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From: "Erik Andersen" <era@x500.eu>
To: "'Kyle Hamilton'" <aerowolf@gmail.com>, "'Tom Gindin'" <tgindin@us.ibm.com>
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Cc: 'PKIX' <pkix@ietf.org>, SG17-Q11 <t09sg17q11@lists.itu.int>, Directory list <x500standard@freelists.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] Unclear public-key certificate definition in X.509
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Hi Kyle,

This is an important discussion.

I am completely aware that X.509 has a life outside directory, although
directories, especially LDAP systems, are often used for holding the
different PKI components. In my effort to modernize X.509, I am trying =
to
remove references to directory where it is not necessary. The main =
directory
content is the schema information (attribute types, object classes and
matching rules) for holding and accessing PKI/PMI components.

As to distinguished name, it seems too late to change that. It is part =
of
many profiles and also of RFC 5280.

I do not believe that it would be wise to separate the content of X.509 =
into
two different documents. X.509 is well established and well known. =
Putting
the non-directory stuff into a separate document will cause confusion =
and
many references will have to changed.

(ASN.1 was never part of X.500, but of X.400 (1984), and it was =
separated
quite early.)

Erik Andersen
Andersen's L-Service
Elsevej 48,
DK-3500 Vaerloese
Denmark
Mobile: +45 2097 1490
e-amail: era@x500.eu
Skype: andersen-erik
http://www.x500.eu/
http://www.x500standard.com/
http://dk.linkedin.com/in/andersenerik

-----Oprindelig meddelelse-----
Fra: Kyle Hamilton [mailto:aerowolf@gmail.com]=20
Sendt: 1. december 2011 03:43
Til: Tom Gindin
Cc: Erik Andersen; PKIX
Emne: Re: [pkix] Unclear public-key certificate definition in X.509



On Fri, Nov 12, 2010 at 4:38 PM, Tom Gindin <tgindin@us.ibm.com> wrote:
> =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0It no longer has the problem which it had before. =A0Of =
course, it's
> a little odd to describe a certificate as a function of specifically =
the
> DN of the issuer, since the critical functional dependency is on the
> issuer's key pair.

The original X.509 use-case was that the Directory was everything, that
everything could be Distinguishably Named, and that the Distinguished =
Name
was the correct indexing system.  The problem is that the original =
designers
hadn't had the experience of a decade of nearly universal worldwide
deployment, with the format being extended into realms it was never =
intended
to go.

Perhaps X.509 could be formally decoupled from X.500, or (much like =
ASN.1)
the data format and semantics could be moved to a different standard =
while
the DIT bindings remain in X.509.

> The CA(A) expression just confuses me, because it suggests that the CA =
is
> a function of the subject name.

Unfortunately, the original designers appear to have not thought about =
what
would happen if you had a DN collision with multiple certificates and =
keys.

The key to the lock is unique, which means that it also meets the
requirement to be a database key.  The key is the key; the binding and =
all
the rest is just metadata.

-Kyle H


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Cc: 'PKIX' <pkix@ietf.org>, pkix-bounces@ietf.org, SG17-Q11 <t09sg17q11@lists.itu.int>, Directory list <x500standard@freelists.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] Unclear public-key certificate definition in X.509
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Erik and Kyle,

Erik, you said:

" I am completely aware that X.509 has a life outside directory, (...) 
as to distinguished name, it seems too late to change that ". 

It is never too late.

X.509 does not define what a DN is.

ITU-T Rec. X.501 (11/2008), alias  ISO/IEC 9594-2:2008, defines it only in 
the context of a DIT 

9.1.3 distinguished name (of an entry): Every object entry, alias entry, 
and subentry has at least one distinguished name. 
If any RDN for the entry or any superior entry includes an attribute for 
which there exist multiple distinguished 
values differentiated by context (as described in 9.3), then the entry 
shall have multiple distinguished names 
differentiated by context. The  primary distinguished name is that 
distinguished name in which each RDN has the 
primary distinguished value of each contributing attribute as the main 
value in the RDN construct. 

Furthermore, X.509 includes inappropriate sentences like:
"Although the CAs are unambiguously defined by a distinguished name in the 
DIT, .."

It is the time to allow the existence of X.509 without using a Directory.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Kyle, you said: :

"Unfortunately, the original designers appear to have not thought about 
what
would happen if you had a DN collision with multiple certificates and 
keys".

I would rather say: "The original designers appear to have not given 
sufficient information about what
would happen if you had a DN collision". 

The reality as that a DN name is only unique for the CA which has issued 
it. 
This statement is valid for the next upper the CA, and until a root CA is 
reached.
This means that only the sequence of DN is unique for a given trust 
anchor.

In order to avoid any name collision when DN are used for access control 
purposes, in the most general case
the structure of name placed in an ACL should start with a trust anchor 
and be followed by a sequence of DNs.

When  there is a single trust anchor, the first element may be omitted, 
... but only as long as there is not a second trust anchor later on.

When there is a single certification path under that single trust anchor, 
the intermediate DNs of the CAs may be omitted, 
... but only as long as there is not a second certification path below 
that trust anchor.

This guidance is not given anywhere.

Denis

=========================================================================================
Hi Kyle,

This is an important discussion.

I am completely aware that X.509 has a life outside directory, although
directories, especially LDAP systems, are often used for holding the
different PKI components. In my effort to modernize X.509, I am trying to
remove references to directory where it is not necessary. The main 
directory
content is the schema information (attribute types, object classes and
matching rules) for holding and accessing PKI/PMI components.

As to distinguished name, it seems too late to change that. It is part of
many profiles and also of RFC 5280.

I do not believe that it would be wise to separate the content of X.509 
into
two different documents. X.509 is well established and well known. Putting
the non-directory stuff into a separate document will cause confusion and
many references will have to changed.

(ASN.1 was never part of X.500, but of X.400 (1984), and it was separated
quite early.)

Erik Andersen
Andersen's L-Service
Elsevej 48,
DK-3500 Vaerloese
Denmark
Mobile: +45 2097 1490
e-amail: era@x500.eu
Skype: andersen-erik
http://www.x500.eu/
http://www.x500standard.com/
http://dk.linkedin.com/in/andersenerik

-----Oprindelig meddelelse-----
Fra: Kyle Hamilton [mailto:aerowolf@gmail.com] 
Sendt: 1. december 2011 03:43
Til: Tom Gindin
Cc: Erik Andersen; PKIX
Emne: Re: [pkix] Unclear public-key certificate definition in X.509



On Fri, Nov 12, 2010 at 4:38 PM, Tom Gindin <tgindin@us.ibm.com> wrote:

>        It no longer has the problem which it had before.  Of course, 
it's
> a little odd to describe a certificate as a function of specifically the
> DN of the issuer, since the critical functional dependency is on the
> issuer's key pair.

The original X.509 use-case was that the Directory was everything, that
everything could be Distinguishably Named, and that the Distinguished Name
was the correct indexing system.  The problem is that the original 
designers
hadn't had the experience of a decade of nearly universal worldwide
deployment, with the format being extended into realms it was never 
intended
to go.

Perhaps X.509 could be formally decoupled from X.500, or (much like ASN.1)
the data format and semantics could be moved to a different standard while
the DIT bindings remain in X.509.

> The CA(A) expression just confuses me, because it suggests that the CA 
is
> a function of the subject name.

Unfortunately, the original designers appear to have not thought about 
what
would happen if you had a DN collision with multiple certificates and 
keys.

The key to the lock is unique, which means that it also meets the
requirement to be a database key.  The key is the key; the binding and all
the rest is just metadata.

-Kyle H




--=_alternative 00575FB7C1257959_=
Content-Type: text/html; charset="US-ASCII"

<font size=2 face="sans-serif">Erik and Kyle,</font>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">Erik, you said:</font>
<br>
<br><tt><font size=2>&quot; I am completely aware that X.509 has a life
outside directory, (...) </font></tt>
<br><tt><font size=2>as to distinguished name, it seems too late to change
that &quot;. </font></tt>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">It is never too late.</font>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">X.509 does not define what a DN is.</font>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">ITU-T Rec. X.501 (11/2008), alias &nbsp;ISO/IEC
9594-2:2008, defines it only in the context of a DIT </font>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">9.1.3 distinguished name (of an entry):
Every object entry, alias entry, and subentry has at least one distinguished
name. <br>
If any RDN for the entry or any superior entry includes an attribute for
which there exist multiple distinguished </font>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">values differentiated by context (as
described in 9.3), then the entry shall have multiple distinguished names
<br>
differentiated by context. The &nbsp;primary distinguished name is that
distinguished name in which each RDN has the </font>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">primary distinguished value of each
contributing attribute as the main value in the RDN construct. </font>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">Furthermore, X.509 includes inappropriate
sentences like:</font>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">&quot;Although the CAs are unambiguously
defined by a distinguished name in the DIT, ..&quot;</font>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">It is the time to allow the existence
of X.509 without using a Directory.</font>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</font>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">Kyle, you said: :</font>
<br>
<br><tt><font size=2>&quot;Unfortunately, the original designers appear
to have not thought about what<br>
would happen if you had a DN collision with multiple certificates and keys&quot;.</font></tt>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="Arial">I would rather say: &quot;The original designers
appear to have not given sufficient information about what<br>
would happen if you had a DN collision&quot;. </font>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">The reality as that a DN name is only
unique for the CA which has issued it. <br>
This statement is valid for the next upper the CA, and until a root CA
is reached.</font>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">This means that only the sequence of
DN is unique for a given trust anchor.</font>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">In order to avoid any name collision
when DN are used for access control purposes, in the most general case<br>
the structure of name placed in an ACL should start with a trust anchor
and be followed by a sequence of DNs.</font>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">When &nbsp;there is a single trust anchor,
the first element may be omitted, <br>
... but only as long as there is not a second trust anchor later on.</font>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">When there is a single certification
path under that single trust anchor, the intermediate DNs of the CAs may
be omitted, <br>
... but only as long as there is not a second certification path below
that trust anchor.</font>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">This guidance is not given anywhere.</font>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">Denis</font>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">=========================================================================================</font>
<br><tt><font size=2>Hi Kyle,<br>
<br>
This is an important discussion.<br>
<br>
I am completely aware that X.509 has a life outside directory, although<br>
directories, especially LDAP systems, are often used for holding the<br>
different PKI components. In my effort to modernize X.509, I am trying
to<br>
remove references to directory where it is not necessary. The main directory<br>
content is the schema information (attribute types, object classes and<br>
matching rules) for holding and accessing PKI/PMI components.<br>
<br>
As to distinguished name, it seems too late to change that. It is part
of<br>
many profiles and also of RFC 5280.<br>
<br>
I do not believe that it would be wise to separate the content of X.509
into<br>
two different documents. X.509 is well established and well known. Putting<br>
the non-directory stuff into a separate document will cause confusion and<br>
many references will have to changed.<br>
<br>
(ASN.1 was never part of X.500, but of X.400 (1984), and it was separated<br>
quite early.)<br>
<br>
Erik Andersen<br>
Andersen's L-Service<br>
Elsevej 48,<br>
DK-3500 Vaerloese<br>
Denmark<br>
Mobile: +45 2097 1490<br>
e-amail: era@x500.eu<br>
Skype: andersen-erik<br>
</font></tt><a href=http://www.x500.eu/><tt><font size=2>http://www.x500.eu/</font></tt></a><tt><font size=2><br>
</font></tt><a href=http://www.x500standard.com/><tt><font size=2>http://www.x500standard.com/</font></tt></a><tt><font size=2><br>
</font></tt><a href=http://dk.linkedin.com/in/andersenerik><tt><font size=2>http://dk.linkedin.com/in/andersenerik</font></tt></a><tt><font size=2><br>
<br>
-----Oprindelig meddelelse-----<br>
Fra: Kyle Hamilton [</font></tt><a href=mailto:aerowolf@gmail.com><tt><font size=2>mailto:aerowolf@gmail.com</font></tt></a><tt><font size=2>]
<br>
Sendt: 1. december 2011 03:43<br>
Til: Tom Gindin<br>
Cc: Erik Andersen; PKIX<br>
Emne: Re: [pkix] Unclear public-key certificate definition in X.509<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
On Fri, Nov 12, 2010 at 4:38 PM, Tom Gindin &lt;tgindin@us.ibm.com&gt;
wrote:</font></tt>
<br><tt><font size=2><br>
&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;It no longer has the problem which it had
before. &nbsp;Of course, it's<br>
&gt; a little odd to describe a certificate as a function of specifically
the<br>
&gt; DN of the issuer, since the critical functional dependency is on the<br>
&gt; issuer's key pair.<br>
<br>
The original X.509 use-case was that the Directory was everything, that<br>
everything could be Distinguishably Named, and that the Distinguished Name<br>
was the correct indexing system. &nbsp;The problem is that the original
designers<br>
hadn't had the experience of a decade of nearly universal worldwide<br>
deployment, with the format being extended into realms it was never intended<br>
to go.<br>
<br>
Perhaps X.509 could be formally decoupled from X.500, or (much like ASN.1)<br>
the data format and semantics could be moved to a different standard while<br>
the DIT bindings remain in X.509.<br>
<br>
&gt; The CA(A) expression just confuses me, because it suggests that the
CA is<br>
&gt; a function of the subject name.<br>
<br>
Unfortunately, the original designers appear to have not thought about
what<br>
would happen if you had a DN collision with multiple certificates and keys.<br>
<br>
The key to the lock is unique, which means that it also meets the<br>
requirement to be a database key. &nbsp;The key is the key; the binding
and all<br>
the rest is just metadata.<br>
<br>
-Kyle H<br>
<br>
</font></tt>
<br>
<br>
--=_alternative 00575FB7C1257959_=--

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Subject: Re: [pkix] [x500standard] Re: Unclear public-key certificate definition in X.509
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Hi Denis

Thanks for your comments.=20

=20

There has been several suggestions to remove the concept of alternative
distinguished name (name with context). I have produced a proposal for =
the
necessary text changes to remove that concept. I have for a long time =
been
aware that alterative distinguished names do fit well into the X.509
concepts.

=20

The note, to which you are referring, should just be deleted.=20

=20

Erik Andersen

Andersen's L-Service

Elsevej 48,

DK-3500 Vaerloese

Denmark

Mobile: +45 2097 1490

e-amail: era@x500.eu

Skype: andersen-erik

 <http://www.x500.eu/> http://www.x500.eu/

 <http://www.x500standard.com/> http://www.x500standard.com/

 <http://dk.linkedin.com/in/andersenerik>
http://dk.linkedin.com/in/andersenerik

=20

Fra: x500standard-bounce@freelists.org
[mailto:x500standard-bounce@freelists.org] P=E5 vegne af =
denis.pinkas@bull.net
Sendt: 1. december 2011 16:55
Til: Erik Andersen
Cc: 'PKIX'; pkix-bounces@ietf.org; SG17-Q11; Directory list
Emne: [x500standard] Re: [pkix] Unclear public-key certificate =
definition in
X.509

=20

Erik and Kyle,=20

Erik, you said:=20

" I am completely aware that X.509 has a life outside directory, (...)=20
as to distinguished name, it seems too late to change that ".=20

It is never too late.=20

X.509 does not define what a DN is.=20

ITU-T Rec. X.501 (11/2008), alias  ISO/IEC 9594-2:2008, defines it only =
in
the context of a DIT=20

9.1.3 distinguished name (of an entry): Every object entry, alias entry, =
and
subentry has at least one distinguished name.=20
If any RDN for the entry or any superior entry includes an attribute for
which there exist multiple distinguished=20
values differentiated by context (as described in 9.3), then the entry =
shall
have multiple distinguished names=20
differentiated by context. The  primary distinguished name is that
distinguished name in which each RDN has the=20
primary distinguished value of each contributing attribute as the main =
value
in the RDN construct.=20

Furthermore, X.509 includes inappropriate sentences like:=20
"Although the CAs are unambiguously defined by a distinguished name in =
the
DIT, .."=20

It is the time to allow the existence of X.509 without using a =
Directory.=20

-------------------------------------------------------------------------=
---
-------------------------------------------------------------------------=
---
-=20
Kyle, you said: :=20

"Unfortunately, the original designers appear to have not thought about =
what
would happen if you had a DN collision with multiple certificates and =
keys".


I would rather say: "The original designers appear to have not given
sufficient information about what
would happen if you had a DN collision".=20

The reality as that a DN name is only unique for the CA which has issued =
it.

This statement is valid for the next upper the CA, and until a root CA =
is
reached.=20
This means that only the sequence of DN is unique for a given trust =
anchor.=20

In order to avoid any name collision when DN are used for access control
purposes, in the most general case
the structure of name placed in an ACL should start with a trust anchor =
and
be followed by a sequence of DNs.=20

When  there is a single trust anchor, the first element may be omitted,=20
... but only as long as there is not a second trust anchor later on.=20

When there is a single certification path under that single trust =
anchor,
the intermediate DNs of the CAs may be omitted,=20
... but only as long as there is not a second certification path below =
that
trust anchor.=20

This guidance is not given anywhere.=20

Denis=20

=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=20
Hi Kyle,

This is an important discussion.

I am completely aware that X.509 has a life outside directory, although
directories, especially LDAP systems, are often used for holding the
different PKI components. In my effort to modernize X.509, I am trying =
to
remove references to directory where it is not necessary. The main =
directory
content is the schema information (attribute types, object classes and
matching rules) for holding and accessing PKI/PMI components.

As to distinguished name, it seems too late to change that. It is part =
of
many profiles and also of RFC 5280.

I do not believe that it would be wise to separate the content of X.509 =
into
two different documents. X.509 is well established and well known. =
Putting
the non-directory stuff into a separate document will cause confusion =
and
many references will have to changed.

(ASN.1 was never part of X.500, but of X.400 (1984), and it was =
separated
quite early.)

Erik Andersen
Andersen's L-Service
Elsevej 48,
DK-3500 Vaerloese
Denmark
Mobile: +45 2097 1490
e-amail: era@x500.eu
Skype: andersen-erik
 <http://www.x500.eu/> http://www.x500.eu/
 <http://www.x500standard.com/> http://www.x500standard.com/
 <http://dk.linkedin.com/in/andersenerik>
http://dk.linkedin.com/in/andersenerik

-----Oprindelig meddelelse-----
Fra: Kyle Hamilton [ <mailto:aerowolf@gmail.com> =
mailto:aerowolf@gmail.com]=20
Sendt: 1. december 2011 03:43
Til: Tom Gindin
Cc: Erik Andersen; PKIX
Emne: Re: [pkix] Unclear public-key certificate definition in X.509



On Fri, Nov 12, 2010 at 4:38 PM, Tom Gindin <tgindin@us.ibm.com> wrote:=20

>        It no longer has the problem which it had before.  Of course, =
it's
> a little odd to describe a certificate as a function of specifically =
the
> DN of the issuer, since the critical functional dependency is on the
> issuer's key pair.

The original X.509 use-case was that the Directory was everything, that
everything could be Distinguishably Named, and that the Distinguished =
Name
was the correct indexing system.  The problem is that the original =
designers
hadn't had the experience of a decade of nearly universal worldwide
deployment, with the format being extended into realms it was never =
intended
to go.

Perhaps X.509 could be formally decoupled from X.500, or (much like =
ASN.1)
the data format and semantics could be moved to a different standard =
while
the DIT bindings remain in X.509.

> The CA(A) expression just confuses me, because it suggests that the CA =
is
> a function of the subject name.

Unfortunately, the original designers appear to have not thought about =
what
would happen if you had a DN collision with multiple certificates and =
keys.

The key to the lock is unique, which means that it also meets the
requirement to be a database key.  The key is the key; the binding and =
all
the rest is just metadata.

-Kyle H





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</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=3DEN-GB link=3Dblue =
vlink=3Dpurple><div class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D'>Hi Denis<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D'>Thanks for your comments. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D'>There has been several suggestions to remove the concept of =
alternative distinguished name (name with context). I have produced a =
proposal for the necessary text changes to remove that concept. I have =
for a long time been aware that alterative distinguished names do fit =
well into the X.509 concepts.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D'>The note, to which you are referring, should just be deleted. =
<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#1F497D'>Erik =
Andersen<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#1F497D'>Andersen's =
L-Service<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#1F497D'>Elsevej =
48,<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#1F497D'>DK-3500 =
Vaerloese<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#1F497D'>Denmark<o:p=
></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#1F497D'>Mobile: =
+45 2097 1490<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#1F497D'>e-amail: =
</span><span lang=3DDA =
style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#1F497D'><a =
href=3D"era@x500.eu"><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'color:blue'>era@x500.eu</span></a></span><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#1F497D'><o:p></o:p>=
</span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DDA =
style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#1F497D'>Skype: =
andersen-erik<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DDA =
style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#1F497D'><a =
href=3D"http://www.x500.eu/"><span =
style=3D'color:blue'>http://www.x500.eu/</span></a><o:p></o:p></span></p>=
<p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DDA =
style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#1F497D'><a =
href=3D"http://www.x500standard.com/"><span =
style=3D'color:blue'>http://www.x500standard.com/</span></a><o:p></o:p></=
span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:black'><a =
href=3D"http://dk.linkedin.com/in/andersenerik"><span lang=3DDA =
style=3D'color:blue'>http://dk.linkedin.com/in/andersenerik</span></a></s=
pan><span lang=3DDA =
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style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0cm =
0cm 0cm'><p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span lang=3DDA =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>Fra:</span><=
/b><span lang=3DDA =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> =
x500standard-bounce@freelists.org =
[mailto:x500standard-bounce@freelists.org] <b>P=E5 vegne af =
</b>denis.pinkas@bull.net<br><b>Sendt:</b> 1. december 2011 =
16:55<br><b>Til:</b> Erik Andersen<br><b>Cc:</b> 'PKIX'; =
pkix-bounces@ietf.org; SG17-Q11; Directory list<br><b>Emne:</b> =
[x500standard] Re: [pkix] Unclear public-key certificate definition in =
X.509<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'margin-bottom:12.0pt'><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'>Erik and =
Kyle,</span> <br><br><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'>Erik, you =
said:</span> <br><br><tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&quot; I am =
completely aware that X.509 has a life outside directory, (...) =
</span></tt><br><tt><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>as to distinguished =
name, it seems too late to change that &quot;. </span></tt><br><br><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'>It is never =
too late.</span> <br><br><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'>X.509 does =
not define what a DN is.</span> <br><br><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'>ITU-T Rec. =
X.501 (11/2008), alias &nbsp;ISO/IEC 9594-2:2008, defines it only in the =
context of a DIT </span><br><br><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'>9.1.3 =
distinguished name (of an entry): Every object entry, alias entry, and =
subentry has at least one distinguished name. <br>If any RDN for the =
entry or any superior entry includes an attribute for which there exist =
multiple distinguished </span><br><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'>values =
differentiated by context (as described in 9.3), then the entry shall =
have multiple distinguished names <br>differentiated by context. The =
&nbsp;primary distinguished name is that distinguished name in which =
each RDN has the </span><br><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'>primary =
distinguished value of each contributing attribute as the main value in =
the RDN construct. </span><br><br><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'>Furthermore, =
X.509 includes inappropriate sentences like:</span> <br><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'>&quot;Althoug=
h the CAs are unambiguously defined by a distinguished name in the DIT, =
..&quot;</span> <br><br><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'>It is the =
time to allow the existence of X.509 without using a Directory.</span> =
<br><br><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'>-------------=
-------------------------------------------------------------------------=
-------------------------------------------------------------------</span=
> <br><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'>Kyle, you =
said: :</span> <br><br><tt><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>&quot;Unfortunately, the original designers =
appear to have not thought about what</span></tt><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New"'><br><tt>would =
happen if you had a DN collision with multiple certificates and =
keys&quot;.</tt></span> <br><br><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'>I would =
rather say: &quot;The original designers appear to have not given =
sufficient information about what<br>would happen if you had a DN =
collision&quot;. </span><br><br><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'>The reality =
as that a DN name is only unique for the CA which has issued it. =
<br>This statement is valid for the next upper the CA, and until a root =
CA is reached.</span> <br><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'>This means =
that only the sequence of DN is unique for a given trust anchor.</span> =
<br><br><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'>In order to =
avoid any name collision when DN are used for access control purposes, =
in the most general case<br>the structure of name placed in an ACL =
should start with a trust anchor and be followed by a sequence of =
DNs.</span> <br><br><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'>When =
&nbsp;there is a single trust anchor, the first element may be omitted, =
<br>... but only as long as there is not a second trust anchor later =
on.</span> <br><br><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'>When there =
is a single certification path under that single trust anchor, the =
intermediate DNs of the CAs may be omitted, <br>... but only as long as =
there is not a second certification path below that trust anchor.</span> =
<br><br><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'>This =
guidance is not given anywhere.</span> <br><br><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'>Denis</span> =
<br><br><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'>=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D</span> <br><tt><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>Hi Kyle,</span></tt><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New"'><br><br><tt>This is =
an important discussion.</tt><br><br><tt>I am completely aware that =
X.509 has a life outside directory, although</tt><br><tt>directories, =
especially LDAP systems, are often used for holding =
the</tt><br><tt>different PKI components. In my effort to modernize =
X.509, I am trying to</tt><br><tt>remove references to directory where =
it is not necessary. The main directory</tt><br><tt>content is the =
schema information (attribute types, object classes =
and</tt><br><tt>matching rules) for holding and accessing PKI/PMI =
components.</tt><br><br><tt>As to distinguished name, it seems too late =
to change that. It is part of</tt><br><tt>many profiles and also of RFC =
5280.</tt><br><br><tt>I do not believe that it would be wise to separate =
the content of X.509 into</tt><br><tt>two different documents. X.509 is =
well established and well known. Putting</tt><br><tt>the non-directory =
stuff into a separate document will cause confusion and</tt><br><tt>many =
references will have to changed.</tt><br><br><tt>(ASN.1 was never part =
of X.500, but of X.400 (1984), and it was separated</tt><br><tt>quite =
early.)</tt><br><br><tt>Erik Andersen</tt><br><tt>Andersen's =
L-Service</tt><br><tt>Elsevej 48,</tt><br><tt>DK-3500 =
Vaerloese</tt><br><tt>Denmark</tt><br><tt>Mobile: +45 2097 =
1490</tt><br><tt>e-amail: <a =
href=3D"mailto:era@x500.eu">era@x500.eu</a></tt><br><tt>Skype: =
andersen-erik</tt><br></span><a href=3D"http://www.x500.eu/"><tt><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>http://www.x500.eu/</span></tt></a><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New"'><br></span><a =
href=3D"http://www.x500standard.com/"><tt><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>http://www.x500standard.com/</span></tt></a><s=
pan style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New"'><br></span><a =
href=3D"http://dk.linkedin.com/in/andersenerik"><tt><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>http://dk.linkedin.com/in/andersenerik</span><=
/tt></a><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier =
New"'><br><br><tt>-----Oprindelig meddelelse-----</tt><br><tt>Fra: Kyle =
Hamilton [</tt></span><a href=3D"mailto:aerowolf@gmail.com"><tt><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>mailto:aerowolf@gmail.com</span></tt></a><tt><=
span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>] </span></tt><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New"'><br><tt>Sendt: 1. =
december 2011 03:43</tt><br><tt>Til: Tom Gindin</tt><br><tt>Cc: Erik =
Andersen; PKIX</tt><br><tt>Emne: Re: [pkix] Unclear public-key =
certificate definition in X.509</tt><br><br><br><br><tt>On Fri, Nov 12, =
2010 at 4:38 PM, Tom Gindin &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:tgindin@us.ibm.com">tgindin@us.ibm.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:</tt></span> <br><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New"'><br><tt>&gt; &nbsp; =
&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;It no longer has the problem which it had before. =
&nbsp;Of course, it's</tt><br><tt>&gt; a little odd to describe a =
certificate as a function of specifically the</tt><br><tt>&gt; DN of the =
issuer, since the critical functional dependency is on =
the</tt><br><tt>&gt; issuer's key pair.</tt><br><br><tt>The original =
X.509 use-case was that the Directory was everything, =
that</tt><br><tt>everything could be Distinguishably Named, and that the =
Distinguished Name</tt><br><tt>was the correct indexing system. =
&nbsp;The problem is that the original designers</tt><br><tt>hadn't had =
the experience of a decade of nearly universal =
worldwide</tt><br><tt>deployment, with the format being extended into =
realms it was never intended</tt><br><tt>to go.</tt><br><br><tt>Perhaps =
X.509 could be formally decoupled from X.500, or (much like =
ASN.1)</tt><br><tt>the data format and semantics could be moved to a =
different standard while</tt><br><tt>the DIT bindings remain in =
X.509.</tt><br><br><tt>&gt; The CA(A) expression just confuses me, =
because it suggests that the CA is</tt><br><tt>&gt; a function of the =
subject name.</tt><br><br><tt>Unfortunately, the original designers =
appear to have not thought about what</tt><br><tt>would happen if you =
had a DN collision with multiple certificates and =
keys.</tt><br><br><tt>The key to the lock is unique, which means that it =
also meets the</tt><br><tt>requirement to be a database key. &nbsp;The =
key is the key; the binding and all</tt><br><tt>the rest is just =
metadata.</tt><br><br><tt>-Kyle =
H</tt><br><br><br></span><o:p></o:p></p></div></body></html>
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From: "Kyle Hamilton" <aerowolf@gmail.com>
To: "Tom Gindin" <tgindin@us.ibm.com>
Date: Wed, 30 Nov 2011 18:42:43 -0800 (Pacific Standard Time)
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From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
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Subject: [pkix] Wg adoption of draft-turner-pkix-cmc-serverkeygeneration-00?
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Folks,

Sean posted this doc back in July. There was some discussion o the PKIX
list but not a lot. the doc proposes extensions to CMC to support key
pair generation by a server. TYhere has been recent discussion about this
general topic, so it appears to be of interest to at least some set of folks.

Unless I hear otherwise over the next two weeks, I plan to approve 
adoption of this as a WG doc.

Steve

From anders.rundgren@telia.com  Fri Dec  2 09:49:24 2011
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Wg adoption of draft-turner-pkix-cmc-serverkeygeneration-00?
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On 2011-12-02 16:52, Stephen Kent wrote:
> Folks,
> 
> Sean posted this doc back in July. There was some discussion o the PKIX
> list but not a lot. the doc proposes extensions to CMC to support key
> pair generation by a server. TYhere has been recent discussion about this
> general topic, so it appears to be of interest to at least some set of folks.

I have no idea if CMC is interesting or not (CMP and SCEP seems to be
more popular) but the concept of generating keys on the server seems
like a better idea for encryption keys since it eliminates key
archiving from the client.

In my SKS/KeyGen2 scheme I originally had both key backup and key restore
but nowadays it only supports key restore which simplified the design and
possibly also reduces the attack space.

Anders


> 
> Unless I hear otherwise over the next two weeks, I plan to approve 
> adoption of this as a WG doc.
> 
> Steve
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
> 


From kyanha@kyanha.net  Sat Dec  3 10:55:49 2011
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From: Kyle Hamilton <kyanha@kyanha.net>
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Subject: [pkix] I-D draft-hamilton-crlwhitelist-00
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All,

I've uploaded a new draft, documenting a supplemental production to
current CRLs.  It is a simple format to include certificate
authentication data as a crlEntryExtension, and a whitelist with the
same authenticated data format in a crlExtension.

There is no protocol from PKIX which can directly use or consume
certificate strong authentication data.  Nevertheless, until it's
provided in some manner, no protocol ever will be able to.

(If you don't like using the CRL for this data, please, will you write
something up to do it and propose it?  We need this capability, and we
need it soon.)

-Kyle H

From hallam@gmail.com  Fri Dec  9 06:01:06 2011
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Subject: Re: [pkix] fyi: Sovereign Keys: an EFF proposal for more secure TLS authentication
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Agreed that 80% of the benefit without the practical difficulties is much
better.

What happens in Sovereign keys when someone makes a mistake and either
loses their key or discloses it? 'Be careful' is not an acceptable answer
when non-specialized entities are meant to do this.


Where I think the security world has gone wrong over the past few decades
is making access control the be all and end all of security and
ignoring accountability as a tool.

An access control scheme cannot have more than 0% false positives which
means that you have to tolerate a much higher degree of false negatives
than you would like. Consider the Wikileaks situation where a low level
clerk had access to half a million cables because he might have a plausible
need to look at any one of them.


Accountability does not block the bad action but combined with access
control you can block what you know must never happen while still placing
limits on what is allowed.

the useful contribution in sovereign keys seems to me to be the idea of
having an unalterable audit log. Which is an opportunity to remind people
once again that the Harber and Stornetta catenate cert patent has expired
and now would be a good time to do something interesting there.

A general purpose notary protocol would have much wide application.


On Mon, Nov 28, 2011 at 8:49 AM, Miller, Timothy J. <tmiller@mitre.org>wrote:

> I really don't see a heck of a lot of conceptual difference between this
> proposal and several current and past proposals.  Functionally this is
> just pushing the name binding back to a separate  level from the CA, only
> now I need to trust both the CA and the Registrar to run things correctly.
>
>
> Personally I think client-side incorporation of continuity-of-use data
> into trust management--either individually or supported by independent
> inspection points (see Perspectives, Convergence, or even Google's
> Certificate Catalog,
> http://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.com/2011/04/improving-ssl-certificate-
> security.html)--probably nets 80% of the benefit and will be much easier
> to accomplish in the decentralized Internet.  Yes, there  are observed
> issues with current practices at server-side (ref. the SK proposal
> Appendix A.3 and the cited blog from Andy Steingruebl), but if a
> continuity-type model gains traction operational practice *will* change
> and those false positives resolve themselves.
>
> Finally this statement bugs me:
>
> """
> Generalising from the above problem, Perspectives and Convergence rely on
> parties other than the domain holder to characterise what state the
> domain's operational deployment /should/ be in
> """
>
>
> This ignores (common?) situation where site owner and domain owner can be
> different entities.
>
> -- T
>
> On 11/21/11 6:25 PM, "=JeffH" <Jeff.Hodges@KingsMountain.com> wrote:
>
> >Of possible interest...
> >
> >
> >Subject: [SSL Observatory] Sovereign Keys: an EFF proposal for more secure
> >       TLS authentication
> >From: Peter Eckersley <pde@eff.org>
> >Date: Fri, 18 Nov 2011 14:31:42 -0800
> >To: observatory@eff.org
> >
> >For quite a while at EFF, we've been pondering different possible
> >solutions to
> >the structural insecurities that are present in PKIX (and, to a lesser but
> >still quite significant extent, DNSSEC).
> >
> >This year, our thinking solidified around an idea for using append-only
> >data
> >structures to store keys.  We are publishing this proposal for the first
> >time
> >today:
> >
> >https://eff.org/sovereign-keys
> >
> >On that page you can find links to a high level overview and detailed
> >design
> >docs.  The design has a number of nice features, including very strong
> >resistance to server impersonation attacks and automatic failover to
> >secure
> >routing methods (ideally, Tor hidden services) when server impersonation
> >occurrs.
> >
> >It should be read as a long-term, moderately ambitious proposal.  Even if
> >the
> >Internet community likes this design or something similar, less systematic
> >solutions (various forms of pinning, Perspectives/Convergence, the
> >Decentralized SSL Observatory) will certainly remain necessary and
> >important
> >for at least a number of years.
> >
> >--
> >Peter Eckersley                            pde@eff.org
> >Technology Projects Director      Tel  +1 415 436 9333 x131
> >Electronic Frontier Foundation    Fax  +1 415 436 9993
> >
> >
> >
> >_______________________________________________
> >pkix mailing list
> >pkix@ietf.org
> >https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>



-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

--f46d0447f31636fb8a04b3a93715
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Agreed that 80% of the benefit without the practical difficulties is much b=
etter.<div><br></div><div>What happens in Sovereign keys when someone makes=
 a mistake and either loses their key or discloses it? &#39;Be careful&#39;=
 is not an acceptable answer when non-specialized entities are meant to do =
this.<br>
<br><br>Where I think the security world has gone wrong over the past few d=
ecades is making access control the be all and end all of security and igno=
ring=A0accountability=A0as a tool.</div><div><br></div><div>An access contr=
ol scheme cannot have more than 0% false positives which means that you hav=
e to tolerate a much higher degree of false negatives than you would like. =
Consider the Wikileaks situation where a low level clerk had access to half=
 a million cables because he might have a plausible need to look at any one=
 of them.=A0</div>
<div><br><br>Accountability does not block the bad action but combined with=
 access control you can block what you know must never happen while still p=
lacing limits on what is allowed.</div><div><br></div><div>the useful contr=
ibution in sovereign keys seems to me to be the idea of having an unalterab=
le audit log. Which is an opportunity to remind people once again that the =
Harber and Stornetta catenate cert patent has expired and now would be a go=
od time to do something interesting there.</div>
<div><br></div><div>A general purpose notary protocol would have much wide =
application.</div><div><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Mon, Nov 28, 2=
011 at 8:49 AM, Miller, Timothy J. <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:=
tmiller@mitre.org">tmiller@mitre.org</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">I really don&#39;t see a heck of a lot of c=
onceptual difference between this<br>
proposal and several current and past proposals. =A0Functionally this is<br=
>
just pushing the name binding back to a separate =A0level from the CA, only=
<br>
now I need to trust both the CA and the Registrar to run things correctly.<=
br>
<br>
<br>
Personally I think client-side incorporation of continuity-of-use data<br>
into trust management--either individually or supported by independent<br>
inspection points (see Perspectives, Convergence, or even Google&#39;s<br>
Certificate Catalog,<br>
<a href=3D"http://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.com/2011/04/improving-ssl-c=
ertificate-
security.html" target=3D"_blank">http://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.com/2=
011/04/improving-ssl-certificate-<br>
security.html</a>)--probably nets 80% of the benefit and will be much easie=
r<br>
to accomplish in the decentralized Internet. =A0Yes, there =A0are observed<=
br>
issues with current practices at server-side (ref. the SK proposal<br>
Appendix A.3 and the cited blog from Andy Steingruebl), but if a<br>
continuity-type model gains traction operational practice *will* change<br>
and those false positives resolve themselves.<br>
<br>
Finally this statement bugs me:<br>
<br>
&quot;&quot;&quot;<br>
Generalising from the above problem, Perspectives and Convergence rely on<b=
r>
parties other than the domain holder to characterise what state the<br>
domain&#39;s operational deployment /should/ be in<br>
&quot;&quot;&quot;<br>
<br>
<br>
This ignores (common?) situation where site owner and domain owner can be<b=
r>
different entities.<br>
<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
-- T<br>
</font></span><div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5"><br>
On 11/21/11 6:25 PM, &quot;=3DJeffH&quot; &lt;Jeff.Hodges@KingsMountain.com=
&gt; wrote:<br>
<br>
&gt;Of possible interest...<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;Subject: [SSL Observatory] Sovereign Keys: an EFF proposal for more sec=
ure<br>
&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0 TLS authentication<br>
&gt;From: Peter Eckersley &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pde@eff.org">pde@eff.org</a=
>&gt;<br>
&gt;Date: Fri, 18 Nov 2011 14:31:42 -0800<br>
&gt;To: <a href=3D"mailto:observatory@eff.org">observatory@eff.org</a><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;For quite a while at EFF, we&#39;ve been pondering different possible<b=
r>
&gt;solutions to<br>
&gt;the structural insecurities that are present in PKIX (and, to a lesser =
but<br>
&gt;still quite significant extent, DNSSEC).<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;This year, our thinking solidified around an idea for using append-only=
<br>
&gt;data<br>
&gt;structures to store keys. =A0We are publishing this proposal for the fi=
rst<br>
&gt;time<br>
&gt;today:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<a href=3D"https://eff.org/sovereign-keys" target=3D"_blank">https://ef=
f.org/sovereign-keys</a><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;On that page you can find links to a high level overview and detailed<b=
r>
&gt;design<br>
&gt;docs. =A0The design has a number of nice features, including very stron=
g<br>
&gt;resistance to server impersonation attacks and automatic failover to<br=
>
&gt;secure<br>
&gt;routing methods (ideally, Tor hidden services) when server impersonatio=
n<br>
&gt;occurrs.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;It should be read as a long-term, moderately ambitious proposal. =A0Eve=
n if<br>
&gt;the<br>
&gt;Internet community likes this design or something similar, less systema=
tic<br>
&gt;solutions (various forms of pinning, Perspectives/Convergence, the<br>
&gt;Decentralized SSL Observatory) will certainly remain necessary and<br>
&gt;important<br>
&gt;for at least a number of years.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;--<br>
&gt;Peter Eckersley =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=
<a href=3D"mailto:pde@eff.org">pde@eff.org</a><br>
&gt;Technology Projects Director =A0 =A0 =A0Tel =A0<a href=3D"tel:%2B1%2041=
5%20436%209333%20x131" value=3D"+14154369333">+1 415 436 9333 x131</a><br>
&gt;Electronic Frontier Foundation =A0 =A0Fax =A0<a href=3D"tel:%2B1%20415%=
20436%209993" value=3D"+14154369993">+1 415 436 9993</a><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;_______________________________________________<br>
&gt;pkix mailing list<br>
&gt;<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt;<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix" target=3D"_blank=
">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix</a><br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
pkix mailing list<br>
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<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br>=
Website: <a href=3D"http://hallambaker.com/">http://hallambaker.com/</a><br=
><br>
</div>

--f46d0447f31636fb8a04b3a93715--

From agl@google.com  Fri Dec  9 06:16:16 2011
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On Fri, Dec 9, 2011 at 9:01 AM, Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com> wrote:
> A general purpose notary protocol would have much wide application.

And, although it is probably superfluous, with a lead-in like that I
could hardly not mention Certificate Transparency, even in an inchoate
state: http://www.imperialviolet.org/2011/11/29/certtransparency.html


Cheers

AGL

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From: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
To: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>, Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] fyi: Sovereign Keys: an EFF proposal for more secure TLS authentication
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On 12/9/11 8:16 AM, "Adam Langley" <agl@google.com> wrote:

>And, although it is probably superfluous, with a lead-in like that I
>could hardly not mention Certificate Transparency, even in an inchoate
>state: http://www.imperialviolet.org/2011/11/29/certtransparency.html

You may want to rethink the approach, or at least your arguments for it.

Your 10-second summary is functionally equivalent to a second CA that
signs atop certificates issued by other CAs.  We can pursue this course ad
infinitum and the same problems exist at all levels, so I really don't see
the point.

Additionally, while your definition of side-channels is fine as it stands,
you ignore approaches like OCSP stapling which similarly eliminate
side-channels under your definition.  So criticizing current practice for
requiring side-channels (as you define them) is inappropriate.

-- T


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On Fri, Dec 9, 2011 at 2:52 PM, Miller, Timothy J. <tmiller@mitre.org> wrot=
e:
> On 12/9/11 8:16 AM, "Adam Langley" <agl@google.com> wrote:
>
>>And, although it is probably superfluous, with a lead-in like that I
>>could hardly not mention Certificate Transparency, even in an inchoate
>>state: http://www.imperialviolet.org/2011/11/29/certtransparency.html
>
> You may want to rethink the approach, or at least your arguments for it.
>
> Your 10-second summary is functionally equivalent to a second CA that
> signs atop certificates issued by other CAs. =A0We can pursue this course=
 ad
> infinitum and the same problems exist at all levels, so I really don't se=
e
> the point.

Then you need to read the full paper, because it is _not_ equivalent
to a second CA.

> Additionally, while your definition of side-channels is fine as it stands=
,
> you ignore approaches like OCSP stapling which similarly eliminate
> side-channels under your definition. =A0So criticizing current practice f=
or
> requiring side-channels (as you define them) is inappropriate.
>
> -- T
>
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix

From agl@google.com  Fri Dec  9 07:50:04 2011
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On Fri, Dec 9, 2011 at 9:52 AM, Miller, Timothy J. <tmiller@mitre.org> wrot=
e:
> Your 10-second summary is functionally equivalent to a second CA that
> signs atop certificates issued by other CAs. =C2=A0We can pursue this cou=
rse ad
> infinitum and the same problems exist at all levels, so I really don't se=
e
> the point.

As Ben says, it's very different from being another CA because it's
doing a different job. A CA attests to a relationship between an
identity and a public key, while a log is simply a notary, and a
notary can be audited by its clients to ensure that it doesn't sign
non-public information. Being a log is much easier than being a CA and
we can achieve stronger properties of logs.

> Additionally, while your definition of side-channels is fine as it stands=
,
> you ignore approaches like OCSP stapling which similarly eliminate
> side-channels under your definition.

OCSP stapling does not count as a side-channel under my definition.
OCSP stapling (suitably enhanced with the ability to staple for
several certificates and then required by clients) would be a great
way to solve the revocation problem. But CT doesn't aim to solve the
revocation problem and, unlike requiring OCSP stapling from all sites,
I believe that CT can reasonably be deployed.


Cheers

AGL

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On Fri, Dec 9, 2011 at 2:52 PM, Miller, Timothy J. <tmiller@mitre.org> wrot=
e:
> On 12/9/11 8:16 AM, "Adam Langley" <agl@google.com> wrote:
>
>>And, although it is probably superfluous, with a lead-in like that I
>>could hardly not mention Certificate Transparency, even in an inchoate
>>state: http://www.imperialviolet.org/2011/11/29/certtransparency.html
>
> You may want to rethink the approach, or at least your arguments for it.
>
> Your 10-second summary is functionally equivalent to a second CA that
> signs atop certificates issued by other CAs. =A0We can pursue this course=
 ad
> infinitum and the same problems exist at all levels, so I really don't se=
e
> the point.

Then you need to read the full paper, because it is _not_ equivalent
to a second CA.

> Additionally, while your definition of side-channels is fine as it stands=
,
> you ignore approaches like OCSP stapling which similarly eliminate
> side-channels under your definition. =A0So criticizing current practice f=
or
> requiring side-channels (as you define them) is inappropriate.
>
> -- T
>
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix

From tmiller@mitre.org  Fri Dec  9 09:32:17 2011
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From: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
To: Ben Laurie <ben@links.org>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] fyi: Sovereign Keys: an EFF proposal for more secure TLS authentication
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Subject: Re: [pkix] fyi: Sovereign Keys: an EFF proposal for more secure TLS authentication
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On 12/9/11 9:30 AM, "Ben Laurie" <ben@links.org> wrote:

>Then you need to read the full paper, because it is _not_ equivalent
>to a second CA.

I have, and I said *functionally* equivalent, not *operationally*
equivalent.

Look at it this way:  The CA tells a user "I say this name is bound to
this key."  Your notary basically says "Yeah, what he said."  The words
are different but the message is the same.

Note that the only way you can support detection of a colluding notary is
to use what you've defined as a side channel.  The client needs to check
with the notary's public list to show that a server-provided proof set
isn't valid--a fact you recognize in the paper but not on the summary.
This is part of the "reconsider your arguments" comment.

Also, you missed a fraud case in your discussion.  What happens if a CA
fraudulently issues a cert *and* registers it with a non-colluding notary?
 The notary has no interaction with the entity the cert identifies, and
can only take the CA's word for it. So the cert goes on the viewable list,
the proof set goes to the fraudulent user, and the user gets spoofed.

Finally, IMHO you place undue faith in the ability to "untrust" a notary;
if the notary list comes from the browser makers--who by your own argument
have a *proven* inability to manage roots of trust--then why should the
notary list supplied and updated by the same source be somehow more
trustworthy?

On a side note, these aren't personal comments.  You placed the work in
the public sphere in what appears to be a solicitation for comments and
criticism.  I'm not particularly invested other than just trying to help
improve the work.

-- T


From benlaurie@gmail.com  Fri Dec  9 09:47:51 2011
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Subject: Re: [pkix] fyi: Sovereign Keys: an EFF proposal for more secure TLS authentication
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On Fri, Dec 9, 2011 at 5:32 PM, Miller, Timothy J. <tmiller@mitre.org> wrot=
e:
> On 12/9/11 9:30 AM, "Ben Laurie" <ben@links.org> wrote:
>
>>Then you need to read the full paper, because it is _not_ equivalent
>>to a second CA.
>
> I have, and I said *functionally* equivalent, not *operationally*
> equivalent.
>
> Look at it this way: =A0The CA tells a user "I say this name is bound to
> this key." =A0Your notary basically says "Yeah, what he said." =A0The wor=
ds
> are different but the message is the same.
>
> Note that the only way you can support detection of a colluding notary is
> to use what you've defined as a side channel. =A0The client needs to chec=
k
> with the notary's public list to show that a server-provided proof set
> isn't valid--a fact you recognize in the paper but not on the summary.

The summary says "clients check these proofs".

> This is part of the "reconsider your arguments" comment.
>
> Also, you missed a fraud case in your discussion. =A0What happens if a CA
> fraudulently issues a cert *and* registers it with a non-colluding notary=
?

The legitimate owner notices and takes action.

>=A0The notary has no interaction with the entity the cert identifies, and
> can only take the CA's word for it. So the cert goes on the viewable list=
,
> the proof set goes to the fraudulent user, and the user gets spoofed.

Correct. However, this fact is detected.

>
> Finally, IMHO you place undue faith in the ability to "untrust" a notary;
> if the notary list comes from the browser makers--who by your own argumen=
t
> have a *proven* inability to manage roots of trust--then why should the
> notary list supplied and updated by the same source be somehow more
> trustworthy?

Because their current inability is thrust upon them, not caused by
incompetence or unreliability.

> On a side note, these aren't personal comments. =A0You placed the work in
> the public sphere in what appears to be a solicitation for comments and
> criticism. =A0I'm not particularly invested other than just trying to hel=
p
> improve the work.

Indeed, we are happy to receive comments, thankyou for your interest.

From agl@google.com  Fri Dec  9 09:57:24 2011
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Cc: IETF PKIX WG <pkix@ietf.org>, Ben Laurie <ben@links.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] fyi: Sovereign Keys: an EFF proposal for more secure TLS authentication
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On Fri, Dec 9, 2011 at 12:32 PM, Miller, Timothy J. <tmiller@mitre.org> wro=
te:
> Look at it this way: =C2=A0The CA tells a user "I say this name is bound =
to
> this key." =C2=A0Your notary basically says "Yeah, what he said." =C2=A0T=
he words
> are different but the message is the same.

Rather than "what he said", we intend the log to assert "this
statement has been published".

That doesn't stop a user from being compromised, as you point out. But
it means that it's possible to answer the question: "what's the
current set of valid certificates for example.com"? Only example.com
can really decide whether a certificate for example.com is correct or
not and, once certificates are public, we envision services that let
them sign up for updates. In the event of a problem, there's proof, in
the logs, of misissuance by a CA. Indeed, anyone can watch the logs
and, perhaps, notice that a small CA is suddenly issuing certificates
for sites that one wouldn't expect them to.

I don't claim that this is perfection, but I'm suggesting that it's an
improvement, and one that we can reasonably deploy.

> Note that the only way you can support detection of a colluding notary is
> to use what you've defined as a side channel. =C2=A0The client needs to c=
heck
> with the notary's public list to show that a server-provided proof set
> isn't valid--a fact you recognize in the paper but not on the summary.
> This is part of the "reconsider your arguments" comment.

That's probably the result of sloppy wording by myself. The problem is
with blocking side-channels: requests to third-parties that are
required before a connection can be established. OCSP lookups should
fall into this category but, due to practical concerns, common
browsers don't actually block, thus mostly eliminating the
effectiveness of revocation checking.

We're trying not to repeat that mistake. However, non-blocking
side-channels in general are essential: they're how we push updates
for one and without any updates you quickly end up with unpatched
vulnerabilities. An attacker who can partition a victim from the
Internet for an unbounded amount of time can win.

> Finally, IMHO you place undue faith in the ability to "untrust" a notary;
> if the notary list comes from the browser makers--who by your own argumen=
t
> have a *proven* inability to manage roots of trust--then why should the
> notary list supplied and updated by the same source be somehow more
> trustworthy?

The correct working of notaries can be established much more easily
because they're asserting something that's easy to check. You're
absolutely correct that we need a plan in place to be able to revoke
and replace a log without incurring costs similar to revoking a CA.
The exact form of that remains to be seen but it likely involves
requiring only n of m trusted signatures.


Cheers

AGL

From tmiller@mitre.org  Fri Dec  9 13:08:34 2011
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From: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
To: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] fyi: Sovereign Keys: an EFF proposal for more secure TLS authentication
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On 12/9/11 11:57 AM, "Adam Langley" <agl@google.com> wrote:

>That doesn't stop a user from being compromised, as you point out. But
>it means that it's possible to answer the question: "what's the
>current set of valid certificates for example.com"?

Actually, not so much.  Since the selection of notaries is potentially
random, an inspection of some m of n notaries only yields a probability
you have to interpret, not an actual answer.  Further, this confidence
score is proportional to the cardinality of the set of notaries, and since
the set of notaries is unbounded this is going to be a problem.

You can require example.com to specify which notaries are authorized to
vouchsafe for example.com certificates, but now you have the problem of
communicating this to the user.  You can't do it in-band because the
attacker will simply supply his own list of colluding (or duped) notaries.
 This is almost exactly the problem you were trying to solve, but removed
to a different level.

>I don't claim that this is perfection, but I'm suggesting that it's an
>improvement, and one that we can reasonably deploy.

Overall I still think it's easier to have the notary (keeping in mind that
the user can be his own notary) observe what example.com publishes by
simply observing example.com directly, then communicate this to the user.
There are fewer moving parts, the code will be simpler, and the assurance
is nearly the same.

-- T


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Subject: Re: [pkix] fyi: Sovereign Keys: an EFF proposal for more secure TLS authentication
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On Fri, Dec 9, 2011 at 4:08 PM, Miller, Timothy J. <tmiller@mitre.org> wrot=
e:
> Actually, not so much. =C2=A0Since the selection of notaries is potential=
ly
> random

No it's not. The set of notaries is globally known. See the "It's easy
on the server operator" section of
http://www.imperialviolet.org/2011/11/29/certtransparency.html or the
PDF for more details.

> Overall I still think it's easier to have the notary (keeping in mind tha=
t
> the user can be his own notary) observe what example.com publishes by
> simply observing example.com directly, then communicate this to the user.
> There are fewer moving parts, the code will be simpler, and the assurance
> is nearly the same.

See "Why not Convergence":
http://www.imperialviolet.org/2011/09/07/convergence.html


Cheers

AGL

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From: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
To: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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On 12/9/11 3:21 PM, "Adam Langley" <agl@google.com> wrote:

>On Fri, Dec 9, 2011 at 4:08 PM, Miller, Timothy J. <tmiller@mitre.org>
>wrote:
>> Actually, not so much.  Since the selection of notaries is potentially
>> random
>
>No it's not. The set of notaries is globally known. See the "It's easy
>on the server operator" section of
>http://www.imperialviolet.org/2011/11/29/certtransparency.html or the
>PDF for more details.

I think you mistake my meaning.  Is there a canonical list of notaries,
who maintains this list, and how do I trust that entity?  If there is no
such list, how does the user know which notaries to inspect when he
chooses to inspect them in order to verify suspect notary authenticators?
If the user is supplied with the notary or notaries in-band, how does the
user know that the notary is not in collusion with (or duped by) the site
to which he connects?  If the realization of collusion is *after the
compromise event* how is this better than current practice?

>> Overall I still think it's easier to have the notary (keeping in mind
>>that
>> the user can be his own notary) observe what example.com publishes by
>> simply observing example.com directly, then communicate this to the
>>user.
>> There are fewer moving parts, the code will be simpler, and the
>>assurance
>> is nearly the same.
>
>See "Why not Convergence":
>http://www.imperialviolet.org/2011/09/07/convergence.html

You omit the case where the user is his own trust notary (e.g. Certificate
Patrol).  This resolves the internal server issue, and potentially the
captive portal.  This case reduces the sharing of situational awareness
among otherwise non-communicating users, but that doesn't impact the
routine use case where a user has a relationship with a site the already
exists *at the time the attack is executed*.

I'm not looking for perfect here, I'm looking for good enough.  You've put
together a system with a number of new moving parts, requires an entirely
new infrastructure, a new trust model, an new behavior model, and at first
analysis doesn't seem like it offers a really compelling advantage.

-- T




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On Fri, Dec 9, 2011 at 4:38 PM, Miller, Timothy J. <tmiller@mitre.org> wrote:
> Is there a canonical list of notaries,

Yes. Since server operators include the audit proof in their TLS
reply, the set of logs is known.

> who maintains this list, and how do I trust that entity?

Browsers maintain this list in the same fashion as root CAs. You trust
your browser because you have to - it mediates everything you do on
the web. The browsers can reasonably maintain such a list because the
job of a log is much easier than a CA, therefore misbehaviour can be
detected and is clearly a failure. And because it will be possible to
revoke and replace a log, as opposed to a large CA.

> If the realization of collusion is *after the compromise event* how is this better than current practice?

Because right now our detection is terrible. Having a global view of
all certificates would be a huge improvement.

> You omit the case where the user is his own trust notary (e.g. Certificate
> Patrol).

Certificate Patrol is great for people like us. But it's terrible for
the average user, whom we cannot reasonably ask to evaluate
certificates or to even understand what they are.


Cheers

AGL

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To: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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On 12/9/11 4:11 PM, "Adam Langley" <agl@google.com> wrote:

>On Fri, Dec 9, 2011 at 4:38 PM, Miller, Timothy J. <tmiller@mitre.org>
>wrote:
>> Is there a canonical list of notaries,
>
>Yes. Since server operators include the audit proof in their TLS
>reply, the set of logs is known.

That's not quite what I was asking.  How does the browser know that the
list of notaries provided with the proof are the "correct" notaries for
the site?  This question should be rhetorical, because given only the
information available in-band the answer is obviously "it doesn't."  The
browser must implicitly trust that the proofs come from the set of
notaries chosen by the site, not the set of notaries chosen by the
attacker. =20

This is the exact same problem the browser currently has when deciding
whether a fraudulently obtained cert from CA X presented by an attacker is
"correct" (instead of the properly obtained cert from CA A).

>Browsers maintain this list in the same fashion as root CAs. You trust
>your browser because you have to - it mediates everything you do on
>the web. The browsers can reasonably maintain such a list because the
>job of a log is much easier than a CA, therefore misbehaviour can be
>detected and is clearly a failure. And because it will be possible to
>revoke and replace a log, as opposed to a large CA.

You keep going on about how it's easier for a browser because it's easier
to be a notary than a CA, but there really is no such connection.  The
maintenance of a trust list on the browser side of this equation is no
different whether that trust list is a list of CAs or a list of notaries.

It may be true that it's easier to be a notary under your scheme than a CA
under X.509, but really, I'm not sure I see much of a difference.  This
isn't an indictment of your scheme so much as a lamentation of the corners
being cut in current X.509 CA practice.  :)

>>If the realization of collusion is *after the compromise event* how is
>>this better than current practice?
>
>Because right now our detection is terrible. Having a global view of
>all certificates would be a huge improvement.

Now we arrive at the kernel of your concept.  You=B9ve improved detection,
but only detection after the fact.  I posit that the average user wants
detection before the fact.  My experience is users really want assurance
that their personal information is not misused, and what providers really
want assurance that customers are not misusing others' personal
information.  Recall the modified CIA triangle:  Confidentiality,
Integrity, and Authenticity.  This is a core tenet of information
assurance.

Simply put, detection after the fact is one instant too late.

>Certificate Patrol is great for people like us. But it's terrible for
>the average user, whom we cannot reasonably ask to evaluate
>certificates or to even understand what they are.

You misunderstand what Certificate Patrol means to the user.  Certificate
Patrol tells the user "This is the site you've connected to in the past,
which you trusted previously."  This is what the user really wants to
know.  The fact Certificate Patrol uses site certificates to identify
sites is relevant to the function but not relevant to the user interface.

Further, in re: usability: I'm sorry, but at least some research on this
specific topic (and admittedly there isn't much) directly contradicts you.
 E.g., I refer you to:

Simson Garfinkle. "Johnny 2: A User Test of Key Continuity Management with
S/MIME and Outlook Express". Talk or presentation,  9, September, 2005.


-- T


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>
>That's not quite what I was asking.  How does the browser know that the
>list of notaries provided with the proof are the "correct" notaries for
>the site?  

This sort of gets at a different question.  Why does a browser need to
always operate with a broad trust posture?  Folks know when they are
banking and could easily indicate that intent to the browser, without
needing to have the ability to authenticate their favorite shoe shop,
doctor, etc. during that session.  This selection could be implemented as
a selection of notary (or a temporary reduction of the TA store, or a
temporary usage of name constraints, etc.).  



From tmiller@mitre.org  Mon Dec 12 05:54:31 2011
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From: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
To: Carl Wallace <carl@redhoundsoftware.com>, Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] fyi: Sovereign Keys: an EFF proposal for more secure TLS authentication
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Subject: Re: [pkix] fyi: Sovereign Keys: an EFF proposal for more secure TLS authentication
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On 12/12/11 7:36 AM, "Carl Wallace" <carl@redhoundsoftware.com> wrote:

>>That's not quite what I was asking.  How does the browser know that the
>>list of notaries provided with the proof are the "correct" notaries for
>>the site? =20
>
>This sort of gets at a different question.  Why does a browser need to
>always operate with a broad trust posture?  Folks know when they are
>banking and could easily indicate that intent to the browser, without
>needing to have the ability to authenticate their favorite shoe shop,
>doctor, etc. during that session.  This selection could be implemented as
>a selection of notary (or a temporary reduction of the TA store, or a
>temporary usage of name constraints, etc.).

Browsers operate with a broad trust posture because trust anchor choice is
in the hands of the site, not in the hands of the user.  E.g., I have no
way to enforce my preference for, say, Verisign over Entrust when
connecting to my bank's web server.

Similarly with notaries under the proffered scheme; the bank chooses the
notaries it wants to work with and then tells me.  I have no say in that
matter, and have to trust the list offered to my browser actually
represents the intention of the real corporate entity that owns the site.

If you want to modify the scheme where I tell the bank I only trust
notaries X, Y, and Z, then I have a say in the decision.  But the result
of this would be requiring the bank to register with *all* notaries, since
there may very well be no common subset of acceptable notaries among all
the bank's patrons.  You might try to do real-time registration, but I
have no ideas on how you'd make that work within the timeliness required
by the connection protocol and still maintain some semblance of trust.

-- T


From carl@redhoundsoftware.com  Mon Dec 12 06:40:01 2011
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From: Carl Wallace <carl@redhoundsoftware.com>
To: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
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On 12/12/11 8:54 AM, "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org> wrote:

>On 12/12/11 7:36 AM, "Carl Wallace" <carl@redhoundsoftware.com> wrote:
>
>>>That's not quite what I was asking.  How does the browser know that the
>>>list of notaries provided with the proof are the "correct" notaries for
>>>the site?  
>>
>>This sort of gets at a different question.  Why does a browser need to
>>always operate with a broad trust posture?  Folks know when they are
>>banking and could easily indicate that intent to the browser, without
>>needing to have the ability to authenticate their favorite shoe shop,
>>doctor, etc. during that session.  This selection could be implemented as
>>a selection of notary (or a temporary reduction of the TA store, or a
>>temporary usage of name constraints, etc.).
>
>Browsers operate with a broad trust posture because trust anchor choice is
>in the hands of the site, not in the hands of the user.  E.g., I have no
>way to enforce my preference for, say, Verisign over Entrust when
>connecting to my bank's web server.

I understand why a broad posture is required, just not why it must always
be used (I think you missed the word always above).  There was no
suggestion that a preference be expressed in terms of favoring one
certificate mill over another.  A browser mode similar to site specific
browsing (with a corresponding narrowing of trust) is closer to what I was
thinking about than you suggestions below.

>
>Similarly with notaries under the proffered scheme; the bank chooses the
>notaries it wants to work with and then tells me.  I have no say in that
>matter, and have to trust the list offered to my browser actually
>represents the intention of the real corporate entity that owns the site.
>
>If you want to modify the scheme where I tell the bank I only trust
>notaries X, Y, and Z, then I have a say in the decision.  But the result
>of this would be requiring the bank to register with *all* notaries, since
>there may very well be no common subset of acceptable notaries among all
>the bank's patrons.  You might try to do real-time registration, but I
>have no ideas on how you'd make that work within the timeliness required
>by the connection protocol and still maintain some semblance of trust.
>
>-- T
>



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Subject: Re: [pkix] fyi: Sovereign Keys: an EFF proposal for more secure TLS authentication
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On Mon, Dec 12, 2011 at 8:21 AM, Miller, Timothy J. <tmiller@mitre.org> wro=
te:
> That's not quite what I was asking. =C2=A0How does the browser know that =
the
> list of notaries provided with the proof are the "correct" notaries for
> the site?

There isn't a different set of notaries for each site. The browser
knows and trusts a set of notaries. An attacker can choose the
notaries that it gets to sign a certificate and, if it gets a quorum
of notaries, then it has broken the system.

> Now we arrive at the kernel of your concept. =C2=A0You=C2=B9ve improved d=
etection,
> but only detection after the fact. =C2=A0I posit that the average user wa=
nts
> detection before the fact.

Yes, I agree. But we're not proposing such a scheme because we don't
want to do better, but because we don't realistically think that we
can achieve anything stronger.

We're claiming that this is a real improvement on the status quo. A
counter argument may be to suggest that limited resources would be
better spent elsewhere. That means showing that CT is better than all
the alternatives, which we believe that it is. You have a specific
example of a possible, better path below...

> Further, in re: usability: I'm sorry, but at least some research on this
> specific topic (and admittedly there isn't much) directly contradicts you=
.
> =C2=A0E.g., I refer you to:
>
> Simson Garfinkle. "Johnny 2: A User Test of Key Continuity Management wit=
h
> S/MIME and Outlook Express". Talk or presentation, =C2=A09, September, 20=
05.

I'm always happy to see actual UI research :) But it's very unclear if
KCM/TOFU translates to the web.

Everything's fine until a key changes, and keys certainly change in
the real world. In personal interactions, there are always
possibilities to query to key change. Indeed, folks in the study tried
a form of this, even though they couldn't phone/talk due to the
constraints of the study: "Some settled on a form of Email Based
Identi=EF=AC=81cation and Authentication[2]: they sent an email message to =
the
attacker=E2=80=99s apparent campaign address to see if the attacker could r=
ead
and reply to such messages."

But KCM on the web means that we end up asking users the question:
"The key for www.bankofamerica.com has changed. Trust yes/no?". We
have numbers from opt-in Chrome users which suggests that people click
through our big, red interstitials at a very high rate. But let's
assume that they phone Bank of America and manage to get confirmation
of a fingerprint. (That would be a pretty stunning achievement in
itself!)

But websites are complex, what happens when a subresource fails and we
ask the user: "The key for tc50.akacdn.com has changed..."?


Cheers

AGL


Cheers

AGL

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From koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com  Mon Dec 12 22:13:30 2011
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From: koichi sugimoto <koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.co.jp>
To: pkix@ietf.org
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Subject: [pkix] Interoparability problem between RFC 5280 and EDIFACT
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Dir Sirs,

We have now been facing a problem relating the length of serial number
in X.509 certificate.
If the serial number is more than or equal to 18 octets, some
application cannot work correctly.
It seems to be caused by EDIFACT standard.

Reference:
http://www.gefeg.com/jswg/v4/data/v4-9735-5.pdf

RFC 5280 permits the length of the certificate serial number to be up
to 20 octets.
For example, hexadecimal representation
'11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 aa bb cc dd ee ff 00 11 22 33 44'
must be acceptable.

RFC 5280 on page 18:
>   Given the uniqueness requirements above, serial numbers can be
>   expected to contain long integers.  Certificate users MUST be able to
>   handle serialNumber values up to 20 octets.  Conforming CAs MUST NOT
>   use serialNumber values longer than 20 octets.

On the other hand, EDIFACT specifies the length of the 'CERTIFICATE  REFERENCE'
must be less than or equal to 35 characters.
In this case,
'11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 aa bb cc dd ee ff 00 11 22'
cannot be accptable to EDIFACT.

I'm not sure about implementation of EDIFACT, therefore, this kind of
simple hexadecimal
representation may not be applied to.


Have you faced similar problem?
As for RFC 5280, how was the length specified?


Regards,
Koichi Sugimoto.

From pgut001@login01.cs.auckland.ac.nz  Mon Dec 12 23:40:15 2011
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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.co.jp, pkix@ietf.org,
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Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2011 20:40:11 +1300
Subject: Re: [pkix] Interoparability problem between RFC 5280 and EDIFACT
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koichi sugimoto <koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.co.jp> writes:

>On the other hand, EDIFACT specifies the length of the 'CERTIFICATE  REFERENCE'
>must be less than or equal to 35 characters.
>In this case,
>'11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 aa bb cc dd ee ff 00 11 22'
>cannot be accptable to EDIFACT.

That spec was written with EDIFACT certificates in mind; the only thing they 
have in common with X.509 is that both use the word "certificates".  So you 
will run into problems because you're using the fields to convey information 
that they were never designed to convey.  The solution is to apply whatever 
kludge works:

- Convince the CA to user shorter serial numbers (given your email address,
  I'm assuming your organisation is the CA, so you'd just have to change your
  software to use shorter serial numbers).
- Have your app recognise truncated forms of the reference string.
- Stuff additional bits of the value into other, optional fields.
- Change the encoding to allow a higher encoding density.
- ...

Peter.

From koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com  Tue Dec 13 01:23:27 2011
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Interoparability problem between RFC 5280 and EDIFACT
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Hello Peter,

You mean the application has a bug?
If the application is compliant to RFC 5280, then, the application
must be able to handle 20 octets.
Therefore, the encoding function that generates the 'CERTIFICATE
REFERENCE' should convert
5 octets to less than 9 charcters.
For example, base64 is one of the most familiar encoding, that
converts 3 octets to 4 characters.
It meets the requirement?

Regards,
Koichi Sugimoto.

2011/12/13 Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>:
> koichi sugimoto <koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.co.jp> writes:
>
>>On the other hand, EDIFACT specifies the length of the 'CERTIFICATE =A0RE=
FERENCE'
>>must be less than or equal to 35 characters.
>>In this case,
>>'11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 aa bb cc dd ee ff 00 11 22'
>>cannot be accptable to EDIFACT.
>
> That spec was written with EDIFACT certificates in mind; the only thing t=
hey
> have in common with X.509 is that both use the word "certificates". =A0So=
 you
> will run into problems because you're using the fields to convey informat=
ion
> that they were never designed to convey. =A0The solution is to apply what=
ever
> kludge works:
>
> - Convince the CA to user shorter serial numbers (given your email addres=
s,
> =A0I'm assuming your organisation is the CA, so you'd just have to change=
 your
> =A0software to use shorter serial numbers).
> - Have your app recognise truncated forms of the reference string.
> - Stuff additional bits of the value into other, optional fields.
> - Change the encoding to allow a higher encoding density.
> - ...
>
> Peter.

From rob.stradling@comodo.com  Tue Dec 13 01:56:54 2011
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On Friday 09 Dec 2011 15:49:56 Adam Langley wrote:
> On Fri, Dec 9, 2011 at 9:52 AM, Miller, Timothy J. <tmiller@mitre.org> 
wrote:
<snip>
> > Additionally, while your definition of side-channels is fine as it
> > stands, you ignore approaches like OCSP stapling which similarly
> > eliminate side-channels under your definition.
> 
> OCSP stapling does not count as a side-channel under my definition.
> OCSP stapling (suitably enhanced with the ability to staple for
> several certificates and then required by clients) would be a great
> way to solve the revocation problem. But CT doesn't aim to solve the
> revocation problem and, unlike requiring OCSP stapling from all sites,
> I believe that CT can reasonably be deployed.

Adam, please explain how you reached this conclusion.

If "requiring OCSP stapling from all sites" cannot reasonably be deployed, 
then surely we cannot expect ubiquitous support for _any_ new TLS extension?

If I understand your paper correctly, _every_ TLS server would ultimately be 
required to send an audit proof during each (initial) TLS handshake.  If we 
cannot expect TLS extensions to be supported ubiquitously, then we cannot rely 
on them for CT.

This leaves us with the possibility of sending audit proofs using an "...extra 
certificate, containing the Merkle signature, in the certificate chain presented 
by the server..."
Earlier this year I suggested a similar "extra certificate" idea [1], although 
my intended payload was multiple OCSP Responses rather than an audit proof.  I 
found that whilst most common browsers simply discarded the extra certificate, 
it did cause problems in a few cases.  (You might like to tell Ben that 
OpenSSL was one of those cases ;-) ).
I "solved" a few of the problems by violating the TLS RFC's rule that "Each 
following certificate must directly certify the one preceding it", but I 
couldn't get either of these approaches to work with old versions of Android.

So when you say that "most existing verification code will ignore it", you are 
correct.  However, I concluded that "most" was not good enough.

[1] 
https://groups.google.com/group/mozilla.dev.security.policy/browse_thread/thread/9b09a0d97ef8be52/28b508b67dfefc55?lnk=gst&q=another+different+idea#28b508b67dfefc55

[2]
https://groups.google.com/group/mozilla.dev.security.policy/browse_thread/thread/9b09a0d97ef8be52/091f20438aecaeb6?lnk=gst&q=another+stapling+hack+idea#091f20438aecaeb6

> Cheers
> 
> AGL
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix

Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online

From pgut001@login01.cs.auckland.ac.nz  Tue Dec 13 06:13:08 2011
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Interoparability problem between RFC 5280 and EDIFACT
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koichi sugimoto <koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.co.jp> writes:

>You mean the application has a bug?

No, it's working fine (or at least any bug(s) aren't in this area :-).

>If the application is compliant to RFC 5280, then, the application must be
>able to handle 20 octets. Therefore, the encoding function that generates the
>'CERTIFICATE REFERENCE' should convert 5 octets to less than 9 charcters.

Uhh, I thought the problem was that the hex-encoding was creating 40 bytes of
ASCII from 20 binary bytes, and that exceeded the 35-byte field length?

>For example, base64 is one of the most familiar encoding, that converts 3
>octets to 4 characters. It meets the requirement?

It should meet the requirements, depending on what the character-set
constraints are for the 'CERTIFICATE REFERENCE' field.  This is why I
suggested a range of options, if the other side rejects non-ASCII hex
characters then you can't use base64 and have to try one of the other tricks.

Peter.

From agl@google.com  Tue Dec 13 08:00:12 2011
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Subject: Re: [pkix] fyi: Sovereign Keys: an EFF proposal for more secure TLS authentication
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On Mon, Dec 12, 2011 at 12:30 PM, Miller, Timothy J. <tmiller@mitre.org> wr=
ote:
>=C2=A0Do you have a plan to reach a consensus on who and how to control
> this? =C2=A0It would seem a big gap to me.

Yes, the set of logs is known to the browser. The consensus needs to
be reached with other browser vendors. We haven't discussed it with
them yet.

> KCM's weak point has always been key introduction (key changeover is a
> special case of key introduction). =C2=A0The best solution is to go out o=
f band
> (e.g., SMS messages, snail mail notification, even robocalling), which wa=
s
> prohibited in Simson's study (though as you note the participants tried t=
o
> emulate OOB verification using in-band methods). =C2=A0IMHO this is a sol=
vable
> problem but not in the general case; it's up to each community of interes=
t
> to solve it with a method most appropriate to that community. =C2=A0For
> example, I'd allow my employer to send me an internal mail notification,
> my bank to send me an SMS alert, and my favorite forum to post a notice o=
n
> the landing page.
>
> Key changeover is trivially solvable using in-band transmittal of the
> successor key signed by the predecessor key, but we don't have a protocol
> or extension for that.
>
> The current interstitials fail in large part because they don't actually
> mean anything to the user. =C2=A0There are a lot of CAs out there and the=
re's
> simply no way to capture them all. =C2=A0As a result, virtually all users=
 are
> being mal-trained at some point or another, and carrying that training
> over to places where it's inappropriate.
>
> In re: subresources, that's an exposure of internals that probably
> shouldn't be happening anyway. =C2=A0User experience could drive correcti=
on
> over time.

I agree that interstitials are terrible, but I can't see that we can
avoid them in this situation. In the event that a key changes (and a
signature of the new key, by the old, isn't included), we have to do
something. A hard fail will simply encourage users to flush the
browser caches and start over.

We could request that the user contact the institution in question and
make them enter a suitably encoded fingerprint into the interstitial
in order to proceed. I don't know if normal people would actually cope
with that, but maybe they would.

But the problem with subdomains is a big one. Due to CDNs, same-origin
security etc, there are lots of subdomains in the average page. If a
page includes some Twitter Javascript, then the correct action is to
phone Twitter, but the user may have no relationship to Twitter and
the bank probably don't have a clue that Twitter is doing a key
rotation.

Also, if KCM involves storing fingerprints on disk then we have to
flush them on user request. But it's not too hard to get people to
flush browser caches when something goes wrong because sites don't
always get caching right and so folks have trained themselves to flush
caches in initial triage. As an attacker, causing "something goes
wrong" isn't too hard.

But, although I worry about usability problems with KCM on the web, I
would point out that these schemes are not mutually exclusive. There's
nothing stopping KCM atop of PKIX used as an introduction mechanism.
You may criticize us for being insufficiently aggressive, and maybe
that's fair, but we are openly only trying to get an incremental
improvement here.


Cheers

AGL

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Subject: Re: [pkix] fyi: Sovereign Keys: an EFF proposal for more secure TLS authentication
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On Tue, Dec 13, 2011 at 4:56 AM, Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com> w=
rote:
> If "requiring OCSP stapling from all sites" cannot reasonably be deployed=
,
> then surely we cannot expect ubiquitous support for _any_ new TLS extensi=
on?

I agree. In additional to the requirement to support a TLS extension,
OCSP stapling requires constant, fresh data making it even harder. But
I agree that requiring every server on the Internet to support a new
TLS extension isn't going to be viable for some time.

> Earlier this year I suggested a similar "extra certificate" idea [1], alt=
hough
> my intended payload was multiple OCSP Responses rather than an audit proo=
f. =C2=A0I
> found that whilst most common browsers simply discarded the extra certifi=
cate,
> it did cause problems in a few cases. =C2=A0(You might like to tell Ben t=
hat
> OpenSSL was one of those cases ;-) ).
> I "solved" a few of the problems by violating the TLS RFC's rule that "Ea=
ch
> following certificate must directly certify the one preceding it", but I
> couldn't get either of these approaches to work with old versions of Andr=
oid.
>
> So when you say that "most existing verification code will ignore it", yo=
u are
> correct. =C2=A0However, I concluded that "most" was not good enough.

Yep, if we can't wedge the extra data in anywhere then we're in
trouble. But the sooner that we start working on making it possible,
the better things will be.

This is not something that we expect to be done next year, it's going
to take many years to deploy.


Cheers

AGL

From koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.com  Tue Dec 13 19:28:25 2011
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Interoparability problem between RFC 5280 and EDIFACT
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Dear Sirs,

2011/12/13 Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>:
> koichi sugimoto <koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.co.jp> writes:
>
>>You mean the application has a bug?
>
> No, it's working fine (or at least any bug(s) aren't in this area :-).
>
>>If the application is compliant to RFC 5280, then, the application must be
>>able to handle 20 octets. Therefore, the encoding function that generates the
>>'CERTIFICATE REFERENCE' should convert 5 octets to less than 9 charcters.
>
> Uhh, I thought the problem was that the hex-encoding was creating 40 bytes of
> ASCII from 20 binary bytes, and that exceeded the 35-byte field length?
Yes.
Therefore, if the developper is familiar with RFC 5280, then, he/she
must implement
some compression method to the value of 'CERTIFICATE REFERENCE' field.

Does anyone know about a reference implementation of this field?

Regards,
Koichi Sugimoto.

From pgut001@login01.cs.auckland.ac.nz  Tue Dec 13 19:41:05 2011
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Interoparability problem between RFC 5280 and EDIFACT
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koichi sugimoto <koichi.sugimoto@globalsign.co.jp> writes:

>Therefore, if the developper is familiar with RFC 5280, then, he/she must
>implement some compression method to the value of 'CERTIFICATE REFERENCE'
>field.
>
>Does anyone know about a reference implementation of this field?

The problem here is that you have two incompatible standards, so there isn't
any single reference way to resolve this, there's only a list of things you
can try (see my earlier message).  For example my code doesn't generate 20-
byte serial numbers so it just works automatically without requiring any
special adaptations.  OTOH someone else's code that does generate 20-byte
serial numbers wouldn't work automatically, so you'd have to truncate the
value, or use a more efficient encoding, or something else.  I doubt there's
any definitive way to do this, it's just whatever a particular vendor decides
to do.

Peter.

From rob.stradling@comodo.com  Wed Dec 14 02:21:19 2011
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From: Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] fyi: Sovereign Keys: an EFF proposal for more secure TLS authentication
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On Tuesday 13 Dec 2011 16:05:52 Adam Langley wrote:
> On Tue, Dec 13, 2011 at 4:56 AM, Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com> 
wrote:
> > If "requiring OCSP stapling from all sites" cannot reasonably be
> > deployed, then surely we cannot expect ubiquitous support for _any_ new
> > TLS extension?
> 
> I agree. In additional to the requirement to support a TLS extension,
> OCSP stapling requires constant, fresh data making it even harder.

Fair point.  CT Audit Proofs don't have this "even harder" requirement, of 
course, since they will be static data.

<snip>
> > So when you say that "most existing verification code will ignore it",
> > you are correct.  However, I concluded that "most" was not good enough.
> 
> Yep, if we can't wedge the extra data in anywhere then we're in
> trouble. But the sooner that we start working on making it possible,
> the better things will be.

I've thought of a couple of other ways of wedging the data into the TLS 
handshake, although these methods would require more collaboration from the 
CAs than you've thus far intended to require (or perhaps expected).

IDEA 1 - PUT THE AUDIT PROOF INSIDE THE END-ENTITY CERTIFICATE:
When a CA is about to issue a certificate, it publishes the "ToBeSigned" 
certificate data to the Public Log.  The Public Log generates an Audit Proof of 
the "ToBeSigned" data and returns this to the CA.  The CA encapsulates the 
Audit Proof in a certificate extension, appends this extension to the 
"ToBeSigned" certificate data, and recalculates ASN.1 tag lengths as necessary.  
Then the CA signs the certificate and provides it to the certificate applicant.
Browsers would recognize the Audit Proof certificate extension and would have 
code to strip this extension and reconstruct the original "ToBeSigned" 
certificate data, so that the Audit Proof can be verified.
Since the Public Log is involved prior to certificate issuance, the Public Log 
could conceivably check CAA records, the Google Safebrowsing blacklist, etc, 
etc, and refuse to generate an Audit Proof if any problems are encountered.

IDEA 2 - CERTIFICATE INSIDE A CERTIFICATE:
A certificate is issued and added to the Public Log in the manner your doc 
describes.  Then, the CA issues a second certificate, which contains (in a 
certificate extension) the Audit Proof and the first certificate's signature and 
serial number.  The second certificate's Subject, Issuer, Validity Dates, 
Extensions, etc, must exactly match those of the first certificate.
The site owner configures their TLS Server to send the second certificate.
Browsers would recognize the new certificate extension and would have code to 
pull apart the second certificate, reconstruct the first certificate, and verify 
the Audit Proof.
Since the first certificate would never be seen by legacy Browsers, its 
signature could use SHA-2.  The second certificate's signature would probably 
use SHA-1 whilst there remain a significant number of legacy Browsers that 
don't support SHA-2.
Certificate serial numbers are meant to be unique amongst the set of 
certificates issued by any particular CA, but maybe it would be OK to break 
this rule for each pair of certificates envisaged by this idea, since they are 
essentially the same.  If revocation is required, both certificates should be 
revoked together, so sharing a serial number would make sure this happens.

Comments welcome.

> This is not something that we expect to be done next year, it's going
> to take many years to deploy.

If at least one my ideas would work, I think it could be deployed more quickly 
than that.  You'd only need buy-in from the CAs and Browsers.  No need to 
update any webserver software, and no need for site admins to do anything any 
differently.

> Cheers
> 
> AGL

Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online

From tmiller@mitre.org  Wed Dec 14 05:05:49 2011
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From: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
To: Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>, Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] fyi: Sovereign Keys: an EFF proposal for more secure TLS authentication
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Both concepts are certs-within-certs, when all is said and done.  The CT
audit proof is nothing more than a certificate with an unusual format and
signature algorithm.

-- T

On 12/14/11 4:21 AM, "Rob Stradling" <rob.stradling@comodo.com> wrote:

>On Tuesday 13 Dec 2011 16:05:52 Adam Langley wrote:
>> On Tue, Dec 13, 2011 at 4:56 AM, Rob Stradling
>><rob.stradling@comodo.com>
>wrote:
>> > If "requiring OCSP stapling from all sites" cannot reasonably be
>> > deployed, then surely we cannot expect ubiquitous support for _any_
>>new
>> > TLS extension?
>>=20
>> I agree. In additional to the requirement to support a TLS extension,
>> OCSP stapling requires constant, fresh data making it even harder.
>
>Fair point.  CT Audit Proofs don't have this "even harder" requirement,
>of=20
>course, since they will be static data.
>
><snip>
>> > So when you say that "most existing verification code will ignore it",
>> > you are correct.  However, I concluded that "most" was not good
>>enough.
>>=20
>> Yep, if we can't wedge the extra data in anywhere then we're in
>> trouble. But the sooner that we start working on making it possible,
>> the better things will be.
>
>I've thought of a couple of other ways of wedging the data into the TLS
>handshake, although these methods would require more collaboration from
>the=20
>CAs than you've thus far intended to require (or perhaps expected).
>
>IDEA 1 - PUT THE AUDIT PROOF INSIDE THE END-ENTITY CERTIFICATE:
>When a CA is about to issue a certificate, it publishes the "ToBeSigned"
>certificate data to the Public Log.  The Public Log generates an Audit
>Proof of=20
>the "ToBeSigned" data and returns this to the CA.  The CA encapsulates
>the=20
>Audit Proof in a certificate extension, appends this extension to the
>"ToBeSigned" certificate data, and recalculates ASN.1 tag lengths as
>necessary. =20
>Then the CA signs the certificate and provides it to the certificate
>applicant.
>Browsers would recognize the Audit Proof certificate extension and would
>have=20
>code to strip this extension and reconstruct the original "ToBeSigned"
>certificate data, so that the Audit Proof can be verified.
>Since the Public Log is involved prior to certificate issuance, the
>Public Log=20
>could conceivably check CAA records, the Google Safebrowsing blacklist,
>etc,=20
>etc, and refuse to generate an Audit Proof if any problems are
>encountered.
>
>IDEA 2 - CERTIFICATE INSIDE A CERTIFICATE:
>A certificate is issued and added to the Public Log in the manner your
>doc=20
>describes.  Then, the CA issues a second certificate, which contains (in
>a=20
>certificate extension) the Audit Proof and the first certificate's
>signature and=20
>serial number.  The second certificate's Subject, Issuer, Validity Dates,
>Extensions, etc, must exactly match those of the first certificate.
>The site owner configures their TLS Server to send the second certificate.
>Browsers would recognize the new certificate extension and would have
>code to=20
>pull apart the second certificate, reconstruct the first certificate, and
>verify=20
>the Audit Proof.
>Since the first certificate would never be seen by legacy Browsers, its
>signature could use SHA-2.  The second certificate's signature would
>probably=20
>use SHA-1 whilst there remain a significant number of legacy Browsers
>that=20
>don't support SHA-2.
>Certificate serial numbers are meant to be unique amongst the set of
>certificates issued by any particular CA, but maybe it would be OK to
>break=20
>this rule for each pair of certificates envisaged by this idea, since
>they are=20
>essentially the same.  If revocation is required, both certificates
>should be=20
>revoked together, so sharing a serial number would make sure this happens.
>
>Comments welcome.
>
>> This is not something that we expect to be done next year, it's going
>> to take many years to deploy.
>
>If at least one my ideas would work, I think it could be deployed more
>quickly=20
>than that.  You'd only need buy-in from the CAs and Browsers.  No need to
>update any webserver software, and no need for site admins to do anything
>any=20
>differently.
>
>> Cheers
>>=20
>> AGL
>
>Rob Stradling
>Senior Research & Development Scientist
>COMODO - Creating Trust Online


From agl@google.com  Wed Dec 14 09:04:08 2011
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Subject: Re: [pkix] fyi: Sovereign Keys: an EFF proposal for more secure TLS authentication
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On Wed, Dec 14, 2011 at 5:21 AM, Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com> wrote:
> I've thought of a couple of other ways of wedging the data into the TLS
> handshake, although these methods would require more collaboration from the
> CAs than you've thus far intended to require (or perhaps expected).

Absolutely, putting the audit proof inside the TBSCertificate would be
nice and clean. But, while I've no doubt that a CA, such as
yourselves, would have no problem handling that, I do fear that
getting every CA to implement might be a struggle. Not to mention
dealing with folks who have an intermediate CA.

Because of this, wedging the data in afterward, while technically
obnoxious, is much easier to deploy, assuming that we can get the
client compatibility. (I also promise to leave extension space for
others if we end up using some trick!)

Thanks to your hint, I've confirmed that Android < 2.2 rejects
certificate chains with superfluous certificates. Thankfully, we can
typically wait a while in order to get rid of phones but I'm also
taking a look at other ways in which to squeeze the data. My current
attempt is running at https://fenton.imperialviolet.org which works on
everything that I've tried so far. Of course, none of this is a
replacement for a wide scale test on google.com, but that'll have to
wait until next year.


Cheers

AGL

From rob.stradling@comodo.com  Wed Dec 14 14:23:30 2011
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Subject: Re: [pkix] fyi: Sovereign Keys: an EFF proposal for more secure TLS authentication
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On Wednesday 14 Dec 2011 17:04:06 Adam Langley wrote:
> On Wed, Dec 14, 2011 at 5:21 AM, Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com> 
wrote:
> > I've thought of a couple of other ways of wedging the data into the TLS
> > handshake, although these methods would require more collaboration from
> > the CAs than you've thus far intended to require (or perhaps expected).
> 
> Absolutely, putting the audit proof inside the TBSCertificate would be
> nice and clean. But, while I've no doubt that a CA, such as
> yourselves, would have no problem handling that, I do fear that
> getting every CA to implement might be a struggle. Not to mention
> dealing with folks who have an intermediate CA.
> 
> Because of this, wedging the data in afterward, while technically
> obnoxious, is much easier to deploy, assuming that we can get the
> client compatibility.

How about getting CT to support both approaches (TBSCertificate and "wedging 
the data in afterward") ?

If the TBSCertificate method has better client compatibility, CAs will want to 
support it.  But for those CAs that struggle to support it, "wedging the data 
in afterward" would work well enough for many customers.

> (I also promise to leave extension space for others if we end up using some
> trick!)

Sounds useful, but I'm not sure what you mean.  (Are you saying what I just 
wrote above, perhaps?)

> Thanks to your hint, I've confirmed that Android < 2.2 rejects
> certificate chains with superfluous certificates.

Glad to help.

> Thankfully, we can typically wait a while in order to get rid of phones

Huh?  Not sure I follow you.  (Are you saying that people tend to replace 
their phones more often than their desktops/laptops/netbooks, so we don't need 
to support legacy phone OSes/browsers for as long as legacy 
desktop/laptop/netbook browsers?)

> but I'm also taking a look at other ways in which to squeeze the data. My
> current attempt is running at https://fenton.imperialviolet.org which works
> on everything that I've tried so far.

I can't see any squeezed data using "openssl s_client -connect 
fenton.imperialviolet.org:443".  Where should I be looking?

> Of course, none of this is a replacement for a wide scale test on
> google.com, but that'll have to wait until next year.
> 
> 
> Cheers
> 
> AGL

Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online

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From: Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
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Adam Langley wrote:
> 
> Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com> wrote:
> >
> > I've thought of a couple of other ways of wedging the data into the TLS
> > handshake, although these methods would require more collaboration from
> > the CAs than you've thus far intended to require (or perhaps expected).
> 
> Because of this, wedging the data in afterward, while technically
> obnoxious, is much easier to deploy, assuming that we can get the
> client compatibility. (I also promise to leave extension space for
> others if we end up using some trick!)
> 
> Thanks to your hint, I've confirmed that Android < 2.2 rejects
> certificate chains with superfluous certificates. Thankfully, we can
> typically wait a while in order to get rid of phones but I'm also
> taking a look at other ways in which to squeeze the data.

The obvious solution is to use a TLS extension.  I fail to see
a reason why a TLS extension would not be the appropriate tool.

I am very strongly opposed to stuffing protocol extensions encodes
as X.509v3 into *regular* TLS Certificate handshake messages,
because it is a clear violation of the protocol and it would is a
perfectly sensible behaviour for a TLS peer to abort the TLS handshake
if being served a *regular* Certificate handshake message that does not
contain a well formed, ordered and valid certfication path.


-Martin

From agl@google.com  Wed Dec 14 14:40:26 2011
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Subject: Re: [pkix] fyi: Sovereign Keys: an EFF proposal for more secure TLS authentication
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On Wed, Dec 14, 2011 at 5:23 PM, Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com> w=
rote:
> How about getting CT to support both approaches (TBSCertificate and "wedg=
ing
> the data in afterward") ?

I suspect that we'll end up supporting three methods of getting the
audit proof to the client:

1) Terrible hack that doesn't need CA co-operation nor server changes
2) A TLS extension: doesn't need CA co-operation but does need server chang=
es
3) An X.509 extension: needs CA co-operation but not server changes.

> Sounds useful, but I'm not sure what you mean. =C2=A0(Are you saying what=
 I just
> wrote above, perhaps?)

I'm just saying that, if I find a good way to wedge data in, I'll make
sure that other people can use it after us - i.e. by making it
extensible if need be.

> Huh? =C2=A0Not sure I follow you. =C2=A0(Are you saying that people tend =
to replace
> their phones more often than their desktops/laptops/netbooks, so we don't=
 need
> to support legacy phone OSes/browsers for as long as legacy
> desktop/laptop/netbook browsers?)

Right, exactly.

> I can't see any squeezed data using "openssl s_client -connect
> fenton.imperialviolet.org:443". =C2=A0Where should I be looking?

If you look at the leaf certificate in DER form you'll see the word
"testing" in there, which isn't part of a normal COMODO certificate.
I'm not going to mention the terrible thing that I've done because
this is the PKIX mailing list and it would be like discussing hunting
at a PETA meeting :)

But, if it works...


Cheers

AGL

From agl@google.com  Wed Dec 14 14:44:18 2011
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On Wed, Dec 14, 2011 at 5:28 PM, Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com> wrote:
> The obvious solution is to use a TLS extension. =C2=A0I fail to see
> a reason why a TLS extension would not be the appropriate tool.

A TLS extension is absolutely the correct solution to this and is
likely to be supported.

However, I'm still getting bug reports from people who have literally
not updated their HTTPS server software since 1999. We seeking to
reduce the cost imposed on them, and many others like them.


Cheers

AGL

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To: Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] fyi: Sovereign Keys: an EFF proposal for more secure TLS authentication
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On Wed, Dec 14, 2011 at 10:23 PM, Rob Stradling
<rob.stradling@comodo.com> wrote:
> On Wednesday 14 Dec 2011 17:04:06 Adam Langley wrote:
>> On Wed, Dec 14, 2011 at 5:21 AM, Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com=
>
> wrote:
>> > I've thought of a couple of other ways of wedging the data into the TL=
S
>> > handshake, although these methods would require more collaboration fro=
m
>> > the CAs than you've thus far intended to require (or perhaps expected)=
.
>>
>> Absolutely, putting the audit proof inside the TBSCertificate would be
>> nice and clean. But, while I've no doubt that a CA, such as
>> yourselves, would have no problem handling that, I do fear that
>> getting every CA to implement might be a struggle. Not to mention
>> dealing with folks who have an intermediate CA.
>>
>> Because of this, wedging the data in afterward, while technically
>> obnoxious, is much easier to deploy, assuming that we can get the
>> client compatibility.
>
> How about getting CT to support both approaches (TBSCertificate and "wedg=
ing
> the data in afterward") ?
>
> If the TBSCertificate method has better client compatibility, CAs will wa=
nt to
> support it. =A0But for those CAs that struggle to support it, "wedging th=
e data
> in afterward" would work well enough for many customers.
>
>> (I also promise to leave extension space for others if we end up using s=
ome
>> trick!)
>
> Sounds useful, but I'm not sure what you mean. =A0(Are you saying what I =
just
> wrote above, perhaps?)
>
>> Thanks to your hint, I've confirmed that Android < 2.2 rejects
>> certificate chains with superfluous certificates.
>
> Glad to help.
>
>> Thankfully, we can typically wait a while in order to get rid of phones
>
> Huh? =A0Not sure I follow you. =A0(Are you saying that people tend to rep=
lace
> their phones more often than their desktops/laptops/netbooks, so we don't=
 need
> to support legacy phone OSes/browsers for as long as legacy
> desktop/laptop/netbook browsers?)
>
>> but I'm also taking a look at other ways in which to squeeze the data. M=
y
>> current attempt is running at https://fenton.imperialviolet.org which wo=
rks
>> on everything that I've tried so far.
>
> I can't see any squeezed data using "openssl s_client -connect
> fenton.imperialviolet.org:443". =A0Where should I be looking?

Parameters on the signature algorithm :-)

>
>> Of course, none of this is a replacement for a wide scale test on
>> google.com, but that'll have to wait until next year.
>>
>>
>> Cheers
>>
>> AGL
>
> Rob Stradling
> Senior Research & Development Scientist
> COMODO - Creating Trust Online
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix

From paul.hoffman@vpnc.org  Wed Dec 14 15:22:31 2011
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Subject: Re: [pkix] fyi: Sovereign Keys: an EFF proposal for more secure TLS
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On Dec 14, 2011, at 2:44 PM, Adam Langley wrote:

> On Wed, Dec 14, 2011 at 5:28 PM, Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com> wrote:
>> The obvious solution is to use a TLS extension.  I fail to see
>> a reason why a TLS extension would not be the appropriate tool.
>=20
> A TLS extension is absolutely the correct solution to this and is
> likely to be supported.
>=20
> However, I'm still getting bug reports from people who have literally
> not updated their HTTPS server software since 1999. We seeking to
> reduce the cost imposed on them, and many others like them.


Please don't. I recognize that this thread is in the PKIX WG, but I'm =
pretty sure that if it was in the TLS WG, people would say "ability to =
handle TLS extensions is required".

--Paul Hoffman


From mrex@sap.com  Wed Dec 14 16:46:05 2011
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From: Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
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In-Reply-To: <CAG5KPzxxTJ=dKGCyO6Gz9VvNtrZNrPCGnED8CsnvepJQxjtw6w@mail.gmail.com> from "Ben Laurie" at Dec 14, 11 11:04:08 pm
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Ben Laurie wrote:
> 
>>
>>> but I'm also taking a look at other ways in which to squeeze the data. My
>>> current attempt is running at https://fenton.imperialviolet.org which works
>>> on everything that I've tried so far.
>>
>> I can't see any squeezed data using "openssl s_client -connect
>> fenton.imperialviolet.org:443".  Where should I be looking?
> 
> Parameters on the signature algorithm :-)

My SSL client fails with an ASN.1 decoding error.

which is pretty much in compliance with
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3447#appendix-A.2.4

   A.2.4 RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5

   The object identifier for RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 shall be one of the
   following.  The choice of OID depends on the choice of hash
   algorithm: MD2, MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, or SHA-512.  Note that
   if either MD2 or MD5 is used, then the OID is just as in PKCS #1
   v1.5.  For each OID, the parameters field associated with this OID in
   a value of type AlgorithmIdentifier shall have a value of type NULL.


Your server certificate contains an invalid AlgId structure,
so all sensible PKI software that recognizes the OID of that AlgId
ought to reject your certificate, and those who PKI software which
does not recognize the sha1WithRsaEncryption OID in that AlgId
(should there be any such PKI software -- this is probably the most
commonly used AlgId around) then that PKI software would not be able
to do a lot of PKI-like stuff with the decoded result...


But otherwise, yes, the AlgId parameter seems to be an
"extensible" part in X.509 certificates that is not
fenced off by the digital signature on the certificate.

-Martin

From pgut001@login01.cs.auckland.ac.nz  Wed Dec 14 22:32:12 2011
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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: agl@google.com, rob.stradling@comodo.com
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Adam Langley <agl@google.com> writes:

>If you look at the leaf certificate in DER form you'll see the word "testing"
>in there, which isn't part of a normal COMODO certificate. 

Or just use dumpasn1:

1091   20:           SEQUENCE {
1093    9:             OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 2 840 113549 1 1 5'
1104    7:             OCTET STRING 'testing'
         :             }
1113  257:           BIT STRING
         :             4E A5 34 27 4F D7 A2 52 96 C2 85 76 AC 80 67 8B
         :             12 3F 7D DE 0E A4 D0 76 68 05 4F 56 DB 53 B4 02
         :             1E CB 53 F3 07 97 80 A4 A1 18 AA 3D 81 E6 97 80
         :             0A 94 ED 72 2D 1C BD 9D 05 8B 88 65 17 1C 66 EA
         :             EC 18 F3 54 1B A8 2C C5 60 1E D8 68 64 91 67 A5
         :             98 26 30 9E 1F 3D 80 ED DF 01 A8 43 DA E3 FB 9A
         :             71 8F 76 1B A8 2D 4D 96 BA 08 C8 D6 DF E7 45 1C
         :             93 48 3A 9E 07 07 F8 FA A4 BC 5D 89 38 24 6D AA
         :                     [ Another 128 bytes skipped ]

>But, if it works...

Only on implementations that accept any old rubbish.  Mind you there's an
awful lot of those out there (I grabbed it with Firefox, which doesn't care or
even seem to notice it, and MSIE is the same), so it may indeed work.

Peter.

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On Wednesday 14 Dec 2011 22:40:23 Adam Langley wrote:
> On Wed, Dec 14, 2011 at 5:23 PM, Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>
<snip>
> > I can't see any squeezed data using "openssl s_client -connect
> > fenton.imperialviolet.org:443".  Where should I be looking?
> 
> If you look at the leaf certificate in DER form you'll see the word
> "testing" in there, which isn't part of a normal COMODO certificate.
> I'm not going to mention the terrible thing that I've done because
> this is the PKIX mailing list and it would be like discussing hunting
> at a PETA meeting :)
> 
> But, if it works...

That's clever.  However, when you applied for that certificate you agreed to 
our subscriber agreement [1] which says...

"...1.7. Restrictions. Subscriber shall not:...
(ii) modify, license, create a derivative work of, or transfer any Certificate 
(except as required to use the Certificate) or Private Key;"

So there might be some legal hoops to jump through if you do decide to go with 
this "terrible thing" approach.

[1] 
https://www.comodo.com/repository/docs/20090820_SslCertificateSubscriberAgreement.html

> Cheers
> 
> AGL

Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online

From william.polk@nist.gov  Thu Dec 15 02:45:05 2011
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From: "Polk, William T." <william.polk@nist.gov>
To: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>, "mrex@sap.com" <mrex@sap.com>
Date: Thu, 15 Dec 2011 05:44:17 -0500
Thread-Topic: [pkix] fyi: Sovereign Keys: an EFF proposal for more secure TLS
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Is it really a priority to protect people running software more than a decade old?

Personally, I am more interested in ways to simplify and motivate migration to appropriate security protocols and cryptographic algorithms & key sizes.  Making system updates part of the system life cycle -- instead of the Ron Popeil ("Set it and forget it!") style of system administration -- could significantly improve security on the Internet.

Tim
________________________________________
From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Adam Langley [agl@google.com]
Sent: Wednesday, December 14, 2011 5:44 PM
To: mrex@sap.com
Cc: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] fyi: Sovereign Keys: an EFF proposal for more secure TLS

On Wed, Dec 14, 2011 at 5:28 PM, Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com> wrote:
> The obvious solution is to use a TLS extension.  I fail to see
> a reason why a TLS extension would not be the appropriate tool.

A TLS extension is absolutely the correct solution to this and is
likely to be supported.

However, I'm still getting bug reports from people who have literally
not updated their HTTPS server software since 1999. We seeking to
reduce the cost imposed on them, and many others like them.


Cheers

AGL
_______________________________________________
pkix mailing list
pkix@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix

From benlaurie@gmail.com  Thu Dec 15 03:01:08 2011
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Subject: Re: [pkix] fyi: Sovereign Keys: an EFF proposal for more secure TLS
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On Thu, Dec 15, 2011 at 12:45 AM, Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com> wrote:
> Ben Laurie wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>> but I'm also taking a look at other ways in which to squeeze the data.=
 My
>>>> current attempt is running at https://fenton.imperialviolet.org which =
works
>>>> on everything that I've tried so far.
>>>
>>> I can't see any squeezed data using "openssl s_client -connect
>>> fenton.imperialviolet.org:443". =A0Where should I be looking?
>>
>> Parameters on the signature algorithm :-)
>
> My SSL client fails with an ASN.1 decoding error.

What is your client?

>
> which is pretty much in compliance with
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3447#appendix-A.2.4
>
> =A0 A.2.4 RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5
>
> =A0 The object identifier for RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 shall be one of the
> =A0 following. =A0The choice of OID depends on the choice of hash
> =A0 algorithm: MD2, MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, or SHA-512. =A0Note tha=
t
> =A0 if either MD2 or MD5 is used, then the OID is just as in PKCS #1
> =A0 v1.5. =A0For each OID, the parameters field associated with this OID =
in
> =A0 a value of type AlgorithmIdentifier shall have a value of type NULL.
>
>
> Your server certificate contains an invalid AlgId structure,
> so all sensible PKI software that recognizes the OID of that AlgId
> ought to reject your certificate, and those who PKI software which
> does not recognize the sha1WithRsaEncryption OID in that AlgId
> (should there be any such PKI software -- this is probably the most
> commonly used AlgId around) then that PKI software would not be able
> to do a lot of PKI-like stuff with the decoded result...
>
>
> But otherwise, yes, the AlgId parameter seems to be an
> "extensible" part in X.509 certificates that is not
> fenced off by the digital signature on the certificate.
>
> -Martin

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On Thu, Dec 15, 2011 at 12:45 AM, Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com> wrote:
> Ben Laurie wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>> but I'm also taking a look at other ways in which to squeeze the data.=
 My
>>>> current attempt is running at https://fenton.imperialviolet.org which =
works
>>>> on everything that I've tried so far.
>>>
>>> I can't see any squeezed data using "openssl s_client -connect
>>> fenton.imperialviolet.org:443". =A0Where should I be looking?
>>
>> Parameters on the signature algorithm :-)
>
> My SSL client fails with an ASN.1 decoding error.
>
> which is pretty much in compliance with
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3447#appendix-A.2.4
>
> =A0 A.2.4 RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5
>
> =A0 The object identifier for RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 shall be one of the
> =A0 following. =A0The choice of OID depends on the choice of hash
> =A0 algorithm: MD2, MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, or SHA-512. =A0Note tha=
t
> =A0 if either MD2 or MD5 is used, then the OID is just as in PKCS #1
> =A0 v1.5. =A0For each OID, the parameters field associated with this OID =
in
> =A0 a value of type AlgorithmIdentifier shall have a value of type NULL.

BTW, 3447 is not normative on the content of certificates, only the
contents of signatures :-)

> Your server certificate contains an invalid AlgId structure,
> so all sensible PKI software that recognizes the OID of that AlgId
> ought to reject your certificate, and those who PKI software which
> does not recognize the sha1WithRsaEncryption OID in that AlgId
> (should there be any such PKI software -- this is probably the most
> commonly used AlgId around) then that PKI software would not be able
> to do a lot of PKI-like stuff with the decoded result...
>
>
> But otherwise, yes, the AlgId parameter seems to be an
> "extensible" part in X.509 certificates that is not
> fenced off by the digital signature on the certificate.
>
> -Martin

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Subject: Re: [pkix] fyi: Sovereign Keys: an EFF proposal for more secure TLS authentication
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On Thu, Dec 15, 2011 at 10:32 AM, Rob Stradling
<rob.stradling@comodo.com> wrote:
> On Wednesday 14 Dec 2011 22:40:23 Adam Langley wrote:
>> On Wed, Dec 14, 2011 at 5:23 PM, Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com=
>
> <snip>
>> > I can't see any squeezed data using "openssl s_client -connect
>> > fenton.imperialviolet.org:443". =A0Where should I be looking?
>>
>> If you look at the leaf certificate in DER form you'll see the word
>> "testing" in there, which isn't part of a normal COMODO certificate.
>> I'm not going to mention the terrible thing that I've done because
>> this is the PKIX mailing list and it would be like discussing hunting
>> at a PETA meeting :)
>>
>> But, if it works...
>
> That's clever. =A0However, when you applied for that certificate you agre=
ed to
> our subscriber agreement [1] which says...
>
> "...1.7. Restrictions. Subscriber shall not:...
> (ii) modify, license, create a derivative work of, or transfer any Certif=
icate
> (except as required to use the Certificate) or Private Key;"
>
> So there might be some legal hoops to jump through if you do decide to go=
 with
> this "terrible thing" approach.

If you can't transfer a certificate, how can you use it for TLS?

>
> [1]
> https://www.comodo.com/repository/docs/20090820_SslCertificateSubscriberA=
greement.html
>
>> Cheers
>>
>> AGL
>
> Rob Stradling
> Senior Research & Development Scientist
> COMODO - Creating Trust Online
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix

From benlaurie@gmail.com  Thu Dec 15 03:06:10 2011
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To: Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>
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Cc: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] fyi: Sovereign Keys: an EFF proposal for more secure TLS authentication
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On Thu, Dec 15, 2011 at 11:05 AM, Ben Laurie <ben@links.org> wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 15, 2011 at 10:32 AM, Rob Stradling
> <rob.stradling@comodo.com> wrote:
>> On Wednesday 14 Dec 2011 22:40:23 Adam Langley wrote:
>>> On Wed, Dec 14, 2011 at 5:23 PM, Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.co=
m>
>> <snip>
>>> > I can't see any squeezed data using "openssl s_client -connect
>>> > fenton.imperialviolet.org:443". =A0Where should I be looking?
>>>
>>> If you look at the leaf certificate in DER form you'll see the word
>>> "testing" in there, which isn't part of a normal COMODO certificate.
>>> I'm not going to mention the terrible thing that I've done because
>>> this is the PKIX mailing list and it would be like discussing hunting
>>> at a PETA meeting :)
>>>
>>> But, if it works...
>>
>> That's clever. =A0However, when you applied for that certificate you agr=
eed to
>> our subscriber agreement [1] which says...
>>
>> "...1.7. Restrictions. Subscriber shall not:...
>> (ii) modify, license, create a derivative work of, or transfer any Certi=
ficate
>> (except as required to use the Certificate) or Private Key;"
>>
>> So there might be some legal hoops to jump through if you do decide to g=
o with
>> this "terrible thing" approach.
>
> If you can't transfer a certificate, how can you use it for TLS?

Silly me - you have "except as required to use the Certificate". Would
this not also apply to modifications needed for CT?

>
>>
>> [1]
>> https://www.comodo.com/repository/docs/20090820_SslCertificateSubscriber=
Agreement.html
>>
>>> Cheers
>>>
>>> AGL
>>
>> Rob Stradling
>> Senior Research & Development Scientist
>> COMODO - Creating Trust Online
>> _______________________________________________
>> pkix mailing list
>> pkix@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix

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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: ben@links.org, mrex@sap.com
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Subject: Re: [pkix] fyi: Sovereign Keys: an EFF proposal for more secure TLS
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Ben Laurie <ben@links.org> writes:

>What is your client?

I was going to ask that too, there's actually a client that doesn't just
obliviously accept this cert?

Peter.

From rob.stradling@comodo.com  Thu Dec 15 03:25:04 2011
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On Thursday 15 Dec 2011 11:06:03 Ben Laurie wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 15, 2011 at 11:05 AM, Ben Laurie <ben@links.org> wrote:
> > On Thu, Dec 15, 2011 at 10:32 AM, Rob Stradling
> > 
> > <rob.stradling@comodo.com> wrote:
> >> On Wednesday 14 Dec 2011 22:40:23 Adam Langley wrote:
> >>> On Wed, Dec 14, 2011 at 5:23 PM, Rob Stradling
> >>> <rob.stradling@comodo.com>
> >> 
> >> <snip>
> >> 
> >>> > I can't see any squeezed data using "openssl s_client -connect
> >>> > fenton.imperialviolet.org:443".  Where should I be looking?
> >>> 
> >>> If you look at the leaf certificate in DER form you'll see the word
> >>> "testing" in there, which isn't part of a normal COMODO certificate.
> >>> I'm not going to mention the terrible thing that I've done because
> >>> this is the PKIX mailing list and it would be like discussing hunting
> >>> at a PETA meeting :)
> >>> 
> >>> But, if it works...
> >> 
> >> That's clever.  However, when you applied for that certificate you
> >> agreed to our subscriber agreement [1] which says...
> >> 
> >> "...1.7. Restrictions. Subscriber shall not:...
> >> (ii) modify, license, create a derivative work of, or transfer any
> >> Certificate (except as required to use the Certificate) or Private
> >> Key;"
> >> 
> >> So there might be some legal hoops to jump through if you do decide to
> >> go with this "terrible thing" approach.
> > 
> > If you can't transfer a certificate, how can you use it for TLS?
> 
> Silly me - you have "except as required to use the Certificate". Would
> this not also apply to modifications needed for CT?

IANAL, but the positioning of the commas seems to suggest that "except as 
required to use the Certificate" applies only to "transfer any Certificate", and 
not to "modify" or "create a derivative work of".

> >> [1]
> >> https://www.comodo.com/repository/docs/20090820_SslCertificateSubscriber
> >> Agreement.html
> >> 
> >>> Cheers
> >>> 
> >>> AGL
> >> 
> >> Rob Stradling
> >> Senior Research & Development Scientist
> >> COMODO - Creating Trust Online
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> pkix mailing list
> >> pkix@ietf.org
> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix

Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online

From benlaurie@gmail.com  Thu Dec 15 03:40:17 2011
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Subject: Re: [pkix] fyi: Sovereign Keys: an EFF proposal for more secure TLS authentication
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On Thu, Dec 15, 2011 at 11:24 AM, Rob Stradling
<rob.stradling@comodo.com> wrote:
> On Thursday 15 Dec 2011 11:06:03 Ben Laurie wrote:
>> On Thu, Dec 15, 2011 at 11:05 AM, Ben Laurie <ben@links.org> wrote:
>> > On Thu, Dec 15, 2011 at 10:32 AM, Rob Stradling
>> >
>> > <rob.stradling@comodo.com> wrote:
>> >> On Wednesday 14 Dec 2011 22:40:23 Adam Langley wrote:
>> >>> On Wed, Dec 14, 2011 at 5:23 PM, Rob Stradling
>> >>> <rob.stradling@comodo.com>
>> >>
>> >> <snip>
>> >>
>> >>> > I can't see any squeezed data using "openssl s_client -connect
>> >>> > fenton.imperialviolet.org:443". =A0Where should I be looking?
>> >>>
>> >>> If you look at the leaf certificate in DER form you'll see the word
>> >>> "testing" in there, which isn't part of a normal COMODO certificate.
>> >>> I'm not going to mention the terrible thing that I've done because
>> >>> this is the PKIX mailing list and it would be like discussing huntin=
g
>> >>> at a PETA meeting :)
>> >>>
>> >>> But, if it works...
>> >>
>> >> That's clever. =A0However, when you applied for that certificate you
>> >> agreed to our subscriber agreement [1] which says...
>> >>
>> >> "...1.7. Restrictions. Subscriber shall not:...
>> >> (ii) modify, license, create a derivative work of, or transfer any
>> >> Certificate (except as required to use the Certificate) or Private
>> >> Key;"
>> >>
>> >> So there might be some legal hoops to jump through if you do decide t=
o
>> >> go with this "terrible thing" approach.
>> >
>> > If you can't transfer a certificate, how can you use it for TLS?
>>
>> Silly me - you have "except as required to use the Certificate". Would
>> this not also apply to modifications needed for CT?
>
> IANAL, but the positioning of the commas seems to suggest that "except as
> required to use the Certificate" applies only to "transfer any Certificat=
e", and
> not to "modify" or "create a derivative work of".

:-) Either way, its your licence, presumably you can fix it if you need to.

From rob.stradling@comodo.com  Thu Dec 15 03:46:13 2011
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From: Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>
To: Ben Laurie <ben@links.org>
Date: Thu, 15 Dec 2011 11:46:08 +0000
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Subject: Re: [pkix] fyi: Sovereign Keys: an EFF proposal for more secure TLS authentication
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On Thursday 15 Dec 2011 11:40:10 Ben Laurie wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 15, 2011 at 11:24 AM, Rob Stradling
> 
> <rob.stradling@comodo.com> wrote:
> > On Thursday 15 Dec 2011 11:06:03 Ben Laurie wrote:
> >> On Thu, Dec 15, 2011 at 11:05 AM, Ben Laurie <ben@links.org> wrote:
> >> > On Thu, Dec 15, 2011 at 10:32 AM, Rob Stradling
> >> > 
> >> > <rob.stradling@comodo.com> wrote:
> >> >> On Wednesday 14 Dec 2011 22:40:23 Adam Langley wrote:
> >> >>> On Wed, Dec 14, 2011 at 5:23 PM, Rob Stradling
> >> >>> <rob.stradling@comodo.com>
> >> >> 
> >> >> <snip>
> >> >> 
> >> >>> > I can't see any squeezed data using "openssl s_client -connect
> >> >>> > fenton.imperialviolet.org:443".  Where should I be looking?
> >> >>> 
> >> >>> If you look at the leaf certificate in DER form you'll see the word
> >> >>> "testing" in there, which isn't part of a normal COMODO certificate.
> >> >>> I'm not going to mention the terrible thing that I've done because
> >> >>> this is the PKIX mailing list and it would be like discussing
> >> >>> hunting at a PETA meeting :)
> >> >>> 
> >> >>> But, if it works...
> >> >> 
> >> >> That's clever.  However, when you applied for that certificate you
> >> >> agreed to our subscriber agreement [1] which says...
> >> >> 
> >> >> "...1.7. Restrictions. Subscriber shall not:...
> >> >> (ii) modify, license, create a derivative work of, or transfer any
> >> >> Certificate (except as required to use the Certificate) or Private
> >> >> Key;"
> >> >> 
> >> >> So there might be some legal hoops to jump through if you do decide
> >> >> to go with this "terrible thing" approach.
> >> > 
> >> > If you can't transfer a certificate, how can you use it for TLS?
> >> 
> >> Silly me - you have "except as required to use the Certificate". Would
> >> this not also apply to modifications needed for CT?
> > 
> > IANAL, but the positioning of the commas seems to suggest that "except as
> > required to use the Certificate" applies only to "transfer any
> > Certificate", and not to "modify" or "create a derivative work of".
> :
> :-) Either way, its your licence, presumably you can fix it if you need to.

Sure.

Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online

From mrex@sap.com  Thu Dec 15 09:56:12 2011
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From: Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
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To: ben@links.org (Ben Laurie)
Date: Thu, 15 Dec 2011 18:56:02 +0100 (MET)
In-Reply-To: <CAG5KPzwPezCpCJmb2=Y1zvREgB80wA6BvVRB3p_tUcSO62a7aw@mail.gmail.com> from "Ben Laurie" at Dec 15, 11 11:02:52 am
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Subject: Re: [pkix] fyi: Sovereign Keys: an EFF proposal for more secure TLS
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Ben Laurie wrote:
> 
> Martin Rex wrote:
> >
> > Ben Laurie wrote:
> > >
> > > Parameters on the signature algorithm :-)
> >
> > My SSL client fails with an ASN.1 decoding error.
> >
> > which is pretty much in compliance with
> > http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3447#appendix-A.2.4
> >
> >   A.2.4 RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5
> >
> >   The object identifier for RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 shall be one of the
> >   following.  The choice of OID depends on the choice of hash
> >   algorithm: MD2, MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, or SHA-512.  Note that
> >   if either MD2 or MD5 is used, then the OID is just as in PKCS #1
> >   v1.5.  For each OID, the parameters field associated with this OID in
> >   a value of type AlgorithmIdentifier shall have a value of type NULL.
> 
> BTW, 3447 is not normative on the content of certificates, only the
> contents of signatures :-)

rfc3447 *IS* normative on the ASN.1 encoding and decoding for the
sha1WithRSAEncryption AlgId.

  ITU-T Rec. X.509 11/2008  page 12:


  AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM:SupportedAlgorithms} ::= SEQUENCE {
    algorithm ALGORITHM.&id ({SupportedAlgorithms}),
    parameters ALGORITHM.&Type ({SupportedAlgorithms}{ @algorithm}) OPTIONAL }

  -- Definition of the following information object set is deferred,
  -- perhaps to standardized profiles or to protocol implementation
  -- conformance statements. The set is required to specify a table
  -- constraint on the parameters component of AlgorithmIdentifier.

  SupportedAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= { ... }

in combination with rfc-3447 PKCS #1 v2.1, page 57 (ASN.1 Module):

  --
  -- When the following OIDs are used in an AlgorithmIdentifier the
  -- parameters MUST be present and MUST be NULL.
  --
  md2WithRSAEncryption       OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 2 }
  md5WithRSAEncryption       OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 4 }
  sha1WithRSAEncryption      OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 5 }
  sha256WithRSAEncryption    OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 11 }
  sha384WithRSAEncryption    OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 12 }
  sha512WithRSAEncryption    OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 13 }


Differing values for signatureAlgorithm on the outer Certificate
structure and the TBSCertificate structure, on the other hand,
might(!) be ignored by RPs when verifying the certificate,
because there exists no requirement to compare these fields
in rfc5280 6.1.3 Basic Certificate Processing (and neither am I
aware of any such requirement in ITU-T Rec. X.509 11/2008).


-Martin

From mrex@sap.com  Thu Dec 15 10:03:09 2011
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From: Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
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To: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann)
Date: Thu, 15 Dec 2011 19:02:59 +0100 (MET)
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Subject: Re: [pkix] fyi: Sovereign Keys: an EFF proposal for more secure TLS
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Peter Gutmann wrote:
> 
> Ben Laurie <ben@links.org> writes:
> > 
> >What is your client?

One of the two SSL/TLS clients that we are shipping with our products.
(the one that I maintain).

> 
> I was going to ask that too, there's actually a client that doesn't just
> obliviously accept this cert?

Actually, every *CORRECT* implementation of an ASN.1 decoder for
AlgId that recognizes sha1WithRSAEncryption will have to reject
that cert, because of the non-NULL parameters field.
 
Enforcing the esoteric stuff in the comment fields of the ASN.1 module
is something that ASN.1 compilers will usually not provide, and what
any sensible implementor will have to manually add.

-Martin

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To: ben@links.org (Ben Laurie)
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Ben Laurie wrote:
> 
> Ben Laurie wrote:
> > Rob Stradling wrote:
> > >
> > > That's clever.  However, when you applied for that certificate
> > > you agreed to our subscriber agreement [1] which says...
> > >    https://www.comodo.com/repository/docs/20090820_SslCertificateSubscriberAgreement.html
> > >
> > > "...1.7. Restrictions. Subscriber shall not:...
> > > (ii) modify, license, create a derivative work of, or transfer any
> > > Certificate (except as required to use the Certificate) or Private Key;"
> > >
> > > So there might be some legal hoops to jump through if you do decide
> > > to go with this "terrible thing" approach.
> >
> > If you can't transfer a certificate, how can you use it for TLS?
> 
> Silly me - you have "except as required to use the Certificate". Would
> this not also apply to modifications needed for CT?


Here in Germany, this certainly would apply
(provided that this clause would not be found to be entirely invalid).

-Martin

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From rob.stradling@comodo.com  Fri Dec 16 01:07:03 2011
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From: Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] fyi: Sovereign Keys: an EFF proposal for more secure TLS
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On Thursday 15 Dec 2011 18:02:59 Martin Rex wrote:
> Peter Gutmann wrote:
> > Ben Laurie <ben@links.org> writes:
> > >What is your client?
> 
> One of the two SSL/TLS clients that we are shipping with our products.
> (the one that I maintain).
> 
> > I was going to ask that too, there's actually a client that doesn't just
> > obliviously accept this cert?
> 
> Actually, every *CORRECT* implementation of an ASN.1 decoder for
> AlgId that recognizes sha1WithRSAEncryption will have to reject
> that cert, because of the non-NULL parameters field.
> 
> Enforcing the esoteric stuff in the comment fields of the ASN.1 module
> is something that ASN.1 compilers will usually not provide, and what
> any sensible implementor will have to manually add.

Martin, are you saying that it is never sensible to apply the robustness 
principle when decoding ASN.1 data?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robustness_principle

> -Martin
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix

Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online

From mrex@sap.com  Fri Dec 16 08:05:02 2011
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From: Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
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To: rob.stradling@comodo.com (Rob Stradling)
Date: Fri, 16 Dec 2011 17:04:43 +0100 (MET)
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Rob Stradling wrote:
> 
> On Thursday 15 Dec 2011 18:02:59 Martin Rex wrote:
> > Peter Gutmann wrote:
> > > Ben Laurie <ben@links.org> writes:
> > > >What is your client?
> > 
> > One of the two SSL/TLS clients that we are shipping with our products.
> > (the one that I maintain).
> > 
> > > I was going to ask that too, there's actually a client that doesn't just
> > > obliviously accept this cert?
> > 
> > Actually, every *CORRECT* implementation of an ASN.1 decoder for
> > AlgId that recognizes sha1WithRSAEncryption will have to reject
> > that cert, because of the non-NULL parameters field.
> > 
> > Enforcing the esoteric stuff in the comment fields of the ASN.1 module
> > is something that ASN.1 compilers will usually not provide, and what
> > any sensible implementor will have to manually add.
> 
> Martin, are you saying that it is never sensible to apply the robustness 
> principle when decoding ASN.1 data?
> 
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robustness_principle

The rubustness principle should only be applied to communication protocols
when you are the terminal endpoint and the questionable communication protocol
elements are completely gone after processing.  That could be applied
to semantic restrictions on contents of an X.509 certificate created
by the CA, interpreted by the user, but entirely ignored by any
transport agent in between.

What we have:

 CA <-> SrvApp <-> SrvPKI <-> SrvTLS <-> CliTLS <-> CliPKI <-> CliApp <-> User

What you are suggesting would result in the follwing:

(1q) CliApp -> CliPKI:  "perform a certificate path validation on the EE cert"
(1a) CliPKI -> CliApp:  (liberal) "I did, the EE cert is valid"
(2q) CliApp -> CliPKI:  "great!  Please give me the validated EE cert"
(2a) CliPKI -> CliApp:  (conservative) "I can't, the EE cert is invalid"

To me, that would look quite inconsistent.
The result of (1a) and (2a) ought to be the same.

 (A)  either the certificate is *valid* -- in which case specification
      of AlgorithmIdentifier in ITU-T X.509 ASN.1 and PKCS#1 v2.1 ASN.1
      must be wrong

 (B)  or the certificate is *invalid* because of the incorrect AlgId
      parameter for sha1WithRSAEncryption.  You can not really perform
      a PKIX certificate path validation on a certificate if you can
      not decode or do not even recognize the AlgId parameter of the
      digital signature.


-Martin

From kent@bbn.com  Sun Dec 18 16:10:36 2011
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At 9:06 AM +0000 12/16/11, Rob Stradling wrote:
>O...
>
>Martin, are you saying that it is never sensible to apply the robustness
>principle when decoding ASN.1 data?
>
>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robustness_principle
>

NO is a good answer here, and in most security contexts.

ASN.1 decoding should, under the best circumstances, identify the 
error so that an RP can try to "persuade" the issuer of broken certs, 
CRLs, etc. to fix them. The decoded ought not core dump. But it also 
should reject invalid syntax. Failign to do so merely encourages the 
issuance of broken certs etc., and eventually imposes a burden on all 
RPs to accommodate errors by some issuers.

Steve

From rob.stradling@comodo.com  Mon Dec 19 01:51:11 2011
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Subject: Re: [pkix] fyi: Sovereign Keys: an EFF proposal for more secure TLS
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On Sunday 18 Dec 2011 20:40:06 Stephen Kent wrote:
> At 9:06 AM +0000 12/16/11, Rob Stradling wrote:
> >O...
> >
> >Martin, are you saying that it is never sensible to apply the robustness
> >principle when decoding ASN.1 data?
> >
> >http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robustness_principle
> 
> NO is a good answer here, and in most security contexts.
> 
> ASN.1 decoding should, under the best circumstances, identify the
> error so that an RP can try to "persuade" the issuer of broken certs,
> CRLs, etc. to fix them. The decoded ought not core dump. But it also
> should reject invalid syntax. Failign to do so merely encourages the
> issuance of broken certs etc., and eventually imposes a burden on all
> RPs to accommodate errors by some issuers.
> 
> Steve

I was actually thinking of PKCS#10 CSRs when I asked that question.  When we 
launched our CA ~10 years ago, my ASN.1 CSR decoder only accepted CSRs that 
were encoded 100% correctly.  Over time, I've had to relax the rules several 
times to accommodate various varieties of broken encoding.  I've never been 
able to suggest a business case for turning away customers just because their 
CSR generation software contains bugs!

CAs are the "terminal endpoint" for CSRs, so hopefully Martin will forgive me.  
;-)

Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online

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Subject: Re: [pkix] fyi: Sovereign Keys: an EFF proposal for more secure TLS
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At 9:51 AM +0000 12/19/11, Rob Stradling wrote:
>On Sunday 18 Dec 2011 20:40:06 Stephen Kent wrote:
>>  At 9:06 AM +0000 12/16/11, Rob Stradling wrote:
>>  >O...
>>  >
>>  >Martin, are you saying that it is never sensible to apply the robustness
>>  >principle when decoding ASN.1 data?
>>  >
>>  >http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robustness_principle
>>
>>  NO is a good answer here, and in most security contexts.
>>
>>  ASN.1 decoding should, under the best circumstances, identify the
>>  error so that an RP can try to "persuade" the issuer of broken certs,
>>  CRLs, etc. to fix them. The decoded ought not core dump. But it also
>>  should reject invalid syntax. Failign to do so merely encourages the
>>  issuance of broken certs etc., and eventually imposes a burden on all
>>  RPs to accommodate errors by some issuers.
>>
>>  Steve
>
>I was actually thinking of PKCS#10 CSRs when I asked that question.  When we
>launched our CA ~10 years ago, my ASN.1 CSR decoder only accepted CSRs that
>were encoded 100% correctly.  Over time, I've had to relax the rules several
>times to accommodate various varieties of broken encoding.  I've never been
>able to suggest a business case for turning away customers just because their
>CSR generation software contains bugs!
>
>CAs are the "terminal endpoint" for CSRs, so hopefully Martin will 
>forgive me. 
>;-)
>
>Rob Stradling
>Senior Research & Development Scientist
>COMODO - Creating Trust Online

I understand the commercial rationale for such behavior, but I think
we agree that it results in precisely the problem I noted.

Steve



From rob.stradling@comodo.com  Mon Dec 19 07:10:38 2011
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On Monday 19 Dec 2011 14:38:31 Stephen Kent wrote:
> At 9:51 AM +0000 12/19/11, Rob Stradling wrote:
> >On Sunday 18 Dec 2011 20:40:06 Stephen Kent wrote:
> >>  At 9:06 AM +0000 12/16/11, Rob Stradling wrote:
> >>  >O...
> >>  >
> >>  >Martin, are you saying that it is never sensible to apply the
> >>  >robustness principle when decoding ASN.1 data?
> >>  >
> >>  >http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robustness_principle
> >>  
> >>  NO is a good answer here, and in most security contexts.
> >>  
> >>  ASN.1 decoding should, under the best circumstances, identify the
> >>  error so that an RP can try to "persuade" the issuer of broken certs,
> >>  CRLs, etc. to fix them. The decoded ought not core dump. But it also
> >>  should reject invalid syntax. Failign to do so merely encourages the
> >>  issuance of broken certs etc., and eventually imposes a burden on all
> >>  RPs to accommodate errors by some issuers.
> >>  
> >>  Steve
> >
> >I was actually thinking of PKCS#10 CSRs when I asked that question.  When
> >we launched our CA ~10 years ago, my ASN.1 CSR decoder only accepted CSRs
> >that were encoded 100% correctly.  Over time, I've had to relax the rules
> >several times to accommodate various varieties of broken encoding.  I've
> >never been able to suggest a business case for turning away customers
> >just because their CSR generation software contains bugs!
> >
> >CAs are the "terminal endpoint" for CSRs, so hopefully Martin will
> >forgive me.
> >;-)
> >
> >Rob Stradling
> >Senior Research & Development Scientist
> >COMODO - Creating Trust Online
> 
> I understand the commercial rationale for such behavior, but I think
> we agree that it results in precisely the problem I noted.

Relaxing the decoding rules certainly doesn't alleviate the problem, but IMHO 
it doesn't necessarily make the problem any worse.  For example, if we'd 
decided instead to persist with only allowing correctly encoded CSRs, 
customers with broken CSR generation software would've simply gone to a 
different CA that did accept their incorrectly encoded CSRs.  There would still 
be no incentive for the authors of the broken software to fix their code.

But as for discouraging incorrectly encoded certificates: if just one major TLS 
Client rejected Adam's "terrible thing" signature algorithm parameters hack, 
then I'd imagine this would provide sufficient incentive for Adam to abandon the 
idea.

> Steve

Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online

From agl@google.com  Mon Dec 19 07:23:53 2011
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On Mon, Dec 19, 2011 at 10:10 AM, Rob Stradling
<rob.stradling@comodo.com> wrote:
> But as for discouraging incorrectly encoded certificates: if just one major TLS
> Client rejected Adam's "terrible thing" signature algorithm parameters hack,
> then I'd imagine this would provide sufficient incentive for Adam to abandon the
> idea.

That's pretty much true - our tolerance for breaking things is pretty limited.

As a browser, we're in largely the same situation as the CAs ("there's
no point in taking a hard line because users will just move to a
different browser.") None the less, we do try to win small victories
where we can, and we take a fair amount of flack for it. (We banned
EDH parameters < 512 bits rather than work around it. We're pushing
1/n-1 record splitting before Firefox and IE, and thus taking a lot of
the heat. We're banning MD2/4/5 in certificate chains. We're banning
RSA keys < 1024 bits.)

But a way to include extra data in a certificate chain is valuable,
and not just for us (i.e.
https://github.com/moxie0/Convergence/wiki/TACK). We'll take it if we
can, even if it means having to pinch our noses.


Cheers

AGL

From rob.stradling@comodo.com  Mon Dec 19 07:44:15 2011
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On Monday 19 Dec 2011 15:23:51 Adam Langley wrote:
> On Mon, Dec 19, 2011 at 10:10 AM, Rob Stradling
> 
> <rob.stradling@comodo.com> wrote:
> > But as for discouraging incorrectly encoded certificates: if just one
> > major TLS Client rejected Adam's "terrible thing" signature algorithm
> > parameters hack, then I'd imagine this would provide sufficient
> > incentive for Adam to abandon the idea.
> 
> That's pretty much true - our tolerance for breaking things is pretty
> limited.
> 
> As a browser, we're in largely the same situation as the CAs ("there's
> no point in taking a hard line because users will just move to a
> different browser.") None the less, we do try to win small victories
> where we can, and we take a fair amount of flack for it. (We banned
> EDH parameters < 512 bits rather than work around it. We're pushing
> 1/n-1 record splitting before Firefox and IE, and thus taking a lot of
> the heat. We're banning MD2/4/5 in certificate chains. We're banning
> RSA keys < 1024 bits.)
> 
> But a way to include extra data in a certificate chain is valuable,
> and not just for us (i.e.
> https://github.com/moxie0/Convergence/wiki/TACK). We'll take it if we
> can, even if it means having to pinch our noses.

Adam, now you've got me wondering if I was too hasty to abandon [2] the idea 
of using an "extra certificate" for sending (multiple) OCSP Responses without 
requiring webserver code changes! [1]

openssl s_client -connect ocspstaplingtest.comodoca.com:443
(sorry for the expired cert; like I said, I'd abandoned the idea!)

[1] 
https://groups.google.com/group/mozilla.dev.security.policy/browse_thread/thread/9b09a0d97ef8be52/28b508b67dfefc55?lnk=gst&q=another+different+idea#28b508b67dfefc55

[2] 
https://groups.google.com/group/mozilla.dev.security.policy/browse_thread/thread/9b09a0d97ef8be52/091f20438aecaeb6?lnk=gst&q=another+stapling+hack+idea#091f20438aecaeb6

> Cheers
> 
> AGL

Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online

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On Mon, Dec 19, 2011 at 10:44 AM, Rob Stradling
<rob.stradling@comodo.com> wrote:
> Adam, now you've got me wondering if I was too hasty to abandon [2] the idea
> of using an "extra certificate" for sending (multiple) OCSP Responses without
> requiring webserver code changes! [1]
>
> openssl s_client -connect ocspstaplingtest.comodoca.com:443
> (sorry for the expired cert; like I said, I'd abandoned the idea!)

It's too early to say. I need to run an experiment to gauge the
effectiveness of wedging data into the certificate chain with the
fleet of clients that are out there. Obviously, we have a reasonably
popular web site with which we can try and run this experiment, but
setting up such a thing will take a couple of months given that
Christmas is in the way.

As I mentioned, if we do find that it's effective, I'm certainly not
going to define a format that excludes anything else in the future.
And, since the code change should be very small, I'd also be happy to
put OCSP multi-stapling via the cert chain into Chrome.


Cheers

AGL

From kent@bbn.com  Mon Dec 19 07:54:47 2011
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>  > I understand the commercial rationale for such behavior, but I think
>  > we agree that it results in precisely the problem I noted.
>
>Relaxing the decoding rules certainly doesn't alleviate the problem, but IMHO
>it doesn't necessarily make the problem any worse.  For example, if we'd
>decided instead to persist with only allowing correctly encoded CSRs,
>customers with broken CSR generation software would've simply gone to a
>different CA that did accept their incorrectly encoded CSRs.  There 
>would still
>be no incentive for the authors of the broken software to fix their code.

The ability to go to a second CA that does not require correct syntax 
arises precisely because such CA behavior is not perceived as "bad." 
Slippery slope, v2 :-).

>But as for discouraging incorrectly encoded certificates: if just 
>one major TLS  Client rejected Adam's "terrible thing" signature 
>algorithm parameters hack,  then I'd imagine this would provide 
>sufficient incentive for Adam to abandon the
>idea.

yes, that would be a nice outcome. but, given the very poor track record of
browsers (in general) correctly implementing correct cert processing 
I am not encouraged.

Steve

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-----Original Message-----
From: Stephen Kent
> From: Rob Stradling
>> Relaxing the decoding rules certainly doesn't alleviate the problem,=20
>> but IMHO it doesn't necessarily make the problem any worse.  For=20
>> example, if we'd decided instead to persist with only allowing=20
>> correctly encoded CSRs, customers with broken CSR generation software

>> would've simply gone to a different CA that did accept their=20
>> incorrectly encoded CSRs.  There would still be no incentive for the=20
>> authors of the broken software to fix their code.
>
> The ability to go to a second CA that does not require correct
> syntax arises precisely because such CA behavior is not
> perceived as "bad."=20

Accept/Reject is a false dichotomy.  Why is Flag not among the
alternatives:

"Warning: the certificate signing request submitted by browser <UA
string> is garbled.  We've done our best to interpret your request, but
please check to ensure that the certificate is acceptable before putting
it to use."

That ought to shame any vendor capable of feeling shame :-).

Dave=20

From mrex@sap.com  Mon Dec 19 08:34:10 2011
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To: rob.stradling@comodo.com (Rob Stradling)
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Rob Stradling wrote:
> 
> > At 9:06 AM +0000 12/16/11, Rob Stradling wrote:
> > >
> > >Martin, are you saying that it is never sensible to apply the robustness
> > >principle when decoding ASN.1 data?
> > >
> > >http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robustness_principle
> 
> I was actually thinking of PKCS#10 CSRs when I asked that question.  When we 
> launched our CA ~10 years ago, my ASN.1 CSR decoder only accepted CSRs that 
> were encoded 100% correctly.  Over time, I've had to relax the rules several 
> times to accommodate various varieties of broken encoding.  I've never been 
> able to suggest a business case for turning away customers just because their 
> CSR generation software contains bugs!
> 
> CAs are the "terminal endpoint" for CSRs, so hopefully Martin will
> forgive me.  ;-)

Correct, for PKCS#10 I would consider it OK to tolerate _some_ amount
of non-conformance -- in case that you ensure that none of that
incorrect ASN.1 gets incoporated into the issued certificate.
But I would still exclude errors on the PKCS#10 signature and its encoding
from that tolerance.


There is also a difference between inaccuracies that are detected late,
(like incorrect DER-encoding of unused bits on named BitStrings),
which probably resulted in this recommendation in ITU-T X.509 11/2008, pg 11

    When checking signatures in received data, it shall check the
    signature against the actual data received rather than its
    conversion of the received data to a distinguished encoding.


-Martin

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On Mon, Dec 19, 2011 at 4:29 PM, Kemp, David P. <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil> wro=
te:
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Stephen Kent
>> From: Rob Stradling
>>> Relaxing the decoding rules certainly doesn't alleviate the problem,
>>> but IMHO it doesn't necessarily make the problem any worse. =A0For
>>> example, if we'd decided instead to persist with only allowing
>>> correctly encoded CSRs, customers with broken CSR generation software
>
>>> would've simply gone to a different CA that did accept their
>>> incorrectly encoded CSRs. =A0There would still be no incentive for the
>>> authors of the broken software to fix their code.
>>
>> The ability to go to a second CA that does not require correct
>> syntax arises precisely because such CA behavior is not
>> perceived as "bad."
>
> Accept/Reject is a false dichotomy. =A0Why is Flag not among the
> alternatives:
>
> "Warning: the certificate signing request submitted by browser <UA
> string> is garbled. =A0We've done our best to interpret your request, but
> please check to ensure that the certificate is acceptable before putting
> it to use."

Because what that actually says, despite the words on it, is "do you
want to go to the site you just went to or not?". Naturally, the
answer is generally "yes".

> That ought to shame any vendor capable of feeling shame :-).
>
> Dave
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix

From mstjohns@comcast.net  Mon Dec 19 09:35:20 2011
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Let me pile on with Steve and say that the robustness principle has two parts. The first - which seems to be overlooked here -  is "be conservative in what you send".  

For security you need to be a) conservative in what you send and b) a total and utter paranoid in what you accept.

More comments coming to other emails.

Mike


At 03:40 PM 12/18/2011, Stephen Kent wrote:
>At 9:06 AM +0000 12/16/11, Rob Stradling wrote:
>>O...
>>
>>Martin, are you saying that it is never sensible to apply the robustness
>>principle when decoding ASN.1 data?
>>
>>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robustness_principle
>
>NO is a good answer here, and in most security contexts.
>
>ASN.1 decoding should, under the best circumstances, identify the error so that an RP can try to "persuade" the issuer of broken certs, CRLs, etc. to fix them. The decoded ought not core dump. But it also should reject invalid syntax. Failign to do so merely encourages the issuance of broken certs etc., and eventually imposes a burden on all RPs to accommodate errors by some issuers.
>
>Steve
>_______________________________________________
>pkix mailing list
>pkix@ietf.org
>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix



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As I mentioned in my private note to you, I find your analysis of X.509 and RFC5280 unconvincing.

Encoding issues first:
1) The ASN1 SIGNED macro uses the signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmId value in the outer wrapper to determine the signature type used to validate the signature.
2) X.509 says that "signature contains the algorithm identifier for the algorithm and hash function used by the CA in signing the certificate" for the inside signature AlgorithmId.  That's in ADDITION to the outside algorithmIdentifier and is a strong indicate tha X.509 expects them to be identical.
3)  RFC 5280 says (4.1.1.2)  about the certificate inside "signature field"
 This field MUST contain the same algorithm identifier as the
   signature field in the sequence tbsCertificate (Section 4.1.2.3).
4) Not all signature algorithms have NULL for their parameters field (for example RSA PSS)
5) The certificate processing description in RFC5280 does not say "ensure the ASN1 and certificate is properly encoded" as that's pretty much a no-brainer.  Under your argument, I could pass in a signed object that just sort of looked like a certificate but had additional fields inside the signature wrapper and that would be OK since the signature just happened to verify and I was able to find all the certificate fields.

For implementations:
I believe at least a few implementations just do a look up of the encoded AlgorithmIdentifier rather than parsing out the OID in the AlgId.  So any mucking about with the field will cause things to fail.

So how about moving on from this rather *hackish* idea.  The RPs that *might* accept are obviously broken.

Mike





At 12:56 PM 12/15/2011, Martin Rex wrote:
>Ben Laurie wrote:
>> 
>> Martin Rex wrote:
>> >
>> > Ben Laurie wrote:
>> > >
>> > > Parameters on the signature algorithm :-)
>> >
>> > My SSL client fails with an ASN.1 decoding error.
>> >
>> > which is pretty much in compliance with
>> > http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3447#appendix-A.2.4
>> >
>> >   A.2.4 RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5
>> >
>> >   The object identifier for RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 shall be one of the
>> >   following.  The choice of OID depends on the choice of hash
>> >   algorithm: MD2, MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, or SHA-512.  Note that
>> >   if either MD2 or MD5 is used, then the OID is just as in PKCS #1
>> >   v1.5.  For each OID, the parameters field associated with this OID in
>> >   a value of type AlgorithmIdentifier shall have a value of type NULL.
>> 
>> BTW, 3447 is not normative on the content of certificates, only the
>> contents of signatures :-)
>
>rfc3447 *IS* normative on the ASN.1 encoding and decoding for the
>sha1WithRSAEncryption AlgId.
>
>  ITU-T Rec. X.509 11/2008  page 12:
>
>
>  AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM:SupportedAlgorithms} ::= SEQUENCE {
>    algorithm ALGORITHM.&id ({SupportedAlgorithms}),
>    parameters ALGORITHM.&Type ({SupportedAlgorithms}{ @algorithm}) OPTIONAL }
>
>  -- Definition of the following information object set is deferred,
>  -- perhaps to standardized profiles or to protocol implementation
>  -- conformance statements. The set is required to specify a table
>  -- constraint on the parameters component of AlgorithmIdentifier.
>
>  SupportedAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= { ... }
>
>in combination with rfc-3447 PKCS #1 v2.1, page 57 (ASN.1 Module):
>
>  --
>  -- When the following OIDs are used in an AlgorithmIdentifier the
>  -- parameters MUST be present and MUST be NULL.
>  --
>  md2WithRSAEncryption       OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 2 }
>  md5WithRSAEncryption       OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 4 }
>  sha1WithRSAEncryption      OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 5 }
>  sha256WithRSAEncryption    OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 11 }
>  sha384WithRSAEncryption    OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 12 }
>  sha512WithRSAEncryption    OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 13 }
>
>
>Differing values for signatureAlgorithm on the outer Certificate
>structure and the TBSCertificate structure, on the other hand,
>might(!) be ignored by RPs when verifying the certificate,
>because there exists no requirement to compare these fields
>in rfc5280 6.1.3 Basic Certificate Processing (and neither am I
>aware of any such requirement in ITU-T Rec. X.509 11/2008).
>
>
>-Martin
>_______________________________________________
>pkix mailing list
>pkix@ietf.org
>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix


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Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"

<html>
<body>
As I mentioned in my private note to you, I find your analysis of X.509
and RFC5280 unconvincing.<br><br>
Encoding issues first:<br>
1) The ASN1 SIGNED macro uses the signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmId value in
the outer wrapper to determine the signature type used to validate the
signature.<br>
2) X.509 says that &quot;<font size=2><b>signature </b></font>contains
the algorithm identifier for the algorithm and hash function used by the
CA in signing the certificate&quot; for the inside signature
AlgorithmId.&nbsp; That's in ADDITION to the outside algorithmIdentifier
and is a strong indicate tha X.509 expects them to be identical.<br>
3)&nbsp; RFC 5280 says (4.1.1.2)&nbsp; about the certificate inside
&quot;signature field&quot;<br>
<pre>&nbsp;This field MUST contain the same algorithm identifier as the
&nbsp;&nbsp; signature field in the sequence tbsCertificate (Section
4.1.2.3).
4) Not all signature algorithms have NULL for their parameters field (for
example RSA PSS)
5) The certificate processing description in RFC5280 does not say
&quot;ensure the ASN1 and certificate is properly encoded&quot; as that's
pretty much a no-brainer.&nbsp; Under your argument, I could pass in a
signed object that just sort of looked like a certificate but had
additional fields inside the signature wrapper and that would be OK since
the signature just happened to verify and I was able to find all the
certificate fields.

For implementations:
I believe at least a few implementations just do a look up of the encoded
AlgorithmIdentifier rather than parsing out the OID in the AlgId.&nbsp;
So any mucking about with the field will cause things to fail.

So how about moving on from this rather *hackish* idea.&nbsp; The RPs
that *might* accept are obviously broken.

Mike





</pre>At 12:56 PM 12/15/2011, Martin Rex wrote:<br>
<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite="">Ben Laurie wrote:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Martin Rex wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; Ben Laurie wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; Parameters on the signature algorithm :-)<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; My SSL client fails with an ASN.1 decoding error.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; which is pretty much in compliance with<br>
&gt; &gt;
<a href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3447#appendix-A.2.4" eudora="autourl">
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3447#appendix-A.2.4</a><br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; A.2.4 RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; The object identifier for RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 shall
be one of the<br>
&gt; &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; following.&nbsp; The choice of OID depends on the
choice of hash<br>
&gt; &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; algorithm: MD2, MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, or
SHA-512.&nbsp; Note that<br>
&gt; &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; if either MD2 or MD5 is used, then the OID is just
as in PKCS #1<br>
&gt; &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; v1.5.&nbsp; For each OID, the parameters field
associated with this OID in<br>
&gt; &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; a value of type AlgorithmIdentifier shall have a
value of type NULL.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; BTW, 3447 is not normative on the content of certificates, only
the<br>
&gt; contents of signatures :-)<br><br>
rfc3447 *IS* normative on the ASN.1 encoding and decoding for the<br>
sha1WithRSAEncryption AlgId.<br><br>
&nbsp; ITU-T Rec. X.509 11/2008&nbsp; page 12:<br><br>
<br>
&nbsp; AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM:SupportedAlgorithms} ::= SEQUENCE
{<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; algorithm ALGORITHM.&amp;id
({SupportedAlgorithms}),<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; parameters ALGORITHM.&amp;Type ({SupportedAlgorithms}{
@algorithm}) OPTIONAL }<br><br>
&nbsp; -- Definition of the following information object set is
deferred,<br>
&nbsp; -- perhaps to standardized profiles or to protocol
implementation<br>
&nbsp; -- conformance statements. The set is required to specify a
table<br>
&nbsp; -- constraint on the parameters component of
AlgorithmIdentifier.<br><br>
&nbsp; SupportedAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= { ... }<br><br>
in combination with rfc-3447 PKCS #1 v2.1, page 57 (ASN.1
Module):<br><br>
&nbsp; --<br>
&nbsp; -- When the following OIDs are used in an AlgorithmIdentifier
the<br>
&nbsp; -- parameters MUST be present and MUST be NULL.<br>
&nbsp; --<br>
&nbsp; md2WithRSAEncryption&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; OBJECT
IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 2 }<br>
&nbsp; md5WithRSAEncryption&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; OBJECT
IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 4 }<br>
&nbsp; sha1WithRSAEncryption&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; OBJECT
IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 5 }<br>
&nbsp; sha256WithRSAEncryption&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
pkcs-1 11 }<br>
&nbsp; sha384WithRSAEncryption&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
pkcs-1 12 }<br>
&nbsp; sha512WithRSAEncryption&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
pkcs-1 13 }<br><br>
<br>
Differing values for signatureAlgorithm on the outer Certificate<br>
structure and the TBSCertificate structure, on the other hand,<br>
might(!) be ignored by RPs when verifying the certificate,<br>
because there exists no requirement to compare these fields<br>
in rfc5280 6.1.3 Basic Certificate Processing (and neither am I<br>
aware of any such requirement in ITU-T Rec. X.509 11/2008).<br><br>
<br>
-Martin<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
pkix mailing list<br>
pkix@ietf.org<br>
<a href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix" eudora="autourl">
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix</a></blockquote></body>
<br>
</html>

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+1

This is a standards process and while support for legacy platforms is good
there is a major difference between supporting a legacy platform with a bug
and exploiting that bug to deploy a new feature.

There is no way that we can be sure that all software and hardware out
there is going to be tolerate this form of abuse. In particular I suspect
that it is the type of check that FIPS140 certified HSMs are likely to do.


The parameters issue actually came up in another forum last week. The spec
apparently allows DSA certs to inherit parameters from higher certs in the
chain. This creates an opportunity to attack where a CA issues a cross cert
with malicious parameters.


On Mon, Dec 19, 2011 at 12:56 PM, Michael StJohns <mstjohns@comcast.net>wrote:

>  As I mentioned in my private note to you, I find your analysis of X.509
> and RFC5280 unconvincing.
>
> Encoding issues first:
> 1) The ASN1 SIGNED macro uses the signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmId value in
> the outer wrapper to determine the signature type used to validate the
> signature.
> 2) X.509 says that "*signature *contains the algorithm identifier for the
> algorithm and hash function used by the CA in signing the certificate" for
> the inside signature AlgorithmId.  That's in ADDITION to the outside
> algorithmIdentifier and is a strong indicate tha X.509 expects them to be
> identical.
> 3)  RFC 5280 says (4.1.1.2)  about the certificate inside "signature field"
>
>  This field MUST contain the same algorithm identifier as the
>    signature field in the sequence tbsCertificate (Section
> 4.1.2.3).
> 4) Not all signature algorithms have NULL for their parameters field (for
> example RSA PSS)
> 5) The certificate processing description in RFC5280 does not say
> "ensure the ASN1 and certificate is properly encoded" as that's
> pretty much a no-brainer.  Under your argument, I could pass in a
> signed object that just sort of looked like a certificate but had
> additional fields inside the signature wrapper and that would be OK since
> the signature just happened to verify and I was able to find all the
> certificate fields.
>
> For implementations:
> I believe at least a few implementations just do a look up of the encoded
> AlgorithmIdentifier rather than parsing out the OID in the AlgId.
> So any mucking about with the field will cause things to fail.
>
> So how about moving on from this rather *hackish* idea.  The RPs
> that *might* accept are obviously broken.
>
> Mike
>
>
>
>
>
>
> At 12:56 PM 12/15/2011, Martin Rex wrote:
>
> Ben Laurie wrote:
> >
> > Martin Rex wrote:
> > >
> > > Ben Laurie wrote:
> > > >
> > > > Parameters on the signature algorithm :-)
> > >
> > > My SSL client fails with an ASN.1 decoding error.
> > >
> > > which is pretty much in compliance with
> > > http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3447#appendix-A.2.4
> > >
> > >   A.2.4 RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5
> > >
> > >   The object identifier for RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 shall be one of the
> > >   following.  The choice of OID depends on the choice of hash
> > >   algorithm: MD2, MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, or SHA-512.  Note that
> > >   if either MD2 or MD5 is used, then the OID is just as in PKCS #1
> > >   v1.5.  For each OID, the parameters field associated with this OID in
> > >   a value of type AlgorithmIdentifier shall have a value of type NULL.
> >
> > BTW, 3447 is not normative on the content of certificates, only the
> > contents of signatures :-)
>
> rfc3447 *IS* normative on the ASN.1 encoding and decoding for the
> sha1WithRSAEncryption AlgId.
>
>   ITU-T Rec. X.509 11/2008  page 12:
>
>
>   AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM:SupportedAlgorithms} ::= SEQUENCE {
>     algorithm ALGORITHM.&id ({SupportedAlgorithms}),
>     parameters ALGORITHM.&Type ({SupportedAlgorithms}{ @algorithm})
> OPTIONAL }
>
>   -- Definition of the following information object set is deferred,
>   -- perhaps to standardized profiles or to protocol implementation
>   -- conformance statements. The set is required to specify a table
>   -- constraint on the parameters component of AlgorithmIdentifier.
>
>   SupportedAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= { ... }
>
> in combination with rfc-3447 PKCS #1 v2.1, page 57 (ASN.1 Module):
>
>   --
>   -- When the following OIDs are used in an AlgorithmIdentifier the
>   -- parameters MUST be present and MUST be NULL.
>   --
>   md2WithRSAEncryption       OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 2 }
>   md5WithRSAEncryption       OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 4 }
>   sha1WithRSAEncryption      OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 5 }
>   sha256WithRSAEncryption    OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 11 }
>   sha384WithRSAEncryption    OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 12 }
>   sha512WithRSAEncryption    OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 13 }
>
>
> Differing values for signatureAlgorithm on the outer Certificate
> structure and the TBSCertificate structure, on the other hand,
> might(!) be ignored by RPs when verifying the certificate,
> because there exists no requirement to compare these fields
> in rfc5280 6.1.3 Basic Certificate Processing (and neither am I
> aware of any such requirement in ITU-T Rec. X.509 11/2008).
>
>
> -Martin
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
>  https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>
>


-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

--f46d0444ef298c92d304b475d3fc
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
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+1<div><br></div><div>This is a standards process and while support for leg=
acy platforms is good there is a major difference between supporting a lega=
cy platform with a bug and exploiting that bug to deploy a new feature.</di=
v>
<div><br></div><div>There is no way that we can be sure that all software a=
nd hardware out there is going to be tolerate this form of abuse. In partic=
ular I suspect that it is the type of check that FIPS140 certified HSMs are=
 likely to do.</div>
<div><br></div><div><br></div><div>The parameters issue actually came up in=
 another forum last week. The spec apparently allows DSA certs to inherit p=
arameters from higher certs in the chain. This creates an opportunity to at=
tack where a CA issues a cross cert with malicious parameters.</div>
<div><br></div><div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Mon, Dec 19, 2011 at =
12:56 PM, Michael StJohns <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mstjohns@=
comcast.net">mstjohns@comcast.net</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote clas=
s=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;pad=
ding-left:1ex">

<div>
As I mentioned in my private note to you, I find your analysis of X.509
and RFC5280 unconvincing.<br><br>
Encoding issues first:<br>
1) The ASN1 SIGNED macro uses the signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmId value in
the outer wrapper to determine the signature type used to validate the
signature.<br>
2) X.509 says that &quot;<font><b>signature </b></font>contains
the algorithm identifier for the algorithm and hash function used by the
CA in signing the certificate&quot; for the inside signature
AlgorithmId.=A0 That&#39;s in ADDITION to the outside algorithmIdentifier
and is a strong indicate tha X.509 expects them to be identical.<br>
3)=A0 RFC 5280 says (4.1.1.2)=A0 about the certificate inside
&quot;signature field&quot;<br>
<pre>=A0This field MUST contain the same algorithm identifier as the
=A0=A0 signature field in the sequence tbsCertificate (Section
4.1.2.3).
4) Not all signature algorithms have NULL for their parameters field (for
example RSA PSS)
5) The certificate processing description in RFC5280 does not say
&quot;ensure the ASN1 and certificate is properly encoded&quot; as that&#39=
;s
pretty much a no-brainer.=A0 Under your argument, I could pass in a
signed object that just sort of looked like a certificate but had
additional fields inside the signature wrapper and that would be OK since
the signature just happened to verify and I was able to find all the
certificate fields.

For implementations:
I believe at least a few implementations just do a look up of the encoded
AlgorithmIdentifier rather than parsing out the OID in the AlgId.=A0
So any mucking about with the field will cause things to fail.

So how about moving on from this rather *hackish* idea.=A0 The RPs
that *might* accept are obviously broken.

Mike





</pre><div><div class=3D"h5">At 12:56 PM 12/15/2011, Martin Rex wrote:<br>
<blockquote type=3D"cite">Ben Laurie wrote:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Martin Rex wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; Ben Laurie wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; Parameters on the signature algorithm :-)<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; My SSL client fails with an ASN.1 decoding error.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; which is pretty much in compliance with<br>
&gt; &gt;
<a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3447#appendix-A.2.4" target=3D"_bl=
ank">
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3447#appendix-A.2.4</a><br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;=A0=A0 A.2.4 RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;=A0=A0 The object identifier for RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 shall
be one of the<br>
&gt; &gt;=A0=A0 following.=A0 The choice of OID depends on the
choice of hash<br>
&gt; &gt;=A0=A0 algorithm: MD2, MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, or
SHA-512.=A0 Note that<br>
&gt; &gt;=A0=A0 if either MD2 or MD5 is used, then the OID is just
as in PKCS #1<br>
&gt; &gt;=A0=A0 v1.5.=A0 For each OID, the parameters field
associated with this OID in<br>
&gt; &gt;=A0=A0 a value of type AlgorithmIdentifier shall have a
value of type NULL.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; BTW, 3447 is not normative on the content of certificates, only
the<br>
&gt; contents of signatures :-)<br><br>
rfc3447 *IS* normative on the ASN.1 encoding and decoding for the<br>
sha1WithRSAEncryption AlgId.<br><br>
=A0 ITU-T Rec. X.509 11/2008=A0 page 12:<br><br>
<br>
=A0 AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM:SupportedAlgorithms} ::=3D SEQUENCE
{<br>
=A0=A0=A0 algorithm ALGORITHM.&amp;id
({SupportedAlgorithms}),<br>
=A0=A0=A0 parameters ALGORITHM.&amp;Type ({SupportedAlgorithms}{
@algorithm}) OPTIONAL }<br><br>
=A0 -- Definition of the following information object set is
deferred,<br>
=A0 -- perhaps to standardized profiles or to protocol
implementation<br>
=A0 -- conformance statements. The set is required to specify a
table<br>
=A0 -- constraint on the parameters component of
AlgorithmIdentifier.<br><br>
=A0 SupportedAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::=3D { ... }<br><br>
in combination with rfc-3447 PKCS #1 v2.1, page 57 (ASN.1
Module):<br><br>
=A0 --<br>
=A0 -- When the following OIDs are used in an AlgorithmIdentifier
the<br>
=A0 -- parameters MUST be present and MUST be NULL.<br>
=A0 --<br>
=A0 md2WithRSAEncryption=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 OBJECT
IDENTIFIER ::=3D { pkcs-1 2 }<br>
=A0 md5WithRSAEncryption=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 OBJECT
IDENTIFIER ::=3D { pkcs-1 4 }<br>
=A0 sha1WithRSAEncryption=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 OBJECT
IDENTIFIER ::=3D { pkcs-1 5 }<br>
=A0 sha256WithRSAEncryption=A0=A0=A0 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=3D {
pkcs-1 11 }<br>
=A0 sha384WithRSAEncryption=A0=A0=A0 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=3D {
pkcs-1 12 }<br>
=A0 sha512WithRSAEncryption=A0=A0=A0 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=3D {
pkcs-1 13 }<br><br>
<br>
Differing values for signatureAlgorithm on the outer Certificate<br>
structure and the TBSCertificate structure, on the other hand,<br>
might(!) be ignored by RPs when verifying the certificate,<br>
because there exists no requirement to compare these fields<br>
in rfc5280 6.1.3 Basic Certificate Processing (and neither am I<br>
aware of any such requirement in ITU-T Rec. X.509 11/2008).<br><br>
<br>
-Martin<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
pkix mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">pkix@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix" target=3D"_blank">
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix</a></blockquote></div></div></di=
v>
<br>

<br>_______________________________________________<br>
pkix mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br>Website:=
 <a href=3D"http://hallambaker.com/">http://hallambaker.com/</a><br><br>
</div>

--f46d0444ef298c92d304b475d3fc--

From mrex@sap.com  Mon Dec 19 11:32:12 2011
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From: Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
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To: mstjohns@comcast.net (Michael StJohns)
Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2011 20:32:05 +0100 (MET)
In-Reply-To: <5e770c39-5543-4113-9f48-e1e4e877f630@DEWDFEEDGE03.wdf.sap.corp> from "Michael StJohns" at Dec 19, 11 12:56:01 pm
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Michael StJohns wrote:
> 
> Encoding issues first:
> 1) The ASN1 SIGNED macro uses the signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmId value
>    in the outer wrapper to determine the signature type used to
>    validate the signature.
>
> 2) X.509 says that "signature contains the algorithm identifier for the
>    algorithm and hash function used by the CA in signing the certificate"
>    for the inside signature AlgorithmId.  That's in ADDITION to the
>    outside algorithmIdentifier and is a strong indicate tha X.509
>    expects them to be identical.

I'm not questioning the "intentions", but it certainly is a flawed assumption
to expect RPs to perform checks that are *NOT* explicitly listed in 6.1.3.
There *might* be implementations that do.


>
> 3)  RFC 5280 says (4.1.1.2)  about the certificate inside "signature field"
>     This field MUST contain the same algorithm identifier as the
>     signature field in the sequence tbsCertificate (Section 4.1.2.3).

It does *NOT* say this in 6.1.3, so it is perfectly OK for an RP
to simply not care.


>
> 4) Not all signature algorithms have NULL for their parameters field
>    (for example RSA PSS)

I know.  ITU-T X.509 11/2008 explictly calls for specification that define
AlgorithmIdentifiers to list exact constraints on valid parameters.
rfc3447 (and its predecessors 2437, 2313) specify NULL.


>
> 5) The certificate processing description in RFC5280 does not say
> "ensure the ASN1 and certificate is properly encoded" as that's pretty
> much a no-brainer.  Under your argument, I could pass in a signed object
> that just sort of looked like a certificate but had additional fields
> inside the signature wrapper and that would be OK since the signature
> just happened to verify and I was able to find all the certificate fields.


I don't think I said that.

RFC5280 certificate path validation requires you to look at details
of TBSCertificate, and when doing ASN.1 decoding, one normally does
all of the stuff that is "visible" in one go, any only the stuff
that is "ANY defined by" might get worked on in additional decoding
steps when considered relevant or necessary -- or may get ignored
otherwise.

That the SignatureAlgorithm on the Certificate structure and the
TBSCertificate structure should be the same is a "semantic" requirement,
something that is *NOT* implemented by the ASN.1 decoder, but rather
the application caller on top of the decoder.  AlgorithmIdentifier
parameters, on the other hand, are defined in a fashion that they
ought to be processed by the ASN.1 decoder.


> 
> For implementations:
> I believe at least a few implementations just do a look up of the
> encoded AlgorithmIdentifier rather than parsing out the OID in the AlgId.
> So any mucking about with the field will cause things to fail.

Curiously, a large percentage of the installed base (which is dominated
by only a few implementations) seems to not care.


> 
> So how about moving on from this rather *hackish* idea.
> The RPs that *might* accept are obviously broken.

Yes, but primarily their ASN.1 decoders seem to be broken.


-Martin

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From: Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
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To: hallam@gmail.com (Phillip Hallam-Baker)
Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2011 20:52:59 +0100 (MET)
In-Reply-To: <CAMm+Lwgzt_AX==0_ZjYP7QyPqnFDnHCzdxvqjyC239SK+fCP5w@mail.gmail.com> from "Phillip Hallam-Baker" at Dec 19, 11 01:07:40 pm
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Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
> 
> The parameters issue actually came up in another forum last week. The spec
> apparently allows DSA certs to inherit parameters from higher certs in the
> chain. This creates an opportunity to attack where a CA issues a cross cert
> with malicious parameters.

I also noticed the goofy DSA AlgorithmIdentifier parameters a short
while ago (because one of those goof-ups is used CMS).

Originally there were these:
  id-dsa           (OID 1.2.840.10040.4.1)  with DSA parameters p,q,g
  id-dsa-with-sha1 (OID 1.2.840.10040.4.3)  with NULL

some CMS implementations abused id-dsa with NULL parameters for
DSA signatures ... but on top of that, there is this crazy idea that
a public key in a certificate tagged with id-dsa and no parameters
should inherit parameters from the issuing CA cert.


I consider the reference of the DSA parameters from the CA certificate
a thoroughly crazy option and we delibertately do not support it
-- we do not have CA certs available when doing the signature processing.

-Martin

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At 8:32 PM +0100 12/19/11, Martin Rex wrote:
>...
>
>It does *NOT* say this in 6.1.3, so it is perfectly OK for an RP
>to simply not care.

Cert processing is presumed to take place using data extracted from a cert.
When cert syntax is violated, this data extraction should fail. The 
requirement that the alg ID in the cert and the alg ID in the sig 
block MUST match applies during the processing of the cert, prior to 
path processing. This might be a syntax-verified operation under the 
updated ASN.1 syntax. In any case, I agree with Mike that code that 
fails to match the two alg IDs creates a vulnerability and is non 
compliant.


>Curiously, a large percentage of the installed base (which is dominated
>by only a few implementations) seems to not care.

Several years ago, Microsoft decided that it was not necessary to match
subject and issuer names durig  path validation. One might assume 
that MS products constitute a non-trivial part of the deployed base. 
Such behavior is still wrong.

Steve

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Subject: Re: [pkix] fyi: Sovereign Keys: an EFF proposal for more
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--=====================_319676702==.ALT
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At 02:32 PM 12/19/2011, Martin Rex wrote:
>Michael StJohns wrote:
>> 
>> Encoding issues first:
>> 1) The ASN1 SIGNED macro uses the signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmId value
>>    in the outer wrapper to determine the signature type used to
>>    validate the signature.
>>
>> 2) X.509 says that "signature contains the algorithm identifier for the
>>    algorithm and hash function used by the CA in signing the certificate"
>>    for the inside signature AlgorithmId.  That's in ADDITION to the
>>    outside algorithmIdentifier and is a strong indicate tha X.509
>>    expects them to be identical.
>
>I'm not questioning the "intentions", but it certainly is a flawed assumption
>to expect RPs to perform checks that are *NOT* explicitly listed in 6.1.3.
>There *might* be implementations that do.

I'm sure there are flawed implementations that do not check the match.  I am sure there are correct  implementations that do.  You can make no assumption which one your RP is.

There are any number of certificate requirements in the body of RFC5280 that are not reiterated in section 6.1.3 (or other where in 6) - that does not mean they are irrelevant for the validation of the certificate.




>>
>> 5) The certificate processing description in RFC5280 does not say
>> "ensure the ASN1 and certificate is properly encoded" as that's pretty
>> much a no-brainer.  Under your argument, I could pass in a signed object
>> that just sort of looked like a certificate but had additional fields
>> inside the signature wrapper and that would be OK since the signature
>> just happened to verify and I was able to find all the certificate fields.
>
>
>I don't think I said that.
>
>RFC5280 certificate path validation requires you to look at details
>of TBSCertificate, and when doing ASN.1 decoding, one normally does
>all of the stuff that is "visible" in one go, any only the stuff
>that is "ANY defined by" might get worked on in additional decoding
>steps when considered relevant or necessary -- or may get ignored
>otherwise.


You hung your hat on 6.1.3 as being the only important part of verifying the certificate so  6.1.3(a) says 


>(a)  Verify the basic certificate information.  The certificate
>           MUST satisfy each of the following:
>
>         (1)  The signature on the certificate can be verified using
>              working_public_key_algorithm, the working_public_key, and
>              the working_public_key_parameters.
>
>         (2)  The certificate validity period includes the current time.
>
>         (3)  At the current time, the certificate is not revoked.  This
>              may be determined by obtaining the appropriate CRL
>              (Section 6.3), by status information, or by out-of-band
>              mechanisms.
>
>         (4)  The certificate issuer name is the working_issuer_name.

No where does it say that the certificate cannot have extra fields past the extensions, so by your argument since 6.1.3. is silent on the extra elements, then a certificate with extra fields - as long as it satisfies the above - would be acceptable.

If you claim that "verify the basic certificate information" covers ensuring correct ASN1 encoding of a Certificate structure, then I claim it also covers ensuring a match between the inside and outside signature algorithm.



--=====================_319676702==.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"

<html>
<body>
At 02:32 PM 12/19/2011, Martin Rex wrote:<br>
<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite="">Michael StJohns wrote:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Encoding issues first:<br>
&gt; 1) The ASN1 SIGNED macro uses the signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmId
value<br>
&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; in the outer wrapper to determine the signature
type used to<br>
&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; validate the signature.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; 2) X.509 says that &quot;signature contains the algorithm identifier
for the<br>
&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; algorithm and hash function used by the CA in
signing the certificate&quot;<br>
&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; for the inside signature AlgorithmId.&nbsp; That's
in ADDITION to the<br>
&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; outside algorithmIdentifier and is a strong
indicate tha X.509<br>
&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; expects them to be identical.<br><br>
I'm not questioning the &quot;intentions&quot;, but it certainly is a
flawed assumption<br>
to expect RPs to perform checks that are *NOT* explicitly listed in
6.1.3.<br>
There *might* be implementations that do.</blockquote><br>
I'm sure there are flawed implementations that do not check the
match.&nbsp; I am sure there are correct&nbsp; implementations that
do.&nbsp; You can make no assumption which one your RP is.<br><br>
There are any number of certificate requirements in the body of RFC5280
that are not reiterated in section 6.1.3 (or other where in 6) - that
does not mean they are irrelevant for the validation of the
certificate.<br><br>
<br><br>
<br>
<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite="">&gt;<br>
&gt; 5) The certificate processing description in RFC5280 does not
say<br>
&gt; &quot;ensure the ASN1 and certificate is properly encoded&quot; as
that's pretty<br>
&gt; much a no-brainer.&nbsp; Under your argument, I could pass in a
signed object<br>
&gt; that just sort of looked like a certificate but had additional
fields<br>
&gt; inside the signature wrapper and that would be OK since the
signature<br>
&gt; just happened to verify and I was able to find all the certificate
fields.<br><br>
<br>
I don't think I said that.<br><br>
RFC5280 certificate path validation requires you to look at details<br>
of TBSCertificate, and when doing ASN.1 decoding, one normally does<br>
all of the stuff that is &quot;visible&quot; in one go, any only the
stuff<br>
that is &quot;ANY defined by&quot; might get worked on in additional
decoding<br>
steps when considered relevant or necessary -- or may get ignored<br>
otherwise.</blockquote><br><br>
You hung your hat on 6.1.3 as being the only important part of verifying
the certificate so&nbsp; 6.1.3(a) says <br><br>
<br>
<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite=""><pre>(a)&nbsp; Verify the basic
certificate information.&nbsp; The certificate
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; MUST satisfy
each of the following:

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; (1)&nbsp; The signature
on the certificate can be verified using
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
working_public_key_algorithm, the working_public_key, and
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
the working_public_key_parameters.

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; (2)&nbsp; The
certificate validity period includes the current time.

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; (3)&nbsp; At the current
time, the certificate is not revoked.&nbsp; This
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
may be determined by obtaining the appropriate CRL
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
(Section 6.3), by status information, or by out-of-band
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
mechanisms.

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; (4)&nbsp; The
certificate issuer name is the working_issuer_name.
</pre><font face="Courier New, Courier"></font></blockquote><br>
No where does it say that the certificate cannot have extra fields past
the extensions, so by your argument since 6.1.3. is silent on the extra
elements, then a certificate with extra fields - as long as it satisfies
the above - would be acceptable.<br><br>
If you claim that &quot;verify the basic certificate information&quot;
covers ensuring correct ASN1 encoding of a Certificate structure, then I
claim it also covers ensuring a match between the inside and outside
signature algorithm.<br><br>
</body>
<br>
</html>

--=====================_319676702==.ALT--


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From: "Hill, Brad" <bhill@paypal-inc.com>
To: Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>, Adam Langley <agl@google.com>, "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2011 15:28:57 -0700
Thread-Topic: CA T&A proofs as cert extensions.  WAS: [pkix] fyi: Sovereign Keys
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Subject: [pkix] CA T&A proofs as cert extensions. WAS: fyi: Sovereign Keys
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Rob and others,

  Catching up on this list, I see you've also thought of an idea I'd sent a=
n email to Ben and Adam about privately on the 12th, and have been refining=
 in consultation with some other folks: including the CA Transparency and A=
uditability proof as an extension in the issued certificate.

Since it's clear it's not a completely unobvious idea, I'll share what I've=
 got so far here to get it out in public and hopefully further the discussi=
on.  (though it may be premature to get into details at this level) Given t=
he evidence of the uptake rate of renegotiation fixes, TLS 1.1 intolerance =
and plain ordinary misconfiguration, I think that any scheme that relies on=
 server operators making configuration changes isn't going to be hard-fail =
before I retire.  I think there are natural incentives for CAs to participa=
te in a scheme like this and if they do it makes full deployment look possi=
ble.
-------------------

Before beginning this protocol, the CA generates a key pair and leaf certif=
icate (Basic Constraints CA=3Dfalse) intended specifically for use in this =
protocol.  The purpose of this new certificate is to allow the CA to authen=
ticate itself to the log without adding additional attack surface from this=
 protocol to the standard issuing certificate private key. The new certific=
ate ("CAProtoCert Signing Certificate") should have an Enhanced Key Usage (=
EKU) extension ("CAProtoCert Signing") indicating it is intended for use sp=
ecifically with this protocol.  The CAProtoCert Signing Certificate must be=
 signed by the same issuing certificate used to sign the certificate intend=
ed to be registered in the log. (i.e. the Authority field in the CAProtoCer=
t Signing Cert MUST match that of any CAProtoCert it signs.)

1)	A Relying Party submits CSR to CA, authenticated per standard practice t=
oday.
2)	CA formulates the entire X.509v3 TBSCertificate structure that would res=
ult from issuance, but does not sign it.=20
3)	The CA formulates the "CAProtoCert" by doing the following to the  TBSCe=
rtificate:
	a)	Add critical extension to "poison" the TBSCertificate. (described below=
)=20
	b)	The CA signs the CAProtoCert with its CAProtoCert Signing Certificate.
4)	CA sends to the Public Log:
	a)	A certificate chain.  The first certificate in the chain MUST be the CA=
's CAProtoCert Signing Certificate, the next certificate MUST be the issuin=
g certificate for the CAProtoCert Signing Certificate, which MUST also be t=
he issuing certificate identified by the CAProtoCert's Authority and Author=
ity Key Indicator extensions, and the chain must terminate at a well-known =
public trust root.
5)	Public Log verifies the CAProtoCert
	a)	The CAProtoCert signing cert, issuing CA certificate and chain is valid=
 according to standard PKIX rules.
	b)	A certificate which would result from the Authority certificate signing=
 the CAProtoCert is valid according to standard PKIX rules.
	c)	The issuing certificate matches exactly the Authority indicated in the =
CAProtoCert.
	d)	The signature of the CAProtoCert validates with the key of the CAProtoC=
ert Signing Certificate.
6)	If 5 succeeds, the Public Log adds the CAProtoCert to the log/tree.
7)	Public Log calculates Merkle proof for new cert.
8)	Public Log sends Merkle proof back to CA.
9)	CA verifies Merkle proof.
10)	CA replaces the "poison" extension with an extension containing the act=
ual value of the Merkle proof.
11)	The CA adds a new extension containing the signature over the CAProtoCe=
rt with the CAProtoCert Signing Certificate.
12)	CA signs the certificate with its standard issuing certificate.  (inclu=
ding over the Merkle proof extension and original CAProtoCert Signature ext=
ension) This signature replaces the existing signature block with the CAPro=
toCert Signing Certificate's signature.
13)	CA gives certificate to RP.
14)	[At browser TLS connection time] Browser gets certificate from RP.
15)	Browser verifies certificate according to standard PKIX rules.
16)	Browser is CT aware and finds Merkle proof in an X.509v3 cert extension=
.
17)	Browser re-creates the CAProtoCert by:
	a)	Replacing the Merkle proof with the "poison" extension
	b)	Removing the CAProtoCert Signing Cert signature extension and replacing=
 the signature block with the values from this extension.
18)	The browser validates the Merkle proof over the CAProtoCert.

"Poison" Extension:  This is simply an extension marked as "critical" which=
 it is intended that browsers and other TLS client libraries never support.=
  The presence of the unrecognized critical extension should cause all clie=
nts to fail to validate any CAProtoCert should it be presented outside the =
context of the log.  =20

Acknowledgments:

Thanks to Jeff Hodges, Ben Laurie, Nico Williams and Marsh Ray for their fe=
edback and contributions to this proposal.=20

----------
Though obviously under NOTE WELL on this list, additionally:

This is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 United States Lic=
ense.
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/us/=20

THIS SPECIFICATION IS PROVIDED "AS IS." PayPal, Inc., Brad Hill, et al MAKE=
 NO REPRESENTATIONS OR WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT L=
IMITED TO, WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE,=
 TITLE OR NON-INFRINGEMENT.

Brad Hill
Sr. MTS, Internet Standards and Governance PayPal Information Risk Manageme=
nt
cell: 206.245.7844 / skype: hillbrad
email: bhill@paypal-inc.com

> -----Original Message-----
> From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
> Rob Stradling
> Sent: Wednesday, December 14, 2011 4:21 AM
> To: Adam Langley
> Cc: pkix@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [pkix] fyi: Sovereign Keys: an EFF proposal for more secure =
TLS
> authentication
>=20
> On Tuesday 13 Dec 2011 16:05:52 Adam Langley wrote:
> > On Tue, Dec 13, 2011 at 4:56 AM, Rob Stradling
> > <rob.stradling@comodo.com>
> wrote:
> > > If "requiring OCSP stapling from all sites" cannot reasonably be
> > > deployed, then surely we cannot expect ubiquitous support for _any_
> > > new TLS extension?
> >
> > I agree. In additional to the requirement to support a TLS extension,
> > OCSP stapling requires constant, fresh data making it even harder.
>=20
> Fair point.  CT Audit Proofs don't have this "even harder" requirement, o=
f
> course, since they will be static data.
>=20
> <snip>
> > > So when you say that "most existing verification code will ignore
> > > it", you are correct.  However, I concluded that "most" was not good
> enough.
> >
> > Yep, if we can't wedge the extra data in anywhere then we're in
> > trouble. But the sooner that we start working on making it possible,
> > the better things will be.
>=20
> I've thought of a couple of other ways of wedging the data into the TLS
> handshake, although these methods would require more collaboration from
> the CAs than you've thus far intended to require (or perhaps expected).
>=20
> IDEA 1 - PUT THE AUDIT PROOF INSIDE THE END-ENTITY CERTIFICATE:
> When a CA is about to issue a certificate, it publishes the "ToBeSigned"
> certificate data to the Public Log.  The Public Log generates an Audit Pr=
oof of
> the "ToBeSigned" data and returns this to the CA.  The CA encapsulates th=
e
> Audit Proof in a certificate extension, appends this extension to the
> "ToBeSigned" certificate data, and recalculates ASN.1 tag lengths as
> necessary.
> Then the CA signs the certificate and provides it to the certificate appl=
icant.
> Browsers would recognize the Audit Proof certificate extension and would
> have code to strip this extension and reconstruct the original "ToBeSigne=
d"
> certificate data, so that the Audit Proof can be verified.
> Since the Public Log is involved prior to certificate issuance, the Publi=
c Log
> could conceivably check CAA records, the Google Safebrowsing blacklist, e=
tc,
> etc, and refuse to generate an Audit Proof if any problems are encountere=
d.
>=20
> IDEA 2 - CERTIFICATE INSIDE A CERTIFICATE:
> A certificate is issued and added to the Public Log in the manner your do=
c
> describes.  Then, the CA issues a second certificate, which contains (in =
a
> certificate extension) the Audit Proof and the first certificate's signat=
ure and
> serial number.  The second certificate's Subject, Issuer, Validity Dates,
> Extensions, etc, must exactly match those of the first certificate.
> The site owner configures their TLS Server to send the second certificate=
.
> Browsers would recognize the new certificate extension and would have
> code to pull apart the second certificate, reconstruct the first certific=
ate, and
> verify the Audit Proof.
> Since the first certificate would never be seen by legacy Browsers, its
> signature could use SHA-2.  The second certificate's signature would prob=
ably
> use SHA-1 whilst there remain a significant number of legacy Browsers tha=
t
> don't support SHA-2.
> Certificate serial numbers are meant to be unique amongst the set of
> certificates issued by any particular CA, but maybe it would be OK to bre=
ak
> this rule for each pair of certificates envisaged by this idea, since the=
y are
> essentially the same.  If revocation is required, both certificates shoul=
d be
> revoked together, so sharing a serial number would make sure this happens=
.
>=20
> Comments welcome.
>=20
> > This is not something that we expect to be done next year, it's going
> > to take many years to deploy.
>=20
> If at least one my ideas would work, I think it could be deployed more qu=
ickly
> than that.  You'd only need buy-in from the CAs and Browsers.  No need to
> update any webserver software, and no need for site admins to do anything
> any differently.
>=20
> > Cheers
> >
> > AGL
>=20
> Rob Stradling
> Senior Research & Development Scientist
> COMODO - Creating Trust Online
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix

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From: Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
Message-Id: <201112192233.pBJMXuAJ010792@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp>
To: kent@bbn.com (Stephen Kent)
Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2011 23:33:56 +0100 (MET)
In-Reply-To: <p06240800cb154fd172ad@[192.168.144.140]> from "Stephen Kent" at Dec 19, 11 03:41:17 pm
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Subject: Re: [pkix] fyi: Sovereign Keys: an EFF proposal for more
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Stephen Kent wrote:
> 
> At 8:32 PM +0100 12/19/11, Martin Rex wrote:
> >...
> >
> >It does *NOT* say this in 6.1.3, so it is perfectly OK for an RP
> >to simply not care.
> 
> Cert processing is presumed to take place using data extracted from a cert.
> When cert syntax is violated, this data extraction should fail. The 
> requirement that the alg ID in the cert and the alg ID in the sig 
> block MUST match applies during the processing of the cert, prior to 
> path processing. This might be a syntax-verified operation under the 
> updated ASN.1 syntax.


rfc5280 declares itself a profile of ITU-T X.509 08/2005,
and so far I have been unsuccessful to find any such requirement
in X.509.

X.509 does also not have a requirement for a CA certificate to
contain a "Basic Constraint CA=TRUE marked critical", that is something
that is specific to rfc5280 and its predecessors -- and the reason why
one might expect RPs to follow it is rfc5280 section 6.1.4 (k)

But without a requirement for comparing the two AlgIds in rfc5280
6.1.3 / 6.1.4, _no_ RP is required to perform any such comparison.


>
>                      In any case, I agree with Mike that code that 
> fails to match the two alg IDs creates a vulnerability and is non 
> compliant.

Could you elaborate why exactly you believe this to be a security problem?

While X.509 certs and X.509 CRLs duplicate the signatureAlgorithm inside
the signed data, there is no such duplication in OCSP (rfc2560)
and CMS (the latter being reused by timestamping rfc3161).

If there was a security problem, then this probably should have been
changed prior to advancing CMS to full Internet standard (5652).


> 
> >Curiously, a large percentage of the installed base (which is dominated
> >by only a few implementations) seems to not care.
> 
> Several years ago, Microsoft decided that it was not necessary to match
> subject and issuer names durig  path validation. One might assume 
> that MS products constitute a non-trivial part of the deployed base. 
> Such behavior is still wrong.

I don't know their rationale for (not) doing this, so I can not comment
on whether it is acceptable.

ITU-T X.509 08/1997 (E) require comparison of the name chaining in
section 12.4.3 Certification Path Processing Procedure
uppper part of page 34 under (a).

rfc2459 requires the comparison of the name chaining in section
6.1 Basic Path validation, top of page 55 under (4).

rfc3280 reworded this in a (IMO less clear) fashion in
section 6.1.3 Basic Certificate Processing (a)(4) bottom of page 70.


Not comparing the names looks more like a potential evasion of
policy schemes rather than a security problem.  (Personally,
I consider all the policy stuff as part of a business model
enforcement rather than security architecture).


-Martin

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To: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>, Michael StJohns <mstjohns@comcast.net>
Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2011 19:30:08 -0500
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Cc: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>, Ben Laurie <ben@links.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] fyi: Sovereign Keys: an EFF proposal for more secure TLS
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Phillip,

DSA parameters are NOT to be inherited from the signed macro or from signat=
ure field.  They need to come from SPKI or from the Issuer.

What specs are you reading?

Did you see my paper on this 1995.

BTW, I have always thought that the parameters field in the signature field=
 is a perfect place to throw the random data to avoid hash collision attack=
.  I am glad I did not suggest to this list.

From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Phi=
llip Hallam-Baker
Sent: Monday, December 19, 2011 1:08 PM
To: Michael StJohns
Cc: pkix@ietf.org; Ben Laurie
Subject: Re: [pkix] fyi: Sovereign Keys: an EFF proposal for more secure TL=
S

+1

This is a standards process and while support for legacy platforms is good =
there is a major difference between supporting a legacy platform with a bug=
 and exploiting that bug to deploy a new feature.

There is no way that we can be sure that all software and hardware out ther=
e is going to be tolerate this form of abuse. In particular I suspect that =
it is the type of check that FIPS140 certified HSMs are likely to do.


The parameters issue actually came up in another forum last week. The spec =
apparently allows DSA certs to inherit parameters from higher certs in the =
chain. This creates an opportunity to attack where a CA issues a cross cert=
 with malicious parameters.


On Mon, Dec 19, 2011 at 12:56 PM, Michael StJohns <mstjohns@comcast.net<mai=
lto:mstjohns@comcast.net>> wrote:
As I mentioned in my private note to you, I find your analysis of X.509 and=
 RFC5280 unconvincing.

Encoding issues first:
1) The ASN1 SIGNED macro uses the signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmId value in t=
he outer wrapper to determine the signature type used to validate the signa=
ture.
2) X.509 says that "signature contains the algorithm identifier for the alg=
orithm and hash function used by the CA in signing the certificate" for the=
 inside signature AlgorithmId.  That's in ADDITION to the outside algorithm=
Identifier and is a strong indicate tha X.509 expects them to be identical.
3)  RFC 5280 says (4.1.1.2)  about the certificate inside "signature field"

 This field MUST contain the same algorithm identifier as the

   signature field in the sequence tbsCertificate (Section

4.1.2.3).

4) Not all signature algorithms have NULL for their parameters field (for

example RSA PSS)

5) The certificate processing description in RFC5280 does not say

"ensure the ASN1 and certificate is properly encoded" as that's

pretty much a no-brainer.  Under your argument, I could pass in a

signed object that just sort of looked like a certificate but had

additional fields inside the signature wrapper and that would be OK since

the signature just happened to verify and I was able to find all the

certificate fields.



For implementations:

I believe at least a few implementations just do a look up of the encoded

AlgorithmIdentifier rather than parsing out the OID in the AlgId.

So any mucking about with the field will cause things to fail.



So how about moving on from this rather *hackish* idea.  The RPs

that *might* accept are obviously broken.



Mike










At 12:56 PM 12/15/2011, Martin Rex wrote:

Ben Laurie wrote:
>
> Martin Rex wrote:
> >
> > Ben Laurie wrote:
> > >
> > > Parameters on the signature algorithm :-)
> >
> > My SSL client fails with an ASN.1 decoding error.
> >
> > which is pretty much in compliance with
> > http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3447#appendix-A.2.4
> >
> >   A.2.4 RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5
> >
> >   The object identifier for RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 shall be one of the
> >   following.  The choice of OID depends on the choice of hash
> >   algorithm: MD2, MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, or SHA-512.  Note that
> >   if either MD2 or MD5 is used, then the OID is just as in PKCS #1
> >   v1.5.  For each OID, the parameters field associated with this OID in
> >   a value of type AlgorithmIdentifier shall have a value of type NULL.
>
> BTW, 3447 is not normative on the content of certificates, only the
> contents of signatures :-)

rfc3447 *IS* normative on the ASN.1 encoding and decoding for the
sha1WithRSAEncryption AlgId.

  ITU-T Rec. X.509 11/2008  page 12:


  AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM:SupportedAlgorithms} ::=3D SEQUENCE {
    algorithm ALGORITHM.&id ({SupportedAlgorithms}),
    parameters ALGORITHM.&Type ({SupportedAlgorithms}{ @algorithm}) OPTIONA=
L }

  -- Definition of the following information object set is deferred,
  -- perhaps to standardized profiles or to protocol implementation
  -- conformance statements. The set is required to specify a table
  -- constraint on the parameters component of AlgorithmIdentifier.

  SupportedAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::=3D { ... }

in combination with rfc-3447 PKCS #1 v2.1, page 57 (ASN.1 Module):

  --
  -- When the following OIDs are used in an AlgorithmIdentifier the
  -- parameters MUST be present and MUST be NULL.
  --
  md2WithRSAEncryption       OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=3D { pkcs-1 2 }
  md5WithRSAEncryption       OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=3D { pkcs-1 4 }
  sha1WithRSAEncryption      OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=3D { pkcs-1 5 }
  sha256WithRSAEncryption    OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=3D { pkcs-1 11 }
  sha384WithRSAEncryption    OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=3D { pkcs-1 12 }
  sha512WithRSAEncryption    OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=3D { pkcs-1 13 }


Differing values for signatureAlgorithm on the outer Certificate
structure and the TBSCertificate structure, on the other hand,
might(!) be ignored by RPs when verifying the certificate,
because there exists no requirement to compare these fields
in rfc5280 6.1.3 Basic Certificate Processing (and neither am I
aware of any such requirement in ITU-T Rec. X.509 11/2008).


-Martin
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<o:idmap v:ext=3D"edit" data=3D"1" />
</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=3DEN-US link=3Dblue vli=
nk=3Dpurple><div class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'f=
ont-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>Phillip,<o:p=
></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-=
family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p c=
lass=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-s=
erif";color:#1F497D'>DSA parameters are NOT to be inherited from the signed=
 macro or from signature field.&nbsp; They need to come from SPKI or from t=
he Issuer.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-si=
ze:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p><=
/span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"=
Arial","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>What specs are you reading?<o:p></o:p></=
span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"A=
rial","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMs=
oNormal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";col=
or:#1F497D'>Did you see my paper on this 1995.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p clas=
s=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-seri=
f";color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span st=
yle=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>BTW,=
 I have always thought that the parameters field in the signature field is =
a perfect place to throw the random data to avoid hash collision attack.&nb=
sp; I am glad I did not suggest to this list.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=
=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif=
";color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><div style=3D'border:none;bord=
er-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal>=
<b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:=
</span></b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif=
"'> pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] <b>On Behalf Of </=
b>Phillip Hallam-Baker<br><b>Sent:</b> Monday, December 19, 2011 1:08 PM<br=
><b>To:</b> Michael StJohns<br><b>Cc:</b> pkix@ietf.org; Ben Laurie<br><b>S=
ubject:</b> Re: [pkix] fyi: Sovereign Keys: an EFF proposal for more secure=
 TLS<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><=
p class=3DMsoNormal>+1<o:p></o:p></p><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;<=
/o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>This is a standards process and wh=
ile support for legacy platforms is good there is a major difference betwee=
n supporting a legacy platform with a bug and exploiting that bug to deploy=
 a new feature.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</=
o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>There is no way that we can be sure=
 that all software and hardware out there is going to be tolerate this form=
 of abuse. In particular I suspect that it is the type of check that FIPS14=
0 certified HSMs are likely to do.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoN=
ormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p=
></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>The parameters issue actually came up =
in another forum last week. The spec apparently allows DSA certs to inherit=
 parameters from higher certs in the chain. This creates an opportunity to =
attack where a CA issues a cross cert with malicious parameters.<o:p></o:p>=
</p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p clas=
s=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>On Mon, Dec 19=
, 2011 at 12:56 PM, Michael StJohns &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mstjohns@comcast.=
net">mstjohns@comcast.net</a>&gt; wrote:<o:p></o:p></p><div><p class=3DMsoN=
ormal>As I mentioned in my private note to you, I find your analysis of X.5=
09 and RFC5280 unconvincing.<br><br>Encoding issues first:<br>1) The ASN1 S=
IGNED macro uses the signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmId value in the outer wrap=
per to determine the signature type used to validate the signature.<br>2) X=
.509 says that &quot;<b>signature </b>contains the algorithm identifier for=
 the algorithm and hash function used by the CA in signing the certificate&=
quot; for the inside signature AlgorithmId.&nbsp; That's in ADDITION to the=
 outside algorithmIdentifier and is a strong indicate tha X.509 expects the=
m to be identical.<br>3)&nbsp; RFC 5280 says (4.1.1.2)&nbsp; about the cert=
ificate inside &quot;signature field&quot;<o:p></o:p></p><pre>&nbsp;This fi=
eld MUST contain the same algorithm identifier as the<o:p></o:p></pre><pre>=
&nbsp;&nbsp; signature field in the sequence tbsCertificate (Section<o:p></=
o:p></pre><pre>4.1.2.3).<o:p></o:p></pre><pre>4) Not all signature algorith=
ms have NULL for their parameters field (for<o:p></o:p></pre><pre>example R=
SA PSS)<o:p></o:p></pre><pre>5) The certificate processing description in R=
FC5280 does not say<o:p></o:p></pre><pre>&quot;ensure the ASN1 and certific=
ate is properly encoded&quot; as that's<o:p></o:p></pre><pre>pretty much a =
no-brainer.&nbsp; Under your argument, I could pass in a<o:p></o:p></pre><p=
re>signed object that just sort of looked like a certificate but had<o:p></=
o:p></pre><pre>additional fields inside the signature wrapper and that woul=
d be OK since<o:p></o:p></pre><pre>the signature just happened to verify an=
d I was able to find all the<o:p></o:p></pre><pre>certificate fields.<o:p><=
/o:p></pre><pre><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></pre><pre>For implementations:<o:p></o:p>=
</pre><pre>I believe at least a few implementations just do a look up of th=
e encoded<o:p></o:p></pre><pre>AlgorithmIdentifier rather than parsing out =
the OID in the AlgId.&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></pre><pre>So any mucking about with =
the field will cause things to fail.<o:p></o:p></pre><pre><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>=
</pre><pre>So how about moving on from this rather *hackish* idea.&nbsp; Th=
e RPs<o:p></o:p></pre><pre>that *might* accept are obviously broken.<o:p></=
o:p></pre><pre><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></pre><pre>Mike<o:p></o:p></pre><pre><o:p>&=
nbsp;</o:p></pre><pre><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></pre><pre><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></pre><p=
re><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></pre><pre><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></pre><div><div><p class=3D=
MsoNormal>At 12:56 PM 12/15/2011, Martin Rex wrote:<br><br><o:p></o:p></p><=
p class=3DMsoNormal>Ben Laurie wrote:<br>&gt; <br>&gt; Martin Rex wrote:<br=
>&gt; &gt;<br>&gt; &gt; Ben Laurie wrote:<br>&gt; &gt; &gt;<br>&gt; &gt; &g=
t; Parameters on the signature algorithm :-)<br>&gt; &gt;<br>&gt; &gt; My S=
SL client fails with an ASN.1 decoding error.<br>&gt; &gt;<br>&gt; &gt; whi=
ch is pretty much in compliance with<br>&gt; &gt; <a href=3D"http://tools.i=
etf.org/html/rfc3447#appendix-A.2.4" target=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.or=
g/html/rfc3447#appendix-A.2.4</a><br>&gt; &gt;<br>&gt; &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; A.2=
.4 RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5<br>&gt; &gt;<br>&gt; &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; The object ident=
ifier for RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 shall be one of the<br>&gt; &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; fo=
llowing.&nbsp; The choice of OID depends on the choice of hash<br>&gt; &gt;=
&nbsp;&nbsp; algorithm: MD2, MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, or SHA-512.&nbsp=
; Note that<br>&gt; &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; if either MD2 or MD5 is used, then the=
 OID is just as in PKCS #1<br>&gt; &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; v1.5.&nbsp; For each OI=
D, the parameters field associated with this OID in<br>&gt; &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp=
; a value of type AlgorithmIdentifier shall have a value of type NULL.<br>&=
gt; <br>&gt; BTW, 3447 is not normative on the content of certificates, onl=
y the<br>&gt; contents of signatures :-)<br><br>rfc3447 *IS* normative on t=
he ASN.1 encoding and decoding for the<br>sha1WithRSAEncryption AlgId.<br><=
br>&nbsp; ITU-T Rec. X.509 11/2008&nbsp; page 12:<br><br><br>&nbsp; Algorit=
hmIdentifier{ALGORITHM:SupportedAlgorithms} ::=3D SEQUENCE {<br>&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp; algorithm ALGORITHM.&amp;id ({SupportedAlgorithms}),<br>&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp; parameters ALGORITHM.&amp;Type ({SupportedAlgorithms}{ @algorithm})=
 OPTIONAL }<br><br>&nbsp; -- Definition of the following information object=
 set is deferred,<br>&nbsp; -- perhaps to standardized profiles or to proto=
col implementation<br>&nbsp; -- conformance statements. The set is required=
 to specify a table<br>&nbsp; -- constraint on the parameters component of =
AlgorithmIdentifier.<br><br>&nbsp; SupportedAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::=3D { ..=
. }<br><br>in combination with rfc-3447 PKCS #1 v2.1, page 57 (ASN.1 Module=
):<br><br>&nbsp; --<br>&nbsp; -- When the following OIDs are used in an Alg=
orithmIdentifier the<br>&nbsp; -- parameters MUST be present and MUST be NU=
LL.<br>&nbsp; --<br>&nbsp; md2WithRSAEncryption&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp; OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=3D { pkcs-1 2 }<br>&nbsp; md5WithRSAEncryptio=
n&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=3D { pkcs-1 4 }<=
br>&nbsp; sha1WithRSAEncryption&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; OBJECT IDENTI=
FIER ::=3D { pkcs-1 5 }<br>&nbsp; sha256WithRSAEncryption&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=3D { pkcs-1 11 }<br>&nbsp; sha384WithRSAEncryption&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp; OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=3D { pkcs-1 12 }<br>&nbsp; sha512WithR=
SAEncryption&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=3D { pkcs-1 13 }<br><br=
><br>Differing values for signatureAlgorithm on the outer Certificate<br>st=
ructure and the TBSCertificate structure, on the other hand,<br>might(!) be=
 ignored by RPs when verifying the certificate,<br>because there exists no =
requirement to compare these fields<br>in rfc5280 6.1.3 Basic Certificate P=
rocessing (and neither am I<br>aware of any such requirement in ITU-T Rec. =
X.509 11/2008).<br><br><br>-Martin<br>_____________________________________=
__________<br>pkix mailing list<br><a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org" target=
=3D"_blank">pkix@ietf.org</a><br><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/li=
stinfo/pkix" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix</=
a><o:p></o:p></p></div></div></div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-bot=
tom:12.0pt'><br><br>_______________________________________________<br>pkix=
 mailing list<br><a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a><br><a h=
ref=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix" target=3D"_blank">https:=
//www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix</a><o:p></o:p></p></div><p class=3DMso=
Normal><br><br clear=3Dall><o:p></o:p></p><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&n=
bsp;</o:p></p></div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-bottom:12.0pt'>-- =
<br>Website: <a href=3D"http://hallambaker.com/">http://hallambaker.com/</a=
><o:p></o:p></p></div></div></body></html>=

--_000_B83745DA469B7847811819C5005244AF0F56EC7Bscygexch7cygnac_--

From tom@ritter.vg  Mon Dec 19 17:33:11 2011
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Subject: Re: [pkix] fyi: Sovereign Keys: an EFF proposal for more secure TLS
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On 19 December 2011 19:30, Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com> wrote:
> DSA parameters are NOT to be inherited from the signed macro or from
> signature field.=A0 They need to come from SPKI or from the Issuer.
>
> What specs are you reading?

The original thread is here:
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/websec/current/msg00867.html
[websec] Key pinning for DSA keys with inherited domain params by
James Manger in the websec working group regarding the key pinning
draft.

-tom

From SChokhani@cygnacom.com  Mon Dec 19 17:38:07 2011
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From: Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>
To: Tom Ritter <tom@ritter.vg>
Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2011 20:38:03 -0500
Thread-Topic: [pkix] fyi: Sovereign Keys: an EFF proposal for more secure TLS
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In that case, the parameters can be in SPKI.  The parameters should not be =
taken from the signature algorithm or SIGNED MACRO.

-----Original Message-----
From: Tom Ritter [mailto:tom@ritter.vg]=20
Sent: Monday, December 19, 2011 8:33 PM
To: Santosh Chokhani
Cc: Phillip Hallam-Baker; pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] fyi: Sovereign Keys: an EFF proposal for more secure TL=
S

On 19 December 2011 19:30, Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com> wrote:
> DSA parameters are NOT to be inherited from the signed macro or from
> signature field.=A0 They need to come from SPKI or from the Issuer.
>
> What specs are you reading?

The original thread is here:
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/websec/current/msg00867.html
[websec] Key pinning for DSA keys with inherited domain params by
James Manger in the websec working group regarding the key pinning
draft.

-tom

From pgut001@login01.cs.auckland.ac.nz  Mon Dec 19 18:39:22 2011
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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
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Michael StJohns <mstjohns@comcast.net> writes:

>I'm sure there are flawed implementations that do not check the match. I am 
>sure there are correct implementations that do. You can make no assumption 
>which one your RP is.

Given the difficulty in locating implementations that even bothered checking 
whether the algoID parameters made any sense (the only ones that turned up 
were pretty obscure ones, no major/mainstream implementation even bothered 
checking the params), I'd say there's a pretty good likelihood that few, if 
any, will then go beyond that and check the match.

Peter.


From markscherling@shaw.ca  Mon Dec 19 19:04:53 2011
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Hi there,

Please remove Mark Scherling from this mailing list ... I am sad to =
inform you that he has passed away.

Thanks.

His wife, Gerry=

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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] fyi: Sovereign Keys: an EFF proposal for more secure TLS
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Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com> writes:

>Relaxing the decoding rules certainly doesn't alleviate the problem, but IMHO 
>it doesn't necessarily make the problem any worse. For example, if we'd 
>decided instead to persist with only allowing correctly encoded CSRs, 
>customers with broken CSR generation software would've simply gone to a 
>different CA that did accept their incorrectly encoded CSRs. There would still 
>be no incentive for the authors of the broken software to fix their code.

This is the direct expression of the PKI toxic codependency problem that I've
commented on in the past, implementers have to accept all manner of broken 
certs because of the large deployed base of such certs, and everyone can keep
deploying broken certs because everything accepts them.

Peter.

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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] fyi: Sovereign Keys: an EFF proposal for more secure TLS
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Michael StJohns <mstjohns@comcast.net> writes:

>For security you need to be a) conservative in what you send and b) a total 
>and utter paranoid in what you accept.

Unfortunately this doesn't work so well in the real world, where you often 
have to accept any old rubbish because everyone else does as well.  For 
example within the last two weeks I've had to change my code to accept 
messages from an implementation that defaults to using a 15-year-old obsolete 
block cipher in its messages, but then uses ~2.5 *million* iterations of 
hashing to set up the keys for the cipher, which my code rejected (quite 
sensibly) as a DoS attack.  Since the implementation that does this is GPG, 
you don't have any choice, you can either do it or (effectively) choose not to 
talk PGP any more.

So the above, while laudable in theory, only works if you're prepared to not 
talk to any implementation except your own one.

Peter.

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Subject: Re: [pkix] fyi: Sovereign Keys: an EFF proposal for more secure TLS
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On Dec 20, 2011, at 5:05 AM, Peter Gutmann wrote:

> Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com> writes:
>=20
>> Relaxing the decoding rules certainly doesn't alleviate the problem, but=
 IMHO=20
>> it doesn't necessarily make the problem any worse. For example, if we'd=
=20
>> decided instead to persist with only allowing correctly encoded CSRs,=20
>> customers with broken CSR generation software would've simply gone to a=
=20
>> different CA that did accept their incorrectly encoded CSRs. There would=
 still=20
>> be no incentive for the authors of the broken software to fix their code=
.
>=20
> This is the direct expression of the PKI toxic codependency problem that =
I've
> commented on in the past, implementers have to accept all manner of broke=
n=20
> certs because of the large deployed base of such certs, and everyone can =
keep
> deploying broken certs because everything accepts them.

Agree, and I think that the IETF is ill-equipped to solve this, as we're al=
l individuals here speaking only for ourselves.

The CA/Browser consortium might be able to do a better job, at least for HT=
TPS. They really have >99% of the browser vendors there (sorry, Omniweb) an=
d the most important CAs. Maybe they can do something to reduce the brokenn=
ess of the deployed base.

We won't be able to do Michael's "utter paranoia", but we could do "somewha=
t less liberal"=

From rob.stradling@comodo.com  Tue Dec 20 02:49:45 2011
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From: Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>
To: "Hill, Brad" <bhill@paypal-inc.com>, Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] CA T&A proofs as cert extensions. WAS: fyi: Sovereign Keys
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On Monday 19 Dec 2011 22:28:57 Hill, Brad wrote:
> Rob and others,
> 
>   Catching up on this list, I see you've also thought of an idea I'd sent
> an email to Ben and Adam about privately on the 12th, and have been
> refining in consultation with some other folks: including the CA
> Transparency and Auditability proof as an extension in the issued
> certificate.
> 
> Since it's clear it's not a completely unobvious idea, I'll share what I've
> got so far here to get it out in public and hopefully further the
> discussion.  (though it may be premature to get into details at this
> level) Given the evidence of the uptake rate of renegotiation fixes, TLS
> 1.1 intolerance and plain ordinary misconfiguration, I think that any
> scheme that relies on server operators making configuration changes isn't
> going to be hard-fail before I retire.  I think there are natural
> incentives for CAs to participate in a scheme like this and if they do it
> makes full deployment look possible. -------------------
> 
> Before beginning this protocol, the CA generates a key pair and leaf
> certificate (Basic Constraints CA=false) intended specifically for use in
> this protocol.  The purpose of this new certificate is to allow the CA to
> authenticate itself to the log without adding additional attack surface
> from this protocol to the standard issuing certificate private key.

Hi Brad.  Have you thought of any particular attacks that this would defend 
against?

Since this would give the CAs (especially those who operate lots of 
intermediate CA certs) extra work to do, I'd like to know why it would be 
necessary.

In my similar proposal, I envisaged the two certificates being signed by the 
same Issuer: the "outer" certificate would typically have an RSA/SHA-1 
signature (for maximum compatibility), but the "inner" certificate's signature 
could use a stronger hash algorithm.  CT-aware clients would verify the 
"inner" signature with the stronger hash; legacy clients would verify the 
"outer" signature with the SHA-1 hash.
To achieve this same thing with your proposal, the client would need to obtain 
the CAProtoCert Signing Certificate from somewhere.  To avoid side-channels, it 
would need to be embedded in the "outer" certificate, but this would 
approximately double the size of the cert.

<snip>
> 6)      If 5 succeeds, the Public Log adds the CAProtoCert to the log/tree.

Adam,

A few months ago you proposed solving the problems with revocation checking by 
having CAs issue certificates that are valid for only a few days (and so don't 
really need to be subjected to revocation checking).  This would probably 
result in lots and lots of certificates with the same 
Issuer/Subject/Key/Extensions, differing only in their Serial Numbers, Validity 
Dates and Signatures.

If short-duration certs and CT both happen, the CT Public Log would end up 
containing lots and lots of duplicated certificate fields.

So I'm wondering...
Instead of tying each CT log entry / Merkle proof to an individual certificate, 
would it be possible to instead tie each CT log entry / Merkle proof to some 
sort of data structure that contains just the Issuer/Subject/Key/Extensions?

This would mean that the purpose of a CA contacting a Public Log would be to 
announce that CA's intention to issue 1 or more certificates containing the 
specified Issuer/Subject/Key/Extensions.

The same Merkle proof could then be embedded into each certificate that 
contains that exact combination of Issuer/Subject/Key/Extensions.

Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online

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        I would like to present a counterproposal, which is much closer to 
our current model.  I call it "renewal endorsement", and would implement 
it through two non-critical X.509 extensions.  The first and simpler 
extension would be called "Renewal endorsement expected", and would go 
into the older certificate.  It would contain an optional public key, or 
perhaps a SEQUENCE of them.  It would be conveyed as part of a PKCS#10 in 
the usual way and copied into the certificate by the CA.   The second 
extension would be a CMS SignedData called "Renewal endorsement" going 
into the new certificate, containing the issuer name and the new public 
key signed by the public key from the "Renewal endorsement expected" 
extension or the public key in the older certificate if the extension was 
absent or didn't contain a public key.  It would be created using the old 
key, and included in the PKCS#10 in the usual way, then copied into the 
certificate by the CA. 
        If the original certificate contains the "Renewal endorsement 
expected" extension, and the received one does not contain the "Renewal 
endorsement", the UI should put up a screen with a statement such as "This 
certificate was issued to a site which is unusually likely to have been 
compromised.  The site you reached last time stated that its policy was to 
use key rollover, and this new certificate did not do so."  The screen 
should then include "The site claims to be www.x at IP1, and its issuer is 
Y.  On your last visit to it that same name was issued by Z at IP2". 
Similarly, if the signature does not verify against an expected key (NOT 
against the certificate), the UI should put up a similar error, with the 
second sentence "The endorsement on this site was signed by a key which 
wasn't in the last certificate".  A wild card name match without 
endorsement should put up a similar message.
        This would not make the users' keys sovereign, but at least they 
would have some influence on their successors independent of the global 
set of CA's.  The advantages of the centralized PKI for introduction would 
remain, but a user who has previously visited a site would detect the use 
of a compromised CA or RA to issue a certificate to an attacker.

Tom Gindin

P.S.    The suggestion above is mine, and not necessarily that of my 
employer.





From:   "Hill, Brad" <bhill@paypal-inc.com>
To:     Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>, Adam Langley 
<agl@google.com>, "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>, 
Date:   12/19/2011 05:29 PM
Subject:        [pkix] CA T&A proofs as cert extensions. WAS: fyi: 
Sovereign Keys
Sent by:        pkix-bounces@ietf.org



Rob and others,

  Catching up on this list, I see you've also thought of an idea I'd sent 
an email to Ben and Adam about privately on the 12th, and have been 
refining in consultation with some other folks: including the CA 
Transparency and Auditability proof as an extension in the issued 
certificate.

Since it's clear it's not a completely unobvious idea, I'll share what 
I've got so far here to get it out in public and hopefully further the 
discussion.  (though it may be premature to get into details at this 
level) Given the evidence of the uptake rate of renegotiation fixes, TLS 
1.1 intolerance and plain ordinary misconfiguration, I think that any 
scheme that relies on server operators making configuration changes isn't 
going to be hard-fail before I retire.  I think there are natural 
incentives for CAs to participate in a scheme like this and if they do it 
makes full deployment look possible.
-------------------

Before beginning this protocol, the CA generates a key pair and leaf 
certificate (Basic Constraints CA=false) intended specifically for use in 
this protocol.  The purpose of this new certificate is to allow the CA to 
authenticate itself to the log without adding additional attack surface 
from this protocol to the standard issuing certificate private key. The 
new certificate ("CAProtoCert Signing Certificate") should have an 
Enhanced Key Usage (EKU) extension ("CAProtoCert Signing") indicating it 
is intended for use specifically with this protocol.  The CAProtoCert 
Signing Certificate must be signed by the same issuing certificate used to 
sign the certificate intended to be registered in the log. (i.e. the 
Authority field in the CAProtoCert Signing Cert MUST match that of any 
CAProtoCert it signs.)

1)               A Relying Party submits CSR to CA, authenticated per 
standard practice today.
2)               CA formulates the entire X.509v3 TBSCertificate structure 
that would result from issuance, but does not sign it. 
3)               The CA formulates the "CAProtoCert" by doing the 
following to the  TBSCertificate:
                 a)              Add critical extension to "poison" the 
TBSCertificate. (described below) 
                 b)              The CA signs the CAProtoCert with its 
CAProtoCert Signing Certificate.
4)               CA sends to the Public Log:
                 a)              A certificate chain.  The first 
certificate in the chain MUST be the CA's CAProtoCert Signing Certificate, 
the next certificate MUST be the issuing certificate for the CAProtoCert 
Signing Certificate, which MUST also be the issuing certificate identified 
by the CAProtoCert's Authority and Authority Key Indicator extensions, and 
the chain must terminate at a well-known public trust root.
5)               Public Log verifies the CAProtoCert
                 a)              The CAProtoCert signing cert, issuing CA 
certificate and chain is valid according to standard PKIX rules.
                 b)              A certificate which would result from the 
Authority certificate signing the CAProtoCert is valid according to 
standard PKIX rules.
                 c)              The issuing certificate matches exactly 
the Authority indicated in the CAProtoCert.
                 d)              The signature of the CAProtoCert 
validates with the key of the CAProtoCert Signing Certificate.
6)               If 5 succeeds, the Public Log adds the CAProtoCert to the 
log/tree.
7)               Public Log calculates Merkle proof for new cert.
8)               Public Log sends Merkle proof back to CA.
9)               CA verifies Merkle proof.
10)              CA replaces the "poison" extension with an extension 
containing the actual value of the Merkle proof.
11)              The CA adds a new extension containing the signature over 
the CAProtoCert with the CAProtoCert Signing Certificate.
12)              CA signs the certificate with its standard issuing 
certificate.  (including over the Merkle proof extension and original 
CAProtoCert Signature extension) This signature replaces the existing 
signature block with the CAProtoCert Signing Certificate's signature.
13)              CA gives certificate to RP.
14)              [At browser TLS connection time] Browser gets certificate 
from RP.
15)              Browser verifies certificate according to standard PKIX 
rules.
16)              Browser is CT aware and finds Merkle proof in an X.509v3 
cert extension.
17)              Browser re-creates the CAProtoCert by:
                 a)              Replacing the Merkle proof with the 
"poison" extension
                 b)              Removing the CAProtoCert Signing Cert 
signature extension and replacing the signature block with the values from 
this extension.
18)              The browser validates the Merkle proof over the 
CAProtoCert.

"Poison" Extension:  This is simply an extension marked as "critical" 
which it is intended that browsers and other TLS client libraries never 
support.  The presence of the unrecognized critical extension should cause 
all clients to fail to validate any CAProtoCert should it be presented 
outside the context of the log. 

Acknowledgments:

Thanks to Jeff Hodges, Ben Laurie, Nico Williams and Marsh Ray for their 
feedback and contributions to this proposal. 

----------
Though obviously under NOTE WELL on this list, additionally:

This is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 United States 
License.
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/us/ 

THIS SPECIFICATION IS PROVIDED "AS IS." PayPal, Inc., Brad Hill, et al 
MAKE NO REPRESENTATIONS OR WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT 
NOT LIMITED TO, WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 
PURPOSE, TITLE OR NON-INFRINGEMENT.

Brad Hill
Sr. MTS, Internet Standards and Governance PayPal Information Risk 
Management
cell: 206.245.7844 / skype: hillbrad
email: bhill@paypal-inc.com

> -----Original Message-----
> From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
> Rob Stradling
> Sent: Wednesday, December 14, 2011 4:21 AM
> To: Adam Langley
> Cc: pkix@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [pkix] fyi: Sovereign Keys: an EFF proposal for more secure 
TLS
> authentication
> 
> On Tuesday 13 Dec 2011 16:05:52 Adam Langley wrote:
> > On Tue, Dec 13, 2011 at 4:56 AM, Rob Stradling
> > <rob.stradling@comodo.com>
> wrote:
> > > If "requiring OCSP stapling from all sites" cannot reasonably be
> > > deployed, then surely we cannot expect ubiquitous support for _any_
> > > new TLS extension?
> >
> > I agree. In additional to the requirement to support a TLS extension,
> > OCSP stapling requires constant, fresh data making it even harder.
> 
> Fair point.  CT Audit Proofs don't have this "even harder" requirement, 
of
> course, since they will be static data.
> 
> <snip>
> > > So when you say that "most existing verification code will ignore
> > > it", you are correct.  However, I concluded that "most" was not good
> enough.
> >
> > Yep, if we can't wedge the extra data in anywhere then we're in
> > trouble. But the sooner that we start working on making it possible,
> > the better things will be.
> 
> I've thought of a couple of other ways of wedging the data into the TLS
> handshake, although these methods would require more collaboration from
> the CAs than you've thus far intended to require (or perhaps expected).
> 
> IDEA 1 - PUT THE AUDIT PROOF INSIDE THE END-ENTITY CERTIFICATE:
> When a CA is about to issue a certificate, it publishes the "ToBeSigned"
> certificate data to the Public Log.  The Public Log generates an Audit 
Proof of
> the "ToBeSigned" data and returns this to the CA.  The CA encapsulates 
the
> Audit Proof in a certificate extension, appends this extension to the
> "ToBeSigned" certificate data, and recalculates ASN.1 tag lengths as
> necessary.
> Then the CA signs the certificate and provides it to the certificate 
applicant.
> Browsers would recognize the Audit Proof certificate extension and would
> have code to strip this extension and reconstruct the original 
"ToBeSigned"
> certificate data, so that the Audit Proof can be verified.
> Since the Public Log is involved prior to certificate issuance, the 
Public Log
> could conceivably check CAA records, the Google Safebrowsing blacklist, 
etc,
> etc, and refuse to generate an Audit Proof if any problems are 
encountered.
> 
> IDEA 2 - CERTIFICATE INSIDE A CERTIFICATE:
> A certificate is issued and added to the Public Log in the manner your 
doc
> describes.  Then, the CA issues a second certificate, which contains (in 
a
> certificate extension) the Audit Proof and the first certificate's 
signature and
> serial number.  The second certificate's Subject, Issuer, Validity 
Dates,
> Extensions, etc, must exactly match those of the first certificate.
> The site owner configures their TLS Server to send the second 
certificate.
> Browsers would recognize the new certificate extension and would have
> code to pull apart the second certificate, reconstruct the first 
certificate, and
> verify the Audit Proof.
> Since the first certificate would never be seen by legacy Browsers, its
> signature could use SHA-2.  The second certificate's signature would 
probably
> use SHA-1 whilst there remain a significant number of legacy Browsers 
that
> don't support SHA-2.
> Certificate serial numbers are meant to be unique amongst the set of
> certificates issued by any particular CA, but maybe it would be OK to 
break
> this rule for each pair of certificates envisaged by this idea, since 
they are
> essentially the same.  If revocation is required, both certificates 
should be
> revoked together, so sharing a serial number would make sure this 
happens.
> 
> Comments welcome.
> 
> > This is not something that we expect to be done next year, it's going
> > to take many years to deploy.
> 
> If at least one my ideas would work, I think it could be deployed more 
quickly
> than that.  You'd only need buy-in from the CAs and Browsers.  No need 
to
> update any webserver software, and no need for site admins to do 
anything
> any differently.
> 
> > Cheers
> >
> > AGL
> 
> Rob Stradling
> Senior Research & Development Scientist
> COMODO - Creating Trust Online
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
_______________________________________________
pkix mailing list
pkix@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix




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To: Tom Gindin <tgindin@us.ibm.com>
Date: Tue, 20 Dec 2011 15:45:30 +0200
Thread-Topic: [pkix] CA T&A proofs as cert extensions. WAS: fyi: Sovereign Keys
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Subject: Re: [pkix] CA T&A proofs as cert extensions. WAS: fyi: Sovereign	Keys
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Hi Tom

When you say that the UI should put us a screen with some statement, what U=
I is this?  If it's in the relying party, then this works only for such rel=
ying parties that cache the previously-seen certificates, such as a browser=
 implementing the cached info TLS extension. Usually RPs don't have that in=
formation.

Yoav

On Dec 20, 2011, at 3:28 PM, Tom Gindin wrote:

>        I would like to present a counterproposal, which is much closer to
> our current model.  I call it "renewal endorsement", and would implement
> it through two non-critical X.509 extensions.  The first and simpler
> extension would be called "Renewal endorsement expected", and would go
> into the older certificate.  It would contain an optional public key, or
> perhaps a SEQUENCE of them.  It would be conveyed as part of a PKCS#10 in
> the usual way and copied into the certificate by the CA.   The second
> extension would be a CMS SignedData called "Renewal endorsement" going
> into the new certificate, containing the issuer name and the new public
> key signed by the public key from the "Renewal endorsement expected"
> extension or the public key in the older certificate if the extension was
> absent or didn't contain a public key.  It would be created using the old
> key, and included in the PKCS#10 in the usual way, then copied into the
> certificate by the CA.
>        If the original certificate contains the "Renewal endorsement
> expected" extension, and the received one does not contain the "Renewal
> endorsement", the UI should put up a screen with a statement such as "Thi=
s
> certificate was issued to a site which is unusually likely to have been
> compromised.  The site you reached last time stated that its policy was t=
o
> use key rollover, and this new certificate did not do so."  The screen
> should then include "The site claims to be www.x at IP1, and its issuer i=
s
> Y.  On your last visit to it that same name was issued by Z at IP2".
> Similarly, if the signature does not verify against an expected key (NOT
> against the certificate), the UI should put up a similar error, with the
> second sentence "The endorsement on this site was signed by a key which
> wasn't in the last certificate".  A wild card name match without
> endorsement should put up a similar message.
>        This would not make the users' keys sovereign, but at least they
> would have some influence on their successors independent of the global
> set of CA's.  The advantages of the centralized PKI for introduction woul=
d
> remain, but a user who has previously visited a site would detect the use
> of a compromised CA or RA to issue a certificate to an attacker.
>=20
> Tom Gindin
>=20
> P.S.    The suggestion above is mine, and not necessarily that of my
> employer.
>=20


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Subject: Re: [pkix] CA T&A proofs as cert extensions. WAS: fyi: Sovereign	Keys
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        I am largely thinking of browsers, although POP clients could do 
the same thing.  After all, browsers are the single most common RP type. 
I'd be happier with a DNS+Cert hijack resulting in even 10% of the 
affected users seeing the problem (and a warning that this is more likely 
malicious than careless) than with the current state of affairs.
        A mail server seeing this condition (although most mail servers 
don't use TLS) should just drop the connection and print a warning.  I 
don't know what the server administrator would do with it.

Tom Gindin




From:   Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com>
To:     Tom Gindin/Watson/IBM@IBMUS, 
Cc:     "Hill, Brad" <bhill@paypal-inc.com>, "pkix@ietf.org" 
<pkix@ietf.org>
Date:   12/20/2011 08:45 AM
Subject:        Re: [pkix] CA T&A proofs as cert extensions. WAS: fyi: 
Sovereign       Keys



Hi Tom

When you say that the UI should put us a screen with some statement, what 
UI is this?  If it's in the relying party, then this works only for such 
relying parties that cache the previously-seen certificates, such as a 
browser implementing the cached info TLS extension. Usually RPs don't have 
that information.

Yoav

On Dec 20, 2011, at 3:28 PM, Tom Gindin wrote:

>        I would like to present a counterproposal, which is much closer 
to
> our current model.  I call it "renewal endorsement", and would implement
> it through two non-critical X.509 extensions.  The first and simpler
> extension would be called "Renewal endorsement expected", and would go
> into the older certificate.  It would contain an optional public key, or
> perhaps a SEQUENCE of them.  It would be conveyed as part of a PKCS#10 
in
> the usual way and copied into the certificate by the CA.   The second
> extension would be a CMS SignedData called "Renewal endorsement" going
> into the new certificate, containing the issuer name and the new public
> key signed by the public key from the "Renewal endorsement expected"
> extension or the public key in the older certificate if the extension 
was
> absent or didn't contain a public key.  It would be created using the 
old
> key, and included in the PKCS#10 in the usual way, then copied into the
> certificate by the CA.
>        If the original certificate contains the "Renewal endorsement
> expected" extension, and the received one does not contain the "Renewal
> endorsement", the UI should put up a screen with a statement such as 
"This
> certificate was issued to a site which is unusually likely to have been
> compromised.  The site you reached last time stated that its policy was 
to
> use key rollover, and this new certificate did not do so."  The screen
> should then include "The site claims to be www.x at IP1, and its issuer 
is
> Y.  On your last visit to it that same name was issued by Z at IP2".
> Similarly, if the signature does not verify against an expected key (NOT
> against the certificate), the UI should put up a similar error, with the
> second sentence "The endorsement on this site was signed by a key which
> wasn't in the last certificate".  A wild card name match without
> endorsement should put up a similar message.
>        This would not make the users' keys sovereign, but at least they
> would have some influence on their successors independent of the global
> set of CA's.  The advantages of the centralized PKI for introduction 
would
> remain, but a user who has previously visited a site would detect the 
use
> of a compromised CA or RA to issue a certificate to an attacker.
> 
> Tom Gindin
> 
> P.S.    The suggestion above is mine, and not necessarily that of my
> employer.
> 




From kent@bbn.com  Tue Dec 20 15:45:43 2011
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Subject: [pkix] draft-turner-pkix-cmc-serverkeygeneration-00
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Based on comments I received, we'll accept this as a PKIX WG item.

Sean, feel free to submit it with a new name.

Steve

From mattking1@gmail.com  Tue Dec 27 05:59:36 2011
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Subject: [pkix] Revised Submission: claimSigning EKU draft for PKIX WG Consideration
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Dear PKIX Working Group

Happy Holidays!  I have posted an updated draft document describing
the claimSigning
EKU.  It is titled =93draft-king-pkix-claimsigning-extn-03.txt=94
(abstract below) and it can be found at the following link for your
review:

http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-king-pkix-claimsigning-extn/?include_=
text=3D1

This revised draft replaces "draft-king-pkix-claimsigning-extn-02.txt".

I ask that the attached draft be considered as a new work item for
this group.  Thank you in advance for your time.

Matt
--
Matt King
Protiviti Inc.
Government Services
Matthew.King@pgs.protiviti.com
mattking1@gmail.com
410-271-5624 (Mobile)

ABSTRACT
This document specifies an Extended Key Usage (EKU) value which
   indicates that the certificate holder is authorized to sign security
   tokens to assert claims, or attributes, about a subject.

   When a certificate that asserts the claimSigning EKU signs a claim,
   the owner of the service holding that certificate is asserting that a
   statement about the subject is true. For example, a IdP secure token
   service (STS) would use an X.509 certificate containing the
   claimSigning EKU to sign SAML assertions containing an identifier and
   attributes about a user. This EKU value would allow for a separation
   between the designation that a given Identity belongs within a given
   Federation, and the empowerment of that entity within the federation
   to sign claims..  This approach allows for greater flexibility for
   the operators of Federated systems and for Certification Authorities
   and avoids the overloading of other, already established methods
   (such as Assurance Level designation via certificatePolicy OID).

On Fri, Oct 28, 2011 at 12:53 PM, Matt King <mattking1@gmail.com> wrote:
> Dear PKIX Working Group
>
> I have posted an updated draft document describing the claimSigning
> EKU. =A0It is titled =93draft-king-pkix-claimsigning-extn-02.txt=94
> (abstract below) and it can be found at the following link for your
> review:
>
> http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-king-pkix-claimsigning-extn/?includ=
e_text=3D1
>
> This revised draft replaces "draft-king-pkix-claimsigning-extn-01.txt".
>
> I ask that the attached draft be considered as a new work item for
> this group. =A0Thank you in advance for your time.
>
> Matt
> --
> Matt King
> Protiviti Inc.
> Government Services
> Matthew.King@pgs.protiviti.com
> mattking1@gmail.com
> 410-271-5624=A0(Mobile)
>
> On Wed, May 25, 2011 at 3:36 PM, Matt King <mattking1@gmail.com> wrote:
>> Dear PKIX Working Group
>>
>> I have posted an updated draft document describing the claimSigning EKU.=
 =A0It is
>> titled =93draft-king-pkix-claimsigning-extn-01.txt=94 (abstract below) a=
nd
>> it can be found at the following link for your review:
>>
>> http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-king-pkix-claimsigning-extn/?inclu=
de_text=3D1
>>
>> This revised draft replaces both the initial draft
>> "draft-king-pkix-claimsigning-extn-00.txt"
>> and "draft-patterson-pkix-attribute-signing-eku". =A0The authors of both
>> drafts have
>> collaborated and addressed all comments received to date and are
>> moving forward with this single submission.
>>
>> I ask that the attached draft be considered as a new work item for
>> this group. =A0Thank you in advance for your time.
>>
>> Matt
>> --
>> Matt King
>> Protiviti Inc.
>> Government Services
>> Matthew.King@pgs.protiviti.com
>> mattking1@gmail.com
>> 410-271-5624=A0(Mobile)
>>
>>
>> Abstract
>>
>> =A0 This memo specifies an Extended Key Usage (EKU) X.509 certificate
>> =A0 extension which indicates that the certificate holder is authorized
>> =A0 to sign security tokens to assert claims, or attributes, about a
>> =A0 principal.
>>
>> =A0 When an owner of a certificate that asserts the claimSigning EKU
>> =A0 signs a claim, the owner is asserting that a statement about the
>> =A0 principal is true. For example, a IdP secure token service (STS)
>> =A0 would use an X.509 certificate containing the claimSigning EKU to
>> =A0 sign SAML assertions containing an identifier and attributes about a
>> =A0 user. This additional EKU value would further allow the
>> =A0 differentiation of certificates used to identify a particular server
>> =A0 from those used by the server to sign identity or attribute claims.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Apr 22, 2011 at 1:51 PM, Matt King <mattking1@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> Dear PKIX Working Group
>>>
>>> I have posted an draft document describing a claimSigning EKU. =A0It is
>>> titled =93draft-king-pkix-claimsigning-extn-00.txt=94 (abstract below) =
and
>>> it can be found at the following link for your review:
>>>
>>> http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-king-pkix-claimsigning-extn/?incl=
ude_text=3D1
>>>
>>> I ask that the attached draft be considered as a new work item for
>>> this group. =A0Thank you in advance for your time.
>>>
>>> Abstract
>>>
>>> =A0 This memo specifies an Extended Key Usage (EKU) X.509 certificate
>>> =A0 extension which indicates that the certificate holder is authorized
>>> =A0 to sign security tokens to assert claims, or attributes, about a
>>> =A0 principal.
>>>
>>> =A0 When an owner of a certificate that asserts the claimSigning EKU
>>> =A0 signs a claim, the owner is asserting that a statement about the
>>> =A0 principal is true. For example, a IdP secure token service (STS)
>>> =A0 would use an X.509 certificate containing the claimSigning EKU to
>>> =A0 sign SAML assertions containing an identifier and attributes about =
a
>>> =A0 user.
>>>
>>>
>>> --
>>> Matt King
>>> Protiviti
>>> Government Services
>>> Matthew.King@pgs.protiviti.com
>>> mattking1@gmail.com
>>> 410-271-5624=A0(Mobile)
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> Matt King
>> mattking1@gmail.com
>> 410-271-5624=A0(Mobile)
>>
>
>
>
> --
> Matt King
> mattking1@gmail.com
> 410-271-5624=A0(Mobile)



--=20
Matt King
mattking1@gmail.com
410-271-5624 (Mobile)
