
From ppatterson@carillonis.com  Sun May  1 15:11:42 2011
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From: Patrick Patterson <ppatterson@carillonis.com>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] claimSigning EKU draft for PKIX WG Consideration
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Hi Matt:

Nor was I aware of your proposal.

If you want to work together on this, I'm all for it... from a quick =
look, it seems that we may be trying to accomplish the same thing.

Let's take this offline.

Best Regards,

Patrick.


On 2011-04-26, at 3:38 AM, Stefan Santesson wrote:

> Matt,
>=20
> In-line.
>=20
> On 11-04-26 4:20 AM, "Matt King" <mattking1@gmail.com> wrote:
>=20
>> Hi Stefan
>>=20
>> Thanks for your comments.  To address some of your concerns:
>>=20
>> 1. We were not aware of the competing proposal and will analyze it to
>> understand and proved more information about the differences
>> 2. We will fix the wrapping issue and missing ASN.1 section
>> 3. We will evaluate the feasibility and pracicality of defining a
>> claimSigning protocol
>=20
> That is not what I was suggesting. But if you feel that is desired =
then
> that should probably be a matter for another work group. My point is =
that
> different type of standards can put different requirements on EKU
> processing. A standard just defining EKU can for example not put
> requirements on clients not implementing the standard. So you need in =
any
> case clear up the requirements language of that section.
>=20
>> 4. I'll need to consult with my team about your metadata signing
>> comment, but I do believe that someone who signs metadata is making a
>> claim that the contents of the metadata are true.  While you could
>> execute this operation with a general purpose PKI, it would have more
>> meaning if the metadata is signed with keys associated with a cert
>> asserting a claimSigning EKU.
>=20
> Well, following your reasoning, all signing is claim signing. You can
> always say that you claim something in the act of signing. The term
> "Claims" however has been used lately in the industry in a much more
> defined manner. I'd say it has been used as a substitution for the =
term
> "Attribute" with a minor semantical twist that I never have =
understood,
> but in any case very close to attributes. SAML works with attributes =
and
> Information Cards with claims, even though they produce SAML =
assertions
> with attributes (identical to the claims) in the end. In the end of =
the
> day, the meta data catalog do not contain neither claims, nor =
attributes
> of subjects. It contain metadata about identity providers, service
> providers and attribute providers etc.
>=20
> I think you need to clarify your use of the term claims in your =
document
> to do what you suggest.
>=20
>=20
> /Stefan
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix

---
Patrick Patterson
President and Chief PKI Architect
Carillon Information Security Inc.
http://www.carillon.ca

tel: +1 514 485 0789
mobile: +1 514 994 8699
fax: +1 450 424 9559






From kent@bbn.com  Mon May  2 05:51:11 2011
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Date: Mon, 2 May 2011 08:11:28 -0400
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Recommended Language for a Security Issue
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At 5:52 PM -0700 4/19/11, Henry B. Hotz wrote:
>I still don't think I have this right.  My latest iteration on the 
>warning label to go in the draft-hotz-kx509 (not yet submitted) is:
>
>    The public key in the request is sent in the clear, and without any
>    guarantees that the requestor actually possesses the corresponding
>    private key.  Therefore the only appropriate uses of the returned
>    certificate are those where the subsequent use independently
>    guarantees that the user possesses the private key.  In particular
>    the returned certificate MUST NOT be used for durable signatures of
>    application data unless the application's use is appropriately
>    structured, or the identity of the signer is not important.
>
>In less formal terms: the public key in the request could be sniffed 
>by someone and they could send their own request with the same 
>public key.  Then there would exist two certs whose keys would match 
>something signed by the first requestor.  That might support a form 
>of plagiarism.

The last sentence is too narrow, in the general PKI case, although it 
might be less of an issue in the Kerberos case. I suggest you look at 
the literature re why proof-of-possesion is an important aspect of 
cert
request protocols.

Steve

From wwwrun@rfc-editor.org  Tue May  3 17:19:55 2011
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Subject: [pkix] RFC 6170 on Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure -- Certificate Image
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A new Request for Comments is now available in online RFC libraries.

        
        RFC 6170

        Title:      Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure 
                    -- Certificate Image 
        Author:     S. Santesson, R. Housley,
                    S. Bajaj, L. Rosenthol
        Status:     Standards Track
        Stream:     IETF
        Date:       May 2011
        Mailbox:    sts@aaa-sec.com, 
                    housley@vigilsec.com, 
                    siddharthietf@gmail.com, 
                    leonardr@adobe.com
        Pages:      12
        Characters: 25240
        Updates:    RFC3709

        I-D Tag:    draft-ietf-pkix-certimage-11.txt

        URL:        http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6170.txt

This document specifies a method to bind a visual representation of a
certificate in the form of a certificate image to a public key
certificate as defined in RFC 5280, by defining a new
"otherLogos" image type according to RFC 3709.  [STANDARDS-TRACK]

This document is a product of the Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) Working Group of the IETF.

This is now a Proposed Standard Protocol.

STANDARDS TRACK: This document specifies an Internet standards track
protocol for the Internet community,and requests discussion and suggestions
for improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the Internet
Official Protocol Standards (STD 1) for the standardization state and
status of this protocol.  Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

This announcement is sent to the IETF-Announce and rfc-dist lists.
To subscribe or unsubscribe, see
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unlimited distribution.


The RFC Editor Team
Association Management Solutions, LLC



From stefan@aaa-sec.com  Thu May  5 06:11:56 2011
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Date: Thu, 05 May 2011 15:11:47 +0200
From: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>
To: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
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Thread-Topic: Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols
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Subject: [pkix] Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols
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> This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.

--B_3387453110_9582092
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I'm curious about implementer opinions on what protocol you use/prefer for
certificate distribution of intermediary CA certificates.

Certs include the AIA extension to allow a verifier to walk up the path of
an EE cert. However, that is not a preferable solution.
In cross certification schemes among other's the intermediary cert that
chains to one of the RP trust anchor may be provided from a cross certifying
PKI, bridge CA or similar.

In such case, what is the most preferred protocol to distribute / make
available such intermediary certificates from one or more sources. I can
think of a number of possible alternatives like LDAP, XKMS, FTP of a PKCS#7
certs only file, etc.

/Stefan



--B_3387453110_9582092
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	charset="US-ASCII"
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<html><head></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: s=
pace; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-size:=
 14px; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><div>I'm curious about implemente=
r opinions on what protocol you use/prefer for certificate distribution of i=
ntermediary CA certificates.</div><div><br></div><div>Certs include the AIA =
extension to allow a verifier to walk up the path of an EE cert. However, th=
at is not a preferable solution.</div><div>In cross certification schemes am=
ong other's the intermediary cert that chains to one of the RP trust anchor =
may be provided from a cross certifying PKI, bridge CA or similar.</div><div=
><br></div><div>In such case, what is the most preferred protocol to distrib=
ute / make available such intermediary certificates from one or more sources=
. I can think of a number of possible alternatives like LDAP, XKMS, FTP of a=
 PKCS#7 certs only file, etc.</div><div><br></div><div>/Stefan</div></body><=
/html>

--B_3387453110_9582092--



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From: Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>
To: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>, "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Date: Thu, 5 May 2011 09:37:18 -0400
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Stefan,

Why would caIssuers field in AIA not be a preferred approach?

From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Ste=
fan Santesson
Sent: Thursday, May 05, 2011 9:12 AM
To: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: [pkix] Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols

I'm curious about implementer opinions on what protocol you use/prefer for =
certificate distribution of intermediary CA certificates.

Certs include the AIA extension to allow a verifier to walk up the path of =
an EE cert. However, that is not a preferable solution.
In cross certification schemes among other's the intermediary cert that cha=
ins to one of the RP trust anchor may be provided from a cross certifying P=
KI, bridge CA or similar.

In such case, what is the most preferred protocol to distribute / make avai=
lable such intermediary certificates from one or more sources. I can think =
of a number of possible alternatives like LDAP, XKMS, FTP of a PKCS#7 certs=
 only file, etc.

/Stefan

--_000_B83745DA469B7847811819C5005244AF0F41EEDCscygexch7cygnac_
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Server/PublishedLinksService" xmlns:Z=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:" xmlns:=
st=3D"&#1;" xmlns=3D"http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40"><head><meta http-equi=
v=3DContent-Type content=3D"text/html; charset=3Dus-ascii"><meta name=3DGen=
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<o:idmap v:ext=3D"edit" data=3D"1" />
</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=3DEN-US link=3Dblue vli=
nk=3Dpurple style=3D'word-wrap: break-word;-webkit-nbsp-mode: space;-webkit=
-line-break: after-white-space'><div class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNor=
mal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#=
1F497D'>Stefan,<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'fo=
nt-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</=
o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-fam=
ily:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>Why would caIssuers field in AIA no=
t be a preferred approach?<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o=
:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><div><div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #=
B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span style=
=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span></b><sp=
an style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> pkix-bounc=
es@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] <b>On Behalf Of </b>Stefan Sante=
sson<br><b>Sent:</b> Thursday, May 05, 2011 9:12 AM<br><b>To:</b> pkix@ietf=
.org<br><b>Subject:</b> [pkix] Intermediary CA certificate distribution pro=
tocols<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o=
:p></p><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-famil=
y:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>I'm curious about implementer opinion=
s on what protocol you use/prefer for certificate distribution of intermedi=
ary CA certificates.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><=
span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:bla=
ck'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=
=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>Certs =
include the AIA extension to allow a verifier to walk up the path of an EE =
cert. However, that is not a preferable solution.<o:p></o:p></span></p></di=
v><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Ca=
libri","sans-serif";color:black'>In cross certification schemes among other=
's the intermediary cert that chains to one of the RP trust anchor may be p=
rovided from a cross certifying PKI, bridge CA or similar.<o:p></o:p></span=
></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-f=
amily:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div=
><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Cal=
ibri","sans-serif";color:black'>In such case, what is the most preferred pr=
otocol to distribute / make available such intermediary certificates from o=
ne or more sources. I can think of a number of possible alternatives like L=
DAP, XKMS, FTP of a PKCS#7 certs only file, etc.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div=
><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Cal=
ibri","sans-serif";color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p c=
lass=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","san=
s-serif";color:black'>/Stefan<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div></body></htm=
l>=

--_000_B83745DA469B7847811819C5005244AF0F41EEDCscygexch7cygnac_--

From paul.hoffman@vpnc.org  Thu May  5 06:57:04 2011
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols
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On May 5, 2011, at 6:37 AM, Santosh Chokhani wrote:=20

> Why would caIssuers field in AIA not be a preferred approach?

Because you might not have network connectivity to all the locations =
listed in the AIA. For example, in IPsec, you might have only IP =
connectivity by IP address and not even have a DNS resolver until after =
the IPsec tunnel is set up.

You might also not want to announce to the world which CA certificates =
you want, in order to reduce tracking.

--Paul Hoffman


From stefan@aaa-sec.com  Thu May  5 07:03:23 2011
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From: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>
To: Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>, "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols
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> This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
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For the reasons pointed out by Paul, and because the relying party may use a
CA certificate that is not listed in the path assumed by the issuer.

The EE certificate issuer may assume the path   TA_A -> intCA_001 -> CA_002
-> EE

The certs used in this path are:
[TA_A -> TA_A]
[TA_A -> intCA_001]
[intCA_001 -> CA_002], and
[CA_002 -> EE]

The AIA in the EE cert will identify the location of the [intCA_001 ->
CA_002] cert.

The RP may not trust TA_A, but have internally cross certified CA_002 under
a trusted TA_X
The certs of this path are:
[TA_X -> TA_X]
[TA_X -> CA_002]
[CA_002 -> EE]

The EE cert is the same, thus the EE cert is still pointing to [intCA_001 ->
CA_002]. However this cert is not trusted by the RP. Thus AIA is not useful
for this case.

The question is. If I have a local Trust Anchor  (TA_X) that provides a
whole bunch of intermediary certificates as a service to local and/or remote
hosts that are configured to trust TA_X but not TA_A, then what is the best
protocol to use to make the intermediary certs issued by TA_X available to
other hosts in the network?

/Stefan



From:  Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>
Date:  Thu, 5 May 2011 09:37:18 -0400
To:  Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>, "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject:  RE: Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols

> Stefan,
>  
> Why would caIssuers field in AIA not be a preferred approach?
>  
> 
> From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Stefan
> Santesson
> Sent: Thursday, May 05, 2011 9:12 AM
> To: pkix@ietf.org
> Subject: [pkix] Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols
>  
> 
> I'm curious about implementer opinions on what protocol you use/prefer for
> certificate distribution of intermediary CA certificates.
> 
>  
> 
> Certs include the AIA extension to allow a verifier to walk up the path of an
> EE cert. However, that is not a preferable solution.
> 
> In cross certification schemes among other's the intermediary cert that chains
> to one of the RP trust anchor may be provided from a cross certifying PKI,
> bridge CA or similar.
> 
>  
> 
> In such case, what is the most preferred protocol to distribute / make
> available such intermediary certificates from one or more sources. I can think
> of a number of possible alternatives like LDAP, XKMS, FTP of a PKCS#7 certs
> only file, etc.
> 
>  
> 
> /Stefan



--B_3387456165_9760312
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	charset="US-ASCII"
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<html><head></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: s=
pace; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-size:=
 14px; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><div>For the reasons pointed out =
by Paul, and&nbsp;because the relying party may use a CA certificate that is=
 not listed in the path assumed by the issuer.</div><div><br></div><div>The =
EE certificate issuer may assume the path &nbsp; TA_A -&gt; intCA_001 -&gt; =
CA_002 -&gt; EE</div><div><br></div><div>The certs used in this path are:&nb=
sp;</div><div>[TA_A -&gt; TA_A]</div><div>[TA_A -&gt;&nbsp;intCA_001]</div><=
div>[intCA_001 -&gt; CA_002], and&nbsp;</div><div>[CA_002 -&gt; EE]</div><di=
v><br></div><div>The AIA in the EE cert will identify the location of the&nb=
sp;[intCA_001 -&gt; CA_002] cert.</div><div><br></div><div>The RP may not tr=
ust TA_A, but have internally cross certified CA_002 under a trusted TA_X</d=
iv><div>The certs of this path are:</div><div><div>[TA_X -&gt; TA_X]</div><d=
iv>[TA_X -&gt; CA_002]</div><div>[CA_002 -&gt; EE]</div></div><div><br></div=
><div>The EE cert is the same, thus the EE cert is still pointing to&nbsp;[i=
ntCA_001 -&gt; CA_002]. However this cert is not trusted by the RP. Thus AIA=
 is not useful for this case.</div><div><br></div><div>The question is. If I=
 have a local Trust Anchor &nbsp;(TA_X) that provides a whole bunch of inter=
mediary certificates as a service to local and/or remote hosts that are conf=
igured to trust TA_X but not TA_A, then what is the best protocol to use to =
make the intermediary certs issued by TA_X available to other hosts in the n=
etwork?</div><div><br></div><div>/Stefan</div><div><br></div><div><br></div>=
<div><br></div><span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION"><div style=3D"font-family:Calib=
ri; font-size:11pt; text-align:left; color:black; BORDER-BOTTOM: medium none=
; BORDER-LEFT: medium none; PADDING-BOTTOM: 0in; PADDING-LEFT: 0in; PADDING-=
RIGHT: 0in; BORDER-TOP: #b5c4df 1pt solid; BORDER-RIGHT: medium none; PADDIN=
G-TOP: 3pt"><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">From: </span> Santosh Chokhani &l=
t;<a href=3D"mailto:SChokhani@cygnacom.com">SChokhani@cygnacom.com</a>&gt;<br>=
<span style=3D"font-weight:bold">Date: </span> Thu, 5 May 2011 09:37:18 -0400<=
br><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">To: </span> Stefan Santesson &lt;<a href=3D"=
mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com">stefan@aaa-sec.com</a>&gt;, "<a href=3D"mailto:pkix=
@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>" &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.o=
rg</a>&gt;<br><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">Subject: </span> RE: Intermedia=
ry CA certificate distribution protocols<br></div><div><br></div><blockquote=
 id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid=
; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;"><div xmlns:v=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:=
vml" xmlns:o=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" xmlns:w=3D"urn:schemas-=
microsoft-com:office:word" xmlns:x=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:excel" =
xmlns:p=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:powerpoint" xmlns:a=3D"urn:schemas-m=
icrosoft-com:office:access" xmlns:dt=3D"uuid:C2F41010-65B3-11d1-A29F-00AA00C14=
882" xmlns:s=3D"uuid:BDC6E3F0-6DA3-11d1-A2A3-00AA00C14882" xmlns:rs=3D"urn:schem=
as-microsoft-com:rowset" xmlns:z=3D"#RowsetSchema" xmlns:b=3D"urn:schemas-micros=
oft-com:office:publisher" xmlns:ss=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:spreads=
heet" xmlns:c=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:component:spreadsheet" xmlns=
:odc=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:odc" xmlns:oa=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-=
com:office:activation" xmlns:html=3D"http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40" xmlns:q=3D=
"http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" xmlns:rtc=3D"http://microsoft.com/=
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<o:idmap v:ext=3D"edit" data=3D"1" />
</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--><div lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purp=
le" style=3D"word-wrap: break-word;-webkit-nbsp-mode: space;-webkit-line-break=
: after-white-space"><div class=3D"WordSection1"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span st=
yle=3D"font-size: 9pt; color: rgb(31, 73, 125); font-family: Arial, sans-serif=
; ">Stefan,<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size=
: 9pt; color: rgb(31, 73, 125); font-family: Arial, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp=
;</o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 9pt; color: r=
gb(31, 73, 125); font-family: Arial, sans-serif; ">Why would caIssuers field=
 in AIA not be a preferred approach?<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNorma=
l"><span style=3D"font-size: 9pt; color: rgb(31, 73, 125); font-family: Arial,=
 sans-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><div><div style=3D"border:none;bord=
er-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><=
b><span style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma, sans-serif; ">From:</sp=
an></b><span style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma, sans-serif; "> <a =
href=3D"mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org">pkix-bounces@ietf.org</a> [<a href=3D"mail=
to:pkix-bounces@ietf.org">mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org</a>] <b>On Behalf Of =
</b>Stefan Santesson<br><b>Sent:</b> Thursday, May 05, 2011 9:12 AM<br><b>To=
:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a><br><b>Subject:</b> [p=
kix] Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols<o:p></o:p></span></p=
></div></div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><div><p class=3D"MsoNor=
mal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, san=
s-serif; ">I'm curious about implementer opinions on what protocol you use/p=
refer for certificate distribution of intermediary CA certificates.<o:p></o:=
p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt;=
 color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: bl=
ack; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">Certs include the AIA extension to =
allow a verifier to walk up the path of an EE cert. However, that is not a p=
referable solution.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><sp=
an style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;=
 ">In cross certification schemes among other's the intermediary cert that c=
hains to one of the RP trust anchor may be provided from a cross certifying =
PKI, bridge CA or similar.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNorm=
al"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span =
style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">=
In such case, what is the most preferred protocol to distribute / make avail=
able such intermediary certificates from one or more sources. I can think of=
 a number of possible alternatives like LDAP, XKMS, FTP of a PKCS#7 certs on=
ly file, etc.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span sty=
le=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><o:=
p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-s=
ize: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">/Stefan<o:p><=
/o:p></span></p></div></div></div></div></blockquote></span></body></html>

--B_3387456165_9760312--



From SChokhani@cygnacom.com  Thu May  5 07:42:19 2011
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From: Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>
To: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
Date: Thu, 5 May 2011 10:42:16 -0400
Thread-Topic: [pkix] Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols
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How would a CA help you with that?

Why do you need access to all locations in the AIA?  You need access to one=
 only.

What would you do about CRL DP and OCSP?

Are you recommending IP address pointer.

If you want to reduce tracking, is this not an RP issue?

-----Original Message-----
From: Paul Hoffman [mailto:paul.hoffman@vpnc.org]=20
Sent: Thursday, May 05, 2011 9:57 AM
To: Santosh Chokhani
Cc: Stefan Santesson; pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols


On May 5, 2011, at 6:37 AM, Santosh Chokhani wrote:=20

> Why would caIssuers field in AIA not be a preferred approach?

Because you might not have network connectivity to all the locations listed=
 in the AIA. For example, in IPsec, you might have only IP connectivity by =
IP address and not even have a DNS resolver until after the IPsec tunnel is=
 set up.

You might also not want to announce to the world which CA certificates you =
want, in order to reduce tracking.

--Paul Hoffman


From rbarnes@bbn.com  Thu May  5 07:52:30 2011
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This is maybe slightly off-topic for this list, but I imagine that in =
practice that the more widely-used ways of distributing intermediate CA =
information are in applications: In TLS, you can put the whole chain in =
the Certificate payload.  I think there's a similar slot in IPsec, and =
of course in S/MIME, you can just append more certificates to the =
message. =20

--Richard


On May 5, 2011, at 3:11 PM, Stefan Santesson wrote:

> I'm curious about implementer opinions on what protocol you use/prefer =
for certificate distribution of intermediary CA certificates.
>=20
> Certs include the AIA extension to allow a verifier to walk up the =
path of an EE cert. However, that is not a preferable solution.
> In cross certification schemes among other's the intermediary cert =
that chains to one of the RP trust anchor may be provided from a cross =
certifying PKI, bridge CA or similar.
>=20
> In such case, what is the most preferred protocol to distribute / make =
available such intermediary certificates from one or more sources. I can =
think of a number of possible alternatives like LDAP, XKMS, FTP of a =
PKCS#7 certs only file, etc.
>=20
> /Stefan
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix


From stefan@aaa-sec.com  Thu May  5 08:01:12 2011
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From: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>
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Thread-Topic: Why use AIA Re: [pkix] Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols
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Santosh,

I respect the many interesting questions about the use of AIA, however
that is not the subject of my thread.
For my use-case AIA is not applicable.

I would suggest that any further discussion about AIA is done in this
separate thread. I hope that is OK.


/Stefan




On 11-05-05 4:42 PM, "Santosh Chokhani" <SChokhani@cygnacom.com> wrote:

>How would a CA help you with that?
>
>Why do you need access to all locations in the AIA?  You need access to
>one only.
>
>What would you do about CRL DP and OCSP?
>
>Are you recommending IP address pointer.
>
>If you want to reduce tracking, is this not an RP issue?
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Paul Hoffman [mailto:paul.hoffman@vpnc.org]
>Sent: Thursday, May 05, 2011 9:57 AM
>To: Santosh Chokhani
>Cc: Stefan Santesson; pkix@ietf.org
>Subject: Re: [pkix] Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols
>
>
>On May 5, 2011, at 6:37 AM, Santosh Chokhani wrote:
>
>> Why would caIssuers field in AIA not be a preferred approach?
>
>Because you might not have network connectivity to all the locations
>listed in the AIA. For example, in IPsec, you might have only IP
>connectivity by IP address and not even have a DNS resolver until after
>the IPsec tunnel is set up.
>
>You might also not want to announce to the world which CA certificates
>you want, in order to reduce tracking.
>
>--Paul Hoffman
>



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From: Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>
To: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>, "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Date: Thu, 5 May 2011 11:12:08 -0400
Thread-Topic: Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols
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References: <B83745DA469B7847811819C5005244AF0F41EEDC@scygexch7.cygnacom.com> <C9E87607.1D516%stefan@aaa-sec.com>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols
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SIA is a good use for that.

From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com]
Sent: Thursday, May 05, 2011 10:03 AM
To: Santosh Chokhani; pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols

For the reasons pointed out by Paul, and because the relying party may use =
a CA certificate that is not listed in the path assumed by the issuer.

The EE certificate issuer may assume the path   TA_A -> intCA_001 -> CA_002=
 -> EE

The certs used in this path are:
[TA_A -> TA_A]
[TA_A -> intCA_001]
[intCA_001 -> CA_002], and
[CA_002 -> EE]

The AIA in the EE cert will identify the location of the [intCA_001 -> CA_0=
02] cert.

The RP may not trust TA_A, but have internally cross certified CA_002 under=
 a trusted TA_X
The certs of this path are:
[TA_X -> TA_X]
[TA_X -> CA_002]
[CA_002 -> EE]

The EE cert is the same, thus the EE cert is still pointing to [intCA_001 -=
> CA_002]. However this cert is not trusted by the RP. Thus AIA is not usef=
ul for this case.

The question is. If I have a local Trust Anchor  (TA_X) that provides a who=
le bunch of intermediary certificates as a service to local and/or remote h=
osts that are configured to trust TA_X but not TA_A, then what is the best =
protocol to use to make the intermediary certs issued by TA_X available to =
other hosts in the network?

/Stefan



From: Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com<mailto:SChokhani@cygnacom.co=
m>>
Date: Thu, 5 May 2011 09:37:18 -0400
To: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com<mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com>>, "pkix=
@ietf.org<mailto:pkix@ietf.org>" <pkix@ietf.org<mailto:pkix@ietf.org>>
Subject: RE: Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols

Stefan,

Why would caIssuers field in AIA not be a preferred approach?

From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org<mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org> [mailto:pkix-boun=
ces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Stefan Santesson
Sent: Thursday, May 05, 2011 9:12 AM
To: pkix@ietf.org<mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: [pkix] Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols

I'm curious about implementer opinions on what protocol you use/prefer for =
certificate distribution of intermediary CA certificates.

Certs include the AIA extension to allow a verifier to walk up the path of =
an EE cert. However, that is not a preferable solution.
In cross certification schemes among other's the intermediary cert that cha=
ins to one of the RP trust anchor may be provided from a cross certifying P=
KI, bridge CA or similar.

In such case, what is the most preferred protocol to distribute / make avai=
lable such intermediary certificates from one or more sources. I can think =
of a number of possible alternatives like LDAP, XKMS, FTP of a PKCS#7 certs=
 only file, etc.

/Stefan

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nk=3Dpurple style=3D'word-wrap: break-word;-webkit-nbsp-mode: space;-webkit=
-line-break: after-white-space'><div class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNor=
mal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#=
993366'>SIA is a good use for that.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNorm=
al><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#9=
93366'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><div><div style=3D'border:none;border-to=
p:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal><b><s=
pan style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</spa=
n></b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> S=
tefan Santesson [mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com] <br><b>Sent:</b> Thursday, May =
05, 2011 10:03 AM<br><b>To:</b> Santosh Chokhani; pkix@ietf.org<br><b>Subje=
ct:</b> Re: Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols<o:p></o:p></=
span></p></div></div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><div><p clas=
s=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-s=
erif";color:black'>For the reasons pointed out by Paul, and&nbsp;because th=
e relying party may use a CA certificate that is not listed in the path ass=
umed by the issuer.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><s=
pan style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:blac=
k'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=
=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>The EE=
 certificate issuer may assume the path &nbsp; TA_A -&gt; intCA_001 -&gt; C=
A_002 -&gt; EE<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span s=
tyle=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'><o=
:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'fo=
nt-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>The certs us=
ed in this path are:&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNo=
rmal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";col=
or:black'>[TA_A -&gt; TA_A]<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoN=
ormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";co=
lor:black'>[TA_A -&gt;&nbsp;intCA_001]<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p c=
lass=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","san=
s-serif";color:black'>[intCA_001 -&gt; CA_002], and&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span>=
</p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-fa=
mily:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>[CA_002 -&gt; EE]<o:p></o:p></span=
></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-f=
amily:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div=
><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Cal=
ibri","sans-serif";color:black'>The AIA in the EE cert will identify the lo=
cation of the&nbsp;[intCA_001 -&gt; CA_002] cert.<o:p></o:p></span></p></di=
v><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Ca=
libri","sans-serif";color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sa=
ns-serif";color:black'>The RP may not trust TA_A, but have internally cross=
 certified CA_002 under a trusted TA_X<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p c=
lass=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","san=
s-serif";color:black'>The certs of this path are:<o:p></o:p></span></p></di=
v><div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-famil=
y:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>[TA_X -&gt; TA_X]<o:p></o:p></span></=
p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>[TA_X -&gt; CA_002]<o:p></o:p></span=
></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-f=
amily:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>[CA_002 -&gt; EE]<o:p></o:p></spa=
n></p></div></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt=
;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></=
p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>The EE cert is the same, thus the EE=
 cert is still pointing to&nbsp;[intCA_001 -&gt; CA_002]. However this cert=
 is not trusted by the RP. Thus AIA is not useful for this case.<o:p></o:p>=
</span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;=
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p=
></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-famil=
y:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>The question is. If I have a local Tr=
ust Anchor &nbsp;(TA_X) that provides a whole bunch of intermediary certifi=
cates as a service to local and/or remote hosts that are configured to trus=
t TA_X but not TA_A, then what is the best protocol to use to make the inte=
rmediary certs issued by TA_X available to other hosts in the network?<o:p>=
</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:1=
0.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></sp=
an></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font=
-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>/Stefan<o:p></o:p></span></p></=
div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"=
Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><=
p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","=
sans-serif";color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D=
MsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif=
";color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div style=3D'border:none;=
border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNor=
mal><b><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";c=
olor:black'>From: </span></b><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"C=
alibri","sans-serif";color:black'>Santosh Chokhani &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:SC=
hokhani@cygnacom.com">SChokhani@cygnacom.com</a>&gt;<br><b>Date: </b>Thu, 5=
 May 2011 09:37:18 -0400<br><b>To: </b>Stefan Santesson &lt;<a href=3D"mail=
to:stefan@aaa-sec.com">stefan@aaa-sec.com</a>&gt;, &quot;<a href=3D"mailto:=
pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org"=
>pkix@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br><b>Subject: </b>RE: Intermediary CA certificate d=
istribution protocols<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>=
<span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:bl=
ack'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><blockquote style=3D'border:none;bor=
der-left:solid #B5C4DF 4.5pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 4.0pt;margin-left:3.75pt;m=
argin-right:0in' id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"><div><div><p cla=
ss=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-ser=
if";color:#1F497D'>Stefan,</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></s=
pan></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Ar=
ial","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><=
o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;fo=
nt-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>Why would caIssuers field in =
AIA not be a preferred approach?</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o=
:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:bl=
ack'><o:p></o:p></span></p><div><div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid =
#B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span styl=
e=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif";color:black'>From:<=
/span></b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"=
;color:black'> <a href=3D"mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org">pkix-bounces@ietf.o=
rg</a> [<a href=3D"mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org">mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.o=
rg</a>] <b>On Behalf Of </b>Stefan Santesson<br><b>Sent:</b> Thursday, May =
05, 2011 9:12 AM<br><b>To:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.o=
rg</a><br><b>Subject:</b> [pkix] Intermediary CA certificate distribution p=
rotocols</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div></di=
v><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:black'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span>=
</p><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"=
Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>I'm curious about implementer opinions o=
n what protocol you use/prefer for certificate distribution of intermediary=
 CA certificates.</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><=
/div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:=
"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:black=
'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font=
-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>Certs include =
the AIA extension to allow a verifier to walk up the path of an EE cert. Ho=
wever, that is not a preferable solution.</span><span style=3D'color:black'=
><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-=
size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>In cross certif=
ication schemes among other's the intermediary cert that chains to one of t=
he RP trust anchor may be provided from a cross certifying PKI, bridge CA o=
r similar.</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><d=
iv><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibr=
i","sans-serif";color:black'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p>=
</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:1=
0.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>In such case, what is=
 the most preferred protocol to distribute / make available such intermedia=
ry certificates from one or more sources. I can think of a number of possib=
le alternatives like LDAP, XKMS, FTP of a PKCS#7 certs only file, etc.</spa=
n><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DM=
soNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"=
;color:black'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></=
p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>/Stefan</span><span style=3D'color:b=
lack'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div></div></blockquote></div></body></h=
tml>=

--_000_B83745DA469B7847811819C5005244AF0F41EF00scygexch7cygnac_--

From mrex@sap.com  Thu May  5 08:20:02 2011
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From: Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
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To: rbarnes@bbn.com (Richard L. Barnes)
Date: Thu, 5 May 2011 17:19:52 +0200 (MEST)
In-Reply-To: <0621EF62-9B0E-4B7C-8C96-FD01BDCEEFC1@bbn.com> from "Richard L. Barnes" at May 5, 11 04:52:24 pm
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols
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Richard L. Barnes wrote:
> 
> This is maybe slightly off-topic for this list, but I imagine that in
> practice that the more widely-used ways of distributing intermediate
> CA information are in applications: In TLS, you can put the whole chain
> in the Certificate payload.

That is not an accurate characterization.  In TLS, you MUST put the whole
chain into the Certificate payload, any you may only omit the self-signed
certificate at the end of the chain.


>                               I think there's a similar slot in IPsec,
> and of course in S/MIME, you can just append more certificates
> to the message.  

PKCS#7 and its successor CMS provides room for an unsorted
certificate junkyard  http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2315#section-6.6
whose content may or may not be helpful in building certificate chains.

XMLSecurity might allow multiple occurrances of the X509Certificate
container, but using more than one seems to be unusual.

WS-Security tried to improve that by allowing certificate chains in
one of two Chain formats, PKCS#7 (the junkyard) and a well-formed chain
similar to what TLS does (X509PKIPathv1).

I can not comment on IPsec.

-Martin

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Date: Thu, 05 May 2011 17:20:44 +0200
From: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>
To: Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>, "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols
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> This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
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SIA is at most a way to communicate the location of the data.
I'm interested what the best protocol for distributing that data is, in
general. We can assume for now that the location of the data is known by
local configuration, by SIA or by whatever means.

/Stefan

From:  Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>
Date:  Thu, 5 May 2011 11:12:08 -0400
To:  Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>, "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject:  RE: Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols

> SIA is a good use for that.
>  
> 
> From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com]
> Sent: Thursday, May 05, 2011 10:03 AM
> To: Santosh Chokhani; pkix@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols
>  
> 
> For the reasons pointed out by Paul, and because the relying party may use a
> CA certificate that is not listed in the path assumed by the issuer.
> 
>  
> 
> The EE certificate issuer may assume the path   TA_A -> intCA_001 -> CA_002 ->
> EE
> 
>  
> 
> The certs used in this path are:
> 
> [TA_A -> TA_A]
> 
> [TA_A -> intCA_001]
> 
> [intCA_001 -> CA_002], and
> 
> [CA_002 -> EE]
> 
>  
> 
> The AIA in the EE cert will identify the location of the [intCA_001 -> CA_002]
> cert.
> 
>  
> 
> The RP may not trust TA_A, but have internally cross certified CA_002 under a
> trusted TA_X
> 
> The certs of this path are:
> 
> [TA_X -> TA_X]
> 
> [TA_X -> CA_002]
> 
> [CA_002 -> EE]
> 
>  
> 
> The EE cert is the same, thus the EE cert is still pointing to [intCA_001 ->
> CA_002]. However this cert is not trusted by the RP. Thus AIA is not useful
> for this case.
> 
>  
> 
> The question is. If I have a local Trust Anchor  (TA_X) that provides a whole
> bunch of intermediary certificates as a service to local and/or remote hosts
> that are configured to trust TA_X but not TA_A, then what is the best protocol
> to use to make the intermediary certs issued by TA_X available to other hosts
> in the network?
> 
>  
> 
> /Stefan
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
> From: Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>
> Date: Thu, 5 May 2011 09:37:18 -0400
> To: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>, "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
> Subject: RE: Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols
> 
>  
>> 
>> Stefan,
>>  
>> Why would caIssuers field in AIA not be a preferred approach?
>>  
>> 
>> From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
>> Stefan Santesson
>> Sent: Thursday, May 05, 2011 9:12 AM
>> To: pkix@ietf.org
>> Subject: [pkix] Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols
>>  
>> 
>> I'm curious about implementer opinions on what protocol you use/prefer for
>> certificate distribution of intermediary CA certificates.
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> Certs include the AIA extension to allow a verifier to walk up the path of an
>> EE cert. However, that is not a preferable solution.
>> 
>> In cross certification schemes among other's the intermediary cert that
>> chains to one of the RP trust anchor may be provided from a cross certifying
>> PKI, bridge CA or similar.
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> In such case, what is the most preferred protocol to distribute / make
>> available such intermediary certificates from one or more sources. I can
>> think of a number of possible alternatives like LDAP, XKMS, FTP of a PKCS#7
>> certs only file, etc.
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> /Stefan



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unicate the location of the data.</div><div>I'm interested what the best pro=
tocol for distributing that data is, in general. We can assume for now that =
the location of the data is known by local configuration, by SIA or by whate=
ver means.</div><div><br></div><div>/Stefan</div><div><br></div><span id=3D"OL=
K_SRC_BODY_SECTION"><div style=3D"font-family:Calibri; font-size:11pt; text-al=
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nt-weight:bold">From: </span> Santosh Chokhani &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:SChokhani=
@cygnacom.com">SChokhani@cygnacom.com</a>&gt;<br><span style=3D"font-weight:bo=
ld">Date: </span> Thu, 5 May 2011 11:12:08 -0400<br><span style=3D"font-weight=
:bold">To: </span> Stefan Santesson &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com">=
stefan@aaa-sec.com</a>&gt;, "<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a=
>" &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br><span style=3D"=
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le" style=3D"word-wrap: break-word;-webkit-nbsp-mode: space;-webkit-line-break=
: after-white-space"><div class=3D"WordSection1"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span st=
yle=3D"font-size: 9pt; color: rgb(153, 51, 102); font-family: Arial, sans-seri=
f; ">SIA is a good use for that.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><=
span style=3D"font-size: 9pt; color: rgb(153, 51, 102); font-family: Arial, sa=
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span style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma, sans-serif; ">From:</span>=
</b><span style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma, sans-serif; "> Stefan=
 Santesson [<a href=3D"mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com">mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com</a=
>] <br><b>Sent:</b> Thursday, May 05, 2011 10:03 AM<br><b>To:</b> Santosh Ch=
okhani; <a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a><br><b>Subject:</b> =
Re: Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols<o:p></o:p></span></p>=
</div></div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><div><p class=3D"MsoNorm=
al"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif; ">For the reasons pointed out by Paul, and&nbsp;because the relying =
party may use a CA certificate that is not listed in the path assumed by the=
 issuer.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"f=
ont-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nb=
sp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: =
10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">The EE certificate=
 issuer may assume the path &nbsp; TA_A -&gt; intCA_001 -&gt; CA_002 -&gt; E=
E<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-siz=
e: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:=
p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt;=
 color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">The certs used in this pa=
th are:&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span sty=
le=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">[TA=
_A -&gt; TA_A]<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span st=
yle=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">[T=
A_A -&gt;&nbsp;intCA_001]<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNorma=
l"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-=
serif; ">[intCA_001 -&gt; CA_002], and&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div=
><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-fam=
ily: Calibri, sans-serif; ">[CA_002 -&gt; EE]<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><di=
v><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-fa=
mily: Calibri, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=
=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Cali=
bri, sans-serif; ">The AIA in the EE cert will identify the location of the&=
nbsp;[intCA_001 -&gt; CA_002] cert.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=
=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Cali=
bri, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNorma=
l"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-=
serif; ">The RP may not trust TA_A, but have internally cross certified CA_0=
02 under a trusted TA_X<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"=
><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-se=
rif; ">The certs of this path are:<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><div><p c=
lass=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: =
Calibri, sans-serif; ">[TA_X -&gt; TA_X]<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family:=
 Calibri, sans-serif; ">[TA_X -&gt; CA_002]<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div>=
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-fami=
ly: Calibri, sans-serif; ">[CA_002 -&gt; EE]<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></di=
v><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; fo=
nt-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family:=
 Calibri, sans-serif; ">The EE cert is the same, thus the EE cert is still p=
ointing to&nbsp;[intCA_001 -&gt; CA_002]. However this cert is not trusted b=
y the RP. Thus AIA is not useful for this case.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><=
div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-=
family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p cla=
ss=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Ca=
libri, sans-serif; ">The question is. If I have a local Trust Anchor &nbsp;(=
TA_X) that provides a whole bunch of intermediary certificates as a service =
to local and/or remote hosts that are configured to trust TA_X but not TA_A,=
 then what is the best protocol to use to make the intermediary certs issued=
 by TA_X available to other hosts in the network?<o:p></o:p></span></p></div=
><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; fon=
t-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p c=
lass=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: =
Calibri, sans-serif; ">/Stefan<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"Mso=
Normal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, =
sans-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><s=
pan style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif=
; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D=
"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><o:p>&=
nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div style=3D"border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF=
 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-=
size: 11pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">From: </span><=
/b><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-se=
rif; ">Santosh Chokhani &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:SChokhani@cygnacom.com">SChokhan=
i@cygnacom.com</a>&gt;<br><b>Date: </b>Thu, 5 May 2011 09:37:18 -0400<br><b>=
To: </b>Stefan Santesson &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com">stefan@aaa-=
sec.com</a>&gt;, "<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>" &lt;<a h=
ref=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br><b>Subject: </b>RE: Inte=
rmediary CA certificate distribution protocols<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><d=
iv><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-f=
amily: Calibri, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><blockquote =
style=3D"border:none;border-left:solid #B5C4DF 4.5pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 4.0pt=
;margin-left:3.75pt;margin-right:0in" id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE=
"><div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 9pt; color: rgb(31,=
 73, 125); font-family: Arial, sans-serif; ">Stefan,</span><span style=3D"colo=
r:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: =
9pt; color: rgb(31, 73, 125); font-family: Arial, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;</span=
><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span =
style=3D"font-size: 9pt; color: rgb(31, 73, 125); font-family: Arial, sans-ser=
if; ">Why would caIssuers field in AIA not be a preferred approach?</span><s=
pan style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span sty=
le=3D"font-size: 9pt; color: rgb(31, 73, 125); font-family: Arial, sans-serif;=
 ">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p><div><div st=
yle=3D"border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in"><=
p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size: 10pt; color: black; font-fami=
ly: Tahoma, sans-serif; ">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-size: 10pt; colo=
r: black; font-family: Tahoma, sans-serif; "> <a href=3D"mailto:pkix-bounces@i=
etf.org">pkix-bounces@ietf.org</a> [<a href=3D"mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org">m=
ailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org</a>] <b>On Behalf Of </b>Stefan Santesson<br><b>=
Sent:</b> Thursday, May 05, 2011 9:12 AM<br><b>To:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:pkix@=
ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a><br><b>Subject:</b> [pkix] Intermediary CA certif=
icate distribution protocols</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></sp=
an></p></div></div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"color:black">&nbsp;<o:p=
></o:p></span></p><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; =
color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">I'm curious about implemen=
ter opinions on what protocol you use/prefer for certificate distribution of=
 intermediary CA certificates.</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></=
span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; col=
or: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"col=
or:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D=
"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">Certs =
include the AIA extension to allow a verifier to walk up the path of an EE c=
ert. However, that is not a preferable solution.</span><span style=3D"color:bl=
ack"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font=
-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">In cross ce=
rtification schemes among other's the intermediary cert that chains to one o=
f the RP trust anchor may be provided from a cross certifying PKI, bridge CA=
 or similar.</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><di=
v><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-fa=
mily: Calibri, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o=
:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt=
; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">In such case, what is th=
e most preferred protocol to distribute / make available such intermediary c=
ertificates from one or more sources. I can think of a number of possible al=
ternatives like LDAP, XKMS, FTP of a PKCS#7 certs only file, etc.</span><spa=
n style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">=
<span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-ser=
if; ">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><di=
v><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-fa=
mily: Calibri, sans-serif; ">/Stefan</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></=
o:p></span></p></div></div></div></blockquote></div></div></div></blockquote=
></span></body></html>

--B_3387460848_10044810--



From stefan@aaa-sec.com  Thu May  5 08:26:08 2011
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Date: Thu, 05 May 2011 17:25:58 +0200
From: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>
To: "Richard L. Barnes" <rbarnes@bbn.com>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols
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Absolutely right Richard, but in some cases the sender does not know what
Roots/Trust Anchors the receiver will use and can not provide all
necessary certificates for any theoretically possible path.

The RP decision to rely on another Trust Anchor may require the RP to also
download CA certificates provided by that TA. It is the protocol for that
exchange I'm interested in.

/Stefan


On 11-05-05 4:52 PM, "Richard L. Barnes" <rbarnes@bbn.com> wrote:

>This is maybe slightly off-topic for this list, but I imagine that in
>practice that the more widely-used ways of distributing intermediate CA
>information are in applications: In TLS, you can put the whole chain in
>the Certificate payload.  I think there's a similar slot in IPsec, and of
>course in S/MIME, you can just append more certificates to the message.
>
>--Richard
>
>
>On May 5, 2011, at 3:11 PM, Stefan Santesson wrote:
>
>> I'm curious about implementer opinions on what protocol you use/prefer
>>for certificate distribution of intermediary CA certificates.
>> 
>> Certs include the AIA extension to allow a verifier to walk up the path
>>of an EE cert. However, that is not a preferable solution.
>> In cross certification schemes among other's the intermediary cert that
>>chains to one of the RP trust anchor may be provided from a cross
>>certifying PKI, bridge CA or similar.
>> 
>> In such case, what is the most preferred protocol to distribute / make
>>available such intermediary certificates from one or more sources. I can
>>think of a number of possible alternatives like LDAP, XKMS, FTP of a
>>PKCS#7 certs only file, etc.
>> 
>> /Stefan
>> _______________________________________________
>> pkix mailing list
>> pkix@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>
>_______________________________________________
>pkix mailing list
>pkix@ietf.org
>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix



From paul.hoffman@vpnc.org  Thu May  5 08:29:35 2011
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References: <C9E86EB3.1D4C0%stefan@aaa-sec.com> <B83745DA469B7847811819C5005244AF0F41EEDC@scygexch7.cygnacom.com> <90414111-E674-45B2-918B-E3E807F4DC63@vpnc.org> <B83745DA469B7847811819C5005244AF0F41EEF0@scygexch7.cygnacom.com>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols
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The answers I gave might not meet your personal usage scenarios, but =
they do apply to many people.

--Paul Hoffman


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Subject: Re: [pkix] Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols
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On May 5, 2011, at 8:11 AM, Stefan Santesson wrote:

> I'm curious about implementer opinions on what protocol you use/prefer for certificate distribution of intermediary CA certificates.

SSL or S/MIME?

I've always interpreted the "other certificate" capabilities in either as meaning:

There is a possibility the you (RP) might need these certificate for validation
to succeed, so I'll send them to you just in case.

Note that this may still require installation of a trust anchor by the RP.

EJN


From david.cooper@nist.gov  Thu May  5 08:51:05 2011
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Date: Thu, 05 May 2011 11:50:47 -0400
From: "David A. Cooper" <david.cooper@nist.gov>
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To: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>
References: <C9E88C02.1D61D%stefan@aaa-sec.com>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols
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    Stefan,<br>
    <br>
    It used to be that LDAP was the preferred method for distributing CA
    certificates, but over time HTTP of a certs-only CMS message seems
    to have overtaken LDAP in popularity.<br>
    <br>
    The best solution is to use the AIA and SIA extensions to
    communicate the location of this data.&nbsp; For SIA, this can begin by
    including an SIA extension in the self-signed trust anchor
    certificate.<br>
    <br>
    In the scenario that you describe below, either AIA or SIA <b>should</b>
    work.&nbsp; X.509 says that "The <b>issuedToThisCA</b> elements of the <b>crossCertificatePair</b>
    attribute of a CA's directory entry shall be used to store all,
    except self-issued certificates issued to this CA." (Self-issued
    certificates appear in the cACertificate attribute.)&nbsp; Similarly the
    certs-only CMS message referred to by an HTTP URI in an AIA
    extension should include all certificates issued to the issuing CA.&nbsp;
    Of course, there is always the possibility that a CA may issue a
    cross-certificate to another CA without informing the subject CA.<br>
    <br>
    I agree with Santosh about the SIA extension, and I would really
    like to see support for this extension more widely implemented.&nbsp; I
    believe that SIA extensions offer two advantages over AIA
    extensions.&nbsp; First, with the SIA extension, I can pre-populate a
    certificate cache in order to make path validation more efficient.&nbsp;
    When I install a trust anchor, I can follow the SIA extension in
    that certificate to obtain all CA certificates issued by the trust
    anchor and then follow the SIA extension in those certificates
    recursively in order to fully pre-populate a certificate cache so
    when the time comes to validate a certificate I can quickly build
    the path based on locally cached intermediate certificates.<br>
    <br>
    I also believe that SIA has a security advantage over AIA.&nbsp; With the
    AIA extension, I am downloading information using a URL in a
    certificate that I haven't yet validated.&nbsp; This certificate may have
    just been placed in a "signed" email that was sent to me by a
    spammer (just as spammers use other techniques to obtain evidence of
    who has opened their emails).&nbsp; With the SIA extension, I can
    validate the certificate before using the URL to download more
    intermediate certificates, and so only make use of URLs that I have
    already verified as coming from "trusted" sources.<br>
    <br>
    Dave<br>
    <br>
    On 05/05/2011 11:20 AM, Stefan Santesson wrote:
    <blockquote cite="mid:C9E88C02.1D61D%25stefan@aaa-sec.com"
      type="cite">
      <div>SIA is at most a way to communicate the location of the data.</div>
      <div>I'm interested what the best protocol for distributing that
        data is, in general. We can assume for now that the location of
        the data is known by local configuration, by SIA or by whatever
        means.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>/Stefan</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <span id="OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
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          border-style: solid none none; border-color: rgb(181, 196,
          223) -moz-use-text-color -moz-use-text-color; padding: 3pt 0in
          0in;"><span style="font-weight: bold;">From: </span> Santosh
          Chokhani &lt;<a moz-do-not-send="true"
            href="mailto:SChokhani@cygnacom.com">SChokhani@cygnacom.com</a>&gt;<br>
          <span style="font-weight: bold;">Date: </span> Thu, 5 May
          2011 11:12:08 -0400<br>
          <span style="font-weight: bold;">To: </span> Stefan Santesson
          &lt;<a moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com">stefan@aaa-sec.com</a>&gt;,
          "<a moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>"
          &lt;<a moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>
          <span style="font-weight: bold;">Subject: </span> RE:
          Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols<br>
        </div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
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                <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: 9pt; color:
                    rgb(153, 51, 102); font-family: Arial,sans-serif;">SIA
                    is a good use for that.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: 9pt; color:
                    rgb(153, 51, 102); font-family: Arial,sans-serif;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                <div>
                  <div style="border-right: medium none; border-width:
                    1pt medium medium; border-style: solid none none;
                    border-color: rgb(181, 196, 223) -moz-use-text-color
                    -moz-use-text-color; padding: 3pt 0in 0in;">
                    <p class="MsoNormal"><b><span style="font-size:
                          10pt; font-family: Tahoma,sans-serif;">From:</span></b><span
                        style="font-size: 10pt; font-family:
                        Tahoma,sans-serif;"> Stefan Santesson [<a
                          moz-do-not-send="true"
                          href="mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com">mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com</a>]
                        <br>
                        <b>Sent:</b> Thursday, May 05, 2011 10:03 AM<br>
                        <b>To:</b> Santosh Chokhani; <a
                          moz-do-not-send="true"
                          href="mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a><br>
                        <b>Subject:</b> Re: Intermediary CA certificate
                        distribution protocols<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                  </div>
                </div>
                <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
                <div>
                  <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: 10.5pt;
                      color: black; font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">For
                      the reasons pointed out by Paul, and&nbsp;because the
                      relying party may use a CA certificate that is not
                      listed in the path assumed by the issuer.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                </div>
                <div>
                  <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: 10.5pt;
                      color: black; font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                </div>
                <div>
                  <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: 10.5pt;
                      color: black; font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">The
                      EE certificate issuer may assume the path &nbsp; TA_A
                      -&gt; intCA_001 -&gt; CA_002 -&gt; EE<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                </div>
                <div>
                  <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: 10.5pt;
                      color: black; font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                </div>
                <div>
                  <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: 10.5pt;
                      color: black; font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">The
                      certs used in this path are:&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                </div>
                <div>
                  <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: 10.5pt;
                      color: black; font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">[TA_A
                      -&gt; TA_A]<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                </div>
                <div>
                  <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: 10.5pt;
                      color: black; font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">[TA_A
                      -&gt;&nbsp;intCA_001]<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                </div>
                <div>
                  <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: 10.5pt;
                      color: black; font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">[intCA_001
                      -&gt; CA_002], and&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                </div>
                <div>
                  <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: 10.5pt;
                      color: black; font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">[CA_002
                      -&gt; EE]<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                </div>
                <div>
                  <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: 10.5pt;
                      color: black; font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                </div>
                <div>
                  <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: 10.5pt;
                      color: black; font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">The
                      AIA in the EE cert will identify the location of
                      the&nbsp;[intCA_001 -&gt; CA_002] cert.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                </div>
                <div>
                  <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: 10.5pt;
                      color: black; font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                </div>
                <div>
                  <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: 10.5pt;
                      color: black; font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">The
                      RP may not trust TA_A, but have internally cross
                      certified CA_002 under a trusted TA_X<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                </div>
                <div>
                  <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: 10.5pt;
                      color: black; font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">The
                      certs of this path are:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                </div>
                <div>
                  <div>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: 10.5pt;
                        color: black; font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">[TA_X
                        -&gt; TA_X]<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                  </div>
                  <div>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: 10.5pt;
                        color: black; font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">[TA_X
                        -&gt; CA_002]<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                  </div>
                  <div>
                    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: 10.5pt;
                        color: black; font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">[CA_002
                        -&gt; EE]<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                  </div>
                </div>
                <div>
                  <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: 10.5pt;
                      color: black; font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                </div>
                <div>
                  <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: 10.5pt;
                      color: black; font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">The
                      EE cert is the same, thus the EE cert is still
                      pointing to&nbsp;[intCA_001 -&gt; CA_002]. However this
                      cert is not trusted by the RP. Thus AIA is not
                      useful for this case.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                </div>
                <div>
                  <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: 10.5pt;
                      color: black; font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                </div>
                <div>
                  <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: 10.5pt;
                      color: black; font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">The
                      question is. If I have a local Trust Anchor
                      &nbsp;(TA_X) that provides a whole bunch of
                      intermediary certificates as a service to local
                      and/or remote hosts that are configured to trust
                      TA_X but not TA_A, then what is the best protocol
                      to use to make the intermediary certs issued by
                      TA_X available to other hosts in the network?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                </div>
                <div>
                  <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: 10.5pt;
                      color: black; font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                </div>
                <div>
                  <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: 10.5pt;
                      color: black; font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">/Stefan<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                </div>
                <div>
                  <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: 10.5pt;
                      color: black; font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                </div>
                <div>
                  <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: 10.5pt;
                      color: black; font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                </div>
                <div>
                  <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: 10.5pt;
                      color: black; font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                </div>
                <div style="border-right: medium none; border-width: 1pt
                  medium medium; border-style: solid none none;
                  border-color: rgb(181, 196, 223) -moz-use-text-color
                  -moz-use-text-color; padding: 3pt 0in 0in;">
                  <p class="MsoNormal"><b><span style="font-size: 11pt;
                        color: black; font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">From:
                      </span></b><span style="font-size: 11pt; color:
                      black; font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">Santosh
                      Chokhani &lt;<a moz-do-not-send="true"
                        href="mailto:SChokhani@cygnacom.com">SChokhani@cygnacom.com</a>&gt;<br>
                      <b>Date: </b>Thu, 5 May 2011 09:37:18 -0400<br>
                      <b>To: </b>Stefan Santesson &lt;<a
                        moz-do-not-send="true"
                        href="mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com">stefan@aaa-sec.com</a>&gt;,
                      "<a moz-do-not-send="true"
                        href="mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>"
                      &lt;<a moz-do-not-send="true"
                        href="mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>
                      <b>Subject: </b>RE: Intermediary CA certificate
                      distribution protocols<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                </div>
                <div>
                  <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: 10.5pt;
                      color: black; font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                </div>
                <blockquote style="border-width: medium medium medium
                  4.5pt; border-style: none none none solid;
                  border-color: -moz-use-text-color -moz-use-text-color
                  -moz-use-text-color rgb(181, 196, 223); padding: 0in
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                  id="MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE">
                  <div>
                    <div>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: 9pt;
                          color: rgb(31, 73, 125); font-family:
                          Arial,sans-serif;">Stefan,</span><span
                          style="color: black;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: 9pt;
                          color: rgb(31, 73, 125); font-family:
                          Arial,sans-serif;">&nbsp;</span><span style="color:
                          black;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: 9pt;
                          color: rgb(31, 73, 125); font-family:
                          Arial,sans-serif;">Why would caIssuers field
                          in AIA not be a preferred approach?</span><span
                          style="color: black;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: 9pt;
                          color: rgb(31, 73, 125); font-family:
                          Arial,sans-serif;">&nbsp;</span><span style="color:
                          black;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
                      <div>
                        <div style="border-right: medium none;
                          border-width: 1pt medium medium; border-style:
                          solid none none; border-color: rgb(181, 196,
                          223) -moz-use-text-color -moz-use-text-color;
                          padding: 3pt 0in 0in;">
                          <p class="MsoNormal"><b><span
                                style="font-size: 10pt; color: black;
                                font-family: Tahoma,sans-serif;">From:</span></b><span
                              style="font-size: 10pt; color: black;
                              font-family: Tahoma,sans-serif;"> <a
                                moz-do-not-send="true"
                                href="mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org">pkix-bounces@ietf.org</a>
                              [<a moz-do-not-send="true"
                                href="mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org">mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org</a>]
                              <b>On Behalf Of </b>Stefan Santesson<br>
                              <b>Sent:</b> Thursday, May 05, 2011 9:12
                              AM<br>
                              <b>To:</b> <a moz-do-not-send="true"
                                href="mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a><br>
                              <b>Subject:</b> [pkix] Intermediary CA
                              certificate distribution protocols</span><span
                              style="color: black;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        </div>
                      </div>
                      <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color: black;">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                      <div>
                        <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:
                            10.5pt; color: black; font-family:
                            Calibri,sans-serif;">I'm curious about
                            implementer opinions on what protocol you
                            use/prefer for certificate distribution of
                            intermediary CA certificates.</span><span
                            style="color: black;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
                      </div>
                      <div>
                        <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:
                            10.5pt; color: black; font-family:
                            Calibri,sans-serif;">&nbsp;</span><span
                            style="color: black;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
                      </div>
                      <div>
                        <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:
                            10.5pt; color: black; font-family:
                            Calibri,sans-serif;">Certs include the AIA
                            extension to allow a verifier to walk up the
                            path of an EE cert. However, that is not a
                            preferable solution.</span><span
                            style="color: black;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
                      </div>
                      <div>
                        <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:
                            10.5pt; color: black; font-family:
                            Calibri,sans-serif;">In cross certification
                            schemes among other's the intermediary cert
                            that chains to one of the RP trust anchor
                            may be provided from a cross certifying PKI,
                            bridge CA or similar.</span><span
                            style="color: black;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
                      </div>
                      <div>
                        <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:
                            10.5pt; color: black; font-family:
                            Calibri,sans-serif;">&nbsp;</span><span
                            style="color: black;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
                      </div>
                      <div>
                        <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:
                            10.5pt; color: black; font-family:
                            Calibri,sans-serif;">In such case, what is
                            the most preferred protocol to distribute /
                            make available such intermediary
                            certificates from one or more sources. I can
                            think of a number of possible alternatives
                            like LDAP, XKMS, FTP of a PKCS#7 certs only
                            file, etc.</span><span style="color: black;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
                      </div>
                      <div>
                        <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:
                            10.5pt; color: black; font-family:
                            Calibri,sans-serif;">&nbsp;</span><span
                            style="color: black;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
                      </div>
                      <div>
                        <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:
                            10.5pt; color: black; font-family:
                            Calibri,sans-serif;">/Stefan</span><span
                            style="color: black;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
                      </div>
                    </div>
                  </div>
                </blockquote>
              </div>
            </div>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </span></blockquote>
    <br>
  </body>
</html>

From mrex@sap.com  Thu May  5 09:36:44 2011
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From: Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
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To: stefan@aaa-sec.com (Stefan Santesson)
Date: Thu, 5 May 2011 18:36:35 +0200 (MEST)
In-Reply-To: <C9E86EB3.1D4C0%stefan@aaa-sec.com> from "Stefan Santesson" at May 5, 11 03:11:47 pm
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols
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Stefan Santesson wrote:
> 
> I'm curious about implementer opinions on what protocol you use/prefer for
> certificate distribution of intermediary CA certificates.
> 
> Certs include the AIA extension to allow a verifier to walk up the path of
> an EE cert. However, that is not a preferable solution.

"not a preferable solution"?  It appears that some serious security
vulnerabilities have found their way into at least parts of the installed
base based on negligent chasing of AIA caIssuers from untrusted certs.

It is a serious security problem and would be completely irresponsible
to have software perform AIA caIssuers downloads for (still unverified
and therefore) untrusted certs without a sufficiently adept/clueful
human end user authorizing each download URL _before_ the download
is being attempted.

We had a discussion on this on the TLS WG mailing list in Aug 2010.

  http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg06813.html
  http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg06824.html
  http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg06830.html


>
> In cross certification schemes among other's the intermediary cert that
> chains to one of the RP trust anchor may be provided from a cross certifying
> PKI, bridge CA or similar.

I agree.  Those who engage in cross-certifying/bridging ought to bear
the burden on providing and missing cross-certs to all entities
within that PKI.


> 
> In such case, what is the most preferred protocol to distribute / make
> available such intermediary certificates from one or more sources. I can
> think of a number of possible alternatives like LDAP, XKMS, FTP of a PKCS#7
> certs only file, etc.

There should be a protocol and an architecture that allows entities
to build certificate chains for communication peers in a trustworthy
and protected fashion, i.e. reliably precluding access to untrusted/
unverified resources.  If it doesn't exist yet, then it is about
time for it to be created in case that cross-certifying / bridging
of PKIs (rather than the ~100 independent roots of the TLS X.509 PKI)
is considered a use case for the real world that needs to be supported.


-Martin 

From SChokhani@cygnacom.com  Thu May  5 09:40:49 2011
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From: Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>
To: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>, "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Date: Thu, 5 May 2011 12:40:43 -0400
Thread-Topic: Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols
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SIA had URI and that could be HTTP or LDAP.

Or, are you asking how to populate each RP store in case it is network disc=
onnected.

BTW, you can also resolve via DNS the URI in SIA to location of your choice=
 on your network.

From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com]
Sent: Thursday, May 05, 2011 11:21 AM
To: Santosh Chokhani; pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols

SIA is at most a way to communicate the location of the data.
I'm interested what the best protocol for distributing that data is, in gen=
eral. We can assume for now that the location of the data is known by local=
 configuration, by SIA or by whatever means.

/Stefan

From: Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com<mailto:SChokhani@cygnacom.co=
m>>
Date: Thu, 5 May 2011 11:12:08 -0400
To: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com<mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com>>, "pkix=
@ietf.org<mailto:pkix@ietf.org>" <pkix@ietf.org<mailto:pkix@ietf.org>>
Subject: RE: Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols

SIA is a good use for that.

From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com]
Sent: Thursday, May 05, 2011 10:03 AM
To: Santosh Chokhani; pkix@ietf.org<mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols

For the reasons pointed out by Paul, and because the relying party may use =
a CA certificate that is not listed in the path assumed by the issuer.

The EE certificate issuer may assume the path   TA_A -> intCA_001 -> CA_002=
 -> EE

The certs used in this path are:
[TA_A -> TA_A]
[TA_A -> intCA_001]
[intCA_001 -> CA_002], and
[CA_002 -> EE]

The AIA in the EE cert will identify the location of the [intCA_001 -> CA_0=
02] cert.

The RP may not trust TA_A, but have internally cross certified CA_002 under=
 a trusted TA_X
The certs of this path are:
[TA_X -> TA_X]
[TA_X -> CA_002]
[CA_002 -> EE]

The EE cert is the same, thus the EE cert is still pointing to [intCA_001 -=
> CA_002]. However this cert is not trusted by the RP. Thus AIA is not usef=
ul for this case.

The question is. If I have a local Trust Anchor  (TA_X) that provides a who=
le bunch of intermediary certificates as a service to local and/or remote h=
osts that are configured to trust TA_X but not TA_A, then what is the best =
protocol to use to make the intermediary certs issued by TA_X available to =
other hosts in the network?

/Stefan



From: Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com<mailto:SChokhani@cygnacom.co=
m>>
Date: Thu, 5 May 2011 09:37:18 -0400
To: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com<mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com>>, "pkix=
@ietf.org<mailto:pkix@ietf.org>" <pkix@ietf.org<mailto:pkix@ietf.org>>
Subject: RE: Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols

Stefan,

Why would caIssuers field in AIA not be a preferred approach?

From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org<mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org> [mailto:pkix-boun=
ces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Stefan Santesson
Sent: Thursday, May 05, 2011 9:12 AM
To: pkix@ietf.org<mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: [pkix] Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols

I'm curious about implementer opinions on what protocol you use/prefer for =
certificate distribution of intermediary CA certificates.

Certs include the AIA extension to allow a verifier to walk up the path of =
an EE cert. However, that is not a preferable solution.
In cross certification schemes among other's the intermediary cert that cha=
ins to one of the RP trust anchor may be provided from a cross certifying P=
KI, bridge CA or similar.

In such case, what is the most preferred protocol to distribute / make avai=
lable such intermediary certificates from one or more sources. I can think =
of a number of possible alternatives like LDAP, XKMS, FTP of a PKCS#7 certs=
 only file, etc.

/Stefan

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nk=3Dpurple style=3D'word-wrap: break-word;-webkit-nbsp-mode: space;-webkit=
-line-break: after-white-space'><div class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNor=
mal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#=
003300'>SIA had URI and that could be HTTP or LDAP.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p=
 class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans=
-serif";color:#003300'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><sp=
an style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#003300'=
>Or, are you asking how to populate each RP store in case it is network dis=
connected.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-si=
ze:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#003300'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p><=
/span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"=
Arial","sans-serif";color:#003300'>BTW, you can also resolve via DNS the UR=
I in SIA to location of your choice on your network.<o:p></o:p></span></p><=
p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","san=
s-serif";color:#003300'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><div><div style=3D'bord=
er:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=
=3DMsoNormal><b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-=
serif"'>From:</span></b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma=
","sans-serif"'> Stefan Santesson [mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com] <br><b>Sent:<=
/b> Thursday, May 05, 2011 11:21 AM<br><b>To:</b> Santosh Chokhani; pkix@ie=
tf.org<br><b>Subject:</b> Re: Intermediary CA certificate distribution prot=
ocols<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:=
p></p><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family=
:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>SIA is at most a way to communicate th=
e location of the data.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNorma=
l><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:=
black'>I'm interested what the best protocol for distributing that data is,=
 in general. We can assume for now that the location of the data is known b=
y local configuration, by SIA or by whatever means.<o:p></o:p></span></p></=
div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"=
Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><=
p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","=
sans-serif";color:black'>/Stefan<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=
=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-se=
rif";color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div style=3D'border:no=
ne;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=3DMso=
Normal><b><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif=
";color:black'>From: </span></b><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family=
:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>Santosh Chokhani &lt;<a href=3D"mailto=
:SChokhani@cygnacom.com">SChokhani@cygnacom.com</a>&gt;<br><b>Date: </b>Thu=
, 5 May 2011 11:12:08 -0400<br><b>To: </b>Stefan Santesson &lt;<a href=3D"m=
ailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com">stefan@aaa-sec.com</a>&gt;, &quot;<a href=3D"mail=
to:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.o=
rg">pkix@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br><b>Subject: </b>RE: Intermediary CA certificat=
e distribution protocols<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNorm=
al><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color=
:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><blockquote style=3D'border:none;=
border-left:solid #B5C4DF 4.5pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 4.0pt;margin-left:3.75p=
t;margin-right:0in' id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"><div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-=
serif";color:#993366'>SIA is a good use for that.</span><span style=3D'colo=
r:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-siz=
e:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#993366'>&nbsp;</span><span =
style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><div><div style=3D'border:none;=
border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNor=
mal><b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif";co=
lor:black'>From:</span></b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tah=
oma","sans-serif";color:black'> Stefan Santesson [<a href=3D"mailto:stefan@=
aaa-sec.com">mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com</a>] <br><b>Sent:</b> Thursday, May =
05, 2011 10:03 AM<br><b>To:</b> Santosh Chokhani; <a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ie=
tf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a><br><b>Subject:</b> Re: Intermediary CA certificat=
e distribution protocols</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></spa=
n></p></div></div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:black'>&nbsp;<o=
:p></o:p></span></p><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5=
pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>For the reasons pointed =
out by Paul, and&nbsp;because the relying party may use a CA certificate th=
at is not listed in the path assumed by the issuer.</span><span style=3D'co=
lor:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span styl=
e=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>&nbsp=
;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p cla=
ss=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-=
serif";color:black'>The EE certificate issuer may assume the path &nbsp; TA=
_A -&gt; intCA_001 -&gt; CA_002 -&gt; EE</span><span style=3D'color:black'>=
<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-s=
ize:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>&nbsp;</span><sp=
an style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNor=
mal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";colo=
r:black'>The certs used in this path are:&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:=
black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D=
'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>[TA_A -&g=
t; TA_A]</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div=
><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri"=
,"sans-serif";color:black'>[TA_A -&gt;&nbsp;intCA_001]</span><span style=3D=
'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span s=
tyle=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>[i=
ntCA_001 -&gt; CA_002], and&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></=
o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.=
5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>[CA_002 -&gt; EE]</span=
><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMs=
oNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";=
color:black'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p=
></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-famil=
y:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>The AIA in the EE cert will identify =
the location of the&nbsp;[intCA_001 -&gt; CA_002] cert.</span><span style=
=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><spa=
n style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'=
>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div>=
<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri",=
"sans-serif";color:black'>The RP may not trust TA_A, but have internally cr=
oss certified CA_002 under a trusted TA_X</span><span style=3D'color:black'=
><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-=
size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>The certs of th=
is path are:</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div>=
<div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:=
"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>[TA_X -&gt; TA_X]</span><span style=3D'=
color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span st=
yle=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>[TA=
_X -&gt; CA_002]</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></=
div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"=
Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>[CA_002 -&gt; EE]</span><span style=3D'c=
olor:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><sp=
an style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black=
'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div=
><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri"=
,"sans-serif";color:black'>The EE cert is the same, thus the EE cert is sti=
ll pointing to&nbsp;[intCA_001 -&gt; CA_002]. However this cert is not trus=
ted by the RP. Thus AIA is not useful for this case.</span><span style=3D'c=
olor:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span sty=
le=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>&nbs=
p;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p cl=
ass=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans=
-serif";color:black'>The question is. If I have a local Trust Anchor &nbsp;=
(TA_X) that provides a whole bunch of intermediary certificates as a servic=
e to local and/or remote hosts that are configured to trust TA_X but not TA=
_A, then what is the best protocol to use to make the intermediary certs is=
sued by TA_X available to other hosts in the network?</span><span style=3D'=
color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span st=
yle=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>&nb=
sp;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p c=
lass=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","san=
s-serif";color:black'>/Stefan</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p>=
</span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;=
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D=
'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span s=
tyle=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>&n=
bsp;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sa=
ns-serif";color:black'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p>=
</span></p></div><div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;p=
adding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span style=3D'font-size:=
11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>From: </span></b><sp=
an style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black=
'>Santosh Chokhani &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:SChokhani@cygnacom.com">SChokhani@=
cygnacom.com</a>&gt;<br><b>Date: </b>Thu, 5 May 2011 09:37:18 -0400<br><b>T=
o: </b>Stefan Santesson &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com">stefan@aa=
a-sec.com</a>&gt;, &quot;<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>=
&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br><b>Sub=
ject: </b>RE: Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols</span><spa=
n style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNorm=
al><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color=
:black'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></di=
v><blockquote style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid #B5C4DF 4.5pt;padding:=
0in 0in 0in 4.0pt;margin-left:3.75pt;margin-top:5.0pt;margin-right:0in;marg=
in-bottom:5.0pt' id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"><div><div><p cla=
ss=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-ser=
if";color:#1F497D'>Stefan,</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></s=
pan></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Ar=
ial","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><=
o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;fo=
nt-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>Why would caIssuers field in =
AIA not be a preferred approach?</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o=
:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:bl=
ack'><o:p></o:p></span></p><div><div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid =
#B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span styl=
e=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif";color:black'>From:<=
/span></b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"=
;color:black'> <a href=3D"mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org">pkix-bounces@ietf.o=
rg</a> [<a href=3D"mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org">mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.o=
rg</a>] <b>On Behalf Of </b>Stefan Santesson<br><b>Sent:</b> Thursday, May =
05, 2011 9:12 AM<br><b>To:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.o=
rg</a><br><b>Subject:</b> [pkix] Intermediary CA certificate distribution p=
rotocols</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div></di=
v><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:black'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span>=
</p><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"=
Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>I'm curious about implementer opinions o=
n what protocol you use/prefer for certificate distribution of intermediary=
 CA certificates.</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><=
/div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:=
"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:black=
'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font=
-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>Certs include =
the AIA extension to allow a verifier to walk up the path of an EE cert. Ho=
wever, that is not a preferable solution.</span><span style=3D'color:black'=
><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-=
size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>In cross certif=
ication schemes among other's the intermediary cert that chains to one of t=
he RP trust anchor may be provided from a cross certifying PKI, bridge CA o=
r similar.</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><d=
iv><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibr=
i","sans-serif";color:black'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p>=
</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:1=
0.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>In such case, what is=
 the most preferred protocol to distribute / make available such intermedia=
ry certificates from one or more sources. I can think of a number of possib=
le alternatives like LDAP, XKMS, FTP of a PKCS#7 certs only file, etc.</spa=
n><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DM=
soNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"=
;color:black'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></=
p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>/Stefan</span><span style=3D'color:b=
lack'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div></div></blockquote></div></div></bl=
ockquote></div></body></html>=

--_000_B83745DA469B7847811819C5005244AF0F41EF25scygexch7cygnac_--

From stefan@aaa-sec.com  Thu May  5 09:42:12 2011
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Date: Thu, 05 May 2011 18:42:00 +0200
From: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>
To: "David A. Cooper" <david.cooper@nist.gov>
Message-ID: <C9E89E58.1D695%stefan@aaa-sec.com>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols
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Thanks David,

You are spot on the issue I wanted to address. I'm also assuming that http
access to a PKCS#7 is more popular than LDAP.
The thing is that the number of available certs will expand over time, so
the RP host getting these certs will need to poll for new data frequently
(or every time a certificate is validated) in order to update the cache.
I'm not sure a PKCS#7 certs only file is the most efficient solution for a
continuous update scenario, but it might very well be.

/Stefan



From:  "David A. Cooper" <david.cooper@nist.gov>
Date:  Thu, 05 May 2011 11:50:47 -0400
To:  Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>
Cc:  "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject:  Re: [pkix] Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols

>     
>  Stefan,
>  
>  It used to be that LDAP was the preferred method for distributing CA
> certificates, but over time HTTP of a certs-only CMS message seems to have
> overtaken LDAP in popularity.
>  
>  The best solution is to use the AIA and SIA extensions to communicate the
> location of this data.  For SIA, this can begin by including an SIA extension
> in the self-signed trust anchor certificate.
>  
>  In the scenario that you describe below, either AIA or SIA should work.
> X.509 says that "The issuedToThisCA elements of the crossCertificatePair
> attribute of a CA's directory entry shall be used to store all, except
> self-issued certificates issued to this CA." (Self-issued certificates appear
> in the cACertificate attribute.)  Similarly the certs-only CMS message
> referred to by an HTTP URI in an AIA extension should include all certificates
> issued to the issuing CA.  Of course, there is always the possibility that a
> CA may issue a cross-certificate to another CA without informing the subject
> CA.
>  
>  I agree with Santosh about the SIA extension, and I would really like to see
> support for this extension more widely implemented.  I believe that SIA
> extensions offer two advantages over AIA extensions.  First, with the SIA
> extension, I can pre-populate a certificate cache in order to make path
> validation more efficient.  When I install a trust anchor, I can follow the
> SIA extension in that certificate to obtain all CA certificates issued by the
> trust anchor and then follow the SIA extension in those certificates
> recursively in order to fully pre-populate a certificate cache so when the
> time comes to validate a certificate I can quickly build the path based on
> locally cached intermediate certificates.
>  
>  I also believe that SIA has a security advantage over AIA.  With the AIA
> extension, I am downloading information using a URL in a certificate that I
> haven't yet validated.  This certificate may have just been placed in a
> "signed" email that was sent to me by a spammer (just as spammers use other
> techniques to obtain evidence of who has opened their emails).  With the SIA
> extension, I can validate the certificate before using the URL to download
> more intermediate certificates, and so only make use of URLs that I have
> already verified as coming from "trusted" sources.
>  
>  Dave
>  
>  On 05/05/2011 11:20 AM, Stefan Santesson wrote:
>>  
>> SIA is at most a way to communicate the location of the data.
>>  
>> I'm interested what the best protocol for distributing that data is, in
>> general. We can assume for now that the location of the data is known by
>> local configuration, by SIA or by whatever means.
>>  
>> 
>>  
>>  
>> /Stefan
>>  
>> 
>>  
>>   
>> From:  Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>
>>  Date:  Thu, 5 May 2011 11:12:08 -0400
>>  To:  Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>, "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
>>  Subject:  RE: Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols
>>  
>>  
>> 
>>  
>>  
>>>  
>>>   
>>>  
>>>  
>>> 
>>> SIA is a good use for that.
>>>  
>>>  
>>>  
>>>  
>>>  
>>> 
>>> From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com]
>>>  Sent: Thursday, May 05, 2011 10:03 AM
>>>  To: Santosh Chokhani; pkix@ietf.org
>>>  Subject: Re: Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols
>>>  
>>>  
>>>  
>>>  
>>>  
>>>  
>>> 
>>> For the reasons pointed out by Paul, and because the relying party may use a
>>> CA certificate that is not listed in the path assumed by the issuer.
>>>  
>>>  
>>>  
>>> 
>>>  
>>>  
>>>  
>>>  
>>> 
>>> The EE certificate issuer may assume the path   TA_A -> intCA_001 -> CA_002
>>> -> EE
>>>  
>>>  
>>>  
>>> 
>>>  
>>>  
>>>  
>>>  
>>> 
>>> The certs used in this path are:
>>>  
>>>  
>>>  
>>> 
>>> [TA_A -> TA_A]
>>>  
>>>  
>>>  
>>> 
>>> [TA_A -> intCA_001]
>>>  
>>>  
>>>  
>>> 
>>> [intCA_001 -> CA_002], and
>>>  
>>>  
>>>  
>>> 
>>> [CA_002 -> EE]
>>>  
>>>  
>>>  
>>> 
>>>  
>>>  
>>>  
>>>  
>>> 
>>> The AIA in the EE cert will identify the location of the [intCA_001 ->
>>> CA_002] cert.
>>>  
>>>  
>>>  
>>> 
>>>  
>>>  
>>>  
>>>  
>>> 
>>> The RP may not trust TA_A, but have internally cross certified CA_002 under
>>> a trusted TA_X
>>>  
>>>  
>>>  
>>> 
>>> The certs of this path are:
>>>  
>>>  
>>>  
>>>  
>>> 
>>> [TA_X -> TA_X]
>>>  
>>>  
>>>  
>>> 
>>> [TA_X -> CA_002]
>>>  
>>>  
>>>  
>>> 
>>> [CA_002 -> EE]
>>>  
>>>  
>>>  
>>>  
>>> 
>>>  
>>>  
>>>  
>>>  
>>> 
>>> The EE cert is the same, thus the EE cert is still pointing to [intCA_001 ->
>>> CA_002]. However this cert is not trusted by the RP. Thus AIA is not useful
>>> for this case.
>>>  
>>>  
>>>  
>>> 
>>>  
>>>  
>>>  
>>>  
>>> 
>>> The question is. If I have a local Trust Anchor  (TA_X) that provides a
>>> whole bunch of intermediary certificates as a service to local and/or remote
>>> hosts that are configured to trust TA_X but not TA_A, then what is the best
>>> protocol to use to make the intermediary certs issued by TA_X available to
>>> other hosts in the network?
>>>  
>>>  
>>>  
>>> 
>>>  
>>>  
>>>  
>>>  
>>> 
>>> /Stefan
>>>  
>>>  
>>>  
>>> 
>>>  
>>>  
>>>  
>>>  
>>> 
>>>  
>>>  
>>>  
>>>  
>>> 
>>>  
>>>  
>>>  
>>>  
>>> 
>>> From: Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>
>>>  Date: Thu, 5 May 2011 09:37:18 -0400
>>>  To: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>, "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
>>>  Subject: RE: Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols
>>>  
>>>  
>>>  
>>> 
>>>  
>>>  
>>>  
>>>>  
>>>>  
>>>>  
>>>> 
>>>> Stefan,
>>>>  
>>>>  
>>>>  
>>>> Why would caIssuers field in AIA not be a preferred approach?
>>>>  
>>>>  
>>>>  
>>>>  
>>>>  
>>>> 
>>>> From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
>>>> Stefan Santesson
>>>>  Sent: Thursday, May 05, 2011 9:12 AM
>>>>  To: pkix@ietf.org
>>>>  Subject: [pkix] Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols
>>>>  
>>>>  
>>>>  
>>>>  
>>>>  
>>>>  
>>>> 
>>>> I'm curious about implementer opinions on what protocol you use/prefer for
>>>> certificate distribution of intermediary CA certificates.
>>>>  
>>>>  
>>>>  
>>>> 
>>>>  
>>>>  
>>>>  
>>>>  
>>>> 
>>>> Certs include the AIA extension to allow a verifier to walk up the path of
>>>> an EE cert. However, that is not a preferable solution.
>>>>  
>>>>  
>>>>  
>>>> 
>>>> In cross certification schemes among other's the intermediary cert that
>>>> chains to one of the RP trust anchor may be provided from a cross
>>>> certifying PKI, bridge CA or similar.
>>>>  
>>>>  
>>>>  
>>>> 
>>>>  
>>>>  
>>>>  
>>>>  
>>>> 
>>>> In such case, what is the most preferred protocol to distribute / make
>>>> available such intermediary certificates from one or more sources. I can
>>>> think of a number of possible alternatives like LDAP, XKMS, FTP of a PKCS#7
>>>> certs only file, etc.
>>>>  
>>>>  
>>>>  
>>>> 
>>>>  
>>>>  
>>>>  
>>>>  
>>>> 
>>>> /Stefan
>>>>  
>>>>  
>>>>  
>>>>  
>>>  
>>>  
>>>  
>>>  
>>  
>  
>  
> _______________________________________________ pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix



--B_3387465727_10162870
Content-type: text/html;
	charset="US-ASCII"
Content-transfer-encoding: quoted-printable

<html><head></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: s=
pace; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-size:=
 14px; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><div>Thanks David,</div><div><br>=
</div><div>You are spot on the issue I wanted to address. I'm also assuming =
that http access to a PKCS#7 is more popular than LDAP.</div><div>The thing =
is that the number of available certs will expand over time, so the RP host =
getting these certs will need to poll for new data frequently (or every time=
 a certificate is validated) in order to update the cache.</div><div>I'm not=
 sure a PKCS#7 certs only file is the most efficient solution for a continuo=
us update scenario, but it might very well be.</div><div><br></div><div>/Ste=
fan</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY=
_SECTION"><div style=3D"font-family:Calibri; font-size:11pt; text-align:left; =
color:black; BORDER-BOTTOM: medium none; BORDER-LEFT: medium none; PADDING-B=
OTTOM: 0in; PADDING-LEFT: 0in; PADDING-RIGHT: 0in; BORDER-TOP: #b5c4df 1pt s=
olid; BORDER-RIGHT: medium none; PADDING-TOP: 3pt"><span style=3D"font-weight:=
bold">From: </span> "David A. Cooper" &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:david.cooper@nist.=
gov">david.cooper@nist.gov</a>&gt;<br><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">Date: <=
/span> Thu, 05 May 2011 11:50:47 -0400<br><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">To:=
 </span> Stefan Santesson &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com">stefan@aaa=
-sec.com</a>&gt;<br><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">Cc: </span> "<a href=3D"mai=
lto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>" &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pki=
x@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">Subject: </span> Re: [p=
kix] Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols<br></div><div><br></=
div><blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: =
#b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;"><div>
  
    
  
  <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#ffffff">
    Stefan,<br>
    <br>
    It used to be that LDAP was the preferred method for distributing CA
    certificates, but over time HTTP of a certs-only CMS message seems
    to have overtaken LDAP in popularity.<br>
    <br>
    The best solution is to use the AIA and SIA extensions to
    communicate the location of this data.&nbsp; For SIA, this can begin by=
    including an SIA extension in the self-signed trust anchor
    certificate.<br>
    <br>
    In the scenario that you describe below, either AIA or SIA <b>should</b=
>
    work.&nbsp; X.509 says that "The <b>issuedToThisCA</b> elements of the =
<b>crossCertificatePair</b>
    attribute of a CA's directory entry shall be used to store all,
    except self-issued certificates issued to this CA." (Self-issued
    certificates appear in the cACertificate attribute.)&nbsp; Similarly th=
e
    certs-only CMS message referred to by an HTTP URI in an AIA
    extension should include all certificates issued to the issuing CA.&nbs=
p;
    Of course, there is always the possibility that a CA may issue a
    cross-certificate to another CA without informing the subject CA.<br>
    <br>
    I agree with Santosh about the SIA extension, and I would really
    like to see support for this extension more widely implemented.&nbsp; I=
    believe that SIA extensions offer two advantages over AIA
    extensions.&nbsp; First, with the SIA extension, I can pre-populate a
    certificate cache in order to make path validation more efficient.&nbsp=
;
    When I install a trust anchor, I can follow the SIA extension in
    that certificate to obtain all CA certificates issued by the trust
    anchor and then follow the SIA extension in those certificates
    recursively in order to fully pre-populate a certificate cache so
    when the time comes to validate a certificate I can quickly build
    the path based on locally cached intermediate certificates.<br>
    <br>
    I also believe that SIA has a security advantage over AIA.&nbsp; With t=
he
    AIA extension, I am downloading information using a URL in a
    certificate that I haven't yet validated.&nbsp; This certificate may ha=
ve
    just been placed in a "signed" email that was sent to me by a
    spammer (just as spammers use other techniques to obtain evidence of
    who has opened their emails).&nbsp; With the SIA extension, I can
    validate the certificate before using the URL to download more
    intermediate certificates, and so only make use of URLs that I have
    already verified as coming from "trusted" sources.<br>
    <br>
    Dave<br>
    <br>
    On 05/05/2011 11:20 AM, Stefan Santesson wrote:
    <blockquote cite=3D"mid:C9E88C02.1D61D%25stefan@aaa-sec.com" type=3D"cite">=
      <div>SIA is at most a way to communicate the location of the data.</d=
iv>
      <div>I'm interested what the best protocol for distributing that
        data is, in general. We can assume for now that the location of
        the data is known by local configuration, by SIA or by whatever
        means.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>/Stefan</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
        <div style=3D"font-family: Calibri; font-size: 11pt; text-align:
          left; color: black; border-width: 1pt medium medium;
          border-style: solid none none; border-color: rgb(181, 196,
          223) -moz-use-text-color -moz-use-text-color; padding: 3pt 0in
          0in;"><span style=3D"font-weight: bold;">From: </span> Santosh
          Chokhani &lt;<a moz-do-not-send=3D"true" href=3D"mailto:SChokhani@cyg=
nacom.com">SChokhani@cygnacom.com</a>&gt;<br>
          <span style=3D"font-weight: bold;">Date: </span> Thu, 5 May
          2011 11:12:08 -0400<br>
          <span style=3D"font-weight: bold;">To: </span> Stefan Santesson
          &lt;<a moz-do-not-send=3D"true" href=3D"mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com">st=
efan@aaa-sec.com</a>&gt;,
          "<a moz-do-not-send=3D"true" href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.=
org</a>"
          &lt;<a moz-do-not-send=3D"true" href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ie=
tf.org</a>&gt;<br>
          <span style=3D"font-weight: bold;">Subject: </span> RE:
          Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols<br>
        </div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
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                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 9pt; color: rg=
b(153, 51, 102); font-family: Arial, sans-serif; ">SIA
                    is a good use for that.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 9pt; color: rg=
b(153, 51, 102); font-family: Arial, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
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                <div>
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                    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size: 10pt; f=
ont-family: Tahoma, sans-serif; ">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-size: 10=
pt; font-family: Tahoma, sans-serif; "> Stefan Santesson [<a moz-do-not-send=
=3D"true" href=3D"mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com">mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com</a>]
                        <br>
                        <b>Sent:</b> Thursday, May 05, 2011 10:03 AM<br>
                        <b>To:</b> Santosh Chokhani; <a moz-do-not-send=3D"tr=
ue" href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a><br>
                        <b>Subject:</b> Re: Intermediary CA certificate
                        distribution protocols<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                  </div>
                </div>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
                <div>
                  <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; colo=
r: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">For
                      the reasons pointed out by Paul, and&nbsp;because the=
                      relying party may use a CA certificate that is not
                      listed in the path assumed by the issuer.<o:p></o:p><=
/span></p>
                </div>
                <div>
                  <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; colo=
r: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                </div>
                <div>
                  <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; colo=
r: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">The
                      EE certificate issuer may assume the path &nbsp; TA_A=
                      -&gt; intCA_001 -&gt; CA_002 -&gt; EE<o:p></o:p></spa=
n></p>
                </div>
                <div>
                  <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; colo=
r: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                </div>
                <div>
                  <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; colo=
r: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">The
                      certs used in this path are:&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span><=
/p>
                </div>
                <div>
                  <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; colo=
r: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">[TA_A
                      -&gt; TA_A]<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                </div>
                <div>
                  <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; colo=
r: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">[TA_A
                      -&gt;&nbsp;intCA_001]<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                </div>
                <div>
                  <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; colo=
r: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">[intCA_001
                      -&gt; CA_002], and&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                </div>
                <div>
                  <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; colo=
r: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">[CA_002
                      -&gt; EE]<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                </div>
                <div>
                  <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; colo=
r: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                </div>
                <div>
                  <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; colo=
r: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">The
                      AIA in the EE cert will identify the location of
                      the&nbsp;[intCA_001 -&gt; CA_002] cert.<o:p></o:p></s=
pan></p>
                </div>
                <div>
                  <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; colo=
r: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                </div>
                <div>
                  <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; colo=
r: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">The
                      RP may not trust TA_A, but have internally cross
                      certified CA_002 under a trusted TA_X<o:p></o:p></spa=
n></p>
                </div>
                <div>
                  <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; colo=
r: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">The
                      certs of this path are:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                </div>
                <div>
                  <div>
                    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; co=
lor: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">[TA_X
                        -&gt; TA_X]<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                  </div>
                  <div>
                    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; co=
lor: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">[TA_X
                        -&gt; CA_002]<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                  </div>
                  <div>
                    <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; co=
lor: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">[CA_002
                        -&gt; EE]<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                  </div>
                </div>
                <div>
                  <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; colo=
r: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                </div>
                <div>
                  <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; colo=
r: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">The
                      EE cert is the same, thus the EE cert is still
                      pointing to&nbsp;[intCA_001 -&gt; CA_002]. However th=
is
                      cert is not trusted by the RP. Thus AIA is not
                      useful for this case.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                </div>
                <div>
                  <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; colo=
r: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                </div>
                <div>
                  <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; colo=
r: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">The
                      question is. If I have a local Trust Anchor
                      &nbsp;(TA_X) that provides a whole bunch of
                      intermediary certificates as a service to local
                      and/or remote hosts that are configured to trust
                      TA_X but not TA_A, then what is the best protocol
                      to use to make the intermediary certs issued by
                      TA_X available to other hosts in the network?<o:p></o=
:p></span></p>
                </div>
                <div>
                  <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; colo=
r: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                </div>
                <div>
                  <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; colo=
r: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">/Stefan<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                </div>
                <div>
                  <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; colo=
r: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                </div>
                <div>
                  <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; colo=
r: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                </div>
                <div>
                  <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; colo=
r: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                </div>
                <div style=3D"border-right: medium none; border-width: 1pt
                  medium medium; border-style: solid none none;
                  border-color: rgb(181, 196, 223) -moz-use-text-color
                  -moz-use-text-color; padding: 3pt 0in 0in;">
                  <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; col=
or: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">From:
                      </span></b><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; color: black=
; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">Santosh
                      Chokhani &lt;<a moz-do-not-send=3D"true" href=3D"mailto:S=
Chokhani@cygnacom.com">SChokhani@cygnacom.com</a>&gt;<br>
                      <b>Date: </b>Thu, 5 May 2011 09:37:18 -0400<br>
                      <b>To: </b>Stefan Santesson &lt;<a moz-do-not-send=3D"t=
rue" href=3D"mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com">stefan@aaa-sec.com</a>&gt;,
                      "<a moz-do-not-send=3D"true" href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org=
">pkix@ietf.org</a>"
                      &lt;<a moz-do-not-send=3D"true" href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.=
org">pkix@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>
                      <b>Subject: </b>RE: Intermediary CA certificate
                      distribution protocols<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                </div>
                <div>
                  <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; colo=
r: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                </div>
                <blockquote style=3D"border-width: medium medium medium
                  4.5pt; border-style: none none none solid;
                  border-color: -moz-use-text-color -moz-use-text-color
                  -moz-use-text-color rgb(181, 196, 223); padding: 0in
                  0in 0in 4pt; margin-left: 3.75pt; margin-right: 0in;" id=3D=
"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE">
                  <div>
                    <div>
                      <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 9pt; col=
or: rgb(31, 73, 125); font-family: Arial, sans-serif; ">Stefan,</span><span =
style=3D"color: black;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
                      <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 9pt; col=
or: rgb(31, 73, 125); font-family: Arial, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;</span><span s=
tyle=3D"color:
                          black;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
                      <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 9pt; col=
or: rgb(31, 73, 125); font-family: Arial, sans-serif; ">Why would caIssuers =
field
                          in AIA not be a preferred approach?</span><span s=
tyle=3D"color: black;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
                      <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 9pt; col=
or: rgb(31, 73, 125); font-family: Arial, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;</span><span s=
tyle=3D"color:
                          black;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
                      <div>
                        <div style=3D"border-right: medium none;
                          border-width: 1pt medium medium; border-style:
                          solid none none; border-color: rgb(181, 196,
                          223) -moz-use-text-color -moz-use-text-color;
                          padding: 3pt 0in 0in;">
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size: 1=
0pt; color: black; font-family: Tahoma, sans-serif; ">From:</span></b><span =
style=3D"font-size: 10pt; color: black; font-family: Tahoma, sans-serif; "> <a=
 moz-do-not-send=3D"true" href=3D"mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org">pkix-bounces@iet=
f.org</a>
                              [<a moz-do-not-send=3D"true" href=3D"mailto:pkix-=
bounces@ietf.org">mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org</a>]
                              <b>On Behalf Of </b>Stefan Santesson<br>
                              <b>Sent:</b> Thursday, May 05, 2011 9:12
                              AM<br>
                              <b>To:</b> <a moz-do-not-send=3D"true" href=3D"ma=
ilto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a><br>
                              <b>Subject:</b> [pkix] Intermediary CA
                              certificate distribution protocols</span><spa=
n style=3D"color: black;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        </div>
                      </div>
                      <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"color: black;">&nbs=
p;<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                      <div>
                        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt=
; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">I'm curious about
                            implementer opinions on what protocol you
                            use/prefer for certificate distribution of
                            intermediary CA certificates.</span><span style=
=3D"color: black;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
                      </div>
                      <div>
                        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt=
; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;</span><span style=
=3D"color: black;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
                      </div>
                      <div>
                        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt=
; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">Certs include the AIA
                            extension to allow a verifier to walk up the
                            path of an EE cert. However, that is not a
                            preferable solution.</span><span style=3D"color: =
black;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
                      </div>
                      <div>
                        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt=
; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">In cross certification
                            schemes among other's the intermediary cert
                            that chains to one of the RP trust anchor
                            may be provided from a cross certifying PKI,
                            bridge CA or similar.</span><span style=3D"color:=
 black;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
                      </div>
                      <div>
                        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt=
; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;</span><span style=
=3D"color: black;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
                      </div>
                      <div>
                        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt=
; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">In such case, what is
                            the most preferred protocol to distribute /
                            make available such intermediary
                            certificates from one or more sources. I can
                            think of a number of possible alternatives
                            like LDAP, XKMS, FTP of a PKCS#7 certs only
                            file, etc.</span><span style=3D"color: black;"><o=
:p></o:p></span></p>
                      </div>
                      <div>
                        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt=
; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;</span><span style=
=3D"color: black;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
                      </div>
                      <div>
                        <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt=
; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">/Stefan</span><span styl=
e=3D"color: black;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
                      </div>
                    </div>
                  </div>
                </blockquote>
              </div>
            </div>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </span></blockquote>
    <br>
  </div></div>
_______________________________________________
pkix mailing list
<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix">https://www.ietf.org/m=
ailman/listinfo/pkix</a>
</blockquote></span></body></html>

--B_3387465727_10162870--



From ejnorman@doit.wisc.edu  Thu May  5 10:00:46 2011
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Date: Thu, 05 May 2011 12:00:33 -0500
From: Eric Norman <ejnorman@doit.wisc.edu>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols
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On May 5, 2011, at 10:25 AM, Stefan Santesson wrote:

> Absolutely right Richard, but in some cases the sender does not know what
> Roots/Trust Anchors the receiver will use and can not provide all
> necessary certificates for any theoretically possible path.
> 
> The RP decision to rely on another Trust Anchor may require the RP to also
> download CA certificates provided by that TA. It is the protocol for that
> exchange I'm interested in.

Is there an implicit assumption about "when" here?

If you're asking an RP to make such a decision as soon as they encounter an EE
certificate that they can't connect to one of their trust anchors, then I think you're
asking for a system that would gloriously fail usability concerns.

EJN



From SChokhani@cygnacom.com  Thu May  5 10:21:11 2011
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From: Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>
To: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>, "Richard L. Barnes" <rbarnes@bbn.com>
Date: Thu, 5 May 2011 13:21:08 -0400
Thread-Topic: [pkix] Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols
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In addition to what Stefan says, for client authenticated TLS, there is a p=
roblem in the client certificate side.  While TLS spec may say that the tru=
st anchors sent by the Server are advisory, browsers such as IE, use them a=
nd when the path terminates prior to that TA, the browser does not use the =
client certificate inhibiting client authenticated TLS.

The only fix I have seen to that is for the server to send a broad set of T=
As to the client.

-----Original Message-----
From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Ste=
fan Santesson
Sent: Thursday, May 05, 2011 11:26 AM
To: Richard L. Barnes
Cc: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols

Absolutely right Richard, but in some cases the sender does not know what
Roots/Trust Anchors the receiver will use and can not provide all
necessary certificates for any theoretically possible path.

The RP decision to rely on another Trust Anchor may require the RP to also
download CA certificates provided by that TA. It is the protocol for that
exchange I'm interested in.

/Stefan


On 11-05-05 4:52 PM, "Richard L. Barnes" <rbarnes@bbn.com> wrote:

>This is maybe slightly off-topic for this list, but I imagine that in
>practice that the more widely-used ways of distributing intermediate CA
>information are in applications: In TLS, you can put the whole chain in
>the Certificate payload.  I think there's a similar slot in IPsec, and of
>course in S/MIME, you can just append more certificates to the message.
>
>--Richard
>
>
>On May 5, 2011, at 3:11 PM, Stefan Santesson wrote:
>
>> I'm curious about implementer opinions on what protocol you use/prefer
>>for certificate distribution of intermediary CA certificates.
>>=20
>> Certs include the AIA extension to allow a verifier to walk up the path
>>of an EE cert. However, that is not a preferable solution.
>> In cross certification schemes among other's the intermediary cert that
>>chains to one of the RP trust anchor may be provided from a cross
>>certifying PKI, bridge CA or similar.
>>=20
>> In such case, what is the most preferred protocol to distribute / make
>>available such intermediary certificates from one or more sources. I can
>>think of a number of possible alternatives like LDAP, XKMS, FTP of a
>>PKCS#7 certs only file, etc.
>>=20
>> /Stefan
>> _______________________________________________
>> pkix mailing list
>> pkix@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>
>_______________________________________________
>pkix mailing list
>pkix@ietf.org
>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix


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To: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
Date: Thu, 5 May 2011 13:21:49 -0400
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Paul,

Your response in not helpful to me in terms of either learning on this foru=
m or contributing to this forum.

-----Original Message-----
From: Paul Hoffman [mailto:paul.hoffman@vpnc.org]=20
Sent: Thursday, May 05, 2011 11:29 AM
To: Santosh Chokhani
Cc: Stefan Santesson; pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols

The answers I gave might not meet your personal usage scenarios, but they d=
o apply to many people.

--Paul Hoffman


From SChokhani@cygnacom.com  Thu May  5 10:30:17 2011
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From: Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>
To: "mrex@sap.com" <mrex@sap.com>, Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>
Date: Thu, 5 May 2011 13:30:13 -0400
Thread-Topic: [pkix] Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols
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References: <C9E86EB3.1D4C0%stefan@aaa-sec.com> from "Stefan Santesson" at May 5, 11 03:11:47 pm <201105051636.p45GaZXN002610@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp>
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Cc: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols
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Aren't the certificate chains also passed in the clear before the session i=
s secured?

Would that not offer an attack vector as well, albeit a bit harder.

Also, for cross-certified environments when the Server and Client TA set ar=
e different, you need to use AIA or SIA to complete the path.

BTW, if TLS folks are concerned with AIA, they can use SIA starting with th=
e value in the RP TA obviating your concern.

-----Original Message-----
From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Mar=
tin Rex
Sent: Thursday, May 05, 2011 12:37 PM
To: Stefan Santesson
Cc: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols

Stefan Santesson wrote:
>=20
> I'm curious about implementer opinions on what protocol you use/prefer fo=
r
> certificate distribution of intermediary CA certificates.
>=20
> Certs include the AIA extension to allow a verifier to walk up the path o=
f
> an EE cert. However, that is not a preferable solution.

"not a preferable solution"?  It appears that some serious security
vulnerabilities have found their way into at least parts of the installed
base based on negligent chasing of AIA caIssuers from untrusted certs.

It is a serious security problem and would be completely irresponsible
to have software perform AIA caIssuers downloads for (still unverified
and therefore) untrusted certs without a sufficiently adept/clueful
human end user authorizing each download URL _before_ the download
is being attempted.

We had a discussion on this on the TLS WG mailing list in Aug 2010.

  http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg06813.html
  http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg06824.html
  http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg06830.html


>
> In cross certification schemes among other's the intermediary cert that
> chains to one of the RP trust anchor may be provided from a cross certify=
ing
> PKI, bridge CA or similar.

I agree.  Those who engage in cross-certifying/bridging ought to bear
the burden on providing and missing cross-certs to all entities
within that PKI.


>=20
> In such case, what is the most preferred protocol to distribute / make
> available such intermediary certificates from one or more sources. I can
> think of a number of possible alternatives like LDAP, XKMS, FTP of a PKCS=
#7
> certs only file, etc.

There should be a protocol and an architecture that allows entities
to build certificate chains for communication peers in a trustworthy
and protected fashion, i.e. reliably precluding access to untrusted/
unverified resources.  If it doesn't exist yet, then it is about
time for it to be created in case that cross-certifying / bridging
of PKIs (rather than the ~100 independent roots of the TLS X.509 PKI)
is considered a use case for the real world that needs to be supported.


-Martin=20
_______________________________________________
pkix mailing list
pkix@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix

From mrex@sap.com  Thu May  5 12:22:32 2011
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To: SChokhani@cygnacom.com (Santosh Chokhani)
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In-Reply-To: <B83745DA469B7847811819C5005244AF0F41EF2F@scygexch7.cygnacom.com> from "Santosh Chokhani" at May 5, 11 01:30:13 pm
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols
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Santosh Chokhani wrote:
> 
> Aren't the certificate chains also passed in the clear before
> the session is secured?

Yes, they are.

> 
> Would that not offer an attack vector as well, albeit a bit harder.

Unless you want to stop communicating entirely, the attack vector
that you parse protocol PDUs (explicit PDUs, ASN.1, XML, etc.)
in not avoidable.

Searching locally preconfigured places for certificates to complete
a certification path should not be a problem; considering
additional certs supplied by the peer in-band with the communication
protocol also does not create an additional attack vector.

But being able to entice a communication peer to automatically access
arbitrary resources described by an attacker-supplied, unverified URI,
is a whole different category.

The most important part of rfc-5280 is 6.1.3 (a)
  http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-6.1.3

The security-relevant issue is to perform (a1) and (a2) _before_ (a3),
(but somehow rfc5280 goofed (a4), because (a4) ought to be the
 first check in the list under 6.1.3 (a)).

AIA OCSP URIs and CRL-DP URIs should only be accessed after the
signature on the certificate has been successfully validated with
a trusted key (a public key that has been verified to be trustworthy
under your set of trust anchors).

You still can be screwed by any single one of the CAs issued under any of
your trust anchors with crafted AIA OCSP URIs and CRL-DP URIs,
but that is a risk that you subscribe to when you
"open the shrink wrap around the trust anchor cert" (or its software
 container, e.g. preloaded in a browser) and decide to use it...


> 
> Also, for cross-certified environments when the Server and Client TA
> set are different, you need to use AIA or SIA to complete the path.
> 
> BTW, if TLS folks are concerned with AIA, they can use SIA starting with
> the value in the RP TA obviating your concern.

I'm fine with what the TLS spec says (MUST send the entire chain),

But I'm irritated about very dangerous automatic AIA caIssuer chasing
that I've seen in a pretty common PKI Software when visualizing
Certificate contents, and I read a description of some browser
behaviour that also sounded like automatic AIA caIssuer chasing.


-Martin

From stefan@aaa-sec.com  Thu May  5 15:24:36 2011
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Date: Fri, 06 May 2011 00:24:26 +0200
From: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>
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I totally agree that path discovery through AIA is a bad solution
providing many attack vectors to defeat a bad PKI implementation. And it
is messy to use on the fly letting users wait for network time-outs etc
when processing options.

It's way better to solve bottom up discovery by simply providing the path
(as TLS requires).

However. As stated before, I would like to focus this discussion on
top-down path discovery when the RP use a TA different from the one
assumed by the sender. The use case I have in mind is when the RP relies
on one or a few TAs to provide trust in only those CAs that are approved
for a given context. The RP just installs the few TA root certificates and
trows all other roots in the bin. It then downloads and caches all
intermediary certs provided by the locally accepted TAs.

This guarantees that only those chains that chains to one of the cached
intermediary certs will be accepted.

The question at hand is what's the best suited protocol for such
continuous caching of intermediary certs from the few trusted TAs?

My current main choices are:
-Http access to PKCS#7 certs only file
-LDAP
-XKMS

Who has experience of pros and cons of theses solutions?
What is lacking?
Is there more to be done in this area?


/Stefan


On 11-05-05 6:36 PM, "Martin Rex" <mrex@sap.com> wrote:

>Stefan Santesson wrote:
>> 
>> I'm curious about implementer opinions on what protocol you use/prefer
>>for
>> certificate distribution of intermediary CA certificates.
>> 
>> Certs include the AIA extension to allow a verifier to walk up the path
>>of
>> an EE cert. However, that is not a preferable solution.
>
>"not a preferable solution"?  It appears that some serious security
>vulnerabilities have found their way into at least parts of the installed
>base based on negligent chasing of AIA caIssuers from untrusted certs.
>
>It is a serious security problem and would be completely irresponsible
>to have software perform AIA caIssuers downloads for (still unverified
>and therefore) untrusted certs without a sufficiently adept/clueful
>human end user authorizing each download URL _before_ the download
>is being attempted.
>
>We had a discussion on this on the TLS WG mailing list in Aug 2010.
>
>  http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg06813.html
>  http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg06824.html
>  http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg06830.html
>
>
>>
>> In cross certification schemes among other's the intermediary cert that
>> chains to one of the RP trust anchor may be provided from a cross
>>certifying
>> PKI, bridge CA or similar.
>
>I agree.  Those who engage in cross-certifying/bridging ought to bear
>the burden on providing and missing cross-certs to all entities
>within that PKI.
>
>
>> 
>> In such case, what is the most preferred protocol to distribute / make
>> available such intermediary certificates from one or more sources. I can
>> think of a number of possible alternatives like LDAP, XKMS, FTP of a
>>PKCS#7
>> certs only file, etc.
>
>There should be a protocol and an architecture that allows entities
>to build certificate chains for communication peers in a trustworthy
>and protected fashion, i.e. reliably precluding access to untrusted/
>unverified resources.  If it doesn't exist yet, then it is about
>time for it to be created in case that cross-certifying / bridging
>of PKIs (rather than the ~100 independent roots of the TLS X.509 PKI)
>is considered a use case for the real world that needs to be supported.
>
>
>-Martin 
>_______________________________________________
>pkix mailing list
>pkix@ietf.org
>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix



From swilson@lockstep.com.au  Thu May  5 15:44:27 2011
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On 6/05/2011 8:24 AM, Stefan Santesson wrote:
> I totally agree that path discovery through AIA is a bad solution
> providing many attack vectors to defeat a bad PKI implementation. And it
> is messy to use on the fly letting users wait for network time-outs etc
> when processing options.
>
> It's way better to solve bottom up discovery by simply providing the path
> (as TLS requires).
Yeah, I've always thought that the path discovery problem is trivial. 
Why wouldn't someone digitally signing a transaction always send the 
through the entire certificate chain?  Or more precisely, why wouldn't 
their software send through the entire chain as applicable in the 
context it's operating in?

Stephen Wilson
Lockstep

http://lockstep.com.au <http://www.lockstep.com.au>
Lockstep Consulting provides independent specialist advice and analysis
on digital identity and privacy.Lockstep Technologies develops unique
new smart ID solutions that enhance privacy and prevent identity theft.



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      On 6/05/2011 8:24 AM, Stefan Santesson wrote:</tt>
    <blockquote cite="mid:C9E8EBF0.1D984%25stefan@aaa-sec.com"
      type="cite">
      <pre wrap=""><tt>I totally agree that path discovery through AIA is a bad solution
providing many attack vectors to defeat a bad PKI implementation. And it
is messy to use on the fly letting users wait for network time-outs etc
when processing options.

It's way better to solve bottom up discovery by simply providing the path
(as TLS requires).
</tt></pre>
    </blockquote>
    <tt>Yeah, I've always thought that the path discovery problem is
      trivial. Why wouldn't someone digitally signing a transaction
      always send the through the entire certificate chain?&nbsp; Or more
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    <p class="MsoNormal"><tt>&nbsp;</tt></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><tt><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family:
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          Lockstep </span></tt></p>
    <tt><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: &quot;Courier
        New&quot;;"><a href="http://www.lockstep.com.au">http://lockstep.com.au</a><br>
        Lockstep Consulting provides independent specialist advice and
        analysis <br>
        on digital identity and privacy.<span style="">&nbsp;
        </span>Lockstep Technologies develops unique <br>
        new smart ID solutions that enhance privacy and prevent identity
        theft.<br style="">
        <br style="">
      </span><br>
    </tt>
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--------------020004080009070307020001--


From hotz@jpl.nasa.gov  Thu May  5 16:59:06 2011
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols
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On May 5, 2011, at 3:24 PM, Stefan Santesson wrote:

> I totally agree that path discovery through AIA is a bad solution
> providing many attack vectors to defeat a bad PKI implementation. And =
it
> is messy to use on the fly letting users wait for network time-outs =
etc
> when processing options.
>=20
> It's way better to solve bottom up discovery by simply providing the =
path
> (as TLS requires).

Agree as first choice, though you provided a kind of counter-example =
earlier in this thread.  ;-)

> However. As stated before, I would like to focus this discussion on
> top-down path discovery when the RP use a TA different from the one
> assumed by the sender. The use case I have in mind is when the RP =
relies
> on one or a few TAs to provide trust in only those CAs that are =
approved
> for a given context. The RP just installs the few TA root certificates =
and
> trows all other roots in the bin. It then downloads and caches all
> intermediary certs provided by the locally accepted TAs.

This sounds like an exponential-growth problem.  Turning your =
description around, I think you are creating requirements:

1) the number of TAs is small.
2) the number of intermediate CAs under each TAs is small.
3) the RP knows when any of the above change, and how to get the =
updates.

> This guarantees that only those chains that chains to one of the =
cached
> intermediary certs will be accepted.

Sounds reasonable to me.

> The question at hand is what's the best suited protocol for such
> continuous caching of intermediary certs from the few trusted TAs?
>=20
> My current main choices are:
> -Http access to PKCS#7 certs only file
> -LDAP
> -XKMS
>=20
> Who has experience of pros and cons of theses solutions?
> What is lacking?
> Is there more to be done in this area?

I've no experience with XKMS.  The other two seem to work.

I'm kind of stuck on the above requirements though.  Can you explain why =
I shouldn't focus on them first?  Your application already solves those =
parts of the problem?

>=20
> /Stefan
>=20
>=20
> On 11-05-05 6:36 PM, "Martin Rex" <mrex@sap.com> wrote:
>=20
>> Stefan Santesson wrote:
>>>=20
>>> I'm curious about implementer opinions on what protocol you =
use/prefer
>>> for
>>> certificate distribution of intermediary CA certificates.
>>>=20
>>> Certs include the AIA extension to allow a verifier to walk up the =
path
>>> of
>>> an EE cert. However, that is not a preferable solution.
>>=20
>> "not a preferable solution"?  It appears that some serious security
>> vulnerabilities have found their way into at least parts of the =
installed
>> base based on negligent chasing of AIA caIssuers from untrusted =
certs.
>>=20
>> It is a serious security problem and would be completely =
irresponsible
>> to have software perform AIA caIssuers downloads for (still =
unverified
>> and therefore) untrusted certs without a sufficiently adept/clueful
>> human end user authorizing each download URL _before_ the download
>> is being attempted.
>>=20
>> We had a discussion on this on the TLS WG mailing list in Aug 2010.
>>=20
>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg06813.html
>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg06824.html
>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg06830.html
>>=20
>>=20
>>>=20
>>> In cross certification schemes among other's the intermediary cert =
that
>>> chains to one of the RP trust anchor may be provided from a cross
>>> certifying
>>> PKI, bridge CA or similar.
>>=20
>> I agree.  Those who engage in cross-certifying/bridging ought to bear
>> the burden on providing and missing cross-certs to all entities
>> within that PKI.
>>=20
>>=20
>>>=20
>>> In such case, what is the most preferred protocol to distribute / =
make
>>> available such intermediary certificates from one or more sources. I =
can
>>> think of a number of possible alternatives like LDAP, XKMS, FTP of a
>>> PKCS#7
>>> certs only file, etc.
>>=20
>> There should be a protocol and an architecture that allows entities
>> to build certificate chains for communication peers in a trustworthy
>> and protected fashion, i.e. reliably precluding access to untrusted/
>> unverified resources.  If it doesn't exist yet, then it is about
>> time for it to be created in case that cross-certifying / bridging
>> of PKIs (rather than the ~100 independent roots of the TLS X.509 PKI)
>> is considered a use case for the real world that needs to be =
supported.
>>=20
>>=20
>> -Martin=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> pkix mailing list
>> pkix@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix

------------------------------------------------------
The opinions expressed in this message are mine,
not those of Caltech, JPL, NASA, or the US Government.
Henry.B.Hotz@jpl.nasa.gov, or hbhotz@oxy.edu




From mrex@sap.com  Thu May  5 18:45:03 2011
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To: stefan@aaa-sec.com (Stefan Santesson)
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Stefan Santesson wrote:
> 
> The question at hand is what's the best suited protocol for such
> continuous caching of intermediary certs from the few trusted TAs?
> 
> My current main choices are:
> -Http access to PKCS#7 certs only file
> -LDAP
> -XKMS

AIA caIssuers allows both, ASN.1 DER single cert or PKCS7/CMS certs only bag

rfc 5280, section 4221 Authority Information Access, last para on page 50:
   http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#page-50

   Where the information is available via HTTP or FTP, accessLocation
   MUST be a uniformResourceIdentifier and the URI MUST point to either
   a single DER encoded certificate as specified in [RFC2585] or a
   collection of certificates in a BER or DER encoded "certs-only" CMS
   message as specified in [RFC2797].

And I only found ASN.1 DER single cert in the statistically INsignificant
number of server certs I that I looked at.
 
There are these two other cert distribution methods shipping as
part of Microsoft Operating systems.

The approach up to W2K3 to regularly poll a TrustAnchor update
from the vendors server (but I've never seen any of these Windows
machines asking the user for consent to update the trust anchors,
or telling the user what exactly was changed during the update).
But you can still look in the certificate store to find out which
trust anchors you happen to trust.

And then there is the approach in Win7 (probably started in Vista)
where you have no clue whatsoever which trust anchors your browser
will trust, because missing certificates and missing trustanchors
will be automatically downloaded and added (no asking, no telling),
and even if you look at the cert store, decide you don't like some
cert and delete it -- it will automatically reappear on the next
certificate path validation.   So if you want to discontinue trusting
a cert, you must move it manually into the untrusted issuers container.
Which is a tad difficult to do if you don't have the slighest clue
which certs your machine will automatically trust...


What might help, if there was a protocol (and service based on it)
offered by every of your trust anchors that engages in cross-certing,
where you could send in a list of Issuer DNames asking them to return
all valid path certs to (cross-)CA-certs that were created with this
issuer name in them.


-Martin

From wwwrun@rfc-editor.org  Fri May  6 02:09:01 2011
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Subject: [pkix] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC4334 (2798)
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The following errata report has been submitted for RFC4334,
"Certificate Extensions and Attributes Supporting Authentication in Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) and Wireless Local Area Networks (WLAN)".

--------------------------------------
You may review the report below and at:
http://www.rfc-editor.org/errata_search.php?rfc=4334&eid=2798

--------------------------------------
Type: Technical
Reported by: duka laszlone <dukalaszlone@freemail.hu>

Section: rfc4334

Original Text
-------------
hello.......anyaa

Corrected Text
--------------


Notes
-----


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--------------------------------------
RFC4334 (draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3770bis-03)
--------------------------------------
Title               : Certificate Extensions and Attributes Supporting Authentication in Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) and Wireless Local Area Networks (WLAN)
Publication Date    : February 2006
Author(s)           : R. Housley, T. Moore
Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
Source              : Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509)
Area                : Security
Stream              : IETF
Verifying Party     : IESG

From stefan@aaa-sec.com  Fri May  6 02:10:10 2011
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Date: Fri, 06 May 2011 11:05:22 +0200
From: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>
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Hi Henry,

On 11-05-06 1:59 AM, "Henry B. Hotz" <hotz@jpl.nasa.gov> wrote:

>This sounds like an exponential-growth problem.  Turning your description
>around, I think you are creating requirements:
>
>1) the number of TAs is small.
>2) the number of intermediate CAs under each TAs is small.
>3) the RP knows when any of the above change, and how to get the updates.

I understand your concern, but this is not an exponential growth problem.

It would be if you would attempt to collect all issued cert from all
trusted CA's, starting from 100+ TAs.

However, the top down model in my use-case is an act of selecting a vey
limited number of TA's that you specifically select as your trust
provider. So condition 1) is absolutely met. The number of intermediary
CAs under each CA does not have to be small, but manageable. In my
particular case it is in the range of about 100-200 CAs.

The RP does not know then a new intermediary CA is added and here is the
root of my wandering what the best protocol for this is.
The RP needs to frequently update it's cache. Avoiding unnecessary
transfer of data can be achieved in the case of a PKCS#7 file by using
HTTP caching and HTTP headers to only download an updated cert file if it
has been changed. This allows frequent caching without excessive bandwidth
waste.

I assume LDAP and XKMS has other in-protocol functions for determining if
anything has changed, but I'm not sure that would be easier.

A specific use case is the somewhat 500 trust services in EU listed a
complex structure of signed XML files, called Trust-service Status Lists
(TSL). It is currently very hard for an RP application to extract relevant
CA keys and TA's from those XML files. To solve this you can create a
locally trusted TA who digs into those TSLs and cross certifies any
relevant CA out of those listed in the available TSLs. The only thing you
give to the RP is the locally trusted TA cert and a way to obtain the
cross certificates from that TA.

You may create several (but few) TA's representing different trust
policies. The RP installs the TA's representing the trust policies it
accepts, download related intermediary certificates and suddenly is able
to correctly trust all EU CA's that are compatible with the selected
policies. 

This solution is simple, straight forward, compatible with current PKI
implementations and so much easier than letting each RP dig into all
national TSL files to figure out what to trust.

/Stefan






From wwwrun@rfc-editor.org  Fri May  6 02:18:04 2011
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Subject: [pkix] [Editorial Errata Reported] RFC4334 (2799)
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The following errata report has been submitted for RFC4334,
"Certificate Extensions and Attributes Supporting Authentication in Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) and Wireless Local Area Networks (WLAN)".

--------------------------------------
You may review the report below and at:
http://www.rfc-editor.org/errata_search.php?rfc=4334&eid=2799

--------------------------------------
Type: Editorial
Reported by: duka laszlone <dukalaszlone@freemail.hu>

Section: e.g,1,2,3,

Original Text
-------------
global

Corrected Text
--------------


Notes
-----


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--------------------------------------
RFC4334 (draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3770bis-03)
--------------------------------------
Title               : Certificate Extensions and Attributes Supporting Authentication in Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) and Wireless Local Area Networks (WLAN)
Publication Date    : February 2006
Author(s)           : R. Housley, T. Moore
Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
Source              : Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509)
Area                : Security
Stream              : IETF
Verifying Party     : IESG

From wwwrun@rfc-editor.org  Fri May  6 02:19:27 2011
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Subject: [pkix] [Editorial Errata Reported] RFC4334 (2800)
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The following errata report has been submitted for RFC4334,
"Certificate Extensions and Attributes Supporting Authentication in Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) and Wireless Local Area Networks (WLAN)".

--------------------------------------
You may review the report below and at:
http://www.rfc-editor.org/errata_search.php?rfc=4334&eid=2800

--------------------------------------
Type: Editorial
Reported by: duka laszlone <dukalaszlone@freemail.hu>

Section: e.g,1,2,3,

Original Text
-------------
2119

Corrected Text
--------------


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-----


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--------------------------------------
RFC4334 (draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3770bis-03)
--------------------------------------
Title               : Certificate Extensions and Attributes Supporting Authentication in Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) and Wireless Local Area Networks (WLAN)
Publication Date    : February 2006
Author(s)           : R. Housley, T. Moore
Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
Source              : Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509)
Area                : Security
Stream              : IETF
Verifying Party     : IESG

From stefan@aaa-sec.com  Fri May  6 02:51:17 2011
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Date: Fri, 06 May 2011 11:49:59 +0200
From: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>
To: RFC Errata System <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org>, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>, <timmoore@microsoft.com>, <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>, <turners@ieca.com>, <kent@bbn.com>
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Thread-Topic: [Technical Errata Reported] RFC4334 (2798)
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Subject: Re: [pkix] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC4334 (2798)
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Errata 2798, 2799 and 2800 are clearly just an abuse of the errata
reporting system and should be deleted.

/Stefan


On 11-05-06 11:09 AM, "RFC Errata System" <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org>
wrote:

>
>The following errata report has been submitted for RFC4334,
>"Certificate Extensions and Attributes Supporting Authentication in
>Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) and Wireless Local Area Networks (WLAN)".
>
>--------------------------------------
>You may review the report below and at:
>http://www.rfc-editor.org/errata_search.php?rfc=4334&eid=2798
>
>--------------------------------------
>Type: Technical
>Reported by: duka laszlone <dukalaszlone@freemail.hu>
>
>Section: rfc4334
>
>Original Text
>-------------
>hello.......anyaa
>
>Corrected Text
>--------------
>
>
>Notes
>-----
>
>
>Instructions:
>-------------
>This errata is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please
>use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or
>rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party (IESG)
>can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary.
>
>--------------------------------------
>RFC4334 (draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3770bis-03)
>--------------------------------------
>Title               : Certificate Extensions and Attributes Supporting
>Authentication in Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) and Wireless Local Area
>Networks (WLAN)
>Publication Date    : February 2006
>Author(s)           : R. Housley, T. Moore
>Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
>Source              : Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509)
>Area                : Security
>Stream              : IETF
>Verifying Party     : IESG



From DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil  Fri May  6 05:40:40 2011
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Thread-Topic: [pkix] Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols
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From: "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols
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-----Original Message-----
From: Stefan Santesson
>=20
> On 11-05-06 1:59 AM, "Henry B. Hotz" <hotz@jpl.nasa.gov> wrote:
>
>> This sounds like an exponential-growth problem.  Turning
>> your description around, I think you are creating requirements:
>>
>> 1) the number of TAs is small.
>> 2) the number of intermediate CAs under each TAs is small.
>> 3) the RP knows when any of the above change, and how to get the
updates.
>
> I understand your concern, but this is not an exponential growth
problem.

I suppose Henry was using a bit of hyperbole - it is an O(N*M) problem
which, unlike exponential, is tractable even as the number of TAs (N)
and Intermediate CAs per TA (M) increase.  If it were not, then web
browser caches would grind to a halt as the number of web pages visited
(N) and images per page (M) increased.  But web caches work fine at
scale, and so should certificate caches.  By analogy with the browser,
the user/administrator of the RP system should be able to tune the
certificate cache size as appropriate.

> Avoiding unnecessary transfer of data can be achieved in
> the case of a PKCS#7 file by using HTTP caching and HTTP headers
> to only download an updated cert file if it has been changed.
> This allows frequent caching without excessive bandwidth waste.

Did we put you up to this? :-)  I couldn't have said it better myself.



> The only thing you give to the RP is the locally trusted TA cert
> and a way to obtain the cross certificates from that TA.
>
> This solution is simple, straight forward, compatible with
> current PKI implementations and so much easier than letting
> each RP dig into all national TSL files to figure out what
> to trust.
>
> /Stefan

I vote for using PKCS#7 over HTTP for cert transfers.  (We've been using
HTTP for CRLs rather than LDAP for years.)  And the obvious way for the
TA to publish its current list of Intermediate CAs is a SIA URL in the
TA cert pointing to an HTML file containing links to each Intermediate
CA cert.  The RP fetches the HTML list if it has changed, and fetches
each cert anchor (<a href=3D...>) in the list if that cert is not =
already
cached.

What could be simpler or more standard or more bandwidth efficient?

If the TA has privacy concerns, it can authenticate the RP using https,
generate the list on the fly based on the RP's privileges, and use
dynamic IntCA cert links (random and valid only for N seconds).  All
standard web stuff.

Dave

From SChokhani@cygnacom.com  Sat May  7 04:08:03 2011
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From: Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>
To: "mrex@sap.com" <mrex@sap.com>
Date: Sat, 7 May 2011 07:07:57 -0400
Thread-Topic: [pkix] Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols
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In the end the AIA chasing is done using a certificate provided by the serv=
er.  So, either the server gave you a bad certificate or an attacker substi=
tuted it in which case he can substitute the whole chain.

Basically, AIA and SIA is a trade off of performance.  Each has its benefit=
s and drawbacks.  Security-wise one can argue that SIA is safer.  But, just=
 as you argue for processing PDU correctly, one can process payload from AI=
A correctly.

Your analysis about 5280 is incorrect.  I hope we are talking about the sam=
e thing.  Item 1 in 6.1.3 a is the important thing.  This ensures signature=
s chain.  Item 4 ensures names chain, which is totally superfluous once the=
 signatures chain.  If an attacker has your private key, it matters not wha=
t name he binds that key to.  So, name chaining in a certification path is =
not security relevant.

-----Original Message-----
From: Martin Rex [mailto:mrex@sap.com]=20
Sent: Thursday, May 05, 2011 3:22 PM
To: Santosh Chokhani
Cc: mrex@sap.com; stefan@aaa-sec.com; pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols

Santosh Chokhani wrote:
>=20
> Aren't the certificate chains also passed in the clear before
> the session is secured?

Yes, they are.

>=20
> Would that not offer an attack vector as well, albeit a bit harder.

Unless you want to stop communicating entirely, the attack vector
that you parse protocol PDUs (explicit PDUs, ASN.1, XML, etc.)
in not avoidable.

Searching locally preconfigured places for certificates to complete
a certification path should not be a problem; considering
additional certs supplied by the peer in-band with the communication
protocol also does not create an additional attack vector.

But being able to entice a communication peer to automatically access
arbitrary resources described by an attacker-supplied, unverified URI,
is a whole different category.

The most important part of rfc-5280 is 6.1.3 (a)
  http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-6.1.3

The security-relevant issue is to perform (a1) and (a2) _before_ (a3),
(but somehow rfc5280 goofed (a4), because (a4) ought to be the
 first check in the list under 6.1.3 (a)).

AIA OCSP URIs and CRL-DP URIs should only be accessed after the
signature on the certificate has been successfully validated with
a trusted key (a public key that has been verified to be trustworthy
under your set of trust anchors).

You still can be screwed by any single one of the CAs issued under any of
your trust anchors with crafted AIA OCSP URIs and CRL-DP URIs,
but that is a risk that you subscribe to when you
"open the shrink wrap around the trust anchor cert" (or its software
 container, e.g. preloaded in a browser) and decide to use it...


>=20
> Also, for cross-certified environments when the Server and Client TA
> set are different, you need to use AIA or SIA to complete the path.
>=20
> BTW, if TLS folks are concerned with AIA, they can use SIA starting with
> the value in the RP TA obviating your concern.

I'm fine with what the TLS spec says (MUST send the entire chain),

But I'm irritated about very dangerous automatic AIA caIssuer chasing
that I've seen in a pretty common PKI Software when visualizing
Certificate contents, and I read a description of some browser
behaviour that also sounded like automatic AIA caIssuer chasing.


-Martin

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When a TSBCertificate provides trust anchor information, is it then a
requirement that the subject and the issuer are the same entity?

 

Is a TBSCertificate used for anything else that for trust anchor
information?

 

Erik Andersen

 


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vlink=3Dpurple><div class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal>When a =
TSBCertificate provides trust anchor information, is it then a =
requirement that the subject and the issuer are the same =
entity?<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>Is a TBSCertificate used for anything else that for =
trust anchor information?<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
lang=3DDA style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Consolas'>Erik =
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From ejnorman@doit.wisc.edu  Sun May  8 09:10:14 2011
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Subject: Re: [pkix] TBSCertificate as trust anchor information
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On May 8, 2011, at 10:34 AM, Erik Andersen wrote:

> When a TSBCertificate provides trust anchor information, is it then a requirement that the subject and the issuer are the same entity?

I say no.  I should have the ability to mark any public key/subject pair that I choose as trustworthy.
In other words, what's a trust anchor is something I decide, not someone else.  Yes, that means
that I probably have to do some out-of-band stuff, but that's not a problem PKIX can solve.

EJN

From SChokhani@cygnacom.com  Sun May  8 09:29:33 2011
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From: Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>
To: Erik Andersen <era@x500.eu>, PKIX <pkix@ietf.org>
Date: Sun, 8 May 2011 12:29:30 -0400
Thread-Topic: [pkix] TBSCertificate as trust anchor information
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Erik,

Also see Section 3 of RFC 5914 for usage of TBSCertificate.

In that usage, it need not have the issuer and subject the same entity.

From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Eri=
k Andersen
Sent: Sunday, May 08, 2011 11:35 AM
To: PKIX
Subject: [pkix] TBSCertificate as trust anchor information

When a TSBCertificate provides trust anchor information, is it then a requi=
rement that the subject and the issuer are the same entity?

Is a TBSCertificate used for anything else that for trust anchor informatio=
n?

Erik Andersen


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</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=3DEN-US link=3Dblue vli=
nk=3Dpurple><div class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'f=
ont-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>Erik,<o:p></=
o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-fam=
ily:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p clas=
s=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-seri=
f";color:#1F497D'>Also see Section 3 of RFC 5914 for usage of TBSCertificat=
e.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt=
;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></=
p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","=
sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>In that usage, it need not have the issuer and s=
ubject the same entity.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span sty=
le=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p>=
&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><div><div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C=
4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span style=3D=
'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span></b><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> pkix-bounces@=
ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] <b>On Behalf Of </b>Erik Andersen<b=
r><b>Sent:</b> Sunday, May 08, 2011 11:35 AM<br><b>To:</b> PKIX<br><b>Subje=
ct:</b> [pkix] TBSCertificate as trust anchor information<o:p></o:p></span>=
</p></div></div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNor=
mal><span lang=3DEN-GB>When a TSBCertificate provides trust anchor informat=
ion, is it then a requirement that the subject and the issuer are the same =
entity?<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p>&=
nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB>Is a TBSCerti=
ficate used for anything else that for trust anchor information?<o:p></o:p>=
</span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span>=
</p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DDA style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-fam=
ily:Consolas'>Erik Andersen<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span=
 lang=3DDA><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div></body></html>=

--_000_B83745DA469B7847811819C5005244AF0F41F030scygexch7cygnac_--

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Cc: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols
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        It sounds perfectly reasonable.  The main limitation on such a 
solution is that existing self-signed certificates treated as trust 
anchors do NOT typically contain SIA extensions and most of them last 
another 20+ years.

                        Tom Gindin




From:   "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>
To:     <pkix@ietf.org>
Date:   05/06/2011 08:41 AM
Subject:        Re: [pkix] Intermediary CA certificate distribution 
protocols
Sent by:        pkix-bounces@ietf.org





-----Original Message-----
From: Stefan Santesson
> 
> On 11-05-06 1:59 AM, "Henry B. Hotz" <hotz@jpl.nasa.gov> wrote:
>
>> This sounds like an exponential-growth problem.  Turning
>> your description around, I think you are creating requirements:
>>
>> 1) the number of TAs is small.
>> 2) the number of intermediate CAs under each TAs is small.
>> 3) the RP knows when any of the above change, and how to get the
updates.
>
> I understand your concern, but this is not an exponential growth
problem.

I suppose Henry was using a bit of hyperbole - it is an O(N*M) problem
which, unlike exponential, is tractable even as the number of TAs (N)
and Intermediate CAs per TA (M) increase.  If it were not, then web
browser caches would grind to a halt as the number of web pages visited
(N) and images per page (M) increased.  But web caches work fine at
scale, and so should certificate caches.  By analogy with the browser,
the user/administrator of the RP system should be able to tune the
certificate cache size as appropriate.

> Avoiding unnecessary transfer of data can be achieved in
> the case of a PKCS#7 file by using HTTP caching and HTTP headers
> to only download an updated cert file if it has been changed.
> This allows frequent caching without excessive bandwidth waste.

Did we put you up to this? :-)  I couldn't have said it better myself.



> The only thing you give to the RP is the locally trusted TA cert
> and a way to obtain the cross certificates from that TA.
>
> This solution is simple, straight forward, compatible with
> current PKI implementations and so much easier than letting
> each RP dig into all national TSL files to figure out what
> to trust.
>
> /Stefan

I vote for using PKCS#7 over HTTP for cert transfers.  (We've been using
HTTP for CRLs rather than LDAP for years.)  And the obvious way for the
TA to publish its current list of Intermediate CAs is a SIA URL in the
TA cert pointing to an HTML file containing links to each Intermediate
CA cert.  The RP fetches the HTML list if it has changed, and fetches
each cert anchor (<a href=...>) in the list if that cert is not already
cached.

What could be simpler or more standard or more bandwidth efficient?

If the TA has privacy concerns, it can authenticate the RP using https,
generate the list on the fly based on the RP's privileges, and use
dynamic IntCA cert links (random and valid only for N seconds).  All
standard web stuff.

Dave
_______________________________________________
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On May 5, 2011, at 8:11 AM, Stefan Santesson wrote:

> In such case, what is the most preferred protocol to distribute / make =
available such intermediary certificates from one or more sources. I can =
think of a number of possible alternatives like LDAP, XKMS, FTP of a =
PKCS#7 certs only file, etc.

Anything but LDAP.  Something bound to HTTP preferred.

-- T


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From: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
To: Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>
Date: Mon, 9 May 2011 09:08:37 -0400
Thread-Topic: [pkix] Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols
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References: <C9E86EB3.1D4C0%stefan@aaa-sec.com> from "Stefan Santesson" at May 5, 11 03:11:47 pm <201105051636.p45GaZXN002610@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp> <B83745DA469B7847811819C5005244AF0F41EF2F@scygexch7.cygnacom.com>
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On May 5, 2011, at 12:30 PM, Santosh Chokhani wrote:

> Aren't the certificate chains also passed in the clear before the =
session is secured?

It depends on the web server.  IIS defaults to TLS renegotiation, so the =
session is server-authenticated up through ChangeCipherSpec. and then =
the handshake is restarted under the session key.

This only protects the client's chain and identity, though.

-- T


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From: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
To: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>
Date: Mon, 9 May 2011 09:12:51 -0400
Thread-Topic: [pkix] Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols
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On May 5, 2011, at 5:24 PM, Stefan Santesson wrote:

> My current main choices are:
> -Http access to PKCS#7 certs only file
> -LDAP
> -XKMS
>=20
> Who has experience of pros and cons of theses solutions?
> What is lacking?
> Is there more to be done in this area?

LDAP will make your network boundary people very unhappy.  It's a =
difficult protocol to proxy properly, so you end up with direct access =
to the server more often than not.  Plus you have to allow anonymous =
binding, which means you need to dedicate the server to serving these =
objects and no other, which is a waste of resources.  LDAP also won't =
leverage client-side network caches, nor will many clients be able to =
check for updates without a complete handshake and LDAP query--which are =
generally expensive. =20

HTTP is your best answer.  Coupled with compression and =
if-modified-since it gets quite efficient.

-- T



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From: Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
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To: SChokhani@cygnacom.com (Santosh Chokhani)
Date: Mon, 9 May 2011 20:52:17 +0200 (MEST)
In-Reply-To: <B83745DA469B7847811819C5005244AF0F41F014@scygexch7.cygnacom.com> from "Santosh Chokhani" at May 7, 11 07:07:57 am
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Santosh Chokhani wrote:
> 
> In the end the AIA chasing is done using a certificate provided by
> the server.  So, either the server gave you a bad certificate or an
> attacker substituted it in which case he can substitute the whole chain.
> 
> Basically, AIA and SIA is a trade off of performance.  Each has its
> benefits and drawbacks.  Security-wise one can argue that SIA is safer.
> But, just as you argue for processing PDU correctly, one can process
> payload from AIA correctly.

It is impossible make "AIA chasing" safe.

You can try "white-listing" AIA locations, but in that case you are
really searching pre-configured locations it doesn't really matter
(security-wise) that there is AIA info in the peers cert.

There are two security-relevant aspects about "AIA chasing":

  - being able to coerce your peer into accessing arbitrary URIs from
    still untrusted&unverified certificates

  - being able to coerce your peer into accessing *SOME* HTTP-URI
    as a result of path construction and being able to attach
    and HTTP-redirect the peer's request.

By being too liberal in what your implementation does in order to
build certificate chains, you can get your consumers into big trouble.
Any searches should be limited to local resources and securely
authenticated remote resources.


> 
> Your analysis about 5280 is incorrect.  I hope we are talking about
> the same thing.  Item 1 in 6.1.3 a is the important thing.

All of rfc-5280 6.1.3 (a) is important,  And it is important that
(1) and (2) are performed before (3).  But technically, if (4) is
necessary at all (I believe it is), then it ought be the first in
the list.  The public key crypto operation is going to be significantly
more expensive than a name comparison where one of the names is a
trusted name.  Therefore it just is not sensible to do (4) after (1).


>
> This ensures signatures chain.  Item 4 ensures names chain, which is
> totally superfluous once the signatures chain.

As described above, there are places in rfc5280 that say that issuer&subject
chaining MUST be checked.  When it is to be checked at all, then it would
be sensible to perform the name comparison before the PK-operation.

So it's either first in the list or not in the list at all, but not at (4).


-Martin

From anders.rundgren@telia.com  Mon May  9 13:03:08 2011
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On 2011-05-09 20:52, Martin Rex wrote:
<snip>
> 
> It is impossible make "AIA chasing" safe.

I think you are greatly overstating the security problems with AIAs.

A browser can download pages that contains URLs that points to arbitrary servers.
if that works, AIAs that point to very specific data read by code that isn't
particularly complex should present very limited security risks.

Anders

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Anders Rundgren wrote:
> 
> On 2011-05-09 20:52, Martin Rex wrote:
> <snip>
> > 
> > It is impossible make "AIA chasing" safe.
> 
> I think you are greatly overstating the security problems with AIAs.

No, the problem is real.

> 
> A browser can download pages that contains URLs that points
> to arbitrary servers.

Correct.  A secure web browser is an oxymoron.

>
> if that works, AIAs that point to very specific data read by code that
> isn't particularly complex should present very limited security risks.

A web browser is a gaping security hole, so if you're looking at the
world purely from a browsers perspective, then you might not see
any additional security problems.


There are some folks, however, who believe that a browser that starts
a session with a "trusted" server, and where that server can be trusted
to _not_ serve any off-site _nor_ non-HTTPS urls, becomes vulnerable
through AIA-chasing, because that can be served on the initial
clear-text handshake when it is still unprotected and unverified.


But if one's attitude is that everything is a browser app, and everyone
and his dog is allowed to tell one's browse what to open, then one
might not bother if one's PKI software uses the same careless approach,
independent of what app is calling it.


-Martin

From hotz@jpl.nasa.gov  Mon May  9 15:09:06 2011
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On May 9, 2011, at 1:02 PM, Anders Rundgren wrote:

> On 2011-05-09 20:52, Martin Rex wrote:
> <snip>
>>=20
>> It is impossible make "AIA chasing" safe.
>=20
> I think you are greatly overstating the security problems with AIAs.
>=20
> A browser can download pages that contains URLs that points to =
arbitrary servers.
> if that works, AIAs that point to very specific data read by code that =
isn't
> particularly complex should present very limited security risks.

Not directly comparable.  The browser will only get those referrals =
*after* it has completed the TLS verification of the server.  =
Furthermore any referrals will need to go through the same process from =
scratch (unless they are only referrals to local content).

I'm assuming https://-only;  otherwise this whole discussion seems moot.

------------------------------------------------------
The opinions expressed in this message are mine,
not those of Caltech, JPL, NASA, or the US Government.
Henry.B.Hotz@jpl.nasa.gov, or hbhotz@oxy.edu




From anders.rundgren@telia.com  Mon May  9 21:56:39 2011
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IMO, all Internet-facing SW *must* whitstand "bad content";
it doesn't matter if it is reading PKI(X) structures or is
streaming video.

Compared to protecting servers against attacks, this problem
is pretty well analyzed and solved.  IE's AIA-based certificate
caching works perfectly well AFAICT.  Firefox typically requires
manual install of sub CAs for smart cards and that *sucks*.

Anders Rundgren
developer of Internet-facing PKI-powered software


On 2011-05-09 22:35, Martin Rex wrote:
> Anders Rundgren wrote:
>>
>> On 2011-05-09 20:52, Martin Rex wrote:
>> <snip>
>>>
>>> It is impossible make "AIA chasing" safe.
>>
>> I think you are greatly overstating the security problems with AIAs.
> 
> No, the problem is real.
> 
>>
>> A browser can download pages that contains URLs that points
>> to arbitrary servers.
> 
> Correct.  A secure web browser is an oxymoron.
> 
>>
>> if that works, AIAs that point to very specific data read by code that
>> isn't particularly complex should present very limited security risks.
> 
> A web browser is a gaping security hole, so if you're looking at the
> world purely from a browsers perspective, then you might not see
> any additional security problems.
> 
> 
> There are some folks, however, who believe that a browser that starts
> a session with a "trusted" server, and where that server can be trusted
> to _not_ serve any off-site _nor_ non-HTTPS urls, becomes vulnerable
> through AIA-chasing, because that can be served on the initial
> clear-text handshake when it is still unprotected and unverified.
> 
> 
> But if one's attitude is that everything is a browser app, and everyone
> and his dog is allowed to tell one's browse what to open, then one
> might not bother if one's PKI software uses the same careless approach,
> independent of what app is calling it.
> 
> 
> -Martin
> 


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In 5280,   4.2.1.13.  CRL Distribution Points, it mentions that

This profile
   RECOMMENDS against segmenting CRLs by reason code.  When a conforming
   CA includes a cRLDistributionPoints extension in a certificate, it
   MUST include at least one DistributionPoint that points to a CRL that
   covers the certificate for all reasons.


But it also mentions as following:

   Each CRL has a particular scope.  The CRL scope is the set of
   certificates that could appear on a given CRL.  For example, the
   scope could be "all certificates issued by CA X", "all CA
   certificates issued by CA X", "all certificates issued by CA X that
   have been revoked for reasons of key compromise and CA compromise",
   or a set of certificates based on arbitrary local information, such
   as "all certificates issued to the NIST employees located in
   Boulder".


I am confused about these statements. Does it mean that CRL should not be segmented by reason, but it can be segemented by other mechnism?

And when it is segemented by other mechnism, it must include one full CRL also? 



From SChokhani@cygnacom.com  Tue May 10 06:15:52 2011
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To: "mrex@sap.com" <mrex@sap.com>
Date: Tue, 10 May 2011 09:14:43 -0400
Thread-Topic: [pkix] Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols
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Martin,

In AIA chasing when the PK enabling software visits the URL. all it can do =
is download a payload for certificate processing and fail that.  AIA chasin=
g does not mean invoking a browser.

In terms of name checking, it is not a particularly useful check from secur=
ity viewpoint.  It is not necessary once signature chains.  Furthermore, ev=
en if succeeds, signature chaining must be done.  SDSI and SPKI designs wer=
e correctly based on the same principle.  Your point about order is accepta=
ble.  Note that 5280 states that anything that provides equivalent results =
is acceptable.  5280 logic for path validation is not optimized for perform=
ance.  It is possible to make several performance oriented optimizations.  =
For example, one could perform all the checks in Section 6 of 5280 before y=
ou check the signatures on the certificates and CRLs that are relevant.  On=
e can also employ a strategy of build a little and verify a little since si=
gnature verification is less expensive than accessing pointers for CRL and =
certificates over the Internet.  Also note that RSA public key operation is=
 not particularly expensive.  What takes up most of the delays we observe i=
s accessing various Internet resources.

-----Original Message-----
From: Martin Rex [mailto:mrex@sap.com]=20
Sent: Monday, May 09, 2011 2:52 PM
To: Santosh Chokhani
Cc: mrex@sap.com; stefan@aaa-sec.com; pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] Intermediary CA certificate distribution protocols

Santosh Chokhani wrote:
>=20
> In the end the AIA chasing is done using a certificate provided by
> the server.  So, either the server gave you a bad certificate or an
> attacker substituted it in which case he can substitute the whole chain.
>=20
> Basically, AIA and SIA is a trade off of performance.  Each has its
> benefits and drawbacks.  Security-wise one can argue that SIA is safer.
> But, just as you argue for processing PDU correctly, one can process
> payload from AIA correctly.

It is impossible make "AIA chasing" safe.

You can try "white-listing" AIA locations, but in that case you are
really searching pre-configured locations it doesn't really matter
(security-wise) that there is AIA info in the peers cert.

There are two security-relevant aspects about "AIA chasing":

  - being able to coerce your peer into accessing arbitrary URIs from
    still untrusted&unverified certificates

  - being able to coerce your peer into accessing *SOME* HTTP-URI
    as a result of path construction and being able to attach
    and HTTP-redirect the peer's request.

By being too liberal in what your implementation does in order to
build certificate chains, you can get your consumers into big trouble.
Any searches should be limited to local resources and securely
authenticated remote resources.


>=20
> Your analysis about 5280 is incorrect.  I hope we are talking about
> the same thing.  Item 1 in 6.1.3 a is the important thing.

All of rfc-5280 6.1.3 (a) is important,  And it is important that
(1) and (2) are performed before (3).  But technically, if (4) is
necessary at all (I believe it is), then it ought be the first in
the list.  The public key crypto operation is going to be significantly
more expensive than a name comparison where one of the names is a
trusted name.  Therefore it just is not sensible to do (4) after (1).


>
> This ensures signatures chain.  Item 4 ensures names chain, which is
> totally superfluous once the signatures chain.

As described above, there are places in rfc5280 that say that issuer&subjec=
t
chaining MUST be checked.  When it is to be checked at all, then it would
be sensible to perform the name comparison before the PK-operation.

So it's either first in the list or not in the list at all, but not at (4).


-Martin

From tmiller@mitre.org  Tue May 10 07:50:07 2011
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From: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
To: Zhuxian <zhuxian@huawei.com>
Date: Tue, 10 May 2011 08:20:17 -0400
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The way I understand it is CRL segmentation is supposed to support =
efficiencies for the relying party, so that a constrained RP won't have =
to download a complete (potentially large) CRL in order to perform a =
validation.  However, to make this work the RP needs to know *in =
advance* which CRL segment to request; therefore CRL segmentation should =
be deterministic.  Segmentation by reason code is non-deterministic; the =
RP has no clue why the cert might be revoked, and so will always have to =
download *all* segments to get an answer, mooting all the benefit of =
segments.

You can segment deterministically by data that exists in the cert: DN =
component, serial number, validity dates, keyUsage, EKU, SANs, or other =
extensions; but not by data that exists only in the CRL: reason code, =
revocation date, etc.

That said, not all RPs support segmented CRLs (they're optional) so a CA =
must always produce an unsegmented CRL to support those RPs.  If your =
PKI is entirely internal, you can do whatever you want, but I wouldn't =
recommend it--no PKI stays internal forever.

-- T


On May 10, 2011, at 3:11 AM, Zhuxian wrote:

>=20
> In 5280,   4.2.1.13.  CRL Distribution Points, it mentions that
>=20
> This profile
>   RECOMMENDS against segmenting CRLs by reason code.  When a =
conforming
>   CA includes a cRLDistributionPoints extension in a certificate, it
>   MUST include at least one DistributionPoint that points to a CRL =
that
>   covers the certificate for all reasons.
>=20
>=20
> But it also mentions as following:
>=20
>   Each CRL has a particular scope.  The CRL scope is the set of
>   certificates that could appear on a given CRL.  For example, the
>   scope could be "all certificates issued by CA X", "all CA
>   certificates issued by CA X", "all certificates issued by CA X that
>   have been revoked for reasons of key compromise and CA compromise",
>   or a set of certificates based on arbitrary local information, such
>   as "all certificates issued to the NIST employees located in
>   Boulder".
>=20
>=20
> I am confused about these statements. Does it mean that CRL should not =
be segmented by reason, but it can be segemented by other mechnism?
>=20
> And when it is segemented by other mechnism, it must include one full =
CRL also?=20
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix


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To: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>, Zhuxian <zhuxian@huawei.com>
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In addition, note that the CRL partitioning could be stochastic and/or dyna=
mic.

Stochastic in the sense that the rules could be simply random partitioning.

Dynamic in the sense that during a CA's life, the CA can change the rules f=
or partitioning for yet to be issued certificates.

All of this is feasible and secure since the relying party simply matches t=
he DP asserted in the CDP of a certificate to the DP asserted in the IDP of=
 the CRL to ensure that it has the correct partition; the relying party nee=
d not know the logic for partitioning.

-----Original Message-----
From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Mil=
ler, Timothy J.
Sent: Tuesday, May 10, 2011 8:20 AM
To: Zhuxian
Cc: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] question about CRL's scope

The way I understand it is CRL segmentation is supposed to support efficien=
cies for the relying party, so that a constrained RP won't have to download=
 a complete (potentially large) CRL in order to perform a validation.  Howe=
ver, to make this work the RP needs to know *in advance* which CRL segment =
to request; therefore CRL segmentation should be deterministic.  Segmentati=
on by reason code is non-deterministic; the RP has no clue why the cert mig=
ht be revoked, and so will always have to download *all* segments to get an=
 answer, mooting all the benefit of segments.

You can segment deterministically by data that exists in the cert: DN compo=
nent, serial number, validity dates, keyUsage, EKU, SANs, or other extensio=
ns; but not by data that exists only in the CRL: reason code, revocation da=
te, etc.

That said, not all RPs support segmented CRLs (they're optional) so a CA mu=
st always produce an unsegmented CRL to support those RPs.  If your PKI is =
entirely internal, you can do whatever you want, but I wouldn't recommend i=
t--no PKI stays internal forever.

-- T


On May 10, 2011, at 3:11 AM, Zhuxian wrote:

>=20
> In 5280,   4.2.1.13.  CRL Distribution Points, it mentions that
>=20
> This profile
>   RECOMMENDS against segmenting CRLs by reason code.  When a conforming
>   CA includes a cRLDistributionPoints extension in a certificate, it
>   MUST include at least one DistributionPoint that points to a CRL that
>   covers the certificate for all reasons.
>=20
>=20
> But it also mentions as following:
>=20
>   Each CRL has a particular scope.  The CRL scope is the set of
>   certificates that could appear on a given CRL.  For example, the
>   scope could be "all certificates issued by CA X", "all CA
>   certificates issued by CA X", "all certificates issued by CA X that
>   have been revoked for reasons of key compromise and CA compromise",
>   or a set of certificates based on arbitrary local information, such
>   as "all certificates issued to the NIST employees located in
>   Boulder".
>=20
>=20
> I am confused about these statements. Does it mean that CRL should not be=
 segmented by reason, but it can be segemented by other mechnism?
>=20
> And when it is segemented by other mechnism, it must include one full CRL=
 also?=20
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix


From hotz@jpl.nasa.gov  Tue May 10 10:26:29 2011
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On May 9, 2011, at 9:57 PM, Anders Rundgren wrote:

> IMO, all Internet-facing SW *must* whitstand "bad content";
> it doesn't matter if it is reading PKI(X) structures or is
> streaming video.


While I agree in theory, in practice there will always be bugs.  One of =
the reasons for "defense in depth" is to limit the impact of =
newly-discovered bugs.  A ready-made "visit this site that exploits this =
bug you haven't fixed yet" feature seems like a bad thing.
------------------------------------------------------
The opinions expressed in this message are mine,
not those of Caltech, JPL, NASA, or the US Government.
Henry.B.Hotz@jpl.nasa.gov, or hbhotz@oxy.edu




From anders.rundgren@telia.com  Tue May 10 10:58:24 2011
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On 2011-05-10 19:26, Henry B. Hotz wrote:
> 
> On May 9, 2011, at 9:57 PM, Anders Rundgren wrote:
> 
>> IMO, all Internet-facing SW *must* whitstand "bad content";
>> it doesn't matter if it is reading PKI(X) structures or is
>> streaming video.
> 
> 
> While I agree in theory, in practice there will always be bugs. 
> One of the reasons for "defense in depth" is to limit the impact
> of newly-discovered bugs.  A ready-made "visit this site that exploits
> this bug you haven't fixed yet" feature seems like a bad thing.

What I meant is that PKI(X) structures do not present bigger risks
than other objects in spite of that they deal with "security".

But sure, I was recently involved in a case where a s.c. security expert
declared CRL retrieval as a "highly risky endeavor" and made the poor
customer invest in a quite expensive, proprietary semi-off-line CRL
proxy arrangement.  That's progress :-)

Anders
Continuing writing PKI SW that is *designed* for the Internet:
http://webpki.org/auth-token-4-the-cloud.html


> ------------------------------------------------------
> The opinions expressed in this message are mine,
> not those of Caltech, JPL, NASA, or the US Government.
> Henry.B.Hotz@jpl.nasa.gov, or hbhotz@oxy.edu
> 
> 
> 
> 


From mrex@sap.com  Tue May 10 11:25:10 2011
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Anders Rundgren wrote:
> 
> Compared to protecting servers against attacks, this problem
> is pretty well analyzed and solved.  IE's AIA-based certificate
> caching works perfectly well AFAICT.

Solved?  Cough...  It is a real security vulnerability waiting
to be exploited.

There appears to be an automatic AIA-based certificate retrieval,
and it looks like it is part of MS CryptoAPI rather than, or in
addition to, MSIE, because automatic silent AIA-retrieval is also
performed when you are visualizing a cert in a file (*.cer)
when you double-click on it in Windows Explorer.

The interesting question is: does the PKI software of your TLS server
do silent automatic AIA-chasing for client certs?  And what about
AIA-chasing of server certs when your TLS server performs
programmatic TLS client access to other servers?

Supporting occasional AIA-guided discovery of intermediate CA certs,
each download individually, interactively and counsciously approved
by leap-of-faith may be OK, but automatic silent AIA-chasing
certainly is _not_ OK.  It might be convenient, but that does not
make it less of a security problem.


>
> Firefox typically requires manual install of sub CAs for
> smart cards and that *sucks*.

I admit to have no real experience with PKCS#11 interfaces to
cryptographic tokens / smartcards, but the PKCS#11 interface definition
seems to support storing more than a single cert on a token, in which
case the token not carrying all path certs would be a defective token
personalization and a software not retrieving all path certificates
would indicate a defective pkcs#11 caller.


-Martin

From hotz@jpl.nasa.gov  Tue May 10 11:54:21 2011
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In my experience the card only contains the user's cert.  Everything =
else needs to be configured, though the system may be able to verify the =
card from it's pre-existing trust anchors.  Don't think there is any =
standard expectation w.r.t. intermediate certs, so Anders' comment =
probably applies many places.

IMO it's better to require custom client config to use a smart card, =
than to chase unverified attributes over the 'net.  Depends on the =
application though.

On May 10, 2011, at 10:48 AM, Martin Rex wrote:

>> Firefox typically requires manual install of sub CAs for
>> smart cards and that *sucks*.
>=20
> I admit to have no real experience with PKCS#11 interfaces to
> cryptographic tokens / smartcards, but the PKCS#11 interface =
definition
> seems to support storing more than a single cert on a token, in which
> case the token not carrying all path certs would be a defective token
> personalization and a software not retrieving all path certificates
> would indicate a defective pkcs#11 caller.

------------------------------------------------------
The opinions expressed in this message are mine,
not those of Caltech, JPL, NASA, or the US Government.
Henry.B.Hotz@jpl.nasa.gov, or hbhotz@oxy.edu




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Miller, Timothy J. wrote:
> 
> The way I understand it is CRL segmentation is supposed to support
> efficiencies for the relying party, so that a constrained RP won't have
> to download a complete (potentially large) CRL in order to perform a
> validation.  However, to make this work the RP needs to know *in
> advance* which CRL segment to request; therefore CRL segmentation should
> be deterministic.  Segmentation by reason code is non-deterministic; the
> RP has no clue why the cert might be revoked, and so will always have to
> download *all* segments to get an answer, mooting all the benefit of
> segments.

CRL segmentation by reason code is pure and unnecessary bloat.

Which of the CRL reason codes:

   CRLReason ::= ENUMERATED {
        unspecified             (0),
        keyCompromise           (1),
        cACompromise            (2),
        affiliationChanged      (3),
        superseded              (4),
        cessationOfOperation    (5),
        certificateHold         (6),
             -- value 7 is not used
        removeFromCRL           (8),
        privilegeWithdrawn      (9),
        aACompromise           (10) }

is so utterly insignificant that an RP wants to consciously ignore
such a revocation when doing revocation checking, and at the same
time this reasonCode most be so extremely common that the huge amount
of saved bandwidth makes up for a 4x increase in code complexity.


-Martin

From DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil  Tue May 10 13:48:29 2011
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The original purpose of segmentation by reason code was to allow a
time/size tradeoff.  Revocation due to key compromise was deemed more
serious than revocation for other reasons, yet key compromise accounts
for a negligible volume of revocations.  So if relying parties wanted to
know about compromises within an hour but revocation for other reasons
could wait for a week, then the nearly-always empty CKL could be
downloaded hourly at little cost without also needing to download a huge
all-reasons CRL.

If there is no business need to prioritize by revocation reason, then
there is no need for technical mechanisms to support differentiated QoS.
The profile RECOMMENDS against segmenting by reason code based on an
assumption that Internet RPs will have equal timeliness requirements for
all reasons.=20

Dave



-----Original Message-----
From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
Miller, Timothy J.
Sent: Tuesday, May 10, 2011 8:20 AM
To: Zhuxian
Cc: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] question about CRL's scope

The way I understand it is CRL segmentation is supposed to support
efficiencies for the relying party, so that a constrained RP won't have
to download a complete (potentially large) CRL in order to perform a
validation.  However, to make this work the RP needs to know *in
advance* which CRL segment to request; therefore CRL segmentation should
be deterministic.  Segmentation by reason code is non-deterministic; the
RP has no clue why the cert might be revoked, and so will always have to
download *all* segments to get an answer, mooting all the benefit of
segments.

You can segment deterministically by data that exists in the cert: DN
component, serial number, validity dates, keyUsage, EKU, SANs, or other
extensions; but not by data that exists only in the CRL: reason code,
revocation date, etc.

That said, not all RPs support segmented CRLs (they're optional) so a CA
must always produce an unsegmented CRL to support those RPs.  If your
PKI is entirely internal, you can do whatever you want, but I wouldn't
recommend it--no PKI stays internal forever.

-- T


On May 10, 2011, at 3:11 AM, Zhuxian wrote:

>=20
> In 5280,   4.2.1.13.  CRL Distribution Points, it mentions that
>=20
> This profile
>   RECOMMENDS against segmenting CRLs by reason code.  When a
conforming
>   CA includes a cRLDistributionPoints extension in a certificate, it
>   MUST include at least one DistributionPoint that points to a CRL
that
>   covers the certificate for all reasons.
>=20
>=20
> But it also mentions as following:
>=20
>   Each CRL has a particular scope.  The CRL scope is the set of
>   certificates that could appear on a given CRL.  For example, the
>   scope could be "all certificates issued by CA X", "all CA
>   certificates issued by CA X", "all certificates issued by CA X that
>   have been revoked for reasons of key compromise and CA compromise",
>   or a set of certificates based on arbitrary local information, such
>   as "all certificates issued to the NIST employees located in
>   Boulder".
>=20
>=20
> I am confused about these statements. Does it mean that CRL should not
be segmented by reason, but it can be segemented by other mechnism?
>=20
> And when it is segemented by other mechnism, it must include one full
CRL also?=20
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix


From mrex@sap.com  Tue May 10 16:49:09 2011
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Henry B. Hotz wrote:
> 
> In my experience the card only contains the user's cert.
> Everything else needs to be configured, though the system may be able
> to verify the card from it's pre-existing trust anchors.
> Don't think there is any standard expectation w.r.t. intermediate
> certs, so Anders' comment probably applies many places.

>From what I know about "the old days", there were early Smartcards in
the 199x with ridiculously small storage capacities, like 1 KByte.
But back then, we had VeriSign RootCAs with X.509v1 certs directly
signing EndEntity certs (i.e. no path certificates between the EE cert
and the rootCA cert).

But that was 15+ years ago.  Todays multi-CA-hierarchies should not
be used with hardware tokens / smart cards that can not accomodate
all intermediate CA certs that are used.


> 
> IMO it's better to require custom client config to use a smart card,
> than to chase unverified attributes over the 'net.
> Depends on the application though.

There is the option of interactive, conscious approval of cert discovery
aided by AIA in a leap-of-faith.

And if _you_ are trying to configure your browser to use your token,
then the AIA in the cert on your token is actually a "trusted source".

Using a token/smartcard first time for login to machine is different,
where the machine MUST not trust any information from the cert on your
token until it has been successfully verified.


-Martin

From tgindin@us.ibm.com  Tue May 10 17:11:34 2011
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Subject: Re: [pkix] question about CRL's scope
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        Zhuxian:

        You can use the Distribution Point as a partition identifier, and 
label the certificates belonging to a given partition by putting that 
value into CRLDistributionPoints while labelling the CRL using 
IssuingDistributionPoint.  A simple scheme, which many CA implementors 
would use, is to assign a base partition name to each partition, putting 
an HTTP URL of the form http://(host)/(CRLDir)/(partname).crl into CRLDP, 
and use the value (partname) as the CN attribute of any directory names in 
an LDAP or directory name DistributionPoint in CRLDP.
        I would probably be remiss not to point out that LDAP 
DistributionPoints interoperate far better beyond a single organization 
than directory name ones do, although not usually as well as HTTP ones.

                Tom Gindin
P.S. - The opinions above are mine, and not necessarily those of my 
employer.




From:   Zhuxian <zhuxian@huawei.com>
To:     "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Date:   05/10/2011 04:23 AM
Subject:        [pkix] question about CRL's scope
Sent by:        pkix-bounces@ietf.org




In 5280,   4.2.1.13.  CRL Distribution Points, it mentions that

This profile
   RECOMMENDS against segmenting CRLs by reason code.  When a conforming
   CA includes a cRLDistributionPoints extension in a certificate, it
   MUST include at least one DistributionPoint that points to a CRL that
   covers the certificate for all reasons.


But it also mentions as following:

   Each CRL has a particular scope.  The CRL scope is the set of
   certificates that could appear on a given CRL.  For example, the
   scope could be "all certificates issued by CA X", "all CA
   certificates issued by CA X", "all certificates issued by CA X that
   have been revoked for reasons of key compromise and CA compromise",
   or a set of certificates based on arbitrary local information, such
   as "all certificates issued to the NIST employees located in
   Boulder".


I am confused about these statements. Does it mean that CRL should not be 
segmented by reason, but it can be segemented by other mechnism?

And when it is segemented by other mechnism, it must include one full CRL 
also? 


_______________________________________________
pkix mailing list
pkix@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix



From tgindin@us.ibm.com  Tue May 10 17:13:11 2011
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Subject: Re: [pkix] TBSCertificate as trust anchor information
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        The most meaningful signature possible on a trust anchor would be 
the Relying Party's own, or that of a single party trusted by the RP as a 
TA issuer.  The issuer name of a trust anchor has no particular meaning 
specific to RFC 5914 or any path validation, so it might as well mean "the 
named entity is the one who actually decided to trust this TA".

                Tom Gindin




From:   Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>
To:     Erik Andersen <era@x500.eu>, PKIX <pkix@ietf.org>
Date:   05/08/2011 12:30 PM
Subject:        Re: [pkix] TBSCertificate as trust anchor information
Sent by:        pkix-bounces@ietf.org



Erik,
 
Also see Section 3 of RFC 5914 for usage of TBSCertificate.
 
In that usage, it need not have the issuer and subject the same entity.
 
From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of 
Erik Andersen
Sent: Sunday, May 08, 2011 11:35 AM
To: PKIX
Subject: [pkix] TBSCertificate as trust anchor information
 
When a TSBCertificate provides trust anchor information, is it then a 
requirement that the subject and the issuer are the same entity?
 
Is a TBSCertificate used for anything else that for trust anchor 
information?
 
Erik Andersen
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From SChokhani@cygnacom.com  Tue May 10 17:29:58 2011
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From: Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>
To: Tom Gindin <tgindin@us.ibm.com>
Date: Tue, 10 May 2011 20:29:54 -0400
Thread-Topic: [pkix] TBSCertificate as trust anchor information
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Tom,

So, do you agree that issuer and subject DN in TBSCertificate structure nee=
d not be the same?

-----Original Message-----
From: Tom Gindin [mailto:tgindin@us.ibm.com]=20
Sent: Tuesday, May 10, 2011 8:13 PM
To: Santosh Chokhani
Cc: Erik Andersen; PKIX
Subject: Re: [pkix] TBSCertificate as trust anchor information

        The most meaningful signature possible on a trust anchor would be=20
the Relying Party's own, or that of a single party trusted by the RP as a=20
TA issuer.  The issuer name of a trust anchor has no particular meaning=20
specific to RFC 5914 or any path validation, so it might as well mean "the=
=20
named entity is the one who actually decided to trust this TA".

                Tom Gindin




From:   Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>
To:     Erik Andersen <era@x500.eu>, PKIX <pkix@ietf.org>
Date:   05/08/2011 12:30 PM
Subject:        Re: [pkix] TBSCertificate as trust anchor information
Sent by:        pkix-bounces@ietf.org



Erik,
=20
Also see Section 3 of RFC 5914 for usage of TBSCertificate.
=20
In that usage, it need not have the issuer and subject the same entity.
=20
From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of=20
Erik Andersen
Sent: Sunday, May 08, 2011 11:35 AM
To: PKIX
Subject: [pkix] TBSCertificate as trust anchor information
=20
When a TSBCertificate provides trust anchor information, is it then a=20
requirement that the subject and the issuer are the same entity?
=20
Is a TBSCertificate used for anything else that for trust anchor=20
information?
=20
Erik Andersen
 _______________________________________________
pkix mailing list
pkix@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix



From zhuxian@huawei.com  Tue May 10 22:09:01 2011
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From: Zhuxian <zhuxian@huawei.com>
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Thank u all for the reply.

Now I am clear why partition CRL by reason code is not RECOMMEND by this profile. 

However, as it is just not RECOMMEND, 5280 still support reason code based partition in the CRL processing algorithm.

To develop a RP supporting 5280 compliant PKI, it should also implement the reason code logic.

And i still have some question about this feature.

1. If conforming CAs implement partion CRL, does it mean it MUST include CDP and use the DP to point to the CRL segment?
     Otherwise, only out-of-band mechnism can be used to get the corresponding CRL segment and the security issue (such as to check the CRL is really the segment matched the certificate) should also be handled out-of-band.

2. For reason code handling, 

For the CRL Distribution Points, in 4.2.1.13, it mentions as following:
  If the DistributionPoint omits the reasons field, the CRL MUST
   include revocation information for all reasons. 

For the IDP in CRL, in 5.2.5, it mentions as following:
   If onlySomeReasons does not appear,
   the distribution point MUST contain revocations for all reason codes.   

However, in the 6.3.3 CRL processing algorithm, 
  (d)  Compute the interim_reasons_mask for this CRL as follows:
        (2)  If the IDP CRL extension includes onlySomeReasons but the
              DP omits reasons, then set interim_reasons_mask to the
              value of onlySomeReasons in the IDP CRL extension.

         (3)  If the IDP CRL extension is not present or omits
              onlySomeReasons but the DP includes reasons, then set
              interim_reasons_mask to the value of DP reasons.

It seems that these statements are contradict. If DP omits reasons, then the CRL segment MUST include revocation information for all reasons. But why here mention IDP include onlySomeReasons? In which scenario will this happen? Or is it just for making the algorithm can handle CRLs from non-conforming CAs?
If DP omits reasons, and IDP includes onlySomeReasons, then the iterim_reasons_mask may only include some reasons. Then RP should check another DP. Does this means in this scenario, each different DP in CDP are just released for some reasons that encoded in IDP? If DP here should be treat as all reasons, then why check another DP?

3.  in 5.2.5 Issuing Distribution Point:
   If the distributionPoint field is absent, the CRL MUST contain
   entries for all revoked unexpired certificates issued by the CRL
   issuer, if any, within the scope of the CRL.

  Here what is the exact meaning for scope? Does it only mean partition by onlyContainsUserCerts, or onlyContainsCACerts? And not partition by onlySomeReasons?

-Kurt Zhu
  

>-----Original Message-----
>From: Tom Gindin [mailto:tgindin@us.ibm.com] 
>Sent: Wednesday, May 11, 2011 8:11 AM
>To: Zhuxian
>Cc: pkix@ietf.org
>Subject: Re: [pkix] question about CRL's scope
>
>        Zhuxian:
>
>        You can use the Distribution Point as a partition 
>identifier, and label the certificates belonging to a given 
>partition by putting that value into CRLDistributionPoints 
>while labelling the CRL using IssuingDistributionPoint.  A 
>simple scheme, which many CA implementors would use, is to 
>assign a base partition name to each partition, putting an 
>HTTP URL of the form http://(host)/(CRLDir)/(partname).crl 
>into CRLDP, and use the value (partname) as the CN attribute 
>of any directory names in an LDAP or directory name 
>DistributionPoint in CRLDP.
>        I would probably be remiss not to point out that LDAP 
>DistributionPoints interoperate far better beyond a single 
>organization than directory name ones do, although not usually 
>as well as HTTP ones.
>
>                Tom Gindin
>P.S. - The opinions above are mine, and not necessarily those 
>of my employer.
>
>
>
>
>From:   Zhuxian <zhuxian@huawei.com>
>To:     "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
>Date:   05/10/2011 04:23 AM
>Subject:        [pkix] question about CRL's scope
>Sent by:        pkix-bounces@ietf.org
>
>
>
>
>In 5280,   4.2.1.13.  CRL Distribution Points, it mentions that
>
>This profile
>   RECOMMENDS against segmenting CRLs by reason code.  When a 
>conforming
>   CA includes a cRLDistributionPoints extension in a certificate, it
>   MUST include at least one DistributionPoint that points to 
>a CRL that
>   covers the certificate for all reasons.
>
>
>But it also mentions as following:
>
>   Each CRL has a particular scope.  The CRL scope is the set of
>   certificates that could appear on a given CRL.  For example, the
>   scope could be "all certificates issued by CA X", "all CA
>   certificates issued by CA X", "all certificates issued by CA X that
>   have been revoked for reasons of key compromise and CA compromise",
>   or a set of certificates based on arbitrary local information, such
>   as "all certificates issued to the NIST employees located in
>   Boulder".
>
>
>I am confused about these statements. Does it mean that CRL 
>should not be 
>segmented by reason, but it can be segemented by other mechnism?
>
>And when it is segemented by other mechnism, it must include 
>one full CRL 
>also? 
>
>
>_______________________________________________
>pkix mailing list
>pkix@ietf.org
>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>
>
>

From tgindin@us.ibm.com  Wed May 11 04:26:08 2011
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Subject: Re: [pkix] TBSCertificate as trust anchor information
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        Yes.  I was suggesting that issuer isn't actually used for 
anything much, so there's no reason for it to be the same as subject. It's 
the same as subject when the CA itself signs and distributes the root, 
which is the most usual practice.  There is AFAIK nothing stopping someone 
from using a cross-certificate as an anchor, and there should be nothing 
stopping someone from using the TBS section of that as an anchor.

Tom Gindin





From:   Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>
To:     Tom Gindin/Watson/IBM@IBMUS
Cc:     Erik Andersen <era@x500.eu>, PKIX <pkix@ietf.org>
Date:   05/10/2011 08:30 PM
Subject:        RE: [pkix] TBSCertificate as trust anchor information



Tom,

So, do you agree that issuer and subject DN in TBSCertificate structure 
need not be the same?

-----Original Message-----
From: Tom Gindin [mailto:tgindin@us.ibm.com] 
Sent: Tuesday, May 10, 2011 8:13 PM
To: Santosh Chokhani
Cc: Erik Andersen; PKIX
Subject: Re: [pkix] TBSCertificate as trust anchor information

        The most meaningful signature possible on a trust anchor would be 
the Relying Party's own, or that of a single party trusted by the RP as a 
TA issuer.  The issuer name of a trust anchor has no particular meaning 
specific to RFC 5914 or any path validation, so it might as well mean "the 

named entity is the one who actually decided to trust this TA".

                Tom Gindin




From:   Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>
To:     Erik Andersen <era@x500.eu>, PKIX <pkix@ietf.org>
Date:   05/08/2011 12:30 PM
Subject:        Re: [pkix] TBSCertificate as trust anchor information
Sent by:        pkix-bounces@ietf.org



Erik,
 
Also see Section 3 of RFC 5914 for usage of TBSCertificate.
 
In that usage, it need not have the issuer and subject the same entity.
 
From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of 
Erik Andersen
Sent: Sunday, May 08, 2011 11:35 AM
To: PKIX
Subject: [pkix] TBSCertificate as trust anchor information
 
When a TSBCertificate provides trust anchor information, is it then a 
requirement that the subject and the issuer are the same entity?
 
Is a TBSCertificate used for anything else that for trust anchor 
information?
 
Erik Andersen
 _______________________________________________
pkix mailing list
pkix@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix





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        I sometimes think of the IDP extension as set up in the following 
way:
        IDP ::= GROUP { -- Just so you don't try to compile this
                distributionPoint,       -- a partition name set by the CA
                onlyTheseCertTypes BIT STRING OPTIONAL,
                onlyTheseReasons ReasonFlags OPTIONAL,
                indirect                BOOLEAN
}
        The two "ONLY" fields are similar, and if either is not present 
that one doesn't restrict the set of revocations in the CRL.  To answer 
your first question, partitioning can mean "use ONLY", "use DP", or both.
        To answer your second question, there's no contradiction.  This is 
just an example of being strict in what you create but permissive in what 
you accept.  A CA shouldn't create an IDP/CDP mismatch like that, but the 
relying party's software should use the narrower scope if they do.
        To answer your third question, the scope of a CRL with no 
Distribution Point is "all revocations other than those which don't meet 
filters which are present in the IDP extension (if any)".  If reasonFlags 
is present, all revocations for reasons other than those in that bit 
string are excluded from the scope; while if any of the "only" booleans 
for certificate type are set to TRUE, revocations of certificates of other 
types are excluded from the scope.

Tom Gindin





From:   Zhuxian <zhuxian@huawei.com>
To:     Tom Gindin/Watson/IBM@IBMUS
Cc:     "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Date:   05/11/2011 01:09 AM
Subject:        RE: [pkix] question about CRL's scope



Thank u all for the reply.

Now I am clear why partition CRL by reason code is not RECOMMEND by this 
profile. 

However, as it is just not RECOMMEND, 5280 still support reason code based 
partition in the CRL processing algorithm.

To develop a RP supporting 5280 compliant PKI, it should also implement 
the reason code logic.

And i still have some question about this feature.

1. If conforming CAs implement partion CRL, does it mean it MUST include 
CDP and use the DP to point to the CRL segment?
     Otherwise, only out-of-band mechnism can be used to get the 
corresponding CRL segment and the security issue (such as to check the CRL 
is really the segment matched the certificate) should also be handled 
out-of-band.

2. For reason code handling, 

For the CRL Distribution Points, in 4.2.1.13, it mentions as following:
  If the DistributionPoint omits the reasons field, the CRL MUST
   include revocation information for all reasons. 

For the IDP in CRL, in 5.2.5, it mentions as following:
   If onlySomeReasons does not appear,
   the distribution point MUST contain revocations for all reason codes. 

However, in the 6.3.3 CRL processing algorithm, 
  (d)  Compute the interim_reasons_mask for this CRL as follows:
        (2)  If the IDP CRL extension includes onlySomeReasons but the
              DP omits reasons, then set interim_reasons_mask to the
              value of onlySomeReasons in the IDP CRL extension.

         (3)  If the IDP CRL extension is not present or omits
              onlySomeReasons but the DP includes reasons, then set
              interim_reasons_mask to the value of DP reasons.

It seems that these statements are contradict. If DP omits reasons, then 
the CRL segment MUST include revocation information for all reasons. But 
why here mention IDP include onlySomeReasons? In which scenario will this 
happen? Or is it just for making the algorithm can handle CRLs from 
non-conforming CAs?
If DP omits reasons, and IDP includes onlySomeReasons, then the 
iterim_reasons_mask may only include some reasons. Then RP should check 
another DP. Does this means in this scenario, each different DP in CDP are 
just released for some reasons that encoded in IDP? If DP here should be 
treat as all reasons, then why check another DP?

3.  in 5.2.5 Issuing Distribution Point:
   If the distributionPoint field is absent, the CRL MUST contain
   entries for all revoked unexpired certificates issued by the CRL
   issuer, if any, within the scope of the CRL.

  Here what is the exact meaning for scope? Does it only mean partition by 
onlyContainsUserCerts, or onlyContainsCACerts? And not partition by 
onlySomeReasons?

-Kurt Zhu
 

>-----Original Message-----
>From: Tom Gindin [mailto:tgindin@us.ibm.com] 
>Sent: Wednesday, May 11, 2011 8:11 AM
>To: Zhuxian
>Cc: pkix@ietf.org
>Subject: Re: [pkix] question about CRL's scope
>
>        Zhuxian:
>
>        You can use the Distribution Point as a partition 
>identifier, and label the certificates belonging to a given 
>partition by putting that value into CRLDistributionPoints 
>while labelling the CRL using IssuingDistributionPoint.  A 
>simple scheme, which many CA implementors would use, is to 
>assign a base partition name to each partition, putting an 
>HTTP URL of the form http://(host)/(CRLDir)/(partname).crl 
>into CRLDP, and use the value (partname) as the CN attribute 
>of any directory names in an LDAP or directory name 
>DistributionPoint in CRLDP.
>        I would probably be remiss not to point out that LDAP 
>DistributionPoints interoperate far better beyond a single 
>organization than directory name ones do, although not usually 
>as well as HTTP ones.
>
>                Tom Gindin
>P.S. - The opinions above are mine, and not necessarily those 
>of my employer.
>
>
>
>
>From:   Zhuxian <zhuxian@huawei.com>
>To:     "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
>Date:   05/10/2011 04:23 AM
>Subject:        [pkix] question about CRL's scope
>Sent by:        pkix-bounces@ietf.org
>
>
>
>
>In 5280,   4.2.1.13.  CRL Distribution Points, it mentions that
>
>This profile
>   RECOMMENDS against segmenting CRLs by reason code.  When a 
>conforming
>   CA includes a cRLDistributionPoints extension in a certificate, it
>   MUST include at least one DistributionPoint that points to 
>a CRL that
>   covers the certificate for all reasons.
>
>
>But it also mentions as following:
>
>   Each CRL has a particular scope.  The CRL scope is the set of
>   certificates that could appear on a given CRL.  For example, the
>   scope could be "all certificates issued by CA X", "all CA
>   certificates issued by CA X", "all certificates issued by CA X that
>   have been revoked for reasons of key compromise and CA compromise",
>   or a set of certificates based on arbitrary local information, such
>   as "all certificates issued to the NIST employees located in
>   Boulder".
>
>
>I am confused about these statements. Does it mean that CRL 
>should not be 
>segmented by reason, but it can be segemented by other mechnism?
>
>And when it is segemented by other mechnism, it must include 
>one full CRL 
>also? 
>
>
>_______________________________________________
>pkix mailing list
>pkix@ietf.org
>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>
>
>



From rob.stradling@comodo.com  Wed May 11 06:23:07 2011
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Subject: Re: [pkix] question about CRL's scope
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On Wednesday 11 May 2011 13:52:31 Tom Gindin wrote:
<snip>
>         To answer your third question, the scope of a CRL with no
> Distribution Point is "all revocations other than those which don't meet
> filters which are present in the IDP extension (if any)".

This question came up over at mozilla.dev.security.policy recently and there 
was some disagreement.

The 1997 version of X.509 says the following about the IDP extension:
"The distributionPoint component contains the name of the distribution point 
in one or more name forms. If this field is absent, the CRL shall contain 
entries for all revoked unexpired certificates issued by the CRL issuer".

However, RFC5280 doesn't seem to contain any similar text that would mandate 
any particular scope when the IDP extension is omitted.

Somebody argued that because of this, and because RFC5280 mentions the "all 
certificates issued to the NIST employees located in Boulder" scope example, 
and because X.509 is only referenced informatively (and not normatively), then 
there's nothing to stop an RFC5280-compliant CA from partitioning CRLs using 
arbitrary scopes and always omitting the IDP extension.

Time for a defect report for RFC5280?

<snip>

Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online

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To: Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>, "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
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Page 65 of 5280 states:

"  If the distributionPoint field is absent, the CRL MUST contain
   entries for all revoked unexpired certificates issued by the CRL
   issuer, if any, within the scope of the CRL."

Clearly if IDP is absent, the DP is absent and scope of the CRL is complete=
  (w.r.t. to the base (vice delta))

That said, I do not object to adding more clarity to 5280.  Partitioning CR=
L and not assertion IDP causes security hole since relying parties cannot s=
cope that CRL and will correctly use it and end up using a potential revoke=
d certificate.

A more comprehensive description of CRL processing is in Annex B of X.509, =
which is normative for X.509, albeit may not be for 5280.  But, those rules=
 should be treated as invariant since they are security critical.

-----Original Message-----
From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Rob=
 Stradling
Sent: Wednesday, May 11, 2011 9:22 AM
To: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] question about CRL's scope

On Wednesday 11 May 2011 13:52:31 Tom Gindin wrote:
<snip>
>         To answer your third question, the scope of a CRL with no
> Distribution Point is "all revocations other than those which don't meet
> filters which are present in the IDP extension (if any)".

This question came up over at mozilla.dev.security.policy recently and ther=
e=20
was some disagreement.

The 1997 version of X.509 says the following about the IDP extension:
"The distributionPoint component contains the name of the distribution poin=
t=20
in one or more name forms. If this field is absent, the CRL shall contain=20
entries for all revoked unexpired certificates issued by the CRL issuer".

However, RFC5280 doesn't seem to contain any similar text that would mandat=
e=20
any particular scope when the IDP extension is omitted.

Somebody argued that because of this, and because RFC5280 mentions the "all=
=20
certificates issued to the NIST employees located in Boulder" scope example=
,=20
and because X.509 is only referenced informatively (and not normatively), t=
hen=20
there's nothing to stop an RFC5280-compliant CA from partitioning CRLs usin=
g=20
arbitrary scopes and always omitting the IDP extension.

Time for a defect report for RFC5280?

<snip>

Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online
_______________________________________________
pkix mailing list
pkix@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix

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On Wednesday 11 May 2011 14:52:46 Santosh Chokhani wrote:
> Page 65 of 5280 states:
> 
> "  If the distributionPoint field is absent, the CRL MUST contain
>    entries for all revoked unexpired certificates issued by the CRL
>    issuer, if any, within the scope of the CRL."

Yes, but where is the "scope of the CRL" defined?
Without a definition, the suggestion is that the CA is free to make up their 
own arbitrary scope.

The similar clause in X.509 1997 doesn't have the ", within the scope of the 
CRL" get out clause.

> Clearly if IDP is absent, the DP is absent and scope of the CRL is complete
>  (w.r.t. to the base (vice delta))
> 
> That said, I do not object to adding more clarity to 5280.  Partitioning
> CRL and not assertion IDP causes security hole since relying parties
> cannot scope that CRL and will correctly

I presume you meant "incorrectly".

> use it and end up using a potential revoked certificate.
> 
> A more comprehensive description of CRL processing is in Annex B of X.509,
> which is normative for X.509, albeit may not be for 5280.  But, those
> rules should be treated as invariant since they are security critical.

<snip>

Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online

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Subject: Re: [pkix] question about CRL's scope
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Yes -- incorrectly.

-----Original Message-----
From: Rob Stradling [mailto:rob.stradling@comodo.com]=20
Sent: Wednesday, May 11, 2011 10:12 AM
To: Santosh Chokhani
Cc: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] question about CRL's scope

On Wednesday 11 May 2011 14:52:46 Santosh Chokhani wrote:
> Page 65 of 5280 states:
>=20
> "  If the distributionPoint field is absent, the CRL MUST contain
>    entries for all revoked unexpired certificates issued by the CRL
>    issuer, if any, within the scope of the CRL."

Yes, but where is the "scope of the CRL" defined?
Without a definition, the suggestion is that the CA is free to make up thei=
r=20
own arbitrary scope.

The similar clause in X.509 1997 doesn't have the ", within the scope of th=
e=20
CRL" get out clause.

> Clearly if IDP is absent, the DP is absent and scope of the CRL is comple=
te
>  (w.r.t. to the base (vice delta))
>=20
> That said, I do not object to adding more clarity to 5280.  Partitioning
> CRL and not assertion IDP causes security hole since relying parties
> cannot scope that CRL and will correctly

I presume you meant "incorrectly".

> use it and end up using a potential revoked certificate.
>=20
> A more comprehensive description of CRL processing is in Annex B of X.509=
,
> which is normative for X.509, albeit may not be for 5280.  But, those
> rules should be treated as invariant since they are security critical.

<snip>

Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online

From zhuxian@huawei.com  Wed May 11 21:03:20 2011
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So totally: 

For the first question, if conforming CAs implement partition CRL, it MUST include CRL Distribution Points and use the DP to point to the CRL segment. 

For the 2nd question, some CA may issue certificate with CRL Distribution Points which includes several DP and each DP omiting the reasons field. And the CA issues several partition CRLs with IDP and  includes onlySomeReasons. 
     Then this algorithm can handle this secanrio.

For the 3nd question, partitioning CRL,  but not assertion IDP or "assertioin IDP but without distributionPoint field" causes security hole.  

am I right?

-Kurt Zhu 

>-----Original Message-----
>From: Tom Gindin [mailto:tgindin@us.ibm.com] 
>Sent: Wednesday, May 11, 2011 8:53 PM
>To: Zhuxian
>Cc: pkix@ietf.org
>Subject: RE: [pkix] question about CRL's scope
>
>        I sometimes think of the IDP extension as set up in 
>the following
>way:
>        IDP ::= GROUP { -- Just so you don't try to compile this
>                distributionPoint,       -- a partition name 
>set by the CA
>                onlyTheseCertTypes BIT STRING OPTIONAL,
>                onlyTheseReasons ReasonFlags OPTIONAL,
>                indirect                BOOLEAN
>}
>        The two "ONLY" fields are similar, and if either is 
>not present that one doesn't restrict the set of revocations 
>in the CRL.  To answer your first question, partitioning can 
>mean "use ONLY", "use DP", or both.
>        To answer your second question, there's no 
>contradiction.  This is just an example of being strict in 
>what you create but permissive in what you accept.  A CA 
>shouldn't create an IDP/CDP mismatch like that, but the 
>relying party's software should use the narrower scope if they do.
>        To answer your third question, the scope of a CRL with 
>no Distribution Point is "all revocations other than those 
>which don't meet filters which are present in the IDP 
>extension (if any)".  If reasonFlags is present, all 
>revocations for reasons other than those in that bit string 
>are excluded from the scope; while if any of the "only" 
>booleans for certificate type are set to TRUE, revocations of 
>certificates of other types are excluded from the scope.
>
>Tom Gindin
>
>
>
>
>
>From:   Zhuxian <zhuxian@huawei.com>
>To:     Tom Gindin/Watson/IBM@IBMUS
>Cc:     "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
>Date:   05/11/2011 01:09 AM
>Subject:        RE: [pkix] question about CRL's scope
>
>
>
>Thank u all for the reply.
>
>Now I am clear why partition CRL by reason code is not 
>RECOMMEND by this profile. 
>
>However, as it is just not RECOMMEND, 5280 still support 
>reason code based partition in the CRL processing algorithm.
>
>To develop a RP supporting 5280 compliant PKI, it should also 
>implement the reason code logic.
>
>And i still have some question about this feature.
>
>1. If conforming CAs implement partion CRL, does it mean it 
>MUST include CDP and use the DP to point to the CRL segment?
>     Otherwise, only out-of-band mechnism can be used to get 
>the corresponding CRL segment and the security issue (such as 
>to check the CRL is really the segment matched the 
>certificate) should also be handled out-of-band.
>
>2. For reason code handling, 
>
>For the CRL Distribution Points, in 4.2.1.13, it mentions as following:
>  If the DistributionPoint omits the reasons field, the CRL MUST
>   include revocation information for all reasons. 
>
>For the IDP in CRL, in 5.2.5, it mentions as following:
>   If onlySomeReasons does not appear,
>   the distribution point MUST contain revocations for all 
>reason codes. 
>
>However, in the 6.3.3 CRL processing algorithm,
>  (d)  Compute the interim_reasons_mask for this CRL as follows:
>        (2)  If the IDP CRL extension includes onlySomeReasons but the
>              DP omits reasons, then set interim_reasons_mask to the
>              value of onlySomeReasons in the IDP CRL extension.
>
>         (3)  If the IDP CRL extension is not present or omits
>              onlySomeReasons but the DP includes reasons, then set
>              interim_reasons_mask to the value of DP reasons.
>
>It seems that these statements are contradict. If DP omits 
>reasons, then the CRL segment MUST include revocation 
>information for all reasons. But why here mention IDP include 
>onlySomeReasons? In which scenario will this happen? Or is it 
>just for making the algorithm can handle CRLs from non-conforming CAs?
>If DP omits reasons, and IDP includes onlySomeReasons, then 
>the iterim_reasons_mask may only include some reasons. Then RP 
>should check another DP. Does this means in this scenario, 
>each different DP in CDP are just released for some reasons 
>that encoded in IDP? If DP here should be treat as all 
>reasons, then why check another DP?
>
>3.  in 5.2.5 Issuing Distribution Point:
>   If the distributionPoint field is absent, the CRL MUST contain
>   entries for all revoked unexpired certificates issued by the CRL
>   issuer, if any, within the scope of the CRL.
>
>  Here what is the exact meaning for scope? Does it only mean 
>partition by onlyContainsUserCerts, or onlyContainsCACerts? 
>And not partition by onlySomeReasons?
>
>-Kurt Zhu
> 
>
>>-----Original Message-----
>>From: Tom Gindin [mailto:tgindin@us.ibm.com]
>>Sent: Wednesday, May 11, 2011 8:11 AM
>>To: Zhuxian
>>Cc: pkix@ietf.org
>>Subject: Re: [pkix] question about CRL's scope
>>
>>        Zhuxian:
>>
>>        You can use the Distribution Point as a partition identifier, 
>>and label the certificates belonging to a given partition by putting 
>>that value into CRLDistributionPoints while labelling the CRL using 
>>IssuingDistributionPoint.  A simple scheme, which many CA 
>implementors 
>>would use, is to assign a base partition name to each partition, 
>>putting an HTTP URL of the form http://(host)/(CRLDir)/(partname).crl
>>into CRLDP, and use the value (partname) as the CN attribute of any 
>>directory names in an LDAP or directory name DistributionPoint in 
>>CRLDP.
>>        I would probably be remiss not to point out that LDAP 
>>DistributionPoints interoperate far better beyond a single 
>organization 
>>than directory name ones do, although not usually as well as 
>HTTP ones.
>>
>>                Tom Gindin
>>P.S. - The opinions above are mine, and not necessarily those of my 
>>employer.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>From:   Zhuxian <zhuxian@huawei.com>
>>To:     "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
>>Date:   05/10/2011 04:23 AM
>>Subject:        [pkix] question about CRL's scope
>>Sent by:        pkix-bounces@ietf.org
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>In 5280,   4.2.1.13.  CRL Distribution Points, it mentions that
>>
>>This profile
>>   RECOMMENDS against segmenting CRLs by reason code.  When a 
>>conforming
>>   CA includes a cRLDistributionPoints extension in a certificate, it
>>   MUST include at least one DistributionPoint that points to a CRL 
>>that
>>   covers the certificate for all reasons.
>>
>>
>>But it also mentions as following:
>>
>>   Each CRL has a particular scope.  The CRL scope is the set of
>>   certificates that could appear on a given CRL.  For example, the
>>   scope could be "all certificates issued by CA X", "all CA
>>   certificates issued by CA X", "all certificates issued by CA X that
>>   have been revoked for reasons of key compromise and CA compromise",
>>   or a set of certificates based on arbitrary local information, such
>>   as "all certificates issued to the NIST employees located in
>>   Boulder".
>>
>>
>>I am confused about these statements. Does it mean that CRL 
>should not 
>>be segmented by reason, but it can be segemented by other mechnism?
>>
>>And when it is segemented by other mechnism, it must include one full 
>>CRL also?
>>
>>
>>_______________________________________________
>>pkix mailing list
>>pkix@ietf.org
>>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>>
>>
>>
>
>
>

From pritikin@cisco.com  Fri May 13 15:55:40 2011
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From: max pritikin <pritikin@cisco.com>
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Thank you everybody that engaged in discussion both on and off this list =
about enrollment. I've made the following changes to the draft for those =
of you who are interested:

- Section 3 now provides a requirements discussion. Hopefully additional =
conversations can use this to clarify what requirements the proposal =
does or does not meet.=20

- Section 8.6 now provides a proof-of-posession method. The security =
considerations section no longer calls this out as a lack/problem.

Username/password and PIN based authentication of clients is discussed =
in detail but the transport method used is still the HTTP Basic =
Authentication. There is a discussion in the security vulnerabilities =
concerning sending a cleartext password to even an authenticated server =
over a TLS connection.=20

This draft continues to toe the line between a profile of CMC and a =
fully independent simpler alternative. I've very much appreciated the =
mailing list discussions and am continuing to improve the draft and my =
reference implementation(s). =20

Thanks for any continued feedback,

- max

Begin forwarded message:

> From: internet-drafts@ietf.org
> Date: May 13, 2011 4:53:14 PM MDT
> To: pritikin@cisco.com
> Cc: pritikin@cisco.com
> Subject: New Version Notification for draft-pritikin-est-01.txt
>=20
> A new version of I-D, draft-pritikin-est-01.txt has been successfully =
submitted by Max Pritikin and posted to the IETF repository.
>=20
> Filename:	 draft-pritikin-est
> Revision:	 01
> Title:		 Enrollment over Secure Transport
> Creation date:	 2011-05-13
> WG ID:		 Individual Submission
> Number of pages: 22
>=20
> Abstract:
>   This document specifies certificate Enrollment over Secure Transport
>   (EST).  EST is a certificate enrollment over HTTPS protocol that is
>   trivially accessible by modern clients.  The CMC &quot;Simple PKI
>   Messages&quot; and simple certificate responses are leveraged and =
EST is
>   designed to be easily implemented by clients and servers running
>   other common enrollment mechanisms such as SCEP.  Renewal and rekey
>   mechanisms are described consistent with CMP.
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> The IETF Secretariat


From anders.rundgren@telia.com  Sat May 14 07:36:20 2011
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On 2011-05-14 00:55, max pritikin wrote:
> 
> Thank you everybody that engaged in discussion both on
> and off this list about enrollment. I've made the following
> changes to the draft for those of you who are interested:
> 
> - Section 3 now provides a requirements discussion.
> Hopefully additional conversations can use this to clarify
> what requirements the proposal does or does not meet.

Max,

I still don't get what the scope is.  Although iPhone utilizes
SCEP, there is an Apple-specific enrollment XML-based "profile bootstrap"
pass which IMO greatly enhances usability in addition to addressing
authentication in a universal fashion.

Another possible target are CMSes (Card Management Systems).

The overarching question remains: Have Apple, Microsoft, Google
or CMS vendors actually expressed a need for a new/revised
protocol?

Anders

> 
> - Section 8.6 now provides a proof-of-posession method. The security considerations section no longer calls this out as a lack/problem.
> 
> Username/password and PIN based authentication of clients is discussed in detail but the transport method used is still the HTTP Basic Authentication. There is a discussion in the security vulnerabilities concerning sending a cleartext password to even an authenticated server over a TLS connection. 
> 
> This draft continues to toe the line between a profile of CMC and a fully independent simpler alternative. I've very much appreciated the mailing list discussions and am continuing to improve the draft and my reference implementation(s).  
> 
> Thanks for any continued feedback,
> 
> - max
> 
> Begin forwarded message:
> 
>> From: internet-drafts@ietf.org
>> Date: May 13, 2011 4:53:14 PM MDT
>> To: pritikin@cisco.com
>> Cc: pritikin@cisco.com
>> Subject: New Version Notification for draft-pritikin-est-01.txt
>>
>> A new version of I-D, draft-pritikin-est-01.txt has been successfully submitted by Max Pritikin and posted to the IETF repository.
>>
>> Filename:	 draft-pritikin-est
>> Revision:	 01
>> Title:		 Enrollment over Secure Transport
>> Creation date:	 2011-05-13
>> WG ID:		 Individual Submission
>> Number of pages: 22
>>
>> Abstract:
>>   This document specifies certificate Enrollment over Secure Transport
>>   (EST).  EST is a certificate enrollment over HTTPS protocol that is
>>   trivially accessible by modern clients.  The CMC &quot;Simple PKI
>>   Messages&quot; and simple certificate responses are leveraged and EST is
>>   designed to be easily implemented by clients and servers running
>>   other common enrollment mechanisms such as SCEP.  Renewal and rekey
>>   mechanisms are described consistent with CMP.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> The IETF Secretariat
> 
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
> 


From pritikin@cisco.com  Mon May 16 08:47:56 2011
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To: Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren@telia.com>
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On May 14, 2011, at 8:36 AM, Anders Rundgren wrote:

> On 2011-05-14 00:55, max pritikin wrote:
>>=20
>> Thank you everybody that engaged in discussion both on
>> and off this list about enrollment. I've made the following
>> changes to the draft for those of you who are interested:
>>=20
>> - Section 3 now provides a requirements discussion.
>> Hopefully additional conversations can use this to clarify
>> what requirements the proposal does or does not meet.
>=20
> Max,
>=20
> I still don't get what the scope is.

Please see the draft-pritikin-est-01 text: Introduction, Overview, and =
Requirements. They are not long.=20

My goal is a 'common enrollment protocol for end points'. Whatever else =
is positive or lacking wrt PKI technologies I'd like to see this area =
improved.=20

The idea of continued "X-specific enrollment" is exactly what I'd like =
to see go away.=20

- max

>  Although iPhone utilizes
> SCEP, there is an Apple-specific enrollment XML-based "profile =
bootstrap"
> pass which IMO greatly enhances usability in addition to addressing
> authentication in a universal fashion.
>=20
> Another possible target are CMSes (Card Management Systems).
>=20
> The overarching question remains: Have Apple, Microsoft, Google
> or CMS vendors actually expressed a need for a new/revised
> protocol?
>=20
> Anders
>=20
>>=20
>> - Section 8.6 now provides a proof-of-posession method. The security =
considerations section no longer calls this out as a lack/problem.
>>=20
>> Username/password and PIN based authentication of clients is =
discussed in detail but the transport method used is still the HTTP =
Basic Authentication. There is a discussion in the security =
vulnerabilities concerning sending a cleartext password to even an =
authenticated server over a TLS connection.=20
>>=20
>> This draft continues to toe the line between a profile of CMC and a =
fully independent simpler alternative. I've very much appreciated the =
mailing list discussions and am continuing to improve the draft and my =
reference implementation(s). =20
>>=20
>> Thanks for any continued feedback,
>>=20
>> - max
>>=20
>> Begin forwarded message:
>>=20
>>> From: internet-drafts@ietf.org
>>> Date: May 13, 2011 4:53:14 PM MDT
>>> To: pritikin@cisco.com
>>> Cc: pritikin@cisco.com
>>> Subject: New Version Notification for draft-pritikin-est-01.txt
>>>=20
>>> A new version of I-D, draft-pritikin-est-01.txt has been =
successfully submitted by Max Pritikin and posted to the IETF =
repository.
>>>=20
>>> Filename:	 draft-pritikin-est
>>> Revision:	 01
>>> Title:		 Enrollment over Secure Transport
>>> Creation date:	 2011-05-13
>>> WG ID:		 Individual Submission
>>> Number of pages: 22
>>>=20
>>> Abstract:
>>>  This document specifies certificate Enrollment over Secure =
Transport
>>>  (EST).  EST is a certificate enrollment over HTTPS protocol that is
>>>  trivially accessible by modern clients.  The CMC &quot;Simple PKI
>>>  Messages&quot; and simple certificate responses are leveraged and =
EST is
>>>  designed to be easily implemented by clients and servers running
>>>  other common enrollment mechanisms such as SCEP.  Renewal and rekey
>>>  mechanisms are described consistent with CMP.
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> The IETF Secretariat
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> pkix mailing list
>> pkix@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix


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--0016e6d27bd3b57e5a04a3673dea
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1

All,

I presented CAA at the Prague SAAG. Since then a DNS RR has been assigned
and deployment is proceeding. Test vectors have been deployed and I should
be able to publish them (plus some reference code) shortly. An updated draft
is available at:

http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hallambaker-donotissue-04

The main substantive changes are (1) the change of the copyright to
modifications permitted and (2) inserting the new RR.

Three people have now implemented the draft independently and confirmed the
same test vectors.


The CAA protocol specification has two parts:

1) Issuer restrictions which may be used to specify which CAs are authorized
to issue certificates for a domain.

2) Relying party restrictions which may be used by relying applications.
Note that since certificates are valid for up to three years, whether an
application may rely on a certificate is not the same as whether a CA may
issue a new certificate.

There is also a bunch of 'social' and 'policy' infrastructure that has to be
layered on top of CAA, including the requirement that CAs verify CAA records
during issue as part of minimum issue requirements. This is not the place to
discuss that type of issue, that is something that really belongs in
CABForum. Equally, CABForum would prefer to avoid being a protocol standards
body.


The question now is what to do with respect to progressing CAA on standards
track. After discussion with the ADs, it appears that PKIX may be the best
place for the following reasons:

1) The purpose of CAA is entirely directed at how to issue and how to use
certificates. It is independent of any application layer (e.g. HTTP) or
transport layer (e.g. IPSEC, TLS) protocol.

2) CAA is designed to refine and improve the existing Internet PKI rather
than replace it with a new one.

3) CAA does not depend on DNSSEC. It is clearly better if a domain deploys
DNSSEC since that allows for better accountability. But DNSSEC deployment is
not a critical dependency.

4) The design tropes and architecture of CAA is designed with PKIX and PKIX
applications in mind. Thus ASN.1 OIDs are used as digest algorithm
identifiers and as object identifiers.

5) While the relying party restrictions bear some similarity to the
objectives of DANE, CAA is first and foremost an accountability control and
not an access control. As such CAA enables but does not does not depend on
deployment in applications.


One consequence of (5) is that CAA can be deployed without getting buy in
from the browser providers or other application providers. The only parties
that need to support CAA are Certification Authorities and they have a very
strong incentive to take any and all precautions to prevent miss-issue.

A second consequence of (5) is that the correct response to detecting a
certificate that is not compliant with the CAA record might be something
other than a client refusing to connect. If CAA is successful, fraudulent
issue events at sites with CAA records should be exceptionally rare and
those that do occur are more likely to be the result of mis-configuration
than an attack. Reporting non-compliant certs and using some other form of
revocation may provide a sufficient solution.

Both consequences mean that the protections of CAA extend beyond the
application clients that implement CAA. It is a refinement and improvement
of the existing deployed infrastructure, not a proposal to replace it with
something new.


A third consequence of (5) is that legacy infrastructure is going to be
accumulating round us as we attempt to work on the drafts. For this reason
we have been rather careful to provide a minimal set of initial functions
and a comprehensive extension mechanism (tag value pairs) rather than trying
to anticipate every possible use case and requirement.

At present CAA is specified as a global property of a DNS domain. It is not
currently possible to specify restrictions of the form 'Carol is authorized
to issue certificates for HTTPS for example.com but not for any other
protocol though there are ways in which the protocol could be extended to do
this should that use case be compelling.

-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

--0016e6d27bd3b57e5a04a3673dea
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

All,<div><br></div><div>I presented CAA at the Prague SAAG. Since then a DN=
S RR has been assigned and deployment is proceeding. Test vectors have been=
 deployed and I should be able to publish them (plus some reference code) s=
hortly. An updated draft is available at:</div>
<div><br></div><div><a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hallambaker=
-donotissue-04">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hallambaker-donotissue-04<=
/a></div><div><br></div><div>The main substantive changes are (1) the chang=
e of the copyright to modifications permitted and (2) inserting the new RR.=
</div>
<div><br></div><div>Three people have now implemented the draft independent=
ly and confirmed the same test vectors.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div>=
<div>The CAA protocol specification has two parts:</div><div><br></div>
<div>1) Issuer restrictions which may be used to specify which CAs are auth=
orized to issue certificates for a domain.</div><div><br></div><div>2) Rely=
ing party restrictions which may be used by relying applications. Note that=
 since certificates are valid for up to three years, whether an application=
 may rely on a certificate is not the same as whether a CA may issue a new =
certificate.</div>
<div><br></div><div>There is also a bunch of &#39;social&#39; and &#39;poli=
cy&#39; infrastructure that has to be layered on top of CAA, including the =
requirement that CAs verify CAA records during issue as part of minimum iss=
ue requirements. This is not the place to discuss that type of issue, that =
is something that really belongs in CABForum. Equally, CABForum would prefe=
r to avoid being a protocol standards body.</div>
<div><br></div><div><br></div><div>The question now is what to do with resp=
ect to progressing CAA on standards track. After discussion with the ADs, i=
t appears that PKIX may be the best place for the following reasons:</div>
<div><br></div><div>1) The purpose of CAA is entirely directed at how to is=
sue and how to use certificates. It is independent of any application layer=
 (e.g. HTTP) or transport layer (e.g. IPSEC, TLS) protocol.</div><div><br>
</div><div>2) CAA is designed to refine and improve the existing Internet P=
KI rather than replace it with a new one.</div><div><br></div><div>3) CAA d=
oes not depend on DNSSEC. It is clearly better if a domain deploys DNSSEC s=
ince that allows for better accountability. But DNSSEC deployment is not a =
critical dependency.</div>
<div><br></div><div>4) The design tropes and architecture of CAA is designe=
d with PKIX and PKIX applications in mind. Thus ASN.1 OIDs are used as dige=
st algorithm identifiers and as object identifiers.</div><div><br></div>
<div>5) While the relying party restrictions bear some similarity to the ob=
jectives of DANE, CAA is first and foremost an accountability control and n=
ot an access control. As such CAA enables but does not does not depend on d=
eployment in applications.<br clear=3D"all">
<br></div><div><br></div><div>One consequence of (5) is that CAA can be dep=
loyed without getting buy in from the browser providers or other applicatio=
n providers. The only parties that need to support CAA are Certification Au=
thorities and they have a very strong incentive to take any and all precaut=
ions to prevent miss-issue.</div>
<div><br></div><div>A second consequence of (5) is that the correct respons=
e to detecting a certificate that is not compliant with the CAA record migh=
t be something other than a client refusing to connect. If CAA is successfu=
l, fraudulent issue events at sites with CAA records should be exceptionall=
y rare and those that do occur are more likely to be the result of mis-conf=
iguration than an attack. Reporting non-compliant certs and using some othe=
r form of revocation may provide a sufficient solution.</div>
<div><br></div><div>Both consequences mean that the protections of CAA exte=
nd beyond the application clients that implement CAA. It is a refinement an=
d improvement of the existing deployed infrastructure, not a proposal to re=
place it with something new.=A0</div>
<div><br></div><div><br></div><div>A third consequence of (5) is that legac=
y infrastructure is going to be accumulating round us as we attempt to work=
 on the drafts. For this reason we have been rather careful to provide a mi=
nimal set of initial functions and a comprehensive extension mechanism (tag=
 value pairs) rather than trying to anticipate every possible use case and =
requirement.</div>
<div><br></div><div>At present CAA is specified as a global property of a D=
NS domain. It is not currently possible to specify restrictions of the form=
 &#39;Carol is authorized to issue certificates for HTTPS for <a href=3D"ht=
tp://example.com">example.com</a> but not for any other protocol though the=
re are ways in which the protocol could be extended to do this should that =
use case be compelling.</div>
<div><br></div><div>-- <br>Website: <a href=3D"http://hallambaker.com/">htt=
p://hallambaker.com/</a><br><br>
</div>

--0016e6d27bd3b57e5a04a3673dea--

From anders.rundgren@telia.com  Mon May 16 13:20:41 2011
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On 2011-05-16 17:47, max pritikin wrote:
> 
> On May 14, 2011, at 8:36 AM, Anders Rundgren wrote:
> 
>> On 2011-05-14 00:55, max pritikin wrote:
>>>
>>> Thank you everybody that engaged in discussion both on
>>> and off this list about enrollment. I've made the following
>>> changes to the draft for those of you who are interested:
>>>
>>> - Section 3 now provides a requirements discussion.
>>> Hopefully additional conversations can use this to clarify
>>> what requirements the proposal does or does not meet.
>>
>> Max,
>>
>> I still don't get what the scope is.
> 
> Please see the draft-pritikin-est-01 text: Introduction, Overview, and Requirements. They are not long. 
> 
> My goal is a 'common enrollment protocol for end points'. Whatever else is positive or lacking wrt PKI technologies I'd like to see this area improved. 
> 
> The idea of continued "X-specific enrollment" is exactly what I'd like to see go away. 

I'm going here next week:

http://www.w3.org/2011/identity-ws

IMO, a browser-based enrollment scheme should be possible to apply
to [close to] all enrollments where a human performs a part of the
client-side process.  If a networked device hasn't a browser interface
it must today be considered as "marginal".

However, browsers do not speak ASN.1 except as a part of an
inner structure so obviously there is a "impedance mismatch"
between PKIX-related enrollments and browser-based enrollments.

Note: HTTP bindings <> Browser bindings since the latter
is built on some kind of language or format.

Anders

> - max
> 
>>  Although iPhone utilizes
>> SCEP, there is an Apple-specific enrollment XML-based "profile bootstrap"
>> pass which IMO greatly enhances usability in addition to addressing
>> authentication in a universal fashion.
>>
>> Another possible target are CMSes (Card Management Systems).
>>
>> The overarching question remains: Have Apple, Microsoft, Google
>> or CMS vendors actually expressed a need for a new/revised
>> protocol?
>>
>> Anders
>>
>>>
>>> - Section 8.6 now provides a proof-of-posession method. The security considerations section no longer calls this out as a lack/problem.
>>>
>>> Username/password and PIN based authentication of clients is discussed in detail but the transport method used is still the HTTP Basic Authentication. There is a discussion in the security vulnerabilities concerning sending a cleartext password to even an authenticated server over a TLS connection. 
>>>
>>> This draft continues to toe the line between a profile of CMC and a fully independent simpler alternative. I've very much appreciated the mailing list discussions and am continuing to improve the draft and my reference implementation(s).  
>>>
>>> Thanks for any continued feedback,
>>>
>>> - max
>>>
>>> Begin forwarded message:
>>>
>>>> From: internet-drafts@ietf.org
>>>> Date: May 13, 2011 4:53:14 PM MDT
>>>> To: pritikin@cisco.com
>>>> Cc: pritikin@cisco.com
>>>> Subject: New Version Notification for draft-pritikin-est-01.txt
>>>>
>>>> A new version of I-D, draft-pritikin-est-01.txt has been successfully submitted by Max Pritikin and posted to the IETF repository.
>>>>
>>>> Filename:	 draft-pritikin-est
>>>> Revision:	 01
>>>> Title:		 Enrollment over Secure Transport
>>>> Creation date:	 2011-05-13
>>>> WG ID:		 Individual Submission
>>>> Number of pages: 22
>>>>
>>>> Abstract:
>>>>  This document specifies certificate Enrollment over Secure Transport
>>>>  (EST).  EST is a certificate enrollment over HTTPS protocol that is
>>>>  trivially accessible by modern clients.  The CMC &quot;Simple PKI
>>>>  Messages&quot; and simple certificate responses are leveraged and EST is
>>>>  designed to be easily implemented by clients and servers running
>>>>  other common enrollment mechanisms such as SCEP.  Renewal and rekey
>>>>  mechanisms are described consistent with CMP.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The IETF Secretariat
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> pkix mailing list
>>> pkix@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> pkix mailing list
>> pkix@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
> 
> 


From James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com  Tue May 17 00:57:29 2011
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From: "Manger, James H" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com>
To: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>, "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Date: Tue, 17 May 2011 17:57:18 +1000
Thread-Topic: [pkix] Proposing CAA as PKIX Working Group Item
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> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hallambaker-donotissue-04

>

> The question now is what to do with respect to progressing CAA on standar=
ds track.

> After discussion with the ADs, it appears that PKIX may be the best place=
 for the following reasons:





I support progressing CAA on the standards track, and doing so in PKIX. It =
looks like a useful and deployable scheme.



A couple of small comments:



1. It was confusing (to me) for "bit 0" of the "Flags" field to be the most=
 significant bit. That is, a "Flags" value of 1 (as in many examples) means=
 that "bit 7" is set ("Issuer use"), not bit 0 ("Critical"). I guess if thi=
s is DNS convention it should be kept, but it is the opposite to the conven=
tion in, say, ITU specs. The confusion is compounded as the flag names are =
introduced in 2.1 (eg "Critical"); followed by examples in 2.1.1 that use d=
ecimal values for the flags (eg CAA 1 policy ...); yet the bit numbers are =
not specified until 3.1. I guess I saw the first flag definition ("Critical=
") and the first example (with "1") and guessed they went together.



2. The "Critical" flag [2.1. The CAA RR type] should probably only apply to=
 issuers if the "Issuer" flag is also set. Similarly, it should only apply =
to relying parties if the "Relying Party" flag is set. The text in 2.1 migh=
t imply this already if the "Issue" flag determines what is in the "Extende=
d Issuer Authorization Set". The text in 3.1 "Syntax" however makes no such=
 restriction: "A CA MUST NOT issue certificates for any Domain that contain=
s a CAA critical property for an unknown or unsupported property type". 3.1=
 also seems to be missing the text about how the "Critical" flag affects re=
lying parties. [It might be better if 3.1 doesn't duplicate 2.1 as much - j=
ust give bit numbers to flag names, leaving all description to 2.1].



3. 'flags' is an unsigned integer between 0 and 255, not 0 and 15 as stated=
 in 3.1.1. "Canonical Presentation Format". Might be nicer to use hex, inst=
ead of decimal, since it is a bunch of bit fields (unless that is never don=
e elsewhere in DNS text formats).



4. Has IANA created a CAA properties registry? In which case including the =
URI would be good. Though perhaps the text just says IANA has done this in =
anticipation.



Typo: extraneous "the" in 4. "Security considerations": "...increases the b=
oth the probability..."



--

James Manger


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<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&gt; <a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hal=
lambaker-donotissue-04">
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hallambaker-donotissue-04</a><o:p></o:p></=
p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&gt;<o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&gt; The question now is what to do with respect to =
progressing CAA on standards track.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&gt; After discussion with the ADs, it appears that =
PKIX may be the best place for the following reasons:<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;
color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;
color:#1F497D">I support progressing CAA on the standards track, and doing =
so in PKIX. It looks like a useful and deployable scheme.<o:p></o:p></span>=
</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;
color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;
color:#1F497D">A couple of small comments:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;
color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;
color:#1F497D">1. It was confusing (to me) for &#8220;bit 0&#8221; of the &=
#8220;Flags&#8221; field to be the most significant bit. That is, a &#8220;=
Flags&#8221; value of 1 (as in many examples) means that
 &#8220;bit 7&#8221; is set (&#8220;Issuer use&#8221;), not bit 0 (&#8220;C=
ritical&#8221;). I guess if this is DNS convention it should be kept, but i=
t is the opposite to the convention in, say, ITU specs. The confusion is co=
mpounded as the flag names are introduced in 2.1 (eg &#8220;Critical&#8221;=
); followed
 by examples in 2.1.1 that use decimal values for the flags (eg CAA 1 polic=
y &#8230;); yet the bit numbers are not specified until 3.1. I guess I saw =
the first flag definition (&#8220;Critical&#8221;) and the first example (w=
ith &#8220;1&#8221;) and guessed they went together.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;
color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;
color:#1F497D">2. The &#8220;Critical&#8221; flag [2.1. The CAA RR type] sh=
ould probably only apply to issuers if the &#8220;Issuer&#8221; flag is als=
o set. Similarly, it should only apply to relying
 parties if the &#8220;Relying Party&#8221; flag is set. The text in 2.1 mi=
ght imply this already if the &#8220;Issue&#8221; flag determines what is i=
n the &#8220;Extended Issuer Authorization Set&#8221;. The text in 3.1 &#82=
20;Syntax&#8221; however makes no such restriction: &#8220;A CA MUST NOT is=
sue certificates
 for any Domain that contains a CAA critical property for an unknown or uns=
upported property type&#8221;. 3.1 also seems to be missing the text about =
how the &#8220;Critical&#8221; flag affects relying parties. [It might be b=
etter if 3.1 doesn&#8217;t duplicate 2.1 as much &#8211; just
 give bit numbers to flag names, leaving all description to 2.1].<o:p></o:p=
></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;
color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;
color:#1F497D">3. &#8216;flags&#8217; is an unsigned integer between 0 and =
255, not 0 and 15 as stated in 3.1.1. &#8220;Canonical Presentation Format&=
#8221;. Might be nicer to use hex, instead
 of decimal, since it is a bunch of bit fields (unless that is never done e=
lsewhere in DNS text formats).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;
color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;
color:#1F497D">4. Has IANA created a CAA properties registry? In which case=
 including the URI would be good. Though perhaps the text just says IANA ha=
s done this in anticipation.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;
color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;
color:#1F497D">Typo: extraneous &#8220;the&#8221; in 4. &#8220;Security con=
siderations&#8221;: &#8220;&#8230;increases the both the probability&#8230;=
&#8221;<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;
color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;
color:#1F497D">--<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;
color:#1F497D">James Manger<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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From paul.hoffman@vpnc.org  Tue May 17 07:48:43 2011
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I am confused by this request. Given that you have an RRtype assigned =
and already have implementations, it would be pretty destructive for =
this WG to accept the document and make any semantic or protocol =
changes. However, if we can't many any semantic or protocol changes (and =
I think both are warranted), why should the WG work on it at all? =
Wouldn't it be better to publish it as an RFC through the Independent =
Submissions Editor so that the protocol that has been deployed doesn't =
change?

These may be questions for the ADs, not for the WG.

--Paul Hoffman=

From anders.rundgren@telia.com  Wed May 18 00:53:53 2011
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Subject: [pkix] draft-pritikin-est-01.txt versus HTML's <keygen>
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Hi Max,

What's missing in your quest is some kind of stated relation to

   http://www.w3.org/wiki/HTML/Elements/keygen

and similar stuff from other vendors.

Anders


From pritikin@cisco.com  Wed May 18 06:05:26 2011
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Subject: Re: [pkix] draft-pritikin-est-01.txt versus HTML's <keygen>
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This is a good point, I should add an appendix with such discussions.=20

HTML/Elements/keygen doesn't include proof-of-possession nor does it =
appear to mandate HTTPS. Given all the troubles in the web space =
regarding phishing and man-in-the-middle and spoofed urls etc this seems =
like a bit too simplistic. Given that I myself tend to argue toward =
simplicity I really appreciate this approach of paring to the bone and =
seeing only what must be added but I'm worried this is too simplistic.=20=


- max

On May 18, 2011, at 1:54 AM, Anders Rundgren wrote:

> Hi Max,
>=20
> What's missing in your quest is some kind of stated relation to
>=20
>   http://www.w3.org/wiki/HTML/Elements/keygen
>=20
> and similar stuff from other vendors.
>=20
> Anders
>=20


From tomasg@primekey.se  Wed May 18 06:56:47 2011
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From: Tomas Gustavsson <tomasg@primekey.se>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] draft-pritikin-est-01.txt versus HTML's <keygen>
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I do believe that keygen supports proof of possession. It either 
generates the old netscape SPKAC request message, or a CRMF request 
message, both of which is self-signed by the requestor.

Cheers,
Tomas

On 05/18/2011 03:05 PM, max pritikin wrote:
> This is a good point, I should add an appendix with such discussions.
>
> HTML/Elements/keygen doesn't include proof-of-possession nor does it appear to mandate HTTPS. Given all the troubles in the web space regarding phishing and man-in-the-middle and spoofed urls etc this seems like a bit too simplistic. Given that I myself tend to argue toward simplicity I really appreciate this approach of paring to the bone and seeing only what must be added but I'm worried this is too simplistic.
>
> - max
>
> On May 18, 2011, at 1:54 AM, Anders Rundgren wrote:
>
>> Hi Max,
>>
>> What's missing in your quest is some kind of stated relation to
>>
>>    http://www.w3.org/wiki/HTML/Elements/keygen
>>
>> and similar stuff from other vendors.
>>
>> Anders
>>
>
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix

From hallam@gmail.com  Wed May 18 07:54:02 2011
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Proposing CAA as PKIX Working Group Item
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On Tue, May 17, 2011 at 3:57 AM, Manger, James H <
James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com> wrote:

>  > http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hallambaker-donotissue-04
>
> >
>
> > The question now is what to do with respect to progressing CAA on
> standards track.
>
> > After discussion with the ADs, it appears that PKIX may be the best pla=
ce
> for the following reasons:
>
>
>
>
>
> I support progressing CAA on the standards track, and doing so in PKIX. I=
t
> looks like a useful and deployable scheme.
>
>
>
> A couple of small comments:
>
>
>
> 1. It was confusing (to me) for =93bit 0=94 of the =93Flags=94 field to b=
e the most
> significant bit. That is, a =93Flags=94 value of 1 (as in many examples) =
means
> that =93bit 7=94 is set (=93Issuer use=94), not bit 0 (=93Critical=94). I=
 guess if this
> is DNS convention it should be kept, but it is the opposite to the
> convention in, say, ITU specs.
>

It is the DNS convention and it confused the heck out of us while we were
writing the spec.

What I think I might do is to write them out as flags constants: 0x80 etc.




> The confusion is compounded as the flag names are introduced in 2.1 (eg
> =93Critical=94); followed by examples in 2.1.1 that use decimal values fo=
r the
> flags (eg CAA 1 policy =85); yet the bit numbers are not specified until =
3.1.
> I guess I saw the first flag definition (=93Critical=94) and the first ex=
ample
> (with =931=94) and guessed they went together.
>
>
>
> 2. The =93Critical=94 flag [2.1. The CAA RR type] should probably only ap=
ply to
> issuers if the =93Issuer=94 flag is also set. Similarly, it should only a=
pply to
> relying parties if the =93Relying Party=94 flag is set.
>

The idea of critical was to provide for an escape hole to allow an orderly
transition to a completely different scheme or possibly to allow for
exceptions to be specified 'Any EV issuer except Fred'.

What we might want to do though would be to separate out the critical for
relying and critical for issuer.




> The text in 2.1 might imply this already if the =93Issue=94 flag determin=
es
> what is in the =93Extended Issuer Authorization Set=94. The text in 3.1 =
=93Syntax=94
> however makes no such restriction: =93A CA MUST NOT issue certificates fo=
r any
> Domain that contains a CAA critical property for an unknown or unsupporte=
d
> property type=94. 3.1 also seems to be missing the text about how the
> =93Critical=94 flag affects relying parties. [It might be better if 3.1 d=
oesn=92t
> duplicate 2.1 as much =96 just give bit numbers to flag names, leaving al=
l
> description to 2.1].
>

Telling CAs what to do is relatively easy as there are few points to update
and they would have an immediate interest to update their software to track
changes.

Changing the relying side of things would be trickier as once that software
is released it is going to be legacy for a heck of a long time.



> 3. =91flags=92 is an unsigned integer between 0 and 255, not 0 and 15 as =
stated
> in 3.1.1. =93Canonical Presentation Format=94. Might be nicer to use hex,
> instead of decimal, since it is a bunch of bit fields (unless that is nev=
er
> done elsewhere in DNS text formats).
>

The 15 thing is an oversight (we extended the field to make DNS parsing
easier).

Again, the decimal thing is a DNS artifact :-(



> 4. Has IANA created a CAA properties registry? In which case including th=
e
> URI would be good. Though perhaps the text just says IANA has done this i=
n
> anticipation.
>

No IANA has assigned the RR but the registry would be created by the act of
publishing the ID as an RFC.


Typo: extraneous =93the=94 in 4. =93Security considerations=94: =93=85incre=
ases the both
> the probability=85=94
>

Will fix in next version, thanks.


--=20
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

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<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue, May 17, 2011 at 3:57 AM, Manger,=
 James H <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:James.H.Manger@team.telstr=
a.com">James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote=
 class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc soli=
d;padding-left:1ex;">






<div lang=3D"EN-AU" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple">
<div><div class=3D"im">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&gt; <a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hal=
lambaker-donotissue-04" target=3D"_blank">
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hallambaker-donotissue-04</a></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&gt;=A0</p>
</div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">&gt; The question now is what to do with respe=
ct to progressing CAA on standards track.</p><div class=3D"im">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&gt; After discussion with the ADs, it appears that =
PKIX may be the best place for the following reasons:</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">=A0</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D">=A0</=
span></p>
</div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D"=
>I support progressing CAA on the standards track, and doing so in PKIX. It=
 looks like a useful and deployable scheme.</span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D">=A0</=
span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D">A cou=
ple of small comments:</span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D">=A0</=
span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D">1. It=
 was confusing (to me) for =93bit 0=94 of the =93Flags=94 field to be the m=
ost significant bit. That is, a =93Flags=94 value of 1 (as in many examples=
) means that
 =93bit 7=94 is set (=93Issuer use=94), not bit 0 (=93Critical=94). I guess=
 if this is DNS convention it should be kept, but it is the opposite to the=
 convention in, say, ITU specs.</span></p></div></div></blockquote><div><br=
></div>
<div>It is the DNS convention and it confused the heck out of us while we w=
ere writing the spec.=A0</div><div><br></div><div>What I think I might do i=
s to write them out as flags constants: 0x80 etc.</div><div><br></div><div>
<br></div><div>=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0=
 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;"><div lang=3D"EN-AU"=
 link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple"><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"=
font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D"> The confusion is compounded as the flag na=
mes are introduced in 2.1 (eg =93Critical=94); followed
 by examples in 2.1.1 that use decimal values for the flags (eg CAA 1 polic=
y =85); yet the bit numbers are not specified until 3.1. I guess I saw the =
first flag definition (=93Critical=94) and the first example (with =931=94)=
 and guessed they went together.</span></p>

<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D">=A0</=
span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D">2. Th=
e =93Critical=94 flag [2.1. The CAA RR type] should probably only apply to =
issuers if the =93Issuer=94 flag is also set. Similarly, it should only app=
ly to relying
 parties if the =93Relying Party=94 flag is set. </span></p></div></div></b=
lockquote><div><br></div><div>The idea of critical was to provide for an es=
cape hole to allow an orderly transition to a completely different scheme o=
r possibly to allow for exceptions to be specified &#39;Any EV issuer excep=
t Fred&#39;.</div>
<div><br></div><div>What we might want to do though would be to separate ou=
t the critical for relying and critical for issuer.</div><div><br></div><di=
v><br></div><div>=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin=
:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
<div lang=3D"EN-AU" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple"><div><p class=3D"MsoNorm=
al"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D">The text in 2.1 might im=
ply this already if the =93Issue=94 flag determines what is in the =93Exten=
ded Issuer Authorization Set=94. The text in 3.1 =93Syntax=94 however makes=
 no such restriction: =93A CA MUST NOT issue certificates
 for any Domain that contains a CAA critical property for an unknown or uns=
upported property type=94. 3.1 also seems to be missing the text about how =
the =93Critical=94 flag affects relying parties. [It might be better if 3.1=
 doesn=92t duplicate 2.1 as much =96 just
 give bit numbers to flag names, leaving all description to 2.1].</span></p=
></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Telling CAs what to do is rel=
atively easy as there are few points to update and they would have an immed=
iate interest to update their software to track changes.</div>
<div><br></div><div>Changing the relying side of things would be trickier a=
s once that software is released it is going to be legacy for a heck of a l=
ong time.</div><div><br></div><div>=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quot=
e" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;"=
>
<div lang=3D"EN-AU" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple"><div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D">3. =
=91flags=92 is an unsigned integer between 0 and 255, not 0 and 15 as state=
d in 3.1.1. =93Canonical Presentation Format=94. Might be nicer to use hex,=
 instead
 of decimal, since it is a bunch of bit fields (unless that is never done e=
lsewhere in DNS text formats).</span></p></div></div></blockquote><div><br>=
</div><div>The 15 thing is an oversight (we extended the field to make DNS =
parsing easier).</div>
<div><br></div><div>Again, the decimal thing is a DNS artifact :-(</div><di=
v><br></div><div>=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin=
:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;"><div lang=3D"EN-A=
U" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple">
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D">4. Ha=
s IANA created a CAA properties registry? In which case including the URI w=
ould be good. Though perhaps the text just says IANA has done this in antic=
ipation.</span></p>
</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>No IANA has assigned the RR bu=
t the registry would be created by the act of publishing the ID as an RFC.=
=A0</div><div>=A0</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" sty=
le=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
<div lang=3D"EN-AU" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple"><div><p class=3D"MsoNorm=
al"><font class=3D"Apple-style-span" color=3D"#1f497d"><span class=3D"Apple=
-style-span" style=3D"font-size: 15px;"></span></font></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D">Typo:=
 extraneous =93the=94 in 4. =93Security considerations=94: =93=85increases =
the both the probability=85=94</span></p></div></div></blockquote><div><br>=
</div><div>Will fix in next version, thanks.=A0</div>
</div><br clear=3D"all"><br>-- <br>Website: <a href=3D"http://hallambaker.c=
om/">http://hallambaker.com/</a><br><br>

--001636ed6ce304122204a38e0f7d--

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From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
To: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Proposing CAA as PKIX Working Group Item
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On Tue, May 17, 2011 at 10:48 AM, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>wrote:

> I am confused by this request. Given that you have an RRtype assigned and
> already have implementations, it would be pretty destructive for this WG to
> accept the document and make any semantic or protocol changes.


That depends on what the changes were and what motivated them.

This particular proposal crosses the boundary between PKIX and DNS. I don't
think it is particularly productive to have two separate groups working on a
proposal at the same time if it can be helped. Since assignment of the DNS
RR was blocking for deployment we worked on that aspect first.

I did however notify this WG that the draft had been proposed and was being
discussed in the DNS group.


There is still opportunity for this WG to make changes:

1) Propose changes to the description of the implementation.

2) Propose new property tags with different semantics.

3) Propose an entirely new syntax for the RR which would of course require a
new DNS RR assignment.

Which of these make sense depends entirely on what the reason behind the
change is and what the impact is. Change of type (1) is relatively cheap,
change of type (3) has much higher costs.

If the reason for a change is to support a new use case, fix a bug in the
spec or make the scheme more efficient then it may well make sense to
completely revise the spec and apply for a new RR. If on the other hand the
reason for the change is that someone wants to make a change I don't think
it is likely to get consensus.


I don't think it very likely that we are going to want to look at a complete
redesign. But I could imagine people have ideas for new property tags that
could be usefully added.

The DNS is the Internet infrastructure for making assertions about Internet
services associated with a domain name. If someone wants to make such an
assertion then it should appear in the DNS. If there is an assertion in the
DNS then it should relate directly or indirectly to an Internet service.


However, if we can't many any semantic or protocol changes (and I think both
> are warranted), why should the WG work on it at all? Wouldn't it be better
> to publish it as an RFC through the Independent Submissions Editor so that
> the protocol that has been deployed doesn't change?
>
> These may be questions for the ADs, not for the WG.


Who suggested this particular course of action since CAA is clearly in PKIX
scope.




-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

--001485f91cd22f0ed304a38e6364
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On Tue, May 17, 2011 at 10:48 AM, Paul Hoffman <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a hre=
f=3D"mailto:paul.hoffman@vpnc.org">paul.hoffman@vpnc.org</a>&gt;</span> wro=
te:<br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
I am confused by this request. Given that you have an RRtype assigned and a=
lready have implementations, it would be pretty destructive for this WG to =
accept the document and make any semantic or protocol changes. </blockquote=
>
<div><br></div><div>That depends on what the changes were and what motivate=
d them.</div><div><br></div><div>This particular proposal crosses the bound=
ary between PKIX and DNS. I don&#39;t think it is particularly productive t=
o have two separate groups working on a proposal at the same time if it can=
 be helped. Since assignment of the DNS RR was blocking for deployment we w=
orked on that aspect first.</div>
<div><br></div><div>I did however notify this WG that the draft had been pr=
oposed and was being discussed in the DNS group.</div><div><br></div><div><=
br></div><div>There is still opportunity for this WG to make changes:</div>
<div><br></div><div>1) Propose changes to the description of the implementa=
tion.</div><div><br></div><div>2) Propose new property tags with different =
semantics.</div><div><br></div><div>3)=A0Propose an entirely new syntax for=
 the RR which would of course require a new DNS RR assignment.</div>
<div><br></div><div>Which of these make sense depends entirely on what the =
reason behind the change is and what the impact is. Change of type (1) is r=
elatively cheap, change of type (3) has much higher costs.</div><div><br>
</div><div>If the reason for a change is to support a new use case, fix a b=
ug in the spec or make the scheme more efficient then it may well make sens=
e to completely revise the spec and apply for a new RR. If on the other han=
d the reason for the change is that someone wants to make a change I don&#3=
9;t think it is likely to get consensus.</div>
<div><br></div><div><br></div><div>I don&#39;t think it very likely that we=
 are going to want to look at a complete redesign. But I could imagine peop=
le have ideas for new property tags that could be usefully added.</div>
<div><br></div><div>The DNS is the Internet infrastructure for making asser=
tions about Internet services associated with a domain name. If someone wan=
ts to make such an assertion then it should appear in the DNS. If there is =
an assertion in the DNS then it should relate directly or indirectly to an =
Internet service.</div>
<div><br></div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"ma=
rgin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">However, if w=
e can&#39;t many any semantic or protocol changes (and I think both are war=
ranted), why should the WG work on it at all? Wouldn&#39;t it be better to =
publish it as an RFC through the Independent Submissions Editor so that the=
 protocol that has been deployed doesn&#39;t change?<br>

<br>
These may be questions for the ADs, not for the WG.</blockquote><div><br></=
div><div>Who suggested this particular course of action since CAA is clearl=
y in PKIX scope.=A0</div></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div=
>
<br>-- <br>Website: <a href=3D"http://hallambaker.com/">http://hallambaker.=
com/</a><br><br>

--001485f91cd22f0ed304a38e6364--

From anders.rundgren@telia.com  Wed May 18 23:21:43 2011
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Subject: Re: [pkix] draft-pritikin-est-01.txt versus HTML's <keygen>
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On 2011-05-18 15:05, max pritikin wrote:
> This is a good point, I should add an appendix with such discussions.

Well, my point was rather that <keygen> and Microsoft's counterpart
"CertEnroll" are already implemented in maybe a billion clients.

Since you want to address all end-points you need to come up with
a scheme that makes the browser-vendors happy and united.

<snip>
Anders

From tomas@primekey.se  Thu May 19 00:23:53 2011
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On 05/19/2011 08:22 AM, Anders Rundgren wrote:
> On 2011-05-18 15:05, max pritikin wrote:
>> This is a good point, I should add an appendix with such discussions.
>
> Well, my point was rather that<keygen>  and Microsoft's counterpart
> "CertEnroll" are already implemented in maybe a billion clients.
>
> Since you want to address all end-points you need to come up with
> a scheme that makes the browser-vendors happy and united.

Ah, united, what a wonderful word, I believe it when I see it :-)

From stefan@aaa-sec.com  Mon May 23 02:50:33 2011
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From: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>
To: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
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Thread-Topic: [pkix] Proposing CAA as PKIX Working Group Item
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Phil,

I'm confused to. This draft to me seems to be an amendment of the DNS record
and not of the PKIX protocols.
If you want to define a way to carry X.509 data in a protocol, then PKIX is
usually not the place to do it, but the WG dealing with that protocol.

I'm not questioning your proposal or whether it should be standardized, just
why it ought to be dealt with by PKIX.

/Stefan


From:  Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
Date:  Wed, 18 May 2011 11:17:31 -0400
To:  Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
Cc:  <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject:  Re: [pkix] Proposing CAA as PKIX Working Group Item

> On Tue, May 17, 2011 at 10:48 AM, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> wrote:
>> I am confused by this request. Given that you have an RRtype assigned and
>> already have implementations, it would be pretty destructive for this WG to
>> accept the document and make any semantic or protocol changes.
> 
> That depends on what the changes were and what motivated them.
> 
> This particular proposal crosses the boundary between PKIX and DNS. I don't
> think it is particularly productive to have two separate groups working on a
> proposal at the same time if it can be helped. Since assignment of the DNS RR
> was blocking for deployment we worked on that aspect first.
> 
> I did however notify this WG that the draft had been proposed and was being
> discussed in the DNS group.
> 
> 
> There is still opportunity for this WG to make changes:
> 
> 1) Propose changes to the description of the implementation.
> 
> 2) Propose new property tags with different semantics.
> 
> 3) Propose an entirely new syntax for the RR which would of course require a
> new DNS RR assignment.
> 
> Which of these make sense depends entirely on what the reason behind the
> change is and what the impact is. Change of type (1) is relatively cheap,
> change of type (3) has much higher costs.
> 
> If the reason for a change is to support a new use case, fix a bug in the spec
> or make the scheme more efficient then it may well make sense to completely
> revise the spec and apply for a new RR. If on the other hand the reason for
> the change is that someone wants to make a change I don't think it is likely
> to get consensus.
> 
> 
> I don't think it very likely that we are going to want to look at a complete
> redesign. But I could imagine people have ideas for new property tags that
> could be usefully added.
> 
> The DNS is the Internet infrastructure for making assertions about Internet
> services associated with a domain name. If someone wants to make such an
> assertion then it should appear in the DNS. If there is an assertion in the
> DNS then it should relate directly or indirectly to an Internet service.
> 
> 
>> However, if we can't many any semantic or protocol changes (and I think both
>> are warranted), why should the WG work on it at all? Wouldn't it be better to
>> publish it as an RFC through the Independent Submissions Editor so that the
>> protocol that has been deployed doesn't change?
>> 
>> These may be questions for the ADs, not for the WG.
> 
> Who suggested this particular course of action since CAA is clearly in PKIX
> scope. 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> -- 
> Website: http://hallambaker.com/
> 
> _______________________________________________ pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix



--B_3388995465_48275616
Content-type: text/html;
	charset="US-ASCII"
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<html><head></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: s=
pace; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-size:=
 14px; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><div>Phil,</div><div><br></div><d=
iv>I'm confused to. This draft to me seems to be an amendment of the DNS rec=
ord and not of the PKIX protocols.</div><div>If you want to define a way to =
carry X.509 data in a protocol, then PKIX is usually not the place to do it,=
 but the WG dealing with that protocol.</div><div><br></div><div>I'm not que=
stioning your proposal or whether it should be standardized, just why it oug=
ht to be dealt with by PKIX.</div><div><br></div><div>/Stefan</div><div><br>=
</div><div><br></div><span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION"><div style=3D"font-family=
:Calibri; font-size:11pt; text-align:left; color:black; BORDER-BOTTOM: mediu=
m none; BORDER-LEFT: medium none; PADDING-BOTTOM: 0in; PADDING-LEFT: 0in; PA=
DDING-RIGHT: 0in; BORDER-TOP: #b5c4df 1pt solid; BORDER-RIGHT: medium none; =
PADDING-TOP: 3pt"><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">From: </span> Phillip Halla=
m-Baker &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:hallam@gmail.com">hallam@gmail.com</a>&gt;<br><s=
pan style=3D"font-weight:bold">Date: </span> Wed, 18 May 2011 11:17:31 -0400<b=
r><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">To: </span> Paul Hoffman &lt;<a href=3D"mailt=
o:paul.hoffman@vpnc.org">paul.hoffman@vpnc.org</a>&gt;<br><span style=3D"font-=
weight:bold">Cc: </span> &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a=
>&gt;<br><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">Subject: </span> Re: [pkix] Proposin=
g CAA as PKIX Working Group Item<br></div><div><br></div><blockquote id=3D"MAC=
_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDIN=
G:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">On Tue, May 17, 2011 at 10:48 AM, Paul Hoffman <=
span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:paul.hoffman@vpnc.org">paul.hoffman@vpnc.=
org</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gma=
il_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1=
ex;">
I am confused by this request. Given that you have an RRtype assigned and a=
lready have implementations, it would be pretty destructive for this WG to a=
ccept the document and make any semantic or protocol changes. </blockquote><=
div><br></div><div>That depends on what the changes were and what motivated =
them.</div><div><br></div><div>This particular proposal crosses the boundary=
 between PKIX and DNS. I don't think it is particularly productive to have t=
wo separate groups working on a proposal at the same time if it can be helpe=
d. Since assignment of the DNS RR was blocking for deployment we worked on t=
hat aspect first.</div><div><br></div><div>I did however notify this WG that=
 the draft had been proposed and was being discussed in the DNS group.</div>=
<div><br></div><div><br></div><div>There is still opportunity for this WG to=
 make changes:</div><div><br></div><div>1) Propose changes to the descriptio=
n of the implementation.</div><div><br></div><div>2) Propose new property ta=
gs with different semantics.</div><div><br></div><div>3)&nbsp;Propose an ent=
irely new syntax for the RR which would of course require a new DNS RR assig=
nment.</div><div><br></div><div>Which of these make sense depends entirely o=
n what the reason behind the change is and what the impact is. Change of typ=
e (1) is relatively cheap, change of type (3) has much higher costs.</div><d=
iv><br></div><div>If the reason for a change is to support a new use case, f=
ix a bug in the spec or make the scheme more efficient then it may well make=
 sense to completely revise the spec and apply for a new RR. If on the other=
 hand the reason for the change is that someone wants to make a change I don=
't think it is likely to get consensus.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><=
div>I don't think it very likely that we are going to want to look at a comp=
lete redesign. But I could imagine people have ideas for new property tags t=
hat could be usefully added.</div><div><br></div><div>The DNS is the Interne=
t infrastructure for making assertions about Internet services associated wi=
th a domain name. If someone wants to make such an assertion then it should =
appear in the DNS. If there is an assertion in the DNS then it should relate=
 directly or indirectly to an Internet service.</div><div><br></div><div><br=
></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:=
1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">However, if we can't many any semantic or =
protocol changes (and I think both are warranted), why should the WG work on=
 it at all? Wouldn't it be better to publish it as an RFC through the Indepe=
ndent Submissions Editor so that the protocol that has been deployed doesn't=
 change?<br><br>
These may be questions for the ADs, not for the WG.</blockquote><div><br></=
div><div>Who suggested this particular course of action since CAA is clearly=
 in PKIX scope.&nbsp;</div></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></di=
v><br>-- <br>Website: <a href=3D"http://hallambaker.com/">http://hallambaker.c=
om/</a><br><br>
_______________________________________________
pkix mailing list
<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix">https://www.ietf.org/m=
ailman/listinfo/pkix</a>
</blockquote></span></body></html>

--B_3388995465_48275616--



From stefan@aaa-sec.com  Mon May 23 03:14:46 2011
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Date: Mon, 23 May 2011 12:14:38 +0200
From: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>
To: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Message-ID: <CA00002E.21E7F%stefan@aaa-sec.com>
Thread-Topic: Trust Constraints - Possible request for yet another certificate extension
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Subject: [pkix] Trust Constraints - Possible request for yet another certificate extension
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All,

I have come across a need that I don't know how to solve with the existing
certificate extensions.
I would like to discuss what the best solution is, which may include
defining a new extension.

I'm running a cross certifying PKI which extracts a fairly large number of
intermediary CAs and certifies them under a single root.
I create a number of root authorities, each representing a different policy
for approving CAs to be certified under this root.

Example: 
Root 1 only certifies CA:s that issues qualified certificates

I would like to include some optional information in the root certificate
that the relying party MAY use to understand policy used to certify CAs
under that root.
A relying party using this root MAY use this information to apply extra
controls, such as verifying that the end entity certificate being verified
under that root is a qualified certificate by examining the QcStatements
extension from RFC 3739.

So the options I have considered and dismissed are:

- certificate policy extension, and
- EKU

Both are bad. The policy extension is designed to list certificate policies
that can be included in the EE cert (that is what the path validation
algorithm does). The EKU is only meant to be included in EE certs and its
inclusion in other certs is subject to non-standardized handling that makes
such solution highly unpredictable.

The cleanest way that I can think of is to include such information in a new
extension along this structure:

TrustConstraints :== SEQUENCE OF TrustConstraint
TrustConstraint :== SEQUENCE {
  constraint     OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
  constraintInfo  OCTET STRING  OPTIONAL }

The constraintInfo content is defined by the constraint OID. The reason why
I put it in an OCTET STRING is because it is way easier to code than having
an "any defined by" structure. This way I can always parse this extension
with a simple fixed ASN.1 structure and pass the byte[] array to higher
logic for processing if I recognize the OID, or else trash it. The
constraints data could for example carry XML data or a JSON object according
to the definition of the constraint OID. This way we would not have to
bother with I18N stuff in the extension definition. Clean and simple.

This extension is only meant to be placed in CA certificates, possibly only
in self signed root certificates.

Thoughts?

/Stefan






  





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<html><head></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: s=
pace; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-size:=
 14px; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><div>All,</div><div><br></div><di=
v>I have come across a need that I don't know how to solve with the existing=
 certificate extensions.</div><div>I would like to discuss what the best sol=
ution is, which may include defining a new extension.</div><div><br></div><d=
iv>I'm running a cross certifying PKI which extracts a fairly large number o=
f intermediary CAs and certifies them under a single root.</div><div>I creat=
e a number of root authorities, each representing a different policy for app=
roving CAs to be certified under this root.</div><div><br></div><div>Example=
:&nbsp;</div><div>Root 1 only certifies CA:s that issues qualified certifica=
tes</div><div><br></div><div>I would like to include some optional informati=
on in the root certificate that the relying party MAY use to understand poli=
cy used to certify CAs under that root.</div><div>A relying party using this=
 root MAY use this information to apply extra controls, such as verifying th=
at the end entity certificate being verified under that root is a qualified =
certificate by examining the QcStatements extension from RFC 3739.</div><div=
><br></div><div>So the options I have considered and dismissed are:</div><di=
v><br></div><div>- certificate policy extension, and</div><div>- EKU</div><d=
iv><br></div><div>Both are bad. The policy extension is designed to list cer=
tificate policies that can be included in the EE cert (that is what the path=
 validation algorithm does). The EKU is only meant to be included in EE cert=
s and its inclusion in other certs is subject to non-standardized handling t=
hat makes such solution highly unpredictable.</div><div><br></div><div>The c=
leanest way that I can think of is to include such information in a new exte=
nsion along this structure:</div><div><br></div><div>TrustConstraints :=3D=3D SE=
QUENCE OF TrustConstraint</div><div>TrustConstraint :=3D=3D SEQUENCE {</div><div=
>&nbsp;&nbsp;constraint &nbsp; &nbsp; OBJECT IDENTIFIER,</div><div>&nbsp;&nb=
sp;constraintInfo &nbsp;OCTET STRING &nbsp;OPTIONAL }</div><div><br></div><d=
iv>The constraintInfo content is defined by the constraint OID. The reason w=
hy I put it in an OCTET STRING is because it is way easier to code than havi=
ng an "any defined by" structure. This way I can always parse this extension=
 with a simple fixed ASN.1 structure and pass the byte[] array to higher log=
ic for processing if I recognize the OID, or else trash it. The constraints =
data could for example carry XML data or a JSON object according to the defi=
nition of the constraint OID. This way we would not have to bother with I18N=
 stuff in the extension definition. Clean and simple.</div><div><br></div><d=
iv>This extension is only meant to be placed in CA certificates, possibly on=
ly in self signed root certificates.</div><div><br></div><div>Thoughts?</div=
><div><br></div><div>/Stefan</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></d=
iv><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>&nbsp;&nbsp;</div><div>=
<br></div><div><br></div></body></html>

--B_3388997682_48407680--



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Subject: Re: [pkix] Trust Constraints - Possible request for yet another certificate extension
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From SChokhani@cygnacom.com  Mon May 23 12:10:54 2011
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From: Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>
To: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>, "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Date: Mon, 23 May 2011 15:10:46 -0400
Thread-Topic: [pkix] Trust Constraints - Possible request for yet another certificate extension
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Trust Constraints - Possible request for yet another certificate extension
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Stefan,

>From your description it is not clear if you mean this as a capability or c=
onstraint?

Specifically, is the Root 1 only good for qualified certificates and nothin=
g else?  Another example is what does the absence of this constraint means?

I am guessing that you mean this as a capability and not a constraint.

From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Ste=
fan Santesson
Sent: Monday, May 23, 2011 6:15 AM
To: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: [pkix] Trust Constraints - Possible request for yet another certif=
icate extension

All,

I have come across a need that I don't know how to solve with the existing =
certificate extensions.
I would like to discuss what the best solution is, which may include defini=
ng a new extension.

I'm running a cross certifying PKI which extracts a fairly large number of =
intermediary CAs and certifies them under a single root.
I create a number of root authorities, each representing a different policy=
 for approving CAs to be certified under this root.

Example:
Root 1 only certifies CA:s that issues qualified certificates

I would like to include some optional information in the root certificate t=
hat the relying party MAY use to understand policy used to certify CAs unde=
r that root.
A relying party using this root MAY use this information to apply extra con=
trols, such as verifying that the end entity certificate being verified und=
er that root is a qualified certificate by examining the QcStatements exten=
sion from RFC 3739.

So the options I have considered and dismissed are:

- certificate policy extension, and
- EKU

Both are bad. The policy extension is designed to list certificate policies=
 that can be included in the EE cert (that is what the path validation algo=
rithm does). The EKU is only meant to be included in EE certs and its inclu=
sion in other certs is subject to non-standardized handling that makes such=
 solution highly unpredictable.

The cleanest way that I can think of is to include such information in a ne=
w extension along this structure:

TrustConstraints :=3D=3D SEQUENCE OF TrustConstraint
TrustConstraint :=3D=3D SEQUENCE {
  constraint     OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
  constraintInfo  OCTET STRING  OPTIONAL }

The constraintInfo content is defined by the constraint OID. The reason why=
 I put it in an OCTET STRING is because it is way easier to code than havin=
g an "any defined by" structure. This way I can always parse this extension=
 with a simple fixed ASN.1 structure and pass the byte[] array to higher lo=
gic for processing if I recognize the OID, or else trash it. The constraint=
s data could for example carry XML data or a JSON object according to the d=
efinition of the constraint OID. This way we would not have to bother with =
I18N stuff in the extension definition. Clean and simple.

This extension is only meant to be placed in CA certificates, possibly only=
 in self signed root certificates.

Thoughts?

/Stefan










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</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=3DEN-US link=3Dblue vli=
nk=3Dpurple style=3D'word-wrap: break-word;-webkit-nbsp-mode: space;-webkit=
-line-break: after-white-space'><div class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNor=
mal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#=
1F497D'>Stefan,<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'fo=
nt-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</=
o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-fam=
ily:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>From your description it is not cle=
ar if you mean this as a capability or constraint?<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-=
serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><spa=
n style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>=
Specifically, is the Root 1 only good for qualified certificates and nothin=
g else?&nbsp; Another example is what does the absence of this constraint m=
eans?<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:9.=
0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span=
></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial=
","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>I am guessing that you mean this as a capabil=
ity and not a constraint.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span s=
tyle=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:=
p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><div><div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B=
5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span style=
=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span></b><sp=
an style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> pkix-bounc=
es@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] <b>On Behalf Of </b>Stefan Sante=
sson<br><b>Sent:</b> Monday, May 23, 2011 6:15 AM<br><b>To:</b> pkix@ietf.o=
rg<br><b>Subject:</b> [pkix] Trust Constraints - Possible request for yet a=
nother certificate extension<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p class=3DMs=
oNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-=
size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>All,<o:p></o:p>=
</span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;=
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p=
></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-famil=
y:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>I have come across a need that I don'=
t know how to solve with the existing certificate extensions.<o:p></o:p></s=
pan></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;fon=
t-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>I would like to discuss what t=
he best solution is, which may include defining a new extension.<o:p></o:p>=
</span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;=
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p=
></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-famil=
y:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>I'm running a cross certifying PKI wh=
ich extracts a fairly large number of intermediary CAs and certifies them u=
nder a single root.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><s=
pan style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:blac=
k'>I create a number of root authorities, each representing a different pol=
icy for approving CAs to be certified under this root.<o:p></o:p></span></p=
></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-famil=
y:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><di=
v><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri=
","sans-serif";color:black'>Example:&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div>=
<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri",=
"sans-serif";color:black'>Root 1 only certifies CA:s that issues qualified =
certificates<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span sty=
le=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'><o:p=
>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font=
-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>I would like t=
o include some optional information in the root certificate that the relyin=
g party MAY use to understand policy used to certify CAs under that root.<o=
:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-siz=
e:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>A relying party us=
ing this root MAY use this information to apply extra controls, such as ver=
ifying that the end entity certificate being verified under that root is a =
qualified certificate by examining the QcStatements extension from RFC 3739=
.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-=
size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:=
p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5p=
t;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>So the options I have con=
sidered and dismissed are:<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNo=
rmal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";col=
or:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span=
 style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>=
- certificate policy extension, and<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p clas=
s=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-s=
erif";color:black'>- EKU<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNorm=
al><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color=
:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span s=
tyle=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>Bo=
th are bad. The policy extension is designed to list certificate policies t=
hat can be included in the EE cert (that is what the path validation algori=
thm does). The EKU is only meant to be included in EE certs and its inclusi=
on in other certs is subject to non-standardized handling that makes such s=
olution highly unpredictable.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMs=
oNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";=
color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><s=
pan style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:blac=
k'>The cleanest way that I can think of is to include such information in a=
 new extension along this structure:<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p cla=
ss=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-=
serif";color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNo=
rmal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";col=
or:black'>TrustConstraints :=3D=3D SEQUENCE OF TrustConstraint<o:p></o:p></=
span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;fo=
nt-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>TrustConstraint :=3D=3D SEQUE=
NCE {<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'f=
ont-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>&nbsp;&nbsp=
;constraint &nbsp; &nbsp; OBJECT IDENTIFIER,<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><di=
v><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri=
","sans-serif";color:black'>&nbsp;&nbsp;constraintInfo &nbsp;OCTET STRING &=
nbsp;OPTIONAL }<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'><=
o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'f=
ont-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>The constra=
intInfo content is defined by the constraint OID. The reason why I put it i=
n an OCTET STRING is because it is way easier to code than having an &quot;=
any defined by&quot; structure. This way I can always parse this extension =
with a simple fixed ASN.1 structure and pass the byte[] array to higher log=
ic for processing if I recognize the OID, or else trash it. The constraints=
 data could for example carry XML data or a JSON object according to the de=
finition of the constraint OID. This way we would not have to bother with I=
18N stuff in the extension definition. Clean and simple.<o:p></o:p></span><=
/p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-fam=
ily:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><=
div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calib=
ri","sans-serif";color:black'>This extension is only meant to be placed in =
CA certificates, possibly only in self signed root certificates.<o:p></o:p>=
</span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;=
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p=
></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-famil=
y:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>Thoughts?<o:p></o:p></span></p></div>=
<div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Cali=
bri","sans-serif";color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p cl=
ass=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans=
-serif";color:black'>/Stefan<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMso=
Normal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";c=
olor:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><sp=
an style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black=
'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=
=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'><o:p>&=
nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-s=
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Date: Mon, 23 May 2011 21:39:20 +0200
From: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>
To: Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>, "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Message-ID: <CA007F75.21F9D%stefan@aaa-sec.com>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] Trust Constraints - Possible request for yet another certificate extension
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Trust Constraints - Possible request for yet another certificate extension
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I intend to use this in my validation software to constrain what certificate
that are accepted as valid.

In my use case this maps to the information about trust services that is
provided in EU Trust service lists.
I may include information in the root declaring that only qualified EE
certificates are supposed to be validated under this root.

I may however include CA certificates that are only used to validate
timestamps and OCSP responses to support signature validation of signatures
based on qualified certificates. I could then include information in the CA
certificates to OCSP responders and CAs certifying TSAs that they are to be
used only to validate time stamp tokens and OCSP responses. That way I will
avoid using them by mistake to validate a qualified certificate.

As I said, I can't put this in certificate policies, because I control the
issuance of end entity certs and what policies they use.

So one constraintsInfo I would like to be able to include is the
TrustServiceType declaration carried for that CA in an EU Trust Service
List. That tells me if that CA is used to support time stamping, OCSP,
qualified certificates, regular EE certificates etc. This information about
the service is lost when I cross certify these CAs and I'm looking for a way
to store such information in the issued CA certificate so my validation
software can make use of it.

I care less if this is called capability or constraints, and more about the
capacity to store such information.
If not standardized here, I think I will just create a private extension for
this purpose, since I need it.

/Stefan


From:  Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>
Date:  Mon, 23 May 2011 15:10:46 -0400
To:  Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>, "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject:  RE: [pkix] Trust Constraints - Possible request for yet another
certificate extension

> Stefan,
>  
> From your description it is not clear if you mean this as a capability or
> constraint?
>  
> Specifically, is the Root 1 only good for qualified certificates and nothing
> else?  Another example is what does the absence of this constraint means?
>  
> I am guessing that you mean this as a capability and not a constraint.
>  
> 
> From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Stefan
> Santesson
> Sent: Monday, May 23, 2011 6:15 AM
> To: pkix@ietf.org
> Subject: [pkix] Trust Constraints - Possible request for yet another
> certificate extension
>  
> 
> All,
> 
>  
> 
> I have come across a need that I don't know how to solve with the existing
> certificate extensions.
> 
> I would like to discuss what the best solution is, which may include defining
> a new extension.
> 
>  
> 
> I'm running a cross certifying PKI which extracts a fairly large number of
> intermediary CAs and certifies them under a single root.
> 
> I create a number of root authorities, each representing a different policy
> for approving CAs to be certified under this root.
> 
>  
> 
> Example: 
> 
> Root 1 only certifies CA:s that issues qualified certificates
> 
>  
> 
> I would like to include some optional information in the root certificate that
> the relying party MAY use to understand policy used to certify CAs under that
> root.
> 
> A relying party using this root MAY use this information to apply extra
> controls, such as verifying that the end entity certificate being verified
> under that root is a qualified certificate by examining the QcStatements
> extension from RFC 3739.
> 
>  
> 
> So the options I have considered and dismissed are:
> 
>  
> 
> - certificate policy extension, and
> 
> - EKU
> 
>  
> 
> Both are bad. The policy extension is designed to list certificate policies
> that can be included in the EE cert (that is what the path validation
> algorithm does). The EKU is only meant to be included in EE certs and its
> inclusion in other certs is subject to non-standardized handling that makes
> such solution highly unpredictable.
> 
>  
> 
> The cleanest way that I can think of is to include such information in a new
> extension along this structure:
> 
>  
> 
> TrustConstraints :== SEQUENCE OF TrustConstraint
> 
> TrustConstraint :== SEQUENCE {
> 
>   constraint     OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
> 
>   constraintInfo  OCTET STRING  OPTIONAL }
> 
>  
> 
> The constraintInfo content is defined by the constraint OID. The reason why I
> put it in an OCTET STRING is because it is way easier to code than having an
> "any defined by" structure. This way I can always parse this extension with a
> simple fixed ASN.1 structure and pass the byte[] array to higher logic for
> processing if I recognize the OID, or else trash it. The constraints data
> could for example carry XML data or a JSON object according to the definition
> of the constraint OID. This way we would not have to bother with I18N stuff in
> the extension definition. Clean and simple.
> 
>  
> 
> This extension is only meant to be placed in CA certificates, possibly only in
> self signed root certificates.
> 
>  
> 
> Thoughts?
> 
>  
> 
> /Stefan
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
>   
> 
>  
> 
>  



--B_3389031565_49907298
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<html><head></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: s=
pace; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-size:=
 14px; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><div>I intend to use this in my v=
alidation software to constrain what certificate that are accepted as valid.=
</div><div><br></div><div>In my use case this maps to the information about =
trust services that is provided in EU Trust service lists.</div><div>I may i=
nclude information in the root declaring that only qualified EE certificates=
 are supposed to be validated under this root.</div><div><br></div><div>I ma=
y however include CA certificates that are only used to validate timestamps =
and OCSP responses to support signature validation of signatures based on qu=
alified certificates. I could then include information in the CA certificate=
s to OCSP responders and CAs certifying TSAs that they are to be used only t=
o validate time stamp tokens and OCSP responses. That way I will avoid using=
 them by mistake to validate a qualified certificate.</div><div><br></div><d=
iv>As I said, I can't put this in certificate policies, because I control th=
e issuance of end entity certs and what policies they use.</div><div><br></d=
iv><div>So one constraintsInfo I would like to be able to include is the Tru=
stServiceType declaration carried for that CA in an EU Trust Service List. T=
hat tells me if that CA is used to support time stamping, OCSP, qualified ce=
rtificates, regular EE certificates etc. This information about the service =
is lost when I cross certify these CAs and I'm looking for a way to store su=
ch information in the issued CA certificate so my validation software can ma=
ke use of it.</div><div><br></div><div>I care less if this is called capabil=
ity or constraints, and more about the capacity to store such information.</=
div><div>If not standardized here, I think I will just create a private exte=
nsion for this purpose, since I need it.</div><div><br></div><div>/Stefan</d=
iv><div><br></div><div><br></div><span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION"><div style=3D=
"font-family:Calibri; font-size:11pt; text-align:left; color:black; BORDER-B=
OTTOM: medium none; BORDER-LEFT: medium none; PADDING-BOTTOM: 0in; PADDING-L=
EFT: 0in; PADDING-RIGHT: 0in; BORDER-TOP: #b5c4df 1pt solid; BORDER-RIGHT: m=
edium none; PADDING-TOP: 3pt"><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">From: </span> S=
antosh Chokhani &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:SChokhani@cygnacom.com">SChokhani@cygnac=
om.com</a>&gt;<br><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">Date: </span> Mon, 23 May 2=
011 15:10:46 -0400<br><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">To: </span> Stefan Sant=
esson &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com">stefan@aaa-sec.com</a>&gt;, "<=
a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>" &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ie=
tf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">Subject: </s=
pan> RE: [pkix] Trust Constraints - Possible request for yet another certifi=
cate extension<br></div><div><br></div><blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTI=
ON_BLOCKQUOTE" style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:=
0 0 0 5;"><div xmlns:v=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:vml" xmlns:o=3D"urn:schemas-=
microsoft-com:office:office" xmlns:w=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:word"=
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<o:shapelayout v:ext=3D"edit">
<o:idmap v:ext=3D"edit" data=3D"1" />
</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--><div lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purp=
le" style=3D"word-wrap: break-word;-webkit-nbsp-mode: space;-webkit-line-break=
: after-white-space"><div class=3D"WordSection1"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span st=
yle=3D"font-size: 9pt; color: rgb(31, 73, 125); font-family: Arial, sans-serif=
; ">Stefan,<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size=
: 9pt; color: rgb(31, 73, 125); font-family: Arial, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp=
;</o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 9pt; color: r=
gb(31, 73, 125); font-family: Arial, sans-serif; ">From your description it =
is not clear if you mean this as a capability or constraint?<o:p></o:p></spa=
n></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 9pt; color: rgb(31, 73, 1=
25); font-family: Arial, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3D=
"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 9pt; color: rgb(31, 73, 125); font-famil=
y: Arial, sans-serif; ">Specifically, is the Root 1 only good for qualified =
certificates and nothing else?&nbsp; Another example is what does the absenc=
e of this constraint means?<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span =
style=3D"font-size: 9pt; color: rgb(31, 73, 125); font-family: Arial, sans-ser=
if; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-siz=
e: 9pt; color: rgb(31, 73, 125); font-family: Arial, sans-serif; ">I am gues=
sing that you mean this as a capability and not a constraint.<o:p></o:p></sp=
an></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 9pt; color: rgb(31, 73, =
125); font-family: Arial, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><div><di=
v style=3D"border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0i=
n"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma=
, sans-serif; ">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: T=
ahoma, sans-serif; "> <a href=3D"mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org">pkix-bounces@ie=
tf.org</a> [<a href=3D"mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org">mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.=
org</a>] <b>On Behalf Of </b>Stefan Santesson<br><b>Sent:</b> Monday, May 23=
, 2011 6:15 AM<br><b>To:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a=
><br><b>Subject:</b> [pkix] Trust Constraints - Possible request for yet ano=
ther certificate extension<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p class=3D"MsoNor=
mal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: =
10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">All,<o:p></o:p></s=
pan></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; colo=
r: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></=
div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; =
font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">I have come across a need that I don't k=
now how to solve with the existing certificate extensions.<o:p></o:p></span>=
</p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: b=
lack; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">I would like to discuss what the b=
est solution is, which may include defining a new extension.<o:p></o:p></spa=
n></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color:=
 black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></di=
v><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; fo=
nt-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">I'm running a cross certifying PKI which e=
xtracts a fairly large number of intermediary CAs and certifies them under a=
 single root.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span sty=
le=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">I c=
reate a number of root authorities, each representing a different policy for=
 approving CAs to be certified under this root.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><=
div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-=
family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p cla=
ss=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Ca=
libri, sans-serif; ">Example:&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=
=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Cali=
bri, sans-serif; ">Root 1 only certifies CA:s that issues qualified certific=
ates<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-=
size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;<=
/o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5=
pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">I would like to includ=
e some optional information in the root certificate that the relying party M=
AY use to understand policy used to certify CAs under that root.<o:p></o:p><=
/span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; co=
lor: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">A relying party using this r=
oot MAY use this information to apply extra controls, such as verifying that=
 the end entity certificate being verified under that root is a qualified ce=
rtificate by examining the QcStatements extension from RFC 3739.<o:p></o:p><=
/span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; co=
lor: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>=
</div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black=
; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">So the options I have considered and d=
ismissed are:<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span sty=
le=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><o:=
p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-s=
ize: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">- certificate=
 policy extension, and<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">=
<span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-ser=
if; ">- EKU<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=
=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><o:p>=
&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-siz=
e: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">Both are bad. T=
he policy extension is designed to list certificate policies that can be inc=
luded in the EE cert (that is what the path validation algorithm does). The =
EKU is only meant to be included in EE certs and its inclusion in other cert=
s is subject to non-standardized handling that makes such solution highly un=
predictable.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span styl=
e=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><o:p=
>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-si=
ze: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">The cleanest w=
ay that I can think of is to include such information in a new extension alo=
ng this structure:<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><spa=
n style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; =
"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"f=
ont-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">TrustCon=
straints :=3D=3D SEQUENCE OF TrustConstraint<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family:=
 Calibri, sans-serif; ">TrustConstraint :=3D=3D SEQUENCE {<o:p></o:p></span></p>=
</div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black=
; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;&nbsp;constraint &nbsp; &nbsp; O=
BJECT IDENTIFIER,<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span=
 style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "=
>&nbsp;&nbsp;constraintInfo &nbsp;OCTET STRING &nbsp;OPTIONAL }<o:p></o:p></=
span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; col=
or: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><=
/div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black;=
 font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">The constraintInfo content is defined b=
y the constraint OID. The reason why I put it in an OCTET STRING is because =
it is way easier to code than having an "any defined by" structure. This way=
 I can always parse this extension with a simple fixed ASN.1 structure and p=
ass the byte[] array to higher logic for processing if I recognize the OID, =
or else trash it. The constraints data could for example carry XML data or a=
 JSON object according to the definition of the constraint OID. This way we =
would not have to bother with I18N stuff in the extension definition. Clean =
and simple.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=
=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><o:p>=
&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-siz=
e: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">This extension =
is only meant to be placed in CA certificates, possibly only in self signed =
root certificates.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><spa=
n style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; =
"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"f=
ont-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">Thoughts=
?<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-siz=
e: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:=
p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt;=
 color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">/Stefan<o:p></o:p></span>=
</p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: b=
lack; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div>=
<div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font=
-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p cl=
ass=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: C=
alibri, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNo=
rmal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sa=
ns-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><spa=
n style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; =
"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"f=
ont-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nb=
sp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: =
10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;&nbsp;<o:p><=
/o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5=
pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></spa=
n></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color:=
 black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></di=
v></div></div></div></blockquote></span></body></html>

--B_3389031565_49907298--



From stefan@aaa-sec.com  Mon May 23 12:45:52 2011
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Date: Mon, 23 May 2011 21:42:34 +0200
From: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>
To: <denis.pinkas@bull.net>, pkix <pkix@ietf.org>
Message-ID: <CA0084E3.21FCA%stefan@aaa-sec.com>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] Trust Constraints - Possible request for yet another certificate extension
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Trust Constraints - Possible request for yet another certificate extension
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Denis,

A signature policy is carried in the signature. That is kind of useless for
me.
That tells me nothing about the purpose of a CA that I find in my trust
store.

/Stefan


From:  Denis Pinkas <denis.pinkas@bull.net>
Reply-To:  <denis.pinkas@bull.net>
Date:  Mon, 23 May 2011 13:46:20 +0200
To:  pkix <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject:  Re: [pkix] Trust Constraints - Possible request for yet another
certificate extension

> Stefan,
>=20
> You said: "This extension is only meant to be placed in CA certificates,
> possibly only in self signed root certificates".
>=20
> I do not believe, it is a good idea.
>=20
> A CA may certify many other CAs for different purposes. It is the end-use=
r or
> the application that will decide
> which intermediate or end-entity certificates may be trusted.
>=20
> The right placement of constraints is in a signature policy or in a valid=
ation
> policy.
>=20
> For signature policy formats, refer to ETSI TR 102 038 V1.1.1 (2002-04) o=
r
> ETSI TR 102 272 V1.1.1 (2003-12).
> =20
> Denis
> =20
>> =20
>> -----  Message re=E7u -----
>> =20
>> De  : pkix-bounces <mailto :pkix-bounces@ietf.org>
>> =20
>> =C0  : pkix@ietf.org <mailto :pkix@ietf.org>
>> =20
>> Date  : 2011-05-23, 12:14:38
>> =20
>> Sujet  : [pkix] Trust Constraints - Possible request for yet another
>> certificateextension
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>> =20
>> =20
>> =20
>> All,
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>> I have come across a need that I don't know how to solve with the  exist=
ing
>> certificate extensions.
>> =20
>> I would like to discuss what the best solution is, which may include
>> defining a new extension.
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>> I'm running a cross certifying PKI which extracts a fairly large number =
 of
>> intermediary CAs and certifies them under a single root.
>> =20
>> I create a number of root authorities, each representing a different  po=
licy
>> for approving CAs to be certified under this root.
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>> Example:=20
>> =20
>> Root 1 only certifies CA:s that issues qualified certificates
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>> I would like to include some optional information in the root certificat=
e
>> that the relying party MAY use to understand policy used to certify CAs =
under
>> that root.
>> =20
>> A relying party using this root MAY use this information to apply extra
>> controls, such as verifying that the end entity certificate being verifi=
ed
>> under that root is a qualified certificate by examining the QcStatements
>> extension from RFC 3739.
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>> So the options I have considered and dismissed are:
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>> - certificate policy extension, and
>> =20
>> - EKU
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>> Both are bad. The policy extension is designed to list certificate  poli=
cies
>> that can be included in the EE cert (that is what the path validation
>> algorithm does). The EKU is only meant to be included in EE certs and it=
s
>> inclusion in other certs is subject to non-standardized handling that ma=
kes
>> such solution highly unpredictable.
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>> The cleanest way that I can think of is to include such information in a=
  new
>> extension along this structure:
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>> TrustConstraints :=3D=3D SEQUENCE OF TrustConstraint
>> =20
>> TrustConstraint :=3D=3D SEQUENCE {
>> =20
>>   constraint     OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
>> =20
>>   constraintInfo  OCTET STRING  OPTIONAL }
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>> The constraintInfo content is defined by the constraint OID. The reason =
 why
>> I put it in an OCTET STRING is because it is way easier to code than  ha=
ving
>> an "any defined by" structure. This way I can always parse this  extensi=
on
>> with a simple fixed ASN.1 structure and pass the byte[] array to  higher
>> logic for processing if I recognize the OID, or else trash it. The
>> constraints data could for example carry XML data or a JSON object accor=
ding
>> to the definition of the constraint OID. This way we would not have to b=
other
>> with I18N stuff in the extension definition. Clean and simple.
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>> This extension is only meant to be placed in CA certificates, possibly  =
only
>> in self signed root certificates.
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>> Thoughts?
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>> /Stefan
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>>  =20
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>>=20
> _______________________________________________ pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix



--B_3389031757_49934617
Content-type: text/html;
	charset="ISO-8859-1"
Content-transfer-encoding: quoted-printable

<html><head></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: s=
pace; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-size:=
 14px; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><div>Denis,</div><div><br></div><=
div>A signature policy is carried in the signature. That is kind of useless =
for me.</div><div>That tells me nothing about the purpose of a CA that I fin=
d in my trust store.</div><div><br></div><div>/Stefan</div><div><br></div><d=
iv><br></div><span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION"><div style=3D"font-family:Calibri=
; font-size:11pt; text-align:left; color:black; BORDER-BOTTOM: medium none; =
BORDER-LEFT: medium none; PADDING-BOTTOM: 0in; PADDING-LEFT: 0in; PADDING-RI=
GHT: 0in; BORDER-TOP: #b5c4df 1pt solid; BORDER-RIGHT: medium none; PADDING-=
TOP: 3pt"><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">From: </span> Denis Pinkas &lt;<a h=
ref=3D"mailto:denis.pinkas@bull.net">denis.pinkas@bull.net</a>&gt;<br><span st=
yle=3D"font-weight:bold">Reply-To: </span> &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:denis.pinkas@bu=
ll.net">denis.pinkas@bull.net</a>&gt;<br><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">Date=
: </span> Mon, 23 May 2011 13:46:20 +0200<br><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">=
To: </span> pkix &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br=
><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">Subject: </span> Re: [pkix] Trust Constraint=
s - Possible request for yet another certificate extension<br></div><div><br=
></div><blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=3D"BORDER-LEF=
T: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;"><div><div style=3D"FONT-=
SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: Tahoma" leftmargin=3D"5" topmargin=3D"5" #ffffff=3D""><p>=
Stefan,</p><p>You said: "This extension is only meant to be placed in CA cer=
tificates, 
possibly only in self signed root certificates".</p><p>I do not believe, it=
 is a good idea.</p><p>A CA may certify many other CAs for different purpose=
s. It is the end-user or 
the application that will decide <br>which intermediate or end-entity 
certificates may be trusted.</p><p>The right placement of constraints is in=
 a signature policy or in 
a&nbsp;validation policy.</p><div>For signature policy formats, refer to <s=
pan lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: black; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; m=
so-fareast-font-family: 'MS Mincho'; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-fareast-l=
anguage: JA; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA"><strong>ETSI 
TR 102 038 V1.1.1 (2002-04)</strong></span><span lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"FONT-S=
IZE: 10pt; COLOR: black; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: 'MS Mi=
ncho'; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-fareast-language: JA; mso-bidi-language=
: AR-SA"> 
or <span lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: black; FONT-FAMILY: Ar=
ial; mso-fareast-font-family: 'MS Mincho'; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-far=
east-language: JA; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA"><strong>ETSI 
TR 102 272 V1.1.1 (2003-12)</strong></span></span>.</div><div>&nbsp;</div><=
div>Denis</div><div>&nbsp;</div><blockquote style=3D"PADDING-RIGHT: 0px; PADDI=
NG-LEFT: 5px; MARGIN-LEFT: 5px; BORDER-LEFT: #000000 2px solid; MARGIN-RIGHT=
: 0px">
  <div style=3D"FONT-WEIGHT: normal; FONT-SIZE: 9pt; LINE-HEIGHT: normal; FON=
T-STYLE: normal; FONT-VARIANT: normal">----- 
  Message re=E7u ----- </div>
  <div style=3D"FONT-WEIGHT: normal; FONT-SIZE: 9pt; BACKGROUND: #e4e4e4; LIN=
E-HEIGHT: normal; FONT-STYLE: normal; FONT-VARIANT: normal; font-color: blac=
k"><b>De 
  :</b> <a href=3D"mailto :pkix-bounces@ietf.org">pkix-bounces</a> </div>
  <div style=3D"FONT-WEIGHT: normal; FONT-SIZE: 9pt; LINE-HEIGHT: normal; FON=
T-STYLE: normal; FONT-VARIANT: normal"><b>=C0 
  :</b> <a href=3D"mailto :pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a> </div>
  <div style=3D"FONT-WEIGHT: normal; FONT-SIZE: 9pt; LINE-HEIGHT: normal; FON=
T-STYLE: normal; FONT-VARIANT: normal"><b>Date 
  :</b> 2011-05-23, 12:14:38</div>
  <div style=3D"FONT-WEIGHT: normal; FONT-SIZE: 9pt; LINE-HEIGHT: normal; FON=
T-STYLE: normal; FONT-VARIANT: normal"><b>Sujet 
  :</b> [pkix] Trust Constraints - Possible request for yet another 
  certificateextension</div>
  <div><br></div>
  <div></div>
  <div></div>
  <div>
  <div>All,</div>
  <div><br></div>
  <div>I have come across a need that I don't know how to solve with the 
  existing certificate extensions.</div>
  <div>I would like to discuss what the best solution is, which may include=
 
  defining a new extension.</div>
  <div><br></div>
  <div>I'm running a cross certifying PKI which extracts a fairly large num=
ber 
  of intermediary CAs and certifies them under a single root.</div>
  <div>I create a number of root authorities, each representing a different=
 
  policy for approving CAs to be certified under this root.</div>
  <div><br></div>
  <div>Example:&nbsp;</div>
  <div>Root 1 only certifies CA:s that issues qualified certificates</div>
  <div><br></div>
  <div>I would like to include some optional information in the root certif=
icate 
  that the relying party MAY use to understand policy used to certify CAs u=
nder 
  that root.</div>
  <div>A relying party using this root MAY use this information to apply ex=
tra 
  controls, such as verifying that the end entity certificate being verifie=
d 
  under that root is a qualified certificate by examining the QcStatements =
  extension from RFC 3739.</div>
  <div><br></div>
  <div>So the options I have considered and dismissed are:</div>
  <div><br></div>
  <div>- certificate policy extension, and</div>
  <div>- EKU</div>
  <div><br></div>
  <div>Both are bad. The policy extension is designed to list certificate 
  policies that can be included in the EE cert (that is what the path valid=
ation 
  algorithm does). The EKU is only meant to be included in EE certs and its=
 
  inclusion in other certs is subject to non-standardized handling that mak=
es 
  such solution highly unpredictable.</div>
  <div><br></div>
  <div>The cleanest way that I can think of is to include such information =
in a 
  new extension along this structure:</div>
  <div><br></div>
  <div>TrustConstraints :=3D=3D SEQUENCE OF TrustConstraint</div>
  <div>TrustConstraint :=3D=3D SEQUENCE {</div>
  <div>&nbsp;&nbsp;constraint &nbsp; &nbsp; OBJECT IDENTIFIER,</div>
  <div>&nbsp;&nbsp;constraintInfo &nbsp;OCTET STRING &nbsp;OPTIONAL }</div>=
  <div><br></div>
  <div>The constraintInfo content is defined by the constraint OID. The rea=
son 
  why I put it in an OCTET STRING is because it is way easier to code than =
  having an "any defined by" structure. This way I can always parse this 
  extension with a simple fixed ASN.1 structure and pass the byte[] array t=
o 
  higher logic for processing if I recognize the OID, or else trash it. The=
 
  constraints data could for example carry XML data or a JSON object accord=
ing 
  to the definition of the constraint OID. This way we would not have to bo=
ther 
  with I18N stuff in the extension definition. Clean and simple.</div>
  <div><br></div>
  <div>This extension is only meant to be placed in CA certificates, possib=
ly 
  only in self signed root certificates.</div>
  <div><br></div>
  <div>Thoughts?</div>
  <div><br></div>
  <div>/Stefan</div>
  <div><br></div>
  <div><br></div>
  <div><br></div>
  <div><br></div>
  <div><br></div>
  <div><br></div>
  <div>&nbsp;&nbsp;</div>
  <div><br></div>
  <div><br></div></div></blockquote></div></div>
_______________________________________________
pkix mailing list
<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix">https://www.ietf.org/m=
ailman/listinfo/pkix</a>
</blockquote></span></body></html>

--B_3389031757_49934617--



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Subject: Re: [pkix] Trust Constraints - Possible request for yet another certificate extension
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Stefan,

You miss the point.

The capability and constraint is not simply a terminology issue.

What you are saying is that if the constraint is present, then the CA can o=
nly be used for the listed purposes.  Right?

You are also saying that the constraint's absence means that the CA can be =
used for any purpose.  Right?

Here are some suggestions:


1.     This need not be in a root certificate.  It can be in root issued CA=
 certificates unless you envision root to be direct issuer of end entity ce=
rtificates

2.     I suggest you define both the permitted and excluded capabilities

3.     I suggest that the path validation logic honor the presence of this =
extension in downstream CAs a la name constraints

4.     I suggest you think about what the relying party should do if it doe=
s not understand semantics of one of the OIDs present in the extension, esp=
ecially in the excluded field.
From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com]
Sent: Monday, May 23, 2011 3:39 PM
To: Santosh Chokhani; pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] Trust Constraints - Possible request for yet another ce=
rtificate extension

I intend to use this in my validation software to constrain what certificat=
e that are accepted as valid.

In my use case this maps to the information about trust services that is pr=
ovided in EU Trust service lists.
I may include information in the root declaring that only qualified EE cert=
ificates are supposed to be validated under this root.

I may however include CA certificates that are only used to validate timest=
amps and OCSP responses to support signature validation of signatures based=
 on qualified certificates. I could then include information in the CA cert=
ificates to OCSP responders and CAs certifying TSAs that they are to be use=
d only to validate time stamp tokens and OCSP responses. That way I will av=
oid using them by mistake to validate a qualified certificate.

As I said, I can't put this in certificate policies, because I control the =
issuance of end entity certs and what policies they use.

So one constraintsInfo I would like to be able to include is the TrustServi=
ceType declaration carried for that CA in an EU Trust Service List. That te=
lls me if that CA is used to support time stamping, OCSP, qualified certifi=
cates, regular EE certificates etc. This information about the service is l=
ost when I cross certify these CAs and I'm looking for a way to store such =
information in the issued CA certificate so my validation software can make=
 use of it.

I care less if this is called capability or constraints, and more about the=
 capacity to store such information.
If not standardized here, I think I will just create a private extension fo=
r this purpose, since I need it.

/Stefan


From: Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com<mailto:SChokhani@cygnacom.co=
m>>
Date: Mon, 23 May 2011 15:10:46 -0400
To: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com<mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com>>, "pkix=
@ietf.org<mailto:pkix@ietf.org>" <pkix@ietf.org<mailto:pkix@ietf.org>>
Subject: RE: [pkix] Trust Constraints - Possible request for yet another ce=
rtificate extension

Stefan,

>From your description it is not clear if you mean this as a capability or c=
onstraint?

Specifically, is the Root 1 only good for qualified certificates and nothin=
g else?  Another example is what does the absence of this constraint means?

I am guessing that you mean this as a capability and not a constraint.

From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org<mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org> [mailto:pkix-boun=
ces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Stefan Santesson
Sent: Monday, May 23, 2011 6:15 AM
To: pkix@ietf.org<mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: [pkix] Trust Constraints - Possible request for yet another certif=
icate extension

All,

I have come across a need that I don't know how to solve with the existing =
certificate extensions.
I would like to discuss what the best solution is, which may include defini=
ng a new extension.

I'm running a cross certifying PKI which extracts a fairly large number of =
intermediary CAs and certifies them under a single root.
I create a number of root authorities, each representing a different policy=
 for approving CAs to be certified under this root.

Example:
Root 1 only certifies CA:s that issues qualified certificates

I would like to include some optional information in the root certificate t=
hat the relying party MAY use to understand policy used to certify CAs unde=
r that root.
A relying party using this root MAY use this information to apply extra con=
trols, such as verifying that the end entity certificate being verified und=
er that root is a qualified certificate by examining the QcStatements exten=
sion from RFC 3739.

So the options I have considered and dismissed are:

- certificate policy extension, and
- EKU

Both are bad. The policy extension is designed to list certificate policies=
 that can be included in the EE cert (that is what the path validation algo=
rithm does). The EKU is only meant to be included in EE certs and its inclu=
sion in other certs is subject to non-standardized handling that makes such=
 solution highly unpredictable.

The cleanest way that I can think of is to include such information in a ne=
w extension along this structure:

TrustConstraints :=3D=3D SEQUENCE OF TrustConstraint
TrustConstraint :=3D=3D SEQUENCE {
  constraint     OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
  constraintInfo  OCTET STRING  OPTIONAL }

The constraintInfo content is defined by the constraint OID. The reason why=
 I put it in an OCTET STRING is because it is way easier to code than havin=
g an "any defined by" structure. This way I can always parse this extension=
 with a simple fixed ASN.1 structure and pass the byte[] array to higher lo=
gic for processing if I recognize the OID, or else trash it. The constraint=
s data could for example carry XML data or a JSON object according to the d=
efinition of the constraint OID. This way we would not have to bother with =
I18N stuff in the extension definition. Clean and simple.

This extension is only meant to be placed in CA certificates, possibly only=
 in self signed root certificates.

Thoughts?

/Stefan










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nk=3Dpurple style=3D'word-wrap: break-word;-webkit-nbsp-mode: space;-webkit=
-line-break: after-white-space'><div class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNor=
mal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#=
993366'>Stefan,<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'fo=
nt-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#993366'><o:p>&nbsp;</=
o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-fam=
ily:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#993366'>You miss the point.<o:p></o:p></spa=
n></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Aria=
l","sans-serif";color:#993366'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNo=
rmal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:=
#993366'>The capability and constraint is not simply a terminology issue.<o=
:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;fon=
t-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#993366'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p=
 class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans=
-serif";color:#993366'>What you are saying is that if the constraint is pre=
sent, then the CA can only be used for the listed purposes.&nbsp; Right?<o:=
p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font=
-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#993366'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-=
serif";color:#993366'>You are also saying that the constraint&#8217;s absen=
ce means that the CA can be used for any purpose.&nbsp; Right?<o:p></o:p></=
span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"A=
rial","sans-serif";color:#993366'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMs=
oNormal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";col=
or:#993366'>Here are some suggestions:<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoN=
ormal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color=
:#993366'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoListParagraph style=3D'=
text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1'><![if !supportLists]><span styl=
e=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#993366'><span =
style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>1.<span style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'>&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span></span></span><![endif]><span style=3D'font-s=
ize:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#993366'>This need not be =
in a root certificate.&nbsp; It can be in root issued CA certificates unles=
s you envision root to be direct issuer of end entity certificates<o:p></o:=
p></span></p><p class=3DMsoListParagraph style=3D'text-indent:-.25in;mso-li=
st:l0 level1 lfo1'><![if !supportLists]><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font=
-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#993366'><span style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'=
>2.<span style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </=
span></span></span><![endif]><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Ar=
ial","sans-serif";color:#993366'>I suggest you define both the permitted an=
d excluded capabilities<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoListParagraph st=
yle=3D'text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1'><![if !supportLists]><sp=
an style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#993366'=
><span style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>3.<span style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Rom=
an"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span></span></span><![endif]><span style=3D=
'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#993366'>I suggest =
that the path validation logic honor the presence of this extension in down=
stream CAs a la name constraints<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoListPar=
agraph style=3D'text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1'><![if !supportL=
ists]><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color=
:#993366'><span style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>4.<span style=3D'font:7.0pt "Time=
s New Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span></span></span><![endif]><span=
 style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#993366'>I=
 suggest you think about what the relying party should do if it does not un=
derstand semantics of one of the OIDs present in the extension, especially =
in the excluded field.<o:p></o:p></span></p><div><div style=3D'border:none;=
border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNor=
mal><b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>F=
rom:</span></b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-s=
erif"'> Stefan Santesson [mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com] <br><b>Sent:</b> Monda=
y, May 23, 2011 3:39 PM<br><b>To:</b> Santosh Chokhani; pkix@ietf.org<br><b=
>Subject:</b> Re: [pkix] Trust Constraints - Possible request for yet anoth=
er certificate extension<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p class=3DMsoNor=
mal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size=
:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>I intend to use thi=
s in my validation software to constrain what certificate that are accepted=
 as valid.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=
=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'><o:p>&=
nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-s=
ize:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>In my use case t=
his maps to the information about trust services that is provided in EU Tru=
st service lists.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><spa=
n style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'=
>I may include information in the root declaring that only qualified EE cer=
tificates are supposed to be validated under this root.<o:p></o:p></span></=
p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><d=
iv><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibr=
i","sans-serif";color:black'>I may however include CA certificates that are=
 only used to validate timestamps and OCSP responses to support signature v=
alidation of signatures based on qualified certificates. I could then inclu=
de information in the CA certificates to OCSP responders and CAs certifying=
 TSAs that they are to be used only to validate time stamp tokens and OCSP =
responses. That way I will avoid using them by mistake to validate a qualif=
ied certificate.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span=
 style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>=
<o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'=
font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>As I said,=
 I can't put this in certificate policies, because I control the issuance o=
f end entity certs and what policies they use.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><=
div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calib=
ri","sans-serif";color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p cla=
ss=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-=
serif";color:black'>So one constraintsInfo I would like to be able to inclu=
de is the TrustServiceType declaration carried for that CA in an EU Trust S=
ervice List. That tells me if that CA is used to support time stamping, OCS=
P, qualified certificates, regular EE certificates etc. This information ab=
out the service is lost when I cross certify these CAs and I'm looking for =
a way to store such information in the issued CA certificate so my validati=
on software can make use of it.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D=
MsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif=
";color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>=
<span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:bl=
ack'>I care less if this is called capability or constraints, and more abou=
t the capacity to store such information.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><=
p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","=
sans-serif";color:black'>If not standardized here, I think I will just crea=
te a private extension for this purpose, since I need it.<o:p></o:p></span>=
</p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-fa=
mily:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div>=
<div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Cali=
bri","sans-serif";color:black'>/Stefan<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p c=
lass=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","san=
s-serif";color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMso=
Normal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";c=
olor:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div style=3D'border:none;bor=
der-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal=
><b><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";colo=
r:black'>From: </span></b><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Cali=
bri","sans-serif";color:black'>Santosh Chokhani &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:SChok=
hani@cygnacom.com">SChokhani@cygnacom.com</a>&gt;<br><b>Date: </b>Mon, 23 M=
ay 2011 15:10:46 -0400<br><b>To: </b>Stefan Santesson &lt;<a href=3D"mailto=
:stefan@aaa-sec.com">stefan@aaa-sec.com</a>&gt;, &quot;<a href=3D"mailto:pk=
ix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">p=
kix@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br><b>Subject: </b>RE: [pkix] Trust Constraints - Poss=
ible request for yet another certificate extension<o:p></o:p></span></p></d=
iv><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"C=
alibri","sans-serif";color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><blockq=
uote style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid #B5C4DF 4.5pt;padding:0in 0in 0=
in 4.0pt;margin-left:3.75pt;margin-right:0in' id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION=
_BLOCKQUOTE"><div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;=
font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>Stefan,</span><span style=
=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'=
font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</spa=
n><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><s=
pan style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#1F497D=
'>From your description it is not clear if you mean this as a capability or=
 constraint?</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p cla=
ss=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-ser=
if";color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></sp=
an></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Ari=
al","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>Specifically, is the Root 1 only good for q=
ualified certificates and nothing else?&nbsp; Another example is what does =
the absence of this constraint means?</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:=
p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font=
-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'col=
or:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-si=
ze:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>I am guessing that=
 you mean this as a capability and not a constraint.</span><span style=3D'c=
olor:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-=
size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><sp=
an style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><div><div style=3D'border:no=
ne;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=3DMso=
Normal><b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"=
;color:black'>From:</span></b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"=
Tahoma","sans-serif";color:black'> <a href=3D"mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org"=
>pkix-bounces@ietf.org</a> [<a href=3D"mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org">mailto=
:pkix-bounces@ietf.org</a>] <b>On Behalf Of </b>Stefan Santesson<br><b>Sent=
:</b> Monday, May 23, 2011 6:15 AM<br><b>To:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:pkix@iet=
f.org">pkix@ietf.org</a><br><b>Subject:</b> [pkix] Trust Constraints - Poss=
ible request for yet another certificate extension</span><span style=3D'col=
or:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span styl=
e=3D'color:black'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><sp=
an style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black=
'>All,</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><=
p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","=
sans-serif";color:black'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:=
p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5p=
t;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>I have come across a need=
 that I don't know how to solve with the existing certificate extensions.</=
span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=
=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-se=
rif";color:black'>I would like to discuss what the best solution is, which =
may include defining a new extension.</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:=
p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size=
:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>&nbsp;</span><span =
style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal=
><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:b=
lack'>I'm running a cross certifying PKI which extracts a fairly large numb=
er of intermediary CAs and certifies them under a single root.</span><span =
style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal=
><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:b=
lack'>I create a number of root authorities, each representing a different =
policy for approving CAs to be certified under this root.</span><span style=
=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><spa=
n style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'=
>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div>=
<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri",=
"sans-serif";color:black'>Example:&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:black'>=
<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-s=
ize:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>Root 1 only cert=
ifies CA:s that issues qualified certificates</span><span style=3D'color:bl=
ack'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'f=
ont-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>&nbsp;</spa=
n><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DM=
soNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"=
;color:black'>I would like to include some optional information in the root=
 certificate that the relying party MAY use to understand policy used to ce=
rtify CAs under that root.</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></s=
pan></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;fon=
t-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>A relying party using this roo=
t MAY use this information to apply extra controls, such as verifying that =
the end entity certificate being verified under that root is a qualified ce=
rtificate by examining the QcStatements extension from RFC 3739.</span><spa=
n style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNorm=
al><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color=
:black'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></di=
v><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Ca=
libri","sans-serif";color:black'>So the options I have considered and dismi=
ssed are:</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><di=
v><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri=
","sans-serif";color:black'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p><=
/o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10=
.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>- certificate policy e=
xtension, and</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div=
><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Cal=
ibri","sans-serif";color:black'>- EKU</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:=
p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size=
:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>&nbsp;</span><span =
style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal=
><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:b=
lack'>Both are bad. The policy extension is designed to list certificate po=
licies that can be included in the EE cert (that is what the path validatio=
n algorithm does). The EKU is only meant to be included in EE certs and its=
 inclusion in other certs is subject to non-standardized handling that make=
s such solution highly unpredictable.</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:=
p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size=
:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>&nbsp;</span><span =
style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal=
><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:b=
lack'>The cleanest way that I can think of is to include such information i=
n a new extension along this structure:</span><span style=3D'color:black'><=
o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-si=
ze:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>&nbsp;</span><spa=
n style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNorm=
al><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color=
:black'>TrustConstraints :=3D=3D SEQUENCE OF TrustConstraint</span><span st=
yle=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><=
span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:bla=
ck'>TrustConstraint :=3D=3D SEQUENCE {</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o=
:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-siz=
e:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>&nbsp;&nbsp;constr=
aint &nbsp; &nbsp; OBJECT IDENTIFIER,</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:=
p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size=
:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>&nbsp;&nbsp;constra=
intInfo &nbsp;OCTET STRING &nbsp;OPTIONAL }</span><span style=3D'color:blac=
k'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'fon=
t-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>&nbsp;</span>=
<span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMso=
Normal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";c=
olor:black'>The constraintInfo content is defined by the constraint OID. Th=
e reason why I put it in an OCTET STRING is because it is way easier to cod=
e than having an &quot;any defined by&quot; structure. This way I can alway=
s parse this extension with a simple fixed ASN.1 structure and pass the byt=
e[] array to higher logic for processing if I recognize the OID, or else tr=
ash it. The constraints data could for example carry XML data or a JSON obj=
ect according to the definition of the constraint OID. This way we would no=
t have to bother with I18N stuff in the extension definition. Clean and sim=
ple.</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sa=
ns-serif";color:black'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p>=
</span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;=
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>This extension is only mean=
t to be placed in CA certificates, possibly only in self signed root certif=
icates.</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div>=
<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri",=
"sans-serif";color:black'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o=
:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5=
pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>Thoughts?</span><span st=
yle=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><=
span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:bla=
ck'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><d=
iv><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibr=
i","sans-serif";color:black'>/Stefan</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p=
></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:=
10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>&nbsp;</span><span s=
tyle=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>=
<span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:bl=
ack'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><=
div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calib=
ri","sans-serif";color:black'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p=
></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:=
10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>&nbsp;</span><span s=
tyle=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>=
<span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:bl=
ack'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><=
div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calib=
ri","sans-serif";color:black'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p=
></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:=
10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>&nbsp;&nbsp;</span><=
span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoN=
ormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";co=
lor:black'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><=
/div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:=
"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:black=
'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div></div></blockquote></div></body></html>=

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From stefan@aaa-sec.com  Mon May 23 15:05:34 2011
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Date: Tue, 24 May 2011 00:03:10 +0200
From: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>
To: Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>, "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Message-ID: <CA009CD0.21FDB%stefan@aaa-sec.com>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] Trust Constraints - Possible request for yet another certificate extension
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Trust Constraints - Possible request for yet another certificate extension
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Santosh,

In that case I think I go for capabilities, or even service information. I
think I like that better "Service Information extension", because it is
actually information about the service provided by that CA.

Anyone who do not understand the information is free to do what they want.
This is not supposed to change the laws of PKI, general path validation
rules applies.
I do not need to declare excluded and permitted. It would be quite possible
to define such statements though, but I don't need them. I just need
information about the service provided by each CA, and by the root.
Also I do not need to check persistence of the path, each CA certificate
service information stands for itself. The RP is free to draw any conclusio=
n
it wishes from it.
It is not top down constraining =3D You are not allowed to trust this CA in
any other way than the one I say.
It is pure information =3D here is information about what is so. Choose for
yourself if this influences your trust decision.

What I mainly need to include is the TSL Trust Service Type declarations
defined in ETSI TS 102 231, such as:

http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/CA/PKC - A Certification authority
issuing public key certificates.
http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/CA/QC - A Certification authority
issuing Qualified Certificates.
http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/TSA - A Time stamping authority.
http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/Certstatus/OCSP - A Certificate status
provider operating an OCSP-server.
http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/Certstatus/CRL - A Certificate status
provider operating a CRL.

I would then carry these in an XML structure that defines the purpose of
including each declaration, like:
<ServicesByThisAuthority>
   <Service>http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/CA/QC</Service>
</ServicesByThisAuthority>

or
<ServicesUnderThisAuthority>
   <Service>http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/TSA</Service>
</ServicesUnderThisAuthority>

In a RootCA I could include:

<ServicesUnderThisAuthority>
   <Service>http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/CA/QC</Service>
   <Service>http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/Certstatus/OCSP</Service>
   <Service>http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/TSA</Service>
</ServicesUnderThisAuthority>

And then include the service information for each CA i Issue under this
root. This would allow me to:
- Not accept any other EE certificate type but qualified certificates under
this root, but
- Still allow validation of timestamps and OCSP responses under this root
under proper authorities.

/Stefan


From:  Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>
Date:  Mon, 23 May 2011 15:53:44 -0400
To:  Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>, "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject:  Re: [pkix] Trust Constraints - Possible request for yet another
certificate extension

> Stefan,
> =20
> You miss the point.
> =20
> The capability and constraint is not simply a terminology issue.
> =20
> What you are saying is that if the constraint is present, then the CA can=
 only
> be used for the listed purposes.  Right?
> =20
> You are also saying that the constraint=B9s absence means that the CA can b=
e
> used for any purpose.  Right?
> =20
> Here are some suggestions:
> =20
> 1.     This need not be in a root certificate.  It can be in root issued =
CA
> certificates unless you envision root to be direct issuer of end entity
> certificates
>=20
> 2.     I suggest you define both the permitted and excluded capabilities
>=20
> 3.     I suggest that the path validation logic honor the presence of thi=
s
> extension in downstream CAs a la name constraints
>=20
> 4.     I suggest you think about what the relying party should do if it d=
oes
> not understand semantics of one of the OIDs present in the extension,
> especially in the excluded field.
>=20
> From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com]
> Sent: Monday, May 23, 2011 3:39 PM
> To: Santosh Chokhani; pkix@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [pkix] Trust Constraints - Possible request for yet another
> certificate extension
> =20
>=20
> I intend to use this in my validation software to constrain what certific=
ate
> that are accepted as valid.
>=20
> =20
>=20
> In my use case this maps to the information about trust services that is
> provided in EU Trust service lists.
>=20
> I may include information in the root declaring that only qualified EE
> certificates are supposed to be validated under this root.
>=20
> =20
>=20
> I may however include CA certificates that are only used to validate
> timestamps and OCSP responses to support signature validation of signatur=
es
> based on qualified certificates. I could then include information in the =
CA
> certificates to OCSP responders and CAs certifying TSAs that they are to =
be
> used only to validate time stamp tokens and OCSP responses. That way I wi=
ll
> avoid using them by mistake to validate a qualified certificate.
>=20
> =20
>=20
> As I said, I can't put this in certificate policies, because I control th=
e
> issuance of end entity certs and what policies they use.
>=20
> =20
>=20
> So one constraintsInfo I would like to be able to include is the
> TrustServiceType declaration carried for that CA in an EU Trust Service L=
ist.
> That tells me if that CA is used to support time stamping, OCSP, qualifie=
d
> certificates, regular EE certificates etc. This information about the ser=
vice
> is lost when I cross certify these CAs and I'm looking for a way to store=
 such
> information in the issued CA certificate so my validation software can ma=
ke
> use of it.
>=20
> =20
>=20
> I care less if this is called capability or constraints, and more about t=
he
> capacity to store such information.
>=20
> If not standardized here, I think I will just create a private extension =
for
> this purpose, since I need it.
>=20
> =20
>=20
> /Stefan
>=20
> =20
>=20
> =20
>=20
> From: Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>
> Date: Mon, 23 May 2011 15:10:46 -0400
> To: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>, "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org=
>
> Subject: RE: [pkix] Trust Constraints - Possible request for yet another
> certificate extension
>=20
> =20
>>=20
>> Stefan,
>> =20
>> From your description it is not clear if you mean this as a capability o=
r
>> constraint?
>> =20
>> Specifically, is the Root 1 only good for qualified certificates and not=
hing
>> else?  Another example is what does the absence of this constraint means=
?
>> =20
>> I am guessing that you mean this as a capability and not a constraint.
>> =20
>>=20
>> From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
>> Stefan Santesson
>> Sent: Monday, May 23, 2011 6:15 AM
>> To: pkix@ietf.org
>> Subject: [pkix] Trust Constraints - Possible request for yet another
>> certificate extension
>> =20
>>=20
>> All,
>>=20
>> =20
>>=20
>> I have come across a need that I don't know how to solve with the existi=
ng
>> certificate extensions.
>>=20
>> I would like to discuss what the best solution is, which may include def=
ining
>> a new extension.
>>=20
>> =20
>>=20
>> I'm running a cross certifying PKI which extracts a fairly large number =
of
>> intermediary CAs and certifies them under a single root.
>>=20
>> I create a number of root authorities, each representing a different pol=
icy
>> for approving CAs to be certified under this root.
>>=20
>> =20
>>=20
>> Example:=20
>>=20
>> Root 1 only certifies CA:s that issues qualified certificates
>>=20
>> =20
>>=20
>> I would like to include some optional information in the root certificat=
e
>> that the relying party MAY use to understand policy used to certify CAs =
under
>> that root.
>>=20
>> A relying party using this root MAY use this information to apply extra
>> controls, such as verifying that the end entity certificate being verifi=
ed
>> under that root is a qualified certificate by examining the QcStatements
>> extension from RFC 3739.
>>=20
>> =20
>>=20
>> So the options I have considered and dismissed are:
>>=20
>> =20
>>=20
>> - certificate policy extension, and
>>=20
>> - EKU
>>=20
>> =20
>>=20
>> Both are bad. The policy extension is designed to list certificate polic=
ies
>> that can be included in the EE cert (that is what the path validation
>> algorithm does). The EKU is only meant to be included in EE certs and it=
s
>> inclusion in other certs is subject to non-standardized handling that ma=
kes
>> such solution highly unpredictable.
>>=20
>> =20
>>=20
>> The cleanest way that I can think of is to include such information in a=
 new
>> extension along this structure:
>>=20
>> =20
>>=20
>> TrustConstraints :=3D=3D SEQUENCE OF TrustConstraint
>>=20
>> TrustConstraint :=3D=3D SEQUENCE {
>>=20
>>   constraint     OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
>>=20
>>   constraintInfo  OCTET STRING  OPTIONAL }
>>=20
>> =20
>>=20
>> The constraintInfo content is defined by the constraint OID. The reason =
why I
>> put it in an OCTET STRING is because it is way easier to code than havin=
g an
>> "any defined by" structure. This way I can always parse this extension w=
ith a
>> simple fixed ASN.1 structure and pass the byte[] array to higher logic f=
or
>> processing if I recognize the OID, or else trash it. The constraints dat=
a
>> could for example carry XML data or a JSON object according to the defin=
ition
>> of the constraint OID. This way we would not have to bother with I18N st=
uff
>> in the extension definition. Clean and simple.
>>=20
>> =20
>>=20
>> This extension is only meant to be placed in CA certificates, possibly o=
nly
>> in self signed root certificates.
>>=20
>> =20
>>=20
>> Thoughts?
>>=20
>> =20
>>=20
>> /Stefan
>>=20
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>>=20
>>  =20
>>=20
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
> _______________________________________________ pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix



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<html><head></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: s=
pace; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-size:=
 14px; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><div>Santosh,</div><div><br></div=
><div>In that case I think I go for capabilities, or even service informatio=
n. I think I like that better "Service Information extension", because it is=
 actually information about the service provided by that CA.</div><div><br><=
/div><div>Anyone who do not understand the information is free to do what th=
ey want. This is not supposed to change the laws of PKI, general path valida=
tion rules applies.</div><div>I do not need to declare excluded and permitte=
d. It would be quite possible to define such statements though, but I don't =
need them. I just need information about the service provided by each CA, an=
d by the root.</div><div>Also I do not need to check persistence of the path=
, each CA certificate service information stands for itself. The RP is free =
to draw any conclusion it wishes from it.</div><div>It is not top down const=
raining =3D You are not allowed to trust this CA in any other way than the one=
 I say.</div><div>It is pure information =3D here is information about what is=
 so. Choose for yourself if this influences your trust decision.</div><div><=
br></div><div>What I mainly need to include is the TSL Trust Service Type de=
clarations defined in ETSI TS 102 231, such as:&nbsp;</div><div><br></div><d=
iv><div>http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/CA/PKC -&nbsp;A Certification au=
thority issuing public key certificates.</div><div>http://uri.etsi.org/TrstS=
vc/Svctype/CA/QC&nbsp;- A Certification authority issuing Qualified Certific=
ates.</div><div>http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/TSA&nbsp;- A Time stampi=
ng authority.</div><div>http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/Certstatus/OCSP =
-&nbsp;A Certificate status provider operating an OCSP-server.</div><div>htt=
p://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/Certstatus/CRL -&nbsp;A Certificate status =
provider operating a CRL.</div><div><br></div></div><div>I would then carry =
these in an XML structure that defines the purpose of including each declara=
tion, like:</div><div>&lt;ServicesByThisAuthority&gt;</div><div>&nbsp;&nbsp;=
 &lt;Service&gt;http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/CA/QC&lt;/Service&gt;</d=
iv><div><div>&lt;/ServicesByThisAuthority&gt;</div></div><div><br></div><div=
>or</div><div><div>&lt;ServicesUnderThisAuthority&gt;</div><div>&nbsp;&nbsp;=
 &lt;Service&gt;http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/TSA&lt;/Service&gt;</div=
><div><div>&lt;/ServicesUnderThisAuthority&gt;</div></div></div><div><br></d=
iv><div>In a RootCA I could include:</div><div><br></div><div><div><div>&lt;=
ServicesUnderThisAuthority&gt;</div><div>&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;Service&gt;http://=
uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/CA/QC&lt;/Service&gt;</div><div></div><div>&nbs=
p;&nbsp; &lt;Service&gt;http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/Certstatus/OCSP&=
lt;/Service&gt;</div><div></div><div>&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;Service&gt;http://uri.=
etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/TSA&lt;/Service&gt;</div><div></div><div>&lt;/Servi=
cesUnderThisAuthority&gt;</div></div></div><div><br></div><div>And then incl=
ude the service information for each CA i Issue under this root. This would =
allow me to:</div><div>- Not accept any other EE certificate type but qualif=
ied certificates under this root, but</div><div>- Still allow validation of =
timestamps and OCSP responses under this root under proper authorities.</div=
><div><br></div><div>/Stefan</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><span id=3D"OL=
K_SRC_BODY_SECTION"><div style=3D"font-family:Calibri; font-size:11pt; text-al=
ign:left; color:black; BORDER-BOTTOM: medium none; BORDER-LEFT: medium none;=
 PADDING-BOTTOM: 0in; PADDING-LEFT: 0in; PADDING-RIGHT: 0in; BORDER-TOP: #b5=
c4df 1pt solid; BORDER-RIGHT: medium none; PADDING-TOP: 3pt"><span style=3D"fo=
nt-weight:bold">From: </span> Santosh Chokhani &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:SChokhani=
@cygnacom.com">SChokhani@cygnacom.com</a>&gt;<br><span style=3D"font-weight:bo=
ld">Date: </span> Mon, 23 May 2011 15:53:44 -0400<br><span style=3D"font-weigh=
t:bold">To: </span> Stefan Santesson &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com"=
>stefan@aaa-sec.com</a>&gt;, "<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</=
a>" &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br><span style=3D=
"font-weight:bold">Subject: </span> Re: [pkix] Trust Constraints - Possible =
request for yet another certificate extension<br></div><div><br></div><block=
quote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 =
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</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--><div lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purp=
le" style=3D"word-wrap: break-word;-webkit-nbsp-mode: space;-webkit-line-break=
: after-white-space"><div class=3D"WordSection1"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span st=
yle=3D"font-size: 9pt; color: rgb(153, 51, 102); font-family: Arial, sans-seri=
f; ">Stefan,<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-siz=
e: 9pt; color: rgb(153, 51, 102); font-family: Arial, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nb=
sp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 9pt; color:=
 rgb(153, 51, 102); font-family: Arial, sans-serif; ">You miss the point.<o:=
p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 9pt; color: =
rgb(153, 51, 102); font-family: Arial, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span=
></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 9pt; color: rgb(153, 51, 1=
02); font-family: Arial, sans-serif; ">The capability and constraint is not =
simply a terminology issue.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span =
style=3D"font-size: 9pt; color: rgb(153, 51, 102); font-family: Arial, sans-se=
rif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-si=
ze: 9pt; color: rgb(153, 51, 102); font-family: Arial, sans-serif; ">What yo=
u are saying is that if the constraint is present, then the CA can only be u=
sed for the listed purposes.&nbsp; Right?<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"Mso=
Normal"><span style=3D"font-size: 9pt; color: rgb(153, 51, 102); font-family: =
Arial, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span =
style=3D"font-size: 9pt; color: rgb(153, 51, 102); font-family: Arial, sans-se=
rif; ">You are also saying that the constraint&#8217;s absence means that th=
e CA can be used for any purpose.&nbsp; Right?<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=
=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 9pt; color: rgb(153, 51, 102); font-fam=
ily: Arial, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><=
span style=3D"font-size: 9pt; color: rgb(153, 51, 102); font-family: Arial, sa=
ns-serif; ">Here are some suggestions:<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNor=
mal"><span style=3D"font-size: 9pt; color: rgb(153, 51, 102); font-family: Ari=
al, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoListParagraph" st=
yle=3D"text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1"><span style=3D"font-size:9.0p=
t;font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#993366"><span =
style=3D"mso-list:Ignore">1.<span style=3D"font:7.0pt &quot;Times New Roman&quot=
;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span></span></span><span style=3D"font-size: 9pt=
; color: rgb(153, 51, 102); font-family: Arial, sans-serif; ">This need not =
be in a root certificate.&nbsp; It can be in root issued CA certificates unl=
ess you envision root to be direct issuer of end entity certificates<o:p></o=
:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"text-indent:-.25in;mso-list=
:l0 level1 lfo1"><span style=3D"font-size:9.0pt;font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,=
&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#993366"><span style=3D"mso-list:Ignore">2.<span =
style=3D"font:7.0pt &quot;Times New Roman&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </sp=
an></span></span><span style=3D"font-size: 9pt; color: rgb(153, 51, 102); font=
-family: Arial, sans-serif; ">I suggest you define both the permitted and ex=
cluded capabilities<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"=
text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1"><span style=3D"font-size:9.0pt;fon=
t-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#993366"><span style=
=3D"mso-list:Ignore">3.<span style=3D"font:7.0pt &quot;Times New Roman&quot;">&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span></span></span><span style=3D"font-size: 9pt; col=
or: rgb(153, 51, 102); font-family: Arial, sans-serif; ">I suggest that the =
path validation logic honor the presence of this extension in downstream CAs=
 a la name constraints<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoListParagraph" styl=
e=3D"text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1"><span style=3D"font-size:9.0pt;=
font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#993366"><span st=
yle=3D"mso-list:Ignore">4.<span style=3D"font:7.0pt &quot;Times New Roman&quot;"=
>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span></span></span><span style=3D"font-size: 9pt; =
color: rgb(153, 51, 102); font-family: Arial, sans-serif; ">I suggest you th=
ink about what the relying party should do if it does not understand semanti=
cs of one of the OIDs present in the extension, especially in the excluded f=
ield.<o:p></o:p></span></p><div><div style=3D"border:none;border-top:solid #B5=
C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"f=
ont-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma, sans-serif; ">From:</span></b><span sty=
le=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma, sans-serif; "> Stefan Santesson [<=
a href=3D"mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com">mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com</a>] <br><b>Sen=
t:</b> Monday, May 23, 2011 3:39 PM<br><b>To:</b> Santosh Chokhani; <a href=3D=
"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a><br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [pkix] Trust=
 Constraints - Possible request for yet another certificate extension<o:p></=
o:p></span></p></div></div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><div><p=
 class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family=
: Calibri, sans-serif; ">I intend to use this in my validation software to c=
onstrain what certificate that are accepted as valid.<o:p></o:p></span></p><=
/div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black;=
 font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div>=
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-fami=
ly: Calibri, sans-serif; ">In my use case this maps to the information about=
 trust services that is provided in EU Trust service lists.<o:p></o:p></span=
></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: =
black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">I may include information in the =
root declaring that only qualified EE certificates are supposed to be valida=
ted under this root.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><s=
pan style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif=
; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D=
"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">I may =
however include CA certificates that are only used to validate timestamps an=
d OCSP responses to support signature validation of signatures based on qual=
ified certificates. I could then include information in the CA certificates =
to OCSP responders and CAs certifying TSAs that they are to be used only to =
validate time stamp tokens and OCSP responses. That way I will avoid using t=
hem by mistake to validate a qualified certificate.<o:p></o:p></span></p></d=
iv><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; f=
ont-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p=
 class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family=
: Calibri, sans-serif; ">As I said, I can't put this in certificate policies=
, because I control the issuance of end entity certs and what policies they =
use.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-=
size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;<=
/o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5=
pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">So one constraintsInfo=
 I would like to be able to include is the TrustServiceType declaration carr=
ied for that CA in an EU Trust Service List. That tells me if that CA is use=
d to support time stamping, OCSP, qualified certificates, regular EE certifi=
cates etc. This information about the service is lost when I cross certify t=
hese CAs and I'm looking for a way to store such information in the issued C=
A certificate so my validation software can make use of it.<o:p></o:p></span=
></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: =
black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div=
><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; fon=
t-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">I care less if this is called capability or=
 constraints, and more about the capacity to store such information.<o:p></o=
:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt=
; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">If not standardized here=
, I think I will just create a private extension for this purpose, since I n=
eed it.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"fo=
nt-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nbs=
p;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 1=
0.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">/Stefan<o:p></o:p><=
/span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; co=
lor: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>=
</div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black=
; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div=
 style=3D"border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in=
"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; color: black; font-f=
amily: Calibri, sans-serif; ">From: </span></b><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt;=
 color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">Santosh Chokhani &lt;<a h=
ref=3D"mailto:SChokhani@cygnacom.com">SChokhani@cygnacom.com</a>&gt;<br><b>Dat=
e: </b>Mon, 23 May 2011 15:10:46 -0400<br><b>To: </b>Stefan Santesson &lt;<a=
 href=3D"mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com">stefan@aaa-sec.com</a>&gt;, "<a href=3D"mail=
to:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>" &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix=
@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br><b>Subject: </b>RE: [pkix] Trust Constraints - Possible=
 request for yet another certificate extension<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><d=
iv><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-f=
amily: Calibri, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><blockquote =
style=3D"border:none;border-left:solid #B5C4DF 4.5pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 4.0pt=
;margin-left:3.75pt;margin-right:0in" id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE=
"><div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 9pt; color: rgb(31,=
 73, 125); font-family: Arial, sans-serif; ">Stefan,</span><span style=3D"colo=
r:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: =
9pt; color: rgb(31, 73, 125); font-family: Arial, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;</span=
><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span =
style=3D"font-size: 9pt; color: rgb(31, 73, 125); font-family: Arial, sans-ser=
if; ">From your description it is not clear if you mean this as a capability=
 or constraint?</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p cla=
ss=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 9pt; color: rgb(31, 73, 125); font-fa=
mily: Arial, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p=
></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 9pt; color: rgb(31,=
 73, 125); font-family: Arial, sans-serif; ">Specifically, is the Root 1 onl=
y good for qualified certificates and nothing else?&nbsp; Another example is=
 what does the absence of this constraint means?</span><span style=3D"color:bl=
ack"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 9pt;=
 color: rgb(31, 73, 125); font-family: Arial, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;</span><sp=
an style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span styl=
e=3D"font-size: 9pt; color: rgb(31, 73, 125); font-family: Arial, sans-serif; =
">I am guessing that you mean this as a capability and not a constraint.</sp=
an><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><spa=
n style=3D"font-size: 9pt; color: rgb(31, 73, 125); font-family: Arial, sans-s=
erif; ">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p><div><d=
iv style=3D"border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0=
in"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size: 10pt; color: black; font=
-family: Tahoma, sans-serif; ">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-size: 10pt;=
 color: black; font-family: Tahoma, sans-serif; "> <a href=3D"mailto:pkix-boun=
ces@ietf.org">pkix-bounces@ietf.org</a> [<a href=3D"mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.o=
rg">mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org</a>] <b>On Behalf Of </b>Stefan Santesson<b=
r><b>Sent:</b> Monday, May 23, 2011 6:15 AM<br><b>To:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:pk=
ix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a><br><b>Subject:</b> [pkix] Trust Constraints -=
 Possible request for yet another certificate extension</span><span style=3D"c=
olor:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span sty=
le=3D"color:black">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span=
 style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "=
>All,</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p cl=
ass=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: C=
alibri, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></sp=
an></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color=
: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">I have come across a need that =
I don't know how to solve with the existing certificate extensions.</span><s=
pan style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal=
"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; ">I would like to discuss what the best solution is, which may include=
 defining a new extension.</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span=
></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: =
black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:b=
lack"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"fon=
t-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">I'm runnin=
g a cross certifying PKI which extracts a fairly large number of intermediar=
y CAs and certifies them under a single root.</span><span style=3D"color:black=
"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-si=
ze: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">I create a num=
ber of root authorities, each representing a different policy for approving =
CAs to be certified under this root.</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></=
o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5p=
t; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;</span><span styl=
e=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span =
style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">=
Example:&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><=
div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-=
family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">Root 1 only certifies CA:s that issues qualif=
ied certificates</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div=
><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; fon=
t-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p=
></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10=
.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">I would like to incl=
ude some optional information in the root certificate that the relying party=
 MAY use to understand policy used to certify CAs under that root.</span><sp=
an style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"=
><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-se=
rif; ">A relying party using this root MAY use this information to apply ext=
ra controls, such as verifying that the end entity certificate being verifie=
d under that root is a qualified certificate by examining the QcStatements e=
xtension from RFC 3739.</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></=
p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: bla=
ck; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:blac=
k"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-s=
ize: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">So the option=
s I have considered and dismissed are:</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p>=
</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.=
5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;</span><span st=
yle=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><spa=
n style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; =
">- certificate policy extension, and</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p><=
/o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5=
pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">- EKU</span><span styl=
e=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span =
style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">=
&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p c=
lass=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: =
Calibri, sans-serif; ">Both are bad. The policy extension is designed to lis=
t certificate policies that can be included in the EE cert (that is what the=
 path validation algorithm does). The EKU is only meant to be included in EE=
 certs and its inclusion in other certs is subject to non-standardized handl=
ing that makes such solution highly unpredictable.</span><span style=3D"color:=
black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"fo=
nt-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;</s=
pan><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"Mso=
Normal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, =
sans-serif; ">The cleanest way that I can think of is to include such inform=
ation in a new extension along this structure:</span><span style=3D"color:blac=
k"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-s=
ize: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;</span>=
<span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNorm=
al"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif; ">TrustConstraints :=3D=3D SEQUENCE OF TrustConstraint</span><span style=
=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span s=
tyle=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">T=
rustConstraint :=3D=3D SEQUENCE {</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></s=
pan></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; colo=
r: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;&nbsp;constraint &nbsp; =
&nbsp; OBJECT IDENTIFIER,</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span>=
</p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: b=
lack; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;&nbsp;constraintInfo &nbsp;O=
CTET STRING &nbsp;OPTIONAL }</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></sp=
an></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color=
: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color=
:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"f=
ont-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">The cons=
traintInfo content is defined by the constraint OID. The reason why I put it=
 in an OCTET STRING is because it is way easier to code than having an "any =
defined by" structure. This way I can always parse this extension with a sim=
ple fixed ASN.1 structure and pass the byte[] array to higher logic for proc=
essing if I recognize the OID, or else trash it. The constraints data could =
for example carry XML data or a JSON object according to the definition of t=
he constraint OID. This way we would not have to bother with I18N stuff in t=
he extension definition. Clean and simple.</span><span style=3D"color:black"><=
o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:=
 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;</span><spa=
n style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">=
<span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-ser=
if; ">This extension is only meant to be placed in CA certificates, possibly=
 only in self signed root certificates.</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p=
></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10=
.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;</span><span s=
tyle=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><sp=
an style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;=
 ">Thoughts?</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><di=
v><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-fa=
mily: Calibri, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o=
:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt=
; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">/Stefan</span><span styl=
e=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span =
style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">=
&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p c=
lass=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: =
Calibri, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></s=
pan></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; colo=
r: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"colo=
r:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"=
font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;<=
/span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"M=
soNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri=
, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p=
></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: blac=
k; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:black=
"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-si=
ze: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;&nbsp;</=
span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"Ms=
oNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri,=
 sans-serif; ">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>=
</div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black=
; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:black"=
><o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div></div></blockquote></div></div></div>____=
___________________________________________
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ailman/listinfo/pkix</a>
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Date: Mon, 23 May 2011 21:01:40 -0400
From: Massimiliano Pala <pala@isis.poly.edu>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Trust Constraints - Possible request for yet another certificate extension
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Hello Stephan,

if it is uri that you are thinking about, we could also extend PRQP to
include those extensions. This would provide flexibility and availability=

for those URIs also for currently issued CAs...

Cheers,
Max



On 05/23/2011 06:03 PM, Stefan Santesson wrote:
> Santosh,
>
> In that case I think I go for capabilities, or even service information=
=2E
> I think I like that better "Service Information extension", because it
> is actually information about the service provided by that CA.
>
> Anyone who do not understand the information is free to do what they
> want. This is not supposed to change the laws of PKI, general path
> validation rules applies.
> I do not need to declare excluded and permitted. It would be quite
> possible to define such statements though, but I don't need them. I jus=
t
> need information about the service provided by each CA, and by the root=
=2E
> Also I do not need to check persistence of the path, each CA certificat=
e
> service information stands for itself. The RP is free to draw any
> conclusion it wishes from it.
> It is not top down constraining =3D You are not allowed to trust this C=
A
> in any other way than the one I say.
> It is pure information =3D here is information about what is so. Choose=

> for yourself if this influences your trust decision.
>
> What I mainly need to include is the TSL Trust Service Type declaration=
s
> defined in ETSI TS 102 231, such as:
>
> http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/CA/PKC - A Certification authority
> issuing public key certificates.
> http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/CA/QC - A Certification authority
> issuing Qualified Certificates.
> http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/TSA - A Time stamping authority.
> http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/Certstatus/OCSP - A Certificate
> status provider operating an OCSP-server.
> http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/Certstatus/CRL - A Certificate
> status provider operating a CRL.
>
> I would then carry these in an XML structure that defines the purpose o=
f
> including each declaration, like:
> <ServicesByThisAuthority>
> <Service>http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/CA/QC</Service>
> </ServicesByThisAuthority>
>
> or
> <ServicesUnderThisAuthority>
> <Service>http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/TSA</Service>
> </ServicesUnderThisAuthority>
>
> In a RootCA I could include:
>
> <ServicesUnderThisAuthority>
> <Service>http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/CA/QC</Service>
> <Service>http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/Certstatus/OCSP</Service>
> <Service>http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/TSA</Service>
> </ServicesUnderThisAuthority>
>
> And then include the service information for each CA i Issue under this=

> root. This would allow me to:
> - Not accept any other EE certificate type but qualified certificates
> under this root, but
> - Still allow validation of timestamps and OCSP responses under this
> root under proper authorities.
>
> /Stefan

--=20

http://member.acm.org/~openca/

Massimiliano Pala, Ph.D.
Director, OpenCA Labs
Professor, NYU Poly


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From kyanha@kyanha.net  Mon May 23 18:11:04 2011
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From: "Kyle Hamilton" <kyanha@kyanha.net>
To: "Stefan Santesson" <stefan@aaa-sec.com>
Date: Mon, 23 May 2011 18:11:02 -0700 (Pacific Daylight Time)
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Trust Constraints - Possible request for yet another certificate extension
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On Mon, May 23, 2011 at 12:39 PM, Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com> wrote:
> I intend to use this in my validation software to constrain what certificate
> that are accepted as valid.

Okay, but this doesn't explain why it has to be a self-limiting constraint.

You have a single cross-certifying root.  The Policies extension is the correct semantic place to convey those Policies through the various trust chains.  i.e., if a particular CA is only going to be used to issue Qualified Certificates, then the cross-certificate needs to contain only the Qualified Certificates policy.

You should look at PolicyMapping.

The appropriate way to handle this is to have a cross-certifying trust anchor with policies and mappings in the cross-certifications.  They relate to the interpretation of the entire chain, not merely the end entity.  The cross-certified CA does not need to have any knowledge of the cross-certifier, and you're trying to convey an authority limitation upon the certificates which a given CA can issue; both of these point to Policies as the correct place for the Authority of your policy to be conveyed.

It is actually legitimate for a given CA certificate to chain validly but to be trusted for no purposes.  This doesn't invalidate the identity of the holder of that key (the operator of the CA), which is what is actually certified.  Thus, the intermediate CA certificate may be validly chained to a trust anchor but not have any policies or assertions which can be proven to your software by it.

Just create a policy OID that maps to a technical policy of "always invalid", and map the policies which the offending CA issues to that.

-Kyle H

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From stefan@aaa-sec.com  Mon May 23 23:05:13 2011
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Date: Tue, 24 May 2011 08:05:04 +0200
From: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>
To: Kyle Hamilton <kyanha@kyanha.net>
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Thread-Topic: [pkix] Trust Constraints - Possible request for yet another certificate extension
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Trust Constraints - Possible request for yet another certificate extension
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Kyle,

On 11-05-24 3:11 AM, "Kyle Hamilton" <kyanha@kyanha.net> wrote:

>
>
>On Mon, May 23, 2011 at 12:39 PM, Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>
>wrote:
>> I intend to use this in my validation software to constrain what
>>certificate
>> that are accepted as valid.
>
>Okay, but this doesn't explain why it has to be a self-limiting
>constraint.
>
>You have a single cross-certifying root.  The Policies extension is the
>correct semantic place to convey those Policies through the various trust
>chains.  i.e., if a particular CA is only going to be used to issue
>Qualified Certificates, then the cross-certificate needs to contain only
>the Qualified Certificates policy.

No this does not work. When I cross certify I have no clue what policy the
cross-certified CA will use when issuing end-entity certs.
I wish so that certificate policies was correctly implemented out there,
but it is in fact terribly, terribly broken. About 50% of CAs out there in
the EU PKIs include policy OIDs in CA certificates that defines the policy
under which the CA operates, and not the policy they use to issue end
certs, so the policy in the CA cert does not tell me what policy they
include in the certs they issue.

Also, I have no way to tell which policy OID used out there that
corresponds to qualified certificates. I can't keep track of 500 trust
services and figure out what OIDs they use and what they mean.

However, I do know their service declaration in the national Trust-service
List they are listed in, and I know that they MUST include a QC-statement
extension in their qualified certificate, so ignoring the cert policy
makes this all implementable.


>
>You should look at PolicyMapping.
>
>The appropriate way to handle this is to have a cross-certifying trust
>anchor with policies and mappings in the cross-certifications.  They
>relate to the interpretation of the entire chain, not merely the end
>entity.  The cross-certified CA does not need to have any knowledge of
>the cross-certifier, and you're trying to convey an authority limitation
>upon the certificates which a given CA can issue; both of these point to
>Policies as the correct place for the Authority of your policy to be
>conveyed.
>
>It is actually legitimate for a given CA certificate to chain validly but
>to be trusted for no purposes.  This doesn't invalidate the identity of
>the holder of that key (the operator of the CA), which is what is
>actually certified.  Thus, the intermediate CA certificate may be validly
>chained to a trust anchor but not have any policies or assertions which
>can be proven to your software by it.
>
>Just create a policy OID that maps to a technical policy of "always
>invalid", and map the policies which the offending CA issues to that.


Again, I really wish certificate policies wasn't broken in todays
implementations, and that CAs used consistent policies.

Since I have control over both the code that cross certifies, and the code
that validates signatures based on the cross certification, I will use
some kind of serviceInfo extension to do the job. The question is just
whether it should be standardized.

If it is standardized, I would prefer to define the extension in PKIX and
then standardize infoStatements related to EU Trust Service lists in ETSI
based on the PKIX extension.


/Stefan

>
>-Kyle H
>_______________________________________________
>pkix mailing list
>pkix@ietf.org
>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix



From SChokhani@cygnacom.com  Tue May 24 04:32:19 2011
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From: Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>
To: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>, "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Date: Tue, 24 May 2011 07:32:09 -0400
Thread-Topic: [pkix] Trust Constraints - Possible request for yet another certificate extension
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Stefan,

It seems that this is not something infrastructure telling you.  It seems r=
elying party decision.  In that case, it may be better to let the relying p=
arty associate with the certificates like Microsoft does in CAPI store.

If you think this is something from a CA to relying parties, albeit advisor=
y, then adding a richer extension with what I am permitting and what I am n=
ot permitting and let the relying party use the information from any or all=
 CAs in the path a more versatile solution that what you are saying.  Since=
 what I am saying helps implement your requirement also, it is better to ha=
ve a standard that is broader.

From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com]
Sent: Monday, May 23, 2011 6:03 PM
To: Santosh Chokhani; pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] Trust Constraints - Possible request for yet another ce=
rtificate extension

Santosh,

In that case I think I go for capabilities, or even service information. I =
think I like that better "Service Information extension", because it is act=
ually information about the service provided by that CA.

Anyone who do not understand the information is free to do what they want. =
This is not supposed to change the laws of PKI, general path validation rul=
es applies.
I do not need to declare excluded and permitted. It would be quite possible=
 to define such statements though, but I don't need them. I just need infor=
mation about the service provided by each CA, and by the root.
Also I do not need to check persistence of the path, each CA certificate se=
rvice information stands for itself. The RP is free to draw any conclusion =
it wishes from it.
It is not top down constraining =3D You are not allowed to trust this CA in=
 any other way than the one I say.
It is pure information =3D here is information about what is so. Choose for=
 yourself if this influences your trust decision.

What I mainly need to include is the TSL Trust Service Type declarations de=
fined in ETSI TS 102 231, such as:

http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/CA/PKC - A Certification authority issu=
ing public key certificates.
http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/CA/QC - A Certification authority issui=
ng Qualified Certificates.
http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/TSA - A Time stamping authority.
http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/Certstatus/OCSP - A Certificate status =
provider operating an OCSP-server.
http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/Certstatus/CRL - A Certificate status p=
rovider operating a CRL.

I would then carry these in an XML structure that defines the purpose of in=
cluding each declaration, like:
<ServicesByThisAuthority>
   <Service>http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/CA/QC</Service>
</ServicesByThisAuthority>

or
<ServicesUnderThisAuthority>
   <Service>http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/TSA</Service>
</ServicesUnderThisAuthority>

In a RootCA I could include:

<ServicesUnderThisAuthority>
   <Service>http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/CA/QC</Service>
   <Service>http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/Certstatus/OCSP</Service>
   <Service>http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/TSA</Service>
</ServicesUnderThisAuthority>

And then include the service information for each CA i Issue under this roo=
t. This would allow me to:
- Not accept any other EE certificate type but qualified certificates under=
 this root, but
- Still allow validation of timestamps and OCSP responses under this root u=
nder proper authorities.

/Stefan


From: Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com<mailto:SChokhani@cygnacom.co=
m>>
Date: Mon, 23 May 2011 15:53:44 -0400
To: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com<mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com>>, "pkix=
@ietf.org<mailto:pkix@ietf.org>" <pkix@ietf.org<mailto:pkix@ietf.org>>
Subject: Re: [pkix] Trust Constraints - Possible request for yet another ce=
rtificate extension

Stefan,

You miss the point.

The capability and constraint is not simply a terminology issue.

What you are saying is that if the constraint is present, then the CA can o=
nly be used for the listed purposes.  Right?

You are also saying that the constraint's absence means that the CA can be =
used for any purpose.  Right?

Here are some suggestions:


1.     This need not be in a root certificate.  It can be in root issued CA=
 certificates unless you envision root to be direct issuer of end entity ce=
rtificates

2.     I suggest you define both the permitted and excluded capabilities

3.     I suggest that the path validation logic honor the presence of this =
extension in downstream CAs a la name constraints

4.     I suggest you think about what the relying party should do if it doe=
s not understand semantics of one of the OIDs present in the extension, esp=
ecially in the excluded field.
From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com]
Sent: Monday, May 23, 2011 3:39 PM
To: Santosh Chokhani; pkix@ietf.org<mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] Trust Constraints - Possible request for yet another ce=
rtificate extension

I intend to use this in my validation software to constrain what certificat=
e that are accepted as valid.

In my use case this maps to the information about trust services that is pr=
ovided in EU Trust service lists.
I may include information in the root declaring that only qualified EE cert=
ificates are supposed to be validated under this root.

I may however include CA certificates that are only used to validate timest=
amps and OCSP responses to support signature validation of signatures based=
 on qualified certificates. I could then include information in the CA cert=
ificates to OCSP responders and CAs certifying TSAs that they are to be use=
d only to validate time stamp tokens and OCSP responses. That way I will av=
oid using them by mistake to validate a qualified certificate.

As I said, I can't put this in certificate policies, because I control the =
issuance of end entity certs and what policies they use.

So one constraintsInfo I would like to be able to include is the TrustServi=
ceType declaration carried for that CA in an EU Trust Service List. That te=
lls me if that CA is used to support time stamping, OCSP, qualified certifi=
cates, regular EE certificates etc. This information about the service is l=
ost when I cross certify these CAs and I'm looking for a way to store such =
information in the issued CA certificate so my validation software can make=
 use of it.

I care less if this is called capability or constraints, and more about the=
 capacity to store such information.
If not standardized here, I think I will just create a private extension fo=
r this purpose, since I need it.

/Stefan


From: Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com<mailto:SChokhani@cygnacom.co=
m>>
Date: Mon, 23 May 2011 15:10:46 -0400
To: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com<mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com>>, "pkix=
@ietf.org<mailto:pkix@ietf.org>" <pkix@ietf.org<mailto:pkix@ietf.org>>
Subject: RE: [pkix] Trust Constraints - Possible request for yet another ce=
rtificate extension

Stefan,

>From your description it is not clear if you mean this as a capability or c=
onstraint?

Specifically, is the Root 1 only good for qualified certificates and nothin=
g else?  Another example is what does the absence of this constraint means?

I am guessing that you mean this as a capability and not a constraint.

From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org<mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org> [mailto:pkix-boun=
ces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Stefan Santesson
Sent: Monday, May 23, 2011 6:15 AM
To: pkix@ietf.org<mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: [pkix] Trust Constraints - Possible request for yet another certif=
icate extension

All,

I have come across a need that I don't know how to solve with the existing =
certificate extensions.
I would like to discuss what the best solution is, which may include defini=
ng a new extension.

I'm running a cross certifying PKI which extracts a fairly large number of =
intermediary CAs and certifies them under a single root.
I create a number of root authorities, each representing a different policy=
 for approving CAs to be certified under this root.

Example:
Root 1 only certifies CA:s that issues qualified certificates

I would like to include some optional information in the root certificate t=
hat the relying party MAY use to understand policy used to certify CAs unde=
r that root.
A relying party using this root MAY use this information to apply extra con=
trols, such as verifying that the end entity certificate being verified und=
er that root is a qualified certificate by examining the QcStatements exten=
sion from RFC 3739.

So the options I have considered and dismissed are:

- certificate policy extension, and
- EKU

Both are bad. The policy extension is designed to list certificate policies=
 that can be included in the EE cert (that is what the path validation algo=
rithm does). The EKU is only meant to be included in EE certs and its inclu=
sion in other certs is subject to non-standardized handling that makes such=
 solution highly unpredictable.

The cleanest way that I can think of is to include such information in a ne=
w extension along this structure:

TrustConstraints :=3D=3D SEQUENCE OF TrustConstraint
TrustConstraint :=3D=3D SEQUENCE {
  constraint     OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
  constraintInfo  OCTET STRING  OPTIONAL }

The constraintInfo content is defined by the constraint OID. The reason why=
 I put it in an OCTET STRING is because it is way easier to code than havin=
g an "any defined by" structure. This way I can always parse this extension=
 with a simple fixed ASN.1 structure and pass the byte[] array to higher lo=
gic for processing if I recognize the OID, or else trash it. The constraint=
s data could for example carry XML data or a JSON object according to the d=
efinition of the constraint OID. This way we would not have to bother with =
I18N stuff in the extension definition. Clean and simple.

This extension is only meant to be placed in CA certificates, possibly only=
 in self signed root certificates.

Thoughts?

/Stefan









_______________________________________________ pkix mailing list pkix@ietf=
.org<mailto:pkix@ietf.org> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix

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</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=3DEN-US link=3Dblue vli=
nk=3Dpurple style=3D'word-wrap: break-word;-webkit-nbsp-mode: space;-webkit=
-line-break: after-white-space'><div class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNor=
mal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#=
003300'>Stefan,<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'fo=
nt-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#003300'><o:p>&nbsp;</=
o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-fam=
ily:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#003300'>It seems that this is not something=
 infrastructure telling you.&nbsp; It seems relying party decision.&nbsp; I=
n that case, it may be better to let the relying party associate with the c=
ertificates like Microsoft does in CAPI store.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p clas=
s=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-seri=
f";color:#003300'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span st=
yle=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#003300'>If y=
ou think this is something from a CA to relying parties, albeit advisory, t=
hen adding a richer extension with what I am permitting and what I am not p=
ermitting and let the relying party use the information from any or all CAs=
 in the path a more versatile solution that what you are saying.&nbsp; Sinc=
e what I am saying helps implement your requirement also, it is better to h=
ave a standard that is broader.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><=
span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#00330=
0'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><div><div style=3D'border:none;border-top:so=
lid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span></=
b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> Stefa=
n Santesson [mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com] <br><b>Sent:</b> Monday, May 23, 20=
11 6:03 PM<br><b>To:</b> Santosh Chokhani; pkix@ietf.org<br><b>Subject:</b>=
 Re: [pkix] Trust Constraints - Possible request for yet another certificat=
e extension<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbs=
p;</o:p></p><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-=
family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>Santosh,<o:p></o:p></span></p></=
div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"=
Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><=
p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","=
sans-serif";color:black'>In that case I think I go for capabilities, or eve=
n service information. I think I like that better &quot;Service Information=
 extension&quot;, because it is actually information about the service prov=
ided by that CA.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span=
 style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>=
<o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'=
font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>Anyone who=
 do not understand the information is free to do what they want. This is no=
t supposed to change the laws of PKI, general path validation rules applies=
.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-=
size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>I do not need t=
o declare excluded and permitted. It would be quite possible to define such=
 statements though, but I don't need them. I just need information about th=
e service provided by each CA, and by the root.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div>=
<div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Cali=
bri","sans-serif";color:black'>Also I do not need to check persistence of t=
he path, each CA certificate service information stands for itself. The RP =
is free to draw any conclusion it wishes from it.<o:p></o:p></span></p></di=
v><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Ca=
libri","sans-serif";color:black'>It is not top down constraining =3D You ar=
e not allowed to trust this CA in any other way than the one I say.<o:p></o=
:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5=
pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>It is pure information =
=3D here is information about what is so. Choose for yourself if this influ=
ences your trust decision.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNo=
rmal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";col=
or:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span=
 style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>=
What I mainly need to include is the TSL Trust Service Type declarations de=
fined in ETSI TS 102 231, such as:&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p=
 class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","s=
ans-serif";color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><div><p clas=
s=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-s=
erif";color:black'>http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/CA/PKC -&nbsp;A Cert=
ification authority issuing public key certificates.<o:p></o:p></span></p><=
/div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:=
"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/CA/=
QC&nbsp;- A Certification authority issuing Qualified Certificates.<o:p></o=
:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5=
pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>http://uri.etsi.org/Trst=
Svc/Svctype/TSA&nbsp;- A Time stamping authority.<o:p></o:p></span></p></di=
v><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Ca=
libri","sans-serif";color:black'>http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/Certst=
atus/OCSP -&nbsp;A Certificate status provider operating an OCSP-server.<o:=
p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size=
:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>http://uri.etsi.org=
/TrstSvc/Svctype/Certstatus/CRL -&nbsp;A Certificate status provider operat=
ing a CRL.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=
=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'><o:p>&=
nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'=
font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>I would th=
en carry these in an XML structure that defines the purpose of including ea=
ch declaration, like:<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>=
<span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:bl=
ack'>&lt;ServicesByThisAuthority&gt;<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p cla=
ss=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-=
serif";color:black'>&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;Service&gt;http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc=
/Svctype/CA/QC&lt;/Service&gt;<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><div><p clas=
s=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-s=
erif";color:black'>&lt;/ServicesByThisAuthority&gt;<o:p></o:p></span></p></=
div></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-fa=
mily:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div>=
<div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Cali=
bri","sans-serif";color:black'>or<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><div><p c=
lass=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","san=
s-serif";color:black'>&lt;ServicesUnderThisAuthority&gt;<o:p></o:p></span><=
/p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-fam=
ily:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;Service&gt;http://=
uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/TSA&lt;/Service&gt;<o:p></o:p></span></p></div=
><div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family=
:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>&lt;/ServicesUnderThisAuthority&gt;<o:=
p></o:p></span></p></div></div></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=
=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'><o:p>&=
nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-s=
ize:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>In a RootCA I co=
uld include:<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span sty=
le=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'><o:p=
>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span sty=
le=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>&lt;=
ServicesUnderThisAuthority&gt;<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DM=
soNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"=
;color:black'>&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;Service&gt;http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svcty=
pe/CA/QC&lt;/Service&gt;<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNorm=
al><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color=
:black'>&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;Service&gt;http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/Cer=
tstatus/OCSP&lt;/Service&gt;<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMso=
Normal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";c=
olor:black'>&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;Service&gt;http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype=
/TSA&lt;/Service&gt;<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><=
span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:bla=
ck'>&lt;/ServicesUnderThisAuthority&gt;<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div></=
div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"=
Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><=
p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","=
sans-serif";color:black'>And then include the service information for each =
CA i Issue under this root. This would allow me to:<o:p></o:p></span></p></=
div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"=
Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>- Not accept any other EE certificate ty=
pe but qualified certificates under this root, but<o:p></o:p></span></p></d=
iv><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"C=
alibri","sans-serif";color:black'>- Still allow validation of timestamps an=
d OCSP responses under this root under proper authorities.<o:p></o:p></span=
></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-f=
amily:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div=
><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Cal=
ibri","sans-serif";color:black'>/Stefan<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sa=
ns-serif";color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMs=
oNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";=
color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div style=3D'border:none;bo=
rder-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNorma=
l><b><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";col=
or:black'>From: </span></b><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Cal=
ibri","sans-serif";color:black'>Santosh Chokhani &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:SCho=
khani@cygnacom.com">SChokhani@cygnacom.com</a>&gt;<br><b>Date: </b>Mon, 23 =
May 2011 15:53:44 -0400<br><b>To: </b>Stefan Santesson &lt;<a href=3D"mailt=
o:stefan@aaa-sec.com">stefan@aaa-sec.com</a>&gt;, &quot;<a href=3D"mailto:p=
kix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">=
pkix@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br><b>Subject: </b>Re: [pkix] Trust Constraints - Pos=
sible request for yet another certificate extension<o:p></o:p></span></p></=
div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"=
Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><block=
quote style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid #B5C4DF 4.5pt;padding:0in 0in =
0in 4.0pt;margin-left:3.75pt;margin-right:0in' id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTIO=
N_BLOCKQUOTE"><div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt=
;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#993366'>Stefan,</span><span style=
=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'=
font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#993366'>&nbsp;</spa=
n><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><s=
pan style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#993366=
'>You miss the point.</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span><=
/p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial",=
"sans-serif";color:#993366'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p><=
/o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-fa=
mily:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#993366'>The capability and constraint is n=
ot simply a terminology issue.</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p=
></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family=
:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#993366'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:blac=
k'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0p=
t;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#993366'>What you are saying is th=
at if the constraint is present, then the CA can only be used for the liste=
d purposes.&nbsp; Right?</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></spa=
n></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Aria=
l","sans-serif";color:#993366'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:=
p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font=
-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#993366'>You are also saying that the co=
nstraint&#8217;s absence means that the CA can be used for any purpose.&nbs=
p; Right?</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=
=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif=
";color:#993366'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span=
></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial=
","sans-serif";color:#993366'>Here are some suggestions:</span><span style=
=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'=
font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#993366'>&nbsp;</spa=
n><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoListParag=
raph style=3D'text-indent:-.25in'><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-famil=
y:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#993366'>1.</span><span style=3D'font-size:7.0=
pt;color:#993366'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span><span style=3D'font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#993366'>This need not be in a=
 root certificate.&nbsp; It can be in root issued CA certificates unless yo=
u envision root to be direct issuer of end entity certificates</span><span =
style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoListParagraph sty=
le=3D'text-indent:-.25in'><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial=
","sans-serif";color:#993366'>2.</span><span style=3D'font-size:7.0pt;color=
:#993366'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;fo=
nt-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#993366'>I suggest you define both the=
 permitted and excluded capabilities</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p=
></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoListParagraph style=3D'text-indent:-.25in'>=
<span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#9933=
66'>3.</span><span style=3D'font-size:7.0pt;color:#993366'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp; </span><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-se=
rif";color:#993366'>I suggest that the path validation logic honor the pres=
ence of this extension in downstream CAs a la name constraints</span><span =
style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoListParagraph sty=
le=3D'text-indent:-.25in'><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial=
","sans-serif";color:#993366'>4.</span><span style=3D'font-size:7.0pt;color=
:#993366'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;fo=
nt-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#993366'>I suggest you think about wha=
t the relying party should do if it does not understand semantics of one of=
 the OIDs present in the extension, especially in the excluded field.</span=
><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><div><div style=3D'borde=
r:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=
=3DMsoNormal><b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-=
serif";color:black'>From:</span></b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-fa=
mily:"Tahoma","sans-serif";color:black'> Stefan Santesson [<a href=3D"mailt=
o:stefan@aaa-sec.com">mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com</a>] <br><b>Sent:</b> Monda=
y, May 23, 2011 3:39 PM<br><b>To:</b> Santosh Chokhani; <a href=3D"mailto:p=
kix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a><br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [pkix] Trust Constra=
ints - Possible request for yet another certificate extension</span><span s=
tyle=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p class=3DMsoNormal=
><span style=3D'color:black'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p><div><p class=3DMs=
oNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";=
color:black'>I intend to use this in my validation software to constrain wh=
at certificate that are accepted as valid.</span><span style=3D'color:black=
'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font=
-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>&nbsp;</span><=
span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoN=
ormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";co=
lor:black'>In my use case this maps to the information about trust services=
 that is provided in EU Trust service lists.</span><span style=3D'color:bla=
ck'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'fo=
nt-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>I may includ=
e information in the root declaring that only qualified EE certificates are=
 supposed to be validated under this root.</span><span style=3D'color:black=
'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font=
-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>&nbsp;</span><=
span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoN=
ormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";co=
lor:black'>I may however include CA certificates that are only used to vali=
date timestamps and OCSP responses to support signature validation of signa=
tures based on qualified certificates. I could then include information in =
the CA certificates to OCSP responders and CAs certifying TSAs that they ar=
e to be used only to validate time stamp tokens and OCSP responses. That wa=
y I will avoid using them by mistake to validate a qualified certificate.</=
span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=
=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-se=
rif";color:black'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></spa=
n></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-=
family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>As I said, I can't put this in c=
ertificate policies, because I control the issuance of end entity certs and=
 what policies they use.</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></spa=
n></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-=
family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'colo=
r:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=
=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>So one=
 constraintsInfo I would like to be able to include is the TrustServiceType=
 declaration carried for that CA in an EU Trust Service List. That tells me=
 if that CA is used to support time stamping, OCSP, qualified certificates,=
 regular EE certificates etc. This information about the service is lost wh=
en I cross certify these CAs and I'm looking for a way to store such inform=
ation in the issued CA certificate so my validation software can make use o=
f it.</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p=
 class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","s=
ans-serif";color:black'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p=
></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt=
;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>I care less if this is cal=
led capability or constraints, and more about the capacity to store such in=
formation.</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><d=
iv><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibr=
i","sans-serif";color:black'>If not standardized here, I think I will just =
create a private extension for this purpose, since I need it.</span><span s=
tyle=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>=
<span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:bl=
ack'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><=
div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calib=
ri","sans-serif";color:black'>/Stefan</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:=
p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size=
:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>&nbsp;</span><span =
style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal=
><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:b=
lack'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div>=
<div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in =
0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-famil=
y:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>From: </span></b><span style=3D'font-=
size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>Santosh Chokhan=
i &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:SChokhani@cygnacom.com">SChokhani@cygnacom.com</a>&=
gt;<br><b>Date: </b>Mon, 23 May 2011 15:10:46 -0400<br><b>To: </b>Stefan Sa=
ntesson &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com">stefan@aaa-sec.com</a>&gt=
;, &quot;<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>&quot; &lt;<a hr=
ef=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br><b>Subject: </b>RE: [p=
kix] Trust Constraints - Possible request for yet another certificate exten=
sion</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sa=
ns-serif";color:black'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p>=
</span></p></div><blockquote style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid #B5C4DF=
 4.5pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 4.0pt;margin-left:3.75pt;margin-top:5.0pt;margin=
-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt' id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"><=
div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"A=
rial","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>Stefan,</span><span style=3D'color:black'=
><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;=
font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D=
'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'fon=
t-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>From your desc=
ription it is not clear if you mean this as a capability or constraint?</sp=
an><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><=
span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=
=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif=
";color:#1F497D'>Specifically, is the Root 1 only good for qualified certif=
icates and nothing else?&nbsp; Another example is what does the absence of =
this constraint means?</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span>=
</p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial"=
,"sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p>=
</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-f=
amily:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>I am guessing that you mean this =
as a capability and not a constraint.</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:=
p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font=
-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'col=
or:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><div><div style=3D'border:none;border-top:s=
olid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span=
 style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif";color:black'>F=
rom:</span></b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-s=
erif";color:black'> <a href=3D"mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org">pkix-bounces@i=
etf.org</a> [<a href=3D"mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org">mailto:pkix-bounces@i=
etf.org</a>] <b>On Behalf Of </b>Stefan Santesson<br><b>Sent:</b> Monday, M=
ay 23, 2011 6:15 AM<br><b>To:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@iet=
f.org</a><br><b>Subject:</b> [pkix] Trust Constraints - Possible request fo=
r yet another certificate extension</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p>=
</o:p></span></p></div></div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:blac=
k'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'fon=
t-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>All,</span><s=
pan style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNo=
rmal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";col=
or:black'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></=
div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"=
Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>I have come across a need that I don't k=
now how to solve with the existing certificate extensions.</span><span styl=
e=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><sp=
an style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black=
'>I would like to discuss what the best solution is, which may include defi=
ning a new extension.</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span><=
/p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-fam=
ily:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:b=
lack'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'=
font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>I'm runnin=
g a cross certifying PKI which extracts a fairly large number of intermedia=
ry CAs and certifies them under a single root.</span><span style=3D'color:b=
lack'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'=
font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>I create a=
 number of root authorities, each representing a different policy for appro=
ving CAs to be certified under this root.</span><span style=3D'color:black'=
><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-=
size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>&nbsp;</span><s=
pan style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNo=
rmal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";col=
or:black'>Example:&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></spa=
n></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-=
family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>Root 1 only certifies CA:s that =
issues qualified certificates</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p>=
</span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;=
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D=
'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span s=
tyle=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>I =
would like to include some optional information in the root certificate tha=
t the relying party MAY use to understand policy used to certify CAs under =
that root.</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><d=
iv><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibr=
i","sans-serif";color:black'>A relying party using this root MAY use this i=
nformation to apply extra controls, such as verifying that the end entity c=
ertificate being verified under that root is a qualified certificate by exa=
mining the QcStatements extension from RFC 3739.</span><span style=3D'color=
:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=
=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>&nbsp;=
</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p clas=
s=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-s=
erif";color:black'>So the options I have considered and dismissed are:</spa=
n><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DM=
soNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"=
;color:black'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></=
p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-fami=
ly:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>- certificate policy extension, and<=
/span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=
=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-se=
rif";color:black'>- EKU</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span=
></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-f=
amily:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color=
:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=
=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>Both a=
re bad. The policy extension is designed to list certificate policies that =
can be included in the EE cert (that is what the path validation algorithm =
does). The EKU is only meant to be included in EE certs and its inclusion i=
n other certs is subject to non-standardized handling that makes such solut=
ion highly unpredictable.</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></sp=
an></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font=
-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'col=
or:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=
=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>The cl=
eanest way that I can think of is to include such information in a new exte=
nsion along this structure:</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></=
span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;fo=
nt-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'c=
olor:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span sty=
le=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>Trus=
tConstraints :=3D=3D SEQUENCE OF TrustConstraint</span><span style=3D'color=
:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=
=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>TrustC=
onstraint :=3D=3D SEQUENCE {</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p><=
/span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;f=
ont-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>&nbsp;&nbsp;constraint &nbsp=
; &nbsp; OBJECT IDENTIFIER,</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></=
span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;fo=
nt-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>&nbsp;&nbsp;constraintInfo &n=
bsp;OCTET STRING &nbsp;OPTIONAL }</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></=
o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.=
5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>&nbsp;</span><span styl=
e=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><sp=
an style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black=
'>The constraintInfo content is defined by the constraint OID. The reason w=
hy I put it in an OCTET STRING is because it is way easier to code than hav=
ing an &quot;any defined by&quot; structure. This way I can always parse th=
is extension with a simple fixed ASN.1 structure and pass the byte[] array =
to higher logic for processing if I recognize the OID, or else trash it. Th=
e constraints data could for example carry XML data or a JSON object accord=
ing to the definition of the constraint OID. This way we would not have to =
bother with I18N stuff in the extension definition. Clean and simple.</span=
><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMs=
oNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";=
color:black'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p=
></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-famil=
y:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>This extension is only meant to be pl=
aced in CA certificates, possibly only in self signed root certificates.</s=
pan><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=
=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-se=
rif";color:black'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></spa=
n></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-=
family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>Thoughts?</span><span style=3D'c=
olor:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span sty=
le=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>&nbs=
p;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p cl=
ass=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans=
-serif";color:black'>/Stefan</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p><=
/span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;f=
ont-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'=
color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span st=
yle=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>&nb=
sp;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p c=
lass=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","san=
s-serif";color:black'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p><=
/span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;f=
ont-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'=
color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span st=
yle=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>&nb=
sp;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p c=
lass=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","san=
s-serif";color:black'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p><=
/span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;f=
ont-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>&nbsp;&nbsp;</span><span sty=
le=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><s=
pan style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:blac=
k'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><di=
v><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:"Calibri=
","sans-serif";color:black'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p><=
/o:p></span></p></div></div></div></blockquote></div></div><p class=3DMsoNo=
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To: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 25 May 2011 08:13:46 -0400
Thread-Topic: [pkix] Proposing CAA as PKIX Working Group Item
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From mattking1@gmail.com  Wed May 25 12:36:46 2011
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Date: Wed, 25 May 2011 15:36:44 -0400
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From: Matt King <mattking1@gmail.com>
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Cc: matt.tebo@pgs.protiviti.com, pkix-chairs@tools.ietf.org
Subject: [pkix] Revised Submission: claimSigning EKU draft for PKIX WG Consideration
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Dear PKIX Working Group

I have posted an updated draft document describing the claimSigning EKU.  I=
t is
titled =93draft-king-pkix-claimsigning-extn-01.txt=94 (abstract below) and
it can be found at the following link for your review:

http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-king-pkix-claimsigning-extn/?include_=
text=3D1

This revised draft replaces both the initial draft
"draft-king-pkix-claimsigning-extn-00.txt"
and "draft-patterson-pkix-attribute-signing-eku".  The authors of both
drafts have
collaborated and addressed all comments received to date and are
moving forward with this single submission.

I ask that the attached draft be considered as a new work item for
this group.  Thank you in advance for your time.

Matt
--=20
Matt King
Protiviti Inc.
Government Services
Matthew.King@pgs.protiviti.com
mattking1@gmail.com
410-271-5624 (Mobile)


Abstract

   This memo specifies an Extended Key Usage (EKU) X.509 certificate
   extension which indicates that the certificate holder is authorized
   to sign security tokens to assert claims, or attributes, about a
   principal.

   When an owner of a certificate that asserts the claimSigning EKU
   signs a claim, the owner is asserting that a statement about the
   principal is true. For example, a IdP secure token service (STS)
   would use an X.509 certificate containing the claimSigning EKU to
   sign SAML assertions containing an identifier and attributes about a
   user. This additional EKU value would further allow the
   differentiation of certificates used to identify a particular server
   from those used by the server to sign identity or attribute claims.




On Fri, Apr 22, 2011 at 1:51 PM, Matt King <mattking1@gmail.com> wrote:
> Dear PKIX Working Group
>
> I have posted an draft document describing a claimSigning EKU. =A0It is
> titled =93draft-king-pkix-claimsigning-extn-00.txt=94 (abstract below) an=
d
> it can be found at the following link for your review:
>
> http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-king-pkix-claimsigning-extn/?includ=
e_text=3D1
>
> I ask that the attached draft be considered as a new work item for
> this group. =A0Thank you in advance for your time.
>
> Abstract
>
> =A0 This memo specifies an Extended Key Usage (EKU) X.509 certificate
> =A0 extension which indicates that the certificate holder is authorized
> =A0 to sign security tokens to assert claims, or attributes, about a
> =A0 principal.
>
> =A0 When an owner of a certificate that asserts the claimSigning EKU
> =A0 signs a claim, the owner is asserting that a statement about the
> =A0 principal is true. For example, a IdP secure token service (STS)
> =A0 would use an X.509 certificate containing the claimSigning EKU to
> =A0 sign SAML assertions containing an identifier and attributes about a
> =A0 user.
>
>
> --
> Matt King
> Protiviti
> Government Services
> Matthew.King@pgs.protiviti.com
> mattking1@gmail.com
> 410-271-5624=A0(Mobile)
>



--=20
Matt King
mattking1@gmail.com
410-271-5624 (Mobile)

From hallam@gmail.com  Wed May 25 14:01:47 2011
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Date: Wed, 25 May 2011 14:01:45 -0700
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From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
To: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Proposing CAA as PKIX Working Group Item
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--0016369fa2522a654204a42003b1
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1

PKIX has in the past specified means of using DNS records for specifying
information that relates to management of PKIs.

The analogy I would use here is to SNMP. A MIB is part of the SNMP protocol
but the definition of the MIB itself is the job of the group that defines
the protocol that it describes.

Here CAA is a DNS record that provides information that is to be used by
Certificate Issuers. PKIX protocol is both the provider and the consumer of
this data. The DNS is merely the conduit.


The reason DNS is relevant here is that DNS has a unique relationship to the
interpretation of DNS names.



On Mon, May 23, 2011 at 2:37 AM, Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>wrote:

> Phil,
>
> I'm confused to. This draft to me seems to be an amendment of the DNS
> record and not of the PKIX protocols.
> If you want to define a way to carry X.509 data in a protocol, then PKIX is
> usually not the place to do it, but the WG dealing with that protocol.
>
> I'm not questioning your proposal or whether it should be standardized,
> just why it ought to be dealt with by PKIX.
>
> /Stefan
>
>
> From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
> Date: Wed, 18 May 2011 11:17:31 -0400
> To: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
> Cc: <pkix@ietf.org>
> Subject: Re: [pkix] Proposing CAA as PKIX Working Group Item
>
> On Tue, May 17, 2011 at 10:48 AM, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>wrote:
>
>> I am confused by this request. Given that you have an RRtype assigned and
>> already have implementations, it would be pretty destructive for this WG to
>> accept the document and make any semantic or protocol changes.
>
>
> That depends on what the changes were and what motivated them.
>
> This particular proposal crosses the boundary between PKIX and DNS. I don't
> think it is particularly productive to have two separate groups working on a
> proposal at the same time if it can be helped. Since assignment of the DNS
> RR was blocking for deployment we worked on that aspect first.
>
> I did however notify this WG that the draft had been proposed and was being
> discussed in the DNS group.
>
>
> There is still opportunity for this WG to make changes:
>
> 1) Propose changes to the description of the implementation.
>
> 2) Propose new property tags with different semantics.
>
> 3) Propose an entirely new syntax for the RR which would of course require
> a new DNS RR assignment.
>
> Which of these make sense depends entirely on what the reason behind the
> change is and what the impact is. Change of type (1) is relatively cheap,
> change of type (3) has much higher costs.
>
> If the reason for a change is to support a new use case, fix a bug in the
> spec or make the scheme more efficient then it may well make sense to
> completely revise the spec and apply for a new RR. If on the other hand the
> reason for the change is that someone wants to make a change I don't think
> it is likely to get consensus.
>
>
> I don't think it very likely that we are going to want to look at a
> complete redesign. But I could imagine people have ideas for new property
> tags that could be usefully added.
>
> The DNS is the Internet infrastructure for making assertions about Internet
> services associated with a domain name. If someone wants to make such an
> assertion then it should appear in the DNS. If there is an assertion in the
> DNS then it should relate directly or indirectly to an Internet service.
>
>
> However, if we can't many any semantic or protocol changes (and I think
>> both are warranted), why should the WG work on it at all? Wouldn't it be
>> better to publish it as an RFC through the Independent Submissions Editor so
>> that the protocol that has been deployed doesn't change?
>>
>> These may be questions for the ADs, not for the WG.
>
>
> Who suggested this particular course of action since CAA is clearly in PKIX
> scope.
>
>
>
>
> --
> Website: http://hallambaker.com/
>
> _______________________________________________ pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>
>


-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

--0016369fa2522a654204a42003b1
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

PKIX has in the past specified means of using DNS records for specifying in=
formation that relates to management of PKIs.<div><br></div><div>The analog=
y I would use here is to SNMP. A MIB is part of the SNMP protocol but the d=
efinition of the MIB itself is the job of the group that defines the protoc=
ol that it describes.</div>
<div><br></div><div>Here CAA is a DNS record that provides information that=
 is to be used by Certificate Issuers. PKIX protocol is both the provider a=
nd the consumer of this data. The DNS is merely the conduit.</div><div>
<br></div><div><br></div><div>The reason DNS is relevant here is that DNS h=
as a unique relationship to the interpretation of DNS names.=A0</div><div><=
br></div><div><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Mon, May 23, 2011 at 2:=
37 AM, Stefan Santesson <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:stefan@aaa-=
sec.com">stefan@aaa-sec.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;"><div style=3D"word-wrap:break-word;color:rg=
b(0, 0, 0);font-size:14px;font-family:Calibri, sans-serif"><div>Phil,</div>=
<div>
<br></div><div>I&#39;m confused to. This draft to me seems to be an amendme=
nt of the DNS record and not of the PKIX protocols.</div><div>If you want t=
o define a way to carry X.509 data in a protocol, then PKIX is usually not =
the place to do it, but the WG dealing with that protocol.</div>
<div><br></div><div>I&#39;m not questioning your proposal or whether it sho=
uld be standardized, just why it ought to be dealt with by PKIX.</div><div>=
<br></div><div>/Stefan</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><span><div style=
=3D"font-family:Calibri;font-size:11pt;text-align:left;color:black;border-b=
ottom:medium none;border-left:medium none;padding-bottom:0in;padding-left:0=
in;padding-right:0in;border-top:#b5c4df 1pt solid;border-right:medium none;=
padding-top:3pt">
<span style=3D"font-weight:bold">From: </span> Phillip Hallam-Baker &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:hallam@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">hallam@gmail.com</a>&gt;=
<br><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">Date: </span> Wed, 18 May 2011 11:17:3=
1 -0400<br>
<span style=3D"font-weight:bold">To: </span> Paul Hoffman &lt;<a href=3D"ma=
ilto:paul.hoffman@vpnc.org" target=3D"_blank">paul.hoffman@vpnc.org</a>&gt;=
<br><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">Cc: </span> &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pkix=
@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">pkix@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>
<span style=3D"font-weight:bold">Subject: </span> Re: [pkix] Proposing CAA =
as PKIX Working Group Item<br></div><div><br></div><blockquote style=3D"bor=
der-left:#b5c4df 5 solid;padding:0 0 0 5;margin:0 0 0 5"><div><div></div><d=
iv class=3D"h5">
On Tue, May 17, 2011 at 10:48 AM, Paul Hoffman <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a hre=
f=3D"mailto:paul.hoffman@vpnc.org" target=3D"_blank">paul.hoffman@vpnc.org<=
/a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gm=
ail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-le=
ft:1ex">

I am confused by this request. Given that you have an RRtype assigned and a=
lready have implementations, it would be pretty destructive for this WG to =
accept the document and make any semantic or protocol changes. </blockquote=
>
<div><br></div><div>That depends on what the changes were and what motivate=
d them.</div><div><br></div><div>This particular proposal crosses the bound=
ary between PKIX and DNS. I don&#39;t think it is particularly productive t=
o have two separate groups working on a proposal at the same time if it can=
 be helped. Since assignment of the DNS RR was blocking for deployment we w=
orked on that aspect first.</div>
<div><br></div><div>I did however notify this WG that the draft had been pr=
oposed and was being discussed in the DNS group.</div><div><br></div><div><=
br></div><div>There is still opportunity for this WG to make changes:</div>
<div><br></div><div>1) Propose changes to the description of the implementa=
tion.</div><div><br></div><div>2) Propose new property tags with different =
semantics.</div><div><br></div><div>3)=A0Propose an entirely new syntax for=
 the RR which would of course require a new DNS RR assignment.</div>
<div><br></div><div>Which of these make sense depends entirely on what the =
reason behind the change is and what the impact is. Change of type (1) is r=
elatively cheap, change of type (3) has much higher costs.</div><div><br>
</div><div>If the reason for a change is to support a new use case, fix a b=
ug in the spec or make the scheme more efficient then it may well make sens=
e to completely revise the spec and apply for a new RR. If on the other han=
d the reason for the change is that someone wants to make a change I don&#3=
9;t think it is likely to get consensus.</div>
<div><br></div><div><br></div><div>I don&#39;t think it very likely that we=
 are going to want to look at a complete redesign. But I could imagine peop=
le have ideas for new property tags that could be usefully added.</div>
<div><br></div><div>The DNS is the Internet infrastructure for making asser=
tions about Internet services associated with a domain name. If someone wan=
ts to make such an assertion then it should appear in the DNS. If there is =
an assertion in the DNS then it should relate directly or indirectly to an =
Internet service.</div>
<div><br></div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"ma=
rgin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">However, if we=
 can&#39;t many any semantic or protocol changes (and I think both are warr=
anted), why should the WG work on it at all? Wouldn&#39;t it be better to p=
ublish it as an RFC through the Independent Submissions Editor so that the =
protocol that has been deployed doesn&#39;t change?<br>
<br>
These may be questions for the ADs, not for the WG.</blockquote><div><br></=
div><div>Who suggested this particular course of action since CAA is clearl=
y in PKIX scope.=A0</div></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div=
>
<br>-- <br>Website: <a href=3D"http://hallambaker.com/" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttp://hallambaker.com/</a><br><br></div></div>
_______________________________________________
pkix mailing list
<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">pkix@ietf.org</a>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix</a>
</blockquote></span></div>
</blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><br>-- <br>Website: <a href=3D"htt=
p://hallambaker.com/">http://hallambaker.com/</a><br><br>
</div>

--0016369fa2522a654204a42003b1--

From alan.sill@ttu.edu  Wed May 25 15:22:24 2011
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To me, based on the proposal and this description, CAA fits the  
definition of a profile rather than a base standard.  As such, it is  
still suitable as a work item, IMO, for this group, as profiles are  
still useful things.

Thanks,
Alan

On May 25, 2011, at 4:01 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:

> PKIX has in the past specified means of using DNS records for  
> specifying information that relates to management of PKIs.
>
> The analogy I would use here is to SNMP. A MIB is part of the SNMP  
> protocol but the definition of the MIB itself is the job of the  
> group that defines the protocol that it describes.
>
> Here CAA is a DNS record that provides information that is to be  
> used by Certificate Issuers. PKIX protocol is both the provider and  
> the consumer of this data. The DNS is merely the conduit.
>
>
> The reason DNS is relevant here is that DNS has a unique  
> relationship to the interpretation of DNS names.
>
>
>
> On Mon, May 23, 2011 at 2:37 AM, Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa- 
> sec.com> wrote:
> Phil,
>
> I'm confused to. This draft to me seems to be an amendment of the  
> DNS record and not of the PKIX protocols.
> If you want to define a way to carry X.509 data in a protocol, then  
> PKIX is usually not the place to do it, but the WG dealing with that  
> protocol.
>
> I'm not questioning your proposal or whether it should be  
> standardized, just why it ought to be dealt with by PKIX.
>
> /Stefan
>
>
> From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
> Date: Wed, 18 May 2011 11:17:31 -0400
> To: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
> Cc: <pkix@ietf.org>
> Subject: Re: [pkix] Proposing CAA as PKIX Working Group Item
>
> On Tue, May 17, 2011 at 10:48 AM, Paul Hoffman  
> <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> wrote:
> I am confused by this request. Given that you have an RRtype  
> assigned and already have implementations, it would be pretty  
> destructive for this WG to accept the document and make any semantic  
> or protocol changes.
>
> That depends on what the changes were and what motivated them.
>
> This particular proposal crosses the boundary between PKIX and DNS.  
> I don't think it is particularly productive to have two separate  
> groups working on a proposal at the same time if it can be helped.  
> Since assignment of the DNS RR was blocking for deployment we worked  
> on that aspect first.
>
> I did however notify this WG that the draft had been proposed and  
> was being discussed in the DNS group.
>
>
> There is still opportunity for this WG to make changes:
>
> 1) Propose changes to the description of the implementation.
>
> 2) Propose new property tags with different semantics.
>
> 3) Propose an entirely new syntax for the RR which would of course  
> require a new DNS RR assignment.
>
> Which of these make sense depends entirely on what the reason behind  
> the change is and what the impact is. Change of type (1) is  
> relatively cheap, change of type (3) has much higher costs.
>
> If the reason for a change is to support a new use case, fix a bug  
> in the spec or make the scheme more efficient then it may well make  
> sense to completely revise the spec and apply for a new RR. If on  
> the other hand the reason for the change is that someone wants to  
> make a change I don't think it is likely to get consensus.
>
>
> I don't think it very likely that we are going to want to look at a  
> complete redesign. But I could imagine people have ideas for new  
> property tags that could be usefully added.
>
> The DNS is the Internet infrastructure for making assertions about  
> Internet services associated with a domain name. If someone wants to  
> make such an assertion then it should appear in the DNS. If there is  
> an assertion in the DNS then it should relate directly or indirectly  
> to an Internet service.
>
>
> However, if we can't many any semantic or protocol changes (and I  
> think both are warranted), why should the WG work on it at all?  
> Wouldn't it be better to publish it as an RFC through the  
> Independent Submissions Editor so that the protocol that has been  
> deployed doesn't change?
>
> These may be questions for the ADs, not for the WG.
>
> Who suggested this particular course of action since CAA is clearly  
> in PKIX scope.
>
>
>
>
> -- 
> Website: http://hallambaker.com/
>
> _______________________________________________ pkix mailing list pkix@ietf.org 
>  https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>
>
>
> -- 
> Website: http://hallambaker.com/
>
> <ATT00001..txt>

Alan Sill, Ph.D
Senior Scientist, High Performance Computing Center
Adjunct Professor of Physics
TTU

====================================================================
:  Alan Sill, Texas Tech University  Office: Drane 162, MS 4-1167  :
:  e-mail: Alan.Sill@ttu.edu   ph. 806-742-4350  fax 806-742-4358  :
====================================================================





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Subject: Re: [pkix] Proposing CAA as PKIX Working Group Item
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--001636c594ffd44c8604a42281b4
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1

The CAA spec breaks down into two parts

1) Syntax for how to express the tag-value pair lists in the form of a DNS
record.

2) Interpretation of statements expressed in syntax above in the context of
certificate issue.


Part 1 of the spec is the only part that is relevant to DNSEXT and that work
is now complete. The RR syntax cannot now be changed for the CAA record. the
only way to make a change is by applying for a new RR.

Part 1 is also fairly straightforward. If tag value pairs can't solve a
problem then it is probably not a problem that can be solved at the DNS
level :-)


The area where work is required is in part 2. In particular questions such
as wether the description really tells issuers what they need to know in an
unambiguous format.

Another question that could come up is that people might say that they need
to be able to specify issue authorization on a per-protocol granularity (or
they may not).


On Wed, May 25, 2011 at 3:22 PM, Alan Sill <Alan.Sill@ttu.edu> wrote:

> To me, based on the proposal and this description, CAA fits the definition
> of a profile rather than a base standard.  As such, it is still suitable as
> a work item, IMO, for this group, as profiles are still useful things.
>
> Thanks,
> Alan
>
>
> On May 25, 2011, at 4:01 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
>
>  PKIX has in the past specified means of using DNS records for specifying
>> information that relates to management of PKIs.
>>
>> The analogy I would use here is to SNMP. A MIB is part of the SNMP
>> protocol but the definition of the MIB itself is the job of the group that
>> defines the protocol that it describes.
>>
>> Here CAA is a DNS record that provides information that is to be used by
>> Certificate Issuers. PKIX protocol is both the provider and the consumer of
>> this data. The DNS is merely the conduit.
>>
>>
>> The reason DNS is relevant here is that DNS has a unique relationship to
>> the interpretation of DNS names.
>>
>>
>>
>> On Mon, May 23, 2011 at 2:37 AM, Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>
>> wrote:
>> Phil,
>>
>> I'm confused to. This draft to me seems to be an amendment of the DNS
>> record and not of the PKIX protocols.
>> If you want to define a way to carry X.509 data in a protocol, then PKIX
>> is usually not the place to do it, but the WG dealing with that protocol.
>>
>> I'm not questioning your proposal or whether it should be standardized,
>> just why it ought to be dealt with by PKIX.
>>
>> /Stefan
>>
>>
>> From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
>> Date: Wed, 18 May 2011 11:17:31 -0400
>> To: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
>> Cc: <pkix@ietf.org>
>> Subject: Re: [pkix] Proposing CAA as PKIX Working Group Item
>>
>> On Tue, May 17, 2011 at 10:48 AM, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
>> wrote:
>> I am confused by this request. Given that you have an RRtype assigned and
>> already have implementations, it would be pretty destructive for this WG to
>> accept the document and make any semantic or protocol changes.
>>
>> That depends on what the changes were and what motivated them.
>>
>> This particular proposal crosses the boundary between PKIX and DNS. I
>> don't think it is particularly productive to have two separate groups
>> working on a proposal at the same time if it can be helped. Since assignment
>> of the DNS RR was blocking for deployment we worked on that aspect first.
>>
>> I did however notify this WG that the draft had been proposed and was
>> being discussed in the DNS group.
>>
>>
>> There is still opportunity for this WG to make changes:
>>
>> 1) Propose changes to the description of the implementation.
>>
>> 2) Propose new property tags with different semantics.
>>
>> 3) Propose an entirely new syntax for the RR which would of course require
>> a new DNS RR assignment.
>>
>> Which of these make sense depends entirely on what the reason behind the
>> change is and what the impact is. Change of type (1) is relatively cheap,
>> change of type (3) has much higher costs.
>>
>> If the reason for a change is to support a new use case, fix a bug in the
>> spec or make the scheme more efficient then it may well make sense to
>> completely revise the spec and apply for a new RR. If on the other hand the
>> reason for the change is that someone wants to make a change I don't think
>> it is likely to get consensus.
>>
>>
>> I don't think it very likely that we are going to want to look at a
>> complete redesign. But I could imagine people have ideas for new property
>> tags that could be usefully added.
>>
>> The DNS is the Internet infrastructure for making assertions about
>> Internet services associated with a domain name. If someone wants to make
>> such an assertion then it should appear in the DNS. If there is an assertion
>> in the DNS then it should relate directly or indirectly to an Internet
>> service.
>>
>>
>> However, if we can't many any semantic or protocol changes (and I think
>> both are warranted), why should the WG work on it at all? Wouldn't it be
>> better to publish it as an RFC through the Independent Submissions Editor so
>> that the protocol that has been deployed doesn't change?
>>
>> These may be questions for the ADs, not for the WG.
>>
>> Who suggested this particular course of action since CAA is clearly in
>> PKIX scope.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> Website: http://hallambaker.com/
>>
>> _______________________________________________ pkix mailing list
>> pkix@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> Website: http://hallambaker.com/
>>
>> <ATT00001..txt>
>>
>
> Alan Sill, Ph.D
> Senior Scientist, High Performance Computing Center
> Adjunct Professor of Physics
> TTU
>
> ====================================================================
> :  Alan Sill, Texas Tech University  Office: Drane 162, MS 4-1167  :
> :  e-mail: Alan.Sill@ttu.edu   ph. 806-742-4350  fax 806-742-4358  :
> ====================================================================
>
>
>
>
>


-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

--001636c594ffd44c8604a42281b4
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

The CAA spec breaks down into two parts<div><br></div><div>1) Syntax for ho=
w to express the tag-value pair lists in the form of a DNS record.</div><di=
v><br></div><div>2) Interpretation of statements expressed in syntax above =
in the context of certificate issue.</div>
<div><br></div><div><br></div><div>Part 1 of the spec is the only part that=
 is relevant to DNSEXT and that work is now complete. The RR syntax cannot =
now be changed for the CAA record. the only way to make a change is by appl=
ying for a new RR.</div>
<div><br></div><div>Part 1 is also fairly straightforward. If tag value pai=
rs can&#39;t solve a problem then it is probably not a problem that can be =
solved at the DNS level :-)</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>The are=
a where work is required is in part 2. In particular questions such as weth=
er the description really tells issuers what they need to know in an unambi=
guous format.</div>
<div><br></div><div>Another question that could come up is that people migh=
t say that they need to be able to specify issue authorization on a per-pro=
tocol granularity (or they may not).</div><div><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_=
quote">
On Wed, May 25, 2011 at 3:22 PM, Alan Sill <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D=
"mailto:Alan.Sill@ttu.edu">Alan.Sill@ttu.edu</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><bloc=
kquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #cc=
c solid;padding-left:1ex;">
To me, based on the proposal and this description, CAA fits the definition =
of a profile rather than a base standard. =A0As such, it is still suitable =
as a work item, IMO, for this group, as profiles are still useful things.<b=
r>

<br>
Thanks,<br>
Alan<div><div></div><div class=3D"h5"><br>
<br>
On May 25, 2011, at 4:01 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:<br>
<br>
</div></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;bo=
rder-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div><div></div><div class=3D"h5=
">
PKIX has in the past specified means of using DNS records for specifying in=
formation that relates to management of PKIs.<br>
<br>
The analogy I would use here is to SNMP. A MIB is part of the SNMP protocol=
 but the definition of the MIB itself is the job of the group that defines =
the protocol that it describes.<br>
<br>
Here CAA is a DNS record that provides information that is to be used by Ce=
rtificate Issuers. PKIX protocol is both the provider and the consumer of t=
his data. The DNS is merely the conduit.<br>
<br>
<br>
The reason DNS is relevant here is that DNS has a unique relationship to th=
e interpretation of DNS names.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
On Mon, May 23, 2011 at 2:37 AM, Stefan Santesson &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ste=
fan@aaa-sec.com" target=3D"_blank">stefan@aaa-sec.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
Phil,<br>
<br>
I&#39;m confused to. This draft to me seems to be an amendment of the DNS r=
ecord and not of the PKIX protocols.<br>
If you want to define a way to carry X.509 data in a protocol, then PKIX is=
 usually not the place to do it, but the WG dealing with that protocol.<br>
<br>
I&#39;m not questioning your proposal or whether it should be standardized,=
 just why it ought to be dealt with by PKIX.<br>
<br>
/Stefan<br>
<br>
<br>
From: Phillip Hallam-Baker &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:hallam@gmail.com" target=
=3D"_blank">hallam@gmail.com</a>&gt;<br>
Date: Wed, 18 May 2011 11:17:31 -0400<br>
To: Paul Hoffman &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:paul.hoffman@vpnc.org" target=3D"_bl=
ank">paul.hoffman@vpnc.org</a>&gt;<br>
Cc: &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">pkix@ietf.org</a=
>&gt;<br>
Subject: Re: [pkix] Proposing CAA as PKIX Working Group Item<br>
<br>
On Tue, May 17, 2011 at 10:48 AM, Paul Hoffman &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:paul.h=
offman@vpnc.org" target=3D"_blank">paul.hoffman@vpnc.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
I am confused by this request. Given that you have an RRtype assigned and a=
lready have implementations, it would be pretty destructive for this WG to =
accept the document and make any semantic or protocol changes.<br>
<br>
That depends on what the changes were and what motivated them.<br>
<br>
This particular proposal crosses the boundary between PKIX and DNS. I don&#=
39;t think it is particularly productive to have two separate groups workin=
g on a proposal at the same time if it can be helped. Since assignment of t=
he DNS RR was blocking for deployment we worked on that aspect first.<br>

<br>
I did however notify this WG that the draft had been proposed and was being=
 discussed in the DNS group.<br>
<br>
<br>
There is still opportunity for this WG to make changes:<br>
<br>
1) Propose changes to the description of the implementation.<br>
<br>
2) Propose new property tags with different semantics.<br>
<br>
3) Propose an entirely new syntax for the RR which would of course require =
a new DNS RR assignment.<br>
<br>
Which of these make sense depends entirely on what the reason behind the ch=
ange is and what the impact is. Change of type (1) is relatively cheap, cha=
nge of type (3) has much higher costs.<br>
<br>
If the reason for a change is to support a new use case, fix a bug in the s=
pec or make the scheme more efficient then it may well make sense to comple=
tely revise the spec and apply for a new RR. If on the other hand the reaso=
n for the change is that someone wants to make a change I don&#39;t think i=
t is likely to get consensus.<br>

<br>
<br>
I don&#39;t think it very likely that we are going to want to look at a com=
plete redesign. But I could imagine people have ideas for new property tags=
 that could be usefully added.<br>
<br>
The DNS is the Internet infrastructure for making assertions about Internet=
 services associated with a domain name. If someone wants to make such an a=
ssertion then it should appear in the DNS. If there is an assertion in the =
DNS then it should relate directly or indirectly to an Internet service.<br=
>

<br>
<br>
However, if we can&#39;t many any semantic or protocol changes (and I think=
 both are warranted), why should the WG work on it at all? Wouldn&#39;t it =
be better to publish it as an RFC through the Independent Submissions Edito=
r so that the protocol that has been deployed doesn&#39;t change?<br>

<br>
These may be questions for the ADs, not for the WG.<br>
<br>
Who suggested this particular course of action since CAA is clearly in PKIX=
 scope.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
-- <br>
Website: <a href=3D"http://hallambaker.com/" target=3D"_blank">http://halla=
mbaker.com/</a><br>
<br>
_______________________________________________ pkix mailing list <a href=
=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">pkix@ietf.org</a> <a href=3D"ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix" target=3D"_blank">https://www.iet=
f.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix</a><br>

<br>
<br>
<br>
-- <br>
Website: <a href=3D"http://hallambaker.com/" target=3D"_blank">http://halla=
mbaker.com/</a><br>
<br></div></div>
&lt;ATT00001..txt&gt;<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
Alan Sill, Ph.D<br>
Senior Scientist, High Performance Computing Center<br>
Adjunct Professor of Physics<br>
TTU<br>
<br>
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D<br><font color=3D"#8=
88888">
: =A0Alan Sill, Texas Tech University =A0Office: Drane 162, MS 4-1167 =A0:<=
br>
: =A0e-mail: <a href=3D"mailto:Alan.Sill@ttu.edu" target=3D"_blank">Alan.Si=
ll@ttu.edu</a> =A0 ph. <a href=3D"tel:806-742-4350" value=3D"+18067424350" =
target=3D"_blank">806-742-4350</a> =A0fax <a href=3D"tel:806-742-4358" valu=
e=3D"+18067424358" target=3D"_blank">806-742-4358</a> =A0:<br>

=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
</font></blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><br>-- <br>Website: <a href=
=3D"http://hallambaker.com/">http://hallambaker.com/</a><br><br>
</div>

--001636c594ffd44c8604a42281b4--

From koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com  Wed May 25 20:20:31 2011
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Date: Thu, 26 May 2011 12:20:28 +0900
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From: koichi sugimoto <koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.co.jp>
To: pkix@ietf.org
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Cc: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] Proposing CAA as PKIX Working Group Item
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I'm afraid that CAA as well as DANE are bad influence on the PKI.
The reason are:

1) Both drafts control certificate path validation, define trust
anchor, policy control, etc..
   Therefore, relying party must consider about 2 path validations,
one is pkix path validation
   and the other is CAA or DANE based path validation. Why cannot we
adopt only pkix based path validation?
   IMHO, pkix based path validation is carefully considerd among
PKIX-WG, so that, preventing the result of
   pkix based path validation by CAA or DANE based one seems to be
very dengerous.
   Recently, I happend to attend one of the DNSSEC meeting. In the
meeting, I'm very surprised at
   most of all the attendees are unfamiliar with PKI.
   Certificates chained up to public root are issued through vetting
from various security point of view.
   It's a very big problem if such kind of certificates are rejected
by some DNS with poor knowledged
   operators, I think.
   From this point, PKIX-WG is required to reconsider about CAA and DANE?

2) If DNS prohibits the issuarance of the certificate to some domain
except for pre-defined certification
   aurhorities, it seems to inhibit fee competition in the certification ar=
ea.
   Further, if some mismatch between DNS registration (TLSA or CAA
record) and certificate issued to a web
   server occurred, it causes confusion in SSL area.

How should we cope with above?

Sorry for my poor english.


Regards,
Koichi Sugimoto.


2011/5/19 Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>:
> On Tue, May 17, 2011 at 10:48 AM, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
> wrote:
>>
>> I am confused by this request. Given that you have an RRtype assigned an=
d
>> already have implementations, it would be pretty destructive for this WG=
 to
>> accept the document and make any semantic or protocol changes.
>
> That depends on what the changes were and what motivated them.
> This particular proposal crosses the boundary between PKIX and DNS. I don=
't
> think it is particularly productive to have two separate groups working o=
n a
> proposal at the same time if it can be helped. Since assignment of the DN=
S
> RR was blocking for deployment we worked on that aspect first.
> I did however notify this WG that the draft had been proposed and was bei=
ng
> discussed in the DNS group.
>
> There is still opportunity for this WG to make changes:
> 1) Propose changes to the description of the implementation.
> 2) Propose new property tags with different semantics.
> 3)=A0Propose an entirely new syntax for the RR which would of course requ=
ire a
> new DNS RR assignment.
> Which of these make sense depends entirely on what the reason behind the
> change is and what the impact is. Change of type (1) is relatively cheap,
> change of type (3) has much higher costs.
> If the reason for a change is to support a new use case, fix a bug in the
> spec or make the scheme more efficient then it may well make sense to
> completely revise the spec and apply for a new RR. If on the other hand t=
he
> reason for the change is that someone wants to make a change I don't thin=
k
> it is likely to get consensus.
>
> I don't think it very likely that we are going to want to look at a compl=
ete
> redesign. But I could imagine people have ideas for new property tags tha=
t
> could be usefully added.
> The DNS is the Internet infrastructure for making assertions about Intern=
et
> services associated with a domain name. If someone wants to make such an
> assertion then it should appear in the DNS. If there is an assertion in t=
he
> DNS then it should relate directly or indirectly to an Internet service.
>
>> However, if we can't many any semantic or protocol changes (and I think
>> both are warranted), why should the WG work on it at all? Wouldn't it be
>> better to publish it as an RFC through the Independent Submissions Edito=
r so
>> that the protocol that has been deployed doesn't change?
>>
>> These may be questions for the ADs, not for the WG.
>
> Who suggested this particular course of action since CAA is clearly in PK=
IX
> scope.
>
>
>
> --
> Website: http://hallambaker.com/
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>
>

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Cc: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] Proposing CAA as PKIX Working Group Item
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From mrex@sap.com  Thu May 26 08:56:19 2011
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From: Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
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To: koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.co.jp (koichi sugimoto)
Date: Thu, 26 May 2011 17:56:13 +0200 (MEST)
In-Reply-To: <BANLkTimwaWRGDYRPXnGn5zTWUOYUs57pdw@mail.gmail.com> from "koichi sugimoto" at May 26, 11 12:20:28 pm
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Proposing CAA as PKIX Working Group Item
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koichi sugimoto wrote:
> 
> I'm afraid that CAA as well as DANE are bad influence on the PKI.

CAA does not have any influence, because it aimes at issuance policy
for commercial CAs only.

DANE does not have a bad influence, it offers cheaper or more easily
available alternatives to certificate path validation under a huge
set of independent omnipotent commercial CAs shipping preconfigured
as trust anchors with most TLS-capable (client) software.


> The reason are:
> 
> 1) Both drafts control certificate path validation, define trust
>     anchor, policy control, etc..

CAA only affects CA issuing policy _at_the_time_of_issuing_.
A DNS admin that drops or replaces his CAA record does not
invalidate any existing server certificate by that DNS change.

Only DANE is targetting certificate path validation.


> 
> 2) If DNS prohibits the issurance of the certificate to some domain
>    except for pre-defined certification authorities, it seems to
>    inhibit fee competition in the certification area.

I'm failing to follow your line of thought.

DNS does not prohibt anything at all.

There may be DNS admins providing _guidance_ on certificate issuance
to commercial CAs for servers/hostnames in their domains. and these
DNS admins can publish this guidance with CAA DNS records.  The DNS
admins can change these CAA records whenever they see fit, it is
not supposed to affect the validity of the existing server certificates
and not be relevant to certificate path validation for any RP.


-Martin

From paul.hoffman@vpnc.org  Thu May 26 09:16:10 2011
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Proposing CAA as PKIX Working Group Item
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On May 26, 2011, at 8:56 AM, Martin Rex wrote:

> koichi sugimoto wrote:
>>=20
>> I'm afraid that CAA as well as DANE are bad influence on the PKI.
>=20
> CAA does not have any influence, because it aimes at issuance policy
> for commercial CAs only.
>=20
> DANE does not have a bad influence, it offers cheaper or more easily
> available alternatives to certificate path validation under a huge
> set of independent omnipotent commercial CAs shipping preconfigured
> as trust anchors with most TLS-capable (client) software.
>=20
>=20
>> The reason are:
>>=20
>> 1) Both drafts control certificate path validation, define trust
>>    anchor, policy control, etc..
>=20
> CAA only affects CA issuing policy _at_the_time_of_issuing_.
> A DNS admin that drops or replaces his CAA record does not
> invalidate any existing server certificate by that DNS change.
>=20
> Only DANE is targetting certificate path validation.
>=20
>=20
>>=20
>> 2) If DNS prohibits the issurance of the certificate to some domain
>>   except for pre-defined certification authorities, it seems to
>>   inhibit fee competition in the certification area.
>=20
> I'm failing to follow your line of thought.
>=20
> DNS does not prohibt anything at all.
>=20
> There may be DNS admins providing _guidance_ on certificate issuance
> to commercial CAs for servers/hostnames in their domains. and these
> DNS admins can publish this guidance with CAA DNS records.  The DNS
> admins can change these CAA records whenever they see fit, it is
> not supposed to affect the validity of the existing server =
certificates
> and not be relevant to certificate path validation for any RP.


Martin is correct on all counts here except one minor one: the current =
draft is not limited to "commercial" CAs.

--Paul Hoffman


From koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com  Thu May 26 19:31:01 2011
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Proposing CAA as PKIX Working Group Item
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Hello Sirs,

>> 1) Both drafts control certificate path validation, define trust
>>     anchor, policy control, etc..
>
> CAA only affects CA issuing policy _at_the_time_of_issuing_.
> A DNS admin that drops or replaces his CAA record does not
> invalidate any existing server certificate by that DNS change.
If the 2nd column of CA RR record has bit-6 (relying application use)
and 3rd column of CAA RR record is "path",
then, the relying application may reject the issued certificate and therefo=
re,
this produces the same result as invalid of path validation?

>> 2) If DNS prohibits the issurance of the certificate to some domain
>>    except for pre-defined certification authorities, it seems to
>>    inhibit fee competition in the certification area.
>
> I'm failing to follow your line of thought.
>
> DNS does not prohibt anything at all.
>
> There may be DNS admins providing _guidance_ on certificate issuance
> to commercial CAs for servers/hostnames in their domains. and these
> DNS admins can publish this guidance with CAA DNS records.  The DNS
> admins can change these CAA records whenever they see fit, it is
> not supposed to affect the validity of the existing server certificates
> and not be relevant to certificate path validation for any RP.

Suppose that an owner of a web server wants to get a certificate and
the domain is
authorized only to some CA domain A.
Then, the owner of the web server is likely to get the certificate
that belongs to the CA domain A,
because the owner of the web server requires additional steps to get
the certificate that belongs to
the CA domain B, where A is not equal to B.
I'm afraid that it produces unfair competition.


Regards,
Koichi Sugimoto.


2011/5/27 Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>:
> koichi sugimoto wrote:
>>
>> I'm afraid that CAA as well as DANE are bad influence on the PKI.
>
> CAA does not have any influence, because it aimes at issuance policy
> for commercial CAs only.
>
> DANE does not have a bad influence, it offers cheaper or more easily
> available alternatives to certificate path validation under a huge
> set of independent omnipotent commercial CAs shipping preconfigured
> as trust anchors with most TLS-capable (client) software.
>
>
>> The reason are:
>>
>> 1) Both drafts control certificate path validation, define trust
>> =A0 =A0 anchor, policy control, etc..
>
> CAA only affects CA issuing policy _at_the_time_of_issuing_.
> A DNS admin that drops or replaces his CAA record does not
> invalidate any existing server certificate by that DNS change.
>
> Only DANE is targetting certificate path validation.
>
>
>>
>> 2) If DNS prohibits the issurance of the certificate to some domain
>> =A0 =A0except for pre-defined certification authorities, it seems to
>> =A0 =A0inhibit fee competition in the certification area.
>
> I'm failing to follow your line of thought.
>
> DNS does not prohibt anything at all.
>
> There may be DNS admins providing _guidance_ on certificate issuance
> to commercial CAs for servers/hostnames in their domains. and these
> DNS admins can publish this guidance with CAA DNS records. =A0The DNS
> admins can change these CAA records whenever they see fit, it is
> not supposed to affect the validity of the existing server certificates
> and not be relevant to certificate path validation for any RP.
>
>
> -Martin
>

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On Thu, May 26, 2011 at 11:56 AM, Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com> wrote:

> koichi sugimoto wrote:
> >
> > I'm afraid that CAA as well as DANE are bad influence on the PKI.
>
> CAA does not have any influence, because it aimes at issuance policy
> for commercial CAs only.
>

This is not the case and I suggest that you read the specification.

CAA is not just aimed at commercial CAs and it is not limited to issuance.

There are substantial differences between what CAA provides and what DANE is
considering. DANE is considering only one aspect of the key distribution
problem. CAA can use DNSSEC but does not require DNSSEC. DANE is absolutely
predicated on DNSSEC deployment.






> >
> > 2) If DNS prohibits the issurance of the certificate to some domain
> >    except for pre-defined certification authorities, it seems to
> >    inhibit fee competition in the certification area.
>
> I'm failing to follow your line of thought.
>
> DNS does not prohibt anything at all.
>
> There may be DNS admins providing _guidance_ on certificate issuance
> to commercial CAs for servers/hostnames in their domains. and these
> DNS admins can publish this guidance with CAA DNS records.  The DNS
> admins can change these CAA records whenever they see fit, it is
> not supposed to affect the validity of the existing server certificates
> and not be relevant to certificate path validation for any RP.


If the domain name holder is saying 'do not issue a certificate for this
domain', why would any CA imagine that they should be doing that without
further process?

Let us imagine that there is in fact a problem where the domain registrar is
totallyevildns.com and they have published a CAA record for all their
domains specifying that only their in-house CA can issue.

When the first domain name holder attempts to issue a certificate from a
different CA that CA is going to generate an exception and place the
certificate issue process on hold while it is sorted out - just as for any
other exception. So then they are going to quickly discover what
totallyevildns.com has done and the likely outcome there is huge bad
publicity for the registrar and at least one lost customer.

A smart CA is going to have a backup plan involving transfer of the DNS
domain to a different registry worked out. But I rather doubt that it will
prove necessary.


If you have a DNS registrar or DNS outsourcer that is sticking unauthorized
junk in your zone you have a major security problem already.
-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

--0016369fa252f6cfbf04a43a26cd
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Thu, May 26, 2011 at 11:56 AM, Martin=
 Rex <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mrex@sap.com">mrex@sap.com</a>=
&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0=
 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
<div class=3D"im">koichi sugimoto wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I&#39;m afraid that CAA as well as DANE are bad influence on the PKI.<=
br>
<br>
</div>CAA does not have any influence, because it aimes at issuance policy<=
br>
for commercial CAs only.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>This is not th=
e case and I suggest that you read the specification.</div><div><br></div><=
div>CAA is not just aimed at commercial CAs and it is not limited to issuan=
ce.</div>
<div><br></div><div>There are substantial differences between what CAA prov=
ides and what DANE is considering. DANE is considering only one aspect of t=
he key distribution problem. CAA can use DNSSEC but does not require DNSSEC=
. DANE is absolutely predicated on DNSSEC deployment.</div>
<div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>=A0</div><=
blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px=
 #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
&gt;<br>
&gt; 2) If DNS prohibits the issurance of the certificate to some domain<br=
>
&gt; =A0 =A0except for pre-defined certification authorities, it seems to<b=
r>
<div class=3D"im">&gt; =A0 =A0inhibit fee competition in the certification =
area.<br>
<br>
</div>I&#39;m failing to follow your line of thought.<br>
<br>
DNS does not prohibt anything at all.<br>
<br>
There may be DNS admins providing _guidance_ on certificate issuance<br>
to commercial CAs for servers/hostnames in their domains. and these<br>
DNS admins can publish this guidance with CAA DNS records. =A0The DNS<br>
admins can change these CAA records whenever they see fit, it is<br>
not supposed to affect the validity of the existing server certificates<br>
and not be relevant to certificate path validation for any RP.</blockquote>=
<div><br></div><div>If the domain name holder is saying &#39;do not issue a=
 certificate for this domain&#39;, why would any CA imagine that they shoul=
d be doing that without further process?</div>
<div><br></div><div>Let us imagine that there is in fact a problem where th=
e domain registrar is <a href=3D"http://totallyevildns.com">totallyevildns.=
com</a> and they have published a CAA record for all their domains specifyi=
ng that only their in-house CA can issue.</div>
<div><br></div><div>When the first domain name holder attempts to issue a c=
ertificate from a different CA that CA is going to generate an exception an=
d place the certificate issue process on hold while it is sorted out - just=
 as for any other exception. So then they are going to quickly discover wha=
t <a href=3D"http://totallyevildns.com">totallyevildns.com</a> has done and=
 the likely outcome there is huge bad publicity for the registrar and at le=
ast one lost customer.</div>
<div><br></div><div>A smart CA is going to have a backup plan involving tra=
nsfer of the DNS domain to a different registry worked out. But I rather do=
ubt that it will prove necessary.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>
If you have a DNS registrar or DNS outsourcer that is sticking unauthorized=
 junk in your zone you have a major security problem already.</div></div>--=
 <br>Website: <a href=3D"http://hallambaker.com/">http://hallambaker.com/</=
a><br>
<br>

--0016369fa252f6cfbf04a43a26cd--

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I think I have come up with a better solution than the extension I was
considering.

I could just define a SIA accessMethod OID and accessLocation to point at a
signed file containing the information about the CA service I want to make
available.
So all I need is to define my own accessMethod OID. This is a lot simpler
for me to implement than a new extension.

And it is safe, since those who do not understand it will just safely ignor=
e
it.

Thus, I do not propose definition of any new extension.

/Stefan


From:  Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>
Date:  Tue, 24 May 2011 07:32:09 -0400
To:  Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>, "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject:  Re: [pkix] Trust Constraints - Possible request for yet another
certificate extension

> Stefan,
> =20
> It seems that this is not something infrastructure telling you.  It seems
> relying party decision.  In that case, it may be better to let the relyin=
g
> party associate with the certificates like Microsoft does in CAPI store.
> =20
> If you think this is something from a CA to relying parties, albeit advis=
ory,
> then adding a richer extension with what I am permitting and what I am no=
t
> permitting and let the relying party use the information from any or all =
CAs
> in the path a more versatile solution that what you are saying.  Since wh=
at I
> am saying helps implement your requirement also, it is better to have a
> standard that is broader.
> =20
>=20
> From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com]
> Sent: Monday, May 23, 2011 6:03 PM
> To: Santosh Chokhani; pkix@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [pkix] Trust Constraints - Possible request for yet another
> certificate extension
> =20
>=20
> Santosh,
>=20
> =20
>=20
> In that case I think I go for capabilities, or even service information. =
I
> think I like that better "Service Information extension", because it is
> actually information about the service provided by that CA.
>=20
> =20
>=20
> Anyone who do not understand the information is free to do what they want=
.
> This is not supposed to change the laws of PKI, general path validation r=
ules
> applies.
>=20
> I do not need to declare excluded and permitted. It would be quite possib=
le to
> define such statements though, but I don't need them. I just need informa=
tion
> about the service provided by each CA, and by the root.
>=20
> Also I do not need to check persistence of the path, each CA certificate
> service information stands for itself. The RP is free to draw any conclus=
ion
> it wishes from it.
>=20
> It is not top down constraining =3D You are not allowed to trust this CA in=
 any
> other way than the one I say.
>=20
> It is pure information =3D here is information about what is so. Choose for
> yourself if this influences your trust decision.
>=20
> =20
>=20
> What I mainly need to include is the TSL Trust Service Type declarations
> defined in ETSI TS 102 231, such as:
>=20
> =20
>=20
> http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/CA/PKC - A Certification authority is=
suing
> public key certificates.
>=20
> http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/CA/QC - A Certification authority iss=
uing
> Qualified Certificates.
>=20
> http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/TSA - A Time stamping authority.
>=20
> http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/Certstatus/OCSP - A Certificate statu=
s
> provider operating an OCSP-server.
>=20
> http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/Certstatus/CRL - A Certificate status
> provider operating a CRL.
>=20
> =20
>=20
> I would then carry these in an XML structure that defines the purpose of
> including each declaration, like:
>=20
> <ServicesByThisAuthority>
>=20
>    <Service>http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/CA/QC</Service>
>=20
> </ServicesByThisAuthority>
>=20
> =20
>=20
> or
>=20
> <ServicesUnderThisAuthority>
>=20
>    <Service>http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/TSA</Service>
>=20
> </ServicesUnderThisAuthority>
>=20
> =20
>=20
> In a RootCA I could include:
>=20
> =20
>=20
> <ServicesUnderThisAuthority>
>=20
>    <Service>http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/CA/QC</Service>
>=20
>    <Service>http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/Certstatus/OCSP</Service>
>=20
>    <Service>http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/TSA</Service>
>=20
> </ServicesUnderThisAuthority>
>=20
> =20
>=20
> And then include the service information for each CA i Issue under this r=
oot.
> This would allow me to:
>=20
> - Not accept any other EE certificate type but qualified certificates und=
er
> this root, but
>=20
> - Still allow validation of timestamps and OCSP responses under this root
> under proper authorities.
>=20
> =20
>=20
> /Stefan
>=20
> =20
>=20
> =20
>=20
> From: Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>
> Date: Mon, 23 May 2011 15:53:44 -0400
> To: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>, "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org=
>
> Subject: Re: [pkix] Trust Constraints - Possible request for yet another
> certificate extension
>=20
> =20
>>=20
>> Stefan,
>> =20
>> You miss the point.
>> =20
>> The capability and constraint is not simply a terminology issue.
>> =20
>> What you are saying is that if the constraint is present, then the CA ca=
n
>> only be used for the listed purposes.  Right?
>> =20
>> You are also saying that the constraint=B9s absence means that the CA can =
be
>> used for any purpose.  Right?
>> =20
>> Here are some suggestions:
>> =20
>> 1.     This need not be in a root certificate.  It can be in root issued=
 CA
>> certificates unless you envision root to be direct issuer of end entity
>> certificates
>>=20
>> 2.     I suggest you define both the permitted and excluded capabilities
>>=20
>> 3.     I suggest that the path validation logic honor the presence of th=
is
>> extension in downstream CAs a la name constraints
>>=20
>> 4.     I suggest you think about what the relying party should do if it =
does
>> not understand semantics of one of the OIDs present in the extension,
>> especially in the excluded field.
>>=20
>> From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com]
>> Sent: Monday, May 23, 2011 3:39 PM
>> To: Santosh Chokhani; pkix@ietf.org
>> Subject: Re: [pkix] Trust Constraints - Possible request for yet another
>> certificate extension
>> =20
>>=20
>> I intend to use this in my validation software to constrain what certifi=
cate
>> that are accepted as valid.
>>=20
>> =20
>>=20
>> In my use case this maps to the information about trust services that is
>> provided in EU Trust service lists.
>>=20
>> I may include information in the root declaring that only qualified EE
>> certificates are supposed to be validated under this root.
>>=20
>> =20
>>=20
>> I may however include CA certificates that are only used to validate
>> timestamps and OCSP responses to support signature validation of signatu=
res
>> based on qualified certificates. I could then include information in the=
 CA
>> certificates to OCSP responders and CAs certifying TSAs that they are to=
 be
>> used only to validate time stamp tokens and OCSP responses. That way I w=
ill
>> avoid using them by mistake to validate a qualified certificate.
>>=20
>> =20
>>=20
>> As I said, I can't put this in certificate policies, because I control t=
he
>> issuance of end entity certs and what policies they use.
>>=20
>> =20
>>=20
>> So one constraintsInfo I would like to be able to include is the
>> TrustServiceType declaration carried for that CA in an EU Trust Service =
List.
>> That tells me if that CA is used to support time stamping, OCSP, qualifi=
ed
>> certificates, regular EE certificates etc. This information about the se=
rvice
>> is lost when I cross certify these CAs and I'm looking for a way to stor=
e
>> such information in the issued CA certificate so my validation software =
can
>> make use of it.
>>=20
>> =20
>>=20
>> I care less if this is called capability or constraints, and more about =
the
>> capacity to store such information.
>>=20
>> If not standardized here, I think I will just create a private extension=
 for
>> this purpose, since I need it.
>>=20
>> =20
>>=20
>> /Stefan
>>=20
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>>=20
>> From: Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>
>> Date: Mon, 23 May 2011 15:10:46 -0400
>> To: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>, "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.or=
g>
>> Subject: RE: [pkix] Trust Constraints - Possible request for yet another
>> certificate extension
>>=20
>> =20
>>>=20
>>> Stefan,
>>> =20
>>> From your description it is not clear if you mean this as a capability =
or
>>> constraint?
>>> =20
>>> Specifically, is the Root 1 only good for qualified certificates and no=
thing
>>> else?  Another example is what does the absence of this constraint mean=
s?
>>> =20
>>> I am guessing that you mean this as a capability and not a constraint.
>>> =20
>>>=20
>>> From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
>>> Stefan Santesson
>>> Sent: Monday, May 23, 2011 6:15 AM
>>> To: pkix@ietf.org
>>> Subject: [pkix] Trust Constraints - Possible request for yet another
>>> certificate extension
>>> =20
>>>=20
>>> All,
>>>=20
>>> =20
>>>=20
>>> I have come across a need that I don't know how to solve with the exist=
ing
>>> certificate extensions.
>>>=20
>>> I would like to discuss what the best solution is, which may include
>>> defining a new extension.
>>>=20
>>> =20
>>>=20
>>> I'm running a cross certifying PKI which extracts a fairly large number=
 of
>>> intermediary CAs and certifies them under a single root.
>>>=20
>>> I create a number of root authorities, each representing a different po=
licy
>>> for approving CAs to be certified under this root.
>>>=20
>>> =20
>>>=20
>>> Example:=20
>>>=20
>>> Root 1 only certifies CA:s that issues qualified certificates
>>>=20
>>> =20
>>>=20
>>> I would like to include some optional information in the root certifica=
te
>>> that the relying party MAY use to understand policy used to certify CAs
>>> under that root.
>>>=20
>>> A relying party using this root MAY use this information to apply extra
>>> controls, such as verifying that the end entity certificate being verif=
ied
>>> under that root is a qualified certificate by examining the QcStatement=
s
>>> extension from RFC 3739.
>>>=20
>>> =20
>>>=20
>>> So the options I have considered and dismissed are:
>>>=20
>>> =20
>>>=20
>>> - certificate policy extension, and
>>>=20
>>> - EKU
>>>=20
>>> =20
>>>=20
>>> Both are bad. The policy extension is designed to list certificate poli=
cies
>>> that can be included in the EE cert (that is what the path validation
>>> algorithm does). The EKU is only meant to be included in EE certs and i=
ts
>>> inclusion in other certs is subject to non-standardized handling that m=
akes
>>> such solution highly unpredictable.
>>>=20
>>> =20
>>>=20
>>> The cleanest way that I can think of is to include such information in =
a new
>>> extension along this structure:
>>>=20
>>> =20
>>>=20
>>> TrustConstraints :=3D=3D SEQUENCE OF TrustConstraint
>>>=20
>>> TrustConstraint :=3D=3D SEQUENCE {
>>>=20
>>>   constraint     OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
>>>=20
>>>   constraintInfo  OCTET STRING  OPTIONAL }
>>>=20
>>> =20
>>>=20
>>> The constraintInfo content is defined by the constraint OID. The reason=
 why
>>> I put it in an OCTET STRING is because it is way easier to code than ha=
ving
>>> an "any defined by" structure. This way I can always parse this extensi=
on
>>> with a simple fixed ASN.1 structure and pass the byte[] array to higher
>>> logic for processing if I recognize the OID, or else trash it. The
>>> constraints data could for example carry XML data or a JSON object acco=
rding
>>> to the definition of the constraint OID. This way we would not have to
>>> bother with I18N stuff in the extension definition. Clean and simple.
>>>=20
>>> =20
>>>=20
>>> This extension is only meant to be placed in CA certificates, possibly =
only
>>> in self signed root certificates.
>>>=20
>>> =20
>>>=20
>>> Thoughts?
>>>=20
>>> =20
>>>=20
>>> /Stefan
>>>=20
>>> =20
>>>=20
>>> =20
>>>=20
>>> =20
>>>=20
>>> =20
>>>=20
>>> =20
>>>=20
>>> =20
>>>=20
>>>  =20
>>>=20
>>> =20
>>>=20
>>> =20
>> _______________________________________________ pkix mailing list
>> pkix@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
> _______________________________________________ pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix



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<html><head></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: s=
pace; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-size:=
 14px; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><div>I think I have come up with =
a better solution than the extension I was considering.</div><div><br></div>=
<div>I could just define a SIA accessMethod OID and accessLocation to point =
at a signed file containing the information about the CA service I want to m=
ake available.</div><div>So all I need is to define my own accessMethod OID.=
 This is a lot simpler for me to implement than a new extension.</div><div><=
br></div><div>And it is safe, since those who do not understand it will just=
 safely ignore it.</div><div><br></div><div>Thus, I do not propose definitio=
n of any new extension.</div><div><br></div><div>/Stefan</div><div><br></div=
><div><br></div><span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION"><div style=3D"font-family:Cali=
bri; font-size:11pt; text-align:left; color:black; BORDER-BOTTOM: medium non=
e; BORDER-LEFT: medium none; PADDING-BOTTOM: 0in; PADDING-LEFT: 0in; PADDING=
-RIGHT: 0in; BORDER-TOP: #b5c4df 1pt solid; BORDER-RIGHT: medium none; PADDI=
NG-TOP: 3pt"><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">From: </span> Santosh Chokhani &=
lt;<a href=3D"mailto:SChokhani@cygnacom.com">SChokhani@cygnacom.com</a>&gt;<br=
><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">Date: </span> Tue, 24 May 2011 07:32:09 -040=
0<br><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">To: </span> Stefan Santesson &lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com">stefan@aaa-sec.com</a>&gt;, "<a href=3D"mailto:pk=
ix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>" &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf=
.org</a>&gt;<br><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">Subject: </span> Re: [pkix] T=
rust Constraints - Possible request for yet another certificate extension<br=
></div><div><br></div><blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" st=
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</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--><div lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purp=
le" style=3D"word-wrap: break-word;-webkit-nbsp-mode: space;-webkit-line-break=
: after-white-space"><div class=3D"WordSection1"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span st=
yle=3D"font-size: 9pt; color: rgb(0, 51, 0); font-family: Arial, sans-serif; "=
>Stefan,<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 9=
pt; color: rgb(0, 51, 0); font-family: Arial, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p=
></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 9pt; color: rgb(0, =
51, 0); font-family: Arial, sans-serif; ">It seems that this is not somethin=
g infrastructure telling you.&nbsp; It seems relying party decision.&nbsp; I=
n that case, it may be better to let the relying party associate with the ce=
rtificates like Microsoft does in CAPI store.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D=
"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 9pt; color: rgb(0, 51, 0); font-family: =
Arial, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span =
style=3D"font-size: 9pt; color: rgb(0, 51, 0); font-family: Arial, sans-serif;=
 ">If you think this is something from a CA to relying parties, albeit advis=
ory, then adding a richer extension with what I am permitting and what I am =
not permitting and let the relying party use the information from any or all=
 CAs in the path a more versatile solution that what you are saying.&nbsp; S=
ince what I am saying helps implement your requirement also, it is better to=
 have a standard that is broader.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">=
<span style=3D"font-size: 9pt; color: rgb(0, 51, 0); font-family: Arial, sans-=
serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><div><div style=3D"border:none;border-top=
:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><spa=
n style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma, sans-serif; ">From:</span></b=
><span style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma, sans-serif; "> Stefan Sa=
ntesson [<a href=3D"mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com">mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com</a>] =
<br><b>Sent:</b> Monday, May 23, 2011 6:03 PM<br><b>To:</b> Santosh Chokhani=
; <a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a><br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [p=
kix] Trust Constraints - Possible request for yet another certificate extens=
ion<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p><=
/p><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; f=
ont-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">Santosh,<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div>=
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-fami=
ly: Calibri, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"=
MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibr=
i, sans-serif; ">In that case I think I go for capabilities, or even service=
 information. I think I like that better "Service Information extension", be=
cause it is actually information about the service provided by that CA.<o:p>=
</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.=
5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></sp=
an></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color=
: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">Anyone who do not understand th=
e information is free to do what they want. This is not supposed to change t=
he laws of PKI, general path validation rules applies.<o:p></o:p></span></p>=
</div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black=
; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">I do not need to declare excluded and =
permitted. It would be quite possible to define such statements though, but =
I don't need them. I just need information about the service provided by eac=
h CA, and by the root.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">=
<span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-ser=
if; ">Also I do not need to check persistence of the path, each CA certifica=
te service information stands for itself. The RP is free to draw any conclus=
ion it wishes from it.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">=
<span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-ser=
if; ">It is not top down constraining =3D You are not allowed to trust this CA=
 in any other way than the one I say.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p cla=
ss=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Ca=
libri, sans-serif; ">It is pure information =3D here is information about what=
 is so. Choose for yourself if this influences your trust decision.<o:p></o:=
p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt;=
 color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: bl=
ack; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">What I mainly need to include is th=
e TSL Trust Service Type declarations defined in ETSI TS 102 231, such as:&n=
bsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-=
size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;<=
/o:p></span></p></div><div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:=
 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><a href=3D"http://u=
ri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/CA/PKC">http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/CA/P=
KC</a> -&nbsp;A Certification authority issuing public key certificates.<o:p=
></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10=
.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><a href=3D"http://uri.=
etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/CA/QC">http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/CA/QC</a=
>&nbsp;- A Certification authority issuing Qualified Certificates.<o:p></o:p=
></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; =
color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><a href=3D"http://uri.etsi.o=
rg/TrstSvc/Svctype/TSA">http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/TSA</a>&nbsp;- A=
 Time stamping authority.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNorma=
l"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-=
serif; "><a href=3D"http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/Certstatus/OCSP">http:=
//uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/Certstatus/OCSP</a> -&nbsp;A Certificate stat=
us provider operating an OCSP-server.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p cla=
ss=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Ca=
libri, sans-serif; "><a href=3D"http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/Certstatus=
/CRL">http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/Certstatus/CRL</a> -&nbsp;A Certif=
icate status provider operating a CRL.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p cl=
ass=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: C=
alibri, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div></div><div><p class=3D=
"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calib=
ri, sans-serif; ">I would then carry these in an XML structure that defines =
the purpose of including each declaration, like:<o:p></o:p></span></p></div>=
<div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font=
-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">&lt;ServicesByThisAuthority&gt;<o:p></o:p></=
span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; col=
or: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;Service&gt;<=
a href=3D"http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/CA/QC&lt;/Service&gt;">http://ur=
i.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/CA/QC&lt;/Service&gt;</a><o:p></o:p></span></p></=
div><div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: bl=
ack; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">&lt;/ServicesByThisAuthority&gt;<o:=
p></o:p></span></p></div></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-s=
ize: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</=
o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5p=
t; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">or<o:p></o:p></span></p=
></div><div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color:=
 black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">&lt;ServicesUnderThisAuthority&g=
t;<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-si=
ze: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;&nbsp; &=
lt;Service&gt;<a href=3D"http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/TSA&lt;/Service&g=
t;">http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/TSA&lt;/Service&gt;</a><o:p></o:p></=
span></p></div><div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt=
; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">&lt;/ServicesUnderThisAu=
thority&gt;<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"=
><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-se=
rif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span sty=
le=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">In =
a RootCA I could include:<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNorma=
l"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-=
serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><div><div><p class=3D"MsoNorma=
l"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-=
serif; ">&lt;ServicesUnderThisAuthority&gt;<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div>=
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-fami=
ly: Calibri, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;Service&gt;<a href=3D"http://uri.e=
tsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/CA/QC&lt;/Service&gt;">http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/S=
vctype/CA/QC&lt;/Service&gt;</a><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"M=
soNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri=
, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;Service&gt;<a href=3D"http://uri.etsi.org/Trs=
tSvc/Svctype/Certstatus/OCSP&lt;/Service&gt;">http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Sv=
ctype/Certstatus/OCSP&lt;/Service&gt;</a><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p=
 class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family=
: Calibri, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;&nbsp; &lt;Service&gt;<a href=3D"http://uri.ets=
i.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/TSA&lt;/Service&gt;">http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svcty=
pe/TSA&lt;/Service&gt;</a><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNorm=
al"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans=
-serif; ">&lt;/ServicesUnderThisAuthority&gt;<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></d=
iv></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: bl=
ack; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><=
div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-=
family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">And then include the service information for =
each CA i Issue under this root. This would allow me to:<o:p></o:p></span></=
p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: bla=
ck; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">- Not accept any other EE certificat=
e type but qualified certificates under this root, but<o:p></o:p></span></p>=
</div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black=
; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">- Still allow validation of timestamps=
 and OCSP responses under this root under proper authorities.<o:p></o:p></sp=
an></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color=
: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></d=
iv><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; f=
ont-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">/Stefan<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><=
p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-famil=
y: Calibri, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"M=
soNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri=
, sans-serif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div style=3D"border:none;bo=
rder-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"=
><b><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; ">From: </span></b><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; color: black; font-fa=
mily: Calibri, sans-serif; ">Santosh Chokhani &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:SChokhani@=
cygnacom.com">SChokhani@cygnacom.com</a>&gt;<br><b>Date: </b>Mon, 23 May 201=
1 15:53:44 -0400<br><b>To: </b>Stefan Santesson &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:stefan@a=
aa-sec.com">stefan@aaa-sec.com</a>&gt;, "<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix=
@ietf.org</a>" &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br><=
b>Subject: </b>Re: [pkix] Trust Constraints - Possible request for yet anoth=
er certificate extension<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal=
"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><blockquote style=3D"border:none;bor=
der-left:solid #B5C4DF 4.5pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 4.0pt;margin-left:3.75pt;ma=
rgin-right:0in" id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"><div><div><p class=3D"=
MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 9pt; color: rgb(153, 51, 102); font-famil=
y: Arial, sans-serif; ">Stefan,</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p><=
/span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 9pt; color: rgb(153, =
51, 102); font-family: Arial, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:=
black"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 9p=
t; color: rgb(153, 51, 102); font-family: Arial, sans-serif; ">You miss the =
point.</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNo=
rmal"><span style=3D"font-size: 9pt; color: rgb(153, 51, 102); font-family: Ar=
ial, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span>=
</p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 9pt; color: rgb(153, 51, 10=
2); font-family: Arial, sans-serif; ">The capability and constraint is not s=
imply a terminology issue.</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span=
></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 9pt; color: rgb(153, 51, 1=
02); font-family: Arial, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:black=
"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 9pt; co=
lor: rgb(153, 51, 102); font-family: Arial, sans-serif; ">What you are sayin=
g is that if the constraint is present, then the CA can only be used for the=
 listed purposes.&nbsp; Right?</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></=
span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 9pt; color: rgb(153, 5=
1, 102); font-family: Arial, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:b=
lack"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 9pt=
; color: rgb(153, 51, 102); font-family: Arial, sans-serif; ">You are also s=
aying that the constraint&#8217;s absence means that the CA can be used for =
any purpose.&nbsp; Right?</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span>=
</p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 9pt; color: rgb(153, 51, 10=
2); font-family: Arial, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:black"=
><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 9pt; col=
or: rgb(153, 51, 102); font-family: Arial, sans-serif; ">Here are some sugge=
stions:</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoN=
ormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 9pt; color: rgb(153, 51, 102); font-family: A=
rial, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span=
></p><p class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"text-indent:-.25in"><span style=3D"fon=
t-size: 9pt; color: rgb(153, 51, 102); font-family: Arial, sans-serif; ">1.<=
/span><span style=3D"font-size:7.0pt;color:#993366">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <=
/span><span style=3D"font-size: 9pt; color: rgb(153, 51, 102); font-family: Ar=
ial, sans-serif; ">This need not be in a root certificate.&nbsp; It can be i=
n root issued CA certificates unless you envision root to be direct issuer o=
f end entity certificates</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span>=
</p><p class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"text-indent:-.25in"><span style=3D"font=
-size: 9pt; color: rgb(153, 51, 102); font-family: Arial, sans-serif; ">2.</=
span><span style=3D"font-size:7.0pt;color:#993366">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </=
span><span style=3D"font-size: 9pt; color: rgb(153, 51, 102); font-family: Ari=
al, sans-serif; ">I suggest you define both the permitted and excluded capab=
ilities</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoL=
istParagraph" style=3D"text-indent:-.25in"><span style=3D"font-size: 9pt; color:=
 rgb(153, 51, 102); font-family: Arial, sans-serif; ">3.</span><span style=3D"=
font-size:7.0pt;color:#993366">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span><span style=3D"=
font-size: 9pt; color: rgb(153, 51, 102); font-family: Arial, sans-serif; ">=
I suggest that the path validation logic honor the presence of this extensio=
n in downstream CAs a la name constraints</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o=
:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"text-indent:-.25in"><=
span style=3D"font-size: 9pt; color: rgb(153, 51, 102); font-family: Arial, sa=
ns-serif; ">4.</span><span style=3D"font-size:7.0pt;color:#993366">&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span><span style=3D"font-size: 9pt; color: rgb(153, 51, 102); =
font-family: Arial, sans-serif; ">I suggest you think about what the relying=
 party should do if it does not understand semantics of one of the OIDs pres=
ent in the extension, especially in the excluded field.</span><span style=3D"c=
olor:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p><div><div style=3D"border:none;border-top:so=
lid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span s=
tyle=3D"font-size: 10pt; color: black; font-family: Tahoma, sans-serif; ">From=
:</span></b><span style=3D"font-size: 10pt; color: black; font-family: Tahoma,=
 sans-serif; "> Stefan Santesson [<a href=3D"mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com">mailto=
:stefan@aaa-sec.com</a>] <br><b>Sent:</b> Monday, May 23, 2011 3:39 PM<br><b=
>To:</b> Santosh Chokhani; <a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a><=
br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [pkix] Trust Constraints - Possible request for yet a=
nother certificate extension</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></sp=
an></p></div></div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"color:black">&nbsp;<o:p=
></o:p></span></p><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; =
color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">I intend to use this in my=
 validation software to constrain what certificate that are accepted as vali=
d.</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=
=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Cali=
bri, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span>=
</p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: b=
lack; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">In my use case this maps to the in=
formation about trust services that is provided in EU Trust service lists.</=
span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"Ms=
oNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri,=
 sans-serif; ">I may include information in the root declaring that only qua=
lified EE certificates are supposed to be validated under this root.</span><=
span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNorma=
l"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-=
serif; ">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div>=
<div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font=
-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">I may however include CA certificates that a=
re only used to validate timestamps and OCSP responses to support signature =
validation of signatures based on qualified certificates. I could then inclu=
de information in the CA certificates to OCSP responders and CAs certifying =
TSAs that they are to be used only to validate time stamp tokens and OCSP re=
sponses. That way I will avoid using them by mistake to validate a qualified=
 certificate.</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><d=
iv><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-f=
amily: Calibri, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></=
o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5p=
t; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">As I said, I can't put =
this in certificate policies, because I control the issuance of end entity c=
erts and what policies they use.</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p>=
</span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; c=
olor: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"c=
olor:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span styl=
e=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">So o=
ne constraintsInfo I would like to be able to include is the TrustServiceTyp=
e declaration carried for that CA in an EU Trust Service List. That tells me=
 if that CA is used to support time stamping, OCSP, qualified certificates, =
regular EE certificates etc. This information about the service is lost when=
 I cross certify these CAs and I'm looking for a way to store such informati=
on in the issued CA certificate so my validation software can make use of it=
.</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D=
"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calib=
ri, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span><=
/p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: bl=
ack; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">I care less if this is called capab=
ility or constraints, and more about the capacity to store such information.=
</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"=
MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibr=
i, sans-serif; ">If not standardized here, I think I will just create a priv=
ate extension for this purpose, since I need it.</span><span style=3D"color:bl=
ack"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font=
-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;</spa=
n><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNo=
rmal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sa=
ns-serif; ">/Stefan</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></=
div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; =
font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:black"><=
o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:=
 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;</span><spa=
n style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div style=3D"border:none;bo=
rder-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"=
><b><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; ">From: </span></b><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; color: black; font-fa=
mily: Calibri, sans-serif; ">Santosh Chokhani &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:SChokhani@=
cygnacom.com">SChokhani@cygnacom.com</a>&gt;<br><b>Date: </b>Mon, 23 May 201=
1 15:10:46 -0400<br><b>To: </b>Stefan Santesson &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:stefan@a=
aa-sec.com">stefan@aaa-sec.com</a>&gt;, "<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix=
@ietf.org</a>" &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br><=
b>Subject: </b>RE: [pkix] Trust Constraints - Possible request for yet anoth=
er certificate extension</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span><=
/p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: bl=
ack; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:bla=
ck"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><blockquote style=3D"border:none;border-left:s=
olid #B5C4DF 4.5pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 4.0pt;margin-left:3.75pt;margin-top:5=
.0pt;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt" id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCK=
QUOTE"><div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 9pt; color: rg=
b(31, 73, 125); font-family: Arial, sans-serif; ">Stefan,</span><span style=3D=
"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-s=
ize: 9pt; color: rgb(31, 73, 125); font-family: Arial, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;<=
/span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><=
span style=3D"font-size: 9pt; color: rgb(31, 73, 125); font-family: Arial, san=
s-serif; ">From your description it is not clear if you mean this as a capab=
ility or constraint?</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p><=
p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 9pt; color: rgb(31, 73, 125); fo=
nt-family: Arial, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p>=
</o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 9pt; color: rg=
b(31, 73, 125); font-family: Arial, sans-serif; ">Specifically, is the Root =
1 only good for qualified certificates and nothing else?&nbsp; Another examp=
le is what does the absence of this constraint means?</span><span style=3D"col=
or:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:=
 9pt; color: rgb(31, 73, 125); font-family: Arial, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;</spa=
n><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span=
 style=3D"font-size: 9pt; color: rgb(31, 73, 125); font-family: Arial, sans-se=
rif; ">I am guessing that you mean this as a capability and not a constraint=
.</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"=
><span style=3D"font-size: 9pt; color: rgb(31, 73, 125); font-family: Arial, s=
ans-serif; ">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p><d=
iv><div style=3D"border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in =
0in 0in"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size: 10pt; color: black;=
 font-family: Tahoma, sans-serif; ">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-size: =
10pt; color: black; font-family: Tahoma, sans-serif; "> <a href=3D"mailto:pkix=
-bounces@ietf.org">pkix-bounces@ietf.org</a> [<a href=3D"mailto:pkix-bounces@i=
etf.org">mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org</a>] <b>On Behalf Of </b>Stefan Santes=
son<br><b>Sent:</b> Monday, May 23, 2011 6:15 AM<br><b>To:</b> <a href=3D"mail=
to:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a><br><b>Subject:</b> [pkix] Trust Constrai=
nts - Possible request for yet another certificate extension</span><span sty=
le=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><spa=
n style=3D"color:black">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">=
<span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-ser=
if; ">All,</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div>=
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-fami=
ly: Calibri, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p=
></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; =
color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">I have come across a need =
that I don't know how to solve with the existing certificate extensions.</sp=
an><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoN=
ormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, s=
ans-serif; ">I would like to discuss what the best solution is, which may in=
clude defining a new extension.</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p><=
/span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; co=
lor: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"co=
lor:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=
=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">I'm r=
unning a cross certifying PKI which extracts a fairly large number of interm=
ediary CAs and certifies them under a single root.</span><span style=3D"color:=
black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"fo=
nt-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">I create =
a number of root authorities, each representing a different policy for appro=
ving CAs to be certified under this root.</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o=
:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: =
10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;</span><span=
 style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><=
span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-seri=
f; ">Example:&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></=
div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; =
font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">Root 1 only certifies CA:s that issues q=
ualified certificates</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>=
</div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black=
; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:black"=
><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-siz=
e: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">I would like to=
 include some optional information in the root certificate that the relying =
party MAY use to understand policy used to certify CAs under that root.</spa=
n><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNo=
rmal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sa=
ns-serif; ">A relying party using this root MAY use this information to appl=
y extra controls, such as verifying that the end entity certificate being ve=
rified under that root is a qualified certificate by examining the QcStateme=
nts extension from RFC 3739.</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></sp=
an></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color=
: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color=
:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"f=
ont-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">So the o=
ptions I have considered and dismissed are:</span><span style=3D"color:black">=
<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size=
: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;</span><sp=
an style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"=
><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-se=
rif; ">- certificate policy extension, and</span><span style=3D"color:black"><=
o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:=
 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">- EKU</span><span=
 style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><=
span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-seri=
f; ">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div=
><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-fam=
ily: Calibri, sans-serif; ">Both are bad. The policy extension is designed t=
o list certificate policies that can be included in the EE cert (that is wha=
t the path validation algorithm does). The EKU is only meant to be included =
in EE certs and its inclusion in other certs is subject to non-standardized =
handling that makes such solution highly unpredictable.</span><span style=3D"c=
olor:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span styl=
e=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">&nbs=
p;</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=
=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Cali=
bri, sans-serif; ">The cleanest way that I can think of is to include such i=
nformation in a new extension along this structure:</span><span style=3D"color=
:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"f=
ont-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;</=
span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"Ms=
oNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri,=
 sans-serif; ">TrustConstraints :=3D=3D SEQUENCE OF TrustConstraint</span><span =
style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><s=
pan style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif=
; ">TrustConstraint :=3D=3D SEQUENCE {</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:=
p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt;=
 color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;&nbsp;constraint &n=
bsp; &nbsp; OBJECT IDENTIFIER,</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></=
span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; col=
or: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;&nbsp;constraintInfo &n=
bsp;OCTET STRING &nbsp;OPTIONAL }</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p=
></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; =
color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"=
color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span sty=
le=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">The=
 constraintInfo content is defined by the constraint OID. The reason why I p=
ut it in an OCTET STRING is because it is way easier to code than having an =
"any defined by" structure. This way I can always parse this extension with =
a simple fixed ASN.1 structure and pass the byte[] array to higher logic for=
 processing if I recognize the OID, or else trash it. The constraints data c=
ould for example carry XML data or a JSON object according to the definition=
 of the constraint OID. This way we would not have to bother with I18N stuff=
 in the extension definition. Clean and simple.</span><span style=3D"color:bla=
ck"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-=
size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;</span=
><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNor=
mal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, san=
s-serif; ">This extension is only meant to be placed in CA certificates, pos=
sibly only in self signed root certificates.</span><span style=3D"color:black"=
><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-siz=
e: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;</span><s=
pan style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal=
"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; ">Thoughts?</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></di=
v><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; fo=
nt-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:=
p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 1=
0.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">/Stefan</span><span=
 style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><=
span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-seri=
f; ">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div=
><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-fam=
ily: Calibri, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:=
p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt;=
 color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D=
"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span st=
yle=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">&n=
bsp;</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p cla=
ss=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Ca=
libri, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></spa=
n></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color:=
 black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:=
black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"fo=
nt-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;&nb=
sp;</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p clas=
s=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: Cal=
ibri, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span=
></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: =
black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:b=
lack"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div></div></blockquote></div></div><p cl=
ass=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.5pt; color: black; font-family: C=
alibri, sans-serif; ">_______________________________________________ pkix m=
ailing list <a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a> <a href=3D"https:=
//www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/=
pkix</a> <o:p></o:p></span></p></blockquote></div></div></div>______________=
_________________________________
pkix mailing list
<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix">https://www.ietf.org/m=
ailman/listinfo/pkix</a>
</blockquote></span></body></html>

--B_3389352330_62999833--



From stefan@aaa-sec.com  Sat May 28 12:24:54 2011
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Date: Sat, 28 May 2011 21:24:34 +0200
From: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>
To: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
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Thread-Topic: Trusted responders in OCSP
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Subject: [pkix] Trusted responders in OCSP
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I'm worried about the new wording in rfc2560bis regarding trusted
responders.

I've spent some time now doing actual implementation of OCSP checking using
existing libraries and I fear that current RFC 256obis will cause more
confusion and less interoperability, than if we keep 2560 as it is.

The current bis text might be all "X.509" purish but it is not very helpful
in attaining interoperability.

RFC 2560 does not deal with key rollover. It seams to assume that CAs do
what they in practice always do, i.e. They let the lifetime of their issuing
key exceed the lifetime of any certificate they issue.
The self designation express that the responder certificate "is THE
certificate of the CA" that issued the cert being checked. I interpret this
to be the CA certificate found in the cert path of the certificate being
validated.

Most implementers seems to have agreed and understood this to be an easy
check.

If (response signature can be verified by CA cert) {check OK} else {ceck
FAIL}

The same goes for designated responders:

If (designated responder cert can be verified by the CA cert) {check OK}
else {ceck FAIL}


Since this is the current configuration around which interoperability is
achieved, this is the configuration that should be promoted in rfc2560bis as
MUST implement for OCSP clients.
Anything else should be OPTIONAL.

Beyond this there are a kazillion of configuration options for allowing key
rollover, designated responders and even (which I have seen examples of)
designated CAs only issuing responder certs. These are all fine in local
communities under local policy, but no one should expect a general OCSP
client to handle them.

/Stefan





--B_3389462677_65776721
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<html><head></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: s=
pace; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-size:=
 14px; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><div>I'm worried about the new wo=
rding in rfc2560bis regarding trusted responders.</div><div><br></div><div>I=
've spent some time now doing actual implementation of OCSP checking using e=
xisting libraries and&nbsp;I fear that current RFC 256obis will cause more c=
onfusion and less interoperability, than if we keep 2560 as it is.</div><div=
><br></div><div>The current bis text might be all "X.509" purish but it is n=
ot very helpful in attaining interoperability.</div><div><br></div><div><div=
>RFC 2560 does not deal with key rollover. It seams to assume that CAs do wh=
at they in practice always do, i.e. They let the lifetime of their issuing k=
ey exceed the lifetime of any certificate they issue.</div><div>The self des=
ignation express that the responder certificate "is THE certificate of the C=
A" that issued the cert being checked. I interpret this to be the CA certifi=
cate found in the cert path of the certificate being validated.</div></div><=
div><br></div><div>Most implementers seems to have agreed and understood thi=
s to be an easy check.</div><div><br></div><div>If (response signature can b=
e verified by CA cert) {check OK} else {ceck FAIL}</div><div><br></div><div>=
The same goes for designated responders:</div><div><br></div><div>If (design=
ated responder cert can be verified by the CA cert)&nbsp;{check OK} else {ce=
ck FAIL}</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>Since this is the current c=
onfiguration around which interoperability is achieved, this is the configur=
ation that should be promoted in rfc2560bis as MUST implement for OCSP clien=
ts.</div><div>Anything else should be OPTIONAL.</div><div><br></div><div>Bey=
ond this there are a kazillion of configuration options for allowing key rol=
lover, designated responders and even (which I have seen examples of) design=
ated CAs only issuing responder certs. These are all fine in local communiti=
es under local policy, but no one should expect a general OCSP client to han=
dle them.</div><div><br></div><div>/Stefan</div><div><br></div><div><br></di=
v></body></html>

--B_3389462677_65776721--



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From: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>
To: Matt King <mattking1@gmail.com>, <pkix@ietf.org>
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Thread-Topic: [pkix] Revised Submission: claimSigning EKU draft for PKIX WG Consideration
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Revised Submission: claimSigning EKU draft for PKIX WG Consideration
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Matt,

This draft carries a lot of the same problem as the last draft.

The requirements are all over the place and it is neither clear to me by
reading this draft what the context of these requirements are, what usages
that actually constitutes claim signing and how you would fulfill them.

For example. You SHOULD not escrow certificates? (I assume you mean the
private key). What is the context of such requirement and why would you
include such requirement.

Section 4 states that conformant implementations MUST implement the listed
steps which starts with that users SHOULD make use of the extension. So is
it a MUST or a SHOULD?

It is easy to see only the application you are dealing with, where your
context of using this may seem clear to you. But if others are to use the
same specification in their local context, are you sure that all
requirements you put up are reasonable to them? For example with respect
to key usage settings etc?

I personally don't like the word "claim signing". I don't see any standard
referenced that defines this term or give the context for it's use. I
think it is very important to add that context to the specification. I
would be more comfortable to relate it to the SAML protocol suite and the
need for signing of assertions (or what other purpose you are targeting
this for).=20

Except that I don't want to dismiss this proposal. If correctly written
and scoped it might be useful.
Perhaps you van provide some use cases that makes it easier for us to
understand your proposal.

/Stefan


On 11-05-25 9:36 PM, "Matt King" <mattking1@gmail.com> wrote:

>Dear PKIX Working Group
>
>I have posted an updated draft document describing the claimSigning EKU.
>It is
>titled =B3draft-king-pkix-claimsigning-extn-01.txt=B2 (abstract below) and
>it can be found at the following link for your review:
>
>http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-king-pkix-claimsigning-extn/?include
>_text=3D1
>
>This revised draft replaces both the initial draft
>"draft-king-pkix-claimsigning-extn-00.txt"
>and "draft-patterson-pkix-attribute-signing-eku".  The authors of both
>drafts have
>collaborated and addressed all comments received to date and are
>moving forward with this single submission.
>
>I ask that the attached draft be considered as a new work item for
>this group.  Thank you in advance for your time.
>
>Matt
>--=20
>Matt King
>Protiviti Inc.
>Government Services
>Matthew.King@pgs.protiviti.com
>mattking1@gmail.com
>410-271-5624 (Mobile)
>
>
>Abstract
>
>   This memo specifies an Extended Key Usage (EKU) X.509 certificate
>   extension which indicates that the certificate holder is authorized
>   to sign security tokens to assert claims, or attributes, about a
>   principal.
>
>   When an owner of a certificate that asserts the claimSigning EKU
>   signs a claim, the owner is asserting that a statement about the
>   principal is true. For example, a IdP secure token service (STS)
>   would use an X.509 certificate containing the claimSigning EKU to
>   sign SAML assertions containing an identifier and attributes about a
>   user. This additional EKU value would further allow the
>   differentiation of certificates used to identify a particular server
>   from those used by the server to sign identity or attribute claims.
>
>
>
>
>On Fri, Apr 22, 2011 at 1:51 PM, Matt King <mattking1@gmail.com> wrote:
>> Dear PKIX Working Group
>>
>> I have posted an draft document describing a claimSigning EKU.  It is
>> titled =B3draft-king-pkix-claimsigning-extn-00.txt=B2 (abstract below) and
>> it can be found at the following link for your review:
>>
>>=20
>>http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-king-pkix-claimsigning-extn/?includ
>>e_text=3D1
>>
>> I ask that the attached draft be considered as a new work item for
>> this group.  Thank you in advance for your time.
>>
>> Abstract
>>
>>   This memo specifies an Extended Key Usage (EKU) X.509 certificate
>>   extension which indicates that the certificate holder is authorized
>>   to sign security tokens to assert claims, or attributes, about a
>>   principal.
>>
>>   When an owner of a certificate that asserts the claimSigning EKU
>>   signs a claim, the owner is asserting that a statement about the
>>   principal is true. For example, a IdP secure token service (STS)
>>   would use an X.509 certificate containing the claimSigning EKU to
>>   sign SAML assertions containing an identifier and attributes about a
>>   user.
>>
>>
>> --
>> Matt King
>> Protiviti
>> Government Services
>> Matthew.King@pgs.protiviti.com
>> mattking1@gmail.com
>> 410-271-5624 (Mobile)
>>
>
>
>
>--=20
>Matt King
>mattking1@gmail.com
>410-271-5624 (Mobile)
>_______________________________________________
>pkix mailing list
>pkix@ietf.org
>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix



From peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr  Mon May 30 01:04:05 2011
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Revised Submission: claimSigning EKU draft for PKIX WG Consideration
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On 05/30/2011 01:21 AM, Stefan Santesson wrote:
> Matt,
>
> This draft carries a lot of the same problem as the last draft.
I haven' read te last version but:

We have already several texts which statements/assertions
about subjects and other things, e.g. OCSP, SCVP, DVCS
and to some degree also TSP. all define a specific
extended key usages.

the first three are services may be considered in the scope of
such a claimSigning thing. or is it intended that the signer
does not make an assertion? but just a claim?

the scope of this extension is very broad. it looks more
like "this is not a person" (but a server/service).

to a certain degree, some text looks like a best practice definition
for all kinds of certificates used by servers that provide attestations
assertions which not that different from CA signing devices?

the escrow remarks are not very motivated, I almost think
that they are questionable for the same practical reason
that one might want to escrow (backup) a CA key.

refereing to 'local practices' when the proposed value is not
present looks like ignoring other specifications.

the only exemple given is about an idp.









From tomas@primekey.se  Mon May 30 01:11:50 2011
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Trusted responders in OCSP
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I agree that, also according to my experience, this is how OCSP
validation works in practice today. Wich is probably why it generally
works quite well.

Cheers,
Tomas

On 05/28/2011 09:24 PM, Stefan Santesson wrote:
> I'm worried about the new wording in rfc2560bis regarding trusted
> responders.
> 
> I've spent some time now doing actual implementation of OCSP checking
> using existing libraries and I fear that current RFC 256obis will cause
> more confusion and less interoperability, than if we keep 2560 as it is.
> 
> The current bis text might be all "X.509" purish but it is not very
> helpful in attaining interoperability.
> 
> RFC 2560 does not deal with key rollover. It seams to assume that CAs do
> what they in practice always do, i.e. They let the lifetime of their
> issuing key exceed the lifetime of any certificate they issue.
> The self designation express that the responder certificate "is THE
> certificate of the CA" that issued the cert being checked. I interpret
> this to be the CA certificate found in the cert path of the certificate
> being validated.
> 
> Most implementers seems to have agreed and understood this to be an easy
> check.
> 
> If (response signature can be verified by CA cert) {check OK} else {ceck
> FAIL}
> 
> The same goes for designated responders:
> 
> If (designated responder cert can be verified by the CA cert) {check OK}
> else {ceck FAIL}
> 
> 
> Since this is the current configuration around which interoperability is
> achieved, this is the configuration that should be promoted in
> rfc2560bis as MUST implement for OCSP clients.
> Anything else should be OPTIONAL.
> 
> Beyond this there are a kazillion of configuration options for allowing
> key rollover, designated responders and even (which I have seen examples
> of) designated CAs only issuing responder certs. These are all fine in
> local communities under local policy, but no one should expect a general
> OCSP client to handle them.
> 
> /Stefan
> 
> 
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix


From stefan@aaa-sec.com  Mon May 30 02:46:45 2011
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From: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>
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This is how I would like to change this section in RFC 2560bis

http://tinyurl.com/2560bis-tr


/Stefan

On 11-05-30 10:11 AM, "Tomas Gustavsson" <tomas@primekey.se> wrote:

>
>I agree that, also according to my experience, this is how OCSP
>validation works in practice today. Wich is probably why it generally
>works quite well.
>
>Cheers,
>Tomas
>
>On 05/28/2011 09:24 PM, Stefan Santesson wrote:
>> I'm worried about the new wording in rfc2560bis regarding trusted
>> responders.
>> 
>> I've spent some time now doing actual implementation of OCSP checking
>> using existing libraries and I fear that current RFC 256obis will cause
>> more confusion and less interoperability, than if we keep 2560 as it is.
>> 
>> The current bis text might be all "X.509" purish but it is not very
>> helpful in attaining interoperability.
>> 
>> RFC 2560 does not deal with key rollover. It seams to assume that CAs do
>> what they in practice always do, i.e. They let the lifetime of their
>> issuing key exceed the lifetime of any certificate they issue.
>> The self designation express that the responder certificate "is THE
>> certificate of the CA" that issued the cert being checked. I interpret
>> this to be the CA certificate found in the cert path of the certificate
>> being validated.
>> 
>> Most implementers seems to have agreed and understood this to be an easy
>> check.
>> 
>> If (response signature can be verified by CA cert) {check OK} else {ceck
>> FAIL}
>> 
>> The same goes for designated responders:
>> 
>> If (designated responder cert can be verified by the CA cert) {check OK}
>> else {ceck FAIL}
>> 
>> 
>> Since this is the current configuration around which interoperability is
>> achieved, this is the configuration that should be promoted in
>> rfc2560bis as MUST implement for OCSP clients.
>> Anything else should be OPTIONAL.
>> 
>> Beyond this there are a kazillion of configuration options for allowing
>> key rollover, designated responders and even (which I have seen examples
>> of) designated CAs only issuing responder certs. These are all fine in
>> local communities under local policy, but no one should expect a general
>> OCSP client to handle them.
>> 
>> /Stefan
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> _______________________________________________
>> pkix mailing list
>> pkix@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>
>_______________________________________________
>pkix mailing list
>pkix@ietf.org
>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix



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Much clearer, and easier to read, than the current text IMHO.
Such, easy to read, texts, limiting the MUST options, are good for
interoperability.

Regards,
Tomas

On 05/30/2011 11:46 AM, Stefan Santesson wrote:
> This is how I would like to change this section in RFC 2560bis
> 
> http://tinyurl.com/2560bis-tr
> 
> 
> /Stefan
> 
> On 11-05-30 10:11 AM, "Tomas Gustavsson" <tomas@primekey.se> wrote:
> 
>>
>> I agree that, also according to my experience, this is how OCSP
>> validation works in practice today. Wich is probably why it generally
>> works quite well.
>>
>> Cheers,
>> Tomas
>>
>> On 05/28/2011 09:24 PM, Stefan Santesson wrote:
>>> I'm worried about the new wording in rfc2560bis regarding trusted
>>> responders.
>>>
>>> I've spent some time now doing actual implementation of OCSP checking
>>> using existing libraries and I fear that current RFC 256obis will cause
>>> more confusion and less interoperability, than if we keep 2560 as it is.
>>>
>>> The current bis text might be all "X.509" purish but it is not very
>>> helpful in attaining interoperability.
>>>
>>> RFC 2560 does not deal with key rollover. It seams to assume that CAs do
>>> what they in practice always do, i.e. They let the lifetime of their
>>> issuing key exceed the lifetime of any certificate they issue.
>>> The self designation express that the responder certificate "is THE
>>> certificate of the CA" that issued the cert being checked. I interpret
>>> this to be the CA certificate found in the cert path of the certificate
>>> being validated.
>>>
>>> Most implementers seems to have agreed and understood this to be an easy
>>> check.
>>>
>>> If (response signature can be verified by CA cert) {check OK} else {ceck
>>> FAIL}
>>>
>>> The same goes for designated responders:
>>>
>>> If (designated responder cert can be verified by the CA cert) {check OK}
>>> else {ceck FAIL}
>>>
>>>
>>> Since this is the current configuration around which interoperability is
>>> achieved, this is the configuration that should be promoted in
>>> rfc2560bis as MUST implement for OCSP clients.
>>> Anything else should be OPTIONAL.
>>>
>>> Beyond this there are a kazillion of configuration options for allowing
>>> key rollover, designated responders and even (which I have seen examples
>>> of) designated CAs only issuing responder certs. These are all fine in
>>> local communities under local policy, but no one should expect a general
>>> OCSP client to handle them.
>>>
>>> /Stefan
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> pkix mailing list
>>> pkix@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> pkix mailing list
>> pkix@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix


From dcarella@linagora.com  Mon May 30 08:57:00 2011
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Date: Mon, 30 May 2011 17:56:56 +0200
From: David CARELLA <dcarella@linagora.com>
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Subject: [pkix] Best practices for Certificate Policy OIDs in certificates
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This is a cryptographically signed message in MIME format.

--------------ms000304030203040900060004
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
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Hi all,

After reading RFC 5280, =A7 4.2.1.4 Certificate Policies, I have several =

questions about the best practices on certificate policies:
- certificate policies writing (number of documents),
- setting the certificate policy OIDs (and qualifiers) in CA and end=20
entities certificates.

I suppose that I have:
- entities and theirs certificates:
     - Root CA,
     - Sub CA 1 (Intermediate CA), issued by Root CA,
     - Sub CA 2 (End CA), issued by Sub CA 1,
     - End entities (EE), issued by Sub CA 2;
- certificate policies:
     - Root CA certificate policy (describe Root CA and Sub CA 1): OID-0,=

     - Sub CA 1 certificate policy (describe Sub CA 1 and Sub CA 2): OID-=
1,
     - Sub CA 2 certificate policy (describe Sub CA 2 and End entities): =

OID-2.


Which is the best practice, for certificate policies writing?
1. One certificate policy (CP) by CA (cf. above),
    i.e.:
    - one CP for Root CA,
    - one CP for each level 1 Sub CA,
    - and one CP for each level 2 Sub CA,
2. One certificate policy for Root CA and level 1 Sub CA,
    and one certificate policy for each level 2 Sub CA (as End CA),
3. Other case?


Which is the best technical practice, among the following examples, or=20
other cases?

--- Example 1
According to RFC 5280, and strictly respected.

Root CA: Certificate policy:
- policyIdentifier: anyPolicy [2.5.29.32.0]
- policyQualifiers: - cPSuri: URI

Sub CA 1: Certificate policy:
- policyIdentifier: anyPolicy [2.5.29.32.0]
- policyQualifiers: - cPSuri: URI

Sub CA 2: Certificate policy:
- policyIdentifier: anyPolicy [2.5.29.32.0]
- policyQualifiers: - cPSuri: URI

End entity: Certificate policy:
- policyIdentifier: OID (OID-2)

--> E.g. URI =3D http://pki.project.org/cps/


--- Example 2
According to RFC 5280, and according to what I saw in Firefox=20
("conformed" built-in CAs).

Root CA: Certificate policy:
- policyIdentifier: anyPolicy [2.5.29.32.0]
- policyQualifiers: - cPSuri: URI

Sub CA 1: Certificate policy:
- policyIdentifier: anyPolicy [2.5.29.32.0]
- policyQualifiers: - cPSuri: URI

Sub CA 2: Certificate policy:
- policyIdentifier: OID (OID-2)
- policyQualifiers: - cPSuri: URI

End entity: Certificate policy:
- policyIdentifier: OID (OID-2)
- policyQualifiers:
     - cPSuri: URI
     - userNotice: - explicitText: text (if need)

--> E.g. URI =3D http://pki.project.org/cps/


--- Example 3
Sometimes, I saw the following case (for the Sub CA 2, from my example=20
2), but it isn't conformed to the recommendations described in RFC 5280, =

because there are two OIDs, and cPSuri isn't needful for OID!=3DanyPolicy=
=2E
Is it still a good practice?

Sub CA 2:
Certificate policy:
- policyIdentifier: OID (OID-2)
- policyQualifiers: - cPSuri: URI
Certificate policy:
- policyIdentifier: anyPolicy [2.5.29.32.0]

--> E.g. URI =3D http://pki.project.org/cps/


Best regards,
David CARELLA


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From kent@bbn.com  Tue May 31 12:32:27 2011
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Date: Tue, 31 May 2011 15:30:12 -0400
To: Matt King <mattking1@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Revised Submission: claimSigning EKU draft for PKIX WG Consideration
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I concur with Stefan's assessment of this doc.

Steve
