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To: "David A. Cooper" <david.cooper@nist.gov>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Cross-cert as anchor (was Re: AD Review ofdraft-ietf-pkix-rfc5280-clarifications-03.txt)
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        The trust anchor information defined in RFC 5280 6.1.1-d-1 
includes the DN of the first certificate in the chain, but not the DN of 
the issuer.  The process of using a CA certificate as a trust anchor drops 
those fields which distinguish a self-signed certificate from an ordinary 
cross-certificate, so there seems little reason to accept one type as an 
anchor but not the other.  There is also no requirement that only 
self-signed certificates be used as a certificate within CertPathControls 
in RFC 5914 section 2.5.  Further comments marked as [TG].

Tom Gindin




From:   "David A. Cooper" <david.cooper@nist.gov>
To:     Tom Gindin/Watson/IBM@IBMUS
Cc:     PKIX <pkix@ietf.org>
Date:   09/28/2011 10:42 AM
Subject:        Re: Cross-cert as anchor (was Re: [pkix] AD Review 
ofdraft-ietf-pkix-rfc5280-clarifications-03.txt)



On 09/27/2011 09:13 PM, Tom Gindin wrote:
>          The issuer of the cross-certificate is clearly NOT the trust
> anchor in the first scenario.  If it were, the RP would trust paths
> originating at that issuer through any of its many cross-certificates
> instead of only those using the trusted cross-certificate.

The X.509 path validation algorithm simply takes a trust anchor, a 
prospective certification path, and other information, and provides a 
valid/not valid response (or at least that's a slightly simplified 
version of how it works).  There is nothing that says that if you choose 
to use a particular trust anchor when validating one particular 
prospective certification path that you must accept any certification 
path that can be validated using that same trust anchor.  So, any claim 
that the issuer of a certificate cannot have been used as a trust anchor 
when validating one prospective certification path because you would be 
unwilling to use that same trust anchor to validate other prospective 
certification paths simply demonstrates a misunderstanding of the 
standard.

[TG] I know that RFC 5280 section 6.1 permits an application to limit the 
set of paths beyond what passes basic certificate processing by 
"augmenting the algorithm".  However, an implementation of basic 
certificate processing using the issuer of the cross certificate as an 
anchor will accept all paths whose first certificate is a 
cross-certificate from that issuer unless they fail other criteria, so 
most implementations will accept them although it's possible to augment 
the algorithm in such a way as to reject them.

> I am not
> requiring that the cross-certificates in question be checked for
> revocation or even verified, so they aren't part of the path.

So what you are proposing is that the certificate from which you extract 
the trust anchor information is not actually processed as the first 
certificate in the path, as others are arguing should be done with the 
certificate from which trust anchor information is extracted.   Rather 
you are suggesting that the relying party should be free to impose 
constraints on the set of certification paths that it will accept from a 
given trust anchor.  I don't think anyone has argued against that.  That 
is why the path validation algorithm allows for inputs such as 
initial-permitted-subtrees to be specified.  But, the values of these 
inputs are specified by the relying party, not by the trust anchor.  The 
trust anchor imposes constraints by (1) not issuing certificates that 
violate its own self-imposed constraints and (2) including appropriate 
constraints extensions in an cross-certificates that it issues.

[TG] I am proposing that the RP can adopt constraints on an anchor which 
were originally defined by another entity which issued a cross-certificate 
for that anchor.  While the RP is free to impose any constraints it 
wishes, many RP's support more than a few issuers and might appreciate a 
means of delegating the definition of those constraints. 

> It's only more logical to regard the issuer of the cross certificate as 
the anchor
> if you are committed to the idea that the only certificates which should
> be used as anchors are self-signed.  TrustAnchorInfo in RFC 5914 section 
2
> has no analogue of the issuer field or the certificate signature, so
> whether a certificate is self-signed or a cross-certificate has no 
effect
> on whether it's a valid source for that information.

Not true at all.  It is perfectly reasonable to regard the issue of the 
cross-certificate as the trust anchor if you intend to process the 
cross-certificate as if it were the first certificate in the prospective 
certification path in order to process any constraints extensions in the 
certificate.

[TG]    It's at least equally reasonable to treat constraints extensions 
in such a certificate as part of the anchor definition instead.

>          Trust anchors are decided on by the RP, and whether the issuer 
of
> a CA certificate intended it to be used as an anchor does not bind him. 
We
> can assume that a self-signed CA certificate was intended for use by 
RP's
> as an anchor, but I see no reason why a cross-certificate cannot also be
> used as an anchor.

It can, and I never argued otherwise.  But, if you decide to process 
this extension in order to honor any constraints extensions that it has, 
then this cross-certificate is the first certificate in the 
certification path and the issuer of the certificate is the trust 
anchor.  The subject of the cross-certificate is only the trust anchor 
if that subject issued the first certificate in the prospective 
certification path, and in that case, since the relying party gets to 
select the values for the path validation inputs, it is up to the 
relying party to decide whether its wants to consider the information in 
the cross-certificate when it decides what values to use for the path 
validation inputs.

[TG]    I'm not arguing that you should process the cross certificate as 
the first certificate in the path.  I'm arguing that you should extract 
the constraints from it using the same mappings as in RFC 5914 section 
2.5.

> From:   "David A. Cooper"<david.cooper@nist.gov>
> To:     Tom Gindin/Watson/IBM@IBMUS
> Cc:     PKIX<pkix@ietf.org>
> Date:   09/27/2011 11:09 AM
> Subject:        Re: [pkix] AD Review
> ofdraft-ietf-pkix-rfc5280-clarifications-03.txt
>
>
>
> Perhaps I am misunderstanding, but I don't see how your examples differ
> from ordinary path validation, except in the way that you describe them.
>
> There are a couple of ways to look at your examples.  In the first
> scenario, the most logical view seems to be that the issuer of the
> cross-certificate is the trust anchor and the cross-certificate is the
> first certificate in the prospective certification path.
>
> In the second scenario, the RP creates its own CA, which it uses as a
> trust anchor, and the certificates that it issues to the "national root
> CA's" are the first certificates in any prospective certification
> paths.  The second scenario could also be accomplished with the RP
> establishing a CA and issuing cross-certificates if the RP simply
> associated appropriate constraints with each of the national root CAs
> and used those constraints as inputs to the path validation algorithm.
>
> It seems that only be viewing these scenarios in an unusual manner
> (i.e., calling the subject of the first (non-self-signed) certificate in
> the path the trust anchor even though you want that certificate to be
> included as part of the of the prospective certification path).
>
> Neither of these examples, however, involve a CA issuing a self-signed
> certificate that includes constraints extensions, with the expectation
> that relying parties will enforce those constraints, and then
> intentionally issuing certificates that violate those constraints.
>
> On 09/26/2011 08:46 PM, Tom Gindin wrote:
>>           I think it's legitimate for an intermediate CA certificate to 
be
>> used as a trust anchor, and for the RP to honor the constraint 
extensions.
>>    Given that, why should name constraints or policy constraints in a
>> self-signed certificate not be honored?
>>           The cases I envision accept a trust anchor in the form an 
ordinary
>> cross-certificate, at least in appearance.  I see two scenarios where 
this
>> can be valuable.  In the first scenario, an extranet application trusts 
a
>> set of corporate CA's by trusting their cross-certificates and enforces
>> name constraints on them.  That application does NOT accept public
>> certificates from the CA's which issued the corporate CA's 
certificates,
>> nor certificates from all of the organizations which those CA's have
>> cross-certified.  It simply trusts the corporate CA's on its list.
>>           In the second scenario, a distributor of RP software 
distributes
>> trust anchors as certificates as many such packages do.  It wishes to
>> enforce on many national root CA's a constraint that each may issue
>> certificates containing only certain country codes in DNS names or in
>> DN's, and may not issue certificates covering the global TLD's, while
>> accepting their certificates for their own countries.  It creates a
>> certificate for that CA with such a name constraint and an issuer
>> representing the RP itself.  This certificate will not be self-signed, 
as
>> the distributor is imposing the name constraint rather than the 
national
>> root CA itself.  Is something wrong with this scenario?
>>           Constraints are always enforced as limitations on what a 
relying
>> party will accept, and I don't see how that differs between a trust 
anchor
>> and an intermediate CA.  We need not imply that a CA which exceeds its
>> published constraints is thereby acting improperly to reject the 
exceeding
>> certificates, and thus I don't see that the points in your second
>> paragraph are relevant to implementations.




From internet-drafts@ietf.org  Mon Oct  3 05:03:29 2011
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Subject: [pkix] I-D Action: draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-04.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts director=
ies. This draft is a work item of the Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) Wor=
king Group of the IETF.

	Title           : X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certific=
ate Status Protocol - OCSP
	Author(s)       : David Cooper
                          Stefan Santesson
	Filename        : draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-04.txt
	Pages           : 43
	Date            : 2011-10-03

   This document specifies a protocol useful in determining the current
   status of a digital certificate without requiring CRLs.



A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-04.txt

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
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From martin.peylo@nsn.com  Mon Oct  3 07:03:04 2011
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From: "Peylo, Martin (NSN - FI/Espoo)" <martin.peylo@nsn.com>
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Subject: [pkix] PKIX review on draft-ietf-pkix-cmp-transport-protocols-14.txt
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Dear PKIX working group members,

the content of the "CMPtrans" draft is now quite complete.  The
interested readers will see that it now became quite short,
straightforward and largely reflects the implemented reality.

It would be great if you could review this document and provide feedback
of any kind.

Now the draft describes a way how to transport all CMP messages over
HTTP.  This includes the optional transporting of "CMP Announcements"
which are specified in RFC 4210 but couldn't serve any use at all
before.

Other kinds of transport as e.g. the "TCP-Based Management Protocol" or
high-level mentioning of FTP or email transport were completely removed.
The "TCP-Based" transport is generally considered to be inferior
compared with HTTP and does not provide any advantage.  Description of
transport over other existing protocols is left as future challenge for
those who find the use case.=20

<http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-pkix-cmp-transport-protocols-14>

Kind regards,
Martin



-----Original Message-----
From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
ext internet-drafts@ietf.org
Sent: Thursday, September 29, 2011 2:40 PM
To: i-d-announce@ietf.org
Cc: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: [pkix] I-D Action:
draft-ietf-pkix-cmp-transport-protocols-14.txt

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
directories. This draft is a work item of the Public-Key Infrastructure
(X.509) Working Group of the IETF.

	Title           : Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure --
HTTP Transport for CMP
	Author(s)       : Tomi Kause
                          Martin Peylo
	Filename        : draft-ietf-pkix-cmp-transport-protocols-14.txt
	Pages           : 15
	Date            : 2011-09-29

   This document describes how to layer the Certificate Management
   Protocol over HTTP.  It is the &quot;CMPtrans&quot; document
referenced in RFC
   4210 and therefore updates the reference given therein.


A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-cmp-transport-protoc
ols-14.txt

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From: "Kyle Hamilton" <aerowolf@gmail.com>
To: pkix@ietf.org
Date: Sat, 1 Oct 2011 07:00:10 -0700 (Pacific Daylight Time)
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Subject: [pkix] OCSP handling versus the DigiNotar incident, best practices?
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All,

There appears to be no differentiation in OCSP libraries and OCSP-consuming applications as to "valid" versus "unknown" responses, and no differentiation between "responded unknown" and "non-responded unknown".

I have a bit of a problem with this, as it permits the magnification of errors (error in CA key control magnified by error in OCSP handling compounds to critical incident).

Would it make sense to change the interpretation of an "unknown" response from a CA's OCSP responder from "the OCSP responder doesn't know what the CA hasn't told it" to "the CA doesn't know about this certificate at all, so it's best to treat it as revoked"?

Or is this something that will be so contentious here that it must be separately profiled?

-Kyle H

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From liaquat.khan@ascertia.com  Mon Oct  3 10:57:00 2011
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From: "Liaquat Khan" <liaquat.khan@ascertia.com>
To: "'Kyle Hamilton'" <aerowolf@gmail.com>, <pkix@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] OCSP handling versus the DigiNotar incident, best practices?
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Hi Kyle

Changing the OCSP responder functionality in this way has been discussed a
few times before.  I believe you are asking for a white-list check rather
than a black-list.  I.e. "good" response only if the certificate was issued
by the CA and is not revoked.  From past experience, I don't think this will
be accepted as a change to the standard because of the already installations
out there (since many OCSP responders work off CRLs, without access the DB
of issued certs).  Easiest route to achieving what you want is the use of
specific profiles IMO.  I also agree with you that this is an important
point.   

Regards
Liaquat

-----Original Message-----
From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Kyle
Hamilton
Sent: 01 October 2011 15:00
To: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: [pkix] OCSP handling versus the DigiNotar incident, best practices?

All,

There appears to be no differentiation in OCSP libraries and OCSP-consuming
applications as to "valid" versus "unknown" responses, and no
differentiation between "responded unknown" and "non-responded unknown".

I have a bit of a problem with this, as it permits the magnification of
errors (error in CA key control magnified by error in OCSP handling
compounds to critical incident).

Would it make sense to change the interpretation of an "unknown" response
from a CA's OCSP responder from "the OCSP responder doesn't know what the CA
hasn't told it" to "the CA doesn't know about this certificate at all, so
it's best to treat it as revoked"?

Or is this something that will be so contentious here that it must be
separately profiled?

-Kyle H



From simon@tardell.se  Mon Oct  3 12:12:35 2011
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>
> Would it make sense to change the interpretation of an "unknown" response


No, it wouldn't. You can't change the semantics of the protocol. Look at it
this way: What can a client do with a "good", "revoked" and "unknown"
response respectively? With a "good" response it can proceed, with "revoked"
it stops, and with "unknown" it can ask another responder if one is
available (or download CRLs). If "unknown" means "I KNOW this certificate
was never issued" the behavior of the client must be different -- it should
act identically in the "revoked" and "unknown" case, and there would be no
way to tell a client that someone else might have better information about
the status of a certificate.

If you want to assert something about the issuance of a certificate you
could do so through an extension in SingleResponse. In my mind, it would do
little to address the DigiNotar case, though. If the OCSP responder is
dependent of the CA, then a compromise of the CA would compromise the
responder, at least for some time. If the OCSP responder asserts the
issuance of a certificate entirely independent of the CA it is in effect a
CA of its own. If so, why don't just issue two certs from two independent
CAs and require both of them to be valid (generalize to n of m to get your
required level of security and redundancy)?

Simon Tardell,
Technology Nexus.

On Sat, Oct 1, 2011 at 16:00, Kyle Hamilton <aerowolf@gmail.com> wrote:

> All,
>
> There appears to be no differentiation in OCSP libraries and OCSP-consuming
> applications as to "valid" versus "unknown" responses, and no
> differentiation between "responded unknown" and "non-responded unknown".
>
> I have a bit of a problem with this, as it permits the magnification of
> errors (error in CA key control magnified by error in OCSP handling
> compounds to critical incident).
>
> Would it make sense to change the interpretation of an "unknown" response
> from a CA's OCSP responder from "the OCSP responder doesn't know what the CA
> hasn't told it" to "the CA doesn't know about this certificate at all, so
> it's best to treat it as revoked"?
>
> Or is this something that will be so contentious here that it must be
> separately profiled?
>
> -Kyle H
>
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>
>

--0016e6ddff46b86b9304ae69cce2
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0=
px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0.8ex; border-left-width: 1px; border-=
left-color: rgb(204, 204, 204); border-left-style: solid; padding-left: 1ex=
; ">
Would it make sense to change the interpretation of an &quot;unknown&quot; =
response</blockquote><div><br></div><div>No, it wouldn&#39;t. You can&#39;t=
 change the semantics of the protocol. Look at it this way: What can a clie=
nt do with a &quot;good&quot;, &quot;revoked&quot; and &quot;unknown&quot; =
response respectively? With a &quot;good&quot; response it can proceed, wit=
h &quot;revoked&quot; it stops, and with &quot;unknown&quot; it can ask ano=
ther responder if one is available (or download CRLs). If &quot;unknown&quo=
t; means &quot;I KNOW this certificate was never issued&quot; the behavior =
of the client must be different -- it should act identically in the &quot;r=
evoked&quot; and &quot;unknown&quot; case, and there would be no way to tel=
l a client that someone else might have better information about the status=
 of a certificate.</div>
<div><br></div><div>If you want to assert something about the issuance of a=
 certificate you could do so through an extension in SingleResponse. In my =
mind, it would do little to address the DigiNotar case, though. If the OCSP=
 responder is dependent of the CA, then a compromise of the CA would compro=
mise the responder, at least for some time. If the OCSP responder asserts t=
he issuance of a certificate entirely independent of the CA it is in effect=
 a CA of its own. If so, why don&#39;t just issue two certs from two indepe=
ndent CAs and require both of them to be valid (generalize to n of m to get=
 your required level of security and redundancy)?=A0</div>
<div><br></div><div>Simon Tardell,</div><div>Technology Nexus.</div><div><b=
r><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Sat, Oct 1, 2011 at 16:00, Kyle Hamilton <s=
pan dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:aerowolf@gmail.com">aerowolf@gmail.co=
m</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">All,<br>
<br>
There appears to be no differentiation in OCSP libraries and OCSP-consuming=
 applications as to &quot;valid&quot; versus &quot;unknown&quot; responses,=
 and no differentiation between &quot;responded unknown&quot; and &quot;non=
-responded unknown&quot;.<br>

<br>
I have a bit of a problem with this, as it permits the magnification of err=
ors (error in CA key control magnified by error in OCSP handling compounds =
to critical incident).<br>
<br>
Would it make sense to change the interpretation of an &quot;unknown&quot; =
response from a CA&#39;s OCSP responder from &quot;the OCSP responder doesn=
&#39;t know what the CA hasn&#39;t told it&quot; to &quot;the CA doesn&#39;=
t know about this certificate at all, so it&#39;s best to treat it as revok=
ed&quot;?<br>

<br>
Or is this something that will be so contentious here that it must be separ=
ately profiled?<br>
<br>
-Kyle H<br>
<br>_______________________________________________<br>
pkix mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div>

--0016e6ddff46b86b9304ae69cce2--

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To: Simon Tardell <simon@tardell.se>
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Cc: pkix@ietf.org, Kyle Hamilton <aerowolf@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [pkix] OCSP handling versus the DigiNotar incident, best practices?
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On Mon, Oct 3, 2011 at 3:15 PM, Simon Tardell <simon@tardell.se> wrote:
>> Would it make sense to change the interpretation of an "unknown" response
>
> No, it wouldn't. You can't change the semantics of the protocol. Look at it
> this way: What can a client do with a "good", "revoked" and "unknown"
> response respectively? With a "good" response it can proceed, with "revoked"
> it stops, and with "unknown" it can ask another responder if one is
> available (or download CRLs). If "unknown" means "I KNOW this certificate
> was never issued" the behavior of the client must be different -- it should
> act identically in the "revoked" and "unknown" case, and there would be no
> way to tell a client that someone else might have better information about
> the status of a certificate.

No, there is a huge difference between "I do not know the status of
this cert" and "I know that there is no such cert".

This was lossage when first proposed and it is going to be fixed. The
discussion in PKIX was driven by a commercial position that is no
longer operative (it is an ex-dot-com, if you hadn't merged him to his
perch he would be pushing up the daisies, etc.)


The point of OCSP was to communicate information. I need to
communicate information that differentiates the two very distinct
conditions. The other CAs seemed to be similarly convinced of that
need when we met last week. So what this group is being asked is HOW
to communicate said information not 'whether'.



-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

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From: Simon Tardell <simon@tardell.se>
To: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
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Cc: pkix@ietf.org, Kyle Hamilton <aerowolf@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [pkix] OCSP handling versus the DigiNotar incident, best practices?
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On Tue, Oct 4, 2011 at 02:10, Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Mon, Oct 3, 2011 at 3:15 PM, Simon Tardell <simon@tardell.se> wrote:
> >> Would it make sense to change the interpretation of an "unknown"
> response
> >
> > No, it wouldn't. You can't change the semantics of the protocol. Look at
> it
> > this way: What can a client do with a "good", "revoked" and "unknown"
> > response respectively? With a "good" response it can proceed, with
> "revoked"
> > it stops, and with "unknown" it can ask another responder if one is
> > available (or download CRLs). If "unknown" means "I KNOW this certificate
> > was never issued" the behavior of the client must be different -- it
> should
> > act identically in the "revoked" and "unknown" case, and there would be
> no
> > way to tell a client that someone else might have better information
> about
> > the status of a certificate.
>
> No, there is a huge difference between "I do not know the status of
> this cert" and "I know that there is no such cert".
>
>
Which is my point. Furthermore, from the clients point of view, "I know
there is no such cert" is equivalent to "this cert is revoked (and will stay
revoked until it maybe is issued)". There are only three outcomes:
use-this-cert, don't-use-this-cert or
ask-someoneelse-about-this-cert-because-my-papers-are-in-a-mess.

Hence, if you need to assert a certificate was not issued (ever or yet), you
should answer revoked, possibly qualifying with reason code certificateHold
if you want to cater for the possibility it might be issued in the future.
If you need to differentiate between revoked and not issued (but I don't see
 why, please enlighten me) you could do so by introducing a critical single
extension.

What I don't want to see is that the semantics of the "unknown" response
changes.

This was lossage when first proposed and it is going to be fixed. The
> discussion in PKIX was driven by a commercial position that is no
> longer operative (it is an ex-dot-com, if you hadn't merged him to his
> perch he would be pushing up the daisies, etc.)



> The point of OCSP was to communicate information. I need to
> communicate information that differentiates the two very distinct
> conditions. The other CAs seemed to be similarly convinced of that
> need when we met last week. So what this group is being asked is HOW
> to communicate said information not 'whether'.
>
>
Of course. But it won't solve the DigiNotar problem. DigiNotar did exactly
what I mentioned above: they started to respond "revoked" for all
certificates they didn't know were issued. And how did it help? The problem
is that the OCSP responder isn't independent in any meaningful sense of the
word. If you can't trust them to run a CA, you can't trust them to run an
OCSP responder.

(This is not an argument that we shouldn't decide what to answer in the case
of "non-issued", it is just to say, it doesn't help much, and it is not the
best way to solve the underlying problem.)

Simon Tardell.

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<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue, Oct 4, 2011 at 02:10, Phillip Ha=
llam-Baker <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:hallam@gmail.com">hallam=
@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
<div class=3D"im">On Mon, Oct 3, 2011 at 3:15 PM, Simon Tardell &lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:simon@tardell.se">simon@tardell.se</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt; Would it make sense to change the interpretation of an &quot;unkno=
wn&quot; response<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; No, it wouldn&#39;t. You can&#39;t change the semantics of the protoco=
l. Look at it<br>
&gt; this way: What can a client do with a &quot;good&quot;, &quot;revoked&=
quot; and &quot;unknown&quot;<br>
&gt; response respectively? With a &quot;good&quot; response it can proceed=
, with &quot;revoked&quot;<br>
&gt; it stops, and with &quot;unknown&quot; it can ask another responder if=
 one is<br>
&gt; available (or download CRLs). If &quot;unknown&quot; means &quot;I KNO=
W this certificate<br>
&gt; was never issued&quot; the behavior of the client must be different --=
 it should<br>
&gt; act identically in the &quot;revoked&quot; and &quot;unknown&quot; cas=
e, and there would be no<br>
&gt; way to tell a client that someone else might have better information a=
bout<br>
&gt; the status of a certificate.<br>
<br>
</div>No, there is a huge difference between &quot;I do not know the status=
 of<br>
this cert&quot; and &quot;I know that there is no such cert&quot;.<br>
<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Which is my point. Furthermore, from t=
he clients point of view, &quot;I know there is no such cert&quot; is equiv=
alent to &quot;this cert is revoked (and will stay revoked until it maybe i=
s issued)&quot;. There are only three outcomes: use-this-cert, don&#39;t-us=
e-this-cert or ask-someoneelse-about-this-cert-because-my-papers-are-in-a-m=
ess.=A0</div>
<div><br></div><div>Hence, if you need to assert a certificate was not issu=
ed (ever or yet), you should answer revoked, possibly qualifying with reaso=
n code certificateHold if you want to cater for the possibility it might be=
 issued in the future. If you need to differentiate between revoked and not=
 issued (but I don&#39;t see =A0why, please enlighten me) you could do so b=
y introducing a critical single extension.</div>
<div>=A0</div><div>What I don&#39;t want to see is that the semantics of th=
e &quot;unknown&quot; response changes.=A0</div><div><br></div><blockquote =
class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid=
;padding-left:1ex;">

This was lossage when first proposed and it is going to be fixed. The<br>
discussion in PKIX was driven by a commercial position that is no<br>
longer operative (it is an ex-dot-com, if you hadn&#39;t merged him to his<=
br>
perch he would be pushing up the daisies, etc.)</blockquote><div><br></div>=
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
<br>
The point of OCSP was to communicate information. I need to<br>
communicate information that differentiates the two very distinct<br>
conditions. The other CAs seemed to be similarly convinced of that<br>
need when we met last week. So what this group is being asked is HOW<br>
to communicate said information not &#39;whether&#39;.<br>
<font color=3D"#888888"><br></font></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Of cour=
se. But it won&#39;t solve the DigiNotar problem. DigiNotar did exactly wha=
t I mentioned above: they started to respond &quot;revoked&quot; for all ce=
rtificates they didn&#39;t know were issued. And how did it help? The probl=
em is that the OCSP responder isn&#39;t independent in any meaningful sense=
 of the word. If you can&#39;t trust them to run a CA, you can&#39;t trust =
them to run an OCSP responder.</div>
<div><br></div><div>(This is not an argument that we shouldn&#39;t decide w=
hat to answer in the case of &quot;non-issued&quot;, it is just to say, it =
doesn&#39;t help much, and it is not the best way to solve the underlying p=
roblem.)</div>
<div>=A0</div><div>Simon Tardell.</div></div>

--0015174413328579e304ae75e457--

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To: Kyle Hamilton <kyanha@kyanha.net>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] OCSP handling versus the DigiNotar incident, best practices?
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On Tue, Oct 4, 2011 at 03:30, Kyle Hamilton <kyanha@kyanha.net> wrote:

>
>
> On Mon, Oct 3, 2011 at 12:15 PM, Simon Tardell <simon@tardell.se> wrote:
>
>> Would it make sense to change the interpretation of an "unknown" response
>>>
>>
>> No, it wouldn't. You can't change the semantics of the protocol. Look at
>> it
>> this way: What can a client do with a "good", "revoked" and "unknown"
>> response respectively?
>>
>
> How about 'no response', which is also a valid case?
>
> I suggest that it should be treated as a negative 'unknown', which should
> be treated separately from a positive 'unknown' response from the
> originating PKI, which should be treated differently from a positive
> "unknown" response signed by the verifier's PKI.  Thus, there is a larger
> number of states than is contemplated within OCSP.
>

Try to look at it from the client's perspective. It can act in three
different ways: Accept the cert, reject cert, or look for more information.
So that is what the protocol should communicate. It is a bit unfortunate
that the names of these responses are "good", "revoked" and "unknown". I
would be perfectly happy with keeping the protocol as is and change the
labels to "accept", "reject", "whydontyouasksomeoneelse".

As it stands, current implementations treat the two unknowns as equal to no
> response.  This creates the problem that DigiNotar had to be removed for:


DigiNotar did answer revoked for non issued certs (from Sept 1, a bit tardy,
but nonetheless). So apparently something else prompted the removal of
DigiNotar from the list of 176 trusted certs.


>
>  With a "good" response it can proceed, with "revoked"
>> it stops, and with "unknown" it can ask another responder if one is
>> available (or download CRLs). If "unknown" means "I KNOW this certificate
>> was never issued" the behavior of the client must be different -- it
>> should
>> act identically in the "revoked" and "unknown" case, and there would be no
>> way to tell a client that someone else might have better information about
>> the status of a certificate.
>>
>
> How about, "The OCSP responder which was signed by the originating CA
> claims it's unknown" versus "The OCSP responder which I'm configured with
> that isn't signed by the originating CA claims it's unknown"?
>
> There are more variables than the current semantic addresses.
>
>
>  If you want to assert something about the issuance of a certificate you
>> could do so through an extension in SingleResponse. In my mind, it would
>> do
>> little to address the DigiNotar case, though. If the OCSP responder is
>> dependent of the CA, then a compromise of the CA would compromise the
>> responder, at least for some time.
>>
>
> OCSP requires that responder certificates not be permitted any other
> purposes.  So, under this alternate semantic, the compromise of the CA would
> require the issuance of an OCSP certificate which is either recorded (and
> hopefully revoked upon discovery) or unrecorded (unknown).  The only thing
> that can recover from that is revocation of the CA involved.
>

I am not sure I follow -- an OCSP responder that get its information from
the CA, whitelist or blacklist, would be about as corrupt as the CA once the
CA gets corrupted.


> The "backward compatibility" argument fails too.  Right now, because of the
> mandate that things stay the broken same, that argument means we effectively
> can't act to change the standards to protect against the
> post-standardization identification of a new threat vector at the standards
> level.  Are we too proud to admit that we were wrong, that we didn't see all
> threat vectors because we trusted the cryptography?
>

I don't agree. The standard does not prevent OCSP responders from preventing
non issued certs being used. It is just not spelled out how to. I am not
against doing that, but I am saying it will not help much.


> The lack of security that exists today is so much worse than what we can
> create that I feel we're derelicting our duty.


I can agree to that, but that can't be fixed here. We have to get away from
the 176 trusted certificates. It is, as noted elsewhere, an inherently
broken system. I believe that can be done without breaking the current
protocols (neither OCSP nor TLS).


>
>  If the OCSP responder asserts the
>> issuance of a certificate entirely independent of the CA it is in effect a
>> CA of its own. If so, why don't just issue two certs from two independent
>> CAs and require both of them to be valid (generalize to n of m to get your
>> required level of security and redundancy)?
>>
>
> Several reasons, actually.
>
> First, OCSP was designed to permit corporations to effectively insist to
> their internal cells that a particular certificate was good or wasn't,
> overriding the originator.


There are a lot of wishes that went into the design of OCSP. That would be
one.


>  (That's the reason for the "unknown" response in the first place.)
>

Another reason, more important, in my mind, was to build some some support
for redundancy into the protocol.


> Second, TLS only permits the atomic assertion of one certificate chain.
>

That's true in a limited sense of the word, only. But enhancing the
browsers' behavior when it comes to validation of the claimed identity of
the server is an encumbrance of the browser makers.

/Simon

--0015174413329c5b8e04ae76500e
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<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue, Oct 4, 2011 at 03:30, Kyle Hamil=
ton <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:kyanha@kyanha.net">kyanha@kyanh=
a.net</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"m=
argin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
<div class=3D"im"><br>
<br>
On Mon, Oct 3, 2011 at 12:15 PM, Simon Tardell &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:simon@=
tardell.se" target=3D"_blank">simon@tardell.se</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"m=
argin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
Would it make sense to change the interpretation of an &quot;unknown&quot; =
response<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
No, it wouldn&#39;t. You can&#39;t change the semantics of the protocol. Lo=
ok at it<br>
this way: What can a client do with a &quot;good&quot;, &quot;revoked&quot;=
 and &quot;unknown&quot;<br>
response respectively?<br>
</blockquote>
<br></div>
How about &#39;no response&#39;, which is also a valid case?<br>
<br>
I suggest that it should be treated as a negative &#39;unknown&#39;, which =
should be treated separately from a positive &#39;unknown&#39; response fro=
m the originating PKI, which should be treated differently from a positive =
&quot;unknown&quot; response signed by the verifier&#39;s PKI. =A0Thus, the=
re is a larger number of states than is contemplated within OCSP.<br>
</blockquote><div><br></div><div>Try to look at it from the client&#39;s pe=
rspective. It can act in three different ways: Accept the cert, reject cert=
, or look for more information. So that is what the protocol should communi=
cate. It is a bit unfortunate that the names of these responses are &quot;g=
ood&quot;, &quot;revoked&quot; and &quot;unknown&quot;. I would be perfectl=
y happy with keeping the protocol as is and change the labels to &quot;acce=
pt&quot;, &quot;reject&quot;, &quot;whydontyouasksomeoneelse&quot;.</div>
<div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex=
;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
As it stands, current implementations treat the two unknowns as equal to no=
 response. =A0This creates the problem that DigiNotar had to be removed for=
:</blockquote><div>=A0</div><div>DigiNotar did answer revoked for non issue=
d certs (from Sept 1, a bit tardy, but nonetheless). So apparently somethin=
g else prompted the removal of DigiNotar from the list of 176 trusted certs=
.</div>
<div>=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;=
border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;"><div class=3D"im">
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
With a &quot;good&quot; response it can proceed, with &quot;revoked&quot;<b=
r>
it stops, and with &quot;unknown&quot; it can ask another responder if one =
is<br>
available (or download CRLs). If &quot;unknown&quot; means &quot;I KNOW thi=
s certificate<br>
was never issued&quot; the behavior of the client must be different -- it s=
hould<br>
act identically in the &quot;revoked&quot; and &quot;unknown&quot; case, an=
d there would be no<br>
way to tell a client that someone else might have better information about<=
br>
the status of a certificate.<br>
</blockquote>
<br></div>
How about, &quot;The OCSP responder which was signed by the originating CA =
claims it&#39;s unknown&quot; versus &quot;The OCSP responder which I&#39;m=
 configured with that isn&#39;t signed by the originating CA claims it&#39;=
s unknown&quot;?<br>

<br>
There are more variables than the current semantic addresses.<div class=3D"=
im"><br>
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
If you want to assert something about the issuance of a certificate you<br>
could do so through an extension in SingleResponse. In my mind, it would do=
<br>
little to address the DigiNotar case, though. If the OCSP responder is<br>
dependent of the CA, then a compromise of the CA would compromise the<br>
responder, at least for some time.<br>
</blockquote>
<br></div>
OCSP requires that responder certificates not be permitted any other purpos=
es. =A0So, under this alternate semantic, the compromise of the CA would re=
quire the issuance of an OCSP certificate which is either recorded (and hop=
efully revoked upon discovery) or unrecorded (unknown). =A0The only thing t=
hat can recover from that is revocation of the CA involved.<br>
</blockquote><div><br></div><div>I am not sure I follow -- an OCSP responde=
r that get its information from the CA, whitelist or blacklist, would be ab=
out as corrupt as the CA once the CA gets corrupted.</div><div>=A0</div><bl=
ockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #=
ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">

The &quot;backward compatibility&quot; argument fails too. =A0Right now, be=
cause of the mandate that things stay the broken same, that argument means =
we effectively can&#39;t act to change the standards to protect against the=
 post-standardization identification of a new threat vector at the standard=
s level. =A0Are we too proud to admit that we were wrong, that we didn&#39;=
t see all threat vectors because we trusted the cryptography?<br>
</blockquote><div><br></div><div>I don&#39;t agree. The standard does not p=
revent OCSP responders from preventing non issued certs being used. It is j=
ust not spelled out how to. I am not against doing that, but I am saying it=
 will not help much.</div>
<div>=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;=
border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">The lack of security that exi=
sts today is so much worse than what we can create that I feel we&#39;re de=
relicting our duty.</blockquote>
<div><br></div><div>I can agree to that, but that can&#39;t be fixed here. =
We have to get away from the 176 trusted certificates. It is, as noted else=
where, an inherently broken system. I believe that can be done without brea=
king the current protocols (neither OCSP nor TLS).=A0</div>
<div>=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;=
border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;"><div class=3D"im">
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
If the OCSP responder asserts the<br>
issuance of a certificate entirely independent of the CA it is in effect a<=
br>
CA of its own. If so, why don&#39;t just issue two certs from two independe=
nt<br>
CAs and require both of them to be valid (generalize to n of m to get your<=
br>
required level of security and redundancy)?=A0<br>
</blockquote>
<br></div>
Several reasons, actually.<br>
<br>
First, OCSP was designed to permit corporations to effectively insist to th=
eir internal cells that a particular certificate was good or wasn&#39;t, ov=
erriding the originator. </blockquote><div><br></div><div>There are a lot o=
f wishes that went into the design of OCSP. That would be one.=A0</div>
<div>=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;=
border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">=A0(That&#39;s the reason for=
 the &quot;unknown&quot; response in the first place.)<br></blockquote><div=
><br>
</div><div>Another reason, more important, in my mind, was to build some so=
me support for redundancy into the protocol.</div><div>=A0</div><blockquote=
 class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc soli=
d;padding-left:1ex;">

Second, TLS only permits the atomic assertion of one certificate chain.<br>=
</blockquote><div><br></div><div>That&#39;s true in a limited sense of the =
word, only. But enhancing the browsers&#39; behavior when it comes to valid=
ation of the claimed identity of the server is an encumbrance of the browse=
r makers.</div>
<div>=A0</div><div>/Simon</div></div><br>

--0015174413329c5b8e04ae76500e--

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From: "Bentkofsky, Michael" <MBentkofsky@verisign.com>
To: Simon Tardell <simon@tardell.se>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] OCSP handling versus the DigiNotar incident,	best practices?
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Subject: Re: [pkix] OCSP handling versus the DigiNotar incident, best practices?
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I am writing this having implemented an OCSP responder for a large set of C=
A's (as my e-mail address would suggest), however I am no longer in charge =
of that service so these views are my own.

I know that we grappled with these issues to implement our OCSP responder, =
and made several choices that complicate this a bit more. Although we ultim=
ately chose to implement "good" to mean "issued + not revoked" I know many =
CA's implement "good" to mean "not revoked", but that doesn't mean the cert=
 being validated was ever issued. We chose to use "unknown" to mean "never =
issued", but the problem remained that this response is unsigned and could =
be forged. So what's a poor client to do? The only clear case is "revoked" =
in reality.

I know that I have felt with the increasing reliance on OCSP for certificat=
e verification, and questions like this manifesting themselves in client im=
plementation choices like failing-back to CRL when OCSP doesn't give a clea=
r answer suggests an opportunity to re-think the approach a bit.

Michael

From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Sim=
on Tardell
Sent: Tuesday, October 04, 2011 6:11 AM
To: Kyle Hamilton
Cc: pkix@ietf.org; Kyle Hamilton
Subject: Re: [pkix] OCSP handling versus the DigiNotar incident, best pract=
ices?


On Tue, Oct 4, 2011 at 03:30, Kyle Hamilton <kyanha@kyanha.net<mailto:kyanh=
a@kyanha.net>> wrote:


On Mon, Oct 3, 2011 at 12:15 PM, Simon Tardell <simon@tardell.se<mailto:sim=
on@tardell.se>> wrote:
Would it make sense to change the interpretation of an "unknown" response

No, it wouldn't. You can't change the semantics of the protocol. Look at it
this way: What can a client do with a "good", "revoked" and "unknown"
response respectively?

How about 'no response', which is also a valid case?

I suggest that it should be treated as a negative 'unknown', which should b=
e treated separately from a positive 'unknown' response from the originatin=
g PKI, which should be treated differently from a positive "unknown" respon=
se signed by the verifier's PKI.  Thus, there is a larger number of states =
than is contemplated within OCSP.

Try to look at it from the client's perspective. It can act in three differ=
ent ways: Accept the cert, reject cert, or look for more information. So th=
at is what the protocol should communicate. It is a bit unfortunate that th=
e names of these responses are "good", "revoked" and "unknown". I would be =
perfectly happy with keeping the protocol as is and change the labels to "a=
ccept", "reject", "whydontyouasksomeoneelse".

As it stands, current implementations treat the two unknowns as equal to no=
 response.  This creates the problem that DigiNotar had to be removed for:

DigiNotar did answer revoked for non issued certs (from Sept 1, a bit tardy=
, but nonetheless). So apparently something else prompted the removal of Di=
giNotar from the list of 176 trusted certs.


With a "good" response it can proceed, with "revoked"
it stops, and with "unknown" it can ask another responder if one is
available (or download CRLs). If "unknown" means "I KNOW this certificate
was never issued" the behavior of the client must be different -- it should
act identically in the "revoked" and "unknown" case, and there would be no
way to tell a client that someone else might have better information about
the status of a certificate.

How about, "The OCSP responder which was signed by the originating CA claim=
s it's unknown" versus "The OCSP responder which I'm configured with that i=
sn't signed by the originating CA claims it's unknown"?

There are more variables than the current semantic addresses.

If you want to assert something about the issuance of a certificate you
could do so through an extension in SingleResponse. In my mind, it would do
little to address the DigiNotar case, though. If the OCSP responder is
dependent of the CA, then a compromise of the CA would compromise the
responder, at least for some time.

OCSP requires that responder certificates not be permitted any other purpos=
es.  So, under this alternate semantic, the compromise of the CA would requ=
ire the issuance of an OCSP certificate which is either recorded (and hopef=
ully revoked upon discovery) or unrecorded (unknown).  The only thing that =
can recover from that is revocation of the CA involved.

I am not sure I follow -- an OCSP responder that get its information from t=
he CA, whitelist or blacklist, would be about as corrupt as the CA once the=
 CA gets corrupted.

The "backward compatibility" argument fails too.  Right now, because of the=
 mandate that things stay the broken same, that argument means we effective=
ly can't act to change the standards to protect against the post-standardiz=
ation identification of a new threat vector at the standards level.  Are we=
 too proud to admit that we were wrong, that we didn't see all threat vecto=
rs because we trusted the cryptography?

I don't agree. The standard does not prevent OCSP responders from preventin=
g non issued certs being used. It is just not spelled out how to. I am not =
against doing that, but I am saying it will not help much.

The lack of security that exists today is so much worse than what we can cr=
eate that I feel we're derelicting our duty.

I can agree to that, but that can't be fixed here. We have to get away from=
 the 176 trusted certificates. It is, as noted elsewhere, an inherently bro=
ken system. I believe that can be done without breaking the current protoco=
ls (neither OCSP nor TLS).


If the OCSP responder asserts the
issuance of a certificate entirely independent of the CA it is in effect a
CA of its own. If so, why don't just issue two certs from two independent
CAs and require both of them to be valid (generalize to n of m to get your
required level of security and redundancy)?

Several reasons, actually.

First, OCSP was designed to permit corporations to effectively insist to th=
eir internal cells that a particular certificate was good or wasn't, overri=
ding the originator.

There are a lot of wishes that went into the design of OCSP. That would be =
one.

 (That's the reason for the "unknown" response in the first place.)

Another reason, more important, in my mind, was to build some some support =
for redundancy into the protocol.

Second, TLS only permits the atomic assertion of one certificate chain.

That's true in a limited sense of the word, only. But enhancing the browser=
s' behavior when it comes to validation of the claimed identity of the serv=
er is an encumbrance of the browser makers.

/Simon


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<div class=3D"WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">I am writing this having =
implemented an OCSP responder for a large set of CA&#8217;s (as my e-mail a=
ddress would suggest), however I am no longer in charge of that
 service so these views are my own.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">I know that we grappled w=
ith these issues to implement our OCSP responder, and made several choices =
that complicate this a bit more. Although we ultimately
 chose to implement &#8220;good&#8221; to mean &#8220;issued &#43; not revo=
ked&#8221; I know many CA&#8217;s implement &#8220;good&#8221; to mean &#82=
20;not revoked&#8221;, but that doesn&#8217;t mean the cert being validated=
 was ever issued. We chose to use &#8220;unknown&#8221; to mean &#8220;neve=
r issued&#8221;, but the problem remained that
 this response is unsigned and could be forged. So what&#8217;s a poor clie=
nt to do? The only clear case is &#8220;revoked&#8221; in reality.
<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">I know that I have felt w=
ith the increasing reliance on OCSP for certificate verification, and quest=
ions like this manifesting themselves in client implementation
 choices like failing-back to CRL when OCSP doesn&#8217;t give a clear answ=
er suggests an opportunity to re-think the approach a bit.<o:p></o:p></span=
></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">Michael<o:p></o:p></span>=
</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p>
<div style=3D"border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in =
0in 0in">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"> pkix-bou=
nces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org]
<b>On Behalf Of </b>Simon Tardell<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, October 04, 2011 6:11 AM<br>
<b>To:</b> Kyle Hamilton<br>
<b>Cc:</b> pkix@ietf.org; Kyle Hamilton<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [pkix] OCSP handling versus the DigiNotar incident, bes=
t practices?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12.0pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">On Tue, Oct 4, 2011 at 03:30, Kyle Hamilton &lt;<a h=
ref=3D"mailto:kyanha@kyanha.net">kyanha@kyanha.net</a>&gt; wrote:<o:p></o:p=
></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><br>
<br>
On Mon, Oct 3, 2011 at 12:15 PM, Simon Tardell &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:simon@=
tardell.se" target=3D"_blank">simon@tardell.se</a>&gt; wrote:<o:p></o:p></p=
>
<blockquote style=3D"border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0i=
n 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Would it make sense to change the interpretation of =
an &quot;unknown&quot; response<o:p></o:p></p>
</blockquote>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><br>
No, it wouldn't. You can't change the semantics of the protocol. Look at it=
<br>
this way: What can a client do with a &quot;good&quot;, &quot;revoked&quot;=
 and &quot;unknown&quot;<br>
response respectively?<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">How about 'no response', which is also a valid case?=
<br>
<br>
I suggest that it should be treated as a negative 'unknown', which should b=
e treated separately from a positive 'unknown' response from the originatin=
g PKI, which should be treated differently from a positive &quot;unknown&qu=
ot; response signed by the verifier's PKI.
 &nbsp;Thus, there is a larger number of states than is contemplated within=
 OCSP.<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Try to look at it from the client's perspective. It =
can act in three different ways: Accept the cert, reject cert, or look for =
more information. So that is what the protocol should communicate. It is a =
bit unfortunate that the names of
 these responses are &quot;good&quot;, &quot;revoked&quot; and &quot;unknow=
n&quot;. I would be perfectly happy with keeping the protocol as is and cha=
nge the labels to &quot;accept&quot;, &quot;reject&quot;, &quot;whydontyoua=
sksomeoneelse&quot;.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<blockquote style=3D"border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0i=
n 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">As it stands, current implementations treat the two =
unknowns as equal to no response. &nbsp;This creates the problem that DigiN=
otar had to be removed for:<o:p></o:p></p>
</blockquote>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">DigiNotar did answer revoked for non issued certs (f=
rom Sept 1, a bit tardy, but nonetheless). So apparently something else pro=
mpted the removal of DigiNotar from the list of 176 trusted certs.<o:p></o:=
p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<blockquote style=3D"border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0i=
n 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in">
<div>
<blockquote style=3D"border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0i=
n 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">With a &quot;good&quot; response it can proceed, wit=
h &quot;revoked&quot;<br>
it stops, and with &quot;unknown&quot; it can ask another responder if one =
is<br>
available (or download CRLs). If &quot;unknown&quot; means &quot;I KNOW thi=
s certificate<br>
was never issued&quot; the behavior of the client must be different -- it s=
hould<br>
act identically in the &quot;revoked&quot; and &quot;unknown&quot; case, an=
d there would be no<br>
way to tell a client that someone else might have better information about<=
br>
the status of a certificate.<o:p></o:p></p>
</blockquote>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">How about, &quot;The OCSP responder which was signed=
 by the originating CA claims it's unknown&quot; versus &quot;The OCSP resp=
onder which I'm configured with that isn't signed by the originating CA cla=
ims it's unknown&quot;?<br>
<br>
There are more variables than the current semantic addresses.<o:p></o:p></p=
>
<div>
<blockquote style=3D"border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0i=
n 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12.0pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">If you want to assert something about the issuance o=
f a certificate you<br>
could do so through an extension in SingleResponse. In my mind, it would do=
<br>
little to address the DigiNotar case, though. If the OCSP responder is<br>
dependent of the CA, then a compromise of the CA would compromise the<br>
responder, at least for some time.<o:p></o:p></p>
</blockquote>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">OCSP requires that responder certificates not be per=
mitted any other purposes. &nbsp;So, under this alternate semantic, the com=
promise of the CA would require the issuance of an OCSP certificate which i=
s either recorded (and hopefully revoked
 upon discovery) or unrecorded (unknown). &nbsp;The only thing that can rec=
over from that is revocation of the CA involved.<o:p></o:p></p>
</blockquote>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">I am not sure I follow -- an OCSP responder that get=
 its information from the CA, whitelist or blacklist, would be about as cor=
rupt as the CA once the CA gets corrupted.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<blockquote style=3D"border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0i=
n 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">The &quot;backward compatibility&quot; argument fail=
s too. &nbsp;Right now, because of the mandate that things stay the broken =
same, that argument means we effectively can't act to change the standards =
to protect against the post-standardization identification
 of a new threat vector at the standards level. &nbsp;Are we too proud to a=
dmit that we were wrong, that we didn't see all threat vectors because we t=
rusted the cryptography?<o:p></o:p></p>
</blockquote>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">I don't agree. The standard does not prevent OCSP re=
sponders from preventing non issued certs being used. It is just not spelle=
d out how to. I am not against doing that, but I am saying it will not help=
 much.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<blockquote style=3D"border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0i=
n 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">The lack of security that exists today is so much wo=
rse than what we can create that I feel we're derelicting our duty.<o:p></o=
:p></p>
</blockquote>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">I can agree to that, but that can't be fixed here. W=
e have to get away from the 176 trusted certificates. It is, as noted elsew=
here, an inherently broken system. I believe that can be done without break=
ing the current protocols (neither
 OCSP nor TLS).&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<blockquote style=3D"border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0i=
n 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in">
<div>
<blockquote style=3D"border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0i=
n 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">If the OCSP responder asserts the<br>
issuance of a certificate entirely independent of the CA it is in effect a<=
br>
CA of its own. If so, why don't just issue two certs from two independent<b=
r>
CAs and require both of them to be valid (generalize to n of m to get your<=
br>
required level of security and redundancy)?&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</blockquote>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Several reasons, actually.<br>
<br>
First, OCSP was designed to permit corporations to effectively insist to th=
eir internal cells that a particular certificate was good or wasn't, overri=
ding the originator.
<o:p></o:p></p>
</blockquote>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">There are a lot of wishes that went into the design =
of OCSP. That would be one.&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<blockquote style=3D"border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0i=
n 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;(That's the reason for the &quot;unknown&quot;=
 response in the first place.)<o:p></o:p></p>
</blockquote>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Another reason, more important, in my mind, was to b=
uild some some support for redundancy into the protocol.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<blockquote style=3D"border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0i=
n 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Second, TLS only permits the atomic assertion of one=
 certificate chain.<o:p></o:p></p>
</blockquote>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">That's true in a limited sense of the word, only. Bu=
t enhancing the browsers' behavior when it comes to validation of the claim=
ed identity of the server is an encumbrance of the browser makers.<o:p></o:=
p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">/Simon<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
</body>
</html>

--_000_080FBD5B7A09F845842100A6DE7962330ACECA99BRN1WNEXMBX01vc_--

From kent@bbn.com  Tue Oct  4 08:11:07 2011
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Date: Tue, 4 Oct 2011 11:12:29 -0400
To: "Bentkofsky, Michael" <MBentkofsky@verisign.com>
From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
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Cc: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] OCSP handling versus the DigiNotar incident, best practices?
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>...
>
>I know that we grappled with these issues to implement our OCSP 
>responder, and made several choices that complicate this a bit more. 
>Although we ultimately chose to implement "good" to mean "issued + 
>not revoked" I know many CA's implement "good" to mean "not 
>revoked", but that doesn't mean the cert being validated was ever 
>issued. We chose to use "unknown" to mean "never issued", but the 
>problem remained that this response is unsigned and could be forged. 
>So what's a poor client to do? The only clear case is "revoked" in 
>reality.
>
>I know that I have felt with the increasing reliance on OCSP for 
>certificate verification, and questions like this manifesting 
>themselves in client implementation choices like failing-back to CRL 
>when OCSP doesn't give a clear answer suggests an opportunity to 
>re-think the approach a bit.
>
>Michael

I'm confused by the comment above: " ... failing-back to CRL when 
OCSP doesn't give a clear answer..." A CRL does not tell an RP if a 
cert is valid. It has the same limitation as an OCSP response (not 
coincidentally) in that it tells an RP only of an issued, not yet 
expired, cert has been revoked.  cert validation is a separate 
processing step.  PKIX developed SCVP to enable an OCSP-like 
server-based validation capability.  I do not envision PKIX changing 
OCSP to offer SCVP-style functionality. Read the SCVP requirements 
doc to understand why PKIX chose to not "tweak" OCSP to provide this 
sort of capability.

Steve

From piyush@identicate.com  Tue Oct  4 08:14:42 2011
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Cc: pkix@ietf.org, 'Kyle Hamilton' <aerowolf@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [pkix] OCSP handling versus the DigiNotar incident, best practices?
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> -----Original Message-----
> From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
> Phillip Hallam-Baker
> Sent: Monday, October 03, 2011 5:11 PM
> To: Simon Tardell
> Cc: pkix@ietf.org; Kyle Hamilton
> Subject: Re: [pkix] OCSP handling versus the DigiNotar incident, best
> practices?
> 
> On Mon, Oct 3, 2011 at 3:15 PM, Simon Tardell <simon@tardell.se> wrote:
> >> Would it make sense to change the interpretation of an "unknown"
> >> response
> >
> > No, it wouldn't. You can't change the semantics of the protocol. Look
> > at it this way: What can a client do with a "good", "revoked" and
> "unknown"
> > response respectively? With a "good" response it can proceed, with
> "revoked"
> > it stops, and with "unknown" it can ask another responder if one is
> > available (or download CRLs). If "unknown" means "I KNOW this
> > certificate was never issued" the behavior of the client must be
> > different -- it should act identically in the "revoked" and "unknown"
> > case, and there would be no way to tell a client that someone else
> > might have better information about the status of a certificate.
> 
> No, there is a huge difference between "I do not know the status of this
> cert" and "I know that there is no such cert".
> 
> This was lossage when first proposed and it is going to be fixed. The
> discussion in PKIX was driven by a commercial position that is no longer
> operative (it is an ex-dot-com, if you hadn't merged him to his perch he
> would be pushing up the daisies, etc.)
> 
> 
> The point of OCSP was to communicate information. I need to communicate
> information that differentiates the two very distinct conditions. The
other
> CAs seemed to be similarly convinced of that need when we met last week.
> So what this group is being asked is HOW to communicate said information
> not 'whether'.
> 

While I agree that the two conditions are distinct, I'm interested in
understanding the need for "is issued" information to be communicated by
OCSP responder. The fact that RP is checking the revocation status indicates
that it has verified that the said CA issued the certificate and that it
chains up to a trust anchor that RP trusts. 
If you are talking about the case where CA is compromised, then all bets are
off any way. You cannot trust an OCSP responder that is acting on behalf of
that CA.

-Piyush


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From: "Bentkofsky, Michael" <MBentkofsky@verisign.com>
To: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] OCSP handling versus the DigiNotar incident,  best practices?
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Cc: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] OCSP handling versus the DigiNotar incident, best practices?
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Steve,

I was referring to discussions like these:

http://www.gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg/Certificate-Options.html

"B[y] default OCSP checks are disabled. The enable option may be used to en=
able OCSP checks via Dirmngr. If CRL checks are also enabled, CRLs will be =
used as a fallback if for some reason an OCSP request won't succeed."

http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee619754%28WS.10%29.aspx

"Determining Preference between OCSP and CRLs ..."

(longer discussion)

http://www.carbonwind.net/blog/post/Random-SSLTLS-101-OCSPCRL-in-practice.a=
spx


Thanks,
Michael



-----Original Message-----
From: Stephen Kent [mailto:kent@bbn.com]=20
Sent: Tuesday, October 04, 2011 11:12 AM
To: Bentkofsky, Michael
Cc: Simon Tardell; pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] OCSP handling versus the DigiNotar incident, best pract=
ices?

>...
>
>I know that we grappled with these issues to implement our OCSP=20
>responder, and made several choices that complicate this a bit more.=20
>Although we ultimately chose to implement "good" to mean "issued +=20
>not revoked" I know many CA's implement "good" to mean "not=20
>revoked", but that doesn't mean the cert being validated was ever=20
>issued. We chose to use "unknown" to mean "never issued", but the=20
>problem remained that this response is unsigned and could be forged.=20
>So what's a poor client to do? The only clear case is "revoked" in=20
>reality.
>
>I know that I have felt with the increasing reliance on OCSP for=20
>certificate verification, and questions like this manifesting=20
>themselves in client implementation choices like failing-back to CRL=20
>when OCSP doesn't give a clear answer suggests an opportunity to=20
>re-think the approach a bit.
>
>Michael

I'm confused by the comment above: " ... failing-back to CRL when=20
OCSP doesn't give a clear answer..." A CRL does not tell an RP if a=20
cert is valid. It has the same limitation as an OCSP response (not=20
coincidentally) in that it tells an RP only of an issued, not yet=20
expired, cert has been revoked.  cert validation is a separate=20
processing step.  PKIX developed SCVP to enable an OCSP-like=20
server-based validation capability.  I do not envision PKIX changing=20
OCSP to offer SCVP-style functionality. Read the SCVP requirements=20
doc to understand why PKIX chose to not "tweak" OCSP to provide this=20
sort of capability.

Steve

From kent@bbn.com  Tue Oct  4 09:11:05 2011
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Date: Tue, 4 Oct 2011 12:05:52 -0400
To: "Bentkofsky, Michael" <MBentkofsky@verisign.com>
From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] OCSP handling versus the DigiNotar incident, best  practices?
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At 3:42 PM +0000 10/4/11, Bentkofsky, Michael wrote:
>Steve,
>
>I was referring to discussions like these:
>
>http://www.gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg/Certificate-Options.html
>
>"B[y] default OCSP checks are disabled. The enable option may be 
>used to enable OCSP checks via Dirmngr. If CRL checks are also 
>enabled, CRLs will be used as a fallback if for some reason an OCSP 
>request won't succeed."
>
>http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee619754%28WS.10%29.aspx
>
>"Determining Preference between OCSP and CRLs ..."
>
>(longer discussion)
>
>http://www.carbonwind.net/blog/post/Random-SSLTLS-101-OCSPCRL-in-practice.aspx
>
>
>Thanks,
>Michael

In that context, the comparison makes sense, i.e., OCSP and CRLs are 
intended to be (roughly) equivalent mechanisms for conveying 
revocation status. That's appropriate, but the rest of your message 
was discussing the issue of the ambiguity of OCSP responses, as 
interpreted by different responders. Hence the confusion.

Steve

From SChokhani@cygnacom.com  Tue Oct  4 09:28:43 2011
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From: Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>
To: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Date: Tue, 4 Oct 2011 12:31:44 -0400
Thread-Topic: [pkix] I-D Action: draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-04.txt
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I do not see a need or benefit to progressing this document.

It is a step back from existing RFC 2560.

My security concerns regarding this draft are well documented.

I would support an effort if it required crypto binding for the Responder K=
ey and CA Key or if required Responder Certification Path and Subject Certi=
ficate "Certification Path" name matching.

-----Original Message-----
From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of int=
ernet-drafts@ietf.org
Sent: Monday, October 03, 2011 8:03 AM
To: i-d-announce@ietf.org
Cc: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: [pkix] I-D Action: draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-04.txt

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts director=
ies. This draft is a work item of the Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) Wor=
king Group of the IETF.

	Title           : X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certific=
ate Status Protocol - OCSP
	Author(s)       : David Cooper
                          Stefan Santesson
	Filename        : draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-04.txt
	Pages           : 43
	Date            : 2011-10-03

   This document specifies a protocol useful in determining the current
   status of a digital certificate without requiring CRLs.



A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-04.txt

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/

This Internet-Draft can be retrieved at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-04.txt
_______________________________________________
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From mrex@sap.com  Tue Oct  4 13:01:40 2011
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From: Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
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To: kent@bbn.com (Stephen Kent)
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Subject: Re: [pkix] OCSP handling versus the DigiNotar incident,
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Stephen Kent wrote:
> 
> Bentkofsky, Michael wrote:
> >
> >I was referring to discussions like these:
> >
> >http://www.gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg/Certificate-Options.html
> >
> >"B[y] default OCSP checks are disabled. The enable option may be 
> >used to enable OCSP checks via Dirmngr. If CRL checks are also 
> >enabled, CRLs will be used as a fallback if for some reason an OCSP 
> >request won't succeed."
> >
> >http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee619754%28WS.10%29.aspx
> >
> >"Determining Preference between OCSP and CRLs ..."
> >
> >(longer discussion)
> >
> >http://www.carbonwind.net/blog/post/Random-SSLTLS-101-OCSPCRL-in-practice.aspx
> 
> In that context, the comparison makes sense, i.e., OCSP and CRLs are 
> intended to be (roughly) equivalent mechanisms for conveying 
> revocation status. That's appropriate, but the rest of your message 
> was discussing the issue of the ambiguity of OCSP responses, as 
> interpreted by different responders. Hence the confusion.


I share your notion that OCSP and CRLs are intended to be roughly
equivalent mechanisms for conveying revocation status.  This is
particularly true for "local" OCSP responsers working on CRLs.

But the OCSP & CRL scheme has some design weaknesses. it identifies
certs only weakly (by issuer&serial rather than certificate hash)
and it is based on the somewhat flawed assumption that a CA is
fully aware of all certs that where signed with the CA's key.

The latter is somewhat ignorant of the realities of disaster recovery.
I would _not_ be surprised if most CA issuance could be made to fail
(keeping track of issued certs), so that traces/accounting info of
recently issued certs can be logically or physically destroyed by
a sufficiently potent attacker (like a local admin) and desaster
recovery (re-install from backup) will lead to the situation that
the most recently issued certs are not on record.

It appears that in the DigiNotar case, remote logical deletion of trace/audit
files was sufficient to preclude timely revocation of a "*.google.com"
certificate.  Other possibilities for an attacker to hide from revocation
checking might be to create new certs with previously issued serials from
innocuous real certs, or create new certs without CRL&OCSP info in
X.509 certificate extensions.

The whole OCSP & CRLs model seems to be vitally dependent on the premise
that it is impossible to subvert a CA.  As it turns out, this premise
is fatally flawed.

There is nothing that protocols can do for you when a "trusted CA" is
compromised while the CA does not know about it yet, of course.
But I would hope that there is a desire to do better than DigiNotar
*when* it happens.

The current solution to the problem: "Kill the CA and the entire PKI
surrounding this CA along with it, and as fast as possible"
seems like a somewhat strange concept for disaster recovery, and
IMHO rather like a lack thereof.


-Martin

From simon@josefsson.org  Wed Oct  5 02:21:19 2011
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Subject: [pkix] OCSP ResponderID
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All,

I'm implementing OCSP right now.  I cannot find any discussion about the
ResponderID structure in RFC 2560 nor in RFC2560bis, or I have gone
blind re-reading the same document too many times.

For the responderID.byName field, the document could say the field
should contain the identity of the responder.  That is what I assume
should be in there.  Is there a requirement/assumption for the byName to
be the same as the Subject of the certificate that signed the response,
if any?  Is that a MUST/SHOULD/MAY for responders?  MUST/SHOULD/MAY the
requester validate that property?

I'm concerned with the hard-coded use of SHA1 in the responderID.byKey
field.  I don't see any attack, it is just that there doesn't seem to be
any way to negotiate another hash function.  Could we deprecated the
field?  If most deployments use byName that may be possible.
Alternatively, we could specify an extension where the client can
specify a sequence of preferred hash algorithms and the server can
select an appropriate algorithm and use that instead.  Or the responder
could snuck a byKey SHA-256 hash in a responseExtensions.

Thanks,
/Simon

From piyush@identicate.com  Wed Oct  5 21:34:23 2011
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Subject: Re: [pkix] OCSP ResponderID
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> -----Original Message-----
> From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
> Simon Josefsson
> Sent: Wednesday, October 05, 2011 2:24 AM
> To: pkix@ietf.org
> Subject: [pkix] OCSP ResponderID
> 
> All,
> 
> I'm implementing OCSP right now.  I cannot find any discussion about the
> ResponderID structure in RFC 2560 nor in RFC2560bis, or I have gone blind
re-
> reading the same document too many times.
> 
> For the responderID.byName field, the document could say the field should
> contain the identity of the responder.  That is what I assume should be in
> there.  Is there a requirement/assumption for the byName to be the same as
> the Subject of the certificate that signed the response, if any?  Is that
a
> MUST/SHOULD/MAY for responders?  MUST/SHOULD/MAY the requester
> validate that property?

You are right in saying that the details are missing from the document. I
believe that the purpose of this field is to help the requestor locate the
correct certificate that is used to sign the response. I have not seen a
single implementation that sets it to anything other than the subject name
of the signer (if byname is used). 
In case of name clash, where the responder has multiple signing certificates
(with same name but different signing key), they use the keyhash option.
> 
> I'm concerned with the hard-coded use of SHA1 in the responderID.byKey
> field.  I don't see any attack, it is just that there doesn't seem to be
any way
> to negotiate another hash function.  Could we deprecated the field?  If
most
> deployments use byName that may be possible.
> Alternatively, we could specify an extension where the client can specify
a
> sequence of preferred hash algorithms and the server can select an
> appropriate algorithm and use that instead.  Or the responder could snuck
a
> byKey SHA-256 hash in a responseExtensions.
> 

I don't think that hash function used for creating the responder ID has any
security implications. In the worst case, the requestor will find more than
one certificate with the same keyhash and it'll result in an extra signature
check to find the right certificate.

> Thanks,
> /Simon

-Piyush



From kent@bbn.com  Mon Oct 10 12:50:56 2011
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Subject: Re: [pkix] OCSP handling versus the DigiNotar incident,
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At 9:54 PM +0200 10/4/11, Martin Rex wrote:
>...
>
>
>I share your notion that OCSP and CRLs are intended to be roughly
>equivalent mechanisms for conveying revocation status.  This is
>particularly true for "local" OCSP responsers working on CRLs.
>
>But the OCSP & CRL scheme has some design weaknesses. it identifies
>certs only weakly (by issuer&serial rather than certificate hash)
>and it is based on the somewhat flawed assumption that a CA is
>fully aware of all certs that where signed with the CA's key.

A CRL almost always is signed by the CA that issued the cert, and 
that CA is responsible for the cert serial #. So, that should be 
strong enough.  In OCSP,
there is also an implied scope for the OCSP server. So, while a hash 
has a certain attraction, I don't think it's critical.

Steve

From tomasg@primekey.se  Mon Oct 10 13:47:00 2011
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Date: Mon, 10 Oct 2011 21:46:55 +0100
From: Tomas Gustavsson <tomasg@primekey.se>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] PKIX review on draft-ietf-pkix-cmp-transport-protocols-14.txt
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Hi Martin,

I like the new draft. Short, detailed, and without the TCP. I can't find
any problems right now.

I'm not enough expert on http, so I assume that it is ok to include both
"cache control" and "pragma" in all responses, both HTTP 1.0 and 1.1?

I am not 100% sure that EJBCA is completely compliant with the new
draft. It might be, but at least the new draft is clear enough so it
should be easy to create checks in the test suite for all the elements.

Regards,
Tomas Gustavsson
http://www.ejbca.org/
http://www.primekey.se/



On 10/03/2011 03:05 PM, Peylo, Martin (NSN - FI/Espoo) wrote:
> Dear PKIX working group members,
> 
> the content of the "CMPtrans" draft is now quite complete.  The
> interested readers will see that it now became quite short,
> straightforward and largely reflects the implemented reality.
> 
> It would be great if you could review this document and provide feedback
> of any kind.
> 
> Now the draft describes a way how to transport all CMP messages over
> HTTP.  This includes the optional transporting of "CMP Announcements"
> which are specified in RFC 4210 but couldn't serve any use at all
> before.
> 
> Other kinds of transport as e.g. the "TCP-Based Management Protocol" or
> high-level mentioning of FTP or email transport were completely removed.
> The "TCP-Based" transport is generally considered to be inferior
> compared with HTTP and does not provide any advantage.  Description of
> transport over other existing protocols is left as future challenge for
> those who find the use case. 
> 
> <http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-pkix-cmp-transport-protocols-14>
> 
> Kind regards,
> Martin
> 
> 
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
> ext internet-drafts@ietf.org
> Sent: Thursday, September 29, 2011 2:40 PM
> To: i-d-announce@ietf.org
> Cc: pkix@ietf.org
> Subject: [pkix] I-D Action:
> draft-ietf-pkix-cmp-transport-protocols-14.txt
> 
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
> directories. This draft is a work item of the Public-Key Infrastructure
> (X.509) Working Group of the IETF.
> 
> 	Title           : Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure --
> HTTP Transport for CMP
> 	Author(s)       : Tomi Kause
>                           Martin Peylo
> 	Filename        : draft-ietf-pkix-cmp-transport-protocols-14.txt
> 	Pages           : 15
> 	Date            : 2011-09-29
> 
>    This document describes how to layer the Certificate Management
>    Protocol over HTTP.  It is the &quot;CMPtrans&quot; document
> referenced in RFC
>    4210 and therefore updates the reference given therein.
> 
> 
> A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-cmp-transport-protoc
> ols-14.txt
> 
> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
> 
> This Internet-Draft can be retrieved at:
> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-cmp-transport-protoco
> ls-14.txt
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
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> _______________________________________________
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From swilson@lockstep.com.au  Mon Oct 10 14:04:39 2011
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Subject: [pkix] Browsers and CRLs more basically [was: OCSP handling versus the DigiNotar incident, best practices?]
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There are a bunch of subtle technicalities in this thread, but I am left 
wondering about a simpler, higher level question.  People on this list 
with more engineering familiarity with browsers across the board may 
know ...

Generally speaking, wouldn't the rogue CA problem be greatly ameliorated 
if browsers checked CRLs and validated certificate paths properly?  Is 
it not the case that browser software (and S/MIME email clients etc). 
are pretty crap in this regard?

Cheers,

Steve Wilson.

Lockstep

http://lockstep.com.au
Lockstep Consulting provides independent specialist advice and analysis
on digital identity and privacy.Lockstep Technologies develops unique
new smart ID solutions that enhance privacy and prevent identity theft.



On 5/10/2011 2:12 AM, Stephen Kent wrote:
>> ...
>>
>> I know that we grappled with these issues to implement our OCSP 
>> responder, and made several choices that complicate this a bit more. 
>> Although we ultimately chose to implement "good" to mean "issued + 
>> not revoked" I know many CA's implement "good" to mean "not revoked", 
>> but that doesn't mean the cert being validated was ever issued. We 
>> chose to use "unknown" to mean "never issued", but the problem 
>> remained that this response is unsigned and could be forged. So 
>> what's a poor client to do? The only clear case is "revoked" in reality.
>>
>> I know that I have felt with the increasing reliance on OCSP for 
>> certificate verification, and questions like this manifesting 
>> themselves in client implementation choices like failing-back to CRL 
>> when OCSP doesn't give a clear answer suggests an opportunity to 
>> re-think the approach a bit.
>>
>> Michael
>
> I'm confused by the comment above: " ... failing-back to CRL when OCSP 
> doesn't give a clear answer..." A CRL does not tell an RP if a cert is 
> valid. It has the same limitation as an OCSP response (not 
> coincidentally) in that it tells an RP only of an issued, not yet 
> expired, cert has been revoked.  cert validation is a separate 
> processing step.  PKIX developed SCVP to enable an OCSP-like 
> server-based validation capability.  I do not envision PKIX changing 
> OCSP to offer SCVP-style functionality. Read the SCVP requirements doc 
> to understand why PKIX chose to not "tweak" OCSP to provide this sort 
> of capability.
>
> Steve
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>
>

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    <tt><br>
      There are a bunch of subtle technicalities in this thread, but I
      am left wondering about a simpler, higher level question.&nbsp; People
      on this list with more engineering familiarity with browsers
      across the board may know ... <br>
      <br>
      Generally speaking, wouldn't the rogue CA problem be greatly
      ameliorated if browsers checked CRLs and validated certificate
      paths properly?&nbsp; Is it not the case that browser software (and
      S/MIME email clients etc). are pretty crap in this regard?&nbsp; <br>
      <br>
      Cheers, <br>
      <br>
      Steve Wilson.<br>
      <br>
    </tt>
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    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
        style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;;
        mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;">Lockstep <o:p></o:p></span></p>
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      &quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New
      Roman&quot;;mso-ansi-language:
      EN-AU;mso-fareast-language:EN-US;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"><a
        href="http://lockstep.com.au">http://lockstep.com.au</a><br>
      Lockstep Consulting provides independent specialist advice and
      analysis <br>
      on digital identity and privacy.<span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;
      </span>Lockstep Technologies develops unique <br>
      new smart ID solutions that enhance privacy and prevent identity
      theft.<br style="mso-special-character:line-break">
      <!--[if !supportLineBreakNewLine]--><br
        style="mso-special-character:line-break">
      <!--[endif]--></span><br>
    <tt><br>
      On 5/10/2011 2:12 AM, Stephen Kent wrote:</tt>
    <blockquote cite="mid:p06240804cab0cd8f1be1@%5B128.89.89.239%5D"
      type="cite">
      <blockquote type="cite"><tt>...
          <br>
          <br>
          I know that we grappled with these issues to implement our
          OCSP responder, and made several choices that complicate this
          a bit more. Although we ultimately chose to implement "good"
          to mean "issued + not revoked" I know many CA's implement
          "good" to mean "not revoked", but that doesn't mean the cert
          being validated was ever issued. We chose to use "unknown" to
          mean "never issued", but the problem remained that this
          response is unsigned and could be forged. So what's a poor
          client to do? The only clear case is "revoked" in reality.
        </tt>
        <tt><br>
          <br>
          I know that I have felt with the increasing reliance on OCSP
          for certificate verification, and questions like this
          manifesting themselves in client implementation choices like
          failing-back to CRL when OCSP doesn't give a clear answer
          suggests an opportunity to re-think the approach a bit.
        </tt>
        <tt><br>
          <br>
          Michael
        </tt>
        <tt><br>
        </tt></blockquote>
      <tt><br>
        I'm confused by the comment above: " ... failing-back to CRL
        when OCSP doesn't give a clear answer..." A CRL does not tell an
        RP if a cert is valid. It has the same limitation as an OCSP
        response (not coincidentally) in that it tells an RP only of an
        issued, not yet expired, cert has been revoked.&nbsp; cert validation
        is a separate processing step.&nbsp; PKIX developed SCVP to enable an
        OCSP-like server-based validation capability.&nbsp; I do not envision
        PKIX changing OCSP to offer SCVP-style functionality. Read the
        SCVP requirements doc to understand why PKIX chose to not
        "tweak" OCSP to provide this sort of capability.
        <br>
        <br>
        Steve
      </tt>
      <tt><br>
        _______________________________________________
        <br>
        pkix mailing list
        <br>
        <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>
        <br>
        <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix</a>
        <br>
        <br>
        <br>
      </tt>
    </blockquote>
  </body>
</html>

--------------020607010306080802080804--


From Walter.Goulet@rsa.com  Tue Oct 11 06:55:51 2011
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From: <Walter.Goulet@rsa.com>
To: <pkix@ietf.org>
Date: Tue, 11 Oct 2011 09:55:09 -0400
Thread-Topic: Guidance for assigning CertPolicyID values
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Subject: [pkix] Guidance for assigning CertPolicyID values
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Hi,

 

Looking through the various RFCs I can't seem to find any solid guidance on
what OID values to use for CertPolicyID (within the Certificate Policies
extension) when I'm setting up a private enterprise PKI. Are there any
conventions that are generally used for assigning such values? 

 

Thanks,

Walter Goulet

Senior Practice Consultant

RSA, The Security Division of EMC

M: (224) 277-6821

 


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vlink=3Dpurple><div class=3DWordSection1><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>Hi,<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>Looking =
through the various RFCs I can&#8217;t seem to find any solid guidance =
on what OID values to use for CertPolicyID (within the Certificate =
Policies extension) when I&#8217;m setting up a private enterprise PKI. =
Are there any conventions that are generally used for assigning such =
values? <o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>Thanks,<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>Walter =
Goulet<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>Senior Practice =
Consultant<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>RSA, The Security Division =
of EMC<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>M: (224) =
277-6821<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div></body></html>
------=_NextPart_001_0139_01CC87F3.7AFCEAE0--

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------=_NextPart_000_0138_01CC87F3.7AFCEAE0--

From tmiller@mitre.org  Tue Oct 11 07:12:38 2011
Return-Path: <tmiller@mitre.org>
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From: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
To: "Walter.Goulet@rsa.com" <Walter.Goulet@rsa.com>, "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] Guidance for assigning CertPolicyID values
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Date: Tue, 11 Oct 2011 14:12:32 +0000
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Guidance for assigning CertPolicyID values
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If your organization already owns an OID arc, get a branch allocated and
go to town.

If you don't have an OID arc of your own, establish one.   You can go to
the ISO for this, or any of a number of sub-organizations (e.g., ANSI or
IANA).

-- T

On 10/11/11 8:55 AM, "Walter.Goulet@rsa.com" <Walter.Goulet@rsa.com> wrote:

>Hi,
>=20
>Looking through the various RFCs I can=B9t seem to find any solid guidance
>on what OID values to use for CertPolicyID (within the Certificate
>Policies extension) when I=B9m setting up a private enterprise PKI. Are
>there any conventions that are generally used for assigning such values?
>=20
>Thanks,
>Walter Goulet
>Senior Practice Consultant
>RSA, The Security Division of EMC
>M: (224) 277-6821
>=20
>
>_______________________________________________
>pkix mailing list
>pkix@ietf.org
>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix


From david.cooper@nist.gov  Tue Oct 11 12:04:21 2011
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Cc: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] Guidance for assigning CertPolicyID values
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There really aren't any generic certificate policies that have been 
defined, so there couldn't be any generic guidance about what OID values 
to use.

For a private enterprise PKI, if you have developed a certificate 
policy, then you can assign it an OID from an OID arc that your 
organization owns, as suggested below.  Otherwise, I would suggest 
simply not including a certificatePolicies extension in the 
certificates.  If all of the certificates in the private enterprise PKI 
will be issued under the same policy, and this PKI will not become part 
of a larger PKI through cross-certification, then there may not be a 
need to include certificate policy information in the certificates.

On 10/11/2011 10:12 AM, Miller, Timothy J. wrote:
> If your organization already owns an OID arc, get a branch allocated and
> go to town.
>
> If you don't have an OID arc of your own, establish one.   You can go to
> the ISO for this, or any of a number of sub-organizations (e.g., ANSI or
> IANA).
>
> -- T
>
> On 10/11/11 8:55 AM, "Walter.Goulet@rsa.com"<Walter.Goulet@rsa.com>  wrote:
>> Hi,
>>
>> Looking through the various RFCs I can¹t seem to find any solid guidance
>> on what OID values to use for CertPolicyID (within the Certificate
>> Policies extension) when I¹m setting up a private enterprise PKI. Are
>> there any conventions that are generally used for assigning such values?
>>
>> Thanks,
>> Walter Goulet
>> Senior Practice Consultant
>> RSA, The Security Division of EMC
>> M: (224) 277-6821

From Walter.Goulet@rsa.com  Tue Oct 11 12:07:54 2011
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From: <Walter.Goulet@rsa.com>
To: <david.cooper@nist.gov>
Date: Tue, 11 Oct 2011 15:07:34 -0400
Thread-Topic: [pkix] Guidance for assigning CertPolicyID values
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Guidance for assigning CertPolicyID values
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Ok, thanks for the guidance. I'll go with allocating an OID arc that the
organization already owns.

Walter

> -----Original Message-----
> From: David A. Cooper [mailto:david.cooper@nist.gov]
> Sent: Tuesday, October 11, 2011 2:04 PM
> To: Goulet, Walter
> Cc: pkix@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [pkix] Guidance for assigning CertPolicyID values
>=20
> There really aren't any generic certificate policies that have been
defined, so
> there couldn't be any generic guidance about what OID values to use.
>=20
> For a private enterprise PKI, if you have developed a certificate =
policy,
then
> you can assign it an OID from an OID arc that your organization owns, =
as
> suggested below.  Otherwise, I would suggest simply not including a
> certificatePolicies extension in the certificates.  If all of the
certificates in the
> private enterprise PKI will be issued under the same policy, and this =
PKI
will
> not become part of a larger PKI through cross-certification, then =
there
may
> not be a need to include certificate policy information in the
certificates.
>=20
> On 10/11/2011 10:12 AM, Miller, Timothy J. wrote:
> > If your organization already owns an OID arc, get a branch allocated
> > and go to town.
> >
> > If you don't have an OID arc of your own, establish one.   You can =
go to
> > the ISO for this, or any of a number of sub-organizations (e.g., =
ANSI
> > or IANA).
> >
> > -- T
> >
> > On 10/11/11 8:55 AM, "Walter.Goulet@rsa.com"<Walter.Goulet@rsa.com>
> wrote:
> >> Hi,
> >>
> >> Looking through the various RFCs I can=B9t seem to find any solid
> >> guidance on what OID values to use for CertPolicyID (within the
> >> Certificate Policies extension) when I=B9m setting up a private
> >> enterprise PKI. Are there any conventions that are generally used =
for
> assigning such values?
> >>
> >> Thanks,
> >> Walter Goulet
> >> Senior Practice Consultant
> >> RSA, The Security Division of EMC
> >> M: (224) 277-6821


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From mstjohns@comcast.net  Tue Oct 11 12:18:33 2011
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Date: Tue, 11 Oct 2011 15:18:26 -0400
To: "Walter.Goulet@rsa.com" <Walter.Goulet@rsa.com>, "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
From: Michael StJohns <mstjohns@comcast.net>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Guidance for assigning CertPolicyID values
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As someone who has screwed this up at least twice, I recommend creating a=
 second level of groupings under your top-level OID - e.g. extension ids,=
 policy ids, etc and then stick your policies under the policy branch rather=
 than directly under your top-level OID.

If the question you're asking is which of the existing policy IDs you should=
 use for an enterprise system - that's a different question than the one Tim=
 answered.  If the scope of your private PKI is internal, and you don't have=
 any need to differentiate between various policy domains, then don't use=
 any.   As far as I know there is no "Private Enterprise PKI" general policy=
 that's been defined.

Mike



At 10:12 AM 10/11/2011, Miller, Timothy J. wrote:
>If your organization already owns an OID arc, get a branch allocated and
>go to town.
>
>If you don't have an OID arc of your own, establish one.   You can go to
>the ISO for this, or any of a number of sub-organizations (e.g., ANSI or
>IANA).
>
>-- T
>
>On 10/11/11 8:55 AM, "Walter.Goulet@rsa.com" <Walter.Goulet@rsa.com> wrote:
>
>>Hi,
>>=20
>>Looking through the various RFCs I can=B9t seem to find any solid guidance
>>on what OID values to use for CertPolicyID (within the Certificate
>>Policies extension) when I=B9m setting up a private enterprise PKI. Are
>>there any conventions that are generally used for assigning such values?
>>=20
>>Thanks,
>>Walter Goulet
>>Senior Practice Consultant
>>RSA, The Security Division of EMC
>>M: (224) 277-6821
>>=20
>>
>>_______________________________________________
>>pkix mailing list
>>pkix@ietf.org
>>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>
>_______________________________________________
>pkix mailing list
>pkix@ietf.org
>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix



From internet-drafts@ietf.org  Thu Oct 20 11:16:55 2011
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Subject: [pkix] I-D Action: draft-ietf-pkix-caa-03.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts director=
ies. This draft is a work item of the Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) Wor=
king Group of the IETF.

	Title           : DNS Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) Resource=
 Record
	Author(s)       : Phillip Hallam-Baker
                          Rob Stradling
	Filename        : draft-ietf-pkix-caa-03.txt
	Pages           : 15
	Date            : 2011-10-20

   The Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) DNS Resource Record
   allows a DNS domain name holder to specify the certificate signing
   certificate(s) authorized to issue certificates for that domain.  CAA
   resource records allow a public Certification Authority to implement
   additional controls to reduce the risk of unintended certificate mis-
   issue.


A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-caa-03.txt

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/

This Internet-Draft can be retrieved at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-caa-03.txt

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Subject: [pkix] draft-ietf-pkix-caa-03
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I am hoping to get one more rev of the draft in before the cut-off date. But
since this adds functionality (reporting) wanted to get a sketch out there).

I have updated the draft as follows:

* Removed Ben Laurie as a contributor since he was interested in the client
side enforcement capability.

* Removed the issuer bit and modified the meaning of the critical bit so
that this is now a critical bit for functions that relate only to cert
issue.

* Added a sketch of a mechanism to enable reporting as proposed by Brad
Hill.


Still to do:

* Need much more explanatory work on the reporting scheme.

* Need security considerations for reporting scheme

* The reporting scheme and the issue scheme could probably both benefit from
mandating that the syntax of the property values follows some regular
scheme, most likely the traditional HTTP/MIME syntax:

       property-value          = principal-value *( ";" parameter )
       principal-value         = dns-name | uri | quoted-string

       parameter               = attribute "=" value
       attribute               = token
       value                   = token | quoted-string

[Have to check up on my ABNF there]

This would seem to be a better approach to doing reporting than what I have
at the moment. The domain can simply specify a list of reporting formats
that it will accept data in (and possibly a list of protocols).



-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

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<div>I am hoping to get one more rev of the draft in before the cut-off dat=
e. But since this adds functionality (reporting) wanted to get a sketch out=
 there).</div><div><br></div>I have updated the draft as follows:<div><br>
</div><div>* Removed Ben Laurie as a contributor since he was interested in=
 the client side enforcement capability.</div><div><br></div><div>* Removed=
 the issuer bit and modified the meaning of the critical bit so that this i=
s now a critical bit for functions that relate only to cert issue.</div>
<div><br></div><div>* Added a sketch of a mechanism to enable reporting as =
proposed by Brad Hill.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>Still to do:=
</div><div><br></div><div>* Need much more explanatory work on the reportin=
g scheme.</div>
<div><br></div><div>* Need security considerations for reporting scheme</di=
v><div><br></div><div>* The reporting scheme and the issue scheme could pro=
bably both benefit from mandating that the syntax of the property values fo=
llows some regular scheme, most likely the traditional HTTP/MIME syntax:</d=
iv>
<div><span class=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"font-family: &#39;Times New =
Roman&#39;; font-size: medium; "><pre>       property-value          =3D pr=
incipal-value *( &quot;;&quot; parameter )
       principal-value         =3D dns-name | uri | quoted-string </pre><pr=
e>       parameter               =3D attribute &quot;=3D&quot; value
       attribute               =3D token
       value                   =3D token | quoted-string</pre></span></div>=
<div>[Have to check up on my ABNF there]<br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div><d=
iv>This would seem to be a better approach to doing reporting than what I h=
ave at the moment. The domain can simply specify a list of reporting format=
s that it will accept data in (and possibly a list of protocols).</div>
<div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div>-- <br>Website: <a href=3D"htt=
p://hallambaker.com/">http://hallambaker.com/</a><br><br>
</div>

--0016368e1b695805d204afbf2556--

From kyanha@kyanha.net  Thu Oct 20 23:42:49 2011
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From: "Kyle Hamilton" <kyanha@kyanha.net>
To: pkix@ietf.org
Date: Thu, 20 Oct 2011 23:42:25 -0700 (Pacific Daylight Time)
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Subject: [pkix] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
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From Walter.Goulet@rsa.com  Fri Oct 21 07:27:40 2011
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From: <Walter.Goulet@rsa.com>
To: <kyanha@kyanha.net>
Date: Fri, 21 Oct 2011 10:27:15 -0400
Thread-Topic: [pkix] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
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Hi Kyle,

Thanks for producing this draft. Upon reading it, the most obvious issue
that strikes me is CRL size; if I'm understanding your proposal =
correctly,
all CAs will be required to generate a very large all-encompassing CRL =
which
contains all non-expired certificates that have been issued by that CA.
Network bandwidth issues aside (think mobile devices), your proposal =
would
also require that this large CRL be stored for every CA that the RP =
trusts.
While delta CRLs will be smaller, they too will still be large since new
delta CRLs will need to continue to be generated daily to reflect newly
issued certificates.

I like the idea of a whitelist, but distributing it via CRLs seems
unmanageable. Would it not be better to propose such an approach using =
OCSP
instead?=20

Thanks,
Walter

> -----Original Message-----
> From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf =
Of
> Kyle Hamilton
> Sent: Friday, October 21, 2011 1:42 AM
> To: pkix@ietf.org
> Subject: [pkix] Fwd: New Version Notification for
draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
>=20
> All,
>=20
> DigiNotar (and its subsequent bankruptcy) is an example of why =
blacklist-
> based revocation is a bad idea.  However, Mozilla will not do anything =
to
> change its
>=20
> I propose that PKIX create a whitelist-based format.
>=20
> To obtain whitelist CRL processing as inexpensively as possible:
>=20
> 0) Import CRL.
> 1) Change the initial stream identifier from 1 to 3.
> 2) Change default processing path for unlisted certificates to INVALID =
or
> REVOKED.
> 3) Add entries to the main CRL for issued certificates, with the
reasonCode
> removeFromCrl.
>=20
> I request that the WG evaluate this and potentially take it up.
>=20
> Thanks for your time,
>=20
> -Kyle H
>=20
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From:  <internet-drafts@ietf.org>
> Date: Thu, Oct 20, 2011 at 9:27 AM
> Subject: New Version Notification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
> To: kyanha@kyanha.net
> Cc: kyanha@kyanha.net
>=20
>=20
> A new version of I-D, draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt has been successfully
> submitted by Kyle Hamilton and posted to the IETF repository.
>=20
> Filename: =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0draft-hamilton-cmr
> Revision: =A0 =A0 =A0 =A000
> Title: =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 Certificate Manifest Register (Certificate =
Revocation
List v4)
> Creation date: =A0 2011-10-20 WG ID: =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 Individual =
Submission Number
of
> pages: 6
>=20
> Abstract:
> =A0 In the spirit of simple, incremental improvement, we describe a
> =A0 whitelist-based revocation mechanism called the &quot;Certificate
> =A0 Manifest Register&quot;. =A0This is a list of all =
potentially-valid
> =A0 certificates which are (as of the date of production) known to =
have
> =A0 been legitimately issued by the CA and how they are to be treated =
by
> =A0 the client. =A0This permits certificates which are checked against =
it
> =A0 to be presumed invalid unless listed.
>=20
> =A0 Several recent events have cast doubt on the sufficiency of
> =A0 blacklist-based PKIX certificate revocation mechanisms. =A0At =
least
> =A0 one publicly-trusted Certification Authority was recently found to
> =A0 have been penetrated by a state-backed attacker, which issued =
itself
> =A0 several certificates valid for a particular global web search and
> =A0 email provider and then removed the records that it had done so. =
=A0In
> =A0 effect, the attacker was able to cause the CA to sleepwalk. =
=A0There
> =A0 was nothing that the client software developers could do to =
protect
> =A0 their users and themselves except remove the trust in that =
CA&#39;s
> =A0 root. =A0This event directly caused that particular CA&#39;s =
insolvency.
>=20
> =A0 The Certificate Revocation List format and definitions (X.509v2 as
> =A0 described in RFC 5280, its predecessors, and possibly its
> =A0 successors) are used and adapted whole-hog, with no data format
> =A0 changes and the alteration of one rule and one semantic to support
> =A0 whitelist-based processing. =A0CMR is defined to use version =
integer 3
> =A0 (v4) to differentiate its processing path from v2 CRL. =A0The =
changes
> =A0 from the CRL Profile are so minor, though, that they potentially
> =A0 might be implemented without a version bump, without disruption to
> =A0 current v2 CRL consumers.
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> The IETF Secretariat


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------=_NextPart_000_0027_01CC8FD3.9F203020--

From pala@isis.poly.edu  Fri Oct 21 08:41:11 2011
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Date: Fri, 21 Oct 2011 11:41:07 -0400
From: Massimiliano Pala <pala@isis.poly.edu>
Organization: NYU Poly
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
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Hi Kyle,

I have to say that in general I am not a lover of white-listing, mostly because of
Privacy concerns.

It seems to me that what you are proposing is mostly targeted to CAs that are focused
on server certificates. Besides the size of the CRLs and all of the considerations
behind mobile devices, I think the solution does not address the real problem you
posed as a motivation: the inclusion of Trust Anchors in applications and the
inability to dynamically add/remove trust (well.. from the average user perspective!).

Therefore, I think the item should not be a WG item (sorry Kyle).

Best Regards,
Max


On 10/21/2011 02:42 AM, Kyle Hamilton wrote:
> All,
>
> DigiNotar (and its subsequent bankruptcy) is an example of why blacklist-based revocation
> is a bad idea. However, Mozilla will not do anything to change its
> I propose that PKIX create a whitelist-based format.
>
> To obtain whitelist CRL processing as inexpensively as possible:
>
> 0) Import CRL.
> 1) Change the initial stream identifier from 1 to 3.
> 2) Change default processing path for unlisted certificates to INVALID or REVOKED.
> 3) Add entries to the main CRL for issued certificates, with the reasonCode removeFromCrl.
>
> I request that the WG evaluate this and potentially take it up.
>
> Thanks for your time,
>
> -Kyle H
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: <internet-drafts@ietf.org>
> Date: Thu, Oct 20, 2011 at 9:27 AM
> Subject: New Version Notification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
> To: kyanha@kyanha.net
> Cc: kyanha@kyanha.net
>
>
> A new version of I-D, draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt has been successfully submitted by Kyle
> Hamilton and posted to the IETF repository.
>
> Filename:        draft-hamilton-cmr
> Revision:        00
> Title:           Certificate Manifest Register (Certificate Revocation List v4)
> Creation date:   2011-10-20
> WG ID:           Individual Submission
> Number of pages: 6
>
> Abstract:
>    In the spirit of simple, incremental improvement, we describe a
>    whitelist-based revocation mechanism called the &quot;Certificate
>    Manifest Register&quot;.  This is a list of all potentially-valid
>    certificates which are (as of the date of production) known to have
>    been legitimately issued by the CA and how they are to be treated by
>    the client.  This permits certificates which are checked against it
>    to be presumed invalid unless listed.
>
>    Several recent events have cast doubt on the sufficiency of
>    blacklist-based PKIX certificate revocation mechanisms.  At least
>    one publicly-trusted Certification Authority was recently found to
>    have been penetrated by a state-backed attacker, which issued itself
>    several certificates valid for a particular global web search and
>    email provider and then removed the records that it had done so.  In
>    effect, the attacker was able to cause the CA to sleepwalk.  There
>    was nothing that the client software developers could do to protect
>    their users and themselves except remove the trust in that CA&#39;s
>    root.  This event directly caused that particular CA&#39;s insolvency.
>
>    The Certificate Revocation List format and definitions (X.509v2 as
>    described in RFC 5280, its predecessors, and possibly its
>    successors) are used and adapted whole-hog, with no data format
>    changes and the alteration of one rule and one semantic to support
>    whitelist-based processing.  CMR is defined to use version integer 3
>    (v4) to differentiate its processing path from v2 CRL.  The changes
>    from the CRL Profile are so minor, though, that they potentially
>    might be implemented without a version bump, without disruption to
>    current v2 CRL consumers.
>
>
>
>
> The IETF Secretariat
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix


-- 

tel.718-260-4009 | web: http://member.acm.org/~openca/

Massimiliano Pala, Ph.D.
Director & Founder, OpenCA Labs
Research Professor, NYU Poly
Assistant Director, CRISSP

http://crissp.poly.edu

From kyanha@kyanha.net  Sun Oct 23 06:52:23 2011
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From: "Kyle Hamilton" <kyanha@kyanha.net>
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From kyanha@kyanha.net  Sun Oct 23 08:20:39 2011
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From: "Kyle Hamilton" <kyanha@kyanha.net>
To: "Massimiliano Pala" <pala@isis.poly.edu>
Date: Sun, 23 Oct 2011 08:20:23 -0700 (Pacific Daylight Time)
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On Fri, Oct 21, 2011 at 8:41 AM, Massimiliano Pala <pala@isis.poly.edu> wrote:
> Hi Kyle,
>
> I have to say that in general I am not a lover of white-listing, mostly
> because of
> Privacy concerns.

Mr Pala,

I'm a privacy activist.  I'm building a system to take what PKIX currently perceives as "privacy" and make it look like the garish spotlight of public attention.

If CAs as a whole body -- meaning every one of them, legion -- could provide the guarantee that they would never screw up or sleepwalk, then CAs could legitimately keep their lists of issued serial numbers private.  Since they can't, the consumer of the service must demand that the CAs do the minimum necessary to ensure that the guarantees that the RP expects from the service can still be provided -- which means that the list of valid serial numbers (and no other part of the certificates involved!) must be made available.

In this case, there is one single action which can be done by every publicly-trusted CA, whole-cloth, with a single and straightforward implementation in every library with no changes to current CRL production/processing, copypasting the CRL code with minimal design and code changes to implement it.  It is minimally-invasive to CA businesses, and most importantly *it provides a means for CAs to prevent themselves from being forced into bankruptcy*.

If CAs wish to obscure the number of real certificates, they would be able to generate a bunch of fake serial numbers with the understanding that they were taking the liability for non-issued serial number collision.  Either way, a bounded set of potential target false serials is much smaller than the unbounded set that currently exists, and is an incremental improvement which can be made.

> It seems to me that what you are proposing is mostly targeted to CAs that
> are focused
> on server certificates.

I'm actually suffering a bit of a lack of imagination how it can be used directly in a server-certificate focused system.  Do you seriously think that a new manifest could be issued and distributed to every consumer immediately upon every new certificate issuance?  The only thing that needs that kind of update interval is the CA's own OCSP infrastructure.  Asynchronous messages could be sent with newly-issued credentials and processed after the CMR issuance and distribution caught up.

This is not a replacement for the CRL as it currently exists in every circumstance.  It's not supposed to be.  More than anything else, I need this for client, email, and other non-realtime communications.  But, it actually can improve server-certificate based systems (by feeding OCSP servers which are currently fed by CRLs with additional information that can close gaping barn-doors in the security boundary).

> Besides the size of the CRLs and all of the
> considerations
> behind mobile devices, I think the solution does not address the real
> problem you
> posed as a motivation: the inclusion of Trust Anchors in applications and
> the
> inability to dynamically add/remove trust (well.. from the average user
> perspective!).

Uh.  Did you even read my draft?  I don't want to dynamically add or remove trust, I want to be able to handle that all programmatically with more authoritative information than what can currently be obtained via the standards.  I don't want to have to remove trust at all, and I certainly don't think a binary "trusted/untrusted" is sufficient.

This is what brought up the motivation for this: we need some standard to communicate bulk authoritative trust information between CAs and consuming software that doesn't assume that the cryptography, implementation, and human institution behind it all are flawless.  If we ever have subscription CAs (subscribe to a single source of revocation information, for example), they're going to need this.  If we ever have subscription cross-certification CAs (subscribe to a single source of trust and let it do the due diligence about other CAs' CPSes and such), they're going to need this.

It's 2011, so where's my flying car?  We've reached the apparent limit of what can be achieved with the current infrastructure, and there are major flaws and failures which the people who want to keep the current infrastructure static are burying their heads in the sand about.

> Therefore, I think the item should not be a WG item (sorry Kyle).

Incremental improvement.  This is one thing which can be implemented for thousandths or millionths of cents on the dollars already spent on the problem, which will do more than anything else that has already been done, to protect more people and systems than have ever been protected, against more threats than have ever been protected against.

The security that PKIX has engineered up to now is fragile to this class of attacks.  Businesses which are built around providing services in this security space have no security that they will not be forced insolvent if they suffer an attack.  PKIX WG is the body which is supposed to be charged with providing identity and security services to the Internet and all of its participating consumers and service providers.  If we don't act now, the next time that a CA goes insolvent will be on our heads, moreso for the warning we've received.

This highlights a philosophical difference, between making something better and leaving something alone.  I'm all for "if it isn't broke, don't fix it"; however, a cost-benefit analysis suggests that leaving this one alone costs far more than the minimal changes required to improve it.

Think about it this way, for a moment:  A corporation (corporations are people too) formed and existed (was born and lived), which based its entire business model and life around the standards from PKIX.    That corporation, that person, was basically slipped a zolpidem mickey and induced to sign things it never would have signed otherwise, things that it wasn't given or didn't keep a copy of -- and the results of it were that the corporation was taken over (imprisoned) by a state, and then forced into insolvency (killed).

A corporate person died because of PKIX WG's oversight.  Do you want to kill another one, too?

> Best Regards,
> Max

-Kyle H

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Date: Sun, 23 Oct 2011 13:08:46 -0400
From: Scott Schmit <i.grok@comcast.net>
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On Sun, Oct 23, 2011 at 08:20:23AM -0700, Kyle Hamilton wrote:
> If CAs as a whole body -- meaning every one of them, legion -- could
> provide the guarantee that they would never screw up or sleepwalk,
> then CAs could legitimately keep their lists of issued serial numbers
> private.  Since they can't, the consumer of the service must demand
> that the CAs do the minimum necessary to ensure that the guarantees
> that the RP expects from the service can still be provided -- which
> means that the list of valid serial numbers (and no other part of the
> certificates involved!) must be made available.

If only the serial number is used to check that the cert is valid or
revoked, what's to prevent an attacker from generating a fraudulent
certificate with a serial number duplicating a legitimate certificate?
Now the whitelist attests to the validity of not only the legitimate
cert, but also the fraudulent ones as well.

Reading your draft, you seem to recognize that that including a hash of
the certificate would be an improvement, but it's not clear to me that
you realize that without it, this change does very little to improve the
RP's security. This proposal neutralizes attackers that are able to get
control of the CA certificate issuance process but cannot control the
serial number. How likely is that? If we make this change, how likely is
it to stay that way?

Also, I don't know that we can make that kind of change without working
with ITU-T to revise X.509. AIUI, they own the X.509 format, the IETF
only profiled it for Internet use. For example, the X.509v2 CRL format
states that the next update field is optional, but RFC 5280 says that
it's required anyway. I would expect that bumping the format number from
v2 to v4 would also require action by ITU-T.

If you want to proceed down this path anyway, then I'd suggest not
altering the v2 CRL format at all. Instead, change the interpretation of
missing information, and alter the protocols that provide or use it
accordingly so that RPs can take advantage of that interpretation.

--=20
Scott Schmit

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From denis.pinkas@bull.net  Mon Oct 24 01:53:01 2011
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Fwd: New Version Notification for	draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
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Kyle,

The solution you propose is not adequate to solve the issue: it is=20
inappropriate to list  all good certificates using
a CRL structure since the list would be too long.

It is also inappropriate to use the term CRLs to advertise "good"=20
certificates since CRLs are for black lists only.

If you want to make some improvements, they could be made on OCSP.=20

When reading an OCSP response, it is currently not possible to know what=20
source of information was used.
It would be interesting to define a singleExtensions in a SingleResponse=20
to signal that the response what picked=20
using directly the CA data base rather than simply a CRL and at the same=20
time extend the error  response codes=20
to add "does not exist".

Denis




De :    Massimiliano Pala <pala@isis.poly.edu>
A :     pkix@ietf.org
Date :  21/10/2011 17:42
Objet : Re: [pkix] Fwd: New Version Notification for=20
draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
Envoy=E9 par :    pkix-bounces@ietf.org



Hi Kyle,

I have to say that in general I am not a lover of white-listing, mostly=20
because of
Privacy concerns.

It seems to me that what you are proposing is mostly targeted to CAs that=20
are focused
on server certificates. Besides the size of the CRLs and all of the=20
considerations
behind mobile devices, I think the solution does not address the real=20
problem you
posed as a motivation: the inclusion of Trust Anchors in applications and=20
the
inability to dynamically add/remove trust (well.. from the average user=20
perspective!).

Therefore, I think the item should not be a WG item (sorry Kyle).

Best Regards,
Max


On 10/21/2011 02:42 AM, Kyle Hamilton wrote:
> All,
>
> DigiNotar (and its subsequent bankruptcy) is an example of why=20
blacklist-based revocation
> is a bad idea. However, Mozilla will not do anything to change its
> I propose that PKIX create a whitelist-based format.
>
> To obtain whitelist CRL processing as inexpensively as possible:
>
> 0) Import CRL.
> 1) Change the initial stream identifier from 1 to 3.
> 2) Change default processing path for unlisted certificates to INVALID=20
or REVOKED.
> 3) Add entries to the main CRL for issued certificates, with the=20
reasonCode removeFromCrl.
>
> I request that the WG evaluate this and potentially take it up.
>
> Thanks for your time,
>
> -Kyle H
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: <internet-drafts@ietf.org>
> Date: Thu, Oct 20, 2011 at 9:27 AM
> Subject: New Version Notification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
> To: kyanha@kyanha.net
> Cc: kyanha@kyanha.net
>
>
> A new version of I-D, draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt has been successfully=20
submitted by Kyle
> Hamilton and posted to the IETF repository.
>
> Filename:        draft-hamilton-cmr
> Revision:        00
> Title:           Certificate Manifest Register (Certificate Revocation=20
List v4)
> Creation date:   2011-10-20
> WG ID:           Individual Submission
> Number of pages: 6
>
> Abstract:
>    In the spirit of simple, incremental improvement, we describe a
>    whitelist-based revocation mechanism called the &quot;Certificate
>    Manifest Register&quot;.  This is a list of all potentially-valid
>    certificates which are (as of the date of production) known to have
>    been legitimately issued by the CA and how they are to be treated by
>    the client.  This permits certificates which are checked against it
>    to be presumed invalid unless listed.
>
>    Several recent events have cast doubt on the sufficiency of
>    blacklist-based PKIX certificate revocation mechanisms.  At least
>    one publicly-trusted Certification Authority was recently found to
>    have been penetrated by a state-backed attacker, which issued itself
>    several certificates valid for a particular global web search and
>    email provider and then removed the records that it had done so.  In
>    effect, the attacker was able to cause the CA to sleepwalk.  There
>    was nothing that the client software developers could do to protect
>    their users and themselves except remove the trust in that CA&#39;s
>    root.  This event directly caused that particular CA&#39;s=20
insolvency.
>
>    The Certificate Revocation List format and definitions (X.509v2 as
>    described in RFC 5280, its predecessors, and possibly its
>    successors) are used and adapted whole-hog, with no data format
>    changes and the alteration of one rule and one semantic to support
>    whitelist-based processing.  CMR is defined to use version integer 3
>    (v4) to differentiate its processing path from v2 CRL.  The changes
>    from the CRL Profile are so minor, though, that they potentially
>    might be implemented without a version bump, without disruption to
>    current v2 CRL consumers.
>
>
>
>
> The IETF Secretariat
>
>
>
> =5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=
=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix


--=20

tel.718-260-4009 | web: http://member.acm.org/~openca/

Massimiliano Pala, Ph.D.
Director & Founder, OpenCA Labs
Research Professor, NYU Poly
Assistant Director, CRISSP

http://crissp.poly.edu
=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=
=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F
pkix mailing list
pkix@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix


--=_alternative 002AC1B5C1257933_=
Content-Type: text/html; charset="ISO-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<font size=3D2 face=3D"sans-serif">Kyle,</font>
<br>
<br><font size=3D2 face=3D"sans-serif">The solution you propose is not adeq=
uate
to solve the issue: it is inappropriate to list &nbsp;all good certificates
using<br>
a CRL structure since the list would be too long.</font>
<br>
<br><font size=3D2 face=3D"sans-serif">It is also inappropriate to use the
term CRLs to advertise &quot;good&quot; certificates since CRLs are for
black lists only.</font>
<br>
<br><font size=3D2 face=3D"sans-serif">If you want to make some improvement=
s,
they could be made on OCSP. </font>
<br>
<br><font size=3D2 face=3D"sans-serif">When reading an OCSP response, it is
currently not possible to know what source of information was used.</font>
<br><font size=3D2 face=3D"sans-serif">It would be interesting to define </=
font><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman">a
singleExtensions</font><font size=3D2 face=3D"sans-serif"> in</font><font s=
ize=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman">
a SingleResponse</font><font size=3D2 face=3D"sans-serif"> to signal that t=
he
response what picked <br>
using directly the CA data base rather than simply a CRL and at the same
time extend the error &nbsp;response codes <br>
to add &quot;does not exist&quot;.</font>
<br>
<br><font size=3D2 face=3D"sans-serif">Denis</font>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br><font size=3D1 color=3D#5f5f5f face=3D"sans-serif">De : &nbsp; &nbsp; &=
nbsp;
&nbsp;</font><font size=3D1 face=3D"sans-serif">Massimiliano Pala &lt;pala@=
isis.poly.edu&gt;</font>
<br><font size=3D1 color=3D#5f5f5f face=3D"sans-serif">A : &nbsp; &nbsp; &n=
bsp;
&nbsp;</font><font size=3D1 face=3D"sans-serif">pkix@ietf.org</font>
<br><font size=3D1 color=3D#5f5f5f face=3D"sans-serif">Date : &nbsp; &nbsp;=
 &nbsp;
&nbsp;</font><font size=3D1 face=3D"sans-serif">21/10/2011 17:42</font>
<br><font size=3D1 color=3D#5f5f5f face=3D"sans-serif">Objet : &nbsp; &nbsp;
&nbsp; &nbsp;</font><font size=3D1 face=3D"sans-serif">Re: [pkix] Fwd:
New Version Notification for &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;draft-hamilton-cmr-=
00.txt</font>
<br><font size=3D1 color=3D#5f5f5f face=3D"sans-serif">Envoy=E9 par : &nbsp=
; &nbsp;
&nbsp; &nbsp;</font><font size=3D1 face=3D"sans-serif">pkix-bounces@ietf.or=
g</font>
<br>
<hr noshade>
<br>
<br>
<br><tt><font size=3D2>Hi Kyle,<br>
<br>
I have to say that in general I am not a lover of white-listing, mostly
because of<br>
Privacy concerns.<br>
<br>
It seems to me that what you are proposing is mostly targeted to CAs that
are focused<br>
on server certificates. Besides the size of the CRLs and all of the conside=
rations<br>
behind mobile devices, I think the solution does not address the real probl=
em
you<br>
posed as a motivation: the inclusion of Trust Anchors in applications and
the<br>
inability to dynamically add/remove trust (well.. from the average user
perspective!).<br>
<br>
Therefore, I think the item should not be a WG item (sorry Kyle).<br>
<br>
Best Regards,<br>
Max<br>
<br>
<br>
On 10/21/2011 02:42 AM, Kyle Hamilton wrote:<br>
&gt; All,<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; DigiNotar (and its subsequent bankruptcy) is an example of why blackli=
st-based
revocation<br>
&gt; is a bad idea. However, Mozilla will not do anything to change its<br>
&gt; I propose that PKIX create a whitelist-based format.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; To obtain whitelist CRL processing as inexpensively as possible:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; 0) Import CRL.<br>
&gt; 1) Change the initial stream identifier from 1 to 3.<br>
&gt; 2) Change default processing path for unlisted certificates to INVALID
or REVOKED.<br>
&gt; 3) Add entries to the main CRL for issued certificates, with the reaso=
nCode
removeFromCrl.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I request that the WG evaluate this and potentially take it up.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Thanks for your time,<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; -Kyle H<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; ---------- Forwarded message ----------<br>
&gt; From: &lt;internet-drafts@ietf.org&gt;<br>
&gt; Date: Thu, Oct 20, 2011 at 9:27 AM<br>
&gt; Subject: New Version Notification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt<br>
&gt; To: kyanha@kyanha.net<br>
&gt; Cc: kyanha@kyanha.net<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; A new version of I-D, draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt has been successfully
submitted by Kyle<br>
&gt; Hamilton and posted to the IETF repository.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Filename: &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;draft-hamilton-cmr<br>
&gt; Revision: &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;00<br>
&gt; Title: &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Certificate Manifest Register
(Certificate Revocation List v4)<br>
&gt; Creation date: &nbsp; 2011-10-20<br>
&gt; WG ID: &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Individual Submission<br>
&gt; Number of pages: 6<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Abstract:<br>
&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp;In the spirit of simple, incremental improvement, we
describe a<br>
&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp;whitelist-based revocation mechanism called the &amp;quot=
;Certificate<br>
&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp;Manifest Register&amp;quot;. &nbsp;This is a list of
all potentially-valid<br>
&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp;certificates which are (as of the date of production)
known to have<br>
&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp;been legitimately issued by the CA and how they are to
be treated by<br>
&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp;the client. &nbsp;This permits certificates which are
checked against it<br>
&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp;to be presumed invalid unless listed.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp;Several recent events have cast doubt on the sufficiency
of<br>
&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp;blacklist-based PKIX certificate revocation mechanisms.
&nbsp;At least<br>
&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp;one publicly-trusted Certification Authority was recently
found to<br>
&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp;have been penetrated by a state-backed attacker, which
issued itself<br>
&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp;several certificates valid for a particular global web
search and<br>
&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp;email provider and then removed the records that it had
done so. &nbsp;In<br>
&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp;effect, the attacker was able to cause the CA to sleepwal=
k.
&nbsp;There<br>
&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp;was nothing that the client software developers could
do to protect<br>
&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp;their users and themselves except remove the trust in
that CA&amp;#39;s<br>
&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp;root. &nbsp;This event directly caused that particular
CA&amp;#39;s insolvency.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp;The Certificate Revocation List format and definitions
(X.509v2 as<br>
&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp;described in RFC 5280, its predecessors, and possibly
its<br>
&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp;successors) are used and adapted whole-hog, with no data
format<br>
&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp;changes and the alteration of one rule and one semantic
to support<br>
&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp;whitelist-based processing. &nbsp;CMR is defined to use
version integer 3<br>
&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp;(v4) to differentiate its processing path from v2 CRL.
&nbsp;The changes<br>
&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp;from the CRL Profile are so minor, though, that they
potentially<br>
&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp;might be implemented without a version bump, without
disruption to<br>
&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp;current v2 CRL consumers.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; The IETF Secretariat<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; =5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=
=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F<br>
&gt; pkix mailing list<br>
&gt; pkix@ietf.org<br>
&gt; </font></tt><a href=3Dhttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix><tt><=
font size=3D2>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix</font></tt></a><tt=
><font size=3D2><br>
<br>
<br>
-- <br>
<br>
tel.718-260-4009 | web: </font></tt><a href=3Dhttp://member.acm.org/~openca=
/><tt><font size=3D2>http://member.acm.org/~openca/</font></tt></a><tt><fon=
t size=3D2><br>
<br>
Massimiliano Pala, Ph.D.<br>
Director &amp; Founder, OpenCA Labs<br>
Research Professor, NYU Poly<br>
Assistant Director, CRISSP<br>
<br>
</font></tt><a href=3Dhttp://crissp.poly.edu/><tt><font size=3D2>http://cri=
ssp.poly.edu</font></tt></a><tt><font size=3D2><br>
=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=
=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F<br>
pkix mailing list<br>
pkix@ietf.org<br>
</font></tt><a href=3Dhttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix><tt><font =
size=3D2>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix</font></tt></a><tt><fon=
t size=3D2><br>
</font></tt>
<br>
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denis.pinkas@bull.net wrote:
> 
> The solution you propose is not adequate to solve the issue: it is 
> inappropriate to list  all good certificates using
> a CRL structure since the list would be too long.

There is truth in your words, but there are a number of CA
(I know a few operated by the US gov.) that use CRLs far beyond
reasonable sizes ( more than one million certs in the CRL).

A CA should be retired (i.e. not issue new certificates) early enough
so that it will be extremely unlikely that the growth of its CRL
for the already issued certs will not exceed reasonable sizes
(probably 50.000)


But without strong authentication of the certs in CRLs and OCSP
(=certificate hash), the shortcoming that X.509/PKIX can not cope
with disaster recovery and be made to fail remains as a problem.


> 
> It is also inappropriate to use the term CRLs to advertise "good" 
> certificates since CRLs are for black lists only.

I principle, I agree.

But somehow that particular seems to have already been committed
by X.509/PKIX with the CRLReason "removeFromCRL(8)".  ;-)


> 
> If you want to make some improvements, they could be made on OCSP. 

OCSP when performed by the RP is a serious privacy problem
(unless operating a local OCSP responder that feeds on CRLs,
 but the latter is unable to check against a list of existing
 certs unless there is a standardized format to distribute
 that information...)


-Martin

From Walter.Goulet@rsa.com  Mon Oct 24 09:01:07 2011
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From: <Walter.Goulet@rsa.com>
To: <mrex@sap.com>, <denis.pinkas@bull.net>
Date: Mon, 24 Oct 2011 12:00:52 -0400
Thread-Topic: [pkix] Fwd: New Version Notification
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References: <OF1D3604B6.81D7F01F-ONC1257931.0044C4A0-C1257933.0030D164@bull.net>	from "denis.pinkas@bull.net" at Oct 24, 11 10:53:13 am <201110241535.p9OFZhBg014876@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp>
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> -----Original Message-----
> From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
> Martin Rex
> Sent: Monday, October 24, 2011 10:36 AM
> To: denis.pinkas@bull.net
> Cc: pkix@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [pkix] Fwd: New Version Notification
>
> denis.pinkas@bull.net wrote:
> >
> > The solution you propose is not adequate to solve the issue: it is
> > inappropriate to list  all good certificates using a CRL structure
> > since the list would be too long.
>
> There is truth in your words, but there are a number of CA (I know a few
> operated by the US gov.) that use CRLs far beyond reasonable sizes ( more
> than one million certs in the CRL).
>
> A CA should be retired (i.e. not issue new certificates) early enough so =
that it
> will be extremely unlikely that the growth of its CRL for the already iss=
ued
> certs will not exceed reasonable sizes (probably 50.000)
>
>
> But without strong authentication of the certs in CRLs and OCSP (=3Dcerti=
ficate
> hash), the shortcoming that X.509/PKIX can not cope with disaster recover=
y
> and be made to fail remains as a problem.
>
>
> >
> > It is also inappropriate to use the term CRLs to advertise "good"
> > certificates since CRLs are for black lists only.
>
> I principle, I agree.
>
> But somehow that particular seems to have already been committed by
> X.509/PKIX with the CRLReason "removeFromCRL(8)".  ;-)
>
>
> >
> > If you want to make some improvements, they could be made on OCSP.
>
> OCSP when performed by the RP is a serious privacy problem (unless
> operating a local OCSP responder that feeds on CRLs,  but the latter is u=
nable
> to check against a list of existing  certs unless there is a standardized=
 format
> to distribute  that information...)
>

Would you care to elaborate on the bit regarding the privacy issues surroun=
ding OCSP? I hear this as a rather constant refrain against the use of OCSP=
. Is the privacy issue the theoretical mapping that an OCSP responder could=
 do against an RP's IP address, meaning that the OCSP responder could have =
a time/date stamp along with IP address for sites which a user visits? If s=
o, I don't see how OCSP compromises privacy any more so than a public DNS r=
esolver could. Is there some more fundamental issue that I'm missing?


>
> -Martin
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix

Thanks,
Walter

From mrex@sap.com  Mon Oct 24 09:24:53 2011
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From: Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
Message-Id: <201110241624.p9OGOje0018005@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp>
To: Walter.Goulet@rsa.com
Date: Mon, 24 Oct 2011 18:24:45 +0200 (MEST)
In-Reply-To: <B8E4DC0DD2F9A74AB88B4529E8FED39CEBA0F0FE@MX22A.corp.emc.com> from "Walter.Goulet@rsa.com" at Oct 24, 11 12:00:52 pm
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Walter.Goulet@rsa.com wrote:
> 
> > >
> > > If you want to make some improvements, they could be made on OCSP.
> >
> > OCSP when performed by the RP is a serious privacy problem (unless
> > operating a local OCSP responder that feeds on CRLs,  but the latter
> > is unable to check against a list of existing certs unless there is
> > a standardized format to distribute that information...)
> >
> 
> Would you care to elaborate on the bit regarding the privacy issues
> surrounding OCSP?  I hear this as a rather constant refrain against
> the use of OCSP.  Is the privacy issue the theoretical mapping that
> an OCSP responder could do against an RP's IP address, meaning that
> the OCSP responder could have a time/date stamp along with IP address
> for sites which a user visits?

Correct.  And the user does not have a choice in that OCSP responder,
the CA may choose to operate that OCSP responder in a country that
is very privacy-ignorant.

The only way to migitate this privacy problem would be to locally operate
an OCSP responder that feeds on CRLs (or avoid the OCSP overhead
entirely and work locally on CRLs in a proprietary fashion).


>
> If so, I don't see how OCSP compromises privacy any more so than
> a public DNS resolver could.
> Is there some more fundamental issue that I'm missing?

With DNS you have the freedom of choice whom to ask and there is
no bias towards the cert issuer.  Finding recursive DNS resolver
that operates in a country with reasonable privacy protection
laws that prohibit the DNS server operater to log client IP-Addresses
and what DNS requests they wanted to have resolved is fairly easy.


-Martin

From Walter.Goulet@rsa.com  Mon Oct 24 09:41:51 2011
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From: <Walter.Goulet@rsa.com>
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> -----Original Message-----
> From: Martin Rex [mailto:mrex@sap.com]
> Sent: Monday, October 24, 2011 11:25 AM
> To: Goulet, Walter
> Cc: mrex@sap.com; denis.pinkas@bull.net; pkix@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [pkix] Fwd: New Version Notification
> 
> Walter.Goulet@rsa.com wrote:
> >
> > > >
> > > > If you want to make some improvements, they could be made on
> OCSP.
> > >
> > > OCSP when performed by the RP is a serious privacy problem (unless
> > > operating a local OCSP responder that feeds on CRLs,  but the latter
> > > is unable to check against a list of existing certs unless there is
> > > a standardized format to distribute that information...)
> > >
> >
> > Would you care to elaborate on the bit regarding the privacy issues
> > surrounding OCSP?  I hear this as a rather constant refrain against
> > the use of OCSP.  Is the privacy issue the theoretical mapping that an
> > OCSP responder could do against an RP's IP address, meaning that the
> > OCSP responder could have a time/date stamp along with IP address for
> > sites which a user visits?
> 
> Correct.  And the user does not have a choice in that OCSP responder, the
CA
> may choose to operate that OCSP responder in a country that is very
privacy-
> ignorant.
> 
> The only way to migitate this privacy problem would be to locally operate
an
> OCSP responder that feeds on CRLs (or avoid the OCSP overhead entirely
> and work locally on CRLs in a proprietary fashion).
> 
> 
> >
> > If so, I don't see how OCSP compromises privacy any more so than a
> > public DNS resolver could.
> > Is there some more fundamental issue that I'm missing?
> 
> With DNS you have the freedom of choice whom to ask and there is no bias
> towards the cert issuer.  Finding recursive DNS resolver that operates in
a
> country with reasonable privacy protection laws that prohibit the DNS
server
> operater to log client IP-Addresses and what DNS requests they wanted to
> have resolved is fairly easy.
> 
> 
> -Martin

I'm still not sure I quite get it since a user could make the same choice
regarding which CA they want to trust. Same goes for site operators that are
buying SSL certificates for their sites; if user privacy is a paramount
concern (for both users and site operators), then shouldn't site operators
simply choose to use CAs which do business in countries with privacy
protection laws? Same for users, if a user is sophisticated enough to find a
recursive DNS resolver that is located in a privacy friendly country then
they will have the means to manually choose which CAs to trust.

That being said, a hybrid solution using Kyle's CMR to generate certificate
whitelists that are only distributed to OCSP responders is a compelling
alternative. By not distributing the very large whitelist CRLs to all
devices but instead distributing them to a smaller subset of OCSP responders
many of the size/network bandwidth constraints are alleviated.

Thanks,
Walter

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From paul.hoffman@vpnc.org  Mon Oct 24 09:59:08 2011
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References: <B8E4DC0DD2F9A74AB88B4529E8FED39CEBA0F0FE@MX22A.corp.emc.com> from "Walter.Goulet@rsa.com" at Oct 24, 11 12:00:52 pm <201110241624.p9OGOje0018005@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp> <B8E4DC0DD2F9A74AB88B4529E8FED39CEBA0F133@MX22A.corp.emc.com>
To: Walter.Goulet@rsa.com
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Cc: PKIX <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] New Version Notification
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On Oct 24, 2011, at 9:41 AM, <Walter.Goulet@rsa.com> =
<Walter.Goulet@rsa.com> wrote:

> I'm still not sure I quite get it since a user could make the same =
choice
> regarding which CA they want to trust.

Relying parties in multi-CA environments do not get to choose which CA =
they want to trust.

> Same goes for site operators that are
> buying SSL certificates for their sites; if user privacy is a =
paramount
> concern (for both users and site operators), then shouldn't site =
operators
> simply choose to use CAs which do business in countries with privacy
> protection laws?

Relying parties and site operators often have different privacy models.

> Same for users, if a user is sophisticated enough to find a
> recursive DNS resolver that is located in a privacy friendly country =
then
> they will have the means to manually choose which CAs to trust.

Please name a single commonly-used operating system where that statement =
is true. Editing the list of name servers is easier than even finding =
(much less editing) the list of trusted CAs in the OSs I am familiar =
with.

--Paul Hoffman


From Walter.Goulet@rsa.com  Mon Oct 24 10:10:31 2011
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From: <Walter.Goulet@rsa.com>
To: <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
Date: Mon, 24 Oct 2011 13:09:50 -0400
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References: <B8E4DC0DD2F9A74AB88B4529E8FED39CEBA0F0FE@MX22A.corp.emc.com> from "Walter.Goulet@rsa.com" at Oct 24, 11 12:00:52 pm <201110241624.p9OGOje0018005@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp> <B8E4DC0DD2F9A74AB88B4529E8FED39CEBA0F133@MX22A.corp.emc.com> <90C8C8E4-2CFB-473B-AEB7-F55D9EAC6FCD@vpnc.org>
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> -----Original Message-----
> From: Paul Hoffman [mailto:paul.hoffman@vpnc.org]
> Sent: Monday, October 24, 2011 11:59 AM
> To: Goulet, Walter
> Cc: PKIX
> Subject: Re: [pkix] New Version Notification
> 
> On Oct 24, 2011, at 9:41 AM, <Walter.Goulet@rsa.com>
> <Walter.Goulet@rsa.com> wrote:
> 
> > I'm still not sure I quite get it since a user could make the same
> > choice regarding which CA they want to trust.
> 
> Relying parties in multi-CA environments do not get to choose which CA
they
> want to trust.
> 
> > Same goes for site operators that are
> > buying SSL certificates for their sites; if user privacy is a
> > paramount concern (for both users and site operators), then shouldn't
> > site operators simply choose to use CAs which do business in countries
> > with privacy protection laws?
> 
> Relying parties and site operators often have different privacy models.
> 
> > Same for users, if a user is sophisticated enough to find a recursive
> > DNS resolver that is located in a privacy friendly country then they
> > will have the means to manually choose which CAs to trust.
> 
> Please name a single commonly-used operating system where that
> statement is true. Editing the list of name servers is easier than even
finding
> (much less editing) the list of trusted CAs in the OSs I am familiar with.
> 
> --Paul Hoffman
> 

Interesting;  I've always thought Firefox for example made it rather simple
to remove CAs from your trust list. On Windows it's a little harder because
of Microsoft's automatic update functionality they use for third party
trusted roots; you'd have to turn off that feature then manually edit your
trust list which, while doable; is certainly not easy. Not sure about Apple
OSs.

Thanks,
Walter

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From kent@bbn.com  Mon Oct 24 10:25:19 2011
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Subject: [pkix] agenda time slots?
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Folks,

Our meetings in Taipei is approaching quickly, so I hereby
solicit requests for agenda slots.

Send replies to me and to Stefan

Steve

From pala@isis.poly.edu  Mon Oct 24 11:51:15 2011
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Fwd: New Version Notification
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On 10/24/2011 12:24 PM, Martin Rex wrote:
[...]
> Correct.  And the user does not have a choice in that OCSP responder,
> the CA may choose to operate that OCSP responder in a country that
> is very privacy-ignorant.
>
> The only way to migitate this privacy problem would be to locally operate
> an OCSP responder that feeds on CRLs (or avoid the OCSP overhead
> entirely and work locally on CRLs in a proprietary fashion).

I would like to add the fact that there's been quite few publication on
the matter. Some good work (although it would be quite difficult to implement
in the current OCSP standard) is from Tsudik [1].

Personally I worked on the matter, never released the software as.. too
many different things to do - but it is possible to actually enhance the
current OCSP requests and responses by obfuscating the requested certificate
identifier (serial number) thus allowing for some privacy for the requester
(eg., n out of m type of privacy).

If people think that an extension to the OCSP standard could be useful
for privacy-preserving (but compatible) OCSP services.. well, I can take
on the task... with some collaborators.. :D

Cheers,
Max

[1] 
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=tsudik%20ocsp%20privacy&source=web&cd=4&ved=0CCwQFjAD&url=http%3A%2F%2Fsprout.ics.uci.edu%2Fpapers%2Fprivacy_revocation.pdf&ei=PLOlTuDSJsfm0QGp1vGPBQ&usg=AFQjCNEBDGBBIgt_cTdxdKGrr-9sLXHAIQ&cad=rja

-- 

tel.718-260-4009 | web: http://member.acm.org/~openca/

Massimiliano Pala, Ph.D.
Director & Founder, OpenCA Labs
Research Professor, NYU Poly
Assistant Director, CRISSP

http://crissp.poly.edu
http://www.poly.edu/user/mpala
http://www.openca.org/


From mrex@sap.com  Mon Oct 24 12:09:29 2011
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From: Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
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To: Walter.Goulet@rsa.com
Date: Mon, 24 Oct 2011 21:09:23 +0200 (MEST)
In-Reply-To: <B8E4DC0DD2F9A74AB88B4529E8FED39CEBA0F168@MX22A.corp.emc.com> from "Walter.Goulet@rsa.com" at Oct 24, 11 01:09:50 pm
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Walter.Goulet@rsa.com wrote:
> 
> Paul Hoffman wrote:
> > 
> > Relying parties and site operators often have different privacy models.
> >
> > Walter Goulet wrote:
> > > 
> > > Same for users, if a user is sophisticated enough to find a recursive
> > > DNS resolver that is located in a privacy friendly country then they
> > > will have the means to manually choose which CAs to trust.
> > 
> > Please name a single commonly-used operating system where that
> > statement is true. Editing the list of name servers is easier than even
> > finding (much less editing) the list of trusted CAs in the OSs
> > I am familiar with.
> 
> Interesting;  I've always thought Firefox for example made it rather simple
> to remove CAs from your trust list. On Windows it's a little harder because
> of Microsoft's automatic update functionality they use for third party
> trusted roots; you'd have to turn off that feature then manually edit your
> trust list which, while doable; is certainly not easy.

You do not seem to be familiar with any Version of Microsoft Windows
from the 6.x Series (Vista =6.0, Win7= 6.1).

While it is true that with Windows 5.x (XP=5.1, 2003=5.2) it was
possible to see *ALL* of your trustanchors and disable automatic
updating for that list, both of these are gone in Vista an later.

You simply don't know which trust anchors there are in Vista an
Win7 because the trust anchor certificates are not preloaded and
only downloaded on the fly when needed.  Deleting a trust anchor
will not get you anywhere, it will be automatically downloaded
again.  If you want to get rid of a TrustAnchor, you'll have
to obtain the certificate and add it to the "Untrusted Certs"
list.  But how could that scheme work if you do not have the
slighest idea how large that Microsoft-maintained dynamic
Trust universe is, and which three letter agencies besides
Microsoft have to power to make your Windows machine trust
a CA of their choice whenever they see it fit.


With respect to selecting a recursive DNS resolver that does not
violate your privacy: for a home DSL subscription where I live,
you typically get an IP Address of a recursive DNS resolver
conveyed through DHCP.  So for a number of users living in
jurisdiction with reasonable privacy protections by law, there
is no additional configuration required, it just works.


-Martin

From Walter.Goulet@rsa.com  Mon Oct 24 12:30:53 2011
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> -----Original Message-----
> From: Martin Rex [mailto:mrex@sap.com]
> Sent: Monday, October 24, 2011 2:09 PM
> To: Goulet, Walter
> Cc: paul.hoffman@vpnc.org; pkix@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [pkix] New Version Notification
>
> Walter.Goulet@rsa.com wrote:
> >
> > Paul Hoffman wrote:
> > >
> > > Relying parties and site operators often have different privacy model=
s.
> > >
> > > Walter Goulet wrote:
> > > >
> > > > Same for users, if a user is sophisticated enough to find a
> > > > recursive DNS resolver that is located in a privacy friendly
> > > > country then they will have the means to manually choose which CAs =
to
> trust.
> > >
> > > Please name a single commonly-used operating system where that
> > > statement is true. Editing the list of name servers is easier than
> > > even finding (much less editing) the list of trusted CAs in the OSs
> > > I am familiar with.
> >
> > Interesting;  I've always thought Firefox for example made it rather
> > simple to remove CAs from your trust list. On Windows it's a little
> > harder because of Microsoft's automatic update functionality they use
> > for third party trusted roots; you'd have to turn off that feature
> > then manually edit your trust list which, while doable; is certainly no=
t easy.
>
> You do not seem to be familiar with any Version of Microsoft Windows from
> the 6.x Series (Vista =3D6.0, Win7=3D 6.1).
>
> While it is true that with Windows 5.x (XP=3D5.1, 2003=3D5.2) it was poss=
ible to
> see *ALL* of your trustanchors and disable automatic updating for that li=
st,
> both of these are gone in Vista an later.
>
> You simply don't know which trust anchors there are in Vista an
> Win7 because the trust anchor certificates are not preloaded and only
> downloaded on the fly when needed.  Deleting a trust anchor will not get
> you anywhere, it will be automatically downloaded again.  If you want to =
get
> rid of a TrustAnchor, you'll have to obtain the certificate and add it to=
 the
> "Untrusted Certs"
> list.  But how could that scheme work if you do not have the slighest ide=
a
> how large that Microsoft-maintained dynamic Trust universe is, and which
> three letter agencies besides Microsoft have to power to make your
> Windows machine trust a CA of their choice whenever they see it fit.
>
>
> With respect to selecting a recursive DNS resolver that does not violate =
your
> privacy: for a home DSL subscription where I live, you typically get an I=
P
> Address of a recursive DNS resolver conveyed through DHCP.  So for a
> number of users living in jurisdiction with reasonable privacy protection=
s by
> law, there is no additional configuration required, it just works.
>
>
> -Martin

No no, I'm quite familiar with how Windows Vista and later manage their tru=
st stores; I've had some painful conversations with customers trying to exp=
lain why or why not a particular root is not present on their Windows boxes=
. The differences between earlier versions of Windows and the later version=
s caused me many customer management headaches when setting up enterprise P=
KI deployments. My short reply obviously didn't convey this clearly enough.

But rather than arguing this point (and after a very illuminating lunch con=
versation on this topic with a non-technologist), I see the potential priva=
cy issues with OCSP and why they are not simple fixes.

From denis.pinkas@bull.net  Tue Oct 25 00:43:06 2011
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Martin,

You said:

"While it is true that with Windows 5.x (XP=5.1, 2003=5.2) it was
possible to see *ALL* of your trustanchors and disable automatic
updating for that list, both of these are gone in Vista an later.

You simply don't know which trust anchors there are in Vista an
Win7 because the trust anchor certificates are not preloaded and
only downloaded on the fly when needed.  Deleting a trust anchor
will not get you anywhere, it will be automatically downloaded
again.  If you want to get rid of a TrustAnchor, you'll have
to obtain the certificate and add it to the "Untrusted Certs"
list."

Although it is a little bit outside the core discussion, would it be 
possible that you give pointers 
to MS technical papers which tell more about this ?

It seems that the new "trust model" from MS is no more adequate, ... which 
is quite a problem.

Denis
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Content-Type: text/html; charset="US-ASCII"

<font size=2 face="sans-serif">Martin,</font>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">You said:</font>
<br>
<br><tt><font size=2>&quot;While it is true that with Windows 5.x (XP=5.1,
2003=5.2) it was<br>
possible to see *ALL* of your trustanchors and disable automatic<br>
updating for that list, both of these are gone in Vista an later.<br>
<br>
You simply don't know which trust anchors there are in Vista an<br>
Win7 because the trust anchor certificates are not preloaded and<br>
only downloaded on the fly when needed. &nbsp;Deleting a trust anchor<br>
will not get you anywhere, it will be automatically downloaded<br>
again. &nbsp;If you want to get rid of a TrustAnchor, you'll have<br>
to obtain the certificate and add it to the &quot;Untrusted Certs&quot;<br>
list.&quot;</font></tt>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">Although it is a little bit outside
the core discussion, would it be possible that you give pointers <br>
to MS technical papers which tell more about this ?</font>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">It seems that the new &quot;trust model&quot;
from MS is no more adequate, ... which is quite a problem.</font>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">Denis</font>
--=_alternative 002A4CCEC1257934_=--

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At 5:35 PM +0200 10/24/11, Martin Rex wrote:
>denis.pinkas@bull.net wrote:
>>
>>  The solution you propose is not adequate to solve the issue: it is
>>  inappropriate to list  all good certificates using
>>  a CRL structure since the list would be too long.
>
>There is truth in your words, but there are a number of CA
>(I know a few operated by the US gov.) that use CRLs far beyond
>reasonable sizes ( more than one million certs in the CRL).

true, but these are examples of bad system design, not a 
justification for very large CRLs.

>A CA should be retired (i.e. not issue new certificates) early enough
>so that it will be extremely unlikely that the growth of its CRL
>for the already issued certs will not exceed reasonable sizes
>(probably 50.000)

That's a very odd suggestion. The usual suggestion is that one should 
manage the cert lifetimes to keep the CRL size manageable. (This 
assumes a fill CRL, not
taking advantage of any of the schemes that break a CRL into smaller pieces.)

>But without strong authentication of the certs in CRLs and OCSP
>(=certificate hash), the shortcoming that X.509/PKIX can not cope
>with disaster recovery and be made to fail remains as a problem.

What do you mean by "... strong authentication of the certs in CRLs..." A CRL
does not contain a cert, pere se.

>...
>
>But somehow that particular seems to have already been committed
>by X.509/PKIX with the CRLReason "removeFromCRL(8)".  ;-)

Well, almost. One first revokes a cert, then declares a Mulligan via 
this extension.  There is no reason code that says "I didn't really 
revoke it; I just wanted to whitelist it later" :-). RemoveFromCRL is 
a good an idea as cert on hold, IMHO.

>  >
>>  If you want to make some improvements, they could be made on OCSP.
>
>OCSP when performed by the RP is a serious privacy problem
>(unless operating a local OCSP responder that feeds on CRLs,
>  but the latter is unable to check against a list of existing
>  certs unless there is a standardized format to distribute
>  that information...)

I agree that there are potential privacy issues, but use of a local
responder is a viable alternative, as you noted.  If privacy were
viewed as a bigger concern, we'd see such responders offered by
folks analogous to the way that TOR nodes are operated.

The more relevant issue, is that we have SCVP as a query protocol
to determine cert status, not just revocation status, so OCSP is
not the preferred approach anyway.

Steve

From tmiller@mitre.org  Tue Oct 25 05:24:34 2011
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On 10/25/11 2:43 AM, "denis.pinkas@bull.net" <denis.pinkas@bull.net> wrote:
>Although it is a little bit outside
>the core discussion, would it be possible that you give pointers
>to MS technical papers which tell more about this ?

http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc751157.aspx

-- T





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On 10/25/11 7:17 AM, "Stephen Kent" <kent@bbn.com> wrote:

>>A CA should be retired (i.e. not issue new certificates) early enough
>>so that it will be extremely unlikely that the growth of its CRL
>>for the already issued certs will not exceed reasonable sizes
>>(probably 50.000)
>
>That's a very odd suggestion. The usual suggestion is that one should
>manage the cert lifetimes to keep the CRL size manageable. (This
>assumes a fill CRL, not
>taking advantage of any of the schemes that break a CRL into smaller
>pieces.)

... Or at least learn why revocations appear excessive and make
administrative or business process changes to eliminate unnecessary
sources.

-- T


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Steve,

You said:

The more relevant issue, is that we have SCVP as a query protocol
to determine cert status, not just revocation status, so OCSP is
not the preferred approach anyway.

SCVP does not guaranty in anyway that the certificate exists.
OCSP is much simpler than SCVP and is, IMO, the preferred approach.

Denis
=20





De :    Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
A :     mrex@sap.com
Cc :    pkix@ietf.org
Date :  25/10/2011 14:17
Objet : Re: [pkix] Fwd: New Version Notification
Envoy=E9 par :    pkix-bounces@ietf.org



At 5:35 PM +0200 10/24/11, Martin Rex wrote:
>denis.pinkas@bull.net wrote:
>>
>>  The solution you propose is not adequate to solve the issue: it is
>>  inappropriate to list  all good certificates using
>>  a CRL structure since the list would be too long.
>
>There is truth in your words, but there are a number of CA
>(I know a few operated by the US gov.) that use CRLs far beyond
>reasonable sizes ( more than one million certs in the CRL).

true, but these are examples of bad system design, not a=20
justification for very large CRLs.

>A CA should be retired (i.e. not issue new certificates) early enough
>so that it will be extremely unlikely that the growth of its CRL
>for the already issued certs will not exceed reasonable sizes
>(probably 50.000)

That's a very odd suggestion. The usual suggestion is that one should=20
manage the cert lifetimes to keep the CRL size manageable. (This=20
assumes a fill CRL, not
taking advantage of any of the schemes that break a CRL into smaller=20
pieces.)

>But without strong authentication of the certs in CRLs and OCSP
>(=3Dcertificate hash), the shortcoming that X.509/PKIX can not cope
>with disaster recovery and be made to fail remains as a problem.

What do you mean by "... strong authentication of the certs in CRLs..." A=20
CRL
does not contain a cert, pere se.

>...
>
>But somehow that particular seems to have already been committed
>by X.509/PKIX with the CRLReason "removeFromCRL(8)".  ;-)

Well, almost. One first revokes a cert, then declares a Mulligan via=20
this extension.  There is no reason code that says "I didn't really=20
revoke it; I just wanted to whitelist it later" :-). RemoveFromCRL is=20
a good an idea as cert on hold, IMHO.

>  >
>>  If you want to make some improvements, they could be made on OCSP.
>
>OCSP when performed by the RP is a serious privacy problem
>(unless operating a local OCSP responder that feeds on CRLs,
>  but the latter is unable to check against a list of existing
>  certs unless there is a standardized format to distribute
>  that information...)

I agree that there are potential privacy issues, but use of a local
responder is a viable alternative, as you noted.  If privacy were
viewed as a bigger concern, we'd see such responders offered by
folks analogous to the way that TOR nodes are operated.

The more relevant issue, is that we have SCVP as a query protocol
to determine cert status, not just revocation status, so OCSP is
not the preferred approach anyway.

Steve
=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=
=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F
pkix mailing list
pkix@ietf.org
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<font size=3D2 face=3D"sans-serif">Steve,</font>
<br>
<br><font size=3D2 face=3D"sans-serif">You said:</font>
<br>
<br><tt><font size=3D2>The more relevant issue, is that we have SCVP as a
query protocol<br>
to determine cert status, not just revocation status, so OCSP is<br>
not the preferred approach anyway.</font></tt>
<br>
<br><font size=3D2 face=3D"sans-serif">SCVP does not guaranty in anyway that
the certificate exists.</font>
<br><font size=3D2 face=3D"sans-serif">OCSP is much simpler than SCVP and i=
s,
IMO, the preferred approach.</font>
<br>
<br><font size=3D2 face=3D"sans-serif">Denis</font>
<br><font size=3D2 face=3D"sans-serif">&nbsp;</font>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br><font size=3D1 color=3D#5f5f5f face=3D"sans-serif">De : &nbsp; &nbsp; &=
nbsp;
&nbsp;</font><font size=3D1 face=3D"sans-serif">Stephen Kent &lt;kent@bbn.c=
om&gt;</font>
<br><font size=3D1 color=3D#5f5f5f face=3D"sans-serif">A : &nbsp; &nbsp; &n=
bsp;
&nbsp;</font><font size=3D1 face=3D"sans-serif">mrex@sap.com</font>
<br><font size=3D1 color=3D#5f5f5f face=3D"sans-serif">Cc&nbsp;: &nbsp; &nb=
sp;
&nbsp; &nbsp;</font><font size=3D1 face=3D"sans-serif">pkix@ietf.org</font>
<br><font size=3D1 color=3D#5f5f5f face=3D"sans-serif">Date : &nbsp; &nbsp;=
 &nbsp;
&nbsp;</font><font size=3D1 face=3D"sans-serif">25/10/2011 14:17</font>
<br><font size=3D1 color=3D#5f5f5f face=3D"sans-serif">Objet : &nbsp; &nbsp;
&nbsp; &nbsp;</font><font size=3D1 face=3D"sans-serif">Re: [pkix] Fwd:
New Version Notification</font>
<br><font size=3D1 color=3D#5f5f5f face=3D"sans-serif">Envoy=E9 par : &nbsp=
; &nbsp;
&nbsp; &nbsp;</font><font size=3D1 face=3D"sans-serif">pkix-bounces@ietf.or=
g</font>
<br>
<hr noshade>
<br>
<br>
<br><tt><font size=3D2>At 5:35 PM +0200 10/24/11, Martin Rex wrote:<br>
&gt;denis.pinkas@bull.net wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &nbsp;The solution you propose is not adequate to solve the issue:
it is<br>
&gt;&gt; &nbsp;inappropriate to list &nbsp;all good certificates using<br>
&gt;&gt; &nbsp;a CRL structure since the list would be too long.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;There is truth in your words, but there are a number of CA<br>
&gt;(I know a few operated by the US gov.) that use CRLs far beyond<br>
&gt;reasonable sizes ( more than one million certs in the CRL).<br>
<br>
true, but these are examples of bad system design, not a <br>
justification for very large CRLs.<br>
<br>
&gt;A CA should be retired (i.e. not issue new certificates) early enough<b=
r>
&gt;so that it will be extremely unlikely that the growth of its CRL<br>
&gt;for the already issued certs will not exceed reasonable sizes<br>
&gt;(probably 50.000)<br>
<br>
That's a very odd suggestion. The usual suggestion is that one should <br>
manage the cert lifetimes to keep the CRL size manageable. (This <br>
assumes a fill CRL, not<br>
taking advantage of any of the schemes that break a CRL into smaller pieces=
.)<br>
<br>
&gt;But without strong authentication of the certs in CRLs and OCSP<br>
&gt;(=3Dcertificate hash), the shortcoming that X.509/PKIX can not cope<br>
&gt;with disaster recovery and be made to fail remains as a problem.<br>
<br>
What do you mean by &quot;... strong authentication of the certs in CRLs...=
&quot;
A CRL<br>
does not contain a cert, pere se.<br>
<br>
&gt;...<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;But somehow that particular seems to have already been committed<br>
&gt;by X.509/PKIX with the CRLReason &quot;removeFromCRL(8)&quot;. &nbsp;;-=
)<br>
<br>
Well, almost. One first revokes a cert, then declares a Mulligan via <br>
this extension. &nbsp;There is no reason code that says &quot;I didn't
really <br>
revoke it; I just wanted to whitelist it later&quot; :-). RemoveFromCRL
is <br>
a good an idea as cert on hold, IMHO.<br>
<br>
&gt; &nbsp;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &nbsp;If you want to make some improvements, they could be made
on OCSP.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;OCSP when performed by the RP is a serious privacy problem<br>
&gt;(unless operating a local OCSP responder that feeds on CRLs,<br>
&gt; &nbsp;but the latter is unable to check against a list of existing<br>
&gt; &nbsp;certs unless there is a standardized format to distribute<br>
&gt; &nbsp;that information...)<br>
<br>
I agree that there are potential privacy issues, but use of a local<br>
responder is a viable alternative, as you noted. &nbsp;If privacy were<br>
viewed as a bigger concern, we'd see such responders offered by<br>
folks analogous to the way that TOR nodes are operated.<br>
<br>
The more relevant issue, is that we have SCVP as a query protocol<br>
to determine cert status, not just revocation status, so OCSP is<br>
not the preferred approach anyway.<br>
<br>
Steve<br>
=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=
=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F<br>
pkix mailing list<br>
pkix@ietf.org<br>
</font></tt><a href=3Dhttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix><tt><font =
size=3D2>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix</font></tt></a><tt><fon=
t size=3D2><br>
</font></tt>
<br>
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From liaquat.khan@ascertia.com  Tue Oct 25 06:45:27 2011
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From: "Liaquat Khan" <liaquat.khan@ascertia.com>
To: <denis.pinkas@bull.net>, <pkix@ietf.org>
References: <201110241535.p9OFZhBg014876@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp>	<p06240808cacb75284b47@[128.89.89.93]> <OFF43B3E5E.77AFEDDC-ONC1257934.00490666-C1257934.0049F709@bull.net>
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I wouldn=92t say OCSP is preferred approach compared to SCVP, any more =
than
SCVP is preferred approach compared to OCSP. =20

They are trying to meet different needs, i.e. one is certificate =
revocation
checking only whilst other is full certificate path building and =
validation.


=20

I agree with Denis though that SCVP doesn=92t necessarily require that =
the
SCVP server much check that the certificate was actually issued by the =
CA in
a legitimate way.   Of course SCVP server could be made to check this =
was
the case by comparing what is the CA database, but as far my =
understanding
is this is outside the scope of the actual protocol.   In case of OCSP =
it=92s
only the serial number that the OCSP responder has to go by, and it can =
only
check this serial number in the CA database (as opposed to the full
certificate).   So in this respect SCVP can be said to be =93better=94 =
than
OCSP,  probably this is what Steve was also referring to.   To be honest =
in
a real-world I doubt many SCVP servers will actually have access to the =
CAs
databases, since they will probably be owned and operated by separate =
entity
to the CA(s). =20

=20

Regards

Liaquat

=20

From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
denis.pinkas@bull.net
Sent: 25 October 2011 14:28
To: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] Fwd: New Version Notification

=20

Steve,=20

You said:=20

The more relevant issue, is that we have SCVP as a query protocol
to determine cert status, not just revocation status, so OCSP is
not the preferred approach anyway.=20

SCVP does not guaranty in anyway that the certificate exists.=20
OCSP is much simpler than SCVP and is, IMO, the preferred approach.=20

Denis=20
 =20





De :        Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>=20
A :        mrex@sap.com=20
Cc :        pkix@ietf.org=20
Date :        25/10/2011 14:17=20
Objet :        Re: [pkix] Fwd: New Version Notification=20
Envoy=E9 par :        pkix-bounces@ietf.org=20

  _____ =20




At 5:35 PM +0200 10/24/11, Martin Rex wrote:
>denis.pinkas@bull.net wrote:
>>
>>  The solution you propose is not adequate to solve the issue: it is
>>  inappropriate to list  all good certificates using
>>  a CRL structure since the list would be too long.
>
>There is truth in your words, but there are a number of CA
>(I know a few operated by the US gov.) that use CRLs far beyond
>reasonable sizes ( more than one million certs in the CRL).

true, but these are examples of bad system design, not a=20
justification for very large CRLs.

>A CA should be retired (i.e. not issue new certificates) early enough
>so that it will be extremely unlikely that the growth of its CRL
>for the already issued certs will not exceed reasonable sizes
>(probably 50.000)

That's a very odd suggestion. The usual suggestion is that one should=20
manage the cert lifetimes to keep the CRL size manageable. (This=20
assumes a fill CRL, not
taking advantage of any of the schemes that break a CRL into smaller
pieces.)

>But without strong authentication of the certs in CRLs and OCSP
>(=3Dcertificate hash), the shortcoming that X.509/PKIX can not cope
>with disaster recovery and be made to fail remains as a problem.

What do you mean by "... strong authentication of the certs in CRLs..." =
A
CRL
does not contain a cert, pere se.

>...
>
>But somehow that particular seems to have already been committed
>by X.509/PKIX with the CRLReason "removeFromCRL(8)".  ;-)

Well, almost. One first revokes a cert, then declares a Mulligan via=20
this extension.  There is no reason code that says "I didn't really=20
revoke it; I just wanted to whitelist it later" :-). RemoveFromCRL is=20
a good an idea as cert on hold, IMHO.

>  >
>>  If you want to make some improvements, they could be made on OCSP.
>
>OCSP when performed by the RP is a serious privacy problem
>(unless operating a local OCSP responder that feeds on CRLs,
>  but the latter is unable to check against a list of existing
>  certs unless there is a standardized format to distribute
>  that information...)

I agree that there are potential privacy issues, but use of a local
responder is a viable alternative, as you noted.  If privacy were
viewed as a bigger concern, we'd see such responders offered by
folks analogous to the way that TOR nodes are operated.

The more relevant issue, is that we have SCVP as a query protocol
to determine cert status, not just revocation status, so OCSP is
not the preferred approach anyway.

Steve
_______________________________________________
pkix mailing list
pkix@ietf.org
 <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix


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<o:idmap v:ext=3D"edit" data=3D"1" />
</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=3DEN-GB link=3Dblue =
vlink=3Dpurple><div class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D'>I wouldn&#8217;t say OCSP is preferred approach compared to SCVP, any =
more than SCVP is preferred approach compared to OCSP.=A0 =
<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D'>They are trying to meet different needs, i.e. one is certificate =
revocation checking only whilst other is full certificate path building =
and validation.=A0 <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D'>I agree with Denis though that SCVP doesn&#8217;t necessarily require =
that the SCVP server much check that the certificate was actually issued =
by the CA in a legitimate way. =A0=A0Of course SCVP server could be made =
to check this was the case by comparing what is the CA database, but as =
far my understanding is this is outside the scope of the actual =
protocol.=A0 =A0In case of OCSP it&#8217;s only the serial number that =
the OCSP responder has to go by, and it can only check this serial =
number in the CA database (as opposed to the full certificate).=A0 =A0So =
in this respect SCVP can be said to be &#8220;better&#8221; than =
OCSP,=A0 probably this is what Steve was also referring to. =A0=A0To be =
honest in a real-world I doubt many SCVP servers will actually have =
access to the CAs databases, since they will probably be owned and =
operated by separate entity to the CA(s). =A0<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D'>Regards<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D'>Liaquat<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span =
lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span>=
</b><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> =
pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] <b>On Behalf Of =
</b>denis.pinkas@bull.net<br><b>Sent:</b> 25 October 2011 =
14:28<br><b>To:</b> pkix@ietf.org<br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [pkix] Fwd: New =
Version Notification<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'>Steve,</span>=
 <br><br><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'>You =
said:</span> <br><br><tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>The more =
relevant issue, is that we have SCVP as a query =
protocol</span></tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier =
New"'><br><tt>to determine cert status, not just revocation status, so =
OCSP is</tt><br><tt>not the preferred approach anyway.</tt></span> =
<br><br><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'>SCVP does =
not guaranty in anyway that the certificate exists.</span> <br><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'>OCSP is much =
simpler than SCVP and is, IMO, the preferred approach.</span> =
<br><br><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'>Denis</span> =
<br><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'>&nbsp;</span>=
 <br><br><br><br><br><br><span =
style=3D'font-size:7.5pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#5F5F5F'>=
De : &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;</span><span =
style=3D'font-size:7.5pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'>Stephen Kent =
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:kent@bbn.com">kent@bbn.com</a>&gt;</span> =
<br><span =
style=3D'font-size:7.5pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#5F5F5F'>=
A : &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;</span><span =
style=3D'font-size:7.5pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'><a =
href=3D"mailto:mrex@sap.com">mrex@sap.com</a></span> <br><span =
style=3D'font-size:7.5pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#5F5F5F'>=
Cc&nbsp;: &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;</span><span =
style=3D'font-size:7.5pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'><a =
href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a></span> <br><span =
style=3D'font-size:7.5pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#5F5F5F'>=
Date : &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;</span><span =
style=3D'font-size:7.5pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'>25/10/2011 =
14:17</span> <br><span =
style=3D'font-size:7.5pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#5F5F5F'>=
Objet : &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;</span><span =
style=3D'font-size:7.5pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'>Re: [pkix] =
Fwd: New Version Notification</span> <br><span =
style=3D'font-size:7.5pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#5F5F5F'>=
Envoy=E9 par : &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;</span><span =
style=3D'font-size:7.5pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'><a =
href=3D"mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org">pkix-bounces@ietf.org</a></span> =
<o:p></o:p></p><div class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dcenter =
style=3D'text-align:center'><hr size=3D2 width=3D"100%" noshade =
style=3D'color:#A0A0A0' align=3Dcenter></div><p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'margin-bottom:12.0pt'><br><br><br><tt><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>At 5:35 PM +0200 10/24/11, Martin Rex =
wrote:</span></tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier =
New"'><br><tt>&gt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:denis.pinkas@bull.net">denis.pinkas@bull.net</a> =
wrote:</tt><br><tt>&gt;&gt;</tt><br><tt>&gt;&gt; &nbsp;The solution you =
propose is not adequate to solve the issue: it is</tt><br><tt>&gt;&gt; =
&nbsp;inappropriate to list &nbsp;all good certificates =
using</tt><br><tt>&gt;&gt; &nbsp;a CRL structure since the list would be =
too long.</tt><br><tt>&gt;</tt><br><tt>&gt;There is truth in your words, =
but there are a number of CA</tt><br><tt>&gt;(I know a few operated by =
the US gov.) that use CRLs far beyond</tt><br><tt>&gt;reasonable sizes ( =
more than one million certs in the CRL).</tt><br><br><tt>true, but these =
are examples of bad system design, not a </tt><br><tt>justification for =
very large CRLs.</tt><br><br><tt>&gt;A CA should be retired (i.e. not =
issue new certificates) early enough</tt><br><tt>&gt;so that it will be =
extremely unlikely that the growth of its CRL</tt><br><tt>&gt;for the =
already issued certs will not exceed reasonable =
sizes</tt><br><tt>&gt;(probably 50.000)</tt><br><br><tt>That's a very =
odd suggestion. The usual suggestion is that one should =
</tt><br><tt>manage the cert lifetimes to keep the CRL size manageable. =
(This </tt><br><tt>assumes a fill CRL, not</tt><br><tt>taking advantage =
of any of the schemes that break a CRL into smaller =
pieces.)</tt><br><br><tt>&gt;But without strong authentication of the =
certs in CRLs and OCSP</tt><br><tt>&gt;(=3Dcertificate hash), the =
shortcoming that X.509/PKIX can not cope</tt><br><tt>&gt;with disaster =
recovery and be made to fail remains as a problem.</tt><br><br><tt>What =
do you mean by &quot;... strong authentication of the certs in =
CRLs...&quot; A CRL</tt><br><tt>does not contain a cert, pere =
se.</tt><br><br><tt>&gt;...</tt><br><tt>&gt;</tt><br><tt>&gt;But somehow =
that particular seems to have already been committed</tt><br><tt>&gt;by =
X.509/PKIX with the CRLReason &quot;removeFromCRL(8)&quot;. =
&nbsp;;-)</tt><br><br><tt>Well, almost. One first revokes a cert, then =
declares a Mulligan via </tt><br><tt>this extension. &nbsp;There is no =
reason code that says &quot;I didn't really </tt><br><tt>revoke it; I =
just wanted to whitelist it later&quot; :-). RemoveFromCRL is =
</tt><br><tt>a good an idea as cert on hold, IMHO.</tt><br><br><tt>&gt; =
&nbsp;&gt;</tt><br><tt>&gt;&gt; &nbsp;If you want to make some =
improvements, they could be made on =
OCSP.</tt><br><tt>&gt;</tt><br><tt>&gt;OCSP when performed by the RP is =
a serious privacy problem</tt><br><tt>&gt;(unless operating a local OCSP =
responder that feeds on CRLs,</tt><br><tt>&gt; &nbsp;but the latter is =
unable to check against a list of existing</tt><br><tt>&gt; &nbsp;certs =
unless there is a standardized format to distribute</tt><br><tt>&gt; =
&nbsp;that information...)</tt><br><br><tt>I agree that there are =
potential privacy issues, but use of a local</tt><br><tt>responder is a =
viable alternative, as you noted. &nbsp;If privacy =
were</tt><br><tt>viewed as a bigger concern, we'd see such responders =
offered by</tt><br><tt>folks analogous to the way that TOR nodes are =
operated.</tt><br><br><tt>The more relevant issue, is that we have SCVP =
as a query protocol</tt><br><tt>to determine cert status, not just =
revocation status, so OCSP is</tt><br><tt>not the preferred approach =
anyway.</tt><br><br><tt>Steve</tt><br><tt>_______________________________=
________________</tt><br><tt>pkix mailing list</tt><br><tt><a =
href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a></tt><br></span><a =
href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix"><tt><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix</sp=
an></tt></a><o:p></o:p></p></div></body></html>
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From Walter.Goulet@rsa.com  Tue Oct 25 07:49:47 2011
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From: <Walter.Goulet@rsa.com>
To: <tmiller@mitre.org>, <denis.pinkas@bull.net>, <pkix@ietf.org>
Date: Tue, 25 Oct 2011 10:49:29 -0400
Thread-Topic: [pkix] New Version Notification
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> -----Original Message-----
> From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
> Miller, Timothy J.
> Sent: Tuesday, October 25, 2011 7:25 AM
> To: denis.pinkas@bull.net; pkix@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [pkix] New Version Notification
> 
> On 10/25/11 2:43 AM, "denis.pinkas@bull.net" <denis.pinkas@bull.net>
> wrote:
> >Although it is a little bit outside
> >the core discussion, would it be possible that you give pointers to MS
> >technical papers which tell more about this ?
> 
> http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc751157.aspx
> 
> -- T
> 
Also http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb457160.aspx which
describes the automatic root certificate update component that was introduce
in Windows XP. 

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From: "Kyle Hamilton" <kyanha@kyanha.net>
To: mrex@sap.com
Date: Tue, 25 Oct 2011 09:06:39 -0700 (Pacific Daylight Time)
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From kyanha@kyanha.net  Tue Oct 25 09:20:18 2011
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From: "Kyle Hamilton" <kyanha@kyanha.net>
To: denis.pinkas@bull.net
Date: Tue, 25 Oct 2011 09:20:09 -0700 (Pacific Daylight Time)
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
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From kyanha@kyanha.net  Tue Oct 25 09:28:41 2011
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From trevorf@exchange.microsoft.com  Tue Oct 25 13:55:37 2011
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From: Trevor Freeman <trevorf@exchange.microsoft.com>
To: "mrex@sap.com" <mrex@sap.com>, "Walter.Goulet@rsa.com" <Walter.Goulet@rsa.com>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] New Version Notification
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Hi Martin,

If you want details on the Microsoft root CA program and how it works, it's=
 published here http://support.microsoft.com/kb/931125 There is a link to t=
he current list of third party root CAs.=20

It is a windows group policy setting to turn on\off third party root CA tru=
st. You can find the node under security settings\public key policies\certi=
ficate path validation settings.

Trevor=20

-----Original Message-----
From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Mar=
tin Rex
Sent: Monday, October 24, 2011 12:09 PM
To: Walter.Goulet@rsa.com
Cc: pkix@ietf.org; paul.hoffman@vpnc.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] New Version Notification

Walter.Goulet@rsa.com wrote:
>=20
> Paul Hoffman wrote:
> >=20
> > Relying parties and site operators often have different privacy models.
> >
> > Walter Goulet wrote:
> > >=20
> > > Same for users, if a user is sophisticated enough to find a=20
> > > recursive DNS resolver that is located in a privacy friendly=20
> > > country then they will have the means to manually choose which CAs to=
 trust.
> >=20
> > Please name a single commonly-used operating system where that=20
> > statement is true. Editing the list of name servers is easier than=20
> > even finding (much less editing) the list of trusted CAs in the OSs=20
> > I am familiar with.
>=20
> Interesting;  I've always thought Firefox for example made it rather=20
> simple to remove CAs from your trust list. On Windows it's a little=20
> harder because of Microsoft's automatic update functionality they use=20
> for third party trusted roots; you'd have to turn off that feature=20
> then manually edit your trust list which, while doable; is certainly not =
easy.

You do not seem to be familiar with any Version of Microsoft Windows from t=
he 6.x Series (Vista =3D6.0, Win7=3D 6.1).

While it is true that with Windows 5.x (XP=3D5.1, 2003=3D5.2) it was possib=
le to see *ALL* of your trustanchors and disable automatic updating for tha=
t list, both of these are gone in Vista an later.

You simply don't know which trust anchors there are in Vista an
Win7 because the trust anchor certificates are not preloaded and only downl=
oaded on the fly when needed.  Deleting a trust anchor will not get you any=
where, it will be automatically downloaded again.  If you want to get rid o=
f a TrustAnchor, you'll have to obtain the certificate and add it to the "U=
ntrusted Certs"
list.  But how could that scheme work if you do not have the slighest idea =
how large that Microsoft-maintained dynamic Trust universe is, and which th=
ree letter agencies besides Microsoft have to power to make your Windows ma=
chine trust a CA of their choice whenever they see it fit.


With respect to selecting a recursive DNS resolver that does not violate yo=
ur privacy: for a home DSL subscription where I live, you typically get an =
IP Address of a recursive DNS resolver conveyed through DHCP.  So for a num=
ber of users living in jurisdiction with reasonable privacy protections by =
law, there is no additional configuration required, it just works.


-Martin
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From mrex@sap.com  Tue Oct 25 14:09:58 2011
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From: Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
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To: kent@bbn.com (Stephen Kent)
Date: Tue, 25 Oct 2011 23:09:48 +0200 (MEST)
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Stephen Kent wrote:
> 
> Martin Rex wrote:
> >
> > A CA should be retired (i.e. not issue new certificates) early enough
> > so that it will be extremely unlikely that the growth of its CRL
> > for the already issued certs will [...] exceed reasonable sizes
> > (probably 50.000)
> 
> That's a very odd suggestion. The usual suggestion is that one should 
> manage the cert lifetimes to keep the CRL size manageable.
> (This assumes a fill CRL, not taking advantage of any of the schemes
>  that break a CRL into smaller pieces.)


To me it looks like the idea
"manage the cert lifetimes to keep the CRL size manageable"
fails badly in practice.  At best for the limited use of pure online
authentication.

If checking of a digital signature some time into the past is desired,
then one needs to carry along expired certs on the CRL basically
forever (you also need that to be able to revoke a cert after
it has expired (in case that you notice that it has been compromised
only after the certificate has expired).

There are also schemes involving offline operation and verification
of digital signatures by X.509 certs where you have to archive the
CRL used in the verification along with the document as evidence
individually for each transaction.  The storage requirements are
huge when such a CRL is 20+ MBytes.


Really, I think that a CA (i.e. that specific issuer DName) should
be retired when the expected growth of the CRL during the remaining
lifetime of all certs signed with the issuer DName exceeds a
reasonable size.


> 
> >But without strong authentication of the certs in CRLs and OCSP
> >(=certificate hash), the shortcoming that X.509/PKIX can not cope
> >with disaster recovery and be made to fail remains as a problem.
> 
> What do you mean by "... strong authentication of the certs in CRLs..."
> A CRL does not contain a cert, pere se.


The idea of X.509 CRLs is based on a number of assumptions which were
proven to be flawed by the DigiNotar CA compromise.  The primary
problem is that its designers did not account for disaster recovery
at all, i.e. the possibility that an attacker might succeed to have
arbitrary certificates signed by the CA key and destroy audit/logs
about issuance of these certs (like certs with attacker-chosen
attributes, duplicate serial numbers of previously issued certs, 
omission of CRL-distribution points or OCSP-AIA extensions, or
potentially attributes such as BasicConstraint cA=TRUE)

In the DigiNotar case, the only solution after the hack was to kill
the entire PKI surrounding that CA as fast as possible, which means
having to re-issue credentials to *ALL* current certificate holders
in extremely short time and no real transition period available.

If there was a central database of previously issued, known-safe
certificates on backup, something which is normally available for desaster
recovery, then it would be possible to tell known-good and unknown
(likely fake) certs reliably apart based on their certificate hash
even without the slightest knowledge about how many and which fraudulent
certs had been issued.  The certificate serial number is unreliable
for telling those certs apart.  If you don't know which certs the
attacker managed to craft, you don't know whether he re-used existing
serials and which of them.


-Martin

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Martin Rex wrote:
> 
> > 
> > >But without strong authentication of the certs in CRLs and OCSP
> > >(=certificate hash), the shortcoming that X.509/PKIX can not cope
> > >with disaster recovery and be made to fail remains as a problem.
> > 
> > What do you mean by "... strong authentication of the certs in CRLs..."
> > A CRL does not contain a cert, pere se.
> 
> The idea of X.509 CRLs is based on a number of assumptions which were
> proven to be flawed by the DigiNotar CA compromise.  The primary
> problem is that its designers did not account for disaster recovery
> at all, i.e. the possibility that an attacker might succeed to have
> arbitrary certificates signed by the CA key and destroy audit/logs
> about issuance of these certs (like certs with attacker-chosen
> attributes, duplicate serial numbers of previously issued certs, 
> omission of CRL-distribution points or OCSP-AIA extensions, or
> potentially attributes such as BasicConstraint cA=TRUE)

Actually, the attacker might have issued himself a CRLsigner cert
and inserted his own CRL-Distribution points of OCSP-AIA extensions
into his fraudulent certs.  So conveying such information through
the cert itself rather than through CA cert seems to open another
can of worms.

-Martin

From tgindin@us.ibm.com  Tue Oct 25 19:08:54 2011
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
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        Walter:

        You could do what Kyle suggests by partitioning the CRL using CRL 
Distribution Points.  Indeed, it would be unworkable to do so without them 
for the reasons you point out.  Likewise, only server certificates would 
need to go on those whitelist CRL's.
        My issue is simpler, and I don't see that anyone has raised it. 
Does the problem of compromised RA's get solved in this way?  Unless the 
semantics of CRL Distribution Point allow the CA to say "don't accept this 
certificate without accessing the CRL", those browsers which accept 
servers without revocation checking will continue to do so.  If those 
semantics do permit a certificate to demand checking (whether by adding a 
new flag or by redefining critical on the CRL DP extension to imply that), 
whitelist is hardly necessary.
        Of course, we can most simply let CA's demand revocation checking 
by adding a new critical extension called "Untrustworthy without 
revocation check", whose value is an enumeration consisting of getCRL, 
useOCSP, getSomeStatus.  The problem is that all existing browsers will 
reject that certificate and so no CA's will issue such certificates by 
default for several years.  Thus, it would probably be more practical to 
ask browsers to interpret CRLDP critical as meaning "if you can't get the 
CRL, reject this cert".  Is that legitimate?

Tom Gindin




From:   <Walter.Goulet@rsa.com>
To:     <kyanha@kyanha.net>
Cc:     pkix@ietf.org
Date:   10/21/2011 10:28 AM
Subject:        Re: [pkix] Fwd: New Version Notification for 
draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
Sent by:        pkix-bounces@ietf.org



Hi Kyle,

Thanks for producing this draft. Upon reading it, the most obvious issue
that strikes me is CRL size; if I'm understanding your proposal correctly,
all CAs will be required to generate a very large all-encompassing CRL 
which
contains all non-expired certificates that have been issued by that CA.
Network bandwidth issues aside (think mobile devices), your proposal would
also require that this large CRL be stored for every CA that the RP 
trusts.
While delta CRLs will be smaller, they too will still be large since new
delta CRLs will need to continue to be generated daily to reflect newly
issued certificates.

I like the idea of a whitelist, but distributing it via CRLs seems
unmanageable. Would it not be better to propose such an approach using 
OCSP
instead? 

Thanks,
Walter

> -----Original Message-----
> From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
> Kyle Hamilton
> Sent: Friday, October 21, 2011 1:42 AM
> To: pkix@ietf.org
> Subject: [pkix] Fwd: New Version Notification for
draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
> 
> All,
> 
> DigiNotar (and its subsequent bankruptcy) is an example of why 
blacklist-
> based revocation is a bad idea.  However, Mozilla will not do anything 
to
> change its
> 
> I propose that PKIX create a whitelist-based format.
> 
> To obtain whitelist CRL processing as inexpensively as possible:
> 
> 0) Import CRL.
> 1) Change the initial stream identifier from 1 to 3.
> 2) Change default processing path for unlisted certificates to INVALID 
or
> REVOKED.
> 3) Add entries to the main CRL for issued certificates, with the
reasonCode
> removeFromCrl.
> 
> I request that the WG evaluate this and potentially take it up.
> 
> Thanks for your time,
> 
> -Kyle H
> 
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From:  <internet-drafts@ietf.org>
> Date: Thu, Oct 20, 2011 at 9:27 AM
> Subject: New Version Notification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
> To: kyanha@kyanha.net
> Cc: kyanha@kyanha.net
> 
> 
> A new version of I-D, draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt has been successfully
> submitted by Kyle Hamilton and posted to the IETF repository.
> 
> Filename:        draft-hamilton-cmr
> Revision:        00
> Title:           Certificate Manifest Register (Certificate Revocation
List v4)
> Creation date:   2011-10-20 WG ID:           Individual Submission 
Number
of
> pages: 6
> 
> Abstract:
>   In the spirit of simple, incremental improvement, we describe a
>   whitelist-based revocation mechanism called the &quot;Certificate
>   Manifest Register&quot;.  This is a list of all potentially-valid
>   certificates which are (as of the date of production) known to have
>   been legitimately issued by the CA and how they are to be treated by
>   the client.  This permits certificates which are checked against it
>   to be presumed invalid unless listed.
> 
>   Several recent events have cast doubt on the sufficiency of
>   blacklist-based PKIX certificate revocation mechanisms.  At least
>   one publicly-trusted Certification Authority was recently found to
>   have been penetrated by a state-backed attacker, which issued itself
>   several certificates valid for a particular global web search and
>   email provider and then removed the records that it had done so.  In
>   effect, the attacker was able to cause the CA to sleepwalk.  There
>   was nothing that the client software developers could do to protect
>   their users and themselves except remove the trust in that CA&#39;s
>   root.  This event directly caused that particular CA&#39;s insolvency.
> 
>   The Certificate Revocation List format and definitions (X.509v2 as
>   described in RFC 5280, its predecessors, and possibly its
>   successors) are used and adapted whole-hog, with no data format
>   changes and the alteration of one rule and one semantic to support
>   whitelist-based processing.  CMR is defined to use version integer 3
>   (v4) to differentiate its processing path from v2 CRL.  The changes
>   from the CRL Profile are so minor, though, that they potentially
>   might be implemented without a version bump, without disruption to
>   current v2 CRL consumers.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The IETF Secretariat

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On Tue, Oct 25, 2011 at 23:09, Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com> wrote:

> If checking of a digital signature some time into the past is desired,
> then one needs to carry along expired certs on the CRL basically
> forever


That is one way. Another way would be to save the CRL (or OCSP response)
that was current at the time of the signature creation.

The idea of X.509 CRLs is based on a number of assumptions which were
proven to be flawed by the DigiNotar CA compromise.  The primary
problem is that its designers did not account for disaster recovery
at all, [=85]
In the DigiNotar case, the only solution after the hack was to kill
the entire PKI surrounding that CA as fast as possible, which means
having to re-issue credentials to *ALL* current certificate holders
in extremely short time and no real transition period available.
If there was a central database of previously issued, known-safe
certificates on backup, something which is normally available for desaster
recovery, then it would be possible to tell known-good and unknown
(likely fake) certs reliably apart based on their certificate hash
even without the slightest knowledge about how many and which fraudulent
certs had been issued.  The certificate serial number is unreliable
for telling those certs apart.  If you don't know which certs the
attacker managed to craft, you don't know whether he re-used existing
serials and which of them.

I agree, but=85given DigiNotar's screwup, would you trust that they had the=
ir
database of issued certificates in order? What about an attack that managed
to insert the fraudulent certificates into the database in a way that they
could not be separated from the good ones without quite some effort? I don'=
t
think it is a stretch of mind to imagine that.

Being a customer of a CA, you should have your own disaster recovery plan.
What if your CA does a DigiNotar? Have a backup certificate for your keys,
so that you can rollover. It is a simpler, more resilient solution to the
same problem.

Simon Tardell,
Technology Nexus.

--001485f85edaae879204b02f0e97
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On Tue, Oct 25, 2011 at 23:09, Martin Rex <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"=
mailto:mrex@sap.com">mrex@sap.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><div class=3D"gm=
ail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;bor=
der-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
If checking of a digital signature some time into the past is desired,<br>
then one needs to carry along expired certs on the CRL basically<br>
forever </blockquote><div><br></div><div>That is one way. Another way would=
 be to save the CRL (or OCSP response) that was current at the time of the =
signature creation.</div><div><br></div><div><table class=3D"Bs nH iY" cell=
padding=3D"0" style=3D"position: relative; -webkit-border-horizontal-spacin=
g: 0px; -webkit-border-vertical-spacing: 0px; padding-top: 0px; padding-rig=
ht: 0px; padding-bottom: 0px; padding-left: 0px; border-collapse: collapse;=
 background-image: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-orig=
in: initial; background-clip: initial; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)=
; width: 923px; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: in=
itial initial; ">
<tbody><tr><td class=3D"Bu" style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; ma=
rgin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0px; vertical-align: top; padding-top: 0px; =
padding-right: 0px; padding-bottom: 0px; padding-left: 0px; "><blockquote>T=
he idea of X.509 CRLs is based on a number of assumptions which were<br>
proven to be flawed by the DigiNotar CA compromise. =A0The primary<br>probl=
em is that its designers did not account for disaster recovery<br>at all, [=
=85]<br>In the DigiNotar case, the only solution after the hack was to kill=
<br>
the entire PKI surrounding that CA as fast as possible, which means<br>havi=
ng to re-issue credentials to *ALL* current certificate holders<br>in extre=
mely short time and no real transition period available.<br>If there was a =
central database of previously issued, known-safe<br>
certificates on backup, something which is normally available for desaster<=
br>recovery, then it would be possible to tell known-good and unknown<br>(l=
ikely fake) certs reliably apart based on their certificate hash<br>even wi=
thout the slightest knowledge about how many and which fraudulent<br>
certs had been issued. =A0The certificate serial number is unreliable<br>fo=
r telling those certs apart. =A0If you don&#39;t know which certs the<br>at=
tacker managed to craft, you don&#39;t know whether he re-used existing<br>
serials and which of them.<br></blockquote>I agree, but=85given DigiNotar&#=
39;s screwup, woul<span class=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"border-collapse=
: separate; ">d you trust that they had their database of issued certificat=
es in order? What about an attack that managed to insert the fraudulent cer=
tificates into the database in a way that they could not be separated from =
the good ones without quite some effort? I don&#39;t think it is a stretch =
of mind to imagine that.<br>
<br>Being a customer of a CA, you should have your own disaster recovery pl=
an. What if your CA does a DigiNotar? Have a backup certificate for your ke=
ys, so that you can rollover. It is a simpler, more resilient solution to t=
he same problem.<br>
<br>Simon Tardell,<br>Technology Nexus.</span></td></tr></tbody></table></d=
iv></div>

--001485f85edaae879204b02f0e97--

From mrex@sap.com  Wed Oct 26 04:59:47 2011
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From: Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
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To: simon@tardell.se (Simon Tardell)
Date: Wed, 26 Oct 2011 13:59:33 +0200 (MEST)
In-Reply-To: <CANkYYy4fJ-FSRJ+LiJMjitU1gBS70hxYopzHeotCOMLBR0ZYew@mail.gmail.com> from "Simon Tardell" at Oct 26, 11 10:01:03 am
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Simon Tardell wrote:
> 
> On Tue, Oct 25, 2011 at 23:09, Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com> wrote:
> > 
> > If checking of a digital signature some time into the past is desired,
> > then one needs to carry along expired certs on the CRL basically
> > forever
> 
> That is one way. Another way would be to save the CRL (or OCSP response)
> that was current at the time of the signature creation.

No, you normally have to save the CRL at the time of _verification_.

If your scenarios involve something like an rfc3161 timestamp, then
you _do_ want to use the current CRL at the time of verification,
but query about the certificate status for the rfc3161 timestamp
rather than for the certificate status at the time of signature
verification.



> > In the DigiNotar case, the only solution after the hack was to kill
> > the entire PKI surrounding that CA as fast as possible, which means
> > having to re-issue credentials to *ALL* current certificate holders
> > in extremely short time and no real transition period available.
> > If there was a central database of previously issued, known-safe
> > certificates on backup, something which is normally available for desaster
> > recovery, then it would be possible to tell known-good and unknown
> > (likely fake) certs reliably apart based on their certificate hash
> > even without the slightest knowledge about how many and which fraudulent
> > certs had been issued.  The certificate serial number is unreliable
> > for telling those certs apart.  If you don't know which certs the
> > attacker managed to craft, you don't know whether he re-used existing
> > serials and which of them.
>
> I agree, but given DigiNotar's screwup, would you trust that they had
> their database of issued certificates in order? What about an attack
> that managed to insert the fraudulent certificates into the database
> in a way that they could not be separated from the good ones without
> quite some effort? I don't think it is a stretch of mind to imagine that.


That applies _only_ to the _online_ database.  You can still trust
the backups going some time back, this is exactly why you ought to
perform disaster recovery after a breakin.

You go back in time with sufficient safety margin and then audit
all transaction records in newer backups for their accuracy.


> 
> Being a customer of a CA, you should have your own disaster recovery plan.
> What if your CA does a DigiNotar? Have a backup certificate for your keys,
> so that you can rollover. It is a simpler, more resilient solution to the
> same problem.

Except that it doesn't work with existing hardware and software and
probably noone is doing it...


-Martin

From simon@tardell.se  Wed Oct 26 05:34:34 2011
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On Wed, Oct 26, 2011 at 13:59, Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com> wrote:

> Simon Tardell wrote:
> >
> > On Tue, Oct 25, 2011 at 23:09, Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > If checking of a digital signature some time into the past is desired=
,
> > > then one needs to carry along expired certs on the CRL basically
> > > forever
> >
> > That is one way. Another way would be to save the CRL (or OCSP response=
)
> > that was current at the time of the signature creation.
>
> No, you normally have to save the CRL at the time of _verification_.
>
> If your scenarios involve something like an rfc3161 timestamp, then
> you _do_ want to use the current CRL at the time of verification,
> but query about the certificate status for the rfc3161 timestamp
> rather than for the certificate status at the time of signature
> verification.


The assumption here was that you verify the signature shortly after the
creation (to minimize the risk that something bad happens in the meantime),
and thereafter you rely on information that was available at that time (plu=
s
any timestamps on timestamps on timestamps=85).


> > > In the DigiNotar case, the only solution after the hack was to kill
> > > the entire PKI surrounding that CA as fast as possible, which means
> > > having to re-issue credentials to *ALL* current certificate holders
> > > in extremely short time and no real transition period available.
> > > If there was a central database of previously issued, known-safe
> > > certificates on backup, something which is normally available for
> desaster
> > > recovery, then it would be possible to tell known-good and unknown
> > > (likely fake) certs reliably apart based on their certificate hash
> > > even without the slightest knowledge about how many and which
> fraudulent
> > > certs had been issued.  The certificate serial number is unreliable
> > > for telling those certs apart.  If you don't know which certs the
> > > attacker managed to craft, you don't know whether he re-used existing
> > > serials and which of them.
> >
> > I agree, but given DigiNotar's screwup, would you trust that they had
> > their database of issued certificates in order? What about an attack
> > that managed to insert the fraudulent certificates into the database
> > in a way that they could not be separated from the good ones without
> > quite some effort? I don't think it is a stretch of mind to imagine tha=
t.
>
>
> That applies _only_ to the _online_ database.  You can still trust
> the backups going some time back, this is exactly why you ought to
> perform disaster recovery after a breakin.
>
> You go back in time with sufficient safety margin and then audit
> all transaction records in newer backups for their accuracy.


Which could take some time, during which you can't use the CA at all.


> >
> > Being a customer of a CA, you should have your own disaster recovery
> plan.
> > What if your CA does a DigiNotar? Have a backup certificate for your
> keys,
> > so that you can rollover. It is a simpler, more resilient solution to t=
he
> > same problem.
>
> Except that it doesn't work with existing hardware and software and
> probably noone is doing it...
>

It doesn't require any special software at all. Just replace the server cer=
t
with one from another CA that you have already prepared.

It would of course be nice if the client could send its list of accepted CA=
s
to the server as part of the SSL handshake to make it more magic, but I
believe we are in the wrong wg for that=85 (I could think of a few more
mechanisms that would achieve the same thing, but would preserve the
handshake protocol, still outside of the scope of this group; however, I
believe that the general idea, redundancy, is the only viable way to
mitigate the DigiNotar type threat)


/Simon

--0016367fb2ddbe757404b032e0be
Content-Type: text/html; charset=windows-1252
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Wed, Oct 26, 2011 at 13:59, Martin Re=
x <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mrex@sap.com">mrex@sap.com</a>&gt=
;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 =
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
<div class=3D"im">Simon Tardell wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; On Tue, Oct 25, 2011 at 23:09, Martin Rex &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mrex@s=
ap.com">mrex@sap.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; If checking of a digital signature some time into the past is des=
ired,<br>
&gt; &gt; then one needs to carry along expired certs on the CRL basically<=
br>
&gt; &gt; forever<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; That is one way. Another way would be to save the CRL (or OCSP respons=
e)<br>
&gt; that was current at the time of the signature creation.<br>
<br>
</div>No, you normally have to save the CRL at the time of _verification_.<=
br>
<br>
If your scenarios involve something like an rfc3161 timestamp, then<br>
you _do_ want to use the current CRL at the time of verification,<br>
but query about the certificate status for the rfc3161 timestamp<br>
rather than for the certificate status at the time of signature<br>
verification.</blockquote><div><br></div><div>The assumption here was that =
you verify the signature shortly after the creation (to minimize the risk t=
hat something bad happens in the meantime), and thereafter you rely on info=
rmation that was available at that time (plus any timestamps on timestamps =
on timestamps=85).=A0</div>
<div>=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;=
border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;"><div class=3D"im">
&gt; &gt; In the DigiNotar case, the only solution after the hack was to ki=
ll<br>
&gt; &gt; the entire PKI surrounding that CA as fast as possible, which mea=
ns<br>
&gt; &gt; having to re-issue credentials to *ALL* current certificate holde=
rs<br>
&gt; &gt; in extremely short time and no real transition period available.<=
br>
&gt; &gt; If there was a central database of previously issued, known-safe<=
br>
&gt; &gt; certificates on backup, something which is normally available for=
 desaster<br>
&gt; &gt; recovery, then it would be possible to tell known-good and unknow=
n<br>
&gt; &gt; (likely fake) certs reliably apart based on their certificate has=
h<br>
&gt; &gt; even without the slightest knowledge about how many and which fra=
udulent<br>
&gt; &gt; certs had been issued. =A0The certificate serial number is unreli=
able<br>
&gt; &gt; for telling those certs apart. =A0If you don&#39;t know which cer=
ts the<br>
&gt; &gt; attacker managed to craft, you don&#39;t know whether he re-used =
existing<br>
&gt; &gt; serials and which of them.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I agree, but given DigiNotar&#39;s screwup, would you trust that they =
had<br>
&gt; their database of issued certificates in order? What about an attack<b=
r>
&gt; that managed to insert the fraudulent certificates into the database<b=
r>
&gt; in a way that they could not be separated from the good ones without<b=
r>
&gt; quite some effort? I don&#39;t think it is a stretch of mind to imagin=
e that.<br>
<br>
<br>
</div>That applies _only_ to the _online_ database. =A0You can still trust<=
br>
the backups going some time back, this is exactly why you ought to<br>
perform disaster recovery after a breakin.<br>
<br>
You go back in time with sufficient safety margin and then audit<br>
all transaction records in newer backups for their accuracy.</blockquote><d=
iv><br></div><div>Which could take some time, during which you can&#39;t us=
e the CA at all.=A0</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" s=
tyle=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
<div class=3D"im">
<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Being a customer of a CA, you should have your own disaster recovery p=
lan.<br>
&gt; What if your CA does a DigiNotar? Have a backup certificate for your k=
eys,<br>
&gt; so that you can rollover. It is a simpler, more resilient solution to =
the<br>
&gt; same problem.<br>
<br>
</div>Except that it doesn&#39;t work with existing hardware and software a=
nd<br>
probably noone is doing it...<font class=3D"Apple-style-span" color=3D"#888=
888"><br></font></blockquote><div>=A0</div><div>It doesn&#39;t require any =
special software at all. Just replace the server cert with one from another=
 CA that you have already prepared.</div>
<div><br></div><div>It would of course be nice if the client could send its=
 list of accepted CAs to the server as part of the SSL handshake to make it=
 more magic, but I believe we are in the wrong wg for that=85 (I could thin=
k of a few more mechanisms that would achieve the same thing, but would pre=
serve the handshake protocol, still outside of the scope of this group; how=
ever, I believe that the general idea, redundancy, is the only viable way t=
o mitigate the DigiNotar type threat)</div>
<div><br></div><div><br></div><div>/Simon</div><div><br></div></div>

--0016367fb2ddbe757404b032e0be--

From tomasg@primekey.se  Wed Oct 26 06:42:05 2011
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On 10/26/2011 02:59 PM, Martin Rex wrote:
> Simon Tardell wrote:
>>
>> On Tue, Oct 25, 2011 at 23:09, Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com> wrote:
>>>
>>> If checking of a digital signature some time into the past is desired,
>>> then one needs to carry along expired certs on the CRL basically
>>> forever
>>
>> That is one way. Another way would be to save the CRL (or OCSP response)
>> that was current at the time of the signature creation.
> 
> No, you normally have to save the CRL at the time of _verification_.
> 
> If your scenarios involve something like an rfc3161 timestamp, then
> you _do_ want to use the current CRL at the time of verification,
> but query about the certificate status for the rfc3161 timestamp
> rather than for the certificate status at the time of signature
> verification.

<snip>

Martgin, I think this is incorrect (all depending on your specific use
case of course). When verifying a digital signature you are often more
interested in seeing if the certificate was revoked _at the time of
signature creation_, than if it is revoked now.
Especially so when talking about long term signatures, i.e. something
that can be archived. In these cases you are not interested if the
certificate is expired or revoked _now_, because you want to know if the
signed document is valid, i.e. if it was properly signed back then.

Archiving specifications do this. Something as easy as PDF signatures
cater for both embedding CRLs and/or OCSP responses when you sign the
document. With this information embedded you can verify the document at
any time in the future without relying on CAs still being around and
uncompromised, or something as silly as keeping all expired certificates
in CRLs.

Cheers,
Tomas

From Walter.Goulet@rsa.com  Wed Oct 26 07:17:37 2011
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From: <Walter.Goulet@rsa.com>
To: <tgindin@us.ibm.com>
Date: Wed, 26 Oct 2011 10:17:02 -0400
Thread-Topic: [pkix] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
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> -----Original Message-----
> From: Tom Gindin [mailto:tgindin@us.ibm.com]
> Sent: Tuesday, October 25, 2011 9:09 PM
> To: Goulet, Walter
> Cc: kyanha@kyanha.net; pkix@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [pkix] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-hamilton-cmr-
> 00.txt
>=20
>         Walter:
>=20
>         My issue is simpler, and I don't see that anyone has raised it.
> Does the problem of compromised RA's get solved in this way?=20

Compromising a RA is simply another way to get a CA to issue false certific=
ates; and if revocation is used properly then I'm not sure why traditional =
blacklist based CRLs would work. As long as the CA is aware of the breach I=
 don't see why the CA can't issue updated CRLs to revoke certs issued by th=
e compromised RA.

>         Of course, we can most simply let CA's demand revocation checking=
 by
> adding a new critical extension called "Untrustworthy without revocation
> check", whose value is an enumeration consisting of getCRL, useOCSP,
> getSomeStatus.  The problem is that all existing browsers will reject tha=
t
> certificate and so no CA's will issue such certificates by default for se=
veral
> years.  Thus, it would probably be more practical to ask browsers to inte=
rpret
> CRLDP critical as meaning "if you can't get the CRL, reject this cert".  =
Is that
> legitimate?
>=20
> Tom Gindin

I don't believe such an approach is legitimate because I don't think it sol=
ves the core problem of forcing browsers to implement hard fail. The issues=
 with hard fail (primarily discussed in context of OCSP hard fail) appear t=
o be privacy (discussed earlier) and availability. That is, availability of=
 OCSP responders maintained by CAs directly impacts the availability of SSL=
 protected websites; if a large CAs OCSP responders fail then all sites usi=
ng certificates issued by that CA are unavailable. As I understand it from =
discussions within the browser community, unless these issues were to be su=
fficiently addressed we are unlikely to see hard fail implemented.

Thanks,
Walter

From mrex@sap.com  Wed Oct 26 10:10:33 2011
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From: Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
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To: simon@tardell.se (Simon Tardell)
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In-Reply-To: <CANkYYy5jyPUkRr6aPsC4n17TYTdwa1renJ8xhE7zJHL0mhbuyw@mail.gmail.com> from "Simon Tardell" at Oct 26, 11 02:34:31 pm
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Simon Tardell wrote:
> 
> Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com> wrote:
> >
> > Simon Tardell wrote:
> > >
> > > Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > If checking of a digital signature some time into the past is desired,
> > > > then one needs to carry along expired certs on the CRL basically
> > > > forever
> > >
> > > That is one way. Another way would be to save the CRL (or OCSP response)
> > > that was current at the time of the signature creation.
> >
> > No, you normally have to save the CRL at the time of _verification_.
> >
> > If your scenarios involve something like an rfc3161 timestamp, then
> > you _do_ want to use the current CRL at the time of verification,
> > but query about the certificate status for the rfc3161 timestamp
> > rather than for the certificate status at the time of signature
> > verification.
> 
> 
> The assumption here was that you verify the signature shortly after the
> creation (to minimize the risk that something bad happens in the meantime),
> and thereafter you rely on information that was available at that time
> (plus any timestamps on timestamps on timestamps).

The point in time where you verify a digital signature is extremely
dependent on the usage scenario, and "verify signature shortly after
the creation" basically only exists for purely online-connected
scenarios, and does not work at all for offline/disconnected scenarios.

If a digital signature is for some singular transaction, then you
typically check revocation at the time of processing that transaction
and verifying the signature for the time current time, and then you
have to archive the CRL that you used during that verification
in your audit/accounting logs.

If a digital signature is for something that is for multiple use,
either some kind of capability/privilege/authorization, then
your typically checking revocation each time you process the
signed data with the current CRL for the current time, and the
time of signature creation may be quite some time in the past.

And if the digital signature is used e.g. for signing code and
with an rfc3161 (or similar) timestamp, then you want to check
the current CRL at the time of processing, but for the point
in time of the secure timestamp rather than the current time.


Not carrying through expired certs in current CRLs and not being
able to revoke certs after expiration creates serious problems for
a number of usage scenarios, so IMHO, limiting CRL size by
short certificate lifetimes works only for limited-purpose CAs.


> 
> > That applies _only_ to the _online_ database.  You can still trust
> > the backups going some time back, this is exactly why you ought to
> > perform disaster recovery after a breakin.
> >
> > You go back in time with sufficient safety margin and then audit
> > all transaction records in newer backups for their accuracy.
> 
> Which could take some time, during which you can't use the CA at all.

Just a short time, less than 12 hours.  I talking about real desaster
recovery, not any kind of desaster memorial.

The "could take some time" would apply solely to very recently issued
certs that need to be confirmed through audit before being reinserted
into the last-known-good backup.


> 
> > >
> > > Being a customer of a CA, you should have your own disaster recovery
> > > plan.
> > > What if your CA does a DigiNotar? Have a backup certificate for
> > > your keys, so that you can rollover. It is a simpler, more resilient
> > > solution to the same problem.
> >
> > Except that it doesn't work with existing hardware and software and
> > probably noone is doing it...
> 
> It doesn't require any special software at all. Just replace the server
> cert with one from another CA that you have already prepared.

Having to manually re-personalize every holder of a certificate from the
CA is a *HUGE* effort, and I do not think that having those lying around
is very common.

How many companies provide PKI credentials (soft or hard) to their employees?
And how many of those companies create *two* PKI credentials for *every*
employee upfront so that they can "switch" when something bad happens?
(and have up-to-date ACLs for both of them on all their systems).

I know several of the former, but exactly none of the latter.


What are the desasters for which you should plan a very quick desaster
recovery probably depends on the primary purpose of your business.

The primary purpose of a CA should be trust and availability, so the
desasters for which they should plan for quick desaster recovery is
availability/connectivity and security breaches of their infrastructure
and operational procedures.  If that is not what your planning for to
recover from quickly, then maybe you should not be in the CA business.


-Martin

From kent@bbn.com  Wed Oct 26 10:31:34 2011
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At 11:09 PM +0200 10/25/11, Martin Rex wrote:
>Stephen Kent wrote:
>>
>>  Martin Rex wrote:
>>  >
>>  > A CA should be retired (i.e. not issue new certificates) early enough
>>  > so that it will be extremely unlikely that the growth of its CRL
>>  > for the already issued certs will [...] exceed reasonable sizes
>>  > (probably 50.000)
>>
>>  That's a very odd suggestion. The usual suggestion is that one should
>>  manage the cert lifetimes to keep the CRL size manageable.
>>  (This assumes a fill CRL, not taking advantage of any of the schemes
>>   that break a CRL into smaller pieces.)
>
>
>To me it looks like the idea
>"manage the cert lifetimes to keep the CRL size manageable"
>fails badly in practice.  At best for the limited use of pure online
>authentication.

Online auth is the principle use for certs today; NR apps are a 
special case. More to the point, the discussion here is motivated by 
online auth, so ...

>If checking of a digital signature some time into the past is desired,
>then one needs to carry along expired certs on the CRL basically
>forever (you also need that to be able to revoke a cert after
>it has expired (in case that you notice that it has been compromised
>only after the certificate has expired).

There are at least two models. One calls for a CA to maintain an 
ever-growing list of expired, revoked certs on CRLs.  The other calls 
for RPs to acquire and retain CRLs and CA certs needed to establish 
the validity of an EE cert at the time of a transaction. The latter 
model closely parallels what we do in the physical world, and teh 
LTANS WG produced specs that support this model. I think the first 
model is an unreasonable burden on CAs, and other RPs, so I always 
advise client to not follow that model.  It is also fair to say that 
X.509 did not intend the first model, i.e., the default practice is 
to remove expired certs from CRLs.

>There are also schemes involving offline operation and verification
>of digital signatures by X.509 certs where you have to archive the
>CRL used in the verification along with the document as evidence
>individually for each transaction.  The storage requirements are
>huge when such a CRL is 20+ MBytes.

but, as i said earlier, is the result of poor cert lifetime management.

>Really, I think that a CA (i.e. that specific issuer DName) should
>be retired when the expected growth of the CRL during the remaining
>lifetime of all certs signed with the issuer DName exceeds a
>reasonable size.

One could do that, but it's not consistent with baseline assumptions for CA
operation, and it's not needed.

>
>The idea of X.509 CRLs is based on a number of assumptions which were
>proven to be flawed by the DigiNotar CA compromise.

I do not agree. The DigiNotar compromise fallout was a result of poor practices
that are outside the scope of standards.

>  The primary
>problem is that its designers did not account for disaster recovery
>at all, i.e. the possibility that an attacker might succeed to have
>arbitrary certificates signed by the CA key and destroy audit/logs
>about issuance of these certs (like certs with attacker-chosen
>attributes, duplicate serial numbers of previously issued certs,
>omission of CRL-distribution points or OCSP-AIA extensions, or
>potentially attributes such as BasicConstraint cA=TRUE)

Details such as audit trails are outside the scope of X.509 and PKIX 
specs. They are the province of CPs and CPS's.

>In the DigiNotar case, the only solution after the hack was to kill
>the entire PKI surrounding that CA as fast as possible, which means
>having to re-issue credentials to *ALL* current certificate holders
>in extremely short time and no real transition period available.

The price a CA pays for poor security controls, and the price 
Subjects pay for choosing a poorly managed CA.

>If there was a central database of previously issued, known-safe
>certificates on backup, something which is normally available for desaster
>recovery, then it would be possible to tell known-good and unknown
>(likely fake) certs reliably apart based on their certificate hash
>even without the slightest knowledge about how many and which fraudulent
>certs had been issued.  The certificate serial number is unreliable
>for telling those certs apart.  If you don't know which certs the
>attacker managed to craft, you don't know whether he re-used existing
>serials and which of them.

A "central database" for all CAs is infeasible, as it would have to 
span an unknown number of CAs, sub-CAs, etc. Each CA is responsible 
for its own disaster recovery. It is inappropriate to burden all CAs 
with a privacy-insensitive solution to a per-CA problem.

Steve

From kent@bbn.com  Wed Oct 26 10:31:38 2011
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At 3:27 PM +0200 10/25/11, denis.pinkas@bull.net wrote:
>Steve,
>
>You said:
>
>The more relevant issue, is that we have SCVP as a query protocol
>to determine cert status, not just revocation status, so OCSP is
>not the preferred approach anyway.
>
>SCVP does not guaranty in anyway that the certificate exists.
>OCSP is much simpler than SCVP and is, IMO, the preferred approach.
>
>Denis

The DPV function of SCVP validates a target cert. So, the result 
should be equivalent to a white list, in the normal case. If there 
has been a CA compromise, then bogus certs may be issued, and SCVP 
would not detect them
as bogus. But, the same is true for a white list, i.e., the attacker could
issue a new white list and make it available to targeted clients. the details
of the attack would be different, but the bottom line is the same.

If there is an RA compromise, but not a CA compromise, then SCVP will
not detect the bogus cert until the CA/RA detects the compromise, 
But, here too, the CA would presumably have updated the white list to 
include the
bogus certs, so the effect is the same.  In both cases, when the compromise
is detected, the bogus certs can be revoked, or de-white listed, IF 
the CA knows which ones were issued.  That, as Martin and I have 
debated, is a matter of
local good housekeeping, and outside the scope of IETF (and ITU-T) standards.

So, I am not persuaded, so far, that a white list approach offers any 
substantial benefits over use of existing protocols. It also creates 
all
the problems of vert large CRLs, which we really do not want to perputate.

Steve

From kent@bbn.com  Wed Oct 26 11:54:11 2011
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At 7:09 PM +0200 10/26/11, Martin Rex wrote:
>...
>The point in time where you verify a digital signature is extremely
>dependent on the usage scenario, and "verify signature shortly after
>the creation" basically only exists for purely online-connected
>scenarios, and does not work at all for offline/disconnected scenarios.
>
>If a digital signature is for some singular transaction, then you
>typically check revocation at the time of processing that transaction
>and verifying the signature for the time current time, and then you
>have to archive the CRL that you used during that verification
>in your audit/accounting logs.

yes, this is the typical NR scenario. Before committing to the
signed doc, verify the sig chain, verify cert status up the chain, time stamp
and archive the data, and proceed.

>If a digital signature is for something that is for multiple use,
>either some kind of capability/privilege/authorization, then
>your typically checking revocation each time you process the
>signed data with the current CRL for the current time, and the
>time of signature creation may be quite some time in the past.

this is the typical auth scenario. but, this has no implication for
keeping expired certs on a CRL, so why is this relevant to the discussion?

>And if the digital signature is used e.g. for signing code and
>with an rfc3161 (or similar) timestamp, then you want to check
>the current CRL at the time of processing, but for the point
>in time of the secure timestamp rather than the current time.

I am not familiar with code signing and 3161 time stamps being used together.
A 3161 timestamp is usually used for NR contexts, and code signing is
usually an auth/integrity context.

>Not carrying through expired certs in current CRLs and not being
>able to revoke certs after expiration creates serious problems for
>a number of usage scenarios, so IMHO, limiting CRL size by
>short certificate lifetimes works only for limited-purpose CAs.

I don't see how the paragraph above is supported by the examples
you cited. real time auth and NR based on timestamped, archived
certs and CRLs do not require CRLs to carry expired cert info.

Steve

From hallam@gmail.com  Wed Oct 26 14:02:43 2011
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Subject: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
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--f46d04430354d5f60404b039f948
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1

Thinking laterally on this issue.

The issue here seems to come up with the problem that OCSP does not have a
proper response code for 'does not exist', Now let us imagine for a moment
that we borrow from the prior art in DNSSEC and have an NSEC3 type
capability that provides a status for the 'gaps' between certificates.
Wouldn't this meet all the essential use cases?

The gaps could be specified either as gaps between certificate serial
numbers or gaps between cert hashes. I would like to see an OCSP extension
to allow the hash of the cert to be specified in any case.

So the old style OCSP token is (essentially)

   Sign (key, { {status-value, issuer, serial, {extensions}} } )

I would like to change that for certs that exist to:

   Sign (key, { {status-value, issuer, serial, {certhash, extensions}} } )

And if there is a query for a cert that does not exist and the request
indicates that you can process it, you would get back:

   Sign (key, { {non-existent, issuer, dummy-serial, {{start-indicator,
end-indicator}, extensions}} } )


This type of response would only ever be returned in an OCSP query response.
There would be no point whatsoever in stapling a non-existent OCSP token to
a TLS cert chain (OK not unless you were an attacker and you knew it would
cause the chain to break somehow, but we design it to avoid that happening)

It might be desirable to obfusticate the start and end indicators somewhat
to prevent cert population walking. But I rather doubt we would end up
hiding any information that can't be got using stats.


This has been in the DNSSEC spec for over a decade so it is almost certainly
unencumbered. It allows us to provide a signed response to every OCSP query
from static data. So why didn't we think of doing it from the start?


The only (minor) issue is that if there is a cert issued AFTER the date of
the OCSP token, the negative response token becomes invalid. Although that
turns out to be a moot point as if someone can hand you the negative
response token in response to the OCSP request, they can stop you getting
the valid OCSP token so you are hosed anyway.

--f46d04430354d5f60404b039f948
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Thinking laterally on this issue.
<div><br></div><div>The issue here seems to come up with the problem that O=
CSP does not have a proper response code for &#39;does not exist&#39;,=A0No=
w let us imagine for a moment that we borrow from the prior art in DNSSEC a=
nd have an NSEC3 type capability that provides a status for the &#39;gaps&#=
39; between certificates. Wouldn&#39;t this meet all the essential use case=
s?</div>
<div><br></div><div>The gaps could be specified either as gaps between cert=
ificate serial numbers or gaps between cert hashes. I would like to see an =
OCSP extension to allow the hash of the cert to be specified in any case.</=
div>
<div><br></div><div>So the old style OCSP token is (essentially)</div><div>=
<br></div><div>=A0 =A0Sign (key, {=A0{status-value, issuer, serial, {extens=
ions}} } )</div><div><br></div><div>I would like to change that for certs t=
hat exist to:</div>
<div><br></div><div>=A0 =A0Sign (key, {=A0{status-value, issuer, serial, {c=
erthash, extensions}} } )</div><div><br></div><div>And if there is a query =
for a cert that does not exist and the request indicates that you can proce=
ss it, you would get back:</div>
<div><br></div><div>=A0 =A0Sign (key, {=A0{non-existent, issuer, dummy-seri=
al, {{start-indicator, end-indicator}, extensions}} } )</div><div><br></div=
><div><br></div><div>This type of response would only ever be returned in a=
n OCSP query response. There would be no point whatsoever in stapling a non=
-existent OCSP token to a TLS cert chain (OK not unless you were an attacke=
r and you knew it would cause the chain to break somehow, but we design it =
to avoid that happening)</div>
<div><br></div><div>It might be desirable to obfusticate the start and end =
indicators somewhat to prevent cert population walking. But I rather doubt =
we would end up hiding any information that can&#39;t be got using stats.=
=A0</div>
<div><br></div><div><br></div><div>This has been in the DNSSEC spec for ove=
r a decade so it is almost certainly unencumbered. It allows us to provide =
a signed response to every OCSP query from static data. So why didn&#39;t w=
e think of doing it from the start?</div>
<div><br></div><div><br></div><div>The only (minor) issue is that if there =
is a cert issued AFTER the date of the OCSP token, the negative response to=
ken becomes invalid. Although that turns out to be a moot point as if someo=
ne can hand you the negative response token in response to the OCSP request=
, they can stop you getting the valid OCSP token so you are hosed anyway.</=
div>
<div><br></div>

--f46d04430354d5f60404b039f948--

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Date: Wed, 26 Oct 2011 17:45:41 -0400
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Phil,

While this isn't really a use case, but wouldn't it seem from discussions o=
f the last few days seem to indicate that user privacy is a big problem wit=
h OCSP? I wonder if the WG's efforts would be better spent focusing on tack=
ling that problem. Or is this an issue that is seen as out of scope for thi=
s WG?

Thanks,
Walter

From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Phi=
llip Hallam-Baker
Sent: Wednesday, October 26, 2011 4:03 PM
To: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version Notification =
for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt

Thinking laterally on this issue.

The issue here seems to come up with the problem that OCSP does not have a =
proper response code for 'does not exist', Now let us imagine for a moment =
that we borrow from the prior art in DNSSEC and have an NSEC3 type capabili=
ty that provides a status for the 'gaps' between certificates. Wouldn't thi=
s meet all the essential use cases?



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</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=3DEN-US link=3Dblue vli=
nk=3Dpurple><div class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'f=
ont-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>Phil,<o:p=
></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font=
-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><=
p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","=
sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>While this isn&#8217;t really a use case, but wo=
uldn&#8217;t it seem from discussions of the last few days seem to indicate=
 that user privacy is a big problem with OCSP? I wonder if the WG&#8217;s e=
fforts would be better spent focusing on tackling that problem. Or is this =
an issue that is seen as out of scope for this WG?<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sa=
ns-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><=
span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F=
497D'>Thanks,<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font=
-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>Walter<o:p><=
/o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-f=
amily:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><di=
v style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 4.0=
pt'><div><div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3=
.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;f=
ont-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span></b><span style=3D'font-size:=
10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pk=
ix-bounces@ietf.org] <b>On Behalf Of </b>Phillip Hallam-Baker<br><b>Sent:</=
b> Wednesday, October 26, 2011 4:03 PM<br><b>To:</b> pkix@ietf.org<br><b>Su=
bject:</b> [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version Notificatio=
n for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p class=
=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>Thinking laterally o=
n this issue. <o:p></o:p></p><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p=
></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>The issue here seems to come up with the p=
roblem that OCSP does not have a proper response code for 'does not exist',=
&nbsp;Now let us imagine for a moment that we borrow from the prior art in =
DNSSEC and have an NSEC3 type capability that provides a status for the 'ga=
ps' between certificates. Wouldn't this meet all the essential use cases?<o=
:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><di=
v><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div></div></div></body></html=
>=

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From hallam@gmail.com  Wed Oct 26 15:08:29 2011
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Date: Wed, 26 Oct 2011 18:08:27 -0400
Message-ID: <CAMm+Lwgs4KRXcVKv_v97ts5WFwPgyaYRzo_AZKQNb1OnReXH4Q@mail.gmail.com>
From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
To: Walter.Goulet@rsa.com
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Cc: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
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If user privacy is a concern then the solution is to move to OCSP stapling.

This is something that can probably be driven quite well by privacy audits
and appropriate privacy policy to encourage stapling.

But really, this information is no more privacy sensitive than any of the
other info sloshing round the net and the CA seeing it is probably a lesser
concern than the ISP, backbone provider etc.


At the end of the day the IP address will continue to give away the store.

On Wed, Oct 26, 2011 at 5:45 PM, <Walter.Goulet@rsa.com> wrote:

> Phil,****
>
> ** **
>
> While this isn=92t really a use case, but wouldn=92t it seem from discuss=
ions
> of the last few days seem to indicate that user privacy is a big problem
> with OCSP? I wonder if the WG=92s efforts would be better spent focusing =
on
> tackling that problem. Or is this an issue that is seen as out of scope f=
or
> this WG?****
>
> ** **
>
> Thanks,****
>
> Walter****
>
> ** **
>
> *From:* pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] *On Behalf O=
f
> *Phillip Hallam-Baker
> *Sent:* Wednesday, October 26, 2011 4:03 PM
> *To:* pkix@ietf.org
> *Subject:* [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version
> Notification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt****
>
> ** **
>
> Thinking laterally on this issue. ****
>
> ** **
>
> The issue here seems to come up with the problem that OCSP does not have =
a
> proper response code for 'does not exist', Now let us imagine for a momen=
t
> that we borrow from the prior art in DNSSEC and have an NSEC3 type
> capability that provides a status for the 'gaps' between certificates.
> Wouldn't this meet all the essential use cases?****
>
> ** **
>
> ** **
>



--=20
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

--f46d0444ee9b40c65904b03ae56e
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If user privacy is a concern then the solution is to move to OCSP stapling.=
<div><br></div><div>This is something that can probably be driven quite wel=
l by privacy audits and appropriate privacy policy to encourage stapling.</=
div>
<div><br></div><div>But really, this information is no more privacy sensiti=
ve than any of the other info sloshing round the net and the CA seeing it i=
s probably a lesser concern than the ISP, backbone provider etc.</div><div>
<br></div><div><br></div><div>At the end of the day the IP address will con=
tinue to give away the store.</div><div><br><div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"=
>On Wed, Oct 26, 2011 at 5:45 PM,  <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:=
Walter.Goulet@rsa.com">Walter.Goulet@rsa.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;"><div lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"=
purple"><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;color:#=
1F497D">Phil,<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D"><u></=
u>=A0<u></u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0=
pt;color:#1F497D">While this isn=92t really a use case, but wouldn=92t it s=
eem from discussions of the last few days seem to indicate that user privac=
y is a big problem with OCSP? I wonder if the WG=92s efforts would be bette=
r spent focusing on tackling that problem. Or is this an issue that is seen=
 as out of scope for this WG?<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D"><u></=
u>=A0<u></u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0=
pt;color:#1F497D">Thanks,<u></u><u></u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><s=
pan style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D">Walter<u></u><u></u></span></p=
>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;color:#1F497D"><u></=
u>=A0<u></u></span></p><div style=3D"border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5=
pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 4.0pt"><div><div style=3D"border:none;border-top:sol=
id #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">From:</span></b>=
<span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt"> <a href=3D"mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org" =
target=3D"_blank">pkix-bounces@ietf.org</a> [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:pkix-=
bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">pkix-bounces@ietf.org</a>] <b>On Behalf=
 Of </b>Phillip Hallam-Baker<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Wednesday, October 26, 2011 4:03 PM<br><b>To:</b> <a href=3D"m=
ailto:pkix@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">pkix@ietf.org</a><br><b>Subject:</b>=
 [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version Notification for draf=
t-hamilton-cmr-00.txt<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div></div><div class=3D"im"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p><=
p class=3D"MsoNormal">Thinking laterally on this issue. <u></u><u></u></p><=
div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoN=
ormal">The issue here seems to come up with the problem that OCSP does not =
have a proper response code for &#39;does not exist&#39;,=A0Now let us imag=
ine for a moment that we borrow from the prior art in DNSSEC and have an NS=
EC3 type capability that provides a status for the &#39;gaps&#39; between c=
ertificates. Wouldn&#39;t this meet all the essential use cases?<u></u><u><=
/u></p>
</div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p class=
=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p></div></div></div></div></div></blockqu=
ote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br>Website: <a href=3D"h=
ttp://hallambaker.com/">http://hallambaker.com/</a><br>
<br>
</div></div>

--f46d0444ee9b40c65904b03ae56e--

From denis.pinkas@bull.net  Thu Oct 27 01:22:25 2011
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Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version Notification	for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
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Phil,

We both agree that the problem comes from the fact that OCSP does not have 
a proper response code for 'does not exist';

Since CertStatus is a CHOICE, we would need to move to OCSP v2 to add a 
new choice.

However, simply adding this response code to OCSP v2 would not be 
sufficient.

It would be necessary to advertise to the client that a given OCSP server 
has a direct access to the CA list of issued certificates,
and hence is is able to send back this new response code.

I would simply propose that we advertise this in a singleExtensions, by 
defining an extension.

Denis

 
> Thinking laterally on this issue. 
> 
> The issue here seems to come up with the problem that OCSP does not 
> have a proper response code for 'does not exist', Now let us imagine
> for a moment that we borrow from the prior art in DNSSEC and have an
> NSEC3 type capability that provides a status for the 'gaps' between 
> certificates. Wouldn't this meet all the essential use cases?
> 
> The gaps could be specified either as gaps between certificate 
> serial numbers or gaps between cert hashes. I would like to see an 
> OCSP extension to allow the hash of the cert to be specified in any 
case.
> 
> So the old style OCSP token is (essentially)
> 
>    Sign (key, { {status-value, issuer, serial, {extensions}} } )
> 
> I would like to change that for certs that exist to:
> 
>    Sign (key, { {status-value, issuer, serial, {certhash, extensions}} } 
)
> 
> And if there is a query for a cert that does not exist and the 
> request indicates that you can process it, you would get back:
> 
>    Sign (key, { {non-existent, issuer, dummy-serial, {{start-
> indicator, end-indicator}, extensions}} } )
> 
> This type of response would only ever be returned in an OCSP query 
> response. There would be no point whatsoever in stapling a non-
> existent OCSP token to a TLS cert chain (OK not unless you were an 
> attacker and you knew it would cause the chain to break somehow, but
> we design it to avoid that happening)
> 
> It might be desirable to obfusticate the start and end indicators 
> somewhat to prevent cert population walking. But I rather doubt we 
> would end up hiding any information that can't be got using stats. 
> 
> This has been in the DNSSEC spec for over a decade so it is almost 
> certainly unencumbered. It allows us to provide a signed response to
> every OCSP query from static data. So why didn't we think of doing 
> it from the start?
> 
> The only (minor) issue is that if there is a cert issued AFTER the 
> date of the OCSP token, the negative response token becomes invalid.
> Although that turns out to be a moot point as if someone can hand 
> you the negative response token in response to the OCSP request, 
> they can stop you getting the valid OCSP token so you are hosed anyway.
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix

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<font size=2 face="sans-serif">Phil,</font>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">We both agree that </font><font size=2 face="Arial">the
problem comes from the fact that OCSP does not have a proper response code
for 'does not exist';</font>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="Arial">Since CertStatus is a CHOICE, we would need
to move to OCSP v2 to add a new choice.</font>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="Arial">However, simply adding this response code
to OCSP v2 would not be sufficient.</font>
<br><font size=2 face="Arial"><br>
It would be necessary to advertise to the client that a given OCSP server
has a direct access to the CA list of issued certificates,<br>
and hence is is able to send back this new response code.</font>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="Arial">I would simply propose that we advertise
this in a singleExtensions</font><font size=2 face="Times New Roman">,</font><font size=2 face="Arial">
by defining an extension.</font>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="Arial">Denis</font>
<br>
<br><tt><font size=2>&nbsp;<br>
&gt; Thinking laterally on this issue. </font></tt>
<br><tt><font size=2>&gt; <br>
&gt; The issue here seems to come up with the problem that OCSP does not
<br>
&gt; have a proper response code for 'does not exist',&nbsp;Now let us
imagine<br>
&gt; for a moment that we borrow from the prior art in DNSSEC and have
an<br>
&gt; NSEC3 type capability that provides a status for the 'gaps' between
<br>
&gt; certificates. Wouldn't this meet all the essential use cases?</font></tt>
<br><tt><font size=2>&gt; <br>
&gt; The gaps could be specified either as gaps between certificate <br>
&gt; serial numbers or gaps between cert hashes. I would like to see an
<br>
&gt; OCSP extension to allow the hash of the cert to be specified in any
case.</font></tt>
<br><tt><font size=2>&gt; <br>
&gt; So the old style OCSP token is (essentially)</font></tt>
<br><tt><font size=2>&gt; <br>
&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp;Sign (key, {&nbsp;{status-value, issuer, serial, {extensions}}
} )</font></tt>
<br><tt><font size=2>&gt; <br>
&gt; I would like to change that for certs that exist to:</font></tt>
<br><tt><font size=2>&gt; <br>
&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp;Sign (key, {&nbsp;{status-value, issuer, serial, {certhash,
extensions}} } )</font></tt>
<br><tt><font size=2>&gt; <br>
&gt; And if there is a query for a cert that does not exist and the <br>
&gt; request indicates that you can process it, you would get back:</font></tt>
<br><tt><font size=2>&gt; <br>
&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp;Sign (key, {&nbsp;{non-existent, issuer, dummy-serial,
{{start-<br>
&gt; indicator, end-indicator}, extensions}} } )</font></tt>
<br><tt><font size=2>&gt; <br>
&gt; This type of response would only ever be returned in an OCSP query
<br>
&gt; response. There would be no point whatsoever in stapling a non-<br>
&gt; existent OCSP token to a TLS cert chain (OK not unless you were an
<br>
&gt; attacker and you knew it would cause the chain to break somehow, but<br>
&gt; we design it to avoid that happening)</font></tt>
<br><tt><font size=2>&gt; <br>
&gt; It might be desirable to obfusticate the start and end indicators
<br>
&gt; somewhat to prevent cert population walking. But I rather doubt we
<br>
&gt; would end up hiding any information that can't be got using stats.&nbsp;</font></tt>
<br><tt><font size=2>&gt; <br>
&gt; This has been in the DNSSEC spec for over a decade so it is almost
<br>
&gt; certainly unencumbered. It allows us to provide a signed response
to<br>
&gt; every OCSP query from static data. So why didn't we think of doing
<br>
&gt; it from the start?</font></tt>
<br><tt><font size=2>&gt; <br>
&gt; The only (minor) issue is that if there is a cert issued AFTER the
<br>
&gt; date of the OCSP token, the negative response token becomes invalid.<br>
&gt; Although that turns out to be a moot point as if someone can hand
<br>
&gt; you the negative response token in response to the OCSP request, <br>
&gt; they can stop you getting the valid OCSP token so you are hosed anyway.</font></tt>
<br><tt><font size=2>&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; pkix mailing list<br>
&gt; pkix@ietf.org<br>
&gt; </font></tt><a href=https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix><tt><font size=2>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix</font></tt></a><tt><font size=2><br>
</font></tt>
--=_alternative 002DEE15C1257936_=--

From mrex@sap.com  Thu Oct 27 05:29:35 2011
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From: Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
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To: tomasg@primekey.se (Tomas Gustavsson)
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Tomas Gustavsson wrote:
> 
> On 10/26/2011 02:59 PM, Martin Rex wrote:
> > Simon Tardell wrote:
> >>
> >> On Tue, Oct 25, 2011 at 23:09, Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com> wrote:
> >>>
> >>> If checking of a digital signature some time into the past is desired,
> >>> then one needs to carry along expired certs on the CRL basically
> >>> forever
> >>
> >> That is one way. Another way would be to save the CRL (or OCSP response)
> >> that was current at the time of the signature creation.
> > 
> > No, you normally have to save the CRL at the time of _verification_.
> > 
> > If your scenarios involve something like an rfc3161 timestamp, then
> > you _do_ want to use the current CRL at the time of verification,
> > but query about the certificate status for the rfc3161 timestamp
> > rather than for the certificate status at the time of signature
> > verification.
> 
> <snip>
> 
> Martin, I think this is incorrect (all depending on your specific use
> case of course). When verifying a digital signature you are often more
> interested in seeing if the certificate was revoked _at the time of
> signature creation_, than if it is revoked now.


You can not trust the signing time at all, because that time is self-asserted
by the signer.  What you can trust is either the current time (from a locally
trusted time source) and the timestamp from a trusted timestamping service.

The only CRL for which it seems to be standardized how to get it
is the *currently* valid CRL.  If expired certs are removed from the
CRL, you run in a lots of undefined protocol areas.

  - when do get certs removed from the CRL after they have expired ?
  - what do you do with certs where you determine their compromise
    only after they've expired ?
  - how do you determine which past CRL (number/id) you would need
    to query (in case that expired certs get removed from the CRL) ?
  - how do you obtain specific past CRLs?

As soon as you add usage scenarios with timestamps, you need to carry
certs on the CRL forever or you get completely unpredictable behaviour
for you software because of the undefined situations.


>
> Especially so when talking about long term signatures, i.e. something
> that can be archived. In these cases you are not interested if the
> certificate is expired or revoked _now_, because you want to know if the
> signed document is valid, i.e. if it was properly signed back then.

On the contrary -- you want to know whether the cert is revoked _now_,
because the only well-defined scheme in the existing protocols to
obtain the exact point in time when a cert was revoked is to query
the *current* CRL for the revocationDate and invalidityDate for this
cert.

It is not uncommon that certificate compromises (and more so misissued certs)
are detected, reported and revoked *after* the compromise (or missisue),
and it could be that it is only detected, reported and revoked several
CRL generations after a fraudulent signature has been created.


> 
> Archiving specifications do this. Something as easy as PDF signatures
> cater for both embedding CRLs and/or OCSP responses when you sign the
> document. With this information embedded you can verify the document at
> any time in the future without relying on CAs still being around and
> uncompromised, or something as silly as keeping all expired certificates
> in CRLs.

While you can not undo actions that happened in the past, you very probably
want to have the revocation show up on every future signature verification
that authorizes continued or additional resource access or privileges.

For the purpose of accounting, you archive the initial signature verification
along with then current CRL that was used.  But if it is something
like a lease rather than a sale, you might be repeating the verification
at later times, and then with the _new_ CRL, even when checking against
the point in time when the contract was originally verified and established.


-Martin

From mrex@sap.com  Thu Oct 27 05:42:52 2011
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From: Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
Message-Id: <201110271242.p9RCghuR010205@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp>
To: kent@bbn.com (Stephen Kent)
Date: Thu, 27 Oct 2011 14:42:43 +0200 (MEST)
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Stephen Kent wrote:
> 
> >
> > In the DigiNotar case, the only solution after the hack was to kill
> > the entire PKI surrounding that CA as fast as possible, which means
> > having to re-issue credentials to *ALL* current certificate holders
> > in extremely short time and no real transition period available.
> 
> The price a CA pays for poor security controls, and the price 
> Subjects pay for choosing a poorly managed CA.

I think you're greatly oversimplifying the situation.  I assume
that they had passed the relevant audits.  What came as a suprise
was not that subverting the CA was possible, I'm pretty confident
that can be done to all CAs of the TLS X.509 PKI.  What came as
a suprise was that such a thorough compromise was doable entirely
remotely, with no need for physical access to anything.  And this
is the only detail where I assume (acutally HOPE) that other CAs
might differ (or at least will try differ for the future).


> 
> >If there was a central database of previously issued, known-safe
> >certificates on backup, something which is normally available for desaster
> >recovery, then it would be possible to tell known-good and unknown
> >(likely fake) certs reliably apart based on their certificate hash
> >even without the slightest knowledge about how many and which fraudulent
> >certs had been issued.  The certificate serial number is unreliable
> >for telling those certs apart.  If you don't know which certs the
> >attacker managed to craft, you don't know whether he re-used existing
> >serials and which of them.
> 
> A "central database" for all CAs is infeasible, as it would have to 
> span an unknown number of CAs, sub-CAs, etc. Each CA is responsible 
> for its own disaster recovery. It is inappropriate to burden all CAs 
> with a privacy-insensitive solution to a per-CA problem.

I'm sorry if my terminology was confusing.  That is not what I meant.

I was refering to a central database for *each* CA, a database that is
populated for each issued cert.  That central database should be
accessible to the OCSP responder of the CA and to the RAs for the CA.
(RAs will have to check for duplicate public keys, which they ought
 to refuse unless it's a clear renewal of an existing cert).

It's up to the CA operater whether they share an OCSP responder
or database for several distinct issuer DNames.


-Martin

From tomasg@primekey.se  Thu Oct 27 07:58:56 2011
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On 10/27/2011 03:29 PM, Martin Rex wrote:
> Tomas Gustavsson wrote:
>>
>> On 10/26/2011 02:59 PM, Martin Rex wrote:
>>> Simon Tardell wrote:
>>>>
>>>> On Tue, Oct 25, 2011 at 23:09, Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> If checking of a digital signature some time into the past is desired,
>>>>> then one needs to carry along expired certs on the CRL basically
>>>>> forever
>>>>
>>>> That is one way. Another way would be to save the CRL (or OCSP response)
>>>> that was current at the time of the signature creation.
>>>
>>> No, you normally have to save the CRL at the time of _verification_.
>>>
>>> If your scenarios involve something like an rfc3161 timestamp, then
>>> you _do_ want to use the current CRL at the time of verification,
>>> but query about the certificate status for the rfc3161 timestamp
>>> rather than for the certificate status at the time of signature
>>> verification.
>>
>> <snip>
>>
>> Martin, I think this is incorrect (all depending on your specific use
>> case of course). When verifying a digital signature you are often more
>> interested in seeing if the certificate was revoked _at the time of
>> signature creation_, than if it is revoked now.
> 
> 
> You can not trust the signing time at all, because that time is self-asserted
> by the signer.  What you can trust is either the current time (from a locally
> trusted time source) and the timestamp from a trusted timestamping service.
> 
> The only CRL for which it seems to be standardized how to get it
> is the *currently* valid CRL.  If expired certs are removed from the
> CRL, you run in a lots of undefined protocol areas.
> 
>   - when do get certs removed from the CRL after they have expired ?
>   - what do you do with certs where you determine their compromise
>     only after they've expired ?
>   - how do you determine which past CRL (number/id) you would need
>     to query (in case that expired certs get removed from the CRL) ?
>   - how do you obtain specific past CRLs?
> 
> As soon as you add usage scenarios with timestamps, you need to carry
> certs on the CRL forever or you get completely unpredictable behaviour
> for you software because of the undefined situations.
> 
> 
>>
>> Especially so when talking about long term signatures, i.e. something
>> that can be archived. In these cases you are not interested if the
>> certificate is expired or revoked _now_, because you want to know if the
>> signed document is valid, i.e. if it was properly signed back then.
> 
> On the contrary -- you want to know whether the cert is revoked _now_,
> because the only well-defined scheme in the existing protocols to
> obtain the exact point in time when a cert was revoked is to query
> the *current* CRL for the revocationDate and invalidityDate for this
> cert.

It is well described and standardized in several papers and document
formats how should work and why. I guess you know PAdES for example
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PAdES)?

Keeping expired certificates on CRLs is imho an example of plugging a
square peg into a round hole.

Regarding existing protocols, most protocols are really tuned to reject
expired certificates. No need to do revocation checking. And if you are
doing something more exotic anyhow (like long term validation), I think
it's better stick to one of the established standards that has been
around for ages now.

There are many ways to solve problems, and many ways tries to do it by
inventing something unlimitedly expensive to maintain. I am afraid that
this falls into that category.

Cheers,
Tomas

> 
> It is not uncommon that certificate compromises (and more so misissued certs)
> are detected, reported and revoked *after* the compromise (or missisue),
> and it could be that it is only detected, reported and revoked several
> CRL generations after a fraudulent signature has been created.
> 
> 
>>
>> Archiving specifications do this. Something as easy as PDF signatures
>> cater for both embedding CRLs and/or OCSP responses when you sign the
>> document. With this information embedded you can verify the document at
>> any time in the future without relying on CAs still being around and
>> uncompromised, or something as silly as keeping all expired certificates
>> in CRLs.
> 
> While you can not undo actions that happened in the past, you very probably
> want to have the revocation show up on every future signature verification
> that authorizes continued or additional resource access or privileges.
> 
> For the purpose of accounting, you archive the initial signature verification
> along with then current CRL that was used.  But if it is something
> like a lease rather than a sale, you might be repeating the verification
> at later times, and then with the _new_ CRL, even when checking against
> the point in time when the contract was originally verified and established.
> 
> 
> -Martin


From mrex@sap.com  Thu Oct 27 08:35:57 2011
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To: tomasg@primekey.se (Tomas Gustavsson)
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Tomas Gustavsson wrote:
> > 
> > >
> > > Especially so when talking about long term signatures, i.e. something
> > > that can be archived. In these cases you are not interested if the
> > > certificate is expired or revoked _now_, because you want to know if the
> > > signed document is valid, i.e. if it was properly signed back then.
> > 
> > On the contrary -- you want to know whether the cert is revoked _now_,
> > because the only well-defined scheme in the existing protocols to
> > obtain the exact point in time when a cert was revoked is to query
> > the *current* CRL for the revocationDate and invalidityDate for this
> > cert.
> 
> It is well described and standardized in several papers and document
> formats how should work and why. I guess you know PAdES for example
> (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PAdES)?

No, I don't know anything about those, but they must be irrelevant.

> 
> Keeping expired certificates on CRLs is imho an example of plugging a
> square peg into a round hole.

No, it isn't.

Scenario: you get some data and a PKCS#7 or CMS detached SignedData
for it along with an rfc3161 timestamp from a trusted time stamping
service.  The PKCS#7 includes the entire certificate chain of the
signer.  The timestamp is 3 years old and the signer cert expired
2.5 years ago.

How do you verify that based on the PDUs that you get
(PKCS#7 or CMS SignedData with RFC3161 timestamp, a chain of X.509v3
certs with CRLDistributionPoints in them).

And if verification of that old signature is meaningful to you at
all, then you ABSOLUTELY want to know if that signer cert, which
expired 2.5 years ago, had been determined to have been compromised
whether it was retroactively revoked with an invalidity date
of 2.8 or 3.2 years into the past, because it would make a difference
for your decision to trust the information *now*.

If the answer is not in rfc3280+rfc2630+rfc3161, then the behaviour
is *undefined*.


> 
> Regarding existing protocols, most protocols are really tuned to reject
> expired certificates. No need to do revocation checking. And if you are
> doing something more exotic anyhow (like long term validation), I think
> it's better stick to one of the established standards that has been
> around for ages now.

PAdES says it is for the European requirements for electronic signatures,
so it has a very limited scope and purpose and is likely overkill for
a number of environment and uses (there are more things under the sun
besides legal contracts and fiscal accounting/bookkeeping.


-Martin

From trevorf@exchange.microsoft.com  Thu Oct 27 09:44:22 2011
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From: Trevor Freeman <trevorf@exchange.microsoft.com>
To: "denis.pinkas@bull.net" <denis.pinkas@bull.net>, "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version Notification	for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
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I agree you need a new choice hence v2 because todays good actually means n=
ot revoked.

The OSCP responder does not need access to the CA, just a list or set of li=
sts for all the issued certificates.

From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of den=
is.pinkas@bull.net
Sent: Thursday, October 27, 2011 1:23 AM
To: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version Notificat=
ion for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt

Phil,

We both agree that the problem comes from the fact that OCSP does not have =
a proper response code for 'does not exist';

Since CertStatus is a CHOICE, we would need to move to OCSP v2 to add a new=
 choice.

However, simply adding this response code to OCSP v2 would not be sufficien=
t.

It would be necessary to advertise to the client that a given OCSP server h=
as a direct access to the CA list of issued certificates,
and hence is is able to send back this new response code.

I would simply propose that we advertise this in a singleExtensions, by def=
ining an extension.

Denis


> Thinking laterally on this issue.
>
> The issue here seems to come up with the problem that OCSP does not
> have a proper response code for 'does not exist', Now let us imagine
> for a moment that we borrow from the prior art in DNSSEC and have an
> NSEC3 type capability that provides a status for the 'gaps' between
> certificates. Wouldn't this meet all the essential use cases?
>
> The gaps could be specified either as gaps between certificate
> serial numbers or gaps between cert hashes. I would like to see an
> OCSP extension to allow the hash of the cert to be specified in any case.
>
> So the old style OCSP token is (essentially)
>
>    Sign (key, { {status-value, issuer, serial, {extensions}} } )
>
> I would like to change that for certs that exist to:
>
>    Sign (key, { {status-value, issuer, serial, {certhash, extensions}} } =
)
>
> And if there is a query for a cert that does not exist and the
> request indicates that you can process it, you would get back:
>
>    Sign (key, { {non-existent, issuer, dummy-serial, {{start-
> indicator, end-indicator}, extensions}} } )
>
> This type of response would only ever be returned in an OCSP query
> response. There would be no point whatsoever in stapling a non-
> existent OCSP token to a TLS cert chain (OK not unless you were an
> attacker and you knew it would cause the chain to break somehow, but
> we design it to avoid that happening)
>
> It might be desirable to obfusticate the start and end indicators
> somewhat to prevent cert population walking. But I rather doubt we
> would end up hiding any information that can't be got using stats.
>
> This has been in the DNSSEC spec for over a decade so it is almost
> certainly unencumbered. It allows us to provide a signed response to
> every OCSP query from static data. So why didn't we think of doing
> it from the start?
>
> The only (minor) issue is that if there is a cert issued AFTER the
> date of the OCSP token, the negative response token becomes invalid.
> Although that turns out to be a moot point as if someone can hand
> you the negative response token in response to the OCSP request,
> they can stop you getting the valid OCSP token so you are hosed anyway.
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org<mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix

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<body lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple" style=3D"tab-interval:.=
5in">
<div class=3D"WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=
;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;;color:#4F6228">I agree yo=
u need a new choice hence v2 because todays good actually means not
 revoked.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=
;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;;color:#4F6228"><o:p>&nbsp=
;</o:p></span></b></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=
;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;;color:#4F6228">The OSCP r=
esponder does not need access to the CA, just a list or set of lists
 for all the issued certificates. <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=
;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;;color:#4F6228"><o:p>&nbsp=
;</o:p></span></b></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times Ne=
w Roman&quot;">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:=
&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Tim=
es New Roman&quot;"> pkix-bounces@ietf.org
 [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] <b>On Behalf Of </b>denis.pinkas@bull.net<b=
r>
<b>Sent:</b> Thursday, October 27, 2011 1:23 AM<br>
<b>To:</b> pkix@ietf.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version No=
tification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ar=
ial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">Phil,</span>
<br>
<br>
<span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,&quot;sans-se=
rif&quot;">We both agree that the problem comes from the fact that OCSP doe=
s not have a proper response code for 'does not exist';</span>
<br>
<br>
<span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,&quot;sans-se=
rif&quot;">Since CertStatus is a CHOICE, we would need to move to OCSP v2 t=
o add a new choice.</span>
<br>
<br>
<span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,&quot;sans-se=
rif&quot;">However, simply adding this response code to OCSP v2 would not b=
e sufficient.</span>
<br>
<span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,&quot;sans-se=
rif&quot;"><br>
It would be necessary to advertise to the client that a given OCSP server h=
as a direct access to the CA list of issued certificates,<br>
and hence is is able to send back this new response code.</span> <br>
<br>
<span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,&quot;sans-se=
rif&quot;">I would simply propose that we advertise this in a singleExtensi=
ons</span><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">,</span><span style=3D"font-size=
:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;"> by defining =
an
 extension.</span> <br>
<br>
<span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,&quot;sans-se=
rif&quot;">Denis</span> <br>
<br>
<tt><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">&nbsp;</span></tt><span style=3D"font-=
size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;"><br>
<tt>&gt; Thinking laterally on this issue. </tt></span><br>
<tt><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">&gt; </span></tt><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;"><br>
<tt>&gt; The issue here seems to come up with the problem that OCSP does no=
t </tt><br>
<tt>&gt; have a proper response code for 'does not exist',&nbsp;Now let us =
imagine</tt><br>
<tt>&gt; for a moment that we borrow from the prior art in DNSSEC and have =
an</tt><br>
<tt>&gt; NSEC3 type capability that provides a status for the 'gaps' betwee=
n </tt><br>
<tt>&gt; certificates. Wouldn't this meet all the essential use cases?</tt>=
</span> <br>
<tt><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">&gt; </span></tt><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;"><br>
<tt>&gt; The gaps could be specified either as gaps between certificate </t=
t><br>
<tt>&gt; serial numbers or gaps between cert hashes. I would like to see an=
 </tt><br>
<tt>&gt; OCSP extension to allow the hash of the cert to be specified in an=
y case.</tt></span>
<br>
<tt><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">&gt; </span></tt><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;"><br>
<tt>&gt; So the old style OCSP token is (essentially)</tt></span> <br>
<tt><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">&gt; </span></tt><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;"><br>
<tt>&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp;Sign (key, {&nbsp;{status-value, issuer, serial, {ext=
ensions}} } )</tt></span>
<br>
<tt><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">&gt; </span></tt><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;"><br>
<tt>&gt; I would like to change that for certs that exist to:</tt></span> <=
br>
<tt><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">&gt; </span></tt><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;"><br>
<tt>&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp;Sign (key, {&nbsp;{status-value, issuer, serial, {cer=
thash, extensions}} } )</tt></span>
<br>
<tt><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">&gt; </span></tt><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;"><br>
<tt>&gt; And if there is a query for a cert that does not exist and the </t=
t><br>
<tt>&gt; request indicates that you can process it, you would get back:</tt=
></span> <br>
<tt><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">&gt; </span></tt><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;"><br>
<tt>&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp;Sign (key, {&nbsp;{non-existent, issuer, dummy-serial=
, {{start-</tt><br>
<tt>&gt; indicator, end-indicator}, extensions}} } )</tt></span> <br>
<tt><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">&gt; </span></tt><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;"><br>
<tt>&gt; This type of response would only ever be returned in an OCSP query=
 </tt><br>
<tt>&gt; response. There would be no point whatsoever in stapling a non-</t=
t><br>
<tt>&gt; existent OCSP token to a TLS cert chain (OK not unless you were an=
 </tt><br>
<tt>&gt; attacker and you knew it would cause the chain to break somehow, b=
ut</tt><br>
<tt>&gt; we design it to avoid that happening)</tt></span> <br>
<tt><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">&gt; </span></tt><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;"><br>
<tt>&gt; It might be desirable to obfusticate the start and end indicators =
</tt><br>
<tt>&gt; somewhat to prevent cert population walking. But I rather doubt we=
 </tt><br>
<tt>&gt; would end up hiding any information that can't be got using stats.=
&nbsp;</tt></span>
<br>
<tt><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">&gt; </span></tt><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;"><br>
<tt>&gt; This has been in the DNSSEC spec for over a decade so it is almost=
 </tt><br>
<tt>&gt; certainly unencumbered. It allows us to provide a signed response =
to</tt><br>
<tt>&gt; every OCSP query from static data. So why didn't we think of doing=
 </tt><br>
<tt>&gt; it from the start?</tt></span> <br>
<tt><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">&gt; </span></tt><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;"><br>
<tt>&gt; The only (minor) issue is that if there is a cert issued AFTER the=
 </tt><br>
<tt>&gt; date of the OCSP token, the negative response token becomes invali=
d.</tt><br>
<tt>&gt; Although that turns out to be a moot point as if someone can hand =
</tt><br>
<tt>&gt; you the negative response token in response to the OCSP request, <=
/tt><br>
<tt>&gt; they can stop you getting the valid OCSP token so you are hosed an=
yway.</tt></span>
<br>
<tt><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">&gt; _________________________________=
______________</span></tt><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Courier New&quot;"><br>
<tt>&gt; <span class=3D"GramE">pkix</span> mailing list</tt><br>
<tt>&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a></tt><br>
<tt>&gt; </tt></span><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix"=
><tt><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo=
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From Walter.Goulet@rsa.com  Thu Oct 27 09:59:41 2011
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From: <Walter.Goulet@rsa.com>
To: <hallam@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 27 Oct 2011 12:59:27 -0400
Thread-Topic: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
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As Paul pointed out earlier, site operators may well have different privacy=
 goals than RPs. OCSP stapling pushes the responsibility of maintaining pri=
vacy to the site operators and doesn't do anything to help a RP to ensure t=
heir privacy (other than perhaps providing a way for their browser to tell =
them that a particular site is providing privacy protection measures since =
the browser could theoretically display a different chrome if it detects th=
e OCSP stapling extension in the TLS response it gets from a site). Then en=
d users could choose not to visit sites that don't provide this feature or =
choose to not perform revocation checking for such sites and accept the ris=
k that the given site's certificate has been revoked. I think we will all a=
gree this is hardly a desirable solution.

Thus I'm thinking it might be better to focus on solving the end to end pri=
vacy issues with OCSP first.

From: Phillip Hallam-Baker [mailto:hallam@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, October 26, 2011 5:08 PM
To: Goulet, Walter
Cc: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version Notificat=
ion for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt

If user privacy is a concern then the solution is to move to OCSP stapling.

This is something that can probably be driven quite well by privacy audits =
and appropriate privacy policy to encourage stapling.

But really, this information is no more privacy sensitive than any of the o=
ther info sloshing round the net and the CA seeing it is probably a lesser =
concern than the ISP, backbone provider etc.


At the end of the day the IP address will continue to give away the store.


--_000_B8E4DC0DD2F9A74AB88B4529E8FED39CF6E62450MX22Acorpemccom_
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<o:idmap v:ext=3D"edit" data=3D"1" />
</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=3DEN-US link=3Dblue vli=
nk=3Dpurple><div class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'f=
ont-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>As Paul p=
ointed out earlier, site operators may well have different privacy goals th=
an RPs. OCSP stapling pushes the responsibility of maintaining privacy to t=
he site operators and doesn&#8217;t do anything to help a RP to ensure thei=
r privacy (other than perhaps providing a way for their browser to tell the=
m that a particular site is providing privacy protection measures since the=
 browser could theoretically display a different chrome if it detects the O=
CSP stapling extension in the TLS response it gets from a site). Then end u=
sers could choose not to visit sites that don&#8217;t provide this feature =
or choose to not perform revocation checking for such sites and accept the =
risk that the given site&#8217;s certificate has been revoked. I think we w=
ill all agree this is hardly a desirable solution.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sa=
ns-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><=
span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F=
497D'>Thus I&#8217;m thinking it might be better to focus on solving the en=
d to end privacy issues with OCSP first.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMs=
oNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";=
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><div style=3D'border:none;border=
-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 4.0pt'><div><div style=3D'border=
:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=3D=
MsoNormal><b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-ser=
if"'>From:</span></b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","=
sans-serif"'> Phillip Hallam-Baker [mailto:hallam@gmail.com] <br><b>Sent:</=
b> Wednesday, October 26, 2011 5:08 PM<br><b>To:</b> Goulet, Walter<br><b>C=
c:</b> pkix@ietf.org<br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal =
Was: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt<o:p></o:p>=
</span></p></div></div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=
=3DMsoNormal>If user privacy is a concern then the solution is to move to O=
CSP stapling.<o:p></o:p></p><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>=
</div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>This is something that can probably be driv=
en quite well by privacy audits and appropriate privacy policy to encourage=
 stapling.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p><=
/p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>But really, this information is no more =
privacy sensitive than any of the other info sloshing round the net and the=
 CA seeing it is probably a lesser concern than the ISP, backbone provider =
etc.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></d=
iv><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMso=
Normal>At the end of the day the IP address will continue to give away the =
store.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-b=
ottom:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div></div></div></div></body></html>=

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From mrex@sap.com  Thu Oct 27 10:17:10 2011
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Walter.Goulet@rsa.com wrote:
> 
> As Paul pointed out earlier, site operators may well have different
> privacy goals than RPs. OCSP stapling pushes the responsibility of
> maintaining privacy to the site operators and doesn't do anything
> to help a RP to ensure their privacy (other than perhaps providing
> a way for their browser to tell them that a particular site is
> providing privacy protection measures since the browser could
> theoretically display a different chrome if it detects the OCSP
> stapling extension in the TLS response it gets from a site).
> Then end users could choose not to visit sites that don't provide
> this feature or choose to not perform revocation checking for such
> sites and accept the risk that the given site's certificate has
> been revoked.
> I think we will all agree this is hardly a desirable solution.

Actually, this *IS* a desirable solution and it is common practice in
the installed base.  All of the windows machines I'm using have
revocation checking disabled as shipped by the vendor, and for
the non-Microsoft-Browsers that I'm using, I have it manually
disabled.

So the way forward would be to get the multiple-OCSP stapling out
into the installed base and at some point in the future an option
in the browser to warn about sites that do not include stapled
OCSP in their TLS handshake.


> 
> Thus I'm thinking it might be better to focus on solving the
> end to end privacy issues with OCSP first.

The only universally workable solution that I see is to have
the cert owner acquire the OCSP responses and convey them
inband.  Everything else either voids privacy or difficult
or environment-specific to configure or simply won't work in
many environments (like Home users).


-Martin

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Are we jumping the gun here?

Before we decide how to do it, is everyone in agreement that this is the way
forward?


Lets discuss that first and then work out how to handle the signalling. I am
sure that we can work that out and I am sure that there are much better
people to do that than me.

I see the following open issues:

1) Is the approach the right one?
2) Should the intervals be digest values or serial number values or both?
3) What should the backwards compatibility strategy be?


On Thu, Oct 27, 2011 at 12:44 PM, Trevor Freeman <
trevorf@exchange.microsoft.com> wrote:

>  *I agree you need a new choice hence v2 because todays good actually
> means not revoked.*
>
> * *
>
> *The OSCP responder does not need access to the CA, just a list or set of
> lists for all the issued certificates. *
>
> * *
>
> *From:* pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] *On Behalf Of
> *denis.pinkas@bull.net
> *Sent:* Thursday, October 27, 2011 1:23 AM
> *To:* pkix@ietf.org
> *Subject:* Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version
> Notification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt****
>
> ** **
>
> Phil,
>
> We both agree that the problem comes from the fact that OCSP does not have
> a proper response code for 'does not exist';
>
> Since CertStatus is a CHOICE, we would need to move to OCSP v2 to add a new
> choice.
>
> However, simply adding this response code to OCSP v2 would not be
> sufficient.
>
> It would be necessary to advertise to the client that a given OCSP server
> has a direct access to the CA list of issued certificates,
> and hence is is able to send back this new response code.
>
> I would simply propose that we advertise this in a singleExtensions, by
> defining an extension.
>
> Denis
>
>
> > Thinking laterally on this issue.
> >
> > The issue here seems to come up with the problem that OCSP does not
> > have a proper response code for 'does not exist', Now let us imagine
> > for a moment that we borrow from the prior art in DNSSEC and have an
> > NSEC3 type capability that provides a status for the 'gaps' between
> > certificates. Wouldn't this meet all the essential use cases?
> >
> > The gaps could be specified either as gaps between certificate
> > serial numbers or gaps between cert hashes. I would like to see an
> > OCSP extension to allow the hash of the cert to be specified in any case.
> >
> > So the old style OCSP token is (essentially)
> >
> >    Sign (key, { {status-value, issuer, serial, {extensions}} } )
> >
> > I would like to change that for certs that exist to:
> >
> >    Sign (key, { {status-value, issuer, serial, {certhash, extensions}} }
> )
> >
> > And if there is a query for a cert that does not exist and the
> > request indicates that you can process it, you would get back:
> >
> >    Sign (key, { {non-existent, issuer, dummy-serial, {{start-
> > indicator, end-indicator}, extensions}} } )
> >
> > This type of response would only ever be returned in an OCSP query
> > response. There would be no point whatsoever in stapling a non-
> > existent OCSP token to a TLS cert chain (OK not unless you were an
> > attacker and you knew it would cause the chain to break somehow, but
> > we design it to avoid that happening)
> >
> > It might be desirable to obfusticate the start and end indicators
> > somewhat to prevent cert population walking. But I rather doubt we
> > would end up hiding any information that can't be got using stats.
> >
> > This has been in the DNSSEC spec for over a decade so it is almost
> > certainly unencumbered. It allows us to provide a signed response to
> > every OCSP query from static data. So why didn't we think of doing
> > it from the start?
> >
> > The only (minor) issue is that if there is a cert issued AFTER the
> > date of the OCSP token, the negative response token becomes invalid.
> > Although that turns out to be a moot point as if someone can hand
> > you the negative response token in response to the OCSP request,
> > they can stop you getting the valid OCSP token so you are hosed anyway.
> > _______________________________________________
> > pkix mailing list
> > pkix@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix****
>
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>
>


-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

--f46d0447850b27508904b04aff0a
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Are we jumping the gun here?<div><br></div><div>Before we decide how to do =
it, is everyone in agreement that this is the way forward?</div><div><br></=
div><div><br></div><div>Lets discuss that first and then work out how to ha=
ndle the signalling. I am sure that we can work that out and I am sure that=
 there are much better people to do that than me.=A0<br>
<br>I see the following open issues:</div><div><br></div><div>1) Is the app=
roach the right one?</div><div>2) Should the intervals be digest values or =
serial number values or both?</div><div>3) What should the backwards compat=
ibility strategy be?</div>
<div><br></div><div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Thu, Oct 27, 2011 at =
12:44 PM, Trevor Freeman <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:trevorf@ex=
change.microsoft.com">trevorf@exchange.microsoft.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<=
br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">







<div lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple">
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;color:#4F6228">I =
agree you need a new choice hence v2 because todays good actually means not
 revoked.<u></u><u></u></span></b></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;color:#4F6228"><u=
></u>=A0<u></u></span></b></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;color:#4F6228">Th=
e OSCP responder does not need access to the CA, just a list or set of list=
s
 for all the issued certificates. <u></u><u></u></span></b></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;color:#4F6228"><u=
></u>=A0<u></u></span></b></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">From:</span></b>=
<span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt"> <a href=3D"mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org" =
target=3D"_blank">pkix-bounces@ietf.org</a>
 [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">pkix-bo=
unces@ietf.org</a>] <b>On Behalf Of </b><a href=3D"mailto:denis.pinkas@bull=
.net" target=3D"_blank">denis.pinkas@bull.net</a><br>
<b>Sent:</b> Thursday, October 27, 2011 1:23 AM<br>
<b>To:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">pkix@ietf.org=
</a><br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version No=
tification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt<u></u><u></u></span></p><div><div>=
</div><div class=3D"h5">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">Phil,</span>
<br>
<br>
<span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">We both agree that the problem comes from =
the fact that OCSP does not have a proper response code for &#39;does not e=
xist&#39;;</span>
<br>
<br>
<span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">Since CertStatus is a CHOICE, we would nee=
d to move to OCSP v2 to add a new choice.</span>
<br>
<br>
<span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">However, simply adding this response code =
to OCSP v2 would not be sufficient.</span>
<br>
<span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt"><br>
It would be necessary to advertise to the client that a given OCSP server h=
as a direct access to the CA list of issued certificates,<br>
and hence is is able to send back this new response code.</span> <br>
<br>
<span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">I would simply propose that we advertise t=
his in a singleExtensions</span><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">,</span><s=
pan style=3D"font-size:10.0pt"> by defining an
 extension.</span> <br>
<br>
<span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">Denis</span> <br>
<br>
<tt><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">=A0</span></tt><span style=3D"font-siz=
e:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;"><br>
<tt>&gt; Thinking laterally on this issue. </tt></span><br>
<tt><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">&gt; </span></tt><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;"><br>
<tt>&gt; The issue here seems to come up with the problem that OCSP does no=
t </tt><br>
<tt>&gt; have a proper response code for &#39;does not exist&#39;,=A0Now le=
t us imagine</tt><br>
<tt>&gt; for a moment that we borrow from the prior art in DNSSEC and have =
an</tt><br>
<tt>&gt; NSEC3 type capability that provides a status for the &#39;gaps&#39=
; between </tt><br>
<tt>&gt; certificates. Wouldn&#39;t this meet all the essential use cases?<=
/tt></span> <br>
<tt><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">&gt; </span></tt><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;"><br>
<tt>&gt; The gaps could be specified either as gaps between certificate </t=
t><br>
<tt>&gt; serial numbers or gaps between cert hashes. I would like to see an=
 </tt><br>
<tt>&gt; OCSP extension to allow the hash of the cert to be specified in an=
y case.</tt></span>
<br>
<tt><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">&gt; </span></tt><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;"><br>
<tt>&gt; So the old style OCSP token is (essentially)</tt></span> <br>
<tt><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">&gt; </span></tt><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;"><br>
<tt>&gt; =A0 =A0Sign (key, {=A0{status-value, issuer, serial, {extensions}}=
 } )</tt></span>
<br>
<tt><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">&gt; </span></tt><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;"><br>
<tt>&gt; I would like to change that for certs that exist to:</tt></span> <=
br>
<tt><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">&gt; </span></tt><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;"><br>
<tt>&gt; =A0 =A0Sign (key, {=A0{status-value, issuer, serial, {certhash, ex=
tensions}} } )</tt></span>
<br>
<tt><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">&gt; </span></tt><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;"><br>
<tt>&gt; And if there is a query for a cert that does not exist and the </t=
t><br>
<tt>&gt; request indicates that you can process it, you would get back:</tt=
></span> <br>
<tt><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">&gt; </span></tt><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;"><br>
<tt>&gt; =A0 =A0Sign (key, {=A0{non-existent, issuer, dummy-serial, {{start=
-</tt><br>
<tt>&gt; indicator, end-indicator}, extensions}} } )</tt></span> <br>
<tt><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">&gt; </span></tt><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;"><br>
<tt>&gt; This type of response would only ever be returned in an OCSP query=
 </tt><br>
<tt>&gt; response. There would be no point whatsoever in stapling a non-</t=
t><br>
<tt>&gt; existent OCSP token to a TLS cert chain (OK not unless you were an=
 </tt><br>
<tt>&gt; attacker and you knew it would cause the chain to break somehow, b=
ut</tt><br>
<tt>&gt; we design it to avoid that happening)</tt></span> <br>
<tt><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">&gt; </span></tt><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;"><br>
<tt>&gt; It might be desirable to obfusticate the start and end indicators =
</tt><br>
<tt>&gt; somewhat to prevent cert population walking. But I rather doubt we=
 </tt><br>
<tt>&gt; would end up hiding any information that can&#39;t be got using st=
ats.=A0</tt></span>
<br>
<tt><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">&gt; </span></tt><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;"><br>
<tt>&gt; This has been in the DNSSEC spec for over a decade so it is almost=
 </tt><br>
<tt>&gt; certainly unencumbered. It allows us to provide a signed response =
to</tt><br>
<tt>&gt; every OCSP query from static data. So why didn&#39;t we think of d=
oing </tt><br>
<tt>&gt; it from the start?</tt></span> <br>
<tt><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">&gt; </span></tt><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;"><br>
<tt>&gt; The only (minor) issue is that if there is a cert issued AFTER the=
 </tt><br>
<tt>&gt; date of the OCSP token, the negative response token becomes invali=
d.</tt><br>
<tt>&gt; Although that turns out to be a moot point as if someone can hand =
</tt><br>
<tt>&gt; you the negative response token in response to the OCSP request, <=
/tt><br>
<tt>&gt; they can stop you getting the valid OCSP token so you are hosed an=
yway.</tt></span>
<br>
<tt><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">&gt; _________________________________=
______________</span></tt><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Courier New&quot;"><br>
<tt>&gt; <span>pkix</span> mailing list</tt><br>
<tt>&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">pkix@ietf.org</=
a></tt><br>
<tt>&gt; </tt></span><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix"=
 target=3D"_blank"><tt><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt">https://www.ietf.or=
g/mailman/listinfo/pkix</span></tt></a><u></u><u></u></p>
</div></div></div>
</div>

<br>_______________________________________________<br>
pkix mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br>Website:=
 <a href=3D"http://hallambaker.com/">http://hallambaker.com/</a><br><br>
</div>

--f46d0447850b27508904b04aff0a--

From kent@bbn.com  Thu Oct 27 10:35:21 2011
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Date: Thu, 27 Oct 2011 13:32:41 -0400
To: mrex@sap.com
From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
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At 2:42 PM +0200 10/27/11, Martin Rex wrote:
>Stephen Kent wrote:
>>
>>  >
>>  > In the DigiNotar case, the only solution after the hack was to kill
>>  > the entire PKI surrounding that CA as fast as possible, which means
>>  > having to re-issue credentials to *ALL* current certificate holders
>>  > in extremely short time and no real transition period available.
>>
>>  The price a CA pays for poor security controls, and the price
>>  Subjects pay for choosing a poorly managed CA.
>
>I think you're greatly oversimplifying the situation.  I assume
>that they had passed the relevant audits.  What came as a suprise
>was not that subverting the CA was possible, I'm pretty confident
>that can be done to all CAs of the TLS X.509 PKI.  What came as
>a suprise was that such a thorough compromise was doable entirely
>remotely, with no need for physical access to anything.  And this
>is the only detail where I assume (acutally HOPE) that other CAs
>might differ (or at least will try differ for the future).

I don't see how you observation about the vulnerability of the CA/RA
relative to remote attacks contradicts my observations. It is commonly believed
that the folks who perform security audits are generally unqualified, low paid
(hot be confused with low priced) folks who follow checklists and are
in the business of approving applicants, so that they can be paid, repeatedly.
This problem is hardly confined to the CA business.

>  > >If there was a central database of previously issued, known-safe
>  > >certificates on backup, something which is normally available for desaster
>>  >recovery, then it would be possible to tell known-good and unknown
>>  >(likely fake) certs reliably apart based on their certificate hash
>>  >even without the slightest knowledge about how many and which fraudulent
>>  >certs had been issued.  The certificate serial number is unreliable
>>  >for telling those certs apart.  If you don't know which certs the
>>  >attacker managed to craft, you don't know whether he re-used existing
>>  >serials and which of them.
>>
>>  A "central database" for all CAs is infeasible, as it would have to
>>  span an unknown number of CAs, sub-CAs, etc. Each CA is responsible
>>  for its own disaster recovery. It is inappropriate to burden all CAs
>>  with a privacy-insensitive solution to a per-CA problem.
>
>I'm sorry if my terminology was confusing.  That is not what I meant.

good.

>I was refering to a central database for *each* CA, a database that is
>populated for each issued cert.  That central database should be
>accessible to the OCSP responder of the CA and to the RAs for the CA.
>(RAs will have to check for duplicate public keys, which they ought
>  to refuse unless it's a clear renewal of an existing cert).

Tha make more sense.  The CA product we sold, long ago, had that sort of
DB. Our FIPS 140 level 3 crypto, in a later version, even maintained
audit info internally on each cert it signed. This was possible 
because the device didn't sign a hash of a cert, but rather took a 
TBS cert as input, assigned the serial number, computed the hash, and 
signed the result.

>It's up to the CA operater whether they share an OCSP responder
>or database for several distinct issuer DNames.

everything is, ultimately, up to each CA operator.

Steve

From paul.hoffman@vpnc.org  Thu Oct 27 10:42:53 2011
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On Oct 27, 2011, at 10:17 AM, Martin Rex wrote:

> Walter.Goulet@rsa.com wrote:
>>=20
>> As Paul pointed out earlier, site operators may well have different
>> privacy goals than RPs. OCSP stapling pushes the responsibility of
>> maintaining privacy to the site operators and doesn't do anything
>> to help a RP to ensure their privacy (other than perhaps providing
>> a way for their browser to tell them that a particular site is
>> providing privacy protection measures since the browser could
>> theoretically display a different chrome if it detects the OCSP
>> stapling extension in the TLS response it gets from a site).
>> Then end users could choose not to visit sites that don't provide
>> this feature or choose to not perform revocation checking for such
>> sites and accept the risk that the given site's certificate has
>> been revoked.
>> I think we will all agree this is hardly a desirable solution.
>=20
> Actually, this *IS* a desirable solution and it is common practice in
> the installed base.  All of the windows machines I'm using have
> revocation checking disabled as shipped by the vendor, and for
> the non-Microsoft-Browsers that I'm using, I have it manually
> disabled.
>=20
> So the way forward would be to get the multiple-OCSP stapling out
> into the installed base and at some point in the future an option
> in the browser to warn about sites that do not include stapled
> OCSP in their TLS handshake.
>=20
>=20
>>=20
>> Thus I'm thinking it might be better to focus on solving the
>> end to end privacy issues with OCSP first.
>=20
> The only universally workable solution that I see is to have
> the cert owner acquire the OCSP responses and convey them
> inband.  Everything else either voids privacy or difficult
> or environment-specific to configure or simply won't work in
> many environments (like Home users).

FWIW, I'm with Martin on this one. Site operators and relying parties =
may have different privacy goals, but they should have the same =
authentication goals. In general, a good model for PKIX would be "here =
is my cert and here is my freshest proof of validity". Compare that with =
"here is my cert and you have to go off looking for validity information =
on your own".

--Paul Hoffman


From hallam@gmail.com  Thu Oct 27 12:36:26 2011
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From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
To: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version
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I can't see any problem with stapling from a privacy point of view.

A different user interface on the other hand, I think that would never fly.
How the bits get there should not be something that the typical consumer
wants to worry about.

All that 95% of users care about is how to get back to flinging birds at
pigs.

On Thu, Oct 27, 2011 at 1:42 PM, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> wrote:

> On Oct 27, 2011, at 10:17 AM, Martin Rex wrote:
>
> > Walter.Goulet@rsa.com wrote:
> >>
> >> As Paul pointed out earlier, site operators may well have different
> >> privacy goals than RPs. OCSP stapling pushes the responsibility of
> >> maintaining privacy to the site operators and doesn't do anything
> >> to help a RP to ensure their privacy (other than perhaps providing
> >> a way for their browser to tell them that a particular site is
> >> providing privacy protection measures since the browser could
> >> theoretically display a different chrome if it detects the OCSP
> >> stapling extension in the TLS response it gets from a site).
> >> Then end users could choose not to visit sites that don't provide
> >> this feature or choose to not perform revocation checking for such
> >> sites and accept the risk that the given site's certificate has
> >> been revoked.
> >> I think we will all agree this is hardly a desirable solution.
> >
> > Actually, this *IS* a desirable solution and it is common practice in
> > the installed base.  All of the windows machines I'm using have
> > revocation checking disabled as shipped by the vendor, and for
> > the non-Microsoft-Browsers that I'm using, I have it manually
> > disabled.
> >
> > So the way forward would be to get the multiple-OCSP stapling out
> > into the installed base and at some point in the future an option
> > in the browser to warn about sites that do not include stapled
> > OCSP in their TLS handshake.
> >
> >
> >>
> >> Thus I'm thinking it might be better to focus on solving the
> >> end to end privacy issues with OCSP first.
> >
> > The only universally workable solution that I see is to have
> > the cert owner acquire the OCSP responses and convey them
> > inband.  Everything else either voids privacy or difficult
> > or environment-specific to configure or simply won't work in
> > many environments (like Home users).
>
> FWIW, I'm with Martin on this one. Site operators and relying parties may
> have different privacy goals, but they should have the same authentication
> goals. In general, a good model for PKIX would be "here is my cert and here
> is my freshest proof of validity". Compare that with "here is my cert and
> you have to go off looking for validity information on your own".
>
> --Paul Hoffman
>
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>



-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

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I can&#39;t see any problem with stapling from a privacy point of view.<div=
><br></div><div>A different user interface on the other hand, I think that =
would never fly. How the bits get there should not be something that the ty=
pical consumer wants to worry about.</div>
<div><br></div><div>All that 95% of users care about is how to get back to =
flinging birds at pigs.<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Thu, Oct 27, 2=
011 at 1:42 PM, Paul Hoffman <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:paul.h=
offman@vpnc.org">paul.hoffman@vpnc.org</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;"><div><div></div><div class=3D"h5">On Oct 27=
, 2011, at 10:17 AM, Martin Rex wrote:<br>
<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:Walter.Goulet@rsa.com">Walter.Goulet@rsa.com</a> wro=
te:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; As Paul pointed out earlier, site operators may well have differen=
t<br>
&gt;&gt; privacy goals than RPs. OCSP stapling pushes the responsibility of=
<br>
&gt;&gt; maintaining privacy to the site operators and doesn&#39;t do anyth=
ing<br>
&gt;&gt; to help a RP to ensure their privacy (other than perhaps providing=
<br>
&gt;&gt; a way for their browser to tell them that a particular site is<br>
&gt;&gt; providing privacy protection measures since the browser could<br>
&gt;&gt; theoretically display a different chrome if it detects the OCSP<br=
>
&gt;&gt; stapling extension in the TLS response it gets from a site).<br>
&gt;&gt; Then end users could choose not to visit sites that don&#39;t prov=
ide<br>
&gt;&gt; this feature or choose to not perform revocation checking for such=
<br>
&gt;&gt; sites and accept the risk that the given site&#39;s certificate ha=
s<br>
&gt;&gt; been revoked.<br>
&gt;&gt; I think we will all agree this is hardly a desirable solution.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Actually, this *IS* a desirable solution and it is common practice in<=
br>
&gt; the installed base. =A0All of the windows machines I&#39;m using have<=
br>
&gt; revocation checking disabled as shipped by the vendor, and for<br>
&gt; the non-Microsoft-Browsers that I&#39;m using, I have it manually<br>
&gt; disabled.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; So the way forward would be to get the multiple-OCSP stapling out<br>
&gt; into the installed base and at some point in the future an option<br>
&gt; in the browser to warn about sites that do not include stapled<br>
&gt; OCSP in their TLS handshake.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Thus I&#39;m thinking it might be better to focus on solving the<b=
r>
&gt;&gt; end to end privacy issues with OCSP first.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; The only universally workable solution that I see is to have<br>
&gt; the cert owner acquire the OCSP responses and convey them<br>
&gt; inband. =A0Everything else either voids privacy or difficult<br>
&gt; or environment-specific to configure or simply won&#39;t work in<br>
&gt; many environments (like Home users).<br>
<br>
</div></div>FWIW, I&#39;m with Martin on this one. Site operators and relyi=
ng parties may have different privacy goals, but they should have the same =
authentication goals. In general, a good model for PKIX would be &quot;here=
 is my cert and here is my freshest proof of validity&quot;. Compare that w=
ith &quot;here is my cert and you have to go off looking for validity infor=
mation on your own&quot;.<br>

<br>
--Paul Hoffman<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
pkix mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix</a><br>
</blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br>Website: <a =
href=3D"http://hallambaker.com/">http://hallambaker.com/</a><br><br>
</div>

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From tomas@primekey.se  Thu Oct 27 12:42:09 2011
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On 10/27/2011 08:32 PM, Stephen Kent wrote:
> At 2:42 PM +0200 10/27/11, Martin Rex wrote:
>> Stephen Kent wrote:
>>>
>>>  >
>>>  > In the DigiNotar case, the only solution after the hack was to kill
>>>  > the entire PKI surrounding that CA as fast as possible, which means
>>>  > having to re-issue credentials to *ALL* current certificate holders
>>>  > in extremely short time and no real transition period available.
>>>
>>>  The price a CA pays for poor security controls, and the price
>>>  Subjects pay for choosing a poorly managed CA.
>>
>> I think you're greatly oversimplifying the situation.  I assume
>> that they had passed the relevant audits.  What came as a suprise
>> was not that subverting the CA was possible, I'm pretty confident
>> that can be done to all CAs of the TLS X.509 PKI.  What came as
>> a suprise was that such a thorough compromise was doable entirely
>> remotely, with no need for physical access to anything.  And this
>> is the only detail where I assume (acutally HOPE) that other CAs
>> might differ (or at least will try differ for the future).
> 
> I don't see how you observation about the vulnerability of the CA/RA
> relative to remote attacks contradicts my observations. It is commonly
> believed
> that the folks who perform security audits are generally unqualified,
> low paid
> (hot be confused with low priced) folks who follow checklists and are
> in the business of approving applicants, so that they can be paid,
> repeatedly.
> This problem is hardly confined to the CA business.
> 
>>  > >If there was a central database of previously issued, known-safe
>>  > >certificates on backup, something which is normally available for
>> desaster
>>>  >recovery, then it would be possible to tell known-good and unknown
>>>  >(likely fake) certs reliably apart based on their certificate hash
>>>  >even without the slightest knowledge about how many and which
>>> fraudulent
>>>  >certs had been issued.  The certificate serial number is unreliable
>>>  >for telling those certs apart.  If you don't know which certs the
>>>  >attacker managed to craft, you don't know whether he re-used existing
>>>  >serials and which of them.
>>>
>>>  A "central database" for all CAs is infeasible, as it would have to
>>>  span an unknown number of CAs, sub-CAs, etc. Each CA is responsible
>>>  for its own disaster recovery. It is inappropriate to burden all CAs
>>>  with a privacy-insensitive solution to a per-CA problem.
>>
>> I'm sorry if my terminology was confusing.  That is not what I meant.
> 
> good.
> 
>> I was refering to a central database for *each* CA, a database that is
>> populated for each issued cert.  That central database should be
>> accessible to the OCSP responder of the CA and to the RAs for the CA.
>> (RAs will have to check for duplicate public keys, which they ought
>>  to refuse unless it's a clear renewal of an existing cert).
> 
> Tha make more sense.  The CA product we sold, long ago, had that sort of
> DB. Our FIPS 140 level 3 crypto, in a later version, even maintained
> audit info internally on each cert it signed. This was possible because
> the device didn't sign a hash of a cert, but rather took a TBS cert as
> input, assigned the serial number, computed the hash, and signed the
> result.

I would actually assume that this is the capability of most CA products.
Keeping a database of issued cert should be normal. Whether this is
available to responders or not might be a different issue, some has it
(ejbca for example), some not. For RAs that would of course depend on
the architecture deployed, but even if the RA does not have it the CA
could deny the issuance if renewal is not allowed.

> 
>> It's up to the CA operater whether they share an OCSP responder
>> or database for several distinct issuer DNames.
> 
> everything is, ultimately, up to each CA operator.
> 
> Steve
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix


From Walter.Goulet@rsa.com  Thu Oct 27 12:49:23 2011
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The privacy issue with OCSP stapling is simply that some site operators may=
 not care as much about user privacy and thus don't support that feature, e=
ven though an end user visiting that site is very concerned about privacy (=
and wants a 0% chance that a record of their visit to that site was created=
 by the CA that owns the OCSP responder). Sites which go the extra mile to =
protect user privacy by supporting OCSP stapling should deserve an addition=
al indicator in the browser to indicate to users that such additional prote=
ctions are taking place. At least then users can avoid visiting sites which=
 don't provide such protections.

Is there any reason why this shouldn't be done? Browsers already display di=
fferent chrome for sites which purchase certificates that have been validat=
ed with a high degree of assurance (EV-SSL). I'd argue that sites which are=
 taking steps to provide user privacy protections should get similar treatm=
ent since user privacy is a concept that a typical end user will embrace ev=
en more than they have for the extended validation that is done for EV-SSL =
certs.

From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Phi=
llip Hallam-Baker
Sent: Thursday, October 27, 2011 2:36 PM
To: Paul Hoffman
Cc: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version

I can't see any problem with stapling from a privacy point of view.

A different user interface on the other hand, I think that would never fly.=
 How the bits get there should not be something that the typical consumer w=
ants to worry about.

All that 95% of users care about is how to get back to flinging birds at pi=
gs.
On Thu, Oct 27, 2011 at 1:42 PM, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org<mailto=
:paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>> wrote:
On Oct 27, 2011, at 10:17 AM, Martin Rex wrote:


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</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=3DEN-US link=3Dblue vli=
nk=3Dpurple><div class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'f=
ont-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>The priva=
cy issue with OCSP stapling is simply that some site operators may not care=
 as much about user privacy and thus don&#8217;t support that feature, even=
 though an end user visiting that site is very concerned about privacy (and=
 wants a 0% chance that a record of their visit to that site was created by=
 the CA that owns the OCSP responder). Sites which go the extra mile to pro=
tect user privacy by supporting OCSP stapling should deserve an additional =
indicator in the browser to indicate to users that such additional protecti=
ons are taking place. At least then users can avoid visiting sites which do=
n&#8217;t provide such protections.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNorm=
al><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color=
:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'f=
ont-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>Is there =
any reason why this shouldn&#8217;t be done? Browsers already display diffe=
rent chrome for sites which purchase certificates that have been validated =
with a high degree of assurance (EV-SSL). I&#8217;d argue that sites which =
are taking steps to provide user privacy protections should get similar tre=
atment since user privacy is a concept that a typical end user will embrace=
 even more than they have for the extended validation that is done for EV-S=
SL certs.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-siz=
e:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p=
></span></p><div style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:=
0in 0in 0in 4.0pt'><div><div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF =
1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span style=3D'fon=
t-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span></b><span styl=
e=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> pkix-bounces@ietf=
.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] <b>On Behalf Of </b>Phillip Hallam-Bake=
r<br><b>Sent:</b> Thursday, October 27, 2011 2:36 PM<br><b>To:</b> Paul Hof=
fman<br><b>Cc:</b> pkix@ietf.org<br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [pkix] An alternati=
ve proposal Was: Fwd: New Version<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p class=
=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>I can't see any prob=
lem with stapling from a privacy point of view.<o:p></o:p></p><div><p class=
=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>A differe=
nt user interface on the other hand, I think that would never fly. How the =
bits get there should not be something that the typical consumer wants to w=
orry about.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>=
</p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-bottom:12.0pt'>All that=
 95% of users care about is how to get back to flinging birds at pigs.<o:p>=
</o:p></p><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>On Thu, Oct 27, 2011 at 1:42 PM, Paul H=
offman &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:paul.hoffman@vpnc.org">paul.hoffman@vpnc.org</=
a>&gt; wrote:<o:p></o:p></p><div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-=
bottom:12.0pt'>On Oct 27, 2011, at 10:17 AM, Martin Rex wrote:<br><br><o:p>=
</o:p></p></div></div></div></div></div></div></body></html>=

--_000_B8E4DC0DD2F9A74AB88B4529E8FED39CF6E6250AMX22Acorpemccom_--

From tomasg@primekey.se  Thu Oct 27 12:49:24 2011
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Date: Thu, 27 Oct 2011 22:49:20 +0300
From: Tomas Gustavsson <tomasg@primekey.se>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Fwd: New Version Notification
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On 10/27/2011 06:35 PM, Martin Rex wrote:
> Tomas Gustavsson wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>> Especially so when talking about long term signatures, i.e. something
>>>> that can be archived. In these cases you are not interested if the
>>>> certificate is expired or revoked _now_, because you want to know if the
>>>> signed document is valid, i.e. if it was properly signed back then.
>>>
>>> On the contrary -- you want to know whether the cert is revoked _now_,
>>> because the only well-defined scheme in the existing protocols to
>>> obtain the exact point in time when a cert was revoked is to query
>>> the *current* CRL for the revocationDate and invalidityDate for this
>>> cert.
>>
>> It is well described and standardized in several papers and document
>> formats how should work and why. I guess you know PAdES for example
>> (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PAdES)?
> 
> No, I don't know anything about those, but they must be irrelevant.

I read that as irony. Quite funny actually.

> 
>>
>> Keeping expired certificates on CRLs is imho an example of plugging a
>> square peg into a round hole.
> 
> No, it isn't.
> 
> Scenario: you get some data and a PKCS#7 or CMS detached SignedData
> for it along with an rfc3161 timestamp from a trusted time stamping
> service.  The PKCS#7 includes the entire certificate chain of the
> signer.  The timestamp is 3 years old and the signer cert expired
> 2.5 years ago.
> 
> How do you verify that based on the PDUs that you get
> (PKCS#7 or CMS SignedData with RFC3161 timestamp, a chain of X.509v3
> certs with CRLDistributionPoints in them).
> 
> And if verification of that old signature is meaningful to you at
> all, then you ABSOLUTELY want to know if that signer cert, which
> expired 2.5 years ago, had been determined to have been compromised
> whether it was retroactively revoked with an invalidity date
> of 2.8 or 3.2 years into the past, because it would make a difference
> for your decision to trust the information *now*.

I think you need to extend this to say 10-50 years...
If the actual scope of the document is such that it is of _real_
importance that it needs to be verified 2-50 years in the future, the
system should be designed to cope with evens such as the CA going out of
business for example. Your scheme seems to fail if the CA is not around
anymore, such as DigiNotar. The CA (including CRLs) not being available
does not mean the document signature is invalid.
> 
> If the answer is not in rfc3280+rfc2630+rfc3161, then the behaviour
> is *undefined*.

I like frc5280 etc, but I don't think they do, or even claim to, define
the whole truth.

> 
> 
>>
>> Regarding existing protocols, most protocols are really tuned to reject
>> expired certificates. No need to do revocation checking. And if you are
>> doing something more exotic anyhow (like long term validation), I think
>> it's better stick to one of the established standards that has been
>> around for ages now.
> 
> PAdES says it is for the European requirements for electronic signatures,
> so it has a very limited scope and purpose and is likely overkill for
> a number of environment and uses (there are more things under the sun
> besides legal contracts and fiscal accounting/bookkeeping.

RFC5280 says that it is for the "Internet community". This does not mean
it is not suitable as reference for a non-internet community.
On the contrary actually.

> 
> 
> -Martin


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From: Paul Hoffman
> On Oct 27, 2011, at 10:17 AM, Martin Rex wrote:
>>=20
>> The only universally workable solution that I see is to have
>> the cert owner acquire the OCSP responses and convey them
>> inband.  Everything else either voids privacy or difficult
>> or environment-specific to configure or simply won't work in
>> many environments (like Home users).
>
> FWIW, I'm with Martin on this one. Site operators and relying
> parties may have different privacy goals, but they should
> have the same authentication goals. In general, a good model
> for PKIX would be "here is my cert and here is my freshest
> proof of validity". Compare that with "here is my cert and
> you have to go off looking for validity information on your own".

And of course the freshest proof of validity conveyed with the cert
could be a CRL instead of an OCSP response.  Inband conveyance is
another justification for CAs to limit the size of each individual CRL
to the size of a few certs, as opposed to the size of a 1080p HD mpeg of
a cat.

From david.cooper@nist.gov  Thu Oct 27 13:17:53 2011
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    So, would users be presented with an indicator that the site
    "protects user privacy" if the site supports OCSP stapling, even if
    the site violated the user's privacy in every other way possible
    (see "Privacy leakage on the Internet" at
    <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/77/slides/plenaryt-5.pdf">http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/77/slides/plenaryt-5.pdf</a>)?<br>
    <br>
    A user requesting information from an OCSP responder may leak some
    information to the responder, but there is no assurance that a site
    protects a user's privacy simply because it supports OCSP stapling. 
    What if the sites that were the worst offenders in terms of sharing
    user information with third parties were the first ones to rush to
    implement OCSP stapling so that they could get the browser indicator
    that implies that they "go the extra mile to protect user privacy"?<br>
    <br>
    On 10/27/2011 03:49 PM, <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:Walter.Goulet@rsa.com">Walter.Goulet@rsa.com</a> wrote:
    <blockquote
      cite="mid:B8E4DC0DD2F9A74AB88B4529E8FED39CF6E6250A@MX22A.corp.emc.com"
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        <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family:
            &quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;; color: rgb(31,
            73, 125);">The privacy issue with OCSP stapling is simply
            that some site operators may not care as much about user
            privacy and thus don’t support that feature, even though an
            end user visiting that site is very concerned about privacy
            (and wants a 0% chance that a record of their visit to that
            site was created by the CA that owns the OCSP responder).
            Sites which go the extra mile to protect user privacy by
            supporting OCSP stapling should deserve an additional
            indicator in the browser to indicate to users that such
            additional protections are taking place. At least then users
            can avoid visiting sites which don’t provide such
            protections.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family:
            &quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;; color: rgb(31,
            73, 125);"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family:
            &quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;; color: rgb(31,
            73, 125);">Is there any reason why this shouldn’t be done?
            Browsers already display different chrome for sites which
            purchase certificates that have been validated with a high
            degree of assurance (EV-SSL). I’d argue that sites which are
            taking steps to provide user privacy protections should get
            similar treatment since user privacy is a concept that a
            typical end user will embrace even more than they have for
            the extended validation that is done for EV-SSL certs.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
  </body>
</html>

From mrex@sap.com  Thu Oct 27 13:38:21 2011
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From: Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
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To: david.cooper@nist.gov (David A. Cooper)
Date: Thu, 27 Oct 2011 22:38:18 +0200 (MEST)
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David A. Cooper wrote:
> 
> So, would users be presented with an indicator that the site
> "protects user privacy" if the site supports OCSP stapling, even if
> the site violated the user's privacy in every other way possible

No, the idea is that this becomes the "expected behaviour", and that
those _not_ doing it get red-flagged, red-crossed, or earn themselves
a warning popup with a message:

  Privacy alert:
  this site did not provide a fresh proof for the validity of his
  server certificate.  It is suggested that you poll the CAs
  OCSP responder indicated in the server certificate, but that
  OCSP responder may be tracking that an when you're accessing this
  site -- so your consent for making that OCSP request is necessary.

-Martin

From david.cooper@nist.gov  Thu Oct 27 13:51:13 2011
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<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN">
<html>
  <head>
    <meta content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1"
      http-equiv="Content-Type">
    <title></title>
  </head>
  <body text="#000000" bgcolor="#ffffff">
    Please read Walter's message again:<br>
    <br>
    On 10/27/2011 03:49 PM, <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:Walter.Goulet@rsa.com">Walter.Goulet@rsa.com</a> wrote:
    <blockquote
      cite="mid:B8E4DC0DD2F9A74AB88B4529E8FED39CF6E6250A@MX22A.corp.emc.com"
      type="cite">
      <style>@font-face {
  font-family: "Calibri";
}@font-face {
  font-family: "Tahoma";
}p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal { margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; }a:link, span.MsoHyperlink { color: blue; text-decoration: underline; }a:visited, span.MsoHyperlinkFollowed { color: purple; text-decoration: underline; }span.EmailStyle17 { font-family: "Calibri","sans-serif"; color: rgb(31, 73, 125); }.MsoChpDefault { font-family: "Calibri","sans-serif"; }div.WordSection1 { page: WordSection1; }</style>
      <div class="WordSection1">
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family:
            &quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;; color: rgb(31,
            73, 125);">Sites which go the extra mile to protect user
            privacy by supporting OCSP stapling should deserve an
            additional indicator in the browser to indicate to users
            that such additional protections are taking place. <br>
          </span></p>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    How can this be interpreted as red-flagging those sites that do not
    support OCSP stapling?&nbsp; The lack of a red-flag warning is not an
    "additional indicator".<br>
    <br>
    I don't think the idea of red-flagging sites is any better.&nbsp; Almost
    no users would understand the privacy warning, and it still doesn't
    address the question of why should this potential privacy problem be
    called out for special user attention when there are so many worse
    privacy violations that are being perpetrated.<br>
    <br>
    On 10/27/2011 04:38 PM, Martin Rex wrote:
    <blockquote
      cite="mid:201110272038.p9RKcIis007343@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp"
      type="cite">
      <pre wrap="">David A. Cooper wrote:
</pre>
      <blockquote type="cite">
        <pre wrap="">
So, would users be presented with an indicator that the site
"protects user privacy" if the site supports OCSP stapling, even if
the site violated the user's privacy in every other way possible
</pre>
      </blockquote>
      <pre wrap="">
No, the idea is that this becomes the "expected behaviour", and that
those _not_ doing it get red-flagged, red-crossed, or earn themselves
a warning popup with a message:

  Privacy alert:
  this site did not provide a fresh proof for the validity of his
  server certificate.  It is suggested that you poll the CAs
  OCSP responder indicated in the server certificate, but that
  OCSP responder may be tracking that an when you're accessing this
  site -- so your consent for making that OCSP request is necessary.

-Martin
.

</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
  </body>
</html>

From mrex@sap.com  Thu Oct 27 14:33:27 2011
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From: Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
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To: tomasg@primekey.se (Tomas Gustavsson)
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Tomas Gustavsson wrote:
> 
> >>
> >> It is well described and standardized in several papers and document
> >> formats how should work and why. I guess you know PAdES for example
> >> (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PAdES)?
> > 
> > No, I don't know anything about those, but they must be irrelevant.
> 
> I read that as irony. Quite funny actually.

No, actually that wasn't a joke, but the naked truth.
For most of the protocols and technologies that were doing in the IETF,
those specs are completely irrelevant.


> 
> > 
> > Scenario: you get some data and a PKCS#7 or CMS detached SignedData
> > for it along with an rfc3161 timestamp from a trusted time stamping
> > service.  The PKCS#7 includes the entire certificate chain of the
> > signer.  The timestamp is 3 years old and the signer cert expired
> > 2.5 years ago.
> > 
> > How do you verify that based on the PDUs that you get
> > (PKCS#7 or CMS SignedData with RFC3161 timestamp, a chain of X.509v3
> > certs with CRLDistributionPoints in them).
> > 
> > And if verification of that old signature is meaningful to you at
> > all, then you ABSOLUTELY want to know if that signer cert, which
> > expired 2.5 years ago, had been determined to have been compromised
> > whether it was retroactively revoked with an invalidity date
> > of 2.8 or 3.2 years into the past, because it would make a difference
> > for your decision to trust the information *now*.
> 
> I think you need to extend this to say 10-50 years...
> If the actual scope of the document is such that it is of _real_
> importance that it needs to be verified 2-50 years in the future, the
> system should be designed to cope with evens such as the CA going out of
> business for example. Your scheme seems to fail if the CA is not around
> anymore, such as DigiNotar. The CA (including CRLs) not being available
> does not mean the document signature is invalid.


Which makes such CAs entirely useless for protocols such as S/Mime EMail.

The only protocol that was sensibly usable for secure EMail 16 years ago
was PGP, and the only protcol that seems sensibly usable for secure EMail
is still PGP.  S/Mime sucks big time.

I have PGP-signed Emails from 1995, and they still verify today
(although the trust in the crypto algorithms of back then is fading...)

Most of the S/Mime signed EMails that I received fail Signature
verification (pretty much all of them after some months to a year).
Simple X.509v3 is completely unusable for S/Mime.  It could be made
to work if the receiving S/Mime client would add and rfc3161 timestamp
to every received Email, but the prerequisite is that the CA keeps
certs on the CRL forever.

A sensible S/Mime implementation requires rfc3161+rfc2630+rfc3280
and this technology *IMPLIES* that CAs keep expired certs on their
CRLs for at least 10 years and allow retroactive revocation of certs
for at least 10 years (it depends on the lifetime of your timestamp
server cert -- having to wade through your entire archives before
the timestamping cert expires and re-stamp everything is not workable
for casual users).


I'm curious: are there any sensible S/Mime implementations out there
that do this (add rfc3161 timestamps to received messages)?
I consider S/Mime for EMail pretty much useless without this.
(although we have started using rfc3161, we're *not* using
 PKCS#7/CMS for EMail)


> 
> > If the answer is not in rfc3280+rfc2630+rfc3161, then the behaviour
> > is *undefined*.
> 
> I like frc5280 etc, but I don't think they do, or even claim to, define
> the whole truth.

When you're newly adopting a technology, then you start out with the
minimum set of protocols that are necessary to compose a useful
technology.  S/Mime with short-lived X.509 certs without rfc3161
is pretty useless for and medium-term integrity protection and authentication
of data.  The minimum is 3161 and its references (2630 and actually 2459
rather than 3280).  So that is the starting point.  And it requires
a CA that keeps expired certs on its CRL and supports retroactively
revoking certs, even expired ones.


> 
> > PAdES says it is for the European requirements for electronic signatures,
> > so it has a very limited scope and purpose and is likely overkill for
> > a number of environment and uses (there are more things under the sun
> > besides legal contracts and fiscal accounting/bookkeeping.
> 
> RFC5280 says that it is for the "Internet community". This does not mean
> it is not suitable as reference for a non-internet community.
> On the contrary actually.

Easy availability of the specs has been the biggest advantage for technology
developed by the IETF.  Unfortunately, some of the specs reference non-free
specs from other SDOs (like those pesky X9.*  DH/ECDH/ECDSA).
I certainly do have a very strong reluctance to implement any parts of
specs that are *NOT* openly available (and it reliably precludes
that I check out the effort in my spare time just out of curiosity).



-Martin

From peter.lipp@iaik.tugraz.at  Thu Oct 27 14:36:30 2011
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Am 27.10.2011 17:35, schrieb Martin Rex:
> PAdES says it is for the European requirements for electronic signatures,
> so it has a very limited scope and purpose
This is not necessarily true. Overkill for some stuff - may well be. But:

> Scenario: you get some data and a PKCS#7 or CMS detached SignedData
> for it along with an rfc3161 timestamp from a trusted time stamping
> service.  The PKCS#7 includes the entire certificate chain of the
> signer.  The timestamp is 3 years old and the signer cert expired
> 2.5 years ago.
>
> How do you verify that based on the PDUs that you get
> (PKCS#7 or CMS SignedData with RFC3161 timestamp, a chain of X.509v3
> certs with CRLDistributionPoints in them).
Sounds very much like the services provided by X/C/PAdES - so maybe not 
as irrelevant as you may believe.

Peter




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From: Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
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Peter Lipp wrote:
> 
> Martin Rex wrote:
> > 
> > Scenario: you get some data and a PKCS#7 or CMS detached SignedData
> > for it along with an rfc3161 timestamp from a trusted time stamping
> > service.  The PKCS#7 includes the entire certificate chain of the
> > signer.  The timestamp is 3 years old and the signer cert expired
> > 2.5 years ago.
> >
> > How do you verify that based on the PDUs that you get
> > (PKCS#7 or CMS SignedData with RFC3161 timestamp, a chain of X.509v3
> > certs with CRLDistributionPoints in them).
>
> Sounds very much like the services provided by X/C/PAdES - so maybe not 
> as irrelevant as you may believe.

I'm in development and usually on a very tight resources budget,
so I'm usually going for the KISS principle, or the quote from
Antoine de Saint-Exupery "Perfection in Design is achived not
when there is nothing left to add, but when there is nothing
left to take away".

So my approach would certainly be
What _subset_ of rfc2630 + rfc3161 + rfc3280 do I need.
I will certainly not look for additional or more feature-rich
specifications to add to the list of requirements, and even
less so for additional specs from outside the IETF.

-Martin

From tomas@primekey.se  Thu Oct 27 23:38:11 2011
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On 10/28/2011 03:24 AM, Martin Rex wrote:
> Peter Lipp wrote:
>>
>> Martin Rex wrote:
>>>
>>> Scenario: you get some data and a PKCS#7 or CMS detached SignedData
>>> for it along with an rfc3161 timestamp from a trusted time stamping
>>> service.  The PKCS#7 includes the entire certificate chain of the
>>> signer.  The timestamp is 3 years old and the signer cert expired
>>> 2.5 years ago.
>>>
>>> How do you verify that based on the PDUs that you get
>>> (PKCS#7 or CMS SignedData with RFC3161 timestamp, a chain of X.509v3
>>> certs with CRLDistributionPoints in them).
>>
>> Sounds very much like the services provided by X/C/PAdES - so maybe not 
>> as irrelevant as you may believe.
> 
> I'm in development and usually on a very tight resources budget,
> so I'm usually going for the KISS principle, or the quote from
> Antoine de Saint-Exupery "Perfection in Design is achived not
> when there is nothing left to add, but when there is nothing
> left to take away".
> 
> So my approach would certainly be
> What _subset_ of rfc2630 + rfc3161 + rfc3280 do I need.
> I will certainly not look for additional or more feature-rich
> specifications to add to the list of requirements, and even
> less so for additional specs from outside the IETF.

Just out of curiosity, is IETF doing any work related to long term
signatures?
I do agree that the openness of standards from IETF, Oasis and some
others are far superior to the semi-closed standards (ISO et al).

Regarding S/MIME for secure email I consider that pretty much a dead
fish as well. That area needs substantial overhaul, on several fronts,
in order to be usable outside very limited communities.
If your goal is to re-invent secure email, good luck :-)

For other purposes (I don't consider email a good case for long term
signatures) I'd still look around, also outside IETF, for something
standardised. Especially if on a tight budget since reusing already done
work usually saves me time. Home-grown stuff has a tendency to get back
to bite you in the long run.

Cheers,
Tomas

> 
> -Martin
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix


From rob.stradling@comodo.com  Fri Oct 28 02:20:41 2011
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From: Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version
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On Thursday 27 Oct 2011 18:42:49 Paul Hoffman wrote:
<snip>
> FWIW, I'm with Martin on this one. Site operators and relying parties may
> have different privacy goals, but they should have the same authentication
> goals. In general, a good model for PKIX would be "here is my cert and
> here is my freshest proof of validity". Compare that with "here is my cert
> and you have to go off looking for validity information on your own".

A few months ago I was investigating the roadmap for adding OCSP Stapling 
support to the nginx webserver.  One site operator chimed in with his opinion 
[1], which clearly doesn't favour "here is my cert and here is my freshest 
proof of validity".

When a webserver disables OCSP Stapling by default (or enables it by default 
but provides an option to disable it), what incentive does the site operator 
have to enable it (or to not disable it)?


[1] http://mailman.nginx.org/pipermail/nginx-devel/2011-June/000958.html

"As an user, I would prefer it disabled and available as an optional
module and not part as core.
As of Apache 2.3 OSCP Stapling is disabled by default too.

I don't really get why use an high-performance web server to handle
queries only saving money to certification authorities.
So we pay like $100/200 for the SSL certificate, and then we pay again
server and bandwidth fees to answer OSCP ?

Clients have time to wait OSCP answer from CA and in the other side,
nginx server is already very busy so it is probably not a good idea to
load it with bonus features."


Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online

From denis.pinkas@bull.net  Fri Oct 28 02:36:38 2011
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Message en plusieurs parties au format MIME
--=_alternative 0034AD0CC1257937_=
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII"

Martin,

Apparently, you have not read the RFCs for a long time, since two of the 
references you mention are now obsolete: rfc2630 + rfc3280

There exists an RFC which describes how to form a signature that can be 
verified beyond the end of the validity of the signer's certificate.
Take a look at RFC 5126. There also exists many ETSI Technical 
Specifications, but it is unfortunate that you already mentioned 
that you will not look at them.

Denis

===================================================================================================

Peter Lipp wrote:
> 
> Martin Rex wrote:
> > 
> > Scenario: you get some data and a PKCS#7 or CMS detached SignedData
> > for it along with an rfc3161 timestamp from a trusted time stamping
> > service.  The PKCS#7 includes the entire certificate chain of the
> > signer.  The timestamp is 3 years old and the signer cert expired
> > 2.5 years ago.
> >
> > How do you verify that based on the PDUs that you get
> > (PKCS#7 or CMS SignedData with RFC3161 timestamp, a chain of X.509v3
> > certs with CRLDistributionPoints in them).
>
> Sounds very much like the services provided by X/C/PAdES - so maybe not 
> as irrelevant as you may believe.

I'm in development and usually on a very tight resources budget,
so I'm usually going for the KISS principle, or the quote from
Antoine de Saint-Exupery "Perfection in Design is achived not
when there is nothing left to add, but when there is nothing
left to take away".

So my approach would certainly be
What _subset_ of rfc2630 + rfc3161 + rfc3280 do I need.
I will certainly not look for additional or more feature-rich
specifications to add to the list of requirements, and even
less so for additional specs from outside the IETF.

-Martin


--=_alternative 0034AD0CC1257937_=
Content-Type: text/html; charset="US-ASCII"

<font size=2 face="Arial">Martin,</font>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="Arial">Apparently, you have not read the RFCs for
a long time, since two of the references you mention are now obsolete:
rfc2630 + rfc3280</font>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="Arial">There exists an RFC which describes how to
form a signature that can be verified beyond the end of the validity of
the signer's certificate.</font>
<br><font size=2 face="Arial">Take a look at RFC 5126. There also exists
many ETSI Technical Specifications, but it is unfortunate that you already
mentioned <br>
that you will not look at them.</font>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="Arial">Denis</font>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">===================================================================================================</font>
<br>
<br><tt><font size=2>Peter Lipp wrote:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Martin Rex wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt; <br>
&gt; &gt; Scenario: you get some data and a PKCS#7 or CMS detached SignedData<br>
&gt; &gt; for it along with an rfc3161 timestamp from a trusted time stamping<br>
&gt; &gt; service. &nbsp;The PKCS#7 includes the entire certificate chain
of the<br>
&gt; &gt; signer. &nbsp;The timestamp is 3 years old and the signer cert
expired<br>
&gt; &gt; 2.5 years ago.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; How do you verify that based on the PDUs that you get<br>
&gt; &gt; (PKCS#7 or CMS SignedData with RFC3161 timestamp, a chain of
X.509v3<br>
&gt; &gt; certs with CRLDistributionPoints in them).<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Sounds very much like the services provided by X/C/PAdES - so maybe
not <br>
&gt; as irrelevant as you may believe.<br>
<br>
I'm in development and usually on a very tight resources budget,<br>
so I'm usually going for the KISS principle, or the quote from<br>
Antoine de Saint-Exupery &quot;Perfection in Design is achived not<br>
when there is nothing left to add, but when there is nothing<br>
left to take away&quot;.<br>
<br>
So my approach would certainly be<br>
What _subset_ of rfc2630 + rfc3161 + rfc3280 do I need.<br>
I will certainly not look for additional or more feature-rich<br>
specifications to add to the list of requirements, and even<br>
less so for additional specs from outside the IETF.<br>
<br>
-Martin<br>
</font></tt>
<br>
--=_alternative 0034AD0CC1257937_=--

From simon@josefsson.org  Fri Oct 28 03:25:58 2011
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Hi folks,

I'm implementing OCSP for GnuTLS and want to reach everyone interested
in testing the early preview code for this.  If you have experience with
OCSP before and has ideas on what poor OCSP interfaces to avoid, and
have some hints on what a good OCSP implementation should contain, that
will be tremendously useful.  For more details see:

http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.encryption.gpg.gnutls.devel/5564

Further, is anyone aware of OCSP test vectors and/or live OCSP test
servers?

Maybe it will even be ready before you guys push out OCSPv2. :-)

Thanks,
/Simon

From mrex@sap.com  Fri Oct 28 07:11:17 2011
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From: Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
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To: denis.pinkas@bull.net
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In-Reply-To: <OF6BD01E59.2DA17EB6-ONC1257937.003373FC-C1257937.0034D421@bull.net> from "denis.pinkas@bull.net" at Oct 28, 11 11:37:02 am
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denis.pinkas@bull.net wrote:
> 
> Apparently, you have not read the RFCs for a long time, since two of the 
> references you mention are now obsolete: rfc2630 + rfc3280

Actually, no, they aren't.  rfc0791 describes the core IPv4 protocol,
rfc0793 describes the core TCP for IPv4 protocol, rfc2630 describes
the core CMS protocol and rfc2246 describes the core TLS protocol.

What I was given was an implementation of PKCS#7 (rfc2315) and
what I needed was something that I can use with rfc3161 timestamps.

The other issue is: if you want to ship into productive installed bases
that are up to 10 years old, you really don't want to face them with
fancy new stuff, but rather be very conservative,  So what is really
relevant is described in the original documents, not in the newer
kitchen-sink ones.


> 
> There exists an RFC which describes how to form a signature that can be 
> verified beyond the end of the validity of the signer's certificate.
> Take a look at RFC 5126. There also exists many ETSI Technical 
> Specifications, but it is unfortunate that you already mentioned 
> that you will not look at them.

Compare size and comprehensibility of rfc3161 with rfc5126.

Unless you're on a research project with no timelines and unlimited
resources, it is pretty clear which of those is easier to implement
and fully (!!) test, and the difference in effort is more than a
magnitude.

-Martin

From paul.hoffman@vpnc.org  Fri Oct 28 07:15:36 2011
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On Oct 28, 2011, at 2:20 AM, Rob Stradling wrote:

> A few months ago I was investigating the roadmap for adding OCSP =
Stapling=20
> support to the nginx webserver.  One site operator chimed in with his =
opinion=20
> [1], which clearly doesn't favour "here is my cert and here is my =
freshest=20
> proof of validity".

It is quite believable that one site operator might not like the idea, =
yes. However, from his response, it is not clear that he understood your =
proposal. He said:

> So we pay like $100/200 for the SSL certificate, and then we pay again
> server and bandwidth fees to answer OSCP ?

That sounds like he thought that you were requiring him to do OCSP =
responding, not OCSP stapling. Call it "OCSP stapling" might have =
confused him as it has some folks in the IETF. A better term would be =
"validity proof stapling".

> When a webserver disables OCSP Stapling by default (or enables it by =
default=20
> but provides an option to disable it), what incentive does the site =
operator=20
> have to enable it (or to not disable it)?

If the PKIX community (whatever that is) moves from a "RP pulls validity =
info from CA" model to a "RP gets validity info from validated host" =
model, then the hosts will have an incentive. Until then, their =
incentive will remain as they are now, and so will the incentives for =
CAs. This thread is a discussion of how the model might change.

--Paul Hoffman


From mrex@sap.com  Fri Oct 28 07:35:32 2011
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From: Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
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To: rob.stradling@comodo.com (Rob Stradling)
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In-Reply-To: <201110281020.36403.rob.stradling@comodo.com> from "Rob Stradling" at Oct 28, 11 10:20:36 am
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Rob Stradling wrote:
> 
> I don't really get why use an high-performance web server to handle
> queries only saving money to certification authorities.
> So we pay like $100/200 for the SSL certificate, and then we pay again
> server and bandwidth fees to answer OSCP ?
> 
> Clients have time to wait OSCP answer from CA and in the other side,
> nginx server is already very busy so it is probably not a good idea to
> load it with bonus features."

That is based on a complete misunderstanding of the technology at hand.

The client will have to do the OCSP download to arbitrary OCSP servers
*during* the TLS handshake (i.e. stalling the server on the handhake),
and that is for unpredictable OCSP servers with no contractual
aggreements for connectivity and availability.

The TLS server, on the other hand, can perform OCSP retrieval for
his very own cert with an infrequent recurring asynchronous operation
(e.g. once every few hours), it is always exactly the same OCSP server,
the CA has a contractual obligation towards the Server cert purchaser
to provide this service, and the Server operater can select a suitable
CA with an OCSP service quality and connectivity that meets the servers
expectations.

In case that the asynchronous OCSP retrievel job on the Web Server fails,
it will *NOT* immediately result in TLS handshake failures -- instead,
the server can continue to send the previous OCSP response.  So
the whole system is much more fault tolerant and provides a support
window to fix technical problems with the OCSP several hours before
it will affect the availability of the TLS server.


Anyone with a clue about "high performance servers" should know that
having to perform under-the-cover communication with third-parties
*during* the handshake is a real performance killer and seriously
impairs the robustness (and therefore availability) of the service.


-Martin

From mrex@sap.com  Fri Oct 28 08:44:56 2011
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From: Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
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To: tomas@primekey.se (Tomas Gustavsson)
Date: Fri, 28 Oct 2011 17:44:47 +0200 (MEST)
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Tomas Gustavsson wrote:
> 
> Martin Rex wrote:
> > 
> > So my approach would certainly be
> > What _subset_ of rfc2630 + rfc3161 + rfc3280 do I need.
> > I will certainly not look for additional or more feature-rich
> > specifications to add to the list of requirements, and even
> > less so for additional specs from outside the IETF.
> 
> Just out of curiosity, is IETF doing any work related to long term
> signatures?

There is rfc3161.


>
> I do agree that the openness of standards from IETF, Oasis and some
> others are far superior to the semi-closed standards (ISO et al).

What it even more important: the effort that is necessary to fix, change
or extend an existing protocol.  What certainly helps is if you've been
active before in the SDO that is relevant for the protocols you're using.

The big plus of the IETF is that it is open, there is no formal membership,
public discussion archives, public mailing lists, and once you're used
to how the IETF works, many things _can_ be done through remote
participation.


> 
> Regarding S/MIME for secure email I consider that pretty much a dead
> fish as well. That area needs substantial overhaul, on several fronts,
> in order to be usable outside very limited communities.
> If your goal is to re-invent secure email, good luck :-)

The situation with S/Mime is really somewhat strange.
>From the origin of its name (S/Mime and CMS) it claims to be
protection at the message transport level, and rather than
for "online" communication, it should be usable for
offline (non-connected) communication.   Archiving Email is
also far form uncommon, so it should be suitable for
non-volatile data as well.

Original PGP does this extremely well, and provides exactly
what is necessary: data origin authentication, data integrity
protection and optionally data confidentially protection --
and it works just fine for Email archives.

The X.509 stuff, as it turns out, is still entangled and polluted with
concepts like "non-repudiation", "legally binding expression of intent"
"policy", "authority".  And while there might be areas where these
attributes matter, _EMail_transport_ is definitely all the wrong place
for it.


> 
> For other purposes (I don't consider email a good case for long term
> signatures) I'd still look around, also outside IETF, for something
> standardised. Especially if on a tight budget since reusing already done
> work usually saves me time. Home-grown stuff has a tendency to get back
> to bite you in the long run.

Secure EMail _without_ longterm data origin authentication and longterm data
integrity protection and longterm data confidentiality protection
is seriously broken and pretty useless.

But if you're looking for longterm archival of "legally binding
expressions of intent" (in the non-repudiation sense), or for the
purpose of accounting/bookkeeping, then that is a completely different
issue.  For such purposes, legislative requirements may become
relevant for your solution, and you may have to turn to the kitchen sink
lobbyists and protocol specs from some other SDOs.


-Martin

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Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com> writes:

>The situation with S/Mime is really somewhat strange. From the origin of its
>name (S/Mime and CMS) it claims to be protection at the message transport
>level, and rather than for "online" communication, it should be usable for
>offline (non-connected) communication.

While there's probably some major user of encrypted email hiding somewhere 
(governments and multinationals who can define their own reality, I'd guess), 
pretty much all the commercial usage of S/MIME (as CMS) I've ever seen has 
been for messaging other than encrypted email.  There are tens or even 
hundreds of GB of data bouncing around the world every day as CMS-encrypted 
store-and-forward messaging (FTP, HTTP, email, hand-carried on SD cards, you 
name it), and that's only the small subset that I know of.

>Original PGP does this extremely well, and provides exactly what is
>necessary: data origin authentication, data integrity protection and
>optionally data confidentially protection -- and it works just fine for Email
>archives.

Yup.  The main reason why CMS gets used in place of PGP is because there's
some perception at the management level that you need to involve certificates
whenever you do anything with security.  I've rarely seen any situations where
this actually increases security, but it always hugely increases complexity
and cost.

(Not playing the PGP advocate here, I'd use CMS myself, just pointing out some
real-world observations).

Peter.

From SChokhani@cygnacom.com  Fri Oct 28 09:13:34 2011
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From: Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>
To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>, "mrex@sap.com" <mrex@sap.com>
Date: Fri, 28 Oct 2011 12:13:30 -0400
Thread-Topic: [pkix] Fwd: New Version Notification
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Fwd: New Version Notification
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Some of us use encrypted e-mail S/MIME extensively.

-----Original Message-----
From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Pet=
er Gutmann
Sent: Friday, October 28, 2011 12:10 PM
To: mrex@sap.com
Cc: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] Fwd: New Version Notification

Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com> writes:

>The situation with S/Mime is really somewhat strange. From the origin of i=
ts
>name (S/Mime and CMS) it claims to be protection at the message transport
>level, and rather than for "online" communication, it should be usable for
>offline (non-connected) communication.

While there's probably some major user of encrypted email hiding somewhere=
=20
(governments and multinationals who can define their own reality, I'd guess=
),=20
pretty much all the commercial usage of S/MIME (as CMS) I've ever seen has=
=20
been for messaging other than encrypted email.  There are tens or even=20
hundreds of GB of data bouncing around the world every day as CMS-encrypted=
=20
store-and-forward messaging (FTP, HTTP, email, hand-carried on SD cards, yo=
u=20
name it), and that's only the small subset that I know of.

>Original PGP does this extremely well, and provides exactly what is
>necessary: data origin authentication, data integrity protection and
>optionally data confidentially protection -- and it works just fine for Em=
ail
>archives.

Yup.  The main reason why CMS gets used in place of PGP is because there's
some perception at the management level that you need to involve certificat=
es
whenever you do anything with security.  I've rarely seen any situations wh=
ere
this actually increases security, but it always hugely increases complexity
and cost.

(Not playing the PGP advocate here, I'd use CMS myself, just pointing out s=
ome
real-world observations).

Peter.
_______________________________________________
pkix mailing list
pkix@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix

From kyanha@kyanha.net  Fri Oct 28 09:14:48 2011
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Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
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On Wed, Oct 26, 2011 at 2:02 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com> wr=
ote:
> Thinking laterally on this issue.
> The issue here seems to come up with the problem that OCSP does not have =
a
> proper response code for 'does not exist',

I have no problem at all with improving OCSP, as a separate item.  I
really want to improve it, actually.  The problem is that by
definition, any OCSP responder which can respond with a "does not
exist" will be required to respond in that manner for any and every
certificate serial number which is not listed on the CRL.  CRL cannot
meaningfully feed such a responder.

=A0Now let us imagine for a moment
> that we borrow from the prior art in DNSSEC and have an NSEC3 type
> capability that provides a status for the 'gaps' between certificates.
> Wouldn't this meet all the essential use cases?
> The gaps could be specified either as gaps between certificate serial
> numbers or gaps between cert hashes. I would like to see an OCSP extensio=
n
> to allow the hash of the cert to be specified in any case.
> So the old style OCSP token is (essentially)
> =A0 =A0Sign (key, {=A0{status-value, issuer, serial, {extensions}} } )
> I would like to change that for certs that exist to:
> =A0 =A0Sign (key, {=A0{status-value, issuer, serial, {certhash, extension=
s}} } )
> And if there is a query for a cert that does not exist and the request
> indicates that you can process it, you would get back:
> =A0 =A0Sign (key, {=A0{non-existent, issuer, dummy-serial, {{start-indica=
tor,
> end-indicator}, extensions}} } )

How about,

Sign(key, { {status-value, issuer, serial, { certhash,
extended-status-value, extensions } } })

and

Sign(key, { { status-value REVOKED, issuer, serial, {certhash,
extended-status-value NeverIssued, otherextensions } } })

-Kyle H

From peter.sylvester@gmail.com  Thu Oct 27 12:59:36 2011
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Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
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On 10/27/2011 06:44 PM, Trevor Freeman wrote:
>
> *I agree you need a new choice hence v2 because todays good actually means not revoked.*
>
you just can add an extension that says "when I said revoked, it really means more, it doesn't even 
exist"
>
> **
>
> **
>
> *The OSCP responder does not need access to the CA, just a list or set of lists for all the issued 
> certificates.*
>
It needs some information that can be used to verify if a cert had been issued.
a strong one way function (in oder to avoid the word hash) towards that info to see
whether a cert is valid for example.


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    On 10/27/2011 06:44 PM, Trevor Freeman wrote:
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        <p class="MsoNormal"><b style=""><span style="font-size: 11pt;
              font-family: &quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;
              color: rgb(79, 98, 40);">I agree you need a new choice
              hence v2 because todays good actually means not revoked.</span></b></p>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    you just can add an extension that says "when I said revoked, it
    really means more, it doesn't even exist"<br>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:E545B914D50B2A4B994F198378B1525D427367E2@DF-M14-12.exchange.corp.microsoft.com"
      type="cite">
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              New Roman&quot;;color:#4F6228"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
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              style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times
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              style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times
              New Roman&quot;;color:#4F6228">The OSCP responder does not
              need access to the CA, just a list or set of lists for all
              the issued certificates.</span></b><br>
        </p>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    It needs some information that can be used to verify if a cert had
    been issued.<br>
    a strong one way function (in oder to avoid the word hash) towards
    that info to see<br>
    whether a cert is valid for example. <br>
    <br>
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--------------000309050609090406060505--

From mattking1@gmail.com  Fri Oct 28 09:53:44 2011
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Cc: matt.tebo@pgs.protiviti.com, pkix-chairs@tools.ietf.org, wendy.brown@pgs.protiviti.com
Subject: [pkix] Revised Submission: claimSigning EKU draft for PKIX WG Consideration
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Dear PKIX Working Group

I have posted an updated draft document describing the claimSigning
EKU.  It is titled =93draft-king-pkix-claimsigning-extn-02.txt=94
(abstract below) and it can be found at the following link for your
review:

http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-king-pkix-claimsigning-extn/?include_=
text=3D1

This revised draft replaces "draft-king-pkix-claimsigning-extn-01.txt".

I ask that the attached draft be considered as a new work item for
this group.  Thank you in advance for your time.

Matt
--
Matt King
Protiviti Inc.
Government Services
Matthew.King@pgs.protiviti.com
mattking1@gmail.com
410-271-5624 (Mobile)

On Wed, May 25, 2011 at 3:36 PM, Matt King <mattking1@gmail.com> wrote:
> Dear PKIX Working Group
>
> I have posted an updated draft document describing the claimSigning EKU. =
=A0It is
> titled =93draft-king-pkix-claimsigning-extn-01.txt=94 (abstract below) an=
d
> it can be found at the following link for your review:
>
> http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-king-pkix-claimsigning-extn/?includ=
e_text=3D1
>
> This revised draft replaces both the initial draft
> "draft-king-pkix-claimsigning-extn-00.txt"
> and "draft-patterson-pkix-attribute-signing-eku". =A0The authors of both
> drafts have
> collaborated and addressed all comments received to date and are
> moving forward with this single submission.
>
> I ask that the attached draft be considered as a new work item for
> this group. =A0Thank you in advance for your time.
>
> Matt
> --
> Matt King
> Protiviti Inc.
> Government Services
> Matthew.King@pgs.protiviti.com
> mattking1@gmail.com
> 410-271-5624=A0(Mobile)
>
>
> Abstract
>
> =A0 This memo specifies an Extended Key Usage (EKU) X.509 certificate
> =A0 extension which indicates that the certificate holder is authorized
> =A0 to sign security tokens to assert claims, or attributes, about a
> =A0 principal.
>
> =A0 When an owner of a certificate that asserts the claimSigning EKU
> =A0 signs a claim, the owner is asserting that a statement about the
> =A0 principal is true. For example, a IdP secure token service (STS)
> =A0 would use an X.509 certificate containing the claimSigning EKU to
> =A0 sign SAML assertions containing an identifier and attributes about a
> =A0 user. This additional EKU value would further allow the
> =A0 differentiation of certificates used to identify a particular server
> =A0 from those used by the server to sign identity or attribute claims.
>
>
>
>
> On Fri, Apr 22, 2011 at 1:51 PM, Matt King <mattking1@gmail.com> wrote:
>> Dear PKIX Working Group
>>
>> I have posted an draft document describing a claimSigning EKU. =A0It is
>> titled =93draft-king-pkix-claimsigning-extn-00.txt=94 (abstract below) a=
nd
>> it can be found at the following link for your review:
>>
>> http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-king-pkix-claimsigning-extn/?inclu=
de_text=3D1
>>
>> I ask that the attached draft be considered as a new work item for
>> this group. =A0Thank you in advance for your time.
>>
>> Abstract
>>
>> =A0 This memo specifies an Extended Key Usage (EKU) X.509 certificate
>> =A0 extension which indicates that the certificate holder is authorized
>> =A0 to sign security tokens to assert claims, or attributes, about a
>> =A0 principal.
>>
>> =A0 When an owner of a certificate that asserts the claimSigning EKU
>> =A0 signs a claim, the owner is asserting that a statement about the
>> =A0 principal is true. For example, a IdP secure token service (STS)
>> =A0 would use an X.509 certificate containing the claimSigning EKU to
>> =A0 sign SAML assertions containing an identifier and attributes about a
>> =A0 user.
>>
>>
>> --
>> Matt King
>> Protiviti
>> Government Services
>> Matthew.King@pgs.protiviti.com
>> mattking1@gmail.com
>> 410-271-5624=A0(Mobile)
>>
>
>
>
> --
> Matt King
> mattking1@gmail.com
> 410-271-5624=A0(Mobile)
>



--=20
Matt King
mattking1@gmail.com
410-271-5624 (Mobile)

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Applications already disable links and images to minimize tracking -
disabling OCSP queries would seem to fall into the same beaconing
category and shouldn't require the user to take additional action beyond
what already exists.



-----Original Message-----
From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
David A. Cooper
Sent: Thursday, October 27, 2011 4:51 PM
To: mrex@sap.com
Cc: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version

Please read Walter's message again:

On 10/27/2011 03:49 PM, Walter.Goulet@rsa.com wrote:=20

	Sites which go the extra mile to protect user privacy by
supporting OCSP stapling should deserve an additional indicator in the
browser to indicate to users that such additional protections are taking
place.=20
=09


How can this be interpreted as red-flagging those sites that do not
support OCSP stapling?  The lack of a red-flag warning is not an
"additional indicator".

I don't think the idea of red-flagging sites is any better.  Almost no
users would understand the privacy warning, and it still doesn't address
the question of why should this potential privacy problem be called out
for special user attention when there are so many worse privacy
violations that are being perpetrated.

On 10/27/2011 04:38 PM, Martin Rex wrote:=20

	David A. Cooper wrote:

	=09
		So, would users be presented with an indicator that the
site
		"protects user privacy" if the site supports OCSP
stapling, even if
		the site violated the user's privacy in every other way
possible

=09
	No, the idea is that this becomes the "expected behaviour", and
that
	those _not_ doing it get red-flagged, red-crossed, or earn
themselves
	a warning popup with a message:
=09
	  Privacy alert:
	  this site did not provide a fresh proof for the validity of
his
	  server certificate.  It is suggested that you poll the CAs
	  OCSP responder indicated in the server certificate, but that
	  OCSP responder may be tracking that an when you're accessing
this
	  site -- so your consent for making that OCSP request is
necessary.
=09
	-Martin
	.
=09



From kent@bbn.com  Sun Oct 30 14:21:12 2011
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At 9:37 AM +0300 10/28/11, Tomas Gustavsson wrote:
>On 10/28/2011 03:24 AM, Martin Rex wrote:
>>  Peter Lipp wrote:
>>>
>>>  Martin Rex wrote:
>>>>
>>>>  Scenario: you get some data and a PKCS#7 or CMS detached SignedData
>>>>  for it along with an rfc3161 timestamp from a trusted time stamping
>>>>  service.  The PKCS#7 includes the entire certificate chain of the
>>>>  signer.  The timestamp is 3 years old and the signer cert expired
>>>>  2.5 years ago.
>>>>
>>>>  How do you verify that based on the PDUs that you get
>>>>  (PKCS#7 or CMS SignedData with RFC3161 timestamp, a chain of X.509v3
>>>>  certs with CRLDistributionPoints in them).
>>>
>>>  Sounds very much like the services provided by X/C/PAdES - so maybe not
>>>  as irrelevant as you may believe.
>>
>>  I'm in development and usually on a very tight resources budget,
>>  so I'm usually going for the KISS principle, or the quote from
>>  Antoine de Saint-Exupery "Perfection in Design is achived not
>>  when there is nothing left to add, but when there is nothing
>>  left to take away".
>>
>>  So my approach would certainly be
>>  What _subset_ of rfc2630 + rfc3161 + rfc3280 do I need.
>>  I will certainly not look for additional or more feature-rich
>>  specifications to add to the list of requirements, and even
>>  less so for additional specs from outside the IETF.
>
>Just out of curiosity, is IETF doing any work related to long term
>signatures?

see the (now closed) LTANS WG.

Steve

From rob.stradling@comodo.com  Mon Oct 31 06:20:50 2011
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On Friday 28 Oct 2011 15:15:21 Paul Hoffman wrote:
> On Oct 28, 2011, at 2:20 AM, Rob Stradling wrote:
> > A few months ago I was investigating the roadmap for adding OCSP Stapling
> > support to the nginx webserver.  One site operator chimed in with his
> > opinion [1], which clearly doesn't favour "here is my cert and here is
> > my freshest proof of validity".
> 
> It is quite believable that one site operator might not like the idea, yes.
> However, from his response, it is not clear that he understood your
> proposal.

Good point.  I did assume that he knew what I was talking about.

> He said:
> > So we pay like $100/200 for the SSL certificate, and then we pay again
> > server and bandwidth fees to answer OSCP ?
> 
> That sounds like he thought that you were requiring him to do OCSP
> responding, not OCSP stapling.

I took "pay...bandwidth fees to answer OCSP" to be referring to the extra 
~1-2K he would need to serve for each TLS handshake that contains a stapled 
OCSP Response.

I understood his complaint to be: Clients can fetch this data from the CA, so 
why should he be required to serve it?  The CA already received money for the 
cert, so the CA should foot the bill for serving the revocation information.
(IMHO, this complaint is not entirely unreasonable).

> Call it "OCSP stapling" might have confused him as it has some folks in the
> IETF. A better term would be "validity proof stapling".
> 
> > When a webserver disables OCSP Stapling by default (or enables it by
> > default but provides an option to disable it), what incentive does the
> > site operator have to enable it (or to not disable it)?
> 
> If the PKIX community (whatever that is) moves from a "RP pulls validity
> info from CA" model to a "RP gets validity info from validated host"
> model, then the hosts will have an incentive. Until then, their incentive
> will remain as they are now, and so will the incentives for CAs. This
> thread is a discussion of how the model might change.
> 
> --Paul Hoffman

Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online

From mmyers@fastq.com  Mon Oct 31 06:33:57 2011
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All,

On this subject, note also RFC 4806, where Haanes Tschofenig and I  
designed and documented the same technique for IKEv2.

http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4806

The limited scale of its adoption is likely due to the fact that IKE  
uses UDP and consequently there exists fragmentation issues.

Mike

From mrex@sap.com  Mon Oct 31 10:36:01 2011
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Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version
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Rob Stradling wrote:
> 
> > He said:
> > > So we pay like $100/200 for the SSL certificate, and then we pay again
> > > server and bandwidth fees to answer OSCP ?
> > 
> > That sounds like he thought that you were requiring him to do OCSP
> > responding, not OCSP stapling.
> 
> I took "pay...bandwidth fees to answer OCSP" to be referring to the extra 
> ~1-2K he would need to serve for each TLS handshake that contains a stapled 
> OCSP Response.
> 
> I understood his complaint to be: Clients can fetch this data from the CA,
> so why should he be required to serve it?  The CA already received money
> for the cert, so the CA should foot the bill for serving the revocation
> information. (IMHO, this complaint is not entirely unreasonable).


I checked the current proposal for an TLS extension for stapling
multiple OCSP responses:
  http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-pettersen-tls-ext-multiple-ocsp-02

and single-OCSP response:
  http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6066#section-8

and I consider both pretty disappointing and useless for the purpose
of more efficient OCSP processing.

The idea to require the server stalling the TLS handshake to obtain an OCSP
response from some arbitrary client-specified OCSP responder with
some arbitrary OCSP request attributes is IMHO a very bad idea for
the general use case; I would never want my servers to perform such
requests and can understand other server operaters who do not want
this either.


A generally useful TLS extension for OCSP response stapling should be a 
"take it or leave it approach", i.e.  the server provides OCSP stapling
for exactly the (first) OCSP responder in the OCSP AIA resources of the
certificate(s) of the server certificate chain and both server and client
can cache these responses for a few hours, and the client can indicate
whether it still has cached OCSP-responses available and for which
server certificate chain, which would obviate the sending of the
stapled OCSP responses with each and every handshake (such as
abbreviated TLS handshakes, aka session resumes) and still work
successfully/transparently for credentials updates on the server.


-Martin

From paul.hoffman@vpnc.org  Mon Oct 31 10:53:46 2011
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Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version
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On Oct 31, 2011, at 10:35 AM, Martin Rex wrote:

> A generally useful TLS extension for OCSP response stapling should be =
a=20
> "take it or leave it approach", i.e.  the server provides OCSP =
stapling
> for exactly the (first) OCSP responder in the OCSP AIA resources of =
the
> certificate(s) of the server certificate chain and both server and =
client
> can cache these responses for a few hours, and the client can indicate
> whether it still has cached OCSP-responses available and for which
> server certificate chain, which would obviate the sending of the
> stapled OCSP responses with each and every handshake (such as
> abbreviated TLS handshakes, aka session resumes) and still work
> successfully/transparently for credentials updates on the server.

s/a few hours/as long as they want/, but yes. The purpose of stapling is =
not to change who does OCSP, but to make validation more sane for RPs. =
If an RP would have cached its validation effort for a few hours, then =
the server doesn't need to be any faster than that.

--Paul Hoffman

