Subject: [perpass] OpenPGP mail/news header

From: Simon Josefsson <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 28 Aug 2014 16:00:43 +0200

Folks,

I have updated a six (!) year old document describing the OpenPGP
mail/news header field.  As it encourages and promotes use of
encrypted/signed email, I thought it would be relevant to this list.
All feedback is appreciated, either directly to me or here.

http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-josefsson-openpgp-mailnews-header-07

/Simon

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From: Hannes Tschofenig <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 28 Aug 2014 16:32:38 +0200

Simon, just today I enjoyed reading this blog post:
http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2014/08/whats-matter-with-pgp.html

Ciao
Hannes

On 08/28/2014 04:00 PM, Simon Josefsson wrote:
> _______________________________________________
> perpass mailing list
> [email-masked]
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/perpass
>

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From: Paul Wouters <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 28 Aug 2014 10:54:20 -0400 (EDT)

> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-josefsson-openpgp-mailnews-header-07

I think it would be better to announce both keyid and fingerprint.

Would it be better to use the longer keyid version?

Should a warning be added to the Security Considerations about v3 keys
being vulnerable to forging of fingerprints?
See: https://github.com/coruus/cooperpair/tree/master/keysteak

It would be nice to support OPENPGPKEY DNS records in header as well?

either:

OpenPGP: dns:[email-masked]

or

OpenPGP: dns=ab16de0656382d91838914109ab89a0a4e04321550a1a20ace7a8b66._openpgpkey.nohats.ca

Perhaps add a reference to:

http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-wouters-dane-openpgp

Paul

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From: Simon Josefsson <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 28 Aug 2014 21:26:15 +0200

> Would it be better to use the longer keyid version?

Both key id and full fingerprint are permitted.

> See: https://github.com/coruus/cooperpair/tree/master/keysteak

There is already the following text:

   Version 3 OpenPGP keys can be created with a chosen key id (aka "the
   0xDEADBEEF attack").  Verifying the Key ID of a retrieved key against
   the one provided in the field is thus not sufficient to protect
   against a man-in-the-middle attack.  Instead, the web-of-trust
   mechanism should be used.

> OpenPGP:
> dns=ab16de0656382d91838914109ab89a0a4e04321550a1a20ace7a8b66._openpgpkey.nohats.ca

Should already be supported through RFC 4501, or am I missing something?

OpenPGP: id=12345678; url=dns:ab16de0656382d91838914109ab89a0a4e04321550a1a20ace7a8b66._openpgpkey.nohats.ca?TYPE=OPENPGPKEY

OpenPGP: id=12345678; url=dns:simon.josefsson.org?TYPE=CERT

> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-wouters-dane-openpgp

Please propose some text to give the reference some context, and I'll
consider it. :-)

/Simon