From nobody Thu Nov 1 00:16:56 2018 Return-Path: X-Original-To: pearg@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: pearg@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 58D50130E04 for ; Thu, 1 Nov 2018 00:16:54 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -2.001 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.001 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIMWL_WL_MED=-0.001, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=salesforce.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id wg9HDFv1rWQa for ; Thu, 1 Nov 2018 00:16:52 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail-it1-x135.google.com (mail-it1-x135.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::135]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5178E130DFE for ; Thu, 1 Nov 2018 00:16:52 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-it1-x135.google.com with SMTP id s16so841756itj.1 for ; Thu, 01 Nov 2018 00:16:52 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=salesforce.com; s=google; h=mime-version:from:date:message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=yhsW9R9X3hYLzbdtMCICTjBOmTNJQZUgEummCjjMwLM=; b=At1gQ9vof6ebUm1Sw7m/6IzKvzQWNqLa2EW4/8KEcrnmV/ToVnGIu5xgLWvCaAYn5I ZE+LvuDFlbkUs90kN78ZNNDUcOX6QOqFk6BqOEYdT+rJnBtVimA5oV+PDSeXc3u1OwWC AzFUcs5e7bDoVUwOOnKj+65Lw0VqDd3BnIGSM= X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:from:date:message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=yhsW9R9X3hYLzbdtMCICTjBOmTNJQZUgEummCjjMwLM=; b=XnJjsA6jLMmwfDYrp6pJ8GdLbh/ENRAzasJC5u19ca+zaXP/nT0/8vpWnGV+ew3761 xsNd0MkihtIvo34Thja0WKAhOrW5re+4rNFMhrmq1NxGK8gmsEhkktF7vDWjmSFKtlgz DElAT7+21Gb7+wlfGa4Vy92rcTW2rc3dq82Nc3v001ZmGcGe0sgPV5g8o7N2wb7DB3BH pi94TFP7s/M+oXArt+0OoC4+g/uovlRPQZ2B/SJs3A5L9PS0Yi2Kq9ZRcY7z2njzVLmT bYgwIo9rErowUAI2wcMIKJLbjInK2v19MLX89FZSYqIM4kFgVyIt1RAdoAV8P/dq6LHu V6bw== X-Gm-Message-State: AGRZ1gLeZ+K7+SpyCTM/jOSA86cNlupU43UKYJot98qHaLz1FqsumsHS 5qufYXf6bmUgqwWwNhU1BFPMpUkkaV3CixdcsGNDu0cseLlJtw== X-Google-Smtp-Source: AJdET5cqN47eCdEOpYz2wVrQ9Fp3Nt9OzOkUcMfl5b7TAAWyp7q3a24M2odBotQVVdJlhqspd1Rei+36MpFkbZm4BZo= X-Received: by 2002:a02:1e5c:: with SMTP id m89-v6mr4646747jad.124.1541056611289; Thu, 01 Nov 2018 00:16:51 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 From: Shivan Sahib Date: Thu, 1 Nov 2018 00:16:40 -0700 Message-ID: To: pearg@irtf.org Cc: melinda.shore@nomountain.net Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="000000000000e5547105799533a1" Archived-At: Subject: [Pearg] Agenda for IETF 103 meeting X-BeenThere: pearg@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Privacy Enhancements and Assessment Proposed RG List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 01 Nov 2018 07:16:54 -0000 --000000000000e5547105799533a1 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Hello all, The agenda for next week is online: https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/103/materials/agenda-103-pearg-02.txt Will be a presentation-heavy first meeting :) Cheers, Shivan --000000000000e5547105799533a1 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Hello all,


Will= be a presentation-heavy first meeting :)

Cheers,<= /div>
Shivan
--000000000000e5547105799533a1-- From nobody Thu Nov 1 09:40:45 2018 Return-Path: X-Original-To: pearg@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: pearg@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0C6741277BB for ; Thu, 1 Nov 2018 09:40:43 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.901 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.901 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id dQHnsJ7GmUd1 for ; Thu, 1 Nov 2018 09:40:40 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smarthost1.greenhost.nl (smarthost1.greenhost.nl [195.190.28.89]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9CBD21286D9 for ; Thu, 1 Nov 2018 09:40:39 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.greenhost.nl ([213.108.110.112]) by smarthost1.greenhost.nl with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:128) (Exim 4.84_2) (envelope-from ) id 1gIG1N-0006yf-91 for pearg@irtf.org; Thu, 01 Nov 2018 17:40:38 +0100 To: pearg@irtf.org From: Amelia Andersdotter Openpgp: preference=signencrypt Autocrypt: addr=amelia@article19.org; prefer-encrypt=mutual; keydata= xsFNBFjWlnsBEAC+jUN+LJE+mmxEL8lHSrvg47xSBMb9GdtH1Jr8tRSxXiO6R5E+FydsfqkL sjO0dI3x/VnNBi/kgPFFWiAzDEwGTiR/C9b/Muo+xrY+it6e49N56LTPGezrY2dy5yo6VcLl 7UwGz3fIWiNIj7dvuoPMBoO1uacF073E+dqDM5CmNh6o+OrHW8zhUlC9hKgXCq+8XpZJw90H un1zsHF0sRDiurjfYaCcbdAGK9+th9378ed1ZvLVo5uBVQXdydl3eJkNCOELq7VOS7oxSliA uX5/nj9A4LjeeYXgNbwGfKrMjlffP0FcAcgfzg9seqDd1DEk9EVaUMTr32fbWOQHjinXSC7r Lw4xaNfoBebIe1M6z16Xg7+bXXCTdmJYcL9ugmkvT6tGnR12Pfoca1oBwXPvA0VIRi86kCSU D9qvZ3Vl07MKD2hsvFkGZJOQfEaYv5QLpCWv6RCjfDNC05IyMeSW4H18Fr/BoHX8FXHV3+9H LsbJQ/Zrofd/Cm+TKEmXLAtYc7iXvzV+mw3/u0VYqjEy/CRYa62Ah0NNNVIuswfRVIfx3UZo jX4y8j2Kh0jtUV5A4GGf8H3SzQ/cB0I7wTRHU9mCPVCtH6M26nPumL4Zr4D6uGnAmPf9xnlX lokOn2Qxf/mBldsL41PDbEpYhZvvn5kJ/Z9Qh7Fks/hfTbbJowARAQABzSxBbWVsaWEgQW5k ZXJzZG90dGVyIDxhbWVsaWFAYW5kZXJzZG90dGVyLmNjPsLBlwQTAQgAQQIbIwUJCWYBgAUL CQgHAgYVCAkKCwIEFgIDAQIeAQIXgBYhBD1dtsq4UrmIBVpqb/7xwpS06AtVBQJY1pdiAhkB AAoJEP7xwpS06AtVI0sP/Al6eUycymdT1R7v0uEQv4coonnOUV6FKj/4wc+wM+A0h7vlqADr j4nS7RRSQRUo8xJ9tvR9J1Eyske5bvakOYv64f9PrNY1Z6ABhJzK34kJxekEfeLmpXAB4wst GhD8dGC/z/b9Oau0AW1GWIP0eNWq4acDf9Qf+j0wqQi25OZUXnu5KeUX7mvPTHKZLyEZlwHV atXmZHWKnQWtEPZTQfv/zESsoBAm1TbaLapgxVG9uLW+I9kj72TB/AZ5hMSKMYWZ2dC+8eEs Xd22tn6907aUmZhFT89jbEyS996WeZ+SQ5G1Okrq02qYXcCi5vm3AuvLlbRYHguh42TLaVq1 er7PiYOYH77FFmnZWW6ChFnf7xsDep2tpNxn+QUZLgO3+5kL7TfO7D2H57kjVVMdkNn+01nz kfcn76K7nuU6Dc4pItPzbDndhdxulnm9cicOEfGQqvta9ffxk4YWyAu9PUNARVRNf6OnoDQQ Zo8l1o37q9PFXJyQwzvxdd9u6uzTny2wp9eig75pD3dYHCRIQeYmkv1kB81mc86cwgvuw1Qy /QwiCBNXSSuIvLO78b+/dB0DLVQC/c6gtyWXRpC4ysF4EaEZophjT60d12YRanR+fWuH+qu2 wsT+z1d4tC5/6UJMPr3bxREh9JHThm5Y3cDBmcn0PGqtDKkwjCkqex5bzsFNBFjWlnsBEADF jusaTo9W8VeWluCK/oJqyyyF1wMvou0ldfuoOpUZrOqsY67TM7yBqsv5COPVgAV+xp+axor5 oHWxibd283w0Ok4dK6tvtNGwUqyDRlHtQ92DG/u4Tg5eOwrHNUn73/rfeBD9KhKAXcNKKPoc cLgR8oQTXpO7eRo+0NI52pXQ6LdZ0wddYeTcHglsNKN1TK+CyYS7xfGolsZXXoBOKcyhfj/c kPFVIHWpGpEtcYWTZWvXgLprzHvpKzkzNyBwejaXE+bqCT2dRl3omI/e2t3Vq33hFUUSAdxr FF29vMX/YsSnYqsFOIoayna+TRsDFAfZvbvHBOMckeJzvA8yBdadw7CM08Uw8wqH7n9BA3oq //QpZJekPfrc2E9nM9H0d51T0uStLMbYDWdwxvfPA3p9z8L91vobt8bM/Jbhl9h+X2Yq9oBC iTI7b2izYd9FVG4BwBIdeh3bh9R9HExgRjF3XQ6uafT3pcVOPASdv9FRUYH1Va7QWQifoha0 B7UXKx1OpX1Z6XR2NQ9KN2MvlwvBKdHtm6tBzUIFzW6D8vUOxiYKBA4fppJt/LJF4jsaCEyI /CVQnkC0yL5DKFOdigxTipwEL9Uc6r7VfR5OAGFd6vzuJFy+j+/WhzaVT1oVYp6eQXh0bBtq qH2Mq9sAMnIjvaNYIKiQKgMa1Pa3OWQbQQARAQABwsF8BBgBCAAmFiEEPV22yrhSuYgFWmpv /vHClLToC1UFAljWlnsCGwwFCQlmAYAACgkQ/vHClLToC1XnRw//W4lzE8FddceKXGRwO/T1 u4uzH9EjPCj+3/eHCrLI+h1m7QPyH1DrFAtZBoA6UoaF0+vIAJXM9/HI1FZ09EUdJr5X/+YR EErFom4DbE1FK8fpK1/Hw2zI+7Xa8bVkmYrKhMGhi1Gq6Dtksn/H4USdJL53ZPt10SVNK7H3 w93Yp1GC4+0zWjfrsKfsHYZZr2SZyb5/gZlngfgaqiQLhIcPYmiU1GQi9QWkGxWRxk0YQXBw hekewvgltATxlRSCwguAi4uck9fAct9GGdpsshSOgAb9YIAnEV3EqaGnf0PknXp3vNHAZWrf M+RyuNdm2L5TjDU0rIrvyqGP3pR33cREGOAil5Sz2uFArmwsPt8VffbEXlf7qZqRBKaYeKt0 qnxKMx1+e1JilVsfb8qtnAWAFDyR0HMlVj/dvGAmq/auPSOAUWRSnDRyT6rv/vXxrbkL4uxW ax46qdpDhR15mS5MTng6b5b3Uox7xlveo/Sx71AdNf4goPvB/ntv0DiMuh+fmLGk3zrxs4Xd 30Sx+qQwVaXR5xc5rgnF81wvfmuAOb2eP9mpD6DoabkpxC8fLk17AK7Q1ZTgcZ+8XLRFnavd PrwCa9RU0BF53lJMSTPzyBcMwZ4sqA6Z5IRFVt7rEbSeeD8REiawo+FvVt9j0fKdNEBeaJ3W Y5hlhNPcUXr4q1U= Organization: ARTICLE19 Message-ID: Date: Thu, 1 Nov 2018 17:40:36 +0100 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/60.2.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Language: en-US-large X-Virus-Scanned: by clamav at smarthost1.samage.net X-Scan-Signature: 488b5a33f748713be529de57fa847022 Archived-At: Subject: [Pearg] differential privacy in dynamic systems X-BeenThere: pearg@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Privacy Enhancements and Assessment Proposed RG List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 01 Nov 2018 16:40:43 -0000 Hi all, To kick off a differential privacy discussion, I would like to share a recent find: http://sist.shanghaitech.edu.cn/faculty/luoxl/class/2017Fall_EE251/Global= SIP2017/pdfs/0000487.pdf It covers differentially private Kalman filtering, or differential privacy in dynamic environments. I send it because the layout of what differential privacy *does* is fairly straight forward: the differential mechanism adds noise to data released after a query, which in the case of a dynamic measurement necessarily implies reducing the quality of the released data. In the Kalman filter, this is particularly obvious since measurements are already assumed to be noisy. Adding more noise makes measurements more noisy. The paper creates a differentially private estimator by organising the "real" measurements in blocks, and then adding noise to th= em. I think the structure of the paper also displays some of the big research topics in differential privacy: - existence of the transformation matrix D, which organises measurements in blocks. - computational tractability of transformation matrix D. This is typically a tricky problem. - estimation of how much "worse" estimators get by making measurements more noisy (cf. the final example in the paper). In relation to the last point, this paper by John Duchi and Michael I. Jordan covers the loss of accuracy in estimators from differentially private released data: https://arxiv.org/abs/1604.02390 There are a bunch of really interesting questions that arise from the above presentations: 1) when can we deal with estimators being worse? 2) the data aggregator will continue to have full control over the entire dataset that is being queried: differential privacy is aggregator-centered, because it assumes the aggregator will process the data before handing it out, 3) should measurements be made more noisy at collection, rather than at query and how does that impact power relations between aggregators and queriers under question 2). best regards, --=20 Amelia Andersdotter Technical Consultant, Digital Programme ARTICLE19 www.article19.org PGP: 3D5D B6CA B852 B988 055A 6A6F FEF1 C294 B4E8 0B55 From nobody Sun Nov 4 21:11:42 2018 Return-Path: X-Original-To: pearg@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: pearg@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 49FA6130E9B for ; Sun, 4 Nov 2018 21:11:30 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -2.001 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.001 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIMWL_WL_MED=-0.001, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=salesforce.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id vxdgEBtt_6z2 for ; Sun, 4 Nov 2018 21:11:26 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail-it1-x133.google.com (mail-it1-x133.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::133]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BB77E130DC5 for ; Sun, 4 Nov 2018 21:11:26 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-it1-x133.google.com with SMTP id h13so11019660itl.1 for ; Sun, 04 Nov 2018 21:11:26 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=salesforce.com; s=google; h=mime-version:from:date:message-id:subject:to; bh=1nVVaQ/aSx31RUJWdwvuQaJuJLoJj01F0ykFuE1U328=; b=FmJ/+cPdpL+BUJWOFmfr9AOUeSyJakI27cKmUyjASa1cvm9Gef8uh68f+6KNMrjvxi lSkh9bt5239Rc10OWS24PfERaRNR+mEAPi5pVStK5ZwrLzD+IH28aIVr92LM5ye/Bx6F yRmkdDya8mXX5OR9jM7Evt+/Nh3v3l7Ix7goU= X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:from:date:message-id:subject:to; bh=1nVVaQ/aSx31RUJWdwvuQaJuJLoJj01F0ykFuE1U328=; b=DjPGbMugkYG6URcuwUDrBJCkmfHBrZpL8gCZ8jF0sVhkui44X1R6BaaGxiwcdN0HE8 /CtER7v26rvyTCDPK6Ih//UeoV0n21agtgD0L6PN8Mbof6DR2U1gB9UXv0+xytexZilH U3D5yJRlOLHhDeA8BqxqTSCUuU/MJShD0W5W7dW7dmTHxeaVz962UZPwpz+N68wJPrVN i29gvJ8N9hNiLY32FwzlcCsWngFXkUEqKLxa79UeIUrZC3VqlmzvgpL9c+5x/0q61sLN QMJFLF/Baky5VhLuV8FL3thiZgU42tNWD4j5g1dJ3CNSavVDYQ5PVZhbxePST8lIxeya j6Qg== X-Gm-Message-State: AGRZ1gI+7loVHf6CXBU2yH8IGegXJa0K0BuxNdAfcFU7/+gGTRVv7TEc sUw+NvM6tbvwupzlU5s2nTpd5OGKSegPq1JTfxFjaFciMsKPow== X-Google-Smtp-Source: AJdET5dHvwrzbCG1+Y6CbN/UG7oCU/fxdZRRNJqXvEpeq6C5enAQgHEqJpkuNgAoQnHdxDJ5VVmhrmq0z52oIMlWHk4= X-Received: by 2002:a02:1e5c:: with SMTP id m89-v6mr18137513jad.124.1541394685835; Sun, 04 Nov 2018 21:11:25 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 From: Shivan Sahib Date: Mon, 5 Nov 2018 12:11:12 +0700 Message-ID: To: pearg@irtf.org Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="000000000000b568fb0579e3ea49" Archived-At: Subject: [Pearg] PrivCount X-BeenThere: pearg@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Privacy Enhancements and Assessment Proposed RG List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 05 Nov 2018 05:11:37 -0000 --000000000000b568fb0579e3ea49 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Hi all, I was pointed to the spec for PrivCount ("privacy-preserving way to collect aggregate statistics about the Tor network without exposing the statistics from any single Tor relay"), which might be interesting to some of the people in this group. https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/288-privcount-with-shamir.txt --000000000000b568fb0579e3ea49 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Hi all,

I was pointed to the spec for PrivCount ("privacy-preserving way to= collect aggregate statistics about the Tor network without exposing the st= atistics from any single Tor relay"), which might be interesting to so= me of the people in this group.



--000000000000b568fb0579e3ea49-- From nobody Wed Nov 7 03:40:16 2018 Return-Path: X-Original-To: pearg@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: pearg@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1643A12D4E8 for ; Wed, 7 Nov 2018 03:40:15 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -2.001 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.001 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIMWL_WL_MED=-0.001, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=salesforce.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 0u-lKlpJJPJ1 for ; Wed, 7 Nov 2018 03:40:13 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail-it1-x12f.google.com (mail-it1-x12f.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::12f]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0A25E129C6B for ; Wed, 7 Nov 2018 03:40:13 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-it1-x12f.google.com with SMTP id t190-v6so16650865itb.2 for ; Wed, 07 Nov 2018 03:40:12 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=salesforce.com; s=google; h=mime-version:from:date:message-id:subject:to; bh=ENN8tmMgJPHXl5ZabXkUKM1YZMdOqfMYh3fXef/7Q8Q=; b=Lv5iYqdQt5EuXhXhcI3KCjRGMxSM1j2ndbTW3vPxwM60avpY1xLF7Z34LntXBtP+5b lGIE3EYhKZeks1+xsaxSXQLBnnQgeQvCJ54yE02GGP/DiJdKJp2uxt1H/OED2YS7Nxj6 ruOKcqeb10MJviTU1KPZXY2Td6hs9MqAwoj7A= X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:from:date:message-id:subject:to; bh=ENN8tmMgJPHXl5ZabXkUKM1YZMdOqfMYh3fXef/7Q8Q=; b=NrKzn4OWRSAuWeNf6BMuwlRowKiiEVk2gaBE9CK5L8E5UgtYGk3VcOU3CcKTE0gub9 Nz5+XoDp+0R1rBZTeBYlNbBrm/TG/J3B4VFm/MZrgkCstV1WEsTXhebNVcfOVI1PdJA+ nXn3Ov3uij6XZPgZYFg+MU0MKrFrirg/8sxgr8KUAqMlM89BJALhXoNvAhJNoWKIgpns b53Qm98VA1mGPD24VXPELp6ckEr4bG5WTtmLLROjJDVEJeEftsJ3Wun56A4fbs/BEe+e wk6TdVx2ytqcw/BrPQKa1H2Y37MBO20NTXT9WHkSK4BM102zJ2jm0RNiCAwA3kT/dAa0 pEeQ== X-Gm-Message-State: AGRZ1gKvIf8d+apcGvmYi/REQFU5ODt+8SXBpJJeszu4wYkXY7u1I7m8 Rc73d/vNbxlA0mdtp2HMIvPLsUJJFQGFshC2FFgrb8tcirU= X-Google-Smtp-Source: AJdET5dL7/CUoJvC9PX2TRkrndU6EpAoNC5Q2pKv7WzezsolCgpOAcf3kMHf+RV7c25HQuGjyX3B48uDhs3tDFufipE= X-Received: by 2002:a24:a642:: with SMTP id r2-v6mr1496490iti.55.1541590812101; Wed, 07 Nov 2018 03:40:12 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 From: Shivan Sahib Date: Wed, 7 Nov 2018 18:39:52 +0700 Message-ID: To: pearg@irtf.org Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="000000000000beb23c057a11946b" Archived-At: Subject: [Pearg] Thanks! X-BeenThere: pearg@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Privacy Enhancements and Assessment Proposed RG List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 07 Nov 2018 11:40:15 -0000 --000000000000beb23c057a11946b Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Thanks everyone for attending the meeting today, especially our presenters. Apologies that we ran over by a bit, and it would be good to continue the conversations on list. Also if people have ideas on what would be good work items for the RG, please suggest! - Shivan --000000000000beb23c057a11946b Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Thanks everyone for attending the meeting today, especiall= y our presenters. Apologies that we ran over by a bit, and it would be good= to continue the conversations on list. Also if people have ideas on what w= ould be good work items for the RG, please suggest!

- Sh= ivan
--000000000000beb23c057a11946b-- From nobody Wed Nov 7 18:59:56 2018 Return-Path: X-Original-To: pearg@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: pearg@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D544A130F02 for ; Wed, 7 Nov 2018 18:59:44 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.988 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.988 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, T_KAM_HTML_FONT_INVALID=0.01, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id PORKrOBQgM-a for ; Wed, 7 Nov 2018 18:59:39 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail-wm1-x330.google.com (mail-wm1-x330.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::330]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D4F8D130EF7 for ; Wed, 7 Nov 2018 18:59:38 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-wm1-x330.google.com with SMTP id f1-v6so524438wmg.1 for ; Wed, 07 Nov 2018 18:59:38 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to; bh=hc+znZvWc6a9ho9JtdA8enU/B87Oq1m/59dpZ5VpNZI=; b=dVuP3FSeULzFNAl+UaUAZnSFLjqK0ndVPvIxUIFFKTZjklP1QxYNDgWb22STzbOqL8 DxTVRelbCNf6eX/L9Wz0qD0AUo+ZOVvyE5RQVbuyGRjx3mxWg6eKeay03RYkxNiocy1R hmIT3bd7GoybuLUcPl5Tx+J5xSwrhVkJCuGIn2uv+bTqVluQ+Vb8KRYUy8JdSW/kTUyj AKx3XLCyJSzGIaLEKN6kaT+l6I3RhQHgUa6QJiVcgsZSCx7NuX7UuYFLXajQK3GDRV14 7Mldq13iGitqGOsLIjWEIkrqDBmwUsvwtHUHvsg0sBra6IjTBLrYdas0Hl1+exdmBztB Pw0Q== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to; bh=hc+znZvWc6a9ho9JtdA8enU/B87Oq1m/59dpZ5VpNZI=; b=odc+cvjiruwObbFxCFr6lnCsxWfy+N8tCeHIiFgZn2Ki+DRn2MdS/tzsW72BwWXjv3 slTG8pF8Fmqkke+ffEkN6HmJF50EXmtYmp/JQi+6lGCTDtdfgIKd9lZBdbgIq2j0mr3m G+nyxaqZIeRPlqyGperBoBsuEFhIJWOWx29qFd5ka8guNLV+QLqrNBVrgr4C0hHRw79W bka7IbsterFyHtrAYQodrjMcM22aq4D30af85RF6pV+1c7KonTPPJx85WMJyr5Dwg4hO x8Lgm9Lc9R76/IdBTV9y9I3aqZSLnQZYhTpskb7nFjhcU5oC8pohNvQOweccF4vddR7v RotA== X-Gm-Message-State: AGRZ1gLlPOLbJyLbp5lXMx2MXFi6EunGAAgJSPR/AjqPT6PO6/k00lHt JnAFsUx8o9nM8QedrcX3rwl4A9Ej611zF+UoAxj6Jw== X-Google-Smtp-Source: AJdET5dFWsMyZt6zZZr0bok+cg1ZbB+2ipWS4lBRidAGh97xRpyjbjGwXkVvj6rapzppHb5Fhq9P5kAjhGQxKGhI2TU= X-Received: by 2002:a1c:6754:: with SMTP id b81-v6mr2150585wmc.104.1541645977072; Wed, 07 Nov 2018 18:59:37 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: In-Reply-To: From: Corinne Cath Date: Thu, 8 Nov 2018 09:58:59 +0700 Message-ID: To: pearg@irtf.org Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="000000000000d53aa4057a1e6c2b" Archived-At: Subject: [Pearg] PearG IETF 103 notes X-BeenThere: pearg@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Privacy Enhancements and Assessment Proposed RG List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 08 Nov 2018 02:59:51 -0000 --000000000000d53aa4057a1e6c2b Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable hi, Please find below the notes I took during the inaugural PearG meeting yesterday. Ommissions, Dutchisms and mistakes are all mine. Best, --=20 Corinne Cath - Speth Ph.D. Candidate, Oxford Internet Institute & Alan Turing Institute Web: www.oii.ox.ac.uk/people/corinne-cath Email: ccath@turing.ac.uk & corinnecath@gmail.com Twitter: @C_Cath *Administrivia* *Charter:* Mic-line: Q: how do you define privacy? Is it about protocols? Maybe look at the business model of data monetization. A: yes, the privacy of protocols but we will also look at the application layer. Q: I thought it was notable that privacy beyond just confidentiality was highlighted, but no particular research items or topics seemed to be suggested. *Presentations:* Presentation 1: Bennett Cyphers (staff technologist) from EFF on Privacy Badgers - EFF is member funded non-profit - Privacy, free expression and innovation Context of privacy badgers: a story of how sometimes protocols are not enough. 2009 =E2=80=93 2012: DNT and the dream of a universal opt-out. Let=E2=80=99= s do this. Industry was interested too, in order to pre-empt (more) regulation, amongst other reasons. 2012 =E2=80=93 2018. Turn around on DNT in late 2012 because things were br= eaking down. EFF saw need for other way to allow people to opt-out of tracking. Privacy badger is born. Privacy Badger: - Both sticks and carrots (stop non-consensual tracking, spread awareness, promote DNT compliance, publish trackers who don=E2=80=99t DNT by blocking = them) - But faced constraints as small non-profit. It turns DNT on in your browser. Next steps: Badger Sett - Pre-train privacy badger on popular sites - Use privacy badger to survey the web - Test out new heuristics and measure the effectiveness - Privacy Badger mobile is needed bc of the importance of mobile browsing and apps. Mic open: - Privacy badger as part of the W3C DNT, why not? - Privacy sett does more than you mentioned in your talk - Interaction with other extensions sometimes is a problem - No telemetry data back to EFF, so your model of doing your own surveying of the web is great. - How much of cat and mouse game is it? A: it=E2=80=99s a pretty small ext= ension, add-blockers operate on such a scale that they consider it to be much work to avoid privacy badger. - Do you also provide guidance for privacy-preserving website? A: We refer to the DNT policy that is available for people who are interested in guidance. - How does it interact with add-blockers? A: we don=E2=80=99t block adds pe= rse, because they also track. You can also auto-adjust your settings. Presentation 2: Sofia Celi & Jurren van Bergen (Centro de autonomia digital) No evidence of communication: Off-the-record messaging protocol in version 4 (OTRv4) - Comes out of an academic paper - Provides encryption w forward secrecy; authentication, deniability. - Different version - Other protocols drew inspiration for it (like signal) Why version 4? - Deniability is crucial - Has a specification - Can find more info on the git repo Mic open: - Work in IETF on MLS, how does it relate? A: MLS does not provide deniability. - MLS wants to improve crypto, so it would seem that you have the same security guarantees, maybe you want to have the same kind of scrutiny applied to your stuff. We are an inspiration protocol. - Can you explain what is message and participation deniability? A: it means that no one can prove you participated and that nobody can prove that you sent that message. - MLS is agnostic on deniability currently. We would love to have your participation in the MLS working group. Presentation 3: David Oliver (Guardian Project) pluggable transport (obfuscates the address and network flows, to prevent DPI.) Surveillance is bad. Privacy is core to enabling human rights. Guardian Project focuses on mobile operating systems. DPI: - IP was to route, but routing data got weaponized. - DPI of traffic analysis, you can see the content of every packet in your traffic - Encryption also adheres to recognizable patterns. You can defend through obfuscation: - Service address - Content of the packet What is suspicious develops fast and deployment of work should hence also be faster =3D pluggable transports. Mic open: - Tensions between scale and half-life of mechanisms, the more successful you are the quicker you will have to turn over. A: yes, we are on the cutting edge and we expose a lot of problems so others can get involved. - Could you make all of the normal things the same? A: good point, lets talk offline. - Transport services working group might be relevant. - Have you thought of use-cases where both end-points are compromised? How do you detect anthrax and bombs (in the mail analogy). What about security concerns and not just privacy? A: primarily, with the earlier version the net-effect =E2=80=93 we are not exposing anything that previously got expos= ed. Let=E2=80=99s take it offline. - What if you want to inspect traffic for child pornography? A: I can=E2=80= =99t speak for the implementers. There is a tension. Presenter 4: Gunes Acar paper on Battery Status not included: assessing privacy in web standards New web features lead to privacy concerns. W3C has a self-review questionnaire. Came out of the privacy interest group (PING). Battery status API introduced in 2011. New research shows multiple privacy vulnerabilities. Mic open: - Recommendations on measurement are relevant. Participated in it 8 years ago. I think this should not be standardized. Because there is no way of having the info in the API without leaking. But drive in the W3C was very strong. This is an important part of history on device API. Our threat model understanding is better now but it remains a back-and-forth. - PING group is very happy with this research. Security and privacy questionnaire in W3C is currently being updated. We need people to get involved in the work. We should reach out early. -Implicit assumption in this work that API enable this kind of fingerprinting are bad, but that=E2=80=99s not the consensus of the browser vendors. It is not practical to prevent it in many cases. --000000000000d53aa4057a1e6c2b Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
hi,=C2=A0

Please find below the notes I took during the in= augural PearG meeting yesterday.

Ommissions, Dutchisms and mistakes ar= e all mine.=C2=A0

Best,

--=C2=A0
Cor= inne Cath - Speth
Ph.D.=C2=A0Candidate, Oxford Internet Institute & Alan Turing I= nstitute=C2=A0

Web:=C2=A0www.oii.= ox.ac.uk/people/corinne-cath=C2=A0
Email:=C2=A0ccath@turing.ac.uk=C2=A0&=C2=A0<= a href=3D"mailto:corinnecath@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">corinnecath@gmail= .com
Twitter: @C_Cath


Administri= via

=C2=A0

Charter:

Mic-line:

Q: how do you= define privacy? Is it about protocols? Maybe look at the business model of= data monetization.

A: yes, the p= rivacy of protocols but we will also look at the application layer.

=C2=A0

Q: I thought = it was notable that privacy beyond just confidentiality was highlighted, bu= t no particular research items or topics seemed to be suggested.

=C2=A0

Presentati= ons:

Presentation = 1: Bennett Cyphers (staff technologist) from EFF on Privacy Badgers

-=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 EFF is member funded non-profit

-=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 Privacy, free expression and innovation

=C2=A0

Context of pr= ivacy badgers: a story of how sometimes protocols are not enough.

=C2=A0

2009 =E2=80= =93 2012: DNT and the dream of a universal opt-out. Let=E2=80=99s do this.= =C2=A0 Industry was interested too, in order to pre-empt (more) regulation,= amongst other reasons.

=C2=A0

2012 =E2=80= =93 2018. Turn around on DNT in late 2012 because things were breaking down= . EFF saw need for other way to allow people to opt-out of tracking. Privac= y badger is born.


Privacy Badger:

-=C2=A0Both sticks and carrots (stop non-consensual tracking, = spread awareness, promote DNT compliance, publish trackers who don=E2=80=99= t DNT by blocking them)

-=C2=A0But faced constraints as smal= l non-profit.

=C2=A0

It turns DNT = on in your browser.

=C2=A0

Next steps: B= adger Sett

-=C2=A0=C2=A0Pre-train privacy badg= er on popular sites

-=C2=A0=C2=A0Use privacy badger = to survey the web

-=C2=A0=C2=A0Test out new heuris= tics and measure the effectiveness

-=C2=A0Privacy Badger mobile is need= ed bc of the importance of mobile browsing and apps.

=C2=A0

Mic open:

-=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0= Privacy badger as part of the W3C DNT, why not?

-=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0Privacy sett does more than you mentioned in y= our talk

-=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0Interaction with other extensions sometimes is a pro= blem

-=C2=A0No telemetry data back to EFF, so your model of doing your own s= urveying of the web is great.

-=C2=A0 How much of cat and mouse game is it? A: it=E2=80=99s a pretty = small extension, add-blockers operate on such a scale that they consider it= to be much work to avoid privacy badger.

-=C2=A0Do you also provide guidance for privacy-preserving website? A: = We refer to the DNT policy that is available for people who are interested = in guidance.

-=C2=A0How does it interact with add-blockers? A: we don=E2=80=99t block ad= ds perse, because they also track. You can also auto-adjust your settings. =

=C2=A0

=C2=A0

Presentation 2: Sofia Celi & Jurren van Bergen (Centro de auton= omia digital) No evidence of communication: Off-the-record messaging protoc= ol in version 4 (OTRv4)=C2=A0<= /p>

-=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2= =A0 Comes out of an academic paper

-=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0= =C2=A0 Provides encryption w forward sec= recy; authentication, deniability.

-=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0= =C2=A0 Different version

-=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2= =A0 Other protocols drew inspiration for= it (like signal)

=C2=A0

Why version 4?

-=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2= =A0 Deniability is crucial

-=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0= =C2=A0 Has a specification

-=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2= =A0 Can find more info on the git repo

=C2=A0

Mic open:

-=C2=A0=C2=A0Work in IETF on MLS, how does it relate? A: MLS does not prov= ide deniability.

-=C2=A0=C2=A0MLS wants to improve crypto, so it would seem that you hav= e the same security guarantees, maybe you want to have the same kind of scr= utiny applied to your stuff. We are an inspiration protocol.

-=C2=A0Can you explain what is message and participation deniability? A= : it means that no one can prove you participated and that nobody can prove= that you sent that message.

-=C2=A0MLS is agnostic on deniability currently. We would love to have your= participation in the MLS working group.

=C2=A0

=C2=A0

Presentation 3: David Oliver (Guardian Project) pluggable transport= (obfuscates the address and network flows, to prevent DPI.)=C2=A0Surveillance is bad. Privacy is core to enabli= ng human rights. Guardian Project focuses on mobile operating systems.

=C2=A0

DPI:

-=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2= =A0 IP was to route, but routing data go= t weaponized.

-=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0= =C2=A0 DPI of traffic analysis, you can = see the content of every packet in your traffic

-=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2= =A0 Encryption also adheres to recogniza= ble patterns.

You can defend through obfuscation:

-=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2= =A0 Service address

-=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2= =A0 Content of the packet

=C2=A0

What is suspicious develops fast and deployment of work should henc= e also be faster =3D pluggable transports.

=C2=A0

Mic open:

-=C2=A0Tensions between scale and half-life of mechanisms, the more succes= sful you are the quicker you will have to turn over. A: yes, we are on the = cutting edge and we expose a lot of problems so others can get involved.

-=C2=A0Could you make all of the normal things the same? A: good point,= lets talk offline.

-=C2=A0 Transport services working group might be relevant. =C2=A0

-=C2=A0Have you thought of use-cases where both end-points are compromi= sed? How do you detect anthrax and bombs (in the mail analogy). What about = security concerns and not just privacy? A: primarily, with the earlier vers= ion the net-effect =E2=80=93 we are not exposing anything that previously g= ot exposed. Let=E2=80=99s take it offline.

-=C2=A0What if you want to inspect traffic for child pornography? A: I can= =E2=80=99t speak for the implementers. There is a tension.


Presenter 4: Gunes Acar paper on Battery Sta= tus not included: assessing privacy in web standards=C2=A0New web features lead to privacy concerns.

W3C has a self-review questionnaire. Came out of the privacy intere= st group (PING).

=C2=A0

Battery status API introduced in 2011. New research shows multiple = privacy vulnerabilities.

=C2=A0

Mic open:

-=C2=A0Recommendations on measurement are relevant. Participated in it 8 y= ears ago. I think this should not be standardized. Because there is no way = of having the info in the API without leaking. But drive in the W3C was ver= y strong. This is an important part of history on device API. Our threat mo= del understanding is better now but it remains a back-and-forth.

-=C2=A0PING group is very happy with this research. Security and privac= y questionnaire in W3C is currently being updated. We need people to get in= volved in the work. We should reach out early.

-Implicit assumption in t= his work that API enable this kind of fingerprinting are bad, but that=E2= =80=99s not the consensus of the browser vendors. It is not practical to pr= event it in many cases. =C2=A0

=C2=A0

--000000000000d53aa4057a1e6c2b-- From nobody Wed Nov 7 19:53:21 2018 Return-Path: X-Original-To: pearg@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: pearg@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E9A1F130DF2 for ; Wed, 7 Nov 2018 19:53:18 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.9 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.9 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id lmyTLp-T_uqh for ; Wed, 7 Nov 2018 19:53:17 -0800 (PST) Received: from smarthost1.greenhost.nl (smarthost1.greenhost.nl [195.190.28.89]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1BC2712958B for ; Wed, 7 Nov 2018 19:53:17 -0800 (PST) Received: from smtp.greenhost.nl ([213.108.110.112]) by smarthost1.greenhost.nl with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:128) (Exim 4.84_2) (envelope-from ) id 1gKbNb-0005In-I2 for pearg@irtf.org; Thu, 08 Nov 2018 04:53:15 +0100 To: pearg@irtf.org References: From: Mallory Knodel Openpgp: preference=signencrypt Autocrypt: addr=mallory@article19.org; prefer-encrypt=mutual; keydata= xsBNBEx0TWcBCAC8sirY3nlDnRwY6XWmsvZtM9kmEK6H8no3ZuQ723PKwHOddw1nOykh0in/ /QGRmwtyVzsfLh6/94UUZTn10oo+xGAfw2gf1on5IJTIiphykk732PNnUakVGWwHNKQquTVc kLrydUaFVMb89BAXqExBKlMg2ciEjzbYMCs3I/qZAZ0Wr5nF3RQS8O78elTNAgWTZ98yKTZV DlRoDpnvbfwtIPqnISoSjDEvEUBdpykvS3jHqlR1f6Mx6Xs97S5CORaer/0qTcDm0PAb1Z9l IhMsFl05tNt2FpgS4/RN8NyLasAQNOlScpTJbAfRuyyvRm1N8GLIL1KX+YYeLyqzhdhZABEB AAHNJU1hbGxvcnkgS25vZGVsIDxtYWxsb3J5QG1heWZpcnN0Lm9yZz7CwJgEEwECAEICGwMG CwkIBwMCBhUIAgkKCwQWAgMBAh4BAheAAhkBFiEE4+tj4GWjskC82bBxDDKicb08x4AFAlqo 9WUFCRAV234ACgkQDDKicb08x4DklAf+ODKRmP6C2MnBz6vL8N8l3vZJUqoRcYXTn3uTpT05 Wou87ZIZ/P/OV2/uOMKkczLQQydj5S8PxbLTeg+U5f/63hdy99ON+K2b4izg7Qasdl1SqXTH q1pmhbrcbLbVKDJ345fdEg7RuMnv4gd3EaT/yQa99zHy8JHaBKaPEUQAa65HTt2Sy2c6L6BA aMZx1TOZ9/cZ7L1gJyytJbEyvg/JLOatJEI4rewUWU2TMSGJijwjAUBagwDPWyxpz+vXdKsD tqRTpY4xvXaeUQo0QXf0c5j1Gcglzv7ywZcyz1MGD1aLS9/CqeB3I4EMbvH/33LS3jNkfKbV XOTSjmo7l22CNc7ATQRMdE1nAQgA4mpP2LjFuAW2li9FPbDYOMzt0MtThXsnvHyY0fDv8FlU qnKgPrMY80VHntnxwqepFS3ncunVX4ipq+fadta+LHpTnbJSmlphBrc9qGJxqcjwf4yo35Xh OXCJFwnaoAwIX237lXRe4Xh6X4VMuJt8jiZdvgpbk/whvQH2grcq8KjCcy1iuL5pBl8ZwYG/ dphitFhQdqEcnc/krIqG4KQgKiUi3K/GR0OeEmw/cscWD7/CLEo7eHiaGQhSOyDQbM+Iu2o/ 6uMXMUPsYlMMqgmVL68zMacO3PE17jx0rQ8oZ7CpBY8YZWOWrzXrtFT8JO9guuCPsvd4KT6y 97y9LRJlPQARAQABwsB8BBgBAgAmAhsMFiEE4+tj4GWjskC82bBxDDKicb08x4AFAlqo9WYF CRAV238ACgkQDDKicb08x4DU4QgAmlyBlFhfU0jpkbyD3HQ+3CJqWdBT422pVIrj3qNT2ehy fWO66Muidmd4Y279uV3p3TQEJOQvnV7FVAC9+bI7AdBy00BAjHgJ5eSQZxKTXUoeeBAsTZHN /HaHewjYWHMvCuuzir/Wt3A6Cehh8gp9I/Vg+oL3dTldVqqgZLgnA83bT/R8fI/e85LDlpdx KJ0+uy/grg3AbH7LUUrmMIC2iO8mQWYuNlizsUZLFvJhCAU2c5l8B5mv2BoWFhL+l7mmNcdF bwBFXon7Ea1jkCnbWVxtXkPYkcuWuMSTJswn9HhZVJWjUonKqUZKAb9PxRzC9crZ+X14tQT3 iJt2a4ZM4w== Message-ID: Date: Thu, 8 Nov 2018 10:53:13 +0700 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/60.2.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Virus-Scanned: by clamav at smarthost1.samage.net X-Scan-Signature: 739ba1b2be5fabc1cc6069058737919f Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Pearg] Thanks! X-BeenThere: pearg@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Privacy Enhancements and Assessment Proposed RG List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 08 Nov 2018 03:53:19 -0000 On 07/11/2018 18:39, Shivan Sahib wrote: > Thanks everyone for attending the meeting today, especially our > presenters. Apologies that we ran over by a bit, and it would be good to > continue the conversations on list. Also if people have ideas on what > would be good work items for the RG, please suggest! > Thanks for a great meeting, Shivan! I'm interested in working on a draft that addresses the inherent tension between measurement and privacy. I've spoken to a few academics about the topic already but if there is anyone currently engaged in this group who would like to help with the structure of this document I'm open to discussing off list at this stage! -Mallory -- Mallory Knodel Head of Digital :: article19.org gpg fingerprint :: E3EB 63E0 65A3 B240 BCD9 B071 0C32 A271 BD3C C780 From nobody Wed Nov 7 21:06:46 2018 Return-Path: X-Original-To: pearg@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: pearg@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id EE916127332 for ; Wed, 7 Nov 2018 21:06:45 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -4.199 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.199 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id eLQTlSRHIp2y for ; Wed, 7 Nov 2018 21:06:43 -0800 (PST) Received: from virgo01.ee.ethz.ch (virgo01.ee.ethz.ch [129.132.2.226]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ADH-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 088B3126CB6 for ; Wed, 7 Nov 2018 21:06:43 -0800 (PST) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by virgo01.ee.ethz.ch (Postfix) with ESMTP id 42rB8d1WXczMmPy; Thu, 8 Nov 2018 06:06:41 +0100 (CET) X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at virgo01.ee.ethz.ch Received: from virgo01.ee.ethz.ch ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (virgo01.ee.ethz.ch [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id LbIZeRHxSsIR; Thu, 8 Nov 2018 06:06:39 +0100 (CET) X-MtScore: NO score=0 Received: from dhcp-821a.meeting.ietf.org (dhcp-821a.meeting.ietf.org [31.133.130.26]) by virgo01.ee.ethz.ch (Postfix) with ESMTPSA; Thu, 8 Nov 2018 06:06:38 +0100 (CET) Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 11.5 \(3445.9.1\)) From: =?utf-8?Q?Mirja_K=C3=BChlewind?= In-Reply-To: Date: Thu, 8 Nov 2018 12:06:33 +0700 Cc: pearg@irtf.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Message-Id: References: To: Mallory Knodel X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.3445.9.1) Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Pearg] Thanks! X-BeenThere: pearg@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Privacy Enhancements and Assessment Proposed RG List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 08 Nov 2018 05:06:46 -0000 Hi Mallory, hi all, please note that RFC 7258 has one paragraph on this tension: "While PM is an attack, other forms of monitoring that might fit the definition of PM can be beneficial and not part of any attack, e.g., network management functions monitor packets or flows and anti-spam mechanisms need to see mail message content. Some monitoring can even be part of the mitigation for PM, for example, certificate transparency [RFC6962] involves monitoring Public Key Infrastructure in ways that could detect some PM attack techniques. However, there is clear potential for monitoring mechanisms to be abused for PM, so this tension needs careful consideration in protocol design. Making networks unmanageable to mitigate PM is not an acceptable outcome, but ignoring PM would go against the consensus documented here. An appropriate balance will emerge over time as real instances of this tension are considered.=E2=80=9C Mirja > Am 08.11.2018 um 10:53 schrieb Mallory Knodel : >=20 > On 07/11/2018 18:39, Shivan Sahib wrote: >> Thanks everyone for attending the meeting today, especially our >> presenters. Apologies that we ran over by a bit, and it would be good = to >> continue the conversations on list. Also if people have ideas on what >> would be good work items for the RG, please suggest! >>=20 >=20 > Thanks for a great meeting, Shivan! >=20 > I'm interested in working on a draft that addresses the inherent = tension > between measurement and privacy. I've spoken to a few academics about > the topic already but if there is anyone currently engaged in this = group > who would like to help with the structure of this document I'm open to > discussing off list at this stage! >=20 > -Mallory >=20 > --=20 > Mallory Knodel > Head of Digital :: article19.org > gpg fingerprint :: E3EB 63E0 65A3 B240 BCD9 B071 0C32 A271 BD3C C780 >=20 > --=20 > Pearg mailing list > Pearg@irtf.org > https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/pearg From nobody Wed Nov 7 22:37:32 2018 Return-Path: X-Original-To: pearg@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: pearg@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B18A7130DC8 for ; Wed, 7 Nov 2018 22:37:30 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.9 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.9 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 9WiGMQ0vA7Yv for ; Wed, 7 Nov 2018 22:37:28 -0800 (PST) Received: from smarthost1.greenhost.nl (smarthost1.greenhost.nl [195.190.28.89]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 749AD12D4ED for ; Wed, 7 Nov 2018 22:37:28 -0800 (PST) Received: from smtp.greenhost.nl ([213.108.110.112]) by smarthost1.greenhost.nl with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:128) (Exim 4.84_2) (envelope-from ) id 1gKdwT-0000tY-R1; Thu, 08 Nov 2018 07:37:26 +0100 Date: Thu, 8 Nov 2018 06:37:25 +0000 (UTC) From: Mallory Knodel To: Mirja =?utf-8?Q?K=C3=BChlewind?= Cc: pearg@irtf.org Message-ID: <1239814576.40178559.1541659045180.JavaMail.zimbra@article19.org> In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Mailer: Zimbra 8.7.11_GA_1854 (zclient/8.7.11_GA_1854) Thread-Topic: Thanks! Thread-Index: nj51MRFF0+KCS+B726NikthonI56cQ== X-Virus-Scanned: by clamav at smarthost1.samage.net X-Scan-Signature: 4cc6a862e0a753e674eb374334b394fd Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Pearg] Thanks! X-BeenThere: pearg@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Privacy Enhancements and Assessment Proposed RG List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 08 Nov 2018 06:37:31 -0000 Excellent. This will be a useful reference and thanks for sharing it.=20 -M ----- Original Message ----- From: Mirja K=C3=BChlewind To: Mallory Knodel Cc: pearg@irtf.org Sent: Thu, 08 Nov 2018 05:06:33 -0000 (UTC) Subject: Re: [Pearg] Thanks! Hi Mallory, hi all, please note that RFC 7258 has one paragraph on this tension: "While PM is an attack, other forms of monitoring that might fit the definition of PM can be beneficial and not part of any attack, e.g., network management functions monitor packets or flows and anti-spam mechanisms need to see mail message content. Some monitoring can even be part of the mitigation for PM, for example, certificate transparency [RFC6962] involves monitoring Public Key Infrastructure in ways that could detect some PM attack techniques. However, there is clear potential for monitoring mechanisms to be abused for PM, so this tension needs careful consideration in protocol design. Making networks unmanageable to mitigate PM is not an acceptable outcome, but ignoring PM would go against the consensus documented here. An appropriate balance will emerge over time as real instances of this tension are considered.=E2=80=9C Mirja > Am 08.11.2018 um 10:53 schrieb Mallory Knodel : >=20 > On 07/11/2018 18:39, Shivan Sahib wrote: >> Thanks everyone for attending the meeting today, especially our >> presenters. Apologies that we ran over by a bit, and it would be good to >> continue the conversations on list. Also if people have ideas on what >> would be good work items for the RG, please suggest! >>=20 >=20 > Thanks for a great meeting, Shivan! >=20 > I'm interested in working on a draft that addresses the inherent tension > between measurement and privacy. I've spoken to a few academics about > the topic already but if there is anyone currently engaged in this group > who would like to help with the structure of this document I'm open to > discussing off list at this stage! >=20 > -Mallory >=20 > --=20 > Mallory Knodel > Head of Digital :: article19.org > gpg fingerprint :: E3EB 63E0 65A3 B240 BCD9 B071 0C32 A271 BD3C C780 >=20 > --=20 > Pearg mailing list > Pearg@irtf.org > https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/pearg From nobody Tue Nov 27 11:22:34 2018 Return-Path: X-Original-To: pearg@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: pearg@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C9FDB124D68 for ; Tue, 27 Nov 2018 11:22:32 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -3.459 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.459 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIMWL_WL_MED=-1.459, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=salesforce.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id hbzYfJ4SzeOx for ; Tue, 27 Nov 2018 11:22:29 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail-io1-xd2f.google.com (mail-io1-xd2f.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::d2f]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id CBA1212896A for ; Tue, 27 Nov 2018 11:22:29 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-io1-xd2f.google.com with SMTP id m19so17929495ioh.3 for ; Tue, 27 Nov 2018 11:22:29 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=salesforce.com; s=google; h=mime-version:from:date:message-id:subject:to; bh=fadGa6M1MNswBioednTqUWHqEmddTyIBRuuqnXCTbU0=; b=AYDC8ErO+zH5Cp0d3FK75Y1Eqca9L06PobR3jajguyUeNAbMJRB1cphBLphx3Q3lfP uVFct1aA+z0EYO2hBpgoOdM3iRG3bJ30EbeDltCw6ROSjBKztWCQPh43n+yT7/AO3Hm4 i5BKYZPLH38M0ahvOp9MZlPJpo56KIWr1UHCo= X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:from:date:message-id:subject:to; bh=fadGa6M1MNswBioednTqUWHqEmddTyIBRuuqnXCTbU0=; b=c0zqtgkJUEdgvbw2QUBHPorNy3/e+ooJZUGq967DzN6rt21OjSm0sjGG4+f2VnrYMe nUIvl2ZCBTKXv+CVrpZyGKDdq4TyC9DbPxL3iugZ9OVEcvBbQ92nOhvk6/7os8YT/r/O ykj8V2bFDGaXv55o3zBLm2/1xDVpzSMJZ4sJHao4jmjuvuHO9tZMMgUQIpyThvPQZJo7 Zsg2egV8Y3TokCxcDmWXZltckatLnj9nIR0xp43/R8TyGVAM2fz57SU7XGl+y7sMiv6U VU1Ory6WWs5st6CzJgLs6+Gqkph6y6421WAXVwHOCgSS5clpFio0WMFajDdPd5usqOSV e1VQ== X-Gm-Message-State: AA+aEWYPSy+ajKWVQOKjnDmKPTWM4Y67lIuDPfVFNsyyNmm4+W8+F49F MyQ43rZnVpZjyKO2gfxpQ8YaGhTRuSTQUZhPK19rxyJVwxDcGA== X-Google-Smtp-Source: AFSGD/VVTVHh84jtaJwHP8bDn/aAbzcN0u5d3UsU+UjNB+VYqQp3bbIwR7nV7olMW2N5f6CsQp//yG10rSp6iHcCkz4= X-Received: by 2002:a6b:ca03:: with SMTP id a3-v6mr25710517iog.208.1543346548706; Tue, 27 Nov 2018 11:22:28 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 From: Shivan Sahib Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2018 11:22:17 -0800 Message-ID: To: pearg@irtf.org Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="000000000000cd67a6057baa5e43" Archived-At: Subject: [Pearg] Prio: privacy preserving telemetry X-BeenThere: pearg@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Privacy Enhancements and Assessment Proposed RG List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2018 19:22:33 -0000 --000000000000cd67a6057baa5e43 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Hi all, Figured this might be of interest to some folks in this group: Prio is a privacy-preserving telemetry framework developed and deployed by Stanford + Mozilla (in Firefox). https://hacks.mozilla.org/2018/10/testing-privacy-preserving-telemetry-with-prio/ --000000000000cd67a6057baa5e43 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Hi all,

Figured this m= ight be of interest to some folks in this group: Prio is a privacy-preservi= ng telemetry framework developed and deployed by Stanford=C2=A0+ Mozilla (i= n Firefox).=C2=A0



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