-IP (RFC 2003) is inevitable to apply IPsec between PaC and
>    EP, it should be described in the pre-requisites section with
>    justification.
>    
> => I still don't understand: the IP-in-IP is part of the solution,
> this is not something which has to exist independently.

Then I think IPsec tunnel mode can also be part of the solution(s).
This is my point.

> 
>    > => it is not bad but ESP/transport over an IP-in-IP tunnel is better.
>    
>    I have one basic question.  Why draft-touch-ipsec-vpn-05.txt is not an
>    IPsec WG document if ESP/transport over an IP-in-IP tunnel is better?
>    
> => better in this case. IMHO Touch's draft should be an IPsec WG document
> and it is not because nobody asked for and it is not for standard track.
>    
>    > => to leave the choice is more complex. Simplicity was a design goal.
>    
>    But is draft-touch-ipsec-vpn-05.txt a standard method?
> 
> => what do you mean here by "standard"? It is a conformant method but
> Touch's draft is not for the standard track, it is more a BCP (Best
> Current Practice).

A conformant method does not always mean that it interoperates.  I
think IKE needs modification to negotiate the method by signaling.
Please see my comment below on this.

> 
>    If it is not a standard method, how can we maintain
>    interoperability if we mandate the method only.
>    
> => so your usage of "standard" is conformant, isn't it? Transport mode
> for an IP-over-IP tunnel is conformant.

How is the use of IP-in-IP encapsulation outside the transport mode
packet negotiated between IKE initiator and responder?  If we rely on
the use of IP-in-IP/transport mode to be enabled by pre-configuration
not by signaling, I think it is very hard to interoperate because
transport mode is used without IP-in-IP encapsulation in most cases.

> 
>    I don't understand why the described approach is best because the draft 
>    does not give enough information or references on why it is considered
>    to be best.
> 
> => so you ask for a rationale?

Yes.  My current opinion is that IP-in-IP/transport mode should not be
mandated until IKE supports negotiation of the mode (otherwise it
would create an interoperability problem).

> 
>    I'd rather think that the best place to discuss double
>    IPsec is the IPsec WG, not the PANA WG.
>    
> => double IPsec is in the IPsec architecture (RFC 2401 and its successor).
> There is nothing to discuss today...

I would like to know whether RFC 2401 or its successor describes the
particular double IPsec scheme that uses IP-in-IP/transport mode for 
host-to-IPsecGW and tunnel mode for host-to-host.

> 
>  Regards
> 
> Francis.Dupont@enst-bretagne.fr
> 

Regards,
Yoshihiro Ohba



From pana-request@research.telcordia.com  Sun May 25 12:50:03 2003
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 In your previous mail you wrote:

   >    But is draft-touch-ipsec-vpn-05.txt a standard method?
   > 
   > => what do you mean here by "standard"? It is a conformant method but
   > Touch's draft is not for the standard track, it is more a BCP (Best
   > Current Practice).
   
   A conformant method does not always mean that it interoperates.

=> it interoperates as soon as both sides agree about what to do.

   I think IKE needs modification to negotiate the method by signaling.

=> IKE doesn't need any modification to handle transport mode.
   
   > 
   >    If it is not a standard method, how can we maintain
   >    interoperability if we mandate the method only.
   >    
   > => so your usage of "standard" is conformant, isn't it? Transport mode
   > for an IP-over-IP tunnel is conformant.
   
   How is the use of IP-in-IP encapsulation outside the transport mode
   packet negotiated between IKE initiator and responder?  If we rely on
   the use of IP-in-IP/transport mode to be enabled by pre-configuration
   not by signaling, I think it is very hard to interoperate because
   transport mode is used without IP-in-IP encapsulation in most cases.
   
=> transport mode can be used with any kind of traffic. I can't see
why this couldn't interoperate as soon as the policies on both ends
match, i.e., we have not one end with tunnel mode and the other with
transport mode over a tunnel.

   Yes.  My current opinion is that IP-in-IP/transport mode should not be
   mandated until IKE supports negotiation of the mode (otherwise it
   would create an interoperability problem).
   
=> IKE supports negociation of transport mode (cf RFC 2407 4.5 Encapsulation
Mode or for IKEv2 draft-07 3.10.1 USE_TRANSPORT_MODE). I really can't see
an issue here... Can you be more specific about your concern?

Regards

Francis.Dupont@enst-bretagne.fr



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On Sun, May 25, 2003 at 06:44:31PM +0200, Francis Dupont wrote:
>    How is the use of IP-in-IP encapsulation outside the transport mode
>    packet negotiated between IKE initiator and responder?  If we rely on
>    the use of IP-in-IP/transport mode to be enabled by pre-configuration
>    not by signaling, I think it is very hard to interoperate because
>    transport mode is used without IP-in-IP encapsulation in most cases.
>    
> => transport mode can be used with any kind of traffic. I can't see
> why this couldn't interoperate as soon as the policies on both ends
> match, i.e., we have not one end with tunnel mode and the other with
> transport mode over a tunnel.

How is the policy of using IP-in-IP negotiated in IKE?  If you assume
a pre-configured policy on this, it is very hard to interoperate
because (i) in most cases (or policies) transport mode is used without
IP-in-IP encapsulation and thus policy mis-configuration is likely to
occur, and (ii) it is also difficult to detect the mis-configuration
in pre-configured policies (PaC and EP will see IKE succeeded but
subsequent data traffic will not pass).  In addition, PaC and EP may
use not also IP-in-IP/transport mode (for protecting traffic to/from
the Internet) but also just transport mode for local non-ICMP traffic
between PaC and EP (in this case IP-in-IP is clearly an overhead).
How is the pre-configured policy constructed for this case?  I still
think using tunnel mode is cleanest for protecting traffic to/from the
Internet in the access network since there is not a policy issue of
this kind.



> 
>    Yes.  My current opinion is that IP-in-IP/transport mode should not be
>    mandated until IKE supports negotiation of the mode (otherwise it
>    would create an interoperability problem).
>    
> => IKE supports negociation of transport mode (cf RFC 2407 4.5 Encapsulation
> Mode or for IKEv2 draft-07 3.10.1 USE_TRANSPORT_MODE). 

Negotiation of transport mode is required for the scheme to work but
it is not sufficient if we consider additional policy requirement of
using IP-in-IP.

> I really can't see
> an issue here... Can you be more specific about your concern?

Please see my comments above.

> 
> Regards
> 
> Francis.Dupont@enst-bretagne.fr
> 

Yoshihiro Ohba



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 In your previous mail you wrote:

   How is the policy of using IP-in-IP negotiated in IKE?

=> no, IP-in-IP is not negociated by IKE. IKE can only negociate SAs
and in this case IKE negociates the transport mode SA pair to protect
packets going through the IP-in-IP tunnel.

   If you assume
   a pre-configured policy on this, it is very hard to interoperate
   because (i) in most cases (or policies) transport mode is used without
   IP-in-IP encapsulation and thus policy mis-configuration is likely to
   occur,

=> the IPsec policy is very simple: protect packets going through the
IP-in-IP tunnel, i.e., source and destination = PaC and EP (link-local)
addresses, protocol = IP-in-IP (4 or 41).

   and (ii) it is also difficult to detect the mis-configuration
   in pre-configured policies (PaC and EP will see IKE succeeded but
   subsequent data traffic will not pass).

=> I don't understand all this stuff about pre-configured policies.
Do you talk about SPD entries or something else?

   In addition, PaC and EP may
   use not also IP-in-IP/transport mode (for protecting traffic to/from
   the Internet) but also just transport mode for local non-ICMP traffic
   between PaC and EP (in this case IP-in-IP is clearly an overhead).

=> the "local" traffic between the PaC and the EP doesn't matter as
soon as IKE can bypass protection and IP-in-IP packets are not
recursively encapsulated. The purpose is to protect traffic to/from
the Internet and this can be easily done by routing every not-local
thing through the tunnel as it is done in current "mobile" IPsec VPNs.

   How is the pre-configured policy constructed for this case?  I still
   think using tunnel mode is cleanest for protecting traffic to/from the
   Internet in the access network since there is not a policy issue of
   this kind.
   
=> There is no such policy issue.

Regards

Francis.Dupont@enst-bretagne.fr



From pana-request@research.telcordia.com  Tue May 27 02:19:28 2003
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Date: Mon, 26 May 2003 23:11:57 -0400
To: Francis Dupont <Francis.Dupont@enst-bretagne.fr>
Cc: Yoshihiro Ohba <yohba@tari.toshiba.com>,
        Jean-Michel COMBES <jeanmichel.combes@francetelecom.com>,
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Subject: Re: Securing the first hop in PANA using IPsec
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On Mon, May 26, 2003 at 05:37:12PM +0200, Francis Dupont wrote:
>  In your previous mail you wrote:
> 
>    How is the policy of using IP-in-IP negotiated in IKE?
> 
> => no, IP-in-IP is not negociated by IKE. IKE can only negociate SAs
> and in this case IKE negociates the transport mode SA pair to protect
> packets going through the IP-in-IP tunnel.

Yes, that is my understanding.

> 
>    If you assume
>    a pre-configured policy on this, it is very hard to interoperate
>    because (i) in most cases (or policies) transport mode is used without
>    IP-in-IP encapsulation and thus policy mis-configuration is likely to
>    occur,
> 
> => the IPsec policy is very simple: protect packets going through the
> IP-in-IP tunnel, i.e., source and destination = PaC and EP (link-local)
> addresses, protocol = IP-in-IP (4 or 41).

This is not simpler than using IPsec tunnel mode, since tunnel mode
automatically comes with tunneling without introducing new policies,
while IP-in-IP/transport mode needs a new policy to use IP-in-IP
encapsulation.  I still think that tunnel mode is sufficient.  Why do
we need IP-in-IP/transport mode?

> 
>    and (ii) it is also difficult to detect the mis-configuration
>    in pre-configured policies (PaC and EP will see IKE succeeded but
>    subsequent data traffic will not pass).
> 
> => I don't understand all this stuff about pre-configured policies.
> Do you talk about SPD entries or something else?

I'm talking about SPD.  I used the term "pre-configured" to be
equivalent to "non-negotiable".  If the use of IP-in-IP is not
negotiable in IKE, how can any IPsec entity uniquely determine whether
additional IP-in-IP encapsulation is applied to a transport mode SA?
Or are you proposing that IP-in-IP encapsulation must be always
applied to any transport mode SA?

> 
>    In addition, PaC and EP may
>    use not also IP-in-IP/transport mode (for protecting traffic to/from
>    the Internet) but also just transport mode for local non-ICMP traffic
>    between PaC and EP (in this case IP-in-IP is clearly an overhead).
> 
> => the "local" traffic between the PaC and the EP doesn't matter as
> soon as IKE can bypass protection and IP-in-IP packets are not
> recursively encapsulated. The purpose is to protect traffic to/from
> the Internet and this can be easily done by routing every not-local
> thing through the tunnel as it is done in current "mobile" IPsec VPNs.

What do you mean by mobile IPsec VPNs?

> 
>    How is the pre-configured policy constructed for this case?  I still
>    think using tunnel mode is cleanest for protecting traffic to/from the
>    Internet in the access network since there is not a policy issue of
>    this kind.
>    
> => There is no such policy issue.

Please see my comment on SPD above.

Yoshihiro Ohba



From pana-request@research.telcordia.com  Tue May 27 04:25:22 2003
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        Alper Yegin <alper@docomolabs-usa.com>,
        pana <pana@research.telcordia.com>
Subject: Re: Securing the first hop in PANA using IPsec 
In-reply-to: Your message of Mon, 26 May 2003 23:11:57 EDT.
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 In your previous mail you wrote:

   > => the IPsec policy is very simple: protect packets going through the
   > IP-in-IP tunnel, i.e., source and destination = PaC and EP (link-local)
   > addresses, protocol = IP-in-IP (4 or 41).
   
   This is not simpler than using IPsec tunnel mode, since tunnel mode
   automatically comes with tunneling without introducing new policies,
   while IP-in-IP/transport mode needs a new policy to use IP-in-IP
   encapsulation.  I still think that tunnel mode is sufficient.  Why do
   we need IP-in-IP/transport mode?
   
=> we don't need it but there is a trade-off between the tunnel mode
which is simpler (just because it is very common in fact) with single
encapsulation and the transport mode over IP-in-IP which is far
simpler with double encapsulation (no bypass for the remote IKE for
instance). So to solve the trade-off the important thing is to know
if the double encapsulation will be the standard or a rare case.
As an user of "mobile" IPsec VPNs, I believe that as soon as the
burden of using IPsec doesn't matter (which should be the case here),
the double encapsulation should be very frequent. In fact, I believe
also that legacy auth/XAUTH will be a serious competitor here too.

   I'm talking about SPD.  I used the term "pre-configured" to be
   equivalent to "non-negotiable".

=> in our case the SPD is not supposed (nor required) to be negotiable:
the IP-in-IP tunnel and the SPD entries are setup by PANA before IKE
is launched/triggered (so you can come back to the pre-requisites
issue (*) :-).

   If the use of IP-in-IP is not
   negotiable in IKE, how can any IPsec entity uniquely determine whether
   additional IP-in-IP encapsulation is applied to a transport mode SA?

=> I disagree about the order of applications. No additional IP-in-IP
is applied to a transport mode SA: an additional transport mode SA
is applied to IP-in-IP.

   Or are you proposing that IP-in-IP encapsulation must be always
   applied to any transport mode SA?
   
=> this makes no sense.

   > => the "local" traffic between the PaC and the EP doesn't matter as
   > soon as IKE can bypass protection and IP-in-IP packets are not
   > recursively encapsulated. The purpose is to protect traffic to/from
   > the Internet and this can be easily done by routing every not-local
   > thing through the tunnel as it is done in current "mobile" IPsec VPNs.
   
   What do you mean by mobile IPsec VPNs?
   
=> an IPsec VPN where one end is a host with a dynamic address. This host
is a "road warrior" and in fact is nomadic but as this term seems to be
pedantic the common term is "mobile".

Regards

Francis.Dupont@enst-bretagne.fr

PS (*): in the document pre-requisites are about required parameters,
not about how to use them (learn/know/acquire, no build/setup/...).



From pana-request@research.telcordia.com  Wed May 28 06:16:44 2003
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Dan Forsberg <dan.forsberg@nokia.com> added the comment:

New version (c).
Changes:
- Session ID (sec. 9.4.9): Diameter format is MAY not MUST.
- Device ID (sec 9.4.3): Device ID contains type field and
data field in the AVP data part.
- Unknown type for Device-Id and Protection-Capability AVPs
(UNKNOWN 0).

_______________________________________________
PANA Issues <pana_issues@danforsberg.info>
http://danforsberg.info:8080/pana-issues/issue9
_______________________________________________



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Subject: WG Last Call: draft-ietf-pana-requirements-06.txt 
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Hello,
 
This is a WG last call for: Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network
Access (PANA) Requirements

I-D : draft-ietf-pana-requirements-06.txt
 
Status sought : Informational

Please send in your comments by June 12th, 2003 to the WG discussion
list. 

-Chairs



