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From: Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 3 Jul 2018 11:09:48 -0400
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To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Cc: tony@yaanatech.co.uk, "patient@ietf.org" <patient@ietf.org>,  Brian Witten <brian_witten@symantec.com>, "Diego R. Lopez" <diego.r.lopez@telefonica.com>
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Subject: Re: [Patient] DOJ first on encryption services
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On Sun, Mar 18, 2018 at 9:06 AM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>
>
> On Sun, Mar 18, 2018 at 12:54 PM, Tony Rutkowski <tony@yaanatech.co..uk>
> wrote:
>>
>> Your point is one that deserves further discussion, Eric - which seems
>> likely to scale rapidly going forward.  It is key.
>>
>> So how does draft-ietf-tls-sni-encryption it into the argument?
>
>
> As you suggest, SNI encryption is intended to conceal the SNI, which of
> course would make SNI inspection difficult.
>
> My evaluation of the current state of SNI encryption is that given the
> current technical state, it will not see particularly wide deployment, with
> the primary scenario being "at-risk" sites who are subject to censorship who
> either hide behind or co-tenant with sites which are not subject to
> censorship. That probably isn't going to be incredibly common right now. Of
> course, this is regrettable from the perspective of people designing these
> protocols, but I think that's the situation.

EKR posted a draft to encrypt SNI, see:
https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg26468.html

It targets the CDNs who host most of the web traffic in the US at
least.  The right place to comment on this would be the TLS list of
course, but since proposals are being posted, this is a reality and
needs to be discussed.  Those using SNI need to make sure their use
cases are clear and understood and argue the pros and cons.

Best regards,
Kathleen

>
> -Ekr
>
>> On 18-Mar-18 8:45 AM, Eric Rescorla wrote:
>>
>> On Sun, Mar 18, 2018 at 12:30 PM, Tony Rutkowski <tony@yaanatech.co.uk>
>> wrote:
>>>
>>> Hi Diego,
>>>
>>> It is also worth referencing a relatively recent Lawfare article on the
>>> scaling litigation in the U.S. against those supporting e2e encryption
>>> services or capabilities.
>>>
>>> https://www.lawfareblog.com/did-congress-immunize-twitter-against-lawsuits-supporting-isis
>>>
>>> This litigation trend is also likely to increase the insurance costs of
>>> providers.  Indeed, a provider that supports TLS1.3, QUIC, SNI, etc, may not
>>> even be able to get insurance.  It may be fun and games to play crypto rebel
>>> in venues like the IETF where the risk exposure is minimal, but when it
>>> comes to real world consequences and costs, the equations for providers are
>>> rather different.
>>
>>
>> I think this rather overestimates the degree to which both TLS 1.3 and
>> QUIC change the equation about what a provider is able to determine from
>> traffic inspection. As a practical matter, the primary change from TLS 1.2
>> is that the provider does not get to see the server's certificate, but it
>> does see the SNI. Given that the SNI contains the identity of the server
>> that the client is connected to and that the other identities in the
>> certificate are often whatever the provider decided to co-locate on the same
>> machine, I'm not sure how much information you are really losing.
>>
>> -Ekr
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> --tony
>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> PATIENT mailing list
>>> PATIENT@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/patient
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> PATIENT mailing list
>> PATIENT@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/patient
>>
>>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> PATIENT mailing list
> PATIENT@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/patient
>



-- 

Best regards,
Kathleen


From nobody Tue Jul  3 09:04:32 2018
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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Tue, 3 Jul 2018 08:59:32 -0700
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To: Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>
Cc: tony@yaanatech.co.uk, "patient@ietf.org" <patient@ietf.org>,  Brian Witten <brian_witten@symantec.com>, "Diego R. Lopez" <diego.r.lopez@telefonica.com>
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--000000000000ca929e05701a6803
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On Tue, Jul 3, 2018 at 8:09 AM, Kathleen Moriarty <
kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Sun, Mar 18, 2018 at 9:06 AM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
> >
> >
> > On Sun, Mar 18, 2018 at 12:54 PM, Tony Rutkowski <tony@yaanatech.co..uk>
> > wrote:
> >>
> >> Your point is one that deserves further discussion, Eric - which seems
> >> likely to scale rapidly going forward.  It is key.
> >>
> >> So how does draft-ietf-tls-sni-encryption it into the argument?
> >
> >
> > As you suggest, SNI encryption is intended to conceal the SNI, which of
> > course would make SNI inspection difficult.
> >
> > My evaluation of the current state of SNI encryption is that given the
> > current technical state, it will not see particularly wide deployment,
> with
> > the primary scenario being "at-risk" sites who are subject to censorship
> who
> > either hide behind or co-tenant with sites which are not subject to
> > censorship. That probably isn't going to be incredibly common right now.
> Of
> > course, this is regrettable from the perspective of people designing
> these
> > protocols, but I think that's the situation.
>
> EKR posted a draft to encrypt SNI, see:
> https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg26468.html
>
> It targets the CDNs who host most of the web traffic in the US at
> least.  The right place to comment on this would be the TLS list of
> course, but since proposals are being posted, this is a reality and
> needs to be discussed.  Those using SNI need to make sure their use
> cases are clear and understood and argue the pros and cons.
>

Kathleen,

Thanks for pointing out this draft.

As they say, predictions are hard, especially about the future. In March,
the ESNI problem looked pretty intractable and then subsequently we had
this idea about why it might be workable.

-Ekr

Best regards,
> Kathleen
>
> >
> > -Ekr
> >
> >> On 18-Mar-18 8:45 AM, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> >>
> >> On Sun, Mar 18, 2018 at 12:30 PM, Tony Rutkowski <tony@yaanatech.co.uk>
> >> wrote:
> >>>
> >>> Hi Diego,
> >>>
> >>> It is also worth referencing a relatively recent Lawfare article on the
> >>> scaling litigation in the U.S. against those supporting e2e encryption
> >>> services or capabilities.
> >>>
> >>> https://www.lawfareblog.com/did-congress-immunize-twitter-
> against-lawsuits-supporting-isis
> >>>
> >>> This litigation trend is also likely to increase the insurance costs of
> >>> providers.  Indeed, a provider that supports TLS1.3, QUIC, SNI, etc,
> may not
> >>> even be able to get insurance.  It may be fun and games to play crypto
> rebel
> >>> in venues like the IETF where the risk exposure is minimal, but when it
> >>> comes to real world consequences and costs, the equations for
> providers are
> >>> rather different.
> >>
> >>
> >> I think this rather overestimates the degree to which both TLS 1.3 and
> >> QUIC change the equation about what a provider is able to determine from
> >> traffic inspection. As a practical matter, the primary change from TLS
> 1.2
> >> is that the provider does not get to see the server's certificate, but
> it
> >> does see the SNI. Given that the SNI contains the identity of the server
> >> that the client is connected to and that the other identities in the
> >> certificate are often whatever the provider decided to co-locate on the
> same
> >> machine, I'm not sure how much information you are really losing.
> >>
> >> -Ekr
> >>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> --tony
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> _______________________________________________
> >>> PATIENT mailing list
> >>> PATIENT@ietf.org
> >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/patient
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> PATIENT mailing list
> >> PATIENT@ietf.org
> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/patient
> >>
> >>
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > PATIENT mailing list
> > PATIENT@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/patient
> >
>
>
>
> --
>
> Best regards,
> Kathleen
>

--000000000000ca929e05701a6803
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On Tue, Jul 3, 2018 at 8:09 AM, Kathleen Moriarty <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt=
;<a href=3D"mailto:kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">kath=
leen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"=
gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-=
left:1ex">On Sun, Mar 18, 2018 at 9:06 AM, Eric Rescorla &lt;<a href=3D"mai=
lto:ekr@rtfm.com">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; On Sun, Mar 18, 2018 at 12:54 PM, Tony Rutkowski &lt;tony@yaanatech.co=
..uk&gt;<br>
<span class=3D"">&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Your point is one that deserves further discussion, Eric - which s=
eems<br>
&gt;&gt; likely to scale rapidly going forward.=C2=A0 It is key.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; So how does draft-ietf-tls-sni-encryption it into the argument?<br=
>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; As you suggest, SNI encryption is intended to conceal the SNI, which o=
f<br>
&gt; course would make SNI inspection difficult.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; My evaluation of the current state of SNI encryption is that given the=
<br>
&gt; current technical state, it will not see particularly wide deployment,=
 with<br>
&gt; the primary scenario being &quot;at-risk&quot; sites who are subject t=
o censorship who<br>
&gt; either hide behind or co-tenant with sites which are not subject to<br=
>
&gt; censorship. That probably isn&#39;t going to be incredibly common righ=
t now. Of<br>
&gt; course, this is regrettable from the perspective of people designing t=
hese<br>
&gt; protocols, but I think that&#39;s the situation.<br>
<br>
</span>EKR posted a draft to encrypt SNI, see:<br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg26468.html"=
 rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mail-<wbr>archiv=
e/web/tls/current/<wbr>msg26468.html</a><br>
<br>
It targets the CDNs who host most of the web traffic in the US at<br>
least.=C2=A0 The right place to comment on this would be the TLS list of<br=
>
course, but since proposals are being posted, this is a reality and<br>
needs to be discussed.=C2=A0 Those using SNI need to make sure their use<br=
>
cases are clear and understood and argue the pros and cons.<br></blockquote=
><div><br></div><div>Kathleen,</div><div><br></div><div>Thanks for pointing=
 out this draft.</div><div><br></div><div>As they say, predictions are hard=
, especially about the future. In March, the ESNI problem looked pretty int=
ractable and then subsequently we had this idea about why it might be worka=
ble.<br></div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div><blockquote clas=
s=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;pad=
ding-left:1ex">
Best regards,<br>
Kathleen<br>
<div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5"><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; -Ekr<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; On 18-Mar-18 8:45 AM, Eric Rescorla wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; On Sun, Mar 18, 2018 at 12:30 PM, Tony Rutkowski &lt;<a href=3D"ma=
ilto:tony@yaanatech.co.uk">tony@yaanatech.co.uk</a>&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Hi Diego,<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; It is also worth referencing a relatively recent Lawfare artic=
le on the<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; scaling litigation in the U.S. against those supporting e2e en=
cryption<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; services or capabilities.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.lawfareblog.com/did-congress-immunize-t=
witter-against-lawsuits-supporting-isis" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blan=
k">https://www.lawfareblog.com/<wbr>did-congress-immunize-twitter-<wbr>agai=
nst-lawsuits-supporting-<wbr>isis</a><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; This litigation trend is also likely to increase the insurance=
 costs of<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; providers.=C2=A0 Indeed, a provider that supports TLS1.3, QUIC=
, SNI, etc, may not<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; even be able to get insurance.=C2=A0 It may be fun and games t=
o play crypto rebel<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; in venues like the IETF where the risk exposure is minimal, bu=
t when it<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; comes to real world consequences and costs, the equations for =
providers are<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; rather different.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; I think this rather overestimates the degree to which both TLS 1.3=
 and<br>
&gt;&gt; QUIC change the equation about what a provider is able to determin=
e from<br>
&gt;&gt; traffic inspection. As a practical matter, the primary change from=
 TLS 1.2<br>
&gt;&gt; is that the provider does not get to see the server&#39;s certific=
ate, but it<br>
&gt;&gt; does see the SNI. Given that the SNI contains the identity of the =
server<br>
&gt;&gt; that the client is connected to and that the other identities in t=
he<br>
&gt;&gt; certificate are often whatever the provider decided to co-locate o=
n the same<br>
&gt;&gt; machine, I&#39;m not sure how much information you are really losi=
ng.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; -Ekr<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; --tony<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; ______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; PATIENT mailing list<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:PATIENT@ietf.org">PATIENT@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/patient" rel=
=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinf=
o/patient</a><br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; ______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
&gt;&gt; PATIENT mailing list<br>
&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:PATIENT@ietf.org">PATIENT@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/patient" rel=3D"n=
oreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/pat=
ient</a><br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; ______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
&gt; PATIENT mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:PATIENT@ietf.org">PATIENT@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/patient" rel=3D"noref=
errer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/patient=
</a><br>
&gt;<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
</div></div><span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888">-- <br>
<br>
Best regards,<br>
Kathleen<br>
</font></span></blockquote></div><br></div></div>

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From: Bret Jordan <jordan.ietf@gmail.com>
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Cc: Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>, "patient@ietf.org" <patient@ietf.org>, tony@yaanatech.co.uk, Brian Witten <brian_witten@symantec.com>, "Diego R. Lopez" <diego.r.lopez@telefonica.com>
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=46rom my personal perspective, we need to be careful with all of these =
efforts. It feels like the pendulum has swung so far to one side, the =
side of privacy-at-any-cost, that we are unknowingly increasing the risk =
to individuals and organizations by enabling threat actors and =
intrusions sets to attack networks and clients without any level of =
protection from the network.=20

It also feels like a lot of these initiatives are being done without =
adequately involving and ensuring that enterprise networks and critical =
infrastructure can work with these changes. Question, do we know how =
these ideas and changes are going to impact an organizations ability to =
fulfill their requirements for regulatory compliance?=20

If we continue down these paths, then I fear networks will be required =
to wrap all traffic in some other less secure protocol, outright deny =
some of these protocols, or be forced to fully proxy all traffic or take =
an approach that Google has done with their BeyondCorp design. =20

The IETF work needs to do more outreach with enterprise networks and =
critical infrastructure and be fundamentally more inclusive. =
Privacy-at-any-cost is not a holistic design.=20

Thanks,
Bret
PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050
"Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that =
can not be unscrambled is an egg."

> On Jul 3, 2018, at 9:59 AM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>=20
>=20
>=20
> On Tue, Jul 3, 2018 at 8:09 AM, Kathleen Moriarty =
<kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com =
<mailto:kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>> wrote:
> On Sun, Mar 18, 2018 at 9:06 AM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com =
<mailto:ekr@rtfm.com>> wrote:
> >
> >
> > On Sun, Mar 18, 2018 at 12:54 PM, Tony Rutkowski =
<tony@yaanatech.co...uk>
> > wrote:
> >>
> >> Your point is one that deserves further discussion, Eric - which =
seems
> >> likely to scale rapidly going forward.  It is key.
> >>
> >> So how does draft-ietf-tls-sni-encryption it into the argument?
> >
> >
> > As you suggest, SNI encryption is intended to conceal the SNI, which =
of
> > course would make SNI inspection difficult.
> >
> > My evaluation of the current state of SNI encryption is that given =
the
> > current technical state, it will not see particularly wide =
deployment, with
> > the primary scenario being "at-risk" sites who are subject to =
censorship who
> > either hide behind or co-tenant with sites which are not subject to
> > censorship. That probably isn't going to be incredibly common right =
now. Of
> > course, this is regrettable from the perspective of people designing =
these
> > protocols, but I think that's the situation.
>=20
> EKR posted a draft to encrypt SNI, see:
> https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg26468.html =
<https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg26468.html>
>=20
> It targets the CDNs who host most of the web traffic in the US at
> least.  The right place to comment on this would be the TLS list of
> course, but since proposals are being posted, this is a reality and
> needs to be discussed.  Those using SNI need to make sure their use
> cases are clear and understood and argue the pros and cons.
>=20
> Kathleen,
>=20
> Thanks for pointing out this draft.
>=20
> As they say, predictions are hard, especially about the future. In =
March, the ESNI problem looked pretty intractable and then subsequently =
we had this idea about why it might be workable.
>=20
> -Ekr
>=20
> Best regards,
> Kathleen
>=20
> >
> > -Ekr
> >
> >> On 18-Mar-18 8:45 AM, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> >>
> >> On Sun, Mar 18, 2018 at 12:30 PM, Tony Rutkowski =
<tony@yaanatech.co.uk <mailto:tony@yaanatech.co.uk>>
> >> wrote:
> >>>
> >>> Hi Diego,
> >>>
> >>> It is also worth referencing a relatively recent Lawfare article =
on the
> >>> scaling litigation in the U.S. against those supporting e2e =
encryption
> >>> services or capabilities.
> >>>
> >>> =
https://www.lawfareblog.com/did-congress-immunize-twitter-against-lawsuits=
-supporting-isis =
<https://www.lawfareblog.com/did-congress-immunize-twitter-against-lawsuit=
s-supporting-isis>
> >>>
> >>> This litigation trend is also likely to increase the insurance =
costs of
> >>> providers.  Indeed, a provider that supports TLS1.3, QUIC, SNI, =
etc, may not
> >>> even be able to get insurance.  It may be fun and games to play =
crypto rebel
> >>> in venues like the IETF where the risk exposure is minimal, but =
when it
> >>> comes to real world consequences and costs, the equations for =
providers are
> >>> rather different.
> >>
> >>
> >> I think this rather overestimates the degree to which both TLS 1.3 =
and
> >> QUIC change the equation about what a provider is able to determine =
from
> >> traffic inspection. As a practical matter, the primary change from =
TLS 1.2
> >> is that the provider does not get to see the server's certificate, =
but it
> >> does see the SNI. Given that the SNI contains the identity of the =
server
> >> that the client is connected to and that the other identities in =
the
> >> certificate are often whatever the provider decided to co-locate on =
the same
> >> machine, I'm not sure how much information you are really losing.
> >>
> >> -Ekr
> >>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> --tony
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> _______________________________________________
> >>> PATIENT mailing list
> >>> PATIENT@ietf.org <mailto:PATIENT@ietf.org>
> >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/patient =
<https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/patient>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> PATIENT mailing list
> >> PATIENT@ietf.org <mailto:PATIENT@ietf.org>
> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/patient =
<https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/patient>
> >>
> >>
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > PATIENT mailing list
> > PATIENT@ietf.org <mailto:PATIENT@ietf.org>
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/patient =
<https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/patient>
> >
>=20
>=20
>=20
> --=20
>=20
> Best regards,
> Kathleen
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> PATIENT mailing list
> PATIENT@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/patient


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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dus-ascii"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D""><div =
class=3D"">=46rom my personal perspective, we need to be careful with =
all of these efforts. It feels like the pendulum has swung so far to one =
side, the side of privacy-at-any-cost, that we are unknowingly =
increasing the risk to individuals and organizations by enabling threat =
actors and intrusions sets to attack networks and clients without any =
level of protection from the network.&nbsp;</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">It also feels like a lot of these =
initiatives are being done without adequately involving and ensuring =
that enterprise networks and critical infrastructure can work with these =
changes. Question, do we know how these ideas and changes are going to =
impact an organizations ability to fulfill their requirements for =
regulatory compliance?&nbsp;</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">If we continue down these paths, then I =
fear networks will be required to wrap all traffic in some other less =
secure protocol, outright deny some of these protocols, or be forced to =
fully proxy all traffic or take an approach that Google has done with =
their BeyondCorp design. &nbsp;</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">The IETF work needs to do more outreach =
with enterprise networks and critical infrastructure and be =
fundamentally more inclusive. Privacy-at-any-cost is not a holistic =
design.&nbsp;</div><br class=3D""><div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); color: rgb(0, 0, 0); =
font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: =
none; white-space: normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
text-decoration: none;"><div class=3D"" style=3D"orphans: 2; widows: 2; =
font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; =
font-variant-position: normal; line-height: normal; =
-webkit-text-decorations-in-effect: none;"><span =
class=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"border-collapse: separate; =
font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; =
font-variant-position: normal; line-height: normal; border-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-decorations-in-effect: none;">Thanks,</span></div><div =
class=3D"" style=3D"orphans: 2; widows: 2; font-variant-ligatures: =
normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-position: normal; =
line-height: normal; -webkit-text-decorations-in-effect: none;"><span =
class=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"border-collapse: separate; =
font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; =
font-variant-position: normal; line-height: normal; text-align: =
-webkit-auto; border-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-decorations-in-effect: =
none;">Bret</span></div><div class=3D"" style=3D"orphans: 2; widows: =
2;"><span class=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"border-collapse: separate; =
text-align: -webkit-auto; border-spacing: 0px;"><span =
class=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"border-collapse: separate; =
text-align: -webkit-auto; border-spacing: 0px;"><div class=3D"" =
style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: =
after-white-space;"><span class=3D"Apple-style-span" =
style=3D"border-collapse: separate; text-align: -webkit-auto; =
border-spacing: 0px;"><div class=3D"" style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;"><span =
class=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"border-collapse: separate; =
text-align: -webkit-auto; border-spacing: 0px;"><div class=3D"" =
style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: =
after-white-space;"><span class=3D"Apple-style-span" =
style=3D"border-collapse: separate; text-align: -webkit-auto; =
border-spacing: 0px;"><div class=3D""><font color=3D"#7c7c7c" =
face=3D"Calibre, Verdana" class=3D"" style=3D"font-variant-ligatures: =
normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-position: normal; =
line-height: normal; -webkit-text-decorations-in-effect: none;"><span =
class=3D"" style=3D"font-size: 11px;">PGP =
Fingerprint:&nbsp;</span></font><span class=3D"" style=3D"text-align: =
-webkit-auto; font-size: 11px;"><font color=3D"#7c7c7c" face=3D"Calibre, =
Verdana" class=3D"">63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447 &nbsp;F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 =
0050</font></span></div><div class=3D"" style=3D"font-variant-ligatures: =
normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-position: normal; =
line-height: normal; -webkit-text-decorations-in-effect: none;"><span =
class=3D"" style=3D"color: rgb(124, 124, 124); font-size: 8pt; =
font-family: Calibre, Verdana; text-align: -webkit-auto;">"Without =
cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that can not =
be unscrambled is an =
egg."</span></div></span></div></span></div></span></div></span></span></d=
iv></div>
</div>
<div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div =
class=3D"">On Jul 3, 2018, at 9:59 AM, Eric Rescorla &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com" class=3D"">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D""><div =
dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; =
font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: =
none;" class=3D""><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><br class=3D""><div =
class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue, Jul 3, 2018 at 8:09 AM, Kathleen =
Moriarty<span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><span =
dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"">&lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank" =
class=3D"">kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span><span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>wrote:<br =
class=3D""><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin: 0px 0px =
0px 0.8ex; border-left-width: 1px; border-left-style: solid; =
border-left-color: rgb(204, 204, 204); padding-left: 1ex;">On Sun, Mar =
18, 2018 at 9:06 AM, Eric Rescorla &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com" =
class=3D"">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br class=3D"">&gt;<br =
class=3D"">&gt;<br class=3D"">&gt; On Sun, Mar 18, 2018 at 12:54 PM, =
Tony Rutkowski &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:tony@yaanatech.co" =
class=3D"">tony@yaanatech.co</a>...uk&gt;<br class=3D""><span =
class=3D"">&gt; wrote:<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt; =
Your point is one that deserves further discussion, Eric - which =
seems<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt; likely to scale rapidly going =
forward.&nbsp; It is key.<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt; =
So how does draft-ietf-tls-sni-encryption it into the argument?<br =
class=3D"">&gt;<br class=3D"">&gt;<br class=3D"">&gt; As you suggest, =
SNI encryption is intended to conceal the SNI, which of<br class=3D"">&gt;=
 course would make SNI inspection difficult.<br class=3D"">&gt;<br =
class=3D"">&gt; My evaluation of the current state of SNI encryption is =
that given the<br class=3D"">&gt; current technical state, it will not =
see particularly wide deployment, with<br class=3D"">&gt; the primary =
scenario being "at-risk" sites who are subject to censorship who<br =
class=3D"">&gt; either hide behind or co-tenant with sites which are not =
subject to<br class=3D"">&gt; censorship. That probably isn't going to =
be incredibly common right now. Of<br class=3D"">&gt; course, this is =
regrettable from the perspective of people designing these<br =
class=3D"">&gt; protocols, but I think that's the situation.<br =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></span>EKR posted a draft to encrypt SNI, =
see:<br class=3D""><a =
href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg26468.html" =
rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank" =
class=3D"">https://www.ietf.org/mail-<wbr =
class=3D"">archive/web/tls/current/<wbr class=3D"">msg26468.html</a><br =
class=3D""><br class=3D"">It targets the CDNs who host most of the web =
traffic in the US at<br class=3D"">least.&nbsp; The right place to =
comment on this would be the TLS list of<br class=3D"">course, but since =
proposals are being posted, this is a reality and<br class=3D"">needs to =
be discussed.&nbsp; Those using SNI need to make sure their use<br =
class=3D"">cases are clear and understood and argue the pros and =
cons.<br class=3D""></blockquote><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div=
 class=3D"">Kathleen,</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">Thanks for pointing out this draft.</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">As they say, predictions are hard, =
especially about the future. In March, the ESNI problem looked pretty =
intractable and then subsequently we had this idea about why it might be =
workable.<br class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">-Ekr</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><blockquote =
class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; =
border-left-width: 1px; border-left-style: solid; border-left-color: =
rgb(204, 204, 204); padding-left: 1ex;">Best regards,<br =
class=3D"">Kathleen<br class=3D""><div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div =
class=3D"h5"><br class=3D"">&gt;<br class=3D"">&gt; -Ekr<br =
class=3D"">&gt;<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt; On 18-Mar-18 8:45 AM, Eric =
Rescorla wrote:<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt; On Sun, =
Mar 18, 2018 at 12:30 PM, Tony Rutkowski &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:tony@yaanatech.co.uk" =
class=3D"">tony@yaanatech.co.uk</a>&gt;<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt; wrote:<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt; Hi Diego,<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt; It is also worth =
referencing a relatively recent Lawfare article on the<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt; scaling litigation in the U.S. against those =
supporting e2e encryption<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt; services or =
capabilities.<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><a =
href=3D"https://www.lawfareblog.com/did-congress-immunize-twitter-against-=
lawsuits-supporting-isis" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank" =
class=3D"">https://www.lawfareblog.com/<wbr =
class=3D"">did-congress-immunize-twitter-<wbr =
class=3D"">against-lawsuits-supporting-<wbr class=3D"">isis</a><br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt; This litigation trend =
is also likely to increase the insurance costs of<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt; providers.&nbsp; Indeed, a provider that =
supports TLS1.3, QUIC, SNI, etc, may not<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt; even =
be able to get insurance.&nbsp; It may be fun and games to play crypto =
rebel<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt; in venues like the IETF where the risk =
exposure is minimal, but when it<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt; comes to =
real world consequences and costs, the equations for providers are<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt; rather different.<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt; I think this rather =
overestimates the degree to which both TLS 1.3 and<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt; =
QUIC change the equation about what a provider is able to determine =
from<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt; traffic inspection. As a practical matter, =
the primary change from TLS 1.2<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt; is that the =
provider does not get to see the server's certificate, but it<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt; does see the SNI. Given that the SNI contains the =
identity of the server<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt; that the client is =
connected to and that the other identities in the<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt; =
certificate are often whatever the provider decided to co-locate on the =
same<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt; machine, I'm not sure how much information =
you are really losing.<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt; =
-Ekr<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt; --tony<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt; =
______________________________<wbr class=3D"">_________________<br =
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class=3D"">&gt; ______________________________<wbr =
class=3D"">_________________<br class=3D"">&gt; PATIENT mailing list<br =
class=3D"">&gt;<span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><a =
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target=3D"_blank" class=3D"">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr =
class=3D"">listinfo/patient</a><br class=3D"">&gt;<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D""><br class=3D""><br class=3D""></div></div><span =
class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888" class=3D"">--<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><br class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">Best regards,<br class=3D"">Kathleen<br =
class=3D""></font></span></blockquote></div><br =
class=3D""></div></div><span style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); =
font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; =
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