
From rob.stradling@comodo.com  Tue Nov  1 04:41:16 2011
Return-Path: <rob.stradling@comodo.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4A0C021F8B86 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue,  1 Nov 2011 04:41:16 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id s3izHFMY-2zJ for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue,  1 Nov 2011 04:41:15 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mmmail1.mcr.colo.comodoca.net (mdfw.comodoca.net [91.209.196.68]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5F88821F8C6A for <pkix@ietf.org>; Tue,  1 Nov 2011 04:41:13 -0700 (PDT)
Received: (qmail 27038 invoked from network); 1 Nov 2011 11:41:11 -0000
Received: from ian.bd.office.comodo.net (HELO ian.brad.office.comodo.net) (192.168.0.201) by mail.colo.comodoca.net with ESMTPS (DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA encrypted); 1 Nov 2011 11:41:11 -0000
Received: (qmail 24584 invoked by uid 1000); 1 Nov 2011 11:41:11 -0000
Received: from nigel.brad.office.comodo.net (HELO nigel.localnet) (192.168.0.58) by ian.brad.office.comodo.net (qpsmtpd/0.40) with (AES256-SHA encrypted) ESMTPS; Tue, 01 Nov 2011 11:41:11 +0000
From: Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>
To: mrex@sap.com
Date: Tue, 1 Nov 2011 11:41:10 +0000
User-Agent: KMail/1.13.7 (Linux/2.6.39-gentoo-r3; KDE/4.6.5; i686; ; )
References: <201110311735.p9VHZmSi011560@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp>
In-Reply-To: <201110311735.p9VHZmSi011560@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: Text/Plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Message-Id: <201111011141.10411.rob.stradling@comodo.com>
Cc: pkix@ietf.org, paul.hoffman@vpnc.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 01 Nov 2011 11:41:16 -0000

On Monday 31 Oct 2011 17:35:48 Martin Rex wrote:
<snip>
> ...and the client can indicate whether it still has cached OCSP-responses
> available and for which server certificate chain, which would obviate the
> sending of the stapled OCSP responses with each and every handshake (such as
> abbreviated TLS handshakes, aka session resumes) and still work
> successfully/transparently for credentials updates on the server.

Do you think the best way to accomplish this would be to extend draft-ietf-
tls-cached-info ?

> -Martin

Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online

From tmiller@mitre.org  Tue Nov  1 05:18:18 2011
Return-Path: <tmiller@mitre.org>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4704D11E81DB for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue,  1 Nov 2011 05:18:18 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 8ORSsVnzrWRH for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue,  1 Nov 2011 05:18:17 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (smtpksrv1.mitre.org [198.49.146.77]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id CA16E11E81C3 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Tue,  1 Nov 2011 05:18:17 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by localhost (Postfix) with SMTP id 2C14F21B17A2; Tue,  1 Nov 2011 08:18:17 -0400 (EDT)
Received: from IMCCAS04.MITRE.ORG (imccas04.mitre.org [129.83.29.81]) by smtpksrv1.mitre.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2591C21B17A0; Tue,  1 Nov 2011 08:18:17 -0400 (EDT)
Received: from IMCMBX01.MITRE.ORG ([169.254.1.57]) by IMCCAS04.MITRE.ORG ([129.83.29.81]) with mapi id 14.01.0339.001; Tue, 1 Nov 2011 08:18:16 -0400
From: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
To: Kyle Hamilton <kyanha@kyanha.net>, Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
Thread-Index: AQHMlYy53o6yhaO2SES0DD1Qj9f8npWX5O4A
Date: Tue, 1 Nov 2011 12:18:16 +0000
Message-ID: <CAD54D18.1E57%tmiller@mitre.org>
In-Reply-To: <CADgtLZ7Y0T6drdkc0ZoRQc85MwRbkcSPvgGHgrgkTEaLWvcDcA@mail.gmail.com>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
user-agent: Microsoft-MacOutlook/14.13.0.110805
x-originating-ip: [172.31.61.3]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-ID: <324915BD1BF66647A0DA267ACE08AD43@imc.mitre.org>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Cc: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 01 Nov 2011 12:18:18 -0000

On 10/28/11 11:14 AM, "Kyle Hamilton" <kyanha@kyanha.net> wrote:

>On Wed, Oct 26, 2011 at 2:02 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
>wrote:
>> Thinking laterally on this issue.
>> The issue here seems to come up with the problem that OCSP does not
>>have a
>> proper response code for 'does not exist',
>
>I have no problem at all with improving OCSP, as a separate item.  I
>really want to improve it, actually.  The problem is that by
>definition, any OCSP responder which can respond with a "does not
>exist" will be required to respond in that manner for any and every
>certificate serial number which is not listed on the CRL.  CRL cannot
>meaningfully feed such a responder.

Since OCSP services can be delegated, the responder may not have access to
the CA database.  A responder without access to the CA database can *only*
respond with 'revoked' or 'good.'  Technically the 'good' answer is 'I
don't know otherwise' because it represents the absence of data.

Don't presume that a responder is synonymous with a CA.  There are
compelling reasons to divorce these services, and real PKIs do so in
practice.

-- T


From hallam@gmail.com  Tue Nov  1 11:03:06 2011
Return-Path: <hallam@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 474E71F0C6F for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue,  1 Nov 2011 11:03:06 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -3.442
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.442 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.156,  BAYES_00=-2.599, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id IlmvwWvWpWJp for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue,  1 Nov 2011 11:03:05 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-qy0-f172.google.com (mail-qy0-f172.google.com [209.85.216.172]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 791C41F0C4D for <pkix@ietf.org>; Tue,  1 Nov 2011 11:03:05 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by qyk34 with SMTP id 34so4914604qyk.10 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Tue, 01 Nov 2011 11:01:59 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=JGOxVZWcav10LRN2z+N42oUG1b7a/Z9TFK27suDRfI8=; b=xRg45u5WAbmYr2krXl+WSTbZgVF/7DkBe5G3hEMiuuaAL1fIvP21dZE/149Q19ZwA9 9fJe1JNtRqd9/ceIQjCctAp1wTL35Jy/SddufNEM8u3brh3z2Gci0JjNL9UeefDvAXQm mL0moH/LVXvtsYzKV52Y33dP6L62g24F0oWXg=
MIME-Version: 1.0
Received: by 10.182.49.1 with SMTP id q1mr119928obn.48.1320170519510; Tue, 01 Nov 2011 11:01:59 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by 10.182.42.99 with HTTP; Tue, 1 Nov 2011 11:01:59 -0700 (PDT)
In-Reply-To: <CAD54D18.1E57%tmiller@mitre.org>
References: <CADgtLZ7Y0T6drdkc0ZoRQc85MwRbkcSPvgGHgrgkTEaLWvcDcA@mail.gmail.com> <CAD54D18.1E57%tmiller@mitre.org>
Date: Tue, 1 Nov 2011 14:01:59 -0400
Message-ID: <CAMm+LwjSBmHrptB-fmM=SSj0T=TMQwKsUPsiN7vSLSDp8O0ABQ@mail.gmail.com>
From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
To: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=f46d0447850bdbbe3a04b0b026c5
Cc: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 01 Nov 2011 18:03:06 -0000

--f46d0447850bdbbe3a04b0b026c5
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1

On Tue, Nov 1, 2011 at 8:18 AM, Miller, Timothy J. <tmiller@mitre.org>wrote:

> On 10/28/11 11:14 AM, "Kyle Hamilton" <kyanha@kyanha.net> wrote:
>
> >On Wed, Oct 26, 2011 at 2:02 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
> >wrote:
> >> Thinking laterally on this issue.
> >> The issue here seems to come up with the problem that OCSP does not
> >>have a
> >> proper response code for 'does not exist',
> >
> >I have no problem at all with improving OCSP, as a separate item.  I
> >really want to improve it, actually.  The problem is that by
> >definition, any OCSP responder which can respond with a "does not
> >exist" will be required to respond in that manner for any and every
> >certificate serial number which is not listed on the CRL.  CRL cannot
> >meaningfully feed such a responder.
>
> Since OCSP services can be delegated, the responder may not have access to
> the CA database.  A responder without access to the CA database can *only*
> respond with 'revoked' or 'good.'  Technically the 'good' answer is 'I
> don't know otherwise' because it represents the absence of data.
>
> Don't presume that a responder is synonymous with a CA.  There are
> compelling reasons to divorce these services, and real PKIs do so in
> practice


Such as?

People advanced this claim when OCSP was being developed. I have never seen
any particularly good argument as to why the Valicert model of doing things
was better than having the CA do the work. They certainly lost the argument
in the market.

Allowing a random third party to make use of the OCSP protocol to publish
whatever information they might be able to provide is unobjectionable.

Requiring that the protocol be *only* capable of supporting the
capabilities of such a third party responder is nonsense on stilts. It was
bogus then and it is bogus now.


If the OCSP responder knows that a certificate should not exist it should
be able to say so. Responding 'not invalid' for not revoked and does not
exist is no longer acceptable.

-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

--f46d0447850bdbbe3a04b0b026c5
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue, Nov 1, 2011 at 8:18 AM, Miller, =
Timothy J. <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:tmiller@mitre.org">tmill=
er@mitre.org</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" sty=
le=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
<div class=3D"im">On 10/28/11 11:14 AM, &quot;Kyle Hamilton&quot; &lt;<a hr=
ef=3D"mailto:kyanha@kyanha.net">kyanha@kyanha.net</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
<br>
&gt;On Wed, Oct 26, 2011 at 2:02 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker &lt;<a href=3D"ma=
ilto:hallam@gmail.com">hallam@gmail.com</a>&gt;<br>
&gt;wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt; Thinking laterally on this issue.<br>
&gt;&gt; The issue here seems to come up with the problem that OCSP does no=
t<br>
&gt;&gt;have a<br>
&gt;&gt; proper response code for &#39;does not exist&#39;,<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;I have no problem at all with improving OCSP, as a separate item. =A0I<=
br>
&gt;really want to improve it, actually. =A0The problem is that by<br>
&gt;definition, any OCSP responder which can respond with a &quot;does not<=
br>
&gt;exist&quot; will be required to respond in that manner for any and ever=
y<br>
&gt;certificate serial number which is not listed on the CRL. =A0CRL cannot=
<br>
&gt;meaningfully feed such a responder.<br>
<br>
</div>Since OCSP services can be delegated, the responder may not have acce=
ss to<br>
the CA database. =A0A responder without access to the CA database can *only=
*<br>
respond with &#39;revoked&#39; or &#39;good.&#39; =A0Technically the &#39;g=
ood&#39; answer is &#39;I<br>
don&#39;t know otherwise&#39; because it represents the absence of data.<br=
>
<br>
Don&#39;t presume that a responder is synonymous with a CA. =A0There are<br=
>
compelling reasons to divorce these services, and real PKIs do so in<br>
practice</blockquote><div><br></div><div>Such as?=A0</div><div><br></div><d=
iv>People advanced this claim when OCSP was being developed. I have never s=
een any particularly good argument as to why the Valicert model of doing th=
ings was better than having the CA do the work. They certainly lost the arg=
ument in the market.</div>
<div><br></div><div>Allowing a random third party to make use of the OCSP p=
rotocol to publish whatever information they might be able to provide is un=
objectionable.</div><div><br></div><div>Requiring that the protocol be *onl=
y* capable of supporting the capabilities of such a third party responder i=
s nonsense on stilts. It was bogus then and it is bogus now.</div>
<div><br></div></div><div><br></div><div>If the OCSP responder knows that a=
 certificate should not exist it should be able to say so. Responding &#39;=
not invalid&#39; for not revoked and does not exist is no longer acceptable=
.</div>
<div><br></div>-- <br>Website: <a href=3D"http://hallambaker.com/">http://h=
allambaker.com/</a><br><br>

--f46d0447850bdbbe3a04b0b026c5--

From tmiller@mitre.org  Tue Nov  1 13:26:51 2011
Return-Path: <tmiller@mitre.org>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 40A3811E8193 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue,  1 Nov 2011 13:26:51 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id BBiUmav8rS29 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue,  1 Nov 2011 13:26:49 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (smtpksrv1.mitre.org [198.49.146.77]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C520111E808C for <pkix@ietf.org>; Tue,  1 Nov 2011 13:26:49 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by localhost (Postfix) with SMTP id 7CE5421B078E; Tue,  1 Nov 2011 16:24:14 -0400 (EDT)
Received: from IMCCAS03.MITRE.ORG (imccas03.mitre.org [129.83.29.80]) by smtpksrv1.mitre.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 769E621B0676; Tue,  1 Nov 2011 16:24:14 -0400 (EDT)
Received: from IMCMBX01.MITRE.ORG ([169.254.1.57]) by IMCCAS03.MITRE.ORG ([129.83.29.80]) with mapi id 14.01.0339.001; Tue, 1 Nov 2011 16:24:14 -0400
From: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
To: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
Thread-Index: AQHMlYy53o6yhaO2SES0DD1Qj9f8npWX5O4AgACzuYD//9PoAA==
Date: Tue, 1 Nov 2011 20:24:14 +0000
Message-ID: <CAD5BD5A.1EC7%tmiller@mitre.org>
In-Reply-To: <CAMm+LwjSBmHrptB-fmM=SSj0T=TMQwKsUPsiN7vSLSDp8O0ABQ@mail.gmail.com>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
user-agent: Microsoft-MacOutlook/14.13.0.110805
x-originating-ip: [172.31.0.74]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-ID: <C47FFEC2B8369E4DB377A6537F9A9D06@imc.mitre.org>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Cc: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 01 Nov 2011 20:26:51 -0000

On 11/1/11 1:01 PM, "Phillip Hallam-Baker" <hallam@gmail.com> wrote:

>Don't presume that a responder is synonymous with a CA.  There are
>compelling reasons to divorce these services, and real PKIs do so in
>practice

>Such as?

Such as limiting untrusted, unverified entities from accessing services on
component where critical key material and critical services are kept.  We
call this "risk mitigation."

>People advanced this claim when OCSP was being developed. I have never
>seen any particularly good argument as to why the Valicert model of doing
>things was better than having the CA do the work. They certainly lost the
>argument in the market.

The largest PKI on the planet operates this way, and no fewer than two
companies have sufficient business that they continue to offer delegated
OCSP service software and appliances.  I find your definition of "lost"
rather strange.

>Requiring that the protocol be *only* capable of supporting the
>capabilities of such a third party responder is nonsense on stilts. It
>was bogus then and it is bogus now.

Behavior of OCSP services using any of the trust models must be
consistent, else client responses will not be consistent and system
failures will result.

>If the OCSP responder knows that a certificate should not exist it should
>be able to say so. Responding 'not invalid' for not revoked and does not
>exist is no longer acceptable.

If the OCSP specification permits 'does not exist' (DNE) then the behavior
of Direct and Delegated trust responders are inconsistent with the
behavior of CA-signed responders; they *cannot* respond with DNE, and a
response of 'unknown' in that case is likewise improper.  What behavior
would you expect from a client in this case?

-- T


From kyanha@kyanha.net  Tue Nov  1 15:20:57 2011
Return-Path: <kyanha@kyanha.net>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 06B8411E80BE for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue,  1 Nov 2011 15:20:57 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -0.948
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.948 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.324, BAYES_00=-2.599, FM_FORGED_GMAIL=0.622, J_CHICKENPOX_45=0.6, MIME_BASE64_TEXT=1.753, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id rvn3EC+tVlRt for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue,  1 Nov 2011 15:20:56 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-yw0-f44.google.com (mail-yw0-f44.google.com [209.85.213.44]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 605EF11E80AB for <pkix@ietf.org>; Tue,  1 Nov 2011 15:20:56 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by ywt2 with SMTP id 2so8940100ywt.31 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Tue, 01 Nov 2011 15:20:55 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by 10.151.3.13 with SMTP id f13mr2873895ybi.3.1320186055711; Tue, 01 Nov 2011 15:20:55 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from penango (c-67-188-178-93.hsd1.ca.comcast.net. [67.188.178.93]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPS id j13sm951776ani.19.2011.11.01.15.20.53 (version=SSLv3 cipher=OTHER); Tue, 01 Nov 2011 15:20:54 -0700 (PDT)
From: "Kyle Hamilton" <kyanha@kyanha.net>
To: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
Date: Tue, 1 Nov 2011 15:20:43 -0700 (Pacific Daylight Time)
Message-ID: <guhgomblrhy0lpcbljjezwJv4X.penango@mail.gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <CAMm+Lwjc=M7h2mTN1AhHPH0LQGO+oN5JSFSG6my5ud5yJezXMA@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAMm+Lwjc=M7h2mTN1AhHPH0LQGO+oN5JSFSG6my5ud5yJezXMA@mail.gmail.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/signed; protocol="application/pkcs7-signature"; micalg="sha1"; boundary=gmsm1.8.9.1eqguhgomfatim2wfbtpq2
Cc: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 01 Nov 2011 22:20:57 -0000

This is an S/MIME signed message generated with Penango.
--gmsm1.8.9.1eqguhgomfatim2wfbtpq2
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset=iso-8859-1
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--gmsm1.8.9.1eqguhgomfatim2wfbtpq2
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="Verify This Message with Penango.p7s"
Content-Description: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-signature; name="Verify This Message with Penango.p7s"
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--gmsm1.8.9.1eqguhgomfatim2wfbtpq2--


From kyanha@kyanha.net  Tue Nov  1 15:22:28 2011
Return-Path: <kyanha@kyanha.net>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id AF06F11E80DE for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue,  1 Nov 2011 15:22:28 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.078
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.078 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.899,  BAYES_00=-2.599, FM_FORGED_GMAIL=0.622, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id FQ41CMlFfHcA for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue,  1 Nov 2011 15:22:27 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-gx0-f172.google.com (mail-gx0-f172.google.com [209.85.161.172]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 86ED311E80AB for <pkix@ietf.org>; Tue,  1 Nov 2011 15:22:27 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by ggnv1 with SMTP id v1so8921310ggn.31 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Tue, 01 Nov 2011 15:22:27 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by 10.236.124.76 with SMTP id w52mr2568910yhh.51.1320186147039; Tue, 01 Nov 2011 15:22:27 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from penango (c-67-188-178-93.hsd1.ca.comcast.net. [67.188.178.93]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPS id i50sm673491yhk.11.2011.11.01.15.22.25 (version=SSLv3 cipher=OTHER); Tue, 01 Nov 2011 15:22:25 -0700 (PDT)
From: "Kyle Hamilton" <kyanha@kyanha.net>
To: "Peter Sylvester" <peter.sylvester@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 1 Nov 2011 15:22:14 -0700 (Pacific Daylight Time)
Message-ID: <guhgql6t3whamelfc9jezwJv4X.penango@mail.gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <CAMm+Lwjc=M7h2mTN1AhHPH0LQGO+oN5JSFSG6my5ud5yJezXMA@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAMm+Lwjc=M7h2mTN1AhHPH0LQGO+oN5JSFSG6my5ud5yJezXMA@mail.gmail.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/signed; protocol="application/pkcs7-signature"; micalg="sha1"; boundary=gmsm1.8.9.1eqguhgql8jo6g9dlmyjf2
Cc: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 01 Nov 2011 22:22:28 -0000

This is an S/MIME signed message generated with Penango.
--gmsm1.8.9.1eqguhgql8jo6g9dlmyjf2
Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

Again, please:  Do not let perfection become the enemy of any improvement at all.

On Thu, Oct 27, 2011 at 12:59 PM, Peter Sylvester <peter.sylvester@gmail.com> wrote:
> you just can add an extension that says "when I said revoked, it really
> means more, it doesn't even exist"

True.  I suggest something like this elsewhere in the thread.

(At least there are some discussions going on now.)

>> The OSCP responder does not need access to the CA, just a list or set of
>> lists for all the issued certificates.

...such as my proposal...

> It needs some information that can be used to verify if a cert had been
> issued.
> a strong one way function (in oder to avoid the word hash) towards that info
> to see
> whether a cert is valid for example.

I like the 'for example', as it implies that there are other ways to approach the problem.  (I prefer the term 'digest'.)

As I said, I propose what I do simply so that an extremely easy-to-implement (copy+paste with minimal editing) incremental improvement can be made.  I believe that reducing the threat space[1] with a mechanism that enforces desirable semantics[2] in a way that people already understand[3] is preferable to requiring a major version bump at the least, much less additional debugging time before being ready to roll out to the public... and that only after PKIX finally standardizes something it hasn't been able to in the past decade, with additional mandates that don't address what the applications need and can implement /right now/.

I believe that it's more desirable to get people in the mood to improve things at all with small, easily-understandable engineering steps, than to demand that they accept yet another overblown "standard" that achieves at best the zero security effect of no implementation and at worst the negative security effect of immature technology failure during its roll out.  Once we get the implementers in the mode of looking for a whitelist, we can improve it with strong ID data for issued certificates and provided as a CRL/CMR extension.  Maybe something like:

-- contains one entry for each certificate
CertificateIssuanceList ::= SEQUENCE  (0..MAX) of CertificateIssuanceEntry;

-- contains multiple algorithm/digest tuples for one certificate
CertificateIssuanceEntry ::= SEQUENCE (0..MAX) of CertificateIssuanceAtom;

-- individual algorithm/digest tuple
CertificateIssuanceAtom ::= SEQUENCE {
    DigestAlgorithmOid OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
    DigestValue OCTET STRING }

This would permit the same certificate to be identified strongly with multiple digest algorithms, which would permit stronger verification by a wider variety of clients than provided by a single algorithm.  RPs would ignore hashes with algorithms they don't trust, and the CA could provide multiple hash values for diverse consumers with the same semantics in the same structure.  (Personally, I'd check all of them, under the theory that they will all test true even if I can't rely on the security of any one or more of them.  If there's any mismatch at all, even in the broken digests, then something's wrong.)  Notably, it wouldn't disclose the serial number of the matching certificate.

In the meantime, though, there's no reason that the CRL couldn't be usefully extended with 'removeFromCrl'.

The DigiNotar sleepwalk attack is going to become a much larger problem unless we take action now to stop it, and Mozilla will not do anything without standards body backing.  Please, I know that this isn't optimal or ideal, but it's an important first step to improving the infrastructure as a whole.

Incremental improvement, not perfection or bust.  PKIX-WG was wrong 10 years ago about what it thought the perfect and ideal system would be, and there's no chance that any new monolithic standard will correctly predict the future 10 years from now.  There are major problems which prevent the PKIX standards from taking root, and the body's inflexibility and unwillingness to accept that its standards are broken in fundamental ways is the reason they have remained unaddressed.  That self-reverential "reality should be this way" view prevents it from considering or accepting incremental changes to help address -- as stopgap measures -- the security holes which permitted the compromise of a CA to cause a person's death.  PKIX-WG was warned about this vector in the past, and did nothing to defend it.

Let's look at the costs of a public CA distrust:

- the CA's death, thus the deprivation of a taxpayer and lower tax revenues from its newly-unemployed employees, and thus a Gross Domestic Product hit for the entire state.
- the costs to every site enrolled in the CA's PKI of having to get recertified immediately, which is an instant priority given that browser users (presumably and hopefully) won't go to uncertified sites.  They can't make sales during the time they're uncertified, and each will instantly lose a portion of their customer bases as a result.
- the costs to every other CA which must have enrollment channels sufficient to handle the influx of new enrollees.
- the costs to everyone who uses or shops at the sites newly uncertified.  Imagine if Thawte SGC CA or Equifax Secure CA were compromised.  (Not familiar with Thawte SGC CA?  That's the one that issues to mail.google.com.  Equifax Secure CA issues to docs.google.com.)
- the costs to the entire CA/Browser trust model and consumer confidence.

We cannot sit back and say "that's the cost the certified party pays for choosing a poorly-run CA".  There are simply far too many people who are affected, with far too much cost to each one.  (Besides, even audited CAs make mistakes.  The only thing that consumers have to rely upon are audits, and those audits obviously don't catch everything.  We should allow them to continue to do their job, and provide them a means to help end entities/relying parties protect themselves.)

-Kyle H

[1] Implementations MUST be able to handle serial numbers up to 160 bits, or 20 bytes.  (Notably, a serial number might require a 21-byte encoding, since it's an integer and not a bit string or octet string.)  This means that the threat space for CAs which enforce random serial numbers is (exp(2,160) - count(CRL)), or (with 65,536 entries on the CRL) around 2**146.  The threat space for CAs which alter their CRLs to this spec is becomes (count(CRL,entriesRemoved)), which instantly removes 2**152 or so possibilities.

[2] Desirable semantics include "if a particular serial number on this list is found to have an invalid certificate associated with it, the CA can instantly and decisively take action by revoking and reissuing where appropriate", and "the CA knows that this list is more accurate than providing simple revocation data." Additional desirable semantics are the capacity for internal OCSP to answer for serial numbers[4] known to not be in the list as "never issued".  If the generation of this list were periodically entry-by-entry verified in a process completely separate from the technical operation of the CA, it could provide an extra, affirmative, records-based and thus not easily technically defeated approach to increase the probability of detecting CA compromise, and for both the enrollee and the RP successfully defending against CA compromise.

[3] People understand the CRL.  More importantly, implementors understand the CRL.  We should build on what we've got.  Once one gets past idealistic preconceived notions of "this is what this is for and never anything more because it just is" and starts looking toward making it all work, one understands that the best changes are the least changes in an already overly-complex and over-budget system of dubious actual utility.

[4] Once a spec comes out (still waiting for I-Ds) that will permit the stronger authentication of certificates, it will be a major implementation task for an immature technology.  In the meantime, some protection -- and it is protection, for both the CA and the end entities involved -- is better than none.  Do not let the perfect become the enemy of the good.

--gmsm1.8.9.1eqguhgql8jo6g9dlmyjf2
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="Verify This Message with Penango.p7s"
Content-Description: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-signature; name="Verify This Message with Penango.p7s"
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--gmsm1.8.9.1eqguhgql8jo6g9dlmyjf2--


From tmiller@mitre.org  Wed Nov  2 05:11:00 2011
Return-Path: <tmiller@mitre.org>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0FA0911E8186 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  2 Nov 2011 05:11:00 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.000,  BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id xYGH6G51I5Ez for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  2 Nov 2011 05:10:59 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (smtpksrv1.mitre.org [198.49.146.77]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E5FC911E817E for <pkix@ietf.org>; Wed,  2 Nov 2011 05:10:58 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by localhost (Postfix) with SMTP id 0BE1021B0B5A; Wed,  2 Nov 2011 08:10:52 -0400 (EDT)
Received: from IMCCAS01.MITRE.ORG (imccas01.mitre.org [129.83.29.78]) by smtpksrv1.mitre.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id F03C721B0B56; Wed,  2 Nov 2011 08:10:51 -0400 (EDT)
Received: from IMCMBX01.MITRE.ORG ([169.254.1.57]) by IMCCAS01.MITRE.ORG ([129.83.29.78]) with mapi id 14.01.0339.001; Wed, 2 Nov 2011 08:10:51 -0400
From: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
To: Kyle Hamilton <kyanha@kyanha.net>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
Thread-Index: AQHMmOR+3o6yhaO2SES0DD1Qj9f8npWZbmMA
Date: Wed, 2 Nov 2011 12:10:51 +0000
Message-ID: <CAD69C35.1EF7%tmiller@mitre.org>
In-Reply-To: <guhgomblrhy0lpcbljjezwJv4X.penango@mail.gmail.com>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: yes
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
user-agent: Microsoft-MacOutlook/14.13.0.110805
x-originating-ip: [172.31.61.109]
Content-Type: multipart/signed; protocol="application/pkcs7-signature"; micalg=sha1; boundary="B_3403062654_8105230"
MIME-Version: 1.0
Cc: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 02 Nov 2011 12:11:00 -0000

--B_3403062654_8105230
Content-type: text/plain;
	charset="US-ASCII"
Content-transfer-encoding: 7bit

On 11/1/11 5:20 PM, "Kyle Hamilton" <kyanha@kyanha.net> wrote:

>A responder without access to the CA database can answer REVOKED or
>UNKNOWN.

Current OCSP clients treat UNKNOWN as a failure.  UNKNOWN means the
responder cannot provide an answer; e.g., the responder doesn't have
current data, or the responder is not authorized to respond for that
issuer.  

Recall that the authoritative statement of validity is the CRL.  CRLs do
not communicate cert existence.  A responder seeded with a CRL has its
answer--the cert is good.

If the OCSP query is for a non-existent serial number, the responder's
answer is irrelevant anyway because the cert will fail path validation.
So I really don't see why this is a concern to you.

-- T

--B_3403062654_8105230
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-signature; name="smime.p7s"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="smime.p7s"

MIII8wYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIII5DCCCOACAQExCzAJBgUrDgMCGgUAMAsGCSqGSIb3DQEHAaCC
B1MwggNnMIICT6ADAgECAgJKiTANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADBdMRIwEAYDVQQKEwltaXRyZS5v
cmcxHjAcBgNVBAsTFUNlcnRpZmljYXRlIEF1dGhvcml0eTEnMCUGA1UEAxMeTUlUUkUgQ29y
cG9yYXRpb24gUHJpbWFyeSBDQS0xMB4XDTEwMTAxOTE5NDgyM1oXDTEyMDQxMTE5NDgyM1ow
WjESMBAGA1UEChMJbWl0cmUub3JnMQ8wDQYDVQQLEwZQZW9wbGUxFzAVBgoJkiaJk/IsZAEB
Ewd0bWlsbGVyMRowGAYDVQQDExFNaWxsZXIgVGltb3RoeSBKLjCBnzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEF
AAOBjQAwgYkCgYEAywNGbC0nD+WhMj5RDPEYcv6L2KrQs90o3zX1kl4s5TLb4uG7zupkWSnZ
d1Ni65wfLgWHVmUGz/bGiWrt0zPc581IO0XQwOTalCovURg6W+6s1NQZfYLOW+m0Nad3pVJU
DH8mh/hMTZuOTMk5monAPV2AKWmHt5rQhkybWbdm+1sCAwEAAaOBtzCBtDAOBgNVHQ8BAf8E
BAMCBeAwHQYDVR0OBBYEFK1vgpXFLstO1aGlfwtbfKyncwR+MB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFIe0D0iN
YjNCwS1RGkgewp67CrGtMEQGA1UdHwQ9MDswOaA3oDWGM2h0dHA6Ly93d3cubWl0cmUub3Jn
L3RlY2gvbWlpL3BraS9jYTFfbWl0cmVfb3JnLmNybDAcBgNVHREEFTATgRF0bWlsbGVyQG1p
dHJlLm9yZzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFAAOCAQEAsPSW3r89o4XHKdsOCLLLJT2mT7sam2+375d8
53zGBkUbfwD9nvpNWdYhRHczMoQou2iEJHba5+VaImVB9kRbvl+8FZ7bHXUMc009aCoO9Fwi
p3h+KvQji0W9RUANDY49E49R++tngdzzhodMVAcPn72UU0yTZYbiXJgIuaHYcNEbTqZzSY5W
DV3UMewBKm0nMgxf0Wtp5TfUz3tP2Kln8/IRaQv+bHQ9A8w1NcvWNYqNqpaN7bMdhVFxsxSe
lZeFS80zTBGxYxLud09qS1gDenYmd5jTWp6qYdeIMt6RDi0Nx5tl1la47bGHEJF6wnIe70PE
ajWFGj3x1MNP9jgL8zCCA+QwggLMoAMCAQICAQUwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQAwWjESMBAGA1UE
ChMJbWl0cmUub3JnMR4wHAYDVQQLExVDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBBdXRob3JpdHkxJDAiBgNVBAMT
G01JVFJFIENvcnBvcmF0aW9uIFJvb3QgQ0EtMTAeFw0wNjA2MDMxNzEzMjJaFw0xMjA2MDMx
NzEzMjJaMF0xEjAQBgNVBAoTCW1pdHJlLm9yZzEeMBwGA1UECxMVQ2VydGlmaWNhdGUgQXV0
aG9yaXR5MScwJQYDVQQDEx5NSVRSRSBDb3Jwb3JhdGlvbiBQcmltYXJ5IENBLTEwggEiMA0G
CSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDI8HtWXRCCqBC3S7xDZ25Gzt5lQ+eGV+Uo8U8x
cYb6KoakiZizqd9sU+yfSrwWqSUWyb9QRXYklDdztKvB+up70KsJtUWHvrU7Fkjt+dRaJRqw
0/Yg0bX1oB+tDwigmwAS0bMd4hpxL4zkI3gLTJ9QLoKkFlNz1mV2MtRq28mvjTsrWL7taetG
wxUqEgJ+CaI79eJVH1h5fLN5GoWsvLpi0kIm4l3RBF/Aq0pGl6TmhTrsjOvsKUcO08mztQ5O
MxgFLZ9PPO0L7DA5Onr4DdlsTKa5BwBlHCYaSNUF7ZHwyJfbpHTYiKDP73TdkAv/pum/HQOe
SuVHZQWvUoEZ8GqZAgMBAAGjgbEwga4wEgYDVR0TAQH/BAgwBgEB/wIBAjAOBgNVHQ8BAf8E
BAMCAYYwHQYDVR0OBBYEFIe0D0iNYjNCwS1RGkgewp67CrGtMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFMdwUQDY
Tf7kAdRolsU9n5qX/nQvMEgGA1UdHwRBMD8wPaA7oDmGN2h0dHA6Ly93d3cubWl0cmUub3Jn
L3RlY2gvbWlpL3BraS9yb290Y2ExX21pdHJlX29yZy5jcmwwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQADggEB
AE1ubuuuKezdIgI9u15f2pI3X5EkKWqLH+nDcgB7u7rQsrRX2NVn0TZr5zQxmJKiN1zBTmtf
EjY4jbDAh/rBUGjvqMg5z4iJBGUL5Xxhq0aaiJuo//xYM/OW539ZADOSOtTae6Hwp3Ikb6fW
Qf/rvvYtutrYIiTya7wXKl5oHk/a4gnN0T48ajzZmLJTrzS6SIn3IXpSYRe5yIHvu0ZAFHEy
Xp4/MisCtCd/jxKYGEUPldgutq546IbsT4DMP32KDUzpYdzFZe2ncMitWoT8NmvXjo0loJaq
D02gTXhyakSWWelYu0ueflQFgn5AKjOZt7VIlc47KdnRXEycZ2Hs2qAxggFoMIIBZAIBATBj
MF0xEjAQBgNVBAoTCW1pdHJlLm9yZzEeMBwGA1UECxMVQ2VydGlmaWNhdGUgQXV0aG9yaXR5
MScwJQYDVQQDEx5NSVRSRSBDb3Jwb3JhdGlvbiBQcmltYXJ5IENBLTECAkqJMAkGBSsOAwIa
BQCgXTAjBgkqhkiG9w0BCQQxFgQUKZ8/qIgy9Q03BqJQNeqbTp/xvOEwGAYJKoZIhvcNAQkD
MQsGCSqGSIb3DQEHATAcBgkqhkiG9w0BCQUxDxcNMTExMTAyMTIxMDU0WjANBgkqhkiG9w0B
AQEFAASBgGpag3mDaaz3n4EJC1JfXp0EL8cKLepFGjmhNaiqnfdeuVeAM+bFyJbrGro9KmKW
UPifZ3om5WiYqzQo9Nl2YvCQ0gybtMKpeISaM1h9GJzTEG2oILBfTbgdZPvOTd1+sl9lTMjA
9czn+5OGXYAMxHF7rqozCCPbLhvQ3r1G8gy1

--B_3403062654_8105230--

From kyanha@kyanha.net  Wed Nov  2 12:57:04 2011
Return-Path: <kyanha@kyanha.net>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 398C511E80FD for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  2 Nov 2011 12:57:04 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.314
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.314 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.090, BAYES_00=-2.599, FM_FORGED_GMAIL=0.622, MIME_BASE64_TEXT=1.753, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id ceXZRoOQ9tDl for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  2 Nov 2011 12:57:03 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-qw0-f44.google.com (mail-qw0-f44.google.com [209.85.216.44]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 93AFE11E80E9 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Wed,  2 Nov 2011 12:57:03 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by qadc10 with SMTP id c10so669950qad.31 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Wed, 02 Nov 2011 12:57:03 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by 10.68.72.170 with SMTP id e10mr6743872pbv.6.1320263822633; Wed, 02 Nov 2011 12:57:02 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from penango (c-67-188-178-93.hsd1.ca.comcast.net. [67.188.178.93]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPS id 4sm7173571pbj.18.2011.11.02.12.57.00 (version=SSLv3 cipher=OTHER); Wed, 02 Nov 2011 12:57:01 -0700 (PDT)
From: "Kyle Hamilton" <kyanha@kyanha.net>
To: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
Date: Wed, 2 Nov 2011 12:56:59 -0700 (Pacific Daylight Time)
Message-ID: <guiqzn5a187ivcfzdyjezwJv4X.penango@mail.gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <CAD69C35.1EF7%tmiller@mitre.org>
References: <guhgomblrhy0lpcbljjezwJv4X.penango@mail.gmail.com> <CAD69C35.1EF7%tmiller@mitre.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/signed; protocol="application/pkcs7-signature"; micalg="sha1"; boundary=gmsm1.8.9.1eqguiqzn81i7p632l68q2
Cc: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 02 Nov 2011 19:57:04 -0000

This is an S/MIME signed message generated with Penango.
--gmsm1.8.9.1eqguiqzn81i7p632l68q2
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset=iso-8859-1
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--gmsm1.8.9.1eqguiqzn81i7p632l68q2
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="Verify This Message with Penango.p7s"
Content-Description: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-signature; name="Verify This Message with Penango.p7s"
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--gmsm1.8.9.1eqguiqzn81i7p632l68q2--


From pgut001@login01.cs.auckland.ac.nz  Wed Nov  2 13:02:33 2011
Return-Path: <pgut001@login01.cs.auckland.ac.nz>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0C6E311E8122 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  2 Nov 2011 13:02:33 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 0ds4OXek+vY9 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  2 Nov 2011 13:02:32 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mx2.auckland.ac.nz (mx2.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.12.44]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 30B6C11E80E9 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Wed,  2 Nov 2011 13:02:30 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=auckland.ac.nz; i=pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz; q=dns/txt; s=uoa; t=1320264152; x=1351800152; h=from:to:subject:cc:in-reply-to:message-id:date; bh=myZ5Ov5gOdtMlHSoLOJymrW7iO8PLDObNCIpqrVs7Nw=; b=StM+9SRnl4Ptw7hHpkrZ2NUFuqQYoArzGl1pn8cb5Ws0KjuZeOCDu2m2 1FT/D954okc/0hy9NtxEu9uU3vaLGp+NlkYpHz4KDvjV3vTfcLzR3e6Hb E1x/D7vSgCSD/hG1aVQsxmwMvPqSnFIbpZgiLTAutK5PG1ONZ+lg78D+/ g=;
X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.69,445,1315137600"; d="scan'208";a="88505167"
X-Ironport-HAT: UNIVERSITY - $RELAY-THROTTLE
X-Ironport-Source: 130.216.34.40 - Outgoing - Outgoing
Received: from login01.fos.auckland.ac.nz ([130.216.34.40]) by mx2-int.auckland.ac.nz with ESMTP/TLS/AES256-SHA; 03 Nov 2011 09:02:30 +1300
Received: from pgut001 by login01.fos.auckland.ac.nz with local (Exim 4.69) (envelope-from <pgut001@login01.cs.auckland.ac.nz>) id 1RLh13-0001pC-HH; Thu, 03 Nov 2011 09:02:29 +1300
From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: kyanha@kyanha.net, tmiller@mitre.org
In-Reply-To: <CAD69C35.1EF7%tmiller@mitre.org>
Message-Id: <E1RLh13-0001pC-HH@login01.fos.auckland.ac.nz>
Date: Thu, 03 Nov 2011 09:02:29 +1300
Cc: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 02 Nov 2011 20:02:33 -0000

"Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org> writes:

>Current OCSP clients treat UNKNOWN as a failure.  

No, current OCSP clients treat Unknown as pretty much anything.  In particular
since Unknown != Revoked, many treat it as "Not revoked" -> "Good" (OCSP's
"Good" doesn't actually mean that the cert is good, merely that it's not on a
CRL).

Oh, and responders are no better, they may report a cert as "Good" (meaning
"Not revoked") if it's not on a CRL.  Or pretty much anything else, depending
on the responder and how it's configured.

Peter.

From kyanha@kyanha.net  Wed Nov  2 13:28:01 2011
Return-Path: <kyanha@kyanha.net>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 94E1911E80BC for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  2 Nov 2011 13:28:01 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.304
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.304 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.080, BAYES_00=-2.599, FM_FORGED_GMAIL=0.622, MIME_BASE64_TEXT=1.753, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 7lXkVlwdNyo3 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  2 Nov 2011 13:28:01 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-vx0-f172.google.com (mail-vx0-f172.google.com [209.85.220.172]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0714011E8199 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Wed,  2 Nov 2011 13:28:00 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by vcbfl11 with SMTP id fl11so634584vcb.31 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Wed, 02 Nov 2011 13:28:00 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by 10.68.72.73 with SMTP id b9mr6869074pbv.100.1320265679993; Wed, 02 Nov 2011 13:27:59 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from penango (c-67-188-178-93.hsd1.ca.comcast.net. [67.188.178.93]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPS id y6sm7380626pbi.5.2011.11.02.13.27.58 (version=SSLv3 cipher=OTHER); Wed, 02 Nov 2011 13:27:59 -0700 (PDT)
From: "Kyle Hamilton" <kyanha@kyanha.net>
To: "Peter Gutmann" <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
Date: Wed, 2 Nov 2011 13:27:58 -0700 (Pacific Daylight Time)
Message-ID: <guis3hda8qwf69le0vjezwJv4X.penango@mail.gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <CAMm+Lwjc=M7h2mTN1AhHPH0LQGO+oN5JSFSG6my5ud5yJezXMA@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAMm+Lwjc=M7h2mTN1AhHPH0LQGO+oN5JSFSG6my5ud5yJezXMA@mail.gmail.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/signed; protocol="application/pkcs7-signature"; micalg="sha1"; boundary=gmsm1.8.9.2eqguis3hf9usvex61fuk2
Cc: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 02 Nov 2011 20:28:01 -0000

This is an S/MIME signed message generated with Penango.
--gmsm1.8.9.2eqguis3hf9usvex61fuk2
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset=iso-8859-1

DQoNCk9uIFdlZCwgTm92IDIsIDIwMTEgYXQgMTowMiBQTSwgUGV0ZXIgR3V0bWFubiA8cGd1dDAw
MUBjcy5hdWNrbGFuZC5hYy5uej4gd3JvdGU6DQo+ICJNaWxsZXIsIFRpbW90aHkgSi4iIDx0bWls
bGVyQG1pdHJlLm9yZz4gd3JpdGVzOg0KPg0KPj5DdXJyZW50IE9DU1AgY2xpZW50cyB0cmVhdCBV
TktOT1dOIGFzIGEgZmFpbHVyZS4NCj4NCj4gTm8sIGN1cnJlbnQgT0NTUCBjbGllbnRzIHRyZWF0
IFVua25vd24gYXMgcHJldHR5IG11Y2ggYW55dGhpbmcuIKBJbiBwYXJ0aWN1bGFyDQo+IHNpbmNl
IFVua25vd24gIT0gUmV2b2tlZCwgbWFueSB0cmVhdCBpdCBhcyAiTm90IHJldm9rZWQiIC0+ICJH
b29kIiAoT0NTUCdzDQo+ICJHb29kIiBkb2Vzbid0IGFjdHVhbGx5IG1lYW4gdGhhdCB0aGUgY2Vy
dCBpcyBnb29kLCBtZXJlbHkgdGhhdCBpdCdzIG5vdCBvbiBhDQo+IENSTCkuDQoNClRoaXMgaXMg
d2h5IHdlIG5lZWQgYSBDUkwtbGlrZSB3aGl0ZWxpc3QsIGluc3RlYWQgb2YgYSBibGFja2xpc3Qs
IHRvIHByb3ZlIHRoYXQgYSBjZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSB3YXMgaW4gZmFjdCBpc3N1ZWQgaW4gYWNjb3Jk
YW5jZSB3aXRoIHRoZSBwb2xpY3kuDQoNCj4gT2gsIGFuZCByZXNwb25kZXJzIGFyZSBubyBiZXR0
ZXIsIHRoZXkgbWF5IHJlcG9ydCBhIGNlcnQgYXMgIkdvb2QiIChtZWFuaW5nDQo+ICJOb3QgcmV2
b2tlZCIpIGlmIGl0J3Mgbm90IG9uIGEgQ1JMLiCgT3IgcHJldHR5IG11Y2ggYW55dGhpbmcgZWxz
ZSwgZGVwZW5kaW5nDQo+IG9uIHRoZSByZXNwb25kZXIgYW5kIGhvdyBpdCdzIGNvbmZpZ3VyZWQu
DQoNCldoaWNoIGlzIHdoeSBPQ1NQIG5lZWRzIHRvIGJlIGZpeGVkLCBieSBwcm92aWRpbmcgdGhl
IHJlc3BvbmRlcnMgd2l0aCBhdXRob3JpdGF0aXZlIGxpc3RzIG9mIHZhbGlkIGNlcnRpZmljYXRl
cy4NCg0KLUt5bGUgSA==
--gmsm1.8.9.2eqguis3hf9usvex61fuk2
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="Verify This Message with Penango.p7s"
Content-Description: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-signature; name="Verify This Message with Penango.p7s"
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--gmsm1.8.9.2eqguis3hf9usvex61fuk2--


From hallam@gmail.com  Wed Nov  2 16:57:45 2011
Return-Path: <hallam@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4644911E80AB for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  2 Nov 2011 16:57:45 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -3.451
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.451 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.147,  BAYES_00=-2.599, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 4t02Dle5bVPj for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  2 Nov 2011 16:57:44 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-qw0-f44.google.com (mail-qw0-f44.google.com [209.85.216.44]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7F3D211E8073 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Wed,  2 Nov 2011 16:57:44 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by qadc10 with SMTP id c10so879194qad.31 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Wed, 02 Nov 2011 16:57:32 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=5NHl0d4KnzELyqR14LGJrp/8swRJzes2pw2yL+jxyLc=; b=WPB1LPW5nRxKTcWQPzDViecdfnn6qExZ3SosmI7ihaW4NEDtIob7a4IFfyiQ+gLFH8 QTexThnnf9PSYs0NEvEeuJdt/2Ab4rx36Kdc955KYDaRmR0G4jiLxYUrWYLFVDQ6vX1e nwMgZClIjGuJSaIXH1YZg+96KDO0JVtEmuJ3c=
MIME-Version: 1.0
Received: by 10.182.74.41 with SMTP id q9mr1359313obv.28.1320278252096; Wed, 02 Nov 2011 16:57:32 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by 10.182.42.99 with HTTP; Wed, 2 Nov 2011 16:57:32 -0700 (PDT)
In-Reply-To: <CAD69C35.1EF7%tmiller@mitre.org>
References: <guhgomblrhy0lpcbljjezwJv4X.penango@mail.gmail.com> <CAD69C35.1EF7%tmiller@mitre.org>
Date: Wed, 2 Nov 2011 19:57:32 -0400
Message-ID: <CAMm+Lwi4eQkk8FdTNZr8fojNCK62GN_n8opOCbgQX6V3PZztLQ@mail.gmail.com>
From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
To: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=f46d044470e3388aab04b0c93c27
Cc: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 02 Nov 2011 23:57:45 -0000

--f46d044470e3388aab04b0c93c27
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1

No, the CRL is only authoritative for invalidity.

Looks to me like you are going to have a problem when we fix this. That is
your problem, not ours.

We can fix it here or elsewhere but you have no veto on it being fixed.


And the 'worlds biggest PKI' cost how much per cert? Not a model Io feel
like following.


On Wed, Nov 2, 2011 at 8:10 AM, Miller, Timothy J. <tmiller@mitre.org>wrote:

> On 11/1/11 5:20 PM, "Kyle Hamilton" <kyanha@kyanha.net> wrote:
>
> >A responder without access to the CA database can answer REVOKED or
> >UNKNOWN.
>
> Current OCSP clients treat UNKNOWN as a failure.  UNKNOWN means the
> responder cannot provide an answer; e.g., the responder doesn't have
> current data, or the responder is not authorized to respond for that
> issuer.
>
> Recall that the authoritative statement of validity is the CRL.  CRLs do
> not communicate cert existence.  A responder seeded with a CRL has its
> answer--the cert is good.
>
> If the OCSP query is for a non-existent serial number, the responder's
> answer is irrelevant anyway because the cert will fail path validation.
> So I really don't see why this is a concern to you.
>
> -- T
>



-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

--f46d044470e3388aab04b0c93c27
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

No, the CRL is only authoritative for invalidity.<div><br></div><div>Looks =
to me like you are going to have a problem when we fix this. That is your p=
roblem, not ours.</div><div><br></div><div>We can fix it here or elsewhere =
but you have no veto on it being fixed.</div>
<div><br></div><div><br></div><div>And the &#39;worlds biggest PKI&#39; cos=
t how much per cert? Not a model Io feel like following.</div><div><br></di=
v><div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Wed, Nov 2, 2011 at 8:10 AM, Mille=
r, Timothy J. <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:tmiller@mitre.org">tm=
iller@mitre.org</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;"><div class=3D"im">On 11/1/11 5:20 PM, &quot=
;Kyle Hamilton&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:kyanha@kyanha.net">kyanha@kyanha=
.net</a>&gt; wrote:<br>

<br>
&gt;A responder without access to the CA database can answer REVOKED or<br>
&gt;UNKNOWN.<br>
<br>
</div>Current OCSP clients treat UNKNOWN as a failure. =A0UNKNOWN means the=
<br>
responder cannot provide an answer; e.g., the responder doesn&#39;t have<br=
>
current data, or the responder is not authorized to respond for that<br>
issuer.<br>
<br>
Recall that the authoritative statement of validity is the CRL. =A0CRLs do<=
br>
not communicate cert existence. =A0A responder seeded with a CRL has its<br=
>
answer--the cert is good.<br>
<br>
If the OCSP query is for a non-existent serial number, the responder&#39;s<=
br>
answer is irrelevant anyway because the cert will fail path validation.<br>
So I really don&#39;t see why this is a concern to you.<br>
<font color=3D"#888888"><br>
-- T<br>
</font></blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br>Websi=
te: <a href=3D"http://hallambaker.com/">http://hallambaker.com/</a><br><br>
</div>

--f46d044470e3388aab04b0c93c27--

From hallam@gmail.com  Wed Nov  2 17:08:50 2011
Return-Path: <hallam@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8F6A011E80F3 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  2 Nov 2011 17:08:50 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -3.459
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.459 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.139,  BAYES_00=-2.599, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id JhrzRB0aQT0Q for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  2 Nov 2011 17:08:49 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-qw0-f44.google.com (mail-qw0-f44.google.com [209.85.216.44]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7B25C11E80E7 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Wed,  2 Nov 2011 17:08:49 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by qadc10 with SMTP id c10so886170qad.31 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Wed, 02 Nov 2011 17:08:49 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=QJL5vdHoDqoRAu69RE70OzSEFUZe/f9K1Io6hIQmcP8=; b=lL3CSTJ+isuRlsu6XkobmuyaIKt6p7G+HqE2zdodjRg46t6nWHo33aYA0vqrzfiWK5 5vhinoh/TL0Td9LNgyU0zr4bdHvCo5w8CF5y13A4o1om7/smxJqi+t5Uh4SQC2CV8Mft nlFAKMjwyQ1P2ox365z/mSxqRP+nzjwv4czuA=
MIME-Version: 1.0
Received: by 10.182.115.40 with SMTP id jl8mr1378949obb.8.1320278928814; Wed, 02 Nov 2011 17:08:48 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by 10.182.42.99 with HTTP; Wed, 2 Nov 2011 17:08:48 -0700 (PDT)
In-Reply-To: <guiqzn5a187ivcfzdyjezwJv4X.penango@mail.gmail.com>
References: <guhgomblrhy0lpcbljjezwJv4X.penango@mail.gmail.com> <CAD69C35.1EF7%tmiller@mitre.org> <guiqzn5a187ivcfzdyjezwJv4X.penango@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 2 Nov 2011 20:08:48 -0400
Message-ID: <CAMm+Lwief-XF+SZOdnh3RevqfP7GQyz+NEU-vkKnRPphZAn3Yg@mail.gmail.com>
From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
To: Kyle Hamilton <kyanha@kyanha.net>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=f46d0444808b8e712704b0c964da
Cc: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 03 Nov 2011 00:08:50 -0000

--f46d0444808b8e712704b0c964da
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1

On Wed, Nov 2, 2011 at 3:56 PM, Kyle Hamilton <kyanha@kyanha.net> wrote:

>
>
> On Wed, Nov 2, 2011 at 5:10 AM, Miller, Timothy J. <tmiller@mitre.org>
> wrote:
>
>> On 11/1/11 5:20 PM, "Kyle Hamilton" <kyanha@kyanha.net> wrote:
>>
>>  A responder without access to the CA database can answer REVOKED or
>>> UNKNOWN.
>>>
>>
>> Current OCSP clients treat UNKNOWN as a failure.  UNKNOWN means the
>> responder cannot provide an answer; e.g., the responder doesn't have
>> current data, or the responder is not authorized to respond for that
>> issuer.
>>
>
> Or "the responder doesn't have information on what serial numbers were
> actually issued, so it cannot authoritatively answer VALID".
>
>
>  Recall that the authoritative statement of validity is the CRL.  CRLs do
>> not communicate cert existence.  A responder seeded with a CRL has its
>> answer--the cert is good.
>>
>
> The CRL is completely insufficient for this need.
>
>
>  If the OCSP query is for a non-existent serial number, the responder's
>> answer is irrelevant anyway because the cert will fail path validation.
>> So I really don't see why this is a concern to you.
>>
>
> No, it won't, not if the CA's hardware was induced to do something that
> wasn't authorized.
>
> The records are the only legitimate authoritative source for enrollment
> information, and if a CA's doing its job right it also has every
> certificate (or at least certificate serial number, since PKIX-WG never
> provided any other means to identify certificates) ever issued to that
> entity and its disposition.
>
> A person -died- because of this.  So I don't really see why this isn't a
> concern to you.
>

I am not aware of a death being reported linked to the DigiNotar incident.
Perhaps you can provide a source. Several people have claimed that it
'must' have resulted in deaths but these are not people who I know to have
close connections with the green movement in Iran.

Communications compromise due to SSL CA breach are serious but only one
compromise vector. Lost/confiscated laptops and mobiles are a much bigger
problem. Everyone involved knows that the authorities can and do arrest
people and force them to disclose contact information, passwords etc.


-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

--f46d0444808b8e712704b0c964da
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Wed, Nov 2, 2011 at 3:56 PM, Kyle Ham=
ilton <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:kyanha@kyanha.net">kyanha@kya=
nha.net</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D=
"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
<div class=3D"im"><br>
<br>
On Wed, Nov 2, 2011 at 5:10 AM, Miller, Timothy J. &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:tm=
iller@mitre.org" target=3D"_blank">tmiller@mitre.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
On 11/1/11 5:20 PM, &quot;Kyle Hamilton&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:kyanha@=
kyanha.net" target=3D"_blank">kyanha@kyanha.net</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
A responder without access to the CA database can answer REVOKED or<br>
UNKNOWN.<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
Current OCSP clients treat UNKNOWN as a failure. =A0UNKNOWN means the<br>
responder cannot provide an answer; e.g., the responder doesn&#39;t have<br=
>
current data, or the responder is not authorized to respond for that<br>
issuer.<br>
</blockquote>
<br></div>
Or &quot;the responder doesn&#39;t have information on what serial numbers =
were actually issued, so it cannot authoritatively answer VALID&quot;.<div =
class=3D"im"><br>
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
Recall that the authoritative statement of validity is the CRL. =A0CRLs do<=
br>
not communicate cert existence. =A0A responder seeded with a CRL has its<br=
>
answer--the cert is good.<br>
</blockquote>
<br></div>
The CRL is completely insufficient for this need.<div class=3D"im"><br>
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
If the OCSP query is for a non-existent serial number, the responder&#39;s<=
br>
answer is irrelevant anyway because the cert will fail path validation.<br>
So I really don&#39;t see why this is a concern to you.<br>
</blockquote>
<br></div>
No, it won&#39;t, not if the CA&#39;s hardware was induced to do something =
that wasn&#39;t authorized.<br>
<br>
The records are the only legitimate authoritative source for enrollment inf=
ormation, and if a CA&#39;s doing its job right it also has every certifica=
te (or at least certificate serial number, since PKIX-WG never provided any=
 other means to identify certificates) ever issued to that entity and its d=
isposition.<br>

<br>
A person -died- because of this. =A0So I don&#39;t really see why this isn&=
#39;t a concern to you.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I am not aware =
of a death being reported linked to the DigiNotar incident. Perhaps you can=
 provide a source. Several people have claimed that it &#39;must&#39; have =
resulted in deaths but these are not people who I know to have close connec=
tions with the green movement in Iran.</div>
<div><br></div><div>Communications compromise due to SSL CA breach are seri=
ous but only one compromise vector. Lost/confiscated laptops and mobiles ar=
e a much bigger problem. Everyone involved knows that the authorities can a=
nd do arrest people and force them to disclose contact information, passwor=
ds etc.</div>
<div><br></div></div><div><br></div>-- <br>Website: <a href=3D"http://halla=
mbaker.com/">http://hallambaker.com/</a><br><br>

--f46d0444808b8e712704b0c964da--

From kyanha@kyanha.net  Wed Nov  2 17:44:08 2011
Return-Path: <kyanha@kyanha.net>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9A42B11E80E7 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  2 Nov 2011 17:44:08 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.296
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.296 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.072, BAYES_00=-2.599, FM_FORGED_GMAIL=0.622, MIME_BASE64_TEXT=1.753, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id Qc1sLej9mJ32 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  2 Nov 2011 17:44:08 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-pz0-f50.google.com (mail-pz0-f50.google.com [209.85.210.50]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0862211E80DB for <pkix@ietf.org>; Wed,  2 Nov 2011 17:44:07 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by pzk4 with SMTP id 4so825836pzk.9 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Wed, 02 Nov 2011 17:44:06 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by 10.68.29.130 with SMTP id k2mr8082124pbh.7.1320281046476; Wed, 02 Nov 2011 17:44:06 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from penango (c-67-188-178-93.hsd1.ca.comcast.net. [67.188.178.93]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPS id b3sm8944710pbl.8.2011.11.02.17.44.04 (version=SSLv3 cipher=OTHER); Wed, 02 Nov 2011 17:44:05 -0700 (PDT)
From: "Kyle Hamilton" <kyanha@kyanha.net>
To: "Phillip Hallam-Baker" <hallam@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 2 Nov 2011 17:44:02 -0700 (Pacific Daylight Time)
Message-ID: <guj18s9et8mrzli0yrjezwJv4X.penango@mail.gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <CAMm+Lwjc=M7h2mTN1AhHPH0LQGO+oN5JSFSG6my5ud5yJezXMA@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAMm+Lwjc=M7h2mTN1AhHPH0LQGO+oN5JSFSG6my5ud5yJezXMA@mail.gmail.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/signed; protocol="application/pkcs7-signature"; micalg="sha1"; boundary=gmsm1.8.9.2eqguj18sbbu93myv33h92
Cc: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 03 Nov 2011 00:44:08 -0000

This is an S/MIME signed message generated with Penango.
--gmsm1.8.9.2eqguj18sbbu93myv33h92
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset=iso-8859-1
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--gmsm1.8.9.2eqguj18sbbu93myv33h92
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="Verify This Message with Penango.p7s"
Content-Description: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-signature; name="Verify This Message with Penango.p7s"
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--gmsm1.8.9.2eqguj18sbbu93myv33h92--


From hallam@gmail.com  Wed Nov  2 18:02:02 2011
Return-Path: <hallam@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id EDA3411E80B0 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  2 Nov 2011 18:02:01 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -3.466
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.466 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.132,  BAYES_00=-2.599, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id Frr34b3d3S0Q for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  2 Nov 2011 18:02:01 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-qw0-f44.google.com (mail-qw0-f44.google.com [209.85.216.44]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1A5FF11E8073 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Wed,  2 Nov 2011 18:02:01 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by qadc10 with SMTP id c10so914065qad.31 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Wed, 02 Nov 2011 18:01:57 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=no/O6EphToBYrstwnxnb6lGC7fKuwe63BM7q4Z8lSiM=; b=JgnUJdLwX0G9X/zrvtu5NoKShYWhVdvn6xhnMFFEWjlUfEtlo6bGFcDno/ydi0/wWc 3ej4E/nrRt9NAoqn/APy9dlWpuIz1ARDZLZacygzZBk6kjbE5wXfWpHAMJGb6nKjujGK 68Rp9j5e0fFv6MSei+OXkcs0IJrSW8ylRfM7U=
MIME-Version: 1.0
Received: by 10.182.110.1 with SMTP id hw1mr1386908obb.38.1320282117035; Wed, 02 Nov 2011 18:01:57 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by 10.182.42.99 with HTTP; Wed, 2 Nov 2011 18:01:56 -0700 (PDT)
In-Reply-To: <guj18s9et8mrzli0yrjezwJv4X.penango@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAMm+Lwjc=M7h2mTN1AhHPH0LQGO+oN5JSFSG6my5ud5yJezXMA@mail.gmail.com> <guj18s9et8mrzli0yrjezwJv4X.penango@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 2 Nov 2011 21:01:56 -0400
Message-ID: <CAMm+LwiZ+72Do+RQ9SUQtifbcXVm53exwc3q6j5Pa9EL9nisww@mail.gmail.com>
From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
To: Kyle Hamilton <kyanha@kyanha.net>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=f46d0443035496d49f04b0ca22ad
Cc: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 03 Nov 2011 01:02:02 -0000

--f46d0443035496d49f04b0ca22ad
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1

On Wed, Nov 2, 2011 at 8:44 PM, Kyle Hamilton <kyanha@kyanha.net> wrote:

>
> On Wed, Nov 2, 2011 at 5:08 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> A person -died- because of this.  So I don't really see why this isn't a
>>> concern to you.
>>>
>>
>> I am not aware of a death being reported linked to the DigiNotar incident.
>> Perhaps you can provide a source.
>>
>
> The death of a corporate person, which body was forced insolvent,
> dismantled and sold for scrap.  This is documented.  If you want
> references, perhaps you should read the draft you're commenting on (which
> actually does explain this).
>

Corporations are not people. No really, they are not.

This country already fought one civil war over the belief that people were
property. Now there are people thinking that property is people. Both ways
of thinking are wrong.



> The death of a corporation is not to be taken lightly.  It directly
> impacts the lives of all of its employees, deprives the state of a
> taxpayer, and reduces the amount of tax revenue the state can extract from
> that corporation's employees.


In this case we have real people's lives at stake.

Confusing the issue with hyperbole trivializes the issue.


-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

--f46d0443035496d49f04b0ca22ad
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Wed, Nov 2, 2011 at 8:44 PM, Kyle Ham=
ilton <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:kyanha@kyanha.net">kyanha@kya=
nha.net</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D=
"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
<div class=3D"im"><br>
On Wed, Nov 2, 2011 at 5:08 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:=
hallam@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">hallam@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"m=
argin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
A person -died- because of this. =A0So I don&#39;t really see why this isn&=
#39;t a<br>
concern to you.<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
I am not aware of a death being reported linked to the DigiNotar incident.<=
br>
Perhaps you can provide a source.<br>
</blockquote>
<br></div>
The death of a corporate person, which body was forced insolvent, dismantle=
d and sold for scrap. =A0This is documented. =A0If you want references, per=
haps you should read the draft you&#39;re commenting on (which actually doe=
s explain this).<br>
</blockquote><div><br></div><div>Corporations are not people. No really, th=
ey are not.</div><div><br></div><div>This country already fought one civil =
war over the belief that people were property. Now there are people thinkin=
g that property is people. Both ways of thinking are wrong.</div>
<div><br></div><div>=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"mar=
gin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
The death of a corporation is not to be taken lightly. =A0It directly impac=
ts the lives of all of its employees, deprives the state of a taxpayer, and=
 reduces the amount of tax revenue the state can extract from that corporat=
ion&#39;s employees.</blockquote>
<div><br></div><div>In this case we have real people&#39;s lives at stake.=
=A0</div><div><br></div><div>Confusing the issue with hyperbole trivializes=
 the issue.</div><div><br></div><div>=A0</div></div>-- <br>Website: <a href=
=3D"http://hallambaker.com/">http://hallambaker.com/</a><br>
<br>

--f46d0443035496d49f04b0ca22ad--

From swilson@lockstep.com.au  Wed Nov  2 18:33:56 2011
Return-Path: <swilson@lockstep.com.au>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 32F8D11E8105 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  2 Nov 2011 18:33:56 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.298
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.298 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=1.300,  BAYES_00=-2.599, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id G35YXuEDu5Sr for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  2 Nov 2011 18:33:54 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtp182.iad.emailsrvr.com (smtp182.iad.emailsrvr.com [207.97.245.182]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5E7EF11E80BB for <pkix@ietf.org>; Wed,  2 Nov 2011 18:33:54 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from localhost (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by smtp28.relay.iad1a.emailsrvr.com (SMTP Server) with ESMTP id 3510EE0618 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Wed,  2 Nov 2011 21:33:53 -0400 (EDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: OK
Received: by smtp28.relay.iad1a.emailsrvr.com (Authenticated sender: swilson-AT-lockstep.com.au) with ESMTPA id 4FF3CE031D for <pkix@ietf.org>; Wed,  2 Nov 2011 21:33:47 -0400 (EDT)
Message-ID: <4EB1EF6B.40402@lockstep.com.au>
Date: Thu, 03 Nov 2011 12:33:31 +1100
From: Stephen Wilson <swilson@lockstep.com.au>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 5.1; rv:7.0.1) Gecko/20110929 Thunderbird/7.0.1
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
References: <CAMm+Lwjc=M7h2mTN1AhHPH0LQGO+oN5JSFSG6my5ud5yJezXMA@mail.gmail.com> <guj18s9et8mrzli0yrjezwJv4X.penango@mail.gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <guj18s9et8mrzli0yrjezwJv4X.penango@mail.gmail.com>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="------------040606080003010305090305"
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
Reply-To: swilson@lockstep.com.au
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 03 Nov 2011 01:33:56 -0000

This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
--------------040606080003010305090305
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit


Whoah whoah whoah! PKI is already littered with pseudo legal nonsense, 
like "non repudiation".  But confusing corporations with natual persons 
is a new low.  I haven't followed the engineering pros and cons of this 
thread -- only for lack of time -- but I observe that arguing for 
technological changes because a corporation as "-died-" [shrill emphasis 
in the original] devalues the debate to near zero.

Stephen Wilson
Lockstep

http://lockstep.com.au
Lockstep Consulting provides independent specialist advice and analysis
on digital identity and privacy.Lockstep Technologies develops unique
new smart ID solutions that enhance privacy and prevent identity theft.



On 3/11/2011 11:44 AM, Kyle Hamilton wrote:
>
> On Wed, Nov 2, 2011 at 5:08 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker 
> <hallam@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> A person -died- because of this.  So I don't really see why this 
>>> isn't a
>>> concern to you.
>>
>> I am not aware of a death being reported linked to the DigiNotar 
>> incident.
>> Perhaps you can provide a source.
>
> The death of a corporate person, which body was forced insolvent, 
> dismantled and sold for scrap.  This is documented.  If you want 
> references, perhaps you should read the draft you're commenting on 
> (which actually does explain this).
>
> The death of a corporation is not to be taken lightly.  It directly 
> impacts the lives of all of its employees, deprives the state of a 
> taxpayer, and reduces the amount of tax revenue the state can extract 
> from that corporation's employees.
>
>> Several people have claimed that it 'must'
>> have resulted in deaths but these are not people who I know to have 
>> close
>> connections with the green movement in Iran.
>
> This is a red herring.  I'm not going to approach what the attacker 
> did with the certs.  That's far outside the realm of what PKIX can 
> control.
>
> What PKIX can control is how easy it is to get information that the 
> certificate was never validly issued.  This is something which it does 
> not currently do, and which my draft is intended to correct.
>
> (I'm also looking at the fact that there currently exist two main 
> sources of OCSP responses: the issuer and the relying party.  The 
> issuer currently can issue REVOKED for everything it knows wasn't 
> issued, but the relying party's OCSP responder doesn't know what 
> wasn't issued so it cannot ever legitimately answer VALID.  My draft 
> is a format to get information from the issuer to the relying party's 
> OCSP server more than anything else.)
>
>> Communications compromise due to SSL CA breach are serious but only one
>> compromise vector. Lost/confiscated laptops and mobiles are a much 
>> bigger
>> problem. Everyone involved knows that the authorities can and do arrest
>> people and force them to disclose contact information, passwords etc.
>
> Red herring.  The argument you propose is akin to demanding that the 
> banks which provide payment services for a multiple parties not bother 
> with securing the infrastructure which permits payments, simply 
> because 'everyone involved knows' that the state can mandate 
> disclosure anyway.  It is completely outside of the realm of what any 
> engineering task force can do, much less PKIX-WG.
>
> "Lost laptops" and "lost mobiles" are, indeed, a much bigger problem.  
> They are also completely out of scope for what this draft is intended 
> to address.  (I've other ideas that will be drafted to help deal with 
> this.)
>
> The world has never been changed by a nay-sayer.  The world has never 
> actually been improved by a nay-sayer.  There's a valid need for a 
> whitelist, and PKIX was warned as a body that by not providing defense 
> in-depth (not providing any means at all for defense-in-depth, 
> actually) the system would break.
>
> Now, it's time to clean up the mess that PKIX-WG has left CAs, 
> software manufacturers, and their interested and relying parties with.
>
> Since IETF is "Internet ENGINEERING Task Force", I seek comments from 
> implementors and engineers.
> -Kyle H
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix

--------------040606080003010305090305
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

<html>
  <head>
    <meta content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1"
      http-equiv="Content-Type">
  </head>
  <body bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
    <tt><br>
      Whoah whoah whoah! PKI is already littered with pseudo legal
      nonsense, like "non repudiation".&nbsp; But confusing corporations with
      natual persons is a new low.&nbsp; I haven't followed the engineering
      pros and cons of this thread -- only for lack of time -- but I
      observe that arguing for technological changes because a
      corporation as "-died-" [shrill emphasis in the original] devalues
      the debate to near zero.&nbsp; <br>
      <br>
    </tt>
    <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;
      charset=ISO-8859-1">
    <meta name="ProgId" content="Word.Document">
    <meta name="Generator" content="Microsoft Word 12">
    <meta name="Originator" content="Microsoft Word 12">
    <link rel="File-List"
href="file:///C:%5CDOCUME%7E1%5CSydney%5CLOCALS%7E1%5CTemp%5Cmsohtmlclip1%5C01%5Cclip_filelist.xml">
    <link rel="themeData"
href="file:///C:%5CDOCUME%7E1%5CSydney%5CLOCALS%7E1%5CTemp%5Cmsohtmlclip1%5C01%5Cclip_themedata.thmx">
    <link rel="colorSchemeMapping"
href="file:///C:%5CDOCUME%7E1%5CSydney%5CLOCALS%7E1%5CTemp%5Cmsohtmlclip1%5C01%5Cclip_colorschememapping.xml">
    <!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
 <w:WordDocument>
  <w:View>Normal</w:View>
  <w:Zoom>0</w:Zoom>
  <w:TrackMoves/>
  <w:TrackFormatting/>
  <w:PunctuationKerning/>
  <w:ValidateAgainstSchemas/>
  <w:SaveIfXMLInvalid>false</w:SaveIfXMLInvalid>
  <w:IgnoreMixedContent>false</w:IgnoreMixedContent>
  <w:AlwaysShowPlaceholderText>false</w:AlwaysShowPlaceholderText>
  <w:DoNotPromoteQF/>
  <w:LidThemeOther>EN-AU</w:LidThemeOther>
  <w:LidThemeAsian>X-NONE</w:LidThemeAsian>
  <w:LidThemeComplexScript>X-NONE</w:LidThemeComplexScript>
  <w:Compatibility>
   <w:BreakWrappedTables/>
   <w:SnapToGridInCell/>
   <w:WrapTextWithPunct/>
   <w:UseAsianBreakRules/>
   <w:DontGrowAutofit/>
   <w:SplitPgBreakAndParaMark/>
   <w:DontVertAlignCellWithSp/>
   <w:DontBreakConstrainedForcedTables/>
   <w:DontVertAlignInTxbx/>
   <w:Word11KerningPairs/>
   <w:CachedColBalance/>
  </w:Compatibility>
  <w:BrowserLevel>MicrosoftInternetExplorer4</w:BrowserLevel>
  <m:mathPr>
   <m:mathFont m:val="Cambria Math"/>
   <m:brkBin m:val="before"/>
   <m:brkBinSub m:val="&#45;-"/>
   <m:smallFrac m:val="off"/>
   <m:dispDef/>
   <m:lMargin m:val="0"/>
   <m:rMargin m:val="0"/>
   <m:defJc m:val="centerGroup"/>
   <m:wrapIndent m:val="1440"/>
   <m:intLim m:val="subSup"/>
   <m:naryLim m:val="undOvr"/>
  </m:mathPr></w:WordDocument>
</xml><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
 <w:LatentStyles DefLockedState="false" DefUnhideWhenUsed="true"
  DefSemiHidden="true" DefQFormat="false" DefPriority="99"
  LatentStyleCount="267">
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="0" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Normal"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="heading 1"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" QFormat="true" Name="heading 2"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" QFormat="true" Name="heading 3"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" QFormat="true" Name="heading 4"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" QFormat="true" Name="heading 5"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" QFormat="true" Name="heading 6"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" QFormat="true" Name="heading 7"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" QFormat="true" Name="heading 8"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" QFormat="true" Name="heading 9"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" Name="toc 1"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" Name="toc 2"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" Name="toc 3"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" Name="toc 4"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" Name="toc 5"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" Name="toc 6"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" Name="toc 7"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" Name="toc 8"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" Name="toc 9"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="35" QFormat="true" Name="caption"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="10" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Title"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="0" Name="Default Paragraph Font"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="11" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Subtitle"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="0" Name="Hyperlink"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="22" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Strong"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="20" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Emphasis"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="59" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Table Grid"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Placeholder Text"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="1" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="No Spacing"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Shading"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light List"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Grid"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 1"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 2"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 1"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 2"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 1"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 2"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 3"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Dark List"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Shading"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful List"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Grid"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Shading Accent 1"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light List Accent 1"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Grid Accent 1"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 1 Accent 1"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 2 Accent 1"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 1 Accent 1"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Revision"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="34" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="List Paragraph"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="29" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Quote"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="30" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Intense Quote"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 2 Accent 1"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 1 Accent 1"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 2 Accent 1"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 3 Accent 1"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Dark List Accent 1"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Shading Accent 1"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful List Accent 1"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Grid Accent 1"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Shading Accent 2"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light List Accent 2"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Grid Accent 2"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 1 Accent 2"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 2 Accent 2"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 1 Accent 2"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 2 Accent 2"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 1 Accent 2"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 2 Accent 2"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 3 Accent 2"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Dark List Accent 2"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Shading Accent 2"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful List Accent 2"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Grid Accent 2"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Shading Accent 3"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light List Accent 3"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Grid Accent 3"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 1 Accent 3"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 2 Accent 3"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 1 Accent 3"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 2 Accent 3"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 1 Accent 3"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 2 Accent 3"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 3 Accent 3"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Dark List Accent 3"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Shading Accent 3"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful List Accent 3"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Grid Accent 3"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Shading Accent 4"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light List Accent 4"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Grid Accent 4"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 1 Accent 4"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 2 Accent 4"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 1 Accent 4"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 2 Accent 4"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 1 Accent 4"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 2 Accent 4"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 3 Accent 4"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Dark List Accent 4"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Shading Accent 4"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful List Accent 4"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Grid Accent 4"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Shading Accent 5"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light List Accent 5"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Grid Accent 5"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 1 Accent 5"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 2 Accent 5"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 1 Accent 5"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 2 Accent 5"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 1 Accent 5"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 2 Accent 5"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 3 Accent 5"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Dark List Accent 5"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Shading Accent 5"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful List Accent 5"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Grid Accent 5"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Shading Accent 6"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light List Accent 6"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Grid Accent 6"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 1 Accent 6"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 2 Accent 6"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 1 Accent 6"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 2 Accent 6"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 1 Accent 6"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 2 Accent 6"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 3 Accent 6"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Dark List Accent 6"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Shading Accent 6"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful List Accent 6"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Grid Accent 6"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="19" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Subtle Emphasis"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="21" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Intense Emphasis"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="31" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Subtle Reference"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="32" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Intense Reference"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="33" SemiHidden="false"
   UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Book Title"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="37" Name="Bibliography"/>
  <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" QFormat="true" Name="TOC Heading"/>
 </w:LatentStyles>
</xml><![endif]-->
    <style>
<!--
 /* Font Definitions */
 @font-face
	{font-family:"Cambria Math";
	panose-1:2 4 5 3 5 4 6 3 2 4;
	mso-font-charset:0;
	mso-generic-font-family:roman;
	mso-font-pitch:variable;
	mso-font-signature:-1610611985 1107304683 0 0 159 0;}
 /* Style Definitions */
 p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal
	{mso-style-unhide:no;
	mso-style-qformat:yes;
	mso-style-parent:"";
	margin:0pt;
	margin-bottom:.0001pt;
	mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
	font-size:12.0pt;
	font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";
	mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman";
	mso-fareast-language:EN-US;}
a:link, span.MsoHyperlink
	{mso-style-unhide:no;
	color:blue;
	text-decoration:underline;
	text-underline:single;}
a:visited, span.MsoHyperlinkFollowed
	{mso-style-noshow:yes;
	mso-style-priority:99;
	color:purple;
	mso-themecolor:followedhyperlink;
	text-decoration:underline;
	text-underline:single;}
.MsoChpDefault
	{mso-style-type:export-only;
	mso-default-props:yes;
	font-size:10.0pt;
	mso-ansi-font-size:10.0pt;
	mso-bidi-font-size:10.0pt;}
@page WordSection1
	{size:612.0pt 792.0pt;
	margin:72.0pt 90.0pt 72.0pt 90.0pt;
	mso-header-margin:35.4pt;
	mso-footer-margin:35.4pt;
	mso-paper-source:0;}
div.WordSection1
	{page:WordSection1;}
-->
</style><!--[if gte mso 10]>
<style>
 /* Style Definitions */
 table.MsoNormalTable
	{mso-style-name:"Table Normal";
	mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0;
	mso-tstyle-colband-size:0;
	mso-style-noshow:yes;
	mso-style-priority:99;
	mso-style-qformat:yes;
	mso-style-parent:"";
	mso-padding-alt:0pt 5.4pt 0pt 5.4pt;
	mso-para-margin:0pt;
	mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt;
	mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
	font-size:11.0pt;
	font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
	mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri;
	mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin;
	mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman";
	mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-fareast;
	mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri;
	mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin;
	mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
	mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi;}
</style>
<![endif]-->
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
        style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;;
        mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;">Stephen Wilson<br>
        Lockstep <o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span
        style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;;
        mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;"><a
          href="http://lockstep.com.au">http://lockstep.com.au</a><br>
        Lockstep Consulting provides independent specialist advice and
        analysis <br>
        on digital identity and privacy.<span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;
        </span>Lockstep Technologies develops unique <br>
        new smart ID solutions that enhance privacy and prevent identity
        theft.<br style="mso-special-character:line-break">
        <!--[if !supportLineBreakNewLine]--><br
          style="mso-special-character:line-break">
        <!--[endif]--></span></p>
    <br>
    <tt><br>
      On 3/11/2011 11:44 AM, Kyle Hamilton wrote:</tt>
    <blockquote
      cite="mid:guj18s9et8mrzli0yrjezwJv4X.penango@mail.gmail.com"
      type="cite">
      <tt><br>
        On Wed, Nov 2, 2011 at 5:08 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker
        <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:hallam@gmail.com">&lt;hallam@gmail.com&gt;</a> wrote:
        <br>
      </tt>
      <blockquote type="cite">
        <blockquote type="cite"><tt>A person -died- because of this. &nbsp;So
            I don't really see why this isn't a
            <br>
            concern to you.
            <br>
          </tt></blockquote>
        <tt><br>
          I am not aware of a death being reported linked to the
          DigiNotar incident.
          <br>
          Perhaps you can provide a source.
          <br>
        </tt></blockquote>
      <tt><br>
        The death of a corporate person, which body was forced
        insolvent, dismantled and sold for scrap.&nbsp; This is documented.&nbsp;
        If you want references, perhaps you should read the draft you're
        commenting on (which actually does explain this).
        <br>
        <br>
        The death of a corporation is not to be taken lightly.&nbsp; It
        directly impacts the lives of all of its employees, deprives the
        state of a taxpayer, and reduces the amount of tax revenue the
        state can extract from that corporation's employees.
      </tt>
      <tt><br>
        <br>
      </tt>
      <blockquote type="cite"><tt>Several people have claimed that it
          'must'
          <br>
          have resulted in deaths but these are not people who I know to
          have close
          <br>
          connections with the green movement in Iran.
          <br>
        </tt></blockquote>
      <tt><br>
        This is a red herring.&nbsp; I'm not going to approach what the
        attacker did with the certs.&nbsp; That's far outside the realm of
        what PKIX can control.
        <br>
        <br>
        What PKIX can control is how easy it is to get information that
        the certificate was never validly issued.&nbsp; This is something
        which it does not currently do, and which my draft is intended
        to correct.
      </tt>
      <tt><br>
        <br>
        (I'm also looking at the fact that there currently exist two
        main sources of OCSP responses: the issuer and the relying
        party.&nbsp; The issuer currently can issue REVOKED for everything it
        knows wasn't issued, but the relying party's OCSP responder
        doesn't know what wasn't issued so it cannot ever legitimately
        answer VALID.&nbsp; My draft is a format to get information from the
        issuer to the relying party's OCSP server more than anything
        else.)
      </tt>
      <tt><br>
        <br>
      </tt>
      <blockquote type="cite"><tt>Communications compromise due to SSL
          CA breach are serious but only one
          <br>
          compromise vector. Lost/confiscated laptops and mobiles are a
          much bigger
          <br>
          problem. Everyone involved knows that the authorities can and
          do arrest
          <br>
          people and force them to disclose contact information,
          passwords etc.
          <br>
        </tt></blockquote>
      <tt><br>
        Red herring.&nbsp; The argument you propose is akin to demanding that
        the banks which provide payment services for a multiple parties
        not bother with securing the infrastructure which permits
        payments, simply because 'everyone involved knows' that the
        state can mandate disclosure anyway.&nbsp; It is completely outside
        of the realm of what any engineering task force can do, much
        less PKIX-WG.
        <br>
        <br>
        "Lost laptops" and "lost mobiles" are, indeed, a much bigger
        problem.&nbsp; They are also completely out of scope for what this
        draft is intended to address.&nbsp; (I've other ideas that will be
        drafted to help deal with this.)
      </tt>
      <tt><br>
        <br>
        The world has never been changed by a nay-sayer.&nbsp; The world has
        never actually been improved by a nay-sayer.&nbsp; There's a valid
        need for a whitelist, and PKIX was warned as a body that by not
        providing defense in-depth (not providing any means at all for
        defense-in-depth, actually) the system would break.
      </tt>
      <tt><br>
        <br>
        Now, it's time to clean up the mess that PKIX-WG has left CAs,
        software manufacturers, and their interested and relying parties
        with.
      </tt>
      <tt><br>
        <br>
        Since IETF is "Internet ENGINEERING Task Force", I seek comments
        from implementors and engineers.&nbsp; </tt>
      <tt><br>
        -Kyle H
        <br>
        <br>
      </tt>
      <fieldset class="mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
      <tt><br>
      </tt>
      <pre wrap=""><tt>_______________________________________________
pkix mailing list
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix</a>
</tt></pre>
    </blockquote>
  </body>
</html>

--------------040606080003010305090305--


From kyanha@kyanha.net  Wed Nov  2 18:37:42 2011
Return-Path: <kyanha@kyanha.net>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4B2AC11E80FE for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  2 Nov 2011 18:37:42 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.289
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.289 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.065, BAYES_00=-2.599, FM_FORGED_GMAIL=0.622, MIME_BASE64_TEXT=1.753, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id STtfMXnqccQY for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  2 Nov 2011 18:37:41 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-pz0-f50.google.com (mail-pz0-f50.google.com [209.85.210.50]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id BF6A511E80BB for <pkix@ietf.org>; Wed,  2 Nov 2011 18:37:41 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by pzk4 with SMTP id 4so920519pzk.9 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Wed, 02 Nov 2011 18:37:41 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by 10.68.28.133 with SMTP id b5mr8381597pbh.28.1320284261444; Wed, 02 Nov 2011 18:37:41 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from penango (c-67-188-178-93.hsd1.ca.comcast.net. [67.188.178.93]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPS id a4sm4998448pbd.7.2011.11.02.18.37.39 (version=SSLv3 cipher=OTHER); Wed, 02 Nov 2011 18:37:40 -0700 (PDT)
From: "Kyle Hamilton" <kyanha@kyanha.net>
To: "Phillip Hallam-Baker" <hallam@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 2 Nov 2011 18:37:37 -0700 (Pacific Daylight Time)
Message-ID: <guj35oxmjpkigv004wjezwJv4X.penango@mail.gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <CAMm+Lwjc=M7h2mTN1AhHPH0LQGO+oN5JSFSG6my5ud5yJezXMA@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAMm+Lwjc=M7h2mTN1AhHPH0LQGO+oN5JSFSG6my5ud5yJezXMA@mail.gmail.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/signed; protocol="application/pkcs7-signature"; micalg="sha1"; boundary=gmsm1.8.9.2eqguj35p0aaelehsho1x2
Cc: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 03 Nov 2011 01:37:42 -0000

This is an S/MIME signed message generated with Penango.
--gmsm1.8.9.2eqguj35p0aaelehsho1x2
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset=iso-8859-1
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--gmsm1.8.9.2eqguj35p0aaelehsho1x2
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="Verify This Message with Penango.p7s"
Content-Description: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-signature; name="Verify This Message with Penango.p7s"
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--gmsm1.8.9.2eqguj35p0aaelehsho1x2--


From pgut001@login01.cs.auckland.ac.nz  Wed Nov  2 18:41:49 2011
Return-Path: <pgut001@login01.cs.auckland.ac.nz>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9FE401F0C38 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  2 Nov 2011 18:41:49 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id kVxqsoS-MJ4t for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  2 Nov 2011 18:41:49 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mx2.auckland.ac.nz (mx2.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.12.44]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B81CD1F0C36 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Wed,  2 Nov 2011 18:41:48 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=auckland.ac.nz; i=pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz; q=dns/txt; s=uoa; t=1320284509; x=1351820509; h=from:to:subject:cc:in-reply-to:message-id:date; bh=ZdJb24h8AwLqQOitqIa03KhX7TolJTGVK8s4zct5Egc=; b=MWHTw1fRMb2JWg+ddm+yPLSW0Ak96iCk7P9piKn8HVmMINKcyRoKtEa5 qVtu1J3CxA/v+FTDehSEflLMAmCno3M9kCMKzh1n9pGbiszB9weLUanfU eqUoQM1cbKv5VqKLD4C0L9GYOy0dF9mgUcxtFu1r9OF9fZWRlxO8BLxyI s=;
X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.69,446,1315137600"; d="scan'208";a="88583985"
X-Ironport-HAT: UNIVERSITY - $RELAY-THROTTLE
X-Ironport-Source: 130.216.34.40 - Outgoing - Outgoing
Received: from login01.fos.auckland.ac.nz ([130.216.34.40]) by mx2-int.auckland.ac.nz with ESMTP/TLS/AES256-SHA; 03 Nov 2011 14:41:48 +1300
Received: from pgut001 by login01.fos.auckland.ac.nz with local (Exim 4.69) (envelope-from <pgut001@login01.cs.auckland.ac.nz>) id 1RLmJP-0003yM-3D; Thu, 03 Nov 2011 14:41:47 +1300
From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: hallam@gmail.com, kyanha@kyanha.net
In-Reply-To: <CAMm+LwiZ+72Do+RQ9SUQtifbcXVm53exwc3q6j5Pa9EL9nisww@mail.gmail.com>
Message-Id: <E1RLmJP-0003yM-3D@login01.fos.auckland.ac.nz>
Date: Thu, 03 Nov 2011 14:41:47 +1300
Cc: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 03 Nov 2011 01:41:49 -0000

Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com> writes:

>Corporations are not people. No really, they are not.
>
>This country already fought one civil war over the belief that people were
>property. Now there are people thinking that property is people. Both ways of
>thinking are wrong.

Right or wrong, most (all?) countries in the world recognise corporations as
legal people, just not natural people.  OTOH this is getting way, waaaay off
topic.

Peter.

From mrex@sap.com  Wed Nov  2 19:24:18 2011
Return-Path: <mrex@sap.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5B5541F0C45 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  2 Nov 2011 19:24:18 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -10.122
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-10.122 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.127, BAYES_00=-2.599, HELO_EQ_DE=0.35, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-8]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id UCln36a6pH89 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  2 Nov 2011 19:24:17 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtpde02.sap-ag.de (smtpde02.sap-ag.de [155.56.68.140]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 95F8F1F0C36 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Wed,  2 Nov 2011 19:24:17 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail.sap.corp by smtpde02.sap-ag.de (26) with ESMTP id pA32O71W007530 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=OK); Thu, 3 Nov 2011 03:24:07 +0100 (MET)
From: Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
Message-Id: <201111030224.pA32O6Nm023675@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp>
To: rob.stradling@comodo.com (Rob Stradling)
Date: Thu, 3 Nov 2011 03:24:06 +0100 (MET)
In-Reply-To: <201111011141.10411.rob.stradling@comodo.com> from "Rob Stradling" at Nov 1, 11 11:41:10 am
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-SAP: out
Cc: pkix@ietf.org, paul.hoffman@vpnc.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
Reply-To: mrex@sap.com
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 03 Nov 2011 02:24:18 -0000

Rob Stradling wrote:
> 
> On Monday 31 Oct 2011 17:35:48 Martin Rex wrote:
> >
> > ...and the client can indicate whether it still has cached OCSP-responses
> > available and for which server certificate chain, which would obviate the
> > sending of the stapled OCSP responses with each and every handshake (such as
> > abbreviated TLS handshakes, aka session resumes) and still work
> > successfully/transparently for credentials updates on the server.
> 
> Do you think the best way to accomplish this would be to extend draft-ietf-
> tls-cached-info ?

While in theory this could be done, I would not go down that road.

tls-cached-info is primarily to deal with data that is part of the
regular handshake.  While it is conceivable to apply it to TLS extension
payload as well, I would rather try to newly define a TLS extension
exactly with the desired properties (and accomodate serialized
DNSSEC records for DANE validation in that extension as an alternative).

I'm actually more appalled by the idea of the currently existing
OCSP-responses through TLS extension schemes/proposals that it
is built on the assumption that the server will perform an OCSP
request to an OCSP server specified by the clients and include
attributes supplied by the client in the request.  This might
require the server to perform multiple OCSP requests during
the handshake and result in several dozens of distinct
sets of OCSP responses per server certificate up to unique
sets of OCSP responses per each requests -- that's awfully
complex and extremely brittle.

If anything, I would be interested in a *SIMPLE* TLS extension
which results in _one_ single set of OCSP responses per server
certificate that the server can cache for several hours and
refresh truely asynchronous.  And that is something where
monitoring the OCSP retrieval on the server side would
make sense without having to define filters on which kind
of client-specified OCSP requests ought to be ignored for sanity.

-Martin

From hallam@gmail.com  Wed Nov  2 19:56:03 2011
Return-Path: <hallam@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A30CA1F0C38 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  2 Nov 2011 19:56:03 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -3.473
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.473 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.125,  BAYES_00=-2.599, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id jHl5mMwBJLJ3 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  2 Nov 2011 19:56:02 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-gx0-f172.google.com (mail-gx0-f172.google.com [209.85.161.172]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 932F61F0C36 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Wed,  2 Nov 2011 19:56:02 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by ggnv1 with SMTP id v1so930216ggn.31 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Wed, 02 Nov 2011 19:56:02 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=mmMFxp5gxTyL2YSdgHYLEjCvKtlmCM5aq4DHrQMyUTA=; b=l49iGcCThbXjemJaM1T4f9yQn1D+982UCfpSwaS+VY0DciNaDQ0LPIsK2vXWHBtREF sSkgT6Yl7/8JPTkh4Zuxax7fBU9YzLTg9MhBKKTyA35sPip4/8E3Jz2wHOKZu+AwsO1S 7lGD6Rk0VTiz91Yvp6PIBG282kYGtr3UnZW9Q=
MIME-Version: 1.0
Received: by 10.182.74.41 with SMTP id q9mr1459280obv.28.1320288961281; Wed, 02 Nov 2011 19:56:01 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by 10.182.42.99 with HTTP; Wed, 2 Nov 2011 19:56:01 -0700 (PDT)
In-Reply-To: <guj35oxmjpkigv004wjezwJv4X.penango@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAMm+Lwjc=M7h2mTN1AhHPH0LQGO+oN5JSFSG6my5ud5yJezXMA@mail.gmail.com> <guj35oxmjpkigv004wjezwJv4X.penango@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 2 Nov 2011 22:56:01 -0400
Message-ID: <CAMm+LwhRpFmmpdJuCuPLUzEFZMeZ0uiBLcub3Xs438GmnCSBHg@mail.gmail.com>
From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
To: Kyle Hamilton <kyanha@kyanha.net>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=f46d044470e389bdf704b0cbba29
Cc: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 03 Nov 2011 02:56:03 -0000

--f46d044470e389bdf704b0cbba29
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1

Your original claim was misleading and offensive.

Some of us here have a much closer relationship to the events in question
than you imagine. Do not take these matters lightly if you want to be taken
seriously here.



On Wed, Nov 2, 2011 at 9:37 PM, Kyle Hamilton <kyanha@kyanha.net> wrote:

>
> On Wed, Nov 2, 2011 at 6:01 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Corporations are not people. No really, they are not.
>>
>
> As long as the state disagrees, I must go with the state definition.  If I
> don't, then I'm living in a psychotic, delusional fantasy world which has
> no bearing on reality.
>
>
>  This country already fought one civil war over the belief that people were
>> property. Now there are people thinking that property is people. Both ways
>> of thinking are wrong.
>>
>
> In principle, I agree with you.  In practice, I can't.  We must live with
> the living, and respect the dead who got us to this state.
>
>  The death of a corporation is not to be taken lightly.  It directly
>>> impacts the lives of all of its employees, deprives the state of a
>>> taxpayer,
>>> and reduces the amount of tax revenue the state can extract from that
>>> corporation's employees.
>>>
>>
>> In this case we have real people's lives at stake.
>> Confusing the issue with hyperbole trivializes the issue.
>>
>
> Given that the IETF was set up under state contracts (DARPA), I must go
> with the state definition, because that's how the law works.  Don't like
> it?  Make political change in your sovereign, not the IETF.  NOTHING will
> be changed by your complaining that it's wrong.
>
> Also, corporation-as-person has a really nice side effect profile: it
> permits discussion of "the RP's OCSP responder" which is instituted by
> corporate governance.  Until a trustworthy (with issuance data)
> publicly-available subscription OCSP service exists, I'm going to assume
> that the reason for RP-based OCSP is to spread revocation information
> throughout the corporate body like an inoculation.
>
> That is where the disconnect between known-issued and known-revoked
> certificates is least obvious and particularly damaging.  The DigiNotar
> incident showed that the PKIX mechanisms were insufficient to meet the
> needs of the end-user.  Corporate risk managers had to instantly get new
> certificates, and thousands if not hundreds of thousands of guilders were
> spent by people (including corporations, via their paychecks to the natural
> people who perform the corporation's work) who were certified and had to do
> a new enrollment as a result.
>
> Now, DigiNotar has really gotten people's attention because now it's not
> just the corporations who are hurt by this.
>
> Hyperbole or not, I prefer to live in reality, where (however regrettably)
> the law says that corporations are people.  I'm not going to labor under
> any psychotic delusion that they have no standing under the law and cannot
> bring suit in their own names (which is part of the state definition of
> 'person', incidentally).  They are people, with birth (filing of articles
> of incorporation) and death (dissolution of corporation), until the law
> does not recognize them as such.
>
> -Kyle H
>



-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

--f46d044470e389bdf704b0cbba29
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Your original claim was misleading and offensive.<div><br></div><div>Some o=
f us here have a much closer relationship to the events in question than yo=
u imagine. Do not take these matters lightly if you want to be taken seriou=
sly here.<br>
<div><br></div><div><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Wed, Nov 2, 2011 =
at 9:37 PM, Kyle Hamilton <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:kyanha@ky=
anha.net">kyanha@kyanha.net</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"g=
mail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-l=
eft:1ex;">
<div class=3D"im"><br>
On Wed, Nov 2, 2011 at 6:01 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:=
hallam@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">hallam@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
Corporations are not people. No really, they are not.<br>
</blockquote>
<br></div>
As long as the state disagrees, I must go with the state definition. =A0If =
I don&#39;t, then I&#39;m living in a psychotic, delusional fantasy world w=
hich has no bearing on reality.<div class=3D"im"><br>
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
This country already fought one civil war over the belief that people were<=
br>
property. Now there are people thinking that property is people. Both ways<=
br>
of thinking are wrong.<br>
</blockquote>
<br></div>
In principle, I agree with you. =A0In practice, I can&#39;t. =A0We must liv=
e with the living, and respect the dead who got us to this state.<br>
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div class=3D"im"><blockquote class=3D"gmail=
_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:=
1ex">

The death of a corporation is not to be taken lightly. =A0It directly<br>
impacts the lives of all of its employees, deprives the state of a taxpayer=
,<br>
and reduces the amount of tax revenue the state can extract from that<br>
corporation&#39;s employees.<br>
</blockquote>
<br></div><div class=3D"im">
In this case we have real people&#39;s lives at stake.=A0<br>
Confusing the issue with hyperbole trivializes the issue.<br>
</div></blockquote>
<br>
Given that the IETF was set up under state contracts (DARPA), I must go wit=
h the state definition, because that&#39;s how the law works. =A0Don&#39;t =
like it? =A0Make political change in your sovereign, not the IETF. =A0NOTHI=
NG will be changed by your complaining that it&#39;s wrong.<br>

<br>
Also, corporation-as-person has a really nice side effect profile: it permi=
ts discussion of &quot;the RP&#39;s OCSP responder&quot; which is institute=
d by corporate governance. =A0Until a trustworthy (with issuance data) publ=
icly-available subscription OCSP service exists, I&#39;m going to assume th=
at the reason for RP-based OCSP is to spread revocation information through=
out the corporate body like an inoculation.<br>

<br>
That is where the disconnect between known-issued and known-revoked certifi=
cates is least obvious and particularly damaging. =A0The DigiNotar incident=
 showed that the PKIX mechanisms were insufficient to meet the needs of the=
 end-user. =A0Corporate risk managers had to instantly get new certificates=
, and thousands if not hundreds of thousands of guilders were spent by peop=
le (including corporations, via their paychecks to the natural people who p=
erform the corporation&#39;s work) who were certified and had to do a new e=
nrollment as a result.<br>

<br>
Now, DigiNotar has really gotten people&#39;s attention because now it&#39;=
s not just the corporations who are hurt by this.<br>
<br>
Hyperbole or not, I prefer to live in reality, where (however regrettably) =
the law says that corporations are people. =A0I&#39;m not going to labor un=
der any psychotic delusion that they have no standing under the law and can=
not bring suit in their own names (which is part of the state definition of=
 &#39;person&#39;, incidentally). =A0They are people, with birth (filing of=
 articles of incorporation) and death (dissolution of corporation), until t=
he law does not recognize them as such.<br>

<br>
-Kyle H<br>
</blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br>Website: <a =
href=3D"http://hallambaker.com/">http://hallambaker.com/</a><br><br>
</div></div>

--f46d044470e389bdf704b0cbba29--

From ynir@checkpoint.com  Thu Nov  3 00:15:22 2011
Return-Path: <ynir@checkpoint.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 524511F0C81 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 00:15:22 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -10.443
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-10.443 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.156, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-8]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id NNKVahzBE6-9 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 00:15:21 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from michael.checkpoint.com (smtp.checkpoint.com [194.29.34.68]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id F05C91F0C79 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 00:15:19 -0700 (PDT)
X-CheckPoint: {4EB23F20-10006-1B221DC2-FFFF}
Received: from il-ex01.ad.checkpoint.com (il-ex01.ad.checkpoint.com [194.29.34.26]) by michael.checkpoint.com (8.13.8/8.13.8) with ESMTP id pA37FGkS002171;  Thu, 3 Nov 2011 09:15:16 +0200
Received: from il-ex01.ad.checkpoint.com ([126.0.0.2]) by il-ex01.ad.checkpoint.com ([126.0.0.2]) with mapi; Thu, 3 Nov 2011 09:15:16 +0200
From: Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com>
To: Kyle Hamilton <kyanha@kyanha.net>, Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 3 Nov 2011 09:15:14 +0200
Thread-Topic: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
Thread-Index: AcyZ+FYEKbfyEnQQQ6SCbLR62n0BfA==
Message-ID: <CAD80910.882B%ynir@checkpoint.com>
In-Reply-To: <guj35oxmjpkigv004wjezwJv4X.penango@mail.gmail.com>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
user-agent: Microsoft-MacOutlook/14.13.0.110805
acceptlanguage: en-US
x-kse-antivirus-interceptor-info: scan successful
x-kse-antivirus-info: Clean
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Cc: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 03 Nov 2011 07:15:22 -0000

On 11/3/11 3:37 AM, "Kyle Hamilton" <kyanha@kyanha.net> wrote:

>
>On Wed, Nov 2, 2011 at 6:01 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
>wrote:
>> Corporations are not people. No really, they are not.
>
>As long as the state disagrees, I must go with the state definition.  If
>I don't, then I'm living in a psychotic, delusional fantasy world which
>has no bearing on reality.

No, the state does not disagree. Corporations are variously called
"fictitious person", "legal entity", or "legal person". That does not mean
that they are people. They don't get the same rights as real people. The
legal fiction is only necessary so that corporations can own property,
take on obligations (contracts), sue, and be sued.

I can own a corporation, but I can't own a natural person. If I decide to
close a corporation that I own (make it "die" by your words) I don't think
I'm going to jail for murder.

It's enough to say that the DigiNotar incident had economic consequences.
That's a good enough reason to take action without talking about dead
people.=20

I also think it's wrong to focus on the damage to DigiNotar. They were
hacked, their customers and partners lost confidence, and they had to shut
down. Businesses not living up to their customers' expectations and having
to close down is a common event in any industry, and is not unique to the
security industry. We should devote greater attention to the damage
(economic or physical) that is suffered by relying parties and end
entities - the web surfers and the website owners. Those are unique to the
PKI industry, so they're directly related to this working group.

As an analogy, if we were writing standards for bullet-proof vests, and
there was this company that made bad vests and sold them to police forces
and the army, we would be worried about the police officers and the
soldiers, who might suffer some real death more than about the
manufacturer with its fictional person death.


From kyanha@kyanha.net  Thu Nov  3 02:22:39 2011
Return-Path: <kyanha@kyanha.net>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id DA80E1F0C88 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 02:22:39 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.284
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.284 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.060, BAYES_00=-2.599, FM_FORGED_GMAIL=0.622, MIME_BASE64_TEXT=1.753, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id kPhLNAApV2UX for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 02:22:39 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-yw0-f44.google.com (mail-yw0-f44.google.com [209.85.213.44]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E4AFB1F0C81 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 02:22:38 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by ywt2 with SMTP id 2so1282222ywt.31 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu, 03 Nov 2011 02:22:38 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by 10.68.20.134 with SMTP id n6mr11205264pbe.16.1320312157518; Thu, 03 Nov 2011 02:22:37 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from penango (c-67-188-178-93.hsd1.ca.comcast.net. [67.188.178.93]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPS id p10sm11649812pbd.15.2011.11.03.02.22.35 (version=SSLv3 cipher=OTHER); Thu, 03 Nov 2011 02:22:36 -0700 (PDT)
From: "Kyle Hamilton" <kyanha@kyanha.net>
To: mrex@sap.com
Date: Thu, 3 Nov 2011 02:22:30 -0700 (Pacific Daylight Time)
Message-ID: <gujjrj56m2femn14efjezwJv4X.penango@mail.gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <201110271717.p9RHH5LF025823@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp>
References: <B8E4DC0DD2F9A74AB88B4529E8FED39CF6E62450@MX22A.corp.emc.com> from "Walter.Goulet@rsa.com" at Oct 27, 11 12:59:27 pm <201110271717.p9RHH5LF025823@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/signed; protocol="application/pkcs7-signature"; micalg="sha1"; boundary=gmsm1.8.9.2eqgujjrj8ey3wnz5iwz32
Cc: pkix@ietf.org, paul.hoffman@vpnc.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 03 Nov 2011 09:22:40 -0000

This is an S/MIME signed message generated with Penango.
--gmsm1.8.9.2eqgujjrj8ey3wnz5iwz32
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset=iso-8859-1
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=
--gmsm1.8.9.2eqgujjrj8ey3wnz5iwz32
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="Verify This Message with Penango.p7s"
Content-Description: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-signature; name="Verify This Message with Penango.p7s"
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--gmsm1.8.9.2eqgujjrj8ey3wnz5iwz32--


From rob.stradling@comodo.com  Thu Nov  3 03:44:45 2011
Return-Path: <rob.stradling@comodo.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A6F121F0C9A for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 03:44:45 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.000,  BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 4rKXKMICpQUX for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 03:44:45 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mmmail1.mcr.colo.comodoca.net (mdfw.comodoca.net [91.209.196.68]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id CBAC51F0C94 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 03:44:43 -0700 (PDT)
Received: (qmail 1204 invoked from network); 3 Nov 2011 10:44:42 -0000
Received: from ian.bd.office.comodo.net (HELO ian.brad.office.comodo.net) (192.168.0.201) by mail.colo.comodoca.net with ESMTPS (DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA encrypted); 3 Nov 2011 10:44:42 -0000
Received: (qmail 2407 invoked by uid 1000); 3 Nov 2011 10:44:41 -0000
Received: from nigel.brad.office.comodo.net (HELO nigel.localnet) (192.168.0.58) by ian.brad.office.comodo.net (qpsmtpd/0.40) with (AES256-SHA encrypted) ESMTPS; Thu, 03 Nov 2011 10:44:41 +0000
From: Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>
To: mrex@sap.com
Date: Thu, 3 Nov 2011 10:44:40 +0000
User-Agent: KMail/1.13.7 (Linux/3.0.6-gentoo; KDE/4.6.5; i686; ; )
References: <201111030224.pA32O6Nm023675@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp>
In-Reply-To: <201111030224.pA32O6Nm023675@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: Text/Plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Message-Id: <201111031044.41037.rob.stradling@comodo.com>
Cc: pkix@ietf.org, paul.hoffman@vpnc.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 03 Nov 2011 10:44:45 -0000

On Thursday 03 Nov 2011 02:24:06 Martin Rex wrote:
<snip>
> I'm actually more appalled by the idea of the currently existing
> OCSP-responses through TLS extension schemes/proposals that it
> is built on the assumption that the server will perform an OCSP
> request to an OCSP server specified by the clients and include
> attributes supplied by the client in the request.  This might
> require the server to perform multiple OCSP requests during
> the handshake and result in several dozens of distinct
> sets of OCSP responses per server certificate up to unique
> sets of OCSP responses per each requests -- that's awfully
> complex and extremely brittle.

Agreed.  However, it looks like the TLS Server is free to ignore the 
"attributes supplied by the client" and staple a cached OCSP Response.

http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6066#section-8 says...
"Servers that receive a client hello containing the "status_request" extension 
MAY return a suitable certificate status response to the client along with 
their certificate.  If OCSP is requested, they (Servers) SHOULD use the 
information contained in the extension when selecting an OCSP responder and 
SHOULD include request_extensions in the OCSP request".

(Note: 1 MAY and 2 SHOULDs, rather than 3 MUST/REQUIRED/SHALLs)

<snip>

Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online

From rob.stradling@comodo.com  Thu Nov  3 04:16:07 2011
Return-Path: <rob.stradling@comodo.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E13601F0C3C for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 04:16:07 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 2BI0TM9dCspM for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 04:16:07 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mmmail1.mcr.colo.comodoca.net (mdfw.comodoca.net [91.209.196.68]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 04A171F0C81 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 04:16:06 -0700 (PDT)
Received: (qmail 12192 invoked from network); 3 Nov 2011 11:16:01 -0000
Received: from ian.bd.office.comodo.net (HELO ian.brad.office.comodo.net) (192.168.0.201) by mail.colo.comodoca.net with ESMTPS (DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA encrypted); 3 Nov 2011 11:16:01 -0000
Received: (qmail 19445 invoked by uid 1000); 3 Nov 2011 11:16:00 -0000
Received: from nigel.brad.office.comodo.net (HELO nigel.localnet) (192.168.0.58) by ian.brad.office.comodo.net (qpsmtpd/0.40) with (AES256-SHA encrypted) ESMTPS; Thu, 03 Nov 2011 11:16:00 +0000
From: Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>
To: "Kyle Hamilton" <kyanha@kyanha.net>
Date: Thu, 3 Nov 2011 11:15:59 +0000
User-Agent: KMail/1.13.7 (Linux/3.0.6-gentoo; KDE/4.6.5; i686; ; )
References: <B8E4DC0DD2F9A74AB88B4529E8FED39CF6E62450@MX22A.corp.emc.com> <201110271717.p9RHH5LF025823@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp> <gujjrj56m2femn14efjezwJv4X.penango@mail.gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <gujjrj56m2femn14efjezwJv4X.penango@mail.gmail.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: Text/Plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Message-Id: <201111031115.59433.rob.stradling@comodo.com>
Cc: pkix@ietf.org, paul.hoffman@vpnc.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 03 Nov 2011 11:16:08 -0000

On Thursday 03 Nov 2011 09:22:30 Kyle Hamilton wrote:
<snip>
> > If anything, I would be interested in a *SIMPLE* TLS extension
> > which results in _one_ single set of OCSP responses per server
> > certificate that the server can cache for several hours and
> > refresh truely asynchronous.  And that is something where
> > monitoring the OCSP retrieval on the server side would
> > make sense without having to define filters on which kind
> > of client-specified OCSP requests ought to be ignored for sanity.
> 
> I think that this is inappropriate as a TLS extension.

Why do you think this?

> Instead, the problem can be completely solved in PKIX.

Maybe it could, but IMHO that's not an argument for why it might be 
"inappropriate as a TLS extension".

<snip>

Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online

From tmiller@mitre.org  Thu Nov  3 05:01:59 2011
Return-Path: <tmiller@mitre.org>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D646611E80FA for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 05:01:59 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id xyRuVZpLiKVb for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 05:01:59 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (smtpksrv1.mitre.org [198.49.146.77]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2FD8611E80E8 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 05:01:59 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by localhost (Postfix) with SMTP id BFDDF21B1876; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 08:01:54 -0400 (EDT)
Received: from IMCCAS03.MITRE.ORG (imccas03.mitre.org [129.83.29.80]) by smtpksrv1.mitre.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id AF6D421B1007; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 08:01:54 -0400 (EDT)
Received: from IMCMBX01.MITRE.ORG ([169.254.1.57]) by IMCCAS03.MITRE.ORG ([129.83.29.80]) with mapi id 14.01.0339.001; Thu, 3 Nov 2011 08:01:54 -0400
From: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
To: Kyle Hamilton <kyanha@kyanha.net>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
Thread-Index: AQHMmOR+3o6yhaO2SES0DD1Qj9f8npWZbmMAgADWC4CAALnHAA==
Date: Thu, 3 Nov 2011 12:01:54 +0000
Message-ID: <CAD7EC92.1FBD%tmiller@mitre.org>
In-Reply-To: <guiqzn5a187ivcfzdyjezwJv4X.penango@mail.gmail.com>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: yes
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
user-agent: Microsoft-MacOutlook/14.13.0.110805
x-originating-ip: [172.31.62.101]
Content-Type: multipart/signed; protocol="application/pkcs7-signature"; micalg=sha1; boundary="B_3403148514_9848185"
MIME-Version: 1.0
Cc: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 03 Nov 2011 12:02:00 -0000

--B_3403148514_9848185
Content-type: text/plain;
	charset="US-ASCII"
Content-transfer-encoding: 7bit

On 11/2/11 2:56 PM, "Kyle Hamilton" <kyanha@kyanha.net> wrote:

>No, it won't, not if the CA's hardware was induced to do something that
>wasn't authorized.

If the CA is compromised, the game is over and whitelisting won't save it.
 A compromised CA will generate false CRLs and whitelists equally well.

-- T

--B_3403148514_9848185
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-signature; name="smime.p7s"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="smime.p7s"
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--B_3403148514_9848185--

From tmiller@mitre.org  Thu Nov  3 05:23:14 2011
Return-Path: <tmiller@mitre.org>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B0DD41F0C5F for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 05:23:13 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.000,  BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id cS7nBcRQVS5Q for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 05:23:12 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (smtpksrv1.mitre.org [198.49.146.77]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B6F951F0C61 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 05:23:12 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by localhost (Postfix) with SMTP id 602BD21B091A; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 08:23:10 -0400 (EDT)
Received: from IMCCAS01.MITRE.ORG (imccas01.mitre.org [129.83.29.78]) by smtpksrv1.mitre.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 536F921B048B; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 08:23:10 -0400 (EDT)
Received: from IMCMBX01.MITRE.ORG ([169.254.1.57]) by IMCCAS01.MITRE.ORG ([129.83.29.78]) with mapi id 14.01.0339.001; Thu, 3 Nov 2011 08:23:09 -0400
From: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
To: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
Thread-Index: AQHMmOR+3o6yhaO2SES0DD1Qj9f8npWZbmMAgAEZQACAAHyAAA==
Date: Thu, 3 Nov 2011 12:23:09 +0000
Message-ID: <CAD7ED0F.1FBF%tmiller@mitre.org>
In-Reply-To: <CAMm+Lwi4eQkk8FdTNZr8fojNCK62GN_n8opOCbgQX6V3PZztLQ@mail.gmail.com>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
user-agent: Microsoft-MacOutlook/14.13.0.110805
x-originating-ip: [172.31.62.101]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-ID: <50388300CC4B0E4993A0437BD2FF039E@imc.mitre.org>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Cc: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 03 Nov 2011 12:23:14 -0000

So let me summarize the problem(s) that I think you're trying to address:

1. A CA is defrauded and issues certificates (e.g. Verisign, 2001).

2. A CA is compromised and issues certificates (e.g. DigiNotar et.al.,
2011).

3. A Subscriber certificate fraudulently claims to be issued from a CA
where it was not, in fact, issued.

In (1), blacklisting the issued certificates works; whitelisting gains you
nothing.  When the fraud is detected, the certificates are revoked, the
CRL works its way through the infrastructure, and eventually no-one trusts
the fraudulent certificates.  Whitelisting is ineffective because the
fraudulent certificates *are on the whitelist* (at least until they are
discovered, at which point they move to the blacklist).

In (2), neither blacklisting nor whitelisting the issued certificates is
effective because the CA is authoritative for the both.  A malicious
trusted user of the CA can remove revoked certificates from the CRL, and
can insert certificate records into the database.  The only effective
response in this case is to blacklist the CA, which invalidates anything
that CA has issued.

In (3), the fraud should be detected by certificate path discovery.  The
claimed issuer won't be in the discovered path, and the whitelist is never
referenced.  What they relying party does with this information is their
own decision.

CRLs may be insufficient in some cases; e.g., the Verisign incident
involved code signing certificates which for good or ill have a special
validation logic, and a general lack of CRL checking meant that DigiNotar
CA revocation weren't being honored.  However, the 'fix' for both cases
was just another form of blacklisting (e.g., see "Untrusted Certificates"
in any Windows CAPI instance).

Finally, we know with CRLs that too many relying parties simply ignore
them.  Why would whitelists (CVLs?  NegaCRLs?) be any different?  What
compels a relying party to check a whitelist when it currently doesn't
check a blacklist?

And on a personal note, I'm not trying to 'veto' anything.  IETF doesn't
work that way.  I'm just trying to understand what the goal is and give my
opinion.

-- T


From tmiller@mitre.org  Thu Nov  3 05:35:21 2011
Return-Path: <tmiller@mitre.org>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 567EA11E80F9 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 05:35:21 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id QsWyVjabgzLq for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 05:35:20 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (smtpksrv1.mitre.org [198.49.146.77]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id DB56E11E8088 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 05:35:20 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by localhost (Postfix) with SMTP id 6605221B03EC; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 08:35:16 -0400 (EDT)
Received: from IMCCAS02.MITRE.ORG (imccas02.mitre.org [129.83.29.79]) by smtpksrv1.mitre.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5974621B0151; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 08:35:16 -0400 (EDT)
Received: from IMCMBX01.MITRE.ORG ([169.254.1.57]) by IMCCAS02.MITRE.ORG ([129.83.29.79]) with mapi id 14.01.0339.001; Thu, 3 Nov 2011 08:35:15 -0400
From: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
To: Kyle Hamilton <kyanha@kyanha.net>, "mrex@sap.com" <mrex@sap.com>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version
Thread-Index: AQHMmgoc6CmUY2saPEyZJmaoCSAF/5WbBMUA
Date: Thu, 3 Nov 2011 12:35:14 +0000
Message-ID: <CAD7F424.1FEE%tmiller@mitre.org>
In-Reply-To: <gujjrj56m2femn14efjezwJv4X.penango@mail.gmail.com>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
user-agent: Microsoft-MacOutlook/14.13.0.110805
x-originating-ip: [172.31.0.176]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-ID: <082CD7B9A1787544A8D495CF6A426217@imc.mitre.org>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Cc: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>, "paul.hoffman@vpnc.org" <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 03 Nov 2011 12:35:21 -0000

On 11/3/11 4:22 AM, "Kyle Hamilton" <kyanha@kyanha.net> wrote:

>Have a self-signed certificate which contains everything -- not just one
>certificate chain, but several certificate chains.  Not just one OCSP
>response, but several OCSP responses.  Not just one timestamp, but
>several timestamps.  Have provable signature chains, all of which end up
>signing the self-certified key inside a certificate extension, which
>self-certified key is used to authenticate TLS.  If any one of those
>identity chains is trusted, then the ownership of the key can in fact be
>determined and the connection meets browser https standards.

Color me confused, but how is this different from SPKI delegation?
Wouldn't that be simpler?

-- T


From hallam@gmail.com  Thu Nov  3 05:37:48 2011
Return-Path: <hallam@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6CCED11E810F for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 05:37:48 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -3.479
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.479 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.119,  BAYES_00=-2.599, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id BhIWB68oEhFZ for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 05:37:47 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-vx0-f172.google.com (mail-vx0-f172.google.com [209.85.220.172]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6BD6811E8110 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 05:37:47 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by vcbfl11 with SMTP id fl11so1222115vcb.31 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu, 03 Nov 2011 05:37:47 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=4PzqLAZhK6HhwNXnozhebGfX6ik0gXKs6q53vSG1AQc=; b=Ao2GioAlhIirWQGMAOJYIdaVGtV2frV6uXlBKLp3pJyIBbtiPUgG1miNpPcrG/gDvl YEmMGQSnmj2jLYr8s4nVUnnuUBgE8opfxNinGHfxMu+sgz1JalKIBBpI9mebc81GKWzX qdhyve1StGGY3Eo1n3OQjDddQD9LLT4zBwHLk=
MIME-Version: 1.0
Received: by 10.182.74.41 with SMTP id q9mr1834848obv.28.1320323866745; Thu, 03 Nov 2011 05:37:46 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by 10.182.42.99 with HTTP; Thu, 3 Nov 2011 05:37:46 -0700 (PDT)
In-Reply-To: <CAD7EC92.1FBD%tmiller@mitre.org>
References: <guiqzn5a187ivcfzdyjezwJv4X.penango@mail.gmail.com> <CAD7EC92.1FBD%tmiller@mitre.org>
Date: Thu, 3 Nov 2011 08:37:46 -0400
Message-ID: <CAMm+LwgDzckznfhB6Kk6rxr-i=tv5gZfYse9SYkrfk-8pXpt_g@mail.gmail.com>
From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
To: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=f46d044470e310dcd504b0d3db42
Cc: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 03 Nov 2011 12:37:48 -0000

--f46d044470e310dcd504b0d3db42
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1

On Thu, Nov 3, 2011 at 8:01 AM, Miller, Timothy J. <tmiller@mitre.org>wrote:

> On 11/2/11 2:56 PM, "Kyle Hamilton" <kyanha@kyanha.net> wrote:
>
> >No, it won't, not if the CA's hardware was induced to do something that
> >wasn't authorized.
>
> If the CA is compromised, the game is over and whitelisting won't save it.
>  A compromised CA will generate false CRLs and whitelists equally well.


That was the old thinking. It is not the current thinking.

In the DigiNotar case, whitelisting could have allowed the issue to be
detected much earlier.


The authoritative source for status information is and always has been the
CA certificate database. At present the specs are defective in not
supporting disclosure of 'does not exist'.

I don't see any valid technical reason not to do so. The third party
responder thing seems to me to be a commercial issue, not a technical one.


-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

--f46d044470e310dcd504b0d3db42
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Thu, Nov 3, 2011 at 8:01 AM, Miller, =
Timothy J. <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:tmiller@mitre.org">tmill=
er@mitre.org</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" sty=
le=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
<div class=3D"im">On 11/2/11 2:56 PM, &quot;Kyle Hamilton&quot; &lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:kyanha@kyanha.net">kyanha@kyanha.net</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
<br>
&gt;No, it won&#39;t, not if the CA&#39;s hardware was induced to do someth=
ing that<br>
&gt;wasn&#39;t authorized.<br>
<br>
</div>If the CA is compromised, the game is over and whitelisting won&#39;t=
 save it.<br>
=A0A compromised CA will generate false CRLs and whitelists equally well.</=
blockquote><div><br></div><div>That was the old thinking. It is not the cur=
rent thinking.</div><div><br></div><div>In the DigiNotar case, whitelisting=
 could have allowed the issue to be detected much earlier.</div>
</div><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div><div>The authoritative source for st=
atus information is and always has been the CA certificate database. At pre=
sent the specs are defective in not supporting disclosure of &#39;does not =
exist&#39;.</div>
<div><br></div><div>I don&#39;t see any valid technical reason not to do so=
. The third party responder thing seems to me to be a commercial issue, not=
 a technical one.=A0</div><div><br></div><div><br></div>-- <br>Website: <a =
href=3D"http://hallambaker.com/">http://hallambaker.com/</a><br>
<br>

--f46d044470e310dcd504b0d3db42--

From tmiller@mitre.org  Thu Nov  3 05:57:16 2011
Return-Path: <tmiller@mitre.org>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B81F511E80D2 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 05:57:16 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id oAi2FhOibv7l for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 05:57:16 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (smtpksrv1.mitre.org [198.49.146.77]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4392C11E808E for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 05:57:16 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by localhost (Postfix) with SMTP id BB9BE21B138B; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 08:57:15 -0400 (EDT)
Received: from IMCCAS01.MITRE.ORG (imccas01.mitre.org [129.83.29.78]) by smtpksrv1.mitre.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id AE6F321B0962; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 08:57:15 -0400 (EDT)
Received: from IMCMBX01.MITRE.ORG ([169.254.1.57]) by IMCCAS01.MITRE.ORG ([129.83.29.78]) with mapi id 14.01.0339.001; Thu, 3 Nov 2011 08:57:15 -0400
From: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
To: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
Thread-Index: AQHMmOR+3o6yhaO2SES0DD1Qj9f8npWZbmMAgADWC4CAALnHAIAAXdcA//+xnYA=
Date: Thu, 3 Nov 2011 12:57:14 +0000
Message-ID: <CAD7F7D5.2003%tmiller@mitre.org>
In-Reply-To: <CAMm+LwgDzckznfhB6Kk6rxr-i=tv5gZfYse9SYkrfk-8pXpt_g@mail.gmail.com>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
user-agent: Microsoft-MacOutlook/14.13.0.110805
x-originating-ip: [172.31.0.176]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-ID: <C430EF7001A0CE45B4BF374D02EA23FF@imc.mitre.org>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Cc: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 03 Nov 2011 12:57:16 -0000

On 11/3/11 7:37 AM, "Phillip Hallam-Baker" <hallam@gmail.com> wrote:

>That was the old thinking. It is not the current thinking.

Maybe not yours, but so far I can't seem to grasp exactly why you think
that way.

>In the DigiNotar case, whitelisting could have allowed the issue to be
>detected much earlier.

Ok, how?  Give me a scenario.

>The authoritative source for status information is and always has been
>the CA certificate database. At present the specs are defective in not
>supporting disclosure of 'does not exist'.

DigiNotar and Comodo were attacked through compromised Registration
Authority account credentials.  The attacker in these cases was acting as
an authorized RA.  This means that as far as internal processes at the CA
are concerned, the fraudulent certificates were properly issued and had
entries in the CA database.

Detecting which certificates were frauds required checking the CA database
against data external to the CA--e.g., paperwork, email, payment records,
etc.--because the CA database itself was at question.  So where does the
whitelist fit in again?


-- T


From rob.stradling@comodo.com  Thu Nov  3 06:11:07 2011
Return-Path: <rob.stradling@comodo.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 37AC011E80F4 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 06:11:07 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.000,  BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 6SMFh1BDAPK0 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 06:11:06 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mmmail1.mcr.colo.comodoca.net (mdfw.comodoca.net [91.209.196.68]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0D80E21F8D24 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 06:11:05 -0700 (PDT)
Received: (qmail 24655 invoked from network); 3 Nov 2011 13:11:01 -0000
Received: from ian.bd.office.comodo.net (HELO ian.brad.office.comodo.net) (192.168.0.201) by mail.colo.comodoca.net with ESMTPS (DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA encrypted); 3 Nov 2011 13:11:01 -0000
Received: (qmail 18027 invoked by uid 1000); 3 Nov 2011 13:11:01 -0000
Received: from nigel.brad.office.comodo.net (HELO nigel.localnet) (192.168.0.58) by ian.brad.office.comodo.net (qpsmtpd/0.40) with (AES256-SHA encrypted) ESMTPS; Thu, 03 Nov 2011 13:11:01 +0000
From: Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>
To: pkix@ietf.org
Date: Thu, 3 Nov 2011 13:10:58 +0000
User-Agent: KMail/1.13.7 (Linux/3.0.6-gentoo; KDE/4.6.5; i686; ; )
References: <CAD7F7D5.2003%tmiller@mitre.org>
In-Reply-To: <CAD7F7D5.2003%tmiller@mitre.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: Text/Plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Message-Id: <201111031311.00428.rob.stradling@comodo.com>
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 03 Nov 2011 13:11:07 -0000

On Thursday 03 Nov 2011 12:57:14 Miller, Timothy J. wrote:
> On 11/3/11 7:37 AM, "Phillip Hallam-Baker" <hallam@gmail.com> wrote:
> >That was the old thinking. It is not the current thinking.
> 
> Maybe not yours, but so far I can't seem to grasp exactly why you think
> that way.
> 
> >In the DigiNotar case, whitelisting could have allowed the issue to be
> >detected much earlier.
> 
> Ok, how?  Give me a scenario.

http://isc.sans.edu/diary.html?storyid=11512

"Some of the CA servers have had parts of their logs deleted, leading to 
DigiNotar not knowing what certificates were issued."

"The OCSP server's working at DigiNotar has been reversed since Sept 1st. 
Normally these servers respond with good to all certificates except those on 
the CRL (a blacklist). The OCSP now operates in whitelist mode: it will call 
all unknown certificates signed by DigiNotar as revoked (a whitelist). 
Hence we need to make sure to use the OCSP server to validate DigiNotar 
certificates -should we want/need to- and not rely on the published CRLs 
anymore."

> >The authoritative source for status information is and always has been
> >the CA certificate database. At present the specs are defective in not
> >supporting disclosure of 'does not exist'.
> 
> DigiNotar and Comodo were attacked through compromised Registration
> Authority account credentials.  The attacker in these cases was acting as
> an authorized RA.  This means that as far as internal processes at the CA
> are concerned, the fraudulent certificates were properly issued and had
> entries in the CA database.

In the Comodo case, yes, the fraudulent certificates did have entries in our CA 
database.  They were detected and revoked within a few hours of being issued.

> Detecting which certificates were frauds required checking the CA database
> against data external to the CA--e.g., paperwork, email, payment records,
> etc.--because the CA database itself was at question.  So where does the
> whitelist fit in again?
> 
> 
> -- T
> 
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix

Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online
Office Tel: +44.(0)1274.730505
Office Fax: +44.(0)1274.730909
www.comodo.com

COMODO CA Limited, Registered in England No. 04058690
Registered Office:
  3rd Floor, 26 Office Village, Exchange Quay,
  Trafford Road, Salford, Manchester M5 3EQ

This e-mail and any files transmitted with it are confidential and intended
solely for the use of the individual or entity to whom they are addressed.
If you have received this email in error please notify the sender by replying
to the e-mail containing this attachment. Replies to this email may be
monitored by Comodo for operational or business reasons. Whilst every
endeavour is taken to ensure that e-mails are free from viruses, no liability
can be accepted and the recipient is requested to use their own virus checking
software.

From DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil  Thu Nov  3 06:52:19 2011
Return-Path: <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 51EAD11E8127 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 06:52:15 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id laO0wLtA5nWl for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 06:52:14 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from stingray.missi.ncsc.mil (stingray.missi.ncsc.mil [144.51.50.20]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id F0F5D11E8087 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 06:52:13 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from AUGUSTINE.missi.ncsc.mil (augustine.missi.ncsc.mil [144.51.60.33]) by stingray.missi.ncsc.mil with ESMTP id pA3DpxFF003120; Thu, 3 Nov 2011 09:51:59 -0400 (EDT)
Received: from DABECK.missi.ncsc.mil ([144.51.60.15]) by AUGUSTINE.missi.ncsc.mil with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.4675);  Thu, 3 Nov 2011 09:52:35 -0400
Content-class: urn:content-classes:message
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft Exchange V6.5
Date: Thu, 3 Nov 2011 09:51:59 -0400
Message-ID: <C1A47F1540DF3246A8D30C853C05D0DA01B96B6B@DABECK.missi.ncsc.mil>
In-Reply-To: <201111031311.00428.rob.stradling@comodo.com>
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
Thread-Topic: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New VersionNotification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
Thread-Index: AcyaKhbBbg2Kx5XQT3O6IjXuCgQhmQABCaWA
References: <CAD7F7D5.2003%tmiller@mitre.org> <201111031311.00428.rob.stradling@comodo.com>
From: "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>
To: "Rob Stradling" <rob.stradling@comodo.com>, <pkix@ietf.org>
X-OriginalArrivalTime: 03 Nov 2011 13:52:35.0250 (UTC) FILETIME=[D7427920:01CC9A2F]
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New VersionNotification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 03 Nov 2011 13:52:19 -0000

"logs deleted"?  If the CA does not have a database, and database
backups, and audit logs, and offsite audit log backups, showing what
certificate serial numbers have been signed (only one of which would be
needed to reconstruct current CRLs), that pretty much makes the case
that neither a whitelist nor a blacklist is worth the bits it is printed
on.  Given the lack of even rudimentary availability controls, what
would make any RP believe that a cert, listed on a whitelist or not, has
any validity?

Dave


-----Original Message-----
From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
Rob Stradling

http://isc.sans.edu/diary.html?storyid=3D11512

"Some of the CA servers have had parts of their logs deleted, leading to
DigiNotar not knowing what certificates were issued."

"The OCSP server's working at DigiNotar has been reversed since Sept
1st.=20
Normally these servers respond with good to all certificates except
those on the CRL (a blacklist). The OCSP now operates in whitelist mode:
it will call all unknown certificates signed by DigiNotar as revoked (a
whitelist).=20
Hence we need to make sure to use the OCSP server to validate DigiNotar
certificates -should we want/need to- and not rely on the published CRLs
anymore."


From kent@bbn.com  Thu Nov  3 08:12:30 2011
Return-Path: <kent@bbn.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id EBFBB1F0C78 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 08:12:30 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -106.484
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-106.484 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.115, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id fd7PLHQOvE7x for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 08:12:30 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtp.bbn.com (smtp.bbn.com [128.33.1.81]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7BB4C1F0C34 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 08:12:30 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from dommiel.bbn.com ([192.1.122.15]:39901 helo=[193.0.26.186]) by smtp.bbn.com with esmtp (Exim 4.74 (FreeBSD)) (envelope-from <kent@bbn.com>) id 1RLyxx-0009FS-54; Thu, 03 Nov 2011 11:12:29 -0400
Mime-Version: 1.0
Message-Id: <p06240805cad8272d360d@[193.0.26.186]>
In-Reply-To: <gujjrj56m2femn14efjezwJv4X.penango@mail.gmail.com>
References: <B8E4DC0DD2F9A74AB88B4529E8FED39CF6E62450@MX22A.corp.emc.com> from	"Walter.Goulet@rsa.com" at Oct 27,	11 12:59:27 pm <201110271717.p9RHH5LF025823@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp> <gujjrj56m2femn14efjezwJv4X.penango@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 3 Nov 2011 11:12:24 -0400
To: "Kyle Hamilton" <kyanha@kyanha.net>
From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed"
Cc: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 03 Nov 2011 15:12:31 -0000

At 2:22 AM -0700 11/3/11, Kyle Hamilton wrote:
>C
>>...
>
>I think that this is inappropriate as a TLS extension.
>
>Instead, the problem can be completely solved in PKIX.
>
>Have a self-signed certificate which contains everything -- not just 
>one certificate chain, but several certificate chains.  Not just one 
>OCSP response, but several OCSP responses.  Not just one timestamp, 
>but several timestamps.  Have provable signature chains, all of 
>which end up signing the self-certified key inside a certificate 
>extension, which self-certified key is used to authenticate TLS.  If 
>any one of those identity chains is trusted, then the ownership of 
>the key can in fact be determined and the connection meets browser 
>https standards.

One ought mot confuse the ability to encode data as a cert extension with the
desirability of doing so :-).

I do not envision this sort of stuffing everything into a cert to be 
adopted by PKIX.

Steve

From hallam@gmail.com  Thu Nov  3 10:43:11 2011
Return-Path: <hallam@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id AC8F91F0CB6 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 10:43:11 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -3.484
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.484 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.114,  BAYES_00=-2.599, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 4ArFAFoL0TlP for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 10:43:11 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-qw0-f44.google.com (mail-qw0-f44.google.com [209.85.216.44]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C49901F0C76 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 10:43:10 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by qadc10 with SMTP id c10so1732994qad.31 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu, 03 Nov 2011 10:43:10 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=we3Jaed5+9LD5j6MZrZqmWipOJvY9iXNrDJcuA4zGo0=; b=elLneKPzigb3ubs5/E7a1NkJK3Rbj0bdrBlLmlqFAIJBWCyFVLvYMQpgGB4pdLuZtl YJRd5CM/b0PhlWOSH5Iy72pJ5mWDIPu3+kX4B8v6fz7xI3BxVnRm7pCIUi3sSmzWj6O3 ZXxghnPZLQCqe6gAmXT/h+iag43WzpWa0cFWo=
MIME-Version: 1.0
Received: by 10.182.115.40 with SMTP id jl8mr2124493obb.8.1320342190197; Thu, 03 Nov 2011 10:43:10 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by 10.182.42.99 with HTTP; Thu, 3 Nov 2011 10:43:09 -0700 (PDT)
In-Reply-To: <CAD7F7D5.2003%tmiller@mitre.org>
References: <CAMm+LwgDzckznfhB6Kk6rxr-i=tv5gZfYse9SYkrfk-8pXpt_g@mail.gmail.com> <CAD7F7D5.2003%tmiller@mitre.org>
Date: Thu, 3 Nov 2011 13:43:09 -0400
Message-ID: <CAMm+LwhcVmkyAvyMNmAgmzfD=2d25i_1RLb=WLU7NjCU7POLWw@mail.gmail.com>
From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
To: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=f46d0444808b3a8abb04b0d81ff4
Cc: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 03 Nov 2011 17:43:11 -0000

--f46d0444808b3a8abb04b0d81ff4
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1

No, DigiNotar was owned by the attacker completely. They were able to issue
certs and to delete the issue logs.

It is not a compromise that should be remotely possible at an audited CA,
there are certainly other issues there. But even if we secure all
commercial CAs to absolutely prevent a repeat we cannot guarantee that we
won't see a repeat on private issue and we can't expect to convince folk
meddling with the CA cert model to accept the assurances either.



On Thu, Nov 3, 2011 at 8:57 AM, Miller, Timothy J. <tmiller@mitre.org>wrote:

> On 11/3/11 7:37 AM, "Phillip Hallam-Baker" <hallam@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> >That was the old thinking. It is not the current thinking.
>
> Maybe not yours, but so far I can't seem to grasp exactly why you think
> that way.
>
> >In the DigiNotar case, whitelisting could have allowed the issue to be
> >detected much earlier.
>
> Ok, how?  Give me a scenario.
>
> >The authoritative source for status information is and always has been
> >the CA certificate database. At present the specs are defective in not
> >supporting disclosure of 'does not exist'.
>
> DigiNotar and Comodo were attacked through compromised Registration
> Authority account credentials.  The attacker in these cases was acting as
> an authorized RA.  This means that as far as internal processes at the CA
> are concerned, the fraudulent certificates were properly issued and had
> entries in the CA database.
>
> Detecting which certificates were frauds required checking the CA database
> against data external to the CA--e.g., paperwork, email, payment records,
> etc.--because the CA database itself was at question.  So where does the
> whitelist fit in again?
>
>
> -- T
>
>


-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

--f46d0444808b3a8abb04b0d81ff4
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

No, DigiNotar was owned by the attacker completely. They were able to issue=
 certs and to delete the issue logs.<div><br></div><div>It is not a comprom=
ise that should be remotely possible at an audited CA, there are certainly =
other issues there. But even if we secure all commercial CAs to absolutely =
prevent a repeat we cannot guarantee that we won&#39;t see a repeat on priv=
ate issue and we can&#39;t expect to convince folk meddling with the CA cer=
t model to accept the assurances either.</div>
<div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Thu, N=
ov 3, 2011 at 8:57 AM, Miller, Timothy J. <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"=
mailto:tmiller@mitre.org">tmiller@mitre.org</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><block=
quote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc=
 solid;padding-left:1ex;">
<div class=3D"im">On 11/3/11 7:37 AM, &quot;Phillip Hallam-Baker&quot; &lt;=
<a href=3D"mailto:hallam@gmail.com">hallam@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
<br>
&gt;That was the old thinking. It is not the current thinking.<br>
<br>
</div>Maybe not yours, but so far I can&#39;t seem to grasp exactly why you=
 think<br>
that way.<br>
<div class=3D"im"><br>
&gt;In the DigiNotar case, whitelisting could have allowed the issue to be<=
br>
&gt;detected much earlier.<br>
<br>
</div>Ok, how? =A0Give me a scenario.<br>
<div class=3D"im"><br>
&gt;The authoritative source for status information is and always has been<=
br>
&gt;the CA certificate database. At present the specs are defective in not<=
br>
&gt;supporting disclosure of &#39;does not exist&#39;.<br>
<br>
</div>DigiNotar and Comodo were attacked through compromised Registration<b=
r>
Authority account credentials. =A0The attacker in these cases was acting as=
<br>
an authorized RA. =A0This means that as far as internal processes at the CA=
<br>
are concerned, the fraudulent certificates were properly issued and had<br>
entries in the CA database.<br>
<br>
Detecting which certificates were frauds required checking the CA database<=
br>
against data external to the CA--e.g., paperwork, email, payment records,<b=
r>
etc.--because the CA database itself was at question. =A0So where does the<=
br>
whitelist fit in again?<br>
<font color=3D"#888888"><br>
<br>
-- T<br>
<br>
</font></blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br>Websi=
te: <a href=3D"http://hallambaker.com/">http://hallambaker.com/</a><br><br>
</div>

--f46d0444808b3a8abb04b0d81ff4--

From hallam@gmail.com  Thu Nov  3 10:44:26 2011
Return-Path: <hallam@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E030811E80CA for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 10:44:26 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -3.489
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.489 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.109,  BAYES_00=-2.599, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id CuKp68Ny+3Z9 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 10:44:25 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-qy0-f172.google.com (mail-qy0-f172.google.com [209.85.216.172]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5882A11E8083 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 10:44:25 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by qyl16 with SMTP id 16so1373454qyl.10 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu, 03 Nov 2011 10:44:24 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=bZvS13cGQ3eQtcgtIsvxnS/ayEGWmsLUUTnvxd3tKIo=; b=wYYiprzdN174MjyAceD0Y0qwx5BGWXT4lpgMucDcQXA+IauQbLqNfpfSdY1Vnvgib1 XaTbG/BRl1lc+ehGLW+7BjiW6umpqRFSmjII8hPfk0wU1TohPBjCbApOvTrGubW3wW+s SyuMz2aJjzXTywkM00iBlWPeqlmi3ay+FsO7w=
MIME-Version: 1.0
Received: by 10.182.69.52 with SMTP id b20mr2090664obu.58.1320342264704; Thu, 03 Nov 2011 10:44:24 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by 10.182.42.99 with HTTP; Thu, 3 Nov 2011 10:44:24 -0700 (PDT)
In-Reply-To: <C1A47F1540DF3246A8D30C853C05D0DA01B96B6B@DABECK.missi.ncsc.mil>
References: <CAD7F7D5.2003%tmiller@mitre.org> <201111031311.00428.rob.stradling@comodo.com> <C1A47F1540DF3246A8D30C853C05D0DA01B96B6B@DABECK.missi.ncsc.mil>
Date: Thu, 3 Nov 2011 13:44:24 -0400
Message-ID: <CAMm+LwiL_qXfyfrARCUVV1rntsxekE=MjQZa+zcNNcujnYsD-A@mail.gmail.com>
From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
To: "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=14dae93b5a00ab6c8e04b0d823c4
Cc: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New VersionNotification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 03 Nov 2011 17:44:27 -0000

--14dae93b5a00ab6c8e04b0d823c4
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1

To enable the inconsistency in the CA response to be detected more quickly
so that the euthanasia squad can be called in quicker.

On Thu, Nov 3, 2011 at 9:51 AM, Kemp, David P. <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>wrote:

> "logs deleted"?  If the CA does not have a database, and database
> backups, and audit logs, and offsite audit log backups, showing what
> certificate serial numbers have been signed (only one of which would be
> needed to reconstruct current CRLs), that pretty much makes the case
> that neither a whitelist nor a blacklist is worth the bits it is printed
> on.  Given the lack of even rudimentary availability controls, what
> would make any RP believe that a cert, listed on a whitelist or not, has
> any validity?
>
> Dave
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
> Rob Stradling
>
> http://isc.sans.edu/diary.html?storyid=11512
>
> "Some of the CA servers have had parts of their logs deleted, leading to
> DigiNotar not knowing what certificates were issued."
>
> "The OCSP server's working at DigiNotar has been reversed since Sept
> 1st.
> Normally these servers respond with good to all certificates except
> those on the CRL (a blacklist). The OCSP now operates in whitelist mode:
> it will call all unknown certificates signed by DigiNotar as revoked (a
> whitelist).
> Hence we need to make sure to use the OCSP server to validate DigiNotar
> certificates -should we want/need to- and not rely on the published CRLs
> anymore."
>
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>



-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

--14dae93b5a00ab6c8e04b0d823c4
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

To enable the inconsistency in the CA response to be detected more quickly =
so that the=A0euthanasia=A0squad can be called in quicker.<br><br><div clas=
s=3D"gmail_quote">On Thu, Nov 3, 2011 at 9:51 AM, Kemp, David P. <span dir=
=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil">DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil=
</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">&quot;logs deleted&quot;? =A0If the CA does=
 not have a database, and database<br>
backups, and audit logs, and offsite audit log backups, showing what<br>
certificate serial numbers have been signed (only one of which would be<br>
needed to reconstruct current CRLs), that pretty much makes the case<br>
that neither a whitelist nor a blacklist is worth the bits it is printed<br=
>
on. =A0Given the lack of even rudimentary availability controls, what<br>
would make any RP believe that a cert, listed on a whitelist or not, has<br=
>
any validity?<br>
<br>
Dave<br>
<div class=3D"im"><br>
<br>
-----Original Message-----<br>
From: <a href=3D"mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org">pkix-bounces@ietf.org</a> [m=
ailto:<a href=3D"mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org">pkix-bounces@ietf.org</a>] O=
n Behalf Of<br>
</div>Rob Stradling<br>
<div class=3D"im"><br>
<a href=3D"http://isc.sans.edu/diary.html?storyid=3D11512" target=3D"_blank=
">http://isc.sans.edu/diary.html?storyid=3D11512</a><br>
<br>
&quot;Some of the CA servers have had parts of their logs deleted, leading =
to<br>
DigiNotar not knowing what certificates were issued.&quot;<br>
<br>
&quot;The OCSP server&#39;s working at DigiNotar has been reversed since Se=
pt<br>
1st.<br>
Normally these servers respond with good to all certificates except<br>
those on the CRL (a blacklist). The OCSP now operates in whitelist mode:<br=
>
it will call all unknown certificates signed by DigiNotar as revoked (a<br>
whitelist).<br>
Hence we need to make sure to use the OCSP server to validate DigiNotar<br>
certificates -should we want/need to- and not rely on the published CRLs<br=
>
anymore.&quot;<br>
<br>
</div><div><div></div><div class=3D"h5">___________________________________=
____________<br>
pkix mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br>=
Website: <a href=3D"http://hallambaker.com/">http://hallambaker.com/</a><br=
><br>

--14dae93b5a00ab6c8e04b0d823c4--

From hallam@gmail.com  Thu Nov  3 11:08:24 2011
Return-Path: <hallam@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2447211E8137 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 11:08:24 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -3.494
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.494 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.104,  BAYES_00=-2.599, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 04KF24t7DGex for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 11:08:23 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-pz0-f50.google.com (mail-pz0-f50.google.com [209.85.210.50]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7253C11E811B for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 11:08:23 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by pzk4 with SMTP id 4so3073260pzk.9 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu, 03 Nov 2011 11:08:00 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=sIyDuvQacUcE0R+GraZQZLIjJbxaIC1uJKFMSwl/Xps=; b=fAojeVBxZf6lOaJlvHLK8HOq66eussIfeEbuHuRdlnQlzN20YT+8or+HVTHDw6ZLoR f2DfmVc1gbpu+xjf5l3kvkpScGRsAnXqdzixUSoQwcJyt2ZNFaQKCnD4bKpF6ydPUFzY 3PKd+pjKgmNkWp4Z7Bt//zpvy6NyVwLKA/ftY=
MIME-Version: 1.0
Received: by 10.182.69.52 with SMTP id b20mr2111092obu.58.1320343678076; Thu, 03 Nov 2011 11:07:58 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by 10.182.42.99 with HTTP; Thu, 3 Nov 2011 11:07:56 -0700 (PDT)
In-Reply-To: <p06240805cad8272d360d@193.0.26.186>
References: <B8E4DC0DD2F9A74AB88B4529E8FED39CF6E62450@MX22A.corp.emc.com> <201110271717.p9RHH5LF025823@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp> <gujjrj56m2femn14efjezwJv4X.penango@mail.gmail.com> <p06240805cad8272d360d@193.0.26.186>
Date: Thu, 3 Nov 2011 14:07:56 -0400
Message-ID: <CAMm+LwhXyEJhcn27vZ5+-Nq5L1=csz7EyM09WDUe13_e7-aurQ@mail.gmail.com>
From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
To: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=14dae93b5a00e9c71f04b0d87701
Cc: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 03 Nov 2011 18:08:24 -0000

--14dae93b5a00e9c71f04b0d87701
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1

On Thu, Nov 3, 2011 at 11:12 AM, Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> wrote:

> At 2:22 AM -0700 11/3/11, Kyle Hamilton wrote:
>
>> C
>>
>>> ...
>>>
>>
>> I think that this is inappropriate as a TLS extension.
>>
>> Instead, the problem can be completely solved in PKIX.
>>
>> Have a self-signed certificate which contains everything -- not just one
>> certificate chain, but several certificate chains.  Not just one OCSP
>> response, but several OCSP responses.  Not just one timestamp, but several
>> timestamps.  Have provable signature chains, all of which end up signing
>> the self-certified key inside a certificate extension, which self-certified
>> key is used to authenticate TLS.  If any one of those identity chains is
>> trusted, then the ownership of the key can in fact be determined and the
>> connection meets browser https standards.
>>
>
> One ought mot confuse the ability to encode data as a cert extension with
> the
> desirability of doing so :-).
>
> I do not envision this sort of stuffing everything into a cert to be
> adopted by PKIX.
>

Well I could see it happening if there was no other way to do it :)

But we have a slot in the protocol that is made for this exact purpose so
there would have to be a good reason not to use TLS extensions for an
extension to TLS IMO


-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

--14dae93b5a00e9c71f04b0d87701
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Thu, Nov 3, 2011 at 11:12 AM, Stephen=
 Kent <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:kent@bbn.com">kent@bbn.com</a=
>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 =
0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
At 2:22 AM -0700 11/3/11, Kyle Hamilton wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
C<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
...<br>
</blockquote><div class=3D"im">
<br>
I think that this is inappropriate as a TLS extension.<br>
<br>
Instead, the problem can be completely solved in PKIX.<br>
<br>
Have a self-signed certificate which contains everything -- not just one ce=
rtificate chain, but several certificate chains. =A0Not just one OCSP respo=
nse, but several OCSP responses. =A0Not just one timestamp, but several tim=
estamps. =A0Have provable signature chains, all of which end up signing the=
 self-certified key inside a certificate extension, which self-certified ke=
y is used to authenticate TLS. =A0If any one of those identity chains is tr=
usted, then the ownership of the key can in fact be determined and the conn=
ection meets browser https standards.<br>

</div></blockquote>
<br>
One ought mot confuse the ability to encode data as a cert extension with t=
he<br>
desirability of doing so :-).<br>
<br>
I do not envision this sort of stuffing everything into a cert to be adopte=
d by PKIX.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Well I could see it happenin=
g if there was no other way to do it :)</div><div><br></div><div>But we hav=
e a slot in the protocol that is made for this exact purpose so there would=
 have to be a good reason not to use TLS extensions for an extension to TLS=
 IMO=A0</div>
</div><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br>Website: <a href=3D"http://ha=
llambaker.com/">http://hallambaker.com/</a><br><br>

--14dae93b5a00e9c71f04b0d87701--

From tmiller@mitre.org  Thu Nov  3 11:57:42 2011
Return-Path: <tmiller@mitre.org>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 353F611E80F0 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 11:57:42 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.000,  BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id h9P9G4r0afWQ for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 11:57:41 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (smtpksrv1.mitre.org [198.49.146.77]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5F07811E80DA for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 11:57:41 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by localhost (Postfix) with SMTP id B362321B1079; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 14:57:40 -0400 (EDT)
Received: from IMCCAS02.MITRE.ORG (imccas02.mitre.org [129.83.29.79]) by smtpksrv1.mitre.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A0F0421B0982; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 14:57:40 -0400 (EDT)
Received: from IMCMBX01.MITRE.ORG ([169.254.1.57]) by IMCCAS02.MITRE.ORG ([129.83.29.79]) with mapi id 14.01.0339.001; Thu, 3 Nov 2011 14:57:40 -0400
From: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
To: Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>, "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
Thread-Index: AQHMmOR+3o6yhaO2SES0DD1Qj9f8npWZbmMAgADWC4CAALnHAIAAXdcA//+xnYCAAFepAIAADQmA
Date: Thu, 3 Nov 2011 18:57:40 +0000
Message-ID: <CAD84AD8.2055%tmiller@mitre.org>
In-Reply-To: <201111031311.00428.rob.stradling@comodo.com>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
user-agent: Microsoft-MacOutlook/14.13.0.110805
x-originating-ip: [172.31.60.130]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-ID: <A42DD1C78512BC4B9B09A9CDC545955F@imc.mitre.org>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 03 Nov 2011 18:57:42 -0000

On 11/3/11 8:10 AM, "Rob Stradling" <rob.stradling@comodo.com> wrote:

>On Thursday 03 Nov 2011 12:57:14 Miller, Timothy J. wrote:
>> On 11/3/11 7:37 AM, "Phillip Hallam-Baker" <hallam@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>In the DigiNotar case, whitelisting could have allowed the issue to be
>> >detected much earlier.
>>=20
>> Ok, how?  Give me a scenario.
>
>http://isc.sans.edu/diary.html?storyid=3D11512
>
>"Some of the CA servers have had parts of their logs deleted, leading to
>DigiNotar not knowing what certificates were issued."
>
>"The OCSP server's working at DigiNotar has been reversed since Sept 1st.
>Normally these servers respond with good to all certificates except those
>on=20
>the CRL (a blacklist). The OCSP now operates in whitelist mode: it will
>call=20
>all unknown certificates signed by DigiNotar as revoked (a whitelist).
>Hence we need to make sure to use the OCSP server to validate DigiNotar
>certificates -should we want/need to- and not rely on the published CRLs
>anymore."

This is a valid *response* strategy in the DigiNotar case because of the
specifics of the attack; switching DigiNotar's responder to whitelisting
essentially functions as a bulk revocation of everything but certs issued
prior to the compromise (which are assumed valid) without having to
positively identify those certs individually.  This is necessary because
the corrupted CA data meant that the attacker-issued certs simply can't be
identified; even given external data with which to validate an issuance,
the issuance data is missing, so revocation simply can't be done.

However, from a *pre-attack detection* standpoint, I don't see how
whitelisting helps.  The attacker corrupted the CA data for unknown
reasons; indeed, he may simply have been erasing record of the intrusion,
and cast too wide a net.  A more careful attacker may not do this, in
which case whitelisting doesn't yield a benefit as the attacker-issued
certs *are on the whitelist*.  Further, whitelisting would not be
necessary as a response in cases where the CA data is preserved because
the data to support revocation is available, as we see in Comodo's case. I
won't dispute that it may still be convenient.

What's most telling to me in the DigiNotar case is that whitelisting was
accomplished with no change to the standard or client implementation;
DigiNotar simply altered the behavior of the responder.  This tells me
that a whitelisting feature of the protocol simply isn't needed.  If you
want to run your responder as a whitelist you already have everything you
need, just plop a statement or two in your CP and/or CPS and get on with
it.

-- T


From pgut001@login01.cs.auckland.ac.nz  Thu Nov  3 14:23:38 2011
Return-Path: <pgut001@login01.cs.auckland.ac.nz>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id CE3901F0CCF for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 14:23:38 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.539
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.539 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.060,  BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 6Upo06gwMI+k for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 14:23:38 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mx2.auckland.ac.nz (mx2.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.12.44]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0680F1F0CC7 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 14:23:36 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=auckland.ac.nz; i=pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz; q=dns/txt; s=uoa; t=1320355418; x=1351891418; h=from:to:subject:cc:in-reply-to:message-id:date; bh=Ah7WdAmvbSS5RUwik5wl48khvLyreo4D6vPlYgt0Cvw=; b=IotQc6u0hI4MbLeBOgGkQhp20D9aITkmoHDnB3xsCsev+YoPUigDrOkU ZsiYSROqK6mjtq0mQ5Qtou0fQMgH7ox5hQrVJFDoJyCljAXz/03O5YUtj yGAeO89XIjlX8/m9UOLMBqeCNx9Hvie239FRAadDN4rcpf2UU/mBeoV52 I=;
X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.69,452,1315137600"; d="scan'208";a="88703239"
X-Ironport-HAT: UNIVERSITY - $RELAY-THROTTLE
X-Ironport-Source: 130.216.34.40 - Outgoing - Outgoing
Received: from login01.fos.auckland.ac.nz ([130.216.34.40]) by mx2-int.auckland.ac.nz with ESMTP/TLS/AES256-SHA; 04 Nov 2011 10:23:35 +1300
Received: from pgut001 by login01.fos.auckland.ac.nz with local (Exim 4.69) (envelope-from <pgut001@login01.cs.auckland.ac.nz>) id 1RM4l4-0004Uo-UC; Fri, 04 Nov 2011 10:23:34 +1300
From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: hallam@gmail.com, tmiller@mitre.org
In-Reply-To: <CAMm+LwgDzckznfhB6Kk6rxr-i=tv5gZfYse9SYkrfk-8pXpt_g@mail.gmail.com>
Message-Id: <E1RM4l4-0004Uo-UC@login01.fos.auckland.ac.nz>
Date: Fri, 04 Nov 2011 10:23:34 +1300
Cc: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 03 Nov 2011 21:23:38 -0000

Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com> writes:

>In the DigiNotar case, whitelisting could have allowed the issue to be
>detected much earlier.

Would it?  Diginotar went to some lengths to cover up the problem, and
according to the recent EFF results, other CAs have also covered up
compromises.  If the CA doesn't want to admit that there's a problem then a
whitelist won't help.  The question really becomes "how far will a CA go to
maintain the illusion that it's providing a security service to users"?

Peter.

From pgut001@login01.cs.auckland.ac.nz  Thu Nov  3 14:36:03 2011
Return-Path: <pgut001@login01.cs.auckland.ac.nz>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id CFC2A1F0CC2 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 14:36:02 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.549
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.549 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.050,  BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id ogGln9Kzaz4A for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 14:36:02 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mx2.auckland.ac.nz (mx2.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.12.44]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 040A11F0CB6 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu,  3 Nov 2011 14:36:01 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=auckland.ac.nz; i=pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz; q=dns/txt; s=uoa; t=1320356162; x=1351892162; h=from:to:subject:cc:in-reply-to:message-id:date; bh=uvtXseVWnQBKElyA53aFx2TQOVJfqoe5YHphqCvkQzg=; b=sl2R56U+tvm9GeQyJHIAuI4YWUIw3f4RiWzhDE8ayBULHjAevMvyz0dR X3xY+EkpDYxgyPLxChd5xB+dMc7vyrzPLkid/+DUT0q5lFeOvYVC6kC6p d0p9UtqqUMQn9B2lBjSpWMVq8AiX7tcsJdGh9AUOMiXBTxr+VuFmc8GBt 8=;
X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.69,452,1315137600"; d="scan'208";a="88708783"
X-Ironport-HAT: UNIVERSITY - $RELAY-THROTTLE
X-Ironport-Source: 130.216.34.40 - Outgoing - Outgoing
Received: from login01.fos.auckland.ac.nz ([130.216.34.40]) by mx2-int.auckland.ac.nz with ESMTP/TLS/AES256-SHA; 04 Nov 2011 10:36:01 +1300
Received: from pgut001 by login01.fos.auckland.ac.nz with local (Exim 4.69) (envelope-from <pgut001@login01.cs.auckland.ac.nz>) id 1RM4x6-0004tJ-Sh; Fri, 04 Nov 2011 10:36:00 +1300
From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: kent@bbn.com, kyanha@kyanha.net
In-Reply-To: <p06240805cad8272d360d@[193.0.26.186]>
Message-Id: <E1RM4x6-0004tJ-Sh@login01.fos.auckland.ac.nz>
Date: Fri, 04 Nov 2011 10:36:00 +1300
Cc: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 03 Nov 2011 21:36:03 -0000

Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> writes:

>One ought mot confuse the ability to encode data as a cert extension with the
>desirability of doing so :-).
>
>I do not envision this sort of stuffing everything into a cert to be adopted
>by PKIX.

Exactly.  Defining a mechanism for putting theme music into a certificate (RFC
3709, PKIX Standards Track) is perfectly appropriate for PKIX, but this...
this is just going too far.

Peter (sorry, couldn't resist :-).

From stefan@aaa-sec.com  Fri Nov  4 06:50:38 2011
Return-Path: <stefan@aaa-sec.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9C5F521F8C1C for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri,  4 Nov 2011 06:50:38 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -102.55
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-102.55 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.699, BAYES_00=-2.599, HELO_EQ_SE=0.35, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, MIME_QP_LONG_LINE=1.396, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-1, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id rnJN4nIyMTmq for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri,  4 Nov 2011 06:50:37 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from s87.loopia.se (s87.loopia.se [194.9.95.113]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 257A321F8C19 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Fri,  4 Nov 2011 06:50:35 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from s327.loopia.se (s34.loopia.se [194.9.94.70]) by s87.loopia.se (Postfix) with ESMTP id A5DF95325D9 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Fri,  4 Nov 2011 14:41:07 +0100 (CET)
Received: (qmail 51398 invoked from network); 4 Nov 2011 13:41:02 -0000
Received: from gw.aaa-sec.ideon.se (HELO [192.168.1.208]) (stefan@fiddler.nu@[85.235.7.89]) (envelope-sender <stefan@aaa-sec.com>) by s327.loopia.se (qmail-ldap-1.03) with DES-CBC3-SHA encrypted SMTP for <pkix@ietf.org>; 4 Nov 2011 13:41:02 -0000
User-Agent: Microsoft-MacOutlook/14.13.0.110805
Date: Fri, 04 Nov 2011 14:40:58 +0100
From: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>
To: <pkix@ietf.org>
Message-ID: <CAD9A9FA.2D6B6%stefan@aaa-sec.com>
Thread-Topic: Need for a SAML identity extension?
Mime-version: 1.0
Content-type: multipart/alternative; boundary="B_3403262462_7725615"
Subject: [pkix] Need for a SAML identity extension?
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 04 Nov 2011 13:50:38 -0000

> This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.

--B_3403262462_7725615
Content-type: text/plain;
	charset="US-ASCII"
Content-transfer-encoding: 7bit

Here is something that I'm actually surprised to not have seen people
screaming for before.

But now I have come across a legitimate case where I need to issue a
certificate holding an identity that I have obtained from a SAML assertion.
AND some applications will need to recover that SAML identity from the
certificate at some point.
And just following standards, I'm left with a number of non-attractive
solutions.

The use case is electronic signatures. SAML does not cover this
functionality, so thus I need to create a signing cert holding the asserted
identity, which is captured from a SAML assertion.
In case of problems I need to recover that SAML identity in order to find
the signer through the IdP that issued the assertion.

PKI standards has put the bets on a small number of identity attributes,
which has lead to overloaded semantics. The most clear case is the
serialNumber attribute, but there are more.
SAML assertions have a much more open attitude to identity attributes which
can be much more freely defined with a lot more accurate semantics.

So if I want to assert such identity in a certificate, where and how do I
store it?

Do I convert it to the traditional subject name attributes?
Do I try to specify the original semantics using the RFC 3739
semanticsIdentifier ?
Or do I translate them to traditional subjectName attributes for backwards
compatibility AND then put the original SAML attributes in a new SAML
Attribute extension.

Well, from a development perspective, the last option is absolutely the
easiest to handle. Then the cert would pass all legacy code when validated
and when it reaches the code that needs the SAML attributes, then it would
just get them from the new extension.

Have others encountered the same issue?
How did you solve it?

Is there a need for a new extension here?

/Stefan



--B_3403262462_7725615
Content-type: text/html;
	charset="US-ASCII"
Content-transfer-encoding: quoted-printable

<html><head></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: s=
pace; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-size:=
 14px; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><div>Here is something that I'm a=
ctually surprised to not have seen people screaming for before.</div><div><b=
r></div><div>But now I have come across a legitimate case where I need to is=
sue a certificate holding an identity that I have obtained from a SAML asser=
tion.</div><div>AND some applications will need to recover that SAML identit=
y from the certificate at some point.</div><div>And just following standards=
, I'm left with a number of non-attractive solutions.</div><div><br></div><d=
iv>The use case is electronic signatures. SAML does not cover this functiona=
lity, so thus I need to create a signing cert holding the asserted identity,=
 which is captured from a SAML assertion.</div><div>In case of problems I ne=
ed to recover that SAML identity in order to find the signer through the IdP=
 that issued the assertion.</div><div><br></div><div>PKI standards has put t=
he bets on a small number of identity attributes, which has lead to overload=
ed semantics. The most clear case is the serialNumber attribute, but there a=
re more.</div><div>SAML assertions have a much more open attitude to identit=
y attributes which can be much more freely defined with a lot more accurate =
semantics.</div><div><br></div><div>So if I want to assert such identity in =
a certificate, where and how do I store it?</div><div><br></div><div>Do I co=
nvert it to the traditional subject name attributes?</div><div>Do I try to s=
pecify the original semantics using the RFC 3739 semanticsIdentifier ?</div>=
<div>Or do I translate them to traditional subjectName attributes for backwa=
rds compatibility AND then put the original SAML attributes in a new SAML At=
tribute extension.</div><div><br></div><div>Well, from a development perspec=
tive, the last option is absolutely the easiest to handle. Then the cert wou=
ld pass all legacy code when validated and when it reaches the code that nee=
ds the SAML attributes, then it would just get them from the new extension.<=
/div><div><br></div><div>Have others encountered the same issue?</div><div>H=
ow did you solve it?</div><div><br></div><div>Is there a need for a new exte=
nsion here?</div><div><br></div><div>/Stefan</div></body></html>

--B_3403262462_7725615--



From brauckmann@dfn-cert.de  Fri Nov  4 07:20:57 2011
Return-Path: <brauckmann@dfn-cert.de>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9DDAB21F8C50 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri,  4 Nov 2011 07:20:57 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -9.949
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-9.949 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, HELO_EQ_DE=0.35, MIME_8BIT_HEADER=0.3, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-8]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id DZbCGyNGrNnw for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri,  4 Nov 2011 07:20:56 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from sam.dfn-cert.de (sam.dfn-cert.de [193.174.13.196]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A400921F8C53 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Fri,  4 Nov 2011 07:20:56 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from [193.174.12.38] (fozzie.dfn-cert.de [193.174.12.38]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (Client CN "Juergen Brauckmann", Issuer "DFN-CERT Services GmbH CA - G02" (verified OK)) by animal.dfn-cert.de (Postfix) with ESMTPS id CFC00257819E; Fri,  4 Nov 2011 15:20:09 +0100 (CET)
Message-ID: <4EB3F497.2070205@dfn-cert.de>
Date: Fri, 04 Nov 2011 15:20:07 +0100
From: =?ISO-8859-15?Q?J=FCrgen_Brauckmann?= <brauckmann@dfn-cert.de>
Organization: DFN-CERT Services GmbH
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>
References: <CAD9A9FA.2D6B6%stefan@aaa-sec.com>
In-Reply-To: <CAD9A9FA.2D6B6%stefan@aaa-sec.com>
X-Enigmail-Version: 1.3.2
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-15
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Cc: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] Need for a SAML identity extension?
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 04 Nov 2011 14:20:57 -0000

Stefan Santesson schrieb:
> But now I have come across a legitimate case where I need to issue a
> certificate holding an identity that I have obtained from a SAML assertion.
> AND some applications will need to recover that SAML identity from the
> certificate at some point.

The GridShib project did considerable work in this area. Mission
statement: "Bridging SAML/Shibboleth and X.509 PKI for campus and grid
interoperability".

http://gridshib.globus.org/

http://dev.globus.org/wiki/SAML_in_X.509_Validation

http://gridshib.globus.org/docs/gridshib-saml-tools-0.3.0/readme.html

Hope that helps,
  Juergen

From stefan@aaa-sec.com  Fri Nov  4 07:38:15 2011
Return-Path: <stefan@aaa-sec.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B067C21F8C5D for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri,  4 Nov 2011 07:38:15 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -102.75
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-102.75 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.199, BAYES_00=-2.599, HELO_EQ_SE=0.35, MIME_8BIT_HEADER=0.3, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-1, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id DKJjqxjIfX99 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri,  4 Nov 2011 07:38:15 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from s87.loopia.se (s87.loopia.se [194.9.95.113]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D68A421F8C51 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Fri,  4 Nov 2011 07:38:14 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from s326.loopia.se (s34.loopia.se [194.9.94.70]) by s87.loopia.se (Postfix) with ESMTP id BBAF04DD9AC for <pkix@ietf.org>; Fri,  4 Nov 2011 15:38:17 +0100 (CET)
Received: (qmail 99406 invoked from network); 4 Nov 2011 14:38:12 -0000
Received: from gw.aaa-sec.ideon.se (HELO [192.168.1.208]) (stefan@fiddler.nu@[85.235.7.89]) (envelope-sender <stefan@aaa-sec.com>) by s326.loopia.se (qmail-ldap-1.03) with DES-CBC3-SHA encrypted SMTP for <brauckmann@dfn-cert.de>; 4 Nov 2011 14:38:12 -0000
User-Agent: Microsoft-MacOutlook/14.13.0.110805
Date: Fri, 04 Nov 2011 15:37:39 +0100
From: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>
To: =?ISO-8859-1?B?SvxyZ2Vu?= Brauckmann <brauckmann@dfn-cert.de>
Message-ID: <CAD9B6AB.2D6D4%stefan@aaa-sec.com>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] Need for a SAML identity extension?
In-Reply-To: <4EB3F497.2070205@dfn-cert.de>
Mime-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset="ISO-8859-1"
Content-transfer-encoding: quoted-printable
Cc: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] Need for a SAML identity extension?
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 04 Nov 2011 14:38:15 -0000

Thank you,

Very interesting indeed. I see they solved this by putting the whole SAML
assertion (or a reference to it) in a cert extension.
That might be a bit more complicated than what was looking for, but may
very well be the appropriate solution in the end.

/Stefan

On 11-11-04 3:20 PM, "J=FCrgen Brauckmann" <brauckmann@dfn-cert.de> wrote:

>Stefan Santesson schrieb:
>> But now I have come across a legitimate case where I need to issue a
>> certificate holding an identity that I have obtained from a SAML
>>assertion.
>> AND some applications will need to recover that SAML identity from the
>> certificate at some point.
>
>The GridShib project did considerable work in this area. Mission
>statement: "Bridging SAML/Shibboleth and X.509 PKI for campus and grid
>interoperability".
>
>http://gridshib.globus.org/
>
>http://dev.globus.org/wiki/SAML_in_X.509_Validation
>
>http://gridshib.globus.org/docs/gridshib-saml-tools-0.3.0/readme.html
>
>Hope that helps,
>  Juergen



From mrex@sap.com  Fri Nov  4 11:55:31 2011
Return-Path: <mrex@sap.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 40BF71F0C55 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri,  4 Nov 2011 11:55:31 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -10.13
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-10.13 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.119,  BAYES_00=-2.599, HELO_EQ_DE=0.35, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-8]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id uLJDAs-pv0tZ for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri,  4 Nov 2011 11:55:30 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtpde01.sap-ag.de (smtpde01.sap-ag.de [155.56.68.170]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 62FB91F0C54 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Fri,  4 Nov 2011 11:55:30 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail.sap.corp by smtpde01.sap-ag.de (26) with ESMTP id pA4ItI6D020380 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=OK); Fri, 4 Nov 2011 19:55:18 +0100 (MET)
From: Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
Message-Id: <201111041855.pA4ItIlO011745@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp>
To: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann)
Date: Fri, 4 Nov 2011 19:55:18 +0100 (MET)
In-Reply-To: <E1RM4l4-0004Uo-UC@login01.fos.auckland.ac.nz> from "Peter Gutmann" at Nov 4, 11 10:23:34 am
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-SAP: out
Cc: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
Reply-To: mrex@sap.com
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 04 Nov 2011 18:55:31 -0000

Peter Gutmann wrote:
> 
> Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com> writes:
> >
> > In the DigiNotar case, whitelisting could have allowed the issue to be
> > detected much earlier.
> 
> Would it?  Diginotar went to some lengths to cover up the problem, and
> according to the recent EFF results, other CAs have also covered up
> compromises.  If the CA doesn't want to admit that there's a problem then a
> whitelist won't help.  The question really becomes "how far will a CA go to
> maintain the illusion that it's providing a security service to users"?

It might have, but does not need to.

A whitelisting approach is primarily a means of damage control for
the CA and recognizing the facts and realities of a desaster recovery
process.  Having a "last-known-good" backup from some time in the
past, and having to re-audit accounting logs for newer records
in order to tell incorrect or fraudulent stuff apart from the
good stuff is IMO nothing new or special, that is a pretty normal
concept in the business and accounting world.

While whitelisting could be easily and quickly made to work with
an OCSP responder that is colocated near or hosted by the CA and
with access to the issuing database, it does not seem to work with
the idea of "local OCSP responders".

Conceptually, local OCSP responders work on CRLs and therefore
there is a time delay between informtion published by the CA and
information known ot local OCSP responders.  Having local OCSP
declare a new certificate as "revoked (never issued)" for a few
hours after issue looks like a problem 


White-listing based on cryptographically strong identifiers
(such as a certificate hash) can help a CA to perform damage-control,
the benefit for the RP is really not that great.  Essentially,
it represents an ad-hoc alternative signature on an existing
credential with a different signer cert -- but that has the
prerequisite that the break-in was noticed, stopped, and the
CA has regained control over its operations and an OCSP
responder credential around that is still trustworthy.


There is no change to the vulnerability for RPs before the CA break-in
is detected and stopped.  There is no protection if the CA does
not clean up appropriately, and neither when the fraudulent issuance
was coerced (i.e. known to the CA) by some vicious governmental or
other agency--independent of the (il)legality of such coercion
under whatever jurisdiction.


My personal conspiracy theory for the particular attack on DigiNotar
and a few other CAs would be that it was a governmentally backed
intelligence operation.  But rather than looking for dissidents as
primary targets, this may have been an attempt to identify
foreign undercover agents that were trying to blend with the
crowds of webmail customers for their secret communication.
While I would expect those agents to use additional crypto inside
(i.e. inside TLS) for their actual communication, blending/hiding
that you're using encrypted Email and which peers you're communicating with
is *much* harder if the observer is able to strip the TLS encapsulation.

Of course, if they find information about dissidents while listening
in to that communication of their target group, they will likely use
that as well.  But I would find it strange if they wasted their
attack capabilities (which work only for a short time) for
non-professional folks that they could probably monitor with
traditional (physical) surveillance just as effectively.
For me, this looks like a Stuxnet-related investigation.


-Martin

From trevorf@exchange.microsoft.com  Fri Nov  4 13:55:24 2011
Return-Path: <trevorf@exchange.microsoft.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9396411E80B4 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri,  4 Nov 2011 13:55:24 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -110.709
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-110.709 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.111, BAYES_00=-2.599, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-8, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id xQAiTRB7-x8N for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri,  4 Nov 2011 13:55:22 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail.exchange.microsoft.com (mail1.exchange.microsoft.com [131.107.1.17]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D15E811E8082 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Fri,  4 Nov 2011 13:55:21 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from df-h14-01.exchange.corp.microsoft.com (157.54.78.139) by DF-G14-01.exchange.corp.microsoft.com (157.54.87.87) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 14.2.247.2; Fri, 4 Nov 2011 13:55:21 -0700
Received: from PIO-MLT-06.exchange.corp.microsoft.com (157.54.94.24) by DF-H14-01.exchange.corp.microsoft.com (157.54.78.139) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 14.2.202.4; Fri, 4 Nov 2011 13:55:21 -0700
Received: from DF-M14-12.exchange.corp.microsoft.com ([fe80::7c94:4036:120:c95f]) by PIO-MLT-06.exchange.corp.microsoft.com ([fe80::d57f:521a:3ae6:c130%10]) with mapi id 14.02.0247.002; Fri, 4 Nov 2011 13:55:21 -0700
From: Trevor Freeman <trevorf@exchange.microsoft.com>
To: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>, "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: Need for a SAML identity extension?
Thread-Index: AQHMmvjB5NKYVPDPA0iWk/bwAecaZ5WdKEIQ
Date: Fri, 4 Nov 2011 20:55:20 +0000
Message-ID: <E545B914D50B2A4B994F198378B1525D4277E34D@DF-M14-12.exchange.corp.microsoft.com>
References: <CAD9A9FA.2D6B6%stefan@aaa-sec.com>
In-Reply-To: <CAD9A9FA.2D6B6%stefan@aaa-sec.com>
Accept-Language: en-GB, en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
x-originating-ip: [157.54.51.103]
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="_000_E545B914D50B2A4B994F198378B1525D4277E34DDFM1412exchange_"
MIME-Version: 1.0
Subject: Re: [pkix] Need for a SAML identity extension?
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 04 Nov 2011 20:55:24 -0000

--_000_E545B914D50B2A4B994F198378B1525D4277E34DDFM1412exchange_
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Hi Stefan,

The problem you describe is not unique to X.509 and SAML as SAML has the sa=
me issues with itself as there are scenarios where a STS may issues a token=
 based on another SAML token. This is known as Claims transformation and it=
 is a common practice. When the new token is issued it may contain the othe=
r tokens - a progress known as "stapling".  Stapling is not common today as=
 the relying parties' software is not mature enough to process the stapled =
data yet.

I don't see your example as changing the CA model. Today we trust the CAs t=
o follow their CSP to validate the information included in the certificate.=
 The fact that the CA got the information from a SAML token, vs. a driving =
licensee vs. a passport is of no interest and would not change my perceptio=
n of the certificate. We don't have any granularity of good or bad data in =
the certificate - it is all treated the same based on the issuance policy.

The CA will have to reconcile the likely difference in validity for the SAM=
L token vs. the certificate. Why would a CA put data into an object with a =
binding typically measured in months based on data from an object with a bi=
nding typically measured in hours? How would the CA know if the STS refused=
 to issue a new token halfway through the lifetime of the certificate - wha=
t then?

Overall I would suggest you define a new SubjectAltName and stop there. The=
 CA validated the data before it included it in the certificate. If the RP =
trusts the CA, they trust that process.  If the RP wants specifics about a =
specific certificate, then can take it up with the CA.

Trevor

From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Ste=
fan Santesson
Sent: Friday, November 04, 2011 6:41 AM
To: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: [pkix] Need for a SAML identity extension?

Here is something that I'm actually surprised to not have seen people screa=
ming for before.

But now I have come across a legitimate case where I need to issue a certif=
icate holding an identity that I have obtained from a SAML assertion.
AND some applications will need to recover that SAML identity from the cert=
ificate at some point.
And just following standards, I'm left with a number of non-attractive solu=
tions.

The use case is electronic signatures. SAML does not cover this functionali=
ty, so thus I need to create a signing cert holding the asserted identity, =
which is captured from a SAML assertion.
In case of problems I need to recover that SAML identity in order to find t=
he signer through the IdP that issued the assertion.

PKI standards has put the bets on a small number of identity attributes, wh=
ich has lead to overloaded semantics. The most clear case is the serialNumb=
er attribute, but there are more.
SAML assertions have a much more open attitude to identity attributes which=
 can be much more freely defined with a lot more accurate semantics.

So if I want to assert such identity in a certificate, where and how do I s=
tore it?

Do I convert it to the traditional subject name attributes?
Do I try to specify the original semantics using the RFC 3739 semanticsIden=
tifier ?
Or do I translate them to traditional subjectName attributes for backwards =
compatibility AND then put the original SAML attributes in a new SAML Attri=
bute extension.

Well, from a development perspective, the last option is absolutely the eas=
iest to handle. Then the cert would pass all legacy code when validated and=
 when it reaches the code that needs the SAML attributes, then it would jus=
t get them from the new extension.

Have others encountered the same issue?
How did you solve it?

Is there a need for a new extension here?

/Stefan

--_000_E545B914D50B2A4B994F198378B1525D4277E34DDFM1412exchange_
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<html xmlns:v=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:vml" xmlns:o=3D"urn:schemas-micr=
osoft-com:office:office" xmlns:w=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:word" =
xmlns:m=3D"http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2004/12/omml" xmlns=3D"http:=
//www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40">
<head>
<meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3Dus-ascii"=
>
<meta name=3D"ProgId" content=3D"Word.Document">
<meta name=3D"Generator" content=3D"Microsoft Word 14">
<meta name=3D"Originator" content=3D"Microsoft Word 14">
<link rel=3D"File-List" href=3D"cid:filelist.xml@01CC9AF9.638C1200"><!--[if=
 gte mso 9]><xml>
<o:OfficeDocumentSettings>
<o:AllowPNG/>
</o:OfficeDocumentSettings>
</xml><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<w:WordDocument>
<w:SpellingState>Clean</w:SpellingState>
<w:GrammarState>Clean</w:GrammarState>
<w:TrackMoves/>
<w:TrackFormatting/>
<w:EnvelopeVis/>
<w:ValidateAgainstSchemas/>
<w:SaveIfXMLInvalid>false</w:SaveIfXMLInvalid>
<w:IgnoreMixedContent>false</w:IgnoreMixedContent>
<w:AlwaysShowPlaceholderText>false</w:AlwaysShowPlaceholderText>
<w:DoNotPromoteQF/>
<w:LidThemeOther>EN-US</w:LidThemeOther>
<w:LidThemeAsian>X-NONE</w:LidThemeAsian>
<w:LidThemeComplexScript>X-NONE</w:LidThemeComplexScript>
<w:Compatibility>
<w:DoNotExpandShiftReturn/>
<w:BreakWrappedTables/>
<w:SplitPgBreakAndParaMark/>
<w:EnableOpenTypeKerning/>
</w:Compatibility>
<m:mathPr>
<m:mathFont m:val=3D"Cambria Math"/>
<m:brkBin m:val=3D"before"/>
<m:brkBinSub m:val=3D"&#45;-"/>
<m:smallFrac m:val=3D"off"/>
<m:dispDef/>
<m:lMargin m:val=3D"0"/>
<m:rMargin m:val=3D"0"/>
<m:defJc m:val=3D"centerGroup"/>
<m:wrapIndent m:val=3D"1440"/>
<m:intLim m:val=3D"subSup"/>
<m:naryLim m:val=3D"undOvr"/>
</m:mathPr></w:WordDocument>
</xml><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<w:LatentStyles DefLockedState=3D"false" DefUnhideWhenUsed=3D"true" DefSemi=
Hidden=3D"true" DefQFormat=3D"false" DefPriority=3D"99" LatentStyleCount=3D=
"267">
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"0" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhide=
WhenUsed=3D"false" QFormat=3D"true" Name=3D"Normal"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"9" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhide=
WhenUsed=3D"false" QFormat=3D"true" Name=3D"heading 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"9" QFormat=3D"true" Name=3D"he=
ading 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"9" QFormat=3D"true" Name=3D"he=
ading 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"9" QFormat=3D"true" Name=3D"he=
ading 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"9" QFormat=3D"true" Name=3D"he=
ading 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"9" QFormat=3D"true" Name=3D"he=
ading 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"9" QFormat=3D"true" Name=3D"he=
ading 7"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"9" QFormat=3D"true" Name=3D"he=
ading 8"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"9" QFormat=3D"true" Name=3D"he=
ading 9"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"39" Name=3D"toc 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"39" Name=3D"toc 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"39" Name=3D"toc 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"39" Name=3D"toc 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"39" Name=3D"toc 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"39" Name=3D"toc 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"39" Name=3D"toc 7"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"39" Name=3D"toc 8"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"39" Name=3D"toc 9"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"35" QFormat=3D"true" Name=3D"c=
aption"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"10" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" QFormat=3D"true" Name=3D"Title"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"1" Name=3D"Default Paragraph F=
ont"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"11" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" QFormat=3D"true" Name=3D"Subtitle"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"22" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" QFormat=3D"true" Name=3D"Strong"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"20" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" QFormat=3D"true" Name=3D"Emphasis"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"59" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Table Grid"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Placehold=
er Text"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"1" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhide=
WhenUsed=3D"false" QFormat=3D"true" Name=3D"No Spacing"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"60" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Light Shading"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"61" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Light List"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"62" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Light Grid"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"63" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Medium Shading 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"64" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Medium Shading 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"65" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Medium List 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"66" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Medium List 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"67" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Medium Grid 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"68" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Medium Grid 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"69" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Medium Grid 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"70" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Dark List"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"71" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Colorful Shading"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"72" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Colorful List"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"73" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Colorful Grid"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"60" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Light Shading Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"61" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Light List Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"62" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Light Grid Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"63" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Medium Shading 1 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"64" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Medium Shading 2 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"65" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Medium List 1 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" UnhideWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Revision"=
/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"34" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" QFormat=3D"true" Name=3D"List Paragraph"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"29" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" QFormat=3D"true" Name=3D"Quote"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"30" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" QFormat=3D"true" Name=3D"Intense Quote"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"66" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Medium List 2 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"67" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Medium Grid 1 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"68" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Medium Grid 2 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"69" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Medium Grid 3 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"70" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Dark List Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"71" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Colorful Shading Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"72" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Colorful List Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"73" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Colorful Grid Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"60" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Light Shading Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"61" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Light List Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"62" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Light Grid Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"63" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Medium Shading 1 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"64" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Medium Shading 2 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"65" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Medium List 1 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"66" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Medium List 2 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"67" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Medium Grid 1 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"68" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Medium Grid 2 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"69" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Medium Grid 3 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"70" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Dark List Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"71" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Colorful Shading Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"72" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Colorful List Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"73" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Colorful Grid Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"60" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Light Shading Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"61" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Light List Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"62" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Light Grid Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"63" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Medium Shading 1 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"64" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Medium Shading 2 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"65" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Medium List 1 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"66" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Medium List 2 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"67" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Medium Grid 1 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"68" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Medium Grid 2 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"69" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Medium Grid 3 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"70" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Dark List Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"71" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Colorful Shading Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"72" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Colorful List Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"73" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Colorful Grid Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"60" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Light Shading Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"61" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Light List Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"62" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Light Grid Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"63" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Medium Shading 1 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"64" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Medium Shading 2 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"65" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Medium List 1 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"66" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Medium List 2 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"67" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Medium Grid 1 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"68" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Medium Grid 2 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"69" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Medium Grid 3 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"70" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Dark List Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"71" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Colorful Shading Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"72" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Colorful List Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"73" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Colorful Grid Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"60" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Light Shading Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"61" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Light List Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"62" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Light Grid Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"63" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Medium Shading 1 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"64" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Medium Shading 2 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"65" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Medium List 1 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"66" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Medium List 2 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"67" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Medium Grid 1 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"68" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Medium Grid 2 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"69" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Medium Grid 3 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"70" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Dark List Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"71" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Colorful Shading Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"72" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Colorful List Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"73" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Colorful Grid Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"60" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Light Shading Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"61" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Light List Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"62" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Light Grid Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"63" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Medium Shading 1 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"64" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Medium Shading 2 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"65" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Medium List 1 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"66" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Medium List 2 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"67" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Medium Grid 1 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"68" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Medium Grid 2 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"69" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Medium Grid 3 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"70" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Dark List Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"71" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Colorful Shading Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"72" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Colorful List Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"73" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" Name=3D"Colorful Grid Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"19" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" QFormat=3D"true" Name=3D"Subtle Emphasis"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"21" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" QFormat=3D"true" Name=3D"Intense Emphasis"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"31" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" QFormat=3D"true" Name=3D"Subtle Reference"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"32" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" QFormat=3D"true" Name=3D"Intense Reference"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"33" SemiHidden=3D"false" Unhid=
eWhenUsed=3D"false" QFormat=3D"true" Name=3D"Book Title"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"37" Name=3D"Bibliography"/>
<w:LsdException Locked=3D"false" Priority=3D"39" QFormat=3D"true" Name=3D"T=
OC Heading"/>
</w:LatentStyles>
</xml><![endif]--><style><!--
/* Font Definitions */
@font-face
	{font-family:"Cambria Math";
	panose-1:2 4 5 3 5 4 6 3 2 4;
	mso-font-charset:1;
	mso-generic-font-family:roman;
	mso-font-format:other;
	mso-font-pitch:variable;
	mso-font-signature:0 0 0 0 0 0;}
@font-face
	{font-family:Calibri;
	panose-1:2 15 5 2 2 2 4 3 2 4;
	mso-font-charset:0;
	mso-generic-font-family:swiss;
	mso-font-pitch:variable;
	mso-font-signature:-520092929 1073786111 9 0 415 0;}
@font-face
	{font-family:Tahoma;
	panose-1:2 11 6 4 3 5 4 4 2 4;
	mso-font-charset:0;
	mso-generic-font-family:swiss;
	mso-font-pitch:variable;
	mso-font-signature:-520081665 -1073717157 41 0 66047 0;}
/* Style Definitions */
p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal
	{mso-style-unhide:no;
	mso-style-qformat:yes;
	mso-style-parent:"";
	margin:0in;
	margin-bottom:.0001pt;
	mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
	font-size:12.0pt;
	font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";
	mso-fareast-font-family:Calibri;}
a:link, span.MsoHyperlink
	{mso-style-noshow:yes;
	mso-style-priority:99;
	color:blue;
	text-decoration:underline;
	text-underline:single;}
a:visited, span.MsoHyperlinkFollowed
	{mso-style-noshow:yes;
	mso-style-priority:99;
	color:purple;
	text-decoration:underline;
	text-underline:single;}
span.EmailStyle17
	{mso-style-type:personal-reply;
	mso-style-noshow:yes;
	mso-style-unhide:no;
	mso-ansi-font-size:11.0pt;
	mso-bidi-font-size:11.0pt;
	font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
	mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri;
	mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri;
	mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
	color:#4F6228;
	font-weight:bold;
	mso-bidi-font-weight:normal;}
span.SpellE
	{mso-style-name:"";
	mso-spl-e:yes;}
span.GramE
	{mso-style-name:"";
	mso-gram-e:yes;}
.MsoChpDefault
	{mso-style-type:export-only;
	mso-default-props:yes;
	font-size:10.0pt;
	mso-ansi-font-size:10.0pt;
	mso-bidi-font-size:10.0pt;}
@page WordSection1
	{size:8.5in 11.0in;
	margin:1.0in 1.0in 1.0in 1.0in;
	mso-header-margin:.5in;
	mso-footer-margin:.5in;
	mso-paper-source:0;}
div.WordSection1
	{page:WordSection1;}
--></style><!--[if gte mso 10]><style>/* Style Definitions */
table.MsoNormalTable
	{mso-style-name:"Table Normal";
	mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0;
	mso-tstyle-colband-size:0;
	mso-style-noshow:yes;
	mso-style-priority:99;
	mso-style-parent:"";
	mso-padding-alt:0in 5.4pt 0in 5.4pt;
	mso-para-margin:0in;
	mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt;
	mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
	font-size:10.0pt;
	font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";}
</style><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<o:shapedefaults v:ext=3D"edit" spidmax=3D"1026" />
</xml><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<o:shapelayout v:ext=3D"edit">
<o:idmap v:ext=3D"edit" data=3D"1" />
</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]-->
</head>
<body lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple" style=3D"tab-interval:.=
5in">
<div class=3D"WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=
;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;;color:#4F6228">Hi Stefan,=
<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=
;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;;color:#4F6228"><o:p>&nbsp=
;</o:p></span></b></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=
;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;;color:#4F6228">The proble=
m you describe is not unique to X.509 and SAML as SAML has the same
 issues with itself as there are scenarios where a STS may issues a token b=
ased on another SAML token. This is known as Claims transformation and it i=
s a common practice. When the new token is issued it may contain the other =
tokens &#8211; a progress known as &#8220;stapling&#8221;.
<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;</span>Stapling is not common today =
as the relying parties&#8217; software is not mature enough to process the =
stapled data yet.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=
;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;;color:#4F6228"><o:p>&nbsp=
;</o:p></span></b></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=
;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;;color:#4F6228">I don&#821=
7;t see your example as changing the CA model. Today we trust the CAs to fo=
llow
 their CSP to validate the information included in the certificate. The fac=
t that the CA got the information from a SAML token, vs. a driving licensee=
 vs. a passport is of no interest and would not change my perception of the=
 certificate. We don&#8217;t have any
 granularity of good or bad data in the certificate &#8211; it is all treat=
ed the same based on the issuance policy.
<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=
;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;;color:#4F6228"><o:p>&nbsp=
;</o:p></span></b></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=
;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;;color:#4F6228">The CA wil=
l have to reconcile the likely difference in validity for the SAML token
 vs. the certificate. Why would a CA put data into an object with a binding=
 typically measured in months based on data from an object with a binding t=
ypically measured in hours? How would the CA know if the STS refused to iss=
ue a new token halfway through the
 lifetime of the certificate &#8211; what then?<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=
;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;;color:#4F6228"><o:p>&nbsp=
;</o:p></span></b></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=
;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;;color:#4F6228">Overall I =
would suggest you define a new SubjectAltName and stop there. The CA
 validated the data before it included it in the certificate. If the RP tru=
sts the CA, they trust that process.
<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;</span><span class=3D"GramE">If the =
RP wants specifics about a specific certificate, then can take it up with t=
he CA.</span>
<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=
;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;;color:#4F6228"><o:p>&nbsp=
;</o:p></span></b></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=
;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;;color:#4F6228">Trevor<o:p=
></o:p></span></b></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;=
;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;;color:#4F6228"><o:p>&nbsp=
;</o:p></span></b></p>
<div>
<div style=3D"border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in =
0in 0in">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times Ne=
w Roman&quot;">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:=
&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Tim=
es New Roman&quot;"> pkix-bounces@ietf.org
 [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] <b>On Behalf <span class=3D"GramE">Of</span=
> </b>Stefan Santesson<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Friday, November 04, 2011 6:41 AM<br>
<b>To:</b> pkix@ietf.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> [pkix] Need for a SAML identity extension?<o:p></o:p></span=
></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times New =
Roman&quot;;color:black">Here is something that I'm actually surprised to n=
ot have seen people screaming for before.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times New =
Roman&quot;;color:black"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times New =
Roman&quot;;color:black">But now I have come across a legitimate case where=
 I need to issue a certificate holding an identity that I have obtained
 from a SAML assertion.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times New =
Roman&quot;;color:black">AND some applications will need to recover that SA=
ML identity from the certificate at some point.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times New =
Roman&quot;;color:black">And just following standards, I'm left with a numb=
er of non-attractive solutions.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times New =
Roman&quot;;color:black"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times New =
Roman&quot;;color:black">The use case is electronic signatures. SAML does n=
ot cover this functionality, so thus I need to create a signing cert
 holding the asserted identity, which is captured from a SAML assertion.<o:=
p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times New =
Roman&quot;;color:black">In case of problems I need to recover that SAML id=
entity in order to find the signer through the IdP that issued the
 assertion.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times New =
Roman&quot;;color:black"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times New =
Roman&quot;;color:black">PKI standards has put the bets on a small number o=
f identity attributes, which has lead to overloaded semantics. The
 most clear case is the serialNumber attribute, but there are more.<o:p></o=
:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times New =
Roman&quot;;color:black">SAML assertions have a much more open attitude to =
identity attributes which can be much more freely defined with a lot
 more accurate semantics.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times New =
Roman&quot;;color:black"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times New =
Roman&quot;;color:black">So if I want to assert such identity in a certific=
ate, where and how do I store it?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times New =
Roman&quot;;color:black"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times New =
Roman&quot;;color:black">Do I convert it to the traditional subject name at=
tributes?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times New =
Roman&quot;;color:black">Do I try to specify the original semantics using t=
he RFC 3739 semanticsIdentifier ?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times New =
Roman&quot;;color:black">Or do I translate them to traditional subjectName =
attributes for backwards compatibility AND then put the original SAML
 attributes in a new SAML Attribute extension.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times New =
Roman&quot;;color:black"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times New =
Roman&quot;;color:black">Well, from a development perspective, the last opt=
ion is absolutely the easiest to handle. Then the cert would pass
 all legacy code when validated and when it reaches the code that needs the=
 SAML attributes, then it would just get them from the new extension.<o:p><=
/o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times New =
Roman&quot;;color:black"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times New =
Roman&quot;;color:black">Have others encountered the same issue?<o:p></o:p>=
</span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times New =
Roman&quot;;color:black">How did you solve it?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times New =
Roman&quot;;color:black"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times New =
Roman&quot;;color:black">Is there a need for a new extension here?<o:p></o:=
p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times New =
Roman&quot;;color:black"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times New =
Roman&quot;;color:black">/Stefan<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
</div>
</body>
</html>

--_000_E545B914D50B2A4B994F198378B1525D4277E34DDFM1412exchange_--

From kyanha@kyanha.net  Sun Nov  6 09:03:57 2011
Return-Path: <kyanha@kyanha.net>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E067F21F851F for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sun,  6 Nov 2011 09:03:57 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.279
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.279 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.055, BAYES_00=-2.599, FM_FORGED_GMAIL=0.622, MIME_BASE64_TEXT=1.753, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 2uX9EceD1+S9 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sun,  6 Nov 2011 09:03:57 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail-gx0-f172.google.com (mail-gx0-f172.google.com [209.85.161.172]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0FE4D21F84D5 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Sun,  6 Nov 2011 09:03:56 -0800 (PST)
Received: by ggnv1 with SMTP id v1so5120218ggn.31 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Sun, 06 Nov 2011 09:03:56 -0800 (PST)
Received: by 10.42.150.135 with SMTP id a7mr37445441icw.53.1320599036213; Sun, 06 Nov 2011 09:03:56 -0800 (PST)
Received: from penango (c-67-188-178-93.hsd1.ca.comcast.net. [67.188.178.93]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPS id wn14sm3672785pbb.5.2011.11.06.09.03.52 (version=SSLv3 cipher=OTHER); Sun, 06 Nov 2011 09:03:54 -0800 (PST)
From: "Kyle Hamilton" <kyanha@kyanha.net>
To: "Rob Stradling" <rob.stradling@comodo.com>
Date: Sun, 6 Nov 2011 09:03:46 -0800 (Pacific Standard Time)
Message-ID: <guoakah6rw2uhp08wvjezwJv4X.penango@mail.gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <201110271717.p9RHH5LF025823@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp>
References: <B8E4DC0DD2F9A74AB88B4529E8FED39CF6E62450@MX22A.corp.emc.com> from "Walter.Goulet@rsa.com" at Oct 27, 11 12:59:27 pm <201110271717.p9RHH5LF025823@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/signed; protocol="application/pkcs7-signature"; micalg="sha1"; boundary=gmsm1.9.0eqguoakald7bjfmq51au2
Cc: pkix@ietf.org, paul.hoffman@vpnc.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 06 Nov 2011 17:03:58 -0000

This is an S/MIME signed message generated with Penango.
--gmsm1.9.0eqguoakald7bjfmq51au2
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset=iso-8859-1
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--gmsm1.9.0eqguoakald7bjfmq51au2
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="Verify This Message with Penango.p7s"
Content-Description: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-signature; name="Verify This Message with Penango.p7s"
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--gmsm1.9.0eqguoakald7bjfmq51au2--


From denis.pinkas@bull.net  Mon Nov  7 01:05:48 2011
Return-Path: <denis.pinkas@bull.net>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6C5C221F851F for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 01:05:48 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.062
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.062 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.186,  BAYES_00=-2.599, HELO_EQ_FR=0.35, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 5zlag0OuOatM for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 01:05:47 -0800 (PST)
Received: from odin2.bull.net (odin2.bull.net [129.184.85.11]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E913521F84F5 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 01:05:46 -0800 (PST)
Received: from MSGC-003.bull.fr (MSGC-003.frcl.bull.fr [129.184.87.131]) by odin2.bull.net (Bull S.A.) with ESMTP id 2957718056 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 10:15:50 +0100 (CET)
In-Reply-To: <OF524322AE.26AC5A2C-ONC1257936.002B78E6-C1257936.002E07E9@bull.net>
References: <CAMm+Lwjc=M7h2mTN1AhHPH0LQGO+oN5JSFSG6my5ud5yJezXMA@mail.gmail.com> <OF524322AE.26AC5A2C-ONC1257936.002B78E6-C1257936.002E07E9@bull.net>
To: pkix@ietf.org
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-KeepSent: 6ACC9D95:CD2746C7-C125793F:0047483F; type=4; name=$KeepSent
X-Mailer: Lotus Notes Release 8.5.2 August 10, 2010
From: denis.pinkas@bull.net
Message-ID: <OF6ACC9D95.CD2746C7-ONC125793F.0047483F-C1257941.003203C3@bull.net>
Date: Mon, 7 Nov 2011 10:06:17 +0100
X-MIMETrack: Serialize by Router on MSGC-003/SRV/BULL(Release 8.5.2FP1|November 29, 2010) at 07/11/2011 10:06:18, Serialize complete at 07/11/2011 10:06:18
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="=_alternative 0031EDB4C1257941_="
Subject: [pkix] Proposed new singleExtension for OCSP
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 07 Nov 2011 09:05:48 -0000

Message en plusieurs parties au format MIME
--=_alternative 0031EDB4C1257941_=
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="ISO-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

In order to take advantage of OCSP responders which would be able to use=20
white lists of certificates,=20
looking back at comments made by Peter Sylvester, it is not mandatory to=20
support a new certStatus,
as I previously mentioned, but simply a new singleExtension.

This new single extension SHOULD be supported as soon as the responder=20
uses white lists of certificates
( I would even say "SHALL  be supported within 2 years from now" to allow=20
a smooth migration).

This single extension would indicate something like "cert. status checked=20
using white lists".

Although not mandatory, this new extension could also include the hash=20
value of the certificate computed=20
with a hash function chosen by the OCSP responder.

In order to illustrate the difference of behavior between an OCSP=20
responder using CRLs and=20
another one using white lists of certificates in case the query is about a =

certificate which has never been issued.

a) OCSP responder using CRLs

certStatus =3D good


b) OCSP responder using  white lists of certificates

certStatus=3D revoked

singleExtension "cert. status checked using white lists" present.


Should this become a new work item for the PKIX WG ?

Denis=20









De :    denis.pinkas@bull.net
A :     pkix@ietf.org
Date :  27/10/2011 10:22
Objet : Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version=20
Notification    for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
Envoy=E9 par :    pkix-bounces@ietf.org



Phil,=20

We both agree that the problem comes from the fact that OCSP does not have =

a proper response code for 'does not exist';=20

Since CertStatus is a CHOICE, we would need to move to OCSP v2 to add a=20
new choice.=20

However, simply adding this response code to OCSP v2 would not be=20
sufficient.=20

It would be necessary to advertise to the client that a given OCSP server=20
has a direct access to the CA list of issued certificates,
and hence is is able to send back this new response code.=20

I would simply propose that we advertise this in a singleExtensions, by=20
defining an extension.=20

Denis=20

=20
> Thinking laterally on this issue.=20
>=20
> The issue here seems to come up with the problem that OCSP does not=20
> have a proper response code for 'does not exist', Now let us imagine
> for a moment that we borrow from the prior art in DNSSEC and have an
> NSEC3 type capability that provides a status for the 'gaps' between=20
> certificates. Wouldn't this meet all the essential use cases?=20
>=20
> The gaps could be specified either as gaps between certificate=20
> serial numbers or gaps between cert hashes. I would like to see an=20
> OCSP extension to allow the hash of the cert to be specified in any=20
case.=20
>=20
> So the old style OCSP token is (essentially)=20
>=20
>    Sign (key, { {status-value, issuer, serial, {extensions}} } )=20
>=20
> I would like to change that for certs that exist to:=20
>=20
>    Sign (key, { {status-value, issuer, serial, {certhash, extensions}} } =

)=20
>=20
> And if there is a query for a cert that does not exist and the=20
> request indicates that you can process it, you would get back:=20
>=20
>    Sign (key, { {non-existent, issuer, dummy-serial, {{start-
> indicator, end-indicator}, extensions}} } )=20
>=20
> This type of response would only ever be returned in an OCSP query=20
> response. There would be no point whatsoever in stapling a non-
> existent OCSP token to a TLS cert chain (OK not unless you were an=20
> attacker and you knew it would cause the chain to break somehow, but
> we design it to avoid that happening)=20
>=20
> It might be desirable to obfusticate the start and end indicators=20
> somewhat to prevent cert population walking. But I rather doubt we=20
> would end up hiding any information that can't be got using stats. =20
>=20
> This has been in the DNSSEC spec for over a decade so it is almost=20
> certainly unencumbered. It allows us to provide a signed response to
> every OCSP query from static data. So why didn't we think of doing=20
> it from the start?=20
>=20
> The only (minor) issue is that if there is a cert issued AFTER the=20
> date of the OCSP token, the negative response token becomes invalid.
> Although that turns out to be a moot point as if someone can hand=20
> you the negative response token in response to the OCSP request,=20
> they can stop you getting the valid OCSP token so you are hosed anyway.=20
> =5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=
=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=
=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F
pkix mailing list
pkix@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix


--=_alternative 0031EDB4C1257941_=
Content-Type: text/html; charset="ISO-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<font size=3D2 face=3D"sans-serif">In order to take advantage of OCSP respo=
nders
which would be able to use white lists of certificates, <br>
looking back at comments made by Peter Sylvester, it is not mandatory to
support a new certStatus,<br>
as I previously mentioned, but simply a new </font><font size=3D2 face=3D"A=
rial">singleExtension</font><font size=3D2 face=3D"sans-serif">.</font>
<br>
<br><font size=3D2 face=3D"sans-serif">This new single extension SHOULD be
supported as soon as the responder uses white lists of certificates<br>
( I would even say &quot;SHALL &nbsp;be supported within 2 years from now&q=
uot;
to allow a smooth migration).</font>
<br>
<br><font size=3D2 face=3D"sans-serif">This single extension would indicate
something like &quot;cert. status checked using white lists&quot;.</font>
<br>
<br><font size=3D2 face=3D"sans-serif">Although not mandatory, this new ext=
ension
could also include the hash value of the certificate computed <br>
with a hash function chosen by the OCSP responder.</font>
<br>
<br><font size=3D2 face=3D"sans-serif">In order to illustrate the difference
of behavior between an OCSP responder using CRLs and <br>
another one using white lists of certificates in case the query is about
a certificate which has never been issued.</font>
<br>
<br><font size=3D2 face=3D"sans-serif">a) OCSP responder using CRLs</font>
<br>
<br><font size=3D2 face=3D"sans-serif">certStatus =3D good</font>
<br>
<br>
<br><font size=3D2 face=3D"sans-serif">b) OCSP responder using &nbsp;white
lists of certificates</font>
<br>
<br><font size=3D2 face=3D"sans-serif">certStatus=3D revoked</font>
<br>
<br><font size=3D2 face=3D"Arial">singleExtension</font><font size=3D2 face=
=3D"sans-serif">
&quot;cert. status checked using white lists&quot; present.</font>
<br>
<br>
<br><font size=3D2 face=3D"sans-serif">Should this become a new work item f=
or
the PKIX WG ?</font>
<br>
<br><font size=3D2 face=3D"sans-serif">Denis </font>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br><font size=3D1 color=3D#5f5f5f face=3D"sans-serif">De : &nbsp; &nbsp; &=
nbsp;
&nbsp;</font><font size=3D1 face=3D"sans-serif">denis.pinkas@bull.net</font>
<br><font size=3D1 color=3D#5f5f5f face=3D"sans-serif">A : &nbsp; &nbsp; &n=
bsp;
&nbsp;</font><font size=3D1 face=3D"sans-serif">pkix@ietf.org</font>
<br><font size=3D1 color=3D#5f5f5f face=3D"sans-serif">Date : &nbsp; &nbsp;=
 &nbsp;
&nbsp;</font><font size=3D1 face=3D"sans-serif">27/10/2011 10:22</font>
<br><font size=3D1 color=3D#5f5f5f face=3D"sans-serif">Objet : &nbsp; &nbsp;
&nbsp; &nbsp;</font><font size=3D1 face=3D"sans-serif">Re: [pkix] An
alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version Notification &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;
&nbsp;for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt</font>
<br><font size=3D1 color=3D#5f5f5f face=3D"sans-serif">Envoy=E9 par : &nbsp=
; &nbsp;
&nbsp; &nbsp;</font><font size=3D1 face=3D"sans-serif">pkix-bounces@ietf.or=
g</font>
<br>
<hr noshade>
<br>
<br>
<br><font size=3D2 face=3D"sans-serif">Phil,</font><font size=3D3> <br>
</font><font size=3D2 face=3D"sans-serif"><br>
We both agree that </font><font size=3D2 face=3D"Arial">the problem comes f=
rom
the fact that OCSP does not have a proper response code for 'does not exist=
';</font><font size=3D3>
<br>
</font><font size=3D2 face=3D"Arial"><br>
Since CertStatus is a CHOICE, we would need to move to OCSP v2 to add a
new choice.</font><font size=3D3> <br>
</font><font size=3D2 face=3D"Arial"><br>
However, simply adding this response code to OCSP v2 would not be sufficien=
t.</font><font size=3D3>
</font><font size=3D2 face=3D"Arial"><br>
<br>
It would be necessary to advertise to the client that a given OCSP server
has a direct access to the CA list of issued certificates,<br>
and hence is is able to send back this new response code.</font><font size=
=3D3>
<br>
</font><font size=3D2 face=3D"Arial"><br>
I would simply propose that we advertise this in a singleExtensions</font><=
font size=3D2 face=3D"Times New Roman">,</font><font size=3D2 face=3D"Arial=
">
by defining an extension.</font><font size=3D3> <br>
</font><font size=3D2 face=3D"Arial"><br>
Denis</font><font size=3D3> <br>
</font><tt><font size=3D2><br>
 <br>
&gt; Thinking laterally on this issue. <br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; The issue here seems to come up with the problem that OCSP does not
<br>
&gt; have a proper response code for 'does not exist', Now let us imagine<b=
r>
&gt; for a moment that we borrow from the prior art in DNSSEC and have
an<br>
&gt; NSEC3 type capability that provides a status for the 'gaps' between
<br>
&gt; certificates. Wouldn't this meet all the essential use cases?</font></=
tt><font size=3D3>
</font><tt><font size=3D2><br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; The gaps could be specified either as gaps between certificate <br>
&gt; serial numbers or gaps between cert hashes. I would like to see an
<br>
&gt; OCSP extension to allow the hash of the cert to be specified in any
case.</font></tt><font size=3D3> </font><tt><font size=3D2><br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; So the old style OCSP token is (essentially)</font></tt><font size=3D3>
</font><tt><font size=3D2><br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp;Sign (key, { {status-value, issuer, serial, {extensions}}
} )</font></tt><font size=3D3> </font><tt><font size=3D2><br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; I would like to change that for certs that exist to:</font></tt><font =
size=3D3>
</font><tt><font size=3D2><br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp;Sign (key, { {status-value, issuer, serial, {certhash,
extensions}} } )</font></tt><font size=3D3> </font><tt><font size=3D2><br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; And if there is a query for a cert that does not exist and the <br>
&gt; request indicates that you can process it, you would get back:</font><=
/tt><font size=3D3>
</font><tt><font size=3D2><br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp;Sign (key, { {non-existent, issuer, dummy-serial, {{start=
-<br>
&gt; indicator, end-indicator}, extensions}} } )</font></tt><font size=3D3>
</font><tt><font size=3D2><br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; This type of response would only ever be returned in an OCSP query
<br>
&gt; response. There would be no point whatsoever in stapling a non-<br>
&gt; existent OCSP token to a TLS cert chain (OK not unless you were an
<br>
&gt; attacker and you knew it would cause the chain to break somehow, but<b=
r>
&gt; we design it to avoid that happening)</font></tt><font size=3D3> </fon=
t><tt><font size=3D2><br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; It might be desirable to obfusticate the start and end indicators
<br>
&gt; somewhat to prevent cert population walking. But I rather doubt we
<br>
&gt; would end up hiding any information that can't be got using stats.
</font></tt><font size=3D3>&nbsp;</font><tt><font size=3D2><br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; This has been in the DNSSEC spec for over a decade so it is almost
<br>
&gt; certainly unencumbered. It allows us to provide a signed response
to<br>
&gt; every OCSP query from static data. So why didn't we think of doing
<br>
&gt; it from the start?</font></tt><font size=3D3> </font><tt><font size=3D=
2><br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; The only (minor) issue is that if there is a cert issued AFTER the
<br>
&gt; date of the OCSP token, the negative response token becomes invalid.<b=
r>
&gt; Although that turns out to be a moot point as if someone can hand
<br>
&gt; you the negative response token in response to the OCSP request, <br>
&gt; they can stop you getting the valid OCSP token so you are hosed anyway=
.</font></tt><font size=3D3>
</font><tt><font size=3D2><br>
&gt; =5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=
=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F<br>
&gt; pkix mailing list<br>
&gt; pkix@ietf.org<br>
&gt; </font></tt><a href=3Dhttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix><tt><=
font size=3D2 color=3Dblue><u>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix</u=
></font></tt></a><tt><font size=3D2>=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=
=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=
=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F<br>
pkix mailing list<br>
pkix@ietf.org<br>
</font></tt><a href=3Dhttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix><tt><font =
size=3D2>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix</font></tt></a><tt><fon=
t size=3D2><br>
</font></tt>
<br>
--=_alternative 0031EDB4C1257941_=--

From peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr  Mon Nov  7 03:42:37 2011
Return-Path: <peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id DD24821F8B17 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 03:42:37 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.598
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.598 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id Xh8q6muWQlP8 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 03:42:37 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mx1.on-x.com (mx1.on-x.com [92.103.215.13]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 15A8821F842B for <pkix@ietf.org>; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 03:42:37 -0800 (PST)
Received: from varuna.puteaux.on-x (varuna.puteaux.on-x [192.168.10.6]) by mx1.on-x.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9CE618067 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 12:42:35 +0100 (CET)
Received: from smtps.on-x.com (mintaka.puteaux.on-x [192.168.14.11]) by varuna.puteaux.on-x (Postfix) with ESMTP id 08FDD16F7A for <pkix@ietf.org>; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 12:27:32 +0100 (CET)
Received: from [192.168.18.180] (unknown [192.168.18.180]) by smtps.on-x.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 5222823633D for <pkix@ietf.org>; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 06:42:24 -0500 (EST)
Message-ID: <4EB7C43E.3050409@edelweb.fr>
Date: Mon, 07 Nov 2011 12:42:54 +0100
From: Peter Sylvester <peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:7.0.1) Gecko/20110929 Thunderbird/7.0.1
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: PKIX <pkix@ietf.org>
References: <4EA19CD8.6090705@edelweb.fr>
In-Reply-To: <4EA19CD8.6090705@edelweb.fr>
X-Forwarded-Message-Id: <4EA19CD8.6090705@edelweb.fr>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="------------080503030605010708010400"
Subject: [pkix] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 07 Nov 2011 11:42:38 -0000

This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
--------------080503030605010708010400
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

For some (known) reason, the following mail did not get through PKIX.
After the discussions of the last two weeks, I'll add:

- It is amusing how programmers have  difficulties to add new
   syntaxes to toolkits etc., well, the current state of ASN.1
   tools used in favorite middleware doesn't not make this
   simple.
   It seems in fact easier to many to use an existing API for CRLs
   than making a new one for some other data structure.

- Nevertheless, when one attempts to do so, the project
   often just ends when the real work begins, i.e. when it comes
   to using the data. The task becomes difficult when the
   semantics is not well defined.

-------- Original Message --------
Subject: 	[pkix] New Version Notification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
Date: 	Fri, 21 Oct 2011 18:24:56 +0200
From: 	Peter Sylvester <peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr>
To: 	pkix@ietf.org



As far as I remember:  a version field in an asn.1 syntax indicates a change in the syntax, i.e. adding
new fields at the end, not a change in semantics.

As an attacker: if I get a list of valid serial numbers, I would try to get a cert with such a number.


--------------080503030605010708010400
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

<html>
  <head>

    <meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1">
  </head>
  <body bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
    For some (known) reason, the following mail did not get through
    PKIX.<br>
    After the discussions of the last two weeks, I'll add:<br>
    <br>
    - It is amusing how programmers have&nbsp; difficulties to add new<br>
    &nbsp; syntaxes to toolkits etc., well, the current state of ASN.1 <br>
    &nbsp; tools used in favorite middleware doesn't not make this<br>
    &nbsp; simple. <br>
    &nbsp; It seems in fact easier to many to use an existing API for CRLs<br>
    &nbsp; than making a new one for some other data structure.<br>
    &nbsp;<br>
    - Nevertheless, when one attempts to do so, the project<br>
    &nbsp; often just ends when the real work begins, i.e. when it comes<br>
    &nbsp; to using the data. The task becomes difficult when the<br>
    &nbsp; semantics is not well defined.&nbsp; <br>
    <br>
    -------- Original Message --------
    <table class="moz-email-headers-table" border="0" cellpadding="0"
      cellspacing="0">
      <tbody>
        <tr>
          <th align="RIGHT" nowrap="nowrap" valign="BASELINE">Subject: </th>
          <td>[pkix] New Version Notification for
            draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <th align="RIGHT" nowrap="nowrap" valign="BASELINE">Date: </th>
          <td>Fri, 21 Oct 2011 18:24:56 +0200</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <th align="RIGHT" nowrap="nowrap" valign="BASELINE">From: </th>
          <td>Peter Sylvester <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr">&lt;peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr&gt;</a></td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <th align="RIGHT" nowrap="nowrap" valign="BASELINE">To: </th>
          <td><a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a></td>
        </tr>
      </tbody>
    </table>
    <br>
    <br>
    <pre>As far as I remember:  a version field in an asn.1 syntax indicates a change in the syntax, i.e. adding
new fields at the end, not a change in semantics.

As an attacker: if I get a list of valid serial numbers, I would try to get a cert with such a number.
</pre>
  </body>
</html>

--------------080503030605010708010400--

From tmiller@mitre.org  Mon Nov  7 05:55:30 2011
Return-Path: <tmiller@mitre.org>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id EC4A521F8B70 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 05:55:30 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id seUeD40x+O8W for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 05:55:30 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (smtpksrv1.mitre.org [198.49.146.77]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 558AE21F8B6F for <pkix@ietf.org>; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 05:55:30 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by localhost (Postfix) with SMTP id A7D0121B0C77; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 08:55:29 -0500 (EST)
Received: from IMCCAS03.MITRE.ORG (imccas03.mitre.org [129.83.29.80]) by smtpksrv1.mitre.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9B02F21B0C22; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 08:55:29 -0500 (EST)
Received: from IMCMBX01.MITRE.ORG ([169.254.1.57]) by IMCCAS03.MITRE.ORG ([129.83.29.80]) with mapi id 14.01.0339.001; Mon, 7 Nov 2011 08:55:29 -0500
From: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
To: Kyle Hamilton <kyanha@kyanha.net>, Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version
Thread-Index: AQHMnKYL6CmUY2saPEyZJmaoCSAF/5WhX9mA
Date: Mon, 7 Nov 2011 13:55:29 +0000
Message-ID: <CADD3D76.2114%tmiller@mitre.org>
In-Reply-To: <guoakah6rw2uhp08wvjezwJv4X.penango@mail.gmail.com>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
user-agent: Microsoft-MacOutlook/14.13.0.110805
x-originating-ip: [172.31.3.178]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-ID: <5AFCA5D3A4F73F448E290642FE3ACA3D@imc.mitre.org>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Cc: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>, "paul.hoffman@vpnc.org" <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 07 Nov 2011 13:55:31 -0000

On 11/6/11 11:03 AM, "Kyle Hamilton" <kyanha@kyanha.net> wrote:

>PKIX-WG is all about authenticated information.  Why does it limit itself
>to one rigid, brittle, and broken paradigm where it only needs to provide
>one piece of it?  We're not the ITU.  We have much different needs than
>they ever envisioned.  We have been shackled by that worldview that says,
>in effect, self-signed certificates have no conceivable use, so they have
>no possible use.  This is completely untrue, and has absolutely no place
>enshrined in an Internet standard.

Um, what?  No-one is stopping you from using Certificate in any way you
choose.  Self-signed certificates have plenty of uses, and in fact are
used extensively in real systems.  You can use PKIX-defined formats
without using PKIX-defined trust concepts; I use key continuity systems
avery day using CA-signed certificates, and they work.  TCG uses
PKIX-defined formats with a *completely different* delegation trust model,
and the Grid people have also built different trust models atop the same
formats.

PKIX in reality defines very little:  (1) A format for data; (2) a method
of binding a key to that data; and (3) one method of establishing
assurance in that binding.  Everything else is your business.

>PKIX-WG can completely solve this impedence mismatch.  Even better, it
>can be done simply, easily, and relatively cheaply.

You have a complete misapprehension of how this body functions and what it
provides.

-- T


From tmiller@mitre.org  Mon Nov  7 06:00:48 2011
Return-Path: <tmiller@mitre.org>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9C9F821F8BE4 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 06:00:48 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 45tNrq1LjUSo for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 06:00:44 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (smtpksrv1.mitre.org [198.49.146.77]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8030121F8BC5 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 06:00:44 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by localhost (Postfix) with SMTP id 2E02421B0D28; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 09:00:44 -0500 (EST)
Received: from IMCCAS01.MITRE.ORG (imccas01.mitre.org [129.83.29.78]) by smtpksrv1.mitre.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1019421B0CFE; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 09:00:44 -0500 (EST)
Received: from IMCMBX01.MITRE.ORG ([169.254.1.57]) by IMCCAS01.MITRE.ORG ([129.83.29.78]) with mapi id 14.01.0339.001; Mon, 7 Nov 2011 09:00:43 -0500
From: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
To: "denis.pinkas@bull.net" <denis.pinkas@bull.net>, "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] Proposed new singleExtension for OCSP
Thread-Index: AQHMnSxzAIJDF8bQtkGhezvWvxyumZWhYCiA
Date: Mon, 7 Nov 2011 14:00:43 +0000
Message-ID: <CADD4010.212D%tmiller@mitre.org>
In-Reply-To: <OF6ACC9D95.CD2746C7-ONC125793F.0047483F-C1257941.003203C3@bull.net>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
user-agent: Microsoft-MacOutlook/14.13.0.110805
x-originating-ip: [172.31.3.178]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-ID: <E61D92124ABE544A8BDF86F68C904B68@imc.mitre.org>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Subject: Re: [pkix] Proposed new singleExtension for OCSP
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 07 Nov 2011 14:00:48 -0000

Since a Responder desiring whitelist functions need only respond "Revoked"
for certificates for which is has no positive record, I see no reason to
introduce a new extension to a standards-track protocol.

Also, RFCs do not mandate implementation timelines.

-- T


On 11/7/11 3:06 AM, "denis.pinkas@bull.net" <denis.pinkas@bull.net> wrote:

>In order to take advantage of OCSP responders
>which would be able to use white lists of certificates,
>looking back at comments made by Peter Sylvester, it is not mandatory to
>support a new certStatus,
>as I previously mentioned, but simply a new singleExtension.
>
>This new single extension SHOULD be
>supported as soon as the responder uses white lists of certificates
>( I would even say "SHALL  be supported within 2 years from now"
>to allow a smooth migration).
>
>This single extension would indicate
>something like "cert. status checked using white lists".
>
>Although not mandatory, this new extension
>could also include the hash value of the certificate computed
>with a hash function chosen by the OCSP responder.
>
>In order to illustrate the difference
>of behavior between an OCSP responder using CRLs and
>another one using white lists of certificates in case the query is about
>a certificate which has never been issued.
>
>a) OCSP responder using CRLs
>
>certStatus =3D good
>
>
>b) OCSP responder using  white
>lists of certificates
>
>certStatus=3D revoked
>
>singleExtension
>"cert. status checked using white lists" present.
>
>
>Should this become a new work item for
>the PKIX WG ?
>
>Denis=20
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>De :     =20
> denis.pinkas@bull.net
>A :     =20
> pkix@ietf.org
>Date :     =20
> 27/10/2011 10:22
>Objet :   =20
>   Re: [pkix] An
>alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version Notification
> for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
>Envoy=E9 par :   =20
>   pkix-bounces@ietf.org
>________________________________________
>
>
>
>Phil,=20
>
>We both agree that the problem comes from
>the fact that OCSP does not have a proper response code for 'does not
>exist';
>
>Since CertStatus is a CHOICE, we would need to move to OCSP v2 to add a
>new choice.=20
>
>However, simply adding this response code to OCSP v2 would not be
>sufficient.
>
>It would be necessary to advertise to the client that a given OCSP server
>has a direct access to the CA list of issued certificates,
>and hence is is able to send back this new response code.
>
>I would simply propose that we advertise this in a singleExtensions,
>by defining an extension.
>
>Denis=20
>
>=20
>> Thinking laterally on this issue.
>>=20
>> The issue here seems to come up with the problem that OCSP does not
>
>> have a proper response code for 'does not exist', Now let us imagine
>> for a moment that we borrow from the prior art in DNSSEC and have
>an
>> NSEC3 type capability that provides a status for the 'gaps' between
>
>> certificates. Wouldn't this meet all the essential use cases?
>>=20
>> The gaps could be specified either as gaps between certificate
>> serial numbers or gaps between cert hashes. I would like to see an
>
>> OCSP extension to allow the hash of the cert to be specified in any
>case.=20
>>=20
>> So the old style OCSP token is (essentially)
>>=20
>>    Sign (key, { {status-value, issuer, serial, {extensions}}
>} )=20
>>=20
>> I would like to change that for certs that exist to:
>>=20
>>    Sign (key, { {status-value, issuer, serial, {certhash,
>extensions}} } )=20
>>=20
>> And if there is a query for a cert that does not exist and the
>> request indicates that you can process it, you would get back:
>>=20
>>    Sign (key, { {non-existent, issuer, dummy-serial, {{start-
>> indicator, end-indicator}, extensions}} } )
>>=20
>> This type of response would only ever be returned in an OCSP query
>
>> response. There would be no point whatsoever in stapling a non-
>> existent OCSP token to a TLS cert chain (OK not unless you were an
>
>> attacker and you knew it would cause the chain to break somehow, but
>> we design it to avoid that happening)
>>=20
>> It might be desirable to obfusticate the start and end indicators
>
>> somewhat to prevent cert population walking. But I rather doubt we
>
>> would end up hiding any information that can't be got using stats.
>=20
>>=20
>> This has been in the DNSSEC spec for over a decade so it is almost
>
>> certainly unencumbered. It allows us to provide a signed response
>to
>> every OCSP query from static data. So why didn't we think of doing
>
>> it from the start?
>>=20
>> The only (minor) issue is that if there is a cert issued AFTER the
>
>> date of the OCSP token, the negative response token becomes invalid.
>> Although that turns out to be a moot point as if someone can hand
>
>> you the negative response token in response to the OCSP request,
>> they can stop you getting the valid OCSP token so you are hosed anyway.
>> _______________________________________________
>> pkix mailing list
>> pkix@ietf.org
>>=20
>>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix_______________________________
>>________________
>pkix mailing list
>pkix@ietf.org
>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>
>_______________________________________________
>pkix mailing list
>pkix@ietf.org
>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix


From rob.stradling@comodo.com  Mon Nov  7 06:34:28 2011
Return-Path: <rob.stradling@comodo.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id CFE0B21F8B0C for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 06:34:28 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.000,  BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id nyPBEMfbVmjP for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 06:34:28 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mmmail1.mcr.colo.comodoca.net (mdfw.comodoca.net [91.209.196.68]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id BE3FC21F86A0 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 06:34:19 -0800 (PST)
Received: (qmail 973 invoked from network); 7 Nov 2011 14:34:18 -0000
Received: from ian.bd.office.comodo.net (HELO ian.brad.office.comodo.net) (192.168.0.201) by mail.colo.comodoca.net with ESMTPS (DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA encrypted); 7 Nov 2011 14:34:18 -0000
Received: (qmail 22027 invoked by uid 1000); 7 Nov 2011 14:34:18 -0000
Received: from nigel.brad.office.comodo.net (HELO nigel.localnet) (192.168.0.58) by ian.brad.office.comodo.net (qpsmtpd/0.40) with (AES256-SHA encrypted) ESMTPS; Mon, 07 Nov 2011 14:34:18 +0000
From: Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>
To: pkix@ietf.org
Date: Mon, 7 Nov 2011 14:34:17 +0000
User-Agent: KMail/1.13.7 (Linux/3.0.6-gentoo; KDE/4.6.5; i686; ; )
References: <CADD4010.212D%tmiller@mitre.org>
In-Reply-To: <CADD4010.212D%tmiller@mitre.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: Text/Plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Message-Id: <201111071434.17358.rob.stradling@comodo.com>
Subject: Re: [pkix] Proposed new singleExtension for OCSP
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 07 Nov 2011 14:34:29 -0000

On Monday 07 Nov 2011 14:00:43 Miller, Timothy J. wrote:
> Since a Responder desiring whitelist functions

But what if the OCSP Client wants to know that there is "no positive record" 
of the certificate's existence?

> need only respond "Revoked" for certificates for which is has no positive
> record,

This would be problematic for Responders that only use pre-generated 
Responses.  However, if such a Responder has access to the CA's database, it 
would be able to include a "cert. status checked using white lists" indicator 
and/or a hash of the certificate in a new singleExtension in the Response.

Are we trying to concoct a mechanism to prove the existence of a cert?  Or to 
prove the non-existence of a cert?  Or both?  Or either?

> I see no reason to introduce a new extension to a standards-track
> protocol.
<snip>

Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online

From peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr  Mon Nov  7 06:58:51 2011
Return-Path: <peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7F12321F8BE9 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 06:58:51 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.979
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.979 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.619, BAYES_00=-2.599, SARE_LWSHORTT=1.24]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id otXMWA-kEpgF for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 06:58:51 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mx1.on-x.com (mx1.on-x.com [92.103.215.13]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0848021F8BE7 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 06:58:51 -0800 (PST)
Received: from varuna.puteaux.on-x (varuna.puteaux.on-x [192.168.10.6]) by mx1.on-x.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 26FDB810C for <pkix@ietf.org>; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 13:32:32 +0100 (CET)
Received: from smtps.on-x.com (mintaka.puteaux.on-x [192.168.14.11]) by varuna.puteaux.on-x (Postfix) with ESMTP id F2F5716F7A for <pkix@ietf.org>; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 13:17:28 +0100 (CET)
Received: from [192.168.18.180] (unknown [192.168.18.180]) by smtps.on-x.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id D75CA23633D for <pkix@ietf.org>; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 07:32:20 -0500 (EST)
Message-ID: <4EB7CFF3.8090204@edelweb.fr>
Date: Mon, 07 Nov 2011 13:32:51 +0100
From: Peter Sylvester <peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:7.0.1) Gecko/20110929 Thunderbird/7.0.1
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: pkix@ietf.org
References: <201110281435.p9SEZI0U008301@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp>
In-Reply-To: <201110281435.p9SEZI0U008301@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 07 Nov 2011 14:58:51 -0000

If a server can get an OCSP response in a guaranted way,
the CA might as well propose to create short term certs,
one day or so. ? Where is the need for OCSP in that case?

On 10/28/2011 04:35 PM, Martin Rex wrote


The TLS server, on the other hand, can perform OCSP retrieval for
his very own cert with an infrequent recurring asynchronous operation
(e.g. once every few hours), it is always exactly the same OCSP server,
the CA has a contractual obligation towards the Server cert purchaser
to provide this service, and the Server operater can select a suitable
CA with an OCSP service quality and connectivity that meets the servers
expectations.




From peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr  Mon Nov  7 07:53:52 2011
Return-Path: <peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 67D8921F8C1D for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 07:53:52 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.288
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.288 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.310,  BAYES_00=-2.599, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id YFsv8hUsrW4Q for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 07:53:51 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mx1.on-x.com (mx1.on-x.com [92.103.215.13]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 17F1921F8C10 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 07:53:51 -0800 (PST)
Received: from varuna.puteaux.on-x (varuna.puteaux.on-x [192.168.10.6]) by mx1.on-x.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7797A80BB for <pkix@ietf.org>; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 13:16:56 +0100 (CET)
Received: from smtps.on-x.com (mintaka.puteaux.on-x [192.168.14.11]) by varuna.puteaux.on-x (Postfix) with ESMTP id C049916F7A for <pkix@ietf.org>; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 13:01:52 +0100 (CET)
Received: from [192.168.18.180] (unknown [192.168.18.180]) by smtps.on-x.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 8CAE723633D for <pkix@ietf.org>; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 07:16:44 -0500 (EST)
Message-ID: <4EB7CC4A.5070708@edelweb.fr>
Date: Mon, 07 Nov 2011 13:17:14 +0100
From: Peter Sylvester <peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:7.0.1) Gecko/20110929 Thunderbird/7.0.1
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: pkix@ietf.org
References: <CAMm+Lwjc=M7h2mTN1AhHPH0LQGO+oN5JSFSG6my5ud5yJezXMA@mail.gmail.com> <OF524322AE.26AC5A2C-ONC1257936.002B78E6-C1257936.002E07E9@bull.net> <OF6ACC9D95.CD2746C7-ONC125793F.0047483F-C1257941.003203C3@bull.net>
In-Reply-To: <OF6ACC9D95.CD2746C7-ONC125793F.0047483F-C1257941.003203C3@bull.net>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="------------090905050409070704050805"
Subject: Re: [pkix] Proposed new singleExtension for OCSP
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 07 Nov 2011 15:53:52 -0000

This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
--------------090905050409070704050805
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

On 11/07/2011 10:06 AM, denis.pinkas@bull.net wrote:
>
>
>
> b) OCSP responder using  white lists of certificates
>
> certStatus= revoked
>
> singleExtension"cert. status checked using white lists" present.
Such an extension is not really necessary IMO. If you have a white list, you
respond good only to the good ones, and revoked to anything else
(in you realm), i.e.,  unknown,  when one asks you a question about a CA
that you don't handle. One can also use a revocation date of last 
century etc.

For the good case, one may add a fingerprint in the response, ... and
for the revoked case also, if it was on the white list.

I am not sure whether there is RP software that implies existence
of a cert when an OCSP responder returns revoked. ;-)

So what remains to define, is an extension that returns some representation
of an existing which is "better" that just a serial number.
A client sending a fingerprint seems better to me.

I vaguely remember that the last draft before RFC still had the
possibility that a client could send a certificate to the server, an
option which was silently dropped.







--------------090905050409070704050805
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

<html>
  <head>
    <meta content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1"
      http-equiv="Content-Type">
  </head>
  <body bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
    On 11/07/2011 10:06 AM, <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:denis.pinkas@bull.net">denis.pinkas@bull.net</a> wrote:<br>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:OF6ACC9D95.CD2746C7-ONC125793F.0047483F-C1257941.003203C3@bull.net"
      type="cite">
      <br>
      <br>
      <br>
      <font face="sans-serif" size="2">b) OCSP responder using &nbsp;white
        lists of certificates</font>
      <br>
      <br>
      <font face="sans-serif" size="2">certStatus= revoked</font>
      <br>
      <br>
      <font face="Arial" size="2">singleExtension</font><font
        face="sans-serif" size="2">
        "cert. status checked using white lists" present.</font>
      <br>
    </blockquote>
    Such an extension is not really necessary IMO. If you have a white
    list, you<br>
    respond good only to the good ones, and revoked to anything else<br>
    (in you realm), i.e.,&nbsp; unknown,&nbsp; when one asks you a question about
    a CA<br>
    that you don't handle. One can also use a revocation date of last
    century etc.&nbsp; <br>
    <br>
    For the good case, one may add a fingerprint in the response, ...
    and<br>
    for the revoked case also, if it was on the white list.<br>
    <br>
    I am not sure whether there is RP software that implies existence<br>
    of a cert when an OCSP responder returns revoked. ;-)<br>
    <br>
    So what remains to define, is an extension that returns some
    representation<br>
    of an existing which is "better" that just a serial number.<br>
    A client sending a fingerprint seems better to me. <br>
    <br>
    I vaguely remember that the last draft before RFC still had the<br>
    possibility that a client could send a certificate to the server, an<br>
    option which was silently dropped. <br>
    <br>
    <br>
    <br>
    <br>
    <br>
    <br>
  </body>
</html>

--------------090905050409070704050805--

From kyanha@kyanha.net  Mon Nov  7 10:40:00 2011
Return-Path: <kyanha@kyanha.net>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1BB7411E8099 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 10:40:00 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.275
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.275 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.051, BAYES_00=-2.599, FM_FORGED_GMAIL=0.622, MIME_BASE64_TEXT=1.753, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id AwuObtq9qxJI for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 10:39:59 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail-qw0-f44.google.com (mail-qw0-f44.google.com [209.85.216.44]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7CC4811E8098 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 10:39:59 -0800 (PST)
Received: by qadc10 with SMTP id c10so4714894qad.31 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Mon, 07 Nov 2011 10:39:58 -0800 (PST)
Received: by 10.68.15.225 with SMTP id a1mr1182070pbd.66.1320691197530; Mon, 07 Nov 2011 10:39:57 -0800 (PST)
Received: from penango (c-67-188-178-93.hsd1.ca.comcast.net. [67.188.178.93]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPS id t5sm38299848pbb.13.2011.11.07.10.39.54 (version=SSLv3 cipher=OTHER); Mon, 07 Nov 2011 10:39:56 -0800 (PST)
From: "Kyle Hamilton" <kyanha@kyanha.net>
To: "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>
Date: Mon, 7 Nov 2011 10:39:50 -0800 (Pacific Standard Time)
Message-ID: <guptfoftlohsjhfilbjezwJv4X.penango@mail.gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <CAMm+Lwjc=M7h2mTN1AhHPH0LQGO+oN5JSFSG6my5ud5yJezXMA@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAMm+Lwjc=M7h2mTN1AhHPH0LQGO+oN5JSFSG6my5ud5yJezXMA@mail.gmail.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/signed; protocol="application/pkcs7-signature"; micalg="sha1"; boundary=gmsm1.9.0eqguptfohiglmvuulv2p2
Cc: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New VersionNotification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 07 Nov 2011 18:40:00 -0000

This is an S/MIME signed message generated with Penango.
--gmsm1.9.0eqguptfohiglmvuulv2p2
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset=iso-8859-1
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--gmsm1.9.0eqguptfohiglmvuulv2p2
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="Verify This Message with Penango.p7s"
Content-Description: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-signature; name="Verify This Message with Penango.p7s"

MIAGCSqGSIb3DQEHAqCAMIACAQExCzAJBgUrDgMCGgUAMIAGCSqGSIb3DQEHAQAAoIINAjCCBjQw
ggQcoAMCAQICASAwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQAwfTELMAkGA1UEBhMCSUwxFjAUBgNVBAoTDVN0YXJ0
Q29tIEx0ZC4xKzApBgNVBAsTIlNlY3VyZSBEaWdpdGFsIENlcnRpZmljYXRlIFNpZ25pbmcxKTAn
BgNVBAMTIFN0YXJ0Q29tIENlcnRpZmljYXRpb24gQXV0aG9yaXR5MB4XDTA3MTAyNDIxMDI1NVoX
DTE3MTAyNDIxMDI1NVowgYwxCzAJBgNVBAYTAklMMRYwFAYDVQQKEw1TdGFydENvbSBMdGQuMSsw
KQYDVQQLEyJTZWN1cmUgRGlnaXRhbCBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBTaWduaW5nMTgwNgYDVQQDEy9TdGFy
dENvbSBDbGFzcyAyIFByaW1hcnkgSW50ZXJtZWRpYXRlIENsaWVudCBDQTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcN
AQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAMsohUWcASz7GfKrpTOMKqANy9BV7V0igWdGxA8IU77L3aTxErQ+
fcxtDYZ36Z6GH0YFn7fq5RADteP0AYzrCA+EQTfi8q1+kA3m0nwtwXG94M5sIqsvs7lRP1aycBke
/s5g9hJHryZ2acScnzczjBCAo7X1v5G3yw8MDP2m2RCye0KfgZ4nODerZJVzhAlOD9YejvAXZqHk
sw56HzElVIoYSZ3q4+RJuPXXfIoyby+Y2m1E+YzX5iCZXBx05gk6MKAW1vaw4/v2OOLy6FZH3XHH
tOkzUreG//CsFnB9+uaYSlR65cdGzTsmoIK8WH1ygoXhRBm98SD7Hf/r3FELNvUCAwEAAaOCAa0w
ggGpMA8GA1UdEwEB/wQFMAMBAf8wDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgEGMB0GA1UdDgQWBBSuVYNv7DHKufcd
+q9rMfPIHeOsuzAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBROC+8apEBbpRdphzDKNGhD0EGu8jBmBggrBgEFBQcBAQRa
MFgwJwYIKwYBBQUHMAGGG2h0dHA6Ly9vY3NwLnN0YXJ0c3NsLmNvbS9jYTAtBggrBgEFBQcwAoYh
aHR0cDovL3d3dy5zdGFydHNzbC5jb20vc2ZzY2EuY3J0MFsGA1UdHwRUMFIwJ6AloCOGIWh0dHA6
Ly93d3cuc3RhcnRzc2wuY29tL3Nmc2NhLmNybDAnoCWgI4YhaHR0cDovL2NybC5zdGFydHNzbC5j
b20vc2ZzY2EuY3JsMIGABgNVHSAEeTB3MHUGCysGAQQBgbU3AQIBMGYwLgYIKwYBBQUHAgEWImh0
dHA6Ly93d3cuc3RhcnRzc2wuY29tL3BvbGljeS5wZGYwNAYIKwYBBQUHAgEWKGh0dHA6Ly93d3cu
c3RhcnRzc2wuY29tL2ludGVybWVkaWF0ZS5wZGYwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQADggIBADqpJw3I07QW
ke9plNBpxUxcffc7nUrIQpJHDci91DFG7fVhHRkMZ1J+BKg5UNUxIFJ2Z9B90Micc/NXcs7kPBRd
n6XGO/vPc87Y6R+cWS9Nc9+fp3Enmsm94OxOwI9wn8qnr/6o3mD4noP9JphwUPTXwHovjavRnhUQ
HLfo/i2NG0XXgTHXS2Xm0kVUozXqpYpAdumMiB/vezj1QHQJDmUdPYMcp+reg9901zkyT3fDW/iv
JVv6pWtkh6Pw2ytZT7mvg7YhX3V50Nv860cV11mocUVcqBLv0gcT+HBDYtbuvexNftwNQKD5193A
7zN4vG7CTYkXxytSjKuXrpEatEiFPxWgb84nVj25SU5q/r1Xhwby6mLhkbaXslkVtwEWT3Van49r
KjlK4XrUKYYWtnfzq6aSak5u0Vpxd1rY79tWhD3EdCvOhNz/QplNa+VkIsrcp7+8ZhP1l1b2U6Ma
xIVteuVMD3X0vziIwr7jxYae9FZjbxlpUemqXjcC0QaFfN7qI0JsQMALL7iGRBg7K0CoOBzECdD3
fuZil5kU/LP9cr1BK31U0Uy651bFnAMMMkqhAChIbn0ei72VnbpSsrrSdF0BAGYQ8vyHae5aCg+H
75dVCV33K6FuxZrf09yTz+Vx/PkdRUYkXmZz/OTfyJXsUOUXrym6KvI2rYpccSk5MIIGxjCCBa6g
AwIBAgICCMUwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQAwgYwxCzAJBgNVBAYTAklMMRYwFAYDVQQKEw1TdGFydENv
bSBMdGQuMSswKQYDVQQLEyJTZWN1cmUgRGlnaXRhbCBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBTaWduaW5nMTgwNgYD
VQQDEy9TdGFydENvbSBDbGFzcyAyIFByaW1hcnkgSW50ZXJtZWRpYXRlIENsaWVudCBDQTAeFw0x
MDA2MDUxNzE5MDFaFw0xMjA2MDUyMDMxMzFaMIHAMSAwHgYDVQQNExcyMDc2MDUtQzh5TUxvb3ll
VE85NFFKeDELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxEzARBgNVBAgTCkNhbGlmb3JuaWExETAPBgNVBAcTCFNhbiBK
b3NlMS0wKwYDVQQLEyRTdGFydENvbSBWZXJpZmllZCBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBNZW1iZXIxFjAUBgNV
BAMTDUt5bGUgSGFtaWx0b24xIDAeBgkqhkiG9w0BCQEWEWt5YW5oYUBreWFuaGEubmV0MIIBIjAN
BgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA5YylxEUtOSlqBT0sxqB7H0YUDx30ADzggTrSLA9n
JVa0QCcIXhk04n7VUD5Augbc40rWhgmB8xl6N9pQ5qvAQZj8JmNej6LRlueN/et9MCjNN0euH0Ky
zzKBSE5fxoUPYTTa6QBBurmKNR0navAKWBi8ITLRPi864zTay2oW1A1E1nt69SgJGn3PAv/LyKII
WWMzu9YeJsRCd4u6vLHOsGHvr5rc7Dq4bXx8x+vyHgSuYccAnNu81lOC2Unea4TORMoULiwKOTRb
pEy35H9Y7MW+SCTlaQiSLgxvYB260OuofHZgcS0wr/OnbGVAEUeBRYhfu3BaxNlZ6zY7mvs9NwID
AQABo4IC+jCCAvYwCQYDVR0TBAIwADALBgNVHQ8EBAMCBLAwHQYDVR0lBBYwFAYIKwYBBQUHAwIG
CCsGAQUFBwMEMB0GA1UdDgQWBBThUNrymHVQVA3i/K/6BF4dnrmTqDAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBSuVYNv
7DHKufcd+q9rMfPIHeOsuzAcBgNVHREEFTATgRFreWFuaGFAa3lhbmhhLm5ldDCCAUIGA1UdIASC
ATkwggE1MIIBMQYLKwYBBAGBtTcBAgEwggEgMC4GCCsGAQUFBwIBFiJodHRwOi8vd3d3LnN0YXJ0
c3NsLmNvbS9wb2xpY3kucGRmMDQGCCsGAQUFBwIBFihodHRwOi8vd3d3LnN0YXJ0c3NsLmNvbS9p
bnRlcm1lZGlhdGUucGRmMIG3BggrBgEFBQcCAjCBqjAUFg1TdGFydENvbSBMdGQuMAMCAQEagZFM
aW1pdGVkIExpYWJpbGl0eSwgc2VlIHNlY3Rpb24gKkxlZ2FsIExpbWl0YXRpb25zKiBvZiB0aGUg
U3RhcnRDb20gQ2VydGlmaWNhdGlvbiBBdXRob3JpdHkgUG9saWN5IGF2YWlsYWJsZSBhdCBodHRw
Oi8vd3d3LnN0YXJ0c3NsLmNvbS9wb2xpY3kucGRmMGMGA1UdHwRcMFowK6ApoCeGJWh0dHA6Ly93
d3cuc3RhcnRzc2wuY29tL2NydHUyLWNybC5jcmwwK6ApoCeGJWh0dHA6Ly9jcmwuc3RhcnRzc2wu
Y29tL2NydHUyLWNybC5jcmwwgY4GCCsGAQUFBwEBBIGBMH8wOQYIKwYBBQUHMAGGLWh0dHA6Ly9v
Y3NwLnN0YXJ0c3NsLmNvbS9zdWIvY2xhc3MyL2NsaWVudC9jYTBCBggrBgEFBQcwAoY2aHR0cDov
L3d3dy5zdGFydHNzbC5jb20vY2VydHMvc3ViLmNsYXNzMi5jbGllbnQuY2EuY3J0MCMGA1UdEgQc
MBqGGGh0dHA6Ly93d3cuc3RhcnRzc2wuY29tLzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFAAOCAQEAjquLhQpUqqxo
pg1hbv8zADjhTUY1Gxm1Ha/5Ntdjds7HZ54jOqD2fVwWRbqLAtq+rwHIaudvk13icftTedJlV01r
+6VjmOZhSwOPPiYG/v81ABitv8bfyOkei/3BblORXOyzwuXHrbmMOgaEcCmQmqyTo1UJiNMy5Tw0
CvDt+KbSbGP2lQL8BAGyLhswuGePoReqw221KsX6sZJ4Eovk70SlNN19YiRAFYdWL+ggY5mMPn9S
qXk8GGLaOyg3g2HnVr7Y4MLYfI0pheoRvoGxj8a4xofTz3u6OlGYE/3D5/uLQbw/rTz6GVVgUFPi
GFSKZjzXwfEYJ3Kd1BMXCyfE6zGCAnwwggJ4AgEBMIGTMIGMMQswCQYDVQQGEwJJTDEWMBQGA1UE
ChMNU3RhcnRDb20gTHRkLjErMCkGA1UECxMiU2VjdXJlIERpZ2l0YWwgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGUgU2ln
bmluZzE4MDYGA1UEAxMvU3RhcnRDb20gQ2xhc3MgMiBQcmltYXJ5IEludGVybWVkaWF0ZSBDbGll
bnQgQ0ECAgjFMAkGBSsOAwIaBQCggb4wGAYJKoZIhvcNAQkDMQsGCSqGSIb3DQEHATAcBgkqhkiG
9w0BCQUxDxcNMTExMTA3MTgzOTUwWjAjBgkqhkiG9w0BCQQxFgQUALmaMYOsEfQ9dnTJmceD7qXz
b2MwXwYJKoZIhvcNAQkPMVIwUDALBglghkgBZQMEAQIwCgYIKoZIhvcNAwcwDgYIKoZIhvcNAwIC
AgCAMA0GCCqGSIb3DQMCAgFAMAcGBSsOAwIHMA0GCCqGSIb3DQMCAgEoMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUA
BIIBAMooQr2T5ylbNSGUQui7lK5IlxGw0ucMiYBnJ3ztt/61/1MR47YnS5xO3FFat0BgnDdFRYLP
+DkmDeecDfzcWBvlpZ8neEsOGUr9tW2VVEFFwWMCKv2uvj3SN/FPZ+2nqsWDiiOjza2uFH+Xgnst
64pLbDiTAIvwvkAJsHZegyhTYtw/QN40netk84+dhDmqafpxV9MrOH2Wpdj4P/ufIU8I5rhcxZn9
nGWar/zxFps1DibHCyJiWHKXjWyyUM9tqAG979RKcMuPegQb8TbntPITmidKNywy5G7tHXoSAT0p
iLFopfkWjn9x+FsIhlwW7XfD1uEXtAODatvWpqsReEwAAAAAAAA=
--gmsm1.9.0eqguptfohiglmvuulv2p2--


From hallam@gmail.com  Mon Nov  7 10:49:29 2011
Return-Path: <hallam@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 757C311E8086 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 10:49:29 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.045
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.045 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-1.353, BAYES_00=-2.599, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-1, SARE_HTML_USL_OBFU=1.666, SARE_LWSHORTT=1.24]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id U0QgPQ3-xCQK for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 10:49:28 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail-vw0-f44.google.com (mail-vw0-f44.google.com [209.85.212.44]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8558C11E8085 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 10:49:28 -0800 (PST)
Received: by vws5 with SMTP id 5so2456390vws.31 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Mon, 07 Nov 2011 10:49:22 -0800 (PST)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=m2fUKjM/dppVZ70dg7cJRIchdrSKfgUmsLmw3iymfYg=; b=FY5fsdlj9EpL5dDZn+rhegRNLN81CqNLd4t2m/ZY7HqT5WWp0eAaBdKXceM5QF+U6N a63l+HAFaPI2lbkTQMuIeMdkAKdXY23+njLeSt/J0OZys1X3GIYV/S+db6J2cGvXYton 9nPicuCrqtjIEcvdD990F1HFxHsumrQl15MMM=
MIME-Version: 1.0
Received: by 10.182.45.102 with SMTP id l6mr5331490obm.0.1320691762349; Mon, 07 Nov 2011 10:49:22 -0800 (PST)
Received: by 10.182.42.99 with HTTP; Mon, 7 Nov 2011 10:49:22 -0800 (PST)
In-Reply-To: <4EB7CFF3.8090204@edelweb.fr>
References: <201110281435.p9SEZI0U008301@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp> <4EB7CFF3.8090204@edelweb.fr>
Date: Mon, 7 Nov 2011 13:49:22 -0500
Message-ID: <CAMm+LwgSYeZgKCka-2zXu-aq1rNg=Bh4tsH_XPkHR2vwiYqUBg@mail.gmail.com>
From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
To: Peter Sylvester <peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=f46d0444ef0b5a482c04b129832e
Cc: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 07 Nov 2011 18:49:29 -0000

--f46d0444ef0b5a482c04b129832e
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1

I have proposed essentially that model a few times in the past couple of
years.

The problem seems to be with the download of the cert and installation into
the server which has to be completely automated if that type of scheme was
to work. Umm much like an OCSP token...

Now given where we are, there are practical problems with that model. Most
of the browsers will go demand an OCSP token in any case.


But maybe if the browsers (etc.) recognized short lifetime certs as such
and were willing to special case them now then we could start using that
model a few years down the line.

Right now the practical disadvantages are problematic. But looking at where
we will be in ten years time with most Web servers hosted on short term
cloud services. Well maybe long term certs won't make any sense at all.

I don't want to end up in a situation where the customers are requesting
short term certs so they can manage their cloud exposure but having to
validate the cert chains anyhow.


On Mon, Nov 7, 2011 at 7:32 AM, Peter Sylvester
<peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr>wrote:

>
> If a server can get an OCSP response in a guaranted way,
> the CA might as well propose to create short term certs,
> one day or so. ? Where is the need for OCSP in that case?
>
> On 10/28/2011 04:35 PM, Martin Rex wrote
>
>
>
> The TLS server, on the other hand, can perform OCSP retrieval for
> his very own cert with an infrequent recurring asynchronous operation
> (e.g. once every few hours), it is always exactly the same OCSP server,
> the CA has a contractual obligation towards the Server cert purchaser
> to provide this service, and the Server operater can select a suitable
> CA with an OCSP service quality and connectivity that meets the servers
> expectations.
>
>
>
> ______________________________**_________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/**listinfo/pkix<https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>
>



-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

--f46d0444ef0b5a482c04b129832e
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

I have proposed essentially that model a few times in the past couple of ye=
ars.<div><br></div><div>The problem seems to be with the download of the ce=
rt and installation into the server which has to be completely automated if=
 that type of scheme was to work. Umm much like an OCSP token...</div>
<div><br></div><div>Now given where we are, there are practical problems wi=
th that model. Most of the browsers will go demand an OCSP token in any cas=
e.</div><div>=A0</div><div><br></div><div>But maybe if the browsers (etc.) =
recognized short lifetime certs as such and were willing to special case th=
em now then we could start using that model a few years down the line.</div=
>
<div><br></div><div>Right now the practical disadvantages are problematic. =
But looking at where we will be in ten years time with most Web servers hos=
ted on short term cloud services. Well maybe long term certs won&#39;t make=
 any sense at all.</div>
<div><br></div><div>I don&#39;t want to end up in a situation where the cus=
tomers are requesting short term certs so they can manage their cloud expos=
ure but having to validate the cert chains anyhow.</div><div><br></div>
<div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Mon, Nov 7, 2011 at 7:32 AM, Peter S=
ylvester <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr=
">peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"=
gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-=
left:1ex;">
<br>
If a server can get an OCSP response in a guaranted way,<br>
the CA might as well propose to create short term certs,<br>
one day or so. ? Where is the need for OCSP in that case?<br>
<br>
On 10/28/2011 04:35 PM, Martin Rex wrote<div class=3D"im HOEnZb"><br>
<br>
<br>
The TLS server, on the other hand, can perform OCSP retrieval for<br>
his very own cert with an infrequent recurring asynchronous operation<br>
(e.g. once every few hours), it is always exactly the same OCSP server,<br>
the CA has a contractual obligation towards the Server cert purchaser<br>
to provide this service, and the Server operater can select a suitable<br>
CA with an OCSP service quality and connectivity that meets the servers<br>
expectations.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br></div><div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5">
______________________________<u></u>_________________<br>
pkix mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">pkix@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/<u></u>listinfo/pkix</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br>=
Website: <a href=3D"http://hallambaker.com/">http://hallambaker.com/</a><br=
><br>
</div>

--f46d0444ef0b5a482c04b129832e--

From tmiller@mitre.org  Mon Nov  7 10:57:30 2011
Return-Path: <tmiller@mitre.org>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3059511E809F for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 10:57:30 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 7koKjIuafqAZ for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 10:57:29 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (smtpksrv1.mitre.org [198.49.146.77]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 95A4311E809C for <pkix@ietf.org>; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 10:57:29 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by localhost (Postfix) with SMTP id 0257421B17D9; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 13:57:29 -0500 (EST)
Received: from IMCCAS04.MITRE.ORG (imccas04.mitre.org [129.83.29.81]) by smtpksrv1.mitre.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D658F21B0E1D; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 13:57:28 -0500 (EST)
Received: from IMCMBX01.MITRE.ORG ([169.254.1.57]) by IMCCAS04.MITRE.ORG ([129.83.29.81]) with mapi id 14.01.0339.001; Mon, 7 Nov 2011 13:57:28 -0500
From: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
To: Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>, "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] Proposed new singleExtension for OCSP
Thread-Index: AQHMnSxzAIJDF8bQtkGhezvWvxyumZWhYCiAgABt+ID//+TvAA==
Date: Mon, 7 Nov 2011 18:57:27 +0000
Message-ID: <CADD8473.2157%tmiller@mitre.org>
In-Reply-To: <201111071434.17358.rob.stradling@comodo.com>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
user-agent: Microsoft-MacOutlook/14.13.0.110805
x-originating-ip: [172.31.4.88]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-ID: <2AE4597882209942A5A069CC6C815346@imc.mitre.org>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Subject: Re: [pkix] Proposed new singleExtension for OCSP
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 07 Nov 2011 18:57:30 -0000

On 11/7/11 8:34 AM, "Rob Stradling" <rob.stradling@comodo.com> wrote:

>But what if the OCSP Client wants to know that there is "no positive
>record"
>of the certificate's existence?

It can ask my shoe size while it's at it, that doesn't mean it needs a
response. =20

>This would be problematic for Responders that only use pre-generated
>Responses. =20

If the Responder is using pre-signed responses the Responder can't answer
because it can't sign the response.  You can't do pre-signing in this mode
because the set of non-existing certificates is infinite.

If the Responder *can* sign the response, why is it using pre-signed
responses?


-- T


From tmiller@mitre.org  Mon Nov  7 11:10:04 2011
Return-Path: <tmiller@mitre.org>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id DAF7421F84A9 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 11:10:03 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.000,  BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id agZgAkR63bcB for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 11:10:03 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (smtpksrv1.mitre.org [198.49.146.77]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id BF27421F84B3 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 11:10:02 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by localhost (Postfix) with SMTP id 6279421B05FE; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 14:10:02 -0500 (EST)
Received: from IMCCAS03.MITRE.ORG (imccas03.mitre.org [129.83.29.80]) by smtpksrv1.mitre.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4B63521B0DEF; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 14:10:02 -0500 (EST)
Received: from IMCMBX01.MITRE.ORG ([169.254.1.57]) by IMCCAS03.MITRE.ORG ([129.83.29.80]) with mapi id 14.01.0339.001; Mon, 7 Nov 2011 14:10:02 -0500
From: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
To: Kyle Hamilton <kyanha@kyanha.net>, "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New VersionNotification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
Thread-Index: AQHMnYDZcL8O8zcVWECQrC9fMKwtBg==
Date: Mon, 7 Nov 2011 19:10:01 +0000
Message-ID: <CADD8856.2177%tmiller@mitre.org>
In-Reply-To: <guptfoftlohsjhfilbjezwJv4X.penango@mail.gmail.com>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
user-agent: Microsoft-MacOutlook/14.13.0.110805
x-originating-ip: [172.31.4.88]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-ID: <75B33DADA61A49429816F638E04E14C8@imc.mitre.org>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Cc: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New VersionNotification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 07 Nov 2011 19:10:04 -0000

On 11/7/11 12:39 PM, "Kyle Hamilton" <kyanha@kyanha.net> wrote:

>If the logs are deleted, then the whitelist would still serve as a record
>of what the CA believes the legitimately-issued certificates are supposed
>to be.  By doing so, the unlogged certifications would not be on the list
>and so would fail validation.

If the CA records (e.g., logs) are corrupt, where exactly does the
whitelist come from?  God?

>[...] They do not dictate terms to us, [...] We do not dictate terms to
>them,=20

It's called a contract.

-- T


From tmiller@mitre.org  Mon Nov  7 11:14:43 2011
Return-Path: <tmiller@mitre.org>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7057D21F8B6E for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 11:14:43 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id VlmiZN2mFQpK for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 11:14:42 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (smtpksrv1.mitre.org [198.49.146.77]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8F62A21F8B62 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 11:14:42 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by localhost (Postfix) with SMTP id 3852521B0CC9; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 14:14:42 -0500 (EST)
Received: from IMCCAS01.MITRE.ORG (imccas01.mitre.org [129.83.29.78]) by smtpksrv1.mitre.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 27F8321B0C0E; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 14:14:42 -0500 (EST)
Received: from IMCMBX01.MITRE.ORG ([169.254.1.57]) by IMCCAS01.MITRE.ORG ([129.83.29.78]) with mapi id 14.01.0339.001; Mon, 7 Nov 2011 14:14:41 -0500
From: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
To: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>, Peter Sylvester <peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version
Thread-Index: AQHMnUld6CmUY2saPEyZJmaoCSAF/5WiFSwA//+ie4A=
Date: Mon, 7 Nov 2011 19:14:41 +0000
Message-ID: <CADD897C.2182%tmiller@mitre.org>
In-Reply-To: <CAMm+LwgSYeZgKCka-2zXu-aq1rNg=Bh4tsH_XPkHR2vwiYqUBg@mail.gmail.com>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
user-agent: Microsoft-MacOutlook/14.13.0.110805
x-originating-ip: [172.31.4.88]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-ID: <0D2909F4F828B245AEE79D2AB2B01E27@imc.mitre.org>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Cc: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 07 Nov 2011 19:14:43 -0000

On 11/7/11 12:49 PM, "Phillip Hallam-Baker" <hallam@gmail.com> wrote:

>I have proposed essentially that model a few times in the past couple of
>years.

Microsoft has this model in deployment.  Look up Network Access Protection
with health certificates.

>But maybe if the browsers (etc.) recognized short lifetime certs as such
>and were willing to special case them now then we could start using that
>model a few years down the line.

No "special case" is required.  The browsers may need additional
enrollment capabilities, but that doesn't require special handling of the
certificates themselves.  There is no technical difference between a cert
valid for a year, a month, a day, or a minute.

-- T


From kent@bbn.com  Mon Nov  7 11:59:40 2011
Return-Path: <kent@bbn.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E49981F0C3E for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 11:59:40 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -106.38
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-106.38 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.219, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id ruvbgRudJjMx for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 11:59:40 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtp.bbn.com (smtp.bbn.com [128.33.0.80]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2D9971F0C38 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 11:59:40 -0800 (PST)
Received: from dhcp89-089-006.bbn.com ([128.89.89.6]:49164) by smtp.bbn.com with esmtp (Exim 4.74 (FreeBSD)) (envelope-from <kent@bbn.com>) id 1RNVM2-000Krg-4y; Mon, 07 Nov 2011 14:59:38 -0500
Mime-Version: 1.0
Message-Id: <p06240804cadde86ffe78@[128.89.89.6]>
Date: Mon, 7 Nov 2011 14:59:35 -0500
To: pkix@ietf.org
From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed"
Subject: [pkix] PKIX session cancelled for Taipei meeting
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 07 Nov 2011 19:59:41 -0000

Folks,

We had only two requests for slots, and one of those was for a remote 
presentation.  As a result, Stefan and I have elected to cancel the 
PKIX session for Taipei.  This was not an easy decision, as PKIX has 
met at every IETF meeting for over 15 years. With the permission of 
our AD and the secretariat, we plan to bequeath our time slot to the 
SIDR WG, which has encountered some scheduling problems.

Steve

From DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil  Mon Nov  7 12:00:24 2011
Return-Path: <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8C24911E809F for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 12:00:24 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id q8coU1CCtfEL for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 12:00:23 -0800 (PST)
Received: from stingray.missi.ncsc.mil (stingray.missi.ncsc.mil [144.51.50.20]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D27F511E80B8 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 12:00:19 -0800 (PST)
Received: from AUGUSTINE.missi.ncsc.mil (augustine.missi.ncsc.mil [144.51.60.33]) by stingray.missi.ncsc.mil with ESMTP id pA7K0GGH093831 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Mon, 7 Nov 2011 15:00:16 -0500 (EST)
Received: from DABECK.missi.ncsc.mil ([144.51.60.15]) by AUGUSTINE.missi.ncsc.mil with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.4675);  Mon, 7 Nov 2011 15:00:53 -0500
Content-class: urn:content-classes:message
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft Exchange V6.5
Date: Mon, 7 Nov 2011 15:00:15 -0500
Message-ID: <C1A47F1540DF3246A8D30C853C05D0DA01B96B6C@DABECK.missi.ncsc.mil>
In-Reply-To: <guptfoftlohsjhfilbjezwJv4X.penango@mail.gmail.com>
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
Thread-Topic: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New VersionNotification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
Thread-Index: AcydfKoP1qg+mAkpSiGw2rRehqMiXQABwJMg
References: <CAMm+Lwjc=M7h2mTN1AhHPH0LQGO+oN5JSFSG6my5ud5yJezXMA@mail.gmail.com> <guptfoftlohsjhfilbjezwJv4X.penango@mail.gmail.com>
From: "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>
To: <pkix@ietf.org>
X-OriginalArrivalTime: 07 Nov 2011 20:00:53.0015 (UTC) FILETIME=[F434D270:01CC9D87]
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New VersionNotification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 07 Nov 2011 20:00:24 -0000

As an individual consumer, I have no right to dictate how Ford Motor =
Corporation builds cars.  But I do have the right to not buy a used =
Pinto after seeing exploding gas tanks on TV.  Fleet consumers (e.g. =
police departments) have more leverage to request production changes, =
but still no right to dictate.

I would choose not to trust a CA that cannot determine what certificates =
it has issued after being attacked by hacker or hurricane.  "Properly =
recorded in the files it has on hand" is a pretty low bar, and before =
granting access to valuable private information based on a cert, I'd set =
the bar a little higher.  I fully realize that the CA has no legal =
obligation to respond to my lack of faith.

Dave


-----Original Message-----
From: Kyle Hamilton [mailto:kyanha@kyanha.net]=20
Sent: Monday, November 07, 2011 1:40 PM
To: Kemp, David P.
Cc: Rob Stradling; pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New =
VersionNotification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt


On Thu, Nov 3, 2011 at 6:51 AM, Kemp, David P. <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil> =
wrote:
> "logs deleted"? =A0If the CA does not have a database, and database
> backups, and audit logs, and offsite audit log backups, showing what
> certificate serial numbers have been signed (only one of which would =
be
> needed to reconstruct current CRLs), that pretty much makes the case
> that neither a whitelist nor a blacklist is worth the bits it is =
printed
> on.

I disagree.

If the logs are deleted, then the whitelist would still serve as a =
record of what the CA believes the legitimately-issued certificates are =
supposed to be.  By doing so, the unlogged certifications would not be =
on the list and so would fail validation.

> =A0Given the lack of even rudimentary availability controls, what
> would make any RP believe that a cert, listed on a whitelist or not, =
has
> any validity?

What makes you think that we (consumers and businesses) should expect =
CAs to perform anywhere near the level we're currently demanding of =
them?  They do not dictate terms to us, they do not have any legitimate =
right to restrict what we do or how we interact with anyone else, and we =
shouldn't be trusting them or giving them any power more than the =
absolute minimum of "the CA states and provides OCSP to the effect that =
this certificate and the subject it was issued to are properly recorded =
in its files."

We do not dictate terms to them, we have no legitimate right to restrict =
what they do or how they interact with anyone else, and they certainly =
don't trust anything we say, only the documents we provide.  For lack of =
any better term, we are equals to them.  We have the right and =
responsibility to use their services for what they're good for -- and =
not for what they're not good for.

So, a whitelist works to permit the CA to essentially separately confirm =
the certificate, transferring the countersignature separately (through a =
different channel) from the actual data structure which encodes the =
certified information.  In this model, the signature on the certificate =
acts as an integrity mechanism (the equivalent of a CRC) more than an =
authentication mechanism.

-Kyle H

From mrex@sap.com  Mon Nov  7 12:05:01 2011
Return-Path: <mrex@sap.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 18C4A1F0C3E for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 12:05:01 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -9.513
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-9.513 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.504, BAYES_00=-2.599, HELO_EQ_DE=0.35, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-8, SARE_LWSHORTT=1.24]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id zEw8s4p665sO for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 12:05:00 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpde02.sap-ag.de (smtpde02.sap-ag.de [155.56.68.140]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 489801F0C38 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 12:05:00 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail.sap.corp by smtpde02.sap-ag.de (26) with ESMTP id pA7K4u5M023451 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=OK); Mon, 7 Nov 2011 21:04:56 +0100 (MET)
From: Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
Message-Id: <201111072004.pA7K4ud9011988@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp>
To: peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr (Peter Sylvester)
Date: Mon, 7 Nov 2011 21:04:56 +0100 (MET)
In-Reply-To: <4EB7CFF3.8090204@edelweb.fr> from "Peter Sylvester" at Nov 7, 11 01:32:51 pm
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-SAP: out
Cc: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
Reply-To: mrex@sap.com
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 07 Nov 2011 20:05:01 -0000

Peter Sylvester wrote:
> 
> If a server can get an OCSP response in a guaranted way,
> the CA might as well propose to create short term certs,
> one day or so. ? Where is the need for OCSP in that case?

Frequently changing server certificates are a serious problem
with cert pinning, i.e. sensible TLS clients warning about servers
that change their certificate whenever they change it.

And I do not know how many TLS (server) implementations support
transparent "inflight" update the server credential, i.e. while the
server is up and running and has active connections with the current
credential ongoing.


-Martin

From kent@bbn.com  Mon Nov  7 12:17:42 2011
Return-Path: <kent@bbn.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7C17211E80BB for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 12:17:42 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -106.4
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-106.4 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.200,  BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id M58+gLYgFxJo for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 12:17:42 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtp.bbn.com (smtp.bbn.com [128.33.0.80]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 08E1C11E80B8 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Mon,  7 Nov 2011 12:17:42 -0800 (PST)
Received: from dhcp89-089-006.bbn.com ([128.89.89.6]:49165) by smtp.bbn.com with esmtp (Exim 4.74 (FreeBSD)) (envelope-from <kent@bbn.com>) id 1RNVdP-000LB2-Ej; Mon, 07 Nov 2011 15:17:35 -0500
Mime-Version: 1.0
Message-Id: <p06240805cadde9322c36@[128.89.89.6]>
In-Reply-To: <guoakah6rw2uhp08wvjezwJv4X.penango@mail.gmail.com>
References: <B8E4DC0DD2F9A74AB88B4529E8FED39CF6E62450@MX22A.corp.emc.com> from	"Walter.Goulet@rsa.com" at Oct 27,	11 12:59:27 pm <201110271717.p9RHH5LF025823@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp> <guoakah6rw2uhp08wvjezwJv4X.penango@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 7 Nov 2011 15:07:37 -0500
To: "Kyle Hamilton" <kyanha@kyanha.net>
From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed"
Cc: pkix@ietf.org, paul.hoffman@vpnc.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 07 Nov 2011 20:17:42 -0000

Kyle,

I think your proposal has several problems.

First, many folks have noted why they do not believe that a whitelist 
would really solve the cited problem.

Second, many folks believe that DigiNotor is a bad example, because 
their security practices seem to have been rather lax.

Other methods, consistent with current standards, can accommodate 
failures of the sort noted. For example, it is common practice for 
many CAs to have an offline CA, and subordinate, online (production) 
CAs. If one of the production CAs were compromised ala the DigiNotor 
case, one could revoke the production CA cert, and reissue certs to 
all of the (known, valid) clients under a new, production CA. This 
could be done using the extant public keys for each client, so the 
only requirement is distribution of the new certs to the clients, for 
inclusion in TLS handshakes (I use the TLS example because that is 
the context of the cited failure.)

Steve

From rob.stradling@comodo.com  Tue Nov  8 04:04:56 2011
Return-Path: <rob.stradling@comodo.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 810B321F8C5F for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue,  8 Nov 2011 04:04:56 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 6uG8SWBCu3bl for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue,  8 Nov 2011 04:04:56 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mmmail1.mcr.colo.comodoca.net (mdfw.comodoca.net [91.209.196.68]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7BA8221F8C5E for <pkix@ietf.org>; Tue,  8 Nov 2011 04:04:54 -0800 (PST)
Received: (qmail 16261 invoked from network); 8 Nov 2011 12:04:52 -0000
Received: from ian.bd.office.comodo.net (HELO ian.brad.office.comodo.net) (192.168.0.201) by mail.colo.comodoca.net with ESMTPS (DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA encrypted); 8 Nov 2011 12:04:52 -0000
Received: (qmail 11081 invoked by uid 1000); 8 Nov 2011 12:04:52 -0000
Received: from nigel.brad.office.comodo.net (HELO nigel.localnet) (192.168.0.58) by ian.brad.office.comodo.net (qpsmtpd/0.40) with (AES256-SHA encrypted) ESMTPS; Tue, 08 Nov 2011 12:04:52 +0000
From: Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>
To: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
Date: Tue, 8 Nov 2011 12:04:50 +0000
User-Agent: KMail/1.13.7 (Linux/3.0.6-gentoo; KDE/4.6.5; i686; ; )
References: <CADD8473.2157%tmiller@mitre.org>
In-Reply-To: <CADD8473.2157%tmiller@mitre.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: Text/Plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Message-Id: <201111081204.51166.rob.stradling@comodo.com>
Cc: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] Proposed new singleExtension for OCSP
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 08 Nov 2011 12:04:56 -0000

On Monday 07 Nov 2011 18:57:27 Miller, Timothy J. wrote:
> On 11/7/11 8:34 AM, "Rob Stradling" <rob.stradling@comodo.com> wrote:
> >But what if the OCSP Client wants to know that there is "no positive
> >record"
> >of the certificate's existence?
> 
> It can ask my shoe size while it's at it, that doesn't mean it needs a
> response.

Are you suggesting that OCSP Clients have absolutely no right to know whether 
or not a given serial number belongs to an existing certificate?

> >This would be problematic for Responders that only use pre-generated
> >Responses.
> 
> If the Responder is using pre-signed responses the Responder can't answer
> because it can't sign the response.  You can't do pre-signing in this mode
> because the set of non-existing certificates is infinite.

Exactly my point.  However, if the code that pre-signs the Responses has 
access to the CA's database, the pre-signed Responses could include a new 
singleExtension with a hash of the certificate.  This would indicate a positive 
record of the cert's existence to OCSP Clients.

> If the Responder *can* sign the response, why is it using pre-signed
> responses?

It most likely wouldn't be.

> -- T

Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online

From tmiller@mitre.org  Tue Nov  8 04:44:00 2011
Return-Path: <tmiller@mitre.org>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B4C0321F8C4D for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue,  8 Nov 2011 04:44:00 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id UsRQQD7h2MnS for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue,  8 Nov 2011 04:44:00 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (smtpksrv1.mitre.org [198.49.146.77]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 16AB821F8AF3 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Tue,  8 Nov 2011 04:44:00 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by localhost (Postfix) with SMTP id 7FB9021B038C; Tue,  8 Nov 2011 07:43:56 -0500 (EST)
Received: from IMCCAS04.MITRE.ORG (imccas04.mitre.org [129.83.29.81]) by smtpksrv1.mitre.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7981821B0172; Tue,  8 Nov 2011 07:43:56 -0500 (EST)
Received: from IMCMBX01.MITRE.ORG ([169.254.1.57]) by IMCCAS04.MITRE.ORG ([129.83.29.81]) with mapi id 14.01.0339.001; Tue, 8 Nov 2011 07:43:56 -0500
From: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
To: "mrex@sap.com" <mrex@sap.com>, Peter Sylvester <peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version
Thread-Index: AQHMnYiF6CmUY2saPEyZJmaoCSAF/5Wi3FSA
Date: Tue, 8 Nov 2011 12:43:56 +0000
Message-ID: <CADE7FDC.21BA%tmiller@mitre.org>
In-Reply-To: <201111072004.pA7K4ud9011988@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
user-agent: Microsoft-MacOutlook/14.13.0.110805
x-originating-ip: [172.31.62.112]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-ID: <19440CC490BD1F46AB5C030F5B46899A@imc.mitre.org>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Cc: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 08 Nov 2011 12:44:00 -0000

On 11/7/11 2:04 PM, "Martin Rex" <mrex@sap.com> wrote:

>And I do not know how many TLS (server) implementations support
>transparent "inflight" update the server credential, i.e. while the
>server is up and running and has active connections with the current
>credential ongoing.

IIS tries to do this, but making it work without service interruption
required auto-enrollment and a non-busy CA.  Usually a service
interruption results.

-- T


From tmiller@mitre.org  Tue Nov  8 05:22:52 2011
Return-Path: <tmiller@mitre.org>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 47D9121F8C8F for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue,  8 Nov 2011 05:22:52 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 07HINKkkjEjD for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue,  8 Nov 2011 05:22:51 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (smtpksrv1.mitre.org [198.49.146.77]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6AEFF21F867F for <pkix@ietf.org>; Tue,  8 Nov 2011 05:22:51 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by localhost (Postfix) with SMTP id E124C21B049D; Tue,  8 Nov 2011 08:22:50 -0500 (EST)
Received: from IMCCAS04.MITRE.ORG (imccas04.mitre.org [129.83.29.81]) by smtpksrv1.mitre.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id DAF5821B0498; Tue,  8 Nov 2011 08:22:50 -0500 (EST)
Received: from IMCMBX01.MITRE.ORG ([169.254.1.57]) by IMCCAS04.MITRE.ORG ([129.83.29.81]) with mapi id 14.01.0339.001; Tue, 8 Nov 2011 08:22:50 -0500
From: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
To: Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] Proposed new singleExtension for OCSP
Thread-Index: AQHMnSxzAIJDF8bQtkGhezvWvxyumZWhYCiAgABt+ID//+TvAIABg6UA//+xMwA=
Date: Tue, 8 Nov 2011 13:22:50 +0000
Message-ID: <CADE87C6.21E6%tmiller@mitre.org>
In-Reply-To: <201111081204.51166.rob.stradling@comodo.com>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
user-agent: Microsoft-MacOutlook/14.13.0.110805
x-originating-ip: [172.31.62.112]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-ID: <9AE1FB8D2B6CA340ABFF688FFCAB7B8D@imc.mitre.org>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Cc: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] Proposed new singleExtension for OCSP
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 08 Nov 2011 13:22:52 -0000

On 11/8/11 6:04 AM, "Rob Stradling" <rob.stradling@comodo.com> wrote:

>Are you suggesting that OCSP Clients have absolutely no right to know
>whether
>or not a given serial number belongs to an existing certificate?

How can I say this more clearly?

If you can't trust the CA to know what it has issued and what it hasn't,
you can't create a trustable whitelist.  If you can trust the CA to know
what it has issued and what it hasn't, you don't need a whitelist.

Period. =20

End of concept.

Did I miss anything?

>Exactly my point.  However, if the code that pre-signs the Responses has
>access to the CA's database, the pre-signed Responses could include a new
>singleExtension with a hash of the certificate.  This would indicate a
>positive=20
>record of the cert's existence to OCSP Clients.

My fraudulent cert is in the damn database, so a response gets generated.
What was the goal again?

-- T


From hallam@gmail.com  Tue Nov  8 13:11:16 2011
Return-Path: <hallam@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 18CC811E808E for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue,  8 Nov 2011 13:11:16 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -3.446
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.446 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.152,  BAYES_00=-2.599, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 1FnS4rfpPCRP for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue,  8 Nov 2011 13:11:15 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail-bw0-f44.google.com (mail-bw0-f44.google.com [209.85.214.44]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B49CB11E8085 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Tue,  8 Nov 2011 13:11:14 -0800 (PST)
Received: by bkbzv15 with SMTP id zv15so1023776bkb.31 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Tue, 08 Nov 2011 13:11:12 -0800 (PST)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=MnBMLbzOVL0lfxTBzGMZyZVMUkvAWXay79NMmjIixRA=; b=vL5YfBHgN1+4jbaMV2Je96grX3jaYhAu/UIy7/goO/wQJyV1SBbdMGqzxR/xAWPc9D iCvIFve1gIawWrY0rVhl/TpKNHdRaICHUY4z+EYPC+ME715/kaUaIKuKmHvfV/iVCpqB XDRmWwSdDzTbBEJdfgoPQI12C1aMv0QLM5RXw=
MIME-Version: 1.0
Received: by 10.182.147.4 with SMTP id tg4mr10468377obb.60.1320786671986; Tue, 08 Nov 2011 13:11:11 -0800 (PST)
Received: by 10.182.42.99 with HTTP; Tue, 8 Nov 2011 13:11:11 -0800 (PST)
In-Reply-To: <CADE87C6.21E6%tmiller@mitre.org>
References: <201111081204.51166.rob.stradling@comodo.com> <CADE87C6.21E6%tmiller@mitre.org>
Date: Tue, 8 Nov 2011 16:11:11 -0500
Message-ID: <CAMm+LwgOGk_vDbpzqzfcMMFXr8EM7uo18oH7ftjAFjvXOx2Hrg@mail.gmail.com>
From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
To: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=f46d044400666869ad04b13f9c50
Cc: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] Proposed new singleExtension for OCSP
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 08 Nov 2011 21:11:16 -0000

--f46d044400666869ad04b13f9c50
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1

On Tue, Nov 8, 2011 at 8:22 AM, Miller, Timothy J. <tmiller@mitre.org>wrote:

> On 11/8/11 6:04 AM, "Rob Stradling" <rob.stradling@comodo.com> wrote:
>
> >Are you suggesting that OCSP Clients have absolutely no right to know
> >whether
> >or not a given serial number belongs to an existing certificate?
>
> How can I say this more clearly?
>
> If you can't trust the CA to know what it has issued and what it hasn't,
> you can't create a trustable whitelist.  If you can trust the CA to know
> what it has issued and what it hasn't, you don't need a whitelist.
>

Are we talking here about audited public CAs or CAs in general?

Private CAs have always been able to screw up in interesting and novel
ways, many of them have. Such failures don't attract notice, maybe they
should have.

A system with a single point of failure may be appropriate for your
application. But that has never been the approach to design of commercial
public CAs, at least not for the ones I have been involved with.

A control for a situation that should never occur? Of course! KGB doctrine
was always that there be two separate systems with completely independent
operational principles that were each independently capable of providing
complete security.


The proposal to have an extension for 'there really is a cert with this
serial' seems a no brainer to me. It is 100% compatible with the deployed
base. If your systems can't generate it and you don't want it then fine.
But I don't see how we approach our risk control should matter to you.





> Period.
>
> End of concept.
>
> Did I miss anything?
>
> >Exactly my point.  However, if the code that pre-signs the Responses has
> >access to the CA's database, the pre-signed Responses could include a new
> >singleExtension with a hash of the certificate.  This would indicate a
> >positive
> >record of the cert's existence to OCSP Clients.
>
> My fraudulent cert is in the damn database, so a response gets generated.
> What was the goal again?
>
> -- T
>
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>



-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

--f46d044400666869ad04b13f9c50
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue, Nov 8, 2011 at 8:22 AM, Miller, =
Timothy J. <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:tmiller@mitre.org">tmill=
er@mitre.org</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" sty=
le=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
<div class=3D"im">On 11/8/11 6:04 AM, &quot;Rob Stradling&quot; &lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:rob.stradling@comodo.com">rob.stradling@comodo.com</a>&gt; wrote=
:<br>
<br>
&gt;Are you suggesting that OCSP Clients have absolutely no right to know<b=
r>
&gt;whether<br>
&gt;or not a given serial number belongs to an existing certificate?<br>
<br>
</div>How can I say this more clearly?<br>
<br>
If you can&#39;t trust the CA to know what it has issued and what it hasn&#=
39;t,<br>
you can&#39;t create a trustable whitelist. =A0If you can trust the CA to k=
now<br>
what it has issued and what it hasn&#39;t, you don&#39;t need a whitelist.<=
br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Are we talking here about audited publi=
c CAs or CAs in general?</div><div><br></div><div>Private CAs have always b=
een able to screw up in interesting and novel ways, many of them have. Such=
 failures don&#39;t attract notice, maybe they should have.</div>
<div><br></div><div>A system with a single point of failure may be appropri=
ate for your application. But that has never been the approach to design of=
 commercial public CAs, at least not for the ones I have been involved with=
.</div>
<div><br></div><div>A control for a situation that should never occur? Of c=
ourse! KGB doctrine was always that there be two separate systems with comp=
letely independent operational principles that were each independently capa=
ble of providing complete security.=A0</div>
<div><br></div><div><br></div><div>The proposal to have an extension for &#=
39;there really is a cert with this serial&#39; seems a no brainer to me. I=
t is 100% compatible with the deployed base. If your systems can&#39;t gene=
rate it and you don&#39;t want it then fine. But I don&#39;t see how we app=
roach our risk control should matter to you.</div>
<div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>=A0</div><blockquote clas=
s=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;pad=
ding-left:1ex;">
Period.<br>
<br>
End of concept.<br>
<br>
Did I miss anything?<br>
<div class=3D"im"><br>
&gt;Exactly my point. =A0However, if the code that pre-signs the Responses =
has<br>
&gt;access to the CA&#39;s database, the pre-signed Responses could include=
 a new<br>
&gt;singleExtension with a hash of the certificate. =A0This would indicate =
a<br>
&gt;positive<br>
&gt;record of the cert&#39;s existence to OCSP Clients.<br>
<br>
</div>My fraudulent cert is in the damn database, so a response gets genera=
ted.<br>
What was the goal again?<br>
<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
-- T<br>
</font></span><div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5"><br>
_______________________________________________<br>
pkix mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br>=
Website: <a href=3D"http://hallambaker.com/">http://hallambaker.com/</a><br=
><br>

--f46d044400666869ad04b13f9c50--

From tmiller@mitre.org  Tue Nov  8 14:04:24 2011
Return-Path: <tmiller@mitre.org>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8DB6921F8B16 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue,  8 Nov 2011 14:04:24 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id mMxUzhKvbAhh for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue,  8 Nov 2011 14:04:24 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (smtpksrv1.mitre.org [198.49.146.77]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7D7A521F8B0B for <pkix@ietf.org>; Tue,  8 Nov 2011 14:04:23 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by localhost (Postfix) with SMTP id B851121B0C66; Tue,  8 Nov 2011 17:04:22 -0500 (EST)
Received: from IMCCAS03.MITRE.ORG (imccas03.mitre.org [129.83.29.80]) by smtpksrv1.mitre.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A294F21B0C5F; Tue,  8 Nov 2011 17:04:22 -0500 (EST)
Received: from IMCMBX01.MITRE.ORG ([169.254.1.57]) by IMCCAS03.MITRE.ORG ([129.83.29.80]) with mapi id 14.01.0339.001; Tue, 8 Nov 2011 17:04:21 -0500
From: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
To: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] Proposed new singleExtension for OCSP
Thread-Index: AQHMnSxzAIJDF8bQtkGhezvWvxyumZWhYCiAgABt+ID//+TvAIABg6UA//+xMwCAAOdzgP//qkIA
Date: Tue, 8 Nov 2011 22:04:21 +0000
Message-ID: <CADEFE3C.2259%tmiller@mitre.org>
In-Reply-To: <CAMm+LwgOGk_vDbpzqzfcMMFXr8EM7uo18oH7ftjAFjvXOx2Hrg@mail.gmail.com>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
user-agent: Microsoft-MacOutlook/14.13.0.110805
x-originating-ip: [172.31.32.39]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-ID: <8173FD58EC0DA34B9DE66A93EC148454@imc.mitre.org>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Cc: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] Proposed new singleExtension for OCSP
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 08 Nov 2011 22:04:24 -0000

On 11/8/11 3:11 PM, "Phillip Hallam-Baker" <hallam@gmail.com> wrote:
>The proposal to have an extension for 'there really is a cert with this
>serial' seems a no brainer to me. It is 100% compatible with the deployed
>base. If your systems can't generate it and you don't want it then fine.
>But I don't see how we approach our risk control should matter to you.

Let me ask this another way.  Given the following responses from a
putative whitelist-based OSCP responder:

1. good
2. good + whitelist info
3. revoked
4. revoked + whitelist info
5. unknown
6. unknown + whitelist info

How do you expect a client to process and act on each of these responses?
Is the relying application supposed to treat (1) as good and (2) as
double-plus-good?  Similarly is (3) more or less invalid than (4)?  Is (5)
more or less unknown than (6)?  How do these distinctions matter in
practice?

-- T


From mrex@sap.com  Tue Nov  8 15:34:29 2011
Return-Path: <mrex@sap.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C303821F8B03 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue,  8 Nov 2011 15:34:29 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -10.119
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-10.119 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.130, BAYES_00=-2.599, HELO_EQ_DE=0.35, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-8]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 41f5HdPBDcvg for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue,  8 Nov 2011 15:34:29 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpde02.sap-ag.de (smtpde02.sap-ag.de [155.56.68.140]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E2D2121F8B02 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Tue,  8 Nov 2011 15:34:28 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail.sap.corp by smtpde02.sap-ag.de (26) with ESMTP id pA8NYPgq001524 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=OK); Wed, 9 Nov 2011 00:34:25 +0100 (MET)
From: Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
Message-Id: <201111082334.pA8NYO8Y015987@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp>
To: tmiller@mitre.org (Miller, Timothy J.)
Date: Wed, 9 Nov 2011 00:34:24 +0100 (MET)
In-Reply-To: <CADEFE3C.2259%tmiller@mitre.org> from "Miller, Timothy J." at Nov 8, 11 10:04:21 pm
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-SAP: out
Cc: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] Proposed new singleExtension for OCSP
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
Reply-To: mrex@sap.com
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 08 Nov 2011 23:34:29 -0000

Miller, Timothy J. wrote:
> 
> Let me ask this another way.  Given the following responses from a
> putative whitelist-based OSCP responder:
> 
> 1. good
> 2. good + whitelist info
> 3. revoked
> 4. revoked + whitelist info
> 5. unknown
> 6. unknown + whitelist info

While the classification  good / revoked / unknown is what rfc2560
acutally defines, this is purposefully misleading terminology.

The orginal OCSP does contain "good", all it has is

"not known to be be bad (based on the revocation info that I've checked
 and the assumption that I should know)".

I would expect the "whitelist" to not contain any revoked certs,
in which (4) does not exist, and I believe (6) does not make any sense.


> 
> How do you expect a client to process and act on each of these responses?
> Is the relying application supposed to treat (1) as good and (2) as
> double-plus-good?

That is a problem that current TLS clients seem to have solved already
(those that request OCSP but do not hard fail if they can not obtain
 an OCSP response).


>
> How do these distinctions matter in practice?

They can help to reduce the risk from hash collisions with
older signatures (and potially weak signature algorithms)
of a CA key that is still in use (i.e. a "tainted" key).

e.g. http://www.win.tue.nl/hashclash/rogue-ca/

If the OCSP responder would be returning a hash of the originally
issued certificate (with a stronger hash algorithm, of course)
from a whitelist, then you have less problems with "tainted"
CA keys.

Personally, I consider all RootCA certs with a 2048-bit or larger
RSA key and SHA-1 for the self-signed signature a "tainted" keypair.

-Martin

From tom@ritter.vg  Tue Nov  8 16:49:18 2011
Return-Path: <tom@ritter.vg>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 47EE121F8AD3 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue,  8 Nov 2011 16:49:18 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.977
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.977 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.000, BAYES_00=-2.599, FM_FORGED_GMAIL=0.622, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id p4Lhc5CPc7Nj for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue,  8 Nov 2011 16:49:17 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail-iy0-f172.google.com (mail-iy0-f172.google.com [209.85.210.172]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B448921F8801 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Tue,  8 Nov 2011 16:49:17 -0800 (PST)
Received: by iaeo4 with SMTP id o4so1494865iae.31 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Tue, 08 Nov 2011 16:49:17 -0800 (PST)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=ritter.vg; s=vg; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date:message-id:subject:to :content-type:content-transfer-encoding; bh=LJy00CWSThJBoXjZB+FV3w73UQPt6kw3GPWQx5jSM00=; b=VwDwMsGROJeLn+vljJNK03mSmtx79k1CpMH/cegFdfJWE+Mz9dPe/gEOf2yyftQvnP NrRb3+KCX3xMoGfgHMVcuhOSTPCeSZILdZdARU7R2AVkbEA3AZmB4qJNjIUK6O00lcLa m91NzsbDcdS2E8vh6wF0EP9iHrY23M1qpcLo8=
Received: by 10.42.72.194 with SMTP id p2mr164562icj.19.1320799757328; Tue, 08 Nov 2011 16:49:17 -0800 (PST)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Received: by 10.43.44.5 with HTTP; Tue, 8 Nov 2011 16:48:55 -0800 (PST)
In-Reply-To: <CADEFE3C.2259%tmiller@mitre.org>
References: <CAMm+LwgOGk_vDbpzqzfcMMFXr8EM7uo18oH7ftjAFjvXOx2Hrg@mail.gmail.com> <CADEFE3C.2259%tmiller@mitre.org>
From: Tom Ritter <tom@ritter.vg>
Date: Tue, 8 Nov 2011 19:48:55 -0500
Message-ID: <CA+cU71=ytJkiswMi3rEeq8bwnsW8MULEMnVwCw6nHkZf2o9Lpg@mail.gmail.com>
To: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Subject: Re: [pkix] Proposed new singleExtension for OCSP
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 09 Nov 2011 00:49:18 -0000

> Let me ask this another way. =A0Given the following responses from a
> putative whitelist-based OSCP responder:
>
> 1. good
> 2. good + whitelist info
> 3. revoked
> 4. revoked + whitelist info
> 5. unknown
> 6. unknown + whitelist info
>
> How do you expect a client to process and act on each of these responses?
> Is the relying application supposed to treat (1) as good and (2) as
> double-plus-good? =A0Similarly is (3) more or less invalid than (4)? =A0I=
s (5)
> more or less unknown than (6)? =A0How do these distinctions matter in
> practice?

Browsers have successfully distinguished between EV and non-EV certs.
Some people actually do make trust decisions based on calculated trust
via the Web of Trust, and 'somewhat trusting' certain signatures.  You
can download and run an executable on Windows with or without a
Publisher signature.  But they all afford greater trust to one path,
and less trust to the other (while still allowing the action).  If a
browser makes the decision to expose an indicator of greater trust to
a whitelisting OCSP server (which I agree with) - organizations that
care will seek out that indicator.

To respond to an earlier criticism:

> If you can't trust the CA to know what it has issued and what it hasn't,
> you can't create a trustable whitelist.  If you can trust the CA to know
> what it has issued and what it hasn't, you don't need a whitelist.

This assumes the OCSP database is populated automatically.  Just as an
auditor should flag a deployment that accepts client certificates but
doesn't validate them (as adding no security), so too should an
auditor flag such an OCSP deployment.  I agree - it would be useless.
It should be deployed such that it is another barrier for an attacker
to overcome.

I support OCSP responders acting on whitelists instead of blacklists,
and would like a way in the protocol to know whether a responder is
acting based off that or not - rather than knowing by reading audit
reports I may or not even be able to access.

-tom

From DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil  Wed Nov  9 06:56:10 2011
Return-Path: <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3AE5121F8B64 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  9 Nov 2011 06:56:10 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id k1mNmj+EO8+5 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  9 Nov 2011 06:56:09 -0800 (PST)
Received: from stingray.missi.ncsc.mil (stingray.missi.ncsc.mil [144.51.50.20]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 905B921F8B59 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Wed,  9 Nov 2011 06:56:09 -0800 (PST)
Received: from AUGUSTINE.missi.ncsc.mil (augustine.missi.ncsc.mil [144.51.60.33]) by stingray.missi.ncsc.mil with ESMTP id pA9Eu67f041960 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Wed, 9 Nov 2011 09:56:08 -0500 (EST)
Received: from DABECK.missi.ncsc.mil ([144.51.60.15]) by AUGUSTINE.missi.ncsc.mil with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.4675);  Wed, 9 Nov 2011 09:56:44 -0500
Content-class: urn:content-classes:message
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft Exchange V6.5
Date: Wed, 9 Nov 2011 09:56:06 -0500
Message-ID: <C1A47F1540DF3246A8D30C853C05D0DA01B96B6D@DABECK.missi.ncsc.mil>
In-Reply-To: <CA+cU71=ytJkiswMi3rEeq8bwnsW8MULEMnVwCw6nHkZf2o9Lpg@mail.gmail.com>
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
Thread-Topic: [pkix] Proposed new singleExtension for OCSP
Thread-Index: AcyeeXWUeji7t/IjTs+Hul7DPh+TgAAa1QAw
References: <CAMm+LwgOGk_vDbpzqzfcMMFXr8EM7uo18oH7ftjAFjvXOx2Hrg@mail.gmail.com><CADEFE3C.2259%tmiller@mitre.org> <CA+cU71=ytJkiswMi3rEeq8bwnsW8MULEMnVwCw6nHkZf2o9Lpg@mail.gmail.com>
From: "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>
To: <pkix@ietf.org>
X-OriginalArrivalTime: 09 Nov 2011 14:56:44.0328 (UTC) FILETIME=[CBF7AA80:01CC9EEF]
Subject: Re: [pkix] Proposed new singleExtension for OCSP
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 09 Nov 2011 14:56:10 -0000

Tom,

Technical mechanisms don't exist in a vacuum, they exist to support
business processes.  The business process of a CA (as described in its
CPS) is to know its subscribers and convey information about them to
RPs.  Technical mechanisms (certs, whitelists, blacklists) aren't a CA's
business, they merely convey information the CA has obtained through
conducting its business.  As an analogy, Gartner Group does not exist to
produce PDF files, it's business is market analysis.  PDF and HTML are
just mechanisms used to convey that information.

A whitelist is not another barrier for an attacker to overcome, it is
the same barrier as a blacklist because it reflects (a different view
of) the same business information.  I'm not sure why you think manual
population is more reliable than automatic population, but assuming
that's true, manual population of a blacklist from all information known
to the CA is no more or less reliable than manual population of a
whitelist from the identical information.  If the CA's information has
been corrupted by intentional or natural events, neither blacklist nor
whitelist can make the transmitted information more reliable than it was
prior to transmission.

If the CA's information is corrupted to the point where it cannot figure
out who its subscribers are and what certs it has issued, then the CA
should reset its operations, declare a "recovered" date, rekey the CA,
and revoke the previous CA key.  At that point a blacklist would start
empty and a whitelist would include all certs issued after the recovery
date.  The same bandwidth/efficiency arguments for using black or white
lists exist as always, but there is no valid argument that whitelists
provide an "additional barrier" to attackers.

A CA that discovered that its operations had been compromised but chose
to continue signing certificates using the same key as used during the
period of compromise is only providing additional evidence that it is
not worthy of trust.

Dave



-----Original Message-----
From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
Tom Ritter

> If you can't trust the CA to know what it has issued and what it=20
> hasn't, you can't create a trustable whitelist.  If you can trust the=20
> CA to know what it has issued and what it hasn't, you don't need a
whitelist.

This assumes the OCSP database is populated automatically.  Just as an
auditor should flag a deployment that accepts client certificates but
doesn't validate them (as adding no security), so too should an auditor
flag such an OCSP deployment.  I agree - it would be useless.
It should be deployed such that it is another barrier for an attacker to
overcome.


From denis.pinkas@bull.net  Wed Nov  9 07:15:06 2011
Return-Path: <denis.pinkas@bull.net>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9984421F8C2B for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  9 Nov 2011 07:15:06 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.093
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.093 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.155,  BAYES_00=-2.599, HELO_EQ_FR=0.35, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id mHQvYvbdnKdR for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  9 Nov 2011 07:15:05 -0800 (PST)
Received: from odin2.bull.net (odin2.bull.net [129.184.85.11]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2F3C921F8B83 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Wed,  9 Nov 2011 07:15:05 -0800 (PST)
Received: from MSGC-003.bull.fr (MSGC-003.frcl.bull.fr [129.184.87.131]) by odin2.bull.net (Bull S.A.) with ESMTP id 189011804E for <pkix@ietf.org>; Wed,  9 Nov 2011 16:25:02 +0100 (CET)
In-Reply-To: <C1A47F1540DF3246A8D30C853C05D0DA01B96B6D@DABECK.missi.ncsc.mil>
References: <CAMm+LwgOGk_vDbpzqzfcMMFXr8EM7uo18oH7ftjAFjvXOx2Hrg@mail.gmail.com><CADEFE3C.2259%tmiller@mitre.org> <CA+cU71=ytJkiswMi3rEeq8bwnsW8MULEMnVwCw6nHkZf2o9Lpg@mail.gmail.com> <C1A47F1540DF3246A8D30C853C05D0DA01B96B6D@DABECK.missi.ncsc.mil>
To: pkix@ietf.org
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-KeepSent: D3FE7E94:3ADA32A8-C1257943:0052CAF9; type=4; name=$KeepSent
X-Mailer: Lotus Notes Release 8.5.2 August 10, 2010
From: denis.pinkas@bull.net
Message-ID: <OFD3FE7E94.3ADA32A8-ONC1257943.0052CAF9-C1257943.0053D3D9@bull.net>
Date: Wed, 9 Nov 2011 16:15:37 +0100
X-MIMETrack: Serialize by Router on MSGC-003/SRV/BULL(Release 8.5.2FP1|November 29, 2010) at 09/11/2011 16:15:37, Serialize complete at 09/11/2011 16:15:37
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="=_alternative 0053CC43C1257943_="
Subject: Re: [pkix] Proposed new singleExtension for OCSP
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 09 Nov 2011 15:15:06 -0000

Message en plusieurs parties au format MIME
--=_alternative 0053CC43C1257943_=
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="ISO-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

David,

You said:

"A CA that discovered that its operations had been compromised but chose
to continue signing certificates using the same key as used during the
period of compromise is only providing additional evidence that it is
not worthy of trust".

I believe you meant:

"A CA that discovered it cannot figure the exact extend of the damages but =

chose
to continue signing certificates using the same key as used during the
period of compromise is only providing additional evidence that it is
not worthy of trust".

 ... but we are far away from the original question:

Do you believe that it is worthwhile to define this new extension ?

Denis



De :    "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>
A :     <pkix@ietf.org>
Date :  09/11/2011 15:56
Objet : Re: [pkix] Proposed new singleExtension for OCSP
Envoy=E9 par :    pkix-bounces@ietf.org



Tom,

Technical mechanisms don't exist in a vacuum, they exist to support
business processes.  The business process of a CA (as described in its
CPS) is to know its subscribers and convey information about them to
RPs.  Technical mechanisms (certs, whitelists, blacklists) aren't a CA's
business, they merely convey information the CA has obtained through
conducting its business.  As an analogy, Gartner Group does not exist to
produce PDF files, it's business is market analysis.  PDF and HTML are
just mechanisms used to convey that information.

A whitelist is not another barrier for an attacker to overcome, it is
the same barrier as a blacklist because it reflects (a different view
of) the same business information.  I'm not sure why you think manual
population is more reliable than automatic population, but assuming
that's true, manual population of a blacklist from all information known
to the CA is no more or less reliable than manual population of a
whitelist from the identical information.  If the CA's information has
been corrupted by intentional or natural events, neither blacklist nor
whitelist can make the transmitted information more reliable than it was
prior to transmission.

If the CA's information is corrupted to the point where it cannot figure
out who its subscribers are and what certs it has issued, then the CA
should reset its operations, declare a "recovered" date, rekey the CA,
and revoke the previous CA key.  At that point a blacklist would start
empty and a whitelist would include all certs issued after the recovery
date.  The same bandwidth/efficiency arguments for using black or white
lists exist as always, but there is no valid argument that whitelists
provide an "additional barrier" to attackers.

A CA that discovered that its operations had been compromised but chose
to continue signing certificates using the same key as used during the
period of compromise is only providing additional evidence that it is
not worthy of trust.

Dave



-----Original Message-----
From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
Tom Ritter

> If you can't trust the CA to know what it has issued and what it=20
> hasn't, you can't create a trustable whitelist.  If you can trust the=20
> CA to know what it has issued and what it hasn't, you don't need a
whitelist.

This assumes the OCSP database is populated automatically.  Just as an
auditor should flag a deployment that accepts client certificates but
doesn't validate them (as adding no security), so too should an auditor
flag such an OCSP deployment.  I agree - it would be useless.
It should be deployed such that it is another barrier for an attacker to
overcome.

=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=
=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F
pkix mailing list
pkix@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix


--=_alternative 0053CC43C1257943_=
Content-Type: text/html; charset="ISO-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<font size=3D2 face=3D"sans-serif">David,</font>
<br>
<br><font size=3D2 face=3D"Arial">You said:</font>
<br>
<br><font size=3D2 face=3D"Arial">&quot;A CA that discovered that its opera=
tions
had been compromised but chose<br>
to continue signing certificates using the same key as used during the<br>
period of compromise is only providing additional evidence that it is<br>
not worthy of trust&quot;.</font>
<br>
<br><font size=3D2 face=3D"Arial">I believe you meant:</font>
<br>
<br><font size=3D2 face=3D"Arial">&quot;A CA that discovered it cannot figu=
re
the exact extend of the damages but chose<br>
to continue signing certificates using the same key as used during the<br>
period of compromise is only providing additional evidence that it is<br>
not worthy of trust&quot;.</font>
<br>
<br><font size=3D2 face=3D"Arial">&nbsp;... but we are far away from the or=
iginal
question:</font>
<br>
<br><font size=3D2 face=3D"Arial">Do you believe that it is worthwhile to d=
efine
this new extension ?</font>
<br>
<br><font size=3D2 face=3D"Arial">Denis</font>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br><font size=3D1 color=3D#5f5f5f face=3D"sans-serif">De : &nbsp; &nbsp; &=
nbsp;
&nbsp;</font><font size=3D1 face=3D"sans-serif">&quot;Kemp, David P.&quot;
&lt;DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil&gt;</font>
<br><font size=3D1 color=3D#5f5f5f face=3D"sans-serif">A : &nbsp; &nbsp; &n=
bsp;
&nbsp;</font><font size=3D1 face=3D"sans-serif">&lt;pkix@ietf.org&gt;</font>
<br><font size=3D1 color=3D#5f5f5f face=3D"sans-serif">Date : &nbsp; &nbsp;=
 &nbsp;
&nbsp;</font><font size=3D1 face=3D"sans-serif">09/11/2011 15:56</font>
<br><font size=3D1 color=3D#5f5f5f face=3D"sans-serif">Objet : &nbsp; &nbsp;
&nbsp; &nbsp;</font><font size=3D1 face=3D"sans-serif">Re: [pkix] Proposed
new singleExtension for OCSP</font>
<br><font size=3D1 color=3D#5f5f5f face=3D"sans-serif">Envoy=E9 par : &nbsp=
; &nbsp;
&nbsp; &nbsp;</font><font size=3D1 face=3D"sans-serif">pkix-bounces@ietf.or=
g</font>
<br>
<hr noshade>
<br>
<br>
<br><tt><font size=3D2>Tom,<br>
<br>
Technical mechanisms don't exist in a vacuum, they exist to support<br>
business processes. &nbsp;The business process of a CA (as described in
its<br>
CPS) is to know its subscribers and convey information about them to<br>
RPs. &nbsp;Technical mechanisms (certs, whitelists, blacklists) aren't
a CA's<br>
business, they merely convey information the CA has obtained through<br>
conducting its business. &nbsp;As an analogy, Gartner Group does not exist
to<br>
produce PDF files, it's business is market analysis. &nbsp;PDF and HTML
are<br>
just mechanisms used to convey that information.<br>
<br>
A whitelist is not another barrier for an attacker to overcome, it is<br>
the same barrier as a blacklist because it reflects (a different view<br>
of) the same business information. &nbsp;I'm not sure why you think manual<=
br>
population is more reliable than automatic population, but assuming<br>
that's true, manual population of a blacklist from all information known<br>
to the CA is no more or less reliable than manual population of a<br>
whitelist from the identical information. &nbsp;If the CA's information
has<br>
been corrupted by intentional or natural events, neither blacklist nor<br>
whitelist can make the transmitted information more reliable than it was<br>
prior to transmission.<br>
<br>
If the CA's information is corrupted to the point where it cannot figure<br>
out who its subscribers are and what certs it has issued, then the CA<br>
should reset its operations, declare a &quot;recovered&quot; date, rekey
the CA,<br>
and revoke the previous CA key. &nbsp;At that point a blacklist would start=
<br>
empty and a whitelist would include all certs issued after the recovery<br>
date. &nbsp;The same bandwidth/efficiency arguments for using black or
white<br>
lists exist as always, but there is no valid argument that whitelists<br>
provide an &quot;additional barrier&quot; to attackers.<br>
<br>
A CA that discovered that its operations had been compromised but chose<br>
to continue signing certificates using the same key as used during the<br>
period of compromise is only providing additional evidence that it is<br>
not worthy of trust.<br>
<br>
Dave<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
-----Original Message-----<br>
From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [</font></tt><a href=3D"mailto:pkix-bounces@iet=
f.org"><tt><font size=3D2>mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org</font></tt></a><tt><=
font size=3D2>]
On Behalf Of<br>
Tom Ritter<br>
<br>
&gt; If you can't trust the CA to know what it has issued and what it <br>
&gt; hasn't, you can't create a trustable whitelist. &nbsp;If you can trust
the <br>
&gt; CA to know what it has issued and what it hasn't, you don't need a<br>
whitelist.<br>
<br>
This assumes the OCSP database is populated automatically. &nbsp;Just as
an<br>
auditor should flag a deployment that accepts client certificates but<br>
doesn't validate them (as adding no security), so too should an auditor<br>
flag such an OCSP deployment. &nbsp;I agree - it would be useless.<br>
It should be deployed such that it is another barrier for an attacker to<br>
overcome.<br>
<br>
=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=
=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F<br>
pkix mailing list<br>
pkix@ietf.org<br>
</font></tt><a href=3Dhttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix><tt><font =
size=3D2>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix</font></tt></a><tt><fon=
t size=3D2><br>
</font></tt>
<br>
--=_alternative 0053CC43C1257943_=--

From liaquat.khan@ascertia.com  Wed Nov  9 07:47:36 2011
Return-Path: <liaquat.khan@ascertia.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8004D21F8A64 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  9 Nov 2011 07:47:36 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -0.691
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.691 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_ILLEGAL_IP=1.908]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id Ep-1qnnwoleL for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  9 Nov 2011 07:47:35 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail.ascertia.com (www.ascertia.com [94.136.44.32]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5434321F85AE for <pkix@ietf.org>; Wed,  9 Nov 2011 07:47:35 -0800 (PST)
Received: from LENOVOLK ([2.223.82.12]) by ascertia.com with MailEnable ESMTP; Wed, 9 Nov 2011 15:49:13 +0000
From: "Liaquat Khan" <liaquat.khan@ascertia.com>
To: "'Kemp, David P.'" <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>, <pkix@ietf.org>
References: <CAMm+LwgOGk_vDbpzqzfcMMFXr8EM7uo18oH7ftjAFjvXOx2Hrg@mail.gmail.com><CADEFE3C.2259%tmiller@mitre.org>	<CA+cU71=ytJkiswMi3rEeq8bwnsW8MULEMnVwCw6nHkZf2o9Lpg@mail.gmail.com> <C1A47F1540DF3246A8D30C853C05D0DA01B96B6D@DABECK.missi.ncsc.mil>
In-Reply-To: <C1A47F1540DF3246A8D30C853C05D0DA01B96B6D@DABECK.missi.ncsc.mil>
Date: Wed, 9 Nov 2011 15:47:27 -0000
Message-ID: <00e101cc9ef6$e21bfc10$a653f430$@ascertia.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook 14.0
Thread-Index: AQFr+JJDHTkvpLbdFiXJ5qCp+cT4jgFz4EIUAZATN2oA6wwPYZZGg8TA
Content-Language: en-gb
X-ME-Bayesian: 0.000000
Subject: Re: [pkix] Proposed new singleExtension for OCSP
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 09 Nov 2011 15:47:36 -0000

Isn't it true though that a white-list check would help the CA to detect the
problem?  I.e. there is a fake certificate out there which is being used (I
agree this assumes that an attacker managed to get a fake certificate
somehow and not injected it into the CA's database - maybe I am wrong but I
believe this was the case for DigiNotar). 

-----Original Message-----
From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
Kemp, David P.
Sent: 09 November 2011 14:56
To: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] Proposed new singleExtension for OCSP

Tom,

Technical mechanisms don't exist in a vacuum, they exist to support business
processes.  The business process of a CA (as described in its
CPS) is to know its subscribers and convey information about them to RPs.
Technical mechanisms (certs, whitelists, blacklists) aren't a CA's business,
they merely convey information the CA has obtained through conducting its
business.  As an analogy, Gartner Group does not exist to produce PDF files,
it's business is market analysis.  PDF and HTML are just mechanisms used to
convey that information.

A whitelist is not another barrier for an attacker to overcome, it is the
same barrier as a blacklist because it reflects (a different view
of) the same business information.  I'm not sure why you think manual
population is more reliable than automatic population, but assuming that's
true, manual population of a blacklist from all information known to the CA
is no more or less reliable than manual population of a whitelist from the
identical information.  If the CA's information has been corrupted by
intentional or natural events, neither blacklist nor whitelist can make the
transmitted information more reliable than it was prior to transmission.

If the CA's information is corrupted to the point where it cannot figure out
who its subscribers are and what certs it has issued, then the CA should
reset its operations, declare a "recovered" date, rekey the CA, and revoke
the previous CA key.  At that point a blacklist would start empty and a
whitelist would include all certs issued after the recovery date.  The same
bandwidth/efficiency arguments for using black or white lists exist as
always, but there is no valid argument that whitelists provide an
"additional barrier" to attackers.

A CA that discovered that its operations had been compromised but chose to
continue signing certificates using the same key as used during the period
of compromise is only providing additional evidence that it is not worthy of
trust.

Dave



-----Original Message-----
From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Tom
Ritter

> If you can't trust the CA to know what it has issued and what it 
> hasn't, you can't create a trustable whitelist.  If you can trust the 
> CA to know what it has issued and what it hasn't, you don't need a
whitelist.

This assumes the OCSP database is populated automatically.  Just as an
auditor should flag a deployment that accepts client certificates but
doesn't validate them (as adding no security), so too should an auditor flag
such an OCSP deployment.  I agree - it would be useless.
It should be deployed such that it is another barrier for an attacker to
overcome.

_______________________________________________
pkix mailing list
pkix@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix



From paul.hoffman@vpnc.org  Wed Nov  9 08:34:23 2011
Return-Path: <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3611821F8C73 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  9 Nov 2011 08:34:23 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -102.572
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-102.572 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.027, BAYES_00=-2.599, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id n7Ha6fOW1rfM for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  9 Nov 2011 08:34:22 -0800 (PST)
Received: from hoffman.proper.com (IPv6.Hoffman.Proper.COM [IPv6:2605:8e00:100:41::81]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B72C121F8C41 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Wed,  9 Nov 2011 08:34:22 -0800 (PST)
Received: from [10.20.30.100] (50-0-66-4.dsl.dynamic.fusionbroadband.com [50.0.66.4]) (authenticated bits=0) by hoffman.proper.com (8.14.4/8.14.3) with ESMTP id pA9GP919097027 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES128-SHA bits=128 verify=NO); Wed, 9 Nov 2011 09:25:09 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from paul.hoffman@vpnc.org)
Mime-Version: 1.0 (Apple Message framework v1251.1)
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
From: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
In-Reply-To: <00e101cc9ef6$e21bfc10$a653f430$@ascertia.com>
Date: Wed, 9 Nov 2011 08:25:09 -0800
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Message-Id: <319E9B25-F333-4B99-B34B-0A7A1F0CAB59@vpnc.org>
References: <CAMm+LwgOGk_vDbpzqzfcMMFXr8EM7uo18oH7ftjAFjvXOx2Hrg@mail.gmail.com><CADEFE3C.2259%tmiller@mitre.org>	<CA+cU71=ytJkiswMi3rEeq8bwnsW8MULEMnVwCw6nHkZf2o9Lpg@mail.gmail.com> <C1A47F1540DF3246A8D30C853C05D0DA01B96B6D@DABECK.missi.ncsc.mil> <00e101cc9ef6$e21bfc10$a653f430$@ascertia.com>
To: Liaquat Khan <liaquat.khan@ascertia.com>
X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.1251.1)
Cc: PKIX <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] Proposed new singleExtension for OCSP
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 09 Nov 2011 16:34:23 -0000

On Nov 9, 2011, at 7:47 AM, Liaquat Khan wrote:

> Isn't it true though that a white-list check would help the CA to =
detect the
> problem? =20

That would be an *internal* mechanism, not the externally-visible =
mechanism that started this thread.

--Paul Hoffman


From kent@bbn.com  Wed Nov  9 10:32:25 2011
Return-Path: <kent@bbn.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id AD25F1F0C34 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  9 Nov 2011 10:32:25 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -106.442
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-106.442 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.157, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id z5xQhHCg552T for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  9 Nov 2011 10:32:25 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtp.bbn.com (smtp.bbn.com [128.33.0.80]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id BDF411F0C36 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Wed,  9 Nov 2011 10:32:21 -0800 (PST)
Received: from dhcp89-089-006.bbn.com ([128.89.89.6]:49157) by smtp.bbn.com with esmtp (Exim 4.74 (FreeBSD)) (envelope-from <kent@bbn.com>) id 1ROCwZ-000113-Uf for pkix@ietf.org; Wed, 09 Nov 2011 13:32:16 -0500
Mime-Version: 1.0
Message-Id: <p0624080acae06dd3843d@[128.89.89.6]>
Date: Wed, 9 Nov 2011 13:32:06 -0500
To: pkix@ietf.org
From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed"
Subject: [pkix] OCSP extension
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 09 Nov 2011 18:32:25 -0000

Folks,

While the discussion of a whitelist per se is not new, the question 
of whether OCSP should be extended to provide status info other than 
revocation status.

Discussion of this topic triggered the development of SCVP, as an 
alternative to revising and extending OCSP to provide status info 
other that revocation status.

An OSCP response of the form "good" clearly moves back into this 
territory.  Issued and not revoked is skating close :-).

The recent observation that "good" is a misleading OCSP response 
alludes to this issue. (Maybe if we named the protocol OCRSP ("R" = 
"revocation") we might have avoided this problem, but ...

I am worried that we are again heading down the path of asking OCSP to
convey cert validity, vs. cert revocation status.

I'd much rather see this question explored in the context of the SCVP 
validation (vs. path discovery) function, even though I realize that 
there are some subtle differences  between the "issued and not 
revoked" response and cert validity.

Steve

From tmiller@mitre.org  Wed Nov  9 11:05:41 2011
Return-Path: <tmiller@mitre.org>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5C6351F0C46 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  9 Nov 2011 11:05:41 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id XYdbchG+WKjN for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  9 Nov 2011 11:05:40 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (smtpksrv1.mitre.org [198.49.146.77]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D49641F0C43 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Wed,  9 Nov 2011 11:05:40 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by localhost (Postfix) with SMTP id 6136121B11B4; Wed,  9 Nov 2011 14:05:40 -0500 (EST)
Received: from IMCCAS03.MITRE.ORG (imccas03.mitre.org [129.83.29.80]) by smtpksrv1.mitre.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5B48E21B1135; Wed,  9 Nov 2011 14:05:40 -0500 (EST)
Received: from IMCMBX01.MITRE.ORG ([169.254.1.57]) by IMCCAS03.MITRE.ORG ([129.83.29.80]) with mapi id 14.01.0339.001; Wed, 9 Nov 2011 14:05:39 -0500
From: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
To: Liaquat Khan <liaquat.khan@ascertia.com>, "'Kemp, David P.'" <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>, "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] Proposed new singleExtension for OCSP
Thread-Index: AQHMnSxzAIJDF8bQtkGhezvWvxyumZWhYCiAgABt+ID//+TvAIABg6UA//+xMwCAAOdzgP//qkIAABJSd4AAHZZpAAAByxuA///SyIA=
Date: Wed, 9 Nov 2011 19:05:39 +0000
Message-ID: <CAE02AD9.22CE%tmiller@mitre.org>
In-Reply-To: <00e101cc9ef6$e21bfc10$a653f430$@ascertia.com>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
user-agent: Microsoft-MacOutlook/14.13.0.110805
x-originating-ip: [172.31.32.108]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-ID: <580A22340B6D0241AC2BE9D8650EC834@imc.mitre.org>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Subject: Re: [pkix] Proposed new singleExtension for OCSP
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 09 Nov 2011 19:05:41 -0000

On 11/9/11 9:47 AM, "Liaquat Khan" <liaquat.khan@ascertia.com> wrote:

>Isn't it true though that a white-list check would help the CA to detect
>the
>problem?  I.e. there is a fake certificate out there which is being used
>(I
>agree this assumes that an attacker managed to get a fake certificate
>somehow and not injected it into the CA's database - maybe I am wrong but
>I
>believe this was the case for DigiNotar).

This depends what you mean by fake.  If it's just a name collision, the
cert won't chain and you don't need the whitelist.  If it was fraudulently
issued, it only matters in the single case where the CA record of that
cert is destroyed.

-- T


From tmiller@mitre.org  Wed Nov  9 11:34:04 2011
Return-Path: <tmiller@mitre.org>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A0A3811E808B for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  9 Nov 2011 11:34:04 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.000,  BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id EemHaQdXschE for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  9 Nov 2011 11:34:04 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (smtpksrv1.mitre.org [198.49.146.77]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0CE9111E8083 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Wed,  9 Nov 2011 11:34:04 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by localhost (Postfix) with SMTP id AFBD721B11DE; Wed,  9 Nov 2011 14:34:03 -0500 (EST)
Received: from IMCCAS03.MITRE.ORG (imccas03.mitre.org [129.83.29.80]) by smtpksrv1.mitre.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A901F21B11D7; Wed,  9 Nov 2011 14:34:03 -0500 (EST)
Received: from IMCMBX01.MITRE.ORG ([169.254.1.57]) by IMCCAS03.MITRE.ORG ([129.83.29.80]) with mapi id 14.01.0339.001; Wed, 9 Nov 2011 14:34:03 -0500
From: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
To: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>, "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] OCSP extension
Thread-Index: AQHMnw3zfOJCLYYvsEa2oo4XZUK+cZWk3jCA
Date: Wed, 9 Nov 2011 19:34:03 +0000
Message-ID: <CAE0311F.22F7%tmiller@mitre.org>
In-Reply-To: <p0624080acae06dd3843d@[128.89.89.6]>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
user-agent: Microsoft-MacOutlook/14.13.0.110805
x-originating-ip: [172.31.32.108]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-ID: <A3F22F1B4702FA40AA1A23F64AA75D03@imc.mitre.org>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Subject: Re: [pkix] OCSP extension
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 09 Nov 2011 19:34:04 -0000

On 11/9/11 12:32 PM, "Stephen Kent" <kent@bbn.com> wrote:

>Discussion of this topic triggered the development of SCVP, as an
>alternative to revising and extending OCSP to provide status info
>other that revocation status.
>
>An OSCP response of the form "good" clearly moves back into this
>territory.  Issued and not revoked is skating close :-).
>
>The recent observation that "good" is a misleading OCSP response
>alludes to this issue. (Maybe if we named the protocol OCRSP ("R" =3D
>"revocation") we might have avoided this problem, but ...
>
>I am worried that we are again heading down the path of asking OCSP to
>convey cert validity, vs. cert revocation status.

That's a fair point.  I'll cop to blurring this line in the discussion,
but I am aware of the distinction between the response and a statement of
validity.

>I'd much rather see this question explored in the context of the SCVP
>validation (vs. path discovery) function, even though I realize that
>there are some subtle differences  between the "issued and not
>revoked" response and cert validity.

You stole my thunder; that's where I was going to go next responding to
Martin & Tom.

-- T


From mrex@sap.com  Wed Nov  9 14:38:50 2011
Return-Path: <mrex@sap.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 633A411E808E for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  9 Nov 2011 14:38:50 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -9.082
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-9.082 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.922, BAYES_05=-1.11, HELO_EQ_DE=0.35, J_CHICKENPOX_34=0.6, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-8]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id knwTxpI8xkWE for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  9 Nov 2011 14:38:49 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpde01.sap-ag.de (smtpde01.sap-ag.de [155.56.68.170]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3BB9211E8087 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Wed,  9 Nov 2011 14:38:48 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail.sap.corp by smtpde01.sap-ag.de (26) with ESMTP id pA9Mcf1P000219 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=OK); Wed, 9 Nov 2011 23:38:42 +0100 (MET)
From: Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
Message-Id: <201111092238.pA9McfqQ004634@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp>
To: kent@bbn.com (Stephen Kent)
Date: Wed, 9 Nov 2011 23:38:41 +0100 (MET)
In-Reply-To: <p06240805cadde9322c36@[128.89.89.6]> from "Stephen Kent" at Nov 7, 11 03:07:37 pm
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-SAP: out
Cc: pkix@ietf.org, paul.hoffman@vpnc.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
Reply-To: mrex@sap.com
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 09 Nov 2011 22:38:50 -0000

Stephen Kent wrote:
> 
> Kyle,
> 
> I think your proposal has several problems.

I'm sympathetic with Kyle's motiviation and at least some
of his goal, but I'm not feeling comfortable yet with this specific
proposal.


> 
> First, many folks have noted why they do not believe that a whitelist 
> would really solve the cited problem.
> 
> Second, many folks believe that DigiNotor is a bad example, because 
> their security practices seem to have been rather lax.

I think that DigiNotar is a perfectly valid example and actually
representative for a larger number of real CAs.  Btw. Up to today,
my Windows XP machine "trusted RootCA store" has been populated
by Microsoft with 345 RootCA certs (46 of those expired), so the
risk is ever expanding.  You probably read the news about
the recent revocation of cross-certificates for a Malaysian CA
that probably does not have its own RootCA in the Browsers, e.g.:
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/11/03/certificate_authority_banished/

I'm slightly puzzled by the text in this software update:
http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/520453/30/0/threaded

  Several weak certificates were issued by Malaysian intermediate CA
  "Digicert Sdn. Bhd." This event, along with other issues, has lead to
  Entrust Inc. and Verizon Cybertrust to revoke the CA's cross-signed
  certificates.

Does this mean that Digicert Malaysia obtained *TWO* independent
cross-certificates, one from Entrust Inc. plus one from Verizon Cybertrust,
both of which have rootCA certs as trust anchors in Browsers?
(and the result that revoking only one of those might not help?)


> 
> Other methods, consistent with current standards, can accommodate 
> failures of the sort noted. For example, it is common practice for 
> many CAs to have an offline CA, and subordinate, online (production) 
> CAs. If one of the production CAs were compromised ala the DigiNotor 
> case, one could revoke the production CA cert, and reissue certs to 
> all of the (known, valid) clients under a new, production CA. This 
> could be done using the extant public keys for each client, so the 
> only requirement is distribution of the new certs to the clients, for 
> inclusion in TLS handshakes (I use the TLS example because that is 
> the context of the cited failure.)


I don't think this helps by any measure.  At best it helps customers
to get a new cert without having to pay again, but the administrative
overhead is exactly the same as enrolling with an CA from an entirely
different company, therefore I do not see this as a solution of any kind.

While it is a common US military stereotype in Hollywood movies
that they blindly and quickly nuke the entire area of an outbreak
or contamination, rather than trying to minimize collateral damage
and save lives, I do not think that is a desirable goal for
PKIX to always, quickly and unconditionally nuke CAs, and entire PKIs
along with it, whenever there is the slightest sign of suspicious
activity on any of the CAs equipment.

There was just the other news report about another dutch CA operated
by KPN has suspended certificate issuance for an investigation:
http://www.kpn.com/corporate/overkpn/Newsroom/nieuwsbericht/KPN-stopt-uit-voorzorg-uitgifte-nieuwe-veiligheidscertificaten.htm
They found malware on some of their machines and it seems that
this malware may have sneaked in already 4 years ago.  They haven't
found any evidence yet that any fraudulent certs have been issued.


So whitelist could really help to deal more sensibly and safely
with (much more common) security breaches rather than complete CA
compromises.


Why should the compromise of a CA adversely affect the credentials
of a TLS server AT ALL?  As you suggest yourself "reissue certs
under a new CA using the extant public keys".  Your suggestion
only cuts down on the CA expenses (for RA checking and invoicing)
but hits the certificate holders as badly as possible (the same
re-personalization effort as for getting certs issued from a CA
operated by a different company.

I would really appreciate *NOT* having to re-personalize everything
*PLUS* not having to constantly software-update the blacklists
wihtin every TLS client (in particular the huge numbers of
them without credentials) for every such event.


Your assumption
"reissue certs under a new CA using the extant public keys"
is vitally dependent on the ability to distinguish good from
fraudulent certs.  If the CA is capable of performing this
distinction, and the organization is sufficiently trusted for
continued confirmation of prior known-good RA validations,
then the most reasonable engineering approach would be to
convey exactly this information to the RPs -- which would
obviate the immediate nuking of the CA and its surrounding PKI,
i.e. obviate the repersonalization of all current certificate holders.


And it is up to PKIX to "wiggle out" a solution to limit the
necessity for frequent nuking CAs&PKIs.


-Martin


From tgindin@us.ibm.com  Wed Nov  9 17:52:22 2011
Return-Path: <tgindin@us.ibm.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1EEF121F8511 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  9 Nov 2011 17:52:22 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.258
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.258 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.341,  BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 0aamse7411Ya for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  9 Nov 2011 17:52:21 -0800 (PST)
Received: from e3.ny.us.ibm.com (e3.ny.us.ibm.com [32.97.182.143]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6F26D21F84D4 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Wed,  9 Nov 2011 17:52:21 -0800 (PST)
Received: from /spool/local by e3.ny.us.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted for <pkix@ietf.org> from <tgindin@us.ibm.com>; Wed, 9 Nov 2011 20:52:20 -0500
Received: from d01relay05.pok.ibm.com ([9.56.227.237]) by e3.ny.us.ibm.com ([192.168.1.103]) with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted;  Wed, 9 Nov 2011 20:52:18 -0500
Received: from d01av04.pok.ibm.com (d01av04.pok.ibm.com [9.56.224.64]) by d01relay05.pok.ibm.com (8.13.8/8.13.8/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id pAA1qIFJ228322 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Wed, 9 Nov 2011 20:52:18 -0500
Received: from d01av04.pok.ibm.com (loopback [127.0.0.1]) by d01av04.pok.ibm.com (8.14.4/8.13.1/NCO v10.0 AVout) with ESMTP id pAA1qH1S030210 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Wed, 9 Nov 2011 20:52:17 -0500
Received: from d01ml062.pok.ibm.com (d01ml062.pok.ibm.com [9.63.10.95]) by d01av04.pok.ibm.com (8.14.4/8.13.1/NCO v10.0 AVin) with ESMTP id pAA1qHlO030192; Wed, 9 Nov 2011 20:52:17 -0500
In-Reply-To: <CADD8856.2177%tmiller@mitre.org>
References: <guptfoftlohsjhfilbjezwJv4X.penango@mail.gmail.com> <CADD8856.2177%tmiller@mitre.org>
To: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-KeepSent: 36C2C56A:C8D2FECA-85257943:0077DA61; type=4; name=$KeepSent
X-Mailer: Lotus Notes Build V853_CD5_06022011 June 02, 2011
From: Tom Gindin <tgindin@us.ibm.com>
Message-ID: <OF36C2C56A.C8D2FECA-ON85257943.0077DA61-85257944.000A4DD8@us.ibm.com>
Date: Wed, 9 Nov 2011 20:52:16 -0500
X-MIMETrack: Serialize by Router on D01ML062/01/M/IBM(Release 8.5.2FP1 ZX852FP1HF12|September 28, 2011) at 11/09/2011 20:52:16, Serialize complete at 11/09/2011 20:52:16
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII"
x-cbid: 11111001-8974-0000-0000-000001C074F4
Cc: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New VersionNotification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 10 Nov 2011 01:52:22 -0000

        There are three parties interested in the revocation status of a 
certificate - CA, subscriber and RP.  For public CA's, the RP is not 
normally a party to the contract between the CA and the subscriber.  Since 
revocation checking involves an interaction between the RP and a provider 
chosen by the CA, contracts may not help.

                Tom Gindin





From:   "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
To:     Kyle Hamilton <kyanha@kyanha.net>, "Kemp, David P." 
<DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>, 
Cc:     "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Date:   11/07/2011 02:11 PM
Subject:        Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New 
VersionNotification for draft-hamilton-cmr-00.txt
Sent by:        pkix-bounces@ietf.org



On 11/7/11 12:39 PM, "Kyle Hamilton" <kyanha@kyanha.net> wrote:

>If the logs are deleted, then the whitelist would still serve as a record
>of what the CA believes the legitimately-issued certificates are supposed
>to be.  By doing so, the unlogged certifications would not be on the list
>and so would fail validation.

If the CA records (e.g., logs) are corrupt, where exactly does the
whitelist come from?  God?

>[...] They do not dictate terms to us, [...] We do not dictate terms to
>them, 

It's called a contract.

-- T

_______________________________________________
pkix mailing list
pkix@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix




From ynir@checkpoint.com  Wed Nov  9 23:30:23 2011
Return-Path: <ynir@checkpoint.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E8C6E1F0C36 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  9 Nov 2011 23:30:22 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -10.345
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-10.345 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.254, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-8]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 5iDhLoQv9Nfc for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  9 Nov 2011 23:30:22 -0800 (PST)
Received: from michael.checkpoint.com (smtp.checkpoint.com [194.29.34.68]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A50A621F84D6 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Wed,  9 Nov 2011 23:30:20 -0800 (PST)
X-CheckPoint: {4EBB7D78-6-1B221DC2-1FFFF}
Received: from il-ex01.ad.checkpoint.com (il-ex01.ad.checkpoint.com [194.29.34.26]) by michael.checkpoint.com (8.13.8/8.13.8) with ESMTP id pAA7UHfC004956 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 09:30:17 +0200
Received: from il-ex01.ad.checkpoint.com ([126.0.0.2]) by il-ex01.ad.checkpoint.com ([126.0.0.2]) with mapi; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 09:30:09 +0200
From: Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com>
To: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Date: Thu, 10 Nov 2011 09:30:05 +0200
Thread-Topic: Malaysian CA (Was: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version)
Thread-Index: AcyfepMMMl7yX1N8Toa8FAcpo3N8dA==
Message-ID: <CAE1494C.9222%ynir@checkpoint.com>
In-Reply-To: <201111092238.pA9McfqQ004634@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
user-agent: Microsoft-MacOutlook/14.13.0.110805
acceptlanguage: en-US
x-kse-antivirus-interceptor-info: scan successful
x-kse-antivirus-info: Clean
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Subject: [pkix] Malaysian CA (Was: An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version)
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 10 Nov 2011 07:30:23 -0000

On 11/10/11 12:38 AM, "Martin Rex" <mrex@sap.com> wrote:
>You probably read the news about
>the recent revocation of cross-certificates for a Malaysian CA
>that probably does not have its own RootCA in the Browsers, e.g.:
>http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/11/03/certificate_authority_banished/
>
>I'm slightly puzzled by the text in this software update:
>http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/520453/30/0/threaded
>
>  Several weak certificates were issued by Malaysian intermediate CA
>  "Digicert Sdn. Bhd." This event, along with other issues, has lead to
>  Entrust Inc. and Verizon Cybertrust to revoke the CA's cross-signed
>  certificates.
>
>Does this mean that Digicert Malaysia obtained *TWO* independent
>cross-certificates, one from Entrust Inc. plus one from Verizon
>Cybertrust,
>both of which have rootCA certs as trust anchors in Browsers?
>(and the result that revoking only one of those might not help?)=09

I was wondering about that. The CA issued 22 certificates with 512-bit
public keys.  How could this possibly happen?

Is it that the EE made a PKCS#10 with a 512-bit public key, and the CA
just signed it?  That wouldn't be too bad.

If the CA generated the public keys, how did it happen that all the other
customers get good public keys, but a particular subset gets weak ones?
Was this caused by a break-in?

This is far weirder than the mis-issued certificates stories.

Yoav


From rob.stradling@comodo.com  Thu Nov 10 04:22:58 2011
Return-Path: <rob.stradling@comodo.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1ECAC21F86EE for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 04:22:58 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 7Nf-LQdZozoh for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 04:22:55 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mmmail1.mcr.colo.comodoca.net (mdfw.comodoca.net [91.209.196.68]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6808D21F8B1E for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 04:22:54 -0800 (PST)
Received: (qmail 32358 invoked from network); 10 Nov 2011 12:22:52 -0000
Received: from ian.bd.office.comodo.net (HELO ian.brad.office.comodo.net) (192.168.0.201) by mail.colo.comodoca.net with ESMTPS (DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA encrypted); 10 Nov 2011 12:22:52 -0000
Received: (qmail 18241 invoked by uid 1000); 10 Nov 2011 12:22:52 -0000
Received: from nigel.brad.office.comodo.net (HELO nigel.localnet) (192.168.0.58) by ian.brad.office.comodo.net (qpsmtpd/0.40) with (AES256-SHA encrypted) ESMTPS; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 12:22:52 +0000
From: Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>
To: pkix@ietf.org
Date: Thu, 10 Nov 2011 12:22:48 +0000
User-Agent: KMail/1.13.7 (Linux/3.0.6-gentoo; KDE/4.6.5; i686; ; )
References: <CAE1494C.9222%ynir@checkpoint.com>
In-Reply-To: <CAE1494C.9222%ynir@checkpoint.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: Text/Plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Message-Id: <201111101222.48532.rob.stradling@comodo.com>
Subject: Re: [pkix] Malaysian CA (Was: An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version)
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 10 Nov 2011 12:22:58 -0000

On Thursday 10 Nov 2011 07:30:05 Yoav Nir wrote:
> On 11/10/11 12:38 AM, "Martin Rex" <mrex@sap.com> wrote:
> >You probably read the news about
> >the recent revocation of cross-certificates for a Malaysian CA
> >that probably does not have its own RootCA in the Browsers, e.g.:
> >http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/11/03/certificate_authority_banished/
> >
> >I'm slightly puzzled by the text in this software update:
> >http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/520453/30/0/threaded
> >
> >  Several weak certificates were issued by Malaysian intermediate CA
> >  "Digicert Sdn. Bhd." This event, along with other issues, has lead to
> >  Entrust Inc. and Verizon Cybertrust to revoke the CA's cross-signed
> >  certificates.
> >
> >Does this mean that Digicert Malaysia obtained *TWO* independent
> >cross-certificates, one from Entrust Inc. plus one from Verizon
> >Cybertrust,

Yes.

http://www.digicert.com.my/repository.htm
http://www.digicert.com.my/download/Digisign%20Server%20ID%20Enrich.cer
http://www.digicert.com.my/download/Digisign%20Server%20ID%20-%20(Enrich).cer

-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----

-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----

I understand that these 2 certs have been revoked by Entrust and Cybertrust.

> >both of which have rootCA certs as trust anchors in Browsers?
> >(and the result that revoking only one of those might not help?)

The 2 certs above have different keypairs, so they couldn't have been used 
interchangeably for verifying any given EE cert.

> I was wondering about that. The CA issued 22 certificates with 512-bit
> public keys.  How could this possibly happen?
> 
> Is it that the EE made a PKCS#10 with a 512-bit public key, and the CA
> just signed it?  That wouldn't be too bad.
> 
> If the CA generated the public keys, how did it happen that all the other
> customers get good public keys, but a particular subset gets weak ones?
> Was this caused by a break-in?
> 
> This is far weirder than the mis-issued certificates stories.
> 
> Yoav
> 
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix

Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online

From denis.pinkas@bull.net  Thu Nov 10 05:02:08 2011
Return-Path: <denis.pinkas@bull.net>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 49CB721F8A95 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 05:02:08 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.115
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.115 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.133,  BAYES_00=-2.599, HELO_EQ_FR=0.35, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 0H8+JkVvB53T for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 05:02:07 -0800 (PST)
Received: from odin2.bull.net (odin2.bull.net [129.184.85.11]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5979721F84D7 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 05:02:07 -0800 (PST)
Received: from MSGC-003.bull.fr (MSGC-003.frcl.bull.fr [129.184.87.131]) by odin2.bull.net (Bull S.A.) with ESMTP id CDD121801C for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 14:12:02 +0100 (CET)
In-Reply-To: <p0624080acae06dd3843d@[128.89.89.6]>
References: <p0624080acae06dd3843d@[128.89.89.6]>
To: pkix@ietf.org
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-KeepSent: 49E6E31A:F80645F6-C1257944:0035E7E4; type=4; name=$KeepSent
X-Mailer: Lotus Notes Release 8.5.2 August 10, 2010
From: denis.pinkas@bull.net
Message-ID: <OF49E6E31A.F80645F6-ONC1257944.0035E7E4-C1257944.0047A830@bull.net>
Date: Thu, 10 Nov 2011 14:02:41 +0100
X-MIMETrack: Serialize by Router on MSGC-003/SRV/BULL(Release 8.5.2FP1|November 29, 2010) at 10/11/2011 14:02:41, Serialize complete at 10/11/2011 14:02:41
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="=_alternative 00477ECBC1257944_="
Subject: Re: [pkix] OCSP extension
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 10 Nov 2011 13:02:08 -0000

Message en plusieurs parties au format MIME
--=_alternative 00477ECBC1257944_=
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII"

Steve,,

This topic has nothing to do with SCVP, since "good and really issued" is 
very different from "this certification path is valid".
So this discussion should stay with OCSP and should not be redirected to 
SCVP.

For a RP point of view, the proposed extension  is able to provide a 
better confidence . 

Some validation policies could (in the future) mandate the presence of 
this new extension, 
so that only OCSP responses containing this new extension will be 
accepted.

My first proposal for a certificate that was not isued was:

a) OCSP responder using CRLs

certStatus = good


b) OCSP responder using  white lists of certificates

certStatus= revoked

singleExtension "cert. status checked using white lists" present.

This proposal is insufficient since it does not allow a RP to know that 
the certificate was not issued and hence is not able 
to help the CA to discover a security breach.

In order to make the difference between "issued" and "not issued", the CA 
SHALL add a hash of the certificate
 when the certificate was issued.

Then, in case a RP observes that it got a certificate that was correctly 
signed but at the same time the OCSP responder 
indicates that it was not issued, the RP should contact the CA so that the 
CA can take immediate actions to investigate 
immediately the origin of the problem and take corrective measures if 
possible. 

Denis




Folks,

While the discussion of a whitelist per se is not new, the question 
of whether OCSP should be extended to provide status info other than 
revocation status.

Discussion of this topic triggered the development of SCVP, as an 
alternative to revising and extending OCSP to provide status info 
other that revocation status.

An OSCP response of the form "good" clearly moves back into this 
territory.  Issued and not revoked is skating close :-).

The recent observation that "good" is a misleading OCSP response 
alludes to this issue. (Maybe if we named the protocol OCRSP ("R" = 
"revocation") we might have avoided this problem, but ...

I am worried that we are again heading down the path of asking OCSP to
convey cert validity, vs. cert revocation status.

I'd much rather see this question explored in the context of the SCVP 
validation (vs. path discovery) function, even though I realize that 
there are some subtle differences  between the "issued and not 
revoked" response and cert validity.

Steve
_______________________________________________
pkix mailing list
pkix@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix


--=_alternative 00477ECBC1257944_=
Content-Type: text/html; charset="US-ASCII"

<font size=2 face="sans-serif">Steve,,</font>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="Arial">This topic has nothing to do with SCVP, since
&quot;good and really issued&quot; is very different from &quot;this certification
path is valid&quot;.</font>
<br><font size=2 face="Arial">So this discussion should stay with OCSP
and should not be redirected to SCVP.</font>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">For a RP point of view, the proposed
extension &nbsp;is able to provide a better confidence . <br>
<br>
Some validation policies could (in the future) mandate the presence of
this new extension, <br>
so that only OCSP responses containing this new extension will be accepted.</font>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">My first proposal for a certificate
that was not isued was:</font>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">a) OCSP responder using CRLs</font>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">certStatus = good</font>
<br>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">b) OCSP responder using &nbsp;white
lists of certificates</font>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">certStatus= revoked</font>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="Arial">singleExtension</font><font size=2 face="sans-serif">
&quot;cert. status checked using white lists&quot; present.</font>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">This proposal is insufficient since
it does not allow a RP to know that the certificate was not issued and
hence is not able <br>
to help the CA to discover a security breach.</font>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">In order to make the difference between
&quot;issued&quot; and &quot;not issued&quot;, the CA SHALL add a hash
of the certificate<br>
 when the certificate was issued.</font>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">Then, in case a RP observes that it
got a certificate that was correctly signed but at the same time the OCSP
responder <br>
indicates that it was not issued, the RP should contact the CA so that
the CA can take immediate actions to investigate <br>
immediately the origin of the problem and take corrective measures if possible.
</font>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">Denis</font>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br><tt><font size=2>Folks,<br>
<br>
While the discussion of a whitelist per se is not new, the question <br>
of whether OCSP should be extended to provide status info other than <br>
revocation status.<br>
<br>
Discussion of this topic triggered the development of SCVP, as an <br>
alternative to revising and extending OCSP to provide status info <br>
other that revocation status.<br>
<br>
An OSCP response of the form &quot;good&quot; clearly moves back into this
<br>
territory. &nbsp;Issued and not revoked is skating close :-).<br>
<br>
The recent observation that &quot;good&quot; is a misleading OCSP response
<br>
alludes to this issue. (Maybe if we named the protocol OCRSP (&quot;R&quot;
= <br>
&quot;revocation&quot;) we might have avoided this problem, but ...<br>
<br>
I am worried that we are again heading down the path of asking OCSP to<br>
convey cert validity, vs. cert revocation status.<br>
<br>
I'd much rather see this question explored in the context of the SCVP <br>
validation (vs. path discovery) function, even though I realize that <br>
there are some subtle differences &nbsp;between the &quot;issued and not
<br>
revoked&quot; response and cert validity.<br>
<br>
Steve<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
pkix mailing list<br>
pkix@ietf.org<br>
</font></tt><a href=https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix><tt><font size=2>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix</font></tt></a><tt><font size=2><br>
</font></tt>
<br>
--=_alternative 00477ECBC1257944_=--

From peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr  Thu Nov 10 06:36:59 2011
Return-Path: <peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8278A21F8B48 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 06:36:59 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.392
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.392 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.206,  BAYES_00=-2.599, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id uzj-512ORfjq for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 06:36:58 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mx1.on-x.com (mx1.on-x.com [92.103.215.13]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 17E9921F84AE for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 06:36:58 -0800 (PST)
Received: from varuna.puteaux.on-x (varuna.puteaux.on-x [192.168.10.6]) by mx1.on-x.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C9E3081D8 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 15:36:56 +0100 (CET)
Received: from smtps.on-x.com (mintaka.puteaux.on-x [192.168.14.11]) by varuna.puteaux.on-x (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2393316F7A for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 15:21:13 +0100 (CET)
Received: from [192.168.18.180] (unknown [192.168.18.180]) by smtps.on-x.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id B201823633D for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 09:36:44 -0500 (EST)
Message-ID: <4EBBE18F.6050708@edelweb.fr>
Date: Thu, 10 Nov 2011 15:37:03 +0100
From: Peter Sylvester <peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:7.0.1) Gecko/20110929 Thunderbird/7.0.1
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: pkix@ietf.org
References: <p0624080acae06dd3843d@[128.89.89.6]> <OF49E6E31A.F80645F6-ONC1257944.0035E7E4-C1257944.0047A830@bull.net>
In-Reply-To: <OF49E6E31A.F80645F6-ONC1257944.0035E7E4-C1257944.0047A830@bull.net>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="------------080105090901070001080006"
Subject: Re: [pkix] OCSP extension
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 10 Nov 2011 14:36:59 -0000

This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
--------------080105090901070001080006
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

On 11/10/2011 02:02 PM, denis.pinkas@bull.net wrote:
> Steve,,
>
> This topic has nothing to do with SCVP, since "good and really issued" 
> is very different from "this certification path is valid".
> So this discussion should stay with OCSP and should not be redirected 
> to SCVP.
I wondered how long it would take to come to this comparison. Indeed,
he discussion started with OCSP. The reason is not that OCSP is best suited,
but there is already much more deployment and software.

Anyway:


>
> For a RP point of view, the proposed extension  is able to provide a 
> better confidence .
This is an incomplete interpretation.
>
> Some validation policies could (in the future) mandate the presence of 
> this new extension,
> so that only OCSP responses containing this new extension will be 
> accepted.
>
> My first proposal for a certificate that was not isued was:
>
> a) OCSP responder using CRLs
>
> certStatus = good
>
>
> b) OCSP responder using  white lists of certificates
>
> certStatus= revoked
>
> singleExtension"cert. status checked using white lists" present.
>
> This proposal is insufficient since it does not allow a RP to know 
> that the certificate was not issued and hence is not able
> to help the CA to discover a security breach.
But the responder knows the problem and is probably better placed than 
the RP.
>
> In order to make the difference between "issued" and "not issued", the 
> CA SHALL add a hash of the certificate
> when the certificate was issued.



- a client that is interested to obtain more information about a cert, 
adds an
   extension that let's say as a layman: send the certificate in question.

- The server is able to say "revoked" if the cert is not on its "whitelist".
     But, in case of 'good', the client doesn't know whether whether the
     server operates with a white list.
     making the extension critical, doesn't seem a good choice for me.
    ==>
- A server can respond with another extension indication: "good, and I 
have a whitelist"
     well, it may be that the client doesn't want to show the cert.
     ==>
- The client is supposed to have the cert, so the client can send the hash,
     and the server responds with a corresponding cert if it has a 
matching one.

- When receiving "revoked" without a cert, the client doesn't know 
whether the
   cert exists,  but the server does, and can take actions. The server 
may respond
   with a non-critical extension indicating 'revoked because I have no 
record'.

>
> Then, in case a RP observes that it got a certificate that was 
> correctly signed but at the same time the OCSP responder
> indicates that it was not issued, the RP should contact the CA so that 
> the CA can take immediate actions to investigate
> immediately the origin of the problem and take corrective measures if 
> possible.
I don't care.
>
> Denis
>
>
>
>
> Folks,
>
> While the discussion of a whitelist per se is not new, the question
> of whether OCSP should be extended to provide status info other than
> revocation status.
For the purpose of revocation status delivery, OCSP is
a "Eier legende Wollmilchsau.", there are several layers
of protocols, it seems to be meant to be as "yet another
session/dialog/presentation/...  extensible  protocol.
Too much anyway, but it exists.
>
> Discussion of this topic triggered the development of SCVP, as an
> alternative to revising and extending OCSP to provide status info
> other that revocation status.
>
> An OSCP response of the form "good" clearly moves back into this
> territory.  Issued and not revoked is skating close :-).
>
> The recent observation that "good" is a misleading OCSP response
> alludes to this issue. (Maybe if we named the protocol OCRSP ("R" =
> "revocation") we might have avoided this problem, but ...
>
> I am worried that we are again heading down the path of asking OCSP to
> convey cert validity, vs. cert revocation status.
>
> I'd much rather see this question explored in the context of the SCVP
> validation (vs. path discovery) function, even though I realize that
> there are some subtle differences  between the "issued and not
> revoked" response and cert validity.
Steve, if you want to have SCVP doing this, then I think
one should define a very limited profile, i.e.

  client send cert hash with some appropriate wantback,
  and server sends the cert. Just this, all other features
  of SCVP may be rejected by the server.

Discussion about whether it is better to use SCVP or OCSP
IMO not very helpful at that stage.

BTW: I remind that another protocol says:

    When verifying a public key certificate, the DVCS verifies that the
    certificate included in the request is a valid certificate and
    determines its revocation status at a specified time.

    As a replacement for certificates, certification identifiers
    (ESSCertId, CertId)  MAY be used in requests and responses, if this
    is sufficient to perform the service, e.g., when the corresponding
    certificates are provided elsewhere in a request or response (as part
    of the SignedData type).

regards
/P


--------------080105090901070001080006
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

<html>
  <head>
    <meta content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1"
      http-equiv="Content-Type">
  </head>
  <body bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
    On 11/10/2011 02:02 PM, <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated"
      href="mailto:denis.pinkas@bull.net">denis.pinkas@bull.net</a>
    wrote:
    <blockquote
cite="mid:OF49E6E31A.F80645F6-ONC1257944.0035E7E4-C1257944.0047A830@bull.net"
      type="cite"><font face="sans-serif" size="2">Steve,,</font> <br>
      <br>
      <font face="Arial" size="2">This topic has nothing to do with
        SCVP, since "good and really issued" is very different from
        "this certification path is valid".</font> <br>
      <font face="Arial" size="2">So this discussion should stay with
        OCSP and should not be redirected to SCVP.</font> <br>
    </blockquote>
    I wondered how long it would take to come to this comparison.
    Indeed,<br>
    he discussion started with OCSP. The reason is not that OCSP is best
    suited,<br>
    but there is already much more deployment and software. <br>
    <br>
    Anyway:<br>
    <br>
    <br>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:OF49E6E31A.F80645F6-ONC1257944.0035E7E4-C1257944.0047A830@bull.net"
      type="cite"> <br>
      <font face="sans-serif" size="2">For a RP point of view, the
        proposed extension &nbsp;is able to provide a better confidence . <br>
      </font></blockquote>
    This is an incomplete interpretation.&nbsp; <br>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:OF49E6E31A.F80645F6-ONC1257944.0035E7E4-C1257944.0047A830@bull.net"
      type="cite"><font face="sans-serif" size="2"> <br>
        Some validation policies could (in the future) mandate the
        presence of this new extension, <br>
        so that only OCSP responses containing this new extension will
        be accepted.</font> <br>
      <br>
      <font face="sans-serif" size="2">My first proposal for a
        certificate that was not isued was:</font> <br>
      <br>
      <font face="sans-serif" size="2">a) OCSP responder using CRLs</font>
      <br>
      <br>
      <font face="sans-serif" size="2">certStatus = good</font> <br>
      <br>
      <br>
      <font face="sans-serif" size="2">b) OCSP responder using &nbsp;white
        lists of certificates</font> <br>
      <br>
      <font face="sans-serif" size="2">certStatus= revoked</font> <br>
      <br>
      <font face="Arial" size="2">singleExtension</font><font
        face="sans-serif" size="2"> "cert. status checked using white
        lists" present.</font> <br>
      <br>
      <font face="sans-serif" size="2">This proposal is insufficient
        since it does not allow a RP to know that the certificate was
        not issued and hence is not able <br>
        to help the CA to discover a security breach.</font> <br>
    </blockquote>
    But the responder knows the problem and is probably better placed
    than the RP.<br>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:OF49E6E31A.F80645F6-ONC1257944.0035E7E4-C1257944.0047A830@bull.net"
      type="cite"> <br>
      <font face="sans-serif" size="2">In order to make the difference
        between "issued" and "not issued", the CA SHALL add a hash of
        the certificate<br>
        when the certificate was issued.</font> <br>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    <br>
    <br>
    - a client that is interested to obtain more information about a
    cert, adds an<br>
    &nbsp; extension that let's say as a layman: send the certificate in
    question.<br>
    <br>
    - The server is able to say "revoked" if the cert is not on its
    "whitelist".<br>
    &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; But, in case of 'good', the client doesn't know whether whether
    the<br>
    &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; server operates with a white list.<br>
    &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; making the extension critical, doesn't seem a good choice for
    me.<br>
    &nbsp;&nbsp; ==&gt;<br>
    - A server can respond with another extension indication: "good, and
    I have a whitelist"<br>
    &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; well, it may be that the client doesn't want to show the cert.<br>
    &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; ==&gt;<br>
    - The client is supposed to have the cert, so the client can send
    the hash,<br>
    &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; and the server responds with a corresponding cert if it has a
    matching one.<br>
    <br>
    - When receiving "revoked" without a cert, the client doesn't know
    whether the<br>
    &nbsp; cert exists,&nbsp; but the server does, and can take actions. The
    server may respond<br>
    &nbsp; with a non-critical extension indicating 'revoked because I have
    no record'.<br>
    &nbsp;&nbsp; <br>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:OF49E6E31A.F80645F6-ONC1257944.0035E7E4-C1257944.0047A830@bull.net"
      type="cite"> <br>
      <font face="sans-serif" size="2">Then, in case a RP observes that
        it got a certificate that was correctly signed but at the same
        time the OCSP responder <br>
        indicates that it was not issued, the RP should contact the CA
        so that the CA can take immediate actions to investigate <br>
        immediately the origin of the problem and take corrective
        measures if possible. </font> <br>
    </blockquote>
    I don't care. <br>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:OF49E6E31A.F80645F6-ONC1257944.0035E7E4-C1257944.0047A830@bull.net"
      type="cite"> <br>
      <font face="sans-serif" size="2">Denis</font> <br>
      <br>
      <br>
      <br>
      <br>
      <tt><font size="2">Folks,<br>
          <br>
          While the discussion of a whitelist per se is not new, the
          question <br>
          of whether OCSP should be extended to provide status info
          other than <br>
          revocation status.<br>
        </font></tt></blockquote>
    For the purpose of revocation status delivery, OCSP is<br>
    a "Eier legende Wollmilchsau.", there are several layers<br>
    of protocols, it seems to be meant to be as "yet another<br>
    session/dialog/presentation/...&nbsp; extensible&nbsp; protocol. <br>
    Too much anyway, but it exists.<br>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:OF49E6E31A.F80645F6-ONC1257944.0035E7E4-C1257944.0047A830@bull.net"
      type="cite"><tt><font size="2"> <br>
          Discussion of this topic triggered the development of SCVP, as
          an <br>
          alternative to revising and extending OCSP to provide status
          info <br>
          other that revocation status.<br>
          <br>
          An OSCP response of the form "good" clearly moves back into
          this <br>
          territory. &nbsp;Issued and not revoked is skating close :-).<br>
          <br>
          The recent observation that "good" is a misleading OCSP
          response <br>
          alludes to this issue. (Maybe if we named the protocol OCRSP
          ("R" = <br>
          "revocation") we might have avoided this problem, but ...<br>
          <br>
          I am worried that we are again heading down the path of asking
          OCSP to<br>
          convey cert validity, vs. cert revocation status.<br>
          <br>
          I'd much rather see this question explored in the context of
          the SCVP <br>
          validation (vs. path discovery) function, even though I
          realize that <br>
          there are some subtle differences &nbsp;between the "issued and not
          <br>
          revoked" response and cert validity.<br>
        </font></tt></blockquote>
    Steve, if you want to have SCVP doing this, then I think<br>
    one should define a very limited profile, i.e.<br>
    <br>
    &nbsp;client send cert hash with some appropriate wantback,<br>
    &nbsp;and server sends the cert. Just this, all other features<br>
    &nbsp;of SCVP may be rejected by the server. <br>
    <br>
    Discussion about whether it is better to use SCVP or OCSP<br>
    IMO not very helpful at that stage. <br>
    <br>
    BTW: I remind that another protocol says:<br>
    <pre>   When verifying a public key certificate, the DVCS verifies that the
   certificate included in the request is a valid certificate and
   determines its revocation status at a specified time. 

   As a replacement for certificates, certification identifiers
   (ESSCertId, CertId)  MAY be used in requests and responses, if this
   is sufficient to perform the service, e.g., when the corresponding
   certificates are provided elsewhere in a request or response (as part
   of the SignedData type).
</pre>
    regards<br>
    /P<br>
    <br>
  </body>
</html>

--------------080105090901070001080006--

From tim.moses@entrust.com  Thu Nov 10 06:54:58 2011
Return-Path: <tim.moses@entrust.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 900EE21F8B02 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 06:54:58 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id xmaJPcy23g9m for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 06:54:57 -0800 (PST)
Received: from ipedge2.entrust.com (ipedge2.entrust.com [216.191.252.25]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id AA4ED21F8AFE for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 06:54:57 -0800 (PST)
X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.69,489,1315195200";  d="scan'208";a="188293"
Received: from unknown (HELO sottexch7.corp.ad.entrust.com) ([10.4.51.73]) by ipedge2.entrust.com with ESMTP; 10 Nov 2011 09:54:55 -0500
Received: from sottexch7.corp.ad.entrust.com ([fe80::ed40:b6f9:9995:701f]) by sottexch7.corp.ad.entrust.com ([fe80::ed40:b6f9:9995:701f%10]) with mapi; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 09:54:54 -0500
From: Tim Moses <tim.moses@entrust.com>
To: 'Yoav Nir' <ynir@checkpoint.com>
Date: Thu, 10 Nov 2011 09:54:53 -0500
Thread-Topic: [pkix] Malaysian CA (Was: An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version)
Thread-Index: AcyfepMMMl7yX1N8Toa8FAcpo3N8dAAPeFDg
Message-ID: <A3144629B5AC714A8BF27806EBFA7057012ED55F0F@sottexch7.corp.ad.entrust.com>
References: <201111092238.pA9McfqQ004634@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp> <CAE1494C.9222%ynir@checkpoint.com>
In-Reply-To: <CAE1494C.9222%ynir@checkpoint.com>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
acceptlanguage: en-US
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Cc: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] Malaysian CA (Was: An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version)
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 10 Nov 2011 14:54:58 -0000

Yoav - You've answered your own question.  Why would a CA be generating ser=
ver SSL keys?

Best regards.  Tim.

-----Original Message-----
From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Yoa=
v Nir
Sent: Thursday, November 10, 2011 2:30 AM
To: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: [pkix] Malaysian CA (Was: An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Ve=
rsion)



On 11/10/11 12:38 AM, "Martin Rex" <mrex@sap.com> wrote:
>You probably read the news about
>the recent revocation of cross-certificates for a Malaysian CA
>that probably does not have its own RootCA in the Browsers, e.g.:
>http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/11/03/certificate_authority_banished/
>
>I'm slightly puzzled by the text in this software update:
>http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/520453/30/0/threaded
>
>  Several weak certificates were issued by Malaysian intermediate CA
>  "Digicert Sdn. Bhd." This event, along with other issues, has lead to
>  Entrust Inc. and Verizon Cybertrust to revoke the CA's cross-signed
>  certificates.
>
>Does this mean that Digicert Malaysia obtained *TWO* independent
>cross-certificates, one from Entrust Inc. plus one from Verizon
>Cybertrust,
>both of which have rootCA certs as trust anchors in Browsers?
>(and the result that revoking only one of those might not help?)=09

I was wondering about that. The CA issued 22 certificates with 512-bit
public keys.  How could this possibly happen?

Is it that the EE made a PKCS#10 with a 512-bit public key, and the CA
just signed it?  That wouldn't be too bad.

If the CA generated the public keys, how did it happen that all the other
customers get good public keys, but a particular subset gets weak ones?
Was this caused by a break-in?

This is far weirder than the mis-issued certificates stories.

Yoav

_______________________________________________
pkix mailing list
pkix@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix

From peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr  Thu Nov 10 07:05:20 2011
Return-Path: <peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 55BD121F8AFB for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 07:05:20 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.444
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.444 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.155,  BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id PSTzxCLzKGV8 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 07:05:19 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mx1.on-x.com (mx1.on-x.com [92.103.215.13]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id BBB9221F8AF5 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 07:05:19 -0800 (PST)
Received: from varuna.puteaux.on-x (varuna.puteaux.on-x [192.168.10.6]) by mx1.on-x.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 08BBC81D8 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 16:05:15 +0100 (CET)
Received: from smtps.on-x.com (mintaka.puteaux.on-x [192.168.14.11]) by varuna.puteaux.on-x (Postfix) with ESMTP id 48F5616F7A for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 15:49:31 +0100 (CET)
Received: from [192.168.18.180] (unknown [192.168.18.180]) by smtps.on-x.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 1628523633D for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 10:05:02 -0500 (EST)
Message-ID: <4EBBE832.1090207@edelweb.fr>
Date: Thu, 10 Nov 2011 16:05:22 +0100
From: Peter Sylvester <peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:7.0.1) Gecko/20110929 Thunderbird/7.0.1
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: pkix@ietf.org
References: <CAMm+LwgOGk_vDbpzqzfcMMFXr8EM7uo18oH7ftjAFjvXOx2Hrg@mail.gmail.com><CADEFE3C.2259%tmiller@mitre.org>	<CA+cU71=ytJkiswMi3rEeq8bwnsW8MULEMnVwCw6nHkZf2o9Lpg@mail.gmail.com> <C1A47F1540DF3246A8D30C853C05D0DA01B96B6D@DABECK.missi.ncsc.mil> <00e101cc9ef6$e21bfc10$a653f430$@ascertia.com> <319E9B25-F333-4B99-B34B-0A7A1F0CAB59@vpnc.org>
In-Reply-To: <319E9B25-F333-4B99-B34B-0A7A1F0CAB59@vpnc.org>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Subject: Re: [pkix] Proposed new singleExtension for OCSP
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 10 Nov 2011 15:05:20 -0000

On 11/09/2011 05:25 PM, Paul Hoffman wrote:
> On Nov 9, 2011, at 7:47 AM, Liaquat Khan wrote:
>
>> Isn't it true though that a white-list check would help the CA to detect the
>> problem?
> That would be an *internal* mechanism, not the externally-visible mechanism that started this thread.

This remark sounds like "believe us, we have our *internal*' measure, 
you might
want to audit them, but ...".

A data format that allows a CA server to make a snapshot to be stored in an
electronic safe doesn't seem to me a useless thing.  A standardized format
simplifies reversability and auditing.





From kent@bbn.com  Thu Nov 10 08:03:31 2011
Return-Path: <kent@bbn.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C696521F8B2B for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 08:03:31 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -106.509
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-106.509 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.089, BAYES_00=-2.599, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id gbjOaJTm-3jj for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 08:03:31 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtp.bbn.com (smtp.bbn.com [128.33.0.80]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id F113121F8A6F for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 08:03:30 -0800 (PST)
Received: from dommiel.bbn.com ([192.1.122.15]:40797 helo=[192.168.1.14]) by smtp.bbn.com with esmtp (Exim 4.74 (FreeBSD)) (envelope-from <kent@bbn.com>) id 1ROX67-000GS2-Tn; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 11:03:28 -0500
Mime-Version: 1.0
Message-Id: <p06240806cae1a0e17f3d@[192.168.1.14]>
In-Reply-To: <OF49E6E31A.F80645F6-ONC1257944.0035E7E4-C1257944.0047A830@bull.net>
References: <p0624080acae06dd3843d@[128.89.89.6]> <OF49E6E31A.F80645F6-ONC1257944.0035E7E4-C1257944.0047A830@bull.net>
Date: Thu, 10 Nov 2011 11:03:25 -0500
To: denis.pinkas@bull.net
From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="============_-891181489==_ma============"
Cc: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] OCSP extension
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 10 Nov 2011 16:03:31 -0000

--============_-891181489==_ma============
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed"

At 2:02 PM +0100 11/10/11, denis.pinkas@bull.net wrote:
>Steve,,
>
>This topic has nothing to do with SCVP, since "good and really 
>issued" is very different from "this certification path is valid".
>So this discussion should stay with OCSP and should not be redirected to SCVP.

I understand your objection, but one could, I believe, use SCVP here 
for the intended application.  OCSP is revocation status protocol, so 
the question "was this cert issued" is not really in scope for it 
either. The question "was it issued and not revoked" is pretty close 
to the scope, and arguably closer than the "is it valid relative to a 
specified point in a cert path.

>For a RP point of view, the proposed extension  is able to provide a 
>better confidence .

agreed.

>Some validation policies could (in the future) mandate the presence 
>of this new extension,
>so that only OCSP responses containing this new extension will be accepted.

yes, maybe.

>My first proposal for a certificate that was not isued was:
>
>a) OCSP responder using CRLs
>
>certStatus = good
>
>
>b) OCSP responder using  white lists of certificates
>
>certStatus= revoked
>
>singleExtension "cert. status checked using white lists" present.

"revoked" is not really accurate. It is force fitting the status into 
the current set of responses, for backward compatability, right?

>This proposal is insufficient since it does not allow a RP to know 
>that the certificate was not issued and hence is not able
>to help the CA to discover a security breach.

I do not recall that a goal of this was to have RPs help a CA 
discover a breech,
but it may have been cited on one of the many messages.

>In order to make the difference between "issued" and "not issued", 
>the CA SHALL add a hash of the certificate
>when the certificate was issued.

that makes this an even less desirable design, as it increases CRL 
size by an even greater factor!

>Then, in case a RP observes that it got a certificate that was 
>correctly signed but at the same time the OCSP responder
>indicates that it was not issued, the RP should contact the CA so 
>that the CA can take immediate actions to investigate
>immediately the origin of the problem and take corrective measures 
>if possible.

Yes, one could do that, but I think it may make more sense to suggest 
that the OCSP server contacts the CA, in many contexts. In the 
context we've been discussing, i.e., browser clients validating web 
site certs in the public Internet, I have little confidence in that 
set of RPs contacting a CA.  Also, we should note that an OCSP server 
operated by a CA provides an obvious, immediate path to the CA in 
question.

Steve
--============_-891181489==_ma============
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"

<!doctype html public "-//W3C//DTD W3 HTML//EN">
<html><head><style type="text/css"><!--
blockquote, dl, ul, ol, li { padding-top: 0 ; padding-bottom: 0 }
 --></style><title>Re: [pkix] OCSP extension</title></head><body>
<div>At 2:02 PM +0100 11/10/11, denis.pinkas@bull.net wrote:</div>
<blockquote type="cite" cite><font size="-1">Steve,,</font><br>
<br>
<font face="Arial" size="-1">This topic has nothing to do with SCVP,
since &quot;good and really issued&quot; is very different from
&quot;this certification path is valid&quot;.</font></blockquote>
<blockquote type="cite" cite><font face="Arial" size="-1">So this
discussion should stay with OCSP and should not be redirected to
SCVP.</font></blockquote>
<div><br></div>
<div>I understand your objection, but one could, I believe, use SCVP
here for the intended application.&nbsp; OCSP is revocation status
protocol, so the question &quot;was this cert issued&quot; is not
really in scope for it either. The question &quot;was it issued and
not revoked&quot; is pretty close to the scope, and arguably closer
than the &quot;is it valid relative to a specified point in a cert
path.</div>
<div><br></div>
<blockquote type="cite" cite>F<font size="-1">or a RP point of view,
the proposed extension &nbsp;is able to provide a better confidence
.</font></blockquote>
<div><br></div>
<div>agreed.<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite" cite><font size="-1">Some validation policies
could (in the future) mandate the presence of this new
extension,</font></blockquote>
<blockquote type="cite" cite><font size="-1">so that only OCSP
responses containing this new extension will be
accepted.</font></blockquote>
<div><br></div>
<div>yes, maybe.</div>
<div><br></div>
<blockquote type="cite" cite><font size="-1">My first proposal for a
certificate that was not isued was:</font><br>
<br>
<font size="-1">a) OCSP responder using CRLs</font><br>
<br>
<font size="-1">certStatus = good</font><br>
<br>
<br>
<font size="-1">b) OCSP responder using &nbsp;white lists of
certificates</font><br>
<br>
<font size="-1">certStatus= revoked</font><br>
<br>
<font face="Arial" size="-1">singleExtension</font><font size="-1">
&quot;cert. status checked using white lists&quot;
present.</font></blockquote>
<div><br></div>
<div>&quot;revoked&quot; is not really accurate. It is force fitting
the status into the current set of responses, for backward
compatability, right?</div>
<div><br></div>
<blockquote type="cite" cite><font size="-1">This proposal is
insufficient since it does not allow a RP to know that the certificate
was not issued and hence is not able</font></blockquote>
<blockquote type="cite" cite><font size="-1">to help the CA to
discover a security breach.</font></blockquote>
<div><br></div>
<div>I do not recall that a goal of this was to have RPs help a CA
discover a breech,</div>
<div>but it may have been cited on one of the many messages.</div>
<div><br></div>
<blockquote type="cite" cite><font size="-1">In order to make the
difference between &quot;issued&quot; and &quot;not issued&quot;, the
CA SHALL add a hash of the certificate<br>
when the certificate was issued.</font></blockquote>
<div><br></div>
<div>that makes this an even less desirable design, as it increases
CRL size by an even greater factor!</div>
<div><br></div>
<blockquote type="cite" cite><font size="-1">Then, in case a RP
observes that it got a certificate that was correctly signed but at
the same time the OCSP responder<br>
indicates that it was not issued, the RP should contact the CA so that
the CA can take immediate actions to investigate</font></blockquote>
<blockquote type="cite" cite><font size="-1">immediately the origin of
the problem and take corrective measures if
possible.</font></blockquote>
<div><br></div>
<div>Yes, one could do that, but I think it may make more sense to
suggest that the OCSP server contacts the CA, in many contexts. In the
context we've been discussing, i.e., browser clients validating web
site certs in the public Internet, I have little confidence in that
set of RPs contacting a CA.&nbsp; Also, we should note that an OCSP
server operated by a CA provides an obvious, immediate path to the CA
in question.</div>
<div><br></div>
<div>Steve</div>
</body>
</html>
--============_-891181489==_ma============--

From kent@bbn.com  Thu Nov 10 08:03:36 2011
Return-Path: <kent@bbn.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2D1BC21F8B4B for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 08:03:36 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -106.513
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-106.513 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.086, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id wXFvZjLKuLiD for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 08:03:35 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtp.bbn.com (smtp.bbn.com [128.33.1.81]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5A35521F8B4E for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 08:03:35 -0800 (PST)
Received: from dommiel.bbn.com ([192.1.122.15]:58236 helo=[192.168.1.14]) by smtp.bbn.com with esmtp (Exim 4.74 (FreeBSD)) (envelope-from <kent@bbn.com>) id 1ROX6E-000H8I-3a; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 11:03:34 -0500
Mime-Version: 1.0
Message-Id: <p06240804cae19f000e9b@[192.168.1.14]>
In-Reply-To: <201111092238.pA9McfqQ004634@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp>
References: <201111092238.pA9McfqQ004634@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp>
Date: Thu, 10 Nov 2011 11:03:31 -0500
To: mrex@sap.com
From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed"
Cc: pkix@ietf.org, paul.hoffman@vpnc.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 10 Nov 2011 16:03:36 -0000

Martin,

The point I and other have made is that well-run CAs ought not be 
susceptible to the sort of massive failure that DigiNotor exhibited.

We do not favor creating new mechanisms (which impose burdens on CAs, 
RPs, OCSP servers, etc.) designed to address procedural security 
lapses at poorly run CAs.

As folks have noted, many of the failure scenarios cited would NOT be 
ameliorated by a white list, as the white list also could be forged as
a side effect of issuing bogus certs. When it is detected that bogus certs have
been issued, then a competently run CA can revoke them.

Steve

From tmiller@mitre.org  Thu Nov 10 08:11:42 2011
Return-Path: <tmiller@mitre.org>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D2AB021F84D4 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 08:11:42 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id jfTahX06z25i for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 08:11:42 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (smtpksrv1.mitre.org [198.49.146.77]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2569B21F86EE for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 08:11:42 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by localhost (Postfix) with SMTP id 2FF6321B1536; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 11:11:41 -0500 (EST)
Received: from IMCCAS01.MITRE.ORG (imccas01.mitre.org [129.83.29.78]) by smtpksrv1.mitre.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1B75321B18BD; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 11:11:41 -0500 (EST)
Received: from IMCMBX01.MITRE.ORG ([169.254.1.77]) by IMCCAS01.MITRE.ORG ([129.83.29.78]) with mapi id 14.01.0339.001; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 11:11:40 -0500
From: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
To: "mrex@sap.com" <mrex@sap.com>, Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version
Thread-Index: AQHMnzBU6CmUY2saPEyZJmaoCSAF/5WmN7mA
Date: Thu, 10 Nov 2011 16:11:40 +0000
Message-ID: <CAE126DA.2328%tmiller@mitre.org>
In-Reply-To: <201111092238.pA9McfqQ004634@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
user-agent: Microsoft-MacOutlook/14.13.0.110805
x-originating-ip: [172.31.4.210]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-ID: <5C78FA92E8A72C498A311EA23E4BFDF9@imc.mitre.org>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Cc: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>, "paul.hoffman@vpnc.org" <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 10 Nov 2011 16:11:43 -0000

On 11/9/11 4:38 PM, "Martin Rex" <mrex@sap.com> wrote:

>Does this mean that Digicert Malaysia obtained *TWO* independent
>cross-certificates, one from Entrust Inc. plus one from Verizon
>Cybertrust,
>both of which have rootCA certs as trust anchors in Browsers?
>(and the result that revoking only one of those might not help?)

Yes.  PKIs are not limited in the number of cross-certificates they can
issue or accept.

>So whitelist could really help to deal more sensibly and safely
>with (much more common) security breaches rather than complete CA
>compromises.

I still don't see how.  If a breach at an issuer that is less than
"complete CA compromise" results in a fraudulent certificate, how does the
whitelist inform the relying party about anything more than a simple
revocation?

>Why should the compromise of a CA adversely affect the credentials
>of a TLS server AT ALL?

Because in X.509, the key the web server is using isn't the important
part; the *name* the certificate bears is what matters (keys are bound to
names, not the other way around, remember).  A compromised CA can bind a
new key to any existing name or names.

This is exactly what the attacker did in both the Comodo and DigiNotar
incidents.

A response to this kind of compromise does not need to revoke all
certs--provided=20
the CA can revoke all the fraudulent certificates.  This requires that the
CA know at least the serial number of those certificates.  If the CA
doesn't know or can't recover all these values, then the only other
recourse is to invalidate the CA because there is no way to assure relying
parties that a given certificate is not fraudulent.

Consider a CA that has issued the set of certs A, where cert x (in A) is
known to be valid, and all others in A are frauds.  In this case, an OCSP
or SCVP service can validate x and invalidate everything else by comparing
all queries to x. =20

That=B9s great, but unfortunately, it's also insufficient.  The CA must als=
o
issue a CRL, but the set A may be infinite.  Relying parties that need
CRLs can't reach a conclusion, so to support all relying parties the CA
must be invalidated.

If OCSP and CRLs are to be semantically equivalent, whitelist extensions
to OCSP means we need to change CRLs too, or add a third instrument
("Certificates Issued List") that carries the same information.  This
ripples through all implementations.

In my opinion, OCSP and CRL semantics must be consistent, else the
difference can be exploited.  For example, an attacker can block OCSP
services using whitelists but permit CRLs that lack that data, and the
relying party will improperly conclude that a given certificate is not
revoked.

-- T


From DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil  Thu Nov 10 08:57:35 2011
Return-Path: <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2718221F8500 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 08:57:35 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.000,  BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id RsTCmvpd17Ih for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 08:57:34 -0800 (PST)
Received: from stingray.missi.ncsc.mil (stingray.missi.ncsc.mil [144.51.50.20]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 888F421F84FA for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 08:57:34 -0800 (PST)
Received: from AUGUSTINE.missi.ncsc.mil (augustine.missi.ncsc.mil [144.51.60.33]) by stingray.missi.ncsc.mil with ESMTP id pAAGvXeK077766 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 11:57:34 -0500 (EST)
Received: from DABECK.missi.ncsc.mil ([144.51.60.16]) by AUGUSTINE.missi.ncsc.mil with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.4675);  Thu, 10 Nov 2011 11:58:11 -0500
Content-class: urn:content-classes:message
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft Exchange V6.5
Date: Thu, 10 Nov 2011 11:57:33 -0500
Message-ID: <C1A47F1540DF3246A8D30C853C05D0DA01B96B6E@DABECK.missi.ncsc.mil>
In-Reply-To: <4EBBE832.1090207@edelweb.fr>
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
Thread-Topic: [pkix] Proposed new singleExtension for OCSP
Thread-Index: AcyfujP6LvS78oBRR1SwyzY2fQ71fAAC+gTA
References: <CAMm+LwgOGk_vDbpzqzfcMMFXr8EM7uo18oH7ftjAFjvXOx2Hrg@mail.gmail.com><CADEFE3C.2259%tmiller@mitre.org>	<CA+cU71=ytJkiswMi3rEeq8bwnsW8MULEMnVwCw6nHkZf2o9Lpg@mail.gmail.com><C1A47F1540DF3246A8D30C853C05D0DA01B96B6D@DABECK.missi.ncsc.mil><00e101cc9ef6$e21bfc10$a653f430$@ascertia.com><319E9B25-F333-4B99-B34B-0A7A1F0CAB59@vpnc.org> <4EBBE832.1090207@edelweb.fr>
From: "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>
To: <pkix@ietf.org>
X-OriginalArrivalTime: 10 Nov 2011 16:58:11.0578 (UTC) FILETIME=[EDEB85A0:01CC9FC9]
Subject: Re: [pkix] Proposed new singleExtension for OCSP
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 10 Nov 2011 16:57:35 -0000

As far as detecting "magically appearing" certs goes, there are many
possible mechanisms:

1) CA exposes a view of its database to non-CA-operated responders, just
as it would to CA-operated responders
2) Responder queries CA for database status before generating response
3) Responder informs CA of cert query but doesn't expect a response
4) Responder generates a list of certs queried in the last N minutes and
forwards it to the CA

None of these require an OCSP extension.


If RPs really care about this, the CA's CPS could contain a clause
saying:

"To protect against the possibility that some attacker could use our
private key without our knowledge to sign bogus certificates, all status
responders are required as a condition of operation to inform us of all
certificates queried within xxx hours."

Yes, the RP would have to trust that compliance with the CPS is audited.
Do you know of any RPs that care to do more for this specific bizarre
use case while being satisfied with auditing the many more important
things that happen every day?

Dave



-----Original Message-----
From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
Peter Sylvester
Sent: Thursday, November 10, 2011 10:05 AM
To: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] Proposed new singleExtension for OCSP

On 11/09/2011 05:25 PM, Paul Hoffman wrote:
> On Nov 9, 2011, at 7:47 AM, Liaquat Khan wrote:
>
>> Isn't it true though that a white-list check would help the CA to=20
>> detect the problem?
> That would be an *internal* mechanism, not the externally-visible
mechanism that started this thread.

This remark sounds like "believe us, we have our *internal*' measure,
you might want to audit them, but ...".

A data format that allows a CA server to make a snapshot to be stored in
an electronic safe doesn't seem to me a useless thing.  A standardized
format simplifies reversability and auditing.



From david.cooper@nist.gov  Thu Nov 10 09:04:25 2011
Return-Path: <david.cooper@nist.gov>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 15D3321F8B66 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 09:04:25 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.113
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.113 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.486,  BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id RrwwddhuQJSr for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 09:04:24 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtp.nist.gov (rimp1.nist.gov [129.6.16.226]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6A55A21F8B65 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 09:04:24 -0800 (PST)
Received: from st26.ncsl.nist.gov (st26.ncsl.nist.gov [129.6.54.72]) by smtp.nist.gov (8.13.1/8.13.1) with ESMTP id pAAH4Ef6030547 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 12:04:14 -0500
Message-ID: <4EBC0409.1090200@nist.gov>
Date: Thu, 10 Nov 2011 12:04:09 -0500
From: "David A. Cooper" <david.cooper@nist.gov>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US; rv:1.9.2.23) Gecko/20110928 Mandriva/3.1.15-0.1mdv2010.2 (2010.2) Thunderbird/3.1.15
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
References: <201111092238.pA9McfqQ004634@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp>
In-Reply-To: <201111092238.pA9McfqQ004634@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-NIST-MailScanner: Found to be clean
X-NIST-MailScanner-From: david.cooper@nist.gov
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 10 Nov 2011 17:04:25 -0000

If a CA has been compromised, but has a record of every certificate that 
was fraudulently issued, it can simply revoke those certificates.  No 
white list needed.  If a CA has been compromised and can't be certain 
about what certificates were fraudulently issued, how can the CA be 
certain that the attacker hasn't generated an OCSP responder certificate?

If I understand the basic idea behind the recent compromises, the 
attacker has obtained fraudulent TLS server certificates.  Presumably 
this means that the attacker was also able to redirect traffic from the 
legitimate sites to servers controlled by the attacker.  Couldn't the 
attacker similarly redirect traffic to an OCSP responder that it 
controls?  If an attacker has so much control over a CA that it can get 
the CA to issue fraudulent certificates and it can remove from the CA's 
logs any record that the certificates were issued (or at least prevent 
the CA's operators from determining the serial numbers of the fraudulent 
certificates), shouldn't it be assumed that the attacker would be able 
to get the CA to issue it a fraudulent OCSP responder certificate (with 
an id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck extension, of course)?  The attacker could then 
have its OCSP responder provide a response of "good" for the fraudulent 
certificates that the attacker obtained from the CA, and it could even 
include the new "white list" extension in the OCSP response so that the 
relying party could have extra confidence that the certificates really 
were legitimate.  The client would accept the OCSP response from the 
attacker based on the fraudulently-issued OCSP responder certificate, 
and the fact that the OCSP responder certificate didn't appear on a 
"white list" wouldn't matter since the certificate has an 
id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck extension.  (I don't think anyone is suggesting 
that a relying party should have to download a CA's entire white list 
before using OCSP to determine the status of a certificate.)

Under what circumstances could a white list protect against such an 
attack without requiring the revocation of the compromised CA's 
certificate?  Under which of those circumstances would the current 
certificate revocation mechanisms be inadequate?

Dave

On 11/09/2011 05:38 PM, Martin Rex wrote:
> So whitelist could really help to deal more sensibly and safely
> with (much more common) security breaches rather than complete CA
> compromises.


From peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr  Thu Nov 10 09:05:31 2011
Return-Path: <peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id AE08621F8B73 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 09:05:31 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.475
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.475 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.124,  BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id igSPS5jZA1PF for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 09:05:31 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mx1.on-x.com (mx1.on-x.com [92.103.215.13]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 051FD21F8B75 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 09:05:31 -0800 (PST)
Received: from varuna.puteaux.on-x (varuna.puteaux.on-x [192.168.10.6]) by mx1.on-x.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1A30A8214 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 18:05:30 +0100 (CET)
Received: from smtps.on-x.com (mintaka.puteaux.on-x [192.168.14.11]) by varuna.puteaux.on-x (Postfix) with ESMTP id 36CB016F7A for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 17:49:45 +0100 (CET)
Received: from [192.168.18.180] (unknown [192.168.18.180]) by smtps.on-x.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 1DE0523633D for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 12:05:18 -0500 (EST)
Message-ID: <4EBC0461.6010401@edelweb.fr>
Date: Thu, 10 Nov 2011 18:05:37 +0100
From: Peter Sylvester <peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:7.0.1) Gecko/20110929 Thunderbird/7.0.1
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: pkix@ietf.org
References: <CAMm+LwgOGk_vDbpzqzfcMMFXr8EM7uo18oH7ftjAFjvXOx2Hrg@mail.gmail.com><CADEFE3C.2259%tmiller@mitre.org>	<CA+cU71=ytJkiswMi3rEeq8bwnsW8MULEMnVwCw6nHkZf2o9Lpg@mail.gmail.com><C1A47F1540DF3246A8D30C853C05D0DA01B96B6D@DABECK.missi.ncsc.mil><00e101cc9ef6$e21bfc10$a653f430$@ascertia.com><319E9B25-F333-4B99-B34B-0A7A1F0CAB59@vpnc.org> <4EBBE832.1090207@edelweb.fr> <C1A47F1540DF3246A8D30C853C05D0DA01B96B6E@DABECK.missi.ncsc.mil>
In-Reply-To: <C1A47F1540DF3246A8D30C853C05D0DA01B96B6E@DABECK.missi.ncsc.mil>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Subject: Re: [pkix] Proposed new singleExtension for OCSP
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 10 Nov 2011 17:05:31 -0000

Did I mention OCSP. It seems that there are in fact two discussions in 
this thread.

   client-"notary"
   "notary"-CA



On 11/10/2011 05:57 PM, Kemp, David P. wrote:
> As far as detecting "magically appearing" certs goes, there are many
> possible mechanisms:
>
> 1) CA exposes a view of its database to non-CA-operated responders, just
> as it would to CA-operated responders
> 2) Responder queries CA for database status before generating response
> 3) Responder informs CA of cert query but doesn't expect a response
> 4) Responder generates a list of certs queried in the last N minutes and
> forwards it to the CA
>
> None of these require an OCSP extension.

>
>
> If RPs really care about this, the CA's CPS could contain a clause
> saying:
>
> "To protect against the possibility that some attacker could use our
> private key without our knowledge to sign bogus certificates, all status
> responders are required as a condition of operation to inform us of all
> certificates queried within xxx hours."
>
> Yes, the RP would have to trust that compliance with the CPS is audited.
> Do you know of any RPs that care to do more for this specific bizarre
> use case while being satisfied with auditing the many more important
> things that happen every day?
>
> Dave
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
> Peter Sylvester
> Sent: Thursday, November 10, 2011 10:05 AM
> To: pkix@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [pkix] Proposed new singleExtension for OCSP
>
> On 11/09/2011 05:25 PM, Paul Hoffman wrote:
>> On Nov 9, 2011, at 7:47 AM, Liaquat Khan wrote:
>>
>>> Isn't it true though that a white-list check would help the CA to
>>> detect the problem?
>> That would be an *internal* mechanism, not the externally-visible
> mechanism that started this thread.
>
> This remark sounds like "believe us, we have our *internal*' measure,
> you might want to audit them, but ...".
>
> A data format that allows a CA server to make a snapshot to be stored in
> an electronic safe doesn't seem to me a useless thing.  A standardized
> format simplifies reversability and auditing.
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix


From mrex@sap.com  Thu Nov 10 10:52:51 2011
Return-Path: <mrex@sap.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9B5BC21F8B45 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 10:52:51 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -10.11
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-10.11 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.139,  BAYES_00=-2.599, HELO_EQ_DE=0.35, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-8]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id PaLMCdBaCmKn for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 10:52:51 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpde01.sap-ag.de (smtpde01.sap-ag.de [155.56.68.170]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D1F7521F8A67 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 10:52:50 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail.sap.corp by smtpde01.sap-ag.de (26) with ESMTP id pAAIqgPD017030 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=OK); Thu, 10 Nov 2011 19:52:47 +0100 (MET)
From: Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
Message-Id: <201111101852.pAAIqgtG012711@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp>
To: david.cooper@nist.gov (David A. Cooper)
Date: Thu, 10 Nov 2011 19:52:42 +0100 (MET)
In-Reply-To: <4EBC0409.1090200@nist.gov> from "David A. Cooper" at Nov 10, 11 12:04:09 pm
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-SAP: out
Cc: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
Reply-To: mrex@sap.com
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 10 Nov 2011 18:52:51 -0000

David A. Cooper wrote:
> 
> If a CA has been compromised, but has a record of every certificate that 
> was fraudulently issued, it can simply revoke those certificates.  No 
> white list needed.  If a CA has been compromised and can't be certain 
> about what certificates were fraudulently issued, how can the CA be 
> certain that the attacker hasn't generated an OCSP responder certificate?

If I CA determines a security breach, it will have to investigate.
When it finds no find records of certificate issuance, that does
not proof that none were issued.  Requiring a whitelist means
that in order to make a fraudulently and covertly created cert
MUST be added to the online database of issued certs when there
is a whitelist requirement.  Without such a requirement, not only
covertly created certs will have to be considered valid, but also
all other certs that may have been created without access to
the CA hardware, that includes those created by a hash collision.
Remeber that the fake rapidSSL cert was created *WITHOUT* a
a CA breakin.  If there was a whitelisting requirement,
then a CA breakin and revealing of the fraudulent cert
at least to the issuing CA will be an unavoidable prerequisite.



I also pointed to the X.509/PKIX design flaw in previous messages.
Conveying the OCSP responder through the

  EE cert ("this is where you can query the revocation status of this cert")

instead of through the

  CA cert ("this is where I you can query the revocation status of certs
            that I have issued")

is a design flaw in the OCSP-AIA and CRL-distributionpoint extensions.

One of the complaints about the certs issued by that Malaysian CA
was that the certs were issed with not revocation info in them:

  ... The omissions of Digicert Malaysia appear to be a serious violation
  of CA security standards. Its use of 512-bit keys, for instance,
  stand in stark contrast to the minimum requirement that keys contain
  twice that length. What's more, the lack of revocation information
  makes it harder to recall Digicert Malaysia certificates if they're
  found to be flawed, and the failure to include EKU information
  allows them to be abused in ways that otherwise wouldn't be possible.

Being able to issue yourself CRL signer, OCSP signer certs and
subordinate CA certs *AND* controlling the location where these
fraudulent certs will be checked for revocation looks like a
very bad idea to me.


-Martin

From pgut001@login01.cs.auckland.ac.nz  Thu Nov 10 16:25:01 2011
Return-Path: <pgut001@login01.cs.auckland.ac.nz>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 30B311F0C5F for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 16:25:01 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.556
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.556 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.043,  BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id d4D328aBU4jq for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 16:25:00 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mx2.auckland.ac.nz (mx2.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.12.44]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5517B1F0C5E for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 16:24:59 -0800 (PST)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=auckland.ac.nz; i=pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz; q=dns/txt; s=uoa; t=1320971101; x=1352507101; h=from:to:subject:cc:in-reply-to:message-id:date; bh=z6MRvJp3ji8kMtG+Bqi+6xbtnwcErHa4MOWpEIv0PbY=; b=MkrSGF0T+mnkQ1O0PmXoW3I9c73Qlixjceeao53AhxDQcJVHQcGivsGi Ds6utCknSGaFRlSI+iNCBeA/vgNXuX5OqR4ZZOnPL3UnL8NuZU9J7zvSR nRKPhuSGWNRbUWbBJMUpGwWLzK/PKXELpFmabDeAF+1zF/iMsXLtu0dym 8=;
X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.69,491,1315137600"; d="scan'208";a="89770560"
X-Ironport-HAT: UNIVERSITY - $RELAY-THROTTLE
X-Ironport-Source: 130.216.34.40 - Outgoing - Outgoing
Received: from login01.fos.auckland.ac.nz ([130.216.34.40]) by mx2-int.auckland.ac.nz with ESMTP/TLS/AES256-SHA; 11 Nov 2011 13:24:56 +1300
Received: from pgut001 by login01.fos.auckland.ac.nz with local (Exim 4.69) (envelope-from <pgut001@login01.cs.auckland.ac.nz>) id 1ROevP-0002Jn-Pj; Fri, 11 Nov 2011 13:24:55 +1300
From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: tim.moses@entrust.com, ynir@checkpoint.com
In-Reply-To: <A3144629B5AC714A8BF27806EBFA7057012ED55F0F@sottexch7.corp.ad.entrust.com>
Message-Id: <E1ROevP-0002Jn-Pj@login01.fos.auckland.ac.nz>
Date: Fri, 11 Nov 2011 13:24:55 +1300
Cc: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] Malaysian CA (Was: An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version)
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 11 Nov 2011 00:25:01 -0000

Tim Moses <tim.moses@entrust.com> writes:

>You've answered your own question.  Why would a CA be generating server SSL
>keys?

The CA generates the client's key for them and sends it out as a PKCS #12
file, it's relatively common.  So no, I don't think he's answered his own
question.

Peter.

From tgindin@us.ibm.com  Thu Nov 10 17:21:26 2011
Return-Path: <tgindin@us.ibm.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B0B3521F850B for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 17:21:26 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.429
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.429 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.170,  BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id tqZgGVpHRV7p for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 17:21:25 -0800 (PST)
Received: from e9.ny.us.ibm.com (e9.ny.us.ibm.com [32.97.182.139]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 78BD621F8508 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 17:21:25 -0800 (PST)
Received: from /spool/local by e9.ny.us.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted for <pkix@ietf.org> from <tgindin@us.ibm.com>; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 20:21:22 -0500
Received: from d01relay07.pok.ibm.com ([9.56.227.147]) by e9.ny.us.ibm.com ([192.168.1.109]) with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted;  Thu, 10 Nov 2011 20:21:21 -0500
Received: from d01av02.pok.ibm.com (d01av02.pok.ibm.com [9.56.224.216]) by d01relay07.pok.ibm.com (8.13.8/8.13.8/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id pAB1LKwJ3244094 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 20:21:20 -0500
Received: from d01av02.pok.ibm.com (loopback [127.0.0.1]) by d01av02.pok.ibm.com (8.14.4/8.13.1/NCO v10.0 AVout) with ESMTP id pAB1LKWI015026 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 23:21:20 -0200
Received: from d01ml062.pok.ibm.com (d01ml062.pok.ibm.com [9.63.10.95]) by d01av02.pok.ibm.com (8.14.4/8.13.1/NCO v10.0 AVin) with ESMTP id pAB1LKfc015021; Thu, 10 Nov 2011 23:21:20 -0200
In-Reply-To: <4EBC0409.1090200@nist.gov>
References: <201111092238.pA9McfqQ004634@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp> <4EBC0409.1090200@nist.gov>
To: "David A. Cooper" <david.cooper@nist.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-KeepSent: 354B5F92:3BFCA7A6-85257944:00623271; type=4; name=$KeepSent
X-Mailer: Lotus Notes Build V853_CD5_06022011 June 02, 2011
From: Tom Gindin <tgindin@us.ibm.com>
Message-ID: <OF354B5F92.3BFCA7A6-ON85257944.00623271-85257945.00077863@us.ibm.com>
Date: Thu, 10 Nov 2011 20:21:18 -0500
X-MIMETrack: Serialize by Router on D01ML062/01/M/IBM(Release 8.5.2FP1 ZX852FP1HF12|September 28, 2011) at 11/10/2011 20:21:19, Serialize complete at 11/10/2011 20:21:19
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII"
x-cbid: 11111101-7182-0000-0000-0000002C2D97
Cc: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: [pkix] CRL Whitelist Requirements Was An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 11 Nov 2011 01:21:26 -0000

        I don't think that the various whitelist proposals can work unless 
there is a way of issuing a set of whitelist CRL's (a single whitelist CRL 
is unwieldy for any but the smallest CA's), and also a way of detecting 
bogus CRL Distribution Points issued by an attacker in temporary control 
of the CA's key.
        I think that a whitelist CRL for a distribution point consisting 
of a lot of removeFromCRL entries with a few ones with other reason codes 
is workable, and if the distribution point CRL's are partitioned with 1000 
or so certificates assigned to each one they are easily downloaded. 
However, an attacker with reasonable sophistication would surely issue his 
own distribution point CRL or a certificate pointing at a captive OCSP 
server - perhaps both.  For similar reasons to those you give below, I see 
little point to any whitelist procedure unless it makes an RP capable of 
detecting this.
        Any recovery from a CA compromise short of revoking the issuer 
will violate the principle that all security lies in the key.  Once the 
key has ever been compromised, its signature on a long-lived document has 
only provisional value.  Under those conditions, the security of a 
predefined set of servers is actually greater than that of the 
once-compromised key.  So to detect a bogus CRL signed by the temporarily 
successful attacker, we'd need a constraint extension that allowed the 
issuer's certificate to restrict the domains allowed to be used for 
Distribution Points or OCSP servers.  To have that constraint extension 
enforced, the CA's own certificate would not be a self-signed root.  It 
could be (as I suggested in a different context, 
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/current/msg29762.html) a 
cross-certificate from the RP maker or distributor.  For such a purpose 
the anchor would need to be the RP's own chosen issuer rather than the 
cross-certificate, along the lines which you earlier suggested.
        We don't have these facilities now, but I don't believe that they 
break X.509's model.  Are they worth it?

Tom Gindin

P.S.    The opinions above are mine, and not necessarily those of my 
employer.



From:   "David A. Cooper" <david.cooper@nist.gov>
To:     "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>, 
Date:   11/10/2011 12:06 PM
Subject:        Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version
Sent by:        pkix-bounces@ietf.org



If a CA has been compromised, but has a record of every certificate that 
was fraudulently issued, it can simply revoke those certificates.  No 
white list needed.  If a CA has been compromised and can't be certain 
about what certificates were fraudulently issued, how can the CA be 
certain that the attacker hasn't generated an OCSP responder certificate?

If I understand the basic idea behind the recent compromises, the 
attacker has obtained fraudulent TLS server certificates.  Presumably 
this means that the attacker was also able to redirect traffic from the 
legitimate sites to servers controlled by the attacker.  Couldn't the 
attacker similarly redirect traffic to an OCSP responder that it 
controls?  If an attacker has so much control over a CA that it can get 
the CA to issue fraudulent certificates and it can remove from the CA's 
logs any record that the certificates were issued (or at least prevent 
the CA's operators from determining the serial numbers of the fraudulent 
certificates), shouldn't it be assumed that the attacker would be able 
to get the CA to issue it a fraudulent OCSP responder certificate (with 
an id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck extension, of course)?  The attacker could then 
have its OCSP responder provide a response of "good" for the fraudulent 
certificates that the attacker obtained from the CA, and it could even 
include the new "white list" extension in the OCSP response so that the 
relying party could have extra confidence that the certificates really 
were legitimate.  The client would accept the OCSP response from the 
attacker based on the fraudulently-issued OCSP responder certificate, 
and the fact that the OCSP responder certificate didn't appear on a 
"white list" wouldn't matter since the certificate has an 
id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck extension.  (I don't think anyone is suggesting 
that a relying party should have to download a CA's entire white list 
before using OCSP to determine the status of a certificate.)

Under what circumstances could a white list protect against such an 
attack without requiring the revocation of the compromised CA's 
certificate?  Under which of those circumstances would the current 
certificate revocation mechanisms be inadequate?

Dave

On 11/09/2011 05:38 PM, Martin Rex wrote:
> So whitelist could really help to deal more sensibly and safely
> with (much more common) security breaches rather than complete CA
> compromises.

_______________________________________________
pkix mailing list
pkix@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix




From kyanha@kyanha.net  Fri Nov 11 16:21:43 2011
Return-Path: <kyanha@kyanha.net>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id CBA8621F845D for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri, 11 Nov 2011 16:21:43 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.272
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.272 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.048, BAYES_00=-2.599, FM_FORGED_GMAIL=0.622, MIME_BASE64_TEXT=1.753, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id E6yK+bjPP-DA for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri, 11 Nov 2011 16:21:43 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail-gx0-f172.google.com (mail-gx0-f172.google.com [209.85.161.172]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4CF0321F845C for <pkix@ietf.org>; Fri, 11 Nov 2011 16:21:43 -0800 (PST)
Received: by ggnr4 with SMTP id r4so3769560ggn.31 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Fri, 11 Nov 2011 16:21:40 -0800 (PST)
Received: by 10.68.32.194 with SMTP id l2mr28229312pbi.57.1321057300238; Fri, 11 Nov 2011 16:21:40 -0800 (PST)
Received: from penango (c-67-188-178-93.hsd1.ca.comcast.net. [67.188.178.93]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPS id c3sm34051861pbt.12.2011.11.11.16.21.37 (version=SSLv3 cipher=OTHER); Fri, 11 Nov 2011 16:21:38 -0800 (PST)
From: "Kyle Hamilton" <kyanha@kyanha.net>
To: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
Date: Fri, 11 Nov 2011 16:21:39 -0800 (Pacific Standard Time)
Message-ID: <guvveoay7ukmyvwz6ajezwJv4X.penango@mail.gmail.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/signed; protocol="application/pkcs7-signature"; micalg="sha1"; boundary=gmsm1.9.0eqguvveoe65gqo9h8ff02
Cc: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>, "paul.hoffman@vpnc.org" <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 12 Nov 2011 00:21:43 -0000

This is an S/MIME signed message generated with Penango.
--gmsm1.9.0eqguvveoe65gqo9h8ff02
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset=iso-8859-1
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--gmsm1.9.0eqguvveoe65gqo9h8ff02
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="Verify This Message with Penango.p7s"
Content-Description: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-signature; name="Verify This Message with Penango.p7s"
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--gmsm1.9.0eqguvveoe65gqo9h8ff02--


From ynir@checkpoint.com  Fri Nov 11 17:20:58 2011
Return-Path: <ynir@checkpoint.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9BAB121F84A0 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri, 11 Nov 2011 17:20:58 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -10.353
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-10.353 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.246, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-8]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 1PigtgMxXB1Z for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri, 11 Nov 2011 17:20:58 -0800 (PST)
Received: from michael.checkpoint.com (smtp.checkpoint.com [194.29.34.68]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id BDC7121F849E for <pkix@ietf.org>; Fri, 11 Nov 2011 17:20:57 -0800 (PST)
X-CheckPoint: {4EBDC9D3-0-1B221DC2-1FFFF}
Received: from il-ex01.ad.checkpoint.com (il-ex01.ad.checkpoint.com [194.29.34.26]) by michael.checkpoint.com (8.13.8/8.13.8) with ESMTP id pAC1KZH7027513;  Sat, 12 Nov 2011 03:20:36 +0200
Received: from il-ex01.ad.checkpoint.com ([126.0.0.2]) by il-ex01.ad.checkpoint.com ([126.0.0.2]) with mapi; Sat, 12 Nov 2011 03:20:35 +0200
From: Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com>
To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>, "tim.moses@entrust.com" <tim.moses@entrust.com>
Date: Sat, 12 Nov 2011 03:20:31 +0200
Thread-Topic: [pkix] Malaysian CA (Was: An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version)
Thread-Index: Acyg2Ub3RMI/b9w+RYC9f8ND9Oxu0w==
Message-ID: <CAE29EB4.92D7%ynir@checkpoint.com>
In-Reply-To: <E1ROevP-0002Jn-Pj@login01.fos.auckland.ac.nz>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
user-agent: Microsoft-MacOutlook/14.13.0.110805
acceptlanguage: en-US
x-kse-antivirus-interceptor-info: scan successful
x-kse-antivirus-info: Clean
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Cc: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] Malaysian CA (Was: An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version)
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 12 Nov 2011 01:20:58 -0000

On 11/11/11 2:24 AM, "Peter Gutmann" <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> wrote:

>Tim Moses <tim.moses@entrust.com> writes:
>
>>You've answered your own question.  Why would a CA be generating server
>>SSL
>>keys?
>
>The CA generates the client's key for them and sends it out as a PKCS #12
>file, it's relatively common.  So no, I don't think he's answered his own
>question.
>
>Peter.

True. Most website administrators don't know the secret openssl
incantation to generate a PKCS#10.

If all the CA did was agree to sign requests without checking for weak
keys, that could be considered a bug worth fixing, but it would be
entirely their customers' fault. If that had prompted the blacklisting and
revocation of the CA certificate, I would say the community was
over-reacting this time.

Yoav


From pgut001@login01.cs.auckland.ac.nz  Fri Nov 11 19:07:15 2011
Return-Path: <pgut001@login01.cs.auckland.ac.nz>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C1A1A11E8080 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri, 11 Nov 2011 19:07:15 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.562
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.562 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.038,  BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id Lq5I7mGf5RUH for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri, 11 Nov 2011 19:07:15 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mx2.auckland.ac.nz (mx2.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.12.44]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id AC7F311E8073 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Fri, 11 Nov 2011 19:07:13 -0800 (PST)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=auckland.ac.nz; i=pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz; q=dns/txt; s=uoa; t=1321067235; x=1352603235; h=from:to:subject:cc:in-reply-to:message-id:date; bh=jx3kIccvaklQVKWLfTJrvMAQO4pM+alEgwWwTYFppJs=; b=i9I2wG0l4FWG03EC60QuRN7JNn9V+5ooToudaLpxz9LRzCpkPHW1BT17 ZWkMwp22udjmaBqSvARLms0tvm+M35xOwJ229SJaUWs3ZDWXxOyzsEavH mx+w0ca3rjUQmYLp2510pN4pDJ2vlReGWCrtPvvtycLyOVq7gOZG/uGsw A=;
X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.69,498,1315137600"; d="scan'208";a="89883131"
X-Ironport-HAT: UNIVERSITY - $RELAY-THROTTLE
X-Ironport-Source: 130.216.34.40 - Outgoing - Outgoing
Received: from login01.fos.auckland.ac.nz ([130.216.34.40]) by mx2-int.auckland.ac.nz with ESMTP/TLS/AES256-SHA; 12 Nov 2011 16:07:12 +1300
Received: from pgut001 by login01.fos.auckland.ac.nz with local (Exim 4.69) (envelope-from <pgut001@login01.cs.auckland.ac.nz>) id 1RP3w0-0002PQ-4z; Sat, 12 Nov 2011 16:07:12 +1300
From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz, tim.moses@entrust.com, ynir@checkpoint.com
In-Reply-To: <CAE29EB4.92D7%ynir@checkpoint.com>
Message-Id: <E1RP3w0-0002PQ-4z@login01.fos.auckland.ac.nz>
Date: Sat, 12 Nov 2011 16:07:12 +1300
Cc: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] Malaysian CA (Was: An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version)
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 12 Nov 2011 03:07:15 -0000

Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com> writes:
>On 11/11/11 2:24 AM, "Peter Gutmann" <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> wrote:
>>The CA generates the client's key for them and sends it out as a PKCS #12
>>file, it's relatively common.  
>
>True. Most website administrators don't know the secret openssl incantation
>to generate a PKCS#10.

I'm not sure it's actually that, for almost all of the ones I know of it's the
CA that insists on generating the private key.  The reasons are usually some
handwaving variant of "it's for security reasons", but the explanations
generally aren't very convincing [0].  I suspect the main motivator is
convenience for the CA, the client enters their email address and credit card
details on a web page and the CA emails them their new key and cert, it's
the lowest-overhead-cost way of doing it.

Peter.

[0] I've been sent PKCS #12 files from commercial CAs that generate insecure
    RSA keys, so they're really not at all convincing.

From ynir@checkpoint.com  Fri Nov 11 22:03:46 2011
Return-Path: <ynir@checkpoint.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8EDE421F84A0 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri, 11 Nov 2011 22:03:46 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -10.36
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-10.36 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.239,  BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-8]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id hElpcDk65CnJ for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri, 11 Nov 2011 22:03:46 -0800 (PST)
Received: from michael.checkpoint.com (smtp.checkpoint.com [194.29.34.68]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A005221F849E for <pkix@ietf.org>; Fri, 11 Nov 2011 22:03:45 -0800 (PST)
X-CheckPoint: {4EBE0C19-0-1B221DC2-1FFFF}
Received: from il-ex01.ad.checkpoint.com (il-ex01.ad.checkpoint.com [194.29.34.26]) by michael.checkpoint.com (8.13.8/8.13.8) with ESMTP id pAC63TrG021527;  Sat, 12 Nov 2011 08:03:30 +0200
Received: from il-ex01.ad.checkpoint.com ([126.0.0.2]) by il-ex01.ad.checkpoint.com ([126.0.0.2]) with mapi; Sat, 12 Nov 2011 08:03:29 +0200
From: Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com>
To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>, "tim.moses@entrust.com" <tim.moses@entrust.com>
Date: Sat, 12 Nov 2011 08:03:26 +0200
Thread-Topic: [pkix] Malaysian CA (Was: An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version)
Thread-Index: AcyhAMzO+dt4ItDTS4uKkQlR+mkvkQ==
Message-ID: <CAE42C7E.9342%ynir@checkpoint.com>
In-Reply-To: <E1RP3w0-0002PQ-4z@login01.fos.auckland.ac.nz>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
user-agent: Microsoft-MacOutlook/14.13.0.110805
acceptlanguage: en-US
x-kse-antivirus-interceptor-info: scan successful
x-kse-antivirus-info: Clean
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Cc: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] Malaysian CA (Was: An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version)
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 12 Nov 2011 06:03:46 -0000

On 11/12/11 11:07 AM, "Peter Gutmann" <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> wrote:

>Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com> writes:
>>On 11/11/11 2:24 AM, "Peter Gutmann" <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> wrote:
>>>The CA generates the client's key for them and sends it out as a PKCS
>>>#12
>>>file, it's relatively common.
>>
>>True. Most website administrators don't know the secret openssl
>>incantation
>>to generate a PKCS#10.
>
>I'm not sure it's actually that, for almost all of the ones I know of
>it's the
>CA that insists on generating the private key.  The reasons are usually
>some
>handwaving variant of "it's for security reasons", but the explanations
>generally aren't very convincing [0].  I suspect the main motivator is
>convenience for the CA, the client enters their email address and credit
>card
>details on a web page and the CA emails them their new key and cert, it's
>the lowest-overhead-cost way of doing it.
>
>Peter.
>
>[0] I've been sent PKCS #12 files from commercial CAs that generate
>insecure
>    RSA keys, so they're really not at all convincing.

Maybe. The MD5 attack on RapidSSL would not succeed if they didn't accept
PKCS#10 requests.

I just checked, and openssl's genrsa subcommand generates 512-bit RSA keys
by default.  Maybe bad defaults killed the Malaysian CA.


From turners@ieca.com  Sun Nov 13 17:18:39 2011
Return-Path: <turners@ieca.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 55D3611E80AC for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sun, 13 Nov 2011 17:18:39 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -102.279
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-102.279 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.014, BAYES_00=-2.599, IP_NOT_FRIENDLY=0.334, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id geQgtt4-sKGQ for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sun, 13 Nov 2011 17:18:38 -0800 (PST)
Received: from gateway.websitewelcome.com (gateway03.websitewelcome.com [67.18.34.23]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B526511E809F for <pkix@ietf.org>; Sun, 13 Nov 2011 17:18:38 -0800 (PST)
Received: by gateway.websitewelcome.com (Postfix, from userid 5007) id 69E23FE78438A; Sun, 13 Nov 2011 19:18:37 -0600 (CST)
Received: from gator1743.hostgator.com (gator1743.hostgator.com [184.173.253.227]) by gateway.websitewelcome.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5F42DFE78436A for <pkix@ietf.org>; Sun, 13 Nov 2011 19:18:37 -0600 (CST)
Received: from [130.129.38.246] (port=51774 helo=dhcp-26f6.meeting.ietf.org) by gator1743.hostgator.com with esmtpsa (TLSv1:AES256-SHA:256) (Exim 4.69) (envelope-from <turners@ieca.com>) id 1RPlC0-0005IN-SI; Sun, 13 Nov 2011 19:18:37 -0600
Message-ID: <4EC06C6B.7000303@ieca.com>
Date: Mon, 14 Nov 2011 09:18:35 +0800
From: Sean Turner <turners@ieca.com>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.6; rv:8.0) Gecko/20111105 Thunderbird/8.0
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>
References: <4E52511F.6060408@ieca.com><8CC89B24-D7DE-4C7A-9DBF-CCAFC90A8D6E@vpnc.org><4E7B64AB.4080301@nist.gov><2F398806-5337-465D-BDEB-C11FB74A61A2@vpnc.org> <394EDEB1-75D2-44B1-BB3C-D08474CDFA92@vpnc.org> <C1A47F1540DF3246A8D30C853C05D0DA01B96B47@DABECK.missi.ncsc.mil>
In-Reply-To: <C1A47F1540DF3246A8D30C853C05D0DA01B96B47@DABECK.missi.ncsc.mil>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-AntiAbuse: This header was added to track abuse, please include it with any abuse report
X-AntiAbuse: Primary Hostname - gator1743.hostgator.com
X-AntiAbuse: Original Domain - ietf.org
X-AntiAbuse: Originator/Caller UID/GID - [47 12] / [47 12]
X-AntiAbuse: Sender Address Domain - ieca.com
X-BWhitelist: no
X-Source: 
X-Source-Args: 
X-Source-Dir: 
X-Source-Sender: dhcp-26f6.meeting.ietf.org [130.129.38.246]:51774
X-Source-Auth: sean.turner@ieca.com
X-Email-Count: 10
X-Source-Cap: ZG9tbWdyNDg7ZG9tbWdyNDg7Z2F0b3IxNzQzLmhvc3RnYXRvci5jb20=
Cc: PKIX <pkix@ietf.org>, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 14 Nov 2011 01:18:39 -0000

So maybe I'm being simple minded but this is pretty much what I was 
asking for.

spt

On 9/28/11 12:16 AM, Kemp, David P. wrote:
> Change 1 - on page 12 replace:
>    "X.509 v3 also includes an extension that identifies the subject of a
>     certificate as being either a CA or an end entity, reducing the
>     reliance on out-of-band information demanded in PEM.
>
> with:
>     X.509 v3 also includes two extensions that identify ...
>
>
> Change 2 - on page 12-13 replace:
>    "This specification covers two classes of certificates: CA
>     certificates and end entity certificates.  CA certificates may be
>     further divided into three classes: cross-certificates, self-issued
>     certificates, and self-signed certificates.  Cross-certificates are
>     CA certificates in which the issuer and subject are different
>     entities.  Cross-certificates describe a trust relationship between
>     the two CAs.  Self-issued certificates are CA certificates in which
>     the issuer and subject are the same entity.  Self-issued certificates
>     are generated to support changes in policy or operations.  Self-
>     signed certificates are self-issued certificates where the digital
>     signature may be verified by the public key bound into the
>     certificate.  Self-signed certificates are used to convey a public
>     key for use to begin certification paths.  End entity certificates
>     are issued to subjects that are not authorized to issue
> certificates."
>
> with:
>
>    "This specification covers two classes of certificates: CA
>     certificates and end entity certificates.  CA and EE certificates may
> be
>     further divided into three classes: CA-issued certificates,
> self-issued
>     certificates, and self-signed certificates.  Cross-certificates are
>     CA certificates in which the issuer and subject are different
>     entities.  Cross-certificates describe a trust relationship between
>     the two CAs.  Self-issued certificates are certificates in which
>     the issuer and subject are the same entity.  Self-issued certificates
>     are generated to support changes in policy or operations.  Self-
>     signed certificates are self-issued certificates where the digital
>     signature may be verified by the public key bound into the
>     certificate.  Self-signed CA certificates are used to convey a public
>     key for use to begin certification paths.  End entity certificates
>     are issued to subjects that are not authorized to issue certificates.
>     Self-signed end entity certificates are used to convey a public key
>     and other information directly to relying parties without using
>     a PKI."
>
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
> Paul Hoffman
> Sent: Tuesday, September 27, 2011 9:55 AM
> To: PKIX
> Subject: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs (was: Re: AD Review
> ofdraft-ietf-pkix-rfc5280-clarifications-03.txt)
>
>> On Aug 22, 2011, at 5:52 AM, Sean Turner wrote:
>>
>>> I think the -03 version is just about ready to go.  That is I have no
> comments on the existing text though I expect getting it through the
> IESG will be interesting (Apps ADs love to discuss about anything to do
> with characters strings/sets).  But, I think this draft needs to also
> address the issue of self-signed EE certificates.  I know at least the
> DANE WG had a lengthy discussion about self-signed EE certificates, I
> see that Max's EST draft also includes them, and they're used in the
> wild.  I want to see text included that addresses them.
>>>
>
> This thread started there, but then sidetracked on more "improvements"
> on trust anchors that are express as certificates. Could we please have
> two threads?
>
> --Paul Hoffman
>
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>

From tmiller@mitre.org  Sun Nov 13 17:47:40 2011
Return-Path: <tmiller@mitre.org>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A96691F0C4E for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sun, 13 Nov 2011 17:47:40 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id LWfpCcuiHdOI for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sun, 13 Nov 2011 17:47:40 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (smtpksrv1.mitre.org [198.49.146.77]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0FFFA1F0C46 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Sun, 13 Nov 2011 17:47:40 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by localhost (Postfix) with SMTP id 2F23121B0603; Sun, 13 Nov 2011 20:47:39 -0500 (EST)
Received: from IMCCAS04.MITRE.ORG (imccas04.mitre.org [129.83.29.81]) by smtpksrv1.mitre.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2690821B04C1; Sun, 13 Nov 2011 20:47:39 -0500 (EST)
Received: from IMCMBX01.MITRE.ORG ([169.254.1.18]) by IMCCAS04.MITRE.ORG ([129.83.29.81]) with mapi id 14.01.0339.001; Sun, 13 Nov 2011 20:47:38 -0500
From: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
To: Kyle Hamilton <kyanha@kyanha.net>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version
Thread-Index: AQHMoNEL6CmUY2saPEyZJmaoCSAF/5WrjHsA
Date: Mon, 14 Nov 2011 01:47:38 +0000
Message-ID: <CAE5CED1.23F8%tmiller@mitre.org>
In-Reply-To: <guvveoay7ukmyvwz6ajezwJv4X.penango@mail.gmail.com>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: yes
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
user-agent: Microsoft-MacOutlook/14.13.0.110805
x-originating-ip: [172.31.34.51]
Content-Type: multipart/signed; protocol="application/pkcs7-signature"; micalg=sha1; boundary="B_3404058480_9700955"
MIME-Version: 1.0
Cc: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>, "paul.hoffman@vpnc.org" <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 14 Nov 2011 01:47:40 -0000

--B_3404058480_9700955
Content-type: text/plain;
	charset="US-ASCII"
Content-transfer-encoding: 7bit

On 11/11/11 6:21 PM, "Kyle Hamilton" <kyanha@kyanha.net> wrote:

>SPKI delegation only permits one authority, one root.

Um, WTF?  SPKI delegation is completely open.  I can delegate to as many
sub-keys as I choose, or have my key delegated to by as many authorities
as I need.  

What SPKI *doesn't* do is shove them all into a single data structure.
But so what?

-- T

--B_3404058480_9700955
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-signature; name="smime.p7s"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="smime.p7s"
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--B_3404058480_9700955--

From tmiller@mitre.org  Sun Nov 13 17:55:55 2011
Return-Path: <tmiller@mitre.org>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0B52A11E8109 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sun, 13 Nov 2011 17:55:55 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.000,  BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id C-8vIyDjU5a1 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sun, 13 Nov 2011 17:55:54 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (smtpksrv1.mitre.org [198.49.146.77]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4611211E8082 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Sun, 13 Nov 2011 17:55:54 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by localhost (Postfix) with SMTP id EB2AA21B0639; Sun, 13 Nov 2011 20:55:53 -0500 (EST)
Received: from IMCCAS01.MITRE.ORG (imccas01.mitre.org [129.83.29.78]) by smtpksrv1.mitre.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E354421B062E; Sun, 13 Nov 2011 20:55:53 -0500 (EST)
Received: from IMCMBX01.MITRE.ORG ([169.254.1.18]) by IMCCAS01.MITRE.ORG ([129.83.29.78]) with mapi id 14.01.0339.001; Sun, 13 Nov 2011 20:55:53 -0500
From: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
To: Sean Turner <turners@ieca.com>, "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
Thread-Index: AQHMomtYK+6nacw8f0a2iVOXAK08TJWri3kA
Date: Mon, 14 Nov 2011 01:55:54 +0000
Message-ID: <CAE5D098.23FC%tmiller@mitre.org>
In-Reply-To: <4EC06C6B.7000303@ieca.com>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
user-agent: Microsoft-MacOutlook/14.13.0.110805
x-originating-ip: [172.31.34.51]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-ID: <8787DBCE2F6DDC41AE8A71E450AF629E@imc.mitre.org>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Cc: PKIX <pkix@ietf.org>, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 14 Nov 2011 01:55:55 -0000

Um, maybe I missed something but there's no such thing as an end-entity
self-signed certificate.  Since constraints can't be enforced every
self-signed cert is potentially a CA, and should be treated as such.

-- T

On 11/13/11 7:18 PM, "Sean Turner" <turners@ieca.com> wrote:

>So maybe I'm being simple minded but this is pretty much what I was
>asking for.
>
>spt
>
>On 9/28/11 12:16 AM, Kemp, David P. wrote:
>> Change 1 - on page 12 replace:
>>    "X.509 v3 also includes an extension that identifies the subject of a
>>     certificate as being either a CA or an end entity, reducing the
>>     reliance on out-of-band information demanded in PEM.
>>
>> with:
>>     X.509 v3 also includes two extensions that identify ...
>>
>>
>> Change 2 - on page 12-13 replace:
>>    "This specification covers two classes of certificates: CA
>>     certificates and end entity certificates.  CA certificates may be
>>     further divided into three classes: cross-certificates, self-issued
>>     certificates, and self-signed certificates.  Cross-certificates are
>>     CA certificates in which the issuer and subject are different
>>     entities.  Cross-certificates describe a trust relationship between
>>     the two CAs.  Self-issued certificates are CA certificates in which
>>     the issuer and subject are the same entity.  Self-issued
>>certificates
>>     are generated to support changes in policy or operations.  Self-
>>     signed certificates are self-issued certificates where the digital
>>     signature may be verified by the public key bound into the
>>     certificate.  Self-signed certificates are used to convey a public
>>     key for use to begin certification paths.  End entity certificates
>>     are issued to subjects that are not authorized to issue
>> certificates."
>>
>> with:
>>
>>    "This specification covers two classes of certificates: CA
>>     certificates and end entity certificates.  CA and EE certificates
>>may
>> be
>>     further divided into three classes: CA-issued certificates,
>> self-issued
>>     certificates, and self-signed certificates.  Cross-certificates are
>>     CA certificates in which the issuer and subject are different
>>     entities.  Cross-certificates describe a trust relationship between
>>     the two CAs.  Self-issued certificates are certificates in which
>>     the issuer and subject are the same entity.  Self-issued
>>certificates
>>     are generated to support changes in policy or operations.  Self-
>>     signed certificates are self-issued certificates where the digital
>>     signature may be verified by the public key bound into the
>>     certificate.  Self-signed CA certificates are used to convey a
>>public
>>     key for use to begin certification paths.  End entity certificates
>>     are issued to subjects that are not authorized to issue
>>certificates.
>>     Self-signed end entity certificates are used to convey a public key
>>     and other information directly to relying parties without using
>>     a PKI."
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
>> Paul Hoffman
>> Sent: Tuesday, September 27, 2011 9:55 AM
>> To: PKIX
>> Subject: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs (was: Re: AD Review
>> ofdraft-ietf-pkix-rfc5280-clarifications-03.txt)
>>
>>> On Aug 22, 2011, at 5:52 AM, Sean Turner wrote:
>>>
>>>> I think the -03 version is just about ready to go.  That is I have no
>> comments on the existing text though I expect getting it through the
>> IESG will be interesting (Apps ADs love to discuss about anything to do
>> with characters strings/sets).  But, I think this draft needs to also
>> address the issue of self-signed EE certificates.  I know at least the
>> DANE WG had a lengthy discussion about self-signed EE certificates, I
>> see that Max's EST draft also includes them, and they're used in the
>> wild.  I want to see text included that addresses them.
>>>>
>>
>> This thread started there, but then sidetracked on more "improvements"
>> on trust anchors that are express as certificates. Could we please have
>> two threads?
>>
>> --Paul Hoffman
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> pkix mailing list
>> pkix@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>> _______________________________________________
>> pkix mailing list
>> pkix@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>>
>_______________________________________________
>pkix mailing list
>pkix@ietf.org
>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix


From trevorf@exchange.microsoft.com  Sun Nov 13 18:18:58 2011
Return-Path: <trevorf@exchange.microsoft.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2D28311E80DF for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sun, 13 Nov 2011 18:18:58 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -110.699
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-110.699 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.100, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-8, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id JHTzE8lYbsSt for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sun, 13 Nov 2011 18:18:57 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail.exchange.microsoft.com (mail7.exchange.microsoft.com [131.107.1.27]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4562211E80E5 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Sun, 13 Nov 2011 18:18:57 -0800 (PST)
Received: from df-h14-02.exchange.corp.microsoft.com (157.54.78.140) by DF-G14-02.exchange.corp.microsoft.com (157.54.87.56) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 14.2.247.2; Sun, 13 Nov 2011 18:18:56 -0800
Received: from PIO-MLT-06.exchange.corp.microsoft.com (157.54.94.24) by DF-H14-02.exchange.corp.microsoft.com (157.54.78.140) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 14.2.247.5; Sun, 13 Nov 2011 18:18:56 -0800
Received: from DF-M14-12.exchange.corp.microsoft.com ([fe80::7c94:4036:120:c95f]) by PIO-MLT-06.exchange.corp.microsoft.com ([fe80::d57f:521a:3ae6:c130%10]) with mapi id 14.02.0247.002; Sun, 13 Nov 2011 18:18:56 -0800
From: Trevor Freeman <trevorf@exchange.microsoft.com>
To: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>, Sean Turner <turners@ieca.com>,  "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
Thread-Index: AQHMomtbw9AJYcfzSUGCYGmTut3p+ZWsIlsA//9+k8A=
Date: Mon, 14 Nov 2011 02:18:55 +0000
Message-ID: <E545B914D50B2A4B994F198378B1525D42787E35@DF-M14-12.exchange.corp.microsoft.com>
References: <4EC06C6B.7000303@ieca.com> <CAE5D098.23FC%tmiller@mitre.org>
In-Reply-To: <CAE5D098.23FC%tmiller@mitre.org>
Accept-Language: en-GB, en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
x-originating-ip: [157.54.123.12]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Cc: PKIX <pkix@ietf.org>, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 14 Nov 2011 02:18:58 -0000

What about a application who wants to use a pki enabled protocol using a se=
lf-signed certificate because they will validate the certificate by other m=
eans  and will never issue a certificate to another entity. There are a lot=
 of implementations who create such certificates and don't want to be brand=
ed as a CA. We do that in Microsoft Exchange and assert in the basic constr=
aints =3D end entity in a self-signed certificate.

-----Original Message-----
From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Mil=
ler, Timothy J.
Sent: Monday, November 14, 2011 9:56 AM
To: Sean Turner; Kemp, David P.
Cc: PKIX; Paul Hoffman
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs

Um, maybe I missed something but there's no such thing as an end-entity sel=
f-signed certificate.  Since constraints can't be enforced every self-signe=
d cert is potentially a CA, and should be treated as such.

-- T

On 11/13/11 7:18 PM, "Sean Turner" <turners@ieca.com> wrote:

>So maybe I'm being simple minded but this is pretty much what I was=20
>asking for.
>
>spt
>
>On 9/28/11 12:16 AM, Kemp, David P. wrote:
>> Change 1 - on page 12 replace:
>>    "X.509 v3 also includes an extension that identifies the subject of a
>>     certificate as being either a CA or an end entity, reducing the
>>     reliance on out-of-band information demanded in PEM.
>>
>> with:
>>     X.509 v3 also includes two extensions that identify ...
>>
>>
>> Change 2 - on page 12-13 replace:
>>    "This specification covers two classes of certificates: CA
>>     certificates and end entity certificates.  CA certificates may be
>>     further divided into three classes: cross-certificates, self-issued
>>     certificates, and self-signed certificates.  Cross-certificates are
>>     CA certificates in which the issuer and subject are different
>>     entities.  Cross-certificates describe a trust relationship between
>>     the two CAs.  Self-issued certificates are CA certificates in which
>>     the issuer and subject are the same entity.  Self-issued=20
>>certificates
>>     are generated to support changes in policy or operations.  Self-
>>     signed certificates are self-issued certificates where the digital
>>     signature may be verified by the public key bound into the
>>     certificate.  Self-signed certificates are used to convey a public
>>     key for use to begin certification paths.  End entity certificates
>>     are issued to subjects that are not authorized to issue =20
>>certificates."
>>
>> with:
>>
>>    "This specification covers two classes of certificates: CA
>>     certificates and end entity certificates.  CA and EE certificates=20
>>may  be
>>     further divided into three classes: CA-issued certificates, =20
>>self-issued
>>     certificates, and self-signed certificates.  Cross-certificates are
>>     CA certificates in which the issuer and subject are different
>>     entities.  Cross-certificates describe a trust relationship between
>>     the two CAs.  Self-issued certificates are certificates in which
>>     the issuer and subject are the same entity.  Self-issued=20
>>certificates
>>     are generated to support changes in policy or operations.  Self-
>>     signed certificates are self-issued certificates where the digital
>>     signature may be verified by the public key bound into the
>>     certificate.  Self-signed CA certificates are used to convey a=20
>>public
>>     key for use to begin certification paths.  End entity certificates
>>     are issued to subjects that are not authorized to issue=20
>>certificates.
>>     Self-signed end entity certificates are used to convey a public key
>>     and other information directly to relying parties without using
>>     a PKI."
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf=20
>> Of Paul Hoffman
>> Sent: Tuesday, September 27, 2011 9:55 AM
>> To: PKIX
>> Subject: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs (was: Re: AD Review
>> ofdraft-ietf-pkix-rfc5280-clarifications-03.txt)
>>
>>> On Aug 22, 2011, at 5:52 AM, Sean Turner wrote:
>>>
>>>> I think the -03 version is just about ready to go.  That is I have=20
>>>> no
>> comments on the existing text though I expect getting it through the=20
>> IESG will be interesting (Apps ADs love to discuss about anything to=20
>> do with characters strings/sets).  But, I think this draft needs to=20
>> also address the issue of self-signed EE certificates.  I know at=20
>> least the DANE WG had a lengthy discussion about self-signed EE=20
>> certificates, I see that Max's EST draft also includes them, and=20
>> they're used in the wild.  I want to see text included that addresses th=
em.
>>>>
>>
>> This thread started there, but then sidetracked on more "improvements"
>> on trust anchors that are express as certificates. Could we please=20
>> have two threads?
>>
>> --Paul Hoffman
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> pkix mailing list
>> pkix@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>> _______________________________________________
>> pkix mailing list
>> pkix@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>>
>_______________________________________________
>pkix mailing list
>pkix@ietf.org
>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix

_______________________________________________
pkix mailing list
pkix@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix

From turners@ieca.com  Sun Nov 13 18:36:06 2011
Return-Path: <turners@ieca.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6908A11E8185 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sun, 13 Nov 2011 18:36:06 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -102.277
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-102.277 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.012, BAYES_00=-2.599, IP_NOT_FRIENDLY=0.334, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 1NBK1Db7ZTZB for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sun, 13 Nov 2011 18:36:05 -0800 (PST)
Received: from gateway.websitewelcome.com (gateway11.websitewelcome.com [67.18.55.4]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id BFD5011E8177 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Sun, 13 Nov 2011 18:36:05 -0800 (PST)
Received: by gateway.websitewelcome.com (Postfix, from userid 5011) id 2CB824ADE2962; Sun, 13 Nov 2011 20:36:05 -0600 (CST)
Received: from gator1743.hostgator.com (gator1743.hostgator.com [184.173.253.227]) by gateway.websitewelcome.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1EDCC4ADE2942 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Sun, 13 Nov 2011 20:36:05 -0600 (CST)
Received: from [130.129.38.246] (port=51949 helo=dhcp-26f6.meeting.ietf.org) by gator1743.hostgator.com with esmtpsa (TLSv1:AES256-SHA:256) (Exim 4.69) (envelope-from <turners@ieca.com>) id 1RPmOy-00013y-9o; Sun, 13 Nov 2011 20:36:04 -0600
Message-ID: <4EC07E91.4030704@ieca.com>
Date: Mon, 14 Nov 2011 10:36:01 +0800
From: Sean Turner <turners@ieca.com>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.6; rv:8.0) Gecko/20111105 Thunderbird/8.0
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
References: <CAE5D098.23FC%tmiller@mitre.org>
In-Reply-To: <CAE5D098.23FC%tmiller@mitre.org>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-AntiAbuse: This header was added to track abuse, please include it with any abuse report
X-AntiAbuse: Primary Hostname - gator1743.hostgator.com
X-AntiAbuse: Original Domain - ietf.org
X-AntiAbuse: Originator/Caller UID/GID - [47 12] / [47 12]
X-AntiAbuse: Sender Address Domain - ieca.com
X-BWhitelist: no
X-Source: 
X-Source-Args: 
X-Source-Dir: 
X-Source-Sender: dhcp-26f6.meeting.ietf.org [130.129.38.246]:51949
X-Source-Auth: sean.turner@ieca.com
X-Email-Count: 16
X-Source-Cap: ZG9tbWdyNDg7ZG9tbWdyNDg7Z2F0b3IxNzQzLmhvc3RnYXRvci5jb20=
Cc: PKIX <pkix@ietf.org>, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 14 Nov 2011 02:36:06 -0000

Tim,

You're right there's no such thing as an EE self-signed cert according 
to RFC 5280.  The point is for RFC 5280 to be updated to say that there 
are such things as EE self-signed certs, which reflects reality (e.g., 
dane).

spt

On 11/14/11 9:55 AM, Miller, Timothy J. wrote:
> Um, maybe I missed something but there's no such thing as an end-entity
> self-signed certificate.  Since constraints can't be enforced every
> self-signed cert is potentially a CA, and should be treated as such.
>
> -- T
>
> On 11/13/11 7:18 PM, "Sean Turner"<turners@ieca.com>  wrote:
>
>> So maybe I'm being simple minded but this is pretty much what I was
>> asking for.
>>
>> spt
>>
>> On 9/28/11 12:16 AM, Kemp, David P. wrote:
>>> Change 1 - on page 12 replace:
>>>     "X.509 v3 also includes an extension that identifies the subject of a
>>>      certificate as being either a CA or an end entity, reducing the
>>>      reliance on out-of-band information demanded in PEM.
>>>
>>> with:
>>>      X.509 v3 also includes two extensions that identify ...
>>>
>>>
>>> Change 2 - on page 12-13 replace:
>>>     "This specification covers two classes of certificates: CA
>>>      certificates and end entity certificates.  CA certificates may be
>>>      further divided into three classes: cross-certificates, self-issued
>>>      certificates, and self-signed certificates.  Cross-certificates are
>>>      CA certificates in which the issuer and subject are different
>>>      entities.  Cross-certificates describe a trust relationship between
>>>      the two CAs.  Self-issued certificates are CA certificates in which
>>>      the issuer and subject are the same entity.  Self-issued
>>> certificates
>>>      are generated to support changes in policy or operations.  Self-
>>>      signed certificates are self-issued certificates where the digital
>>>      signature may be verified by the public key bound into the
>>>      certificate.  Self-signed certificates are used to convey a public
>>>      key for use to begin certification paths.  End entity certificates
>>>      are issued to subjects that are not authorized to issue
>>> certificates."
>>>
>>> with:
>>>
>>>     "This specification covers two classes of certificates: CA
>>>      certificates and end entity certificates.  CA and EE certificates
>>> may
>>> be
>>>      further divided into three classes: CA-issued certificates,
>>> self-issued
>>>      certificates, and self-signed certificates.  Cross-certificates are
>>>      CA certificates in which the issuer and subject are different
>>>      entities.  Cross-certificates describe a trust relationship between
>>>      the two CAs.  Self-issued certificates are certificates in which
>>>      the issuer and subject are the same entity.  Self-issued
>>> certificates
>>>      are generated to support changes in policy or operations.  Self-
>>>      signed certificates are self-issued certificates where the digital
>>>      signature may be verified by the public key bound into the
>>>      certificate.  Self-signed CA certificates are used to convey a
>>> public
>>>      key for use to begin certification paths.  End entity certificates
>>>      are issued to subjects that are not authorized to issue
>>> certificates.
>>>      Self-signed end entity certificates are used to convey a public key
>>>      and other information directly to relying parties without using
>>>      a PKI."
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
>>> Paul Hoffman
>>> Sent: Tuesday, September 27, 2011 9:55 AM
>>> To: PKIX
>>> Subject: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs (was: Re: AD Review
>>> ofdraft-ietf-pkix-rfc5280-clarifications-03.txt)
>>>
>>>> On Aug 22, 2011, at 5:52 AM, Sean Turner wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> I think the -03 version is just about ready to go.  That is I have no
>>> comments on the existing text though I expect getting it through the
>>> IESG will be interesting (Apps ADs love to discuss about anything to do
>>> with characters strings/sets).  But, I think this draft needs to also
>>> address the issue of self-signed EE certificates.  I know at least the
>>> DANE WG had a lengthy discussion about self-signed EE certificates, I
>>> see that Max's EST draft also includes them, and they're used in the
>>> wild.  I want to see text included that addresses them.
>>>>>
>>>
>>> This thread started there, but then sidetracked on more "improvements"
>>> on trust anchors that are express as certificates. Could we please have
>>> two threads?
>>>
>>> --Paul Hoffman
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> pkix mailing list
>>> pkix@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> pkix mailing list
>>> pkix@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> pkix mailing list
>> pkix@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>
>

From ynir@checkpoint.com  Sun Nov 13 18:48:09 2011
Return-Path: <ynir@checkpoint.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1814D21F8591 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sun, 13 Nov 2011 18:48:09 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -10.387
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-10.387 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.212, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-8]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id mApQyopTOnpK for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sun, 13 Nov 2011 18:48:08 -0800 (PST)
Received: from michael.checkpoint.com (smtp.checkpoint.com [194.29.34.68]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9C54D21F858D for <pkix@ietf.org>; Sun, 13 Nov 2011 18:48:07 -0800 (PST)
X-CheckPoint: {4EC0812D-0-1B221DC2-1FFFF}
Received: from il-ex01.ad.checkpoint.com (il-ex01.ad.checkpoint.com [194.29.34.26]) by michael.checkpoint.com (8.13.8/8.13.8) with ESMTP id pAE2m3Xv019466;  Mon, 14 Nov 2011 04:48:03 +0200
Received: from il-ex03.ad.checkpoint.com (194.29.34.71) by il-ex01.ad.checkpoint.com (194.29.34.26) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 8.3.213.0; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 04:48:03 +0200
Received: from il-ex01.ad.checkpoint.com ([126.0.0.2]) by il-ex03.ad.checkpoint.com ([194.29.34.71]) with mapi; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 04:48:02 +0200
From: Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com>
To: Sean Turner <turners@ieca.com>
Date: Mon, 14 Nov 2011 04:48:00 +0200
Thread-Topic: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
Thread-Index: Acyid9OQGL6dfnfDQQyNcK2uORKtNA==
Message-ID: <E7A56751-9C0B-4FF1-8470-4CA05ECE9903@checkpoint.com>
References: <CAE5D098.23FC%tmiller@mitre.org> <4EC07E91.4030704@ieca.com>
In-Reply-To: <4EC07E91.4030704@ieca.com>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
acceptlanguage: en-US
x-kse-antivirus-interceptor-info: scan successful
x-kse-antivirus-info: Clean
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-KSE-AntiSpam-Interceptor-Info: protection disabled
Cc: PKIX <pkix@ietf.org>, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 14 Nov 2011 02:48:09 -0000

And yet even DANE has not decided that they really need it.

You can always generate a self-signed certificate, and have that sign an EE=
 certificate. You could write a 5-line script to do it with OpenSSL. 4 if y=
ou follow the suggestion to use the same public key for CA and EE (this cam=
e up today in DANE)

Yoav

On Nov 14, 2011, at 10:36 AM, Sean Turner wrote:

> Tim,
>=20
> You're right there's no such thing as an EE self-signed cert according=20
> to RFC 5280.  The point is for RFC 5280 to be updated to say that there=20
> are such things as EE self-signed certs, which reflects reality (e.g.,=20
> dane).
>=20
> spt
>=20
> On 11/14/11 9:55 AM, Miller, Timothy J. wrote:
>> Um, maybe I missed something but there's no such thing as an end-entity
>> self-signed certificate.  Since constraints can't be enforced every
>> self-signed cert is potentially a CA, and should be treated as such.
>>=20
>> -- T
>>=20
>> On 11/13/11 7:18 PM, "Sean Turner"<turners@ieca.com>  wrote:
>>=20
>>> So maybe I'm being simple minded but this is pretty much what I was
>>> asking for.
>>>=20
>>> spt
>>>=20
>>> On 9/28/11 12:16 AM, Kemp, David P. wrote:
>>>> Change 1 - on page 12 replace:
>>>>    "X.509 v3 also includes an extension that identifies the subject of=
 a
>>>>     certificate as being either a CA or an end entity, reducing the
>>>>     reliance on out-of-band information demanded in PEM.
>>>>=20
>>>> with:
>>>>     X.509 v3 also includes two extensions that identify ...
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>> Change 2 - on page 12-13 replace:
>>>>    "This specification covers two classes of certificates: CA
>>>>     certificates and end entity certificates.  CA certificates may be
>>>>     further divided into three classes: cross-certificates, self-issue=
d
>>>>     certificates, and self-signed certificates.  Cross-certificates ar=
e
>>>>     CA certificates in which the issuer and subject are different
>>>>     entities.  Cross-certificates describe a trust relationship betwee=
n
>>>>     the two CAs.  Self-issued certificates are CA certificates in whic=
h
>>>>     the issuer and subject are the same entity.  Self-issued
>>>> certificates
>>>>     are generated to support changes in policy or operations.  Self-
>>>>     signed certificates are self-issued certificates where the digital
>>>>     signature may be verified by the public key bound into the
>>>>     certificate.  Self-signed certificates are used to convey a public
>>>>     key for use to begin certification paths.  End entity certificates
>>>>     are issued to subjects that are not authorized to issue
>>>> certificates."
>>>>=20
>>>> with:
>>>>=20
>>>>    "This specification covers two classes of certificates: CA
>>>>     certificates and end entity certificates.  CA and EE certificates
>>>> may
>>>> be
>>>>     further divided into three classes: CA-issued certificates,
>>>> self-issued
>>>>     certificates, and self-signed certificates.  Cross-certificates ar=
e
>>>>     CA certificates in which the issuer and subject are different
>>>>     entities.  Cross-certificates describe a trust relationship betwee=
n
>>>>     the two CAs.  Self-issued certificates are certificates in which
>>>>     the issuer and subject are the same entity.  Self-issued
>>>> certificates
>>>>     are generated to support changes in policy or operations.  Self-
>>>>     signed certificates are self-issued certificates where the digital
>>>>     signature may be verified by the public key bound into the
>>>>     certificate.  Self-signed CA certificates are used to convey a
>>>> public
>>>>     key for use to begin certification paths.  End entity certificates
>>>>     are issued to subjects that are not authorized to issue
>>>> certificates.
>>>>     Self-signed end entity certificates are used to convey a public ke=
y
>>>>     and other information directly to relying parties without using
>>>>     a PKI."
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>> From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf O=
f
>>>> Paul Hoffman
>>>> Sent: Tuesday, September 27, 2011 9:55 AM
>>>> To: PKIX
>>>> Subject: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs (was: Re: AD Review
>>>> ofdraft-ietf-pkix-rfc5280-clarifications-03.txt)
>>>>=20
>>>>> On Aug 22, 2011, at 5:52 AM, Sean Turner wrote:
>>>>>=20
>>>>>> I think the -03 version is just about ready to go.  That is I have n=
o
>>>> comments on the existing text though I expect getting it through the
>>>> IESG will be interesting (Apps ADs love to discuss about anything to d=
o
>>>> with characters strings/sets).  But, I think this draft needs to also
>>>> address the issue of self-signed EE certificates.  I know at least the
>>>> DANE WG had a lengthy discussion about self-signed EE certificates, I
>>>> see that Max's EST draft also includes them, and they're used in the
>>>> wild.  I want to see text included that addresses them.
>>>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>> This thread started there, but then sidetracked on more "improvements"
>>>> on trust anchors that are express as certificates. Could we please hav=
e
>>>> two threads?
>>>>=20
>>>> --Paul Hoffman
>>>>=20
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> pkix mailing list
>>>> pkix@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> pkix mailing list
>>>> pkix@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>>>>=20
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> pkix mailing list
>>> pkix@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>>=20
>>=20
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>=20
> Scanned by Check Point Total Security Gateway.


From paul.hoffman@vpnc.org  Sun Nov 13 20:56:52 2011
Return-Path: <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id AD90711E81C5 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sun, 13 Nov 2011 20:56:52 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -102.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-102.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id HSSiBcYGJmf7 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sun, 13 Nov 2011 20:56:52 -0800 (PST)
Received: from hoffman.proper.com (IPv6.Hoffman.Proper.COM [IPv6:2605:8e00:100:41::81]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3505911E81C9 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Sun, 13 Nov 2011 20:56:52 -0800 (PST)
Received: from dhcp-2121.meeting.ietf.org (dhcp-2121.meeting.ietf.org [130.129.33.33]) (authenticated bits=0) by hoffman.proper.com (8.14.4/8.14.3) with ESMTP id pAE4un3Z021057 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES128-SHA bits=128 verify=NO) for <pkix@ietf.org>; Sun, 13 Nov 2011 21:56:51 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from paul.hoffman@vpnc.org)
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Mime-Version: 1.0 (Apple Message framework v1251.1)
From: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
In-Reply-To: <E7A56751-9C0B-4FF1-8470-4CA05ECE9903@checkpoint.com>
Date: Mon, 14 Nov 2011 12:56:50 +0800
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Message-Id: <EC482347-A87B-49FC-BB2E-699915913D6B@vpnc.org>
References: <CAE5D098.23FC%tmiller@mitre.org> <4EC07E91.4030704@ieca.com> <E7A56751-9C0B-4FF1-8470-4CA05ECE9903@checkpoint.com>
To: PKIX <pkix@ietf.org>
X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.1251.1)
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 14 Nov 2011 04:56:52 -0000

On Nov 14, 2011, at 10:48 AM, Yoav Nir wrote:

> And yet even DANE has not decided that they really need it.

That is a premature statement, and "really" is unclear in this context. =
As we discovered in the WG this morning, it is still an open question.

--Paul Hoffman


From i.grok@comcast.net  Mon Nov 14 04:27:33 2011
Return-Path: <i.grok@comcast.net>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B5A4F21F8E63 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 04:27:33 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -102.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-102.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id XmBwQWf3z6xT for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 04:27:33 -0800 (PST)
Received: from qmta03.westchester.pa.mail.comcast.net (qmta03.westchester.pa.mail.comcast.net [76.96.62.32]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 194D821F8E39 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 04:27:33 -0800 (PST)
Received: from omta10.westchester.pa.mail.comcast.net ([76.96.62.28]) by qmta03.westchester.pa.mail.comcast.net with comcast id x0QX1h0040cZkys530TZEa; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 12:27:33 +0000
Received: from odin.ulthar.us ([68.33.77.0]) by omta10.westchester.pa.mail.comcast.net with comcast id x0TZ1h00X00PQ6U3W0TZDq; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 12:27:33 +0000
Received: from odin.ulthar.us (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by odin.ulthar.us (8.14.4/8.14.3) with ESMTP id pAECRV9c009877 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 07:27:31 -0500
Received: (from draco@localhost) by odin.ulthar.us (8.14.4/8.14.4/Submit) id pAECRRjD009875 for pkix@ietf.org; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 07:27:27 -0500
Date: Mon, 14 Nov 2011 07:27:27 -0500
From: Scott Schmit <i.grok@comcast.net>
To: pkix@ietf.org
Message-ID: <20111114122727.GA9731@odin.ulthar.us>
Mail-Followup-To: pkix@ietf.org
References: <CAE5D098.23FC%tmiller@mitre.org> <4EC07E91.4030704@ieca.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/signed; protocol="application/x-pkcs7-signature"; micalg=sha1; boundary="1yeeQ81UyVL57Vl7"
Content-Disposition: inline
In-Reply-To: <4EC07E91.4030704@ieca.com>
User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15)
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 14 Nov 2011 12:27:33 -0000

--1yeeQ81UyVL57Vl7
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Disposition: inline
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

On Mon, Nov 14, 2011 at 10:36:01AM +0800, Sean Turner wrote:
> On 11/14/11 9:55 AM, Miller, Timothy J. wrote:
> >Um, maybe I missed something but there's no such thing as an end-entity
> >self-signed certificate.  Since constraints can't be enforced every
> >self-signed cert is potentially a CA, and should be treated as such.
>
> You're right there's no such thing as an EE self-signed cert
> according to RFC 5280.  The point is for RFC 5280 to be updated to
> say that there are such things as EE self-signed certs, which
> reflects reality (e.g., dane).

To head off the other subthread, I think it would be fairer to say
"reflects reality (e.g., the 7 million HTTPS servers with self-signed
certificates [1])". I'm not sure how solid that 7 million number is, but
it's fair to say that it's probably a lot--I run into HTTPS sites that
use a self-signed certificate fairly regularly, and they're generated by
default when I install mod_ssl on my machines.

DANE using/not using this will be as a result of the users out there
already doing it or in spite of them IMHO.

[1]
https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/keyassure/current/msg01810.html

--=20
Scott Schmit

--1yeeQ81UyVL57Vl7
Content-Type: application/x-pkcs7-signature
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="smime.p7s"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
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--1yeeQ81UyVL57Vl7--

From trevorf@exchange.microsoft.com  Mon Nov 14 04:53:55 2011
Return-Path: <trevorf@exchange.microsoft.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id DD45311E8284 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 04:53:55 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -110.69
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-110.69 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.091, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-8, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id LLKzE8JHGAvQ for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 04:53:55 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail.exchange.microsoft.com (mail7.exchange.microsoft.com [131.107.1.27]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 618CB11E815A for <pkix@ietf.org>; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 04:53:55 -0800 (PST)
Received: from df-h14-02.exchange.corp.microsoft.com (157.54.78.140) by DF-G14-02.exchange.corp.microsoft.com (157.54.87.56) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 14.2.247.2; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 04:53:55 -0800
Received: from PIO-MLT-06.exchange.corp.microsoft.com (157.54.94.24) by DF-H14-02.exchange.corp.microsoft.com (157.54.78.140) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 14.2.247.5; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 04:53:54 -0800
Received: from DF-M14-12.exchange.corp.microsoft.com ([fe80::7c94:4036:120:c95f]) by PIO-MLT-06.exchange.corp.microsoft.com ([fe80::d57f:521a:3ae6:c130%10]) with mapi id 14.02.0247.002; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 04:53:54 -0800
From: Trevor Freeman <trevorf@exchange.microsoft.com>
To: Scott Schmit <i.grok@comcast.net>, "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
Thread-Index: AQHMomtbw9AJYcfzSUGCYGmTut3p+ZWsIlsAgAALNoCAAKU+gP//gLQg
Date: Mon, 14 Nov 2011 12:53:54 +0000
Message-ID: <E545B914D50B2A4B994F198378B1525D427887F7@DF-M14-12.exchange.corp.microsoft.com>
References: <CAE5D098.23FC%tmiller@mitre.org> <4EC07E91.4030704@ieca.com> <20111114122727.GA9731@odin.ulthar.us>
In-Reply-To: <20111114122727.GA9731@odin.ulthar.us>
Accept-Language: en-GB, en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
x-originating-ip: [157.54.123.12]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 14 Nov 2011 12:53:56 -0000

It's not just web sites. The protocol logs from our public email gateways s=
how the majority of SMTP servers who advertise STARTTLS on the internet hav=
e self-signed certificates.=20

-----Original Message-----
From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Sco=
tt Schmit
Sent: Monday, November 14, 2011 8:27 PM
To: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs

On Mon, Nov 14, 2011 at 10:36:01AM +0800, Sean Turner wrote:
> On 11/14/11 9:55 AM, Miller, Timothy J. wrote:
> >Um, maybe I missed something but there's no such thing as an=20
> >end-entity self-signed certificate.  Since constraints can't be=20
> >enforced every self-signed cert is potentially a CA, and should be treat=
ed as such.
>
> You're right there's no such thing as an EE self-signed cert according=20
> to RFC 5280.  The point is for RFC 5280 to be updated to say that=20
> there are such things as EE self-signed certs, which reflects reality=20
> (e.g., dane).

To head off the other subthread, I think it would be fairer to say "reflect=
s reality (e.g., the 7 million HTTPS servers with self-signed certificates =
[1])". I'm not sure how solid that 7 million number is, but it's fair to sa=
y that it's probably a lot--I run into HTTPS sites that use a self-signed c=
ertificate fairly regularly, and they're generated by default when I instal=
l mod_ssl on my machines.

DANE using/not using this will be as a result of the users out there alread=
y doing it or in spite of them IMHO.

[1]
https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/keyassure/current/msg01810.html

--
Scott Schmit

From tmiller@mitre.org  Mon Nov 14 05:21:04 2011
Return-Path: <tmiller@mitre.org>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 535D811E82CD for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 05:21:04 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id kRCohgE-xpZv for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 05:21:03 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (smtpksrv1.mitre.org [198.49.146.77]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6FB7111E82CB for <pkix@ietf.org>; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 05:21:03 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by localhost (Postfix) with SMTP id C3C1821B08F3; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 08:21:02 -0500 (EST)
Received: from IMCCAS01.MITRE.ORG (imccas01.mitre.org [129.83.29.78]) by smtpksrv1.mitre.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A16CF21B090A; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 08:21:02 -0500 (EST)
Received: from IMCMBX01.MITRE.ORG ([169.254.1.18]) by IMCCAS01.MITRE.ORG ([129.83.29.78]) with mapi id 14.01.0339.001; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 08:21:02 -0500
From: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
To: Trevor Freeman <trevorf@exchange.microsoft.com>, Sean Turner <turners@ieca.com>, "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
Thread-Index: AQHMomtYK+6nacw8f0a2iVOXAK08TJWri3kAgABrBoCAAFRlgA==
Date: Mon, 14 Nov 2011 13:21:01 +0000
Message-ID: <CAE67094.2414%tmiller@mitre.org>
In-Reply-To: <E545B914D50B2A4B994F198378B1525D42787E35@DF-M14-12.exchange.corp.microsoft.com>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
user-agent: Microsoft-MacOutlook/14.13.0.110805
x-originating-ip: [172.31.33.17]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-ID: <BC967413E7F8D144BAEC35C5BBA3A0E1@imc.mitre.org>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Cc: PKIX <pkix@ietf.org>, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 14 Nov 2011 13:21:04 -0000

I should have been more clear:  RFC5280 path vaildation does not apply to
self-signed certificates.  So none of the constraints in such certificates
apply with compliant algorithms.

In short, the change is insufficient because the text proposal is not
matched by behavior of the path validation algorithm, and the two should
align.

It may be relatively common practice to apply certificate path validation
to certificate trees of depth 0, but that doesn't make it safe.

-- T


On 11/13/11 8:18 PM, "Trevor Freeman" <trevorf@exchange.microsoft.com>
wrote:

>What about a application who wants to use a pki enabled protocol using a
>self-signed certificate because they will validate the certificate by
>other means  and will never issue a certificate to another entity. There
>are a lot of implementations who create such certificates and don't want
>to be branded as a CA. We do that in Microsoft Exchange and assert in the
>basic constraints =3D end entity in a self-signed certificate.
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
>Miller, Timothy J.
>Sent: Monday, November 14, 2011 9:56 AM
>To: Sean Turner; Kemp, David P.
>Cc: PKIX; Paul Hoffman
>Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
>
>Um, maybe I missed something but there's no such thing as an end-entity
>self-signed certificate.  Since constraints can't be enforced every
>self-signed cert is potentially a CA, and should be treated as such.
>
>-- T
>
>On 11/13/11 7:18 PM, "Sean Turner" <turners@ieca.com> wrote:
>
>>So maybe I'm being simple minded but this is pretty much what I was
>>asking for.
>>
>>spt
>>
>>On 9/28/11 12:16 AM, Kemp, David P. wrote:
>>> Change 1 - on page 12 replace:
>>>    "X.509 v3 also includes an extension that identifies the subject of
>>>a
>>>     certificate as being either a CA or an end entity, reducing the
>>>     reliance on out-of-band information demanded in PEM.
>>>
>>> with:
>>>     X.509 v3 also includes two extensions that identify ...
>>>
>>>
>>> Change 2 - on page 12-13 replace:
>>>    "This specification covers two classes of certificates: CA
>>>     certificates and end entity certificates.  CA certificates may be
>>>     further divided into three classes: cross-certificates, self-issued
>>>     certificates, and self-signed certificates.  Cross-certificates are
>>>     CA certificates in which the issuer and subject are different
>>>     entities.  Cross-certificates describe a trust relationship between
>>>     the two CAs.  Self-issued certificates are CA certificates in which
>>>     the issuer and subject are the same entity.  Self-issued
>>>certificates
>>>     are generated to support changes in policy or operations.  Self-
>>>     signed certificates are self-issued certificates where the digital
>>>     signature may be verified by the public key bound into the
>>>     certificate.  Self-signed certificates are used to convey a public
>>>     key for use to begin certification paths.  End entity certificates
>>>     are issued to subjects that are not authorized to issue
>>>certificates."
>>>
>>> with:
>>>
>>>    "This specification covers two classes of certificates: CA
>>>     certificates and end entity certificates.  CA and EE certificates
>>>may  be
>>>     further divided into three classes: CA-issued certificates,
>>>self-issued
>>>     certificates, and self-signed certificates.  Cross-certificates are
>>>     CA certificates in which the issuer and subject are different
>>>     entities.  Cross-certificates describe a trust relationship between
>>>     the two CAs.  Self-issued certificates are certificates in which
>>>     the issuer and subject are the same entity.  Self-issued
>>>certificates
>>>     are generated to support changes in policy or operations.  Self-
>>>     signed certificates are self-issued certificates where the digital
>>>     signature may be verified by the public key bound into the
>>>     certificate.  Self-signed CA certificates are used to convey a
>>>public
>>>     key for use to begin certification paths.  End entity certificates
>>>     are issued to subjects that are not authorized to issue
>>>certificates.
>>>     Self-signed end entity certificates are used to convey a public key
>>>     and other information directly to relying parties without using
>>>     a PKI."
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf
>>> Of Paul Hoffman
>>> Sent: Tuesday, September 27, 2011 9:55 AM
>>> To: PKIX
>>> Subject: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs (was: Re: AD Review
>>> ofdraft-ietf-pkix-rfc5280-clarifications-03.txt)
>>>
>>>> On Aug 22, 2011, at 5:52 AM, Sean Turner wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> I think the -03 version is just about ready to go.  That is I have
>>>>> no
>>> comments on the existing text though I expect getting it through the
>>> IESG will be interesting (Apps ADs love to discuss about anything to
>>> do with characters strings/sets).  But, I think this draft needs to
>>> also address the issue of self-signed EE certificates.  I know at
>>> least the DANE WG had a lengthy discussion about self-signed EE
>>> certificates, I see that Max's EST draft also includes them, and
>>> they're used in the wild.  I want to see text included that addresses
>>>them.
>>>>>
>>>
>>> This thread started there, but then sidetracked on more "improvements"
>>> on trust anchors that are express as certificates. Could we please
>>> have two threads?
>>>
>>> --Paul Hoffman
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> pkix mailing list
>>> pkix@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> pkix mailing list
>>> pkix@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>>>
>>_______________________________________________
>>pkix mailing list
>>pkix@ietf.org
>>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>
>_______________________________________________
>pkix mailing list
>pkix@ietf.org
>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix


From tmiller@mitre.org  Mon Nov 14 05:30:01 2011
Return-Path: <tmiller@mitre.org>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7112821F8CBD for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 05:30:01 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id mH4ORFh4gwgx for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 05:30:00 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (smtpksrv1.mitre.org [198.49.146.77]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7982021F8CBB for <pkix@ietf.org>; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 05:30:00 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by localhost (Postfix) with SMTP id 23C6F21B0915; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 08:30:00 -0500 (EST)
Received: from IMCCAS02.MITRE.ORG (imccas02.mitre.org [129.83.29.79]) by smtpksrv1.mitre.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0E9A321B0920; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 08:30:00 -0500 (EST)
Received: from IMCMBX01.MITRE.ORG ([169.254.1.18]) by IMCCAS02.MITRE.ORG ([129.83.29.79]) with mapi id 14.01.0339.001; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 08:29:59 -0500
From: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
To: Trevor Freeman <trevorf@exchange.microsoft.com>, Sean Turner <turners@ieca.com>, "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
Thread-Index: AQHMomtYK+6nacw8f0a2iVOXAK08TJWri3kAgABrBoCAAFRlgIAAAn+A
Date: Mon, 14 Nov 2011 13:29:59 +0000
Message-ID: <CAE67287.2424%tmiller@mitre.org>
In-Reply-To: <CAE67094.2414%tmiller@mitre.org>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
user-agent: Microsoft-MacOutlook/14.13.0.110805
x-originating-ip: [172.31.33.17]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-ID: <9E724C957C615A4696761E944AAEFE14@imc.mitre.org>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Cc: PKIX <pkix@ietf.org>, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 14 Nov 2011 13:30:01 -0000

To elaborate:  If you want to transport public keys in X.509 structures
for convenience, by all means go ahead.  But if you're not going to follow
X.509 trust models, you shouldn't be using X.509 processing to validate
those keys; roll your own and be explicit about it.

Key continuity management is a perfectly valid concept (and more secure
though more cumbersome than X.509), but expecting to translate seamlessly
between that model and X.509 without any issues is a mistake.  The
differences in understanding, both obvious and subtle, create
opportunities for exploitation.

-- T


On 11/14/11 7:21 AM, "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org> wrote:

>I should have been more clear:  RFC5280 path vaildation does not apply to
>self-signed certificates.  So none of the constraints in such certificates
>apply with compliant algorithms.
>
>In short, the change is insufficient because the text proposal is not
>matched by behavior of the path validation algorithm, and the two should
>align.
>
>It may be relatively common practice to apply certificate path validation
>to certificate trees of depth 0, but that doesn't make it safe.
>
>-- T
>
>
>On 11/13/11 8:18 PM, "Trevor Freeman" <trevorf@exchange.microsoft.com>
>wrote:
>
>>What about a application who wants to use a pki enabled protocol using a
>>self-signed certificate because they will validate the certificate by
>>other means  and will never issue a certificate to another entity. There
>>are a lot of implementations who create such certificates and don't want
>>to be branded as a CA. We do that in Microsoft Exchange and assert in the
>>basic constraints =3D end entity in a self-signed certificate.
>>
>>-----Original Message-----
>>From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
>>Miller, Timothy J.
>>Sent: Monday, November 14, 2011 9:56 AM
>>To: Sean Turner; Kemp, David P.
>>Cc: PKIX; Paul Hoffman
>>Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
>>
>>Um, maybe I missed something but there's no such thing as an end-entity
>>self-signed certificate.  Since constraints can't be enforced every
>>self-signed cert is potentially a CA, and should be treated as such.
>>
>>-- T
>>
>>On 11/13/11 7:18 PM, "Sean Turner" <turners@ieca.com> wrote:
>>
>>>So maybe I'm being simple minded but this is pretty much what I was
>>>asking for.
>>>
>>>spt
>>>
>>>On 9/28/11 12:16 AM, Kemp, David P. wrote:
>>>> Change 1 - on page 12 replace:
>>>>    "X.509 v3 also includes an extension that identifies the subject of
>>>>a
>>>>     certificate as being either a CA or an end entity, reducing the
>>>>     reliance on out-of-band information demanded in PEM.
>>>>
>>>> with:
>>>>     X.509 v3 also includes two extensions that identify ...
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Change 2 - on page 12-13 replace:
>>>>    "This specification covers two classes of certificates: CA
>>>>     certificates and end entity certificates.  CA certificates may be
>>>>     further divided into three classes: cross-certificates,
>>>>self-issued
>>>>     certificates, and self-signed certificates.  Cross-certificates
>>>>are
>>>>     CA certificates in which the issuer and subject are different
>>>>     entities.  Cross-certificates describe a trust relationship
>>>>between
>>>>     the two CAs.  Self-issued certificates are CA certificates in
>>>>which
>>>>     the issuer and subject are the same entity.  Self-issued
>>>>certificates
>>>>     are generated to support changes in policy or operations.  Self-
>>>>     signed certificates are self-issued certificates where the digital
>>>>     signature may be verified by the public key bound into the
>>>>     certificate.  Self-signed certificates are used to convey a public
>>>>     key for use to begin certification paths.  End entity certificates
>>>>     are issued to subjects that are not authorized to issue
>>>>certificates."
>>>>
>>>> with:
>>>>
>>>>    "This specification covers two classes of certificates: CA
>>>>     certificates and end entity certificates.  CA and EE certificates
>>>>may  be
>>>>     further divided into three classes: CA-issued certificates,
>>>>self-issued
>>>>     certificates, and self-signed certificates.  Cross-certificates
>>>>are
>>>>     CA certificates in which the issuer and subject are different
>>>>     entities.  Cross-certificates describe a trust relationship
>>>>between
>>>>     the two CAs.  Self-issued certificates are certificates in which
>>>>     the issuer and subject are the same entity.  Self-issued
>>>>certificates
>>>>     are generated to support changes in policy or operations.  Self-
>>>>     signed certificates are self-issued certificates where the digital
>>>>     signature may be verified by the public key bound into the
>>>>     certificate.  Self-signed CA certificates are used to convey a
>>>>public
>>>>     key for use to begin certification paths.  End entity certificates
>>>>     are issued to subjects that are not authorized to issue
>>>>certificates.
>>>>     Self-signed end entity certificates are used to convey a public
>>>>key
>>>>     and other information directly to relying parties without using
>>>>     a PKI."
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>> From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf
>>>> Of Paul Hoffman
>>>> Sent: Tuesday, September 27, 2011 9:55 AM
>>>> To: PKIX
>>>> Subject: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs (was: Re: AD Review
>>>> ofdraft-ietf-pkix-rfc5280-clarifications-03.txt)
>>>>
>>>>> On Aug 22, 2011, at 5:52 AM, Sean Turner wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> I think the -03 version is just about ready to go.  That is I have
>>>>>> no
>>>> comments on the existing text though I expect getting it through the
>>>> IESG will be interesting (Apps ADs love to discuss about anything to
>>>> do with characters strings/sets).  But, I think this draft needs to
>>>> also address the issue of self-signed EE certificates.  I know at
>>>> least the DANE WG had a lengthy discussion about self-signed EE
>>>> certificates, I see that Max's EST draft also includes them, and
>>>> they're used in the wild.  I want to see text included that addresses
>>>>them.
>>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> This thread started there, but then sidetracked on more "improvements"
>>>> on trust anchors that are express as certificates. Could we please
>>>> have two threads?
>>>>
>>>> --Paul Hoffman
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> pkix mailing list
>>>> pkix@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> pkix mailing list
>>>> pkix@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>>>>
>>>_______________________________________________
>>>pkix mailing list
>>>pkix@ietf.org
>>>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>>
>>_______________________________________________
>>pkix mailing list
>>pkix@ietf.org
>>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>
>_______________________________________________
>pkix mailing list
>pkix@ietf.org
>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix


From tim.moses@entrust.com  Mon Nov 14 06:18:28 2011
Return-Path: <tim.moses@entrust.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 99C3011E8297 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 06:18:28 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id ixKEWOXOu9sT for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 06:18:28 -0800 (PST)
Received: from ipedge2.entrust.com (ipedge2.entrust.com [216.191.252.25]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E58EE11E8206 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 06:18:27 -0800 (PST)
X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.69,509,1315195200";  d="scan'208";a="193159"
Received: from unknown (HELO sottexch7.corp.ad.entrust.com) ([10.4.51.73]) by ipedge2.entrust.com with ESMTP; 14 Nov 2011 09:18:27 -0500
Received: from sottexch7.corp.ad.entrust.com ([fe80::ed40:b6f9:9995:701f]) by sottexch7.corp.ad.entrust.com ([fe80::ed40:b6f9:9995:701f%10]) with mapi; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 09:18:26 -0500
From: Tim Moses <tim.moses@entrust.com>
To: 'Yoav Nir' <ynir@checkpoint.com>
Date: Mon, 14 Nov 2011 09:18:26 -0500
Thread-Topic: [pkix] Malaysian CA (Was: An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version)
Thread-Index: Acyg2Ub3RMI/b9w+RYC9f8ND9Oxu0wB/YOKA
Message-ID: <A3144629B5AC714A8BF27806EBFA7057012ED55F27@sottexch7.corp.ad.entrust.com>
References: <E1ROevP-0002Jn-Pj@login01.fos.auckland.ac.nz> <CAE29EB4.92D7%ynir@checkpoint.com>
In-Reply-To: <CAE29EB4.92D7%ynir@checkpoint.com>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
acceptlanguage: en-US
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Cc: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] Malaysian CA (Was: An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version)
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 14 Nov 2011 14:18:28 -0000

Yoav - I don't believe CA-generated subscriber key-pairs is a common practi=
ce in the mainstream SSL PKI.

I agree, if the only mistake this CA made was to certify some weak keys, th=
en it would have been asked to revoke them, adjust some settings and contin=
ue with its business.

In general, PKIX CAs are not forgiven for signing any old thing presented t=
o them in a certificate request.  They are required to enforce policy flowe=
d down to them by upstream CAs and (ultimately) the policy management autho=
rity.

Best regards.  Tim.

-----Original Message-----
From: Yoav Nir [mailto:ynir@checkpoint.com]=20
Sent: Friday, November 11, 2011 8:21 PM
To: Peter Gutmann; Tim Moses
Cc: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] Malaysian CA (Was: An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: Ne=
w Version)



On 11/11/11 2:24 AM, "Peter Gutmann" <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> wrote:

>Tim Moses <tim.moses@entrust.com> writes:
>
>>You've answered your own question.  Why would a CA be generating server
>>SSL
>>keys?
>
>The CA generates the client's key for them and sends it out as a PKCS #12
>file, it's relatively common.  So no, I don't think he's answered his own
>question.
>
>Peter.

True. Most website administrators don't know the secret openssl
incantation to generate a PKCS#10.

If all the CA did was agree to sign requests without checking for weak
keys, that could be considered a bug worth fixing, but it would be
entirely their customers' fault. If that had prompted the blacklisting and
revocation of the CA certificate, I would say the community was
over-reacting this time.

Yoav


From mrex@sap.com  Mon Nov 14 10:38:34 2011
Return-Path: <mrex@sap.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5E69811E81EE for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 10:38:34 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -9.362
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-9.362 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.628, BAYES_00=-2.599, HELO_EQ_DE=0.35, J_CHICKENPOX_24=0.6, J_CHICKENPOX_25=0.6, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-8, SARE_MILLIONSOF=0.315]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id GqtWlPuBSdgG for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 10:38:33 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpde02.sap-ag.de (smtpde02.sap-ag.de [155.56.68.140]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8EBC011E81B0 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 10:38:33 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail.sap.corp by smtpde02.sap-ag.de (26) with ESMTP id pAEIcNED011576 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=OK); Mon, 14 Nov 2011 19:38:24 +0100 (MET)
From: Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
Message-Id: <201111141838.pAEIcNLh016480@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp>
To: tmiller@mitre.org (Miller Timothy J.)
Date: Mon, 14 Nov 2011 19:38:23 +0100 (MET)
In-Reply-To: <CAE67094.2414%tmiller@mitre.org> from "Miller, Timothy J." at Nov 14, 11 01:21:01 pm
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-SAP: out
Cc: pkix@ietf.org, paul.hoffman@vpnc.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
Reply-To: mrex@sap.com
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 14 Nov 2011 18:38:34 -0000

Miller, Timothy J. wrote:
> 
> I should have been more clear:  RFC5280 path validation does not apply to
> self-signed certificates.  So none of the constraints in such certificates
> apply with compliant algorithms.

That is sort-of correct.


> 
> In short, the change is insufficient because the text proposal is not
> matched by behavior of the path validation algorithm, and the two should
> align.
> 
> It may be relatively common practice to apply certificate path validation
> to certificate trees of depth 0, but that doesn't make it safe.

Neither X.509[1] nor PKIX(rfc5280)[2] define a
"certificate path validation to certificate trees of depth 0"
so I'm somewhat confused what you mean.


[1] X.509-200811  10.5.1 Basic certificate check

   Self-signed certificates, if encountered in the path, are ignored.


[2] rfc5280, Section 6.1  Basic Path Validation, near end of page 73

   When the trust anchor is provided in the form of a self-signed
   certificate, this self-signed certificate is not included as part of
   the prospective certification path. 


Anyhow, some existing _implementations_ (igoring X.509 and PKIX specs)
will path-validate self-signed certs to itself (i.e. receiving a self-signed
cert as end-entity cert and check it against a locally stored trust anchor
containing the same self-signed cert.  That operation will likely succeed
for self-signed certs that look like CA certs, i.e. either X.509v3 with
BasicContraint cA=TRUE or X.509v1.  I don't know well it works for
self-signed X.509v3 certs with BasicConstraint cA=FALSE or without
BasicConstraints.


The current situation is that X.509 explicitly says that the standard
does not cover self-signed end-entity certs:


  3.4.61 self-signed certificate: A special case of self-issued
         certificates where the private key used by the CA to sign
         the certificate corresponds to the public key that is
         certified within the certificate. A CA might use a self-signed
         certificate, for example, to advertise their public key or other
         information about their operations.

     NOTE  Use of self-issued certificates and self-signed certificates
           issued by other than CAs are outside the scope of this
           Recommendation | International Standard.

And rfc-5280, being a mere profile of X.509, therefore does not currently
describe (desired) semantics and processing of self-signed X.509 certs
either.

In spite of X.509 and rfc5280 being silent about them, self-signed
X.509 certs are in widespread use (millions of them in current use),
and implementations have been supporting their use for decades.

So the only part that is lacking is coverage and guidance by the
standards, following the current practice of the installed base
where possible.


-Martin

From mrex@sap.com  Mon Nov 14 10:53:07 2011
Return-Path: <mrex@sap.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B0F8121F8D05 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 10:53:07 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -10.105
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-10.105 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.144, BAYES_00=-2.599, HELO_EQ_DE=0.35, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-8]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 1PvR6fext4P8 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 10:53:07 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpde02.sap-ag.de (smtpde02.sap-ag.de [155.56.68.140]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5EEB221F8D04 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 10:53:06 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail.sap.corp by smtpde02.sap-ag.de (26) with ESMTP id pAEIr1tT019746 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=OK); Mon, 14 Nov 2011 19:53:01 +0100 (MET)
From: Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
Message-Id: <201111141853.pAEIr0ff017348@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp>
To: trevorf@exchange.microsoft.com (Trevor Freeman)
Date: Mon, 14 Nov 2011 19:53:00 +0100 (MET)
In-Reply-To: <E545B914D50B2A4B994F198378B1525D427887F7@DF-M14-12.exchange.corp.microsoft.com> from "Trevor Freeman" at Nov 14, 11 12:53:54 pm
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-SAP: out
Cc: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
Reply-To: mrex@sap.com
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 14 Nov 2011 18:53:07 -0000

Trevor Freeman wrote:
> 
> It's not just web sites. The protocol logs from our public email
> gateways show the majority of SMTP servers who advertise STARTTLS
> on the internet have self-signed certificates. 

SMPTS & STARTTLS are a completely different issue.  Their purpose
is _strictly_ limited to optimistic encryption.  Both, PKIX certificate
path validation of any kind as well as server endpoint identification
of the hostname would preclude the TLS handshake to complete
successfully in the installed base of TLS servers.  And it is far
too late to turn back the clock on the installed base.


Even such large companies such as Google use X.509 certs from
a private CA (which precludes PKIX certificate path validation)
and through the use of DNS MX-record indirection there is *NO*
secure match between target/recipient domain and the names contained
in the SMTP server's TLS server certificate.

Most TLS servers will fallback to SMTP (MTA-to-MTA) delivery,
in which case both checks (PKIX path validation and server
endpoint identification) would not provide any real security anyway.

-Martin

From tmiller@mitre.org  Mon Nov 14 11:00:39 2011
Return-Path: <tmiller@mitre.org>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id AF84E21F8E56 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 11:00:39 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id hoAQpjCmvpTy for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 11:00:39 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (smtpksrv1.mitre.org [198.49.146.77]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D5D1E21F8E4C for <pkix@ietf.org>; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 11:00:38 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by localhost (Postfix) with SMTP id 1B4BA21B0AA7; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 14:00:38 -0500 (EST)
Received: from IMCCAS04.MITRE.ORG (imccas04.mitre.org [129.83.29.81]) by smtpksrv1.mitre.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id F37AE21B0AC9; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 14:00:37 -0500 (EST)
Received: from IMCMBX01.MITRE.ORG ([169.254.1.18]) by IMCCAS04.MITRE.ORG ([129.83.29.81]) with mapi id 14.01.0339.001; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 14:00:37 -0500
From: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
To: "mrex@sap.com" <mrex@sap.com>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
Thread-Index: AQHMovyWK+6nacw8f0a2iVOXAK08TJWsqJwA
Date: Mon, 14 Nov 2011 19:00:37 +0000
Message-ID: <CAE6BEF2.2480%tmiller@mitre.org>
In-Reply-To: <201111141838.pAEIcNLh016480@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
user-agent: Microsoft-MacOutlook/14.13.0.110805
x-originating-ip: [172.31.35.80]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-ID: <9A8EEBCE8918FA4C8E65FE013706D141@imc.mitre.org>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Cc: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>, "DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil" <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>, "paul.hoffman@vpnc.org" <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 14 Nov 2011 19:00:39 -0000

On 11/14/11 12:38 PM, "Martin Rex" <mrex@sap.com> wrote:

>So the only part that is lacking is coverage and guidance by the
>standards, following the current practice of the installed base
>where possible.

I believe I said:

>In short, the change is insufficient because the text proposal is not
>matched by behavior of the path validation algorithm, and the two should
>align.


The proposal text adds self-signed certificates to descriptive text but
doesn't include self-signed certificates into the important bits, like
adding them to the path validation algorithm.  This is a problem, and as
pointed out in private mail we actually have a way to do this in RFC 5937,
but that's only Informational.

Proceeding with any change that fails to change the algorithm would do
nothing to drive convergence of inconsistent implementations, and would
IMHO exacerbate the problem by making it seem as if the RFC covers the
case when it actually does not.

Without changes to both the descriptive text and the algorithm, I wouldn't
consider the proposal complete.


-- T


From DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil  Mon Nov 14 12:29:19 2011
Return-Path: <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A067921F8E8E for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 12:29:19 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id XjM0T3bCQZOR for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 12:29:19 -0800 (PST)
Received: from stingray.missi.ncsc.mil (stingray.missi.ncsc.mil [144.51.50.20]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id F367021F8E8D for <pkix@ietf.org>; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 12:29:18 -0800 (PST)
Received: from AUGUSTINE.missi.ncsc.mil (augustine.missi.ncsc.mil [144.51.60.33]) by stingray.missi.ncsc.mil with ESMTP id pAEKTHXo052625 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 15:29:18 -0500 (EST)
Received: from DABECK.missi.ncsc.mil ([144.51.60.16]) by AUGUSTINE.missi.ncsc.mil with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.4675);  Mon, 14 Nov 2011 15:29:56 -0500
Content-class: urn:content-classes:message
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft Exchange V6.5
Date: Mon, 14 Nov 2011 15:29:16 -0500
Message-ID: <C1A47F1540DF3246A8D30C853C05D0DA01B96B70@DABECK.missi.ncsc.mil>
In-Reply-To: <CAE6BEF2.2480%tmiller@mitre.org>
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
Thread-Topic: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
Thread-Index: AQHMovyWK+6nacw8f0a2iVOXAK08TJWsqJwAgAAdE2A=
References: <201111141838.pAEIcNLh016480@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp> <CAE6BEF2.2480%tmiller@mitre.org>
From: "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>
To: <pkix@ietf.org>
X-OriginalArrivalTime: 14 Nov 2011 20:29:56.0687 (UTC) FILETIME=[2C684DF0:01CCA30C]
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 14 Nov 2011 20:29:19 -0000

Nothing precludes an Informational RFC (such as 5937) from being
included in a list of acquisition requirements, and nothing precludes
vendors from building products that comply with Informational RFCs.
There's no reason to believe that the standards-track status of the RFC
will affect its speed of adoption.

The 5280 proposed descriptive text changes it from being incompatible
with self-signed EE certs to being compatible with them.  Fixing that
obstacle to convergence is necessary regardless of whether/how
additional incentives are applied.

Dave



-----Original Message-----
From: Miller, Timothy J. [mailto:tmiller@mitre.org]=20
Sent: Monday, November 14, 2011 2:01 PM
To: mrex@sap.com
Cc: trevorf@exchange.microsoft.com; turners@ieca.com; Kemp, David P.;
pkix@ietf.org; paul.hoffman@vpnc.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs

On 11/14/11 12:38 PM, "Martin Rex" <mrex@sap.com> wrote:

>So the only part that is lacking is coverage and guidance by the=20
>standards, following the current practice of the installed base where=20
>possible.

I believe I said:

>In short, the change is insufficient because the text proposal is not=20
>matched by behavior of the path validation algorithm, and the two=20
>should align.


The proposal text adds self-signed certificates to descriptive text but
doesn't include self-signed certificates into the important bits, like
adding them to the path validation algorithm.  This is a problem, and as
pointed out in private mail we actually have a way to do this in RFC
5937, but that's only Informational.

Proceeding with any change that fails to change the algorithm would do
nothing to drive convergence of inconsistent implementations, and would
IMHO exacerbate the problem by making it seem as if the RFC covers the
case when it actually does not.

Without changes to both the descriptive text and the algorithm, I
wouldn't consider the proposal complete.


-- T


From mrex@sap.com  Mon Nov 14 12:47:59 2011
Return-Path: <mrex@sap.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3A7981F0CE2 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 12:47:59 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -9.808
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-9.808 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.159, BAYES_00=-2.599, HELO_EQ_DE=0.35, J_CHICKENPOX_24=0.6, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-8]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 72A84kE2nkbs for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 12:47:58 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpde01.sap-ag.de (smtpde01.sap-ag.de [155.56.68.170]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5C1071F0CD6 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 12:47:58 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail.sap.corp by smtpde01.sap-ag.de (26) with ESMTP id pAEKlmtv005292 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=OK); Mon, 14 Nov 2011 21:47:48 +0100 (MET)
From: Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
Message-Id: <201111142047.pAEKllRY024093@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp>
To: tmiller@mitre.org (Miller Timothy J.)
Date: Mon, 14 Nov 2011 21:47:47 +0100 (MET)
In-Reply-To: <CAE6BEF2.2480%tmiller@mitre.org> from "Miller, Timothy J." at Nov 14, 11 07:00:37 pm
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-SAP: out
Cc: paul.hoffman@vpnc.org, pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
Reply-To: mrex@sap.com
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 14 Nov 2011 20:47:59 -0000

Miller, Timothy J. wrote:
> 
> On 11/14/11 12:38 PM, "Martin Rex" <mrex@sap.com> wrote:
> 
> >So the only part that is lacking is coverage and guidance by the
> >standards, following the current practice of the installed base
> >where possible.
> 
> I believe I said:
> 
> >In short, the change is insufficient because the text proposal is not
> >matched by behavior of the path validation algorithm, and the two should
> >align.

I'm sorry, I failed to read the prior messages:
https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/current/msg29992.html
https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/current/msg29772.html


> 
> The proposal text adds self-signed certificates to descriptive text but
> doesn't include self-signed certificates into the important bits, like
> adding them to the path validation algorithm.  This is a problem,
> 
> Proceeding with any change that fails to change the algorithm would do
> nothing to drive convergence of inconsistent implementations, and would
> IMHO exacerbate the problem by making it seem as if the RFC covers the
> case when it actually does not.
> 
> Without changes to both the descriptive text and the algorithm, I wouldn't
> consider the proposal complete.

I agree.  The more important part is not officially acknowledging
that they do exist, but how they should (not) be processed.

In particular, a guidance what such certs should look like that they're
less likely to get confused with real CA certs when configured as trusted.

But that is likely also the more controversial part...


>
> and as pointed out in private mail we actually have a way to do this
> in RFC 5937, but that's only Informational.

RFC 5937 "Using Trust Anchor Constraints during Certification Path Processing"
is IMO entirely irrelevant to the issue of self-signed end-entity certs,
that exist, by definition, in a PKI-less space.  There are only two
attributes where "honoring" by default IMO makes sense (a) the validity
and (b) absence of BasicConstraints cA=TRUE.


rfc5937 & rfc5914 only makes sense for rootCA certs of PKIs, and even
there they're completely irrelevent for >90% of the installed base.


Btw. the name constraints processing in rfc5937 might interact badly
with (b) and (c) of rfc5280 section 6.1.3.

-Martin

From trevorf@exchange.microsoft.com  Mon Nov 14 16:44:42 2011
Return-Path: <trevorf@exchange.microsoft.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C3C7421F8E51 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 16:44:42 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -110.682
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-110.682 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.083, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-8, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 5SaiL0nvzjoW for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 16:44:42 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail.exchange.microsoft.com (mail7.exchange.microsoft.com [131.107.1.27]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 401F221F8E4D for <pkix@ietf.org>; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 16:44:42 -0800 (PST)
Received: from df-h14-02.exchange.corp.microsoft.com (157.54.78.140) by DF-G14-02.exchange.corp.microsoft.com (157.54.87.56) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 14.2.247.2; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 16:44:41 -0800
Received: from PIO-MLT-05.exchange.corp.microsoft.com (157.54.94.22) by DF-H14-02.exchange.corp.microsoft.com (157.54.78.140) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 14.2.247.5; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 16:44:41 -0800
Received: from DF-M14-12.exchange.corp.microsoft.com ([fe80::7c94:4036:120:c95f]) by PIO-MLT-05.exchange.corp.microsoft.com ([fe80::d940:e316:1daa:5e6a%10]) with mapi id 14.02.0247.002; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 16:44:41 -0800
From: Trevor Freeman <trevorf@exchange.microsoft.com>
To: "mrex@sap.com" <mrex@sap.com>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
Thread-Index: AQHMov6hw9AJYcfzSUGCYGmTut3p+ZWtF19A
Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2011 00:44:40 +0000
Message-ID: <E545B914D50B2A4B994F198378B1525D42788F1B@DF-M14-12.exchange.corp.microsoft.com>
References: <E545B914D50B2A4B994F198378B1525D427887F7@DF-M14-12.exchange.corp.microsoft.com> from "Trevor Freeman" at Nov 14, 11 12:53:54 pm <201111141853.pAEIr0ff017348@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp>
In-Reply-To: <201111141853.pAEIr0ff017348@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp>
Accept-Language: en-GB, en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
x-originating-ip: [157.54.123.12]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Cc: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2011 00:44:42 -0000

Wow - Martin you cannot seriously expect me to buy into such as sweeping ge=
neralization.

It is a matter of local policy what the sending server does wrt the receivi=
ng server certificate. It is common practice for organization to enforce TL=
S authentication with partner domains. Some verticals have adopted it as a =
requirement.  At Microsoft we have over 50 domains we enforce TLS authentic=
ation for SMTP delivery.  If the server does not have a local policy for th=
e domain; it does not validate the certificate resulting in unauthenticated=
 encrypted deliver which is a security oxymoron but it gives some people co=
mfort. Probably the same set that think man did not land on the moon and El=
vis is alive.

Trevor=20

-----Original Message-----
From: Martin Rex [mailto:mrex@sap.com]=20
Sent: Tuesday, November 15, 2011 2:53 AM
To: Trevor Freeman
Cc: i.grok@comcast.net; pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs

Trevor Freeman wrote:
>=20
> It's not just web sites. The protocol logs from our public email=20
> gateways show the majority of SMTP servers who advertise STARTTLS on=20
> the internet have self-signed certificates.

SMPTS & STARTTLS are a completely different issue.  Their purpose is _stric=
tly_ limited to optimistic encryption.  Both, PKIX certificate path validat=
ion of any kind as well as server endpoint identification of the hostname w=
ould preclude the TLS handshake to complete successfully in the installed b=
ase of TLS servers.  And it is far too late to turn back the clock on the i=
nstalled base.


Even such large companies such as Google use X.509 certs from a private CA =
(which precludes PKIX certificate path validation) and through the use of D=
NS MX-record indirection there is *NO* secure match between target/recipien=
t domain and the names contained in the SMTP server's TLS server certificat=
e.

Most TLS servers will fallback to SMTP (MTA-to-MTA) delivery, in which case=
 both checks (PKIX path validation and server endpoint identification) woul=
d not provide any real security anyway.

-Martin

From pgut001@login01.cs.auckland.ac.nz  Mon Nov 14 16:49:43 2011
Return-Path: <pgut001@login01.cs.auckland.ac.nz>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7452E21F8E4D for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 16:49:43 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.566
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.566 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.033,  BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id l1fcaGhJfUuT for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 16:49:42 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mx2.auckland.ac.nz (mx2.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.12.44]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 89B8821F8E4C for <pkix@ietf.org>; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 16:49:41 -0800 (PST)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=auckland.ac.nz; i=pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz; q=dns/txt; s=uoa; t=1321318182; x=1352854182; h=from:to:subject:cc:in-reply-to:message-id:date; bh=7ZDSGsCHL7F6Ktja4vHO/GwY9KaGS9YFm44Gc70R57s=; b=Wv5C/RPQOhyswqTAzUV7z9Z/AByd2KPmW/6eV3obOge1cQPhuckI5YtR ga5K/5xEHK4PhyllGSUlAm/WILOjsAn+CXv0rVjypGiS4FaISLL0y/B0b bhT8xKQhAli/Z8r9wfCOWSC6cWOTs95ci5qsv2nAEaipuRBGwPZ2nxHZz w=;
X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.69,512,1315137600"; d="scan'208";a="90316006"
X-Ironport-HAT: UNIVERSITY - $RELAY-THROTTLE
X-Ironport-Source: 130.216.34.40 - Outgoing - Outgoing
Received: from login01.fos.auckland.ac.nz ([130.216.34.40]) by mx2-int.auckland.ac.nz with ESMTP/TLS/AES256-SHA; 15 Nov 2011 13:49:40 +1300
Received: from pgut001 by login01.fos.auckland.ac.nz with local (Exim 4.69) (envelope-from <pgut001@login01.cs.auckland.ac.nz>) id 1RQ7DX-0004dU-W3; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 13:49:39 +1300
From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: tim.moses@entrust.com, ynir@checkpoint.com
In-Reply-To: <A3144629B5AC714A8BF27806EBFA7057012ED55F27@sottexch7.corp.ad.entrust.com>
Message-Id: <E1RQ7DX-0004dU-W3@login01.fos.auckland.ac.nz>
Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2011 13:49:39 +1300
Cc: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] Malaysian CA (Was: An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version)
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2011 00:49:43 -0000

Tim Moses <tim.moses@entrust.com> writes:

>I don't believe CA-generated subscriber key-pairs is a common practice in the
>mainstream SSL PKI.

Unfortunately we don't have any real figures for this, but I run into it an
awful lot.  I'd rate it as "disturbingly widespread", possibly not so much for
SSL PKI but for higher-value stuff like signing of messages/transactions.
That's more or less the reverse of what you'd really want to see, SSL's PKI is
effectively anon-DH so it doesn't really matter where you get your keys from,
but when you're signing tax returns or EDI transactions you probably want a
bit of control over where your key's been.

Peter.

From pgut001@login01.cs.auckland.ac.nz  Mon Nov 14 17:19:23 2011
Return-Path: <pgut001@login01.cs.auckland.ac.nz>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 36F861F0CF1 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 17:19:23 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.569
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.569 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.030,  BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id miF0UNzWL3bs for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 17:19:22 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mx2.auckland.ac.nz (mx2.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.12.44]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3C2701F0CE1 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 17:19:21 -0800 (PST)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=auckland.ac.nz; i=pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz; q=dns/txt; s=uoa; t=1321319962; x=1352855962; h=from:to:subject:in-reply-to:message-id:date; bh=UmE/z7EmDt1kP98kuX6L5tsI2Ao6tYd1qTGOvfCV4aU=; b=nyE+8VzNAJWxatBAh3GYCnx1KdrOdzJGKiJyCP9V/s74jivjGMpvWtHr amVscg90JFrg8FUanehDf+YKIlCknU0/N3sjcu3d2oguHv84wJbsWrgUR qBQiXTnEogWVxK0QGkKsOo89fUewcyHLrlbdhUwKmqJFN+ueHumfDA8gL A=;
X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.69,512,1315137600"; d="scan'208";a="90323401"
X-Ironport-HAT: UNIVERSITY - $RELAY-THROTTLE
X-Ironport-Source: 130.216.34.40 - Outgoing - Outgoing
Received: from login01.fos.auckland.ac.nz ([130.216.34.40]) by mx2-int.auckland.ac.nz with ESMTP/TLS/AES256-SHA; 15 Nov 2011 14:19:21 +1300
Received: from pgut001 by login01.fos.auckland.ac.nz with local (Exim 4.69) (envelope-from <pgut001@login01.cs.auckland.ac.nz>) id 1RQ7gG-0005ud-TB; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 14:19:20 +1300
From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil, pkix@ietf.org
In-Reply-To: <C1A47F1540DF3246A8D30C853C05D0DA01B96B70@DABECK.missi.ncsc.mil>
Message-Id: <E1RQ7gG-0005ud-TB@login01.fos.auckland.ac.nz>
Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2011 14:19:20 +1300
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2011 01:19:23 -0000

"Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil> writes:

>Nothing precludes an Informational RFC (such as 5937) from being included in
>a list of acquisition requirements, and nothing precludes vendors from
>building products that comply with Informational RFCs. There's no reason to
>believe that the standards-track status of the RFC will affect its speed of
>adoption.

Actually, something does preclude an RFC of any kind from being written.  I
tried this more than a decade ago:

http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/pubs/autonomous.txt

and after battling intense opposition from PKIX ("but that's not how you're
supposed to do PKI!") I tried to get it published as an independent,
informational RFC.  At the time I was told that this would be seen as an
attempt to do an end-run around an IETF standing committee and it would be
referred back to PKIX, who would then again reject it, at which point I
realised it was a hopeless battle.

If it is indeed possible to publish such a document as an informational RFC
then I can get that draft re-submitted in no time, I just don't want to run
into the same problem again.

Peter.

From mrex@sap.com  Mon Nov 14 17:36:10 2011
Return-Path: <mrex@sap.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1E50B11E80D2 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 17:36:10 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -10.105
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-10.105 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.144, BAYES_00=-2.599, HELO_EQ_DE=0.35, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-8]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id tvki8RHH87Vi for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 17:36:09 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpde02.sap-ag.de (smtpde02.sap-ag.de [155.56.68.140]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 34DE011E80CA for <pkix@ietf.org>; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 17:36:09 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail.sap.corp by smtpde02.sap-ag.de (26) with ESMTP id pAF1ZwgV013963 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=OK); Tue, 15 Nov 2011 02:35:58 +0100 (MET)
From: Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
Message-Id: <201111150135.pAF1Zwk9010614@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp>
To: trevorf@exchange.microsoft.com (Trevor Freeman)
Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2011 02:35:58 +0100 (MET)
In-Reply-To: <E545B914D50B2A4B994F198378B1525D42788F1B@DF-M14-12.exchange.corp.microsoft.com> from "Trevor Freeman" at Nov 15, 11 00:44:40 am
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-SAP: out
Cc: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
Reply-To: mrex@sap.com
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2011 01:36:10 -0000

Trevor Freeman wrote:
> 
> It is a matter of local policy what the sending server does wrt the
> receiving server certificate. It is common practice for organization
> to enforce TLS authentication with partner domains. Some verticals
> have adopted it as a requirement.

In theory, it can be could be done on a one-by-one basis.
There were 193 Million DNS domains mid of last year.
This scales nowhere.

>
> At Microsoft we have over 50 domains we enforce TLS authentication
> for SMTP delivery.

That seems to cover roughly 0.000026% of the internet -- way to go.

You mean for "@exchange.microsoft.com"?

 ;; QUESTION SECTION:
 ;exchange.microsoft.com.	IN  MX
 
 ;; ANSWER SECTION:
 exchange.microsoft.com.  3600	IN  MX	10 mail1.exchange.microsoft.com.
 exchange.microsoft.com.  3600	IN  MX	10 mail7.exchange.microsoft.com.


Although the server certificates that are presented by those two servers
chain to an old 1024-bit md5WithRSA-signed "GTE CyberTrust Global Root" 
they are issued to "mail1.exchange.microsoft.com" and
"mail7.exchange.microsoft.com" respectively, instead
of "exchange.microsoft.com".


I didn't notice DNSSEC in .microsoft.com, so DNS spoofing should be
possible.  What would happen if someone successfully spoofed an
MX record for exchange.microsoft.com point to "mail1.evilguy.x-y-y"
onto one of your 50 partners that tries to deliver EMail to you,
pointing to a server with an official TLS server certificate
for "mail1.evilguy.x-y-y" ?  


-Martin

From ynir@checkpoint.com  Mon Nov 14 17:37:19 2011
Return-Path: <ynir@checkpoint.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9049821F8E89 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 17:37:19 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -10.397
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-10.397 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.202, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-8]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id njJjwEt2m4EH for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 17:37:19 -0800 (PST)
Received: from michael.checkpoint.com (smtp.checkpoint.com [194.29.34.68]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8529421F8E7F for <pkix@ietf.org>; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 17:37:18 -0800 (PST)
X-CheckPoint: {4EC1C20A-0-1B221DC2-1FFFF}
Received: from il-ex01.ad.checkpoint.com (il-ex01.ad.checkpoint.com [194.29.34.26]) by michael.checkpoint.com (8.13.8/8.13.8) with ESMTP id pAF1atLx027695;  Tue, 15 Nov 2011 03:36:55 +0200
Received: from il-ex03.ad.checkpoint.com (194.29.34.71) by il-ex01.ad.checkpoint.com (194.29.34.26) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 8.3.213.0; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 03:36:55 +0200
Received: from il-ex01.ad.checkpoint.com ([126.0.0.2]) by il-ex03.ad.checkpoint.com ([194.29.34.71]) with mapi; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 03:36:54 +0200
From: Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com>
To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2011 03:36:51 +0200
Thread-Topic: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
Thread-Index: AcyjNw2HGsnRpTCwRwahCv6G5B0byQ==
Message-ID: <A0E9C8F6-A4F3-4508-883F-7B6E7518D9E0@checkpoint.com>
References: <E1RQ7gG-0005ud-TB@login01.fos.auckland.ac.nz>
In-Reply-To: <E1RQ7gG-0005ud-TB@login01.fos.auckland.ac.nz>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
acceptlanguage: en-US
x-kse-antivirus-interceptor-info: scan successful
x-kse-antivirus-info: Clean
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-KSE-AntiSpam-Interceptor-Info: protection disabled
Cc: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2011 01:37:19 -0000

On Nov 15, 2011, at 9:19 AM, Peter Gutmann wrote:

> "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil> writes:
>=20
>> Nothing precludes an Informational RFC (such as 5937) from being include=
d in
>> a list of acquisition requirements, and nothing precludes vendors from
>> building products that comply with Informational RFCs. There's no reason=
 to
>> believe that the standards-track status of the RFC will affect its speed=
 of
>> adoption.
>=20
> Actually, something does preclude an RFC of any kind from being written. =
 I
> tried this more than a decade ago:
>=20
> http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/pubs/autonomous.txt
>=20
> and after battling intense opposition from PKIX ("but that's not how you'=
re
> supposed to do PKI!") I tried to get it published as an independent,
> informational RFC.  At the time I was told that this would be seen as an
> attempt to do an end-run around an IETF standing committee and it would b=
e
> referred back to PKIX, who would then again reject it, at which point I
> realised it was a hopeless battle.
>=20
> If it is indeed possible to publish such a document as an informational R=
FC
> then I can get that draft re-submitted in no time, I just don't want to r=
un
> into the same problem again.

You won't know unless you try.

And while the powers that be can prevent your document from becoming an RFC=
 (sometimes), you and everyone else can submit a draft whenever you want. A=
FAIK the most popular of the three certificate enrollment protocols is stil=
l http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-nourse-scep-23 .

It may be that with the DANE requirements, it would be easier to get that a=
utonomous certificate document published. But you never know.

Yoav=

From mrex@sap.com  Mon Nov 14 18:02:34 2011
Return-Path: <mrex@sap.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 528EA1F0C3F for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 18:02:34 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -10.108
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-10.108 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.141, BAYES_00=-2.599, HELO_EQ_DE=0.35, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-8]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id FGQZ7bW1MJTJ for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 18:02:33 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpde01.sap-ag.de (smtpde01.sap-ag.de [155.56.68.170]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 87D021F0C38 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 18:02:33 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail.sap.corp by smtpde01.sap-ag.de (26) with ESMTP id pAF22NVX019455 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=OK); Tue, 15 Nov 2011 03:02:23 +0100 (MET)
From: Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
Message-Id: <201111150202.pAF22Mx3011916@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp>
To: trevorf@exchange.microsoft.com (Trevor Freeman)
Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2011 03:02:22 +0100 (MET)
In-Reply-To: <E545B914D50B2A4B994F198378B1525D42788F1B@DF-M14-12.exchange.corp.microsoft.com> from "Trevor Freeman" at Nov 15, 11 00:44:40 am
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-SAP: out
Cc: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
Reply-To: mrex@sap.com
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2011 02:02:34 -0000

Trevor Freeman wrote:
> 
> 
> It is a matter of local policy what the sending server does wrt the
> receiving server certificate. It is common practice for organization
> to enforce TLS authentication with partner domains. Some verticals have
> adopted it as a requirement.  At Microsoft we have over 50 domains
> we enforce TLS authentication for SMTP delivery.

 ;; QUESTION SECTION:
 ;live.com.			IN	MX
 
 ;; ANSWER SECTION:
 live.com.		3600	IN	MX	5 mx4.hotmail.com.
 live.com.		3600	IN	MX	5 mx1.hotmail.com.
 live.com.		3600	IN	MX	5 mx2.hotmail.com.
 live.com.		3600	IN	MX	5 mx3.hotmail.com.

 ;; QUESTION SECTION:
 ;hotmail.com.			IN	MX
 
 ;; ANSWER SECTION:
 hotmail.com.		3600	IN	MX	5 mx1.hotmail.com.
 hotmail.com.		3600	IN	MX	5 mx2.hotmail.com.
 hotmail.com.		3600	IN	MX	5 mx3.hotmail.com.
 hotmail.com.		3600	IN	MX	5 mx4.hotmail.com.


openssl s_client told me that, in contrast to the MX-hosts for
exchange.microsoft.com, none of the above hotmail MX-hosts
supports STARTTLS.

So no amount of configuration will help you in ensuring that an Email
sent from @exchange.microsoft.com to @live.com or @hotmail.com
is not disclosed while it is delivered over the internet ... or rerouted
to someone else.

Is @hotmail.com and @live.com still owned by Microsoft?

Actions speak louder than words.


-Martin

From tim.moses@entrust.com  Mon Nov 14 18:20:14 2011
Return-Path: <tim.moses@entrust.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E4DB811E8348 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 18:20:14 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id fsiAIzaheIjI for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 18:20:14 -0800 (PST)
Received: from ipedge2.entrust.com (ipedge2.entrust.com [216.191.252.25]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5200D11E8341 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 18:20:14 -0800 (PST)
X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.69,512,1315195200";  d="scan'208";a="194327"
Received: from unknown (HELO sottexch7.corp.ad.entrust.com) ([10.4.51.73]) by ipedge2.entrust.com with ESMTP; 14 Nov 2011 21:20:13 -0500
Received: from sottexch7.corp.ad.entrust.com ([fe80::ed40:b6f9:9995:701f]) by sottexch7.corp.ad.entrust.com ([fe80::ed40:b6f9:9995:701f%10]) with mapi; Mon, 14 Nov 2011 21:20:13 -0500
From: Tim Moses <tim.moses@entrust.com>
To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
Date: Mon, 14 Nov 2011 21:20:12 -0500
Thread-Topic: [pkix] Malaysian CA (Was: An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version)
Thread-Index: AcyjPRsOsrfvHeW3R2W4RigTbhTP4A==
Message-ID: <0343AC5D-0707-4464-80AC-C64DBB6FADC6@entrust.com>
References: <E1RQ7DX-0004dU-W3@login01.fos.auckland.ac.nz>
In-Reply-To: <E1RQ7DX-0004dU-W3@login01.fos.auckland.ac.nz>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
acceptlanguage: en-US
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Cc: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] Malaysian CA (Was: An alternative proposal Was: Fwd: New Version)
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2011 02:20:15 -0000

We were discussing the SSL PKI.=20



On 2011-11-14, at 7:49 PM, "Peter Gutmann" <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> wrot=
e:

> Tim Moses <tim.moses@entrust.com> writes:
>=20
>> I don't believe CA-generated subscriber key-pairs is a common practice i=
n the
>> mainstream SSL PKI.
>=20
> Unfortunately we don't have any real figures for this, but I run into it =
an
> awful lot.  I'd rate it as "disturbingly widespread", possibly not so muc=
h for
> SSL PKI but for higher-value stuff like signing of messages/transactions.
> That's more or less the reverse of what you'd really want to see, SSL's P=
KI is
> effectively anon-DH so it doesn't really matter where you get your keys f=
rom,
> but when you're signing tax returns or EDI transactions you probably want=
 a
> bit of control over where your key's been.
>=20
> Peter.

From pgut001@login01.cs.auckland.ac.nz  Tue Nov 15 01:08:55 2011
Return-Path: <pgut001@login01.cs.auckland.ac.nz>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E548E21F8F2B for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 01:08:55 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.574
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.574 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.025,  BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 1-yBAhdIEkbw for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 01:08:55 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mx2.auckland.ac.nz (mx2.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.12.44]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0076721F8F29 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 01:08:53 -0800 (PST)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=auckland.ac.nz; i=pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz; q=dns/txt; s=uoa; t=1321348135; x=1352884135; h=from:to:subject:cc:in-reply-to:message-id:date; bh=LlcMl7YYKeufauB2pGeB0535WHDUxddme++XyNOc8e8=; b=ItTpnruCU1j69FnUeQ0/kdjEv/hNF/LJt8VCAT8F2BEjcSO+RPdWXg8c uWsRIsd5/+xm0aLUaugSOVZr+R1TtF6wXwsuNs7VUoNg4QTiCr1MITDRt 21vNHMDxuCSJA5XL2G/D76gQqwRHNtmBoA1k/OlrcTeA8XvonlASfNbzh A=;
X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.69,513,1315137600"; d="scan'208";a="90381417"
X-Ironport-HAT: UNIVERSITY - $RELAY-THROTTLE
X-Ironport-Source: 130.216.34.40 - Outgoing - Outgoing
Received: from login01.fos.auckland.ac.nz ([130.216.34.40]) by mx2-int.auckland.ac.nz with ESMTP/TLS/AES256-SHA; 15 Nov 2011 22:08:52 +1300
Received: from pgut001 by login01.fos.auckland.ac.nz with local (Exim 4.69) (envelope-from <pgut001@login01.cs.auckland.ac.nz>) id 1RQF0e-00037T-B7; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 22:08:52 +1300
From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz, ynir@checkpoint.com
In-Reply-To: <A0E9C8F6-A4F3-4508-883F-7B6E7518D9E0@checkpoint.com>
Message-Id: <E1RQF0e-00037T-B7@login01.fos.auckland.ac.nz>
Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2011 22:08:52 +1300
Cc: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2011 09:08:56 -0000

Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com> writes:

>You won't know unless you try.

Well, I'd have to spend some time editing the whole thing into XML, and if
it's going to run into the same roadblock as last time I kinda have better
things to do... let's see how bored I get on the flight to Australia on
Friday.

Peter.


From trevorf@exchange.microsoft.com  Tue Nov 15 01:40:42 2011
Return-Path: <trevorf@exchange.microsoft.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7435311E81B0 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 01:40:42 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -110.676
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-110.676 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.077, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-8, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id tU3hbWRmzggv for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 01:40:41 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail.exchange.microsoft.com (mail7.exchange.microsoft.com [131.107.1.27]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id CFCC211E819E for <pkix@ietf.org>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 01:40:41 -0800 (PST)
Received: from df-h14-02.exchange.corp.microsoft.com (157.54.78.140) by DF-G14-02.exchange.corp.microsoft.com (157.54.87.56) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 14.2.247.2; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 01:40:41 -0800
Received: from PIO-MLT-06.exchange.corp.microsoft.com (157.54.94.24) by DF-H14-02.exchange.corp.microsoft.com (157.54.78.140) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 14.2.247.5; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 01:40:41 -0800
Received: from DF-M14-12.exchange.corp.microsoft.com ([fe80::7c94:4036:120:c95f]) by PIO-MLT-06.exchange.corp.microsoft.com ([fe80::d57f:521a:3ae6:c130%10]) with mapi id 14.02.0247.002; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 01:40:41 -0800
From: Trevor Freeman <trevorf@exchange.microsoft.com>
To: "mrex@sap.com" <mrex@sap.com>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
Thread-Index: AQHMozbsw9AJYcfzSUGCYGmTut3p+ZWtoxbw
Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2011 09:40:40 +0000
Message-ID: <E545B914D50B2A4B994F198378B1525D42789A94@DF-M14-12.exchange.corp.microsoft.com>
References: <E545B914D50B2A4B994F198378B1525D42788F1B@DF-M14-12.exchange.corp.microsoft.com> from "Trevor Freeman" at Nov 15, 11 00:44:40 am <201111150135.pAF1Zwk9010614@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp>
In-Reply-To: <201111150135.pAF1Zwk9010614@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp>
Accept-Language: en-GB, en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
x-originating-ip: [157.54.123.12]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Cc: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2011 09:40:42 -0000

Martin,

I have no idea what point you are trying to make here .

If you want to know how SMTP server authenticate the DNS name they are tryi=
ng to reach via TLS - I suggest you read the product documentation rather t=
han speculating. As I said it is a matter of local policy.=20

Email delivery is not as reliable as you think. Typically on outbound gatew=
ays there are tens or hundreds of domains whose messages are stuck in retry=
. Email administrators don't have time to diagnose the reason for each doma=
in. For the vast bulk of the domains, they simply want the message delivere=
d at all costs, secure or not. Administrators only nominate a small fractio=
n of the domains  to enforce authentication of the receiving domain. If the=
 domain is on the require authentication list and authentication fails, the=
 domain is put into retry. If the domain is not on the require authenticati=
on list, we don't check the certificate and if TLS negotiation fails or is =
not available, the email server sends in the clear. What that should tell y=
ou is that even if DNS SEC were widely available, if the domain was not on =
the require authentication list, we would not check the DNSSEC entry just l=
ike we would not check the DNS name in the certificate for the same reason,=
 if authentication fails we will still try and deliver to the domain becaus=
e that is what the administrators wants.

Trevor

-----Original Message-----
From: Martin Rex [mailto:mrex@sap.com]=20
Sent: Tuesday, November 15, 2011 9:36 AM
To: Trevor Freeman
Cc: mrex@sap.com; i.grok@comcast.net; pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs

Trevor Freeman wrote:
>=20
> It is a matter of local policy what the sending server does wrt the=20
> receiving server certificate. It is common practice for organization=20
> to enforce TLS authentication with partner domains. Some verticals=20
> have adopted it as a requirement.

In theory, it can be could be done on a one-by-one basis.
There were 193 Million DNS domains mid of last year.
This scales nowhere.

>
> At Microsoft we have over 50 domains we enforce TLS authentication for=20
> SMTP delivery.

That seems to cover roughly 0.000026% of the internet -- way to go.

You mean for "@exchange.microsoft.com"?

 ;; QUESTION SECTION:
 ;exchange.microsoft.com.	IN  MX
=20
 ;; ANSWER SECTION:
 exchange.microsoft.com.  3600	IN  MX	10 mail1.exchange.microsoft.com.
 exchange.microsoft.com.  3600	IN  MX	10 mail7.exchange.microsoft.com.


Although the server certificates that are presented by those two servers ch=
ain to an old 1024-bit md5WithRSA-signed "GTE CyberTrust Global Root"=20
they are issued to "mail1.exchange.microsoft.com" and "mail7.exchange.micro=
soft.com" respectively, instead of "exchange.microsoft.com".


I didn't notice DNSSEC in .microsoft.com, so DNS spoofing should be possibl=
e.  What would happen if someone successfully spoofed an MX record for exch=
ange.microsoft.com point to "mail1.evilguy.x-y-y"
onto one of your 50 partners that tries to deliver EMail to you, pointing t=
o a server with an official TLS server certificate for "mail1.evilguy.x-y-y=
" ? =20


-Martin

From tmiller@mitre.org  Tue Nov 15 05:40:13 2011
Return-Path: <tmiller@mitre.org>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0813511E8113 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 05:40:13 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id HrlB+Acjka1G for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 05:40:12 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (smtpksrv1.mitre.org [198.49.146.77]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6CA6011E810C for <pkix@ietf.org>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 05:40:12 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by localhost (Postfix) with SMTP id B31EB21B0ECA; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 08:40:11 -0500 (EST)
Received: from IMCCAS02.MITRE.ORG (imccas02.mitre.org [129.83.29.79]) by smtpksrv1.mitre.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id AD78A21B0EC0; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 08:40:11 -0500 (EST)
Received: from IMCMBX01.MITRE.ORG ([169.254.1.18]) by IMCCAS02.MITRE.ORG ([129.83.29.79]) with mapi id 14.01.0339.001; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 08:40:11 -0500
From: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
To: "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>, "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
Thread-Index: AQHMovyWK+6nacw8f0a2iVOXAK08TJWsqJwAgAAdE2CAARu2AA==
Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2011 13:40:11 +0000
Message-ID: <CAE7C61C.24EA%tmiller@mitre.org>
In-Reply-To: <C1A47F1540DF3246A8D30C853C05D0DA01B96B70@DABECK.missi.ncsc.mil>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
user-agent: Microsoft-MacOutlook/14.13.0.110805
x-originating-ip: [172.31.2.83]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-ID: <4B1CF18E7A18AD4E9DD86ED0FF155A60@imc.mitre.org>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2011 13:40:13 -0000

On 11/14/11 2:29 PM, "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil> wrote:

>Nothing precludes an Informational RFC (such as 5937) from being
>included in a list of acquisition requirements, and nothing precludes
>vendors from building products that comply with Informational RFCs.

Nothing formal, but obscurity is a tough nut to crack.  :)

>The 5280 proposed descriptive text changes it from being incompatible
>with self-signed EE certs to being compatible with them.  Fixing that
>obstacle to convergence is necessary regardless of whether/how
>additional incentives are applied.

Fixing the textual issue is necessary but not sufficient, and leaves the
reader with the impression that *all* the methods described by the RFC
similarly include self-signed certificate processing.  This is patently
false because the path validation algorithm terminates without applying
constraints in self-signed certificates.  This may result in a trust
decision made assuming that constraints are applied when the
implementation does not actually do so, and we already have *multiple*
examples of how that works out (how many basicConstraints bugs have we had
so far?).

-- T


From thierry.moreau@connotech.com  Tue Nov 15 05:44:25 2011
Return-Path: <thierry.moreau@connotech.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E788211E813F for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 05:44:25 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -0.437
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.437 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, FH_RELAY_NODNS=1.451, HELO_MISMATCH_ORG=0.611,  RDNS_NONE=0.1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id OivdUeMKEoA1 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 05:44:22 -0800 (PST)
Received: from bretelle.intaglionic.org (unknown [76.10.176.241]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 168C711E810C for <pkix@ietf.org>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 05:44:21 -0800 (PST)
Received: from [192.168.1.200] (unknown [192.168.1.200]) by bretelle.intaglionic.org (Postfix) with ESMTPA id 15BB830818; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 14:13:27 -0500 (EST)
Message-ID: <4EC270E1.5060908@connotech.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2011 09:02:09 -0500
From: Thierry Moreau <thierry.moreau@connotech.com>
User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.17 (X11/20090608)
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
References: <E1RQ7gG-0005ud-TB@login01.fos.auckland.ac.nz>
In-Reply-To: <E1RQ7gG-0005ud-TB@login01.fos.auckland.ac.nz>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Cc: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2011 13:44:26 -0000

Peter Gutmann wrote:
> "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil> writes:
> 
>> Nothing precludes an Informational RFC (such as 5937) from being included in
>> a list of acquisition requirements, and nothing precludes vendors from
>> building products that comply with Informational RFCs. There's no reason to
>> believe that the standards-track status of the RFC will affect its speed of
>> adoption.
> 
> Actually, something does preclude an RFC of any kind from being written.  I
> tried this more than a decade ago:
> 
> http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/pubs/autonomous.txt
> 
> and after battling intense opposition from PKIX ("but that's not how you're
> supposed to do PKI!") I tried to get it published as an independent,
> informational RFC.  At the time I was told that this would be seen as an
> attempt to do an end-run around an IETF standing committee and it would be
> referred back to PKIX, who would then again reject it, at which point I
> realised it was a hopeless battle.

I also tried the independent RFC publication route for a variation of 
the self-signed end-entity certificate, i.e. "auto-issued" with the 
draft "Auto Issued X.509 Certificate Mechanism (AIXCM)", 
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-moreau-pkix-aixcm-00
With similar reactions, I came to the same conclusion.

(Nonetheless in the short period where the idea was discussed, it was 
appreciated by the drafters of an application-oriented protocol which 
now has this draft as an informative reference.)

Regards,

- Thierry Moreau

> 
> If it is indeed possible to publish such a document as an informational RFC
> then I can get that draft re-submitted in no time, I just don't want to run
> into the same problem again.
> 
> Peter.
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
> 


From anders.rundgren@telia.com  Tue Nov 15 06:00:05 2011
Return-Path: <anders.rundgren@telia.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5759E21F8D50 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 06:00:05 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -3.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 1o1r42t57bCq for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 06:00:04 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtp-out11.han.skanova.net (smtp-out11.han.skanova.net [195.67.226.200]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3446921F8D4A for <pkix@ietf.org>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 06:00:04 -0800 (PST)
Received: from [192.168.3.131] (193.12.106.2) by smtp-out11.han.skanova.net (8.5.133) (authenticated as u36408181) id 4EC0B688000C20DD for pkix@ietf.org; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 15:00:02 +0100
Message-ID: <4EC2705C.8080306@telia.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2011 14:59:56 +0100
From: Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren@telia.com>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:8.0) Gecko/20111105 Thunderbird/8.0
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: pkix@ietf.org
References: <E1RQ7gG-0005ud-TB@login01.fos.auckland.ac.nz> <4EC270E1.5060908@connotech.com>
In-Reply-To: <4EC270E1.5060908@connotech.com>
X-Enigmail-Version: 1.3.3
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Subject: [pkix] Google TLS Origin-Bound Certificates. was: End-entity self-signed certs
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2011 14:00:05 -0000

http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-balfanz-tls-obc-01.txt

more wood on the fire :-)

Anders

From tgindin@us.ibm.com  Tue Nov 15 06:20:54 2011
Return-Path: <tgindin@us.ibm.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 66A0811E80B0 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 06:20:54 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.186
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.186 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.187, BAYES_00=-2.599, J_CHICKENPOX_24=0.6, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id fuK0SfbvfAOD for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 06:20:53 -0800 (PST)
Received: from e9.ny.us.ibm.com (e9.ny.us.ibm.com [32.97.182.139]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 60BEF11E80A6 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 06:20:50 -0800 (PST)
Received: from /spool/local by e9.ny.us.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted for <pkix@ietf.org> from <tgindin@us.ibm.com>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 09:20:47 -0500
Received: from d01relay01.pok.ibm.com ([9.56.227.233]) by e9.ny.us.ibm.com ([192.168.1.109]) with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted;  Tue, 15 Nov 2011 09:20:44 -0500
Received: from d01av03.pok.ibm.com (d01av03.pok.ibm.com [9.56.224.217]) by d01relay01.pok.ibm.com (8.13.8/8.13.8/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id pAFEKgTX179654 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 09:20:43 -0500
Received: from d01av03.pok.ibm.com (loopback [127.0.0.1]) by d01av03.pok.ibm.com (8.14.4/8.13.1/NCO v10.0 AVout) with ESMTP id pAFEKg8S029376 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 12:20:42 -0200
Received: from d01mc062.pok.ibm.com ([9.63.8.113]) by d01av03.pok.ibm.com (8.14.4/8.13.1/NCO v10.0 AVin) with ESMTP id pAFEKglW029179; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 12:20:42 -0200
In-Reply-To: <201111142047.pAEKllRY024093@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp>
References: <CAE6BEF2.2480%tmiller@mitre.org> from "Miller, Timothy J." at Nov 14, 11 07:00:37 pm <201111142047.pAEKllRY024093@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp>
To: mrex@sap.com
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-KeepSent: 1A5A64CB:C04A8158-85257948:007A8667; type=4; name=$KeepSent
X-Mailer: Lotus Notes Build V853_CD5_06022011 June 02, 2011
From: Tom Gindin <tgindin@us.ibm.com>
Message-ID: <OF1A5A64CB.C04A8158-ON85257948.007A8667-85257949.004ECC67@us.ibm.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2011 09:20:39 -0500
X-MIMETrack: Serialize by Router on D01MC062/01/M/IBM(Release 8.5.2FP1|November 29, 2010) at 11/15/2011 09:20:41, Serialize complete at 11/15/2011 09:20:41
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII"
x-cbid: 11111514-7182-0000-0000-00000031388B
Cc: pkix@ietf.org, paul.hoffman@vpnc.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2011 14:20:54 -0000

        Key Usage, Subject Alt Name, and possibly EKU, make sense to me as 
well.  If nothing else, having KeyUsage with CASign off is a pretty good 
indicator that it's not a CA certificate, and the absence of Basic 
Constraints only matters if there's some other extension to make it a v3 
certificate.
        So my proposal would look like the following, in those cases where 
a self-signed certificate has been accepted by direct trust:
1       Issuer and Subject must match by the definition of a self-signed 
certificate
2       Version, Validity, Subject, and Subject Public Key Info have their 
usual meanings
3       Signature is verified against Subject Public Key Info
4       Serial number and the unique ID's don't have much meaning
5       The Basic Constraints, Key Usage, Subject Alternative Name, and 
Extended Key Usage extensions should be treated as having the same meaning 
which they have for typical EE certificates
6       PKIX-defined extensions other than those in #5 should not be 
processed
7       Nobody except the certificate subject vouches for the contents of 
most of these fields.  In particular, the attributes within Subject and 
the values of Subject Alternative Name are not verified by any trusted 
entity, nor are the values of Extended Key Usage.

Tom Gindin





From:   Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
To:     tmiller@mitre.org (Miller Timothy J.), 
Cc:     paul.hoffman@vpnc.org, pkix@ietf.org
Date:   11/14/2011 03:53 PM
Subject:        Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
Sent by:        pkix-bounces@ietf.org



Miller, Timothy J. wrote:
> 
> On 11/14/11 12:38 PM, "Martin Rex" <mrex@sap.com> wrote:
> 
> >So the only part that is lacking is coverage and guidance by the
> >standards, following the current practice of the installed base
> >where possible.
> 
> I believe I said:
> 
> >In short, the change is insufficient because the text proposal is not
> >matched by behavior of the path validation algorithm, and the two 
should
> >align.

I'm sorry, I failed to read the prior messages:
https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/current/msg29992.html
https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/current/msg29772.html


> 
> The proposal text adds self-signed certificates to descriptive text but
> doesn't include self-signed certificates into the important bits, like
> adding them to the path validation algorithm.  This is a problem,
> 
> Proceeding with any change that fails to change the algorithm would do
> nothing to drive convergence of inconsistent implementations, and would
> IMHO exacerbate the problem by making it seem as if the RFC covers the
> case when it actually does not.
> 
> Without changes to both the descriptive text and the algorithm, I 
wouldn't
> consider the proposal complete.

I agree.  The more important part is not officially acknowledging
that they do exist, but how they should (not) be processed.

In particular, a guidance what such certs should look like that they're
less likely to get confused with real CA certs when configured as trusted.

But that is likely also the more controversial part...


>
> and as pointed out in private mail we actually have a way to do this
> in RFC 5937, but that's only Informational.

RFC 5937 "Using Trust Anchor Constraints during Certification Path 
Processing"
is IMO entirely irrelevant to the issue of self-signed end-entity certs,
that exist, by definition, in a PKI-less space.  There are only two
attributes where "honoring" by default IMO makes sense (a) the validity
and (b) absence of BasicConstraints cA=TRUE.


rfc5937 & rfc5914 only makes sense for rootCA certs of PKIs, and even
there they're completely irrelevent for >90% of the installed base.


Btw. the name constraints processing in rfc5937 might interact badly
with (b) and (c) of rfc5280 section 6.1.3.

-Martin
_______________________________________________
pkix mailing list
pkix@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix




From mrex@sap.com  Tue Nov 15 06:59:14 2011
Return-Path: <mrex@sap.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id F2C2E21F8B24 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 06:59:14 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -10.111
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-10.111 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.138, BAYES_00=-2.599, HELO_EQ_DE=0.35, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-8]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id sIw9zhEZcmaS for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 06:59:11 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpde01.sap-ag.de (smtpde01.sap-ag.de [155.56.68.170]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D3E1E21F8B21 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 06:59:07 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail.sap.corp by smtpde01.sap-ag.de (26) with ESMTP id pAFEx3el019191 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=OK); Tue, 15 Nov 2011 15:59:03 +0100 (MET)
From: Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
Message-Id: <201111151459.pAFEx2kf025457@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp>
To: tgindin@us.ibm.com (Tom Gindin)
Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2011 15:59:02 +0100 (MET)
In-Reply-To: <OF1A5A64CB.C04A8158-ON85257948.007A8667-85257949.004ECC67@us.ibm.com> from "Tom Gindin" at Nov 15, 11 09:20:39 am
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-SAP: out
Cc: pkix@ietf.org, paul.hoffman@vpnc.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
Reply-To: mrex@sap.com
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2011 14:59:15 -0000

Tom Gindin wrote:
> 
>         Key Usage, Subject Alt Name, and possibly EKU, make sense to me as 
> well.  If nothing else, having KeyUsage with CASign off is a pretty good 
> indicator that it's not a CA certificate, and the absence of Basic 
> Constraints only matters if there's some other extension to make it a v3 
> certificate.

As it turns out, reality does not fit your plans:

  http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/current/msg29091.html

Several of the self-signed RootCA certificates in the TLS X.509 PKI have
inconsistency problems (are not valid X.509v3 CA certs per PKIX/rfc5280):

  http://www.entrust.net/knowledge-base/technote.cfm?tn=7875


If you're configuring a self-signed certificate as trusted, then
you're always trusting _only_ the key, not any of the self-asserted
attributes in the certificate.  Those attributes are only a handle
to make it easier to deal with self-signed certs rather than
looking only at hexdumps of public keys alone.


>
>         So my proposal would look like the following, in those cases where 
> a self-signed certificate has been accepted by direct trust:
> 1       Issuer and Subject must match by the definition of a self-signed 
> certificate
> 2       Version, Validity, Subject, and Subject Public Key Info have their 
> usual meanings
> 3       Signature is verified against Subject Public Key Info
> 4       Serial number and the unique ID's don't have much meaning
> 5       The Basic Constraints, Key Usage, Subject Alternative Name, and 
> Extended Key Usage extensions should be treated as having the same meaning 
> which they have for typical EE certificates
> 6       PKIX-defined extensions other than those in #5 should not be 
> processed
> 7       Nobody except the certificate subject vouches for the contents of 
> most of these fields.  In particular, the attributes within Subject and 
> the values of Subject Alternative Name are not verified by any trusted 
> entity, nor are the values of Extended Key Usage.
 

I fail to see the purpose of (5).
Even the subject name in self-signed certs are untrusted.

To change that, the RP would have to perform an even stronger verification
of the claimed name than that done by RAs of commercial CAs before issuing
an EV cert.


-Martin

From denis.pinkas@bull.net  Tue Nov 15 07:11:43 2011
Return-Path: <denis.pinkas@bull.net>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E9D8521F8B32 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 07:11:43 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.132
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.132 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.116,  BAYES_00=-2.599, HELO_EQ_FR=0.35, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id chSi4XECEeZK for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 07:11:38 -0800 (PST)
Received: from odin2.bull.net (odin2.bull.net [129.184.85.11]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 025D221F8B12 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 07:11:38 -0800 (PST)
Received: from MSGC-003.bull.fr (MSGC-003.frcl.bull.fr [129.184.87.131]) by odin2.bull.net (Bull S.A.) with ESMTP id 2B80318076 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 16:21:17 +0100 (CET)
In-Reply-To: <201111151459.pAFEx2kf025457@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp>
References: <OF1A5A64CB.C04A8158-ON85257948.007A8667-85257949.004ECC67@us.ibm.com>	from "Tom Gindin" at Nov 15, 11 09:20:39 am <201111151459.pAFEx2kf025457@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp>
To: pkix@ietf.org
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-KeepSent: FF7D53F5:DC530A9B-C1257949:0052F91F; type=4; name=$KeepSent
X-Mailer: Lotus Notes Release 8.5.2 August 10, 2010
From: denis.pinkas@bull.net
Message-ID: <OFFF7D53F5.DC530A9B-ONC1257949.0052F91F-C1257949.0053837B@bull.net>
Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2011 16:12:12 +0100
X-MIMETrack: Serialize by Router on MSGC-003/SRV/BULL(Release 8.5.2FP1|November 29, 2010) at 15/11/2011 16:12:12, Serialize complete at 15/11/2011 16:12:12
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="=_alternative 00538069C1257949_="
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2011 15:11:44 -0000

Message en plusieurs parties au format MIME
--=_alternative 00538069C1257949_=
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII"

I support Tom's proposal in general.
 
Martin, the point is NOT to draft a specification which would be backwards 
compatible with all existing implementations.
The point is to write a draft which will define rules on how using 
self-signed EE certificates.
If you trust a self-signed EE certificate, then you trust all its content, 
otherwise you don't trust it.

Denis



Tom Gindin wrote:
> 
>         Key Usage, Subject Alt Name, and possibly EKU, make sense to me 
as 
> well.  If nothing else, having KeyUsage with CASign off is a pretty good 

> indicator that it's not a CA certificate, and the absence of Basic 
> Constraints only matters if there's some other extension to make it a v3 

> certificate.

As it turns out, reality does not fit your plans:

  http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/current/msg29091.html

Several of the self-signed RootCA certificates in the TLS X.509 PKI have
inconsistency problems (are not valid X.509v3 CA certs per PKIX/rfc5280):

  http://www.entrust.net/knowledge-base/technote.cfm?tn=7875


If you're configuring a self-signed certificate as trusted, then
you're always trusting _only_ the key, not any of the self-asserted
attributes in the certificate.  Those attributes are only a handle
to make it easier to deal with self-signed certs rather than
looking only at hexdumps of public keys alone.


>
>         So my proposal would look like the following, in those cases 
where 
> a self-signed certificate has been accepted by direct trust:
> 1       Issuer and Subject must match by the definition of a self-signed 

> certificate
> 2       Version, Validity, Subject, and Subject Public Key Info have 
their 
> usual meanings
> 3       Signature is verified against Subject Public Key Info
> 4       Serial number and the unique ID's don't have much meaning
> 5       The Basic Constraints, Key Usage, Subject Alternative Name, and 
> Extended Key Usage extensions should be treated as having the same 
meaning 
> which they have for typical EE certificates
> 6       PKIX-defined extensions other than those in #5 should not be 
> processed
> 7       Nobody except the certificate subject vouches for the contents 
of 
> most of these fields.  In particular, the attributes within Subject and 
> the values of Subject Alternative Name are not verified by any trusted 
> entity, nor are the values of Extended Key Usage.
 

I fail to see the purpose of (5).
Even the subject name in self-signed certs are untrusted.

To change that, the RP would have to perform an even stronger verification
of the claimed name than that done by RAs of commercial CAs before issuing
an EV cert.


-Martin
_______________________________________________
pkix mailing list
pkix@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix


--=_alternative 00538069C1257949_=
Content-Type: text/html; charset="US-ASCII"

<font size=2 face="sans-serif">I support Tom's proposal in general.</font>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">&nbsp;</font>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">Martin, the point is NOT to draft a
specification which would be backwards compatible with all existing implementations.</font>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">The point is to write a draft which
will define rules on how using self-signed EE certificates.</font>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">If you trust a self-signed EE certificate,
then you trust all its content, otherwise you don't trust it.</font>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">Denis</font>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br><tt><font size=2>Tom Gindin wrote:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Key Usage, Subject Alt Name, and possibly
EKU, make sense to me as <br>
&gt; well. &nbsp;If nothing else, having KeyUsage with CASign off is a
pretty good <br>
&gt; indicator that it's not a CA certificate, and the absence of Basic
<br>
&gt; Constraints only matters if there's some other extension to make it
a v3 <br>
&gt; certificate.<br>
<br>
As it turns out, reality does not fit your plans:<br>
<br>
 &nbsp;</font></tt><a href="http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/current/msg29091.html"><tt><font size=2>http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/current/msg29091.html</font></tt></a><tt><font size=2><br>
<br>
Several of the self-signed RootCA certificates in the TLS X.509 PKI have<br>
inconsistency problems (are not valid X.509v3 CA certs per PKIX/rfc5280):<br>
<br>
 &nbsp;</font></tt><a href="http://www.entrust.net/knowledge-base/technote.cfm?tn=7875"><tt><font size=2>http://www.entrust.net/knowledge-base/technote.cfm?tn=7875</font></tt></a><tt><font size=2><br>
<br>
<br>
If you're configuring a self-signed certificate as trusted, then<br>
you're always trusting _only_ the key, not any of the self-asserted<br>
attributes in the certificate. &nbsp;Those attributes are only a handle<br>
to make it easier to deal with self-signed certs rather than<br>
looking only at hexdumps of public keys alone.<br>
<br>
<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; So my proposal would look like the following,
in those cases where <br>
&gt; a self-signed certificate has been accepted by direct trust:<br>
&gt; 1 &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Issuer and Subject must match by the definition
of a self-signed <br>
&gt; certificate<br>
&gt; 2 &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Version, Validity, Subject, and Subject Public
Key Info have their <br>
&gt; usual meanings<br>
&gt; 3 &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Signature is verified against Subject Public
Key Info<br>
&gt; 4 &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Serial number and the unique ID's don't have
much meaning<br>
&gt; 5 &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; The Basic Constraints, Key Usage, Subject Alternative
Name, and <br>
&gt; Extended Key Usage extensions should be treated as having the same
meaning <br>
&gt; which they have for typical EE certificates<br>
&gt; 6 &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; PKIX-defined extensions other than those in
#5 should not be <br>
&gt; processed<br>
&gt; 7 &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Nobody except the certificate subject vouches
for the contents of <br>
&gt; most of these fields. &nbsp;In particular, the attributes within Subject
and <br>
&gt; the values of Subject Alternative Name are not verified by any trusted
<br>
&gt; entity, nor are the values of Extended Key Usage.<br>
 <br>
<br>
I fail to see the purpose of (5).<br>
Even the subject name in self-signed certs are untrusted.<br>
<br>
To change that, the RP would have to perform an even stronger verification<br>
of the claimed name than that done by RAs of commercial CAs before issuing<br>
an EV cert.<br>
<br>
<br>
-Martin<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
pkix mailing list<br>
pkix@ietf.org<br>
</font></tt><a href=https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix><tt><font size=2>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix</font></tt></a><tt><font size=2><br>
</font></tt>
<br>
--=_alternative 00538069C1257949_=--

From mrex@sap.com  Tue Nov 15 07:22:18 2011
Return-Path: <mrex@sap.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3499B21F8B59 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 07:22:18 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -10.114
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-10.114 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.135, BAYES_00=-2.599, HELO_EQ_DE=0.35, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-8]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id G-5zpW1++XfD for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 07:22:17 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpde01.sap-ag.de (smtpde01.sap-ag.de [155.56.68.170]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 62F7C21F8B51 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 07:22:17 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail.sap.corp by smtpde01.sap-ag.de (26) with ESMTP id pAFFMGV3005705 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=OK); Tue, 15 Nov 2011 16:22:16 +0100 (MET)
From: Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
Message-Id: <201111151522.pAFFMEod026923@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp>
To: denis.pinkas@bull.net
Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2011 16:22:14 +0100 (MET)
In-Reply-To: <OFFF7D53F5.DC530A9B-ONC1257949.0052F91F-C1257949.0053837B@bull.net> from "denis.pinkas@bull.net" at Nov 15, 11 04:12:12 pm
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-SAP: out
Cc: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
Reply-To: mrex@sap.com
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2011 15:22:18 -0000

denis.pinkas@bull.net wrote:
> 
> I support Tom's proposal in general.
>  
> Martin, the point is NOT to draft a specification which would be backwards 
> compatible with all existing implementations.
> The point is to write a draft which will define rules on how using 
> self-signed EE certificates.
> If you trust a self-signed EE certificate, then you trust all its content, 
> otherwise you don't trust it.

There really is no point in processing any constraints for
as self-signed end-entity cert.  Such a cert ought to never appear
as signer of any other cert (otherwise it is by definition not an
end-entity, but a CA cert).  For a self-signed cert, the attributes
and any constraints that may be present are completely static.

So if any processing of the self-consistency of such data should
be done at all, then prior to accepting of that certificate as
trusted.  Doing it over and over again when the certificate is
use is a complete waste of resources.

-Martin

From tmiller@mitre.org  Tue Nov 15 07:53:04 2011
Return-Path: <tmiller@mitre.org>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id BAB0E21F8AF5 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 07:53:04 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.000,  BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id qG0s227664vN for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 07:53:04 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (smtpksrv1.mitre.org [198.49.146.77]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0A8ED21F8B49 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 07:53:03 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by localhost (Postfix) with SMTP id 3573421B0F8C; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 10:53:02 -0500 (EST)
Received: from IMCCAS01.MITRE.ORG (imccas01.mitre.org [129.83.29.78]) by smtpksrv1.mitre.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2F84021B0F42; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 10:53:02 -0500 (EST)
Received: from IMCMBX01.MITRE.ORG ([169.254.1.18]) by IMCCAS01.MITRE.ORG ([129.83.29.78]) with mapi id 14.01.0339.001; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 10:53:01 -0500
From: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
To: Tom Gindin <tgindin@us.ibm.com>, "mrex@sap.com" <mrex@sap.com>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
Thread-Index: AQHMow6qK+6nacw8f0a2iVOXAK08TJWuUTOA//+1N4A=
Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2011 15:53:01 +0000
Message-ID: <CAE7E646.2555%tmiller@mitre.org>
In-Reply-To: <OF1A5A64CB.C04A8158-ON85257948.007A8667-85257949.004ECC67@us.ibm.com>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
user-agent: Microsoft-MacOutlook/14.13.0.110805
x-originating-ip: [172.31.1.164]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-ID: <C175C43E7C3DA243BF66B4319C5381D3@imc.mitre.org>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Cc: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>, "paul.hoffman@vpnc.org" <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2011 15:53:04 -0000

On 11/15/11 8:20 AM, "Tom Gindin" <tgindin@us.ibm.com> wrote:

>4       Serial number and the unique ID's don't have much meaning

Yes they do.  E.g., Microsoft Smart Card Logon in Windows Server 2008 or
later permits mapping certificates to accounts using Issuer and Serial
Number.  Since a self-signer can forge any issuer DN, this is a potential
problem.

>6       PKIX-defined extensions other than those in #5 should not be
>Processed

I presume this means an augmentation to path validation is forthcoming.

-- T


From tmiller@mitre.org  Tue Nov 15 07:56:35 2011
Return-Path: <tmiller@mitre.org>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1149311E808C for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 07:56:35 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 54U3KnJMWVGs for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 07:56:34 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (smtpksrv1.mitre.org [198.49.146.77]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7244C11E808A for <pkix@ietf.org>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 07:56:34 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by localhost (Postfix) with SMTP id 2186A21B0F7E; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 10:56:34 -0500 (EST)
Received: from IMCCAS03.MITRE.ORG (imccas03.mitre.org [129.83.29.80]) by smtpksrv1.mitre.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1B1DC21B0F89; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 10:56:34 -0500 (EST)
Received: from IMCMBX01.MITRE.ORG ([169.254.1.18]) by IMCCAS03.MITRE.ORG ([129.83.29.80]) with mapi id 14.01.0339.001; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 10:56:33 -0500
From: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
To: "denis.pinkas@bull.net" <denis.pinkas@bull.net>, "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
Thread-Index: AQHMo6ccK+6nacw8f0a2iVOXAK08TJWuXmoA//+nywA=
Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2011 15:56:33 +0000
Message-ID: <CAE7E77D.256A%tmiller@mitre.org>
In-Reply-To: <OFFF7D53F5.DC530A9B-ONC1257949.0052F91F-C1257949.0053837B@bull.net>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
user-agent: Microsoft-MacOutlook/14.13.0.110805
x-originating-ip: [172.31.1.164]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-ID: <802E1224FB9CED48A51100546C5EA749@imc.mitre.org>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2011 15:56:35 -0000

On 11/15/11 9:12 AM, "denis.pinkas@bull.net" <denis.pinkas@bull.net> wrote:

>I support Tom's proposal in general.
>=20
>Martin, the point is NOT to draft a
>specification which would be backwards compatible with all existing
>implementations.
>The point is to write a draft which
>will define rules on how using self-signed EE certificates.
>If you trust a self-signed EE certificate,
>then you trust all its content, otherwise you don't trust it.

The only trustable content in a self-signed certificate is the public key,
and only when that key is verified by the signature.

*Nothing* else in that cert has any meaning.  The signer can lie about
everything *except* his possession of the private key.

-- T


From thierry.moreau@connotech.com  Tue Nov 15 11:45:11 2011
Return-Path: <thierry.moreau@connotech.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9F7E421F869E for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 11:45:11 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -0.437
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.437 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, FH_RELAY_NODNS=1.451, HELO_MISMATCH_ORG=0.611,  RDNS_NONE=0.1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id QNjcyJ18V4t3 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 11:45:06 -0800 (PST)
Received: from bretelle.intaglionic.org (unknown [76.10.176.241]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8D35E21F85BB for <pkix@ietf.org>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 11:45:06 -0800 (PST)
Received: from [192.168.1.200] (unknown [192.168.1.200]) by bretelle.intaglionic.org (Postfix) with ESMTPA id 46789307F5; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 20:14:11 -0500 (EST)
Message-ID: <4EC2C56F.7090105@connotech.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2011 15:02:55 -0500
From: Thierry Moreau <thierry.moreau@connotech.com>
User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.17 (X11/20090608)
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
References: <CAE7E77D.256A%tmiller@mitre.org>
In-Reply-To: <CAE7E77D.256A%tmiller@mitre.org>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Cc: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2011 19:45:11 -0000

Miller, Timothy J. wrote:
> On 11/15/11 9:12 AM, "denis.pinkas@bull.net" <denis.pinkas@bull.net> wrote:
> 
>> I support Tom's proposal in general.
>>
>> Martin, the point is NOT to draft a
>> specification which would be backwards compatible with all existing
>> implementations.
>> The point is to write a draft which
>> will define rules on how using self-signed EE certificates.
>> If you trust a self-signed EE certificate,
>> then you trust all its content, otherwise you don't trust it.
> 
> The only trustable content in a self-signed certificate is the public key,
> and only when that key is verified by the signature.
> 
> *Nothing* else in that cert has any meaning.  The signer can lie about
> everything *except* his possession of the private key.
> 

Let us see the semantic of "the signer possession of the private key".

(A) Only the alleged signer is in possession of the private key.

(A') A set of entities, including the signer, has the private key. (A 
key escrow agent, an attacker, an outsourcer, ... may be in the set)

Since I can trivially prepare a self-signed certificate for any CA 
entity with a locally generated key pair, the possession can further be 
characterized by:

(B) Only an entity other than the alleged signer is in possession of the 
private key.

(B') A set of entities, not including the alleged signer, ...

And for sake of completeness, since I can prepare such a certificate and 
then destroy the private key:

(C) No entity is in possession of the private key.

And also:

(D) The private key is publicly known.


Nothing in the self-signed certificate ensures you that either (A) or a 
suitable instance of (A') applies. That's a leap-of-faith decision.


Then, the same leap-of-faith applied to the certificate public key can 
be applied to other elements of the self-signed certificate.


PKI discussions are deemed to last forever.


Regards,

- Thierry Moreau



From ehimawan@gmail.com  Tue Nov 15 12:13:28 2011
Return-Path: <ehimawan@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id DCA221F0C7A for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 12:13:28 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -3.598
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.598 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id V1-hjFTNPyuz for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 12:13:27 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail-wy0-f172.google.com (mail-wy0-f172.google.com [74.125.82.172]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4176C1F0C79 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 12:13:27 -0800 (PST)
Received: by wyf28 with SMTP id 28so6472855wyf.31 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 12:13:26 -0800 (PST)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=mime-version:date:message-id:subject:from:to:content-type; bh=ovLyaFk9+YHXa/7epO6iU1YvqdWyn2tmMwDNcRGlHzo=; b=dT28FlQqIVpr/VPOinEarSN0u9xuMPLQLxIXwOFoSfgf2hpkiPn7LVfUBd94JipKbJ IARMUEPx099TV2bZqbEm4R2p9br+rQpBuLGkPhnfDZcBunyz2J89LLe11UtteTuFW3XF X5lPKosoeTpgZs5MCm/9g+JNxzfjc7lhvcT1A=
MIME-Version: 1.0
Received: by 10.216.180.66 with SMTP id i44mr4650173wem.95.1321388006437; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 12:13:26 -0800 (PST)
Received: by 10.216.27.9 with HTTP; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 12:13:26 -0800 (PST)
Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2011 14:13:26 -0600
Message-ID: <CAFY=A4759WXObvtb0mZU6zB137N314yw2Zi=f0b=oD2zW+NYYA@mail.gmail.com>
From: Erwin Himawan <ehimawan@gmail.com>
To: pkix@ietf.org
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=0016364267cdbbf31104b1cb9e42
Subject: [pkix] Which CA to use for Inter PKI (Domain) Cross Certification
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2011 20:13:29 -0000

--0016364267cdbbf31104b1cb9e42
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1

Hi,

If I have a PKI with hierarchical CAs (Root CA -> Intermediate CA ->
Issuing CA) and I would like to cross sign with other (PKI) domain, which
CA should I use for cross-signing (root CA, Intermediate CA)?

TWG-98-59 (Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Technical Specifications: Part A
- Technical Concept of Operations) specifies that a "Principal CA" performs
the cross certification.
Furthermore, it also mentions that in a hierarchical topology, the
principal CA is the root CA.

I would like to get more insight on the pros and cons of having root CA
performs the cross signing vs having the Intermediate CA performs this
function.

Thanks
Erwin

--0016364267cdbbf31104b1cb9e42
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Hi,<div><br></div><div>If I have a PKI with hierarchical CAs (Root CA -&gt;=
 Intermediate CA -&gt; Issuing CA) and I would like to cross sign with othe=
r (PKI) domain, which CA should I use for cross-signing (root CA, Intermedi=
ate CA)? =A0</div>
<div><br></div><div>TWG-98-59 (Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)=A0Technical =
Specifications: Part A -=A0Technical Concept of Operations) specifies that =
a &quot;Principal CA&quot; performs the cross certification.</div><div>Furt=
hermore, it also mentions that in a hierarchical topology, the principal CA=
 is the root CA.</div>
<div><br></div><div>I would like to get more insight on the pros and cons o=
f having root CA performs the cross signing vs having the Intermediate CA p=
erforms this function.</div><div><br></div><div>Thanks</div><div>Erwin</div=
>
<div><br></div>

--0016364267cdbbf31104b1cb9e42--

From DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil  Tue Nov 15 12:52:39 2011
Return-Path: <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C573311E809C for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 12:52:39 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.000,  BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id nLVTX6avoEMQ for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 12:52:35 -0800 (PST)
Received: from stingray.missi.ncsc.mil (stingray.missi.ncsc.mil [144.51.50.20]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B8F9A11E8073 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 12:52:35 -0800 (PST)
Received: from AUGUSTINE.missi.ncsc.mil (augustine.missi.ncsc.mil [144.51.60.33]) by stingray.missi.ncsc.mil with ESMTP id pAFKqZdB081751 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 15:52:35 -0500 (EST)
Received: from DABECK.missi.ncsc.mil ([144.51.60.16]) by AUGUSTINE.missi.ncsc.mil with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.4675);  Tue, 15 Nov 2011 15:53:14 -0500
Content-class: urn:content-classes:message
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft Exchange V6.5
Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2011 15:52:34 -0500
Message-ID: <C1A47F1540DF3246A8D30C853C05D0DA01B96B71@DABECK.missi.ncsc.mil>
In-Reply-To: <4EC2C56F.7090105@connotech.com>
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
Thread-Topic: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
Thread-Index: AcyjzyUFJGkR3QR2Q36MrArXSt4R7AABTFvQ
References: <CAE7E77D.256A%tmiller@mitre.org> <4EC2C56F.7090105@connotech.com>
From: "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>
To: <pkix@ietf.org>
X-OriginalArrivalTime: 15 Nov 2011 20:53:14.0406 (UTC) FILETIME=[97ED0C60:01CCA3D8]
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2011 20:52:39 -0000

Nits.   A private key could be known to one entity [A], few entities
[A'], or all entities [D], but that is true of all keys, symmetric and
asymmetric.  The indictment applies to all cryptography, and yet
Kerberos, PKI, and Wi-Fi still manage to see practical use because
self-interest encourages subjects not to share their keys with
attackers.

There is no "alleged signer"; the signature can be generated only by an
entity that possesses the private key, and every other field in the
certificate can have any value, with zero assurance.  So [B] and [B'] do
not exist independently of [A] and [A'].

Private keys (again, symmetric and asymmetric) are routinely destroyed
as a matter of good cryptographic hygiene.  So [C] is a feature, not a
bug - it allows unique identifiers to be created in a manner that
precludes (to the limit of cryptographic strength) impersonation or
forgery.

Dave



-----Original Message-----
From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
Thierry Moreau
Sent: Tuesday, November 15, 2011 3:03 PM
To: Miller, Timothy J.
Cc: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs

Miller, Timothy J. wrote:
> On 11/15/11 9:12 AM, "denis.pinkas@bull.net" <denis.pinkas@bull.net>
wrote:
>=20
>> I support Tom's proposal in general.
>>
>> Martin, the point is NOT to draft a
>> specification which would be backwards compatible with all existing=20
>> implementations.
>> The point is to write a draft which
>> will define rules on how using self-signed EE certificates.
>> If you trust a self-signed EE certificate, then you trust all its=20
>> content, otherwise you don't trust it.
>=20
> The only trustable content in a self-signed certificate is the public=20
> key, and only when that key is verified by the signature.
>=20
> *Nothing* else in that cert has any meaning.  The signer can lie about

> everything *except* his possession of the private key.
>=20

Let us see the semantic of "the signer possession of the private key".

(A) Only the alleged signer is in possession of the private key.

(A') A set of entities, including the signer, has the private key. (A
key escrow agent, an attacker, an outsourcer, ... may be in the set)

Since I can trivially prepare a self-signed certificate for any CA
entity with a locally generated key pair, the possession can further be
characterized by:

(B) Only an entity other than the alleged signer is in possession of the
private key.

(B') A set of entities, not including the alleged signer, ...

And for sake of completeness, since I can prepare such a certificate and
then destroy the private key:

(C) No entity is in possession of the private key.

And also:

(D) The private key is publicly known.


Nothing in the self-signed certificate ensures you that either (A) or a
suitable instance of (A') applies. That's a leap-of-faith decision.


Then, the same leap-of-faith applied to the certificate public key can=20
be applied to other elements of the self-signed certificate.


PKI discussions are deemed to last forever.


Regards,

- Thierry Moreau


_______________________________________________
pkix mailing list
pkix@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix

From tmiller@mitre.org  Tue Nov 15 14:17:07 2011
Return-Path: <tmiller@mitre.org>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 101C211E80C1 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 14:17:07 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id RSyUhvQYmBxz for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 14:17:06 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (smtpksrv1.mitre.org [198.49.146.77]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 96CB711E80BA for <pkix@ietf.org>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 14:17:06 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by localhost (Postfix) with SMTP id E7B3B21B0748 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 17:17:05 -0500 (EST)
Received: from IMCCAS04.MITRE.ORG (imccas04.mitre.org [129.83.29.81]) by smtpksrv1.mitre.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A063921B0B8F for <pkix@ietf.org>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 17:17:05 -0500 (EST)
Received: from IMCMBX01.MITRE.ORG ([169.254.1.18]) by IMCCAS04.MITRE.ORG ([129.83.29.81]) with mapi id 14.01.0339.001; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 17:17:05 -0500
From: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
To: PKIX <pkix@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: Does anyone know if Adobe Reader X is expecting archive-cutoff in OCSP responses when it validates expired signature certificates?
Thread-Index: AQHMo+ROGI/3ieNA5EW+AtgcUwZecQ==
Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2011 22:17:05 +0000
Message-ID: <CAE840FF.25BA%tmiller@mitre.org>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
user-agent: Microsoft-MacOutlook/14.13.0.110805
x-originating-ip: [172.31.2.177]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-ID: <206A18CB5FF5104F94292DE356587F94@imc.mitre.org>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Subject: [pkix] Does anyone know if Adobe Reader X is expecting archive-cutoff in OCSP responses when it validates expired signature certificates?
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2011 22:17:07 -0000

Inquiring minds want to know.  Replies off-list are probably best.

-- T


From trevorf@exchange.microsoft.com  Tue Nov 15 16:05:15 2011
Return-Path: <trevorf@exchange.microsoft.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 49C0311E8149 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 16:05:15 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -110.666
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-110.666 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.067, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-8, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id xxNhlRgl-PoR for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 16:05:14 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail.exchange.microsoft.com (mail7.exchange.microsoft.com [131.107.1.27]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A172011E8119 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 16:05:14 -0800 (PST)
Received: from df-h14-02.exchange.corp.microsoft.com (157.54.78.140) by DF-G14-02.exchange.corp.microsoft.com (157.54.87.56) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 14.2.247.2; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 16:05:14 -0800
Received: from PIO-MLT-05.exchange.corp.microsoft.com (157.54.94.22) by DF-H14-02.exchange.corp.microsoft.com (157.54.78.140) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 14.2.247.5; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 16:05:14 -0800
Received: from DF-M14-12.exchange.corp.microsoft.com ([fe80::7c94:4036:120:c95f]) by PIO-MLT-05.exchange.corp.microsoft.com ([fe80::d940:e316:1daa:5e6a%10]) with mapi id 14.02.0247.002; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 16:05:13 -0800
From: Trevor Freeman <trevorf@exchange.microsoft.com>
To: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>, "denis.pinkas@bull.net" <denis.pinkas@bull.net>, "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
Thread-Index: AQHMo6ccw9AJYcfzSUGCYGmTut3p+ZWukLQAgAAMZICAAAE4MA==
Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2011 00:05:13 +0000
Message-ID: <E545B914D50B2A4B994F198378B1525D4278A2C1@DF-M14-12.exchange.corp.microsoft.com>
References: <OFFF7D53F5.DC530A9B-ONC1257949.0052F91F-C1257949.0053837B@bull.net> <CAE7E77D.256A%tmiller@mitre.org>
In-Reply-To: <CAE7E77D.256A%tmiller@mitre.org>
Accept-Language: en-GB, en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
x-originating-ip: [157.54.123.12]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2011 00:05:15 -0000

Of course other attributes of the certificate have meaning.=20

Just because I am creating a self-signed certificate does not mean I want t=
hat key to be used for anything. It's the principle of least privilege. Onl=
y enable the set of uses you need. You are trusting the key for use in some=
 protocol, what is wrong with trusting the certificate extensions as well.=
=20

-----Original Message-----
From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Mil=
ler, Timothy J.
Sent: Tuesday, November 15, 2011 11:57 PM
To: denis.pinkas@bull.net; pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs

On 11/15/11 9:12 AM, "denis.pinkas@bull.net" <denis.pinkas@bull.net> wrote:

>I support Tom's proposal in general.
>=20
>Martin, the point is NOT to draft a
>specification which would be backwards compatible with all existing=20
>implementations.
>The point is to write a draft which
>will define rules on how using self-signed EE certificates.
>If you trust a self-signed EE certificate, then you trust all its=20
>content, otherwise you don't trust it.

The only trustable content in a self-signed certificate is the public key, =
and only when that key is verified by the signature.

*Nothing* else in that cert has any meaning.  The signer can lie about ever=
ything *except* his possession of the private key.

-- T

_______________________________________________
pkix mailing list
pkix@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix

From thierry.moreau@connotech.com  Tue Nov 15 17:52:58 2011
Return-Path: <thierry.moreau@connotech.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E595911E8166 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 17:52:58 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -0.437
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.437 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, FH_RELAY_NODNS=1.451, HELO_MISMATCH_ORG=0.611,  RDNS_NONE=0.1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id Vn-8DsRjJF2U for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 17:52:58 -0800 (PST)
Received: from bretelle.intaglionic.org (unknown [76.10.176.241]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1B62111E80CB for <pkix@ietf.org>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 17:52:58 -0800 (PST)
Received: from [192.168.1.200] (unknown [192.168.1.200]) by bretelle.intaglionic.org (Postfix) with ESMTPA id 5D4BD3080C; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 02:22:00 -0500 (EST)
Message-ID: <4EC31BA7.4070300@connotech.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2011 21:10:47 -0500
From: Thierry Moreau <thierry.moreau@connotech.com>
User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.17 (X11/20090608)
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>
References: <CAE7E77D.256A%tmiller@mitre.org> <4EC2C56F.7090105@connotech.com> <C1A47F1540DF3246A8D30C853C05D0DA01B96B71@DABECK.missi.ncsc.mil>
In-Reply-To: <C1A47F1540DF3246A8D30C853C05D0DA01B96B71@DABECK.missi.ncsc.mil>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Cc: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2011 01:52:59 -0000

Kemp, David P. wrote:
> Nits.   A private key could be known to one entity [A], few entities
> [A'], or all entities [D], but that is true of all keys, symmetric and
> asymmetric.  The indictment applies to all cryptography, and yet
> Kerberos, PKI, and Wi-Fi still manage to see practical use because
> self-interest encourages subjects not to share their keys with
> attackers.
> 
> There is no "alleged signer";

I thought that the very purpose of a PKI was to distribute trust about 
the alleged signer (the one indicated in an end-entity certificate 
backed/signed by a CA) when a) signatures along the certification path 
validates, b) there is an out-of-band basis of trust for the CA public 
key, and c) the CA is careful in carrying evidence of security breaches 
into CRLs and/or on-line OCSP services. Under these conditions, the 
relying party can be (somewhat) confident that the true signer is the 
alleged one.

You seem to state that there is no alleged signer (then presumably only 
trusted or legitimate ones) for any public key. Then I don't see a 
purpose in pursuing this discussion about reliable portions of a 
self-signed certificate (a special case in the big picture, yet an 
inescapable one).

>                               the signature can be generated only by an
> entity that possesses the private key, and every other field in the
> certificate can have any value, with zero assurance.  So [B] and [B'] do
> not exist independently of [A] and [A'].
> 

Ah, I see. Bogus self-signed certificates do not exist because an active 
ietf/pkix participant says so. From now on, I should feel confident to 
accept any self-signed certificate that comes to my browser.

Regards,

- Thierry Moreau

> Private keys (again, symmetric and asymmetric) are routinely destroyed
> as a matter of good cryptographic hygiene.  So [C] is a feature, not a
> bug - it allows unique identifiers to be created in a manner that
> precludes (to the limit of cryptographic strength) impersonation or
> forgery.
> 
> Dave
> 
> 
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
> Thierry Moreau
> Sent: Tuesday, November 15, 2011 3:03 PM
> To: Miller, Timothy J.
> Cc: pkix@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
> 
> Miller, Timothy J. wrote:
>> On 11/15/11 9:12 AM, "denis.pinkas@bull.net" <denis.pinkas@bull.net>
> wrote:
>>> I support Tom's proposal in general.
>>>
>>> Martin, the point is NOT to draft a
>>> specification which would be backwards compatible with all existing 
>>> implementations.
>>> The point is to write a draft which
>>> will define rules on how using self-signed EE certificates.
>>> If you trust a self-signed EE certificate, then you trust all its 
>>> content, otherwise you don't trust it.
>> The only trustable content in a self-signed certificate is the public 
>> key, and only when that key is verified by the signature.
>>
>> *Nothing* else in that cert has any meaning.  The signer can lie about
> 
>> everything *except* his possession of the private key.
>>
> 
> Let us see the semantic of "the signer possession of the private key".
> 
> (A) Only the alleged signer is in possession of the private key.
> 
> (A') A set of entities, including the signer, has the private key. (A
> key escrow agent, an attacker, an outsourcer, ... may be in the set)
> 
> Since I can trivially prepare a self-signed certificate for any CA
> entity with a locally generated key pair, the possession can further be
> characterized by:
> 
> (B) Only an entity other than the alleged signer is in possession of the
> private key.
> 
> (B') A set of entities, not including the alleged signer, ...
> 
> And for sake of completeness, since I can prepare such a certificate and
> then destroy the private key:
> 
> (C) No entity is in possession of the private key.
> 
> And also:
> 
> (D) The private key is publicly known.
> 
> 
> Nothing in the self-signed certificate ensures you that either (A) or a
> suitable instance of (A') applies. That's a leap-of-faith decision.
> 
> 
> Then, the same leap-of-faith applied to the certificate public key can 
> be applied to other elements of the self-signed certificate.
> 
> 
> PKI discussions are deemed to last forever.
> 
> 
> Regards,
> 
> - Thierry Moreau

From tgindin@us.ibm.com  Tue Nov 15 18:38:54 2011
Return-Path: <tgindin@us.ibm.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D9D571F0C98 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 18:38:54 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.139
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.139 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.140, BAYES_00=-2.599, J_CHICKENPOX_37=0.6, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id KlGKHOPG9R9Z for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 18:38:54 -0800 (PST)
Received: from e2.ny.us.ibm.com (e2.ny.us.ibm.com [32.97.182.142]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1DA411F0C60 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 18:38:46 -0800 (PST)
Received: from /spool/local by e2.ny.us.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted for <pkix@ietf.org> from <tgindin@us.ibm.com>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 21:38:44 -0500
Received: from d01relay02.pok.ibm.com (9.56.227.234) by e2.ny.us.ibm.com (192.168.1.102) with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted;  Tue, 15 Nov 2011 21:38:43 -0500
Received: from d01av04.pok.ibm.com (d01av04.pok.ibm.com [9.56.224.64]) by d01relay02.pok.ibm.com (8.13.8/8.13.8/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id pAG2cf7Q453058 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 21:38:42 -0500
Received: from d01av04.pok.ibm.com (loopback [127.0.0.1]) by d01av04.pok.ibm.com (8.14.4/8.13.1/NCO v10.0 AVout) with ESMTP id pAG2cfHR002934 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 21:38:41 -0500
Received: from d01ml062.pok.ibm.com (d01ml062.pok.ibm.com [9.63.10.95]) by d01av04.pok.ibm.com (8.14.4/8.13.1/NCO v10.0 AVin) with ESMTP id pAG2cfIV002929; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 21:38:41 -0500
In-Reply-To: <201111151522.pAFFMEod026923@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp>
References: <OFFF7D53F5.DC530A9B-ONC1257949.0052F91F-C1257949.0053837B@bull.net>	from "denis.pinkas@bull.net" at Nov 15, 11 04:12:12 pm <201111151522.pAFFMEod026923@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp>
To: mrex@sap.com
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-KeepSent: AA359AC7:EAC5145E-85257949:0058C95C; type=4; name=$KeepSent
X-Mailer: Lotus Notes Build V853_CD5_06022011 June 02, 2011
From: Tom Gindin <tgindin@us.ibm.com>
Message-ID: <OFAA359AC7.EAC5145E-ON85257949.0058C95C-8525794A.000E87A8@us.ibm.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2011 21:38:40 -0500
X-MIMETrack: Serialize by Router on D01ML062/01/M/IBM(Release 8.5.2FP1 ZX852FP1HF12|September 28, 2011) at 11/15/2011 21:38:40, Serialize complete at 11/15/2011 21:38:40
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII"
x-cbid: 11111602-5112-0000-0000-0000021385B2
Cc: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2011 02:38:55 -0000

        Martin:

        As we all recognize, you can't trust much in a self-signed 
certificate.  Everything in it except version, signature and public key 
info is just a claim.  However, if you're going to manually add a 
self-signed certificate to a particular user's entry in your personal 
address book so you can encrypt email to it (something a user might 
legitimately do with such a certificate), SAN.rfc822Address is a 
meaningful field for the email client to use.  Similarly, SAN.DNSName and 
the CN attribute of the subject are reasonable places to put the claimed 
name of a test TLS server where the client's user is individually familiar 
with the administrator - I don't want to encourage anyone to trust public 
servers which do that.
        An individual trust decision for a self-signed certificate 
typically means that the person accepting that certificate believes that 
its values for the naming attributes that his client cares about (host 
name for TLS servers, email address for mail users) are correct.  Maybe 
that should mean that such a self-signed certificate should trigger an 
extra warning if it contains more than one such name.  The only other use 
case I can think of that I'd want to encourage is the one where a user who 
has already authenticated to an HTTPS server via password uploads a 
self-signed client certificate into his own registration record for future 
connections.  It's no weaker than a password, and harder to steal.  In 
that case, the name fields are irrelevant and the actual trust decision is 
similar to SSH.

Tom Gindin





From:   Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
To:     denis.pinkas@bull.net, 
Cc:     pkix@ietf.org
Date:   11/15/2011 10:28 AM
Subject:        Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
Sent by:        pkix-bounces@ietf.org



denis.pinkas@bull.net wrote:
> 
> I support Tom's proposal in general.
> 
> Martin, the point is NOT to draft a specification which would be 
backwards 
> compatible with all existing implementations.
> The point is to write a draft which will define rules on how using 
> self-signed EE certificates.
> If you trust a self-signed EE certificate, then you trust all its 
content, 
> otherwise you don't trust it.

There really is no point in processing any constraints for
as self-signed end-entity cert.  Such a cert ought to never appear
as signer of any other cert (otherwise it is by definition not an
end-entity, but a CA cert).  For a self-signed cert, the attributes
and any constraints that may be present are completely static.

So if any processing of the self-consistency of such data should
be done at all, then prior to accepting of that certificate as
trusted.  Doing it over and over again when the certificate is
use is a complete waste of resources.

-Martin
_______________________________________________
pkix mailing list
pkix@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix




From william.polk@nist.gov  Tue Nov 15 22:59:41 2011
Return-Path: <william.polk@nist.gov>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9AC2911E81B7 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 22:59:41 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id vfABHKfQmaV3 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 22:59:41 -0800 (PST)
Received: from wsget2.nist.gov (wsget2.nist.gov [129.6.13.151]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D583611E81AD for <pkix@ietf.org>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 22:59:40 -0800 (PST)
Received: from WSXGHUB1.xchange.nist.gov (129.6.18.96) by wsget2.nist.gov (129.6.13.151) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 14.1.339.1; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 01:59:35 -0500
Received: from MBCLUSTER.xchange.nist.gov ([fe80::41df:f63f:c718:e08]) by WSXGHUB1.xchange.nist.gov ([129.6.18.96]) with mapi; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 01:59:39 -0500
From: "Polk, William T." <william.polk@nist.gov>
To: Erwin Himawan <ehimawan@gmail.com>, "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2011 01:59:00 -0500
Thread-Topic: [pkix] Which CA to use for Inter PKI (Domain) Cross Certification
Thread-Index: Acyj0vq5vHFIZVtTQ0Wu1pHhHWePcAANcsgJ
Message-ID: <D7A0423E5E193F40BE6E94126930C49308E9EA774E@MBCLUSTER.xchange.nist.gov>
References: <CAFY=A4759WXObvtb0mZU6zB137N314yw2Zi=f0b=oD2zW+NYYA@mail.gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <CAFY=A4759WXObvtb0mZU6zB137N314yw2Zi=f0b=oD2zW+NYYA@mail.gmail.com>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
acceptlanguage: en-US
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
MIME-Version: 1.0
Subject: Re: [pkix] Which CA to use for Inter PKI (Domain) Cross Certification
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2011 06:59:41 -0000

If you are operating a hierarchical PKI, you could theoretically use any CA to issue a certificate to the principal CA.  A relying party that chose to use your root CA as a trust anchor would be able to build a path for certificates in the other domain through the intermediate CA.

There is an obvious negative impact: a longer path.  You have to get at least one additional certificate and more importantly, status information for at least one more certificate.

Another *possible* negative impact would be asymmetry: assuming the other PKI domain wishes to trust your entire domain, they will want to cross certify with your root CA.  Otherwise, they can only establish paths for certificates issued in a subtree of your hierarchical PKI.  The cross certification process is also simpler IMHO if the two principal CAs cross certify directly.  (I consider this a "possible negative", since there might be a valid scenario where the other domain only wants to recognize a subtree from your hierarchical PKI.)

There may be a significant positive impact of issuing the certificate for the other Principal CA from an intermediate CA, though.  Many PKIs lock their Root CA down pretty tightly, and issue long lived CRLs (e.g., 30 days) so they don't have to get access very often.  Since relying parties may choose to cache that 30 day CRL, revoking your trust relationship with that PKI domain may leave your relying parties with a long window of vulnerability.  If you issue the certificate from an intermediate CA, which is usually online, that window of vulnerability is likely to be hours instead of days or weeks.

Is this the sort of information you are looking for?

Tim

________________________________________
From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Erwin Himawan [ehimawan@gmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, November 15, 2011 3:13 PM
To: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: [pkix] Which CA to use for Inter PKI (Domain) Cross Certification

Hi,

If I have a PKI with hierarchical CAs (Root CA -> Intermediate CA -> Issuing CA) and I would like to cross sign with other (PKI) domain, which CA should I use for cross-signing (root CA, Intermediate CA)?

TWG-98-59 (Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Technical Specifications: Part A - Technical Concept of Operations) specifies that a "Principal CA" performs the cross certification.
Furthermore, it also mentions that in a hierarchical topology, the principal CA is the root CA.

I would like to get more insight on the pros and cons of having root CA performs the cross signing vs having the Intermediate CA performs this function.

Thanks
Erwin


From internet-drafts@ietf.org  Tue Nov 15 23:13:57 2011
Return-Path: <internet-drafts@ietf.org>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3D28711E8099; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 23:13:57 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -102.581
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-102.581 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.018, BAYES_00=-2.599, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id UJqHHlo8mu0D; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 23:13:52 -0800 (PST)
Received: from ietfa.amsl.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C759021F9212; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 23:13:52 -0800 (PST)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
From: internet-drafts@ietf.org
To: i-d-announce@ietf.org
X-Test-IDTracker: no
X-IETF-IDTracker: 3.64
Message-ID: <20111116071352.26421.79163.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2011 23:13:52 -0800
Cc: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: [pkix] I-D Action: draft-ietf-pkix-pubkey-caps-04.txt
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2011 07:13:57 -0000

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts director=
ies. This draft is a work item of the Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) Wor=
king Group of the IETF.

	Title           : S/MIME Capabilities for Public Key Definitions
	Author(s)       : Jim Schaad
	Filename        : draft-ietf-pkix-pubkey-caps-04.txt
	Pages           : 23
	Date            : 2011-11-15

   This document defines a set of S/MIME Capability types for ASN.1
   encoding for the current set of public keys define in the PKIX
   working group.  This facilitates the ability for a requester to
   specify information on the public keys and signature algorithms to be
   used in responses.  An example of where this is used is with the OCSP
   Agility draft.


A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-pubkey-caps-04.txt

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/

This Internet-Draft can be retrieved at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-pubkey-caps-04.txt


From ietf@augustcellars.com  Tue Nov 15 23:58:21 2011
Return-Path: <ietf@augustcellars.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0DD3411E815D for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 23:58:21 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -3.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id Rs0D6o13rdSO for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 23:58:20 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtp2.pacifier.net (smtp2.pacifier.net [64.255.237.172]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4E18811E81A9 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 23:58:20 -0800 (PST)
Received: from Tobias (dhcp-10a6.meeting.ietf.org [130.129.16.166]) (using TLSv1 with cipher AES128-SHA (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) (Authenticated sender: schaad@nwlink.com) by smtp2.pacifier.net (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id CF64A2CA0C for <pkix@ietf.org>; Tue, 15 Nov 2011 23:58:19 -0800 (PST)
From: "Jim Schaad" <ietf@augustcellars.com>
To: <pkix@ietf.org>
References: <20111116071352.26421.68245.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com>
In-Reply-To: <20111116071352.26421.68245.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com>
Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2011 15:57:46 +0800
Message-ID: <03b201cca435$6f3a1080$4dae3180$@augustcellars.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook 14.0
Content-Language: en-us
Thread-Index: AQHJ1PxdqkJ94j9fz/oUxNgBCHu/TZW0wA9A
Subject: [pkix] FW: New Version Notification for draft-ietf-pkix-pubkey-caps-04.txt
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2011 07:58:21 -0000

The update is just to address an issue dealing with what is and what is =
not a normative reference.  Since this is the PKIX working group, Paul =
and my document about using 2008 ASN.1 should not have been a normative =
reference.

Jim


> -----Original Message-----
> From: internet-drafts@ietf.org [mailto:internet-drafts@ietf.org]
> Sent: Wednesday, November 16, 2011 3:14 PM
> To: ietf@augustcellars.com
> Cc: ietf@augustcellars.com
> Subject: New Version Notification for =
draft-ietf-pkix-pubkey-caps-04.txt
>=20
> A new version of I-D, draft-ietf-pkix-pubkey-caps-04.txt has been
> successfully submitted by Jim Schaad and posted to the IETF =
repository.
>=20
> Filename:	 draft-ietf-pkix-pubkey-caps
> Revision:	 04
> Title:		 S/MIME Capabilities for Public Key Definitions
> Creation date:	 2011-11-16
> WG ID:		 pkix
> Number of pages: 23
>=20
> Abstract:
>    This document defines a set of S/MIME Capability types for ASN.1
>    encoding for the current set of public keys define in the PKIX
>    working group.  This facilitates the ability for a requester to
>    specify information on the public keys and signature algorithms to =
be
>    used in responses.  An example of where this is used is with the =
OCSP
>    Agility draft.
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> The IETF Secretariat


From denis.pinkas@bull.net  Wed Nov 16 00:05:07 2011
Return-Path: <denis.pinkas@bull.net>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id CB79811E81E4 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 00:05:07 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.145
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.145 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.103,  BAYES_00=-2.599, HELO_EQ_FR=0.35, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 5pRaIJjsgPBa for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 00:05:07 -0800 (PST)
Received: from odin2.bull.net (odin2.bull.net [129.184.85.11]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 18A3311E81B1 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 00:05:06 -0800 (PST)
Received: from MSGC-003.bull.fr (MSGC-003.frcl.bull.fr [129.184.87.131]) by odin2.bull.net (Bull S.A.) with ESMTP id 593CE18079 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 09:14:46 +0100 (CET)
In-Reply-To: <CAE7E77D.256A%tmiller@mitre.org>
References: <OFFF7D53F5.DC530A9B-ONC1257949.0052F91F-C1257949.0053837B@bull.net> <CAE7E77D.256A%tmiller@mitre.org>
To: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-KeepSent: E9FD672F:3469364F-C1257949:005A2899; type=4; name=$KeepSent
X-Mailer: Lotus Notes Release 8.5.2 August 10, 2010
From: denis.pinkas@bull.net
Message-ID: <OFE9FD672F.3469364F-ONC1257949.005A2899-C125794A.002C7855@bull.net>
Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2011 09:05:44 +0100
X-MIMETrack: Serialize by Router on MSGC-003/SRV/BULL(Release 8.5.2FP1|November 29, 2010) at 16/11/2011 09:05:44, Serialize complete at 16/11/2011 09:05:44
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="=_alternative 005AD8C5C1257949_="
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2011 08:05:07 -0000

Message en plusieurs parties au format MIME
--=_alternative 005AD8C5C1257949_=
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII"

Tim,

I do not think so.

Please take a look at some products like Adobe Acrobat X Pro and Adobe 
Reader.
They allow to generate self-signed certificates which contain in 
particular a DN, a public key and a key usage.
All values are either either accepted alltogether or rejected.

They allow to verify signatures using direct trust rather than a path 
validation scheme. 

It is certainly not usable when there are numerous certificates, but fully 
adequate on a small scale.

Please, don't confuse lies and trust.

Denis




>I support Tom's proposal in general.
> 
>Martin, the point is NOT to draft a
>specification which would be backwards compatible with all existing
>implementations.
>The point is to write a draft which
>will define rules on how using self-signed EE certificates.
>If you trust a self-signed EE certificate,
>then you trust all its content, otherwise you don't trust it.

The only trustable content in a self-signed certificate is the public key,
and only when that key is verified by the signature.

*Nothing* else in that cert has any meaning.  The signer can lie about
everything *except* his possession of the private key.

-- T



--=_alternative 005AD8C5C1257949_=
Content-Type: text/html; charset="US-ASCII"

<font size=2 face="sans-serif">Tim,</font>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">I do not think so.</font>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">Please take a look at some products
like Adobe Acrobat X Pro and Adobe Reader.</font>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">They allow to generate self-signed certificates
which contain in particular a DN, a public key and a key usage.</font>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">All values are either either accepted
alltogether or rejected.</font>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">They allow to verify signatures using
direct trust rather than a path validation scheme. </font>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">It is certainly not usable when there
are numerous certificates, but fully adequate on a small scale.</font>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">Please, don't confuse lies and trust.</font>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">Denis</font>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br><tt><font size=2><br>
&gt;I support Tom's proposal in general.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;Martin, the point is NOT to draft a<br>
&gt;specification which would be backwards compatible with all existing<br>
&gt;implementations.<br>
&gt;The point is to write a draft which<br>
&gt;will define rules on how using self-signed EE certificates.<br>
&gt;If you trust a self-signed EE certificate,<br>
&gt;then you trust all its content, otherwise you don't trust it.<br>
<br>
The only trustable content in a self-signed certificate is the public key,<br>
and only when that key is verified by the signature.<br>
<br>
*Nothing* else in that cert has any meaning. &nbsp;The signer can lie about<br>
everything *except* his possession of the private key.<br>
<br>
-- T<br>
<br>
</font></tt>
<br>
--=_alternative 005AD8C5C1257949_=--

From tmiller@mitre.org  Wed Nov 16 06:21:19 2011
Return-Path: <tmiller@mitre.org>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id CE03221F94D4 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 06:21:19 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.000,  BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id bsUxKCgyUFcb for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 06:21:19 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (smtpksrv1.mitre.org [198.49.146.77]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E267A21F94B1 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 06:21:18 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by localhost (Postfix) with SMTP id 50CB821B1305; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 09:21:18 -0500 (EST)
Received: from IMCCAS02.MITRE.ORG (imccas02.mitre.org [129.83.29.79]) by smtpksrv1.mitre.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 49DF921B00F8; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 09:21:18 -0500 (EST)
Received: from IMCMBX01.MITRE.ORG ([169.254.1.18]) by IMCCAS02.MITRE.ORG ([129.83.29.79]) with mapi id 14.01.0339.001; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 09:21:18 -0500
From: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
To: Trevor Freeman <trevorf@exchange.microsoft.com>, "denis.pinkas@bull.net" <denis.pinkas@bull.net>, "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
Thread-Index: AQHMo6ccK+6nacw8f0a2iVOXAK08TJWuXmoA//+nywCAAO0hgIAAipYA
Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2011 14:21:17 +0000
Message-ID: <CAE9228C.25DE%tmiller@mitre.org>
In-Reply-To: <E545B914D50B2A4B994F198378B1525D4278A2C1@DF-M14-12.exchange.corp.microsoft.com>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
user-agent: Microsoft-MacOutlook/14.13.0.110805
x-originating-ip: [172.31.35.93]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-ID: <6D4F415B46096142B3717CAC65430932@imc.mitre.org>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2011 14:21:19 -0000

On 11/15/11 6:05 PM, "Trevor Freeman" <trevorf@exchange.microsoft.com>
wrote:

>Of course other attributes of the certificate have meaning.

Not really.  Since they're self-asserted, they can be re-asserted at any
time.  E.g., today my self-signed instrument permits only signing;
tomorrow I'll reissue that instrument (using the same key) to permit
encryption. =20

-- T


From tmiller@mitre.org  Wed Nov 16 06:28:29 2011
Return-Path: <tmiller@mitre.org>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B13ED21F958E for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 06:28:29 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id dXOTchQh+MTu for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 06:28:28 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (smtpksrv1.mitre.org [198.49.146.77]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9A43F21F94B9 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 06:28:28 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by localhost (Postfix) with SMTP id 49CE521B1309; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 09:28:28 -0500 (EST)
Received: from IMCCAS04.MITRE.ORG (imccas04.mitre.org [129.83.29.81]) by smtpksrv1.mitre.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 42E7B21B00F6; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 09:28:28 -0500 (EST)
Received: from IMCMBX01.MITRE.ORG ([169.254.1.18]) by IMCCAS04.MITRE.ORG ([129.83.29.81]) with mapi id 14.01.0339.001; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 09:28:28 -0500
From: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
To: Thierry Moreau <thierry.moreau@connotech.com>, "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
Thread-Index: AQHMo6ccK+6nacw8f0a2iVOXAK08TJWuXmoA//+nywCAAKlugIAADeAAgABY6ICAAGmHgA==
Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2011 14:28:27 +0000
Message-ID: <CAE923FC.25EC%tmiller@mitre.org>
In-Reply-To: <4EC31BA7.4070300@connotech.com>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
user-agent: Microsoft-MacOutlook/14.13.0.110805
x-originating-ip: [172.31.35.93]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-ID: <5ADC2DFBD1688746B5971AB309E0B63E@imc.mitre.org>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Cc: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2011 14:28:29 -0000

On 11/15/11 8:10 PM, "Thierry Moreau" <thierry.moreau@connotech.com> wrote:

>I thought that the very purpose of a PKI was to distribute trust about
>the alleged signer (the one indicated in an end-entity certificate
>backed/signed by a CA) when a) signatures along the certification path
>validates, b) there is an out-of-band basis of trust for the CA public
>key, and c) the CA is careful in carrying evidence of security breaches
>into CRLs and/or on-line OCSP services. Under these conditions, the
>relying party can be (somewhat) confident that the true signer is the
>alleged one.

The context of this discussion is self-signed, not CA-signed.  These are
entirely different, so don't confuse the two.

>You seem to state that there is no alleged signer (then presumably only
>trusted or legitimate ones) for any public key. Then I don't see a
>purpose in pursuing this discussion about reliable portions of a
>self-signed certificate (a special case in the big picture, yet an
>inescapable one).

I think you're trying to distinguish between the identity of the entity
*holding* a private key from the identity to which the private key is
bound.  You can't do that without specifying hardware, so I recommend you
don't go there. =20

*From the perspective of network interactions* the current private key
holder *is* the identity bound to the that key.


>Ah, I see. Bogus self-signed certificates do not exist because an active
>ietf/pkix participant says so.

No, bogus self-signed certificates do not exist because you can't
distinguish between them and the putative "legitimate" self-signed
certificates.  A difference that makes no difference is, in fact, no
difference.

>					From now on, I should feel confident to
>accept any self-signed certificate that comes to my browser.

Don't be dense.

-- T


From tmiller@mitre.org  Wed Nov 16 06:32:02 2011
Return-Path: <tmiller@mitre.org>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 53DE81F0C74 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 06:32:02 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.299
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.299 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.300, BAYES_00=-2.599, J_CHICKENPOX_37=0.6, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id OTLC5kthhuhI for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 06:32:01 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (smtpksrv1.mitre.org [198.49.146.77]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8FD041F0C5E for <pkix@ietf.org>; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 06:32:01 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by localhost (Postfix) with SMTP id 3F97A21B1319; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 09:32:01 -0500 (EST)
Received: from IMCCAS02.MITRE.ORG (imccas02.mitre.org [129.83.29.79]) by smtpksrv1.mitre.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3A7A521B1315; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 09:32:01 -0500 (EST)
Received: from IMCMBX01.MITRE.ORG ([169.254.1.18]) by IMCCAS02.MITRE.ORG ([129.83.29.79]) with mapi id 14.01.0339.001; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 09:32:01 -0500
From: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
To: Tom Gindin <tgindin@us.ibm.com>, "mrex@sap.com" <mrex@sap.com>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
Thread-Index: AQHMo6paK+6nacw8f0a2iVOXAK08TJWvHi8AgABiuwA=
Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2011 14:32:01 +0000
Message-ID: <CAE924D8.25F5%tmiller@mitre.org>
In-Reply-To: <OFAA359AC7.EAC5145E-ON85257949.0058C95C-8525794A.000E87A8@us.ibm.com>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
user-agent: Microsoft-MacOutlook/14.13.0.110805
x-originating-ip: [172.31.35.93]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-ID: <8CAC93A9C2F3114582D028278A9639D8@imc.mitre.org>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Cc: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2011 14:32:02 -0000

My point (assuming I have one :) is basically under these assumptions, you
don't actually need the certificates.  If you're going out-of-band to
establish trust (IOW, associate a key to an identity), then stuff those
*independently verified attributes* in the damn key database (or Contacts
list, or authorized_keys file, or whatever) and throw the cert out--it's
not required and it's just going to confuse people.

-- T

On 11/15/11 8:38 PM, "Tom Gindin" <tgindin@us.ibm.com> wrote:

>        Martin:
>
>        As we all recognize, you can't trust much in a self-signed
>certificate.  Everything in it except version, signature and public key
>info is just a claim.  However, if you're going to manually add a
>self-signed certificate to a particular user's entry in your personal
>address book so you can encrypt email to it (something a user might
>legitimately do with such a certificate), SAN.rfc822Address is a
>meaningful field for the email client to use.  Similarly, SAN.DNSName and
>the CN attribute of the subject are reasonable places to put the claimed
>name of a test TLS server where the client's user is individually
>familiar=20
>with the administrator - I don't want to encourage anyone to trust public
>servers which do that.
>        An individual trust decision for a self-signed certificate
>typically means that the person accepting that certificate believes that
>its values for the naming attributes that his client cares about (host
>name for TLS servers, email address for mail users) are correct.  Maybe
>that should mean that such a self-signed certificate should trigger an
>extra warning if it contains more than one such name.  The only other use
>case I can think of that I'd want to encourage is the one where a user
>who=20
>has already authenticated to an HTTPS server via password uploads a
>self-signed client certificate into his own registration record for
>future=20
>connections.  It's no weaker than a password, and harder to steal.  In
>that case, the name fields are irrelevant and the actual trust decision
>is=20
>similar to SSH.
>
>Tom Gindin
>
>
>
>
>
>From:   Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
>To:     denis.pinkas@bull.net,
>Cc:     pkix@ietf.org
>Date:   11/15/2011 10:28 AM
>Subject:        Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
>Sent by:        pkix-bounces@ietf.org
>
>
>
>denis.pinkas@bull.net wrote:
>>=20
>> I support Tom's proposal in general.
>>=20
>> Martin, the point is NOT to draft a specification which would be
>backwards=20
>> compatible with all existing implementations.
>> The point is to write a draft which will define rules on how using
>> self-signed EE certificates.
>> If you trust a self-signed EE certificate, then you trust all its
>content,=20
>> otherwise you don't trust it.
>
>There really is no point in processing any constraints for
>as self-signed end-entity cert.  Such a cert ought to never appear
>as signer of any other cert (otherwise it is by definition not an
>end-entity, but a CA cert).  For a self-signed cert, the attributes
>and any constraints that may be present are completely static.
>
>So if any processing of the self-consistency of such data should
>be done at all, then prior to accepting of that certificate as
>trusted.  Doing it over and over again when the certificate is
>use is a complete waste of resources.
>
>-Martin
>_______________________________________________
>pkix mailing list
>pkix@ietf.org
>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>
>
>
>_______________________________________________
>pkix mailing list
>pkix@ietf.org
>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix


From tmiller@mitre.org  Wed Nov 16 06:40:47 2011
Return-Path: <tmiller@mitre.org>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C909511E80EE for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 06:40:47 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.59
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.59 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.009,  BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id R4ySicvBYf-R for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 06:40:47 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (smtpksrv1.mitre.org [198.49.146.77]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1F5FD11E80EA for <pkix@ietf.org>; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 06:40:47 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by localhost (Postfix) with SMTP id 7E31B21B1320; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 09:40:42 -0500 (EST)
Received: from IMCCAS03.MITRE.ORG (imccas03.mitre.org [129.83.29.80]) by smtpksrv1.mitre.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 79A1321B131E; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 09:40:42 -0500 (EST)
Received: from IMCMBX01.MITRE.ORG ([169.254.1.18]) by IMCCAS03.MITRE.ORG ([129.83.29.80]) with mapi id 14.01.0339.001; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 09:40:42 -0500
From: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
To: "denis.pinkas@bull.net" <denis.pinkas@bull.net>, "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
Thread-Index: AQHMo6ccK+6nacw8f0a2iVOXAK08TJWuXmoA//+nywCAAXNiAIAACbwA
Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2011 14:40:42 +0000
Message-ID: <CAE92653.2601%tmiller@mitre.org>
In-Reply-To: <OFE9FD672F.3469364F-ONC1257949.005A2899-C125794A.002C7855@bull.net>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
user-agent: Microsoft-MacOutlook/14.13.0.110805
x-originating-ip: [172.31.35.93]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-ID: <96B2B4937618894191A6456477DD4B4C@imc.mitre.org>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2011 14:40:47 -0000

I'm starting to think y'all are missing the point.  If you're directly
trusting end-entity keys, you're *not* using X.509.  This is a perfectly
valid approach to authentication (no-one is arguing that SSH is a
failure), but it's up to you how to verify identities and attributes under
such a scheme. =20

Relying on X.509 mechanisms to bind keys to attributes *without also using
X.509 methods of trust* is the exact wrong thing to do.

-- T


On 11/16/11 2:05 AM, "denis.pinkas@bull.net" <denis.pinkas@bull.net> wrote:

>Tim,
>
>I do not think so.
>
>Please take a look at some products
>like Adobe Acrobat X Pro and Adobe Reader.
>They allow to generate self-signed certificates
>which contain in particular a DN, a public key and a key usage.
>All values are either either accepted
>alltogether or rejected.
>
>They allow to verify signatures using
>direct trust rather than a path validation scheme.
>
>It is certainly not usable when there
>are numerous certificates, but fully adequate on a small scale.
>
>Please, don't confuse lies and trust.
>
>Denis
>
>
>
>
>>I support Tom's proposal in general.
>>=20
>>Martin, the point is NOT to draft a
>>specification which would be backwards compatible with all existing
>>implementations.
>>The point is to write a draft which
>>will define rules on how using self-signed EE certificates.
>>If you trust a self-signed EE certificate,
>>then you trust all its content, otherwise you don't trust it.
>
>The only trustable content in a self-signed certificate is the public key,
>and only when that key is verified by the signature.
>
>*Nothing* else in that cert has any meaning.  The signer can lie about
>everything *except* his possession of the private key.
>
>-- T
>
>
>_______________________________________________
>pkix mailing list
>pkix@ietf.org
>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix


From tgindin@us.ibm.com  Wed Nov 16 07:24:22 2011
Return-Path: <tgindin@us.ibm.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0216A21F943E for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 07:24:22 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.111
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.111 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.112, BAYES_00=-2.599, J_CHICKENPOX_37=0.6, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id OxeUofmpIvKr for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 07:24:21 -0800 (PST)
Received: from e2.ny.us.ibm.com (e2.ny.us.ibm.com [32.97.182.142]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2E5A221F943D for <pkix@ietf.org>; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 07:24:21 -0800 (PST)
Received: from /spool/local by e2.ny.us.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted for <pkix@ietf.org> from <tgindin@us.ibm.com>; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 10:23:10 -0500
Received: from d01relay01.pok.ibm.com (9.56.227.233) by e2.ny.us.ibm.com (192.168.1.102) with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted;  Wed, 16 Nov 2011 10:22:04 -0500
Received: from d01av01.pok.ibm.com (d01av01.pok.ibm.com [9.56.224.215]) by d01relay01.pok.ibm.com (8.13.8/8.13.8/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id pAGFLwrL237108 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 10:21:58 -0500
Received: from d01av01.pok.ibm.com (loopback [127.0.0.1]) by d01av01.pok.ibm.com (8.14.4/8.13.1/NCO v10.0 AVout) with ESMTP id pAGFLwKR007412 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 10:21:58 -0500
Received: from d01ml062.pok.ibm.com (d01ml062.pok.ibm.com [9.63.10.95]) by d01av01.pok.ibm.com (8.14.4/8.13.1/NCO v10.0 AVin) with ESMTP id pAGFLwvr007400; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 10:21:58 -0500
In-Reply-To: <CAE924D8.25F5%tmiller@mitre.org>
References: <OFAA359AC7.EAC5145E-ON85257949.0058C95C-8525794A.000E87A8@us.ibm.com> <CAE924D8.25F5%tmiller@mitre.org>
To: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-KeepSent: D71AE5E9:0DFA5B37-8525794A:00539A04; type=4; name=$KeepSent
X-Mailer: Lotus Notes Build V853_CD5_06022011 June 02, 2011
From: Tom Gindin <tgindin@us.ibm.com>
Message-ID: <OFD71AE5E9.0DFA5B37-ON8525794A.00539A04-8525794A.00546882@us.ibm.com>
Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2011 10:21:56 -0500
X-MIMETrack: Serialize by Router on D01ML062/01/M/IBM(Release 8.5.2FP1 ZX852FP1HF12|September 28, 2011) at 11/16/2011 10:21:58, Serialize complete at 11/16/2011 10:21:58
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII"
x-cbid: 11111615-5112-0000-0000-00000218EE8D
Cc: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2011 15:24:22 -0000

        No, Tim.  The application or protocol needs a certificate (e.g. 
RFC 5246 sections 7.4.2 and 7.4.6 or RFC 3852 section 5.1).  The code 
implementing those standards expects a certificate rather than a 
collection of attributes, and the users want to give the code something it 
will understand and process.

Tom Gindin




From:   "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
To:     Tom Gindin/Watson/IBM@IBMUS, "mrex@sap.com" <mrex@sap.com>, 
Cc:     "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Date:   11/16/2011 09:34 AM
Subject:        Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs



My point (assuming I have one :) is basically under these assumptions, you
don't actually need the certificates.  If you're going out-of-band to
establish trust (IOW, associate a key to an identity), then stuff those
*independently verified attributes* in the damn key database (or Contacts
list, or authorized_keys file, or whatever) and throw the cert out--it's
not required and it's just going to confuse people.

-- T

On 11/15/11 8:38 PM, "Tom Gindin" <tgindin@us.ibm.com> wrote:

>        Martin:
>
>        As we all recognize, you can't trust much in a self-signed
>certificate.  Everything in it except version, signature and public key
>info is just a claim.  However, if you're going to manually add a
>self-signed certificate to a particular user's entry in your personal
>address book so you can encrypt email to it (something a user might
>legitimately do with such a certificate), SAN.rfc822Address is a
>meaningful field for the email client to use.  Similarly, SAN.DNSName and
>the CN attribute of the subject are reasonable places to put the claimed
>name of a test TLS server where the client's user is individually
>familiar 
>with the administrator - I don't want to encourage anyone to trust public
>servers which do that.
>        An individual trust decision for a self-signed certificate
>typically means that the person accepting that certificate believes that
>its values for the naming attributes that his client cares about (host
>name for TLS servers, email address for mail users) are correct.  Maybe
>that should mean that such a self-signed certificate should trigger an
>extra warning if it contains more than one such name.  The only other use
>case I can think of that I'd want to encourage is the one where a user
>who 
>has already authenticated to an HTTPS server via password uploads a
>self-signed client certificate into his own registration record for
>future 
>connections.  It's no weaker than a password, and harder to steal.  In
>that case, the name fields are irrelevant and the actual trust decision
>is 
>similar to SSH.
>
>Tom Gindin
>
>
>
>
>
>From:   Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
>To:     denis.pinkas@bull.net,
>Cc:     pkix@ietf.org
>Date:   11/15/2011 10:28 AM
>Subject:        Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
>Sent by:        pkix-bounces@ietf.org
>
>
>
>denis.pinkas@bull.net wrote:
>> 
>> I support Tom's proposal in general.
>> 
>> Martin, the point is NOT to draft a specification which would be
>backwards 
>> compatible with all existing implementations.
>> The point is to write a draft which will define rules on how using
>> self-signed EE certificates.
>> If you trust a self-signed EE certificate, then you trust all its
>content, 
>> otherwise you don't trust it.
>
>There really is no point in processing any constraints for
>as self-signed end-entity cert.  Such a cert ought to never appear
>as signer of any other cert (otherwise it is by definition not an
>end-entity, but a CA cert).  For a self-signed cert, the attributes
>and any constraints that may be present are completely static.
>
>So if any processing of the self-consistency of such data should
>be done at all, then prior to accepting of that certificate as
>trusted.  Doing it over and over again when the certificate is
>use is a complete waste of resources.
>
>-Martin
>_______________________________________________
>pkix mailing list
>pkix@ietf.org
>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>
>
>
>_______________________________________________
>pkix mailing list
>pkix@ietf.org
>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix




From DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil  Wed Nov 16 07:38:52 2011
Return-Path: <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6D21411E8096 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 07:38:52 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id MvMQ+wSmmD5r for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 07:38:52 -0800 (PST)
Received: from stingray.missi.ncsc.mil (stingray.missi.ncsc.mil [144.51.50.20]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id CAE2F11E8095 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 07:38:51 -0800 (PST)
Received: from AUGUSTINE.missi.ncsc.mil (augustine.missi.ncsc.mil [144.51.60.33]) by stingray.missi.ncsc.mil with ESMTP id pAGFcpGH003509 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 10:38:51 -0500 (EST)
Received: from DABECK.missi.ncsc.mil ([144.51.60.16]) by AUGUSTINE.missi.ncsc.mil with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.4675);  Wed, 16 Nov 2011 10:39:30 -0500
Content-class: urn:content-classes:message
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft Exchange V6.5
Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2011 10:38:51 -0500
Message-ID: <C1A47F1540DF3246A8D30C853C05D0DA01B96B73@DABECK.missi.ncsc.mil>
In-Reply-To: <4EC31BA7.4070300@connotech.com>
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
Thread-Topic: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
Thread-Index: AcykAngT8CK80aUZTmaUlJ1lhfpQcwAanwdg
References: <CAE7E77D.256A%tmiller@mitre.org> <4EC2C56F.7090105@connotech.com> <C1A47F1540DF3246A8D30C853C05D0DA01B96B71@DABECK.missi.ncsc.mil> <4EC31BA7.4070300@connotech.com>
From: "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>
To: <pkix@ietf.org>
X-OriginalArrivalTime: 16 Nov 2011 15:39:30.0875 (UTC) FILETIME=[EEA3E8B0:01CCA475]
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2011 15:38:52 -0000

-----Original Message-----
From: Thierry Moreau [mailto:thierry.moreau@connotech.com]=20

> You seem to state that there is no alleged signer (then presumably
> only trusted or legitimate ones) for any public key. Then I don't
> see a purpose in pursuing this discussion about reliable portions
> of a self-signed certificate (a special case in the big picture,
> yet an inescapable one).

Put your thinking cap on, this isn't difficult.  Do you agree that if I
possess a keypair, I can use it to sign anything at all, including using
the name of any person or organization in the subject and issuer fields?
If I create a self-signed cert with Subject =3D Issuer =3D
thierry.moreau@connotech.com, do you have any reason to believe anything
contained in the TBS portion of that cert?

>From Wikipedia: "An allegation (also called adduction) is a claim of a
fact by a party in a pleading, which the party claims to be able to
prove."

Because a self-signed cert can be created by anyone and can contain
anything, it cannot claim to prove anything.  In particular, my cert
cannot claim to prove that it was signed by you any more than my writing
your name on a piece of paper proves that you signed the paper.  Because
there is no credible proof, there is no allegation, and no alleged
signer.
(I'm having visions of a Monty Python skit in which Eric Idle stands in
a courtroom in front of Judge John Cleese, signs a document on the spot,
shows it to the judge, points to a person in the room, and says "Here's
your proof - 'is name's right there in black an' white.")


>>                               the signature can be generated only by=20
>> an entity that possesses the private key, and every other field in
the=20
>> certificate can have any value, with zero assurance.  So [B] and [B']

>> do not exist independently of [A] and [A'].
>
> Ah, I see. Bogus self-signed certificates do not exist because
> an active ietf/pkix participant says so. From now on, I should
> feel confident to accept any self-signed certificate that comes to my
browser.

That's a breathtaking leap of illogic.  All self-signed certificates are
bogus (zero-assurance) until some out-of-band mechanism is used to
designate them as trustable.  Unless you're a masochist, how to you get
from "they're all bogus" to "I should accept them all"?



From SChokhani@cygnacom.com  Wed Nov 16 07:45:14 2011
Return-Path: <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4A6C11F0C35 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 07:45:14 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id S1PaVOJTzQEX for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 07:45:13 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail108.messagelabs.com (mail108.messagelabs.com [216.82.250.51]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id DDD7921F94FB for <pkix@ietf.org>; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 07:45:12 -0800 (PST)
X-Env-Sender: SChokhani@cygnacom.com
X-Msg-Ref: server-7.tower-108.messagelabs.com!1321458310!30175590!1
X-Originating-IP: [216.191.252.21]
X-StarScan-Version: 6.3.6; banners=-,-,-
X-VirusChecked: Checked
Received: (qmail 5491 invoked from network); 16 Nov 2011 15:45:11 -0000
Received: from sottexche1.entrust.com (HELO sottexchE1.entrust.com) (216.191.252.21) by server-7.tower-108.messagelabs.com with AES128-SHA encrypted SMTP; 16 Nov 2011 15:45:11 -0000
Received: from scygexch7.cygnacom.com (10.4.60.22) by sottexchE1.entrust.com (216.191.252.21) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 8.2.254.0; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 10:44:52 -0500
Received: from scygexch7.cygnacom.com ([::1]) by scygexch7.cygnacom.com ([::1]) with mapi; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 10:45:09 -0500
From: Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>
To: "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>, "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2011 10:45:08 -0500
Thread-Topic: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
Thread-Index: AcykAngT8CK80aUZTmaUlJ1lhfpQcwAanwdgAAJRnhA=
Message-ID: <B83745DA469B7847811819C5005244AF0F530A37@scygexch7.cygnacom.com>
References: <CAE7E77D.256A%tmiller@mitre.org> <4EC2C56F.7090105@connotech.com> <C1A47F1540DF3246A8D30C853C05D0DA01B96B71@DABECK.missi.ncsc.mil> <4EC31BA7.4070300@connotech.com> <C1A47F1540DF3246A8D30C853C05D0DA01B96B73@DABECK.missi.ncsc.mil>
In-Reply-To: <C1A47F1540DF3246A8D30C853C05D0DA01B96B73@DABECK.missi.ncsc.mil>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
acceptlanguage: en-US
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2011 15:45:14 -0000

Not only do I agree with Dave Kemp, but I want to further add that for prec=
isely the reasons Dave cited, using extensions like basic constraints and k=
ey usage to determine if self-signed certificate is a CA or not is not a go=
od idea since creator of the signed certificate can add these extensions.

This, however does not mean that the relying parties do not use these exten=
sions to decide if a trust anchor is a CA or not.  However, doing so, requi=
res the relying parties to make an explicit decision about the self-signed =
payload uaing some out of band means as Dave cited.

-----Original Message-----
From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Kem=
p, David P.
Sent: Wednesday, November 16, 2011 10:39 AM
To: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs



-----Original Message-----
From: Thierry Moreau [mailto:thierry.moreau@connotech.com]=20

> You seem to state that there is no alleged signer (then presumably
> only trusted or legitimate ones) for any public key. Then I don't
> see a purpose in pursuing this discussion about reliable portions
> of a self-signed certificate (a special case in the big picture,
> yet an inescapable one).

Put your thinking cap on, this isn't difficult.  Do you agree that if I
possess a keypair, I can use it to sign anything at all, including using
the name of any person or organization in the subject and issuer fields?
If I create a self-signed cert with Subject =3D Issuer =3D
thierry.moreau@connotech.com, do you have any reason to believe anything
contained in the TBS portion of that cert?

>From Wikipedia: "An allegation (also called adduction) is a claim of a
fact by a party in a pleading, which the party claims to be able to
prove."

Because a self-signed cert can be created by anyone and can contain
anything, it cannot claim to prove anything.  In particular, my cert
cannot claim to prove that it was signed by you any more than my writing
your name on a piece of paper proves that you signed the paper.  Because
there is no credible proof, there is no allegation, and no alleged
signer.
(I'm having visions of a Monty Python skit in which Eric Idle stands in
a courtroom in front of Judge John Cleese, signs a document on the spot,
shows it to the judge, points to a person in the room, and says "Here's
your proof - 'is name's right there in black an' white.")


>>                               the signature can be generated only by=20
>> an entity that possesses the private key, and every other field in
the=20
>> certificate can have any value, with zero assurance.  So [B] and [B']

>> do not exist independently of [A] and [A'].
>
> Ah, I see. Bogus self-signed certificates do not exist because
> an active ietf/pkix participant says so. From now on, I should
> feel confident to accept any self-signed certificate that comes to my
browser.

That's a breathtaking leap of illogic.  All self-signed certificates are
bogus (zero-assurance) until some out-of-band mechanism is used to
designate them as trustable.  Unless you're a masochist, how to you get
from "they're all bogus" to "I should accept them all"?


_______________________________________________
pkix mailing list
pkix@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix

From tmiller@mitre.org  Wed Nov 16 08:38:00 2011
Return-Path: <tmiller@mitre.org>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id F09FD11E808B for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 08:37:59 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.59
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.59 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.009,  BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id iY7uUrs-iTMK for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 08:37:59 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (smtpksrv1.mitre.org [198.49.146.77]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 655F611E8085 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 08:37:59 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by localhost (Postfix) with SMTP id E9A5421B13BB; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 11:37:58 -0500 (EST)
Received: from IMCCAS03.MITRE.ORG (imccas03.mitre.org [129.83.29.80]) by smtpksrv1.mitre.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E486E21B13BA; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 11:37:58 -0500 (EST)
Received: from IMCMBX01.MITRE.ORG ([169.254.1.18]) by IMCCAS03.MITRE.ORG ([129.83.29.80]) with mapi id 14.01.0339.001; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 11:37:58 -0500
From: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
To: Tom Gindin <tgindin@us.ibm.com>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
Thread-Index: AQHMo6paK+6nacw8f0a2iVOXAK08TJWvHi8AgABiuwCAAHKGAP//sKIA
Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2011 16:37:59 +0000
Message-ID: <CAE940A2.2624%tmiller@mitre.org>
In-Reply-To: <OFD71AE5E9.0DFA5B37-ON8525794A.00539A04-8525794A.00546882@us.ibm.com>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
user-agent: Microsoft-MacOutlook/14.13.0.110805
x-originating-ip: [172.31.1.141]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-ID: <07577B9190AF684EA765EF33E3460A22@imc.mitre.org>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Cc: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2011 16:38:00 -0000

On 11/16/11 9:21 AM, "Tom Gindin" <tgindin@us.ibm.com> wrote:

>        No, Tim.  The application or protocol needs a certificate (e.g.
>RFC 5246 sections 7.4.2 and 7.4.6 or RFC 3852 section 5.1).  The code
>implementing those standards expects a certificate rather than a
>collection of attributes, and the users want to give the code something
>it=20
>will understand and process.

So rewrite the code.  :)

I'm only being half-facetious.  If the protocol is defined to require
X.509 formats *and* requires  X.509 processing (as both TLS and CMS
currently do), then by implication that protocol relies on the X.509 trust
model because *only* under the X.509 trust model does X.509 processing of
X.509 attributes actually tell you anything you can rely on.

If you want to do something different, then you need to *write code* to
support "something different."  Attempting to slap a few new words into a
spec isn't enough, and in fact will be very very dangerous to others.

There's nothing particularly wrong with using X.509 formats for
convenience of key transport, but if your "something different" is a
non-X.509 trust model, then you should *explicitly* dispense with X.509
processing and everything it can tell you about the attributes bound into
certificates.  You're on your own from there.

You mix and match trust semantics at your peril.  We have plenty of
vulnerability history on this topic to draw on, so I don't see why this is
even remotely controversial.

-- T


From trevorf@exchange.microsoft.com  Wed Nov 16 18:35:11 2011
Return-Path: <trevorf@exchange.microsoft.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id F09AD1F0C3D for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 18:35:11 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -110.654
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-110.654 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.055, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-8, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id HILvLBg52pok for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 18:35:11 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail.exchange.microsoft.com (mail1.exchange.microsoft.com [131.107.1.17]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 470EF1F0C38 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 18:35:11 -0800 (PST)
Received: from df-h14-01.exchange.corp.microsoft.com (157.54.78.139) by DF-G14-01.exchange.corp.microsoft.com (157.54.87.87) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 14.2.247.2; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 18:35:10 -0800
Received: from PIO-MLT-06.exchange.corp.microsoft.com (157.54.94.24) by DF-H14-01.exchange.corp.microsoft.com (157.54.78.139) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 14.2.247.5; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 18:35:10 -0800
Received: from DF-M14-12.exchange.corp.microsoft.com ([fe80::7c94:4036:120:c95f]) by PIO-MLT-06.exchange.corp.microsoft.com ([fe80::d57f:521a:3ae6:c130%10]) with mapi id 14.02.0247.002; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 18:35:10 -0800
From: Trevor Freeman <trevorf@exchange.microsoft.com>
To: Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>, "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>, "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
Thread-Index: AQHMo6ccw9AJYcfzSUGCYGmTut3p+ZWukLQAgAAMZICAAETWgIAADd8AgABY6YCAAOHFgIAAAcIAgAAmWxA=
Date: Thu, 17 Nov 2011 02:35:10 +0000
Message-ID: <E545B914D50B2A4B994F198378B1525D4278B6E2@DF-M14-12.exchange.corp.microsoft.com>
References: <CAE7E77D.256A%tmiller@mitre.org> <4EC2C56F.7090105@connotech.com> <C1A47F1540DF3246A8D30C853C05D0DA01B96B71@DABECK.missi.ncsc.mil> <4EC31BA7.4070300@connotech.com> <C1A47F1540DF3246A8D30C853C05D0DA01B96B73@DABECK.missi.ncsc.mil> <B83745DA469B7847811819C5005244AF0F530A37@scygexch7.cygnacom.com>
In-Reply-To: <B83745DA469B7847811819C5005244AF0F530A37@scygexch7.cygnacom.com>
Accept-Language: en-GB, en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
x-originating-ip: [157.54.123.12]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 17 Nov 2011 02:35:12 -0000

Yes the extensions in the self-signed certificate are self-asserted data, b=
ut so what. If you decide to trust the certificate, you can either accept t=
he assertions or not. You get to choose. You are going to be trusting other=
 assertions from the key.=20

If the self-signer wants to define some restriction over what they intend t=
o use the key for - what wrong with using existing mechanisms to communicat=
e those restrictions.=20

If you have code that understands all those restrictions from pkix, you wan=
t to reuse it rather than invent something new.

-----Original Message-----
From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of San=
tosh Chokhani
Sent: Wednesday, November 16, 2011 11:45 PM
To: Kemp, David P.; pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs

Not only do I agree with Dave Kemp, but I want to further add that for prec=
isely the reasons Dave cited, using extensions like basic constraints and k=
ey usage to determine if self-signed certificate is a CA or not is not a go=
od idea since creator of the signed certificate can add these extensions.

This, however does not mean that the relying parties do not use these exten=
sions to decide if a trust anchor is a CA or not.  However, doing so, requi=
res the relying parties to make an explicit decision about the self-signed =
payload uaing some out of band means as Dave cited.

-----Original Message-----
From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Kem=
p, David P.
Sent: Wednesday, November 16, 2011 10:39 AM
To: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs



-----Original Message-----
From: Thierry Moreau [mailto:thierry.moreau@connotech.com]=20

> You seem to state that there is no alleged signer (then presumably=20
> only trusted or legitimate ones) for any public key. Then I don't see=20
> a purpose in pursuing this discussion about reliable portions of a=20
> self-signed certificate (a special case in the big picture, yet an=20
> inescapable one).

Put your thinking cap on, this isn't difficult.  Do you agree that if I pos=
sess a keypair, I can use it to sign anything at all, including using the n=
ame of any person or organization in the subject and issuer fields?
If I create a self-signed cert with Subject =3D Issuer =3D thierry.moreau@c=
onnotech.com, do you have any reason to believe anything contained in the T=
BS portion of that cert?

>From Wikipedia: "An allegation (also called adduction) is a claim of a fact=
 by a party in a pleading, which the party claims to be able to prove."

Because a self-signed cert can be created by anyone and can contain anythin=
g, it cannot claim to prove anything.  In particular, my cert cannot claim =
to prove that it was signed by you any more than my writing your name on a =
piece of paper proves that you signed the paper.  Because there is no credi=
ble proof, there is no allegation, and no alleged signer.
(I'm having visions of a Monty Python skit in which Eric Idle stands in a c=
ourtroom in front of Judge John Cleese, signs a document on the spot, shows=
 it to the judge, points to a person in the room, and says "Here's your pro=
of - 'is name's right there in black an' white.")


>>                               the signature can be generated only by=20
>> an entity that possesses the private key, and every other field in
the=20
>> certificate can have any value, with zero assurance.  So [B] and [B']

>> do not exist independently of [A] and [A'].
>
> Ah, I see. Bogus self-signed certificates do not exist because an=20
> active ietf/pkix participant says so. From now on, I should feel=20
> confident to accept any self-signed certificate that comes to my
browser.

That's a breathtaking leap of illogic.  All self-signed certificates are bo=
gus (zero-assurance) until some out-of-band mechanism is used to designate =
them as trustable.  Unless you're a masochist, how to you get from "they're=
 all bogus" to "I should accept them all"?


_______________________________________________
pkix mailing list
pkix@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
_______________________________________________
pkix mailing list
pkix@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix

From pgut001@login01.cs.auckland.ac.nz  Wed Nov 16 19:14:17 2011
Return-Path: <pgut001@login01.cs.auckland.ac.nz>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7670C11E80FB for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 19:14:17 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.536
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.536 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.063,  BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 1B1KMmq1xAkF for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 19:14:10 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mx2.auckland.ac.nz (mx2.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.12.44]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6864711E80F5 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 19:14:09 -0800 (PST)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=auckland.ac.nz; i=pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz; q=dns/txt; s=uoa; t=1321499650; x=1353035650; h=from:to:subject:message-id:date; bh=mlUxjSM4vV0G10OljrYFfFMPMivzWjA3EJ0WFe52294=; b=lI8COo/SeZN0J1HoCNnMsbonWphsnvBWs+h7dkvyLRBty9B5PjAF2Xa0 PHzfKsa97QMdIKSVf+rbzpKZSDjT7JquyR4aWLUdTd8oHZI3dHE4qE/nX TGW2lUZAi5veAUQAVUNEEpJ8hXdhO2GFBVEjV3Bq+cTDWWc0u098FQeO5 8=;
X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.69,524,1315137600"; d="scan'208";a="90696008"
X-Ironport-HAT: UNIVERSITY - $RELAY-THROTTLE
X-Ironport-Source: 130.216.34.40 - Outgoing - Outgoing
Received: from login01.fos.auckland.ac.nz ([130.216.34.40]) by mx2-int.auckland.ac.nz with ESMTP/TLS/AES256-SHA; 17 Nov 2011 16:14:08 +1300
Received: from pgut001 by login01.fos.auckland.ac.nz with local (Exim 4.69) (envelope-from <pgut001@login01.cs.auckland.ac.nz>) id 1RQsQR-0001Kc-I7 for pkix@ietf.org; Thu, 17 Nov 2011 16:14:07 +1300
From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: pkix@ietf.org
Message-Id: <E1RQsQR-0001Kc-I7@login01.fos.auckland.ac.nz>
Date: Thu, 17 Nov 2011 16:14:07 +1300
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 17 Nov 2011 03:14:17 -0000

"Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller at mitre.org> writes:

>The only trustable content in a self-signed certificate is the public key,
>and only when that key is verified by the signature.
>
>*Nothing* else in that cert has any meaning.  The signer can lie about
>everything *except* his possession of the private key.

What a strange view of trust.  If I get a certificate directly from you, I
know that what's in there is exactly what you choose to put in there, and I
can trust it as much as I trust you.  If I get a certificate purporting to be
yours from a CA then all I can be sure of is that at some point a payment to
the CA cleared, possibly from a stolen credit card or bank account.

Nothing in a CA-issued cert has much meaning (because the card used to buy it
could be stolen, I can't even be sure that payment was made).  OTOH I can
trust everything in a self-signed cert obtained from you as much as I trust
you, which seems to be a good match.

Peter.

PS: For anyone who thinks CA certs are more trustworthy than self-signed ones,
    I have a little executable I can send you that you can run on your 
    personal PC/laptop.  You can trust it, it's been signed with a CA-issued 
    cert for the Malaysian government.


From SChokhani@cygnacom.com  Thu Nov 17 05:51:25 2011
Return-Path: <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8C1BF21F9A0D for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 17 Nov 2011 05:51:25 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id PZ9SqvjuxofH for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 17 Nov 2011 05:51:24 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail165.messagelabs.com (mail165.messagelabs.com [216.82.253.147]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D6CB021F9A07 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu, 17 Nov 2011 05:51:24 -0800 (PST)
X-Env-Sender: SChokhani@cygnacom.com
X-Msg-Ref: server-7.tower-165.messagelabs.com!1321537879!29142976!1
X-Originating-IP: [216.191.252.21]
X-StarScan-Version: 6.3.6; banners=-,-,-
X-VirusChecked: Checked
Received: (qmail 12355 invoked from network); 17 Nov 2011 13:51:22 -0000
Received: from sottexche1.entrust.com (HELO sottexchE1.entrust.com) (216.191.252.21) by server-7.tower-165.messagelabs.com with AES128-SHA encrypted SMTP; 17 Nov 2011 13:51:22 -0000
Received: from scygexch7.cygnacom.com (10.4.60.22) by sottexchE1.entrust.com (216.191.252.21) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 8.2.254.0; Thu, 17 Nov 2011 08:50:58 -0500
Received: from scygexch7.cygnacom.com ([::1]) by scygexch7.cygnacom.com ([::1]) with mapi; Thu, 17 Nov 2011 08:51:19 -0500
From: Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>
To: Trevor Freeman <trevorf@exchange.microsoft.com>, "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>, "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Date: Thu, 17 Nov 2011 08:51:19 -0500
Thread-Topic: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
Thread-Index: AQHMo6ccw9AJYcfzSUGCYGmTut3p+ZWukLQAgAAMZICAAETWgIAADd8AgABY6YCAAOHFgIAAAcIAgAAmWxCAAKShIA==
Message-ID: <B83745DA469B7847811819C5005244AF0F530A84@scygexch7.cygnacom.com>
References: <CAE7E77D.256A%tmiller@mitre.org> <4EC2C56F.7090105@connotech.com> <C1A47F1540DF3246A8D30C853C05D0DA01B96B71@DABECK.missi.ncsc.mil> <4EC31BA7.4070300@connotech.com> <C1A47F1540DF3246A8D30C853C05D0DA01B96B73@DABECK.missi.ncsc.mil> <B83745DA469B7847811819C5005244AF0F530A37@scygexch7.cygnacom.com> <E545B914D50B2A4B994F198378B1525D4278B6E2@DF-M14-12.exchange.corp.microsoft.com>
In-Reply-To: <E545B914D50B2A4B994F198378B1525D4278B6E2@DF-M14-12.exchange.corp.microsoft.com>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
acceptlanguage: en-US
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 17 Nov 2011 13:51:25 -0000

Trevor,

Seems to me that my second paragraph said what you are saying.

-----Original Message-----
From: Trevor Freeman [mailto:trevorf@exchange.microsoft.com]=20
Sent: Wednesday, November 16, 2011 9:35 PM
To: Santosh Chokhani; Kemp, David P.; pkix@ietf.org
Subject: RE: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs

Yes the extensions in the self-signed certificate are self-asserted data, b=
ut so what. If you decide to trust the certificate, you can either accept t=
he assertions or not. You get to choose. You are going to be trusting other=
 assertions from the key.=20

If the self-signer wants to define some restriction over what they intend t=
o use the key for - what wrong with using existing mechanisms to communicat=
e those restrictions.=20

If you have code that understands all those restrictions from pkix, you wan=
t to reuse it rather than invent something new.

-----Original Message-----
From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of San=
tosh Chokhani
Sent: Wednesday, November 16, 2011 11:45 PM
To: Kemp, David P.; pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs

Not only do I agree with Dave Kemp, but I want to further add that for prec=
isely the reasons Dave cited, using extensions like basic constraints and k=
ey usage to determine if self-signed certificate is a CA or not is not a go=
od idea since creator of the signed certificate can add these extensions.

This, however does not mean that the relying parties do not use these exten=
sions to decide if a trust anchor is a CA or not.  However, doing so, requi=
res the relying parties to make an explicit decision about the self-signed =
payload uaing some out of band means as Dave cited.

-----Original Message-----
From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Kem=
p, David P.
Sent: Wednesday, November 16, 2011 10:39 AM
To: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs



-----Original Message-----
From: Thierry Moreau [mailto:thierry.moreau@connotech.com]=20

> You seem to state that there is no alleged signer (then presumably=20
> only trusted or legitimate ones) for any public key. Then I don't see=20
> a purpose in pursuing this discussion about reliable portions of a=20
> self-signed certificate (a special case in the big picture, yet an=20
> inescapable one).

Put your thinking cap on, this isn't difficult.  Do you agree that if I pos=
sess a keypair, I can use it to sign anything at all, including using the n=
ame of any person or organization in the subject and issuer fields?
If I create a self-signed cert with Subject =3D Issuer =3D thierry.moreau@c=
onnotech.com, do you have any reason to believe anything contained in the T=
BS portion of that cert?

>From Wikipedia: "An allegation (also called adduction) is a claim of a fact=
 by a party in a pleading, which the party claims to be able to prove."

Because a self-signed cert can be created by anyone and can contain anythin=
g, it cannot claim to prove anything.  In particular, my cert cannot claim =
to prove that it was signed by you any more than my writing your name on a =
piece of paper proves that you signed the paper.  Because there is no credi=
ble proof, there is no allegation, and no alleged signer.
(I'm having visions of a Monty Python skit in which Eric Idle stands in a c=
ourtroom in front of Judge John Cleese, signs a document on the spot, shows=
 it to the judge, points to a person in the room, and says "Here's your pro=
of - 'is name's right there in black an' white.")


>>                               the signature can be generated only by=20
>> an entity that possesses the private key, and every other field in
the=20
>> certificate can have any value, with zero assurance.  So [B] and [B']

>> do not exist independently of [A] and [A'].
>
> Ah, I see. Bogus self-signed certificates do not exist because an=20
> active ietf/pkix participant says so. From now on, I should feel=20
> confident to accept any self-signed certificate that comes to my
browser.

That's a breathtaking leap of illogic.  All self-signed certificates are bo=
gus (zero-assurance) until some out-of-band mechanism is used to designate =
them as trustable.  Unless you're a masochist, how to you get from "they're=
 all bogus" to "I should accept them all"?


_______________________________________________
pkix mailing list
pkix@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
_______________________________________________
pkix mailing list
pkix@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix

From tgindin@us.ibm.com  Thu Nov 17 06:06:03 2011
Return-Path: <tgindin@us.ibm.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6550421F999C for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 17 Nov 2011 06:06:03 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.392
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.392 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.207,  BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id upm9xgpah3r5 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 17 Nov 2011 06:06:02 -0800 (PST)
Received: from e9.ny.us.ibm.com (e9.ny.us.ibm.com [32.97.182.139]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 62CB021F9962 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu, 17 Nov 2011 06:06:02 -0800 (PST)
Received: from /spool/local by e9.ny.us.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted for <pkix@ietf.org> from <tgindin@us.ibm.com>; Thu, 17 Nov 2011 09:06:00 -0500
Received: from d01relay07.pok.ibm.com ([9.56.227.147]) by e9.ny.us.ibm.com ([192.168.1.109]) with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted;  Thu, 17 Nov 2011 09:05:57 -0500
Received: from d01av01.pok.ibm.com (d01av01.pok.ibm.com [9.56.224.215]) by d01relay07.pok.ibm.com (8.13.8/8.13.8/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id pAHE5pYf1880206 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu, 17 Nov 2011 09:05:52 -0500
Received: from d01av01.pok.ibm.com (loopback [127.0.0.1]) by d01av01.pok.ibm.com (8.14.4/8.13.1/NCO v10.0 AVout) with ESMTP id pAHE5mLU009388 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu, 17 Nov 2011 09:05:48 -0500
Received: from d01ml062.pok.ibm.com (d01ml062.pok.ibm.com [9.63.10.95]) by d01av01.pok.ibm.com (8.14.4/8.13.1/NCO v10.0 AVin) with ESMTP id pAHE5mRt009330; Thu, 17 Nov 2011 09:05:48 -0500
In-Reply-To: <CAE940A2.2624%tmiller@mitre.org>
References: <OFD71AE5E9.0DFA5B37-ON8525794A.00539A04-8525794A.00546882@us.ibm.com> <CAE940A2.2624%tmiller@mitre.org>
To: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-KeepSent: 9646DA1F:5333B1A8-8525794A:0080ABD8; type=4; name=$KeepSent
X-Mailer: Lotus Notes Build V853_CD5_06022011 June 02, 2011
From: Tom Gindin <tgindin@us.ibm.com>
Message-ID: <OF9646DA1F.5333B1A8-ON8525794A.0080ABD8-8525794B.004D701F@us.ibm.com>
Date: Thu, 17 Nov 2011 09:05:48 -0500
X-MIMETrack: Serialize by Router on D01ML062/01/M/IBM(Release 8.5.2FP1 ZX852FP1HF12|September 28, 2011) at 11/17/2011 09:05:47, Serialize complete at 11/17/2011 09:05:47
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII"
x-cbid: 11111714-7182-0000-0000-000000357D39
Cc: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 17 Nov 2011 14:06:03 -0000

        Tim:

        I don't buy this.  It seems little more dangerous to directly 
trust an EE self-signed certificate than to directly trust an EE 
certificate from a root you don't currently trust, and it is less 
dangerous to do either than to trust that root because that's the only way 
to trust the leaf.  What is truly dangerous is for users to make ad-hoc 
trust decisions based on very little (including overriding unexpected 
browser messages that a server certificate is untrusted), or for software 
vendors to configure RP's so that they trust every commercial CA in the 
world to have unlimited naming scope until such a CA is proven thoroughly 
untrustworthy.
        My own understanding of the X.509 trust model is that a 
certificate is to be accepted only if it or one of its ancestors in a 
valid chain is directly trusted.  Direct trust of an EE certificate, which 
typically involves trusting the binding of the key to the name and the key 
usage, does not break that model.
        In any case, X.509 version 4 section 8.1.5 says, with respect to 
self-issued certificates, that "Self-issued certificates of type b) may 
only appear as end certificates in a path, and shall be processed as end 
certificates" and defines type b as having "key usages other than 
certificate and CRL signing (such as time-stamping)".  It's true that that 
section describes the entity creating these certificates as a CA, but the 
usage is not restricted to those characteristic of CA's and there is no 
restriction that these certificates cannot be self-signed.

Tom Gindin

P.S. -  The opinions above are mine, and not necessarily those of my 
employer




From:   "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
To:     Tom Gindin/Watson/IBM@IBMUS, 
Cc:     "mrex@sap.com" <mrex@sap.com>, "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Date:   11/16/2011 11:38 AM
Subject:        Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs



On 11/16/11 9:21 AM, "Tom Gindin" <tgindin@us.ibm.com> wrote:

>        No, Tim.  The application or protocol needs a certificate (e.g.
>RFC 5246 sections 7.4.2 and 7.4.6 or RFC 3852 section 5.1).  The code
>implementing those standards expects a certificate rather than a
>collection of attributes, and the users want to give the code something
>it 
>will understand and process.

So rewrite the code.  :)

I'm only being half-facetious.  If the protocol is defined to require
X.509 formats *and* requires  X.509 processing (as both TLS and CMS
currently do), then by implication that protocol relies on the X.509 trust
model because *only* under the X.509 trust model does X.509 processing of
X.509 attributes actually tell you anything you can rely on.

If you want to do something different, then you need to *write code* to
support "something different."  Attempting to slap a few new words into a
spec isn't enough, and in fact will be very very dangerous to others.

There's nothing particularly wrong with using X.509 formats for
convenience of key transport, but if your "something different" is a
non-X.509 trust model, then you should *explicitly* dispense with X.509
processing and everything it can tell you about the attributes bound into
certificates.  You're on your own from there.

You mix and match trust semantics at your peril.  We have plenty of
vulnerability history on this topic to draw on, so I don't see why this is
even remotely controversial.

-- T




From DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil  Thu Nov 17 06:06:25 2011
Return-Path: <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 352F421F9A85 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 17 Nov 2011 06:06:25 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id RI8BbMzPVhWT for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 17 Nov 2011 06:06:24 -0800 (PST)
Received: from stingray.missi.ncsc.mil (stingray.missi.ncsc.mil [144.51.50.20]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 66A8221F9A81 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu, 17 Nov 2011 06:06:24 -0800 (PST)
Received: from AUGUSTINE.missi.ncsc.mil (augustine.missi.ncsc.mil [144.51.60.33]) by stingray.missi.ncsc.mil with ESMTP id pAHE6NpL031910 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu, 17 Nov 2011 09:06:23 -0500 (EST)
Received: from DABECK.missi.ncsc.mil ([144.51.60.16]) by AUGUSTINE.missi.ncsc.mil with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.4675);  Thu, 17 Nov 2011 09:07:02 -0500
Content-class: urn:content-classes:message
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft Exchange V6.5
Date: Thu, 17 Nov 2011 09:06:23 -0500
Message-ID: <C1A47F1540DF3246A8D30C853C05D0DA01B96B76@DABECK.missi.ncsc.mil>
In-Reply-To: <E1RQsQR-0001Kc-I7@login01.fos.auckland.ac.nz>
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
Thread-Topic: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
Thread-Index: Acyk1wYCa7fFm2ceTeeLh+Vdewth3gAWgG1Q
References: <E1RQsQR-0001Kc-I7@login01.fos.auckland.ac.nz>
From: "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>
To: <pkix@ietf.org>
X-OriginalArrivalTime: 17 Nov 2011 14:07:02.0953 (UTC) FILETIME=[2E3BF190:01CCA532]
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 17 Nov 2011 14:06:25 -0000

Sorry, but I'd trust the certs on Tim's CA-issued common access card
before I'd trust something Tim handed me himself.  Nothing personal, you
understand; I'm sure the feeling is mutual :-).

Most PGP keys aren't obtained at a key-signing party, and most
self-signed X.509 certs aren't obtained face-to-face, but at the end of
a path in a TLS handshake.  If there are out-of-band means of trust
(such as f2f, or an independent-channel fingerprint), great.  If not,
the cert isn't worth a warm bucket of spit.

Dave



-----Original Message-----
From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
Peter Gutmann
Sent: Wednesday, November 16, 2011 10:14 PM
To: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs

"Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller at mitre.org> writes:

>The only trustable content in a self-signed certificate is the public=20
>key, and only when that key is verified by the signature.
>
>*Nothing* else in that cert has any meaning.  The signer can lie about=20
>everything *except* his possession of the private key.

What a strange view of trust.  If I get a certificate directly from you,
I know that what's in there is exactly what you choose to put in there,
and I can trust it as much as I trust you.  If I get a certificate
purporting to be yours from a CA then all I can be sure of is that at
some point a payment to the CA cleared, possibly from a stolen credit
card or bank account.

Nothing in a CA-issued cert has much meaning (because the card used to
buy it could be stolen, I can't even be sure that payment was made).
OTOH I can trust everything in a self-signed cert obtained from you as
much as I trust you, which seems to be a good match.

Peter.

PS: For anyone who thinks CA certs are more trustworthy than self-signed
ones,
    I have a little executable I can send you that you can run on your=20
    personal PC/laptop.  You can trust it, it's been signed with a
CA-issued=20
    cert for the Malaysian government.

_______________________________________________
pkix mailing list
pkix@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix

From tmiller@mitre.org  Thu Nov 17 07:41:56 2011
Return-Path: <tmiller@mitre.org>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8A22C1F0C77 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 17 Nov 2011 07:41:56 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.591
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.591 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.008,  BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id Hw1BiQ61gZ-Y for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 17 Nov 2011 07:41:56 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (smtpksrv1.mitre.org [198.49.146.77]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 146251F0C69 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu, 17 Nov 2011 07:41:56 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by localhost (Postfix) with SMTP id ACAF921B1718; Thu, 17 Nov 2011 10:41:55 -0500 (EST)
Received: from IMCCAS01.MITRE.ORG (imccas01.mitre.org [129.83.29.78]) by smtpksrv1.mitre.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 92D8F21B1712; Thu, 17 Nov 2011 10:41:55 -0500 (EST)
Received: from IMCMBX01.MITRE.ORG ([169.254.1.18]) by IMCCAS01.MITRE.ORG ([129.83.29.78]) with mapi id 14.01.0339.001; Thu, 17 Nov 2011 10:41:55 -0500
From: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
To: "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>, "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
Thread-Index: AQHMpNb3K+6nacw8f0a2iVOXAK08TJWxblCA//+2F4A=
Date: Thu, 17 Nov 2011 15:41:55 +0000
Message-ID: <CAEA86D8.26FE%tmiller@mitre.org>
In-Reply-To: <C1A47F1540DF3246A8D30C853C05D0DA01B96B76@DABECK.missi.ncsc.mil>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
user-agent: Microsoft-MacOutlook/14.13.0.110805
x-originating-ip: [172.31.3.206]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-ID: <D040EF774A40034E8668CD3D4C9ACC74@imc.mitre.org>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 17 Nov 2011 15:41:56 -0000

On 11/17/11 8:06 AM, "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil> wrote:

>Sorry, but I'd trust the certs on Tim's CA-issued common access card
>before I'd trust something Tim handed me himself.  Nothing personal, you
>understand; I'm sure the feeling is mutual :-).

I don't trust the certs I issue myself either; I've always been told I'm
too clever for my own good.  Plus they're all software certs anyway, and
we all know how current platforms suck at protecting those keys.  :)

-- T


From pgut001@login01.cs.auckland.ac.nz  Thu Nov 17 12:49:13 2011
Return-Path: <pgut001@login01.cs.auckland.ac.nz>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 289AD1F0C45 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 17 Nov 2011 12:49:13 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.54
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.54 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.059,  BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id hR5HnUnYD9d5 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 17 Nov 2011 12:49:12 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mx2.auckland.ac.nz (mx2.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.12.44]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0B7B51F0C3C for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu, 17 Nov 2011 12:49:09 -0800 (PST)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=auckland.ac.nz; i=pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz; q=dns/txt; s=uoa; t=1321562952; x=1353098952; h=from:to:subject:in-reply-to:message-id:date; bh=vHA52E3dNaWugWfK8o6utcaVpxWbURJYxRVz2Zbppu0=; b=Nt/u7YRuhRZ8XBdllNDRYWnHP45xcZpQHt/NjuMPAEtkOnDYLzy/3qlD 07EmlHxaw/6sJfWgG3PSWtzn+uL7olNB+b5kw9YLUUbYJP6Hhaff+Q3py H/hykoIE2Uu/qZewGo2mtVe+zcBfPExbTcg+/8/wsnJQkGrM4KVAMW077 E=;
X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.69,529,1315137600"; d="scan'208";a="90786864"
X-Ironport-HAT: UNIVERSITY - $RELAY-THROTTLE
X-Ironport-Source: 130.216.34.40 - Outgoing - Outgoing
Received: from login01.fos.auckland.ac.nz ([130.216.34.40]) by mx2-int.auckland.ac.nz with ESMTP/TLS/AES256-SHA; 18 Nov 2011 09:49:00 +1300
Received: from pgut001 by login01.fos.auckland.ac.nz with local (Exim 4.69) (envelope-from <pgut001@login01.cs.auckland.ac.nz>) id 1RR8tI-0006uu-5G; Fri, 18 Nov 2011 09:49:00 +1300
From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil, pkix@ietf.org
In-Reply-To: <C1A47F1540DF3246A8D30C853C05D0DA01B96B76@DABECK.missi.ncsc.mil>
Message-Id: <E1RR8tI-0006uu-5G@login01.fos.auckland.ac.nz>
Date: Fri, 18 Nov 2011 09:49:00 +1300
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 17 Nov 2011 20:49:13 -0000

"Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil> writes:

>Sorry, but I'd trust the certs on Tim's CA-issued common access card before 
>I'd trust something Tim handed me himself.  Nothing personal, you understand; 
>I'm sure the feeling is mutual :-).

That's a rather unusual special case because the issuer is Tim's employer (or 
connected to his employer) and thus has direct knowledge of him and his work 
role.  For the vast majority of commercial certs from public CAs the CA 
wouldn't know the cert-holder from Adam (or, since this is the Internet, from 
Fido), and vice versa.

>If there are out-of-band means of trust (such as f2f, or an independent-
>channel fingerprint), great.  If not, the cert isn't worth a warm bucket of 
>spit.

Yup, and that's pretty much the problem statement for public CAs (with various 
extensions, e.g. if you do actually run into a CA that refuses to sell you a 
cert you just keep trying other CAs until you find one that'll take your 
stolen credit card, as e.g. malware authors after code-signing certs have been 
doing for awhile now).

In any case, regardless of whether the info in a cert has any validity or not, 
it's still needed to establish a crypto connection (for SSL).  Given that all 
the phishing, UX, and other data we've collected to date indicates that they 
have zero effect on phishing so that using them has the same effect as 
anon-DH, they're still useful for something.  So you'd really need to say "the 
*contents* of the cert aren't worth ...", since the cert itself still serves 
as a crypto ignition key for anon-DH done with RSA.

(I'm not sure if we're still talking about SSL certs here, since I doubt Tim's 
CAC gets used in a web server).

Peter.

From DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil  Thu Nov 17 13:19:50 2011
Return-Path: <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7B3E321F9671 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 17 Nov 2011 13:19:50 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.000,  BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id uxe02MB4WeZU for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 17 Nov 2011 13:19:50 -0800 (PST)
Received: from stingray.missi.ncsc.mil (stingray.missi.ncsc.mil [144.51.50.20]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E9E3921F96C3 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu, 17 Nov 2011 13:19:49 -0800 (PST)
Received: from AUGUSTINE.missi.ncsc.mil (augustine.missi.ncsc.mil [144.51.60.33]) by stingray.missi.ncsc.mil with ESMTP id pAHLJkgG045371 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu, 17 Nov 2011 16:19:47 -0500 (EST)
Received: from DABECK.missi.ncsc.mil ([144.51.60.16]) by AUGUSTINE.missi.ncsc.mil with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.4675);  Thu, 17 Nov 2011 16:20:25 -0500
Content-class: urn:content-classes:message
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft Exchange V6.5
Date: Thu, 17 Nov 2011 16:19:45 -0500
Message-ID: <C1A47F1540DF3246A8D30C853C05D0DA01B96B77@DABECK.missi.ncsc.mil>
In-Reply-To: <E1RR8tI-0006uu-5G@login01.fos.auckland.ac.nz>
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
Thread-Topic: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
Thread-Index: AcylalqzUzLwVQ2sS4WGf6p/FClgbwAAZiYg
References: <C1A47F1540DF3246A8D30C853C05D0DA01B96B76@DABECK.missi.ncsc.mil> <E1RR8tI-0006uu-5G@login01.fos.auckland.ac.nz>
From: "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>
To: <pkix@ietf.org>
X-OriginalArrivalTime: 17 Nov 2011 21:20:25.0968 (UTC) FILETIME=[B93D2700:01CCA56E]
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 17 Nov 2011 21:19:50 -0000

I'm not going to defend public CAs, since I'm in the
federation-of-organizational-CAs camp.

However, this thread is not about CAs at all, it's about non-PKI usage
of X.509 data structures and the development of standard processing
rules for non-PKI certificates to ensure that they do not create
PKI-related application vulnerabilities.

Regardless of what voodoo you go through before accepting a peer-to-peer
(self-signed EE) cert, it should be separate from and not confusable
with the voodoo required to enable a PKI trust anchor.

Dave


-----Original Message-----
From: Peter Gutmann [mailto:pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz]=20

Yup, and that's pretty much the problem statement for public CAs ...


From trevorf@exchange.microsoft.com  Thu Nov 17 20:04:54 2011
Return-Path: <trevorf@exchange.microsoft.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 721DF11E80CD for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 17 Nov 2011 20:04:54 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -110.646
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-110.646 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.048, BAYES_00=-2.599, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-8, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id WMN7bbWTRdbI for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 17 Nov 2011 20:04:53 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail.exchange.microsoft.com (mail1.exchange.microsoft.com [131.107.1.17]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 73D0511E80E1 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Thu, 17 Nov 2011 20:04:53 -0800 (PST)
Received: from df-h14-01.exchange.corp.microsoft.com (157.54.78.139) by DF-G14-01.exchange.corp.microsoft.com (157.54.87.87) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 14.2.247.2; Thu, 17 Nov 2011 20:04:52 -0800
Received: from PIO-MLT-06.exchange.corp.microsoft.com (157.54.94.24) by DF-H14-01.exchange.corp.microsoft.com (157.54.78.139) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 14.2.247.5; Thu, 17 Nov 2011 20:04:52 -0800
Received: from DF-M14-12.exchange.corp.microsoft.com ([fe80::7c94:4036:120:c95f]) by PIO-MLT-06.exchange.corp.microsoft.com ([fe80::d57f:521a:3ae6:c130%10]) with mapi id 14.02.0267.001; Thu, 17 Nov 2011 20:04:52 -0800
From: Trevor Freeman <trevorf@exchange.microsoft.com>
To: Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>, "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>, "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
Thread-Index: AQHMo6ccw9AJYcfzSUGCYGmTut3p+ZWukLQAgAAMZICAAETWgIAADd8AgABY6YCAAOHFgIAAAcIAgAAmWxCAAKShIIABD+kp
Date: Fri, 18 Nov 2011 04:04:51 +0000
Message-ID: <E545B914D50B2A4B994F198378B1525D4278C64E@DF-M14-12.exchange.corp.microsoft.com>
References: <CAE7E77D.256A%tmiller@mitre.org> <4EC2C56F.7090105@connotech.com> <C1A47F1540DF3246A8D30C853C05D0DA01B96B71@DABECK.missi.ncsc.mil> <4EC31BA7.4070300@connotech.com> <C1A47F1540DF3246A8D30C853C05D0DA01B96B73@DABECK.missi.ncsc.mil> <B83745DA469B7847811819C5005244AF0F530A37@scygexch7.cygnacom.com> <E545B914D50B2A4B994F198378B1525D4278B6E2@DF-M14-12.exchange.corp.microsoft.com>, <B83745DA469B7847811819C5005244AF0F530A84@scygexch7.cygnacom.com>
In-Reply-To: <B83745DA469B7847811819C5005244AF0F530A84@scygexch7.cygnacom.com>
Accept-Language: en-GB, en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="_000_E545B914D50B2A4B994F198378B1525D4278C64EDFM1412exchange_"
MIME-Version: 1.0
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 18 Nov 2011 04:04:54 -0000

--_000_E545B914D50B2A4B994F198378B1525D4278C64EDFM1412exchange_
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Yes we are in violent agreement :)

Sent from my Windows Phone
________________________________
From: Santosh Chokhani
Sent: 11/17/2011 9:51 PM
To: Trevor Freeman; Kemp, David P.; pkix@ietf.org
Subject: RE: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs

Trevor,

Seems to me that my second paragraph said what you are saying.

-----Original Message-----
From: Trevor Freeman [mailto:trevorf@exchange.microsoft.com]
Sent: Wednesday, November 16, 2011 9:35 PM
To: Santosh Chokhani; Kemp, David P.; pkix@ietf.org
Subject: RE: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs

Yes the extensions in the self-signed certificate are self-asserted data, b=
ut so what. If you decide to trust the certificate, you can either accept t=
he assertions or not. You get to choose. You are going to be trusting other=
 assertions from the key.

If the self-signer wants to define some restriction over what they intend t=
o use the key for - what wrong with using existing mechanisms to communicat=
e those restrictions.

If you have code that understands all those restrictions from pkix, you wan=
t to reuse it rather than invent something new.

-----Original Message-----
From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of San=
tosh Chokhani
Sent: Wednesday, November 16, 2011 11:45 PM
To: Kemp, David P.; pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs

Not only do I agree with Dave Kemp, but I want to further add that for prec=
isely the reasons Dave cited, using extensions like basic constraints and k=
ey usage to determine if self-signed certificate is a CA or not is not a go=
od idea since creator of the signed certificate can add these extensions.

This, however does not mean that the relying parties do not use these exten=
sions to decide if a trust anchor is a CA or not.  However, doing so, requi=
res the relying parties to make an explicit decision about the self-signed =
payload uaing some out of band means as Dave cited.

-----Original Message-----
From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Kem=
p, David P.
Sent: Wednesday, November 16, 2011 10:39 AM
To: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs



-----Original Message-----
From: Thierry Moreau [mailto:thierry.moreau@connotech.com]

> You seem to state that there is no alleged signer (then presumably
> only trusted or legitimate ones) for any public key. Then I don't see
> a purpose in pursuing this discussion about reliable portions of a
> self-signed certificate (a special case in the big picture, yet an
> inescapable one).

Put your thinking cap on, this isn't difficult.  Do you agree that if I pos=
sess a keypair, I can use it to sign anything at all, including using the n=
ame of any person or organization in the subject and issuer fields?
If I create a self-signed cert with Subject =3D Issuer =3D thierry.moreau@c=
onnotech.com, do you have any reason to believe anything contained in the T=
BS portion of that cert?

>From Wikipedia: "An allegation (also called adduction) is a claim of a fact=
 by a party in a pleading, which the party claims to be able to prove."

Because a self-signed cert can be created by anyone and can contain anythin=
g, it cannot claim to prove anything.  In particular, my cert cannot claim =
to prove that it was signed by you any more than my writing your name on a =
piece of paper proves that you signed the paper.  Because there is no credi=
ble proof, there is no allegation, and no alleged signer.
(I'm having visions of a Monty Python skit in which Eric Idle stands in a c=
ourtroom in front of Judge John Cleese, signs a document on the spot, shows=
 it to the judge, points to a person in the room, and says "Here's your pro=
of - 'is name's right there in black an' white.")


>>                               the signature can be generated only by
>> an entity that possesses the private key, and every other field in
the
>> certificate can have any value, with zero assurance.  So [B] and [B']

>> do not exist independently of [A] and [A'].
>
> Ah, I see. Bogus self-signed certificates do not exist because an
> active ietf/pkix participant says so. From now on, I should feel
> confident to accept any self-signed certificate that comes to my
browser.

That's a breathtaking leap of illogic.  All self-signed certificates are bo=
gus (zero-assurance) until some out-of-band mechanism is used to designate =
them as trustable.  Unless you're a masochist, how to you get from "they're=
 all bogus" to "I should accept them all"?


_______________________________________________
pkix mailing list
pkix@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
_______________________________________________
pkix mailing list
pkix@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix

--_000_E545B914D50B2A4B994F198378B1525D4278C64EDFM1412exchange_
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3Dus-ascii"=
>
<meta name=3D"Generator" content=3D"Microsoft Exchange Server">
<!-- converted from text --><style><!-- .EmailQuote { margin-left: 1pt; pad=
ding-left: 4pt; border-left: #800000 2px solid; } --></style>
</head>
<body>
<div>
<div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Calibri,sans-serif; font-size:11pt">Yes we are in=
 violent agreement :)<br>
<br>
Sent from my Windows Phone<br>
</div>
</div>
<hr>
<span style=3D"font-family:Tahoma,sans-serif; font-size:10pt; font-weight:b=
old">From:
</span><span style=3D"font-family:Tahoma,sans-serif; font-size:10pt">Santos=
h Chokhani</span><br>
<span style=3D"font-family:Tahoma,sans-serif; font-size:10pt; font-weight:b=
old">Sent:
</span><span style=3D"font-family:Tahoma,sans-serif; font-size:10pt">11/17/=
2011 9:51 PM</span><br>
<span style=3D"font-family:Tahoma,sans-serif; font-size:10pt; font-weight:b=
old">To:
</span><span style=3D"font-family:Tahoma,sans-serif; font-size:10pt">Trevor=
 Freeman; Kemp, David P.; pkix@ietf.org</span><br>
<span style=3D"font-family:Tahoma,sans-serif; font-size:10pt; font-weight:b=
old">Subject:
</span><span style=3D"font-family:Tahoma,sans-serif; font-size:10pt">RE: [p=
kix] End-entity self-signed certs</span><br>
<br>
</div>
<font size=3D"2"><span style=3D"font-size:10pt;">
<div class=3D"PlainText">Trevor,<br>
<br>
Seems to me that my second paragraph said what you are saying.<br>
<br>
-----Original Message-----<br>
From: Trevor Freeman [<a href=3D"mailto:trevorf@exchange.microsoft.com">mai=
lto:trevorf@exchange.microsoft.com</a>]
<br>
Sent: Wednesday, November 16, 2011 9:35 PM<br>
To: Santosh Chokhani; Kemp, David P.; pkix@ietf.org<br>
Subject: RE: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs<br>
<br>
Yes the extensions in the self-signed certificate are self-asserted data, b=
ut so what. If you decide to trust the certificate, you can either accept t=
he assertions or not. You get to choose. You are going to be trusting other=
 assertions from the key.
<br>
<br>
If the self-signer wants to define some restriction over what they intend t=
o use the key for - what wrong with using existing mechanisms to communicat=
e those restrictions.
<br>
<br>
If you have code that understands all those restrictions from pkix, you wan=
t to reuse it rather than invent something new.<br>
<br>
-----Original Message-----<br>
From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [<a href=3D"mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org">mailt=
o:pkix-bounces@ietf.org</a>] On Behalf Of Santosh Chokhani<br>
Sent: Wednesday, November 16, 2011 11:45 PM<br>
To: Kemp, David P.; pkix@ietf.org<br>
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs<br>
<br>
Not only do I agree with Dave Kemp, but I want to further add that for prec=
isely the reasons Dave cited, using extensions like basic constraints and k=
ey usage to determine if self-signed certificate is a CA or not is not a go=
od idea since creator of the signed
 certificate can add these extensions.<br>
<br>
This, however does not mean that the relying parties do not use these exten=
sions to decide if a trust anchor is a CA or not.&nbsp; However, doing so, =
requires the relying parties to make an explicit decision about the self-si=
gned payload uaing some out of band means
 as Dave cited.<br>
<br>
-----Original Message-----<br>
From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [<a href=3D"mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org">mailt=
o:pkix-bounces@ietf.org</a>] On Behalf Of Kemp, David P.<br>
Sent: Wednesday, November 16, 2011 10:39 AM<br>
To: pkix@ietf.org<br>
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
-----Original Message-----<br>
From: Thierry Moreau [<a href=3D"mailto:thierry.moreau@connotech.com">mailt=
o:thierry.moreau@connotech.com</a>]
<br>
<br>
&gt; You seem to state that there is no alleged signer (then presumably <br=
>
&gt; only trusted or legitimate ones) for any public key. Then I don't see =
<br>
&gt; a purpose in pursuing this discussion about reliable portions of a <br=
>
&gt; self-signed certificate (a special case in the big picture, yet an <br=
>
&gt; inescapable one).<br>
<br>
Put your thinking cap on, this isn't difficult.&nbsp; Do you agree that if =
I possess a keypair, I can use it to sign anything at all, including using =
the name of any person or organization in the subject and issuer fields?<br=
>
If I create a self-signed cert with Subject =3D Issuer =3D thierry.moreau@c=
onnotech.com, do you have any reason to believe anything contained in the T=
BS portion of that cert?<br>
<br>
>From Wikipedia: &quot;An allegation (also called adduction) is a claim of a=
 fact by a party in a pleading, which the party claims to be able to prove.=
&quot;<br>
<br>
Because a self-signed cert can be created by anyone and can contain anythin=
g, it cannot claim to prove anything.&nbsp; In particular, my cert cannot c=
laim to prove that it was signed by you any more than my writing your name =
on a piece of paper proves that you signed
 the paper.&nbsp; Because there is no credible proof, there is no allegatio=
n, and no alleged signer.<br>
(I'm having visions of a Monty Python skit in which Eric Idle stands in a c=
ourtroom in front of Judge John Cleese, signs a document on the spot, shows=
 it to the judge, points to a person in the room, and says &quot;Here's you=
r proof - 'is name's right there in black
 an' white.&quot;)<br>
<br>
<br>
&gt;&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; the signature can be generated only =
by <br>
&gt;&gt; an entity that possesses the private key, and every other field in=
<br>
the <br>
&gt;&gt; certificate can have any value, with zero assurance.&nbsp; So [B] =
and [B']<br>
<br>
&gt;&gt; do not exist independently of [A] and [A'].<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Ah, I see. Bogus self-signed certificates do not exist because an <br>
&gt; active ietf/pkix participant says so. From now on, I should feel <br>
&gt; confident to accept any self-signed certificate that comes to my<br>
browser.<br>
<br>
That's a breathtaking leap of illogic.&nbsp; All self-signed certificates a=
re bogus (zero-assurance) until some out-of-band mechanism is used to desig=
nate them as trustable.&nbsp; Unless you're a masochist, how to you get fro=
m &quot;they're all bogus&quot; to &quot;I should accept
 them all&quot;?<br>
<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
pkix mailing list<br>
pkix@ietf.org<br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix">https://www.ietf.org=
/mailman/listinfo/pkix</a><br>
_______________________________________________<br>
pkix mailing list<br>
pkix@ietf.org<br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix">https://www.ietf.org=
/mailman/listinfo/pkix</a><br>
</div>
</span></font>
</body>
</html>

--_000_E545B914D50B2A4B994F198378B1525D4278C64EDFM1412exchange_--

From pgut001@login01.cs.auckland.ac.nz  Sat Nov 19 16:14:44 2011
Return-Path: <pgut001@login01.cs.auckland.ac.nz>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4C2B821F8511 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sat, 19 Nov 2011 16:14:44 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.543
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.543 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.056,  BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 0PGN7JbGUMG3 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sat, 19 Nov 2011 16:14:43 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mx2.auckland.ac.nz (mx2.auckland.ac.nz [130.216.12.44]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 46DA721F8510 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Sat, 19 Nov 2011 16:14:42 -0800 (PST)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=auckland.ac.nz; i=pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz; q=dns/txt; s=uoa; t=1321748083; x=1353284083; h=from:to:subject:cc:in-reply-to:message-id:date; bh=8t9QX79+wFasL6yEb70jZesq5CnQTKtY4DU4BgZpIRM=; b=QqOQAMxNi6RKbkAdVWqA5pZ/9FVLCLqfJ485+7/jbSW5f9JcjRt3id7s i1nkqmpbIR7LHOH3tACaRuu8pxufSzgTPhTSVuCIfSzQH1VMmGcO0DWHn nyP0HmwdF4q2x1yXxez7KZJ0rKDBHJnQ1KI/ohphHzXspa2hNGn1XM+N+ g=;
X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.69,540,1315137600"; d="scan'208";a="91010311"
X-Ironport-HAT: UNIVERSITY - $RELAY-THROTTLE
X-Ironport-Source: 130.216.34.40 - Outgoing - Outgoing
Received: from login01.fos.auckland.ac.nz ([130.216.34.40]) by mx2-int.auckland.ac.nz with ESMTP/TLS/AES256-SHA; 20 Nov 2011 13:14:39 +1300
Received: from pgut001 by login01.fos.auckland.ac.nz with local (Exim 4.69) (envelope-from <pgut001@login01.cs.auckland.ac.nz>) id 1RRv3P-0004wD-3M; Sun, 20 Nov 2011 13:14:39 +1300
From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz, thierry.moreau@connotech.com
In-Reply-To: <4EC270E1.5060908@connotech.com>
Message-Id: <E1RRv3P-0004wD-3M@login01.fos.auckland.ac.nz>
Date: Sun, 20 Nov 2011 13:14:39 +1300
Cc: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 20 Nov 2011 00:14:44 -0000

Thierry Moreau <thierry.moreau@connotech.com> writes:

>I also tried the independent RFC publication route for a variation of the
>self-signed end-entity certificate, i.e. "auto-issued" with the draft "Auto
>Issued X.509 Certificate Mechanism (AIXCM)",
>http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-moreau-pkix-aixcm-00 With similar reactions,
>I came to the same conclusion.

Something like this was eventually snuck past PKIX disguised as a (handwave)
grid-computing mechanism (I'm talking about Proxy Certificates here), although
I'm not sure if that was a genuine attempt to fix a grid computing problem or
a genuine attempt to do an end-run around the PKIX roadblock.

Similarly, PKIX has a straightforward positive-assertion, whitelist-based
certificate status protocol as a standards-track RFC that was snuck through as
something completely different, although unfortunately the level of disguise
is sufficient that most people reading the spec don't recognise what you can
actually do with it.

Anyway, I'll reformat my old draft in XML and see what happens...

Peter.

From Jeff.Hodges@KingsMountain.com  Mon Nov 21 16:26:24 2011
Return-Path: <Jeff.Hodges@KingsMountain.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1D7701F0C67 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 21 Nov 2011 16:26:24 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -98.636
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-98.636 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_20=-0.74, FH_RELAY_NODNS=1.451, HELO_MISMATCH_COM=0.553, RDNS_NONE=0.1, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id q7pMJKgf7v2K for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 21 Nov 2011 16:26:19 -0800 (PST)
Received: from oproxy8-pub.bluehost.com (oproxy8.bluehost.com [IPv6:2605:dc00:100:2::a8]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with SMTP id 74B631F0C4C for <pkix@ietf.org>; Mon, 21 Nov 2011 16:26:19 -0800 (PST)
Received: (qmail 26792 invoked by uid 0); 22 Nov 2011 00:26:16 -0000
Received: from unknown (HELO box514.bluehost.com) (74.220.219.114) by oproxy8.bluehost.com with SMTP; 22 Nov 2011 00:26:16 -0000
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kingsmountain.com; s=default;  h=Content-Transfer-Encoding:Content-Type:Subject:To:MIME-Version:From:Date:Message-ID; bh=uzS2ZYtI4uNx4X97vcF9Xh8twr0+AkSOHYaeWVBkR9w=;  b=ehRrzLbgqD7uDqEmkqYa07oEfOyijf3nqfBPqdK7cXy0qsp4TyYud1nhXEJ2dOnmVjZ8tAXWiJ+tPSz7tWF7cnXMytlzbkwNa/H9Z0qjDrExU812KJdLagZeVJkvLYx5;
Received: from adsl-67-125-67-217.dsl.snfc21.pacbell.net ([67.125.67.217] helo=[192.168.12.109]) by box514.bluehost.com with esmtpsa (TLSv1:AES256-SHA:256) (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from <Jeff.Hodges@KingsMountain.com>) id 1RSeBk-0006yo-0v for pkix@ietf.org; Mon, 21 Nov 2011 17:26:16 -0700
Message-ID: <4ECAEC15.9000708@KingsMountain.com>
Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2011 16:25:57 -0800
From: =JeffH <Jeff.Hodges@KingsMountain.com>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux x86_64; en-US; rv:1.9.2.23) Gecko/20110921 Thunderbird/3.1.15
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: IETF PKIX WG <pkix@ietf.org>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Identified-User: {11025:box514.bluehost.com:kingsmou:kingsmountain.com} {sentby:smtp auth 67.125.67.217 authed with jeff.hodges+kingsmountain.com}
Subject: [pkix] fyi: Sovereign Keys: an EFF proposal for more secure TLS authentication
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2011 00:26:24 -0000

Of possible interest...


Subject: [SSL Observatory] Sovereign Keys: an EFF proposal for more secure
	TLS authentication
From: Peter Eckersley <pde@eff.org>
Date: Fri, 18 Nov 2011 14:31:42 -0800
To: observatory@eff.org

For quite a while at EFF, we've been pondering different possible solutions to
the structural insecurities that are present in PKIX (and, to a lesser but
still quite significant extent, DNSSEC).

This year, our thinking solidified around an idea for using append-only data
structures to store keys.  We are publishing this proposal for the first time
today:

https://eff.org/sovereign-keys

On that page you can find links to a high level overview and detailed design
docs.  The design has a number of nice features, including very strong
resistance to server impersonation attacks and automatic failover to secure
routing methods (ideally, Tor hidden services) when server impersonation
occurrs.

It should be read as a long-term, moderately ambitious proposal.  Even if the
Internet community likes this design or something similar, less systematic
solutions (various forms of pinning, Perspectives/Convergence, the
Decentralized SSL Observatory) will certainly remain necessary and important
for at least a number of years.

-- 
Peter Eckersley                            pde@eff.org
Technology Projects Director      Tel  +1 415 436 9333 x131
Electronic Frontier Foundation    Fax  +1 415 436 9993




From wwwrun@rfc-editor.org  Mon Nov 21 22:07:55 2011
Return-Path: <wwwrun@rfc-editor.org>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7266E21F8876; Mon, 21 Nov 2011 22:07:55 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -102.196
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-102.196 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.196, BAYES_00=-2.599, J_CHICKENPOX_93=0.6, NO_RELAYS=-0.001, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id PNK6EnBX1uEb; Mon, 21 Nov 2011 22:07:55 -0800 (PST)
Received: from rfc-editor.org (rfc-editor.org [IPv6:2001:1890:123a::1:2f]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0C28121F886A; Mon, 21 Nov 2011 22:07:54 -0800 (PST)
Received: by rfc-editor.org (Postfix, from userid 30) id 6C250B1E002; Mon, 21 Nov 2011 22:02:03 -0800 (PST)
To: ietf-announce@ietf.org, rfc-dist@rfc-editor.org
From: rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org
Message-Id: <20111122060206.6C250B1E002@rfc-editor.org>
Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2011 22:02:03 -0800 (PST)
Cc: pkix@ietf.org, rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org
Subject: [pkix] RFC 6402 on Certificate Management over CMS (CMC) Updates
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2011 06:07:55 -0000

A new Request for Comments is now available in online RFC libraries.

        
        RFC 6402

        Title:      Certificate Management over CMS (CMC) 
                    Updates 
        Author:     J. Schaad
        Status:     Standards Track
        Stream:     IETF
        Date:       November 2011
        Mailbox:    jimsch@augustcellars.com
        Pages:      37
        Characters: 66722
        Updates:    RFC5272, RFC5273, RFC5274

        I-D Tag:    draft-ietf-pkix-rfc5272-bis-08.txt

        URL:        http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6402.txt

This document contains a set of updates to the base syntax for CMC, a
Certificate Management protocol using the Cryptographic Message
Syntax (CMS).  This document updates RFC 5272, RFC 5273, and RFC
5274.

The new items in this document are: new controls for future work in
doing server side key generation, definition of a Subject Information
Access value to identify CMC servers, and the registration of a port
number for TCP/IP for the CMC service to run on.  [STANDARDS-TRACK]

This document is a product of the Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) Working Group of the IETF.

This is now a Proposed Standard Protocol.

STANDARDS TRACK: This document specifies an Internet standards track
protocol for the Internet community,and requests discussion and suggestions
for improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the Internet
Official Protocol Standards (STD 1) for the standardization state and
status of this protocol.  Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

This announcement is sent to the IETF-Announce and rfc-dist lists.
To subscribe or unsubscribe, see
  http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-announce
  http://mailman.rfc-editor.org/mailman/listinfo/rfc-dist

For searching the RFC series, see http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfcsearch.html.
For downloading RFCs, see http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc.html.

Requests for special distribution should be addressed to either the
author of the RFC in question, or to rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org.  Unless
specifically noted otherwise on the RFC itself, all RFCs are for
unlimited distribution.


The RFC Editor Team
Association Management Solutions, LLC



From tgindin@us.ibm.com  Tue Nov 22 05:05:56 2011
Return-Path: <tgindin@us.ibm.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 166E721F8D14 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 22 Nov 2011 05:05:56 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.422
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.422 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.177,  BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id rUgvTty8bQEL for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 22 Nov 2011 05:05:54 -0800 (PST)
Received: from e5.ny.us.ibm.com (e5.ny.us.ibm.com [32.97.182.145]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D217921F8D57 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Tue, 22 Nov 2011 05:05:53 -0800 (PST)
Received: from /spool/local by e5.ny.us.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted for <pkix@ietf.org> from <tgindin@us.ibm.com>; Tue, 22 Nov 2011 08:05:46 -0500
Received: from d01relay03.pok.ibm.com ([9.56.227.235]) by e5.ny.us.ibm.com ([192.168.1.105]) with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted;  Tue, 22 Nov 2011 08:05:27 -0500
Received: from d01av02.pok.ibm.com (d01av02.pok.ibm.com [9.56.224.216]) by d01relay03.pok.ibm.com (8.13.8/8.13.8/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id pAMD5M59095272 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Tue, 22 Nov 2011 08:05:22 -0500
Received: from d01av02.pok.ibm.com (loopback [127.0.0.1]) by d01av02.pok.ibm.com (8.14.4/8.13.1/NCO v10.0 AVout) with ESMTP id pAMD5L3E021055 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Tue, 22 Nov 2011 11:05:21 -0200
Received: from d01ml062.pok.ibm.com (d01ml062.pok.ibm.com [9.63.10.95]) by d01av02.pok.ibm.com (8.14.4/8.13.1/NCO v10.0 AVin) with ESMTP id pAMD5Lrl021048; Tue, 22 Nov 2011 11:05:21 -0200
In-Reply-To: <C1A47F1540DF3246A8D30C853C05D0DA01B96B77@DABECK.missi.ncsc.mil>
References: <C1A47F1540DF3246A8D30C853C05D0DA01B96B76@DABECK.missi.ncsc.mil>	<E1RR8tI-0006uu-5G@login01.fos.auckland.ac.nz> <C1A47F1540DF3246A8D30C853C05D0DA01B96B77@DABECK.missi.ncsc.mil>
To: "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-KeepSent: 961BF8DF:3D2A1AC6-8525794F:0072C374; type=4; name=$KeepSent
X-Mailer: Lotus Notes Build V853_CD5_06022011 June 02, 2011
From: Tom Gindin <tgindin@us.ibm.com>
Message-ID: <OF961BF8DF.3D2A1AC6-ON8525794F.0072C374-85257950.0047EA9C@us.ibm.com>
Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2011 08:05:18 -0500
X-MIMETrack: Serialize by Router on D01ML062/01/M/IBM(Release 8.5.2FP1 ZX852FP1HF12|September 28, 2011) at 11/22/2011 08:05:20, Serialize complete at 11/22/2011 08:05:20
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII"
x-cbid: 11112213-5930-0000-0000-0000021E7D89
Cc: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2011 13:05:56 -0000

        I think it might be helpful to think in terms of assurance levels 
for individual users when discussing a TLS client's use of a self-signed 
certificate.  Using SP 800-63's four levels, no self-signed certificate 
should ever be treated as a Level 3 or 4 credential any more than a 
password should.  Correspondingly, a self-signed certificate is among the 
strongest likely possibilities for a Level 1 credential, where there is no 
identity proofing requirement.  I believe that once a user has established 
a Level 2 credential (a process which is in no way helped by a self-signed 
certificate), the replacement of a password by a self-signed certificate 
strengthens the server's reason to trust the user, but only slightly.  The 
absence of a revocation facility for self-signed certificates is a 
weakness compared to publicly issued certificates, but not compared to 
passwords or other shared secrets.
        In the above, I am assuming that a typical Level 2 password is 
stored associated with a user ID in a repository controlled by the server, 
and that putting a certificate in that same repository does not change the 
security-relevant characteristics of that repository.
        Likewise, the storage of a self-signed certificate in a local 
address book entry in which the presence of any certificate at all is 
optional is similar in many ways to level 2 above.  The user of the mail 
client (not the originator of the certificate) chooses whether to store 
the certificate or not.  In this case, however, the sender may think he 
has better assurance of encryption than he actually has while in the Level 
2 case the server is not permitting the user any actions beyond those 
authorized by a password.

Tom Gindin




From:   "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>
To:     <pkix@ietf.org>, 
Date:   11/17/2011 04:21 PM
Subject:        Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
Sent by:        pkix-bounces@ietf.org



I'm not going to defend public CAs, since I'm in the
federation-of-organizational-CAs camp.

However, this thread is not about CAs at all, it's about non-PKI usage
of X.509 data structures and the development of standard processing
rules for non-PKI certificates to ensure that they do not create
PKI-related application vulnerabilities.

Regardless of what voodoo you go through before accepting a peer-to-peer
(self-signed EE) cert, it should be separate from and not confusable
with the voodoo required to enable a PKI trust anchor.

Dave


-----Original Message-----
From: Peter Gutmann [mailto:pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz] 

Yup, and that's pretty much the problem statement for public CAs ...

_______________________________________________
pkix mailing list
pkix@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix




From DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil  Tue Nov 22 07:24:51 2011
Return-Path: <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id CDA401F0C46 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 22 Nov 2011 07:24:51 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id E1L4QUDLLPry for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 22 Nov 2011 07:24:51 -0800 (PST)
Received: from stingray.missi.ncsc.mil (stingray.missi.ncsc.mil [144.51.50.20]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 060711F0C50 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Tue, 22 Nov 2011 07:24:50 -0800 (PST)
Received: from AUGUSTINE.missi.ncsc.mil (augustine.missi.ncsc.mil [144.51.60.33]) by stingray.missi.ncsc.mil with ESMTP id pAMFOoC3038571 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Tue, 22 Nov 2011 10:24:50 -0500 (EST)
Received: from DABECK.missi.ncsc.mil ([144.51.60.15]) by AUGUSTINE.missi.ncsc.mil with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.4675);  Tue, 22 Nov 2011 10:25:31 -0500
Content-class: urn:content-classes:message
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft Exchange V6.5
Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2011 10:24:49 -0500
Message-ID: <C1A47F1540DF3246A8D30C853C05D0DA01B96B78@DABECK.missi.ncsc.mil>
In-Reply-To: <OF961BF8DF.3D2A1AC6-ON8525794F.0072C374-85257950.0047EA9C@us.ibm.com>
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
Thread-Topic: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
Thread-Index: AcypF3ffz4q2eXCFRqmR9GYrCIyIDwAEDUvQ
References: <C1A47F1540DF3246A8D30C853C05D0DA01B96B76@DABECK.missi.ncsc.mil>	<E1RR8tI-0006uu-5G@login01.fos.auckland.ac.nz> <C1A47F1540DF3246A8D30C853C05D0DA01B96B77@DABECK.missi.ncsc.mil> <OF961BF8DF.3D2A1AC6-ON8525794F.0072C374-85257950.0047EA9C@us.ibm.com>
From: "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>
To: <pkix@ietf.org>
X-OriginalArrivalTime: 22 Nov 2011 15:25:31.0843 (UTC) FILETIME=[F9044930:01CCA92A]
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2011 15:24:51 -0000

Yes, it's very helpful to think in terms of certificate assurance
levels.  However, I think the password model has a closer relationship
to PKI than to self-signed certificates, at least in cases where two
parties are involved with passwords.  It would be great if users had the
choice, when signing up for Yahoo or gmail or Facebook, to get a cert,
or a password (or both).  And if NYTimes wants to allow users to sign in
with Facebook-issued Level 1 or Level 2 certs, it could do so without
users exposing all their Facebook data to the Times.

You could certainly bootstrap a password into a user-signed cert, but
that doesn't help with federation - each RP has to do its own assurance
on the user-supplied content or get supplemental information from the
password issuer.

Dave


-----Original Message-----
From: Tom Gindin [mailto:tgindin@us.ibm.com]=20
Sent: Tuesday, November 22, 2011 8:05 AM
To: Kemp, David P.
Cc: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs


        I think it might be helpful to think in terms of assurance
levels for individual users when discussing a TLS client's use of a
self-signed certificate.  Using SP 800-63's four levels, no self-signed
certificate should ever be treated as a Level 3 or 4 credential any more
than a password should.  Correspondingly, a self-signed certificate is
among the strongest likely possibilities for a Level 1 credential, where
there is no identity proofing requirement.  I believe that once a user
has established a Level 2 credential (a process which is in no way
helped by a self-signed certificate), the replacement of a password by a
self-signed certificate strengthens the server's reason to trust the
user, but only slightly.  The absence of a revocation facility for
self-signed certificates is a weakness compared to publicly issued
certificates, but not compared to passwords or other shared secrets.
        In the above, I am assuming that a typical Level 2 password is
stored associated with a user ID in a repository controlled by the
server, and that putting a certificate in that same repository does not
change the security-relevant characteristics of that repository.
        Likewise, the storage of a self-signed certificate in a local
address book entry in which the presence of any certificate at all is
optional is similar in many ways to level 2 above.  The user of the mail
client (not the originator of the certificate) chooses whether to store
the certificate or not.  In this case, however, the sender may think he
has better assurance of encryption than he actually has while in the
Level
2 case the server is not permitting the user any actions beyond those
authorized by a password.

Tom Gindin




From:   "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>
To:     <pkix@ietf.org>,=20
Date:   11/17/2011 04:21 PM
Subject:        Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
Sent by:        pkix-bounces@ietf.org



I'm not going to defend public CAs, since I'm in the
federation-of-organizational-CAs camp.

However, this thread is not about CAs at all, it's about non-PKI usage
of X.509 data structures and the development of standard processing
rules for non-PKI certificates to ensure that they do not create
PKI-related application vulnerabilities.

Regardless of what voodoo you go through before accepting a peer-to-peer
(self-signed EE) cert, it should be separate from and not confusable
with the voodoo required to enable a PKI trust anchor.

Dave


-----Original Message-----
From: Peter Gutmann [mailto:pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz]=20

Yup, and that's pretty much the problem statement for public CAs ...

_______________________________________________
pkix mailing list
pkix@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix




From Jeff.Hodges@KingsMountain.com  Fri Nov 25 11:38:36 2011
Return-Path: <Jeff.Hodges@KingsMountain.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 741C721F8B1D for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri, 25 Nov 2011 11:38:36 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -97.895
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-97.895 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_50=0.001, FH_RELAY_NODNS=1.451, HELO_MISMATCH_COM=0.553, RDNS_NONE=0.1, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id msZydJKF2nNH for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri, 25 Nov 2011 11:38:35 -0800 (PST)
Received: from oproxy9.bluehost.com (oproxy9.bluehost.com [IPv6:2605:dc00:100:2::a2]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with SMTP id 8A25E21F8B18 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Fri, 25 Nov 2011 11:38:35 -0800 (PST)
Received: (qmail 5186 invoked by uid 0); 25 Nov 2011 19:38:33 -0000
Received: from unknown (HELO box514.bluehost.com) (74.220.219.114) by oproxy9.bluehost.com with SMTP; 25 Nov 2011 19:38:33 -0000
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kingsmountain.com; s=default;  h=Content-Transfer-Encoding:Content-Type:Subject:To:MIME-Version:From:Date:Message-ID; bh=4EGb3bFpPc7gSMpvOpclieXd8hyUhtUgk7sV1nW45FE=;  b=dIXSU+Qzv382g9xb2hXMuKEeJ0EOM9wVrZkO78wHz8o0UZPNeK4p0Hk1Wcyvam8qoGkZaBocNPD0maSy80nU6HlBMQHdMdfk2/TLf0Gs1FSKS+yqObAOW3yymFSCqPlJ;
Received: from 204.157-62-69.ftth.swbr.surewest.net ([69.62.157.204] helo=[10.0.1.11]) by box514.bluehost.com with esmtpsa (TLSv1:AES256-SHA:256) (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from <Jeff.Hodges@KingsMountain.com>) id 1RU1bV-0006uZ-Cd for pkix@ietf.org; Fri, 25 Nov 2011 12:38:33 -0700
Message-ID: <4ECFEEB8.2020309@KingsMountain.com>
Date: Fri, 25 Nov 2011 11:38:32 -0800
From: =JeffH <Jeff.Hodges@KingsMountain.com>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux x86_64; en-US; rv:1.9.2.23) Gecko/20110921 Thunderbird/3.1.15
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: IETF PKIX WG <pkix@ietf.org>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Identified-User: {11025:box514.bluehost.com:kingsmou:kingsmountain.com} {sentby:smtp auth 69.62.157.204 authed with jeff.hodges+kingsmountain.com}
Subject: [pkix] fyi: The weakest link in the chain: Vulnerabilities
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 25 Nov 2011 19:38:36 -0000

Of possible interest:

The weakest link in the chain: Vulnerabilities in the SSL certificate authority
system and what should be done about them
[ An Access Policy Brief Regarding the Consequences of the DigiNotar breach
for Civil Society and Commercial Enterprise.
Discussion Paper for Comment
November 2011 ]
https://www.accessnow.org/page/-/docs/Weakest_Link_in_the_Chain.pdf

From tmiller@mitre.org  Mon Nov 28 05:49:55 2011
Return-Path: <tmiller@mitre.org>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 00F1821F8C66 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 28 Nov 2011 05:49:55 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -3.999
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.999 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_50=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id x+Z7Gu3ycpRd for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 28 Nov 2011 05:49:51 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (smtpksrv1.mitre.org [198.49.146.77]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 09F7E21F8C61 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Mon, 28 Nov 2011 05:49:50 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by localhost (Postfix) with SMTP id E171321B15D0; Mon, 28 Nov 2011 08:49:47 -0500 (EST)
Received: from IMCCAS01.MITRE.ORG (imccas01.mitre.org [129.83.29.78]) by smtpksrv1.mitre.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id CD89321B15C1; Mon, 28 Nov 2011 08:49:47 -0500 (EST)
Received: from IMCMBX01.MITRE.ORG ([169.254.1.18]) by IMCCAS01.MITRE.ORG ([129.83.29.78]) with mapi id 14.01.0339.001; Mon, 28 Nov 2011 08:49:47 -0500
From: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
To: =JeffH <Jeff.Hodges@KingsMountain.com>, IETF PKIX WG <pkix@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] fyi: Sovereign Keys: an EFF proposal for more secure TLS authentication
Thread-Index: AQHMrdSWx9rRYowDuEKvLVajZs2eSA==
Date: Mon, 28 Nov 2011 13:49:47 +0000
Message-ID: <CAF8E928.28AA%tmiller@mitre.org>
In-Reply-To: <4ECAEC15.9000708@KingsMountain.com>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
user-agent: Microsoft-MacOutlook/14.13.0.110805
x-originating-ip: [172.31.4.151]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-ID: <FE33C483A84DB8409BAF04F190753C53@imc.mitre.org>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Subject: Re: [pkix] fyi: Sovereign Keys: an EFF proposal for more secure TLS authentication
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 28 Nov 2011 13:49:55 -0000

I really don't see a heck of a lot of conceptual difference between this
proposal and several current and past proposals.  Functionally this is
just pushing the name binding back to a separate  level from the CA, only
now I need to trust both the CA and the Registrar to run things correctly.
=20

Personally I think client-side incorporation of continuity-of-use data
into trust management--either individually or supported by independent
inspection points (see Perspectives, Convergence, or even Google's
Certificate Catalog,
http://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.com/2011/04/improving-ssl-certificate-
security.html)--probably nets 80% of the benefit and will be much easier
to accomplish in the decentralized Internet.  Yes, there  are observed
issues with current practices at server-side (ref. the SK proposal
Appendix A.3 and the cited blog from Andy Steingruebl), but if a
continuity-type model gains traction operational practice *will* change
and those false positives resolve themselves.

Finally this statement bugs me:

"""
Generalising from the above problem, Perspectives and Convergence rely on
parties other than the domain holder to characterise what state the
domain's operational deployment /should/ be in
"""


This ignores (common?) situation where site owner and domain owner can be
different entities.

-- T

On 11/21/11 6:25 PM, "=3DJeffH" <Jeff.Hodges@KingsMountain.com> wrote:

>Of possible interest...
>
>
>Subject: [SSL Observatory] Sovereign Keys: an EFF proposal for more secure
>	TLS authentication
>From: Peter Eckersley <pde@eff.org>
>Date: Fri, 18 Nov 2011 14:31:42 -0800
>To: observatory@eff.org
>
>For quite a while at EFF, we've been pondering different possible
>solutions to
>the structural insecurities that are present in PKIX (and, to a lesser but
>still quite significant extent, DNSSEC).
>
>This year, our thinking solidified around an idea for using append-only
>data
>structures to store keys.  We are publishing this proposal for the first
>time
>today:
>
>https://eff.org/sovereign-keys
>
>On that page you can find links to a high level overview and detailed
>design
>docs.  The design has a number of nice features, including very strong
>resistance to server impersonation attacks and automatic failover to
>secure
>routing methods (ideally, Tor hidden services) when server impersonation
>occurrs.
>
>It should be read as a long-term, moderately ambitious proposal.  Even if
>the
>Internet community likes this design or something similar, less systematic
>solutions (various forms of pinning, Perspectives/Convergence, the
>Decentralized SSL Observatory) will certainly remain necessary and
>important
>for at least a number of years.
>
>--=20
>Peter Eckersley                            pde@eff.org
>Technology Projects Director      Tel  +1 415 436 9333 x131
>Electronic Frontier Foundation    Fax  +1 415 436 9993
>
>
>
>_______________________________________________
>pkix mailing list
>pkix@ietf.org
>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix


From tmiller@mitre.org  Mon Nov 28 06:52:43 2011
Return-Path: <tmiller@mitre.org>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 52A4821F84AC for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 28 Nov 2011 06:52:43 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -5.299
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-5.299 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=1.300,  BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id BDo-UaKcYrlB for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 28 Nov 2011 06:52:42 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (smtpksrv1.mitre.org [198.49.146.77]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id BA43D21F84AA for <pkix@ietf.org>; Mon, 28 Nov 2011 06:52:42 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by localhost (Postfix) with SMTP id 2CFD121B164E; Mon, 28 Nov 2011 09:52:42 -0500 (EST)
Received: from IMCCAS04.MITRE.ORG (imccas04.mitre.org [129.83.29.81]) by smtpksrv1.mitre.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1A52D21B1650; Mon, 28 Nov 2011 09:52:42 -0500 (EST)
Received: from IMCMBX01.MITRE.ORG ([169.254.1.18]) by IMCCAS04.MITRE.ORG ([129.83.29.81]) with mapi id 14.01.0339.001; Mon, 28 Nov 2011 09:52:41 -0500
From: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
To: Tom Gindin <tgindin@us.ibm.com>, "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
Thread-Index: AQHMpNb3K+6nacw8f0a2iVOXAK08TJWxblCAgABwfQCAAAiYgIAHUYIAgAknZQA=
Date: Mon, 28 Nov 2011 14:52:41 +0000
Message-ID: <CAF8F980.28E8%tmiller@mitre.org>
In-Reply-To: <OF961BF8DF.3D2A1AC6-ON8525794F.0072C374-85257950.0047EA9C@us.ibm.com>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
user-agent: Microsoft-MacOutlook/14.13.0.110805
x-originating-ip: [172.31.6.240]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-ID: <E60DB3A280953D4BA31FDFAAB990386C@imc.mitre.org>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Cc: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 28 Nov 2011 14:52:43 -0000

On 11/22/11 7:05 AM, "Tom Gindin" <tgindin@us.ibm.com> wrote:

>        I think it might be helpful to think in terms of assurance levels
>for individual users when discussing a TLS client's use of a self-signed
>certificate.  Using SP 800-63's four levels, no self-signed certificate
>should ever be treated as a Level 3 or 4 credential any more than a
>password should. =20

You're misreading 800-63.  Nothing in 800-63 says you must use the
attributes in the certificate.

Level 3 and 4 require binding the key to the person by methods appropriate
to those levels (e.g., hardware activated tokens at Level 4) *and* using
identity proofing methods appropriate to those levels.  Nothing about
these requirements actually say I have to use certificates.  I *can* use
certificates if the issuer obeys Level 3/4 and asserts policies to that
effect (e.g., FPKI Common Policy OIDs), but I'm free to use local identity
data--as long as I use Level 3 and 4 identity proofing methods to
establish that local data.

>From Section 5 (emphasis added):

"""
In this guidance, the party to be authenticated is called a claimant and
the party verifying
that identity is called a verifier.  When a claimant successfully
demonstrates possession
and control of a token in an on-line authentication to a verifier through
an authentication=20
protocol, the verifier can verify that the clamant is the subscriber.  The
verifier passes on=20
an assertion about the identity of the subscriber to the relying party.
That assertion=20
includes identity information about a subscriber, such as the subscriber
name, an=20
identifier assigned at registration, or other subscriber attributes that
were verified in the
registration process (subject to the policies of the CSP and the needs of
the application). =20
Where the verifier is also the relying party, the assertion may be
implicit.  In addition, the
subscriber=B9s identifying information *may* be incorporated in credentials
(e.g., public key=20
certificates) made available by the claimant.  The relying party can use
the authenticated=20
information provided by the verifier/CSP to make access control or
authorization=20
decisions.=20
"""


-- T


From Jeff.Hodges@KingsMountain.com  Mon Nov 28 11:00:43 2011
Return-Path: <Jeff.Hodges@KingsMountain.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0A01D11E80BA for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 28 Nov 2011 11:00:43 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -97.895
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-97.895 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_50=0.001, FH_RELAY_NODNS=1.451, HELO_MISMATCH_COM=0.553, RDNS_NONE=0.1, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id w5zZ4HQhfzEJ for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 28 Nov 2011 11:00:41 -0800 (PST)
Received: from oproxy4-pub.bluehost.com (oproxy4.bluehost.com [IPv6:2605:dc00:100:2::a4]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with SMTP id 60E3D11E80B6 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Mon, 28 Nov 2011 11:00:41 -0800 (PST)
Received: (qmail 22920 invoked by uid 0); 28 Nov 2011 19:00:41 -0000
Received: from unknown (HELO box514.bluehost.com) (74.220.219.114) by cpoproxy1.bluehost.com with SMTP; 28 Nov 2011 19:00:41 -0000
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kingsmountain.com; s=default;  h=Content-Transfer-Encoding:Content-Type:Subject:To:MIME-Version:From:Date:Message-ID; bh=4q85kCluxVWD7MWn9dCHnESdQrRxdWJOVCsoEepFo+k=;  b=A38DZTZEeX7obaya6DlaFAn3Z/nAd1COcs8rFdV04X4Tkrg5mn0iZ6UgJTGhqv5wKx9V6tGBzPbNdR7cukZoPI/EPFs9rt5pvASjXb2JJkbhV2ICP+lRp212xd9icNFb;
Received: from outbound4.ebay.com ([216.113.168.128] helo=[10.244.137.141]) by box514.bluehost.com with esmtpsa (TLSv1:AES256-SHA:256) (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from <Jeff.Hodges@KingsMountain.com>) id 1RV6RU-0006WM-PK for pkix@ietf.org; Mon, 28 Nov 2011 12:00:40 -0700
Message-ID: <4ED3DA59.1070609@KingsMountain.com>
Date: Mon, 28 Nov 2011 11:00:41 -0800
From: =JeffH <Jeff.Hodges@KingsMountain.com>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux x86_64; en-US; rv:1.9.2.23) Gecko/20110921 Thunderbird/3.1.15
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: IETF PKIX WG <pkix@ietf.org>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Identified-User: {11025:box514.bluehost.com:kingsmou:kingsmountain.com} {sentby:smtp auth 216.113.168.128 authed with jeff.hodges+kingsmountain.com}
Subject: [pkix] fyi: Certificate Authority Transparency and Auditability
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 28 Nov 2011 19:00:43 -0000

Also of possible interest...

Subject: [cryptography] Auditable CAs
From: Ben Laurie <ben@links.org>
Date: Sun, 27 Nov 2011 21:00:28 +0000
To: Crypto discussion list <cryptography@randombit.net>

Given the recent discussion on Sovereign Keys I thought people might
be interested in a related, but less ambitious, idea Adam Langley and
I have been kicking around:
http://www.links.org/files/CertificateAuthorityTransparencyandAuditability.pdf.
_______________________________________________
cryptography mailing list
cryptography@randombit.net
http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography

From tgindin@us.ibm.com  Wed Nov 30 05:52:29 2011
Return-Path: <tgindin@us.ibm.com>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5100921F84B1 for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 30 Nov 2011 05:52:29 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.599
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id V4faRgocrNWG for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 30 Nov 2011 05:52:28 -0800 (PST)
Received: from e9.ny.us.ibm.com (e9.ny.us.ibm.com [32.97.182.139]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7959F21F84A4 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Wed, 30 Nov 2011 05:52:27 -0800 (PST)
Received: from /spool/local by e9.ny.us.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted for <pkix@ietf.org> from <tgindin@us.ibm.com>; Wed, 30 Nov 2011 08:52:26 -0500
Received: from d01relay06.pok.ibm.com ([9.56.227.116]) by e9.ny.us.ibm.com ([192.168.1.109]) with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted;  Wed, 30 Nov 2011 08:52:25 -0500
Received: from d01av05.pok.ibm.com (d01av05.pok.ibm.com [9.56.224.195]) by d01relay06.pok.ibm.com (8.13.8/8.13.8/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id pAUDqNWP3027124 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Wed, 30 Nov 2011 08:52:24 -0500
Received: from d01av05.pok.ibm.com (loopback [127.0.0.1]) by d01av05.pok.ibm.com (8.14.4/8.13.1/NCO v10.0 AVout) with ESMTP id pAUDqNkD010434 for <pkix@ietf.org>; Wed, 30 Nov 2011 08:52:23 -0500
Received: from d01ml062.pok.ibm.com (d01ml062.pok.ibm.com [9.63.10.95]) by d01av05.pok.ibm.com (8.14.4/8.13.1/NCO v10.0 AVin) with ESMTP id pAUDqN68010400; Wed, 30 Nov 2011 08:52:23 -0500
In-Reply-To: <CAF8F980.28E8%tmiller@mitre.org>
References: <OF961BF8DF.3D2A1AC6-ON8525794F.0072C374-85257950.0047EA9C@us.ibm.com> <CAF8F980.28E8%tmiller@mitre.org>
To: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-KeepSent: 784A6F1F:16E68AAB-85257957:008146D7; type=4; name=$KeepSent
X-Mailer: Lotus Notes Build V853_CD5_06022011 June 02, 2011
From: Tom Gindin <tgindin@us.ibm.com>
Message-ID: <OF784A6F1F.16E68AAB-ON85257957.008146D7-85257958.004C352A@us.ibm.com>
Date: Wed, 30 Nov 2011 08:52:21 -0500
X-MIMETrack: Serialize by Router on D01ML062/01/M/IBM(Release 8.5.2FP1 ZX852FP1HF12|September 28, 2011) at 11/30/2011 08:52:22, Serialize complete at 11/30/2011 08:52:22
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="ISO-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
x-cbid: 11113013-7182-0000-0000-00000048827E
Cc: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 30 Nov 2011 13:52:29 -0000

        The main point I've tried to make in this thread is the usefulness =

of self-signed certificates for level 1 and as a credential after level 2=20
proofing, rather than their unsuitability for higher assurance levels.=20
Nonetheless, I don't know if anyone has ever used them at higher levels=20
and I don't think they should.
        The revocation requirements for levels 3 and 4 are IMHO a stronger =

reason not to use self-signed certificates at those levels than the fact=20
that a self-signed certificate consists mainly of information which nobody =

except the claimant has vouched for.  The lack of revocation is irrelevant =

to level 1, relevant but not crippling for level 2, serious for 3 and even =

worse for 4.  You are right that a self-signed certificate could possibly=20
represent a strong enough proofing process for level 3 or 4, although=20
using one makes it hard for that fact to be conveyed between a CSP and a=20
separate RP.
        Further comments below, marked by [TG].

Tom Gindin





From:   "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
To:     Tom Gindin/Watson/IBM@IBMUS, "Kemp, David P."=20
<DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>,=20
Cc:     "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Date:   11/28/2011 09:53 AM
Subject:        Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs



On 11/22/11 7:05 AM, "Tom Gindin" <tgindin@us.ibm.com> wrote:

>        I think it might be helpful to think in terms of assurance levels
>for individual users when discussing a TLS client's use of a self-signed
>certificate.  Using SP 800-63's four levels, no self-signed certificate
>should ever be treated as a Level 3 or 4 credential any more than a
>password should.=20

You're misreading 800-63.  Nothing in 800-63 says you must use the
attributes in the certificate.

[TG] There is nobody who can publish revocations for a typical self-signed =

certificate, although the mechanism proposed by "sovereign key" has some=20
possibilities.  It's true that registrations being invalidated by=20
replacing them in a repository is probably good enough for Level 2,=20
although 800-63 doesn't say so.  It MIGHT be considered adequate at Level=20
3 as well, but the requirements on the verifier suggest that it shouldn't=20
be.  The certificate name need not be relevant, although many=20
implementations would find it more convenient if either the DN or the SAN=20
contained the account name.

Level 3 and 4 require binding the key to the person by methods appropriate
to those levels (e.g., hardware activated tokens at Level 4) *and* using
identity proofing methods appropriate to those levels.  Nothing about
these requirements actually say I have to use certificates.  I *can* use
certificates if the issuer obeys Level 3/4 and asserts policies to that
effect (e.g., FPKI Common Policy OIDs), but I'm free to use local identity
data--as long as I use Level 3 and 4 identity proofing methods to
establish that local data.

>From Section 5 (emphasis added):

"""
In this guidance, the party to be authenticated is called a claimant and
the party verifying
that identity is called a verifier.  When a claimant successfully
demonstrates possession
and control of a token in an on-line authentication to a verifier through
an authentication=20
protocol, the verifier can verify that the clamant is the subscriber.  The
verifier passes on=20
an assertion about the identity of the subscriber to the relying party.
That assertion=20
includes identity information about a subscriber, such as the subscriber
name, an=20
identifier assigned at registration, or other subscriber attributes that
were verified in the
registration process (subject to the policies of the CSP and the needs of
the application).=20
Where the verifier is also the relying party, the assertion may be
implicit.  In addition, the
subscriber=B9s identifying information *may* be incorporated in credentials
(e.g., public key=20
certificates) made available by the claimant.  The relying party can use
the authenticated=20
information provided by the verifier/CSP to make access control or
authorization=20
decisions.=20
"""

[TG] I'm more interested in the revocation requirements for Level 3.  From =

8.3.1.3, "Verifiers shall ensure that the tokens they rely upon are either =

freshly issued (within 24 hours) or still valid", although the next=20
sentence does say "Shared secret based authentication systems may simply=20
remove revoked Subscribers from the verification database".

-- T




From tmiller@mitre.org  Wed Nov 30 06:40:32 2011
Return-Path: <tmiller@mitre.org>
X-Original-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: pkix@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7EC1121F8B3B for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 30 Nov 2011 06:40:32 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -5.949
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-5.949 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.650,  BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id IuMSg-g+Egtd for <pkix@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 30 Nov 2011 06:40:31 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (smtpksrv1.mitre.org [198.49.146.77]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A58A621F8AFE for <pkix@ietf.org>; Wed, 30 Nov 2011 06:40:31 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtpksrv1.mitre.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by localhost (Postfix) with SMTP id DF2F221B177D; Wed, 30 Nov 2011 09:40:30 -0500 (EST)
Received: from IMCCAS01.MITRE.ORG (imccas01.mitre.org [129.83.29.78]) by smtpksrv1.mitre.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A364921B0D62; Wed, 30 Nov 2011 09:40:30 -0500 (EST)
Received: from IMCMBX01.MITRE.ORG ([169.254.1.18]) by IMCCAS01.MITRE.ORG ([129.83.29.78]) with mapi id 14.01.0339.001; Wed, 30 Nov 2011 09:40:30 -0500
From: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
To: Tom Gindin <tgindin@us.ibm.com>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
Thread-Index: AQHMpNb3K+6nacw8f0a2iVOXAK08TJWxblCAgABwfQCAAAiYgIAHUYIAgAknZQCAA3hngP//qNuA
Date: Wed, 30 Nov 2011 14:40:29 +0000
Message-ID: <CAFB9AE2.29C3%tmiller@mitre.org>
In-Reply-To: <OF784A6F1F.16E68AAB-ON85257957.008146D7-85257958.004C352A@us.ibm.com>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
user-agent: Microsoft-MacOutlook/14.13.0.110805
x-originating-ip: [172.31.39.64]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-ID: <3B373740D8A42547B5AD2ACBCDF83613@imc.mitre.org>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Cc: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] End-entity self-signed certs
X-BeenThere: pkix@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix>
List-Post: <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>, <mailto:pkix-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 30 Nov 2011 14:40:32 -0000

On 11/30/11 7:52 AM, "Tom Gindin" <tgindin@us.ibm.com> wrote:

>        The main point I've tried to make in this thread is the
>usefulness=20
>of self-signed certificates for level 1 and as a credential after level 2
>proofing, rather than their unsuitability for higher assurance levels.
>Nonetheless, I don't know if anyone has ever used them at higher levels
>and I don't think they should.

To counter, I'm trying to make the point that functionally speaking the
self-signed certificate is nothing more than a container for the public
key.  A key continuity system wouldn't even look at the certificate
attributes.  Practically speaking, however, the certificate is needed
because the *protocols on which systems are built* are built around X.509
objects.

For example, I can (and have) build a web service that uses key continuity
for authN and authZ.  However, to *use* that service the user must have a
certificate, because the TLS protocol requires certificates to function.

>        The revocation requirements for levels 3 and 4 are IMHO a
>stronger=20
>reason not to use self-signed certificates at those levels than the fact
>that a self-signed certificate consists mainly of information which
>nobody=20
>except the claimant has vouched for.  The lack of revocation is
>irrelevant=20
>to level 1, relevant but not crippling for level 2, serious for 3 and
>even=20
>worse for 4.  You are right that a self-signed certificate could possibly
>represent a strong enough proofing process for level 3 or 4, although
>using one makes it hard for that fact to be conveyed between a CSP and a
>separate RP.

As you noted, revocation in key continuity systems are achieved by
de-authorizing the key.  I don=B9t see this as a problem for LOA3/4, but it
does make the C&A job more important.

-- T

