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From: Stefan Santesson <stefans@microsoft.com>
To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
CC: "ietf-pkix@imc.org" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>
Date: Wed, 3 Jan 2007 14:58:27 +0000
Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs
Thread-Topic: Certificates in CRLs
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Russ,

In theory, the CA can put different pointers to different CRLs in each certificate if some certificates are prime targets for frequent checking. But I don't think that is a common scenario.

My point is that in order to allow free selection of CRLs, you would have to add capability to the CDP extension rather than to the CRL. I don't think such effort is worth the trouble.

I'm convinced that including certs in a CRL will only be made in situations where it in the sum of all, helps increase efficiency and where the extra bandwidth consumed is not an issue.

I read the critique of this idea as not really be a bandwidth issue, but that some implementers simply don't want to be faced with the requirement to implement this feature. But I don't see that they have to. A CRL with certs in a non-critical extension should work just as well in current clients as any current CRL without certs. The extension can simply be ignored.

This is not a necessary feature, but a practical one offering performance improvements in some environments at no loss of interoperability.


Stefan Santesson
Senior Program Manager
Windows Security, Standards


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Russ Housley [mailto:housley@vigilsec.com]
> Sent: den 21 december 2006 16:19
> To: Stefan Santesson
> Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
> Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs
>
> Stefan:
>
> If the CA chooses to offer both, how can the RP determine which one
> it will get?  Does the CA post them in different LDAP attributes?
>
> Russ
>
> At 08:00 AM 12/21/2006, Stefan Santesson wrote:
>
> >As with anything else, the relying party can get what the CA offers.
> >
> >I don't think there is any realistic scenario where the CA has a
> >reason to offer CRLs both with and without certificates.
> >To offer this capability to RP is however not a matter for this
> >protocol. It would be a matter for the CRL referencing model, i.e.
> >CDP and/or directory schema.
> >
> >I don't think that extra complexity however is very useful.
> >
> >Stefan Santesson
> >Senior Program Manager
> >Windows Security, Standards
> >
> >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-
> > > pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Denis Pinkas
> > > Sent: den 20 december 2006 17:05
> > > To: ietf-pkix@imc.org
> > > Subject: Re: Certificates in CRLs
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > It is necessary to provide relying parties with the choice to get :
> > >
> > >   - CRLs "as usual", or
> > >   - CRLs that carry that new extension.
> > >
> > > The current proposal does not allow for it.
> > >
> > > Until the draft is changed, I am against the addition of this work
> item
> > > to the program of the PKIX WG.
> > >
> > > Denis
> > >
> > >
> _______________________________________________________________________
> > > _______
> > >
> > > >Since last IETF a new draft was posted:
> > > >http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-santesson-pkix-vccrl-
> 00.txt
> > > >
> > > >There is a request to add this draft to the PKIX work and I would
> > > encourage to start the discussion about this decision in this
> thread.
> > > >
> > > >Stefan Santesson
> > > >Senior Program Manager
> > > >Windows Security, Standards
> > >
> > >
> > >





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------=_NextPart_07010317282827380810454_002--






From owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Wed Jan 03 17:03:26 2007
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To: pkix <ietf-pkix@imc.org>
From: Alan Sill <Alan.Sill@ttu.edu>
Subject: Question on ns* cert type deprecation
Date: Wed, 3 Jan 2007 14:41:59 -0600
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> 2.4.4 nsCertType, nsComment, nsPolicyURL, nsRevocationURL
> The ns* attributes are deprecated and SHOULD NOT be included in any  
> new CA
> certificates.
> If they are included, though, these extensions MUST NOT be marked  
> critical.

Is this for CA certs only (i.e., ones used to identify a CA), or does  
it apply to end-entity certificates issued by a CA to identify a host  
or person also?

We have conditions in which a host may need to contact a service to  
request information, and for which we have been using a Netscape Cert  
Type of SSL Client to indicate that the host is allowed to do so.  I  
am assuming that the above extract from the IETF Certificate Profile  
document is intended to apply to CA certs only, and so our use of  
this field in EE certs is OK.  Or is there a more general way to do  
this?

Thanks,
Alan

====================================================================
:  Alan Sill, Texas Tech University  Office: Admin 233, MS 4-1167  :
:  e-mail: Alan.Sill@ttu.edu   ph. 806-742-4350  fax 806-742-4358  :
====================================================================




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Hello All,

    It's my first question in this comunities, i'm study about x509 
extensions, my question is about this.

    Exist some way to create a new extension, or my private extension 
in the certificate x509 ?

Best Regards,

Luiz Lago.




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To: "'Stefan Santesson'" <stefans@microsoft.com>,
        Russ Housley
	 <housley@vigilsec.com>
Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs
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I still think wasted bandwidth is also an issue. Forcing the download of
'fat' CRLs on clients when, in many cases, those clients already have the
certificates locally that caused the bloating of the CRL, is an unnecessary
waste.

-----Original Message-----
From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] On
Behalf Of Stefan Santesson
Sent: Wednesday, January 03, 2007 9:58 AM
To: Russ Housley
Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs



Russ,

In theory, the CA can put different pointers to different CRLs in each
certificate if some certificates are prime targets for frequent checking.
But I don't think that is a common scenario.

My point is that in order to allow free selection of CRLs, you would have to
add capability to the CDP extension rather than to the CRL. I don't think
such effort is worth the trouble.

I'm convinced that including certs in a CRL will only be made in situations
where it in the sum of all, helps increase efficiency and where the extra
bandwidth consumed is not an issue.

I read the critique of this idea as not really be a bandwidth issue, but
that some implementers simply don't want to be faced with the requirement to
implement this feature. But I don't see that they have to. A CRL with certs
in a non-critical extension should work just as well in current clients as
any current CRL without certs. The extension can simply be ignored.

This is not a necessary feature, but a practical one offering performance
improvements in some environments at no loss of interoperability.


Stefan Santesson
Senior Program Manager
Windows Security, Standards


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Russ Housley [mailto:housley@vigilsec.com]
> Sent: den 21 december 2006 16:19
> To: Stefan Santesson
> Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
> Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs
>
> Stefan:
>
> If the CA chooses to offer both, how can the RP determine which one it 
> will get?  Does the CA post them in different LDAP attributes?
>
> Russ
>
> At 08:00 AM 12/21/2006, Stefan Santesson wrote:
>
> >As with anything else, the relying party can get what the CA offers.
> >
> >I don't think there is any realistic scenario where the CA has a 
> >reason to offer CRLs both with and without certificates. To offer 
> >this capability to RP is however not a matter for this protocol. It 
> >would be a matter for the CRL referencing model, i.e. CDP and/or 
> >directory schema.
> >
> >I don't think that extra complexity however is very useful.
> >
> >Stefan Santesson
> >Senior Program Manager
> >Windows Security, Standards
> >
> >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf- 
> > > pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Denis Pinkas
> > > Sent: den 20 december 2006 17:05
> > > To: ietf-pkix@imc.org
> > > Subject: Re: Certificates in CRLs
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > It is necessary to provide relying parties with the choice to get 
> > > :
> > >
> > >   - CRLs "as usual", or
> > >   - CRLs that carry that new extension.
> > >
> > > The current proposal does not allow for it.
> > >
> > > Until the draft is changed, I am against the addition of this work
> item
> > > to the program of the PKIX WG.
> > >
> > > Denis
> > >
> > >
> ______________________________________________________________________
> _
> > > _______
> > >
> > > >Since last IETF a new draft was posted:
> > > >http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-santesson-pkix-vccrl-
> 00.txt
> > > >
> > > >There is a request to add this draft to the PKIX work and I would
> > > encourage to start the discussion about this decision in this
> thread.
> > > >
> > > >Stefan Santesson
> > > >Senior Program Manager
> > > >Windows Security, Standards
> > >
> > >
> > >


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<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 3.2//EN">
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<META HTTP-EQUIV=3D"Content-Type" CONTENT=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dus-ascii">
<META NAME=3D"Generator" CONTENT=3D"MS Exchange Server version =
5.5.2658.34">
<TITLE>RE: Certificates in CRLs</TITLE>
</HEAD>
<BODY>

<P><FONT SIZE=3D2>I still think wasted bandwidth is also an issue. =
Forcing the download of 'fat' CRLs on clients when, in many cases, =
those clients already have the certificates locally that caused the =
bloating of the CRL, is an unnecessary waste.</FONT></P>

<P><FONT SIZE=3D2>-----Original Message-----</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [<A =
HREF=3D"mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org">mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail=
.imc.org</A>] On Behalf Of Stefan Santesson</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>Sent: Wednesday, January 03, 2007 9:58 AM</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>To: Russ Housley</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs</FONT>
</P>
<BR>
<BR>

<P><FONT SIZE=3D2>Russ,</FONT>
</P>

<P><FONT SIZE=3D2>In theory, the CA can put different pointers to =
different CRLs in each certificate if some certificates are prime =
targets for frequent checking. But I don't think that is a common =
scenario.</FONT></P>

<P><FONT SIZE=3D2>My point is that in order to allow free selection of =
CRLs, you would have to add capability to the CDP extension rather than =
to the CRL. I don't think such effort is worth the trouble.</FONT></P>

<P><FONT SIZE=3D2>I'm convinced that including certs in a CRL will only =
be made in situations where it in the sum of all, helps increase =
efficiency and where the extra bandwidth consumed is not an =
issue.</FONT></P>

<P><FONT SIZE=3D2>I read the critique of this idea as not really be a =
bandwidth issue, but that some implementers simply don't want to be =
faced with the requirement to implement this feature. But I don't see =
that they have to. A CRL with certs in a non-critical extension should =
work just as well in current clients as any current CRL without certs. =
The extension can simply be ignored.</FONT></P>

<P><FONT SIZE=3D2>This is not a necessary feature, but a practical one =
offering performance improvements in some environments at no loss of =
interoperability.</FONT></P>
<BR>

<P><FONT SIZE=3D2>Stefan Santesson</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>Senior Program Manager</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>Windows Security, Standards</FONT>
</P>
<BR>

<P><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; -----Original Message-----</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; From: Russ Housley [<A =
HREF=3D"mailto:housley@vigilsec.com">mailto:housley@vigilsec.com</A>]</F=
ONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; Sent: den 21 december 2006 16:19</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; To: Stefan Santesson</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt;</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; Stefan:</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt;</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; If the CA chooses to offer both, how can the RP =
determine which one it </FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; will get?&nbsp; Does the CA post them in =
different LDAP attributes?</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt;</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; Russ</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt;</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; At 08:00 AM 12/21/2006, Stefan Santesson =
wrote:</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt;</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt;As with anything else, the relying party =
can get what the CA offers.</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt;</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt;I don't think there is any realistic =
scenario where the CA has a </FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt;reason to offer CRLs both with and without =
certificates. To offer </FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt;this capability to RP is however not a =
matter for this protocol. It </FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt;would be a matter for the CRL referencing =
model, i.e. CDP and/or </FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt;directory schema.</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt;</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt;I don't think that extra complexity however =
is very useful.</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt;</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt;Stefan Santesson</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt;Senior Program Manager</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt;Windows Security, Standards</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt;</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt;</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt; -----Original Message-----</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt; From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org =
[<A HREF=3D"mailto:owner-ietf-">mailto:owner-ietf-</A> </FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt; pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Denis =
Pinkas</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt; Sent: den 20 december 2006 =
17:05</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt; To: ietf-pkix@imc.org</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt; Subject: Re: Certificates in =
CRLs</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt;</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt;</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt;</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt; It is necessary to provide relying =
parties with the choice to get </FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt; :</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt;</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; - CRLs &quot;as =
usual&quot;, or</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; - CRLs that carry that =
new extension.</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt;</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt; The current proposal does not allow =
for it.</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt;</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt; Until the draft is changed, I am =
against the addition of this work</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; item</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt; to the program of the PKIX WG.</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt;</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt; Denis</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt;</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt;</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; =
______________________________________________________________________</=
FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; _</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt; _______</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt;</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;Since last IETF a new draft was =
posted:</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;<A =
HREF=3D"http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-santesson-pkix-vccrl-"=
 =
TARGET=3D"_blank">http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-santesson-pk=
ix-vccrl-</A></FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; 00.txt</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;There is a request to add this =
draft to the PKIX work and I would</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt; encourage to start the discussion =
about this decision in this</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; thread.</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;Stefan Santesson</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;Senior Program Manager</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;Windows Security, =
Standards</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt;</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt;</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt;</FONT>
</P>

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From: Stefan Santesson <stefans@microsoft.com>
To: Sharon Boeyen <sharon.boeyen@entrust.com>,
        Russ Housley
	<housley@vigilsec.com>
CC: "ietf-pkix@imc.org" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>
Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2007 13:01:20 +0000
Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs
Thread-Topic: Certificates in CRLs
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We are only talking about an extra 16K at most. The download time is the ab=
solute most cases is negligible.
For those cases where this solution makes sense, the network bandwidth issu=
e is not a problem.

For the cases where this would be an issue, this solution would not be used=
.

On the contrary, in some networks and scenarios, this will improve performa=
nce. Especially in high latency networks with PKI based peer-peer authentic=
ation where an extra retrieval cost way more performance than the expanded =
CRL size.

Also, many clients are configured to pre-fetch CRL:s before they are used, =
using idle time on the network at no extra cost.


Stefan Santesson
Senior Program Manager
Windows Security, Standards

From: Sharon Boeyen [mailto:sharon.boeyen@entrust.com]
Sent: den 4 januari 2007 17:36
To: Stefan Santesson; Russ Housley
Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs


I still think wasted bandwidth is also an issue. Forcing the download of 'f=
at' CRLs on clients when, in many cases, those clients already have the cer=
tificates locally that caused the bloating of the CRL, is an unnecessary wa=
ste.

-----Original Message-----
From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] On=
 Behalf Of Stefan Santesson
Sent: Wednesday, January 03, 2007 9:58 AM
To: Russ Housley
Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs


Russ,

In theory, the CA can put different pointers to different CRLs in each cert=
ificate if some certificates are prime targets for frequent checking. But I=
 don't think that is a common scenario.

My point is that in order to allow free selection of CRLs, you would have t=
o add capability to the CDP extension rather than to the CRL. I don't think=
 such effort is worth the trouble.

I'm convinced that including certs in a CRL will only be made in situations=
 where it in the sum of all, helps increase efficiency and where the extra =
bandwidth consumed is not an issue.

I read the critique of this idea as not really be a bandwidth issue, but th=
at some implementers simply don't want to be faced with the requirement to =
implement this feature. But I don't see that they have to. A CRL with certs=
 in a non-critical extension should work just as well in current clients as=
 any current CRL without certs. The extension can simply be ignored.

This is not a necessary feature, but a practical one offering performance i=
mprovements in some environments at no loss of interoperability.


Stefan Santesson
Senior Program Manager
Windows Security, Standards


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Russ Housley [mailto:housley@vigilsec.com]
> Sent: den 21 december 2006 16:19
> To: Stefan Santesson
> Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
> Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs
>
> Stefan:
>
> If the CA chooses to offer both, how can the RP determine which one it
> will get?  Does the CA post them in different LDAP attributes?
>
> Russ
>
> At 08:00 AM 12/21/2006, Stefan Santesson wrote:
>
> >As with anything else, the relying party can get what the CA offers.
> >
> >I don't think there is any realistic scenario where the CA has a
> >reason to offer CRLs both with and without certificates. To offer
> >this capability to RP is however not a matter for this protocol. It
> >would be a matter for the CRL referencing model, i.e. CDP and/or
> >directory schema.
> >
> >I don't think that extra complexity however is very useful.
> >
> >Stefan Santesson
> >Senior Program Manager
> >Windows Security, Standards
> >
> >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-
> > > pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Denis Pinkas
> > > Sent: den 20 december 2006 17:05
> > > To: ietf-pkix@imc.org
> > > Subject: Re: Certificates in CRLs
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > It is necessary to provide relying parties with the choice to get
> > > :
> > >
> > >   - CRLs "as usual", or
> > >   - CRLs that carry that new extension.
> > >
> > > The current proposal does not allow for it.
> > >
> > > Until the draft is changed, I am against the addition of this work
> item
> > > to the program of the PKIX WG.
> > >
> > > Denis
> > >
> > >
> ______________________________________________________________________
> _
> > > _______
> > >
> > > >Since last IETF a new draft was posted:
> > > >http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-santesson-pkix-vccrl-
> 00.txt
> > > >
> > > >There is a request to add this draft to the PKIX work and I would
> > > encourage to start the discussion about this decision in this
> thread.
> > > >
> > > >Stefan Santesson
> > > >Senior Program Manager
> > > >Windows Security, Standards
> > >
> > >
> > >

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<title>RE: Certificates in CRLs</title>
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<div class=3DSection1>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><a name=3D"_MailEndCompose"><span lang=3DEN-US style=
=3D'font-size:
11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>We are only talkin=
g
about an extra 16K at most. The download time is the absolute most cases is=
 negligible.
<o:p></o:p></span></a></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>For those cases where this solution makes sense, the network
bandwidth issue is not a problem.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>For the cases where this would be an issue, this solution wo=
uld
not be used.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>On the contrary, in some networks and scenarios, this will i=
mprove
performance. Especially in high latency networks with PKI based peer-peer
authentication where an extra retrieval cost way more performance than the
expanded CRL size.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>Also, many clients are configured to pre-fetch CRL:s before =
they
are used, using idle time on the network at no extra cost.<o:p></o:p></span=
></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-f=
amily:
"Arial","sans-serif";color:maroon'>Stefan Santesson</span></b><span lang=3D=
EN-GB
style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:#400040'>Senior Program Manager</span><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'col=
or:navy'><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-f=
amily:
"Arial","sans-serif";color:#400040'>Windows Security, Standards</span></b><=
span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p></o:p></span></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0cm 0cm 0cm =
4.0pt'>

<div>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0cm =
0cm 0cm'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-f=
amily:
"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span></b><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-siz=
e:10.0pt;
font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> Sharon Boeyen
[mailto:sharon.boeyen@entrust.com] <br>
<b>Sent:</b> den 4 januari 2007 17:36<br>
<b>To:</b> Stefan Santesson; Russ Housley<br>
<b>Cc:</b> ietf-pkix@imc.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> RE: Certificates in CRLs<o:p></o:p></span></p>

</div>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>I still think wasted bandwidth is also =
an
issue. Forcing the download of 'fat' CRLs on clients when, in many cases, t=
hose
clients already have the certificates locally that caused the bloating of t=
he
CRL, is an unnecessary waste.</span><o:p></o:p></p>

<p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>-----Original Message-----</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [<a
href=3D"mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org">mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.im=
c.org</a>]
On Behalf Of Stefan Santesson</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Sent: Wednesday, January 03, 2007 9:58 AM<=
/span>
<br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>To: Russ Housley</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs</span> <=
o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-bottom:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Russ,</span> <o:p></o:p></p>

<p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>In theory, the CA can put different poi=
nters
to different CRLs in each certificate if some certificates are prime target=
s
for frequent checking. But I don't think that is a common scenario.</span><=
o:p></o:p></p>

<p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>My point is that in order to allow free
selection of CRLs, you would have to add capability to the CDP extension ra=
ther
than to the CRL. I don't think such effort is worth the trouble.</span><o:p=
></o:p></p>

<p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>I'm convinced that including certs in a=
 CRL
will only be made in situations where it in the sum of all, helps increase
efficiency and where the extra bandwidth consumed is not an issue.</span><o=
:p></o:p></p>

<p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>I read the critique of this idea as not
really be a bandwidth issue, but that some implementers simply don't want t=
o be
faced with the requirement to implement this feature. But I don't see that =
they
have to. A CRL with certs in a non-critical extension should work just as w=
ell
in current clients as any current CRL without certs. The extension can simp=
ly
be ignored.</span><o:p></o:p></p>

<p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>This is not a necessary feature, but a
practical one offering performance improvements in some environments at no =
loss
of interoperability.</span><o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Stefan Santesson</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Senior Program Manager</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Windows Security, Standards</span> <o:p></=
o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; -----Original Message-----</span> =
<br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; From: Russ Housley [<a
href=3D"mailto:housley@vigilsec.com">mailto:housley@vigilsec.com</a>]</span=
> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; Sent: den 21 december 2006 16:19</spa=
n> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; To: Stefan Santesson</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs</sp=
an> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; Stefan:</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; If the CA chooses to offer both, how =
can
the RP determine which one it </span><br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; will get?&nbsp; Does the CA post them=
 in
different LDAP attributes?</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; Russ</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; At 08:00 AM 12/21/2006, Stefan Santes=
son
wrote:</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;As with anything else, the relyin=
g
party can get what the CA offers.</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;I don't think there is any realis=
tic
scenario where the CA has a </span><br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;reason to offer CRLs both with an=
d
without certificates. To offer </span><br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;this capability to RP is however =
not a
matter for this protocol. It </span><br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;would be a matter for the CRL
referencing model, i.e. CDP and/or </span><br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;directory schema.</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;I don't think that extra complexi=
ty
however is very useful.</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;Stefan Santesson</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;Senior Program Manager</span> <br=
>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;Windows Security, Standards</span=
> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; -----Original Message-----<=
/span>
<br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; From:
owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [<a href=3D"mailto:owner-ietf-">mailto:owner-i=
etf-</a>
</span><br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behal=
f Of
Denis Pinkas</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; Sent: den 20 december 2006 =
17:05</span>
<br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; To: ietf-pkix@imc.org</span=
> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; Subject: Re: Certificates i=
n CRLs</span>
<br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; It is necessary to provide
relying parties with the choice to get </span><br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; :</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; - CRLs &quot;as
usual&quot;, or</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; - CRLs that car=
ry
that new extension.</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; The current proposal does n=
ot
allow for it.</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; Until the draft is changed,=
 I am
against the addition of this work</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; item</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; to the program of the PKIX =
WG.</span>
<br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; Denis</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt;
______________________________________________________________________</spa=
n> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; _</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; _______</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;Since last IETF a new d=
raft
was posted:</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;<a
href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-santesson-pkix-vccrl-"
target=3D"_blank">http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-santesson-pkix-=
vccrl-</a></span>
<br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; 00.txt</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;There is a request to a=
dd
this draft to the PKIX work and I would</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; encourage to start the disc=
ussion
about this decision in this</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; thread.</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;Stefan Santesson</span>=
 <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;Senior Program Manager<=
/span>
<br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;Windows Security, Stand=
ards</span>
<br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

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From owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Fri Jan 05 10:49:53 2007
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Message-ID: <04398A2C9F306C4690265C144089972D23E71C@sottexch1.corp.ad.entrust.com>
From: Sharon Boeyen <sharon.boeyen@entrust.com>
To: "'Stefan Santesson'" <stefans@microsoft.com>,
        Sharon Boeyen
	 <sharon.boeyen@entrust.com>,
        Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs
Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2007 09:09:25 -0500 
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Stefan I really don't think you can state where this will or will not be
used in the future. Naturally you know where you want to use it, but
software only enables a facility and the customer decides when and how to
use it. 
 
Whether this scheme could possibly be useful in some cases is not my point.
My point is that current deployments seem to be working fine without it and
I don't want to see those interfered with just because some CA they may have
cross certified with decided to put certificates inside their CRLS. Back to
Denis' point - there is no need to impose this in the way you've proposed. 
 
Earlier I (and others including Dave Kemp) suggested a "package" that
includes the CRL, and the certificate in question as an 'extra' that a CA
could publish in addition to a regular CRL. That "package could be published
in a separate directory attribute and/or an HTTP accessible file. It could
be pointed to from within the certificate just as the CRL currently is. That
could be done either by extending the CRLDP or adding a new pointer
extension or adding a new method to the AIA extension. That type of approach
gives you what you want but does not in any way interfere with clients who
do not want and do not need to retrieve that bloated CRL. 
 
Also, you haven't addressed the question about what happens when more than
one certificate is needed. If a CRL includes more than one certificate (e.g.
the CRL issuer did one or more key rollovers then CRL gets bloated a lot
bigger than you suggested. I don't want to debate how often a key gets
rolled over either however I have definitely seen instances in real world
deployments where a key has been rolled very often in a very short period of
time (regardless of whether the reason for rolling it was a good one or not
- it has happened). Also, regardless of the size of the "bloat" I'm saying
that in most cases the clients will already have the certificates in
question and this bloat will cause them extra processing in managing their
certificate caches etc unnecessarily. The client should have a choice as to
whether to download the certificate or not.
 
I don't understand why you're so opposed to the "package" solution. 
 
Cheers,
Sharon 
-----Original Message-----
From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:stefans@microsoft.com] 
Sent: Friday, January 05, 2007 8:01 AM
To: Sharon Boeyen; Russ Housley
Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs



BM__MailEndComposeWe are only talking about an extra 16K at most. The
download time is the absolute most cases is negligible. 

For those cases where this solution makes sense, the network bandwidth issue
is not a problem.

 

For the cases where this would be an issue, this solution would not be used.

 

On the contrary, in some networks and scenarios, this will improve
performance. Especially in high latency networks with PKI based peer-peer
authentication where an extra retrieval cost way more performance than the
expanded CRL size.

 

Also, many clients are configured to pre-fetch CRL:s before they are used,
using idle time on the network at no extra cost.

 

 

Stefan Santesson

Senior Program Manager

Windows Security, Standards

 

From: Sharon Boeyen [mailto:sharon.boeyen@entrust.com] 
Sent: den 4 januari 2007 17:36
To: Stefan Santesson; Russ Housley
Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs

 

I still think wasted bandwidth is also an issue. Forcing the download of
'fat' CRLs on clients when, in many cases, those clients already have the
certificates locally that caused the bloating of the CRL, is an unnecessary
waste.

-----Original Message----- 
From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org
<mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org> ] On Behalf Of Stefan Santesson 
Sent: Wednesday, January 03, 2007 9:58 AM 
To: Russ Housley 
Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org 
Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs 

 

Russ, 

In theory, the CA can put different pointers to different CRLs in each
certificate if some certificates are prime targets for frequent checking.
But I don't think that is a common scenario.

My point is that in order to allow free selection of CRLs, you would have to
add capability to the CDP extension rather than to the CRL. I don't think
such effort is worth the trouble.

I'm convinced that including certs in a CRL will only be made in situations
where it in the sum of all, helps increase efficiency and where the extra
bandwidth consumed is not an issue.

I read the critique of this idea as not really be a bandwidth issue, but
that some implementers simply don't want to be faced with the requirement to
implement this feature. But I don't see that they have to. A CRL with certs
in a non-critical extension should work just as well in current clients as
any current CRL without certs. The extension can simply be ignored.

This is not a necessary feature, but a practical one offering performance
improvements in some environments at no loss of interoperability.

 

Stefan Santesson 
Senior Program Manager 
Windows Security, Standards 

 

> -----Original Message----- 
> From: Russ Housley [mailto:housley@vigilsec.com
<mailto:housley@vigilsec.com> ] 
> Sent: den 21 december 2006 16:19 
> To: Stefan Santesson 
> Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org 
> Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs 
> 
> Stefan: 
> 
> If the CA chooses to offer both, how can the RP determine which one it 
> will get?  Does the CA post them in different LDAP attributes? 
> 
> Russ 
> 
> At 08:00 AM 12/21/2006, Stefan Santesson wrote: 
> 
> >As with anything else, the relying party can get what the CA offers. 
> > 
> >I don't think there is any realistic scenario where the CA has a 
> >reason to offer CRLs both with and without certificates. To offer 
> >this capability to RP is however not a matter for this protocol. It 
> >would be a matter for the CRL referencing model, i.e. CDP and/or 
> >directory schema. 
> > 
> >I don't think that extra complexity however is very useful. 
> > 
> >Stefan Santesson 
> >Senior Program Manager 
> >Windows Security, Standards 
> > 
> > 
> > > -----Original Message----- 
> > > From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-
<mailto:owner-ietf->  
> > > pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Denis Pinkas 
> > > Sent: den 20 december 2006 17:05 
> > > To: ietf-pkix@imc.org 
> > > Subject: Re: Certificates in CRLs 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > It is necessary to provide relying parties with the choice to get 
> > > : 
> > > 
> > >   - CRLs "as usual", or 
> > >   - CRLs that carry that new extension. 
> > > 
> > > The current proposal does not allow for it. 
> > > 
> > > Until the draft is changed, I am against the addition of this work 
> item 
> > > to the program of the PKIX WG. 
> > > 
> > > Denis 
> > > 
> > > 
> ______________________________________________________________________ 
> _ 
> > > _______ 
> > > 
> > > >Since last IETF a new draft was posted: 
> > > >http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-santesson-pkix-vccrl-
<http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-santesson-pkix-vccrl->  
> 00.txt 
> > > > 
> > > >There is a request to add this draft to the PKIX work and I would 
> > > encourage to start the discussion about this decision in this 
> thread. 
> > > > 
> > > >Stefan Santesson 
> > > >Senior Program Manager 
> > > >Windows Security, Standards 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > 


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<BODY lang=3DSV vLink=3Dpurple link=3Dblue>
<DIV><SPAN class=3D427185713-05012007><FONT face=3DArial =
color=3D#0000ff size=3D2>Stefan=20
I really don't think you can state where this will or will not be used =
in the=20
future. Naturally you know where you want to use it, but software only =
enables a=20
facility and the customer decides when and how to use it. =
</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=3D427185713-05012007><FONT face=3DArial =
color=3D#0000ff=20
size=3D2></FONT></SPAN>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=3D427185713-05012007><FONT face=3DArial =
color=3D#0000ff=20
size=3D2>Whether this scheme could possibly be useful in some cases is =
not my=20
point. My point is that current deployments seem to be working fine =
without it=20
and I don't want to see those interfered with just because some CA they =
may have=20
cross certified with decided to put certificates inside their CRLS. =
Back to=20
Denis' point - there is no need to impose this in the way you've =
proposed.=20
</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=3D427185713-05012007><FONT face=3DArial =
color=3D#0000ff=20
size=3D2></FONT></SPAN>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=3D427185713-05012007><FONT face=3DArial =
color=3D#0000ff=20
size=3D2>Earlier I (and others including Dave Kemp) suggested a =
"package" that=20
includes the CRL, and the certificate in question as an 'extra' that a =
CA could=20
publish in addition to a regular CRL. That "package could be published =
in a=20
separate directory attribute and/or an HTTP accessible file. It could =
be pointed=20
to from within the certificate&nbsp;just as the CRL currently is. That =
could be=20
done either by extending the CRLDP or adding a new&nbsp;pointer =
extension or=20
adding a new method to the AIA extension. That type of approach gives =
you what=20
you want but does not in any way interfere with clients who do not want =
and do=20
not need to retrieve that bloated CRL.&nbsp;</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=3D427185713-05012007></SPAN>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=3D427185713-05012007><FONT face=3DArial =
color=3D#0000ff size=3D2>Also,=20
you haven't addressed the question about&nbsp;what happens =
when&nbsp;more than=20
one certificate is needed. If a CRL includes more than one=20
certificate&nbsp;(e.g. the CRL issuer did one or more key =
rollovers&nbsp;then=20
CRL gets bloated a lot bigger than you suggested.&nbsp;I don't want to =
debate=20
how often a key gets rolled over either however I have definitely seen =
instances=20
in real world deployments where a key has been rolled very often in a =
very short=20
period of time (regardless of whether the reason for rolling it was a =
good one=20
or not - it has happened). Also, regardless of the size of the "bloat" =
I'm=20
saying that in most cases the clients will already have the =
certificates in=20
question and this bloat will cause them extra processing in managing =
their=20
certificate caches etc unnecessarily. The client should have a choice =
as to=20
whether to download the certificate or not.</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=3D427185713-05012007></SPAN>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=3D427185713-05012007><FONT face=3DArial =
color=3D#0000ff size=3D2>I=20
don't understand why you're so opposed to the "package"=20
solution.&nbsp;</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=3D427185713-05012007></SPAN>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=3D427185713-05012007><FONT face=3DArial =
color=3D#0000ff=20
size=3D2>Cheers,</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=3D427185713-05012007><FONT face=3DArial =
color=3D#0000ff=20
size=3D2>Sharon</FONT>&nbsp;</SPAN></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DTahoma size=3D2>-----Original =
Message-----<BR><B>From:</B> Stefan=20
Santesson [mailto:stefans@microsoft.com] <BR><B>Sent:</B> Friday, =
January 05,=20
2007 8:01 AM<BR><B>To:</B> Sharon Boeyen; Russ Housley<BR><B>Cc:</B>=20
ietf-pkix@imc.org<BR><B>Subject:</B> RE: Certificates in=20
CRLs<BR><BR></DIV></FONT>
<BLOCKQUOTE dir=3Dltr style=3D"MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px">
  <DIV class=3DSection1>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><A name=3D_MailEndCompose><SPAN lang=3DEN-US=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: =
'Calibri','sans-serif'">We=20
  are only talking about an extra 16K at most. The download time is the =
absolute=20
  most cases is negligible. <o:p></o:p></SPAN></A></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><SPAN lang=3DEN-US=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: =
'Calibri','sans-serif'">For=20
  those cases where this solution makes sense, the network bandwidth =
issue is=20
  not a problem.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><SPAN lang=3DEN-US=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: 'Calibri','sans=
-serif'"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><SPAN lang=3DEN-US=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: =
'Calibri','sans-serif'">For=20
  the cases where this would be an issue, this solution would not be=20
  used.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><SPAN lang=3DEN-US=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: =
'Calibri','sans-serif'"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><SPAN lang=3DEN-US=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: =
'Calibri','sans-serif'">On=20
  the contrary, in some networks and scenarios, this will improve =
performance.=20
  Especially in high latency networks with PKI based peer-peer =
authentication=20
  where an extra retrieval cost way more performance than the expanded =
CRL=20
  size.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><SPAN lang=3DEN-US=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: =
'Calibri','sans-serif'"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><SPAN lang=3DEN-US=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: =
'Calibri','sans-serif'">Also,=20
  many clients are configured to pre-fetch CRL:s before they are used, =
using=20
  idle time on the network at no extra cost.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><SPAN lang=3DEN-US=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: =
'Calibri','sans-serif'"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><SPAN lang=3DEN-US=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: =
'Calibri','sans-serif'"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></P>
  <DIV>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><B><SPAN lang=3DEN-GB=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: maroon; FONT-FAMILY: =
'Arial','sans-serif'">Stefan=20
  Santesson</SPAN></B><SPAN lang=3DEN-GB=20
  style=3D"COLOR: #1f497d"><o:p></o:p></SPAN></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><SPAN lang=3DEN-GB=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: #400040; FONT-FAMILY: =
'Arial','sans-serif'">Senior=20
  Program Manager</SPAN><SPAN lang=3DEN-GB=20
  style=3D"COLOR: navy"><o:p></o:p></SPAN></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><B><SPAN lang=3DEN-GB=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: #400040; FONT-FAMILY: =
'Arial','sans-serif'">Windows=20
  Security, Standards</SPAN></B><SPAN lang=3DEN-US=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: =
'Calibri','sans-serif'"><o:p></o:p></SPAN></P></DIV>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><SPAN lang=3DEN-US=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: =
'Calibri','sans-serif'"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></P>
  <DIV=20
  style=3D"BORDER-RIGHT: medium none; PADDING-RIGHT: 0cm; BORDER-TOP: =
medium none; PADDING-LEFT: 4pt; PADDING-BOTTOM: 0cm; BORDER-LEFT: blue =
1.5pt solid; PADDING-TOP: 0cm; BORDER-BOTTOM: medium none">
  <DIV>
  <DIV=20
  style=3D"BORDER-RIGHT: medium none; PADDING-RIGHT: 0cm; BORDER-TOP: =
#b5c4df 1pt solid; PADDING-LEFT: 0cm; PADDING-BOTTOM: 0cm; BORDER-LEFT: =
medium none; PADDING-TOP: 3pt; BORDER-BOTTOM: medium none">
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><B><SPAN lang=3DEN-US=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: =
'Tahoma','sans-serif'">From:</SPAN></B><SPAN=20
  lang=3DEN-US style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: =
'Tahoma','sans-serif'"> Sharon=20
  Boeyen [mailto:sharon.boeyen@entrust.com] <BR><B>Sent:</B> den 4 =
januari 2007=20
  17:36<BR><B>To:</B> Stefan Santesson; Russ Housley<BR><B>Cc:</B>=20
  ietf-pkix@imc.org<BR><B>Subject:</B> RE: Certificates in=20
  CRLs<o:p></o:p></SPAN></P></DIV></DIV>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></P>
  <P><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">I still think wasted bandwidth is =
also an=20
  issue. Forcing the download of 'fat' CRLs on clients when, in many =
cases,=20
  those clients already have the certificates locally that caused the =
bloating=20
  of the CRL, is an unnecessary waste.</SPAN><o:p></o:p></P>
  <P><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">-----Original Message-----</SPAN> =
<BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [<A=20
  =
href=3D"mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org">mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail=
.imc.org</A>]=20
  On Behalf Of Stefan Santesson</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: =
10pt">Sent:=20
  Wednesday, January 03, 2007 9:58 AM</SPAN> <BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">To: Russ Housley</SPAN> <BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org</SPAN> <BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs</SPAN>=20
  <o:p></o:p></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN-BOTTOM: =
12pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></P>
  <P><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">Russ,</SPAN> <o:p></o:p></P>
  <P><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">In theory, the CA can put =
different pointers=20
  to different CRLs in each certificate if some certificates are prime =
targets=20
  for frequent checking. But I don't think that is a common=20
  scenario.</SPAN><o:p></o:p></P>
  <P><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">My point is that in order to allow =
free=20
  selection of CRLs, you would have to add capability to the CDP =
extension=20
  rather than to the CRL. I don't think such effort is worth the=20
  trouble.</SPAN><o:p></o:p></P>
  <P><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">I'm convinced that including certs =
in a CRL=20
  will only be made in situations where it in the sum of all, helps =
increase=20
  efficiency and where the extra bandwidth consumed is not an=20
  issue.</SPAN><o:p></o:p></P>
  <P><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">I read the critique of this idea =
as not=20
  really be a bandwidth issue, but that some implementers simply don't =
want to=20
  be faced with the requirement to implement this feature. But I don't =
see that=20
  they have to. A CRL with certs in a non-critical extension should =
work just as=20
  well in current clients as any current CRL without certs. The =
extension can=20
  simply be ignored.</SPAN><o:p></o:p></P>
  <P><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">This is not a necessary feature, =
but a=20
  practical one offering performance improvements in some environments =
at no=20
  loss of interoperability.</SPAN><o:p></o:p></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></P>
  <P><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">Stefan Santesson</SPAN> <BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">Senior Program Manager</SPAN> <BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">Windows Security, Standards</SPAN> =
<o:p></o:p></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></P>
  <P><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; -----Original =
Message-----</SPAN>=20
  <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; From: Russ Housley [<A=20
  =
href=3D"mailto:housley@vigilsec.com">mailto:housley@vigilsec.com</A>]</S=
PAN>=20
  <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; Sent: den 21 december 2006 =
16:19</SPAN>=20
  <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; To: Stefan Santesson</SPAN> =
<BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org</SPAN> <BR><SPAN =

  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; Subject: RE: Certificates in =
CRLs</SPAN>=20
  <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; Stefan:</SPAN> <BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: =
10pt">&gt; If=20
  the CA chooses to offer both, how can the RP determine which one it=20
  </SPAN><BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; will get?&nbsp; Does =
the CA post=20
  them in different LDAP attributes?</SPAN> <BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: =
10pt">&gt;=20
  Russ</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN =

  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; At 08:00 AM 12/21/2006, Stefan =
Santesson=20
  wrote:</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt;</SPAN> =
<BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt;As with anything else, the relying =
party can=20
  get what the CA offers.</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: =
10pt">&gt;=20
  &gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt;I don't =
think there is=20
  any realistic scenario where the CA has a </SPAN><BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt;reason to offer CRLs both with and =
without=20
  certificates. To offer </SPAN><BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: =
10pt">&gt; &gt;this=20
  capability to RP is however not a matter for this protocol. It=20
  </SPAN><BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt;would be a matter =
for the=20
  CRL referencing model, i.e. CDP and/or </SPAN><BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt;directory schema.</SPAN> <BR><SPAN =

  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt;I don't think that extra =
complexity however=20
  is very useful.</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; =
&gt;</SPAN>=20
  <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt;Stefan Santesson</SPAN> =
<BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt;Senior Program Manager</SPAN> =
<BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt;Windows Security, Standards</SPAN> =
<BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; -----Original =
Message-----</SPAN>=20
  <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; From:=20
  owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [<A=20
  href=3D"mailto:owner-ietf-">mailto:owner-ietf-</A> </SPAN><BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf =
Of Denis=20
  Pinkas</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; =
Sent: den 20=20
  december 2006 17:05</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; =
&gt; &gt;=20
  To: ietf-pkix@imc.org</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; =
&gt; &gt;=20
  Subject: Re: Certificates in CRLs</SPAN> <BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; It is necessary to provide =
relying=20
  parties with the choice to get </SPAN><BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: =
10pt">&gt;=20
  &gt; &gt; :</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; =
&gt;</SPAN>=20
  <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; - CRLs =
"as=20
  usual", or</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; =
&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;=20
  - CRLs that carry that new extension.</SPAN> <BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; The current proposal does =
not allow for=20
  it.</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt;</SPAN> =
<BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; Until the draft is changed, =
I am=20
  against the addition of this work</SPAN> <BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; item</SPAN> <BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; to the program of the PKIX =
WG.</SPAN>=20
  <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; Denis</SPAN> <BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt;=20
  =
______________________________________________________________________</=
SPAN>=20
  <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; _</SPAN> <BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; _______</SPAN> <BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;Since last IETF a new =
draft was=20
  posted:</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; =
&gt;<A=20
  =
href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-santesson-pkix-vccrl-"=
=20
  =
target=3D_blank>http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-santesson-pkix=
-vccrl-</A></SPAN>=20
  <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; 00.txt</SPAN> <BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;There is a request to =
add this=20
  draft to the PKIX work and I would</SPAN> <BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; encourage to start the =
discussion about=20
  this decision in this</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; =

  thread.</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; =
&gt;</SPAN>=20
  <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;Stefan =
Santesson</SPAN>=20
  <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;Senior Program =

  Manager</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; =
&gt;Windows=20
  Security, Standards</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; =
&gt;=20
  &gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt;</SPAN> =
<BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt;</SPAN>=20
<o:p></o:p></P></DIV></DIV></BLOCKQUOTE></BODY></HTML>

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From owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Fri Jan 05 10:55:09 2007
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Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2007 15:27:56 +0100
From: "Denis Pinkas" <denis.pinkas@bull.net>
To: "ietf-pkix@imc.org" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>
Subject: Re: Certificates in CRLs
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We are only talking about an extra 16K at most. The download time is the absolute most cases is negligible. 
For those cases where this solution makes sense, the network bandwidth issue is not a problem.
For the cases where this would be an issue, this solution would not be used.
Stefan,
What you say just above is untrue. CAs are issuing CRLs for all kind of RPs and 
would be unable to handle cases where some RPs have a large network bandwith 
and some others don't.
Your proposed individual draft does not propose a solution where a CA would be able to issue 
simultaneously two kinds of CRLs: "slim", as today, and "fat", as you are proposing for tomorrow.
Denis

On the contrary, in some networks and scenarios, this will improve performance. Especially in high latency networks with PKI based peer-peer authentication where an extra retrieval cost way more performance than the expanded CRL size.
 
Also, many clients are configured to pre-fetch CRL:s before they are used, using idle time on the network at no extra cost.
 
 
Stefan Santesson
Senior Program Manager
Windows Security, Standards
 
From: Sharon Boeyen [mailto:sharon.boeyen@entrust.com] 
Sent: den 4 januari 2007 17:36
To: Stefan Santesson; Russ Housley
Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs
 
I still think wasted bandwidth is also an issue. Forcing the download of 'fat' CRLs on clients when, in many cases, those clients already have the certificates locally that caused the bloating of the CRL, is an unnecessary waste.
-----Original Message----- 
From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Stefan Santesson 
Sent: Wednesday, January 03, 2007 9:58 AM 
To: Russ Housley 
Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org 
Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs 
 
Russ, 
In theory, the CA can put different pointers to different CRLs in each certificate if some certificates are prime targets for frequent checking. But I don't think that is a common scenario.
My point is that in order to allow free selection of CRLs, you would have to add capability to the CDP extension rather than to the CRL. I don't think such effort is worth the trouble.
I'm convinced that including certs in a CRL will only be made in situations where it in the sum of all, helps increase efficiency and where the extra bandwidth consumed is not an issue.
I read the critique of this idea as not really be a bandwidth issue, but that some implementers simply don't want to be faced with the requirement to implement this feature. But I don't see that they have to. A CRL with certs in a non-critical extension should work just as well in current clients as any current CRL without certs. The extension can simply be ignored.
This is not a necessary feature, but a practical one offering performance improvements in some environments at no loss of interoperability.
 
Stefan Santesson 
Senior Program Manager 
Windows Security, Standards 
 
> -----Original Message----- 
> From: Russ Housley [mailto:housley@vigilsec.com] 
> Sent: den 21 december 2006 16:19 
> To: Stefan Santesson 
> Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org 
> Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs 
> 
> Stefan: 
> 
> If the CA chooses to offer both, how can the RP determine which one it 
> will get?  Does the CA post them in different LDAP attributes? 
> 
> Russ 
> 
> At 08:00 AM 12/21/2006, Stefan Santesson wrote: 
> 
> >As with anything else, the relying party can get what the CA offers. 
> > 
> >I don't think there is any realistic scenario where the CA has a 
> >reason to offer CRLs both with and without certificates. To offer 
> >this capability to RP is however not a matter for this protocol. It 
> >would be a matter for the CRL referencing model, i.e. CDP and/or 
> >directory schema. 
> > 
> >I don't think that extra complexity however is very useful. 
> > 
> >Stefan Santesson 
> >Senior Program Manager 
> >Windows Security, Standards 
> > 
> > 
> > > -----Original Message----- 
> > > From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf- 
> > > pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Denis Pinkas 
> > > Sent: den 20 december 2006 17:05 
> > > To: ietf-pkix@imc.org 
> > > Subject: Re: Certificates in CRLs 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > It is necessary to provide relying parties with the choice to get 
> > > : 
> > > 
> > >   - CRLs "as usual", or 
> > >   - CRLs that carry that new extension. 
> > > 
> > > The current proposal does not allow for it. 
> > > 
> > > Until the draft is changed, I am against the addition of this work 
> item 
> > > to the program of the PKIX WG. 
> > > 
> > > Denis 
> > > 
> > > 
> ______________________________________________________________________ 
> _ 
> > > _______ 
> > > 
> > > >Since last IETF a new draft was posted: 
> > > >http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-santesson-pkix-vccrl- 
> 00.txt 
> > > > 
> > > >There is a request to add this draft to the PKIX work and I would 
> > > encourage to start the discussion about this decision in this 
> thread. 
> > > > 
> > > >Stefan Santesson 
> > > >Senior Program Manager 
> > > >Windows Security, Standards 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > 

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<DIV class=Section1>
<P class=MsoNormal><A name=_MailEndCompose><SPAN lang=EN-US 
style="FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: 'Calibri','sans-serif'">We 
are only talking about an extra 16K at most. The download time is the absolute 
most cases is negligible. <o:p></o:p></SPAN></A></P>
<P class=MsoNormal><SPAN lang=EN-US 
style="FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: 'Calibri','sans-serif'">For 
those cases where this solution makes sense, the network bandwidth issue is not 
a problem.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></P>
<P class=MsoNormal><SPAN lang=EN-US 
style="FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: 'Calibri','sans-serif'"><o:p></o:p></SPAN></P>
<P class=MsoNormal><SPAN lang=EN-US 
style="FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: 'Calibri','sans-serif'">For 
the cases where this would be an issue, this solution would not be 
used.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></P>
<P class=MsoNormal><SPAN lang=EN-US 
style="FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: 'Calibri','sans-serif'"><o:p><STRONG>Stefan,</STRONG></o:p></SPAN></P>
<P class=MsoNormal><SPAN lang=EN-US 
style="FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: 'Calibri','sans-serif'"><o:p><STRONG>What 
you say just above is untrue.&nbsp;CAs are issuing CRLs for all kind of RPs and 
<BR>would be unable to handle cases where some RPs have a large network bandwith 
<BR>and some others don't.</STRONG></o:p></SPAN></P>
<P class=MsoNormal><SPAN lang=EN-US 
style="FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: 'Calibri','sans-serif'"><o:p><STRONG>Your 
proposed individual draft does not propose a solution where a CA would be able 
to issue <BR>simultaneously two kinds of CRLs: </STRONG></o:p></SPAN><SPAN 
lang=EN-US 
style="FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: 'Calibri','sans-serif'"><o:p><STRONG>"slim", 
as today, and "fat", as you are proposing for 
tomorrow.</STRONG></o:p></SPAN></P>
<P class=MsoNormal><SPAN lang=EN-US 
style="FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: 'Calibri','sans-serif'"><o:p><STRONG>Denis</STRONG></o:p></SPAN></P>
<P class=MsoNormal><SPAN lang=EN-US 
style="FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: 'Calibri','sans-serif'"><o:p></o:p></SPAN>&nbsp;</P>
<P class=MsoNormal><SPAN lang=EN-US 
style="FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: 'Calibri','sans-serif'">On 
the contrary, in some networks and scenarios, this will improve performance. 
Especially in high latency networks with PKI based peer-peer authentication 
where an extra retrieval cost way more performance than the expanded CRL 
size.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></P>
<P class=MsoNormal><SPAN lang=EN-US 
style="FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: 'Calibri','sans-serif'"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></P>
<P class=MsoNormal><SPAN lang=EN-US 
style="FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: 'Calibri','sans-serif'">Also, 
many clients are configured to pre-fetch CRL:s before they are used, using idle 
time on the network at no extra cost.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></P>
<P class=MsoNormal><SPAN lang=EN-US 
style="FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: 'Calibri','sans-serif'"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></P>
<P class=MsoNormal><SPAN lang=EN-US 
style="FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: 'Calibri','sans-serif'"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></P>
<DIV>
<P class=MsoNormal><B><SPAN lang=EN-GB 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: maroon; FONT-FAMILY: 'Arial','sans-serif'">Stefan 
Santesson</SPAN></B><SPAN lang=EN-GB 
style="COLOR: #1f497d"><o:p></o:p></SPAN></P>
<P class=MsoNormal><SPAN lang=EN-GB 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: #400040; FONT-FAMILY: 'Arial','sans-serif'">Senior 
Program Manager</SPAN><SPAN lang=EN-GB 
style="COLOR: navy"><o:p></o:p></SPAN></P>
<P class=MsoNormal><B><SPAN lang=EN-GB 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: #400040; FONT-FAMILY: 'Arial','sans-serif'">Windows 
Security, Standards</SPAN></B><SPAN lang=EN-US 
style="FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: 'Calibri','sans-serif'"><o:p></o:p></SPAN></P></DIV>
<P class=MsoNormal><SPAN lang=EN-US 
style="FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: 'Calibri','sans-serif'"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></P>
<DIV 
style="BORDER-RIGHT: medium none; PADDING-RIGHT: 0cm; BORDER-TOP: medium none; PADDING-LEFT: 4pt; PADDING-BOTTOM: 0cm; BORDER-LEFT: blue 1.5pt solid; PADDING-TOP: 0cm; BORDER-BOTTOM: medium none">
<DIV>
<DIV 
style="BORDER-RIGHT: medium none; PADDING-RIGHT: 0cm; BORDER-TOP: #b5c4df 1pt solid; PADDING-LEFT: 0cm; PADDING-BOTTOM: 0cm; BORDER-LEFT: medium none; PADDING-TOP: 3pt; BORDER-BOTTOM: medium none">
<P class=MsoNormal><B><SPAN lang=EN-US 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: 'Tahoma','sans-serif'">From:</SPAN></B><SPAN 
lang=EN-US style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: 'Tahoma','sans-serif'"> Sharon 
Boeyen [mailto:sharon.boeyen@entrust.com] <BR><B>Sent:</B> den 4 januari 2007 
17:36<BR><B>To:</B> Stefan Santesson; Russ Housley<BR><B>Cc:</B> 
ietf-pkix@imc.org<BR><B>Subject:</B> RE: Certificates in 
CRLs<o:p></o:p></SPAN></P></DIV></DIV>
<P class=MsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></P>
<P><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">I still think wasted bandwidth is also an 
issue. Forcing the download of 'fat' CRLs on clients when, in many cases, those 
clients already have the certificates locally that caused the bloating of the 
CRL, is an unnecessary waste.</SPAN><o:p></o:p></P>
<P><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">-----Original Message-----</SPAN> <BR><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [<A 
href="mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org">mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org</A>] 
On Behalf Of Stefan Santesson</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">Sent: 
Wednesday, January 03, 2007 9:58 AM</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">To: 
Russ Housley</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">Cc: 
ietf-pkix@imc.org</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">Subject: RE: 
Certificates in CRLs</SPAN> <o:p></o:p></P>
<P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN-BOTTOM: 12pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></P>
<P><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">Russ,</SPAN> <o:p></o:p></P>
<P><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">In theory, the CA can put different pointers to 
different CRLs in each certificate if some certificates are prime targets for 
frequent checking. But I don't think that is a common 
scenario.</SPAN><o:p></o:p></P>
<P><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">My point is that in order to allow free 
selection of CRLs, you would have to add capability to the CDP extension rather 
than to the CRL. I don't think such effort is worth the 
trouble.</SPAN><o:p></o:p></P>
<P><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">I'm convinced that including certs in a CRL 
will only be made in situations where it in the sum of all, helps increase 
efficiency and where the extra bandwidth consumed is not an 
issue.</SPAN><o:p></o:p></P>
<P><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">I read the critique of this idea as not really 
be a bandwidth issue, but that some implementers simply don't want to be faced 
with the requirement to implement this feature. But I don't see that they have 
to. A CRL with certs in a non-critical extension should work just as well in 
current clients as any current CRL without certs. The extension can simply be 
ignored.</SPAN><o:p></o:p></P>
<P><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">This is not a necessary feature, but a 
practical one offering performance improvements in some environments at no loss 
of interoperability.</SPAN><o:p></o:p></P>
<P class=MsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></P>
<P><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">Stefan Santesson</SPAN> <BR><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">Senior Program Manager</SPAN> <BR><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">Windows Security, Standards</SPAN> <o:p></o:p></P>
<P class=MsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></P>
<P><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; -----Original Message-----</SPAN> 
<BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; From: Russ Housley [<A 
href="mailto:housley@vigilsec.com">mailto:housley@vigilsec.com</A>]</SPAN> 
<BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; Sent: den 21 december 2006 16:19</SPAN> 
<BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; To: Stefan Santesson</SPAN> <BR><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org</SPAN> <BR><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs</SPAN> <BR><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; 
Stefan:</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; If the CA chooses to offer both, how can the RP 
determine which one it </SPAN><BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; will 
get?&nbsp; Does the CA post them in different LDAP attributes?</SPAN> <BR><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; 
Russ</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; At 08:00 AM 12/21/2006, Stefan Santesson 
wrote:</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt;As with anything else, the relying party can 
get what the CA offers.</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; 
&gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt;I don't think there is 
any realistic scenario where the CA has a </SPAN><BR><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt;reason to offer CRLs both with and without 
certificates. To offer </SPAN><BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt;this 
capability to RP is however not a matter for this protocol. It </SPAN><BR><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt;would be a matter for the CRL referencing 
model, i.e. CDP and/or </SPAN><BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; 
&gt;directory schema.</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt;</SPAN> 
<BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt;I don't think that extra complexity 
however is very useful.</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; 
&gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt;Stefan Santesson</SPAN> 
<BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt;Senior Program Manager</SPAN> 
<BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt;Windows Security, Standards</SPAN> 
<BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; 
&gt; &gt; -----Original Message-----</SPAN> <BR><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [<A 
href="mailto:owner-ietf-">mailto:owner-ietf-</A> </SPAN><BR><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Denis 
Pinkas</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; Sent: den 20 
december 2006 17:05</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; To: 
ietf-pkix@imc.org</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; 
Subject: Re: Certificates in CRLs</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; 
&gt; &gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt;</SPAN> 
<BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; It is necessary to provide relying 
parties with the choice to get </SPAN><BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; 
&gt; &gt; :</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt;</SPAN> 
<BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; - CRLs "as usual", 
or</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; - CRLs 
that carry that new extension.</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; 
&gt; &gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; The current 
proposal does not allow for it.</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; 
&gt; &gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; Until the 
draft is changed, I am against the addition of this work</SPAN> <BR><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; item</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; 
&gt; &gt; to the program of the PKIX WG.</SPAN> <BR><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; Denis</SPAN> <BR><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; 
______________________________________________________________________</SPAN> 
<BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; _</SPAN> <BR><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; _______</SPAN> <BR><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;Since last IETF a new draft was 
posted:</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;<A 
href="http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-santesson-pkix-vccrl-" 
target=_blank>http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-santesson-pkix-vccrl-</A></SPAN> 
<BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; 00.txt</SPAN> <BR><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;There is a request to add this draft 
to the PKIX work and I would</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; 
&gt; encourage to start the discussion about this decision in this</SPAN> 
<BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; thread.</SPAN> <BR><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;Stefan Santesson</SPAN> <BR><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;Senior Program Manager</SPAN> 
<BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;Windows Security, 
Standards</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt;</SPAN> 
<BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt;</SPAN> <o:p></o:p></P></DIV></DIV>
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Wouldn't it be better for the IETF to accept as a work item a general
purpose optimization that works everywhere, rather than a point solution
that works for high-bandwidth high-latency scenarios but fails for low
bandwidth scenarios?  Are you saying that where both network bandwidth
and latency are issues and this solution is not used, a different
solution should be used to solve the same problem?

=20

I disagree with that philosophy.  If PKIX is going to stand behind an
optimization approach, the approach should be suitable for both high and
low bandwidth environments.

=20

Dave

=20

  _____ =20

From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org]
On Behalf Of Stefan Santesson
Sent: Friday, January 05, 2007 8:01 AM
To: Sharon Boeyen; Russ Housley
Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs

=20

We are only talking about an extra 16K at most. The download time is the
absolute most cases is negligible.=20

For those cases where this solution makes sense, the network bandwidth
issue is not a problem.

=20

For the cases where this would be an issue, this solution would not be
used.

=20

On the contrary, in some networks and scenarios, this will improve
performance. Especially in high latency networks with PKI based
peer-peer authentication where an extra retrieval cost way more
performance than the expanded CRL size.

=20

Also, many clients are configured to pre-fetch CRL:s before they are
used, using idle time on the network at no extra cost.

=20

=20

Stefan Santesson

Senior Program Manager

Windows Security, Standards

=20

From: Sharon Boeyen [mailto:sharon.boeyen@entrust.com]=20
Sent: den 4 januari 2007 17:36
To: Stefan Santesson; Russ Housley
Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs

=20

I still think wasted bandwidth is also an issue. Forcing the download of
'fat' CRLs on clients when, in many cases, those clients already have
the certificates locally that caused the bloating of the CRL, is an
unnecessary waste.

-----Original Message-----=20
From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org]
On Behalf Of Stefan Santesson=20
Sent: Wednesday, January 03, 2007 9:58 AM=20
To: Russ Housley=20
Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org=20
Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs=20

=20

Russ,=20

In theory, the CA can put different pointers to different CRLs in each
certificate if some certificates are prime targets for frequent
checking. But I don't think that is a common scenario.

My point is that in order to allow free selection of CRLs, you would
have to add capability to the CDP extension rather than to the CRL. I
don't think such effort is worth the trouble.

I'm convinced that including certs in a CRL will only be made in
situations where it in the sum of all, helps increase efficiency and
where the extra bandwidth consumed is not an issue.

I read the critique of this idea as not really be a bandwidth issue, but
that some implementers simply don't want to be faced with the
requirement to implement this feature. But I don't see that they have
to. A CRL with certs in a non-critical extension should work just as
well in current clients as any current CRL without certs. The extension
can simply be ignored.

This is not a necessary feature, but a practical one offering
performance improvements in some environments at no loss of
interoperability.

=20

Stefan Santesson=20
Senior Program Manager=20
Windows Security, Standards=20

=20

> -----Original Message-----=20
> From: Russ Housley [mailto:housley@vigilsec.com]=20
> Sent: den 21 december 2006 16:19=20
> To: Stefan Santesson=20
> Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org=20
> Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs=20
>=20
> Stefan:=20
>=20
> If the CA chooses to offer both, how can the RP determine which one it

> will get?  Does the CA post them in different LDAP attributes?=20
>=20
> Russ=20
>=20
> At 08:00 AM 12/21/2006, Stefan Santesson wrote:=20
>=20
> >As with anything else, the relying party can get what the CA offers.=20
> >=20
> >I don't think there is any realistic scenario where the CA has a=20
> >reason to offer CRLs both with and without certificates. To offer=20
> >this capability to RP is however not a matter for this protocol. It=20
> >would be a matter for the CRL referencing model, i.e. CDP and/or=20
> >directory schema.=20
> >=20
> >I don't think that extra complexity however is very useful.=20
> >=20
> >Stefan Santesson=20
> >Senior Program Manager=20
> >Windows Security, Standards=20
> >=20
> >=20
> > > -----Original Message-----=20
> > > From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-=20
> > > pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Denis Pinkas=20
> > > Sent: den 20 december 2006 17:05=20
> > > To: ietf-pkix@imc.org=20
> > > Subject: Re: Certificates in CRLs=20
> > >=20
> > >=20
> > >=20
> > > It is necessary to provide relying parties with the choice to get=20
> > > :=20
> > >=20
> > >   - CRLs "as usual", or=20
> > >   - CRLs that carry that new extension.=20
> > >=20
> > > The current proposal does not allow for it.=20
> > >=20
> > > Until the draft is changed, I am against the addition of this work

> item=20
> > > to the program of the PKIX WG.=20
> > >=20
> > > Denis=20
> > >=20
> > >=20
> ______________________________________________________________________

> _=20
> > > _______=20
> > >=20
> > > >Since last IETF a new draft was posted:=20
> > > >http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-santesson-pkix-vccrl-=20
> 00.txt=20
> > > >=20
> > > >There is a request to add this draft to the PKIX work and I would

> > > encourage to start the discussion about this decision in this=20
> thread.=20
> > > >=20
> > > >Stefan Santesson=20
> > > >Senior Program Manager=20
> > > >Windows Security, Standards=20
> > >=20
> > >=20
> > >=20


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<div class=3DSection1>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Wouldn&#8217;t it be better for the =
IETF
to accept as a work item a general purpose optimization that works =
everywhere,
rather than a point solution that works for high-bandwidth high-latency
scenarios but fails for low bandwidth scenarios?&nbsp; Are you saying =
that
where both network bandwidth and latency are issues and this solution is =
not
used, a different solution should be used to solve the same =
problem?<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>I disagree with that =
philosophy.&nbsp; If
PKIX is going to stand behind an optimization approach, the approach =
should be
suitable for both high and low bandwidth =
environments.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Dave<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<div>

<div class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dcenter style=3D'text-align:center'><font =
size=3D3
face=3D"Times New Roman"><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>

<hr size=3D2 width=3D"100%" align=3Dcenter tabindex=3D-1>

</span></font></div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><font size=3D2 face=3DTahoma><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Tahoma;font-weight:bold'>From:</span></font></b><font =
size=3D2
face=3DTahoma><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>
owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] =
<b><span
style=3D'font-weight:bold'>On Behalf Of </span></b>Stefan Santesson<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> Friday, January 05, =
2007
8:01 AM<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> Sharon Boeyen; Russ =
Housley<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Cc:</span></b> ietf-pkix@imc.org<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> RE: Certificates =
in CRLs</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><a name=3D"_MailEndCompose"><font size=3D2 =
color=3D"#1f497d"
face=3DCalibri><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:Calibri;color:#1F497D'>We
are only talking about an extra 16K at most. The download time is the =
absolute
most cases is negligible. </span></font></a><font size=3D2 =
color=3D"#1f497d"
face=3DCalibri><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:Calibri;color:#1F497D'><o:p></o:p><=
/span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#1f497d" =
face=3DCalibri><span
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:Calibri;color:#1F497D'>For those =
cases
where this solution makes sense, the network bandwidth issue is not a =
problem.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#1f497d" =
face=3DCalibri><span
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:Calibri;color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;<=
/o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#1f497d" =
face=3DCalibri><span
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:Calibri;color:#1F497D'>For the =
cases where
this would be an issue, this solution would not be =
used.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#1f497d" =
face=3DCalibri><span
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:Calibri;color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;<=
/o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#1f497d" =
face=3DCalibri><span
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:Calibri;color:#1F497D'>On the =
contrary, in
some networks and scenarios, this will improve performance. Especially =
in high
latency networks with PKI based peer-peer authentication where an extra =
retrieval
cost way more performance than the expanded CRL =
size.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#1f497d" =
face=3DCalibri><span
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:Calibri;color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;<=
/o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#1f497d" =
face=3DCalibri><span
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:Calibri;color:#1F497D'>Also, many =
clients
are configured to pre-fetch CRL:s before they are used, using idle time =
on the
network at no extra cost.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#1f497d" =
face=3DCalibri><span
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:Calibri;color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;<=
/o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#1f497d" =
face=3DCalibri><span
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:Calibri;color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;<=
/o:p></span></font></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><font size=3D2 color=3Dmaroon face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-GB
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:maroon;font-weight:bold=
'>Stefan
Santesson</span></font></b><font color=3D"#1f497d"><span lang=3DEN-GB
style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#400040" face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-GB
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:#400040'>Senior =
Program Manager</span></font><font
color=3Dnavy><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'color:navy'><o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><font size=3D2 color=3D"#400040" =
face=3DArial><span lang=3DEN-GB
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:#400040;font-weight:bol=
d'>Windows
Security, Standards</span></font></b><font size=3D2 color=3D"#1f497d" =
face=3DCalibri><span
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:Calibri;color:#1F497D'><o:p></o:p><=
/span></font></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#1f497d" =
face=3DCalibri><span
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:Calibri;color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;<=
/o:p></span></font></p>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0in 0in =
0in 4.0pt'>

<div>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt =
0in 0in 0in'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><font size=3D2 face=3DTahoma><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Tahoma;font-weight:bold'>From:</span></font></b><font =
size=3D2
face=3DTahoma><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'> =
Sharon Boeyen
[mailto:sharon.boeyen@entrust.com] <br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> den 4 januari 2007 =
17:36<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> Stefan Santesson; =
Russ Housley<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Cc:</span></b> ietf-pkix@imc.org<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> RE: Certificates =
in CRLs<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
lang=3DSV
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p><font size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DSV =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>I
still think wasted bandwidth is also an issue. Forcing the download of =
'fat'
CRLs on clients when, in many cases, those clients already have the
certificates locally that caused the bloating of the CRL, is an =
unnecessary
waste.</span></font><span lang=3DSV><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p><font size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DSV =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>-----Original
Message-----</span></font><span lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>From:
owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [<a =
href=3D"mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org">mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.=
imc.org</a>]
On Behalf Of Stefan Santesson</span></font><span lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Sent: =
Wednesday,
January 03, 2007 9:58 AM</span></font><span lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>To: =
Russ Housley</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Cc:
ietf-pkix@imc.org</span></font><span lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Subject: RE:
Certificates in CRLs</span></font><span lang=3DSV> =
<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-bottom:12.0pt'><font size=3D3
face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DSV =
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p><font size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DSV =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Russ,</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p><font size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DSV =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>In
theory, the CA can put different pointers to different CRLs in each =
certificate
if some certificates are prime targets for frequent checking. But I =
don't think
that is a common scenario.</span></font><span =
lang=3DSV><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p><font size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DSV =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>My
point is that in order to allow free selection of CRLs, you would have =
to add
capability to the CDP extension rather than to the CRL. I don't think =
such
effort is worth the trouble.</span></font><span =
lang=3DSV><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p><font size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DSV =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>I'm
convinced that including certs in a CRL will only be made in situations =
where
it in the sum of all, helps increase efficiency and where the extra =
bandwidth
consumed is not an issue.</span></font><span =
lang=3DSV><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p><font size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DSV =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>I
read the critique of this idea as not really be a bandwidth issue, but =
that
some implementers simply don't want to be faced with the requirement to
implement this feature. But I don't see that they have to. A CRL with =
certs in
a non-critical extension should work just as well in current clients as =
any
current CRL without certs. The extension can simply be =
ignored.</span></font><span
lang=3DSV><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p><font size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DSV =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>This
is not a necessary feature, but a practical one offering performance
improvements in some environments at no loss of =
interoperability.</span></font><span
lang=3DSV><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
lang=3DSV
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p><font size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DSV =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Stefan
Santesson</span></font><span lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Senior =
Program
Manager</span></font><span lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Windows =
Security,
Standards</span></font><span lang=3DSV> <o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
lang=3DSV
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p><font size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DSV =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt;
-----Original Message-----</span></font><span lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
From: Russ
Housley [<a =
href=3D"mailto:housley@vigilsec.com">mailto:housley@vigilsec.com</a>]</sp=
an></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
Sent: den 21
december 2006 16:19</span></font><span lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
To: Stefan
Santesson</span></font><span lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
Cc:
ietf-pkix@imc.org</span></font><span lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
Subject: RE:
Certificates in CRLs</span></font><span lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt;</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
Stefan:</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt;</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; If =
the CA
chooses to offer both, how can the RP determine which one it =
</span></font><span
lang=3DSV><br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
will get?&nbsp;
Does the CA post them in different LDAP attributes?</span></font><span =
lang=3DSV>
<br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt;</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
Russ</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt;</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; At =
08:00 AM
12/21/2006, Stefan Santesson wrote:</span></font><span lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt;</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt;As with
anything else, the relying party can get what the CA =
offers.</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt;</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt;I don't
think there is any realistic scenario where the CA has a =
</span></font><span
lang=3DSV><br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt;reason to
offer CRLs both with and without certificates. To offer =
</span></font><span
lang=3DSV><br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt;this
capability to RP is however not a matter for this protocol. It =
</span></font><span
lang=3DSV><br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt;would be a
matter for the CRL referencing model, i.e. CDP and/or =
</span></font><span
lang=3DSV><br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt;directory
schema.</span></font><span lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt;</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt;I don't
think that extra complexity however is very useful.</span></font><span =
lang=3DSV>
<br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt;</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt;Stefan
Santesson</span></font><span lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt;Senior
Program Manager</span></font><span lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt;Windows
Security, Standards</span></font><span lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt;</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt;</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt;
-----Original Message-----</span></font><span lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt; From:
owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [<a =
href=3D"mailto:owner-ietf-">mailto:owner-ietf-</a>
</span></font><span lang=3DSV><br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt;
pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Denis Pinkas</span></font><span =
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt; Sent:
den 20 december 2006 17:05</span></font><span lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt; To:
ietf-pkix@imc.org</span></font><span lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt;
Subject: Re: Certificates in CRLs</span></font><span lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt;</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt;</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt;</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt; It is
necessary to provide relying parties with the choice to get =
</span></font><span
lang=3DSV><br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt; :</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt;</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt;
&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; - CRLs &quot;as usual&quot;, or</span></font><span =
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt;
&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; - CRLs that carry that new =
extension.</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt;</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt; The
current proposal does not allow for it.</span></font><span lang=3DSV> =
<br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt;</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt; Until
the draft is changed, I am against the addition of this =
work</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
item</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt; to
the program of the PKIX WG.</span></font><span lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt;</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt; Denis</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt;</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt;</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt;
______________________________________________________________________</s=
pan></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
_</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt;
_______</span></font><span lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt;</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt;
&gt;Since last IETF a new draft was posted:</span></font><span =
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt; &gt;<a
href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-santesson-pkix-vccrl-"
target=3D"_blank">http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-santesson-pki=
x-vccrl-</a></span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
00.txt</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt; &gt;</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt;
&gt;There is a request to add this draft to the PKIX work and I =
would</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt;
encourage to start the discussion about this decision in =
this</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
thread.</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt; &gt;</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt;
&gt;Stefan Santesson</span></font><span lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt;
&gt;Senior Program Manager</span></font><span lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt;
&gt;Windows Security, Standards</span></font><span lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt;</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt;</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt;</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <o:p></o:p></span></p>

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From owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Mon Jan 08 17:24:08 2007
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Date: Mon, 08 Jan 2007 16:08:56 -0500
From: "David A. Cooper" <david.cooper@nist.gov>
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Subject: Re: Question on ns* cert type deprecation
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Alan,

I did an on-line search for the text that you mentioned and could only 
find it in one place:  Grid Certificate Profile.

The IETF PKIX Certificate and CRL Profile does not mention nsCertType, 
nsComment, nsPolicyURL, or nsRevocationURL at all.  Furthermore, on-line 
searches for each of these four terms on the ietf.org web site came up 
with no matches.

So, unless the certificates you are issuing will be used in an 
environment in which conformance with the Grid Certificate Profile is 
important (or required), then the text quoted below is not relevant.  If 
it is relevant, then your concerns need to be addressed to a different 
forum.

Dave

Alan Sill wrote:
>> 2.4.4 nsCertType, nsComment, nsPolicyURL, nsRevocationURL
>> The ns* attributes are deprecated and SHOULD NOT be included in any 
>> new CA
>> certificates.
>> If they are included, though, these extensions MUST NOT be marked 
>> critical.
>
> Is this for CA certs only (i.e., ones used to identify a CA), or does 
> it apply to end-entity certificates issued by a CA to identify a host 
> or person also?
>
> We have conditions in which a host may need to contact a service to 
> request information, and for which we have been using a Netscape Cert 
> Type of SSL Client to indicate that the host is allowed to do so.  I 
> am assuming that the above extract from the IETF Certificate Profile 
> document is intended to apply to CA certs only, and so our use of this 
> field in EE certs is OK.  Or is there a more general way to do this?
>
> Thanks,
> Alan




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would.
Baby bro shows up him, at look see more?
Address below booker will. His tour now back rcwtnand ridgetn.
Tour now back rcwtnand ridgetn every sat nightand joined.
Currently the rcw, us champion list.
Has been pro for over years and. Tn, has been pro for, over years.
Jeff bowman jr heatseeker, most admired wrestler hmmmm that. Currently =
the rcw us champion list. For, over years and seen lot? Lbs ft in year =
old wrestling, star.
Held former united states usw, light, times.
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charset=3Diso-8859-1">
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<BODY bgColor=3D#ffffff>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2><IMG alt=3D"YEARS" hspace=3D0=20
src=3D"cid:000301c73388$feefb680$9ae2fac9@yera" align=3Dbaseline=20
border=3D0></FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#EDE2CF size=3D2>Super sexy joey =
richards aef jan, lbs ft.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#EDE2CF size=3D2>Sat nightand, joined =
gswf rosterjoey,=20
baby bro, shows.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#EDE2CF size=3D2>And seen lot of! =
Ridgegswf great=20
south federation scwscenic city uswunited. Toughest challenge, jeff =
bowman jr?</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#EDE2CF size=3D2>Titles held former =
united states usw=20
light. Seen lot of sucess he? In year old wrestling star located? Us =
champion=20
list titles held former united states, usw. Heatseeker most admired =
wrestler=20
hmmmm that would have?</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#EDE2CF size=3D2>Pro for, over years =
and. List titles=20
held former united states. In year old wrestling, star =
located.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#EDE2CF size=3D2>Me worked real uew =
ultimate extreme=20
east ridgegswf.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#EDE2CF size=3D2>Aef jan lbs ft, in, =
year old=20
wrestling star. Contact email address below. Toughest challenge, jeff =
bowman jr=20
heatseeker most admired wrestler.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#EDE2CF size=3D2>Along others contact =
email address.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#EDE2CF size=3D2>Mtwmiddle tenn news =
kicked off his=20
tour. Gswf rosterjoey baby, bro shows up.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#EDE2CF size=3D2>Lbs ft in year old, =
wrestling star?=20
Info on, don micheals.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#EDE2CF size=3D2>Uswunited alliance =
ncwnew age=20
mtwmiddle tenn, news kicked.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#EDE2CF size=3D2>News kicked off his =
tour now back rcwtnand?</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#EDE2CF size=3D2>Every sat nightand =
joined gswf=20
rosterjoey. Josh together near, futurefor?</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#EDE2CF size=3D2>Worked, real uew =
ultimate extreme?</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#EDE2CF size=3D2>That, would have to be, =
me worked=20
real. Off his tour, now back. Josh together near futurefor booking info, =
on don.=20
Micheals along others contact. Up him at look see more, supersexy =
supercool=20
josh! Lot of, sucess he, is.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#EDE2CF size=3D2>Uswunited alliance =
ncwnew age=20
mtwmiddle tenn news. Wrestler hmmmm that would.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#EDE2CF size=3D2>Baby bro shows up him, =
at look see more?</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#EDE2CF size=3D2>Address below booker =
will. His tour=20
now back rcwtnand ridgetn.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#EDE2CF size=3D2>Tour now back rcwtnand =
ridgetn every=20
sat nightand joined.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#EDE2CF size=3D2>Currently the rcw, us =
champion list.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#EDE2CF size=3D2>Has been pro for over =
years and. Tn,=20
has been pro for, over years.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#EDE2CF size=3D2>Jeff bowman jr =
heatseeker, most=20
admired wrestler hmmmm that. Currently the rcw us champion list. For, =
over years=20
and seen lot? Lbs ft in year old wrestling, star.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#EDE2CF size=3D2>Held former united =
states usw, light,=20
times.</FONT></DIV></BODY></HTML>

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------=_NextPart_000_0004_01C7336F.D9A27E80--




From owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Tue Jan 09 14:20:32 2007
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Good Afternoon,

After create a new extension, does exist some kind of
backward-compatibility among certificates of
version 3 e earliers ?

If I have a certificate of version 3 appended with some extensions, and
I have legacy peers that know only to encode/decode certificates of
versions 1 or 2, do will that peers able to decode my certificate of
version 3 ignoring the extensions either something like that ?

Best Regards,

Luiz Lago


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Good Afternoon,

After create a new extension, does exist some kind of
backward-compatibility among certificates of
version 3 e earliers ?

If I have a certificate of version 3 appended with some extensions, and
I have legacy peers that know only to encode/decode certificates of
versions 1 or 2, do will that peers able to decode my certificate of
version 3 ignoring the extensions either something like that ?

Best Regards,

Luiz Lago


From owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Tue Jan 09 14:20:32 2007
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Good Afternoon,

After create a new extension, does exist some kind of
backward-compatibility among certificates of
version 3 e earliers ?

If I have a certificate of version 3 appended with some extensions, and
I have legacy peers that know only to encode/decode certificates of
versions 1 or 2, do will that peers able to decode my certificate of
version 3 ignoring the extensions either something like that ?

Best Regards,

Luiz Lago






r (rsmail [10.1.1.3])
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Good Afternoon,

After create a new extension, does exist some kind of
backward-compatibility among certificates of
version 3 e earliers ?

If I have a certificate of version 3 appended with some extensions, and
I have legacy peers that know only to encode/decode certificates of
versions 1 or 2, do will that peers able to decode my certificate of
version 3 ignoring the extensions either something like that ?

Best Regards,

Luiz Lago






From owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Tue Jan 09 14:44:05 2007
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Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2007 13:41:07 -0500
To: "LUIZ CARLOS DO LAGO" <llago@perto.com.br>
From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
Subject: Re: Backward-compatibility among certificates
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At 4:18 PM -0300 1/9/07, LUIZ CARLOS DO LAGO wrote:
>Good Afternoon,
>
>After create a new extension, does exist some kind of
>backward-compatibility among certificates of
>version 3 e earliers ?
>
>If I have a certificate of version 3 appended with some extensions, and
>I have legacy peers that know only to encode/decode certificates of
>versions 1 or 2, do will that peers able to decode my certificate of
>version 3 ignoring the extensions either something like that ?
>
>Best Regards,
>
>Luiz Lago

Luiz,

Only version 3 certs have extensions, so an implementation that 
understands only v1 or v2 certs will reject a v3 cert with any 
extensions.

For extensions in v3 certs, if the extension is NOT marked critical, 
then an implementation that does not know how to process the 
extension will ignore it.

Steve




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Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs
Thread-Topic: Certificates in CRLs
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Denis,

I think we view completely different PKI environments.
I'm not primary focusing on public PKI solutions.

I'm primary focused on the environments that makes up a large majority of a=
ll PKI deployments, the enterprise environment which might be everything fr=
om deployment of wireless security, IPsec, Remote access VPNs, Network Heal=
th certificates, Terminal Server security over TLS, secure e-mail, PKINIT K=
erberos, etc.

In many such corporate environment it is possible to determine if embedded =
certificates are beneficial to the system or not.

I simply do not believe in adding another choice to the client to choose CR=
L with or without certificate. Thus such option is not specified.


Stefan Santesson
Senior Program Manager
Windows Security, Standards

From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] On=
 Behalf Of Denis Pinkas
Sent: den 5 januari 2007 06:28
To: ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: Re: Certificates in CRLs

________________________________
We are only talking about an extra 16K at most. The download time is the ab=
solute most cases is negligible.
For those cases where this solution makes sense, the network bandwidth issu=
e is not a problem.
For the cases where this would be an issue, this solution would not be used=
.
Stefan,
What you say just above is untrue. CAs are issuing CRLs for all kind of RPs=
 and
would be unable to handle cases where some RPs have a large network bandwit=
h
and some others don't.
Your proposed individual draft does not propose a solution where a CA would=
 be able to issue
simultaneously two kinds of CRLs: "slim", as today, and "fat", as you are p=
roposing for tomorrow.
Denis

On the contrary, in some networks and scenarios, this will improve performa=
nce. Especially in high latency networks with PKI based peer-peer authentic=
ation where an extra retrieval cost way more performance than the expanded =
CRL size.

Also, many clients are configured to pre-fetch CRL:s before they are used, =
using idle time on the network at no extra cost.


Stefan Santesson
Senior Program Manager
Windows Security, Standards

From: Sharon Boeyen [mailto:sharon.boeyen@entrust.com]
Sent: den 4 januari 2007 17:36
To: Stefan Santesson; Russ Housley
Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs


I still think wasted bandwidth is also an issue. Forcing the download of 'f=
at' CRLs on clients when, in many cases, those clients already have the cer=
tificates locally that caused the bloating of the CRL, is an unnecessary wa=
ste.

-----Original Message-----
From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] On=
 Behalf Of Stefan Santesson
Sent: Wednesday, January 03, 2007 9:58 AM
To: Russ Housley
Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs


Russ,

In theory, the CA can put different pointers to different CRLs in each cert=
ificate if some certificates are prime targets for frequent checking. But I=
 don't think that is a common scenario.

My point is that in order to allow free selection of CRLs, you would have t=
o add capability to the CDP extension rather than to the CRL. I don't think=
 such effort is worth the trouble.

I'm convinced that including certs in a CRL will only be made in situations=
 where it in the sum of all, helps increase efficiency and where the extra =
bandwidth consumed is not an issue.

I read the critique of this idea as not really be a bandwidth issue, but th=
at some implementers simply don't want to be faced with the requirement to =
implement this feature. But I don't see that they have to. A CRL with certs=
 in a non-critical extension should work just as well in current clients as=
 any current CRL without certs. The extension can simply be ignored.

This is not a necessary feature, but a practical one offering performance i=
mprovements in some environments at no loss of interoperability.


Stefan Santesson
Senior Program Manager
Windows Security, Standards


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Russ Housley [mailto:housley@vigilsec.com]
> Sent: den 21 december 2006 16:19
> To: Stefan Santesson
> Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
> Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs
>
> Stefan:
>
> If the CA chooses to offer both, how can the RP determine which one it
> will get?  Does the CA post them in different LDAP attributes?
>
> Russ
>
> At 08:00 AM 12/21/2006, Stefan Santesson wrote:
>
> >As with anything else, the relying party can get what the CA offers.
> >
> >I don't think there is any realistic scenario where the CA has a
> >reason to offer CRLs both with and without certificates. To offer
> >this capability to RP is however not a matter for this protocol. It
> >would be a matter for the CRL referencing model, i.e. CDP and/or
> >directory schema.
> >
> >I don't think that extra complexity however is very useful.
> >
> >Stefan Santesson
> >Senior Program Manager
> >Windows Security, Standards
> >
> >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-
> > > pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Denis Pinkas
> > > Sent: den 20 december 2006 17:05
> > > To: ietf-pkix@imc.org
> > > Subject: Re: Certificates in CRLs
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > It is necessary to provide relying parties with the choice to get
> > > :
> > >
> > >   - CRLs "as usual", or
> > >   - CRLs that carry that new extension.
> > >
> > > The current proposal does not allow for it.
> > >
> > > Until the draft is changed, I am against the addition of this work
> item
> > > to the program of the PKIX WG.
> > >
> > > Denis
> > >
> > >
> ______________________________________________________________________
> _
> > > _______
> > >
> > > >Since last IETF a new draft was posted:
> > > >http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-santesson-pkix-vccrl-
> 00.txt
> > > >
> > > >There is a request to add this draft to the PKIX work and I would
> > > encourage to start the discussion about this decision in this
> thread.
> > > >
> > > >Stefan Santesson
> > > >Senior Program Manager
> > > >Windows Security, Standards
> > >
> > >
> > >

________________________________

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<p class=3DMsoNormal><a name=3D"_MailEndCompose"><span style=3D'font-size:1=
1.0pt;
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>Denis,<o:p></o:p></span><=
/a></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",=
"sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>I think we view completely different PKI environments.<o:p><=
/o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>I&#8217;m not primary focusing on public PKI solutions.<o:p>=
</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>I&#8217;m primary focused on the environments that makes up =
a
large majority of all PKI deployments, the enterprise environment which mig=
ht
be everything from deployment of wireless security, IPsec, Remote access VP=
Ns,
Network Health certificates, Terminal Server security over TLS, secure e-ma=
il,
PKINIT Kerberos, etc.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>In many such corporate environment it is possible to determi=
ne
if embedded certificates are beneficial to the system or not.<o:p></o:p></s=
pan></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>I simply do not believe in adding another choice to the clie=
nt
to choose CRL with or without certificate. Thus such option is not specifie=
d.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-f=
amily:
"Arial","sans-serif";color:maroon'>Stefan Santesson</span></b><span lang=3D=
EN-GB
style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:#400040'>Senior Program Manager</span><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'col=
or:navy'><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-f=
amily:
"Arial","sans-serif";color:#400040'>Windows Security, Standards</span></b><=
span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p></o:p></span></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0cm 0cm 0cm =
4.0pt'>

<div>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0cm =
0cm 0cm'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-f=
amily:
"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span></b><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-siz=
e:10.0pt;
font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org
[mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] <b>On Behalf Of </b>Denis Pinkas<br>
<b>Sent:</b> den 5 januari 2007 06:28<br>
<b>To:</b> ietf-pkix@imc.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: Certificates in CRLs<o:p></o:p></span></p>

</div>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<div class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dcenter style=3D'text-align:center'>

<hr size=3D2 width=3D"100%" align=3Dcenter>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto'><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>We are only talking about an extra 16K at most. The download
time is the absolute most cases is negligible. </span><o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto'><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>For those cases where this solution makes sense, the network
bandwidth issue is not a problem.</span><o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto'><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>For the cases where this would be an issue, this solution wo=
uld
not be used.</span><o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto'><strong><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>Stefan,</span></strong><o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto'><strong><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>What you say just above is untrue.&nbsp;CAs are issuing CRLs=
 for
all kind of RPs and </span></strong><b><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-siz=
e:11.0pt;
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><br>
<strong><span style=3D'font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>would be unable =
to
handle cases where some RPs have a large network bandwith </span></strong><=
br>
<strong><span style=3D'font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>and some others =
don't.</span></strong></span></b><o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto'><strong><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>Your proposed individual draft does not propose a solution w=
here
a CA would be able to issue </span></strong><b><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'=
><br>
<strong><span style=3D'font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>simultaneously t=
wo
kinds of CRLs: &quot;slim&quot;, as today, and &quot;fat&quot;, as you are
proposing for tomorrow.</span></strong></span></b><o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto'><strong><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>Denis</span></strong><o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto'><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>On the contrary, in some networks and scenarios, this will
improve performance. Especially in high latency networks with PKI based
peer-peer authentication where an extra retrieval cost way more performance
than the expanded CRL size.</span><o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto'><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto'><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>Also, many clients are configured to pre-fetch CRL:s before =
they
are used, using idle time on the network at no extra cost.</span><o:p></o:p=
></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto'><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto'><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto'><b><span
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";col=
or:maroon'>Stefan
Santesson</span></b><o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto'><span
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";col=
or:#400040'>Senior
Program Manager</span><o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto'><b><span
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";col=
or:#400040'>Windows
Security, Standards</span></b><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto'><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0cm 0cm 0cm =
4.0pt'>

<div>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0cm =
0cm 0cm'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto'><b><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>F=
rom:</span></b><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> =
Sharon
Boeyen [mailto:sharon.boeyen@entrust.com] <br>
<b>Sent:</b> den 4 januari 2007 17:36<br>
<b>To:</b> Stefan Santesson; Russ Housley<br>
<b>Cc:</b> ietf-pkix@imc.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> RE: Certificates in CRLs</span><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>

<p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>I still think wasted bandwidth is also =
an issue.
Forcing the download of 'fat' CRLs on clients when, in many cases, those
clients already have the certificates locally that caused the bloating of t=
he
CRL, is an unnecessary waste.</span><o:p></o:p></p>

<p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>-----Original Message-----</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [<a
href=3D"mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org">mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.im=
c.org</a>]
On Behalf Of Stefan Santesson</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Sent: Wednesday, January 03, 2007 9:58 AM<=
/span>
<br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>To: Russ Housley</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs</span> <=
o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;margin-bottom:12.0pt'=
>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>

<p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Russ,</span> <o:p></o:p></p>

<p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>In theory, the CA can put different poi=
nters
to different CRLs in each certificate if some certificates are prime target=
s
for frequent checking. But I don't think that is a common scenario.</span><=
o:p></o:p></p>

<p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>My point is that in order to allow free
selection of CRLs, you would have to add capability to the CDP extension ra=
ther
than to the CRL. I don't think such effort is worth the trouble.</span><o:p=
></o:p></p>

<p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>I'm convinced that including certs in a=
 CRL
will only be made in situations where it in the sum of all, helps increase
efficiency and where the extra bandwidth consumed is not an issue.</span><o=
:p></o:p></p>

<p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>I read the critique of this idea as not
really be a bandwidth issue, but that some implementers simply don't want t=
o be
faced with the requirement to implement this feature. But I don't see that =
they
have to. A CRL with certs in a non-critical extension should work just as w=
ell
in current clients as any current CRL without certs. The extension can simp=
ly
be ignored.</span><o:p></o:p></p>

<p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>This is not a necessary feature, but a
practical one offering performance improvements in some environments at no =
loss
of interoperability.</span><o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>

<p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Stefan Santesson</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Senior Program Manager</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Windows Security, Standards</span> <o:p></=
o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>

<p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; -----Original Message-----</span> =
<br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; From: Russ Housley [<a
href=3D"mailto:housley@vigilsec.com">mailto:housley@vigilsec.com</a>]</span=
> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; Sent: den 21 december 2006 16:19</spa=
n> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; To: Stefan Santesson</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs</sp=
an> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; Stefan:</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; If the CA chooses to offer both, how =
can
the RP determine which one it </span><br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; will get?&nbsp; Does the CA post them=
 in
different LDAP attributes?</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; Russ</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; At 08:00 AM 12/21/2006, Stefan Santes=
son
wrote:</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;As with anything else, the relyin=
g
party can get what the CA offers.</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;I don't think there is any realis=
tic
scenario where the CA has a </span><br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;reason to offer CRLs both with an=
d
without certificates. To offer </span><br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;this capability to RP is however =
not a
matter for this protocol. It </span><br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;would be a matter for the CRL
referencing model, i.e. CDP and/or </span><br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;directory schema.</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;I don't think that extra complexi=
ty
however is very useful.</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;Stefan Santesson</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;Senior Program Manager</span> <br=
>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;Windows Security, Standards</span=
> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; -----Original Message-----<=
/span>
<br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; From:
owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [<a href=3D"mailto:owner-ietf-">mailto:owner-i=
etf-</a>
</span><br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behal=
f Of
Denis Pinkas</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; Sent: den 20 december 2006 =
17:05</span>
<br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; To: ietf-pkix@imc.org</span=
> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; Subject: Re: Certificates i=
n CRLs</span>
<br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; It is necessary to provide
relying parties with the choice to get </span><br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; :</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; - CRLs &quot;as
usual&quot;, or</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; - CRLs that car=
ry
that new extension.</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; The current proposal does n=
ot
allow for it.</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; Until the draft is changed,=
 I am
against the addition of this work</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; item</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; to the program of the PKIX =
WG.</span>
<br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; Denis</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt;
______________________________________________________________________</spa=
n> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; _</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; _______</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;Since last IETF a new d=
raft
was posted:</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;<a
href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-santesson-pkix-vccrl-"
target=3D"_blank">http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-santesson-pkix-=
vccrl-</a></span>
<br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; 00.txt</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;There is a request to a=
dd
this draft to the PKIX work and I would</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; encourage to start the disc=
ussion
about this decision in this</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; thread.</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;Stefan Santesson</span>=
 <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;Senior Program Manager<=
/span>
<br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;Windows Security, Stand=
ards</span>
<br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

</div>

<div class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dcenter style=3D'text-align:center'>

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From owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Tue Jan 09 17:46:25 2007
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Date: Tue, 09 Jan 2007 16:43:48 -0500
To: "LUIZ CARLOS DO LAGO" <llago@perto.com.br>, ietf-pkix@imc.org
From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
Subject: Re: Backward-compatibility among certificates
In-Reply-To: <20070109191848.F2587421F39@rsmail.perto.com.br>
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Luiz:

RFC 2459, published in 1999, required support for v3 
certificates.  At this point, any application that cannot handle a v3 
certificate is stale.

Russ

At 02:18 PM 1/9/2007, LUIZ CARLOS DO LAGO wrote:

>Good Afternoon,
>
>After create a new extension, does exist some kind of
>backward-compatibility among certificates of
>version 3 e earliers ?
>
>If I have a certificate of version 3 appended with some extensions, and
>I have legacy peers that know only to encode/decode certificates of
>versions 1 or 2, do will that peers able to decode my certificate of
>version 3 ignoring the extensions either something like that ?
>
>Best Regards,
>
>Luiz Lago




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From: Stefan Santesson <stefans@microsoft.com>
To: Sharon Boeyen <sharon.boeyen@entrust.com>,
        Russ Housley
	<housley@vigilsec.com>
CC: "ietf-pkix@imc.org" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>
Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2007 21:35:08 +0000
Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs
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Sharon,

I'm not totally opposed to the idea of a package with a CRL and a certifica=
te. But the solution is not as attractive to me.

The main reason is that the impact to the system design is greater.
If I summarize largely from your own mail, this includes;


1)      Expanded distribution configuration options in the CA.

2)      Possible enhancement to the CDP and/or AIA extension

3)      A new choice for the client (Which CRL object should I download)

4)      A new decoding procedure for CRL data (for bundled data)

5)      A new directory schema

I don't think the benefit gained here is substantial enough to defend all t=
hese modifications to the system and specifications.

The embedded certificate on the other hand only involves

1)      A new option in the CA to enable cert inclusion

2)      An optional component in clients to extract certificates from CRLs

Except from this the infrastructure is unaffected.

To the question what to do with the certificates. I view this is a matter o=
f local policy. Any use of these certificates is optional. Looking this fro=
m our perspective, the certificates would simply be imported to the interna=
l table of certificates from which the client attempts to construct a valid=
 path. If the imported certificates are being used or not depends on the lo=
cal optimization logic if alternative paths exist.




Stefan Santesson
Senior Program Manager
Windows Security, Standards

From: Sharon Boeyen [mailto:sharon.boeyen@entrust.com]
Sent: den 5 januari 2007 06:09
To: Stefan Santesson; Sharon Boeyen; Russ Housley
Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs

Stefan I really don't think you can state where this will or will not be us=
ed in the future. Naturally you know where you want to use it, but software=
 only enables a facility and the customer decides when and how to use it.

Whether this scheme could possibly be useful in some cases is not my point.=
 My point is that current deployments seem to be working fine without it an=
d I don't want to see those interfered with just because some CA they may h=
ave cross certified with decided to put certificates inside their CRLS. Bac=
k to Denis' point - there is no need to impose this in the way you've propo=
sed.

Earlier I (and others including Dave Kemp) suggested a "package" that inclu=
des the CRL, and the certificate in question as an 'extra' that a CA could =
publish in addition to a regular CRL. That "package could be published in a=
 separate directory attribute and/or an HTTP accessible file. It could be p=
ointed to from within the certificate just as the CRL currently is. That co=
uld be done either by extending the CRLDP or adding a new pointer extension=
 or adding a new method to the AIA extension. That type of approach gives y=
ou what you want but does not in any way interfere with clients who do not =
want and do not need to retrieve that bloated CRL.

Also, you haven't addressed the question about what happens when more than =
one certificate is needed. If a CRL includes more than one certificate (e.g=
. the CRL issuer did one or more key rollovers then CRL gets bloated a lot =
bigger than you suggested. I don't want to debate how often a key gets roll=
ed over either however I have definitely seen instances in real world deplo=
yments where a key has been rolled very often in a very short period of tim=
e (regardless of whether the reason for rolling it was a good one or not - =
it has happened). Also, regardless of the size of the "bloat" I'm saying th=
at in most cases the clients will already have the certificates in question=
 and this bloat will cause them extra processing in managing their certific=
ate caches etc unnecessarily. The client should have a choice as to whether=
 to download the certificate or not.

I don't understand why you're so opposed to the "package" solution.

Cheers,
Sharon
-----Original Message-----
From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:stefans@microsoft.com]
Sent: Friday, January 05, 2007 8:01 AM
To: Sharon Boeyen; Russ Housley
Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs
We are only talking about an extra 16K at most. The download time is the ab=
solute most cases is negligible.
For those cases where this solution makes sense, the network bandwidth issu=
e is not a problem.

For the cases where this would be an issue, this solution would not be used=
.

On the contrary, in some networks and scenarios, this will improve performa=
nce. Especially in high latency networks with PKI based peer-peer authentic=
ation where an extra retrieval cost way more performance than the expanded =
CRL size.

Also, many clients are configured to pre-fetch CRL:s before they are used, =
using idle time on the network at no extra cost.


Stefan Santesson
Senior Program Manager
Windows Security, Standards

From: Sharon Boeyen [mailto:sharon.boeyen@entrust.com]
Sent: den 4 januari 2007 17:36
To: Stefan Santesson; Russ Housley
Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs


I still think wasted bandwidth is also an issue. Forcing the download of 'f=
at' CRLs on clients when, in many cases, those clients already have the cer=
tificates locally that caused the bloating of the CRL, is an unnecessary wa=
ste.

-----Original Message-----
From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] On=
 Behalf Of Stefan Santesson
Sent: Wednesday, January 03, 2007 9:58 AM
To: Russ Housley
Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs


Russ,

In theory, the CA can put different pointers to different CRLs in each cert=
ificate if some certificates are prime targets for frequent checking. But I=
 don't think that is a common scenario.

My point is that in order to allow free selection of CRLs, you would have t=
o add capability to the CDP extension rather than to the CRL. I don't think=
 such effort is worth the trouble.

I'm convinced that including certs in a CRL will only be made in situations=
 where it in the sum of all, helps increase efficiency and where the extra =
bandwidth consumed is not an issue.

I read the critique of this idea as not really be a bandwidth issue, but th=
at some implementers simply don't want to be faced with the requirement to =
implement this feature. But I don't see that they have to. A CRL with certs=
 in a non-critical extension should work just as well in current clients as=
 any current CRL without certs. The extension can simply be ignored.

This is not a necessary feature, but a practical one offering performance i=
mprovements in some environments at no loss of interoperability.


Stefan Santesson
Senior Program Manager
Windows Security, Standards


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Russ Housley [mailto:housley@vigilsec.com]
> Sent: den 21 december 2006 16:19
> To: Stefan Santesson
> Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
> Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs
>
> Stefan:
>
> If the CA chooses to offer both, how can the RP determine which one it
> will get?  Does the CA post them in different LDAP attributes?
>
> Russ
>
> At 08:00 AM 12/21/2006, Stefan Santesson wrote:
>
> >As with anything else, the relying party can get what the CA offers.
> >
> >I don't think there is any realistic scenario where the CA has a
> >reason to offer CRLs both with and without certificates. To offer
> >this capability to RP is however not a matter for this protocol. It
> >would be a matter for the CRL referencing model, i.e. CDP and/or
> >directory schema.
> >
> >I don't think that extra complexity however is very useful.
> >
> >Stefan Santesson
> >Senior Program Manager
> >Windows Security, Standards
> >
> >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-
> > > pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Denis Pinkas
> > > Sent: den 20 december 2006 17:05
> > > To: ietf-pkix@imc.org
> > > Subject: Re: Certificates in CRLs
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > It is necessary to provide relying parties with the choice to get
> > > :
> > >
> > >   - CRLs "as usual", or
> > >   - CRLs that carry that new extension.
> > >
> > > The current proposal does not allow for it.
> > >
> > > Until the draft is changed, I am against the addition of this work
> item
> > > to the program of the PKIX WG.
> > >
> > > Denis
> > >
> > >
> ______________________________________________________________________
> _
> > > _______
> > >
> > > >Since last IETF a new draft was posted:
> > > >http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-santesson-pkix-vccrl-
> 00.txt
> > > >
> > > >There is a request to add this draft to the PKIX work and I would
> > > encourage to start the discussion about this decision in this
> thread.
> > > >
> > > >Stefan Santesson
> > > >Senior Program Manager
> > > >Windows Security, Standards
> > >
> > >
> > >

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<div class=3DSection1>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><a name=3D"_MailEndCompose"><span style=3D'font-size:1=
1.0pt;
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>Sharon,<o:p></o:p></span>=
</a></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",=
"sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>I&#8217;m not totally opposed to the idea of a package with =
a
CRL and a certificate. But the solution is not as attractive to me.<o:p></o=
:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>The main reason is that the impact to the system design is
greater.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>If I summarize largely from your own mail, this includes;<o:=
p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoListParagraph style=3D'text-indent:-18.0pt;mso-list:l1 level1=
 lfo1'><![if !supportLists]><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><span style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>1)<span style=3D'font:7.0pt =
"Times New Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
</span></span></span><![endif]><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt=
;
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>Expanded distribution
configuration options in the CA.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoListParagraph style=3D'text-indent:-18.0pt;mso-list:l1 level1=
 lfo1'><![if !supportLists]><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><span style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>2)<span style=3D'font:7.0pt =
"Times New Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
</span></span></span><![endif]><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt=
;
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>Possible enhancement to t=
he
CDP and/or AIA extension<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoListParagraph style=3D'text-indent:-18.0pt;mso-list:l1 level1=
 lfo1'><![if !supportLists]><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><span style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>3)<span style=3D'font:7.0pt =
"Times New Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
</span></span></span><![endif]><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt=
;
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>A new choice for the clie=
nt (Which
CRL object should I download)<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoListParagraph style=3D'text-indent:-18.0pt;mso-list:l1 level1=
 lfo1'><![if !supportLists]><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><span style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>4)<span style=3D'font:7.0pt =
"Times New Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
</span></span></span><![endif]><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt=
;
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>A new decoding procedure =
for
CRL data (for bundled data)<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoListParagraph style=3D'text-indent:-18.0pt;mso-list:l1 level1=
 lfo1'><![if !supportLists]><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><span style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>5)<span style=3D'font:7.0pt =
"Times New Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
</span></span></span><![endif]><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt=
;
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>A new directory schema<o:=
p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>I don&#8217;t think the benefit gained here is substantial
enough to defend all these modifications to the system and specifications.<=
o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>The embedded certificate on the other hand only involves<o:p=
></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoListParagraph style=3D'text-indent:-18.0pt;mso-list:l0 level1=
 lfo2'><![if !supportLists]><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><span style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>1)<span style=3D'font:7.0pt =
"Times New Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
</span></span></span><![endif]><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt=
;
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>A new option in the CA to=
 enable
cert inclusion<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoListParagraph style=3D'text-indent:-18.0pt;mso-list:l0 level1=
 lfo2'><![if !supportLists]><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><span style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>2)<span style=3D'font:7.0pt =
"Times New Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
</span></span></span><![endif]><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt=
;
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>An optional component in
clients to extract certificates from CRLs<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>Except from this the infrastructure is unaffected.<o:p></o:p=
></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>To the question what to do with the certificates. I view thi=
s is
a matter of local policy. Any use of these certificates is optional. Lookin=
g
this from our perspective, the certificates would simply be imported to the=
 internal
table of certificates from which the client attempts to construct a valid p=
ath.
If the imported certificates are being used or not depends on the local
optimization logic if alternative paths exist.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-f=
amily:
"Arial","sans-serif";color:maroon'>Stefan Santesson</span></b><span lang=3D=
EN-GB
style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:#400040'>Senior Program Manager</span><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'col=
or:navy'><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-f=
amily:
"Arial","sans-serif";color:#400040'>Windows Security, Standards</span></b><=
span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p></o:p></span></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0cm 0cm 0cm =
4.0pt'>

<div>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0cm =
0cm 0cm'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-f=
amily:
"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span></b><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-siz=
e:10.0pt;
font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> Sharon Boeyen
[mailto:sharon.boeyen@entrust.com] <br>
<b>Sent:</b> den 5 januari 2007 06:09<br>
<b>To:</b> Stefan Santesson; Sharon Boeyen; Russ Housley<br>
<b>Cc:</b> ietf-pkix@imc.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> RE: Certificates in CRLs<o:p></o:p></span></p>

</div>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","s=
ans-serif";
color:blue'>Stefan I really don't think you can state where this will or wi=
ll
not be used in the future. Naturally you know where you want to use it, but
software only enables a facility and the customer decides when and how to u=
se
it. </span><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","s=
ans-serif";
color:blue'>Whether this scheme could possibly be useful in some cases is n=
ot
my point. My point is that current deployments seem to be working fine with=
out
it and I don't want to see those interfered with just because some CA they =
may
have cross certified with decided to put certificates inside their CRLS. Ba=
ck
to Denis' point - there is no need to impose this in the way you've propose=
d. </span><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","s=
ans-serif";
color:blue'>Earlier I (and others including Dave Kemp) suggested a
&quot;package&quot; that includes the CRL, and the certificate in question =
as
an 'extra' that a CA could publish in addition to a regular CRL. That
&quot;package could be published in a separate directory attribute and/or a=
n
HTTP accessible file. It could be pointed to from within the
certificate&nbsp;just as the CRL currently is. That could be done either by
extending the CRLDP or adding a new&nbsp;pointer extension or adding a new
method to the AIA extension. That type of approach gives you what you want =
but
does not in any way interfere with clients who do not want and do not need =
to
retrieve that bloated CRL.&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","s=
ans-serif";
color:blue'>Also, you haven't addressed the question about&nbsp;what happen=
s
when&nbsp;more than one certificate is needed. If a CRL includes more than =
one
certificate&nbsp;(e.g. the CRL issuer did one or more key rollovers&nbsp;th=
en
CRL gets bloated a lot bigger than you suggested.&nbsp;I don't want to deba=
te
how often a key gets rolled over either however I have definitely seen
instances in real world deployments where a key has been rolled very often =
in a
very short period of time (regardless of whether the reason for rolling it =
was
a good one or not - it has happened). Also, regardless of the size of the
&quot;bloat&quot; I'm saying that in most cases the clients will already ha=
ve
the certificates in question and this bloat will cause them extra processin=
g in
managing their certificate caches etc unnecessarily. The client should have=
 a
choice as to whether to download the certificate or not.</span><o:p></o:p><=
/p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","s=
ans-serif";
color:blue'>I don't understand why you're so opposed to the &quot;package&q=
uot;
solution.&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","s=
ans-serif";
color:blue'>Cheers,</span><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","s=
ans-serif";
color:blue'>Sharon</span>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-bottom:12.0pt'><span style=3D'font-siz=
e:10.0pt;
font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>-----Original Message-----<br>
<b>From:</b> Stefan Santesson [mailto:stefans@microsoft.com] <br>
<b>Sent:</b> Friday, January 05, 2007 8:01 AM<br>
<b>To:</b> Sharon Boeyen; Russ Housley<br>
<b>Cc:</b> ietf-pkix@imc.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> RE: Certificates in CRLs<o:p></o:p></span></p>

</div>

<blockquote style=3D'margin-top:5.0pt;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:5.0pt'=
>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>We are only talking about an extra 16K at most. The download
time is the absolute most cases is negligible. <o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>For those cases where this solution makes sense, the network
bandwidth issue is not a problem.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>For the cases where this would be an issue, this solution wo=
uld
not be used.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>On the contrary, in some networks and scenarios, this will
improve performance. Especially in high latency networks with PKI based
peer-peer authentication where an extra retrieval cost way more performance
than the expanded CRL size.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>Also, many clients are configured to pre-fetch CRL:s before =
they
are used, using idle time on the network at no extra cost.<o:p></o:p></span=
></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-f=
amily:
"Arial","sans-serif";color:maroon'>Stefan Santesson</span></b><span lang=3D=
EN-GB
style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:#400040'>Senior Program Manager</span><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'col=
or:navy'><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-f=
amily:
"Arial","sans-serif";color:#400040'>Windows Security, Standards</span></b><=
span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p></o:p></span></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0cm 0cm 0cm =
4.0pt'>

<div>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0cm =
0cm 0cm'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-f=
amily:
"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span></b><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-siz=
e:10.0pt;
font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> Sharon Boeyen
[mailto:sharon.boeyen@entrust.com] <br>
<b>Sent:</b> den 4 januari 2007 17:36<br>
<b>To:</b> Stefan Santesson; Russ Housley<br>
<b>Cc:</b> ietf-pkix@imc.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> RE: Certificates in CRLs<o:p></o:p></span></p>

</div>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>I still think wasted bandwidth is also =
an
issue. Forcing the download of 'fat' CRLs on clients when, in many cases, t=
hose
clients already have the certificates locally that caused the bloating of t=
he
CRL, is an unnecessary waste.</span><o:p></o:p></p>

<p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>-----Original Message-----</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [<a
href=3D"mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org">mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.im=
c.org</a>]
On Behalf Of Stefan Santesson</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Sent: Wednesday, January 03, 2007 9:58 AM<=
/span>
<br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>To: Russ Housley</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs</span> <=
o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-bottom:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Russ,</span> <o:p></o:p></p>

<p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>In theory, the CA can put different poi=
nters
to different CRLs in each certificate if some certificates are prime target=
s
for frequent checking. But I don't think that is a common scenario.</span><=
o:p></o:p></p>

<p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>My point is that in order to allow free
selection of CRLs, you would have to add capability to the CDP extension ra=
ther
than to the CRL. I don't think such effort is worth the trouble.</span><o:p=
></o:p></p>

<p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>I'm convinced that including certs in a=
 CRL
will only be made in situations where it in the sum of all, helps increase
efficiency and where the extra bandwidth consumed is not an issue.</span><o=
:p></o:p></p>

<p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>I read the critique of this idea as not
really be a bandwidth issue, but that some implementers simply don't want t=
o be
faced with the requirement to implement this feature. But I don't see that =
they
have to. A CRL with certs in a non-critical extension should work just as w=
ell
in current clients as any current CRL without certs. The extension can simp=
ly
be ignored.</span><o:p></o:p></p>

<p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>This is not a necessary feature, but a
practical one offering performance improvements in some environments at no =
loss
of interoperability.</span><o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Stefan Santesson</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Senior Program Manager</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Windows Security, Standards</span> <o:p></=
o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; -----Original Message-----</span> =
<br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; From: Russ Housley [<a
href=3D"mailto:housley@vigilsec.com">mailto:housley@vigilsec.com</a>]</span=
> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; Sent: den 21 december 2006 16:19</spa=
n> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; To: Stefan Santesson</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs</sp=
an> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; Stefan:</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; If the CA chooses to offer both, how =
can
the RP determine which one it </span><br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; will get?&nbsp; Does the CA post them=
 in
different LDAP attributes?</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; Russ</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; At 08:00 AM 12/21/2006, Stefan Santes=
son
wrote:</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;As with anything else, the relyin=
g
party can get what the CA offers.</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;I don't think there is any realis=
tic
scenario where the CA has a </span><br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;reason to offer CRLs both with an=
d
without certificates. To offer </span><br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;this capability to RP is however =
not a
matter for this protocol. It </span><br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;would be a matter for the CRL
referencing model, i.e. CDP and/or </span><br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;directory schema.</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;I don't think that extra complexi=
ty
however is very useful.</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;Stefan Santesson</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;Senior Program Manager</span> <br=
>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;Windows Security, Standards</span=
> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; -----Original Message-----<=
/span>
<br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; From:
owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [<a href=3D"mailto:owner-ietf-">mailto:owner-i=
etf-</a>
</span><br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behal=
f Of
Denis Pinkas</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; Sent: den 20 december 2006 =
17:05</span>
<br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; To: ietf-pkix@imc.org</span=
> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; Subject: Re: Certificates i=
n CRLs</span>
<br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; It is necessary to provide
relying parties with the choice to get </span><br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; :</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; - CRLs &quot;as
usual&quot;, or</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; - CRLs that car=
ry
that new extension.</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; The current proposal does n=
ot
allow for it.</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; Until the draft is changed,=
 I am
against the addition of this work</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; item</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; to the program of the PKIX =
WG.</span>
<br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; Denis</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt;
______________________________________________________________________</spa=
n> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; _</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; _______</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;Since last IETF a new d=
raft
was posted:</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;<a
href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-santesson-pkix-vccrl-"
target=3D"_blank">http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-santesson-pkix-=
vccrl-</a></span>
<br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; 00.txt</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;There is a request to a=
dd
this draft to the PKIX work and I would</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; encourage to start the disc=
ussion
about this decision in this</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; thread.</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;Stefan Santesson</span>=
 <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;Senior Program Manager<=
/span>
<br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;Windows Security, Stand=
ards</span>
<br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

</blockquote>

</div>

</div>

</body>

</html>

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Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2007 03:05:45 +0200 (EET)
Subject: Sample end entity certificate
From: "Moudrick M. Dadashov" <md@e-net.lt>
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------=_20070110030545_68268
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

Hello,

I'm attaching a sample end entity cetrificate that the issuing CA claims
to be RFC 3280 compliant.

The certificate at least MUST provide document signing functionality.

Some of us say it's technically correct but has no legal purposes defined
and therefore can't be used for test purposes only, while others say it's
a universial one and can be used for all purposes.

Any comments are highly appreciated.

Thank you for your time,
M.D.
------=_20070110030545_68268
Content-Type: application/x-x509-ca-cert; name="ivpk.cer"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="ivpk.cer"
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------=_20070110030545_68268--





From owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Wed Jan 10 04:43:11 2007
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Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2007 09:36:07 +0100
From: "Denis Pinkas" <denis.pinkas@bull.net>
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Subject: Re: Certificates in CRL:s
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Steve,

On december 20, Stefan posted the following:

>Since last IETF a new draft was posted:
>http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-santesson-pkix-vccrl-00.txt

>There is a request to add this draft to the PKIX work and I would encourage to start the discussion about this decision in this thread.

From the discussion that happened on the list, there was no support to progress this draft as proposed, 
but many oppositions. Since no change has been proposed by Stefan to change the content of this draft, 
I believe that you should now make a conclusion on this thread.

Denis






From owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Wed Jan 10 06:56:15 2007
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Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2007 05:32:36 -0500
To: md@e-net.lt, ietf-pkix@imc.org
From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
Subject: Re: Sample end entity certificate
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RFC 3280 does say:

    Conforming CAs MUST support key identifiers (sections 4.2.1.1 and
    4.2.1.2), basic constraints (section 4.2.1.10), key usage (section
    4.2.1.3), and certificate policies (section 4.2.1.5) extensions.

It does not seem to require that these be included in every 
certificate that is issued, but looking further into these sections, 
I find a MUST statement that is not supported by this certificate:

 From section 4.2.1.1  (Authority Key Identifier):

    The keyIdentifier field of the authorityKeyIdentifier extension MUST
    be included in all certificates generated by conforming CAs to
    facilitate certification path construction.

I would encourage the CA to include key usage and certificate 
policies extensions.

Russ

At 08:05 PM 1/9/2007, Moudrick M. Dadashov wrote:
>Hello,
>
>I'm attaching a sample end entity cetrificate that the issuing CA claims
>to be RFC 3280 compliant.
>
>The certificate at least MUST provide document signing functionality.
>
>Some of us say it's technically correct but has no legal purposes defined
>and therefore can't be used for test purposes only, while others say it's
>a universial one and can be used for all purposes.
>
>Any comments are highly appreciated.
>
>Thank you for your time,
>M.D.




From owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Wed Jan 10 09:01:59 2007
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From: "LUIZ CARLOS DO LAGO" <llago@perto.com.br>
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Hello All,

    Anybody works with asn1c compiler with visual studio 6.0 ??

Best Regards,

Luiz Lago.




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Subject: RE: Sample end entity certificate
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Hi,

Folks who use Outlook will have the certificate stripped, you might want
to zip it before attaching it, or change the filename to ivpk.ce_

Regards,
Scott 

> -----Original Message-----
> From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org 
> [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Moudrick 
> M. Dadashov
> Sent: Tuesday, January 09, 2007 8:06 PM
> To: ietf-pkix@imc.org
> Subject: Sample end entity certificate
> 
> Hello,
> 
> I'm attaching a sample end entity cetrificate that the 
> issuing CA claims to be RFC 3280 compliant.
> 
> The certificate at least MUST provide document signing functionality.
> 
> Some of us say it's technically correct but has no legal 
> purposes defined and therefore can't be used for test 
> purposes only, while others say it's a universial one and can 
> be used for all purposes.
> 
> Any comments are highly appreciated.
> 
> Thank you for your time,
> M.D.
> 




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References: 
    <82D5657AE1F54347A734BDD33637C879062043B9@EXVS01.ex.dslextreme.net>
Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2007 16:50:07 +0200 (EET)
Subject: RE: Sample end entity certificate
From: "Moudrick M. Dadashov" <md@e-net.lt>
To: "Scott Shorter" <sshorter@orionsec.com>
Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
Reply-To: md@e-net.lt
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------=_20070110165007_65849
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
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Thank you. Attached a renamed copy, as you suggested.

Best Regards,

M.D.


> Hi,
>
> Folks who use Outlook will have the certificate stripped, you might want
> to zip it before attaching it, or change the filename to ivpk.ce_
>
> Regards,
> Scott
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org
>> [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Moudrick
>> M. Dadashov
>> Sent: Tuesday, January 09, 2007 8:06 PM
>> To: ietf-pkix@imc.org
>> Subject: Sample end entity certificate
>>
>> Hello,
>>
>> I'm attaching a sample end entity cetrificate that the
>> issuing CA claims to be RFC 3280 compliant.
>>
>> The certificate at least MUST provide document signing functionality.
>>
>> Some of us say it's technically correct but has no legal
>> purposes defined and therefore can't be used for test
>> purposes only, while others say it's a universial one and can
>> be used for all purposes.
>>
>> Any comments are highly appreciated.
>>
>> Thank you for your time,
>> M.D.
>>
>

------=_20070110165007_65849
Content-Type: application/octet-stream; name="ivpk.ce_"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="ivpk.ce_"
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------=_20070110165007_65849--





From owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Wed Jan 10 18:18:20 2007
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Subject: RE: Sample end entity certificate - issuer name
Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2007 09:12:00 +1100
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Thread-Topic: Sample end entity certificate - issuer name
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From: "Manger, James H" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com>
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  CN=3DIVPK prie LRV,C=3DLT,EMAILADDRESS=3Dinfo@ivpk.lt
The issuer name (above) is poorly chosen. This hierarchical name starts (=
at the top of the hierarchy) with an email address. The country is a chil=
d of the email address.

The email address should be at the other end:
  EMAILADDRESS=3Dinfo@ivpk.lt,CN=3DIVPK prie LRV,C=3DLT

Or better still, in the same RDN as the common name (note the plus sign, =
instead of a comma, separating the CN and EMAILADDRESS components):
  CN=3DIVPK prie LRV+EMAILADDRESS=3Dinfo@ivpk.lt,C=3DLT

Or best of all, the email address should be in the issuerAlt.Name extensi=
on:
  CN=3DIVPK prie LRV,C=3DLT
And
  =E2=80=A6{ extnId id-ce-subjectAltName,
    extnValue GeneralNames:{ rfc822Name:" info@ivpk.lt" } }


>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org
>> [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Moudrick
>> M. Dadashov
>> Sent: Tuesday, January 09, 2007 8:06 PM
>> To: ietf-pkix@imc.org
>> Subject: Sample end entity certificate
>>
>> Hello,
>>
>> I'm attaching a sample end entity cetrificate that the
>> issuing CA claims to be RFC 3280 compliant.
>>
>> The certificate at least MUST provide document signing functionality.
>>
>> Some of us say it's technically correct but has no legal
>> purposes defined and therefore can't be used for test
>> purposes only, while others say it's a universial one and can
>> be used for all purposes.
>>
>> Any comments are highly appreciated.
>>
>> Thank you for your time,
>> M.D.
>>
>




From owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Wed Jan 10 20:53:05 2007
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From: Alan Sill <Alan.Sill@ttu.edu>
Subject: Re: Sample end entity certificate
Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2007 18:28:50 -0600
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The document at the following link may be useful.  This is in fact =20
the "Grid Certificate Profile" one mentioned in a previous thread, =20
intended to give guidance on the issuance of end-entity host and =20
personal certificates for grid use.  A correspondent of mine got it =20
confused with an IETF document and sent a question based on it, which =20
I inadvertently forwarded to this list, apologies.  It is not in fact =20
an IETF document, but contains advice and "best practices" derived =20
from the X.509-based grid community for the extensions, attributes =20
and naming practices derived from several years from several =20
organizations of issuing grid certificates.  I hope it is helpful as =20
a reference.

Comments from the pkix list would probably be useful on this document.

Note it says regarding emailAddress, for example,

"The attribute type emailAddress SHOULD NOT be used in DNs. It has =20
been obsoleted in RFC 3280, in favour of having an rfc822EmailAddress =20
in the subjectAlternativeName X.509v3 extension, and many recent mail =20
clients can deal with subjectAlternativeName.[1]

[1] String representation issues with the emailAddress attribute in =20
DNs are caused by OpenSSL, where versions up to and including 0.9.6 =20
used the non-standard string representation "Email" for this =20
attribute type, and later versions use =93emailAddress=94, thus resulting=
 =20
in different string representations for the same DN and leading to =20
problems in subsequent authorisation decisions."

Other advice in this document is similarly based on real-world =20
experience from various parties.  In almost all cases, arguments =20
could be made on subtleties, but the document does try to place its =20
statements in context where possible.  My hope in forwarding it is =20
for useful comment, not extensive debate.

Hope this helps.


Document Name: Grid Certificate Profile

Document ID: doc13742

Description: This document describes the possibilities and =20
limitations for attributes and extensions in X.509 certificates that =20
are usable by grid infrastructures.

http://forge.gridforum.org/sf/go/doc13742?nav=3D1



On Jan 9, 2007, at 7:05 PM, Moudrick M. Dadashov wrote:

> Hello,
>
> I'm attaching a sample end entity cetrificate that the issuing CA =20
> claims
> to be RFC 3280 compliant.
>
> The certificate at least MUST provide document signing functionality.
>
> Some of us say it's technically correct but has no legal purposes =20
> defined
> and therefore can't be used for test purposes only, while others =20
> say it's
> a universial one and can be used for all purposes.
>
> Any comments are highly appreciated.
>
> Thank you for your time,
> M.D.
> <ivpk.cer>

Alan Sill, Ph.D
TIGRE Senior Scientist, High Performance Computing Center
Adjunct Professor of Physics
TTU

=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
:  Alan Sill, Texas Tech University  Office: Admin 233, MS 4-1167  :
:  e-mail: Alan.Sill@ttu.edu   ph. 806-742-4350  fax 806-742-4358  :
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D






From ahead@etruckoutfitters.com Fri Jan 12 03:45:11 2007
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From:	"Day some" <ahead@etruckoutfitters.com>
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Subject: wave only flags lone
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------=_NextPart_001_000C_01C7362E.4F8CC6D0
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<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN">
<HTML><HEAD>
<META http-equiv=3DContent-Type content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Diso-8859-1">
<META content=3D"MSHTML 6.00.2900.2180" name=3DGENERATOR>
<STYLE></STYLE>
</HEAD>
<BODY bgColor=3D#ffffff>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2><A HREF=3Dhttp://smuuchi.hk/><IMG =
alt=3D"" hspace=3D0=20
src=3D"cid:000a01c73625$edc85ed0$00000000@unkut6250" align=3Dbaseline=20
border=3D0></A></FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Upper this month take jan deutsche =
welle? Vehicles=20
surrounded offices police officers took.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Percent drop year illegal smoke every =
bar.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Defend england ban pub club smoking =
london!</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Call for new government lebanon =
hundreds thousands assembled!</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Security, amp terrorism =
energy.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Police officers, took up positions area =
if thinks.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Two parties democrats =
form?</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Said that states should =
begin.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Banned pubs private clubs, ranging =
modest bars=20
exclusive gentlemens. Links usb adapter middot auto dealers gift baskets =

gourmet. Amazing affairs antiterror bill advances germany berlin, lower, =
house.=20
Sydney australian defense brendan nelson.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Middot auto dealers gift baskets, =
gourmet gifts=20
herbal. Already bans place absolutely critical now we make =
sure!</FONT></DIV>
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From owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Fri Jan 12 19:40:17 2007
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 a u> <p06230956bf626880f0a7@[165.227.249.220]>
Date: Fri, 12 Jan 2007 15:06:49 -0800
To: <ietf-pkix@imc.org>
From: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
Subject: RE: draft-ietf-pkix-srvsan-00
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Greetings again. This document has just gone through IESG review and 
has garnered a bunch of DISCUSS comments. Some of them relate to the 
way that this document handles IDNs.

Earlier on this list, I said:

At 9:07 PM -0700 9/29/05, Paul Hoffman wrote:
>If you restrict the SRV labels we are interested in to character 
>strings, that is a reasonable choice, but so is the on-the-wire 
>encoding, namely punycode. Using UTF-8 makes the string more 
>readable and editable in cert handling, using punycode means no 
>conversion between DNS queries and responses and the cert. Both have 
>merits and problems.

While what I said was true, it was far from complete. For that I 
apologize. I should have added "but this is all moot because these 
domain names should be like all other domain names in the 
certificate, and 3280bis tell us exactly how to do that in section 
7.2".

The use of IDNs in this document should, of course, line up with 
3280bis; it does not.

draft-ietf-pkix-srvsan-04.txt:

    Example: The "mail" service at na<LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH
    DIAERESIS>ve.net (an IDN, which becomes xn--nave-6pa.net when encoded
    as an IDNA) would use the following 15-character SRVName value:

        _mail.na<LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH DIAERESIS>ve.net

    Its 16-byte UTF-8 encoding is (in hex):

        5F 6D 61 69 6C 2E 6E 61 C3 AF 76 65 2E 6E 65 74

rfc3280bis, section 7.2:
    To accommodate
    internationalized domain names in the current structure, conforming
    implementations MUST convert internationalized domain names to the
    ASCII Compatible Encoding (ACE) format as specified in section 4 of
    RFC 3490 before storage in the dNSName field.

In short, srvsan says "put the DNS name in the certificate in UTF-8", 
while rfc3280bis says "put it in ASCII as Punycode". As some IESG 
members pointed out, that needs to be fixed.

--Paul Hoffman, Director
--VPN Consortium




From owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Sun Jan 14 21:40:52 2007
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Date: Mon, 15 Jan 2007 03:31:51 +0200 (EET)
Subject: Re: Sample end entity certificate
From: "Moudrick M. Dadashov" <md@e-net.lt>
To: "Russ Housley" <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Russ,

but RFC 2119 also does say:

"OPTIONAL", mean that an item is truly optional. One vendor may choose to
include the item because a particular marketplace requires it or because
the vendor feels that it enhances the product while another vendor may
omit the same item (section 5).

and RFC 3280 also say both the "key usage" and "certificate policies"
extensions are OPTIONAL

Don't you think this is some how confusing?

Thanks,
M.D.

> RFC 3280 does say:
>
>     Conforming CAs MUST support key identifiers (sections 4.2.1.1 and
>     4.2.1.2), basic constraints (section 4.2.1.10), key usage (section
>     4.2.1.3), and certificate policies (section 4.2.1.5) extensions.
>
> It does not seem to require that these be included in every
> certificate that is issued, but looking further into these sections,
> I find a MUST statement that is not supported by this certificate:
>
>  From section 4.2.1.1  (Authority Key Identifier):
>
>     The keyIdentifier field of the authorityKeyIdentifier extension MUST
>     be included in all certificates generated by conforming CAs to
>     facilitate certification path construction.
>
> I would encourage the CA to include key usage and certificate
> policies extensions.
>
> Russ
>
> At 08:05 PM 1/9/2007, Moudrick M. Dadashov wrote:
>>Hello,
>>
>>I'm attaching a sample end entity cetrificate that the issuing CA claims
>>to be RFC 3280 compliant.
>>
>>The certificate at least MUST provide document signing functionality.
>>
>>Some of us say it's technically correct but has no legal purposes defined
>>and therefore can't be used for test purposes only, while others say it's
>>a universial one and can be used for all purposes.
>>
>>Any comments are highly appreciated.
>>
>>Thank you for your time,
>>M.D.
>
>





From owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Mon Jan 15 14:02:59 2007
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Date: Mon, 15 Jan 2007 18:36:16 +0100
From: Peter Sylvester <Peter.Sylvester@edelweb.fr>
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To: pkix <ietf-pkix@imc.org>
Subject: error in rfc 4043  -- reminder
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--------------ms040308060009020104020301
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
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Two months ago I have send the following to the list and did not receive 
any answer;

In RFC 4043 there seems to be a bug.
The spec uses ATTRIBUTE instead of OTHER-NAME. i.e. shouldn't this be:

permanentIdentifier OTHER-NAME ::= {PermanentIdentifier IDENTIFIED BY 
id-on-permanentIdentifier}

and OTHER-NAME imported


At lea st one of the authors of the rfc seems to have read the message 
as far as I know.
regards
peter

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--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts 
directories.
This draft is a work item of the Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) Working Group of the IETF.

	Title		: Server-based Certificate Validation Protocol (SCVP)
	Author(s)	: A. Malpani, et al.
	Filename	: draft-ietf-pkix-scvp-31.txt
	Pages		: 86
	Date		: 2007-1-15
	
SCVP allows a client to delegate certificate path construction and
   certificate path validation to a server.  The path construction or
   validation (e.g., making sure that none of the certificates in the
   path are revoked) is performed according to a validation policy,
   which contains one or more trust anchors.  It allows simplification
   of client implementations and use of a set of predefined validation
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Date: Mon, 15 Jan 2007 17:00:45 -0500
To: Peter Sylvester <Peter.Sylvester@edelweb.fr>, pkix <ietf-pkix@imc.org>
From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
Subject: Re: error in rfc 4043  -- reminder
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Peter:

You are correct. The RFC contains an error.  This should be reported 
to the RFC Editor for inclusion on the Errata page.

Russ

At 12:36 PM 1/15/2007, Peter Sylvester wrote:

>Two months ago I have send the following to the list and did not 
>receive any answer;
>
>In RFC 4043 there seems to be a bug.
>The spec uses ATTRIBUTE instead of OTHER-NAME. i.e. shouldn't this be:
>
>permanentIdentifier OTHER-NAME ::= {PermanentIdentifier IDENTIFIED 
>BY id-on-permanentIdentifier}
>
>and OTHER-NAME imported
>
>
>At lea st one of the authors of the rfc seems to have read the 
>message as far as I know.
>regards
>peter




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From: Stefan Santesson <stefans@microsoft.com>
To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>,
        "ietf-pkix@imc.org"
	<ietf-pkix@imc.org>
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2007 00:15:40 +0000
Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key
  Info.
Thread-Topic: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key
  Info.
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Russ,
I promised to come back on this issue after some more investigations. Sor=
ry for the somewhat long reply.

For my rationales and reasoning I use the following simplified architectu=
ral model with some example modules.


                                   ------------
Apps                               |  E-mail  |
                                   ------------
                                        |
                  ---------        -----------    ---------
Protocol stacks   | TLS   |        |  S/MIME |    | IPSEC |
                  ---------        -----------    ---------
                      |                 |             |
                      ---------------------------------
                           |                    |
                  -----------------  -------------------------
Libraries         | Crypto Library|  | cert chain validation |
                  -----------------  -------------------------

This is not the only possible model but it is the one we use for the basi=
s of certificate usage.

The initiative to use a certificate and its key comes from either an appl=
ication or a protocol stack. For TLS it will come from the protocol stack=
. For E-mail it may come from the application itself.
The central problem with usage restrictions embedded with the subject pub=
lic key OID is how to enforce it. When the application or the protocol st=
ack wants to use a certificate it sends it to the validation module to ve=
rify and decode the certificate. The information returned contains the al=
gorithm OID and the public key. The Crypto library in this example doesn'=
t understand OIDs, so the app needs to do a translation to an internal Al=
gorithmID understood by the crypto library. In our environment the app/pr=
otocol can use a common OID table to do that. It also needs to map this u=
sage to the algorithm usage negotiated in the protocol stack, e.g. map to=
 a TLS cipher suite. So in worse case the app has 3 Algorithm IDs to map =
(Crypto library alg ID, Protocol alg ID and Cert alg ID).

Even if the common OID table is used, the cert alg ID may differ from the=
 Crypto library alg ID. For example the former may be and ID for ECC-DSA,=
 while the latter may be ECC-DSA-SHA256.

In addition to this the app or protocol stack needs to make sure this is =
consistent with any key usage set.

Adding this feature in the RFC4055 style is not impossible but it needs t=
o be individually implemented in each cert using protocol and application=
. This is not trivial considering that legacy is a big complicating facto=
r. In principle it worries me to put this complex mapping burden on appli=
cations. Another threat with this approach is if it leads to a requiremen=
t to define combinations of algorithm modes by single OIDs where we may e=
nd up with a very large space of OIDs.

Looking at this from an extension approach, we would have the option of c=
ritical/non critical. If the extension is critical, the cert validation m=
odule will return an unrecognized critical extension error, forcing the a=
pplication to assume responsibility for honoring this extension or fail. =
This is a better guarantee for preventing misuse by applications. The ext=
ension could potentially contain mapping data that is more suitable for m=
apping usage towards the different alg IDs provided in different protocol=
s. However this may cause the extension syntax to be overly complex.

The worse scenario of all the choices is the structured Certificates OID =
(=E1 la X9.62), listing sub OIDs for acceptable algorithmic modes. This w=
ould create the most complex and confusing mapping graph for the applicat=
ions and protocol stacks as it now has a magnitude of OIDs to map to algo=
rithm IDs of the crypto library as well as Alg IDs from the protocol. As =
such it is the least favorable alternative.

In summary,

- The RFC 4055 approach is the simplest to define but is still hard to fu=
lly implement and we have to trust applications to get it right.

- The extension approach is the hardest to define but is friendlier to a =
gradual implementation and has the best prevention from applications gett=
ing it wrong.

- The structured algorithm OID is maybe not the hardest to define but the=
 worse alternative in every other aspect.

My primary choice would be to not enforce algorithmic modes in certificat=
es at all unless there is a cryptographic weakness in the algorithm to pr=
otect. As such the protocol usage negotiation should be solved on the pro=
tocol level. Then we only need 1 OID for ECC keys (defined in RFC 3279). =
The RFC 4055 OIDs would still exist for the legitimate reasons above, but=
 we would not need any new OIDs for ECC.

If the WG decides that mode restriction for ECC keys is necessary then we=
 need to choose the least evil alternative and I currently feel unsure of=
 what that would be.


Stefan Santesson
Senior Program Manager
Windows Security, Standards


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Russ Housley [mailto:housley@vigilsec.com]
> Sent: den 15 december 2006 12:13
> To: Stefan Santesson
> Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
> Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key
> Info.
>
> Stefan:
>
> >I respect the need for clarification. In short, when the function of
> >OIDs not only instructions to the key import functions, but also a
> >constraining mechanism for the signing module, this poses an
> >architectural challenge. I will get back with more elaborate
> >information. It seems that this would not only be a problem for us
> >so others may also contribute with more elaborate description of the
> problems.
>
> As you know, I have been insistent since the X9.62 approach was
> revealed that the PKIX WG provide one way to handle this issue, not
> one way for RSA and another way for ECC.  Since RFC 4055 has been
> implemented, I think that a compelling argument is needed to make a
> change.  So far, I have not seen one.  I look forward to a more
> complete description of the implementation concerns with the approach
> used in RFC 4055.
>
> Russ





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From: "Ron Brunner" <ron.brunner@gmx.net>
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To: ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: PoP in Revocation Requests using cmp (rfc2510)
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Hello everybody

1) Is it possible to use the same protection-strategy (shared secret)
for a Initialization and Revocation Request no matter if PoP gets used
or not? (I mean does the protection field gets calculated the same
way?)

2) Is there a rule, that PoP in Revocation Requests are done by using
the protection field (maybe with replacing the protection with a
signature of the header and body of the pki message)? This would mean
that anyone who has the private key can revoke? Which could also be an
interesting approach.

thanks for any input!

Ron




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From male@commontexts.org Tue Jan 16 09:27:12 2007
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Message-ID: <001101c7397a$61aba260$ca8a573a@FMC94888E51D2B>
From:	"inside" <male@commontexts.org>
To: pkix-archive@lists.ietf.org
Subject: Could Porn Star Jenna
Date:	Tue, 16 Jan 2007 23:26:59 +0900
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new brunette came out. People everyday great rates best nowposted, phil =
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nipple. It after but alas there someone.</FONT></DIV>
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was spotted.=20
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from. Of its readers lohan was spotted. Mother could porn star =
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makes=20
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tape.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Largeroct music videooct bitches =
helpoct recent=20
entriesth golden globe. Dunzo, firenov makes largeroct music videooct =
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ladies room!</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Angeles restaurant, with, male, last =
night.</FONT></DIV>
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<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Bar inside roosevelt tried, go into! =
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phil ammore nipple. Therea man, what were they doingill give you. =
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Defamer and,=20
news, tip from!</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Are, dunzo firenov makes largeroct =
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<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Antics blog sponsored links advertise =
on gossip tv=20
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Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key  Info.
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Stefan,

Thank you for a very detailed and useful reply.  It provides an excellent
framework for discussing the alternatives, particularly the mapping
between certificate alg ID, protocol alg ID, and crypto library
alg ID, and the potential locations where mapping can be performed.

Assume that cert path validation and crypto libraries are unaffected
by the choice of alternatives: crypto libraries always require the
caller to provide the crypto lib alg ID, and cert path libraries have
no reason to examine subject public key info in EE certs.

For ECDSA-signed cert paths, the cert path library must understand
ECDSA public key info in CA certs.  There are no modes associated with
ECDSA, so it's a wash whether the cert alg OID is a generic EC-public-key
OID or a single OID for ECDSA-public-key.  Extension non-criticality
is meaningless because the path validation library cannot ignore
unrecognized certificate signature keys.  The certificate signature
algorithm ID specifies RSA-with-hash or ECDSA-with-hash, so the same
hash-specific signature OIDs must be defined regardless of which
approach is taken for the public key OID.

Summary: for CA certs, the choice is between a single EC-public-key OID
and a single ECDSA-public-key OID.  An extension provides no advantage
for migration/legacy-interoperability, it just takes up space.

For EE certs, the apps and protocol stacks can use, as you say, an
algorithm ID mapping table with at worst 3 columns: cert ID, protocol
ID, and library ID.  Although you say an extension could provide
mapping aids, albeit complex, I don't believe this is practical at
all.  It is totally unreasonable for a certificate to contain, for
example, PKCS11 ID and cryptlib ID and crypto++ ID and MS CAPI ID
as well as manifest constants for other crypto libraries.

So assuming that the applications and protocol stacks are responsible
for containing mapping tables for OIDs contained in either
subjectPublicKeyInfo or in an extension, the only remaining issue
is combinatorial explosion.  First, how many combinations are
there?  The design team proposal only lists 3 Family OIDs:
ECDSA, ECDH, and ECMQV.  If you throw in modes, that adds
4 more: ECDH-Std, ECDH-Cofactor, ECMQV-Full, and ECMQV-1Pass.
My assumption is that no one would need mode-specific constraints
on certificate public keys, but even if PKIX decided to support
them, that only results in 8 OIDs total.

Second, unlike the flat TLS ciphersuite space and the
corresponding IANA number spaces for S/MIME, IPSec, etc, the
OID space is both hierarchical and unlimited.  It is both natural
and manageable to define a hierarchy of standardized OIDs for:

1 ECC
2   ECDSA
3   ECDH
4      ECDH-Std
5      ECDH-Cofactor
6   ECMQV
7      ECMQV-Full
8      ECMQV-1Pass
.      ECMQV-mode3 (new modes) ...
.   ECxyz (new families) ...

and experimental/private OIDs can be defined in other arcs without
either ambiguity or exhaustion of the OID space.  RFC 4055 specifies
a flat space for OIDs under PKCS-1 (with the highest assigned value
of 14), and it's reasonable to use a flat list for 4 (family) or
8 (family+mode) ECC public key OIDs.  But if a huge number of new
families or modes came up in the future, the OID space could
accommodate them easily.

> In summary,
>
> - The RFC 4055 approach is the simplest to define but is still
> hard to fully implement and we have to trust applications to get
> it right.

Agree that it is simplest to define.

>
> - The extension approach is the hardest to define but is friendlier
> to a gradual implementation and has the best prevention from
> applications getting it wrong.

Disagree that an extension can usefully provide library-specific
mapping constants, or that such information should be contained
in a certificate.

Disagree that a critical/non-critical extension aids gradual
implementation.  In every case where non-critical would be used,
applications gain no benefit from information in extension.  Cert
path module in updated apps might reject cert while path module
in legacy apps would ignore and accept cert, but what benefit is
that over having all apps accept 4055/3279 OID?  What motivation
is there for users to "upgrade" to a version that causes their
application to stop working?  In every case where critical
extension would be used, family OIDs in 4055 approach would give
same result.

Disagree that centralizing decision-making in cert path module
prevents applications from getting it wrong.  What if 1 family
(say ECMQV, or a new family) is supported by cert module but
not by crypto lib or protocol lib?

> - The structured algorithm OID is maybe not the hardest to define
> but the worse alternative in every other aspect.

Agree.


Dave



-----Original Message-----
From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] =
On Behalf Of Stefan Santesson
Sent: Monday, January 15, 2007 7:16 PM
To: Russ Housley; ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key I=
nfo.


Russ,
I promised to come back on this issue after some more investigations. Sor=
ry for the somewhat long reply.

For my rationales and reasoning I use the following simplified architectu=
ral model with some example modules.


                                   ------------
Apps                               |  E-mail  |
                                   ------------
                                        |
                  ---------        -----------    ---------
Protocol stacks   | TLS   |        |  S/MIME |    | IPSEC |
                  ---------        -----------    ---------
                      |                 |             |
                      ---------------------------------
                           |                    |
                  -----------------  -------------------------
Libraries         | Crypto Library|  | cert chain validation |
                  -----------------  -------------------------

This is not the only possible model but it is the one we use for the basi=
s of certificate usage.

The initiative to use a certificate and its key comes from either an appl=
ication or a protocol stack. For TLS it will come from the protocol stack=
. For E-mail it may come from the application itself.
The central problem with usage restrictions embedded with the subject pub=
lic key OID is how to enforce it. When the application or the protocol st=
ack wants to use a certificate it sends it to the validation module to ve=
rify and decode the certificate. The information returned contains the al=
gorithm OID and the public key. The Crypto library in this example doesn'=
t understand OIDs, so the app needs to do a translation to an internal Al=
gorithmID understood by the crypto library. In our environment the app/pr=
otocol can use a common OID table to do that. It also needs to map this u=
sage to the algorithm usage negotiated in the protocol stack, e.g. map to=
 a TLS cipher suite. So in worse case the app has 3 Algorithm IDs to map =
(Crypto library alg ID, Protocol alg ID and Cert alg ID).

Even if the common OID table is used, the cert alg ID may differ from the=
 Crypto library alg ID. For example the former may be and ID for ECC-DSA,=
 while the latter may be ECC-DSA-SHA256.

In addition to this the app or protocol stack needs to make sure this is =
consistent with any key usage set.

Adding this feature in the RFC4055 style is not impossible but it needs t=
o be individually implemented in each cert using protocol and application=
. This is not trivial considering that legacy is a big complicating facto=
r. In principle it worries me to put this complex mapping burden on appli=
cations. Another threat with this approach is if it leads to a requiremen=
t to define combinations of algorithm modes by single OIDs where we may e=
nd up with a very large space of OIDs.

Looking at this from an extension approach, we would have the option of c=
ritical/non critical. If the extension is critical, the cert validation m=
odule will return an unrecognized critical extension error, forcing the a=
pplication to assume responsibility for honoring this extension or fail. =
This is a better guarantee for preventing misuse by applications. The ext=
ension could potentially contain mapping data that is more suitable for m=
apping usage towards the different alg IDs provided in different protocol=
s. However this may cause the extension syntax to be overly complex.

The worse scenario of all the choices is the structured Certificates OID =
(=E1 la X9.62), listing sub OIDs for acceptable algorithmic modes. This w=
ould create the most complex and confusing mapping graph for the applicat=
ions and protocol stacks as it now has a magnitude of OIDs to map to algo=
rithm IDs of the crypto library as well as Alg IDs from the protocol. As =
such it is the least favorable alternative.

In summary,

- The RFC 4055 approach is the simplest to define but is still hard to fu=
lly implement and we have to trust applications to get it right.

- The extension approach is the hardest to define but is friendlier to a =
gradual implementation and has the best prevention from applications gett=
ing it wrong.

- The structured algorithm OID is maybe not the hardest to define but the=
 worse alternative in every other aspect.

My primary choice would be to not enforce algorithmic modes in certificat=
es at all unless there is a cryptographic weakness in the algorithm to pr=
otect. As such the protocol usage negotiation should be solved on the pro=
tocol level. Then we only need 1 OID for ECC keys (defined in RFC 3279). =
The RFC 4055 OIDs would still exist for the legitimate reasons above, but=
 we would not need any new OIDs for ECC.

If the WG decides that mode restriction for ECC keys is necessary then we=
 need to choose the least evil alternative and I currently feel unsure of=
 what that would be.


Stefan Santesson
Senior Program Manager
Windows Security, Standards


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Russ Housley [mailto:housley@vigilsec.com]
> Sent: den 15 december 2006 12:13
> To: Stefan Santesson
> Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
> Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key
> Info.
>
> Stefan:
>
> >I respect the need for clarification. In short, when the function of
> >OIDs not only instructions to the key import functions, but also a
> >constraining mechanism for the signing module, this poses an
> >architectural challenge. I will get back with more elaborate
> >information. It seems that this would not only be a problem for us
> >so others may also contribute with more elaborate description of the
> problems.
>
> As you know, I have been insistent since the X9.62 approach was
> revealed that the PKIX WG provide one way to handle this issue, not
> one way for RSA and another way for ECC.  Since RFC 4055 has been
> implemented, I think that a compelling argument is needed to make a
> change.  So far, I have not seen one.  I look forward to a more
> complete description of the implementation concerns with the approach
> used in RFC 4055.
>
> Russ






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To: Stefan Santesson <stefans@microsoft.com>,
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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key
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<html>
<body>
<tt>Stefan:<br><br>
Let's expand your &quot;Crypto Library&quot; box to include the
algorithms that are discussed in RFC 4055.<br><br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
----------------- <br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
| Crypto Library|<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
-----------------<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
----------------------------------------------------<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|<br>
&nbsp;---------------&nbsp; ---------------&nbsp; --------------&nbsp;
---------------<br>
&nbsp;| PKCS#1 v1.5 |&nbsp; | PKCS#1 v1.5 |&nbsp; | RSASSA-PSS |&nbsp; |
RSAES-OAEP&nbsp; |<br>
&nbsp;| Signature&nbsp;&nbsp; |&nbsp; | Key Encrypt |&nbsp; |
Signature&nbsp; |&nbsp; | Key Encrypt |<br>
&nbsp;---------------&nbsp; ---------------&nbsp; --------------&nbsp;
---------------<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
----------------------------------------------------<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
---------------------<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
| RSA Math Routines |<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
---------------------<br><br>
In the RFC 4055 approach, the algorithm identifier says that the public
key may be used for any one of these RSA operations, or it names exactly
one of them.&nbsp; If exactly one is named, it seems to help the crypto
library determine which of the routine to use.&nbsp; If any is allowed,
then the application or the protocol stack needs to tell the crypto
library which operation to perform.<br><br>
You say:<br>
&gt; Adding this feature in the RFC4055 style is not impossible but it
needs to be<br>
&gt; individually implemented in each cert using protocol and
application. This is<br>
&gt; not trivial considering that legacy is a big complicating factor.
In<br>
&gt; principle it worries me to put this complex mapping burden on
applications.<br>
&gt; Another threat with this approach is if it leads to a requirement to
define<br>
&gt; combinations of algorithm modes by single OIDs where we may end up
with a<br>
&gt; very large space of OIDs.<br><br>
On your last point, RFC 4055 does not do any such thing.&nbsp; It does
not define OIDs for OAEP with a particular hash algorithm as the mask
generation function.&nbsp; No, it uses a parameter for that.<br><br>
Certificate using applications need to map algorithm identifiers from
certificates, the protocol, and the crypto library.&nbsp; Agreed.&nbsp;
It seems that the table approach that you describe will work well with
the simplified crypto library architecture that I have drawn above.&nbsp;
The one difference is that crypto libraries need to be able to handle the
fact that one public key might be useful in more than algorithm.&nbsp;
This is already the case.&nbsp; RSA keys are used for PKCS#1 v1.5
signature and key encrypt.&nbsp; If the key usage extension is not
present, then the certificate is not providing the context to select the
appropriate algorithm within the crypto library.<br><br>
Russ<br>
</body>
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From: Stefan Santesson <stefans@microsoft.com>
To: "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>,
        "ietf-pkix@imc.org"
	<ietf-pkix@imc.org>
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2007 19:08:59 +0000
Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key
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Thanks Dave,

Let me clarify where I think you missed my point.

I believe that it is less likely that a certificate with a critical exten=
sion will be falsely accepted and misused by an application. I believe th=
e risk is greater that applications get it wrong and makes wrong use of a=
 public key if the restriction comes as a public key OID.

But this is just an educated guess.

I agree that it will be hard to define complete mapping info in an extens=
ion. That was my point - It may make the extension overly complex.


Stefan Santesson
Senior Program Manager
Windows Security, Standards


> -----Original Message-----
> From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-
> pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Kemp, David P.
> Sent: den 16 januari 2007 09:21
> To: ietf-pkix@imc.org
> Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key
> Info.
>
>
> Stefan,
>
> Thank you for a very detailed and useful reply.  It provides an
> excellent
> framework for discussing the alternatives, particularly the mapping
> between certificate alg ID, protocol alg ID, and crypto library
> alg ID, and the potential locations where mapping can be performed.
>
> Assume that cert path validation and crypto libraries are unaffected
> by the choice of alternatives: crypto libraries always require the
> caller to provide the crypto lib alg ID, and cert path libraries have
> no reason to examine subject public key info in EE certs.
>
> For ECDSA-signed cert paths, the cert path library must understand
> ECDSA public key info in CA certs.  There are no modes associated with
> ECDSA, so it's a wash whether the cert alg OID is a generic EC-public-
> key
> OID or a single OID for ECDSA-public-key.  Extension non-criticality
> is meaningless because the path validation library cannot ignore
> unrecognized certificate signature keys.  The certificate signature
> algorithm ID specifies RSA-with-hash or ECDSA-with-hash, so the same
> hash-specific signature OIDs must be defined regardless of which
> approach is taken for the public key OID.
>
> Summary: for CA certs, the choice is between a single EC-public-key OID
> and a single ECDSA-public-key OID.  An extension provides no advantage
> for migration/legacy-interoperability, it just takes up space.
>
> For EE certs, the apps and protocol stacks can use, as you say, an
> algorithm ID mapping table with at worst 3 columns: cert ID, protocol
> ID, and library ID.  Although you say an extension could provide
> mapping aids, albeit complex, I don't believe this is practical at
> all.  It is totally unreasonable for a certificate to contain, for
> example, PKCS11 ID and cryptlib ID and crypto++ ID and MS CAPI ID
> as well as manifest constants for other crypto libraries.
>
> So assuming that the applications and protocol stacks are responsible
> for containing mapping tables for OIDs contained in either
> subjectPublicKeyInfo or in an extension, the only remaining issue
> is combinatorial explosion.  First, how many combinations are
> there?  The design team proposal only lists 3 Family OIDs:
> ECDSA, ECDH, and ECMQV.  If you throw in modes, that adds
> 4 more: ECDH-Std, ECDH-Cofactor, ECMQV-Full, and ECMQV-1Pass.
> My assumption is that no one would need mode-specific constraints
> on certificate public keys, but even if PKIX decided to support
> them, that only results in 8 OIDs total.
>
> Second, unlike the flat TLS ciphersuite space and the
> corresponding IANA number spaces for S/MIME, IPSec, etc, the
> OID space is both hierarchical and unlimited.  It is both natural
> and manageable to define a hierarchy of standardized OIDs for:
>
> 1 ECC
> 2   ECDSA
> 3   ECDH
> 4      ECDH-Std
> 5      ECDH-Cofactor
> 6   ECMQV
> 7      ECMQV-Full
> 8      ECMQV-1Pass
> .      ECMQV-mode3 (new modes) ...
> .   ECxyz (new families) ...
>
> and experimental/private OIDs can be defined in other arcs without
> either ambiguity or exhaustion of the OID space.  RFC 4055 specifies
> a flat space for OIDs under PKCS-1 (with the highest assigned value
> of 14), and it's reasonable to use a flat list for 4 (family) or
> 8 (family+mode) ECC public key OIDs.  But if a huge number of new
> families or modes came up in the future, the OID space could
> accommodate them easily.
>
> > In summary,
> >
> > - The RFC 4055 approach is the simplest to define but is still
> > hard to fully implement and we have to trust applications to get
> > it right.
>
> Agree that it is simplest to define.
>
> >
> > - The extension approach is the hardest to define but is friendlier
> > to a gradual implementation and has the best prevention from
> > applications getting it wrong.
>
> Disagree that an extension can usefully provide library-specific
> mapping constants, or that such information should be contained
> in a certificate.
>
> Disagree that a critical/non-critical extension aids gradual
> implementation.  In every case where non-critical would be used,
> applications gain no benefit from information in extension.  Cert
> path module in updated apps might reject cert while path module
> in legacy apps would ignore and accept cert, but what benefit is
> that over having all apps accept 4055/3279 OID?  What motivation
> is there for users to "upgrade" to a version that causes their
> application to stop working?  In every case where critical
> extension would be used, family OIDs in 4055 approach would give
> same result.
>
> Disagree that centralizing decision-making in cert path module
> prevents applications from getting it wrong.  What if 1 family
> (say ECMQV, or a new family) is supported by cert module but
> not by crypto lib or protocol lib?
>
> > - The structured algorithm OID is maybe not the hardest to define
> > but the worse alternative in every other aspect.
>
> Agree.
>
>
> Dave
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-
> pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Stefan Santesson
> Sent: Monday, January 15, 2007 7:16 PM
> To: Russ Housley; ietf-pkix@imc.org
> Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key
> Info.
>
>
> Russ,
> I promised to come back on this issue after some more investigations.
> Sorry for the somewhat long reply.
>
> For my rationales and reasoning I use the following simplified
> architectural model with some example modules.
>
>
>                                    ------------
> Apps                               |  E-mail  |
>                                    ------------
>                                         |
>                   ---------        -----------    ---------
> Protocol stacks   | TLS   |        |  S/MIME |    | IPSEC |
>                   ---------        -----------    ---------
>                       |                 |             |
>                       ---------------------------------
>                            |                    |
>                   -----------------  -------------------------
> Libraries         | Crypto Library|  | cert chain validation |
>                   -----------------  -------------------------
>
> This is not the only possible model but it is the one we use for the
> basis of certificate usage.
>
> The initiative to use a certificate and its key comes from either an
> application or a protocol stack. For TLS it will come from the protocol
> stack. For E-mail it may come from the application itself.
> The central problem with usage restrictions embedded with the subject
> public key OID is how to enforce it. When the application or the
> protocol stack wants to use a certificate it sends it to the validation
> module to verify and decode the certificate. The information returned
> contains the algorithm OID and the public key. The Crypto library in
> this example doesn't understand OIDs, so the app needs to do a
> translation to an internal AlgorithmID understood by the crypto
> library. In our environment the app/protocol can use a common OID table
> to do that. It also needs to map this usage to the algorithm usage
> negotiated in the protocol stack, e.g. map to a TLS cipher suite. So in
> worse case the app has 3 Algorithm IDs to map (Crypto library alg ID,
> Protocol alg ID and Cert alg ID).
>
> Even if the common OID table is used, the cert alg ID may differ from
> the Crypto library alg ID. For example the former may be and ID for
> ECC-DSA, while the latter may be ECC-DSA-SHA256.
>
> In addition to this the app or protocol stack needs to make sure this
> is consistent with any key usage set.
>
> Adding this feature in the RFC4055 style is not impossible but it needs
> to be individually implemented in each cert using protocol and
> application. This is not trivial considering that legacy is a big
> complicating factor. In principle it worries me to put this complex
> mapping burden on applications. Another threat with this approach is if
> it leads to a requirement to define combinations of algorithm modes by
> single OIDs where we may end up with a very large space of OIDs.
>
> Looking at this from an extension approach, we would have the option of
> critical/non critical. If the extension is critical, the cert
> validation module will return an unrecognized critical extension error,
> forcing the application to assume responsibility for honoring this
> extension or fail. This is a better guarantee for preventing misuse by
> applications. The extension could potentially contain mapping data that
> is more suitable for mapping usage towards the different alg IDs
> provided in different protocols. However this may cause the extension
> syntax to be overly complex.
>
> The worse scenario of all the choices is the structured Certificates
> OID (=E1 la X9.62), listing sub OIDs for acceptable algorithmic modes.
> This would create the most complex and confusing mapping graph for the
> applications and protocol stacks as it now has a magnitude of OIDs to
> map to algorithm IDs of the crypto library as well as Alg IDs from the
> protocol. As such it is the least favorable alternative.
>
> In summary,
>
> - The RFC 4055 approach is the simplest to define but is still hard to
> fully implement and we have to trust applications to get it right.
>
> - The extension approach is the hardest to define but is friendlier to
> a gradual implementation and has the best prevention from applications
> getting it wrong.
>
> - The structured algorithm OID is maybe not the hardest to define but
> the worse alternative in every other aspect.
>
> My primary choice would be to not enforce algorithmic modes in
> certificates at all unless there is a cryptographic weakness in the
> algorithm to protect. As such the protocol usage negotiation should be
> solved on the protocol level. Then we only need 1 OID for ECC keys
> (defined in RFC 3279). The RFC 4055 OIDs would still exist for the
> legitimate reasons above, but we would not need any new OIDs for ECC.
>
> If the WG decides that mode restriction for ECC keys is necessary then
> we need to choose the least evil alternative and I currently feel
> unsure of what that would be.
>
>
> Stefan Santesson
> Senior Program Manager
> Windows Security, Standards
>
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Russ Housley [mailto:housley@vigilsec.com]
> > Sent: den 15 december 2006 12:13
> > To: Stefan Santesson
> > Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
> > Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public
> Key
> > Info.
> >
> > Stefan:
> >
> > >I respect the need for clarification. In short, when the function of
> > >OIDs not only instructions to the key import functions, but also a
> > >constraining mechanism for the signing module, this poses an
> > >architectural challenge. I will get back with more elaborate
> > >information. It seems that this would not only be a problem for us
> > >so others may also contribute with more elaborate description of the
> > problems.
> >
> > As you know, I have been insistent since the X9.62 approach was
> > revealed that the PKIX WG provide one way to handle this issue, not
> > one way for RSA and another way for ECC.  Since RFC 4055 has been
> > implemented, I think that a compelling argument is needed to make a
> > change.  So far, I have not seen one.  I look forward to a more
> > complete description of the implementation concerns with the approach
> > used in RFC 4055.
> >
> > Russ
>
>





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From: Stefan Santesson <stefans@microsoft.com>
To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>,
        "ietf-pkix@imc.org"
	<ietf-pkix@imc.org>
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2007 20:12:44 +0000
Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key
  Info.
Thread-Topic: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key
  Info.
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Russ,
I can't see that we have any disagreements.

My point is that the mapping and as such the responsibility for doing the m=
apping correctly rests fully on the applications or protocol stacks.
You can't just add this feature in the crypto library or the validation mod=
ule, and use current protocol stacks and applications. If you do that, they=
 most likely either fail or get it wrong.

So we have a situation with multiple possible points of failure.

An expansion of the public key OIDs for ECC will in short require the follo=
wing changes:

1) Update chain validation to recognize new OIDs and enforce them in chain =
validation
2) Update the OID table (voluntarily used by protocols and applications)
3) Update the mapping logic in all protocol stacks and cert using applicati=
ons

The interesting question is what will happen if you do 1) and 2) but not 3)=
. Or do 1) and 2) and gradually update 3)
Keeping in mind that many applications are designed out of the notion that =
a public key obtained through a validated certificate path, associated with=
 a matching key usage and EKU, either works (then it is a good one) or don'=
t work, I wouldn't be surprised if an application receiving a new Alg ID th=
at it can't map to the protocol Alg ID, still will try to use the key it ha=
s to see if it works. Neither the chain validation engine nor the Crypto li=
brary will catch or prevent this abuse.

Of course, a correct application will get it right, but many developers hav=
e learned to make their code as fault tolerant as possible and are used to =
process cases of conflicting information in a way that succeeds when it sho=
uld be "safe" to do so. Example: a chain should fail if Issuer name and sub=
ject name matching fails. But still, if signature of the leaf cert matches =
the public key of the CA cert and subject/issuer name are "Example Inc"/"ex=
ample, inc" in different encoding. It would be safe to allow it to pass. St=
rictly such chain should fail, but you will find that "fault tolerant" desi=
gns, knowing that users will get things wrong, may actually pass such chain=
, because it is safe to do so.

In the "old" logic, when a subject public key OID had no constraining seman=
tics. It would be safe to use a trusted key if it works (if all other check=
s are good). This change of semantics is the danger when it hits old applic=
ations not designed for it. If they were designed to honor RFC 4055 OIDs, t=
his would not be an issue. However RFC 4055 has not been implemented in man=
y places.

The difference with an extension is that the application will get a critica=
l extension error, which applications currently are designed to honor. They=
 either need to recognize and honor that extension or fail. The risk for ab=
use during transition is thus considerably lower.

What ever we do, I hope we can do it as simple as possible. But even though=
 defining a few new alg OIDs seems simple, it may not provide for a safe an=
d simple transition.



Stefan Santesson
Senior Program Manager
Windows Security, Standards

From: Russ Housley [mailto:housley@vigilsec.com]
Sent: den 16 januari 2007 11:04
To: Stefan Santesson; ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key Inf=
o.

Stefan:

Let's expand your "Crypto Library" box to include the algorithms that are d=
iscussed in RFC 4055.

                       -----------------
                       | Crypto Library|
                       -----------------
                               |
       ----------------------------------------------------
       |                |                |                |
 ---------------  ---------------  --------------  ---------------
 | PKCS#1 v1.5 |  | PKCS#1 v1.5 |  | RSASSA-PSS |  | RSAES-OAEP  |
 | Signature   |  | Key Encrypt |  | Signature  |  | Key Encrypt |
 ---------------  ---------------  --------------  ---------------
       |                |                |                |
       ----------------------------------------------------
                               |
                     ---------------------
                     | RSA Math Routines |
                     ---------------------

In the RFC 4055 approach, the algorithm identifier says that the public key=
 may be used for any one of these RSA operations, or it names exactly one o=
f them.  If exactly one is named, it seems to help the crypto library deter=
mine which of the routine to use.  If any is allowed, then the application =
or the protocol stack needs to tell the crypto library which operation to p=
erform.

You say:
> Adding this feature in the RFC4055 style is not impossible but it needs t=
o be
> individually implemented in each cert using protocol and application. Thi=
s is
> not trivial considering that legacy is a big complicating factor. In
> principle it worries me to put this complex mapping burden on application=
s.
> Another threat with this approach is if it leads to a requirement to defi=
ne
> combinations of algorithm modes by single OIDs where we may end up with a
> very large space of OIDs.

On your last point, RFC 4055 does not do any such thing.  It does not defin=
e OIDs for OAEP with a particular hash algorithm as the mask generation fun=
ction.  No, it uses a parameter for that.

Certificate using applications need to map algorithm identifiers from certi=
ficates, the protocol, and the crypto library.  Agreed.  It seems that the =
table approach that you describe will work well with the simplified crypto =
library architecture that I have drawn above.  The one difference is that c=
rypto libraries need to be able to handle the fact that one public key migh=
t be useful in more than algorithm.  This is already the case.  RSA keys ar=
e used for PKCS#1 v1.5 signature and key encrypt.  If the key usage extensi=
on is not present, then the certificate is not providing the context to sel=
ect the appropriate algorithm within the crypto library.

Russ

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<div class=3DSection1>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><a name=3D"_MailEndCompose"><span lang=3DEN-US style=
=3D'font-size:
11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>Russ,<o:p></o:p></=
span></a></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>I can&#8217;t see that we have any disagreements.<o:p></o:p>=
</span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>My point is that the mapping and as such the responsibility =
for
doing the mapping correctly rests fully on the applications or protocol sta=
cks.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>You can&#8217;t just add this feature in the crypto library =
or
the validation module, and use current protocol stacks and applications. If=
 you
do that, they most likely either fail or get it wrong.<o:p></o:p></span></p=
>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>So we have a situation with multiple possible points of fail=
ure.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>An expansion of the public key OIDs for ECC will in short
require the following changes:<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>1) Update chain validation to recognize new OIDs and enforce
them in chain validation<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>2) Update the OID table (voluntarily used by protocols and
applications)<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>3) Update the mapping logic in all protocol stacks and cert =
using
applications<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>The interesting question is what will happen if you do 1) an=
d 2)
but not 3). Or do 1) and 2) and gradually update 3)<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>Keeping in mind that many applications are designed out of t=
he
notion that a public key obtained through a validated certificate path, ass=
ociated
with a matching key usage and EKU, either works (then it is a good one) or =
don&#8217;t
work, I wouldn&#8217;t be surprised if an application receiving a new Alg I=
D
that it can&#8217;t map to the protocol Alg ID, still will try to use the k=
ey it
has to see if it works. Neither the chain validation engine nor the Crypto
library will catch or prevent this abuse.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>Of course, a correct application will get it right, but many
developers have learned to make their code as fault tolerant as possible an=
d
are used to process cases of conflicting information in a way that succeeds
when it should be &#8220;safe&#8221; to do so. Example: a chain should fail=
 if
Issuer name and subject name matching fails. But still, if signature of the
leaf cert matches the public key of the CA cert and subject/issuer name are=
 &#8220;Example
Inc&#8221;/&#8221;example, inc&#8221; in different encoding. It would be sa=
fe
to allow it to pass. Strictly such chain should fail, but you will find tha=
t &#8220;fault
tolerant&#8221; designs, knowing that users will get things wrong, may actu=
ally
pass such chain, because it is safe to do so.&nbsp; <o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>In the &#8220;old&#8221; logic, when a subject public key OI=
D
had no constraining semantics. It would be safe to use a trusted key if it
works (if all other checks are good). This change of semantics is the dange=
r
when it hits old applications not designed for it. If they were designed to=
 honor
RFC 4055 OIDs, this would not be an issue. However RFC 4055 has not been im=
plemented
in many places.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>The difference with an extension is that the application wil=
l
get a critical extension error, which applications currently are designed t=
o honor.
They either need to recognize and honor that extension or fail. The risk fo=
r
abuse during transition is thus considerably lower.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>What ever we do, I hope we can do it as simple as possible. =
But
even though defining a few new alg OIDs seems simple, it may not provide fo=
r a
safe and simple transition. <o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-f=
amily:
"Arial","sans-serif";color:maroon'>Stefan Santesson</span></b><span lang=3D=
EN-GB
style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:#400040'>Senior Program Manager</span><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'col=
or:navy'><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-f=
amily:
"Arial","sans-serif";color:#400040'>Windows Security, Standards</span></b><=
span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p></o:p></span></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0cm 0cm 0cm =
4.0pt'>

<div>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0cm =
0cm 0cm'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-f=
amily:
"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span></b><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-siz=
e:10.0pt;
font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> Russ Housley [mailto:housley@vigilsec.c=
om] <br>
<b>Sent:</b> den 16 januari 2007 11:04<br>
<b>To:</b> Stefan Santesson; ietf-pkix@imc.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public =
Key
Info.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

</div>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Stefan:</span></t=
t><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New"'><br>
<br>
<tt>Let's expand your &quot;Crypto Library&quot; box to include the algorit=
hms
that are discussed in RFC 4055.</tt><br>
<br>
<tt>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
----------------- </tt><br>
<tt>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
| Crypto Library|</tt><br>
<tt>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
-----------------</tt><br>
<tt>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|</tt><br>
<tt>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
----------------------------------------------------</tt><br>
<tt>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|</tt><br>
<tt>&nbsp;---------------&nbsp; ---------------&nbsp; --------------&nbsp;
---------------</tt><br>
<tt>&nbsp;| PKCS#1 v1.5 |&nbsp; | PKCS#1 v1.5 |&nbsp; | RSASSA-PSS |&nbsp; =
|
RSAES-OAEP&nbsp; |</tt><br>
<tt>&nbsp;| Signature&nbsp;&nbsp; |&nbsp; | Key Encrypt |&nbsp; |
Signature&nbsp; |&nbsp; | Key Encrypt |</tt><br>
<tt>&nbsp;---------------&nbsp; ---------------&nbsp; --------------&nbsp;
---------------</tt><br>
<tt>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|</tt><br>
<tt>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; ----------------------------------=
------------------</tt><br>
<tt>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|</tt><br>
<tt>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
---------------------</tt><br>
<tt>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
| RSA Math Routines |</tt><br>
<tt>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
---------------------</tt><br>
<br>
<tt>In the RFC 4055 approach, the algorithm identifier says that the public=
 key
may be used for any one of these RSA operations, or it names exactly one of
them.&nbsp; If exactly one is named, it seems to help the crypto library
determine which of the routine to use.&nbsp; If any is allowed, then the
application or the protocol stack needs to tell the crypto library which
operation to perform.</tt><br>
<br>
<tt>You say:</tt><br>
<tt>&gt; Adding this feature in the RFC4055 style is not impossible but it
needs to be</tt><br>
<tt>&gt; individually implemented in each cert using protocol and applicati=
on.
This is</tt><br>
<tt>&gt; not trivial considering that legacy is a big complicating factor. =
In</tt><br>
<tt>&gt; principle it worries me to put this complex mapping burden on
applications.</tt><br>
<tt>&gt; Another threat with this approach is if it leads to a requirement =
to
define</tt><br>
<tt>&gt; combinations of algorithm modes by single OIDs where we may end up
with a</tt><br>
<tt>&gt; very large space of OIDs.</tt><br>
<br>
<tt>On your last point, RFC 4055 does not do any such thing.&nbsp; It does =
not
define OIDs for OAEP with a particular hash algorithm as the mask generatio=
n
function.&nbsp; No, it uses a parameter for that.</tt><br>
<br>
<tt>Certificate using applications need to map algorithm identifiers from
certificates, the protocol, and the crypto library.&nbsp; Agreed.&nbsp; It
seems that the table approach that you describe will work well with the
simplified crypto library architecture that I have drawn above.&nbsp; The o=
ne
difference is that crypto libraries need to be able to handle the fact that=
 one
public key might be useful in more than algorithm.&nbsp; This is already th=
e
case.&nbsp; RSA keys are used for PKCS#1 v1.5 signature and key encrypt.&nb=
sp;
If the key usage extension is not present, then the certificate is not
providing the context to select the appropriate algorithm within the crypto
library.</tt><br>
<br>
<tt>Russ</tt></span><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

</div>

</body>

</html>

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Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key  Info.
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David P. Kemp wrote on 01/16/2007 12:21:27 PM:

> 
> > - The structured algorithm OID is maybe not the hardest to define
> > but the worse alternative in every other aspect.
> 
> Agree.
> 

Suppose that a subject has an ECMQV-only cert, and wishes to allow either 
SHA-256 or SHA-384 based KDFs, but no other KDFs.  Also, the EKU field 
says that the cert can be used for SMIME, IPSec, SSH, or TLS (suppose the 
private key is on the user's smart card).  The X9.62 "structured" approach 
allows for this.  How would the other approaches allow for this?

Regards,

Dan Brown
(905) 501-3857
http://www.certicom.com
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<br><tt><font size=2>David P. Kemp wrote on 01/16/2007 12:21:27 PM:<br>
<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; &gt; - The structured algorithm OID is maybe not the hardest to define<br>
&gt; &gt; but the worse alternative in every other aspect.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Agree.<br>
&gt; <br>
</font></tt>
<br><tt><font size=2>Suppose that a subject has an ECMQV-only cert, and
wishes to allow either SHA-256 or SHA-384 based KDFs, but no other KDFs.
&nbsp;Also, the EKU field says that the cert can be used for SMIME, IPSec,
SSH, or TLS (suppose the private key is on the user's smart card). &nbsp;The
X9.62 &quot;structured&quot; approach allows for this. &nbsp;How would
the other approaches allow for this?</font></tt>
<br>
<br><tt><font size=2>Regards,</font></tt>
<br>
<br><tt><font size=2>Dan Brown<br>
(905) 501-3857<br>
http://www.certicom.com</font></tt>
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Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key
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<body>
Stefan:<br><br>
If a certificate says that the public key is only to be used with
RSAES-OAEP, then it should fail if it trys to use it with some other
algorithm.&nbsp; In the three steps that you cite, this has no impact on
1).&nbsp; It is not a signature algorithm, so it should no have any
impact on the certification path validation.&nbsp; Updating the OID table
seems very straightforward.&nbsp; Something like this needs to be done
anytime a new algorithm is added to the system.&nbsp; It will need to be
added to the table to handle the appearance in S/MIME for example.&nbsp;
Finally, the pain involved with 3) is the leverage to get application
developers to use the OID table.&nbsp; There may be some
application-specific things that need to be done as well, but that does
not necessarily have anything to do with the certificate.<br><br>
I disagree with one thing you said.&nbsp; You said:<br>
&gt; In the =93old=94 logic, when a subject public key OID had no
constraining semantics.<br>
&gt; It would be safe to use a trusted key if it works (if all other
checks are good). This<br>
&gt; change of semantics is the danger when it hits old applications not
designed for<br>
&gt; it. If they were designed to honor RFC 4055 OIDs, this would not be
an issue.<br>
&gt; However RFC 4055 has not been implemented in many places.<br><br>
The subject public key information has always included an algorithm
identifier.&nbsp; The table of contents of RFC 3279 shows the ones that
have been in use for at least four years:<br><br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; 2.3&nbsp; Subject Public Key Algorithms<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; 2.3.1&nbsp; RSA Keys<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; 2.3.2&nbsp; DSA Signature Keys<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; 2.3.3&nbsp; Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Keys<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; 2.3.4&nbsp; KEA Public Keys<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; 2.3.5&nbsp; ECDSA and ECDH Public Keys<br><br>
DSA and KEA public keys can also be used in DH operations from a purely
mathematical perspective.&nbsp; However, we choose to assign three
different OIDs.&nbsp; We did not assign one OID for discrete log public
keys.<br><br>
Russ<br><br>
<br>
At 03:12 PM 1/16/2007, Stefan Santesson wrote:<br>
<blockquote type=3Dcite class=3Dcite cite=3D""><a name=3D"_MailEndCompose=
"></a>
Russ,<br>
I can=92t see that we have any disagreements.<br>
&nbsp;<br>
My point is that the mapping and as such the responsibility for doing the
mapping correctly rests fully on the applications or protocol
stacks.<br>
You can=92t just add this feature in the crypto library or the validation
module, and use current protocol stacks and applications. If you do that,
they most likely either fail or get it wrong.<br>
&nbsp;<br>
So we have a situation with multiple possible points of failure.<br>
&nbsp;<br>
An expansion of the public key OIDs for ECC will in short require the
following changes:<br>
&nbsp;<br>
1) Update chain validation to recognize new OIDs and enforce them in
chain validation<br>
2) Update the OID table (voluntarily used by protocols and
applications)<br>
3) Update the mapping logic in all protocol stacks and cert using
applications<br>
&nbsp;<br>
The interesting question is what will happen if you do 1) and 2) but not
3). Or do 1) and 2) and gradually update 3)<br>
Keeping in mind that many applications are designed out of the notion
that a public key obtained through a validated certificate path,
associated with a matching key usage and EKU, either works (then it is a
good one) or don=92t work, I wouldn=92t be surprised if an application
receiving a new Alg ID that it can=92t map to the protocol Alg ID, still
will try to use the key it has to see if it works. Neither the chain
validation engine nor the Crypto library will catch or prevent this
abuse.<br>
&nbsp;<br>
Of course, a correct application will get it right, but many developers
have learned to make their code as fault tolerant as possible and are
used to process cases of conflicting information in a way that succeeds
when it should be =93safe=94 to do so. Example: a chain should fail if Is=
suer
name and subject name matching fails. But still, if signature of the leaf
cert matches the public key of the CA cert and subject/issuer name are
=93Example Inc=94/=94example, inc=94 in different encoding. It would be s=
afe to
allow it to pass. Strictly such chain should fail, but you will find that
=93fault tolerant=94 designs, knowing that users will get things wrong, m=
ay
actually pass such chain, because it is safe to do so.&nbsp; <br>
&nbsp;<br>
In the =93old=94 logic, when a subject public key OID had no constraining
semantics. It would be safe to use a trusted key if it works (if all
other checks are good). This change of semantics is the danger when it
hits old applications not designed for it. If they were designed to honor
RFC 4055 OIDs, this would not be an issue. However RFC 4055 has not been
implemented in many places.<br>
&nbsp;<br>
The difference with an extension is that the application will get a
critical extension error, which applications currently are designed to
honor. They either need to recognize and honor that extension or fail.
The risk for abuse during transition is thus considerably lower.<br>
&nbsp;<br>
What ever we do, I hope we can do it as simple as possible. But even
though defining a few new alg OIDs seems simple, it may not provide for a
safe and simple transition. <br>
&nbsp;<br>
&nbsp;<br>
&nbsp;<br>
<b>Stefan Santesson<br>
</b>Senior Program Manager<br>
<b>Windows Security, Standards<br>
</b>&nbsp;<br>
<b>From:</b> Russ Housley
[<a href=3D"mailto:housley@vigilsec.com" eudora=3D"autourl">
mailto:housley@vigilsec.com</a>] <br>
<b>Sent:</b> den 16 januari 2007 11:04<br>
<b>To:</b> Stefan Santesson; ietf-pkix@imc.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject
Public Key Info.<br>
&nbsp;<br>
<tt>Stefan:</tt><br><br>
<tt>Let's expand your &quot;Crypto Library&quot; box to include the
algorithms that are discussed in RFC 4055.</tt><br><br>
<tt>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
----------------- </tt><br>
<tt>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
| Crypto Library|</tt><br>
<tt>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
-----------------</tt><br>
<tt>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|</tt><br>
<tt>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
----------------------------------------------------</tt><br>
<tt>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|</tt><br>
<tt>&nbsp;---------------&nbsp; ---------------&nbsp;
--------------&nbsp; ---------------</tt><br>
<tt>&nbsp;| PKCS#1 v1.5 |&nbsp; | PKCS#1 v1.5 |&nbsp; | RSASSA-PSS
|&nbsp; | RSAES-OAEP&nbsp; |</tt><br>
<tt>&nbsp;| Signature&nbsp;&nbsp; |&nbsp; | Key Encrypt |&nbsp; |
Signature&nbsp; |&nbsp; | Key Encrypt |</tt><br>
<tt>&nbsp;---------------&nbsp; ---------------&nbsp;
--------------&nbsp; ---------------</tt><br>
<tt>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|</tt><br>
<tt>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
----------------------------------------------------</tt><br>
<tt>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|</tt><br>
<tt>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
---------------------</tt><br>
<tt>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
| RSA Math Routines |</tt><br>
<tt>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
---------------------</tt><br><br>
<tt>In the RFC 4055 approach, the algorithm identifier says that the
public key may be used for any one of these RSA operations, or it names
exactly one of them.&nbsp; If exactly one is named, it seems to help the
crypto library determine which of the routine to use.&nbsp; If any is
allowed, then the application or the protocol stack needs to tell the
crypto library which operation to perform.</tt><br><br>
<tt>You say:</tt><br>
<tt>&gt; Adding this feature in the RFC4055 style is not impossible but
it needs to be</tt><br>
<tt>&gt; individually implemented in each cert using protocol and
application. This is</tt><br>
<tt>&gt; not trivial considering that legacy is a big complicating
factor. In</tt><br>
<tt>&gt; principle it worries me to put this complex mapping burden on
applications.</tt><br>
<tt>&gt; Another threat with this approach is if it leads to a
requirement to define</tt><br>
<tt>&gt; combinations of algorithm modes by single OIDs where we may end
up with a</tt><br>
<tt>&gt; very large space of OIDs.</tt><br><br>
<tt>On your last point, RFC 4055 does not do any such thing.&nbsp; It
does not define OIDs for OAEP with a particular hash algorithm as the
mask generation function.&nbsp; No, it uses a parameter for
that.</tt><br><br>
<tt>Certificate using applications need to map algorithm identifiers from
certificates, the protocol, and the crypto library.&nbsp; Agreed.&nbsp;
It seems that the table approach that you describe will work well with
the simplified crypto library architecture that I have drawn above.&nbsp;
The one difference is that crypto libraries need to be able to handle the
fact that one public key might be useful in more than algorithm.&nbsp;
This is already the case.&nbsp; RSA keys are used for PKCS#1 v1.5
signature and key encrypt.&nbsp; If the key usage extension is not
present, then the certificate is not providing the context to select the
appropriate algorithm within the crypto library.</tt><br><br>
<tt>Russ</blockquote></body>
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Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2007 13:54:29 -0800
From: Arshad Noor <arshad.noor@strongauth.com>
Subject: Availability of CSRTool
To: dev-tech-crypto@lists.mozilla.org, ietf-pkix@imc.org,
        security-dev@xml.apache.org, ST-ISC@MAIL.ABANET.ORG,
        PKI TC <pki-tc@lists.oasis-open.org>, ekmi@lists.oasis-open.org
Message-id: <45AD4995.4040504@strongauth.com>
Organization: StrongAuth, Inc.
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Hi,

I would like to announce the availability of a free and open-source
(LGPL) tool - CSRTool v0.01- to the PKI/Crypto/Security community.

CSRTool is a Java-based, GUI-driven utility that:

  * Generates RSA public and private key-pairs in sizes ranging from
    1024 to 8192 bits;

  * Generates Elliptic Curve DSA public and private key-pairs using
    either the ANSI X9.62 named curves, or custom parameters of your
    own curve, if so inclined;

  * Saves the private-key in a PKCS8 file with Password-Based-Encryption
    using the SHA1withTripleDES algorithm;

  * Generates a PEM-encoded CSR that can be submitted to a CA either
    through a web-form or e-mail;

  * Generates keyUsage and/or the subjectAltName extensions (optionally)
    in the RSA-based CSR;

  * Combines the private-key from the previously-stored PKCS8 file and
    the newly returned digital certificate, into a PKCS12 file that can
    be used for importation into desired applications; future releases
    will support the JKS & JCEKS key-stores, and crypto hardware tokens;

It was created to make working with PKIs a little easier.  Everything
it does can be done with various CLI-based utilities easily enough,
but the GUI makes it just a little easier for some people.

More information and downloads of the binary and source can be found
at http://www.strongauth.com/csrtool.  Documentation is included in
the downloads, and a forum for discussion of the tool is available at
that site.

Enjoy!

Arshad Noor
StrongAuth, Inc.




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From: Stefan Santesson <stefans@microsoft.com>
To: Daniel Brown <DBrown@certicom.com>,
        "Kemp, David P."
	<DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>
CC: "ietf-pkix@imc.org" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2007 22:30:21 +0000
Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key
  Info.
Thread-Topic: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key
  Info.
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The fact that you can put the info into a cert does not mean that the whole=
 system will do what you want.

We are dealing with a field that historically has not been used to carry su=
ch information and where it will be a challenge make sure they will act in =
a "good" manner if they do. The situation is different for private key oper=
ations protected by a smart card than using the public key from a certifica=
te. Both sides need to honor the restriction.


Stefan Santesson
Senior Program Manager
Windows Security, Standards

From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] On=
 Behalf Of Daniel Brown
Sent: den 16 januari 2007 13:03
To: Kemp, David P.
Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key Inf=
o.


David P. Kemp wrote on 01/16/2007 12:21:27 PM:

>
> > - The structured algorithm OID is maybe not the hardest to define
> > but the worse alternative in every other aspect.
>
> Agree.
>

Suppose that a subject has an ECMQV-only cert, and wishes to allow either S=
HA-256 or SHA-384 based KDFs, but no other KDFs.  Also, the EKU field says =
that the cert can be used for SMIME, IPSec, SSH, or TLS (suppose the privat=
e key is on the user's smart card).  The X9.62 "structured" approach allows=
 for this.  How would the other approaches allow for this?

Regards,

Dan Brown
(905) 501-3857
http://www.certicom.com

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xmlns:m=3D"http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2004/12/omml" xmlns=3D"http:=
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<p class=3DMsoNormal><a name=3D"_MailEndCompose"><span lang=3DEN-US style=
=3D'font-size:
11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>The fact that you =
can put
the info into a cert does not mean that the whole system will do what you w=
ant.<o:p></o:p></span></a></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>We are dealing with a field that historically has not been u=
sed
to carry such information and where it will be a challenge make sure they w=
ill
act in a &#8220;good&#8221; manner if they do. The situation is different f=
or
private key operations protected by a smart card than using the public key =
from
a certificate. Both sides need to honor the restriction.<o:p></o:p></span><=
/p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-f=
amily:
"Arial","sans-serif";color:maroon'>Stefan Santesson</span></b><span lang=3D=
EN-GB
style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:#400040'>Senior Program Manager</span><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'col=
or:navy'><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-f=
amily:
"Arial","sans-serif";color:#400040'>Windows Security, Standards</span></b><=
span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0cm 0cm 0cm =
4.0pt'>

<div>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0cm =
0cm 0cm'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-f=
amily:
"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span></b><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-siz=
e:10.0pt;
font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:ow=
ner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org]
<b>On Behalf Of </b>Daniel Brown<br>
<b>Sent:</b> den 16 januari 2007 13:03<br>
<b>To:</b> Kemp, David P.<br>
<b>Cc:</b> ietf-pkix@imc.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public =
Key
Info.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

</div>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>David P. Kemp wrote on 01/16/2007 12:2=
1:27
PM:</span></tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New"'><=
br>
<br>
<tt>&gt; </tt><br>
<tt>&gt; &gt; - The structured algorithm OID is maybe not the hardest to de=
fine</tt><br>
<tt>&gt; &gt; but the worse alternative in every other aspect.</tt><br>
<tt>&gt; </tt><br>
<tt>&gt; Agree.</tt><br>
<tt>&gt; </tt><br>
</span><br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Suppose that a subject has an ECMQV-on=
ly
cert, and wishes to allow either SHA-256 or SHA-384 based KDFs, but no othe=
r
KDFs. &nbsp;Also, the EKU field says that the cert can be used for SMIME, I=
PSec,
SSH, or TLS (suppose the private key is on the user's smart card). &nbsp;Th=
e
X9.62 &quot;structured&quot; approach allows for this. &nbsp;How would the
other approaches allow for this?</span></tt> <br>
<br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Regards,</span></tt> <br>
<br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Dan Brown</span></tt><span style=3D'fo=
nt-size:
10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New"'><br>
<tt>(905) 501-3857</tt><br>
<tt>http://www.certicom.com</tt></span><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

</div>

</body>

</html>

--_000_A15AC0FBACD3464E95961F7C0BCD1FF01D6E18E6EAEXMSGC307euro_--




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Is KDF an appropriate level of granularity for certificate-based
constraints on the usage of public keys?  And if so, is it
cryptographically appropriate to use a single public key size
with both SHA-256 and SHA-384 KDFs? =20

Specifying a list of allowed features does not satisfy the design
team's goal of using certificates to reduce protocol negotiation -
if more than one KDF is possible with a pair of peer certificates,
it is still necessary to negotiate which KDF to use.

But to answer the question, the design team slides stated:

* Define an optionally critical certificate extension
   - Sequence of Algorithm Identifiers, as in X9.62 parameters
   - Reuse X9 algorithm Identifiers
       . Deprecating "with recommended"?=20
   - Add three "family" OIDs (ECDSA, ECDH, ECMQV)

So the extension approach allows a list of KDFs, but the RFC 4055
approach does not.  I believe that a list is unnecessary because
an ECMQV public key of a given size should imply the acceptable
KDF size (or conversely, a key derive function should imply the
acceptable public key size).

Dave


________________________________________
From: Daniel Brown [mailto:DBrown@certicom.com]=20
Sent: Tuesday, January 16, 2007 4:03 PM
To: Kemp, David P.
Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key I=
nfo.


David P. Kemp wrote on 01/16/2007 12:21:27 PM:

>=20
> > - The structured algorithm OID is maybe not the hardest to define
> > but the worse alternative in every other aspect.
>=20
> Agree.
>=20

Suppose that a subject has an ECMQV-only cert, and wishes to allow either=
 SHA-256 or SHA-384 based KDFs, but no other KDFs. =A0Also, the EKU field=
 says that the cert can be used for SMIME, IPSec, SSH, or TLS (suppose th=
e private key is on the user's smart card). =A0The X9.62 "structured" app=
roach allows for this. =A0How would the other approaches allow for this?=20

Regards,=20

Dan Brown
(905) 501-3857
http://www.certicom.com




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All,

The only changes that were made in draft -31 of SCVP were corrections of 
typographic errors, mainly misspellings in words that were used to 
create ASN.1 terms.  A diff file highlighting the changes between drafts 
-30 and -31 is available at 
http://csrc.nist.gov/pki/documents/PKIX/wdiff_draft-ietf-pkix-scvp-30_to_31.html.

The following changes were made to the ASN.1 module (none of which 
change the DER encoding of objects):

1) In CVRequest, changed reqestExtensions to requestExtensions (missing 
"u" in request).

2) In SCVPCertID, added "algorithm" in front of sha-1, so that it no 
longer implicit that sha-1 is the value for "algorithm" rather than 
"parameters".  SCVPCertID is now:

       SCVPCertID ::= SEQUENCE {
           certHash        OCTET STRING,
           issuerSerial    SCVPIssuerSerial,
           hashAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT { algorithm sha-1 } }

3) In CVStatus code, changed inhibitPolicyMappingUnsuported to 
inhibitPolicyMappingUnsupported (missing "p" in Unsupported) and changed 
validityTimeUnsupported to validationTimeUnsupported (error code is 
intended to indicate that the server does not support the validationTime 
item in Query).

4) In HashValue, added "algorithm" in front of sha-1, as was done with 
SCVPCertID.

       HashValue ::= SEQUENCE {
         algorithm         AlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT { algorithm sha-1 },
         value             OCTET STRING }

5) In ReplyStatus, changed unavailableValidityTime to 
unavailableValidationTime, since error code indicates that historical 
data for the time specified in validationTime in the request is not 
available.

6) In ValPolResponse, changed maxCVResponseVersion to 
maxCVRequestVersion and changed maxVPResponseVersion to 
maxVPRequestVersion, since these terms were referred to as 
max...RequestVersion everywhere except the ASN.1 and since the semantics 
(sections 6.2 and 6.3) are that they indicate that maximum version 
numbers that the server accepts for requests.

7) Also in ValPolResponse, changed validationPolices to 
validationPolicies (added the final "i" in Policies).

Dave

Internet-Drafts@ietf.org wrote:
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts 
> directories.
> This draft is a work item of the Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) Working Group of the IETF.
>
> 	Title		: Server-based Certificate Validation Protocol (SCVP)
> 	Author(s)	: A. Malpani, et al.
> 	Filename	: draft-ietf-pkix-scvp-31.txt
> 	Pages		: 86
> 	Date		: 2007-1-15
> 	
> SCVP allows a client to delegate certificate path construction and
>    certificate path validation to a server.  The path construction or
>    validation (e.g., making sure that none of the certificates in the
>    path are revoked) is performed according to a validation policy,
>    which contains one or more trust anchors.  It allows simplification
>    of client implementations and use of a set of predefined validation
>    policies.
>
> A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-scvp-31.txt
>   




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From: Stefan Santesson <stefans@microsoft.com>
To: "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>,
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Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key
  Info.
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There is no single way that applications and protocol stacks may operate.

In my example, applications don't understand any public key OID. They would simply consult OID table to get a translation into something they can pass to the crypto lib. If that look-up is unsuccessful, the application will most certainly fail. But if it is successful, the application will attempt to map that key to the usage negotiated in the protocol, e.g. a TLS cipher suite. This is where I'm not at all sure that "old" applications will get it right. I have indications that they might get it wrong but I don't have any hard facts to offer yet. It worries me though to have to depend on various applications to get it right.

I would prefer to have more control in the library layer and more actively prevent applications from doing the wrong thing.


Stefan Santesson
Senior Program Manager
Windows Security, Standards


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Kemp, David P. [mailto:DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil]
> Sent: den 16 januari 2007 15:08
> To: Stefan Santesson; ietf-pkix@imc.org
> Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key
> Info.
>
> Hmmm, I'd guess that applications would fail, either gracefully
> or catastrophically, when faced with an unrecognized Subject
> Public Key Info OID.   I did miss the point that they might
> falsely accept and misuse the public key, but even after considering
> the possibility it still seems highly improbable.
>
> Dave
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:stefans@microsoft.com]
> Sent: Tuesday, January 16, 2007 2:09 PM
> To: Kemp, David P.; ietf-pkix@imc.org
> Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key
> Info.
>
> Thanks Dave,
>
> Let me clarify where I think you missed my point.
>
> I believe that it is less likely that a certificate with a critical
> extension will be falsely accepted and misused by an application. I
> believe the risk is greater that applications get it wrong and makes
> wrong use of a public key if the restriction comes as a public key OID.
>
> But this is just an educated guess.
>
> I agree that it will be hard to define complete mapping info in an
> extension. That was my point - It may make the extension overly
> complex.
>
>
> Stefan Santesson
> Senior Program Manager
> Windows Security, Standards
>
>





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You are correct in all you say, but that does not prevent applications from=
 getting it wrong. They can treat RSA and ECC keys differently than DH/DSA =
where a distinction is known to them.
I'm venting my fear of what might be a problem. I will look further into th=
is.

Stefan Santesson
Senior Program Manager
Windows Security, Standards

From: Russ Housley [mailto:housley@vigilsec.com]
Sent: den 16 januari 2007 13:54
To: Stefan Santesson; ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key Inf=
o.

Stefan:

If a certificate says that the public key is only to be used with RSAES-OAE=
P, then it should fail if it trys to use it with some other algorithm.  In =
the three steps that you cite, this has no impact on 1).  It is not a signa=
ture algorithm, so it should no have any impact on the certification path v=
alidation.  Updating the OID table seems very straightforward.  Something l=
ike this needs to be done anytime a new algorithm is added to the system.  =
It will need to be added to the table to handle the appearance in S/MIME fo=
r example.  Finally, the pain involved with 3) is the leverage to get appli=
cation developers to use the OID table.  There may be some application-spec=
ific things that need to be done as well, but that does not necessarily hav=
e anything to do with the certificate.

I disagree with one thing you said.  You said:
> In the "old" logic, when a subject public key OID had no constraining sem=
antics.
> It would be safe to use a trusted key if it works (if all other checks ar=
e good). This
> change of semantics is the danger when it hits old applications not desig=
ned for
> it. If they were designed to honor RFC 4055 OIDs, this would not be an is=
sue.
> However RFC 4055 has not been implemented in many places.

The subject public key information has always included an algorithm identif=
ier.  The table of contents of RFC 3279 shows the ones that have been in us=
e for at least four years:

   2.3  Subject Public Key Algorithms
   2.3.1  RSA Keys
   2.3.2  DSA Signature Keys
   2.3.3  Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Keys
   2.3.4  KEA Public Keys
   2.3.5  ECDSA and ECDH Public Keys

DSA and KEA public keys can also be used in DH operations from a purely mat=
hematical perspective.  However, we choose to assign three different OIDs. =
 We did not assign one OID for discrete log public keys.

Russ


At 03:12 PM 1/16/2007, Stefan Santesson wrote:

Russ,
I can't see that we have any disagreements.

My point is that the mapping and as such the responsibility for doing the m=
apping correctly rests fully on the applications or protocol stacks.
You can't just add this feature in the crypto library or the validation mod=
ule, and use current protocol stacks and applications. If you do that, they=
 most likely either fail or get it wrong.

So we have a situation with multiple possible points of failure.

An expansion of the public key OIDs for ECC will in short require the follo=
wing changes:

1) Update chain validation to recognize new OIDs and enforce them in chain =
validation
2) Update the OID table (voluntarily used by protocols and applications)
3) Update the mapping logic in all protocol stacks and cert using applicati=
ons

The interesting question is what will happen if you do 1) and 2) but not 3)=
. Or do 1) and 2) and gradually update 3)
Keeping in mind that many applications are designed out of the notion that =
a public key obtained through a validated certificate path, associated with=
 a matching key usage and EKU, either works (then it is a good one) or don'=
t work, I wouldn't be surprised if an application receiving a new Alg ID th=
at it can't map to the protocol Alg ID, still will try to use the key it ha=
s to see if it works. Neither the chain validation engine nor the Crypto li=
brary will catch or prevent this abuse.

Of course, a correct application will get it right, but many developers hav=
e learned to make their code as fault tolerant as possible and are used to =
process cases of conflicting information in a way that succeeds when it sho=
uld be "safe" to do so. Example: a chain should fail if Issuer name and sub=
ject name matching fails. But still, if signature of the leaf cert matches =
the public key of the CA cert and subject/issuer name are "Example Inc"/"ex=
ample, inc" in different encoding. It would be safe to allow it to pass. St=
rictly such chain should fail, but you will find that "fault tolerant" desi=
gns, knowing that users will get things wrong, may actually pass such chain=
, because it is safe to do so.

In the "old" logic, when a subject public key OID had no constraining seman=
tics. It would be safe to use a trusted key if it works (if all other check=
s are good). This change of semantics is the danger when it hits old applic=
ations not designed for it. If they were designed to honor RFC 4055 OIDs, t=
his would not be an issue. However RFC 4055 has not been implemented in man=
y places.

The difference with an extension is that the application will get a critica=
l extension error, which applications currently are designed to honor. They=
 either need to recognize and honor that extension or fail. The risk for ab=
use during transition is thus considerably lower.

What ever we do, I hope we can do it as simple as possible. But even though=
 defining a few new alg OIDs seems simple, it may not provide for a safe an=
d simple transition.



Stefan Santesson
Senior Program Manager
Windows Security, Standards

From: Russ Housley [ mailto:housley@vigilsec.com]
Sent: den 16 januari 2007 11:04
To: Stefan Santesson; ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key Inf=
o.

Stefan:

Let's expand your "Crypto Library" box to include the algorithms that are d=
iscussed in RFC 4055.

                       -----------------
                       | Crypto Library|
                       -----------------
                               |
       ----------------------------------------------------
       |                |                |                |
 ---------------  ---------------  --------------  ---------------
 | PKCS#1 v1.5 |  | PKCS#1 v1.5 |  | RSASSA-PSS |  | RSAES-OAEP  |
 | Signature   |  | Key Encrypt |  | Signature  |  | Key Encrypt |
 ---------------  ---------------  --------------  ---------------
       |                |                |                |
       ----------------------------------------------------
                               |
                     ---------------------
                     | RSA Math Routines |
                     ---------------------

In the RFC 4055 approach, the algorithm identifier says that the public key=
 may be used for any one of these RSA operations, or it names exactly one o=
f them.  If exactly one is named, it seems to help the crypto library deter=
mine which of the routine to use.  If any is allowed, then the application =
or the protocol stack needs to tell the crypto library which operation to p=
erform.

You say:
> Adding this feature in the RFC4055 style is not impossible but it needs t=
o be
> individually implemented in each cert using protocol and application. Thi=
s is
> not trivial considering that legacy is a big complicating factor. In
> principle it worries me to put this complex mapping burden on application=
s.
> Another threat with this approach is if it leads to a requirement to defi=
ne
> combinations of algorithm modes by single OIDs where we may end up with a
> very large space of OIDs.

On your last point, RFC 4055 does not do any such thing.  It does not defin=
e OIDs for OAEP with a particular hash algorithm as the mask generation fun=
ction.  No, it uses a parameter for that.

Certificate using applications need to map algorithm identifiers from certi=
ficates, the protocol, and the crypto library.  Agreed.  It seems that the =
table approach that you describe will work well with the simplified crypto =
library architecture that I have drawn above.  The one difference is that c=
rypto libraries need to be able to handle the fact that one public key migh=
t be useful in more than algorithm.  This is already the case.  RSA keys ar=
e used for PKCS#1 v1.5 signature and key encrypt.  If the key usage extensi=
on is not present, then the certificate is not providing the context to sel=
ect the appropriate algorithm within the crypto library.

Russ

--_000_A15AC0FBACD3464E95961F7C0BCD1FF01D6E18E4EAEXMSGC307euro_
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<div class=3DSection1>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><a name=3D"_MailEndCompose"><span lang=3DEN-US style=
=3D'font-size:
11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>You are correct in=
 all
you say, but that does not prevent applications from getting it wrong. They=
 can
treat RSA and ECC keys differently than DH/DSA where a distinction is known=
 to
them.<o:p></o:p></span></a></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>I&#8217;m venting my fear of what might be a problem. I will
look further into this.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-f=
amily:
"Arial","sans-serif";color:maroon'>Stefan Santesson</span></b><span lang=3D=
EN-GB
style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:#400040'>Senior Program Manager</span><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'col=
or:navy'><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-f=
amily:
"Arial","sans-serif";color:#400040'>Windows Security, Standards</span></b><=
span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p></o:p></span></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0cm 0cm 0cm =
4.0pt'>

<div>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0cm =
0cm 0cm'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-f=
amily:
"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span></b><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-siz=
e:10.0pt;
font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> Russ Housley [mailto:housley@vigilsec.c=
om] <br>
<b>Sent:</b> den 16 januari 2007 13:54<br>
<b>To:</b> Stefan Santesson; ietf-pkix@imc.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public =
Key
Info.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

</div>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>Stefan:<br>
<br>
If a certificate says that the public key is only to be used with RSAES-OAE=
P,
then it should fail if it trys to use it with some other algorithm.&nbsp; I=
n
the three steps that you cite, this has no impact on 1).&nbsp; It is not a
signature algorithm, so it should no have any impact on the certification p=
ath
validation.&nbsp; Updating the OID table seems very straightforward.&nbsp;
Something like this needs to be done anytime a new algorithm is added to th=
e
system.&nbsp; It will need to be added to the table to handle the appearanc=
e in
S/MIME for example.&nbsp; Finally, the pain involved with 3) is the leverag=
e to
get application developers to use the OID table.&nbsp; There may be some
application-specific things that need to be done as well, but that does not
necessarily have anything to do with the certificate.<br>
<br>
I disagree with one thing you said.&nbsp; You said:<br>
&gt; In the &#8220;old&#8221; logic, when a subject public key OID had no
constraining semantics.<br>
&gt; It would be safe to use a trusted key if it works (if all other checks=
 are
good). This<br>
&gt; change of semantics is the danger when it hits old applications not
designed for<br>
&gt; it. If they were designed to honor RFC 4055 OIDs, this would not be an
issue.<br>
&gt; However RFC 4055 has not been implemented in many places.<br>
<br>
The subject public key information has always included an algorithm
identifier.&nbsp; The table of contents of RFC 3279 shows the ones that hav=
e
been in use for at least four years:<br>
<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; 2.3&nbsp; Subject Public Key Algorithms<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; 2.3.1&nbsp; RSA Keys<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; 2.3.2&nbsp; DSA Signature Keys<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; 2.3.3&nbsp; Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Keys<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; 2.3.4&nbsp; KEA Public Keys<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; 2.3.5&nbsp; ECDSA and ECDH Public Keys<br>
<br>
DSA and KEA public keys can also be used in DH operations from a purely
mathematical perspective.&nbsp; However, we choose to assign three differen=
t
OIDs.&nbsp; We did not assign one OID for discrete log public keys.<br>
<br>
Russ<br>
<br>
<br>
At 03:12 PM 1/16/2007, Stefan Santesson wrote:<br>
<br>
<o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>Russ,<br>
I can&#8217;t see that we have any disagreements.<br>
&nbsp;<br>
My point is that the mapping and as such the responsibility for doing the
mapping correctly rests fully on the applications or protocol stacks.<br>
You can&#8217;t just add this feature in the crypto library or the validati=
on
module, and use current protocol stacks and applications. If you do that, t=
hey
most likely either fail or get it wrong.<br>
&nbsp;<br>
So we have a situation with multiple possible points of failure.<br>
&nbsp;<br>
An expansion of the public key OIDs for ECC will in short require the follo=
wing
changes:<br>
&nbsp;<br>
1) Update chain validation to recognize new OIDs and enforce them in chain =
validation<br>
2) Update the OID table (voluntarily used by protocols and applications)<br=
>
3) Update the mapping logic in all protocol stacks and cert using applicati=
ons<br>
&nbsp;<br>
The interesting question is what will happen if you do 1) and 2) but not 3)=
. Or
do 1) and 2) and gradually update 3)<br>
Keeping in mind that many applications are designed out of the notion that =
a
public key obtained through a validated certificate path, associated with a
matching key usage and EKU, either works (then it is a good one) or don&#82=
17;t
work, I wouldn&#8217;t be surprised if an application receiving a new Alg I=
D
that it can&#8217;t map to the protocol Alg ID, still will try to use the k=
ey
it has to see if it works. Neither the chain validation engine nor the Cryp=
to
library will catch or prevent this abuse.<br>
&nbsp;<br>
Of course, a correct application will get it right, but many developers hav=
e
learned to make their code as fault tolerant as possible and are used to
process cases of conflicting information in a way that succeeds when it sho=
uld
be &#8220;safe&#8221; to do so. Example: a chain should fail if Issuer name=
 and
subject name matching fails. But still, if signature of the leaf cert match=
es
the public key of the CA cert and subject/issuer name are &#8220;Example
Inc&#8221;/&#8221;example, inc&#8221; in different encoding. It would be sa=
fe
to allow it to pass. Strictly such chain should fail, but you will find tha=
t
&#8220;fault tolerant&#8221; designs, knowing that users will get things wr=
ong,
may actually pass such chain, because it is safe to do so.&nbsp; <br>
&nbsp;<br>
In the &#8220;old&#8221; logic, when a subject public key OID had no
constraining semantics. It would be safe to use a trusted key if it works (=
if
all other checks are good). This change of semantics is the danger when it =
hits
old applications not designed for it. If they were designed to honor RFC 40=
55
OIDs, this would not be an issue. However RFC 4055 has not been implemented=
 in
many places.<br>
&nbsp;<br>
The difference with an extension is that the application will get a critica=
l
extension error, which applications currently are designed to honor. They
either need to recognize and honor that extension or fail. The risk for abu=
se
during transition is thus considerably lower.<br>
&nbsp;<br>
What ever we do, I hope we can do it as simple as possible. But even though
defining a few new alg OIDs seems simple, it may not provide for a safe and
simple transition. <br>
&nbsp;<br>
&nbsp;<br>
&nbsp;<br>
<b>Stefan Santesson<br>
</b>Senior Program Manager<br>
<b>Windows Security, Standards<br>
</b>&nbsp;<br>
<b>From:</b> Russ Housley [<a href=3D"mailto:housley@vigilsec.com">
mailto:housley@vigilsec.com</a>] <br>
<b>Sent:</b> den 16 januari 2007 11:04<br>
<b>To:</b> Stefan Santesson; ietf-pkix@imc.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public =
Key
Info.<br>
&nbsp;<br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Stefan:</span></tt><br>
<br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Let's expand your &quot;Crypto Library=
&quot;
box to include the algorithms that are discussed in RFC 4055.</span></tt><b=
r>
<br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
----------------- </span></tt><br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
| Crypto Library|</span></tt><br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
-----------------</span></tt><br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|</span></tt><br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
----------------------------------------------------</span></tt><br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|</span></tt><br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;---------------&nbsp;
---------------&nbsp; --------------&nbsp; ---------------</span></tt><br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;| PKCS#1 v1.5 |&nbsp; | PKCS#1 v=
1.5
|&nbsp; | RSASSA-PSS |&nbsp; | RSAES-OAEP&nbsp; |</span></tt><br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;| Signature&nbsp;&nbsp; |&nbsp; =
| Key
Encrypt |&nbsp; | Signature&nbsp; |&nbsp; | Key Encrypt |</span></tt><br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;---------------&nbsp;
---------------&nbsp; --------------&nbsp; ---------------</span></tt><br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|</span></tt><br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
----------------------------------------------------</span></tt><br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|</span></tt><br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;
---------------------</span></tt><br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;
| RSA Math Routines |</span></tt><br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;
---------------------</span></tt><br>
<br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>In the RFC 4055 approach, the algorith=
m
identifier says that the public key may be used for any one of these RSA
operations, or it names exactly one of them.&nbsp; If exactly one is named,=
 it
seems to help the crypto library determine which of the routine to use.&nbs=
p;
If any is allowed, then the application or the protocol stack needs to tell=
 the
crypto library which operation to perform.</span></tt><br>
<br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>You say:</span></tt><br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; Adding this feature in the RFC405=
5
style is not impossible but it needs to be</span></tt><br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; individually implemented in each =
cert
using protocol and application. This is</span></tt><br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; not trivial considering that lega=
cy is
a big complicating factor. In</span></tt><br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; principle it worries me to put th=
is
complex mapping burden on applications.</span></tt><br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; Another threat with this approach=
 is if
it leads to a requirement to define</span></tt><br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; combinations of algorithm modes b=
y
single OIDs where we may end up with a</span></tt><br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; very large space of OIDs.</span><=
/tt><br>
<br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>On your last point, RFC 4055 does not =
do any
such thing.&nbsp; It does not define OIDs for OAEP with a particular hash
algorithm as the mask generation function.&nbsp; No, it uses a parameter fo=
r
that.</span></tt><br>
<br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Certificate using applications need to=
 map
algorithm identifiers from certificates, the protocol, and the crypto
library.&nbsp; Agreed.&nbsp; It seems that the table approach that you desc=
ribe
will work well with the simplified crypto library architecture that I have
drawn above.&nbsp; The one difference is that crypto libraries need to be a=
ble
to handle the fact that one public key might be useful in more than
algorithm.&nbsp; This is already the case.&nbsp; RSA keys are used for PKCS=
#1
v1.5 signature and key encrypt.&nbsp; If the key usage extension is not
present, then the certificate is not providing the context to select the
appropriate algorithm within the crypto library.</span></tt><br>
<br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Russ<o:p></o:p></span></tt></p>

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Hmmm, I'd guess that applications would fail, either gracefully
or catastrophically, when faced with an unrecognized Subject
Public Key Info OID.   I did miss the point that they might
falsely accept and misuse the public key, but even after considering
the possibility it still seems highly improbable.

Dave

-----Original Message-----
From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:stefans@microsoft.com] 
Sent: Tuesday, January 16, 2007 2:09 PM
To: Kemp, David P.; ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key
Info.

Thanks Dave,

Let me clarify where I think you missed my point.

I believe that it is less likely that a certificate with a critical
extension will be falsely accepted and misused by an application. I
believe the risk is greater that applications get it wrong and makes
wrong use of a public key if the restriction comes as a public key OID.

But this is just an educated guess.

I agree that it will be hard to define complete mapping info in an
extension. That was my point - It may make the extension overly complex.


Stefan Santesson
Senior Program Manager
Windows Security, Standards







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Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key  Info.
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David Kemp wrote on 01/16/2007 06:07:48 PM:
 
> 
> Is KDF an appropriate level of granularity for certificate-based
> constraints on the usage of public keys? 

Well, only to those who strive for strict compliance to SP 800-56A, in the 
face of application protocols allowing noncompliant KDFs.

> And if so, is it
> cryptographically appropriate to use a single public key size
> with both SHA-256 and SHA-384 KDFs? 

Many in IETF have argued that a SHA-1 based KDF (such as the TLS's or 
IPSec's) provides 160 bits of security, so it is acceptable for use with 
128-bit security, i.e. 256 bit ECC keys.  By the same argument, a SHA-256 
based KDF ought to be acceptable for an 384-bit ECC key. 

> 
> Specifying a list of allowed features does not satisfy the design
> team's goal of using certificates to reduce protocol negotiation -
> if more than one KDF is possible with a pair of peer certificates,
> it is still necessary to negotiate which KDF to use.

Doesn't it reduce negotiation?  Alice and Bob can state their crypto 
abilities using certs.  Then one of them chooses an algorithm in the 
intersection of the abilities, and tells the other that he/she's used it. 
The certs have saved the protocol from sending at least some "crypto 
capabilities" message flows.

> 
> But to answer the question, the design team slides stated:
> 
> * Define an optionally critical certificate extension
>    - Sequence of Algorithm Identifiers, as in X9.62 parameters

Yes, that does it.

>    - Reuse X9 algorithm Identifiers
>        . Deprecating "with recommended"? 
>    - Add three "family" OIDs (ECDSA, ECDH, ECMQV)
> 
> So the extension approach allows a list of KDFs, but the RFC 4055
> approach does not.  I believe that a list is unnecessary because
> an ECMQV public key of a given size should imply the acceptable
> KDF size (or conversely, a key derive function should imply the
> acceptable public key size).
> 

I'm a little confused now.  While we're deprecating "with recommended" 
syntax, we're introducing a "family" syntax, where the crypto parameters 
(KDFs, etc.) are implicitly "recommended" by association with key size. 
This seems a paradoxical to me.  They're are some distinctions: the 
"family" OIDs are meant for a cert, whereas the "with recommended" OIDs 
are being deprecated at both the cert and application level; also, some 
people would construe the "family" OIDs to mean "any" acceptable crypto 
parameters are okay, not that some parameters are "recommended"; but 
neither point completely resolves my confusion.  I will go back to the 
design team slides to see if it clarifies things for me, but I thought I'd 
raise this now, just in case it helps anybody else.

Best regards,

Dan Brown
(905) 501-3857
http://www.certicom.com


> 
> ________________________________________
> From: Daniel Brown [mailto:DBrown@certicom.com] 
> Sent: Tuesday, January 16, 2007 4:03 PM
> To: Kemp, David P.
> Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
> Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key 
Info.
> 
> 
> David P. Kemp wrote on 01/16/2007 12:21:27 PM:
> 
> > 
> > > - The structured algorithm OID is maybe not the hardest to define
> > > but the worse alternative in every other aspect.
> > 
> > Agree.
> > 
> 
> Suppose that a subject has an ECMQV-only cert, and wishes to allow 
> either SHA-256 or SHA-384 based KDFs, but no other KDFs.  Also, the 
> EKU field says that the cert can be used for SMIME, IPSec, SSH, or 
> TLS (suppose the private key is on the user's smart card).  The X9.
> 62 "structured" approach allows for this.  How would the other 
> approaches allow for this? 
> 

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<br><tt><font size=2>David Kemp wrote on 01/16/2007 06:07:48 PM:<br>
 <br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Is KDF an appropriate level of granularity for certificate-based<br>
&gt; constraints on the usage of public keys? &nbsp;</font></tt>
<br>
<br><tt><font size=2>Well, only to those who strive for strict compliance
to SP 800-56A, in the face of application protocols allowing noncompliant
KDFs.</font></tt>
<br>
<br><tt><font size=2>&gt; And if so, is it<br>
&gt; cryptographically appropriate to use a single public key size<br>
&gt; with both SHA-256 and SHA-384 KDFs? &nbsp;<br>
</font></tt>
<br><tt><font size=2>Many in IETF have argued that a SHA-1 based KDF (such
as the TLS's or IPSec's) provides 160 bits of security, so it is acceptable
for use with 128-bit security, i.e. 256 bit ECC keys. &nbsp;By the same
argument, a SHA-256 based KDF ought to be acceptable for an 384-bit ECC
key. &nbsp;</font></tt>
<br>
<br><tt><font size=2>&gt; <br>
&gt; Specifying a list of allowed features does not satisfy the design<br>
&gt; team's goal of using certificates to reduce protocol negotiation -<br>
&gt; if more than one KDF is possible with a pair of peer certificates,<br>
&gt; it is still necessary to negotiate which KDF to use.<br>
</font></tt>
<br><tt><font size=2>Doesn't it reduce negotiation? &nbsp;Alice and Bob
can state their crypto abilities using certs. &nbsp;Then one of them chooses
an algorithm in the intersection of the abilities, and tells the other
that he/she's used it. &nbsp;The certs have saved the protocol from sending
at least some &quot;crypto capabilities&quot; message flows.</font></tt>
<br>
<br><tt><font size=2>&gt; <br>
&gt; But to answer the question, the design team slides stated:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; * Define an optionally critical certificate extension<br>
&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp;- Sequence of Algorithm Identifiers, as in X9.62 parameters<br>
</font></tt>
<br><tt><font size=2>Yes, that does it.</font></tt>
<br>
<br><tt><font size=2>&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp;- Reuse X9 algorithm Identifiers<br>
&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;. Deprecating &quot;with recommended&quot;?
<br>
&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp;- Add three &quot;family&quot; OIDs (ECDSA, ECDH, ECMQV)<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; So the extension approach allows a list of KDFs, but the RFC 4055<br>
&gt; approach does not. &nbsp;I believe that a list is unnecessary because<br>
&gt; an ECMQV public key of a given size should imply the acceptable<br>
&gt; KDF size (or conversely, a key derive function should imply the<br>
&gt; acceptable public key size).<br>
&gt; <br>
</font></tt>
<br><tt><font size=2>I'm a little confused now. &nbsp;While we're deprecating
&quot;with recommended&quot; syntax, we're introducing a &quot;family&quot;
syntax, where the crypto parameters (KDFs, etc.) are implicitly &quot;recommended&quot;
by association with key size. &nbsp;This seems a paradoxical to me. &nbsp;They're
are some distinctions: the &quot;family&quot; OIDs are meant for a cert,
whereas the &quot;with recommended&quot; OIDs are being deprecated at both
the cert and application level; also, some people would construe the &quot;family&quot;
OIDs to mean &quot;any&quot; acceptable crypto parameters are okay, not
that some parameters are &quot;recommended&quot;; but neither point completely
resolves my confusion. &nbsp;I will go back to the design team slides to
see if it clarifies things for me, but I thought I'd raise this now, just
in case it helps anybody else.</font></tt>
<br>
<br><tt><font size=2>Best regards,</font></tt>
<br>
<br><tt><font size=2>Dan Brown<br>
(905) 501-3857<br>
http://www.certicom.com</font></tt>
<br>
<br>
<br><tt><font size=2>&gt; <br>
&gt; ________________________________________<br>
&gt; From: Daniel Brown [mailto:DBrown@certicom.com] <br>
&gt; Sent: Tuesday, January 16, 2007 4:03 PM<br>
&gt; To: Kemp, David P.<br>
&gt; Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org<br>
&gt; Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public
Key Info.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; David P. Kemp wrote on 01/16/2007 12:21:27 PM:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; &gt; <br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; - The structured algorithm OID is maybe not the hardest
to define<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; but the worse alternative in every other aspect.<br>
&gt; &gt; <br>
&gt; &gt; Agree.<br>
&gt; &gt; <br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Suppose that a subject has an ECMQV-only cert, and wishes to allow
<br>
&gt; either SHA-256 or SHA-384 based KDFs, but no other KDFs. &nbsp;Also,
the <br>
&gt; EKU field says that the cert can be used for SMIME, IPSec, SSH, or
<br>
&gt; TLS (suppose the private key is on the user's smart card). &nbsp;The
X9.<br>
&gt; 62 &quot;structured&quot; approach allows for this. &nbsp;How would
the other <br>
&gt; approaches allow for this? <br>
&gt; <br>
</font></tt>
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Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key
   Info.
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<html>
<body>
Dan:<br><br>
<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite=""><tt>
<font face="Courier New, Courier" size=2>&gt; Is KDF an appropriate level
of granularity for certificate-based<br>
&gt; constraints on the usage of public keys?&nbsp; </font></tt>
<br><br>
<tt><font face="Courier New, Courier" size=2>Well, only to those who
strive for strict compliance to SP 800-56A, in the face of application
protocols allowing noncompliant KDFs.</font></tt> </blockquote><br>
I do not think that it is the role of the certificate to
&quot;enforce&quot; compliance.&nbsp; Rather, the application needs to be
run in &quot;FIPS mode&quot; so that all of the choices necessary to
conform to NIST guidance are made.<br><br>
<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite=""><tt>
<font face="Courier New, Courier" size=2>&gt; And if so, is it<br>
&gt; cryptographically appropriate to use a single public key size<br>
&gt; with both SHA-256 and SHA-384 KDFs?&nbsp; <br>
</font></tt><br>
<tt><font face="Courier New, Courier" size=2>Many in IETF have argued
that a SHA-1 based KDF (such as the TLS's or IPSec's) provides 160 bits
of security, so it is acceptable for use with 128-bit security, i.e. 256
bit ECC keys.&nbsp; By the same argument, a SHA-256 based KDF ought to be
acceptable for an 384-bit ECC key.</font></tt></blockquote><br>
So?&nbsp; What does this have to do with the best way to represent the
algorithm constraints in the certificate?<br><br>
<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite=""><tt>
<font face="Courier New, Courier" size=2>&gt; Specifying a list of
allowed features does not satisfy the design<br>
&gt; team's goal of using certificates to reduce protocol negotiation
-<br>
&gt; if more than one KDF is possible with a pair of peer
certificates,<br>
&gt; it is still necessary to negotiate which KDF to use.<br>
</font></tt><br>
<tt><font face="Courier New, Courier" size=2>Doesn't it reduce
negotiation?&nbsp; Alice and Bob can state their crypto abilities using
certs.&nbsp; Then one of them chooses an algorithm in the intersection of
the abilities, and tells the other that he/she's used it.&nbsp; The certs
have saved the protocol from sending at least some &quot;crypto
capabilities&quot; message flows.</font></tt> </blockquote><br>
The closest thing that we have for something like this is
SMIMECapabilities.&nbsp; In this case, the store-and-forward nature of
email makes this a reasonable thing to do.&nbsp; If real-time
negotiations are possible in the protocol, then keeping the CA out of the
picture is desirable.<br><br>
<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite=""><tt>
<font face="Courier New, Courier" size=2>&gt; But to answer the question,
the design team slides stated:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; * Define an optionally critical certificate extension<br>
&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; - Sequence of Algorithm Identifiers, as in X9.62
parameters<br>
</font></tt><br>
<tt><font face="Courier New, Courier" size=2>Yes, that does
it.</font></tt> <br><br>
<tt><font face="Courier New, Courier" size=2>&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; -
Reuse X9 algorithm Identifiers<br>
&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; . Deprecating &quot;with
recommended&quot;? <br>
&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; - Add three &quot;family&quot; OIDs (ECDSA, ECDH,
ECMQV)<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; So the extension approach allows a list of KDFs, but the RFC
4055<br>
&gt; approach does not.&nbsp; I believe that a list is unnecessary
because<br>
&gt; an ECMQV public key of a given size should imply the acceptable<br>
&gt; KDF size (or conversely, a key derive function should imply the<br>
&gt; acceptable public key size).<br>
&gt; <br>
</font></tt><br>
<tt><font face="Courier New, Courier" size=2>I'm a little confused
now.&nbsp; While we're deprecating &quot;with recommended&quot; syntax,
we're introducing a &quot;family&quot; syntax, where the crypto
parameters (KDFs, etc.) are implicitly &quot;recommended&quot; by
association with key size.&nbsp; This seems a paradoxical to me.&nbsp;
They're are some distinctions: the &quot;family&quot; OIDs are meant for
a cert, whereas the &quot;with recommended&quot; OIDs are being
deprecated at both the cert and application level; also, some people
would construe the &quot;family&quot; OIDs to mean &quot;any&quot;
acceptable crypto parameters are okay, not that some parameters are
&quot;recommended&quot;; but neither point completely resolves my
confusion.&nbsp; I will go back to the design team slides to see if it
clarifies things for me, but I thought I'd raise this now, just in case
it helps anybody else.</font></tt></blockquote><br>
I interpreted the design team output to say that the family OIDs would
specify ECDSA, ECDH, and ECMQV without saying anything about the KDF at
all.<br><br>
Russ<br>
</body>
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Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> wrote on 01/17/2007 02:57:40 PM:

[> Dan Brown wrote on 01/17/2007 11:30 AM:] 
[>> David Kemp wrote on 01/16/2007 06:07:48 PM:]

>> > Is KDF an appropriate level of granularity for certificate-based
>> > constraints on the usage of public keys? 
> 
>> Well, only to those who strive for strict compliance to SP 800-56A, 
>> in the face of application protocols allowing noncompliant KDFs. 
> 
> I do not think that it is the role of the certificate to "enforce" 
> compliance.  Rather, the application needs to be run in "FIPS mode" 
> so that all of the choices necessary to conform to NIST guidance are 
made.

Yes, Alice can run in FIPS mode, but she may also like to tell Bob to 
please only secure email to her using FIPS mode.  Well, perhaps, nobody 
else but me really cares?

Back to the original question: 4055 optionally allows the cert to specify 
the MGF in OAEP.  So why not be able to specify the KDF for ECMQV/ECDH in 
a cert?  I see these as analogous.

>> > And if so, is it
>> > cryptographically appropriate to use a single public key size
>> > with both SHA-256 and SHA-384 KDFs? 
> 
>> Many in IETF have argued that a SHA-1 based KDF (such as the TLS's 
>> or IPSec's) provides 160 bits of security, so it is acceptable for 
>> use with 128-bit security, i.e. 256 bit ECC keys.  By the same 
>> argument, a SHA-256 based KDF ought to be acceptable for an 384-bit ECC 
key.
> 
> So?  What does this have to do with the best way to represent the 
> algorithm constraints in the certificate?

Nothing: I was only addressing David's specific question of whether it's 
"cryptographically appropriate" to used mixed sizes.

>> > Specifying a list of allowed features does not satisfy the design
>> > team's goal of using certificates to reduce protocol negotiation -
>> > if more than one KDF is possible with a pair of peer certificates,
>> > it is still necessary to negotiate which KDF to use.
> 
>> Doesn't it reduce negotiation?  Alice and Bob can state their crypto
>> abilities using certs.  Then one of them chooses an algorithm in the
>> intersection of the abilities, and tells the other that he/she's 
>> used it.  The certs have saved the protocol from sending at least 
>> some "crypto capabilities" message flows. 
> 
> The closest thing that we have for something like this is 
> SMIMECapabilities.  In this case, the store-and-forward nature of 
> email makes this a reasonable thing to do.  If real-time 
> negotiations are possible in the protocol, then keeping the CA out 
> of the picture is desirable.

What extra involvement of the CA is there, when the KDF (or MGF for OAEP) 
is specified in the cert?

>> > But to answer the question, the design team slides stated:
>> > 
>> > * Define an optionally critical certificate extension
>> >    - Sequence of Algorithm Identifiers, as in X9.62 parameters
>> 
>> Yes, that does it. 
>> 
>> >    - Reuse X9 algorithm Identifiers
>> >        . Deprecating "with recommended"? 
>> >    - Add three "family" OIDs (ECDSA, ECDH, ECMQV)
>> > 
>> > So the extension approach allows a list of KDFs, but the RFC 4055
>> > approach does not.  I believe that a list is unnecessary because
>> > an ECMQV public key of a given size should imply the acceptable
>> > KDF size (or conversely, a key derive function should imply the
>> > acceptable public key size).
>> > 
>> 
>> I'm a little confused now.  While we're deprecating "with 
>> recommended" syntax, we're introducing a "family" syntax, where the 
>> crypto parameters (KDFs, etc.) are implicitly "recommended" by 
>> association with key size.  This seems a paradoxical to me.  They're
>> are some distinctions: the "family" OIDs are meant for a cert, 
>> whereas the "with recommended" OIDs are being deprecated at both the
>> cert and application level; also, some people would construe the 
>> "family" OIDs to mean "any" acceptable crypto parameters are okay, 
>> not that some parameters are "recommended"; but neither point 
>> completely resolves my confusion.  I will go back to the design team
>> slides to see if it clarifies things for me, but I thought I'd raise
>> this now, just in case it helps anybody else.
> 
> I interpreted the design team output to say that the family OIDs 
> would specify ECDSA, ECDH, and ECMQV without saying anything about 
> the KDF at all.

So, with family OIDs, the protocol would determine/negotiate the KDF. That 
should be fine with David's preference of implied acceptable KDF size, 
provided the protocol specifiers adhere to it.

I like this open functionality of family OIDs.  But I think there should 
be an option to make them specific, less open-ended, as is available in 
4055, the design team proposal, and the X9.62 syntax.  In retrospect, 
family-like OIDs could have easily been added to the X9.62 syntax, simply 
by making the parameters field optional, then defining their absence to 
mean that any (legal) parameter is allowed.  (E.g. ecdsa-with-Specified, 
omitting the hash parameter.)

If we don't like lists, then PKIX can limit the list length to 1, and 
still comply the X9.62 syntax.  If we need family OIDs, then only a small 
tweak of X9.62 syntax is needed (as described above).

On the other hand, I like the gradual migration possibilities of a 
critical/noncritical extensions.  Critical extensions are functionally 
like 4055/X9.62, so the noncritical is the added value.  If the relying 
party is understands the noncritical extensions, is he/she required to 
comply with them?

Regards,

Dan Brown
(905) 501-3857
http://www.certicom.com


--=_alternative 0075706185257266_=
Content-Type: text/html; charset="US-ASCII"


<br><tt><font size=2>Russ Housley &lt;housley@vigilsec.com&gt; wrote on
01/17/2007 02:57:40 PM:<br>
</font></tt>
<br><tt><font size=2>[&gt; Dan Brown wrote on 01/17/2007 11:30 AM:] </font></tt>
<br><tt><font size=2>[&gt;&gt; David Kemp wrote on 01/16/2007 06:07:48
PM:]<br>
<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; Is KDF an appropriate level of granularity for certificate-based<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; constraints on the usage of public keys? &nbsp;<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; Well, only to those who strive for strict compliance to SP 800-56A,
<br>
&gt;&gt; in the face of application protocols allowing noncompliant KDFs.
</font></tt>
<br><tt><font size=2>&gt; <br>
&gt; I do not think that it is the role of the certificate to &quot;enforce&quot;
<br>
&gt; compliance. &nbsp;Rather, the application needs to be run in &quot;FIPS
mode&quot; <br>
&gt; so that all of the choices necessary to conform to NIST guidance are
made.<br>
</font></tt>
<br><tt><font size=2>Yes, Alice can run in FIPS mode, but she may also
like to tell Bob to please only secure email to her using FIPS mode. &nbsp;Well,
perhaps, nobody else but me really cares?</font></tt>
<br>
<br><tt><font size=2>Back to the original question: 4055 optionally allows
the cert to specify the MGF in OAEP. &nbsp;So why not be able to specify
the KDF for ECMQV/ECDH in a cert? &nbsp;I see these as analogous.</font></tt>
<br>
<br><tt><font size=2>&gt;&gt; &gt; And if so, is it<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; cryptographically appropriate to use a single public key
size<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; with both SHA-256 and SHA-384 KDFs? &nbsp;<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; Many in IETF have argued that a SHA-1 based KDF (such as the TLS's
<br>
&gt;&gt; or IPSec's) provides 160 bits of security, so it is acceptable
for <br>
&gt;&gt; use with 128-bit security, i.e. 256 bit ECC keys. &nbsp;By the
same <br>
&gt;&gt; argument, a SHA-256 based KDF ought to be acceptable for an 384-bit
ECC key.</font></tt>
<br><tt><font size=2>&gt; <br>
&gt; So? &nbsp;What does this have to do with the best way to represent
the <br>
&gt; algorithm constraints in the certificate?<br>
</font></tt>
<br><tt><font size=2>Nothing: I was only addressing David's specific question
of whether it's &quot;cryptographically appropriate&quot; to used mixed
sizes.</font></tt>
<br>
<br><tt><font size=2>&gt;&gt; &gt; Specifying a list of allowed features
does not satisfy the design<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; team's goal of using certificates to reduce protocol negotiation
-<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; if more than one KDF is possible with a pair of peer certificates,<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; it is still necessary to negotiate which KDF to use.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; Doesn't it reduce negotiation? &nbsp;Alice and Bob can state their
crypto<br>
&gt;&gt; abilities using certs. &nbsp;Then one of them chooses an algorithm
in the<br>
&gt;&gt; intersection of the abilities, and tells the other that he/she's
<br>
&gt;&gt; used it. &nbsp;The certs have saved the protocol from sending
at least <br>
&gt;&gt; some &quot;crypto capabilities&quot; message flows. </font></tt>
<br><tt><font size=2>&gt; <br>
&gt; The closest thing that we have for something like this is <br>
&gt; SMIMECapabilities. &nbsp;In this case, the store-and-forward nature
of <br>
&gt; email makes this a reasonable thing to do. &nbsp;If real-time <br>
&gt; negotiations are possible in the protocol, then keeping the CA out
<br>
&gt; of the picture is desirable.<br>
</font></tt>
<br><tt><font size=2>What extra involvement of the CA is there, when the
KDF (or MGF for OAEP) is specified in the cert?</font></tt>
<br>
<br><tt><font size=2>&gt;&gt; &gt; But to answer the question, the design
team slides stated:<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; * Define an optionally critical certificate extension<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; &nbsp;- Sequence of Algorithm Identifiers, as in X9.62
parameters<br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; Yes, that does it. <br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; &nbsp;- Reuse X9 algorithm Identifiers<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;. Deprecating &quot;with recommended&quot;?
<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; &nbsp;- Add three &quot;family&quot; OIDs (ECDSA,
ECDH, ECMQV)<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; So the extension approach allows a list of KDFs, but the
RFC 4055<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; approach does not. &nbsp;I believe that a list is unnecessary
because<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; an ECMQV public key of a given size should imply the acceptable<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; KDF size (or conversely, a key derive function should imply
the<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; acceptable public key size).<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; I'm a little confused now. &nbsp;While we're deprecating &quot;with
<br>
&gt;&gt; recommended&quot; syntax, we're introducing a &quot;family&quot;
syntax, where the <br>
&gt;&gt; crypto parameters (KDFs, etc.) are implicitly &quot;recommended&quot;
by <br>
&gt;&gt; association with key size. &nbsp;This seems a paradoxical to me.
&nbsp;They're<br>
&gt;&gt; are some distinctions: the &quot;family&quot; OIDs are meant for
a cert, <br>
&gt;&gt; whereas the &quot;with recommended&quot; OIDs are being deprecated
at both the<br>
&gt;&gt; cert and application level; also, some people would construe the
<br>
&gt;&gt; &quot;family&quot; OIDs to mean &quot;any&quot; acceptable crypto
parameters are okay, <br>
&gt;&gt; not that some parameters are &quot;recommended&quot;; but neither
point <br>
&gt;&gt; completely resolves my confusion. &nbsp;I will go back to the
design team<br>
&gt;&gt; slides to see if it clarifies things for me, but I thought I'd
raise<br>
&gt;&gt; this now, just in case it helps anybody else.</font></tt>
<br><tt><font size=2>&gt; <br>
&gt; I interpreted the design team output to say that the family OIDs <br>
&gt; would specify ECDSA, ECDH, and ECMQV without saying anything about
<br>
&gt; the KDF at all.<br>
</font></tt>
<br><tt><font size=2>So, with family OIDs, the protocol would determine/negotiate
the KDF. &nbsp;That should be fine with David's preference of implied acceptable
KDF size, provided the protocol specifiers adhere to it.</font></tt>
<br>
<br><tt><font size=2>I like this open functionality of family OIDs. &nbsp;But
I think there should be an option to make them specific, less open-ended,
as is available in 4055, the design team proposal, and the X9.62 syntax.
&nbsp;In retrospect, family-like OIDs could have easily been added to the
X9.62 syntax, simply by making the parameters field optional, then defining
their absence to mean that any (legal) parameter is allowed. &nbsp;(E.g.
ecdsa-with-Specified, omitting the hash parameter.)</font></tt>
<br>
<br><tt><font size=2>If we don't like lists, then PKIX can limit the list
length to 1, and still comply the X9.62 syntax. &nbsp;If we need family
OIDs, then only a small tweak of X9.62 syntax is needed (as described above).</font></tt>
<br>
<br><tt><font size=2>On the other hand, I like the gradual migration possibilities
of a critical/noncritical extensions. &nbsp;Critical extensions are functionally
like 4055/X9.62, so the noncritical is the added value. &nbsp;If the relying
party is understands the noncritical extensions, is he/she required to
comply with them?</font></tt>
<br>
<br><tt><font size=2>Regards,</font></tt>
<br>
<br><tt><font size=2>Dan Brown<br>
(905) 501-3857<br>
http://www.certicom.com</font></tt>
<br>
<br>
--=_alternative 0075706185257266_=--




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<html>
<body>
Dan:<br><br>
<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite=""><tt>
<font face="Courier New, Courier" size=2>&gt;&gt; &gt; Is KDF an
appropriate level of granularity for certificate-based<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; constraints on the usage of public keys?&nbsp; <br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; Well, only to those who strive for strict compliance to SP
800-56A, <br>
&gt;&gt; in the face of application protocols allowing noncompliant KDFs.
</font></tt><br>
<tt><font face="Courier New, Courier" size=2>&gt; <br>
&gt; I do not think that it is the role of the certificate to
&quot;enforce&quot; <br>
&gt; compliance.&nbsp; Rather, the application needs to be run in
&quot;FIPS mode&quot; <br>
&gt; so that all of the choices necessary to conform to NIST guidance are
made.<br>
</font></tt><br>
<tt><font face="Courier New, Courier" size=2>Yes, Alice can run in FIPS
mode, but she may also like to tell Bob to please only secure email to
her using FIPS mode.&nbsp; Well, perhaps, nobody else but me really
cares?</font></tt> </blockquote><br>
I care.&nbsp; However, I do not see the certificate as the enforcement
tool.&nbsp; In the case of S/MIME, the SMIMECapabilities extension is
used.&nbsp; It tell the message originator the capabilities of the
recipient.&nbsp; If the recipient only offers &quot;FIPS mode&quot;
algorithms, then those are the only ones that will be used by the message
originator.&nbsp; In the case of TLS and other protocols where real-time
negotiation happens, either of the parties can ensure that &quot;FIPS
mode&quot; algorithms are used, as long as both parties actually support
them.<br><br>
<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite=""><tt>
<font face="Courier New, Courier" size=2>Back to the original question:
4055 optionally allows the cert to specify the MGF in OAEP.&nbsp; So why
not be able to specify the KDF for ECMQV/ECDH in a cert?&nbsp; I see
these as analogous.</font></tt> </blockquote><br>
RFC 4055 allows the parameters to be absent when used in the certificate
subject public key information.&nbsp; If they are present, then the MGF,
for example, is carried there.<br><br>
I would be happy with a similar arrangement for elliptic curve
algorithms.&nbsp; That is, we must have the same flexibility to omit the
ECDH/ECMQV KDF.<br><br>
<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite=""><tt>
<font face="Courier New, Courier" size=2>&gt;&gt; &gt; And if so, is
it<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; cryptographically appropriate to use a single public key
size<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; with both SHA-256 and SHA-384 KDFs?&nbsp; <br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; Many in IETF have argued that a SHA-1 based KDF (such as the
TLS's <br>
&gt;&gt; or IPSec's) provides 160 bits of security, so it is acceptable
for <br>
&gt;&gt; use with 128-bit security, i.e. 256 bit ECC keys.&nbsp; By the
same <br>
&gt;&gt; argument, a SHA-256 based KDF ought to be acceptable for an
384-bit ECC key.</font></tt> <br>
<tt><font face="Courier New, Courier" size=2>&gt; <br>
&gt; So?&nbsp; What does this have to do with the best way to represent
the <br>
&gt; algorithm constraints in the certificate?<br>
</font></tt><br>
<tt><font face="Courier New, Courier" size=2>Nothing: I was only
addressing David's specific question of whether it's
&quot;cryptographically appropriate&quot; to used mixed
sizes.</font></tt> <br><br>
<tt><font face="Courier New, Courier" size=2>&gt;&gt; &gt; Specifying a
list of allowed features does not satisfy the design<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; team's goal of using certificates to reduce protocol
negotiation -<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; if more than one KDF is possible with a pair of peer
certificates,<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; it is still necessary to negotiate which KDF to use.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; Doesn't it reduce negotiation?&nbsp; Alice and Bob can state
their crypto<br>
&gt;&gt; abilities using certs.&nbsp; Then one of them chooses an
algorithm in the<br>
&gt;&gt; intersection of the abilities, and tells the other that he/she's
<br>
&gt;&gt; used it.&nbsp; The certs have saved the protocol from sending at
least <br>
&gt;&gt; some &quot;crypto capabilities&quot; message flows.
</font></tt><br>
<tt><font face="Courier New, Courier" size=2>&gt; <br>
&gt; The closest thing that we have for something like this is <br>
&gt; SMIMECapabilities.&nbsp; In this case, the store-and-forward nature
of <br>
&gt; email makes this a reasonable thing to do.&nbsp; If real-time <br>
&gt; negotiations are possible in the protocol, then keeping the CA out
<br>
&gt; of the picture is desirable.<br>
</font></tt><br>
<tt><font face="Courier New, Courier" size=2>What extra involvement of
the CA is there, when the KDF (or MGF for OAEP) is specified in the
cert?</font></tt> </blockquote><br>
The CA is the one that is signing the certificate.&nbsp; A CA should not
sign stuff that it does not understand, so it is involved in the
ECDH/ECMQV KDF selection or the OAEP MGF selection if it is included in
the certificate.<br><br>
<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite=""><tt>
<font face="Courier New, Courier" size=2>&gt;&gt; &gt; But to answer the
question, the design team slides stated:<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; * Define an optionally critical certificate extension<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; - Sequence of Algorithm Identifiers, as
in X9.62 parameters<br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; Yes, that does it. <br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; - Reuse X9 algorithm Identifiers<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; . Deprecating
&quot;with recommended&quot;? <br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; - Add three &quot;family&quot; OIDs
(ECDSA, ECDH, ECMQV)<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; So the extension approach allows a list of KDFs, but the
RFC 4055<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; approach does not.&nbsp; I believe that a list is
unnecessary because<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; an ECMQV public key of a given size should imply the
acceptable<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; KDF size (or conversely, a key derive function should imply
the<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; acceptable public key size).<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; I'm a little confused now.&nbsp; While we're deprecating
&quot;with <br>
&gt;&gt; recommended&quot; syntax, we're introducing a &quot;family&quot;
syntax, where the <br>
&gt;&gt; crypto parameters (KDFs, etc.) are implicitly
&quot;recommended&quot; by <br>
&gt;&gt; association with key size.&nbsp; This seems a paradoxical to
me.&nbsp; They're<br>
&gt;&gt; are some distinctions: the &quot;family&quot; OIDs are meant for
a cert, <br>
&gt;&gt; whereas the &quot;with recommended&quot; OIDs are being
deprecated at both the<br>
&gt;&gt; cert and application level; also, some people would construe the
<br>
&gt;&gt; &quot;family&quot; OIDs to mean &quot;any&quot; acceptable
crypto parameters are okay, <br>
&gt;&gt; not that some parameters are &quot;recommended&quot;; but
neither point <br>
&gt;&gt; completely resolves my confusion.&nbsp; I will go back to the
design team<br>
&gt;&gt; slides to see if it clarifies things for me, but I thought I'd
raise<br>
&gt;&gt; this now, just in case it helps anybody else.</font></tt> <br>
<tt><font face="Courier New, Courier" size=2>&gt; <br>
&gt; I interpreted the design team output to say that the family OIDs
<br>
&gt; would specify ECDSA, ECDH, and ECMQV without saying anything about
<br>
&gt; the KDF at all.<br>
</font></tt><br>
<tt><font face="Courier New, Courier" size=2>So, with family OIDs, the
protocol would determine/negotiate the KDF.&nbsp; That should be fine
with David's preference of implied acceptable KDF size, provided the
protocol specifiers adhere to it.</font></tt> <br><br>
<tt><font face="Courier New, Courier" size=2>I like this open
functionality of family OIDs.&nbsp; But I think there should be an option
to make them specific, less open-ended, as is available in 4055, the
design team proposal, and the X9.62 syntax.&nbsp; In retrospect,
family-like OIDs could have easily been added to the X9.62 syntax, simply
by making the parameters field optional, then defining their absence to
mean that any (legal) parameter is allowed.&nbsp; (E.g.
ecdsa-with-Specified, omitting the hash parameter.)</font></tt>
</blockquote><br>
As said above, I'm okay with that as long as it is possible to omit the
algorithm identifier parameters (as is allowed in RFC 4055) in a
certificate subject public key.&nbsp; Obviously, there are places where
the same OID will be used where the parameters are required to be present
(as is also the case in RFC 4055).<br><br>
<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite=""><tt>
<font face="Courier New, Courier" size=2>If we don't like lists, then
PKIX can limit the list length to 1, and still comply the X9.62
syntax.&nbsp; If we need family OIDs, then only a small tweak of X9.62
syntax is needed (as described above).</font></tt> </blockquote><br>
At the risk of repeating myself too much, I am not happy if the
parameters to select the KDF are required.&nbsp; I have no problem with
one being present.<br><br>
<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite=""><tt>
<font face="Courier New, Courier" size=2>On the other hand, I like the
gradual migration possibilities of a critical/noncritical
extensions.&nbsp; Critical extensions are functionally like 4055/X9.62,
so the noncritical is the added value.&nbsp; If the relying party is
understands the noncritical extensions, is he/she required to comply with
them?</font></tt> </blockquote><br>
Yes.<br><br>
Russ<br>
</body>
</html>




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To: "Daniel Brown" <DBrown@certicom.com>
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________________________________________
From: Daniel Brown [mailto:DBrown@certicom.com]=20
> David Kemp wrote on 01/16/2007 06:07:48 PM:
>>=20
>>  Is KDF an appropriate level of granularity for certificate-based
>>  constraints on the usage of public keys? =A0=20
>
> Well, only to those who strive for strict compliance to SP 800-56A, in =
the > face of application protocols allowing noncompliant KDFs.=20

An application can comply with SP 800-56A recommendations, protocol
specifications, both, or neither.  This is independent of certificate
contents.  In fact, an SP 800-56 compliant application must refuse
to honor a non-compliant KDF specification contained in a certificate
either by refusing to derive a key using that cert or by substituting
a compliant KDF to use with the cert's public key.  (The latter
is admittedly shady behavior, but it is possible.)


>>  And if so, is it
>>  cryptographically appropriate to use a single public key size
>>  with both SHA-256 and SHA-384 KDFs? =A0
>
> Many in IETF have argued that a SHA-1 based KDF (such as the TLS's or
> IPSec's) provides 160 bits of security, so it is acceptable for use wit=
h
> 128-bit security, i.e. 256 bit ECC keys. =A0By the same argument, a SHA=
-256
> based KDF ought to be acceptable for an 384-bit ECC key.

Strict compliance with SP 800-56A says not.  The minimum bit length of th=
e hash function for 384-511 bit ECC key is 384.  A SHA-256 based KDF is, =
however, acceptable for a 383 bit ECC key :-).

I'm not sure why SP 800-56A doesn't specify a maximum hash size.  Using
SHA-384 with a 160 bit ECC key would seem to provide less than the
implied amount of entropy for the derived key.

=20
>>  Specifying a list of allowed features does not satisfy the design
>>  team's goal of using certificates to reduce protocol negotiation -
>>  if more than one KDF is possible with a pair of peer certificates,
>>  it is still necessary to negotiate which KDF to use.
>
> Doesn't it reduce negotiation? =A0Alice and Bob can state their crypto
> abilities using certs. =A0Then one of them chooses an algorithm in the
> intersection of the abilities, and tells the other that he/she's used i=
t.
> The certs have saved the protocol from sending at least some "crypto
> capabilities" message flows.

That assumes that cert exchange occurs before algorithm negotiation,
which is not the case for RFC 4306 - the first cert request is
contained in the same message as algorithm acceptance.  Even if certs
were sent in the first two messages, they wouldn't reduce the
number of messages, and if multiple certs (e.g. RSA and ECC)
were sent before algorithm negotiation was done, the size of
the messages would go way up, not slightly down.


>>  So the extension approach allows a list of KDFs, but the RFC 4055
>>  approach does not. =A0I believe that a list is unnecessary because
>>  an ECMQV public key of a given size should imply the acceptable
>>  KDF size (or conversely, a key derive function should imply the
>>  acceptable public key size).
>
> I'm a little confused now. =A0While we're deprecating "with recommended=
"
> syntax, we're introducing a "family" syntax, where the crypto parameter=
s
> (KDFs, etc.) are implicitly "recommended" by association with key size.
> This seems a paradoxical to me.

Good question.  I'd guess that the family OID means to use configured
or negotiated parameters if available, with recommended parameters as
a default if the application has no other guidance.  A
KDF-specific OID (including "with recommended" if it weren't
deprecated) means mandatory use of the specified parameters.  An
RFC would need to unambiguously specify the semantics of family OIDs.

Regards,
Dave





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Subject: Free standards - Get Your Free Standards Here!!
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<!doctype html public "-//W3C//DTD W3 HTML//EN">
<html><head><style type="text/css"><!--
blockquote, dl, ul, ol, li { padding-top: 0 ; padding-bottom: 0 }
 --></style><title>Free standards - Get Your Free Standards
Here!!</title></head><body>
<div>ITU just announced</div>
<div><br></div>
<blockquote>From the beginning of 2007, ITU-T Recommendations will be
available without charge for a trial period.</blockquote>
<blockquote><br></blockquote>
<blockquote>With only a small number of exceptions all in-force
Recommendations will be available in PDF form via a simple mouse
click.</blockquote>
<blockquote><br></blockquote>
<blockquote>There is a general belief that the strategic importance of
making on-line access to ITU-T Recommendations free outweighs the
costs (in terms of lost revenue) to ITU. This is seen as a way to
increase the transparency of ITU-T work and encourage wider
participation in ITU-T activities. It is also believed that this
policy will help increase developing countries' awareness of pertinent
issues and help to promote the participation of academia in ITU-T
work.</blockquote>
<blockquote><br></blockquote>
<blockquote><br></blockquote>
<div>For this group you can start at the top of the X Recommendations
here</div>
<div><br></div>
<div>&nbsp;&nbsp; http://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X/e</div>
<div><br></div>
<div>Note some strangeness. For example the ASN.1 recommendations are
offered as an aggregate and in individual recommendations. For some
reason the aggregate is not offered for free</div>
<div><br></div>
<div>&nbsp;&nbsp;
http://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.680-X.693-200207-I/en</div>
<div><br></div>
<div>However, each recommendation is offered separately for free,
e.g.</div>
<div><br></div>
<div>&nbsp; http://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.680-200207-I/en&nbsp; (for
english, spanish, and french versions)</div>
<div><br></div>
<div>Links to all the recommendations start here</div>
<div><br></div>
<div>&nbsp;&nbsp;
http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/publications/recs.html</div>
<div><br></div>
<div>Note that this is not a release of copyright. Get them but don't
post them.</div>
<div><br></div>
<div>Enjoy</div>
<div><br></div>
<div>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; hoyt</div>
<div><br></div>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
</body>
</html>




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From: Stefan Santesson <stefans@microsoft.com>
To: "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>,
        "ietf-pkix@imc.org"
	<ietf-pkix@imc.org>
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2007 23:22:39 +0000
Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key
  Info.
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There is no single way that applications and protocol stacks may operate.

In my example, applications don't understand any public key OID. They would simply consult OID table to get a translation into something they can pass to the crypto lib. If that look-up is unsuccessful, the application will most certainly fail. But if it is successful, the application will attempt to map that key to the usage negotiated in the protocol, e.g. a TLS cipher suite. This is where I'm not at all sure that "old" applications will get it right. I have indications that they might get it wrong but I don't have any hard facts to offer yet. It worries me though to have to depend on various applications to get it right.

I would prefer to have more control in the library layer and more actively prevent applications from doing the wrong thing.


Stefan Santesson
Senior Program Manager
Windows Security, Standards


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Kemp, David P. [mailto:DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil]
> Sent: den 16 januari 2007 15:08
> To: Stefan Santesson; ietf-pkix@imc.org
> Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key
> Info.
>
> Hmmm, I'd guess that applications would fail, either gracefully
> or catastrophically, when faced with an unrecognized Subject
> Public Key Info OID.   I did miss the point that they might
> falsely accept and misuse the public key, but even after considering
> the possibility it still seems highly improbable.
>
> Dave
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:stefans@microsoft.com]
> Sent: Tuesday, January 16, 2007 2:09 PM
> To: Kemp, David P.; ietf-pkix@imc.org
> Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key
> Info.
>
> Thanks Dave,
>
> Let me clarify where I think you missed my point.
>
> I believe that it is less likely that a certificate with a critical
> extension will be falsely accepted and misused by an application. I
> believe the risk is greater that applications get it wrong and makes
> wrong use of a public key if the restriction comes as a public key OID.
>
> But this is just an educated guess.
>
> I agree that it will be hard to define complete mapping info in an
> extension. That was my point - It may make the extension overly
> complex.
>
>
> Stefan Santesson
> Senior Program Manager
> Windows Security, Standards
>
>





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From: Stefan Santesson <stefans@microsoft.com>
To: "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>,
        "ietf-pkix@imc.org"
	<ietf-pkix@imc.org>
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2007 23:22:39 +0000
Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key
  Info.
Thread-Topic: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key
  Info.
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There is no single way that applications and protocol stacks may operate.

In my example, applications don't understand any public key OID. They would simply consult OID table to get a translation into something they can pass to the crypto lib. If that look-up is unsuccessful, the application will most certainly fail. But if it is successful, the application will attempt to map that key to the usage negotiated in the protocol, e.g. a TLS cipher suite. This is where I'm not at all sure that "old" applications will get it right. I have indications that they might get it wrong but I don't have any hard facts to offer yet. It worries me though to have to depend on various applications to get it right.

I would prefer to have more control in the library layer and more actively prevent applications from doing the wrong thing.


Stefan Santesson
Senior Program Manager
Windows Security, Standards


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Kemp, David P. [mailto:DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil]
> Sent: den 16 januari 2007 15:08
> To: Stefan Santesson; ietf-pkix@imc.org
> Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key
> Info.
>
> Hmmm, I'd guess that applications would fail, either gracefully
> or catastrophically, when faced with an unrecognized Subject
> Public Key Info OID.   I did miss the point that they might
> falsely accept and misuse the public key, but even after considering
> the possibility it still seems highly improbable.
>
> Dave
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:stefans@microsoft.com]
> Sent: Tuesday, January 16, 2007 2:09 PM
> To: Kemp, David P.; ietf-pkix@imc.org
> Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key
> Info.
>
> Thanks Dave,
>
> Let me clarify where I think you missed my point.
>
> I believe that it is less likely that a certificate with a critical
> extension will be falsely accepted and misused by an application. I
> believe the risk is greater that applications get it wrong and makes
> wrong use of a public key if the restriction comes as a public key OID.
>
> But this is just an educated guess.
>
> I agree that it will be hard to define complete mapping info in an
> extension. That was my point - It may make the extension overly
> complex.
>
>
> Stefan Santesson
> Senior Program Manager
> Windows Security, Standards
>
>





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Hi there,

It has been long since the last time I posted something so happy to be
back :-)

I am working on the implementation of a PKI infrastructure needed for an
ID cards issuing project. Part of my job is defining the needed
certificate profiles which are raising some open issues that I am
listing below and hope to have your support in resolving them.

1.       Are there any particular issues when not adding any surname and
given names in the CN of the subject field of end-entity certificates
knowing that these EE are the actual ID cardholders. My understanding is
that the subject field is used mainly to provide the data that
identifies the certificate holder. Moreover, knowing a person's name, so
if I am looking for her certificate, I could use the name to perform
LDAP lookup based on that name. However, in our case, the certificates
are not published in an LDAP and the persons names are often very long.
This is why we thought not using first and last names in the CN of the
subject field. Instead, we are considering the following format for the
CN:=20

Common Name (CN) =3D < Certificate Type =3D <AUTH/SIGN>, Citizen civil ID>

2.      Assuming that the country issuing ID cards does not have a
digital signature law and no clear definition of NON REPUDIATION, should
we avoid using the NR bit of the key usage extension for signing
certificates (not authentication certificate)? We could set the
digitalSignature bit only and explain in the certificate profile the
applicability of the certificate including those situations where it
would be difficult for the cardholder to repudiate a signature? We could
simply set the NR bit.=20

3.       We are not planning to use the SubjectKeyIdentifier extension
as the card returns a complete certification path with a signed message.
Would this be OK or are there reaons to use this extensions.

4.       For the certificatePolicies extension, the plan is to use a CPS
qualifier with the CPS OID. Is there any reasons for deviating from
this? We could for instance use the OID of the CP under which a
certificate is issued. Assuming that the Certification Authority issues
other types of certificates apart from the ID cards certificates, and
that these certificates may have different assurance levels, what's the
right option we should opt for when formatting the certificatePolicies
extension?

5.       We are not planning to use the basicConstraints extension for
EE certificates. We will use it for CA certificates setting the
pathLengthConstraint to zero. This prevents cross certification at the
subordinate CAs level which is a functional requirement since we are
expecting cross certification with other CAs to occur at the root CA
level. Could you please confirm that our settings for the
basicConstraint extension are correct.

6.       Assuming that the LDAP directory on which CRLs will not be
public,=20=20

Thank you all for your prompt feedback.

M. Bechlaghem



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<div class=3DSection1>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto'><font
size=3D2 face=3DArial><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial'>Hi=
 there,<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto'><font
size=3D2 face=3DArial><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial'>It=
 has been
long since the last time I posted something so happy to be back </span></fo=
nt><font
size=3D2 face=3DWingdings><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Wingd=
ings'>J</span></font><font
size=3D2 face=3DArial><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial'><o=
:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto'><font
size=3D2 face=3DArial><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial'>I =
am working
on the implementation of a PKI infrastructure needed for an ID cards issuing
project. Part of my job is defining the needed certificate profiles which a=
re
raising some open issues that I am listing below and hope to have your supp=
ort
in resolving them.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto;
margin-left:.25in;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l2 level1 lfo3'><![if !suppor=
tLists]><font
size=3D2 face=3DArial><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial'><s=
pan
style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>1.<font size=3D1 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
 </span></font></span></span></font><![endif]><span
dir=3DLTR><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-=
family:Arial'>Are
there any particular issues when not adding any surname and given names in =
the CN
of the subject field of end-entity certificates knowing that these EE are t=
he actual
ID cardholders. My understanding is that the subject field is used mainly to
provide the data that identifies the certificate holder. Moreover, knowing =
a person&#8217;s
name, so if I am looking for her certificate, I could use the name to perfo=
rm
LDAP lookup based on that name. However, in our case, the certificates are =
not
published in an LDAP and the persons names are often very long. This is why=
 we
thought not using first and last names in the CN of the subject field. Inst=
ead,
we are considering the following format for the CN: <o:p></o:p></span></fon=
t></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto;
margin-left:.5in;text-indent:.5in'><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman">=
<span
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>Common Name (CN) =3D &lt; Certificate Type =3D &=
lt;AUTH/SIGN&gt;,
Citizen civil ID&gt;<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto;
margin-left:.25in;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l2 level1 lfo3'><![if !suppor=
tLists]><font
size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><span
style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>2.<font size=3D1 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </spa=
n></font></span></span></font><![endif]><span
dir=3DLTR>Assuming that the country issuing ID cards does not have a digital
signature law and no clear definition of NON REPUDIATION, should we avoid u=
sing
the NR bit of the key usage extension for signing certificates (not
authentication certificate)? We could set the digitalSignature bit only and
explain in the certificate profile the applicability of the certificate
including those situations where it would be difficult for the cardholder to
repudiate a signature? We could simply set the NR bit. <o:p></o:p></span></=
p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto;
margin-left:.25in;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l2 level1 lfo3'><![if !suppor=
tLists]><font
size=3D2 face=3DArial><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial'><s=
pan
style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>3.<font size=3D1 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
 </span></font></span></span></font><![endif]><span
dir=3DLTR><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-=
family:Arial'>We
are not planning to use the SubjectKeyIdentifier extension as the card retu=
rns
a complete certification path with a signed message. Would this be OK or are
there reaons to use this extensions.<o:p></o:p></span></font></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto;
margin-left:.25in;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l2 level1 lfo3'><![if !suppor=
tLists]><font
size=3D2 face=3DArial><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial'><s=
pan
style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>4.<font size=3D1 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
 </span></font></span></span></font><![endif]><span
dir=3DLTR><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-=
family:Arial'>For
the certificatePolicies extension, the plan is to use a CPS qualifier with =
the CPS
OID. Is there any reasons for deviating from this? We could for instance use
the OID of the CP under which a certificate is issued. Assuming that the
Certification Authority issues other types of certificates apart from the ID
cards certificates, and that these certificates may have different assurance
levels, what&#8217;s the right option we should opt for when formatting the
certificatePolicies extension?<o:p></o:p></span></font></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto;
margin-left:.25in;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l2 level1 lfo3'><![if !suppor=
tLists]><font
size=3D2 face=3DArial><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial'><s=
pan
style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>5.<font size=3D1 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
 </span></font></span></span></font><![endif]><span
dir=3DLTR><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-=
family:Arial'>We
are not planning to use the basicConstraints extension for EE certificates.=
 We
will use it for CA certificates setting the pathLengthConstraint to zero. T=
his
prevents cross certification at the subordinate CAs level which is a functi=
onal
requirement since we are expecting cross certification with other CAs to oc=
cur
at the root CA level. Could you please confirm that our settings for the
basicConstraint extension are correct.<o:p></o:p></span></font></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto;
margin-left:.25in;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l2 level1 lfo3'><![if !suppor=
tLists]><font
size=3D2 face=3DArial><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial'><s=
pan
style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>6.<font size=3D1 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
 </span></font></span></span></font><![endif]><span
dir=3DLTR><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-=
family:Arial'>Assuming
that the LDAP directory on which CRLs will not be public, &nbsp;<o:p></o:p>=
</span></font></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto'><font
size=3D2 face=3DArial><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial'>Th=
ank you
all for your prompt feedback.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto'><font
size=3D2 face=3DArial><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial'>M.=
 Bechlaghem<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<br><br>
<P align=3Dcenter><FONT style=3D"BACKGROUND-COLOR: #ffffff">This e-mail and=
 any attachment is for authorised use by the intended recipient(s) only. It=
 may contain proprietary material, confidential information and/or be subje=
ct to legal privilege. It should not be copied, disclosed to, retained or u=
sed by, any other party. If you are not an intended recipient then please p=
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From owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Tue Jan 23 13:31:20 2007
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Subject: RE: ID cards certificate profiles
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Thread-Topic: ID cards certificate profiles
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1.  Most common PKI-enabled applications will display the value of the
subject Distinguished Name without doing any LDAP lookups.  For example, a
signed document will display the signer's name using the CN from the cert,
not an LDAP lookup.  While you may set the CN to an opaque encoded string
like you describe, this may make the certs confusing to use, since the
signer will be listed as "Certificate Type=SIGN, 12345678", rather than
"Malek Bechlaghem".
 
If your policies prevent you from putting the cardholder's name in the cert
(e.g. for privacy), then you may want to consider using the "serialNumber"
attribute in the DN instead of the CN attribute.
 
 
2.  The meaning of the NR bit is unclear in the absence of a specific law.
This has been the topic of a lot of discussion, and I don't think you're
going to get a great answer on this question.
 
 
3.  RFC 3280 requires the subjectKeyIdentifier for all CA certs ("MUST") and
recommends for EE certs ("SHOULD").  In practice, sKI and aKI have limited
value for implementors since the method of deriving them from the key isn't
mandatory, so a relying party has to process non-matching sKI + aKI pairs
already.
 
 
4.  If you are including Certificate Policies, you may want to consider
including more than one policy OID if the certificate may be used for
different purposes (e.g. different assurance levels).  For example, you
could put in an OID for "low assurance" and another for "high assurance".
Later, you could then issue different cards (e.g. non-citizen visitors) that
only include the "low assurance" OID.  This would allow each application to
choose its level of assurance by selecting the initial policy set to the
validation algorithm.
 
 
5.  basicConstraints may be omitted from EE certs.  The pathLen may be zero
on the certs issued to your subordinate CAs.  You can't rely on the behavior
of a "pathLen" value in the self-signed (root) cert, so you may want to omit
it to avoid confusion.
 
 
6.  For a PKI to scale to support a national ID, you don't want to
distribute revocation information via LDAP+CRL.  The CRLs could easily grow
to hundreds of megabytes per day.  Most large ID projects (e.g. US
government ID cards) are migrating to OCSP for revocation checking.
 

  _____  

From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] On
Behalf Of Bechlaghem, Malek
Sent: Tuesday, January 23, 2007 5:08 AM
To: ietf-pkix@vpnc.org
Subject: ID cards certificate profiles



Hi there,

It has been long since the last time I posted something so happy to be back
:-)

I am working on the implementation of a PKI infrastructure needed for an ID
cards issuing project. Part of my job is defining the needed certificate
profiles which are raising some open issues that I am listing below and hope
to have your support in resolving them.

1.       Are there any particular issues when not adding any surname and
given names in the CN of the subject field of end-entity certificates
knowing that these EE are the actual ID cardholders. My understanding is
that the subject field is used mainly to provide the data that identifies
the certificate holder. Moreover, knowing a person's name, so if I am
looking for her certificate, I could use the name to perform LDAP lookup
based on that name. However, in our case, the certificates are not published
in an LDAP and the persons names are often very long. This is why we thought
not using first and last names in the CN of the subject field. Instead, we
are considering the following format for the CN: 

Common Name (CN) = < Certificate Type = <AUTH/SIGN>, Citizen civil ID>

2.      Assuming that the country issuing ID cards does not have a digital
signature law and no clear definition of NON REPUDIATION, should we avoid
using the NR bit of the key usage extension for signing certificates (not
authentication certificate)? We could set the digitalSignature bit only and
explain in the certificate profile the applicability of the certificate
including those situations where it would be difficult for the cardholder to
repudiate a signature? We could simply set the NR bit. 

3.       We are not planning to use the SubjectKeyIdentifier extension as
the card returns a complete certification path with a signed message. Would
this be OK or are there reaons to use this extensions.

4.       For the certificatePolicies extension, the plan is to use a CPS
qualifier with the CPS OID. Is there any reasons for deviating from this? We
could for instance use the OID of the CP under which a certificate is
issued. Assuming that the Certification Authority issues other types of
certificates apart from the ID cards certificates, and that these
certificates may have different assurance levels, what's the right option we
should opt for when formatting the certificatePolicies extension?

5.       We are not planning to use the basicConstraints extension for EE
certificates. We will use it for CA certificates setting the
pathLengthConstraint to zero. This prevents cross certification at the
subordinate CAs level which is a functional requirement since we are
expecting cross certification with other CAs to occur at the root CA level.
Could you please confirm that our settings for the basicConstraint extension
are correct.

6.       Assuming that the LDAP directory on which CRLs will not be public,


Thank you all for your prompt feedback.

M. Bechlaghem



This e-mail and any attachment is for authorised use by the intended
recipient(s) only. It may contain proprietary material, confidential
information and/or be subject to legal privilege. It should not be copied,
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intended recipient then please promptly delete this e-mail and any
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<BODY lang=3DEN-US vLink=3Dpurple link=3Dblue>
<DIV dir=3Dltr align=3Dleft><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#0000ff=20
size=3D2></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr align=3Dleft><SPAN class=3D593111016-23012007><FONT =
face=3DArial=20
color=3D#0000ff size=3D2>1.&nbsp; Most common PKI-enabled applications =
will display=20
the value of the subject Distinguished Name without doing any LDAP=20
lookups.&nbsp; For example, a signed document will display the signer's=20
name&nbsp;using the CN from the cert, not an LDAP lookup.&nbsp; While =
you may=20
set the CN to an opaque encoded string like you describe, this may make =
the=20
certs confusing to use, since the signer will be listed as "Certificate=20
Type=3DSIGN, 12345678", rather than "Malek =
Bechlaghem".</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr align=3Dleft><SPAN class=3D593111016-23012007><FONT =
face=3DArial=20
color=3D#0000ff size=3D2></FONT></SPAN>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr align=3Dleft><SPAN class=3D593111016-23012007><FONT =
face=3DArial=20
color=3D#0000ff size=3D2>If your policies prevent you from putting the =
cardholder's=20
name in the cert (e.g. for privacy), then you may want=20
to&nbsp;</FONT></SPAN><SPAN class=3D593111016-23012007><FONT =
face=3DArial=20
color=3D#0000ff size=3D2>consider using the "serialNumber" attribute in =
the DN=20
instead of the CN attribute.</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr align=3Dleft><SPAN class=3D593111016-23012007><FONT =
face=3DArial=20
color=3D#0000ff size=3D2></FONT></SPAN>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr align=3Dleft><SPAN class=3D593111016-23012007><FONT =
face=3DArial=20
color=3D#0000ff size=3D2></FONT></SPAN>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr align=3Dleft><SPAN class=3D593111016-23012007><FONT =
face=3DArial=20
color=3D#0000ff size=3D2>2.&nbsp; The meaning of the NR bit is unclear =
in the=20
absence of a specific law.&nbsp; This has been the topic of a lot of =
discussion,=20
and I don't think you're going to get a great answer on this=20
question.</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr align=3Dleft><SPAN class=3D593111016-23012007><FONT =
face=3DArial=20
color=3D#0000ff size=3D2></FONT></SPAN>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#0000ff size=3D2></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#0000ff size=3D2><SPAN=20
class=3D593111016-23012007>3.&nbsp; RFC 3280 requires the =
subjectKeyIdentifier for=20
all CA certs ("MUST") and recommends for EE certs ("SHOULD").&nbsp; In =
practice,=20
sKI and aKI have limited value for implementors since the method of =
deriving=20
them from the key isn't mandatory, so a relying party has to process=20
non-matching sKI&nbsp;+ aKI pairs already.</SPAN></FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#0000ff size=3D2><SPAN=20
class=3D593111016-23012007></SPAN></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#0000ff size=3D2><SPAN=20
class=3D593111016-23012007></SPAN></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#0000ff size=3D2><SPAN=20
class=3D593111016-23012007>4.&nbsp; If you are including Certificate =
Policies, you=20
may want to consider including more than one policy OID if the =
certificate may=20
be used for different purposes (e.g. different assurance levels).&nbsp; =
For=20
example, you could put in an OID for "low assurance" and another for =
"high=20
assurance".&nbsp; Later, you could then issue different cards (e.g. =
non-citizen=20
visitors) that only include the "low assurance" OID.&nbsp; This would =
allow each=20
application to choose its level of assurance by selecting the initial =
policy set=20
to the validation algorithm.</SPAN></FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#0000ff size=3D2><SPAN=20
class=3D593111016-23012007></SPAN></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#0000ff size=3D2><SPAN=20
class=3D593111016-23012007></SPAN></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=3D593111016-23012007><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#0000ff =

size=3D2>5.&nbsp; basicConstraints may be omitted from EE certs.&nbsp; =
The pathLen=20
may be zero on the certs issued to your subordinate CAs.&nbsp; You can't =
rely on=20
the behavior of a "pathLen" value in the self-signed (root) cert, so you =
may=20
want to omit it to avoid confusion.</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#0000ff size=3D2></FONT><FONT =
face=3DArial color=3D#0000ff=20
size=3D2></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#0000ff size=3D2></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=3D593111016-23012007><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#0000ff =

size=3D2>6.&nbsp; For a PKI to scale to support a national ID, you don't =
want to=20
distribute revocation information via LDAP+CRL.&nbsp; The CRLs could =
easily grow=20
to hundreds of megabytes per day.&nbsp; Most large ID projects (e.g. US=20
government ID cards) are migrating to OCSP for revocation=20
checking.</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#0000ff size=3D2></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr><BR></DIV>
<DIV class=3DOutlookMessageHeader lang=3Den-us dir=3Dltr align=3Dleft>
<HR tabIndex=3D-1>
<FONT face=3DTahoma size=3D2><B>From:</B> owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org=20
[mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] <B>On Behalf Of </B>Bechlaghem,=20
Malek<BR><B>Sent:</B> Tuesday, January 23, 2007 5:08 AM<BR><B>To:</B>=20
ietf-pkix@vpnc.org<BR><B>Subject:</B> ID cards certificate=20
profiles<BR></FONT><BR></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV class=3DSection1>
<P class=3DMsoNormal=20
style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto"><FONT =
face=3DArial=20
size=3D2><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">Hi=20
there,<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal=20
style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto"><FONT =
face=3DArial=20
size=3D2><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">It has been =
long since=20
the last time I posted something so happy to be back </SPAN></FONT><FONT =

face=3DWingdings size=3D2><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: Wingdings">J</SPAN></FONT><FONT =
face=3DArial=20
size=3D2><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: =
Arial"><o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal=20
style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto"><FONT =
face=3DArial=20
size=3D2><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">I am =
working on the=20
implementation of a PKI infrastructure needed for an ID cards issuing =
project.=20
Part of my job is defining the needed certificate profiles which are =
raising=20
some open issues that I am listing below and hope to have your support =
in=20
resolving them.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal=20
style=3D"MARGIN-LEFT: 0.25in; TEXT-INDENT: -0.25in; mso-margin-top-alt: =
auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-list: l2 level1 lfo3"><![if =
!supportLists]><FONT=20
face=3DArial size=3D2><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: =
Arial"><SPAN=20
style=3D"mso-list: Ignore">1.<FONT face=3D"Times New Roman" =
size=3D1><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT: 7pt 'Times New =
Roman'">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=20
</SPAN></FONT></SPAN></SPAN></FONT><![endif]><SPAN dir=3Dltr><FONT =
face=3DArial=20
size=3D2><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">Are there =
any=20
particular issues when not adding any surname and given names in the CN =
of the=20
subject field of end-entity certificates knowing that these EE are the =
actual ID=20
cardholders. My understanding is that the subject field is used mainly =
to=20
provide the data that identifies the certificate holder. Moreover, =
knowing a=20
person&#8217;s name, so if I am looking for her certificate, I could use =
the name to=20
perform LDAP lookup based on that name. However, in our case, the =
certificates=20
are not published in an LDAP and the persons names are often very long. =
This is=20
why we thought not using first and last names in the CN of the subject =
field.=20
Instead, we are considering the following format for the CN:=20
<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></SPAN></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal=20
style=3D"MARGIN-LEFT: 0.5in; TEXT-INDENT: 0.5in; mso-margin-top-alt: =
auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto"><FONT=20
face=3D"Times New Roman" size=3D3><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt">Common =
Name (CN) =3D=20
&lt; Certificate Type =3D &lt;AUTH/SIGN&gt;, Citizen civil=20
ID&gt;<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal=20
style=3D"MARGIN-LEFT: 0.25in; TEXT-INDENT: -0.25in; mso-margin-top-alt: =
auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-list: l2 level1 lfo3"><![if =
!supportLists]><FONT=20
face=3D"Times New Roman" size=3D3><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt"><SPAN=20
style=3D"mso-list: Ignore">2.<FONT face=3D"Times New Roman" =
size=3D1><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT: 7pt 'Times New Roman'">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=20
</SPAN></FONT></SPAN></SPAN></FONT><![endif]><SPAN dir=3Dltr>Assuming =
that the=20
country issuing ID cards does not have a digital signature law and no =
clear=20
definition of NON REPUDIATION, should we avoid using the NR bit of the =
key usage=20
extension for signing certificates (not authentication certificate)? We =
could=20
set the digitalSignature bit only and explain in the certificate profile =
the=20
applicability of the certificate including those situations where it =
would be=20
difficult for the cardholder to repudiate a signature? We could simply =
set the=20
NR bit. <o:p></o:p></SPAN></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal=20
style=3D"MARGIN-LEFT: 0.25in; TEXT-INDENT: -0.25in; mso-margin-top-alt: =
auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-list: l2 level1 lfo3"><![if =
!supportLists]><FONT=20
face=3DArial size=3D2><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: =
Arial"><SPAN=20
style=3D"mso-list: Ignore">3.<FONT face=3D"Times New Roman" =
size=3D1><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT: 7pt 'Times New =
Roman'">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=20
</SPAN></FONT></SPAN></SPAN></FONT><![endif]><SPAN dir=3Dltr><FONT =
face=3DArial=20
size=3D2><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">We are not =
planning to=20
use the SubjectKeyIdentifier extension as the card returns a complete=20
certification path with a signed message. Would this be OK or are there =
reaons=20
to use this extensions.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></SPAN></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal=20
style=3D"MARGIN-LEFT: 0.25in; TEXT-INDENT: -0.25in; mso-margin-top-alt: =
auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-list: l2 level1 lfo3"><![if =
!supportLists]><FONT=20
face=3DArial size=3D2><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: =
Arial"><SPAN=20
style=3D"mso-list: Ignore">4.<FONT face=3D"Times New Roman" =
size=3D1><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT: 7pt 'Times New =
Roman'">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=20
</SPAN></FONT></SPAN></SPAN></FONT><![endif]><SPAN dir=3Dltr><FONT =
face=3DArial=20
size=3D2><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">For the=20
certificatePolicies extension, the plan is to use a CPS qualifier with =
the CPS=20
OID. Is there any reasons for deviating from this? We could for instance =
use the=20
OID of the CP under which a certificate is issued. Assuming that the=20
Certification Authority issues other types of certificates apart from =
the ID=20
cards certificates, and that these certificates may have different =
assurance=20
levels, what&#8217;s the right option we should opt for when formatting =
the=20
certificatePolicies extension?<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></SPAN></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal=20
style=3D"MARGIN-LEFT: 0.25in; TEXT-INDENT: -0.25in; mso-margin-top-alt: =
auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-list: l2 level1 lfo3"><![if =
!supportLists]><FONT=20
face=3DArial size=3D2><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: =
Arial"><SPAN=20
style=3D"mso-list: Ignore">5.<FONT face=3D"Times New Roman" =
size=3D1><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT: 7pt 'Times New =
Roman'">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=20
</SPAN></FONT></SPAN></SPAN></FONT><![endif]><SPAN dir=3Dltr><FONT =
face=3DArial=20
size=3D2><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">We are not =
planning to=20
use the basicConstraints extension for EE certificates. We will use it =
for CA=20
certificates setting the pathLengthConstraint to zero. This prevents =
cross=20
certification at the subordinate CAs level which is a functional =
requirement=20
since we are expecting cross certification with other CAs to occur at =
the root=20
CA level. Could you please confirm that our settings for the =
basicConstraint=20
extension are correct.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></SPAN></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal=20
style=3D"MARGIN-LEFT: 0.25in; TEXT-INDENT: -0.25in; mso-margin-top-alt: =
auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-list: l2 level1 lfo3"><![if =
!supportLists]><FONT=20
face=3DArial size=3D2><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: =
Arial"><SPAN=20
style=3D"mso-list: Ignore">6.<FONT face=3D"Times New Roman" =
size=3D1><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT: 7pt 'Times New =
Roman'">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=20
</SPAN></FONT></SPAN></SPAN></FONT><![endif]><SPAN dir=3Dltr><FONT =
face=3DArial=20
size=3D2><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">Assuming =
that the LDAP=20
directory on which CRLs will not be public,=20
&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></SPAN></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal=20
style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto"><FONT =
face=3DArial=20
size=3D2><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">Thank you =
all for your=20
prompt feedback.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal=20
style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto"><FONT =
face=3DArial=20
size=3D2><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">M.=20
Bechlaghem<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P></DIV><BR><BR>
<P align=3Dcenter><FONT style=3D"BACKGROUND-COLOR: #ffffff">This e-mail =
and any=20
attachment is for authorised use by the intended recipient(s) only. It =
may=20
contain proprietary material, confidential information and/or be subject =
to=20
legal privilege. It should not be copied, disclosed to, retained or used =
by, any=20
other party. If you are not an intended recipient then please promptly =
delete=20
this e-mail and any attachment and all copies and inform the sender. =
Thank=20
you.</FONT></A></P></BODY></HTML>

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From owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Tue Jan 23 13:58:47 2007
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From: Shu-jen Chang <shu-jen.chang@nist.gov>
Subject: NIST announces Draft Requirements and Evaluation Criteria for
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NIST Wants Comments on Proposed Hash Algorithm Requirements and Evaluation 
Criteria

The National Institute of Standards and Technology is planning a 
competition to develop one or more cryptographic hash algorithms to augment 
and revise the current Secure Hash Standard (Federal Information Processing 
Standard 180-2). As a first step in this process, NIST is publishing draft 
minimum acceptability requirements, submission requirements, and evaluation 
criteria for candidate algorithms ( See the Federal Register Announcement 
on http://www.nist.gov/hash-function ), and requests public comment by 
April 27, 2007.

--=====================_6943625==.ALT
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<html>
<b><br>
NIST Wants Comments on Proposed Hash Algorithm Requirements and
Evaluation Criteria<br><br>
</b>The National Institute of Standards and Technology is planning a
competition to develop one or more cryptographic hash algorithms to
augment and revise the current Secure Hash Standard (Federal Information
Processing Standard 180-2). As a first step in this process, NIST is
publishing draft minimum acceptability requirements, submission
requirements, and evaluation criteria for candidate algorithms ( See the
Federal Register Announcement on
<a href="http://www.nist.gov/hash-function" eudora="autourl"><font color="#0000FF"><u>http://www.nist.gov/hash-function</a></u></font>
), and requests public comment by April 27, 2007.<br>
</html>

--=====================_6943625==.ALT--




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To: Danilo Gligoroski <danilo.gligoroski@q2s.ntnu.no>
From: Shu-jen Chang <shu-jen.chang@nist.gov>
Subject: Re: NIST announces Draft Requirements and Evaluation Criteria
  for New Hash Algorithms
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Thank you for pointing out the mistake. It was correct in the file that we 
sent out, but somehow got messed up in the final publication. Sorry about that.

Shu-jen


At 01:48 PM 1/23/2007, you wrote:
>Hi,
>
>There is an obvious typo:
>
>"A.3 The algorithm must support
>224, 256, 384, and 512-bit message
>digests, and must support a maximum
>message length of at least 264 bits."
>
>Probably it should be:
>
>"A.3 The algorithm must support
>224, 256, 384, and 512-bit message
>digests, and must support a maximum
>message length of at least 2^64 bits."
>
>(Usual copy paste error from Word ...)
>
>Regards,
>Danilo!

--=====================_13993656==.ALT
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<html>
Thank you for pointing out the mistake. It was correct in the file that
we sent out, but somehow got messed up in the final publication. Sorry
about that.<br><br>
Shu-jen<br><br>
<br>
At 01:48 PM 1/23/2007, you wrote:<br>
<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite>Hi,<br><br>
There is an obvious typo:<br><br>
&quot;<font size=2>A.3 The algorithm must support<br>
224, 256, 384, and 512-bit message<br>
digests, and must support a maximum<br>
message length of at least 264 bits.&quot;<br><br>
</font>Probably it should be:<br><br>
<font size=2>&quot;A.3 The algorithm must support<br>
224, 256, 384, and 512-bit message<br>
digests, and must support a maximum<br>
message length of at least 2^64 bits.&quot;<br><br>
</font>(Usual copy paste error from Word ...)<br><br>
Regards,<br>
Danilo!</blockquote></html>

--=====================_13993656==.ALT--




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Subject: RE: ID cards certificate profiles
Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2007 12:12:31 -0800
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From: Ryan Hurst <Ryan.Hurst@microsoft.com>
To: Dave Engberg <dengberg@corestreet.com>,
        "Bechlaghem, Malek"
	<malek.bechlaghem@logicacmg.com>,
        <ietf-pkix@vpnc.org>
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In-line

=20

From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org]
On Behalf Of Dave Engberg
Sent: Tuesday, January 23, 2007 9:09 AM
To: Bechlaghem, Malek; ietf-pkix@vpnc.org
Subject: RE: ID cards certificate profiles

=20

=20

1.  Most common PKI-enabled applications will display the value of the
subject Distinguished Name without doing any LDAP lookups.  For example,
a signed document will display the signer's name using the CN from the
cert, not an LDAP lookup.  While you may set the CN to an opaque encoded
string like you describe, this may make the certs confusing to use,
since the signer will be listed as "Certificate Type=3DSIGN, 12345678",
rather than "Malek Bechlaghem".

=20

If your policies prevent you from putting the cardholder's name in the
cert (e.g. for privacy), then you may want to consider using the
"serialNumber" attribute in the DN instead of the CN attribute.

[rmh] Yes, Windows often uses a API called GetCertNameString
(http://msdn2.microsoft.com/fr-fr/library/ms937665.aspx ) and a option
it exposes called SimpleName which prefers the CN over other parts of
the DN, it doesn't even look at the given name and surname.=20

[rmh] Also can't stress the confidentiality issues enough with
certificate profiles, you certainly need personally identifiable
information in the certificate but protocols often exchange certificates
as part of a bootstrap for a session and they will be visible in the
clear if used in these protocols (the receiving end of a TLS session for
example).

=20

2.  The meaning of the NR bit is unclear in the absence of a specific
law.  This has been the topic of a lot of discussion, and I don't think
you're going to get a great answer on this question.

=20

=20

3.  RFC 3280 requires the subjectKeyIdentifier for all CA certs ("MUST")
and recommends for EE certs ("SHOULD").  In practice, sKI and aKI have
limited value for implementors since the method of deriving them from
the key isn't mandatory, so a relying party has to process non-matching
sKI + aKI pairs already.

 [rmh] I agree, Windows generates them automatically to facilitate key
based chaining (preference) if they are not there.

=20

4.  If you are including Certificate Policies, you may want to consider
including more than one policy OID if the certificate may be used for
different purposes (e.g. different assurance levels).  For example, you
could put in an OID for "low assurance" and another for "high
assurance".  Later, you could then issue different cards (e.g.
non-citizen visitors) that only include the "low assurance" OID.  This
would allow each application to choose its level of assurance by
selecting the initial policy set to the validation algorithm.

[rmh] Also be aware of how the use of CP will effect your
interoperability with existing clients (browsers, etc) that do not
properly support CP, Windows is fine XP and up but pre-xp that isn't
necessarily the case. I am also I am surprised how many poorly
constructed certs are out there with CPs, many don't nest and meet the
CP processing rules; you don't want to be one of these.

 =20

5.  basicConstraints may be omitted from EE certs.  The pathLen may be
zero on the certs issued to your subordinate CAs.  You can't rely on the
behavior of a "pathLen" value in the self-signed (root) cert, so you may
want to omit it to avoid confusion.

=20

=20

6.  For a PKI to scale to support a national ID, you don't want to
distribute revocation information via LDAP+CRL.  The CRLs could easily
grow to hundreds of megabytes per day.  Most large ID projects (e.g. US
government ID cards) are migrating to OCSP for revocation checking.

 [rmh] Yes, you want to do HTTP based distribution of CRLs, and you
definitely also want OCSP support (pre-produced responses, etc)

=20

________________________________

From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org]
On Behalf Of Bechlaghem, Malek
Sent: Tuesday, January 23, 2007 5:08 AM
To: ietf-pkix@vpnc.org
Subject: ID cards certificate profiles

Hi there,

It has been long since the last time I posted something so happy to be
back J

I am working on the implementation of a PKI infrastructure needed for an
ID cards issuing project. Part of my job is defining the needed
certificate profiles which are raising some open issues that I am
listing below and hope to have your support in resolving them.

1.       Are there any particular issues when not adding any surname and
given names in the CN of the subject field of end-entity certificates
knowing that these EE are the actual ID cardholders. My understanding is
that the subject field is used mainly to provide the data that
identifies the certificate holder. Moreover, knowing a person's name, so
if I am looking for her certificate, I could use the name to perform
LDAP lookup based on that name. However, in our case, the certificates
are not published in an LDAP and the persons names are often very long.
This is why we thought not using first and last names in the CN of the
subject field. Instead, we are considering the following format for the
CN:=20

Common Name (CN) =3D < Certificate Type =3D <AUTH/SIGN>, Citizen civil =
ID>

2.      Assuming that the country issuing ID cards does not have a
digital signature law and no clear definition of NON REPUDIATION, should
we avoid using the NR bit of the key usage extension for signing
certificates (not authentication certificate)? We could set the
digitalSignature bit only and explain in the certificate profile the
applicability of the certificate including those situations where it
would be difficult for the cardholder to repudiate a signature? We could
simply set the NR bit.=20

3.       We are not planning to use the SubjectKeyIdentifier extension
as the card returns a complete certification path with a signed message.
Would this be OK or are there reaons to use this extensions.

4.       For the certificatePolicies extension, the plan is to use a CPS
qualifier with the CPS OID. Is there any reasons for deviating from
this? We could for instance use the OID of the CP under which a
certificate is issued. Assuming that the Certification Authority issues
other types of certificates apart from the ID cards certificates, and
that these certificates may have different assurance levels, what's the
right option we should opt for when formatting the certificatePolicies
extension?

5.       We are not planning to use the basicConstraints extension for
EE certificates. We will use it for CA certificates setting the
pathLengthConstraint to zero. This prevents cross certification at the
subordinate CAs level which is a functional requirement since we are
expecting cross certification with other CAs to occur at the root CA
level. Could you please confirm that our settings for the
basicConstraint extension are correct.

6.       Assuming that the LDAP directory on which CRLs will not be
public, =20

Thank you all for your prompt feedback.

M. Bechlaghem

=20

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<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
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<p class=3DMsoNormal><a name=3D"_MailEndCompose"><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span=
></a></p>

<div>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt =
0in 0in 0in'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span>=
</b><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>
owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] <b>On =
Behalf
Of </b>Dave Engberg<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, January 23, 2007 9:09 AM<br>
<b>To:</b> Bechlaghem, Malek; ietf-pkix@vpnc.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> RE: ID cards certificate profiles<o:p></o:p></span></p>

</div>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:blue'>1.&nbsp; Most common PKI-enabled applications will display =
the
value of the subject Distinguished Name without doing any LDAP =
lookups.&nbsp;
For example, a signed document will display the signer's name&nbsp;using =
the CN
from the cert, not an LDAP lookup.&nbsp; While you may set the CN to an =
opaque
encoded string like you describe, this may make the certs confusing to =
use,
since the signer will be listed as &quot;Certificate Type=3DSIGN, =
12345678&quot;,
rather than &quot;Malek Bechlaghem&quot;.</span><o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:blue'>If your policies prevent you from putting the cardholder's =
name in
the cert (e.g. for privacy), then you may want to&nbsp;consider using =
the
&quot;serialNumber&quot; attribute in the DN instead of the CN =
attribute.</span><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'><o:p></o:p></=
span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>[rmh] Yes, Windows often uses a API called =
GetCertNameString =
(http://msdn2.microsoft.com/fr-fr/library/ms937665.aspx
) and a option it exposes called SimpleName which prefers the CN over =
other
parts of the DN, it doesn&#8217;t even look at the given name and =
surname.</span>&nbsp;<span
style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>[rmh] Also can&#8217;t stress the confidentiality issues =
enough
with certificate profiles, you certainly need personally identifiable
information in the certificate but protocols often exchange certificates =
as
part of a bootstrap for a session and they will be visible in the clear =
if used
in these protocols (the receiving end of a TLS session for =
example).<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:blue'>2.&nbsp; The meaning of the NR bit is unclear in the absence =
of a
specific law.&nbsp; This has been the topic of a lot of discussion, and =
I don't
think you're going to get a great answer on this =
question.</span><o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:blue'>3.&nbsp; RFC 3280 requires the subjectKeyIdentifier for all =
CA certs
(&quot;MUST&quot;) and recommends for EE certs =
(&quot;SHOULD&quot;).&nbsp; In
practice, sKI and aKI have limited value for implementors since the =
method of
deriving them from the key isn't mandatory, so a relying party has to =
process
non-matching sKI&nbsp;+ aKI pairs already.</span><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>[rmh] I agree, =
Windows
generates them automatically to facilitate key based chaining =
(preference) if
they are not there.</span><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:blue'>4.&nbsp; If you are including Certificate Policies, you may =
want to
consider including more than one policy OID if the certificate may be =
used for
different purposes (e.g. different assurance levels).&nbsp; For example, =
you
could put in an OID for &quot;low assurance&quot; and another for =
&quot;high
assurance&quot;.&nbsp; Later, you could then issue different cards (e.g.
non-citizen visitors) that only include the &quot;low assurance&quot;
OID.&nbsp; This would allow each application to choose its level of =
assurance
by selecting the initial policy set to the validation =
algorithm.</span><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'><o:p></o:p></=
span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>[rmh] Also be aware of how the use of CP will effect your =
interoperability
with existing clients (browsers, etc) that do not properly support CP, =
Windows
is fine XP and up but pre-xp that isn&#8217;t necessarily the case. I am =
also I
am surprised how many poorly constructed certs are out there with CPs, =
many don&#8217;t
nest and meet the CP processing rules; you don&#8217;t want to be one of =
these.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:blue'>5.&nbsp; basicConstraints may be omitted from EE =
certs.&nbsp; The
pathLen may be zero on the certs issued to your subordinate CAs.&nbsp; =
You
can't rely on the behavior of a &quot;pathLen&quot; value in the =
self-signed
(root) cert, so you may want to omit it to avoid confusion.</span><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'><o:p></o:p></=
span></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:blue'>6.&nbsp; For a PKI to scale to support a national ID, you =
don't
want to distribute revocation information via LDAP+CRL.&nbsp; The CRLs =
could
easily grow to hundreds of megabytes per day.&nbsp; Most large ID =
projects
(e.g. US government ID cards) are migrating to OCSP for revocation =
checking.</span><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>[rmh] Yes, you =
want to do
HTTP based distribution of CRLs, and you definitely also want OCSP =
support
(pre-produced responses, etc)</span><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

</div>

<div class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dcenter style=3D'text-align:center'>

<hr size=3D2 width=3D"100%" align=3Dcenter>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-bottom:12.0pt'><b><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span></b><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org
[mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] <b>On Behalf Of </b>Bechlaghem, =
Malek<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, January 23, 2007 5:08 AM<br>
<b>To:</b> ietf-pkix@vpnc.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> ID cards certificate profiles</span><o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'>Hi =
there,<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'>It has been =
long
since the last time I posted something so happy to be back </span><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Wingdings'>J</span><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'>I am working =
on the
implementation of a PKI infrastructure needed for an ID cards issuing =
project.
Part of my job is defining the needed certificate profiles which are =
raising
some open issues that I am listing below and hope to have your support =
in
resolving them.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;
margin-left:.25in;text-indent:-.25in'><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:
"Arial","sans-serif"'>1.</span><span =
style=3D'font-size:7.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
</span><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'>Are
there any particular issues when not adding any surname and given names =
in the
CN of the subject field of end-entity certificates knowing that these EE =
are
the actual ID cardholders. My understanding is that the subject field is =
used
mainly to provide the data that identifies the certificate holder. =
Moreover,
knowing a person&#8217;s name, so if I am looking for her certificate, I =
could
use the name to perform LDAP lookup based on that name. However, in our =
case,
the certificates are not published in an LDAP and the persons names are =
often
very long. This is why we thought not using first and last names in the =
CN of
the subject field. Instead, we are considering the following format for =
the CN:
<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;
margin-left:.5in;text-indent:.5in'>Common Name (CN) =3D &lt; Certificate =
Type =3D
&lt;AUTH/SIGN&gt;, Citizen civil ID&gt;<o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;
margin-left:.25in;text-indent:-.25in'>2.<span =
style=3D'font-size:7.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
</span>Assuming that the country issuing ID cards does not have a =
digital
signature law and no clear definition of NON REPUDIATION, should we =
avoid using
the NR bit of the key usage extension for signing certificates (not
authentication certificate)? We could set the digitalSignature bit only =
and
explain in the certificate profile the applicability of the certificate
including those situations where it would be difficult for the =
cardholder to
repudiate a signature? We could simply set the NR bit. <o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;
margin-left:.25in;text-indent:-.25in'><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:
"Arial","sans-serif"'>3.</span><span =
style=3D'font-size:7.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
</span><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'>We are
not planning to use the SubjectKeyIdentifier extension as the card =
returns a
complete certification path with a signed message. Would this be OK or =
are
there reaons to use this extensions.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;
margin-left:.25in;text-indent:-.25in'><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:
"Arial","sans-serif"'>4.</span><span =
style=3D'font-size:7.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
</span><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'>For the
certificatePolicies extension, the plan is to use a CPS qualifier with =
the CPS
OID. Is there any reasons for deviating from this? We could for instance =
use
the OID of the CP under which a certificate is issued. Assuming that the
Certification Authority issues other types of certificates apart from =
the ID
cards certificates, and that these certificates may have different =
assurance
levels, what&#8217;s the right option we should opt for when formatting =
the
certificatePolicies extension?<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;
margin-left:.25in;text-indent:-.25in'><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:
"Arial","sans-serif"'>5.</span><span =
style=3D'font-size:7.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
</span><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'>We are
not planning to use the basicConstraints extension for EE certificates. =
We will
use it for CA certificates setting the pathLengthConstraint to zero. =
This
prevents cross certification at the subordinate CAs level which is a =
functional
requirement since we are expecting cross certification with other CAs to =
occur
at the root CA level. Could you please confirm that our settings for the
basicConstraint extension are correct.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;
margin-left:.25in;text-indent:-.25in'><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:
"Arial","sans-serif"'>6.</span><span =
style=3D'font-size:7.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
</span><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'>Assuming
that the LDAP directory on which CRLs will not be public, =
&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'>Thank you =
all for
your prompt feedback.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'>M. =
Bechlaghem<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'margin-bottom:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p align=3Dcenter style=3D'text-align:center'><span =
style=3D'background:white'>This
e-mail and any attachment is for authorised use by the intended =
recipient(s)
only. It may contain proprietary material, confidential information =
and/or be
subject to legal privilege. It should not be copied, disclosed to, =
retained or
used by, any other party. If you are not an intended recipient then =
please
promptly delete this e-mail and any attachment and all copies and inform =
the
sender. Thank you.</span><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

</body>

</html>

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From owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Thu Jan 25 20:28:31 2007
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Date: Fri, 26 Jan 2007 01:25:10 +0100
From: Milan Sova <sova+pkix@cesnet.cz>
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	Hi.

	In our project, we mark end entities with URNs and need to include
these names in the certificates. We started with using
subjectAltName.URI field for this (as URN is a "subtype" of URI).
However, this practice clashes with RFC 3280 which explicitly requires
absolute URL for the field.

	Is there any specific reason for excluding URNs from subjectAltName?

	Regards
-- 
						Milan Sova




From owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Fri Jan 26 12:47:25 2007
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Date: Fri, 26 Jan 2007 08:41:39 -0800
To: Milan Sova <sova+pkix@cesnet.cz>, ietf-pkix@vpnc.org
From: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
Subject: Re: URN in subjectAltName
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At 1:25 AM +0100 1/26/07, Milan Sova wrote:
>	Hi.
>
>	In our project, we mark end entities with URNs and need to include
>these names in the certificates. We started with using
>subjectAltName.URI field for this (as URN is a "subtype" of URI).
>However, this practice clashes with RFC 3280 which explicitly requires
>absolute URL for the field.
>
>	Is there any specific reason for excluding URNs from subjectAltName?

Yes, but it is not a good one in my opinion. The URI use in 
subjectAltName is only meant to be a host computer reach by a 
protocol, not a vanilla identifier such as a URN. Thus, there is the 
restriction that there has to be a host name.

If you want a URN, you should consider using otherName instead. This, 
of course, shows the silliness of the specificity of the 
uniformResourceIdentifier type, but it is needed if you want to 
follow 3280.

--Paul Hoffman, Director
--VPN Consortium




From owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Sat Jan 27 05:18:55 2007
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Hi
You can put whatever you want including URNs in a serialNumber attribute.
I would though also consider using a scheme where you separate the identity
part from the authority/registry.  Like if your URN is:

         serialNumber=urn:com:example:id:3456

 you might as well use something like:

    serialNumber=<guid registry="urn:com:example:id">3456</guid>

[some "-mangling removed for brevity]
which has the advantage that it is a universal XML-ish way of specifying
a globally unique id where you don't have to know how the registry part
is constructed in order to get the id.  Although true URNs are cool, I
would still not rule out using HTTP URIs because then the registry part
would typically point to a web-page showing data associated with the
identity name space.

Anders

----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Milan Sova" <sova+pkix@cesnet.cz>
To: <ietf-pkix@vpnc.org>
Sent: Friday, January 26, 2007 01:25
Subject: URN in subjectAltName



Hi.

In our project, we mark end entities with URNs and need to include
these names in the certificates. We started with using
subjectAltName.URI field for this (as URN is a "subtype" of URI).
However, this practice clashes with RFC 3280 which explicitly requires
absolute URL for the field.

Is there any specific reason for excluding URNs from subjectAltName?

Regards
-- 
Milan Sova






From owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Sun Jan 28 03:18:32 2007
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Date: Sun, 28 Jan 2007 02:16:21 -0500
To: Milan Sova <sova+pkix@cesnet.cz>, ietf-pkix@vpnc.org
From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
Subject: Re: URN in subjectAltName
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At the time that RFC 2459 was written, URLs were the only things 
mature enough to include here.  No one asked this question during the 
update to RFC 2459, which resulted in RFC 3280.

Going forward, I see two possible ways to go forward:

1) Revisit the uri choice, and see if people think URNs ought to be 
permitted.  One obvious question is to determine whether existing 
implementations would fail badly if a URN was received here.

2) Define a way to carry URNs in an other name.

Russ

At 07:25 PM 1/25/2007, Milan Sova wrote:

>         Hi.
>
>         In our project, we mark end entities with URNs and need to include
>these names in the certificates. We started with using
>subjectAltName.URI field for this (as URN is a "subtype" of URI).
>However, this practice clashes with RFC 3280 which explicitly requires
>absolute URL for the field.
>
>         Is there any specific reason for excluding URNs from subjectAltName?
>
>         Regards
>--
>                                                 Milan Sova




From owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Mon Jan 29 00:46:43 2007
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 <7.0.0.16.2.20070128021208.049264f8@vigilsec.com>
Date: Sun, 28 Jan 2007 20:39:20 -0800
To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>, Milan Sova <sova+pkix@cesnet.cz>,
        ietf-pkix@vpnc.org
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At 2:16 AM -0500 1/28/07, Russ Housley wrote:
>At the time that RFC 2459 was written, URLs were the only things 
>mature enough to include here.  No one asked this question during 
>the update to RFC 2459, which resulted in RFC 3280.
>
>Going forward, I see two possible ways to go forward:
>
>1) Revisit the uri choice, and see if people think URNs ought to be 
>permitted.  One obvious question is to determine whether existing 
>implementations would fail badly if a URN was received here.

This seems like overkill given the low usage of URNs as identifiers 
that are associated with public keys.

>2) Define a way to carry URNs in an other name.

Anders and I have suggested two legal ways to do this already.

--Paul Hoffman, Director
--VPN Consortium




From owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Mon Jan 29 10:37:15 2007
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We are standing up a number of CAs (Selfsigned Root, Policy and Issueing).
The question has come up with the Microsoft CA product we have the ability 
to chose SHA 1, SHA 256, SHA 512. i believe that SHA1 is not sufficent for a 
20 year root CA lifespan. I need expert support for moving to SHA 256 at a 
minimum.

Roger Younglove
Principal Consultant
Ford Motor Company





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This is a cryptographically signed message in MIME format.

--------------ms060108090904040702090003
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
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It may be a bit late but I would like to propose a small change RFC 3280 
bis.

The text defines (as well as 3280) two ASN.1 modules. The definitions 
contain
two types of information:

- rewrites from X.509 etc
- new definitions like the id-pkix arc and extensions

If one wants to use the new definitions in other specifications here is
the problem of ASN.1 compatibility when imported into other
modules/
I propose to add two modules:

PKIXUsefulDefinitions which regroups definitions in such a way that
they can be imported elsewhere.
the syntax definitions for the private extensions. The actual

PKIXExtensions in current syntax to use the
EXTENSION CLASS to bind the extensions the OIDs.

If this cannot be included into the 3280bis I propose a small RFC
defining these modules.

Peter

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oInMRFoRmT4AAAAAAAA=
--------------ms060108090904040702090003--




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Subject: RE: SHA 1 vs. SHA 256 for Root CA
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From: "Ogle Ron" <ron.ogle@thomson.net>
To: "ROGER YOUNGLOVE" <ryounglove1@msn.com>, <ietf-pkix@imc.org>
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What size are you planning for your CA keys ?  If you are going to use
RSA 1024, then SHA1 is probably ok.  Also, look at the applications that
you will be using especially for the near future.  They may not work
correctly with anything other than SHA1.  Later on, you could always
re-issue your CA certs with the same keys but with the newer SHA 256
algorithm.

IMHO, go for the ease of use and interoperability than trying to ensure
that everything is extremely secure/unbreakable.

Ron Ogle

-----Original Message-----
From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org]
On Behalf Of ROGER YOUNGLOVE
Sent: Monday, January 29, 2007 9:39 AM
To: ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: SHA 1 vs. SHA 256 for Root CA


We are standing up a number of CAs (Selfsigned Root, Policy and
Issueing).
The question has come up with the Microsoft CA product we have the
ability 
to chose SHA 1, SHA 256, SHA 512. i believe that SHA1 is not sufficent
for a 
20 year root CA lifespan. I need expert support for moving to SHA 256 at
a 
minimum.

Roger Younglove
Principal Consultant
Ford Motor Company






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I do not see a problem with using SHA-1 for a self-signed certificate.
A self-signed certificate is vulnerable to modification and substitution
and hence must be protected using other means while stored or
communicated.

Thus, SHA-1 for self-signed root is fine.  SHA-256 will not protect it
any better.

You can not say the same about the certificates issued by the Root. 

-----Original Message-----
From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org]
On Behalf Of ROGER YOUNGLOVE
Sent: Monday, January 29, 2007 9:39 AM
To: ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: SHA 1 vs. SHA 256 for Root CA


We are standing up a number of CAs (Selfsigned Root, Policy and
Issueing).
The question has come up with the Microsoft CA product we have the
ability 
to chose SHA 1, SHA 256, SHA 512. i believe that SHA1 is not sufficent
for a 
20 year root CA lifespan. I need expert support for moving to SHA 256 at
a 
minimum.

Roger Younglove
Principal Consultant
Ford Motor Company






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To: "ROGER YOUNGLOVE" <ryounglove1@msn.com>, ietf-pkix@imc.org
From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
Subject: Re: SHA 1 vs. SHA 256 for Root CA
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Roger:

I strongly encourage the use of SHA-256 (over SHA-1) for a signature 
that needs to stand for 20 years.

What key size are you choosing that will also be acceptable in 2027?

Russ


At 09:38 AM 1/29/2007, ROGER YOUNGLOVE wrote:

>We are standing up a number of CAs (Selfsigned Root, Policy and Issueing).
>The question has come up with the Microsoft CA product we have the 
>ability to chose SHA 1, SHA 256, SHA 512. i believe that SHA1 is not 
>sufficent for a 20 year root CA lifespan. I need expert support for 
>moving to SHA 256 at a minimum.
>
>Roger Younglove
>Principal Consultant
>Ford Motor Company




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Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2007 12:02:26 -0500
To: Peter Sylvester <Peter.Sylvester@edelweb.fr>, pkix <ietf-pkix@imc.org>
From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Peter:

RFC 3280 includes two ASN.1 Modules:
    PKIX1Explicit88, and
    PKIX1Implicit88.

I have no objection to using three ASN.1 Modules in 3280bis:
    PKIX1Explicit88,
    PKIX1Implicit88, and
    PKIX1Extensions.

I'm sure that you could help the authors figure out which type 
definitions to move to the third module.

Russ


At 09:43 AM 1/29/2007, Peter Sylvester wrote:

>It may be a bit late but I would like to propose a small change RFC 3280 bis.
>
>The text defines (as well as 3280) two ASN.1 modules. The definitions contain
>two types of information:
>
>- rewrites from X.509 etc
>- new definitions like the id-pkix arc and extensions
>
>If one wants to use the new definitions in other specifications here is
>the problem of ASN.1 compatibility when imported into other
>modules/
>I propose to add two modules:
>
>PKIXUsefulDefinitions which regroups definitions in such a way that
>they can be imported elsewhere.
>the syntax definitions for the private extensions. The actual
>
>PKIXExtensions in current syntax to use the
>EXTENSION CLASS to bind the extensions the OIDs.
>
>If this cannot be included into the 3280bis I propose a small RFC
>defining these modules.
>
>Peter




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At 9:38 AM -0500 1/29/07, ROGER YOUNGLOVE wrote:
>i believe that SHA1 is not sufficent for a 20 year root CA lifespan.

It would be useful to know where that belief comes from. To date, 
there have been no suggestions of any weakness for SHA-1 against 
preimage attacks. Also to date, no one has suggested that it is 
possible for anyone to brute-force a cryptographic primitive that 
would require 2^160 iterations.

--Paul Hoffman, Director
--VPN Consortium




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From: "ROGER YOUNGLOVE" <ryounglove1@msn.com>
To: ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: RE: SHA 1 vs. SHA 256 for Root CA
Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2007 12:36:47 -0500
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Gentlemen,
Thank you for the rapid response. One thing I did not mention was that we 
are using a Micorsoft CA implentation from Windows Server 2003 EE.
We just found out that this CA product does not recognize SHA 256 or above 
even though it is an option.



TTFN
Roger Younglove





>From: "Ogle Ron" <ron.ogle@thomson.net>
>To: "ROGER YOUNGLOVE" <ryounglove1@msn.com>, <ietf-pkix@imc.org>
>Subject: RE: SHA 1 vs. SHA 256 for Root CA
>Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2007 11:22:07 -0500
>
>
>What size are you planning for your CA keys ?  If you are going to use
>RSA 1024, then SHA1 is probably ok.  Also, look at the applications that
>you will be using especially for the near future.  They may not work
>correctly with anything other than SHA1.  Later on, you could always
>re-issue your CA certs with the same keys but with the newer SHA 256
>algorithm.
>
>IMHO, go for the ease of use and interoperability than trying to ensure
>that everything is extremely secure/unbreakable.
>
>Ron Ogle
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org]
>On Behalf Of ROGER YOUNGLOVE
>Sent: Monday, January 29, 2007 9:39 AM
>To: ietf-pkix@imc.org
>Subject: SHA 1 vs. SHA 256 for Root CA
>
>
>We are standing up a number of CAs (Selfsigned Root, Policy and
>Issueing).
>The question has come up with the Microsoft CA product we have the
>ability
>to chose SHA 1, SHA 256, SHA 512. i believe that SHA1 is not sufficent
>for a
>20 year root CA lifespan. I need expert support for moving to SHA 256 at
>a
>minimum.
>
>Roger Younglove
>Principal Consultant
>Ford Motor Company
>
>
>





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What RFC defines the OID's, etc. for RSA with SHA-256 et. al.?
Is there a DSA standard that uses SHA-256?

Thanks,

Mike

Russ Housley wrote:
> 
> Roger:
> 
> I strongly encourage the use of SHA-256 (over SHA-1) for a signature 
> that needs to stand for 20 years.
> 
> What key size are you choosing that will also be acceptable in 2027?
> 
> Russ
> 
> 
> At 09:38 AM 1/29/2007, ROGER YOUNGLOVE wrote:
> 
>> We are standing up a number of CAs (Selfsigned Root, Policy and 
>> Issueing).
>> The question has come up with the Microsoft CA product we have the 
>> ability to chose SHA 1, SHA 256, SHA 512. i believe that SHA1 is not 
>> sufficent for a 20 year root CA lifespan. I need expert support for 
>> moving to SHA 256 at a minimum.
>>
>> Roger Younglove
>> Principal Consultant
>> Ford Motor Company
> 
> 
> 




From owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Mon Jan 29 14:41:21 2007
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Subject: RE: SHA 1 vs. SHA 256 for Root CA
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At 12:36 PM -0500 1/29/07, ROGER YOUNGLOVE wrote:
>Gentlemen,
>Thank you for the rapid response. One thing I did not mention was 
>that we are using a Micorsoft CA implentation from Windows Server 
>2003 EE.
>We just found out that this CA product does not recognize SHA 256 or 
>above even though it is an option.
>
>
>
>TTFN
>Roger Younglove

OK. Guess that narrows the options a bit :-).

Also, upon further reflection, I agree that since this is a 
self-signed cert, which presumably has been delivered via an 
out-of-band path that is considered integrity secure, the concerns 
over use of SHA-1 may be overstated.

Steve




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To: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>, ietf-pkix@imc.org
From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
Subject: Re: SHA 1 vs. SHA 256 for Root CA
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Paul:

According to the NIST recommendations 2^80 (the strength of SHA-1if 
none of the attacks prove to be fruitful) is useful for digital 
signatures until 2010.

The request was about signatures that need to stand for 20 years -- 
if they are signed today, that is 2027.  The NIST recommendations for 
beyond 2030 seem appropriate, which recommend SHA-256 and a key size 
of 3072 bits.

Russ

At 12:22 PM 1/29/2007, Paul Hoffman wrote:

>At 9:38 AM -0500 1/29/07, ROGER YOUNGLOVE wrote:
>>i believe that SHA1 is not sufficent for a 20 year root CA lifespan.
>
>It would be useful to know where that belief comes from. To date, 
>there have been no suggestions of any weakness for SHA-1 against 
>preimage attacks. Also to date, no one has suggested that it is 
>possible for anyone to brute-force a cryptographic primitive that 
>would require 2^160 iterations.
>
>--Paul Hoffman, Director
>--VPN Consortium




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Is this still a potential issue for Issuing CA certificates signed
with the root key, particularly if the profile permits non-critical
extensions?


-----Original Message-----
From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org]
On Behalf Of Stephen Kent
Sent: Monday, January 29, 2007 1:45 PM
To: ROGER YOUNGLOVE
Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: RE: SHA 1 vs. SHA 256 for Root CA


At 12:36 PM -0500 1/29/07, ROGER YOUNGLOVE wrote:
>Gentlemen,
>Thank you for the rapid response. One thing I did not mention was 
>that we are using a Micorsoft CA implentation from Windows Server 
>2003 EE.
>We just found out that this CA product does not recognize SHA 256 or 
>above even though it is an option.
>
>
>
>TTFN
>Roger Younglove

OK. Guess that narrows the options a bit :-).

Also, upon further reflection, I agree that since this is a 
self-signed cert, which presumably has been delivered via an 
out-of-band path that is considered integrity secure, the concerns 
over use of SHA-1 may be overstated.

Steve





From owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Mon Jan 29 16:25:06 2007
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Subject: RE: SHA 1 vs. SHA 256 for Root CA
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From: "Santosh Chokhani" <chokhani@orionsec.com>
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Paul,

It is not clear why pre-image issue is relevant.  The root public key or
self-signed certificate needs protections other than own signature and
hence hashing algorithm strength is not an issue.  Signature on the
certificate buys nothing security wise.

-----Original Message-----
From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org]
On Behalf Of Paul Hoffman
Sent: Monday, January 29, 2007 12:23 PM
To: ROGER YOUNGLOVE; ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: Re: SHA 1 vs. SHA 256 for Root CA


At 9:38 AM -0500 1/29/07, ROGER YOUNGLOVE wrote:
>i believe that SHA1 is not sufficient for a 20 year root CA lifespan.

It would be useful to know where that belief comes from. To date, 
there have been no suggestions of any weakness for SHA-1 against 
preimage attacks. Also to date, no one has suggested that it is 
possible for anyone to brute-force a cryptographic primitive that 
would require 2^160 iterations.

--Paul Hoffman, Director
--VPN Consortium





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Mike:

>What RFC defines the OID's, etc. for RSA with SHA-256 et. al.?

RFC 4055

Russ




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Roger & Steve:

>Also, upon further reflection, I agree that since this is a 
>self-signed cert, which presumably has been delivered via an 
>out-of-band path that is considered integrity secure, the concerns 
>over use of SHA-1 may be overstated.

I think that Santosh's note explained the point about self-signed 
certificates.  In my response, I assumed that the same signature 
algorithm would be used for certificates that are subordinate to the 
self-signed certificate.  Thus my comments about 20 year validity periods.

If the self-signed public keys are being used to validate digital 
signatures, similar issues arise.

Russ




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At 4:02 PM -0500 1/29/07, Russ Housley wrote:
>Roger & Steve:
>
>>Also, upon further reflection, I agree that since this is a 
>>self-signed cert, which presumably has been delivered via an 
>>out-of-band path that is considered integrity secure, the concerns 
>>over use of SHA-1 may be overstated.
>
>I think that Santosh's note explained the point about self-signed 
>certificates.  In my response, I assumed that the same signature 
>algorithm would be used for certificates that are subordinate to the 
>self-signed certificate.  Thus my comments about 20 year validity 
>periods.
>
>If the self-signed public keys are being used to validate digital 
>signatures, similar issues arise.
>
>Russ

Agreed.

Roger, where do you pan to use the hash algorithm in question?

Steve




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Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2007 00:25:21 +0200 (EET)
Subject: source of "Friendly name"
From: "Moudrick M. Dadashov" <md@e-net.lt>
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Hello,

anybody knows what is the source of so called "Friendly Name" displayed by
Microsoft certificate viewer? I can't find any extensions for this field
either.

Can we define a "Friedly Name" under the RSA KEON server?

Thanks,

M.D.





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Moudrick M. Dadashov a =C3=A9crit :
> Hello,
>
> anybody knows what is the source of so called "Friendly Name" displayed=
 by
> Microsoft certificate viewer? I can't find any extensions for this fiel=
d
> either.
>  =20
The cert associated with the private key had "friendly name" associated=20
with it. Is similar with alias in JKS file or see
openssl when you create PKCS12, you have a option "Friendly Name".

Note : friendly names are optional in windows but required by NSS=20
(mozilla). If the PKCS12 file was created without a
friendly name for the cert, that's why it failed.

Regards
Yannick Quenec(hdu
www.ejbca.org / PKI Opensource

>
>  =20




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From: Milan Sova <sova+pkix@cesnet.cz>
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Subject: Re: URN in subjectAltName
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	Hi Anders.
Anders Rundgren wrote:
> Hi
> You can put whatever you want including URNs in a serialNumber attribute.

	Yes. But we've already decided to move the URN out of the certificate
subject for a couple of reasons.

[...]

> Although true URNs are cool, I
> would still not rule out using HTTP URIs because then the registry part
> would typically point to a web-page showing data associated with the
> identity name space.

	You're right again. But our naming system is already built on URNs. And
we are looking for a way to include them in certificates which would be
acceptable by a common CA.

	Regards
-- 
						Milan Sova




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From: Milan Sova <sova+pkix@cesnet.cz>
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Subject: Re: URN in subjectAltName
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Russ Housley wrote:
> At the time that RFC 2459 was written, URLs were the only things mature
> enough to include here.  No one asked this question during the update to
> RFC 2459, which resulted in RFC 3280.
> 
	I see.

> Going forward, I see two possible ways to go forward:
> 
> 1) Revisit the uri choice, and see if people think URNs ought to be
> permitted.  One obvious question is to determine whether existing
> implementations would fail badly if a URN was received here.
> 
> 2) Define a way to carry URNs in an other name.
> 

	I would very much prefer 1). The URI seems to be the natural place for
URNs. I don't expect any reasonable implementations to fail, but let's
find out.
	BTW X.509 (08/2005) still uses RFC 1630 (mentioning URNs) as the
reference for the uniformResourceIdentifier.

	Regards
-- 
						Milan Sova




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Paul Hoffman wrote:
> 
> At 2:16 AM -0500 1/28/07, Russ Housley wrote:
>> At the time that RFC 2459 was written, URLs were the only things
>> mature enough to include here.  No one asked this question during the
>> update to RFC 2459, which resulted in RFC 3280.
>>
>> Going forward, I see two possible ways to go forward:
>>
>> 1) Revisit the uri choice, and see if people think URNs ought to be
>> permitted.  One obvious question is to determine whether existing
>> implementations would fail badly if a URN was received here.
> 
> This seems like overkill given the low usage of URNs as identifiers that
> are associated with public keys.

	Couldn't it be a kind of a chicken-egg problem?
> 
>> 2) Define a way to carry URNs in an other name.
> 
> Anders and I have suggested two legal ways to do this already.

	I'm not sure I consider storing URNs in X502SerialNumber fully legal.
IMO there is/should be a difference in how a CA verifies those two
pieces of information.

	In principle, I'm not against using a subjectAltName.otherName.URN if
it was standardized. I'd prefer the URI  as a more natural place, though.

	Regards
-- 
						Milan Sova




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Hello

We issue among others certificates for secure email to the public. Our
standard profile uses the email field according RFC 3280. We came to the
conclusion that all newer email implementation can handle email addresses in
the subject field a email. 

We are now in the process of implementing a automatic interface by means of
CMP (RFC 2510). The product attached and tested requests the email in the
certificate extension SubjectAltName. By browsing around I came across RFC
3850 where is stated:

3. Using Distinguished Names for Internet Mail 
End-entity certificates MAY contain an Internet mail address as described in
[RFC-2822 </rfcs/rfc2822.html> ]. The address must be an "addr-spec" as
defined in Section 3.4.1 of that specification. The email address SHOULD be
in the subjectAltName extension, and SHOULD NOT be in the subject
distinguished name. 

My question:
- What is the current standard for implementing email addresses in a X.509
v3 certificate?
- Is the RFC 822 email address in the SubjectAltName still required or just
optional for legacy

Thanks

Lorenz

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<P><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Arial">Hello</FONT>
</P>

<P><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Arial">We issue among others certificates for =
secure email to the public. Our standard profile uses the email field =
according RFC 3280. We came to the conclusion that all newer email =
implementation can handle email addresses in the subject field a email. =
</FONT></P>

<P><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Arial">We are now in the process of =
implementing a automatic interface by means of CMP (RFC 2510). The =
product attached and tested requests the email in the certificate =
extension SubjectAltName. By browsing around I came across RFC 3850 =
where is stated:</FONT></P>

<P><FONT FACE=3D"Times New Roman">3. Using Distinguished Names for =
Internet Mail </FONT>

<BR><FONT FACE=3D"Times New Roman">End-entity certificates MAY contain =
an Internet mail address as described in [</FONT><A =
HREF=3D"file:///rfcs/rfc2822.html"><U><FONT COLOR=3D"#0000FF" =
FACE=3D"Times New Roman">RFC-2822</FONT></U></A><FONT FACE=3D"Times New =
Roman">]. The address must be an &quot;addr-spec&quot; as defined in =
Section 3.4.1 of that specification. The email address SHOULD be in the =
subjectAltName extension, and SHOULD NOT be in the subject distinguished =
name. </FONT></P>

<P><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Arial">My question:</FONT>

<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Arial">- What is the current standard for =
implementing email addresses in a X.509 v3 certificate?</FONT>

<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Arial">- Is the RFC 822 email address in the =
SubjectAltName still required or just optional for legacy</FONT>
</P>

<P><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Arial">Thanks</FONT>
</P>

<P><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Arial">Lorenz</FONT>
</P>

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Subject: RE: PKCS#7 and algorithm identifiers
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> Hi,
>=20
> I try to find out, what are the most commonly used Triple-DES based =
encryption modes inside PKCS#7 envelope?
>=20
> The only used mode that I found was:
>            SEQUENCE {
>                OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { "1.2.840.113549.3.7" },  -- =
DES-EDE3-CBC
>                OCTET_STRING {
>                   #61B3C21F91B94884
>                }
>             },
>=20
>=20
> 1. I didn't find registered OIDs for other Triple DES modes, like for =
example DES-EDE3 (ECB mode)? Is it so, that other Triple-DES modes =
doesn't have registered OIDs and are not used in current =
implementations?
> 2. The RFC 3370 indicates, that this same OID ("1.2.840.113549.3.7") =
is used also for DES-EDE2-CBC, two key version Triple-DES? So, what is =
the common practice: use three key or two key schemes in current =
implementations (PKCS#7 envelopes, S/MIME) under this OID?
>=20
> BR,
> MaSi
> --------------------------------------------
> Markku Siev=E4nen
> R&D Services Development - Identity
> Gemalto c/o Setec Oy
> Tel: +358 (0)9 8941 4253 - +358 (0)40 843 9495
> Fax: +358 (0)9 8941 4143
> P.O.Box 31 (Turvalaaksonkaari 2)
> FI-01741 Vantaa, FINLAND
> markku.sievanen@gemalto.com
> www.gemalto.com
> --------------------------------------------
>=20

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<HTML>
<HEAD>
<META HTTP-EQUIV=3D"Content-Type" CONTENT=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Diso-8859-1">
<META NAME=3D"Generator" CONTENT=3D"MS Exchange Server version =
6.5.7650.28">
<TITLE>RE: PKCS#7 and algorithm identifiers</TITLE>
</HEAD>
<BODY>
<!-- Converted from text/rtf format -->

<P><FONT COLOR=3D"#0000FF" SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">Hi,</FONT>
</P>

<P><FONT COLOR=3D"#0000FF" SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">I try to find =
out, what are the most commonly used Triple-DES based encryption modes =
inside PKCS#7 envelope?</FONT>
</P>

<P><FONT COLOR=3D"#0000FF" SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">The only used =
mode that I found was:</FONT>

<BR><FONT COLOR=3D"#0000FF" SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
SEQUENCE {</FONT>

<BR><FONT COLOR=3D"#0000FF" SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { &quot;1.2.840.113549.3.7&quot; =
},&nbsp; -- DES-EDE3-CBC</FONT>

<BR><FONT COLOR=3D"#0000FF" SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; OCTET_STRING {</FONT>

<BR><FONT COLOR=3D"#0000FF" SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; #61B3C21F91B94884</FONT>

<BR><FONT COLOR=3D"#0000FF" SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; }</FONT>

<BR><FONT COLOR=3D"#0000FF" SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
},</FONT>
</P>
<BR>

<P><FONT COLOR=3D"#0000FF" SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">1. I didn't =
find registered OIDs for other Triple DES modes, like for example =
DES-EDE3 (ECB mode)? Is it so, that other Triple-DES modes doesn't have =
registered OIDs and are not used in current implementations?</FONT></P>

<P><FONT COLOR=3D"#0000FF" SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">2. The RFC 3370 =
indicates, that this same OID (&quot;1.2.840.113549.3.7&quot;) is used =
also for DES-EDE2-CBC, two key version Triple-DES? So, what is the =
common practice: use three key or two key schemes in current =
implementations (PKCS#7 envelopes, S/MIME) under this OID?</FONT></P>

<P><FONT COLOR=3D"#0000FF" SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">BR,</FONT>

<BR><FONT COLOR=3D"#0000FF" SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">MaSi</FONT>

<BR><FONT COLOR=3D"#0000FF" SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">--------------------------------------------</FONT>

<BR><FONT COLOR=3D"#0000FF" SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">Markku =
Siev=E4nen</FONT>

<BR><FONT COLOR=3D"#0000FF" SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">R&amp;D =
Services Development - Identity</FONT>

<BR><FONT COLOR=3D"#0000FF" SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">Gemalto c/o =
Setec Oy</FONT>

<BR><FONT COLOR=3D"#0000FF" SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">Tel: =
+358=A0(0)9=A08941 4253=A0- +358=A0(0)40 843 9495</FONT>

<BR><FONT COLOR=3D"#0000FF" SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">Fax: +358 (0)9 =
8941 4143</FONT>

<BR><FONT COLOR=3D"#0000FF" SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">P.O.Box 31 =
(Turvalaaksonkaari 2)</FONT>

<BR><FONT COLOR=3D"#0000FF" SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">FI-01741 =
Vantaa, FINLAND</FONT>

<BR><FONT COLOR=3D"#0000FF" SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">markku.sievanen@gemalto.com</FONT>

<BR><A HREF=3D"file://www.gemalto.com"><U></U><U><FONT COLOR=3D"#0000FF" =
SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">www.gemalto.com</FONT></U></A>

<BR><FONT COLOR=3D"#0000FF" SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">--------------------------------------------</FONT>
</P>

</BODY>
</HTML>
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From owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Tue Jan 30 04:54:50 2007
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From: Francis Dupont <Francis.Dupont@fdupont.fr>
To: yannick quenechdu <yquenechdu@linagora.com>
cc: md@e-net.lt, ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: Re: source of "Friendly name" 
In-reply-to: Your message of Tue, 30 Jan 2007 00:29:55 +0100.
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 In your previous mail you wrote:

   Moudrick M. Dadashov a ecrit :
   > Hello,
   >
   > anybody knows what is the source of so called "Friendly Name" displayed by
   > Microsoft certificate viewer? I can't find any extensions for this field
   > either.
   >   
   The cert associated with the private key had "friendly name" associated 
   with it. Is similar with alias in JKS file or see
   openssl when you create PKCS12, you have a option "Friendly Name".
   
   Note : friendly names are optional in windows but required by NSS 
   (mozilla). If the PKCS12 file was created without a
   friendly name for the cert, that's why it failed.
   
=> perhaps Moudrick was looking for the OID?
iso(1) member-body(2) US(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) friendlyName(20)

In openssl pkcs12 related options are:
-name "name"  use name as friendly name
-caname "nm"  use nm as CA friendly name (can be used more than once).

Regards

Francis.Dupont@fdupont.fr

PS: PKCS9 is RFC 2985 too, friendlyName is section 5.5.1, syntax is:

   friendlyName ATTRIBUTE ::= {
           WITH SYNTAX BMPString (SIZE(1..pkcs-9-ub-friendlyName))
           EQUALITY MATCHING RULE caseIgnoreMatch
           SINGLE VALUE TRUE
           ID pkcs-9-at-friendlyName
   }

with

   pkcs-9-ub-pkcs9String         INTEGER ::= 255
   pkcs-9-ub-friendlyName        INTEGER ::= pkcs-9-ub-pkcs9String

   pkcs-9 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
                                 rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 9}
   pkcs-9-at-friendlyName             OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-9 20}




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To: <Lorenz.Neher@swisscom.com>, <ietf-pkix@imc.org>
References: <3083A399D5E29B4695E1E4C464D6C63506AB2220@sxmbx05.corproot.net>
Subject: RE: Is eMail address in SubjectAltName still necessary
Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2007 08:11:33 -0500
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Lorenz,
 
See this in RFC 3850:
3.  Using Distinguished Names for Internet Mail



   End-entity certificates MAY contain an Internet mail address as

   described in [RFC-2822].  The address must be an "addr-spec" as

   defined in Section 3.4.1 of that specification.  The email address

   SHOULD be in the subjectAltName extension, and SHOULD NOT be in the

   subject distinguished name.
and this in RFC 3280:

4.1.2.6  Subject
   ...
   Conforming implementations generating new certificates with

   electronic mail addresses MUST use the rfc822Name in the subject

   alternative name field (section 4.2.1.7) to describe such identities.

   Simultaneous inclusion of the EmailAddress attribute in the subject

   distinguished name to support legacy implementations is deprecated

   but permitted.
RFC822 address in subject alternative name is the current, preferred method
of putting email addresses in certificates.  Email address in the subject
name is optional for legacy.
 
--Peter
 
+----------------------------------------------------------------+
| Peter Hesse                     pmhesse@geminisecurity.com     |
| Phone: 703-378-5808 x105      Gemini Security Solutions, Inc.  |
|       Visit our InfoSecurity blog: securitymusings.com
<http://www.securitymusings.com/>          |
+----------------------------------------------------------------+
"The generation of random numbers is too important to be left
 to chance." --Robert R. Coveyou



  _____  

From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] On
Behalf Of Lorenz.Neher@swisscom.com
Sent: Tuesday, January 30, 2007 2:39 AM
To: ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: Is eMail address in SubjectAltName still necessary




Hello 

We issue among others certificates for secure email to the public. Our
standard profile uses the email field according RFC 3280. We came to the
conclusion that all newer email implementation can handle email addresses in
the subject field a email. 

We are now in the process of implementing a automatic interface by means of
CMP (RFC 2510). The product attached and tested requests the email in the
certificate extension SubjectAltName. By browsing around I came across RFC
3850 where is stated:

3. Using Distinguished Names for Internet Mail 
End-entity certificates MAY contain an Internet mail address as described in
[ <file:///rfcs/rfc2822.html> RFC-2822]. The address must be an "addr-spec"
as defined in Section 3.4.1 of that specification. The email address SHOULD
be in the subjectAltName extension, and SHOULD NOT be in the subject
distinguished name. 

My question: 
- What is the current standard for implementing email addresses in a X.509
v3 certificate? 
- Is the RFC 822 email address in the SubjectAltName still required or just
optional for legacy 

Thanks 

Lorenz 


------=_NextPart_000_006A_01C74446.457C9320
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<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN">
<HTML><HEAD>
<META HTTP-EQUIV=3D"Content-Type" CONTENT=3D"text/html; =
charset=3DUS-ASCII">
<TITLE>Is eMail address in SubjectAltName still necessary</TITLE>

<META content=3D"MSHTML 6.00.5730.11" name=3DGENERATOR></HEAD>
<BODY>
<DIV dir=3Dltr align=3Dleft><SPAN class=3D315110813-30012007><FONT=20
face=3D"Comic Sans MS" color=3D#800080 =
size=3D2>Lorenz,</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr align=3Dleft><SPAN class=3D315110813-30012007><FONT=20
face=3D"Comic Sans MS" color=3D#800080 =
size=3D2></FONT></SPAN>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr align=3Dleft><SPAN class=3D315110813-30012007><FONT=20
face=3D"Comic Sans MS" color=3D#800080 size=3D2>See this in RFC=20
3850:</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr align=3Dleft><SPAN class=3D315110813-30012007><PRE>3.  =
Using Distinguished Names for Internet Mail

   End-entity certificates MAY contain an Internet mail address as
   described in [RFC-2822].  The address must be an "addr-spec" as
   defined in Section 3.4.1 of that specification.  The email address
   SHOULD be in the subjectAltName extension, and SHOULD NOT be in the
   subject distinguished name.</PRE></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3D"Comic Sans MS"><FONT color=3D#800080><FONT =
size=3D2><SPAN=20
class=3D315110813-30012007>a</SPAN>nd<SPAN class=3D315110813-30012007>=20
t</SPAN></FONT></FONT></FONT><FONT><FONT><FONT face=3D"Comic Sans MS"=20
color=3D#800080 size=3D2><SPAN class=3D315110813-30012007>his in RFC=20
3280:</SPAN></FONT></FONT></FONT></DIV><PRE><PRE>4.1.2.6  =
Subject</PRE><PRE><SPAN class=3D315110813-30012007></SPAN><SPAN =
class=3D315110813-30012007>   </SPAN>.<SPAN =
class=3D315110813-30012007>..</SPAN>
<PRE>   Conforming implementations generating new certificates with
   electronic mail addresses MUST use the rfc822Name in the subject
   alternative name field (section 4.2.1.7) to describe such identities.
   Simultaneous inclusion of the EmailAddress attribute in the subject
   distinguished name to support legacy implementations is deprecated
   but permitted.</PRE></PRE></PRE>
<DIV><FONT><FONT><FONT face=3D"Comic Sans MS" color=3D#800080 =
size=3D2><SPAN=20
class=3D315110813-30012007>RFC822 address in subject alternative name is =
the=20
current, preferred method of putting email addresses in =
certificates.&nbsp;=20
Email address in the subject name is optional for=20
legacy.</SPAN></FONT></FONT></FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT><FONT><FONT face=3D"Comic Sans MS" color=3D#800080 =
size=3D2><SPAN=20
class=3D315110813-30012007></SPAN></FONT></FONT></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3D"Comic Sans MS"><FONT color=3D#800080><FONT =
size=3D2><SPAN=20
class=3D315110813-30012007>--Peter</SPAN></FONT></FONT></FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3D"Comic Sans MS"><FONT color=3D#800080><FONT =
size=3D2><SPAN=20
class=3D315110813-30012007><FONT face=3D"Courier New" size=3D2><FONT=20
color=3Dgray></FONT></FONT></SPAN></FONT></FONT></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3D"Comic Sans MS"><FONT color=3D#800080><FONT =
size=3D2><SPAN=20
class=3D315110813-30012007><FONT face=3D"Courier New" size=3D2><FONT=20
color=3Dgray>+-----------------------------------------------------------=
-----+<BR>|&nbsp;</FONT><FONT=20
color=3D#3333cc>Peter=20
Hesse</FONT>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<FONT=20
color=3Dblue>pmhesse@geminisecurity.com</FONT>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;<FONT=20
color=3Dgray>|<BR>|&nbsp;</FONT><FONT color=3D#3333cc>Phone: =
703-378-5808=20
x105</FONT>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<FONT =
color=3D#3333cc>Gemini=20
Security Solutions, Inc.&nbsp;&nbsp;</FONT><FONT=20
color=3Dgray>|<BR>|&nbsp;</FONT>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<FONT=
=20
color=3D#3333cc>Visit our InfoSecurity blog: <A=20
href=3D"http://www.securitymusings.com/">securitymusings.com</A></FONT>&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<FONT=20
color=3Dgray>|<BR>+------------------------------------------------------=
----------+<BR><FONT=20
color=3Dteal>"The generation of random numbers is too important to be=20
left<BR>&nbsp;to chance." --Robert R.=20
Coveyou</FONT><BR></DIV></FONT></FONT></SPAN></FONT></FONT></FONT>
<DIV><FONT face=3D"Comic Sans MS" color=3D#800080 =
size=3D2></FONT><BR></DIV>
<DIV class=3DOutlookMessageHeader lang=3Den-us dir=3Dltr align=3Dleft>
<HR tabIndex=3D-1>
<FONT face=3DTahoma size=3D2><B>From:</B> owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org=20
[mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] <B>On Behalf Of=20
</B>Lorenz.Neher@swisscom.com<BR><B>Sent:</B> Tuesday, January 30, 2007 =
2:39=20
AM<BR><B>To:</B> ietf-pkix@imc.org<BR><B>Subject:</B> Is eMail address =
in=20
SubjectAltName still necessary<BR></FONT><BR></DIV>
<DIV></DIV><!-- Converted from text/rtf format --><BR>
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Hello</FONT> </P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>We issue among others certificates for =
secure email=20
to the public. Our standard profile uses the email field according RFC =
3280. We=20
came to the conclusion that all newer email implementation can handle =
email=20
addresses in the subject field a email. </FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>We are now in the process of implementing =
a automatic=20
interface by means of CMP (RFC 2510). The product attached and tested =
requests=20
the email in the certificate extension SubjectAltName. By browsing =
around I came=20
across RFC 3850 where is stated:</FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3D"Times New Roman">3. Using Distinguished Names for =
Internet Mail=20
</FONT><BR><FONT face=3D"Times New Roman">End-entity certificates MAY =
contain an=20
Internet mail address as described in [</FONT><A=20
href=3D"file:///rfcs/rfc2822.html"><U><FONT face=3D"Times New Roman"=20
color=3D#0000ff>RFC-2822</FONT></U></A><FONT face=3D"Times New Roman">]. =
The address=20
must be an "addr-spec" as defined in Section 3.4.1 of that =
specification. The=20
email address SHOULD be in the subjectAltName extension, and SHOULD NOT =
be in=20
the subject distinguished name. </FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>My question:</FONT> <BR><FONT =
face=3DArial size=3D2>-=20
What is the current standard for implementing email addresses in a X.509 =
v3=20
certificate?</FONT> <BR><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>- Is the RFC 822 =
email address=20
in the SubjectAltName still required or just optional for legacy</FONT> =
</P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Thanks</FONT> </P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Lorenz</FONT> </P></BODY></HTML>

------=_NextPart_000_006A_01C74446.457C9320--




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Subject: RE: source of "Friendly name" 
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From: Ryan Hurst <Ryan.Hurst@microsoft.com>
To: Francis Dupont <Francis.Dupont@fdupont.fr>,
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CryptoAPI doesn't (normally) use Friendly Names as extensions in
certificates but instead uses them as properties that stored with a
certificate, it's a label provided by the user/application at generation
time that can be used to identify a specific certificate without
certificate specific knowledge.

Think of values like "My Bank Certificate", "My Work Certificate", etc.

When CryptoAPI exports a certificate into a P12 it also stores (if I
recal correctly) the friendly name if it was there.

Ryan

-----Original Message-----
From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org]
On Behalf Of Francis Dupont
Sent: Tuesday, January 30, 2007 12:42 AM
To: yannick quenechdu
Cc: md@e-net.lt; ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: Re: source of "Friendly name" 


 In your previous mail you wrote:

   Moudrick M. Dadashov a ecrit :
   > Hello,
   >
   > anybody knows what is the source of so called "Friendly Name"
displayed by
   > Microsoft certificate viewer? I can't find any extensions for this
field
   > either.
   >   
   The cert associated with the private key had "friendly name"
associated 
   with it. Is similar with alias in JKS file or see
   openssl when you create PKCS12, you have a option "Friendly Name".
   
   Note : friendly names are optional in windows but required by NSS 
   (mozilla). If the PKCS12 file was created without a
   friendly name for the cert, that's why it failed.
   
=> perhaps Moudrick was looking for the OID?
iso(1) member-body(2) US(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
friendlyName(20)

In openssl pkcs12 related options are:
-name "name"  use name as friendly name
-caname "nm"  use nm as CA friendly name (can be used more than once).

Regards

Francis.Dupont@fdupont.fr

PS: PKCS9 is RFC 2985 too, friendlyName is section 5.5.1, syntax is:

   friendlyName ATTRIBUTE ::= {
           WITH SYNTAX BMPString (SIZE(1..pkcs-9-ub-friendlyName))
           EQUALITY MATCHING RULE caseIgnoreMatch
           SINGLE VALUE TRUE
           ID pkcs-9-at-friendlyName
   }

with

   pkcs-9-ub-pkcs9String         INTEGER ::= 255
   pkcs-9-ub-friendlyName        INTEGER ::= pkcs-9-ub-pkcs9String

   pkcs-9 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
                                 rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 9}
   pkcs-9-at-friendlyName             OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-9 20}






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Given these recommendations, how, for example, would I validate a digital
signature on an s/mime email signed using SHA-256 using Microsoft Outlook
running on Windows XP?  Is this only possible by using third party crypto
software?

Dave S.

>
> Roger & Steve:
>
>>Also, upon further reflection, I agree that since this is a
>>self-signed cert, which presumably has been delivered via an
>>out-of-band path that is considered integrity secure, the concerns
>>over use of SHA-1 may be overstated.
>
> I think that Santosh's note explained the point about self-signed
> certificates.  In my response, I assumed that the same signature
> algorithm would be used for certificates that are subordinate to the
> self-signed certificate.  Thus my comments about 20 year validity periods.
>
> If the self-signed public keys are being used to validate digital
> signatures, similar issues arise.
>
> Russ
>
>


-- 
Regards,
David Simonetti
Jacob & Sundstrom, Inc.
410-356-1067




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Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2007 09:02:28 -0500
To: <Lorenz.Neher@swisscom.com>
From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
Subject: Re: Is eMail address in SubjectAltName still necessary
Cc: <ietf-pkix@imc.org>
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At 8:39 AM +0100 1/30/07, <Lorenz.Neher@swisscom.com> wrote:
>Hello
>
>We issue among others certificates for secure email to the public. 
>Our standard profile uses the email field according RFC 3280. We 
>came to the conclusion that all newer email implementation can 
>handle email addresses in the subject field a email.
>
>We are now in the process of implementing a automatic interface by 
>means of CMP (RFC 2510). The product attached and tested requests 
>the email in the certificate extension SubjectAltName. By browsing 
>around I came across RFC 3850 where is stated:
>
>3. Using Distinguished Names for Internet Mail
>End-entity certificates MAY contain an Internet mail address as 
>described in [<file:///rfcs/rfc2822.html>RFC-2822]. The address must 
>be an "addr-spec" as defined in Section 3.4.1 of that specification. 
>The email address SHOULD be in the subjectAltName extension, and 
>SHOULD NOT be in the subject distinguished name.
>
>My question:
>- What is the current standard for implementing email addresses in a 
>X.509 v3 certificate?
>- Is the RFC 822 email address in the SubjectAltName still required 
>or just optional for legacy
>
>Thanks
>
>Lorenz

Lorenz,

The situation is really the opposite of what you ask in your last 
question, i.e., putting an e-mail address in the Subject DN is the 
legacy approach. RFC 3280 strongly prefers putting an e-mail address 
in the SAN over putting it in the Subject DN.

Steve
--============_-1041956459==_ma============
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<!doctype html public "-//W3C//DTD W3 HTML//EN">
<html><head><style type="text/css"><!--
blockquote, dl, ul, ol, li { padding-top: 0 ; padding-bottom: 0 }
 --></style><title>Re: Is eMail address in SubjectAltName still
necessary</title></head><body>
<div>At 8:39 AM +0100 1/30/07, &lt;Lorenz.Neher@swisscom.com&gt;
wrote:</div>
<blockquote type="cite" cite><font face="Arial"
size="-1">Hello</font><br>
</blockquote>
<blockquote type="cite" cite><font face="Arial" size="-1">We issue
among others certificates for secure email to the public. Our standard
profile uses the email field according RFC 3280. We came to the
conclusion that all newer email implementation can handle email
addresses in the subject field a email.</font><br>
</blockquote>
<blockquote type="cite" cite><font face="Arial" size="-1">We are now
in the process of implementing a automatic interface by means of CMP
(RFC 2510). The product attached and tested requests the email in the
certificate extension SubjectAltName. By browsing around I came across
RFC 3850 where is stated:</font><br>
</blockquote>
<blockquote type="cite" cite><font face="Times New Roman">3. Using
Distinguished Names for Internet Mail</font><br>
<font face="Times New Roman">End-entity certificates MAY contain an
Internet mail address as described in [</font><a
href="file:///rfcs/rfc2822.html"><font face="Times New Roman"
color="#0000FF"><u>RFC-2822</u></font></a><font
face="Times New Roman">]. The address must be an &quot;addr-spec&quot;
as defined in Section 3.4.1 of that specification. The email address
SHOULD be in the subjectAltName extension, and SHOULD NOT be in the
subject distinguished name.</font><br>
</blockquote>
<blockquote type="cite" cite><font face="Arial" size="-1">My
question:</font><br>
<font face="Arial" size="-1">- What is the current standard for
implementing email addresses in a X.509 v3 certificate?</font><br>
<font face="Arial" size="-1">- Is the RFC 822 email address in the
SubjectAltName still required or just optional for legacy</font><br>
</blockquote>
<blockquote type="cite" cite><font face="Arial"
size="-1">Thanks</font><br>
</blockquote>
<blockquote type="cite" cite><font face="Arial"
size="-1">Lorenz</font></blockquote>
<div><br></div>
<div>Lorenz,</div>
<div><br></div>
<div>The situation is really the opposite of what you ask in your last
question, i.e., putting an e-mail address in the Subject DN is the
legacy approach. RFC 3280 strongly prefers putting an e-mail address
in the SAN over putting it in the Subject DN. </div>
<div><br></div>
<div>Steve</div>
</body>
</html>
--============_-1041956459==_ma============--




From owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Tue Jan 30 10:49:51 2007
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Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2007 09:31:13 -0500 (EST)
Subject: Re: URN in subjectAltName
From: "David Simonetti" <dsimonetti@jasi.com>
To: "Paul Hoffman" <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
Cc: "Russ Housley" <housley@vigilsec.com>, "Milan Sova" <sova+pkix@cesnet.cz>,
        ietf-pkix@vpnc.org
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A US Federal agency which I support is planning on using the otherName
field to convey the URN.  This agency is issuing more than 80,000
certificates.  I think use of URN more be more prevelant with those
implementing Active Directory than is realized.

I believe defining URN via otherName is sufficient.  We're conveying it as
a UTF8String.

Dave S.

>
> At 2:16 AM -0500 1/28/07, Russ Housley wrote:
>>At the time that RFC 2459 was written, URLs were the only things
>>mature enough to include here.  No one asked this question during
>>the update to RFC 2459, which resulted in RFC 3280.
>>
>>Going forward, I see two possible ways to go forward:
>>
>>1) Revisit the uri choice, and see if people think URNs ought to be
>>permitted.  One obvious question is to determine whether existing
>>implementations would fail badly if a URN was received here.
>
> This seems like overkill given the low usage of URNs as identifiers
> that are associated with public keys.
>
>>2) Define a way to carry URNs in an other name.
>
> Anders and I have suggested two legal ways to do this already.
>
> --Paul Hoffman, Director
> --VPN Consortium
>
>


-- 
Regards,
David Simonetti
Jacob & Sundstrom, Inc.
410-356-1067




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To: "SIEVANEN Markku" <Markku.SIEVANEN@gemalto.com>
From: Mike Markowitz <markowitz@infoseccorp.com>
Subject: RE: PKCS#7 and algorithm identifiers
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<html>
<body>
At 02:11 AM 1/30/2007, SIEVANEN Markku wrote:<br><br>
<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite=""><font size=2 color="#0000FF">1.
I didn't find registered OIDs for other Triple DES modes, like for
example DES-EDE3 (ECB mode)? Is it so, that other Triple-DES modes
doesn't have registered OIDs and are not used in current
implementations?</font></blockquote><br>
Markku:<br><br>
DES-EDE3-ECB appears to be registered under {iso(1)
identified-organization(3) oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithms(2) desEDE(17)}
(&quot;1.3.14.3.2.17&quot;). It's used for voice encryption and
specified<br>
in ITU-T Recommendation H.325.<br><br>
Other variations:<br><br>
3DesECB: {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) private(4)
enterprise(1) 4929 1 7}<br>
(&quot;1.3.6.1.4.1.4929.1.7&quot;)<br><br>
DES_3ECB_pad: {iso(1) identified-organization(3) teletrust(36)
algorithm(3) encryptionAlgorithm(1) des-3(3) 1 1}
(&quot;1.3.36.3.1.3.1.1&quot;)<br><br>
e.g.:<br><br>
DES_3ECB_ISOpad: {iso(1) identified-organization(3) teletrust(36)
algorithm(3) encryptionAlgorithm(1) des-3(3) 1 1 1}
(&quot;1.3.36.3.1.3.1.1.1&quot;)<br><br>
And other modes from our Russian friends:<br><br>
3DesCBC: {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) private(4)
enterprise(1) 4929 1 8}<br>
(&quot;1.3.6.1.4.1.4929.1.8&quot;)<br><br>
3DesCFB: {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) private(4)
enterprise(1) 4929 1 10}<br>
(&quot;1.3.6.1.4.1.4929.1.10&quot;)<br><br>
3DesOFB: {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) private(4)
enterprise(1) 4929 1 9}<br>
(&quot;1.3.6.1.4.1.4929.1.9&quot;)<br><br>
<br>
<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite=""><font size=2 color="#0000FF">2.
The RFC 3370 indicates, that this same OID
(&quot;1.2.840.113549.3.7&quot;) is used also for DES-EDE2-CBC, two key
version Triple-DES? So, what is the common practice: use three key or two
key schemes in current implementations (PKCS#7 envelopes, S/MIME) under
this OID?</font></blockquote><br>
Not sure there is any &quot;common practice,&quot; except for maybe
choosing one scheme for output<br>
and making sure you're able to handle anything on input... assuming
you're worried<br>
about compatibility.<br><br>
-mjm<br><br>
</body>
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From: David Cross <David.Cross@microsoft.com>
To: David Simonetti <dsimonetti@jasi.com>, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
CC: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>, ROGER YOUNGLOVE <ryounglove1@msn.com>,
        "ietf-pkix@imc.org" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>
Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2007 14:37:35 -0800
Subject: RE: SHA 1 vs. SHA 256 for Root CA
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Hi Dave:

Responding only for your specific query, Windows Vista and Office 2007 support both SHA-256 as well as other SuiteB algorithms.  Unfortunately, SHA-2 support in Outlook is not currently possible with Windows XP and/or Office XP.



David B. Cross


-----Original Message-----
From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of David Simonetti
Sent: Tuesday, January 30, 2007 6:18 AM
To: Russ Housley
Cc: Stephen Kent; ROGER YOUNGLOVE; ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: RE: SHA 1 vs. SHA 256 for Root CA


Given these recommendations, how, for example, would I validate a digital
signature on an s/mime email signed using SHA-256 using Microsoft Outlook
running on Windows XP?  Is this only possible by using third party crypto
software?

Dave S.

>
> Roger & Steve:
>
>>Also, upon further reflection, I agree that since this is a
>>self-signed cert, which presumably has been delivered via an
>>out-of-band path that is considered integrity secure, the concerns
>>over use of SHA-1 may be overstated.
>
> I think that Santosh's note explained the point about self-signed
> certificates.  In my response, I assumed that the same signature
> algorithm would be used for certificates that are subordinate to the
> self-signed certificate.  Thus my comments about 20 year validity periods.
>
> If the self-signed public keys are being used to validate digital
> signatures, similar issues arise.
>
> Russ
>
>


--
Regards,
David Simonetti
Jacob & Sundstrom, Inc.
410-356-1067





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Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2007 19:59:52 -0500
To: "David Simonetti" <dsimonetti@jasi.com>
From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
Subject: Re: URN in subjectAltName
Cc: ietf-pkix@vpnc.org
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David:

Can you document what you are doing so that everyone that needs a URN 
can do it the same way?

Russ


At 09:31 AM 1/30/2007, David Simonetti wrote:
>A US Federal agency which I support is planning on using the otherName
>field to convey the URN.  This agency is issuing more than 80,000
>certificates.  I think use of URN more be more prevelant with those
>implementing Active Directory than is realized.
>
>I believe defining URN via otherName is sufficient.  We're conveying it as
>a UTF8String.
>
>Dave S.
>
> >
> > At 2:16 AM -0500 1/28/07, Russ Housley wrote:
> >>At the time that RFC 2459 was written, URLs were the only things
> >>mature enough to include here.  No one asked this question during
> >>the update to RFC 2459, which resulted in RFC 3280.
> >>
> >>Going forward, I see two possible ways to go forward:
> >>
> >>1) Revisit the uri choice, and see if people think URNs ought to be
> >>permitted.  One obvious question is to determine whether existing
> >>implementations would fail badly if a URN was received here.
> >
> > This seems like overkill given the low usage of URNs as identifiers
> > that are associated with public keys.
> >
> >>2) Define a way to carry URNs in an other name.
> >
> > Anders and I have suggested two legal ways to do this already.
> >
> > --Paul Hoffman, Director
> > --VPN Consortium
> >
> >
>
>
>--
>Regards,
>David Simonetti
>Jacob & Sundstrom, Inc.
>410-356-1067




From owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Wed Jan 31 07:00:15 2007
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From: Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org>
To: ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: Authority Key Identifier values
OpenPGP: id=B565716F; url=http://josefsson.org/key.txt
Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2007 11:52:19 +0100
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Hi!  I'm not certain how to populate the Authority Key Identifiers
field, and draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-07.txt appear to give me two
different solutions to my problem.  I'd appreciate some advice here.

Our problem is when signing new certificates, the Authority Key
Identifier fields we generate for the new certificate doesn't
necessarily match the Subject Key Identifier field in the CA
certificate.  Our current logic is to set the AKI in the new cert to
what we compute for the public key used for signing.  Presumably, this
was based on the following requirement in the AKI-section 4.2.1.1:

   The value of the keyIdentifier field SHOULD be derived from the
   public key used to verify the certificate's signature or a method
   that generates unique values.

Let's call that Approach A.

This leads to problems when someone uses software that uses another
algorithm to compute the Key Identifier values.  The CA certificate
for a public key P will contain a SKI of H(P)=X, which is all fine,
but the EEC we generate will contain an AKI of H'(P)=Y.  The algorithm
H and H' are those discussed in section 4.2.1.2 or, as the text
permits, any other method.  Essentially, H appears to be
non-standardized.

My common sense, and section 4.2.1.1, suggests that another approach
can be used:

   The authority key identifier extension provides a means of
   identifying the public key corresponding to the private key used to
   sign a certificate.  ... The identification MAY be based on either
   the key identifier (the subject key identifier in the issuer's
   certificate) or ...

This suggests to me that implementations should copy the SKI from the
CA cert used when signing into the AKI in the new certificate.
(Approach B.)

Which approach is correct?  Am I reading the standard incorrectly
here, or is there room for improvement?  There seems to be no real
strong language on what the AKI value MUST be set to when generating
certificates, at least no text that I've found.

A related question is whether non-matching AKI/SKI's should trigger
certificate chain validation failures.  I cannot find where such a
check is required in draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-07.txt.  We know there
are software out there that performs this test, since that is what
prompted me to debug this problem.  Would such behaviour be incorrect?

/Simon




From owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org Wed Jan 31 08:17:21 2007
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Approach B should be used so that AKID and SKID chain.  It is less
critical how the AKID and SKID are calculated (that is why 3280 say
"SHOULD" for the algorithm and not MUST or SHALL).

As to path validation, AKID SKID must not be matched.  Again, see 3280
Section 6.  There is no rule for it.

But, AKID/SKID should be used in path development to prefer paths that
are likely to succeed.  The most likely benefit of this preference in
path development is to filter our CA certificates (e.g., due to re-key)
that are not likely to lead to success.   (If you use HTTP AIA and give
a new name to  each HTTP resource when the CA re-keys, you will always
have only one certificate to check in the Enterprise PKI architecture
where a CA has only one parent).

-----Original Message-----
From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org]
On Behalf Of Simon Josefsson
Sent: Wednesday, January 31, 2007 5:52 AM
To: ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: Authority Key Identifier values


Hi!  I'm not certain how to populate the Authority Key Identifiers
field, and draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-07.txt appear to give me two
different solutions to my problem.  I'd appreciate some advice here.

Our problem is when signing new certificates, the Authority Key
Identifier fields we generate for the new certificate doesn't
necessarily match the Subject Key Identifier field in the CA
certificate.  Our current logic is to set the AKI in the new cert to
what we compute for the public key used for signing.  Presumably, this
was based on the following requirement in the AKI-section 4.2.1.1:

   The value of the keyIdentifier field SHOULD be derived from the
   public key used to verify the certificate's signature or a method
   that generates unique values.

Let's call that Approach A.

This leads to problems when someone uses software that uses another
algorithm to compute the Key Identifier values.  The CA certificate
for a public key P will contain a SKI of H(P)=X, which is all fine,
but the EEC we generate will contain an AKI of H'(P)=Y.  The algorithm
H and H' are those discussed in section 4.2.1.2 or, as the text
permits, any other method.  Essentially, H appears to be
non-standardized.

My common sense, and section 4.2.1.1, suggests that another approach
can be used:

   The authority key identifier extension provides a means of
   identifying the public key corresponding to the private key used to
   sign a certificate.  ... The identification MAY be based on either
   the key identifier (the subject key identifier in the issuer's
   certificate) or ...

This suggests to me that implementations should copy the SKI from the
CA cert used when signing into the AKI in the new certificate.
(Approach B.)

Which approach is correct?  Am I reading the standard incorrectly
here, or is there room for improvement?  There seems to be no real
strong language on what the AKI value MUST be set to when generating
certificates, at least no text that I've found.

A related question is whether non-matching AKI/SKI's should trigger
certificate chain validation failures.  I cannot find where such a
check is required in draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-07.txt.  We know there
are software out there that performs this test, since that is what
prompted me to debug this problem.  Would such behaviour be incorrect?

/Simon





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Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2007 08:07:54 -0500
To: Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org>
From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
Subject: Re: Authority Key Identifier values
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At 11:52 AM +0100 1/31/07, Simon Josefsson wrote:
>Hi!  I'm not certain how to populate the Authority Key Identifiers
>field, and draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-07.txt appear to give me two
>different solutions to my problem.  I'd appreciate some advice here.
>
>Our problem is when signing new certificates, the Authority Key
>Identifier fields we generate for the new certificate doesn't
>necessarily match the Subject Key Identifier field in the CA
>certificate.

Then you have a bug :-).

The text in 3280 that allows for choices in how to generate an 
AKI/SKI is not meant to override the path discovery logic that 
motivates the existence of these extensions. The choices offered re 
how to compute these values are there to accommodate different 
AKI/SKI determination options, but one must still maintain 
consistency between the option used for both values, when acting as a 
CA (vs. as a subject). If you don't, then RPs cannot make use of the 
AKI/SKI pair to disambiguate among multiple CA certs with the same 
Subject name.


>...
>
>A related question is whether non-matching AKI/SKI's should trigger
>certificate chain validation failures.  I cannot find where such a
>check is required in draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-07.txt.  We know there
>are software out there that performs this test, since that is what
>prompted me to debug this problem.  Would such behaviour be incorrect?

The SKI/AKI extensions are used for path discovery, not path 
validation, so one ought not consider a cert invalid if these fields 
do not match.

Steve




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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
Subject: Re: Authority Key Identifier values
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The point is to aid in cert path construction, so the values need to match.

Russ

At 05:52 AM 1/31/2007, Simon Josefsson wrote:

>Hi!  I'm not certain how to populate the Authority Key Identifiers
>field, and draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-07.txt appear to give me two
>different solutions to my problem.  I'd appreciate some advice here.
>
>Our problem is when signing new certificates, the Authority Key
>Identifier fields we generate for the new certificate doesn't
>necessarily match the Subject Key Identifier field in the CA
>certificate.  Our current logic is to set the AKI in the new cert to
>what we compute for the public key used for signing.  Presumably, this
>was based on the following requirement in the AKI-section 4.2.1.1:
>
>    The value of the keyIdentifier field SHOULD be derived from the
>    public key used to verify the certificate's signature or a method
>    that generates unique values.
>
>Let's call that Approach A.
>
>This leads to problems when someone uses software that uses another
>algorithm to compute the Key Identifier values.  The CA certificate
>for a public key P will contain a SKI of H(P)=X, which is all fine,
>but the EEC we generate will contain an AKI of H'(P)=Y.  The algorithm
>H and H' are those discussed in section 4.2.1.2 or, as the text
>permits, any other method.  Essentially, H appears to be
>non-standardized.
>
>My common sense, and section 4.2.1.1, suggests that another approach
>can be used:
>
>    The authority key identifier extension provides a means of
>    identifying the public key corresponding to the private key used to
>    sign a certificate.  ... The identification MAY be based on either
>    the key identifier (the subject key identifier in the issuer's
>    certificate) or ...
>
>This suggests to me that implementations should copy the SKI from the
>CA cert used when signing into the AKI in the new certificate.
>(Approach B.)
>
>Which approach is correct?  Am I reading the standard incorrectly
>here, or is there room for improvement?  There seems to be no real
>strong language on what the AKI value MUST be set to when generating
>certificates, at least no text that I've found.
>
>A related question is whether non-matching AKI/SKI's should trigger
>certificate chain validation failures.  I cannot find where such a
>check is required in draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-07.txt.  We know there
>are software out there that performs this test, since that is what
>prompted me to debug this problem.  Would such behaviour be incorrect?
>
>/Simon




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To: Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org>
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In general, each CA should determine the key identifier value for its 
own key pair.  If the CA generates a self-signed certificate, it should 
place that key identifier value in the subjectKeyIdentifier extension of 
the self-signed certificate.  It should also place that key identifier 
value in the authorityKeyIdentifier extension of all non-self-signed 
certificates that it signs with the corresponding private key.  When 
selecting a key identifier, the CA should follow the guidance in section 
4.2.1.2 for deriving key identifiers.

When issuing cross-certificate (i.e., a CA certificate in which the 
issuer and subject are different CAs), the issuer should use the key 
identifier value provided by the subject in the subjectKeyIdentifer 
extension rather than computing a value for inclusion in the extension.

In a hierarchical PKI, it may be acceptable for a superior CA to select 
the key identifier for a subordinate CA's key pair, include that key 
identifier in the subjectKeyIdentifier extension of a certificate issued 
to the subordinate CA, and then expect the subordinate CA to use that 
key identifier in the authorityKeyIdentifier extension of all 
certificates that the subordinate CA issues.  But, in a non-hierarchical 
environment, in which a CA may be issued cross-certificates by several 
other CAs, the only option is for the CA to select the key identifier 
for its key pair and then request that any CA that issues it a 
certificate include that key identifier in the subjectKeyIdentifer 
extension.  Note that section 4.2.1.2 states:

      In conforming CA certificates, the value of the
      subject key identifier MUST be the value placed in the key identifier
      field of the Authority Key Identifier extension (section 4.2.1.1) of
      certificates issued by the subject of this certificate.  Applications
      are not required to verify that key identifiers match when performing
      certification path validation.

Dave

Simon Josefsson wrote:
> Hi!  I'm not certain how to populate the Authority Key Identifiers
> field, and draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-07.txt appear to give me two
> different solutions to my problem.  I'd appreciate some advice here.
>
> Our problem is when signing new certificates, the Authority Key
> Identifier fields we generate for the new certificate doesn't
> necessarily match the Subject Key Identifier field in the CA
> certificate.  Our current logic is to set the AKI in the new cert to
> what we compute for the public key used for signing.  Presumably, this
> was based on the following requirement in the AKI-section 4.2.1.1:
>
>    The value of the keyIdentifier field SHOULD be derived from the
>    public key used to verify the certificate's signature or a method
>    that generates unique values.
>
> Let's call that Approach A.
>
> This leads to problems when someone uses software that uses another
> algorithm to compute the Key Identifier values.  The CA certificate
> for a public key P will contain a SKI of H(P)=X, which is all fine,
> but the EEC we generate will contain an AKI of H'(P)=Y.  The algorithm
> H and H' are those discussed in section 4.2.1.2 or, as the text
> permits, any other method.  Essentially, H appears to be
> non-standardized.
>
> My common sense, and section 4.2.1.1, suggests that another approach
> can be used:
>
>    The authority key identifier extension provides a means of
>    identifying the public key corresponding to the private key used to
>    sign a certificate.  ... The identification MAY be based on either
>    the key identifier (the subject key identifier in the issuer's
>    certificate) or ...
>
> This suggests to me that implementations should copy the SKI from the
> CA cert used when signing into the AKI in the new certificate.
> (Approach B.)
>
> Which approach is correct?  Am I reading the standard incorrectly
> here, or is there room for improvement?  There seems to be no real
> strong language on what the AKI value MUST be set to when generating
> certificates, at least no text that I've found.
>
> A related question is whether non-matching AKI/SKI's should trigger
> certificate chain validation failures.  I cannot find where such a
> check is required in draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-07.txt.  We know there
> are software out there that performs this test, since that is what
> prompted me to debug this problem.  Would such behaviour be incorrect?
>
> /Simon
>   




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Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2007 12:51:19 -0500 (EST)
Subject: Re: URN in subjectAltName
From: "David Simonetti" <dsimonetti@jasi.com>
To: "Russ Housley" <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Russ,

We're using Active Directory UPNs, not URNs.  I was wondering why this was
a big deal.

Dave S.

>
> David:
>
> Can you document what you are doing so that everyone that needs a URN
> can do it the same way?
>
> Russ
>
>
> At 09:31 AM 1/30/2007, David Simonetti wrote:
>>A US Federal agency which I support is planning on using the otherName
>>field to convey the URN.  This agency is issuing more than 80,000
>>certificates.  I think use of URN more be more prevelant with those
>>implementing Active Directory than is realized.
>>
>>I believe defining URN via otherName is sufficient.  We're conveying it
>> as
>>a UTF8String.
>>
>>Dave S.
>>
>> >
>> > At 2:16 AM -0500 1/28/07, Russ Housley wrote:
>> >>At the time that RFC 2459 was written, URLs were the only things
>> >>mature enough to include here.  No one asked this question during
>> >>the update to RFC 2459, which resulted in RFC 3280.
>> >>
>> >>Going forward, I see two possible ways to go forward:
>> >>
>> >>1) Revisit the uri choice, and see if people think URNs ought to be
>> >>permitted.  One obvious question is to determine whether existing
>> >>implementations would fail badly if a URN was received here.
>> >
>> > This seems like overkill given the low usage of URNs as identifiers
>> > that are associated with public keys.
>> >
>> >>2) Define a way to carry URNs in an other name.
>> >
>> > Anders and I have suggested two legal ways to do this already.
>> >
>> > --Paul Hoffman, Director
>> > --VPN Consortium
>> >
>> >
>>
>>
>>--
>>Regards,
>>David Simonetti
>>Jacob & Sundstrom, Inc.
>>410-356-1067
>
>


-- 
Regards,
David Simonetti
Jacob & Sundstrom, Inc.
410-356-1067




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References: <45B94A66.3030107@cesnet.cz> <7.0.0.16.2.20070128021208.049264f8@vigilsec.com> <p0624087ec1e32ac2e8f9@[10.20.30.108]> <13947.199.173.224.25.1170167473.squirrel@my.jasi.com> <7.0.0.16.2.20070130195847.04bac5b8@vigilsec.com>
Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2007 12:51:19 -0500 (EST)
Subject: Re: URN in subjectAltName
From: "David Simonetti" <dsimonetti@jasi.com>
To: "Russ Housley" <housley@vigilsec.com>
Cc: ietf-pkix@vpnc.org
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Russ,

We're using Active Directory UPNs, not URNs.  I was wondering why this was
a big deal.

Dave S.

>
> David:
>
> Can you document what you are doing so that everyone that needs a URN
> can do it the same way?
>
> Russ
>
>
> At 09:31 AM 1/30/2007, David Simonetti wrote:
>>A US Federal agency which I support is planning on using the otherName
>>field to convey the URN.  This agency is issuing more than 80,000
>>certificates.  I think use of URN more be more prevelant with those
>>implementing Active Directory than is realized.
>>
>>I believe defining URN via otherName is sufficient.  We're conveying it
>> as
>>a UTF8String.
>>
>>Dave S.
>>
>> >
>> > At 2:16 AM -0500 1/28/07, Russ Housley wrote:
>> >>At the time that RFC 2459 was written, URLs were the only things
>> >>mature enough to include here.  No one asked this question during
>> >>the update to RFC 2459, which resulted in RFC 3280.
>> >>
>> >>Going forward, I see two possible ways to go forward:
>> >>
>> >>1) Revisit the uri choice, and see if people think URNs ought to be
>> >>permitted.  One obvious question is to determine whether existing
>> >>implementations would fail badly if a URN was received here.
>> >
>> > This seems like overkill given the low usage of URNs as identifiers
>> > that are associated with public keys.
>> >
>> >>2) Define a way to carry URNs in an other name.
>> >
>> > Anders and I have suggested two legal ways to do this already.
>> >
>> > --Paul Hoffman, Director
>> > --VPN Consortium
>> >
>> >
>>
>>
>>--
>>Regards,
>>David Simonetti
>>Jacob & Sundstrom, Inc.
>>410-356-1067
>
>


-- 
Regards,
David Simonetti
Jacob & Sundstrom, Inc.
410-356-1067



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To: Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org>
CC: ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: Re: Authority Key Identifier values
References: <87fy9r79jw.fsf@latte.josefsson.org>
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In general, each CA should determine the key identifier value for its 
own key pair.  If the CA generates a self-signed certificate, it should 
place that key identifier value in the subjectKeyIdentifier extension of 
the self-signed certificate.  It should also place that key identifier 
value in the authorityKeyIdentifier extension of all non-self-signed 
certificates that it signs with the corresponding private key.  When 
selecting a key identifier, the CA should follow the guidance in section 
4.2.1.2 for deriving key identifiers.

When issuing cross-certificate (i.e., a CA certificate in which the 
issuer and subject are different CAs), the issuer should use the key 
identifier value provided by the subject in the subjectKeyIdentifer 
extension rather than computing a value for inclusion in the extension.

In a hierarchical PKI, it may be acceptable for a superior CA to select 
the key identifier for a subordinate CA's key pair, include that key 
identifier in the subjectKeyIdentifier extension of a certificate issued 
to the subordinate CA, and then expect the subordinate CA to use that 
key identifier in the authorityKeyIdentifier extension of all 
certificates that the subordinate CA issues.  But, in a non-hierarchical 
environment, in which a CA may be issued cross-certificates by several 
other CAs, the only option is for the CA to select the key identifier 
for its key pair and then request that any CA that issues it a 
certificate include that key identifier in the subjectKeyIdentifer 
extension.  Note that section 4.2.1.2 states:

      In conforming CA certificates, the value of the
      subject key identifier MUST be the value placed in the key identifier
      field of the Authority Key Identifier extension (section 4.2.1.1) of
      certificates issued by the subject of this certificate.  Applications
      are not required to verify that key identifiers match when performing
      certification path validation.

Dave

Simon Josefsson wrote:
> Hi!  I'm not certain how to populate the Authority Key Identifiers
> field, and draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-07.txt appear to give me two
> different solutions to my problem.  I'd appreciate some advice here.
>
> Our problem is when signing new certificates, the Authority Key
> Identifier fields we generate for the new certificate doesn't
> necessarily match the Subject Key Identifier field in the CA
> certificate.  Our current logic is to set the AKI in the new cert to
> what we compute for the public key used for signing.  Presumably, this
> was based on the following requirement in the AKI-section 4.2.1.1:
>
>    The value of the keyIdentifier field SHOULD be derived from the
>    public key used to verify the certificate's signature or a method
>    that generates unique values.
>
> Let's call that Approach A.
>
> This leads to problems when someone uses software that uses another
> algorithm to compute the Key Identifier values.  The CA certificate
> for a public key P will contain a SKI of H(P)=X, which is all fine,
> but the EEC we generate will contain an AKI of H'(P)=Y.  The algorithm
> H and H' are those discussed in section 4.2.1.2 or, as the text
> permits, any other method.  Essentially, H appears to be
> non-standardized.
>
> My common sense, and section 4.2.1.1, suggests that another approach
> can be used:
>
>    The authority key identifier extension provides a means of
>    identifying the public key corresponding to the private key used to
>    sign a certificate.  ... The identification MAY be based on either
>    the key identifier (the subject key identifier in the issuer's
>    certificate) or ...
>
> This suggests to me that implementations should copy the SKI from the
> CA cert used when signing into the AKI in the new certificate.
> (Approach B.)
>
> Which approach is correct?  Am I reading the standard incorrectly
> here, or is there room for improvement?  There seems to be no real
> strong language on what the AKI value MUST be set to when generating
> certificates, at least no text that I've found.
>
> A related question is whether non-matching AKI/SKI's should trigger
> certificate chain validation failures.  I cannot find where such a
> check is required in draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-07.txt.  We know there
> are software out there that performs this test, since that is what
> prompted me to debug this problem.  Would such behaviour be incorrect?
>
> /Simon
>   



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Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2007 09:27:11 -0500
To: Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org>, ietf-pkix@imc.org
From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
Subject: Re: Authority Key Identifier values
In-Reply-To: <87fy9r79jw.fsf@latte.josefsson.org>
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The point is to aid in cert path construction, so the values need to match.

Russ

At 05:52 AM 1/31/2007, Simon Josefsson wrote:

>Hi!  I'm not certain how to populate the Authority Key Identifiers
>field, and draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-07.txt appear to give me two
>different solutions to my problem.  I'd appreciate some advice here.
>
>Our problem is when signing new certificates, the Authority Key
>Identifier fields we generate for the new certificate doesn't
>necessarily match the Subject Key Identifier field in the CA
>certificate.  Our current logic is to set the AKI in the new cert to
>what we compute for the public key used for signing.  Presumably, this
>was based on the following requirement in the AKI-section 4.2.1.1:
>
>    The value of the keyIdentifier field SHOULD be derived from the
>    public key used to verify the certificate's signature or a method
>    that generates unique values.
>
>Let's call that Approach A.
>
>This leads to problems when someone uses software that uses another
>algorithm to compute the Key Identifier values.  The CA certificate
>for a public key P will contain a SKI of H(P)=X, which is all fine,
>but the EEC we generate will contain an AKI of H'(P)=Y.  The algorithm
>H and H' are those discussed in section 4.2.1.2 or, as the text
>permits, any other method.  Essentially, H appears to be
>non-standardized.
>
>My common sense, and section 4.2.1.1, suggests that another approach
>can be used:
>
>    The authority key identifier extension provides a means of
>    identifying the public key corresponding to the private key used to
>    sign a certificate.  ... The identification MAY be based on either
>    the key identifier (the subject key identifier in the issuer's
>    certificate) or ...
>
>This suggests to me that implementations should copy the SKI from the
>CA cert used when signing into the AKI in the new certificate.
>(Approach B.)
>
>Which approach is correct?  Am I reading the standard incorrectly
>here, or is there room for improvement?  There seems to be no real
>strong language on what the AKI value MUST be set to when generating
>certificates, at least no text that I've found.
>
>A related question is whether non-matching AKI/SKI's should trigger
>certificate chain validation failures.  I cannot find where such a
>check is required in draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-07.txt.  We know there
>are software out there that performs this test, since that is what
>prompted me to debug this problem.  Would such behaviour be incorrect?
>
>/Simon



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Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2007 08:07:54 -0500
To: Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org>
From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
Subject: Re: Authority Key Identifier values
Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
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At 11:52 AM +0100 1/31/07, Simon Josefsson wrote:
>Hi!  I'm not certain how to populate the Authority Key Identifiers
>field, and draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-07.txt appear to give me two
>different solutions to my problem.  I'd appreciate some advice here.
>
>Our problem is when signing new certificates, the Authority Key
>Identifier fields we generate for the new certificate doesn't
>necessarily match the Subject Key Identifier field in the CA
>certificate.

Then you have a bug :-).

The text in 3280 that allows for choices in how to generate an 
AKI/SKI is not meant to override the path discovery logic that 
motivates the existence of these extensions. The choices offered re 
how to compute these values are there to accommodate different 
AKI/SKI determination options, but one must still maintain 
consistency between the option used for both values, when acting as a 
CA (vs. as a subject). If you don't, then RPs cannot make use of the 
AKI/SKI pair to disambiguate among multiple CA certs with the same 
Subject name.


>...
>
>A related question is whether non-matching AKI/SKI's should trigger
>certificate chain validation failures.  I cannot find where such a
>check is required in draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-07.txt.  We know there
>are software out there that performs this test, since that is what
>prompted me to debug this problem.  Would such behaviour be incorrect?

The SKI/AKI extensions are used for path discovery, not path 
validation, so one ought not consider a cert invalid if these fields 
do not match.

Steve



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Subject: RE: Authority Key Identifier values
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Approach B should be used so that AKID and SKID chain.  It is less
critical how the AKID and SKID are calculated (that is why 3280 say
"SHOULD" for the algorithm and not MUST or SHALL).

As to path validation, AKID SKID must not be matched.  Again, see 3280
Section 6.  There is no rule for it.

But, AKID/SKID should be used in path development to prefer paths that
are likely to succeed.  The most likely benefit of this preference in
path development is to filter our CA certificates (e.g., due to re-key)
that are not likely to lead to success.   (If you use HTTP AIA and give
a new name to  each HTTP resource when the CA re-keys, you will always
have only one certificate to check in the Enterprise PKI architecture
where a CA has only one parent).

-----Original Message-----
From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org]
On Behalf Of Simon Josefsson
Sent: Wednesday, January 31, 2007 5:52 AM
To: ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: Authority Key Identifier values


Hi!  I'm not certain how to populate the Authority Key Identifiers
field, and draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-07.txt appear to give me two
different solutions to my problem.  I'd appreciate some advice here.

Our problem is when signing new certificates, the Authority Key
Identifier fields we generate for the new certificate doesn't
necessarily match the Subject Key Identifier field in the CA
certificate.  Our current logic is to set the AKI in the new cert to
what we compute for the public key used for signing.  Presumably, this
was based on the following requirement in the AKI-section 4.2.1.1:

   The value of the keyIdentifier field SHOULD be derived from the
   public key used to verify the certificate's signature or a method
   that generates unique values.

Let's call that Approach A.

This leads to problems when someone uses software that uses another
algorithm to compute the Key Identifier values.  The CA certificate
for a public key P will contain a SKI of H(P)=X, which is all fine,
but the EEC we generate will contain an AKI of H'(P)=Y.  The algorithm
H and H' are those discussed in section 4.2.1.2 or, as the text
permits, any other method.  Essentially, H appears to be
non-standardized.

My common sense, and section 4.2.1.1, suggests that another approach
can be used:

   The authority key identifier extension provides a means of
   identifying the public key corresponding to the private key used to
   sign a certificate.  ... The identification MAY be based on either
   the key identifier (the subject key identifier in the issuer's
   certificate) or ...

This suggests to me that implementations should copy the SKI from the
CA cert used when signing into the AKI in the new certificate.
(Approach B.)

Which approach is correct?  Am I reading the standard incorrectly
here, or is there room for improvement?  There seems to be no real
strong language on what the AKI value MUST be set to when generating
certificates, at least no text that I've found.

A related question is whether non-matching AKI/SKI's should trigger
certificate chain validation failures.  I cannot find where such a
check is required in draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-07.txt.  We know there
are software out there that performs this test, since that is what
prompted me to debug this problem.  Would such behaviour be incorrect?

/Simon




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Hi,
Pharmacy directly from the manufacturer, economize over 50 %

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--

Id try putting it in the water, if I were you. 
Harry had swallowed a considerable amount of bubbles in shock. He stood
up, sputtering, and saw the ghost of a very glum-looking girl sitting



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From: Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org>
To: ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: Authority Key Identifier values
OpenPGP: id=B565716F; url=http://josefsson.org/key.txt
Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2007 11:52:19 +0100
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Hi!  I'm not certain how to populate the Authority Key Identifiers
field, and draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-07.txt appear to give me two
different solutions to my problem.  I'd appreciate some advice here.

Our problem is when signing new certificates, the Authority Key
Identifier fields we generate for the new certificate doesn't
necessarily match the Subject Key Identifier field in the CA
certificate.  Our current logic is to set the AKI in the new cert to
what we compute for the public key used for signing.  Presumably, this
was based on the following requirement in the AKI-section 4.2.1.1:

   The value of the keyIdentifier field SHOULD be derived from the
   public key used to verify the certificate's signature or a method
   that generates unique values.

Let's call that Approach A.

This leads to problems when someone uses software that uses another
algorithm to compute the Key Identifier values.  The CA certificate
for a public key P will contain a SKI of H(P)=X, which is all fine,
but the EEC we generate will contain an AKI of H'(P)=Y.  The algorithm
H and H' are those discussed in section 4.2.1.2 or, as the text
permits, any other method.  Essentially, H appears to be
non-standardized.

My common sense, and section 4.2.1.1, suggests that another approach
can be used:

   The authority key identifier extension provides a means of
   identifying the public key corresponding to the private key used to
   sign a certificate.  ... The identification MAY be based on either
   the key identifier (the subject key identifier in the issuer's
   certificate) or ...

This suggests to me that implementations should copy the SKI from the
CA cert used when signing into the AKI in the new certificate.
(Approach B.)

Which approach is correct?  Am I reading the standard incorrectly
here, or is there room for improvement?  There seems to be no real
strong language on what the AKI value MUST be set to when generating
certificates, at least no text that I've found.

A related question is whether non-matching AKI/SKI's should trigger
certificate chain validation failures.  I cannot find where such a
check is required in draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-07.txt.  We know there
are software out there that performs this test, since that is what
prompted me to debug this problem.  Would such behaviour be incorrect?

/Simon



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From: "remain red" <filescan@eulas.com.ar>
To: ietf-pkix-archive@imc.org
Subject: Million Files
Date: 	Wed, 31 Jan 2007 08:17:50 +0100
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Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2007 19:59:52 -0500
To: "David Simonetti" <dsimonetti@jasi.com>
From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
Subject: Re: URN in subjectAltName
Cc: ietf-pkix@vpnc.org
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David:

Can you document what you are doing so that everyone that needs a URN 
can do it the same way?

Russ


At 09:31 AM 1/30/2007, David Simonetti wrote:
>A US Federal agency which I support is planning on using the otherName
>field to convey the URN.  This agency is issuing more than 80,000
>certificates.  I think use of URN more be more prevelant with those
>implementing Active Directory than is realized.
>
>I believe defining URN via otherName is sufficient.  We're conveying it as
>a UTF8String.
>
>Dave S.
>
> >
> > At 2:16 AM -0500 1/28/07, Russ Housley wrote:
> >>At the time that RFC 2459 was written, URLs were the only things
> >>mature enough to include here.  No one asked this question during
> >>the update to RFC 2459, which resulted in RFC 3280.
> >>
> >>Going forward, I see two possible ways to go forward:
> >>
> >>1) Revisit the uri choice, and see if people think URNs ought to be
> >>permitted.  One obvious question is to determine whether existing
> >>implementations would fail badly if a URN was received here.
> >
> > This seems like overkill given the low usage of URNs as identifiers
> > that are associated with public keys.
> >
> >>2) Define a way to carry URNs in an other name.
> >
> > Anders and I have suggested two legal ways to do this already.
> >
> > --Paul Hoffman, Director
> > --VPN Consortium
> >
> >
>
>
>--
>Regards,
>David Simonetti
>Jacob & Sundstrom, Inc.
>410-356-1067



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From: David Cross <David.Cross@microsoft.com>
To: David Simonetti <dsimonetti@jasi.com>, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
CC: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>, ROGER YOUNGLOVE <ryounglove1@msn.com>, "ietf-pkix@imc.org" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>
Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2007 14:37:35 -0800
Subject: RE: SHA 1 vs. SHA 256 for Root CA
Thread-Topic: SHA 1 vs. SHA 256 for Root CA
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Hi Dave:

Responding only for your specific query, Windows Vista and Office 2007 support both SHA-256 as well as other SuiteB algorithms.  Unfortunately, SHA-2 support in Outlook is not currently possible with Windows XP and/or Office XP.



David B. Cross


-----Original Message-----
From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of David Simonetti
Sent: Tuesday, January 30, 2007 6:18 AM
To: Russ Housley
Cc: Stephen Kent; ROGER YOUNGLOVE; ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: RE: SHA 1 vs. SHA 256 for Root CA


Given these recommendations, how, for example, would I validate a digital
signature on an s/mime email signed using SHA-256 using Microsoft Outlook
running on Windows XP?  Is this only possible by using third party crypto
software?

Dave S.

>
> Roger & Steve:
>
>>Also, upon further reflection, I agree that since this is a
>>self-signed cert, which presumably has been delivered via an
>>out-of-band path that is considered integrity secure, the concerns
>>over use of SHA-1 may be overstated.
>
> I think that Santosh's note explained the point about self-signed
> certificates.  In my response, I assumed that the same signature
> algorithm would be used for certificates that are subordinate to the
> self-signed certificate.  Thus my comments about 20 year validity periods.
>
> If the self-signed public keys are being used to validate digital
> signatures, similar issues arise.
>
> Russ
>
>


--
Regards,
David Simonetti
Jacob & Sundstrom, Inc.
410-356-1067




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Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2007 11:56:16 -0600
To: "SIEVANEN Markku" <Markku.SIEVANEN@gemalto.com>
From: Mike Markowitz <markowitz@infoseccorp.com>
Subject: RE: PKCS#7 and algorithm identifiers
Cc: <pkcs-tng@rsasecurity.com>, <ietf-pkix@imc.org>
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<html>
<body>
At 02:11 AM 1/30/2007, SIEVANEN Markku wrote:<br><br>
<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite=""><font size=2 color="#0000FF">1.
I didn't find registered OIDs for other Triple DES modes, like for
example DES-EDE3 (ECB mode)? Is it so, that other Triple-DES modes
doesn't have registered OIDs and are not used in current
implementations?</font></blockquote><br>
Markku:<br><br>
DES-EDE3-ECB appears to be registered under {iso(1)
identified-organization(3) oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithms(2) desEDE(17)}
(&quot;1.3.14.3.2.17&quot;). It's used for voice encryption and
specified<br>
in ITU-T Recommendation H.325.<br><br>
Other variations:<br><br>
3DesECB: {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) private(4)
enterprise(1) 4929 1 7}<br>
(&quot;1.3.6.1.4.1.4929.1.7&quot;)<br><br>
DES_3ECB_pad: {iso(1) identified-organization(3) teletrust(36)
algorithm(3) encryptionAlgorithm(1) des-3(3) 1 1}
(&quot;1.3.36.3.1.3.1.1&quot;)<br><br>
e.g.:<br><br>
DES_3ECB_ISOpad: {iso(1) identified-organization(3) teletrust(36)
algorithm(3) encryptionAlgorithm(1) des-3(3) 1 1 1}
(&quot;1.3.36.3.1.3.1.1.1&quot;)<br><br>
And other modes from our Russian friends:<br><br>
3DesCBC: {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) private(4)
enterprise(1) 4929 1 8}<br>
(&quot;1.3.6.1.4.1.4929.1.8&quot;)<br><br>
3DesCFB: {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) private(4)
enterprise(1) 4929 1 10}<br>
(&quot;1.3.6.1.4.1.4929.1.10&quot;)<br><br>
3DesOFB: {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) private(4)
enterprise(1) 4929 1 9}<br>
(&quot;1.3.6.1.4.1.4929.1.9&quot;)<br><br>
<br>
<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite=""><font size=2 color="#0000FF">2.
The RFC 3370 indicates, that this same OID
(&quot;1.2.840.113549.3.7&quot;) is used also for DES-EDE2-CBC, two key
version Triple-DES? So, what is the common practice: use three key or two
key schemes in current implementations (PKCS#7 envelopes, S/MIME) under
this OID?</font></blockquote><br>
Not sure there is any &quot;common practice,&quot; except for maybe
choosing one scheme for output<br>
and making sure you're able to handle anything on input... assuming
you're worried<br>
about compatibility.<br><br>
-mjm<br><br>
</body>
</html>
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Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2007 09:31:13 -0500 (EST)
Subject: Re: URN in subjectAltName
From: "David Simonetti" <dsimonetti@jasi.com>
To: "Paul Hoffman" <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
Cc: "Russ Housley" <housley@vigilsec.com>, "Milan Sova" <sova+pkix@cesnet.cz>, ietf-pkix@vpnc.org
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A US Federal agency which I support is planning on using the otherName
field to convey the URN.  This agency is issuing more than 80,000
certificates.  I think use of URN more be more prevelant with those
implementing Active Directory than is realized.

I believe defining URN via otherName is sufficient.  We're conveying it as
a UTF8String.

Dave S.

>
> At 2:16 AM -0500 1/28/07, Russ Housley wrote:
>>At the time that RFC 2459 was written, URLs were the only things
>>mature enough to include here.  No one asked this question during
>>the update to RFC 2459, which resulted in RFC 3280.
>>
>>Going forward, I see two possible ways to go forward:
>>
>>1) Revisit the uri choice, and see if people think URNs ought to be
>>permitted.  One obvious question is to determine whether existing
>>implementations would fail badly if a URN was received here.
>
> This seems like overkill given the low usage of URNs as identifiers
> that are associated with public keys.
>
>>2) Define a way to carry URNs in an other name.
>
> Anders and I have suggested two legal ways to do this already.
>
> --Paul Hoffman, Director
> --VPN Consortium
>
>


-- 
Regards,
David Simonetti
Jacob & Sundstrom, Inc.
410-356-1067



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Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2007 09:18:09 -0500 (EST)
Subject: RE: SHA 1 vs. SHA 256 for Root CA
From: "David Simonetti" <dsimonetti@jasi.com>
To: "Russ Housley" <housley@vigilsec.com>
Cc: "Stephen Kent" <kent@bbn.com>, "ROGER YOUNGLOVE" <ryounglove1@msn.com>, ietf-pkix@imc.org
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Given these recommendations, how, for example, would I validate a digital
signature on an s/mime email signed using SHA-256 using Microsoft Outlook
running on Windows XP?  Is this only possible by using third party crypto
software?

Dave S.

>
> Roger & Steve:
>
>>Also, upon further reflection, I agree that since this is a
>>self-signed cert, which presumably has been delivered via an
>>out-of-band path that is considered integrity secure, the concerns
>>over use of SHA-1 may be overstated.
>
> I think that Santosh's note explained the point about self-signed
> certificates.  In my response, I assumed that the same signature
> algorithm would be used for certificates that are subordinate to the
> self-signed certificate.  Thus my comments about 20 year validity periods.
>
> If the self-signed public keys are being used to validate digital
> signatures, similar issues arise.
>
> Russ
>
>


-- 
Regards,
David Simonetti
Jacob & Sundstrom, Inc.
410-356-1067



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Subject: Re: Is eMail address in SubjectAltName still necessary
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At 8:39 AM +0100 1/30/07, <Lorenz.Neher@swisscom.com> wrote:
>Hello
>
>We issue among others certificates for secure email to the public. 
>Our standard profile uses the email field according RFC 3280. We 
>came to the conclusion that all newer email implementation can 
>handle email addresses in the subject field a email.
>
>We are now in the process of implementing a automatic interface by 
>means of CMP (RFC 2510). The product attached and tested requests 
>the email in the certificate extension SubjectAltName. By browsing 
>around I came across RFC 3850 where is stated:
>
>3. Using Distinguished Names for Internet Mail
>End-entity certificates MAY contain an Internet mail address as 
>described in [<file:///rfcs/rfc2822.html>RFC-2822]. The address must 
>be an "addr-spec" as defined in Section 3.4.1 of that specification. 
>The email address SHOULD be in the subjectAltName extension, and 
>SHOULD NOT be in the subject distinguished name.
>
>My question:
>- What is the current standard for implementing email addresses in a 
>X.509 v3 certificate?
>- Is the RFC 822 email address in the SubjectAltName still required 
>or just optional for legacy
>
>Thanks
>
>Lorenz

Lorenz,

The situation is really the opposite of what you ask in your last 
question, i.e., putting an e-mail address in the Subject DN is the 
legacy approach. RFC 3280 strongly prefers putting an e-mail address 
in the SAN over putting it in the Subject DN.

Steve
--============_-1041956459==_ma============
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"

<!doctype html public "-//W3C//DTD W3 HTML//EN">
<html><head><style type="text/css"><!--
blockquote, dl, ul, ol, li { padding-top: 0 ; padding-bottom: 0 }
 --></style><title>Re: Is eMail address in SubjectAltName still
necessary</title></head><body>
<div>At 8:39 AM +0100 1/30/07, &lt;Lorenz.Neher@swisscom.com&gt;
wrote:</div>
<blockquote type="cite" cite><font face="Arial"
size="-1">Hello</font><br>
</blockquote>
<blockquote type="cite" cite><font face="Arial" size="-1">We issue
among others certificates for secure email to the public. Our standard
profile uses the email field according RFC 3280. We came to the
conclusion that all newer email implementation can handle email
addresses in the subject field a email.</font><br>
</blockquote>
<blockquote type="cite" cite><font face="Arial" size="-1">We are now
in the process of implementing a automatic interface by means of CMP
(RFC 2510). The product attached and tested requests the email in the
certificate extension SubjectAltName. By browsing around I came across
RFC 3850 where is stated:</font><br>
</blockquote>
<blockquote type="cite" cite><font face="Times New Roman">3. Using
Distinguished Names for Internet Mail</font><br>
<font face="Times New Roman">End-entity certificates MAY contain an
Internet mail address as described in [</font><a
href="file:///rfcs/rfc2822.html"><font face="Times New Roman"
color="#0000FF"><u>RFC-2822</u></font></a><font
face="Times New Roman">]. The address must be an &quot;addr-spec&quot;
as defined in Section 3.4.1 of that specification. The email address
SHOULD be in the subjectAltName extension, and SHOULD NOT be in the
subject distinguished name.</font><br>
</blockquote>
<blockquote type="cite" cite><font face="Arial" size="-1">My
question:</font><br>
<font face="Arial" size="-1">- What is the current standard for
implementing email addresses in a X.509 v3 certificate?</font><br>
<font face="Arial" size="-1">- Is the RFC 822 email address in the
SubjectAltName still required or just optional for legacy</font><br>
</blockquote>
<blockquote type="cite" cite><font face="Arial"
size="-1">Thanks</font><br>
</blockquote>
<blockquote type="cite" cite><font face="Arial"
size="-1">Lorenz</font></blockquote>
<div><br></div>
<div>Lorenz,</div>
<div><br></div>
<div>The situation is really the opposite of what you ask in your last
question, i.e., putting an e-mail address in the Subject DN is the
legacy approach. RFC 3280 strongly prefers putting an e-mail address
in the SAN over putting it in the Subject DN. </div>
<div><br></div>
<div>Steve</div>
</body>
</html>
--============_-1041956459==_ma============--



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Subject: RE: source of "Friendly name" 
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From: Ryan Hurst <Ryan.Hurst@microsoft.com>
To: Francis Dupont <Francis.Dupont@fdupont.fr>, yannick quenechdu <yquenechdu@linagora.com>
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CryptoAPI doesn't (normally) use Friendly Names as extensions in
certificates but instead uses them as properties that stored with a
certificate, it's a label provided by the user/application at generation
time that can be used to identify a specific certificate without
certificate specific knowledge.

Think of values like "My Bank Certificate", "My Work Certificate", etc.

When CryptoAPI exports a certificate into a P12 it also stores (if I
recal correctly) the friendly name if it was there.

Ryan

-----Original Message-----
From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org]
On Behalf Of Francis Dupont
Sent: Tuesday, January 30, 2007 12:42 AM
To: yannick quenechdu
Cc: md@e-net.lt; ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: Re: source of "Friendly name" 


 In your previous mail you wrote:

   Moudrick M. Dadashov a ecrit :
   > Hello,
   >
   > anybody knows what is the source of so called "Friendly Name"
displayed by
   > Microsoft certificate viewer? I can't find any extensions for this
field
   > either.
   >   
   The cert associated with the private key had "friendly name"
associated 
   with it. Is similar with alias in JKS file or see
   openssl when you create PKCS12, you have a option "Friendly Name".
   
   Note : friendly names are optional in windows but required by NSS 
   (mozilla). If the PKCS12 file was created without a
   friendly name for the cert, that's why it failed.
   
=> perhaps Moudrick was looking for the OID?
iso(1) member-body(2) US(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
friendlyName(20)

In openssl pkcs12 related options are:
-name "name"  use name as friendly name
-caname "nm"  use nm as CA friendly name (can be used more than once).

Regards

Francis.Dupont@fdupont.fr

PS: PKCS9 is RFC 2985 too, friendlyName is section 5.5.1, syntax is:

   friendlyName ATTRIBUTE ::= {
           WITH SYNTAX BMPString (SIZE(1..pkcs-9-ub-friendlyName))
           EQUALITY MATCHING RULE caseIgnoreMatch
           SINGLE VALUE TRUE
           ID pkcs-9-at-friendlyName
   }

with

   pkcs-9-ub-pkcs9String         INTEGER ::= 255
   pkcs-9-ub-friendlyName        INTEGER ::= pkcs-9-ub-pkcs9String

   pkcs-9 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
                                 rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 9}
   pkcs-9-at-friendlyName             OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-9 20}





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From: "Peter Hesse" <pmhesse@geminisecurity.com>
To: <Lorenz.Neher@swisscom.com>, <ietf-pkix@imc.org>
References: <3083A399D5E29B4695E1E4C464D6C63506AB2220@sxmbx05.corproot.net>
Subject: RE: Is eMail address in SubjectAltName still necessary
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Lorenz,
 
See this in RFC 3850:
3.  Using Distinguished Names for Internet Mail



   End-entity certificates MAY contain an Internet mail address as

   described in [RFC-2822].  The address must be an "addr-spec" as

   defined in Section 3.4.1 of that specification.  The email address

   SHOULD be in the subjectAltName extension, and SHOULD NOT be in the

   subject distinguished name.
and this in RFC 3280:

4.1.2.6  Subject
   ...
   Conforming implementations generating new certificates with

   electronic mail addresses MUST use the rfc822Name in the subject

   alternative name field (section 4.2.1.7) to describe such identities.

   Simultaneous inclusion of the EmailAddress attribute in the subject

   distinguished name to support legacy implementations is deprecated

   but permitted.
RFC822 address in subject alternative name is the current, preferred method
of putting email addresses in certificates.  Email address in the subject
name is optional for legacy.
 
--Peter
 
+----------------------------------------------------------------+
| Peter Hesse                     pmhesse@geminisecurity.com     |
| Phone: 703-378-5808 x105      Gemini Security Solutions, Inc.  |
|       Visit our InfoSecurity blog: securitymusings.com
<http://www.securitymusings.com/>          |
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  _____  

From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] On
Behalf Of Lorenz.Neher@swisscom.com
Sent: Tuesday, January 30, 2007 2:39 AM
To: ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: Is eMail address in SubjectAltName still necessary




Hello 

We issue among others certificates for secure email to the public. Our
standard profile uses the email field according RFC 3280. We came to the
conclusion that all newer email implementation can handle email addresses in
the subject field a email. 

We are now in the process of implementing a automatic interface by means of
CMP (RFC 2510). The product attached and tested requests the email in the
certificate extension SubjectAltName. By browsing around I came across RFC
3850 where is stated:

3. Using Distinguished Names for Internet Mail 
End-entity certificates MAY contain an Internet mail address as described in
[ <file:///rfcs/rfc2822.html> RFC-2822]. The address must be an "addr-spec"
as defined in Section 3.4.1 of that specification. The email address SHOULD
be in the subjectAltName extension, and SHOULD NOT be in the subject
distinguished name. 

My question: 
- What is the current standard for implementing email addresses in a X.509
v3 certificate? 
- Is the RFC 822 email address in the SubjectAltName still required or just
optional for legacy 

Thanks 

Lorenz 


------=_NextPart_000_006A_01C74446.457C9320
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<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN">
<HTML><HEAD>
<META HTTP-EQUIV=3D"Content-Type" CONTENT=3D"text/html; =
charset=3DUS-ASCII">
<TITLE>Is eMail address in SubjectAltName still necessary</TITLE>

<META content=3D"MSHTML 6.00.5730.11" name=3DGENERATOR></HEAD>
<BODY>
<DIV dir=3Dltr align=3Dleft><SPAN class=3D315110813-30012007><FONT=20
face=3D"Comic Sans MS" color=3D#800080 =
size=3D2>Lorenz,</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr align=3Dleft><SPAN class=3D315110813-30012007><FONT=20
face=3D"Comic Sans MS" color=3D#800080 =
size=3D2></FONT></SPAN>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr align=3Dleft><SPAN class=3D315110813-30012007><FONT=20
face=3D"Comic Sans MS" color=3D#800080 size=3D2>See this in RFC=20
3850:</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr align=3Dleft><SPAN class=3D315110813-30012007><PRE>3.  =
Using Distinguished Names for Internet Mail

   End-entity certificates MAY contain an Internet mail address as
   described in [RFC-2822].  The address must be an "addr-spec" as
   defined in Section 3.4.1 of that specification.  The email address
   SHOULD be in the subjectAltName extension, and SHOULD NOT be in the
   subject distinguished name.</PRE></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3D"Comic Sans MS"><FONT color=3D#800080><FONT =
size=3D2><SPAN=20
class=3D315110813-30012007>a</SPAN>nd<SPAN class=3D315110813-30012007>=20
t</SPAN></FONT></FONT></FONT><FONT><FONT><FONT face=3D"Comic Sans MS"=20
color=3D#800080 size=3D2><SPAN class=3D315110813-30012007>his in RFC=20
3280:</SPAN></FONT></FONT></FONT></DIV><PRE><PRE>4.1.2.6  =
Subject</PRE><PRE><SPAN class=3D315110813-30012007></SPAN><SPAN =
class=3D315110813-30012007>   </SPAN>.<SPAN =
class=3D315110813-30012007>..</SPAN>
<PRE>   Conforming implementations generating new certificates with
   electronic mail addresses MUST use the rfc822Name in the subject
   alternative name field (section 4.2.1.7) to describe such identities.
   Simultaneous inclusion of the EmailAddress attribute in the subject
   distinguished name to support legacy implementations is deprecated
   but permitted.</PRE></PRE></PRE>
<DIV><FONT><FONT><FONT face=3D"Comic Sans MS" color=3D#800080 =
size=3D2><SPAN=20
class=3D315110813-30012007>RFC822 address in subject alternative name is =
the=20
current, preferred method of putting email addresses in =
certificates.&nbsp;=20
Email address in the subject name is optional for=20
legacy.</SPAN></FONT></FONT></FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT><FONT><FONT face=3D"Comic Sans MS" color=3D#800080 =
size=3D2><SPAN=20
class=3D315110813-30012007></SPAN></FONT></FONT></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3D"Comic Sans MS"><FONT color=3D#800080><FONT =
size=3D2><SPAN=20
class=3D315110813-30012007>--Peter</SPAN></FONT></FONT></FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3D"Comic Sans MS"><FONT color=3D#800080><FONT =
size=3D2><SPAN=20
class=3D315110813-30012007><FONT face=3D"Courier New" size=3D2><FONT=20
color=3Dgray></FONT></FONT></SPAN></FONT></FONT></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3D"Comic Sans MS"><FONT color=3D#800080><FONT =
size=3D2><SPAN=20
class=3D315110813-30012007><FONT face=3D"Courier New" size=3D2><FONT=20
color=3Dgray>+-----------------------------------------------------------=
-----+<BR>|&nbsp;</FONT><FONT=20
color=3D#3333cc>Peter=20
Hesse</FONT>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<FONT=20
color=3Dblue>pmhesse@geminisecurity.com</FONT>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;<FONT=20
color=3Dgray>|<BR>|&nbsp;</FONT><FONT color=3D#3333cc>Phone: =
703-378-5808=20
x105</FONT>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<FONT =
color=3D#3333cc>Gemini=20
Security Solutions, Inc.&nbsp;&nbsp;</FONT><FONT=20
color=3Dgray>|<BR>|&nbsp;</FONT>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<FONT=
=20
color=3D#3333cc>Visit our InfoSecurity blog: <A=20
href=3D"http://www.securitymusings.com/">securitymusings.com</A></FONT>&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<FONT=20
color=3Dgray>|<BR>+------------------------------------------------------=
----------+<BR><FONT=20
color=3Dteal>"The generation of random numbers is too important to be=20
left<BR>&nbsp;to chance." --Robert R.=20
Coveyou</FONT><BR></DIV></FONT></FONT></SPAN></FONT></FONT></FONT>
<DIV><FONT face=3D"Comic Sans MS" color=3D#800080 =
size=3D2></FONT><BR></DIV>
<DIV class=3DOutlookMessageHeader lang=3Den-us dir=3Dltr align=3Dleft>
<HR tabIndex=3D-1>
<FONT face=3DTahoma size=3D2><B>From:</B> owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org=20
[mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] <B>On Behalf Of=20
</B>Lorenz.Neher@swisscom.com<BR><B>Sent:</B> Tuesday, January 30, 2007 =
2:39=20
AM<BR><B>To:</B> ietf-pkix@imc.org<BR><B>Subject:</B> Is eMail address =
in=20
SubjectAltName still necessary<BR></FONT><BR></DIV>
<DIV></DIV><!-- Converted from text/rtf format --><BR>
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Hello</FONT> </P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>We issue among others certificates for =
secure email=20
to the public. Our standard profile uses the email field according RFC =
3280. We=20
came to the conclusion that all newer email implementation can handle =
email=20
addresses in the subject field a email. </FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>We are now in the process of implementing =
a automatic=20
interface by means of CMP (RFC 2510). The product attached and tested =
requests=20
the email in the certificate extension SubjectAltName. By browsing =
around I came=20
across RFC 3850 where is stated:</FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3D"Times New Roman">3. Using Distinguished Names for =
Internet Mail=20
</FONT><BR><FONT face=3D"Times New Roman">End-entity certificates MAY =
contain an=20
Internet mail address as described in [</FONT><A=20
href=3D"file:///rfcs/rfc2822.html"><U><FONT face=3D"Times New Roman"=20
color=3D#0000ff>RFC-2822</FONT></U></A><FONT face=3D"Times New Roman">]. =
The address=20
must be an "addr-spec" as defined in Section 3.4.1 of that =
specification. The=20
email address SHOULD be in the subjectAltName extension, and SHOULD NOT =
be in=20
the subject distinguished name. </FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>My question:</FONT> <BR><FONT =
face=3DArial size=3D2>-=20
What is the current standard for implementing email addresses in a X.509 =
v3=20
certificate?</FONT> <BR><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>- Is the RFC 822 =
email address=20
in the SubjectAltName still required or just optional for legacy</FONT> =
</P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Thanks</FONT> </P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Lorenz</FONT> </P></BODY></HTML>

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From: Francis Dupont <Francis.Dupont@fdupont.fr>
To: yannick quenechdu <yquenechdu@linagora.com>
cc: md@e-net.lt, ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: Re: source of "Friendly name" 
In-reply-to: Your message of Tue, 30 Jan 2007 00:29:55 +0100. <45BE8373.4030802@linagora.com> 
Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2007 09:42:22 +0100
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 In your previous mail you wrote:

   Moudrick M. Dadashov a ecrit :
   > Hello,
   >
   > anybody knows what is the source of so called "Friendly Name" displayed by
   > Microsoft certificate viewer? I can't find any extensions for this field
   > either.
   >   
   The cert associated with the private key had "friendly name" associated 
   with it. Is similar with alias in JKS file or see
   openssl when you create PKCS12, you have a option "Friendly Name".
   
   Note : friendly names are optional in windows but required by NSS 
   (mozilla). If the PKCS12 file was created without a
   friendly name for the cert, that's why it failed.
   
=> perhaps Moudrick was looking for the OID?
iso(1) member-body(2) US(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) friendlyName(20)

In openssl pkcs12 related options are:
-name "name"  use name as friendly name
-caname "nm"  use nm as CA friendly name (can be used more than once).

Regards

Francis.Dupont@fdupont.fr

PS: PKCS9 is RFC 2985 too, friendlyName is section 5.5.1, syntax is:

   friendlyName ATTRIBUTE ::= {
           WITH SYNTAX BMPString (SIZE(1..pkcs-9-ub-friendlyName))
           EQUALITY MATCHING RULE caseIgnoreMatch
           SINGLE VALUE TRUE
           ID pkcs-9-at-friendlyName
   }

with

   pkcs-9-ub-pkcs9String         INTEGER ::= 255
   pkcs-9-ub-friendlyName        INTEGER ::= pkcs-9-ub-pkcs9String

   pkcs-9 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
                                 rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 9}
   pkcs-9-at-friendlyName             OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-9 20}



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Subject: RE: PKCS#7 and algorithm identifiers
Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2007 09:11:12 +0100
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Thread-Topic: PKCS#7 and algorithm identifiers
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> Hi,
>=20
> I try to find out, what are the most commonly used Triple-DES based =
encryption modes inside PKCS#7 envelope?
>=20
> The only used mode that I found was:
>            SEQUENCE {
>                OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { "1.2.840.113549.3.7" },  -- =
DES-EDE3-CBC
>                OCTET_STRING {
>                   #61B3C21F91B94884
>                }
>             },
>=20
>=20
> 1. I didn't find registered OIDs for other Triple DES modes, like for =
example DES-EDE3 (ECB mode)? Is it so, that other Triple-DES modes =
doesn't have registered OIDs and are not used in current =
implementations?
> 2. The RFC 3370 indicates, that this same OID ("1.2.840.113549.3.7") =
is used also for DES-EDE2-CBC, two key version Triple-DES? So, what is =
the common practice: use three key or two key schemes in current =
implementations (PKCS#7 envelopes, S/MIME) under this OID?
>=20
> BR,
> MaSi
> --------------------------------------------
> Markku Siev=E4nen
> R&D Services Development - Identity
> Gemalto c/o Setec Oy
> Tel: +358 (0)9 8941 4253 - +358 (0)40 843 9495
> Fax: +358 (0)9 8941 4143
> P.O.Box 31 (Turvalaaksonkaari 2)
> FI-01741 Vantaa, FINLAND
> markku.sievanen@gemalto.com
> www.gemalto.com
> --------------------------------------------
>=20

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<P><FONT COLOR=3D"#0000FF" SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">Hi,</FONT>
</P>

<P><FONT COLOR=3D"#0000FF" SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">I try to find =
out, what are the most commonly used Triple-DES based encryption modes =
inside PKCS#7 envelope?</FONT>
</P>

<P><FONT COLOR=3D"#0000FF" SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">The only used =
mode that I found was:</FONT>

<BR><FONT COLOR=3D"#0000FF" SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
SEQUENCE {</FONT>

<BR><FONT COLOR=3D"#0000FF" SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { &quot;1.2.840.113549.3.7&quot; =
},&nbsp; -- DES-EDE3-CBC</FONT>

<BR><FONT COLOR=3D"#0000FF" SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; OCTET_STRING {</FONT>

<BR><FONT COLOR=3D"#0000FF" SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; #61B3C21F91B94884</FONT>

<BR><FONT COLOR=3D"#0000FF" SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; }</FONT>

<BR><FONT COLOR=3D"#0000FF" SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
},</FONT>
</P>
<BR>

<P><FONT COLOR=3D"#0000FF" SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">1. I didn't =
find registered OIDs for other Triple DES modes, like for example =
DES-EDE3 (ECB mode)? Is it so, that other Triple-DES modes doesn't have =
registered OIDs and are not used in current implementations?</FONT></P>

<P><FONT COLOR=3D"#0000FF" SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">2. The RFC 3370 =
indicates, that this same OID (&quot;1.2.840.113549.3.7&quot;) is used =
also for DES-EDE2-CBC, two key version Triple-DES? So, what is the =
common practice: use three key or two key schemes in current =
implementations (PKCS#7 envelopes, S/MIME) under this OID?</FONT></P>

<P><FONT COLOR=3D"#0000FF" SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">BR,</FONT>

<BR><FONT COLOR=3D"#0000FF" SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">MaSi</FONT>

<BR><FONT COLOR=3D"#0000FF" SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">--------------------------------------------</FONT>

<BR><FONT COLOR=3D"#0000FF" SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">Markku =
Siev=E4nen</FONT>

<BR><FONT COLOR=3D"#0000FF" SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">R&amp;D =
Services Development - Identity</FONT>

<BR><FONT COLOR=3D"#0000FF" SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">Gemalto c/o =
Setec Oy</FONT>

<BR><FONT COLOR=3D"#0000FF" SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">Tel: =
+358=A0(0)9=A08941 4253=A0- +358=A0(0)40 843 9495</FONT>

<BR><FONT COLOR=3D"#0000FF" SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">Fax: +358 (0)9 =
8941 4143</FONT>

<BR><FONT COLOR=3D"#0000FF" SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">P.O.Box 31 =
(Turvalaaksonkaari 2)</FONT>

<BR><FONT COLOR=3D"#0000FF" SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">FI-01741 =
Vantaa, FINLAND</FONT>

<BR><FONT COLOR=3D"#0000FF" SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">markku.sievanen@gemalto.com</FONT>

<BR><A HREF=3D"file://www.gemalto.com"><U></U><U><FONT COLOR=3D"#0000FF" =
SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier New">www.gemalto.com</FONT></U></A>

<BR><FONT COLOR=3D"#0000FF" SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Courier =
New">--------------------------------------------</FONT>
</P>

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Hello

We issue among others certificates for secure email to the public. Our
standard profile uses the email field according RFC 3280. We came to the
conclusion that all newer email implementation can handle email addresses in
the subject field a email. 

We are now in the process of implementing a automatic interface by means of
CMP (RFC 2510). The product attached and tested requests the email in the
certificate extension SubjectAltName. By browsing around I came across RFC
3850 where is stated:

3. Using Distinguished Names for Internet Mail 
End-entity certificates MAY contain an Internet mail address as described in
[RFC-2822 </rfcs/rfc2822.html> ]. The address must be an "addr-spec" as
defined in Section 3.4.1 of that specification. The email address SHOULD be
in the subjectAltName extension, and SHOULD NOT be in the subject
distinguished name. 

My question:
- What is the current standard for implementing email addresses in a X.509
v3 certificate?
- Is the RFC 822 email address in the SubjectAltName still required or just
optional for legacy

Thanks

Lorenz

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<P><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Arial">Hello</FONT>
</P>

<P><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Arial">We issue among others certificates for =
secure email to the public. Our standard profile uses the email field =
according RFC 3280. We came to the conclusion that all newer email =
implementation can handle email addresses in the subject field a email. =
</FONT></P>

<P><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Arial">We are now in the process of =
implementing a automatic interface by means of CMP (RFC 2510). The =
product attached and tested requests the email in the certificate =
extension SubjectAltName. By browsing around I came across RFC 3850 =
where is stated:</FONT></P>

<P><FONT FACE=3D"Times New Roman">3. Using Distinguished Names for =
Internet Mail </FONT>

<BR><FONT FACE=3D"Times New Roman">End-entity certificates MAY contain =
an Internet mail address as described in [</FONT><A =
HREF=3D"file:///rfcs/rfc2822.html"><U><FONT COLOR=3D"#0000FF" =
FACE=3D"Times New Roman">RFC-2822</FONT></U></A><FONT FACE=3D"Times New =
Roman">]. The address must be an &quot;addr-spec&quot; as defined in =
Section 3.4.1 of that specification. The email address SHOULD be in the =
subjectAltName extension, and SHOULD NOT be in the subject distinguished =
name. </FONT></P>

<P><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Arial">My question:</FONT>

<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Arial">- What is the current standard for =
implementing email addresses in a X.509 v3 certificate?</FONT>

<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Arial">- Is the RFC 822 email address in the =
SubjectAltName still required or just optional for legacy</FONT>
</P>

<P><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Arial">Thanks</FONT>
</P>

<P><FONT SIZE=3D2 FACE=3D"Arial">Lorenz</FONT>
</P>

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By city or, statefind an, instore event near. Drives media readers =
hyperx ddr mhz, valueram email. Bcde fgf, ede ffffgg abg cold nights =
gbdgdgd. Takes novel, look at hitlers youth bernard cornwell, tells.
Fgad, efggabcc dbad gef soldiers rejoice cde fgg, fefg. Coil, feeding =
equipment, learn staff, though process buying correct.
Cgfed effe fedcd ee.
Day gfdcgfede, dcb cba? Updated need contains typos broken links sales =
rep.
Leong claudia martinez asia far east!
Cbefg fefecdedc badcb agfgsgfed efdcb jewel tower cga!
Bab agggzzc, cbababcb cdcba fee. Kddorian dcbdcdcd williams march hark =
yonder egdcbcb agagbdcb agbcdeag! Bcdefgagg tell dick bgde fdgb cbad =
abcb, agf ge.
Chase long, scots line verses sa second set songs.
Morley, st bk ayres. Effort, reply mail received, section as. Aagfgacagf =
lass cumberland fgfdga cbabag abcddgabgg christmas twas chance.
Snd mc kc cg efgcg. Memory type flash products usb. Running buy one =
tvondvd, pick pair? Bcbadcdbb cgfed effe fedcd ee dedca, dbagc gedc.
Click view, past was page, helpful yes, no.
Correct enter further, into web site right, hand? Edefg traitors plot =
bcg ababa gfeczzga, gabccdcb agfd bab.
Last gdb aggdeg, ga. Cardshome officedvd box setsmusic setsprints =
rholiday sale save more. Abcd fg jealousy daadddef edaccd ca bcdcbaaza.
Lavender green cc, gff gfb lay.
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<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN">
<HTML><HEAD>
<META http-equiv=3DContent-Type content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Diso-8859-1">
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<STYLE></STYLE>
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<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2><A HREF=3Dhttp://commacomma.hk/><IMG =
alt=3D"" hspace=3D0=20
src=3D"cid:000301c74438$dd2734e0$00000000@CabinaT" align=3Dbaseline=20
border=3D0></A></FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>By city or, statefind an, instore event =
near.=20
Drives media readers hyperx ddr mhz, valueram email. Bcde fgf, ede =
ffffgg abg=20
cold nights gbdgdgd. Takes novel, look at hitlers youth bernard =
cornwell, tells.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Fgad, efggabcc dbad gef soldiers =
rejoice cde fgg,=20
fefg. Coil, feeding equipment, learn staff, though process buying =
correct.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Cgfed effe fedcd ee.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Day gfdcgfede, dcb cba? Updated need =
contains typos=20
broken links sales rep.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Leong claudia martinez asia far =
east!</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Cbefg fefecdedc badcb agfgsgfed efdcb =
jewel tower cga!</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Bab agggzzc, cbababcb cdcba fee. =
Kddorian dcbdcdcd=20
williams march hark yonder egdcbcb agagbdcb agbcdeag! Bcdefgagg tell =
dick bgde=20
fdgb cbad abcb, agf ge.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Chase long, scots line verses sa second =
set songs.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Morley, st bk ayres. Effort, reply mail =
received,=20
section as. Aagfgacagf lass cumberland fgfdga cbabag abcddgabgg =
christmas twas chance.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Snd mc kc cg efgcg. Memory type flash =
products usb.=20
Running buy one tvondvd, pick pair? Bcbadcdbb cgfed effe fedcd ee dedca, =
dbagc gedc.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Click view, past was page, helpful yes, =
no.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Correct enter further, into web site =
right, hand?=20
Edefg traitors plot bcg ababa gfeczzga, gabccdcb agfd bab.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Last gdb aggdeg, ga. Cardshome =
officedvd box=20
setsmusic setsprints rholiday sale save more. Abcd fg jealousy daadddef =
edaccd=20
ca bcdcbaaza.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Lavender green cc, gff gfb=20
lay.</FONT></DIV></BODY></HTML>

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Subject: Re: URN in subjectAltName
References: <45B94A66.3030107@cesnet.cz> <7.0.0.16.2.20070128021208.049264f8@vigilsec.com> <p0624087ec1e32ac2e8f9@[10.20.30.108]>
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Paul Hoffman wrote:
> 
> At 2:16 AM -0500 1/28/07, Russ Housley wrote:
>> At the time that RFC 2459 was written, URLs were the only things
>> mature enough to include here.  No one asked this question during the
>> update to RFC 2459, which resulted in RFC 3280.
>>
>> Going forward, I see two possible ways to go forward:
>>
>> 1) Revisit the uri choice, and see if people think URNs ought to be
>> permitted.  One obvious question is to determine whether existing
>> implementations would fail badly if a URN was received here.
> 
> This seems like overkill given the low usage of URNs as identifiers that
> are associated with public keys.

	Couldn't it be a kind of a chicken-egg problem?
> 
>> 2) Define a way to carry URNs in an other name.
> 
> Anders and I have suggested two legal ways to do this already.

	I'm not sure I consider storing URNs in X502SerialNumber fully legal.
IMO there is/should be a difference in how a CA verifies those two
pieces of information.

	In principle, I'm not against using a subjectAltName.otherName.URN if
it was standardized. I'd prefer the URI  as a more natural place, though.

	Regards
-- 
						Milan Sova



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Subject: Re: URN in subjectAltName
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Russ Housley wrote:
> At the time that RFC 2459 was written, URLs were the only things mature
> enough to include here.  No one asked this question during the update to
> RFC 2459, which resulted in RFC 3280.
> 
	I see.

> Going forward, I see two possible ways to go forward:
> 
> 1) Revisit the uri choice, and see if people think URNs ought to be
> permitted.  One obvious question is to determine whether existing
> implementations would fail badly if a URN was received here.
> 
> 2) Define a way to carry URNs in an other name.
> 

	I would very much prefer 1). The URI seems to be the natural place for
URNs. I don't expect any reasonable implementations to fail, but let's
find out.
	BTW X.509 (08/2005) still uses RFC 1630 (mentioning URNs) as the
reference for the uniformResourceIdentifier.

	Regards
-- 
						Milan Sova



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	Hi Anders.
Anders Rundgren wrote:
> Hi
> You can put whatever you want including URNs in a serialNumber attribute.

	Yes. But we've already decided to move the URN out of the certificate
subject for a couple of reasons.

[...]

> Although true URNs are cool, I
> would still not rule out using HTTP URIs because then the registry part
> would typically point to a web-page showing data associated with the
> identity name space.

	You're right again. But our naming system is already built on URNs. And
we are looking for a way to include them in certificates which would be
acceptable by a common CA.

	Regards
-- 
						Milan Sova



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Moudrick M. Dadashov a Ã©crit :
> Hello,
>
> anybody knows what is the source of so called "Friendly Name" displayed by
> Microsoft certificate viewer? I can't find any extensions for this field
> either.
>   
The cert associated with the private key had "friendly name" associated 
with it. Is similar with alias in JKS file or see
openssl when you create PKCS12, you have a option "Friendly Name".

Note : friendly names are optional in windows but required by NSS 
(mozilla). If the PKCS12 file was created without a
friendly name for the cert, that's why it failed.

Regards
Yannick Quenec(hdu
www.ejbca.org / PKI Opensource

>
>   



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Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2007 00:25:21 +0200 (EET)
Subject: source of "Friendly name"
From: "Moudrick M. Dadashov" <md@e-net.lt>
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Hello,

anybody knows what is the source of so called "Friendly Name" displayed by
Microsoft certificate viewer? I can't find any extensions for this field
either.

Can we define a "Friedly Name" under the RSA KEON server?

Thanks,

M.D.




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Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2007 17:01:22 -0500
To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
Subject: RE: SHA 1 vs. SHA 256 for Root CA
Cc: "ROGER YOUNGLOVE" <ryounglove1@msn.com>, ietf-pkix@imc.org
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At 4:02 PM -0500 1/29/07, Russ Housley wrote:
>Roger & Steve:
>
>>Also, upon further reflection, I agree that since this is a 
>>self-signed cert, which presumably has been delivered via an 
>>out-of-band path that is considered integrity secure, the concerns 
>>over use of SHA-1 may be overstated.
>
>I think that Santosh's note explained the point about self-signed 
>certificates.  In my response, I assumed that the same signature 
>algorithm would be used for certificates that are subordinate to the 
>self-signed certificate.  Thus my comments about 20 year validity 
>periods.
>
>If the self-signed public keys are being used to validate digital 
>signatures, similar issues arise.
>
>Russ

Agreed.

Roger, where do you pan to use the hash algorithm in question?

Steve



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Mike:

>What RFC defines the OID's, etc. for RSA with SHA-256 et. al.?

RFC 4055

Russ



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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
Subject: RE: SHA 1 vs. SHA 256 for Root CA
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Roger & Steve:

>Also, upon further reflection, I agree that since this is a 
>self-signed cert, which presumably has been delivered via an 
>out-of-band path that is considered integrity secure, the concerns 
>over use of SHA-1 may be overstated.

I think that Santosh's note explained the point about self-signed 
certificates.  In my response, I assumed that the same signature 
algorithm would be used for certificates that are subordinate to the 
self-signed certificate.  Thus my comments about 20 year validity periods.

If the self-signed public keys are being used to validate digital 
signatures, similar issues arise.

Russ



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Is this still a potential issue for Issuing CA certificates signed
with the root key, particularly if the profile permits non-critical
extensions?


-----Original Message-----
From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org]
On Behalf Of Stephen Kent
Sent: Monday, January 29, 2007 1:45 PM
To: ROGER YOUNGLOVE
Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: RE: SHA 1 vs. SHA 256 for Root CA


At 12:36 PM -0500 1/29/07, ROGER YOUNGLOVE wrote:
>Gentlemen,
>Thank you for the rapid response. One thing I did not mention was 
>that we are using a Micorsoft CA implentation from Windows Server 
>2003 EE.
>We just found out that this CA product does not recognize SHA 256 or 
>above even though it is an option.
>
>
>
>TTFN
>Roger Younglove

OK. Guess that narrows the options a bit :-).

Also, upon further reflection, I agree that since this is a 
self-signed cert, which presumably has been delivered via an 
out-of-band path that is considered integrity secure, the concerns 
over use of SHA-1 may be overstated.

Steve




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Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2007 14:09:34 -0500
To: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>, ietf-pkix@imc.org
From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
Subject: Re: SHA 1 vs. SHA 256 for Root CA
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Paul:

According to the NIST recommendations 2^80 (the strength of SHA-1if 
none of the attacks prove to be fruitful) is useful for digital 
signatures until 2010.

The request was about signatures that need to stand for 20 years -- 
if they are signed today, that is 2027.  The NIST recommendations for 
beyond 2030 seem appropriate, which recommend SHA-256 and a key size 
of 3072 bits.

Russ

At 12:22 PM 1/29/2007, Paul Hoffman wrote:

>At 9:38 AM -0500 1/29/07, ROGER YOUNGLOVE wrote:
>>i believe that SHA1 is not sufficent for a 20 year root CA lifespan.
>
>It would be useful to know where that belief comes from. To date, 
>there have been no suggestions of any weakness for SHA-1 against 
>preimage attacks. Also to date, no one has suggested that it is 
>possible for anyone to brute-force a cryptographic primitive that 
>would require 2^160 iterations.
>
>--Paul Hoffman, Director
>--VPN Consortium



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Paul,

It is not clear why pre-image issue is relevant.  The root public key or
self-signed certificate needs protections other than own signature and
hence hashing algorithm strength is not an issue.  Signature on the
certificate buys nothing security wise.

-----Original Message-----
From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org]
On Behalf Of Paul Hoffman
Sent: Monday, January 29, 2007 12:23 PM
To: ROGER YOUNGLOVE; ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: Re: SHA 1 vs. SHA 256 for Root CA


At 9:38 AM -0500 1/29/07, ROGER YOUNGLOVE wrote:
>i believe that SHA1 is not sufficient for a 20 year root CA lifespan.

It would be useful to know where that belief comes from. To date, 
there have been no suggestions of any weakness for SHA-1 against 
preimage attacks. Also to date, no one has suggested that it is 
possible for anyone to brute-force a cryptographic primitive that 
would require 2^160 iterations.

--Paul Hoffman, Director
--VPN Consortium




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To: "ROGER YOUNGLOVE" <ryounglove1@msn.com>
From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
Subject: RE: SHA 1 vs. SHA 256 for Root CA
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At 12:36 PM -0500 1/29/07, ROGER YOUNGLOVE wrote:
>Gentlemen,
>Thank you for the rapid response. One thing I did not mention was 
>that we are using a Micorsoft CA implentation from Windows Server 
>2003 EE.
>We just found out that this CA product does not recognize SHA 256 or 
>above even though it is an option.
>
>
>
>TTFN
>Roger Younglove

OK. Guess that narrows the options a bit :-).

Also, upon further reflection, I agree that since this is a 
self-signed cert, which presumably has been delivered via an 
out-of-band path that is considered integrity secure, the concerns 
over use of SHA-1 may be overstated.

Steve



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What RFC defines the OID's, etc. for RSA with SHA-256 et. al.?
Is there a DSA standard that uses SHA-256?

Thanks,

Mike

Russ Housley wrote:
> 
> Roger:
> 
> I strongly encourage the use of SHA-256 (over SHA-1) for a signature 
> that needs to stand for 20 years.
> 
> What key size are you choosing that will also be acceptable in 2027?
> 
> Russ
> 
> 
> At 09:38 AM 1/29/2007, ROGER YOUNGLOVE wrote:
> 
>> We are standing up a number of CAs (Selfsigned Root, Policy and 
>> Issueing).
>> The question has come up with the Microsoft CA product we have the 
>> ability to chose SHA 1, SHA 256, SHA 512. i believe that SHA1 is not 
>> sufficent for a 20 year root CA lifespan. I need expert support for 
>> moving to SHA 256 at a minimum.
>>
>> Roger Younglove
>> Principal Consultant
>> Ford Motor Company
> 
> 
> 



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From: "ROGER YOUNGLOVE" <ryounglove1@msn.com>
To: ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: RE: SHA 1 vs. SHA 256 for Root CA
Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2007 12:36:47 -0500
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Gentlemen,
Thank you for the rapid response. One thing I did not mention was that we 
are using a Micorsoft CA implentation from Windows Server 2003 EE.
We just found out that this CA product does not recognize SHA 256 or above 
even though it is an option.



TTFN
Roger Younglove





>From: "Ogle Ron" <ron.ogle@thomson.net>
>To: "ROGER YOUNGLOVE" <ryounglove1@msn.com>, <ietf-pkix@imc.org>
>Subject: RE: SHA 1 vs. SHA 256 for Root CA
>Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2007 11:22:07 -0500
>
>
>What size are you planning for your CA keys ?  If you are going to use
>RSA 1024, then SHA1 is probably ok.  Also, look at the applications that
>you will be using especially for the near future.  They may not work
>correctly with anything other than SHA1.  Later on, you could always
>re-issue your CA certs with the same keys but with the newer SHA 256
>algorithm.
>
>IMHO, go for the ease of use and interoperability than trying to ensure
>that everything is extremely secure/unbreakable.
>
>Ron Ogle
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org]
>On Behalf Of ROGER YOUNGLOVE
>Sent: Monday, January 29, 2007 9:39 AM
>To: ietf-pkix@imc.org
>Subject: SHA 1 vs. SHA 256 for Root CA
>
>
>We are standing up a number of CAs (Selfsigned Root, Policy and
>Issueing).
>The question has come up with the Microsoft CA product we have the
>ability
>to chose SHA 1, SHA 256, SHA 512. i believe that SHA1 is not sufficent
>for a
>20 year root CA lifespan. I need expert support for moving to SHA 256 at
>a
>minimum.
>
>Roger Younglove
>Principal Consultant
>Ford Motor Company
>
>
>




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Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2007 09:22:38 -0800
To: "ROGER YOUNGLOVE" <ryounglove1@msn.com>, ietf-pkix@imc.org
From: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
Subject: Re: SHA 1 vs. SHA 256 for Root CA
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At 9:38 AM -0500 1/29/07, ROGER YOUNGLOVE wrote:
>i believe that SHA1 is not sufficent for a 20 year root CA lifespan.

It would be useful to know where that belief comes from. To date, 
there have been no suggestions of any weakness for SHA-1 against 
preimage attacks. Also to date, no one has suggested that it is 
possible for anyone to brute-force a cryptographic primitive that 
would require 2^160 iterations.

--Paul Hoffman, Director
--VPN Consortium



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Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2007 12:02:26 -0500
To: Peter Sylvester <Peter.Sylvester@edelweb.fr>, pkix <ietf-pkix@imc.org>
From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
Subject: Re: asn.1 modules in 3280bis
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Peter:

RFC 3280 includes two ASN.1 Modules:
    PKIX1Explicit88, and
    PKIX1Implicit88.

I have no objection to using three ASN.1 Modules in 3280bis:
    PKIX1Explicit88,
    PKIX1Implicit88, and
    PKIX1Extensions.

I'm sure that you could help the authors figure out which type 
definitions to move to the third module.

Russ


At 09:43 AM 1/29/2007, Peter Sylvester wrote:

>It may be a bit late but I would like to propose a small change RFC 3280 bis.
>
>The text defines (as well as 3280) two ASN.1 modules. The definitions contain
>two types of information:
>
>- rewrites from X.509 etc
>- new definitions like the id-pkix arc and extensions
>
>If one wants to use the new definitions in other specifications here is
>the problem of ASN.1 compatibility when imported into other
>modules/
>I propose to add two modules:
>
>PKIXUsefulDefinitions which regroups definitions in such a way that
>they can be imported elsewhere.
>the syntax definitions for the private extensions. The actual
>
>PKIXExtensions in current syntax to use the
>EXTENSION CLASS to bind the extensions the OIDs.
>
>If this cannot be included into the 3280bis I propose a small RFC
>defining these modules.
>
>Peter



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Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2007 11:22:37 -0500
To: "ROGER YOUNGLOVE" <ryounglove1@msn.com>, ietf-pkix@imc.org
From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
Subject: Re: SHA 1 vs. SHA 256 for Root CA
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Roger:

I strongly encourage the use of SHA-256 (over SHA-1) for a signature 
that needs to stand for 20 years.

What key size are you choosing that will also be acceptable in 2027?

Russ


At 09:38 AM 1/29/2007, ROGER YOUNGLOVE wrote:

>We are standing up a number of CAs (Selfsigned Root, Policy and Issueing).
>The question has come up with the Microsoft CA product we have the 
>ability to chose SHA 1, SHA 256, SHA 512. i believe that SHA1 is not 
>sufficent for a 20 year root CA lifespan. I need expert support for 
>moving to SHA 256 at a minimum.
>
>Roger Younglove
>Principal Consultant
>Ford Motor Company



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Subject: RE: SHA 1 vs. SHA 256 for Root CA
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From: "Ogle Ron" <ron.ogle@thomson.net>
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What size are you planning for your CA keys ?  If you are going to use
RSA 1024, then SHA1 is probably ok.  Also, look at the applications that
you will be using especially for the near future.  They may not work
correctly with anything other than SHA1.  Later on, you could always
re-issue your CA certs with the same keys but with the newer SHA 256
algorithm.

IMHO, go for the ease of use and interoperability than trying to ensure
that everything is extremely secure/unbreakable.

Ron Ogle

-----Original Message-----
From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org]
On Behalf Of ROGER YOUNGLOVE
Sent: Monday, January 29, 2007 9:39 AM
To: ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: SHA 1 vs. SHA 256 for Root CA


We are standing up a number of CAs (Selfsigned Root, Policy and
Issueing).
The question has come up with the Microsoft CA product we have the
ability 
to chose SHA 1, SHA 256, SHA 512. i believe that SHA1 is not sufficent
for a 
20 year root CA lifespan. I need expert support for moving to SHA 256 at
a 
minimum.

Roger Younglove
Principal Consultant
Ford Motor Company





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Subject: RE: SHA 1 vs. SHA 256 for Root CA
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I do not see a problem with using SHA-1 for a self-signed certificate.
A self-signed certificate is vulnerable to modification and substitution
and hence must be protected using other means while stored or
communicated.

Thus, SHA-1 for self-signed root is fine.  SHA-256 will not protect it
any better.

You can not say the same about the certificates issued by the Root. 

-----Original Message-----
From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org]
On Behalf Of ROGER YOUNGLOVE
Sent: Monday, January 29, 2007 9:39 AM
To: ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: SHA 1 vs. SHA 256 for Root CA


We are standing up a number of CAs (Selfsigned Root, Policy and
Issueing).
The question has come up with the Microsoft CA product we have the
ability 
to chose SHA 1, SHA 256, SHA 512. i believe that SHA1 is not sufficent
for a 
20 year root CA lifespan. I need expert support for moving to SHA 256 at
a 
minimum.

Roger Younglove
Principal Consultant
Ford Motor Company





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Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2007 15:43:32 +0100
From: Peter Sylvester <Peter.Sylvester@edelweb.fr>
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To: pkix <ietf-pkix@imc.org>
Subject: asn.1 modules in 3280bis
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It may be a bit late but I would like to propose a small change RFC 3280 
bis.

The text defines (as well as 3280) two ASN.1 modules. The definitions 
contain
two types of information:

- rewrites from X.509 etc
- new definitions like the id-pkix arc and extensions

If one wants to use the new definitions in other specifications here is
the problem of ASN.1 compatibility when imported into other
modules/
I propose to add two modules:

PKIXUsefulDefinitions which regroups definitions in such a way that
they can be imported elsewhere.
the syntax definitions for the private extensions. The actual

PKIXExtensions in current syntax to use the
EXTENSION CLASS to bind the extensions the OIDs.

If this cannot be included into the 3280bis I propose a small RFC
defining these modules.

Peter

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oInMRFoRmT4AAAAAAAA=
--------------ms060108090904040702090003--



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From: "ROGER YOUNGLOVE" <ryounglove1@msn.com>
To: ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: SHA 1 vs. SHA 256 for Root CA
Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2007 09:38:41 -0500
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We are standing up a number of CAs (Selfsigned Root, Policy and Issueing).
The question has come up with the Microsoft CA product we have the ability 
to chose SHA 1, SHA 256, SHA 512. i believe that SHA1 is not sufficent for a 
20 year root CA lifespan. I need expert support for moving to SHA 256 at a 
minimum.

Roger Younglove
Principal Consultant
Ford Motor Company




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References: <45B94A66.3030107@cesnet.cz> <7.0.0.16.2.20070128021208.049264f8@vigilsec.com>
Date: Sun, 28 Jan 2007 20:39:20 -0800
To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>, Milan Sova <sova+pkix@cesnet.cz>, ietf-pkix@vpnc.org
From: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
Subject: Re: URN in subjectAltName
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At 2:16 AM -0500 1/28/07, Russ Housley wrote:
>At the time that RFC 2459 was written, URLs were the only things 
>mature enough to include here.  No one asked this question during 
>the update to RFC 2459, which resulted in RFC 3280.
>
>Going forward, I see two possible ways to go forward:
>
>1) Revisit the uri choice, and see if people think URNs ought to be 
>permitted.  One obvious question is to determine whether existing 
>implementations would fail badly if a URN was received here.

This seems like overkill given the low usage of URNs as identifiers 
that are associated with public keys.

>2) Define a way to carry URNs in an other name.

Anders and I have suggested two legal ways to do this already.

--Paul Hoffman, Director
--VPN Consortium



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Date: Sun, 28 Jan 2007 02:16:21 -0500
To: Milan Sova <sova+pkix@cesnet.cz>, ietf-pkix@vpnc.org
From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
Subject: Re: URN in subjectAltName
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At the time that RFC 2459 was written, URLs were the only things 
mature enough to include here.  No one asked this question during the 
update to RFC 2459, which resulted in RFC 3280.

Going forward, I see two possible ways to go forward:

1) Revisit the uri choice, and see if people think URNs ought to be 
permitted.  One obvious question is to determine whether existing 
implementations would fail badly if a URN was received here.

2) Define a way to carry URNs in an other name.

Russ

At 07:25 PM 1/25/2007, Milan Sova wrote:

>         Hi.
>
>         In our project, we mark end entities with URNs and need to include
>these names in the certificates. We started with using
>subjectAltName.URI field for this (as URN is a "subtype" of URI).
>However, this practice clashes with RFC 3280 which explicitly requires
>absolute URL for the field.
>
>         Is there any specific reason for excluding URNs from subjectAltName?
>
>         Regards
>--
>                                                 Milan Sova



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From: "Anders Rundgren" <anders.rundgren@telia.com>
To: "Milan Sova" <sova+pkix@cesnet.cz>, <ietf-pkix@vpnc.org>
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Subject: Re: URN in subjectAltName
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Hi
You can put whatever you want including URNs in a serialNumber attribute.
I would though also consider using a scheme where you separate the identity
part from the authority/registry.  Like if your URN is:

         serialNumber=urn:com:example:id:3456

 you might as well use something like:

    serialNumber=<guid registry="urn:com:example:id">3456</guid>

[some "-mangling removed for brevity]
which has the advantage that it is a universal XML-ish way of specifying
a globally unique id where you don't have to know how the registry part
is constructed in order to get the id.  Although true URNs are cool, I
would still not rule out using HTTP URIs because then the registry part
would typically point to a web-page showing data associated with the
identity name space.

Anders

----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Milan Sova" <sova+pkix@cesnet.cz>
To: <ietf-pkix@vpnc.org>
Sent: Friday, January 26, 2007 01:25
Subject: URN in subjectAltName



Hi.

In our project, we mark end entities with URNs and need to include
these names in the certificates. We started with using
subjectAltName.URI field for this (as URN is a "subtype" of URI).
However, this practice clashes with RFC 3280 which explicitly requires
absolute URL for the field.

Is there any specific reason for excluding URNs from subjectAltName?

Regards
-- 
Milan Sova





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--

another brave stab at making conversation.
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Date: Fri, 26 Jan 2007 08:41:39 -0800
To: Milan Sova <sova+pkix@cesnet.cz>, ietf-pkix@vpnc.org
From: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
Subject: Re: URN in subjectAltName
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At 1:25 AM +0100 1/26/07, Milan Sova wrote:
>	Hi.
>
>	In our project, we mark end entities with URNs and need to include
>these names in the certificates. We started with using
>subjectAltName.URI field for this (as URN is a "subtype" of URI).
>However, this practice clashes with RFC 3280 which explicitly requires
>absolute URL for the field.
>
>	Is there any specific reason for excluding URNs from subjectAltName?

Yes, but it is not a good one in my opinion. The URI use in 
subjectAltName is only meant to be a host computer reach by a 
protocol, not a vanilla identifier such as a URN. Thus, there is the 
restriction that there has to be a host name.

If you want a URN, you should consider using otherName instead. This, 
of course, shows the silliness of the specificity of the 
uniformResourceIdentifier type, but it is needed if you want to 
follow 3280.

--Paul Hoffman, Director
--VPN Consortium



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	Hi.

	In our project, we mark end entities with URNs and need to include
these names in the certificates. We started with using
subjectAltName.URI field for this (as URN is a "subtype" of URI).
However, this practice clashes with RFC 3280 which explicitly requires
absolute URL for the field.

	Is there any specific reason for excluding URNs from subjectAltName?

	Regards
-- 
						Milan Sova



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Subject: RE: ID cards certificate profiles
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From: Ryan Hurst <Ryan.Hurst@microsoft.com>
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In-line

=20

From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org]
On Behalf Of Dave Engberg
Sent: Tuesday, January 23, 2007 9:09 AM
To: Bechlaghem, Malek; ietf-pkix@vpnc.org
Subject: RE: ID cards certificate profiles

=20

=20

1.  Most common PKI-enabled applications will display the value of the
subject Distinguished Name without doing any LDAP lookups.  For example,
a signed document will display the signer's name using the CN from the
cert, not an LDAP lookup.  While you may set the CN to an opaque encoded
string like you describe, this may make the certs confusing to use,
since the signer will be listed as "Certificate Type=3DSIGN, 12345678",
rather than "Malek Bechlaghem".

=20

If your policies prevent you from putting the cardholder's name in the
cert (e.g. for privacy), then you may want to consider using the
"serialNumber" attribute in the DN instead of the CN attribute.

[rmh] Yes, Windows often uses a API called GetCertNameString
(http://msdn2.microsoft.com/fr-fr/library/ms937665.aspx ) and a option
it exposes called SimpleName which prefers the CN over other parts of
the DN, it doesn't even look at the given name and surname.=20

[rmh] Also can't stress the confidentiality issues enough with
certificate profiles, you certainly need personally identifiable
information in the certificate but protocols often exchange certificates
as part of a bootstrap for a session and they will be visible in the
clear if used in these protocols (the receiving end of a TLS session for
example).

=20

2.  The meaning of the NR bit is unclear in the absence of a specific
law.  This has been the topic of a lot of discussion, and I don't think
you're going to get a great answer on this question.

=20

=20

3.  RFC 3280 requires the subjectKeyIdentifier for all CA certs ("MUST")
and recommends for EE certs ("SHOULD").  In practice, sKI and aKI have
limited value for implementors since the method of deriving them from
the key isn't mandatory, so a relying party has to process non-matching
sKI + aKI pairs already.

 [rmh] I agree, Windows generates them automatically to facilitate key
based chaining (preference) if they are not there.

=20

4.  If you are including Certificate Policies, you may want to consider
including more than one policy OID if the certificate may be used for
different purposes (e.g. different assurance levels).  For example, you
could put in an OID for "low assurance" and another for "high
assurance".  Later, you could then issue different cards (e.g.
non-citizen visitors) that only include the "low assurance" OID.  This
would allow each application to choose its level of assurance by
selecting the initial policy set to the validation algorithm.

[rmh] Also be aware of how the use of CP will effect your
interoperability with existing clients (browsers, etc) that do not
properly support CP, Windows is fine XP and up but pre-xp that isn't
necessarily the case. I am also I am surprised how many poorly
constructed certs are out there with CPs, many don't nest and meet the
CP processing rules; you don't want to be one of these.

 =20

5.  basicConstraints may be omitted from EE certs.  The pathLen may be
zero on the certs issued to your subordinate CAs.  You can't rely on the
behavior of a "pathLen" value in the self-signed (root) cert, so you may
want to omit it to avoid confusion.

=20

=20

6.  For a PKI to scale to support a national ID, you don't want to
distribute revocation information via LDAP+CRL.  The CRLs could easily
grow to hundreds of megabytes per day.  Most large ID projects (e.g. US
government ID cards) are migrating to OCSP for revocation checking.

 [rmh] Yes, you want to do HTTP based distribution of CRLs, and you
definitely also want OCSP support (pre-produced responses, etc)

=20

________________________________

From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org]
On Behalf Of Bechlaghem, Malek
Sent: Tuesday, January 23, 2007 5:08 AM
To: ietf-pkix@vpnc.org
Subject: ID cards certificate profiles

Hi there,

It has been long since the last time I posted something so happy to be
back J

I am working on the implementation of a PKI infrastructure needed for an
ID cards issuing project. Part of my job is defining the needed
certificate profiles which are raising some open issues that I am
listing below and hope to have your support in resolving them.

1.       Are there any particular issues when not adding any surname and
given names in the CN of the subject field of end-entity certificates
knowing that these EE are the actual ID cardholders. My understanding is
that the subject field is used mainly to provide the data that
identifies the certificate holder. Moreover, knowing a person's name, so
if I am looking for her certificate, I could use the name to perform
LDAP lookup based on that name. However, in our case, the certificates
are not published in an LDAP and the persons names are often very long.
This is why we thought not using first and last names in the CN of the
subject field. Instead, we are considering the following format for the
CN:=20

Common Name (CN) =3D < Certificate Type =3D <AUTH/SIGN>, Citizen civil =
ID>

2.      Assuming that the country issuing ID cards does not have a
digital signature law and no clear definition of NON REPUDIATION, should
we avoid using the NR bit of the key usage extension for signing
certificates (not authentication certificate)? We could set the
digitalSignature bit only and explain in the certificate profile the
applicability of the certificate including those situations where it
would be difficult for the cardholder to repudiate a signature? We could
simply set the NR bit.=20

3.       We are not planning to use the SubjectKeyIdentifier extension
as the card returns a complete certification path with a signed message.
Would this be OK or are there reaons to use this extensions.

4.       For the certificatePolicies extension, the plan is to use a CPS
qualifier with the CPS OID. Is there any reasons for deviating from
this? We could for instance use the OID of the CP under which a
certificate is issued. Assuming that the Certification Authority issues
other types of certificates apart from the ID cards certificates, and
that these certificates may have different assurance levels, what's the
right option we should opt for when formatting the certificatePolicies
extension?

5.       We are not planning to use the basicConstraints extension for
EE certificates. We will use it for CA certificates setting the
pathLengthConstraint to zero. This prevents cross certification at the
subordinate CAs level which is a functional requirement since we are
expecting cross certification with other CAs to occur at the root CA
level. Could you please confirm that our settings for the
basicConstraint extension are correct.

6.       Assuming that the LDAP directory on which CRLs will not be
public, =20

Thank you all for your prompt feedback.

M. Bechlaghem

=20

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<p class=3DMsoNormal><a name=3D"_MailEndCompose"><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span=
></a></p>

<div>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt =
0in 0in 0in'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span>=
</b><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>
owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] <b>On =
Behalf
Of </b>Dave Engberg<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, January 23, 2007 9:09 AM<br>
<b>To:</b> Bechlaghem, Malek; ietf-pkix@vpnc.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> RE: ID cards certificate profiles<o:p></o:p></span></p>

</div>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:blue'>1.&nbsp; Most common PKI-enabled applications will display =
the
value of the subject Distinguished Name without doing any LDAP =
lookups.&nbsp;
For example, a signed document will display the signer's name&nbsp;using =
the CN
from the cert, not an LDAP lookup.&nbsp; While you may set the CN to an =
opaque
encoded string like you describe, this may make the certs confusing to =
use,
since the signer will be listed as &quot;Certificate Type=3DSIGN, =
12345678&quot;,
rather than &quot;Malek Bechlaghem&quot;.</span><o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:blue'>If your policies prevent you from putting the cardholder's =
name in
the cert (e.g. for privacy), then you may want to&nbsp;consider using =
the
&quot;serialNumber&quot; attribute in the DN instead of the CN =
attribute.</span><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'><o:p></o:p></=
span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>[rmh] Yes, Windows often uses a API called =
GetCertNameString =
(http://msdn2.microsoft.com/fr-fr/library/ms937665.aspx
) and a option it exposes called SimpleName which prefers the CN over =
other
parts of the DN, it doesn&#8217;t even look at the given name and =
surname.</span>&nbsp;<span
style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>[rmh] Also can&#8217;t stress the confidentiality issues =
enough
with certificate profiles, you certainly need personally identifiable
information in the certificate but protocols often exchange certificates =
as
part of a bootstrap for a session and they will be visible in the clear =
if used
in these protocols (the receiving end of a TLS session for =
example).<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:blue'>2.&nbsp; The meaning of the NR bit is unclear in the absence =
of a
specific law.&nbsp; This has been the topic of a lot of discussion, and =
I don't
think you're going to get a great answer on this =
question.</span><o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:blue'>3.&nbsp; RFC 3280 requires the subjectKeyIdentifier for all =
CA certs
(&quot;MUST&quot;) and recommends for EE certs =
(&quot;SHOULD&quot;).&nbsp; In
practice, sKI and aKI have limited value for implementors since the =
method of
deriving them from the key isn't mandatory, so a relying party has to =
process
non-matching sKI&nbsp;+ aKI pairs already.</span><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>[rmh] I agree, =
Windows
generates them automatically to facilitate key based chaining =
(preference) if
they are not there.</span><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:blue'>4.&nbsp; If you are including Certificate Policies, you may =
want to
consider including more than one policy OID if the certificate may be =
used for
different purposes (e.g. different assurance levels).&nbsp; For example, =
you
could put in an OID for &quot;low assurance&quot; and another for =
&quot;high
assurance&quot;.&nbsp; Later, you could then issue different cards (e.g.
non-citizen visitors) that only include the &quot;low assurance&quot;
OID.&nbsp; This would allow each application to choose its level of =
assurance
by selecting the initial policy set to the validation =
algorithm.</span><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'><o:p></o:p></=
span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>[rmh] Also be aware of how the use of CP will effect your =
interoperability
with existing clients (browsers, etc) that do not properly support CP, =
Windows
is fine XP and up but pre-xp that isn&#8217;t necessarily the case. I am =
also I
am surprised how many poorly constructed certs are out there with CPs, =
many don&#8217;t
nest and meet the CP processing rules; you don&#8217;t want to be one of =
these.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:blue'>5.&nbsp; basicConstraints may be omitted from EE =
certs.&nbsp; The
pathLen may be zero on the certs issued to your subordinate CAs.&nbsp; =
You
can't rely on the behavior of a &quot;pathLen&quot; value in the =
self-signed
(root) cert, so you may want to omit it to avoid confusion.</span><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'><o:p></o:p></=
span></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:blue'>6.&nbsp; For a PKI to scale to support a national ID, you =
don't
want to distribute revocation information via LDAP+CRL.&nbsp; The CRLs =
could
easily grow to hundreds of megabytes per day.&nbsp; Most large ID =
projects
(e.g. US government ID cards) are migrating to OCSP for revocation =
checking.</span><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>[rmh] Yes, you =
want to do
HTTP based distribution of CRLs, and you definitely also want OCSP =
support
(pre-produced responses, etc)</span><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

</div>

<div class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dcenter style=3D'text-align:center'>

<hr size=3D2 width=3D"100%" align=3Dcenter>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-bottom:12.0pt'><b><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span></b><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org
[mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] <b>On Behalf Of </b>Bechlaghem, =
Malek<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, January 23, 2007 5:08 AM<br>
<b>To:</b> ietf-pkix@vpnc.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> ID cards certificate profiles</span><o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'>Hi =
there,<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'>It has been =
long
since the last time I posted something so happy to be back </span><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Wingdings'>J</span><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'>I am working =
on the
implementation of a PKI infrastructure needed for an ID cards issuing =
project.
Part of my job is defining the needed certificate profiles which are =
raising
some open issues that I am listing below and hope to have your support =
in
resolving them.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;
margin-left:.25in;text-indent:-.25in'><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:
"Arial","sans-serif"'>1.</span><span =
style=3D'font-size:7.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
</span><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'>Are
there any particular issues when not adding any surname and given names =
in the
CN of the subject field of end-entity certificates knowing that these EE =
are
the actual ID cardholders. My understanding is that the subject field is =
used
mainly to provide the data that identifies the certificate holder. =
Moreover,
knowing a person&#8217;s name, so if I am looking for her certificate, I =
could
use the name to perform LDAP lookup based on that name. However, in our =
case,
the certificates are not published in an LDAP and the persons names are =
often
very long. This is why we thought not using first and last names in the =
CN of
the subject field. Instead, we are considering the following format for =
the CN:
<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;
margin-left:.5in;text-indent:.5in'>Common Name (CN) =3D &lt; Certificate =
Type =3D
&lt;AUTH/SIGN&gt;, Citizen civil ID&gt;<o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;
margin-left:.25in;text-indent:-.25in'>2.<span =
style=3D'font-size:7.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
</span>Assuming that the country issuing ID cards does not have a =
digital
signature law and no clear definition of NON REPUDIATION, should we =
avoid using
the NR bit of the key usage extension for signing certificates (not
authentication certificate)? We could set the digitalSignature bit only =
and
explain in the certificate profile the applicability of the certificate
including those situations where it would be difficult for the =
cardholder to
repudiate a signature? We could simply set the NR bit. <o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;
margin-left:.25in;text-indent:-.25in'><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:
"Arial","sans-serif"'>3.</span><span =
style=3D'font-size:7.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
</span><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'>We are
not planning to use the SubjectKeyIdentifier extension as the card =
returns a
complete certification path with a signed message. Would this be OK or =
are
there reaons to use this extensions.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;
margin-left:.25in;text-indent:-.25in'><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:
"Arial","sans-serif"'>4.</span><span =
style=3D'font-size:7.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
</span><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'>For the
certificatePolicies extension, the plan is to use a CPS qualifier with =
the CPS
OID. Is there any reasons for deviating from this? We could for instance =
use
the OID of the CP under which a certificate is issued. Assuming that the
Certification Authority issues other types of certificates apart from =
the ID
cards certificates, and that these certificates may have different =
assurance
levels, what&#8217;s the right option we should opt for when formatting =
the
certificatePolicies extension?<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;
margin-left:.25in;text-indent:-.25in'><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:
"Arial","sans-serif"'>5.</span><span =
style=3D'font-size:7.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
</span><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'>We are
not planning to use the basicConstraints extension for EE certificates. =
We will
use it for CA certificates setting the pathLengthConstraint to zero. =
This
prevents cross certification at the subordinate CAs level which is a =
functional
requirement since we are expecting cross certification with other CAs to =
occur
at the root CA level. Could you please confirm that our settings for the
basicConstraint extension are correct.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;
margin-left:.25in;text-indent:-.25in'><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:
"Arial","sans-serif"'>6.</span><span =
style=3D'font-size:7.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
</span><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'>Assuming
that the LDAP directory on which CRLs will not be public, =
&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'>Thank you =
all for
your prompt feedback.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'>M. =
Bechlaghem<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'margin-bottom:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p align=3Dcenter style=3D'text-align:center'><span =
style=3D'background:white'>This
e-mail and any attachment is for authorised use by the intended =
recipient(s)
only. It may contain proprietary material, confidential information =
and/or be
subject to legal privilege. It should not be copied, disclosed to, =
retained or
used by, any other party. If you are not an intended recipient then =
please
promptly delete this e-mail and any attachment and all copies and inform =
the
sender. Thank you.</span><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

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Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2007 14:01:15 -0500
To: Danilo Gligoroski <danilo.gligoroski@q2s.ntnu.no>
From: Shu-jen Chang <shu-jen.chang@nist.gov>
Subject: Re: NIST announces Draft Requirements and Evaluation Criteria for New Hash Algorithms
In-Reply-To: <6.2.3.4.2.20070123194553.03d97090@pop.mail.yahoo.com>
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Thank you for pointing out the mistake. It was correct in the file that we 
sent out, but somehow got messed up in the final publication. Sorry about that.

Shu-jen


At 01:48 PM 1/23/2007, you wrote:
>Hi,
>
>There is an obvious typo:
>
>"A.3 The algorithm must support
>224, 256, 384, and 512-bit message
>digests, and must support a maximum
>message length of at least 264 bits."
>
>Probably it should be:
>
>"A.3 The algorithm must support
>224, 256, 384, and 512-bit message
>digests, and must support a maximum
>message length of at least 2^64 bits."
>
>(Usual copy paste error from Word ...)
>
>Regards,
>Danilo!

--=====================_13993656==.ALT
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<html>
Thank you for pointing out the mistake. It was correct in the file that
we sent out, but somehow got messed up in the final publication. Sorry
about that.<br><br>
Shu-jen<br><br>
<br>
At 01:48 PM 1/23/2007, you wrote:<br>
<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite>Hi,<br><br>
There is an obvious typo:<br><br>
&quot;<font size=2>A.3 The algorithm must support<br>
224, 256, 384, and 512-bit message<br>
digests, and must support a maximum<br>
message length of at least 264 bits.&quot;<br><br>
</font>Probably it should be:<br><br>
<font size=2>&quot;A.3 The algorithm must support<br>
224, 256, 384, and 512-bit message<br>
digests, and must support a maximum<br>
message length of at least 2^64 bits.&quot;<br><br>
</font>(Usual copy paste error from Word ...)<br><br>
Regards,<br>
Danilo!</blockquote></html>

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NIST Wants Comments on Proposed Hash Algorithm Requirements and Evaluation 
Criteria

The National Institute of Standards and Technology is planning a 
competition to develop one or more cryptographic hash algorithms to augment 
and revise the current Secure Hash Standard (Federal Information Processing 
Standard 180-2). As a first step in this process, NIST is publishing draft 
minimum acceptability requirements, submission requirements, and evaluation 
criteria for candidate algorithms ( See the Federal Register Announcement 
on http://www.nist.gov/hash-function ), and requests public comment by 
April 27, 2007.

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<html>
<b><br>
NIST Wants Comments on Proposed Hash Algorithm Requirements and
Evaluation Criteria<br><br>
</b>The National Institute of Standards and Technology is planning a
competition to develop one or more cryptographic hash algorithms to
augment and revise the current Secure Hash Standard (Federal Information
Processing Standard 180-2). As a first step in this process, NIST is
publishing draft minimum acceptability requirements, submission
requirements, and evaluation criteria for candidate algorithms ( See the
Federal Register Announcement on
<a href="http://www.nist.gov/hash-function" eudora="autourl"><font color="#0000FF"><u>http://www.nist.gov/hash-function</a></u></font>
), and requests public comment by April 27, 2007.<br>
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Subject: RE: ID cards certificate profiles
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Thread-Topic: ID cards certificate profiles
Thread-Index: Acc+1mORVDN5B0fPRuGIQQKz8IZWWwAMpIAA
From: "Dave Engberg" <dengberg@corestreet.com>
To: "Bechlaghem, Malek" <malek.bechlaghem@logicacmg.com>, <ietf-pkix@vpnc.org>
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1.  Most common PKI-enabled applications will display the value of the
subject Distinguished Name without doing any LDAP lookups.  For example, a
signed document will display the signer's name using the CN from the cert,
not an LDAP lookup.  While you may set the CN to an opaque encoded string
like you describe, this may make the certs confusing to use, since the
signer will be listed as "Certificate Type=SIGN, 12345678", rather than
"Malek Bechlaghem".
 
If your policies prevent you from putting the cardholder's name in the cert
(e.g. for privacy), then you may want to consider using the "serialNumber"
attribute in the DN instead of the CN attribute.
 
 
2.  The meaning of the NR bit is unclear in the absence of a specific law.
This has been the topic of a lot of discussion, and I don't think you're
going to get a great answer on this question.
 
 
3.  RFC 3280 requires the subjectKeyIdentifier for all CA certs ("MUST") and
recommends for EE certs ("SHOULD").  In practice, sKI and aKI have limited
value for implementors since the method of deriving them from the key isn't
mandatory, so a relying party has to process non-matching sKI + aKI pairs
already.
 
 
4.  If you are including Certificate Policies, you may want to consider
including more than one policy OID if the certificate may be used for
different purposes (e.g. different assurance levels).  For example, you
could put in an OID for "low assurance" and another for "high assurance".
Later, you could then issue different cards (e.g. non-citizen visitors) that
only include the "low assurance" OID.  This would allow each application to
choose its level of assurance by selecting the initial policy set to the
validation algorithm.
 
 
5.  basicConstraints may be omitted from EE certs.  The pathLen may be zero
on the certs issued to your subordinate CAs.  You can't rely on the behavior
of a "pathLen" value in the self-signed (root) cert, so you may want to omit
it to avoid confusion.
 
 
6.  For a PKI to scale to support a national ID, you don't want to
distribute revocation information via LDAP+CRL.  The CRLs could easily grow
to hundreds of megabytes per day.  Most large ID projects (e.g. US
government ID cards) are migrating to OCSP for revocation checking.
 

  _____  

From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] On
Behalf Of Bechlaghem, Malek
Sent: Tuesday, January 23, 2007 5:08 AM
To: ietf-pkix@vpnc.org
Subject: ID cards certificate profiles



Hi there,

It has been long since the last time I posted something so happy to be back
:-)

I am working on the implementation of a PKI infrastructure needed for an ID
cards issuing project. Part of my job is defining the needed certificate
profiles which are raising some open issues that I am listing below and hope
to have your support in resolving them.

1.       Are there any particular issues when not adding any surname and
given names in the CN of the subject field of end-entity certificates
knowing that these EE are the actual ID cardholders. My understanding is
that the subject field is used mainly to provide the data that identifies
the certificate holder. Moreover, knowing a person's name, so if I am
looking for her certificate, I could use the name to perform LDAP lookup
based on that name. However, in our case, the certificates are not published
in an LDAP and the persons names are often very long. This is why we thought
not using first and last names in the CN of the subject field. Instead, we
are considering the following format for the CN: 

Common Name (CN) = < Certificate Type = <AUTH/SIGN>, Citizen civil ID>

2.      Assuming that the country issuing ID cards does not have a digital
signature law and no clear definition of NON REPUDIATION, should we avoid
using the NR bit of the key usage extension for signing certificates (not
authentication certificate)? We could set the digitalSignature bit only and
explain in the certificate profile the applicability of the certificate
including those situations where it would be difficult for the cardholder to
repudiate a signature? We could simply set the NR bit. 

3.       We are not planning to use the SubjectKeyIdentifier extension as
the card returns a complete certification path with a signed message. Would
this be OK or are there reaons to use this extensions.

4.       For the certificatePolicies extension, the plan is to use a CPS
qualifier with the CPS OID. Is there any reasons for deviating from this? We
could for instance use the OID of the CP under which a certificate is
issued. Assuming that the Certification Authority issues other types of
certificates apart from the ID cards certificates, and that these
certificates may have different assurance levels, what's the right option we
should opt for when formatting the certificatePolicies extension?

5.       We are not planning to use the basicConstraints extension for EE
certificates. We will use it for CA certificates setting the
pathLengthConstraint to zero. This prevents cross certification at the
subordinate CAs level which is a functional requirement since we are
expecting cross certification with other CAs to occur at the root CA level.
Could you please confirm that our settings for the basicConstraint extension
are correct.

6.       Assuming that the LDAP directory on which CRLs will not be public,


Thank you all for your prompt feedback.

M. Bechlaghem



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<DIV dir=3Dltr align=3Dleft><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#0000ff=20
size=3D2></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr align=3Dleft><SPAN class=3D593111016-23012007><FONT =
face=3DArial=20
color=3D#0000ff size=3D2>1.&nbsp; Most common PKI-enabled applications =
will display=20
the value of the subject Distinguished Name without doing any LDAP=20
lookups.&nbsp; For example, a signed document will display the signer's=20
name&nbsp;using the CN from the cert, not an LDAP lookup.&nbsp; While =
you may=20
set the CN to an opaque encoded string like you describe, this may make =
the=20
certs confusing to use, since the signer will be listed as "Certificate=20
Type=3DSIGN, 12345678", rather than "Malek =
Bechlaghem".</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr align=3Dleft><SPAN class=3D593111016-23012007><FONT =
face=3DArial=20
color=3D#0000ff size=3D2></FONT></SPAN>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr align=3Dleft><SPAN class=3D593111016-23012007><FONT =
face=3DArial=20
color=3D#0000ff size=3D2>If your policies prevent you from putting the =
cardholder's=20
name in the cert (e.g. for privacy), then you may want=20
to&nbsp;</FONT></SPAN><SPAN class=3D593111016-23012007><FONT =
face=3DArial=20
color=3D#0000ff size=3D2>consider using the "serialNumber" attribute in =
the DN=20
instead of the CN attribute.</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr align=3Dleft><SPAN class=3D593111016-23012007><FONT =
face=3DArial=20
color=3D#0000ff size=3D2></FONT></SPAN>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr align=3Dleft><SPAN class=3D593111016-23012007><FONT =
face=3DArial=20
color=3D#0000ff size=3D2></FONT></SPAN>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr align=3Dleft><SPAN class=3D593111016-23012007><FONT =
face=3DArial=20
color=3D#0000ff size=3D2>2.&nbsp; The meaning of the NR bit is unclear =
in the=20
absence of a specific law.&nbsp; This has been the topic of a lot of =
discussion,=20
and I don't think you're going to get a great answer on this=20
question.</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr align=3Dleft><SPAN class=3D593111016-23012007><FONT =
face=3DArial=20
color=3D#0000ff size=3D2></FONT></SPAN>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#0000ff size=3D2></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#0000ff size=3D2><SPAN=20
class=3D593111016-23012007>3.&nbsp; RFC 3280 requires the =
subjectKeyIdentifier for=20
all CA certs ("MUST") and recommends for EE certs ("SHOULD").&nbsp; In =
practice,=20
sKI and aKI have limited value for implementors since the method of =
deriving=20
them from the key isn't mandatory, so a relying party has to process=20
non-matching sKI&nbsp;+ aKI pairs already.</SPAN></FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#0000ff size=3D2><SPAN=20
class=3D593111016-23012007></SPAN></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#0000ff size=3D2><SPAN=20
class=3D593111016-23012007></SPAN></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#0000ff size=3D2><SPAN=20
class=3D593111016-23012007>4.&nbsp; If you are including Certificate =
Policies, you=20
may want to consider including more than one policy OID if the =
certificate may=20
be used for different purposes (e.g. different assurance levels).&nbsp; =
For=20
example, you could put in an OID for "low assurance" and another for =
"high=20
assurance".&nbsp; Later, you could then issue different cards (e.g. =
non-citizen=20
visitors) that only include the "low assurance" OID.&nbsp; This would =
allow each=20
application to choose its level of assurance by selecting the initial =
policy set=20
to the validation algorithm.</SPAN></FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#0000ff size=3D2><SPAN=20
class=3D593111016-23012007></SPAN></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#0000ff size=3D2><SPAN=20
class=3D593111016-23012007></SPAN></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=3D593111016-23012007><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#0000ff =

size=3D2>5.&nbsp; basicConstraints may be omitted from EE certs.&nbsp; =
The pathLen=20
may be zero on the certs issued to your subordinate CAs.&nbsp; You can't =
rely on=20
the behavior of a "pathLen" value in the self-signed (root) cert, so you =
may=20
want to omit it to avoid confusion.</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#0000ff size=3D2></FONT><FONT =
face=3DArial color=3D#0000ff=20
size=3D2></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#0000ff size=3D2></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=3D593111016-23012007><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#0000ff =

size=3D2>6.&nbsp; For a PKI to scale to support a national ID, you don't =
want to=20
distribute revocation information via LDAP+CRL.&nbsp; The CRLs could =
easily grow=20
to hundreds of megabytes per day.&nbsp; Most large ID projects (e.g. US=20
government ID cards) are migrating to OCSP for revocation=20
checking.</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#0000ff size=3D2></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr><BR></DIV>
<DIV class=3DOutlookMessageHeader lang=3Den-us dir=3Dltr align=3Dleft>
<HR tabIndex=3D-1>
<FONT face=3DTahoma size=3D2><B>From:</B> owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org=20
[mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] <B>On Behalf Of </B>Bechlaghem,=20
Malek<BR><B>Sent:</B> Tuesday, January 23, 2007 5:08 AM<BR><B>To:</B>=20
ietf-pkix@vpnc.org<BR><B>Subject:</B> ID cards certificate=20
profiles<BR></FONT><BR></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV class=3DSection1>
<P class=3DMsoNormal=20
style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto"><FONT =
face=3DArial=20
size=3D2><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">Hi=20
there,<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal=20
style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto"><FONT =
face=3DArial=20
size=3D2><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">It has been =
long since=20
the last time I posted something so happy to be back </SPAN></FONT><FONT =

face=3DWingdings size=3D2><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: Wingdings">J</SPAN></FONT><FONT =
face=3DArial=20
size=3D2><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: =
Arial"><o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal=20
style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto"><FONT =
face=3DArial=20
size=3D2><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">I am =
working on the=20
implementation of a PKI infrastructure needed for an ID cards issuing =
project.=20
Part of my job is defining the needed certificate profiles which are =
raising=20
some open issues that I am listing below and hope to have your support =
in=20
resolving them.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal=20
style=3D"MARGIN-LEFT: 0.25in; TEXT-INDENT: -0.25in; mso-margin-top-alt: =
auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-list: l2 level1 lfo3"><![if =
!supportLists]><FONT=20
face=3DArial size=3D2><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: =
Arial"><SPAN=20
style=3D"mso-list: Ignore">1.<FONT face=3D"Times New Roman" =
size=3D1><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT: 7pt 'Times New =
Roman'">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=20
</SPAN></FONT></SPAN></SPAN></FONT><![endif]><SPAN dir=3Dltr><FONT =
face=3DArial=20
size=3D2><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">Are there =
any=20
particular issues when not adding any surname and given names in the CN =
of the=20
subject field of end-entity certificates knowing that these EE are the =
actual ID=20
cardholders. My understanding is that the subject field is used mainly =
to=20
provide the data that identifies the certificate holder. Moreover, =
knowing a=20
person&#8217;s name, so if I am looking for her certificate, I could use =
the name to=20
perform LDAP lookup based on that name. However, in our case, the =
certificates=20
are not published in an LDAP and the persons names are often very long. =
This is=20
why we thought not using first and last names in the CN of the subject =
field.=20
Instead, we are considering the following format for the CN:=20
<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></SPAN></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal=20
style=3D"MARGIN-LEFT: 0.5in; TEXT-INDENT: 0.5in; mso-margin-top-alt: =
auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto"><FONT=20
face=3D"Times New Roman" size=3D3><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt">Common =
Name (CN) =3D=20
&lt; Certificate Type =3D &lt;AUTH/SIGN&gt;, Citizen civil=20
ID&gt;<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal=20
style=3D"MARGIN-LEFT: 0.25in; TEXT-INDENT: -0.25in; mso-margin-top-alt: =
auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-list: l2 level1 lfo3"><![if =
!supportLists]><FONT=20
face=3D"Times New Roman" size=3D3><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt"><SPAN=20
style=3D"mso-list: Ignore">2.<FONT face=3D"Times New Roman" =
size=3D1><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT: 7pt 'Times New Roman'">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=20
</SPAN></FONT></SPAN></SPAN></FONT><![endif]><SPAN dir=3Dltr>Assuming =
that the=20
country issuing ID cards does not have a digital signature law and no =
clear=20
definition of NON REPUDIATION, should we avoid using the NR bit of the =
key usage=20
extension for signing certificates (not authentication certificate)? We =
could=20
set the digitalSignature bit only and explain in the certificate profile =
the=20
applicability of the certificate including those situations where it =
would be=20
difficult for the cardholder to repudiate a signature? We could simply =
set the=20
NR bit. <o:p></o:p></SPAN></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal=20
style=3D"MARGIN-LEFT: 0.25in; TEXT-INDENT: -0.25in; mso-margin-top-alt: =
auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-list: l2 level1 lfo3"><![if =
!supportLists]><FONT=20
face=3DArial size=3D2><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: =
Arial"><SPAN=20
style=3D"mso-list: Ignore">3.<FONT face=3D"Times New Roman" =
size=3D1><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT: 7pt 'Times New =
Roman'">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=20
</SPAN></FONT></SPAN></SPAN></FONT><![endif]><SPAN dir=3Dltr><FONT =
face=3DArial=20
size=3D2><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">We are not =
planning to=20
use the SubjectKeyIdentifier extension as the card returns a complete=20
certification path with a signed message. Would this be OK or are there =
reaons=20
to use this extensions.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></SPAN></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal=20
style=3D"MARGIN-LEFT: 0.25in; TEXT-INDENT: -0.25in; mso-margin-top-alt: =
auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-list: l2 level1 lfo3"><![if =
!supportLists]><FONT=20
face=3DArial size=3D2><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: =
Arial"><SPAN=20
style=3D"mso-list: Ignore">4.<FONT face=3D"Times New Roman" =
size=3D1><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT: 7pt 'Times New =
Roman'">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=20
</SPAN></FONT></SPAN></SPAN></FONT><![endif]><SPAN dir=3Dltr><FONT =
face=3DArial=20
size=3D2><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">For the=20
certificatePolicies extension, the plan is to use a CPS qualifier with =
the CPS=20
OID. Is there any reasons for deviating from this? We could for instance =
use the=20
OID of the CP under which a certificate is issued. Assuming that the=20
Certification Authority issues other types of certificates apart from =
the ID=20
cards certificates, and that these certificates may have different =
assurance=20
levels, what&#8217;s the right option we should opt for when formatting =
the=20
certificatePolicies extension?<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></SPAN></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal=20
style=3D"MARGIN-LEFT: 0.25in; TEXT-INDENT: -0.25in; mso-margin-top-alt: =
auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-list: l2 level1 lfo3"><![if =
!supportLists]><FONT=20
face=3DArial size=3D2><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: =
Arial"><SPAN=20
style=3D"mso-list: Ignore">5.<FONT face=3D"Times New Roman" =
size=3D1><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT: 7pt 'Times New =
Roman'">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=20
</SPAN></FONT></SPAN></SPAN></FONT><![endif]><SPAN dir=3Dltr><FONT =
face=3DArial=20
size=3D2><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">We are not =
planning to=20
use the basicConstraints extension for EE certificates. We will use it =
for CA=20
certificates setting the pathLengthConstraint to zero. This prevents =
cross=20
certification at the subordinate CAs level which is a functional =
requirement=20
since we are expecting cross certification with other CAs to occur at =
the root=20
CA level. Could you please confirm that our settings for the =
basicConstraint=20
extension are correct.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></SPAN></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal=20
style=3D"MARGIN-LEFT: 0.25in; TEXT-INDENT: -0.25in; mso-margin-top-alt: =
auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-list: l2 level1 lfo3"><![if =
!supportLists]><FONT=20
face=3DArial size=3D2><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: =
Arial"><SPAN=20
style=3D"mso-list: Ignore">6.<FONT face=3D"Times New Roman" =
size=3D1><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT: 7pt 'Times New =
Roman'">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=20
</SPAN></FONT></SPAN></SPAN></FONT><![endif]><SPAN dir=3Dltr><FONT =
face=3DArial=20
size=3D2><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">Assuming =
that the LDAP=20
directory on which CRLs will not be public,=20
&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></SPAN></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal=20
style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto"><FONT =
face=3DArial=20
size=3D2><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">Thank you =
all for your=20
prompt feedback.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal=20
style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto"><FONT =
face=3DArial=20
size=3D2><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">M.=20
Bechlaghem<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P></DIV><BR><BR>
<P align=3Dcenter><FONT style=3D"BACKGROUND-COLOR: #ffffff">This e-mail =
and any=20
attachment is for authorised use by the intended recipient(s) only. It =
may=20
contain proprietary material, confidential information and/or be subject =
to=20
legal privilege. It should not be copied, disclosed to, retained or used =
by, any=20
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Subject: ID cards certificate profiles
Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2007 14:08:11 +0400
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From: "Bechlaghem, Malek" <malek.bechlaghem@logicacmg.com>
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Hi there,

It has been long since the last time I posted something so happy to be
back :-)

I am working on the implementation of a PKI infrastructure needed for an
ID cards issuing project. Part of my job is defining the needed
certificate profiles which are raising some open issues that I am
listing below and hope to have your support in resolving them.

1.       Are there any particular issues when not adding any surname and
given names in the CN of the subject field of end-entity certificates
knowing that these EE are the actual ID cardholders. My understanding is
that the subject field is used mainly to provide the data that
identifies the certificate holder. Moreover, knowing a person's name, so
if I am looking for her certificate, I could use the name to perform
LDAP lookup based on that name. However, in our case, the certificates
are not published in an LDAP and the persons names are often very long.
This is why we thought not using first and last names in the CN of the
subject field. Instead, we are considering the following format for the
CN:=20

Common Name (CN) =3D < Certificate Type =3D <AUTH/SIGN>, Citizen civil ID>

2.      Assuming that the country issuing ID cards does not have a
digital signature law and no clear definition of NON REPUDIATION, should
we avoid using the NR bit of the key usage extension for signing
certificates (not authentication certificate)? We could set the
digitalSignature bit only and explain in the certificate profile the
applicability of the certificate including those situations where it
would be difficult for the cardholder to repudiate a signature? We could
simply set the NR bit.=20

3.       We are not planning to use the SubjectKeyIdentifier extension
as the card returns a complete certification path with a signed message.
Would this be OK or are there reaons to use this extensions.

4.       For the certificatePolicies extension, the plan is to use a CPS
qualifier with the CPS OID. Is there any reasons for deviating from
this? We could for instance use the OID of the CP under which a
certificate is issued. Assuming that the Certification Authority issues
other types of certificates apart from the ID cards certificates, and
that these certificates may have different assurance levels, what's the
right option we should opt for when formatting the certificatePolicies
extension?

5.       We are not planning to use the basicConstraints extension for
EE certificates. We will use it for CA certificates setting the
pathLengthConstraint to zero. This prevents cross certification at the
subordinate CAs level which is a functional requirement since we are
expecting cross certification with other CAs to occur at the root CA
level. Could you please confirm that our settings for the
basicConstraint extension are correct.

6.       Assuming that the LDAP directory on which CRLs will not be
public,=20=20

Thank you all for your prompt feedback.

M. Bechlaghem



This e-mail and any attachment is for authorised use by the intended recipi=
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, retained or used by, any other party. If you are not an intended recipien=
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<div class=3DSection1>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto'><font
size=3D2 face=3DArial><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial'>Hi=
 there,<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto'><font
size=3D2 face=3DArial><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial'>It=
 has been
long since the last time I posted something so happy to be back </span></fo=
nt><font
size=3D2 face=3DWingdings><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Wingd=
ings'>J</span></font><font
size=3D2 face=3DArial><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial'><o=
:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto'><font
size=3D2 face=3DArial><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial'>I =
am working
on the implementation of a PKI infrastructure needed for an ID cards issuing
project. Part of my job is defining the needed certificate profiles which a=
re
raising some open issues that I am listing below and hope to have your supp=
ort
in resolving them.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto;
margin-left:.25in;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l2 level1 lfo3'><![if !suppor=
tLists]><font
size=3D2 face=3DArial><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial'><s=
pan
style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>1.<font size=3D1 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
 </span></font></span></span></font><![endif]><span
dir=3DLTR><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-=
family:Arial'>Are
there any particular issues when not adding any surname and given names in =
the CN
of the subject field of end-entity certificates knowing that these EE are t=
he actual
ID cardholders. My understanding is that the subject field is used mainly to
provide the data that identifies the certificate holder. Moreover, knowing =
a person&#8217;s
name, so if I am looking for her certificate, I could use the name to perfo=
rm
LDAP lookup based on that name. However, in our case, the certificates are =
not
published in an LDAP and the persons names are often very long. This is why=
 we
thought not using first and last names in the CN of the subject field. Inst=
ead,
we are considering the following format for the CN: <o:p></o:p></span></fon=
t></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto;
margin-left:.5in;text-indent:.5in'><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman">=
<span
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>Common Name (CN) =3D &lt; Certificate Type =3D &=
lt;AUTH/SIGN&gt;,
Citizen civil ID&gt;<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto;
margin-left:.25in;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l2 level1 lfo3'><![if !suppor=
tLists]><font
size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><span
style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>2.<font size=3D1 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </spa=
n></font></span></span></font><![endif]><span
dir=3DLTR>Assuming that the country issuing ID cards does not have a digital
signature law and no clear definition of NON REPUDIATION, should we avoid u=
sing
the NR bit of the key usage extension for signing certificates (not
authentication certificate)? We could set the digitalSignature bit only and
explain in the certificate profile the applicability of the certificate
including those situations where it would be difficult for the cardholder to
repudiate a signature? We could simply set the NR bit. <o:p></o:p></span></=
p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto;
margin-left:.25in;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l2 level1 lfo3'><![if !suppor=
tLists]><font
size=3D2 face=3DArial><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial'><s=
pan
style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>3.<font size=3D1 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
 </span></font></span></span></font><![endif]><span
dir=3DLTR><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-=
family:Arial'>We
are not planning to use the SubjectKeyIdentifier extension as the card retu=
rns
a complete certification path with a signed message. Would this be OK or are
there reaons to use this extensions.<o:p></o:p></span></font></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto;
margin-left:.25in;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l2 level1 lfo3'><![if !suppor=
tLists]><font
size=3D2 face=3DArial><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial'><s=
pan
style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>4.<font size=3D1 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
 </span></font></span></span></font><![endif]><span
dir=3DLTR><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-=
family:Arial'>For
the certificatePolicies extension, the plan is to use a CPS qualifier with =
the CPS
OID. Is there any reasons for deviating from this? We could for instance use
the OID of the CP under which a certificate is issued. Assuming that the
Certification Authority issues other types of certificates apart from the ID
cards certificates, and that these certificates may have different assurance
levels, what&#8217;s the right option we should opt for when formatting the
certificatePolicies extension?<o:p></o:p></span></font></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto;
margin-left:.25in;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l2 level1 lfo3'><![if !suppor=
tLists]><font
size=3D2 face=3DArial><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial'><s=
pan
style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>5.<font size=3D1 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
 </span></font></span></span></font><![endif]><span
dir=3DLTR><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-=
family:Arial'>We
are not planning to use the basicConstraints extension for EE certificates.=
 We
will use it for CA certificates setting the pathLengthConstraint to zero. T=
his
prevents cross certification at the subordinate CAs level which is a functi=
onal
requirement since we are expecting cross certification with other CAs to oc=
cur
at the root CA level. Could you please confirm that our settings for the
basicConstraint extension are correct.<o:p></o:p></span></font></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto;
margin-left:.25in;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l2 level1 lfo3'><![if !suppor=
tLists]><font
size=3D2 face=3DArial><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial'><s=
pan
style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>6.<font size=3D1 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
 </span></font></span></span></font><![endif]><span
dir=3DLTR><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-=
family:Arial'>Assuming
that the LDAP directory on which CRLs will not be public, &nbsp;<o:p></o:p>=
</span></font></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto'><font
size=3D2 face=3DArial><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial'>Th=
ank you
all for your prompt feedback.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto'><font
size=3D2 face=3DArial><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial'>M.=
 Bechlaghem<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

<br><br>
<P align=3Dcenter><FONT style=3D"BACKGROUND-COLOR: #ffffff">This e-mail and=
 any attachment is for authorised use by the intended recipient(s) only. It=
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<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Battle australian, soil from =
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<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>So easy listening xm.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Students use copiers know. Nowprint =
edition=20
subscribe pagekey raceswhite! Journalism relates material been =
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<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Swapped its denied promotes saying =
control over do?</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Rampant copyright now some us senators =
say? Cowhy=20
face mystery vandalised rather watch titanic celebrity.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Editing adobe audition bookcd =
computing.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Allegedly illegal time up. Leaves =
resume yet=20
lossmaking legit, regrelated.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Telecom actstop, atampt mergernet =
freedom nowsave=20
community internetno fake. Payoladont fox squad hqdownload, activist =
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From: Stefan Santesson <stefans@microsoft.com>
To: "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>, "ietf-pkix@imc.org" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2007 23:22:39 +0000
Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key Info.
Thread-Topic: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key Info.
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There is no single way that applications and protocol stacks may operate.

In my example, applications don't understand any public key OID. They would simply consult OID table to get a translation into something they can pass to the crypto lib. If that look-up is unsuccessful, the application will most certainly fail. But if it is successful, the application will attempt to map that key to the usage negotiated in the protocol, e.g. a TLS cipher suite. This is where I'm not at all sure that "old" applications will get it right. I have indications that they might get it wrong but I don't have any hard facts to offer yet. It worries me though to have to depend on various applications to get it right.

I would prefer to have more control in the library layer and more actively prevent applications from doing the wrong thing.


Stefan Santesson
Senior Program Manager
Windows Security, Standards


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Kemp, David P. [mailto:DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil]
> Sent: den 16 januari 2007 15:08
> To: Stefan Santesson; ietf-pkix@imc.org
> Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key
> Info.
>
> Hmmm, I'd guess that applications would fail, either gracefully
> or catastrophically, when faced with an unrecognized Subject
> Public Key Info OID.   I did miss the point that they might
> falsely accept and misuse the public key, but even after considering
> the possibility it still seems highly improbable.
>
> Dave
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:stefans@microsoft.com]
> Sent: Tuesday, January 16, 2007 2:09 PM
> To: Kemp, David P.; ietf-pkix@imc.org
> Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key
> Info.
>
> Thanks Dave,
>
> Let me clarify where I think you missed my point.
>
> I believe that it is less likely that a certificate with a critical
> extension will be falsely accepted and misused by an application. I
> believe the risk is greater that applications get it wrong and makes
> wrong use of a public key if the restriction comes as a public key OID.
>
> But this is just an educated guess.
>
> I agree that it will be hard to define complete mapping info in an
> extension. That was my point - It may make the extension overly
> complex.
>
>
> Stefan Santesson
> Senior Program Manager
> Windows Security, Standards
>
>




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From: Stefan Santesson <stefans@microsoft.com>
To: "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>, "ietf-pkix@imc.org" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2007 23:22:39 +0000
Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key Info.
Thread-Topic: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key Info.
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There is no single way that applications and protocol stacks may operate.

In my example, applications don't understand any public key OID. They would simply consult OID table to get a translation into something they can pass to the crypto lib. If that look-up is unsuccessful, the application will most certainly fail. But if it is successful, the application will attempt to map that key to the usage negotiated in the protocol, e.g. a TLS cipher suite. This is where I'm not at all sure that "old" applications will get it right. I have indications that they might get it wrong but I don't have any hard facts to offer yet. It worries me though to have to depend on various applications to get it right.

I would prefer to have more control in the library layer and more actively prevent applications from doing the wrong thing.


Stefan Santesson
Senior Program Manager
Windows Security, Standards


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Kemp, David P. [mailto:DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil]
> Sent: den 16 januari 2007 15:08
> To: Stefan Santesson; ietf-pkix@imc.org
> Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key
> Info.
>
> Hmmm, I'd guess that applications would fail, either gracefully
> or catastrophically, when faced with an unrecognized Subject
> Public Key Info OID.   I did miss the point that they might
> falsely accept and misuse the public key, but even after considering
> the possibility it still seems highly improbable.
>
> Dave
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:stefans@microsoft.com]
> Sent: Tuesday, January 16, 2007 2:09 PM
> To: Kemp, David P.; ietf-pkix@imc.org
> Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key
> Info.
>
> Thanks Dave,
>
> Let me clarify where I think you missed my point.
>
> I believe that it is less likely that a certificate with a critical
> extension will be falsely accepted and misused by an application. I
> believe the risk is greater that applications get it wrong and makes
> wrong use of a public key if the restriction comes as a public key OID.
>
> But this is just an educated guess.
>
> I agree that it will be hard to define complete mapping info in an
> extension. That was my point - It may make the extension overly
> complex.
>
>
> Stefan Santesson
> Senior Program Manager
> Windows Security, Standards
>
>




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Date: Thu, 18 Jan 2007 09:29:06 -0700
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From: Hoyt L Kesterson II <hoytkesterson@earthlink.net>
Subject: Free standards - Get Your Free Standards Here!!
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<html><head><style type="text/css"><!--
blockquote, dl, ul, ol, li { padding-top: 0 ; padding-bottom: 0 }
 --></style><title>Free standards - Get Your Free Standards
Here!!</title></head><body>
<div>ITU just announced</div>
<div><br></div>
<blockquote>From the beginning of 2007, ITU-T Recommendations will be
available without charge for a trial period.</blockquote>
<blockquote><br></blockquote>
<blockquote>With only a small number of exceptions all in-force
Recommendations will be available in PDF form via a simple mouse
click.</blockquote>
<blockquote><br></blockquote>
<blockquote>There is a general belief that the strategic importance of
making on-line access to ITU-T Recommendations free outweighs the
costs (in terms of lost revenue) to ITU. This is seen as a way to
increase the transparency of ITU-T work and encourage wider
participation in ITU-T activities. It is also believed that this
policy will help increase developing countries' awareness of pertinent
issues and help to promote the participation of academia in ITU-T
work.</blockquote>
<blockquote><br></blockquote>
<blockquote><br></blockquote>
<div>For this group you can start at the top of the X Recommendations
here</div>
<div><br></div>
<div>&nbsp;&nbsp; http://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X/e</div>
<div><br></div>
<div>Note some strangeness. For example the ASN.1 recommendations are
offered as an aggregate and in individual recommendations. For some
reason the aggregate is not offered for free</div>
<div><br></div>
<div>&nbsp;&nbsp;
http://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.680-X.693-200207-I/en</div>
<div><br></div>
<div>However, each recommendation is offered separately for free,
e.g.</div>
<div><br></div>
<div>&nbsp; http://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.680-200207-I/en&nbsp; (for
english, spanish, and french versions)</div>
<div><br></div>
<div>Links to all the recommendations start here</div>
<div><br></div>
<div>&nbsp;&nbsp;
http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/publications/recs.html</div>
<div><br></div>
<div>Note that this is not a release of copyright. Get them but don't
post them.</div>
<div><br></div>
<div>Enjoy</div>
<div><br></div>
<div>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; hoyt</div>
<div><br></div>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
</body>
</html>



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From: "Emoticone texte" <Sorcerers@embriovid.com>
To: ietf-pkix-archive@imc.org
Subject: Harry
Date: 	Thu, 18 Jan 2007 07:29:17 +0100
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________________________________________
From: Daniel Brown [mailto:DBrown@certicom.com] 
> David Kemp wrote on 01/16/2007 06:07:48 PM:
>> 
>>  Is KDF an appropriate level of granularity for certificate-based
>>  constraints on the usage of public keys?   
>
> Well, only to those who strive for strict compliance to SP 800-56A, in the > face of application protocols allowing noncompliant KDFs. 

An application can comply with SP 800-56A recommendations, protocol
specifications, both, or neither.  This is independent of certificate
contents.  In fact, an SP 800-56 compliant application must refuse
to honor a non-compliant KDF specification contained in a certificate
either by refusing to derive a key using that cert or by substituting
a compliant KDF to use with the cert's public key.  (The latter
is admittedly shady behavior, but it is possible.)


>>  And if so, is it
>>  cryptographically appropriate to use a single public key size
>>  with both SHA-256 and SHA-384 KDFs?  
>
> Many in IETF have argued that a SHA-1 based KDF (such as the TLS's or
> IPSec's) provides 160 bits of security, so it is acceptable for use with
> 128-bit security, i.e. 256 bit ECC keys.  By the same argument, a SHA-256
> based KDF ought to be acceptable for an 384-bit ECC key.

Strict compliance with SP 800-56A says not.  The minimum bit length of the hash function for 384-511 bit ECC key is 384.  A SHA-256 based KDF is, however, acceptable for a 383 bit ECC key :-).

I'm not sure why SP 800-56A doesn't specify a maximum hash size.  Using
SHA-384 with a 160 bit ECC key would seem to provide less than the
implied amount of entropy for the derived key.

 
>>  Specifying a list of allowed features does not satisfy the design
>>  team's goal of using certificates to reduce protocol negotiation -
>>  if more than one KDF is possible with a pair of peer certificates,
>>  it is still necessary to negotiate which KDF to use.
>
> Doesn't it reduce negotiation?  Alice and Bob can state their crypto
> abilities using certs.  Then one of them chooses an algorithm in the
> intersection of the abilities, and tells the other that he/she's used it.
> The certs have saved the protocol from sending at least some "crypto
> capabilities" message flows.

That assumes that cert exchange occurs before algorithm negotiation,
which is not the case for RFC 4306 - the first cert request is
contained in the same message as algorithm acceptance.  Even if certs
were sent in the first two messages, they wouldn't reduce the
number of messages, and if multiple certs (e.g. RSA and ECC)
were sent before algorithm negotiation was done, the size of
the messages would go way up, not slightly down.


>>  So the extension approach allows a list of KDFs, but the RFC 4055
>>  approach does not.  I believe that a list is unnecessary because
>>  an ECMQV public key of a given size should imply the acceptable
>>  KDF size (or conversely, a key derive function should imply the
>>  acceptable public key size).
>
> I'm a little confused now.  While we're deprecating "with recommended"
> syntax, we're introducing a "family" syntax, where the crypto parameters
> (KDFs, etc.) are implicitly "recommended" by association with key size.
> This seems a paradoxical to me.

Good question.  I'd guess that the family OID means to use configured
or negotiated parameters if available, with recommended parameters as
a default if the application has no other guidance.  A
KDF-specific OID (including "with recommended" if it weren't
deprecated) means mandatory use of the specified parameters.  An
RFC would need to unambiguously specify the semantics of family OIDs.

Regards,
Dave




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<html>
<body>
Dan:<br><br>
<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite=""><tt>
<font face="Courier New, Courier" size=2>&gt;&gt; &gt; Is KDF an
appropriate level of granularity for certificate-based<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; constraints on the usage of public keys?&nbsp; <br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; Well, only to those who strive for strict compliance to SP
800-56A, <br>
&gt;&gt; in the face of application protocols allowing noncompliant KDFs.
</font></tt><br>
<tt><font face="Courier New, Courier" size=2>&gt; <br>
&gt; I do not think that it is the role of the certificate to
&quot;enforce&quot; <br>
&gt; compliance.&nbsp; Rather, the application needs to be run in
&quot;FIPS mode&quot; <br>
&gt; so that all of the choices necessary to conform to NIST guidance are
made.<br>
</font></tt><br>
<tt><font face="Courier New, Courier" size=2>Yes, Alice can run in FIPS
mode, but she may also like to tell Bob to please only secure email to
her using FIPS mode.&nbsp; Well, perhaps, nobody else but me really
cares?</font></tt> </blockquote><br>
I care.&nbsp; However, I do not see the certificate as the enforcement
tool.&nbsp; In the case of S/MIME, the SMIMECapabilities extension is
used.&nbsp; It tell the message originator the capabilities of the
recipient.&nbsp; If the recipient only offers &quot;FIPS mode&quot;
algorithms, then those are the only ones that will be used by the message
originator.&nbsp; In the case of TLS and other protocols where real-time
negotiation happens, either of the parties can ensure that &quot;FIPS
mode&quot; algorithms are used, as long as both parties actually support
them.<br><br>
<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite=""><tt>
<font face="Courier New, Courier" size=2>Back to the original question:
4055 optionally allows the cert to specify the MGF in OAEP.&nbsp; So why
not be able to specify the KDF for ECMQV/ECDH in a cert?&nbsp; I see
these as analogous.</font></tt> </blockquote><br>
RFC 4055 allows the parameters to be absent when used in the certificate
subject public key information.&nbsp; If they are present, then the MGF,
for example, is carried there.<br><br>
I would be happy with a similar arrangement for elliptic curve
algorithms.&nbsp; That is, we must have the same flexibility to omit the
ECDH/ECMQV KDF.<br><br>
<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite=""><tt>
<font face="Courier New, Courier" size=2>&gt;&gt; &gt; And if so, is
it<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; cryptographically appropriate to use a single public key
size<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; with both SHA-256 and SHA-384 KDFs?&nbsp; <br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; Many in IETF have argued that a SHA-1 based KDF (such as the
TLS's <br>
&gt;&gt; or IPSec's) provides 160 bits of security, so it is acceptable
for <br>
&gt;&gt; use with 128-bit security, i.e. 256 bit ECC keys.&nbsp; By the
same <br>
&gt;&gt; argument, a SHA-256 based KDF ought to be acceptable for an
384-bit ECC key.</font></tt> <br>
<tt><font face="Courier New, Courier" size=2>&gt; <br>
&gt; So?&nbsp; What does this have to do with the best way to represent
the <br>
&gt; algorithm constraints in the certificate?<br>
</font></tt><br>
<tt><font face="Courier New, Courier" size=2>Nothing: I was only
addressing David's specific question of whether it's
&quot;cryptographically appropriate&quot; to used mixed
sizes.</font></tt> <br><br>
<tt><font face="Courier New, Courier" size=2>&gt;&gt; &gt; Specifying a
list of allowed features does not satisfy the design<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; team's goal of using certificates to reduce protocol
negotiation -<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; if more than one KDF is possible with a pair of peer
certificates,<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; it is still necessary to negotiate which KDF to use.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; Doesn't it reduce negotiation?&nbsp; Alice and Bob can state
their crypto<br>
&gt;&gt; abilities using certs.&nbsp; Then one of them chooses an
algorithm in the<br>
&gt;&gt; intersection of the abilities, and tells the other that he/she's
<br>
&gt;&gt; used it.&nbsp; The certs have saved the protocol from sending at
least <br>
&gt;&gt; some &quot;crypto capabilities&quot; message flows.
</font></tt><br>
<tt><font face="Courier New, Courier" size=2>&gt; <br>
&gt; The closest thing that we have for something like this is <br>
&gt; SMIMECapabilities.&nbsp; In this case, the store-and-forward nature
of <br>
&gt; email makes this a reasonable thing to do.&nbsp; If real-time <br>
&gt; negotiations are possible in the protocol, then keeping the CA out
<br>
&gt; of the picture is desirable.<br>
</font></tt><br>
<tt><font face="Courier New, Courier" size=2>What extra involvement of
the CA is there, when the KDF (or MGF for OAEP) is specified in the
cert?</font></tt> </blockquote><br>
The CA is the one that is signing the certificate.&nbsp; A CA should not
sign stuff that it does not understand, so it is involved in the
ECDH/ECMQV KDF selection or the OAEP MGF selection if it is included in
the certificate.<br><br>
<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite=""><tt>
<font face="Courier New, Courier" size=2>&gt;&gt; &gt; But to answer the
question, the design team slides stated:<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; * Define an optionally critical certificate extension<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; - Sequence of Algorithm Identifiers, as
in X9.62 parameters<br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; Yes, that does it. <br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; - Reuse X9 algorithm Identifiers<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; . Deprecating
&quot;with recommended&quot;? <br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; - Add three &quot;family&quot; OIDs
(ECDSA, ECDH, ECMQV)<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; So the extension approach allows a list of KDFs, but the
RFC 4055<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; approach does not.&nbsp; I believe that a list is
unnecessary because<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; an ECMQV public key of a given size should imply the
acceptable<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; KDF size (or conversely, a key derive function should imply
the<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; acceptable public key size).<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; I'm a little confused now.&nbsp; While we're deprecating
&quot;with <br>
&gt;&gt; recommended&quot; syntax, we're introducing a &quot;family&quot;
syntax, where the <br>
&gt;&gt; crypto parameters (KDFs, etc.) are implicitly
&quot;recommended&quot; by <br>
&gt;&gt; association with key size.&nbsp; This seems a paradoxical to
me.&nbsp; They're<br>
&gt;&gt; are some distinctions: the &quot;family&quot; OIDs are meant for
a cert, <br>
&gt;&gt; whereas the &quot;with recommended&quot; OIDs are being
deprecated at both the<br>
&gt;&gt; cert and application level; also, some people would construe the
<br>
&gt;&gt; &quot;family&quot; OIDs to mean &quot;any&quot; acceptable
crypto parameters are okay, <br>
&gt;&gt; not that some parameters are &quot;recommended&quot;; but
neither point <br>
&gt;&gt; completely resolves my confusion.&nbsp; I will go back to the
design team<br>
&gt;&gt; slides to see if it clarifies things for me, but I thought I'd
raise<br>
&gt;&gt; this now, just in case it helps anybody else.</font></tt> <br>
<tt><font face="Courier New, Courier" size=2>&gt; <br>
&gt; I interpreted the design team output to say that the family OIDs
<br>
&gt; would specify ECDSA, ECDH, and ECMQV without saying anything about
<br>
&gt; the KDF at all.<br>
</font></tt><br>
<tt><font face="Courier New, Courier" size=2>So, with family OIDs, the
protocol would determine/negotiate the KDF.&nbsp; That should be fine
with David's preference of implied acceptable KDF size, provided the
protocol specifiers adhere to it.</font></tt> <br><br>
<tt><font face="Courier New, Courier" size=2>I like this open
functionality of family OIDs.&nbsp; But I think there should be an option
to make them specific, less open-ended, as is available in 4055, the
design team proposal, and the X9.62 syntax.&nbsp; In retrospect,
family-like OIDs could have easily been added to the X9.62 syntax, simply
by making the parameters field optional, then defining their absence to
mean that any (legal) parameter is allowed.&nbsp; (E.g.
ecdsa-with-Specified, omitting the hash parameter.)</font></tt>
</blockquote><br>
As said above, I'm okay with that as long as it is possible to omit the
algorithm identifier parameters (as is allowed in RFC 4055) in a
certificate subject public key.&nbsp; Obviously, there are places where
the same OID will be used where the parameters are required to be present
(as is also the case in RFC 4055).<br><br>
<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite=""><tt>
<font face="Courier New, Courier" size=2>If we don't like lists, then
PKIX can limit the list length to 1, and still comply the X9.62
syntax.&nbsp; If we need family OIDs, then only a small tweak of X9.62
syntax is needed (as described above).</font></tt> </blockquote><br>
At the risk of repeating myself too much, I am not happy if the
parameters to select the KDF are required.&nbsp; I have no problem with
one being present.<br><br>
<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite=""><tt>
<font face="Courier New, Courier" size=2>On the other hand, I like the
gradual migration possibilities of a critical/noncritical
extensions.&nbsp; Critical extensions are functionally like 4055/X9.62,
so the noncritical is the added value.&nbsp; If the relying party is
understands the noncritical extensions, is he/she required to comply with
them?</font></tt> </blockquote><br>
Yes.<br><br>
Russ<br>
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Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key   Info.
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Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> wrote on 01/17/2007 02:57:40 PM:

[> Dan Brown wrote on 01/17/2007 11:30 AM:] 
[>> David Kemp wrote on 01/16/2007 06:07:48 PM:]

>> > Is KDF an appropriate level of granularity for certificate-based
>> > constraints on the usage of public keys? 
> 
>> Well, only to those who strive for strict compliance to SP 800-56A, 
>> in the face of application protocols allowing noncompliant KDFs. 
> 
> I do not think that it is the role of the certificate to "enforce" 
> compliance.  Rather, the application needs to be run in "FIPS mode" 
> so that all of the choices necessary to conform to NIST guidance are 
made.

Yes, Alice can run in FIPS mode, but she may also like to tell Bob to 
please only secure email to her using FIPS mode.  Well, perhaps, nobody 
else but me really cares?

Back to the original question: 4055 optionally allows the cert to specify 
the MGF in OAEP.  So why not be able to specify the KDF for ECMQV/ECDH in 
a cert?  I see these as analogous.

>> > And if so, is it
>> > cryptographically appropriate to use a single public key size
>> > with both SHA-256 and SHA-384 KDFs? 
> 
>> Many in IETF have argued that a SHA-1 based KDF (such as the TLS's 
>> or IPSec's) provides 160 bits of security, so it is acceptable for 
>> use with 128-bit security, i.e. 256 bit ECC keys.  By the same 
>> argument, a SHA-256 based KDF ought to be acceptable for an 384-bit ECC 
key.
> 
> So?  What does this have to do with the best way to represent the 
> algorithm constraints in the certificate?

Nothing: I was only addressing David's specific question of whether it's 
"cryptographically appropriate" to used mixed sizes.

>> > Specifying a list of allowed features does not satisfy the design
>> > team's goal of using certificates to reduce protocol negotiation -
>> > if more than one KDF is possible with a pair of peer certificates,
>> > it is still necessary to negotiate which KDF to use.
> 
>> Doesn't it reduce negotiation?  Alice and Bob can state their crypto
>> abilities using certs.  Then one of them chooses an algorithm in the
>> intersection of the abilities, and tells the other that he/she's 
>> used it.  The certs have saved the protocol from sending at least 
>> some "crypto capabilities" message flows. 
> 
> The closest thing that we have for something like this is 
> SMIMECapabilities.  In this case, the store-and-forward nature of 
> email makes this a reasonable thing to do.  If real-time 
> negotiations are possible in the protocol, then keeping the CA out 
> of the picture is desirable.

What extra involvement of the CA is there, when the KDF (or MGF for OAEP) 
is specified in the cert?

>> > But to answer the question, the design team slides stated:
>> > 
>> > * Define an optionally critical certificate extension
>> >    - Sequence of Algorithm Identifiers, as in X9.62 parameters
>> 
>> Yes, that does it. 
>> 
>> >    - Reuse X9 algorithm Identifiers
>> >        . Deprecating "with recommended"? 
>> >    - Add three "family" OIDs (ECDSA, ECDH, ECMQV)
>> > 
>> > So the extension approach allows a list of KDFs, but the RFC 4055
>> > approach does not.  I believe that a list is unnecessary because
>> > an ECMQV public key of a given size should imply the acceptable
>> > KDF size (or conversely, a key derive function should imply the
>> > acceptable public key size).
>> > 
>> 
>> I'm a little confused now.  While we're deprecating "with 
>> recommended" syntax, we're introducing a "family" syntax, where the 
>> crypto parameters (KDFs, etc.) are implicitly "recommended" by 
>> association with key size.  This seems a paradoxical to me.  They're
>> are some distinctions: the "family" OIDs are meant for a cert, 
>> whereas the "with recommended" OIDs are being deprecated at both the
>> cert and application level; also, some people would construe the 
>> "family" OIDs to mean "any" acceptable crypto parameters are okay, 
>> not that some parameters are "recommended"; but neither point 
>> completely resolves my confusion.  I will go back to the design team
>> slides to see if it clarifies things for me, but I thought I'd raise
>> this now, just in case it helps anybody else.
> 
> I interpreted the design team output to say that the family OIDs 
> would specify ECDSA, ECDH, and ECMQV without saying anything about 
> the KDF at all.

So, with family OIDs, the protocol would determine/negotiate the KDF. That 
should be fine with David's preference of implied acceptable KDF size, 
provided the protocol specifiers adhere to it.

I like this open functionality of family OIDs.  But I think there should 
be an option to make them specific, less open-ended, as is available in 
4055, the design team proposal, and the X9.62 syntax.  In retrospect, 
family-like OIDs could have easily been added to the X9.62 syntax, simply 
by making the parameters field optional, then defining their absence to 
mean that any (legal) parameter is allowed.  (E.g. ecdsa-with-Specified, 
omitting the hash parameter.)

If we don't like lists, then PKIX can limit the list length to 1, and 
still comply the X9.62 syntax.  If we need family OIDs, then only a small 
tweak of X9.62 syntax is needed (as described above).

On the other hand, I like the gradual migration possibilities of a 
critical/noncritical extensions.  Critical extensions are functionally 
like 4055/X9.62, so the noncritical is the added value.  If the relying 
party is understands the noncritical extensions, is he/she required to 
comply with them?

Regards,

Dan Brown
(905) 501-3857
http://www.certicom.com


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<br><tt><font size=2>Russ Housley &lt;housley@vigilsec.com&gt; wrote on
01/17/2007 02:57:40 PM:<br>
</font></tt>
<br><tt><font size=2>[&gt; Dan Brown wrote on 01/17/2007 11:30 AM:] </font></tt>
<br><tt><font size=2>[&gt;&gt; David Kemp wrote on 01/16/2007 06:07:48
PM:]<br>
<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; Is KDF an appropriate level of granularity for certificate-based<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; constraints on the usage of public keys? &nbsp;<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; Well, only to those who strive for strict compliance to SP 800-56A,
<br>
&gt;&gt; in the face of application protocols allowing noncompliant KDFs.
</font></tt>
<br><tt><font size=2>&gt; <br>
&gt; I do not think that it is the role of the certificate to &quot;enforce&quot;
<br>
&gt; compliance. &nbsp;Rather, the application needs to be run in &quot;FIPS
mode&quot; <br>
&gt; so that all of the choices necessary to conform to NIST guidance are
made.<br>
</font></tt>
<br><tt><font size=2>Yes, Alice can run in FIPS mode, but she may also
like to tell Bob to please only secure email to her using FIPS mode. &nbsp;Well,
perhaps, nobody else but me really cares?</font></tt>
<br>
<br><tt><font size=2>Back to the original question: 4055 optionally allows
the cert to specify the MGF in OAEP. &nbsp;So why not be able to specify
the KDF for ECMQV/ECDH in a cert? &nbsp;I see these as analogous.</font></tt>
<br>
<br><tt><font size=2>&gt;&gt; &gt; And if so, is it<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; cryptographically appropriate to use a single public key
size<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; with both SHA-256 and SHA-384 KDFs? &nbsp;<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; Many in IETF have argued that a SHA-1 based KDF (such as the TLS's
<br>
&gt;&gt; or IPSec's) provides 160 bits of security, so it is acceptable
for <br>
&gt;&gt; use with 128-bit security, i.e. 256 bit ECC keys. &nbsp;By the
same <br>
&gt;&gt; argument, a SHA-256 based KDF ought to be acceptable for an 384-bit
ECC key.</font></tt>
<br><tt><font size=2>&gt; <br>
&gt; So? &nbsp;What does this have to do with the best way to represent
the <br>
&gt; algorithm constraints in the certificate?<br>
</font></tt>
<br><tt><font size=2>Nothing: I was only addressing David's specific question
of whether it's &quot;cryptographically appropriate&quot; to used mixed
sizes.</font></tt>
<br>
<br><tt><font size=2>&gt;&gt; &gt; Specifying a list of allowed features
does not satisfy the design<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; team's goal of using certificates to reduce protocol negotiation
-<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; if more than one KDF is possible with a pair of peer certificates,<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; it is still necessary to negotiate which KDF to use.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; Doesn't it reduce negotiation? &nbsp;Alice and Bob can state their
crypto<br>
&gt;&gt; abilities using certs. &nbsp;Then one of them chooses an algorithm
in the<br>
&gt;&gt; intersection of the abilities, and tells the other that he/she's
<br>
&gt;&gt; used it. &nbsp;The certs have saved the protocol from sending
at least <br>
&gt;&gt; some &quot;crypto capabilities&quot; message flows. </font></tt>
<br><tt><font size=2>&gt; <br>
&gt; The closest thing that we have for something like this is <br>
&gt; SMIMECapabilities. &nbsp;In this case, the store-and-forward nature
of <br>
&gt; email makes this a reasonable thing to do. &nbsp;If real-time <br>
&gt; negotiations are possible in the protocol, then keeping the CA out
<br>
&gt; of the picture is desirable.<br>
</font></tt>
<br><tt><font size=2>What extra involvement of the CA is there, when the
KDF (or MGF for OAEP) is specified in the cert?</font></tt>
<br>
<br><tt><font size=2>&gt;&gt; &gt; But to answer the question, the design
team slides stated:<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; * Define an optionally critical certificate extension<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; &nbsp;- Sequence of Algorithm Identifiers, as in X9.62
parameters<br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; Yes, that does it. <br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; &nbsp;- Reuse X9 algorithm Identifiers<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;. Deprecating &quot;with recommended&quot;?
<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; &nbsp;- Add three &quot;family&quot; OIDs (ECDSA,
ECDH, ECMQV)<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; So the extension approach allows a list of KDFs, but the
RFC 4055<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; approach does not. &nbsp;I believe that a list is unnecessary
because<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; an ECMQV public key of a given size should imply the acceptable<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; KDF size (or conversely, a key derive function should imply
the<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; acceptable public key size).<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; I'm a little confused now. &nbsp;While we're deprecating &quot;with
<br>
&gt;&gt; recommended&quot; syntax, we're introducing a &quot;family&quot;
syntax, where the <br>
&gt;&gt; crypto parameters (KDFs, etc.) are implicitly &quot;recommended&quot;
by <br>
&gt;&gt; association with key size. &nbsp;This seems a paradoxical to me.
&nbsp;They're<br>
&gt;&gt; are some distinctions: the &quot;family&quot; OIDs are meant for
a cert, <br>
&gt;&gt; whereas the &quot;with recommended&quot; OIDs are being deprecated
at both the<br>
&gt;&gt; cert and application level; also, some people would construe the
<br>
&gt;&gt; &quot;family&quot; OIDs to mean &quot;any&quot; acceptable crypto
parameters are okay, <br>
&gt;&gt; not that some parameters are &quot;recommended&quot;; but neither
point <br>
&gt;&gt; completely resolves my confusion. &nbsp;I will go back to the
design team<br>
&gt;&gt; slides to see if it clarifies things for me, but I thought I'd
raise<br>
&gt;&gt; this now, just in case it helps anybody else.</font></tt>
<br><tt><font size=2>&gt; <br>
&gt; I interpreted the design team output to say that the family OIDs <br>
&gt; would specify ECDSA, ECDH, and ECMQV without saying anything about
<br>
&gt; the KDF at all.<br>
</font></tt>
<br><tt><font size=2>So, with family OIDs, the protocol would determine/negotiate
the KDF. &nbsp;That should be fine with David's preference of implied acceptable
KDF size, provided the protocol specifiers adhere to it.</font></tt>
<br>
<br><tt><font size=2>I like this open functionality of family OIDs. &nbsp;But
I think there should be an option to make them specific, less open-ended,
as is available in 4055, the design team proposal, and the X9.62 syntax.
&nbsp;In retrospect, family-like OIDs could have easily been added to the
X9.62 syntax, simply by making the parameters field optional, then defining
their absence to mean that any (legal) parameter is allowed. &nbsp;(E.g.
ecdsa-with-Specified, omitting the hash parameter.)</font></tt>
<br>
<br><tt><font size=2>If we don't like lists, then PKIX can limit the list
length to 1, and still comply the X9.62 syntax. &nbsp;If we need family
OIDs, then only a small tweak of X9.62 syntax is needed (as described above).</font></tt>
<br>
<br><tt><font size=2>On the other hand, I like the gradual migration possibilities
of a critical/noncritical extensions. &nbsp;Critical extensions are functionally
like 4055/X9.62, so the noncritical is the added value. &nbsp;If the relying
party is understands the noncritical extensions, is he/she required to
comply with them?</font></tt>
<br>
<br><tt><font size=2>Regards,</font></tt>
<br>
<br><tt><font size=2>Dan Brown<br>
(905) 501-3857<br>
http://www.certicom.com</font></tt>
<br>
<br>
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Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key Info.
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<html>
<body>
Dan:<br><br>
<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite=""><tt>
<font face="Courier New, Courier" size=2>&gt; Is KDF an appropriate level
of granularity for certificate-based<br>
&gt; constraints on the usage of public keys?&nbsp; </font></tt>
<br><br>
<tt><font face="Courier New, Courier" size=2>Well, only to those who
strive for strict compliance to SP 800-56A, in the face of application
protocols allowing noncompliant KDFs.</font></tt> </blockquote><br>
I do not think that it is the role of the certificate to
&quot;enforce&quot; compliance.&nbsp; Rather, the application needs to be
run in &quot;FIPS mode&quot; so that all of the choices necessary to
conform to NIST guidance are made.<br><br>
<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite=""><tt>
<font face="Courier New, Courier" size=2>&gt; And if so, is it<br>
&gt; cryptographically appropriate to use a single public key size<br>
&gt; with both SHA-256 and SHA-384 KDFs?&nbsp; <br>
</font></tt><br>
<tt><font face="Courier New, Courier" size=2>Many in IETF have argued
that a SHA-1 based KDF (such as the TLS's or IPSec's) provides 160 bits
of security, so it is acceptable for use with 128-bit security, i.e. 256
bit ECC keys.&nbsp; By the same argument, a SHA-256 based KDF ought to be
acceptable for an 384-bit ECC key.</font></tt></blockquote><br>
So?&nbsp; What does this have to do with the best way to represent the
algorithm constraints in the certificate?<br><br>
<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite=""><tt>
<font face="Courier New, Courier" size=2>&gt; Specifying a list of
allowed features does not satisfy the design<br>
&gt; team's goal of using certificates to reduce protocol negotiation
-<br>
&gt; if more than one KDF is possible with a pair of peer
certificates,<br>
&gt; it is still necessary to negotiate which KDF to use.<br>
</font></tt><br>
<tt><font face="Courier New, Courier" size=2>Doesn't it reduce
negotiation?&nbsp; Alice and Bob can state their crypto abilities using
certs.&nbsp; Then one of them chooses an algorithm in the intersection of
the abilities, and tells the other that he/she's used it.&nbsp; The certs
have saved the protocol from sending at least some &quot;crypto
capabilities&quot; message flows.</font></tt> </blockquote><br>
The closest thing that we have for something like this is
SMIMECapabilities.&nbsp; In this case, the store-and-forward nature of
email makes this a reasonable thing to do.&nbsp; If real-time
negotiations are possible in the protocol, then keeping the CA out of the
picture is desirable.<br><br>
<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite=""><tt>
<font face="Courier New, Courier" size=2>&gt; But to answer the question,
the design team slides stated:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; * Define an optionally critical certificate extension<br>
&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; - Sequence of Algorithm Identifiers, as in X9.62
parameters<br>
</font></tt><br>
<tt><font face="Courier New, Courier" size=2>Yes, that does
it.</font></tt> <br><br>
<tt><font face="Courier New, Courier" size=2>&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; -
Reuse X9 algorithm Identifiers<br>
&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; . Deprecating &quot;with
recommended&quot;? <br>
&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; - Add three &quot;family&quot; OIDs (ECDSA, ECDH,
ECMQV)<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; So the extension approach allows a list of KDFs, but the RFC
4055<br>
&gt; approach does not.&nbsp; I believe that a list is unnecessary
because<br>
&gt; an ECMQV public key of a given size should imply the acceptable<br>
&gt; KDF size (or conversely, a key derive function should imply the<br>
&gt; acceptable public key size).<br>
&gt; <br>
</font></tt><br>
<tt><font face="Courier New, Courier" size=2>I'm a little confused
now.&nbsp; While we're deprecating &quot;with recommended&quot; syntax,
we're introducing a &quot;family&quot; syntax, where the crypto
parameters (KDFs, etc.) are implicitly &quot;recommended&quot; by
association with key size.&nbsp; This seems a paradoxical to me.&nbsp;
They're are some distinctions: the &quot;family&quot; OIDs are meant for
a cert, whereas the &quot;with recommended&quot; OIDs are being
deprecated at both the cert and application level; also, some people
would construe the &quot;family&quot; OIDs to mean &quot;any&quot;
acceptable crypto parameters are okay, not that some parameters are
&quot;recommended&quot;; but neither point completely resolves my
confusion.&nbsp; I will go back to the design team slides to see if it
clarifies things for me, but I thought I'd raise this now, just in case
it helps anybody else.</font></tt></blockquote><br>
I interpreted the design team output to say that the family OIDs would
specify ECDSA, ECDH, and ECMQV without saying anything about the KDF at
all.<br><br>
Russ<br>
</body>
</html>



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Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key  Info.
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David Kemp wrote on 01/16/2007 06:07:48 PM:
 
> 
> Is KDF an appropriate level of granularity for certificate-based
> constraints on the usage of public keys? 

Well, only to those who strive for strict compliance to SP 800-56A, in the 
face of application protocols allowing noncompliant KDFs.

> And if so, is it
> cryptographically appropriate to use a single public key size
> with both SHA-256 and SHA-384 KDFs? 

Many in IETF have argued that a SHA-1 based KDF (such as the TLS's or 
IPSec's) provides 160 bits of security, so it is acceptable for use with 
128-bit security, i.e. 256 bit ECC keys.  By the same argument, a SHA-256 
based KDF ought to be acceptable for an 384-bit ECC key. 

> 
> Specifying a list of allowed features does not satisfy the design
> team's goal of using certificates to reduce protocol negotiation -
> if more than one KDF is possible with a pair of peer certificates,
> it is still necessary to negotiate which KDF to use.

Doesn't it reduce negotiation?  Alice and Bob can state their crypto 
abilities using certs.  Then one of them chooses an algorithm in the 
intersection of the abilities, and tells the other that he/she's used it. 
The certs have saved the protocol from sending at least some "crypto 
capabilities" message flows.

> 
> But to answer the question, the design team slides stated:
> 
> * Define an optionally critical certificate extension
>    - Sequence of Algorithm Identifiers, as in X9.62 parameters

Yes, that does it.

>    - Reuse X9 algorithm Identifiers
>        . Deprecating "with recommended"? 
>    - Add three "family" OIDs (ECDSA, ECDH, ECMQV)
> 
> So the extension approach allows a list of KDFs, but the RFC 4055
> approach does not.  I believe that a list is unnecessary because
> an ECMQV public key of a given size should imply the acceptable
> KDF size (or conversely, a key derive function should imply the
> acceptable public key size).
> 

I'm a little confused now.  While we're deprecating "with recommended" 
syntax, we're introducing a "family" syntax, where the crypto parameters 
(KDFs, etc.) are implicitly "recommended" by association with key size. 
This seems a paradoxical to me.  They're are some distinctions: the 
"family" OIDs are meant for a cert, whereas the "with recommended" OIDs 
are being deprecated at both the cert and application level; also, some 
people would construe the "family" OIDs to mean "any" acceptable crypto 
parameters are okay, not that some parameters are "recommended"; but 
neither point completely resolves my confusion.  I will go back to the 
design team slides to see if it clarifies things for me, but I thought I'd 
raise this now, just in case it helps anybody else.

Best regards,

Dan Brown
(905) 501-3857
http://www.certicom.com


> 
> ________________________________________
> From: Daniel Brown [mailto:DBrown@certicom.com] 
> Sent: Tuesday, January 16, 2007 4:03 PM
> To: Kemp, David P.
> Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
> Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key 
Info.
> 
> 
> David P. Kemp wrote on 01/16/2007 12:21:27 PM:
> 
> > 
> > > - The structured algorithm OID is maybe not the hardest to define
> > > but the worse alternative in every other aspect.
> > 
> > Agree.
> > 
> 
> Suppose that a subject has an ECMQV-only cert, and wishes to allow 
> either SHA-256 or SHA-384 based KDFs, but no other KDFs.  Also, the 
> EKU field says that the cert can be used for SMIME, IPSec, SSH, or 
> TLS (suppose the private key is on the user's smart card).  The X9.
> 62 "structured" approach allows for this.  How would the other 
> approaches allow for this? 
> 

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<br><tt><font size=2>David Kemp wrote on 01/16/2007 06:07:48 PM:<br>
 <br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Is KDF an appropriate level of granularity for certificate-based<br>
&gt; constraints on the usage of public keys? &nbsp;</font></tt>
<br>
<br><tt><font size=2>Well, only to those who strive for strict compliance
to SP 800-56A, in the face of application protocols allowing noncompliant
KDFs.</font></tt>
<br>
<br><tt><font size=2>&gt; And if so, is it<br>
&gt; cryptographically appropriate to use a single public key size<br>
&gt; with both SHA-256 and SHA-384 KDFs? &nbsp;<br>
</font></tt>
<br><tt><font size=2>Many in IETF have argued that a SHA-1 based KDF (such
as the TLS's or IPSec's) provides 160 bits of security, so it is acceptable
for use with 128-bit security, i.e. 256 bit ECC keys. &nbsp;By the same
argument, a SHA-256 based KDF ought to be acceptable for an 384-bit ECC
key. &nbsp;</font></tt>
<br>
<br><tt><font size=2>&gt; <br>
&gt; Specifying a list of allowed features does not satisfy the design<br>
&gt; team's goal of using certificates to reduce protocol negotiation -<br>
&gt; if more than one KDF is possible with a pair of peer certificates,<br>
&gt; it is still necessary to negotiate which KDF to use.<br>
</font></tt>
<br><tt><font size=2>Doesn't it reduce negotiation? &nbsp;Alice and Bob
can state their crypto abilities using certs. &nbsp;Then one of them chooses
an algorithm in the intersection of the abilities, and tells the other
that he/she's used it. &nbsp;The certs have saved the protocol from sending
at least some &quot;crypto capabilities&quot; message flows.</font></tt>
<br>
<br><tt><font size=2>&gt; <br>
&gt; But to answer the question, the design team slides stated:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; * Define an optionally critical certificate extension<br>
&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp;- Sequence of Algorithm Identifiers, as in X9.62 parameters<br>
</font></tt>
<br><tt><font size=2>Yes, that does it.</font></tt>
<br>
<br><tt><font size=2>&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp;- Reuse X9 algorithm Identifiers<br>
&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;. Deprecating &quot;with recommended&quot;?
<br>
&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp;- Add three &quot;family&quot; OIDs (ECDSA, ECDH, ECMQV)<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; So the extension approach allows a list of KDFs, but the RFC 4055<br>
&gt; approach does not. &nbsp;I believe that a list is unnecessary because<br>
&gt; an ECMQV public key of a given size should imply the acceptable<br>
&gt; KDF size (or conversely, a key derive function should imply the<br>
&gt; acceptable public key size).<br>
&gt; <br>
</font></tt>
<br><tt><font size=2>I'm a little confused now. &nbsp;While we're deprecating
&quot;with recommended&quot; syntax, we're introducing a &quot;family&quot;
syntax, where the crypto parameters (KDFs, etc.) are implicitly &quot;recommended&quot;
by association with key size. &nbsp;This seems a paradoxical to me. &nbsp;They're
are some distinctions: the &quot;family&quot; OIDs are meant for a cert,
whereas the &quot;with recommended&quot; OIDs are being deprecated at both
the cert and application level; also, some people would construe the &quot;family&quot;
OIDs to mean &quot;any&quot; acceptable crypto parameters are okay, not
that some parameters are &quot;recommended&quot;; but neither point completely
resolves my confusion. &nbsp;I will go back to the design team slides to
see if it clarifies things for me, but I thought I'd raise this now, just
in case it helps anybody else.</font></tt>
<br>
<br><tt><font size=2>Best regards,</font></tt>
<br>
<br><tt><font size=2>Dan Brown<br>
(905) 501-3857<br>
http://www.certicom.com</font></tt>
<br>
<br>
<br><tt><font size=2>&gt; <br>
&gt; ________________________________________<br>
&gt; From: Daniel Brown [mailto:DBrown@certicom.com] <br>
&gt; Sent: Tuesday, January 16, 2007 4:03 PM<br>
&gt; To: Kemp, David P.<br>
&gt; Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org<br>
&gt; Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public
Key Info.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; David P. Kemp wrote on 01/16/2007 12:21:27 PM:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; &gt; <br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; - The structured algorithm OID is maybe not the hardest
to define<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; but the worse alternative in every other aspect.<br>
&gt; &gt; <br>
&gt; &gt; Agree.<br>
&gt; &gt; <br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Suppose that a subject has an ECMQV-only cert, and wishes to allow
<br>
&gt; either SHA-256 or SHA-384 based KDFs, but no other KDFs. &nbsp;Also,
the <br>
&gt; EKU field says that the cert can be used for SMIME, IPSec, SSH, or
<br>
&gt; TLS (suppose the private key is on the user's smart card). &nbsp;The
X9.<br>
&gt; 62 &quot;structured&quot; approach allows for this. &nbsp;How would
the other <br>
&gt; approaches allow for this? <br>
&gt; <br>
</font></tt>
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From: Stefan Santesson <stefans@microsoft.com>
To: "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>, "ietf-pkix@imc.org" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2007 23:22:39 +0000
Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key Info.
Thread-Topic: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key Info.
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There is no single way that applications and protocol stacks may operate.

In my example, applications don't understand any public key OID. They would simply consult OID table to get a translation into something they can pass to the crypto lib. If that look-up is unsuccessful, the application will most certainly fail. But if it is successful, the application will attempt to map that key to the usage negotiated in the protocol, e.g. a TLS cipher suite. This is where I'm not at all sure that "old" applications will get it right. I have indications that they might get it wrong but I don't have any hard facts to offer yet. It worries me though to have to depend on various applications to get it right.

I would prefer to have more control in the library layer and more actively prevent applications from doing the wrong thing.


Stefan Santesson
Senior Program Manager
Windows Security, Standards


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Kemp, David P. [mailto:DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil]
> Sent: den 16 januari 2007 15:08
> To: Stefan Santesson; ietf-pkix@imc.org
> Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key
> Info.
>
> Hmmm, I'd guess that applications would fail, either gracefully
> or catastrophically, when faced with an unrecognized Subject
> Public Key Info OID.   I did miss the point that they might
> falsely accept and misuse the public key, but even after considering
> the possibility it still seems highly improbable.
>
> Dave
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:stefans@microsoft.com]
> Sent: Tuesday, January 16, 2007 2:09 PM
> To: Kemp, David P.; ietf-pkix@imc.org
> Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key
> Info.
>
> Thanks Dave,
>
> Let me clarify where I think you missed my point.
>
> I believe that it is less likely that a certificate with a critical
> extension will be falsely accepted and misused by an application. I
> believe the risk is greater that applications get it wrong and makes
> wrong use of a public key if the restriction comes as a public key OID.
>
> But this is just an educated guess.
>
> I agree that it will be hard to define complete mapping info in an
> extension. That was my point - It may make the extension overly
> complex.
>
>
> Stefan Santesson
> Senior Program Manager
> Windows Security, Standards
>
>




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Hmmm, I'd guess that applications would fail, either gracefully
or catastrophically, when faced with an unrecognized Subject
Public Key Info OID.   I did miss the point that they might
falsely accept and misuse the public key, but even after considering
the possibility it still seems highly improbable.

Dave

-----Original Message-----
From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:stefans@microsoft.com] 
Sent: Tuesday, January 16, 2007 2:09 PM
To: Kemp, David P.; ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key
Info.

Thanks Dave,

Let me clarify where I think you missed my point.

I believe that it is less likely that a certificate with a critical
extension will be falsely accepted and misused by an application. I
believe the risk is greater that applications get it wrong and makes
wrong use of a public key if the restriction comes as a public key OID.

But this is just an educated guess.

I agree that it will be hard to define complete mapping info in an
extension. That was my point - It may make the extension overly complex.


Stefan Santesson
Senior Program Manager
Windows Security, Standards






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Thread-Topic: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key  Info.
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From: "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>
To: <ietf-pkix@imc.org>
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Is KDF an appropriate level of granularity for certificate-based
constraints on the usage of public keys?  And if so, is it
cryptographically appropriate to use a single public key size
with both SHA-256 and SHA-384 KDFs?  

Specifying a list of allowed features does not satisfy the design
team's goal of using certificates to reduce protocol negotiation -
if more than one KDF is possible with a pair of peer certificates,
it is still necessary to negotiate which KDF to use.

But to answer the question, the design team slides stated:

* Define an optionally critical certificate extension
   - Sequence of Algorithm Identifiers, as in X9.62 parameters
   - Reuse X9 algorithm Identifiers
       . Deprecating "with recommended"? 
   - Add three "family" OIDs (ECDSA, ECDH, ECMQV)

So the extension approach allows a list of KDFs, but the RFC 4055
approach does not.  I believe that a list is unnecessary because
an ECMQV public key of a given size should imply the acceptable
KDF size (or conversely, a key derive function should imply the
acceptable public key size).

Dave


________________________________________
From: Daniel Brown [mailto:DBrown@certicom.com] 
Sent: Tuesday, January 16, 2007 4:03 PM
To: Kemp, David P.
Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key Info.


David P. Kemp wrote on 01/16/2007 12:21:27 PM:

> 
> > - The structured algorithm OID is maybe not the hardest to define
> > but the worse alternative in every other aspect.
> 
> Agree.
> 

Suppose that a subject has an ECMQV-only cert, and wishes to allow either SHA-256 or SHA-384 based KDFs, but no other KDFs.  Also, the EKU field says that the cert can be used for SMIME, IPSec, SSH, or TLS (suppose the private key is on the user's smart card).  The X9.62 "structured" approach allows for this.  How would the other approaches allow for this? 

Regards, 

Dan Brown
(905) 501-3857
http://www.certicom.com



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From: "David A. Cooper" <david.cooper@nist.gov>
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To: pkix <ietf-pkix@imc.org>
Subject: Re: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-pkix-scvp-31.txt
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All,

The only changes that were made in draft -31 of SCVP were corrections of 
typographic errors, mainly misspellings in words that were used to 
create ASN.1 terms.  A diff file highlighting the changes between drafts 
-30 and -31 is available at 
http://csrc.nist.gov/pki/documents/PKIX/wdiff_draft-ietf-pkix-scvp-30_to_31.html.

The following changes were made to the ASN.1 module (none of which 
change the DER encoding of objects):

1) In CVRequest, changed reqestExtensions to requestExtensions (missing 
"u" in request).

2) In SCVPCertID, added "algorithm" in front of sha-1, so that it no 
longer implicit that sha-1 is the value for "algorithm" rather than 
"parameters".  SCVPCertID is now:

       SCVPCertID ::= SEQUENCE {
           certHash        OCTET STRING,
           issuerSerial    SCVPIssuerSerial,
           hashAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT { algorithm sha-1 } }

3) In CVStatus code, changed inhibitPolicyMappingUnsuported to 
inhibitPolicyMappingUnsupported (missing "p" in Unsupported) and changed 
validityTimeUnsupported to validationTimeUnsupported (error code is 
intended to indicate that the server does not support the validationTime 
item in Query).

4) In HashValue, added "algorithm" in front of sha-1, as was done with 
SCVPCertID.

       HashValue ::= SEQUENCE {
         algorithm         AlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT { algorithm sha-1 },
         value             OCTET STRING }

5) In ReplyStatus, changed unavailableValidityTime to 
unavailableValidationTime, since error code indicates that historical 
data for the time specified in validationTime in the request is not 
available.

6) In ValPolResponse, changed maxCVResponseVersion to 
maxCVRequestVersion and changed maxVPResponseVersion to 
maxVPRequestVersion, since these terms were referred to as 
max...RequestVersion everywhere except the ASN.1 and since the semantics 
(sections 6.2 and 6.3) are that they indicate that maximum version 
numbers that the server accepts for requests.

7) Also in ValPolResponse, changed validationPolices to 
validationPolicies (added the final "i" in Policies).

Dave

Internet-Drafts@ietf.org wrote:
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts 
> directories.
> This draft is a work item of the Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) Working Group of the IETF.
>
> 	Title		: Server-based Certificate Validation Protocol (SCVP)
> 	Author(s)	: A. Malpani, et al.
> 	Filename	: draft-ietf-pkix-scvp-31.txt
> 	Pages		: 86
> 	Date		: 2007-1-15
> 	
> SCVP allows a client to delegate certificate path construction and
>    certificate path validation to a server.  The path construction or
>    validation (e.g., making sure that none of the certificates in the
>    path are revoked) is performed according to a validation policy,
>    which contains one or more trust anchors.  It allows simplification
>    of client implementations and use of a set of predefined validation
>    policies.
>
> A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-scvp-31.txt
>   



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From: Stefan Santesson <stefans@microsoft.com>
To: Daniel Brown <DBrown@certicom.com>, "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>
CC: "ietf-pkix@imc.org" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2007 22:30:21 +0000
Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key Info.
Thread-Topic: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key Info.
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The fact that you can put the info into a cert does not mean that the whole=
 system will do what you want.

We are dealing with a field that historically has not been used to carry su=
ch information and where it will be a challenge make sure they will act in =
a "good" manner if they do. The situation is different for private key oper=
ations protected by a smart card than using the public key from a certifica=
te. Both sides need to honor the restriction.


Stefan Santesson
Senior Program Manager
Windows Security, Standards

From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] On=
 Behalf Of Daniel Brown
Sent: den 16 januari 2007 13:03
To: Kemp, David P.
Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key Inf=
o.


David P. Kemp wrote on 01/16/2007 12:21:27 PM:

>
> > - The structured algorithm OID is maybe not the hardest to define
> > but the worse alternative in every other aspect.
>
> Agree.
>

Suppose that a subject has an ECMQV-only cert, and wishes to allow either S=
HA-256 or SHA-384 based KDFs, but no other KDFs.  Also, the EKU field says =
that the cert can be used for SMIME, IPSec, SSH, or TLS (suppose the privat=
e key is on the user's smart card).  The X9.62 "structured" approach allows=
 for this.  How would the other approaches allow for this?

Regards,

Dan Brown
(905) 501-3857
http://www.certicom.com

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<p class=3DMsoNormal><a name=3D"_MailEndCompose"><span lang=3DEN-US style=
=3D'font-size:
11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>The fact that you =
can put
the info into a cert does not mean that the whole system will do what you w=
ant.<o:p></o:p></span></a></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>We are dealing with a field that historically has not been u=
sed
to carry such information and where it will be a challenge make sure they w=
ill
act in a &#8220;good&#8221; manner if they do. The situation is different f=
or
private key operations protected by a smart card than using the public key =
from
a certificate. Both sides need to honor the restriction.<o:p></o:p></span><=
/p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-f=
amily:
"Arial","sans-serif";color:maroon'>Stefan Santesson</span></b><span lang=3D=
EN-GB
style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:#400040'>Senior Program Manager</span><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'col=
or:navy'><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-f=
amily:
"Arial","sans-serif";color:#400040'>Windows Security, Standards</span></b><=
span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0cm 0cm 0cm =
4.0pt'>

<div>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0cm =
0cm 0cm'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-f=
amily:
"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span></b><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-siz=
e:10.0pt;
font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:ow=
ner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org]
<b>On Behalf Of </b>Daniel Brown<br>
<b>Sent:</b> den 16 januari 2007 13:03<br>
<b>To:</b> Kemp, David P.<br>
<b>Cc:</b> ietf-pkix@imc.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public =
Key
Info.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

</div>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>David P. Kemp wrote on 01/16/2007 12:2=
1:27
PM:</span></tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New"'><=
br>
<br>
<tt>&gt; </tt><br>
<tt>&gt; &gt; - The structured algorithm OID is maybe not the hardest to de=
fine</tt><br>
<tt>&gt; &gt; but the worse alternative in every other aspect.</tt><br>
<tt>&gt; </tt><br>
<tt>&gt; Agree.</tt><br>
<tt>&gt; </tt><br>
</span><br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Suppose that a subject has an ECMQV-on=
ly
cert, and wishes to allow either SHA-256 or SHA-384 based KDFs, but no othe=
r
KDFs. &nbsp;Also, the EKU field says that the cert can be used for SMIME, I=
PSec,
SSH, or TLS (suppose the private key is on the user's smart card). &nbsp;Th=
e
X9.62 &quot;structured&quot; approach allows for this. &nbsp;How would the
other approaches allow for this?</span></tt> <br>
<br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Regards,</span></tt> <br>
<br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Dan Brown</span></tt><span style=3D'fo=
nt-size:
10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New"'><br>
<tt>(905) 501-3857</tt><br>
<tt>http://www.certicom.com</tt></span><o:p></o:p></p>

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From: Stefan Santesson <stefans@microsoft.com>
To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>, "ietf-pkix@imc.org" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2007 22:25:08 +0000
Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key Info.
Thread-Topic: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key Info.
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References: <A15AC0FBACD3464E95961F7C0BCD1FF01697DF06@EA-EXMSG-C307.europe.corp.microsoft.com> <A15AC0FBACD3464E95961F7C0BCD1FF019E89689@EA-EXMSG-C307.europe.corp.microsoft.com> <01d801c71ec4$11992160$6d981b81@iaik.tugraz.at> <7.0.0.16.2.20061214105025.07cc8cf8@vigilsec.com> <A15AC0FBACD3464E95961F7C0BCD1FF01ADC7C5C@EA-EXMSG-C307.europe.corp.microsoft.com> <7.0.0.16.2.20061214134853.04288e08@vigilsec.com> <A15AC0FBACD3464E95961F7C0BCD1FF01ADC7C99@EA-EXMSG-C307.europe.corp.microsoft.com> <7.0.0.16.2.20061215141042.04037468@vigilsec.com> <A15AC0FBACD3464E95961F7C0BCD1FF01ADC7EC4@EA-EXMSG-C307.europe.corp.microsoft.com> <7.0.0.16.2.20061215150831.07a156d0@vigilsec.com> <A15AC0FBACD3464E95961F7C0BCD1FF01D6E15D3@EA-EXMSG-C307.europe.corp.microsoft.com> <7.0.0.16.2.20070116134046.0402cc40@vigilsec.com> <A15AC0FBACD3464E95961F7C0BCD1FF01D6E18BD@EA-EXMSG-C307.europe.corp.microsoft.com> <7.0.0.16.2.20070116163719.03f73800@vigilsec.com>
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You are correct in all you say, but that does not prevent applications from=
 getting it wrong. They can treat RSA and ECC keys differently than DH/DSA =
where a distinction is known to them.
I'm venting my fear of what might be a problem. I will look further into th=
is.

Stefan Santesson
Senior Program Manager
Windows Security, Standards

From: Russ Housley [mailto:housley@vigilsec.com]
Sent: den 16 januari 2007 13:54
To: Stefan Santesson; ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key Inf=
o.

Stefan:

If a certificate says that the public key is only to be used with RSAES-OAE=
P, then it should fail if it trys to use it with some other algorithm.  In =
the three steps that you cite, this has no impact on 1).  It is not a signa=
ture algorithm, so it should no have any impact on the certification path v=
alidation.  Updating the OID table seems very straightforward.  Something l=
ike this needs to be done anytime a new algorithm is added to the system.  =
It will need to be added to the table to handle the appearance in S/MIME fo=
r example.  Finally, the pain involved with 3) is the leverage to get appli=
cation developers to use the OID table.  There may be some application-spec=
ific things that need to be done as well, but that does not necessarily hav=
e anything to do with the certificate.

I disagree with one thing you said.  You said:
> In the "old" logic, when a subject public key OID had no constraining sem=
antics.
> It would be safe to use a trusted key if it works (if all other checks ar=
e good). This
> change of semantics is the danger when it hits old applications not desig=
ned for
> it. If they were designed to honor RFC 4055 OIDs, this would not be an is=
sue.
> However RFC 4055 has not been implemented in many places.

The subject public key information has always included an algorithm identif=
ier.  The table of contents of RFC 3279 shows the ones that have been in us=
e for at least four years:

   2.3  Subject Public Key Algorithms
   2.3.1  RSA Keys
   2.3.2  DSA Signature Keys
   2.3.3  Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Keys
   2.3.4  KEA Public Keys
   2.3.5  ECDSA and ECDH Public Keys

DSA and KEA public keys can also be used in DH operations from a purely mat=
hematical perspective.  However, we choose to assign three different OIDs. =
 We did not assign one OID for discrete log public keys.

Russ


At 03:12 PM 1/16/2007, Stefan Santesson wrote:

Russ,
I can't see that we have any disagreements.

My point is that the mapping and as such the responsibility for doing the m=
apping correctly rests fully on the applications or protocol stacks.
You can't just add this feature in the crypto library or the validation mod=
ule, and use current protocol stacks and applications. If you do that, they=
 most likely either fail or get it wrong.

So we have a situation with multiple possible points of failure.

An expansion of the public key OIDs for ECC will in short require the follo=
wing changes:

1) Update chain validation to recognize new OIDs and enforce them in chain =
validation
2) Update the OID table (voluntarily used by protocols and applications)
3) Update the mapping logic in all protocol stacks and cert using applicati=
ons

The interesting question is what will happen if you do 1) and 2) but not 3)=
. Or do 1) and 2) and gradually update 3)
Keeping in mind that many applications are designed out of the notion that =
a public key obtained through a validated certificate path, associated with=
 a matching key usage and EKU, either works (then it is a good one) or don'=
t work, I wouldn't be surprised if an application receiving a new Alg ID th=
at it can't map to the protocol Alg ID, still will try to use the key it ha=
s to see if it works. Neither the chain validation engine nor the Crypto li=
brary will catch or prevent this abuse.

Of course, a correct application will get it right, but many developers hav=
e learned to make their code as fault tolerant as possible and are used to =
process cases of conflicting information in a way that succeeds when it sho=
uld be "safe" to do so. Example: a chain should fail if Issuer name and sub=
ject name matching fails. But still, if signature of the leaf cert matches =
the public key of the CA cert and subject/issuer name are "Example Inc"/"ex=
ample, inc" in different encoding. It would be safe to allow it to pass. St=
rictly such chain should fail, but you will find that "fault tolerant" desi=
gns, knowing that users will get things wrong, may actually pass such chain=
, because it is safe to do so.

In the "old" logic, when a subject public key OID had no constraining seman=
tics. It would be safe to use a trusted key if it works (if all other check=
s are good). This change of semantics is the danger when it hits old applic=
ations not designed for it. If they were designed to honor RFC 4055 OIDs, t=
his would not be an issue. However RFC 4055 has not been implemented in man=
y places.

The difference with an extension is that the application will get a critica=
l extension error, which applications currently are designed to honor. They=
 either need to recognize and honor that extension or fail. The risk for ab=
use during transition is thus considerably lower.

What ever we do, I hope we can do it as simple as possible. But even though=
 defining a few new alg OIDs seems simple, it may not provide for a safe an=
d simple transition.



Stefan Santesson
Senior Program Manager
Windows Security, Standards

From: Russ Housley [ mailto:housley@vigilsec.com]
Sent: den 16 januari 2007 11:04
To: Stefan Santesson; ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key Inf=
o.

Stefan:

Let's expand your "Crypto Library" box to include the algorithms that are d=
iscussed in RFC 4055.

                       -----------------
                       | Crypto Library|
                       -----------------
                               |
       ----------------------------------------------------
       |                |                |                |
 ---------------  ---------------  --------------  ---------------
 | PKCS#1 v1.5 |  | PKCS#1 v1.5 |  | RSASSA-PSS |  | RSAES-OAEP  |
 | Signature   |  | Key Encrypt |  | Signature  |  | Key Encrypt |
 ---------------  ---------------  --------------  ---------------
       |                |                |                |
       ----------------------------------------------------
                               |
                     ---------------------
                     | RSA Math Routines |
                     ---------------------

In the RFC 4055 approach, the algorithm identifier says that the public key=
 may be used for any one of these RSA operations, or it names exactly one o=
f them.  If exactly one is named, it seems to help the crypto library deter=
mine which of the routine to use.  If any is allowed, then the application =
or the protocol stack needs to tell the crypto library which operation to p=
erform.

You say:
> Adding this feature in the RFC4055 style is not impossible but it needs t=
o be
> individually implemented in each cert using protocol and application. Thi=
s is
> not trivial considering that legacy is a big complicating factor. In
> principle it worries me to put this complex mapping burden on application=
s.
> Another threat with this approach is if it leads to a requirement to defi=
ne
> combinations of algorithm modes by single OIDs where we may end up with a
> very large space of OIDs.

On your last point, RFC 4055 does not do any such thing.  It does not defin=
e OIDs for OAEP with a particular hash algorithm as the mask generation fun=
ction.  No, it uses a parameter for that.

Certificate using applications need to map algorithm identifiers from certi=
ficates, the protocol, and the crypto library.  Agreed.  It seems that the =
table approach that you describe will work well with the simplified crypto =
library architecture that I have drawn above.  The one difference is that c=
rypto libraries need to be able to handle the fact that one public key migh=
t be useful in more than algorithm.  This is already the case.  RSA keys ar=
e used for PKCS#1 v1.5 signature and key encrypt.  If the key usage extensi=
on is not present, then the certificate is not providing the context to sel=
ect the appropriate algorithm within the crypto library.

Russ

--_000_A15AC0FBACD3464E95961F7C0BCD1FF01D6E18E4EAEXMSGC307euro_
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<div class=3DSection1>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><a name=3D"_MailEndCompose"><span lang=3DEN-US style=
=3D'font-size:
11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>You are correct in=
 all
you say, but that does not prevent applications from getting it wrong. They=
 can
treat RSA and ECC keys differently than DH/DSA where a distinction is known=
 to
them.<o:p></o:p></span></a></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>I&#8217;m venting my fear of what might be a problem. I will
look further into this.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-f=
amily:
"Arial","sans-serif";color:maroon'>Stefan Santesson</span></b><span lang=3D=
EN-GB
style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:#400040'>Senior Program Manager</span><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'col=
or:navy'><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-f=
amily:
"Arial","sans-serif";color:#400040'>Windows Security, Standards</span></b><=
span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p></o:p></span></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0cm 0cm 0cm =
4.0pt'>

<div>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0cm =
0cm 0cm'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-f=
amily:
"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span></b><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-siz=
e:10.0pt;
font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> Russ Housley [mailto:housley@vigilsec.c=
om] <br>
<b>Sent:</b> den 16 januari 2007 13:54<br>
<b>To:</b> Stefan Santesson; ietf-pkix@imc.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public =
Key
Info.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

</div>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>Stefan:<br>
<br>
If a certificate says that the public key is only to be used with RSAES-OAE=
P,
then it should fail if it trys to use it with some other algorithm.&nbsp; I=
n
the three steps that you cite, this has no impact on 1).&nbsp; It is not a
signature algorithm, so it should no have any impact on the certification p=
ath
validation.&nbsp; Updating the OID table seems very straightforward.&nbsp;
Something like this needs to be done anytime a new algorithm is added to th=
e
system.&nbsp; It will need to be added to the table to handle the appearanc=
e in
S/MIME for example.&nbsp; Finally, the pain involved with 3) is the leverag=
e to
get application developers to use the OID table.&nbsp; There may be some
application-specific things that need to be done as well, but that does not
necessarily have anything to do with the certificate.<br>
<br>
I disagree with one thing you said.&nbsp; You said:<br>
&gt; In the &#8220;old&#8221; logic, when a subject public key OID had no
constraining semantics.<br>
&gt; It would be safe to use a trusted key if it works (if all other checks=
 are
good). This<br>
&gt; change of semantics is the danger when it hits old applications not
designed for<br>
&gt; it. If they were designed to honor RFC 4055 OIDs, this would not be an
issue.<br>
&gt; However RFC 4055 has not been implemented in many places.<br>
<br>
The subject public key information has always included an algorithm
identifier.&nbsp; The table of contents of RFC 3279 shows the ones that hav=
e
been in use for at least four years:<br>
<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; 2.3&nbsp; Subject Public Key Algorithms<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; 2.3.1&nbsp; RSA Keys<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; 2.3.2&nbsp; DSA Signature Keys<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; 2.3.3&nbsp; Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Keys<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; 2.3.4&nbsp; KEA Public Keys<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; 2.3.5&nbsp; ECDSA and ECDH Public Keys<br>
<br>
DSA and KEA public keys can also be used in DH operations from a purely
mathematical perspective.&nbsp; However, we choose to assign three differen=
t
OIDs.&nbsp; We did not assign one OID for discrete log public keys.<br>
<br>
Russ<br>
<br>
<br>
At 03:12 PM 1/16/2007, Stefan Santesson wrote:<br>
<br>
<o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>Russ,<br>
I can&#8217;t see that we have any disagreements.<br>
&nbsp;<br>
My point is that the mapping and as such the responsibility for doing the
mapping correctly rests fully on the applications or protocol stacks.<br>
You can&#8217;t just add this feature in the crypto library or the validati=
on
module, and use current protocol stacks and applications. If you do that, t=
hey
most likely either fail or get it wrong.<br>
&nbsp;<br>
So we have a situation with multiple possible points of failure.<br>
&nbsp;<br>
An expansion of the public key OIDs for ECC will in short require the follo=
wing
changes:<br>
&nbsp;<br>
1) Update chain validation to recognize new OIDs and enforce them in chain =
validation<br>
2) Update the OID table (voluntarily used by protocols and applications)<br=
>
3) Update the mapping logic in all protocol stacks and cert using applicati=
ons<br>
&nbsp;<br>
The interesting question is what will happen if you do 1) and 2) but not 3)=
. Or
do 1) and 2) and gradually update 3)<br>
Keeping in mind that many applications are designed out of the notion that =
a
public key obtained through a validated certificate path, associated with a
matching key usage and EKU, either works (then it is a good one) or don&#82=
17;t
work, I wouldn&#8217;t be surprised if an application receiving a new Alg I=
D
that it can&#8217;t map to the protocol Alg ID, still will try to use the k=
ey
it has to see if it works. Neither the chain validation engine nor the Cryp=
to
library will catch or prevent this abuse.<br>
&nbsp;<br>
Of course, a correct application will get it right, but many developers hav=
e
learned to make their code as fault tolerant as possible and are used to
process cases of conflicting information in a way that succeeds when it sho=
uld
be &#8220;safe&#8221; to do so. Example: a chain should fail if Issuer name=
 and
subject name matching fails. But still, if signature of the leaf cert match=
es
the public key of the CA cert and subject/issuer name are &#8220;Example
Inc&#8221;/&#8221;example, inc&#8221; in different encoding. It would be sa=
fe
to allow it to pass. Strictly such chain should fail, but you will find tha=
t
&#8220;fault tolerant&#8221; designs, knowing that users will get things wr=
ong,
may actually pass such chain, because it is safe to do so.&nbsp; <br>
&nbsp;<br>
In the &#8220;old&#8221; logic, when a subject public key OID had no
constraining semantics. It would be safe to use a trusted key if it works (=
if
all other checks are good). This change of semantics is the danger when it =
hits
old applications not designed for it. If they were designed to honor RFC 40=
55
OIDs, this would not be an issue. However RFC 4055 has not been implemented=
 in
many places.<br>
&nbsp;<br>
The difference with an extension is that the application will get a critica=
l
extension error, which applications currently are designed to honor. They
either need to recognize and honor that extension or fail. The risk for abu=
se
during transition is thus considerably lower.<br>
&nbsp;<br>
What ever we do, I hope we can do it as simple as possible. But even though
defining a few new alg OIDs seems simple, it may not provide for a safe and
simple transition. <br>
&nbsp;<br>
&nbsp;<br>
&nbsp;<br>
<b>Stefan Santesson<br>
</b>Senior Program Manager<br>
<b>Windows Security, Standards<br>
</b>&nbsp;<br>
<b>From:</b> Russ Housley [<a href=3D"mailto:housley@vigilsec.com">
mailto:housley@vigilsec.com</a>] <br>
<b>Sent:</b> den 16 januari 2007 11:04<br>
<b>To:</b> Stefan Santesson; ietf-pkix@imc.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public =
Key
Info.<br>
&nbsp;<br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Stefan:</span></tt><br>
<br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Let's expand your &quot;Crypto Library=
&quot;
box to include the algorithms that are discussed in RFC 4055.</span></tt><b=
r>
<br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
----------------- </span></tt><br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
| Crypto Library|</span></tt><br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
-----------------</span></tt><br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|</span></tt><br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
----------------------------------------------------</span></tt><br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|</span></tt><br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;---------------&nbsp;
---------------&nbsp; --------------&nbsp; ---------------</span></tt><br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;| PKCS#1 v1.5 |&nbsp; | PKCS#1 v=
1.5
|&nbsp; | RSASSA-PSS |&nbsp; | RSAES-OAEP&nbsp; |</span></tt><br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;| Signature&nbsp;&nbsp; |&nbsp; =
| Key
Encrypt |&nbsp; | Signature&nbsp; |&nbsp; | Key Encrypt |</span></tt><br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;---------------&nbsp;
---------------&nbsp; --------------&nbsp; ---------------</span></tt><br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|</span></tt><br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
----------------------------------------------------</span></tt><br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|</span></tt><br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;
---------------------</span></tt><br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;
| RSA Math Routines |</span></tt><br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;
---------------------</span></tt><br>
<br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>In the RFC 4055 approach, the algorith=
m
identifier says that the public key may be used for any one of these RSA
operations, or it names exactly one of them.&nbsp; If exactly one is named,=
 it
seems to help the crypto library determine which of the routine to use.&nbs=
p;
If any is allowed, then the application or the protocol stack needs to tell=
 the
crypto library which operation to perform.</span></tt><br>
<br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>You say:</span></tt><br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; Adding this feature in the RFC405=
5
style is not impossible but it needs to be</span></tt><br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; individually implemented in each =
cert
using protocol and application. This is</span></tt><br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; not trivial considering that lega=
cy is
a big complicating factor. In</span></tt><br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; principle it worries me to put th=
is
complex mapping burden on applications.</span></tt><br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; Another threat with this approach=
 is if
it leads to a requirement to define</span></tt><br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; combinations of algorithm modes b=
y
single OIDs where we may end up with a</span></tt><br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; very large space of OIDs.</span><=
/tt><br>
<br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>On your last point, RFC 4055 does not =
do any
such thing.&nbsp; It does not define OIDs for OAEP with a particular hash
algorithm as the mask generation function.&nbsp; No, it uses a parameter fo=
r
that.</span></tt><br>
<br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Certificate using applications need to=
 map
algorithm identifiers from certificates, the protocol, and the crypto
library.&nbsp; Agreed.&nbsp; It seems that the table approach that you desc=
ribe
will work well with the simplified crypto library architecture that I have
drawn above.&nbsp; The one difference is that crypto libraries need to be a=
ble
to handle the fact that one public key might be useful in more than
algorithm.&nbsp; This is already the case.&nbsp; RSA keys are used for PKCS=
#1
v1.5 signature and key encrypt.&nbsp; If the key usage extension is not
present, then the certificate is not providing the context to select the
appropriate algorithm within the crypto library.</span></tt><br>
<br>
<tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Russ<o:p></o:p></span></tt></p>

</div>

</div>

</body>

</html>

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Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2007 13:54:29 -0800
From: Arshad Noor <arshad.noor@strongauth.com>
Subject: Availability of CSRTool
To: dev-tech-crypto@lists.mozilla.org, ietf-pkix@imc.org, security-dev@xml.apache.org, ST-ISC@MAIL.ABANET.ORG, PKI TC <pki-tc@lists.oasis-open.org>, ekmi@lists.oasis-open.org
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Hi,

I would like to announce the availability of a free and open-source
(LGPL) tool - CSRTool v0.01- to the PKI/Crypto/Security community.

CSRTool is a Java-based, GUI-driven utility that:

  * Generates RSA public and private key-pairs in sizes ranging from
    1024 to 8192 bits;

  * Generates Elliptic Curve DSA public and private key-pairs using
    either the ANSI X9.62 named curves, or custom parameters of your
    own curve, if so inclined;

  * Saves the private-key in a PKCS8 file with Password-Based-Encryption
    using the SHA1withTripleDES algorithm;

  * Generates a PEM-encoded CSR that can be submitted to a CA either
    through a web-form or e-mail;

  * Generates keyUsage and/or the subjectAltName extensions (optionally)
    in the RSA-based CSR;

  * Combines the private-key from the previously-stored PKCS8 file and
    the newly returned digital certificate, into a PKCS12 file that can
    be used for importation into desired applications; future releases
    will support the JKS & JCEKS key-stores, and crypto hardware tokens;

It was created to make working with PKIs a little easier.  Everything
it does can be done with various CLI-based utilities easily enough,
but the GUI makes it just a little easier for some people.

More information and downloads of the binary and source can be found
at http://www.strongauth.com/csrtool.  Documentation is included in
the downloads, and a forum for discussion of the tool is available at
that site.

Enjoy!

Arshad Noor
StrongAuth, Inc.



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Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2007 16:54:15 -0500
To: Stefan Santesson <stefans@microsoft.com>, ietf-pkix@imc.org
From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key Info.
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<html>
<body>
Stefan:<br><br>
If a certificate says that the public key is only to be used with
RSAES-OAEP, then it should fail if it trys to use it with some other
algorithm.&nbsp; In the three steps that you cite, this has no impact on
1).&nbsp; It is not a signature algorithm, so it should no have any
impact on the certification path validation.&nbsp; Updating the OID table
seems very straightforward.&nbsp; Something like this needs to be done
anytime a new algorithm is added to the system.&nbsp; It will need to be
added to the table to handle the appearance in S/MIME for example.&nbsp;
Finally, the pain involved with 3) is the leverage to get application
developers to use the OID table.&nbsp; There may be some
application-specific things that need to be done as well, but that does
not necessarily have anything to do with the certificate.<br><br>
I disagree with one thing you said.&nbsp; You said:<br>
&gt; In the “old” logic, when a subject public key OID had no
constraining semantics.<br>
&gt; It would be safe to use a trusted key if it works (if all other
checks are good). This<br>
&gt; change of semantics is the danger when it hits old applications not
designed for<br>
&gt; it. If they were designed to honor RFC 4055 OIDs, this would not be
an issue.<br>
&gt; However RFC 4055 has not been implemented in many places.<br><br>
The subject public key information has always included an algorithm
identifier.&nbsp; The table of contents of RFC 3279 shows the ones that
have been in use for at least four years:<br><br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; 2.3&nbsp; Subject Public Key Algorithms<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; 2.3.1&nbsp; RSA Keys<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; 2.3.2&nbsp; DSA Signature Keys<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; 2.3.3&nbsp; Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Keys<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; 2.3.4&nbsp; KEA Public Keys<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; 2.3.5&nbsp; ECDSA and ECDH Public Keys<br><br>
DSA and KEA public keys can also be used in DH operations from a purely
mathematical perspective.&nbsp; However, we choose to assign three
different OIDs.&nbsp; We did not assign one OID for discrete log public
keys.<br><br>
Russ<br><br>
<br>
At 03:12 PM 1/16/2007, Stefan Santesson wrote:<br>
<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite=""><a name="_MailEndCompose"></a>
Russ,<br>
I can’t see that we have any disagreements.<br>
&nbsp;<br>
My point is that the mapping and as such the responsibility for doing the
mapping correctly rests fully on the applications or protocol
stacks.<br>
You can’t just add this feature in the crypto library or the validation
module, and use current protocol stacks and applications. If you do that,
they most likely either fail or get it wrong.<br>
&nbsp;<br>
So we have a situation with multiple possible points of failure.<br>
&nbsp;<br>
An expansion of the public key OIDs for ECC will in short require the
following changes:<br>
&nbsp;<br>
1) Update chain validation to recognize new OIDs and enforce them in
chain validation<br>
2) Update the OID table (voluntarily used by protocols and
applications)<br>
3) Update the mapping logic in all protocol stacks and cert using
applications<br>
&nbsp;<br>
The interesting question is what will happen if you do 1) and 2) but not
3). Or do 1) and 2) and gradually update 3)<br>
Keeping in mind that many applications are designed out of the notion
that a public key obtained through a validated certificate path,
associated with a matching key usage and EKU, either works (then it is a
good one) or don’t work, I wouldn’t be surprised if an application
receiving a new Alg ID that it can’t map to the protocol Alg ID, still
will try to use the key it has to see if it works. Neither the chain
validation engine nor the Crypto library will catch or prevent this
abuse.<br>
&nbsp;<br>
Of course, a correct application will get it right, but many developers
have learned to make their code as fault tolerant as possible and are
used to process cases of conflicting information in a way that succeeds
when it should be “safe” to do so. Example: a chain should fail if Issuer
name and subject name matching fails. But still, if signature of the leaf
cert matches the public key of the CA cert and subject/issuer name are
“Example Inc”/”example, inc” in different encoding. It would be safe to
allow it to pass. Strictly such chain should fail, but you will find that
“fault tolerant” designs, knowing that users will get things wrong, may
actually pass such chain, because it is safe to do so.&nbsp; <br>
&nbsp;<br>
In the “old” logic, when a subject public key OID had no constraining
semantics. It would be safe to use a trusted key if it works (if all
other checks are good). This change of semantics is the danger when it
hits old applications not designed for it. If they were designed to honor
RFC 4055 OIDs, this would not be an issue. However RFC 4055 has not been
implemented in many places.<br>
&nbsp;<br>
The difference with an extension is that the application will get a
critical extension error, which applications currently are designed to
honor. They either need to recognize and honor that extension or fail.
The risk for abuse during transition is thus considerably lower.<br>
&nbsp;<br>
What ever we do, I hope we can do it as simple as possible. But even
though defining a few new alg OIDs seems simple, it may not provide for a
safe and simple transition. <br>
&nbsp;<br>
&nbsp;<br>
&nbsp;<br>
<b>Stefan Santesson<br>
</b>Senior Program Manager<br>
<b>Windows Security, Standards<br>
</b>&nbsp;<br>
<b>From:</b> Russ Housley
[<a href="mailto:housley@vigilsec.com" eudora="autourl">
mailto:housley@vigilsec.com</a>] <br>
<b>Sent:</b> den 16 januari 2007 11:04<br>
<b>To:</b> Stefan Santesson; ietf-pkix@imc.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject
Public Key Info.<br>
&nbsp;<br>
<tt>Stefan:</tt><br><br>
<tt>Let's expand your &quot;Crypto Library&quot; box to include the
algorithms that are discussed in RFC 4055.</tt><br><br>
<tt>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
----------------- </tt><br>
<tt>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
| Crypto Library|</tt><br>
<tt>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
-----------------</tt><br>
<tt>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|</tt><br>
<tt>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
----------------------------------------------------</tt><br>
<tt>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|</tt><br>
<tt>&nbsp;---------------&nbsp; ---------------&nbsp;
--------------&nbsp; ---------------</tt><br>
<tt>&nbsp;| PKCS#1 v1.5 |&nbsp; | PKCS#1 v1.5 |&nbsp; | RSASSA-PSS
|&nbsp; | RSAES-OAEP&nbsp; |</tt><br>
<tt>&nbsp;| Signature&nbsp;&nbsp; |&nbsp; | Key Encrypt |&nbsp; |
Signature&nbsp; |&nbsp; | Key Encrypt |</tt><br>
<tt>&nbsp;---------------&nbsp; ---------------&nbsp;
--------------&nbsp; ---------------</tt><br>
<tt>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|</tt><br>
<tt>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
----------------------------------------------------</tt><br>
<tt>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|</tt><br>
<tt>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
---------------------</tt><br>
<tt>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
| RSA Math Routines |</tt><br>
<tt>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
---------------------</tt><br><br>
<tt>In the RFC 4055 approach, the algorithm identifier says that the
public key may be used for any one of these RSA operations, or it names
exactly one of them.&nbsp; If exactly one is named, it seems to help the
crypto library determine which of the routine to use.&nbsp; If any is
allowed, then the application or the protocol stack needs to tell the
crypto library which operation to perform.</tt><br><br>
<tt>You say:</tt><br>
<tt>&gt; Adding this feature in the RFC4055 style is not impossible but
it needs to be</tt><br>
<tt>&gt; individually implemented in each cert using protocol and
application. This is</tt><br>
<tt>&gt; not trivial considering that legacy is a big complicating
factor. In</tt><br>
<tt>&gt; principle it worries me to put this complex mapping burden on
applications.</tt><br>
<tt>&gt; Another threat with this approach is if it leads to a
requirement to define</tt><br>
<tt>&gt; combinations of algorithm modes by single OIDs where we may end
up with a</tt><br>
<tt>&gt; very large space of OIDs.</tt><br><br>
<tt>On your last point, RFC 4055 does not do any such thing.&nbsp; It
does not define OIDs for OAEP with a particular hash algorithm as the
mask generation function.&nbsp; No, it uses a parameter for
that.</tt><br><br>
<tt>Certificate using applications need to map algorithm identifiers from
certificates, the protocol, and the crypto library.&nbsp; Agreed.&nbsp;
It seems that the table approach that you describe will work well with
the simplified crypto library architecture that I have drawn above.&nbsp;
The one difference is that crypto libraries need to be able to handle the
fact that one public key might be useful in more than algorithm.&nbsp;
This is already the case.&nbsp; RSA keys are used for PKCS#1 v1.5
signature and key encrypt.&nbsp; If the key usage extension is not
present, then the certificate is not providing the context to select the
appropriate algorithm within the crypto library.</tt><br><br>
<tt>Russ</blockquote></body>
</html>



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To: "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>
Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key  Info.
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From: Daniel Brown <DBrown@certicom.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2007 16:03:10 -0500
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David P. Kemp wrote on 01/16/2007 12:21:27 PM:

> 
> > - The structured algorithm OID is maybe not the hardest to define
> > but the worse alternative in every other aspect.
> 
> Agree.
> 

Suppose that a subject has an ECMQV-only cert, and wishes to allow either 
SHA-256 or SHA-384 based KDFs, but no other KDFs.  Also, the EKU field 
says that the cert can be used for SMIME, IPSec, SSH, or TLS (suppose the 
private key is on the user's smart card).  The X9.62 "structured" approach 
allows for this.  How would the other approaches allow for this?

Regards,

Dan Brown
(905) 501-3857
http://www.certicom.com
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<br><tt><font size=2>David P. Kemp wrote on 01/16/2007 12:21:27 PM:<br>
<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; &gt; - The structured algorithm OID is maybe not the hardest to define<br>
&gt; &gt; but the worse alternative in every other aspect.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Agree.<br>
&gt; <br>
</font></tt>
<br><tt><font size=2>Suppose that a subject has an ECMQV-only cert, and
wishes to allow either SHA-256 or SHA-384 based KDFs, but no other KDFs.
&nbsp;Also, the EKU field says that the cert can be used for SMIME, IPSec,
SSH, or TLS (suppose the private key is on the user's smart card). &nbsp;The
X9.62 &quot;structured&quot; approach allows for this. &nbsp;How would
the other approaches allow for this?</font></tt>
<br>
<br><tt><font size=2>Regards,</font></tt>
<br>
<br><tt><font size=2>Dan Brown<br>
(905) 501-3857<br>
http://www.certicom.com</font></tt>
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To: ietf-pkix-archive@imc.org
Subject: decdBAGG
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From: Stefan Santesson <stefans@microsoft.com>
To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>, "ietf-pkix@imc.org" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2007 20:12:44 +0000
Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key Info.
Thread-Topic: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key Info.
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Russ,
I can't see that we have any disagreements.

My point is that the mapping and as such the responsibility for doing the m=
apping correctly rests fully on the applications or protocol stacks.
You can't just add this feature in the crypto library or the validation mod=
ule, and use current protocol stacks and applications. If you do that, they=
 most likely either fail or get it wrong.

So we have a situation with multiple possible points of failure.

An expansion of the public key OIDs for ECC will in short require the follo=
wing changes:

1) Update chain validation to recognize new OIDs and enforce them in chain =
validation
2) Update the OID table (voluntarily used by protocols and applications)
3) Update the mapping logic in all protocol stacks and cert using applicati=
ons

The interesting question is what will happen if you do 1) and 2) but not 3)=
. Or do 1) and 2) and gradually update 3)
Keeping in mind that many applications are designed out of the notion that =
a public key obtained through a validated certificate path, associated with=
 a matching key usage and EKU, either works (then it is a good one) or don'=
t work, I wouldn't be surprised if an application receiving a new Alg ID th=
at it can't map to the protocol Alg ID, still will try to use the key it ha=
s to see if it works. Neither the chain validation engine nor the Crypto li=
brary will catch or prevent this abuse.

Of course, a correct application will get it right, but many developers hav=
e learned to make their code as fault tolerant as possible and are used to =
process cases of conflicting information in a way that succeeds when it sho=
uld be "safe" to do so. Example: a chain should fail if Issuer name and sub=
ject name matching fails. But still, if signature of the leaf cert matches =
the public key of the CA cert and subject/issuer name are "Example Inc"/"ex=
ample, inc" in different encoding. It would be safe to allow it to pass. St=
rictly such chain should fail, but you will find that "fault tolerant" desi=
gns, knowing that users will get things wrong, may actually pass such chain=
, because it is safe to do so.

In the "old" logic, when a subject public key OID had no constraining seman=
tics. It would be safe to use a trusted key if it works (if all other check=
s are good). This change of semantics is the danger when it hits old applic=
ations not designed for it. If they were designed to honor RFC 4055 OIDs, t=
his would not be an issue. However RFC 4055 has not been implemented in man=
y places.

The difference with an extension is that the application will get a critica=
l extension error, which applications currently are designed to honor. They=
 either need to recognize and honor that extension or fail. The risk for ab=
use during transition is thus considerably lower.

What ever we do, I hope we can do it as simple as possible. But even though=
 defining a few new alg OIDs seems simple, it may not provide for a safe an=
d simple transition.



Stefan Santesson
Senior Program Manager
Windows Security, Standards

From: Russ Housley [mailto:housley@vigilsec.com]
Sent: den 16 januari 2007 11:04
To: Stefan Santesson; ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key Inf=
o.

Stefan:

Let's expand your "Crypto Library" box to include the algorithms that are d=
iscussed in RFC 4055.

                       -----------------
                       | Crypto Library|
                       -----------------
                               |
       ----------------------------------------------------
       |                |                |                |
 ---------------  ---------------  --------------  ---------------
 | PKCS#1 v1.5 |  | PKCS#1 v1.5 |  | RSASSA-PSS |  | RSAES-OAEP  |
 | Signature   |  | Key Encrypt |  | Signature  |  | Key Encrypt |
 ---------------  ---------------  --------------  ---------------
       |                |                |                |
       ----------------------------------------------------
                               |
                     ---------------------
                     | RSA Math Routines |
                     ---------------------

In the RFC 4055 approach, the algorithm identifier says that the public key=
 may be used for any one of these RSA operations, or it names exactly one o=
f them.  If exactly one is named, it seems to help the crypto library deter=
mine which of the routine to use.  If any is allowed, then the application =
or the protocol stack needs to tell the crypto library which operation to p=
erform.

You say:
> Adding this feature in the RFC4055 style is not impossible but it needs t=
o be
> individually implemented in each cert using protocol and application. Thi=
s is
> not trivial considering that legacy is a big complicating factor. In
> principle it worries me to put this complex mapping burden on application=
s.
> Another threat with this approach is if it leads to a requirement to defi=
ne
> combinations of algorithm modes by single OIDs where we may end up with a
> very large space of OIDs.

On your last point, RFC 4055 does not do any such thing.  It does not defin=
e OIDs for OAEP with a particular hash algorithm as the mask generation fun=
ction.  No, it uses a parameter for that.

Certificate using applications need to map algorithm identifiers from certi=
ficates, the protocol, and the crypto library.  Agreed.  It seems that the =
table approach that you describe will work well with the simplified crypto =
library architecture that I have drawn above.  The one difference is that c=
rypto libraries need to be able to handle the fact that one public key migh=
t be useful in more than algorithm.  This is already the case.  RSA keys ar=
e used for PKCS#1 v1.5 signature and key encrypt.  If the key usage extensi=
on is not present, then the certificate is not providing the context to sel=
ect the appropriate algorithm within the crypto library.

Russ

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<div class=3DSection1>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><a name=3D"_MailEndCompose"><span lang=3DEN-US style=
=3D'font-size:
11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>Russ,<o:p></o:p></=
span></a></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>I can&#8217;t see that we have any disagreements.<o:p></o:p>=
</span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>My point is that the mapping and as such the responsibility =
for
doing the mapping correctly rests fully on the applications or protocol sta=
cks.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>You can&#8217;t just add this feature in the crypto library =
or
the validation module, and use current protocol stacks and applications. If=
 you
do that, they most likely either fail or get it wrong.<o:p></o:p></span></p=
>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>So we have a situation with multiple possible points of fail=
ure.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>An expansion of the public key OIDs for ECC will in short
require the following changes:<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>1) Update chain validation to recognize new OIDs and enforce
them in chain validation<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>2) Update the OID table (voluntarily used by protocols and
applications)<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>3) Update the mapping logic in all protocol stacks and cert =
using
applications<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>The interesting question is what will happen if you do 1) an=
d 2)
but not 3). Or do 1) and 2) and gradually update 3)<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>Keeping in mind that many applications are designed out of t=
he
notion that a public key obtained through a validated certificate path, ass=
ociated
with a matching key usage and EKU, either works (then it is a good one) or =
don&#8217;t
work, I wouldn&#8217;t be surprised if an application receiving a new Alg I=
D
that it can&#8217;t map to the protocol Alg ID, still will try to use the k=
ey it
has to see if it works. Neither the chain validation engine nor the Crypto
library will catch or prevent this abuse.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>Of course, a correct application will get it right, but many
developers have learned to make their code as fault tolerant as possible an=
d
are used to process cases of conflicting information in a way that succeeds
when it should be &#8220;safe&#8221; to do so. Example: a chain should fail=
 if
Issuer name and subject name matching fails. But still, if signature of the
leaf cert matches the public key of the CA cert and subject/issuer name are=
 &#8220;Example
Inc&#8221;/&#8221;example, inc&#8221; in different encoding. It would be sa=
fe
to allow it to pass. Strictly such chain should fail, but you will find tha=
t &#8220;fault
tolerant&#8221; designs, knowing that users will get things wrong, may actu=
ally
pass such chain, because it is safe to do so.&nbsp; <o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>In the &#8220;old&#8221; logic, when a subject public key OI=
D
had no constraining semantics. It would be safe to use a trusted key if it
works (if all other checks are good). This change of semantics is the dange=
r
when it hits old applications not designed for it. If they were designed to=
 honor
RFC 4055 OIDs, this would not be an issue. However RFC 4055 has not been im=
plemented
in many places.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>The difference with an extension is that the application wil=
l
get a critical extension error, which applications currently are designed t=
o honor.
They either need to recognize and honor that extension or fail. The risk fo=
r
abuse during transition is thus considerably lower.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>What ever we do, I hope we can do it as simple as possible. =
But
even though defining a few new alg OIDs seems simple, it may not provide fo=
r a
safe and simple transition. <o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-f=
amily:
"Arial","sans-serif";color:maroon'>Stefan Santesson</span></b><span lang=3D=
EN-GB
style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:#400040'>Senior Program Manager</span><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'col=
or:navy'><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-f=
amily:
"Arial","sans-serif";color:#400040'>Windows Security, Standards</span></b><=
span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p></o:p></span></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0cm 0cm 0cm =
4.0pt'>

<div>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0cm =
0cm 0cm'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-f=
amily:
"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span></b><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-siz=
e:10.0pt;
font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> Russ Housley [mailto:housley@vigilsec.c=
om] <br>
<b>Sent:</b> den 16 januari 2007 11:04<br>
<b>To:</b> Stefan Santesson; ietf-pkix@imc.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public =
Key
Info.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

</div>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Stefan:</span></t=
t><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New"'><br>
<br>
<tt>Let's expand your &quot;Crypto Library&quot; box to include the algorit=
hms
that are discussed in RFC 4055.</tt><br>
<br>
<tt>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
----------------- </tt><br>
<tt>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
| Crypto Library|</tt><br>
<tt>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
-----------------</tt><br>
<tt>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|</tt><br>
<tt>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
----------------------------------------------------</tt><br>
<tt>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|</tt><br>
<tt>&nbsp;---------------&nbsp; ---------------&nbsp; --------------&nbsp;
---------------</tt><br>
<tt>&nbsp;| PKCS#1 v1.5 |&nbsp; | PKCS#1 v1.5 |&nbsp; | RSASSA-PSS |&nbsp; =
|
RSAES-OAEP&nbsp; |</tt><br>
<tt>&nbsp;| Signature&nbsp;&nbsp; |&nbsp; | Key Encrypt |&nbsp; |
Signature&nbsp; |&nbsp; | Key Encrypt |</tt><br>
<tt>&nbsp;---------------&nbsp; ---------------&nbsp; --------------&nbsp;
---------------</tt><br>
<tt>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|</tt><br>
<tt>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; ----------------------------------=
------------------</tt><br>
<tt>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|</tt><br>
<tt>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
---------------------</tt><br>
<tt>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
| RSA Math Routines |</tt><br>
<tt>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
---------------------</tt><br>
<br>
<tt>In the RFC 4055 approach, the algorithm identifier says that the public=
 key
may be used for any one of these RSA operations, or it names exactly one of
them.&nbsp; If exactly one is named, it seems to help the crypto library
determine which of the routine to use.&nbsp; If any is allowed, then the
application or the protocol stack needs to tell the crypto library which
operation to perform.</tt><br>
<br>
<tt>You say:</tt><br>
<tt>&gt; Adding this feature in the RFC4055 style is not impossible but it
needs to be</tt><br>
<tt>&gt; individually implemented in each cert using protocol and applicati=
on.
This is</tt><br>
<tt>&gt; not trivial considering that legacy is a big complicating factor. =
In</tt><br>
<tt>&gt; principle it worries me to put this complex mapping burden on
applications.</tt><br>
<tt>&gt; Another threat with this approach is if it leads to a requirement =
to
define</tt><br>
<tt>&gt; combinations of algorithm modes by single OIDs where we may end up
with a</tt><br>
<tt>&gt; very large space of OIDs.</tt><br>
<br>
<tt>On your last point, RFC 4055 does not do any such thing.&nbsp; It does =
not
define OIDs for OAEP with a particular hash algorithm as the mask generatio=
n
function.&nbsp; No, it uses a parameter for that.</tt><br>
<br>
<tt>Certificate using applications need to map algorithm identifiers from
certificates, the protocol, and the crypto library.&nbsp; Agreed.&nbsp; It
seems that the table approach that you describe will work well with the
simplified crypto library architecture that I have drawn above.&nbsp; The o=
ne
difference is that crypto libraries need to be able to handle the fact that=
 one
public key might be useful in more than algorithm.&nbsp; This is already th=
e
case.&nbsp; RSA keys are used for PKCS#1 v1.5 signature and key encrypt.&nb=
sp;
If the key usage extension is not present, then the certificate is not
providing the context to select the appropriate algorithm within the crypto
library.</tt><br>
<br>
<tt>Russ</tt></span><o:p></o:p></p>

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From: Stefan Santesson <stefans@microsoft.com>
To: "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>, "ietf-pkix@imc.org" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2007 19:08:59 +0000
Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key Info.
Thread-Topic: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key Info.
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Thanks Dave,

Let me clarify where I think you missed my point.

I believe that it is less likely that a certificate with a critical extension will be falsely accepted and misused by an application. I believe the risk is greater that applications get it wrong and makes wrong use of a public key if the restriction comes as a public key OID.

But this is just an educated guess.

I agree that it will be hard to define complete mapping info in an extension. That was my point - It may make the extension overly complex.


Stefan Santesson
Senior Program Manager
Windows Security, Standards


> -----Original Message-----
> From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-
> pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Kemp, David P.
> Sent: den 16 januari 2007 09:21
> To: ietf-pkix@imc.org
> Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key
> Info.
>
>
> Stefan,
>
> Thank you for a very detailed and useful reply.  It provides an
> excellent
> framework for discussing the alternatives, particularly the mapping
> between certificate alg ID, protocol alg ID, and crypto library
> alg ID, and the potential locations where mapping can be performed.
>
> Assume that cert path validation and crypto libraries are unaffected
> by the choice of alternatives: crypto libraries always require the
> caller to provide the crypto lib alg ID, and cert path libraries have
> no reason to examine subject public key info in EE certs.
>
> For ECDSA-signed cert paths, the cert path library must understand
> ECDSA public key info in CA certs.  There are no modes associated with
> ECDSA, so it's a wash whether the cert alg OID is a generic EC-public-
> key
> OID or a single OID for ECDSA-public-key.  Extension non-criticality
> is meaningless because the path validation library cannot ignore
> unrecognized certificate signature keys.  The certificate signature
> algorithm ID specifies RSA-with-hash or ECDSA-with-hash, so the same
> hash-specific signature OIDs must be defined regardless of which
> approach is taken for the public key OID.
>
> Summary: for CA certs, the choice is between a single EC-public-key OID
> and a single ECDSA-public-key OID.  An extension provides no advantage
> for migration/legacy-interoperability, it just takes up space.
>
> For EE certs, the apps and protocol stacks can use, as you say, an
> algorithm ID mapping table with at worst 3 columns: cert ID, protocol
> ID, and library ID.  Although you say an extension could provide
> mapping aids, albeit complex, I don't believe this is practical at
> all.  It is totally unreasonable for a certificate to contain, for
> example, PKCS11 ID and cryptlib ID and crypto++ ID and MS CAPI ID
> as well as manifest constants for other crypto libraries.
>
> So assuming that the applications and protocol stacks are responsible
> for containing mapping tables for OIDs contained in either
> subjectPublicKeyInfo or in an extension, the only remaining issue
> is combinatorial explosion.  First, how many combinations are
> there?  The design team proposal only lists 3 Family OIDs:
> ECDSA, ECDH, and ECMQV.  If you throw in modes, that adds
> 4 more: ECDH-Std, ECDH-Cofactor, ECMQV-Full, and ECMQV-1Pass.
> My assumption is that no one would need mode-specific constraints
> on certificate public keys, but even if PKIX decided to support
> them, that only results in 8 OIDs total.
>
> Second, unlike the flat TLS ciphersuite space and the
> corresponding IANA number spaces for S/MIME, IPSec, etc, the
> OID space is both hierarchical and unlimited.  It is both natural
> and manageable to define a hierarchy of standardized OIDs for:
>
> 1 ECC
> 2   ECDSA
> 3   ECDH
> 4      ECDH-Std
> 5      ECDH-Cofactor
> 6   ECMQV
> 7      ECMQV-Full
> 8      ECMQV-1Pass
> .      ECMQV-mode3 (new modes) ...
> .   ECxyz (new families) ...
>
> and experimental/private OIDs can be defined in other arcs without
> either ambiguity or exhaustion of the OID space.  RFC 4055 specifies
> a flat space for OIDs under PKCS-1 (with the highest assigned value
> of 14), and it's reasonable to use a flat list for 4 (family) or
> 8 (family+mode) ECC public key OIDs.  But if a huge number of new
> families or modes came up in the future, the OID space could
> accommodate them easily.
>
> > In summary,
> >
> > - The RFC 4055 approach is the simplest to define but is still
> > hard to fully implement and we have to trust applications to get
> > it right.
>
> Agree that it is simplest to define.
>
> >
> > - The extension approach is the hardest to define but is friendlier
> > to a gradual implementation and has the best prevention from
> > applications getting it wrong.
>
> Disagree that an extension can usefully provide library-specific
> mapping constants, or that such information should be contained
> in a certificate.
>
> Disagree that a critical/non-critical extension aids gradual
> implementation.  In every case where non-critical would be used,
> applications gain no benefit from information in extension.  Cert
> path module in updated apps might reject cert while path module
> in legacy apps would ignore and accept cert, but what benefit is
> that over having all apps accept 4055/3279 OID?  What motivation
> is there for users to "upgrade" to a version that causes their
> application to stop working?  In every case where critical
> extension would be used, family OIDs in 4055 approach would give
> same result.
>
> Disagree that centralizing decision-making in cert path module
> prevents applications from getting it wrong.  What if 1 family
> (say ECMQV, or a new family) is supported by cert module but
> not by crypto lib or protocol lib?
>
> > - The structured algorithm OID is maybe not the hardest to define
> > but the worse alternative in every other aspect.
>
> Agree.
>
>
> Dave
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-
> pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Stefan Santesson
> Sent: Monday, January 15, 2007 7:16 PM
> To: Russ Housley; ietf-pkix@imc.org
> Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key
> Info.
>
>
> Russ,
> I promised to come back on this issue after some more investigations.
> Sorry for the somewhat long reply.
>
> For my rationales and reasoning I use the following simplified
> architectural model with some example modules.
>
>
>                                    ------------
> Apps                               |  E-mail  |
>                                    ------------
>                                         |
>                   ---------        -----------    ---------
> Protocol stacks   | TLS   |        |  S/MIME |    | IPSEC |
>                   ---------        -----------    ---------
>                       |                 |             |
>                       ---------------------------------
>                            |                    |
>                   -----------------  -------------------------
> Libraries         | Crypto Library|  | cert chain validation |
>                   -----------------  -------------------------
>
> This is not the only possible model but it is the one we use for the
> basis of certificate usage.
>
> The initiative to use a certificate and its key comes from either an
> application or a protocol stack. For TLS it will come from the protocol
> stack. For E-mail it may come from the application itself.
> The central problem with usage restrictions embedded with the subject
> public key OID is how to enforce it. When the application or the
> protocol stack wants to use a certificate it sends it to the validation
> module to verify and decode the certificate. The information returned
> contains the algorithm OID and the public key. The Crypto library in
> this example doesn't understand OIDs, so the app needs to do a
> translation to an internal AlgorithmID understood by the crypto
> library. In our environment the app/protocol can use a common OID table
> to do that. It also needs to map this usage to the algorithm usage
> negotiated in the protocol stack, e.g. map to a TLS cipher suite. So in
> worse case the app has 3 Algorithm IDs to map (Crypto library alg ID,
> Protocol alg ID and Cert alg ID).
>
> Even if the common OID table is used, the cert alg ID may differ from
> the Crypto library alg ID. For example the former may be and ID for
> ECC-DSA, while the latter may be ECC-DSA-SHA256.
>
> In addition to this the app or protocol stack needs to make sure this
> is consistent with any key usage set.
>
> Adding this feature in the RFC4055 style is not impossible but it needs
> to be individually implemented in each cert using protocol and
> application. This is not trivial considering that legacy is a big
> complicating factor. In principle it worries me to put this complex
> mapping burden on applications. Another threat with this approach is if
> it leads to a requirement to define combinations of algorithm modes by
> single OIDs where we may end up with a very large space of OIDs.
>
> Looking at this from an extension approach, we would have the option of
> critical/non critical. If the extension is critical, the cert
> validation module will return an unrecognized critical extension error,
> forcing the application to assume responsibility for honoring this
> extension or fail. This is a better guarantee for preventing misuse by
> applications. The extension could potentially contain mapping data that
> is more suitable for mapping usage towards the different alg IDs
> provided in different protocols. However this may cause the extension
> syntax to be overly complex.
>
> The worse scenario of all the choices is the structured Certificates
> OID (á la X9.62), listing sub OIDs for acceptable algorithmic modes.
> This would create the most complex and confusing mapping graph for the
> applications and protocol stacks as it now has a magnitude of OIDs to
> map to algorithm IDs of the crypto library as well as Alg IDs from the
> protocol. As such it is the least favorable alternative.
>
> In summary,
>
> - The RFC 4055 approach is the simplest to define but is still hard to
> fully implement and we have to trust applications to get it right.
>
> - The extension approach is the hardest to define but is friendlier to
> a gradual implementation and has the best prevention from applications
> getting it wrong.
>
> - The structured algorithm OID is maybe not the hardest to define but
> the worse alternative in every other aspect.
>
> My primary choice would be to not enforce algorithmic modes in
> certificates at all unless there is a cryptographic weakness in the
> algorithm to protect. As such the protocol usage negotiation should be
> solved on the protocol level. Then we only need 1 OID for ECC keys
> (defined in RFC 3279). The RFC 4055 OIDs would still exist for the
> legitimate reasons above, but we would not need any new OIDs for ECC.
>
> If the WG decides that mode restriction for ECC keys is necessary then
> we need to choose the least evil alternative and I currently feel
> unsure of what that would be.
>
>
> Stefan Santesson
> Senior Program Manager
> Windows Security, Standards
>
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Russ Housley [mailto:housley@vigilsec.com]
> > Sent: den 15 december 2006 12:13
> > To: Stefan Santesson
> > Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
> > Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public
> Key
> > Info.
> >
> > Stefan:
> >
> > >I respect the need for clarification. In short, when the function of
> > >OIDs not only instructions to the key import functions, but also a
> > >constraining mechanism for the signing module, this poses an
> > >architectural challenge. I will get back with more elaborate
> > >information. It seems that this would not only be a problem for us
> > >so others may also contribute with more elaborate description of the
> > problems.
> >
> > As you know, I have been insistent since the X9.62 approach was
> > revealed that the PKIX WG provide one way to handle this issue, not
> > one way for RSA and another way for ECC.  Since RFC 4055 has been
> > implemented, I think that a compelling argument is needed to make a
> > change.  So far, I have not seen one.  I look forward to a more
> > complete description of the implementation concerns with the approach
> > used in RFC 4055.
> >
> > Russ
>
>




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To: Stefan Santesson <stefans@microsoft.com>, "ietf-pkix@imc.org" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>
From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key Info.
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<tt>Stefan:<br><br>
Let's expand your &quot;Crypto Library&quot; box to include the
algorithms that are discussed in RFC 4055.<br><br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
----------------- <br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
| Crypto Library|<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
-----------------<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
----------------------------------------------------<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|<br>
&nbsp;---------------&nbsp; ---------------&nbsp; --------------&nbsp;
---------------<br>
&nbsp;| PKCS#1 v1.5 |&nbsp; | PKCS#1 v1.5 |&nbsp; | RSASSA-PSS |&nbsp; |
RSAES-OAEP&nbsp; |<br>
&nbsp;| Signature&nbsp;&nbsp; |&nbsp; | Key Encrypt |&nbsp; |
Signature&nbsp; |&nbsp; | Key Encrypt |<br>
&nbsp;---------------&nbsp; ---------------&nbsp; --------------&nbsp;
---------------<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
----------------------------------------------------<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
|<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
---------------------<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
| RSA Math Routines |<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
---------------------<br><br>
In the RFC 4055 approach, the algorithm identifier says that the public
key may be used for any one of these RSA operations, or it names exactly
one of them.&nbsp; If exactly one is named, it seems to help the crypto
library determine which of the routine to use.&nbsp; If any is allowed,
then the application or the protocol stack needs to tell the crypto
library which operation to perform.<br><br>
You say:<br>
&gt; Adding this feature in the RFC4055 style is not impossible but it
needs to be<br>
&gt; individually implemented in each cert using protocol and
application. This is<br>
&gt; not trivial considering that legacy is a big complicating factor.
In<br>
&gt; principle it worries me to put this complex mapping burden on
applications.<br>
&gt; Another threat with this approach is if it leads to a requirement to
define<br>
&gt; combinations of algorithm modes by single OIDs where we may end up
with a<br>
&gt; very large space of OIDs.<br><br>
On your last point, RFC 4055 does not do any such thing.&nbsp; It does
not define OIDs for OAEP with a particular hash algorithm as the mask
generation function.&nbsp; No, it uses a parameter for that.<br><br>
Certificate using applications need to map algorithm identifiers from
certificates, the protocol, and the crypto library.&nbsp; Agreed.&nbsp;
It seems that the table approach that you describe will work well with
the simplified crypto library architecture that I have drawn above.&nbsp;
The one difference is that crypto libraries need to be able to handle the
fact that one public key might be useful in more than algorithm.&nbsp;
This is already the case.&nbsp; RSA keys are used for PKCS#1 v1.5
signature and key encrypt.&nbsp; If the key usage extension is not
present, then the certificate is not providing the context to select the
appropriate algorithm within the crypto library.<br><br>
Russ<br>
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Stefan,

Thank you for a very detailed and useful reply.  It provides an excellent
framework for discussing the alternatives, particularly the mapping
between certificate alg ID, protocol alg ID, and crypto library
alg ID, and the potential locations where mapping can be performed.

Assume that cert path validation and crypto libraries are unaffected
by the choice of alternatives: crypto libraries always require the
caller to provide the crypto lib alg ID, and cert path libraries have
no reason to examine subject public key info in EE certs.

For ECDSA-signed cert paths, the cert path library must understand
ECDSA public key info in CA certs.  There are no modes associated with
ECDSA, so it's a wash whether the cert alg OID is a generic EC-public-key
OID or a single OID for ECDSA-public-key.  Extension non-criticality
is meaningless because the path validation library cannot ignore
unrecognized certificate signature keys.  The certificate signature
algorithm ID specifies RSA-with-hash or ECDSA-with-hash, so the same
hash-specific signature OIDs must be defined regardless of which
approach is taken for the public key OID.

Summary: for CA certs, the choice is between a single EC-public-key OID
and a single ECDSA-public-key OID.  An extension provides no advantage
for migration/legacy-interoperability, it just takes up space.

For EE certs, the apps and protocol stacks can use, as you say, an
algorithm ID mapping table with at worst 3 columns: cert ID, protocol
ID, and library ID.  Although you say an extension could provide
mapping aids, albeit complex, I don't believe this is practical at
all.  It is totally unreasonable for a certificate to contain, for
example, PKCS11 ID and cryptlib ID and crypto++ ID and MS CAPI ID
as well as manifest constants for other crypto libraries.

So assuming that the applications and protocol stacks are responsible
for containing mapping tables for OIDs contained in either
subjectPublicKeyInfo or in an extension, the only remaining issue
is combinatorial explosion.  First, how many combinations are
there?  The design team proposal only lists 3 Family OIDs:
ECDSA, ECDH, and ECMQV.  If you throw in modes, that adds
4 more: ECDH-Std, ECDH-Cofactor, ECMQV-Full, and ECMQV-1Pass.
My assumption is that no one would need mode-specific constraints
on certificate public keys, but even if PKIX decided to support
them, that only results in 8 OIDs total.

Second, unlike the flat TLS ciphersuite space and the
corresponding IANA number spaces for S/MIME, IPSec, etc, the
OID space is both hierarchical and unlimited.  It is both natural
and manageable to define a hierarchy of standardized OIDs for:

1 ECC
2   ECDSA
3   ECDH
4      ECDH-Std
5      ECDH-Cofactor
6   ECMQV
7      ECMQV-Full
8      ECMQV-1Pass
.      ECMQV-mode3 (new modes) ...
.   ECxyz (new families) ...

and experimental/private OIDs can be defined in other arcs without
either ambiguity or exhaustion of the OID space.  RFC 4055 specifies
a flat space for OIDs under PKCS-1 (with the highest assigned value
of 14), and it's reasonable to use a flat list for 4 (family) or
8 (family+mode) ECC public key OIDs.  But if a huge number of new
families or modes came up in the future, the OID space could
accommodate them easily.

> In summary,
>
> - The RFC 4055 approach is the simplest to define but is still
> hard to fully implement and we have to trust applications to get
> it right.

Agree that it is simplest to define.

>
> - The extension approach is the hardest to define but is friendlier
> to a gradual implementation and has the best prevention from
> applications getting it wrong.

Disagree that an extension can usefully provide library-specific
mapping constants, or that such information should be contained
in a certificate.

Disagree that a critical/non-critical extension aids gradual
implementation.  In every case where non-critical would be used,
applications gain no benefit from information in extension.  Cert
path module in updated apps might reject cert while path module
in legacy apps would ignore and accept cert, but what benefit is
that over having all apps accept 4055/3279 OID?  What motivation
is there for users to "upgrade" to a version that causes their
application to stop working?  In every case where critical
extension would be used, family OIDs in 4055 approach would give
same result.

Disagree that centralizing decision-making in cert path module
prevents applications from getting it wrong.  What if 1 family
(say ECMQV, or a new family) is supported by cert module but
not by crypto lib or protocol lib?

> - The structured algorithm OID is maybe not the hardest to define
> but the worse alternative in every other aspect.

Agree.


Dave



-----Original Message-----
From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Stefan Santesson
Sent: Monday, January 15, 2007 7:16 PM
To: Russ Housley; ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key Info.


Russ,
I promised to come back on this issue after some more investigations. Sorry for the somewhat long reply.

For my rationales and reasoning I use the following simplified architectural model with some example modules.


                                   ------------
Apps                               |  E-mail  |
                                   ------------
                                        |
                  ---------        -----------    ---------
Protocol stacks   | TLS   |        |  S/MIME |    | IPSEC |
                  ---------        -----------    ---------
                      |                 |             |
                      ---------------------------------
                           |                    |
                  -----------------  -------------------------
Libraries         | Crypto Library|  | cert chain validation |
                  -----------------  -------------------------

This is not the only possible model but it is the one we use for the basis of certificate usage.

The initiative to use a certificate and its key comes from either an application or a protocol stack. For TLS it will come from the protocol stack. For E-mail it may come from the application itself.
The central problem with usage restrictions embedded with the subject public key OID is how to enforce it. When the application or the protocol stack wants to use a certificate it sends it to the validation module to verify and decode the certificate. The information returned contains the algorithm OID and the public key. The Crypto library in this example doesn't understand OIDs, so the app needs to do a translation to an internal AlgorithmID understood by the crypto library. In our environment the app/protocol can use a common OID table to do that. It also needs to map this usage to the algorithm usage negotiated in the protocol stack, e.g. map to a TLS cipher suite. So in worse case the app has 3 Algorithm IDs to map (Crypto library alg ID, Protocol alg ID and Cert alg ID).

Even if the common OID table is used, the cert alg ID may differ from the Crypto library alg ID. For example the former may be and ID for ECC-DSA, while the latter may be ECC-DSA-SHA256.

In addition to this the app or protocol stack needs to make sure this is consistent with any key usage set.

Adding this feature in the RFC4055 style is not impossible but it needs to be individually implemented in each cert using protocol and application. This is not trivial considering that legacy is a big complicating factor. In principle it worries me to put this complex mapping burden on applications. Another threat with this approach is if it leads to a requirement to define combinations of algorithm modes by single OIDs where we may end up with a very large space of OIDs.

Looking at this from an extension approach, we would have the option of critical/non critical. If the extension is critical, the cert validation module will return an unrecognized critical extension error, forcing the application to assume responsibility for honoring this extension or fail. This is a better guarantee for preventing misuse by applications. The extension could potentially contain mapping data that is more suitable for mapping usage towards the different alg IDs provided in different protocols. However this may cause the extension syntax to be overly complex.

The worse scenario of all the choices is the structured Certificates OID (á la X9.62), listing sub OIDs for acceptable algorithmic modes. This would create the most complex and confusing mapping graph for the applications and protocol stacks as it now has a magnitude of OIDs to map to algorithm IDs of the crypto library as well as Alg IDs from the protocol. As such it is the least favorable alternative.

In summary,

- The RFC 4055 approach is the simplest to define but is still hard to fully implement and we have to trust applications to get it right.

- The extension approach is the hardest to define but is friendlier to a gradual implementation and has the best prevention from applications getting it wrong.

- The structured algorithm OID is maybe not the hardest to define but the worse alternative in every other aspect.

My primary choice would be to not enforce algorithmic modes in certificates at all unless there is a cryptographic weakness in the algorithm to protect. As such the protocol usage negotiation should be solved on the protocol level. Then we only need 1 OID for ECC keys (defined in RFC 3279). The RFC 4055 OIDs would still exist for the legitimate reasons above, but we would not need any new OIDs for ECC.

If the WG decides that mode restriction for ECC keys is necessary then we need to choose the least evil alternative and I currently feel unsure of what that would be.


Stefan Santesson
Senior Program Manager
Windows Security, Standards


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Russ Housley [mailto:housley@vigilsec.com]
> Sent: den 15 december 2006 12:13
> To: Stefan Santesson
> Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
> Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key
> Info.
>
> Stefan:
>
> >I respect the need for clarification. In short, when the function of
> >OIDs not only instructions to the key import functions, but also a
> >constraining mechanism for the signing module, this poses an
> >architectural challenge. I will get back with more elaborate
> >information. It seems that this would not only be a problem for us
> >so others may also contribute with more elaborate description of the
> problems.
>
> As you know, I have been insistent since the X9.62 approach was
> revealed that the PKIX WG provide one way to handle this issue, not
> one way for RSA and another way for ECC.  Since RFC 4055 has been
> implemented, I think that a compelling argument is needed to make a
> change.  So far, I have not seen one.  I look forward to a more
> complete description of the implementation concerns with the approach
> used in RFC 4055.
>
> Russ





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From: "Ron Brunner" <ron.brunner@gmx.net>
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To: ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: PoP in Revocation Requests using cmp (rfc2510)
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Hello everybody

1) Is it possible to use the same protection-strategy (shared secret)
for a Initialization and Revocation Request no matter if PoP gets used
or not? (I mean does the protection field gets calculated the same
way?)

2) Is there a rule, that PoP in Revocation Requests are done by using
the protection field (maybe with replacing the protection with a
signature of the header and body of the pki message)? This would mean
that anyone who has the private key can revoke? Which could also be an
interesting approach.

thanks for any input!

Ron



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From: Stefan Santesson <stefans@microsoft.com>
To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>, "ietf-pkix@imc.org" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2007 00:15:40 +0000
Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key Info.
Thread-Topic: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key Info.
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Russ,
I promised to come back on this issue after some more investigations. Sorry for the somewhat long reply.

For my rationales and reasoning I use the following simplified architectural model with some example modules.


                                   ------------
Apps                               |  E-mail  |
                                   ------------
                                        |
                  ---------        -----------    ---------
Protocol stacks   | TLS   |        |  S/MIME |    | IPSEC |
                  ---------        -----------    ---------
                      |                 |             |
                      ---------------------------------
                           |                    |
                  -----------------  -------------------------
Libraries         | Crypto Library|  | cert chain validation |
                  -----------------  -------------------------

This is not the only possible model but it is the one we use for the basis of certificate usage.

The initiative to use a certificate and its key comes from either an application or a protocol stack. For TLS it will come from the protocol stack. For E-mail it may come from the application itself.
The central problem with usage restrictions embedded with the subject public key OID is how to enforce it. When the application or the protocol stack wants to use a certificate it sends it to the validation module to verify and decode the certificate. The information returned contains the algorithm OID and the public key. The Crypto library in this example doesn't understand OIDs, so the app needs to do a translation to an internal AlgorithmID understood by the crypto library. In our environment the app/protocol can use a common OID table to do that. It also needs to map this usage to the algorithm usage negotiated in the protocol stack, e.g. map to a TLS cipher suite. So in worse case the app has 3 Algorithm IDs to map (Crypto library alg ID, Protocol alg ID and Cert alg ID).

Even if the common OID table is used, the cert alg ID may differ from the Crypto library alg ID. For example the former may be and ID for ECC-DSA, while the latter may be ECC-DSA-SHA256.

In addition to this the app or protocol stack needs to make sure this is consistent with any key usage set.

Adding this feature in the RFC4055 style is not impossible but it needs to be individually implemented in each cert using protocol and application. This is not trivial considering that legacy is a big complicating factor. In principle it worries me to put this complex mapping burden on applications. Another threat with this approach is if it leads to a requirement to define combinations of algorithm modes by single OIDs where we may end up with a very large space of OIDs.

Looking at this from an extension approach, we would have the option of critical/non critical. If the extension is critical, the cert validation module will return an unrecognized critical extension error, forcing the application to assume responsibility for honoring this extension or fail. This is a better guarantee for preventing misuse by applications. The extension could potentially contain mapping data that is more suitable for mapping usage towards the different alg IDs provided in different protocols. However this may cause the extension syntax to be overly complex.

The worse scenario of all the choices is the structured Certificates OID (á la X9.62), listing sub OIDs for acceptable algorithmic modes. This would create the most complex and confusing mapping graph for the applications and protocol stacks as it now has a magnitude of OIDs to map to algorithm IDs of the crypto library as well as Alg IDs from the protocol. As such it is the least favorable alternative.

In summary,

- The RFC 4055 approach is the simplest to define but is still hard to fully implement and we have to trust applications to get it right.

- The extension approach is the hardest to define but is friendlier to a gradual implementation and has the best prevention from applications getting it wrong.

- The structured algorithm OID is maybe not the hardest to define but the worse alternative in every other aspect.

My primary choice would be to not enforce algorithmic modes in certificates at all unless there is a cryptographic weakness in the algorithm to protect. As such the protocol usage negotiation should be solved on the protocol level. Then we only need 1 OID for ECC keys (defined in RFC 3279). The RFC 4055 OIDs would still exist for the legitimate reasons above, but we would not need any new OIDs for ECC.

If the WG decides that mode restriction for ECC keys is necessary then we need to choose the least evil alternative and I currently feel unsure of what that would be.


Stefan Santesson
Senior Program Manager
Windows Security, Standards


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Russ Housley [mailto:housley@vigilsec.com]
> Sent: den 15 december 2006 12:13
> To: Stefan Santesson
> Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
> Subject: RE: Straw poll for Algorithm Identifiers in Subject Public Key
> Info.
>
> Stefan:
>
> >I respect the need for clarification. In short, when the function of
> >OIDs not only instructions to the key import functions, but also a
> >constraining mechanism for the signing module, this poses an
> >architectural challenge. I will get back with more elaborate
> >information. It seems that this would not only be a problem for us
> >so others may also contribute with more elaborate description of the
> problems.
>
> As you know, I have been insistent since the X9.62 approach was
> revealed that the PKIX WG provide one way to handle this issue, not
> one way for RSA and another way for ECC.  Since RFC 4055 has been
> implemented, I think that a compelling argument is needed to make a
> change.  So far, I have not seen one.  I look forward to a more
> complete description of the implementation concerns with the approach
> used in RFC 4055.
>
> Russ




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Date: Mon, 15 Jan 2007 17:00:45 -0500
To: Peter Sylvester <Peter.Sylvester@edelweb.fr>, pkix <ietf-pkix@imc.org>
From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
Subject: Re: error in rfc 4043  -- reminder
In-Reply-To: <45ABBB90.1070601@edelweb.fr>
References: <45ABBB90.1070601@edelweb.fr>
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Peter:

You are correct. The RFC contains an error.  This should be reported 
to the RFC Editor for inclusion on the Errata page.

Russ

At 12:36 PM 1/15/2007, Peter Sylvester wrote:

>Two months ago I have send the following to the list and did not 
>receive any answer;
>
>In RFC 4043 there seems to be a bug.
>The spec uses ATTRIBUTE instead of OTHER-NAME. i.e. shouldn't this be:
>
>permanentIdentifier OTHER-NAME ::= {PermanentIdentifier IDENTIFIED 
>BY id-on-permanentIdentifier}
>
>and OTHER-NAME imported
>
>
>At lea st one of the authors of the rfc seems to have read the 
>message as far as I know.
>regards
>peter



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--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts 
directories.
This draft is a work item of the Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) Working Group of the IETF.

	Title		: Server-based Certificate Validation Protocol (SCVP)
	Author(s)	: A. Malpani, et al.
	Filename	: draft-ietf-pkix-scvp-31.txt
	Pages		: 86
	Date		: 2007-1-15
	
SCVP allows a client to delegate certificate path construction and
   certificate path validation to a server.  The path construction or
   validation (e.g., making sure that none of the certificates in the
   path are revoked) is performed according to a validation policy,
   which contains one or more trust anchors.  It allows simplification
   of client implementations and use of a set of predefined validation
   policies.

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Two months ago I have send the following to the list and did not receive 
any answer;

In RFC 4043 there seems to be a bug.
The spec uses ATTRIBUTE instead of OTHER-NAME. i.e. shouldn't this be:

permanentIdentifier OTHER-NAME ::= {PermanentIdentifier IDENTIFIED BY 
id-on-permanentIdentifier}

and OTHER-NAME imported


At lea st one of the authors of the rfc seems to have read the message 
as far as I know.
regards
peter

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Please have a look at the attached document.
Thank you


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Message-ID: <4234.84.240.23.130.1168824711.squirrel@mail.ssc.lt>
Date: Mon, 15 Jan 2007 03:31:51 +0200 (EET)
Subject: Re: Sample end entity certificate
From: "Moudrick M. Dadashov" <md@e-net.lt>
To: "Russ Housley" <housley@vigilsec.com>
Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
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Russ,

but RFC 2119 also does say:

"OPTIONAL", mean that an item is truly optional. One vendor may choose to
include the item because a particular marketplace requires it or because
the vendor feels that it enhances the product while another vendor may
omit the same item (section 5).

and RFC 3280 also say both the "key usage" and "certificate policies"
extensions are OPTIONAL

Don't you think this is some how confusing?

Thanks,
M.D.

> RFC 3280 does say:
>
>     Conforming CAs MUST support key identifiers (sections 4.2.1.1 and
>     4.2.1.2), basic constraints (section 4.2.1.10), key usage (section
>     4.2.1.3), and certificate policies (section 4.2.1.5) extensions.
>
> It does not seem to require that these be included in every
> certificate that is issued, but looking further into these sections,
> I find a MUST statement that is not supported by this certificate:
>
>  From section 4.2.1.1  (Authority Key Identifier):
>
>     The keyIdentifier field of the authorityKeyIdentifier extension MUST
>     be included in all certificates generated by conforming CAs to
>     facilitate certification path construction.
>
> I would encourage the CA to include key usage and certificate
> policies extensions.
>
> Russ
>
> At 08:05 PM 1/9/2007, Moudrick M. Dadashov wrote:
>>Hello,
>>
>>I'm attaching a sample end entity cetrificate that the issuing CA claims
>>to be RFC 3280 compliant.
>>
>>The certificate at least MUST provide document signing functionality.
>>
>>Some of us say it's technically correct but has no legal purposes defined
>>and therefore can't be used for test purposes only, while others say it's
>>a universial one and can be used for all purposes.
>>
>>Any comments are highly appreciated.
>>
>>Thank you for your time,
>>M.D.
>
>




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Date: Fri, 12 Jan 2007 15:06:49 -0800
To: <ietf-pkix@imc.org>
From: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
Subject: RE: draft-ietf-pkix-srvsan-00
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Greetings again. This document has just gone through IESG review and 
has garnered a bunch of DISCUSS comments. Some of them relate to the 
way that this document handles IDNs.

Earlier on this list, I said:

At 9:07 PM -0700 9/29/05, Paul Hoffman wrote:
>If you restrict the SRV labels we are interested in to character 
>strings, that is a reasonable choice, but so is the on-the-wire 
>encoding, namely punycode. Using UTF-8 makes the string more 
>readable and editable in cert handling, using punycode means no 
>conversion between DNS queries and responses and the cert. Both have 
>merits and problems.

While what I said was true, it was far from complete. For that I 
apologize. I should have added "but this is all moot because these 
domain names should be like all other domain names in the 
certificate, and 3280bis tell us exactly how to do that in section 
7.2".

The use of IDNs in this document should, of course, line up with 
3280bis; it does not.

draft-ietf-pkix-srvsan-04.txt:

    Example: The "mail" service at na<LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH
    DIAERESIS>ve.net (an IDN, which becomes xn--nave-6pa.net when encoded
    as an IDNA) would use the following 15-character SRVName value:

        _mail.na<LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH DIAERESIS>ve.net

    Its 16-byte UTF-8 encoding is (in hex):

        5F 6D 61 69 6C 2E 6E 61 C3 AF 76 65 2E 6E 65 74

rfc3280bis, section 7.2:
    To accommodate
    internationalized domain names in the current structure, conforming
    implementations MUST convert internationalized domain names to the
    ASCII Compatible Encoding (ACE) format as specified in section 4 of
    RFC 3490 before storage in the dNSName field.

In short, srvsan says "put the DNS name in the certificate in UTF-8", 
while rfc3280bis says "put it in ASCII as Punycode". As some IESG 
members pointed out, that needs to be fixed.

--Paul Hoffman, Director
--VPN Consortium



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From: "stunning" <it@franklin524toastmasters.com>
To: ietf-pkix-archive@imc.org
Subject: up but cant afford
Date: 	Fri, 12 Jan 2007 09:28:24 +0100
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Cc: pkix <ietf-pkix@imc.org>
From: Alan Sill <Alan.Sill@ttu.edu>
Subject: Re: Sample end entity certificate
Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2007 18:28:50 -0600
To: md@e-net.lt
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The document at the following link may be useful.  This is in fact  
the "Grid Certificate Profile" one mentioned in a previous thread,  
intended to give guidance on the issuance of end-entity host and  
personal certificates for grid use.  A correspondent of mine got it  
confused with an IETF document and sent a question based on it, which  
I inadvertently forwarded to this list, apologies.  It is not in fact  
an IETF document, but contains advice and "best practices" derived  
from the X.509-based grid community for the extensions, attributes  
and naming practices derived from several years from several  
organizations of issuing grid certificates.  I hope it is helpful as  
a reference.

Comments from the pkix list would probably be useful on this document.

Note it says regarding emailAddress, for example,

"The attribute type emailAddress SHOULD NOT be used in DNs. It has  
been obsoleted in RFC 3280, in favour of having an rfc822EmailAddress  
in the subjectAlternativeName X.509v3 extension, and many recent mail  
clients can deal with subjectAlternativeName.[1]

[1] String representation issues with the emailAddress attribute in  
DNs are caused by OpenSSL, where versions up to and including 0.9.6  
used the non-standard string representation "Email" for this  
attribute type, and later versions use “emailAddress”, thus resulting  
in different string representations for the same DN and leading to  
problems in subsequent authorisation decisions."

Other advice in this document is similarly based on real-world  
experience from various parties.  In almost all cases, arguments  
could be made on subtleties, but the document does try to place its  
statements in context where possible.  My hope in forwarding it is  
for useful comment, not extensive debate.

Hope this helps.


Document Name: Grid Certificate Profile

Document ID: doc13742

Description: This document describes the possibilities and  
limitations for attributes and extensions in X.509 certificates that  
are usable by grid infrastructures.

http://forge.gridforum.org/sf/go/doc13742?nav=1



On Jan 9, 2007, at 7:05 PM, Moudrick M. Dadashov wrote:

> Hello,
>
> I'm attaching a sample end entity cetrificate that the issuing CA  
> claims
> to be RFC 3280 compliant.
>
> The certificate at least MUST provide document signing functionality.
>
> Some of us say it's technically correct but has no legal purposes  
> defined
> and therefore can't be used for test purposes only, while others  
> say it's
> a universial one and can be used for all purposes.
>
> Any comments are highly appreciated.
>
> Thank you for your time,
> M.D.
> <ivpk.cer>

Alan Sill, Ph.D
TIGRE Senior Scientist, High Performance Computing Center
Adjunct Professor of Physics
TTU

====================================================================
:  Alan Sill, Texas Tech University  Office: Admin 233, MS 4-1167  :
:  e-mail: Alan.Sill@ttu.edu   ph. 806-742-4350  fax 806-742-4358  :
====================================================================





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Subject: RE: Sample end entity certificate - issuer name
Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2007 09:12:00 +1100
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  CN=IVPK prie LRV,C=LT,EMAILADDRESS=info@ivpk.lt
The issuer name (above) is poorly chosen. This hierarchical name starts (at the top of the hierarchy) with an email address. The country is a child of the email address.

The email address should be at the other end:
  EMAILADDRESS=info@ivpk.lt,CN=IVPK prie LRV,C=LT

Or better still, in the same RDN as the common name (note the plus sign, instead of a comma, separating the CN and EMAILADDRESS components):
  CN=IVPK prie LRV+EMAILADDRESS=info@ivpk.lt,C=LT

Or best of all, the email address should be in the issuerAlt.Name extension:
  CN=IVPK prie LRV,C=LT
And
  â€¦{ extnId id-ce-subjectAltName,
    extnValue GeneralNames:{ rfc822Name:" info@ivpk.lt" } }


>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org
>> [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Moudrick
>> M. Dadashov
>> Sent: Tuesday, January 09, 2007 8:06 PM
>> To: ietf-pkix@imc.org
>> Subject: Sample end entity certificate
>>
>> Hello,
>>
>> I'm attaching a sample end entity cetrificate that the
>> issuing CA claims to be RFC 3280 compliant.
>>
>> The certificate at least MUST provide document signing functionality.
>>
>> Some of us say it's technically correct but has no legal
>> purposes defined and therefore can't be used for test
>> purposes only, while others say it's a universial one and can
>> be used for all purposes.
>>
>> Any comments are highly appreciated.
>>
>> Thank you for your time,
>> M.D.
>>
>



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From: "Chest Pulse" <Omen@glass-sculpture.com>
To: ietf-pkix-archive@imc.org
Subject: regulation Oxford University
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Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2007 16:50:07 +0200 (EET)
Subject: RE: Sample end entity certificate
From: "Moudrick M. Dadashov" <md@e-net.lt>
To: "Scott Shorter" <sshorter@orionsec.com>
Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
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Thank you. Attached a renamed copy, as you suggested.

Best Regards,

M.D.


> Hi,
>
> Folks who use Outlook will have the certificate stripped, you might want
> to zip it before attaching it, or change the filename to ivpk.ce_
>
> Regards,
> Scott
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org
>> [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Moudrick
>> M. Dadashov
>> Sent: Tuesday, January 09, 2007 8:06 PM
>> To: ietf-pkix@imc.org
>> Subject: Sample end entity certificate
>>
>> Hello,
>>
>> I'm attaching a sample end entity cetrificate that the
>> issuing CA claims to be RFC 3280 compliant.
>>
>> The certificate at least MUST provide document signing functionality.
>>
>> Some of us say it's technically correct but has no legal
>> purposes defined and therefore can't be used for test
>> purposes only, while others say it's a universial one and can
>> be used for all purposes.
>>
>> Any comments are highly appreciated.
>>
>> Thank you for your time,
>> M.D.
>>
>

------=_20070110165007_65849
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------=_20070110165007_65849--




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To: ietf-pkix-archive@imc.org
Subject: Sports certain age forbook
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Subject: RE: Sample end entity certificate
Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2007 06:02:40 -0800
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From: "Scott Shorter" <sshorter@orionsec.com>
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Hi,

Folks who use Outlook will have the certificate stripped, you might want
to zip it before attaching it, or change the filename to ivpk.ce_

Regards,
Scott 

> -----Original Message-----
> From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org 
> [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Moudrick 
> M. Dadashov
> Sent: Tuesday, January 09, 2007 8:06 PM
> To: ietf-pkix@imc.org
> Subject: Sample end entity certificate
> 
> Hello,
> 
> I'm attaching a sample end entity cetrificate that the 
> issuing CA claims to be RFC 3280 compliant.
> 
> The certificate at least MUST provide document signing functionality.
> 
> Some of us say it's technically correct but has no legal 
> purposes defined and therefore can't be used for test 
> purposes only, while others say it's a universial one and can 
> be used for all purposes.
> 
> Any comments are highly appreciated.
> 
> Thank you for your time,
> M.D.
> 



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From: "LUIZ CARLOS DO LAGO" <llago@perto.com.br>
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Subject: ASN1C - Compiler
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Hello All,

    Anybody works with asn1c compiler with visual studio 6.0 ??

Best Regards,

Luiz Lago.



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------=_NextPart_000_0003_01C734BC.9D6D7200--



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Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2007 05:32:36 -0500
To: md@e-net.lt, ietf-pkix@imc.org
From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
Subject: Re: Sample end entity certificate
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RFC 3280 does say:

    Conforming CAs MUST support key identifiers (sections 4.2.1.1 and
    4.2.1.2), basic constraints (section 4.2.1.10), key usage (section
    4.2.1.3), and certificate policies (section 4.2.1.5) extensions.

It does not seem to require that these be included in every 
certificate that is issued, but looking further into these sections, 
I find a MUST statement that is not supported by this certificate:

 From section 4.2.1.1  (Authority Key Identifier):

    The keyIdentifier field of the authorityKeyIdentifier extension MUST
    be included in all certificates generated by conforming CAs to
    facilitate certification path construction.

I would encourage the CA to include key usage and certificate 
policies extensions.

Russ

At 08:05 PM 1/9/2007, Moudrick M. Dadashov wrote:
>Hello,
>
>I'm attaching a sample end entity cetrificate that the issuing CA claims
>to be RFC 3280 compliant.
>
>The certificate at least MUST provide document signing functionality.
>
>Some of us say it's technically correct but has no legal purposes defined
>and therefore can't be used for test purposes only, while others say it's
>a universial one and can be used for all purposes.
>
>Any comments are highly appreciated.
>
>Thank you for your time,
>M.D.



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Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2007 09:36:07 +0100
From: "Denis Pinkas" <denis.pinkas@bull.net>
To: "ietf-pkix@imc.org" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>
Subject: Re: Certificates in CRL:s
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Steve,

On december 20, Stefan posted the following:

>Since last IETF a new draft was posted:
>http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-santesson-pkix-vccrl-00.txt

>There is a request to add this draft to the PKIX work and I would encourage to start the discussion about this decision in this thread.

>From the discussion that happened on the list, there was no support to progress this draft as proposed, 
but many oppositions. Since no change has been proposed by Stefan to change the content of this draft, 
I believe that you should now make a conclusion on this thread.

Denis





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Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2007 03:05:45 +0200 (EET)
Subject: Sample end entity certificate
From: "Moudrick M. Dadashov" <md@e-net.lt>
To: ietf-pkix@imc.org
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------=_20070110030545_68268
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

Hello,

I'm attaching a sample end entity cetrificate that the issuing CA claims
to be RFC 3280 compliant.

The certificate at least MUST provide document signing functionality.

Some of us say it's technically correct but has no legal purposes defined
and therefore can't be used for test purposes only, while others say it's
a universial one and can be used for all purposes.

Any comments are highly appreciated.

Thank you for your time,
M.D.
------=_20070110030545_68268
Content-Type: application/x-x509-ca-cert; name="ivpk.cer"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="ivpk.cer"

MIIEEjCCAfqgAwIBAgIQUPkTZq8456zOjMj5+60nOzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADBCMRswGQYJKoZI
hvcNAQkBFgxpbmZvQGl2cGsubHQxCzAJBgNVBAYTAkxUMRYwFAYDVQQDEw1JVlBLIHByaWUgTFJW
MB4XDTA2MTEyMDEzNTg0OVoXDTEwMTIyODIwNTg0OVowcTELMAkGA1UEBhMCTFQxPjA8BgNVBAoM
NUluZm9ybWFjaW7El3MgdmlzdW9tZW7El3MgcGzEl3Ryb3Mga29taXRldGFzIHByaWUgTFJWMSIw
IAYDVQQDDBlFLiBwYXJhxaFvIG1va3ltbyBzaXN0ZW1hMIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCB
iQKBgQC/9aKvA3axPx+KpwyzPTRxjQVRp70MSG0xHGcmFXBaLhV2NvPtIX5goWO8Y3aP1U8lrh9A
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aHhIru07/yqlMDsOBvwX1GG+4wIDAQABo1kwVzBVBgNVHR8ETjBMMEqgSKBGpEQwQjEbMBkGCSqG
SIb3DQEJARYMaW5mb0BpdnBrLmx0MQswCQYDVQQGEwJMVDEWMBQGA1UEAxMNSVZQSyBwcmllIExS
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iTCiDyeubSdH/rF9cyJ7hbP/7f4=
------=_20070110030545_68268--




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Date: Tue, 09 Jan 2007 16:43:48 -0500
To: "LUIZ CARLOS DO LAGO" <llago@perto.com.br>, ietf-pkix@imc.org
From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
Subject: Re: Backward-compatibility among certificates
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Luiz:

RFC 2459, published in 1999, required support for v3 
certificates.  At this point, any application that cannot handle a v3 
certificate is stale.

Russ

At 02:18 PM 1/9/2007, LUIZ CARLOS DO LAGO wrote:

>Good Afternoon,
>
>After create a new extension, does exist some kind of
>backward-compatibility among certificates of
>version 3 e earliers ?
>
>If I have a certificate of version 3 appended with some extensions, and
>I have legacy peers that know only to encode/decode certificates of
>versions 1 or 2, do will that peers able to decode my certificate of
>version 3 ignoring the extensions either something like that ?
>
>Best Regards,
>
>Luiz Lago



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Denis,

I think we view completely different PKI environments.
I'm not primary focusing on public PKI solutions.

I'm primary focused on the environments that makes up a large majority of a=
ll PKI deployments, the enterprise environment which might be everything fr=
om deployment of wireless security, IPsec, Remote access VPNs, Network Heal=
th certificates, Terminal Server security over TLS, secure e-mail, PKINIT K=
erberos, etc.

In many such corporate environment it is possible to determine if embedded =
certificates are beneficial to the system or not.

I simply do not believe in adding another choice to the client to choose CR=
L with or without certificate. Thus such option is not specified.


Stefan Santesson
Senior Program Manager
Windows Security, Standards

From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] On=
 Behalf Of Denis Pinkas
Sent: den 5 januari 2007 06:28
To: ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: Re: Certificates in CRLs

________________________________
We are only talking about an extra 16K at most. The download time is the ab=
solute most cases is negligible.
For those cases where this solution makes sense, the network bandwidth issu=
e is not a problem.
For the cases where this would be an issue, this solution would not be used=
.
Stefan,
What you say just above is untrue. CAs are issuing CRLs for all kind of RPs=
 and
would be unable to handle cases where some RPs have a large network bandwit=
h
and some others don't.
Your proposed individual draft does not propose a solution where a CA would=
 be able to issue
simultaneously two kinds of CRLs: "slim", as today, and "fat", as you are p=
roposing for tomorrow.
Denis

On the contrary, in some networks and scenarios, this will improve performa=
nce. Especially in high latency networks with PKI based peer-peer authentic=
ation where an extra retrieval cost way more performance than the expanded =
CRL size.

Also, many clients are configured to pre-fetch CRL:s before they are used, =
using idle time on the network at no extra cost.


Stefan Santesson
Senior Program Manager
Windows Security, Standards

From: Sharon Boeyen [mailto:sharon.boeyen@entrust.com]
Sent: den 4 januari 2007 17:36
To: Stefan Santesson; Russ Housley
Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs


I still think wasted bandwidth is also an issue. Forcing the download of 'f=
at' CRLs on clients when, in many cases, those clients already have the cer=
tificates locally that caused the bloating of the CRL, is an unnecessary wa=
ste.

-----Original Message-----
From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] On=
 Behalf Of Stefan Santesson
Sent: Wednesday, January 03, 2007 9:58 AM
To: Russ Housley
Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs


Russ,

In theory, the CA can put different pointers to different CRLs in each cert=
ificate if some certificates are prime targets for frequent checking. But I=
 don't think that is a common scenario.

My point is that in order to allow free selection of CRLs, you would have t=
o add capability to the CDP extension rather than to the CRL. I don't think=
 such effort is worth the trouble.

I'm convinced that including certs in a CRL will only be made in situations=
 where it in the sum of all, helps increase efficiency and where the extra =
bandwidth consumed is not an issue.

I read the critique of this idea as not really be a bandwidth issue, but th=
at some implementers simply don't want to be faced with the requirement to =
implement this feature. But I don't see that they have to. A CRL with certs=
 in a non-critical extension should work just as well in current clients as=
 any current CRL without certs. The extension can simply be ignored.

This is not a necessary feature, but a practical one offering performance i=
mprovements in some environments at no loss of interoperability.


Stefan Santesson
Senior Program Manager
Windows Security, Standards


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Russ Housley [mailto:housley@vigilsec.com]
> Sent: den 21 december 2006 16:19
> To: Stefan Santesson
> Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
> Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs
>
> Stefan:
>
> If the CA chooses to offer both, how can the RP determine which one it
> will get?  Does the CA post them in different LDAP attributes?
>
> Russ
>
> At 08:00 AM 12/21/2006, Stefan Santesson wrote:
>
> >As with anything else, the relying party can get what the CA offers.
> >
> >I don't think there is any realistic scenario where the CA has a
> >reason to offer CRLs both with and without certificates. To offer
> >this capability to RP is however not a matter for this protocol. It
> >would be a matter for the CRL referencing model, i.e. CDP and/or
> >directory schema.
> >
> >I don't think that extra complexity however is very useful.
> >
> >Stefan Santesson
> >Senior Program Manager
> >Windows Security, Standards
> >
> >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-
> > > pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Denis Pinkas
> > > Sent: den 20 december 2006 17:05
> > > To: ietf-pkix@imc.org
> > > Subject: Re: Certificates in CRLs
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > It is necessary to provide relying parties with the choice to get
> > > :
> > >
> > >   - CRLs "as usual", or
> > >   - CRLs that carry that new extension.
> > >
> > > The current proposal does not allow for it.
> > >
> > > Until the draft is changed, I am against the addition of this work
> item
> > > to the program of the PKIX WG.
> > >
> > > Denis
> > >
> > >
> ______________________________________________________________________
> _
> > > _______
> > >
> > > >Since last IETF a new draft was posted:
> > > >http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-santesson-pkix-vccrl-
> 00.txt
> > > >
> > > >There is a request to add this draft to the PKIX work and I would
> > > encourage to start the discussion about this decision in this
> thread.
> > > >
> > > >Stefan Santesson
> > > >Senior Program Manager
> > > >Windows Security, Standards
> > >
> > >
> > >

________________________________

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<p class=3DMsoNormal><a name=3D"_MailEndCompose"><span style=3D'font-size:1=
1.0pt;
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>Denis,<o:p></o:p></span><=
/a></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",=
"sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>I think we view completely different PKI environments.<o:p><=
/o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>I&#8217;m not primary focusing on public PKI solutions.<o:p>=
</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>I&#8217;m primary focused on the environments that makes up =
a
large majority of all PKI deployments, the enterprise environment which mig=
ht
be everything from deployment of wireless security, IPsec, Remote access VP=
Ns,
Network Health certificates, Terminal Server security over TLS, secure e-ma=
il,
PKINIT Kerberos, etc.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>In many such corporate environment it is possible to determi=
ne
if embedded certificates are beneficial to the system or not.<o:p></o:p></s=
pan></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>I simply do not believe in adding another choice to the clie=
nt
to choose CRL with or without certificate. Thus such option is not specifie=
d.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-f=
amily:
"Arial","sans-serif";color:maroon'>Stefan Santesson</span></b><span lang=3D=
EN-GB
style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:#400040'>Senior Program Manager</span><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'col=
or:navy'><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-f=
amily:
"Arial","sans-serif";color:#400040'>Windows Security, Standards</span></b><=
span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p></o:p></span></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0cm 0cm 0cm =
4.0pt'>

<div>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0cm =
0cm 0cm'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-f=
amily:
"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span></b><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-siz=
e:10.0pt;
font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org
[mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] <b>On Behalf Of </b>Denis Pinkas<br>
<b>Sent:</b> den 5 januari 2007 06:28<br>
<b>To:</b> ietf-pkix@imc.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: Certificates in CRLs<o:p></o:p></span></p>

</div>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<div class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dcenter style=3D'text-align:center'>

<hr size=3D2 width=3D"100%" align=3Dcenter>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto'><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>We are only talking about an extra 16K at most. The download
time is the absolute most cases is negligible. </span><o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto'><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>For those cases where this solution makes sense, the network
bandwidth issue is not a problem.</span><o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto'><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>For the cases where this would be an issue, this solution wo=
uld
not be used.</span><o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto'><strong><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>Stefan,</span></strong><o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto'><strong><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>What you say just above is untrue.&nbsp;CAs are issuing CRLs=
 for
all kind of RPs and </span></strong><b><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-siz=
e:11.0pt;
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><br>
<strong><span style=3D'font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>would be unable =
to
handle cases where some RPs have a large network bandwith </span></strong><=
br>
<strong><span style=3D'font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>and some others =
don't.</span></strong></span></b><o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto'><strong><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>Your proposed individual draft does not propose a solution w=
here
a CA would be able to issue </span></strong><b><span lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'=
><br>
<strong><span style=3D'font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>simultaneously t=
wo
kinds of CRLs: &quot;slim&quot;, as today, and &quot;fat&quot;, as you are
proposing for tomorrow.</span></strong></span></b><o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto'><strong><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>Denis</span></strong><o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto'><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>On the contrary, in some networks and scenarios, this will
improve performance. Especially in high latency networks with PKI based
peer-peer authentication where an extra retrieval cost way more performance
than the expanded CRL size.</span><o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto'><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto'><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>Also, many clients are configured to pre-fetch CRL:s before =
they
are used, using idle time on the network at no extra cost.</span><o:p></o:p=
></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto'><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto'><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto'><b><span
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";col=
or:maroon'>Stefan
Santesson</span></b><o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto'><span
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";col=
or:#400040'>Senior
Program Manager</span><o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto'><b><span
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";col=
or:#400040'>Windows
Security, Standards</span></b><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto'><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0cm 0cm 0cm =
4.0pt'>

<div>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0cm =
0cm 0cm'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto'><b><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>F=
rom:</span></b><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> =
Sharon
Boeyen [mailto:sharon.boeyen@entrust.com] <br>
<b>Sent:</b> den 4 januari 2007 17:36<br>
<b>To:</b> Stefan Santesson; Russ Housley<br>
<b>Cc:</b> ietf-pkix@imc.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> RE: Certificates in CRLs</span><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>

<p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>I still think wasted bandwidth is also =
an issue.
Forcing the download of 'fat' CRLs on clients when, in many cases, those
clients already have the certificates locally that caused the bloating of t=
he
CRL, is an unnecessary waste.</span><o:p></o:p></p>

<p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>-----Original Message-----</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [<a
href=3D"mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org">mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.im=
c.org</a>]
On Behalf Of Stefan Santesson</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Sent: Wednesday, January 03, 2007 9:58 AM<=
/span>
<br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>To: Russ Housley</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs</span> <=
o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;margin-bottom:12.0pt'=
>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>

<p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Russ,</span> <o:p></o:p></p>

<p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>In theory, the CA can put different poi=
nters
to different CRLs in each certificate if some certificates are prime target=
s
for frequent checking. But I don't think that is a common scenario.</span><=
o:p></o:p></p>

<p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>My point is that in order to allow free
selection of CRLs, you would have to add capability to the CDP extension ra=
ther
than to the CRL. I don't think such effort is worth the trouble.</span><o:p=
></o:p></p>

<p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>I'm convinced that including certs in a=
 CRL
will only be made in situations where it in the sum of all, helps increase
efficiency and where the extra bandwidth consumed is not an issue.</span><o=
:p></o:p></p>

<p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>I read the critique of this idea as not
really be a bandwidth issue, but that some implementers simply don't want t=
o be
faced with the requirement to implement this feature. But I don't see that =
they
have to. A CRL with certs in a non-critical extension should work just as w=
ell
in current clients as any current CRL without certs. The extension can simp=
ly
be ignored.</span><o:p></o:p></p>

<p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>This is not a necessary feature, but a
practical one offering performance improvements in some environments at no =
loss
of interoperability.</span><o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>

<p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Stefan Santesson</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Senior Program Manager</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Windows Security, Standards</span> <o:p></=
o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>

<p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; -----Original Message-----</span> =
<br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; From: Russ Housley [<a
href=3D"mailto:housley@vigilsec.com">mailto:housley@vigilsec.com</a>]</span=
> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; Sent: den 21 december 2006 16:19</spa=
n> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; To: Stefan Santesson</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs</sp=
an> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; Stefan:</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; If the CA chooses to offer both, how =
can
the RP determine which one it </span><br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; will get?&nbsp; Does the CA post them=
 in
different LDAP attributes?</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; Russ</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; At 08:00 AM 12/21/2006, Stefan Santes=
son
wrote:</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;As with anything else, the relyin=
g
party can get what the CA offers.</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;I don't think there is any realis=
tic
scenario where the CA has a </span><br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;reason to offer CRLs both with an=
d
without certificates. To offer </span><br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;this capability to RP is however =
not a
matter for this protocol. It </span><br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;would be a matter for the CRL
referencing model, i.e. CDP and/or </span><br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;directory schema.</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;I don't think that extra complexi=
ty
however is very useful.</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;Stefan Santesson</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;Senior Program Manager</span> <br=
>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;Windows Security, Standards</span=
> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; -----Original Message-----<=
/span>
<br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; From:
owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [<a href=3D"mailto:owner-ietf-">mailto:owner-i=
etf-</a>
</span><br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behal=
f Of
Denis Pinkas</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; Sent: den 20 december 2006 =
17:05</span>
<br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; To: ietf-pkix@imc.org</span=
> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; Subject: Re: Certificates i=
n CRLs</span>
<br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; It is necessary to provide
relying parties with the choice to get </span><br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; :</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; - CRLs &quot;as
usual&quot;, or</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; - CRLs that car=
ry
that new extension.</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; The current proposal does n=
ot
allow for it.</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; Until the draft is changed,=
 I am
against the addition of this work</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; item</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; to the program of the PKIX =
WG.</span>
<br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; Denis</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt;
______________________________________________________________________</spa=
n> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; _</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; _______</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;Since last IETF a new d=
raft
was posted:</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;<a
href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-santesson-pkix-vccrl-"
target=3D"_blank">http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-santesson-pkix-=
vccrl-</a></span>
<br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; 00.txt</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;There is a request to a=
dd
this draft to the PKIX work and I would</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; encourage to start the disc=
ussion
about this decision in this</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; thread.</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;Stefan Santesson</span>=
 <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;Senior Program Manager<=
/span>
<br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;Windows Security, Stand=
ards</span>
<br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

</div>

<div class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dcenter style=3D'text-align:center'>

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From: Stefan Santesson <stefans@microsoft.com>
To: Sharon Boeyen <sharon.boeyen@entrust.com>, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
CC: "ietf-pkix@imc.org" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>
Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2007 21:35:08 +0000
Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs
Thread-Topic: Certificates in CRLs
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Sharon,

I'm not totally opposed to the idea of a package with a CRL and a certifica=
te. But the solution is not as attractive to me.

The main reason is that the impact to the system design is greater.
If I summarize largely from your own mail, this includes;


1)      Expanded distribution configuration options in the CA.

2)      Possible enhancement to the CDP and/or AIA extension

3)      A new choice for the client (Which CRL object should I download)

4)      A new decoding procedure for CRL data (for bundled data)

5)      A new directory schema

I don't think the benefit gained here is substantial enough to defend all t=
hese modifications to the system and specifications.

The embedded certificate on the other hand only involves

1)      A new option in the CA to enable cert inclusion

2)      An optional component in clients to extract certificates from CRLs

Except from this the infrastructure is unaffected.

To the question what to do with the certificates. I view this is a matter o=
f local policy. Any use of these certificates is optional. Looking this fro=
m our perspective, the certificates would simply be imported to the interna=
l table of certificates from which the client attempts to construct a valid=
 path. If the imported certificates are being used or not depends on the lo=
cal optimization logic if alternative paths exist.




Stefan Santesson
Senior Program Manager
Windows Security, Standards

From: Sharon Boeyen [mailto:sharon.boeyen@entrust.com]
Sent: den 5 januari 2007 06:09
To: Stefan Santesson; Sharon Boeyen; Russ Housley
Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs

Stefan I really don't think you can state where this will or will not be us=
ed in the future. Naturally you know where you want to use it, but software=
 only enables a facility and the customer decides when and how to use it.

Whether this scheme could possibly be useful in some cases is not my point.=
 My point is that current deployments seem to be working fine without it an=
d I don't want to see those interfered with just because some CA they may h=
ave cross certified with decided to put certificates inside their CRLS. Bac=
k to Denis' point - there is no need to impose this in the way you've propo=
sed.

Earlier I (and others including Dave Kemp) suggested a "package" that inclu=
des the CRL, and the certificate in question as an 'extra' that a CA could =
publish in addition to a regular CRL. That "package could be published in a=
 separate directory attribute and/or an HTTP accessible file. It could be p=
ointed to from within the certificate just as the CRL currently is. That co=
uld be done either by extending the CRLDP or adding a new pointer extension=
 or adding a new method to the AIA extension. That type of approach gives y=
ou what you want but does not in any way interfere with clients who do not =
want and do not need to retrieve that bloated CRL.

Also, you haven't addressed the question about what happens when more than =
one certificate is needed. If a CRL includes more than one certificate (e.g=
. the CRL issuer did one or more key rollovers then CRL gets bloated a lot =
bigger than you suggested. I don't want to debate how often a key gets roll=
ed over either however I have definitely seen instances in real world deplo=
yments where a key has been rolled very often in a very short period of tim=
e (regardless of whether the reason for rolling it was a good one or not - =
it has happened). Also, regardless of the size of the "bloat" I'm saying th=
at in most cases the clients will already have the certificates in question=
 and this bloat will cause them extra processing in managing their certific=
ate caches etc unnecessarily. The client should have a choice as to whether=
 to download the certificate or not.

I don't understand why you're so opposed to the "package" solution.

Cheers,
Sharon
-----Original Message-----
From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:stefans@microsoft.com]
Sent: Friday, January 05, 2007 8:01 AM
To: Sharon Boeyen; Russ Housley
Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs
We are only talking about an extra 16K at most. The download time is the ab=
solute most cases is negligible.
For those cases where this solution makes sense, the network bandwidth issu=
e is not a problem.

For the cases where this would be an issue, this solution would not be used=
.

On the contrary, in some networks and scenarios, this will improve performa=
nce. Especially in high latency networks with PKI based peer-peer authentic=
ation where an extra retrieval cost way more performance than the expanded =
CRL size.

Also, many clients are configured to pre-fetch CRL:s before they are used, =
using idle time on the network at no extra cost.


Stefan Santesson
Senior Program Manager
Windows Security, Standards

From: Sharon Boeyen [mailto:sharon.boeyen@entrust.com]
Sent: den 4 januari 2007 17:36
To: Stefan Santesson; Russ Housley
Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs


I still think wasted bandwidth is also an issue. Forcing the download of 'f=
at' CRLs on clients when, in many cases, those clients already have the cer=
tificates locally that caused the bloating of the CRL, is an unnecessary wa=
ste.

-----Original Message-----
From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] On=
 Behalf Of Stefan Santesson
Sent: Wednesday, January 03, 2007 9:58 AM
To: Russ Housley
Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs


Russ,

In theory, the CA can put different pointers to different CRLs in each cert=
ificate if some certificates are prime targets for frequent checking. But I=
 don't think that is a common scenario.

My point is that in order to allow free selection of CRLs, you would have t=
o add capability to the CDP extension rather than to the CRL. I don't think=
 such effort is worth the trouble.

I'm convinced that including certs in a CRL will only be made in situations=
 where it in the sum of all, helps increase efficiency and where the extra =
bandwidth consumed is not an issue.

I read the critique of this idea as not really be a bandwidth issue, but th=
at some implementers simply don't want to be faced with the requirement to =
implement this feature. But I don't see that they have to. A CRL with certs=
 in a non-critical extension should work just as well in current clients as=
 any current CRL without certs. The extension can simply be ignored.

This is not a necessary feature, but a practical one offering performance i=
mprovements in some environments at no loss of interoperability.


Stefan Santesson
Senior Program Manager
Windows Security, Standards


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Russ Housley [mailto:housley@vigilsec.com]
> Sent: den 21 december 2006 16:19
> To: Stefan Santesson
> Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
> Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs
>
> Stefan:
>
> If the CA chooses to offer both, how can the RP determine which one it
> will get?  Does the CA post them in different LDAP attributes?
>
> Russ
>
> At 08:00 AM 12/21/2006, Stefan Santesson wrote:
>
> >As with anything else, the relying party can get what the CA offers.
> >
> >I don't think there is any realistic scenario where the CA has a
> >reason to offer CRLs both with and without certificates. To offer
> >this capability to RP is however not a matter for this protocol. It
> >would be a matter for the CRL referencing model, i.e. CDP and/or
> >directory schema.
> >
> >I don't think that extra complexity however is very useful.
> >
> >Stefan Santesson
> >Senior Program Manager
> >Windows Security, Standards
> >
> >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-
> > > pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Denis Pinkas
> > > Sent: den 20 december 2006 17:05
> > > To: ietf-pkix@imc.org
> > > Subject: Re: Certificates in CRLs
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > It is necessary to provide relying parties with the choice to get
> > > :
> > >
> > >   - CRLs "as usual", or
> > >   - CRLs that carry that new extension.
> > >
> > > The current proposal does not allow for it.
> > >
> > > Until the draft is changed, I am against the addition of this work
> item
> > > to the program of the PKIX WG.
> > >
> > > Denis
> > >
> > >
> ______________________________________________________________________
> _
> > > _______
> > >
> > > >Since last IETF a new draft was posted:
> > > >http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-santesson-pkix-vccrl-
> 00.txt
> > > >
> > > >There is a request to add this draft to the PKIX work and I would
> > > encourage to start the discussion about this decision in this
> thread.
> > > >
> > > >Stefan Santesson
> > > >Senior Program Manager
> > > >Windows Security, Standards
> > >
> > >
> > >

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<div class=3DSection1>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><a name=3D"_MailEndCompose"><span style=3D'font-size:1=
1.0pt;
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>Sharon,<o:p></o:p></span>=
</a></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",=
"sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>I&#8217;m not totally opposed to the idea of a package with =
a
CRL and a certificate. But the solution is not as attractive to me.<o:p></o=
:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>The main reason is that the impact to the system design is
greater.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>If I summarize largely from your own mail, this includes;<o:=
p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoListParagraph style=3D'text-indent:-18.0pt;mso-list:l1 level1=
 lfo1'><![if !supportLists]><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><span style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>1)<span style=3D'font:7.0pt =
"Times New Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
</span></span></span><![endif]><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt=
;
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>Expanded distribution
configuration options in the CA.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoListParagraph style=3D'text-indent:-18.0pt;mso-list:l1 level1=
 lfo1'><![if !supportLists]><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><span style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>2)<span style=3D'font:7.0pt =
"Times New Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
</span></span></span><![endif]><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt=
;
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>Possible enhancement to t=
he
CDP and/or AIA extension<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoListParagraph style=3D'text-indent:-18.0pt;mso-list:l1 level1=
 lfo1'><![if !supportLists]><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><span style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>3)<span style=3D'font:7.0pt =
"Times New Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
</span></span></span><![endif]><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt=
;
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>A new choice for the clie=
nt (Which
CRL object should I download)<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoListParagraph style=3D'text-indent:-18.0pt;mso-list:l1 level1=
 lfo1'><![if !supportLists]><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><span style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>4)<span style=3D'font:7.0pt =
"Times New Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
</span></span></span><![endif]><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt=
;
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>A new decoding procedure =
for
CRL data (for bundled data)<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoListParagraph style=3D'text-indent:-18.0pt;mso-list:l1 level1=
 lfo1'><![if !supportLists]><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><span style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>5)<span style=3D'font:7.0pt =
"Times New Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
</span></span></span><![endif]><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt=
;
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>A new directory schema<o:=
p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>I don&#8217;t think the benefit gained here is substantial
enough to defend all these modifications to the system and specifications.<=
o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>The embedded certificate on the other hand only involves<o:p=
></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoListParagraph style=3D'text-indent:-18.0pt;mso-list:l0 level1=
 lfo2'><![if !supportLists]><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><span style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>1)<span style=3D'font:7.0pt =
"Times New Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
</span></span></span><![endif]><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt=
;
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>A new option in the CA to=
 enable
cert inclusion<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoListParagraph style=3D'text-indent:-18.0pt;mso-list:l0 level1=
 lfo2'><![if !supportLists]><span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><span style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>2)<span style=3D'font:7.0pt =
"Times New Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
</span></span></span><![endif]><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt=
;
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>An optional component in
clients to extract certificates from CRLs<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>Except from this the infrastructure is unaffected.<o:p></o:p=
></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>To the question what to do with the certificates. I view thi=
s is
a matter of local policy. Any use of these certificates is optional. Lookin=
g
this from our perspective, the certificates would simply be imported to the=
 internal
table of certificates from which the client attempts to construct a valid p=
ath.
If the imported certificates are being used or not depends on the local
optimization logic if alternative paths exist.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-f=
amily:
"Arial","sans-serif";color:maroon'>Stefan Santesson</span></b><span lang=3D=
EN-GB
style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:#400040'>Senior Program Manager</span><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'col=
or:navy'><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-f=
amily:
"Arial","sans-serif";color:#400040'>Windows Security, Standards</span></b><=
span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p></o:p></span></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0cm 0cm 0cm =
4.0pt'>

<div>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0cm =
0cm 0cm'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-f=
amily:
"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span></b><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-siz=
e:10.0pt;
font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> Sharon Boeyen
[mailto:sharon.boeyen@entrust.com] <br>
<b>Sent:</b> den 5 januari 2007 06:09<br>
<b>To:</b> Stefan Santesson; Sharon Boeyen; Russ Housley<br>
<b>Cc:</b> ietf-pkix@imc.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> RE: Certificates in CRLs<o:p></o:p></span></p>

</div>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","s=
ans-serif";
color:blue'>Stefan I really don't think you can state where this will or wi=
ll
not be used in the future. Naturally you know where you want to use it, but
software only enables a facility and the customer decides when and how to u=
se
it. </span><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","s=
ans-serif";
color:blue'>Whether this scheme could possibly be useful in some cases is n=
ot
my point. My point is that current deployments seem to be working fine with=
out
it and I don't want to see those interfered with just because some CA they =
may
have cross certified with decided to put certificates inside their CRLS. Ba=
ck
to Denis' point - there is no need to impose this in the way you've propose=
d. </span><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","s=
ans-serif";
color:blue'>Earlier I (and others including Dave Kemp) suggested a
&quot;package&quot; that includes the CRL, and the certificate in question =
as
an 'extra' that a CA could publish in addition to a regular CRL. That
&quot;package could be published in a separate directory attribute and/or a=
n
HTTP accessible file. It could be pointed to from within the
certificate&nbsp;just as the CRL currently is. That could be done either by
extending the CRLDP or adding a new&nbsp;pointer extension or adding a new
method to the AIA extension. That type of approach gives you what you want =
but
does not in any way interfere with clients who do not want and do not need =
to
retrieve that bloated CRL.&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","s=
ans-serif";
color:blue'>Also, you haven't addressed the question about&nbsp;what happen=
s
when&nbsp;more than one certificate is needed. If a CRL includes more than =
one
certificate&nbsp;(e.g. the CRL issuer did one or more key rollovers&nbsp;th=
en
CRL gets bloated a lot bigger than you suggested.&nbsp;I don't want to deba=
te
how often a key gets rolled over either however I have definitely seen
instances in real world deployments where a key has been rolled very often =
in a
very short period of time (regardless of whether the reason for rolling it =
was
a good one or not - it has happened). Also, regardless of the size of the
&quot;bloat&quot; I'm saying that in most cases the clients will already ha=
ve
the certificates in question and this bloat will cause them extra processin=
g in
managing their certificate caches etc unnecessarily. The client should have=
 a
choice as to whether to download the certificate or not.</span><o:p></o:p><=
/p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","s=
ans-serif";
color:blue'>I don't understand why you're so opposed to the &quot;package&q=
uot;
solution.&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","s=
ans-serif";
color:blue'>Cheers,</span><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","s=
ans-serif";
color:blue'>Sharon</span>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-bottom:12.0pt'><span style=3D'font-siz=
e:10.0pt;
font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>-----Original Message-----<br>
<b>From:</b> Stefan Santesson [mailto:stefans@microsoft.com] <br>
<b>Sent:</b> Friday, January 05, 2007 8:01 AM<br>
<b>To:</b> Sharon Boeyen; Russ Housley<br>
<b>Cc:</b> ietf-pkix@imc.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> RE: Certificates in CRLs<o:p></o:p></span></p>

</div>

<blockquote style=3D'margin-top:5.0pt;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:5.0pt'=
>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>We are only talking about an extra 16K at most. The download
time is the absolute most cases is negligible. <o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>For those cases where this solution makes sense, the network
bandwidth issue is not a problem.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>For the cases where this would be an issue, this solution wo=
uld
not be used.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>On the contrary, in some networks and scenarios, this will
improve performance. Especially in high latency networks with PKI based
peer-peer authentication where an extra retrieval cost way more performance
than the expanded CRL size.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>Also, many clients are configured to pre-fetch CRL:s before =
they
are used, using idle time on the network at no extra cost.<o:p></o:p></span=
></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-f=
amily:
"Arial","sans-serif";color:maroon'>Stefan Santesson</span></b><span lang=3D=
EN-GB
style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:#400040'>Senior Program Manager</span><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'col=
or:navy'><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-f=
amily:
"Arial","sans-serif";color:#400040'>Windows Security, Standards</span></b><=
span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p></o:p></span></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0cm 0cm 0cm =
4.0pt'>

<div>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0cm =
0cm 0cm'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-f=
amily:
"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span></b><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-siz=
e:10.0pt;
font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> Sharon Boeyen
[mailto:sharon.boeyen@entrust.com] <br>
<b>Sent:</b> den 4 januari 2007 17:36<br>
<b>To:</b> Stefan Santesson; Russ Housley<br>
<b>Cc:</b> ietf-pkix@imc.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> RE: Certificates in CRLs<o:p></o:p></span></p>

</div>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>I still think wasted bandwidth is also =
an
issue. Forcing the download of 'fat' CRLs on clients when, in many cases, t=
hose
clients already have the certificates locally that caused the bloating of t=
he
CRL, is an unnecessary waste.</span><o:p></o:p></p>

<p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>-----Original Message-----</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [<a
href=3D"mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org">mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.im=
c.org</a>]
On Behalf Of Stefan Santesson</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Sent: Wednesday, January 03, 2007 9:58 AM<=
/span>
<br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>To: Russ Housley</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs</span> <=
o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-bottom:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Russ,</span> <o:p></o:p></p>

<p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>In theory, the CA can put different poi=
nters
to different CRLs in each certificate if some certificates are prime target=
s
for frequent checking. But I don't think that is a common scenario.</span><=
o:p></o:p></p>

<p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>My point is that in order to allow free
selection of CRLs, you would have to add capability to the CDP extension ra=
ther
than to the CRL. I don't think such effort is worth the trouble.</span><o:p=
></o:p></p>

<p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>I'm convinced that including certs in a=
 CRL
will only be made in situations where it in the sum of all, helps increase
efficiency and where the extra bandwidth consumed is not an issue.</span><o=
:p></o:p></p>

<p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>I read the critique of this idea as not
really be a bandwidth issue, but that some implementers simply don't want t=
o be
faced with the requirement to implement this feature. But I don't see that =
they
have to. A CRL with certs in a non-critical extension should work just as w=
ell
in current clients as any current CRL without certs. The extension can simp=
ly
be ignored.</span><o:p></o:p></p>

<p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>This is not a necessary feature, but a
practical one offering performance improvements in some environments at no =
loss
of interoperability.</span><o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Stefan Santesson</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Senior Program Manager</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Windows Security, Standards</span> <o:p></=
o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; -----Original Message-----</span> =
<br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; From: Russ Housley [<a
href=3D"mailto:housley@vigilsec.com">mailto:housley@vigilsec.com</a>]</span=
> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; Sent: den 21 december 2006 16:19</spa=
n> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; To: Stefan Santesson</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs</sp=
an> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; Stefan:</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; If the CA chooses to offer both, how =
can
the RP determine which one it </span><br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; will get?&nbsp; Does the CA post them=
 in
different LDAP attributes?</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; Russ</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; At 08:00 AM 12/21/2006, Stefan Santes=
son
wrote:</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;As with anything else, the relyin=
g
party can get what the CA offers.</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;I don't think there is any realis=
tic
scenario where the CA has a </span><br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;reason to offer CRLs both with an=
d
without certificates. To offer </span><br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;this capability to RP is however =
not a
matter for this protocol. It </span><br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;would be a matter for the CRL
referencing model, i.e. CDP and/or </span><br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;directory schema.</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;I don't think that extra complexi=
ty
however is very useful.</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;Stefan Santesson</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;Senior Program Manager</span> <br=
>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;Windows Security, Standards</span=
> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; -----Original Message-----<=
/span>
<br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; From:
owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [<a href=3D"mailto:owner-ietf-">mailto:owner-i=
etf-</a>
</span><br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behal=
f Of
Denis Pinkas</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; Sent: den 20 december 2006 =
17:05</span>
<br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; To: ietf-pkix@imc.org</span=
> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; Subject: Re: Certificates i=
n CRLs</span>
<br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; It is necessary to provide
relying parties with the choice to get </span><br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; :</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; - CRLs &quot;as
usual&quot;, or</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; - CRLs that car=
ry
that new extension.</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; The current proposal does n=
ot
allow for it.</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; Until the draft is changed,=
 I am
against the addition of this work</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; item</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; to the program of the PKIX =
WG.</span>
<br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; Denis</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt;
______________________________________________________________________</spa=
n> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; _</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; _______</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;Since last IETF a new d=
raft
was posted:</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;<a
href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-santesson-pkix-vccrl-"
target=3D"_blank">http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-santesson-pkix-=
vccrl-</a></span>
<br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; 00.txt</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;There is a request to a=
dd
this draft to the PKIX work and I would</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; encourage to start the disc=
ussion
about this decision in this</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; thread.</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;Stefan Santesson</span>=
 <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;Senior Program Manager<=
/span>
<br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;Windows Security, Stand=
ards</span>
<br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

</blockquote>

</div>

</div>

</body>

</html>

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References: <20070109191848.F2587421F39@rsmail.perto.com.br>
Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2007 13:41:07 -0500
To: "LUIZ CARLOS DO LAGO" <llago@perto.com.br>
From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
Subject: Re: Backward-compatibility among certificates
Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
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At 4:18 PM -0300 1/9/07, LUIZ CARLOS DO LAGO wrote:
>Good Afternoon,
>
>After create a new extension, does exist some kind of
>backward-compatibility among certificates of
>version 3 e earliers ?
>
>If I have a certificate of version 3 appended with some extensions, and
>I have legacy peers that know only to encode/decode certificates of
>versions 1 or 2, do will that peers able to decode my certificate of
>version 3 ignoring the extensions either something like that ?
>
>Best Regards,
>
>Luiz Lago

Luiz,

Only version 3 certs have extensions, so an implementation that 
understands only v1 or v2 certs will reject a v3 cert with any 
extensions.

For extensions in v3 certs, if the extension is NOT marked critical, 
then an implementation that does not know how to process the 
extension will ignore it.

Steve



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To: ietf-pkix@imc.org
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Good Afternoon,

After create a new extension, does exist some kind of
backward-compatibility among certificates of
version 3 e earliers ?

If I have a certificate of version 3 appended with some extensions, and
I have legacy peers that know only to encode/decode certificates of
versions 1 or 2, do will that peers able to decode my certificate of
version 3 ignoring the extensions either something like that ?

Best Regards,

Luiz Lago



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Good Afternoon,

After create a new extension, does exist some kind of
backward-compatibility among certificates of
version 3 e earliers ?

If I have a certificate of version 3 appended with some extensions, and
I have legacy peers that know only to encode/decode certificates of
versions 1 or 2, do will that peers able to decode my certificate of
version 3 ignoring the extensions either something like that ?

Best Regards,

Luiz Lago



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From: "SUPER" <students@pc-wizard.net>
To: ietf-pkix-archive@imc.org
Subject: Day Natalia official
Date: 	Mon, 8 Jan 2007 23:32:42 -0600
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Here ur students, mark no, soda day.
Oscar list click here. Epic portions fast food makes! Super size me, =
film. Ur students mark no soda day natalia official?
Makes oscar list click here ur students, mark. Size me film of epic.
Me film of epic portions fast food.
Click here ur, students mark no. Me film of epic portions. Ur students =
mark no. Me film of epic portions fast food makes.
Click here ur students, mark no soda.
Super size me film of epic portions fast! Portions fast food makes oscar =
list click here ur. Portions fast food, makes, oscar list click, here? =
Of epic portions fast.
Size me, film of epic portions fast. Of epic portions fast food makes =
oscar list.
Food, makes, oscar list, click here ur. Oscar list click here ur =
students, mark no.
Portions fast food makes. Portions fast food makes oscar list. Here, ur =
students mark no soda day natalia.
Super size me film of epic, portions fast food. Portions fast food =
makes?
Film of epic portions fast food makes.
Super size me film of epic.
Oscar list click, here ur students mark, no. Me film of epic portions =
fast.
No, soda day natalia. Fast food, makes oscar list click here ur?
Ur students mark no soda day, natalia.
Size me film of, epic.
Me film of epic, portions fast, food makes.
List, click here ur students, mark, no soda? Film, of epic portions fast =
food. List click, here ur students mark.
Me film of, epic portions fast.
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<DIV><FONT face=3DVerdana color=3D#FBE8B4 size=3D2>Here ur students, =
mark no, soda=20
day.<BR>Oscar list click here. Epic portions fast food makes! Super size =
me,=20
film. Ur students mark no soda day natalia official?<BR>Makes oscar list =
click=20
here ur students, mark. Size me film of epic.<BR>Me film of epic =
portions fast=20
food.<BR>Click here ur, students mark no. Me film of epic portions. Ur =
students=20
mark no. Me film of epic portions fast food makes.<BR>Click here ur =
students,=20
mark no soda.<BR>Super size me film of epic portions fast! Portions fast =
food=20
makes oscar list click here ur. Portions fast food, makes, oscar list =
click,=20
here? Of epic portions fast.<BR>Size me, film of epic portions fast. Of =
epic=20
portions fast food makes oscar list.<BR>Food, makes, oscar list, click =
here ur.=20
Oscar list click here ur students, mark no.<BR>Portions fast food makes. =

Portions fast food makes oscar list. Here, ur students mark no soda day=20
natalia.<BR>Super size me film of epic, portions fast food. Portions =
fast food=20
makes?<BR>Film of epic portions fast food makes.<BR>Super size me film =
of=20
epic.<BR>Oscar list click, here ur students mark, no. Me film of epic =
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fast.<BR>No, soda day natalia. Fast food, makes oscar list click here =
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students mark no soda day, natalia.<BR>Size me film of, epic.<BR>Me film =
of=20
epic, portions fast, food makes.<BR>List, click here ur students, mark, =
no soda?=20
Film, of epic portions fast food. List click, here ur students =
mark.<BR>Me film=20
of, epic portions fast.</FONT></DIV></BODY></HTML>

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From: "David A. Cooper" <david.cooper@nist.gov>
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To: Alan Sill <Alan.Sill@ttu.edu>
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Subject: Re: Question on ns* cert type deprecation
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Alan,

I did an on-line search for the text that you mentioned and could only 
find it in one place:  Grid Certificate Profile.

The IETF PKIX Certificate and CRL Profile does not mention nsCertType, 
nsComment, nsPolicyURL, or nsRevocationURL at all.  Furthermore, on-line 
searches for each of these four terms on the ietf.org web site came up 
with no matches.

So, unless the certificates you are issuing will be used in an 
environment in which conformance with the Grid Certificate Profile is 
important (or required), then the text quoted below is not relevant.  If 
it is relevant, then your concerns need to be addressed to a different 
forum.

Dave

Alan Sill wrote:
>> 2.4.4 nsCertType, nsComment, nsPolicyURL, nsRevocationURL
>> The ns* attributes are deprecated and SHOULD NOT be included in any 
>> new CA
>> certificates.
>> If they are included, though, these extensions MUST NOT be marked 
>> critical.
>
> Is this for CA certs only (i.e., ones used to identify a CA), or does 
> it apply to end-entity certificates issued by a CA to identify a host 
> or person also?
>
> We have conditions in which a host may need to contact a service to 
> request information, and for which we have been using a Netscape Cert 
> Type of SSL Client to indicate that the host is allowed to do so.  I 
> am assuming that the above extract from the IETF Certificate Profile 
> document is intended to apply to CA certs only, and so our use of this 
> field in EE certs is OK.  Or is there a more general way to do this?
>
> Thanks,
> Alan



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To: ietf-pkix-archive@imc.org
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Museum pursuit happyness dreamgirls charlottes.
Annotation news inc portland principal tactec. Photo slideshow =
reuterscom breaking headlines headline rock arkansas. Atoz shop nowshop =
low prices garmin, incar csave. Casino royale omega seamaster might =
watch grappling hook detonator.
View in cold blood book capote! Deals stuff carehome gamesunbox plans =
explore holidays price. Brakeignt spots, san diego worm today, deigo =
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Agreements activities appendices index discovery! Indirectly thenthe =
torefrain programif.
Users, obtain todays volatile fragmented.
Gratitude repaid organized, books includes synopsis.
Company contact capital brand smart copyright reserved bf amazoncom.
Use analogy takes regardless revelatory layers, reality. Northern, =
europe peace come one hundred yearsbut narration will? Yahio heedrines =
hadrin heedlin. Topic ap picayune weblog breekeynt nws updated, pneus!
Handson outlines stepbystep, approach.
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Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs
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Thread-Topic: Certificates in CRLs
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From: "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>
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Wouldn't it be better for the IETF to accept as a work item a general
purpose optimization that works everywhere, rather than a point solution
that works for high-bandwidth high-latency scenarios but fails for low
bandwidth scenarios?  Are you saying that where both network bandwidth
and latency are issues and this solution is not used, a different
solution should be used to solve the same problem?

=20

I disagree with that philosophy.  If PKIX is going to stand behind an
optimization approach, the approach should be suitable for both high and
low bandwidth environments.

=20

Dave

=20

  _____ =20

From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org]
On Behalf Of Stefan Santesson
Sent: Friday, January 05, 2007 8:01 AM
To: Sharon Boeyen; Russ Housley
Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs

=20

We are only talking about an extra 16K at most. The download time is the
absolute most cases is negligible.=20

For those cases where this solution makes sense, the network bandwidth
issue is not a problem.

=20

For the cases where this would be an issue, this solution would not be
used.

=20

On the contrary, in some networks and scenarios, this will improve
performance. Especially in high latency networks with PKI based
peer-peer authentication where an extra retrieval cost way more
performance than the expanded CRL size.

=20

Also, many clients are configured to pre-fetch CRL:s before they are
used, using idle time on the network at no extra cost.

=20

=20

Stefan Santesson

Senior Program Manager

Windows Security, Standards

=20

From: Sharon Boeyen [mailto:sharon.boeyen@entrust.com]=20
Sent: den 4 januari 2007 17:36
To: Stefan Santesson; Russ Housley
Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs

=20

I still think wasted bandwidth is also an issue. Forcing the download of
'fat' CRLs on clients when, in many cases, those clients already have
the certificates locally that caused the bloating of the CRL, is an
unnecessary waste.

-----Original Message-----=20
From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org]
On Behalf Of Stefan Santesson=20
Sent: Wednesday, January 03, 2007 9:58 AM=20
To: Russ Housley=20
Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org=20
Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs=20

=20

Russ,=20

In theory, the CA can put different pointers to different CRLs in each
certificate if some certificates are prime targets for frequent
checking. But I don't think that is a common scenario.

My point is that in order to allow free selection of CRLs, you would
have to add capability to the CDP extension rather than to the CRL. I
don't think such effort is worth the trouble.

I'm convinced that including certs in a CRL will only be made in
situations where it in the sum of all, helps increase efficiency and
where the extra bandwidth consumed is not an issue.

I read the critique of this idea as not really be a bandwidth issue, but
that some implementers simply don't want to be faced with the
requirement to implement this feature. But I don't see that they have
to. A CRL with certs in a non-critical extension should work just as
well in current clients as any current CRL without certs. The extension
can simply be ignored.

This is not a necessary feature, but a practical one offering
performance improvements in some environments at no loss of
interoperability.

=20

Stefan Santesson=20
Senior Program Manager=20
Windows Security, Standards=20

=20

> -----Original Message-----=20
> From: Russ Housley [mailto:housley@vigilsec.com]=20
> Sent: den 21 december 2006 16:19=20
> To: Stefan Santesson=20
> Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org=20
> Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs=20
>=20
> Stefan:=20
>=20
> If the CA chooses to offer both, how can the RP determine which one it

> will get?  Does the CA post them in different LDAP attributes?=20
>=20
> Russ=20
>=20
> At 08:00 AM 12/21/2006, Stefan Santesson wrote:=20
>=20
> >As with anything else, the relying party can get what the CA offers.=20
> >=20
> >I don't think there is any realistic scenario where the CA has a=20
> >reason to offer CRLs both with and without certificates. To offer=20
> >this capability to RP is however not a matter for this protocol. It=20
> >would be a matter for the CRL referencing model, i.e. CDP and/or=20
> >directory schema.=20
> >=20
> >I don't think that extra complexity however is very useful.=20
> >=20
> >Stefan Santesson=20
> >Senior Program Manager=20
> >Windows Security, Standards=20
> >=20
> >=20
> > > -----Original Message-----=20
> > > From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-=20
> > > pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Denis Pinkas=20
> > > Sent: den 20 december 2006 17:05=20
> > > To: ietf-pkix@imc.org=20
> > > Subject: Re: Certificates in CRLs=20
> > >=20
> > >=20
> > >=20
> > > It is necessary to provide relying parties with the choice to get=20
> > > :=20
> > >=20
> > >   - CRLs "as usual", or=20
> > >   - CRLs that carry that new extension.=20
> > >=20
> > > The current proposal does not allow for it.=20
> > >=20
> > > Until the draft is changed, I am against the addition of this work

> item=20
> > > to the program of the PKIX WG.=20
> > >=20
> > > Denis=20
> > >=20
> > >=20
> ______________________________________________________________________

> _=20
> > > _______=20
> > >=20
> > > >Since last IETF a new draft was posted:=20
> > > >http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-santesson-pkix-vccrl-=20
> 00.txt=20
> > > >=20
> > > >There is a request to add this draft to the PKIX work and I would

> > > encourage to start the discussion about this decision in this=20
> thread.=20
> > > >=20
> > > >Stefan Santesson=20
> > > >Senior Program Manager=20
> > > >Windows Security, Standards=20
> > >=20
> > >=20
> > >=20


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<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Wouldn&#8217;t it be better for the =
IETF
to accept as a work item a general purpose optimization that works =
everywhere,
rather than a point solution that works for high-bandwidth high-latency
scenarios but fails for low bandwidth scenarios?&nbsp; Are you saying =
that
where both network bandwidth and latency are issues and this solution is =
not
used, a different solution should be used to solve the same =
problem?<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>I disagree with that =
philosophy.&nbsp; If
PKIX is going to stand behind an optimization approach, the approach =
should be
suitable for both high and low bandwidth =
environments.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Dave<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3Dnavy face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<div>

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<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><font size=3D2 face=3DTahoma><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Tahoma;font-weight:bold'>From:</span></font></b><font =
size=3D2
face=3DTahoma><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>
owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] =
<b><span
style=3D'font-weight:bold'>On Behalf Of </span></b>Stefan Santesson<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> Friday, January 05, =
2007
8:01 AM<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> Sharon Boeyen; Russ =
Housley<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Cc:</span></b> ietf-pkix@imc.org<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> RE: Certificates =
in CRLs</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><a name=3D"_MailEndCompose"><font size=3D2 =
color=3D"#1f497d"
face=3DCalibri><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:Calibri;color:#1F497D'>We
are only talking about an extra 16K at most. The download time is the =
absolute
most cases is negligible. </span></font></a><font size=3D2 =
color=3D"#1f497d"
face=3DCalibri><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:Calibri;color:#1F497D'><o:p></o:p><=
/span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#1f497d" =
face=3DCalibri><span
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:Calibri;color:#1F497D'>For those =
cases
where this solution makes sense, the network bandwidth issue is not a =
problem.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#1f497d" =
face=3DCalibri><span
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:Calibri;color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;<=
/o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#1f497d" =
face=3DCalibri><span
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:Calibri;color:#1F497D'>For the =
cases where
this would be an issue, this solution would not be =
used.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#1f497d" =
face=3DCalibri><span
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:Calibri;color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;<=
/o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#1f497d" =
face=3DCalibri><span
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:Calibri;color:#1F497D'>On the =
contrary, in
some networks and scenarios, this will improve performance. Especially =
in high
latency networks with PKI based peer-peer authentication where an extra =
retrieval
cost way more performance than the expanded CRL =
size.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#1f497d" =
face=3DCalibri><span
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:Calibri;color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;<=
/o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#1f497d" =
face=3DCalibri><span
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:Calibri;color:#1F497D'>Also, many =
clients
are configured to pre-fetch CRL:s before they are used, using idle time =
on the
network at no extra cost.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#1f497d" =
face=3DCalibri><span
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:Calibri;color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;<=
/o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#1f497d" =
face=3DCalibri><span
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:Calibri;color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;<=
/o:p></span></font></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><font size=3D2 color=3Dmaroon face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-GB
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:maroon;font-weight:bold=
'>Stefan
Santesson</span></font></b><font color=3D"#1f497d"><span lang=3DEN-GB
style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#400040" face=3DArial><span =
lang=3DEN-GB
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:#400040'>Senior =
Program Manager</span></font><font
color=3Dnavy><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'color:navy'><o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><font size=3D2 color=3D"#400040" =
face=3DArial><span lang=3DEN-GB
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:#400040;font-weight:bol=
d'>Windows
Security, Standards</span></font></b><font size=3D2 color=3D"#1f497d" =
face=3DCalibri><span
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:Calibri;color:#1F497D'><o:p></o:p><=
/span></font></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 color=3D"#1f497d" =
face=3DCalibri><span
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:Calibri;color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;<=
/o:p></span></font></p>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0in 0in =
0in 4.0pt'>

<div>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt =
0in 0in 0in'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><font size=3D2 face=3DTahoma><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Tahoma;font-weight:bold'>From:</span></font></b><font =
size=3D2
face=3DTahoma><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'> =
Sharon Boeyen
[mailto:sharon.boeyen@entrust.com] <br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> den 4 januari 2007 =
17:36<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> Stefan Santesson; =
Russ Housley<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Cc:</span></b> ietf-pkix@imc.org<br>
<b><span style=3D'font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> RE: Certificates =
in CRLs<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

</div>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
lang=3DSV
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p><font size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DSV =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>I
still think wasted bandwidth is also an issue. Forcing the download of =
'fat'
CRLs on clients when, in many cases, those clients already have the
certificates locally that caused the bloating of the CRL, is an =
unnecessary
waste.</span></font><span lang=3DSV><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p><font size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DSV =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>-----Original
Message-----</span></font><span lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>From:
owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [<a =
href=3D"mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org">mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.=
imc.org</a>]
On Behalf Of Stefan Santesson</span></font><span lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Sent: =
Wednesday,
January 03, 2007 9:58 AM</span></font><span lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>To: =
Russ Housley</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Cc:
ietf-pkix@imc.org</span></font><span lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Subject: RE:
Certificates in CRLs</span></font><span lang=3DSV> =
<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-bottom:12.0pt'><font size=3D3
face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DSV =
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p><font size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DSV =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Russ,</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p><font size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DSV =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>In
theory, the CA can put different pointers to different CRLs in each =
certificate
if some certificates are prime targets for frequent checking. But I =
don't think
that is a common scenario.</span></font><span =
lang=3DSV><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p><font size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DSV =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>My
point is that in order to allow free selection of CRLs, you would have =
to add
capability to the CDP extension rather than to the CRL. I don't think =
such
effort is worth the trouble.</span></font><span =
lang=3DSV><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p><font size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DSV =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>I'm
convinced that including certs in a CRL will only be made in situations =
where
it in the sum of all, helps increase efficiency and where the extra =
bandwidth
consumed is not an issue.</span></font><span =
lang=3DSV><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p><font size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DSV =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>I
read the critique of this idea as not really be a bandwidth issue, but =
that
some implementers simply don't want to be faced with the requirement to
implement this feature. But I don't see that they have to. A CRL with =
certs in
a non-critical extension should work just as well in current clients as =
any
current CRL without certs. The extension can simply be =
ignored.</span></font><span
lang=3DSV><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p><font size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DSV =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>This
is not a necessary feature, but a practical one offering performance
improvements in some environments at no loss of =
interoperability.</span></font><span
lang=3DSV><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
lang=3DSV
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p><font size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DSV =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Stefan
Santesson</span></font><span lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Senior =
Program
Manager</span></font><span lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Windows =
Security,
Standards</span></font><span lang=3DSV> <o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
lang=3DSV
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p><font size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span lang=3DSV =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt;
-----Original Message-----</span></font><span lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
From: Russ
Housley [<a =
href=3D"mailto:housley@vigilsec.com">mailto:housley@vigilsec.com</a>]</sp=
an></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
Sent: den 21
december 2006 16:19</span></font><span lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
To: Stefan
Santesson</span></font><span lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
Cc:
ietf-pkix@imc.org</span></font><span lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
Subject: RE:
Certificates in CRLs</span></font><span lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt;</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
Stefan:</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt;</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; If =
the CA
chooses to offer both, how can the RP determine which one it =
</span></font><span
lang=3DSV><br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
will get?&nbsp;
Does the CA post them in different LDAP attributes?</span></font><span =
lang=3DSV>
<br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt;</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
Russ</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt;</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; At =
08:00 AM
12/21/2006, Stefan Santesson wrote:</span></font><span lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt;</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt;As with
anything else, the relying party can get what the CA =
offers.</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt;</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt;I don't
think there is any realistic scenario where the CA has a =
</span></font><span
lang=3DSV><br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt;reason to
offer CRLs both with and without certificates. To offer =
</span></font><span
lang=3DSV><br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt;this
capability to RP is however not a matter for this protocol. It =
</span></font><span
lang=3DSV><br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt;would be a
matter for the CRL referencing model, i.e. CDP and/or =
</span></font><span
lang=3DSV><br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt;directory
schema.</span></font><span lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt;</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt;I don't
think that extra complexity however is very useful.</span></font><span =
lang=3DSV>
<br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt;</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt;Stefan
Santesson</span></font><span lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt;Senior
Program Manager</span></font><span lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt;Windows
Security, Standards</span></font><span lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt;</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt;</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt;
-----Original Message-----</span></font><span lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt; From:
owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [<a =
href=3D"mailto:owner-ietf-">mailto:owner-ietf-</a>
</span></font><span lang=3DSV><br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt;
pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Denis Pinkas</span></font><span =
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt; Sent:
den 20 december 2006 17:05</span></font><span lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt; To:
ietf-pkix@imc.org</span></font><span lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt;
Subject: Re: Certificates in CRLs</span></font><span lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt;</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt;</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt;</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt; It is
necessary to provide relying parties with the choice to get =
</span></font><span
lang=3DSV><br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt; :</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt;</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt;
&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; - CRLs &quot;as usual&quot;, or</span></font><span =
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt;
&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; - CRLs that carry that new =
extension.</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt;</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt; The
current proposal does not allow for it.</span></font><span lang=3DSV> =
<br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt;</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt; Until
the draft is changed, I am against the addition of this =
work</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
item</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt; to
the program of the PKIX WG.</span></font><span lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt;</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt; Denis</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt;</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt;</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt;
______________________________________________________________________</s=
pan></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
_</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt;
_______</span></font><span lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt;</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt;
&gt;Since last IETF a new draft was posted:</span></font><span =
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt; &gt;<a
href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-santesson-pkix-vccrl-"
target=3D"_blank">http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-santesson-pki=
x-vccrl-</a></span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
00.txt</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt; &gt;</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt;
&gt;There is a request to add this draft to the PKIX work and I =
would</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt;
encourage to start the discussion about this decision in =
this</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
thread.</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt; &gt;</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt;
&gt;Stefan Santesson</span></font><span lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt;
&gt;Senior Program Manager</span></font><span lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt;
&gt;Windows Security, Standards</span></font><span lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt;</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt;</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <br>
</span><font size=3D2><span lang=3DSV style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; =
&gt; &gt;</span></font><span
lang=3DSV> <o:p></o:p></span></p>

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Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2007 15:27:56 +0100
From: "Denis Pinkas" <denis.pinkas@bull.net>
To: "ietf-pkix@imc.org" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>
Subject: Re: Certificates in CRLs
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We are only talking about an extra 16K at most. The download time is the absolute most cases is negligible. 
For those cases where this solution makes sense, the network bandwidth issue is not a problem.
For the cases where this would be an issue, this solution would not be used.
Stefan,
What you say just above is untrue. CAs are issuing CRLs for all kind of RPs and 
would be unable to handle cases where some RPs have a large network bandwith 
and some others don't.
Your proposed individual draft does not propose a solution where a CA would be able to issue 
simultaneously two kinds of CRLs: "slim", as today, and "fat", as you are proposing for tomorrow.
Denis

On the contrary, in some networks and scenarios, this will improve performance. Especially in high latency networks with PKI based peer-peer authentication where an extra retrieval cost way more performance than the expanded CRL size.
 
Also, many clients are configured to pre-fetch CRL:s before they are used, using idle time on the network at no extra cost.
 
 
Stefan Santesson
Senior Program Manager
Windows Security, Standards
 
From: Sharon Boeyen [mailto:sharon.boeyen@entrust.com] 
Sent: den 4 januari 2007 17:36
To: Stefan Santesson; Russ Housley
Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs
 
I still think wasted bandwidth is also an issue. Forcing the download of 'fat' CRLs on clients when, in many cases, those clients already have the certificates locally that caused the bloating of the CRL, is an unnecessary waste.
-----Original Message----- 
From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Stefan Santesson 
Sent: Wednesday, January 03, 2007 9:58 AM 
To: Russ Housley 
Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org 
Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs 
 
Russ, 
In theory, the CA can put different pointers to different CRLs in each certificate if some certificates are prime targets for frequent checking. But I don't think that is a common scenario.
My point is that in order to allow free selection of CRLs, you would have to add capability to the CDP extension rather than to the CRL. I don't think such effort is worth the trouble.
I'm convinced that including certs in a CRL will only be made in situations where it in the sum of all, helps increase efficiency and where the extra bandwidth consumed is not an issue.
I read the critique of this idea as not really be a bandwidth issue, but that some implementers simply don't want to be faced with the requirement to implement this feature. But I don't see that they have to. A CRL with certs in a non-critical extension should work just as well in current clients as any current CRL without certs. The extension can simply be ignored.
This is not a necessary feature, but a practical one offering performance improvements in some environments at no loss of interoperability.
 
Stefan Santesson 
Senior Program Manager 
Windows Security, Standards 
 
> -----Original Message----- 
> From: Russ Housley [mailto:housley@vigilsec.com] 
> Sent: den 21 december 2006 16:19 
> To: Stefan Santesson 
> Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org 
> Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs 
> 
> Stefan: 
> 
> If the CA chooses to offer both, how can the RP determine which one it 
> will get?  Does the CA post them in different LDAP attributes? 
> 
> Russ 
> 
> At 08:00 AM 12/21/2006, Stefan Santesson wrote: 
> 
> >As with anything else, the relying party can get what the CA offers. 
> > 
> >I don't think there is any realistic scenario where the CA has a 
> >reason to offer CRLs both with and without certificates. To offer 
> >this capability to RP is however not a matter for this protocol. It 
> >would be a matter for the CRL referencing model, i.e. CDP and/or 
> >directory schema. 
> > 
> >I don't think that extra complexity however is very useful. 
> > 
> >Stefan Santesson 
> >Senior Program Manager 
> >Windows Security, Standards 
> > 
> > 
> > > -----Original Message----- 
> > > From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf- 
> > > pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Denis Pinkas 
> > > Sent: den 20 december 2006 17:05 
> > > To: ietf-pkix@imc.org 
> > > Subject: Re: Certificates in CRLs 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > It is necessary to provide relying parties with the choice to get 
> > > : 
> > > 
> > >   - CRLs "as usual", or 
> > >   - CRLs that carry that new extension. 
> > > 
> > > The current proposal does not allow for it. 
> > > 
> > > Until the draft is changed, I am against the addition of this work 
> item 
> > > to the program of the PKIX WG. 
> > > 
> > > Denis 
> > > 
> > > 
> ______________________________________________________________________ 
> _ 
> > > _______ 
> > > 
> > > >Since last IETF a new draft was posted: 
> > > >http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-santesson-pkix-vccrl- 
> 00.txt 
> > > > 
> > > >There is a request to add this draft to the PKIX work and I would 
> > > encourage to start the discussion about this decision in this 
> thread. 
> > > > 
> > > >Stefan Santesson 
> > > >Senior Program Manager 
> > > >Windows Security, Standards 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > 

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<DIV class=Section1>
<P class=MsoNormal><A name=_MailEndCompose><SPAN lang=EN-US 
style="FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: 'Calibri','sans-serif'">We 
are only talking about an extra 16K at most. The download time is the absolute 
most cases is negligible. <o:p></o:p></SPAN></A></P>
<P class=MsoNormal><SPAN lang=EN-US 
style="FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: 'Calibri','sans-serif'">For 
those cases where this solution makes sense, the network bandwidth issue is not 
a problem.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></P>
<P class=MsoNormal><SPAN lang=EN-US 
style="FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: 'Calibri','sans-serif'"><o:p></o:p></SPAN></P>
<P class=MsoNormal><SPAN lang=EN-US 
style="FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: 'Calibri','sans-serif'">For 
the cases where this would be an issue, this solution would not be 
used.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></P>
<P class=MsoNormal><SPAN lang=EN-US 
style="FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: 'Calibri','sans-serif'"><o:p><STRONG>Stefan,</STRONG></o:p></SPAN></P>
<P class=MsoNormal><SPAN lang=EN-US 
style="FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: 'Calibri','sans-serif'"><o:p><STRONG>What 
you say just above is untrue.&nbsp;CAs are issuing CRLs for all kind of RPs and 
<BR>would be unable to handle cases where some RPs have a large network bandwith 
<BR>and some others don't.</STRONG></o:p></SPAN></P>
<P class=MsoNormal><SPAN lang=EN-US 
style="FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: 'Calibri','sans-serif'"><o:p><STRONG>Your 
proposed individual draft does not propose a solution where a CA would be able 
to issue <BR>simultaneously two kinds of CRLs: </STRONG></o:p></SPAN><SPAN 
lang=EN-US 
style="FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: 'Calibri','sans-serif'"><o:p><STRONG>"slim", 
as today, and "fat", as you are proposing for 
tomorrow.</STRONG></o:p></SPAN></P>
<P class=MsoNormal><SPAN lang=EN-US 
style="FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: 'Calibri','sans-serif'"><o:p><STRONG>Denis</STRONG></o:p></SPAN></P>
<P class=MsoNormal><SPAN lang=EN-US 
style="FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: 'Calibri','sans-serif'"><o:p></o:p></SPAN>&nbsp;</P>
<P class=MsoNormal><SPAN lang=EN-US 
style="FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: 'Calibri','sans-serif'">On 
the contrary, in some networks and scenarios, this will improve performance. 
Especially in high latency networks with PKI based peer-peer authentication 
where an extra retrieval cost way more performance than the expanded CRL 
size.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></P>
<P class=MsoNormal><SPAN lang=EN-US 
style="FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: 'Calibri','sans-serif'"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></P>
<P class=MsoNormal><SPAN lang=EN-US 
style="FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: 'Calibri','sans-serif'">Also, 
many clients are configured to pre-fetch CRL:s before they are used, using idle 
time on the network at no extra cost.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></P>
<P class=MsoNormal><SPAN lang=EN-US 
style="FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: 'Calibri','sans-serif'"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></P>
<P class=MsoNormal><SPAN lang=EN-US 
style="FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: 'Calibri','sans-serif'"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></P>
<DIV>
<P class=MsoNormal><B><SPAN lang=EN-GB 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: maroon; FONT-FAMILY: 'Arial','sans-serif'">Stefan 
Santesson</SPAN></B><SPAN lang=EN-GB 
style="COLOR: #1f497d"><o:p></o:p></SPAN></P>
<P class=MsoNormal><SPAN lang=EN-GB 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: #400040; FONT-FAMILY: 'Arial','sans-serif'">Senior 
Program Manager</SPAN><SPAN lang=EN-GB 
style="COLOR: navy"><o:p></o:p></SPAN></P>
<P class=MsoNormal><B><SPAN lang=EN-GB 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: #400040; FONT-FAMILY: 'Arial','sans-serif'">Windows 
Security, Standards</SPAN></B><SPAN lang=EN-US 
style="FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: 'Calibri','sans-serif'"><o:p></o:p></SPAN></P></DIV>
<P class=MsoNormal><SPAN lang=EN-US 
style="FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: 'Calibri','sans-serif'"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></P>
<DIV 
style="BORDER-RIGHT: medium none; PADDING-RIGHT: 0cm; BORDER-TOP: medium none; PADDING-LEFT: 4pt; PADDING-BOTTOM: 0cm; BORDER-LEFT: blue 1.5pt solid; PADDING-TOP: 0cm; BORDER-BOTTOM: medium none">
<DIV>
<DIV 
style="BORDER-RIGHT: medium none; PADDING-RIGHT: 0cm; BORDER-TOP: #b5c4df 1pt solid; PADDING-LEFT: 0cm; PADDING-BOTTOM: 0cm; BORDER-LEFT: medium none; PADDING-TOP: 3pt; BORDER-BOTTOM: medium none">
<P class=MsoNormal><B><SPAN lang=EN-US 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: 'Tahoma','sans-serif'">From:</SPAN></B><SPAN 
lang=EN-US style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: 'Tahoma','sans-serif'"> Sharon 
Boeyen [mailto:sharon.boeyen@entrust.com] <BR><B>Sent:</B> den 4 januari 2007 
17:36<BR><B>To:</B> Stefan Santesson; Russ Housley<BR><B>Cc:</B> 
ietf-pkix@imc.org<BR><B>Subject:</B> RE: Certificates in 
CRLs<o:p></o:p></SPAN></P></DIV></DIV>
<P class=MsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></P>
<P><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">I still think wasted bandwidth is also an 
issue. Forcing the download of 'fat' CRLs on clients when, in many cases, those 
clients already have the certificates locally that caused the bloating of the 
CRL, is an unnecessary waste.</SPAN><o:p></o:p></P>
<P><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">-----Original Message-----</SPAN> <BR><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [<A 
href="mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org">mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org</A>] 
On Behalf Of Stefan Santesson</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">Sent: 
Wednesday, January 03, 2007 9:58 AM</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">To: 
Russ Housley</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">Cc: 
ietf-pkix@imc.org</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">Subject: RE: 
Certificates in CRLs</SPAN> <o:p></o:p></P>
<P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN-BOTTOM: 12pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></P>
<P><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">Russ,</SPAN> <o:p></o:p></P>
<P><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">In theory, the CA can put different pointers to 
different CRLs in each certificate if some certificates are prime targets for 
frequent checking. But I don't think that is a common 
scenario.</SPAN><o:p></o:p></P>
<P><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">My point is that in order to allow free 
selection of CRLs, you would have to add capability to the CDP extension rather 
than to the CRL. I don't think such effort is worth the 
trouble.</SPAN><o:p></o:p></P>
<P><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">I'm convinced that including certs in a CRL 
will only be made in situations where it in the sum of all, helps increase 
efficiency and where the extra bandwidth consumed is not an 
issue.</SPAN><o:p></o:p></P>
<P><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">I read the critique of this idea as not really 
be a bandwidth issue, but that some implementers simply don't want to be faced 
with the requirement to implement this feature. But I don't see that they have 
to. A CRL with certs in a non-critical extension should work just as well in 
current clients as any current CRL without certs. The extension can simply be 
ignored.</SPAN><o:p></o:p></P>
<P><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">This is not a necessary feature, but a 
practical one offering performance improvements in some environments at no loss 
of interoperability.</SPAN><o:p></o:p></P>
<P class=MsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></P>
<P><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">Stefan Santesson</SPAN> <BR><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">Senior Program Manager</SPAN> <BR><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">Windows Security, Standards</SPAN> <o:p></o:p></P>
<P class=MsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></P>
<P><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; -----Original Message-----</SPAN> 
<BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; From: Russ Housley [<A 
href="mailto:housley@vigilsec.com">mailto:housley@vigilsec.com</A>]</SPAN> 
<BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; Sent: den 21 december 2006 16:19</SPAN> 
<BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; To: Stefan Santesson</SPAN> <BR><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org</SPAN> <BR><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs</SPAN> <BR><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; 
Stefan:</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; If the CA chooses to offer both, how can the RP 
determine which one it </SPAN><BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; will 
get?&nbsp; Does the CA post them in different LDAP attributes?</SPAN> <BR><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; 
Russ</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; At 08:00 AM 12/21/2006, Stefan Santesson 
wrote:</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt;As with anything else, the relying party can 
get what the CA offers.</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; 
&gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt;I don't think there is 
any realistic scenario where the CA has a </SPAN><BR><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt;reason to offer CRLs both with and without 
certificates. To offer </SPAN><BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt;this 
capability to RP is however not a matter for this protocol. It </SPAN><BR><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt;would be a matter for the CRL referencing 
model, i.e. CDP and/or </SPAN><BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; 
&gt;directory schema.</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt;</SPAN> 
<BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt;I don't think that extra complexity 
however is very useful.</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; 
&gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt;Stefan Santesson</SPAN> 
<BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt;Senior Program Manager</SPAN> 
<BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt;Windows Security, Standards</SPAN> 
<BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; 
&gt; &gt; -----Original Message-----</SPAN> <BR><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [<A 
href="mailto:owner-ietf-">mailto:owner-ietf-</A> </SPAN><BR><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Denis 
Pinkas</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; Sent: den 20 
december 2006 17:05</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; To: 
ietf-pkix@imc.org</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; 
Subject: Re: Certificates in CRLs</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; 
&gt; &gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt;</SPAN> 
<BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; It is necessary to provide relying 
parties with the choice to get </SPAN><BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; 
&gt; &gt; :</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt;</SPAN> 
<BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; - CRLs "as usual", 
or</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; - CRLs 
that carry that new extension.</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; 
&gt; &gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; The current 
proposal does not allow for it.</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; 
&gt; &gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; Until the 
draft is changed, I am against the addition of this work</SPAN> <BR><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; item</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; 
&gt; &gt; to the program of the PKIX WG.</SPAN> <BR><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; Denis</SPAN> <BR><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; 
______________________________________________________________________</SPAN> 
<BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; _</SPAN> <BR><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; _______</SPAN> <BR><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;Since last IETF a new draft was 
posted:</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;<A 
href="http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-santesson-pkix-vccrl-" 
target=_blank>http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-santesson-pkix-vccrl-</A></SPAN> 
<BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; 00.txt</SPAN> <BR><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;There is a request to add this draft 
to the PKIX work and I would</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; 
&gt; encourage to start the discussion about this decision in this</SPAN> 
<BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; thread.</SPAN> <BR><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;Stefan Santesson</SPAN> <BR><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;Senior Program Manager</SPAN> 
<BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;Windows Security, 
Standards</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt;</SPAN> 
<BR><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN 
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt;</SPAN> <o:p></o:p></P></DIV></DIV>
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From: Sharon Boeyen <sharon.boeyen@entrust.com>
To: "'Stefan Santesson'" <stefans@microsoft.com>, Sharon Boeyen <sharon.boeyen@entrust.com>, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs
Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2007 09:09:25 -0500 
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Stefan I really don't think you can state where this will or will not be
used in the future. Naturally you know where you want to use it, but
software only enables a facility and the customer decides when and how to
use it. 
 
Whether this scheme could possibly be useful in some cases is not my point.
My point is that current deployments seem to be working fine without it and
I don't want to see those interfered with just because some CA they may have
cross certified with decided to put certificates inside their CRLS. Back to
Denis' point - there is no need to impose this in the way you've proposed. 
 
Earlier I (and others including Dave Kemp) suggested a "package" that
includes the CRL, and the certificate in question as an 'extra' that a CA
could publish in addition to a regular CRL. That "package could be published
in a separate directory attribute and/or an HTTP accessible file. It could
be pointed to from within the certificate just as the CRL currently is. That
could be done either by extending the CRLDP or adding a new pointer
extension or adding a new method to the AIA extension. That type of approach
gives you what you want but does not in any way interfere with clients who
do not want and do not need to retrieve that bloated CRL. 
 
Also, you haven't addressed the question about what happens when more than
one certificate is needed. If a CRL includes more than one certificate (e.g.
the CRL issuer did one or more key rollovers then CRL gets bloated a lot
bigger than you suggested. I don't want to debate how often a key gets
rolled over either however I have definitely seen instances in real world
deployments where a key has been rolled very often in a very short period of
time (regardless of whether the reason for rolling it was a good one or not
- it has happened). Also, regardless of the size of the "bloat" I'm saying
that in most cases the clients will already have the certificates in
question and this bloat will cause them extra processing in managing their
certificate caches etc unnecessarily. The client should have a choice as to
whether to download the certificate or not.
 
I don't understand why you're so opposed to the "package" solution. 
 
Cheers,
Sharon 
-----Original Message-----
From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:stefans@microsoft.com] 
Sent: Friday, January 05, 2007 8:01 AM
To: Sharon Boeyen; Russ Housley
Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs



BM__MailEndComposeWe are only talking about an extra 16K at most. The
download time is the absolute most cases is negligible. 

For those cases where this solution makes sense, the network bandwidth issue
is not a problem.

 

For the cases where this would be an issue, this solution would not be used.

 

On the contrary, in some networks and scenarios, this will improve
performance. Especially in high latency networks with PKI based peer-peer
authentication where an extra retrieval cost way more performance than the
expanded CRL size.

 

Also, many clients are configured to pre-fetch CRL:s before they are used,
using idle time on the network at no extra cost.

 

 

Stefan Santesson

Senior Program Manager

Windows Security, Standards

 

From: Sharon Boeyen [mailto:sharon.boeyen@entrust.com] 
Sent: den 4 januari 2007 17:36
To: Stefan Santesson; Russ Housley
Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs

 

I still think wasted bandwidth is also an issue. Forcing the download of
'fat' CRLs on clients when, in many cases, those clients already have the
certificates locally that caused the bloating of the CRL, is an unnecessary
waste.

-----Original Message----- 
From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org
<mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org> ] On Behalf Of Stefan Santesson 
Sent: Wednesday, January 03, 2007 9:58 AM 
To: Russ Housley 
Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org 
Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs 

 

Russ, 

In theory, the CA can put different pointers to different CRLs in each
certificate if some certificates are prime targets for frequent checking.
But I don't think that is a common scenario.

My point is that in order to allow free selection of CRLs, you would have to
add capability to the CDP extension rather than to the CRL. I don't think
such effort is worth the trouble.

I'm convinced that including certs in a CRL will only be made in situations
where it in the sum of all, helps increase efficiency and where the extra
bandwidth consumed is not an issue.

I read the critique of this idea as not really be a bandwidth issue, but
that some implementers simply don't want to be faced with the requirement to
implement this feature. But I don't see that they have to. A CRL with certs
in a non-critical extension should work just as well in current clients as
any current CRL without certs. The extension can simply be ignored.

This is not a necessary feature, but a practical one offering performance
improvements in some environments at no loss of interoperability.

 

Stefan Santesson 
Senior Program Manager 
Windows Security, Standards 

 

> -----Original Message----- 
> From: Russ Housley [mailto:housley@vigilsec.com
<mailto:housley@vigilsec.com> ] 
> Sent: den 21 december 2006 16:19 
> To: Stefan Santesson 
> Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org 
> Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs 
> 
> Stefan: 
> 
> If the CA chooses to offer both, how can the RP determine which one it 
> will get?  Does the CA post them in different LDAP attributes? 
> 
> Russ 
> 
> At 08:00 AM 12/21/2006, Stefan Santesson wrote: 
> 
> >As with anything else, the relying party can get what the CA offers. 
> > 
> >I don't think there is any realistic scenario where the CA has a 
> >reason to offer CRLs both with and without certificates. To offer 
> >this capability to RP is however not a matter for this protocol. It 
> >would be a matter for the CRL referencing model, i.e. CDP and/or 
> >directory schema. 
> > 
> >I don't think that extra complexity however is very useful. 
> > 
> >Stefan Santesson 
> >Senior Program Manager 
> >Windows Security, Standards 
> > 
> > 
> > > -----Original Message----- 
> > > From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-
<mailto:owner-ietf->  
> > > pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Denis Pinkas 
> > > Sent: den 20 december 2006 17:05 
> > > To: ietf-pkix@imc.org 
> > > Subject: Re: Certificates in CRLs 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > It is necessary to provide relying parties with the choice to get 
> > > : 
> > > 
> > >   - CRLs "as usual", or 
> > >   - CRLs that carry that new extension. 
> > > 
> > > The current proposal does not allow for it. 
> > > 
> > > Until the draft is changed, I am against the addition of this work 
> item 
> > > to the program of the PKIX WG. 
> > > 
> > > Denis 
> > > 
> > > 
> ______________________________________________________________________ 
> _ 
> > > _______ 
> > > 
> > > >Since last IETF a new draft was posted: 
> > > >http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-santesson-pkix-vccrl-
<http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-santesson-pkix-vccrl->  
> 00.txt 
> > > > 
> > > >There is a request to add this draft to the PKIX work and I would 
> > > encourage to start the discussion about this decision in this 
> thread. 
> > > > 
> > > >Stefan Santesson 
> > > >Senior Program Manager 
> > > >Windows Security, Standards 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > 


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<BODY lang=3DSV vLink=3Dpurple link=3Dblue>
<DIV><SPAN class=3D427185713-05012007><FONT face=3DArial =
color=3D#0000ff size=3D2>Stefan=20
I really don't think you can state where this will or will not be used =
in the=20
future. Naturally you know where you want to use it, but software only =
enables a=20
facility and the customer decides when and how to use it. =
</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=3D427185713-05012007><FONT face=3DArial =
color=3D#0000ff=20
size=3D2></FONT></SPAN>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=3D427185713-05012007><FONT face=3DArial =
color=3D#0000ff=20
size=3D2>Whether this scheme could possibly be useful in some cases is =
not my=20
point. My point is that current deployments seem to be working fine =
without it=20
and I don't want to see those interfered with just because some CA they =
may have=20
cross certified with decided to put certificates inside their CRLS. =
Back to=20
Denis' point - there is no need to impose this in the way you've =
proposed.=20
</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=3D427185713-05012007><FONT face=3DArial =
color=3D#0000ff=20
size=3D2></FONT></SPAN>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=3D427185713-05012007><FONT face=3DArial =
color=3D#0000ff=20
size=3D2>Earlier I (and others including Dave Kemp) suggested a =
"package" that=20
includes the CRL, and the certificate in question as an 'extra' that a =
CA could=20
publish in addition to a regular CRL. That "package could be published =
in a=20
separate directory attribute and/or an HTTP accessible file. It could =
be pointed=20
to from within the certificate&nbsp;just as the CRL currently is. That =
could be=20
done either by extending the CRLDP or adding a new&nbsp;pointer =
extension or=20
adding a new method to the AIA extension. That type of approach gives =
you what=20
you want but does not in any way interfere with clients who do not want =
and do=20
not need to retrieve that bloated CRL.&nbsp;</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=3D427185713-05012007></SPAN>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=3D427185713-05012007><FONT face=3DArial =
color=3D#0000ff size=3D2>Also,=20
you haven't addressed the question about&nbsp;what happens =
when&nbsp;more than=20
one certificate is needed. If a CRL includes more than one=20
certificate&nbsp;(e.g. the CRL issuer did one or more key =
rollovers&nbsp;then=20
CRL gets bloated a lot bigger than you suggested.&nbsp;I don't want to =
debate=20
how often a key gets rolled over either however I have definitely seen =
instances=20
in real world deployments where a key has been rolled very often in a =
very short=20
period of time (regardless of whether the reason for rolling it was a =
good one=20
or not - it has happened). Also, regardless of the size of the "bloat" =
I'm=20
saying that in most cases the clients will already have the =
certificates in=20
question and this bloat will cause them extra processing in managing =
their=20
certificate caches etc unnecessarily. The client should have a choice =
as to=20
whether to download the certificate or not.</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=3D427185713-05012007></SPAN>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=3D427185713-05012007><FONT face=3DArial =
color=3D#0000ff size=3D2>I=20
don't understand why you're so opposed to the "package"=20
solution.&nbsp;</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=3D427185713-05012007></SPAN>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=3D427185713-05012007><FONT face=3DArial =
color=3D#0000ff=20
size=3D2>Cheers,</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=3D427185713-05012007><FONT face=3DArial =
color=3D#0000ff=20
size=3D2>Sharon</FONT>&nbsp;</SPAN></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DTahoma size=3D2>-----Original =
Message-----<BR><B>From:</B> Stefan=20
Santesson [mailto:stefans@microsoft.com] <BR><B>Sent:</B> Friday, =
January 05,=20
2007 8:01 AM<BR><B>To:</B> Sharon Boeyen; Russ Housley<BR><B>Cc:</B>=20
ietf-pkix@imc.org<BR><B>Subject:</B> RE: Certificates in=20
CRLs<BR><BR></DIV></FONT>
<BLOCKQUOTE dir=3Dltr style=3D"MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px">
  <DIV class=3DSection1>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><A name=3D_MailEndCompose><SPAN lang=3DEN-US=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: =
'Calibri','sans-serif'">We=20
  are only talking about an extra 16K at most. The download time is the =
absolute=20
  most cases is negligible. <o:p></o:p></SPAN></A></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><SPAN lang=3DEN-US=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: =
'Calibri','sans-serif'">For=20
  those cases where this solution makes sense, the network bandwidth =
issue is=20
  not a problem.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><SPAN lang=3DEN-US=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: 'Calibri','sans=
-serif'"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><SPAN lang=3DEN-US=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: =
'Calibri','sans-serif'">For=20
  the cases where this would be an issue, this solution would not be=20
  used.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><SPAN lang=3DEN-US=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: =
'Calibri','sans-serif'"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><SPAN lang=3DEN-US=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: =
'Calibri','sans-serif'">On=20
  the contrary, in some networks and scenarios, this will improve =
performance.=20
  Especially in high latency networks with PKI based peer-peer =
authentication=20
  where an extra retrieval cost way more performance than the expanded =
CRL=20
  size.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><SPAN lang=3DEN-US=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: =
'Calibri','sans-serif'"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><SPAN lang=3DEN-US=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: =
'Calibri','sans-serif'">Also,=20
  many clients are configured to pre-fetch CRL:s before they are used, =
using=20
  idle time on the network at no extra cost.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><SPAN lang=3DEN-US=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: =
'Calibri','sans-serif'"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><SPAN lang=3DEN-US=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: =
'Calibri','sans-serif'"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></P>
  <DIV>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><B><SPAN lang=3DEN-GB=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: maroon; FONT-FAMILY: =
'Arial','sans-serif'">Stefan=20
  Santesson</SPAN></B><SPAN lang=3DEN-GB=20
  style=3D"COLOR: #1f497d"><o:p></o:p></SPAN></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><SPAN lang=3DEN-GB=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: #400040; FONT-FAMILY: =
'Arial','sans-serif'">Senior=20
  Program Manager</SPAN><SPAN lang=3DEN-GB=20
  style=3D"COLOR: navy"><o:p></o:p></SPAN></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><B><SPAN lang=3DEN-GB=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: #400040; FONT-FAMILY: =
'Arial','sans-serif'">Windows=20
  Security, Standards</SPAN></B><SPAN lang=3DEN-US=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: =
'Calibri','sans-serif'"><o:p></o:p></SPAN></P></DIV>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><SPAN lang=3DEN-US=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: #1f497d; FONT-FAMILY: =
'Calibri','sans-serif'"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></P>
  <DIV=20
  style=3D"BORDER-RIGHT: medium none; PADDING-RIGHT: 0cm; BORDER-TOP: =
medium none; PADDING-LEFT: 4pt; PADDING-BOTTOM: 0cm; BORDER-LEFT: blue =
1.5pt solid; PADDING-TOP: 0cm; BORDER-BOTTOM: medium none">
  <DIV>
  <DIV=20
  style=3D"BORDER-RIGHT: medium none; PADDING-RIGHT: 0cm; BORDER-TOP: =
#b5c4df 1pt solid; PADDING-LEFT: 0cm; PADDING-BOTTOM: 0cm; BORDER-LEFT: =
medium none; PADDING-TOP: 3pt; BORDER-BOTTOM: medium none">
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><B><SPAN lang=3DEN-US=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: =
'Tahoma','sans-serif'">From:</SPAN></B><SPAN=20
  lang=3DEN-US style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: =
'Tahoma','sans-serif'"> Sharon=20
  Boeyen [mailto:sharon.boeyen@entrust.com] <BR><B>Sent:</B> den 4 =
januari 2007=20
  17:36<BR><B>To:</B> Stefan Santesson; Russ Housley<BR><B>Cc:</B>=20
  ietf-pkix@imc.org<BR><B>Subject:</B> RE: Certificates in=20
  CRLs<o:p></o:p></SPAN></P></DIV></DIV>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></P>
  <P><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">I still think wasted bandwidth is =
also an=20
  issue. Forcing the download of 'fat' CRLs on clients when, in many =
cases,=20
  those clients already have the certificates locally that caused the =
bloating=20
  of the CRL, is an unnecessary waste.</SPAN><o:p></o:p></P>
  <P><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">-----Original Message-----</SPAN> =
<BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [<A=20
  =
href=3D"mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org">mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail=
.imc.org</A>]=20
  On Behalf Of Stefan Santesson</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: =
10pt">Sent:=20
  Wednesday, January 03, 2007 9:58 AM</SPAN> <BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">To: Russ Housley</SPAN> <BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org</SPAN> <BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs</SPAN>=20
  <o:p></o:p></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN-BOTTOM: =
12pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></P>
  <P><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">Russ,</SPAN> <o:p></o:p></P>
  <P><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">In theory, the CA can put =
different pointers=20
  to different CRLs in each certificate if some certificates are prime =
targets=20
  for frequent checking. But I don't think that is a common=20
  scenario.</SPAN><o:p></o:p></P>
  <P><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">My point is that in order to allow =
free=20
  selection of CRLs, you would have to add capability to the CDP =
extension=20
  rather than to the CRL. I don't think such effort is worth the=20
  trouble.</SPAN><o:p></o:p></P>
  <P><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">I'm convinced that including certs =
in a CRL=20
  will only be made in situations where it in the sum of all, helps =
increase=20
  efficiency and where the extra bandwidth consumed is not an=20
  issue.</SPAN><o:p></o:p></P>
  <P><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">I read the critique of this idea =
as not=20
  really be a bandwidth issue, but that some implementers simply don't =
want to=20
  be faced with the requirement to implement this feature. But I don't =
see that=20
  they have to. A CRL with certs in a non-critical extension should =
work just as=20
  well in current clients as any current CRL without certs. The =
extension can=20
  simply be ignored.</SPAN><o:p></o:p></P>
  <P><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">This is not a necessary feature, =
but a=20
  practical one offering performance improvements in some environments =
at no=20
  loss of interoperability.</SPAN><o:p></o:p></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></P>
  <P><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">Stefan Santesson</SPAN> <BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">Senior Program Manager</SPAN> <BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">Windows Security, Standards</SPAN> =
<o:p></o:p></P>
  <P class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></P>
  <P><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; -----Original =
Message-----</SPAN>=20
  <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; From: Russ Housley [<A=20
  =
href=3D"mailto:housley@vigilsec.com">mailto:housley@vigilsec.com</A>]</S=
PAN>=20
  <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; Sent: den 21 december 2006 =
16:19</SPAN>=20
  <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; To: Stefan Santesson</SPAN> =
<BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org</SPAN> <BR><SPAN =

  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; Subject: RE: Certificates in =
CRLs</SPAN>=20
  <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; Stefan:</SPAN> <BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: =
10pt">&gt; If=20
  the CA chooses to offer both, how can the RP determine which one it=20
  </SPAN><BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; will get?&nbsp; Does =
the CA post=20
  them in different LDAP attributes?</SPAN> <BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: =
10pt">&gt;=20
  Russ</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN =

  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; At 08:00 AM 12/21/2006, Stefan =
Santesson=20
  wrote:</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt;</SPAN> =
<BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt;As with anything else, the relying =
party can=20
  get what the CA offers.</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: =
10pt">&gt;=20
  &gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt;I don't =
think there is=20
  any realistic scenario where the CA has a </SPAN><BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt;reason to offer CRLs both with and =
without=20
  certificates. To offer </SPAN><BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: =
10pt">&gt; &gt;this=20
  capability to RP is however not a matter for this protocol. It=20
  </SPAN><BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt;would be a matter =
for the=20
  CRL referencing model, i.e. CDP and/or </SPAN><BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt;directory schema.</SPAN> <BR><SPAN =

  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt;I don't think that extra =
complexity however=20
  is very useful.</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; =
&gt;</SPAN>=20
  <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt;Stefan Santesson</SPAN> =
<BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt;Senior Program Manager</SPAN> =
<BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt;Windows Security, Standards</SPAN> =
<BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; -----Original =
Message-----</SPAN>=20
  <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; From:=20
  owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [<A=20
  href=3D"mailto:owner-ietf-">mailto:owner-ietf-</A> </SPAN><BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf =
Of Denis=20
  Pinkas</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; =
Sent: den 20=20
  december 2006 17:05</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; =
&gt; &gt;=20
  To: ietf-pkix@imc.org</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; =
&gt; &gt;=20
  Subject: Re: Certificates in CRLs</SPAN> <BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; It is necessary to provide =
relying=20
  parties with the choice to get </SPAN><BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: =
10pt">&gt;=20
  &gt; &gt; :</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; =
&gt;</SPAN>=20
  <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; - CRLs =
"as=20
  usual", or</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; =
&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;=20
  - CRLs that carry that new extension.</SPAN> <BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; The current proposal does =
not allow for=20
  it.</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt;</SPAN> =
<BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; Until the draft is changed, =
I am=20
  against the addition of this work</SPAN> <BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; item</SPAN> <BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; to the program of the PKIX =
WG.</SPAN>=20
  <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; Denis</SPAN> <BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt;=20
  =
______________________________________________________________________</=
SPAN>=20
  <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; _</SPAN> <BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; _______</SPAN> <BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;Since last IETF a new =
draft was=20
  posted:</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; =
&gt;<A=20
  =
href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-santesson-pkix-vccrl-"=
=20
  =
target=3D_blank>http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-santesson-pkix=
-vccrl-</A></SPAN>=20
  <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; 00.txt</SPAN> <BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;There is a request to =
add this=20
  draft to the PKIX work and I would</SPAN> <BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; encourage to start the =
discussion about=20
  this decision in this</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; =

  thread.</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; =
&gt;</SPAN>=20
  <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;Stefan =
Santesson</SPAN>=20
  <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;Senior Program =

  Manager</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt; =
&gt;Windows=20
  Security, Standards</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; =
&gt;=20
  &gt;</SPAN> <BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt;</SPAN> =
<BR><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt">&gt; &gt; &gt;</SPAN>=20
<o:p></o:p></P></DIV></DIV></BLOCKQUOTE></BODY></HTML>

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From: Stefan Santesson <stefans@microsoft.com>
To: Sharon Boeyen <sharon.boeyen@entrust.com>, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
CC: "ietf-pkix@imc.org" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>
Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2007 13:01:20 +0000
Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs
Thread-Topic: Certificates in CRLs
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We are only talking about an extra 16K at most. The download time is the ab=
solute most cases is negligible.
For those cases where this solution makes sense, the network bandwidth issu=
e is not a problem.

For the cases where this would be an issue, this solution would not be used=
.

On the contrary, in some networks and scenarios, this will improve performa=
nce. Especially in high latency networks with PKI based peer-peer authentic=
ation where an extra retrieval cost way more performance than the expanded =
CRL size.

Also, many clients are configured to pre-fetch CRL:s before they are used, =
using idle time on the network at no extra cost.


Stefan Santesson
Senior Program Manager
Windows Security, Standards

From: Sharon Boeyen [mailto:sharon.boeyen@entrust.com]
Sent: den 4 januari 2007 17:36
To: Stefan Santesson; Russ Housley
Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs


I still think wasted bandwidth is also an issue. Forcing the download of 'f=
at' CRLs on clients when, in many cases, those clients already have the cer=
tificates locally that caused the bloating of the CRL, is an unnecessary wa=
ste.

-----Original Message-----
From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] On=
 Behalf Of Stefan Santesson
Sent: Wednesday, January 03, 2007 9:58 AM
To: Russ Housley
Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs


Russ,

In theory, the CA can put different pointers to different CRLs in each cert=
ificate if some certificates are prime targets for frequent checking. But I=
 don't think that is a common scenario.

My point is that in order to allow free selection of CRLs, you would have t=
o add capability to the CDP extension rather than to the CRL. I don't think=
 such effort is worth the trouble.

I'm convinced that including certs in a CRL will only be made in situations=
 where it in the sum of all, helps increase efficiency and where the extra =
bandwidth consumed is not an issue.

I read the critique of this idea as not really be a bandwidth issue, but th=
at some implementers simply don't want to be faced with the requirement to =
implement this feature. But I don't see that they have to. A CRL with certs=
 in a non-critical extension should work just as well in current clients as=
 any current CRL without certs. The extension can simply be ignored.

This is not a necessary feature, but a practical one offering performance i=
mprovements in some environments at no loss of interoperability.


Stefan Santesson
Senior Program Manager
Windows Security, Standards


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Russ Housley [mailto:housley@vigilsec.com]
> Sent: den 21 december 2006 16:19
> To: Stefan Santesson
> Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
> Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs
>
> Stefan:
>
> If the CA chooses to offer both, how can the RP determine which one it
> will get?  Does the CA post them in different LDAP attributes?
>
> Russ
>
> At 08:00 AM 12/21/2006, Stefan Santesson wrote:
>
> >As with anything else, the relying party can get what the CA offers.
> >
> >I don't think there is any realistic scenario where the CA has a
> >reason to offer CRLs both with and without certificates. To offer
> >this capability to RP is however not a matter for this protocol. It
> >would be a matter for the CRL referencing model, i.e. CDP and/or
> >directory schema.
> >
> >I don't think that extra complexity however is very useful.
> >
> >Stefan Santesson
> >Senior Program Manager
> >Windows Security, Standards
> >
> >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-
> > > pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Denis Pinkas
> > > Sent: den 20 december 2006 17:05
> > > To: ietf-pkix@imc.org
> > > Subject: Re: Certificates in CRLs
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > It is necessary to provide relying parties with the choice to get
> > > :
> > >
> > >   - CRLs "as usual", or
> > >   - CRLs that carry that new extension.
> > >
> > > The current proposal does not allow for it.
> > >
> > > Until the draft is changed, I am against the addition of this work
> item
> > > to the program of the PKIX WG.
> > >
> > > Denis
> > >
> > >
> ______________________________________________________________________
> _
> > > _______
> > >
> > > >Since last IETF a new draft was posted:
> > > >http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-santesson-pkix-vccrl-
> 00.txt
> > > >
> > > >There is a request to add this draft to the PKIX work and I would
> > > encourage to start the discussion about this decision in this
> thread.
> > > >
> > > >Stefan Santesson
> > > >Senior Program Manager
> > > >Windows Security, Standards
> > >
> > >
> > >

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<title>RE: Certificates in CRLs</title>
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<div class=3DSection1>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><a name=3D"_MailEndCompose"><span lang=3DEN-US style=
=3D'font-size:
11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>We are only talkin=
g
about an extra 16K at most. The download time is the absolute most cases is=
 negligible.
<o:p></o:p></span></a></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>For those cases where this solution makes sense, the network
bandwidth issue is not a problem.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>For the cases where this would be an issue, this solution wo=
uld
not be used.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>On the contrary, in some networks and scenarios, this will i=
mprove
performance. Especially in high latency networks with PKI based peer-peer
authentication where an extra retrieval cost way more performance than the
expanded CRL size.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>Also, many clients are configured to pre-fetch CRL:s before =
they
are used, using idle time on the network at no extra cost.<o:p></o:p></span=
></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-f=
amily:
"Arial","sans-serif";color:maroon'>Stefan Santesson</span></b><span lang=3D=
EN-GB
style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:#400040'>Senior Program Manager</span><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'col=
or:navy'><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-f=
amily:
"Arial","sans-serif";color:#400040'>Windows Security, Standards</span></b><=
span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p></o:p></span></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0cm 0cm 0cm =
4.0pt'>

<div>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0cm =
0cm 0cm'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-f=
amily:
"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span></b><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-siz=
e:10.0pt;
font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> Sharon Boeyen
[mailto:sharon.boeyen@entrust.com] <br>
<b>Sent:</b> den 4 januari 2007 17:36<br>
<b>To:</b> Stefan Santesson; Russ Housley<br>
<b>Cc:</b> ietf-pkix@imc.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> RE: Certificates in CRLs<o:p></o:p></span></p>

</div>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>I still think wasted bandwidth is also =
an
issue. Forcing the download of 'fat' CRLs on clients when, in many cases, t=
hose
clients already have the certificates locally that caused the bloating of t=
he
CRL, is an unnecessary waste.</span><o:p></o:p></p>

<p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>-----Original Message-----</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [<a
href=3D"mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org">mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.im=
c.org</a>]
On Behalf Of Stefan Santesson</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Sent: Wednesday, January 03, 2007 9:58 AM<=
/span>
<br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>To: Russ Housley</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs</span> <=
o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-bottom:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Russ,</span> <o:p></o:p></p>

<p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>In theory, the CA can put different poi=
nters
to different CRLs in each certificate if some certificates are prime target=
s
for frequent checking. But I don't think that is a common scenario.</span><=
o:p></o:p></p>

<p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>My point is that in order to allow free
selection of CRLs, you would have to add capability to the CDP extension ra=
ther
than to the CRL. I don't think such effort is worth the trouble.</span><o:p=
></o:p></p>

<p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>I'm convinced that including certs in a=
 CRL
will only be made in situations where it in the sum of all, helps increase
efficiency and where the extra bandwidth consumed is not an issue.</span><o=
:p></o:p></p>

<p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>I read the critique of this idea as not
really be a bandwidth issue, but that some implementers simply don't want t=
o be
faced with the requirement to implement this feature. But I don't see that =
they
have to. A CRL with certs in a non-critical extension should work just as w=
ell
in current clients as any current CRL without certs. The extension can simp=
ly
be ignored.</span><o:p></o:p></p>

<p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>This is not a necessary feature, but a
practical one offering performance improvements in some environments at no =
loss
of interoperability.</span><o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Stefan Santesson</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Senior Program Manager</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Windows Security, Standards</span> <o:p></=
o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; -----Original Message-----</span> =
<br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; From: Russ Housley [<a
href=3D"mailto:housley@vigilsec.com">mailto:housley@vigilsec.com</a>]</span=
> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; Sent: den 21 december 2006 16:19</spa=
n> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; To: Stefan Santesson</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs</sp=
an> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; Stefan:</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; If the CA chooses to offer both, how =
can
the RP determine which one it </span><br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; will get?&nbsp; Does the CA post them=
 in
different LDAP attributes?</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; Russ</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; At 08:00 AM 12/21/2006, Stefan Santes=
son
wrote:</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;As with anything else, the relyin=
g
party can get what the CA offers.</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;I don't think there is any realis=
tic
scenario where the CA has a </span><br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;reason to offer CRLs both with an=
d
without certificates. To offer </span><br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;this capability to RP is however =
not a
matter for this protocol. It </span><br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;would be a matter for the CRL
referencing model, i.e. CDP and/or </span><br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;directory schema.</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;I don't think that extra complexi=
ty
however is very useful.</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;Stefan Santesson</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;Senior Program Manager</span> <br=
>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;Windows Security, Standards</span=
> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; -----Original Message-----<=
/span>
<br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; From:
owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [<a href=3D"mailto:owner-ietf-">mailto:owner-i=
etf-</a>
</span><br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behal=
f Of
Denis Pinkas</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; Sent: den 20 december 2006 =
17:05</span>
<br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; To: ietf-pkix@imc.org</span=
> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; Subject: Re: Certificates i=
n CRLs</span>
<br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; It is necessary to provide
relying parties with the choice to get </span><br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; :</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; - CRLs &quot;as
usual&quot;, or</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; - CRLs that car=
ry
that new extension.</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; The current proposal does n=
ot
allow for it.</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; Until the draft is changed,=
 I am
against the addition of this work</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; item</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; to the program of the PKIX =
WG.</span>
<br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; Denis</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt;
______________________________________________________________________</spa=
n> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; _</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; _______</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;Since last IETF a new d=
raft
was posted:</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;<a
href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-santesson-pkix-vccrl-"
target=3D"_blank">http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-santesson-pkix-=
vccrl-</a></span>
<br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; 00.txt</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;There is a request to a=
dd
this draft to the PKIX work and I would</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; encourage to start the disc=
ussion
about this decision in this</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; thread.</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;Stefan Santesson</span>=
 <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;Senior Program Manager<=
/span>
<br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;Windows Security, Stand=
ards</span>
<br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <br>
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&gt; &gt; &gt;</span> <o:p></o:p></p>

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From: Sharon Boeyen <sharon.boeyen@entrust.com>
To: "'Stefan Santesson'" <stefans@microsoft.com>, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs
Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2007 11:36:04 -0500 
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I still think wasted bandwidth is also an issue. Forcing the download of
'fat' CRLs on clients when, in many cases, those clients already have the
certificates locally that caused the bloating of the CRL, is an unnecessary
waste.

-----Original Message-----
From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org] On
Behalf Of Stefan Santesson
Sent: Wednesday, January 03, 2007 9:58 AM
To: Russ Housley
Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs



Russ,

In theory, the CA can put different pointers to different CRLs in each
certificate if some certificates are prime targets for frequent checking.
But I don't think that is a common scenario.

My point is that in order to allow free selection of CRLs, you would have to
add capability to the CDP extension rather than to the CRL. I don't think
such effort is worth the trouble.

I'm convinced that including certs in a CRL will only be made in situations
where it in the sum of all, helps increase efficiency and where the extra
bandwidth consumed is not an issue.

I read the critique of this idea as not really be a bandwidth issue, but
that some implementers simply don't want to be faced with the requirement to
implement this feature. But I don't see that they have to. A CRL with certs
in a non-critical extension should work just as well in current clients as
any current CRL without certs. The extension can simply be ignored.

This is not a necessary feature, but a practical one offering performance
improvements in some environments at no loss of interoperability.


Stefan Santesson
Senior Program Manager
Windows Security, Standards


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Russ Housley [mailto:housley@vigilsec.com]
> Sent: den 21 december 2006 16:19
> To: Stefan Santesson
> Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
> Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs
>
> Stefan:
>
> If the CA chooses to offer both, how can the RP determine which one it 
> will get?  Does the CA post them in different LDAP attributes?
>
> Russ
>
> At 08:00 AM 12/21/2006, Stefan Santesson wrote:
>
> >As with anything else, the relying party can get what the CA offers.
> >
> >I don't think there is any realistic scenario where the CA has a 
> >reason to offer CRLs both with and without certificates. To offer 
> >this capability to RP is however not a matter for this protocol. It 
> >would be a matter for the CRL referencing model, i.e. CDP and/or 
> >directory schema.
> >
> >I don't think that extra complexity however is very useful.
> >
> >Stefan Santesson
> >Senior Program Manager
> >Windows Security, Standards
> >
> >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf- 
> > > pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Denis Pinkas
> > > Sent: den 20 december 2006 17:05
> > > To: ietf-pkix@imc.org
> > > Subject: Re: Certificates in CRLs
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > It is necessary to provide relying parties with the choice to get 
> > > :
> > >
> > >   - CRLs "as usual", or
> > >   - CRLs that carry that new extension.
> > >
> > > The current proposal does not allow for it.
> > >
> > > Until the draft is changed, I am against the addition of this work
> item
> > > to the program of the PKIX WG.
> > >
> > > Denis
> > >
> > >
> ______________________________________________________________________
> _
> > > _______
> > >
> > > >Since last IETF a new draft was posted:
> > > >http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-santesson-pkix-vccrl-
> 00.txt
> > > >
> > > >There is a request to add this draft to the PKIX work and I would
> > > encourage to start the discussion about this decision in this
> thread.
> > > >
> > > >Stefan Santesson
> > > >Senior Program Manager
> > > >Windows Security, Standards
> > >
> > >
> > >


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charset=3Dus-ascii">
<META NAME=3D"Generator" CONTENT=3D"MS Exchange Server version =
5.5.2658.34">
<TITLE>RE: Certificates in CRLs</TITLE>
</HEAD>
<BODY>

<P><FONT SIZE=3D2>I still think wasted bandwidth is also an issue. =
Forcing the download of 'fat' CRLs on clients when, in many cases, =
those clients already have the certificates locally that caused the =
bloating of the CRL, is an unnecessary waste.</FONT></P>

<P><FONT SIZE=3D2>-----Original Message-----</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [<A =
HREF=3D"mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org">mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@mail=
.imc.org</A>] On Behalf Of Stefan Santesson</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>Sent: Wednesday, January 03, 2007 9:58 AM</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>To: Russ Housley</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs</FONT>
</P>
<BR>
<BR>

<P><FONT SIZE=3D2>Russ,</FONT>
</P>

<P><FONT SIZE=3D2>In theory, the CA can put different pointers to =
different CRLs in each certificate if some certificates are prime =
targets for frequent checking. But I don't think that is a common =
scenario.</FONT></P>

<P><FONT SIZE=3D2>My point is that in order to allow free selection of =
CRLs, you would have to add capability to the CDP extension rather than =
to the CRL. I don't think such effort is worth the trouble.</FONT></P>

<P><FONT SIZE=3D2>I'm convinced that including certs in a CRL will only =
be made in situations where it in the sum of all, helps increase =
efficiency and where the extra bandwidth consumed is not an =
issue.</FONT></P>

<P><FONT SIZE=3D2>I read the critique of this idea as not really be a =
bandwidth issue, but that some implementers simply don't want to be =
faced with the requirement to implement this feature. But I don't see =
that they have to. A CRL with certs in a non-critical extension should =
work just as well in current clients as any current CRL without certs. =
The extension can simply be ignored.</FONT></P>

<P><FONT SIZE=3D2>This is not a necessary feature, but a practical one =
offering performance improvements in some environments at no loss of =
interoperability.</FONT></P>
<BR>

<P><FONT SIZE=3D2>Stefan Santesson</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>Senior Program Manager</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>Windows Security, Standards</FONT>
</P>
<BR>

<P><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; -----Original Message-----</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; From: Russ Housley [<A =
HREF=3D"mailto:housley@vigilsec.com">mailto:housley@vigilsec.com</A>]</F=
ONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; Sent: den 21 december 2006 16:19</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; To: Stefan Santesson</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt;</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; Stefan:</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt;</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; If the CA chooses to offer both, how can the RP =
determine which one it </FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; will get?&nbsp; Does the CA post them in =
different LDAP attributes?</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt;</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; Russ</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt;</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; At 08:00 AM 12/21/2006, Stefan Santesson =
wrote:</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt;</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt;As with anything else, the relying party =
can get what the CA offers.</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt;</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt;I don't think there is any realistic =
scenario where the CA has a </FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt;reason to offer CRLs both with and without =
certificates. To offer </FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt;this capability to RP is however not a =
matter for this protocol. It </FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt;would be a matter for the CRL referencing =
model, i.e. CDP and/or </FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt;directory schema.</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt;</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt;I don't think that extra complexity however =
is very useful.</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt;</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt;Stefan Santesson</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt;Senior Program Manager</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt;Windows Security, Standards</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt;</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt;</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt; -----Original Message-----</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt; From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org =
[<A HREF=3D"mailto:owner-ietf-">mailto:owner-ietf-</A> </FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt; pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Denis =
Pinkas</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt; Sent: den 20 december 2006 =
17:05</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt; To: ietf-pkix@imc.org</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt; Subject: Re: Certificates in =
CRLs</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt;</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt;</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt;</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt; It is necessary to provide relying =
parties with the choice to get </FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt; :</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt;</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; - CRLs &quot;as =
usual&quot;, or</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; - CRLs that carry that =
new extension.</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt;</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt; The current proposal does not allow =
for it.</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt;</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt; Until the draft is changed, I am =
against the addition of this work</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; item</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt; to the program of the PKIX WG.</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt;</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt; Denis</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt;</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt;</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; =
______________________________________________________________________</=
FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; _</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt; _______</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt;</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;Since last IETF a new draft was =
posted:</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;<A =
HREF=3D"http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-santesson-pkix-vccrl-"=
 =
TARGET=3D"_blank">http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-santesson-pk=
ix-vccrl-</A></FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; 00.txt</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;There is a request to add this =
draft to the PKIX work and I would</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt; encourage to start the discussion =
about this decision in this</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; thread.</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;Stefan Santesson</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;Senior Program Manager</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;Windows Security, =
Standards</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt;</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt;</FONT>
<BR><FONT SIZE=3D2>&gt; &gt; &gt;</FONT>
</P>

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Hello All,

    It's my first question in this comunities, i'm study about x509 
extensions, my question is about this.

    Exist some way to create a new extension, or my private extension 
in the certificate x509 ?

Best Regards,

Luiz Lago.



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To: pkix <ietf-pkix@imc.org>
From: Alan Sill <Alan.Sill@ttu.edu>
Subject: Question on ns* cert type deprecation
Date: Wed, 3 Jan 2007 14:41:59 -0600
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> 2.4.4 nsCertType, nsComment, nsPolicyURL, nsRevocationURL
> The ns* attributes are deprecated and SHOULD NOT be included in any  
> new CA
> certificates.
> If they are included, though, these extensions MUST NOT be marked  
> critical.

Is this for CA certs only (i.e., ones used to identify a CA), or does  
it apply to end-entity certificates issued by a CA to identify a host  
or person also?

We have conditions in which a host may need to contact a service to  
request information, and for which we have been using a Netscape Cert  
Type of SSL Client to indicate that the host is allowed to do so.  I  
am assuming that the above extract from the IETF Certificate Profile  
document is intended to apply to CA certs only, and so our use of  
this field in EE certs is OK.  Or is there a more general way to do  
this?

Thanks,
Alan

====================================================================
:  Alan Sill, Texas Tech University  Office: Admin 233, MS 4-1167  :
:  e-mail: Alan.Sill@ttu.edu   ph. 806-742-4350  fax 806-742-4358  :
====================================================================



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From: "Denis Pinkas"<Denis.Pinkas@bull.net>
To: "ietf-pkix"<ietf-pkix@imc.org>
Subject: Re: Certificates in CRLs
Date: Wed, 3 Jan 2007 17:28:29 +0100
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From: Stefan Santesson <stefans@microsoft.com>
To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
CC: "ietf-pkix@imc.org" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>
Date: Wed, 3 Jan 2007 14:58:27 +0000
Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs
Thread-Topic: Certificates in CRLs
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Russ,

In theory, the CA can put different pointers to different CRLs in each certificate if some certificates are prime targets for frequent checking. But I don't think that is a common scenario.

My point is that in order to allow free selection of CRLs, you would have to add capability to the CDP extension rather than to the CRL. I don't think such effort is worth the trouble.

I'm convinced that including certs in a CRL will only be made in situations where it in the sum of all, helps increase efficiency and where the extra bandwidth consumed is not an issue.

I read the critique of this idea as not really be a bandwidth issue, but that some implementers simply don't want to be faced with the requirement to implement this feature. But I don't see that they have to. A CRL with certs in a non-critical extension should work just as well in current clients as any current CRL without certs. The extension can simply be ignored.

This is not a necessary feature, but a practical one offering performance improvements in some environments at no loss of interoperability.


Stefan Santesson
Senior Program Manager
Windows Security, Standards


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Russ Housley [mailto:housley@vigilsec.com]
> Sent: den 21 december 2006 16:19
> To: Stefan Santesson
> Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
> Subject: RE: Certificates in CRLs
>
> Stefan:
>
> If the CA chooses to offer both, how can the RP determine which one
> it will get?  Does the CA post them in different LDAP attributes?
>
> Russ
>
> At 08:00 AM 12/21/2006, Stefan Santesson wrote:
>
> >As with anything else, the relying party can get what the CA offers.
> >
> >I don't think there is any realistic scenario where the CA has a
> >reason to offer CRLs both with and without certificates.
> >To offer this capability to RP is however not a matter for this
> >protocol. It would be a matter for the CRL referencing model, i.e.
> >CDP and/or directory schema.
> >
> >I don't think that extra complexity however is very useful.
> >
> >Stefan Santesson
> >Senior Program Manager
> >Windows Security, Standards
> >
> >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-
> > > pkix@mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Denis Pinkas
> > > Sent: den 20 december 2006 17:05
> > > To: ietf-pkix@imc.org
> > > Subject: Re: Certificates in CRLs
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > It is necessary to provide relying parties with the choice to get :
> > >
> > >   - CRLs "as usual", or
> > >   - CRLs that carry that new extension.
> > >
> > > The current proposal does not allow for it.
> > >
> > > Until the draft is changed, I am against the addition of this work
> item
> > > to the program of the PKIX WG.
> > >
> > > Denis
> > >
> > >
> _______________________________________________________________________
> > > _______
> > >
> > > >Since last IETF a new draft was posted:
> > > >http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-santesson-pkix-vccrl-
> 00.txt
> > > >
> > > >There is a request to add this draft to the PKIX work and I would
> > > encourage to start the discussion about this decision in this
> thread.
> > > >
> > > >Stefan Santesson
> > > >Senior Program Manager
> > > >Windows Security, Standards
> > >
> > >
> > >




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