
From stefan@aaa-sec.com  Fri Mar  1 08:56:13 2013
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Date: Fri, 01 Mar 2013 17:56:08 +0100
From: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>
To: pkix <pkix@ietf.org>
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Subject: [pkix] Agenda posted
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An agenda for the PKIX meeting in Orlando has been posted.

http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/86/agenda/agenda-86-pkix

I have not yet got confirmation from the est editors but assume some of the
authors will provide an update presentation.

/Stefan




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<html><head></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: s=
pace; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-size:=
 14px; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><div>An agenda for the PKIX meeti=
ng in Orlando has been posted.</div><div><br></div><div><a href=3D"http://www.=
ietf.org/proceedings/86/agenda/agenda-86-pkix">http://www.ietf.org/proceedin=
gs/86/agenda/agenda-86-pkix</a></div><div><br></div><div>I have not yet got =
confirmation from the est editors but assume some of the authors will provid=
e an update presentation.</div><div><br></div><div>/Stefan</div><br></body><=
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--B_3445005372_1838468--



From denis.pinkas@bull.net  Mon Mar  4 00:43:09 2013
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Subject: [pkix] Comments on draft-santesson-auth-context-extension-04
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Stefan,


The goal of this document is to associate a public key to be used for 
verifying electronic signatures
with an identifier composed of a set of attributes, typically SAML 
attributes, contained in an authentication token.

MAJOR COMMENTS

1.The proposed draft is not aligned with the current practices of RFC 
5280 and X.509:
the right place to hold such a set of attributes is in the subject 
alternate name.
The subject DN may or may not be empty.

There is no rational in this draft to explain why this straightforward 
approach has not been chosen.

SubjectAltName ::= GeneralNames

GeneralNames ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName

GeneralName ::= CHOICE {

otherName[0]OtherName,

rfc822Name[1]IA5String,

dNSName[2]IA5String,

x400Address[3]ORAddress,

directoryName[4]Name,

ediPartyName[5]EDIPartyName,

uniformResourceIdentifier[6]IA5String,

iPAddress[7]OCTET STRING,

registeredID[8]OBJECT IDENTIFIER }

OtherName ::= SEQUENCE {

type-idOBJECT IDENTIFIER,

value[0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id }

OtherName fits well with the requirements, if you accept to use an OID 
rather than
a uniformResourceIdentifier.

The value component would contain an XML structure conformant with a XML 
schema.

2.The document should be restructured to define:

(a) the general way to answer to the requirements, and
(b) a specific profile, in an Appendix, so that other RFCs could refer 
to the main body of the document.

DETAILED COMMENTS

3.The proposed structure is not appropriate.

a) Why is there a need to have a SEQUENCE ? This should be avoided.

b) Why is contextInfo OPTIONAL? This should be avoided.

AuthenticationContexts ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF

AuthenticationContext

AuthenticationContext ::= SEQUENCE {

contextTypeUTF8String,

contextInfoUTF8String OPTIONAL

}

4.The text states: This extension MAY be marked critical.

If the alternate name is present, why should there be a DN ?

5.The XML schema should be given first (Appendix B) followed by the 
explanations (sections 3.1 and 3.2).
In other words, sections 3.1 and 3.2 should be placed in Appendix B.

6.The vocabulary used in sections 3.1 and 3.2 is confusing and should be 
changed.

An example: "AuthContextInfo Element" does not exist. However, it is 
better to state that the contextInfo component
contains an XML structure which must conform to an XML schema.

7.The XML structure proposed to fit inside contextInfo is overly complex.

AuthenticationInstant is mandatory, whereas it is not needed.

AssertionRef is not needed.

ServiceID is not needed.

8.There are no matching rules defined. This means that the verification 
of the content of that field is not possible.

9.In section 3.2, I failed to understand the explanations for CertRef as 
well as for rdn and san.

Why CertNameType cannot be "factorized" ? (in the example from Page 15, 
there are all the same).

"rdn"The SAML attribute value is placed in the

subject field of the certificate in a

present Relative Distinguished Name

attribute.

"san"The SAML attribute value is placed in the

Subject Alternative Name extension of the

certificate.

I also failed to understand the reason of such "mapping".
The example in Appendix C illustrates the complexity of the proposal.
Can the approach be made simpler ? If not, why ?

10.In section 4, I failed to understand the "dynamic" aspect. My 
understanding is that a person statically
authenticates to a RA (Registration Authority) and then is given back a 
non-repudiation certificate
with SAML attributes in it which may then be used as identity attributes.
I am unsure what the text in this section wants to say when using the 
words "dynamic manner".


Denis


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    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB">Stefan,<br>
        <o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB"><o:p><br>
        </o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB">The goal of this document is to associate a public
        key to be used for verifying electronic signatures <br>
        with an identifier composed of a set of attributes, typically
        SAML attributes, contained in an authentication token.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB">MAJOR COMMENTS<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><span lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->1.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
        style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"> The proposed draft
        is not aligned with the current practices of RFC 5280 and X.509:
        <br>
        the right place to hold such a set of attributes is in the
        subject alternate name. <br>
        The subject DN may or may not be empty. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB">There is no rational in this draft to explain why
        this straightforward approach has not been chosen.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US"
        lang="EN-US"><span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>SubjectAltName

        ::= GeneralNames<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US"
        lang="EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US"
        lang="EN-US"><span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>GeneralNames

        ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US"
        lang="EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US"
        lang="EN-US"><span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>GeneralName

        ::= CHOICE {<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US"
        lang="EN-US"><span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>otherName<span
          style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>[0]<span
          style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>OtherName,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US"
        lang="EN-US"><span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>rfc822Name<span
          style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>[1]<span
          style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>IA5String,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US"
        lang="EN-US"><span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>dNSName<span
          style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>[2]<span
          style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>IA5String,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US"
        lang="EN-US"><span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>x400Address<span
          style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>[3]<span
          style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>ORAddress,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US"
        lang="EN-US"><span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>directoryName<span
          style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>[4]<span
          style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>Name,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US"
        lang="EN-US"><span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>ediPartyName<span
          style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>[5]<span
          style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>EDIPartyName,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US"
        lang="EN-US"><span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>uniformResourceIdentifier<span
          style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>[6]<span
          style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>IA5String,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US"
        lang="EN-US"><span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>iPAddress<span
          style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>[7]<span
          style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>OCTET STRING,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US"
        lang="EN-US"><span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>registeredID<span
          style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>[8]<span
          style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>OBJECT IDENTIFIER }<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US"
        lang="EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US"
        lang="EN-US"><span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>OtherName
        ::= SEQUENCE {<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US"
        lang="EN-US"><span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>type-id<span
          style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>OBJECT IDENTIFIER,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US"
        lang="EN-US"><span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>value<span
          style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>[0] EXPLICIT ANY
        DEFINED BY type-id }<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US"
        lang="EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US"
        lang="EN-US">OtherName fits well with the requirements, if you
        accept to use an OID rather than <br>
        a uniformResourceIdentifier.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US"
        lang="EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB">The value component would contain an XML structure
        conformant with a XML schema.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><span lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->2.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
        style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"> The document
        should be restructured to define:<br>
        <br>
        (a) the general way to answer to the requirements, and <br>
        (b) a specific profile, in an Appendix, so that other RFCs could
        refer to the main body of the document.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB">DETAILED COMMENTS<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><span lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->3.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
        style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"> The proposed
        structure is not appropriate. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB">a) Why is there a need to have a SEQUENCE ? This
        should be avoided.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB">b) Why is contextInfo OPTIONAL? This should be
        avoided.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB"><span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>AuthenticationContexts

        ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB"><span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;

        </span>AuthenticationContext<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB"><span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>AuthenticationContext

        ::= SEQUENCE {<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB"><span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>contextType<span
          style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>UTF8String,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB"><span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>contextInfo<span
          style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>UTF8String OPTIONAL<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB"><span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>}<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><span lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->4.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
        style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"> The text states: <span
          style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</span>This extension MAY be
        marked critical.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB">If the alternate name is present, why should there
        be a DN ?<br>
      </span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><span lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->5.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
        style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"> The XML schema
        should be given first (Appendix B) followed by the explanations
        (sections 3.1 and 3.2). <br>
        In other words, sections 3.1 and 3.2 should be placed in
        Appendix B.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><span lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->6.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
        style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"> The vocabulary
        used in sections 3.1 and 3.2 is confusing and should be changed.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB">An example: &#8220;AuthContextInfo Element&#8221; does not
        exist. However, it is better to state that the contextInfo
        component <br>
        contains an XML structure which must conform to an XML schema.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><span lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->7.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
        style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"> The XML structure
        proposed to fit inside contextInfo is overly complex. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB">AuthenticationInstant is mandatory, whereas it is
        not needed.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB">AssertionRef is not needed.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB">ServiceID is not needed.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><span lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->8.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
        style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"> There are no
        matching rules defined. This means that the verification of the
        content of that field is not possible.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><span lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->9.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
        style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"> In section 3.2, I
        failed to understand the explanations for CertRef as well as for
        rdn and san.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB">Why CertNameType cannot be &#8220;factorized&#8221; ? (in the
        example from Page 15, there are all the same).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB"><span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;

        </span>"rdn"<span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>The SAML
        attribute value is placed in the<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB"><span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;

        </span>subject field of the certificate in a<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB"><span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;

        </span>present Relative Distinguished Name<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB"><span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;

        </span>attribute.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB"><span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;

        </span>"san"<span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>The SAML
        attribute value is placed in the<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB"><span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;

        </span>Subject Alternative Name extension of the<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB"><span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;

        </span>certificate.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB">I also failed to understand the reason of such
        &#8220;mapping&#8221;. <br>
        The example in Appendix C illustrates the complexity of the
        proposal. <br>
        Can the approach be made simpler ? If not, why ?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><span lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
        lang="EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->10.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
        style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"> In section 4, I
        failed to understand the &#8220;dynamic&#8221; aspect. My understanding is
        that a person statically <br>
        authenticates to a RA (Registration Authority) and then is given
        back a non-repudiation certificate <br>
        with SAML attributes in it which may then be used as identity
        attributes. <br>
        I am unsure what the text in this section wants to say when
        using the words &#8220;dynamic manner&#8221;.<br>
      </span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><br>
    </p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText">Denis<br>
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Denis,

First, thanks for your review. I really appreciate it.

It seems to me, especially with your leading concluding comment, that you
have missed out on what this specification attempts to do.
Perhaps you did not read the introduction enough, or perhaps I didn't write
it clear enough.

The purpose is not to associate the subject with a identifier composed of a
set of attributes.
That is, this is NOT a new name form.

This extension helps a relying party to understand the source of the
identity information that is placed in the traditional identity fields of a
certificate.
For example. If the serialNumber attributes holds the string "123456", then
this extension can tell you where this string came from.

The use case addressed is where the CA/RA obtains the authenticated identif=
y
from a SAML assertion when issuing the certificate.
This extension provides means to preserve information about the original
SAML attributes in the cert.


From:  Denis Pinkas <denis.pinkas@bull.net>
Date:  Monday, March 4, 2013 9:42 AM
To:  Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>, pkix <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject:  Comments on draft-santesson-auth-context-extension-04

>    =20
>  =20
>=20
> Stefan,
> =20
> =20
>=20
> =20
> =20
> The goal of this document is to associate a public key to be used for
> verifying electronic signatures
>  with an identifier composed of a set of attributes, typically SAML
> attributes, contained in an authentication token.
> =20
> =20
> =20

No you got this wrong. This is not an Identifier.

> =20
> =20
> MAJOR COMMENTS
> =20
> =20
> =20
> 1. The proposed draft is not aligned with the current practices of RFC 52=
80
> and X.509:=20
>  the right place to hold such a set of attributes is in the subject alter=
nate
> name.=20
>  The subject DN may or may not be empty.
> =20
> =20
> =20
> There is no rational in this draft to explain why this straightforward
> approach has not been chosen.
> =20
> =20
> =20
>    SubjectAltName  ::=3D GeneralNames
> =20
> =20
> =20
>    GeneralNames  ::=3D SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName
> =20
> =20
> =20
>    GeneralName  ::=3D CHOICE {
> =20
>         otherName                       [0]     OtherName,
> =20
>         rfc822Name                      [1]     IA5String,
> =20
>         dNSName                         [2]     IA5String,
> =20
>         x400Address                     [3]     ORAddress,
> =20
>         directoryName                   [4]     Name,
> =20
>         ediPartyName                    [5]     EDIPartyName,
> =20
>         uniformResourceIdentifier       [6]     IA5String,
> =20
>         iPAddress                       [7]     OCTET STRING,
> =20
>         registeredID                    [8]     OBJECT IDENTIFIER }
> =20
> =20
> =20
>    OtherName ::=3D SEQUENCE {
> =20
>         type-id    OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
> =20
>         value      [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id }
> =20
> =20
> =20
> OtherName fits well with the requirements, if you accept to use an OID ra=
ther
> than=20
>  a uniformResourceIdentifier.
> =20
> =20
> =20
> The value component would contain an XML structure conformant with a XML
> schema.
> =20
> =20
> =20

This draft does not contain an identifier, thus this comment is irrelevant.
There is not explanation why we don't store an identifier as a SAN, since w=
e
do not create or store an identifier.

> =20
> =20
> 2. The document should be restructured to define:
> =20
>  (a) the general way to answer to the requirements, and
>  (b) a specific profile, in an Appendix, so that other RFCs could refer t=
o the
> main body of the document.
> =20
> =20
> =20

That could be one way to do it.

> =20
> =20
> DETAILED COMMENTS
> =20
> =20
> =20
> 3. The proposed structure is not appropriate.
> =20
> =20
> =20
> a) Why is there a need to have a SEQUENCE ? This should be avoided.
> =20
> b) Why is contextInfo OPTIONAL? This should be avoided.
> =20
> =20
> =20
>       AuthenticationContexts  ::=3D SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
> =20
>                                  AuthenticationContext
> =20
> =20
> =20
>       AuthenticationContext  ::=3D SEQUENCE {
> =20
>           contextType     UTF8String,
> =20
>           contextInfo     UTF8String OPTIONAL
> =20
>       }
> =20

For exactly the same reason why SAML AuthContextClassRef in a SAML assertio=
n
is mandatory but not the XML structure it defines.
In some cases you don't want to include explicit data, if that data is
static and can be implicitly known through an identifier.

The AuthContextClassRef in SAML is the best example as it is an exact
functional replica of this.
The URL identified by AuthContextClassRef is also a XML Schema ns for
associated XML document.

The XML Schema can define both a static XML document with fixed values as
well as a structure where different values can be entered.

Just including the reference to the XML Schema may then provide sufficient
information to the relying party. The actual XML document is only included
if some variable data need to be communicated within the associated XML
document.

Just including contextType but not contextInfo could be compared with the
case where we include a certificate policy OID, but not the entire policy
text.

This is a really smart way to do this, which is made possible through the
versatility of XML Schemas.


> =20
> =20
> =20
> =20
> 4. The text states:    This extension MAY be marked critical.
> =20
> =20
> =20
> If the alternate name is present, why should there be a DN ?
> =20
> =20

This comment must be based on a misunderstanding of the scope of this
document.

> =20
> =20
> =20
> =20
> 5. The XML schema should be given first (Appendix B) followed by the
> explanations (sections 3.1 and 3.2).
>  In other words, sections 3.1 and 3.2 should be placed in Appendix B.
> =20

That is one way to do it. If I was the implementer, I really wouldn't care
as long as the information is there.
I think it is quite common to place programatic contracts in Appendixes,
wile explaining data elements in the body of the document.

> =20
> =20
> =20
> =20
> 6. The vocabulary used in sections 3.1 and 3.2 is confusing and should be
> changed.
> =20
> =20
> =20
> An example: =B3AuthContextInfo Element=B2 does not exist. However, it is bett=
er to
> state that the contextInfo component
>  contains an XML structure which must conform to an XML schema.
> =20
> =20
> =20

Sorry, I don't get this comment. The AuthContextInfo element does exist. It
is defined in the schema. XML Schema defines syntax and structure but not
the semantics. Semantics are defined the section 3.

> =20
> =20
> 7. The XML structure proposed to fit inside contextInfo is overly complex=
.
> =20
> =20
> =20
> AuthenticationInstant is mandatory, whereas it is not needed.

This information is always available from the SAML assertion and is
considered fundamental, thus required.

> =20
> AssertionRef is not needed.
> =20
> ServiceID is not needed.
> =20

And hence, both are optional.

The XML Schema is actually very simple. Its just the nature of XML Schemas
to look more complex than they actually are.
Perhaps it is easier if you examine it through this following web doc (whic=
h
unfortunately can't be included in the spec):
http://aaa-sec.com/eid2/sigsupport/XMLschema/AuthContExtDoc/index.html


> =20
> =20
> =20
> =20
> 8. There are no matching rules defined. This means that the verification =
of
> the content of that field is not possible.
> =20

First of all, this is not an identifier, thus there is no reason for a
matching rule is it would be if this was an identifier that as a whole
should be compared with something else.

The SAML attribute value does not have to match the value of the cert
attribute, this data in the extension is optional and, if present, is a
hint.=20
But I could actually add some text to clarify this.

> =20
> =20
> =20
> =20
> 9. In section 3.2, I failed to understand the explanations for CertRef as=
 well
> as for rdn and san.
> =20
> =20
> =20
> Why CertNameType cannot be =B3factorized=B2 ? (in the example from Page 15, t=
here
> are all the same).

No, the example in the spec has one e-mail attribute that was placed in the
SubjAltName extension of the cert.

> =20
> =20
> =20
>                       "rdn"   The SAML attribute value is placed in the
> =20
>                               subject field of the certificate in a
> =20
>                               present Relative Distinguished Name
> =20
>                               attribute.
> =20
> =20
> =20
>                       "san"   The SAML attribute value is placed in the
> =20
>                               Subject Alternative Name extension of the
> =20
>                               certificate.
> =20
> =20
> =20
> I also failed to understand the reason of such =B3mapping=B2.

Yes, and I think that is the reason behind most of your comments.

>=20
>  The example in Appendix C illustrates the complexity of the proposal.
>  Can the approach be made simpler ? If not, why ?
> =20
> =20
> =20

No it can't be made simpler. It contains exactly the information we need in
the implementation where it is used.

I could write a whole whitepaper about all detailed reasons, but if you
really think about the use case, it should be clear.

Consider the case where you know users by attributes defined in a SAML
federation, where for example serialNumber is NOT used.
A CA issues a certificate to a user based an a SAML assertion authenticatio=
n
based on the attribute profile of that federation.

A user logs in to your service using a SAML assertion, and sends you a
signed document associated with the issued certificate.
You now need to determine whether that SAML assertion and the certificate
represents the same user.
You also need to determine that the SAML assertion and the certificate
provides compatible levels of assertion for user authentication as defined
in your SAML federation.

This extension gives you exactly the amount of data that is needed in order
to do this in an unambiguous fully automated process.

> =20
> =20
> 10. In section 4, I failed to understand the =B3dynamic=B2 aspect. My
> understanding is that a person statically
>  authenticates to a RA (Registration Authority) and then is given back a
> non-repudiation certificate
>  with SAML attributes in it which may then be used as identity attributes=
.
>  I am unsure what the text in this section wants to say when using the wo=
rds
> =B3dynamic manner=B2.
> =20
> =20


Your view is to restrictive.

The dynamic aspect of this is that a certificate may be issued on the fly a=
t
the instance when it is needed, containing just the information that is
needed for one particular situation.
This extension is (where this is used in the Swedish national
infrastructure) added to certificates that are issued for just one instance
of signing, and hence can be dynamically adapted to the needs of the
intended relying party.

Next time the user signs, a new key pair is generated with new certs that
may contain another set of the user's attributes.

The first instance may for example contain the users private identity based
on a national identifier, the second may carry an organisational identity
based on employee number.
What attributes that are needed in every instance is determined in a servic=
e
context that is outside the scope of this specification.

In these certificates, both the national identifier and the employee number
may be placed as a serialNumber attribute in the subject field.
Despite that, this extension makes it possible for the relying party to kno=
w
exactly what identity information each certificate carries, as it maps to
the attribute profile of a SAML federation.

/Stefan

>=20
> =20
> =20
> Denis
> =20
>       =20



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<html><head></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: s=
pace; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-size:=
 14px; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><div>Denis,</div><div><br></div><=
div>First, thanks for your review. I really appreciate it.</div><div><br></d=
iv><div>It seems to me, especially with your leading concluding comment, tha=
t you have missed out on what this specification attempts to do.</div><div>P=
erhaps you did not read the introduction enough, or perhaps I didn't write i=
t clear enough.</div><div><br></div><div>The purpose is not to associate the=
 subject with a identifier composed of a set of attributes.</div><div>That i=
s, this is NOT a new name form.</div><div><br></div><div>This extension help=
s a relying party to understand the source of the identity information that =
is placed in the traditional identity fields of a certificate.</div><div>For=
 example. If the serialNumber attributes holds the string "123456", then thi=
s extension can tell you where this string came from.</div><div><br></div><d=
iv>The use case addressed is where the CA/RA obtains the authenticated ident=
ify from a SAML assertion when issuing the certificate.</div><div>This exten=
sion provides means to preserve information about the original SAML attribut=
es in the cert.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SE=
CTION"><div style=3D"font-family:Calibri; font-size:11pt; text-align:left; col=
or:black; BORDER-BOTTOM: medium none; BORDER-LEFT: medium none; PADDING-BOTT=
OM: 0in; PADDING-LEFT: 0in; PADDING-RIGHT: 0in; BORDER-TOP: #b5c4df 1pt soli=
d; BORDER-RIGHT: medium none; PADDING-TOP: 3pt"><span style=3D"font-weight:bol=
d">From: </span> Denis Pinkas &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:denis.pinkas@bull.net">den=
is.pinkas@bull.net</a>&gt;<br><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">Date: </span> M=
onday, March 4, 2013 9:42 AM<br><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">To: </span> S=
tefan Santesson &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com">stefan@aaa-sec.com</=
a>&gt;, pkix &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br><sp=
an style=3D"font-weight:bold">Subject: </span> Comments on draft-santesson-aut=
h-context-extension-04<br></div><div><br></div><blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_A=
TTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5;=
 MARGIN:0 0 0 5;"><div>
  
    <meta http-equiv=3D"content-type" content=3D"text/html;
      charset=3DISO-8859-1">
  
  <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
    <meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html;
      charset=3DISO-8859-1">
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-=
GB">Stefan,<br>
        <o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-=
GB"><o:p><br>
        </o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-=
GB">The goal of this document is to associate a public
        key to be used for verifying electronic signatures <br>
        with an identifier composed of a set of attributes, typically
        SAML attributes, contained in an authentication token.<o:p></o:p></=
span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-=
GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    </div></div></blockquote></span><div><br></div><div>No you got this wro=
ng. This is not an Identifier.</div><div><br></div><span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SE=
CTION"><blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=3D"BORDER-LEF=
T: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;"><div><div text=3D"#00000=
0" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF"><p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:=
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-=
GB">MAJOR COMMENTS<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-=
GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'=
mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'=
>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB=
"><!--[if !supportFields]-->1.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><s=
pan
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-e=
nd'></span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN=
-GB"> The proposed draft
        is not aligned with the current practices of RFC 5280 and X.509:
        <br>
        the right place to hold such a set of attributes is in the
        subject alternate name. <br>
        The subject DN may or may not be empty. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-=
GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-=
GB">There is no rational in this draft to explain why
        this straightforward approach has not been chosen.<o:p></o:p></span=
></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-=
GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-=
US"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>SubjectAltName

        ::=3D GeneralNames<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-=
US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-=
US"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>GeneralNames

        ::=3D SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-=
US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-=
US"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>GeneralName

        ::=3D CHOICE {<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-=
US"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
; </span>otherName<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>[0]<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>OtherName,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-=
US"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
; </span>rfc822Name<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>[1]<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>IA5String,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-=
US"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
; </span>dNSName<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>[2]<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:=
yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>IA5String,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-=
US"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
; </span>x400Address<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>[3]<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp; </span>ORAddress,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-=
US"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
; </span>directoryName<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp; </span>[4]<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
</span>Name,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-=
US"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
; </span>ediPartyName<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>[5]<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp; </span>EDIPartyName,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-=
US"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
; </span>uniformResourceIdentifier<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>[6]<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>IA5String,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-=
US"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
; </span>iPAddress<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>[7]<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>OCTET STRING,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-=
US"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
; </span>registeredID<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>[8]<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp; </span>OBJECT IDENTIFIER }<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-=
US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-=
US"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>OtherName
        ::=3D SEQUENCE {<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-=
US"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
; </span>type-id<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>OBJ=
ECT IDENTIFIER,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-=
US"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
; </span>value<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
</span>[0] EXPLICIT ANY
        DEFINED BY type-id }<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-=
US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-=
US">OtherName fits well with the requirements, if you
        accept to use an OID rather than <br>
        a uniformResourceIdentifier.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-=
US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-=
GB">The value component would contain an XML structure
        conformant with a XML schema.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-=
GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    </div></div></blockquote></span><div><br></div><div>This draft does not=
 contain an identifier, thus this comment is irrelevant.</div><div>There is =
not explanation why we don't store an identifier as a SAN, since we do not c=
reate or store an identifier.</div><div><br></div><span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SEC=
TION"><blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=3D"BORDER-LEFT=
: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;"><div><div text=3D"#000000=
" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF"><p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:E=
N-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'=
mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'=
>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB=
"><!--[if !supportFields]-->2.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><s=
pan
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-e=
nd'></span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN=
-GB"> The document
        should be restructured to define:<br>
        <br>
        (a) the general way to answer to the requirements, and <br>
        (b) a specific profile, in an Appendix, so that other RFCs could
        refer to the main body of the document.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-=
GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    </div></div></blockquote></span><div><br></div><div>That could be one w=
ay to do it.</div><div><br></div><span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION"><blockquote=
 id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid=
; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;"><div><div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFF=
F"><p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB=
"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-=
GB">DETAILED COMMENTS<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-=
GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'=
mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'=
>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB=
"><!--[if !supportFields]-->3.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><s=
pan
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-e=
nd'></span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN=
-GB"> The proposed
        structure is not appropriate. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-=
GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-=
GB">a) Why is there a need to have a SEQUENCE ? This
        should be avoided.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-=
GB">b) Why is contextInfo OPTIONAL? This should be
        avoided.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-=
GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-=
GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>Aut=
henticationContexts

        ::=3D SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-=
GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;

        </span>AuthenticationContext<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-=
GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-=
GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>Aut=
henticationContext

        ::=3D SEQUENCE {<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-=
GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>contextType<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp; </span>UTF8String,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-=
GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>contextInfo<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp; </span>UTF8String OPTIONAL<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-=
GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>}<o=
:p></o:p></span></p>
    </div></div></blockquote></span><div><br></div><div>For exactly the sam=
e reason why SAML AuthContextClassRef in a SAML assertion is mandatory but n=
ot the XML structure it defines.</div><div>In some cases you don't want to i=
nclude explicit data, if that data is static and can be implicitly known thr=
ough an identifier.</div><div><br></div><div>The&nbsp;AuthContextClassRef in=
 SAML is the best example as it is an exact functional replica of this.</div=
><div>The URL identified by&nbsp;AuthContextClassRef is also a XML Schema ns=
 for associated XML document.</div><div><br></div><div>The XML Schema can de=
fine both a static XML document with fixed values as well as a structure whe=
re different values can be entered.</div><div><br></div><div>Just including =
the reference to the XML Schema may then provide sufficient information to t=
he relying party. The actual XML document is only included if some variable =
data need to be communicated within the associated XML document.</div><div><=
br></div><div>Just including contextType but not contextInfo could be compar=
ed with the case where we include a certificate policy OID, but not the enti=
re policy text.</div><div><br></div><div>This is a really smart way to do th=
is, which is made possible through the versatility of XML Schemas.</div><div=
><br></div><div><br></div><span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION"><blockquote id=3D"MA=
C_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDI=
NG:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;"><div><div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF"><p c=
lass=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=
&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-=
GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'=
mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'=
>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB=
"><!--[if !supportFields]-->4.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><s=
pan
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-e=
nd'></span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN=
-GB"> The text states: <span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</sp=
an>This extension MAY be
        marked critical.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-=
GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-=
GB">If the alternate name is present, why should there
        be a DN ?<br>
      </span></p>
    </div></div></blockquote></span><div><br></div><div>This comment must b=
e based on a misunderstanding of the scope of this document.</div><div><br><=
/div><span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION"><blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION=
_BLOCKQUOTE" style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0 =
0 0 5;"><div><div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF"><p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><=
span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></=
p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-=
GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'=
mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'=
>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB=
"><!--[if !supportFields]-->5.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><s=
pan
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-e=
nd'></span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN=
-GB"> The XML schema
        should be given first (Appendix B) followed by the explanations
        (sections 3.1 and 3.2). <br>
        In other words, sections 3.1 and 3.2 should be placed in
        Appendix B.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    </div></div></blockquote></span><div><br></div><div>That is one way to =
do it. If I was the implementer, I really wouldn't care as long as the infor=
mation is there.</div><div>I think it is quite common to place programatic c=
ontracts in Appendixes, wile explaining data elements in the body of the doc=
ument.</div><div><br></div><span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION"><blockquote id=3D"M=
AC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADD=
ING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;"><div><div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF"><p =
class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-=
GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'=
mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'=
>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB=
"><!--[if !supportFields]-->6.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><s=
pan
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-e=
nd'></span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN=
-GB"> The vocabulary
        used in sections 3.1 and 3.2 is confusing and should be changed.<o:=
p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-=
GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-=
GB">An example: &#8220;AuthContextInfo Element&#8221; does not
        exist. However, it is better to state that the contextInfo
        component <br>
        contains an XML structure which must conform to an XML schema.<o:p>=
</o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-=
GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    </div></div></blockquote></span><div><br></div><div>Sorry, I don't get =
this comment. The AuthContextInfo element does exist. It is defined in the s=
chema. XML Schema defines syntax and structure but not the semantics. Semant=
ics are defined the section 3.</div><div><br></div><span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SE=
CTION"><blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=3D"BORDER-LEF=
T: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;"><div><div text=3D"#00000=
0" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF"><p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:=
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'=
mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'=
>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB=
"><!--[if !supportFields]-->7.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><s=
pan
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-e=
nd'></span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN=
-GB"> The XML structure
        proposed to fit inside contextInfo is overly complex. <o:p></o:p></=
span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-=
GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-=
GB">AuthenticationInstant is mandatory, whereas it is
        not needed.</span></p></div></div></blockquote></span><div><br></di=
v><div>This information is always available from the SAML assertion and is c=
onsidered fundamental, thus required.</div><div><br></div><span id=3D"OLK_SRC_=
BODY_SECTION"><blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=3D"BOR=
DER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;"><div><div text=3D=
"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF"><p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-la=
nguage:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-=
GB">AssertionRef is not needed.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-=
GB">ServiceID is not needed.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    </div></div></blockquote></span><div><br></div><div>And hence, both are=
 optional.</div><div><br></div><div>The XML Schema is actually very simple. =
Its just the nature of XML Schemas to look more complex than they actually a=
re.</div><div>Perhaps it is easier if you examine it through this following =
web doc (which unfortunately can't be included in the spec):</div><div><a hr=
ef=3D"http://aaa-sec.com/eid2/sigsupport/XMLschema/AuthContExtDoc/index.html">=
http://aaa-sec.com/eid2/sigsupport/XMLschema/AuthContExtDoc/index.html</a></=
div><div><br></div><div><br></div><span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION"><blockquot=
e id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 soli=
d; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;"><div><div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFF=
FF"><p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-G=
B"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-=
GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'=
mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'=
>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB=
"><!--[if !supportFields]-->8.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><s=
pan
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-e=
nd'></span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN=
-GB"> There are no
        matching rules defined. This means that the verification of the
        content of that field is not possible.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    </div></div></blockquote></span><div><br></div><div>First of all, this =
is not an identifier, thus there is no reason for a matching rule is it woul=
d be if this was an identifier that as a whole should be compared with somet=
hing else.</div><div><br></div><div>The SAML attribute value does not have t=
o match the value of the cert attribute, this data in the extension is optio=
nal and, if present, is a hint.&nbsp;</div><div>But I could actually add som=
e text to clarify this.</div><div><br></div><span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">=
<blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c=
4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;"><div><div text=3D"#000000" bgco=
lor=3D"#FFFFFF"><p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" =
lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-=
GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'=
mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'=
>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB=
"><!--[if !supportFields]-->9.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><s=
pan
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-e=
nd'></span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN=
-GB"> In section 3.2, I
        failed to understand the explanations for CertRef as well as for
        rdn and san.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-=
GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-=
GB">Why CertNameType cannot be &#8220;factorized&#8221; ? (in the
        example from Page 15, there are all the same).</span></p></div></di=
v></blockquote></span><div><br></div><div>No, the example in the spec has on=
e e-mail attribute that was placed in the SubjAltName extension of the cert.=
</div><div><br></div><span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION"><blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUT=
LOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 =
0 0 5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;"><div><div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF"><p class=3D=
"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p=
></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-=
GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-=
GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;

        </span>"rdn"<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>The =
SAML
        attribute value is placed in the<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-=
GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;

        </span>subject field of the certificate in a<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-=
GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;

        </span>present Relative Distinguished Name<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-=
GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;

        </span>attribute.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-=
GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-=
GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;

        </span>"san"<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>The =
SAML
        attribute value is placed in the<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-=
GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;

        </span>Subject Alternative Name extension of the<o:p></o:p></span><=
/p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-=
GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;

        </span>certificate.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-=
GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-=
GB">I also failed to understand the reason of such
        &#8220;mapping&#8221;. </span></p></div></div></blockquote></span><=
div><br></div><div>Yes, and I think that is the reason behind most of your c=
omments.</div><div><br></div><span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION"><blockquote id=3D=
"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PA=
DDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;"><div><div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF"><=
p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><b=
r>
        The example in Appendix C illustrates the complexity of the
        proposal. <br>
        Can the approach be made simpler ? If not, why ?<o:p></o:p></span><=
/p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-=
GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    </div></div></blockquote></span><div><br></div><div>No it can't be made=
 simpler. It contains exactly the information we need in the implementation =
where it is used.</div><div><br></div><div>I could write a whole whitepaper =
about all detailed reasons, but if you really think about the use case, it s=
hould be clear.</div><div><br></div><div>Consider the case where you know us=
ers by attributes defined in a SAML federation, where for example serialNumb=
er is NOT used.</div><div>A CA issues a certificate to a user based an a SAM=
L assertion authentication based on the attribute profile of that federation=
.</div><div><br></div><div>A user logs in to your service using a SAML asser=
tion, and sends you a signed document associated with the issued certificate=
.</div><div>You now need to determine whether that SAML assertion and the ce=
rtificate represents the same user.</div><div>You also need to determine tha=
t the SAML assertion and the certificate provides compatible levels of asser=
tion for user authentication as defined in your SAML federation.</div><div><=
br></div><div>This extension gives you exactly the amount of data that is ne=
eded in order to do this in an unambiguous fully automated process.</div><di=
v><br></div><span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION"><blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTR=
IBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MA=
RGIN:0 0 0 5;"><div><div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF"><p class=3D"MsoPlain=
Text"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></=
span></p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'=
mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'=
>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB=
"><!--[if !supportFields]-->10.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><=
span
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-e=
nd'></span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN=
-GB"> In section 4, I
        failed to understand the &#8220;dynamic&#8221; aspect. My understan=
ding is
        that a person statically <br>
        authenticates to a RA (Registration Authority) and then is given
        back a non-repudiation certificate <br>
        with SAML attributes in it which may then be used as identity
        attributes. <br>
        I am unsure what the text in this section wants to say when
        using the words &#8220;dynamic manner&#8221;.<br>
      </span></p>
    </div></div></blockquote></span><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>Your=
 view is to restrictive.</div><div><br></div><div>The dynamic aspect of this=
 is that a certificate may be issued on the fly at the instance when it is n=
eeded, containing just the information that is needed for one particular sit=
uation.</div><div>This extension is (where this is used in the Swedish natio=
nal infrastructure) added to certificates that are issued for just one insta=
nce of signing, and hence can be dynamically adapted to the needs of the int=
ended relying party.</div><div><br></div><div>Next time the user signs, a ne=
w key pair is generated with new certs that may contain another set of the u=
ser's attributes.</div><div><br></div><div>The first instance may for exampl=
e contain the users private identity based on a national identifier, the sec=
ond may carry an organisational identity based on employee number.</div><div=
>What attributes that are needed in every instance is determined in a servic=
e context that is outside the scope of this specification.</div><div><br></d=
iv><div>In these certificates, both the national identifier and the employee=
 number may be placed as a serialNumber attribute in the subject field.</div=
><div>Despite that, this extension makes it possible for the relying party t=
o know exactly what identity information each certificate carries, as it map=
s to the attribute profile of a SAML federation.</div><div><br></div><div>/S=
tefan</div><div><br></div><span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION"><blockquote id=3D"MA=
C_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDI=
NG:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;"><div><div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF"><p c=
lass=3D"MsoPlainText"><br>
    </p>
    <p class=3D"MsoPlainText">Denis<br>
      <span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span>=
</p>
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From md@e-net.lt  Mon Mar  4 02:26:59 2013
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Comments on draft-santesson-auth-context-extension-04
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On 3/4/2013 12:09 PM, Stefan Santesson wrote:
> Denis,
>
> First, thanks for your review. I really appreciate it.
>
> It seems to me, especially with your leading concluding comment, that 
> you have missed out on what this specification attempts to do.
> Perhaps you did not read the introduction enough, or perhaps I didn't 
> write it clear enough.
>
> The purpose is not to associate the subject with a identifier composed 
> of a set of attributes.
> That is, this is NOT a new name form.
>
> This extension helps a relying party to understand the source of the 
> identity information that is placed in the traditional identity fields 
> of a certificate.
> For example. If the serialNumber attributes holds the string "123456", 
> then this extension can tell you where this string came from.
>
How is this related to "semantics identifier" (ETSI TS 119 412-2) then?

M.D.
> The use case addressed is where the CA/RA obtains the authenticated 
> identify from a SAML assertion when issuing the certificate.
> This extension provides means to preserve information about the 
> original SAML attributes in the cert.
>
>
> From: Denis Pinkas <denis.pinkas@bull.net <mailto:denis.pinkas@bull.net>>
> Date: Monday, March 4, 2013 9:42 AM
> To: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com <mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com>>, 
> pkix <pkix@ietf.org <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>>
> Subject: Comments on draft-santesson-auth-context-extension-04
>
>     Stefan,
>
>
>     The goal of this document is to associate a public key to be used
>     for verifying electronic signatures
>     with an identifier composed of a set of attributes, typically SAML
>     attributes, contained in an authentication token.
>
>
> No you got this wrong. This is not an Identifier.
>
>     MAJOR COMMENTS
>
>     1.The proposed draft is not aligned with the current practices of
>     RFC 5280 and X.509:
>     the right place to hold such a set of attributes is in the subject
>     alternate name.
>     The subject DN may or may not be empty.
>
>     There is no rational in this draft to explain why this
>     straightforward approach has not been chosen.
>
>     SubjectAltName ::= GeneralNames
>
>     GeneralNames ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName
>
>     GeneralName ::= CHOICE {
>
>     otherName[0]OtherName,
>
>     rfc822Name[1]IA5String,
>
>     dNSName[2]IA5String,
>
>     x400Address[3]ORAddress,
>
>     directoryName[4]Name,
>
>     ediPartyName[5]EDIPartyName,
>
>     uniformResourceIdentifier[6]IA5String,
>
>     iPAddress[7]OCTET STRING,
>
>     registeredID[8]OBJECT IDENTIFIER }
>
>     OtherName ::= SEQUENCE {
>
>     type-idOBJECT IDENTIFIER,
>
>     value[0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id }
>
>     OtherName fits well with the requirements, if you accept to use an
>     OID rather than
>     a uniformResourceIdentifier.
>
>     The value component would contain an XML structure conformant with
>     a XML schema.
>
>
> This draft does not contain an identifier, thus this comment is 
> irrelevant.
> There is not explanation why we don't store an identifier as a SAN, 
> since we do not create or store an identifier.
>
>     2.The document should be restructured to define:
>
>     (a) the general way to answer to the requirements, and
>     (b) a specific profile, in an Appendix, so that other RFCs could
>     refer to the main body of the document.
>
>
> That could be one way to do it.
>
>     DETAILED COMMENTS
>
>     3.The proposed structure is not appropriate.
>
>     a) Why is there a need to have a SEQUENCE ? This should be avoided.
>
>     b) Why is contextInfo OPTIONAL? This should be avoided.
>
>     AuthenticationContexts ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
>
>     AuthenticationContext
>
>     AuthenticationContext ::= SEQUENCE {
>
>     contextTypeUTF8String,
>
>     contextInfoUTF8String OPTIONAL
>
>     }
>
>
> For exactly the same reason why SAML AuthContextClassRef in a SAML 
> assertion is mandatory but not the XML structure it defines.
> In some cases you don't want to include explicit data, if that data is 
> static and can be implicitly known through an identifier.
>
> The AuthContextClassRef in SAML is the best example as it is an exact 
> functional replica of this.
> The URL identified by AuthContextClassRef is also a XML Schema ns for 
> associated XML document.
>
> The XML Schema can define both a static XML document with fixed values 
> as well as a structure where different values can be entered.
>
> Just including the reference to the XML Schema may then provide 
> sufficient information to the relying party. The actual XML document 
> is only included if some variable data need to be communicated within 
> the associated XML document.
>
> Just including contextType but not contextInfo could be compared with 
> the case where we include a certificate policy OID, but not the entire 
> policy text.
>
> This is a really smart way to do this, which is made possible through 
> the versatility of XML Schemas.
>
>
>     4.The text states: This extension MAY be marked critical.
>
>     If the alternate name is present, why should there be a DN ?
>
>
> This comment must be based on a misunderstanding of the scope of this 
> document.
>
>     5.The XML schema should be given first (Appendix B) followed by
>     the explanations (sections 3.1 and 3.2).
>     In other words, sections 3.1 and 3.2 should be placed in Appendix B.
>
>
> That is one way to do it. If I was the implementer, I really wouldn't 
> care as long as the information is there.
> I think it is quite common to place programatic contracts in 
> Appendixes, wile explaining data elements in the body of the document.
>
>     6.The vocabulary used in sections 3.1 and 3.2 is confusing and
>     should be changed.
>
>     An example: "AuthContextInfo Element" does not exist. However, it
>     is better to state that the contextInfo component
>     contains an XML structure which must conform to an XML schema.
>
>
> Sorry, I don't get this comment. The AuthContextInfo element does 
> exist. It is defined in the schema. XML Schema defines syntax and 
> structure but not the semantics. Semantics are defined the section 3.
>
>     7.The XML structure proposed to fit inside contextInfo is overly
>     complex.
>
>     AuthenticationInstant is mandatory, whereas it is not needed.
>
>
> This information is always available from the SAML assertion and is 
> considered fundamental, thus required.
>
>     AssertionRef is not needed.
>
>     ServiceID is not needed.
>
>
> And hence, both are optional.
>
> The XML Schema is actually very simple. Its just the nature of XML 
> Schemas to look more complex than they actually are.
> Perhaps it is easier if you examine it through this following web doc 
> (which unfortunately can't be included in the spec):
> http://aaa-sec.com/eid2/sigsupport/XMLschema/AuthContExtDoc/index.html
>
>
>     8.There are no matching rules defined. This means that the
>     verification of the content of that field is not possible.
>
>
> First of all, this is not an identifier, thus there is no reason for a 
> matching rule is it would be if this was an identifier that as a whole 
> should be compared with something else.
>
> The SAML attribute value does not have to match the value of the cert 
> attribute, this data in the extension is optional and, if present, is 
> a hint.
> But I could actually add some text to clarify this.
>
>     9.In section 3.2, I failed to understand the explanations for
>     CertRef as well as for rdn and san.
>
>     Why CertNameType cannot be "factorized" ? (in the example from
>     Page 15, there are all the same).
>
>
> No, the example in the spec has one e-mail attribute that was placed 
> in the SubjAltName extension of the cert.
>
>     "rdn"The SAML attribute value is placed in the
>
>     subject field of the certificate in a
>
>     present Relative Distinguished Name
>
>     attribute.
>
>     "san"The SAML attribute value is placed in the
>
>     Subject Alternative Name extension of the
>
>     certificate.
>
>     I also failed to understand the reason of such "mapping".
>
>
> Yes, and I think that is the reason behind most of your comments.
>
>
>     The example in Appendix C illustrates the complexity of the proposal.
>     Can the approach be made simpler ? If not, why ?
>
>
> No it can't be made simpler. It contains exactly the information we 
> need in the implementation where it is used.
>
> I could write a whole whitepaper about all detailed reasons, but if 
> you really think about the use case, it should be clear.
>
> Consider the case where you know users by attributes defined in a SAML 
> federation, where for example serialNumber is NOT used.
> A CA issues a certificate to a user based an a SAML assertion 
> authentication based on the attribute profile of that federation.
>
> A user logs in to your service using a SAML assertion, and sends you a 
> signed document associated with the issued certificate.
> You now need to determine whether that SAML assertion and the 
> certificate represents the same user.
> You also need to determine that the SAML assertion and the certificate 
> provides compatible levels of assertion for user authentication as 
> defined in your SAML federation.
>
> This extension gives you exactly the amount of data that is needed in 
> order to do this in an unambiguous fully automated process.
>
>     10.In section 4, I failed to understand the "dynamic" aspect. My
>     understanding is that a person statically
>     authenticates to a RA (Registration Authority) and then is given
>     back a non-repudiation certificate
>     with SAML attributes in it which may then be used as identity
>     attributes.
>     I am unsure what the text in this section wants to say when using
>     the words "dynamic manner".
>
>
>
> Your view is to restrictive.
>
> The dynamic aspect of this is that a certificate may be issued on the 
> fly at the instance when it is needed, containing just the information 
> that is needed for one particular situation.
> This extension is (where this is used in the Swedish national 
> infrastructure) added to certificates that are issued for just one 
> instance of signing, and hence can be dynamically adapted to the needs 
> of the intended relying party.
>
> Next time the user signs, a new key pair is generated with new certs 
> that may contain another set of the user's attributes.
>
> The first instance may for example contain the users private identity 
> based on a national identifier, the second may carry an organisational 
> identity based on employee number.
> What attributes that are needed in every instance is determined in a 
> service context that is outside the scope of this specification.
>
> In these certificates, both the national identifier and the employee 
> number may be placed as a serialNumber attribute in the subject field.
> Despite that, this extension makes it possible for the relying party 
> to know exactly what identity information each certificate carries, as 
> it maps to the attribute profile of a SAML federation.
>
> /Stefan
>
>
>     Denis
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix


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    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 3/4/2013 12:09 PM, Stefan Santesson
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote cite="mid:CD5A2449.5D025%25stefan@aaa-sec.com"
      type="cite">
      <div>Denis,</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>First, thanks for your review. I really appreciate it.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>It seems to me, especially with your leading concluding
        comment, that you have missed out on what this specification
        attempts to do.</div>
      <div>Perhaps you did not read the introduction enough, or perhaps
        I didn't write it clear enough.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>The purpose is not to associate the subject with a identifier
        composed of a set of attributes.</div>
      <div>That is, this is NOT a new name form.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>This extension helps a relying party to understand the source
        of the identity information that is placed in the traditional
        identity fields of a certificate.</div>
      <div>For example. If the serialNumber attributes holds the string
        "123456", then this extension can tell you where this string
        came from.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    How is this related to "semantics identifier" (ETSI TS 119 412-2)
    then?<br>
    <br>
    M.D. <br>
    <blockquote cite="mid:CD5A2449.5D025%25stefan@aaa-sec.com"
      type="cite">
      <div>The use case addressed is where the CA/RA obtains the
        authenticated identify from a SAML assertion when issuing the
        certificate.</div>
      <div>This extension provides means to preserve information about
        the original SAML attributes in the cert.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <span id="OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
        <div style="font-family:Calibri; font-size:11pt;
          text-align:left; color:black; BORDER-BOTTOM: medium none;
          BORDER-LEFT: medium none; PADDING-BOTTOM: 0in; PADDING-LEFT:
          0in; PADDING-RIGHT: 0in; BORDER-TOP: #b5c4df 1pt solid;
          BORDER-RIGHT: medium none; PADDING-TOP: 3pt"><span
            style="font-weight:bold">From: </span> Denis Pinkas &lt;<a
            moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:denis.pinkas@bull.net">denis.pinkas@bull.net</a>&gt;<br>
          <span style="font-weight:bold">Date: </span> Monday, March 4,
          2013 9:42 AM<br>
          <span style="font-weight:bold">To: </span> Stefan Santesson
          &lt;<a moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com">stefan@aaa-sec.com</a>&gt;,
          pkix &lt;<a moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>
          <span style="font-weight:bold">Subject: </span> Comments on
          draft-santesson-auth-context-extension-04<br>
        </div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <blockquote id="MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
          style="BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0
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          <div>
            <meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html;
              charset=ISO-8859-1">
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              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB">Stefan,<br>
                  <o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p><br>
                  </o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB">The goal
                  of this document is to associate a public key to be
                  used for verifying electronic signatures <br>
                  with an identifier composed of a set of attributes,
                  typically SAML attributes, contained in an
                  authentication token.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
            </div>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </span>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>No you got this wrong. This is not an Identifier.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <span id="OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
        <blockquote id="MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
          style="BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0
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          <div>
            <div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB">MAJOR
                  COMMENTS<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><span lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                  lang="EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->1.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"> The
                  proposed draft is not aligned with the current
                  practices of RFC 5280 and X.509: <br>
                  the right place to hold such a set of attributes is in
                  the subject alternate name. <br>
                  The subject DN may or may not be empty. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB">There is
                  no rational in this draft to explain why this
                  straightforward approach has not been chosen.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang="EN-US"><span
                    style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>SubjectAltName
                  ::= GeneralNames<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang="EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang="EN-US"><span
                    style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>GeneralNames ::=
                  SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang="EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang="EN-US"><span
                    style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>GeneralName ::=
                  CHOICE {<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang="EN-US"><span
                    style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>otherName<span
                    style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>[0]<span
                    style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>OtherName,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang="EN-US"><span
                    style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>rfc822Name<span
                    style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>[1]<span
                    style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>IA5String,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang="EN-US"><span
                    style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>dNSName<span
                    style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>[2]<span
                    style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>IA5String,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang="EN-US"><span
                    style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>x400Address<span
                    style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>[3]<span
                    style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>ORAddress,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang="EN-US"><span
                    style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>directoryName<span
                    style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>[4]<span
                    style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>Name,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang="EN-US"><span
                    style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>ediPartyName<span
                    style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>[5]<span
                    style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>EDIPartyName,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang="EN-US"><span
                    style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>uniformResourceIdentifier<span
                    style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>[6]<span
                    style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>IA5String,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang="EN-US"><span
                    style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>iPAddress<span
                    style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>[7]<span
                    style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>OCTET STRING,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang="EN-US"><span
                    style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>registeredID<span
                    style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>[8]<span
                    style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>OBJECT
                  IDENTIFIER }<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang="EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang="EN-US"><span
                    style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>OtherName ::=
                  SEQUENCE {<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang="EN-US"><span
                    style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>type-id<span
                    style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>OBJECT
                  IDENTIFIER,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang="EN-US"><span
                    style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>value<span
                    style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>[0] EXPLICIT
                  ANY DEFINED BY type-id }<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang="EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang="EN-US">OtherName
                  fits well with the requirements, if you accept to use
                  an OID rather than <br>
                  a uniformResourceIdentifier.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang="EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB">The value
                  component would contain an XML structure conformant
                  with a XML schema.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
            </div>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </span>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>This draft does not contain an identifier, thus this comment
        is irrelevant.</div>
      <div>There is not explanation why we don't store an identifier as
        a SAN, since we do not create or store an identifier.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <span id="OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
        <blockquote id="MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
          style="BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0
          0 0 5;">
          <div>
            <div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><span lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                  lang="EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->2.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"> The
                  document should be restructured to define:<br>
                  <br>
                  (a) the general way to answer to the requirements, and
                  <br>
                  (b) a specific profile, in an Appendix, so that other
                  RFCs could refer to the main body of the document.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
            </div>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </span>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>That could be one way to do it.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <span id="OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
        <blockquote id="MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
          style="BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0
          0 0 5;">
          <div>
            <div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB">DETAILED
                  COMMENTS<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><span lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                  lang="EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->3.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"> The
                  proposed structure is not appropriate. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB">a) Why is
                  there a need to have a SEQUENCE ? This should be
                  avoided.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB">b) Why is
                  contextInfo OPTIONAL? This should be avoided.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><span
                    style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>AuthenticationContexts


                  ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><span
                    style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;


                  </span>AuthenticationContext<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><span
                    style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>AuthenticationContext


                  ::= SEQUENCE {<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><span
                    style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>contextType<span
                    style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>UTF8String,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><span
                    style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>contextInfo<span
                    style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>UTF8String
                  OPTIONAL<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><span
                    style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>}<o:p></o:p></span></p>
            </div>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </span>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>For exactly the same reason why SAML AuthContextClassRef in a
        SAML assertion is mandatory but not the XML structure it
        defines.</div>
      <div>In some cases you don't want to include explicit data, if
        that data is static and can be implicitly known through an
        identifier.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>The&nbsp;AuthContextClassRef in SAML is the best example as it is
        an exact functional replica of this.</div>
      <div>The URL identified by&nbsp;AuthContextClassRef is also a XML
        Schema ns for associated XML document.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>The XML Schema can define both a static XML document with
        fixed values as well as a structure where different values can
        be entered.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>Just including the reference to the XML Schema may then
        provide sufficient information to the relying party. The actual
        XML document is only included if some variable data need to be
        communicated within the associated XML document.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>Just including contextType but not contextInfo could be
        compared with the case where we include a certificate policy
        OID, but not the entire policy text.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>This is a really smart way to do this, which is made possible
        through the versatility of XML Schemas.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <span id="OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
        <blockquote id="MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
          style="BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0
          0 0 5;">
          <div>
            <div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><span lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                  lang="EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->4.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"> The text
                  states: <span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</span>This
                  extension MAY be marked critical.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB">If the
                  alternate name is present, why should there be a DN ?<br>
                </span></p>
            </div>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </span>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>This comment must be based on a misunderstanding of the scope
        of this document.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <span id="OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
        <blockquote id="MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
          style="BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0
          0 0 5;">
          <div>
            <div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><span lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                  lang="EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->5.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"> The XML
                  schema should be given first (Appendix B) followed by
                  the explanations (sections 3.1 and 3.2). <br>
                  In other words, sections 3.1 and 3.2 should be placed
                  in Appendix B.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
            </div>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </span>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>That is one way to do it. If I was the implementer, I really
        wouldn't care as long as the information is there.</div>
      <div>I think it is quite common to place programatic contracts in
        Appendixes, wile explaining data elements in the body of the
        document.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <span id="OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
        <blockquote id="MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
          style="BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0
          0 0 5;">
          <div>
            <div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><span lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                  lang="EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->6.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"> The
                  vocabulary used in sections 3.1 and 3.2 is confusing
                  and should be changed.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB">An
                  example: &#8220;AuthContextInfo Element&#8221; does not exist.
                  However, it is better to state that the contextInfo
                  component <br>
                  contains an XML structure which must conform to an XML
                  schema.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
            </div>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </span>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>Sorry, I don't get this comment. The AuthContextInfo element
        does exist. It is defined in the schema. XML Schema defines
        syntax and structure but not the semantics. Semantics are
        defined the section 3.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <span id="OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
        <blockquote id="MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
          style="BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0
          0 0 5;">
          <div>
            <div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><span lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                  lang="EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->7.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"> The XML
                  structure proposed to fit inside contextInfo is overly
                  complex. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB">AuthenticationInstant
                  is mandatory, whereas it is not needed.</span></p>
            </div>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </span>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>This information is always available from the SAML assertion
        and is considered fundamental, thus required.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <span id="OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
        <blockquote id="MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
          style="BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0
          0 0 5;">
          <div>
            <div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB">AssertionRef
                  is not needed.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB">ServiceID
                  is not needed.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
            </div>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </span>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>And hence, both are optional.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>The XML Schema is actually very simple. Its just the nature
        of XML Schemas to look more complex than they actually are.</div>
      <div>Perhaps it is easier if you examine it through this following
        web doc (which unfortunately can't be included in the spec):</div>
      <div><a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="http://aaa-sec.com/eid2/sigsupport/XMLschema/AuthContExtDoc/index.html">http://aaa-sec.com/eid2/sigsupport/XMLschema/AuthContExtDoc/index.html</a></div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <span id="OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
        <blockquote id="MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
          style="BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0
          0 0 5;">
          <div>
            <div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><span lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                  lang="EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->8.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"> There
                  are no matching rules defined. This means that the
                  verification of the content of that field is not
                  possible.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
            </div>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </span>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>First of all, this is not an identifier, thus there is no
        reason for a matching rule is it would be if this was an
        identifier that as a whole should be compared with something
        else.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>The SAML attribute value does not have to match the value of
        the cert attribute, this data in the extension is optional and,
        if present, is a hint.&nbsp;</div>
      <div>But I could actually add some text to clarify this.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <span id="OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
        <blockquote id="MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
          style="BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0
          0 0 5;">
          <div>
            <div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><span lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                  lang="EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->9.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"> In
                  section 3.2, I failed to understand the explanations
                  for CertRef as well as for rdn and san.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB">Why
                  CertNameType cannot be &#8220;factorized&#8221; ? (in the example
                  from Page 15, there are all the same).</span></p>
            </div>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </span>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>No, the example in the spec has one e-mail attribute that was
        placed in the SubjAltName extension of the cert.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <span id="OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
        <blockquote id="MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
          style="BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0
          0 0 5;">
          <div>
            <div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><span
                    style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>"rdn"<span
                    style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>The SAML
                  attribute value is placed in the<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><span
                    style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;


                  </span>subject field of the certificate in a<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><span
                    style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;


                  </span>present Relative Distinguished Name<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><span
                    style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;


                  </span>attribute.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><span
                    style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>"san"<span
                    style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>The SAML
                  attribute value is placed in the<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><span
                    style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;


                  </span>Subject Alternative Name extension of the<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><span
                    style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;


                  </span>certificate.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB">I also
                  failed to understand the reason of such &#8220;mapping&#8221;. </span></p>
            </div>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </span>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>Yes, and I think that is the reason behind most of your
        comments.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <span id="OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
        <blockquote id="MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
          style="BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0
          0 0 5;">
          <div>
            <div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><br>
                  The example in Appendix C illustrates the complexity
                  of the proposal. <br>
                  Can the approach be made simpler ? If not, why ?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
            </div>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </span>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>No it can't be made simpler. It contains exactly the
        information we need in the implementation where it is used.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>I could write a whole whitepaper about all detailed reasons,
        but if you really think about the use case, it should be clear.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>Consider the case where you know users by attributes defined
        in a SAML federation, where for example serialNumber is NOT
        used.</div>
      <div>A CA issues a certificate to a user based an a SAML assertion
        authentication based on the attribute profile of that
        federation.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>A user logs in to your service using a SAML assertion, and
        sends you a signed document associated with the issued
        certificate.</div>
      <div>You now need to determine whether that SAML assertion and the
        certificate represents the same user.</div>
      <div>You also need to determine that the SAML assertion and the
        certificate provides compatible levels of assertion for user
        authentication as defined in your SAML federation.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>This extension gives you exactly the amount of data that is
        needed in order to do this in an unambiguous fully automated
        process.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <span id="OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
        <blockquote id="MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
          style="BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0
          0 0 5;">
          <div>
            <div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><span lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                  lang="EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->10.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
                  style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"> In
                  section 4, I failed to understand the &#8220;dynamic&#8221;
                  aspect. My understanding is that a person statically <br>
                  authenticates to a RA (Registration Authority) and
                  then is given back a non-repudiation certificate <br>
                  with SAML attributes in it which may then be used as
                  identity attributes. <br>
                  I am unsure what the text in this section wants to say
                  when using the words &#8220;dynamic manner&#8221;.<br>
                </span></p>
            </div>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </span>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>Your view is to restrictive.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>The dynamic aspect of this is that a certificate may be
        issued on the fly at the instance when it is needed, containing
        just the information that is needed for one particular
        situation.</div>
      <div>This extension is (where this is used in the Swedish national
        infrastructure) added to certificates that are issued for just
        one instance of signing, and hence can be dynamically adapted to
        the needs of the intended relying party.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>Next time the user signs, a new key pair is generated with
        new certs that may contain another set of the user's attributes.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>The first instance may for example contain the users private
        identity based on a national identifier, the second may carry an
        organisational identity based on employee number.</div>
      <div>What attributes that are needed in every instance is
        determined in a service context that is outside the scope of
        this specification.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>In these certificates, both the national identifier and the
        employee number may be placed as a serialNumber attribute in the
        subject field.</div>
      <div>Despite that, this extension makes it possible for the
        relying party to know exactly what identity information each
        certificate carries, as it maps to the attribute profile of a
        SAML federation.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>/Stefan</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
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              <p class="MsoPlainText"><br>
              </p>
              <p class="MsoPlainText">Denis<br>
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      <pre wrap="">_______________________________________________
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From stefan@aaa-sec.com  Mon Mar  4 03:58:04 2013
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Date: Mon, 04 Mar 2013 12:58:00 +0100
From: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>
To: "Moudrick M. Dadashov" <md@e-net.lt>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Comments on draft-santesson-auth-context-extension-04
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Hi,

On the question in your mail, these mechanisms are complementary.

The semantics identifier of ETSI TS 119 412-2 may be used to give the value
of a serial number some structure.
If that is all your implementation needs, then you are al done.

In our case, it does not give us all we need, because we have:
1. Already gone through the pain of implementing identity semantics in the
form of a SAML attribute profile, and we need to leverage that also in
certs.
2. We need to map certs to SAML assertions to make sure they represent the
same user.

ETSI TS 119 412-2 does not give us that.

However, these concepts can easily be combined.

The SAML attribute value that is being placed in a serialNumber attribute
can be formatted according to the semantics identifier defined in ETSI TS
119 412-2. And the source of the identifier value may be expressed using the
auth context extension.

This way you can serve the relying party that is trained to interpret the
semantics identifier structure.
At the same time you can serve the relying party that need to know the SAML
origin of the attribute value.

The whole purpose of the extension is that the cert should work as a normal
cert even if the extension is not understood. It just provides additional
information to those trained to understand the extension.
This is the same with semantics identifier. If you don't understand that
identifier, the content of serialNumber is just understood as an arbitrary
string of characters. If you do understand it, it gives you more semantics.

/Stefan



From:  "Moudrick M. Dadashov" <md@e-net.lt>
Date:  Monday, March 4, 2013 11:26 AM
To:  Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>
Cc:  Denis Pinkas <denis.pinkas@bull.net>, pkix <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject:  Re: [pkix] Comments on draft-santesson-auth-context-extension-04

>     
>  
> On 3/4/2013 12:09 PM, Stefan Santesson wrote:
>  
>  
>>  
>> Denis,
>>  
>> 
>>  
>>  
>> First, thanks for your review. I really appreciate it.
>>  
>> 
>>  
>>  
>> It seems to me, especially with your leading concluding comment, that you
>> have missed out on what this specification attempts to do.
>>  
>> Perhaps you did not read the introduction enough, or perhaps I didn't write
>> it clear enough.
>>  
>> 
>>  
>>  
>> The purpose is not to associate the subject with a identifier composed of a
>> set of attributes.
>>  
>> That is, this is NOT a new name form.
>>  
>> 
>>  
>>  
>> This extension helps a relying party to understand the source of the identity
>> information that is placed in the traditional identity fields of a
>> certificate.
>>  
>> For example. If the serialNumber attributes holds the string "123456", then
>> this extension can tell you where this string came from.
>>  
>> 
>>  
>>  
>  How is this related to "semantics identifier" (ETSI TS 119 412-2) then?
>  
>  M.D.







--B_3445246683_762612
Content-type: text/html;
	charset="US-ASCII"
Content-transfer-encoding: quoted-printable

<html><head></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: s=
pace; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-size:=
 14px; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><div>Hi,</div><div><br></div><div=
>On the question in your mail, these mechanisms are complementary.</div><div=
><br></div><div>The semantics identifier of&nbsp;ETSI TS 119 412-2 may be us=
ed to give the value of a serial number some structure.</div><div>If that is=
 all your implementation needs, then you are al done.</div><div><br></div><d=
iv>In our case, it does not give us all we need, because we have:</div><ol><=
li>Already gone through the pain of implementing identity semantics in the f=
orm of a SAML attribute profile, and we need to leverage that also in certs.=
</li><li>We need to map certs to SAML assertions to make sure they represent=
 the same user.</li></ol><div><br></div><div>ETSI TS 119 412-2 does not give=
 us that.</div><div><br></div><div>However, these concepts can easily be com=
bined.</div><div><br></div><div>The SAML attribute value that is being place=
d in a serialNumber attribute can be formatted according to the semantics id=
entifier defined in&nbsp;ETSI TS 119 412-2. And the source of the identifier=
 value may be expressed using the auth context extension.</div><div><br></di=
v><div>This way you can serve the relying party that is trained to interpret=
 the semantics identifier structure.</div><div>At the same time you can serv=
e the relying party that need to know the SAML origin of the attribute value=
.</div><div><br></div><div>The whole purpose of the extension is that the ce=
rt should work as a normal cert even if the extension is not understood. It =
just provides additional information to those trained to understand the exte=
nsion.</div><div>This is the same with semantics identifier. If you don't un=
derstand that identifier, the content of serialNumber is just understood as =
an arbitrary string of characters. If you do understand it, it gives you mor=
e semantics.</div><div><br></div><div>/Stefan</div><div><br></div><div><br><=
/div><div><br></div><span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION"><div style=3D"font-family:=
Calibri; font-size:11pt; text-align:left; color:black; BORDER-BOTTOM: medium=
 none; BORDER-LEFT: medium none; PADDING-BOTTOM: 0in; PADDING-LEFT: 0in; PAD=
DING-RIGHT: 0in; BORDER-TOP: #b5c4df 1pt solid; BORDER-RIGHT: medium none; P=
ADDING-TOP: 3pt"><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">From: </span> "Moudrick M. D=
adashov" &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:md@e-net.lt">md@e-net.lt</a>&gt;<br><span style=
=3D"font-weight:bold">Date: </span> Monday, March 4, 2013 11:26 AM<br><span st=
yle=3D"font-weight:bold">To: </span> Stefan Santesson &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:stef=
an@aaa-sec.com">stefan@aaa-sec.com</a>&gt;<br><span style=3D"font-weight:bold"=
>Cc: </span> Denis Pinkas &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:denis.pinkas@bull.net">denis.p=
inkas@bull.net</a>&gt;, pkix &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.or=
g</a>&gt;<br><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">Subject: </span> Re: [pkix] Comm=
ents on draft-santesson-auth-context-extension-04<br></div><div><br></div><b=
lockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4d=
f 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
  
    <meta content=3D"text/html; charset=3DISO-8859-1" http-equiv=3D"Content-Type"=
>
  
  <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
    <div class=3D"moz-cite-prefix">On 3/4/2013 12:09 PM, Stefan Santesson
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote cite=3D"mid:CD5A2449.5D025%25stefan@aaa-sec.com" type=3D"cite">=

      <div>Denis,</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>First, thanks for your review. I really appreciate it.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>It seems to me, especially with your leading concluding
        comment, that you have missed out on what this specification
        attempts to do.</div>
      <div>Perhaps you did not read the introduction enough, or perhaps
        I didn't write it clear enough.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>The purpose is not to associate the subject with a identifier
        composed of a set of attributes.</div>
      <div>That is, this is NOT a new name form.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>This extension helps a relying party to understand the source
        of the identity information that is placed in the traditional
        identity fields of a certificate.</div>
      <div>For example. If the serialNumber attributes holds the string
        "123456", then this extension can tell you where this string
        came from.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    How is this related to "semantics identifier" (ETSI TS 119 412-2)
    then?<br>
    <br>
    M.D.</div></blockquote></span><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></=
div><div><br></div></body></html>

--B_3445246683_762612--



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From: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>
To: "Moudrick M. Dadashov" <md@e-net.lt>
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Based on comments received today I have updated this draft, preliminary
available at:
http://aaa-sec.com/_temp/draft-santesson-auth-context-extension-04.txt

I have edited the Introduction section to clarify the scope of the document=
.

I have also added a new section (now 3.2) that explains the absence of
attribute matching rules.
The section should also make clear how specific attribute data format
conventions, such as the one expressed in ETSI TS 119 412-2, can co-exist
with this extension.

/Stefan

From:  "Moudrick M. Dadashov" <md@e-net.lt>
Date:  Monday, March 4, 2013 11:26 AM
To:  Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>
Cc:  Denis Pinkas <denis.pinkas@bull.net>, pkix <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject:  Re: [pkix] Comments on draft-santesson-auth-context-extension-04

>    =20
> =20
> On 3/4/2013 12:09 PM, Stefan Santesson wrote:
> =20
> =20
>> =20
>> Denis,
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>> =20
>> First, thanks for your review. I really appreciate it.
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>> =20
>> It seems to me, especially with your leading concluding comment, that yo=
u
>> have missed out on what this specification attempts to do.
>> =20
>> Perhaps you did not read the introduction enough, or perhaps I didn't wr=
ite
>> it clear enough.
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>> =20
>> The purpose is not to associate the subject with a identifier composed o=
f a
>> set of attributes.
>> =20
>> That is, this is NOT a new name form.
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>> =20
>> This extension helps a relying party to understand the source of the ide=
ntity
>> information that is placed in the traditional identity fields of a
>> certificate.
>> =20
>> For example. If the serialNumber attributes holds the string "123456", t=
hen
>> this extension can tell you where this string came from.
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>> =20
>  How is this related to "semantics identifier" (ETSI TS 119 412-2) then?
> =20
>  M.D.=20
> =20
>> =20
>> The use case addressed is where the CA/RA obtains the authenticated iden=
tify
>> from a SAML assertion when issuing the certificate.
>> =20
>> This extension provides means to preserve information about the original=
 SAML
>> attributes in the cert.
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>>  =20
>> From:  Denis Pinkas <denis.pinkas@bull.net>
>>  Date:  Monday, March 4, 2013 9:42 AM
>>  To:  Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>, pkix <pkix@ietf.org>
>>  Subject:  Comments on draft-santesson-auth-context-extension-04
>> =20
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>> =20
>>> =20
>>>  =20
>>>  =20
>>>=20
>>> Stefan,
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>>=20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> The goal of this document is to associate a public key to be used for
>>> verifying electronic signatures
>>>  with an identifier composed of a set of attributes, typically SAML
>>> attributes, contained in an authentication token.
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>  =20
>>=20
>> =20
>> =20
>> No you got this wrong. This is not an Identifier.
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>>  =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>>=20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> MAJOR COMMENTS
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> 1. The proposed draft is not aligned with the current practices of RFC =
5280
>>> and X.509:=20
>>>  the right place to hold such a set of attributes is in the subject
>>> alternate name.
>>>  The subject DN may or may not be empty.
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> There is no rational in this draft to explain why this straightforward
>>> approach has not been chosen.
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>>    SubjectAltName ::=3D GeneralNames
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>>    GeneralNames ::=3D SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>>    GeneralName ::=3D CHOICE {
>>> =20
>>>         otherName                       [0]     OtherName,
>>> =20
>>>         rfc822Name                      [1]     IA5String,
>>> =20
>>>         dNSName                         [2]     IA5String,
>>> =20
>>>         x400Address                     [3]     ORAddress,
>>> =20
>>>         directoryName                   [4]     Name,
>>> =20
>>>         ediPartyName                    [5]     EDIPartyName,
>>> =20
>>>         uniformResourceIdentifier       [6]     IA5String,
>>> =20
>>>         iPAddress                       [7]     OCTET STRING,
>>> =20
>>>         registeredID                    [8]     OBJECT IDENTIFIER }
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>>    OtherName ::=3D SEQUENCE {
>>> =20
>>>         type-id    OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
>>> =20
>>>         value      [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id }
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> OtherName fits well with the requirements, if you accept to use an OID
>>> rather than=20
>>>  a uniformResourceIdentifier.
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> The value component would contain an XML structure conformant with a XM=
L
>>> schema.
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>  =20
>>=20
>> =20
>> =20
>> This draft does not contain an identifier, thus this comment is irreleva=
nt.
>> =20
>> There is not explanation why we don't store an identifier as a SAN, sinc=
e we
>> do not create or store an identifier.
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>>  =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>>=20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> 2. The document should be restructured to define:
>>> =20
>>>  (a) the general way to answer to the requirements, and
>>>  (b) a specific profile, in an Appendix, so that other RFCs could refer=
 to
>>> the main body of the document.
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>  =20
>>=20
>> =20
>> =20
>> That could be one way to do it.
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>>  =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>>=20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> DETAILED COMMENTS
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> 3. The proposed structure is not appropriate.
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> a) Why is there a need to have a SEQUENCE ? This should be avoided.
>>> =20
>>> b) Why is contextInfo OPTIONAL? This should be avoided.
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>>       AuthenticationContexts  ::=3D SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
>>> =20
>>>                                  AuthenticationContext
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>>       AuthenticationContext  ::=3D SEQUENCE {
>>> =20
>>>           contextType     UTF8String,
>>> =20
>>>           contextInfo     UTF8String OPTIONAL
>>> =20
>>>       }
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>  =20
>>=20
>> =20
>> =20
>> For exactly the same reason why SAML AuthContextClassRef in a SAML asser=
tion
>> is mandatory but not the XML structure it defines.
>> =20
>> In some cases you don't want to include explicit data, if that data is s=
tatic
>> and can be implicitly known through an identifier.
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>> =20
>> The AuthContextClassRef in SAML is the best example as it is an exact
>> functional replica of this.
>> =20
>> The URL identified by AuthContextClassRef is also a XML Schema ns for
>> associated XML document.
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>> =20
>> The XML Schema can define both a static XML document with fixed values a=
s
>> well as a structure where different values can be entered.
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>> =20
>> Just including the reference to the XML Schema may then provide sufficie=
nt
>> information to the relying party. The actual XML document is only includ=
ed if
>> some variable data need to be communicated within the associated XML
>> document.
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>> =20
>> Just including contextType but not contextInfo could be compared with th=
e
>> case where we include a certificate policy OID, but not the entire polic=
y
>> text.
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>> =20
>> This is a really smart way to do this, which is made possible through th=
e
>> versatility of XML Schemas.
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>>  =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>>=20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> 4. The text states:    This extension MAY be marked critical.
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> If the alternate name is present, why should there be a DN ?
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>  =20
>>=20
>> =20
>> =20
>> This comment must be based on a misunderstanding of the scope of this
>> document.
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>>  =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>>=20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> 5. The XML schema should be given first (Appendix B) followed by the
>>> explanations (sections 3.1 and 3.2).
>>>  In other words, sections 3.1 and 3.2 should be placed in Appendix B.
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>  =20
>>=20
>> =20
>> =20
>> That is one way to do it. If I was the implementer, I really wouldn't ca=
re as
>> long as the information is there.
>> =20
>> I think it is quite common to place programatic contracts in Appendixes,=
 wile
>> explaining data elements in the body of the document.
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>>  =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>>=20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> 6. The vocabulary used in sections 3.1 and 3.2 is confusing and should =
be
>>> changed.
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> An example: =B3AuthContextInfo Element=B2 does not exist. However, it is be=
tter
>>> to state that the contextInfo component
>>>  contains an XML structure which must conform to an XML schema.
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>  =20
>>=20
>> =20
>> =20
>> Sorry, I don't get this comment. The AuthContextInfo element does exist.=
 It
>> is defined in the schema. XML Schema defines syntax and structure but no=
t the
>> semantics. Semantics are defined the section 3.
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>>  =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>>=20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> 7. The XML structure proposed to fit inside contextInfo is overly compl=
ex.
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> AuthenticationInstant is mandatory, whereas it is not needed.
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>  =20
>>=20
>> =20
>> =20
>> This information is always available from the SAML assertion and is
>> considered fundamental, thus required.
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>>  =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>>=20
>>> =20
>>> AssertionRef is not needed.
>>> =20
>>> ServiceID is not needed.
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>  =20
>>=20
>> =20
>> =20
>> And hence, both are optional.
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>> =20
>> The XML Schema is actually very simple. Its just the nature of XML Schem=
as to
>> look more complex than they actually are.
>> =20
>> Perhaps it is easier if you examine it through this following web doc (w=
hich
>> unfortunately can't be included in the spec):
>> =20
>> http://aaa-sec.com/eid2/sigsupport/XMLschema/AuthContExtDoc/index.html
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>>  =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>>=20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> 8. There are no matching rules defined. This means that the verificatio=
n of
>>> the content of that field is not possible.
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>  =20
>>=20
>> =20
>> =20
>> First of all, this is not an identifier, thus there is no reason for a
>> matching rule is it would be if this was an identifier that as a whole s=
hould
>> be compared with something else.
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>> =20
>> The SAML attribute value does not have to match the value of the cert
>> attribute, this data in the extension is optional and, if present, is a =
hint.
>> =20
>> But I could actually add some text to clarify this.
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>>  =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>>=20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> 9. In section 3.2, I failed to understand the explanations for CertRef =
as
>>> well as for rdn and san.
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> Why CertNameType cannot be =B3factorized=B2 ? (in the example from Page 15,
>>> there are all the same).
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>  =20
>>=20
>> =20
>> =20
>> No, the example in the spec has one e-mail attribute that was placed in =
the
>> SubjAltName extension of the cert.
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>>  =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>>=20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>>                       "rdn"   The SAML attribute value is placed in the
>>> =20
>>>                               subject field of the certificate in a
>>> =20
>>>                               present Relative Distinguished Name
>>> =20
>>>                               attribute.
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>>                       "san"   The SAML attribute value is placed in the
>>> =20
>>>                               Subject Alternative Name extension of the
>>> =20
>>>                               certificate.
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> I also failed to understand the reason of such =B3mapping=B2.
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>  =20
>>=20
>> =20
>> =20
>> Yes, and I think that is the reason behind most of your comments.
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>>  =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>  The example in Appendix C illustrates the complexity of the proposal.
>>>  Can the approach be made simpler ? If not, why ?
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>  =20
>>=20
>> =20
>> =20
>> No it can't be made simpler. It contains exactly the information we need=
 in
>> the implementation where it is used.
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>> =20
>> I could write a whole whitepaper about all detailed reasons, but if you
>> really think about the use case, it should be clear.
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>> =20
>> Consider the case where you know users by attributes defined in a SAML
>> federation, where for example serialNumber is NOT used.
>> =20
>> A CA issues a certificate to a user based an a SAML assertion authentica=
tion
>> based on the attribute profile of that federation.
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>> =20
>> A user logs in to your service using a SAML assertion, and sends you a s=
igned
>> document associated with the issued certificate.
>> =20
>> You now need to determine whether that SAML assertion and the certificat=
e
>> represents the same user.
>> =20
>> You also need to determine that the SAML assertion and the certificate
>> provides compatible levels of assertion for user authentication as defin=
ed in
>> your SAML federation.
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>> =20
>> This extension gives you exactly the amount of data that is needed in or=
der
>> to do this in an unambiguous fully automated process.
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>>  =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>>=20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> 10. In section 4, I failed to understand the =B3dynamic=B2 aspect. My
>>> understanding is that a person statically
>>>  authenticates to a RA (Registration Authority) and then is given back =
a
>>> non-repudiation certificate
>>>  with SAML attributes in it which may then be used as identity attribut=
es.
>>>  I am unsure what the text in this section wants to say when using the =
words
>>> =B3dynamic manner=B2.
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>  =20
>>=20
>> =20
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>> =20
>> Your view is to restrictive.
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>> =20
>> The dynamic aspect of this is that a certificate may be issued on the fl=
y at
>> the instance when it is needed, containing just the information that is
>> needed for one particular situation.
>> =20
>> This extension is (where this is used in the Swedish national infrastruc=
ture)
>> added to certificates that are issued for just one instance of signing, =
and
>> hence can be dynamically adapted to the needs of the intended relying pa=
rty.
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>> =20
>> Next time the user signs, a new key pair is generated with new certs tha=
t may
>> contain another set of the user's attributes.
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>> =20
>> The first instance may for example contain the users private identity ba=
sed
>> on a national identifier, the second may carry an organisational identit=
y
>> based on employee number.
>> =20
>> What attributes that are needed in every instance is determined in a ser=
vice
>> context that is outside the scope of this specification.
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>> =20
>> In these certificates, both the national identifier and the employee num=
ber
>> may be placed as a serialNumber attribute in the subject field.
>> =20
>> Despite that, this extension makes it possible for the relying party to =
know
>> exactly what identity information each certificate carries, as it maps t=
o the
>> attribute profile of a SAML federation.
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>> =20
>> /Stefan
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>>  =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> Denis
>>> =20
>>>       =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>  =20
>>  =20
>> =20
>> _______________________________________________
>> pkix mailing list
>> pkix@ietf.orghttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>> =20
> =20
> =20



--B_3445253835_1241822
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<html><head></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: s=
pace; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-size:=
 14px; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><div>Based on comments received t=
oday I have updated this draft, preliminary available at:</div><div><a href=3D=
"http://aaa-sec.com/_temp/draft-santesson-auth-context-extension-04.txt">htt=
p://aaa-sec.com/_temp/draft-santesson-auth-context-extension-04.txt</a></div=
><div><br></div><div>I have edited the Introduction section to clarify the s=
cope of the document.</div><div><br></div><div>I have also added a new secti=
on (now 3.2) that explains the absence of attribute matching rules.</div><di=
v>The section should also make clear how specific attribute data format conv=
entions, such as the one expressed in&nbsp;ETSI TS 119 412-2, can co-exist w=
ith this extension.</div><div><br></div><div>/Stefan</div><div><br></div><sp=
an id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION"><div style=3D"font-family:Calibri; font-size:11pt=
; text-align:left; color:black; BORDER-BOTTOM: medium none; BORDER-LEFT: med=
ium none; PADDING-BOTTOM: 0in; PADDING-LEFT: 0in; PADDING-RIGHT: 0in; BORDER=
-TOP: #b5c4df 1pt solid; BORDER-RIGHT: medium none; PADDING-TOP: 3pt"><span =
style=3D"font-weight:bold">From: </span> "Moudrick M. Dadashov" &lt;<a href=3D"m=
ailto:md@e-net.lt">md@e-net.lt</a>&gt;<br><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">Dat=
e: </span> Monday, March 4, 2013 11:26 AM<br><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">=
To: </span> Stefan Santesson &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com">stefan@=
aaa-sec.com</a>&gt;<br><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">Cc: </span> Denis Pink=
as &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:denis.pinkas@bull.net">denis.pinkas@bull.net</a>&gt;,=
 pkix &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br><span styl=
e=3D"font-weight:bold">Subject: </span> Re: [pkix] Comments on draft-santesson=
-auth-context-extension-04<br></div><div><br></div><blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLO=
OK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 =
0 5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;"><div>
  
    <meta content=3D"text/html; charset=3DISO-8859-1" http-equiv=3D"Content-Type"=
>
  
  <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
    <div class=3D"moz-cite-prefix">On 3/4/2013 12:09 PM, Stefan Santesson
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote cite=3D"mid:CD5A2449.5D025%25stefan@aaa-sec.com" type=3D"cite">=

      <div>Denis,</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>First, thanks for your review. I really appreciate it.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>It seems to me, especially with your leading concluding
        comment, that you have missed out on what this specification
        attempts to do.</div>
      <div>Perhaps you did not read the introduction enough, or perhaps
        I didn't write it clear enough.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>The purpose is not to associate the subject with a identifier
        composed of a set of attributes.</div>
      <div>That is, this is NOT a new name form.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>This extension helps a relying party to understand the source
        of the identity information that is placed in the traditional
        identity fields of a certificate.</div>
      <div>For example. If the serialNumber attributes holds the string
        "123456", then this extension can tell you where this string
        came from.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    How is this related to "semantics identifier" (ETSI TS 119 412-2)
    then?<br>
    <br>
    M.D. <br>
    <blockquote cite=3D"mid:CD5A2449.5D025%25stefan@aaa-sec.com" type=3D"cite">=

      <div>The use case addressed is where the CA/RA obtains the
        authenticated identify from a SAML assertion when issuing the
        certificate.</div>
      <div>This extension provides means to preserve information about
        the original SAML attributes in the cert.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
        <div style=3D"font-family:Calibri; font-size:11pt;
          text-align:left; color:black; BORDER-BOTTOM: medium none;
          BORDER-LEFT: medium none; PADDING-BOTTOM: 0in; PADDING-LEFT:
          0in; PADDING-RIGHT: 0in; BORDER-TOP: #b5c4df 1pt solid;
          BORDER-RIGHT: medium none; PADDING-TOP: 3pt"><span style=3D"font-we=
ight:bold">From: </span> Denis Pinkas &lt;<a moz-do-not-send=3D"true" href=3D"ma=
ilto:denis.pinkas@bull.net">denis.pinkas@bull.net</a>&gt;<br>
          <span style=3D"font-weight:bold">Date: </span> Monday, March 4,
          2013 9:42 AM<br>
          <span style=3D"font-weight:bold">To: </span> Stefan Santesson
          &lt;<a moz-do-not-send=3D"true" href=3D"mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com">st=
efan@aaa-sec.com</a>&gt;,
          pkix &lt;<a moz-do-not-send=3D"true" href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pk=
ix@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>
          <span style=3D"font-weight:bold">Subject: </span> Comments on
          draft-santesson-auth-context-extension-04<br>
        </div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=3D"BORDER-L=
EFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0
          0 0 5;">
          <div>
            <meta http-equiv=3D"content-type" content=3D"text/html;
              charset=3DISO-8859-1">
            <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
              <meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html;
                charset=3DISO-8859-1">
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB">Stefan,<br>
                  <o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p><br>
                  </o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB">The goal
                  of this document is to associate a public key to be
                  used for verifying electronic signatures <br>
                  with an identifier composed of a set of attributes,
                  typically SAML attributes, contained in an
                  authentication token.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
            </div>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </span>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>No you got this wrong. This is not an Identifier.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
        <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=3D"BORDER-L=
EFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0
          0 0 5;">
          <div>
            <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB">MAJOR
                  COMMENTS<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><span lang=3DEN-=
GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'=
>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB=
"><!--[if !supportFields]-->1.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><s=
pan
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-e=
nd'></span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN=
-GB"> The
                  proposed draft is not aligned with the current
                  practices of RFC 5280 and X.509: <br>
                  the right place to hold such a set of attributes is in
                  the subject alternate name. <br>
                  The subject DN may or may not be empty. <o:p></o:p></span=
></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB">There is
                  no rational in this draft to explain why this
                  straightforward approach has not been chosen.<o:p></o:p><=
/span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-US"=
 lang=3D"EN-US"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>SubjectAltN=
ame
                  ::=3D GeneralNames<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-US"=
 lang=3D"EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-US"=
 lang=3D"EN-US"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>GeneralName=
s ::=3D
                  SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName<o:p></o:p></span></=
p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-US"=
 lang=3D"EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-US"=
 lang=3D"EN-US"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>GeneralName=
 ::=3D
                  CHOICE {<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-US"=
 lang=3D"EN-US"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp; </span>otherName<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>[0]<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:=
yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>OtherName,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-US"=
 lang=3D"EN-US"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp; </span>rfc822Name<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>[1]<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>IA5String,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-US"=
 lang=3D"EN-US"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp; </span>dNSName<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>[2]<span style=3D"mso=
-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>IA5String,<o:p></o:p></span><=
/p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-US"=
 lang=3D"EN-US"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp; </span>x400Address<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>[3]<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>ORAddress,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-US"=
 lang=3D"EN-US"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp; </span>directoryName<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>[4]<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp; </span>Name,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-US"=
 lang=3D"EN-US"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp; </span>ediPartyName<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>[5]<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>EDIPartyName,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-US"=
 lang=3D"EN-US"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp; </span>uniformResourceIdentifier<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>[6]<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes"=
>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>IA5String,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-US"=
 lang=3D"EN-US"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp; </span>iPAddress<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>[7]<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:=
yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>OCTET STRING,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-US"=
 lang=3D"EN-US"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp; </span>registeredID<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>[8]<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>OBJECT
                  IDENTIFIER }<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-US"=
 lang=3D"EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-US"=
 lang=3D"EN-US"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>OtherName :=
:=3D
                  SEQUENCE {<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-US"=
 lang=3D"EN-US"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp; </span>type-id<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
</span>OBJECT
                  IDENTIFIER,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-US"=
 lang=3D"EN-US"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp; </span>value<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp; </span>[0] EXPLICIT
                  ANY DEFINED BY type-id }<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-US"=
 lang=3D"EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-US"=
 lang=3D"EN-US">OtherName
                  fits well with the requirements, if you accept to use
                  an OID rather than <br>
                  a uniformResourceIdentifier.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-US"=
 lang=3D"EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB">The value
                  component would contain an XML structure conformant
                  with a XML schema.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
            </div>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </span>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>This draft does not contain an identifier, thus this comment
        is irrelevant.</div>
      <div>There is not explanation why we don't store an identifier as
        a SAN, since we do not create or store an identifier.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
        <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=3D"BORDER-L=
EFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0
          0 0 5;">
          <div>
            <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><span lang=3DEN-=
GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'=
>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB=
"><!--[if !supportFields]-->2.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><s=
pan
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-e=
nd'></span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN=
-GB"> The
                  document should be restructured to define:<br>
                  <br>
                  (a) the general way to answer to the requirements, and
                  <br>
                  (b) a specific profile, in an Appendix, so that other
                  RFCs could refer to the main body of the document.<o:p></=
o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
            </div>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </span>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>That could be one way to do it.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
        <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=3D"BORDER-L=
EFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0
          0 0 5;">
          <div>
            <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB">DETAILED
                  COMMENTS<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><span lang=3DEN-=
GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'=
>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB=
"><!--[if !supportFields]-->3.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><s=
pan
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-e=
nd'></span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN=
-GB"> The
                  proposed structure is not appropriate. <o:p></o:p></span>=
</p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB">a) Why is
                  there a need to have a SEQUENCE ? This should be
                  avoided.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB">b) Why is
                  contextInfo OPTIONAL? This should be avoided.<o:p></o:p><=
/span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
</span>AuthenticationContexts


                  ::=3D SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;


                  </span>AuthenticationContext<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
</span>AuthenticationContext


                  ::=3D SEQUENCE {<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>contextType<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>UTF8String,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>contextInfo<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>UTF8String
                  OPTIONAL<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
</span>}<o:p></o:p></span></p>
            </div>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </span>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>For exactly the same reason why SAML AuthContextClassRef in a
        SAML assertion is mandatory but not the XML structure it
        defines.</div>
      <div>In some cases you don't want to include explicit data, if
        that data is static and can be implicitly known through an
        identifier.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>The&nbsp;AuthContextClassRef in SAML is the best example as it i=
s
        an exact functional replica of this.</div>
      <div>The URL identified by&nbsp;AuthContextClassRef is also a XML
        Schema ns for associated XML document.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>The XML Schema can define both a static XML document with
        fixed values as well as a structure where different values can
        be entered.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>Just including the reference to the XML Schema may then
        provide sufficient information to the relying party. The actual
        XML document is only included if some variable data need to be
        communicated within the associated XML document.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>Just including contextType but not contextInfo could be
        compared with the case where we include a certificate policy
        OID, but not the entire policy text.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>This is a really smart way to do this, which is made possible
        through the versatility of XML Schemas.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
        <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=3D"BORDER-L=
EFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0
          0 0 5;">
          <div>
            <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><span lang=3DEN-=
GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'=
>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB=
"><!--[if !supportFields]-->4.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><s=
pan
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-e=
nd'></span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN=
-GB"> The text
                  states: <span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
</span>This
                  extension MAY be marked critical.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB">If the
                  alternate name is present, why should there be a DN ?<br>=

                </span></p>
            </div>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </span>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>This comment must be based on a misunderstanding of the scope
        of this document.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
        <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=3D"BORDER-L=
EFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0
          0 0 5;">
          <div>
            <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><span lang=3DEN-=
GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'=
>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB=
"><!--[if !supportFields]-->5.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><s=
pan
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-e=
nd'></span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN=
-GB"> The XML
                  schema should be given first (Appendix B) followed by
                  the explanations (sections 3.1 and 3.2). <br>
                  In other words, sections 3.1 and 3.2 should be placed
                  in Appendix B.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
            </div>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </span>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>That is one way to do it. If I was the implementer, I really
        wouldn't care as long as the information is there.</div>
      <div>I think it is quite common to place programatic contracts in
        Appendixes, wile explaining data elements in the body of the
        document.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
        <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=3D"BORDER-L=
EFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0
          0 0 5;">
          <div>
            <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><span lang=3DEN-=
GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'=
>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB=
"><!--[if !supportFields]-->6.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><s=
pan
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-e=
nd'></span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN=
-GB"> The
                  vocabulary used in sections 3.1 and 3.2 is confusing
                  and should be changed.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB">An
                  example: &#8220;AuthContextInfo Element&#8221; does not e=
xist.
                  However, it is better to state that the contextInfo
                  component <br>
                  contains an XML structure which must conform to an XML
                  schema.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
            </div>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </span>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>Sorry, I don't get this comment. The AuthContextInfo element
        does exist. It is defined in the schema. XML Schema defines
        syntax and structure but not the semantics. Semantics are
        defined the section 3.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
        <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=3D"BORDER-L=
EFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0
          0 0 5;">
          <div>
            <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><span lang=3DEN-=
GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'=
>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB=
"><!--[if !supportFields]-->7.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><s=
pan
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-e=
nd'></span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN=
-GB"> The XML
                  structure proposed to fit inside contextInfo is overly
                  complex. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB">AuthenticationInstant
                  is mandatory, whereas it is not needed.</span></p>
            </div>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </span>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>This information is always available from the SAML assertion
        and is considered fundamental, thus required.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
        <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=3D"BORDER-L=
EFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0
          0 0 5;">
          <div>
            <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB">AssertionRef
                  is not needed.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB">ServiceID
                  is not needed.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
            </div>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </span>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>And hence, both are optional.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>The XML Schema is actually very simple. Its just the nature
        of XML Schemas to look more complex than they actually are.</div>
      <div>Perhaps it is easier if you examine it through this following
        web doc (which unfortunately can't be included in the spec):</div>
      <div><a moz-do-not-send=3D"true" href=3D"http://aaa-sec.com/eid2/sigsuppo=
rt/XMLschema/AuthContExtDoc/index.html">http://aaa-sec.com/eid2/sigsupport/X=
MLschema/AuthContExtDoc/index.html</a></div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
        <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=3D"BORDER-L=
EFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0
          0 0 5;">
          <div>
            <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><span lang=3DEN-=
GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'=
>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB=
"><!--[if !supportFields]-->8.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><s=
pan
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-e=
nd'></span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN=
-GB"> There
                  are no matching rules defined. This means that the
                  verification of the content of that field is not
                  possible.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
            </div>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </span>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>First of all, this is not an identifier, thus there is no
        reason for a matching rule is it would be if this was an
        identifier that as a whole should be compared with something
        else.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>The SAML attribute value does not have to match the value of
        the cert attribute, this data in the extension is optional and,
        if present, is a hint.&nbsp;</div>
      <div>But I could actually add some text to clarify this.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
        <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=3D"BORDER-L=
EFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0
          0 0 5;">
          <div>
            <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><span lang=3DEN-=
GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'=
>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB=
"><!--[if !supportFields]-->9.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><s=
pan
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-e=
nd'></span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN=
-GB"> In
                  section 3.2, I failed to understand the explanations
                  for CertRef as well as for rdn and san.<o:p></o:p></span>=
</p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB">Why
                  CertNameType cannot be &#8220;factorized&#8221; ? (in the=
 example
                  from Page 15, there are all the same).</span></p>
            </div>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </span>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>No, the example in the spec has one e-mail attribute that was
        placed in the SubjAltName extension of the cert.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
        <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=3D"BORDER-L=
EFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0
          0 0 5;">
          <div>
            <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>"rdn"<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp; =
</span>The SAML
                  attribute value is placed in the<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;


                  </span>subject field of the certificate in a<o:p></o:p></=
span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;


                  </span>present Relative Distinguished Name<o:p></o:p></sp=
an></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;


                  </span>attribute.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>"san"<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp; =
</span>The SAML
                  attribute value is placed in the<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;


                  </span>Subject Alternative Name extension of the<o:p></o:=
p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;


                  </span>certificate.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB">I also
                  failed to understand the reason of such &#8220;mapping&#8=
221;. </span></p>
            </div>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </span>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>Yes, and I think that is the reason behind most of your
        comments.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
        <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=3D"BORDER-L=
EFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0
          0 0 5;">
          <div>
            <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB"><br>
                  The example in Appendix C illustrates the complexity
                  of the proposal. <br>
                  Can the approach be made simpler ? If not, why ?<o:p></o:=
p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
            </div>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </span>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>No it can't be made simpler. It contains exactly the
        information we need in the implementation where it is used.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>I could write a whole whitepaper about all detailed reasons,
        but if you really think about the use case, it should be clear.</di=
v>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>Consider the case where you know users by attributes defined
        in a SAML federation, where for example serialNumber is NOT
        used.</div>
      <div>A CA issues a certificate to a user based an a SAML assertion
        authentication based on the attribute profile of that
        federation.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>A user logs in to your service using a SAML assertion, and
        sends you a signed document associated with the issued
        certificate.</div>
      <div>You now need to determine whether that SAML assertion and the
        certificate represents the same user.</div>
      <div>You also need to determine that the SAML assertion and the
        certificate provides compatible levels of assertion for user
        authentication as defined in your SAML federation.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>This extension gives you exactly the amount of data that is
        needed in order to do this in an unambiguous fully automated
        process.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
        <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=3D"BORDER-L=
EFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0
          0 0 5;">
          <div>
            <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"=
 lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><span lang=3DEN-=
GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'=
>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB=
"><!--[if !supportFields]-->10.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><=
span
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-e=
nd'></span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN=
-GB"> In
                  section 4, I failed to understand the &#8220;dynamic&#822=
1;
                  aspect. My understanding is that a person statically <br>=

                  authenticates to a RA (Registration Authority) and
                  then is given back a non-repudiation certificate <br>
                  with SAML attributes in it which may then be used as
                  identity attributes. <br>
                  I am unsure what the text in this section wants to say
                  when using the words &#8220;dynamic manner&#8221;.<br>
                </span></p>
            </div>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </span>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>Your view is to restrictive.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>The dynamic aspect of this is that a certificate may be
        issued on the fly at the instance when it is needed, containing
        just the information that is needed for one particular
        situation.</div>
      <div>This extension is (where this is used in the Swedish national
        infrastructure) added to certificates that are issued for just
        one instance of signing, and hence can be dynamically adapted to
        the needs of the intended relying party.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>Next time the user signs, a new key pair is generated with
        new certs that may contain another set of the user's attributes.</d=
iv>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>The first instance may for example contain the users private
        identity based on a national identifier, the second may carry an
        organisational identity based on employee number.</div>
      <div>What attributes that are needed in every instance is
        determined in a service context that is outside the scope of
        this specification.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>In these certificates, both the national identifier and the
        employee number may be placed as a serialNumber attribute in the
        subject field.</div>
      <div>Despite that, this extension makes it possible for the
        relying party to know exactly what identity information each
        certificate carries, as it maps to the attribute profile of a
        SAML federation.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>/Stefan</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
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            <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><br>
              </p>
              <p class=3D"MsoPlainText">Denis<br>
                <span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o=
:p></span></p>
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      <br>
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      <br>
      <pre wrap=3D"">_______________________________________________
pkix mailing list
<a class=3D"moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.o=
rg</a><a class=3D"moz-txt-link-freetext" href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/li=
stinfo/pkix">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix</a></pre>
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    <br>
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--B_3445253835_1241822--



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Subject: Re: [pkix] Comments on draft-santesson-auth-context-extension-04
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Stefan,

I read the new specification (dated March 4) and it does not solve my 
concerns.
**
The real goal is stated at the top of page 4:


*to verify that the signature was created by the same user that logged on *

*to the service*.

In your response below, you also say:

       "You now need to determine whether that SAML assertion and the 
certificate represents the same user."

This is rather different from the goal stated on page 3:

The primary purpose of this document is to provide a mechanism that

allows an application to understand information that express the

identity of a *subject in a certificate that is stored either in a*

*subject field attribute, as a subject alternative name or in a*

*subject directory attribute.*


If we draw an analogy with the way to construct a DN, we do not mention 
that the DN was created after
the presentation of a passport or an ID card, plus a way to justify the 
place of birth, a a way to justify
the place of living, an that the country name was extracted from the 
presentation of the passport, etc ...

So why should we do this in your context ?

We need to store information in the certificate directly derived from 
the SAML token, so that the application
which performed a SAML authentication can make sure that the certificate 
was delivered for the same person,
by *making a comparison using some set of rules.**
*
So *t**here is a need to have matching rules* for the content of the 
SAML token with the content of
the new extension (whatever it is). If we don't have such rules, then 
the goal at the top of page 4 cannot be met.

I do not see the added value to explain some translation process since 
it would be used for audit purposes only and
the CA MUST anyway maintain information about the issuance of the token. 
So in case of a problem, the
CA SHALL be able to answer and it is not needed to overload the content 
of the certificate with more information.

I still believe that OtherName is the right place to contains the 
parameters extracted from the SAML token,
that will be used for comparison.

Denis


PS. I wonder whether we should continue to have in mind to have this 
document issued as an RFC.
        It may well be a national Swedish standard.

> Based on comments received today I have updated this draft, 
> preliminary available at:
> http://aaa-sec.com/_temp/draft-santesson-auth-context-extension-04.txt
>
> I have edited the Introduction section to clarify the scope of the 
> document.
>
> I have also added a new section (now 3.2) that explains the absence of 
> attribute matching rules.
> The section should also make clear how specific attribute data format 
> conventions, such as the one expressed in ETSI TS 119 412-2, can 
> co-exist with this extension.
>
> /Stefan
>
> From: "Moudrick M. Dadashov" <md@e-net.lt <mailto:md@e-net.lt>>
> Date: Monday, March 4, 2013 11:26 AM
> To: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com <mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com>>
> Cc: Denis Pinkas <denis.pinkas@bull.net 
> <mailto:denis.pinkas@bull.net>>, pkix <pkix@ietf.org 
> <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>>
> Subject: Re: [pkix] Comments on draft-santesson-auth-context-extension-04
>
>     On 3/4/2013 12:09 PM, Stefan Santesson wrote:
>>     Denis,
>>
>>     First, thanks for your review. I really appreciate it.
>>
>>     It seems to me, especially with your leading concluding comment,
>>     that you have missed out on what this specification attempts to do.
>>     Perhaps you did not read the introduction enough, or perhaps I
>>     didn't write it clear enough.
>>
>>     The purpose is not to associate the subject with a identifier
>>     composed of a set of attributes.
>>     That is, this is NOT a new name form.
>>
>>     This extension helps a relying party to understand the source of
>>     the identity information that is placed in the traditional
>>     identity fields of a certificate.
>>     For example. If the serialNumber attributes holds the string
>>     "123456", then this extension can tell you where this string came
>>     from.
>>
>     How is this related to "semantics identifier" (ETSI TS 119 412-2)
>     then?
>
>     M.D.
>>     The use case addressed is where the CA/RA obtains the
>>     authenticated identify from a SAML assertion when issuing the
>>     certificate.
>>     This extension provides means to preserve information about the
>>     original SAML attributes in the cert.
>>
>>
>>     From: Denis Pinkas <denis.pinkas@bull.net
>>     <mailto:denis.pinkas@bull.net>>
>>     Date: Monday, March 4, 2013 9:42 AM
>>     To: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com
>>     <mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com>>, pkix <pkix@ietf.org
>>     <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>>
>>     Subject: Comments on draft-santesson-auth-context-extension-04
>>
>>         Stefan,
>>
>>
>>         The goal of this document is to associate a public key to be
>>         used for verifying electronic signatures
>>         with an identifier composed of a set of attributes, typically
>>         SAML attributes, contained in an authentication token.
>>
>>
>>     No you got this wrong. This is not an Identifier.
>>
>>         MAJOR COMMENTS
>>
>>         1.The proposed draft is not aligned with the current
>>         practices of RFC 5280 and X.509:
>>         the right place to hold such a set of attributes is in the
>>         subject alternate name.
>>         The subject DN may or may not be empty.
>>
>>         There is no rational in this draft to explain why this
>>         straightforward approach has not been chosen.
>>
>>         SubjectAltName ::= GeneralNames
>>
>>         GeneralNames ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName
>>
>>         GeneralName ::= CHOICE {
>>
>>         otherName[0]OtherName,
>>
>>         rfc822Name[1]IA5String,
>>
>>         dNSName[2]IA5String,
>>
>>         x400Address[3]ORAddress,
>>
>>         directoryName[4]Name,
>>
>>         ediPartyName[5]EDIPartyName,
>>
>>         uniformResourceIdentifier[6]IA5String,
>>
>>         iPAddress[7]OCTET STRING,
>>
>>         registeredID[8]OBJECT IDENTIFIER }
>>
>>         OtherName ::= SEQUENCE {
>>
>>         type-idOBJECT IDENTIFIER,
>>
>>         value[0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id }
>>
>>         OtherName fits well with the requirements, if you accept to
>>         use an OID rather than
>>         a uniformResourceIdentifier.
>>
>>         The value component would contain an XML structure conformant
>>         with a XML schema.
>>
>>
>>     This draft does not contain an identifier, thus this comment is
>>     irrelevant.
>>     There is not explanation why we don't store an identifier as a
>>     SAN, since we do not create or store an identifier.
>>
>>         2.The document should be restructured to define:
>>
>>         (a) the general way to answer to the requirements, and
>>         (b) a specific profile, in an Appendix, so that other RFCs
>>         could refer to the main body of the document.
>>
>>
>>     That could be one way to do it.
>>
>>         DETAILED COMMENTS
>>
>>         3.The proposed structure is not appropriate.
>>
>>         a) Why is there a need to have a SEQUENCE ? This should be
>>         avoided.
>>
>>         b) Why is contextInfo OPTIONAL? This should be avoided.
>>
>>         AuthenticationContexts ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
>>
>>         AuthenticationContext
>>
>>         AuthenticationContext ::= SEQUENCE {
>>
>>         contextTypeUTF8String,
>>
>>         contextInfoUTF8String OPTIONAL
>>
>>         }
>>
>>
>>     For exactly the same reason why SAML AuthContextClassRef in a
>>     SAML assertion is mandatory but not the XML structure it defines.
>>     In some cases you don't want to include explicit data, if that
>>     data is static and can be implicitly known through an identifier.
>>
>>     The AuthContextClassRef in SAML is the best example as it is an
>>     exact functional replica of this.
>>     The URL identified by AuthContextClassRef is also a XML Schema ns
>>     for associated XML document.
>>
>>     The XML Schema can define both a static XML document with fixed
>>     values as well as a structure where different values can be entered.
>>
>>     Just including the reference to the XML Schema may then provide
>>     sufficient information to the relying party. The actual XML
>>     document is only included if some variable data need to be
>>     communicated within the associated XML document.
>>
>>     Just including contextType but not contextInfo could be compared
>>     with the case where we include a certificate policy OID, but not
>>     the entire policy text.
>>
>>     This is a really smart way to do this, which is made possible
>>     through the versatility of XML Schemas.
>>
>>
>>         4.The text states: This extension MAY be marked critical.
>>
>>         If the alternate name is present, why should there be a DN ?
>>
>>
>>     This comment must be based on a misunderstanding of the scope of
>>     this document.
>>
>>         5.The XML schema should be given first (Appendix B) followed
>>         by the explanations (sections 3.1 and 3.2).
>>         In other words, sections 3.1 and 3.2 should be placed in
>>         Appendix B.
>>
>>
>>     That is one way to do it. If I was the implementer, I really
>>     wouldn't care as long as the information is there.
>>     I think it is quite common to place programatic contracts in
>>     Appendixes, wile explaining data elements in the body of the
>>     document.
>>
>>         6.The vocabulary used in sections 3.1 and 3.2 is confusing
>>         and should be changed.
>>
>>         An example: "AuthContextInfo Element" does not exist.
>>         However, it is better to state that the contextInfo component
>>         contains an XML structure which must conform to an XML schema.
>>
>>
>>     Sorry, I don't get this comment. The AuthContextInfo element does
>>     exist. It is defined in the schema. XML Schema defines syntax and
>>     structure but not the semantics. Semantics are defined the section 3.
>>
>>         7.The XML structure proposed to fit inside contextInfo is
>>         overly complex.
>>
>>         AuthenticationInstant is mandatory, whereas it is not needed.
>>
>>
>>     This information is always available from the SAML assertion and
>>     is considered fundamental, thus required.
>>
>>         AssertionRef is not needed.
>>
>>         ServiceID is not needed.
>>
>>
>>     And hence, both are optional.
>>
>>     The XML Schema is actually very simple. Its just the nature of
>>     XML Schemas to look more complex than they actually are.
>>     Perhaps it is easier if you examine it through this following web
>>     doc (which unfortunately can't be included in the spec):
>>     http://aaa-sec.com/eid2/sigsupport/XMLschema/AuthContExtDoc/index.html
>>
>>
>>         8.There are no matching rules defined. This means that the
>>         verification of the content of that field is not possible.
>>
>>
>>     First of all, this is not an identifier, thus there is no reason
>>     for a matching rule is it would be if this was an identifier that
>>     as a whole should be compared with something else.
>>
>>     The SAML attribute value does not have to match the value of the
>>     cert attribute, this data in the extension is optional and, if
>>     present, is a hint.
>>     But I could actually add some text to clarify this.
>>
>>         9.In section 3.2, I failed to understand the explanations for
>>         CertRef as well as for rdn and san.
>>
>>         Why CertNameType cannot be "factorized" ? (in the example
>>         from Page 15, there are all the same).
>>
>>
>>     No, the example in the spec has one e-mail attribute that was
>>     placed in the SubjAltName extension of the cert.
>>
>>         "rdn"The SAML attribute value is placed in the
>>
>>         subject field of the certificate in a
>>
>>         present Relative Distinguished Name
>>
>>         attribute.
>>
>>         "san"The SAML attribute value is placed in the
>>
>>         Subject Alternative Name extension of the
>>
>>         certificate.
>>
>>         I also failed to understand the reason of such "mapping".
>>
>>
>>     Yes, and I think that is the reason behind most of your comments.
>>
>>
>>         The example in Appendix C illustrates the complexity of the
>>         proposal.
>>         Can the approach be made simpler ? If not, why ?
>>
>>
>>     No it can't be made simpler. It contains exactly the information
>>     we need in the implementation where it is used.
>>
>>     I could write a whole whitepaper about all detailed reasons, but
>>     if you really think about the use case, it should be clear.
>>
>>     Consider the case where you know users by attributes defined in a
>>     SAML federation, where for example serialNumber is NOT used.
>>     A CA issues a certificate to a user based an a SAML assertion
>>     authentication based on the attribute profile of that federation.
>>
>>     A user logs in to your service using a SAML assertion, and sends
>>     you a signed document associated with the issued certificate.
>>     You now need to determine whether that SAML assertion and the
>>     certificate represents the same user.
>>     You also need to determine that the SAML assertion and the
>>     certificate provides compatible levels of assertion for user
>>     authentication as defined in your SAML federation.
>>
>>     This extension gives you exactly the amount of data that is
>>     needed in order to do this in an unambiguous fully automated process.
>>
>>         10.In section 4, I failed to understand the "dynamic" aspect.
>>         My understanding is that a person statically
>>         authenticates to a RA (Registration Authority) and then is
>>         given back a non-repudiation certificate
>>         with SAML attributes in it which may then be used as identity
>>         attributes.
>>         I am unsure what the text in this section wants to say when
>>         using the words "dynamic manner".
>>
>>
>>
>>     Your view is to restrictive.
>>
>>     The dynamic aspect of this is that a certificate may be issued on
>>     the fly at the instance when it is needed, containing just the
>>     information that is needed for one particular situation.
>>     This extension is (where this is used in the Swedish national
>>     infrastructure) added to certificates that are issued for just
>>     one instance of signing, and hence can be dynamically adapted to
>>     the needs of the intended relying party.
>>
>>     Next time the user signs, a new key pair is generated with new
>>     certs that may contain another set of the user's attributes.
>>
>>     The first instance may for example contain the users private
>>     identity based on a national identifier, the second may carry an
>>     organisational identity based on employee number.
>>     What attributes that are needed in every instance is determined
>>     in a service context that is outside the scope of this specification.
>>
>>     In these certificates, both the national identifier and the
>>     employee number may be placed as a serialNumber attribute in the
>>     subject field.
>>     Despite that, this extension makes it possible for the relying
>>     party to know exactly what identity information each certificate
>>     carries, as it maps to the attribute profile of a SAML federation.
>>
>>     /Stefan
>>
>>
>>         Denis
>>
>>
>>
>>     _______________________________________________
>>     pkix mailing list
>>     pkix@ietf.orghttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>


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    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">Stefan,<br>
      <br>
      I read the new specification (dated March 4) and it does not solve
      my concerns.<br>
      <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
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<![endif]--><br>
      The real goal is stated at the top of page 4:
      <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;
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          lang="EN-GB"><br>
          <o:p></o:p></span></p>
      <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
          lang="EN-GB"><span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;</span><b
            style="mso-bidi-font-weight:normal">to verify
            that the signature was created by the same user that logged
            on <o:p></o:p></b></span></p>
      <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
          style="font-size:12.0pt;
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mso-ansi-language:EN-GB;mso-fareast-language:FR;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"
          lang="EN-GB"><span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp; </span>to the
          service</span></b><span
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        Roman&quot;;mso-fareast-font-family:
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      <br>
      In your response below, you also say:<br>
      <br>
      <span id="OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; "You now need to determine
        whether that SAML assertion and the certificate represents the
        same user."</span><br>
      <br>
      This is rather different from the goal stated on page 3:<br>
      <br>
      <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
          lang="EN-GB"><span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>The
          primary purpose of this document is to
          provide a mechanism that<o:p></o:p></span></p>
      <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
          lang="EN-GB"><span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>allows
          an application <span
            style="background:yellow;mso-highlight:yellow">to understand
            information</span>
          that express the<o:p></o:p></span></p>
      <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
          lang="EN-GB"><span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>identity
          of a <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight:
            normal">subject in a certificate that is stored either in a<o:p></o:p></b></span></p>
      <p class="MsoPlainText"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><span
              style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;
            </span>subject field attribute, as a subject alternative
            name or in a<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
      <p class="MsoPlainText"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><span
              style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;
            </span>subject directory attribute.</span></b></p>
      <br>
      If we draw an analogy with the way to construct a DN, we do not
      mention that the DN was created after <br>
      the presentation of a passport or an ID card, plus a way to
      justify the place of birth, a a way to justify <br>
      the place of living, an that the country name was extracted from
      the presentation of the passport, etc ...<br>
      <br>
      So why should we do this in your context ?<br>
      <br>
      We need to store information in the certificate directly derived
      from the SAML token, so that the application <br>
      which performed a SAML authentication can make sure that the
      certificate was delivered for the same person, <br>
      by <b>making a comparison using some set of rules.</b><b><br>
      </b><br>
      So <b>t</b><b>here is a need to have matching rules</b> for the
      content of the SAML token with the content of <br>
      the new extension (whatever it is). If we don't have such rules,
      then the goal at the top of page 4 cannot be met.<br>
      <br>
      I do not see the added value to explain some translation process
      since it would be used for audit purposes only and <br>
      the CA MUST anyway maintain information about the issuance of the
      token. So in case of a problem, the <br>
      CA SHALL be able to answer and it is not needed to overload the
      content of the certificate with more information.<br>
      <br>
      I still believe that OtherName is the right place to contains the
      parameters extracted from the SAML token, <br>
      that will be used for comparison.<br>
      <br>
      Denis <br>
      <br>
      <br>
      PS. I wonder whether we should continue to have in mind to have
      this document issued as an RFC.<br>
      &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; It may well be a national Swedish standard.<br>
      <br>
    </div>
    <blockquote cite="mid:CD5A661C.5D102%25stefan@aaa-sec.com"
      type="cite">
      <div>Based on comments received today I have updated this draft,
        preliminary available at:</div>
      <div><a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="http://aaa-sec.com/_temp/draft-santesson-auth-context-extension-04.txt">http://aaa-sec.com/_temp/draft-santesson-auth-context-extension-04.txt</a></div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>I have edited the Introduction section to clarify the scope
        of the document.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>I have also added a new section (now 3.2) that explains the
        absence of attribute matching rules.</div>
      <div>The section should also make clear how specific attribute
        data format conventions, such as the one expressed in&nbsp;ETSI TS
        119 412-2, can co-exist with this extension.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>/Stefan</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <span id="OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
        <div style="font-family:Calibri; font-size:11pt;
          text-align:left; color:black; BORDER-BOTTOM: medium none;
          BORDER-LEFT: medium none; PADDING-BOTTOM: 0in; PADDING-LEFT:
          0in; PADDING-RIGHT: 0in; BORDER-TOP: #b5c4df 1pt solid;
          BORDER-RIGHT: medium none; PADDING-TOP: 3pt"><span
            style="font-weight:bold">From: </span> "Moudrick M.
          Dadashov" &lt;<a moz-do-not-send="true"
            href="mailto:md@e-net.lt">md@e-net.lt</a>&gt;<br>
          <span style="font-weight:bold">Date: </span> Monday, March 4,
          2013 11:26 AM<br>
          <span style="font-weight:bold">To: </span> Stefan Santesson
          &lt;<a moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com">stefan@aaa-sec.com</a>&gt;<br>
          <span style="font-weight:bold">Cc: </span> Denis Pinkas &lt;<a
            moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:denis.pinkas@bull.net">denis.pinkas@bull.net</a>&gt;,
          pkix &lt;<a moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>
          <span style="font-weight:bold">Subject: </span> Re: [pkix]
          Comments on draft-santesson-auth-context-extension-04<br>
        </div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <blockquote id="MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
          style="BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0
          0 0 5;">
          <div>
            <meta content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1"
              http-equiv="Content-Type">
            <div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
              <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 3/4/2013 12:09 PM, Stefan
                Santesson wrote:<br>
              </div>
              <blockquote cite="mid:CD5A2449.5D025%25stefan@aaa-sec.com"
                type="cite">
                <div>Denis,</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>First, thanks for your review. I really appreciate
                  it.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>It seems to me, especially with your leading
                  concluding comment, that you have missed out on what
                  this specification attempts to do.</div>
                <div>Perhaps you did not read the introduction enough,
                  or perhaps I didn't write it clear enough.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>The purpose is not to associate the subject with a
                  identifier composed of a set of attributes.</div>
                <div>That is, this is NOT a new name form.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>This extension helps a relying party to understand
                  the source of the identity information that is placed
                  in the traditional identity fields of a certificate.</div>
                <div>For example. If the serialNumber attributes holds
                  the string "123456", then this extension can tell you
                  where this string came from.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
              </blockquote>
              How is this related to "semantics identifier" (ETSI TS 119
              412-2) then?<br>
              <br>
              M.D. <br>
              <blockquote cite="mid:CD5A2449.5D025%25stefan@aaa-sec.com"
                type="cite">
                <div>The use case addressed is where the CA/RA obtains
                  the authenticated identify from a SAML assertion when
                  issuing the certificate.</div>
                <div>This extension provides means to preserve
                  information about the original SAML attributes in the
                  cert.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id="OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
                  <div style="font-family:Calibri; font-size:11pt;
                    text-align:left; color:black; BORDER-BOTTOM: medium
                    none; BORDER-LEFT: medium none; PADDING-BOTTOM: 0in;
                    PADDING-LEFT: 0in; PADDING-RIGHT: 0in; BORDER-TOP:
                    #b5c4df 1pt solid; BORDER-RIGHT: medium none;
                    PADDING-TOP: 3pt"><span style="font-weight:bold">From:
                    </span> Denis Pinkas &lt;<a moz-do-not-send="true"
                      href="mailto:denis.pinkas@bull.net">denis.pinkas@bull.net</a>&gt;<br>
                    <span style="font-weight:bold">Date: </span>
                    Monday, March 4, 2013 9:42 AM<br>
                    <span style="font-weight:bold">To: </span> Stefan
                    Santesson &lt;<a moz-do-not-send="true"
                      href="mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com">stefan@aaa-sec.com</a>&gt;,

                    pkix &lt;<a moz-do-not-send="true"
                      href="mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>
                    <span style="font-weight:bold">Subject: </span>
                    Comments on
                    draft-santesson-auth-context-extension-04<br>
                  </div>
                  <div><br>
                  </div>
                  <blockquote id="MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
                    style="BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <meta http-equiv="content-type"
                        content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1">
                      <div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
                        <meta http-equiv="Content-Type"
                          content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1">
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB">Stefan,<br>
                            <o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p><br>
                            </o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB">The
                            goal of this document is to associate a
                            public key to be used for verifying
                            electronic signatures <br>
                            with an identifier composed of a set of
                            attributes, typically SAML attributes,
                            contained in an authentication token.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                      </div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>No you got this wrong. This is not an Identifier.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id="OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
                  <blockquote id="MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
                    style="BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB">MAJOR

                            COMMENTS<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><span lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                            lang="EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->1.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB">
                            The proposed draft is not aligned with the
                            current practices of RFC 5280 and X.509: <br>
                            the right place to hold such a set of
                            attributes is in the subject alternate name.
                            <br>
                            The subject DN may or may not be empty. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB">There
                            is no rational in this draft to explain why
                            this straightforward approach has not been
                            chosen.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang="EN-US"><span
                              style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>SubjectAltName

                            ::= GeneralNames<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang="EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang="EN-US"><span
                              style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>GeneralNames
                            ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang="EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang="EN-US"><span
                              style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>GeneralName
                            ::= CHOICE {<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang="EN-US"><span
                              style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>otherName<span
                              style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                            </span>[0]<span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                            </span>OtherName,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang="EN-US"><span
                              style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>rfc822Name<span
                              style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                            </span>[1]<span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                            </span>IA5String,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang="EN-US"><span
                              style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>dNSName<span
                              style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                            </span>[2]<span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                            </span>IA5String,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang="EN-US"><span
                              style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>x400Address<span
                              style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                            </span>[3]<span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                            </span>ORAddress,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang="EN-US"><span
                              style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>directoryName<span
                              style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                            </span>[4]<span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                            </span>Name,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang="EN-US"><span
                              style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>ediPartyName<span
                              style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                            </span>[5]<span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                            </span>EDIPartyName,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang="EN-US"><span
                              style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>uniformResourceIdentifier<span
                              style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>[6]<span
                              style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>IA5String,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang="EN-US"><span
                              style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>iPAddress<span
                              style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                            </span>[7]<span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                            </span>OCTET STRING,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang="EN-US"><span
                              style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>registeredID<span
                              style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                            </span>[8]<span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                            </span>OBJECT IDENTIFIER }<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang="EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang="EN-US"><span
                              style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>OtherName
                            ::= SEQUENCE {<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang="EN-US"><span
                              style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>type-id<span
                              style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>OBJECT

                            IDENTIFIER,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang="EN-US"><span
                              style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>value<span
                              style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>[0]
                            EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id }<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang="EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang="EN-US">OtherName

                            fits well with the requirements, if you
                            accept to use an OID rather than <br>
                            a uniformResourceIdentifier.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US" lang="EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB">The
                            value component would contain an XML
                            structure conformant with a XML schema.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                      </div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>This draft does not contain an identifier, thus
                  this comment is irrelevant.</div>
                <div>There is not explanation why we don't store an
                  identifier as a SAN, since we do not create or store
                  an identifier.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id="OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
                  <blockquote id="MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
                    style="BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><span lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                            lang="EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->2.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB">
                            The document should be restructured to
                            define:<br>
                            <br>
                            (a) the general way to answer to the
                            requirements, and <br>
                            (b) a specific profile, in an Appendix, so
                            that other RFCs could refer to the main body
                            of the document.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                      </div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>That could be one way to do it.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id="OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
                  <blockquote id="MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
                    style="BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB">DETAILED

                            COMMENTS<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><span lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                            lang="EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->3.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB">
                            The proposed structure is not appropriate. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB">a)
                            Why is there a need to have a SEQUENCE ?
                            This should be avoided.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB">b)
                            Why is contextInfo OPTIONAL? This should be
                            avoided.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><span
                              style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>AuthenticationContexts



                            ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><span
                              style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;



                            </span>AuthenticationContext<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><span
                              style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>AuthenticationContext



                            ::= SEQUENCE {<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><span
                              style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>contextType<span
                              style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>UTF8String,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><span
                              style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>contextInfo<span
                              style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>UTF8String

                            OPTIONAL<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><span
                              style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>}<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                      </div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>For exactly the same reason why SAML
                  AuthContextClassRef in a SAML assertion is mandatory
                  but not the XML structure it defines.</div>
                <div>In some cases you don't want to include explicit
                  data, if that data is static and can be implicitly
                  known through an identifier.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>The&nbsp;AuthContextClassRef in SAML is the best example
                  as it is an exact functional replica of this.</div>
                <div>The URL identified by&nbsp;AuthContextClassRef is also a
                  XML Schema ns for associated XML document.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>The XML Schema can define both a static XML
                  document with fixed values as well as a structure
                  where different values can be entered.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>Just including the reference to the XML Schema may
                  then provide sufficient information to the relying
                  party. The actual XML document is only included if
                  some variable data need to be communicated within the
                  associated XML document.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>Just including contextType but not contextInfo
                  could be compared with the case where we include a
                  certificate policy OID, but not the entire policy
                  text.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>This is a really smart way to do this, which is
                  made possible through the versatility of XML Schemas.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id="OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
                  <blockquote id="MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
                    style="BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><span lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                            lang="EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->4.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB">
                            The text states: <span
                              style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</span>This
                            extension MAY be marked critical.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB">If
                            the alternate name is present, why should
                            there be a DN ?<br>
                          </span></p>
                      </div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>This comment must be based on a misunderstanding of
                  the scope of this document.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id="OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
                  <blockquote id="MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
                    style="BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><span lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                            lang="EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->5.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB">
                            The XML schema should be given first
                            (Appendix B) followed by the explanations
                            (sections 3.1 and 3.2). <br>
                            In other words, sections 3.1 and 3.2 should
                            be placed in Appendix B.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                      </div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>That is one way to do it. If I was the implementer,
                  I really wouldn't care as long as the information is
                  there.</div>
                <div>I think it is quite common to place programatic
                  contracts in Appendixes, wile explaining data elements
                  in the body of the document.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id="OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
                  <blockquote id="MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
                    style="BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><span lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                            lang="EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->6.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB">
                            The vocabulary used in sections 3.1 and 3.2
                            is confusing and should be changed.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB">An

                            example: &#8220;AuthContextInfo Element&#8221; does not
                            exist. However, it is better to state that
                            the contextInfo component <br>
                            contains an XML structure which must conform
                            to an XML schema.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                      </div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>Sorry, I don't get this comment. The
                  AuthContextInfo element does exist. It is defined in
                  the schema. XML Schema defines syntax and structure
                  but not the semantics. Semantics are defined the
                  section 3.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id="OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
                  <blockquote id="MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
                    style="BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><span lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                            lang="EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->7.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB">
                            The XML structure proposed to fit inside
                            contextInfo is overly complex. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB">AuthenticationInstant

                            is mandatory, whereas it is not needed.</span></p>
                      </div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>This information is always available from the SAML
                  assertion and is considered fundamental, thus
                  required.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id="OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
                  <blockquote id="MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
                    style="BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB">AssertionRef

                            is not needed.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB">ServiceID

                            is not needed.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                      </div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>And hence, both are optional.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>The XML Schema is actually very simple. Its just
                  the nature of XML Schemas to look more complex than
                  they actually are.</div>
                <div>Perhaps it is easier if you examine it through this
                  following web doc (which unfortunately can't be
                  included in the spec):</div>
                <div><a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="http://aaa-sec.com/eid2/sigsupport/XMLschema/AuthContExtDoc/index.html">http://aaa-sec.com/eid2/sigsupport/XMLschema/AuthContExtDoc/index.html</a></div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id="OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
                  <blockquote id="MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
                    style="BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><span lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                            lang="EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->8.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB">
                            There are no matching rules defined. This
                            means that the verification of the content
                            of that field is not possible.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                      </div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>First of all, this is not an identifier, thus there
                  is no reason for a matching rule is it would be if
                  this was an identifier that as a whole should be
                  compared with something else.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>The SAML attribute value does not have to match the
                  value of the cert attribute, this data in the
                  extension is optional and, if present, is a hint.&nbsp;</div>
                <div>But I could actually add some text to clarify this.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id="OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
                  <blockquote id="MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
                    style="BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><span lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                            lang="EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->9.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB">
                            In section 3.2, I failed to understand the
                            explanations for CertRef as well as for rdn
                            and san.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB">Why

                            CertNameType cannot be &#8220;factorized&#8221; ? (in
                            the example from Page 15, there are all the
                            same).</span></p>
                      </div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>No, the example in the spec has one e-mail
                  attribute that was placed in the SubjAltName extension
                  of the cert.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id="OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
                  <blockquote id="MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
                    style="BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><span
                              style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                            </span>"rdn"<span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;
                            </span>The SAML attribute value is placed in
                            the<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><span
                              style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;



                            </span>subject field of the certificate in a<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><span
                              style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;



                            </span>present Relative Distinguished Name<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><span
                              style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;



                            </span>attribute.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><span
                              style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                            </span>"san"<span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;
                            </span>The SAML attribute value is placed in
                            the<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><span
                              style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;



                            </span>Subject Alternative Name extension of
                            the<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><span
                              style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;



                            </span>certificate.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB">I
                            also failed to understand the reason of such
                            &#8220;mapping&#8221;. </span></p>
                      </div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>Yes, and I think that is the reason behind most of
                  your comments.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id="OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
                  <blockquote id="MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
                    style="BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><br>
                            The example in Appendix C illustrates the
                            complexity of the proposal. <br>
                            Can the approach be made simpler ? If not,
                            why ?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                      </div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>No it can't be made simpler. It contains exactly
                  the information we need in the implementation where it
                  is used.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>I could write a whole whitepaper about all detailed
                  reasons, but if you really think about the use case,
                  it should be clear.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>Consider the case where you know users by
                  attributes defined in a SAML federation, where for
                  example serialNumber is NOT used.</div>
                <div>A CA issues a certificate to a user based an a SAML
                  assertion authentication based on the attribute
                  profile of that federation.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>A user logs in to your service using a SAML
                  assertion, and sends you a signed document associated
                  with the issued certificate.</div>
                <div>You now need to determine whether that SAML
                  assertion and the certificate represents the same
                  user.</div>
                <div>You also need to determine that the SAML assertion
                  and the certificate provides compatible levels of
                  assertion for user authentication as defined in your
                  SAML federation.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>This extension gives you exactly the amount of data
                  that is needed in order to do this in an unambiguous
                  fully automated process.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id="OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
                  <blockquote id="MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
                    style="BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class="MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><span lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                            lang="EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->10.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
                            style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB">
                            In section 4, I failed to understand the
                            &#8220;dynamic&#8221; aspect. My understanding is that a
                            person statically <br>
                            authenticates to a RA (Registration
                            Authority) and then is given back a
                            non-repudiation certificate <br>
                            with SAML attributes in it which may then be
                            used as identity attributes. <br>
                            I am unsure what the text in this section
                            wants to say when using the words &#8220;dynamic
                            manner&#8221;.<br>
                          </span></p>
                      </div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>Your view is to restrictive.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>The dynamic aspect of this is that a certificate
                  may be issued on the fly at the instance when it is
                  needed, containing just the information that is needed
                  for one particular situation.</div>
                <div>This extension is (where this is used in the
                  Swedish national infrastructure) added to certificates
                  that are issued for just one instance of signing, and
                  hence can be dynamically adapted to the needs of the
                  intended relying party.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>Next time the user signs, a new key pair is
                  generated with new certs that may contain another set
                  of the user's attributes.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>The first instance may for example contain the
                  users private identity based on a national identifier,
                  the second may carry an organisational identity based
                  on employee number.</div>
                <div>What attributes that are needed in every instance
                  is determined in a service context that is outside the
                  scope of this specification.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>In these certificates, both the national identifier
                  and the employee number may be placed as a
                  serialNumber attribute in the subject field.</div>
                <div>Despite that, this extension makes it possible for
                  the relying party to know exactly what identity
                  information each certificate carries, as it maps to
                  the attribute profile of a SAML federation.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>/Stefan</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
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                        <p class="MsoPlainText">Denis<br>
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                            lang="EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
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                <br>
                <pre wrap="">_______________________________________________
pkix mailing list
<a moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a><a moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix</a></pre>
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From stefan@aaa-sec.com  Tue Mar  5 16:27:30 2013
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Date: Wed, 06 Mar 2013 01:26:59 +0100
From: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>
To: Denis Pinkas <denis.pinkas@bull.net>
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Hi Denis,

Comments in line;

From:  Denis Pinkas <denis.pinkas@bull.net>
Date:  Tuesday, March 5, 2013 6:44 PM
To:  Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>
Cc:  pkix <pkix@ietf.org>, Sean Turner <turners@ieca.com>
Subject:  Re: [pkix] Comments on draft-santesson-auth-context-extension-04

>    =20
> =20
> Stefan,
> =20
>  I read the new specification (dated March 4) and it does not solve my
> concerns.
>       =20
>  The real goal is stated at the top of page 4:
>=20
>=20
> =20
> =20
>  to verify that the signature was created by the same user that logged on
>    to the service.

No that is an example of what you might want to do with this.

> =20
>  In your response below, you also say:
> =20
>        "You now need to determine whether that SAML assertion and the
> certificate represents the same user."
> =20
>  This is rather different from the goal stated on page 3:
> =20
> =20
>=20
>    The primary purpose of this document is to provide a mechanism that
> =20
>    allows an application to understand information that express the
> =20
>    identity of a subject in a certificate that is stored either in a
> =20
>    subject field attribute, as a subject alternative name or in a
> =20
>    subject directory attribute.
> =20

This is the primary function. This can be used to achieve the goal of the
example use case above. There is no contradiction.


>=20
>  If we draw an analogy with the way to construct a DN, we do not mention =
that
> the DN was created after
>  the presentation of a passport or an ID card, plus a way to justify the =
place
> of birth, a a way to justify
>  the place of living, an that the country name was extracted from the
> presentation of the passport, etc ...
> =20
>  So why should we do this in your context ?

Only if it solves a problem you have. Else why bother?

You seem to be missing a big point, and perhaps that is because you have no=
t
dealt with the problems of combining a SAML federation with a PKI
infrastructure?
This extension addresses real practical problems arising from the fact that
cert profiles and SAML federations have different attribute profiles. That
is, they use different attributes and name forms to express the same thing.

Basically, if you have gone through the paint to teach every participating
service to understand user identity according to the SAML attribute profile=
,
you may want to use that also to understand certificate entities.

In some cases that is absolutely necessary but currently not possible
without using quite ugly heuristics and very local conventions that does no=
t
scale very well.

> =20
>  We need to store information in the certificate directly derived from th=
e
> SAML token, so that the application
>  which performed a SAML authentication can make sure that the certificate=
 was
> delivered for the same person,
>  by making a comparison using some set of rules.
>=20
>  So there is a need to have matching rules for the content of the SAML to=
ken
> with the content of
>  the new extension (whatever it is). If we don't have such rules, then th=
e
> goal at the top of page 4 cannot be met.


No, but you put the finger on a problem that caused me to do another update
to make this clear.

I removed the three parameters specifying the saml Attribute and replaced i=
t
with a real saml:attribute element.

This removes any need to discuss attribute matching, because the SAML
attribute stored in this extension, when compared with anything outside of
the cert, is compared with a SAML attribute from a SAML assertion. Matching
SAML attributes is handled by the SAML standard and is therefore outside th=
e
scope of this document.


> =20
>  I do not see the added value to explain some translation process since i=
t
> would be used for audit purposes only and
>  the CA MUST anyway maintain information about the issuance of the token.=
 So
> in case of a problem, the
>  CA SHALL be able to answer and it is not needed to overload the content =
of
> the certificate with more information.

The need does not arise just in case of a problem. This comparison is done
every time a user signs a document in a government service. This is million=
s
of transactions and hence this process must be well defined and automated.
The comparison between the SAML assertion the user presented at login, and
the signature certificate presented by the user in the same session will
originate from multiple Ideneity Providers and signature services, so just
relying on local conventions does not scale and is too static to provide a
future proof solution.

Do I dare to say trust me? :) We have modelled and prototyped this for
almost a year, and without adding this information to the certs, our
infrastructure would not work.

> =20
>  I still believe that OtherName is the right place to contains the parame=
ters
> extracted from the SAML token,
>  that will be used for comparison.

No, for a number of reasons.

We want this cert to be processed just as any normal certificate.
The primary purpose is to declare the information source of present subject
attributes and name forms, not to define a new OTHER name.

The biggest reason why this definitely can't be an other name is because
there is absolutely no guarantee that the content in this extension will
contain any unique name of anything related to the subject.
In it's simplest use it will just identify an XML Schema defining a static
ruleset. In such case that schema identifier will be the same for all certs
issued to various subjects.

An updated version of the draft is available using the same link.

/Stefan

> =20
>  Denis=20
> =20
> =20
>  PS. I wonder whether we should continue to have in mind to have this doc=
ument
> issued as an RFC.
>         It may well be a national Swedish standard.
> =20
> =20
> =20
>> =20
>> Based on comments received today I have updated this draft, preliminary
>> available at:
>> =20
>> http://aaa-sec.com/_temp/draft-santesson-auth-context-extension-04.txt
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>> =20
>> I have edited the Introduction section to clarify the scope of the docum=
ent.
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>> =20
>> I have also added a new section (now 3.2) that explains the absence of
>> attribute matching rules.
>> =20
>> The section should also make clear how specific attribute data format
>> conventions, such as the one expressed in ETSI TS 119 412-2, can co-exis=
t
>> with this extension.
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>> =20
>> /Stefan
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>>  =20
>> From:  "Moudrick M. Dadashov" <md@e-net.lt>
>>  Date:  Monday, March 4, 2013 11:26 AM
>>  To:  Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>
>>  Cc:  Denis Pinkas <denis.pinkas@bull.net>, pkix <pkix@ietf.org>
>>  Subject:  Re: [pkix] Comments on draft-santesson-auth-context-extension=
-04
>> =20
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>> =20
>>> =20
>>>  =20
>>> =20
>>> On 3/4/2013 12:09 PM, Stefan Santesson wrote:
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> Denis,
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> First, thanks for your review. I really appreciate it.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> It seems to me, especially with your leading concluding comment, that =
you
>>>> have missed out on what this specification attempts to do.
>>>> =20
>>>> Perhaps you did not read the introduction enough, or perhaps I didn't =
write
>>>> it clear enough.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> The purpose is not to associate the subject with a identifier composed=
 of a
>>>> set of attributes.
>>>> =20
>>>> That is, this is NOT a new name form.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> This extension helps a relying party to understand the source of the
>>>> identity information that is placed in the traditional identity fields=
 of a
>>>> certificate.
>>>> =20
>>>> For example. If the serialNumber attributes holds the string "123456",=
 then
>>>> this extension can tell you where this string came from.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>  How is this related to "semantics identifier" (ETSI TS 119 412-2) then=
?
>>> =20
>>>  M.D.=20
>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> The use case addressed is where the CA/RA obtains the authenticated
>>>> identify from a SAML assertion when issuing the certificate.
>>>> =20
>>>> This extension provides means to preserve information about the origin=
al
>>>> SAML attributes in the cert.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>>  =20
>>>> From:  Denis Pinkas <denis.pinkas@bull.net>
>>>>  Date:  Monday, March 4, 2013 9:42 AM
>>>>  To:  Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>,  pkix <pkix@ietf.org>
>>>>  Subject:  Comments on draft-santesson-auth-context-extension-04
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>>  =20
>>>>>  =20
>>>>>=20
>>>>> Stefan,
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>>=20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> The goal of this document is to associate a public key to be used for
>>>>> verifying electronic signatures
>>>>>  with an identifier composed of a set of attributes, typically SAML
>>>>> attributes, contained in an authentication token.
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>  =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> No you got this wrong. This is not an Identifier.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>>  =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>>=20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> MAJOR  COMMENTS
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> 1. The proposed draft is not aligned with the current practices of RF=
C
>>>>> 5280 and X.509:
>>>>>  the right place to hold such a set of attributes is in the subject
>>>>> alternate name.
>>>>>  The subject DN may or may not be empty.
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> There is no rational in this draft to explain why this straightforwar=
d
>>>>> approach has not been chosen.
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>>    SubjectAltName  ::=3D GeneralNames
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>>    GeneralNames ::=3D SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>>    GeneralName ::=3D CHOICE {
>>>>> =20
>>>>>         otherName                       [0]     OtherName,
>>>>> =20
>>>>>         rfc822Name                      [1]     IA5String,
>>>>> =20
>>>>>         dNSName                         [2]     IA5String,
>>>>> =20
>>>>>         x400Address                     [3]     ORAddress,
>>>>> =20
>>>>>         directoryName                   [4]     Name,
>>>>> =20
>>>>>         ediPartyName                    [5]     EDIPartyName,
>>>>> =20
>>>>>         uniformResourceIdentifier       [6]     IA5String,
>>>>> =20
>>>>>         iPAddress                       [7]     OCTET STRING,
>>>>> =20
>>>>>         registeredID                    [8]     OBJECT IDENTIFIER }
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>>    OtherName ::=3D SEQUENCE {
>>>>> =20
>>>>>         type-id    OBJECT  IDENTIFIER,
>>>>> =20
>>>>>         value      [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id }
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> OtherName  fits well with the requirements, if you accept to use an O=
ID
>>>>> rather than=20
>>>>>  a uniformResourceIdentifier.
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> The value component would contain an XML structure conformant with a =
XML
>>>>> schema.
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>  =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> This draft does not contain an identifier, thus this comment is irrele=
vant.
>>>> =20
>>>> There is not explanation why we don't store an identifier as a SAN, si=
nce
>>>> we do not create or store an identifier.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>>  =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>>=20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> 2. The document should be restructured to define:
>>>>> =20
>>>>>  (a) the general way to answer to the requirements, and
>>>>>  (b) a specific profile, in an Appendix, so that other RFCs could ref=
er to
>>>>> the main body of the document.
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>  =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> That could be one way to do it.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>>  =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>>=20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> DETAILED  COMMENTS
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> 3. The proposed structure is not appropriate.
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> a) Why is there a need to have a SEQUENCE ? This should be avoided.
>>>>> =20
>>>>> b) Why is contextInfo OPTIONAL? This should be avoided.
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>>       AuthenticationContexts  ::=3D SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
>>>>> =20
>>>>>                                  AuthenticationContext
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>>       AuthenticationContext  ::=3D SEQUENCE {
>>>>> =20
>>>>>           contextType     UTF8String,
>>>>> =20
>>>>>           contextInfo     UTF8String  OPTIONAL
>>>>> =20
>>>>>       }
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>  =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> For exactly the same reason why SAML AuthContextClassRef in a SAML
>>>> assertion is mandatory but not the XML structure it defines.
>>>> =20
>>>> In some cases you don't want to include explicit data, if that data is
>>>> static and can be implicitly known through an identifier.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> The AuthContextClassRef in SAML is the best example as it is an exact
>>>> functional replica of this.
>>>> =20
>>>> The URL identified by AuthContextClassRef is also a XML Schema ns for
>>>> associated XML document.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> The XML Schema can define both a static XML document with fixed values=
 as
>>>> well as a structure where different values can be entered.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> Just including the reference to the XML Schema may then provide suffic=
ient
>>>> information to the relying party. The actual XML document is only incl=
uded
>>>> if some variable data need to be communicated within the associated XM=
L
>>>> document.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> Just including contextType but not contextInfo could be compared with =
the
>>>> case where we include a certificate policy OID, but not the entire pol=
icy
>>>> text.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> This is a really smart way to do this, which is made possible through =
the
>>>> versatility of XML Schemas.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>>  =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>>=20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> 4. The text states:    This extension MAY be marked critical.
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> If the alternate name is present, why should there be a DN ?
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>  =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> This comment must be based on a misunderstanding of the scope of this
>>>> document.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>>  =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>>=20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> 5. The XML schema should be given first (Appendix B) followed by the
>>>>> explanations (sections 3.1 and 3.2).
>>>>>  In other words, sections 3.1 and 3.2 should be placed in Appendix B.
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>  =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> That is one way to do it. If I was the implementer, I really wouldn't =
care
>>>> as long as the information is there.
>>>> =20
>>>> I think it is quite common to place programatic contracts in Appendixe=
s,
>>>> wile explaining data elements in the body of the document.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>>  =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>>=20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> 6. The vocabulary used in sections 3.1 and 3.2 is confusing and shoul=
d be
>>>>> changed.
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> An  example: =B3AuthContextInfo Element=B2 does not exist. However, it is
>>>>> better to state that the contextInfo component
>>>>>  contains an XML structure which must conform to an XML schema.
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>  =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> Sorry, I don't get this comment. The AuthContextInfo element does exis=
t. It
>>>> is defined in the schema. XML Schema defines syntax and structure but =
not
>>>> the semantics. Semantics are defined the section 3.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>>  =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>>=20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> 7. The XML structure proposed to fit inside contextInfo is overly com=
plex.
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> AuthenticationInstant  is mandatory, whereas it is not needed.
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>  =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> This information is always available from the SAML assertion and is
>>>> considered fundamental, thus required.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>>  =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>>=20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> AssertionRef  is not needed.
>>>>> =20
>>>>> ServiceID  is not needed.
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>  =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> And hence, both are optional.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> The XML Schema is actually very simple. Its just the nature of XML Sch=
emas
>>>> to look more complex than they actually are.
>>>> =20
>>>> Perhaps it is easier if you examine it through this following web doc
>>>> (which unfortunately can't be included in the spec):
>>>> =20
>>>> http://aaa-sec.com/eid2/sigsupport/XMLschema/AuthContExtDoc/index.html
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>>  =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>>=20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> 8. There are no matching rules defined. This means that the verificat=
ion
>>>>> of the content of that field is not possible.
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>  =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> First of all, this is not an identifier, thus there is no reason for a
>>>> matching rule is it would be if this was an identifier that as a whole
>>>> should be compared with something else.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> The SAML attribute value does not have to match the value of the cert
>>>> attribute, this data in the extension is optional and, if present, is =
a
>>>> hint.=20
>>>> =20
>>>> But I could actually add some text to clarify this.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>>  =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>>=20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> 9. In section 3.2, I failed to understand the explanations for CertRe=
f as
>>>>> well as for rdn and san.
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> Why  CertNameType cannot be =B3factorized=B2 ? (in the example from Page =
15,
>>>>> there are all the same).
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>  =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> No, the example in the spec has one e-mail attribute that was placed i=
n the
>>>> SubjAltName extension of the cert.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>>  =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>>=20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>>                       "rdn"   The SAML attribute value is placed in t=
he
>>>>> =20
>>>>>                               subject field of the certificate in a
>>>>> =20
>>>>>                               present Relative Distinguished Name
>>>>> =20
>>>>>                               attribute.
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>>                       "san"   The SAML attribute value is placed in t=
he
>>>>> =20
>>>>>                               Subject Alternative Name extension of t=
he
>>>>> =20
>>>>>                               certificate.
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> I also failed to understand the reason of such =B3mapping=B2.
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>  =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> Yes, and I think that is the reason behind most of your comments.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>>  =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>>=20
>>>>>=20
>>>>>  The example in Appendix C illustrates the complexity of the proposal=
.
>>>>>  Can the approach be made simpler ? If not, why ?
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>  =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> No it can't be made simpler. It contains exactly the information we ne=
ed in
>>>> the implementation where it is used.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> I could write a whole whitepaper about all detailed reasons, but if yo=
u
>>>> really think about the use case, it should be clear.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> Consider the case where you know users by attributes defined in a SAML
>>>> federation, where for example serialNumber is NOT used.
>>>> =20
>>>> A CA issues a certificate to a user based an a SAML assertion
>>>> authentication based on the attribute profile of that federation.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> A user logs in to your service using a SAML assertion, and sends you a
>>>> signed document associated with the issued certificate.
>>>> =20
>>>> You now need to determine whether that SAML assertion and the certific=
ate
>>>> represents the same user.
>>>> =20
>>>> You also need to determine that the SAML assertion and the certificate
>>>> provides compatible levels of assertion for user authentication as def=
ined
>>>> in your SAML federation.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> This extension gives you exactly the amount of data that is needed in =
order
>>>> to do this in an unambiguous fully automated process.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>>  =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>>=20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> 10. In section 4, I failed to understand the =B3dynamic=B2 aspect. My
>>>>> understanding is that a person statically
>>>>>  authenticates to a RA (Registration Authority) and then is given bac=
k a
>>>>> non-repudiation certificate
>>>>>  with SAML attributes in it which may then be used as identity attrib=
utes.
>>>>>  I am unsure what the text in this section wants to say when using th=
e
>>>>> words =B3dynamic manner=B2.
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>  =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> Your view is to restrictive.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> The dynamic aspect of this is that a certificate may be issued on the =
fly
>>>> at the instance when it is needed, containing just the information tha=
t is
>>>> needed for one particular situation.
>>>> =20
>>>> This extension is (where this is used in the Swedish national
>>>> infrastructure) added to certificates that are issued for just one ins=
tance
>>>> of signing, and hence can be dynamically adapted to the needs of the
>>>> intended relying party.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> Next time the user signs, a new key pair is generated with new certs t=
hat
>>>> may contain another set of the user's attributes.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> The first instance may for example contain the users private identity =
based
>>>> on a national identifier, the second may carry an organisational ident=
ity
>>>> based on employee number.
>>>> =20
>>>> What attributes that are needed in every instance is determined in a
>>>> service context that is outside the scope of this specification.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> In these certificates, both the national identifier and the employee n=
umber
>>>> may be placed as a serialNumber attribute in the subject field.
>>>> =20
>>>> Despite that, this extension makes it possible for the relying party t=
o
>>>> know exactly what identity information each certificate carries, as it=
 maps
>>>> to the attribute profile of a SAML federation.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> /Stefan
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>>  =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>>=20
>>>>>=20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> Denis
>>>>> =20
>>>>>       =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>  =20
>>>>  =20
>>>> =20
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> pkix mailing list
>>>> pkix@ietf.orghttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>  =20
> =20
> =20



--B_3445378021_1641212
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<html><head></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: s=
pace; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-size:=
 14px; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><div>Hi Denis,</div><div><br></di=
v><div>Comments in line;</div><div><br></div><span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION"=
><div style=3D"font-family:Calibri; font-size:11pt; text-align:left; color:bla=
ck; BORDER-BOTTOM: medium none; BORDER-LEFT: medium none; PADDING-BOTTOM: 0i=
n; PADDING-LEFT: 0in; PADDING-RIGHT: 0in; BORDER-TOP: #b5c4df 1pt solid; BOR=
DER-RIGHT: medium none; PADDING-TOP: 3pt"><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">Fro=
m: </span> Denis Pinkas &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:denis.pinkas@bull.net">denis.pin=
kas@bull.net</a>&gt;<br><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">Date: </span> Tuesday=
, March 5, 2013 6:44 PM<br><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">To: </span> Stefan=
 Santesson &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com">stefan@aaa-sec.com</a>&gt=
;<br><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">Cc: </span> pkix &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pki=
x@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>&gt;, Sean Turner &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:turners@i=
eca.com">turners@ieca.com</a>&gt;<br><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">Subject:=
 </span> Re: [pkix] Comments on draft-santesson-auth-context-extension-04<br=
></div><div><br></div><blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" st=
yle=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;"><div>
  
    <meta content=3D"text/html; charset=3DISO-8859-1" http-equiv=3D"Content-Type"=
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  <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
    <div class=3D"moz-cite-prefix">Stefan,<br>
      <br>
      I read the new specification (dated March 4) and it does not solve
      my concerns.<br>
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<![endif]--><br>
      The real goal is stated at the top of page 4:
      <meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html;
        charset=3DISO-8859-1">
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N-GB"><br>
          <o:p></o:p></span></p>
      <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"E=
N-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;</span><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-we=
ight:normal">to verify
            that the signature was created by the same user that logged
            on <o:p></o:p></b></span></p>
      <b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;=

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mso-ansi-language:EN-GB;mso-fareast-language:FR;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA" la=
ng=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp; </span>to the
          service</span></b><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Times New
        Roman&quot;;mso-fareast-font-family:
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Roman&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB;mso-fareast-language:FR;mso-bidi-langua=
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<![endif]--><br></div></div></div></blockquote></span><div><br></div><div>N=
o that is an example of what you might want to do with this.</div><div><br><=
/div><span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION"><blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION=
_BLOCKQUOTE" style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0 =
0 0 5;"><div><div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF"><div class=3D"moz-cite-pref=
ix">
      <br>
      In your response below, you also say:<br>
      <br>
      <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; "You n=
ow need to determine
        whether that SAML assertion and the certificate represents the
        same user."</span><br>
      <br>
      This is rather different from the goal stated on page 3:<br>
      <br>
      <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"E=
N-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>The
          primary purpose of this document is to
          provide a mechanism that<o:p></o:p></span></p>
      <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"E=
N-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>allows
          an application <span style=3D"background:yellow;mso-highlight:yello=
w">to understand
            information</span>
          that express the<o:p></o:p></span></p>
      <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"E=
N-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>identity
          of a <b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:
            normal">subject in a certificate that is stored either in a<o:p=
></o:p></b></span></p>
      <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span =
style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=
&nbsp;&nbsp;
            </span>subject field attribute, as a subject alternative
            name or in a<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
      <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span =
style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=
&nbsp;&nbsp;
            </span>subject directory attribute.</span></b></p>
      </div></div></div></blockquote></span><div><br></div><div>This is the=
 primary function. This can be used to achieve the goal of the example use c=
ase above. There is no contradiction.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><sp=
an id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION"><blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQU=
OTE" style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">=
<div><div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF"><div class=3D"moz-cite-prefix"><br>=

      If we draw an analogy with the way to construct a DN, we do not
      mention that the DN was created after <br>
      the presentation of a passport or an ID card, plus a way to
      justify the place of birth, a a way to justify <br>
      the place of living, an that the country name was extracted from
      the presentation of the passport, etc ...<br>
      <br>
      So why should we do this in your context ?<br></div></div></div></blo=
ckquote></span><div><br></div><div>Only if it solves a problem you have. Els=
e why bother?</div><div><br></div><div>You seem to be missing a big point, a=
nd perhaps that is because you have not dealt with the problems of combining=
 a SAML federation with a PKI infrastructure?</div><div>This extension addre=
sses real practical problems arising from the fact that cert profiles and SA=
ML federations have different attribute profiles. That is, they use differen=
t attributes and name forms to express the same thing.</div><div><br></div><=
div>Basically, if you have gone through the paint to teach every participati=
ng service to understand user identity according to the SAML attribute profi=
le, you may want to use that also to understand certificate entities.</div><=
div><br></div><div>In some cases that is absolutely necessary but currently =
not possible without using quite ugly heuristics and very local conventions =
that does not scale very well.</div><div><br></div><span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SE=
CTION"><blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=3D"BORDER-LEF=
T: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;"><div><div text=3D"#00000=
0" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF"><div class=3D"moz-cite-prefix">
      <br>
      We need to store information in the certificate directly derived
      from the SAML token, so that the application <br>
      which performed a SAML authentication can make sure that the
      certificate was delivered for the same person, <br>
      by <b>making a comparison using some set of rules.</b><b><br></b></di=
v></div></div></blockquote></span><span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION"><blockquot=
e id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 soli=
d; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;"><div><div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFF=
FF"><div class=3D"moz-cite-prefix"><br>
      So <b>t</b><b>here is a need to have matching rules</b> for the
      content of the SAML token with the content of <br>
      the new extension (whatever it is). If we don't have such rules,
      then the goal at the top of page 4 cannot be met.<br></div></div></di=
v></blockquote></span><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><div>No, but you pu=
t the finger on a problem that caused me to do another update to make this c=
lear.</div><div><br></div><div>I removed the three parameters specifying the=
 saml Attribute and replaced it with a real saml:attribute element.</div><di=
v><br></div><div>This removes any need to discuss attribute matching, becaus=
e the SAML attribute stored in this extension, when compared with anything o=
utside of the cert, is compared with a SAML attribute from a SAML assertion.=
 Matching SAML attributes is handled by the SAML standard and is therefore o=
utside the scope of this document.</div><div><br></div><span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BOD=
Y_SECTION"><blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=3D"border=
-left-color: rgb(181, 196, 223); border-left-width: 5px; border-left-style: =
solid; padding: 0px 0px 0px 5px; margin: 0px 0px 0px 5px; "><div text=3D"#0000=
00" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF"></div></blockquote></span></div><div><br></div><span i=
d=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION"><blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"=
 style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;"><div=
><div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF"><div class=3D"moz-cite-prefix">
      <br>
      I do not see the added value to explain some translation process
      since it would be used for audit purposes only and <br>
      the CA MUST anyway maintain information about the issuance of the
      token. So in case of a problem, the <br>
      CA SHALL be able to answer and it is not needed to overload the
      content of the certificate with more information.<br></div></div></di=
v></blockquote></span><div><br></div><div>The need does not arise just in ca=
se of a problem. This comparison is done every time a user signs a document =
in a government service. This is millions of transactions and hence this pro=
cess must be well defined and automated.</div><div>The comparison between th=
e SAML assertion the user presented at login, and the signature certificate =
presented by the user in the same session will originate from multiple Idene=
ity Providers and signature services, so just relying on local conventions d=
oes not scale and is too static to provide a future proof solution.</div><di=
v><br></div><div>Do I dare to say trust me? :) We have modelled and prototyp=
ed this for almost a year, and without adding this information to the certs,=
 our infrastructure would not work.</div><div><br></div><span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BO=
DY_SECTION"><blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=3D"BORDE=
R-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;"><div><div text=3D"#=
000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF"><div class=3D"moz-cite-prefix">
      <br>
      I still believe that OtherName is the right place to contains the
      parameters extracted from the SAML token, <br>
      that will be used for comparison.<br></div></div></div></blockquote><=
/span><div><br></div><div>No, for a number of reasons.</div><div><br></div><=
div>We want this cert to be processed just as any normal certificate.&nbsp;<=
/div><div>The primary purpose is to declare the information source of presen=
t subject attributes and name forms, not to define a new OTHER name.</div><d=
iv><br></div><div>The biggest reason why this definitely can't be an other n=
ame is because there is absolutely no guarantee that the content in this ext=
ension will contain any unique name of anything related to the subject.</div=
><div>In it's simplest use it will just identify an XML Schema defining a st=
atic ruleset. In such case that schema identifier will be the same for all c=
erts issued to various subjects.</div><div><br></div><div>An updated version=
 of the draft is available using the same link.</div><div><br></div><div>/St=
efan</div><div><br></div><span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION"><blockquote id=3D"MAC=
_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDIN=
G:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;"><div><div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF"><div =
class=3D"moz-cite-prefix">
      <br>
      Denis <br>
      <br>
      <br>
      PS. I wonder whether we should continue to have in mind to have
      this document issued as an RFC.<br>
      &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; It may well be a national Swedis=
h standard.<br>
      <br>
    </div>
    <blockquote cite=3D"mid:CD5A661C.5D102%25stefan@aaa-sec.com" type=3D"cite">=

      <div>Based on comments received today I have updated this draft,
        preliminary available at:</div>
      <div><a moz-do-not-send=3D"true" href=3D"http://aaa-sec.com/_temp/draft-s=
antesson-auth-context-extension-04.txt">http://aaa-sec.com/_temp/draft-sante=
sson-auth-context-extension-04.txt</a></div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>I have edited the Introduction section to clarify the scope
        of the document.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>I have also added a new section (now 3.2) that explains the
        absence of attribute matching rules.</div>
      <div>The section should also make clear how specific attribute
        data format conventions, such as the one expressed in&nbsp;ETSI TS
        119 412-2, can co-exist with this extension.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>/Stefan</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
        <div style=3D"font-family:Calibri; font-size:11pt;
          text-align:left; color:black; BORDER-BOTTOM: medium none;
          BORDER-LEFT: medium none; PADDING-BOTTOM: 0in; PADDING-LEFT:
          0in; PADDING-RIGHT: 0in; BORDER-TOP: #b5c4df 1pt solid;
          BORDER-RIGHT: medium none; PADDING-TOP: 3pt"><span style=3D"font-we=
ight:bold">From: </span> "Moudrick M.
          Dadashov" &lt;<a moz-do-not-send=3D"true" href=3D"mailto:md@e-net.lt"=
>md@e-net.lt</a>&gt;<br>
          <span style=3D"font-weight:bold">Date: </span> Monday, March 4,
          2013 11:26 AM<br>
          <span style=3D"font-weight:bold">To: </span> Stefan Santesson
          &lt;<a moz-do-not-send=3D"true" href=3D"mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com">st=
efan@aaa-sec.com</a>&gt;<br>
          <span style=3D"font-weight:bold">Cc: </span> Denis Pinkas &lt;<a mo=
z-do-not-send=3D"true" href=3D"mailto:denis.pinkas@bull.net">denis.pinkas@bull.n=
et</a>&gt;,
          pkix &lt;<a moz-do-not-send=3D"true" href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pk=
ix@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>
          <span style=3D"font-weight:bold">Subject: </span> Re: [pkix]
          Comments on draft-santesson-auth-context-extension-04<br>
        </div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=3D"BORDER-L=
EFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0
          0 0 5;">
          <div>
            <meta content=3D"text/html; charset=3DISO-8859-1" http-equiv=3D"Conte=
nt-Type">
            <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
              <div class=3D"moz-cite-prefix">On 3/4/2013 12:09 PM, Stefan
                Santesson wrote:<br>
              </div>
              <blockquote cite=3D"mid:CD5A2449.5D025%25stefan@aaa-sec.com" ty=
pe=3D"cite">
                <div>Denis,</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>First, thanks for your review. I really appreciate
                  it.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>It seems to me, especially with your leading
                  concluding comment, that you have missed out on what
                  this specification attempts to do.</div>
                <div>Perhaps you did not read the introduction enough,
                  or perhaps I didn't write it clear enough.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>The purpose is not to associate the subject with a
                  identifier composed of a set of attributes.</div>
                <div>That is, this is NOT a new name form.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>This extension helps a relying party to understand
                  the source of the identity information that is placed
                  in the traditional identity fields of a certificate.</div=
>
                <div>For example. If the serialNumber attributes holds
                  the string "123456", then this extension can tell you
                  where this string came from.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
              </blockquote>
              How is this related to "semantics identifier" (ETSI TS 119
              412-2) then?<br>
              <br>
              M.D. <br>
              <blockquote cite=3D"mid:CD5A2449.5D025%25stefan@aaa-sec.com" ty=
pe=3D"cite">
                <div>The use case addressed is where the CA/RA obtains
                  the authenticated identify from a SAML assertion when
                  issuing the certificate.</div>
                <div>This extension provides means to preserve
                  information about the original SAML attributes in the
                  cert.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
                  <div style=3D"font-family:Calibri; font-size:11pt;
                    text-align:left; color:black; BORDER-BOTTOM: medium
                    none; BORDER-LEFT: medium none; PADDING-BOTTOM: 0in;
                    PADDING-LEFT: 0in; PADDING-RIGHT: 0in; BORDER-TOP:
                    #b5c4df 1pt solid; BORDER-RIGHT: medium none;
                    PADDING-TOP: 3pt"><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">From:
                    </span> Denis Pinkas &lt;<a moz-do-not-send=3D"true" href=
=3D"mailto:denis.pinkas@bull.net">denis.pinkas@bull.net</a>&gt;<br>
                    <span style=3D"font-weight:bold">Date: </span>
                    Monday, March 4, 2013 9:42 AM<br>
                    <span style=3D"font-weight:bold">To: </span> Stefan
                    Santesson &lt;<a moz-do-not-send=3D"true" href=3D"mailto:st=
efan@aaa-sec.com">stefan@aaa-sec.com</a>&gt;,

                    pkix &lt;<a moz-do-not-send=3D"true" href=3D"mailto:pkix@ie=
tf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>
                    <span style=3D"font-weight:bold">Subject: </span>
                    Comments on
                    draft-santesson-auth-context-extension-04<br>
                  </div>
                  <div><br>
                  </div>
                  <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=
=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <meta http-equiv=3D"content-type" content=3D"text/html; c=
harset=3DISO-8859-1">
                      <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
                        <meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html;=
 charset=3DISO-8859-1">
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">Stefan,<br>
                            <o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p><br>
                            </o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">The
                            goal of this document is to associate a
                            public key to be used for verifying
                            electronic signatures <br>
                            with an identifier composed of a set of
                            attributes, typically SAML attributes,
                            contained in an authentication token.<o:p></o:p=
></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                      </div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>No you got this wrong. This is not an Identifier.</div=
>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
                  <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=
=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">MAJOR

                            COMMENTS<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><spa=
n lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'=
>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB=
"><!--[if !supportFields]-->1.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><s=
pan
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-e=
nd'></span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN=
-GB">
                            The proposed draft is not aligned with the
                            current practices of RFC 5280 and X.509: <br>
                            the right place to hold such a set of
                            attributes is in the subject alternate name.
                            <br>
                            The subject DN may or may not be empty. <o:p></=
o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">There
                            is no rational in this draft to explain why
                            this straightforward approach has not been
                            chosen.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-US"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>S=
ubjectAltName

                            ::=3D GeneralNames<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-US"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>G=
eneralNames
                            ::=3D SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName<o:p><=
/o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-US"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>G=
eneralName
                            ::=3D CHOICE {<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-US"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>otherName<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                            </span>[0]<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                            </span>OtherName,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-US"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>rfc822Name<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                            </span>[1]<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                            </span>IA5String,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-US"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>dNSName<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                            </span>[2]<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                            </span>IA5String,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-US"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>x400Address<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                            </span>[3]<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                            </span>ORAddress,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-US"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>directoryName<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                            </span>[4]<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                            </span>Name,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-US"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>ediPartyName<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                            </span>[5]<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                            </span>EDIPartyName,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-US"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>uniformResourceIdentifier<span style=3D"mso-space=
run:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>[6]<span style=3D"mso-spa=
cerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>IA5String,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-US"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>iPAddress<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                            </span>[7]<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                            </span>OCTET STRING,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-US"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>registeredID<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                            </span>[8]<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                            </span>OBJECT IDENTIFIER }<o:p></o:p></span></p=
>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-US"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>O=
therName
                            ::=3D SEQUENCE {<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-US"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>type-id<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp; </span>OBJECT

                            IDENTIFIER,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-US"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>value<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>[0]
                            EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id }<o:p></o:p></s=
pan></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-US">OtherName

                            fits well with the requirements, if you
                            accept to use an OID rather than <br>
                            a uniformResourceIdentifier.<o:p></o:p></span><=
/p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">The
                            value component would contain an XML
                            structure conformant with a XML schema.<o:p></o=
:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                      </div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>This draft does not contain an identifier, thus
                  this comment is irrelevant.</div>
                <div>There is not explanation why we don't store an
                  identifier as a SAN, since we do not create or store
                  an identifier.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
                  <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=
=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><spa=
n lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'=
>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB=
"><!--[if !supportFields]-->2.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><s=
pan
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-e=
nd'></span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN=
-GB">
                            The document should be restructured to
                            define:<br>
                            <br>
                            (a) the general way to answer to the
                            requirements, and <br>
                            (b) a specific profile, in an Appendix, so
                            that other RFCs could refer to the main body
                            of the document.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                      </div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>That could be one way to do it.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
                  <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=
=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">DETAILED

                            COMMENTS<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><spa=
n lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'=
>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB=
"><!--[if !supportFields]-->3.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><s=
pan
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-e=
nd'></span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN=
-GB">
                            The proposed structure is not appropriate. <o:p=
></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">a)
                            Why is there a need to have a SEQUENCE ?
                            This should be avoided.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">b)
                            Why is contextInfo OPTIONAL? This should be
                            avoided.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp; </span>AuthenticationContexts



                            ::=3D SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF<o:p></o:p></span>=
</p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;



                            </span>AuthenticationContext<o:p></o:p></span><=
/p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp; </span>AuthenticationContext



                            ::=3D SEQUENCE {<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>contextType<span style=3D"mso-spaceru=
n:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>UTF8String,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>contextInfo<span style=3D"mso-spaceru=
n:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>UTF8String

                            OPTIONAL<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp; </span>}<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                      </div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>For exactly the same reason why SAML
                  AuthContextClassRef in a SAML assertion is mandatory
                  but not the XML structure it defines.</div>
                <div>In some cases you don't want to include explicit
                  data, if that data is static and can be implicitly
                  known through an identifier.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>The&nbsp;AuthContextClassRef in SAML is the best examp=
le
                  as it is an exact functional replica of this.</div>
                <div>The URL identified by&nbsp;AuthContextClassRef is also=
 a
                  XML Schema ns for associated XML document.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>The XML Schema can define both a static XML
                  document with fixed values as well as a structure
                  where different values can be entered.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>Just including the reference to the XML Schema may
                  then provide sufficient information to the relying
                  party. The actual XML document is only included if
                  some variable data need to be communicated within the
                  associated XML document.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>Just including contextType but not contextInfo
                  could be compared with the case where we include a
                  certificate policy OID, but not the entire policy
                  text.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>This is a really smart way to do this, which is
                  made possible through the versatility of XML Schemas.</di=
v>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
                  <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=
=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><spa=
n lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'=
>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB=
"><!--[if !supportFields]-->4.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><s=
pan
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-e=
nd'></span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN=
-GB">
                            The text states: <span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes"=
>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</span>This
                            extension MAY be marked critical.<o:p></o:p></s=
pan></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">If
                            the alternate name is present, why should
                            there be a DN ?<br>
                          </span></p>
                      </div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>This comment must be based on a misunderstanding of
                  the scope of this document.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
                  <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=
=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><spa=
n lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'=
>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB=
"><!--[if !supportFields]-->5.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><s=
pan
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-e=
nd'></span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN=
-GB">
                            The XML schema should be given first
                            (Appendix B) followed by the explanations
                            (sections 3.1 and 3.2). <br>
                            In other words, sections 3.1 and 3.2 should
                            be placed in Appendix B.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                      </div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>That is one way to do it. If I was the implementer,
                  I really wouldn't care as long as the information is
                  there.</div>
                <div>I think it is quite common to place programatic
                  contracts in Appendixes, wile explaining data elements
                  in the body of the document.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
                  <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=
=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><spa=
n lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'=
>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB=
"><!--[if !supportFields]-->6.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><s=
pan
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-e=
nd'></span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN=
-GB">
                            The vocabulary used in sections 3.1 and 3.2
                            is confusing and should be changed.<o:p></o:p><=
/span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">An

                            example: &#8220;AuthContextInfo Element&#8221; =
does not
                            exist. However, it is better to state that
                            the contextInfo component <br>
                            contains an XML structure which must conform
                            to an XML schema.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                      </div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>Sorry, I don't get this comment. The
                  AuthContextInfo element does exist. It is defined in
                  the schema. XML Schema defines syntax and structure
                  but not the semantics. Semantics are defined the
                  section 3.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
                  <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=
=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><spa=
n lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'=
>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB=
"><!--[if !supportFields]-->7.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><s=
pan
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-e=
nd'></span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN=
-GB">
                            The XML structure proposed to fit inside
                            contextInfo is overly complex. <o:p></o:p></spa=
n></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">AuthenticationInstant

                            is mandatory, whereas it is not needed.</span><=
/p>
                      </div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>This information is always available from the SAML
                  assertion and is considered fundamental, thus
                  required.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
                  <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=
=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">AssertionRef

                            is not needed.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">ServiceID

                            is not needed.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                      </div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>And hence, both are optional.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>The XML Schema is actually very simple. Its just
                  the nature of XML Schemas to look more complex than
                  they actually are.</div>
                <div>Perhaps it is easier if you examine it through this
                  following web doc (which unfortunately can't be
                  included in the spec):</div>
                <div><a moz-do-not-send=3D"true" href=3D"http://aaa-sec.com/eid=
2/sigsupport/XMLschema/AuthContExtDoc/index.html">http://aaa-sec.com/eid2/si=
gsupport/XMLschema/AuthContExtDoc/index.html</a></div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
                  <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=
=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><spa=
n lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'=
>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB=
"><!--[if !supportFields]-->8.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><s=
pan
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-e=
nd'></span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN=
-GB">
                            There are no matching rules defined. This
                            means that the verification of the content
                            of that field is not possible.<o:p></o:p></span=
></p>
                      </div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>First of all, this is not an identifier, thus there
                  is no reason for a matching rule is it would be if
                  this was an identifier that as a whole should be
                  compared with something else.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>The SAML attribute value does not have to match the
                  value of the cert attribute, this data in the
                  extension is optional and, if present, is a hint.&nbsp;</=
div>
                <div>But I could actually add some text to clarify this.</d=
iv>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
                  <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=
=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><spa=
n lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'=
>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB=
"><!--[if !supportFields]-->9.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><s=
pan
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-e=
nd'></span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN=
-GB">
                            In section 3.2, I failed to understand the
                            explanations for CertRef as well as for rdn
                            and san.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">Why

                            CertNameType cannot be &#8220;factorized&#8221;=
 ? (in
                            the example from Page 15, there are all the
                            same).</span></p>
                      </div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>No, the example in the spec has one e-mail
                  attribute that was placed in the SubjAltName extension
                  of the cert.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
                  <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=
=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                            </span>"rdn"<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbs=
p;&nbsp;
                            </span>The SAML attribute value is placed in
                            the<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;



                            </span>subject field of the certificate in a<o:=
p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;



                            </span>present Relative Distinguished Name<o:p>=
</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;



                            </span>attribute.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                            </span>"san"<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbs=
p;&nbsp;
                            </span>The SAML attribute value is placed in
                            the<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;



                            </span>Subject Alternative Name extension of
                            the<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;



                            </span>certificate.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">I
                            also failed to understand the reason of such
                            &#8220;mapping&#8221;. </span></p>
                      </div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>Yes, and I think that is the reason behind most of
                  your comments.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
                  <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=
=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><br>
                            The example in Appendix C illustrates the
                            complexity of the proposal. <br>
                            Can the approach be made simpler ? If not,
                            why ?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                      </div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>No it can't be made simpler. It contains exactly
                  the information we need in the implementation where it
                  is used.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>I could write a whole whitepaper about all detailed
                  reasons, but if you really think about the use case,
                  it should be clear.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>Consider the case where you know users by
                  attributes defined in a SAML federation, where for
                  example serialNumber is NOT used.</div>
                <div>A CA issues a certificate to a user based an a SAML
                  assertion authentication based on the attribute
                  profile of that federation.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>A user logs in to your service using a SAML
                  assertion, and sends you a signed document associated
                  with the issued certificate.</div>
                <div>You now need to determine whether that SAML
                  assertion and the certificate represents the same
                  user.</div>
                <div>You also need to determine that the SAML assertion
                  and the certificate provides compatible levels of
                  assertion for user authentication as defined in your
                  SAML federation.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>This extension gives you exactly the amount of data
                  that is needed in order to do this in an unambiguous
                  fully automated process.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
                  <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=
=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><spa=
n lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'=
>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB=
"><!--[if !supportFields]-->10.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><=
span
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-e=
nd'></span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN=
-GB">
                            In section 4, I failed to understand the
                            &#8220;dynamic&#8221; aspect. My understanding =
is that a
                            person statically <br>
                            authenticates to a RA (Registration
                            Authority) and then is given back a
                            non-repudiation certificate <br>
                            with SAML attributes in it which may then be
                            used as identity attributes. <br>
                            I am unsure what the text in this section
                            wants to say when using the words &#8220;dynami=
c
                            manner&#8221;.<br>
                          </span></p>
                      </div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>Your view is to restrictive.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>The dynamic aspect of this is that a certificate
                  may be issued on the fly at the instance when it is
                  needed, containing just the information that is needed
                  for one particular situation.</div>
                <div>This extension is (where this is used in the
                  Swedish national infrastructure) added to certificates
                  that are issued for just one instance of signing, and
                  hence can be dynamically adapted to the needs of the
                  intended relying party.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>Next time the user signs, a new key pair is
                  generated with new certs that may contain another set
                  of the user's attributes.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>The first instance may for example contain the
                  users private identity based on a national identifier,
                  the second may carry an organisational identity based
                  on employee number.</div>
                <div>What attributes that are needed in every instance
                  is determined in a service context that is outside the
                  scope of this specification.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>In these certificates, both the national identifier
                  and the employee number may be placed as a
                  serialNumber attribute in the subject field.</div>
                <div>Despite that, this extension makes it possible for
                  the relying party to know exactly what identity
                  information each certificate carries, as it maps to
                  the attribute profile of a SAML federation.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>/Stefan</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
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                      <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><br>
                        </p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText">Denis<br>
                          <span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB=
"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
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                <br>
                <pre wrap=3D"">______________________________________________=
_
pkix mailing list
<a moz-do-not-send=3D"true" class=3D"moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href=3D"mailto:pki=
x@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a><a moz-do-not-send=3D"true" class=3D"moz-txt-link-f=
reetext" href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix">https://www.ietf.=
org/mailman/listinfo/pkix</a></pre>
              </blockquote>
              <br>
            </div>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </span>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
  </div></div></blockquote></span></body></html>

--B_3445378021_1641212--




From stefan@aaa-sec.com  Wed Mar  6 04:27:38 2013
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Date: Wed, 06 Mar 2013 13:27:20 +0100
From: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>
To: Denis Pinkas <denis.pinkas@bull.net>
Message-ID: <CD5CE64F.5D520%stefan@aaa-sec.com>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] Comments on draft-santesson-auth-context-extension-04
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Comments on draft-santesson-auth-context-extension-04
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Denis,

I took a look at this this morning with fresh eyes, and some of your
questions triggered me to do further improvements on the Schema,
explanations and examples.

The latest draft is still available from here:
http://aaa-sec.com/_temp/draft-santesson-auth-context-extension-04.txt

Hopefully the new examples will give you a better Idea on how this extensio=
n
can be used and why this is not suitable as an other name form.

I'm really grateful for your review even if I don't do everything exactly a=
s
you suggested.

/Stefan




From:  Denis Pinkas <denis.pinkas@bull.net>
Date:  Tuesday, March 5, 2013 6:44 PM
To:  Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>
Cc:  pkix <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject:  Re: [pkix] Comments on draft-santesson-auth-context-extension-04

>    =20
> =20
> Stefan,
> =20
>  I read the new specification (dated March 4) and it does not solve my
> concerns.
>       =20
>  The real goal is stated at the top of page 4:
>=20
>=20
> =20
> =20
>  to verify that the signature was created by the same user that logged on
>    to the service.
> =20
>  In your response below, you also say:
> =20
>        "You now need to determine whether that SAML assertion and the
> certificate represents the same user."
> =20
>  This is rather different from the goal stated on page 3:
> =20
> =20
>    The primary purpose of this document is to provide a mechanism that
> =20
>    allows an application to understand information that express the
> =20
>    identity of a subject in a certificate that is stored either in a
> =20
>    subject field attribute, as a subject alternative name or in a
> =20
>    subject directory attribute.
> =20
>  If we draw an analogy with the way to construct a DN, we do not mention =
that
> the DN was created after
>  the presentation of a passport or an ID card, plus a way to justify the =
place
> of birth, a a way to justify
>  the place of living, an that the country name was extracted from the
> presentation of the passport, etc ...
> =20
>  So why should we do this in your context ?
> =20
>  We need to store information in the certificate directly derived from th=
e
> SAML token, so that the application
>  which performed a SAML authentication can make sure that the certificate=
 was
> delivered for the same person,
>  by making a comparison using some set of rules.
> =20
>  So there is a need to have matching rules for the content of the SAML to=
ken
> with the content of
>  the new extension (whatever it is). If we don't have such rules, then th=
e
> goal at the top of page 4 cannot be met.
> =20
>  I do not see the added value to explain some translation process since i=
t
> would be used for audit purposes only and
>  the CA MUST anyway maintain information about the issuance of the token.=
 So
> in case of a problem, the
>  CA SHALL be able to answer and it is not needed to overload the content =
of
> the certificate with more information.
> =20
>  I still believe that OtherName is the right place to contains the parame=
ters
> extracted from the SAML token,
>  that will be used for comparison.
> =20
>  Denis=20
> =20
> =20
>  PS. I wonder whether we should continue to have in mind to have this doc=
ument
> issued as an RFC.
>         It may well be a national Swedish standard.
> =20
> =20
> =20
>> =20
>> Based on comments received today I have updated this draft, preliminary
>> available at:
>> =20
>> http://aaa-sec.com/_temp/draft-santesson-auth-context-extension-04.txt
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>> =20
>> I have edited the Introduction section to clarify the scope of the docum=
ent.
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>> =20
>> I have also added a new section (now 3.2) that explains the absence of
>> attribute matching rules.
>> =20
>> The section should also make clear how specific attribute data format
>> conventions, such as the one expressed in ETSI TS 119 412-2, can co-exis=
t
>> with this extension.
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>> =20
>> /Stefan
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>>  =20
>> From:  "Moudrick M. Dadashov" <md@e-net.lt>
>>  Date:  Monday, March 4, 2013 11:26 AM
>>  To:  Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>
>>  Cc:  Denis Pinkas <denis.pinkas@bull.net>, pkix <pkix@ietf.org>
>>  Subject:  Re: [pkix] Comments on draft-santesson-auth-context-extension=
-04
>> =20
>> =20
>>=20
>> =20
>> =20
>>> =20
>>>  =20
>>> =20
>>> On 3/4/2013 12:09 PM, Stefan Santesson wrote:
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> Denis,
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> First, thanks for your review. I really appreciate it.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> It seems to me, especially with your leading concluding comment, that =
you
>>>> have missed out on what this specification attempts to do.
>>>> =20
>>>> Perhaps you did not read the introduction enough, or perhaps I didn't =
write
>>>> it clear enough.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> The purpose is not to associate the subject with a identifier composed=
 of a
>>>> set of attributes.
>>>> =20
>>>> That is, this is NOT a new name form.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> This extension helps a relying party to understand the source of the
>>>> identity information that is placed in the traditional identity fields=
 of a
>>>> certificate.
>>>> =20
>>>> For example. If the serialNumber attributes holds the string "123456",=
 then
>>>> this extension can tell you where this string came from.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>  How is this related to "semantics identifier" (ETSI TS 119 412-2) then=
?
>>> =20
>>>  M.D.=20
>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> The use case addressed is where the CA/RA obtains the authenticated
>>>> identify from a SAML assertion when issuing the certificate.
>>>> =20
>>>> This extension provides means to preserve information about the origin=
al
>>>> SAML attributes in the cert.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>>  =20
>>>> From:  Denis Pinkas <denis.pinkas@bull.net>
>>>>  Date:  Monday, March 4, 2013 9:42 AM
>>>>  To:  Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>,  pkix <pkix@ietf.org>
>>>>  Subject:  Comments on draft-santesson-auth-context-extension-04
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>>  =20
>>>>>  =20
>>>>>=20
>>>>> Stefan,
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>>=20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> The goal of this document is to associate a public key to be used for
>>>>> verifying electronic signatures
>>>>>  with an identifier composed of a set of attributes, typically SAML
>>>>> attributes, contained in an authentication token.
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>  =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> No you got this wrong. This is not an Identifier.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>>  =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>>=20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> MAJOR  COMMENTS
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> 1. The proposed draft is not aligned with the current practices of RF=
C
>>>>> 5280 and X.509:
>>>>>  the right place to hold such a set of attributes is in the subject
>>>>> alternate name.
>>>>>  The subject DN may or may not be empty.
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> There is no rational in this draft to explain why this straightforwar=
d
>>>>> approach has not been chosen.
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>>    SubjectAltName  ::=3D GeneralNames
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>>    GeneralNames ::=3D SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>>    GeneralName ::=3D CHOICE {
>>>>> =20
>>>>>         otherName                       [0]     OtherName,
>>>>> =20
>>>>>         rfc822Name                      [1]     IA5String,
>>>>> =20
>>>>>         dNSName                         [2]     IA5String,
>>>>> =20
>>>>>         x400Address                     [3]     ORAddress,
>>>>> =20
>>>>>         directoryName                   [4]     Name,
>>>>> =20
>>>>>         ediPartyName                    [5]     EDIPartyName,
>>>>> =20
>>>>>         uniformResourceIdentifier       [6]     IA5String,
>>>>> =20
>>>>>         iPAddress                       [7]     OCTET STRING,
>>>>> =20
>>>>>         registeredID                    [8]     OBJECT IDENTIFIER }
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>>    OtherName ::=3D SEQUENCE {
>>>>> =20
>>>>>         type-id    OBJECT  IDENTIFIER,
>>>>> =20
>>>>>         value      [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id }
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> OtherName  fits well with the requirements, if you accept to use an O=
ID
>>>>> rather than=20
>>>>>  a uniformResourceIdentifier.
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> The value component would contain an XML structure conformant with a =
XML
>>>>> schema.
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>  =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> This draft does not contain an identifier, thus this comment is irrele=
vant.
>>>> =20
>>>> There is not explanation why we don't store an identifier as a SAN, si=
nce
>>>> we do not create or store an identifier.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>>  =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>>=20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> 2. The document should be restructured to define:
>>>>> =20
>>>>>  (a) the general way to answer to the requirements, and
>>>>>  (b) a specific profile, in an Appendix, so that other RFCs could ref=
er to
>>>>> the main body of the document.
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>  =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> That could be one way to do it.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>>  =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>>=20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> DETAILED  COMMENTS
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> 3. The proposed structure is not appropriate.
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> a) Why is there a need to have a SEQUENCE ? This should be avoided.
>>>>> =20
>>>>> b) Why is contextInfo OPTIONAL? This should be avoided.
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>>       AuthenticationContexts  ::=3D SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
>>>>> =20
>>>>>                                  AuthenticationContext
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>>       AuthenticationContext  ::=3D SEQUENCE {
>>>>> =20
>>>>>           contextType     UTF8String,
>>>>> =20
>>>>>           contextInfo     UTF8String  OPTIONAL
>>>>> =20
>>>>>       }
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>  =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> For exactly the same reason why SAML AuthContextClassRef in a SAML
>>>> assertion is mandatory but not the XML structure it defines.
>>>> =20
>>>> In some cases you don't want to include explicit data, if that data is
>>>> static and can be implicitly known through an identifier.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> The AuthContextClassRef in SAML is the best example as it is an exact
>>>> functional replica of this.
>>>> =20
>>>> The URL identified by AuthContextClassRef is also a XML Schema ns for
>>>> associated XML document.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> The XML Schema can define both a static XML document with fixed values=
 as
>>>> well as a structure where different values can be entered.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> Just including the reference to the XML Schema may then provide suffic=
ient
>>>> information to the relying party. The actual XML document is only incl=
uded
>>>> if some variable data need to be communicated within the associated XM=
L
>>>> document.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> Just including contextType but not contextInfo could be compared with =
the
>>>> case where we include a certificate policy OID, but not the entire pol=
icy
>>>> text.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> This is a really smart way to do this, which is made possible through =
the
>>>> versatility of XML Schemas.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>>  =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>>=20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> 4. The text states:    This extension MAY be marked critical.
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> If the alternate name is present, why should there be a DN ?
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>  =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> This comment must be based on a misunderstanding of the scope of this
>>>> document.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>>  =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>>=20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> 5. The XML schema should be given first (Appendix B) followed by the
>>>>> explanations (sections 3.1 and 3.2).
>>>>>  In other words, sections 3.1 and 3.2 should be placed in Appendix B.
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>  =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> That is one way to do it. If I was the implementer, I really wouldn't =
care
>>>> as long as the information is there.
>>>> =20
>>>> I think it is quite common to place programatic contracts in Appendixe=
s,
>>>> wile explaining data elements in the body of the document.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>>  =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>>=20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> 6. The vocabulary used in sections 3.1 and 3.2 is confusing and shoul=
d be
>>>>> changed.
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> An  example: =B3AuthContextInfo Element=B2 does not exist. However, it is
>>>>> better to state that the contextInfo component
>>>>>  contains an XML structure which must conform to an XML schema.
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>  =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> Sorry, I don't get this comment. The AuthContextInfo element does exis=
t. It
>>>> is defined in the schema. XML Schema defines syntax and structure but =
not
>>>> the semantics. Semantics are defined the section 3.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>>  =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>>=20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> 7. The XML structure proposed to fit inside contextInfo is overly com=
plex.
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> AuthenticationInstant  is mandatory, whereas it is not needed.
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>  =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> This information is always available from the SAML assertion and is
>>>> considered fundamental, thus required.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>>  =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>>=20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> AssertionRef  is not needed.
>>>>> =20
>>>>> ServiceID  is not needed.
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>  =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> And hence, both are optional.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> The XML Schema is actually very simple. Its just the nature of XML Sch=
emas
>>>> to look more complex than they actually are.
>>>> =20
>>>> Perhaps it is easier if you examine it through this following web doc
>>>> (which unfortunately can't be included in the spec):
>>>> =20
>>>> http://aaa-sec.com/eid2/sigsupport/XMLschema/AuthContExtDoc/index.html
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>>  =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>>=20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> 8. There are no matching rules defined. This means that the verificat=
ion
>>>>> of the content of that field is not possible.
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>  =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> First of all, this is not an identifier, thus there is no reason for a
>>>> matching rule is it would be if this was an identifier that as a whole
>>>> should be compared with something else.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> The SAML attribute value does not have to match the value of the cert
>>>> attribute, this data in the extension is optional and, if present, is =
a
>>>> hint.=20
>>>> =20
>>>> But I could actually add some text to clarify this.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>>  =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>>=20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> 9. In section 3.2, I failed to understand the explanations for CertRe=
f as
>>>>> well as for rdn and san.
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> Why  CertNameType cannot be =B3factorized=B2 ? (in the example from Page =
15,
>>>>> there are all the same).
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>  =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> No, the example in the spec has one e-mail attribute that was placed i=
n the
>>>> SubjAltName extension of the cert.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>>  =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>>=20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>>                       "rdn"   The SAML attribute value is placed in t=
he
>>>>> =20
>>>>>                               subject field of the certificate in a
>>>>> =20
>>>>>                               present Relative Distinguished Name
>>>>> =20
>>>>>                               attribute.
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>>                       "san"   The SAML attribute value is placed in t=
he
>>>>> =20
>>>>>                               Subject Alternative Name extension of t=
he
>>>>> =20
>>>>>                               certificate.
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> I also failed to understand the reason of such =B3mapping=B2.
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>  =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> Yes, and I think that is the reason behind most of your comments.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>>  =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>>=20
>>>>>=20
>>>>>  The example in Appendix C illustrates the complexity of the proposal=
.
>>>>>  Can the approach be made simpler ? If not, why ?
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>  =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> No it can't be made simpler. It contains exactly the information we ne=
ed in
>>>> the implementation where it is used.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> I could write a whole whitepaper about all detailed reasons, but if yo=
u
>>>> really think about the use case, it should be clear.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> Consider the case where you know users by attributes defined in a SAML
>>>> federation, where for example serialNumber is NOT used.
>>>> =20
>>>> A CA issues a certificate to a user based an a SAML assertion
>>>> authentication based on the attribute profile of that federation.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> A user logs in to your service using a SAML assertion, and sends you a
>>>> signed document associated with the issued certificate.
>>>> =20
>>>> You now need to determine whether that SAML assertion and the certific=
ate
>>>> represents the same user.
>>>> =20
>>>> You also need to determine that the SAML assertion and the certificate
>>>> provides compatible levels of assertion for user authentication as def=
ined
>>>> in your SAML federation.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> This extension gives you exactly the amount of data that is needed in =
order
>>>> to do this in an unambiguous fully automated process.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>>  =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>>=20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> 10. In section 4, I failed to understand the =B3dynamic=B2 aspect. My
>>>>> understanding is that a person statically
>>>>>  authenticates to a RA (Registration Authority) and then is given bac=
k a
>>>>> non-repudiation certificate
>>>>>  with SAML attributes in it which may then be used as identity attrib=
utes.
>>>>>  I am unsure what the text in this section wants to say when using th=
e
>>>>> words =B3dynamic manner=B2.
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>  =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> Your view is to restrictive.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> The dynamic aspect of this is that a certificate may be issued on the =
fly
>>>> at the instance when it is needed, containing just the information tha=
t is
>>>> needed for one particular situation.
>>>> =20
>>>> This extension is (where this is used in the Swedish national
>>>> infrastructure) added to certificates that are issued for just one ins=
tance
>>>> of signing, and hence can be dynamically adapted to the needs of the
>>>> intended relying party.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> Next time the user signs, a new key pair is generated with new certs t=
hat
>>>> may contain another set of the user's attributes.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> The first instance may for example contain the users private identity =
based
>>>> on a national identifier, the second may carry an organisational ident=
ity
>>>> based on employee number.
>>>> =20
>>>> What attributes that are needed in every instance is determined in a
>>>> service context that is outside the scope of this specification.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> In these certificates, both the national identifier and the employee n=
umber
>>>> may be placed as a serialNumber attribute in the subject field.
>>>> =20
>>>> Despite that, this extension makes it possible for the relying party t=
o
>>>> know exactly what identity information each certificate carries, as it=
 maps
>>>> to the attribute profile of a SAML federation.
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>> =20
>>>> /Stefan
>>>> =20
>>>>=20
>>>> =20
>>>>  =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>>=20
>>>>>=20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> Denis
>>>>> =20
>>>>>       =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> =20
>>>>  =20
>>>>  =20
>>>> =20
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> pkix mailing list
>>>> pkix@ietf.orghttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>> =20
>>  =20
> =20
> =20
> _______________________________________________ pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix



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pace; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-size:=
 14px; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><div>Denis,</div><div><br></div><=
div>I took a look at this this morning with fresh eyes, and some of your que=
stions triggered me to do further improvements on the Schema, explanations a=
nd examples.</div><div><br></div><div>The latest draft is still available fr=
om here:</div><div>http://aaa-sec.com/_temp/draft-santesson-auth-context-ext=
ension-04.txt</div><div><br></div><div>Hopefully the new examples will give =
you a better Idea on how this extension can be used and why this is not suit=
able as an other name form.</div><div><br></div><div>I'm really grateful for=
 your review even if I don't do everything exactly as you suggested.</div><d=
iv><br></div><div>/Stefan</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div>=
<div><br></div><span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION"><div style=3D"font-family:Calib=
ri; font-size:11pt; text-align:left; color:black; BORDER-BOTTOM: medium none=
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RIGHT: 0in; BORDER-TOP: #b5c4df 1pt solid; BORDER-RIGHT: medium none; PADDIN=
G-TOP: 3pt"><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">From: </span> Denis Pinkas &lt;<a=
 href=3D"mailto:denis.pinkas@bull.net">denis.pinkas@bull.net</a>&gt;<br><span =
style=3D"font-weight:bold">Date: </span> Tuesday, March 5, 2013 6:44 PM<br><sp=
an style=3D"font-weight:bold">To: </span> Stefan Santesson &lt;<a href=3D"mailto=
:stefan@aaa-sec.com">stefan@aaa-sec.com</a>&gt;<br><span style=3D"font-weight:=
bold">Cc: </span> pkix &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>&=
gt;<br><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">Subject: </span> Re: [pkix] Comments o=
n draft-santesson-auth-context-extension-04<br></div><div><br></div><blockqu=
ote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 so=
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    <div class=3D"moz-cite-prefix">Stefan,<br>
      <br>
      I read the new specification (dated March 4) and it does not solve
      my concerns.<br>
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      The real goal is stated at the top of page 4:
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N-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;</span><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-we=
ight:normal">to verify
            that the signature was created by the same user that logged
            on <o:p></o:p></b></span></p>
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      <br>
      In your response below, you also say:<br>
      <br>
      <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; "You n=
ow need to determine
        whether that SAML assertion and the certificate represents the
        same user."</span><br>
      <br>
      This is rather different from the goal stated on page 3:<br>
      <br>
      <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"E=
N-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>The
          primary purpose of this document is to
          provide a mechanism that<o:p></o:p></span></p>
      <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"E=
N-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>allows
          an application <span style=3D"background:yellow;mso-highlight:yello=
w">to understand
            information</span>
          that express the<o:p></o:p></span></p>
      <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"E=
N-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>identity
          of a <b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:
            normal">subject in a certificate that is stored either in a<o:p=
></o:p></b></span></p>
      <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span =
style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=
&nbsp;&nbsp;
            </span>subject field attribute, as a subject alternative
            name or in a<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
      <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span =
style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=
&nbsp;&nbsp;
            </span>subject directory attribute.</span></b></p>
      <br>
      If we draw an analogy with the way to construct a DN, we do not
      mention that the DN was created after <br>
      the presentation of a passport or an ID card, plus a way to
      justify the place of birth, a a way to justify <br>
      the place of living, an that the country name was extracted from
      the presentation of the passport, etc ...<br>
      <br>
      So why should we do this in your context ?<br>
      <br>
      We need to store information in the certificate directly derived
      from the SAML token, so that the application <br>
      which performed a SAML authentication can make sure that the
      certificate was delivered for the same person, <br>
      by <b>making a comparison using some set of rules.</b><b><br>
      </b><br>
      So <b>t</b><b>here is a need to have matching rules</b> for the
      content of the SAML token with the content of <br>
      the new extension (whatever it is). If we don't have such rules,
      then the goal at the top of page 4 cannot be met.<br>
      <br>
      I do not see the added value to explain some translation process
      since it would be used for audit purposes only and <br>
      the CA MUST anyway maintain information about the issuance of the
      token. So in case of a problem, the <br>
      CA SHALL be able to answer and it is not needed to overload the
      content of the certificate with more information.<br>
      <br>
      I still believe that OtherName is the right place to contains the
      parameters extracted from the SAML token, <br>
      that will be used for comparison.<br>
      <br>
      Denis <br>
      <br>
      <br>
      PS. I wonder whether we should continue to have in mind to have
      this document issued as an RFC.<br>
      &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; It may well be a national Swedis=
h standard.<br>
      <br>
    </div>
    <blockquote cite=3D"mid:CD5A661C.5D102%25stefan@aaa-sec.com" type=3D"cite">=

      <div>Based on comments received today I have updated this draft,
        preliminary available at:</div>
      <div><a moz-do-not-send=3D"true" href=3D"http://aaa-sec.com/_temp/draft-s=
antesson-auth-context-extension-04.txt">http://aaa-sec.com/_temp/draft-sante=
sson-auth-context-extension-04.txt</a></div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>I have edited the Introduction section to clarify the scope
        of the document.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>I have also added a new section (now 3.2) that explains the
        absence of attribute matching rules.</div>
      <div>The section should also make clear how specific attribute
        data format conventions, such as the one expressed in&nbsp;ETSI TS
        119 412-2, can co-exist with this extension.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>/Stefan</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
        <div style=3D"font-family:Calibri; font-size:11pt;
          text-align:left; color:black; BORDER-BOTTOM: medium none;
          BORDER-LEFT: medium none; PADDING-BOTTOM: 0in; PADDING-LEFT:
          0in; PADDING-RIGHT: 0in; BORDER-TOP: #b5c4df 1pt solid;
          BORDER-RIGHT: medium none; PADDING-TOP: 3pt"><span style=3D"font-we=
ight:bold">From: </span> "Moudrick M.
          Dadashov" &lt;<a moz-do-not-send=3D"true" href=3D"mailto:md@e-net.lt"=
>md@e-net.lt</a>&gt;<br>
          <span style=3D"font-weight:bold">Date: </span> Monday, March 4,
          2013 11:26 AM<br>
          <span style=3D"font-weight:bold">To: </span> Stefan Santesson
          &lt;<a moz-do-not-send=3D"true" href=3D"mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com">st=
efan@aaa-sec.com</a>&gt;<br>
          <span style=3D"font-weight:bold">Cc: </span> Denis Pinkas &lt;<a mo=
z-do-not-send=3D"true" href=3D"mailto:denis.pinkas@bull.net">denis.pinkas@bull.n=
et</a>&gt;,
          pkix &lt;<a moz-do-not-send=3D"true" href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pk=
ix@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>
          <span style=3D"font-weight:bold">Subject: </span> Re: [pkix]
          Comments on draft-santesson-auth-context-extension-04<br>
        </div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=3D"BORDER-L=
EFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0
          0 0 5;">
          <div>
            <meta content=3D"text/html; charset=3DISO-8859-1" http-equiv=3D"Conte=
nt-Type">
            <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
              <div class=3D"moz-cite-prefix">On 3/4/2013 12:09 PM, Stefan
                Santesson wrote:<br>
              </div>
              <blockquote cite=3D"mid:CD5A2449.5D025%25stefan@aaa-sec.com" ty=
pe=3D"cite">
                <div>Denis,</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>First, thanks for your review. I really appreciate
                  it.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>It seems to me, especially with your leading
                  concluding comment, that you have missed out on what
                  this specification attempts to do.</div>
                <div>Perhaps you did not read the introduction enough,
                  or perhaps I didn't write it clear enough.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>The purpose is not to associate the subject with a
                  identifier composed of a set of attributes.</div>
                <div>That is, this is NOT a new name form.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>This extension helps a relying party to understand
                  the source of the identity information that is placed
                  in the traditional identity fields of a certificate.</div=
>
                <div>For example. If the serialNumber attributes holds
                  the string "123456", then this extension can tell you
                  where this string came from.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
              </blockquote>
              How is this related to "semantics identifier" (ETSI TS 119
              412-2) then?<br>
              <br>
              M.D. <br>
              <blockquote cite=3D"mid:CD5A2449.5D025%25stefan@aaa-sec.com" ty=
pe=3D"cite">
                <div>The use case addressed is where the CA/RA obtains
                  the authenticated identify from a SAML assertion when
                  issuing the certificate.</div>
                <div>This extension provides means to preserve
                  information about the original SAML attributes in the
                  cert.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
                  <div style=3D"font-family:Calibri; font-size:11pt;
                    text-align:left; color:black; BORDER-BOTTOM: medium
                    none; BORDER-LEFT: medium none; PADDING-BOTTOM: 0in;
                    PADDING-LEFT: 0in; PADDING-RIGHT: 0in; BORDER-TOP:
                    #b5c4df 1pt solid; BORDER-RIGHT: medium none;
                    PADDING-TOP: 3pt"><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">From:
                    </span> Denis Pinkas &lt;<a moz-do-not-send=3D"true" href=
=3D"mailto:denis.pinkas@bull.net">denis.pinkas@bull.net</a>&gt;<br>
                    <span style=3D"font-weight:bold">Date: </span>
                    Monday, March 4, 2013 9:42 AM<br>
                    <span style=3D"font-weight:bold">To: </span> Stefan
                    Santesson &lt;<a moz-do-not-send=3D"true" href=3D"mailto:st=
efan@aaa-sec.com">stefan@aaa-sec.com</a>&gt;,

                    pkix &lt;<a moz-do-not-send=3D"true" href=3D"mailto:pkix@ie=
tf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>
                    <span style=3D"font-weight:bold">Subject: </span>
                    Comments on
                    draft-santesson-auth-context-extension-04<br>
                  </div>
                  <div><br>
                  </div>
                  <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=
=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <meta http-equiv=3D"content-type" content=3D"text/html; c=
harset=3DISO-8859-1">
                      <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
                        <meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html;=
 charset=3DISO-8859-1">
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">Stefan,<br>
                            <o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p><br>
                            </o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">The
                            goal of this document is to associate a
                            public key to be used for verifying
                            electronic signatures <br>
                            with an identifier composed of a set of
                            attributes, typically SAML attributes,
                            contained in an authentication token.<o:p></o:p=
></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                      </div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>No you got this wrong. This is not an Identifier.</div=
>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
                  <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=
=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">MAJOR

                            COMMENTS<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><spa=
n lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'=
>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB=
"><!--[if !supportFields]-->1.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><s=
pan
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-e=
nd'></span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN=
-GB">
                            The proposed draft is not aligned with the
                            current practices of RFC 5280 and X.509: <br>
                            the right place to hold such a set of
                            attributes is in the subject alternate name.
                            <br>
                            The subject DN may or may not be empty. <o:p></=
o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">There
                            is no rational in this draft to explain why
                            this straightforward approach has not been
                            chosen.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-US"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>S=
ubjectAltName

                            ::=3D GeneralNames<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-US"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>G=
eneralNames
                            ::=3D SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName<o:p><=
/o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-US"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>G=
eneralName
                            ::=3D CHOICE {<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-US"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>otherName<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                            </span>[0]<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                            </span>OtherName,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-US"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>rfc822Name<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                            </span>[1]<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                            </span>IA5String,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-US"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>dNSName<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                            </span>[2]<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                            </span>IA5String,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-US"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>x400Address<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                            </span>[3]<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                            </span>ORAddress,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-US"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>directoryName<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                            </span>[4]<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                            </span>Name,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-US"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>ediPartyName<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                            </span>[5]<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                            </span>EDIPartyName,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-US"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>uniformResourceIdentifier<span style=3D"mso-space=
run:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>[6]<span style=3D"mso-spa=
cerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>IA5String,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-US"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>iPAddress<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                            </span>[7]<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                            </span>OCTET STRING,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-US"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>registeredID<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                            </span>[8]<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                            </span>OBJECT IDENTIFIER }<o:p></o:p></span></p=
>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-US"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>O=
therName
                            ::=3D SEQUENCE {<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-US"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>type-id<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp; </span>OBJECT

                            IDENTIFIER,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-US"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>value<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>[0]
                            EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id }<o:p></o:p></s=
pan></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-US">OtherName

                            fits well with the requirements, if you
                            accept to use an OID rather than <br>
                            a uniformResourceIdentifier.<o:p></o:p></span><=
/p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-US" lang=3D"EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">The
                            value component would contain an XML
                            structure conformant with a XML schema.<o:p></o=
:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                      </div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>This draft does not contain an identifier, thus
                  this comment is irrelevant.</div>
                <div>There is not explanation why we don't store an
                  identifier as a SAN, since we do not create or store
                  an identifier.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
                  <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=
=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><spa=
n lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'=
>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB=
"><!--[if !supportFields]-->2.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><s=
pan
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-e=
nd'></span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN=
-GB">
                            The document should be restructured to
                            define:<br>
                            <br>
                            (a) the general way to answer to the
                            requirements, and <br>
                            (b) a specific profile, in an Appendix, so
                            that other RFCs could refer to the main body
                            of the document.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                      </div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>That could be one way to do it.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
                  <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=
=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">DETAILED

                            COMMENTS<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><spa=
n lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'=
>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB=
"><!--[if !supportFields]-->3.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><s=
pan
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-e=
nd'></span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN=
-GB">
                            The proposed structure is not appropriate. <o:p=
></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">a)
                            Why is there a need to have a SEQUENCE ?
                            This should be avoided.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">b)
                            Why is contextInfo OPTIONAL? This should be
                            avoided.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp; </span>AuthenticationContexts



                            ::=3D SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF<o:p></o:p></span>=
</p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;



                            </span>AuthenticationContext<o:p></o:p></span><=
/p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp; </span>AuthenticationContext



                            ::=3D SEQUENCE {<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>contextType<span style=3D"mso-spaceru=
n:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>UTF8String,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>contextInfo<span style=3D"mso-spaceru=
n:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>UTF8String

                            OPTIONAL<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp; </span>}<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                      </div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>For exactly the same reason why SAML
                  AuthContextClassRef in a SAML assertion is mandatory
                  but not the XML structure it defines.</div>
                <div>In some cases you don't want to include explicit
                  data, if that data is static and can be implicitly
                  known through an identifier.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>The&nbsp;AuthContextClassRef in SAML is the best examp=
le
                  as it is an exact functional replica of this.</div>
                <div>The URL identified by&nbsp;AuthContextClassRef is also=
 a
                  XML Schema ns for associated XML document.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>The XML Schema can define both a static XML
                  document with fixed values as well as a structure
                  where different values can be entered.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>Just including the reference to the XML Schema may
                  then provide sufficient information to the relying
                  party. The actual XML document is only included if
                  some variable data need to be communicated within the
                  associated XML document.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>Just including contextType but not contextInfo
                  could be compared with the case where we include a
                  certificate policy OID, but not the entire policy
                  text.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>This is a really smart way to do this, which is
                  made possible through the versatility of XML Schemas.</di=
v>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
                  <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=
=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><spa=
n lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'=
>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB=
"><!--[if !supportFields]-->4.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><s=
pan
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-e=
nd'></span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN=
-GB">
                            The text states: <span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes"=
>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</span>This
                            extension MAY be marked critical.<o:p></o:p></s=
pan></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">If
                            the alternate name is present, why should
                            there be a DN ?<br>
                          </span></p>
                      </div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>This comment must be based on a misunderstanding of
                  the scope of this document.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
                  <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=
=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><spa=
n lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'=
>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB=
"><!--[if !supportFields]-->5.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><s=
pan
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-e=
nd'></span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN=
-GB">
                            The XML schema should be given first
                            (Appendix B) followed by the explanations
                            (sections 3.1 and 3.2). <br>
                            In other words, sections 3.1 and 3.2 should
                            be placed in Appendix B.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                      </div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>That is one way to do it. If I was the implementer,
                  I really wouldn't care as long as the information is
                  there.</div>
                <div>I think it is quite common to place programatic
                  contracts in Appendixes, wile explaining data elements
                  in the body of the document.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
                  <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=
=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><spa=
n lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'=
>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB=
"><!--[if !supportFields]-->6.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><s=
pan
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-e=
nd'></span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN=
-GB">
                            The vocabulary used in sections 3.1 and 3.2
                            is confusing and should be changed.<o:p></o:p><=
/span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">An

                            example: &#8220;AuthContextInfo Element&#8221; =
does not
                            exist. However, it is better to state that
                            the contextInfo component <br>
                            contains an XML structure which must conform
                            to an XML schema.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                      </div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>Sorry, I don't get this comment. The
                  AuthContextInfo element does exist. It is defined in
                  the schema. XML Schema defines syntax and structure
                  but not the semantics. Semantics are defined the
                  section 3.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
                  <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=
=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><spa=
n lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'=
>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB=
"><!--[if !supportFields]-->7.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><s=
pan
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-e=
nd'></span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN=
-GB">
                            The XML structure proposed to fit inside
                            contextInfo is overly complex. <o:p></o:p></spa=
n></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">AuthenticationInstant

                            is mandatory, whereas it is not needed.</span><=
/p>
                      </div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>This information is always available from the SAML
                  assertion and is considered fundamental, thus
                  required.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
                  <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=
=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">AssertionRef

                            is not needed.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">ServiceID

                            is not needed.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                      </div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>And hence, both are optional.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>The XML Schema is actually very simple. Its just
                  the nature of XML Schemas to look more complex than
                  they actually are.</div>
                <div>Perhaps it is easier if you examine it through this
                  following web doc (which unfortunately can't be
                  included in the spec):</div>
                <div><a moz-do-not-send=3D"true" href=3D"http://aaa-sec.com/eid=
2/sigsupport/XMLschema/AuthContExtDoc/index.html">http://aaa-sec.com/eid2/si=
gsupport/XMLschema/AuthContExtDoc/index.html</a></div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
                  <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=
=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><spa=
n lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'=
>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB=
"><!--[if !supportFields]-->8.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><s=
pan
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-e=
nd'></span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN=
-GB">
                            There are no matching rules defined. This
                            means that the verification of the content
                            of that field is not possible.<o:p></o:p></span=
></p>
                      </div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>First of all, this is not an identifier, thus there
                  is no reason for a matching rule is it would be if
                  this was an identifier that as a whole should be
                  compared with something else.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>The SAML attribute value does not have to match the
                  value of the cert attribute, this data in the
                  extension is optional and, if present, is a hint.&nbsp;</=
div>
                <div>But I could actually add some text to clarify this.</d=
iv>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
                  <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=
=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><spa=
n lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'=
>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB=
"><!--[if !supportFields]-->9.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><s=
pan
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-e=
nd'></span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN=
-GB">
                            In section 3.2, I failed to understand the
                            explanations for CertRef as well as for rdn
                            and san.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">Why

                            CertNameType cannot be &#8220;factorized&#8221;=
 ? (in
                            the example from Page 15, there are all the
                            same).</span></p>
                      </div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>No, the example in the spec has one e-mail
                  attribute that was placed in the SubjAltName extension
                  of the cert.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
                  <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=
=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                            </span>"rdn"<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbs=
p;&nbsp;
                            </span>The SAML attribute value is placed in
                            the<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;



                            </span>subject field of the certificate in a<o:=
p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;



                            </span>present Relative Distinguished Name<o:p>=
</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;



                            </span>attribute.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                            </span>"san"<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbs=
p;&nbsp;
                            </span>The SAML attribute value is placed in
                            the<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;



                            </span>Subject Alternative Name extension of
                            the<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;



                            </span>certificate.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">I
                            also failed to understand the reason of such
                            &#8220;mapping&#8221;. </span></p>
                      </div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>Yes, and I think that is the reason behind most of
                  your comments.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
                  <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=
=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><br>
                            The example in Appendix C illustrates the
                            complexity of the proposal. <br>
                            Can the approach be made simpler ? If not,
                            why ?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                      </div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>No it can't be made simpler. It contains exactly
                  the information we need in the implementation where it
                  is used.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>I could write a whole whitepaper about all detailed
                  reasons, but if you really think about the use case,
                  it should be clear.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>Consider the case where you know users by
                  attributes defined in a SAML federation, where for
                  example serialNumber is NOT used.</div>
                <div>A CA issues a certificate to a user based an a SAML
                  assertion authentication based on the attribute
                  profile of that federation.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>A user logs in to your service using a SAML
                  assertion, and sends you a signed document associated
                  with the issued certificate.</div>
                <div>You now need to determine whether that SAML
                  assertion and the certificate represents the same
                  user.</div>
                <div>You also need to determine that the SAML assertion
                  and the certificate provides compatible levels of
                  assertion for user authentication as defined in your
                  SAML federation.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>This extension gives you exactly the amount of data
                  that is needed in order to do this in an unambiguous
                  fully automated process.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
                  <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=
=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><spa=
n lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'=
>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB=
"><!--[if !supportFields]-->10.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><=
span
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-e=
nd'></span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN=
-GB">
                            In section 4, I failed to understand the
                            &#8220;dynamic&#8221; aspect. My understanding =
is that a
                            person statically <br>
                            authenticates to a RA (Registration
                            Authority) and then is given back a
                            non-repudiation certificate <br>
                            with SAML attributes in it which may then be
                            used as identity attributes. <br>
                            I am unsure what the text in this section
                            wants to say when using the words &#8220;dynami=
c
                            manner&#8221;.<br>
                          </span></p>
                      </div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>Your view is to restrictive.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>The dynamic aspect of this is that a certificate
                  may be issued on the fly at the instance when it is
                  needed, containing just the information that is needed
                  for one particular situation.</div>
                <div>This extension is (where this is used in the
                  Swedish national infrastructure) added to certificates
                  that are issued for just one instance of signing, and
                  hence can be dynamically adapted to the needs of the
                  intended relying party.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>Next time the user signs, a new key pair is
                  generated with new certs that may contain another set
                  of the user's attributes.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>The first instance may for example contain the
                  users private identity based on a national identifier,
                  the second may carry an organisational identity based
                  on employee number.</div>
                <div>What attributes that are needed in every instance
                  is determined in a service context that is outside the
                  scope of this specification.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>In these certificates, both the national identifier
                  and the employee number may be placed as a
                  serialNumber attribute in the subject field.</div>
                <div>Despite that, this extension makes it possible for
                  the relying party to know exactly what identity
                  information each certificate carries, as it maps to
                  the attribute profile of a SAML federation.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>/Stefan</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
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                      <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><br>
                        </p>
                        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText">Denis<br>
                          <span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB=
"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        <meta name=3D"ProgId" content=3D"Word.Document">
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                </span> <br>
                <fieldset class=3D"mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
                <br>
                <pre wrap=3D"">______________________________________________=
_
pkix mailing list
<a moz-do-not-send=3D"true" class=3D"moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href=3D"mailto:pki=
x@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a><a moz-do-not-send=3D"true" class=3D"moz-txt-link-f=
reetext" href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix">https://www.ietf.=
org/mailman/listinfo/pkix</a></pre>
              </blockquote>
              <br>
            </div>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </span>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
  </div></div>
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From: "Max Pritikin (pritikin)" <pritikin@cisco.com>
To: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] Agenda posted
Thread-Index: AQHOFp2xC4hQ9GUpp0mWuoKXWTwlBJibeBkA
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On Mar 1, 2013, at 9:56 AM, Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com> wrote:

> An agenda for the PKIX meeting in Orlando has been posted.
>=20
> http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/86/agenda/agenda-86-pkix
>=20
> I have not yet got confirmation from the est editors but assume some of t=
he authors will provide an update presentation.

My apologies - I thought we'd responded.=20
Yes, we will provide an update presentation,

- max


>=20
> /Stefan
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix


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Subject: Re: [pkix] Comments on draft-santesson-auth-context-extension-04
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Stefan,

  I wonder whether your had "fresh eyes", because you moved one step 
forwards and then you moved three steps backwards:
Section3.2 "Attribute matching" has now disappeared.

The major disagreements remain: I disagree with the scope and the new 
draft does not solve my concerns.

Allowing to have SAML attributes in a PKC would be a very good thing. 
However, the relying party DOES NOT care
how these SAML attributes have been translated into a subject DN. It is 
the responsibility of the CA.

Thus, if the scope only remains to know how the correspondence was made 
between  the SAML attributes and
the subject DN, I don't believe that this document will be useful for 
the Internet community and thus I am still unconvinced
that this document should progress as an Internet Draft.

If the scope is changed to allow to include SAML attributes as another 
name form in a PKC, then this is
an important issue which deserves an Internet Draft.

Denis

> Denis,
>
> I took a look at this this morning with fresh eyes, and some of your 
> questions triggered me to do further improvements on the Schema, 
> explanations and examples.
>
> The latest draft is still available from here:
> http://aaa-sec.com/_temp/draft-santesson-auth-context-extension-04.txt
>
> Hopefully the new examples will give you a better Idea on how this 
> extension can be used and why this is not suitable as an other name form.
>
> I'm really grateful for your review even if I don't do everything 
> exactly as you suggested.
>
> /Stefan
>
>
>
>
> From: Denis Pinkas <denis.pinkas@bull.net <mailto:denis.pinkas@bull.net>>
> Date: Tuesday, March 5, 2013 6:44 PM
> To: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com <mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com>>
> Cc: pkix <pkix@ietf.org <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>>
> Subject: Re: [pkix] Comments on draft-santesson-auth-context-extension-04
>
>     Stefan,
>
>     I read the new specification (dated March 4) and it does not solve
>     my concerns.
>     **
>     The real goal is stated at the top of page 4:
>
>
>     *to verify that the signature was created by the same user that
>     logged on *
>
>     *to the service*.
>
>     In your response below, you also say:
>
>           "You now need to determine whether that SAML assertion and
>     the certificate represents the same user."
>
>     This is rather different from the goal stated on page 3:
>
>     The primary purpose of this document is to provide a mechanism that
>
>     allows an application to understand information that express the
>
>     identity of a *subject in a certificate that is stored either in a*
>
>     *subject field attribute, as a subject alternative name or in a*
>
>     *subject directory attribute.*
>
>
>     If we draw an analogy with the way to construct a DN, we do not
>     mention that the DN was created after
>     the presentation of a passport or an ID card, plus a way to
>     justify the place of birth, a a way to justify
>     the place of living, an that the country name was extracted from
>     the presentation of the passport, etc ...
>
>     So why should we do this in your context ?
>
>     We need to store information in the certificate directly derived
>     from the SAML token, so that the application
>     which performed a SAML authentication can make sure that the
>     certificate was delivered for the same person,
>     by *making a comparison using some set of rules.**
>     *
>     So *t**here is a need to have matching rules* for the content of
>     the SAML token with the content of
>     the new extension (whatever it is). If we don't have such rules,
>     then the goal at the top of page 4 cannot be met.
>
>     I do not see the added value to explain some translation process
>     since it would be used for audit purposes only and
>     the CA MUST anyway maintain information about the issuance of the
>     token. So in case of a problem, the
>     CA SHALL be able to answer and it is not needed to overload the
>     content of the certificate with more information.
>
>     I still believe that OtherName is the right place to contains the
>     parameters extracted from the SAML token,
>     that will be used for comparison.
>
>     Denis
>
>
>     PS. I wonder whether we should continue to have in mind to have
>     this document issued as an RFC.
>            It may well be a national Swedish standard.
>
>>     Based on comments received today I have updated this draft,
>>     preliminary available at:
>>     http://aaa-sec.com/_temp/draft-santesson-auth-context-extension-04.txt
>>
>>     I have edited the Introduction section to clarify the scope of
>>     the document.
>>
>>     I have also added a new section (now 3.2) that explains the
>>     absence of attribute matching rules.
>>     The section should also make clear how specific attribute data
>>     format conventions, such as the one expressed in ETSI TS 119
>>     412-2, can co-exist with this extension.
>>
>>     /Stefan
>>
>>     From: "Moudrick M. Dadashov" <md@e-net.lt <mailto:md@e-net.lt>>
>>     Date: Monday, March 4, 2013 11:26 AM
>>     To: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com <mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com>>
>>     Cc: Denis Pinkas <denis.pinkas@bull.net
>>     <mailto:denis.pinkas@bull.net>>, pkix <pkix@ietf.org
>>     <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>>
>>     Subject: Re: [pkix] Comments on
>>     draft-santesson-auth-context-extension-04
>>
>>         On 3/4/2013 12:09 PM, Stefan Santesson wrote:
>>>         Denis,
>>>
>>>         First, thanks for your review. I really appreciate it.
>>>
>>>         It seems to me, especially with your leading concluding
>>>         comment, that you have missed out on what this specification
>>>         attempts to do.
>>>         Perhaps you did not read the introduction enough, or perhaps
>>>         I didn't write it clear enough.
>>>
>>>         The purpose is not to associate the subject with a
>>>         identifier composed of a set of attributes.
>>>         That is, this is NOT a new name form.
>>>
>>>         This extension helps a relying party to understand the
>>>         source of the identity information that is placed in the
>>>         traditional identity fields of a certificate.
>>>         For example. If the serialNumber attributes holds the string
>>>         "123456", then this extension can tell you where this string
>>>         came from.
>>>
>>         How is this related to "semantics identifier" (ETSI TS 119
>>         412-2) then?
>>
>>         M.D.
>>>         The use case addressed is where the CA/RA obtains the
>>>         authenticated identify from a SAML assertion when issuing
>>>         the certificate.
>>>         This extension provides means to preserve information about
>>>         the original SAML attributes in the cert.
>>>
>>>
>>>         From: Denis Pinkas <denis.pinkas@bull.net
>>>         <mailto:denis.pinkas@bull.net>>
>>>         Date: Monday, March 4, 2013 9:42 AM
>>>         To: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com
>>>         <mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com>>, pkix <pkix@ietf.org
>>>         <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>>
>>>         Subject: Comments on draft-santesson-auth-context-extension-04
>>>
>>>             Stefan,
>>>
>>>
>>>             The goal of this document is to associate a public key
>>>             to be used for verifying electronic signatures
>>>             with an identifier composed of a set of attributes,
>>>             typically SAML attributes, contained in an
>>>             authentication token.
>>>
>>>
>>>         No you got this wrong. This is not an Identifier.
>>>
>>>             MAJOR COMMENTS
>>>
>>>             1.The proposed draft is not aligned with the current
>>>             practices of RFC 5280 and X.509:
>>>             the right place to hold such a set of attributes is in
>>>             the subject alternate name.
>>>             The subject DN may or may not be empty.
>>>
>>>             There is no rational in this draft to explain why this
>>>             straightforward approach has not been chosen.
>>>
>>>             SubjectAltName ::= GeneralNames
>>>
>>>             GeneralNames ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName
>>>
>>>             GeneralName ::= CHOICE {
>>>
>>>             otherName[0]OtherName,
>>>
>>>             rfc822Name[1]IA5String,
>>>
>>>             dNSName[2]IA5String,
>>>
>>>             x400Address[3]ORAddress,
>>>
>>>             directoryName[4]Name,
>>>
>>>             ediPartyName[5]EDIPartyName,
>>>
>>>             uniformResourceIdentifier[6]IA5String,
>>>
>>>             iPAddress[7]OCTET STRING,
>>>
>>>             registeredID[8]OBJECT IDENTIFIER }
>>>
>>>             OtherName ::= SEQUENCE {
>>>
>>>             type-idOBJECT IDENTIFIER,
>>>
>>>             value[0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id }
>>>
>>>             OtherName fits well with the requirements, if you accept
>>>             to use an OID rather than
>>>             a uniformResourceIdentifier.
>>>
>>>             The value component would contain an XML structure
>>>             conformant with a XML schema.
>>>
>>>
>>>         This draft does not contain an identifier, thus this comment
>>>         is irrelevant.
>>>         There is not explanation why we don't store an identifier as
>>>         a SAN, since we do not create or store an identifier.
>>>
>>>             2.The document should be restructured to define:
>>>
>>>             (a) the general way to answer to the requirements, and
>>>             (b) a specific profile, in an Appendix, so that other
>>>             RFCs could refer to the main body of the document.
>>>
>>>
>>>         That could be one way to do it.
>>>
>>>             DETAILED COMMENTS
>>>
>>>             3.The proposed structure is not appropriate.
>>>
>>>             a) Why is there a need to have a SEQUENCE ? This should
>>>             be avoided.
>>>
>>>             b) Why is contextInfo OPTIONAL? This should be avoided.
>>>
>>>             AuthenticationContexts ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
>>>
>>>             AuthenticationContext
>>>
>>>             AuthenticationContext ::= SEQUENCE {
>>>
>>>             contextTypeUTF8String,
>>>
>>>             contextInfoUTF8String OPTIONAL
>>>
>>>             }
>>>
>>>
>>>         For exactly the same reason why SAML AuthContextClassRef in
>>>         a SAML assertion is mandatory but not the XML structure it
>>>         defines.
>>>         In some cases you don't want to include explicit data, if
>>>         that data is static and can be implicitly known through an
>>>         identifier.
>>>
>>>         The AuthContextClassRef in SAML is the best example as it is
>>>         an exact functional replica of this.
>>>         The URL identified by AuthContextClassRef is also a XML
>>>         Schema ns for associated XML document.
>>>
>>>         The XML Schema can define both a static XML document with
>>>         fixed values as well as a structure where different values
>>>         can be entered.
>>>
>>>         Just including the reference to the XML Schema may then
>>>         provide sufficient information to the relying party. The
>>>         actual XML document is only included if some variable data
>>>         need to be communicated within the associated XML document.
>>>
>>>         Just including contextType but not contextInfo could be
>>>         compared with the case where we include a certificate policy
>>>         OID, but not the entire policy text.
>>>
>>>         This is a really smart way to do this, which is made
>>>         possible through the versatility of XML Schemas.
>>>
>>>
>>>             4.The text states: This extension MAY be marked critical.
>>>
>>>             If the alternate name is present, why should there be a DN ?
>>>
>>>
>>>         This comment must be based on a misunderstanding of the
>>>         scope of this document.
>>>
>>>             5.The XML schema should be given first (Appendix B)
>>>             followed by the explanations (sections 3.1 and 3.2).
>>>             In other words, sections 3.1 and 3.2 should be placed in
>>>             Appendix B.
>>>
>>>
>>>         That is one way to do it. If I was the implementer, I really
>>>         wouldn't care as long as the information is there.
>>>         I think it is quite common to place programatic contracts in
>>>         Appendixes, wile explaining data elements in the body of the
>>>         document.
>>>
>>>             6.The vocabulary used in sections 3.1 and 3.2 is
>>>             confusing and should be changed.
>>>
>>>             An example: "AuthContextInfo Element" does not exist.
>>>             However, it is better to state that the contextInfo
>>>             component
>>>             contains an XML structure which must conform to an XML
>>>             schema.
>>>
>>>
>>>         Sorry, I don't get this comment. The AuthContextInfo element
>>>         does exist. It is defined in the schema. XML Schema defines
>>>         syntax and structure but not the semantics. Semantics are
>>>         defined the section 3.
>>>
>>>             7.The XML structure proposed to fit inside contextInfo
>>>             is overly complex.
>>>
>>>             AuthenticationInstant is mandatory, whereas it is not
>>>             needed.
>>>
>>>
>>>         This information is always available from the SAML assertion
>>>         and is considered fundamental, thus required.
>>>
>>>             AssertionRef is not needed.
>>>
>>>             ServiceID is not needed.
>>>
>>>
>>>         And hence, both are optional.
>>>
>>>         The XML Schema is actually very simple. Its just the nature
>>>         of XML Schemas to look more complex than they actually are.
>>>         Perhaps it is easier if you examine it through this
>>>         following web doc (which unfortunately can't be included in
>>>         the spec):
>>>         http://aaa-sec.com/eid2/sigsupport/XMLschema/AuthContExtDoc/index.html
>>>
>>>
>>>             8.There are no matching rules defined. This means that
>>>             the verification of the content of that field is not
>>>             possible.
>>>
>>>
>>>         First of all, this is not an identifier, thus there is no
>>>         reason for a matching rule is it would be if this was an
>>>         identifier that as a whole should be compared with something
>>>         else.
>>>
>>>         The SAML attribute value does not have to match the value of
>>>         the cert attribute, this data in the extension is optional
>>>         and, if present, is a hint.
>>>         But I could actually add some text to clarify this.
>>>
>>>             9.In section 3.2, I failed to understand the
>>>             explanations for CertRef as well as for rdn and san.
>>>
>>>             Why CertNameType cannot be "factorized" ? (in the
>>>             example from Page 15, there are all the same).
>>>
>>>
>>>         No, the example in the spec has one e-mail attribute that
>>>         was placed in the SubjAltName extension of the cert.
>>>
>>>             "rdn"The SAML attribute value is placed in the
>>>
>>>             subject field of the certificate in a
>>>
>>>             present Relative Distinguished Name
>>>
>>>             attribute.
>>>
>>>             "san"The SAML attribute value is placed in the
>>>
>>>             Subject Alternative Name extension of the
>>>
>>>             certificate.
>>>
>>>             I also failed to understand the reason of such "mapping".
>>>
>>>
>>>         Yes, and I think that is the reason behind most of your
>>>         comments.
>>>
>>>
>>>             The example in Appendix C illustrates the complexity of
>>>             the proposal.
>>>             Can the approach be made simpler ? If not, why ?
>>>
>>>
>>>         No it can't be made simpler. It contains exactly the
>>>         information we need in the implementation where it is used.
>>>
>>>         I could write a whole whitepaper about all detailed reasons,
>>>         but if you really think about the use case, it should be clear.
>>>
>>>         Consider the case where you know users by attributes defined
>>>         in a SAML federation, where for example serialNumber is NOT
>>>         used.
>>>         A CA issues a certificate to a user based an a SAML
>>>         assertion authentication based on the attribute profile of
>>>         that federation.
>>>
>>>         A user logs in to your service using a SAML assertion, and
>>>         sends you a signed document associated with the issued
>>>         certificate.
>>>         You now need to determine whether that SAML assertion and
>>>         the certificate represents the same user.
>>>         You also need to determine that the SAML assertion and the
>>>         certificate provides compatible levels of assertion for user
>>>         authentication as defined in your SAML federation.
>>>
>>>         This extension gives you exactly the amount of data that is
>>>         needed in order to do this in an unambiguous fully automated
>>>         process.
>>>
>>>             10.In section 4, I failed to understand the "dynamic"
>>>             aspect. My understanding is that a person statically
>>>             authenticates to a RA (Registration Authority) and then
>>>             is given back a non-repudiation certificate
>>>             with SAML attributes in it which may then be used as
>>>             identity attributes.
>>>             I am unsure what the text in this section wants to say
>>>             when using the words "dynamic manner".
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>         Your view is to restrictive.
>>>
>>>         The dynamic aspect of this is that a certificate may be
>>>         issued on the fly at the instance when it is needed,
>>>         containing just the information that is needed for one
>>>         particular situation.
>>>         This extension is (where this is used in the Swedish
>>>         national infrastructure) added to certificates that are
>>>         issued for just one instance of signing, and hence can be
>>>         dynamically adapted to the needs of the intended relying party.
>>>
>>>         Next time the user signs, a new key pair is generated with
>>>         new certs that may contain another set of the user's attributes.
>>>
>>>         The first instance may for example contain the users private
>>>         identity based on a national identifier, the second may
>>>         carry an organisational identity based on employee number.
>>>         What attributes that are needed in every instance is
>>>         determined in a service context that is outside the scope of
>>>         this specification.
>>>
>>>         In these certificates, both the national identifier and the
>>>         employee number may be placed as a serialNumber attribute in
>>>         the subject field.
>>>         Despite that, this extension makes it possible for the
>>>         relying party to know exactly what identity information each
>>>         certificate carries, as it maps to the attribute profile of
>>>         a SAML federation.
>>>
>>>         /Stefan
>>>
>>>
>>>             Denis
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>         _______________________________________________
>>>         pkix mailing list
>>>         pkix@ietf.orghttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>>
>
>     _______________________________________________ pkix mailing list
>     pkix@ietf.org <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
>     https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix 
>


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    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">Stefan,<br>
      <br>
      &nbsp;I wonder whether your had "fresh eyes", because you moved one
      step forwards and then you moved three steps backwards:<br>
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<![endif]--> <br>
      <br>
      The major disagreements remain: I disagree with the scope and the
      new draft does not solve my concerns.<br>
      <br>
      Allowing to have SAML attributes in a PKC would be a very good
      thing. However, the relying party DOES NOT care <br>
      how these SAML attributes have been translated into a subject DN.
      It is the responsibility of the CA.<br>
      <br>
      Thus, if the scope only remains to know how the correspondence was
      made between&nbsp; the SAML attributes and <br>
      the subject DN, I don't believe that this document will be useful
      for the Internet community and thus I am still unconvinced <br>
      that this document should progress as an Internet Draft.<br>
      <br>
      If the scope is changed to allow to include SAML attributes as
      another name form in a PKC, then this is <br>
      an important issue which deserves an Internet Draft.<br>
      <br>
      Denis<br>
      <br>
    </div>
    <blockquote cite="mid:CD5CE64F.5D520%25stefan@aaa-sec.com"
      type="cite">
      <div>Denis,</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>I took a look at this this morning with fresh eyes, and some
        of your questions triggered me to do further improvements on the
        Schema, explanations and examples.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>The latest draft is still available from here:</div>
      <div><a class="moz-txt-link-freetext"
href="http://aaa-sec.com/_temp/draft-santesson-auth-context-extension-04.txt">http://aaa-sec.com/_temp/draft-santesson-auth-context-extension-04.txt</a></div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>Hopefully the new examples will give you a better Idea on how
        this extension can be used and why this is not suitable as an
        other name form.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>I'm really grateful for your review even if I don't do
        everything exactly as you suggested.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>/Stefan</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <span id="OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
        <div style="font-family:Calibri; font-size:11pt;
          text-align:left; color:black; BORDER-BOTTOM: medium none;
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          0in; PADDING-RIGHT: 0in; BORDER-TOP: #b5c4df 1pt solid;
          BORDER-RIGHT: medium none; PADDING-TOP: 3pt"><span
            style="font-weight:bold">From: </span> Denis Pinkas &lt;<a
            moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:denis.pinkas@bull.net">denis.pinkas@bull.net</a>&gt;<br>
          <span style="font-weight:bold">Date: </span> Tuesday, March
          5, 2013 6:44 PM<br>
          <span style="font-weight:bold">To: </span> Stefan Santesson
          &lt;<a moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com">stefan@aaa-sec.com</a>&gt;<br>
          <span style="font-weight:bold">Cc: </span> pkix &lt;<a
            moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>
          <span style="font-weight:bold">Subject: </span> Re: [pkix]
          Comments on draft-santesson-auth-context-extension-04<br>
        </div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
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              <div class="moz-cite-prefix">Stefan,<br>
                <br>
                I read the new specification (dated March 4) and it does
                not solve my concerns.<br>
                <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
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<![endif]--><br>
                The real goal is stated at the top of page 4:
                <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;
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                    style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><br>
                    <o:p></o:p></span></p>
                <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                    style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><span
                      style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;</span><b
                      style="mso-bidi-font-weight:normal">to verify that
                      the signature was created by the same user that
                      logged on <o:p></o:p></b></span></p>
                <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                    style="font-size:12.0pt; font-family:&quot;Times New
                    Roman&quot;;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times New
                    Roman&quot;;
mso-ansi-language:EN-GB;mso-fareast-language:FR;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"
                    lang="EN-GB"><span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp; </span>to

                    the service</span></b><span
                  style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&quot;Times New
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Roman&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB;mso-fareast-language:FR;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"
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<![endif]--><br>
                <br>
                In your response below, you also say:<br>
                <br>
                <span id="OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; "You now need to
                  determine whether that SAML assertion and the
                  certificate represents the same user."</span><br>
                <br>
                This is rather different from the goal stated on page 3:<br>
                <br>
                <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                    style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><span
                      style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>The primary
                    purpose of this document is to provide a mechanism
                    that<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                    style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><span
                      style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>allows an
                    application <span
                      style="background:yellow;mso-highlight:yellow">to
                      understand information</span> that express the<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                    style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><span
                      style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>identity of a
                    <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal">subject in a
                      certificate that is stored either in a<o:p></o:p></b></span></p>
                <p class="MsoPlainText"><b
                    style="mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><span
                        style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>subject
                      field attribute, as a subject alternative name or
                      in a<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                <p class="MsoPlainText"><b
                    style="mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang="EN-GB"><span
                        style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>subject
                      directory attribute.</span></b></p>
                <br>
                If we draw an analogy with the way to construct a DN, we
                do not mention that the DN was created after <br>
                the presentation of a passport or an ID card, plus a way
                to justify the place of birth, a a way to justify <br>
                the place of living, an that the country name was
                extracted from the presentation of the passport, etc ...<br>
                <br>
                So why should we do this in your context ?<br>
                <br>
                We need to store information in the certificate directly
                derived from the SAML token, so that the application <br>
                which performed a SAML authentication can make sure that
                the certificate was delivered for the same person, <br>
                by <b>making a comparison using some set of rules.</b><b><br>
                </b><br>
                So <b>t</b><b>here is a need to have matching rules</b>
                for the content of the SAML token with the content of <br>
                the new extension (whatever it is). If we don't have
                such rules, then the goal at the top of page 4 cannot be
                met.<br>
                <br>
                I do not see the added value to explain some translation
                process since it would be used for audit purposes only
                and <br>
                the CA MUST anyway maintain information about the
                issuance of the token. So in case of a problem, the <br>
                CA SHALL be able to answer and it is not needed to
                overload the content of the certificate with more
                information.<br>
                <br>
                I still believe that OtherName is the right place to
                contains the parameters extracted from the SAML token, <br>
                that will be used for comparison.<br>
                <br>
                Denis <br>
                <br>
                <br>
                PS. I wonder whether we should continue to have in mind
                to have this document issued as an RFC.<br>
                &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; It may well be a national Swedish standard.<br>
                <br>
              </div>
              <blockquote cite="mid:CD5A661C.5D102%25stefan@aaa-sec.com"
                type="cite">
                <div>Based on comments received today I have updated
                  this draft, preliminary available at:</div>
                <div><a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="http://aaa-sec.com/_temp/draft-santesson-auth-context-extension-04.txt">http://aaa-sec.com/_temp/draft-santesson-auth-context-extension-04.txt</a></div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>I have edited the Introduction section to clarify
                  the scope of the document.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>I have also added a new section (now 3.2) that
                  explains the absence of attribute matching rules.</div>
                <div>The section should also make clear how specific
                  attribute data format conventions, such as the one
                  expressed in&nbsp;ETSI TS 119 412-2, can co-exist with this
                  extension.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>/Stefan</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id="OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
                  <div style="font-family:Calibri; font-size:11pt;
                    text-align:left; color:black; BORDER-BOTTOM: medium
                    none; BORDER-LEFT: medium none; PADDING-BOTTOM: 0in;
                    PADDING-LEFT: 0in; PADDING-RIGHT: 0in; BORDER-TOP:
                    #b5c4df 1pt solid; BORDER-RIGHT: medium none;
                    PADDING-TOP: 3pt"><span style="font-weight:bold">From:

                    </span> "Moudrick M. Dadashov" &lt;<a
                      moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:md@e-net.lt">md@e-net.lt</a>&gt;<br>
                    <span style="font-weight:bold">Date: </span>
                    Monday, March 4, 2013 11:26 AM<br>
                    <span style="font-weight:bold">To: </span> Stefan
                    Santesson &lt;<a moz-do-not-send="true"
                      href="mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com">stefan@aaa-sec.com</a>&gt;<br>
                    <span style="font-weight:bold">Cc: </span> Denis
                    Pinkas &lt;<a moz-do-not-send="true"
                      href="mailto:denis.pinkas@bull.net">denis.pinkas@bull.net</a>&gt;,


                    pkix &lt;<a moz-do-not-send="true"
                      href="mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>
                    <span style="font-weight:bold">Subject: </span> Re:
                    [pkix] Comments on
                    draft-santesson-auth-context-extension-04<br>
                  </div>
                  <div><br>
                  </div>
                  <blockquote id="MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
                    style="BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <meta content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1"
                        http-equiv="Content-Type">
                      <div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
                        <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 3/4/2013 12:09
                          PM, Stefan Santesson wrote:<br>
                        </div>
                        <blockquote
                          cite="mid:CD5A2449.5D025%25stefan@aaa-sec.com"
                          type="cite">
                          <div>Denis,</div>
                          <div><br>
                          </div>
                          <div>First, thanks for your review. I really
                            appreciate it.</div>
                          <div><br>
                          </div>
                          <div>It seems to me, especially with your
                            leading concluding comment, that you have
                            missed out on what this specification
                            attempts to do.</div>
                          <div>Perhaps you did not read the introduction
                            enough, or perhaps I didn't write it clear
                            enough.</div>
                          <div><br>
                          </div>
                          <div>The purpose is not to associate the
                            subject with a identifier composed of a set
                            of attributes.</div>
                          <div>That is, this is NOT a new name form.</div>
                          <div><br>
                          </div>
                          <div>This extension helps a relying party to
                            understand the source of the identity
                            information that is placed in the
                            traditional identity fields of a
                            certificate.</div>
                          <div>For example. If the serialNumber
                            attributes holds the string "123456", then
                            this extension can tell you where this
                            string came from.</div>
                          <div><br>
                          </div>
                        </blockquote>
                        How is this related to "semantics identifier"
                        (ETSI TS 119 412-2) then?<br>
                        <br>
                        M.D. <br>
                        <blockquote
                          cite="mid:CD5A2449.5D025%25stefan@aaa-sec.com"
                          type="cite">
                          <div>The use case addressed is where the CA/RA
                            obtains the authenticated identify from a
                            SAML assertion when issuing the certificate.</div>
                          <div>This extension provides means to preserve
                            information about the original SAML
                            attributes in the cert.</div>
                          <div><br>
                          </div>
                          <div><br>
                          </div>
                          <span id="OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
                            <div style="font-family:Calibri;
                              font-size:11pt; text-align:left;
                              color:black; BORDER-BOTTOM: medium none;
                              BORDER-LEFT: medium none; PADDING-BOTTOM:
                              0in; PADDING-LEFT: 0in; PADDING-RIGHT:
                              0in; BORDER-TOP: #b5c4df 1pt solid;
                              BORDER-RIGHT: medium none; PADDING-TOP:
                              3pt"><span style="font-weight:bold">From:
                              </span> Denis Pinkas &lt;<a
                                moz-do-not-send="true"
                                href="mailto:denis.pinkas@bull.net">denis.pinkas@bull.net</a>&gt;<br>
                              <span style="font-weight:bold">Date: </span>
                              Monday, March 4, 2013 9:42 AM<br>
                              <span style="font-weight:bold">To: </span>
                              Stefan Santesson &lt;<a
                                moz-do-not-send="true"
                                href="mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com">stefan@aaa-sec.com</a>&gt;,



                              pkix &lt;<a moz-do-not-send="true"
                                href="mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>
                              <span style="font-weight:bold">Subject: </span>
                              Comments on
                              draft-santesson-auth-context-extension-04<br>
                            </div>
                            <div><br>
                            </div>
                            <blockquote
                              id="MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
                              style="BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid;
                              PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                              <div>
                                <meta http-equiv="content-type"
                                  content="text/html;
                                  charset=ISO-8859-1">
                                <div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
                                  <meta http-equiv="Content-Type"
                                    content="text/html;
                                    charset=ISO-8859-1">
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB">Stefan,<br>
                                      <o:p></o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"><o:p><br>
                                      </o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB">The goal of this
                                      document is to associate a public
                                      key to be used for verifying
                                      electronic signatures <br>
                                      with an identifier composed of a
                                      set of attributes, typically SAML
                                      attributes, contained in an
                                      authentication token.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                                </div>
                              </div>
                            </blockquote>
                          </span>
                          <div><br>
                          </div>
                          <div>No you got this wrong. This is not an
                            Identifier.</div>
                          <div><br>
                          </div>
                          <span id="OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
                            <blockquote
                              id="MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
                              style="BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid;
                              PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                              <div>
                                <div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB">MAJOR COMMENTS<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><span lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->1.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"> The proposed draft
                                      is not aligned with the current
                                      practices of RFC 5280 and X.509: <br>
                                      the right place to hold such a set
                                      of attributes is in the subject
                                      alternate name. <br>
                                      The subject DN may or may not be
                                      empty. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB">There is no rational
                                      in this draft to explain why this
                                      straightforward approach has not
                                      been chosen.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US"
                                      lang="EN-US"><span
                                        style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>SubjectAltName



                                      ::= GeneralNames<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US"
                                      lang="EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US"
                                      lang="EN-US"><span
                                        style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>GeneralNames


                                      ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
                                      GeneralName<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US"
                                      lang="EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US"
                                      lang="EN-US"><span
                                        style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>GeneralName


                                      ::= CHOICE {<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US"
                                      lang="EN-US"><span
                                        style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                                      </span>otherName<span
                                        style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;


                                      </span>[0]<span
                                        style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>OtherName,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US"
                                      lang="EN-US"><span
                                        style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                                      </span>rfc822Name<span
                                        style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;


                                      </span>[1]<span
                                        style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>IA5String,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US"
                                      lang="EN-US"><span
                                        style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                                      </span>dNSName<span
                                        style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;


                                      </span>[2]<span
                                        style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>IA5String,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US"
                                      lang="EN-US"><span
                                        style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                                      </span>x400Address<span
                                        style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;


                                      </span>[3]<span
                                        style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>ORAddress,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US"
                                      lang="EN-US"><span
                                        style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                                      </span>directoryName<span
                                        style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;


                                      </span>[4]<span
                                        style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>Name,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US"
                                      lang="EN-US"><span
                                        style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                                      </span>ediPartyName<span
                                        style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;


                                      </span>[5]<span
                                        style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>EDIPartyName,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US"
                                      lang="EN-US"><span
                                        style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                                      </span>uniformResourceIdentifier<span
                                        style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                                      </span>[6]<span
                                        style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>IA5String,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US"
                                      lang="EN-US"><span
                                        style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                                      </span>iPAddress<span
                                        style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;


                                      </span>[7]<span
                                        style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>OCTET

                                      STRING,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US"
                                      lang="EN-US"><span
                                        style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                                      </span>registeredID<span
                                        style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;


                                      </span>[8]<span
                                        style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>OBJECT

                                      IDENTIFIER }<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US"
                                      lang="EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US"
                                      lang="EN-US"><span
                                        style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>OtherName


                                      ::= SEQUENCE {<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US"
                                      lang="EN-US"><span
                                        style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                                      </span>type-id<span
                                        style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>OBJECT



                                      IDENTIFIER,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US"
                                      lang="EN-US"><span
                                        style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
                                      </span>value<span
                                        style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>[0]


                                      EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id }<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US"
                                      lang="EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US"
                                      lang="EN-US">OtherName fits well
                                      with the requirements, if you
                                      accept to use an OID rather than <br>
                                      a uniformResourceIdentifier.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US"
                                      lang="EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB">The value component
                                      would contain an XML structure
                                      conformant with a XML schema.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                                </div>
                              </div>
                            </blockquote>
                          </span>
                          <div><br>
                          </div>
                          <div>This draft does not contain an
                            identifier, thus this comment is irrelevant.</div>
                          <div>There is not explanation why we don't
                            store an identifier as a SAN, since we do
                            not create or store an identifier.</div>
                          <div><br>
                          </div>
                          <span id="OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
                            <blockquote
                              id="MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
                              style="BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid;
                              PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                              <div>
                                <div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><span lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->2.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"> The document should
                                      be restructured to define:<br>
                                      <br>
                                      (a) the general way to answer to
                                      the requirements, and <br>
                                      (b) a specific profile, in an
                                      Appendix, so that other RFCs could
                                      refer to the main body of the
                                      document.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                                </div>
                              </div>
                            </blockquote>
                          </span>
                          <div><br>
                          </div>
                          <div>That could be one way to do it.</div>
                          <div><br>
                          </div>
                          <span id="OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
                            <blockquote
                              id="MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
                              style="BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid;
                              PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                              <div>
                                <div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB">DETAILED COMMENTS<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><span lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->3.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"> The proposed
                                      structure is not appropriate. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB">a) Why is there a
                                      need to have a SEQUENCE ? This
                                      should be avoided.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB">b) Why is contextInfo
                                      OPTIONAL? This should be avoided.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"><span
                                        style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>AuthenticationContexts





                                      ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"><span
                                        style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;





                                      </span>AuthenticationContext<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"><span
                                        style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>AuthenticationContext





                                      ::= SEQUENCE {<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"><span
                                        style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;

                                      </span>contextType<span
                                        style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>UTF8String,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"><span
                                        style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;

                                      </span>contextInfo<span
                                        style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>UTF8String



                                      OPTIONAL<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"><span
                                        style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>}<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                                </div>
                              </div>
                            </blockquote>
                          </span>
                          <div><br>
                          </div>
                          <div>For exactly the same reason why SAML
                            AuthContextClassRef in a SAML assertion is
                            mandatory but not the XML structure it
                            defines.</div>
                          <div>In some cases you don't want to include
                            explicit data, if that data is static and
                            can be implicitly known through an
                            identifier.</div>
                          <div><br>
                          </div>
                          <div>The&nbsp;AuthContextClassRef in SAML is the
                            best example as it is an exact functional
                            replica of this.</div>
                          <div>The URL identified by&nbsp;AuthContextClassRef
                            is also a XML Schema ns for associated XML
                            document.</div>
                          <div><br>
                          </div>
                          <div>The XML Schema can define both a static
                            XML document with fixed values as well as a
                            structure where different values can be
                            entered.</div>
                          <div><br>
                          </div>
                          <div>Just including the reference to the XML
                            Schema may then provide sufficient
                            information to the relying party. The actual
                            XML document is only included if some
                            variable data need to be communicated within
                            the associated XML document.</div>
                          <div><br>
                          </div>
                          <div>Just including contextType but not
                            contextInfo could be compared with the case
                            where we include a certificate policy OID,
                            but not the entire policy text.</div>
                          <div><br>
                          </div>
                          <div>This is a really smart way to do this,
                            which is made possible through the
                            versatility of XML Schemas.</div>
                          <div><br>
                          </div>
                          <div><br>
                          </div>
                          <span id="OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
                            <blockquote
                              id="MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
                              style="BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid;
                              PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                              <div>
                                <div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><span lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->4.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"> The text states: <span
                                        style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</span>This


                                      extension MAY be marked critical.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB">If the alternate name
                                      is present, why should there be a
                                      DN ?<br>
                                    </span></p>
                                </div>
                              </div>
                            </blockquote>
                          </span>
                          <div><br>
                          </div>
                          <div>This comment must be based on a
                            misunderstanding of the scope of this
                            document.</div>
                          <div><br>
                          </div>
                          <span id="OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
                            <blockquote
                              id="MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
                              style="BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid;
                              PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                              <div>
                                <div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><span lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->5.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"> The XML schema
                                      should be given first (Appendix B)
                                      followed by the explanations
                                      (sections 3.1 and 3.2). <br>
                                      In other words, sections 3.1 and
                                      3.2 should be placed in Appendix
                                      B.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                                </div>
                              </div>
                            </blockquote>
                          </span>
                          <div><br>
                          </div>
                          <div>That is one way to do it. If I was the
                            implementer, I really wouldn't care as long
                            as the information is there.</div>
                          <div>I think it is quite common to place
                            programatic contracts in Appendixes, wile
                            explaining data elements in the body of the
                            document.</div>
                          <div><br>
                          </div>
                          <span id="OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
                            <blockquote
                              id="MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
                              style="BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid;
                              PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                              <div>
                                <div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><span lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->6.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"> The vocabulary used
                                      in sections 3.1 and 3.2 is
                                      confusing and should be changed.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB">An example:
                                      &#8220;AuthContextInfo Element&#8221; does not
                                      exist. However, it is better to
                                      state that the contextInfo
                                      component <br>
                                      contains an XML structure which
                                      must conform to an XML schema.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                                </div>
                              </div>
                            </blockquote>
                          </span>
                          <div><br>
                          </div>
                          <div>Sorry, I don't get this comment. The
                            AuthContextInfo element does exist. It is
                            defined in the schema. XML Schema defines
                            syntax and structure but not the semantics.
                            Semantics are defined the section 3.</div>
                          <div><br>
                          </div>
                          <span id="OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
                            <blockquote
                              id="MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
                              style="BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid;
                              PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                              <div>
                                <div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><span lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->7.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"> The XML structure
                                      proposed to fit inside contextInfo
                                      is overly complex. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB">AuthenticationInstant
                                      is mandatory, whereas it is not
                                      needed.</span></p>
                                </div>
                              </div>
                            </blockquote>
                          </span>
                          <div><br>
                          </div>
                          <div>This information is always available from
                            the SAML assertion and is considered
                            fundamental, thus required.</div>
                          <div><br>
                          </div>
                          <span id="OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
                            <blockquote
                              id="MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
                              style="BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid;
                              PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                              <div>
                                <div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB">AssertionRef is not
                                      needed.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB">ServiceID is not
                                      needed.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                                </div>
                              </div>
                            </blockquote>
                          </span>
                          <div><br>
                          </div>
                          <div>And hence, both are optional.</div>
                          <div><br>
                          </div>
                          <div>The XML Schema is actually very simple.
                            Its just the nature of XML Schemas to look
                            more complex than they actually are.</div>
                          <div>Perhaps it is easier if you examine it
                            through this following web doc (which
                            unfortunately can't be included in the
                            spec):</div>
                          <div><a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="http://aaa-sec.com/eid2/sigsupport/XMLschema/AuthContExtDoc/index.html">http://aaa-sec.com/eid2/sigsupport/XMLschema/AuthContExtDoc/index.html</a></div>
                          <div><br>
                          </div>
                          <div><br>
                          </div>
                          <span id="OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
                            <blockquote
                              id="MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
                              style="BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid;
                              PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                              <div>
                                <div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><span lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->8.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"> There are no
                                      matching rules defined. This means
                                      that the verification of the
                                      content of that field is not
                                      possible.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                                </div>
                              </div>
                            </blockquote>
                          </span>
                          <div><br>
                          </div>
                          <div>First of all, this is not an identifier,
                            thus there is no reason for a matching rule
                            is it would be if this was an identifier
                            that as a whole should be compared with
                            something else.</div>
                          <div><br>
                          </div>
                          <div>The SAML attribute value does not have to
                            match the value of the cert attribute, this
                            data in the extension is optional and, if
                            present, is a hint.&nbsp;</div>
                          <div>But I could actually add some text to
                            clarify this.</div>
                          <div><br>
                          </div>
                          <span id="OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
                            <blockquote
                              id="MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
                              style="BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid;
                              PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                              <div>
                                <div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><span lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->9.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"> In section 3.2, I
                                      failed to understand the
                                      explanations for CertRef as well
                                      as for rdn and san.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB">Why CertNameType
                                      cannot be &#8220;factorized&#8221; ? (in the
                                      example from Page 15, there are
                                      all the same).</span></p>
                                </div>
                              </div>
                            </blockquote>
                          </span>
                          <div><br>
                          </div>
                          <div>No, the example in the spec has one
                            e-mail attribute that was placed in the
                            SubjAltName extension of the cert.</div>
                          <div><br>
                          </div>
                          <span id="OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
                            <blockquote
                              id="MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
                              style="BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid;
                              PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                              <div>
                                <div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"><span
                                        style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;


                                      </span>"rdn"<span
                                        style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>The

                                      SAML attribute value is placed in
                                      the<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"><span
                                        style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;





                                      </span>subject field of the
                                      certificate in a<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"><span
                                        style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;





                                      </span>present Relative
                                      Distinguished Name<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"><span
                                        style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;





                                      </span>attribute.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"><span
                                        style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;


                                      </span>"san"<span
                                        style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>The

                                      SAML attribute value is placed in
                                      the<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"><span
                                        style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;





                                      </span>Subject Alternative Name
                                      extension of the<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"><span
                                        style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;





                                      </span>certificate.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB">I also failed to
                                      understand the reason of such
                                      &#8220;mapping&#8221;. </span></p>
                                </div>
                              </div>
                            </blockquote>
                          </span>
                          <div><br>
                          </div>
                          <div>Yes, and I think that is the reason
                            behind most of your comments.</div>
                          <div><br>
                          </div>
                          <span id="OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
                            <blockquote
                              id="MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
                              style="BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid;
                              PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                              <div>
                                <div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"><br>
                                      The example in Appendix C
                                      illustrates the complexity of the
                                      proposal. <br>
                                      Can the approach be made simpler ?
                                      If not, why ?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                                </div>
                              </div>
                            </blockquote>
                          </span>
                          <div><br>
                          </div>
                          <div>No it can't be made simpler. It contains
                            exactly the information we need in the
                            implementation where it is used.</div>
                          <div><br>
                          </div>
                          <div>I could write a whole whitepaper about
                            all detailed reasons, but if you really
                            think about the use case, it should be
                            clear.</div>
                          <div><br>
                          </div>
                          <div>Consider the case where you know users by
                            attributes defined in a SAML federation,
                            where for example serialNumber is NOT used.</div>
                          <div>A CA issues a certificate to a user based
                            an a SAML assertion authentication based on
                            the attribute profile of that federation.</div>
                          <div><br>
                          </div>
                          <div>A user logs in to your service using a
                            SAML assertion, and sends you a signed
                            document associated with the issued
                            certificate.</div>
                          <div>You now need to determine whether that
                            SAML assertion and the certificate
                            represents the same user.</div>
                          <div>You also need to determine that the SAML
                            assertion and the certificate provides
                            compatible levels of assertion for user
                            authentication as defined in your SAML
                            federation.</div>
                          <div><br>
                          </div>
                          <div>This extension gives you exactly the
                            amount of data that is needed in order to do
                            this in an unambiguous fully automated
                            process.</div>
                          <div><br>
                          </div>
                          <span id="OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
                            <blockquote
                              id="MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
                              style="BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid;
                              PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                              <div>
                                <div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields]><span lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->10.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=EN-GB style='mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style='mso-element:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
                                      style="mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                      lang="EN-GB"> In section 4, I
                                      failed to understand the &#8220;dynamic&#8221;
                                      aspect. My understanding is that a
                                      person statically <br>
                                      authenticates to a RA
                                      (Registration Authority) and then
                                      is given back a non-repudiation
                                      certificate <br>
                                      with SAML attributes in it which
                                      may then be used as identity
                                      attributes. <br>
                                      I am unsure what the text in this
                                      section wants to say when using
                                      the words &#8220;dynamic manner&#8221;.<br>
                                    </span></p>
                                </div>
                              </div>
                            </blockquote>
                          </span>
                          <div><br>
                          </div>
                          <div><br>
                          </div>
                          <div>Your view is to restrictive.</div>
                          <div><br>
                          </div>
                          <div>The dynamic aspect of this is that a
                            certificate may be issued on the fly at the
                            instance when it is needed, containing just
                            the information that is needed for one
                            particular situation.</div>
                          <div>This extension is (where this is used in
                            the Swedish national infrastructure) added
                            to certificates that are issued for just one
                            instance of signing, and hence can be
                            dynamically adapted to the needs of the
                            intended relying party.</div>
                          <div><br>
                          </div>
                          <div>Next time the user signs, a new key pair
                            is generated with new certs that may contain
                            another set of the user's attributes.</div>
                          <div><br>
                          </div>
                          <div>The first instance may for example
                            contain the users private identity based on
                            a national identifier, the second may carry
                            an organisational identity based on employee
                            number.</div>
                          <div>What attributes that are needed in every
                            instance is determined in a service context
                            that is outside the scope of this
                            specification.</div>
                          <div><br>
                          </div>
                          <div>In these certificates, both the national
                            identifier and the employee number may be
                            placed as a serialNumber attribute in the
                            subject field.</div>
                          <div>Despite that, this extension makes it
                            possible for the relying party to know
                            exactly what identity information each
                            certificate carries, as it maps to the
                            attribute profile of a SAML federation.</div>
                          <div><br>
                          </div>
                          <div>/Stefan</div>
                          <div><br>
                          </div>
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                                  <p class="MsoPlainText"><br>
                                  </p>
                                  <p class="MsoPlainText">Denis<br>
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                          <pre wrap="">_______________________________________________
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From ben@digicert.com  Fri Mar  8 08:54:17 2013
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From: "Ben Wilson" <ben@digicert.com>
To: "'pkix'" <pkix@ietf.org>
Date: Fri, 8 Mar 2013 09:54:05 -0700
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Do any of you know whether software should process a certificate chain
properly if I construct a policy OID arc (for SSL/TLS Server Certificates)
as follows?


Intermediate CA Policy OID :  

2.16.840.1.114412.1


End Entity Policy OID :

2.16.840.1.114412.1.1

Thanks,

Ben

 


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<o:shapedefaults v:ext=3D"edit" spidmax=3D"1026" />
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<o:shapelayout v:ext=3D"edit">
<o:idmap v:ext=3D"edit" data=3D"1" />
</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=3DEN-US link=3Dblue =
vlink=3Dpurple><div class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal>Do any of =
you know whether software should process a certificate chain properly if =
I construct a policy OID arc (for SSL/TLS Server Certificates) as =
follows?<o:p></o:p></p><table class=3DMsoNormalTable border=3D0 =
cellpadding=3D0><tr><td style=3D'padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt'><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New =
Roman","serif"'>Intermediate CA Policy OID :&nbsp; =
<o:p></o:p></span></p></td><td style=3D'padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt =
.75pt'><p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span =
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New =
Roman","serif"'>2.16.840.1.114412.1<o:p></o:p></span></p></td></tr><tr><t=
d style=3D'padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt'><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"'>End =
Entity Policy OID :<o:p></o:p></span></p></td><td style=3D'padding:.75pt =
.75pt .75pt .75pt'><p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span =
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New =
Roman","serif"'>2.16.840.1.114412.1.1<o:p></o:p></span></p></td></tr></ta=
ble><p class=3DMsoNormal>Thanks,<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>Ben<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div></body></html>
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From: Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>
To: "ben@digicert.com" <ben@digicert.com>, 'pkix' <pkix@ietf.org>
Date: Fri, 8 Mar 2013 12:23:40 -0500
Thread-Topic: [pkix] OID Processing betwee Intermediate CA and End Entity Certificates
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That depends on the status of the require explicit policy in the path valid=
ation state machine and user acceptable policy set.

At best, the chain is good for no certificate policies.

From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Ben=
 Wilson
Sent: Friday, March 08, 2013 11:54 AM
To: 'pkix'
Subject: [pkix] OID Processing betwee Intermediate CA and End Entity Certif=
icates

Do any of you know whether software should process a certificate chain prop=
erly if I construct a policy OID arc (for SSL/TLS Server Certificates) as f=
ollows?
Intermediate CA Policy OID :

2.16.840.1.114412.1

End Entity Policy OID :

2.16.840.1.114412.1.1

Thanks,
Ben


--_000_B83745DA469B7847811819C5005244AFF3DC95F4scygexch7cygnac_
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<o:idmap v:ext=3D"edit" data=3D"1" />
</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=3DEN-US link=3Dblue vli=
nk=3Dpurple><div class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'c=
olor:#1F497D'>That depends on the status of the require explicit policy in =
the path validation state machine and user acceptable policy set.<o:p></o:p=
></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;<=
/o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>At best,=
 the chain is good for no certificate policies.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p cla=
ss=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><d=
iv><div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0=
in 0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-fa=
mily:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span></b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt=
;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bou=
nces@ietf.org] <b>On Behalf Of </b>Ben Wilson<br><b>Sent:</b> Friday, March=
 08, 2013 11:54 AM<br><b>To:</b> 'pkix'<br><b>Subject:</b> [pkix] OID Proce=
ssing betwee Intermediate CA and End Entity Certificates<o:p></o:p></span><=
/p></div></div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNorm=
al>Do any of you know whether software should process a certificate chain p=
roperly if I construct a policy OID arc (for SSL/TLS Server Certificates) a=
s follows?<o:p></o:p></p><table class=3DMsoNormalTable border=3D0 cellpaddi=
ng=3D0><tr><td style=3D'padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt'><p class=3DMsoNorm=
al><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"'>I=
ntermediate CA Policy OID :&nbsp; <o:p></o:p></span></p></td><td style=3D'p=
adding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt'><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-to=
p-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font=
-family:"Times New Roman","serif"'>2.16.840.1.114412.1<o:p></o:p></span></p=
></td></tr><tr><td style=3D'padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt'><p class=3DMso=
Normal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif=
"'>End Entity Policy OID :<o:p></o:p></span></p></td><td style=3D'padding:.=
75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt'><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:au=
to;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:=
"Times New Roman","serif"'>2.16.840.1.114412.1.1<o:p></o:p></span></p></td>=
</tr></table><p class=3DMsoNormal>Thanks,<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNorma=
l>Ben<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div></body>=
</html>=

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From: "Ben Wilson" <ben@digicert.com>
To: "'pkix'" <pkix@ietf.org>
Date: Fri, 8 Mar 2013 10:36:34 -0700
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Subject: Re: [pkix] OID Processing between Intermediate CA and End Entity Certificates
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I've received a couple of clarifications off-list,  but just to clarify -
policy OIDs at the CA level are constraints on what policies an end entity
certificate may include/assert.  

So if you are creating a subCA, and you are going to use it to issue
certificates under multiple end entity policies, it's better to omit the CP
OID altogether.  Alternatives include specifying all policies (which you may
not know beforehand) or the allpolicies OID.

"In other words, contrary of what some people believe there are no policies
for CAs, there are only policy OIDs for EE certificates."  

 So, the OID arc structure will not work as I thought it might -  like a
filter reading left to right.

Thanks,

Ben


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vlink=3Dpurple><div class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'>I&#8217;ve received a couple of clarifications =
off-list,&nbsp; but just to clarify &#8211; policy OIDs at the CA level =
are constraints on what policies an end entity certificate may =
include/assert.&nbsp; <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'>So if you are creating a subCA, and you are =
going to use it to issue certificates under multiple end entity =
policies, it&#8217;s better to omit the CP OID altogether.&nbsp; =
Alternatives include specifying all policies (which you may not know =
beforehand) or the allpolicies OID.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>&#8220;In other words, =
contrary of what some people believe there are no policies for CAs, =
there are only policy OIDs for EE certificates.&#8221;&nbsp; =
<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;So, the OID arc structure will not work as =
I thought it might -&nbsp; like a filter reading left to =
right.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'>Thanks,<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'>Ben</span><o:p></o:p></p></div></body></html>
------=_NextPart_000_0107_01CE1BE8.CE469D60--


From SChokhani@cygnacom.com  Fri Mar  8 09:46:07 2013
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From: Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>
To: "ben@digicert.com" <ben@digicert.com>, 'pkix' <pkix@ietf.org>
Date: Fri, 8 Mar 2013 12:46:02 -0500
Thread-Topic: [pkix] OID Processing between Intermediate CA and End Entity Certificates
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Omitting policy OID may not work.  The chain may be invalid and is at the b=
est not good for any policies.

From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Ben=
 Wilson
Sent: Friday, March 08, 2013 12:37 PM
To: 'pkix'
Subject: Re: [pkix] OID Processing between Intermediate CA and End Entity C=
ertificates

I've received a couple of clarifications off-list,  but just to clarify - p=
olicy OIDs at the CA level are constraints on what policies an end entity c=
ertificate may include/assert.
So if you are creating a subCA, and you are going to use it to issue certif=
icates under multiple end entity policies, it's better to omit the CP OID a=
ltogether.  Alternatives include specifying all policies (which you may not=
 know beforehand) or the allpolicies OID.
"In other words, contrary of what some people believe there are no policies=
 for CAs, there are only policy OIDs for EE certificates."
 So, the OID arc structure will not work as I thought it might -  like a fi=
lter reading left to right.
Thanks,
Ben

--_000_B83745DA469B7847811819C5005244AFF3DC95FAscygexch7cygnac_
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<o:idmap v:ext=3D"edit" data=3D"1" />
</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=3DEN-US link=3Dblue vli=
nk=3Dpurple><div class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'c=
olor:#1F497D'>Omitting policy OID may not work.&nbsp; The chain may be inva=
lid and is at the best not good for any policies.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p c=
lass=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>=
<div><div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt=
 0in 0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-=
family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span></b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0=
pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-b=
ounces@ietf.org] <b>On Behalf Of </b>Ben Wilson<br><b>Sent:</b> Friday, Mar=
ch 08, 2013 12:37 PM<br><b>To:</b> 'pkix'<br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [pkix] OID=
 Processing between Intermediate CA and End Entity Certificates<o:p></o:p><=
/span></p></div></div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3D=
MsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>I&#8217;ve received a couple of cla=
rifications off-list,&nbsp; but just to clarify &#8211; policy OIDs at the =
CA level are constraints on what policies an end entity certificate may inc=
lude/assert.&nbsp; <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=
=3D'color:#1F497D'>So if you are creating a subCA, and you are going to use=
 it to issue certificates under multiple end entity policies, it&#8217;s be=
tter to omit the CP OID altogether.&nbsp; Alternatives include specifying a=
ll policies (which you may not know beforehand) or the allpolicies OID.<o:p=
></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>&#8220=
;In other words, contrary of what some people believe there are no policies=
 for CAs, there are only policy OIDs for EE certificates.&#8221;&nbsp; <o:p=
></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;=
So, the OID arc structure will not work as I thought it might -&nbsp; like =
a filter reading left to right.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><=
span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>Thanks,<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNor=
mal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>Ben</span><o:p></o:p></p></div></body></h=
tml>=

--_000_B83745DA469B7847811819C5005244AFF3DC95FAscygexch7cygnac_--

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From: "Ben Wilson" <ben@digicert.com>
To: "'Santosh Chokhani'" <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>, "'pkix'" <pkix@ietf.org>
References: <010601ce1c23$7aa50030$6fef0090$@digicert.com> <B83745DA469B7847811819C5005244AFF3DC95FA@scygexch7.cygnacom.com>
In-Reply-To: <B83745DA469B7847811819C5005244AFF3DC95FA@scygexch7.cygnacom.com>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] OID Processing between Intermediate CA and End Entity	Certificates
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Thanks, Santosh.  So, is best practice to put in the 2.5.29.32.0 -
"anyPolicy" OID? 

 

From: Santosh Chokhani [mailto:SChokhani@cygnacom.com] 
Sent: Friday, March 08, 2013 10:46 AM
To: ben@digicert.com; 'pkix'
Subject: RE: [pkix] OID Processing between Intermediate CA and End Entity
Certificates

 

Omitting policy OID may not work.  The chain may be invalid and is at the
best not good for any policies.

 

From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Ben
Wilson
Sent: Friday, March 08, 2013 12:37 PM
To: 'pkix'
Subject: Re: [pkix] OID Processing between Intermediate CA and End Entity
Certificates

 

I've received a couple of clarifications off-list,  but just to clarify -
policy OIDs at the CA level are constraints on what policies an end entity
certificate may include/assert.  

So if you are creating a subCA, and you are going to use it to issue
certificates under multiple end entity policies, it's better to omit the CP
OID altogether.  Alternatives include specifying all policies (which you may
not know beforehand) or the allpolicies OID.

"In other words, contrary of what some people believe there are no policies
for CAs, there are only policy OIDs for EE certificates."  

 So, the OID arc structure will not work as I thought it might -  like a
filter reading left to right.

Thanks,

Ben


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</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=3DEN-US link=3Dblue =
vlink=3Dpurple><div class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'>Thanks, Santosh.&nbsp; So, is best practice to =
put in the 2.5.29.32.0 - &quot;anyPolicy&#8221; OID? =
<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><div><div =
style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in =
0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span>=
</b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> =
Santosh Chokhani [mailto:SChokhani@cygnacom.com] <br><b>Sent:</b> =
Friday, March 08, 2013 10:46 AM<br><b>To:</b> ben@digicert.com; =
'pkix'<br><b>Subject:</b> RE: [pkix] OID Processing between Intermediate =
CA and End Entity Certificates<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'>Omitting policy OID may not work.&nbsp; The =
chain may be invalid and is at the best not good for any =
policies.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><div><div =
style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in =
0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span>=
</b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> =
<a href=3D"mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org">pkix-bounces@ietf.org</a> [<a =
href=3D"mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org">mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org</a>] =
<b>On Behalf Of </b>Ben Wilson<br><b>Sent:</b> Friday, March 08, 2013 =
12:37 PM<br><b>To:</b> 'pkix'<br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [pkix] OID =
Processing between Intermediate CA and End Entity =
Certificates<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'>I&#8217;ve received a couple of clarifications =
off-list,&nbsp; but just to clarify &#8211; policy OIDs at the CA level =
are constraints on what policies an end entity certificate may =
include/assert.&nbsp; <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'>So if you are creating a subCA, and you are =
going to use it to issue certificates under multiple end entity =
policies, it&#8217;s better to omit the CP OID altogether.&nbsp; =
Alternatives include specifying all policies (which you may not know =
beforehand) or the allpolicies OID.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>&#8220;In other words, =
contrary of what some people believe there are no policies for CAs, =
there are only policy OIDs for EE certificates.&#8221;&nbsp; =
<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;So, the OID arc structure will not work as =
I thought it might -&nbsp; like a filter reading left to =
right.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'>Thanks,<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'>Ben</span><o:p></o:p></p></div></body></html>
------=_NextPart_000_0118_01CE1BEA.AAE3B4F0--


From SChokhani@cygnacom.com  Fri Mar  8 09:52:26 2013
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From: Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>
To: "ben@digicert.com" <ben@digicert.com>, 'pkix' <pkix@ietf.org>
Date: Fri, 8 Mar 2013 12:52:17 -0500
Thread-Topic: [pkix] OID Processing between Intermediate CA and End Entity Certificates
Thread-Index: AQC2Ehg+PnyaJggAPdetcbY2awQIAwE+PWqJmsI0LaCAAACwgA==
Message-ID: <B83745DA469B7847811819C5005244AFF3DC95FE@scygexch7.cygnacom.com>
References: <010601ce1c23$7aa50030$6fef0090$@digicert.com> <B83745DA469B7847811819C5005244AFF3DC95FA@scygexch7.cygnacom.com> <011701ce1c25$5741f0b0$05c5d210$@digicert.com>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] OID Processing between Intermediate CA and End Entity	Certificates
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--_000_B83745DA469B7847811819C5005244AFF3DC95FEscygexch7cygnac_
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Yes, except some products such as Windows XP and other toolkits may  treat =
"anyPolicy" as a simple OID and not a wild card.

I generally recommend customers to spell out the OIDs.

From: Ben Wilson [mailto:ben@digicert.com]
Sent: Friday, March 08, 2013 12:50 PM
To: Santosh Chokhani; 'pkix'
Subject: RE: [pkix] OID Processing between Intermediate CA and End Entity C=
ertificates

Thanks, Santosh.  So, is best practice to put in the 2.5.29.32.0 - "anyPoli=
cy" OID?

From: Santosh Chokhani [mailto:SChokhani@cygnacom.com]
Sent: Friday, March 08, 2013 10:46 AM
To: ben@digicert.com<mailto:ben@digicert.com>; 'pkix'
Subject: RE: [pkix] OID Processing between Intermediate CA and End Entity C=
ertificates

Omitting policy OID may not work.  The chain may be invalid and is at the b=
est not good for any policies.

From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org<mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org> [mailto:pkix-boun=
ces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Ben Wilson
Sent: Friday, March 08, 2013 12:37 PM
To: 'pkix'
Subject: Re: [pkix] OID Processing between Intermediate CA and End Entity C=
ertificates

I've received a couple of clarifications off-list,  but just to clarify - p=
olicy OIDs at the CA level are constraints on what policies an end entity c=
ertificate may include/assert.
So if you are creating a subCA, and you are going to use it to issue certif=
icates under multiple end entity policies, it's better to omit the CP OID a=
ltogether.  Alternatives include specifying all policies (which you may not=
 know beforehand) or the allpolicies OID.
"In other words, contrary of what some people believe there are no policies=
 for CAs, there are only policy OIDs for EE certificates."
 So, the OID arc structure will not work as I thought it might -  like a fi=
lter reading left to right.
Thanks,
Ben

--_000_B83745DA469B7847811819C5005244AFF3DC95FEscygexch7cygnac_
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<html xmlns:v=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:vml" xmlns:o=3D"urn:schemas-micr=
osoft-com:office:office" xmlns:w=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:word" =
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</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=3DEN-US link=3Dblue vli=
nk=3Dpurple><div class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'c=
olor:#1F497D'>Yes, except some products such as Windows XP and other toolki=
ts may &nbsp;treat &#8220;anyPolicy&#8221; as a simple OID and not a wild c=
ard.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D=
'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F=
497D'>I generally recommend customers to spell out the OIDs.<o:p></o:p></sp=
an></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>=
</span></p><div><div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;pa=
dding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span style=3D'font-size:1=
0.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span></b><span style=3D'fon=
t-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> Ben Wilson [mailto:ben@di=
gicert.com] <br><b>Sent:</b> Friday, March 08, 2013 12:50 PM<br><b>To:</b> =
Santosh Chokhani; 'pkix'<br><b>Subject:</b> RE: [pkix] OID Processing betwe=
en Intermediate CA and End Entity Certificates<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><=
/div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span s=
tyle=3D'color:#1F497D'>Thanks, Santosh.&nbsp; So, is best practice to put i=
n the 2.5.29.32.0 - &quot;anyPolicy&#8221; OID? <o:p></o:p></span></p><p cl=
ass=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><=
div><div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt =
0in 0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-f=
amily:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span></b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0p=
t;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> Santosh Chokhani [<a href=3D"mailto:S=
Chokhani@cygnacom.com">mailto:SChokhani@cygnacom.com</a>] <br><b>Sent:</b> =
Friday, March 08, 2013 10:46 AM<br><b>To:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:ben@digicer=
t.com">ben@digicert.com</a>; 'pkix'<br><b>Subject:</b> RE: [pkix] OID Proce=
ssing between Intermediate CA and End Entity Certificates<o:p></o:p></span>=
</p></div></div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNor=
mal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>Omitting policy OID may not work.&nbsp; T=
he chain may be invalid and is at the best not good for any policies.<o:p><=
/o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nb=
sp;</o:p></span></p><div><div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF=
 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span style=3D'fo=
nt-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span></b><span sty=
le=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> <a href=3D"mailt=
o:pkix-bounces@ietf.org">pkix-bounces@ietf.org</a> [<a href=3D"mailto:pkix-=
bounces@ietf.org">mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org</a>] <b>On Behalf Of </b>Ben=
 Wilson<br><b>Sent:</b> Friday, March 08, 2013 12:37 PM<br><b>To:</b> 'pkix=
'<br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [pkix] OID Processing between Intermediate CA and =
End Entity Certificates<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p class=3DMsoNorm=
al><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>=
I&#8217;ve received a couple of clarifications off-list,&nbsp; but just to =
clarify &#8211; policy OIDs at the CA level are constraints on what policie=
s an end entity certificate may include/assert.&nbsp; <o:p></o:p></span></p=
><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>So if you are creating =
a subCA, and you are going to use it to issue certificates under multiple e=
nd entity policies, it&#8217;s better to omit the CP OID altogether.&nbsp; =
Alternatives include specifying all policies (which you may not know before=
hand) or the allpolicies OID.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><sp=
an style=3D'color:#1F497D'>&#8220;In other words, contrary of what some peo=
ple believe there are no policies for CAs, there are only policy OIDs for E=
E certificates.&#8221;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><sp=
an style=3D'color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;So, the OID arc structure will not work as=
 I thought it might -&nbsp; like a filter reading left to right.<o:p></o:p>=
</span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>Thanks,<o:p><=
/o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>Ben</spa=
n><o:p></o:p></p></div></body></html>=

--_000_B83745DA469B7847811819C5005244AFF3DC95FEscygexch7cygnac_--

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Date: Fri, 08 Mar 2013 12:52:58 -0500
From: Carl Wallace <carl@redhoundsoftware.com>
To: <ben@digicert.com>, 'pkix' <pkix@ietf.org>
Message-ID: <CD5F8F82.3C439%carl@redhoundsoftware.com>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] OID Processing between Intermediate CA and End Entity Certificates
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Sounds like you may be looking for EKU-type semantics, at least before thos=
e
were altered to be like the certificate policy semantics that won't work fo=
r
you. =20

From:  Ben Wilson <ben@digicert.com>
Organization:  DigiCert
Reply-To:  <ben@digicert.com>
Date:  Friday, March 8, 2013 12:49 PM
To:  Santosh Chokhani <schokhani@cygnacom.com>, 'pkix' <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject:  Re: [pkix] OID Processing between Intermediate CA and End Entity
Certificates

> Thanks, Santosh.  So, is best practice to put in the 2.5.29.32.0 - "anyPo=
licy=B2
> OID?=20
> =20
>=20
> From: Santosh Chokhani [mailto:SChokhani@cygnacom.com]
> Sent: Friday, March 08, 2013 10:46 AM
> To: ben@digicert.com; 'pkix'
> Subject: RE: [pkix] OID Processing between Intermediate CA and End Entity
> Certificates
> =20
> Omitting policy OID may not work.  The chain may be invalid and is at the=
 best
> not good for any policies.
> =20
>=20
> From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of B=
en
> Wilson
> Sent: Friday, March 08, 2013 12:37 PM
> To: 'pkix'
> Subject: Re: [pkix] OID Processing between Intermediate CA and End Entity
> Certificates
> =20
> I=B9ve received a couple of clarifications off-list,  but just to clarify =AD
> policy OIDs at the CA level are constraints on what policies an end entit=
y
> certificate may include/assert.
> So if you are creating a subCA, and you are going to use it to issue
> certificates under multiple end entity policies, it=B9s better to omit the =
CP
> OID altogether.  Alternatives include specifying all policies (which you =
may
> not know beforehand) or the allpolicies OID.
> =B3In other words, contrary of what some people believe there are no polici=
es
> for CAs, there are only policy OIDs for EE certificates.=B2
>  So, the OID arc structure will not work as I thought it might -  like a
> filter reading left to right.
> Thanks,
> Ben
> _______________________________________________ pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix



--B_3445591983_3517841
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<html><head></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: s=
pace; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-size:=
 14px; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><div>Sounds like you may be looki=
ng for EKU-type semantics, at least before those were altered to be like the=
&nbsp;certificate policy&nbsp;semantics that won't work for you. &nbsp;</div=
><div><br></div><span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION"><div style=3D"font-family:Cali=
bri; font-size:11pt; text-align:left; color:black; BORDER-BOTTOM: medium non=
e; BORDER-LEFT: medium none; PADDING-BOTTOM: 0in; PADDING-LEFT: 0in; PADDING=
-RIGHT: 0in; BORDER-TOP: #b5c4df 1pt solid; BORDER-RIGHT: medium none; PADDI=
NG-TOP: 3pt"><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">From: </span> Ben Wilson &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:ben@digicert.com">ben@digicert.com</a>&gt;<br><span style=3D"font=
-weight:bold">Organization: </span> DigiCert<br><span style=3D"font-weight:bol=
d">Reply-To: </span> &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ben@digicert.com">ben@digicert.com<=
/a>&gt;<br><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">Date: </span> Friday, March 8, 201=
3 12:49 PM<br><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">To: </span> Santosh Chokhani &l=
t;<a href=3D"mailto:schokhani@cygnacom.com">schokhani@cygnacom.com</a>&gt;, 'p=
kix' &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br><span style=
=3D"font-weight:bold">Subject: </span> Re: [pkix] OID Processing between Inter=
mediate CA and End Entity Certificates<br></div><div><br></div><blockquote i=
d=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; =
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<o:idmap v:ext=3D"edit" data=3D"1" />
</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--><div lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purp=
le"><div class=3D"WordSection1"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"color:#1F497=
D">Thanks, Santosh.&nbsp; So, is best practice to put in the 2.5.29.32.0 - "=
anyPolicy&#8221; OID? <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=
=3D"color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><div><div style=3D"border:none;bo=
rder-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"=
><b><span style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma, sans-serif; ">From:</=
span></b><span style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma, sans-serif; "> S=
antosh Chokhani [<a href=3D"mailto:SChokhani@cygnacom.com">mailto:SChokhani@cy=
gnacom.com</a>] <br><b>Sent:</b> Friday, March 08, 2013 10:46 AM<br><b>To:</=
b> <a href=3D"mailto:ben@digicert.com">ben@digicert.com</a>; 'pkix'<br><b>Subj=
ect:</b> RE: [pkix] OID Processing between Intermediate CA and End Entity Ce=
rtificates<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;=
</o:p></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"color:#1F497D">Omitting policy O=
ID may not work.&nbsp; The chain may be invalid and is at the best not good =
for any policies.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"col=
or:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><div><div style=3D"border:none;border-=
top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><=
span style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma, sans-serif; ">From:</span>=
</b><span style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma, sans-serif; "> <a hre=
f=3D"mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org">pkix-bounces@ietf.org</a> [<a href=3D"mailto:=
pkix-bounces@ietf.org">mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org</a>] <b>On Behalf Of </b=
>Ben Wilson<br><b>Sent:</b> Friday, March 08, 2013 12:37 PM<br><b>To:</b> 'p=
kix'<br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [pkix] OID Processing between Intermediate CA an=
d End Entity Certificates<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p class=3D"MsoNorm=
al"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"color:#1F497D">I&=
#8217;ve received a couple of clarifications off-list,&nbsp; but just to cla=
rify &#8211; policy OIDs at the CA level are constraints on what policies an=
 end entity certificate may include/assert.&nbsp; <o:p></o:p></span></p><p c=
lass=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"color:#1F497D">So if you are creating a subCA,=
 and you are going to use it to issue certificates under multiple end entity=
 policies, it&#8217;s better to omit the CP OID altogether.&nbsp; Alternativ=
es include specifying all policies (which you may not know beforehand) or th=
e allpolicies OID.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"co=
lor:#1F497D">&#8220;In other words, contrary of what some people believe the=
re are no policies for CAs, there are only policy OIDs for EE certificates.&=
#8221;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"color:#=
1F497D">&nbsp;So, the OID arc structure will not work as I thought it might =
-&nbsp; like a filter reading left to right.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"=
MsoNormal"><span style=3D"color:#1F497D">Thanks,<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=
=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"color:#1F497D">Ben</span><o:p></o:p></p></div></di=
v></div>_______________________________________________
pkix mailing list
<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix">https://www.ietf.org/m=
ailman/listinfo/pkix</a>
</blockquote></span></body></html>

--B_3445591983_3517841--



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From: "Piyush Jain" <piyush@ditenity.com>
To: "'Santosh Chokhani'" <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>, <ben@digicert.com>, "'pkix'" <pkix@ietf.org>
References: <010601ce1c23$7aa50030$6fef0090$@digicert.com> <B83745DA469B7847811819C5005244AFF3DC95FA@scygexch7.cygnacom.com> <011701ce1c25$5741f0b0$05c5d210$@digicert.com> <B83745DA469B7847811819C5005244AFF3DC95FE@scygexch7.cygnacom.com>
In-Reply-To: <B83745DA469B7847811819C5005244AFF3DC95FE@scygexch7.cygnacom.com>
Date: Fri, 8 Mar 2013 10:36:05 -0800
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Subject: Re: [pkix] OID Processing between Intermediate CA and End Entity	Certificates
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That may be the reason why some CA certificates have explicit policy OIDs as
well as "anyPolicy" OID in the CP extension.

 

From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
Santosh Chokhani
Sent: Friday, March 08, 2013 9:52 AM
To: ben@digicert.com; 'pkix'
Subject: Re: [pkix] OID Processing between Intermediate CA and End Entity
Certificates

 

Yes, except some products such as Windows XP and other toolkits may  treat
"anyPolicy" as a simple OID and not a wild card.

 

I generally recommend customers to spell out the OIDs.

 

From: Ben Wilson [mailto:ben@digicert.com] 
Sent: Friday, March 08, 2013 12:50 PM
To: Santosh Chokhani; 'pkix'
Subject: RE: [pkix] OID Processing between Intermediate CA and End Entity
Certificates

 

Thanks, Santosh.  So, is best practice to put in the 2.5.29.32.0 -
"anyPolicy" OID? 

 

From: Santosh Chokhani [mailto:SChokhani@cygnacom.com] 
Sent: Friday, March 08, 2013 10:46 AM
To: ben@digicert.com; 'pkix'
Subject: RE: [pkix] OID Processing between Intermediate CA and End Entity
Certificates

 

Omitting policy OID may not work.  The chain may be invalid and is at the
best not good for any policies.

 

From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Ben
Wilson
Sent: Friday, March 08, 2013 12:37 PM
To: 'pkix'
Subject: Re: [pkix] OID Processing between Intermediate CA and End Entity
Certificates

 

I've received a couple of clarifications off-list,  but just to clarify -
policy OIDs at the CA level are constraints on what policies an end entity
certificate may include/assert.  

So if you are creating a subCA, and you are going to use it to issue
certificates under multiple end entity policies, it's better to omit the CP
OID altogether.  Alternatives include specifying all policies (which you may
not know beforehand) or the allpolicies OID.

"In other words, contrary of what some people believe there are no policies
for CAs, there are only policy OIDs for EE certificates."  

 So, the OID arc structure will not work as I thought it might -  like a
filter reading left to right.

Thanks,

Ben


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vlink=3Dpurple><div class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'>That may be the reason why some CA certificates =
have explicit policy OIDs as well as &#8220;anyPolicy&#8221; OID in the =
CP extension.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><div =
style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0in 0in 0in =
4.0pt'><div><div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF =
1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span>=
</b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> =
pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] <b>On Behalf Of =
</b>Santosh Chokhani<br><b>Sent:</b> Friday, March 08, 2013 9:52 =
AM<br><b>To:</b> ben@digicert.com; 'pkix'<br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [pkix] =
OID Processing between Intermediate CA and End Entity =
Certificates<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'>Yes, except some products such as Windows XP and =
other toolkits may &nbsp;treat &#8220;anyPolicy&#8221; as a simple OID =
and not a wild card.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>I generally recommend =
customers to spell out the OIDs.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><div><div =
style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in =
0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span>=
</b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> =
Ben Wilson <a =
href=3D"mailto:[mailto:ben@digicert.com]">[mailto:ben@digicert.com]</a> =
<br><b>Sent:</b> Friday, March 08, 2013 12:50 PM<br><b>To:</b> Santosh =
Chokhani; 'pkix'<br><b>Subject:</b> RE: [pkix] OID Processing between =
Intermediate CA and End Entity =
Certificates<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'>Thanks, Santosh.&nbsp; So, is best practice to =
put in the 2.5.29.32.0 - &quot;anyPolicy&#8221; OID? =
<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><div><div =
style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in =
0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span>=
</b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> =
Santosh Chokhani [<a =
href=3D"mailto:SChokhani@cygnacom.com">mailto:SChokhani@cygnacom.com</a>]=
 <br><b>Sent:</b> Friday, March 08, 2013 10:46 AM<br><b>To:</b> <a =
href=3D"mailto:ben@digicert.com">ben@digicert.com</a>; =
'pkix'<br><b>Subject:</b> RE: [pkix] OID Processing between Intermediate =
CA and End Entity Certificates<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'>Omitting policy OID may not work.&nbsp; The =
chain may be invalid and is at the best not good for any =
policies.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><div><div =
style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in =
0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span>=
</b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> =
<a href=3D"mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org">pkix-bounces@ietf.org</a> [<a =
href=3D"mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org">mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org</a>] =
<b>On Behalf Of </b>Ben Wilson<br><b>Sent:</b> Friday, March 08, 2013 =
12:37 PM<br><b>To:</b> 'pkix'<br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [pkix] OID =
Processing between Intermediate CA and End Entity =
Certificates<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'>I&#8217;ve received a couple of clarifications =
off-list,&nbsp; but just to clarify &#8211; policy OIDs at the CA level =
are constraints on what policies an end entity certificate may =
include/assert.&nbsp; <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'>So if you are creating a subCA, and you are =
going to use it to issue certificates under multiple end entity =
policies, it&#8217;s better to omit the CP OID altogether.&nbsp; =
Alternatives include specifying all policies (which you may not know =
beforehand) or the allpolicies OID.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>&#8220;In other words, =
contrary of what some people believe there are no policies for CAs, =
there are only policy OIDs for EE certificates.&#8221;&nbsp; =
<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;So, the OID arc structure will not work as =
I thought it might -&nbsp; like a filter reading left to =
right.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'>Thanks,<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'>Ben</span><o:p></o:p></p></div></div></body></htm=
l>
------=_NextPart_000_06EB_01CE1BE8.BDEC5DB0--


From mrex@sap.com  Fri Mar  8 15:18:34 2013
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Denis,

While I have no personal interest or use in this proposal myself,
I'm somewhat confused by your message.

Denis Pinkas wrote:
> 
> Allowing to have SAML attributes in a PKC would be a very good thing. 
> However, the relying party DOES NOT care
> how these SAML attributes have been translated into a subject DN. It is 
> the responsibility of the CA.

Stefan said that he _has_ RPs who care.  Where is your problem with this?


> 
> Thus, if the scope only remains to know how the correspondence was made 
> between  the SAML attributes and
> the subject DN, I don't believe that this document will be useful for 
> the Internet community and thus I am still unconvinced
> that this document should progress as an Internet Draft.

"progress as Internet Draft"?
(I have not the slightest idea what that is.)

>From the document header, Stefan seems to be looking for an Individual
Submission with the intended document status "Informational".

Were you thinking of a Standards track document?
Or were you thinking about a WG work item (Last thing I heard was that
PKIX is scheduled to shut down (as IETF WG) and not accepting any further
work items).  Only the latter two would need any kind of "approval".


Stefan's primary interest seems to be sharing information about what he
does (or intends to do) with the IETF community.  And Stefan seems to
solicit and accept feedback and suggestions from the PKIX community
to make this work more useful to others.


> 
> If the scope is changed to allow to include SAML attributes as another 
> name form in a PKC, then this is
> an important issue which deserves an Internet Draft.

Stefan indicated that he needs this extension to convey information
that does not qualify as SAN/otherName, so this feedback seems to be
missing the point.

If you have a need for this, you might have to create your own proposal/I-D
to fit this purpose.


-Martin

From wwwrun@rfc-editor.org  Sun Mar 10 07:30:44 2013
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Subject: [pkix] [Editorial Errata Reported] RFC6844 (3528)
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The following errata report has been submitted for RFC6844,
"DNS Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) Resource Record".

--------------------------------------
You may review the report below and at:
http://www.rfc-editor.org/errata_search.php?rfc=6844&eid=3528

--------------------------------------
Type: Editorial
Reported by: Sean Turner <turners@ieca.com>

Section: s7.3

Original Text
-------------
Reserved>

Corrected Text
--------------
Reserved

Notes
-----
The additional ">" is unnecessary.

Instructions:
-------------
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use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or
rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party (IESG)
can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary. 

--------------------------------------
RFC6844 (draft-ietf-pkix-caa-15)
--------------------------------------
Title               : DNS Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) Resource Record
Publication Date    : January 2013
Author(s)           : P. Hallam-Baker, R. Stradling
Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
Source              : Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509)
Area                : Security
Stream              : IETF
Verifying Party     : IESG

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Subject: [pkix] [Editorial Errata Reported] RFC6844 (3532)
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The following errata report has been submitted for RFC6844,
"DNS Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) Resource Record".

--------------------------------------
You may review the report below and at:
http://www.rfc-editor.org/errata_search.php?rfc=6844&eid=3532

--------------------------------------
Type: Editorial
Reported by: Sean Turner <turners@ieca.com>

Section: s7.3

Original Text
-------------
1-7          Reserved                 [RFC6844]


Corrected Text
--------------
1-7          Unassigned              [RFC6844]


Notes
-----
"Unassigned" is better than Reserved.

Instructions:
-------------
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can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary. 

--------------------------------------
RFC6844 (draft-ietf-pkix-caa-15)
--------------------------------------
Title               : DNS Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) Resource Record
Publication Date    : January 2013
Author(s)           : P. Hallam-Baker, R. Stradling
Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
Source              : Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509)
Area                : Security
Stream              : IETF
Verifying Party     : IESG

From denis.pinkas@bull.net  Mon Mar 11 02:15:07 2013
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Cc: pkix <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] Review of 2560-bis draft 8. Answer to WGLC
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This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
--------------010606060500020302040001
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

*Stefan,*

**

*The review of your individual draft, took me the time I had during the=20
week for the IETF stuff;
hence, why this reply has been delayed.*

*The situation is rather simple, if we forget about the editorial comment=
s,
you have accepted one minor text change and that=92s all.*

**

*So the major problems are not solved to my satisfaction.*

**

*I have maintained below the portion of the text which needs to be=20
further discussed. **
**My comments are in blue.*

**

*There is a new and very important issue that I discovered while reading=20
your comments. **
**See the discussion about singleExtensions and of responseExtensions.*

*Comment 8*: You have changed the meaning of the revoked state in a way=20
that is not what I requested.

The original text was:

*The "revoked" state indicates that the certificate has been revoked*

*(either permanantly or temporarily (on hold)).*

The new text is:

*    The "revoked" state indicates that the certificate has been revoked*

*    either permanently or temporarily on hold (i.e. the revocation reaso=
n*

*    is certificateHold).*

By doing this, you do not allow any other case in the future to have a=20
temporary revocation: =93*temporarily on hold=94***is not the same=20
as*=93**temporarily revoked=94**.*

I propose the following rewording:

*The "revoked" state indicates that the certificate has been revoked *

*    either permanently or temporarily (e.g. placed on hold).*

I substituted "temporarily on hold" with "temporarily. The rest=20
unchanged since the only existing reason code for temporary revocation=20
is certificateHold.

*As you say, the only CURRENT existing reason code for temporary=20
revocation is certificateHold. **
**We must not PREVENT other reasons in the future to mean =93temporary=20
revocation=94, hence why the change is needed.*

The way the text from draft 13 is now written seems to allow using=20
either *=93unknown=94*or *=93revoked=94*for non-issued certificates.
If this is the intent, then the good news is that this does not come=20
anymore into conflict with the French rules which apply
for the Administration since OCSP responders from CAs used by the French=20
Ministries having a direct access to the database of issued certificates
will be able to use *=93unknown*=94, rather than *=93revoked=94*and the r=
eason=20
code *=93onhold=94.*

However, the current text is still mandating the use of *Extended=20
Revoked Definition*, but the rational for its need it is very poor.
As I have said on the PKIX list, the fact that the revocation date is=20
January 1rst, 1970 is fully sufficient to know that we are in that very=20
special case,
and you have not provided a rational to say the contrary.

I have. And I have pointed you to the minutes of the last PKIC meeting.

The consensus of the WG is to have the extension for just those reasons.

As implementer, I don't like heuristics. A date of Jan 1st 1970 may=20
indicate this behaviour,
but may just be a misconfiguration. It is not an explicit statement.

So we could get rid of it, =85 but the text from section 4.4.8 states:

*    This extension MAY be present in other responses to signal that the*

*    responder implements the extended revoked definition in section 2.2.=
*

I have difficulties to understand what is really meant there (=93other=20
responses=94 ?), since the text states:

*    This extension indicates that the responder supports the extended*

*    definition of the "revoked" status to also include non-issued*

*    certificates according to section 2.2.*

Since both =93unknown=94 and revoked=94 can be used, it would be desirabl=
e to=20
be able to include the same extension in both cases,
but in that case that extension should be renamed.

This extension can be included in all responses to signal that a=20
responder implements the expanded definition of revoked.

Doing so makes this fact auditable without having to ask for a=20
non-issued cert.

I would propose to rename it: "*non-issued certificate*=94 which means=20
that the associated CA has no record of ever having issued a certificate
with the certificate serial number in the request (I still consider it=20
as unnecessary in the case of =93revoked=94, but it would be very useful =
in=20
the case of =93unknown=94).
Of course, the text from section 4.4.8 would need to be revised.

I propose the following:

*  *

*4.4.8   Non-issued certificate extension*

*    This extension MUST be included in the OCSP response when the OCSP*

*    responder knows that the CA identified in the request has no record*

*    of ever having issued a certificate with the certificate serial*

*    number indicated in the request.*

*    Clients do not have to parse this extension in order to determine*

*    the status of certificates in responses.*

*    This extension is identified by the object identifier id-pkix-ocsp-*

*    non-issued-cert.*

*      id-pkix-ocsp-non-issued-cert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=3D {id-pkix-ocsp=
 9}*

*    The value of the extension SHALL be NULL. This extension MUST NOT be=
*

*    marked critical.*

Then the text on page 8 would need to be rearranged.

Your extension  variant is a significant change to what has been agreed.

Your extension would need to be a single response extension, and can't=20
be used to audit the behaviour of the OCSP responder
unless you send a request for a non-issued cert.

*Hummm !!! We have a very important point there. Thanks to your comment,=20
I now realize that the proposed extension
applies to the whole response. However, this is not possible and I will=20
now explain why. An OCSP responder may receive
a delegation from several CAs. With some of them, it can use a direct=20
access to the database of certificates,
while for some others, it will use CRLs. So the meaning of =93revoked=94=20
will depend of the CA. *

**

*This means that the indication cannot be global to the OCSP response.=20
If we use an extension, it can only apply **
**to an individual response and thus MUST in singleExtensions instead of=20
responseExtensions.*

**

*Since it is singleExtension, it can used to =93audit the behaviour of th=
e=20
OCSP responder=94 and I do not grasp your rational **
**when you say =93unless you send a request for a non-issued cert=94. The=
re=20
is no need for sending anything.*

We want to avoid sending such fake requests for audit purposes as it may=20
interfere with systems at the responder trying to detect existence of=20
rouge certificates.

*There is no need to sending fake requests.*

This is a type of change that I can't make unless you get support from a=20
majority of the WG for the change of direction you propose.

*The important point is that the text states:*

**

*=93The "revoked" state (=85) _MAY also be returned_ if the associated CA=
=20
has no record of ever having issued a certificate
with the certificate serial number in the request, using any current or=20
previous issuing key (referred to as a
"non-issued" certificate in this document).=94*

**

*The test does **_not_**state =93**_MUST_**also be returned=94. This mean=
s=20
that it is also possible to reply =93unknown=94 if the associated CA **
**has no record of ever having issued a certificate with the certificate=20
serial number in the request. However, this is not **
**straightforward when reading the text and thus the text should be made=20
more explicit.*

**

*Now, we get to the main point. The reason for adding an extension is=20
NOT to say that an extended meaning of revoked **
**is being used, but that the INDIVIDUAL response is given using a=20
direct access to the records of the certificates issued by the CA.*

The current text is:

*    This state MAY also be returned if the*

*    associated CA has no record of ever having issued a certificate with=
*

*    the certificate serial number in the request, using any current or*

*    previous issuing key (referred to as a "non-issued" certificate in*

*    this document).*

*    The "unknown" state indicates that the responder doesn't know about*

*    the certificate being requested.*

*    NOTE: The "revoked" state for known non-issued certificate serial*

*          numbers is allowed in order to reduce the risk of relying*

*          parties using CRLs as a fall back mechanism, which would be*

*          considerably higher if an "unknown" response was returned.*

*    When a responder responds revoked to a status request for a non-*

*    issued certificate, the responder MUST include the extended revoked*

*    definition response extension (section 4.4.8) in the response,*

*    indicating that the OCSP responder supports the extended definition*

*    of revoked state to also cover non-issued certificates. In addition,=
*

*    the SingleResponse related to this non-issued certificate;*

*     - MUST provide the revocation reason certificateHold (6),*

*     - MUST specify the revocationTime January 1, 1970, and;*

*     - MUST NOT include a CRL References extension (section 4.4.2) or an=
y*

*       CRL Entry Extensions (section 4.4.5).*

Proposed text for a replacement:

*    The "unknown" state indicates that the responder doesn't know about*

*    the certificate being requested.*

 =20

*    If the OCSP responder knows that CA identified in the request has*

*    no record of ever having issued a certificate with the certificate*

*    serial number in the request, using any current or previous issuing*

*    key (referred to as a "non-issued" certificate in this document),*

*    the OCSP responder SHALL respond either =93revoked =93 or =93unknown=
=94.*

This is unfortunately very common in your rewording efforts. When trying=20
to fix one thing, you create new even bigger problems.

An infrastructure that provides reproduced responses will respond=20
"unauthorized". This text may be interpreted to interfere with such=20
operations.

*I fear I don=92t understand your argument about =93unauthorized=94, but=20
before replying see below my next comment.*

Further, and worse. This is not backwards compatible. Current OCSP=20
responders may respond "good" even if they have access to CA records.

*You say: =93Current OCSP responders may respond "good" even if they have=
=20
access to CA records=94. Originally RFC 2560 allowed
returning =93good=94 for OCSP responder using CRLs. Since RFC 2560 provid=
ed=20
no way to indicate that a direct access to the database
was being used or not, it was not possible to do better. *

**

*Now, if an OCSP responder has a direct access and indicates in the=20
response that it has such an access, do you really believe
that it will return good ? I don=92t. *

**

*If an OCSP responder wants to return =93good=94, it can still do it, but=
 in=20
that case it will not signal that it is using a direct access **
**and this is perfectly backwards compatible. So I do not =93buy=94 your=20
argumentation.*

**

*Now, may be you understand better why I propose to rename the extension=20
=934.4.8 Non-issued certificate extension=94 and **
**also to change its semantics.*

*    Note: The "revoked" state for known non-issued certificate serial*

*    numbers is allowed in order to reduce the risk of relying parties*

*     using CRLs as a fall back mechanism, which would be possible when*

*    the "unknown" response is returned.*

*    When a responder responds revoked or unknown to a status request*

*    for a non-issued certificate, the responder MUST include the*

*    non-issued certificate extension (see section 4.4.8) in the*

*    response.*

*    When a responder responds revoked to a status request for a non-*

*    issued certificate, in addition, the responder:*

*     - MUST provide the revocation reason certificateHold (6),*

*     - MUST specify the revocationTime January 1, 1970, and;*

*     - MUST NOT include a CRL References extension (section 4.4.2) or an=
y*

*       CRL Entry Extensions (section 4.4.5).*

Finally, the last bullet on page 4 should be reworded:

Current text:

*       o Section 4.4.8 specifies a new extension that indicates that the=
*

*          responder supports the extended use of the "revoked" response*

*          for non-issued certificates defined in section 2.2.*

Proposed replacement text:

*       o   Section 4.4.8 specifies a new extension that indicates that*

*          the OCSP responder knows that CA identified in the request*

*          has no record of ever having issued a certificate with the*

*          certificate serial number present in the request, as defined*

*          in section 2.2.*

No. Again, this changes the scope of the extension and its audit properti=
es.

Such change requires WG consensus.

*See earlier comments.*

*Comment 9:*Solved, if the comment above may be solved.

*Comment 20*:This comment is preliminary classified by you as =93not=20
broken=94. However, since you asked: =93If you don=92t replace 4.2.2.3,
then what really are you missing ?=94, I will provide you with an answer.

This is the wrong way to state the question. Providing an ASN.1 syntax=20
as in 4.2.1 is not enough: the use of every parameter MUST be explained
using English words. So if you explain the use of every parameter after=20
the description of the ASN.1 syntax in section 4.2.1. then section 4.2.2.=
3
is no more needed and thus can be deleted.

The answer to your question =93what is really missing=94 is a description=
 of=20
the use of every parameter listed in the ASN.1 in section 4.2.1

There are sufficient descriptions in the subsections following the ASN.1=20
description. Your change proposals are not compatible with the minimalist=
ic
approach adopted by the WG.

*The key point is whether we want a =93good=94 document or maintain the l=
ow=20
quality of the original document.***

*Comment 26*: You asked for explanations. Let me provide you with an=20
example when CRLs are being used by the OCSP responder in the background.
The OCSP responder needs to make sure that the CRL it uses is valid. If=20
it is simply using published CRLs (i.e. no trusted link with the CA), it=20
needs
to make sure that the CA which has issued the CRL has no been revoked.

No, this is a misstatement. You don't revoke CAs. You revoke CA=20
certificates.

*Right.*

There might be a CA certificate that has been revoked for a reason that=20
does not affect the OCSP responder.

* ..but the contrary may also apply.*

These are operational policies that are outside the scope of the protocol=
.

*The proposed text does not affect the protocol.*

The proposed text in comment 26 is plain wrong, or at least misleading.=20
The OCSP responder does not have to validate the CRL up to any=20
particular root.
It may for example have been configured to directly trust the public key=20
used to validate the CRL.

*T**his depends how it makes sure that it is reading the right CRL. It=20
may or may not use a root CA.*

In France, there is a root CA for the Administration. However, the use=20
of that root CA is optional. Thus a Ministry may have its own root,
but may also have its key certified by the root CA of the=20
Administration. The OCSP responder may use the root CA of the Ministry,
while a relying party may use the root CA of the Administration (or the=20
reverse) to validate the CRL for the target certificate.
Thus the revocation status will be different if the certificate of the=20
CA of the Ministry is revoked by the root CA of the Administration.

Which reinforces my point. How the OCSP responder is configured to trust=20
its information source is outside the scope of the protocol.

The OCSP protocol never claims to provide the same conclusion about=20
revocation than another source the relying party may use.

*We both agree; however would you point me where this is said in the=20
current draft? Since I could not find it,
I believe it is useful to highlight the point in the security=20
considerations section.
*

*
*

*Finally, I believe that the major point indicated earlier comes from=20
the original "bad writing" of  RFC 2560.*

*There is no clear distinction between what applies to=20
***BasicOCSPResponse* and ***what applies *to Single Response.*

*On page 15 from draft-14, the text still states in section  4.2.2.2 =20
Authorized Responder:

    "It is necessary however to ensure that the entity signing this=20
information is authorized to do so".

This is vague. What is "this information " ? This text is within section=20
"4.2.2  Notes on OCSP Responses".
This does not help much.

Is it BasicOCSPResponse ? If it is , this is wrong.

It is SingleResponse, since a single response may be signed by the right=20
key and/or the right certificate,
but not another single response.

How can a reader guess that it is SingleResponse ?

Once again the quality of the text is really bad, and that text and some=20
other portions  (3.2  Signed Response Acceptance Requirements)
would need to be changed.
*

**

*Denis*



> Denis,
>
> My replies in line;
>
> From: Denis Pinkas <denis.pinkas@bull.net <mailto:denis.pinkas@bull.net=
>>
> Date: Monday, February 11, 2013 3:18 PM
> To: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com <mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com>>
> Cc: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com <mailto:kent@bbn.com>>, pkix=20
> <pkix@ietf.org <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>>
> Subject: Re: [pkix] Review of 2560-bis draft 8. Answer to WGLC
>
>     Stefan,
>
>     I have finally reviewed your disposition of comments. I have used
>     draft 13.
>
>     I will not address the comments in sequence, but I will consider
>     four categories:
>
>     *Category 1)*Some comments which seem to be solved. Yes indeed,
>     they may be a few of them !
>
>     *Category 2)*Some comments which might possibly be solved at the
>     WG level.
>
>     *Category 3)*Some comments that I will address at the IETF last
>     call level, rather than the WG last call level, since I disagree
>     that it is =93new ways to say the same thing=94 and it is likely to=
 be
>     a waste of time for both of us to argue again at the WG level
>     (these comments are commented as =93not broken=94).
>
>     *Category 4)*Some typos and editorials found while reading draft 13=
.
>
>     *CATEGORY 1*
>
>     *Comment 4*(was editorial).
>
>     *Comment 5.*
>
>     **
>
>     *Comment 6. *
>
>     *Comment 19*. Solved, since *=93unknown=94*seems now to be also
>     allowed for non-issued certificates
>     (even if the OCSP responder is using a direct access to the
>     certificate database). See comment 8.
>
>     *Comment 13*: Acceptable, since the text uses *=93MAY=94.*
>
>     *Comment 18. *
>
>     *Comment 22.*
>
>     *Comment 23.*
>
>     *Comment 28.*
>
>     *CATEGORY 1*
>
>     *Comment 8*: You have changed the meaning of the revoked state in
>     a way that is not what I requested.
>
>     The original text was:
>
>     *The "revoked" state indicates that the certificate has been revoke=
d*
>
>     *(either permanantly or temporarily (on hold)).*
>
>     The new text is:
>
>     **
>
>     *    The "revoked" state indicates that the certificate has been re=
voked*
>
>     *    either permanently or temporarily on hold (i.e. the revocation=
 reason*
>
>     *    is certificateHold).*
>
>     By doing this, you do not allow any other case in the future to
>     have a temporary revocation: =93*temporarily on hold=94**
>     *is not the same as*=93**temporarily revoked=94**.*
>
>     I propose the following rewording:
>
>     *The "revoked" state indicates that the certificate has been revoke=
d *
>
>     *    either permanently or temporarily (e.g. placed on hold).*
>
>
> I substituted "temporarily on hold" with "temporarily. The rest=20
> unchanged since the only existing reason code for temporary revocation=20
> is certificateHold.
>
>
>
>     The way the text from draft 13 is now written seems to allow using
>     either *=93unknown=94*or *=93revoked=94*for non-issued certificates=
.
>     If this is the intent, then the good news is that this does not
>     come anymore into conflict with the French rules which apply for
>     the Administration since OCSP responders from CAs used by the
>     French Ministries having a direct access to the database
>     of issued certificates will be able to use *=93unknown*=94, rather
>     than *=93revoked=94*and the reason code *=93onhold=94.*
>
>     However, the current text is still mandating the use of *Extended
>     Revoked Definition*, but the rational for its need it is very poor.
>     As I have said on the PKIX list, the fact that the revocation date
>     is January 1rst, 1970 is fully sufficient to know that we are in th=
at
>     very special case, and you have not provided a rational to say the
>     contrary.
>
>
> I have. And I have pointed you to the minutes of the last PKIC meeting.
> The consensus of the WG is to have the extension for just those reasons=
.
>
> As implementer, I don't like heuristics. A date of Jan 1st 1970 may=20
> indicate this behaviour, but may just be a misconfiguration. It is not=20
> an explicit statement.
>
>     So we could get rid of it, =85 but the text from section 4.4.8 stat=
es:
>
>     *    This extension MAY be present in other responses to signal tha=
t the*
>
>     *    responder implements the extended revoked definition in sectio=
n 2.2.*
>
>     I have difficulties to understand what is really meant there
>     (=93other responses=94 ?), since the text states:
>
>     *    This extension indicates that the responder supports the exten=
ded*
>
>     *    definition of the "revoked" status to also include non-issued*
>
>     *    certificates according to section 2.2.*
>
>     Since both =93unknown=94 and revoked=94 can be used, it would be
>     desirable to be able to include the same extension in both cases,
>     but in that case that extension should be renamed.
>
>
> This extension can be included in all responses to signal that a=20
> responder implements the expanded definition of revoked.
> Doing so makes this fact auditable without having to ask for a=20
> non-issued cert.
>
>
>     I would propose to rename it: "*non-issued certificate*=94 which
>     means that the associated CA has no record of ever having issued
>     a certificate with the certificate serial number in the request (I
>     still consider it as unnecessary in the case of =93revoked=94, but =
it
>     would be
>     very useful in the case of =93unknown=94). Of course, the text from
>     section 4.4.8 would need to be revised.
>
>     I propose the following:
>
>     *4.4.8   Non-issued certificate extension*
>
>     *  *
>
>     *    This extension MUST be included in the OCSP response when the =
OCSP*
>
>     *    responder knows that the CA identified in the request has no r=
ecord*
>
>     *    of ever having issued a certificate with the certificate seria=
l*
>
>     *    number indicated in the request.*
>
>     *  *
>
>     *    Clients do not have to parse this extension in order to determ=
ine*
>
>     *    the status of certificates in responses.*
>
>     *  *
>
>     *    This extension is identified by the object identifier id-pkix-=
ocsp-*
>
>     *    non-issued-cert.*
>
>     *  *
>
>     *      id-pkix-ocsp-non-issued-cert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=3D {id-pki=
x-ocsp 9}*
>
>     *  *
>
>     *    The value of the extension SHALL be NULL. This extension MUST =
NOT be*
>
>     *    marked critical.*
>
>     Then the text on page 8 would need to be rearranged.
>
>
> Your extension  variant is a significant change to what has been agreed=
.
> Your extension would need to be a single response extension, and can't=20
> be used to audit the behaviour of the OCSP responder unless you send a=20
> request for a non-issued cert.
> We want to avoid sending such fake requests for audit purposes as it=20
> may interfere with systems at the responder trying to detect existence=20
> of rouge certificates.
>
> This is a type of change that I can't make unless you get support from=20
> a majority of the WG for the change of direction you propose.
>
>     The current text is:
>
>     *    This state MAY also be returned if the*
>
>     *    associated CA has no record of ever having issued a certificat=
e with*
>
>     *    the certificate serial number in the request, using any curren=
t or*
>
>     *    previous issuing key (referred to as a "non-issued" certificat=
e in*
>
>     *    this document).*
>
>     *  *
>
>     *    The "unknown" state indicates that the responder doesn't know =
about*
>
>     *    the certificate being requested.*
>
>     *  *
>
>     *    NOTE: The "revoked" state for known non-issued certificate ser=
ial*
>
>     *          numbers is allowed in order to reduce the risk of relyin=
g*
>
>     *          parties using CRLs as a fall back mechanism, which would=
 be*
>
>     *          considerably higher if an "unknown" response was returne=
d.*
>
>     *  *
>
>     *    When a responder responds revoked to a status request for a no=
n-*
>
>     *    issued certificate, the responder MUST include the extended re=
voked*
>
>     *    definition response extension (section 4.4.8) in the response,=
*
>
>     *    indicating that the OCSP responder supports the extended defin=
ition*
>
>     *    of revoked state to also cover non-issued certificates. In add=
ition,*
>
>     *    the SingleResponse related to this non-issued certificate;*
>
>     *  *
>
>     *     - MUST provide the revocation reason certificateHold (6),*
>
>     *  *
>
>     *     - MUST specify the revocationTime January 1, 1970, and;*
>
>     *  *
>
>     *      - MUST NOT include a CRL References extension (section 4.4.2=
) or any*
>
>     *       CRL Entry Extensions (section 4.4.5).*
>
>     Proposed text for a replacement:
>
>     *    The "unknown" state indicates that the responder doesn't know =
about*
>
>     *    the certificate being requested.*
>
>     *  *
>
>     *    If the OCSP responder knows that CA identified in the request =
has*
>
>     *    no record of ever having issued a certificate with the certifi=
cate*
>
>     *    serial number in the request, using any current or previous is=
suing*
>
>     *    key (referred to as a "non-issued" certificate in this documen=
t),*
>
>     *    the OCSP responder SHALL respond either =93revoked =93 or =93u=
nknown=94.*
>
>
> This is unfortunately very common in your rewording efforts. When=20
> trying to fix one thing, you create new even bigger problems.
>
> An infrastructure that provides reproduced responses will respond=20
> "unauthorized". This text may be interpreted to interfere with such=20
> operations.
> Further, and worse. This is not backwards compatible. Current OCSP=20
> responders may respond "good" even if they have access to CA records.
>
>     *  *
>
>     *    Note: The "revoked" state for known non-issued certificate ser=
ial*
>
>     *    numbers is allowed in order to reduce the risk of relying part=
ies*
>
>     *    using CRLs as a fall back mechanism, which would be possible w=
hen*
>
>     *    the "unknown" response is returned.*
>
>     *  *
>
>     *    When a responder responds revoked or unknown to a status reque=
st*
>
>     *    for a non-issued certificate, the responder MUST include the*
>
>     *    non-issued certificate extension (see section 4.4.8) in the*
>
>     *    response.*
>
>     *  *
>
>     *    When a responder responds revoked to a status request for a no=
n-*
>
>     *    issued certificate, in addition, the responder:*
>
>     *  *
>
>     *     - MUST provide the revocation reason certificateHold (6),*
>
>     *  *
>
>     *     - MUST specify the revocationTime January 1, 1970, and;*
>
>     *  *
>
>     *     - MUST NOT include a CRL References extension (section 4.4.2)=
 or any*
>
>     *       CRL Entry Extensions (section 4.4.5).*
>
>     Finally, the last bullet on page 4 should be reworded:
>
>     Current text:
>
>     *       o Section 4.4.8 specifies a new extension that indicates th=
at the*
>
>     *          responder supports the extended use of the "revoked" res=
ponse*
>
>     *          for non-issued certificates defined in section 2.2.*
>
>     **
>
>     Proposed replacement text:
>
>     *       o  Section 4.4.8 specifies a new extension that indicates t=
hat*
>
>     *          the OCSP responder knows that CA identified in the reque=
st*
>
>     *          has no record of ever having issued a certificate with t=
he*
>
>     *          certificate serial number present in the request, as def=
ined*
>
>     *          in section 2.2.*
>
>
> No. Again, this changes the scope of the extension and its audit=20
> properties.
> Such change requires WG consensus.
>
>
>     *Comment 9:*Solved, if the comment above may be solved.
>
>     *Comment 20*:This comment is preliminary classified by you as =93no=
t
>     broken=94. However, since you asked: =93If you don=92t replace 4.2.=
2.3,
>     then what really are you missing ?=94, I will provide you with an
>     answer.
>
>     This is the wrong way to state the question. Providing an ASN.1
>     syntax as in 4.2.1 is not enough: the use of every parameter
>     MUST be explained using English words. So if you explain the use
>     of every parameter after the description of the ASN.1 syntax
>     in section 4.2.1. then section 4.2.2.3 is no more needed and thus
>     can be deleted.
>
>     The answer to your question =93what is really missing=94 is a
>     description of the use of every parameter listed in the ASN.1 in
>     section 4.2.1
>
>
> There are sufficient descriptions in the subsections following the=20
> ASN.1 description. Your change proposals are not compatible with the=20
> minimalistic approach adopted by the WG.
>
>
>     *Comment 21.*
>
>     While I can agree in general with the intent of the text, I do not
>     understand the first sentence of the Note which speaks of =93CA key
>     rollover=94
>     and is copied below:
>
>     *    Note: CA key rollover is not prohibited when issuing a certifi=
cate*
>
>     *          for an authorized responder for backwards compatibility =
with*
>
>     *          RFC 2560 [RFC2560]. That is, it is not prohibited to iss=
ue a*
>
>     *          certificate for an authorized responder using a differen=
t*
>
>     *          issuing key than the key used to issued the certificate =
being*
>
>     *          checked for revocation. However, such practice is strong=
ly*
>
>     *          discouraged since clients are not required to recognize =
a*
>
>     *          responder with such certificate as an authorized respond=
er.*
>
>     I would propose to delete it, since it does not add anything and
>     thus to have:
>
>     *    Note: For backwards compatibility with RFC 2560 [RFC2560], it =
is*
>
>     *          not prohibited to issue a certificate for an authorized*
>
>     *          responder using a different issuing key than the key use=
d to*
>
>     *          issued the certificate being checked for revocation.*
>
>     *          However, such practice is strongly discouraged since cli=
ents*
>
>     *          are not required to recognize a responder with such*
>
>     *          certificate as an authorized responder.*
>
>
> I agree, your text is better. Updated.
>
>     *Comment 24*: The ASN.1 module in annex B.1 is still wrong, since
>     it does not define NoCheck.
>
>
> No you are wrong. We have confirmed with several ASN.1 experts that=20
> definition of NoCheck is not necessary to define null content.
> The current definition is perfectly valid ASN.1
>
>     *Comment 26*: You asked for explanations. Let me provide you with
>     an example when CRLs are being used by the OCSP responder
>     in the background. The OCSP responder needs to make sure that the
>     CRL it uses is valid. If it is simply using published CRLs
>     (i.e. no trusted link with the CA), it needs to make sure that the
>     CA which has issued the CRL has no been revoked.
>
>
> No, this is a misstatement. You don't revoke CAs. You revoke CA=20
> certificates. There might be a CA certificate that has been revoked=20
> for a reason that does not affect the OCSP responder.
> These are operational policies that are outside the scope of the protoc=
ol.
>
> The proposed text in comment 26 is plain wrong, or at least=20
> misleading. The OCSP responder does not have to validate the CRL up to=20
> any particular root. It may for example have been configured to=20
> directly trust the public key used to validate the CRL.
>
>
>     In France, there is a root CA for the Administration. However, the
>     use of that root CA is optional. Thus a Ministry may have its own
>     root,
>     but may also have its key certified by the root CA of the
>     Administration. The OCSP responder may use the root CA of the
>     Ministry,
>     while a relying party may use the root CA of the Administration
>     (or the reverse) to validate the CRL for the target certificate.
>     Thus the revocation status will be different if the certificate of
>     the CA of the Ministry is revoked by the root CA of the
>     Administration.
>
>
> Which reinforces my point. How the OCSP responder is configured to=20
> trust its information source is outside the scope of the protocol.
>
> The OCSP protocol never claims to provide the same conclusion about=20
> revocation than another source the relying party may use.
>
> I skip category 3 as this will be dealt with in IESG last call.
>
>
>     *CATEGORY 3*
>
>     *Comments*2, 3, 7, 10, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 25 and 27.
>
>     *CATEGORY 4*
>
>     Page 4. The indentation of the bullets in section 1 is not uniform.
>     Bullets 1, 4, 5 and 9 have problems.
>
>     Page 4. The fact that there is now an Annex B.2 dealing with the
>     2008 ASN.1 syntax is missing. This should be added.
>
>     Page 10. Change =93*Se further section 4.2.2.2=94*into =93*See furt=
her
>     section 4.2.2.2=94
>     *
>
>
>
> Thanks. I have fixed them all.
>
> /Stefan
>
>
>     Denis
>     **
>
>     =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
>
>
>
>>     Denis,
>>
>>     Responding to your comments below.
>>
>>     However, one general remark to make recurring comments easier to
>>     understand.
>>
>>     The WG decided to adopt a minimalistic approach to updating RFC
>>     2560. That means that
>>
>>      1. We don't change anything from RFC 2560 unless it is broken,
>>         or the industry clearly need clarifications in order to avoid
>>         interoperability issues.
>>      2. We retain the document structure of RFC 2560 as much as
>>         possible to allow easy comparison of what the changes are in
>>         comparison with RFC 2560.
>>
>>
>>     One can always think up more clever ways to write things out in
>>     words. But that also comes with a risk.
>>     The current words has been around for a long time and we know
>>     from experience which words worked to produce working
>>     implementations, and which did not.
>>     Introducing new ways to say the same thing may introduce new
>>     problems and people might disagree on what the new perfect
>>     wording should be. And this could go on forever.
>>
>>     So when my reply is "Not broken", then that is because the
>>     current wording does not have such problems that is merits a chang=
e.
>>
>>
>>
>>     From: Denis Pinkas <denis.pinkas@bull.net
>>     <mailto:denis.pinkas@bull.net>>
>>     Date: Sunday, January 20, 2013 5:12 PM
>>     To: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com
>>     <mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com>>, Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com
>>     <mailto:kent@bbn.com>>
>>     Cc: pkix <pkix@ietf.org <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>>
>>     Subject: Re: [pkix] Review of 2560-bis draft 8. Answer to WGLC
>>
>>         Please find 32 comments on draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis
>>
>>         1.The document states:
>>
>>         **<Cut away issue 1 regarding authorship etc, as it has been
>>         responded to separately>
>>
>>
>>     Responded to separately.
>>
>>         2.The current text from section 2 states:
>>
>>         2.   Protocol Overview
>>
>>          =20
>>
>>             In lieu of or as a supplement to checking against a period=
ic CRL, it
>>
>>             may be necessary to obtain*timely information*  regarding =
the
>>
>>             revocation status of a certificate (cf. RFC5280], Section =
3.3).
>>
>>             Examples include high-value funds transfer or large stock =
trades.
>>
>>          =20
>>
>>             The Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) enables appl=
ications to
>>
>>             determine the (revocation) state of an identified certific=
ate. OCSP
>>
>>             may be used to satisfy some of the operational requirement=
s of
>>
>>             providing*more timely revocation information*  than is pos=
sible with
>>
>>             CRLs and may also be used to obtain additional status info=
rmation.
>>
>>          =20
>>
>>         This text is misleading because readers may think that OCPS ne=
cessarily provides =93timely information=94.
>>
>>          =20
>>
>>
>>     "may" does not mean "necessarily".
>>
>>         Proposed text replacement:
>>
>>          =20
>>
>>         *The Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) is a
>>         client-server *
>>
>>         *protocol which enables applications to obtain the revocation
>>         status *
>>
>>         *of one or more certificates either "good", "revoked", or
>>         "unknown".*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *The revocation status may be provided by the server either
>>         using a *
>>
>>         *real time access to a database of issued certificates, or
>>         using a *
>>
>>         *batch access to a database of issued certificates, or using a=
 *
>>
>>         *real time access to a database of revocation statuses of
>>         issued *
>>
>>         *certificates, or using a batch access to a database of
>>         revocation *
>>
>>         *statuses of issued certificates, or using CRLs, or using a *
>>
>>         *combination of base CRLs and delta CRLs.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *In the first case, it is possible to obtain timely
>>         revocation status *
>>
>>         *information, whereas in the other cases, the freshness of the=
 *
>>
>>         *revocation status is not better than the mechanisms it is
>>         based on.*
>>
>>          =20
>>
>>          =20
>>
>>
>>     Not broken
>>
>>         3.The current text from section 2 states:
>>
>>          =20
>>
>>             An OCSP client issues a status request to an OCSP responde=
r and
>>
>>             Suspends acceptance of*the certificate in question*  until=
 the
>>
>>             responder provides a response.
>>
>>          =20
>>
>>             This protocol specifies the data that needs to be exchange=
d between
>>
>>             an application checking the status of a certificate and th=
e server
>>
>>             providing that status.
>>
>>          =20
>>
>>         Thus is insufficient for an overview. More details are needed =
to know what the document provides,
>>         in particular that the request may contain several requests fo=
r several certificates issued by different CAs.
>>         The possibility of using extensions should also be advertised.
>>
>>          =20
>>
>>         Proposed text replacement:
>>
>>          =20
>>
>>         When using OCSP, an OCSP client issues a certificate revocatio=
n
>>
>>         status request to an OCSP responder *for one or more
>>         certificates *
>>
>>         *issued by the same CA or for one or more certificates issued
>>         by *
>>
>>         *different CAs *and then suspends acceptance of the
>>         certificate(s)
>>
>>         in question until the responder provides a response.
>>
>>         This document specifies the data that needs to be exchanged
>>         between
>>
>>         an application checking the status of a certificate and the
>>         server
>>
>>         providing that status.
>>
>>         *OCSP may also provide additional status information using *
>>
>>         *extensions. *
>>
>>
>>     Not broken
>>
>>         4.Page 6. Editorial. Punctuation and a CR/LF are missing.
>>
>>         The text states:
>>
>>         *    3. the request contains the information needed by the res=
ponder If*
>>
>>         *       any one of the prior conditions are not met, the OCSP =
responder*
>>
>>         *       produces an error message; otherwise, it returns a def=
initive*
>>
>>         *       response.*
>>
>>         It should state:
>>
>>         *    4. the request contains the information needed by the res=
ponder.*
>>
>>         *  *
>>
>>         *       If any one of the prior conditions are not met, the OC=
SP responder*
>>
>>         *       produces an error message; otherwise, it returns a def=
initive*
>>
>>         *       response.*
>>
>>
>>     Fixed in draft 10.
>>
>>         5.On page 7, the text states:
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *All definitive response messages SHALL be digitally signed.
>>         The key*
>>
>>         *used to sign the response MUST belong to one of the following=
:*
>>
>>         *  *
>>
>>         *    -   the CA who issued the certificate in question*
>>
>>         *    -   a Trusted Responder whose public key is trusted by th=
e requester*
>>
>>         *    -   a CA Designated Responder (Authorized Responder) who =
holds a*
>>
>>         *       specially marked certificate issued directly by the CA=
, indicating*
>>
>>         *       that the responder may issue OCSP responses for that C=
A.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         The paragraph is ambiguous on several aspects.
>>
>>         Delegation is addressed in at least three different places,
>>         but with different terms and conditions.
>>         If some one picks a sentence in one paragraph rather than
>>         another, it will lead to a different conclusion.
>>         RFCs are supposed to be clear.
>>
>>         On page 10, the current text states in section*2.6 OCSP
>>         Signature Authority Delegation *states:
>>
>>          =20
>>
>>         *The key that signs a certificate's status information need
>>         not be the*
>>
>>         *same key that signed the certificate.**A certificate's issuer=
*
>>
>>         *explicitly delegates OCSP signing authority by issuing a
>>         certificate*
>>
>>         *containing a unique value for extendedKeyUsage in the OCSP
>>         signer's*
>>
>>         *certificate. This certificate MUST be issued directly to the*
>>
>>         *responder by the cognizant CA.*
>>
>>          =20
>>
>>         On page 16, there is a section
>>         *4.2.2.2***called*=93**Authorized Responders=94*dealing with t=
he
>>         same topic.
>>
>>         Section 4.2.2.2 states:
>>
>>         *The key that signs a certificate's status information need
>>         not be the*
>>
>>         *same key that signed the certificate**. It is necessary
>>         however to*
>>
>>         *ensure that the entity signing this information is
>>         authorized to do*
>>
>>         *so.Therefore, a certificate's issuer MAY either sign the OCSP=
*
>>
>>         *responses itself or it MAY explicitly designate this
>>         authority to*
>>
>>         *another entity.OCSP signing delegation SHALL be designated
>>         by the*
>>
>>         *inclusion of id-kp-OCSPSigning in an extendedKeyUsage
>>         certificate*
>>
>>         *extension included in the OCSP response signer's
>>         certificate.This*
>>
>>         *certificate MUST be issued directly by the CA that issued the=
*
>>
>>         *certificate in question.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *The CA SHOULD use the same issuing key to issue a delegation*
>>
>>         *certificate as was used to sign the certificate being
>>         checked for*
>>
>>         *revocation. Systems relying on OCSP responses MUST recognize =
a*
>>
>>         *delegation certificate as being issued by the CA that issued
>>         the*
>>
>>         *certificate in question only if the delegation certificate
>>         and the*
>>
>>         *certificate being checked for revocation was signed by the
>>         same key.***
>>
>>         The last sentence above in yellow is the key sentence that is
>>         missing in the two other sections.
>>
>>          =20
>>
>>         Most implementations only support the case where the OCSP Resp=
onder receives an OCSP certificate that is signed by the same key
>>         that was used to sign the target certificate. They do not supp=
ort the case where the OCSP Responder receives an OCSP certificate
>>         that is signed by a key that is different from the one that wa=
s used to sign the target certificate.
>>
>>         It is inappropriate to have three sections dealing with the
>>         same topic with a slightly different meaning.
>>
>>         It is proposed the following.
>>
>>         On page 7, after:
>>
>>         *    -   a CA Designated Responder (Authorized Responder) who =
holds a*
>>
>>         *       specially marked certificate issued directly by the CA=
, indicating*
>>
>>         *       that the responder may issue OCSP responses for that C=
A.*
>>
>>         it is proposed to add =93(*see section 4.2.2.2 for further
>>         details**)=94*, so that the reader knows that more details are
>>         provided later on.
>>
>>         Then we do not need two sections to address delegation which
>>         start with the same sentence:
>>
>>
>>         =93*The key that signs a certificate's status information need
>>         not be the same key that signed the certificate=94.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         It is thus proposed to delete section 2.6.
>>
>>         Section 4.2.2.2 will thus remain the single section providing
>>         full details.
>>
>>          =20
>>
>>
>>     I have added references to section 4.2.2.2 in the quoted sections
>>     in 2.2 and 2.6.
>>     (will be included in draft 11)
>>
>>
>>         6.  Page 7, the text states:
>>
>>         *    A definitive response message is composed of:*
>>
>>         *  *
>>
>>         *    -   version of the response syntax*
>>
>>         *    -   name of the responder*
>>
>>         *    -   responses for each of the certificates in a request*
>>
>>         *    -   optional extensions*
>>
>>         *    -   signature algorithm OID*
>>
>>         *    -  signature computed across hash of the response*
>>
>>         This description does not fit with the ASN.1 syntax which is
>>         detailed later on, and in particular:
>>
>>         *    ResponseData ::=3D SEQUENCE {*
>>
>>         *       version               [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,=
*
>>
>>         *       **responderID               ResponderID,*
>>
>>         *       producedAt                GeneralizedTime,*
>>
>>         *       responses                 SEQUENCE OF SingleResponse,*
>>
>>         *       responseExtensions    [1] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL=
 }*
>>
>>         Proposed text replacement:
>>
>>         *A definitive response message is composed of:*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *- a response status and if there is no error, the following:*
>>
>>         *- the version of the response syntax,*
>>
>>         *- an identifier of the OCSP server,*
>>
>>         *- the time at which the response was produced,*
>>
>>         *- single responses for each of the target certificates,*
>>
>>         *- optional extensions,*
>>
>>         *- the signature algorithm OID,*
>>
>>         *- the signature computed across hash of the response, and*
>>
>>         *- optional certificates.*
>>
>>
>>     This is an overview section. We ought not try to duplicate the
>>     level of detail provided in the detailed protocol section.
>>     A "definitive response" according to tho 2.1 is a response to an
>>     error-free request, so your first remark is redundant.
>>
>>     I have added a note about time to the current list, and changed
>>     "name" to identifier in bullet 2.
>>     (will be included in draft 11)
>>
>>         7.The text states on page 7:
>>
>>         *The response for each of the certificates in a request
>>         consists of*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *-target certificate identifier*
>>
>>         *-certificate status value*
>>
>>         *-response validity interval*
>>
>>         *-optional extensions*
>>
>>         However, there are no explanations for the purpose of these
>>         parameters and how they should be processed.
>>
>>         There are also no explanations on how to process a single
>>         response and how to verify that it is its presence within the
>>         signed structure
>>         is valid or not valid. This is a major deficiency of the
>>         current description of RC 2560 where there is no explanation
>>         on how to validate
>>         a single response.
>>
>>         Text proposal to be added after:
>>
>>         *The purpose of the identifier of the OCSP server is to allow
>>         OCSP *
>>
>>         *clients to find whether the definitive response was signed
>>         by a CA *
>>
>>         *or by an OCSP Responder.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *The identifier of the OCSP server SHOULD either be the name
>>         or the *
>>
>>         *key from a CA, or the name or the key from a OCSP Responder.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *Unless there exist local rules (which are outside the scope
>>         of this *
>>
>>         *document) for verifying that a single response is correctly
>>         signed, *
>>
>>         *the following applies:*
>>
>>         *When the identifier matches with the name of the CA which
>>         has issued *
>>
>>         *the target certificate or corresponds to the key used to
>>         issue the *
>>
>>         *target certificate, then a single response is correctly signe=
d *
>>
>>         *only if the digital signature of the OCSP response is valid
>>         using the *
>>
>>         *key used to sign the target certificate.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *When the identifier does not match with the name of the CA
>>         which has *
>>
>>         *issued the target certificate or does not correspond to the
>>         key used *
>>
>>         *to issue the target certificate, then an single response is
>>         correctly *
>>
>>         *signed only if :*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *(a) there exists in the response an OCSP certificate issued b=
y *
>>
>>         *the CA which has issued the target certificate which is *
>>
>>         *signed by the same key as the one used to issue the *
>>
>>         *target certificate, and*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *(b) the digital signature of the OCSP response is valid using=
 *
>>
>>         *the subjectPublicKey contained in this OCSP certificate.*
>>
>>
>>     Not broken.
>>     All of this is already covered by the document.
>>
>>         8.The text states on page 7:
>>
>>         The "revoked" state indicates that the certificate has been
>>         revoked
>>
>>         *(either permanently or temporarily (on hold)). *This state
>>         MAY also be
>>
>>         returned if the responder knows that the requested
>>         certificate has
>>
>>         *never been issued during the history of the associated CA
>>         *using any
>>
>>         current or previous issuing key. **
>>
>>         The text is ambiguous because there are two embedded
>>         parenthesis and it is unclear whether the inner parenthesis
>>         means =93i.e=94 or =93e.g=94.
>>         This single sentence may let think that on hold is the single
>>         case for temporarily revocation. Since neither X.509 nor RFC
>>         5280 address
>>         the case of a temporary revocation in the context of an OCSP
>>         response (but only in the context of CRLs), we are able to
>>         add another case
>>         of temporary revocation which will only apply in the context
>>         of OCSP.
>>
>>         The above sentence using the terms=93*never been issued during
>>         the history of the associated CA*=93does not capture the fact
>>         that it could be issued in the future, hence why using=93*not
>>         yet been used=94*would be more appropriate.
>>
>>         Finally, it would have been more logical to use =93unknown=94.=
 So
>>         it is important to add a note to explain why we have chosen
>>         that case for =93legacy clients=94,
>>         otherwise the people who have not participate to the
>>         exchanges will not understand.
>>
>>         Proposed text replacement:
>>
>>             *The "revoked" state indicates that the certificate has be=
en revoked,*
>>
>>         *    either permanently or temporarily.*
>>
>>          =20
>>
>>             A certificate may be temporarily revoked either because it=
 is
>>
>>             placed on hold (*i.e. the revocation reason is certificate=
Hold*) or
>>
>>             because the responder is able to know, using a positive li=
st of
>>
>>             issued certificates, that the serial number from the reque=
sted
>>
>>             certificate has*not yet been used*  by the CA to issue a c=
ertificate
>>
>>             (*i.e. the revocation reason is notIssuedOrIrregularlyIssu=
ed*).
>>
>>          =20
>>
>>         *NOTE: The "revoked" state is used rather than the =93unknown=94=
 state, to*
>>
>>         *       make sure that relying parties that were conformant to=
 RFC 2560*
>>
>>         *       will not use CRLs as a fall back mechanism.*
>>
>>          =20
>>
>>
>>     I removed the double parenthesis and adopted your clarification
>>     with regard to "on hold".
>>
>>     The text in draft 10 has changed from what you have commented on.
>>     I believe that text is better.
>>
>>     You "Note" has problems.
>>
>>      1. We do not prevent responders to respond "unknown" if their
>>         assessment is that this is an appropriate response,
>>         considering what they know about the requested serial number.
>>         Thus the term "is used" is misleading.
>>      2. This mechanisms does not "make sure" that the clients do
>>         anything. It's up to the discretion of the relying party to
>>         decide what source of revocation checking they rely on. This
>>         does however reduce the risk of clients falling back to CRL:s
>>      3. This mechanism is not just relevant to old clients, but also
>>         to new one for the same reason.
>>
>>
>>     I have adopted a modified version of your Note:
>>
>>        NOTE: The "revoked" state for known non-issued certificate seri=
al
>>              numbers is allowed in order to reduce the risk of relying
>>              parties using CRLs as a fall back mechanism, which would =
be
>>              considerably higher if an "unknown" response was returned=
.
>>
>>
>>
>>         9.The text states on page 8:
>>
>>         *When a responder responds revoked to a status request for a
>>         non-*
>>
>>         *issued certificate, the responder MUST also;*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *- include the extended revoked definition response extension*
>>
>>         *(section 4.8), indicating that the OCSP responder supports th=
e*
>>
>>         *extended definition of revoked state to also cover non-issued=
*
>>
>>         *certificates,*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *- provide the revocation reason certificateHold (6), and;*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *- specify the revocation date January 1, 1970. *
>>
>>         As already explained on the PKIX list, using the revocation
>>         reason**certificateHold is not appropriate
>>         because it changes the meaning of certificateHold.
>>
>>         The extended revoked definition response extension is a means
>>         to signal that it not a true certificate hold but a =93not
>>         issued certificate=94.
>>         Legacy applications cannot take advantage of it.
>>
>>         Some applications which handle non repudiation enter a
>>         waiting state when the revocation reason certificateHold is
>>         used thus
>>         it is not appropriate to overload the meaning.
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         It is possible to use another enumeration for signalling that
>>         specific case:
>>
>>         notIssuedOrIrregularlyIssued (7).
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         Thus for new applications it would be much better to use
>>         notIssuedOrIrregularlyIssued (7) as already proposed on the
>>         PKIX list.
>>
>>         The above sentence uses the text: =20
>>
>>          =20
>>
>>         =93a status request for a*non-issued certificate*=94
>>
>>          =20
>>
>>         whereas it would be more appropriate to state: =20
>>
>>          =20
>>
>>         =93a status request for a*  serial number which has not been u=
sed by the CA or used irregularly to issue a certificate=94.*
>>
>>         *  *
>>
>>         Placing the ASN.1 description at such a place in the document =
is inappropriate since the ASN.1 structures have not yet been described.
>>         Thus only the functional aspects should be mentioned, but not =
the ASN.1 implications.
>>
>>         *  *
>>
>>         BTW, the description should follow the same order as the ASN.1=
. This is not the case.
>>
>>          =20
>>
>>         This text should be deleted from this section and the appropri=
ate text should be added when the parameters of the response are describe=
d.
>>
>>          =20
>>
>>         The text proposed in the previous comment should be sufficient=
 at this time of reading.
>>
>>          =20
>>
>>         In addition, section*4.4.8Extended Revoked Definition *should
>>         be deleted.**
>>
>>          =20
>>
>>          =20
>>
>>
>>     The referred text has been updates in draft 09.
>>
>>     This has been discussed on the list and you have yet to convince
>>     the list of your new reason code.
>>     I disagree as the risk of running into problems with the deployed
>>     base of application is hugely larger with introduction of a new
>>     reason code, rather than using certificateHold.
>>     No application should be broken, since no application have
>>     business asking for non-issued cert serial numbers in the first
>>     place. Secondly, no application can assume that a certificateHold
>>     reason will be cleared any time soon.
>>
>>
>>         10.The text states on page 8:
>>
>>         *2.4Semantics of thisUpdate, nextUpdate and producedAt*
>>
>>         This section is misplaced. At this time of reading, the
>>         reader does not know that thisUpdate, nextUpdate and
>>         producedAt are values
>>         used by the ASN.1 structures. It is appropriate to describe
>>         what theses parameters mean when the ASN.1 syntax is described=
.
>>         The current ASN.1 syntax is very badly described. One would
>>         expect that after every ASN.1 structure description every
>>         parameter is described.
>>         Unfortunately this is not the case.
>>
>>         The text from this section is not aligned with the text that
>>         is present in section 4.2.2.1.
>>
>>         In particular, in section 2.4:
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *If nextUpdate is not set, the responder is indicating that
>>         newer*
>>
>>         *revocation information is available all the time.*
>>
>>         While in section 4.2.2.1:
>>
>>         *Responses where the nextUpdate value is not set are equivalen=
t *
>>
>>         *to a CRL with no time for nextUpdate (see Section 2.4).*
>>
>>         It is not appropriate to have two different descriptions in
>>         two different places.
>>
>>         Delete section 2.4. See comment number 19 for the description
>>         of these parameters.
>>
>>
>>     Not broken.
>>     The current text segments fits well into a protocol overview secti=
on.
>>
>>         11.Section 2.5 is also misplaced. They use values from the
>>         ASN.1 syntax which has not yet been described.
>>         They should be moved or incorporated in the document once the
>>         ASN.1 description has been done.
>>
>>
>>     Not broken.
>>
>>         12.Remainder: Section 2.6 should be deleted (see comment
>>         number 5).
>>
>>
>>     Not broken.
>>
>>         13.Section 2.7 states:
>>
>>         *2.7CA Key Compromise*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *If an OCSP responder knows that a particular CA's private
>>         key has*
>>
>>         *been compromised, it MAY return the revoked state for all*
>>
>>         *certificates issued by that CA.*
>>
>>         This section is misleading and should be removed. The reason
>>         is the following:
>>
>>         The relying party must verify that the singleResponse is
>>         signed by a responder which is entitled to do so.
>>
>>         a) If the CA key has been compromised and if the response is
>>         signed by that CA key then the singleResponse will be discarde=
d
>>         when performing the certification path validation _whatever
>>         the content of the response may be_.
>>
>>         b) If the CA key which has issued the OCSP certificate has
>>         been compromised and if the response is signed by the key
>>         present
>>         in the OCSP certificate then the singleResponse will be
>>         discarded when performing the certification path validation
>>         _whatever the content of the response may be_.
>>
>>         Security must be provided using the validation of the
>>         certification path. Thus it does not matter what the OCSP
>>         responder states.
>>
>>
>>
>>     Not broken.
>>     An OCSP responder does not have to be chained to the broken CA.
>>     The relying party may have other trust configuration at choice.
>>
>>
>>
>>         14.The text states on page 11:
>>
>>         *3.2Signed Response Acceptance Requirements*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *Prior to accepting a signed response as valid, OCSP clients
>>         SHALL*
>>
>>         *confirm that:*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *1. The certificate identified in a received response
>>         corresponds to*
>>
>>         *that which was identified in the corresponding request;*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *2. The signature on the response is valid;*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *3. The identity of the signer matches the intended recipient
>>         of the*
>>
>>         *request.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *4. The signer is currently authorized to sign the response.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *5. The time at which the status being indicated is known to b=
e*
>>
>>         *correct (thisUpdate) is sufficiently recent.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *6. When available, the time at or before which newer
>>         information will*
>>
>>         *be available about the status of the certificate
>>         (nextUpdate) is*
>>
>>         *greater than the current time.*
>>
>>         This section is misplaced since it uses terms from the ASN.1
>>         syntax and the protocol description has not yet been made,
>>         since it is the next section 4. Its text is not correct either=
.
>>
>>         This description does not take into account the fact that
>>         a*BasicOCSPResponse *may contain one or several
>>         *SingleResponses. *
>>         In particular, the sentence=93*The signer is currently
>>         authorized to sign the response*=94 is misleading because a si=
gner
>>         may be authorized to include some***SingleResponses *but not
>>         necessarily all of them.
>>
>>         The appropriate explanations should be done after the
>>         description of the response, when describing the processing
>>         of the response.
>>
>>         Delete that section.
>>
>>
>>     Not broken.
>>
>>         15.On page 12, after the ASN.1 description, the only
>>         parameters which are described are:
>>
>>         *hashAlgorithm,**issuerNameHash, issuerKeyHash and serialNumbe=
r.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         This is insufficient.In order to cover the full list of
>>         parameters, the following text is proposed:
>>
>>         *requestorName is optional and MAY be used by the server for
>>         access *
>>
>>         *control and audit purposes.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *requestList contains one or more single requests.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *requestExtensions is OPTIONAL.Any specific extension is
>>         OPTIONAL.*
>>
>>         *The critical flag SHOULD NOT be set for any of them. Section
>>         4.4 *
>>
>>         *suggests several useful extensions.Additional extensions MAY
>>         be *
>>
>>         *defined in additional RFCs.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *reqCert contains the identifier of a target certificate.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *issuerNameHash is the hash of the Issuer's distinguished
>>         name.The *
>>
>>         *hash shall be calculated over the DER encoding of the
>>         issuer's name *
>>
>>         *field in the certificate being checked. *
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *issuerKeyHash is the hash of the Issuer's public key.The hash=
 *
>>
>>         *shall be calculated over the value (excluding tag and
>>         length) of the *
>>
>>         *subject public key field in the issuer's certificate.The hash=
 *
>>
>>         *algorithm used for both these hashes, is identified in *
>>
>>         *hashAlgorithm. *
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *The primary reason to use the hash of the CA's public key in =
*
>>
>>         *addition to the hash of the CA's name, to identify the issuer=
, *
>>
>>         *is that it is possible that two CAs may choose to use the sam=
e *
>>
>>         *name (uniqueness in the Name is a recommendation that cannot
>>         be *
>>
>>         *enforced). Two CAs will never, however, have the same public
>>         key *
>>
>>         *unless the CAs either explicitly decided to share their
>>         private *
>>
>>         *key, or the key of one of the CAs was compromised.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *serialNumber is the serial number of the certificate for whic=
h *
>>
>>         *status is being requested.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *singleRequestExtensions is OPTIONAL.Any specific extension is=
 *
>>
>>         *OPTIONAL.The critical flag SHOULD NOT be set for any of them.=
 *
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *The requestor MAY choose to sign the OCSP request.In that
>>         case, the*
>>
>>         *signature is computed over the tbsRequest structure.If the
>>         request*
>>
>>         *is signed, the requestor SHALL specify its name in the
>>         requestorName*
>>
>>         *field.Also, for signed requests, the requestor MAY include*
>>
>>         *certificates that help the OCSP responder verify the
>>         requestor's*
>>
>>         *signature in the certs field of Signature.*
>>
>>
>>     Not broken.
>>     The current text is short, but it is actually sufficient from the
>>     context of the ASN.1 definitions of the section. This is a
>>     detailed protocol section and the reader need to understand ASN.1
>>     in any case to understand and implement the section.
>>     The information about criticality is already covered in the
>>     extension section.
>>
>>
>>         16.Section 4.1.2 is called:=93*Notes on the Request Syntax=94*
>>
>>         The first paragraph has been moved after the description
>>         of*issuerKeyHash *and thus is no more needed.
>>
>>         The second paragraph has been moved after the description
>>         of*requestExtensions. *
>>         However, the sentence
>>         =93 *Unrecognized extensions MUST be ignored (unless they have
>>         the critical flag set and are not understood)*=94
>>         has been deleted since it applies to the OCSP responder and
>>         not to the OCSP client. Thus it is no more needed.
>>
>>         The third paragraph applies to signed requests. However, it
>>         should belong to a section dedicated on how clients should
>>         build OCPS requests,
>>         which is currently missing. See the next comment.
>>
>>         This section should be deleted.
>>
>>
>>     Not broken.
>>
>>         17.There should be a new section called: =93*Requirements for
>>         OCSP clients=94. *
>>
>>         It is important first to re-advertise that the request may be
>>         about several certificates.
>>         Thus it is important to describe the process for building a
>>         request, which is currently missing.
>>
>>         *An OCSP request allows getting in the same response the
>>         revocation *
>>
>>         *status of one or more certificates.In order to request the *
>>
>>         *status of one or more certificates in a single request, OCSP =
*
>>
>>         *clients SHALL follow the following rules :*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *For each candidate certificate, OCSP clients SHALL verify *
>>
>>         *whether there exists a locally defined rule for the
>>         certificate in *
>>
>>         *question which indicates the URI where the OCSP responder is =
*
>>
>>         *located.If this rule exists, it SHALL be followed. *
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *Otherwise, OCSP clients SHALL determine whether the candidate=
 *
>>
>>         *certificate contains an AIA extension with an accessMethod
>>         which *
>>
>>         *contains the id-ad-ocsp OID.If it is the case, the
>>         accessLocation *
>>
>>         *contains a uniformResourceIdentifier (URI) which indicates th=
e *
>>
>>         *location of the OCSP server for that certificate. *
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *Certificates that contain the same URI MAY be grouped in a
>>         single *
>>
>>         *request.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *Note:For each candidate certificate, when performing the path=
 *
>>
>>         *validation algorithm, the OCSP client SHOULD verify that the =
*
>>
>>         *current time is within the validity period of the target *
>>
>>         *certificate.Certificates which are outside their validity *
>>
>>         *period SHOULD NOT be included in the request.*
>>
>>         *The requestor MAY choose to sign the OCSP request. In that
>>         case, the*
>>
>>         *signature is computed over the tbsRequest structure. If the
>>         request*
>>
>>         *is signed, the requestor SHALL specify its name in the
>>         requestorName*
>>
>>         *field. Also, for signed requests, the requestor MAY include*
>>
>>         *certificates that help the OCSP responder verify the
>>         requestor's*
>>
>>         *signature in the certs field of Signature.*
>>
>>
>>     Not broken.
>>
>>     Your text may provide guidance that could be useful to some
>>     implementers, but is completely beyond this document and further,
>>     not generally applicable or true.
>>     As an example, an organisation may setup an in house locally
>>     configured OCSP responder that responds to all certificates "out
>>     there" that is relevant to that organisation.
>>     Such clients would just blindly send OCSP requests to their local
>>     responder, disregarding any information in the cert.
>>     It's totally beyond this spec to have an opinion about this.
>>
>>
>>         18.The text states on page 14:
>>
>>         *The responder MAY include certificates in the*
>>
>>         *certs field of BasicOCSPResponse that help the OCSP client
>>         verify the*
>>
>>         *responder's signature. If no certificates are included then
>>         certs*
>>
>>         *SHOULD be absent.*
>>
>>         While this sentence is true, it is not sufficient. In order
>>         to allow verifying every *SingleResponse*,
>>         it is important to include the relevant certificates which
>>         are pertinent to every *SingleResponse.*
>>
>>         Proposed full text replacement:
>>
>>         The responder MAY include certificates in the certs field of
>>
>>         BasicOCSPResponse that help the OCSP client verify the
>>         responder's
>>
>>         signature.
>>
>>         *For every SingleResponse where the responder is not a CA, the=
 *
>>
>>         *responder SHALL include the relevant OCSP certificate in the
>>         certs *
>>
>>         *field of BasicOCSPResponse in order to allow the OCSP client =
*
>>
>>         *verifying the responder was entitled to include that
>>         SingleResponse *
>>
>>         *in the signed BasicOCSPResponse.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         **If no certificates are included then certs SHOULD be absent.
>>
>>
>>     Not broken.
>>
>>     This requirement would break backwards compatibility with RFC 2560=
.
>>     Further this would not be needed for a locally configured responde=
r.
>>
>>         19.Page 15. The ASN.1 syntax should be changed in order to be
>>         able to use the enumeration case 7 that is not used for CRLs.
>>         This leads to the following change:
>>
>>         Current text:
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *revocationReason[0]EXPLICIT CRLReason OPTIONAL }*
>>
>>         Proposed text change:
>>
>>         Current text:
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *revocationReason [0]EXPLICIT RevocationReason OPTIONAL }*
>>
>>         *RevocationReason ::=3D ENUMERATED {*
>>
>>         *unspecified(0),*
>>
>>         *keyCompromise(1),*
>>
>>         *cACompromise(2),*
>>
>>         *affiliationChanged(3),*
>>
>>         *superseded(4),*
>>
>>         *cessationOfOperation(5),*
>>
>>         *certificateHold(6),*
>>
>>         *notIssuedOrIrregularlyIssued (7),*
>>
>>         *removeFromCRL(8),*
>>
>>         *privilegeWithdrawn(9),*
>>
>>         *aACompromise(10) }*
>>
>>
>>     Not broken.
>>
>>     You have to convince the list about your new reason code.
>>
>>         20.Page 15. After the ASN.1 syntax, there is no description
>>         of every parameter, neither on its use
>>         (except a few words in section*4.2.2.1 Time
>>         *about*thisUpdate, nextUpdate and producedAt).*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         Every parameter needs to be described and explained.
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *responderID indicates either the name or the key from a CA,
>>         or the *
>>
>>         *name or the key from a OCSP Responder.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *producedAt indicates the time at which this response was
>>         signed.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *responses contains one or more single responses.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *responseExtensions is OPTIONAL.Any specific extension is
>>         OPTIONAL.*
>>
>>         *The critical flag may or may not be set.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *certID is usually a copy of the same field which was placed
>>         in the *
>>
>>         *request, but for OCSP responders which pre-produce signed
>>         responses *
>>
>>         *certID may be the identifier of a target certificate that
>>         was not *
>>
>>         *present in the request (see the end of section 4.2).*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *certStatus indicates the status of the certificate: either
>>         good, *
>>
>>         *revoked or unknown.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *thisUpdate indicates the time at which the status being
>>         indicated *
>>
>>         *is known to be correct.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *nextUpdate indicates the time at or before which newer
>>         information *
>>
>>         *will be available about the status of the certificate.If *
>>
>>         *nextUpdate is not set, the server is indicating that newer *
>>
>>         *revocation information is available all the time. *
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *If nextUpdate is set, it often corresponds to the {thisUpdate=
, *
>>
>>         *nextUpdate} interval in CRLs.Responses whose nextUpdate
>>         value is *
>>
>>         *earlier than the local UTC time value SHOULD be considered *
>>
>>         *unreliable.Responses whose thisUpdate time is later than the
>>         local *
>>
>>         *UTC time SHOULD be considered unreliable.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *singleExtensions is OPTIONAL.Any specific extension is
>>         OPTIONAL.*
>>
>>         *The critical flag SHOULD NOT be set for any of them.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *revocationTime indicates the time at which the certificate wa=
s *
>>
>>         *revoked.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *revocationReason is OPTIONAL. It includes all the cases that
>>         are *
>>
>>         *present in CRLReason used for CRLs and an additional case 7
>>         which is*
>>
>>         *not used for CRLs.Case 7 is called
>>         notIssuedOrIrregularlyIssued. *
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *- "notIssued" corresponds to the case where the certificate *
>>
>>         *serial number that was sent was erroneous and has not yet *
>>
>>         *been used by the CA at the time of the query,*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *- "irregularlyIssued" corresponds to the case where the *
>>
>>         *certificate serial number that was sent really exists in a *
>>
>>         *certificate that is correctly signed, but to its knowledge *
>>
>>         *the CA has not issued a certificate with such a serial *
>>
>>         *number. As an example, it may have been issued by the CA *
>>
>>         *because the RA was compromised. *
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *    When a responder responds revoked to a status request for=
 which it*
>>
>>         *    knows that the serial number has not been used by the CA =
or has*
>>
>>         *    been irregularly used irregularly to issue a certificate,=
 then*
>>
>>         *    in RevokedInfo the responder MUST:*
>>
>>         *  *
>>
>>         *          - specify the revocationTime :   January 1, 1970,*
>>
>>         *           - provide the revocationReason: notIssuedOrIrregul=
arlyIssued (7).*
>>
>>         *  *
>>
>>         *    and in SingleResponse the responder MUST NOT include the =
nextUpdate.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *The response MUST include a SingleResponse for each
>>         certificate in*
>>
>>         *the request and SHOULD NOT include any additional
>>         SingleResponse*
>>
>>         *elements.However, there is one exception: *
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *OCSP responders MAY pre-produce signed responses specifying
>>         the *
>>
>>         *status of certificates at a specified time.The time at which =
*
>>
>>         *the status was known to be correct SHALL be reflected in the =
*
>>
>>         *thisUpdate field of the response. *
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *OCSP responders that pre-generate status responses MAY return=
 *
>>
>>         *responses that include additional SingleResponse elements if*
>>
>>         *necessary to improve response pre-generation performance or
>>         cache*
>>
>>         *efficiency (as permitted in [RFC5019]).*
>>
>>         Since the text above provides all the explanations at the
>>         level of the ASN.1 parameters, the general text
>>         from section*4.2.2.3 Basic Response *is no more need and
>>         should be deleted.**
>>
>>         **
>>
>>
>>     Preliminary I would say "not broken".
>>     If you don't replace 4.2.2.3, then what really are you missing?
>>
>>         21.0n page 16, there is a section
>>         *4.2.2.2***called*=93**Authorized Responders=94***
>>
>>         Section 4.2.2.2 states:
>>
>>         *(=85)*
>>
>>         *This certificate MUST be issued directly by the CA that
>>         issued the*
>>
>>         *certificate in question.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *The CA SHOULD use the same issuing key to issue a delegation*
>>
>>         *certificate as was used to sign the certificate being
>>         checked for*
>>
>>         *revocation. Systems relying on OCSP responses MUST recognize =
a*
>>
>>         *delegation certificate as being issued by the CA that issued
>>         the*
>>
>>         *certificate in question only if the delegation certificate
>>         and the*
>>
>>         *certificate being checked for revocation was signed by the
>>         same key.*
>>
>>         This section would need to reformatted to address CA
>>         requirements first and then OCSP responder requirements:
>>
>>         *(=85)*
>>
>>         *This certificate MUST be issued directly by the CA that
>>         issued the*
>>
>>         *certificate in question.The CA SHOULD use the same issuing
>>         key to *
>>
>>         *issue a delegation certificate as was used to sign the
>>         certificate *
>>
>>         *being checked for revocation. *
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *Systems relying on OCSP responses MUST _be able to_
>>         recognize a *
>>
>>         *delegation certificate as being issued by the CA that issued
>>         the *
>>
>>         *certificate in question if the delegation certificate and *
>>
>>         *the certificate being checked _were_ signed by the same key.*
>>
>>
>>     I disagree. The CA is actually free to do anything, but cannot
>>     expect the client to recognise the responder as authorised unless
>>     the same private key is used.
>>     The current text places the requirement where they belong.
>>
>>         22.On page 17, the text states:
>>
>>         *They MUST reject the*
>>
>>         *response if the certificate required to validate the
>>         signature on the*
>>
>>         *response fails to meet at least one of the following criteria=
:*
>>
>>         This is ambiguous. It is inappropriate to have a negative
>>         statement like=93*They MUST reject=94. *
>>         The sentence should be turned in the positive form=93*They
>>         SHALL accept=94*
>>
>>         Since the ASN.1 syntax has now be described, it is possible
>>         to be more specific.
>>
>>         The first occurrence of the word =93response=94 should be chan=
ged
>>         into =93singleResponse=94, while the second occurrence
>>         of the word =93response=94 should be changed into =93ResponseD=
ata=94
>>
>>         Proposed text replacement:
>>
>>         *They SHALL accept a singleResponse if the certificate
>>         required to *
>>
>>         *validate the signature placed on the ResponseData meets one
>>         of the *
>>
>>         *following criteria:*
>>
>>
>>
>>     No, this change is not backwards compatible.
>>     So state the requirements for rejection is not equivalent to
>>     stating requirements for acceptance.
>>     There may be other locally configured reasons to reject in
>>     addition to those listed in the standard.
>>
>>
>>         23.On page 17, the text states:
>>
>>         *3. Includes a value of id-kp-OCSPSigning in an ExtendedKeyUsa=
ge*
>>
>>         *extension and is issued by the CA that issued the
>>         certificate in*
>>
>>         *question as stated above."*
>>
>>         In order to be crystal clear, it is proposed to change the
>>         wording in the following way:
>>
>>         *3. Includes a value of id-kp-OCSPSigning in an ExtendedKeyUsa=
ge*
>>
>>         *extension and was signed by the CA using the same key that
>>         used *
>>
>>         *to issue the certificate in question.*
>>
>>
>>     No, issuing with another key is not prohibited, and may be
>>     accepted by some clients as an authorised responder.
>>
>>         24.On page 17, the text states:
>>
>>         *This SHOULD be a non-critical extension. The value of the
>>         extension *
>>
>>         *SHALL be NULL.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         The ASN.1 syntax is missing. Add:
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *NoCheck ::=3D NULL*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>
>>     Moving this to a separate discussion.
>>     I'm not sure what the preferred way to describe this is.
>>
>>
>>         25.Remainder: On page 18, the general text from
>>         section***4.2.2.3 Basic Response***is no more needed and
>>         should be deleted. See comment 20.
>>
>>         **
>>
>>
>>     Not broken.
>>
>>         26.On page 24, text should be added to the Security
>>         consideration section:
>>
>>         *Different results when using OCSP and CRLs*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *OCSP clients or verifiers must build and verify a
>>         certification path *
>>
>>         *for each target certificate up to a trusted root.When an OCSP=
 *
>>
>>         *Responder is using published CRLs, it must also build and
>>         verify a *
>>
>>         *certification path for the CRLs it uses up to a trusted root.=
*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *However, it should be realized that the root used by an OCSP =
*
>>
>>         *Responder to verified these CRLs is not necessarily the same
>>         as the *
>>
>>         *one that would be used by the OCSP client, if it were going
>>         to verify *
>>
>>         *the CRLs itself.Hence the revocation status may not be
>>         identical *
>>
>>         *in both cases.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         **
>>
>>
>>     I don't understand this one.
>>
>>         27.On page 24, text should be added to the Security
>>         consideration section:
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *Denial of service attack using a flood of queries*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *A denial of service vulnerability is evident with respect to
>>         a flood *
>>
>>         *of queries.The production of a cryptographic signature *
>>
>>         *significantly affects response generation cycle time, thereby=
 *
>>
>>         *exacerbating the situation. *
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *The flood of queries may either come from a flood attack or
>>         from the *
>>
>>         *fact that there are too many certificates supported by the
>>         same OCSP *
>>
>>         *responder.In the later case, the number of queries can be *
>>
>>         *reduced by using a technique similar to the splitting of CRLs=
: *
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *When a block of certificates have been issued with the same *
>>
>>         *accessLocation in the AIA extension field of these
>>         certificates, *
>>
>>         *then the accessLocation should be changed.In this way, a give=
n *
>>
>>         *OCSP server will only be responsible for a block of
>>         certificates.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>
>>     If the security considerations section is talking about splitting
>>     OCSP responders in this way, then the document itself need to
>>     introduce the subject.
>>     I would suggest that it is beyond this update to do so.
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         28.On page 31, the text states.
>>
>>         *An alternative to this module that conforms to the 2002
>>         version of *
>>
>>         *ASN.1 may be found in Section 4 of [RFC5912]. *
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         RFC 5912 omits to define the nocheck extension. Thus it is
>>         inappropriate to refer to RFC 5912.
>>
>>         The corrected module should be defined in this new draft.
>>         A corrected module is providedin *draft-pinkas-rfc2560bis-03.*
>>
>>
>>     Will move this (as stated above) to a separate discussion.
>>
>>         29.Different topics are not covered by the document. These
>>         topics are important.
>>         The following comments propose text to be placed in annexes.
>>         Three annexes are being proposed.
>>
>>         Note: The texts are extracted from*draft-pinkas-rfc2560bis-03.=
*
>>
>>
>>     Not broken.
>>     Each such amendment need to be thoroughly reviewed and motivated.
>>
>>
>>         30.First annex being proposed. This annex is important,
>>         because key rollover is not addressed in the draft.
>>
>>         *KEY ROLLOVER*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *1. CA that directly supports an OCSP service*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *When a CA that directly supports an OCSP service performs a
>>         key *
>>
>>         *rollover:*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *- for certificates issued under the old key, the CA SHALL
>>         continue *
>>
>>         *to sign the revocation status of OCSP responses with that
>>         old key *
>>
>>         *at least until all these certificates are expired, and*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *- for certificates issued under the new key, the CA SHALL
>>         change the *
>>
>>         *accessLocation in the AIA extension field of these
>>         certificates *
>>
>>         *and sign the revocation status of OCSP responses with that
>>         new key *
>>
>>         *at least until all these certificates are expired.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *Note: The change in accessLocation is necessary when the CA
>>         rekeys *
>>
>>         *to meet the following constraints imposed by this standard: *
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *1) a BasicOCSPResponse can only be signed using a single *
>>
>>         *private key; *
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *2) the response must be signed using the same CA key that *
>>
>>         *was used to sign the certificate in question; and*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *3) the OCSP response needs to cover all the certificates *
>>
>>         *queried in the OCSP request.*
>>
>>         *2. CA that uses OCSP responders*
>>
>>         *When a CA that uses OCSP Responders performs a key rollover,
>>         then *
>>
>>         *it MUST either designate a new OCSP Responder or keep the
>>         current *
>>
>>         *OCSP Responder(s).*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *If the CA designates a new OCSP Responder, then it SHALL
>>         change the *
>>
>>         *accessLocation in the AIA extension field for the newly issue=
d *
>>
>>         *certificates and issue an OCSP certificate to the new OCSP
>>         Responder *
>>
>>         *using its new key.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *If the CA keeps the same OCSP Responder(s), then it SHALL
>>         continue *
>>
>>         *to use the same accessLocation(s) in the AIA extension field
>>         for the *
>>
>>         *newly issued certificates and issue an OCSP certificate to th=
e *
>>
>>         *appropriate OCSP Responder(s) using its new key.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *Note: The CA may need to continue issuing certificates to
>>         the OCSP *
>>
>>         *Responder(s) using the old CA key until all the certificates
>>         issued *
>>
>>         *under the CA' old key for which the OCSP Responder(s) are *
>>
>>         *authoritative have expired.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *3. OCSP Responder key rollover*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *When an OCSP Responder performs a key rollover
>>         (asynchronously from *
>>
>>         *a CA key rollover), then each CA which has designated an OCSP=
 *
>>
>>         *Responder SHALL issue a new certificate for that OCSP
>>         Responder and *
>>
>>         *for each of its issuing keys which meets the following
>>         property: *
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *- the issuing key has been used to sign at least one
>>         certificate *
>>
>>         *which contains an AIA extension designating that OCSP
>>         Responder *
>>
>>         *and that certificate is not yet expired.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *An OCSP Responder key rollover does not affect the values of
>>         the *
>>
>>         *URIs that are placed in the accessLocation field from the
>>         target *
>>
>>         *certificates.One or more OCSP Responder MAY respond to an OCS=
P *
>>
>>         *request addressed at a given URI picked from the
>>         accessLocation *
>>
>>         *field from a target certificate.Each OCSP Responder MAY use a=
 *
>>
>>         *different signing key, as long as it got an OCSP certificate =
*
>>
>>         *appropriate for that signing key and for the target
>>         certificate. *
>>
>>         31.Second annex being proposed. This annex is important
>>         because it describes the validation of an OCSP response in
>>         the past
>>         which is of a particular importance when validating
>>         electronic signatures.
>>
>>         *Response processing by an OCSP client*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *OCSP responses can be verified at the current time by an
>>         OCSP client *
>>
>>         *when receiving a response, whereas old responses can be
>>         verified at *
>>
>>         *a time in the past by a verifier.The algorithm below addresse=
s *
>>
>>         *both cases.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *Prior to processing a basic response, OCSP clients MUST
>>         determine *
>>
>>         *the checking time, which may be either the current time or a
>>         time *
>>
>>         *in the past.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *OCSP clients or verifiers SHALL check if the response contain=
s *
>>
>>         *responseExtensions. If such an extension is found and is
>>         recognized, *
>>
>>         *it MUST be processed.If such a critical extension is found an=
d *
>>
>>         *is not recognized, the whole OCSP response MUST be
>>         considered as *
>>
>>         *invalid.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *If the checking time is the current time, and if a nonce
>>         extension *
>>
>>         *has been used in the request and is recognized (see section
>>         4.5.1), *
>>
>>         *OCSP clients MUST check whether the same nonce is present in
>>         the *
>>
>>         *response.If the nonce is not present or is different, then th=
e *
>>
>>         *OCSP response MUST be discarded.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *Only the single response(s) which are/is of interest SHALL be=
 *
>>
>>         *checked.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *STEP 1*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *OCSP clients or verifiers SHALL verify that the certificate *
>>
>>         *identified in a single response is of interest.Otherwise,
>>         proceed *
>>
>>         *to step 3.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *If the certificate status included in a single certificate
>>         response *
>>
>>         *is "unknown", then the revocation status of that certificate
>>         is *
>>
>>         *"unknown", and proceed to step 3.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *If the certificate status from the single certificate
>>         response is *
>>
>>         *either "good" or "revoked", OCSP clients or verifiers SHALL
>>         check *
>>
>>         *that the checking time is within the validity period of the
>>         target *
>>
>>         *certificate.If it is not the case, then the revocation
>>         status of *
>>
>>         *that certificate is "unknown" and proceed to step 3.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *If the checking time is the current time, and if a nonce has
>>         been *
>>
>>         *used in the request, then proceed to step 2.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *If the checking time is the current time, and if no nonce
>>         has been *
>>
>>         *used in the request, OCSP clients MUST check that the
>>         producedAt*
>>
>>         *field is within a time window that is "close enough" to the
>>         current *
>>
>>         *time. *
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *Note: the notion of "close enough" is a local matter.It can
>>         be set *
>>
>>         *to a few minutes to allow for small UTC time differences *
>>
>>         *between the client and the server or to a few hours in case *
>>
>>         *the server is producing pre-computed responses.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *If the checking time is a time in the past, verifiers MUST
>>         check *
>>
>>         *that the producedAt field is in accordance with the
>>         verification *
>>
>>         *rules (e.g. close and/or after the date of a time-stamp token=
).*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *In addition, if the nextUpdate field is present, OCSP
>>         clients MUST *
>>
>>         *check that the time which is indicated is greater than the
>>         checking *
>>
>>         *time, otherwise the single response MUST be discarded.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *If checks are successful, then OCSP clients MUST process the =
*
>>
>>         *singleExtensions field, if it is present. *
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *If the criticality flag is set and the extension is not
>>         understood, *
>>
>>         *then the status of the certificate shall be "unknown" and
>>         proceed to *
>>
>>         *step 3.Otherwise, proceed to step 2. *
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *If the extension is understood, then the extension MUST be *
>>
>>         *processed.According to its content proceed either to step 2
>>         or to *
>>
>>         *step 3. *
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *STEP 2*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *OCSP clients or verifiers MUST build and verify a
>>         certification path *
>>
>>         *for that certificate up to a trusted root, so that they have
>>         the *
>>
>>         *knowledge of the CA public key value that was used to sign th=
e *
>>
>>         *target certificate.The revocation status of each certificate
>>         of *
>>
>>         *that certification path (except the target certificate)
>>         SHALL be *
>>
>>         *checked.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *If no path can be built or if one of the certificates of the
>>         path is *
>>
>>         *revoked, then the revocation status of that certificate is
>>         "unknown", *
>>
>>         *and proceed to step 3. *
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *If the certification path (except the target certificate) is
>>         valid, *
>>
>>         *then two cases need to be considered:*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *a) If the responderID matches with the name or the key from
>>         the CA *
>>
>>         *which has issued the target certificate, then check whether
>>         the *
>>
>>         *OCSP response is signed by the same key that was used to sign=
 *
>>
>>         *the target certificate.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *If it is the case, then the revocation status of that *
>>
>>         *certificate as indicated in the certStatus field is *
>>
>>         *accepted and proceed to step 3.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *If it is not the case, then the revocation status of that *
>>
>>         *certificate is "unknown" and proceed to step 3.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *b) If the responderID does not match with the name or the
>>         key from *
>>
>>         *the CA which has issued the target certificate, then it
>>         indicates *
>>
>>         *the name or the key from an OCSP Responder.Check whether ther=
e *
>>
>>         *exists a local rule which applies to this target certificate
>>         to *
>>
>>         *verify that the signature of the BasicOCSPResponse is valid
>>         for *
>>
>>         *that single response.If this rule exists, it SHALL be
>>         followed. *
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *Otherwise check whether there is an OCSP certificate (i.e.
>>         which *
>>
>>         *has both the ocspSigning OID in the extended key usage
>>         extension *
>>
>>         *and the digitalSignature bit in the key usage extension)
>>         signed *
>>
>>         *by the same key that was used to sign the target certificate.=
 *
>>
>>         *This certificate MUST be present in the certs field from the =
*
>>
>>         *BasicOCSPResponse. *
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *If such certificate is not found or is invalid, then the *
>>
>>         *revocation status of that certificate is "unknown" and *
>>
>>         *proceed to step 3.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *If such certificate exists and if the checking time is *
>>
>>         *within the validity period of this certificate, then it MUST =
*
>>
>>         *be verified whether the OCSP response can be verified using *
>>
>>         *the public key that is present in the OCSP Certificate. *
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *If it is not the case, then the revocation status of that *
>>
>>         *certificate is "unknown" and proceed to step 3.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *If it is the case, then it MUST be verified that the OCSP *
>>
>>         *Certificate has not been revoked.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *If one of these conditions is met, then the status for the
>>         target *
>>
>>         *certificate as indicated in the certStatus field is accepted,=
 *
>>
>>         *otherwise the revocation status is "unknown".*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *STEP 3*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *If there exists another single certificate status response
>>         for a *
>>
>>         *target certificate that is of interest, then proceed to step
>>         1. *
>>
>>         *Otherwise the basic response is now processed.*
>>
>>         32.Third annex being proposed. This annex is important
>>         because it provides guidance on how to build an OCSP
>>         responder in the three cases.
>>         Many text portions are similar, but three full texts are
>>         provided in order to provide a better clarity for each of the
>>         three cases.
>>
>>         *1. Request processing by OCSP servers*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *The behavior of an OCSP server will be different whether the
>>         OCSP *
>>
>>         *server is a CA acting as an OCSP responder, is an OCSP
>>         Responder *
>>
>>         *which received a delegation from one or more CAs, or is a
>>         locally *
>>
>>         *trusted Responder.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *1.1. Processing by a CA acting as an OCSP responder*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *The OCSP responder SHALL maintain a list of entries. Each
>>         entry *
>>
>>         *SHALL contain:*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *- the URI associated to the OCSP responder, from which the
>>         OCSP *
>>
>>         *requests are received, *
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *- the DN from a CA,*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *- an issuing public key from a CA,*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *- the method(s) used to know for which subset of certificates=
 *
>>
>>         *issued by the CA it is responsible for, *
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *- the method(s) used to obtain the revocation status of that =
*
>>
>>         *subset of certificates issued under that CA issuing public
>>         key, *
>>
>>         *and*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *- the method used to gain access and sign with the private ke=
y *
>>
>>         *corresponding to the issuing public key.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *For a given URI value, the OCSP responder SHALL only use one
>>         CA *
>>
>>         *key pair value. *
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *When it receives an OCSP request on that URI, the OCSP
>>         responder *
>>
>>         *SHALL handle exceptions according to section 2.3. *
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *If the OCSP request contains the name of a requestor, the OCS=
P *
>>
>>         *responder SHALL verify whether there exists a locally
>>         defined rule *
>>
>>         *which regulates access control.If this rule exists, it SHALL
>>         be *
>>
>>         *followed.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *Then, for each target certificate, the OCSP responder SHALL
>>         verify *
>>
>>         *whether both the hash of the issuer's DN and the hash of the
>>         issuer *
>>
>>         *public key which are present in the request are eligible to a=
 *
>>
>>         *locally defined rule which indicates that the OCSP responder
>>         is *
>>
>>         *responsible to provide the revocation status of that target *
>>
>>         *certificate.If this rule exists, it SHALL be followed.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *Otherwise, the OCSP responder SHALL determine whether it is *
>>
>>         *responsible to provide the revocation status of that target *
>>
>>         *certificate according to the following rule.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *For each target certificate, the OCSP responder SHALL verify
>>         whether *
>>
>>         *both the hash of the issuer's DN and the hash of the issuer
>>         public *
>>
>>         *key which are present in the request match respectively with
>>         the DN *
>>
>>         *and the hash of the public key of contained in an entry from
>>         the *
>>
>>         *list of entries maintained by this OCSP responder. *
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *When there is no match, then the OCSP responder SHALL
>>         indicate the *
>>
>>         *"unknown" status and proceed with the next target
>>         certificate from *
>>
>>         *the OCSP request.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *When there is a match, then the OCSP responder SHALL use the
>>         serial *
>>
>>         *number of the target certificate that is present in the
>>         request and *
>>
>>         *determine the revocation status of that certificate
>>         according to *
>>
>>         *the method(s) defined in the entry. *
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *When the revocation status is provided by the server using a
>>         real *
>>
>>         *time access to a database of revocation statuses of issued *
>>
>>         *certificates, then the thisUpdate field SHALL be present in t=
he*
>>
>>         *SingleResponse response whereas the nextUpdate field SHALL be=
 *
>>
>>         *missing. *
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *Otherwise, both the thisUpdate and the nextUpdate fields
>>         SHALL be *
>>
>>         *present in the SingleResponse. *
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *The time at which this response will be signed MUST be
>>         indicated in *
>>
>>         *the producedAt field from the SingleResponse.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *If a singleRequestExtensions is present in the request it
>>         MUST be *
>>
>>         *processed.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *If there is another target certificate present in the
>>         request, it *
>>
>>         *SHALL be processed in the same way.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *If a requestExtensions is present in the request it MUST be *
>>
>>         *processed.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *The OCSP response MUST be signed using the CA issuing
>>         private key.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *1.2. Processing by an OCSP Responder*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *For each CA from which the OCSP Responder has received a
>>         delegation, *
>>
>>         *the OCSP Responder SHALL maintain a list of entries. *
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *Each entry SHALL contain:*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *- the URI associated to this OCSP Responder, from which the
>>         OCSP *
>>
>>         *requests are received, *
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *- the DN from a CA,*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *- an issuing public key from a CA,*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *- the method(s) used to know for which subset of certificates=
 *
>>
>>         *issued by the CA it is responsible for, *
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *- the method(s) used to obtain the revocation status of that =
*
>>
>>         *subset of certificates issued under that CA issuing public ke=
y,*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *- an OCSP certificate, *
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *- the OCSP public key contained in that OCSP certificate, and=
*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *- the method used to gain access and sign with the OCSP
>>         private *
>>
>>         *key corresponding to that OCSP certificate.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *For a given URI value, the OCSP Responder SHALL only use one
>>         OCSP *
>>
>>         *key pair value.Therefore there cannot be two entries with the=
 *
>>
>>         *same URI value and a different OCSP public key value.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *NOTE: a BasicOCSPResponse can only be signed using a single
>>         private *
>>
>>         *key. *
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *The OCSP certificate SHALL be signed by the CA issuing
>>         private key *
>>
>>         *which corresponds to the issuing CA public key that is in thi=
s *
>>
>>         *entry.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *When it receives an OCSP request, the OCSP responder SHALL
>>         handle *
>>
>>         *exceptions according to section 2.3. *
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *If the OCSP request contains the name of a requestor, the OCS=
P *
>>
>>         *responder SHALL verify whether there exists a locally
>>         defined rule *
>>
>>         *which regulates access control.If this rule exists, it SHALL
>>         be *
>>
>>         *followed.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *For each target certificate, the OCSP Responder SHALL verify =
*
>>
>>         *whether both the hash of the issuer's DN and the hash of the
>>         issuer *
>>
>>         *public key which are present in the OCSP request match with
>>         those *
>>
>>         *from an entry.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *When there is no match, then the OCSP Responder SHALL
>>         indicate the *
>>
>>         *"unknown" status and proceed with the next target
>>         certificate from *
>>
>>         *the OCSP request.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *When there is a match, the OCSP Responder SHALL use the seria=
l *
>>
>>         *number of the target certificate this is present in the OCSP =
*
>>
>>         *request to determine the revocation status of that certificat=
e *
>>
>>         *according to the method(s) indicated in the entry. *
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *When the revocation status is provided by the server using a
>>         real *
>>
>>         *time access to a database of revocation statuses of issued *
>>
>>         *certificates, then the thisUpdate field SHALL be present in t=
he*
>>
>>         *SingleResponse response whereas the nextUpdate field SHALL be=
 *
>>
>>         *missing. *
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *Otherwise, both the thisUpdate and the nextUpdate fields
>>         SHALL be *
>>
>>         *present in the SingleResponse. *
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *The time at which this response will be signed MUST be
>>         indicated in *
>>
>>         *the producedAt field from the SingleResponse.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *If a singleRequestExtensions is present in the request it
>>         MUST be *
>>
>>         *processed.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *If there is another target certificate present in the
>>         request, it *
>>
>>         *SHALL be processed in the same way.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *If a requestExtensions is present in the request it SHALL be =
*
>>
>>         *processed.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *The OCSP response MUST be signed using the OCSP private key.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *Unless there is a local rule which states differently, for
>>         every *
>>
>>         *target certificate which matches both with the hash of a CA
>>         DN and an *
>>
>>         *issuing public key from an entry, the OCSP certificate of
>>         that entry *
>>
>>         *SHALL be placed in the certs field.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *It may happen, that none of the target certificates from the
>>         OCSP*
>>
>>         *request matches both with the hash of a CA DN and an issuing
>>         public *
>>
>>         *key from an entry.In that case and unless a local rule states=
 *
>>
>>         *differently, the certs field from the BasicOCSPResponse
>>         SHOULD be *
>>
>>         *kept empty (to limit the disclose of the names of the CAs
>>         from which *
>>
>>         *the OCSP Responder received a delegation from).*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *1.3. Processing by a locally trusted Responder*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *For each CA for which the locally trusted Responder is *
>>
>>         *authoritative, the OCSP Responder SHALL maintain a list of
>>         entries. *
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *Each entry SHALL contain:*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *- the URI associated to this OCSP Responder, from which the
>>         OCSP *
>>
>>         *requests are received, *
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *- the DN from a CA,*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *- an issuing public key from a CA,*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *- the method(s) used to know for which subset of certificates=
 *
>>
>>         *issued by the CA it is responsible for, *
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *- the method(s) used to obtain the revocation status of that =
*
>>
>>         *subset of certificates issued under that CA issuing public ke=
y,*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *- the method used to gain access to the private key in order
>>         to *
>>
>>         *sign the OCSP response. *
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *For a given URI value, the OCSP Responder SHALL only use one
>>         private *
>>
>>         *key.Therefore there cannot be two entries with the same URI
>>         value *
>>
>>         *and a different method to gain access to the appropriate
>>         private key.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *NOTE: a BasicOCSPResponse can only be signed using a single
>>         private *
>>
>>         *key. *
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *When it receives an OCSP request, the OCSP responder SHALL
>>         handle *
>>
>>         *exceptions according to section 2.3. *
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *If the OCSP request contains the name of a requestor, the OCS=
P *
>>
>>         *responder SHALL verify whether there exists a locally
>>         defined rule *
>>
>>         *which regulates access control.If this rule exists, it SHALL
>>         be *
>>
>>         *followed.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *For each target certificate, the OCSP Responder SHALL verify =
*
>>
>>         *whether both the hash of the issuer's DN and the hash of the
>>         issuer *
>>
>>         *public key which are present in the OCSP request match with
>>         those *
>>
>>         *from an entry.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *When there is no match, then the OCSP Responder SHALL
>>         indicate the *
>>
>>         *"unknown" status and proceed with the next target
>>         certificate from *
>>
>>         *the OCSP request.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *When there is a match, the OCSP Responder SHALL use the seria=
l *
>>
>>         *number of the target certificate this is present in the OCSP =
*
>>
>>         *request to determine the revocation status of that certificat=
e *
>>
>>         *according to the method(s) indicated in the entry. *
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *When the revocation status is provided by the server using a
>>         real *
>>
>>         *time access to a database of revocation statuses of issued *
>>
>>         *certificates, then the thisUpdate field SHALL be present in t=
he*
>>
>>         *SingleResponse response whereas the nextUpdate field SHALL be=
 *
>>
>>         *missing. *
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *Otherwise, both the thisUpdate and the nextUpdate fields
>>         SHALL be *
>>
>>         *present in the SingleResponse. *
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *The time at which this response will be signed MUST be
>>         indicated in *
>>
>>         *the producedAt field from the SingleResponse.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *If a singleRequestExtensions is present in the request it
>>         MUST be *
>>
>>         *processed.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *If there is another target certificate present in the
>>         request, it *
>>
>>         *SHALL be processed in the same way.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *If a requestExtensions is present in the request it SHALL be =
*
>>
>>         *processed.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *The OCSP response MUST be signed using the OCSP private key.*
>>
>>         **
>>
>>         *The certs field may contain no, one or several OCSP
>>         certificates *
>>
>>         *according to local rules followed by the locally trusted
>>         Responder.*
>>
>>
>>     Not broken.
>>
>>     /Stefan
>>
>>         End of comments
>>
>>
>>         Denis
>>
>>         _______________________________________________ pkix mailing
>>         list pkix@ietf.org <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
>>         https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix=20
>>
>


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        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><b><span
              style=3D"font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Verdana;color:blue;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
              lang=3D"EN-GB">Stefan,<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
        <b> </b>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><b><span
              style=3D"font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Verdana;color:blue;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
              lang=3D"EN-GB">The review of your individual draft, took me
              the time I had during the week for the IETF stuff; <br>
              hence, why this reply has been delayed.</span></b></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><b><span
              style=3D"font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Verdana;color:blue;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
              lang=3D"EN-GB">The situation is rather simple, if we forget
              about the editorial comments, <br>
              you have accepted one minor text change and that=92s all.<o=
:p></o:p></span></b></p>
        <b> </b>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><span
            style=3D"font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Verdana;color:blue;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
            lang=3D"EN-GB"><b>So the major problems are not solved to my
              satisfaction.</b><o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <b> </b>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><span
            style=3D"font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Verdana;color:blue;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
            lang=3D"EN-GB"><b>I have maintained below the portion of the
              text which needs to be further discussed. </b><b><br>
            </b><b>My comments are in blue.</b><o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <b> </b>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><span
            style=3D"font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Verdana;color:blue;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
            lang=3D"EN-GB"><b>There is a new and very important issue tha=
t
              I discovered while reading your comments. </b><b><br>
            </b><b>See the discussion about singleExtensions and of
              responseExtensions.</b><o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><b
            style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight: normal"><span
              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">Comment 8<=
/span></b><span
            style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">: You have
            changed the meaning of the revoked state in a way that is
            not what I requested. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><span
            style=3D"mso-ansi-language: EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">The origina=
l
            text was:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"
          style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:
          0cm;margin-left:0cm;margin-bottom:.0001pt"><b
            style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>The "revoked" st=
ate
              indicates that the certificate has been revoked</span></b><=
span
            style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p><=
/span></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"
          style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:
          0cm;margin-left:0cm;margin-bottom:.0001pt"><b
            style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>(either permanan=
tly
              or temporarily (on hold)).</span></b><span
            style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p><=
/span></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><span
            style=3D"mso-ansi-language: EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">The new tex=
t
            is:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>The =
"revoked" state indicates that the certificate has been revoked</span></b=
><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span=
></pre>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>eith=
er permanently or temporarily on hold (i.e. the revocation reason</span><=
/b><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></sp=
an></pre>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>is c=
ertificateHold).</span></b><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D=
"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></pre>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><span
            style=3D"mso-ansi-language: EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">By doing th=
is,
            you do not allow any other case in the future to have a
            temporary revocation: =93</span><b
            style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
              lang=3D"EN-GB">temporarily on hold=94</span></b><b
            style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"> </span></=
b><span
            style=3D"mso-ansi-language: EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">is not the
            same as<b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"> =93</b></spa=
n><b
            style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt; mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
              lang=3D"EN-GB">temporarily revoked=94</span></b><b
            style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight: normal"><span
              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">.</span></=
b><span
            style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p><=
/span></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><span
            style=3D"mso-ansi-language: EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">I propose t=
he
            following rewording: <o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"
          style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:
          0cm;margin-left:0cm;margin-bottom:.0001pt"><b
            style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>The "revoked" st=
ate
              indicates that the certificate has been revoked </span></b>=
<span
            style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p><=
/span></p>
        <pre style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:=
normal"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span styl=
e=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>either permanently or temporarily (e=
.g. placed on hold).</span></b><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" la=
ng=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></pre>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><span
            style=3D"mso-ansi-language: EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">I substitut=
ed
            "temporarily on hold" with "temporarily. The rest unchanged
            since the only existing reason code for temporary revocation
            is certificateHold.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><span
            style=3D"font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Verdana;color:blue;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
            lang=3D"EN-GB"><b>As you say, the only CURRENT existing reaso=
n
              code for temporary revocation is certificateHold. </b><b><b=
r>
            </b><b>We must not PREVENT other reasons in the future to
              mean =93temporary revocation=94, hence why the change is
              needed.</b><o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><span
            style=3D"mso-ansi-language: EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">The way the
            text from draft 13 is now written seems to allow using
            either </span><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
              lang=3D"EN-GB">=93unknown=94</span></b><span
            style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"> or </span><=
b
            style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight: normal"><span
              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
              lang=3D"EN-GB">=93revoked=94</span></b><span
            style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"> for non-iss=
ued
            certificates. <br>
            If this is the intent, then the good news is that this does
            not come anymore into conflict with the French rules which
            apply<br>
            for the Administration since OCSP responders from CAs used
            by the French Ministries having a direct access to the
            database of issued certificates <br>
            will be able to use </span><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:
            normal"><span
              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
              lang=3D"EN-GB">=93unknown</span></b><span
            style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">=94, rather =
than
          </span><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt; mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
              lang=3D"EN-GB">=93revoked=94</span></b><span
            style=3D"mso-ansi-language: EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"> and the
            reason code </span><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><=
span
              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
              lang=3D"EN-GB">=93onhold=94.</span></b><span
            style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p><=
/span></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><span
            style=3D"mso-ansi-language: EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">However, th=
e
            current text is still mandating the use of </span><b
            style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt; mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
              lang=3D"EN-GB">Extended Revoked Definition</span></b><span
            style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">, but the
            rational for its need it is very poor. <br>
            As I have said on the PKIX list, the fact that the
            revocation date is January 1rst, 1970 is fully sufficient to
            know that we are in that very special case, <br>
            and you have not provided a rational to say the contrary.<o:p=
></o:p></span></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><span
            style=3D"background:
            yellow;mso-highlight:yellow;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
            lang=3D"EN-GB">I have. And I have pointed you to the minutes
            of the last PKIC meeting.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><span
            style=3D"background:
            yellow;mso-highlight:yellow;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
            lang=3D"EN-GB">The consensus of the WG is to have the
            extension for just those reasons.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><span
            style=3D"background:
            yellow;mso-highlight:yellow;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
            lang=3D"EN-GB">As implementer, I don't like heuristics. A dat=
e
            of Jan 1st 1970 may indicate this behaviour, <br>
            but may just be a misconfiguration. It is not an explicit
            statement.</span><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
            lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><span
            style=3D"mso-ansi-language: EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">So we could
            get rid of it, =85 but the text from section 4.4.8 states:<o:=
p></o:p></span></p>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>This=
 extension MAY be present in other responses to signal that the</span></b=
><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span=
></pre>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>resp=
onder implements the extended revoked definition in section 2.2.</span></=
b><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></spa=
n></pre>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><span
            style=3D"mso-ansi-language: EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">I have
            difficulties to understand what is really meant there
            (=93other responses=94 ?), since the text states:<o:p></o:p><=
/span></p>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>This=
 extension indicates that the responder supports the extended</span></b><=
span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span><=
/pre>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>defi=
nition of the "revoked" status to also include non-issued</span></b><span=
 style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></pre=
>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>cert=
ificates according to section 2.2.</span></b><span style=3D"mso-ansi-lang=
uage:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></pre>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><span
            style=3D"mso-ansi-language: EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">Since both
            =93unknown=94 and revoked=94 can be used, it would be desirab=
le to
            be able to include the same extension in both cases, <br>
            but in that case that extension should be renamed.<o:p></o:p>=
</span></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><span
            style=3D"background:
            yellow;mso-highlight:yellow;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
            lang=3D"EN-GB">This extension can be included in all response=
s
            to signal that a responder implements the expanded
            definition of revoked.</span><span
            style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p><=
/span></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><span
            style=3D"mso-ansi-language: EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">Doing so ma=
kes
            this fact auditable without having to ask for a non-issued
            cert.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><span
            style=3D"mso-ansi-language: EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">I would
            propose to rename it: "</span><b
            style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight: normal"><span
              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
              lang=3D"EN-GB">non-issued certificate</span></b><span
            style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">=94 which me=
ans
            that the associated CA has no record of ever having issued a
            certificate <br>
            with the certificate serial number in the request (I still
            consider it as unnecessary in the case of =93revoked=94, but =
it
            would be very useful in the case of =93unknown=94). <br>
            Of course, the text from section 4.4.8 would need to be
            revised.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><span
            style=3D"mso-ansi-language: EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">I propose t=
he
            following:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b></pre>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:
normal"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">4.4.8<span=
 style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>Non-issued certificate extension</=
span></b><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:=
p></span></pre>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>This=
 extension MUST be included in the OCSP response when the OCSP </span></b=
><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span=
></pre>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0</span>re=
sponder knows that the CA identified in the request has no record </span>=
</b><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></s=
pan></pre>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0</span>of=
 ever having issued a certificate with the certificate serial </span></b>=
<span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span>=
</pre>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0</span>nu=
mber indicated in the request.</span></b><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language=
:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></pre>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>Clie=
nts do not have to parse this extension in order to determine </span></b>=
<span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span>=
</pre>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0</span>th=
e status of certificates in responses.</span></b><span style=3D"mso-ansi-=
language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></pre>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>This=
 extension is identified by the object identifier id-pkix-ocsp-</span></b=
><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span=
></pre>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>non-=
issued-cert.</span></b><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN=
-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></pre>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0 </spa=
n>id-pkix-ocsp-non-issued-cert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=3D {id-pkix-ocsp 9}</=
span></b><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:=
p></span></pre>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>The =
value of the extension SHALL be NULL. This extension MUST NOT be</span></=
b><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></spa=
n></pre>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>mark=
ed critical.</span></b><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN=
-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></pre>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><span
            style=3D"mso-ansi-language: EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">Then the te=
xt
            on page 8 would need to be rearranged.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><span
            style=3D"mso-ansi-language: EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">Your extens=
ion
            =A0variant is a significant change to what has been agreed.<o=
:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><span
            style=3D"mso-ansi-language: EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">Your extens=
ion
            would need to be a single response extension, and can't be
            used to audit the behaviour of the OCSP responder <br>
            unless you send a request for a non-issued cert.<o:p></o:p></=
span></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><b><span
              style=3D"font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Verdana;color:blue;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
              lang=3D"EN-GB">Hummm !!! We have a very important point
              there. Thanks to your comment, I now realize that the
              proposed extension <br>
              applies to the whole response. However, this is not
              possible and I will now explain why. An OCSP responder may
              receive <br>
              a delegation from several CAs. With some of them, it can
              use a direct access to the database of certificates, <br>
              while for some others, it will use CRLs. So the meaning of
              =93revoked=94 will depend of the CA. <o:p></o:p></span></b>=
</p>
        <b> </b>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><span
            style=3D"font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Verdana;color:blue;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
            lang=3D"EN-GB"><b>This means that the indication cannot be
              global to the OCSP response. If we use an extension, it
              can only apply </b><b><br>
            </b><b>to an individual response and thus MUST in
              singleExtensions instead of responseExtensions.</b><o:p></o=
:p></span></p>
        <b> </b>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><span
            style=3D"font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Verdana;color:blue;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
            lang=3D"EN-GB"><b>Since it is singleExtension, it can used to
              =93audit the behaviour of the OCSP responder=94 and I do no=
t
              grasp your rational </b><b><br>
            </b><b>when you say =93unless you send a request for a
              non-issued cert=94. There is no need for sending anything.<=
/b><o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><span
            style=3D"background:
            yellow;mso-highlight:yellow;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
            lang=3D"EN-GB">We want to avoid sending such fake requests fo=
r
            audit purposes as it may interfere with systems at the
            responder trying to detect existence of rouge certificates.</=
span><span
            style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p><=
/span></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><span
            style=3D"font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Verdana;color:blue;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
            lang=3D"EN-GB"><b>There is no need to sending fake requests.<=
/b><o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><span
            style=3D"background:
            yellow;mso-highlight:yellow;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
            lang=3D"EN-GB">This is a type of change that I can't make
            unless you get support from a majority of the WG for the
            change of direction you propose.</span><span
            style=3D"mso-ansi-language: EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p>=
</span></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><b><span
              style=3D"font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Verdana;color:blue;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
              lang=3D"EN-GB">The important point is that the text states:=
<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
        <b> </b>
        <p class=3D"MsoPlainText" style=3D"margin-left:27.0pt"><b><span
style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Verdana;color:blue;mso-ansi-languag=
e:EN-GB"
              lang=3D"EN-GB">=93The "revoked" state (=85) <u>MAY also be
                returned</u> if the associated CA has no record of ever
              having issued a certificate <br>
              with the certificate serial number in the request, using
              any current or previous issuing key (referred to as a<br>
              "non-issued" certificate in this document).=94<o:p></o:p></=
span></b></p>
        <b> </b>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><span
            style=3D"font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Verdana;color:blue;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
            lang=3D"EN-GB"><b>The test does </b><b><u>not</u></b><b>
              state =93</b><b><u>MUST</u></b><b> also be returned=94. Thi=
s
              means that it is also possible to reply =93unknown=94 if th=
e
              associated CA </b><b><br>
            </b><b>has no record of ever having issued a certificate
              with the certificate serial number in the request.
              However, this is not </b><b><br>
            </b><b>straightforward when reading the text and thus the
              text should be made more explicit.</b><o:p></o:p></span></p=
>
        <b> </b>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><span
            style=3D"font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Verdana;color:blue;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
            lang=3D"EN-GB"><b>Now, we get to the main point. The reason
              for adding an extension is NOT to say that an extended
              meaning of revoked </b><b><br>
            </b><b>is being used, but that the INDIVIDUAL response is
              given using a direct access to the records of the
              certificates issued by the CA.</b><o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><span
            style=3D"mso-ansi-language: EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">The current
            text is:</span><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language: EN-GB"
            lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p> <br>
            </o:p></span></p>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>This=
 state MAY also be returned if the</span></b><span style=3D"mso-ansi-lang=
uage:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></pre>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>asso=
ciated CA has no record of ever having issued a certificate with</span></=
b><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></spa=
n></pre>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>the =
certificate serial number in the request, using any current or</span></b>=
<span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span>=
</pre>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>prev=
ious issuing key (referred to as a "non-issued" certificate in</span></b>=
<span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span>=
</pre>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>this=
 document).</span></b><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-=
GB"><o:p></o:p></span></pre>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>The =
"unknown" state indicates that the responder doesn't know about</span></b=
><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span=
></pre>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>the =
certificate being requested.</span></b><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:E=
N-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></pre>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>NOTE=
: The "revoked" state for known non-issued certificate serial</span></b><=
span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span><=
/pre>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0 </span>numbers is allowed in order to reduce the risk of relying</=
span></b><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:=
p></span></pre>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0 </span>parties using CRLs as a fall back mechanism, which would be=
</span></b><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></=
o:p></span></pre>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0 </span>considerably higher if an "unknown" response was returned.<=
/span></b><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o=
:p></span></pre>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>When=
 a responder responds revoked to a status request for a non-</span></b><s=
pan style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></=
pre>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>issu=
ed certificate, the responder MUST include the extended revoked</span></b=
><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span=
></pre>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>defi=
nition response extension (section 4.4.8) in the response,</span></b><spa=
n style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></pr=
e>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>indi=
cating that the OCSP responder supports the extended definition</span></b=
><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span=
></pre>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>of r=
evoked state to also cover non-issued certificates. In addition,</span></=
b><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></spa=
n></pre>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>the =
SingleResponse related to this non-issued certificate;</span></b><span st=
yle=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></pre>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0 </span>-=
 MUST provide the revocation reason certificateHold (6),</span></b><span =
style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></pre>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0 </span>-=
 MUST specify the revocationTime January 1, 1970, and;</span></b><span st=
yle=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></pre>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0 </span>-=
 MUST NOT include a CRL References extension (section 4.4.2) or any</span=
></b><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></=
span></pre>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 </=
span>CRL Entry Extensions (section 4.4.5). </span></b><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></pre>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><span
            style=3D"mso-ansi-language: EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">Proposed te=
xt
            for a replacement:</span><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:
            EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p> <br>
            </o:p></span></p>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>The =
"unknown" state indicates that the responder doesn't know about</span></b=
><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span=
></pre>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>the =
certificate being requested.<o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
        <pre><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=
=A0</o:p></span></pre>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>If t=
he OCSP responder knows that CA identified in the request has </span></b>=
<span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span>=
</pre>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0</span>no=
 record of ever having issued a certificate with the certificate </span><=
/b><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></sp=
an></pre>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0</span>se=
rial number in the request, using any current or previous issuing </span>=
</b><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></s=
pan></pre>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0</span>ke=
y (referred to as a "non-issued" certificate in this document), </span></=
b><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></spa=
n></pre>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0</span>th=
e OCSP responder SHALL respond either =93revoked =93 or =93unknown=94.</s=
pan></b><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p=
></span></pre>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><span
            style=3D"mso-ansi-language: EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">This is
            unfortunately very common in your rewording efforts. When
            trying to fix one thing, you create new even bigger
            problems.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><span
            style=3D"mso-ansi-language: EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">An
            infrastructure that provides reproduced responses will
            respond "unauthorized". This text may be interpreted to
            interfere with such operations.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><b><span
              style=3D"font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Verdana;color:blue;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
              lang=3D"EN-GB">I fear I don=92t understand your argument ab=
out
              =93unauthorized=94, but before replying see below my next
              comment.</span></b><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
            lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><span
            style=3D"mso-ansi-language: EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">Further, an=
d
            worse. This is not backwards compatible. Current OCSP
            responders may respond "good" even if they have access to CA
            records.=A0<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><b><span
              style=3D"font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Verdana;color:blue;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
              lang=3D"EN-GB">You say: =93Current OCSP responders may resp=
ond
              "good" even if they have access to CA records=94. Originall=
y
              RFC 2560 allowed <br>
              returning =93good=94 for OCSP responder using CRLs. Since R=
FC
              2560 provided no way to indicate that a direct access to
              the database <br>
              was being used or not, it was not possible to do better. <o=
:p></o:p></span></b></p>
        <b> </b>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><b><span
              style=3D"font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Verdana;color:blue;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
              lang=3D"EN-GB">Now, if an OCSP responder has a direct acces=
s
              and indicates in the response that it has such an access,
              do you really believe <br>
              that it will return good ? I don=92t. <o:p></o:p></span></b=
></p>
        <b> </b>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><span
            style=3D"font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Verdana;color:blue;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
            lang=3D"EN-GB"><b>If an OCSP responder wants to return =93goo=
d=94,
              it can still do it, but in that case it will not signal
              that it is using a direct access </b><b><br>
            </b><b>and this is perfectly backwards compatible. So I do
              not =93buy=94 your argumentation.</b><o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <b> </b>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><span
            style=3D"font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Verdana;color:blue;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
            lang=3D"EN-GB"><b>Now, may be you understand better why I
              propose to rename the extension =934.4.8 Non-issued
              certificate extension=94 and </b><b><br>
            </b><b>also to change its semantics.</b><o:p></o:p></span></p=
>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><span
            style=3D"mso-ansi-language: EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o=
:p></span></p>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>Note=
: The "revoked" state for known non-issued certificate serial </span></b>=
<span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span>=
</pre>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0</span>nu=
mbers is allowed in order to reduce the risk of relying parties </span></=
b><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></spa=
n></pre>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0</span><span st=
yle=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0</span>using CRLs as a fall back mechanism=
, which would be possible when </span></b><span style=3D"mso-ansi-languag=
e:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></pre>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0</span>th=
e "unknown" response is returned.</span></b><span style=3D"mso-ansi-langu=
age:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></pre>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>When=
 a responder responds revoked or unknown to a status request </span></b><=
span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span><=
/pre>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0</span>fo=
r a non-issued certificate, the responder MUST include the </span></b><sp=
an style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></p=
re>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0</span>no=
n-issued certificate extension (see section 4.4.8) in the </span></b><spa=
n style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></pr=
e>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0</span>re=
sponse. </span></b><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"=
><o:p></o:p></span></pre>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0</span>Wh=
en a responder responds revoked to a status request for a non-</span></b>=
<span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span>=
</pre>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>issu=
ed certificate, in addition, the responder:</span></b><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></pre>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0 </span>-=
 MUST provide the revocation reason certificateHold (6),</span></b><span =
style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></pre>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0 </span>-=
 MUST specify the revocationTime January 1, 1970, and;</span></b><span st=
yle=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></pre>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0 </span>-=
 MUST NOT include a CRL References extension (section 4.4.2) or any</span=
></b><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></=
span></pre>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 </=
span>CRL Entry Extensions (section 4.4.5).</span></b><span style=3D"mso-a=
nsi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></pre>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><span
            style=3D"mso-ansi-language: EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">Finally, th=
e
            last bullet on page 4 should be reworded:<o:p></o:p></span></=
p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><span
            style=3D"mso-ansi-language: EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">Current tex=
t:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 </=
span>o Section 4.4.8 specifies a new extension that indicates that the</s=
pan></b><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p=
></span></pre>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0 </span>responder supports the extended use of the "revoked" respon=
se</span></b><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=
</o:p></span></pre>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0 </span>for non-issued certificates defined in section 2.2.</span><=
/b><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></sp=
an></pre>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><span
            style=3D"mso-ansi-language: EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">Proposed
            replacement text:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 </=
span>o<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>Section 4.4.8 specifies=
 a new extension that indicates that </span></b><span style=3D"mso-ansi-l=
anguage:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></pre>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0</span>the OCSP responder knows that CA identified in the reques=
t </span></b><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=
</o:p></span></pre>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0</span>has no record of ever having issued a certificate with th=
e </span></b><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=
</o:p></span></pre>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0</span>certificate serial number present in the request, as defi=
ned </span></b><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:=
p></o:p></span></pre>
        <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0</span>in section 2.2.</span></b><span style=3D"mso-ansi-languag=
e:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></pre>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><span
            style=3D"mso-ansi-language: EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">No. Again,
            this changes the scope of the extension and its audit
            properties.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><span
            style=3D"mso-ansi-language: EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">Such change
            requires WG consensus.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><span
            style=3D"font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Verdana;color:blue;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
            lang=3D"EN-GB"><b>See earlier comments.</b><o:p></o:p></span>=
</p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><b
            style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight: normal"><span
              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">Comment 9:=
</span></b><span
            style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"> Solved, if =
the
            comment above may be solved.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><b
            style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight: normal"><span
              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">Comment 20=
</span></b><span
            style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">:<span
              style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>This comment is
            preliminary classified by you as =93not broken=94. However,
            since you asked: =93If you don=92t replace 4.2.2.3,<br>
            then what really are you missing ?=94, I will provide you wit=
h
            an answer.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><span
            style=3D"mso-ansi-language: EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">This is the
            wrong way to state the question. Providing an ASN.1 syntax
            as in 4.2.1 is not enough: the use of every parameter MUST
            be explained <br>
            using English words. So if you explain the use of every
            parameter after the description of the ASN.1 syntax in
            section 4.2.1. then section 4.2.2.3 <br>
            is no more needed and thus can be deleted.<o:p></o:p></span><=
/p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><span
            style=3D"mso-ansi-language: EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">The answer =
to
            your question =93what is really missing=94 is a description o=
f
            the use of every parameter listed in the ASN.1 in section
            4.2.1<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><span
            style=3D"background:
            yellow;mso-highlight:yellow;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
            lang=3D"EN-GB">There are sufficient descriptions in the
            subsections following the ASN.1 description. Your change
            proposals are not compatible with the minimalistic <br>
            approach adopted by the WG.</span><span
            style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p><=
/span></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><b><span
              style=3D"font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Verdana;color:blue;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
              lang=3D"EN-GB">The key point is whether we want a =93good=94
              document or maintain the low quality of the original
              document.</span></b><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal=
"><span
              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p=
></span></b></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><b
            style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight: normal"><span
              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">Comment 26=
</span></b><span
            style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">: You asked =
for
            explanations. Let me provide you with an example when CRLs
            are being used by the OCSP responder in the background. <br>
            The OCSP responder needs to make sure that the CRL it uses
            is valid. If it is simply using published CRLs (i.e. no
            trusted link with the CA), it needs <br>
            to make sure that the CA which has issued the CRL has no
            been revoked.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><span
            style=3D"background:
            yellow;mso-highlight:yellow;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
            lang=3D"EN-GB">No, this is a misstatement. You don't revoke
            CAs. You revoke CA certificates. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><span
            style=3D"font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Verdana;color:blue;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
            lang=3D"EN-GB"><b>Right.</b><o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><span
            style=3D"background:
            yellow;mso-highlight:yellow;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
            lang=3D"EN-GB">There might be a CA certificate that has been
            revoked for a reason that does not affect the OCSP
            responder.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><span
            style=3D"font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Verdana;color:blue;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
            lang=3D"EN-GB"><b>=A0..but the contrary may also apply.</b><o=
:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><span
            style=3D"background:
            yellow;mso-highlight:yellow;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
            lang=3D"EN-GB">These are operational policies that are outsid=
e
            the scope of the protocol.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><span
            style=3D"font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Verdana;color:blue;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
            lang=3D"EN-GB"><b>The proposed text does not affect the
              protocol.</b><o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><span
            style=3D"background:
            yellow;mso-highlight:yellow;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
            lang=3D"EN-GB">The proposed text in comment 26 is plain wrong=
,
            or at least misleading. The OCSP responder does not have to
            validate the CRL up to any particular root. <br>
            It may for example have been configured to directly trust
            the public key used to validate the CRL.</span><span
            style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p><=
/span></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><span
            style=3D"font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Verdana;color:blue;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
            lang=3D"EN-GB"><b>T</b><b>his depends how it makes sure that
              it is reading the right CRL. It may or may not use a root
              CA.</b></span><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
            lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><span
            style=3D"mso-ansi-language: EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">In <st1:pla=
ce
              w:st=3D"on"><st1:country-region w:st=3D"on">France</st1:cou=
ntry-region></st1:place>,
            there is a root CA for the Administration. However, the use
            of that root CA is optional. Thus a Ministry may have its
            own root, <br>
            but may also have its key certified by the root CA of the
            Administration. The OCSP responder may use the root CA of
            the Ministry, <br>
            while a relying party may use the root CA of the
            Administration (or the reverse) to validate the CRL for the
            target certificate. <br>
            Thus the revocation status will be different if the
            certificate of the CA of the Ministry is revoked by the root
            CA of the Administration.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><span
            style=3D"background:
            yellow;mso-highlight:yellow;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
            lang=3D"EN-GB">Which reinforces my point. How the OCSP
            responder is configured to trust its information source is
            outside the scope of the protocol.</span><span
            style=3D"mso-ansi-language: EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p>=
</span></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><span
            style=3D"background:
            yellow;mso-highlight:yellow;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
            lang=3D"EN-GB">The OCSP protocol never claims to provide the
            same conclusion about revocation than another source the
            relying party may use.</span><span
            style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p><=
/span></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><b><span
              style=3D"font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Verdana;color:blue;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
              lang=3D"EN-GB">We both agree; however would you point me
              where this is said in the current draft? Since I could not
              find it, <br>
              I believe it is useful to highlight the point in the
              security considerations section.<br>
            </span></b></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><b><span
              style=3D"font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Verdana;color:blue;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
              lang=3D"EN-GB"><br>
            </span></b></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><b><span
              style=3D"font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Verdana;color:blue;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
              lang=3D"EN-GB">Finally, I believe that the major point
              indicated earlier comes from the original "bad writing"
              of=A0 RFC 2560.</span></b></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><b><span
              style=3D"font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Verdana;color:blue;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
              lang=3D"EN-GB">There is no clear distinction between what
              applies to </span></b><b><span style=3D"font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Verdana;color:blue;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
              lang=3D"EN-GB"><b><span style=3D"font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Verdana;color:blue;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                  lang=3D"EN-GB">BasicOCSPResponse</span></b> and </span>=
</b><b><span
              style=3D"font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Verdana;color:blue;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
              lang=3D"EN-GB"><b><span style=3D"font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Verdana;color:blue;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                  lang=3D"EN-GB">what applies </span></b>to Single
              Response.</span></b></p>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><b><span
              style=3D"font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Verdana;color:blue;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
              lang=3D"EN-GB">On page 15 from draft-14, the text still
              states in section=A0 4.2.2.2=A0 Authorized Responder:<br>
              <br>
              =A0=A0 "It is necessary however to ensure that the entity
              signing this information is authorized to do so".<br>
              <br>
              This is vague. What is "this information " ? This text is
              within section "4.2.2=A0 Notes on OCSP Responses".<br>
              This does not help much.<br>
              <br>
              Is it BasicOCSPResponse ? If it is , this is wrong.<br>
              <br>
              It is SingleResponse, since a single response may be
              signed by the right key and/or the right certificate, <br>
              but not another single response.<br>
              <br>
              How can a reader guess that it is SingleResponse ?<br>
              <br>
              Once again the quality of the text is really bad, and that
              text and some other portions=A0 (3.2=A0 Signed Response
              Acceptance Requirements)<br>
              would need to be changed.<br>
            </span></b></p>
        <b> </b>
        <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt"><b><span
              style=3D"font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Verdana;color:blue;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
              lang=3D"EN-GB">Denis</span></b></p>
      </o:smarttagtype><br>
      <br>
    </div>
    <blockquote cite=3D"mid:CD54579F.5C53B%25stefan@aaa-sec.com"
      type=3D"cite">
      <div>Denis,</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>My replies in line;</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
        <div style=3D"font-family:Calibri; font-size:11pt;
          text-align:left; color:black; BORDER-BOTTOM: medium none;
          BORDER-LEFT: medium none; PADDING-BOTTOM: 0in; PADDING-LEFT:
          0in; PADDING-RIGHT: 0in; BORDER-TOP: #b5c4df 1pt solid;
          BORDER-RIGHT: medium none; PADDING-TOP: 3pt"><span
            style=3D"font-weight:bold">From: </span> Denis Pinkas &lt;<a
            moz-do-not-send=3D"true" href=3D"mailto:denis.pinkas@bull.net=
">denis.pinkas@bull.net</a>&gt;<br>
          <span style=3D"font-weight:bold">Date: </span> Monday, February
          11, 2013 3:18 PM<br>
          <span style=3D"font-weight:bold">To: </span> Stefan Santesson
          &lt;<a moz-do-not-send=3D"true" href=3D"mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.c=
om">stefan@aaa-sec.com</a>&gt;<br>
          <span style=3D"font-weight:bold">Cc: </span> Stephen Kent &lt;<=
a
            moz-do-not-send=3D"true" href=3D"mailto:kent@bbn.com">kent@bb=
n.com</a>&gt;,

          pkix &lt;<a moz-do-not-send=3D"true" href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.o=
rg">pkix@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>
          <span style=3D"font-weight:bold">Subject: </span> Re: [pkix]
          Review of 2560-bis draft 8. Answer to WGLC<br>
        </div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
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                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">Stef=
an,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">I ha=
ve
                    finally reviewed your disposition of comments. I
                    have used draft 13.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">I wi=
ll
                    not </span><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                    lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB=
"
                      lang=3D"EN-GB">address the comments </span>in
                    sequence, but I will consider four categories:<o:p></=
o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                    style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                      style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">Ca=
tegory

                      1)</span></b><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB=
"
                    lang=3D"EN-GB"> Some </span><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><spa=
n
                      style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><s=
pan
                        style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">=
comments

                      </span></span>which seem to be solved. Yes indeed,
                    they may be a few of them !<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                    style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                      style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">Ca=
tegory

                      2)</span></b><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB=
"
                    lang=3D"EN-GB"> Some </span><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><spa=
n
                      style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><s=
pan
                        style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">=
comments

                      </span></span>which might possibly be solved at
                    the WG level.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                    style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                      style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">Ca=
tegory

                      3)</span></b><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB=
"
                    lang=3D"EN-GB"> Some </span><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><spa=
n
                      style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><s=
pan
                        style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">=
comments

                      </span></span>that I will address at the IETF last
                    call level, rather than the WG last call level,
                    since I disagree <br>
                    that it is =93new ways to say the same thing=94 and i=
t
                    is likely to be a waste of time for both of us to
                    argue again at the WG level <br>
                    (these comments are commented as =93not broken=94).<o=
:p></o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                    style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                      style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">Ca=
tegory

                      4)</span></b><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB=
"
                    lang=3D"EN-GB"> Some typos and editorials found while
                    reading draft 13.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                    style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                      style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">CA=
TEGORY

                      1<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                    style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                      style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">Co=
mment

                      4</span></b><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                    lang=3D"EN-GB"> (was editorial).<o:p></o:p></span></p=
>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                    style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                      style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">Co=
mment

                      5.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                    style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                      style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o=
:p>=A0</o:p></span></b></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                    style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                      style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">Co=
mment

                      6. <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                    style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                      style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">Co=
mment

                      19</span></b><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB=
"
                    lang=3D"EN-GB">. Solved, since </span><b
                    style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight: normal"><span
                      style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier
                      New&quot;; mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">=
=93unknown=94</span></b><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language: EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"> se=
ems
                    now to be also allowed for non-issued certificates <b=
r>
                    (even if the OCSP responder is using a direct access
                    to the certificate database). See comment 8.<o:p></o:=
p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                    style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                      style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">Co=
mment

                      13</span></b><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB=
"
                    lang=3D"EN-GB">: Acceptable, since the text uses </sp=
an><b
                    style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                      style=3D"font-size:10.0pt; font-family:&quot;Courie=
r
                      New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">=93=
MAY=94.</span></b><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
></o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                    style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                      style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">Co=
mment

                      18. <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                    style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                      style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">Co=
mment

                      22.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                    style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                      style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">Co=
mment

                      23.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                    style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                      style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">Co=
mment

                      28.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                    style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                      style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">CA=
TEGORY

                      1<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                    style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                      style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">Co=
mment

                      8</span></b><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                    lang=3D"EN-GB">: You have changed the meaning of the
                    revoked state in a way that is not what I requested.
                    <o:p></o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">The
                    original text was:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                    style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                      style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><s=
pan
                        style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>The
                      "revoked" state indicates that the certificate has
                      been revoked<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                    style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                      style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><s=
pan
                        style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>(either
                      permanantly or temporarily (on hold)).<o:p></o:p></=
span></b></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">The =
new
                    text is:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                    style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                      style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o=
:p>=A0</o:p></span></b></p>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>The =
"revoked" state indicates that the certificate has been revoked<o:p></o:p=
></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>eith=
er permanently or temporarily on hold (i.e. the revocation reason<o:p></o=
:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>is c=
ertificateHold).<o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">By
                    doing this, you do not allow any other case in the
                    future to have a temporary revocation: =93</span><b
                    style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                      style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier
                      New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">t=
emporarily
on


                      hold=94</span></b><b
                    style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                      style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"> <=
br>
                    </span></b><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language: EN-GB"
                    lang=3D"EN-GB">is not the same as<b
                      style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"> =93</b></spa=
n><b
                    style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                      style=3D"font-size:10.0pt; font-family:&quot;Courie=
r
                      New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">t=
emporarily


                      revoked=94</span></b><b
                    style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                      style=3D"mso-ansi-language: EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">.=
<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">I
                    propose the following rewording: <o:p></o:p></span></=
p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                    style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                      style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><s=
pan
                        style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>The
                      "revoked" state indicates that the certificate has
                      been revoked <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>eith=
er permanently or temporarily (e.g. placed on hold).<o:p></o:p></span></b=
></pre>
              </o:smarttagtype></div>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </span>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>I substituted "temporarily on hold" with "temporarily. The
        rest unchanged since the only existing reason code for temporary
        revocation is certificateHold.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
        <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
          style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:=
0
          0 0 5;">
          <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
            <div class=3D"moz-cite-prefix"><o:smarttagtype
                namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttag=
s"
                name=3D"country-region">
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><br>
                </p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">The =
way
                    the text from draft 13 is now written seems to allow
                    using either </span><b
                    style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                      style=3D"font-size:10.0pt; font-family:&quot;Courie=
r
                      New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">=93=
unknown=94</span></b><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"> or =
</span><b
                    style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight: normal"><span
                      style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier
                      New&quot;; mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">=
=93revoked=94</span></b><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language: EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"> fo=
r
                    non-issued certificates. <br>
                    If this is the intent, then the good news is that
                    this does not come anymore into conflict with the
                    French rules which apply for <br>
                    the Administration since OCSP responders from CAs
                    used by the French Ministries having a direct access
                    to the database <br>
                    of issued certificates will be able to use </span><b
                    style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                      style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier
                      New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">=93=
unknown</span></b><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">=94,
                    rather than </span><b
                    style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                      style=3D"font-size:10.0pt; font-family:&quot;Courie=
r
                      New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">=93=
revoked=94</span></b><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"> and
                    the reason code </span><b
                    style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                      style=3D"font-size:10.0pt; font-family:&quot;Courie=
r
                      New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">=93=
onhold=94.</span></b><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
></o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">Howe=
ver,


                    the current text is still mandating the use of </span=
><b
                    style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight: normal"><span
                      style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier
                      New&quot;; mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">=
Extended

                      Revoked Definition</span></b><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">, bu=
t
                    the rational for its need it is very poor. <br>
                    As I have said on the PKIX list, the fact that the
                    revocation date is January 1rst, 1970 is fully
                    sufficient to know that we are in that <br>
                    very special case, and you have not provided a
                    rational to say the contrary.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
              </o:smarttagtype></div>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </span>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>I have. And I have pointed you to the minutes of the last
        PKIC meeting.</div>
      <div>The consensus of the WG is to have the extension for just
        those reasons.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>As implementer, I don't like heuristics. A date of Jan 1st
        1970 may indicate this behaviour, but may just be a
        misconfiguration. It is not an explicit statement.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
        <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
          style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:=
0
          0 0 5;">
          <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
            <div class=3D"moz-cite-prefix"><o:smarttagtype
                namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttag=
s"
                name=3D"country-region">
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">So w=
e
                    could get rid of it, =85 but the text from section
                    4.4.8 states:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>This=
 extension MAY be present in other responses to signal that the<o:p></o:p=
></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>resp=
onder implements the extended revoked definition in section 2.2.<o:p></o:=
p></span></b></pre>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">I ha=
ve
                    difficulties to understand what is really meant
                    there (=93other responses=94 ?), since the text state=
s:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>This=
 extension indicates that the responder supports the extended<o:p></o:p><=
/span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>defi=
nition of the "revoked" status to also include non-issued<o:p></o:p></spa=
n></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>cert=
ificates according to section 2.2.<o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">Sinc=
e
                    both =93unknown=94 and revoked=94 can be used, it wou=
ld be
                    desirable to be able to include the same extension
                    in both cases, <br>
                    but in that case that extension should be renamed.<o:=
p></o:p></span></p>
              </o:smarttagtype></div>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </span>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>This extension can be included in all responses to signal
        that a responder implements the expanded definition of revoked.</=
div>
      <div>Doing so makes this fact auditable without having to ask for
        a non-issued cert.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
        <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
          style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:=
0
          0 0 5;">
          <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
            <div class=3D"moz-cite-prefix"><o:smarttagtype
                namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttag=
s"
                name=3D"country-region">
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><br>
                </p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">I wo=
uld
                    propose to rename it: "</span><b
                    style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                      style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier
                      New&quot;;mso-ansi-language: EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">=
non-issued

                      certificate</span></b><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language: EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">=94
                    which means that the associated CA has no record of
                    ever having issued <br>
                    a certificate with the certificate serial number in
                    the request (I still consider it as unnecessary in
                    the case of =93revoked=94, but it would be <br>
                    very useful in the case of =93unknown=94). Of course,
                    the text from section 4.4.8 would need to be
                    revised.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">I
                    propose the following:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">4.4.8<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>No=
n-issued certificate extension<o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:
normal"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span styl=
e=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>This extension MUST be included in t=
he OCSP response when the OCSP <o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0</span>re=
sponder knows that the CA identified in the request has no record <o:p></=
o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0</span>of=
 ever having issued a certificate with the certificate serial <o:p></o:p>=
</span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0</span>nu=
mber indicated in the request.<o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:
normal"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span styl=
e=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>Clients do not have to parse this ex=
tension in order to determine <o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0</span>th=
e status of certificates in responses.<o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:
normal"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span styl=
e=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>This extension is identified by the =
object identifier id-pkix-ocsp-<o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>non-=
issued-cert.<o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:
normal"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span styl=
e=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0 </span>id-pkix-ocsp-non-issued-cert O=
BJECT IDENTIFIER ::=3D {id-pkix-ocsp 9}<o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:
normal"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span styl=
e=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>The value of the extension SHALL be =
NULL. This extension MUST NOT be<o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>mark=
ed critical.<o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">Then
                    the text on page 8 would need to be rearranged.<o:p><=
/o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
>=A0</o:p></span></p>
              </o:smarttagtype></div>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </span>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>Your extension =A0variant is a significant change to what has
        been agreed.</div>
      <div>Your extension would need to be a single response extension,
        and can't be used to audit the behaviour of the OCSP responder
        unless you send a request for a non-issued cert.</div>
      <div>We want to avoid sending such fake requests for audit
        purposes as it may interfere with systems at the responder
        trying to detect existence of rouge certificates.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>This is a type of change that I can't make unless you get
        support from a majority of the WG for the change of direction
        you propose.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
        <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
          style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:=
0
          0 0 5;">
          <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
            <div class=3D"moz-cite-prefix"><o:smarttagtype
                namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttag=
s"
                name=3D"country-region">
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">The
                    current text is:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>This=
 state MAY also be returned if the<o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>asso=
ciated CA has no record of ever having issued a certificate with<o:p></o:=
p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>the =
certificate serial number in the request, using any current or<o:p></o:p>=
</span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>prev=
ious issuing key (referred to as a "non-issued" certificate in<o:p></o:p>=
</span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>this=
 document).<o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:
normal"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span styl=
e=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>The "unknown" state indicates that t=
he responder doesn't know about<o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>the =
certificate being requested.<o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:
normal"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span styl=
e=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>NOTE: The "revoked" state for known =
non-issued certificate serial<o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0 </span>numbers is allowed in order to reduce the risk of relying<o=
:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0 </span>parties using CRLs as a fall back mechanism, which would be=
<o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0 </span>considerably higher if an "unknown" response was returned.<=
o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:
normal"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span styl=
e=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>When a responder responds revoked to=
 a status request for a non-<o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>issu=
ed certificate, the responder MUST include the extended revoked<o:p></o:p=
></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>defi=
nition response extension (section 4.4.8) in the response,<o:p></o:p></sp=
an></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>indi=
cating that the OCSP responder supports the extended definition<o:p></o:p=
></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>of r=
evoked state to also cover non-issued certificates. In addition,<o:p></o:=
p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>the =
SingleResponse related to this non-issued certificate;<o:p></o:p></span><=
/b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:
normal"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span styl=
e=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0 </span>- MUST provide the revocation rea=
son certificateHold (6),<o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:
normal"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span styl=
e=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0 </span>- MUST specify the revocationTime=
 January 1, 1970, and;<o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:
normal"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span styl=
e=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=
</span>- MUST NOT include a CRL References extension (section 4.4.2) or a=
ny<o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 </=
span>CRL Entry Extensions (section 4.4.5). <o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">Prop=
osed


                    text for a replacement:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>The =
"unknown" state indicates that the responder doesn't know about<o:p></o:p=
></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>the =
certificate being requested.<o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:
normal"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span styl=
e=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>If the OCSP responder knows that CA =
identified in the request has <o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0</span>no=
 record of ever having issued a certificate with the certificate <o:p></o=
:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0</span>se=
rial number in the request, using any current or previous issuing <o:p></=
o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0</span>ke=
y (referred to as a "non-issued" certificate in this document), <o:p></o:=
p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0</span>th=
e OCSP responder SHALL respond either =93revoked =93 or =93unknown=94.<o:=
p></o:p></span></b></pre>
              </o:smarttagtype></div>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </span>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>This is unfortunately very common in your rewording efforts.
        When trying to fix one thing, you create new even bigger
        problems.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>An infrastructure that provides reproduced responses will
        respond "unauthorized". This text may be interpreted to
        interfere with such operations.</div>
      <div>Further, and worse. This is not backwards compatible. Current
        OCSP responders may respond "good" even if they have access to
        CA records.=A0</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
        <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
          style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:=
0
          0 0 5;">
          <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
            <div class=3D"moz-cite-prefix"><o:smarttagtype
                namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttag=
s"
                name=3D"country-region">
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:
normal"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span styl=
e=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>Note: The "revoked" state for known =
non-issued certificate serial <o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0</span>nu=
mbers is allowed in order to reduce the risk of relying parties <o:p></o:=
p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0</span>us=
ing CRLs as a fall back mechanism, which would be possible when <o:p></o:=
p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0</span>th=
e "unknown" response is returned.<o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:
normal"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span styl=
e=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>When a responder responds revoked or=
 unknown to a status request <o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0</span>fo=
r a non-issued certificate, the responder MUST include the <o:p></o:p></s=
pan></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0</span>no=
n-issued certificate extension (see section 4.4.8) in the <o:p></o:p></sp=
an></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0</span>re=
sponse. <o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:
normal"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span styl=
e=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>When a responder responds revoked to=
 a status request for a non-<o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>issu=
ed certificate, in addition, the responder:<o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:
normal"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span styl=
e=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0 </span>- MUST provide the revocation rea=
son certificateHold (6),<o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:
normal"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span styl=
e=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0 </span>- MUST specify the revocationTime=
 January 1, 1970, and;<o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:
normal"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span styl=
e=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0 </span>- MUST NOT include a CRL Referenc=
es extension (section 4.4.2) or any<o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 </=
span>CRL Entry Extensions (section 4.4.5).<o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">Fina=
lly,


                    the last bullet on page 4 should be reworded:<o:p></o=
:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">Curr=
ent
                    text:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 </=
span>o Section 4.4.8 specifies a new extension that indicates that the<o:=
p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0 </span>responder supports the extended use of the "revoked" respon=
se<o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0 </span>for non-issued certificates defined in section 2.2.<o:p></o=
:p></span></b></pre>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                    style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                      style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o=
:p>=A0</o:p></span></b></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">Prop=
osed


                    replacement text:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 </=
span>o <span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0</span>Section 4.4.8 specifies=
 a new extension that indicates that <o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0</span>the OCSP responder knows that CA identified in the reques=
t <o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0</span>has no record of ever having issued a certificate with th=
e <o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0</span>certificate serial number present in the request, as defi=
ned <o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0</span>in section 2.2.<o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
>=A0</o:p></span></p>
              </o:smarttagtype></div>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </span>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>No. Again, this changes the scope of the extension and its
        audit properties.</div>
      <div>Such change requires WG consensus.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
        <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
          style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:=
0
          0 0 5;">
          <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
            <div class=3D"moz-cite-prefix"><o:smarttagtype
                namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttag=
s"
                name=3D"country-region">
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                    style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                      style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">Co=
mment

                      9:</span></b><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB=
"
                    lang=3D"EN-GB"> Solved, if the comment above may be
                    solved.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                    style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                      style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">Co=
mment

                      20</span></b><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB=
"
                    lang=3D"EN-GB">:<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 =
</span>This


                    comment is preliminary classified by you as =93not
                    broken=94. However, since you asked: =93If you don=92=
t
                    replace 4.2.2.3,<br>
                    then what really are you missing ?=94, I will provide
                    you with an answer.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">This=
 is
                    the wrong way to state the question. Providing an
                    ASN.1 syntax as in 4.2.1 is not enough: the use of
                    every parameter <br>
                    MUST be explained using English words. So if you
                    explain the use of every parameter after the
                    description of the ASN.1 syntax <br>
                    in section 4.2.1. then section 4.2.2.3 is no more
                    needed and thus can be deleted.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">The
                    answer to your question =93what is really missing=94 =
is
                    a description of the use of every parameter listed
                    in the ASN.1 in section 4.2.1<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
>=A0</o:p></span></p>
              </o:smarttagtype></div>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </span>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>There are sufficient descriptions in the subsections
        following the ASN.1 description. Your change proposals are not
        compatible with the minimalistic approach adopted by the WG.</div=
>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
        <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
          style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:=
0
          0 0 5;">
          <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
            <div class=3D"moz-cite-prefix"><o:smarttagtype
                namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttag=
s"
                name=3D"country-region">
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                    style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                      style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">Co=
mment

                      21.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">Whil=
e I
                    can agree in general with the intent of the text, I
                    do not understand the first sentence of the Note
                    which speaks of =93CA key rollover=94 <br>
                    and is copied below:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>Note=
: CA key rollover is not prohibited when issuing a certificate<o:p></o:p>=
</span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0 </span>for an authorized responder for backwards compatibility wit=
h<o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0 </span>RFC 2560 [RFC2560]. That is, it is not prohibited to issue =
a<o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0 </span>certificate for an authorized responder using a different<o=
:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0 </span>issuing key than the key used to issued the certificate bei=
ng<o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0 </span>checked for revocation. However, such practice is strongly<=
o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0 </span>discouraged since clients are not required to recognize a<o=
:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0 </span>responder with such certificate as an authorized responder.=
<o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">I wo=
uld
                    propose to delete it, since it does not add anything
                    and thus to have:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>Note=
: For backwards compatibility with RFC 2560 [RFC2560], it is <o:p></o:p><=
/span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0</span>not prohibited to issue a certificate for an authorized <=
o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0</span>responder using a different issuing key than the key used=
 to <o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0</span>issued the certificate being checked for revocation. <o:p=
></o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0</span>However, such practice is strongly discouraged since clie=
nts <o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0</span>are not required to recognize a responder with such <o:p>=
</o:p></span></b></pre>
                <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=
=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0</span>certificate as an authorized responder.<o:p></o:p></span>=
</b></pre>
              </o:smarttagtype></div>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </span>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>I agree, your text is better. Updated.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
        <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
          style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:=
0
          0 0 5;">
          <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
            <div class=3D"moz-cite-prefix"><o:smarttagtype
                namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttag=
s"
                name=3D"country-region">
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                    style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                      style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">Co=
mment

                      24</span></b><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB=
"
                    lang=3D"EN-GB">: The ASN.1 module in annex B.1 is
                    still wrong, since it does not define NoCheck. <o:p><=
/o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
>=A0</o:p></span></p>
              </o:smarttagtype></div>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </span>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>No you are wrong. We have confirmed with several ASN.1
        experts that definition of NoCheck is not necessary to define
        null content.</div>
      <div>The current definition is perfectly valid ASN.1</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
        <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
          style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:=
0
          0 0 5;">
          <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
            <div class=3D"moz-cite-prefix"><o:smarttagtype
                namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttag=
s"
                name=3D"country-region">
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                    style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                      style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">Co=
mment

                      26</span></b><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB=
"
                    lang=3D"EN-GB">: You asked for explanations. Let me
                    provide you with an example when CRLs are being used
                    by the OCSP responder <br>
                    in the background. The OCSP responder needs to make
                    sure that the CRL it uses is valid. If it is simply
                    using published CRLs <br>
                    (i.e. no trusted link with the CA), it needs to make
                    sure that the CA which has issued the CRL has no
                    been revoked.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
>=A0</o:p></span></p>
              </o:smarttagtype></div>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </span>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>No, this is a misstatement. You don't revoke CAs. You revoke
        CA certificates. There might be a CA certificate that has been
        revoked for a reason that does not affect the OCSP responder.</di=
v>
      <div>These are operational policies that are outside the scope of
        the protocol.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>The proposed text in comment 26 is plain wrong, or at least
        misleading. The OCSP responder does not have to validate the CRL
        up to any particular root. It may for example have been
        configured to directly trust the public key used to validate the
        CRL.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
        <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
          style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:=
0
          0 0 5;">
          <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
            <div class=3D"moz-cite-prefix"><o:smarttagtype
                namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttag=
s"
                name=3D"country-region">
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">In <=
st1:place
                      w:st=3D"on"><st1:country-region w:st=3D"on">France<=
/st1:country-region></st1:place>,
                    there is a root CA for the Administration. However,
                    the use of that root CA is optional. Thus a Ministry
                    may have its own root, <br>
                    but may also have its key certified by the root CA
                    of the Administration. The OCSP responder may use
                    the root CA of the Ministry, <br>
                    while a relying party may use the root CA of the
                    Administration (or the reverse) to validate the CRL
                    for the target certificate. <br>
                    Thus the revocation status will be different if the
                    certificate of the CA of the Ministry is revoked by
                    the root CA of the Administration.<o:p></o:p></span><=
/p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
>=A0</o:p></span></p>
              </o:smarttagtype></div>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </span>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>Which reinforces my point. How the OCSP responder is
        configured to trust its information source is outside the scope
        of the protocol.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>The OCSP protocol never claims to provide the same conclusion
        about revocation than another source the relying party may use.</=
div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>I skip category 3 as this will be dealt with in IESG last
        call.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
        <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
          style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:=
0
          0 0 5;">
          <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
            <div class=3D"moz-cite-prefix"><o:smarttagtype
                namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttag=
s"
                name=3D"country-region">
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                    style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                      style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">CA=
TEGORY

                      3<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                    style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                      style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">Co=
mments</span></b><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"> 2, =
3,
                    7, 10, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 25 and 27.<o:p></o:p></spa=
n></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                    style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                      style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">CA=
TEGORY

                      4<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">Page=
 4.
                    The indentation of the bullets in section 1 is not
                    uniform. <br>
                    Bullets 1, 4, 5 and 9 have problems.<o:p></o:p></span=
></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">Page=
 4.
                    The fact that there is now an Annex B.2 dealing with
                    the 2008 ASN.1 syntax is missing. This should be
                    added.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p=
>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">Page
                    10. Change =93</span><b
                    style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                      style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier
                      New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">S=
e
                      further section 4.2.2.2=94</span></b><span
                    style=3D"mso-ansi-language: EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"> in=
to
                    =93</span><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><s=
pan
                      style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier
                      New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">S=
ee


                      further section 4.2.2.2=94<br>
                    </span></b></p>
              </o:smarttagtype></div>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </span>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>Thanks. I have fixed them all.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>/Stefan</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
        <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
          style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:=
0
          0 0 5;">
          <div>
            <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
              <div class=3D"moz-cite-prefix"><o:smarttagtype
                  namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smartt=
ags"
                  name=3D"country-region">
                  <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><br>
                    Denis<br>
                    <b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                        style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Couri=
er
                        New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"=
></span></b><span
                      style=3D"mso-ansi-language: EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><=
o:p></o:p></span></p>
                  <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                      style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o=
:p>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                  <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                      style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o=
:p>=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D


                        <br>
                      </o:p></span></p>
                </o:smarttagtype><br>
              </div>
              <blockquote cite=3D"mid:CD2ABB93.591BC%25stefan@aaa-sec.com=
"
                type=3D"cite">
                <div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">Denis,<=
/div>
                <div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><br>
                </div>
                <div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">Respond=
ing

                  to your comments below.</div>
                <div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><br>
                </div>
                <div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">However=
,
                  one general remark to make recurring comments easier
                  to understand.</div>
                <div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><br>
                </div>
                <div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">The WG
                  decided to adopt a minimalistic approach to updating
                  RFC 2560. That means that=A0</div>
                <ol>
                  <li>We don't change anything from RFC 2560 unless it
                    is broken, or the industry clearly need
                    clarifications in order to avoid interoperability
                    issues.</li>
                  <li>We retain the document structure of RFC 2560 as
                    much as possible to allow easy comparison of what
                    the changes are in comparison with RFC 2560.</li>
                </ol>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">One can
                  always think up more clever ways to write things out
                  in words. But that also comes with a risk.</div>
                <div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">The
                  current words has been around for a long time and we
                  know from experience which words worked to produce
                  working implementations, and which did not.</div>
                <div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">Introdu=
cing

                  new ways to say the same thing may introduce new
                  problems and people might disagree on what the new
                  perfect wording should be. And this could go on
                  forever.</div>
                <div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><br>
                </div>
                <div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">So when
                  my reply is "Not broken", then that is because the
                  current wording does not have such problems that is
                  merits a change.</div>
                <div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><br>
                </div>
                <div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><br>
                </div>
                <div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><br>
                </div>
                <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION" style=3D"font-family:
                  Calibri, sans-serif; ">
                  <div style=3D"font-family:Calibri; font-size:11pt;
                    text-align:left; color:black; BORDER-BOTTOM: medium
                    none; BORDER-LEFT: medium none; PADDING-BOTTOM: 0in;
                    PADDING-LEFT: 0in; PADDING-RIGHT: 0in; BORDER-TOP:
                    #b5c4df 1pt solid; BORDER-RIGHT: medium none;
                    PADDING-TOP: 3pt"><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">Fr=
om:

                    </span> Denis Pinkas &lt;<a moz-do-not-send=3D"true"
                      href=3D"mailto:denis.pinkas@bull.net">denis.pinkas@=
bull.net</a>&gt;<br>
                    <span style=3D"font-weight:bold">Date: </span>
                    Sunday, January 20, 2013 5:12 PM<br>
                    <span style=3D"font-weight:bold">To: </span> Stefan
                    Santesson &lt;<a moz-do-not-send=3D"true"
                      href=3D"mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com">stefan@aaa-sec.c=
om</a>&gt;,


                    Stephen Kent &lt;<a moz-do-not-send=3D"true"
                      href=3D"mailto:kent@bbn.com">kent@bbn.com</a>&gt;<b=
r>
                    <span style=3D"font-weight:bold">Cc: </span> pkix
                    &lt;<a moz-do-not-send=3D"true"
                      href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>&gt;=
<br>
                    <span style=3D"font-weight:bold">Subject: </span> Re:
                    [pkix] Review of 2560-bis draft 8. Answer to WGLC<br>
                  </div>
                  <div><br>
                  </div>
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                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal">Please find 32 comments
                            on <span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis<o=
:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>=A0</o:p></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><!--[if supportFields]><=
span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spaceru=
n:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->1.=
<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element=
:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"> The document states:<o:p></=
o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0=
</o:p></span></b><span
                              style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;
                              font-size: 14px; ">&lt;Cut away issue 1
                              regarding authorship etc, as it has been
                              responded to separately&gt;</span></p>
                        </o:smarttagtype></div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><br>
                </div>
                <div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">Respond=
ed

                  to separately.</div>
                <div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><br>
                </div>
                <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION" style=3D"font-family:
                  Calibri, sans-serif; ">
                  <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
                    style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000"><o:smartt=
agtype
namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags"
                          name=3D"metricconverter">
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><!--[if supportFields]><=
span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spaceru=
n:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->2.=
<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element=
:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"> The current text from
                              section 2 states:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <pre><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" la=
ng=3D"EN-GB">2.<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>Protocol Overv=
iew<o:p></o:p></span></pre>
                          <pre><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" la=
ng=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></pre>
                          <pre><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" la=
ng=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>In lieu of or=
 as a supplement to checking against a periodic CRL, it<o:p></o:p></span>=
</pre>
                          <pre><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" la=
ng=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>may be necess=
ary to obtain <b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal">timely information=
</b> regarding the<o:p></o:p></span></pre>
                          <pre><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" la=
ng=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>revocation st=
atus of a certificate (cf. RFC5280], Section 3.3).<o:p></o:p></span></pre=
>
                          <pre><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" la=
ng=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>Examples incl=
ude high-value funds transfer or large stock trades.<o:p></o:p></span></p=
re>
                          <pre><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" la=
ng=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></pre>
                          <pre><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" la=
ng=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>The Online Ce=
rtificate Status Protocol (OCSP) enables applications to<o:p></o:p></span=
></pre>
                          <pre><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" la=
ng=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>determine the=
 (revocation) state of an identified certificate. OCSP<o:p></o:p></span><=
/pre>
                          <pre><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" la=
ng=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>may be used t=
o satisfy some of the operational requirements of<o:p></o:p></span></pre>
                          <pre><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" la=
ng=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>providing <b =
style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal">more timely revocation information<=
/b> than is possible with<o:p></o:p></span></pre>
                          <pre><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" la=
ng=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>CRLs and may =
also be used to obtain additional status information. <o:p></o:p></span><=
/pre>
                          <pre><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" la=
ng=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></pre>
                          <pre><span style=3D"font-size: 12pt; font-famil=
y: 'Times New Roman'; " lang=3D"EN-GB">This text is misleading because re=
aders may think that OCPS necessarily provides =93timely information=94.<=
o:p></o:p></span></pre>
                          <pre><span style=3D"font-size: 12pt; font-famil=
y: 'Times New Roman'; " lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></pre>
                        </o:smarttagtype></div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><br>
                </div>
                <div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">"may"
                  does not mean "necessarily".</div>
                <div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><br>
                </div>
                <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION" style=3D"font-family:
                  Calibri, sans-serif; ">
                  <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
                    style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000"><o:smartt=
agtype
namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags"
                          name=3D"metricconverter">
                          <pre><span style=3D"font-size: 12pt; font-famil=
y: 'Times New Roman'; " lang=3D"EN-GB">Proposed text replacement:<o:p></o=
:p></span></pre>
                          <pre><span style=3D"font-family: 'Times New Rom=
an'; " lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></pre>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>The

                                Online Certificate Status Protocol
                                (OCSP) is a client-server <o:p></o:p></sp=
an></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>protocol


                                which enables applications to obtain the
                                revocation status <o:p></o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>of
                                one or more certificates either "good",
                                "revoked", or "unknown".<o:p></o:p></span=
></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>The


                                revocation status may be provided by the
                                server either using a <o:p></o:p></span><=
/b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>real

                                time access to a database of issued
                                certificates, or using a <o:p></o:p></spa=
n></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>batch

                                access to a database of issued
                                certificates, or using a <o:p></o:p></spa=
n></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>real

                                time access to a database of revocation
                                statuses of issued <o:p></o:p></span></b>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>certificates,


                                or using a batch access to a database of
                                revocation <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>statuses

                                of issued certificates, or using CRLs,
                                or using a <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>combination


                                of base CRLs and delta CRLs.<o:p></o:p></=
span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>In
                                the first case, it is possible to obtain
                                timely revocation status <o:p></o:p></spa=
n></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>information,


                                whereas in the other cases, the
                                freshness of the <o:p></o:p></span></b></=
p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>revocation


                                status is not better than the mechanisms
                                it is based on.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <pre><span style=3D"font-family: 'Times New Rom=
an'; " lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></pre>
                          <pre><span style=3D"font-family: 'Times New Rom=
an'; " lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></pre>
                        </o:smarttagtype></div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><br>
                </div>
                <div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">Not
                  broken</div>
                <div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><br>
                </div>
                <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION" style=3D"font-family:
                  Calibri, sans-serif; ">
                  <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
                    style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000"><o:smartt=
agtype
namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags"
                          name=3D"metricconverter">
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><!--[if supportFields]><=
span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spaceru=
n:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->3.=
<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element=
:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"> The current text from
                              section 2 states:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <pre><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" la=
ng=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></pre>
                          <pre><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" la=
ng=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>An OCSP clien=
t issues a status request to an OCSP responder and <o:p></o:p></span></pr=
e>
                          <pre><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" la=
ng=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0</span>Suspends ac=
ceptance of <b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal">the certificate in q=
uestion</b> until the <o:p></o:p></span></pre>
                          <pre><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" la=
ng=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0</span>responder p=
rovides a response.<o:p></o:p></span></pre>
                          <pre><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" la=
ng=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></pre>
                          <pre><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" la=
ng=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>This protocol=
 specifies the data that needs to be exchanged between<o:p></o:p></span><=
/pre>
                          <pre><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" la=
ng=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>an applicatio=
n checking the status of a certificate and the server<o:p></o:p></span></=
pre>
                          <pre><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" la=
ng=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>providing tha=
t status.<o:p></o:p></span></pre>
                          <pre><span style=3D"font-family: 'Times New Rom=
an'; " lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></pre>
                          <pre><span style=3D"font-size: 12pt; font-famil=
y: 'Times New Roman'; " lang=3D"EN-GB">Thus is insufficient for an overvi=
ew. More details are needed to know what the document provides,=20
in particular that the request may contain several requests for several c=
ertificates issued by different CAs.=20
The possibility of using extensions should also be advertised.<o:p></o:p>=
</span></pre>
                          <pre><span style=3D"font-size: 12pt; font-famil=
y: 'Times New Roman'; " lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></pre>
                          <pre><span style=3D"font-size: 12pt; font-famil=
y: 'Times New Roman'; " lang=3D"EN-GB">Proposed text replacement:<o:p></o=
:p></span></pre>
                          <pre><span style=3D"font-family: 'Times New Rom=
an'; " lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></pre>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size=
:
                              10pt; font-family: 'Courier New'; "
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>=
When
                              using OCSP, an OCSP client issues a
                              certificate revocation <o:p></o:p></span></=
p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size=
:
                              10pt; font-family: 'Courier New'; "
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>=
status

                              request to an OCSP responder <b
                                style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal">for
                                one or more certificates <o:p></o:p></b><=
/span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>issued

                                by the same CA or for one or more
                                certificates issued by <o:p></o:p></span>=
</b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>different


                                CAs </span></b><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Courier
                              New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">and then suspends acceptance
                              of the certificate(s) <o:p></o:p></span></p=
>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size=
:
                              10pt; font-family: 'Courier New'; "
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>=
in
                              question until the responder provides a
                              response.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size=
:
                              10pt; font-family: 'Courier New'; "
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size=
:
                              10pt; font-family: 'Courier New'; "
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>=
This
                              document specifies the data that needs to
                              be exchanged between<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size=
:
                              10pt; font-family: 'Courier New'; "
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>=
an
                              application checking the status of a
                              certificate and the server<o:p></o:p></span=
></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size=
:
                              10pt; font-family: 'Courier New'; "
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>=
providing

                              that status.<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes=
">=A0
                              </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size=
:
                              10pt; font-family: 'Courier New'; "
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>OCSP

                                may also provide additional status
                                information using <o:p></o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>extensions.


                                <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                        </o:smarttagtype></div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><br>
                </div>
                <div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">Not
                  broken</div>
                <div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><br>
                </div>
                <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION" style=3D"font-family:
                  Calibri, sans-serif; ">
                  <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
                    style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000"><o:smartt=
agtype
namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags"
                          name=3D"metricconverter">
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><!--[if supportFields]><=
span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spaceru=
n:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->4.=
<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element=
:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"> Page 6. Editorial.
                              Punctuation and a CR/LF are missing.<o:p></=
o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">The text states:<o:p></o:p><=
/span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size=
:
                              10pt; font-family: 'Courier New'; "
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                          <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><=
span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>3. t=
he request contains the information needed by the responder If<o:p></o:p>=
</span></b></pre>
                          <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><=
span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 </=
span>any one of the prior conditions are not met, the OCSP responder<o:p>=
</o:p></span></b></pre>
                          <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><=
span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 </=
span>produces an error message; otherwise, it returns a definitive<o:p></=
o:p></span></b></pre>
                          <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><=
span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 </=
span>response.<o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size=
:
                              10pt; font-family: 'Courier New'; "
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">It should state:<o:p></o:p><=
/span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size=
:
                              10pt; font-family: 'Courier New'; "
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                          <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><=
span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>4. t=
he request contains the information needed by the responder.<o:p></o:p></=
span></b></pre>
                          <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><=
span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b></pre>
                          <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:
normal"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span styl=
e=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 </span>If any one of the prior con=
ditions are not met, the OCSP responder<o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                          <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><=
span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 </=
span>produces an error message; otherwise, it returns a definitive<o:p></=
o:p></span></b></pre>
                          <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><=
span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 </=
span>response.<o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                        </o:smarttagtype></div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><br>
                </div>
                <div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">Fixed i=
n
                  draft 10.</div>
                <div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><br>
                </div>
                <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION" style=3D"font-family:
                  Calibri, sans-serif; ">
                  <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
                    style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000"><o:smartt=
agtype
namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags"
                          name=3D"metricconverter">
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><!--[if supportFields]><=
span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spaceru=
n:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->5.=
<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element=
:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"> On page 7, the text states:=
<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0=
</o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>All


                                definitive response messages SHALL be
                                digitally signed. The key<o:p></o:p></spa=
n></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>used

                                to sign the response MUST belong to one
                                of the following:<o:p></o:p></span></b></=
p>
                          <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><=
span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b></pre>
                          <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:
normal"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span styl=
e=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>-<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=
 </span>the CA who issued the certificate in question<o:p></o:p></span></=
b></pre>
                          <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><=
span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>-<sp=
an style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>a Trusted Responder whose public=
 key is trusted by the requester<o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                          <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><=
span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>-<sp=
an style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>a CA Designated Responder (Autho=
rized Responder) who holds a<o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                          <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><=
span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 </=
span>specially marked certificate issued directly by the CA, indicating<o=
:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                          <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><=
span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 </=
span>that the responder may issue OCSP responses for that CA.<o:p></o:p><=
/span></b></pre>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0=
</o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">The paragraph is ambiguous o=
n
                              several aspects. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">Delegation is addressed in a=
t
                              least three different places, but with
                              different terms and conditions. <br>
                              If some one picks a sentence in one
                              paragraph rather than another, it will
                              lead to a different conclusion. <br>
                              RFCs are supposed to be clear.<o:p></o:p></=
span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span
                              style=3D"font-size: 12pt; font-family:
                              'Times New Roman'; " lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0=
</o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span
                              style=3D"font-size: 12pt; font-family:
                              'Times New Roman'; " lang=3D"EN-GB">On page
                              10, the current text states in section</spa=
n><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"> <b
                                style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal">2.6
                                OCSP Signature Authority Delegation </b><=
/span><span
                              style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Times

                              New Roman&quot;;mso-ansi-language: EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">states:</span><span
                              style=3D"font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <pre><span style=3D"font-family: 'Times New Rom=
an'; " lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></pre>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n><span
style=3D"background:lime;mso-highlight:lime">The key that signs a
                                  certificate's status information need
                                  not be the<o:p></o:p></span></span></b>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
style=3D"background:lime;mso-highlight:lime;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>same



                                key that signed the certificate.</span></=
b><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language: EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"> A certificate's issuer<o:=
p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>explicitly


                                delegates OCSP signing authority by
                                issuing a certificate<o:p></o:p></span></=
b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>containing

                                a unique value for extendedKeyUsage in
                                the OCSP signer's<o:p></o:p></span></b></=
p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>certificate.


                                This certificate MUST be issued directly
                                to the<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>responder

                                by the cognizant CA.<o:p></o:p></span></b=
></p>
                          <pre><span style=3D"font-family: 'Times New Rom=
an'; " lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></pre>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">On page 16, there is a
                              section </span><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-family:&quot;Courier
                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB">4.2.2.2</span></b><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language: EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"> </span></b><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">called<b
                                style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"> =93=
</b></span><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight: normal"><spa=
n
                                style=3D"font-family:&quot;Courier
                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language: EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB">Authorized Responders=94</=
span></b><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language: EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"> dealing with the same topic=
.
                              <o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">Section 4.2.2.2 states:<o:p>=
</o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n><span
style=3D"background:lime;mso-highlight:lime">The key that signs a
                                  certificate's status information need
                                  not be the<o:p></o:p></span></span></b>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
style=3D"background:lime;mso-highlight:lime;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>same



                                key that signed the certificate</span></b=
><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language: EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB">. It is necessary however
                                to<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>ensure

                                that the entity signing this information
                                is authorized to do<o:p></o:p></span></b>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>so.<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>T=
herefore,

                                a certificate's issuer MAY either sign
                                the OCSP<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>responses


                                itself or it MAY explicitly designate
                                this authority to<o:p></o:p></span></b></=
p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>another


                                entity.<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0
                                </span>OCSP signing delegation SHALL be
                                designated by the<o:p></o:p></span></b></=
p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>inclusion

                                of id-kp-OCSPSigning in an
                                extendedKeyUsage certificate<o:p></o:p></=
span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>extension


                                included in the OCSP response signer's
                                certificate.<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>T=
his<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>certificate


                                MUST be issued directly by the CA that
                                issued the<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>certificate


                                in question.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>The

                                CA SHOULD use the same issuing key to
                                issue a delegation<o:p></o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>certificate


                                as was used to sign the certificate
                                being checked for<o:p></o:p></span></b></=
p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>revocation.


                                <span
                                  style=3D"background:yellow;mso-highligh=
t:yellow">Systems



                                  relying on OCSP responses MUST
                                  recognize a<o:p></o:p></span></span></b=
></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
style=3D"background:yellow;mso-highlight:yellow;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>delegation



                                certificate as being issued by the CA
                                that issued the<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
style=3D"background:yellow;mso-highlight:yellow;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>certificate



                                in question only if the delegation
                                certificate and the<o:p></o:p></span></b>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
style=3D"background:yellow;mso-highlight:yellow;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>certificate



                                being checked for revocation was signed
                                by the same key.</span></b><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">The last sentence above in
                              yellow is the key sentence that is missing
                              in the two other sections.<o:p></o:p></span=
></p>
                          <pre><span style=3D"font-size: 12pt; font-famil=
y: 'Times New Roman'; " lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></pre>
                          <pre><span style=3D"font-size: 12pt; font-famil=
y: 'Times New Roman'; " lang=3D"EN-GB">Most implementations only support =
the case where the OCSP Responder receives an OCSP certificate that is si=
gned by the same key=20
that was used to sign the target certificate. They do not support the cas=
e where the OCSP Responder receives an OCSP certificate=20
that is signed by a key that is different from the one that was used to s=
ign the target certificate.<o:p></o:p></span></pre>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">It is inappropriate to have
                              three sections dealing with the same topic
                              with a slightly different meaning.<o:p></o:=
p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">It is proposed the following=
.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">On page 7, after:<o:p></o:p>=
</span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><=
span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>-<sp=
an style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>a CA Designated Responder (Autho=
rized Responder) who holds a<o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                          <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><=
span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 </=
span>specially marked certificate issued directly by the CA, indicating<o=
:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                          <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><=
span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 </=
span>that the responder may issue OCSP responses for that CA.<o:p></o:p><=
/span></b></pre>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">it is proposed to add =93(</=
span><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language: EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB">see section 4.2.2.2 for
                                further details</span></b><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight: normal"><spa=
n
                                style=3D"font-family:&quot;Courier
                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language: EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB">)=94</span></b><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">, so that the reader knows
                              that more details are provided later on.<o:=
p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span
                              style=3D"font-size: 12pt; font-family:
                              'Times New Roman'; " lang=3D"EN-GB">Then we
                              do not need two sections to address
                              delegation which start with the same
                              sentence:</span><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"> <br>
                            </span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><br>
                              =93<b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"=
>The

                                key that signs a certificate's status
                                information need not be the same key
                                that signed the certificate=94.<o:p></o:p=
></b></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">It is thus proposed to delet=
e
                              section 2.6.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">Section 4.2.2.2 will thus
                              remain the single section providing full
                              details.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <pre><span style=3D"font-family: 'Times New Rom=
an'; " lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></pre>
                        </o:smarttagtype></div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><br>
                </div>
                <div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">I have
                  added references to section 4.2.2.2 in the quoted
                  sections in 2.2 and 2.6.</div>
                <div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">(will b=
e
                  included in draft 11)</div>
                <div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><br>
                </div>
                <div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><br>
                </div>
                <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION" style=3D"font-family:
                  Calibri, sans-serif; ">
                  <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
                    style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000"><o:smartt=
agtype
namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags"
                          name=3D"metricconverter">
                          <pre><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span> AUTONUM<span style=
=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp; </span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"fon=
t-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; " lang=3D"EN-GB"><!--[if !s=
upportFields]-->6.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><s=
pan style=3D"font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; " lang=3D"E=
N-GB"> Page 7, the text states:<o:p></o:p></span></pre>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><=
span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>A de=
finitive response message is composed of:<o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                          <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><=
span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b></pre>
                          <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:
normal"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span styl=
e=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>-<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=
 </span>version of the response syntax<o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                          <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><=
span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>-<sp=
an style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>name of the responder<o:p></o:p>=
</span></b></pre>
                          <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><=
span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>-<sp=
an style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>responses for each of the certif=
icates in a request<o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                          <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><=
span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>-<sp=
an style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>optional extensions<o:p></o:p></=
span></b></pre>
                          <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><=
span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>-<sp=
an style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>signature algorithm OID<o:p></o:=
p></span></b></pre>
                          <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><=
span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>- <s=
pan style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0</span>signature computed across hash o=
f the response<o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">This description does not fi=
t
                              with the ASN.1 syntax which is detailed
                              later on, and in particular:<o:p></o:p></sp=
an></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><=
span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span></sp=
an>ResponseData ::=3D SEQUENCE {<o:p></o:p></b></pre>
                          <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><=
span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 </span>version<span style=
=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 </span>[0] =
EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,<o:p></o:p></b></pre>
                          <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><=
span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 </span></b><b style=3D"ms=
o-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">responderID<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 </span>ResponderID,<o:p></o:p></span></b><=
/pre>
                          <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><=
span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 </=
span>producedAt<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 </span>GeneralizedTime,<o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                          <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><=
span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 </=
span>responses<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 </span>SEQUENCE OF SingleResponse,<o:p></o:p></span></=
b></pre>
                          <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><=
span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 </=
span>responseExtensions<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>[1]=
 EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL }<o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <pre><span style=3D"font-size: 12pt; font-famil=
y: 'Times New Roman'; " lang=3D"EN-GB">Proposed text replacement:<o:p></o=
:p></span></pre>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>A
                                definitive response message is composed
                                of:<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>-
                                a response status and if there is no
                                error, the following:<o:p></o:p></span></=
b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>-
                                the version of the response syntax,<o:p><=
/o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>-
                                an identifier of the OCSP server,<o:p></o=
:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>-
                                the time at which the response was
                                produced,<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>-
                                single responses for each of the target
                                certificates,<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>-
                                optional extensions,<o:p></o:p></span></b=
></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>-
                                the signature algorithm OID,<o:p></o:p></=
span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>-
                                the signature computed across hash of
                                the response, and<o:p></o:p></span></b></=
p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>-
                                optional certificates.<o:p></o:p></span><=
/b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                        </o:smarttagtype></div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><br>
                </div>
                <div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">This is
                  an overview section. We ought not try to duplicate the
                  level of detail provided in the detailed protocol
                  section.</div>
                <div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">A
                  "definitive response" according to tho 2.1 is a
                  response to an error-free request, so your first
                  remark is redundant.</div>
                <div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><br>
                </div>
                <div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">I have
                  added a note about time to the current list, and
                  changed "name" to identifier in bullet 2.=A0</div>
                <div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">(will b=
e
                  included in draft 11)</div>
                <div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><br>
                </div>
                <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION" style=3D"font-family:
                  Calibri, sans-serif; ">
                  <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
                    style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000"><o:smartt=
agtype
namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags"
                          name=3D"metricconverter">
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><!--[if supportFields]><=
span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spaceru=
n:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->7.=
<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element=
:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"> The text states on page 7:<=
o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>The

                                response for each of the certificates in
                                a request consists of<o:p></o:p></span></=
b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>-<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>t=
arget


                                certificate identifier<o:p></o:p></span><=
/b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>-<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>c=
ertificate


                                status value<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>-<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>r=
esponse


                                validity interval<o:p></o:p></span></b></=
p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>-<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>o=
ptional


                                extensions<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">However, there are no
                              explanations for the purpose of these
                              parameters and how they should be
                              processed.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">There are also no
                              explanations on how to process a single
                              response and how to verify that it is its
                              presence within the signed structure <br>
                              is valid or not valid. This is a major
                              deficiency of the current description of
                              RC 2560 where there is no explanation on
                              how to validate <br>
                              a single response.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">Text proposal to be added
                              after:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>The

                                purpose of the identifier of the OCSP
                                server is to allow OCSP <o:p></o:p></span=
></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>clients

                                to find whether the definitive response
                                was signed by a CA <o:p></o:p></span></b>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>or
                                by an OCSP Responder.<o:p></o:p></span></=
b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>The


                                identifier of the OCSP server SHOULD
                                either be the name or the <o:p></o:p></sp=
an></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>key

                                from a CA, or the name or the key from a
                                OCSP Responder.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>Unless

                                there exist local rules (which are
                                outside the scope of this <o:p></o:p></sp=
an></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>document)


                                for verifying that a single response is
                                correctly signed, <o:p></o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>the


                                following applies:<o:p></o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size=
:
                              10pt; font-family: 'Courier New'; "
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>When

                                the identifier matches with the name of
                                the CA which has issued <o:p></o:p></span=
></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>the

                                target certificate or corresponds to the
                                key used to issue the <o:p></o:p></span><=
/b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>target


                                certificate, then a single response is
                                correctly signed <o:p></o:p></span></b></=
p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>only

                                if the digital signature of the OCSP
                                response is valid using the <o:p></o:p></=
span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>key

                                used to sign the target certificate.<o:p>=
</o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>When

                                the identifier does not match with the
                                name of the CA which has <o:p></o:p></spa=
n></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>issued

                                the target certificate or does not
                                correspond to the key used <o:p></o:p></s=
pan></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>to
                                issue the target certificate, then an
                                single response is correctly <o:p></o:p><=
/span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>signed

                                only if :<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0 </span>(a)


                                there exists in the response an OCSP
                                certificate issued by <o:p></o:p></span><=
/b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0
                                </span>the CA which has issued the
                                target certificate which is <o:p></o:p></=
span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0
                                </span>signed by the same key as the one
                                used to issue the <o:p></o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0
                                </span>target certificate, and<o:p></o:p>=
</span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0 </span>(b)


                                the digital signature of the OCSP
                                response is valid using <o:p></o:p></span=
></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0
                                </span>the subjectPublicKey contained in
                                this OCSP certificate.<o:p></o:p></span><=
/b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                        </o:smarttagtype></div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><br>
                </div>
                <div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">Not
                  broken.</div>
                <div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">All of
                  this is already covered by the document.</div>
                <div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><br>
                </div>
                <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION" style=3D"font-family:
                  Calibri, sans-serif; ">
                  <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
                    style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000"><o:smartt=
agtype
namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags"
                          name=3D"metricconverter">
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><!--[if supportFields]><=
span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spaceru=
n:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->8.=
<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element=
:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"> The text states on page 7:<=
o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>=
The
                              "revoked" state indicates that the
                              certificate has been revoked<o:p></o:p></sp=
an></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>(either


                                permanently or temporarily (on hold)). </=
span></b><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">This state MAY also be<o:p><=
/o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>=
returned

                              if the responder knows that the requested
                              certificate has<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>=
<b
                                style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal">nev=
er

                                been issued during the history of the
                                associated CA </b>using any<o:p></o:p></s=
pan></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>=
current

                              or previous issuing key. <b
                                style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><o:=
p></o:p></b></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">The text is ambiguous becaus=
e
                              there are two embedded parenthesis and it
                              is unclear whether the inner parenthesis
                              means =93i.e=94 or =93e.g=94. <br>
                              This single sentence may let think that on
                              hold is the single case for temporarily
                              revocation. Since neither X.509 nor RFC
                              5280 address <br>
                              the case of a temporary revocation in the
                              context of an OCSP response (but only in
                              the context of CRLs), we are able to add
                              another case <br>
                              of temporary revocation which will only
                              apply in the context of OCSP.<o:p></o:p></s=
pan></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">The above sentence using the
                              terms</span><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt=
;
                              mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"> =93=
</span><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language: EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB">never been issued during
                                the history of the associated CA</span></=
b><span
style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"> =93</s=
pan><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">does not capture the fact <b=
r>
                              that it could be issued in the future,
                              hence why using</span><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"> =93</span><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight: normal"><spa=
n
                                style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family:
                                'Courier New'; " lang=3D"EN-GB">not yet
                                been used=94</span></b><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"> </span><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">would be more appropriate</s=
pan><span
style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">.<o:p><=
/o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">Finally, it would have been
                              more logical to use =93unknown=94. So it is
                              important to add a note to explain why we
                              have chosen that case for =93legacy
                              clients=94, <br>
                              otherwise the people who have not
                              participate to the exchanges will not
                              understand.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                          <pre><span style=3D"font-size: 12pt; font-famil=
y: 'Times New Roman'; " lang=3D"EN-GB">Proposed text replacement:<o:p></o=
:p></span></pre>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <pre><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" la=
ng=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span><b style=3D"m=
so-bidi-font-weight:normal">The "revoked" state indicates that the certif=
icate has been revoked,<o:p></o:p></b></span></pre>
                          <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><=
span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>eith=
er permanently or temporarily.<o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                          <pre><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" la=
ng=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></pre>
                          <pre><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" la=
ng=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>A certificate=
 may be temporarily revoked either because it is <o:p></o:p></span></pre>
                          <pre><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" la=
ng=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0</span>placed on h=
old (<b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal">i.e. the revocation reason =
is certificateHold</b>) or <o:p></o:p></span></pre>
                          <pre><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" la=
ng=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0</span>because the=
 responder is able to know, using a positive list of <o:p></o:p></span></=
pre>
                          <pre><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" la=
ng=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0</span>issued cert=
ificates, that the serial number from the requested <o:p></o:p></span></p=
re>
                          <pre><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" la=
ng=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0</span>certificate=
 has <b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal">not yet been used</b> by th=
e CA to issue a certificate <o:p></o:p></span></pre>
                          <pre><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" la=
ng=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0</span>(<b style=3D=
"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal">i.e. the revocation reason is notIssuedOrIr=
regularlyIssued</b>).<o:p></o:p></span></pre>
                          <pre><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" la=
ng=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></pre>
                          <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><=
span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB">NOTE: The "revoked" state is used rather than the =93=
unknown=94 state, to<o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                          <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><=
span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 </=
span>make sure that relying parties that were conformant to RFC 2560<o:p>=
</o:p></span></b></pre>
                          <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><=
span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 </=
span>will not use CRLs as a fall back mechanism. <o:p></o:p></span></b></=
pre>
                          <pre><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" la=
ng=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></pre>
                        </o:smarttagtype></div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><br>
                </div>
                <div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">I
                  removed the double parenthesis and adopted your
                  clarification with regard to "on hold".=A0</div>
                <div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><br>
                </div>
                <div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">The tex=
t
                  in draft 10 has changed from what you have commented
                  on. I believe that text is better.</div>
                <div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><br>
                </div>
                <div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">You
                  "Note" has problems.</div>
                <ol style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">
                  <li>We do not prevent responders to respond "unknown"
                    if their assessment is that this is an appropriate
                    response, considering what they know about the
                    requested serial number. Thus the term "is used" is
                    misleading.</li>
                  <li>This mechanisms does not "make sure" that the
                    clients do anything. It's up to the discretion of
                    the relying party to decide what source of
                    revocation checking they rely on. This does however
                    reduce the risk of clients falling back to CRL:s</li>
                  <li>This mechanism is not just relevant to old
                    clients, but also to new one for the same reason.</li=
>
                </ol>
                <div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><br>
                </div>
                <div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; ">I have
                  adopted a modified version of your Note:</div>
                <div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><br>
                </div>
                <div>
                  <div><font face=3D"Courier New">=A0 =A0NOTE: The "revok=
ed"
                      state for known non-issued certificate serial</font=
></div>
                  <div><font face=3D"Courier New">=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0numb=
ers is
                      allowed in order to reduce the risk of relying</fon=
t></div>
                  <div><font face=3D"Courier New">=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0part=
ies using
                      CRLs as a fall back mechanism, which would be</font=
></div>
                  <div><font face=3D"Courier New">=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0cons=
iderably
                      higher if an "unknown" response was returned.</font=
></div>
                </div>
                <div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><br>
                </div>
                <div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><br>
                </div>
                <div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><br>
                </div>
                <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION" style=3D"font-family:
                  Calibri, sans-serif; ">
                  <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
                    style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000"><o:smartt=
agtype
namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags"
                          name=3D"metricconverter">
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><!--[if supportFields]><=
span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spaceru=
n:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->9.=
<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element=
:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"> The text states on page 8:<=
o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>When

                                a responder responds revoked to a status
                                request for a non-<o:p></o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>issued


                                certificate, the responder MUST also;<o:p=
></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0 </=
span>-
                                include the extended revoked definition
                                response extension<o:p></o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0 </span>(section


                                4.8), indicating that the OCSP responder
                                supports the<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0 </span>extended


                                definition of revoked state to also
                                cover non-issued<o:p></o:p></span></b></p=
>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0 </span>certificates,<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0 </=
span>-
                                provide the revocation reason
                                certificateHold (6), and;<o:p></o:p></spa=
n></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0 </=
span>-
                                specify the revocation date January 1,
                                1970. <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">As already explained on the
                              PKIX list, using the revocation reason<b
                                style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight: normal"> <=
/b>certificateHold

                              is not appropriate <br>
                              because it changes the meaning of
                              certificateHold. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">The extended revoked
                              definition response extension is a means
                              to signal that it not a true certificate
                              hold but a =93not issued certificate=94. <b=
r>
                              Legacy applications cannot take advantage
                              of it. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">Some applications which
                              handle non repudiation enter a waiting
                              state when the revocation reason
                              certificateHold is used thus <br>
                              it is not appropriate to overload the
                              meaning.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">It is possible to use anothe=
r
                              enumeration for signalling that specific
                              case:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">notIssuedOrIrregularlyIssued
                              (7).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">Thus for new applications it
                              would be much better to use
                              notIssuedOrIrregularlyIssued (7) as
                              already proposed on the PKIX list.<o:p></o:=
p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <pre><span style=3D"font-size: 12pt; font-famil=
y: 'Times New Roman'; " lang=3D"EN-GB">The above sentence uses the text:<=
/span><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN=
-GB"> <o:p></o:p></span></pre>
                          <pre><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" la=
ng=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></pre>
                          <pre><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" la=
ng=3D"EN-GB">=93a status request for a <b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:n=
ormal">non-issued certificate</b>=94 <o:p></o:p></span></pre>
                          <pre><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" la=
ng=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></pre>
                          <pre><span style=3D"font-size: 12pt; font-famil=
y: 'Times New Roman'; " lang=3D"EN-GB">whereas it would be more appropria=
te to state:</span><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;mso-ansi-language:EN-G=
B" lang=3D"EN-GB"> <o:p></o:p></span></pre>
                          <pre><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" la=
ng=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></pre>
                          <pre><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" la=
ng=3D"EN-GB">=93a status request for a<b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:no=
rmal"> serial number which has not been used by the CA or used irregularl=
y to issue a certificate=94.<o:p></o:p></b></span></pre>
                          <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><=
span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b></pre>
                          <pre><span style=3D"font-size: 12pt; font-famil=
y: 'Times New Roman'; " lang=3D"EN-GB">Placing the ASN.1 description at s=
uch a place in the document is inappropriate since the ASN.1 structures h=
ave not yet been described.=20
Thus only the functional aspects should be mentioned, but not the ASN.1 i=
mplications.<o:p></o:p></span></pre>
                          <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><=
span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;
mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b></pre>
                          <pre><span style=3D"font-size: 12pt; font-famil=
y: 'Times New Roman'; " lang=3D"EN-GB">BTW, the description should follow=
 the same order as the ASN.1. This is not the case. <o:p></o:p></span></p=
re>
                          <pre><span style=3D"font-size: 12pt; font-famil=
y: 'Times New Roman'; " lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></pre>
                          <pre><span style=3D"font-size: 12pt; font-famil=
y: 'Times New Roman'; " lang=3D"EN-GB">This text should be deleted from t=
his section and the appropriate text should be added when the parameters =
of the response are described. <o:p></o:p></span></pre>
                          <pre><span style=3D"font-size: 12pt; font-famil=
y: 'Times New Roman'; " lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></pre>
                          <pre><span style=3D"font-size: 12pt; font-famil=
y: 'Times New Roman'; " lang=3D"EN-GB">The text proposed in the previous =
comment should be sufficient at this time of reading.<o:p></o:p></span></=
pre>
                          <pre><span style=3D"font-family: 'Times New Rom=
an'; " lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></pre>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span
                              style=3D"font-size: 12pt; font-family:
                              'Times New Roman'; " lang=3D"EN-GB">In
                              addition, section</span><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language: EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"> 4.4.8<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>E=
xtended



                                Revoked Definition </span></b><span
                              style=3D"font-size: 12pt; font-family:
                              'Times New Roman'; " lang=3D"EN-GB">should
                              be deleted.</span><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;
                                mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><=
o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <pre><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" la=
ng=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></pre>
                          <pre><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" la=
ng=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></pre>
                        </o:smarttagtype></div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>The referred text has been updates in draft 09.</div=
>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>This has been discussed on the list and you have
                  yet to convince the list of your new reason code.</div>
                <div>I disagree as the risk of running into problems
                  with the deployed base of application is hugely larger
                  with introduction of a new reason code, rather than
                  using certificateHold.</div>
                <div>No application should be broken, since no
                  application have business asking for non-issued cert
                  serial numbers in the first place. Secondly, no
                  application can assume that a certificateHold reason
                  will be cleared any time soon.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION" style=3D"font-family:
                  Calibri, sans-serif; ">
                  <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
                    style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000"><o:smartt=
agtype
namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags"
                          name=3D"metricconverter">
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><!--[if supportFields]><=
span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spaceru=
n:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->10=
.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element=
:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"> The text states on page 8:<=
o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB">2.4<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>S=
emantics

                                of thisUpdate, nextUpdate and producedAt<=
o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">This section is misplaced. A=
t
                              this time of reading, the reader does not
                              know that thisUpdate, nextUpdate and
                              producedAt are values <br>
                              used by the ASN.1 structures. It is
                              appropriate to describe what theses
                              parameters mean when the ASN.1 syntax is
                              described. <br>
                              The current ASN.1 syntax is very badly
                              described. One would expect that after
                              every ASN.1 structure description every
                              parameter is described. <br>
                              Unfortunately this is not the case. <br>
                              <o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">The text from this section i=
s
                              not aligned with the text that is present
                              in section 4.2.2.1.</span><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"> <o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">In particular, in section
                              2.4:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>If
                                nextUpdate is not set, the responder is
                                indicating that newer<o:p></o:p></span></=
b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>revocation


                                information is available all the time.<o:=
p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">While in section 4.2.2.1:<o:=
p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>Responses


                                where the nextUpdate value is not set
                                are equivalent <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>to
                                a CRL with no time for nextUpdate (see
                                Section 2.4).<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">It is not appropriate to hav=
e
                              two different descriptions in two
                              different places.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">Delete section 2.4. See
                              comment number 19 for the description of
                              these parameters.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                        </o:smarttagtype></div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>Not broken.</div>
                <div>The current text segments fits well into a protocol
                  overview section.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION" style=3D"font-family:
                  Calibri, sans-serif; ">
                  <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
                    style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000"><o:smartt=
agtype
namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags"
                          name=3D"metricconverter">
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><!--[if supportFields]><=
span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spaceru=
n:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->11=
.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element=
:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"> Section 2.5 is also
                              misplaced. They use values from the ASN.1
                              syntax which has not yet been described. <b=
r>
                              They should be moved or incorporated in
                              the document once the ASN.1 description
                              has been done.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                        </o:smarttagtype></div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>Not broken.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION" style=3D"font-family:
                  Calibri, sans-serif; ">
                  <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
                    style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000"><o:smartt=
agtype
namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags"
                          name=3D"metricconverter">
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><!--[if supportFields]><=
span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spaceru=
n:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->12=
.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element=
:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"> Remainder: Section 2.6
                              should be deleted (see comment number 5).<o=
:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                        </o:smarttagtype></div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>Not broken.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION" style=3D"font-family:
                  Calibri, sans-serif; ">
                  <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
                    style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000"><o:smartt=
agtype
namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags"
                          name=3D"metricconverter">
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><!--[if supportFields]><=
span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spaceru=
n:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->13=
.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element=
:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"> Section 2.7 states:<o:p></o=
:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB">2.7<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>C=
A
                                Key Compromise<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>If
                                an OCSP responder knows that a
                                particular CA's private key has<o:p></o:p=
></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>been


                                compromised, it MAY return the revoked
                                state for all<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>certificates


                                issued by that CA.<o:p></o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">This section is misleading
                              and should be removed. The reason is the
                              following:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">The relying party must verif=
y
                              that the singleResponse is signed by a
                              responder which is entitled to do so.<o:p><=
/o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">a) If the CA key has been
                              compromised and if the response is signed
                              by that CA key then the singleResponse
                              will be discarded <br>
                              when performing the certification path
                              validation <u>whatever the content of the
                                response may be</u>.<o:p></o:p></span></p=
>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">b) If the CA key which has
                              issued the OCSP certificate has been
                              compromised and if the response is signed
                              by the key present <br>
                              in the OCSP certificate then the
                              singleResponse will be discarded when
                              performing the certification path
                              validation<br>
                              <u>whatever the content of the response
                                may be</u>.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">Security must be provided
                              using the validation of the certification
                              path. Thus it does not matter what the
                              OCSP responder states.<o:p></o:p></span></p=
>
                        </o:smarttagtype></div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>Not broken.</div>
                <div>An OCSP responder does not have to be chained to
                  the broken CA. The relying party may have other trust
                  configuration at choice.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION" style=3D"font-family:
                  Calibri, sans-serif; ">
                  <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
                    style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000"><o:smartt=
agtype
namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags"
                          name=3D"metricconverter">
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><br>
                          </p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><!--[if supportFields]><=
span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spaceru=
n:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->14=
.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element=
:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"> The text states on page 11:=
<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB">3.2<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>S=
igned


                                Response Acceptance Requirements<o:p></o:=
p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>Prior

                                to accepting a signed response as valid,
                                OCSP clients SHALL<o:p></o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>confirm


                                that:<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>1.
                                The certificate identified in a received
                                response corresponds to<o:p></o:p></span>=
</b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0 </span>that


                                which was identified in the
                                corresponding request;<o:p></o:p></span><=
/b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>2.
                                The signature on the response is valid;<o=
:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>3.
                                The identity of the signer matches the
                                intended recipient of the<o:p></o:p></spa=
n></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0 </span>request.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>4.
                                The signer is currently authorized to
                                sign the response.<o:p></o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>5.
                                The time at which the status being
                                indicated is known to be<o:p></o:p></span=
></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0 </span>correct


                                (thisUpdate) is sufficiently recent.<o:p>=
</o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>6.
                                When available, the time at or before
                                which newer information will<o:p></o:p></=
span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0 </span>be


                                available about the status of the
                                certificate (nextUpdate) is<o:p></o:p></s=
pan></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0 </span>greater


                                than the current time.<o:p></o:p></span><=
/b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">This section is misplaced
                              since it uses terms from the ASN.1 syntax
                              and the protocol description has not yet
                              been made, <br>
                              since it is the next section 4. Its text
                              is not correct either. <o:p></o:p></span></=
p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">This description does not
                              take into account the fact that a</span><sp=
an
style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"> </span=
><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight: normal"><spa=
n
                                style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family:
                                'Courier New'; " lang=3D"EN-GB">BasicOCSP=
Response

                              </span></b><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">may contain one or several <=
/span><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family:
                                'Courier New'; " lang=3D"EN-GB">SingleRes=
ponses.

                              </span></b><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><br>
                              In particular, the sentence</span><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"> =93</span><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family:
                                'Courier New'; " lang=3D"EN-GB">The signe=
r
                                is currently authorized to sign the
                                response</span></b><span
                              style=3D"font-size:
                              10.0pt;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">=94 </span><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language: EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">is misleading because a
                              signer <br>
                              may be authorized to include some<b
                                style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"> </=
b></span><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight: normal"><spa=
n
                                style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family:
                                'Courier New'; " lang=3D"EN-GB">SingleRes=
ponses

                              </span></b><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">but not necessarily all of
                              them.</span><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"> <o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">The appropriate explanations
                              should be done after the description of
                              the response, when describing the
                              processing of the response.<o:p></o:p></spa=
n></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">Delete that section.<o:p></o=
:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                        </o:smarttagtype></div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>Not broken.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION" style=3D"font-family:
                  Calibri, sans-serif; ">
                  <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
                    style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000"><o:smartt=
agtype
namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags"
                          name=3D"metricconverter">
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><!--[if supportFields]><=
span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spaceru=
n:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->15=
.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element=
:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"> On page 12, after the ASN.1
                              description, the only parameters which are
                              described are: <o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB">hashAlgorithm,</span></b><=
span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"> <b
                                style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal">iss=
uerNameHash,



                                issuerKeyHash and serialNumber.<o:p></o:p=
></b></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span
                              style=3D"font-size: 12pt; font-family:
                              'Times New Roman'; " lang=3D"EN-GB">This is
                              insufficient.<span
                                style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>In
                              order to cover the full list of
                              parameters, the following text is
                              proposed:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>requestorName


                                is optional and MAY be used by the
                                server for access <o:p></o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>control

                                and audit purposes.<o:p></o:p></span></b>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>requestList


                                contains one or more single requests.<o:p=
></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>requestExtensions


                                is OPTIONAL.<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>A=
ny
                                specific extension is OPTIONAL.<o:p></o:p=
></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>The

                                critical flag SHOULD NOT be set for any
                                of them. Section 4.4 <o:p></o:p></span></=
b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>=
<b
                                style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal">sug=
gests


                                several useful extensions.<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>A=
dditional


                                extensions MAY be <o:p></o:p></b></span><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>defined

                                in additional RFCs.<o:p></o:p></span></b>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>reqCert


                                contains the identifier of a target
                                certificate.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>issuerNameHash


                                is the hash of the Issuer's
                                distinguished name.<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>T=
he
                                <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>hash

                                shall be calculated over the DER
                                encoding of the issuer's name <o:p></o:p>=
</span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>field

                                in the certificate being checked. <o:p></=
o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>issuerKeyHash


                                is the hash of the Issuer's public key.<s=
pan
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>T=
he
                                hash <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>shall

                                be calculated over the value (excluding
                                tag and length) of the <o:p></o:p></span>=
</b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>subject


                                public key field in the issuer's
                                certificate.<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>T=
he
                                hash <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>algorithm


                                used for both these hashes, is
                                identified in <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>hashAlgorithm.


                                <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0</s=
pan>The
                                primary reason to use the hash of the
                                CA's public key in <o:p></o:p></span></b>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0 </span>addition


                                to the hash of the CA's name, to
                                identify the issuer, <o:p></o:p></span></=
b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0 </span>is

                                that it is possible that two CAs may
                                choose to use the same <o:p></o:p></span>=
</b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0 </span>name


                                (uniqueness in the Name is a
                                recommendation that cannot be <o:p></o:p>=
</span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0 </span>enforced).



                                Two CAs will never, however, have the
                                same public key <o:p></o:p></span></b></p=
>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0 </span>unless


                                the CAs either explicitly decided to
                                share their private <o:p></o:p></span></b=
></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0 </span>key,

                                or the key of one of the CAs was
                                compromised.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>serialNumber


                                is the serial number of the certificate
                                for which <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>status

                                is being requested.<o:p></o:p></span></b>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>singleRequestExtensions



                                is OPTIONAL.<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>A=
ny
                                specific extension is <o:p></o:p></span><=
/b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>OPTIONAL.<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>T=
he
                                critical flag SHOULD NOT be set for any
                                of them. <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>The


                                requestor MAY choose to sign the OCSP
                                request.<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=
=A0
                                </span>In that case, the<o:p></o:p></span=
></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>signature

                                is computed over the tbsRequest
                                structure.<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes=
">=A0
                                </span>If the request<o:p></o:p></span></=
b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>is
                                signed, the requestor SHALL specify its
                                name in the requestorName<o:p></o:p></spa=
n></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>field.<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>A=
lso,

                                for signed requests, the requestor MAY
                                include<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>certificates


                                that help the OCSP responder verify the
                                requestor's<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>signature

                                in the certs field of Signature.<o:p></o:=
p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                        </o:smarttagtype></div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>Not broken.</div>
                <div>The current text is short, but it is actually
                  sufficient from the context of the ASN.1 definitions
                  of the section. This is a detailed protocol section
                  and the reader need to understand ASN.1 in any case to
                  understand and implement the section.</div>
                <div>The information about criticality is already
                  covered in the extension section.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION" style=3D"font-family:
                  Calibri, sans-serif; ">
                  <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
                    style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000"><o:smartt=
agtype
namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags"
                          name=3D"metricconverter">
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields=
]><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span
style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spaceru=
n:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"font-size: 12pt; font-family:
                              'Times New Roman'; " lang=3D"EN-GB"><!--[if=
 !supportFields]-->16.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><s=
pan
                              style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Times

                              New Roman&quot;;mso-ansi-language: EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"> Section 4.1.2 is called:</s=
pan><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language: EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"> =93<b
                                style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal">Not=
es

                                on the Request Syntax=94<o:p></o:p></b></=
span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">The first paragraph has been
                              moved after the description of</span><span
style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"> </span=
><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight: normal"><spa=
n
                                style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family:
                                'Courier New'; " lang=3D"EN-GB">issuerKey=
Hash

                              </span></b><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">and thus is no more needed.<=
o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">The second paragraph has bee=
n
                              moved after the description of</span><span
style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"> </span=
><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight: normal"><spa=
n
                                style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family:
                                'Courier New'; " lang=3D"EN-GB">requestEx=
tensions.

                              </span></b><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><br>
                              However, the sentence</span><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"> <br>
                              =93 </span><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight=
:
                              normal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10pt;
                                font-family: 'Courier New'; "
                                lang=3D"EN-GB">Unrecognized extensions
                                MUST be ignored (unless they have the
                                critical flag set and are not
                                understood)</span></b><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">=94 <br>
                              has been deleted since it applies to the
                              OCSP responder and not to the OCSP client.
                              Thus it is no more needed.<o:p></o:p></span=
></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">The third paragraph applies
                              to signed requests. However, it should
                              belong to a section dedicated on how
                              clients should build OCPS requests, <br>
                              which is currently missing. See the next
                              comment.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">This section should be
                              deleted.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                        </o:smarttagtype></div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>Not broken.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION" style=3D"font-family:
                  Calibri, sans-serif; ">
                  <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
                    style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000"><o:smartt=
agtype
namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags"
                          name=3D"metricconverter">
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><!--[if supportFields]><=
span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spaceru=
n:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->17=
.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element=
:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"> There should be a new
                              section called</span><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">: =93</span><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB">Requirements for OCSP
                                clients=94. </span></b><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;
                              mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:=
p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">It is important first to
                              re-advertise that the request may be about
                              several certificates. <br>
                              Thus it is important to describe the
                              process for building a request, which is
                              currently missing.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>An
                                OCSP request allows getting in the same
                                response the revocation <o:p></o:p></span=
></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>status

                                of one or more certificates.<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>I=
n
                                order to request the <o:p></o:p></span></=
b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>status

                                of one or more certificates in a single
                                request, OCSP <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>clients


                                SHALL follow the following rules :<o:p></=
o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>For

                                each candidate certificate, OCSP clients
                                SHALL verify <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>whether


                                there exists a locally defined rule for
                                the certificate in <o:p></o:p></span></b>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>question


                                which indicates the URI where the OCSP
                                responder is <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>located.<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>I=
f
                                this rule exists, it SHALL be followed.
                                <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>Otherwise,


                                OCSP clients SHALL determine whether the
                                candidate <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>certificate


                                contains an AIA extension with an
                                accessMethod which <o:p></o:p></span></b>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>contains

                                the id-ad-ocsp OID.<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>I=
f
                                it is the case, the accessLocation <o:p><=
/o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>contains

                                a uniformResourceIdentifier (URI) which
                                indicates the <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>location

                                of the OCSP server for that certificate.
                                <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>Certificates


                                that contain the same URI MAY be grouped
                                in a single <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>request.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB">Note:<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>F=
or
                                each candidate certificate, when
                                performing the path <o:p></o:p></span></b=
></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0 </span>validation



                                algorithm, the OCSP client SHOULD verify
                                that the <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0 </span>current


                                time is within the validity period of
                                the target <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0 </span>certificate.<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>C=
ertificates


                                which are outside their validity <o:p></o=
:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0 </span>period


                                SHOULD NOT be included in the request.<o:=
p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>The


                                requestor MAY choose to sign the OCSP
                                request. In that case, the<o:p></o:p></sp=
an></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>signature

                                is computed over the tbsRequest
                                structure. If the request<o:p></o:p></spa=
n></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>is
                                signed, the requestor SHALL specify its
                                name in the requestorName<o:p></o:p></spa=
n></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>field.

                                Also, for signed requests, the requestor
                                MAY include<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>certificates


                                that help the OCSP responder verify the
                                requestor's<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>signature

                                in the certs field of Signature.<o:p></o:=
p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                        </o:smarttagtype></div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>Not broken.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>Your text may provide guidance that could be useful
                  to some implementers, but is completely beyond this
                  document and further, not generally applicable or
                  true.</div>
                <div>As an example, an organisation may setup an in
                  house locally configured OCSP responder that responds
                  to all certificates "out there" that is relevant to
                  that organisation.</div>
                <div>Such clients would just blindly send OCSP requests
                  to their local responder, disregarding any information
                  in the cert.</div>
                <div>It's totally beyond this spec to have an opinion
                  about this.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION" style=3D"font-family:
                  Calibri, sans-serif; ">
                  <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
                    style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000"><o:smartt=
agtype
namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags"
                          name=3D"metricconverter">
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><!--[if supportFields]><=
span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spaceru=
n:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->18=
.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element=
:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"> The text states on page 14:=
<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>The


                                responder MAY include certificates in
                                the<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>certs

                                field of BasicOCSPResponse that help the
                                OCSP client verify the<o:p></o:p></span><=
/b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>responder's


                                signature. If no certificates are
                                included then certs<o:p></o:p></span></b>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>SHOULD

                                be absent.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">While this sentence is true,
                              it is not sufficient. In order to allow
                              verifying every </span><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-family: 'Courier New'; "
                                lang=3D"EN-GB">SingleResponse</span></b><=
span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">, <br>
                              it is important to include the relevant
                              certificates which are pertinent to every
                            </span><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:
                              normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-family:&quot;Courier
                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language: EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB">SingleResponse.</span></b>=
<span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language: EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">Proposed full text
                              replacement:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>=
The
                              responder MAY include certificates in the
                              certs field of <o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>=
BasicOCSPResponse



                              that help the OCSP client verify the
                              responder's <o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>=
signature.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>For

                                every SingleResponse where the responder
                                is not a CA, the <o:p></o:p></span></b></=
p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>responder


                                SHALL include the relevant OCSP
                                certificate in the certs <o:p></o:p></spa=
n></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>field

                                of BasicOCSPResponse in order to allow
                                the OCSP client <o:p></o:p></span></b></p=
>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>verifying


                                the responder was entitled to include
                                that SingleResponse <o:p></o:p></span></b=
></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>in
                                the signed BasicOCSPResponse.<o:p></o:p><=
/span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n></span></b><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Courier


                              New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">If no certificates are
                              included then certs SHOULD be absent.</span=
><span
style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></=
o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size=
:
                              10pt; font-family: 'Courier New'; "
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                        </o:smarttagtype></div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>Not broken.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>This requirement would break backwards
                  compatibility with RFC 2560.</div>
                <div>Further this would not be needed for a locally
                  configured responder.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION" style=3D"font-family:
                  Calibri, sans-serif; ">
                  <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
                    style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000"><o:smartt=
agtype
namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags"
                          name=3D"metricconverter">
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size=
:
                              10pt; font-family: 'Courier New'; "
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><!--[if supportFields]><=
span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spaceru=
n:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->19=
.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element=
:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"> Page 15. The ASN.1 syntax
                              should be changed in order to be able to
                              use the enumeration case 7 that is not
                              used for CRLs. <br>
                              This leads to the following change:<o:p></o=
:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">Current text:<o:p></o:p></sp=
an></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0 </span>revocationReason<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0 </=
span>[0]<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
 </span>EXPLICIT


                                CRLReason OPTIONAL }<o:p></o:p></span></b=
></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size=
:
                              10pt; font-family: 'Courier New'; "
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">Proposed text change:<o:p></=
o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-fami=
ly:
                              'Courier New'; " lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o=
:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">Current text:<o:p></o:p></sp=
an></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0 </span>revocationReason


                                <span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=
</span>[0]<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
 </span>EXPLICIT


                                RevocationReason OPTIONAL }<o:p></o:p></s=
pan></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size=
:
                              10pt; font-family: 'Courier New'; "
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB">RevocationReason ::=3D
                                ENUMERATED {</span></b><span
                              style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family:
                              'Courier New'; " lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p>=
</span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0 </span>unspecified<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 </span><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0</span><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0</s=
pan>(0),</span></b><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Courier


                              New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0 </span>keyCompromise<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0 </span><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0</span><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0</s=
pan>(1),</span></b><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Courier


                              New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0 </span>cACompromise<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0 </span><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0</span><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
</span>(2),</span></b><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Courier


                              New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0 </span>affiliationChanged<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0 </=
span><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0</span><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0</span=
>(3),</span></b><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Courier


                              New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0 </span>superseded<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0
                                </span><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0</span><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0</span>(4=
),</span></b><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Courier


                              New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0 </span>cessationOfOperation<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span><=
span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0</span><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0</span=
>(5),</span></b><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Courier


                              New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0 </span>certificateHold<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0 </span><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0</span><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0</span=
>(6),</span></b><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Courier


                              New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0 </span>notIssuedOrIrregularlyIssued



                                <span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0</=
span>(7),<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0 </span>removeFromCRL<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0 </span><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0</span><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0</s=
pan>(8),</span></b><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Courier


                              New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0 </span>privilegeWithdrawn<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
</span><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0</s=
pan><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0</s=
pan>(9),</span></b><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Courier


                              New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0 </span>aACompromise<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0 </span><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0</span><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0</span>(1=
0)
                                }</span></b><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Courier
                              New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size=
:
                              10pt; font-family: 'Courier New'; "
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                        </o:smarttagtype></div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>Not broken.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>You have to convince the list about your new reason
                  code.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION" style=3D"font-family:
                  Calibri, sans-serif; ">
                  <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
                    style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000"><o:smartt=
agtype
namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags"
                          name=3D"metricconverter">
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size=
:
                              10pt; font-family: 'Courier New'; "
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><!--[if supportFields=
]><span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span
style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spaceru=
n:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"font-size: 12pt; font-family:
                              'Times New Roman'; " lang=3D"EN-GB"><!--[if=
 !supportFields]-->20.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-=
ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><s=
pan
                              style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Times

                              New Roman&quot;;mso-ansi-language: EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"> Page 15. After the ASN.1
                              syntax, there is no description of every
                              parameter, neither on its use <br>
                              (except a few words in section</span><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"> <b
                                style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight: normal">4.=
2.2.1

                                Time </b></span><span
                              style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;
                              font-family:&quot;Times New
                              Roman&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">about</span><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"> <b
                                style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight: normal">th=
isUpdate,


                                nextUpdate and producedAt).<o:p></o:p></b=
></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span
                              style=3D"font-size: 12pt; font-family:
                              'Times New Roman'; " lang=3D"EN-GB">Every
                              parameter needs to be described and
                              explained.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>responderID


                                indicates either the name or the key
                                from a CA, or the <o:p></o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>name

                                or the key from a OCSP Responder.<o:p></o=
:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>producedAt


                                indicates the time at which this
                                response was signed.<o:p></o:p></span></b=
></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>responses


                                contains one or more single responses.<o:=
p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>responseExtensions


                                is OPTIONAL.<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>A=
ny
                                specific extension is OPTIONAL.<o:p></o:p=
></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>The

                                critical flag may or may not be set.<o:p>=
</o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>certID

                                is usually a copy of the same field
                                which was placed in the <o:p></o:p></span=
></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>request,

                                but for OCSP responders which
                                pre-produce signed responses <o:p></o:p><=
/span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>certID

                                may be the identifier of a target
                                certificate that was not <o:p></o:p></spa=
n></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>present

                                in the request (see the end of section
                                4.2).<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>certStatus


                                indicates the status of the certificate:
                                either good, <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>revoked

                                or unknown.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>thisUpdate


                                indicates the time at which the status
                                being indicated <o:p></o:p></span></b></p=
>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>is
                                known to be correct.<o:p></o:p></span></b=
></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>nextUpdate


                                indicates the time at or before which
                                newer information <o:p></o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>will

                                be available about the status of the
                                certificate.<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>I=
f
                                <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>nextUpdate


                                is not set, the server is indicating
                                that newer <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>revocation


                                information is available all the time. <o=
:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>If
                                nextUpdate is set, it often corresponds
                                to the {thisUpdate, <o:p></o:p></span></b=
></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>nextUpdate}


                                interval in CRLs.<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>R=
esponses

                                whose nextUpdate value is <o:p></o:p></sp=
an></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>earlier

                                than the local UTC time value SHOULD be
                                considered <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>unreliable.<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>R=
esponses


                                whose thisUpdate time is later than the
                                local <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>UTC

                                time SHOULD be considered unreliable.<o:p=
></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>singleExtensions


                                is OPTIONAL.<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>A=
ny
                                specific extension is OPTIONAL.<o:p></o:p=
></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>The

                                critical flag SHOULD NOT be set for any
                                of them.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>revocationTime



                                indicates the time at which the
                                certificate was <o:p></o:p></span></b></p=
>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>revoked.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>revocationReason


                                is OPTIONAL. <span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0</span>It
                                includes all the cases that are <o:p></o:=
p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>present

                                in CRLReason used for CRLs and an
                                additional case 7 which is<o:p></o:p></sp=
an></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>not

                                used for CRLs.<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>C=
ase


                                7 is called
                                notIssuedOrIrregularlyIssued. <o:p></o:p>=
</span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0 </span>-
                                "notIssued" corresponds to the case
                                where the certificate <o:p></o:p></span><=
/b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0 </span>serial


                                number that was sent was erroneous and
                                has not yet <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0 </span>been


                                used by the CA at the time of the query,<=
o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0 </span>-
                                "irregularlyIssued" corresponds to the
                                case where the <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0 </span>certificate



                                serial number that was sent really
                                exists in a <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0 </span>certificate


                                that is correctly signed, but to its
                                knowledge <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0 </span>the

                                CA has not issued a certificate with
                                such a serial <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0 </span>number.


                                <span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0</spa=
n>As

                                an example, it may have been issued by
                                the CA <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0 </span>because


                                the RA was compromised. <o:p></o:p></span=
></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><=
span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>When=
 a responder responds revoked to a status request for which it <o:p></o:p=
></span></b></pre>
                          <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><=
span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0</span>kn=
ows that the serial number has not been used by the CA or has <o:p></o:p>=
</span></b></pre>
                          <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><=
span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0</span>be=
en irregularly used irregularly to issue a certificate, then <o:p></o:p><=
/span></b></pre>
                          <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><=
span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0</span>in=
 RevokedInfo the responder MUST:<o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                          <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><=
span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b></pre>
                          <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:
normal"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span styl=
e=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=
</span><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0</span><span style=3D"mso-spac=
erun:yes">=A0</span>- specify the revocationTime :<span style=3D"mso-spac=
erun:yes">=A0 </span>January 1, 1970,<o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                          <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><=
span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"> <span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0</span><span s=
tyle=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0</span><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=
</span><span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0</span>- provide the revocatio=
nReason: notIssuedOrIrregularlyIssued (7).<o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                          <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><=
span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b></pre>
                          <pre><b style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:
normal"><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><span styl=
e=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </span>and in SingleResponse the responder =
MUST NOT include the nextUpdate.<o:p></o:p></span></b></pre>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>The

                                response MUST include a SingleResponse
                                for each certificate in<o:p></o:p></span>=
</b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>the

                                request and SHOULD NOT include any
                                additional SingleResponse<o:p></o:p></spa=
n></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>elements.<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>H=
owever,


                                there is one exception: <o:p></o:p></span=
></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0 </span>OCSP


                                responders MAY pre-produce signed
                                responses specifying the <o:p></o:p></spa=
n></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0 </span>status

                                of certificates at a specified time.<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>T=
he
                                time at which <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0 </span>the


                                status was known to be correct SHALL be
                                reflected in the <o:p></o:p></span></b></=
p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0 </span>thisUpdate


                                field of the response. <o:p></o:p></span>=
</b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0 </span>OCSP


                                responders that pre-generate status
                                responses MAY return <o:p></o:p></span></=
b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0 </span>responses


                                that include additional SingleResponse
                                elements if<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0 </span>necessary


                                to improve response pre-generation
                                performance or cache<o:p></o:p></span></b=
></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0 </span>efficiency


                                (as permitted in [RFC5019]).<o:p></o:p></=
span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span
                              style=3D"font-size: 12pt; font-family:
                              'Times New Roman'; " lang=3D"EN-GB">Since
                              the text above provides all the
                              explanations at the level of the ASN.1
                              parameters, the general text <br>
                              from section</span><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"> 4.2.2.3 Basic Response </=
span></b><span
                              style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Times

                              New Roman&quot;;mso-ansi-language: EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">is no more need and should b=
e
                              deleted</span><span
                              style=3D"font-family:&quot;Times New
                              Roman&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">.</span><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language: EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                        </o:smarttagtype></div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>Preliminary I would say "not broken".</div>
                <div>If you don't replace 4.2.2.3, then what really are
                  you missing?</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION" style=3D"font-family:
                  Calibri, sans-serif; ">
                  <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
                    style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000"><o:smartt=
agtype
namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags"
                          name=3D"metricconverter">
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><!--[if supportFields]><=
span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spaceru=
n:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->21=
.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element=
:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"> 0n page 16, there is a
                              section </span><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-family: 'Courier New'; "
                                lang=3D"EN-GB">4.2.2.2</span></b><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"> </span></b><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">called</span><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight: normal"><spa=
n
style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"> =93</s=
pan></b><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family:
                                'Courier New'; " lang=3D"EN-GB">Authorize=
d
                                Responders=94</span></b><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;
                                mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><=
o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">Section 4.2.2.2 states:<o:p>=
</o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>(=85)<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>This


                                certificate MUST be issued directly by
                                the CA that issued the<o:p></o:p></span><=
/b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>certificate


                                in question.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>The

                                CA SHOULD use the same issuing key to
                                issue a delegation<o:p></o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>certificate


                                as was used to sign the certificate
                                being checked for<o:p></o:p></span></b></=
p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>revocation.


                                Systems relying on OCSP responses MUST
                                recognize a<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>delegation


                                certificate as being issued by the CA
                                that issued the<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>certificate


                                in question only if the delegation
                                certificate and the<o:p></o:p></span></b>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>certificate


                                being checked for revocation was signed
                                by the same key.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p=
>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">This section would need to
                              reformatted to address CA requirements
                              first and then OCSP responder
                              requirements:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>(=85)<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>This


                                certificate MUST be issued directly by
                                the CA that issued the<o:p></o:p></span><=
/b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>certificate


                                in question.<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>T=
he
                                CA SHOULD use the same issuing key to <o:=
p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>issue

                                a delegation certificate as was used to
                                sign the certificate <o:p></o:p></span></=
b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>being


                                checked for revocation. <o:p></o:p></span=
></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>Systems


                                relying on OCSP responses MUST <u>be
                                  able to</u> recognize a <o:p></o:p></sp=
an></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>delegation


                                certificate as being issued by the CA
                                that issued the <o:p></o:p></span></b></p=
>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>certificate


                                in question if the delegation
                                certificate and <o:p></o:p></span></b></p=
>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>the


                                certificate being checked <u>were</u>
                                signed by the same key.<o:p></o:p></span>=
</b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                        </o:smarttagtype></div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>I disagree. The CA is actually free to do anything,
                  but cannot expect the client to recognise the
                  responder as authorised unless the same private key is
                  used.</div>
                <div>The current text places the requirement where they
                  belong.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION" style=3D"font-family:
                  Calibri, sans-serif; ">
                  <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
                    style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000"><o:smartt=
agtype
namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags"
                          name=3D"metricconverter">
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><!--[if supportFields]><=
span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spaceru=
n:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->22=
.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element=
:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"> On page 17, the text states=
:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>They

                                MUST reject the<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>response

                                if the certificate required to validate
                                the signature on the<o:p></o:p></span></b=
></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>response


                                fails to meet at least one of the
                                following criteria:<o:p></o:p></span></b>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span
                              style=3D"font-size: 12pt; font-family:
                              'Times New Roman'; " lang=3D"EN-GB">This is
                              ambiguous. It is inappropriate to have a
                              negative statement like</span><span
                              style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"> </span><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">=93<b
                                style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal">The=
y
                                MUST reject=94. </b></span><span
                              style=3D"font-size: 12pt; font-family:
                              'Times New Roman'; " lang=3D"EN-GB"><br>
                              The sentence should be turned in the
                              positive form</span><span
                              style=3D"font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"> =93</span><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB">They SHALL accept=94</span=
></b><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"> <o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">Since the ASN.1 syntax has
                              now be described, it is possible to be
                              more specific.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">The first occurrence of the
                              word =93response=94 should be changed into
                              =93singleResponse=94, while the second
                              occurrence <br>
                              of the word =93response=94 should be change=
d
                              into =93ResponseData=94<o:p></o:p></span></=
p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">Proposed text replacement:<o=
:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>They

                                SHALL accept a singleResponse if the
                                certificate required to <o:p></o:p></span=
></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>validate

                                the signature placed on the ResponseData
                                meets one of the <o:p></o:p></span></b></=
p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>following


                                criteria:<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                        </o:smarttagtype></div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>No, this change is not backwards compatible.</div>
                <div>So state the requirements for rejection is not
                  equivalent to stating requirements for acceptance.</div=
>
                <div>There may be other locally configured reasons to
                  reject in addition to those listed in the standard.</di=
v>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION" style=3D"font-family:
                  Calibri, sans-serif; ">
                  <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
                    style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000"><o:smartt=
agtype
namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags"
                          name=3D"metricconverter">
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><!--[if supportFields]><=
span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spaceru=
n:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->23=
.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element=
:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"> On page 17, the text states=
:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>3.
                                Includes a value of id-kp-OCSPSigning in
                                an ExtendedKeyUsage<o:p></o:p></span></b>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>extension


                                and is issued by the CA that issued the
                                certificate in<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>question

                                as stated above."<o:p></o:p></span></b></=
p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">In order to be crystal clear=
,
                              it is proposed to change the wording in
                              the following way:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>3.
                                Includes a value of id-kp-OCSPSigning in
                                an ExtendedKeyUsage<o:p></o:p></span></b>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>extension


                                and was signed by the CA using the same
                                key that used <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>to
                                issue the certificate in question.<o:p></=
o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                        </o:smarttagtype></div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>No, issuing with another key is not prohibited, and
                  may be accepted by some clients as an authorised
                  responder.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION" style=3D"font-family:
                  Calibri, sans-serif; ">
                  <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
                    style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000"><o:smartt=
agtype
namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags"
                          name=3D"metricconverter">
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><!--[if supportFields]><=
span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spaceru=
n:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->24=
.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element=
:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"> On page 17, the text states=
:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>This

                                SHOULD be a non-critical extension. The
                                value of the extension <o:p></o:p></span>=
</b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>SHALL

                                be NULL.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span
                              style=3D"font-size: 12pt; font-family:
                              'Times New Roman'; " lang=3D"EN-GB">The
                              ASN.1 syntax is missing. Add: <o:p></o:p></=
span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>NoCheck

                                ::=3D NULL<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                        </o:smarttagtype></div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>Moving this to a separate discussion.</div>
                <div>I'm not sure what the preferred way to describe
                  this is.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION" style=3D"font-family:
                  Calibri, sans-serif; ">
                  <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
                    style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000"><o:smartt=
agtype
namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags"
                          name=3D"metricconverter">
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><!--[if supportFields]><=
span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spaceru=
n:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->25=
.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element=
:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"> Remainder: On page 18, the
                              general text from section</span><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"> </span=
></b><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family:
                                'Courier New'; " lang=3D"EN-GB">4.2.2.3
                                Basic Response</span></b><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;
                                mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"> =
</span></b><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language: EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">is no more needed and <br>
                              should be deleted. See comment 20.<o:p></o:=
p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0=
</o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                        </o:smarttagtype></div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>Not broken.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION" style=3D"font-family:
                  Calibri, sans-serif; ">
                  <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
                    style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000"><o:smartt=
agtype
namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags"
                          name=3D"metricconverter">
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><!--[if supportFields]><=
span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spaceru=
n:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->26=
.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element=
:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"> On page 24, text should be
                              added to the Security consideration
                              section:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB">Different results when
                                using OCSP and CRLs<o:p></o:p></span></b>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>OCSP

                                clients or verifiers must build and
                                verify a certification path <o:p></o:p></=
span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>for

                                each target certificate up to a trusted
                                root.<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=
 </span>When

                                an OCSP <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>Responder

                                is using published CRLs, it must also
                                build and verify a <o:p></o:p></span></b>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>certification


                                path for the CRLs it uses up to a
                                trusted root.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>However,

                                it should be realized that the root used
                                by an OCSP <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>Responder

                                to verified these CRLs is not
                                necessarily the same as the <o:p></o:p></=
span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>one

                                that would be used by the OCSP client,
                                if it were going to verify <o:p></o:p></s=
pan></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>the

                                CRLs itself.<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>H=
ence


                                the revocation status may not be
                                identical <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>in
                                both cases.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                        </o:smarttagtype></div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>I don't understand this one.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION" style=3D"font-family:
                  Calibri, sans-serif; ">
                  <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
                    style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000"><o:smartt=
agtype
namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags"
                          name=3D"metricconverter">
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><!--[if supportFields]><=
span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spaceru=
n:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->27=
.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element=
:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"> On page 24, text should be
                              added to the Security consideration
                              section:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB">Denial of service attack
                                using a flood of queries<o:p></o:p></span=
></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>A
                                denial of service vulnerability is
                                evident with respect to a flood <o:p></o:=
p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>of
                                queries.<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=
=A0
                                </span>The production of a cryptographic
                                signature <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>significantly


                                affects response generation cycle time,
                                thereby <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>exacerbating


                                the situation. <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>The

                                flood of queries may either come from a
                                flood attack or from the <o:p></o:p></spa=
n></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>fact

                                that there are too many certificates
                                supported by the same OCSP <o:p></o:p></s=
pan></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>responder.<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>I=
n
                                the later case, the number of queries
                                can be <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>reduced

                                by using a technique similar to the
                                splitting of CRLs: <o:p></o:p></span></b>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0 </span>When

                                a block of certificates have been issued
                                with the same <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0 </span>accessLocation


                                in the AIA extension field of these
                                certificates, <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0 </span>then

                                the accessLocation should be changed.<spa=
n
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>I=
n
                                this way, a given <o:p></o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0 </span>OCSP


                                server will only be responsible for a
                                block of certificates.<o:p></o:p></span><=
/b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                        </o:smarttagtype></div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>If the security considerations section is talking
                  about splitting OCSP responders in this way, then the
                  document itself need to introduce the subject.</div>
                <div>I would suggest that it is beyond this update to do
                  so.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION" style=3D"font-family:
                  Calibri, sans-serif; ">
                  <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
                    style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000"><o:smartt=
agtype
namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags"
                          name=3D"metricconverter">
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><!--[if supportFields]><=
span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spaceru=
n:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->28=
.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element=
:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"> On page 31, the text states=
.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>An
                                alternative to this module that conforms
                                to the 2002 version of <o:p></o:p></span>=
</b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>ASN.1

                                may be found in Section 4 of [RFC5912].
                                <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoPlainText"
                            style=3D"tab-stops:308.25pt"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight: normal"><spa=
n
                                style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">RFC 5912 omits to define the
                              nocheck extension. Thus it is
                              inappropriate to refer to RFC 5912. <o:p></=
o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">The corrected module should
                              be defined in this new draft. <br>
                              A corrected module is provided</span><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;
                              mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"> in
                            </span><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language: EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB">draft-pinkas-rfc2560bis-03=
.</span></b><span
                              style=3D"font-size:
                              10.0pt;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                        </o:smarttagtype></div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>Will move this (as stated above) to a separate
                  discussion.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION" style=3D"font-family:
                  Calibri, sans-serif; ">
                  <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
                    style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000"><o:smartt=
agtype
namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags"
                          name=3D"metricconverter">
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><!--[if supportFields]><=
span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spaceru=
n:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->29=
.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element=
:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"> Different topics are not
                              covered by the document. These topics are
                              important. <br>
                              The following comments propose text to be
                              placed in annexes. Three annexes are being
                              proposed.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">Note: The texts are extracte=
d
                              from</span><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;
                              mso-ansi-language:EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"> </=
span><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language: EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB">draft-pinkas-rfc2560bis-03=
.</span></b><span
                              style=3D"font-size:
                              10.0pt;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                        </o:smarttagtype></div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>Not broken.</div>
                <div>Each such amendment need to be thoroughly reviewed
                  and motivated.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION" style=3D"font-family:
                  Calibri, sans-serif; ">
                  <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
                    style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000"><o:smartt=
agtype
namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags"
                          name=3D"metricconverter">
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><!--[if supportFields]><=
span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spaceru=
n:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->30=
.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element=
:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"> First annex being proposed.
                              This annex is important, because key
                              rollover is not addressed in the draft.<o:p=
></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB">KEY ROLLOVER<o:p></o:p></s=
pan></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB">1. CA that directly
                                supports an OCSP service<o:p></o:p></span=
></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>When

                                a CA that directly supports an OCSP
                                service performs a key <o:p></o:p></span>=
</b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>rollover:<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>-
                                for certificates issued under the old
                                key, the CA SHALL continue <o:p></o:p></s=
pan></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
 </span>to

                                sign the revocation status of OCSP
                                responses with that old key <o:p></o:p></=
span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
 </span>at

                                least until all these certificates are
                                expired, and<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>-
                                for certificates issued under the new
                                key, the CA SHALL change the <o:p></o:p><=
/span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
 </span>accessLocation


                                in the AIA extension field of these
                                certificates <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
 </span>and

                                sign the revocation status of OCSP
                                responses with that new key <o:p></o:p></=
span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
 </span>at

                                least until all these certificates are
                                expired.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>Note:

                                The change in accessLocation is
                                necessary when the CA rekeys <o:p></o:p><=
/span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0 </span>to


                                meet the following constraints imposed
                                by this standard: <o:p></o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 </span>1)


                                a BasicOCSPResponse can only be signed
                                using a single <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0

                                </span>private key; <o:p></o:p></span></b=
></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 </span>2)


                                the response must be signed using the
                                same CA key that <o:p></o:p></span></b></=
p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 </span><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
</span>was

                                used to sign the certificate in
                                question; and<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 </span>3)


                                the OCSP response needs to cover all the
                                certificates <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0

                                </span>queried in the OCSP request.<o:p><=
/o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB">2. CA that uses OCSP
                                responders<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>When

                                a CA that uses OCSP Responders performs
                                a key rollover, then <o:p></o:p></span></=
b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>it
                                MUST either designate a new OCSP
                                Responder or keep the current <o:p></o:p>=
</span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>OCSP


                                Responder(s).<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>If
                                the CA designates a new OCSP Responder,
                                then it SHALL change the <o:p></o:p></spa=
n></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>accessLocation


                                in the AIA extension field for the newly
                                issued <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>certificates


                                and issue an OCSP certificate to the new
                                OCSP Responder <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>using

                                its new key.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>If
                                the CA keeps the same OCSP Responder(s),
                                then it SHALL continue <o:p></o:p></span>=
</b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>to
                                use the same accessLocation(s) in the
                                AIA extension field for the <o:p></o:p></=
span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>newly

                                issued certificates and issue an OCSP
                                certificate to the <o:p></o:p></span></b>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>appropriate


                                OCSP Responder(s) using its new key.<o:p>=
</o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>Note:

                                The CA may need to continue issuing
                                certificates to the OCSP <o:p></o:p></spa=
n></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>Responder(s)


                                using the old CA key until all the
                                certificates issued <o:p></o:p></span></b=
></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>under

                                the CA' old key for which the OCSP
                                Responder(s) are <o:p></o:p></span></b></=
p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>authoritative


                                have expired.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB">3. OCSP Responder key
                                rollover<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>When

                                an OCSP Responder performs a key
                                rollover (asynchronously from <o:p></o:p>=
</span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>a
                                CA key rollover), then each CA which has
                                designated an OCSP <o:p></o:p></span></b>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>Responder


                                SHALL issue a new certificate for that
                                OCSP Responder and <o:p></o:p></span></b>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>for

                                each of its issuing keys which meets the
                                following property: <o:p></o:p></span></b=
></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0 </span>-
                                the issuing key has been used to sign at
                                least one certificate <o:p></o:p></span><=
/b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0 </span>which


                                contains an AIA extension designating
                                that OCSP Responder <o:p></o:p></span></b=
></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0 </span>and


                                that certificate is not yet expired.<o:p>=
</o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>An
                                OCSP Responder key rollover does not
                                affect the values of the <o:p></o:p></spa=
n></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>URIs

                                that are placed in the accessLocation
                                field from the target <o:p></o:p></span><=
/b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>certificates.<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>O=
ne
                                or more OCSP Responder MAY respond to an
                                OCSP <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>request


                                addressed at a given URI picked from the
                                accessLocation <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>field

                                from a target certificate.<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>E=
ach

                                OCSP Responder MAY use a <o:p></o:p></spa=
n></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>different


                                signing key, as long as it got an OCSP
                                certificate <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>appropriate


                                for that signing key and for the target
                                certificate. <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><!--[if supportFields]><=
span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spaceru=
n:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->31=
.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element=
:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"> Second annex being proposed=
.
                              This annex is important because it
                              describes the validation of an OCSP
                              response in the past <br>
                              which is of a particular importance when
                              validating electronic signatures.<o:p></o:p=
></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB">Response processing by an
                                OCSP client<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>OCSP


                                responses can be verified at the current
                                time by an OCSP client <o:p></o:p></span>=
</b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>when


                                receiving a response, whereas old
                                responses can be verified at <o:p></o:p><=
/span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>a
                                time in the past by a verifier.<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>T=
he
                                algorithm below addresses <o:p></o:p></sp=
an></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>both

                                cases.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>Prior

                                to processing a basic response, OCSP
                                clients MUST determine <o:p></o:p></span>=
</b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>the

                                checking time, which may be either the
                                current time or a time <o:p></o:p></span>=
</b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>in
                                the past.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>OCSP

                                clients or verifiers SHALL check if the
                                response contains <o:p></o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>responseExtensions.


                                If such an extension is found and is
                                recognized, <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>it
                                MUST be processed.<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>I=
f
                                such a critical extension is found and <o=
:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>is
                                not recognized, the whole OCSP response
                                MUST be considered as <o:p></o:p></span><=
/b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>invalid.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>If
                                the checking time is the current time,
                                and if a nonce extension <o:p></o:p></spa=
n></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>has

                                been used in the request and is
                                recognized (see section 4.5.1), <o:p></o:=
p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>OCSP

                                clients MUST check whether the same
                                nonce is present in the <o:p></o:p></span=
></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>response.<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>I=
f
                                the nonce is not present or is
                                different, then the <o:p></o:p></span></b=
></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>OCSP


                                response MUST be discarded.<o:p></o:p></s=
pan></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>Only

                                the single response(s) which are/is of
                                interest SHALL be <o:p></o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>checked.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB">STEP 1<o:p></o:p></span></=
b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>OCSP

                                clients or verifiers SHALL verify that
                                the certificate <o:p></o:p></span></b></p=
>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>identified


                                in a single response is of interest.<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>O=
therwise,


                                proceed <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>to
                                step 3.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>If
                                the certificate status included in a
                                single certificate response <o:p></o:p></=
span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>is
                                "unknown", then the revocation status of
                                that certificate is <o:p></o:p></span></b=
></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>"unknown",


                                and proceed to step 3.<o:p></o:p></span><=
/b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>If
                                the certificate status from the single
                                certificate response is <o:p></o:p></span=
></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>either


                                "good" or "revoked", OCSP clients or
                                verifiers SHALL check <o:p></o:p></span><=
/b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>that

                                the checking time is within the validity
                                period of the target <o:p></o:p></span></=
b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>certificate.<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>I=
f
                                it is not the case, then the revocation
                                status of <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>that


                                certificate is "unknown" and proceed to
                                step 3.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>If
                                the checking time is the current time,
                                and if a nonce has been <o:p></o:p></span=
></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>used

                                in the request, then proceed to step 2.<o=
:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>If
                                the checking time is the current time,
                                and if no nonce has been <o:p></o:p></spa=
n></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>used

                                in the request, OCSP clients MUST check
                                that the producedAt<o:p></o:p></span></b>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>field

                                is within a time window that is "close
                                enough" to the current <o:p></o:p></span>=
</b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>time.

                                <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>Note:

                                the notion of "close enough" is a local
                                matter.<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0
                                </span>It can be set <o:p></o:p></span></=
b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0 </span>to

                                a few minutes to allow for small UTC
                                time differences <o:p></o:p></span></b></=
p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0 </span>between


                                the client and the server or to a few
                                hours in case <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0 </span>the


                                server is producing pre-computed
                                responses.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>If
                                the checking time is a time in the past,
                                verifiers MUST check <o:p></o:p></span></=
b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>that

                                the producedAt field is in accordance
                                with the verification <o:p></o:p></span><=
/b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>rules

                                (e.g. close and/or after the date of a
                                time-stamp token).<o:p></o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>In
                                addition, if the nextUpdate field is
                                present, OCSP clients MUST <o:p></o:p></s=
pan></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>check

                                that the time which is indicated is
                                greater than the checking <o:p></o:p></sp=
an></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>time,


                                otherwise the single response MUST be
                                discarded.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>If
                                checks are successful, then OCSP clients
                                MUST process the <o:p></o:p></span></b></=
p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>singleExtensions



                                field, if it is present. <o:p></o:p></spa=
n></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>If
                                the criticality flag is set and the
                                extension is not understood, <o:p></o:p><=
/span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>then

                                the status of the certificate shall be
                                "unknown" and proceed to <o:p></o:p></spa=
n></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>step

                                3.<span style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </=
span>Otherwise,


                                proceed to step 2. <o:p></o:p></span></b>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>If
                                the extension is understood, then the
                                extension MUST be <o:p></o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>processed.<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>A=
ccording

                                to its content proceed either to step 2
                                or to <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>step

                                3. <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB">STEP 2<o:p></o:p></span></=
b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>OCSP

                                clients or verifiers MUST build and
                                verify a certification path <o:p></o:p></=
span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>for

                                that certificate up to a trusted root,
                                so that they have the <o:p></o:p></span><=
/b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>knowledge

                                of the CA public key value that was used
                                to sign the <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>target


                                certificate.<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>T=
he
                                revocation status of each certificate of
                                <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>that


                                certification path (except the target
                                certificate) SHALL be <o:p></o:p></span><=
/b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>checked.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>If
                                no path can be built or if one of the
                                certificates of the path is <o:p></o:p></=
span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>revoked,


                                then the revocation status of that
                                certificate is "unknown", <o:p></o:p></sp=
an></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>and

                                proceed to step 3. <o:p></o:p></span></b>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>If
                                the certification path (except the
                                target certificate) is valid, <o:p></o:p>=
</span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>then

                                two cases need to be considered:<o:p></o:=
p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>a)
                                If the responderID matches with the name
                                or the key from the CA <o:p></o:p></span>=
</b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0 </span>which

                                has issued the target certificate, then
                                check whether the <o:p></o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0 </span>OCSP


                                response is signed by the same key that
                                was used to sign <o:p></o:p></span></b></=
p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0 </span>the


                                target certificate.<o:p></o:p></span></b>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0
                                </span>If it is the case, then the
                                revocation status of that <o:p></o:p></sp=
an></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0
                                </span>certificate as indicated in the
                                certStatus field is <o:p></o:p></span></b=
></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0
                                </span>accepted and proceed to step 3.<o:=
p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0
                                </span>If it is not the case, then the
                                revocation status of that <o:p></o:p></sp=
an></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0
                                </span>certificate is "unknown" and
                                proceed to step 3.<o:p></o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>b)
                                If the responderID does not match with
                                the name or the key from <o:p></o:p></spa=
n></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0 </span>the

                                CA which has issued the target
                                certificate, then it indicates <o:p></o:p=
></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0 </span>the

                                name or the key from an OCSP Responder.<s=
pan
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>C=
heck

                                whether there <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0 </span>exists

                                a local rule which applies to this
                                target certificate to <o:p></o:p></span><=
/b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0 </span>verify


                                that the signature of the
                                BasicOCSPResponse is valid for <o:p></o:p=
></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0 </span>that


                                single response.<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>I=
f
                                this rule exists, it SHALL be followed.
                                <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0 </span>Otherwise


                                check whether there is an OCSP
                                certificate (i.e. which <o:p></o:p></span=
></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0 </span>has

                                both the ocspSigning OID in the extended
                                key usage extension <o:p></o:p></span></b=
></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0 </span>and

                                the digitalSignature bit in the key
                                usage extension) signed <o:p></o:p></span=
></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0 </span>by

                                the same key that was used to sign the
                                target certificate. <o:p></o:p></span></b=
></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0 </span>This


                                certificate MUST be present in the certs
                                field from the <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0 </span>BasicOCSPResponse.



                                <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 </span>If


                                such certificate is not found or is
                                invalid, then the <o:p></o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 </span>revocation



                                status of that certificate is "unknown"
                                and <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 </span>proceed


                                to step 3.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 </span>If


                                such certificate exists and if the
                                checking time is <o:p></o:p></span></b></=
p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 </span>within


                                the validity period of this certificate,
                                then it MUST <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 </span>be


                                verified whether the OCSP response can
                                be verified using <o:p></o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 </span>the


                                public key that is present in the OCSP
                                Certificate. <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0
                                </span>If it is not the case, then the
                                revocation status of that <o:p></o:p></sp=
an></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0
                                </span>certificate is "unknown" and
                                proceed to step 3.<o:p></o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0
                                </span>If it is the case, then it MUST
                                be verified that the OCSP <o:p></o:p></sp=
an></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0
                                </span>Certificate has not been revoked.<=
o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
 </span>If

                                one of these conditions is met, then the
                                status for the target <o:p></o:p></span><=
/b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
 </span>certificate


                                as indicated in the certStatus field is
                                accepted, <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
 </span>otherwise


                                the revocation status is "unknown".<o:p><=
/o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB">STEP 3<o:p></o:p></span></=
b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>If
                                there exists another single certificate
                                status response for a <o:p></o:p></span><=
/b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>target


                                certificate that is of interest, then
                                proceed to step 1. <o:p></o:p></span></b>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>Otherwise


                                the basic response is now processed.<o:p>=
</o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><!--[if supportFields]><=
span lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:
EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>&nbsp;</span>AUTONUM<span style=3D'mso-spaceru=
n:yes'>&nbsp;
</span></span><![endif]--><span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><!--[if !supportFields]-->32=
.<!--[endif]--></span><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=3DEN-GB style=3D'mso-ansi-language:EN-GB'><span style=3D'mso-element=
:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"> Third annex being proposed.
                              This annex is important because it
                              provides guidance on how to build an OCSP
                              responder in the three cases. <br>
                              Many text portions are similar, but three
                              full texts are provided in order to
                              provide a better clarity for each of the
                              three cases.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB">1. Request processing by
                                OCSP servers<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>The

                                behavior of an OCSP server will be
                                different whether the OCSP <o:p></o:p></s=
pan></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>server

                                is a CA acting as an OCSP responder, is
                                an OCSP Responder <o:p></o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>which


                                received a delegation from one or more
                                CAs, or is a locally <o:p></o:p></span></=
b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>trusted


                                Responder.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB">1.1. Processing by a CA
                                acting as an OCSP responder<o:p></o:p></s=
pan></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>The

                                OCSP responder SHALL maintain a list of
                                entries. Each entry <o:p></o:p></span></b=
></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>SHALL


                                contain:<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
 </span>-
                                the URI associated to the OCSP
                                responder, from which the OCSP <o:p></o:p=
></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0 </span>requests


                                are received, <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
 </span>-
                                the DN from a CA,<o:p></o:p></span></b></=
p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
 </span>-
                                an issuing public key from a CA,<o:p></o:=
p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
 </span>-
                                the method(s) used to know for which
                                subset of certificates <o:p></o:p></span>=
</b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0 </span>issued


                                by the CA it is responsible for, <o:p></o=
:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
 </span>-
                                the method(s) used to obtain the
                                revocation status of that <o:p></o:p></sp=
an></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0 </span>subset


                                of certificates issued under that CA
                                issuing public key, <o:p></o:p></span></b=
></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0 </span>and<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
 </span>-
                                the method used to gain access and sign
                                with the private key <o:p></o:p></span></=
b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0 </span>corresponding


                                to the issuing public key.<o:p></o:p></sp=
an></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>For

                                a given URI value, the OCSP responder
                                SHALL only use one CA <o:p></o:p></span><=
/b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>key

                                pair value. <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>When

                                it receives an OCSP request on that URI,
                                the OCSP responder <o:p></o:p></span></b>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>SHALL

                                handle exceptions according to section
                                2.3. <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>If
                                the OCSP request contains the name of a
                                requestor, the OCSP <o:p></o:p></span></b=
></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>responder


                                SHALL verify whether there exists a
                                locally defined rule <o:p></o:p></span></=
b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>which


                                regulates access control.<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>I=
f
                                this rule exists, it SHALL be <o:p></o:p>=
</span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>followed.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>Then,

                                for each target certificate, the OCSP
                                responder SHALL verify <o:p></o:p></span>=
</b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>whether

                                both the hash of the issuer's DN and the
                                hash of the issuer <o:p></o:p></span></b>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>public

                                key which are present in the request are
                                eligible to a <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>locally


                                defined rule which indicates that the
                                OCSP responder is <o:p></o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>responsible


                                to provide the revocation status of that
                                target <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>certificate.<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>I=
f
                                this rule exists, it SHALL be followed.<o=
:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>Otherwise,


                                the OCSP responder SHALL determine
                                whether it is <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>responsible


                                to provide the revocation status of that
                                target <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>certificate


                                according to the following rule.<o:p></o:=
p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>For

                                each target certificate, the OCSP
                                responder SHALL verify whether <o:p></o:p=
></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>both

                                the hash of the issuer's DN and the hash
                                of the issuer public <o:p></o:p></span></=
b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>key

                                which are present in the request match
                                respectively with the DN <o:p></o:p></spa=
n></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>and

                                the hash of the public key of contained
                                in an entry from the <o:p></o:p></span></=
b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>list

                                of entries maintained by this OCSP
                                responder. <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>When

                                there is no match, then the OCSP
                                responder SHALL indicate the <o:p></o:p><=
/span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>"unknown"


                                status and proceed with the next target
                                certificate from <o:p></o:p></span></b></=
p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>the

                                OCSP request.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>When

                                there is a match, then the OCSP
                                responder SHALL use the serial <o:p></o:p=
></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>number

                                of the target certificate that is
                                present in the request and <o:p></o:p></s=
pan></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>determine


                                the revocation status of that
                                certificate according to <o:p></o:p></spa=
n></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>the


                                method(s) defined in the entry. <o:p></o:=
p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>When

                                the revocation status is provided by the
                                server using a real <o:p></o:p></span></b=
></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>time

                                access to a database of revocation
                                statuses of issued <o:p></o:p></span></b>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>certificates,


                                then the thisUpdate field SHALL be
                                present in the<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>SingleResponse



                                response whereas the nextUpdate field
                                SHALL be <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>missing.

                                <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>Otherwise,


                                both the thisUpdate and the nextUpdate
                                fields SHALL be <o:p></o:p></span></b></p=
>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>present

                                in the SingleResponse. <o:p></o:p></span>=
</b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>The

                                time at which this response will be
                                signed MUST be indicated in <o:p></o:p></=
span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>the


                                producedAt field from the
                                SingleResponse.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>If
                                a singleRequestExtensions is present in
                                the request it MUST be <o:p></o:p></span>=
</b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>processed.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>If
                                there is another target certificate
                                present in the request, it <o:p></o:p></s=
pan></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>SHALL

                                be processed in the same way.<o:p></o:p><=
/span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>If
                                a requestExtensions is present in the
                                request it MUST be <o:p></o:p></span></b>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>processed.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>The

                                OCSP response MUST be signed using the
                                CA issuing private key.<o:p></o:p></span>=
</b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB">1.2. Processing by an OCSP
                                Responder<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>For

                                each CA from which the OCSP Responder
                                has received a delegation, <o:p></o:p></s=
pan></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>the

                                OCSP Responder SHALL maintain a list of
                                entries. <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>Each

                                entry SHALL contain:<o:p></o:p></span></b=
></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
 </span>-
                                the URI associated to this OCSP
                                Responder, from which the OCSP <o:p></o:p=
></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0 </span>requests


                                are received, <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
 </span>-
                                the DN from a CA,<o:p></o:p></span></b></=
p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
 </span>-
                                an issuing public key from a CA,<o:p></o:=
p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
 </span>-
                                the method(s) used to know for which
                                subset of certificates <o:p></o:p></span>=
</b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0 </span>issued


                                by the CA it is responsible for, <o:p></o=
:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
 </span>-
                                the method(s) used to obtain the
                                revocation status of that <o:p></o:p></sp=
an></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0 </span>subset


                                of certificates issued under that CA
                                issuing public key,<o:p></o:p></span></b>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
 </span>-
                                an OCSP certificate, <o:p></o:p></span></=
b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
 </span>-
                                the OCSP public key contained in that
                                OCSP certificate, and<o:p></o:p></span></=
b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
 </span>-
                                the method used to gain access and sign
                                with the OCSP private <o:p></o:p></span><=
/b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0 </span>key


                                corresponding to that OCSP certificate.<o=
:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>For

                                a given URI value, the OCSP Responder
                                SHALL only use one OCSP <o:p></o:p></span=
></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>key

                                pair value.<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>T=
herefore


                                there cannot be two entries with the <o:p=
></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>same

                                URI value and a different OCSP public
                                key value.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>NOTE:

                                a BasicOCSPResponse can only be signed
                                using a single private <o:p></o:p></span>=
</b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0 </span>key.

                                <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>The

                                OCSP certificate SHALL be signed by the
                                CA issuing private key <o:p></o:p></span>=
</b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>which


                                corresponds to the issuing CA public key
                                that is in this <o:p></o:p></span></b></p=
>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>entry.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>When

                                it receives an OCSP request, the OCSP
                                responder SHALL handle <o:p></o:p></span>=
</b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>exceptions


                                according to section 2.3. <o:p></o:p></sp=
an></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>If
                                the OCSP request contains the name of a
                                requestor, the OCSP <o:p></o:p></span></b=
></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>responder


                                SHALL verify whether there exists a
                                locally defined rule <o:p></o:p></span></=
b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>which


                                regulates access control.<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>I=
f
                                this rule exists, it SHALL be <o:p></o:p>=
</span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>followed.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>For

                                each target certificate, the OCSP
                                Responder SHALL verify <o:p></o:p></span>=
</b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>whether

                                both the hash of the issuer's DN and the
                                hash of the issuer <o:p></o:p></span></b>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>public

                                key which are present in the OCSP
                                request match with those <o:p></o:p></spa=
n></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>from

                                an entry.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>When

                                there is no match, then the OCSP
                                Responder SHALL indicate the <o:p></o:p><=
/span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>"unknown"


                                status and proceed with the next target
                                certificate from <o:p></o:p></span></b></=
p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>the

                                OCSP request.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>When

                                there is a match, the OCSP Responder
                                SHALL use the serial <o:p></o:p></span></=
b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>number

                                of the target certificate this is
                                present in the OCSP <o:p></o:p></span></b=
></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>request

                                to determine the revocation status of
                                that certificate <o:p></o:p></span></b></=
p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>according

                                to the method(s) indicated in the entry.
                                <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>When

                                the revocation status is provided by the
                                server using a real <o:p></o:p></span></b=
></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>time

                                access to a database of revocation
                                statuses of issued <o:p></o:p></span></b>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>certificates,


                                then the thisUpdate field SHALL be
                                present in the<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>SingleResponse



                                response whereas the nextUpdate field
                                SHALL be <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>missing.

                                <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>Otherwise,


                                both the thisUpdate and the nextUpdate
                                fields SHALL be <o:p></o:p></span></b></p=
>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>present

                                in the SingleResponse. <o:p></o:p></span>=
</b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>The

                                time at which this response will be
                                signed MUST be indicated in <o:p></o:p></=
span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>the


                                producedAt field from the
                                SingleResponse.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>If
                                a singleRequestExtensions is present in
                                the request it MUST be <o:p></o:p></span>=
</b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>processed.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>If
                                there is another target certificate
                                present in the request, it <o:p></o:p></s=
pan></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>SHALL

                                be processed in the same way.<o:p></o:p><=
/span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>If
                                a requestExtensions is present in the
                                request it SHALL be <o:p></o:p></span></b=
></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>processed.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>The

                                OCSP response MUST be signed using the
                                OCSP private key.<o:p></o:p></span></b></=
p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>Unless

                                there is a local rule which states
                                differently, for every <o:p></o:p></span>=
</b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>target


                                certificate which matches both with the
                                hash of a CA DN and an <o:p></o:p></span>=
</b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>issuing


                                public key from an entry, the OCSP
                                certificate of that entry <o:p></o:p></sp=
an></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>SHALL

                                be placed in the certs field.<o:p></o:p><=
/span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>It
                                may happen, that none of the target
                                certificates from the OCSP<o:p></o:p></sp=
an></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>request


                                matches both with the hash of a CA DN
                                and an issuing public <o:p></o:p></span><=
/b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>key

                                from an entry.<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>I=
n
                                that case and unless a local rule states
                                <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>differently,


                                the certs field from the
                                BasicOCSPResponse SHOULD be <o:p></o:p></=
span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>kept

                                empty (to limit the disclose of the
                                names of the CAs from which <o:p></o:p></=
span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>the

                                OCSP Responder received a delegation
                                from).<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB">1.3. Processing by a
                                locally trusted Responder<o:p></o:p></spa=
n></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>For

                                each CA for which the locally trusted
                                Responder is <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>authoritative,


                                the OCSP Responder SHALL maintain a list
                                of entries. <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>Each

                                entry SHALL contain:<o:p></o:p></span></b=
></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
 </span>-
                                the URI associated to this OCSP
                                Responder, from which the OCSP <o:p></o:p=
></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0 </span>requests


                                are received, <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
 </span>-
                                the DN from a CA,<o:p></o:p></span></b></=
p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
 </span>-
                                an issuing public key from a CA,<o:p></o:=
p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
 </span>-
                                the method(s) used to know for which
                                subset of certificates <o:p></o:p></span>=
</b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0 </span>issued


                                by the CA it is responsible for, <o:p></o=
:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
 </span>-
                                the method(s) used to obtain the
                                revocation status of that <o:p></o:p></sp=
an></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0 </span>subset


                                of certificates issued under that CA
                                issuing public key,<o:p></o:p></span></b>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
 </span>-
                                the method used to gain access to the
                                private key in order to <o:p></o:p></span=
></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0 </span>sign

                                the OCSP response. <o:p></o:p></span></b>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>For

                                a given URI value, the OCSP Responder
                                SHALL only use one private <o:p></o:p></s=
pan></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>key.<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>T=
herefore


                                there cannot be two entries with the
                                same URI value <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>and

                                a different method to gain access to the
                                appropriate private key.<o:p></o:p></span=
></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>NOTE:

                                a BasicOCSPResponse can only be signed
                                using a single private <o:p></o:p></span>=
</b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0 </span>key.

                                <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>When

                                it receives an OCSP request, the OCSP
                                responder SHALL handle <o:p></o:p></span>=
</b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>exceptions


                                according to section 2.3. <o:p></o:p></sp=
an></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>If
                                the OCSP request contains the name of a
                                requestor, the OCSP <o:p></o:p></span></b=
></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>responder


                                SHALL verify whether there exists a
                                locally defined rule <o:p></o:p></span></=
b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>which


                                regulates access control.<span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0 </span>I=
f
                                this rule exists, it SHALL be <o:p></o:p>=
</span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>followed.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>For

                                each target certificate, the OCSP
                                Responder SHALL verify <o:p></o:p></span>=
</b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>whether

                                both the hash of the issuer's DN and the
                                hash of the issuer <o:p></o:p></span></b>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>public

                                key which are present in the OCSP
                                request match with those <o:p></o:p></spa=
n></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>from

                                an entry.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>When

                                there is no match, then the OCSP
                                Responder SHALL indicate the <o:p></o:p><=
/span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>"unknown"


                                status and proceed with the next target
                                certificate from <o:p></o:p></span></b></=
p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>the

                                OCSP request.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>When

                                there is a match, the OCSP Responder
                                SHALL use the serial <o:p></o:p></span></=
b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>number

                                of the target certificate this is
                                present in the OCSP <o:p></o:p></span></b=
></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>request

                                to determine the revocation status of
                                that certificate <o:p></o:p></span></b></=
p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>according

                                to the method(s) indicated in the entry.
                                <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>When

                                the revocation status is provided by the
                                server using a real <o:p></o:p></span></b=
></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>time

                                access to a database of revocation
                                statuses of issued <o:p></o:p></span></b>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>certificates,


                                then the thisUpdate field SHALL be
                                present in the<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>SingleResponse



                                response whereas the nextUpdate field
                                SHALL be <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>missing.

                                <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>Otherwise,


                                both the thisUpdate and the nextUpdate
                                fields SHALL be <o:p></o:p></span></b></p=
>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>present

                                in the SingleResponse. <o:p></o:p></span>=
</b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>The

                                time at which this response will be
                                signed MUST be indicated in <o:p></o:p></=
span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>the


                                producedAt field from the
                                SingleResponse.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>If
                                a singleRequestExtensions is present in
                                the request it MUST be <o:p></o:p></span>=
</b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>processed.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>If
                                there is another target certificate
                                present in the request, it <o:p></o:p></s=
pan></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>SHALL

                                be processed in the same way.<o:p></o:p><=
/span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>If
                                a requestExtensions is present in the
                                request it SHALL be <o:p></o:p></span></b=
></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>processed.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>The

                                OCSP response MUST be signed using the
                                OCSP private key.<o:p></o:p></span></b></=
p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>The

                                certs field may contain no, one or
                                several OCSP certificates <o:p></o:p></sp=
an></b></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b
                              style=3D"mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
                                style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Courier


                                New&quot;;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                                lang=3D"EN-GB"><span
                                  style=3D"mso-spacerun:yes">=A0=A0 </spa=
n>according

                                to local rules followed by the locally
                                trusted Responder.<o:p></o:p></span></b><=
/p>
                        </o:smarttagtype></div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </span>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>Not broken.</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <div>/Stefan</div>
                <div><br>
                </div>
                <span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION" style=3D"font-family:
                  Calibri, sans-serif; ">
                  <blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"
                    style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0
                    5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;">
                    <div>
                      <div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000"><o:smartt=
agtype
namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags"
                          name=3D"metricconverter">
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB">End of comments<br>
                            </span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><br>
                            Denis<br>
                            <span style=3D"mso-ansi-language:EN-GB"
                              lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
                          <p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span
                              style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language=
:
                              EN-GB" lang=3D"EN-GB"><o:p>=A0</o:p></span>=
</p>
                        </o:smarttagtype> </div>
                    </div>
                    _______________________________________________ pkix
                    mailing list <a moz-do-not-send=3D"true"
                      href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a> <a
                      moz-do-not-send=3D"true"
                      href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix"=
>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix</a>
                  </blockquote>
                </span> </blockquote>
              <br>
            </div>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </span> </blockquote>
    <br>
  </body>
</html>

--------------010606060500020302040001--


From denis.pinkas@bull.net  Mon Mar 11 02:41:46 2013
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Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2013 10:41:40 +0100
From: Denis Pinkas <denis.pinkas@bull.net>
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Cc: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>, pkix <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] Comments on draft-santesson-auth-context-extension-04
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Martin,

The problem is that we currently only have a static description for a 
mapping but no indication on how
a RP shall use the content of the extension, in particular when it is 
critical.

I have also difficulties to understand why this mapping information 
needs to be in the certificate since it will be in the audit trail of 
the CA anyway.

What is important is how the RP shall use that information and my 
understanding is still the following:
making sure the the certificate belongs to a person that has used a SAML 
token.

So it is much straightforward to include in the certificate information 
about the SAML token itself rather than
information on a mapping with the content of the DN which anyway is of 
no value for a RP because it cannot be verified.

If a document is targeted to informational, it is because it may be 
useful outside the community which has an original interest in it.

Denis

> Denis,
>
> While I have no personal interest or use in this proposal myself,
> I'm somewhat confused by your message.
>
> Denis Pinkas wrote:
>> Allowing to have SAML attributes in a PKC would be a very good thing.
>> However, the relying party DOES NOT care
>> how these SAML attributes have been translated into a subject DN. It is
>> the responsibility of the CA.
> Stefan said that he _has_ RPs who care.  Where is your problem with this?
>
>
>> Thus, if the scope only remains to know how the correspondence was made
>> between  the SAML attributes and
>> the subject DN, I don't believe that this document will be useful for
>> the Internet community and thus I am still unconvinced
>> that this document should progress as an Internet Draft.
> "progress as Internet Draft"?
> (I have not the slightest idea what that is.)
>
>  From the document header, Stefan seems to be looking for an Individual
> Submission with the intended document status "Informational".
>
> Were you thinking of a Standards track document?
> Or were you thinking about a WG work item (Last thing I heard was that
> PKIX is scheduled to shut down (as IETF WG) and not accepting any further
> work items).  Only the latter two would need any kind of "approval".
>
>
> Stefan's primary interest seems to be sharing information about what he
> does (or intends to do) with the IETF community.  And Stefan seems to
> solicit and accept feedback and suggestions from the PKIX community
> to make this work more useful to others.
>
>
>> If the scope is changed to allow to include SAML attributes as another
>> name form in a PKC, then this is
>> an important issue which deserves an Internet Draft.
> Stefan indicated that he needs this extension to convey information
> that does not qualify as SAN/otherName, so this feedback seems to be
> missing the point.
>
> If you have a need for this, you might have to create your own proposal/I-D
> to fit this purpose.
>
>
> -Martin



From stefan@aaa-sec.com  Mon Mar 11 05:12:48 2013
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Denis,

If you don't understand how this information can be useful, that probably
is because you don't have a problem that needs this information.

If you don't have a problem that needs this information, why does any of
this bother you?

The matching rules are not necessary because matching of SAML attributes
is defined by SAML.


Anyway. Answering below;

On 3/11/13 10:41 AM, "Denis Pinkas" <denis.pinkas@bull.net> wrote:

>Martin,
>
>The problem is that we currently only have a static description for a
>mapping but no indication on how
>a RP shall use the content of the extension, in particular when it is
>critical.

The information is there. You may use it any way you like. There are many
use-cases describing situations where this information is useful.
Criticality only means that you need to recognise the extension in order
to accept the cert, not that you have to use it in any particular way.

>
>I have also difficulties to understand why this mapping information
>needs to be in the certificate since it will be in the audit trail of
>the CA anyway.


That is probably because you don't have a problem that requires this
information in the cert. The CA audit trail is not available to the RP at
time of cert validation.

>
>What is important is how the RP shall use that information and my
>understanding is still the following:
>making sure the the certificate belongs to a person that has used a SAML
>token.

The RP can use several strategies depending on the amount and type of
information present in the extension.
It either gives you the information you need as RP (filling an information
gap) or it doesn't.
If it does it makes it possible for you to accept the cert.


>
>So it is much straightforward to include in the certificate information
>about the SAML token itself rather than
>information on a mapping with the content of the DN which anyway is of
>no value for a RP because it cannot be verified.

If that is what you need, then feel free to define such extension.
I need a certificate that carries a normal cert name. I just need extra
information to understand what that name is.

>
>If a document is targeted to informational, it is because it may be
>useful outside the community which has an original interest in it.


Not necessarily. But if someone has a problem that is addressed here
(which you obviously have not), then I would not mind make it useful
outside of our project.

/Stefan

>
>Denis
>
>> Denis,
>>
>> While I have no personal interest or use in this proposal myself,
>> I'm somewhat confused by your message.
>>
>> Denis Pinkas wrote:
>>> Allowing to have SAML attributes in a PKC would be a very good thing.
>>> However, the relying party DOES NOT care
>>> how these SAML attributes have been translated into a subject DN. It is
>>> the responsibility of the CA.
>> Stefan said that he _has_ RPs who care.  Where is your problem with
>>this?
>>
>>
>>> Thus, if the scope only remains to know how the correspondence was made
>>> between  the SAML attributes and
>>> the subject DN, I don't believe that this document will be useful for
>>> the Internet community and thus I am still unconvinced
>>> that this document should progress as an Internet Draft.
>> "progress as Internet Draft"?
>> (I have not the slightest idea what that is.)
>>
>>  From the document header, Stefan seems to be looking for an Individual
>> Submission with the intended document status "Informational".
>>
>> Were you thinking of a Standards track document?
>> Or were you thinking about a WG work item (Last thing I heard was that
>> PKIX is scheduled to shut down (as IETF WG) and not accepting any
>>further
>> work items).  Only the latter two would need any kind of "approval".
>>
>>
>> Stefan's primary interest seems to be sharing information about what he
>> does (or intends to do) with the IETF community.  And Stefan seems to
>> solicit and accept feedback and suggestions from the PKIX community
>> to make this work more useful to others.
>>
>>
>>> If the scope is changed to allow to include SAML attributes as another
>>> name form in a PKC, then this is
>>> an important issue which deserves an Internet Draft.
>> Stefan indicated that he needs this extension to convey information
>> that does not qualify as SAN/otherName, so this feedback seems to be
>> missing the point.
>>
>> If you have a need for this, you might have to create your own
>>proposal/I-D
>> to fit this purpose.
>>
>>
>> -Martin
>
>
>_______________________________________________
>pkix mailing list
>pkix@ietf.org
>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix



From peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr  Tue Mar 12 03:10:17 2013
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Subject: [pkix] timestamp signature validation
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Hi,

is a 3161 conformant timestamping client
supposed to verify attribute certficates
that are included in the ESSCertid?

Or, in other words, does someone knows
about any profile that prohibits a
TSA to include an ESScertid pointing to
an X.509 attribute certificate.

Peter

From mrex@sap.com  Tue Mar 12 10:46:47 2013
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Peter Sylvester wrote:
> 
> is a 3161 conformant timestamping client
> supposed to verify attribute certficates
> that are included in the ESSCertid?
> 
> Or, in other words, does someone knows
> about any profile that prohibits a
> TSA to include an ESScertid pointing to
> an X.509 attribute certificate.

Admittedly, I don't have the slightest clue what the term
"attribute certificate" refers to.

The ESSCertID in rfc3161 refers to the TSA signer certificate,
which was used to sign the rfc3161 timestamp.

   http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3161#page-8

   The time-stamp token MUST NOT contain any signatures other than the
   signature of the TSA.  The certificate identifier (ESSCertID) of the
   TSA certificate MUST be included as a signerInfo attribute inside a
   SigningCertificate attribute.

Which part of "SigningCertificate" is unclear to you?

-Martin

From piyush@ditenity.com  Tue Mar 12 11:16:29 2013
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From: "Piyush Jain" <piyush@ditenity.com>
To: <mrex@sap.com>, "'Peter Sylvester'" <peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] timestamp signature validation
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For Martin:
Attribute Certificates profile http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3281.txt 
ESSCertID can also refer to an attribute certificate which is used to convey
authorization information.

For Peter:
I have not come across a profile that mandates or prohibits use of attribute
certificates for time-stamping.

If you think about it, the RP needs to figure out if the TSA is trusted and
is authorized to sign the time-stamp responses. 
If RP can establish this with some out of band mechanism, there is no need
to even look at the attribute certificate.

However, if the environment dictates that authorization info is conveyed
using attribute certificates, then the RP must process and verify attribute
certificates.

But who uses attribute certificates anyway?

-Piyush

> -----Original Message-----
> From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
> Martin Rex
> Sent: Tuesday, March 12, 2013 10:47 AM
> To: Peter Sylvester
> Cc: 'pkix@ietf.org'
> Subject: Re: [pkix] timestamp signature validation
> 
> Peter Sylvester wrote:
> >
> > is a 3161 conformant timestamping client supposed to verify attribute
> > certficates that are included in the ESSCertid?
> >
> > Or, in other words, does someone knows about any profile that
> > prohibits a TSA to include an ESScertid pointing to an X.509 attribute
> > certificate.
> 
> Admittedly, I don't have the slightest clue what the term "attribute
> certificate" refers to.
> 
> The ESSCertID in rfc3161 refers to the TSA signer certificate, which was
used
> to sign the rfc3161 timestamp.
> 
>    http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3161#page-8
> 
>    The time-stamp token MUST NOT contain any signatures other than the
>    signature of the TSA.  The certificate identifier (ESSCertID) of the
>    TSA certificate MUST be included as a signerInfo attribute inside a
>    SigningCertificate attribute.
> 
> Which part of "SigningCertificate" is unclear to you?
> 
> -Martin
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix


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Subject: Re: [pkix] timestamp signature validation
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2013/3/12 Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>

> Peter Sylvester wrote:
> >
> > is a 3161 conformant timestamping client
> > supposed to verify attribute certficates
> > that are included in the ESSCertid?
> >
> > Or, in other words, does someone knows
> > about any profile that prohibits a
> > TSA to include an ESScertid pointing to
> > an X.509 attribute certificate.
>

The only thing that makes me think that only public-key certificates can
*sign* TSA is a small phrase taken from the section 2.4.1 (request format):

   If the certReq field is present and set to true, the TSA's public key
   certificate that is referenced by the ESSCertID identifier inside a
   SigningCertificate attribute in the response MUST be provided by the
   TSA in the certificates field from the SignedData structure in that
   response.  That field may also contain other certificates.

But otherwise, nothing seems to prevent adding attribute certificates in
the CMS as additional certificates.


> Admittedly, I don't have the slightest clue what the term
> "attribute certificate" refers to.
>

That's the second type of X.509 certificates. The first one is about
"public key certificates".

-- 
Erwann.

--20cf3079bfe2a794c604d7be5469
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<br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">2013/3/12 Martin Rex <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<=
a href=3D"mailto:mrex@sap.com" target=3D"_blank">mrex@sap.com</a>&gt;</span=
><br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-le=
ft:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div class=3D"im">Peter Sylvester wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; is a 3161 conformant timestamping client<br>
&gt; supposed to verify attribute certficates<br>
&gt; that are included in the ESSCertid?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Or, in other words, does someone knows<br>
&gt; about any profile that prohibits a<br>
&gt; TSA to include an ESScertid pointing to<br>
&gt; an X.509 attribute certificate.<br></div></blockquote><div><br></div><=
div>The only thing that makes me think that only public-key certificates ca=
n *sign* TSA is a small phrase taken from the section 2.4.1 (request format=
):</div>
<div><br></div><div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0If the certReq field is present and s=
et to true, the TSA&#39;s public key</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0certificate tha=
t is referenced by the ESSCertID identifier inside a</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=
=A0SigningCertificate attribute in the response MUST be provided by the</di=
v>
<div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0TSA in the certificates field from the SignedData structu=
re in that</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0response. =C2=A0That field may also conta=
in other certificates.</div></div><div><br></div><div>But otherwise, nothin=
g seems to prevent adding attribute certificates in the CMS as additional c=
ertificates.</div>
<div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8=
ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div class=3D"im">
</div>Admittedly, I don&#39;t have the slightest clue what the term<br>
&quot;attribute certificate&quot; refers to.<br></blockquote><div><br></div=
><div>That&#39;s the second type of X.509 certificates. The first one is ab=
out &quot;public key certificates&quot;.</div><div><br></div></div>-- <br>
Erwann.

--20cf3079bfe2a794c604d7be5469--

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2013/3/12 Piyush Jain <piyush@ditenity.com>

>
> But who uses attribute certificates anyway?
>

At least one TSP in Czechoslovakia. With Qualified Certificates. The
attribute certificates is additional to the signer.

Other than that, I have never encountered attribute certificates in the
wild.

-- 
Erwann.

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<br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">2013/3/12 Piyush Jain <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;=
<a href=3D"mailto:piyush@ditenity.com" target=3D"_blank">piyush@ditenity.co=
m</a>&gt;</span><br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0=
 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
But who uses attribute certificates anyway?<br></blockquote></div><div><br>=
</div><div>At least one TSP in Czechoslovakia. With Qualified Certificates.=
 The attribute certificates is additional to the signer.</div><div><br>
</div><div>Other than that, I have never encountered attribute certificates=
 in the wild.</div><div><br></div>-- <br>Erwann.

--14dae9cdc33b66ca2804d7be649b--

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Here's a few I know about

Adobe did. It might still do.
Entrust PKI did. It might still do
Taiwan did. It might still do.

and our PERMIS software still gets thousands of downloads a year

David

On 12/03/2013 18:23, Erwann Abalea wrote:
>
> 2013/3/12 Piyush Jain <piyush@ditenity.com <mailto:piyush@ditenity.com>>
>
>
>     But who uses attribute certificates anyway?
>
>
> At least one TSP in Czechoslovakia. With Qualified Certificates. The
> attribute certificates is additional to the signer.
>
> Other than that, I have never encountered attribute certificates in the
> wild.
>
> --
> Erwann.
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
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From: mrex@sap.com (Martin Rex)
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Subject: Re: [pkix] timestamp signature validation
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Piyush Jain wrote:
> For Martin:
> Attribute Certificates profile http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3281.txt 
> ESSCertID can also refer to an attribute certificate which is used to convey
> authorization information.

Thanks.

> 
> For Peter:
> I have not come across a profile that mandates or prohibits use of attribute
> certificates for time-stamping.
> 
> If you think about it, the RP needs to figure out if the TSA is trusted and
> is authorized to sign the time-stamp responses. 
> If RP can establish this with some out of band mechanism, there is no need
> to even look at the attribute certificate.

I also believe that rfc-3161 section-2.3 is clear _and_ complete:

  http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3161#section-2.3

The mere technical possibility to additionally name attribute certs
through ESSCertID (see http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2634#section-5.4.1),
besides the signer cert seems like a 6th wheel on the cart.

Frankly, even the use of ESSCertID looks like a 5th wheel on the cart to me.

My implementation of a TSA client and TimeStamped-CMS verifiers completely
ignore ESSCertID and use only the regular CMS signerInfo.
 

-Martin

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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] timestamp signature validation
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Erwann Abalea <eabalea@gmail.com> writes:=0A=
=0A=
>At least one TSP in Czechoslovakia. With Qualified Certificates. The=0A=
>attribute certificates is additional to the signer. Other than that, I hav=
e=0A=
>never encountered attribute certificates in the wild.=0A=
=0A=
Has anyone considered contacting the TSP (do you mean TSA?) to let them kno=
w=0A=
that they're doing this?  Given some of the totally broken behaviour of bot=
h=0A=
TSAs and TSP clients, they may not even be aware that they're doing this.  =
It=0A=
seems we're having a complex debate over something that may just be yet=0A=
another TSA implementation bug.=0A=
=0A=
Peter.=0A=

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Peter Gutmann wrote:
> Erwann Abalea <eabalea@gmail.com> writes:
> > 
> >At least one TSP in Czechoslovakia. With Qualified Certificates. The
> >attribute certificates is additional to the signer. Other than that, I have
> >never encountered attribute certificates in the wild.
> 
> Has anyone considered contacting the TSP (do you mean TSA?) to let them know
> that they're doing this?  Given some of the totally broken behaviour of both
> TSAs and TSP clients, they may not even be aware that they're doing this.  It
> seems we're having a complex debate over something that may just be yet
> another TSA implementation bug.

I still don't understand how the presence of attribute certificates
could interfere (rather then enabling an otherwise failing) timestamp
verification.

A TSA client that is not explicitly instructed to look for
attribute certificates and to require specific authorization data
ought to be completely ignorant of any certs besides the TSA
signature cert.

Or is there anything in rfc3161 that suggests looking at other certs?

-Martin

From kapetr@mizera.cz  Wed Mar 13 01:52:39 2013
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Hello,

thanks Peter Sylvester you know now about the problem with attr. certs 
in timestamps I have with TSA.

It may be useful for you to see original thread with details and example 
in OpenSSL user forum.

Thread subject: "possible Bug in OpenSSL - rfc 3161 - TSA service"

See:

http://marc.info/?l=openssl-users&w=2&r=1&s=possible+Bug+in+OpenSSL+-+rfc+3161+-+TSA&q=b


--kapetr

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--20cf307c9aa42b087704d7cb88df
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2013/3/13 Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>

> Peter Gutmann wrote:
> > Erwann Abalea <eabalea@gmail.com> writes:
> > >
> > >At least one TSP in Czechoslovakia. With Qualified Certificates. The
>
[read "Czech Republic" instead, as it was notified in private]

> > >attribute certificates is additional to the signer. Other than that, I
> have
> > >never encountered attribute certificates in the wild.
> >
> > Has anyone considered contacting the TSP (do you mean TSA?) to let them
> know
> > that they're doing this?  Given some of the totally broken behaviour of
> both
> > TSAs and TSP clients, they may not even be aware that they're doing
> this.  It
> > seems we're having a complex debate over something that may just be yet
> > another TSA implementation bug.
>

They're aware they're doing this. It's on purpose.


> I still don't understand how the presence of attribute certificates
> could interfere (rather then enabling an otherwise failing) timestamp
> verification.
>

A dark corner from RFC2634. SigningCertificate attribute contains a
sequence of ESSCertID, and usually this sequence is composed of only one
certificate.

[...]
   If more than one certificate is present in the sequence of
   ESSCertIDs, the certificates after the first one limit the set of
   authorization certificates that are used during signature validation.
   Authorization certificates can be either attribute certificates or
   normal certificates.
[...]

Everywhere "certificate" is mentioned, it can either be a public-key
certificate (here named "normal certificate") or an attribute certificate.
(Deciding what to do facing several public-key certificates in such a
situation isn't clear, even after reading that paragraph).

A TSA client that is not explicitly instructed to look for
> attribute certificates and to require specific authorization data
> ought to be completely ignorant of any certs besides the TSA
> signature cert.
>
> Or is there anything in rfc3161 that suggests looking at other certs?


Other than following RFC2634, performing a correct chain validation, and
verify authorizations? No.

-- 
Erwann.

--20cf307c9aa42b087704d7cb88df
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<br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">2013/3/13 Martin Rex <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<=
a href=3D"mailto:mrex@sap.com" target=3D"_blank">mrex@sap.com</a>&gt;</span=
><br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-le=
ft:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div class=3D"im">Peter Gutmann wrote:<br>
&gt; Erwann Abalea &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:eabalea@gmail.com">eabalea@gmail.c=
om</a>&gt; writes:<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;At least one TSP in Czechoslovakia. With Qualified Certificates. T=
he<br></div></blockquote><div>[read &quot;Czech Republic&quot; instead, as =
it was notified in private]=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" st=
yle=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div class=3D"im">
&gt; &gt;attribute certificates is additional to the signer. Other than tha=
t, I have<br>
&gt; &gt;never encountered attribute certificates in the wild.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Has anyone considered contacting the TSP (do you mean TSA?) to let the=
m know<br>
&gt; that they&#39;re doing this? =C2=A0Given some of the totally broken be=
haviour of both<br>
&gt; TSAs and TSP clients, they may not even be aware that they&#39;re doin=
g this. =C2=A0It<br>
&gt; seems we&#39;re having a complex debate over something that may just b=
e yet<br>
&gt; another TSA implementation bug.<br></div></blockquote><div><br></div><=
div>They&#39;re aware they&#39;re doing this. It&#39;s on purpose.</div><di=
v>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;=
border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div class=3D"im">I still don&#39;t understand how the presence of attribut=
e certificates</div>
could interfere (rather then enabling an otherwise failing) timestamp<br>
verification.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>A dark corner from RFC263=
4. SigningCertificate attribute contains a sequence of ESSCertID, and usual=
ly this sequence is composed of only one certificate.</div><div><br></div>
<div>[...]</div><div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0If more than one certificate is pres=
ent in the sequence of</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0ESSCertIDs, the certificates =
after the first one limit the set of</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0authorization c=
ertificates that are used during signature validation.</div>
<div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0Authorization certificates can be either attribute certif=
icates or</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0normal certificates.</div></div><div>[...]=
</div><div><br></div><div>Everywhere &quot;certificate&quot; is mentioned, =
it can either be a public-key certificate (here named &quot;normal certific=
ate&quot;) or an attribute certificate.</div>
<div>(Deciding what to do facing several public-key certificates in such a =
situation isn&#39;t clear, even after reading that paragraph).</div><div><b=
r></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border=
-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
A TSA client that is not explicitly instructed to look for<br>
attribute certificates and to require specific authorization data<br>
ought to be completely ignorant of any certs besides the TSA<br>
signature cert.<br>
<br>
Or is there anything in rfc3161 that suggests looking at other certs?</bloc=
kquote></div><div><br></div><div>Other than following RFC2634, performing a=
 correct chain validation, and verify authorizations? No.</div><div><br>
</div>-- <br>Erwann.

--20cf307c9aa42b087704d7cb88df--

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Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2013 11:30:34 +0100
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On 03/13/2013 11:04 AM, Erwann Abalea wrote:
>
> 2013/3/13 Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com <mailto:mrex@sap.com>>
>
>     Peter Gutmann wrote:
>     > Erwann Abalea <eabalea@gmail.com <mailto:eabalea@gmail.com>> writes:
>     > >
>     > >At least one TSP in Czechoslovakia. With Qualified Certificates. The
>
> [read "Czech Republic" instead, as it was notified in private]
>
>     > >attribute certificates is additional to the signer. Other than that, I have
>     > >never encountered attribute certificates in the wild.
>     >
>     > Has anyone considered contacting the TSP (do you mean TSA?) to let them know
>     > that they're doing this?  Given some of the totally broken behaviour of both
>     > TSAs and TSP clients, they may not even be aware that they're doing this.  It
>     > seems we're having a complex debate over something that may just be yet
>     > another TSA implementation bug.
>
>
> They're aware they're doing this. It's on purpose.
>
>     I still don't understand how the presence of attribute certificates
>     could interfere (rather then enabling an otherwise failing) timestamp
>     verification.
>
>
> A dark corner from RFC2634. SigningCertificate attribute contains a sequence of ESSCertID, and 
> usually this sequence is composed of only one certificate.
>
> [...]
>    If more than one certificate is present in the sequence of
>    ESSCertIDs, the certificates after the first one limit the set of
>    authorization certificates that are used during signature validation.
>    Authorization certificates can be either attribute certificates or
>    normal certificates.
> [...]
>
> Everywhere "certificate" is mentioned, it can either be a public-key certificate (here named 
> "normal certificate") or an attribute certificate.
> (Deciding what to do facing several public-key certificates in such a situation isn't clear, even 
> after reading that paragraph).
>
>     A TSA client that is not explicitly instructed to look for
>     attribute certificates and to require specific authorization data
>     ought to be completely ignorant of any certs besides the TSA
>     signature cert.
>
>     Or is there anything in rfc3161 that suggests looking at other certs?
>
>
> Other than following RFC2634, performing a correct chain validation, and verify authorizations? No.
>

I have a different opinuion.

RFC 3161 mentions that a server must add
an esscertid of the signing certficate.
One uses thus a particular profile of esscertid.
Whilst one can dedate the reason for that (i.e. to be conformant
to the EU directive of signatures), this does obviuously not
stop tsas to add other certs.

But; For the security (whatever that means) of the time stamp any additional
data are not relevant.

A  tsa client can just limit itself to just check the first occurence in the EssCertId
sequence to match with the TSA's public key cert (and treat everything else
similar as a non critical extension.

If TSAs add other things and if some specialized client want to check this
(with some hardcoded values of attribut certs) that outside the scope
of RFC 3161.

RFC 2634 does not require that ALL applications MUST verify all features
as soon as they appear. at least as far as I understand it.
this would be a devive task, how can an application learn
the meaning of an attribute certificate?

Peter












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    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 03/13/2013 11:04 AM, Erwann Abalea
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:CA+i=0E7aTw-FxfdHJcNTsYuW388h4zCzSBADdTucMeAuYWfY9A@mail.gmail.com"
      type="cite"><br>
      <div class="gmail_quote">2013/3/13 Martin Rex <span dir="ltr">&lt;<a
            moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:mrex@sap.com"
            target="_blank">mrex@sap.com</a>&gt;</span><br>
        <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
          .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
          <div class="im">Peter Gutmann wrote:<br>
            &gt; Erwann Abalea &lt;<a moz-do-not-send="true"
              href="mailto:eabalea@gmail.com">eabalea@gmail.com</a>&gt;
            writes:<br>
            &gt; &gt;<br>
            &gt; &gt;At least one TSP in Czechoslovakia. With Qualified
            Certificates. The<br>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
        <div>[read "Czech Republic" instead, as it was notified in
          private]&nbsp;</div>
        <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
          .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
          <div class="im">
            &gt; &gt;attribute certificates is additional to the signer.
            Other than that, I have<br>
            &gt; &gt;never encountered attribute certificates in the
            wild.<br>
            &gt;<br>
            &gt; Has anyone considered contacting the TSP (do you mean
            TSA?) to let them know<br>
            &gt; that they're doing this? &nbsp;Given some of the totally
            broken behaviour of both<br>
            &gt; TSAs and TSP clients, they may not even be aware that
            they're doing this. &nbsp;It<br>
            &gt; seems we're having a complex debate over something that
            may just be yet<br>
            &gt; another TSA implementation bug.<br>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>They're aware they're doing this. It's on purpose.</div>
        <div>&nbsp;</div>
        <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
          .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
          <div class="im">I still don't understand how the presence of
            attribute certificates</div>
          could interfere (rather then enabling an otherwise failing)
          timestamp<br>
          verification.<br>
        </blockquote>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>A dark corner from RFC2634. SigningCertificate attribute
          contains a sequence of ESSCertID, and usually this sequence is
          composed of only one certificate.</div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>[...]</div>
        <div>
          <div>&nbsp; &nbsp;If more than one certificate is present in the
            sequence of</div>
          <div>&nbsp; &nbsp;ESSCertIDs, the certificates after the first one limit
            the set of</div>
          <div>&nbsp; &nbsp;authorization certificates that are used during
            signature validation.</div>
          <div>&nbsp; &nbsp;Authorization certificates can be either attribute
            certificates or</div>
          <div>&nbsp; &nbsp;normal certificates.</div>
        </div>
        <div>[...]</div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>Everywhere "certificate" is mentioned, it can either be a
          public-key certificate (here named "normal certificate") or an
          attribute certificate.</div>
        <div>(Deciding what to do facing several public-key certificates
          in such a situation isn't clear, even after reading that
          paragraph).</div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
          .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
          A TSA client that is not explicitly instructed to look for<br>
          attribute certificates and to require specific authorization
          data<br>
          ought to be completely ignorant of any certs besides the TSA<br>
          signature cert.<br>
          <br>
          Or is there anything in rfc3161 that suggests looking at other
          certs?</blockquote>
      </div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>Other than following RFC2634, performing a correct chain
        validation, and verify authorizations? No.</div>
      <br>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    I have a different opinuion. <br>
    <br>
    RFC 3161 mentions that a server must add <br>
    an esscertid of the signing certficate. <br>
    One uses thus a particular profile of esscertid.<br>
    Whilst one can dedate the reason for that (i.e. to be conformant<br>
    to the EU directive of signatures), this does obviuously not <br>
    stop tsas to add other certs. <br>
    <br>
    But; For the security (whatever that means) of the time stamp any
    additional <br>
    data are not relevant. <br>
    <br>
    A&nbsp; tsa client can just limit itself to just check the first
    occurence in the EssCertId<br>
    sequence to match with the TSA's public key cert (and treat
    everything else<br>
    similar as a non critical extension.<br>
    <br>
    If TSAs add other things and if some specialized client want to
    check this<br>
    (with some hardcoded values of attribut certs) that outside the
    scope<br>
    of RFC 3161.<br>
    <br>
    RFC 2634 does not require that ALL applications MUST verify all
    features<br>
    as soon as they appear. at least as far as I understand it.<br>
    this would be a devive task, how can an application learn<br>
    the meaning of an attribute certificate?<br>
    <br>
    Peter<br>
    <br>
    <br>
    <br>
    <br>
    <br>
    <br>
    <br>
    <br>
    <br>
    <br>
    <br>
  </body>
</html>

--------------090508080601000605020002--

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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] timestamp signature validation
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kapetr@mizera.cz writes:=0A=
=0A=
>It may be useful for you to see original thread with details and example i=
n=0A=
>OpenSSL user forum.=0A=
>=0A=
>Thread subject: "possible Bug in OpenSSL - rfc 3161 - TSA service"=0A=
=0A=
I like the comments made in the thread that "Adobe handles it so it must be=
=0A=
OK".  That's a bit like saying "Internet Explorer handles it so it must be=
=0A=
valid HTML".=0A=
=0A=
Peter.=0A=

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But the IETF web site doesn't show them, for some reason. So, they are 
reproduced below.

Steve
-------

*PKIX WG Meeting March 12, 2013*

Edited by Steve Kent

Co-Chairs: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>

Stefan Santesson <stefans@aaa-sec.com>

The PKIX WG met once, during a 1.5 hour time slot, during IETF 86, in 
Orlando, FL. A total of approximately 49 individuals attended the meeting.

**

*Document Status Review -- Stefan Santesson (3xA)*

There has been progress in document status since November, 2012.

-2 new RFCs: Update to 5280 (6818), DNS CAA (6844)

-1 document in IESG evaluation (2560bis)

-1 active I-D in the WG: EST (-05)

(Slides)

*The Future of PKIX -- Sean Turner (IECA)*

Sean reiterated his plan to complete the orderly shutdown of PKIX. He 
says this is expected to be the last meeting of PKIX, which began in 
1995. The WG list will remain open. (no slides)

*PKIX WG Document*

*Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST) -- Max Pritikin (Cisco)*

Max described changes since the -04 version. He noted that there was a 
lot of helpful comments on the -05 version, which is causing changes 
that will result in an -06 version, which he is working on now. 
Improvements include substantial prose improvements, explicit vs. 
explicit TA terminology, use of well-know UIRs. For the -065 version, 
the authors will fix the MIME representations, to remove the PEM 
headers, and they will include improved security for server-side 
generation exchange. It was reported that there are now two independent 
implementations that interoperate, which would allow the document to 
move very quickly to full standard status. (Slides)

**

*Non-WG Topic Presentation*

*Authentication Context Extension - Stefan Santesson (3XA)*

This proposal describes an X.509 certificate extension that can be used 
by an RP to help map subject identity info, in a federated identity 
management environment based on the use of SAML. Stefan provided 
examples based on European PKI deployments, which motivate this work. 
The extension makes use of XML, because that is the native encoding for 
SAML assertions. Stefan's slides included detailed examples. This is an 
independent submission. (Slides)



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    But the IETF web site doesn't show them, for some reason. So, they
    are reproduced below.<br>
    <br>
    Steve<br>
    -------<br>
    <br>
    <meta name="Title" content="">
    <p class="MsoPlainText"
      style="margin-right:-22.5pt;text-align:center" align="center"><b
        style="mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
          style="font-size:14.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:
          10.0pt;font-family:Monaco">PKIX WG Meeting March 12, 2013<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText" style="margin-right:-22.5pt"><span
        style="font-family:
        Monaco"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText" style="margin-right:-22.5pt"><span
        style="font-family:
        Monaco">Edited by Steve Kent<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText" style="margin-right:-22.5pt"><span
        style="font-family:
        Monaco">Co-Chairs: Stephen Kent <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:kent@bbn.com">&lt;kent@bbn.com&gt;</a> <o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"
      style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:-22.5pt;margin-bottom:
      0in;margin-left:.5in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-indent:.5in"><span
        style="font-family:Monaco"><span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;</span>Stefan
        Santesson
        <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:stefans@aaa-sec.com">&lt;stefans@aaa-sec.com&gt;</a><o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText" style="margin-right:-22.5pt"><span
        style="font-family:
        Monaco"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText" style="margin-right:-22.5pt"><span
        style="font-family:
        Monaco">The PKIX WG met once, during a 1.5 hour time slot,
        during IETF 86, in
        Orlando, FL. A total of approximately 49 individuals attended
        the meeting. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right:-22.5pt"><b
        style="mso-bidi-font-weight:
        normal"><span style="font-family:Monaco"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></b></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right:-22.5pt"><b
        style="mso-bidi-font-weight:
        normal"><span
          style="font-size:14.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:10.0pt;font-family:
          Monaco">Document Status Review &#8211; Stefan Santesson (3xA)<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
    <p class="Default" style="text-indent:.5in"><span
        style="font-family:Monaco">There
        has been progress in document status since November, 2012. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="Default"
      style="margin-left:.75in;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1
      lfo1"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span
style="font-family:Monaco;mso-fareast-font-family:Monaco;mso-bidi-font-family:Monaco"><span
          style="mso-list:Ignore">-<span style="font:7.0pt &quot;Times
            New Roman&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp;
          </span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span
        style="font-family:Monaco">2 new RFCs:
        Update to 5280 (6818), DNS CAA (6844)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="Default"
      style="margin-left:.75in;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1
      lfo1"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span
style="font-family:Monaco;mso-fareast-font-family:Monaco;mso-bidi-font-family:Monaco"><span
          style="mso-list:Ignore">-<span style="font:7.0pt &quot;Times
            New Roman&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp;
          </span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span
        style="font-family:Monaco">1 document in
        IESG evaluation (2560bis)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="Default"
      style="margin-left:.75in;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1
      lfo1"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span
style="font-family:Monaco;mso-fareast-font-family:Monaco;mso-bidi-font-family:Monaco"><span
          style="mso-list:Ignore">-<span style="font:7.0pt &quot;Times
            New Roman&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp;
          </span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span
        style="font-family:Monaco">1 active I-D in
        the WG: EST (-05)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="Default" style="margin-left:.5in"><span
        style="font-family:Monaco">(Slides)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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    <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right:-22.5pt"><b
        style="mso-bidi-font-weight:
        normal"><span style="font-family:Monaco">The Future of PKIX &#8211;
          Sean Turner
          (IECA)<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right:-22.5pt"><span
        style="font-family:Monaco">Sean
        reiterated his plan to complete the orderly shutdown of PKIX. He
        says this is
        expected to be the last meeting of PKIX, which began in 1995.
        The WG list will
        remain open. (no slides)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right:-22.5pt"><span
        style="font-family:Monaco"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right:-22.5pt"><span
        style="font-family:Monaco"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right:-22.5pt"><b
        style="mso-bidi-font-weight:
        normal"><span
          style="font-size:14.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:10.0pt;font-family:
          Monaco">PKIX WG Document<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
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      style="margin-right:-22.5pt;mso-pagination:none;mso-layout-grid-align:
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      style="margin-right:-22.5pt;mso-pagination:none;mso-layout-grid-align:
      none;text-autospace:none"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
style="mso-bidi-font-size:13.0pt;font-family:Monaco;mso-bidi-font-family:Courier;
          mso-bidi-language:EN-US">Enrollment over Secure Transport
          (EST) &#8211; Max Pritikin
          (Cisco)<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"
      style="margin-right:-22.5pt;mso-pagination:none;mso-layout-grid-align:
      none;text-autospace:none"><span style="font-family:Monaco">Max
        described
        changes since the -04 version. He noted that there was a lot of
        helpful
        comments on the -05 version, which is causing changes that will
        result in an
        -06 version, which he is working on now. Improvements include
        substantial prose
        improvements, explicit vs. explicit TA terminology, use of
        well-know UIRs. For
        the -065 version, the authors will fix the MIME representations,
        to remove the
        PEM headers, and they will include improved security for
        server-side generation
        exchange. It was reported that there are now two independent
        implementations
        that interoperate, which would allow the document to move very
        quickly to full
        standard status. (Slides)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"
      style="margin-right:-22.5pt;mso-pagination:none;mso-layout-grid-align:
      none;text-autospace:none"><span style="font-family:Monaco"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
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      style="margin-right:-22.5pt;mso-pagination:none;mso-layout-grid-align:
      none;text-autospace:none"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
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    <p class="MsoNormal"
      style="margin-right:-22.5pt;mso-pagination:none;mso-layout-grid-align:
      none;text-autospace:none"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
style="font-size:14.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Monaco">Non-WG
          Topic
          Presentation<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
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      text-autospace:none"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight:normal"><span
style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Monaco;mso-bidi-font-family:Courier">Authentication
Context
          Extension - Stefan Santesson (3XA)<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
    <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Monaco">This proposal
        describes an
        X.509 certificate extension that can be used by an RP to help
        map subject
        identity info, in a federated identity management environment
        based on the use
        of SAML. Stefan provided examples based on European PKI
        deployments, which
        motivate this work. The extension makes use of XML, because that
        is the native
        encoding for SAML assertions. Stefan&#8217;s slides included detailed
        examples. This
        is an independent submission. (Slides) <o:p></o:p></span></p>
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From mrex@sap.com  Wed Mar 13 09:57:19 2013
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To: Peter Sylvester <peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr>
Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2013 17:57:16 +0100 (CET)
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From: mrex@sap.com (Martin Rex)
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Subject: Re: [pkix] timestamp signature validation
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Peter Sylvester wrote:
>
> Erwann Abalea wrote:
>>
>> Martin Rex wrote:
>>>
>>> A TSA client that is not explicitly instructed to look for
>>> attribute certificates and to require specific authorization data
>>> ought to be completely ignorant of any certs besides the TSA
>>> signature cert.
>>>
>>> Or is there anything in rfc3161 that suggests looking at other certs?
>>
>> Other than following RFC2634, performing a correct chain validation,
>> and verify authorizations? No.

The way rfc3161 is specified, it is only the ASN.1 type ESSCertID
with respect to the TSA Signature certificate that is imported from
rfc2634, not any of the semantics associated with attribute certificates.

That doesn't preclude that specific TSA servers&clients could define
clear semantics in which fashion such data could be come relevant
for the verification of the timestamp.

But absent such out-of-band preconfigured semantics, an rfc3161 TSA
client ought to entirely ignore unsolicited ESSCertID entries
and unsolicited certs in the TimeStampToken for the purpose of
robustness and adherence to he "principle of least surprise".


> 
> A  tsa client can just limit itself to just check the first occurence
> in the EssCertId sequence to match with the TSA's public key cert
> (and treat everything else similar as a non critical extension.

A TSA client may have a preconfigured list of valid TSA signers
consisting of ToBeSigned structures, where an ESSCertID containing
a certificate hash would have to be ignored anyway.

Simply always using the SignerInfo->SignerIdentifier element (which
is mandary at the ASN.1 level) rather than digging through the
signed attributes for an awkward ESSCertID (which is optional
at the ASN.1 level) saves a significant amount of complex and
brittle code.

And if the document itself already lists 8 patents that might
be applicable, an implementor may want to scope his implementation
to the exact functionality that is necessary for interop in order
to limit the "IP trolls attack surface"...



> 
> If TSAs add other things and if some specialized client want to check this
> (with some hardcoded values of attribut certs) that outside the scope
> of RFC 3161.

Correct.

   http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2634#section-5.3

   5.3 Related Signature Verification Context

   Some applications require that additional information be used as part
   of the signature validation process. In particular, authorization
   information from attribute certificates and other public key
   certificates or policy identifiers provide additional information
   about the abilities and intent of the signer. The signing certificate
   attribute described in Section 5.4 provides the ability to bind this
   context information as part of the signature.

While specific applications can "require that additional information
be used as part of the signature validation process", rfc3161 _by_itself_
is clearly no such application that does.

-Martin

From internet-drafts@ietf.org  Wed Mar 13 10:18:24 2013
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Subject: [pkix] I-D Action: draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts director=
ies.
 This draft is a work item of the Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) Working=
 Group of the IETF.

	Title           : X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certific=
ate Status Protocol - OCSP
	Author(s)       : Stefan Santesson
                          Michael Myers
                          Rich Ankney
                          Ambarish Malpani
                          Slava Galperin
                          Carlisle Adams
	Filename        : draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15.txt
	Pages           : 43
	Date            : 2013-03-13

Abstract:
   This document specifies a protocol useful in determining the current
   status of a digital certificate without requiring CRLs. Additional
   mechanisms addressing PKIX operational requirements are specified in
   separate documents. This document obsoletes RFC 2560 and RFC 6277,
   and updates RFC 5912.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis

There's also a htmlized version available at:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15

A diff from the previous version is available at:
http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15


Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/


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Cc: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>, pkix <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] Review of 2560-bis draft 8. Answer to WGLC
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Denis,

You probably saw version -15 was published.  I reviewed your comments 
and I think it's time to move this draft down to IETF LC.

spt

On 3/11/13 5:14 AM, Denis Pinkas wrote:
> *Stefan,*
>
> **
>
> *The review of your individual draft, took me the time I had during the
> week for the IETF stuff;
> hence, why this reply has been delayed.*
>
> *The situation is rather simple, if we forget about the editorial comments,
> you have accepted one minor text change and that’s all.*
>
> **
>
> *So the major problems are not solved to my satisfaction.*
>
> **
>
> *I have maintained below the portion of the text which needs to be
> further discussed. **
> **My comments are in blue.*
>
> **
>
> *There is a new and very important issue that I discovered while reading
> your comments. **
> **See the discussion about singleExtensions and of responseExtensions.*
>
> *Comment 8*: You have changed the meaning of the revoked state in a way
> that is not what I requested.
>
> The original text was:
>
> *The "revoked" state indicates that the certificate has been revoked*
>
> *(either permanantly or temporarily (on hold)).*
>
> The new text is:
>
> *    The "revoked" state indicates that the certificate has been revoked*
>
> *    either permanently or temporarily on hold (i.e. the revocation reason*
>
> *    is certificateHold).*
>
> By doing this, you do not allow any other case in the future to have a
> temporary revocation: “*temporarily on hold”***is not the same
> as*“**temporarily revoked”**.*
>
> I propose the following rewording:
>
> *The "revoked" state indicates that the certificate has been revoked *
>
> *    either permanently or temporarily (e.g. placed on hold).*
>
> I substituted "temporarily on hold" with "temporarily. The rest
> unchanged since the only existing reason code for temporary revocation
> is certificateHold.
>
> *As you say, the only CURRENT existing reason code for temporary
> revocation is certificateHold. **
> **We must not PREVENT other reasons in the future to mean “temporary
> revocation”, hence why the change is needed.*
>
> The way the text from draft 13 is now written seems to allow using
> either *“unknown”*or *“revoked”*for non-issued certificates.
> If this is the intent, then the good news is that this does not come
> anymore into conflict with the French rules which apply
> for the Administration since OCSP responders from CAs used by the French
> Ministries having a direct access to the database of issued certificates
> will be able to use *“unknown*”, rather than *“revoked”*and the reason
> code *“onhold”.*
>
> However, the current text is still mandating the use of *Extended
> Revoked Definition*, but the rational for its need it is very poor.
> As I have said on the PKIX list, the fact that the revocation date is
> January 1rst, 1970 is fully sufficient to know that we are in that very
> special case,
> and you have not provided a rational to say the contrary.
>
> I have. And I have pointed you to the minutes of the last PKIC meeting.
>
> The consensus of the WG is to have the extension for just those reasons.
>
> As implementer, I don't like heuristics. A date of Jan 1st 1970 may
> indicate this behaviour,
> but may just be a misconfiguration. It is not an explicit statement.
>
> So we could get rid of it, … but the text from section 4.4.8 states:
>
> *    This extension MAY be present in other responses to signal that the*
>
> *    responder implements the extended revoked definition in section 2.2.*
>
> I have difficulties to understand what is really meant there (“other
> responses” ?), since the text states:
>
> *    This extension indicates that the responder supports the extended*
>
> *    definition of the "revoked" status to also include non-issued*
>
> *    certificates according to section 2.2.*
>
> Since both “unknown” and revoked” can be used, it would be desirable to
> be able to include the same extension in both cases,
> but in that case that extension should be renamed.
>
> This extension can be included in all responses to signal that a
> responder implements the expanded definition of revoked.
>
> Doing so makes this fact auditable without having to ask for a
> non-issued cert.
>
> I would propose to rename it: "*non-issued certificate*” which means
> that the associated CA has no record of ever having issued a certificate
> with the certificate serial number in the request (I still consider it
> as unnecessary in the case of “revoked”, but it would be very useful in
> the case of “unknown”).
> Of course, the text from section 4.4.8 would need to be revised.
>
> I propose the following:
>
> *  *
>
> *4.4.8   Non-issued certificate extension*
>
> *    This extension MUST be included in the OCSP response when the OCSP*
>
> *    responder knows that the CA identified in the request has no record*
>
> *    of ever having issued a certificate with the certificate serial*
>
> *    number indicated in the request.*
>
> *    Clients do not have to parse this extension in order to determine*
>
> *    the status of certificates in responses.*
>
> *    This extension is identified by the object identifier id-pkix-ocsp-*
>
> *    non-issued-cert.*
>
> *      id-pkix-ocsp-non-issued-cert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix-ocsp 9}*
>
> *    The value of the extension SHALL be NULL. This extension MUST NOT be*
>
> *    marked critical.*
>
> Then the text on page 8 would need to be rearranged.
>
> Your extension  variant is a significant change to what has been agreed.
>
> Your extension would need to be a single response extension, and can't
> be used to audit the behaviour of the OCSP responder
> unless you send a request for a non-issued cert.
>
> *Hummm !!! We have a very important point there. Thanks to your comment,
> I now realize that the proposed extension
> applies to the whole response. However, this is not possible and I will
> now explain why. An OCSP responder may receive
> a delegation from several CAs. With some of them, it can use a direct
> access to the database of certificates,
> while for some others, it will use CRLs. So the meaning of “revoked”
> will depend of the CA. *
>
> **
>
> *This means that the indication cannot be global to the OCSP response.
> If we use an extension, it can only apply **
> **to an individual response and thus MUST in singleExtensions instead of
> responseExtensions.*
>
> **
>
> *Since it is singleExtension, it can used to “audit the behaviour of the
> OCSP responder” and I do not grasp your rational **
> **when you say “unless you send a request for a non-issued cert”. There
> is no need for sending anything.*
>
> We want to avoid sending such fake requests for audit purposes as it may
> interfere with systems at the responder trying to detect existence of
> rouge certificates.
>
> *There is no need to sending fake requests.*
>
> This is a type of change that I can't make unless you get support from a
> majority of the WG for the change of direction you propose.
>
> *The important point is that the text states:*
>
> **
>
> *“The "revoked" state (…) _MAY also be returned_ if the associated CA
> has no record of ever having issued a certificate
> with the certificate serial number in the request, using any current or
> previous issuing key (referred to as a
> "non-issued" certificate in this document).”*
>
> **
>
> *The test does **_not_**state “**_MUST_**also be returned”. This means
> that it is also possible to reply “unknown” if the associated CA **
> **has no record of ever having issued a certificate with the certificate
> serial number in the request. However, this is not **
> **straightforward when reading the text and thus the text should be made
> more explicit.*
>
> **
>
> *Now, we get to the main point. The reason for adding an extension is
> NOT to say that an extended meaning of revoked **
> **is being used, but that the INDIVIDUAL response is given using a
> direct access to the records of the certificates issued by the CA.*
>
> The current text is:
>
> *    This state MAY also be returned if the*
>
> *    associated CA has no record of ever having issued a certificate with*
>
> *    the certificate serial number in the request, using any current or*
>
> *    previous issuing key (referred to as a "non-issued" certificate in*
>
> *    this document).*
>
> *    The "unknown" state indicates that the responder doesn't know about*
>
> *    the certificate being requested.*
>
> *    NOTE: The "revoked" state for known non-issued certificate serial*
>
> *          numbers is allowed in order to reduce the risk of relying*
>
> *          parties using CRLs as a fall back mechanism, which would be*
>
> *          considerably higher if an "unknown" response was returned.*
>
> *    When a responder responds revoked to a status request for a non-*
>
> *    issued certificate, the responder MUST include the extended revoked*
>
> *    definition response extension (section 4.4.8) in the response,*
>
> *    indicating that the OCSP responder supports the extended definition*
>
> *    of revoked state to also cover non-issued certificates. In addition,*
>
> *    the SingleResponse related to this non-issued certificate;*
>
> *     - MUST provide the revocation reason certificateHold (6),*
>
> *     - MUST specify the revocationTime January 1, 1970, and;*
>
> *     - MUST NOT include a CRL References extension (section 4.4.2) or any*
>
> *       CRL Entry Extensions (section 4.4.5).*
>
> Proposed text for a replacement:
>
> *    The "unknown" state indicates that the responder doesn't know about*
>
> *    the certificate being requested.*
>
>
>
> *    If the OCSP responder knows that CA identified in the request has*
>
> *    no record of ever having issued a certificate with the certificate*
>
> *    serial number in the request, using any current or previous issuing*
>
> *    key (referred to as a "non-issued" certificate in this document),*
>
> *    the OCSP responder SHALL respond either “revoked “ or “unknown”.*
>
> This is unfortunately very common in your rewording efforts. When trying
> to fix one thing, you create new even bigger problems.
>
> An infrastructure that provides reproduced responses will respond
> "unauthorized". This text may be interpreted to interfere with such
> operations.
>
> *I fear I don’t understand your argument about “unauthorized”, but
> before replying see below my next comment.*
>
> Further, and worse. This is not backwards compatible. Current OCSP
> responders may respond "good" even if they have access to CA records.
>
> *You say: “Current OCSP responders may respond "good" even if they have
> access to CA records”. Originally RFC 2560 allowed
> returning “good” for OCSP responder using CRLs. Since RFC 2560 provided
> no way to indicate that a direct access to the database
> was being used or not, it was not possible to do better. *
>
> **
>
> *Now, if an OCSP responder has a direct access and indicates in the
> response that it has such an access, do you really believe
> that it will return good ? I don’t. *
>
> **
>
> *If an OCSP responder wants to return “good”, it can still do it, but in
> that case it will not signal that it is using a direct access **
> **and this is perfectly backwards compatible. So I do not “buy” your
> argumentation.*
>
> **
>
> *Now, may be you understand better why I propose to rename the extension
> “4.4.8 Non-issued certificate extension” and **
> **also to change its semantics.*
>
> *    Note: The "revoked" state for known non-issued certificate serial*
>
> *    numbers is allowed in order to reduce the risk of relying parties*
>
> *     using CRLs as a fall back mechanism, which would be possible when*
>
> *    the "unknown" response is returned.*
>
> *    When a responder responds revoked or unknown to a status request*
>
> *    for a non-issued certificate, the responder MUST include the*
>
> *    non-issued certificate extension (see section 4.4.8) in the*
>
> *    response.*
>
> *    When a responder responds revoked to a status request for a non-*
>
> *    issued certificate, in addition, the responder:*
>
> *     - MUST provide the revocation reason certificateHold (6),*
>
> *     - MUST specify the revocationTime January 1, 1970, and;*
>
> *     - MUST NOT include a CRL References extension (section 4.4.2) or any*
>
> *       CRL Entry Extensions (section 4.4.5).*
>
> Finally, the last bullet on page 4 should be reworded:
>
> Current text:
>
> *       o Section 4.4.8 specifies a new extension that indicates that the*
>
> *          responder supports the extended use of the "revoked" response*
>
> *          for non-issued certificates defined in section 2.2.*
>
> Proposed replacement text:
>
> *       o   Section 4.4.8 specifies a new extension that indicates that*
>
> *          the OCSP responder knows that CA identified in the request*
>
> *          has no record of ever having issued a certificate with the*
>
> *          certificate serial number present in the request, as defined*
>
> *          in section 2.2.*
>
> No. Again, this changes the scope of the extension and its audit properties.
>
> Such change requires WG consensus.
>
> *See earlier comments.*
>
> *Comment 9:*Solved, if the comment above may be solved.
>
> *Comment 20*:This comment is preliminary classified by you as “not
> broken”. However, since you asked: “If you don’t replace 4.2.2.3,
> then what really are you missing ?”, I will provide you with an answer.
>
> This is the wrong way to state the question. Providing an ASN.1 syntax
> as in 4.2.1 is not enough: the use of every parameter MUST be explained
> using English words. So if you explain the use of every parameter after
> the description of the ASN.1 syntax in section 4.2.1. then section 4.2.2.3
> is no more needed and thus can be deleted.
>
> The answer to your question “what is really missing” is a description of
> the use of every parameter listed in the ASN.1 in section 4.2.1
>
> There are sufficient descriptions in the subsections following the ASN.1
> description. Your change proposals are not compatible with the minimalistic
> approach adopted by the WG.
>
> *The key point is whether we want a “good” document or maintain the low
> quality of the original document.***
>
> *Comment 26*: You asked for explanations. Let me provide you with an
> example when CRLs are being used by the OCSP responder in the background.
> The OCSP responder needs to make sure that the CRL it uses is valid. If
> it is simply using published CRLs (i.e. no trusted link with the CA), it
> needs
> to make sure that the CA which has issued the CRL has no been revoked.
>
> No, this is a misstatement. You don't revoke CAs. You revoke CA
> certificates.
>
> *Right.*
>
> There might be a CA certificate that has been revoked for a reason that
> does not affect the OCSP responder.
>
> * ..but the contrary may also apply.*
>
> These are operational policies that are outside the scope of the protocol.
>
> *The proposed text does not affect the protocol.*
>
> The proposed text in comment 26 is plain wrong, or at least misleading.
> The OCSP responder does not have to validate the CRL up to any
> particular root.
> It may for example have been configured to directly trust the public key
> used to validate the CRL.
>
> *T**his depends how it makes sure that it is reading the right CRL. It
> may or may not use a root CA.*
>
> In France, there is a root CA for the Administration. However, the use
> of that root CA is optional. Thus a Ministry may have its own root,
> but may also have its key certified by the root CA of the
> Administration. The OCSP responder may use the root CA of the Ministry,
> while a relying party may use the root CA of the Administration (or the
> reverse) to validate the CRL for the target certificate.
> Thus the revocation status will be different if the certificate of the
> CA of the Ministry is revoked by the root CA of the Administration.
>
> Which reinforces my point. How the OCSP responder is configured to trust
> its information source is outside the scope of the protocol.
>
> The OCSP protocol never claims to provide the same conclusion about
> revocation than another source the relying party may use.
>
> *We both agree; however would you point me where this is said in the
> current draft? Since I could not find it,
> I believe it is useful to highlight the point in the security
> considerations section.
> *
>
> *
> *
>
> *Finally, I believe that the major point indicated earlier comes from
> the original "bad writing" of  RFC 2560.*
>
> *There is no clear distinction between what applies to
> ***BasicOCSPResponse* and ***what applies *to Single Response.*
>
> *On page 15 from draft-14, the text still states in section  4.2.2.2
> Authorized Responder:
>
>     "It is necessary however to ensure that the entity signing this
> information is authorized to do so".
>
> This is vague. What is "this information " ? This text is within section
> "4.2.2  Notes on OCSP Responses".
> This does not help much.
>
> Is it BasicOCSPResponse ? If it is , this is wrong.
>
> It is SingleResponse, since a single response may be signed by the right
> key and/or the right certificate,
> but not another single response.
>
> How can a reader guess that it is SingleResponse ?
>
> Once again the quality of the text is really bad, and that text and some
> other portions  (3.2  Signed Response Acceptance Requirements)
> would need to be changed.
> *
>
> **
>
> *Denis*
>
>
>
>> Denis,
>>
>> My replies in line;
>>
>> From: Denis Pinkas <denis.pinkas@bull.net <mailto:denis.pinkas@bull.net>>
>> Date: Monday, February 11, 2013 3:18 PM
>> To: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com <mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com>>
>> Cc: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com <mailto:kent@bbn.com>>, pkix
>> <pkix@ietf.org <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>>
>> Subject: Re: [pkix] Review of 2560-bis draft 8. Answer to WGLC
>>
>>     Stefan,
>>
>>     I have finally reviewed your disposition of comments. I have used
>>     draft 13.
>>
>>     I will not address the comments in sequence, but I will consider
>>     four categories:
>>
>>     *Category 1)*Some comments which seem to be solved. Yes indeed,
>>     they may be a few of them !
>>
>>     *Category 2)*Some comments which might possibly be solved at the
>>     WG level.
>>
>>     *Category 3)*Some comments that I will address at the IETF last
>>     call level, rather than the WG last call level, since I disagree
>>     that it is “new ways to say the same thing” and it is likely to be
>>     a waste of time for both of us to argue again at the WG level
>>     (these comments are commented as “not broken”).
>>
>>     *Category 4)*Some typos and editorials found while reading draft 13.
>>
>>     *CATEGORY 1*
>>
>>     *Comment 4*(was editorial).
>>
>>     *Comment 5.*
>>
>>     **
>>
>>     *Comment 6. *
>>
>>     *Comment 19*. Solved, since *“unknown”*seems now to be also
>>     allowed for non-issued certificates
>>     (even if the OCSP responder is using a direct access to the
>>     certificate database). See comment 8.
>>
>>     *Comment 13*: Acceptable, since the text uses *“MAY”.*
>>
>>     *Comment 18. *
>>
>>     *Comment 22.*
>>
>>     *Comment 23.*
>>
>>     *Comment 28.*
>>
>>     *CATEGORY 1*
>>
>>     *Comment 8*: You have changed the meaning of the revoked state in
>>     a way that is not what I requested.
>>
>>     The original text was:
>>
>>     *The "revoked" state indicates that the certificate has been revoked*
>>
>>     *(either permanantly or temporarily (on hold)).*
>>
>>     The new text is:
>>
>>     **
>>
>>     *    The "revoked" state indicates that the certificate has been revoked*
>>
>>     *    either permanently or temporarily on hold (i.e. the revocation reason*
>>
>>     *    is certificateHold).*
>>
>>     By doing this, you do not allow any other case in the future to
>>     have a temporary revocation: “*temporarily on hold”**
>>     *is not the same as*“**temporarily revoked”**.*
>>
>>     I propose the following rewording:
>>
>>     *The "revoked" state indicates that the certificate has been revoked *
>>
>>     *    either permanently or temporarily (e.g. placed on hold).*
>>
>>
>> I substituted "temporarily on hold" with "temporarily. The rest
>> unchanged since the only existing reason code for temporary revocation
>> is certificateHold.
>>
>>
>>
>>     The way the text from draft 13 is now written seems to allow using
>>     either *“unknown”*or *“revoked”*for non-issued certificates.
>>     If this is the intent, then the good news is that this does not
>>     come anymore into conflict with the French rules which apply for
>>     the Administration since OCSP responders from CAs used by the
>>     French Ministries having a direct access to the database
>>     of issued certificates will be able to use *“unknown*”, rather
>>     than *“revoked”*and the reason code *“onhold”.*
>>
>>     However, the current text is still mandating the use of *Extended
>>     Revoked Definition*, but the rational for its need it is very poor.
>>     As I have said on the PKIX list, the fact that the revocation date
>>     is January 1rst, 1970 is fully sufficient to know that we are in that
>>     very special case, and you have not provided a rational to say the
>>     contrary.
>>
>>
>> I have. And I have pointed you to the minutes of the last PKIC meeting.
>> The consensus of the WG is to have the extension for just those reasons.
>>
>> As implementer, I don't like heuristics. A date of Jan 1st 1970 may
>> indicate this behaviour, but may just be a misconfiguration. It is not
>> an explicit statement.
>>
>>     So we could get rid of it, … but the text from section 4.4.8 states:
>>
>>     *    This extension MAY be present in other responses to signal that the*
>>
>>     *    responder implements the extended revoked definition in section 2.2.*
>>
>>     I have difficulties to understand what is really meant there
>>     (“other responses” ?), since the text states:
>>
>>     *    This extension indicates that the responder supports the extended*
>>
>>     *    definition of the "revoked" status to also include non-issued*
>>
>>     *    certificates according to section 2.2.*
>>
>>     Since both “unknown” and revoked” can be used, it would be
>>     desirable to be able to include the same extension in both cases,
>>     but in that case that extension should be renamed.
>>
>>
>> This extension can be included in all responses to signal that a
>> responder implements the expanded definition of revoked.
>> Doing so makes this fact auditable without having to ask for a
>> non-issued cert.
>>
>>
>>     I would propose to rename it: "*non-issued certificate*” which
>>     means that the associated CA has no record of ever having issued
>>     a certificate with the certificate serial number in the request (I
>>     still consider it as unnecessary in the case of “revoked”, but it
>>     would be
>>     very useful in the case of “unknown”). Of course, the text from
>>     section 4.4.8 would need to be revised.
>>
>>     I propose the following:
>>
>>     *4.4.8   Non-issued certificate extension*
>>
>>     *  *
>>
>>     *    This extension MUST be included in the OCSP response when the OCSP*
>>
>>     *    responder knows that the CA identified in the request has no record*
>>
>>     *    of ever having issued a certificate with the certificate serial*
>>
>>     *    number indicated in the request.*
>>
>>     *  *
>>
>>     *    Clients do not have to parse this extension in order to determine*
>>
>>     *    the status of certificates in responses.*
>>
>>     *  *
>>
>>     *    This extension is identified by the object identifier id-pkix-ocsp-*
>>
>>     *    non-issued-cert.*
>>
>>     *  *
>>
>>     *      id-pkix-ocsp-non-issued-cert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix-ocsp 9}*
>>
>>     *  *
>>
>>     *    The value of the extension SHALL be NULL. This extension MUST NOT be*
>>
>>     *    marked critical.*
>>
>>     Then the text on page 8 would need to be rearranged.
>>
>>
>> Your extension  variant is a significant change to what has been agreed.
>> Your extension would need to be a single response extension, and can't
>> be used to audit the behaviour of the OCSP responder unless you send a
>> request for a non-issued cert.
>> We want to avoid sending such fake requests for audit purposes as it
>> may interfere with systems at the responder trying to detect existence
>> of rouge certificates.
>>
>> This is a type of change that I can't make unless you get support from
>> a majority of the WG for the change of direction you propose.
>>
>>     The current text is:
>>
>>     *    This state MAY also be returned if the*
>>
>>     *    associated CA has no record of ever having issued a certificate with*
>>
>>     *    the certificate serial number in the request, using any current or*
>>
>>     *    previous issuing key (referred to as a "non-issued" certificate in*
>>
>>     *    this document).*
>>
>>     *  *
>>
>>     *    The "unknown" state indicates that the responder doesn't know about*
>>
>>     *    the certificate being requested.*
>>
>>     *  *
>>
>>     *    NOTE: The "revoked" state for known non-issued certificate serial*
>>
>>     *          numbers is allowed in order to reduce the risk of relying*
>>
>>     *          parties using CRLs as a fall back mechanism, which would be*
>>
>>     *          considerably higher if an "unknown" response was returned.*
>>
>>     *  *
>>
>>     *    When a responder responds revoked to a status request for a non-*
>>
>>     *    issued certificate, the responder MUST include the extended revoked*
>>
>>     *    definition response extension (section 4.4.8) in the response,*
>>
>>     *    indicating that the OCSP responder supports the extended definition*
>>
>>     *    of revoked state to also cover non-issued certificates. In addition,*
>>
>>     *    the SingleResponse related to this non-issued certificate;*
>>
>>     *  *
>>
>>     *     - MUST provide the revocation reason certificateHold (6),*
>>
>>     *  *
>>
>>     *     - MUST specify the revocationTime January 1, 1970, and;*
>>
>>     *  *
>>
>>     *      - MUST NOT include a CRL References extension (section 4.4.2) or any*
>>
>>     *       CRL Entry Extensions (section 4.4.5).*
>>
>>     Proposed text for a replacement:
>>
>>     *    The "unknown" state indicates that the responder doesn't know about*
>>
>>     *    the certificate being requested.*
>>
>>     *  *
>>
>>     *    If the OCSP responder knows that CA identified in the request has*
>>
>>     *    no record of ever having issued a certificate with the certificate*
>>
>>     *    serial number in the request, using any current or previous issuing*
>>
>>     *    key (referred to as a "non-issued" certificate in this document),*
>>
>>     *    the OCSP responder SHALL respond either “revoked “ or “unknown”.*
>>
>>
>> This is unfortunately very common in your rewording efforts. When
>> trying to fix one thing, you create new even bigger problems.
>>
>> An infrastructure that provides reproduced responses will respond
>> "unauthorized". This text may be interpreted to interfere with such
>> operations.
>> Further, and worse. This is not backwards compatible. Current OCSP
>> responders may respond "good" even if they have access to CA records.
>>
>>     *  *
>>
>>     *    Note: The "revoked" state for known non-issued certificate serial*
>>
>>     *    numbers is allowed in order to reduce the risk of relying parties*
>>
>>     *    using CRLs as a fall back mechanism, which would be possible when*
>>
>>     *    the "unknown" response is returned.*
>>
>>     *  *
>>
>>     *    When a responder responds revoked or unknown to a status request*
>>
>>     *    for a non-issued certificate, the responder MUST include the*
>>
>>     *    non-issued certificate extension (see section 4.4.8) in the*
>>
>>     *    response.*
>>
>>     *  *
>>
>>     *    When a responder responds revoked to a status request for a non-*
>>
>>     *    issued certificate, in addition, the responder:*
>>
>>     *  *
>>
>>     *     - MUST provide the revocation reason certificateHold (6),*
>>
>>     *  *
>>
>>     *     - MUST specify the revocationTime January 1, 1970, and;*
>>
>>     *  *
>>
>>     *     - MUST NOT include a CRL References extension (section 4.4.2) or any*
>>
>>     *       CRL Entry Extensions (section 4.4.5).*
>>
>>     Finally, the last bullet on page 4 should be reworded:
>>
>>     Current text:
>>
>>     *       o Section 4.4.8 specifies a new extension that indicates that the*
>>
>>     *          responder supports the extended use of the "revoked" response*
>>
>>     *          for non-issued certificates defined in section 2.2.*
>>
>>     **
>>
>>     Proposed replacement text:
>>
>>     *       o  Section 4.4.8 specifies a new extension that indicates that*
>>
>>     *          the OCSP responder knows that CA identified in the request*
>>
>>     *          has no record of ever having issued a certificate with the*
>>
>>     *          certificate serial number present in the request, as defined*
>>
>>     *          in section 2.2.*
>>
>>
>> No. Again, this changes the scope of the extension and its audit
>> properties.
>> Such change requires WG consensus.
>>
>>
>>     *Comment 9:*Solved, if the comment above may be solved.
>>
>>     *Comment 20*:This comment is preliminary classified by you as “not
>>     broken”. However, since you asked: “If you don’t replace 4.2.2.3,
>>     then what really are you missing ?”, I will provide you with an
>>     answer.
>>
>>     This is the wrong way to state the question. Providing an ASN.1
>>     syntax as in 4.2.1 is not enough: the use of every parameter
>>     MUST be explained using English words. So if you explain the use
>>     of every parameter after the description of the ASN.1 syntax
>>     in section 4.2.1. then section 4.2.2.3 is no more needed and thus
>>     can be deleted.
>>
>>     The answer to your question “what is really missing” is a
>>     description of the use of every parameter listed in the ASN.1 in
>>     section 4.2.1
>>
>>
>> There are sufficient descriptions in the subsections following the
>> ASN.1 description. Your change proposals are not compatible with the
>> minimalistic approach adopted by the WG.
>>
>>
>>     *Comment 21.*
>>
>>     While I can agree in general with the intent of the text, I do not
>>     understand the first sentence of the Note which speaks of “CA key
>>     rollover”
>>     and is copied below:
>>
>>     *    Note: CA key rollover is not prohibited when issuing a certificate*
>>
>>     *          for an authorized responder for backwards compatibility with*
>>
>>     *          RFC 2560 [RFC2560]. That is, it is not prohibited to issue a*
>>
>>     *          certificate for an authorized responder using a different*
>>
>>     *          issuing key than the key used to issued the certificate being*
>>
>>     *          checked for revocation. However, such practice is strongly*
>>
>>     *          discouraged since clients are not required to recognize a*
>>
>>     *          responder with such certificate as an authorized responder.*
>>
>>     I would propose to delete it, since it does not add anything and
>>     thus to have:
>>
>>     *    Note: For backwards compatibility with RFC 2560 [RFC2560], it is*
>>
>>     *          not prohibited to issue a certificate for an authorized*
>>
>>     *          responder using a different issuing key than the key used to*
>>
>>     *          issued the certificate being checked for revocation.*
>>
>>     *          However, such practice is strongly discouraged since clients*
>>
>>     *          are not required to recognize a responder with such*
>>
>>     *          certificate as an authorized responder.*
>>
>>
>> I agree, your text is better. Updated.
>>
>>     *Comment 24*: The ASN.1 module in annex B.1 is still wrong, since
>>     it does not define NoCheck.
>>
>>
>> No you are wrong. We have confirmed with several ASN.1 experts that
>> definition of NoCheck is not necessary to define null content.
>> The current definition is perfectly valid ASN.1
>>
>>     *Comment 26*: You asked for explanations. Let me provide you with
>>     an example when CRLs are being used by the OCSP responder
>>     in the background. The OCSP responder needs to make sure that the
>>     CRL it uses is valid. If it is simply using published CRLs
>>     (i.e. no trusted link with the CA), it needs to make sure that the
>>     CA which has issued the CRL has no been revoked.
>>
>>
>> No, this is a misstatement. You don't revoke CAs. You revoke CA
>> certificates. There might be a CA certificate that has been revoked
>> for a reason that does not affect the OCSP responder.
>> These are operational policies that are outside the scope of the protocol.
>>
>> The proposed text in comment 26 is plain wrong, or at least
>> misleading. The OCSP responder does not have to validate the CRL up to
>> any particular root. It may for example have been configured to
>> directly trust the public key used to validate the CRL.
>>
>>
>>     In France, there is a root CA for the Administration. However, the
>>     use of that root CA is optional. Thus a Ministry may have its own
>>     root,
>>     but may also have its key certified by the root CA of the
>>     Administration. The OCSP responder may use the root CA of the
>>     Ministry,
>>     while a relying party may use the root CA of the Administration
>>     (or the reverse) to validate the CRL for the target certificate.
>>     Thus the revocation status will be different if the certificate of
>>     the CA of the Ministry is revoked by the root CA of the
>>     Administration.
>>
>>
>> Which reinforces my point. How the OCSP responder is configured to
>> trust its information source is outside the scope of the protocol.
>>
>> The OCSP protocol never claims to provide the same conclusion about
>> revocation than another source the relying party may use.
>>
>> I skip category 3 as this will be dealt with in IESG last call.
>>
>>
>>     *CATEGORY 3*
>>
>>     *Comments*2, 3, 7, 10, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 25 and 27.
>>
>>     *CATEGORY 4*
>>
>>     Page 4. The indentation of the bullets in section 1 is not uniform.
>>     Bullets 1, 4, 5 and 9 have problems.
>>
>>     Page 4. The fact that there is now an Annex B.2 dealing with the
>>     2008 ASN.1 syntax is missing. This should be added.
>>
>>     Page 10. Change “*Se further section 4.2.2.2”*into “*See further
>>     section 4.2.2.2”
>>     *
>>
>>
>>
>> Thanks. I have fixed them all.
>>
>> /Stefan
>>
>>
>>     Denis
>>     **
>>
>>     =====================================================================================
>>
>>
>>
>>>     Denis,
>>>
>>>     Responding to your comments below.
>>>
>>>     However, one general remark to make recurring comments easier to
>>>     understand.
>>>
>>>     The WG decided to adopt a minimalistic approach to updating RFC
>>>     2560. That means that
>>>
>>>      1. We don't change anything from RFC 2560 unless it is broken,
>>>         or the industry clearly need clarifications in order to avoid
>>>         interoperability issues.
>>>      2. We retain the document structure of RFC 2560 as much as
>>>         possible to allow easy comparison of what the changes are in
>>>         comparison with RFC 2560.
>>>
>>>
>>>     One can always think up more clever ways to write things out in
>>>     words. But that also comes with a risk.
>>>     The current words has been around for a long time and we know
>>>     from experience which words worked to produce working
>>>     implementations, and which did not.
>>>     Introducing new ways to say the same thing may introduce new
>>>     problems and people might disagree on what the new perfect
>>>     wording should be. And this could go on forever.
>>>
>>>     So when my reply is "Not broken", then that is because the
>>>     current wording does not have such problems that is merits a change.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>     From: Denis Pinkas <denis.pinkas@bull.net
>>>     <mailto:denis.pinkas@bull.net>>
>>>     Date: Sunday, January 20, 2013 5:12 PM
>>>     To: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com
>>>     <mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com>>, Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com
>>>     <mailto:kent@bbn.com>>
>>>     Cc: pkix <pkix@ietf.org <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>>
>>>     Subject: Re: [pkix] Review of 2560-bis draft 8. Answer to WGLC
>>>
>>>         Please find 32 comments on draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis
>>>
>>>         1.The document states:
>>>
>>>         **<Cut away issue 1 regarding authorship etc, as it has been
>>>         responded to separately>
>>>
>>>
>>>     Responded to separately.
>>>
>>>         2.The current text from section 2 states:
>>>
>>>         2.   Protocol Overview
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>             In lieu of or as a supplement to checking against a periodic CRL, it
>>>
>>>             may be necessary to obtain*timely information*  regarding the
>>>
>>>             revocation status of a certificate (cf. RFC5280], Section 3.3).
>>>
>>>             Examples include high-value funds transfer or large stock trades.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>             The Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) enables applications to
>>>
>>>             determine the (revocation) state of an identified certificate. OCSP
>>>
>>>             may be used to satisfy some of the operational requirements of
>>>
>>>             providing*more timely revocation information*  than is possible with
>>>
>>>             CRLs and may also be used to obtain additional status information.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>         This text is misleading because readers may think that OCPS necessarily provides “timely information”.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>     "may" does not mean "necessarily".
>>>
>>>         Proposed text replacement:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>         *The Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) is a
>>>         client-server *
>>>
>>>         *protocol which enables applications to obtain the revocation
>>>         status *
>>>
>>>         *of one or more certificates either "good", "revoked", or
>>>         "unknown".*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *The revocation status may be provided by the server either
>>>         using a *
>>>
>>>         *real time access to a database of issued certificates, or
>>>         using a *
>>>
>>>         *batch access to a database of issued certificates, or using a *
>>>
>>>         *real time access to a database of revocation statuses of
>>>         issued *
>>>
>>>         *certificates, or using a batch access to a database of
>>>         revocation *
>>>
>>>         *statuses of issued certificates, or using CRLs, or using a *
>>>
>>>         *combination of base CRLs and delta CRLs.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *In the first case, it is possible to obtain timely
>>>         revocation status *
>>>
>>>         *information, whereas in the other cases, the freshness of the *
>>>
>>>         *revocation status is not better than the mechanisms it is
>>>         based on.*
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>     Not broken
>>>
>>>         3.The current text from section 2 states:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>             An OCSP client issues a status request to an OCSP responder and
>>>
>>>             Suspends acceptance of*the certificate in question*  until the
>>>
>>>             responder provides a response.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>             This protocol specifies the data that needs to be exchanged between
>>>
>>>             an application checking the status of a certificate and the server
>>>
>>>             providing that status.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>         Thus is insufficient for an overview. More details are needed to know what the document provides,
>>>         in particular that the request may contain several requests for several certificates issued by different CAs.
>>>         The possibility of using extensions should also be advertised.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>         Proposed text replacement:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>         When using OCSP, an OCSP client issues a certificate revocation
>>>
>>>         status request to an OCSP responder *for one or more
>>>         certificates *
>>>
>>>         *issued by the same CA or for one or more certificates issued
>>>         by *
>>>
>>>         *different CAs *and then suspends acceptance of the
>>>         certificate(s)
>>>
>>>         in question until the responder provides a response.
>>>
>>>         This document specifies the data that needs to be exchanged
>>>         between
>>>
>>>         an application checking the status of a certificate and the
>>>         server
>>>
>>>         providing that status.
>>>
>>>         *OCSP may also provide additional status information using *
>>>
>>>         *extensions. *
>>>
>>>
>>>     Not broken
>>>
>>>         4.Page 6. Editorial. Punctuation and a CR/LF are missing.
>>>
>>>         The text states:
>>>
>>>         *    3. the request contains the information needed by the responder If*
>>>
>>>         *       any one of the prior conditions are not met, the OCSP responder*
>>>
>>>         *       produces an error message; otherwise, it returns a definitive*
>>>
>>>         *       response.*
>>>
>>>         It should state:
>>>
>>>         *    4. the request contains the information needed by the responder.*
>>>
>>>         *  *
>>>
>>>         *       If any one of the prior conditions are not met, the OCSP responder*
>>>
>>>         *       produces an error message; otherwise, it returns a definitive*
>>>
>>>         *       response.*
>>>
>>>
>>>     Fixed in draft 10.
>>>
>>>         5.On page 7, the text states:
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *All definitive response messages SHALL be digitally signed.
>>>         The key*
>>>
>>>         *used to sign the response MUST belong to one of the following:*
>>>
>>>         *  *
>>>
>>>         *    -   the CA who issued the certificate in question*
>>>
>>>         *    -   a Trusted Responder whose public key is trusted by the requester*
>>>
>>>         *    -   a CA Designated Responder (Authorized Responder) who holds a*
>>>
>>>         *       specially marked certificate issued directly by the CA, indicating*
>>>
>>>         *       that the responder may issue OCSP responses for that CA.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         The paragraph is ambiguous on several aspects.
>>>
>>>         Delegation is addressed in at least three different places,
>>>         but with different terms and conditions.
>>>         If some one picks a sentence in one paragraph rather than
>>>         another, it will lead to a different conclusion.
>>>         RFCs are supposed to be clear.
>>>
>>>         On page 10, the current text states in section*2.6 OCSP
>>>         Signature Authority Delegation *states:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>         *The key that signs a certificate's status information need
>>>         not be the*
>>>
>>>         *same key that signed the certificate.**A certificate's issuer*
>>>
>>>         *explicitly delegates OCSP signing authority by issuing a
>>>         certificate*
>>>
>>>         *containing a unique value for extendedKeyUsage in the OCSP
>>>         signer's*
>>>
>>>         *certificate. This certificate MUST be issued directly to the*
>>>
>>>         *responder by the cognizant CA.*
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>         On page 16, there is a section
>>>         *4.2.2.2***called*“**Authorized Responders”*dealing with the
>>>         same topic.
>>>
>>>         Section 4.2.2.2 states:
>>>
>>>         *The key that signs a certificate's status information need
>>>         not be the*
>>>
>>>         *same key that signed the certificate**. It is necessary
>>>         however to*
>>>
>>>         *ensure that the entity signing this information is
>>>         authorized to do*
>>>
>>>         *so.Therefore, a certificate's issuer MAY either sign the OCSP*
>>>
>>>         *responses itself or it MAY explicitly designate this
>>>         authority to*
>>>
>>>         *another entity.OCSP signing delegation SHALL be designated
>>>         by the*
>>>
>>>         *inclusion of id-kp-OCSPSigning in an extendedKeyUsage
>>>         certificate*
>>>
>>>         *extension included in the OCSP response signer's
>>>         certificate.This*
>>>
>>>         *certificate MUST be issued directly by the CA that issued the*
>>>
>>>         *certificate in question.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *The CA SHOULD use the same issuing key to issue a delegation*
>>>
>>>         *certificate as was used to sign the certificate being
>>>         checked for*
>>>
>>>         *revocation. Systems relying on OCSP responses MUST recognize a*
>>>
>>>         *delegation certificate as being issued by the CA that issued
>>>         the*
>>>
>>>         *certificate in question only if the delegation certificate
>>>         and the*
>>>
>>>         *certificate being checked for revocation was signed by the
>>>         same key.***
>>>
>>>         The last sentence above in yellow is the key sentence that is
>>>         missing in the two other sections.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>         Most implementations only support the case where the OCSP Responder receives an OCSP certificate that is signed by the same key
>>>         that was used to sign the target certificate. They do not support the case where the OCSP Responder receives an OCSP certificate
>>>         that is signed by a key that is different from the one that was used to sign the target certificate.
>>>
>>>         It is inappropriate to have three sections dealing with the
>>>         same topic with a slightly different meaning.
>>>
>>>         It is proposed the following.
>>>
>>>         On page 7, after:
>>>
>>>         *    -   a CA Designated Responder (Authorized Responder) who holds a*
>>>
>>>         *       specially marked certificate issued directly by the CA, indicating*
>>>
>>>         *       that the responder may issue OCSP responses for that CA.*
>>>
>>>         it is proposed to add “(*see section 4.2.2.2 for further
>>>         details**)”*, so that the reader knows that more details are
>>>         provided later on.
>>>
>>>         Then we do not need two sections to address delegation which
>>>         start with the same sentence:
>>>
>>>
>>>         “*The key that signs a certificate's status information need
>>>         not be the same key that signed the certificate”.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         It is thus proposed to delete section 2.6.
>>>
>>>         Section 4.2.2.2 will thus remain the single section providing
>>>         full details.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>     I have added references to section 4.2.2.2 in the quoted sections
>>>     in 2.2 and 2.6.
>>>     (will be included in draft 11)
>>>
>>>
>>>         6.  Page 7, the text states:
>>>
>>>         *    A definitive response message is composed of:*
>>>
>>>         *  *
>>>
>>>         *    -   version of the response syntax*
>>>
>>>         *    -   name of the responder*
>>>
>>>         *    -   responses for each of the certificates in a request*
>>>
>>>         *    -   optional extensions*
>>>
>>>         *    -   signature algorithm OID*
>>>
>>>         *    -  signature computed across hash of the response*
>>>
>>>         This description does not fit with the ASN.1 syntax which is
>>>         detailed later on, and in particular:
>>>
>>>         *    ResponseData ::= SEQUENCE {*
>>>
>>>         *       version               [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,*
>>>
>>>         *       **responderID               ResponderID,*
>>>
>>>         *       producedAt                GeneralizedTime,*
>>>
>>>         *       responses                 SEQUENCE OF SingleResponse,*
>>>
>>>         *       responseExtensions    [1] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL }*
>>>
>>>         Proposed text replacement:
>>>
>>>         *A definitive response message is composed of:*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *- a response status and if there is no error, the following:*
>>>
>>>         *- the version of the response syntax,*
>>>
>>>         *- an identifier of the OCSP server,*
>>>
>>>         *- the time at which the response was produced,*
>>>
>>>         *- single responses for each of the target certificates,*
>>>
>>>         *- optional extensions,*
>>>
>>>         *- the signature algorithm OID,*
>>>
>>>         *- the signature computed across hash of the response, and*
>>>
>>>         *- optional certificates.*
>>>
>>>
>>>     This is an overview section. We ought not try to duplicate the
>>>     level of detail provided in the detailed protocol section.
>>>     A "definitive response" according to tho 2.1 is a response to an
>>>     error-free request, so your first remark is redundant.
>>>
>>>     I have added a note about time to the current list, and changed
>>>     "name" to identifier in bullet 2.
>>>     (will be included in draft 11)
>>>
>>>         7.The text states on page 7:
>>>
>>>         *The response for each of the certificates in a request
>>>         consists of*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *-target certificate identifier*
>>>
>>>         *-certificate status value*
>>>
>>>         *-response validity interval*
>>>
>>>         *-optional extensions*
>>>
>>>         However, there are no explanations for the purpose of these
>>>         parameters and how they should be processed.
>>>
>>>         There are also no explanations on how to process a single
>>>         response and how to verify that it is its presence within the
>>>         signed structure
>>>         is valid or not valid. This is a major deficiency of the
>>>         current description of RC 2560 where there is no explanation
>>>         on how to validate
>>>         a single response.
>>>
>>>         Text proposal to be added after:
>>>
>>>         *The purpose of the identifier of the OCSP server is to allow
>>>         OCSP *
>>>
>>>         *clients to find whether the definitive response was signed
>>>         by a CA *
>>>
>>>         *or by an OCSP Responder.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *The identifier of the OCSP server SHOULD either be the name
>>>         or the *
>>>
>>>         *key from a CA, or the name or the key from a OCSP Responder.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *Unless there exist local rules (which are outside the scope
>>>         of this *
>>>
>>>         *document) for verifying that a single response is correctly
>>>         signed, *
>>>
>>>         *the following applies:*
>>>
>>>         *When the identifier matches with the name of the CA which
>>>         has issued *
>>>
>>>         *the target certificate or corresponds to the key used to
>>>         issue the *
>>>
>>>         *target certificate, then a single response is correctly signed *
>>>
>>>         *only if the digital signature of the OCSP response is valid
>>>         using the *
>>>
>>>         *key used to sign the target certificate.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *When the identifier does not match with the name of the CA
>>>         which has *
>>>
>>>         *issued the target certificate or does not correspond to the
>>>         key used *
>>>
>>>         *to issue the target certificate, then an single response is
>>>         correctly *
>>>
>>>         *signed only if :*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *(a) there exists in the response an OCSP certificate issued by *
>>>
>>>         *the CA which has issued the target certificate which is *
>>>
>>>         *signed by the same key as the one used to issue the *
>>>
>>>         *target certificate, and*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *(b) the digital signature of the OCSP response is valid using *
>>>
>>>         *the subjectPublicKey contained in this OCSP certificate.*
>>>
>>>
>>>     Not broken.
>>>     All of this is already covered by the document.
>>>
>>>         8.The text states on page 7:
>>>
>>>         The "revoked" state indicates that the certificate has been
>>>         revoked
>>>
>>>         *(either permanently or temporarily (on hold)). *This state
>>>         MAY also be
>>>
>>>         returned if the responder knows that the requested
>>>         certificate has
>>>
>>>         *never been issued during the history of the associated CA
>>>         *using any
>>>
>>>         current or previous issuing key. **
>>>
>>>         The text is ambiguous because there are two embedded
>>>         parenthesis and it is unclear whether the inner parenthesis
>>>         means “i.e” or “e.g”.
>>>         This single sentence may let think that on hold is the single
>>>         case for temporarily revocation. Since neither X.509 nor RFC
>>>         5280 address
>>>         the case of a temporary revocation in the context of an OCSP
>>>         response (but only in the context of CRLs), we are able to
>>>         add another case
>>>         of temporary revocation which will only apply in the context
>>>         of OCSP.
>>>
>>>         The above sentence using the terms“*never been issued during
>>>         the history of the associated CA*“does not capture the fact
>>>         that it could be issued in the future, hence why using“*not
>>>         yet been used”*would be more appropriate.
>>>
>>>         Finally, it would have been more logical to use “unknown”. So
>>>         it is important to add a note to explain why we have chosen
>>>         that case for “legacy clients”,
>>>         otherwise the people who have not participate to the
>>>         exchanges will not understand.
>>>
>>>         Proposed text replacement:
>>>
>>>             *The "revoked" state indicates that the certificate has been revoked,*
>>>
>>>         *    either permanently or temporarily.*
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>             A certificate may be temporarily revoked either because it is
>>>
>>>             placed on hold (*i.e. the revocation reason is certificateHold*) or
>>>
>>>             because the responder is able to know, using a positive list of
>>>
>>>             issued certificates, that the serial number from the requested
>>>
>>>             certificate has*not yet been used*  by the CA to issue a certificate
>>>
>>>             (*i.e. the revocation reason is notIssuedOrIrregularlyIssued*).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>         *NOTE: The "revoked" state is used rather than the “unknown” state, to*
>>>
>>>         *       make sure that relying parties that were conformant to RFC 2560*
>>>
>>>         *       will not use CRLs as a fall back mechanism.*
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>     I removed the double parenthesis and adopted your clarification
>>>     with regard to "on hold".
>>>
>>>     The text in draft 10 has changed from what you have commented on.
>>>     I believe that text is better.
>>>
>>>     You "Note" has problems.
>>>
>>>      1. We do not prevent responders to respond "unknown" if their
>>>         assessment is that this is an appropriate response,
>>>         considering what they know about the requested serial number.
>>>         Thus the term "is used" is misleading.
>>>      2. This mechanisms does not "make sure" that the clients do
>>>         anything. It's up to the discretion of the relying party to
>>>         decide what source of revocation checking they rely on. This
>>>         does however reduce the risk of clients falling back to CRL:s
>>>      3. This mechanism is not just relevant to old clients, but also
>>>         to new one for the same reason.
>>>
>>>
>>>     I have adopted a modified version of your Note:
>>>
>>>        NOTE: The "revoked" state for known non-issued certificate serial
>>>              numbers is allowed in order to reduce the risk of relying
>>>              parties using CRLs as a fall back mechanism, which would be
>>>              considerably higher if an "unknown" response was returned.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>         9.The text states on page 8:
>>>
>>>         *When a responder responds revoked to a status request for a
>>>         non-*
>>>
>>>         *issued certificate, the responder MUST also;*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *- include the extended revoked definition response extension*
>>>
>>>         *(section 4.8), indicating that the OCSP responder supports the*
>>>
>>>         *extended definition of revoked state to also cover non-issued*
>>>
>>>         *certificates,*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *- provide the revocation reason certificateHold (6), and;*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *- specify the revocation date January 1, 1970. *
>>>
>>>         As already explained on the PKIX list, using the revocation
>>>         reason**certificateHold is not appropriate
>>>         because it changes the meaning of certificateHold.
>>>
>>>         The extended revoked definition response extension is a means
>>>         to signal that it not a true certificate hold but a “not
>>>         issued certificate”.
>>>         Legacy applications cannot take advantage of it.
>>>
>>>         Some applications which handle non repudiation enter a
>>>         waiting state when the revocation reason certificateHold is
>>>         used thus
>>>         it is not appropriate to overload the meaning.
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         It is possible to use another enumeration for signalling that
>>>         specific case:
>>>
>>>         notIssuedOrIrregularlyIssued (7).
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         Thus for new applications it would be much better to use
>>>         notIssuedOrIrregularlyIssued (7) as already proposed on the
>>>         PKIX list.
>>>
>>>         The above sentence uses the text:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>         “a status request for a*non-issued certificate*”
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>         whereas it would be more appropriate to state:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>         “a status request for a*  serial number which has not been used by the CA or used irregularly to issue a certificate”.*
>>>
>>>         *  *
>>>
>>>         Placing the ASN.1 description at such a place in the document is inappropriate since the ASN.1 structures have not yet been described.
>>>         Thus only the functional aspects should be mentioned, but not the ASN.1 implications.
>>>
>>>         *  *
>>>
>>>         BTW, the description should follow the same order as the ASN.1. This is not the case.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>         This text should be deleted from this section and the appropriate text should be added when the parameters of the response are described.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>         The text proposed in the previous comment should be sufficient at this time of reading.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>         In addition, section*4.4.8Extended Revoked Definition *should
>>>         be deleted.**
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>     The referred text has been updates in draft 09.
>>>
>>>     This has been discussed on the list and you have yet to convince
>>>     the list of your new reason code.
>>>     I disagree as the risk of running into problems with the deployed
>>>     base of application is hugely larger with introduction of a new
>>>     reason code, rather than using certificateHold.
>>>     No application should be broken, since no application have
>>>     business asking for non-issued cert serial numbers in the first
>>>     place. Secondly, no application can assume that a certificateHold
>>>     reason will be cleared any time soon.
>>>
>>>
>>>         10.The text states on page 8:
>>>
>>>         *2.4Semantics of thisUpdate, nextUpdate and producedAt*
>>>
>>>         This section is misplaced. At this time of reading, the
>>>         reader does not know that thisUpdate, nextUpdate and
>>>         producedAt are values
>>>         used by the ASN.1 structures. It is appropriate to describe
>>>         what theses parameters mean when the ASN.1 syntax is described.
>>>         The current ASN.1 syntax is very badly described. One would
>>>         expect that after every ASN.1 structure description every
>>>         parameter is described.
>>>         Unfortunately this is not the case.
>>>
>>>         The text from this section is not aligned with the text that
>>>         is present in section 4.2.2.1.
>>>
>>>         In particular, in section 2.4:
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *If nextUpdate is not set, the responder is indicating that
>>>         newer*
>>>
>>>         *revocation information is available all the time.*
>>>
>>>         While in section 4.2.2.1:
>>>
>>>         *Responses where the nextUpdate value is not set are equivalent *
>>>
>>>         *to a CRL with no time for nextUpdate (see Section 2.4).*
>>>
>>>         It is not appropriate to have two different descriptions in
>>>         two different places.
>>>
>>>         Delete section 2.4. See comment number 19 for the description
>>>         of these parameters.
>>>
>>>
>>>     Not broken.
>>>     The current text segments fits well into a protocol overview section.
>>>
>>>         11.Section 2.5 is also misplaced. They use values from the
>>>         ASN.1 syntax which has not yet been described.
>>>         They should be moved or incorporated in the document once the
>>>         ASN.1 description has been done.
>>>
>>>
>>>     Not broken.
>>>
>>>         12.Remainder: Section 2.6 should be deleted (see comment
>>>         number 5).
>>>
>>>
>>>     Not broken.
>>>
>>>         13.Section 2.7 states:
>>>
>>>         *2.7CA Key Compromise*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *If an OCSP responder knows that a particular CA's private
>>>         key has*
>>>
>>>         *been compromised, it MAY return the revoked state for all*
>>>
>>>         *certificates issued by that CA.*
>>>
>>>         This section is misleading and should be removed. The reason
>>>         is the following:
>>>
>>>         The relying party must verify that the singleResponse is
>>>         signed by a responder which is entitled to do so.
>>>
>>>         a) If the CA key has been compromised and if the response is
>>>         signed by that CA key then the singleResponse will be discarded
>>>         when performing the certification path validation _whatever
>>>         the content of the response may be_.
>>>
>>>         b) If the CA key which has issued the OCSP certificate has
>>>         been compromised and if the response is signed by the key
>>>         present
>>>         in the OCSP certificate then the singleResponse will be
>>>         discarded when performing the certification path validation
>>>         _whatever the content of the response may be_.
>>>
>>>         Security must be provided using the validation of the
>>>         certification path. Thus it does not matter what the OCSP
>>>         responder states.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>     Not broken.
>>>     An OCSP responder does not have to be chained to the broken CA.
>>>     The relying party may have other trust configuration at choice.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>         14.The text states on page 11:
>>>
>>>         *3.2Signed Response Acceptance Requirements*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *Prior to accepting a signed response as valid, OCSP clients
>>>         SHALL*
>>>
>>>         *confirm that:*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *1. The certificate identified in a received response
>>>         corresponds to*
>>>
>>>         *that which was identified in the corresponding request;*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *2. The signature on the response is valid;*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *3. The identity of the signer matches the intended recipient
>>>         of the*
>>>
>>>         *request.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *4. The signer is currently authorized to sign the response.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *5. The time at which the status being indicated is known to be*
>>>
>>>         *correct (thisUpdate) is sufficiently recent.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *6. When available, the time at or before which newer
>>>         information will*
>>>
>>>         *be available about the status of the certificate
>>>         (nextUpdate) is*
>>>
>>>         *greater than the current time.*
>>>
>>>         This section is misplaced since it uses terms from the ASN.1
>>>         syntax and the protocol description has not yet been made,
>>>         since it is the next section 4. Its text is not correct either.
>>>
>>>         This description does not take into account the fact that
>>>         a*BasicOCSPResponse *may contain one or several
>>>         *SingleResponses. *
>>>         In particular, the sentence“*The signer is currently
>>>         authorized to sign the response*” is misleading because a signer
>>>         may be authorized to include some***SingleResponses *but not
>>>         necessarily all of them.
>>>
>>>         The appropriate explanations should be done after the
>>>         description of the response, when describing the processing
>>>         of the response.
>>>
>>>         Delete that section.
>>>
>>>
>>>     Not broken.
>>>
>>>         15.On page 12, after the ASN.1 description, the only
>>>         parameters which are described are:
>>>
>>>         *hashAlgorithm,**issuerNameHash, issuerKeyHash and serialNumber.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         This is insufficient.In order to cover the full list of
>>>         parameters, the following text is proposed:
>>>
>>>         *requestorName is optional and MAY be used by the server for
>>>         access *
>>>
>>>         *control and audit purposes.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *requestList contains one or more single requests.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *requestExtensions is OPTIONAL.Any specific extension is
>>>         OPTIONAL.*
>>>
>>>         *The critical flag SHOULD NOT be set for any of them. Section
>>>         4.4 *
>>>
>>>         *suggests several useful extensions.Additional extensions MAY
>>>         be *
>>>
>>>         *defined in additional RFCs.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *reqCert contains the identifier of a target certificate.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *issuerNameHash is the hash of the Issuer's distinguished
>>>         name.The *
>>>
>>>         *hash shall be calculated over the DER encoding of the
>>>         issuer's name *
>>>
>>>         *field in the certificate being checked. *
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *issuerKeyHash is the hash of the Issuer's public key.The hash *
>>>
>>>         *shall be calculated over the value (excluding tag and
>>>         length) of the *
>>>
>>>         *subject public key field in the issuer's certificate.The hash *
>>>
>>>         *algorithm used for both these hashes, is identified in *
>>>
>>>         *hashAlgorithm. *
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *The primary reason to use the hash of the CA's public key in *
>>>
>>>         *addition to the hash of the CA's name, to identify the issuer, *
>>>
>>>         *is that it is possible that two CAs may choose to use the same *
>>>
>>>         *name (uniqueness in the Name is a recommendation that cannot
>>>         be *
>>>
>>>         *enforced). Two CAs will never, however, have the same public
>>>         key *
>>>
>>>         *unless the CAs either explicitly decided to share their
>>>         private *
>>>
>>>         *key, or the key of one of the CAs was compromised.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *serialNumber is the serial number of the certificate for which *
>>>
>>>         *status is being requested.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *singleRequestExtensions is OPTIONAL.Any specific extension is *
>>>
>>>         *OPTIONAL.The critical flag SHOULD NOT be set for any of them. *
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *The requestor MAY choose to sign the OCSP request.In that
>>>         case, the*
>>>
>>>         *signature is computed over the tbsRequest structure.If the
>>>         request*
>>>
>>>         *is signed, the requestor SHALL specify its name in the
>>>         requestorName*
>>>
>>>         *field.Also, for signed requests, the requestor MAY include*
>>>
>>>         *certificates that help the OCSP responder verify the
>>>         requestor's*
>>>
>>>         *signature in the certs field of Signature.*
>>>
>>>
>>>     Not broken.
>>>     The current text is short, but it is actually sufficient from the
>>>     context of the ASN.1 definitions of the section. This is a
>>>     detailed protocol section and the reader need to understand ASN.1
>>>     in any case to understand and implement the section.
>>>     The information about criticality is already covered in the
>>>     extension section.
>>>
>>>
>>>         16.Section 4.1.2 is called:“*Notes on the Request Syntax”*
>>>
>>>         The first paragraph has been moved after the description
>>>         of*issuerKeyHash *and thus is no more needed.
>>>
>>>         The second paragraph has been moved after the description
>>>         of*requestExtensions. *
>>>         However, the sentence
>>>         “ *Unrecognized extensions MUST be ignored (unless they have
>>>         the critical flag set and are not understood)*”
>>>         has been deleted since it applies to the OCSP responder and
>>>         not to the OCSP client. Thus it is no more needed.
>>>
>>>         The third paragraph applies to signed requests. However, it
>>>         should belong to a section dedicated on how clients should
>>>         build OCPS requests,
>>>         which is currently missing. See the next comment.
>>>
>>>         This section should be deleted.
>>>
>>>
>>>     Not broken.
>>>
>>>         17.There should be a new section called: “*Requirements for
>>>         OCSP clients”. *
>>>
>>>         It is important first to re-advertise that the request may be
>>>         about several certificates.
>>>         Thus it is important to describe the process for building a
>>>         request, which is currently missing.
>>>
>>>         *An OCSP request allows getting in the same response the
>>>         revocation *
>>>
>>>         *status of one or more certificates.In order to request the *
>>>
>>>         *status of one or more certificates in a single request, OCSP *
>>>
>>>         *clients SHALL follow the following rules :*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *For each candidate certificate, OCSP clients SHALL verify *
>>>
>>>         *whether there exists a locally defined rule for the
>>>         certificate in *
>>>
>>>         *question which indicates the URI where the OCSP responder is *
>>>
>>>         *located.If this rule exists, it SHALL be followed. *
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *Otherwise, OCSP clients SHALL determine whether the candidate *
>>>
>>>         *certificate contains an AIA extension with an accessMethod
>>>         which *
>>>
>>>         *contains the id-ad-ocsp OID.If it is the case, the
>>>         accessLocation *
>>>
>>>         *contains a uniformResourceIdentifier (URI) which indicates the *
>>>
>>>         *location of the OCSP server for that certificate. *
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *Certificates that contain the same URI MAY be grouped in a
>>>         single *
>>>
>>>         *request.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *Note:For each candidate certificate, when performing the path *
>>>
>>>         *validation algorithm, the OCSP client SHOULD verify that the *
>>>
>>>         *current time is within the validity period of the target *
>>>
>>>         *certificate.Certificates which are outside their validity *
>>>
>>>         *period SHOULD NOT be included in the request.*
>>>
>>>         *The requestor MAY choose to sign the OCSP request. In that
>>>         case, the*
>>>
>>>         *signature is computed over the tbsRequest structure. If the
>>>         request*
>>>
>>>         *is signed, the requestor SHALL specify its name in the
>>>         requestorName*
>>>
>>>         *field. Also, for signed requests, the requestor MAY include*
>>>
>>>         *certificates that help the OCSP responder verify the
>>>         requestor's*
>>>
>>>         *signature in the certs field of Signature.*
>>>
>>>
>>>     Not broken.
>>>
>>>     Your text may provide guidance that could be useful to some
>>>     implementers, but is completely beyond this document and further,
>>>     not generally applicable or true.
>>>     As an example, an organisation may setup an in house locally
>>>     configured OCSP responder that responds to all certificates "out
>>>     there" that is relevant to that organisation.
>>>     Such clients would just blindly send OCSP requests to their local
>>>     responder, disregarding any information in the cert.
>>>     It's totally beyond this spec to have an opinion about this.
>>>
>>>
>>>         18.The text states on page 14:
>>>
>>>         *The responder MAY include certificates in the*
>>>
>>>         *certs field of BasicOCSPResponse that help the OCSP client
>>>         verify the*
>>>
>>>         *responder's signature. If no certificates are included then
>>>         certs*
>>>
>>>         *SHOULD be absent.*
>>>
>>>         While this sentence is true, it is not sufficient. In order
>>>         to allow verifying every *SingleResponse*,
>>>         it is important to include the relevant certificates which
>>>         are pertinent to every *SingleResponse.*
>>>
>>>         Proposed full text replacement:
>>>
>>>         The responder MAY include certificates in the certs field of
>>>
>>>         BasicOCSPResponse that help the OCSP client verify the
>>>         responder's
>>>
>>>         signature.
>>>
>>>         *For every SingleResponse where the responder is not a CA, the *
>>>
>>>         *responder SHALL include the relevant OCSP certificate in the
>>>         certs *
>>>
>>>         *field of BasicOCSPResponse in order to allow the OCSP client *
>>>
>>>         *verifying the responder was entitled to include that
>>>         SingleResponse *
>>>
>>>         *in the signed BasicOCSPResponse.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         **If no certificates are included then certs SHOULD be absent.
>>>
>>>
>>>     Not broken.
>>>
>>>     This requirement would break backwards compatibility with RFC 2560.
>>>     Further this would not be needed for a locally configured responder.
>>>
>>>         19.Page 15. The ASN.1 syntax should be changed in order to be
>>>         able to use the enumeration case 7 that is not used for CRLs.
>>>         This leads to the following change:
>>>
>>>         Current text:
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *revocationReason[0]EXPLICIT CRLReason OPTIONAL }*
>>>
>>>         Proposed text change:
>>>
>>>         Current text:
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *revocationReason [0]EXPLICIT RevocationReason OPTIONAL }*
>>>
>>>         *RevocationReason ::= ENUMERATED {*
>>>
>>>         *unspecified(0),*
>>>
>>>         *keyCompromise(1),*
>>>
>>>         *cACompromise(2),*
>>>
>>>         *affiliationChanged(3),*
>>>
>>>         *superseded(4),*
>>>
>>>         *cessationOfOperation(5),*
>>>
>>>         *certificateHold(6),*
>>>
>>>         *notIssuedOrIrregularlyIssued (7),*
>>>
>>>         *removeFromCRL(8),*
>>>
>>>         *privilegeWithdrawn(9),*
>>>
>>>         *aACompromise(10) }*
>>>
>>>
>>>     Not broken.
>>>
>>>     You have to convince the list about your new reason code.
>>>
>>>         20.Page 15. After the ASN.1 syntax, there is no description
>>>         of every parameter, neither on its use
>>>         (except a few words in section*4.2.2.1 Time
>>>         *about*thisUpdate, nextUpdate and producedAt).*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         Every parameter needs to be described and explained.
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *responderID indicates either the name or the key from a CA,
>>>         or the *
>>>
>>>         *name or the key from a OCSP Responder.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *producedAt indicates the time at which this response was
>>>         signed.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *responses contains one or more single responses.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *responseExtensions is OPTIONAL.Any specific extension is
>>>         OPTIONAL.*
>>>
>>>         *The critical flag may or may not be set.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *certID is usually a copy of the same field which was placed
>>>         in the *
>>>
>>>         *request, but for OCSP responders which pre-produce signed
>>>         responses *
>>>
>>>         *certID may be the identifier of a target certificate that
>>>         was not *
>>>
>>>         *present in the request (see the end of section 4.2).*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *certStatus indicates the status of the certificate: either
>>>         good, *
>>>
>>>         *revoked or unknown.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *thisUpdate indicates the time at which the status being
>>>         indicated *
>>>
>>>         *is known to be correct.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *nextUpdate indicates the time at or before which newer
>>>         information *
>>>
>>>         *will be available about the status of the certificate.If *
>>>
>>>         *nextUpdate is not set, the server is indicating that newer *
>>>
>>>         *revocation information is available all the time. *
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *If nextUpdate is set, it often corresponds to the {thisUpdate, *
>>>
>>>         *nextUpdate} interval in CRLs.Responses whose nextUpdate
>>>         value is *
>>>
>>>         *earlier than the local UTC time value SHOULD be considered *
>>>
>>>         *unreliable.Responses whose thisUpdate time is later than the
>>>         local *
>>>
>>>         *UTC time SHOULD be considered unreliable.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *singleExtensions is OPTIONAL.Any specific extension is
>>>         OPTIONAL.*
>>>
>>>         *The critical flag SHOULD NOT be set for any of them.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *revocationTime indicates the time at which the certificate was *
>>>
>>>         *revoked.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *revocationReason is OPTIONAL. It includes all the cases that
>>>         are *
>>>
>>>         *present in CRLReason used for CRLs and an additional case 7
>>>         which is*
>>>
>>>         *not used for CRLs.Case 7 is called
>>>         notIssuedOrIrregularlyIssued. *
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *- "notIssued" corresponds to the case where the certificate *
>>>
>>>         *serial number that was sent was erroneous and has not yet *
>>>
>>>         *been used by the CA at the time of the query,*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *- "irregularlyIssued" corresponds to the case where the *
>>>
>>>         *certificate serial number that was sent really exists in a *
>>>
>>>         *certificate that is correctly signed, but to its knowledge *
>>>
>>>         *the CA has not issued a certificate with such a serial *
>>>
>>>         *number. As an example, it may have been issued by the CA *
>>>
>>>         *because the RA was compromised. *
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *    When a responder responds revoked to a status request for which it*
>>>
>>>         *    knows that the serial number has not been used by the CA or has*
>>>
>>>         *    been irregularly used irregularly to issue a certificate, then*
>>>
>>>         *    in RevokedInfo the responder MUST:*
>>>
>>>         *  *
>>>
>>>         *          - specify the revocationTime :   January 1, 1970,*
>>>
>>>         *           - provide the revocationReason: notIssuedOrIrregularlyIssued (7).*
>>>
>>>         *  *
>>>
>>>         *    and in SingleResponse the responder MUST NOT include the nextUpdate.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *The response MUST include a SingleResponse for each
>>>         certificate in*
>>>
>>>         *the request and SHOULD NOT include any additional
>>>         SingleResponse*
>>>
>>>         *elements.However, there is one exception: *
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *OCSP responders MAY pre-produce signed responses specifying
>>>         the *
>>>
>>>         *status of certificates at a specified time.The time at which *
>>>
>>>         *the status was known to be correct SHALL be reflected in the *
>>>
>>>         *thisUpdate field of the response. *
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *OCSP responders that pre-generate status responses MAY return *
>>>
>>>         *responses that include additional SingleResponse elements if*
>>>
>>>         *necessary to improve response pre-generation performance or
>>>         cache*
>>>
>>>         *efficiency (as permitted in [RFC5019]).*
>>>
>>>         Since the text above provides all the explanations at the
>>>         level of the ASN.1 parameters, the general text
>>>         from section*4.2.2.3 Basic Response *is no more need and
>>>         should be deleted.**
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>
>>>     Preliminary I would say "not broken".
>>>     If you don't replace 4.2.2.3, then what really are you missing?
>>>
>>>         21.0n page 16, there is a section
>>>         *4.2.2.2***called*“**Authorized Responders”***
>>>
>>>         Section 4.2.2.2 states:
>>>
>>>         *(…)*
>>>
>>>         *This certificate MUST be issued directly by the CA that
>>>         issued the*
>>>
>>>         *certificate in question.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *The CA SHOULD use the same issuing key to issue a delegation*
>>>
>>>         *certificate as was used to sign the certificate being
>>>         checked for*
>>>
>>>         *revocation. Systems relying on OCSP responses MUST recognize a*
>>>
>>>         *delegation certificate as being issued by the CA that issued
>>>         the*
>>>
>>>         *certificate in question only if the delegation certificate
>>>         and the*
>>>
>>>         *certificate being checked for revocation was signed by the
>>>         same key.*
>>>
>>>         This section would need to reformatted to address CA
>>>         requirements first and then OCSP responder requirements:
>>>
>>>         *(…)*
>>>
>>>         *This certificate MUST be issued directly by the CA that
>>>         issued the*
>>>
>>>         *certificate in question.The CA SHOULD use the same issuing
>>>         key to *
>>>
>>>         *issue a delegation certificate as was used to sign the
>>>         certificate *
>>>
>>>         *being checked for revocation. *
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *Systems relying on OCSP responses MUST _be able to_
>>>         recognize a *
>>>
>>>         *delegation certificate as being issued by the CA that issued
>>>         the *
>>>
>>>         *certificate in question if the delegation certificate and *
>>>
>>>         *the certificate being checked _were_ signed by the same key.*
>>>
>>>
>>>     I disagree. The CA is actually free to do anything, but cannot
>>>     expect the client to recognise the responder as authorised unless
>>>     the same private key is used.
>>>     The current text places the requirement where they belong.
>>>
>>>         22.On page 17, the text states:
>>>
>>>         *They MUST reject the*
>>>
>>>         *response if the certificate required to validate the
>>>         signature on the*
>>>
>>>         *response fails to meet at least one of the following criteria:*
>>>
>>>         This is ambiguous. It is inappropriate to have a negative
>>>         statement like“*They MUST reject”. *
>>>         The sentence should be turned in the positive form“*They
>>>         SHALL accept”*
>>>
>>>         Since the ASN.1 syntax has now be described, it is possible
>>>         to be more specific.
>>>
>>>         The first occurrence of the word “response” should be changed
>>>         into “singleResponse”, while the second occurrence
>>>         of the word “response” should be changed into “ResponseData”
>>>
>>>         Proposed text replacement:
>>>
>>>         *They SHALL accept a singleResponse if the certificate
>>>         required to *
>>>
>>>         *validate the signature placed on the ResponseData meets one
>>>         of the *
>>>
>>>         *following criteria:*
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>     No, this change is not backwards compatible.
>>>     So state the requirements for rejection is not equivalent to
>>>     stating requirements for acceptance.
>>>     There may be other locally configured reasons to reject in
>>>     addition to those listed in the standard.
>>>
>>>
>>>         23.On page 17, the text states:
>>>
>>>         *3. Includes a value of id-kp-OCSPSigning in an ExtendedKeyUsage*
>>>
>>>         *extension and is issued by the CA that issued the
>>>         certificate in*
>>>
>>>         *question as stated above."*
>>>
>>>         In order to be crystal clear, it is proposed to change the
>>>         wording in the following way:
>>>
>>>         *3. Includes a value of id-kp-OCSPSigning in an ExtendedKeyUsage*
>>>
>>>         *extension and was signed by the CA using the same key that
>>>         used *
>>>
>>>         *to issue the certificate in question.*
>>>
>>>
>>>     No, issuing with another key is not prohibited, and may be
>>>     accepted by some clients as an authorised responder.
>>>
>>>         24.On page 17, the text states:
>>>
>>>         *This SHOULD be a non-critical extension. The value of the
>>>         extension *
>>>
>>>         *SHALL be NULL.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         The ASN.1 syntax is missing. Add:
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *NoCheck ::= NULL*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>
>>>     Moving this to a separate discussion.
>>>     I'm not sure what the preferred way to describe this is.
>>>
>>>
>>>         25.Remainder: On page 18, the general text from
>>>         section***4.2.2.3 Basic Response***is no more needed and
>>>         should be deleted. See comment 20.
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>
>>>     Not broken.
>>>
>>>         26.On page 24, text should be added to the Security
>>>         consideration section:
>>>
>>>         *Different results when using OCSP and CRLs*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *OCSP clients or verifiers must build and verify a
>>>         certification path *
>>>
>>>         *for each target certificate up to a trusted root.When an OCSP *
>>>
>>>         *Responder is using published CRLs, it must also build and
>>>         verify a *
>>>
>>>         *certification path for the CRLs it uses up to a trusted root.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *However, it should be realized that the root used by an OCSP *
>>>
>>>         *Responder to verified these CRLs is not necessarily the same
>>>         as the *
>>>
>>>         *one that would be used by the OCSP client, if it were going
>>>         to verify *
>>>
>>>         *the CRLs itself.Hence the revocation status may not be
>>>         identical *
>>>
>>>         *in both cases.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>
>>>     I don't understand this one.
>>>
>>>         27.On page 24, text should be added to the Security
>>>         consideration section:
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *Denial of service attack using a flood of queries*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *A denial of service vulnerability is evident with respect to
>>>         a flood *
>>>
>>>         *of queries.The production of a cryptographic signature *
>>>
>>>         *significantly affects response generation cycle time, thereby *
>>>
>>>         *exacerbating the situation. *
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *The flood of queries may either come from a flood attack or
>>>         from the *
>>>
>>>         *fact that there are too many certificates supported by the
>>>         same OCSP *
>>>
>>>         *responder.In the later case, the number of queries can be *
>>>
>>>         *reduced by using a technique similar to the splitting of CRLs: *
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *When a block of certificates have been issued with the same *
>>>
>>>         *accessLocation in the AIA extension field of these
>>>         certificates, *
>>>
>>>         *then the accessLocation should be changed.In this way, a given *
>>>
>>>         *OCSP server will only be responsible for a block of
>>>         certificates.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>
>>>     If the security considerations section is talking about splitting
>>>     OCSP responders in this way, then the document itself need to
>>>     introduce the subject.
>>>     I would suggest that it is beyond this update to do so.
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         28.On page 31, the text states.
>>>
>>>         *An alternative to this module that conforms to the 2002
>>>         version of *
>>>
>>>         *ASN.1 may be found in Section 4 of [RFC5912]. *
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         RFC 5912 omits to define the nocheck extension. Thus it is
>>>         inappropriate to refer to RFC 5912.
>>>
>>>         The corrected module should be defined in this new draft.
>>>         A corrected module is providedin *draft-pinkas-rfc2560bis-03.*
>>>
>>>
>>>     Will move this (as stated above) to a separate discussion.
>>>
>>>         29.Different topics are not covered by the document. These
>>>         topics are important.
>>>         The following comments propose text to be placed in annexes.
>>>         Three annexes are being proposed.
>>>
>>>         Note: The texts are extracted from*draft-pinkas-rfc2560bis-03.*
>>>
>>>
>>>     Not broken.
>>>     Each such amendment need to be thoroughly reviewed and motivated.
>>>
>>>
>>>         30.First annex being proposed. This annex is important,
>>>         because key rollover is not addressed in the draft.
>>>
>>>         *KEY ROLLOVER*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *1. CA that directly supports an OCSP service*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *When a CA that directly supports an OCSP service performs a
>>>         key *
>>>
>>>         *rollover:*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *- for certificates issued under the old key, the CA SHALL
>>>         continue *
>>>
>>>         *to sign the revocation status of OCSP responses with that
>>>         old key *
>>>
>>>         *at least until all these certificates are expired, and*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *- for certificates issued under the new key, the CA SHALL
>>>         change the *
>>>
>>>         *accessLocation in the AIA extension field of these
>>>         certificates *
>>>
>>>         *and sign the revocation status of OCSP responses with that
>>>         new key *
>>>
>>>         *at least until all these certificates are expired.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *Note: The change in accessLocation is necessary when the CA
>>>         rekeys *
>>>
>>>         *to meet the following constraints imposed by this standard: *
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *1) a BasicOCSPResponse can only be signed using a single *
>>>
>>>         *private key; *
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *2) the response must be signed using the same CA key that *
>>>
>>>         *was used to sign the certificate in question; and*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *3) the OCSP response needs to cover all the certificates *
>>>
>>>         *queried in the OCSP request.*
>>>
>>>         *2. CA that uses OCSP responders*
>>>
>>>         *When a CA that uses OCSP Responders performs a key rollover,
>>>         then *
>>>
>>>         *it MUST either designate a new OCSP Responder or keep the
>>>         current *
>>>
>>>         *OCSP Responder(s).*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *If the CA designates a new OCSP Responder, then it SHALL
>>>         change the *
>>>
>>>         *accessLocation in the AIA extension field for the newly issued *
>>>
>>>         *certificates and issue an OCSP certificate to the new OCSP
>>>         Responder *
>>>
>>>         *using its new key.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *If the CA keeps the same OCSP Responder(s), then it SHALL
>>>         continue *
>>>
>>>         *to use the same accessLocation(s) in the AIA extension field
>>>         for the *
>>>
>>>         *newly issued certificates and issue an OCSP certificate to the *
>>>
>>>         *appropriate OCSP Responder(s) using its new key.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *Note: The CA may need to continue issuing certificates to
>>>         the OCSP *
>>>
>>>         *Responder(s) using the old CA key until all the certificates
>>>         issued *
>>>
>>>         *under the CA' old key for which the OCSP Responder(s) are *
>>>
>>>         *authoritative have expired.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *3. OCSP Responder key rollover*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *When an OCSP Responder performs a key rollover
>>>         (asynchronously from *
>>>
>>>         *a CA key rollover), then each CA which has designated an OCSP *
>>>
>>>         *Responder SHALL issue a new certificate for that OCSP
>>>         Responder and *
>>>
>>>         *for each of its issuing keys which meets the following
>>>         property: *
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *- the issuing key has been used to sign at least one
>>>         certificate *
>>>
>>>         *which contains an AIA extension designating that OCSP
>>>         Responder *
>>>
>>>         *and that certificate is not yet expired.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *An OCSP Responder key rollover does not affect the values of
>>>         the *
>>>
>>>         *URIs that are placed in the accessLocation field from the
>>>         target *
>>>
>>>         *certificates.One or more OCSP Responder MAY respond to an OCSP *
>>>
>>>         *request addressed at a given URI picked from the
>>>         accessLocation *
>>>
>>>         *field from a target certificate.Each OCSP Responder MAY use a *
>>>
>>>         *different signing key, as long as it got an OCSP certificate *
>>>
>>>         *appropriate for that signing key and for the target
>>>         certificate. *
>>>
>>>         31.Second annex being proposed. This annex is important
>>>         because it describes the validation of an OCSP response in
>>>         the past
>>>         which is of a particular importance when validating
>>>         electronic signatures.
>>>
>>>         *Response processing by an OCSP client*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *OCSP responses can be verified at the current time by an
>>>         OCSP client *
>>>
>>>         *when receiving a response, whereas old responses can be
>>>         verified at *
>>>
>>>         *a time in the past by a verifier.The algorithm below addresses *
>>>
>>>         *both cases.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *Prior to processing a basic response, OCSP clients MUST
>>>         determine *
>>>
>>>         *the checking time, which may be either the current time or a
>>>         time *
>>>
>>>         *in the past.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *OCSP clients or verifiers SHALL check if the response contains *
>>>
>>>         *responseExtensions. If such an extension is found and is
>>>         recognized, *
>>>
>>>         *it MUST be processed.If such a critical extension is found and *
>>>
>>>         *is not recognized, the whole OCSP response MUST be
>>>         considered as *
>>>
>>>         *invalid.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *If the checking time is the current time, and if a nonce
>>>         extension *
>>>
>>>         *has been used in the request and is recognized (see section
>>>         4.5.1), *
>>>
>>>         *OCSP clients MUST check whether the same nonce is present in
>>>         the *
>>>
>>>         *response.If the nonce is not present or is different, then the *
>>>
>>>         *OCSP response MUST be discarded.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *Only the single response(s) which are/is of interest SHALL be *
>>>
>>>         *checked.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *STEP 1*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *OCSP clients or verifiers SHALL verify that the certificate *
>>>
>>>         *identified in a single response is of interest.Otherwise,
>>>         proceed *
>>>
>>>         *to step 3.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *If the certificate status included in a single certificate
>>>         response *
>>>
>>>         *is "unknown", then the revocation status of that certificate
>>>         is *
>>>
>>>         *"unknown", and proceed to step 3.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *If the certificate status from the single certificate
>>>         response is *
>>>
>>>         *either "good" or "revoked", OCSP clients or verifiers SHALL
>>>         check *
>>>
>>>         *that the checking time is within the validity period of the
>>>         target *
>>>
>>>         *certificate.If it is not the case, then the revocation
>>>         status of *
>>>
>>>         *that certificate is "unknown" and proceed to step 3.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *If the checking time is the current time, and if a nonce has
>>>         been *
>>>
>>>         *used in the request, then proceed to step 2.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *If the checking time is the current time, and if no nonce
>>>         has been *
>>>
>>>         *used in the request, OCSP clients MUST check that the
>>>         producedAt*
>>>
>>>         *field is within a time window that is "close enough" to the
>>>         current *
>>>
>>>         *time. *
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *Note: the notion of "close enough" is a local matter.It can
>>>         be set *
>>>
>>>         *to a few minutes to allow for small UTC time differences *
>>>
>>>         *between the client and the server or to a few hours in case *
>>>
>>>         *the server is producing pre-computed responses.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *If the checking time is a time in the past, verifiers MUST
>>>         check *
>>>
>>>         *that the producedAt field is in accordance with the
>>>         verification *
>>>
>>>         *rules (e.g. close and/or after the date of a time-stamp token).*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *In addition, if the nextUpdate field is present, OCSP
>>>         clients MUST *
>>>
>>>         *check that the time which is indicated is greater than the
>>>         checking *
>>>
>>>         *time, otherwise the single response MUST be discarded.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *If checks are successful, then OCSP clients MUST process the *
>>>
>>>         *singleExtensions field, if it is present. *
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *If the criticality flag is set and the extension is not
>>>         understood, *
>>>
>>>         *then the status of the certificate shall be "unknown" and
>>>         proceed to *
>>>
>>>         *step 3.Otherwise, proceed to step 2. *
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *If the extension is understood, then the extension MUST be *
>>>
>>>         *processed.According to its content proceed either to step 2
>>>         or to *
>>>
>>>         *step 3. *
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *STEP 2*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *OCSP clients or verifiers MUST build and verify a
>>>         certification path *
>>>
>>>         *for that certificate up to a trusted root, so that they have
>>>         the *
>>>
>>>         *knowledge of the CA public key value that was used to sign the *
>>>
>>>         *target certificate.The revocation status of each certificate
>>>         of *
>>>
>>>         *that certification path (except the target certificate)
>>>         SHALL be *
>>>
>>>         *checked.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *If no path can be built or if one of the certificates of the
>>>         path is *
>>>
>>>         *revoked, then the revocation status of that certificate is
>>>         "unknown", *
>>>
>>>         *and proceed to step 3. *
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *If the certification path (except the target certificate) is
>>>         valid, *
>>>
>>>         *then two cases need to be considered:*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *a) If the responderID matches with the name or the key from
>>>         the CA *
>>>
>>>         *which has issued the target certificate, then check whether
>>>         the *
>>>
>>>         *OCSP response is signed by the same key that was used to sign *
>>>
>>>         *the target certificate.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *If it is the case, then the revocation status of that *
>>>
>>>         *certificate as indicated in the certStatus field is *
>>>
>>>         *accepted and proceed to step 3.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *If it is not the case, then the revocation status of that *
>>>
>>>         *certificate is "unknown" and proceed to step 3.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *b) If the responderID does not match with the name or the
>>>         key from *
>>>
>>>         *the CA which has issued the target certificate, then it
>>>         indicates *
>>>
>>>         *the name or the key from an OCSP Responder.Check whether there *
>>>
>>>         *exists a local rule which applies to this target certificate
>>>         to *
>>>
>>>         *verify that the signature of the BasicOCSPResponse is valid
>>>         for *
>>>
>>>         *that single response.If this rule exists, it SHALL be
>>>         followed. *
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *Otherwise check whether there is an OCSP certificate (i.e.
>>>         which *
>>>
>>>         *has both the ocspSigning OID in the extended key usage
>>>         extension *
>>>
>>>         *and the digitalSignature bit in the key usage extension)
>>>         signed *
>>>
>>>         *by the same key that was used to sign the target certificate. *
>>>
>>>         *This certificate MUST be present in the certs field from the *
>>>
>>>         *BasicOCSPResponse. *
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *If such certificate is not found or is invalid, then the *
>>>
>>>         *revocation status of that certificate is "unknown" and *
>>>
>>>         *proceed to step 3.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *If such certificate exists and if the checking time is *
>>>
>>>         *within the validity period of this certificate, then it MUST *
>>>
>>>         *be verified whether the OCSP response can be verified using *
>>>
>>>         *the public key that is present in the OCSP Certificate. *
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *If it is not the case, then the revocation status of that *
>>>
>>>         *certificate is "unknown" and proceed to step 3.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *If it is the case, then it MUST be verified that the OCSP *
>>>
>>>         *Certificate has not been revoked.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *If one of these conditions is met, then the status for the
>>>         target *
>>>
>>>         *certificate as indicated in the certStatus field is accepted, *
>>>
>>>         *otherwise the revocation status is "unknown".*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *STEP 3*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *If there exists another single certificate status response
>>>         for a *
>>>
>>>         *target certificate that is of interest, then proceed to step
>>>         1. *
>>>
>>>         *Otherwise the basic response is now processed.*
>>>
>>>         32.Third annex being proposed. This annex is important
>>>         because it provides guidance on how to build an OCSP
>>>         responder in the three cases.
>>>         Many text portions are similar, but three full texts are
>>>         provided in order to provide a better clarity for each of the
>>>         three cases.
>>>
>>>         *1. Request processing by OCSP servers*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *The behavior of an OCSP server will be different whether the
>>>         OCSP *
>>>
>>>         *server is a CA acting as an OCSP responder, is an OCSP
>>>         Responder *
>>>
>>>         *which received a delegation from one or more CAs, or is a
>>>         locally *
>>>
>>>         *trusted Responder.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *1.1. Processing by a CA acting as an OCSP responder*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *The OCSP responder SHALL maintain a list of entries. Each
>>>         entry *
>>>
>>>         *SHALL contain:*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *- the URI associated to the OCSP responder, from which the
>>>         OCSP *
>>>
>>>         *requests are received, *
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *- the DN from a CA,*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *- an issuing public key from a CA,*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *- the method(s) used to know for which subset of certificates *
>>>
>>>         *issued by the CA it is responsible for, *
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *- the method(s) used to obtain the revocation status of that *
>>>
>>>         *subset of certificates issued under that CA issuing public
>>>         key, *
>>>
>>>         *and*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *- the method used to gain access and sign with the private key *
>>>
>>>         *corresponding to the issuing public key.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *For a given URI value, the OCSP responder SHALL only use one
>>>         CA *
>>>
>>>         *key pair value. *
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *When it receives an OCSP request on that URI, the OCSP
>>>         responder *
>>>
>>>         *SHALL handle exceptions according to section 2.3. *
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *If the OCSP request contains the name of a requestor, the OCSP *
>>>
>>>         *responder SHALL verify whether there exists a locally
>>>         defined rule *
>>>
>>>         *which regulates access control.If this rule exists, it SHALL
>>>         be *
>>>
>>>         *followed.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *Then, for each target certificate, the OCSP responder SHALL
>>>         verify *
>>>
>>>         *whether both the hash of the issuer's DN and the hash of the
>>>         issuer *
>>>
>>>         *public key which are present in the request are eligible to a *
>>>
>>>         *locally defined rule which indicates that the OCSP responder
>>>         is *
>>>
>>>         *responsible to provide the revocation status of that target *
>>>
>>>         *certificate.If this rule exists, it SHALL be followed.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *Otherwise, the OCSP responder SHALL determine whether it is *
>>>
>>>         *responsible to provide the revocation status of that target *
>>>
>>>         *certificate according to the following rule.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *For each target certificate, the OCSP responder SHALL verify
>>>         whether *
>>>
>>>         *both the hash of the issuer's DN and the hash of the issuer
>>>         public *
>>>
>>>         *key which are present in the request match respectively with
>>>         the DN *
>>>
>>>         *and the hash of the public key of contained in an entry from
>>>         the *
>>>
>>>         *list of entries maintained by this OCSP responder. *
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *When there is no match, then the OCSP responder SHALL
>>>         indicate the *
>>>
>>>         *"unknown" status and proceed with the next target
>>>         certificate from *
>>>
>>>         *the OCSP request.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *When there is a match, then the OCSP responder SHALL use the
>>>         serial *
>>>
>>>         *number of the target certificate that is present in the
>>>         request and *
>>>
>>>         *determine the revocation status of that certificate
>>>         according to *
>>>
>>>         *the method(s) defined in the entry. *
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *When the revocation status is provided by the server using a
>>>         real *
>>>
>>>         *time access to a database of revocation statuses of issued *
>>>
>>>         *certificates, then the thisUpdate field SHALL be present in the*
>>>
>>>         *SingleResponse response whereas the nextUpdate field SHALL be *
>>>
>>>         *missing. *
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *Otherwise, both the thisUpdate and the nextUpdate fields
>>>         SHALL be *
>>>
>>>         *present in the SingleResponse. *
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *The time at which this response will be signed MUST be
>>>         indicated in *
>>>
>>>         *the producedAt field from the SingleResponse.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *If a singleRequestExtensions is present in the request it
>>>         MUST be *
>>>
>>>         *processed.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *If there is another target certificate present in the
>>>         request, it *
>>>
>>>         *SHALL be processed in the same way.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *If a requestExtensions is present in the request it MUST be *
>>>
>>>         *processed.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *The OCSP response MUST be signed using the CA issuing
>>>         private key.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *1.2. Processing by an OCSP Responder*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *For each CA from which the OCSP Responder has received a
>>>         delegation, *
>>>
>>>         *the OCSP Responder SHALL maintain a list of entries. *
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *Each entry SHALL contain:*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *- the URI associated to this OCSP Responder, from which the
>>>         OCSP *
>>>
>>>         *requests are received, *
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *- the DN from a CA,*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *- an issuing public key from a CA,*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *- the method(s) used to know for which subset of certificates *
>>>
>>>         *issued by the CA it is responsible for, *
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *- the method(s) used to obtain the revocation status of that *
>>>
>>>         *subset of certificates issued under that CA issuing public key,*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *- an OCSP certificate, *
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *- the OCSP public key contained in that OCSP certificate, and*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *- the method used to gain access and sign with the OCSP
>>>         private *
>>>
>>>         *key corresponding to that OCSP certificate.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *For a given URI value, the OCSP Responder SHALL only use one
>>>         OCSP *
>>>
>>>         *key pair value.Therefore there cannot be two entries with the *
>>>
>>>         *same URI value and a different OCSP public key value.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *NOTE: a BasicOCSPResponse can only be signed using a single
>>>         private *
>>>
>>>         *key. *
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *The OCSP certificate SHALL be signed by the CA issuing
>>>         private key *
>>>
>>>         *which corresponds to the issuing CA public key that is in this *
>>>
>>>         *entry.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *When it receives an OCSP request, the OCSP responder SHALL
>>>         handle *
>>>
>>>         *exceptions according to section 2.3. *
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *If the OCSP request contains the name of a requestor, the OCSP *
>>>
>>>         *responder SHALL verify whether there exists a locally
>>>         defined rule *
>>>
>>>         *which regulates access control.If this rule exists, it SHALL
>>>         be *
>>>
>>>         *followed.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *For each target certificate, the OCSP Responder SHALL verify *
>>>
>>>         *whether both the hash of the issuer's DN and the hash of the
>>>         issuer *
>>>
>>>         *public key which are present in the OCSP request match with
>>>         those *
>>>
>>>         *from an entry.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *When there is no match, then the OCSP Responder SHALL
>>>         indicate the *
>>>
>>>         *"unknown" status and proceed with the next target
>>>         certificate from *
>>>
>>>         *the OCSP request.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *When there is a match, the OCSP Responder SHALL use the serial *
>>>
>>>         *number of the target certificate this is present in the OCSP *
>>>
>>>         *request to determine the revocation status of that certificate *
>>>
>>>         *according to the method(s) indicated in the entry. *
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *When the revocation status is provided by the server using a
>>>         real *
>>>
>>>         *time access to a database of revocation statuses of issued *
>>>
>>>         *certificates, then the thisUpdate field SHALL be present in the*
>>>
>>>         *SingleResponse response whereas the nextUpdate field SHALL be *
>>>
>>>         *missing. *
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *Otherwise, both the thisUpdate and the nextUpdate fields
>>>         SHALL be *
>>>
>>>         *present in the SingleResponse. *
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *The time at which this response will be signed MUST be
>>>         indicated in *
>>>
>>>         *the producedAt field from the SingleResponse.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *If a singleRequestExtensions is present in the request it
>>>         MUST be *
>>>
>>>         *processed.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *If there is another target certificate present in the
>>>         request, it *
>>>
>>>         *SHALL be processed in the same way.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *If a requestExtensions is present in the request it SHALL be *
>>>
>>>         *processed.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *The OCSP response MUST be signed using the OCSP private key.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *Unless there is a local rule which states differently, for
>>>         every *
>>>
>>>         *target certificate which matches both with the hash of a CA
>>>         DN and an *
>>>
>>>         *issuing public key from an entry, the OCSP certificate of
>>>         that entry *
>>>
>>>         *SHALL be placed in the certs field.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *It may happen, that none of the target certificates from the
>>>         OCSP*
>>>
>>>         *request matches both with the hash of a CA DN and an issuing
>>>         public *
>>>
>>>         *key from an entry.In that case and unless a local rule states *
>>>
>>>         *differently, the certs field from the BasicOCSPResponse
>>>         SHOULD be *
>>>
>>>         *kept empty (to limit the disclose of the names of the CAs
>>>         from which *
>>>
>>>         *the OCSP Responder received a delegation from).*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *1.3. Processing by a locally trusted Responder*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *For each CA for which the locally trusted Responder is *
>>>
>>>         *authoritative, the OCSP Responder SHALL maintain a list of
>>>         entries. *
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *Each entry SHALL contain:*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *- the URI associated to this OCSP Responder, from which the
>>>         OCSP *
>>>
>>>         *requests are received, *
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *- the DN from a CA,*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *- an issuing public key from a CA,*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *- the method(s) used to know for which subset of certificates *
>>>
>>>         *issued by the CA it is responsible for, *
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *- the method(s) used to obtain the revocation status of that *
>>>
>>>         *subset of certificates issued under that CA issuing public key,*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *- the method used to gain access to the private key in order
>>>         to *
>>>
>>>         *sign the OCSP response. *
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *For a given URI value, the OCSP Responder SHALL only use one
>>>         private *
>>>
>>>         *key.Therefore there cannot be two entries with the same URI
>>>         value *
>>>
>>>         *and a different method to gain access to the appropriate
>>>         private key.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *NOTE: a BasicOCSPResponse can only be signed using a single
>>>         private *
>>>
>>>         *key. *
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *When it receives an OCSP request, the OCSP responder SHALL
>>>         handle *
>>>
>>>         *exceptions according to section 2.3. *
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *If the OCSP request contains the name of a requestor, the OCSP *
>>>
>>>         *responder SHALL verify whether there exists a locally
>>>         defined rule *
>>>
>>>         *which regulates access control.If this rule exists, it SHALL
>>>         be *
>>>
>>>         *followed.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *For each target certificate, the OCSP Responder SHALL verify *
>>>
>>>         *whether both the hash of the issuer's DN and the hash of the
>>>         issuer *
>>>
>>>         *public key which are present in the OCSP request match with
>>>         those *
>>>
>>>         *from an entry.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *When there is no match, then the OCSP Responder SHALL
>>>         indicate the *
>>>
>>>         *"unknown" status and proceed with the next target
>>>         certificate from *
>>>
>>>         *the OCSP request.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *When there is a match, the OCSP Responder SHALL use the serial *
>>>
>>>         *number of the target certificate this is present in the OCSP *
>>>
>>>         *request to determine the revocation status of that certificate *
>>>
>>>         *according to the method(s) indicated in the entry. *
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *When the revocation status is provided by the server using a
>>>         real *
>>>
>>>         *time access to a database of revocation statuses of issued *
>>>
>>>         *certificates, then the thisUpdate field SHALL be present in the*
>>>
>>>         *SingleResponse response whereas the nextUpdate field SHALL be *
>>>
>>>         *missing. *
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *Otherwise, both the thisUpdate and the nextUpdate fields
>>>         SHALL be *
>>>
>>>         *present in the SingleResponse. *
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *The time at which this response will be signed MUST be
>>>         indicated in *
>>>
>>>         *the producedAt field from the SingleResponse.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *If a singleRequestExtensions is present in the request it
>>>         MUST be *
>>>
>>>         *processed.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *If there is another target certificate present in the
>>>         request, it *
>>>
>>>         *SHALL be processed in the same way.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *If a requestExtensions is present in the request it SHALL be *
>>>
>>>         *processed.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *The OCSP response MUST be signed using the OCSP private key.*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *The certs field may contain no, one or several OCSP
>>>         certificates *
>>>
>>>         *according to local rules followed by the locally trusted
>>>         Responder.*
>>>
>>>
>>>     Not broken.
>>>
>>>     /Stefan
>>>
>>>         End of comments
>>>
>>>
>>>         Denis
>>>
>>>         _______________________________________________ pkix mailing
>>>         list pkix@ietf.org <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
>>>         https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>>>
>>
>

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The IESG has received a request from the Public-Key Infrastructure
(X.509) WG (pkix) to consider the following document:
- 'X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status
   Protocol - OCSP'
  <draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15.txt> as Proposed Standard

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2013-03-27. Exceptionally, comments may be
sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the
beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.

Abstract


   This document specifies a protocol useful in determining the current
   status of a digital certificate without requiring CRLs. Additional
   mechanisms addressing PKIX operational requirements are specified in
   separate documents. This document obsoletes RFC 2560 and RFC 6277,
   and updates RFC 5912.




The file can be obtained via
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis/

IESG discussion can be tracked via
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis/ballot/


No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.



From iesg-secretary@ietf.org  Wed Mar 13 13:08:38 2013
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The IESG has received a request from the Public-Key Infrastructure
(X.509) WG (pkix) to consider the following document:
- 'X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status
   Protocol - OCSP'
  <draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15.txt> as Proposed Standard

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2013-03-27. Exceptionally, comments may be
sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the
beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.

Abstract


   This document specifies a protocol useful in determining the current
   status of a digital certificate without requiring CRLs. Additional
   mechanisms addressing PKIX operational requirements are specified in
   separate documents. This document obsoletes RFC 2560 and RFC 6277,
   and updates RFC 5912.




The file can be obtained via
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis/

IESG discussion can be tracked via
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis/ballot/


No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.



From wwwrun@rfc-editor.org  Fri Mar 15 18:11:55 2013
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Subject: [pkix] [Editorial Errata Reported] RFC6844 (3547)
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The following errata report has been submitted for RFC6844,
"DNS Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) Resource Record".

--------------------------------------
You may review the report below and at:
http://www.rfc-editor.org/errata_search.php?rfc=6844&eid=3547

--------------------------------------
Type: Editorial
Reported by: Sean Turner <turners@ieca.com>

Section: s7.2

Original Text
-------------
auth         Reserved                [HB2011]
path         Reserved                [HB2011]
policy       Reserved                [HB2011]

Corrected Text
--------------
auth         Reserved                [RFC6844]
path         Reserved                [RFC6844]
policy       Reserved                [RFC6844]

Notes
-----
Better to use the datatracker history to find the values than the expired drafts.

Instructions:
-------------
This errata is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please
use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or
rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party (IESG)
can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary. 

--------------------------------------
RFC6844 (draft-ietf-pkix-caa-15)
--------------------------------------
Title               : DNS Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) Resource Record
Publication Date    : January 2013
Author(s)           : P. Hallam-Baker, R. Stradling
Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
Source              : Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509)
Area                : Security
Stream              : IETF
Verifying Party     : IESG

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The IANA folks asked phb/me to submit this so they'd get instructed to 
update the registry.

spt

On 3/15/13 9:17 PM, Andrew Sullivan wrote:
> I'm inclined not to call this an erratum in the draft. But the registry ought to be updated if it hasn't been.
>

From mrex@sap.com  Fri Mar 15 21:28:00 2013
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To: Erwann Abalea <eabalea@gmail.com>
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From: mrex@sap.com (Martin Rex)
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Subject: Re: [pkix] timestamp signature validation
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Erwann Abalea wrote:
> 
> A dark corner from RFC2634. SigningCertificate attribute contains a
> sequence of ESSCertID, and usually this sequence is composed of only one
> certificate.

There seem to be more dark areas that just "corners" in rfc2634
and its alleged update rfc5035.

The first thing that puzzles me: why does ESSCertID use such
an extremely awkward "ESSCertID"?

http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2634#page-48


   ESSCertID ::=  SEQUENCE {
        certHash                 Hash,
        issuerSerial             IssuerSerial OPTIONAL
   }

   Hash ::= OCTET STRING -- SHA1 hash of entire certificate

   IssuerSerial ::= SEQUENCE {
        issuer                   GeneralNames,
        serialNumber             CertificateSerialNumber
   }

   When creating an ESSCertID, the certHash is computed over the entire
   DER encoded certificate including the signature. The issuerSerial
   would normally be present unless the value can be inferred from other
   information.

   When encoding IssuerSerial, serialNumber is the serial number that
   uniquely identifies the certificate. For non-attribute certificates,
   the issuer MUST contain only the issuer name from the certificate
   encoded in the directoryName choice of GeneralNames. For attribute
   certificates, the issuer MUST contain the issuer name field from the
   attribute certificate.


It says:

"... the isser MUST contain only the issuer name from the certificate
encoded in the directoryName choice of GeneralNames"

But that seems non sensical.

The definition of GeneralNames from rfc5280 looks like this:

   GeneralNames ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName

so GeneralNames does _not_ contain a CHOICE.
There may be a (close to) inifinite number of GeneralName types
contained in that GeneralNames sequence, but that seems awkward.

Looking at what values issuer can have in certs (from 5280 again):

  TBSCertificate  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
       version         [0]  Version DEFAULT v1,
       serialNumber         CertificateSerialNumber,
       signature            AlgorithmIdentifier,
*>     issuer               Name,
       validity             Validity,
       subject              Name,
       subjectPublicKeyInfo SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
       issuerUniqueID  [1]  IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL,
                            -- If present, version MUST be v2 or v3
       subjectUniqueID [2]  IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL,
                            -- If present, version MUST be v2 or v3
       extensions      [3]  Extensions OPTIONAL
                            -- If present, version MUST be v3 --  }

or in CRLs:

  TBSCertList  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
       version                 Version OPTIONAL,
                                   -- if present, MUST be v2
       signature               AlgorithmIdentifier,
*>     issuer                  Name,
       thisUpdate              Time,
       nextUpdate              Time OPTIONAL,
       revokedCertificates     SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE  {
            userCertificate         CertificateSerialNumber,
            revocationDate          Time,
            crlEntryExtensions      Extensions OPTIONAL
                                     -- if present, version MUST be v2
                                 }  OPTIONAL,
       crlExtensions           [0] Extensions OPTIONAL }
                                     -- if present, version MUST be v2

And looking at how CMS (rfc2630) defined IssuerAndSerial

      IssuerAndSerialNumber ::= SEQUENCE {
*>      issuer Name,
        serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber }

      CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER


I fall to understand why ESSCertID uses something so extremely complicated
as a "SEQUENCE of GeneralName", where everyone else has been using "Name"?


It gets even weirder in rfc5035:

        ESSCertIDv2 ::=  SEQUENCE {
            hashAlgorithm           AlgorithmIdentifier
                   DEFAULT {algorithm id-sha256},
            certHash                 Hash,
            issuerSerial             IssuerSerial OPTIONAL
        }


I'm puzzled why rfc5035 defines ESSCertIDv2 in a fashion that it is
thoroughly binary incompatible with ESSCertID from rfc2634?

Had it used "DEFAULT {algorithm id-sha1}," instead, then it would
share the same ASN.1 DER encoding with ESSCertID from rfc2634 when
SHA-1 is used for the hash, vaguely similar how the Validity in
X.509v3 certificates is being slowly migrated from UTCTime to a subset
of GeneralizedTime.


-Martin

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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: IETF PKIX <pkix@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] timestamp signature validation
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Date: Sat, 16 Mar 2013 06:08:28 +0000
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Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com> writes:=0A=
=0A=
>The first thing that puzzles me: why does ESSCertID use such an extremely=
=0A=
>awkward "ESSCertID"?=0A=
=0A=
The PKIX charter explicitly prohibits doing anything in a logical,=0A=
straightforward way (look at... well, I hardly know where to start in terms=
 of=0A=
referencing RFCs for this, there's so many).  However the issue has been=0A=
quickly resolved (as have many other of the more awkward requirements in RF=
Cs)=0A=
by everyone agreeing that an ESSCertID is:=0A=
=0A=
  ESSCertID ::=3D  SEQUENCE { certHash OCTET STRING SIZE(20) -- SHA1 hash }=
=0A=
=0A=
>I'm puzzled why rfc5035 defines ESSCertIDv2 in a fashion that it is=0A=
>thoroughly binary incompatible with ESSCertID from rfc2634?=0A=
=0A=
See above.  As an implementer you just deal with these things and move on,=
=0A=
it's not worth breaking your head over it.=0A=
=0A=
Peter.=0A=

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Subject: Re: [pkix] timestamp signature validation
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2013/3/16 Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>:
> Erwann Abalea wrote:
>>
>> A dark corner from RFC2634. SigningCertificate attribute contains a
>> sequence of ESSCertID, and usually this sequence is composed of only one
>> certificate.
>
> There seem to be more dark areas that just "corners" in rfc2634
> and its alleged update rfc5035.
>
> The first thing that puzzles me: why does ESSCertID use such
> an extremely awkward "ESSCertID"?
>
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2634#page-48
>
>
>    ESSCertID ::=  SEQUENCE {
>         certHash                 Hash,
>         issuerSerial             IssuerSerial OPTIONAL
>    }
>
>    Hash ::= OCTET STRING -- SHA1 hash of entire certificate
>
>    IssuerSerial ::= SEQUENCE {
>         issuer                   GeneralNames,
>         serialNumber             CertificateSerialNumber
>    }
>
>    When creating an ESSCertID, the certHash is computed over the entire
>    DER encoded certificate including the signature. The issuerSerial
>    would normally be present unless the value can be inferred from other
>    information.
>
>    When encoding IssuerSerial, serialNumber is the serial number that
>    uniquely identifies the certificate. For non-attribute certificates,
>    the issuer MUST contain only the issuer name from the certificate
>    encoded in the directoryName choice of GeneralNames. For attribute
>    certificates, the issuer MUST contain the issuer name field from the
>    attribute certificate.
>
>
> It says:
>
> "... the isser MUST contain only the issuer name from the certificate
> encoded in the directoryName choice of GeneralNames"
>
> But that seems non sensical.
>
> The definition of GeneralNames from rfc5280 looks like this:
>
>    GeneralNames ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName
>
> so GeneralNames does _not_ contain a CHOICE.

GeneralNames is a SEQUENCE of GeneralName, and GeneralName is a CHOICE
(among them, directoryName, of type Name).

> There may be a (close to) inifinite number of GeneralName types
> contained in that GeneralNames sequence, but that seems awkward.
>
> Looking at what values issuer can have in certs (from 5280 again):
>
>   TBSCertificate  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
>        version         [0]  Version DEFAULT v1,
>        serialNumber         CertificateSerialNumber,
>        signature            AlgorithmIdentifier,
> *>     issuer               Name,
>        validity             Validity,
>        subject              Name,
>        subjectPublicKeyInfo SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
>        issuerUniqueID  [1]  IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL,
>                             -- If present, version MUST be v2 or v3
>        subjectUniqueID [2]  IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL,
>                             -- If present, version MUST be v2 or v3
>        extensions      [3]  Extensions OPTIONAL
>                             -- If present, version MUST be v3 --  }
>
> or in CRLs:
>
>   TBSCertList  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
>        version                 Version OPTIONAL,
>                                    -- if present, MUST be v2
>        signature               AlgorithmIdentifier,
> *>     issuer                  Name,
>        thisUpdate              Time,
>        nextUpdate              Time OPTIONAL,
>        revokedCertificates     SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE  {
>             userCertificate         CertificateSerialNumber,
>             revocationDate          Time,
>             crlEntryExtensions      Extensions OPTIONAL
>                                      -- if present, version MUST be v2
>                                  }  OPTIONAL,
>        crlExtensions           [0] Extensions OPTIONAL }
>                                      -- if present, version MUST be v2
>
> And looking at how CMS (rfc2630) defined IssuerAndSerial
>
>       IssuerAndSerialNumber ::= SEQUENCE {
> *>      issuer Name,
>         serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber }
>
>       CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER
>
> I fall to understand why ESSCertID uses something so extremely complicated
> as a "SEQUENCE of GeneralName", where everyone else has been using "Name"?

True. But after all, when you encode the AuthorityKeyIdentifier
extension, the authorityCertIssuer is also of GeneralNames type.

> It gets even weirder in rfc5035:
>
>         ESSCertIDv2 ::=  SEQUENCE {
>             hashAlgorithm           AlgorithmIdentifier
>                    DEFAULT {algorithm id-sha256},
>             certHash                 Hash,
>             issuerSerial             IssuerSerial OPTIONAL
>         }
>
>
> I'm puzzled why rfc5035 defines ESSCertIDv2 in a fashion that it is
> thoroughly binary incompatible with ESSCertID from rfc2634?
>
> Had it used "DEFAULT {algorithm id-sha1}," instead, then it would
> share the same ASN.1 DER encoding with ESSCertID from rfc2634 when
> SHA-1 is used for the hash, vaguely similar how the Validity in
> X.509v3 certificates is being slowly migrated from UTCTime to a subset
> of GeneralizedTime.

True again.

-- 
Erwann.

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I'm inclined not to call this an erratum in the draft. But the registry ough=
t to be updated if it hasn't been.=20

--=20
Andrew Sullivan=20
Please excuse my clumbsy thums.=20

On 2013-03-15, at 21:11, RFC Errata System <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org> wrote=
:

> The following errata report has been submitted for RFC6844,
> "DNS Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) Resource Record".
>=20
> --------------------------------------
> You may review the report below and at:
> http://www.rfc-editor.org/errata_search.php?rfc=3D6844&eid=3D3547
>=20
> --------------------------------------
> Type: Editorial
> Reported by: Sean Turner <turners@ieca.com>
>=20
> Section: s7.2
>=20
> Original Text
> -------------
> auth         Reserved                [HB2011]
> path         Reserved                [HB2011]
> policy       Reserved                [HB2011]
>=20
> Corrected Text
> --------------
> auth         Reserved                [RFC6844]
> path         Reserved                [RFC6844]
> policy       Reserved                [RFC6844]
>=20
> Notes
> -----
> Better to use the datatracker history to find the values than the expired d=
rafts.
>=20
> Instructions:
> -------------
> This errata is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please
> use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or
> rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party (IESG)
> can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary.=20
>=20
> --------------------------------------
> RFC6844 (draft-ietf-pkix-caa-15)
> --------------------------------------
> Title               : DNS Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) Reso=
urce Record
> Publication Date    : January 2013
> Author(s)           : P. Hallam-Baker, R. Stradling
> Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
> Source              : Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509)
> Area                : Security
> Stream              : IETF
> Verifying Party     : IESG
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix

From ajs@crankycanuck.ca  Fri Mar 15 18:52:36 2013
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Subject: Re: [pkix] [Editorial Errata Reported] RFC6844 (3547)
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Hrm.  Well, I can see that, I guess. No objection, then.=20

--=20
Andrew Sullivan=20
Please excuse my clumbsy thums.=20

On 2013-03-15, at 21:34, Sean Turner <turners@ieca.com> wrote:

> The IANA folks asked phb/me to submit this so they'd get instructed to upd=
ate the registry.
>=20
> spt
>=20
> On 3/15/13 9:17 PM, Andrew Sullivan wrote:
>> I'm inclined not to call this an erratum in the draft. But the registry o=
ught to be updated if it hasn't been.
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix

From mrex@sap.com  Mon Mar 18 10:49:38 2013
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To: Erwann Abalea <eabalea@gmail.com>
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From: mrex@sap.com (Martin Rex)
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Subject: Re: [pkix] timestamp signature validation
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Erwann Abalea wrote:
> Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>:
> >
> > http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2634#page-48
> >
> >
> >    ESSCertID ::=  SEQUENCE {
> >         certHash                 Hash,
> >         issuerSerial             IssuerSerial OPTIONAL
> >    }
> >
> >    Hash ::= OCTET STRING -- SHA1 hash of entire certificate
> >
> >    IssuerSerial ::= SEQUENCE {
> >         issuer                   GeneralNames,
> >         serialNumber             CertificateSerialNumber
> >    }
> >
> >    When creating an ESSCertID, the certHash is computed over the entire
> >    DER encoded certificate including the signature. The issuerSerial
> >    would normally be present unless the value can be inferred from other
> >    information.
> >
> >    When encoding IssuerSerial, serialNumber is the serial number that
> >    uniquely identifies the certificate. For non-attribute certificates,
> >    the issuer MUST contain only the issuer name from the certificate
> >    encoded in the directoryName choice of GeneralNames. For attribute
> >    certificates, the issuer MUST contain the issuer name field from the
> >    attribute certificate.
> >
>
> > I fall to understand why ESSCertID uses something so extremely complicated
> > as a "SEQUENCE of GeneralName", where everyone else has been using "Name"?
> 
> True. But after all, when you encode the AuthorityKeyIdentifier
> extension, the authorityCertIssuer is also of GeneralNames type.

Did you notice the MUST requirements in the second paragraph,
that I quoted from rfc2634 (setences 2+3)?

rfc2634 does not allow anything else than the "issuer  Name,"
from TBSCertificate to appear in issuerSerial of ESSCertID.

-Martin

From DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil  Mon Mar 18 12:28:22 2013
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From: "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>
To: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] timestamp signature validation
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If you want to be less complex (restrict issuer names to directory name onl=
y) it's easy to profile the ESS syntax to do so.

If the ESS syntax said "Name", it would be impossible to use anything else =
(such as rfc822Name) if issuer SANs later became fashionable.

Usage should be determined by policy; syntax strives to be policy-neutral.



-----Original Message-----
From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Mar=
tin Rex
Sent: Monday, March 18, 2013 1:49 PM
To: Erwann Abalea
Cc: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] timestamp signature validation

Erwann Abalea wrote:
> Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>:
> >
> > http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2634#page-48
> >
> >
> >    ESSCertID ::=3D  SEQUENCE {
> >         certHash                 Hash,
> >         issuerSerial             IssuerSerial OPTIONAL
> >    }
> >
> >    Hash ::=3D OCTET STRING -- SHA1 hash of entire certificate
> >
> >    IssuerSerial ::=3D SEQUENCE {
> >         issuer                   GeneralNames,
> >         serialNumber             CertificateSerialNumber
> >    }
> >
> >    When creating an ESSCertID, the certHash is computed over the entire
> >    DER encoded certificate including the signature. The issuerSerial
> >    would normally be present unless the value can be inferred from othe=
r
> >    information.
> >
> >    When encoding IssuerSerial, serialNumber is the serial number that
> >    uniquely identifies the certificate. For non-attribute certificates,
> >    the issuer MUST contain only the issuer name from the certificate
> >    encoded in the directoryName choice of GeneralNames. For attribute
> >    certificates, the issuer MUST contain the issuer name field from the
> >    attribute certificate.
> >
>
> > I fall to understand why ESSCertID uses something so extremely=20
> > complicated as a "SEQUENCE of GeneralName", where everyone else has bee=
n using "Name"?
>=20
> True. But after all, when you encode the AuthorityKeyIdentifier=20
> extension, the authorityCertIssuer is also of GeneralNames type.

Did you notice the MUST requirements in the second paragraph, that I quoted=
 from rfc2634 (setences 2+3)?

rfc2634 does not allow anything else than the "issuer  Name,"
from TBSCertificate to appear in issuerSerial of ESSCertID.

-Martin
_______________________________________________
pkix mailing list
pkix@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix

From mrex@sap.com  Mon Mar 18 22:20:15 2013
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To: "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] timestamp signature validation
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Kemp, David P. wrote:
>
> If you want to be less complex (restrict issuer names to directory
> name only) it's easy to profile the ESS syntax to do so.

rfc2634 _already_ contains a MUST requirement that restricts the issuer
name to directoryName only.

> 
> If the ESS syntax said "Name", it would be impossible to use anything
> else (such as rfc822Name) if issuer SANs later became fashionable.

As far as rfc2634 is concerned, that is _de_facto_ impossible.

It has to be expected that conforming implementations will properly
enforce the rfc2634 "MUST contain only the issuer name from the
certificate encoded in the directoryName choice" and reject ESSCertIDs
that contains anything else than directroyName.


> 
> Usage should be determined by policy; syntax strives to be policy-neutral.

That is only possible when the semantics are well-defined from the
beginning, i.e. what is allowed to be present, and what to do with
it when an implementation does not recognize/support that data.

For rfc2634 the situation is brief and clear: only directoryName is
permitted, this is a MUST requirement, so any other content MUST
result in the complete rejection of the ESSCertID.

-Martin

From prvs=0790d06f14=rybar@nbusr.sk  Tue Mar 19 03:13:41 2013
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Dear All,

=20

I would like to ask you, where are defined in some sub-clauses of  =
Clause 6 "Certification Path Validation" of RFC 5280 the final steps of =
certificate policy processing which are equivalent to steps defined in =
the Clause 10.5.4 "Final processing" in "Certification path processing =
procedure" of ITU-T Rec. X.509 (11/2008)?

http://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.509-200811-I/en

=20

10.5.4 Final processing of ITU-T Rec. X.509

"

a) Determine the authorities-constrained-policy-set from the =
authorities-constrained-policy-set table. If the table is empty, then =
the authorities-constrained-policy-set is the empty or null set. If the =
authorities-constrained-policy-set[0, path-depth] is any-policy, then =
the authorities-constrained-policy-set is any-policy. Otherwise, the =
authorities-constrained-policy-set is, for each row in the table, the =
value in the left-most cell which does not contain the identifier =
any-policy.

b) Calculate the user-constrained-policy-set by forming the intersection =
of the authorities-constrained-policy-set and the initial-policy-set.=20

c) If the explicit-policy-indicator is set, check that neither the =
authorities-constrained-policy-set nor the user-constrained-policy-set =
is empty.

"

=20

According to ITU-T Rec. X.509 we have two results when =
explicit-policy-indicator is set:

authorities-constrained-policy-set

user-constrained-policy-set

=20

Are also defined such results in RFC 5280 and where?

=20

Peter Rybar
National Security Authority
Information Security and Electronic Signature Department

Budatinska 30, 850 07 Bratislava 57, Slovak Republic
tel.: +421 2 6869 2163
mob.: +421 902 891 155
fax: +421 2 6869 1701
e-mail: peter.rybar@nbusr.sk
e-mail: peterryb@gmail.com

=20


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<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>Dear All,<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>I would like to ask you, where are defined in =
some sub-clauses
of =C2=A0Clause 6 &quot;Certification Path Validation&quot; of RFC 5280 =
the final
steps of certificate policy processing which are equivalent to steps =
defined in
the Clause 10.5.4 &quot;Final processing&quot; in &quot;Certification =
path
processing procedure&quot; of ITU-T Rec. X.509 =
(11/2008)?<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><a
href=3D"http://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.509-200811-I/en">http://www.itu.in=
t/rec/T-REC-X.509-200811-I/en</a><o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>10.5.4 Final processing of ITU-T Rec. =
X.509<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>&quot;<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>a) Determine the =
authorities-constrained-policy-set
from the authorities-constrained-policy-set table. If the table is =
empty, then
the authorities-constrained-policy-set is the empty or null set. If the
authorities-constrained-policy-set[0, path-depth] is any-policy, then =
the
authorities-constrained-policy-set is any-policy. Otherwise, the
authorities-constrained-policy-set is, for each row in the table, the =
value in
the left-most cell which does not contain the identifier =
any-policy.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>b) Calculate the user-constrained-policy-set =
by
forming the intersection of the authorities-constrained-policy-set and =
the
initial-policy-set. <o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>c) If the explicit-policy-indicator is set, =
check that
neither the authorities-constrained-policy-set nor the =
user-constrained-policy-set
is empty.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>&quot;<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>According to ITU-T Rec. X.509 we have two =
results when
explicit-policy-indicator is set:<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>authorities-constrained-policy-set<o:p></o:p><=
/span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>user-constrained-policy-set<o:p></o:p></span><=
/font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>Are also defined such results in RFC 5280 and =
where?<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
lang=3DEN-US
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><st1:PersonName ProductID=3D"Peter Rybar" =
w:st=3D"on"><font
 size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial'>Peter =
Rybar</span></font></st1:PersonName><br>
<font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial'>National
Security Authority<br>
Information Security and Electronic Signature =
Department</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'>Budatinska 30, 850 07 Bratislava 57, Slovak =
Republic<br>
tel.: +421 2 6869 2163<br>
mob.: +421 902 891 155<br>
fax: +421 2 6869 1701<br>
e-mail: <a =
href=3D"mailto:peter.rybar@nbusr.sk">peter.rybar@nbusr.sk</a><br>
e-mail: <a =
href=3D"mailto:peterryb@gmail.com">peterryb@gmail.com</a></span></font><o=
:p></o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D3 face=3D"Times New Roman"><span =
style=3D'font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

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From bilal.ashraf@ascertia.com  Tue Mar 19 04:25:07 2013
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Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2013 16:23:57 +0500
From: Bilal Ashraf <bilal.ashraf@ascertia.com>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Two results when explicit-policy-indicator is set
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Hi,

In RFC 5280, section 6.1.5. Wrap-Up Procedure, before computation of=20
6.1.5 (g), the value of valid_policy_tree is basically the=20
authorities-constrained-policy-set. After intersection of=20
valid_policy_tree (i.e. authorities-constrained-policy-set) with the=20
user-initial-policy-set in 6.1.5 (g), the resultant value will be=20
user-constrained-policy-set.

Hope this works.

Regards,
Bilal.

On 3/19/2013 3:13 PM, Peter Rybar wrote:
>
> Dear All,
>
> I would like to ask you, where are defined in some sub-clauses of=20
>  Clause 6 "Certification Path Validation" of RFC 5280 the final steps=20
> of certificate policy processing which are equivalent to steps defined =

> in the Clause 10.5.4 "Final processing" in "Certification path=20
> processing procedure" of ITU-T Rec. X.509 (11/2008)?
>
> http://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.509-200811-I/en
>
> 10.5.4 Final processing of ITU-T Rec. X.509
>
> "
>
> a) Determine the authorities-constrained-policy-set from the=20
> authorities-constrained-policy-set table. If the table is empty, then=20
> the authorities-constrained-policy-set is the empty or null set. If=20
> the authorities-constrained-policy-set[0, path-depth] is any-policy,=20
> then the authorities-constrained-policy-set is any-policy. Otherwise,=20
> the authorities-constrained-policy-set is, for each row in the table,=20
> the value in the left-most cell which does not contain the identifier=20
> any-policy.
>
> b) Calculate the user-constrained-policy-set by forming the=20
> intersection of the authorities-constrained-policy-set and the=20
> initial-policy-set.
>
> c) If the explicit-policy-indicator is set, check that neither the=20
> authorities-constrained-policy-set nor the user-constrained-policy-set =

> is empty.
>
> "
>
> According to ITU-T Rec. X.509 we have two results when=20
> explicit-policy-indicator is set:
>
> authorities-constrained-policy-set
>
> user-constrained-policy-set
>
> Are also defined such results in RFC 5280 and where?
>
> Peter Rybar
> National Security Authority
> Information Security and Electronic Signature Department
>
> Budatinska 30, 850 07 Bratislava 57, Slovak Republic
> tel.: +421 2 6869 2163
> mob.: +421 902 891 155
> fax: +421 2 6869 1701
> e-mail: peter.rybar@nbusr.sk <mailto:peter.rybar@nbusr.sk>
> e-mail: peterryb@gmail.com <mailto:peterryb@gmail.com>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix


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    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">Hi,<br>
      <br>
      In RFC 5280, section 6.1.5. Wrap-Up Procedure, before computation
      of 6.1.5 (g), the value of valid_policy_tree is basically the
      authorities-constrained-policy-set. After intersection of
      valid_policy_tree (i.e. authorities-constrained-policy-set) with
      the user-initial-policy-set in 6.1.5 (g), the resultant value will
      be user-constrained-policy-set.<br>
      <br>
      Hope this works.<br>
      <br>
      Regards,<br>
      Bilal.<br>
      <br>
      On 3/19/2013 3:13 PM, Peter Rybar wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote cite="mid:201303191013.r2JADbD1099451@mail.nbusr.sk"
      type="cite">
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        <div class="Section1">
          <p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Times New Roman" size="3"><span
                style="font-size:12.0pt" lang="EN-US">Dear All,<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
          <p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Times New Roman" size="3"><span
                style="font-size:12.0pt" lang="EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>
          <p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Times New Roman" size="3"><span
                style="font-size:12.0pt" lang="EN-US">I would like to
                ask you, where are defined in some sub-clauses
                of &nbsp;Clause 6 "Certification Path Validation" of RFC 5280
                the final
                steps of certificate policy processing which are
                equivalent to steps defined in
                the Clause 10.5.4 "Final processing" in "Certification
                path
                processing procedure" of ITU-T Rec. X.509 (11/2008)?<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
          <p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Times New Roman" size="3"><span
                style="font-size:12.0pt" lang="EN-US"><a
                  moz-do-not-send="true"
                  href="http://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.509-200811-I/en">http://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.509-200811-I/en</a><o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
          <p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Times New Roman" size="3"><span
                style="font-size:12.0pt" lang="EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>
          <p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Times New Roman" size="3"><span
                style="font-size:12.0pt" lang="EN-US">10.5.4 Final
                processing of ITU-T Rec. X.509<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
          <p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Times New Roman" size="3"><span
                style="font-size:12.0pt" lang="EN-US">"<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
          <p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Times New Roman" size="3"><span
                style="font-size:12.0pt" lang="EN-US">a) Determine the
                authorities-constrained-policy-set
                from the authorities-constrained-policy-set table. If
                the table is empty, then
                the authorities-constrained-policy-set is the empty or
                null set. If the
                authorities-constrained-policy-set[0, path-depth] is
                any-policy, then the
                authorities-constrained-policy-set is any-policy.
                Otherwise, the
                authorities-constrained-policy-set is, for each row in
                the table, the value in
                the left-most cell which does not contain the identifier
                any-policy.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
          <p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Times New Roman" size="3"><span
                style="font-size:12.0pt" lang="EN-US">b) Calculate the
                user-constrained-policy-set by
                forming the intersection of the
                authorities-constrained-policy-set and the
                initial-policy-set. <o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
          <p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Times New Roman" size="3"><span
                style="font-size:12.0pt" lang="EN-US">c) If the
                explicit-policy-indicator is set, check that
                neither the authorities-constrained-policy-set nor the
                user-constrained-policy-set
                is empty.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
          <p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Times New Roman" size="3"><span
                style="font-size:12.0pt" lang="EN-US">"<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
          <p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Times New Roman" size="3"><span
                style="font-size:12.0pt" lang="EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>
          <p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Times New Roman" size="3"><span
                style="font-size:12.0pt" lang="EN-US">According to ITU-T
                Rec. X.509 we have two results when
                explicit-policy-indicator is set:<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
          <p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Times New Roman" size="3"><span
                style="font-size:12.0pt" lang="EN-US">authorities-constrained-policy-set<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
          <p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Times New Roman" size="3"><span
                style="font-size:12.0pt" lang="EN-US">user-constrained-policy-set<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
          <p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Times New Roman" size="3"><span
                style="font-size:12.0pt" lang="EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>
          <p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Times New Roman" size="3"><span
                style="font-size:12.0pt" lang="EN-US">Are also defined
                such results in RFC 5280 and where?<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
          <p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Times New Roman" size="3"><span
                style="font-size:12.0pt" lang="EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>
          <p class="MsoNormal"><st1:personname productid="Peter Rybar"
              w:st="on"><font face="Arial" size="2"><span
                  style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial">Peter Rybar</span></font></st1:personname><br>
            <font face="Arial" size="2"><span
                style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial">National
                Security Authority<br>
                Information Security and Electronic Signature Department</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>
          <p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Arial" size="2"><span
                style="font-size:10.0pt;
                font-family:Arial">Budatinska 30, 850 07 Bratislava 57,
                Slovak Republic<br>
                tel.: +421 2 6869 2163<br>
                mob.: +421 902 891 155<br>
                fax: +421 2 6869 1701<br>
                e-mail: <a moz-do-not-send="true"
                  href="mailto:peter.rybar@nbusr.sk">peter.rybar@nbusr.sk</a><br>
                e-mail: <a moz-do-not-send="true"
                  href="mailto:peterryb@gmail.com">peterryb@gmail.com</a></span></font><o:p></o:p></p>
          <p class="MsoNormal"><font face="Times New Roman" size="3"><span
                style="font-size:
                12.0pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>
        </div>
        <br>
        <fieldset class="mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
        <br>
        <pre wrap="">_______________________________________________
pkix mailing list
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From: mrex@sap.com (Martin Rex)
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Last Call: <draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15.txt> (X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP) to Proposed Standard
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The IESG wrote:
> 
> The IESG has received a request from the Public-Key Infrastructure
> (X.509) WG (pkix) to consider the following document:
> - 'X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status
>    Protocol - OCSP'
>   <draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15.txt> as Proposed Standard
> 
> The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
> final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
> ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2013-03-27.

I'm having an issue with a subtle, backwards-incompatible change
of the semantics of the exception case with the error code
"unauthorized", which tries to rewrite history 13 years into the
without actually fitting the OCSP spec.

It's about the second change from the introduction:

     o  Section 2.3 extends the use of the "unauthorized" error
         response, as specified in [RFC5019].

While it is true that the error code abuse originally first appeared
in rfc5019, the change was never declared as an update to rfc2560,
nor filed as an errata to rfc2560.

The original Exception cases in rfc2560 define the following semantics:

  http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2560#section-2.3

   2.3 Exception Cases

   In case of errors, the OCSP Responder may return an error message.
   These messages are not signed. Errors can be of the following types:

   -- malformedRequest
   -- internalError
   -- tryLater
   -- sigRequired
   -- unauthorized

 [...]

   The response "sigRequired" is returned in cases where the server
   requires the client sign the request in order to construct a
   response.

   The response "unauthorized" is returned in cases where the client is
   not authorized to make this query to this server.


The proposed "extended" semantics from the rfc2560bis draft:

  http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15#page-9

   The response "unauthorized" is returned in cases where the client is
   not authorized to make this query to this server or the server is not
   capable of responding authoritatively (cf. [RFC5019], Section 2.2.3).

The rfc5019 semantics "The server can not provide an authoritative response
to this specific request" is incompatible with the semantics "you are not
authorized to sumbit OCSP requests to this service".

There is another serious conflict with the rfc5019 repurposed error code
semantics and rfc2560.  While rfc5019 is limited to a single status request,
rfc2560 and rfc2560bis both allow a list of several Requests to
be sent in a single OCSPRequest PDU.  An OCSP response, however, is
not allowed to contain responseBytes when an error code is returned
inthe response status:

  http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15#section-4.2.1

   4.2.1 ASN.1 Specification of the OCSP Response

   An OCSP response at a minimum consists of a responseStatus field
   indicating the processing status of the prior request. If the value
   of responseStatus is one of the error conditions, responseBytes are
   not set.

   OCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
      responseStatus         OCSPResponseStatus,
      responseBytes          [0] EXPLICIT ResponseBytes OPTIONAL }


So it is impossible to convey "OCSP responder is not capable of
responding authoritatively" for a subset of Requests in the requestList
and regular status for the remaining Requests in the List by using
a repurposed "unauthorized" error code.

The current draft neither mention this contradiction, nor does it
provide any guidance how an implementation should behave in this
situation.
 

I would appreciate if this problem of draft-*-rfc2560bis could be fixed
prior to making it a successor for rfc2560.


-Martin

From stefan@aaa-sec.com  Mon Mar 25 19:35:47 2013
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From: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>
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Martin,

Whether we like it or not. This is the legacy.
There is no way for a client to know whether the OCSP responder implements
RFC 2560 only or in combination with RFC 5019.

So therefore, the update that was introduced in 5019 must be expected by
all clients from all responders. Therefore it is included in 2560bis.

What in your mind, would be a better solution?

/Stefan

On 3/23/13 7:52 AM, "Martin Rex" <mrex@sap.com> wrote:

>The IESG wrote:
>> 
>> The IESG has received a request from the Public-Key Infrastructure
>> (X.509) WG (pkix) to consider the following document:
>> - 'X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status
>>    Protocol - OCSP'
>>   <draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15.txt> as Proposed Standard
>> 
>> The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
>> final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
>> ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2013-03-27.
>
>I'm having an issue with a subtle, backwards-incompatible change
>of the semantics of the exception case with the error code
>"unauthorized", which tries to rewrite history 13 years into the
>without actually fitting the OCSP spec.
>
>It's about the second change from the introduction:
>
>     o  Section 2.3 extends the use of the "unauthorized" error
>         response, as specified in [RFC5019].
>
>While it is true that the error code abuse originally first appeared
>in rfc5019, the change was never declared as an update to rfc2560,
>nor filed as an errata to rfc2560.
>
>The original Exception cases in rfc2560 define the following semantics:
>
>  http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2560#section-2.3
>
>   2.3 Exception Cases
>
>   In case of errors, the OCSP Responder may return an error message.
>   These messages are not signed. Errors can be of the following types:
>
>   -- malformedRequest
>   -- internalError
>   -- tryLater
>   -- sigRequired
>   -- unauthorized
>
> [...]
>
>   The response "sigRequired" is returned in cases where the server
>   requires the client sign the request in order to construct a
>   response.
>
>   The response "unauthorized" is returned in cases where the client is
>   not authorized to make this query to this server.
>
>
>The proposed "extended" semantics from the rfc2560bis draft:
>
>  http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15#page-9
>
>   The response "unauthorized" is returned in cases where the client is
>   not authorized to make this query to this server or the server is not
>   capable of responding authoritatively (cf. [RFC5019], Section 2.2.3).
>
>The rfc5019 semantics "The server can not provide an authoritative
>response
>to this specific request" is incompatible with the semantics "you are not
>authorized to sumbit OCSP requests to this service".
>
>There is another serious conflict with the rfc5019 repurposed error code
>semantics and rfc2560.  While rfc5019 is limited to a single status
>request,
>rfc2560 and rfc2560bis both allow a list of several Requests to
>be sent in a single OCSPRequest PDU.  An OCSP response, however, is
>not allowed to contain responseBytes when an error code is returned
>inthe response status:
>
>  http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15#section-4.2.1
>
>   4.2.1 ASN.1 Specification of the OCSP Response
>
>   An OCSP response at a minimum consists of a responseStatus field
>   indicating the processing status of the prior request. If the value
>   of responseStatus is one of the error conditions, responseBytes are
>   not set.
>
>   OCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
>      responseStatus         OCSPResponseStatus,
>      responseBytes          [0] EXPLICIT ResponseBytes OPTIONAL }
>
>
>So it is impossible to convey "OCSP responder is not capable of
>responding authoritatively" for a subset of Requests in the requestList
>and regular status for the remaining Requests in the List by using
>a repurposed "unauthorized" error code.
>
>The current draft neither mention this contradiction, nor does it
>provide any guidance how an implementation should behave in this
>situation.
> 
>
>I would appreciate if this problem of draft-*-rfc2560bis could be fixed
>prior to making it a successor for rfc2560.
>
>
>-Martin



From mrex@sap.com  Mon Mar 25 22:28:57 2013
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From: mrex@sap.com (Martin Rex)
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Last Call: <draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15.txt> (X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP) to Proposed Standard
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Stefan Santesson wrote:
> 
> Whether we like it or not. This is the legacy.
> There is no way for a client to know whether the OCSP responder implements
> RFC 2560 only or in combination with RFC 5019.
> 
> So therefore, the update that was introduced in 5019 must be expected by
> all clients from all responders. Therefore it is included in 2560bis.
> 
> What in your mind, would be a better solution?

Simply listing two mutually exclusive semantics for a single error code
looks like a very bad idea.  The correct solution would be to assign
a new error code for the semantics desirec by rfc5019 and fix rfc5019
and its implementiations.  And then mention the rfc5019 semantics for
the error code "unauthorized" in rfc2560bis as defective and deprecated.

rfc5019 is hardwired to SHA1 for the cert hashing algorithm, so
it will need to get updated at some point already.

The second issue is to explain that the errorcode response for "can not
produce an authoritative response" is not applicable to OCSPRequests
that contain more than one element in the requestList, because the
OCSP client will not know to which elements in the request the error
code response applies.

Actually, it would be sensible to define two more new error codes,
one that indicates that the OCSP server does not support multiple
requestList entries, and one that indicates to the client that the
server does not support one of the OCSP protocol extensions requested
by the client (multiple requests is not a protocol extension).


-Martin

> On 3/23/13 7:52 AM, "Martin Rex" <mrex@sap.com> wrote:
> 
> >The IESG wrote:
> >> 
> >> The IESG has received a request from the Public-Key Infrastructure
> >> (X.509) WG (pkix) to consider the following document:
> >> - 'X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status
> >>    Protocol - OCSP'
> >>   <draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15.txt> as Proposed Standard
> >> 
> >> The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
> >> final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
> >> ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2013-03-27.
> >
> >I'm having an issue with a subtle, backwards-incompatible change
> >of the semantics of the exception case with the error code
> >"unauthorized", which tries to rewrite history 13 years into the
> >without actually fitting the OCSP spec.
> >
> >It's about the second change from the introduction:
> >
> >     o  Section 2.3 extends the use of the "unauthorized" error
> >         response, as specified in [RFC5019].
> >
> >While it is true that the error code abuse originally first appeared
> >in rfc5019, the change was never declared as an update to rfc2560,
> >nor filed as an errata to rfc2560.
> >
> >The original Exception cases in rfc2560 define the following semantics:
> >
> >  http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2560#section-2.3
> >
> >   2.3 Exception Cases
> >
> >   In case of errors, the OCSP Responder may return an error message.
> >   These messages are not signed. Errors can be of the following types:
> >
> >   -- malformedRequest
> >   -- internalError
> >   -- tryLater
> >   -- sigRequired
> >   -- unauthorized
> >
> > [...]
> >
> >   The response "sigRequired" is returned in cases where the server
> >   requires the client sign the request in order to construct a
> >   response.
> >
> >   The response "unauthorized" is returned in cases where the client is
> >   not authorized to make this query to this server.
> >
> >
> >The proposed "extended" semantics from the rfc2560bis draft:
> >
> >  http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15#page-9
> >
> >   The response "unauthorized" is returned in cases where the client is
> >   not authorized to make this query to this server or the server is not
> >   capable of responding authoritatively (cf. [RFC5019], Section 2.2.3).
> >
> >The rfc5019 semantics "The server can not provide an authoritative
> >response
> >to this specific request" is incompatible with the semantics "you are not
> >authorized to sumbit OCSP requests to this service".
> >
> >There is another serious conflict with the rfc5019 repurposed error code
> >semantics and rfc2560.  While rfc5019 is limited to a single status
> >request,
> >rfc2560 and rfc2560bis both allow a list of several Requests to
> >be sent in a single OCSPRequest PDU.  An OCSP response, however, is
> >not allowed to contain responseBytes when an error code is returned
> >inthe response status:
> >
> >  http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15#section-4.2.1
> >
> >   4.2.1 ASN.1 Specification of the OCSP Response
> >
> >   An OCSP response at a minimum consists of a responseStatus field
> >   indicating the processing status of the prior request. If the value
> >   of responseStatus is one of the error conditions, responseBytes are
> >   not set.
> >
> >   OCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
> >      responseStatus         OCSPResponseStatus,
> >      responseBytes          [0] EXPLICIT ResponseBytes OPTIONAL }
> >
> >
> >So it is impossible to convey "OCSP responder is not capable of
> >responding authoritatively" for a subset of Requests in the requestList
> >and regular status for the remaining Requests in the List by using
> >a repurposed "unauthorized" error code.
> >
> >The current draft neither mention this contradiction, nor does it
> >provide any guidance how an implementation should behave in this
> >situation.
> > 
> >
> >I would appreciate if this problem of draft-*-rfc2560bis could be fixed
> >prior to making it a successor for rfc2560.
> >
> >
> >-Martin
> 
> 

From stefan@aaa-sec.com  Tue Mar 26 01:57:16 2013
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From: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>
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Thread-Topic: [pkix] Last Call: <draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15.txt> (X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP) to Proposed Standard
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Last Call: <draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15.txt> (X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP) to Proposed Standard
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Unfortunately what you suggest would not be backwards compatible, and
can't be done within the present effort.

Responders using 5019 need to work in foreseeable time with legacy clients
that knows nothing about the update you suggest.
This group and the IETF made a decision when publishing 5019, that using
"unauthorized" in the present manner was a reasonable tradeoff.

I still think it is.

Unless you can convince the community of your course of action, I don't
see this happening.

/Stefan

On 3/26/13 6:28 AM, "Martin Rex" <mrex@sap.com> wrote:

>Stefan Santesson wrote:
>> 
>> Whether we like it or not. This is the legacy.
>> There is no way for a client to know whether the OCSP responder
>>implements
>> RFC 2560 only or in combination with RFC 5019.
>> 
>> So therefore, the update that was introduced in 5019 must be expected by
>> all clients from all responders. Therefore it is included in 2560bis.
>> 
>> What in your mind, would be a better solution?
>
>Simply listing two mutually exclusive semantics for a single error code
>looks like a very bad idea.  The correct solution would be to assign
>a new error code for the semantics desirec by rfc5019 and fix rfc5019
>and its implementiations.  And then mention the rfc5019 semantics for
>the error code "unauthorized" in rfc2560bis as defective and deprecated.
>
>rfc5019 is hardwired to SHA1 for the cert hashing algorithm, so
>it will need to get updated at some point already.
>
>The second issue is to explain that the errorcode response for "can not
>produce an authoritative response" is not applicable to OCSPRequests
>that contain more than one element in the requestList, because the
>OCSP client will not know to which elements in the request the error
>code response applies.
>
>Actually, it would be sensible to define two more new error codes,
>one that indicates that the OCSP server does not support multiple
>requestList entries, and one that indicates to the client that the
>server does not support one of the OCSP protocol extensions requested
>by the client (multiple requests is not a protocol extension).
>
>
>-Martin
>
>> On 3/23/13 7:52 AM, "Martin Rex" <mrex@sap.com> wrote:
>> 
>> >The IESG wrote:
>> >> 
>> >> The IESG has received a request from the Public-Key Infrastructure
>> >> (X.509) WG (pkix) to consider the following document:
>> >> - 'X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status
>> >>    Protocol - OCSP'
>> >>   <draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15.txt> as Proposed Standard
>> >> 
>> >> The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
>> >> final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to
>>the
>> >> ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2013-03-27.
>> >
>> >I'm having an issue with a subtle, backwards-incompatible change
>> >of the semantics of the exception case with the error code
>> >"unauthorized", which tries to rewrite history 13 years into the
>> >without actually fitting the OCSP spec.
>> >
>> >It's about the second change from the introduction:
>> >
>> >     o  Section 2.3 extends the use of the "unauthorized" error
>> >         response, as specified in [RFC5019].
>> >
>> >While it is true that the error code abuse originally first appeared
>> >in rfc5019, the change was never declared as an update to rfc2560,
>> >nor filed as an errata to rfc2560.
>> >
>> >The original Exception cases in rfc2560 define the following semantics:
>> >
>> >  http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2560#section-2.3
>> >
>> >   2.3 Exception Cases
>> >
>> >   In case of errors, the OCSP Responder may return an error message.
>> >   These messages are not signed. Errors can be of the following types:
>> >
>> >   -- malformedRequest
>> >   -- internalError
>> >   -- tryLater
>> >   -- sigRequired
>> >   -- unauthorized
>> >
>> > [...]
>> >
>> >   The response "sigRequired" is returned in cases where the server
>> >   requires the client sign the request in order to construct a
>> >   response.
>> >
>> >   The response "unauthorized" is returned in cases where the client is
>> >   not authorized to make this query to this server.
>> >
>> >
>> >The proposed "extended" semantics from the rfc2560bis draft:
>> >
>> >  http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15#page-9
>> >
>> >   The response "unauthorized" is returned in cases where the client is
>> >   not authorized to make this query to this server or the server is
>>not
>> >   capable of responding authoritatively (cf. [RFC5019], Section
>>2.2.3).
>> >
>> >The rfc5019 semantics "The server can not provide an authoritative
>> >response
>> >to this specific request" is incompatible with the semantics "you are
>>not
>> >authorized to sumbit OCSP requests to this service".
>> >
>> >There is another serious conflict with the rfc5019 repurposed error
>>code
>> >semantics and rfc2560.  While rfc5019 is limited to a single status
>> >request,
>> >rfc2560 and rfc2560bis both allow a list of several Requests to
>> >be sent in a single OCSPRequest PDU.  An OCSP response, however, is
>> >not allowed to contain responseBytes when an error code is returned
>> >inthe response status:
>> >
>> >  
>>http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15#section-4.2.1
>> >
>> >   4.2.1 ASN.1 Specification of the OCSP Response
>> >
>> >   An OCSP response at a minimum consists of a responseStatus field
>> >   indicating the processing status of the prior request. If the value
>> >   of responseStatus is one of the error conditions, responseBytes are
>> >   not set.
>> >
>> >   OCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
>> >      responseStatus         OCSPResponseStatus,
>> >      responseBytes          [0] EXPLICIT ResponseBytes OPTIONAL }
>> >
>> >
>> >So it is impossible to convey "OCSP responder is not capable of
>> >responding authoritatively" for a subset of Requests in the requestList
>> >and regular status for the remaining Requests in the List by using
>> >a repurposed "unauthorized" error code.
>> >
>> >The current draft neither mention this contradiction, nor does it
>> >provide any guidance how an implementation should behave in this
>> >situation.
>> > 
>> >
>> >I would appreciate if this problem of draft-*-rfc2560bis could be fixed
>> >prior to making it a successor for rfc2560.
>> >
>> >
>> >-Martin
>> 
>> 



From mrex@sap.com  Tue Mar 26 04:13:20 2013
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Last Call: <draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15.txt> (X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP) to Proposed Standard
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Stefan Santesson wrote:
> Unfortunately what you suggest would not be backwards compatible,
> and can't be done within the present effort.

I'm sorry, I can not follow your arguments.

Adding 3 more OCSPResponseStatus error codes { no_authoritative_data(7),
single_requests_only(8), unsupported_extension(8) } with well-defined and
conflict-free semantics to the existing enum would be perfectly backwards
compatible.

Whether and when implementations of rfc5019 or its successor can make
use of additional error codes with well-defined semantics is a seperate
issue.

Sending multiple entries in a requestList is a perfectly valid client
option in rfc2560.  rfc5019 has a requirement for single entries.
What response does rfc5019 define in case that it receives an OCSP request
with multiple entries in requestList.

Keep in mind that OCSP responders are typically located through
Authority Identifier Access "id-ad-ocsp", and that cert extension is
specified to provide for the conventions of rfc2560 -- *NOT* the subset
of rfc5019:

http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#page-51

   The id-ad-ocsp OID is used when revocation information for the
   certificate containing this extension is available using the Online
   Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) [RFC2560].

   When id-ad-ocsp appears as accessMethod, the accessLocation field is
   the location of the OCSP responder, using the conventions defined in
   [RFC2560].



> 
> Responders using 5019 need to work in foreseeable time with legacy clients
> that knows nothing about the update you suggest.
> This group and the IETF made a decision when publishing 5019, that using
> "unauthorized" in the present manner was a reasonable tradeoff.
> 
> I still think it is.

Could you point me to any kind of discussion of this "tradeoff"?
I'm having difficulties finding that information.

The first draft that became rfc5019 seems to have appeared here:

  http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/current/msg17432.html

and it already contained the abuse of the "unauthorized(7)" error code.


I see a first complaint on the mailing list about the error code abuse here
on 02-Nov-2004:

  http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/current/msg17270.html

but the reponse is -crickets-.


In what way is the client going to treat "unauthorized(6)" special and
different from other error codes, such as "internalError(2)" or
"malformedRequest(3)", and where in rfc5019 is that special behaviour
defined?


-Martin

From stefan@aaa-sec.com  Tue Mar 26 04:41:02 2013
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On 3/26/13 12:13 PM, "Martin Rex" <mrex@sap.com> wrote:

>Adding 3 more OCSPResponseStatus error codes { no_authoritative_data(7),
>single_requests_only(8), unsupported_extension(8) } with well-defined and
>conflict-free semantics to the existing enum would be perfectly backwards
>compatible.

Of course it is backwards compatible with the standard, but not with the
installed base.

What would happen to the installed base of clients if OCSP responders
would change from current "unauthorized" to one of your new error codes?

/Stefan



From mrex@sap.com  Tue Mar 26 05:03:07 2013
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Following up to myself:

The real discussion seemed to have started in 2006...
Some folks had a pretty reasonable opinion at some point of the discussion,
e.g. Russ Houseley:
  http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/current/msg03570.html

and then there is lots of real dirty horse-trading in the PKIX discussion.


Oh, here is a message from the Security AD back then (Sam Hartman),
commenting on requirements for rfc2560bis (the I-D under last call right now!):

  http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/current/msg03515.html


What I don't understand:  during the PKIX discussion there seemed to
be some consensus that a prerequisite to abuse the "unauthorized(6)"
would an update of rfc2560 would be required.

But rfc5019 *NEVER* updated rfc2560!!


But what puzzles me most is why is there a problem with defining new
error codes in the first place?


In order to NEVER EVER have such a problem again in any future IETF
spec, there should be a requirement for error code partioning upfront
into good, temporary and final, and there should be reserved error code
points that clients will have to handle gracefully and well-behaved
when they receive it.

I find it most difficult to believe that there are OCSP clients out there
that would crash and burn if they received an OCSPResponseStatus (7),(8)
or (9), rather than an "unauthorized(6)", undefined or a different undefined
return code for the underspecified error situations created by rfc5019
(and rfc2560, as Sam correctly points out).

Should there be such broken clients, then you really do not want to use
them in the first place, because *EVERYONE* can feed those OCSP clients
arbitrary error codes in unsigned OCSPResponses.


-Martin


Martin Rex wrote:
> Stefan Santesson wrote:
> > Unfortunately what you suggest would not be backwards compatible,
> > and can't be done within the present effort.
> 
> I'm sorry, I can not follow your arguments.
> 
> Adding 3 more OCSPResponseStatus error codes { no_authoritative_data(7),
> single_requests_only(8), unsupported_extension(8) } with well-defined and
> conflict-free semantics to the existing enum would be perfectly backwards
> compatible.
> 
> Whether and when implementations of rfc5019 or its successor can make
> use of additional error codes with well-defined semantics is a seperate
> issue.
> 
> Sending multiple entries in a requestList is a perfectly valid client
> option in rfc2560.  rfc5019 has a requirement for single entries.
> What response does rfc5019 define in case that it receives an OCSP request
> with multiple entries in requestList.
> 
> Keep in mind that OCSP responders are typically located through
> Authority Identifier Access "id-ad-ocsp", and that cert extension is
> specified to provide for the conventions of rfc2560 -- *NOT* the subset
> of rfc5019:
> 
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#page-51
> 
>    The id-ad-ocsp OID is used when revocation information for the
>    certificate containing this extension is available using the Online
>    Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) [RFC2560].
> 
>    When id-ad-ocsp appears as accessMethod, the accessLocation field is
>    the location of the OCSP responder, using the conventions defined in
>    [RFC2560].
> 
> 
> 
> > 
> > Responders using 5019 need to work in foreseeable time with legacy clients
> > that knows nothing about the update you suggest.
> > This group and the IETF made a decision when publishing 5019, that using
> > "unauthorized" in the present manner was a reasonable tradeoff.
> > 
> > I still think it is.
> 
> Could you point me to any kind of discussion of this "tradeoff"?
> I'm having difficulties finding that information.
> 
> The first draft that became rfc5019 seems to have appeared here:
> 
>   http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/current/msg17432.html
> 
> and it already contained the abuse of the "unauthorized(7)" error code.
> 
> 
> I see a first complaint on the mailing list about the error code abuse here
> on 02-Nov-2004:
> 
>   http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/current/msg17270.html
> 
> but the reponse is -crickets-.
> 
> 
> In what way is the client going to treat "unauthorized(6)" special and
> different from other error codes, such as "internalError(2)" or
> "malformedRequest(3)", and where in rfc5019 is that special behaviour
> defined?
> 
> 
> -Martin

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To: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>
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From: mrex@sap.com (Martin Rex)
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Last Call: <draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15.txt> (X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP) to Proposed Standard
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Stefan Santesson wrote:
> On 3/26/13 12:13 PM, "Martin Rex" <mrex@sap.com> wrote:
> 
> >Adding 3 more OCSPResponseStatus error codes { no_authoritative_data(7),
> >single_requests_only(8), unsupported_extension(8) } with well-defined and
> >conflict-free semantics to the existing enum would be perfectly backwards
> >compatible.
> 
> Of course it is backwards compatible with the standard, but not with the
> installed base.
> 
> What would happen to the installed base of clients if OCSP responders
> would change from current "unauthorized" to one of your new error codes?

As it was already mentinoned here:
  http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/current/msg04489.html

I would no longer get a popup from my OCSP client that tells my
that I'm unauthorized to submit OCSPRequests to that server, and that
the server has been moved to a blacklist, and that I will have to
manually enable this server after obtaining proper authorization
before my client will send any further requests that OCSP server.

No longer being interactively bothered about this error seems like a
very valuable improvement!

-Martin

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Thread-Topic: [pkix] Last Call: <draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15.txt> (X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP) to Proposed Standard
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What OCSP client are you using that behaves like this?

On 3/26/13 1:09 PM, "Martin Rex" <mrex@sap.com> wrote:

>I would no longer get a popup from my OCSP client that tells my
>that I'm unauthorized to submit OCSPRequests to that server, and that
>the server has been moved to a blacklist



From mrex@sap.com  Tue Mar 26 05:39:50 2013
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Last Call: <draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15.txt> (X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP) to Proposed Standard
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Stefan Santesson wrote:
> What OCSP client are you using that behaves like this?
> 
> On 3/26/13 1:09 PM, "Martin Rex" <mrex@sap.com> wrote:
> 
> >I would no longer get a popup from my OCSP client that tells my
> >that I'm unauthorized to submit OCSPRequests to that server, and that
> >the server has been moved to a blacklist

Every sensible implementation of rfc2560 that does not happen to
be based on rfc5019.

I knew about rfc2560 for several years, but I only learned about the
existence of rfc5019 a few weeks ago -- because of the bogus change
to the "unauthorized" semantics in the rfc2560bis I-D.


-Martin

From stefan@aaa-sec.com  Tue Mar 26 05:54:48 2013
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Thread-Topic: [pkix] Last Call: <draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15.txt> (X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP) to Proposed Standard
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I take it that the answer to my question is none.

Which is what I suspected. The semantics of "unauthorized" does not give
you the basis for such functionality.
And 5019 is very widely deployed.

I'm going to sep down from this discussion and see how it goes.
It is not me you have to convince. It's the community of implementers.

/Stefan

On 3/26/13 1:39 PM, "Martin Rex" <mrex@sap.com> wrote:

>Stefan Santesson wrote:
>> What OCSP client are you using that behaves like this?
>> 
>> On 3/26/13 1:09 PM, "Martin Rex" <mrex@sap.com> wrote:
>> 
>> >I would no longer get a popup from my OCSP client that tells my
>> >that I'm unauthorized to submit OCSPRequests to that server, and that
>> >the server has been moved to a blacklist
>
>Every sensible implementation of rfc2560 that does not happen to
>be based on rfc5019.
>
>I knew about rfc2560 for several years, but I only learned about the
>existence of rfc5019 a few weeks ago -- because of the bogus change
>to the "unauthorized" semantics in the rfc2560bis I-D.
>
>
>-Martin



From mrex@sap.com  Tue Mar 26 07:01:48 2013
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Last Call: <draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15.txt> (X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP) to Proposed Standard
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Stefan Santesson wrote:
> I take it that the answer to my question is none.

Why would an rfc5019 client have a problem with a (7) instead of (6)
OCSPResponseStatus?

And what about an error code for "only a single request" that rfc5019
fails to specify.

> 
> Which is what I suspected. The semantics of "unauthorized" does not give
> you the basis for such functionality.
> And 5019 is very widely deployed.

The way I read this message from the security AD back then:
  http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/current/msg03515.html

rfc5019 was only passed on the promise from PKIX that it would
clean up rfc2560bis -- the I-D under last call here.

So the IESG should return this I-D to PKIX and have them
provide the updates that they agreed to do.

-Martin

From hartmans@mit.edu  Tue Mar 26 07:07:49 2013
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>>>>> "Martin" == Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com> writes:



    Martin> Oh, here is a message from the Security AD back then (Sam
    Martin> Hartman), commenting on requirements for rfc2560bis (the I-D
    Martin> under last call right now!):

    Martin>   http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/current/msg03515.html

To be clear, I didn't comment on which error codes were overloaded to do
what.  My point was simply that there needs to be a minimal set of
client behavior that is guaranteed to work (if permitted by responder
policy) with any responder.  That's the level of interoperability we
generally require from our specs.

It sounds like Martin would like to be able to distinguish three client
behaviors:

1) Use less of the spec and send me a simpler request

2) I can't help you with this particular request

3) Please go away and never come back

That's a fine desire.  In my opinion, it's also fine for us to decide
for interoperability, simplicity or other reasons that we're combining
all that into one error and clients don't get to make this distinction.

From david.black@emc.com  Mon Mar 25 17:26:50 2013
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From: "Black, David" <david.black@emc.com>
To: "sts@aaa-sec.com" <sts@aaa-sec.com>, "mmyers@fastq.com" <mmyers@fastq.com>, "ambarish@gmail.com" <ambarish@gmail.com>, "slava.galperin@gmail.com" <slava.galperin@gmail.com>, "cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca" <cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca>, "gen-art@ietf.org" <gen-art@ietf.org>
Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2013 20:25:57 -0400
Thread-Topic: Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
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Subject: [pkix] Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
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Authors,

I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on Gen-AR=
T, please
see the FAQ at <http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.

Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments you m=
ay receive.

Document: draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
Reviewer: David L. Black
Review Date: March 25, 2013
IETF LC End Date: March 27, 2013

Summary:
This draft is on the right track but has open issues, described in the revi=
ew.

This draft updates the OCSP protocol for obtaining certificate status
with some minor extensions.

Because this is a "bis" draft, I reviewed the diffs against RFC 2560.

I did not check the ASN.1.  I also did not see a writeup for this draft
in the data tracker, and so will rely on the document shepherd to
ensure that the ASN.1 has been checked when the writeup is prepared.

I found five open issues, all of which are minor, plus one idnits item
that is probably ok, but should be double-checked.

Minor issues:

[1] Section 2.2:

	NOTE: The "revoked" state for known non-issued certificate serial=09
		numbers is allowed in order to reduce the risk of relying=09
		parties using CRLs as a fall back mechanism, which would be=09
		considerably higher if an "unknown" response was returned.

Given this explanation, I'm surprised that the use of "revoked" instead of
"unknown" for a known non-issued certificate is a "MAY" requirement and
not a "SHOULD" requirement.  Why is that the case?

It appears that the reason is that the use of "revoked" in this situation
may be dangerous when serial numbers can be predicted for certificates that
will be issued in the future.  If that's what's going on, this concern is
already explained in the security considerations section, but it should
also be mentioned here for completeness.

[2] Section 4.2.2.2:

	The key that signs a certificate's status information need not be the
	same key that signed the certificate. It is necessary however to
	ensure that the entity signing this information is authorized to do
	so.  Therefore, a certificate's issuer MAY either sign the OCSP
	responses itself or it MAY explicitly designate this authority to
	another entity.

The two instances of "MAY" in the above text were both "MUST" in RFC 2560.

The RFC 2560 text construction of "MUST" or "MUST" is a bit odd, but the tw=
o
"MAY"s in this draft are even worse, as they allow "MAY do something else
entirely", despite being enclosed in an either-or construct.  I strongly
suspect that the latter was not intended, so the following would be clearer=
:

	The key that signs a certificate's status information need not be the
	same key that signed the certificate. It is necessary however to
	ensure that the entity signing this information is authorized to do
	so.  Therefore, a certificate's issuer MUST do one of the following:
		- sign the OCSP responses itself, or
		- explicitly designate this authority to another entity.

[3] Section 4.3:

Is the "SHOULD" requirement still appropriate for the DSA with SHA-1 combo
(vs. a "MAY" requirement)?  This requirement was a "MUST" in RFC 2560, but
I wonder about actual usage of DSA in practice.

[4] Section 5, last paragraph:

	Responding a "revoked" state to certificate that has never been=09
	issued may enable someone to obtain a revocation response for a=09
	certificate that is not yet issued, but soon will be issued, if the=09
	CA issues certificates using sequential certificate serial number=09
	assignment.

The above text after starting with the "if" is too narrow - it should say:

	if the certificate serial number of the certificate that
	will be issued can be predicted or guessed by the requester.
	Such prediction is easy for a CA that issues certificates
	using sequential certificate serial number assignment.

There's also a nit in original text - its first line should be:

	Responding with a "revoked" state for a certificate that has never been=09

[5] Section 5.1.1:

	In archival applications it is quite possible that an OCSP responder=09
	might be asked to report the validity of a certificate on a date in=09
	the distant past. Such a certificate might employ a signing method=09
	that is no longer considered acceptably secure. In such=09
	circumstances the responder MUST NOT generate a signature using a=09
	signing mechanism that is not considered acceptably secure.

This could use an additional warning that certificate archival should
not rely solely on signatures in archived certificates for ensuring the
validity and integrity of the archived certificates because the signature
algorithm(s) may transition to no longer being considered acceptably
secure at some point after the certificates are archived.

Nits:

idnits 2.12.15 said:

  -- The document seems to lack a disclaimer for pre-RFC5378 work, but may
     have content which was first submitted before 10 November 2008.  If yo=
u
     have contacted all the original authors and they are all willing to gr=
ant
     the BCP78 rights to the IETF Trust, then this is fine, and you can ign=
ore
     this comment.  If not, you may need to add the pre-RFC5378 disclaimer.=
=20
     (See the Legal Provisions document at
     http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info for more information.)

This looks like it's ok because all the authors of RFC 2560 are also author=
s of
this draft, but it should be double-checked.

Thanks,
--David
----------------------------------------------------
David L. Black, Distinguished Engineer
EMC Corporation, 176 South St., Hopkinton, MA=A0 01748
+1 (508) 293-7953=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 FAX: +1 (508) 293-778=
6
david.black@emc.com=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 Mobile: +1 (978) 394-7754
----------------------------------------------------



From stefan@aaa-sec.com  Mon Mar 25 19:21:07 2013
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Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2013 03:21:02 +0100
From: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>
To: "Black, David" <david.black@emc.com>, "sts@aaa-sec.com" <sts@aaa-sec.com>, "mmyers@fastq.com" <mmyers@fastq.com>, "ambarish@gmail.com" <ambarish@gmail.com>, "slava.galperin@gmail.com" <slava.galperin@gmail.com>, "cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca" <cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca>, "gen-art@ietf.org" <gen-art@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
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Hi David,

Thanks for the review.
My reply in line.

On 3/26/13 1:25 AM, "Black, David" <david.black@emc.com> wrote:

>Authors,
>
>I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on
>Gen-ART, please
>see the FAQ at <http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.
>
>Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments you
>may receive.
>
>Document: draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
>Reviewer: David L. Black
>Review Date: March 25, 2013
>IETF LC End Date: March 27, 2013
>
>Summary:
>This draft is on the right track but has open issues, described in the
>review.
>
>This draft updates the OCSP protocol for obtaining certificate status
>with some minor extensions.
>
>Because this is a "bis" draft, I reviewed the diffs against RFC 2560.
>
>I did not check the ASN.1.  I also did not see a writeup for this draft
>in the data tracker, and so will rely on the document shepherd to
>ensure that the ASN.1 has been checked when the writeup is prepared.
>
>I found five open issues, all of which are minor, plus one idnits item
>that is probably ok, but should be double-checked.
>
>Minor issues:
>
>[1] Section 2.2:
>
>	NOTE: The "revoked" state for known non-issued certificate serial	
>		numbers is allowed in order to reduce the risk of relying	
>		parties using CRLs as a fall back mechanism, which would be	
>		considerably higher if an "unknown" response was returned.
>
>Given this explanation, I'm surprised that the use of "revoked" instead of
>"unknown" for a known non-issued certificate is a "MAY" requirement and
>not a "SHOULD" requirement.  Why is that the case?
>
>It appears that the reason is that the use of "revoked" in this situation
>may be dangerous when serial numbers can be predicted for certificates
>that
>will be issued in the future.  If that's what's going on, this concern is
>already explained in the security considerations section, but it should
>also be mentioned here for completeness.

No, this is not the main reason. The main reason is the one stated as a
Note: in this section:

NOTE: The "revoked" state for known non-issued certificate serial numbers
is allowed in order to reduce the risk of relying parties using CRLs as a
fall back mechanism, which would be considerably higher if an "unknown"
response was returned.


>
>[2] Section 4.2.2.2:
>
>	The key that signs a certificate's status information need not be the
>	same key that signed the certificate. It is necessary however to
>	ensure that the entity signing this information is authorized to do
>	so.  Therefore, a certificate's issuer MAY either sign the OCSP
>	responses itself or it MAY explicitly designate this authority to
>	another entity.
>
>The two instances of "MAY" in the above text were both "MUST" in RFC 2560.
>
>The RFC 2560 text construction of "MUST" or "MUST" is a bit odd, but the
>two
>"MAY"s in this draft are even worse, as they allow "MAY do something else
>entirely", despite being enclosed in an either-or construct.  I strongly
>suspect that the latter was not intended, so the following would be
>clearer:
>
>	The key that signs a certificate's status information need not be the
>	same key that signed the certificate. It is necessary however to
>	ensure that the entity signing this information is authorized to do
>	so.  Therefore, a certificate's issuer MUST do one of the following:
>		- sign the OCSP responses itself, or
>		- explicitly designate this authority to another entity.


I Agree. I will adopt your text.

>
>[3] Section 4.3:
>
>Is the "SHOULD" requirement still appropriate for the DSA with SHA-1 combo
>(vs. a "MAY" requirement)?  This requirement was a "MUST" in RFC 2560, but
>I wonder about actual usage of DSA in practice.

The change in algorithm requirements was provided by RFC 6277, and further
refined in this draft in accordance with requests from Sean Turner.

>
>[4] Section 5, last paragraph:
>
>	Responding a "revoked" state to certificate that has never been	
>	issued may enable someone to obtain a revocation response for a	
>	certificate that is not yet issued, but soon will be issued, if the	
>	CA issues certificates using sequential certificate serial number	
>	assignment.
>
>The above text after starting with the "if" is too narrow - it should say:
>
>	if the certificate serial number of the certificate that
>	will be issued can be predicted or guessed by the requester.
>	Such prediction is easy for a CA that issues certificates
>	using sequential certificate serial number assignment.
>
>There's also a nit in original text - its first line should be:
>
>	Responding with a "revoked" state for a certificate that has never been	

Good suggestions. I will update accordingly.

>
>[5] Section 5.1.1:
>
>	In archival applications it is quite possible that an OCSP responder	
>	might be asked to report the validity of a certificate on a date in	
>	the distant past. Such a certificate might employ a signing method	
>	that is no longer considered acceptably secure. In such	
>	circumstances the responder MUST NOT generate a signature using a	
>	signing mechanism that is not considered acceptably secure.
>
>This could use an additional warning that certificate archival should
>not rely solely on signatures in archived certificates for ensuring the
>validity and integrity of the archived certificates because the signature
>algorithm(s) may transition to no longer being considered acceptably
>secure at some point after the certificates are archived.

This note if I remember correctly is imported from RFC 6277, which is
incorporated into this document. The reason behind the text is only to
avoid usages of insecure algorithms.
Historical validation is a real can of worms that I really would like to
keep a tight lid on. I really want to avoid doing recommendations in this
space as it may trigger a whole flood of things that could be equally
important to say about this subject.

>
>Nits:
>
>idnits 2.12.15 said:
>
>  -- The document seems to lack a disclaimer for pre-RFC5378 work, but may
>     have content which was first submitted before 10 November 2008.  If
>you
>     have contacted all the original authors and they are all willing to
>grant
>     the BCP78 rights to the IETF Trust, then this is fine, and you can
>ignore
>     this comment.  If not, you may need to add the pre-RFC5378
>disclaimer. 
>     (See the Legal Provisions document at
>     http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info for more information.)
>
>This looks like it's ok because all the authors of RFC 2560 are also
>authors of
>this draft, but it should be double-checked.


I defer this one to Sean. I think he has this one under control.


Thanks again for the review.

/Stefan


>
>Thanks,
>--David
>----------------------------------------------------
>David L. Black, Distinguished Engineer
>EMC Corporation, 176 South St., Hopkinton, MA  01748
>+1 (508) 293-7953             FAX: +1 (508) 293-7786
>david.black@emc.com        Mobile: +1 (978) 394-7754
>----------------------------------------------------
>
>



From mrex@sap.com  Tue Mar 26 07:30:26 2013
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To: Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Last Call: <draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15.txt> (X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP) to Proposed Standard
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Sam Hartman wrote:
> Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com> writes:
> Martin>   http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/current/msg03515.html
> 
> To be clear, I didn't comment on which error codes were overloaded to do
> what.  My point was simply that there needs to be a minimal set of
> client behavior that is guaranteed to work (if permitted by responder
> policy) with any responder.  That's the level of interoperability we
> generally require from our specs.
> 
> It sounds like Martin would like to be able to distinguish three client
> behaviors:
> 
> 1) Use less of the spec and send me a simpler request
> 
> 2) I can't help you with this particular request
> 
> 3) Please go away and never come back
> 
> That's a fine desire.  In my opinion, it's also fine for us to decide
> for interoperability, simplicity or other reasons that we're combining
> all that into one error and clients don't get to make this distinction.


When the rfc2560 semantics of "unauthorized(6)" and the rfc5019 semantics
of "unauthorized(6)" are merged into one, then this error code ought
to be renamed to "whatever(6)", because it will be impossible for a
client to know what a server really meant!  Whether an OCSP responder
is rfc2560 compliant or whether it adheres to rfc5019 subset can neither
be determined from the id-ad-ocsp AIA information of an X.509v3 certificate
nor from an OCSPResponse that conveys a responseStatus (6).

Why don't we add sensible, well-defined OCSPResponseStatus error code
now during rfc2560bis, and see how and when we can make appropriate
use of those in clients.

-Martin

From SChokhani@cygnacom.com  Tue Mar 26 14:46:38 2013
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From: Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>
To: 'pkix' <pkix@ietf.org>
Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2013 17:46:35 -0400
Thread-Topic: URI Name Constraint and URN
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I have been wrestling with what one should with a certificate if the SAN in=
 the certificate contains URN and when you get to the certificate, the name=
 constraint state variable indicates permitted and/or excluded values for t=
he URI name form.

I think name constraint is not applicable to URN since it does not have an =
"authority" and thus "host" component by definition.  Thus, regardless of t=
he name constraint state variable, presence of URN should not cause name co=
nstraint violation.

But, when I read 5280, I find the text implying otherwise or ambiguous.


Santosh Chokhani
CygnaCom Solutions, Inc.


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osoft-com:office:office" xmlns:w=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:word" =
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	{size:8.5in 11.0in;
	margin:1.0in 1.0in 1.0in 1.0in;}
div.WordSection1
	{page:WordSection1;}
--></style><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<o:shapedefaults v:ext=3D"edit" spidmax=3D"1026" />
</xml><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<o:shapelayout v:ext=3D"edit">
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</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=3DEN-US link=3Dblue vli=
nk=3Dpurple><div class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal>I have been wres=
tling with what one should with a certificate if the SAN in the certificate=
 contains URN and when you get to the certificate, the name constraint stat=
e variable indicates permitted and/or excluded values for the URI name form=
.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNor=
mal>I think name constraint is not applicable to URN since it does not have=
 an &#8220;authority&#8221; and thus &#8220;host&#8221; component by defini=
tion.&nbsp; Thus, regardless of the name constraint state variable, presenc=
e of URN should not cause name constraint violation.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=
=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>But, when I read 528=
0, I find the text implying otherwise or ambiguous.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=
=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p=
><p class=3DMsoNormal>Santosh Chokhani<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>C=
ygnaCom Solutions, Inc.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p=
></p></div></body></html>=

--_000_B83745DA469B7847811819C5005244AFF3DC9BFCscygexch7cygnac_--

From david.cooper@nist.gov  Tue Mar 26 15:04:04 2013
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Subject: Re: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN
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    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">Santosh,<br>
      <br>
      Here is what RFC 5280 says:<br>
      <blockquote>For URIs, the constraint applies to the host part of
        the name.  The constraint MUST be specified as a fully qualified
        domain name and MAY specify a host or a domain.  Examples would
        be "host.example.com" and ".example.com".  When the constraint
        begins with a period, it MAY be expanded with one or more
        labels.  That is, the constraint ".example.com" is satisfied by
        both host.example.com and my.host.example.com.  However, the
        constraint ".example.com" is not satisfied by "example.com". 
        When the constraint does not begin with a period, it specifies a
        host.  <font color="#3333ff">If a constraint is applied to the
          uniformResourceIdentifier name form and a subsequent
          certificate includes a subjectAltName extension with a
          uniformResourceIdentifier that does not include an authority
          component with a host name specified as a fully qualified
          domain name (e.g., if the URI either does not include an
          authority component or includes an authority component in
          which the host name is specified as an IP address), then the
          application MUST reject the certificate.</font><br>
      </blockquote>
      <br>
      This seems to quite unambiguously say that the application MUST
      reject the certificate.<br>
      <br>
      On 03/26/2013 05:46 PM, Santosh Chokhani wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:B83745DA469B7847811819C5005244AFF3DC9BFC@scygexch7.cygnacom.com"
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      <div class="WordSection1">
        <p class="MsoNormal">I have been wrestling with what one should
          with a certificate if the SAN in the certificate contains URN
          and when you get to the certificate, the name constraint state
          variable indicates permitted and/or excluded values for the
          URI name form.<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">I think name constraint is not applicable
          to URN since it does not have an “authority” and thus “host”
          component by definition.  Thus, regardless of the name
          constraint state variable, presence of URN should not cause
          name constraint violation.<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">But, when I read 5280, I find the text
          implying otherwise or ambiguous.<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">Santosh Chokhani<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">CygnaCom Solutions, Inc.<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN
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>From 5280

(e.g., if the URI either

   does not include an authority component or includes an authority

   component in which the host name is specified as an IP address), then

   the application MUST reject the certificate.

 

It clearly says that if authority component is missing, certificate must be
rejected.

 

From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
Santosh Chokhani
Sent: Tuesday, March 26, 2013 2:47 PM
To: 'pkix'
Subject: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN

 

I have been wrestling with what one should with a certificate if the SAN in
the certificate contains URN and when you get to the certificate, the name
constraint state variable indicates permitted and/or excluded values for the
URI name form.

 

I think name constraint is not applicable to URN since it does not have an
"authority" and thus "host" component by definition.  Thus, regardless of
the name constraint state variable, presence of URN should not cause name
constraint violation.

 

But, when I read 5280, I find the text implying otherwise or ambiguous.

 

 

Santosh Chokhani

CygnaCom Solutions, Inc.

 


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--></style><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<o:shapedefaults v:ext=3D"edit" spidmax=3D"1026" />
</xml><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<o:shapelayout v:ext=3D"edit">
<o:idmap v:ext=3D"edit" data=3D"1" />
</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=3DEN-US link=3Dblue =
vlink=3Dpurple><div class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'>From 5280<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier =
New";color:black'>(e.g., if the URI either<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier =
New";color:black'>&nbsp;&nbsp; does not include an authority component =
or includes an authority<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier =
New";color:black'>&nbsp;&nbsp; component in which the host name is =
specified as an IP address), then<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier =
New";color:black'>&nbsp;&nbsp; the application MUST reject the =
certificate.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>It clearly says that if =
authority component is missing, certificate must be =
rejected.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><div =
style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0in 0in 0in =
4.0pt'><div><div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF =
1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span>=
</b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> =
pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] <b>On Behalf Of =
</b>Santosh Chokhani<br><b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, March 26, 2013 2:47 =
PM<br><b>To:</b> 'pkix'<br><b>Subject:</b> [pkix] URI Name Constraint =
and URN<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>I have been =
wrestling with what one should with a certificate if the SAN in the =
certificate contains URN and when you get to the certificate, the name =
constraint state variable indicates permitted and/or excluded values for =
the URI name form.<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>I think name =
constraint is not applicable to URN since it does not have an =
&#8220;authority&#8221; and thus &#8220;host&#8221; component by =
definition.&nbsp; Thus, regardless of the name constraint state =
variable, presence of URN should not cause name constraint =
violation.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>But, when I read 5280, I find the text implying =
otherwise or ambiguous.<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>Santosh =
Chokhani<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>CygnaCom Solutions, =
Inc.<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div></div></body></html>
------=_NextPart_000_0326_01CE2A33.914E4E90--


From turners@ieca.com  Tue Mar 26 15:04:51 2013
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
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On 3/25/13 10:21 PM, Stefan Santesson wrote:
> Hi David,

>> Nits:
>>
>> idnits 2.12.15 said:
>>
>>   -- The document seems to lack a disclaimer for pre-RFC5378 work, but may
>>      have content which was first submitted before 10 November 2008.  If
>> you
>>      have contacted all the original authors and they are all willing to
>> grant
>>      the BCP78 rights to the IETF Trust, then this is fine, and you can
>> ignore
>>      this comment.  If not, you may need to add the pre-RFC5378
>> disclaimer.
>>      (See the Legal Provisions document at
>>      http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info for more information.)
>>
>> This looks like it's ok because all the authors of RFC 2560 are also
>> authors of
>> this draft, but it should be double-checked.
>
>
> I defer this one to Sean. I think he has this one under control.

I actually contacted all but one of the authors of RFC 2560.  The ones I 
did get in contact with indicated it was fine to publishing under the 
new rules.  The one I did not contact is deceased.   I decided it would 
be in poor taste to contact the widower on this issue.  Based on 
discussions with people who knew the author very well and the minimal 
changes in the draft, I'm comfortable progressing the document with the 
deceased authors name on it and without the disclaimer.

spt

From david.black@emc.com  Tue Mar 26 16:52:34 2013
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From: "Black, David" <david.black@emc.com>
To: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>, "sts@aaa-sec.com" <sts@aaa-sec.com>, "mmyers@fastq.com" <mmyers@fastq.com>, "ambarish@gmail.com" <ambarish@gmail.com>, "slava.galperin@gmail.com" <slava.galperin@gmail.com>, "cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca" <cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca>, "gen-art@ietf.org" <gen-art@ietf.org>
Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2013 19:51:57 -0400
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
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Hi Stefan,

This looks good - thank you for the prompt response.

It looks like my speculation on item [1] was wrong, so could you respond
to the question below, please?:

> >[1] Section 2.2:
> >
> >	NOTE: The "revoked" state for known non-issued certificate serial
> >		numbers is allowed in order to reduce the risk of relying
> >		parties using CRLs as a fall back mechanism, which would be
> >		considerably higher if an "unknown" response was returned.
> >
> >Given this explanation, I'm surprised that the use of "revoked" instead =
of
> >"unknown" for a known non-issued certificate is a "MAY" requirement and
> >not a "SHOULD" requirement.  Why is that the case?

--------------

Beyond that, the proposed actions (or proposed non-actions) on items [2]-[5=
]
are fine with me, Sean's taken care of the author permissions item from
idnits, and I assume someone has or will check the ASN.1 .

Thanks,
--David

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com]
> Sent: Monday, March 25, 2013 10:21 PM
> To: Black, David; sts@aaa-sec.com; mmyers@fastq.com; ambarish@gmail.com;
> slava.galperin@gmail.com; cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca; gen-art@ietf.org
> Cc: pkix@ietf.org; Sean Turner; ietf@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
>=20
> Hi David,
>=20
> Thanks for the review.
> My reply in line.
>=20
> On 3/26/13 1:25 AM, "Black, David" <david.black@emc.com> wrote:
>=20
> >Authors,
> >
> >I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on
> >Gen-ART, please
> >see the FAQ at <http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>=
.
> >
> >Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments yo=
u
> >may receive.
> >
> >Document: draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
> >Reviewer: David L. Black
> >Review Date: March 25, 2013
> >IETF LC End Date: March 27, 2013
> >
> >Summary:
> >This draft is on the right track but has open issues, described in the
> >review.
> >
> >This draft updates the OCSP protocol for obtaining certificate status
> >with some minor extensions.
> >
> >Because this is a "bis" draft, I reviewed the diffs against RFC 2560.
> >
> >I did not check the ASN.1.  I also did not see a writeup for this draft
> >in the data tracker, and so will rely on the document shepherd to
> >ensure that the ASN.1 has been checked when the writeup is prepared.
> >
> >I found five open issues, all of which are minor, plus one idnits item
> >that is probably ok, but should be double-checked.
> >
> >Minor issues:
> >
> >[1] Section 2.2:
> >
> >	NOTE: The "revoked" state for known non-issued certificate serial
> >		numbers is allowed in order to reduce the risk of relying
> >		parties using CRLs as a fall back mechanism, which would be
> >		considerably higher if an "unknown" response was returned.
> >
> >Given this explanation, I'm surprised that the use of "revoked" instead =
of
> >"unknown" for a known non-issued certificate is a "MAY" requirement and
> >not a "SHOULD" requirement.  Why is that the case?
> >
> >It appears that the reason is that the use of "revoked" in this situatio=
n
> >may be dangerous when serial numbers can be predicted for certificates
> >that
> >will be issued in the future.  If that's what's going on, this concern i=
s
> >already explained in the security considerations section, but it should
> >also be mentioned here for completeness.
>=20
> No, this is not the main reason. The main reason is the one stated as a
> Note: in this section:
>=20
> NOTE: The "revoked" state for known non-issued certificate serial numbers
> is allowed in order to reduce the risk of relying parties using CRLs as a
> fall back mechanism, which would be considerably higher if an "unknown"
> response was returned.
>=20
>=20
> >
> >[2] Section 4.2.2.2:
> >
> >	The key that signs a certificate's status information need not be the
> >	same key that signed the certificate. It is necessary however to
> >	ensure that the entity signing this information is authorized to do
> >	so.  Therefore, a certificate's issuer MAY either sign the OCSP
> >	responses itself or it MAY explicitly designate this authority to
> >	another entity.
> >
> >The two instances of "MAY" in the above text were both "MUST" in RFC 256=
0.
> >
> >The RFC 2560 text construction of "MUST" or "MUST" is a bit odd, but the=
 two
> >"MAY"s in this draft are even worse, as they allow "MAY do something els=
e
> >entirely", despite being enclosed in an either-or construct.  I strongly
> >suspect that the latter was not intended, so the following would be
> >clearer:
> >
> >	The key that signs a certificate's status information need not be the
> >	same key that signed the certificate. It is necessary however to
> >	ensure that the entity signing this information is authorized to do
> >	so.  Therefore, a certificate's issuer MUST do one of the following:
> >		- sign the OCSP responses itself, or
> >		- explicitly designate this authority to another entity.
>=20
>=20
> I Agree. I will adopt your text.
>=20
> >
> >[3] Section 4.3:
> >
> >Is the "SHOULD" requirement still appropriate for the DSA with SHA-1 com=
bo
> >(vs. a "MAY" requirement)?  This requirement was a "MUST" in RFC 2560, b=
ut
> >I wonder about actual usage of DSA in practice.
>=20
> The change in algorithm requirements was provided by RFC 6277, and furthe=
r
> refined in this draft in accordance with requests from Sean Turner.
>=20
> >
> >[4] Section 5, last paragraph:
> >
> >	Responding a "revoked" state to certificate that has never been
> >	issued may enable someone to obtain a revocation response for a
> >	certificate that is not yet issued, but soon will be issued, if the
> >	CA issues certificates using sequential certificate serial number
> >	assignment.
> >
> >The above text after starting with the "if" is too narrow - it should sa=
y:
> >
> >	if the certificate serial number of the certificate that
> >	will be issued can be predicted or guessed by the requester.
> >	Such prediction is easy for a CA that issues certificates
> >	using sequential certificate serial number assignment.
> >
> >There's also a nit in original text - its first line should be:
> >
> >	Responding with a "revoked" state for a certificate that has never been
>=20
> Good suggestions. I will update accordingly.
>=20
> >
> >[5] Section 5.1.1:
> >
> >	In archival applications it is quite possible that an OCSP responder
> >	might be asked to report the validity of a certificate on a date in
> >	the distant past. Such a certificate might employ a signing method
> >	that is no longer considered acceptably secure. In such
> >	circumstances the responder MUST NOT generate a signature using a
> >	signing mechanism that is not considered acceptably secure.
> >
> >This could use an additional warning that certificate archival should
> >not rely solely on signatures in archived certificates for ensuring the
> >validity and integrity of the archived certificates because the signatur=
e
> >algorithm(s) may transition to no longer being considered acceptably
> >secure at some point after the certificates are archived.
>=20
> This note if I remember correctly is imported from RFC 6277, which is
> incorporated into this document. The reason behind the text is only to
> avoid usages of insecure algorithms.
> Historical validation is a real can of worms that I really would like to
> keep a tight lid on. I really want to avoid doing recommendations in this
> space as it may trigger a whole flood of things that could be equally
> important to say about this subject.
>=20
> >
> >Nits:
> >
> >idnits 2.12.15 said:
> >
> >  -- The document seems to lack a disclaimer for pre-RFC5378 work, but m=
ay
> >     have content which was first submitted before 10 November 2008.  If
> >you
> >     have contacted all the original authors and they are all willing to
> >grant
> >     the BCP78 rights to the IETF Trust, then this is fine, and you can
> >ignore
> >     this comment.  If not, you may need to add the pre-RFC5378
> >disclaimer.
> >     (See the Legal Provisions document at
> >     http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info for more information.)
> >
> >This looks like it's ok because all the authors of RFC 2560 are also
> >authors of
> >this draft, but it should be double-checked.
>=20
>=20
> I defer this one to Sean. I think he has this one under control.
>=20
>=20
> Thanks again for the review.
>=20
> /Stefan
>=20
>=20
> >
> >Thanks,
> >--David
> >----------------------------------------------------
> >David L. Black, Distinguished Engineer
> >EMC Corporation, 176 South St., Hopkinton, MA  01748
> >+1 (508) 293-7953             FAX: +1 (508) 293-7786
> >david.black@emc.com        Mobile: +1 (978) 394-7754
> >----------------------------------------------------
> >
> >
>=20
>=20


From stefan@aaa-sec.com  Wed Mar 27 04:46:55 2013
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From: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>
To: "Black, David" <david.black@emc.com>, "sts@aaa-sec.com" <sts@aaa-sec.com>, "mmyers@fastq.com" <mmyers@fastq.com>, "ambarish@gmail.com" <ambarish@gmail.com>, "slava.galperin@gmail.com" <slava.galperin@gmail.com>, "cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca" <cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca>, "gen-art@ietf.org" <gen-art@ietf.org>
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Thread-Topic: Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
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Hi David,

Yes I missed to respond to that aspect.

This is a bit complicated, but we have a large legacy to take into account
where some responders implements just RFC 2560, while some deliver
pre-generated responses according to RFC 5019 (Light-weight OCSP). LW
responders are not capable of producing a signed response at the time of
responding and in case such responder finds a request for a certificate
where no pre-produced response exists, it will reply with an unsigned
error response "unauthorized", which also is a legitimate way to respond.
So the actual OCSP responder may actually know that the certificate was
never issued, but since it delivers pre-produced responder through a CDN,
it can not provide a revoked response in real time.

So the major aim with the current writing is to declare that the revoked
response is a MAY because there are other valid alternatives.

We also want to avoid putting down a SHOULD respond revoked if a
certificate is known to be not-issued, because that would require us to
define what "known to be non-issued" actually means. And that could be
quite tricky as OCSP responders by no means are required to have this
knowledge.

The OCSP responder simply have a number of tools to prevent the client
from accepting a bad certificate.
This update of OCSP simply allows responders to use the "revoked" response
as a preventive measure, without mandating it.

This is also related to activities in the CA Browser Forum where they put
down requirements on responders complying with CAB rules to not respond
"good" to certificates that were never issued.
With this update in OCSP, they can now mandate in their policies both the
fact that their responders MUST know if a certificate was never issued and
MUST respond "revoked".

So we allow other communities to raise the bar even if the base standard
defines the response as optional.

In theory we could possibly say that responding revoked is optional, but
if you choose between revoked and unknown then you SHOULD favour revoked
over unknown. But such nested requirements just feels bad and impossible
to test compliance against. I'd much rather just leave it optional. I
think the Note gives a clear recommendation on this and the rationale
without spelling it out as a requirement.

Does this answer your question?


On 3/27/13 12:51 AM, "Black, David" <david.black@emc.com> wrote:

>Hi Stefan,
>
>This looks good - thank you for the prompt response.
>
>It looks like my speculation on item [1] was wrong, so could you respond
>to the question below, please?:
>
>> >[1] Section 2.2:
>> >
>> >	NOTE: The "revoked" state for known non-issued certificate serial
>> >		numbers is allowed in order to reduce the risk of relying
>> >		parties using CRLs as a fall back mechanism, which would be
>> >		considerably higher if an "unknown" response was returned.
>> >
>> >Given this explanation, I'm surprised that the use of "revoked"
>>instead of
>> >"unknown" for a known non-issued certificate is a "MAY" requirement and
>> >not a "SHOULD" requirement.  Why is that the case?
>
>--------------
>
>Beyond that, the proposed actions (or proposed non-actions) on items
>[2]-[5]
>are fine with me, Sean's taken care of the author permissions item from
>idnits, and I assume someone has or will check the ASN.1 .
>
>Thanks,
>--David
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com]
>> Sent: Monday, March 25, 2013 10:21 PM
>> To: Black, David; sts@aaa-sec.com; mmyers@fastq.com; ambarish@gmail.com;
>> slava.galperin@gmail.com; cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca; gen-art@ietf.org
>> Cc: pkix@ietf.org; Sean Turner; ietf@ietf.org
>> Subject: Re: Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
>> 
>> Hi David,
>> 
>> Thanks for the review.
>> My reply in line.
>> 
>> On 3/26/13 1:25 AM, "Black, David" <david.black@emc.com> wrote:
>> 
>> >Authors,
>> >
>> >I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on
>> >Gen-ART, please
>> >see the FAQ at 
>><http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.
>> >
>> >Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments
>>you
>> >may receive.
>> >
>> >Document: draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
>> >Reviewer: David L. Black
>> >Review Date: March 25, 2013
>> >IETF LC End Date: March 27, 2013
>> >
>> >Summary:
>> >This draft is on the right track but has open issues, described in the
>> >review.
>> >
>> >This draft updates the OCSP protocol for obtaining certificate status
>> >with some minor extensions.
>> >
>> >Because this is a "bis" draft, I reviewed the diffs against RFC 2560.
>> >
>> >I did not check the ASN.1.  I also did not see a writeup for this draft
>> >in the data tracker, and so will rely on the document shepherd to
>> >ensure that the ASN.1 has been checked when the writeup is prepared.
>> >
>> >I found five open issues, all of which are minor, plus one idnits item
>> >that is probably ok, but should be double-checked.
>> >
>> >Minor issues:
>> >
>> >[1] Section 2.2:
>> >
>> >	NOTE: The "revoked" state for known non-issued certificate serial
>> >		numbers is allowed in order to reduce the risk of relying
>> >		parties using CRLs as a fall back mechanism, which would be
>> >		considerably higher if an "unknown" response was returned.
>> >
>> >Given this explanation, I'm surprised that the use of "revoked"
>>instead of
>> >"unknown" for a known non-issued certificate is a "MAY" requirement and
>> >not a "SHOULD" requirement.  Why is that the case?
>> >
>> >It appears that the reason is that the use of "revoked" in this
>>situation
>> >may be dangerous when serial numbers can be predicted for certificates
>> >that
>> >will be issued in the future.  If that's what's going on, this concern
>>is
>> >already explained in the security considerations section, but it should
>> >also be mentioned here for completeness.
>> 
>> No, this is not the main reason. The main reason is the one stated as a
>> Note: in this section:
>> 
>> NOTE: The "revoked" state for known non-issued certificate serial
>>numbers
>> is allowed in order to reduce the risk of relying parties using CRLs as
>>a
>> fall back mechanism, which would be considerably higher if an "unknown"
>> response was returned.
>> 
>> 
>> >
>> >[2] Section 4.2.2.2:
>> >
>> >	The key that signs a certificate's status information need not be the
>> >	same key that signed the certificate. It is necessary however to
>> >	ensure that the entity signing this information is authorized to do
>> >	so.  Therefore, a certificate's issuer MAY either sign the OCSP
>> >	responses itself or it MAY explicitly designate this authority to
>> >	another entity.
>> >
>> >The two instances of "MAY" in the above text were both "MUST" in RFC
>>2560.
>> >
>> >The RFC 2560 text construction of "MUST" or "MUST" is a bit odd, but
>>the two
>> >"MAY"s in this draft are even worse, as they allow "MAY do something
>>else
>> >entirely", despite being enclosed in an either-or construct.  I
>>strongly
>> >suspect that the latter was not intended, so the following would be
>> >clearer:
>> >
>> >	The key that signs a certificate's status information need not be the
>> >	same key that signed the certificate. It is necessary however to
>> >	ensure that the entity signing this information is authorized to do
>> >	so.  Therefore, a certificate's issuer MUST do one of the following:
>> >		- sign the OCSP responses itself, or
>> >		- explicitly designate this authority to another entity.
>> 
>> 
>> I Agree. I will adopt your text.
>> 
>> >
>> >[3] Section 4.3:
>> >
>> >Is the "SHOULD" requirement still appropriate for the DSA with SHA-1
>>combo
>> >(vs. a "MAY" requirement)?  This requirement was a "MUST" in RFC 2560,
>>but
>> >I wonder about actual usage of DSA in practice.
>> 
>> The change in algorithm requirements was provided by RFC 6277, and
>>further
>> refined in this draft in accordance with requests from Sean Turner.
>> 
>> >
>> >[4] Section 5, last paragraph:
>> >
>> >	Responding a "revoked" state to certificate that has never been
>> >	issued may enable someone to obtain a revocation response for a
>> >	certificate that is not yet issued, but soon will be issued, if the
>> >	CA issues certificates using sequential certificate serial number
>> >	assignment.
>> >
>> >The above text after starting with the "if" is too narrow - it should
>>say:
>> >
>> >	if the certificate serial number of the certificate that
>> >	will be issued can be predicted or guessed by the requester.
>> >	Such prediction is easy for a CA that issues certificates
>> >	using sequential certificate serial number assignment.
>> >
>> >There's also a nit in original text - its first line should be:
>> >
>> >	Responding with a "revoked" state for a certificate that has never
>>been
>> 
>> Good suggestions. I will update accordingly.
>> 
>> >
>> >[5] Section 5.1.1:
>> >
>> >	In archival applications it is quite possible that an OCSP responder
>> >	might be asked to report the validity of a certificate on a date in
>> >	the distant past. Such a certificate might employ a signing method
>> >	that is no longer considered acceptably secure. In such
>> >	circumstances the responder MUST NOT generate a signature using a
>> >	signing mechanism that is not considered acceptably secure.
>> >
>> >This could use an additional warning that certificate archival should
>> >not rely solely on signatures in archived certificates for ensuring the
>> >validity and integrity of the archived certificates because the
>>signature
>> >algorithm(s) may transition to no longer being considered acceptably
>> >secure at some point after the certificates are archived.
>> 
>> This note if I remember correctly is imported from RFC 6277, which is
>> incorporated into this document. The reason behind the text is only to
>> avoid usages of insecure algorithms.
>> Historical validation is a real can of worms that I really would like to
>> keep a tight lid on. I really want to avoid doing recommendations in
>>this
>> space as it may trigger a whole flood of things that could be equally
>> important to say about this subject.
>> 
>> >
>> >Nits:
>> >
>> >idnits 2.12.15 said:
>> >
>> >  -- The document seems to lack a disclaimer for pre-RFC5378 work, but
>>may
>> >     have content which was first submitted before 10 November 2008.
>>If
>> >you
>> >     have contacted all the original authors and they are all willing
>>to
>> >grant
>> >     the BCP78 rights to the IETF Trust, then this is fine, and you can
>> >ignore
>> >     this comment.  If not, you may need to add the pre-RFC5378
>> >disclaimer.
>> >     (See the Legal Provisions document at
>> >     http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info for more information.)
>> >
>> >This looks like it's ok because all the authors of RFC 2560 are also
>> >authors of
>> >this draft, but it should be double-checked.
>> 
>> 
>> I defer this one to Sean. I think he has this one under control.
>> 
>> 
>> Thanks again for the review.
>> 
>> /Stefan
>> 
>> 
>> >
>> >Thanks,
>> >--David
>> >----------------------------------------------------
>> >David L. Black, Distinguished Engineer
>> >EMC Corporation, 176 South St., Hopkinton, MA  01748
>> >+1 (508) 293-7953             FAX: +1 (508) 293-7786
>> >david.black@emc.com        Mobile: +1 (978) 394-7754
>> >----------------------------------------------------
>> >
>> >
>> 
>> 
>



From mrex@sap.com  Wed Mar 27 07:14:46 2013
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Last Call: <draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15.txt> (X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP) to Proposed Standard
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Stefan Santesson wrote:
> "Martin Rex" <mrex@sap.com> wrote:
> 
> >Adding 3 more OCSPResponseStatus error codes { no_authoritative_data(7),
> >single_requests_only(8), unsupported_extension(8) } with well-defined and
> >conflict-free semantics to the existing enum would be perfectly backwards
> >compatible.
> 
> Of course it is backwards compatible with the standard, but not with the
> installed base.
> 
> What would happen to the installed base of clients if OCSP responders
> would change from current "unauthorized" to one of your new error codes?


Actually, please look at the I-D text again.  Even if the Servers would
change their response to a new error code for the "I can not respond
authoritatively", it will be 100% backwards compatible with the clients.

That is at least what proposed change implies!

So lets assign new error codes and have Server change their response!



"Backwards compatibility" is relevant in the same fashion as interoperability
-- interoperability among independent implementations as well as interop
between new implementations and the installed base.

Since the current change only "conveys" information, and does that in
an extremely ambiguous fashion, moving to a new error code is provably
NOT going to be any problem to interop,  The desired client behaviour
is completely unspecified, so *ANY* client behaviour will be acceptable.


Based on the current text, your claim must be bogus, that assignment of
new error codes for this purpose would be backwards incompatible.


What I can not yet completely rule out, though, is that there are some
currently unstated expectations / desired behaviour that you would
want to retain, and which is currently undocumented.  Should that be
the case, then it is paramount that any such expectation about desired
behaviour is ADDED to the document, in order to enable interop with
independent implementations.

It is conceivable that such "desired/expected" behaviour consists of some
kind of "blacklisting" that had been previously implemented for the
"unauthorized(7)" error code, and that the inventors of the rfc5019
profile (VeriSign and Microsoft) wanted to take advantage of.

Should that be the case, then I would really be curious what kind of
blacklisting that is that implementors are thinking of when they
express their concern a move to a newly assigned error code would
be "backwards incompatible".  Is it about the caching of that responses
on clients?  Is there any "negative response caching"?  Are negative
responses cached "per server" or per (requested) certificate status?


-Martin

From stefan@aaa-sec.com  Wed Mar 27 08:45:52 2013
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Thread-Topic: [pkix] Last Call: <draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15.txt> (X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP) to Proposed Standard
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It is risky to assume that existing clients would work appropriately if
you send them a new never seen before error code.

I'm not willing to assume that unless a big pile of current implementers
assures me that this is the case.

/Stefan

On 3/27/13 3:14 PM, "Martin Rex" <mrex@sap.com> wrote:

>Stefan Santesson wrote:
>> "Martin Rex" <mrex@sap.com> wrote:
>> 
>> >Adding 3 more OCSPResponseStatus error codes {
>>no_authoritative_data(7),
>> >single_requests_only(8), unsupported_extension(8) } with well-defined
>>and
>> >conflict-free semantics to the existing enum would be perfectly
>>backwards
>> >compatible.
>> 
>> Of course it is backwards compatible with the standard, but not with the
>> installed base.
>> 
>> What would happen to the installed base of clients if OCSP responders
>> would change from current "unauthorized" to one of your new error codes?
>
>
>Actually, please look at the I-D text again.  Even if the Servers would
>change their response to a new error code for the "I can not respond
>authoritatively", it will be 100% backwards compatible with the clients.
>
>That is at least what proposed change implies!
>
>So lets assign new error codes and have Server change their response!
>
>
>
>"Backwards compatibility" is relevant in the same fashion as
>interoperability
>-- interoperability among independent implementations as well as interop
>between new implementations and the installed base.
>
>Since the current change only "conveys" information, and does that in
>an extremely ambiguous fashion, moving to a new error code is provably
>NOT going to be any problem to interop,  The desired client behaviour
>is completely unspecified, so *ANY* client behaviour will be acceptable.
>
>
>Based on the current text, your claim must be bogus, that assignment of
>new error codes for this purpose would be backwards incompatible.
>
>
>What I can not yet completely rule out, though, is that there are some
>currently unstated expectations / desired behaviour that you would
>want to retain, and which is currently undocumented.  Should that be
>the case, then it is paramount that any such expectation about desired
>behaviour is ADDED to the document, in order to enable interop with
>independent implementations.
>
>It is conceivable that such "desired/expected" behaviour consists of some
>kind of "blacklisting" that had been previously implemented for the
>"unauthorized(7)" error code, and that the inventors of the rfc5019
>profile (VeriSign and Microsoft) wanted to take advantage of.
>
>Should that be the case, then I would really be curious what kind of
>blacklisting that is that implementors are thinking of when they
>express their concern a move to a newly assigned error code would
>be "backwards incompatible".  Is it about the caching of that responses
>on clients?  Is there any "negative response caching"?  Are negative
>responses cached "per server" or per (requested) certificate status?
>
>
>-Martin



From mrex@sap.com  Wed Mar 27 09:00:09 2013
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In-Reply-To: <CD78CF3D.5ED2E%stefan@aaa-sec.com>
To: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>
Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2013 16:59:23 +0100 (CET)
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From: mrex@sap.com (Martin Rex)
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Last Call: <draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15.txt> (X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP) to Proposed Standard
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Stefan Santesson wrote:
>
> It is risky to assume that existing clients would work appropriately
> if you send them a new never seen before error code.
> 
> I'm not willing to assume that unless a big pile of current implementers
> assures me that this is the case.

As I wrote: As long as the spec is _entirely_silent_ about expected/desirable
behaviour of the client on receipt of a repurposed "unauthorized(7)"
OCSPResponseStatus, the new error code with be provable "backwards
compatible" within the definition of the specification, because
*ANY* client behaviour will formally provable meet the spec and therefore
"be interoperable".

How indiviual OCSP clients behave in particular, and whether all
implementors appreciate the behaviour of their own implementation
will then be _irrelevant_.


... which is why I believe that leaving client behaviour for the receipt
of OCSPResponseStatus error code entirely unspecified is a bad idea,
and for the repurposed "unauthorized(7)" it's a really bad idea.

rfc5019 only talks about caching of signed OCSP responses:
  http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5019#section-6.1
 

-Martin

From mrex@sap.com  Wed Mar 27 14:11:56 2013
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Last Call: <draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15.txt> (X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP) to Proposed Standard
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Sam Hartman wrote:
> Martin Rex wrote:
>> Oh, here is a message from the Security AD back then (Sam
>> Hartman), commenting on requirements for rfc2560bis (the I-D
>> under last call right now!):
>> 
>>   http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/current/msg03515.html
> 
> To be clear, I didn't comment on which error codes were overloaded to do
> what.  My point was simply that there needs to be a minimal set of
> client behavior that is guaranteed to work (if permitted by responder
> policy) with any responder.  That's the level of interoperability we
> generally require from our specs.
> 
> It sounds like Martin would like to be able to distinguish three client
> behaviors:
> 
> 1) Use less of the spec and send me a simpler request
> 
> 2) I can't help you with this particular request
> 
> 3) Please go away and never come back
> 
> That's a fine desire.  In my opinion, it's also fine for us to decide
> for interoperability, simplicity or other reasons that we're combining
> all that into one error and clients don't get to make this distinction.


True.  It was the Security co-AD Russ Housley who indicated _early_ during
the discussion of that draft (2.5 years after it had been adopted
as a WG item) that he considered some of the suggested abuses of
existing error codes "unacceptable":

   http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/current/msg03570.html

So far, I haven't found any arguments that could reasonably invalidate
Russ' initial assessment on the "unacceptable" the error code abuse,
i.e. any kind of transparent trade-off and the facts it could be
based on.

Looking as Russ' comment again, I check the documents again on the
exact behaviour required from an rfc5019 server when receiving an
OCSP request with a requestList.  Myself, I'm surprised and confused
by the answer:  the rfc5019 server is prohibited from returning an error!

rfc2560 neither provides and option nor an error code to refuse
a response based on the presence of multiple entries in request list.

The limit of a single entry in the requestList ist *CLEARLY* limited
to clients conforming to the rfc5019 profile, it is neither limited to
the requests sent to rfc5019 servers, nor does it apply to rfc5019
servers themselves -> "this profile ensures interoperability with
a fully conformant OCSP 2560 client":

   http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5019#page-4

   End of Section 1:

                                                        In the case
   where out-of-band mechanisms may not be available, this profile
   ensures that interoperability will still occur between a fully
   conformant OCSP 2560 client and a responder that is operating in a
   mode as described in this specification.


   2.1.1. OCSPRequest Structure

   OCSPRequests conformant to this profile MUST include only one Request
   in the OCSPRequest.RequestList structure.


Other than what I had assumed from Russ' message about unacceptable
error code abuse, rfc5019 does not define what kind or error code
to (ab)use if a request contains more than one entry in requestList,
and contains this explicit guidance:

  http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5019#section-2.2.1

   2.2.1. OCSPResponse Structure

   In the case where a responder does not have the ability to respond to
   an OCSP request containing a option not supported by the server, it
   SHOULD return the most complete response it can.  For example, in the
   case where a responder only supports pre-produced responses and does
   not have the ability to respond to an OCSP request containing a
   nonce, it SHOULD return a response that does not include a nonce.


But when there are multiple entries received in a requestList from
a "fully conformant OCSP 2560 client", to which rfc5019 allegedly ensures
interoperability, then the option to return "unauthorized" to indicate
inability to obtain authoritative information, and results in
self-contraditory design.


I strongly believe this stuff needs some housekeeping applied.
The currently proposed minimal change of the description for the
"unauthorized" error code in rfc2560bis is only going to make
the mess worse, this is neither a solution, nor an improvement to
anything.

-Martin

 





From SChokhani@cygnacom.com  Wed Mar 27 15:04:12 2013
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From: Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>
To: Piyush Jain <piyush@ditenity.com>, 'pkix' <pkix@ietf.org>
Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2013 18:04:08 -0400
Thread-Topic: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN
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David and Piyush,

Thanks.

I agree with you for the most part.  But, the first sentence in that paragr=
aph can be used to think otherwise: "For URIs, the constraint applies to th=
e host part of the name".

Anyway, that is not my primary point.  I think the URI schemes that cannot =
have host name component should be exempt from name constraint since there =
is nothing to constrain.

Today, we have actual certificates that have URN in them and rejecting them=
 on the basis of upstream URI constraints (which typically apply to URL) do=
es not make sense to me.

My question is was that simply an oversight or is there a reason URN should=
 be rejected.  One could also argue when using URN scheme, the name is not =
hierarchical and there is no point in constraining it.

From: Piyush Jain [mailto:piyush@ditenity.com]
Sent: Tuesday, March 26, 2013 6:07 PM
To: Santosh Chokhani; 'pkix'
Subject: RE: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN

>From 5280
(e.g., if the URI either
   does not include an authority component or includes an authority
   component in which the host name is specified as an IP address), then
   the application MUST reject the certificate.

It clearly says that if authority component is missing, certificate must be=
 rejected.

From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org<mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org> [mailto:pkix-boun=
ces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Santosh Chokhani
Sent: Tuesday, March 26, 2013 2:47 PM
To: 'pkix'
Subject: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN

I have been wrestling with what one should with a certificate if the SAN in=
 the certificate contains URN and when you get to the certificate, the name=
 constraint state variable indicates permitted and/or excluded values for t=
he URI name form.

I think name constraint is not applicable to URN since it does not have an =
"authority" and thus "host" component by definition.  Thus, regardless of t=
he name constraint state variable, presence of URN should not cause name co=
nstraint violation.

But, when I read 5280, I find the text implying otherwise or ambiguous.


Santosh Chokhani
CygnaCom Solutions, Inc.


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<o:idmap v:ext=3D"edit" data=3D"1" />
</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=3DEN-US link=3Dblue vli=
nk=3Dpurple><div class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'c=
olor:#1F497D'>David and Piyush,<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><=
span style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNorm=
al><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>Thanks.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMs=
oNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=
=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>I agree with you for the most pa=
rt.&nbsp; But, the first sentence in that paragraph can be used to think ot=
herwise: &#8220;</span>For URIs, the constraint applies to the host part of=
 the name&#8221;.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><=
p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>Anyway, that is not my pr=
imary point.&nbsp; I think the URI schemes that cannot have host name compo=
nent should be exempt from name constraint since there is nothing to constr=
ain.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D=
'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F=
497D'>Today, we have actual certificates that have URN in them and rejectin=
g them on the basis of upstream URI constraints (which typically apply to U=
RL) does not make sense to me. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><=
span style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNorm=
al><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>My question is was that simply an oversigh=
t or is there a reason URN should be rejected.&nbsp; One could also argue w=
hen using URN scheme, the name is not hierarchical and there is no point in=
 constraining it.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'=
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><div><div style=3D'border:none;b=
order-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNorm=
al><b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>Fr=
om:</span></b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-se=
rif"'> Piyush Jain [mailto:piyush@ditenity.com] <br><b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, M=
arch 26, 2013 6:07 PM<br><b>To:</b> Santosh Chokhani; 'pkix'<br><b>Subject:=
</b> RE: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></di=
v><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span styl=
e=3D'color:#1F497D'>From 5280<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><sp=
an style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New";color:black'>(e.g., =
if the URI either<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'=
font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New";color:black'>&nbsp;&nbsp; does n=
ot include an authority component or includes an authority<o:p></o:p></span=
></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Cour=
ier New";color:black'>&nbsp;&nbsp; component in which the host name is spec=
ified as an IP address), then<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><sp=
an style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New";color:black'>&nbsp;&=
nbsp; the application MUST reject the certificate.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p=
><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>It clearly says that if=
 authority component is missing, certificate must be rejected.<o:p></o:p></=
span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:=
p></span></p><div style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding=
:0in 0in 0in 4.0pt'><div><div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF=
 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span style=3D'fo=
nt-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span></b><span sty=
le=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> </span><a href=
=3D"mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org"><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-fami=
ly:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>pkix-bounces@ietf.org</span></a><span style=3D'fo=
nt-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> [</span><a href=3D"mailt=
o:pkix-bounces@ietf.org"><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahom=
a","sans-serif"'>mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org</span></a><span style=3D'font=
-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>] <b>On Behalf Of </b>Santo=
sh Chokhani<br><b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, March 26, 2013 2:47 PM<br><b>To:</b> '=
pkix'<br><b>Subject:</b> [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN<o:p></o:p></spa=
n></p></div></div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoN=
ormal>I have been wrestling with what one should with a certificate if the =
SAN in the certificate contains URN and when you get to the certificate, th=
e name constraint state variable indicates permitted and/or excluded values=
 for the URI name form.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p=
></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>I think name constraint is not applicable to URN =
since it does not have an &#8220;authority&#8221; and thus &#8220;host&#822=
1; component by definition.&nbsp; Thus, regardless of the name constraint s=
tate variable, presence of URN should not cause name constraint violation.<=
o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNorma=
l>But, when I read 5280, I find the text implying otherwise or ambiguous.<o=
:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal=
><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>Santosh Chokhani<o:p></o:p></p><=
p class=3DMsoNormal>CygnaCom Solutions, Inc.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNo=
rmal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div></div></body></html>=

--_000_B83745DA469B7847811819C5005244AFF3DC9C5Escygexch7cygnac_--

From stefan@aaa-sec.com  Wed Mar 27 08:39:27 2013
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Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2013 16:37:45 +0100
From: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>
To: "Black, David" <david.black@emc.com>, "sts@aaa-sec.com" <sts@aaa-sec.com>, "mmyers@fastq.com" <mmyers@fastq.com>, "ambarish@gmail.com" <ambarish@gmail.com>, "slava.galperin@gmail.com" <slava.galperin@gmail.com>, "cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca" <cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca>, "gen-art@ietf.org" <gen-art@ietf.org>
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Thread-Topic: Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
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I could.

My worry is just that this is such a contentious subject and it took us x
hundreds of emails to reach this state, that if I add more explanations,
people will start disagreeing with it and that we end up in a long debate
on how to correctly express this.

Is this important enough to do that?

/Stefan


On 3/27/13 3:30 PM, "Black, David" <david.black@emc.com> wrote:

>Hi Stefan,
>
>> Does this answer your question?
>
>Yes, please add some of that explanation to the next version of the draft
>;-).
>Coverage of existing responder behavior/limitations (important "running
>code"
>concerns, IMHO) and alternatives to using "revoked" ("have a number of
>tools
>to prevent the client from accepting a bad certificate") seem particularly
>relevant.
>
>Thanks,
>--David
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com]
>> Sent: Wednesday, March 27, 2013 7:44 AM
>> To: Black, David; sts@aaa-sec.com; mmyers@fastq.com; ambarish@gmail.com;
>> slava.galperin@gmail.com; cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca; gen-art@ietf.org
>> Cc: pkix@ietf.org; Sean Turner; ietf@ietf.org
>> Subject: Re: Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
>> 
>> Hi David,
>> 
>> Yes I missed to respond to that aspect.
>> 
>> This is a bit complicated, but we have a large legacy to take into
>>account
>> where some responders implements just RFC 2560, while some deliver
>> pre-generated responses according to RFC 5019 (Light-weight OCSP). LW
>> responders are not capable of producing a signed response at the time of
>> responding and in case such responder finds a request for a certificate
>> where no pre-produced response exists, it will reply with an unsigned
>> error response "unauthorized", which also is a legitimate way to
>>respond.
>> So the actual OCSP responder may actually know that the certificate was
>> never issued, but since it delivers pre-produced responder through a
>>CDN,
>> it can not provide a revoked response in real time.
>> 
>> So the major aim with the current writing is to declare that the revoked
>> response is a MAY because there are other valid alternatives.
>> 
>> We also want to avoid putting down a SHOULD respond revoked if a
>> certificate is known to be not-issued, because that would require us to
>> define what "known to be non-issued" actually means. And that could be
>> quite tricky as OCSP responders by no means are required to have this
>> knowledge.
>> 
>> The OCSP responder simply have a number of tools to prevent the client
>> from accepting a bad certificate.
>> This update of OCSP simply allows responders to use the "revoked"
>>response
>> as a preventive measure, without mandating it.
>> 
>> This is also related to activities in the CA Browser Forum where they
>>put
>> down requirements on responders complying with CAB rules to not respond
>> "good" to certificates that were never issued.
>> With this update in OCSP, they can now mandate in their policies both
>>the
>> fact that their responders MUST know if a certificate was never issued
>>and
>> MUST respond "revoked".
>> 
>> So we allow other communities to raise the bar even if the base standard
>> defines the response as optional.
>> 
>> In theory we could possibly say that responding revoked is optional, but
>> if you choose between revoked and unknown then you SHOULD favour revoked
>> over unknown. But such nested requirements just feels bad and impossible
>> to test compliance against. I'd much rather just leave it optional. I
>> think the Note gives a clear recommendation on this and the rationale
>> without spelling it out as a requirement.
>> 
>> Does this answer your question?
>> 
>> 
>> On 3/27/13 12:51 AM, "Black, David" <david.black@emc.com> wrote:
>> 
>> >Hi Stefan,
>> >
>> >This looks good - thank you for the prompt response.
>> >
>> >It looks like my speculation on item [1] was wrong, so could you
>>respond
>> >to the question below, please?:
>> >
>> >> >[1] Section 2.2:
>> >> >
>> >> >	NOTE: The "revoked" state for known non-issued certificate serial
>> >> >		numbers is allowed in order to reduce the risk of relying
>> >> >		parties using CRLs as a fall back mechanism, which would be
>> >> >		considerably higher if an "unknown" response was returned.
>> >> >
>> >> >Given this explanation, I'm surprised that the use of "revoked"
>> >>instead of
>> >> >"unknown" for a known non-issued certificate is a "MAY" requirement
>>and
>> >> >not a "SHOULD" requirement.  Why is that the case?
>> >
>> >--------------
>> >
>> >Beyond that, the proposed actions (or proposed non-actions) on items
>> >[2]-[5]
>> >are fine with me, Sean's taken care of the author permissions item from
>> >idnits, and I assume someone has or will check the ASN.1 .
>> >
>> >Thanks,
>> >--David
>> >
>> >> -----Original Message-----
>> >> From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com]
>> >> Sent: Monday, March 25, 2013 10:21 PM
>> >> To: Black, David; sts@aaa-sec.com; mmyers@fastq.com;
>>ambarish@gmail.com;
>> >> slava.galperin@gmail.com; cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca; gen-art@ietf.org
>> >> Cc: pkix@ietf.org; Sean Turner; ietf@ietf.org
>> >> Subject: Re: Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
>> >>
>> >> Hi David,
>> >>
>> >> Thanks for the review.
>> >> My reply in line.
>> >>
>> >> On 3/26/13 1:25 AM, "Black, David" <david.black@emc.com> wrote:
>> >>
>> >> >Authors,
>> >> >
>> >> >I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on
>> >> >Gen-ART, please
>> >> >see the FAQ at
>> >><http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.
>> >> >
>> >> >Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call
>>comments
>> >>you
>> >> >may receive.
>> >> >
>> >> >Document: draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
>> >> >Reviewer: David L. Black
>> >> >Review Date: March 25, 2013
>> >> >IETF LC End Date: March 27, 2013
>> >> >
>> >> >Summary:
>> >> >This draft is on the right track but has open issues, described in
>>the
>> >> >review.
>> >> >
>> >> >This draft updates the OCSP protocol for obtaining certificate
>>status
>> >> >with some minor extensions.
>> >> >
>> >> >Because this is a "bis" draft, I reviewed the diffs against RFC
>>2560.
>> >> >
>> >> >I did not check the ASN.1.  I also did not see a writeup for this
>>draft
>> >> >in the data tracker, and so will rely on the document shepherd to
>> >> >ensure that the ASN.1 has been checked when the writeup is prepared.
>> >> >
>> >> >I found five open issues, all of which are minor, plus one idnits
>>item
>> >> >that is probably ok, but should be double-checked.
>> >> >
>> >> >Minor issues:
>> >> >
>> >> >[1] Section 2.2:
>> >> >
>> >> >	NOTE: The "revoked" state for known non-issued certificate serial
>> >> >		numbers is allowed in order to reduce the risk of relying
>> >> >		parties using CRLs as a fall back mechanism, which would be
>> >> >		considerably higher if an "unknown" response was returned.
>> >> >
>> >> >Given this explanation, I'm surprised that the use of "revoked"
>> >>instead of
>> >> >"unknown" for a known non-issued certificate is a "MAY" requirement
>>and
>> >> >not a "SHOULD" requirement.  Why is that the case?
>> >> >
>> >> >It appears that the reason is that the use of "revoked" in this
>> >>situation
>> >> >may be dangerous when serial numbers can be predicted for
>>certificates
>> >> >that
>> >> >will be issued in the future.  If that's what's going on, this
>>concern
>> >>is
>> >> >already explained in the security considerations section, but it
>>should
>> >> >also be mentioned here for completeness.
>> >>
>> >> No, this is not the main reason. The main reason is the one stated
>>as a
>> >> Note: in this section:
>> >>
>> >> NOTE: The "revoked" state for known non-issued certificate serial
>> >>numbers
>> >> is allowed in order to reduce the risk of relying parties using CRLs
>>as
>> >>a
>> >> fall back mechanism, which would be considerably higher if an
>>"unknown"
>> >> response was returned.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> >
>> >> >[2] Section 4.2.2.2:
>> >> >
>> >> >	The key that signs a certificate's status information need not be
>>the
>> >> >	same key that signed the certificate. It is necessary however to
>> >> >	ensure that the entity signing this information is authorized to do
>> >> >	so.  Therefore, a certificate's issuer MAY either sign the OCSP
>> >> >	responses itself or it MAY explicitly designate this authority to
>> >> >	another entity.
>> >> >
>> >> >The two instances of "MAY" in the above text were both "MUST" in RFC
>> >>2560.
>> >> >
>> >> >The RFC 2560 text construction of "MUST" or "MUST" is a bit odd, but
>> >>the two
>> >> >"MAY"s in this draft are even worse, as they allow "MAY do something
>> >>else
>> >> >entirely", despite being enclosed in an either-or construct.  I
>> >>strongly
>> >> >suspect that the latter was not intended, so the following would be
>> >> >clearer:
>> >> >
>> >> >	The key that signs a certificate's status information need not be
>>the
>> >> >	same key that signed the certificate. It is necessary however to
>> >> >	ensure that the entity signing this information is authorized to do
>> >> >	so.  Therefore, a certificate's issuer MUST do one of the
>>following:
>> >> >		- sign the OCSP responses itself, or
>> >> >		- explicitly designate this authority to another entity.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> I Agree. I will adopt your text.
>> >>
>> >> >
>> >> >[3] Section 4.3:
>> >> >
>> >> >Is the "SHOULD" requirement still appropriate for the DSA with SHA-1
>> >>combo
>> >> >(vs. a "MAY" requirement)?  This requirement was a "MUST" in RFC
>>2560,
>> >>but
>> >> >I wonder about actual usage of DSA in practice.
>> >>
>> >> The change in algorithm requirements was provided by RFC 6277, and
>> >>further
>> >> refined in this draft in accordance with requests from Sean Turner.
>> >>
>> >> >
>> >> >[4] Section 5, last paragraph:
>> >> >
>> >> >	Responding a "revoked" state to certificate that has never been
>> >> >	issued may enable someone to obtain a revocation response for a
>> >> >	certificate that is not yet issued, but soon will be issued, if the
>> >> >	CA issues certificates using sequential certificate serial number
>> >> >	assignment.
>> >> >
>> >> >The above text after starting with the "if" is too narrow - it
>>should
>> >>say:
>> >> >
>> >> >	if the certificate serial number of the certificate that
>> >> >	will be issued can be predicted or guessed by the requester.
>> >> >	Such prediction is easy for a CA that issues certificates
>> >> >	using sequential certificate serial number assignment.
>> >> >
>> >> >There's also a nit in original text - its first line should be:
>> >> >
>> >> >	Responding with a "revoked" state for a certificate that has never
>> >>been
>> >>
>> >> Good suggestions. I will update accordingly.
>> >>
>> >> >
>> >> >[5] Section 5.1.1:
>> >> >
>> >> >	In archival applications it is quite possible that an OCSP
>>responder
>> >> >	might be asked to report the validity of a certificate on a date in
>> >> >	the distant past. Such a certificate might employ a signing method
>> >> >	that is no longer considered acceptably secure. In such
>> >> >	circumstances the responder MUST NOT generate a signature using a
>> >> >	signing mechanism that is not considered acceptably secure.
>> >> >
>> >> >This could use an additional warning that certificate archival
>>should
>> >> >not rely solely on signatures in archived certificates for ensuring
>>the
>> >> >validity and integrity of the archived certificates because the
>> >>signature
>> >> >algorithm(s) may transition to no longer being considered acceptably
>> >> >secure at some point after the certificates are archived.
>> >>
>> >> This note if I remember correctly is imported from RFC 6277, which is
>> >> incorporated into this document. The reason behind the text is only
>>to
>> >> avoid usages of insecure algorithms.
>> >> Historical validation is a real can of worms that I really would
>>like to
>> >> keep a tight lid on. I really want to avoid doing recommendations in
>> >>this
>> >> space as it may trigger a whole flood of things that could be equally
>> >> important to say about this subject.
>> >>
>> >> >
>> >> >Nits:
>> >> >
>> >> >idnits 2.12.15 said:
>> >> >
>> >> >  -- The document seems to lack a disclaimer for pre-RFC5378 work,
>>but
>> >>may
>> >> >     have content which was first submitted before 10 November 2008.
>> >>If
>> >> >you
>> >> >     have contacted all the original authors and they are all
>>willing
>> >>to
>> >> >grant
>> >> >     the BCP78 rights to the IETF Trust, then this is fine, and you
>>can
>> >> >ignore
>> >> >     this comment.  If not, you may need to add the pre-RFC5378
>> >> >disclaimer.
>> >> >     (See the Legal Provisions document at
>> >> >     http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info for more information.)
>> >> >
>> >> >This looks like it's ok because all the authors of RFC 2560 are also
>> >> >authors of
>> >> >this draft, but it should be double-checked.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> I defer this one to Sean. I think he has this one under control.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Thanks again for the review.
>> >>
>> >> /Stefan
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> >
>> >> >Thanks,
>> >> >--David
>> >> >----------------------------------------------------
>> >> >David L. Black, Distinguished Engineer
>> >> >EMC Corporation, 176 South St., Hopkinton, MA  01748
>> >> >+1 (508) 293-7953             FAX: +1 (508) 293-7786
>> >> >david.black@emc.com        Mobile: +1 (978) 394-7754
>> >> >----------------------------------------------------
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >>
>> >>
>> >
>> 
>> 
>



From stefan@aaa-sec.com  Thu Mar 28 03:34:18 2013
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To: "Black, David" <david.black@emc.com>, "sts@aaa-sec.com" <sts@aaa-sec.com>, "mmyers@fastq.com" <mmyers@fastq.com>, "ambarish@gmail.com" <ambarish@gmail.com>, "slava.galperin@gmail.com" <slava.galperin@gmail.com>, "cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca" <cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca>, "gen-art@ietf.org" <gen-art@ietf.org>
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I have given this a go by expanding the note as follows:

NOTE: The "revoked" state for known non-issued certificate serial
         numbers is allowed in order to reduce the risk of relying
         parties using CRLs as a fall back mechanism, which would be
         considerably higher if an "unknown" response was returned. The
         "revoked" status is still optional in this context in order to
         maintain backwards compatibility with deployments of RFC 2560.
         For example, the responder may not have any knowledge about
         whether a requested serial number has been assigned to any
         issued certificate, or the responder may provide pre produced
         responses in accordance with RFC 5019 and, for that reason, is
         not capable of providing a signed response for all non-issued
         certificate serial numbers.


Does this solve you issue.
I think this is as far as dare to go without risking a heated debate.

/Stefan


On 3/27/13 5:08 PM, "Black, David" <david.black@emc.com> wrote:

>Stefan,
>
>> Is this important enough to do that?
>
>IMHO, yes - the "running code" aspects of existing responder
>behavior/limitations
>are definitely important enough for an RFC like this that revises a
>protocol spec,
>and the alternatives to "revoked" feel like an important complement to
>those
>aspects (discussion what to do instead when responder
>behavior/limitations are
>encountered).
>
>I appreciate the level of work that may be involved in capturing this, as
>I've had my share of contentious discussions in WGs that I chair - FWIW,
>I'm currently chairing my 4th and 5th WGs.  OTOH, when a WG has put that
>much
>time/effort into reaching a (compromise) decision, it really is valuable
>to record why the decision was reached to avoid recovering that ground
>in the future and (specific to this situation) to give implementers some
>more context/information on how the protocol is likely to work in
>practice.
>
>Thanks,
>--David
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com]
>> Sent: Wednesday, March 27, 2013 11:38 AM
>> To: Black, David; sts@aaa-sec.com; mmyers@fastq.com; ambarish@gmail.com;
>> slava.galperin@gmail.com; cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca; gen-art@ietf.org
>> Cc: pkix@ietf.org; Sean Turner; ietf@ietf.org
>> Subject: Re: Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
>>
>> I could.
>>
>> My worry is just that this is such a contentious subject and it took us
>>x
>> hundreds of emails to reach this state, that if I add more explanations,
>> people will start disagreeing with it and that we end up in a long
>>debate
>> on how to correctly express this.
>>
>> Is this important enough to do that?
>>
>> /Stefan
>>
>>
>> On 3/27/13 3:30 PM, "Black, David" <david.black@emc.com> wrote:
>>
>> >Hi Stefan,
>> >
>> >> Does this answer your question?
>> >
>> >Yes, please add some of that explanation to the next version of the
>>draft
>> >;-).
>> >Coverage of existing responder behavior/limitations (important "running
>> >code"
>> >concerns, IMHO) and alternatives to using "revoked" ("have a number of
>> >tools
>> >to prevent the client from accepting a bad certificate") seem
>>particularly
>> >relevant.
>> >
>> >Thanks,
>> >--David
>> >
>> >> -----Original Message-----
>> >> From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com]
>> >> Sent: Wednesday, March 27, 2013 7:44 AM
>> >> To: Black, David; sts@aaa-sec.com; mmyers@fastq.com;
>>ambarish@gmail.com;
>> >> slava.galperin@gmail.com; cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca; gen-art@ietf.org
>> >> Cc: pkix@ietf.org; Sean Turner; ietf@ietf.org
>> >> Subject: Re: Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
>> >>
>> >> Hi David,
>> >>
>> >> Yes I missed to respond to that aspect.
>> >>
>> >> This is a bit complicated, but we have a large legacy to take into
>> >>account
>> >> where some responders implements just RFC 2560, while some deliver
>> >> pre-generated responses according to RFC 5019 (Light-weight OCSP). LW
>> >> responders are not capable of producing a signed response at the
>>time of
>> >> responding and in case such responder finds a request for a
>>certificate
>> >> where no pre-produced response exists, it will reply with an unsigned
>> >> error response "unauthorized", which also is a legitimate way to
>> >>respond.
>> >> So the actual OCSP responder may actually know that the certificate
>>was
>> >> never issued, but since it delivers pre-produced responder through a
>> >>CDN,
>> >> it can not provide a revoked response in real time.
>> >>
>> >> So the major aim with the current writing is to declare that the
>>revoked
>> >> response is a MAY because there are other valid alternatives.
>> >>
>> >> We also want to avoid putting down a SHOULD respond revoked if a
>> >> certificate is known to be not-issued, because that would require us
>>to
>> >> define what "known to be non-issued" actually means. And that could
>>be
>> >> quite tricky as OCSP responders by no means are required to have this
>> >> knowledge.
>> >>
>> >> The OCSP responder simply have a number of tools to prevent the
>>client
>> >> from accepting a bad certificate.
>> >> This update of OCSP simply allows responders to use the "revoked"
>> >>response
>> >> as a preventive measure, without mandating it.
>> >>
>> >> This is also related to activities in the CA Browser Forum where they
>> >>put
>> >> down requirements on responders complying with CAB rules to not
>>respond
>> >> "good" to certificates that were never issued.
>> >> With this update in OCSP, they can now mandate in their policies both
>> >>the
>> >> fact that their responders MUST know if a certificate was never
>>issued
>> >>and
>> >> MUST respond "revoked".
>> >>
>> >> So we allow other communities to raise the bar even if the base
>>standard
>> >> defines the response as optional.
>> >>
>> >> In theory we could possibly say that responding revoked is optional,
>>but
>> >> if you choose between revoked and unknown then you SHOULD favour
>>revoked
>> >> over unknown. But such nested requirements just feels bad and
>>impossible
>> >> to test compliance against. I'd much rather just leave it optional. I
>> >> think the Note gives a clear recommendation on this and the rationale
>> >> without spelling it out as a requirement.
>> >>
>> >> Does this answer your question?
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> On 3/27/13 12:51 AM, "Black, David" <david.black@emc.com> wrote:
>> >>
>> >> >Hi Stefan,
>> >> >
>> >> >This looks good - thank you for the prompt response.
>> >> >
>> >> >It looks like my speculation on item [1] was wrong, so could you
>> >>respond
>> >> >to the question below, please?:
>> >> >
>> >> >> >[1] Section 2.2:
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >       NOTE: The "revoked" state for known non-issued
>>certificate serial
>> >> >> >               numbers is allowed in order to reduce the risk of
>>relying
>> >> >> >               parties using CRLs as a fall back mechanism,
>>which would be
>> >> >> >               considerably higher if an "unknown" response was
>>returned.
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >Given this explanation, I'm surprised that the use of "revoked"
>> >> >>instead of
>> >> >> >"unknown" for a known non-issued certificate is a "MAY"
>>requirement
>> >>and
>> >> >> >not a "SHOULD" requirement.  Why is that the case?
>> >> >
>> >> >--------------
>> >> >
>> >> >Beyond that, the proposed actions (or proposed non-actions) on items
>> >> >[2]-[5]
>> >> >are fine with me, Sean's taken care of the author permissions item
>>from
>> >> >idnits, and I assume someone has or will check the ASN.1 .
>> >> >
>> >> >Thanks,
>> >> >--David
>> >> >
>> >> >> -----Original Message-----
>> >> >> From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com]
>> >> >> Sent: Monday, March 25, 2013 10:21 PM
>> >> >> To: Black, David; sts@aaa-sec.com; mmyers@fastq.com;
>> >>ambarish@gmail.com;
>> >> >> slava.galperin@gmail.com; cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca; gen-art@ietf.org
>> >> >> Cc: pkix@ietf.org; Sean Turner; ietf@ietf.org
>> >> >> Subject: Re: Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
>> >> >>
>> >> >> Hi David,
>> >> >>
>> >> >> Thanks for the review.
>> >> >> My reply in line.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> On 3/26/13 1:25 AM, "Black, David" <david.black@emc.com> wrote:
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >Authors,
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For
>>background on
>> >> >> >Gen-ART, please
>> >> >> >see the FAQ at
>> >> >><http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call
>> >>comments
>> >> >>you
>> >> >> >may receive.
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >Document: draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
>> >> >> >Reviewer: David L. Black
>> >> >> >Review Date: March 25, 2013
>> >> >> >IETF LC End Date: March 27, 2013
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >Summary:
>> >> >> >This draft is on the right track but has open issues, described
>>in
>> >>the
>> >> >> >review.
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >This draft updates the OCSP protocol for obtaining certificate
>> >>status
>> >> >> >with some minor extensions.
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >Because this is a "bis" draft, I reviewed the diffs against RFC
>> >>2560.
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >I did not check the ASN.1.  I also did not see a writeup for this
>> >>draft
>> >> >> >in the data tracker, and so will rely on the document shepherd to
>> >> >> >ensure that the ASN.1 has been checked when the writeup is
>>prepared.
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >I found five open issues, all of which are minor, plus one idnits
>> >>item
>> >> >> >that is probably ok, but should be double-checked.
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >Minor issues:
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >[1] Section 2.2:
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >       NOTE: The "revoked" state for known non-issued
>>certificate serial
>> >> >> >               numbers is allowed in order to reduce the risk of
>>relying
>> >> >> >               parties using CRLs as a fall back mechanism,
>>which would be
>> >> >> >               considerably higher if an "unknown" response was
>>returned.
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >Given this explanation, I'm surprised that the use of "revoked"
>> >> >>instead of
>> >> >> >"unknown" for a known non-issued certificate is a "MAY"
>>requirement
>> >>and
>> >> >> >not a "SHOULD" requirement.  Why is that the case?
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >It appears that the reason is that the use of "revoked" in this
>> >> >>situation
>> >> >> >may be dangerous when serial numbers can be predicted for
>> >>certificates
>> >> >> >that
>> >> >> >will be issued in the future.  If that's what's going on, this
>> >>concern
>> >> >>is
>> >> >> >already explained in the security considerations section, but it
>> >>should
>> >> >> >also be mentioned here for completeness.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> No, this is not the main reason. The main reason is the one stated
>> >>as a
>> >> >> Note: in this section:
>> >> >>
>> >> >> NOTE: The "revoked" state for known non-issued certificate serial
>> >> >>numbers
>> >> >> is allowed in order to reduce the risk of relying parties using
>>CRLs
>> >>as
>> >> >>a
>> >> >> fall back mechanism, which would be considerably higher if an
>> >>"unknown"
>> >> >> response was returned.
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >[2] Section 4.2.2.2:
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >       The key that signs a certificate's status information
>>need not be
>> >>the
>> >> >> >       same key that signed the certificate. It is necessary
>>however to
>> >> >> >       ensure that the entity signing this information is
>>authorized to
>> do
>> >> >> >       so.  Therefore, a certificate's issuer MAY either sign
>>the OCSP
>> >> >> >       responses itself or it MAY explicitly designate this
>>authority to
>> >> >> >       another entity.
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >The two instances of "MAY" in the above text were both "MUST" in
>>RFC
>> >> >>2560.
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >The RFC 2560 text construction of "MUST" or "MUST" is a bit odd,
>>but
>> >> >>the two
>> >> >> >"MAY"s in this draft are even worse, as they allow "MAY do
>>something
>> >> >>else
>> >> >> >entirely", despite being enclosed in an either-or construct.  I
>> >> >>strongly
>> >> >> >suspect that the latter was not intended, so the following would
>>be
>> >> >> >clearer:
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >       The key that signs a certificate's status information
>>need not be
>> >>the
>> >> >> >       same key that signed the certificate. It is necessary
>>however to
>> >> >> >       ensure that the entity signing this information is
>>authorized to
>> do
>> >> >> >       so.  Therefore, a certificate's issuer MUST do one of the
>> >>following:
>> >> >> >               - sign the OCSP responses itself, or
>> >> >> >               - explicitly designate this authority to another
>>entity.
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >> I Agree. I will adopt your text.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >[3] Section 4.3:
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >Is the "SHOULD" requirement still appropriate for the DSA with
>>SHA-1
>> >> >>combo
>> >> >> >(vs. a "MAY" requirement)?  This requirement was a "MUST" in RFC
>> >>2560,
>> >> >>but
>> >> >> >I wonder about actual usage of DSA in practice.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> The change in algorithm requirements was provided by RFC 6277, and
>> >> >>further
>> >> >> refined in this draft in accordance with requests from Sean
>>Turner.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >[4] Section 5, last paragraph:
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >       Responding a "revoked" state to certificate that has
>>never been
>> >> >> >       issued may enable someone to obtain a revocation response
>>for a
>> >> >> >       certificate that is not yet issued, but soon will be
>>issued, if
>> the
>> >> >> >       CA issues certificates using sequential certificate
>>serial number
>> >> >> >       assignment.
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >The above text after starting with the "if" is too narrow - it
>> >>should
>> >> >>say:
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >       if the certificate serial number of the certificate that
>> >> >> >       will be issued can be predicted or guessed by the
>>requester.
>> >> >> >       Such prediction is easy for a CA that issues certificates
>> >> >> >       using sequential certificate serial number assignment.
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >There's also a nit in original text - its first line should be:
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >       Responding with a "revoked" state for a certificate that
>>has never
>> >> >>been
>> >> >>
>> >> >> Good suggestions. I will update accordingly.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >[5] Section 5.1.1:
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >       In archival applications it is quite possible that an OCSP
>> >>responder
>> >> >> >       might be asked to report the validity of a certificate on
>>a date
>> in
>> >> >> >       the distant past. Such a certificate might employ a
>>signing method
>> >> >> >       that is no longer considered acceptably secure. In such
>> >> >> >       circumstances the responder MUST NOT generate a signature
>>using a
>> >> >> >       signing mechanism that is not considered acceptably
>>secure.
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >This could use an additional warning that certificate archival
>> >>should
>> >> >> >not rely solely on signatures in archived certificates for
>>ensuring
>> >>the
>> >> >> >validity and integrity of the archived certificates because the
>> >> >>signature
>> >> >> >algorithm(s) may transition to no longer being considered
>>acceptably
>> >> >> >secure at some point after the certificates are archived.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> This note if I remember correctly is imported from RFC 6277,
>>which is
>> >> >> incorporated into this document. The reason behind the text is
>>only
>> >>to
>> >> >> avoid usages of insecure algorithms.
>> >> >> Historical validation is a real can of worms that I really would
>> >>like to
>> >> >> keep a tight lid on. I really want to avoid doing recommendations
>>in
>> >> >>this
>> >> >> space as it may trigger a whole flood of things that could be
>>equally
>> >> >> important to say about this subject.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >Nits:
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >idnits 2.12.15 said:
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >  -- The document seems to lack a disclaimer for pre-RFC5378
>>work,
>> >>but
>> >> >>may
>> >> >> >     have content which was first submitted before 10 November
>>2008.
>> >> >>If
>> >> >> >you
>> >> >> >     have contacted all the original authors and they are all
>> >>willing
>> >> >>to
>> >> >> >grant
>> >> >> >     the BCP78 rights to the IETF Trust, then this is fine, and
>>you
>> >>can
>> >> >> >ignore
>> >> >> >     this comment.  If not, you may need to add the pre-RFC5378
>> >> >> >disclaimer.
>> >> >> >     (See the Legal Provisions document at
>> >> >> >     http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info for more information.)
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >This looks like it's ok because all the authors of RFC 2560 are
>>also
>> >> >> >authors of
>> >> >> >this draft, but it should be double-checked.
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >> I defer this one to Sean. I think he has this one under control.
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >> Thanks again for the review.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> /Stefan
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >Thanks,
>> >> >> >--David
>> >> >> >----------------------------------------------------
>> >> >> >David L. Black, Distinguished Engineer
>> >> >> >EMC Corporation, 176 South St., Hopkinton, MA  01748
>> >> >> >+1 (508) 293-7953             FAX: +1 (508) 293-7786
>> >> >> >david.black@emc.com        Mobile: +1 (978) 394-7754
>> >> >> >----------------------------------------------------
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >
>> >>
>> >>
>> >
>>
>>
>



From david.black@emc.com  Wed Mar 27 07:30:48 2013
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From: "Black, David" <david.black@emc.com>
To: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>, "sts@aaa-sec.com" <sts@aaa-sec.com>, "mmyers@fastq.com" <mmyers@fastq.com>, "ambarish@gmail.com" <ambarish@gmail.com>, "slava.galperin@gmail.com" <slava.galperin@gmail.com>, "cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca" <cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca>, "gen-art@ietf.org" <gen-art@ietf.org>
Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2013 10:30:01 -0400
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
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Hi Stefan,

> Does this answer your question?

Yes, please add some of that explanation to the next version of the draft ;=
-).
Coverage of existing responder behavior/limitations (important "running cod=
e"
concerns, IMHO) and alternatives to using "revoked" ("have a number of tool=
s
to prevent the client from accepting a bad certificate") seem particularly
relevant.

Thanks,
--David

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com]
> Sent: Wednesday, March 27, 2013 7:44 AM
> To: Black, David; sts@aaa-sec.com; mmyers@fastq.com; ambarish@gmail.com;
> slava.galperin@gmail.com; cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca; gen-art@ietf.org
> Cc: pkix@ietf.org; Sean Turner; ietf@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
>=20
> Hi David,
>=20
> Yes I missed to respond to that aspect.
>=20
> This is a bit complicated, but we have a large legacy to take into accoun=
t
> where some responders implements just RFC 2560, while some deliver
> pre-generated responses according to RFC 5019 (Light-weight OCSP). LW
> responders are not capable of producing a signed response at the time of
> responding and in case such responder finds a request for a certificate
> where no pre-produced response exists, it will reply with an unsigned
> error response "unauthorized", which also is a legitimate way to respond.
> So the actual OCSP responder may actually know that the certificate was
> never issued, but since it delivers pre-produced responder through a CDN,
> it can not provide a revoked response in real time.
>=20
> So the major aim with the current writing is to declare that the revoked
> response is a MAY because there are other valid alternatives.
>=20
> We also want to avoid putting down a SHOULD respond revoked if a
> certificate is known to be not-issued, because that would require us to
> define what "known to be non-issued" actually means. And that could be
> quite tricky as OCSP responders by no means are required to have this
> knowledge.
>=20
> The OCSP responder simply have a number of tools to prevent the client
> from accepting a bad certificate.
> This update of OCSP simply allows responders to use the "revoked" respons=
e
> as a preventive measure, without mandating it.
>=20
> This is also related to activities in the CA Browser Forum where they put
> down requirements on responders complying with CAB rules to not respond
> "good" to certificates that were never issued.
> With this update in OCSP, they can now mandate in their policies both the
> fact that their responders MUST know if a certificate was never issued an=
d
> MUST respond "revoked".
>=20
> So we allow other communities to raise the bar even if the base standard
> defines the response as optional.
>=20
> In theory we could possibly say that responding revoked is optional, but
> if you choose between revoked and unknown then you SHOULD favour revoked
> over unknown. But such nested requirements just feels bad and impossible
> to test compliance against. I'd much rather just leave it optional. I
> think the Note gives a clear recommendation on this and the rationale
> without spelling it out as a requirement.
>=20
> Does this answer your question?
>=20
>=20
> On 3/27/13 12:51 AM, "Black, David" <david.black@emc.com> wrote:
>=20
> >Hi Stefan,
> >
> >This looks good - thank you for the prompt response.
> >
> >It looks like my speculation on item [1] was wrong, so could you respond
> >to the question below, please?:
> >
> >> >[1] Section 2.2:
> >> >
> >> >	NOTE: The "revoked" state for known non-issued certificate serial
> >> >		numbers is allowed in order to reduce the risk of relying
> >> >		parties using CRLs as a fall back mechanism, which would be
> >> >		considerably higher if an "unknown" response was returned.
> >> >
> >> >Given this explanation, I'm surprised that the use of "revoked"
> >>instead of
> >> >"unknown" for a known non-issued certificate is a "MAY" requirement a=
nd
> >> >not a "SHOULD" requirement.  Why is that the case?
> >
> >--------------
> >
> >Beyond that, the proposed actions (or proposed non-actions) on items
> >[2]-[5]
> >are fine with me, Sean's taken care of the author permissions item from
> >idnits, and I assume someone has or will check the ASN.1 .
> >
> >Thanks,
> >--David
> >
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com]
> >> Sent: Monday, March 25, 2013 10:21 PM
> >> To: Black, David; sts@aaa-sec.com; mmyers@fastq.com; ambarish@gmail.co=
m;
> >> slava.galperin@gmail.com; cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca; gen-art@ietf.org
> >> Cc: pkix@ietf.org; Sean Turner; ietf@ietf.org
> >> Subject: Re: Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
> >>
> >> Hi David,
> >>
> >> Thanks for the review.
> >> My reply in line.
> >>
> >> On 3/26/13 1:25 AM, "Black, David" <david.black@emc.com> wrote:
> >>
> >> >Authors,
> >> >
> >> >I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on
> >> >Gen-ART, please
> >> >see the FAQ at
> >><http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.
> >> >
> >> >Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments
> >>you
> >> >may receive.
> >> >
> >> >Document: draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
> >> >Reviewer: David L. Black
> >> >Review Date: March 25, 2013
> >> >IETF LC End Date: March 27, 2013
> >> >
> >> >Summary:
> >> >This draft is on the right track but has open issues, described in th=
e
> >> >review.
> >> >
> >> >This draft updates the OCSP protocol for obtaining certificate status
> >> >with some minor extensions.
> >> >
> >> >Because this is a "bis" draft, I reviewed the diffs against RFC 2560.
> >> >
> >> >I did not check the ASN.1.  I also did not see a writeup for this dra=
ft
> >> >in the data tracker, and so will rely on the document shepherd to
> >> >ensure that the ASN.1 has been checked when the writeup is prepared.
> >> >
> >> >I found five open issues, all of which are minor, plus one idnits ite=
m
> >> >that is probably ok, but should be double-checked.
> >> >
> >> >Minor issues:
> >> >
> >> >[1] Section 2.2:
> >> >
> >> >	NOTE: The "revoked" state for known non-issued certificate serial
> >> >		numbers is allowed in order to reduce the risk of relying
> >> >		parties using CRLs as a fall back mechanism, which would be
> >> >		considerably higher if an "unknown" response was returned.
> >> >
> >> >Given this explanation, I'm surprised that the use of "revoked"
> >>instead of
> >> >"unknown" for a known non-issued certificate is a "MAY" requirement a=
nd
> >> >not a "SHOULD" requirement.  Why is that the case?
> >> >
> >> >It appears that the reason is that the use of "revoked" in this
> >>situation
> >> >may be dangerous when serial numbers can be predicted for certificate=
s
> >> >that
> >> >will be issued in the future.  If that's what's going on, this concer=
n
> >>is
> >> >already explained in the security considerations section, but it shou=
ld
> >> >also be mentioned here for completeness.
> >>
> >> No, this is not the main reason. The main reason is the one stated as =
a
> >> Note: in this section:
> >>
> >> NOTE: The "revoked" state for known non-issued certificate serial
> >>numbers
> >> is allowed in order to reduce the risk of relying parties using CRLs a=
s
> >>a
> >> fall back mechanism, which would be considerably higher if an "unknown=
"
> >> response was returned.
> >>
> >>
> >> >
> >> >[2] Section 4.2.2.2:
> >> >
> >> >	The key that signs a certificate's status information need not be th=
e
> >> >	same key that signed the certificate. It is necessary however to
> >> >	ensure that the entity signing this information is authorized to do
> >> >	so.  Therefore, a certificate's issuer MAY either sign the OCSP
> >> >	responses itself or it MAY explicitly designate this authority to
> >> >	another entity.
> >> >
> >> >The two instances of "MAY" in the above text were both "MUST" in RFC
> >>2560.
> >> >
> >> >The RFC 2560 text construction of "MUST" or "MUST" is a bit odd, but
> >>the two
> >> >"MAY"s in this draft are even worse, as they allow "MAY do something
> >>else
> >> >entirely", despite being enclosed in an either-or construct.  I
> >>strongly
> >> >suspect that the latter was not intended, so the following would be
> >> >clearer:
> >> >
> >> >	The key that signs a certificate's status information need not be th=
e
> >> >	same key that signed the certificate. It is necessary however to
> >> >	ensure that the entity signing this information is authorized to do
> >> >	so.  Therefore, a certificate's issuer MUST do one of the following:
> >> >		- sign the OCSP responses itself, or
> >> >		- explicitly designate this authority to another entity.
> >>
> >>
> >> I Agree. I will adopt your text.
> >>
> >> >
> >> >[3] Section 4.3:
> >> >
> >> >Is the "SHOULD" requirement still appropriate for the DSA with SHA-1
> >>combo
> >> >(vs. a "MAY" requirement)?  This requirement was a "MUST" in RFC 2560=
,
> >>but
> >> >I wonder about actual usage of DSA in practice.
> >>
> >> The change in algorithm requirements was provided by RFC 6277, and
> >>further
> >> refined in this draft in accordance with requests from Sean Turner.
> >>
> >> >
> >> >[4] Section 5, last paragraph:
> >> >
> >> >	Responding a "revoked" state to certificate that has never been
> >> >	issued may enable someone to obtain a revocation response for a
> >> >	certificate that is not yet issued, but soon will be issued, if the
> >> >	CA issues certificates using sequential certificate serial number
> >> >	assignment.
> >> >
> >> >The above text after starting with the "if" is too narrow - it should
> >>say:
> >> >
> >> >	if the certificate serial number of the certificate that
> >> >	will be issued can be predicted or guessed by the requester.
> >> >	Such prediction is easy for a CA that issues certificates
> >> >	using sequential certificate serial number assignment.
> >> >
> >> >There's also a nit in original text - its first line should be:
> >> >
> >> >	Responding with a "revoked" state for a certificate that has never
> >>been
> >>
> >> Good suggestions. I will update accordingly.
> >>
> >> >
> >> >[5] Section 5.1.1:
> >> >
> >> >	In archival applications it is quite possible that an OCSP responder
> >> >	might be asked to report the validity of a certificate on a date in
> >> >	the distant past. Such a certificate might employ a signing method
> >> >	that is no longer considered acceptably secure. In such
> >> >	circumstances the responder MUST NOT generate a signature using a
> >> >	signing mechanism that is not considered acceptably secure.
> >> >
> >> >This could use an additional warning that certificate archival should
> >> >not rely solely on signatures in archived certificates for ensuring t=
he
> >> >validity and integrity of the archived certificates because the
> >>signature
> >> >algorithm(s) may transition to no longer being considered acceptably
> >> >secure at some point after the certificates are archived.
> >>
> >> This note if I remember correctly is imported from RFC 6277, which is
> >> incorporated into this document. The reason behind the text is only to
> >> avoid usages of insecure algorithms.
> >> Historical validation is a real can of worms that I really would like =
to
> >> keep a tight lid on. I really want to avoid doing recommendations in
> >>this
> >> space as it may trigger a whole flood of things that could be equally
> >> important to say about this subject.
> >>
> >> >
> >> >Nits:
> >> >
> >> >idnits 2.12.15 said:
> >> >
> >> >  -- The document seems to lack a disclaimer for pre-RFC5378 work, bu=
t
> >>may
> >> >     have content which was first submitted before 10 November 2008.
> >>If
> >> >you
> >> >     have contacted all the original authors and they are all willing
> >>to
> >> >grant
> >> >     the BCP78 rights to the IETF Trust, then this is fine, and you c=
an
> >> >ignore
> >> >     this comment.  If not, you may need to add the pre-RFC5378
> >> >disclaimer.
> >> >     (See the Legal Provisions document at
> >> >     http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info for more information.)
> >> >
> >> >This looks like it's ok because all the authors of RFC 2560 are also
> >> >authors of
> >> >this draft, but it should be double-checked.
> >>
> >>
> >> I defer this one to Sean. I think he has this one under control.
> >>
> >>
> >> Thanks again for the review.
> >>
> >> /Stefan
> >>
> >>
> >> >
> >> >Thanks,
> >> >--David
> >> >----------------------------------------------------
> >> >David L. Black, Distinguished Engineer
> >> >EMC Corporation, 176 South St., Hopkinton, MA  01748
> >> >+1 (508) 293-7953             FAX: +1 (508) 293-7786
> >> >david.black@emc.com        Mobile: +1 (978) 394-7754
> >> >----------------------------------------------------
> >> >
> >> >
> >>
> >>
> >
>=20
>=20


From david.black@emc.com  Wed Mar 27 09:14:47 2013
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From: "Black, David" <david.black@emc.com>
To: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>, "sts@aaa-sec.com" <sts@aaa-sec.com>, "mmyers@fastq.com" <mmyers@fastq.com>, "ambarish@gmail.com" <ambarish@gmail.com>, "slava.galperin@gmail.com" <slava.galperin@gmail.com>, "cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca" <cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca>, "gen-art@ietf.org" <gen-art@ietf.org>
Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2013 12:08:34 -0400
Thread-Topic: Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
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Stefan,

> Is this important enough to do that?

IMHO, yes - the "running code" aspects of existing responder behavior/limit=
ations
are definitely important enough for an RFC like this that revises a protoco=
l spec,
and the alternatives to "revoked" feel like an important complement to thos=
e
aspects (discussion what to do instead when responder behavior/limitations =
are
encountered).

I appreciate the level of work that may be involved in capturing this, as
I've had my share of contentious discussions in WGs that I chair - FWIW,
I'm currently chairing my 4th and 5th WGs.  OTOH, when a WG has put that mu=
ch
time/effort into reaching a (compromise) decision, it really is valuable
to record why the decision was reached to avoid recovering that ground
in the future and (specific to this situation) to give implementers some
more context/information on how the protocol is likely to work in practice.

Thanks,
--David

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com]
> Sent: Wednesday, March 27, 2013 11:38 AM
> To: Black, David; sts@aaa-sec.com; mmyers@fastq.com; ambarish@gmail.com;
> slava.galperin@gmail.com; cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca; gen-art@ietf.org
> Cc: pkix@ietf.org; Sean Turner; ietf@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
>
> I could.
>
> My worry is just that this is such a contentious subject and it took us x
> hundreds of emails to reach this state, that if I add more explanations,
> people will start disagreeing with it and that we end up in a long debate
> on how to correctly express this.
>
> Is this important enough to do that?
>
> /Stefan
>
>
> On 3/27/13 3:30 PM, "Black, David" <david.black@emc.com> wrote:
>
> >Hi Stefan,
> >
> >> Does this answer your question?
> >
> >Yes, please add some of that explanation to the next version of the draf=
t
> >;-).
> >Coverage of existing responder behavior/limitations (important "running
> >code"
> >concerns, IMHO) and alternatives to using "revoked" ("have a number of
> >tools
> >to prevent the client from accepting a bad certificate") seem particular=
ly
> >relevant.
> >
> >Thanks,
> >--David
> >
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com]
> >> Sent: Wednesday, March 27, 2013 7:44 AM
> >> To: Black, David; sts@aaa-sec.com; mmyers@fastq.com; ambarish@gmail.co=
m;
> >> slava.galperin@gmail.com; cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca; gen-art@ietf.org
> >> Cc: pkix@ietf.org; Sean Turner; ietf@ietf.org
> >> Subject: Re: Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
> >>
> >> Hi David,
> >>
> >> Yes I missed to respond to that aspect.
> >>
> >> This is a bit complicated, but we have a large legacy to take into
> >>account
> >> where some responders implements just RFC 2560, while some deliver
> >> pre-generated responses according to RFC 5019 (Light-weight OCSP). LW
> >> responders are not capable of producing a signed response at the time =
of
> >> responding and in case such responder finds a request for a certificat=
e
> >> where no pre-produced response exists, it will reply with an unsigned
> >> error response "unauthorized", which also is a legitimate way to
> >>respond.
> >> So the actual OCSP responder may actually know that the certificate wa=
s
> >> never issued, but since it delivers pre-produced responder through a
> >>CDN,
> >> it can not provide a revoked response in real time.
> >>
> >> So the major aim with the current writing is to declare that the revok=
ed
> >> response is a MAY because there are other valid alternatives.
> >>
> >> We also want to avoid putting down a SHOULD respond revoked if a
> >> certificate is known to be not-issued, because that would require us t=
o
> >> define what "known to be non-issued" actually means. And that could be
> >> quite tricky as OCSP responders by no means are required to have this
> >> knowledge.
> >>
> >> The OCSP responder simply have a number of tools to prevent the client
> >> from accepting a bad certificate.
> >> This update of OCSP simply allows responders to use the "revoked"
> >>response
> >> as a preventive measure, without mandating it.
> >>
> >> This is also related to activities in the CA Browser Forum where they
> >>put
> >> down requirements on responders complying with CAB rules to not respon=
d
> >> "good" to certificates that were never issued.
> >> With this update in OCSP, they can now mandate in their policies both
> >>the
> >> fact that their responders MUST know if a certificate was never issued
> >>and
> >> MUST respond "revoked".
> >>
> >> So we allow other communities to raise the bar even if the base standa=
rd
> >> defines the response as optional.
> >>
> >> In theory we could possibly say that responding revoked is optional, b=
ut
> >> if you choose between revoked and unknown then you SHOULD favour revok=
ed
> >> over unknown. But such nested requirements just feels bad and impossib=
le
> >> to test compliance against. I'd much rather just leave it optional. I
> >> think the Note gives a clear recommendation on this and the rationale
> >> without spelling it out as a requirement.
> >>
> >> Does this answer your question?
> >>
> >>
> >> On 3/27/13 12:51 AM, "Black, David" <david.black@emc.com> wrote:
> >>
> >> >Hi Stefan,
> >> >
> >> >This looks good - thank you for the prompt response.
> >> >
> >> >It looks like my speculation on item [1] was wrong, so could you
> >>respond
> >> >to the question below, please?:
> >> >
> >> >> >[1] Section 2.2:
> >> >> >
> >> >> >       NOTE: The "revoked" state for known non-issued certificate =
serial
> >> >> >               numbers is allowed in order to reduce the risk of r=
elying
> >> >> >               parties using CRLs as a fall back mechanism, which =
would be
> >> >> >               considerably higher if an "unknown" response was re=
turned.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >Given this explanation, I'm surprised that the use of "revoked"
> >> >>instead of
> >> >> >"unknown" for a known non-issued certificate is a "MAY" requiremen=
t
> >>and
> >> >> >not a "SHOULD" requirement.  Why is that the case?
> >> >
> >> >--------------
> >> >
> >> >Beyond that, the proposed actions (or proposed non-actions) on items
> >> >[2]-[5]
> >> >are fine with me, Sean's taken care of the author permissions item fr=
om
> >> >idnits, and I assume someone has or will check the ASN.1 .
> >> >
> >> >Thanks,
> >> >--David
> >> >
> >> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> >> From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com]
> >> >> Sent: Monday, March 25, 2013 10:21 PM
> >> >> To: Black, David; sts@aaa-sec.com; mmyers@fastq.com;
> >>ambarish@gmail.com;
> >> >> slava.galperin@gmail.com; cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca; gen-art@ietf.org
> >> >> Cc: pkix@ietf.org; Sean Turner; ietf@ietf.org
> >> >> Subject: Re: Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
> >> >>
> >> >> Hi David,
> >> >>
> >> >> Thanks for the review.
> >> >> My reply in line.
> >> >>
> >> >> On 3/26/13 1:25 AM, "Black, David" <david.black@emc.com> wrote:
> >> >>
> >> >> >Authors,
> >> >> >
> >> >> >I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background =
on
> >> >> >Gen-ART, please
> >> >> >see the FAQ at
> >> >><http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call
> >>comments
> >> >>you
> >> >> >may receive.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >Document: draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
> >> >> >Reviewer: David L. Black
> >> >> >Review Date: March 25, 2013
> >> >> >IETF LC End Date: March 27, 2013
> >> >> >
> >> >> >Summary:
> >> >> >This draft is on the right track but has open issues, described in
> >>the
> >> >> >review.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >This draft updates the OCSP protocol for obtaining certificate
> >>status
> >> >> >with some minor extensions.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >Because this is a "bis" draft, I reviewed the diffs against RFC
> >>2560.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >I did not check the ASN.1.  I also did not see a writeup for this
> >>draft
> >> >> >in the data tracker, and so will rely on the document shepherd to
> >> >> >ensure that the ASN.1 has been checked when the writeup is prepare=
d.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >I found five open issues, all of which are minor, plus one idnits
> >>item
> >> >> >that is probably ok, but should be double-checked.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >Minor issues:
> >> >> >
> >> >> >[1] Section 2.2:
> >> >> >
> >> >> >       NOTE: The "revoked" state for known non-issued certificate =
serial
> >> >> >               numbers is allowed in order to reduce the risk of r=
elying
> >> >> >               parties using CRLs as a fall back mechanism, which =
would be
> >> >> >               considerably higher if an "unknown" response was re=
turned.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >Given this explanation, I'm surprised that the use of "revoked"
> >> >>instead of
> >> >> >"unknown" for a known non-issued certificate is a "MAY" requiremen=
t
> >>and
> >> >> >not a "SHOULD" requirement.  Why is that the case?
> >> >> >
> >> >> >It appears that the reason is that the use of "revoked" in this
> >> >>situation
> >> >> >may be dangerous when serial numbers can be predicted for
> >>certificates
> >> >> >that
> >> >> >will be issued in the future.  If that's what's going on, this
> >>concern
> >> >>is
> >> >> >already explained in the security considerations section, but it
> >>should
> >> >> >also be mentioned here for completeness.
> >> >>
> >> >> No, this is not the main reason. The main reason is the one stated
> >>as a
> >> >> Note: in this section:
> >> >>
> >> >> NOTE: The "revoked" state for known non-issued certificate serial
> >> >>numbers
> >> >> is allowed in order to reduce the risk of relying parties using CRL=
s
> >>as
> >> >>a
> >> >> fall back mechanism, which would be considerably higher if an
> >>"unknown"
> >> >> response was returned.
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >> >
> >> >> >[2] Section 4.2.2.2:
> >> >> >
> >> >> >       The key that signs a certificate's status information need =
not be
> >>the
> >> >> >       same key that signed the certificate. It is necessary howev=
er to
> >> >> >       ensure that the entity signing this information is authoriz=
ed to
> do
> >> >> >       so.  Therefore, a certificate's issuer MAY either sign the =
OCSP
> >> >> >       responses itself or it MAY explicitly designate this author=
ity to
> >> >> >       another entity.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >The two instances of "MAY" in the above text were both "MUST" in R=
FC
> >> >>2560.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >The RFC 2560 text construction of "MUST" or "MUST" is a bit odd, b=
ut
> >> >>the two
> >> >> >"MAY"s in this draft are even worse, as they allow "MAY do somethi=
ng
> >> >>else
> >> >> >entirely", despite being enclosed in an either-or construct.  I
> >> >>strongly
> >> >> >suspect that the latter was not intended, so the following would b=
e
> >> >> >clearer:
> >> >> >
> >> >> >       The key that signs a certificate's status information need =
not be
> >>the
> >> >> >       same key that signed the certificate. It is necessary howev=
er to
> >> >> >       ensure that the entity signing this information is authoriz=
ed to
> do
> >> >> >       so.  Therefore, a certificate's issuer MUST do one of the
> >>following:
> >> >> >               - sign the OCSP responses itself, or
> >> >> >               - explicitly designate this authority to another en=
tity.
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >> I Agree. I will adopt your text.
> >> >>
> >> >> >
> >> >> >[3] Section 4.3:
> >> >> >
> >> >> >Is the "SHOULD" requirement still appropriate for the DSA with SHA=
-1
> >> >>combo
> >> >> >(vs. a "MAY" requirement)?  This requirement was a "MUST" in RFC
> >>2560,
> >> >>but
> >> >> >I wonder about actual usage of DSA in practice.
> >> >>
> >> >> The change in algorithm requirements was provided by RFC 6277, and
> >> >>further
> >> >> refined in this draft in accordance with requests from Sean Turner.
> >> >>
> >> >> >
> >> >> >[4] Section 5, last paragraph:
> >> >> >
> >> >> >       Responding a "revoked" state to certificate that has never =
been
> >> >> >       issued may enable someone to obtain a revocation response f=
or a
> >> >> >       certificate that is not yet issued, but soon will be issued=
, if
> the
> >> >> >       CA issues certificates using sequential certificate serial =
number
> >> >> >       assignment.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >The above text after starting with the "if" is too narrow - it
> >>should
> >> >>say:
> >> >> >
> >> >> >       if the certificate serial number of the certificate that
> >> >> >       will be issued can be predicted or guessed by the requester=
.
> >> >> >       Such prediction is easy for a CA that issues certificates
> >> >> >       using sequential certificate serial number assignment.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >There's also a nit in original text - its first line should be:
> >> >> >
> >> >> >       Responding with a "revoked" state for a certificate that ha=
s never
> >> >>been
> >> >>
> >> >> Good suggestions. I will update accordingly.
> >> >>
> >> >> >
> >> >> >[5] Section 5.1.1:
> >> >> >
> >> >> >       In archival applications it is quite possible that an OCSP
> >>responder
> >> >> >       might be asked to report the validity of a certificate on a=
 date
> in
> >> >> >       the distant past. Such a certificate might employ a signing=
 method
> >> >> >       that is no longer considered acceptably secure. In such
> >> >> >       circumstances the responder MUST NOT generate a signature u=
sing a
> >> >> >       signing mechanism that is not considered acceptably secure.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >This could use an additional warning that certificate archival
> >>should
> >> >> >not rely solely on signatures in archived certificates for ensurin=
g
> >>the
> >> >> >validity and integrity of the archived certificates because the
> >> >>signature
> >> >> >algorithm(s) may transition to no longer being considered acceptab=
ly
> >> >> >secure at some point after the certificates are archived.
> >> >>
> >> >> This note if I remember correctly is imported from RFC 6277, which =
is
> >> >> incorporated into this document. The reason behind the text is only
> >>to
> >> >> avoid usages of insecure algorithms.
> >> >> Historical validation is a real can of worms that I really would
> >>like to
> >> >> keep a tight lid on. I really want to avoid doing recommendations i=
n
> >> >>this
> >> >> space as it may trigger a whole flood of things that could be equal=
ly
> >> >> important to say about this subject.
> >> >>
> >> >> >
> >> >> >Nits:
> >> >> >
> >> >> >idnits 2.12.15 said:
> >> >> >
> >> >> >  -- The document seems to lack a disclaimer for pre-RFC5378 work,
> >>but
> >> >>may
> >> >> >     have content which was first submitted before 10 November 200=
8.
> >> >>If
> >> >> >you
> >> >> >     have contacted all the original authors and they are all
> >>willing
> >> >>to
> >> >> >grant
> >> >> >     the BCP78 rights to the IETF Trust, then this is fine, and yo=
u
> >>can
> >> >> >ignore
> >> >> >     this comment.  If not, you may need to add the pre-RFC5378
> >> >> >disclaimer.
> >> >> >     (See the Legal Provisions document at
> >> >> >     http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info for more information.)
> >> >> >
> >> >> >This looks like it's ok because all the authors of RFC 2560 are al=
so
> >> >> >authors of
> >> >> >this draft, but it should be double-checked.
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >> I defer this one to Sean. I think he has this one under control.
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >> Thanks again for the review.
> >> >>
> >> >> /Stefan
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >> >
> >> >> >Thanks,
> >> >> >--David
> >> >> >----------------------------------------------------
> >> >> >David L. Black, Distinguished Engineer
> >> >> >EMC Corporation, 176 South St., Hopkinton, MA  01748
> >> >> >+1 (508) 293-7953             FAX: +1 (508) 293-7786
> >> >> >david.black@emc.com        Mobile: +1 (978) 394-7754
> >> >> >----------------------------------------------------
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >
> >>
> >>
> >
>
>


From david.black@emc.com  Thu Mar 28 07:52:10 2013
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From: "Black, David" <david.black@emc.com>
To: Carlisle Adams <cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca>, "'Stefan Santesson'" <stefan@aaa-sec.com>, "sts@aaa-sec.com" <sts@aaa-sec.com>, "mmyers@fastq.com" <mmyers@fastq.com>, "ambarish@gmail.com" <ambarish@gmail.com>, "slava.galperin@gmail.com" <slava.galperin@gmail.com>, "gen-art@ietf.org" <gen-art@ietf.org>
Date: Thu, 28 Mar 2013 10:51:22 -0400
Thread-Topic: Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
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> Does this solve you issue.
> I think this is as far as dare to go without risking a heated debate.

Yes, that suffices for me - it provides a cogent explanation of why
"revoked" is optional, and the existing text on CRLs as a fallback
mechanism suffices to illuminate a likely consequence of not using
"revoked".

Thank you,
--David

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Carlisle Adams [mailto:cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca]
> Sent: Thursday, March 28, 2013 9:57 AM
> To: 'Stefan Santesson'; Black, David; sts@aaa-sec.com; mmyers@fastq.com;
> ambarish@gmail.com; slava.galperin@gmail.com; gen-art@ietf.org
> Cc: pkix@ietf.org; 'Sean Turner'; ietf@ietf.org
> Subject: RE: Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
>
> Hi,
>
> This wording sounds fine to me.  Thanks Stefan!
>
> Carlisle.
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com]
> Sent: March-28-13 6:34 AM
> To: Black, David; sts@aaa-sec.com; mmyers@fastq.com; ambarish@gmail.com;
> slava.galperin@gmail.com; cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca; gen-art@ietf.org
> Cc: pkix@ietf.org; Sean Turner; ietf@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
>
> I have given this a go by expanding the note as follows:
>
> NOTE: The "revoked" state for known non-issued certificate serial
>          numbers is allowed in order to reduce the risk of relying
>          parties using CRLs as a fall back mechanism, which would be
>          considerably higher if an "unknown" response was returned. The
>          "revoked" status is still optional in this context in order to
>          maintain backwards compatibility with deployments of RFC 2560.
>          For example, the responder may not have any knowledge about
>          whether a requested serial number has been assigned to any
>          issued certificate, or the responder may provide pre produced
>          responses in accordance with RFC 5019 and, for that reason, is
>          not capable of providing a signed response for all non-issued
>          certificate serial numbers.
>
>
> Does this solve you issue.
> I think this is as far as dare to go without risking a heated debate.
>
> /Stefan
>
>
> On 3/27/13 5:08 PM, "Black, David" <david.black@emc.com> wrote:
>
> >Stefan,
> >
> >> Is this important enough to do that?
> >
> >IMHO, yes - the "running code" aspects of existing responder
> >behavior/limitations are definitely important enough for an RFC like
> >this that revises a protocol spec, and the alternatives to "revoked"
> >feel like an important complement to those aspects (discussion what to
> >do instead when responder behavior/limitations are encountered).
> >
> >I appreciate the level of work that may be involved in capturing this,
> >as I've had my share of contentious discussions in WGs that I chair -
> >FWIW, I'm currently chairing my 4th and 5th WGs.  OTOH, when a WG has
> >put that much time/effort into reaching a (compromise) decision, it
> >really is valuable to record why the decision was reached to avoid
> >recovering that ground in the future and (specific to this situation)
> >to give implementers some more context/information on how the protocol
> >is likely to work in practice.
> >
> >Thanks,
> >--David
> >
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com]
> >> Sent: Wednesday, March 27, 2013 11:38 AM
> >> To: Black, David; sts@aaa-sec.com; mmyers@fastq.com;
> >> ambarish@gmail.com; slava.galperin@gmail.com; cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca;
> >> gen-art@ietf.org
> >> Cc: pkix@ietf.org; Sean Turner; ietf@ietf.org
> >> Subject: Re: Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
> >>
> >> I could.
> >>
> >> My worry is just that this is such a contentious subject and it took
> >>us x  hundreds of emails to reach this state, that if I add more
> >>explanations,  people will start disagreeing with it and that we end
> >>up in a long debate  on how to correctly express this.
> >>
> >> Is this important enough to do that?
> >>
> >> /Stefan
> >>
> >>
> >> On 3/27/13 3:30 PM, "Black, David" <david.black@emc.com> wrote:
> >>
> >> >Hi Stefan,
> >> >
> >> >> Does this answer your question?
> >> >
> >> >Yes, please add some of that explanation to the next version of the
> >>draft
> >> >;-).
> >> >Coverage of existing responder behavior/limitations (important
> >> >"running code"
> >> >concerns, IMHO) and alternatives to using "revoked" ("have a number
> >> >of tools to prevent the client from accepting a bad certificate")
> >> >seem
> >>particularly
> >> >relevant.
> >> >
> >> >Thanks,
> >> >--David
> >> >
> >> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> >> From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com]
> >> >> Sent: Wednesday, March 27, 2013 7:44 AM
> >> >> To: Black, David; sts@aaa-sec.com; mmyers@fastq.com;
> >>ambarish@gmail.com;
> >> >> slava.galperin@gmail.com; cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca; gen-art@ietf.org
> >> >> Cc: pkix@ietf.org; Sean Turner; ietf@ietf.org
> >> >> Subject: Re: Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
> >> >>
> >> >> Hi David,
> >> >>
> >> >> Yes I missed to respond to that aspect.
> >> >>
> >> >> This is a bit complicated, but we have a large legacy to take into
> >> >>account  where some responders implements just RFC 2560, while some
> >> >>deliver  pre-generated responses according to RFC 5019
> >> >>(Light-weight OCSP). LW  responders are not capable of producing a
> >> >>signed response at the
> >>time of
> >> >> responding and in case such responder finds a request for a
> >>certificate
> >> >> where no pre-produced response exists, it will reply with an
> >> >>unsigned  error response "unauthorized", which also is a legitimate
> >> >>way to respond.
> >> >> So the actual OCSP responder may actually know that the
> >> >>certificate
> >>was
> >> >> never issued, but since it delivers pre-produced responder through
> >> >>a CDN,  it can not provide a revoked response in real time.
> >> >>
> >> >> So the major aim with the current writing is to declare that the
> >>revoked
> >> >> response is a MAY because there are other valid alternatives.
> >> >>
> >> >> We also want to avoid putting down a SHOULD respond revoked if a
> >> >> certificate is known to be not-issued, because that would require
> >> >> us
> >>to
> >> >> define what "known to be non-issued" actually means. And that
> >> >> could
> >>be
> >> >> quite tricky as OCSP responders by no means are required to have
> >> >> this knowledge.
> >> >>
> >> >> The OCSP responder simply have a number of tools to prevent the
> >>client
> >> >> from accepting a bad certificate.
> >> >> This update of OCSP simply allows responders to use the "revoked"
> >> >>response
> >> >> as a preventive measure, without mandating it.
> >> >>
> >> >> This is also related to activities in the CA Browser Forum where
> >> >>they put  down requirements on responders complying with CAB rules
> >> >>to not
> >>respond
> >> >> "good" to certificates that were never issued.
> >> >> With this update in OCSP, they can now mandate in their policies
> >> >>both the  fact that their responders MUST know if a certificate was
> >> >>never
> >>issued
> >> >>and
> >> >> MUST respond "revoked".
> >> >>
> >> >> So we allow other communities to raise the bar even if the base
> >>standard
> >> >> defines the response as optional.
> >> >>
> >> >> In theory we could possibly say that responding revoked is
> >> >> optional,
> >>but
> >> >> if you choose between revoked and unknown then you SHOULD favour
> >>revoked
> >> >> over unknown. But such nested requirements just feels bad and
> >>impossible
> >> >> to test compliance against. I'd much rather just leave it
> >> >> optional. I think the Note gives a clear recommendation on this
> >> >> and the rationale without spelling it out as a requirement.
> >> >>
> >> >> Does this answer your question?
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >> On 3/27/13 12:51 AM, "Black, David" <david.black@emc.com> wrote:
> >> >>
> >> >> >Hi Stefan,
> >> >> >
> >> >> >This looks good - thank you for the prompt response.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >It looks like my speculation on item [1] was wrong, so could you
> >> >>respond
> >> >> >to the question below, please?:
> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >[1] Section 2.2:
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >       NOTE: The "revoked" state for known non-issued
> >>certificate serial
> >> >> >> >               numbers is allowed in order to reduce the risk
> >> >> >> > of
> >>relying
> >> >> >> >               parties using CRLs as a fall back mechanism,
> >>which would be
> >> >> >> >               considerably higher if an "unknown" response
> >> >> >> > was
> >>returned.
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >Given this explanation, I'm surprised that the use of "revoked"
> >> >> >>instead of
> >> >> >> >"unknown" for a known non-issued certificate is a "MAY"
> >>requirement
> >> >>and
> >> >> >> >not a "SHOULD" requirement.  Why is that the case?
> >> >> >
> >> >> >--------------
> >> >> >
> >> >> >Beyond that, the proposed actions (or proposed non-actions) on
> >> >> >items [2]-[5] are fine with me, Sean's taken care of the author
> >> >> >permissions item
> >>from
> >> >> >idnits, and I assume someone has or will check the ASN.1 .
> >> >> >
> >> >> >Thanks,
> >> >> >--David
> >> >> >
> >> >> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> >> >> From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com]
> >> >> >> Sent: Monday, March 25, 2013 10:21 PM
> >> >> >> To: Black, David; sts@aaa-sec.com; mmyers@fastq.com;
> >> >>ambarish@gmail.com;
> >> >> >> slava.galperin@gmail.com; cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca;
> >> >> >> gen-art@ietf.org
> >> >> >> Cc: pkix@ietf.org; Sean Turner; ietf@ietf.org
> >> >> >> Subject: Re: Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> Hi David,
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> Thanks for the review.
> >> >> >> My reply in line.
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> On 3/26/13 1:25 AM, "Black, David" <david.black@emc.com> wrote:
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> >Authors,
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For
> >>background on
> >> >> >> >Gen-ART, please
> >> >> >> >see the FAQ at
> >> >> >><http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call
> >> >>comments
> >> >> >>you
> >> >> >> >may receive.
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >Document: draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
> >> >> >> >Reviewer: David L. Black
> >> >> >> >Review Date: March 25, 2013
> >> >> >> >IETF LC End Date: March 27, 2013
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >Summary:
> >> >> >> >This draft is on the right track but has open issues,
> >> >> >> >described
> >>in
> >> >>the
> >> >> >> >review.
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >This draft updates the OCSP protocol for obtaining certificate
> >> >>status
> >> >> >> >with some minor extensions.
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >Because this is a "bis" draft, I reviewed the diffs against
> >> >> >> >RFC
> >> >>2560.
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >I did not check the ASN.1.  I also did not see a writeup for
> >> >> >> >this
> >> >>draft
> >> >> >> >in the data tracker, and so will rely on the document shepherd
> >> >> >> >to ensure that the ASN.1 has been checked when the writeup is
> >>prepared.
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >I found five open issues, all of which are minor, plus one
> >> >> >> >idnits
> >> >>item
> >> >> >> >that is probably ok, but should be double-checked.
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >Minor issues:
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >[1] Section 2.2:
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >       NOTE: The "revoked" state for known non-issued
> >>certificate serial
> >> >> >> >               numbers is allowed in order to reduce the risk
> >> >> >> > of
> >>relying
> >> >> >> >               parties using CRLs as a fall back mechanism,
> >>which would be
> >> >> >> >               considerably higher if an "unknown" response
> >> >> >> > was
> >>returned.
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >Given this explanation, I'm surprised that the use of "revoked"
> >> >> >>instead of
> >> >> >> >"unknown" for a known non-issued certificate is a "MAY"
> >>requirement
> >> >>and
> >> >> >> >not a "SHOULD" requirement.  Why is that the case?
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >It appears that the reason is that the use of "revoked" in
> >> >> >> >this
> >> >> >>situation
> >> >> >> >may be dangerous when serial numbers can be predicted for
> >> >>certificates
> >> >> >> >that
> >> >> >> >will be issued in the future.  If that's what's going on, this
> >> >>concern
> >> >> >>is
> >> >> >> >already explained in the security considerations section, but
> >> >> >> >it
> >> >>should
> >> >> >> >also be mentioned here for completeness.
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> No, this is not the main reason. The main reason is the one
> >> >> >> stated
> >> >>as a
> >> >> >> Note: in this section:
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> NOTE: The "revoked" state for known non-issued certificate
> >> >> >>serial numbers  is allowed in order to reduce the risk of
> >> >> >>relying parties using
> >>CRLs
> >> >>as
> >> >> >>a
> >> >> >> fall back mechanism, which would be considerably higher if an
> >> >>"unknown"
> >> >> >> response was returned.
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >[2] Section 4.2.2.2:
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >       The key that signs a certificate's status information
> >>need not be
> >> >>the
> >> >> >> >       same key that signed the certificate. It is necessary
> >>however to
> >> >> >> >       ensure that the entity signing this information is
> >>authorized to
> >> do
> >> >> >> >       so.  Therefore, a certificate's issuer MAY either sign
> >>the OCSP
> >> >> >> >       responses itself or it MAY explicitly designate this
> >>authority to
> >> >> >> >       another entity.
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >The two instances of "MAY" in the above text were both "MUST"
> >> >> >> >in
> >>RFC
> >> >> >>2560.
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >The RFC 2560 text construction of "MUST" or "MUST" is a bit
> >> >> >> >odd,
> >>but
> >> >> >>the two
> >> >> >> >"MAY"s in this draft are even worse, as they allow "MAY do
> >>something
> >> >> >>else
> >> >> >> >entirely", despite being enclosed in an either-or construct.
> >> >> >> >I
> >> >> >>strongly
> >> >> >> >suspect that the latter was not intended, so the following
> >> >> >> >would
> >>be
> >> >> >> >clearer:
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >       The key that signs a certificate's status information
> >>need not be
> >> >>the
> >> >> >> >       same key that signed the certificate. It is necessary
> >>however to
> >> >> >> >       ensure that the entity signing this information is
> >>authorized to
> >> do
> >> >> >> >       so.  Therefore, a certificate's issuer MUST do one of
> >> >> >> > the
> >> >>following:
> >> >> >> >               - sign the OCSP responses itself, or
> >> >> >> >               - explicitly designate this authority to
> >> >> >> > another
> >>entity.
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> I Agree. I will adopt your text.
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >[3] Section 4.3:
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >Is the "SHOULD" requirement still appropriate for the DSA with
> >>SHA-1
> >> >> >>combo
> >> >> >> >(vs. a "MAY" requirement)?  This requirement was a "MUST" in
> >> >> >> >RFC
> >> >>2560,
> >> >> >>but
> >> >> >> >I wonder about actual usage of DSA in practice.
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> The change in algorithm requirements was provided by RFC 6277,
> >> >> >>and further  refined in this draft in accordance with requests
> >> >> >>from Sean
> >>Turner.
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >[4] Section 5, last paragraph:
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >       Responding a "revoked" state to certificate that has
> >>never been
> >> >> >> >       issued may enable someone to obtain a revocation
> >> >> >> > response
> >>for a
> >> >> >> >       certificate that is not yet issued, but soon will be
> >>issued, if
> >> the
> >> >> >> >       CA issues certificates using sequential certificate
> >>serial number
> >> >> >> >       assignment.
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >The above text after starting with the "if" is too narrow - it
> >> >>should
> >> >> >>say:
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >       if the certificate serial number of the certificate that
> >> >> >> >       will be issued can be predicted or guessed by the
> >>requester.
> >> >> >> >       Such prediction is easy for a CA that issues certificate=
s
> >> >> >> >       using sequential certificate serial number assignment.
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >There's also a nit in original text - its first line should be:
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >       Responding with a "revoked" state for a certificate
> >> >> >> > that
> >>has never
> >> >> >>been
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> Good suggestions. I will update accordingly.
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >[5] Section 5.1.1:
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >       In archival applications it is quite possible that an
> >> >> >> > OCSP
> >> >>responder
> >> >> >> >       might be asked to report the validity of a certificate
> >> >> >> > on
> >>a date
> >> in
> >> >> >> >       the distant past. Such a certificate might employ a
> >>signing method
> >> >> >> >       that is no longer considered acceptably secure. In such
> >> >> >> >       circumstances the responder MUST NOT generate a
> >> >> >> > signature
> >>using a
> >> >> >> >       signing mechanism that is not considered acceptably
> >>secure.
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >This could use an additional warning that certificate archival
> >> >>should
> >> >> >> >not rely solely on signatures in archived certificates for
> >>ensuring
> >> >>the
> >> >> >> >validity and integrity of the archived certificates because
> >> >> >> >the
> >> >> >>signature
> >> >> >> >algorithm(s) may transition to no longer being considered
> >>acceptably
> >> >> >> >secure at some point after the certificates are archived.
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> This note if I remember correctly is imported from RFC 6277,
> >>which is
> >> >> >> incorporated into this document. The reason behind the text is
> >>only
> >> >>to
> >> >> >> avoid usages of insecure algorithms.
> >> >> >> Historical validation is a real can of worms that I really
> >> >> >> would
> >> >>like to
> >> >> >> keep a tight lid on. I really want to avoid doing
> >> >> >> recommendations
> >>in
> >> >> >>this
> >> >> >> space as it may trigger a whole flood of things that could be
> >>equally
> >> >> >> important to say about this subject.
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >Nits:
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >idnits 2.12.15 said:
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >  -- The document seems to lack a disclaimer for pre-RFC5378
> >>work,
> >> >>but
> >> >> >>may
> >> >> >> >     have content which was first submitted before 10 November
> >>2008.
> >> >> >>If
> >> >> >> >you
> >> >> >> >     have contacted all the original authors and they are all
> >> >>willing
> >> >> >>to
> >> >> >> >grant
> >> >> >> >     the BCP78 rights to the IETF Trust, then this is fine,
> >> >> >> >and
> >>you
> >> >>can
> >> >> >> >ignore
> >> >> >> >     this comment.  If not, you may need to add the
> >> >> >> >pre-RFC5378 disclaimer.
> >> >> >> >     (See the Legal Provisions document at
> >> >> >> >     http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info for more
> >> >> >> >information.)
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >This looks like it's ok because all the authors of RFC 2560
> >> >> >> >are
> >>also
> >> >> >> >authors of
> >> >> >> >this draft, but it should be double-checked.
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> I defer this one to Sean. I think he has this one under control.
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> Thanks again for the review.
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> /Stefan
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >Thanks,
> >> >> >> >--David
> >> >> >> >----------------------------------------------------
> >> >> >> >David L. Black, Distinguished Engineer EMC Corporation, 176
> >> >> >> >South St., Hopkinton, MA  01748
> >> >> >> >+1 (508) 293-7953             FAX: +1 (508) 293-7786
> >> >> >> >david.black@emc.com        Mobile: +1 (978) 394-7754
> >> >> >> >----------------------------------------------------
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >
> >>
> >>
> >
>
>
>


From stefan@aaa-sec.com  Thu Mar 28 07:54:09 2013
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Date: Thu, 28 Mar 2013 15:53:53 +0100
From: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>
To: "Black, David" <david.black@emc.com>, Carlisle Adams <cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca>, "sts@aaa-sec.com" <sts@aaa-sec.com>, "mmyers@fastq.com" <mmyers@fastq.com>, "ambarish@gmail.com" <ambarish@gmail.com>, "slava.galperin@gmail.com" <slava.galperin@gmail.com>, "gen-art@ietf.org" <gen-art@ietf.org>
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Thread-Topic: Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
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Great,

I will issue an update shortly.

/Stefan

On 3/28/13 3:51 PM, "Black, David" <david.black@emc.com> wrote:

>> Does this solve you issue.
>> I think this is as far as dare to go without risking a heated debate.
>
>Yes, that suffices for me - it provides a cogent explanation of why
>"revoked" is optional, and the existing text on CRLs as a fallback
>mechanism suffices to illuminate a likely consequence of not using
>"revoked".
>
>Thank you,
>--David
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Carlisle Adams [mailto:cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca]
>> Sent: Thursday, March 28, 2013 9:57 AM
>> To: 'Stefan Santesson'; Black, David; sts@aaa-sec.com; mmyers@fastq.com;
>> ambarish@gmail.com; slava.galperin@gmail.com; gen-art@ietf.org
>> Cc: pkix@ietf.org; 'Sean Turner'; ietf@ietf.org
>> Subject: RE: Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
>>
>> Hi,
>>
>> This wording sounds fine to me.  Thanks Stefan!
>>
>> Carlisle.
>>
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com]
>> Sent: March-28-13 6:34 AM
>> To: Black, David; sts@aaa-sec.com; mmyers@fastq.com; ambarish@gmail.com;
>> slava.galperin@gmail.com; cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca; gen-art@ietf.org
>> Cc: pkix@ietf.org; Sean Turner; ietf@ietf.org
>> Subject: Re: Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
>>
>> I have given this a go by expanding the note as follows:
>>
>> NOTE: The "revoked" state for known non-issued certificate serial
>>          numbers is allowed in order to reduce the risk of relying
>>          parties using CRLs as a fall back mechanism, which would be
>>          considerably higher if an "unknown" response was returned. The
>>          "revoked" status is still optional in this context in order to
>>          maintain backwards compatibility with deployments of RFC 2560.
>>          For example, the responder may not have any knowledge about
>>          whether a requested serial number has been assigned to any
>>          issued certificate, or the responder may provide pre produced
>>          responses in accordance with RFC 5019 and, for that reason, is
>>          not capable of providing a signed response for all non-issued
>>          certificate serial numbers.
>>
>>
>> Does this solve you issue.
>> I think this is as far as dare to go without risking a heated debate.
>>
>> /Stefan
>>
>>
>> On 3/27/13 5:08 PM, "Black, David" <david.black@emc.com> wrote:
>>
>> >Stefan,
>> >
>> >> Is this important enough to do that?
>> >
>> >IMHO, yes - the "running code" aspects of existing responder
>> >behavior/limitations are definitely important enough for an RFC like
>> >this that revises a protocol spec, and the alternatives to "revoked"
>> >feel like an important complement to those aspects (discussion what to
>> >do instead when responder behavior/limitations are encountered).
>> >
>> >I appreciate the level of work that may be involved in capturing this,
>> >as I've had my share of contentious discussions in WGs that I chair -
>> >FWIW, I'm currently chairing my 4th and 5th WGs.  OTOH, when a WG has
>> >put that much time/effort into reaching a (compromise) decision, it
>> >really is valuable to record why the decision was reached to avoid
>> >recovering that ground in the future and (specific to this situation)
>> >to give implementers some more context/information on how the protocol
>> >is likely to work in practice.
>> >
>> >Thanks,
>> >--David
>> >
>> >> -----Original Message-----
>> >> From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com]
>> >> Sent: Wednesday, March 27, 2013 11:38 AM
>> >> To: Black, David; sts@aaa-sec.com; mmyers@fastq.com;
>> >> ambarish@gmail.com; slava.galperin@gmail.com; cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca;
>> >> gen-art@ietf.org
>> >> Cc: pkix@ietf.org; Sean Turner; ietf@ietf.org
>> >> Subject: Re: Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
>> >>
>> >> I could.
>> >>
>> >> My worry is just that this is such a contentious subject and it took
>> >>us x  hundreds of emails to reach this state, that if I add more
>> >>explanations,  people will start disagreeing with it and that we end
>> >>up in a long debate  on how to correctly express this.
>> >>
>> >> Is this important enough to do that?
>> >>
>> >> /Stefan
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> On 3/27/13 3:30 PM, "Black, David" <david.black@emc.com> wrote:
>> >>
>> >> >Hi Stefan,
>> >> >
>> >> >> Does this answer your question?
>> >> >
>> >> >Yes, please add some of that explanation to the next version of the
>> >>draft
>> >> >;-).
>> >> >Coverage of existing responder behavior/limitations (important
>> >> >"running code"
>> >> >concerns, IMHO) and alternatives to using "revoked" ("have a number
>> >> >of tools to prevent the client from accepting a bad certificate")
>> >> >seem
>> >>particularly
>> >> >relevant.
>> >> >
>> >> >Thanks,
>> >> >--David
>> >> >
>> >> >> -----Original Message-----
>> >> >> From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com]
>> >> >> Sent: Wednesday, March 27, 2013 7:44 AM
>> >> >> To: Black, David; sts@aaa-sec.com; mmyers@fastq.com;
>> >>ambarish@gmail.com;
>> >> >> slava.galperin@gmail.com; cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca; gen-art@ietf.org
>> >> >> Cc: pkix@ietf.org; Sean Turner; ietf@ietf.org
>> >> >> Subject: Re: Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
>> >> >>
>> >> >> Hi David,
>> >> >>
>> >> >> Yes I missed to respond to that aspect.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> This is a bit complicated, but we have a large legacy to take into
>> >> >>account  where some responders implements just RFC 2560, while some
>> >> >>deliver  pre-generated responses according to RFC 5019
>> >> >>(Light-weight OCSP). LW  responders are not capable of producing a
>> >> >>signed response at the
>> >>time of
>> >> >> responding and in case such responder finds a request for a
>> >>certificate
>> >> >> where no pre-produced response exists, it will reply with an
>> >> >>unsigned  error response "unauthorized", which also is a legitimate
>> >> >>way to respond.
>> >> >> So the actual OCSP responder may actually know that the
>> >> >>certificate
>> >>was
>> >> >> never issued, but since it delivers pre-produced responder through
>> >> >>a CDN,  it can not provide a revoked response in real time.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> So the major aim with the current writing is to declare that the
>> >>revoked
>> >> >> response is a MAY because there are other valid alternatives.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> We also want to avoid putting down a SHOULD respond revoked if a
>> >> >> certificate is known to be not-issued, because that would require
>> >> >> us
>> >>to
>> >> >> define what "known to be non-issued" actually means. And that
>> >> >> could
>> >>be
>> >> >> quite tricky as OCSP responders by no means are required to have
>> >> >> this knowledge.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> The OCSP responder simply have a number of tools to prevent the
>> >>client
>> >> >> from accepting a bad certificate.
>> >> >> This update of OCSP simply allows responders to use the "revoked"
>> >> >>response
>> >> >> as a preventive measure, without mandating it.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> This is also related to activities in the CA Browser Forum where
>> >> >>they put  down requirements on responders complying with CAB rules
>> >> >>to not
>> >>respond
>> >> >> "good" to certificates that were never issued.
>> >> >> With this update in OCSP, they can now mandate in their policies
>> >> >>both the  fact that their responders MUST know if a certificate was
>> >> >>never
>> >>issued
>> >> >>and
>> >> >> MUST respond "revoked".
>> >> >>
>> >> >> So we allow other communities to raise the bar even if the base
>> >>standard
>> >> >> defines the response as optional.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> In theory we could possibly say that responding revoked is
>> >> >> optional,
>> >>but
>> >> >> if you choose between revoked and unknown then you SHOULD favour
>> >>revoked
>> >> >> over unknown. But such nested requirements just feels bad and
>> >>impossible
>> >> >> to test compliance against. I'd much rather just leave it
>> >> >> optional. I think the Note gives a clear recommendation on this
>> >> >> and the rationale without spelling it out as a requirement.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> Does this answer your question?
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >> On 3/27/13 12:51 AM, "Black, David" <david.black@emc.com> wrote:
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >Hi Stefan,
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >This looks good - thank you for the prompt response.
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >It looks like my speculation on item [1] was wrong, so could you
>> >> >>respond
>> >> >> >to the question below, please?:
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> >[1] Section 2.2:
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> >       NOTE: The "revoked" state for known non-issued
>> >>certificate serial
>> >> >> >> >               numbers is allowed in order to reduce the risk
>> >> >> >> > of
>> >>relying
>> >> >> >> >               parties using CRLs as a fall back mechanism,
>> >>which would be
>> >> >> >> >               considerably higher if an "unknown" response
>> >> >> >> > was
>> >>returned.
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> >Given this explanation, I'm surprised that the use of
>>"revoked"
>> >> >> >>instead of
>> >> >> >> >"unknown" for a known non-issued certificate is a "MAY"
>> >>requirement
>> >> >>and
>> >> >> >> >not a "SHOULD" requirement.  Why is that the case?
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >--------------
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >Beyond that, the proposed actions (or proposed non-actions) on
>> >> >> >items [2]-[5] are fine with me, Sean's taken care of the author
>> >> >> >permissions item
>> >>from
>> >> >> >idnits, and I assume someone has or will check the ASN.1 .
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >Thanks,
>> >> >> >--David
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> -----Original Message-----
>> >> >> >> From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com]
>> >> >> >> Sent: Monday, March 25, 2013 10:21 PM
>> >> >> >> To: Black, David; sts@aaa-sec.com; mmyers@fastq.com;
>> >> >>ambarish@gmail.com;
>> >> >> >> slava.galperin@gmail.com; cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca;
>> >> >> >> gen-art@ietf.org
>> >> >> >> Cc: pkix@ietf.org; Sean Turner; ietf@ietf.org
>> >> >> >> Subject: Re: Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >> Hi David,
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >> Thanks for the review.
>> >> >> >> My reply in line.
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >> On 3/26/13 1:25 AM, "Black, David" <david.black@emc.com> wrote:
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >> >Authors,
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> >I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For
>> >>background on
>> >> >> >> >Gen-ART, please
>> >> >> >> >see the FAQ at
>> >> >> >><http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> >Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call
>> >> >>comments
>> >> >> >>you
>> >> >> >> >may receive.
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> >Document: draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
>> >> >> >> >Reviewer: David L. Black
>> >> >> >> >Review Date: March 25, 2013
>> >> >> >> >IETF LC End Date: March 27, 2013
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> >Summary:
>> >> >> >> >This draft is on the right track but has open issues,
>> >> >> >> >described
>> >>in
>> >> >>the
>> >> >> >> >review.
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> >This draft updates the OCSP protocol for obtaining certificate
>> >> >>status
>> >> >> >> >with some minor extensions.
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> >Because this is a "bis" draft, I reviewed the diffs against
>> >> >> >> >RFC
>> >> >>2560.
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> >I did not check the ASN.1.  I also did not see a writeup for
>> >> >> >> >this
>> >> >>draft
>> >> >> >> >in the data tracker, and so will rely on the document shepherd
>> >> >> >> >to ensure that the ASN.1 has been checked when the writeup is
>> >>prepared.
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> >I found five open issues, all of which are minor, plus one
>> >> >> >> >idnits
>> >> >>item
>> >> >> >> >that is probably ok, but should be double-checked.
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> >Minor issues:
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> >[1] Section 2.2:
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> >       NOTE: The "revoked" state for known non-issued
>> >>certificate serial
>> >> >> >> >               numbers is allowed in order to reduce the risk
>> >> >> >> > of
>> >>relying
>> >> >> >> >               parties using CRLs as a fall back mechanism,
>> >>which would be
>> >> >> >> >               considerably higher if an "unknown" response
>> >> >> >> > was
>> >>returned.
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> >Given this explanation, I'm surprised that the use of
>>"revoked"
>> >> >> >>instead of
>> >> >> >> >"unknown" for a known non-issued certificate is a "MAY"
>> >>requirement
>> >> >>and
>> >> >> >> >not a "SHOULD" requirement.  Why is that the case?
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> >It appears that the reason is that the use of "revoked" in
>> >> >> >> >this
>> >> >> >>situation
>> >> >> >> >may be dangerous when serial numbers can be predicted for
>> >> >>certificates
>> >> >> >> >that
>> >> >> >> >will be issued in the future.  If that's what's going on, this
>> >> >>concern
>> >> >> >>is
>> >> >> >> >already explained in the security considerations section, but
>> >> >> >> >it
>> >> >>should
>> >> >> >> >also be mentioned here for completeness.
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >> No, this is not the main reason. The main reason is the one
>> >> >> >> stated
>> >> >>as a
>> >> >> >> Note: in this section:
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >> NOTE: The "revoked" state for known non-issued certificate
>> >> >> >>serial numbers  is allowed in order to reduce the risk of
>> >> >> >>relying parties using
>> >>CRLs
>> >> >>as
>> >> >> >>a
>> >> >> >> fall back mechanism, which would be considerably higher if an
>> >> >>"unknown"
>> >> >> >> response was returned.
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> >[2] Section 4.2.2.2:
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> >       The key that signs a certificate's status information
>> >>need not be
>> >> >>the
>> >> >> >> >       same key that signed the certificate. It is necessary
>> >>however to
>> >> >> >> >       ensure that the entity signing this information is
>> >>authorized to
>> >> do
>> >> >> >> >       so.  Therefore, a certificate's issuer MAY either sign
>> >>the OCSP
>> >> >> >> >       responses itself or it MAY explicitly designate this
>> >>authority to
>> >> >> >> >       another entity.
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> >The two instances of "MAY" in the above text were both "MUST"
>> >> >> >> >in
>> >>RFC
>> >> >> >>2560.
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> >The RFC 2560 text construction of "MUST" or "MUST" is a bit
>> >> >> >> >odd,
>> >>but
>> >> >> >>the two
>> >> >> >> >"MAY"s in this draft are even worse, as they allow "MAY do
>> >>something
>> >> >> >>else
>> >> >> >> >entirely", despite being enclosed in an either-or construct.
>> >> >> >> >I
>> >> >> >>strongly
>> >> >> >> >suspect that the latter was not intended, so the following
>> >> >> >> >would
>> >>be
>> >> >> >> >clearer:
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> >       The key that signs a certificate's status information
>> >>need not be
>> >> >>the
>> >> >> >> >       same key that signed the certificate. It is necessary
>> >>however to
>> >> >> >> >       ensure that the entity signing this information is
>> >>authorized to
>> >> do
>> >> >> >> >       so.  Therefore, a certificate's issuer MUST do one of
>> >> >> >> > the
>> >> >>following:
>> >> >> >> >               - sign the OCSP responses itself, or
>> >> >> >> >               - explicitly designate this authority to
>> >> >> >> > another
>> >>entity.
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >> I Agree. I will adopt your text.
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> >[3] Section 4.3:
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> >Is the "SHOULD" requirement still appropriate for the DSA with
>> >>SHA-1
>> >> >> >>combo
>> >> >> >> >(vs. a "MAY" requirement)?  This requirement was a "MUST" in
>> >> >> >> >RFC
>> >> >>2560,
>> >> >> >>but
>> >> >> >> >I wonder about actual usage of DSA in practice.
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >> The change in algorithm requirements was provided by RFC 6277,
>> >> >> >>and further  refined in this draft in accordance with requests
>> >> >> >>from Sean
>> >>Turner.
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> >[4] Section 5, last paragraph:
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> >       Responding a "revoked" state to certificate that has
>> >>never been
>> >> >> >> >       issued may enable someone to obtain a revocation
>> >> >> >> > response
>> >>for a
>> >> >> >> >       certificate that is not yet issued, but soon will be
>> >>issued, if
>> >> the
>> >> >> >> >       CA issues certificates using sequential certificate
>> >>serial number
>> >> >> >> >       assignment.
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> >The above text after starting with the "if" is too narrow - it
>> >> >>should
>> >> >> >>say:
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> >       if the certificate serial number of the certificate
>>that
>> >> >> >> >       will be issued can be predicted or guessed by the
>> >>requester.
>> >> >> >> >       Such prediction is easy for a CA that issues
>>certificates
>> >> >> >> >       using sequential certificate serial number assignment.
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> >There's also a nit in original text - its first line should
>>be:
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> >       Responding with a "revoked" state for a certificate
>> >> >> >> > that
>> >>has never
>> >> >> >>been
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >> Good suggestions. I will update accordingly.
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> >[5] Section 5.1.1:
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> >       In archival applications it is quite possible that an
>> >> >> >> > OCSP
>> >> >>responder
>> >> >> >> >       might be asked to report the validity of a certificate
>> >> >> >> > on
>> >>a date
>> >> in
>> >> >> >> >       the distant past. Such a certificate might employ a
>> >>signing method
>> >> >> >> >       that is no longer considered acceptably secure. In such
>> >> >> >> >       circumstances the responder MUST NOT generate a
>> >> >> >> > signature
>> >>using a
>> >> >> >> >       signing mechanism that is not considered acceptably
>> >>secure.
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> >This could use an additional warning that certificate archival
>> >> >>should
>> >> >> >> >not rely solely on signatures in archived certificates for
>> >>ensuring
>> >> >>the
>> >> >> >> >validity and integrity of the archived certificates because
>> >> >> >> >the
>> >> >> >>signature
>> >> >> >> >algorithm(s) may transition to no longer being considered
>> >>acceptably
>> >> >> >> >secure at some point after the certificates are archived.
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >> This note if I remember correctly is imported from RFC 6277,
>> >>which is
>> >> >> >> incorporated into this document. The reason behind the text is
>> >>only
>> >> >>to
>> >> >> >> avoid usages of insecure algorithms.
>> >> >> >> Historical validation is a real can of worms that I really
>> >> >> >> would
>> >> >>like to
>> >> >> >> keep a tight lid on. I really want to avoid doing
>> >> >> >> recommendations
>> >>in
>> >> >> >>this
>> >> >> >> space as it may trigger a whole flood of things that could be
>> >>equally
>> >> >> >> important to say about this subject.
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> >Nits:
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> >idnits 2.12.15 said:
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> >  -- The document seems to lack a disclaimer for pre-RFC5378
>> >>work,
>> >> >>but
>> >> >> >>may
>> >> >> >> >     have content which was first submitted before 10 November
>> >>2008.
>> >> >> >>If
>> >> >> >> >you
>> >> >> >> >     have contacted all the original authors and they are all
>> >> >>willing
>> >> >> >>to
>> >> >> >> >grant
>> >> >> >> >     the BCP78 rights to the IETF Trust, then this is fine,
>> >> >> >> >and
>> >>you
>> >> >>can
>> >> >> >> >ignore
>> >> >> >> >     this comment.  If not, you may need to add the
>> >> >> >> >pre-RFC5378 disclaimer.
>> >> >> >> >     (See the Legal Provisions document at
>> >> >> >> >     http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info for more
>> >> >> >> >information.)
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> >This looks like it's ok because all the authors of RFC 2560
>> >> >> >> >are
>> >>also
>> >> >> >> >authors of
>> >> >> >> >this draft, but it should be double-checked.
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >> I defer this one to Sean. I think he has this one under
>>control.
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >> Thanks again for the review.
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >> /Stefan
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> >Thanks,
>> >> >> >> >--David
>> >> >> >> >----------------------------------------------------
>> >> >> >> >David L. Black, Distinguished Engineer EMC Corporation, 176
>> >> >> >> >South St., Hopkinton, MA  01748
>> >> >> >> >+1 (508) 293-7953             FAX: +1 (508) 293-7786
>> >> >> >> >david.black@emc.com        Mobile: +1 (978) 394-7754
>> >> >> >> >----------------------------------------------------
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >
>> >>
>> >>
>> >
>>
>>
>>
>



From stefan@aaa-sec.com  Thu Mar 28 08:51:21 2013
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Thread-Topic: [pkix] Last Call: <draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15.txt> (X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP) to Proposed Standard
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On 3/27/13 10:11 PM, "Martin Rex" <mrex@sap.com> wrote:

>It was the Security co-AD Russ Housley who indicated _early_ during
>the discussion of that draft (2.5 years after it had been adopted
>as a WG item) that he considered some of the suggested abuses of
>existing error codes "unacceptable"

For the record. Russ comment was:

"I find the use of "unauthorized" to indicate that a client cannot make a
multi-certificate request unacceptable."

Which is completely different from your raised concern.

/Stefan



From stefan@aaa-sec.com  Thu Mar 28 09:08:01 2013
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From: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>
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Thread-Topic: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN
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> This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.

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Santosh,

Clearly URN can't be expressed as a constraint.
If there is a constraint expressing .example.com and the SAN holds a URN
value, I'd say that this is a violation of that constraint.

/Stefan

From:  Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>
Date:  Wednesday, March 27, 2013 11:04 PM
To:  Piyush Jain <piyush@ditenity.com>, 'pkix' <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject:  Re: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN

> David and Piyush,
> =20
> Thanks.
> =20
> I agree with you for the most part.  But, the first sentence in that para=
graph
> can be used to think otherwise: =B3For URIs, the constraint applies to the =
host
> part of the name=B2.
> =20
> Anyway, that is not my primary point.  I think the URI schemes that canno=
t
> have host name component should be exempt from name constraint since ther=
e is
> nothing to constrain.
> =20
> Today, we have actual certificates that have URN in them and rejecting th=
em on
> the basis of upstream URI constraints (which typically apply to URL) does=
 not
> make sense to me.
> =20
> My question is was that simply an oversight or is there a reason URN shou=
ld be
> rejected.  One could also argue when using URN scheme, the name is not
> hierarchical and there is no point in constraining it.
> =20
>=20
> From: Piyush Jain [mailto:piyush@ditenity.com]
> Sent: Tuesday, March 26, 2013 6:07 PM
> To: Santosh Chokhani; 'pkix'
> Subject: RE: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN
> =20
> From 5280
> (e.g., if the URI either
>    does not include an authority component or includes an authority
>    component in which the host name is specified as an IP address), then
>    the application MUST reject the certificate.
> =20
> It clearly says that if authority component is missing, certificate must =
be
> rejected.
> =20
>=20
> From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org <mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org>
> [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org <mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org> ] On Behalf =
Of
> Santosh Chokhani
> Sent: Tuesday, March 26, 2013 2:47 PM
> To: 'pkix'
> Subject: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN
> =20
> I have been wrestling with what one should with a certificate if the SAN =
in
> the certificate contains URN and when you get to the certificate, the nam=
e
> constraint state variable indicates permitted and/or excluded values for =
the
> URI name form.
> =20
> I think name constraint is not applicable to URN since it does not have a=
n
> =B3authority=B2 and thus =B3host=B2 component by definition.  Thus, regardless of=
 the
> name constraint state variable, presence of URN should not cause name
> constraint violation.
> =20
> But, when I read 5280, I find the text implying otherwise or ambiguous.
> =20
> =20
> Santosh Chokhani
> CygnaCom Solutions, Inc.
> =20
> _______________________________________________ pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix



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pace; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-size:=
 14px; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><div>Santosh,</div><div><br></div=
><div>Clearly URN can't be expressed as a constraint.</div><div>If there is =
a constraint expressing .example.com and the SAN holds a URN value, I'd say =
that this is a violation of that constraint.</div><div><br></div><div>/Stefa=
n</div><div><br></div><span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION"><div style=3D"font-famil=
y:Calibri; font-size:11pt; text-align:left; color:black; BORDER-BOTTOM: medi=
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 PADDING-TOP: 3pt"><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">From: </span> Santosh Chok=
hani &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:SChokhani@cygnacom.com">SChokhani@cygnacom.com</a>&=
gt;<br><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">Date: </span> Wednesday, March 27, 201=
3 11:04 PM<br><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">To: </span> Piyush Jain &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:piyush@ditenity.com">piyush@ditenity.com</a>&gt;, 'pkix' &lt;<a=
 href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br><span style=3D"font-weig=
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<o:shapedefaults v:ext=3D"edit" spidmax=3D"1026" />
</xml><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<o:shapelayout v:ext=3D"edit">
<o:idmap v:ext=3D"edit" data=3D"1" />
</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--><div lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purp=
le"><div class=3D"WordSection1"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"color:#1F497=
D">David and Piyush,<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"=
color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D=
"color:#1F497D">Thanks.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span styl=
e=3D"color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span sty=
le=3D"color:#1F497D">I agree with you for the most part.&nbsp; But, the first =
sentence in that paragraph can be used to think otherwise: &#8220;</span>For=
 URIs, the constraint applies to the host part of the name&#8221;.<o:p></o:p=
></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span st=
yle=3D"color:#1F497D">Anyway, that is not my primary point.&nbsp; I think the =
URI schemes that cannot have host name component should be exempt from name =
constraint since there is nothing to constrain.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p clas=
s=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p cla=
ss=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"color:#1F497D">Today, we have actual certificate=
s that have URN in them and rejecting them on the basis of upstream URI cons=
traints (which typically apply to URL) does not make sense to me. <o:p></o:p=
></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:=
p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"color:#1F497D">My question is=
 was that simply an oversight or is there a reason URN should be rejected.&n=
bsp; One could also argue when using URN scheme, the name is not hierarchica=
l and there is no point in constraining it.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"M=
soNormal"><span style=3D"color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><div><div =
style=3D"border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in"=
><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma, =
sans-serif; ">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tah=
oma, sans-serif; "> Piyush Jain [<a href=3D"mailto:piyush@ditenity.com">mailto=
:piyush@ditenity.com</a>] <br><b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, March 26, 2013 6:07 PM<b=
r><b>To:</b> Santosh Chokhani; 'pkix'<br><b>Subject:</b> RE: [pkix] URI Name=
 Constraint and URN<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o=
:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"color:#1F497D">From 528=
0<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10pt; fo=
nt-family: 'Courier New'; color: black; ">(e.g., if the URI either<o:p></o:p=
></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: =
'Courier New'; color: black; ">&nbsp;&nbsp; does not include an authority co=
mponent or includes an authority<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><=
span style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: 'Courier New'; color: black; ">&nb=
sp;&nbsp; component in which the host name is specified as an IP address), t=
hen<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10pt; =
font-family: 'Courier New'; color: black; ">&nbsp;&nbsp; the application MUS=
T reject the certificate.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span st=
yle=3D"color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span s=
tyle=3D"color:#1F497D">It clearly says that if authority component is missing,=
 certificate must be rejected.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><sp=
an style=3D"color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><div style=3D"border:none=
;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 4.0pt"><div><div style=3D"bo=
rder:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in"><p class=
=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma, sans-seri=
f; ">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma, sans=
-serif; "> </span><a href=3D"mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org"><span style=3D"font-s=
ize: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma, sans-serif; ">pkix-bounces@ietf.org</span></=
a><span style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma, sans-serif; "> [</span>=
<a href=3D"mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org"><span style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-fa=
mily: Tahoma, sans-serif; ">mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org</span></a><span sty=
le=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma, sans-serif; ">] <b>On Behalf Of </=
b>Santosh Chokhani<br><b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, March 26, 2013 2:47 PM<br><b>To:=
</b> 'pkix'<br><b>Subject:</b> [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN<o:p></o:p>=
</span></p></div></div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3D"M=
soNormal">I have been wrestling with what one should with a certificate if t=
he SAN in the certificate contains URN and when you get to the certificate, =
the name constraint state variable indicates permitted and/or excluded value=
s for the URI name form.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p=
></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">I think name constraint is not applicable to URN s=
ince it does not have an &#8220;authority&#8221; and thus &#8220;host&#8221;=
 component by definition.&nbsp; Thus, regardless of the name constraint stat=
e variable, presence of URN should not cause name constraint violation.<o:p>=
</o:p></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">But=
, when I read 5280, I find the text implying otherwise or ambiguous.<o:p></o=
:p></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&=
nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">Santosh Chokhani<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3D=
"MsoNormal">CygnaCom Solutions, Inc.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p=
>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div></div></div></div>___________________________________=
____________
pkix mailing list
<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix">https://www.ietf.org/m=
ailman/listinfo/pkix</a>
</blockquote></span></body></html>

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From: Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>
To: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>, Piyush Jain <piyush@ditenity.com>,  'pkix' <pkix@ietf.org>
Date: Thu, 28 Mar 2013 12:11:33 -0400
Thread-Topic: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN
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Stefan,

So, even though constraining URN is meaningless, all URN certificates shoul=
d be rejected.   Did I get you right?

Make no sense at all to me.  May be you can explain why this is useful or r=
ight aside from 5280 having missed the scenario.

From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com]
Sent: Thursday, March 28, 2013 12:08 PM
To: Santosh Chokhani; Piyush Jain; 'pkix'
Subject: Re: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN

Santosh,

Clearly URN can't be expressed as a constraint.
If there is a constraint expressing .example.com and the SAN holds a URN va=
lue, I'd say that this is a violation of that constraint.

/Stefan

From: Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com<mailto:SChokhani@cygnacom.co=
m>>
Date: Wednesday, March 27, 2013 11:04 PM
To: Piyush Jain <piyush@ditenity.com<mailto:piyush@ditenity.com>>, 'pkix' <=
pkix@ietf.org<mailto:pkix@ietf.org>>
Subject: Re: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN

David and Piyush,

Thanks.

I agree with you for the most part.  But, the first sentence in that paragr=
aph can be used to think otherwise: "For URIs, the constraint applies to th=
e host part of the name".

Anyway, that is not my primary point.  I think the URI schemes that cannot =
have host name component should be exempt from name constraint since there =
is nothing to constrain.

Today, we have actual certificates that have URN in them and rejecting them=
 on the basis of upstream URI constraints (which typically apply to URL) do=
es not make sense to me.

My question is was that simply an oversight or is there a reason URN should=
 be rejected.  One could also argue when using URN scheme, the name is not =
hierarchical and there is no point in constraining it.

From: Piyush Jain [mailto:piyush@ditenity.com]
Sent: Tuesday, March 26, 2013 6:07 PM
To: Santosh Chokhani; 'pkix'
Subject: RE: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN

>From 5280
(e.g., if the URI either
   does not include an authority component or includes an authority
   component in which the host name is specified as an IP address), then
   the application MUST reject the certificate.

It clearly says that if authority component is missing, certificate must be=
 rejected.

From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org<mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org> [mailto:pkix-boun=
ces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Santosh Chokhani
Sent: Tuesday, March 26, 2013 2:47 PM
To: 'pkix'
Subject: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN

I have been wrestling with what one should with a certificate if the SAN in=
 the certificate contains URN and when you get to the certificate, the name=
 constraint state variable indicates permitted and/or excluded values for t=
he URI name form.

I think name constraint is not applicable to URN since it does not have an =
"authority" and thus "host" component by definition.  Thus, regardless of t=
he name constraint state variable, presence of URN should not cause name co=
nstraint violation.

But, when I read 5280, I find the text implying otherwise or ambiguous.


Santosh Chokhani
CygnaCom Solutions, Inc.

_______________________________________________ pkix mailing list pkix@ietf=
.org<mailto:pkix@ietf.org> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix

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<o:idmap v:ext=3D"edit" data=3D"1" />
</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=3DEN-US link=3Dblue vli=
nk=3Dpurple><div class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'c=
olor:#1F497D'>Stefan,<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=
=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span s=
tyle=3D'color:#1F497D'>So, even though constraining URN is meaningless, all=
 URN certificates should be rejected.&nbsp;&nbsp; Did I get you right?<o:p>=
</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&n=
bsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>Mak=
e no sense at all to me.&nbsp; May be you can explain why this is useful or=
 right aside from 5280 having missed the scenario.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p=
><div><div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0p=
t 0in 0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font=
-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span></b><span style=3D'font-size:10.=
0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> Stefan Santesson [mailto:stefan@aaa=
-sec.com] <br><b>Sent:</b> Thursday, March 28, 2013 12:08 PM<br><b>To:</b> =
Santosh Chokhani; Piyush Jain; 'pkix'<br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [pkix] URI Nam=
e Constraint and URN<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p class=3DMsoNormal>=
<o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.=
5pt;color:black'>Santosh,<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNor=
mal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></=
p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;color:bla=
ck'>Clearly URN can't be expressed as a constraint.<o:p></o:p></span></p></=
div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;color:black'>=
If there is a constraint expressing .example.com and the SAN holds a URN va=
lue, I'd say that this is a violation of that constraint.<o:p></o:p></span>=
</p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;color:b=
lack'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span sty=
le=3D'font-size:10.5pt;color:black'>/Stefan<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div=
><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;color:black'><o:p>&nb=
sp;</o:p></span></p></div><div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4D=
F 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span style=3D'c=
olor:black'>From: </span></b><span style=3D'color:black'>Santosh Chokhani &=
lt;<a href=3D"mailto:SChokhani@cygnacom.com">SChokhani@cygnacom.com</a>&gt;=
<br><b>Date: </b>Wednesday, March 27, 2013 11:04 PM<br><b>To: </b>Piyush Ja=
in &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:piyush@ditenity.com">piyush@ditenity.com</a>&gt;, =
'pkix' &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br><b>Sub=
ject: </b>Re: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN<o:p></o:p></span></p></div=
><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;color:black'><o:=
p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><blockquote style=3D'border:none;border-left=
:solid #B5C4DF 4.5pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 4.0pt;margin-left:3.75pt;margin-ri=
ght:0in' id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"><div><div><p class=3DMso=
Normal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>David and Piyush,</span><span style=3D=
'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'col=
or:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p>=
<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>Thanks.</span><span styl=
e=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D=
'color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span>=
</p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>I agree with you for=
 the most part.&nbsp; But, the first sentence in that paragraph can be used=
 to think otherwise: &#8220;</span><span style=3D'color:black'>For URIs, th=
e constraint applies to the host part of the name&#8221;.<o:p></o:p></span>=
</p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:black'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></spa=
n></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>Anyway, that is no=
t my primary point.&nbsp; I think the URI schemes that cannot have host nam=
e component should be exempt from name constraint since there is nothing to=
 constrain.</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p clas=
s=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'col=
or:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#=
1F497D'>Today, we have actual certificates that have URN in them and reject=
ing them on the basis of upstream URI constraints (which typically apply to=
 URL) does not make sense to me. </span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></=
o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</s=
pan><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>=
<span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>My question is was that simply an oversight o=
r is there a reason URN should be rejected.&nbsp; One could also argue when=
 using URN scheme, the name is not hierarchical and there is no point in co=
nstraining it.</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p c=
lass=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'=
color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><div><div style=3D'border:none;border-to=
p:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal><b><s=
pan style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif";color:black=
'>From:</span></b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","san=
s-serif";color:black'> Piyush Jain [<a href=3D"mailto:piyush@ditenity.com">=
mailto:piyush@ditenity.com</a>] <br><b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, March 26, 2013 6:=
07 PM<br><b>To:</b> Santosh Chokhani; 'pkix'<br><b>Subject:</b> RE: [pkix] =
URI Name Constraint and URN</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></=
span></p></div></div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:black'>&nbsp=
;<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>F=
rom 5280</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=
=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New";colo=
r:black'>(e.g., if the URI either</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></=
o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-fa=
mily:"Courier New";color:black'>&nbsp;&nbsp; does not include an authority =
component or includes an authority</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p><=
/o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-f=
amily:"Courier New";color:black'>&nbsp;&nbsp; component in which the host n=
ame is specified as an IP address), then</span><span style=3D'color:black'>=
<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;=
font-family:"Courier New";color:black'>&nbsp;&nbsp; the application MUST re=
ject the certificate.</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span><=
/p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><span st=
yle=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=
=3D'color:#1F497D'>It clearly says that if authority component is missing, =
certificate must be rejected.</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p>=
</span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span>=
<span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><div style=3D'border:none=
;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 4.0pt'><div><div style=3D=
'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p c=
lass=3DMsoNormal><b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","s=
ans-serif";color:black'>From:</span></b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;fon=
t-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif";color:black'> </span><span style=3D'color:bl=
ack'><a href=3D"mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org"><span style=3D'font-size:10.0=
pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>pkix-bounces@ietf.org</span></a></spa=
n><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif";color:b=
lack'> [</span><span style=3D'color:black'><a href=3D"mailto:pkix-bounces@i=
etf.org"><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'=
>mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org</span></a></span><span style=3D'font-size:10.=
0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif";color:black'>] <b>On Behalf Of </b>Sa=
ntosh Chokhani<br><b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, March 26, 2013 2:47 PM<br><b>To:</b=
> 'pkix'<br><b>Subject:</b> [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN</span><span =
style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p class=3DMsoNorma=
l><span style=3D'color:black'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNor=
mal><span style=3D'color:black'>I have been wrestling with what one should =
with a certificate if the SAN in the certificate contains URN and when you =
get to the certificate, the name constraint state variable indicates permit=
ted and/or excluded values for the URI name form.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p c=
lass=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:black'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p><p=
 class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:black'>I think name constraint is n=
ot applicable to URN since it does not have an &#8220;authority&#8221; and =
thus &#8220;host&#8221; component by definition.&nbsp; Thus, regardless of =
the name constraint state variable, presence of URN should not cause name c=
onstraint violation.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=
=3D'color:black'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span sty=
le=3D'color:black'>But, when I read 5280, I find the text implying otherwis=
e or ambiguous.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'co=
lor:black'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'=
color:black'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=
=3D'color:black'>Santosh Chokhani<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal=
><span style=3D'color:black'>CygnaCom Solutions, Inc.<o:p></o:p></span></p>=
<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:black'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></=
p></div></div></div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;co=
lor:black'>_______________________________________________ pkix mailing lis=
t <a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a> <a href=3D"https://www=
.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix=
</a> <o:p></o:p></span></p></blockquote></div></body></html>=

--_000_B83745DA469B7847811819C5005244AFF3DC9CA5scygexch7cygnac_--

From stefan@aaa-sec.com  Thu Mar 28 09:21:43 2013
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Date: Thu, 28 Mar 2013 17:21:31 +0100
From: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>
To: Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>, Piyush Jain <piyush@ditenity.com>, 'pkix' <pkix@ietf.org>
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Thread-Topic: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN
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Subject: Re: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN
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Not all URN certificates.

Only certificates with a URN where a CA certificate in the current path has
provided a constraints for URI:s according to the standard as a
permittedSubtree constraint.

RFC 5280 states:
   The name constraints extension, which MUST be used only in a CA
   certificate, indicates a name space within which all subject names in
   subsequent certificates in a certification path MUST be located.

I simply can't see how "urn:com:contoso:whatever"  can be claimed to fit
within the permitted subtree constraint ".example.com"

If ".example.com" is an excluded subtree, then I have no problem accepting
the cert, because the URN is not excluded.

/Stefan


From:  Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>
Date:  Thursday, March 28, 2013 5:11 PM
To:  Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>, Piyush Jain
<piyush@ditenity.com>, 'pkix' <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject:  Re: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN

> Stefan,
> =20
> So, even though constraining URN is meaningless, all URN certificates sho=
uld
> be rejected.   Did I get you right?
> =20
> Make no sense at all to me.  May be you can explain why this is useful or
> right aside from 5280 having missed the scenario.
> =20
>=20
> From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com]
> Sent: Thursday, March 28, 2013 12:08 PM
> To: Santosh Chokhani; Piyush Jain; 'pkix'
> Subject: Re: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN
> =20
>=20
> Santosh,
>=20
> =20
>=20
> Clearly URN can't be expressed as a constraint.
>=20
> If there is a constraint expressing .example.com and the SAN holds a URN
> value, I'd say that this is a violation of that constraint.
>=20
> =20
>=20
> /Stefan
>=20
> =20
>=20
> From: Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>
> Date: Wednesday, March 27, 2013 11:04 PM
> To: Piyush Jain <piyush@ditenity.com>, 'pkix' <pkix@ietf.org>
> Subject: Re: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN
>=20
> =20
>>=20
>> David and Piyush,
>> =20
>> Thanks.
>> =20
>> I agree with you for the most part.  But, the first sentence in that
>> paragraph can be used to think otherwise: =B3For URIs, the constraint appl=
ies
>> to the host part of the name=B2.
>> =20
>> Anyway, that is not my primary point.  I think the URI schemes that cann=
ot
>> have host name component should be exempt from name constraint since the=
re is
>> nothing to constrain.
>> =20
>> Today, we have actual certificates that have URN in them and rejecting t=
hem
>> on the basis of upstream URI constraints (which typically apply to URL) =
does
>> not make sense to me.
>> =20
>> My question is was that simply an oversight or is there a reason URN sho=
uld
>> be rejected.  One could also argue when using URN scheme, the name is no=
t
>> hierarchical and there is no point in constraining it.
>> =20
>>=20
>> From: Piyush Jain [mailto:piyush@ditenity.com]
>> Sent: Tuesday, March 26, 2013 6:07 PM
>> To: Santosh Chokhani; 'pkix'
>> Subject: RE: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN
>> =20
>> From 5280
>> (e.g., if the URI either
>>    does not include an authority component or includes an authority
>>    component in which the host name is specified as an IP address), then
>>    the application MUST reject the certificate.
>> =20
>> It clearly says that if authority component is missing, certificate must=
 be
>> rejected.
>> =20
>>=20
>> From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org <mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org>
>> [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org <mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org> ] On Behalf=
 Of
>> Santosh Chokhani
>> Sent: Tuesday, March 26, 2013 2:47 PM
>> To: 'pkix'
>> Subject: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN
>> =20
>> I have been wrestling with what one should with a certificate if the SAN=
 in
>> the certificate contains URN and when you get to the certificate, the na=
me
>> constraint state variable indicates permitted and/or excluded values for=
 the
>> URI name form.
>> =20
>> I think name constraint is not applicable to URN since it does not have =
an
>> =B3authority=B2 and thus =B3host=B2 component by definition.  Thus, regardless o=
f the
>> name constraint state variable, presence of URN should not cause name
>> constraint violation.
>> =20
>> But, when I read 5280, I find the text implying otherwise or ambiguous.
>> =20
>> =20
>> Santosh Chokhani
>> CygnaCom Solutions, Inc.
>> =20
>> _______________________________________________ pkix mailing list
>> pkix@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
> _______________________________________________ pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix



--B_3447336095_1933215
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<html><head></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: s=
pace; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-size:=
 14px; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><div>Not all URN certificates.</d=
iv><div><br></div><div>Only certificates with a URN where a CA certificate i=
n the current path has provided a constraints for URI:s according to the sta=
ndard as a permittedSubtree constraint.</div><div><br></div><div>RFC 5280 st=
ates:</div><div><pre class=3D"newpage" style=3D"font-size: 1em; margin-top: 0px;=
 margin-bottom: 0px; page-break-before: always; ">   The name constraints ex=
tension, which MUST be used only in a CA
   certificate, indicates a name space within which all <b>subject names in=

   subsequent certificates in a certification path MUST be located</b>.</pr=
e></div><div><br></div><div>I simply can't see how "urn:com:contoso:whatever=
" &nbsp;can be claimed to fit within the permitted subtree constraint ".exam=
ple.com"</div><div><br></div><div>If ".example.com" is an excluded subtree, =
then I have no problem accepting the cert, because the URN is not excluded.<=
/div><div><br></div><div>/Stefan</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><span id=
=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION"><div style=3D"font-family:Calibri; font-size:11pt; tex=
t-align:left; color:black; BORDER-BOTTOM: medium none; BORDER-LEFT: medium n=
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 #b5c4df 1pt solid; BORDER-RIGHT: medium none; PADDING-TOP: 3pt"><span style=
=3D"font-weight:bold">From: </span> Santosh Chokhani &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:SChok=
hani@cygnacom.com">SChokhani@cygnacom.com</a>&gt;<br><span style=3D"font-weigh=
t:bold">Date: </span> Thursday, March 28, 2013 5:11 PM<br><span style=3D"font-=
weight:bold">To: </span> Stefan Santesson &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:stefan@aaa-sec=
.com">stefan@aaa-sec.com</a>&gt;, Piyush Jain &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:piyush@dit=
enity.com">piyush@ditenity.com</a>&gt;, 'pkix' &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf=
.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">Subject: </spa=
n> Re: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN<br></div><div><br></div><blockquot=
e id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE" style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 soli=
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</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--><div lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purp=
le"><div class=3D"WordSection1"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"color:#1F497=
D">Stefan,<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"color:#1F4=
97D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"color:#1F=
497D">So, even though constraining URN is meaningless, all URN certificates =
should be rejected.&nbsp;&nbsp; Did I get you right?<o:p></o:p></span></p><p=
 class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><=
p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"color:#1F497D">Make no sense at all to me.&=
nbsp; May be you can explain why this is useful or right aside from 5280 hav=
ing missed the scenario.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span sty=
le=3D"color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><div><div style=3D"border:none;=
border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in"><p class=3D"MsoNorma=
l"><b><span style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma, sans-serif; ">From:=
</span></b><span style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma, sans-serif; ">=
 Stefan Santesson [<a href=3D"mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com">mailto:stefan@aaa-sec=
.com</a>] <br><b>Sent:</b> Thursday, March 28, 2013 12:08 PM<br><b>To:</b> S=
antosh Chokhani; Piyush Jain; 'pkix'<br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [pkix] URI Name =
Constraint and URN<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:=
p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;co=
lor:black">Santosh,<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><sp=
an style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;color:black"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><d=
iv><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;color:black">Clearly U=
RN can't be expressed as a constraint.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p cl=
ass=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;color:black">If there is a con=
straint expressing .example.com and the SAN holds a URN value, I'd say that =
this is a violation of that constraint.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p c=
lass=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;color:black"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p=
></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;co=
lor:black">/Stefan<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><spa=
n style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;color:black"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><di=
v style=3D"border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0i=
n"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"color:black">From: </span></b><span =
style=3D"color:black">Santosh Chokhani &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:SChokhani@cygnacom.=
com">SChokhani@cygnacom.com</a>&gt;<br><b>Date: </b>Wednesday, March 27, 201=
3 11:04 PM<br><b>To: </b>Piyush Jain &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:piyush@ditenity.com=
">piyush@ditenity.com</a>&gt;, 'pkix' &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pki=
x@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br><b>Subject: </b>Re: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN=
<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size=
:10.5pt;color:black"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><blockquote style=3D"bo=
rder:none;border-left:solid #B5C4DF 4.5pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 4.0pt;margin-l=
eft:3.75pt;margin-right:0in" id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"><div><d=
iv><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"color:#1F497D">David and Piyush,</span>=
<span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span s=
tyle=3D"color:#1F497D">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></spa=
n></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"color:#1F497D">Thanks.</span><span s=
tyle=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"c=
olor:#1F497D">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p><=
p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"color:#1F497D">I agree with you for the mos=
t part.&nbsp; But, the first sentence in that paragraph can be used to think=
 otherwise: &#8220;</span><span style=3D"color:black">For URIs, the constraint=
 applies to the host part of the name&#8221;.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D=
"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"color:black">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"=
MsoNormal"><span style=3D"color:#1F497D">Anyway, that is not my primary point.=
&nbsp; I think the URI schemes that cannot have host name component should b=
e exempt from name constraint since there is nothing to constrain.</span><sp=
an style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span styl=
e=3D"color:#1F497D">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span><=
/p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"color:#1F497D">Today, we have actual ce=
rtificates that have URN in them and rejecting them on the basis of upstream=
 URI constraints (which typically apply to URL) does not make sense to me. <=
/span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><=
span style=3D"color:#1F497D">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p=
></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"color:#1F497D">My question is =
was that simply an oversight or is there a reason URN should be rejected.&nb=
sp; One could also argue when using URN scheme, the name is not hierarchical=
 and there is no point in constraining it.</span><span style=3D"color:black"><=
o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"color:#1F497D">&nbsp;=
</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p><div><div style=3D"bord=
er:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in"><p class=3D"=
MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma, sans-serif;=
 color: black; ">From:</span></b><span style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: =
Tahoma, sans-serif; color: black; "> Piyush Jain [<a href=3D"mailto:piyush@dit=
enity.com">mailto:piyush@ditenity.com</a>] <br><b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, March 2=
6, 2013 6:07 PM<br><b>To:</b> Santosh Chokhani; 'pkix'<br><b>Subject:</b> RE=
: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></=
o:p></span></p></div></div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"color:black">&n=
bsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"color:#1F497D">F=
rom 5280</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"Mso=
Normal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: 'Courier New'; color: bla=
ck; ">(e.g., if the URI either</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></=
span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: 'Co=
urier New'; color: black; ">&nbsp;&nbsp; does not include an authority compo=
nent or includes an authority</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></s=
pan></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: 'Cou=
rier New'; color: black; ">&nbsp;&nbsp; component in which the host name is =
specified as an IP address), then</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p=
></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: =
'Courier New'; color: black; ">&nbsp;&nbsp; the application MUST reject the =
certificate.</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D=
"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"color:#1F497D">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:blac=
k"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"color:#1F497D">It=
 clearly says that if authority component is missing, certificate must be re=
jected.</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoN=
ormal"><span style=3D"color:#1F497D">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o=
:p></o:p></span></p><div style=3D"border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;pad=
ding:0in 0in 0in 4.0pt"><div><div style=3D"border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4D=
F 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font=
-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma, sans-serif; color: black; ">From:</span></=
b><span style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma, sans-serif; color: blac=
k; "> </span><span style=3D"color:black"><a href=3D"mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org=
"><span style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma, sans-serif; ">pkix-boun=
ces@ietf.org</span></a></span><span style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tah=
oma, sans-serif; color: black; "> [</span><span style=3D"color:black"><a href=3D=
"mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org"><span style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: Ta=
homa, sans-serif; ">mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org</span></a></span><span styl=
e=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma, sans-serif; color: black; ">] <b>On=
 Behalf Of </b>Santosh Chokhani<br><b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, March 26, 2013 2:47=
 PM<br><b>To:</b> 'pkix'<br><b>Subject:</b> [pkix] URI Name Constraint and U=
RN</span><span style=3D"color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p clas=
s=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"color:black">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=
=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"color:black">I have been wrestling with what one s=
hould with a certificate if the SAN in the certificate contains URN and when=
 you get to the certificate, the name constraint state variable indicates pe=
rmitted and/or excluded values for the URI name form.<o:p></o:p></span></p><=
p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"color:black">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p><p=
 class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"color:black">I think name constraint is not =
applicable to URN since it does not have an &#8220;authority&#8221; and thus=
 &#8220;host&#8221; component by definition.&nbsp; Thus, regardless of the n=
ame constraint state variable, presence of URN should not cause name constra=
int violation.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"color:=
black">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"color:b=
lack">But, when I read 5280, I find the text implying otherwise or ambiguous=
.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"color:black">&nbsp;=
<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"color:black">&nbsp;<=
o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"color:black">Santosh =
Chokhani<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"color:black"=
>CygnaCom Solutions, Inc.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span st=
yle=3D"color:black">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div></div><p class=3D"Ms=
oNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;color:black">________________________=
_______________________ pkix mailing list <a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pki=
x@ietf.org</a> <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix">https://=
www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix</a> <o:p></o:p></span></p></blockquote></=
div></div></div>_______________________________________________
pkix mailing list
<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix">https://www.ietf.org/m=
ailman/listinfo/pkix</a>
</blockquote></span></body></html>

--B_3447336095_1933215--



From SChokhani@cygnacom.com  Thu Mar 28 09:24:32 2013
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From: Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>
To: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>, Piyush Jain <piyush@ditenity.com>,  'pkix' <pkix@ietf.org>
Date: Thu, 28 Mar 2013 12:24:21 -0400
Thread-Topic: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN
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Stefan,

URN by definition do not have "authority" component are not hierarchical.

You are simply parroting what 5280 says and not explaining what the use of =
meaning of doing this is.

May be you should explain how an upstream CA will permit URN and still cons=
train URL.

From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com]
Sent: Thursday, March 28, 2013 12:22 PM
To: Santosh Chokhani; Piyush Jain; 'pkix'
Subject: Re: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN

Not all URN certificates.

Only certificates with a URN where a CA certificate in the current path has=
 provided a constraints for URI:s according to the standard as a permittedS=
ubtree constraint.

RFC 5280 states:

   The name constraints extension, which MUST be used only in a CA

   certificate, indicates a name space within which all subject names in

   subsequent certificates in a certification path MUST be located.

I simply can't see how "urn:com:contoso:whatever"  can be claimed to fit wi=
thin the permitted subtree constraint ".example.com"

If ".example.com" is an excluded subtree, then I have no problem accepting =
the cert, because the URN is not excluded.

/Stefan


From: Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com<mailto:SChokhani@cygnacom.co=
m>>
Date: Thursday, March 28, 2013 5:11 PM
To: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com<mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com>>, Piyus=
h Jain <piyush@ditenity.com<mailto:piyush@ditenity.com>>, 'pkix' <pkix@ietf=
.org<mailto:pkix@ietf.org>>
Subject: Re: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN

Stefan,

So, even though constraining URN is meaningless, all URN certificates shoul=
d be rejected.   Did I get you right?

Make no sense at all to me.  May be you can explain why this is useful or r=
ight aside from 5280 having missed the scenario.

From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com]
Sent: Thursday, March 28, 2013 12:08 PM
To: Santosh Chokhani; Piyush Jain; 'pkix'
Subject: Re: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN

Santosh,

Clearly URN can't be expressed as a constraint.
If there is a constraint expressing .example.com and the SAN holds a URN va=
lue, I'd say that this is a violation of that constraint.

/Stefan

From: Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com<mailto:SChokhani@cygnacom.co=
m>>
Date: Wednesday, March 27, 2013 11:04 PM
To: Piyush Jain <piyush@ditenity.com<mailto:piyush@ditenity.com>>, 'pkix' <=
pkix@ietf.org<mailto:pkix@ietf.org>>
Subject: Re: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN

David and Piyush,

Thanks.

I agree with you for the most part.  But, the first sentence in that paragr=
aph can be used to think otherwise: "For URIs, the constraint applies to th=
e host part of the name".

Anyway, that is not my primary point.  I think the URI schemes that cannot =
have host name component should be exempt from name constraint since there =
is nothing to constrain.

Today, we have actual certificates that have URN in them and rejecting them=
 on the basis of upstream URI constraints (which typically apply to URL) do=
es not make sense to me.

My question is was that simply an oversight or is there a reason URN should=
 be rejected.  One could also argue when using URN scheme, the name is not =
hierarchical and there is no point in constraining it.

From: Piyush Jain [mailto:piyush@ditenity.com]
Sent: Tuesday, March 26, 2013 6:07 PM
To: Santosh Chokhani; 'pkix'
Subject: RE: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN

>From 5280
(e.g., if the URI either
   does not include an authority component or includes an authority
   component in which the host name is specified as an IP address), then
   the application MUST reject the certificate.

It clearly says that if authority component is missing, certificate must be=
 rejected.

From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org<mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org> [mailto:pkix-boun=
ces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Santosh Chokhani
Sent: Tuesday, March 26, 2013 2:47 PM
To: 'pkix'
Subject: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN

I have been wrestling with what one should with a certificate if the SAN in=
 the certificate contains URN and when you get to the certificate, the name=
 constraint state variable indicates permitted and/or excluded values for t=
he URI name form.

I think name constraint is not applicable to URN since it does not have an =
"authority" and thus "host" component by definition.  Thus, regardless of t=
he name constraint state variable, presence of URN should not cause name co=
nstraint violation.

But, when I read 5280, I find the text implying otherwise or ambiguous.


Santosh Chokhani
CygnaCom Solutions, Inc.

_______________________________________________ pkix mailing list pkix@ietf=
.org<mailto:pkix@ietf.org> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
_______________________________________________ pkix mailing list pkix@ietf=
.org<mailto:pkix@ietf.org> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix

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</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=3DEN-US link=3Dblue vli=
nk=3Dpurple><div class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'c=
olor:#1F497D'>Stefan,<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=
=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span s=
tyle=3D'color:#1F497D'>URN by definition do not have &#8220;authority&#8221=
; component are not hierarchical.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal=
><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNo=
rmal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>You are simply parroting what 5280 says =
and not explaining what the use of meaning of doing this is.<o:p></o:p></sp=
an></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>=
</span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>May be you sh=
ould explain how an upstream CA will permit URN and still constrain URL.<o:=
p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>=
&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><div><div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C=
4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span style=3D=
'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span></b><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> Stefan Santes=
son [mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com] <br><b>Sent:</b> Thursday, March 28, 2013 1=
2:22 PM<br><b>To:</b> Santosh Chokhani; Piyush Jain; 'pkix'<br><b>Subject:<=
/b> Re: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div=
><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;color:black'>Not all URN certificates.<o:p></o:p>=
</span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;=
color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><s=
pan style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;color:black'>Only certificates with a URN whe=
re a CA certificate in the current path has provided a constraints for URI:=
s according to the standard as a permittedSubtree constraint.<o:p></o:p></s=
pan></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;col=
or:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span=
 style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;color:black'>RFC 5280 states:<o:p></o:p></span><=
/p></div><div><pre style=3D'page-break-before:always'><span style=3D'font-s=
ize:10.5pt;color:black'>&nbsp;&nbsp; The name constraints extension, which =
MUST be used only in a CA<o:p></o:p></span></pre><pre style=3D'page-break-b=
efore:always'><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;color:black'> &nbsp;&nbsp;cer=
tificate, indicates a name space within which all <b>subject names in<o:p><=
/o:p></b></span></pre><pre style=3D'page-break-before:always'><b><span styl=
e=3D'font-size:10.5pt;color:black'>&nbsp;&nbsp; subsequent certificates in =
a certification path MUST be located</span></b><span style=3D'font-size:10.=
5pt;color:black'>.<o:p></o:p></span></pre></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><=
span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></d=
iv><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;color:black'>I=
 simply can't see how &quot;urn:com:contoso:whatever&quot; &nbsp;can be cla=
imed to fit within the permitted subtree constraint &quot;.example.com&quot=
;<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-=
size:10.5pt;color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3D=
MsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;color:black'>If &quot;.example.co=
m&quot; is an excluded subtree, then I have no problem accepting the cert, =
because the URN is not excluded.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=
=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>=
</span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;=
color:black'>/Stefan<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><=
span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></d=
iv><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;color:black'><=
o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid=
 #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span sty=
le=3D'color:black'>From: </span></b><span style=3D'color:black'>Santosh Cho=
khani &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:SChokhani@cygnacom.com">SChokhani@cygnacom.com<=
/a>&gt;<br><b>Date: </b>Thursday, March 28, 2013 5:11 PM<br><b>To: </b>Stef=
an Santesson &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com">stefan@aaa-sec.com</=
a>&gt;, Piyush Jain &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:piyush@ditenity.com">piyush@diten=
ity.com</a>&gt;, 'pkix' &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org<=
/a>&gt;<br><b>Subject: </b>Re: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN<o:p></o:p=
></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt=
;color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><blockquote style=3D'border=
:none;border-left:solid #B5C4DF 4.5pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 4.0pt;margin-left=
:3.75pt;margin-right:0in' id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"><div><d=
iv><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>Stefan,</span><span s=
tyle=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=
=3D'color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></sp=
an></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>So, even though c=
onstraining URN is meaningless, all URN certificates should be rejected.&nb=
sp;&nbsp; Did I get you right?</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p=
></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span=
><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><sp=
an style=3D'color:#1F497D'>Make no sense at all to me.&nbsp; May be you can=
 explain why this is useful or right aside from 5280 having missed the scen=
ario.</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMs=
oNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:bla=
ck'><o:p></o:p></span></p><div><div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #=
B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span style=
=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif";color:black'>From:</=
span></b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif";=
color:black'> Stefan Santesson [<a href=3D"mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com">mailt=
o:stefan@aaa-sec.com</a>] <br><b>Sent:</b> Thursday, March 28, 2013 12:08 P=
M<br><b>To:</b> Santosh Chokhani; Piyush Jain; 'pkix'<br><b>Subject:</b> Re=
: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p=
></o:p></span></p></div></div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:bla=
ck'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'fo=
nt-size:10.5pt;color:black'>Santosh,</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p=
></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:=
10.5pt;color:black'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></s=
pan></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;col=
or:black'>Clearly URN can't be expressed as a constraint.</span><span style=
=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><spa=
n style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;color:black'>If there is a constraint expressin=
g .example.com and the SAN holds a URN value, I'd say that this is a violat=
ion of that constraint.</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span=
></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;color:=
black'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div=
><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;color:black'>/St=
efan</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;color:black'>&nbsp;</span=
><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div style=3D'bord=
er:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=
=3DMsoNormal><b><span style=3D'color:black'>From: </span></b><span style=3D=
'color:black'>Santosh Chokhani &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:SChokhani@cygnacom.com=
">SChokhani@cygnacom.com</a>&gt;<br><b>Date: </b>Wednesday, March 27, 2013 =
11:04 PM<br><b>To: </b>Piyush Jain &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:piyush@ditenity.co=
m">piyush@ditenity.com</a>&gt;, 'pkix' &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org"=
>pkix@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br><b>Subject: </b>Re: [pkix] URI Name Constraint an=
d URN<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'f=
ont-size:10.5pt;color:black'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p>=
</o:p></span></p></div><blockquote style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid #=
B5C4DF 4.5pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 4.0pt;margin-left:3.75pt;margin-top:5.0pt;=
margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt' id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQU=
OTE"><div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>David and=
 Piyush,</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=
=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'colo=
r:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1=
F497D'>Thanks.</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p c=
lass=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'=
color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'colo=
r:#1F497D'>I agree with you for the most part.&nbsp; But, the first sentenc=
e in that paragraph can be used to think otherwise: &#8220;</span><span sty=
le=3D'color:black'>For URIs, the constraint applies to the host part of the=
 name&#8221;.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'colo=
r:black'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'co=
lor:#1F497D'>Anyway, that is not my primary point.&nbsp; I think the URI sc=
hemes that cannot have host name component should be exempt from name const=
raint since there is nothing to constrain.</span><span style=3D'color:black=
'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>=
&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DM=
soNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>Today, we have actual certificates t=
hat have URN in them and rejecting them on the basis of upstream URI constr=
aints (which typically apply to URL) does not make sense to me. </span><spa=
n style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span st=
yle=3D'color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p><=
/span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>My question is=
 was that simply an oversight or is there a reason URN should be rejected.&=
nbsp; One could also argue when using URN scheme, the name is not hierarchi=
cal and there is no point in constraining it.</span><span style=3D'color:bl=
ack'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497=
D'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><div><div=
 style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in =
0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"T=
ahoma","sans-serif";color:black'>From:</span></b><span style=3D'font-size:1=
0.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif";color:black'> Piyush Jain [<a href=
=3D"mailto:piyush@ditenity.com">mailto:piyush@ditenity.com</a>] <br><b>Sent=
:</b> Tuesday, March 26, 2013 6:07 PM<br><b>To:</b> Santosh Chokhani; 'pkix=
'<br><b>Subject:</b> RE: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN</span><span sty=
le=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p class=3DMsoNormal><=
span style=3D'color:black'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal=
><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>From 5280</span><span style=3D'color:black'>=
<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;=
font-family:"Courier New";color:black'>(e.g., if the URI either</span><span=
 style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span sty=
le=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New";color:black'>&nbsp;&nbsp; =
does not include an authority component or includes an authority</span><spa=
n style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span st=
yle=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New";color:black'>&nbsp;&nbsp;=
 component in which the host name is specified as an IP address), then</spa=
n><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><s=
pan style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New";color:black'>&nbsp;=
&nbsp; the application MUST reject the certificate.</span><span style=3D'co=
lor:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:=
#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>It clearly says that if aut=
hority component is missing, certificate must be rejected.</span><span styl=
e=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D=
'color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span>=
</p><div style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0in 0in =
0in 4.0pt'><div><div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;pa=
dding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span style=3D'font-size:1=
0.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif";color:black'>From:</span></b><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif";color:black'> <=
/span><span style=3D'color:black'><a href=3D"mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org">=
<span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>pkix-bou=
nces@ietf.org</span></a></span><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:=
"Tahoma","sans-serif";color:black'> [</span><span style=3D'color:black'><a =
href=3D"mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org"><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-=
family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org</span></a></span=
><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif";color:bl=
ack'>] <b>On Behalf Of </b>Santosh Chokhani<br><b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, March =
26, 2013 2:47 PM<br><b>To:</b> 'pkix'<br><b>Subject:</b> [pkix] URI Name Co=
nstraint and URN</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></=
div></div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:black'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p=
></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:black'>I have been wr=
estling with what one should with a certificate if the SAN in the certifica=
te contains URN and when you get to the certificate, the name constraint st=
ate variable indicates permitted and/or excluded values for the URI name fo=
rm.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:black'>&=
nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:black'=
>I think name constraint is not applicable to URN since it does not have an=
 &#8220;authority&#8221; and thus &#8220;host&#8221; component by definitio=
n.&nbsp; Thus, regardless of the name constraint state variable, presence o=
f URN should not cause name constraint violation.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p c=
lass=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:black'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p><p=
 class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:black'>But, when I read 5280, I fin=
d the text implying otherwise or ambiguous.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=
=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:black'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p><p cla=
ss=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:black'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p><p c=
lass=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:black'>Santosh Chokhani<o:p></o:p></s=
pan></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:black'>CygnaCom Solutions=
, Inc.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:black=
'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div></div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;color:black'>____________________________________=
___________ pkix mailing list <a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.or=
g</a> <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix">https://www.ie=
tf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix</a> </span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></=
o:p></span></p></blockquote></div></div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D=
'font-size:10.5pt;color:black'>____________________________________________=
___ pkix mailing list <a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a> <a=
 href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix">https://www.ietf.org/m=
ailman/listinfo/pkix</a> <o:p></o:p></span></p></blockquote></div></body></=
html>=

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Subject: [pkix] I-D Action: draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-16.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts director=
ies.
 This draft is a work item of the Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) Working=
 Group of the IETF.

	Title           : X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certific=
ate Status Protocol - OCSP
	Author(s)       : Stefan Santesson
                          Michael Myers
                          Rich Ankney
                          Ambarish Malpani
                          Slava Galperin
                          Carlisle Adams
	Filename        : draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-16.txt
	Pages           : 43
	Date            : 2013-03-28

Abstract:
   This document specifies a protocol useful in determining the current
   status of a digital certificate without requiring CRLs. Additional
   mechanisms addressing PKIX operational requirements are specified in
   separate documents. This document obsoletes RFC 2560 and RFC 6277,
   and updates RFC 5912.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis

There's also a htmlized version available at:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-16

A diff from the previous version is available at:
http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-16


Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
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From: "Piyush Jain" <piyush@ditenity.com>
To: "'Santosh Chokhani'" <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>, "'Stefan Santesson'" <stefan@aaa-sec.com>, "'pkix'" <pkix@ietf.org>
References: <B83745DA469B7847811819C5005244AFF3DC9CA5@scygexch7.cygnacom.com> <CD7A2AA2.5F04F%stefan@aaa-sec.com> <B83745DA469B7847811819C5005244AFF3DC9CAB@scygexch7.cygnacom.com>
In-Reply-To: <B83745DA469B7847811819C5005244AFF3DC9CAB@scygexch7.cygnacom.com>
Date: Thu, 28 Mar 2013 10:37:52 -0700
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Subject: Re: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN
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Santosh,

 

I think I agree with you that constraining URN based on authority does not
make sense.

 

The text - "For URIs, the constraint applies to the host part of the name."
from 5280 indicates that the author assumed that URIs will always have the
authority component, which is a wrong assumption.
 

There may be some value in applying the constraint after using a resolver to
map the URN to a location, or constraining the namespace of the URN itself.


 

So here are the possible scenarios

1)      Constraint is a URL, name is URN. This is what you came across. It
does not make sense to apply authority constraints unless URN is resolved to
a URL

2)      Constraint is URN, name is URL. Not sure if this is useful at all.
5280 is silent on this.

3)      Constraint is URN, name is URN. It might be useful to define
matching rules for this scenario.

4)      Constraint is URL, name is URL. This is the only case 5280 handles
today.

 

-Piyush

 

From: Santosh Chokhani [mailto:SChokhani@cygnacom.com] 
Sent: Thursday, March 28, 2013 9:24 AM
To: Stefan Santesson; Piyush Jain; 'pkix'
Subject: RE: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN

 

Stefan,

 

URN by definition do not have "authority" component are not hierarchical.

 

You are simply parroting what 5280 says and not explaining what the use of
meaning of doing this is.

 

May be you should explain how an upstream CA will permit URN and still
constrain URL.

 

From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com] 
Sent: Thursday, March 28, 2013 12:22 PM
To: Santosh Chokhani; Piyush Jain; 'pkix'
Subject: Re: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN

 

Not all URN certificates.

 

Only certificates with a URN where a CA certificate in the current path has
provided a constraints for URI:s according to the standard as a
permittedSubtree constraint.

 

RFC 5280 states:

   The name constraints extension, which MUST be used only in a CA
   certificate, indicates a name space within which all subject names in
   subsequent certificates in a certification path MUST be located.

 

I simply can't see how "urn:com:contoso:whatever"  can be claimed to fit
within the permitted subtree constraint ".example.com"

 

If ".example.com" is an excluded subtree, then I have no problem accepting
the cert, because the URN is not excluded.

 

/Stefan

 

 

From: Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>
Date: Thursday, March 28, 2013 5:11 PM
To: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>, Piyush Jain
<piyush@ditenity.com>, 'pkix' <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN

 

Stefan,

 

So, even though constraining URN is meaningless, all URN certificates should
be rejected.   Did I get you right?

 

Make no sense at all to me.  May be you can explain why this is useful or
right aside from 5280 having missed the scenario.

 

From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com] 
Sent: Thursday, March 28, 2013 12:08 PM
To: Santosh Chokhani; Piyush Jain; 'pkix'
Subject: Re: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN

 

Santosh,

 

Clearly URN can't be expressed as a constraint.

If there is a constraint expressing .example.com and the SAN holds a URN
value, I'd say that this is a violation of that constraint.

 

/Stefan

 

From: Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>
Date: Wednesday, March 27, 2013 11:04 PM
To: Piyush Jain <piyush@ditenity.com>, 'pkix' <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN

 

David and Piyush,

 

Thanks.

 

I agree with you for the most part.  But, the first sentence in that
paragraph can be used to think otherwise: "For URIs, the constraint applies
to the host part of the name".

 

Anyway, that is not my primary point.  I think the URI schemes that cannot
have host name component should be exempt from name constraint since there
is nothing to constrain.

 

Today, we have actual certificates that have URN in them and rejecting them
on the basis of upstream URI constraints (which typically apply to URL) does
not make sense to me. 

 

My question is was that simply an oversight or is there a reason URN should
be rejected.  One could also argue when using URN scheme, the name is not
hierarchical and there is no point in constraining it.

 

From: Piyush Jain [mailto:piyush@ditenity.com] 
Sent: Tuesday, March 26, 2013 6:07 PM
To: Santosh Chokhani; 'pkix'
Subject: RE: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN

 

>From 5280

(e.g., if the URI either

   does not include an authority component or includes an authority

   component in which the host name is specified as an IP address), then

   the application MUST reject the certificate.

 

It clearly says that if authority component is missing, certificate must be
rejected.

 

From:  <mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org> pkix-bounces@ietf.org [
<mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org> mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
Santosh Chokhani
Sent: Tuesday, March 26, 2013 2:47 PM
To: 'pkix'
Subject: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN

 

I have been wrestling with what one should with a certificate if the SAN in
the certificate contains URN and when you get to the certificate, the name
constraint state variable indicates permitted and/or excluded values for the
URI name form.

 

I think name constraint is not applicable to URN since it does not have an
"authority" and thus "host" component by definition.  Thus, regardless of
the name constraint state variable, presence of URN should not cause name
constraint violation.

 

But, when I read 5280, I find the text implying otherwise or ambiguous.

 

 

Santosh Chokhani

CygnaCom Solutions, Inc.

 

_______________________________________________ pkix mailing list
pkix@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix 

_______________________________________________ pkix mailing list
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</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=3DEN-US link=3Dblue =
vlink=3Dpurple><div class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'>Santosh,<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>I think I agree with you =
that constraining URN based on authority does not make =
sense.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><pre><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D'>The text</span><span =
style=3D'font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'> &#8211; =
&#8220;</span><span style=3D'color:black'>For URIs, the constraint =
applies to the host part of the name.&#8221; </span><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D'>from 5280 indicates that the author assumed that URIs will always =
have the authority component, which is a wrong assumption</span><span =
style=3D'font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>.<o:p></o:p></=
span></pre><pre><span =
style=3D'color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></pre><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>There may be some value =
in applying the constraint after using a resolver to map the URN to a =
location, or constraining the namespace of the URN itself.&nbsp; =
<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>So here are the possible =
scenarios<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoListParagraph =
style=3D'text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1'><![if =
!supportLists]><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'><span =
style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>1)<span style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New =
Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
</span></span></span><![endif]><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>Constraint =
is a URL, name is URN. This is what you came across. It does not make =
sense to apply authority constraints unless URN is resolved to a =
URL<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoListParagraph =
style=3D'text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1'><![if =
!supportLists]><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'><span =
style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>2)<span style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New =
Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
</span></span></span><![endif]><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>Constraint =
is URN, name is URL. Not sure if this is useful at all. 5280 is silent =
on this.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoListParagraph =
style=3D'text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1'><![if =
!supportLists]><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'><span =
style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>3)<span style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New =
Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
</span></span></span><![endif]><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>Constraint =
is URN, name is URN. It might be useful to define matching rules for =
this scenario.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoListParagraph =
style=3D'text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1'><![if =
!supportLists]><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'><span =
style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>4)<span style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New =
Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
</span></span></span><![endif]><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>Constraint =
is URL, name is URL. This is the only case 5280 handles =
today.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'>-Piyush<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><div =
style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0in 0in 0in =
4.0pt'><div><div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF =
1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span>=
</b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> =
Santosh Chokhani [mailto:SChokhani@cygnacom.com] <br><b>Sent:</b> =
Thursday, March 28, 2013 9:24 AM<br><b>To:</b> Stefan Santesson; Piyush =
Jain; 'pkix'<br><b>Subject:</b> RE: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and =
URN<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'>Stefan,<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>URN by definition do not =
have &#8220;authority&#8221; component are not =
hierarchical.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>You are simply parroting =
what 5280 says and not explaining what the use of meaning of doing this =
is.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>May be you should =
explain how an upstream CA will permit URN and still constrain =
URL.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><div><div =
style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in =
0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span>=
</b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> =
Stefan Santesson <a =
href=3D"mailto:[mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com]">[mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com]</=
a> <br><b>Sent:</b> Thursday, March 28, 2013 12:22 PM<br><b>To:</b> =
Santosh Chokhani; Piyush Jain; 'pkix'<br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [pkix] URI =
Name Constraint and URN<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;color:black'>Not all URN =
certificates.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div>=
<div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;color:black'>Only certificates with a URN =
where a CA certificate in the current path has provided a constraints =
for URI:s according to the standard as a permittedSubtree =
constraint.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div>=
<div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;color:black'>RFC 5280 =
states:<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><pre =
style=3D'page-break-before:always'><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;color:black'>&nbsp;&nbsp; The name constraints =
extension, which MUST be used only in a CA<o:p></o:p></span></pre><pre =
style=3D'page-break-before:always'><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;color:black'> &nbsp;&nbsp;certificate, =
indicates a name space within which all <b>subject names =
in<o:p></o:p></b></span></pre><pre =
style=3D'page-break-before:always'><b><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;color:black'>&nbsp;&nbsp; subsequent =
certificates in a certification path MUST be located</span></b><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;color:black'>.<o:p></o:p></span></pre></div><di=
v><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div>=
<div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;color:black'>I =
simply can't see how &quot;urn:com:contoso:whatever&quot; &nbsp;can be =
claimed to fit within the permitted subtree constraint =
&quot;.example.com&quot;<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div>=
<div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;color:black'>If &quot;.example.com&quot; is an =
excluded subtree, then I have no problem accepting the cert, because the =
URN is not excluded.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div>=
<div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;color:black'>/Stefan<o:p></o:p></span></p></div=
><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div>=
<div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div>=
<div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt =
0in 0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span style=3D'color:black'>From: =
</span></b><span style=3D'color:black'>Santosh Chokhani &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:SChokhani@cygnacom.com">SChokhani@cygnacom.com</a>&gt;<br>=
<b>Date: </b>Thursday, March 28, 2013 5:11 PM<br><b>To: </b>Stefan =
Santesson &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com">stefan@aaa-sec.com</a>&gt;, Piyush =
Jain &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:piyush@ditenity.com">piyush@ditenity.com</a>&gt;, 'pkix' =
&lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br><b>Subject: =
</b>Re: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and =
URN<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div>=
<blockquote style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid #B5C4DF =
4.5pt;padding:0in 0in 0in =
4.0pt;margin-left:3.75pt;margin-top:5.0pt;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:=
5.0pt' id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"><div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>Stefan,</span><span =
style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><span =
style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'>So, even though constraining URN is meaningless, =
all URN certificates should be rejected.&nbsp;&nbsp; Did I get you =
right?</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><span =
style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'>Make no sense at all to me.&nbsp; May be you can =
explain why this is useful or right aside from 5280 having missed the =
scenario.</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><span =
style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><div><div =
style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in =
0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif";color:black'>=
From:</span></b><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif";color:black'>=
 Stefan Santesson [<a =
href=3D"mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com">mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com</a>] =
<br><b>Sent:</b> Thursday, March 28, 2013 12:08 PM<br><b>To:</b> Santosh =
Chokhani; Piyush Jain; 'pkix'<br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [pkix] URI Name =
Constraint and URN</span><span =
style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:black'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;color:black'>Santosh,</span><span =
style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;color:black'>&nbsp;</span><span =
style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;color:black'>Clearly =
URN can't be expressed as a constraint.</span><span =
style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;color:black'>If there =
is a constraint expressing .example.com and the SAN holds a URN value, =
I'd say that this is a violation of that constraint.</span><span =
style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;color:black'>&nbsp;</span><span =
style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;color:black'>/Stefan</span><span =
style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;color:black'>&nbsp;</span><span =
style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div =
style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in =
0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span style=3D'color:black'>From: =
</span></b><span style=3D'color:black'>Santosh Chokhani &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:SChokhani@cygnacom.com">SChokhani@cygnacom.com</a>&gt;<br>=
<b>Date: </b>Wednesday, March 27, 2013 11:04 PM<br><b>To: </b>Piyush =
Jain &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:piyush@ditenity.com">piyush@ditenity.com</a>&gt;, 'pkix' =
&lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br><b>Subject: =
</b>Re: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and =
URN<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;color:black'>&nbsp;</span><span =
style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><blockquote =
style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid #B5C4DF 4.5pt;padding:0in 0in 0in =
4.0pt;margin-left:3.75pt;margin-top:5.0pt;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:=
5.0pt' id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"><div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>David and =
Piyush,</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><span =
style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'>Thanks.</span><span =
style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><span =
style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'>I agree with you for the most part.&nbsp; But, =
the first sentence in that paragraph can be used to think otherwise: =
&#8220;</span><span style=3D'color:black'>For URIs, the constraint =
applies to the host part of the name&#8221;.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:black'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>Anyway, that is not my =
primary point.&nbsp; I think the URI schemes that cannot have host name =
component should be exempt from name constraint since there is nothing =
to constrain.</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><span =
style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'>Today, we have actual certificates that have URN =
in them and rejecting them on the basis of upstream URI constraints =
(which typically apply to URL) does not make sense to me. </span><span =
style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><span =
style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'>My question is was that simply an oversight or =
is there a reason URN should be rejected.&nbsp; One could also argue =
when using URN scheme, the name is not hierarchical and there is no =
point in constraining it.</span><span =
style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><span =
style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><div><div =
style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in =
0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif";color:black'>=
From:</span></b><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif";color:black'>=
 Piyush Jain [<a =
href=3D"mailto:piyush@ditenity.com">mailto:piyush@ditenity.com</a>] =
<br><b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, March 26, 2013 6:07 PM<br><b>To:</b> Santosh =
Chokhani; 'pkix'<br><b>Subject:</b> RE: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and =
URN</span><span =
style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:black'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>From 5280</span><span =
style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New";color:black'>(e.g., =
if the URI either</span><span =
style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier =
New";color:black'>&nbsp;&nbsp; does not include an authority component =
or includes an authority</span><span =
style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier =
New";color:black'>&nbsp;&nbsp; component in which the host name is =
specified as an IP address), then</span><span =
style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier =
New";color:black'>&nbsp;&nbsp; the application MUST reject the =
certificate.</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><span =
style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'>It clearly says that if authority component is =
missing, certificate must be rejected.</span><span =
style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><span =
style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><div =
style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0in 0in 0in =
4.0pt'><div><div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF =
1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif";color:black'>=
From:</span></b><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif";color:black'>=
 </span><span style=3D'color:black'><a =
href=3D"mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>pkix-bounces=
@ietf.org</span></a></span><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif";color:black'>=
 [</span><span style=3D'color:black'><a =
href=3D"mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org"><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>mailto:pkix-=
bounces@ietf.org</span></a></span><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif";color:black'>=
] <b>On Behalf Of </b>Santosh Chokhani<br><b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, March =
26, 2013 2:47 PM<br><b>To:</b> 'pkix'<br><b>Subject:</b> [pkix] URI Name =
Constraint and URN</span><span =
style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:black'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:black'>I have been wrestling with =
what one should with a certificate if the SAN in the certificate =
contains URN and when you get to the certificate, the name constraint =
state variable indicates permitted and/or excluded values for the URI =
name form.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:black'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:black'>I think name constraint is =
not applicable to URN since it does not have an &#8220;authority&#8221; =
and thus &#8220;host&#8221; component by definition.&nbsp; Thus, =
regardless of the name constraint state variable, presence of URN should =
not cause name constraint violation.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:black'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:black'>But, when I read 5280, I =
find the text implying otherwise or ambiguous.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:black'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:black'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:black'>Santosh =
Chokhani<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:black'>CygnaCom Solutions, Inc.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:black'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div></div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;color:black'>__________________________________=
_____________ pkix mailing list <a =
href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a> <a =
href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix">https://www.ietf.org/=
mailman/listinfo/pkix</a> </span><span =
style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></blockquote></div></div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.5pt;color:black'>__________________________________=
_____________ pkix mailing list <a =
href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a> <a =
href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix">https://www.ietf.org/=
mailman/listinfo/pkix</a> =
<o:p></o:p></span></p></blockquote></div></div></body></html>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN
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    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 03/28/2013 01:37 PM, Piyush Jain
      wrote:<br>
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      <div class="WordSection1">
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D">Santosh,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D">I think I agree
            with you that constraining URN based on authority does not
            make sense.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
        <pre><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">The text</span><span style="font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"> – “</span><span style="color:black">For URIs, the constraint applies to the host part of the name.” </span><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">from 5280 indicates that the author assumed that URIs will always have the authority component, which is a wrong assumption</span><span style="font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">.</span></pre>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    RFC 5280 says:<br>
    <blockquote>If a constraint is applied to the
      uniformResourceIdentifier name form and a subsequent certificate
      includes a subjectAltName extension with a
      uniformResourceIdentifier that does not include an authority
      component with a host name specified as a fully qualified domain
      name (e.g., if the <font color="#3333ff">URI either does not
        include an authority component</font> or includes an authority
      component in which the host name is specified as an IP address),
      then the application MUST reject the certificate.<br>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    This indicates quite clearly that the author did <b>not</b> assume
    that URIs will always have the authority component.<br>
    <br>
    See also
    <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/current/msg02179.html">http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/current/msg02179.html</a> ("RFC
    3280bis and URI schemes without hostname").<br>
    <br>
  </body>
</html>

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From: "Piyush Jain" <piyush@ditenity.com>
To: "'David A. Cooper'" <david.cooper@nist.gov>, "Santosh Chokhani" <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>
References: <B83745DA469B7847811819C5005244AFF3DC9CA5@scygexch7.cygnacom.com> <CD7A2AA2.5F04F%stefan@aaa-sec.com> <B83745DA469B7847811819C5005244AFF3DC9CAB@scygexch7.cygnacom.com> <000c01ce2bda$fadd38f0$f097aad0$@ditenity.com> <5154860B.7050900@nist.gov>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN
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My apologies to the author(s) for being presumptuous and thank David for
pointing to the discussion thread.

 

So it seems that WG consciously refrained from defining matching rules for
URNs. 

This implies if a CA has a permitted subtree constraint, any descendent
certificate cannot have a URN name. Seems like a limitation which cannot be
addressed without defining matching rules for URNs.

 

From: David A. Cooper [mailto:david.cooper@nist.gov] 
Sent: Thursday, March 28, 2013 11:04 AM
To: Piyush Jain
Cc: 'pkix'
Subject: Re: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN

 

On 03/28/2013 01:37 PM, Piyush Jain wrote:

Santosh,

 

I think I agree with you that constraining URN based on authority does not
make sense.

 

The text - "For URIs, the constraint applies to the host part of the name."
from 5280 indicates that the author assumed that URIs will always have the
authority component, which is a wrong assumption.


RFC 5280 says:

If a constraint is applied to the uniformResourceIdentifier name form and a
subsequent certificate includes a subjectAltName extension with a
uniformResourceIdentifier that does not include an authority component with
a host name specified as a fully qualified domain name (e.g., if the URI
either does not include an authority component or includes an authority
component in which the host name is specified as an IP address), then the
application MUST reject the certificate.


This indicates quite clearly that the author did not assume that URIs will
always have the authority component.

See also http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/current/msg02179.html
("RFC 3280bis and URI schemes without hostname").


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</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body bgcolor=3Dwhite =
lang=3DEN-US link=3Dblue vlink=3Dpurple><div class=3DWordSection1><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>My apologies to the =
author(s) for being presumptuous and thank David for pointing to the =
discussion thread.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>So it seems that WG =
consciously refrained from defining matching rules for URNs. =
<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'>This implies if a CA has a permitted subtree =
constraint, any descendent certificate cannot have a URN name. Seems =
like a limitation which cannot be addressed without defining matching =
rules for URNs.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><div =
style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0in 0in 0in =
4.0pt'><div><div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF =
1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif";color:windowt=
ext'>From:</span></b><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif";color:windowt=
ext'> David A. Cooper [mailto:david.cooper@nist.gov] <br><b>Sent:</b> =
Thursday, March 28, 2013 11:04 AM<br><b>To:</b> Piyush =
Jain<br><b>Cc:</b> 'pkix'<br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [pkix] URI Name =
Constraint and URN<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>On =
03/28/2013 01:37 PM, Piyush Jain wrote:<o:p></o:p></p></div><blockquote =
style=3D'margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt'><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'>Santosh,</span><o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>I think I agree with you =
that constraining URN based on authority does not make =
sense.</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p><pre><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D'>The text</span><span =
style=3D'font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'> &#8211; =
&#8220;</span>For URIs, the constraint applies to the host part of the =
name.&#8221; <span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D'>from 5280 indicates that the author assumed that URIs will always =
have the authority component, which is a wrong assumption</span><span =
style=3D'font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>.</span><o:p><=
/o:p></pre></blockquote><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"'><br>RFC =
5280 says:<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"'>If a =
constraint is applied to the uniformResourceIdentifier name form and a =
subsequent certificate includes a subjectAltName extension with a =
uniformResourceIdentifier that does not include an authority component =
with a host name specified as a fully qualified domain name (e.g., if =
the </span><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New =
Roman","serif";color:#3333FF'>URI either does not include an authority =
component</span><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New =
Roman","serif"'> or includes an authority component in which the host =
name is specified as an IP address), then the application MUST reject =
the certificate.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'margin-bottom:12.0pt'><span =
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New =
Roman","serif"'><br>This indicates quite clearly that the author did =
<b>not</b> assume that URIs will always have the authority =
component.<br><br>See also <a =
href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/current/msg02179.html">=
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/current/msg02179.html</a> =
(&quot;RFC 3280bis and URI schemes without =
hostname&quot;).<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div></body></html>
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From: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
To: Piyush Jain <piyush@ditenity.com>, "'David A. Cooper'" <david.cooper@nist.gov>, Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN
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Subject: Re: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN
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So perhaps the problem is there's no way to apply a single NC rule to URIs
since the sub-types of URIs conflict in how names are constructed.  I.e.,
the right fix is to discard the URI type and treat the sub-type of URLs
and URNs separately.  This would permit separate NC processing for each,
which seems to be what Santosh is asking for.

-- T

On 3/28/13 1:49 PM, "Piyush Jain" <piyush@ditenity.com> wrote:

>My apologies to the author(s) for being presumptuous and thank David for
>pointing to the discussion thread.
>=20
>So it seems that WG consciously refrained from defining matching rules
>for URNs.
>
>This implies if a CA has a permitted subtree constraint, any descendent
>certificate cannot have a URN name. Seems like a limitation which cannot
>be addressed without defining matching rules for URNs.
>=20
>From: David A. Cooper [mailto:david.cooper@nist.gov]
>
>Sent: Thursday, March 28, 2013 11:04 AM
>To: Piyush Jain
>Cc: 'pkix'
>Subject: Re: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN
>
>
>=20
>On 03/28/2013 01:37 PM, Piyush Jain wrote:
>
>
>Santosh,
>=20
>I think I agree with you that constraining URN based on authority does
>not make sense.
>=20
>The text =AD =B3For URIs, the constraint applies to the host part of the
>name.=B2 from 5280 indicates that the author assumed that URIs will always
>have the authority component, which is a wrong assumption.
>
>
>RFC 5280 says:
>If a constraint is applied to the uniformResourceIdentifier name form and
>a subsequent certificate includes a subjectAltName extension with a
>uniformResourceIdentifier
> that does not include an authority component with a host name specified
>as a fully qualified domain name (e.g., if the
>URI either does not include an authority component or includes an
>authority component in which
> the host name is specified as an IP address), then the application MUST
>reject the certificate.
>
>This indicates quite clearly that the author did not assume that URIs
>will always have the authority component.
>
>See also=20
>http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/current/msg02179.html
><http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/current/msg02179.html> ("RFC
>3280bis and URI schemes without hostname").
>
>


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From: "Piyush Jain" <piyush@ditenity.com>
To: "'Miller, Timothy J.'" <tmiller@mitre.org>, "'David A. Cooper'" <david.cooper@nist.gov>, "'Santosh Chokhani'" <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>
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Cc: 'pkix' <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN
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Yes. Applying location constraints to URNs is the problem which must be
fixed.
Defining processing rules for URN constrains is probably nice to have.

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Miller, Timothy J. [mailto:tmiller@mitre.org]
> Sent: Friday, March 29, 2013 6:27 AM
> To: Piyush Jain; 'David A. Cooper'; Santosh Chokhani
> Cc: 'pkix'
> Subject: Re: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN
>=20
> So perhaps the problem is there's no way to apply a single NC rule to =
URIs
> since the sub-types of URIs conflict in how names are constructed.  =
I.e.,
the
> right fix is to discard the URI type and treat the sub-type of URLs =
and
URNs
> separately.  This would permit separate NC processing for each, which
seems
> to be what Santosh is asking for.
>=20
> -- T
>=20
> On 3/28/13 1:49 PM, "Piyush Jain" <piyush@ditenity.com> wrote:
>=20
> >My apologies to the author(s) for being presumptuous and thank David
> >for pointing to the discussion thread.
> >
> >So it seems that WG consciously refrained from defining matching =
rules
> >for URNs.
> >
> >This implies if a CA has a permitted subtree constraint, any =
descendent
> >certificate cannot have a URN name. Seems like a limitation which
> >cannot be addressed without defining matching rules for URNs.
> >
> >From: David A. Cooper [mailto:david.cooper@nist.gov]
> >
> >Sent: Thursday, March 28, 2013 11:04 AM
> >To: Piyush Jain
> >Cc: 'pkix'
> >Subject: Re: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN
> >
> >
> >
> >On 03/28/2013 01:37 PM, Piyush Jain wrote:
> >
> >
> >Santosh,
> >
> >I think I agree with you that constraining URN based on authority =
does
> >not make sense.
> >
> >The text =AD =B3For URIs, the constraint applies to the host part of =
the
> >name.=B2 from 5280 indicates that the author assumed that URIs will
> >always have the authority component, which is a wrong assumption.
> >
> >
> >RFC 5280 says:
> >If a constraint is applied to the uniformResourceIdentifier name form
> >and a subsequent certificate includes a subjectAltName extension with =
a
> >uniformResourceIdentifier  that does not include an authority =
component
> >with a host name specified as a fully qualified domain name (e.g., if
> >the URI either does not include an authority component or includes an
> >authority component in which  the host name is specified as an IP
> >address), then the application MUST reject the certificate.
> >
> >This indicates quite clearly that the author did not assume that URIs
> >will always have the authority component.
> >
> >See also
> >http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/current/msg02179.html
> ><http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/current/msg02179.html>
> ("RFC
> >3280bis and URI schemes without hostname").
> >
> >



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From: Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>
To: "David A. Cooper" <david.cooper@nist.gov>, Piyush Jain <piyush@ditenity.com>
Date: Fri, 29 Mar 2013 12:28:25 -0400
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David,


1.       Can you explain what harm is does to accept a certificate if the u=
pstream CA has URL constrained?


2.       Can you explain how a CA that wishes to constrain URL, but permit =
URN would do so.  Note that this is a real scenario as you know?



3.       Note that SAN description in 5280 already require FQDN for the hos=
t for URI that require authority.  So, why are you hung up on the text in 5=
280 which most likely did not consider URN scenario.  If it did, please exp=
lain why a name constraint is meaningful to URN which not a hierarchical na=
me in the first place.



4.       I read the post you sent below and I read it as supporting what I =
am saying.  Do not constrain the URI that cannot have authority component t=
o it.

"* Decide that this name type is not appropriate for URI schemes that tend =
not to use authorities.

* Relax the rules.  I strongly urge the WG not to take on the task of name =
constraints for URIs without authority in this document."



From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Dav=
id A. Cooper
Sent: Thursday, March 28, 2013 2:04 PM
To: Piyush Jain
Cc: 'pkix'
Subject: Re: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN

On 03/28/2013 01:37 PM, Piyush Jain wrote:
Santosh,

I think I agree with you that constraining URN based on authority does not =
make sense.


The text - "For URIs, the constraint applies to the host part of the name."=
 from 5280 indicates that the author assumed that URIs will always have the=
 authority component, which is a wrong assumption.

RFC 5280 says:
If a constraint is applied to the uniformResourceIdentifier name form and a=
 subsequent certificate includes a subjectAltName extension with a uniformR=
esourceIdentifier that does not include an authority component with a host =
name specified as a fully qualified domain name (e.g., if the URI either do=
es not include an authority component or includes an authority component in=
 which the host name is specified as an IP address), then the application M=
UST reject the certificate.

This indicates quite clearly that the author did not assume that URIs will =
always have the authority component.

See also http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/current/msg02179.html ("=
RFC 3280bis and URI schemes without hostname").

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--></style><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<o:shapedefaults v:ext=3D"edit" spidmax=3D"1026" />
</xml><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<o:shapelayout v:ext=3D"edit">
<o:idmap v:ext=3D"edit" data=3D"1" />
</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body bgcolor=3Dwhite lang=3DEN-US=
 link=3Dblue vlink=3Dpurple><div class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal>=
<span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>David,<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNor=
mal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMs=
oListParagraph style=3D'text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1'><![if !=
supportLists]><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'><span style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'=
>1.<span style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp; </span></span></span><![endif]><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>Can =
you explain what harm is does to accept a certificate if the upstream CA ha=
s URL constrained?<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D=
'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoListParagraph sty=
le=3D'text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1'><![if !supportLists]><spa=
n style=3D'color:#1F497D'><span style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>2.<span style=3D'=
font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span><=
/span></span><![endif]><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>Can you explain how a =
CA that wishes to constrain URL, but permit URN would do so.&nbsp; Note tha=
t this is a real scenario as you know?<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoL=
istParagraph><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p c=
lass=3DMsoListParagraph style=3D'text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1=
'><![if !supportLists]><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'><span style=3D'mso-lis=
t:Ignore'>3.<span style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span></span></span><![endif]><span style=3D'color:#1F4=
97D'>Note that SAN description in 5280 already require FQDN for the host fo=
r URI that require authority.&nbsp; So, why are you hung up on the text in =
5280 which most likely did not consider URN scenario.&nbsp; If it did, plea=
se explain why a name constraint is meaningful to URN which not a hierarchi=
cal name in the first place.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoListParagra=
ph><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMso=
ListParagraph style=3D'text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1'><![if !s=
upportLists]><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'><span style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>=
4.<span style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp; </span></span></span><![endif]><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>I rea=
d the post you sent below and I read it as supporting what I am saying.&nbs=
p; Do not constrain the URI that cannot have authority component to it.<o:p=
></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&=
nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;=
font-family:"Courier New";color:windowtext'>&#8220;* Decide that this name =
type is not appropriate for URI schemes that tend not to use authorities.&n=
bsp; <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10=
.0pt;font-family:"Courier New";color:windowtext'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></=
p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier=
 New";color:windowtext'>* Relax the rules.&nbsp; I strongly urge the WG not=
 to take on the task of name constraints for URIs without authority in this=
 document.&#8221;<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'=
font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New";color:windowtext'><o:p>&nbsp;</o=
:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp=
;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&=
nbsp;</o:p></span></p><div><div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4=
DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span style=3D'=
font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif";color:windowtext'>From:<=
/span></b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"=
;color:windowtext'> pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] <b=
>On Behalf Of </b>David A. Cooper<br><b>Sent:</b> Thursday, March 28, 2013 =
2:04 PM<br><b>To:</b> Piyush Jain<br><b>Cc:</b> 'pkix'<br><b>Subject:</b> R=
e: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p c=
lass=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>On 03/28/20=
13 01:37 PM, Piyush Jain wrote:<o:p></o:p></p></div><blockquote style=3D'ma=
rgin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt'><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'col=
or:#1F497D'>Santosh,</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=
=3D'color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span s=
tyle=3D'color:#1F497D'>I think I agree with you that constraining URN based=
 on authority does not make sense.</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNorma=
l><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p><pre><span styl=
e=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>The=
 text</span><span style=3D'font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D=
'> &#8211; &#8220;</span>For URIs, the constraint applies to the host part =
of the name.&#8221; <span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","=
sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>from 5280 indicates that the author assumed that=
 URIs will always have the authority component, which is a wrong assumption=
</span><span style=3D'font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>.</=
span><o:p></o:p></pre></blockquote><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font=
-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"'><br>RFC 5280 says:<o:p>=
</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-=
family:"Times New Roman","serif"'>If a constraint is applied to the uniform=
ResourceIdentifier name form and a subsequent certificate includes a subjec=
tAltName extension with a uniformResourceIdentifier that does not include a=
n authority component with a host name specified as a fully qualified domai=
n name (e.g., if the </span><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Ti=
mes New Roman","serif";color:#3333FF'>URI either does not include an author=
ity component</span><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New =
Roman","serif"'> or includes an authority component in which the host name =
is specified as an IP address), then the application MUST reject the certif=
icate.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-bottom:12.=
0pt'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"'=
><br>This indicates quite clearly that the author did <b>not</b> assume tha=
t URIs will always have the authority component.<br><br>See also <a href=3D=
"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/current/msg02179.html">http://ww=
w.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/current/msg02179.html</a> (&quot;RFC 3280b=
is and URI schemes without hostname&quot;).<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></bo=
dy></html>=

--_000_B83745DA469B7847811819C5005244AFF3DC9D2Escygexch7cygnac_--

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From: Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>
To: Piyush Jain <piyush@ditenity.com>, "'Miller, Timothy J.'" <tmiller@mitre.org>, "'David A. Cooper'" <david.cooper@nist.gov>
Date: Fri, 29 Mar 2013 12:29:26 -0400
Thread-Topic: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN
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Subject: Re: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN
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There is nothing to constrain when URN is UUID.

-----Original Message-----
From: Piyush Jain [mailto:piyush@ditenity.com]=20
Sent: Friday, March 29, 2013 12:22 PM
To: 'Miller, Timothy J.'; 'David A. Cooper'; Santosh Chokhani
Cc: 'pkix'
Subject: RE: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN

Yes. Applying location constraints to URNs is the problem which must be fix=
ed.
Defining processing rules for URN constrains is probably nice to have.

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Miller, Timothy J. [mailto:tmiller@mitre.org]
> Sent: Friday, March 29, 2013 6:27 AM
> To: Piyush Jain; 'David A. Cooper'; Santosh Chokhani
> Cc: 'pkix'
> Subject: Re: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN
>=20
> So perhaps the problem is there's no way to apply a single NC rule to=20
> URIs since the sub-types of URIs conflict in how names are=20
> constructed.  I.e.,
the
> right fix is to discard the URI type and treat the sub-type of URLs=20
> and
URNs
> separately.  This would permit separate NC processing for each, which
seems
> to be what Santosh is asking for.
>=20
> -- T
>=20
> On 3/28/13 1:49 PM, "Piyush Jain" <piyush@ditenity.com> wrote:
>=20
> >My apologies to the author(s) for being presumptuous and thank David=20
> >for pointing to the discussion thread.
> >
> >So it seems that WG consciously refrained from defining matching=20
> >rules for URNs.
> >
> >This implies if a CA has a permitted subtree constraint, any=20
> >descendent certificate cannot have a URN name. Seems like a=20
> >limitation which cannot be addressed without defining matching rules for=
 URNs.
> >
> >From: David A. Cooper [mailto:david.cooper@nist.gov]
> >
> >Sent: Thursday, March 28, 2013 11:04 AM
> >To: Piyush Jain
> >Cc: 'pkix'
> >Subject: Re: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN
> >
> >
> >
> >On 03/28/2013 01:37 PM, Piyush Jain wrote:
> >
> >
> >Santosh,
> >
> >I think I agree with you that constraining URN based on authority=20
> >does not make sense.
> >
> >The text =AD =B3For URIs, the constraint applies to the host part of the=
=20
> >name.=B2 from 5280 indicates that the author assumed that URIs will=20
> >always have the authority component, which is a wrong assumption.
> >
> >
> >RFC 5280 says:
> >If a constraint is applied to the uniformResourceIdentifier name form=20
> >and a subsequent certificate includes a subjectAltName extension with=20
> >a uniformResourceIdentifier  that does not include an authority=20
> >component with a host name specified as a fully qualified domain name=20
> >(e.g., if the URI either does not include an authority component or=20
> >includes an authority component in which  the host name is specified=20
> >as an IP address), then the application MUST reject the certificate.
> >
> >This indicates quite clearly that the author did not assume that URIs=20
> >will always have the authority component.
> >
> >See also
> >http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/current/msg02179.html
> ><http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/current/msg02179.html>
> ("RFC
> >3280bis and URI schemes without hostname").
> >
> >



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From: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>
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From:  Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>
Date:  Thursday, March 28, 2013 5:24 PM
To:  Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>, Piyush Jain
<piyush@ditenity.com>, 'pkix' <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject:  Re: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN

>=20
> Stefan,
> =20
> URN by definition do not have =B3authority=B2 component are not hierarchical.
> =20
> You are simply parroting what 5280 says and not explaining what the use o=
f
> meaning of doing this is.
> =20
> May be you should explain how an upstream CA will permit URN and still
> constrain URL.

I wish I could but I can't. Not given the current definition of name
constraints.

If you contrain URL in permitted subtree, I can't see given the current
standard, how you could allow a URN as matching that constraint.
Other than of course stick it into a new otherName instead of the SAN URI.

Maybe that would be your best bet as you in any case can't rely on standard
client behaviour to handle this.

/Stefan



--B_3447423012_2324243
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<html><head></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: s=
pace; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-size:=
 14px; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; "><div><span style=3D"font-family: Ca=
libri; font-size: 11pt; text-align: left; font-weight: bold; ">From: </span>=
<span style=3D"font-family: Calibri; font-size: 11pt; text-align: left; "> San=
tosh Chokhani &lt;</span><a href=3D"mailto:SChokhani@cygnacom.com" style=3D"font=
-family: Calibri; font-size: 11pt; text-align: left; ">SChokhani@cygnacom.co=
m</a><span style=3D"font-family: Calibri; font-size: 11pt; text-align: left; "=
>&gt;</span></div><span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION"><div style=3D"font-family:Ca=
libri; font-size:11pt; text-align:left; color:black; BORDER-BOTTOM: medium n=
one; BORDER-LEFT: medium none; PADDING-BOTTOM: 0in; PADDING-LEFT: 0in; PADDI=
NG-RIGHT: 0in; BORDER-TOP: #b5c4df 1pt solid; BORDER-RIGHT: medium none; PAD=
DING-TOP: 3pt"><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">Date: </span> Thursday, March =
28, 2013 5:24 PM<br><span style=3D"font-weight:bold">To: </span> Stefan Santes=
son &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com">stefan@aaa-sec.com</a>&gt;, Piyu=
sh Jain &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:piyush@ditenity.com">piyush@ditenity.com</a>&gt;=
, 'pkix' &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br><span s=
tyle=3D"font-weight:bold">Subject: </span> Re: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and =
URN<br></div><div><br></div><blockquote id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUO=
TE" style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5 solid; PADDING:0 0 0 5; MARGIN:0 0 0 5;"><=
p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 11pt; font-f=
amily: Calibri, sans-serif; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-style: normal; font-va=
riant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: nor=
mal; orphans: 2; text-align: -webkit-auto; text-indent: 0px; text-transform:=
 none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-size-=
adjust: auto; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; "><span style=3D"color: rgb(31, =
73, 125); ">Stefan,<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin:=
 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; color:=
 rgb(0, 0, 0); font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal=
; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: -webk=
it-auto; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows=
: 2; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; -webkit-text-stroke-=
width: 0px; "><span style=3D"color: rgb(31, 73, 125); "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></spa=
n></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 11pt;=
 font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-style: normal; =
font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-heig=
ht: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: -webkit-auto; text-indent: 0px; text-tra=
nsform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-tex=
t-size-adjust: auto; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; "><span style=3D"color: r=
gb(31, 73, 125); ">URN by definition do not have &#8220;authority&#8221; com=
ponent are not hierarchical.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=
=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-seri=
f; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weigh=
t: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-ali=
gn: -webkit-auto; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: norma=
l; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; -webkit-tex=
t-stroke-width: 0px; "><span style=3D"color: rgb(31, 73, 125); "><o:p>&nbsp;</=
o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-si=
ze: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-style:=
 normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: -webkit-auto; text-indent: 0px;=
 text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; -w=
ebkit-text-size-adjust: auto; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; "><span style=3D=
"color: rgb(31, 73, 125); ">You are simply parroting what 5280 says and not =
explaining what the use of meaning of doing this is.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p=
 class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 11pt; font-fa=
mily: Calibri, sans-serif; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-style: normal; font-var=
iant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: norm=
al; orphans: 2; text-align: -webkit-auto; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: =
none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-size-a=
djust: auto; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; "><span style=3D"color: rgb(31, 7=
3, 125); "><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin: 0=
in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; color: r=
gb(0, 0, 0); font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; =
letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: -webkit=
-auto; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: =
2; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; -webkit-text-stroke-wi=
dth: 0px; "><span style=3D"color: rgb(31, 73, 125); ">May be you should explai=
n how an upstream CA will permit URN and still constrain URL.</span></p></bl=
ockquote></span><div><br></div><div>I wish I could but I can't. Not given th=
e current definition of name constraints.</div><div><br></div><div>If you co=
ntrain URL in permitted subtree, I can't see given the current standard, how=
 you could allow a URN as matching that constraint.</div><div>Other than of =
course stick it into a new otherName instead of the SAN URI.</div><div><br><=
/div><div>Maybe that would be your best bet as you in any case can't rely on=
 standard client behaviour to handle this.</div><div><br></div><div>/Stefan<=
/div></body></html>

--B_3447423012_2324243--



From david.black@emc.com  Thu Mar 28 16:16:42 2013
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From: "Black, David" <david.black@emc.com>
To: "Black, David" <david.black@emc.com>, "sts@aaa-sec.com" <sts@aaa-sec.com>,  "mmyers@fastq.com" <mmyers@fastq.com>, "ambarish@gmail.com" <ambarish@gmail.com>, "slava.galperin@gmail.com" <slava.galperin@gmail.com>, "cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca" <cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca>, "gen-art@ietf.org" <gen-art@ietf.org>
Date: Thu, 28 Mar 2013 19:15:53 -0400
Thread-Topic: Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-16
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Cc: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>, "ietf@ietf.org" <ietf@ietf.org>, "Black, David" <david.black@emc.com>
Subject: [pkix] Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-16
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The -16 version of this draft resolves all of the concerns raised by the
Gen-ART review of the -15 version.

Thanks,
--David

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Black, David
> Sent: Monday, March 25, 2013 8:26 PM
> To: sts@aaa-sec.com; mmyers@fastq.com; ambarish@gmail.com;
> slava.galperin@gmail.com; cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca; gen-art@ietf.org
> Cc: Black, David; pkix@ietf.org; Sean Turner; ietf@ietf.org
> Subject: Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
>=20
> Authors,
>=20
> I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on Gen-=
ART,
> please
> see the FAQ at <http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.
>=20
> Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments you=
 may
> receive.
>=20
> Document: draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
> Reviewer: David L. Black
> Review Date: March 25, 2013
> IETF LC End Date: March 27, 2013
>=20
> Summary:
> This draft is on the right track but has open issues, described in the re=
view.
>=20
> This draft updates the OCSP protocol for obtaining certificate status
> with some minor extensions.
>=20
> Because this is a "bis" draft, I reviewed the diffs against RFC 2560.
>=20
> I did not check the ASN.1.  I also did not see a writeup for this draft
> in the data tracker, and so will rely on the document shepherd to
> ensure that the ASN.1 has been checked when the writeup is prepared.
>=20
> I found five open issues, all of which are minor, plus one idnits item
> that is probably ok, but should be double-checked.
>=20
> Minor issues:
>=20
> [1] Section 2.2:
>=20
> 	NOTE: The "revoked" state for known non-issued certificate serial
> 		numbers is allowed in order to reduce the risk of relying
> 		parties using CRLs as a fall back mechanism, which would be
> 		considerably higher if an "unknown" response was returned.
>=20
> Given this explanation, I'm surprised that the use of "revoked" instead o=
f
> "unknown" for a known non-issued certificate is a "MAY" requirement and
> not a "SHOULD" requirement.  Why is that the case?
>=20
> It appears that the reason is that the use of "revoked" in this situation
> may be dangerous when serial numbers can be predicted for certificates th=
at
> will be issued in the future.  If that's what's going on, this concern is
> already explained in the security considerations section, but it should
> also be mentioned here for completeness.
>=20
> [2] Section 4.2.2.2:
>=20
> 	The key that signs a certificate's status information need not be the
> 	same key that signed the certificate. It is necessary however to
> 	ensure that the entity signing this information is authorized to do
> 	so.  Therefore, a certificate's issuer MAY either sign the OCSP
> 	responses itself or it MAY explicitly designate this authority to
> 	another entity.
>=20
> The two instances of "MAY" in the above text were both "MUST" in RFC 2560=
.
>=20
> The RFC 2560 text construction of "MUST" or "MUST" is a bit odd, but the =
two
> "MAY"s in this draft are even worse, as they allow "MAY do something else
> entirely", despite being enclosed in an either-or construct.  I strongly
> suspect that the latter was not intended, so the following would be clear=
er:
>=20
> 	The key that signs a certificate's status information need not be the
> 	same key that signed the certificate. It is necessary however to
> 	ensure that the entity signing this information is authorized to do
> 	so.  Therefore, a certificate's issuer MUST do one of the following:
> 		- sign the OCSP responses itself, or
> 		- explicitly designate this authority to another entity.
>=20
> [3] Section 4.3:
>=20
> Is the "SHOULD" requirement still appropriate for the DSA with SHA-1 comb=
o
> (vs. a "MAY" requirement)?  This requirement was a "MUST" in RFC 2560, bu=
t
> I wonder about actual usage of DSA in practice.
>=20
> [4] Section 5, last paragraph:
>=20
> 	Responding a "revoked" state to certificate that has never been
> 	issued may enable someone to obtain a revocation response for a
> 	certificate that is not yet issued, but soon will be issued, if the
> 	CA issues certificates using sequential certificate serial number
> 	assignment.
>=20
> The above text after starting with the "if" is too narrow - it should say=
:
>=20
> 	if the certificate serial number of the certificate that
> 	will be issued can be predicted or guessed by the requester.
> 	Such prediction is easy for a CA that issues certificates
> 	using sequential certificate serial number assignment.
>=20
> There's also a nit in original text - its first line should be:
>=20
> 	Responding with a "revoked" state for a certificate that has never been
>=20
> [5] Section 5.1.1:
>=20
> 	In archival applications it is quite possible that an OCSP responder
> 	might be asked to report the validity of a certificate on a date in
> 	the distant past. Such a certificate might employ a signing method
> 	that is no longer considered acceptably secure. In such
> 	circumstances the responder MUST NOT generate a signature using a
> 	signing mechanism that is not considered acceptably secure.
>=20
> This could use an additional warning that certificate archival should
> not rely solely on signatures in archived certificates for ensuring the
> validity and integrity of the archived certificates because the signature
> algorithm(s) may transition to no longer being considered acceptably
> secure at some point after the certificates are archived.
>=20
> Nits:
>=20
> idnits 2.12.15 said:
>=20
>   -- The document seems to lack a disclaimer for pre-RFC5378 work, but ma=
y
>      have content which was first submitted before 10 November 2008.  If =
you
>      have contacted all the original authors and they are all willing to =
grant
>      the BCP78 rights to the IETF Trust, then this is fine, and you can i=
gnore
>      this comment.  If not, you may need to add the pre-RFC5378 disclaime=
r.
>      (See the Legal Provisions document at
>      http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info for more information.)
>=20
> This looks like it's ok because all the authors of RFC 2560 are also auth=
ors
> of
> this draft, but it should be double-checked.
>=20
> Thanks,
> --David
> ----------------------------------------------------
> David L. Black, Distinguished Engineer
> EMC Corporation, 176 South St., Hopkinton, MA=A0 01748
> +1 (508) 293-7953=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 FAX: +1 (508) 293-7=
786
> david.black@emc.com=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 Mobile: +1 (978) 394-7754
> ----------------------------------------------------
>=20


From piyush@ditenity.com  Fri Mar 29 09:17:16 2013
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From: "Piyush Jain" <piyush@ditenity.com>
To: "'Stefan Santesson'" <stefan@aaa-sec.com>, "'Black, David'" <david.black@emc.com>, <sts@aaa-sec.com>, <mmyers@fastq.com>, <ambarish@gmail.com>, <slava.galperin@gmail.com>, <cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca>, <gen-art@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
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' "revoked" status is still optional in this context in order to maintain
backwards compatibility with deployments of RFC 2560.'

I fail to understand this statement about backward compatibility.
 How does "revoked" being "optional/required breaks backward compatibility?
The only reason cited in the WG discussions to use revoked for "not-issued"
was that any other approach would break backward compatibility with legacy
clients. And now the draft says that revoked is optional because making it
required won't be backward compatible.

And it gives the impression that best course of action for 2560bis
responders is to start issuing revoked for "not-issued", which is far from
the originally stated goal to provide a way for CAs to be able to return
revoked for such serial numbers.

-Piyush

> -----Original Message-----
> From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
> Stefan Santesson
> Sent: Thursday, March 28, 2013 3:34 AM
> To: Black, David; sts@aaa-sec.com; mmyers@fastq.com;
> ambarish@gmail.com; slava.galperin@gmail.com; cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca;
> gen-art@ietf.org
> Cc: pkix@ietf.org; ietf@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [pkix] Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
> 
> I have given this a go by expanding the note as follows:
> 
> NOTE: The "revoked" state for known non-issued certificate serial
>          numbers is allowed in order to reduce the risk of relying
>          parties using CRLs as a fall back mechanism, which would be
>          considerably higher if an "unknown" response was returned. The
>          "revoked" status is still optional in this context in order to
>          maintain backwards compatibility with deployments of RFC 2560.
>          For example, the responder may not have any knowledge about
>          whether a requested serial number has been assigned to any
>          issued certificate, or the responder may provide pre produced
>          responses in accordance with RFC 5019 and, for that reason, is
>          not capable of providing a signed response for all non-issued
>          certificate serial numbers.
> 
> 
> Does this solve you issue.
> I think this is as far as dare to go without risking a heated debate.
> 
> /Stefan
> 
> 
> On 3/27/13 5:08 PM, "Black, David" <david.black@emc.com> wrote:
> 
> >Stefan,
> >
> >> Is this important enough to do that?
> >
> >IMHO, yes - the "running code" aspects of existing responder
> >behavior/limitations are definitely important enough for an RFC like
> >this that revises a protocol spec, and the alternatives to "revoked"
> >feel like an important complement to those aspects (discussion what to
> >do instead when responder behavior/limitations are encountered).
> >
> >I appreciate the level of work that may be involved in capturing this,
> >as I've had my share of contentious discussions in WGs that I chair -
> >FWIW, I'm currently chairing my 4th and 5th WGs.  OTOH, when a WG has
> >put that much time/effort into reaching a (compromise) decision, it
> >really is valuable to record why the decision was reached to avoid
> >recovering that ground in the future and (specific to this situation)
> >to give implementers some more context/information on how the protocol
> >is likely to work in practice.
> >
> >Thanks,
> >--David
> >
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com]
> >> Sent: Wednesday, March 27, 2013 11:38 AM
> >> To: Black, David; sts@aaa-sec.com; mmyers@fastq.com;
> >> ambarish@gmail.com; slava.galperin@gmail.com;
> cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca;
> >> gen-art@ietf.org
> >> Cc: pkix@ietf.org; Sean Turner; ietf@ietf.org
> >> Subject: Re: Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
> >>
> >> I could.
> >>
> >> My worry is just that this is such a contentious subject and it took
> >>us x  hundreds of emails to reach this state, that if I add more
> >>explanations,  people will start disagreeing with it and that we end
> >>up in a long debate  on how to correctly express this.
> >>
> >> Is this important enough to do that?
> >>
> >> /Stefan
> >>
> >>
> >> On 3/27/13 3:30 PM, "Black, David" <david.black@emc.com> wrote:
> >>
> >> >Hi Stefan,
> >> >
> >> >> Does this answer your question?
> >> >
> >> >Yes, please add some of that explanation to the next version of the
> >>draft
> >> >;-).
> >> >Coverage of existing responder behavior/limitations (important
> >> >"running code"
> >> >concerns, IMHO) and alternatives to using "revoked" ("have a number
> >> >of tools to prevent the client from accepting a bad certificate")
> >> >seem
> >>particularly
> >> >relevant.
> >> >
> >> >Thanks,
> >> >--David
> >> >
> >> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> >> From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com]
> >> >> Sent: Wednesday, March 27, 2013 7:44 AM
> >> >> To: Black, David; sts@aaa-sec.com; mmyers@fastq.com;
> >>ambarish@gmail.com;
> >> >> slava.galperin@gmail.com; cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca; gen-
> art@ietf.org
> >> >> Cc: pkix@ietf.org; Sean Turner; ietf@ietf.org
> >> >> Subject: Re: Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
> >> >>
> >> >> Hi David,
> >> >>
> >> >> Yes I missed to respond to that aspect.
> >> >>
> >> >> This is a bit complicated, but we have a large legacy to take into
> >> >>account  where some responders implements just RFC 2560, while
> some
> >> >>deliver  pre-generated responses according to RFC 5019
> >> >>(Light-weight OCSP). LW  responders are not capable of producing a
> >> >>signed response at the
> >>time of
> >> >> responding and in case such responder finds a request for a
> >>certificate
> >> >> where no pre-produced response exists, it will reply with an
> >> >>unsigned  error response "unauthorized", which also is a legitimate
> >> >>way to respond.
> >> >> So the actual OCSP responder may actually know that the
> >> >>certificate
> >>was
> >> >> never issued, but since it delivers pre-produced responder through
> >> >>a CDN,  it can not provide a revoked response in real time.
> >> >>
> >> >> So the major aim with the current writing is to declare that the
> >>revoked
> >> >> response is a MAY because there are other valid alternatives.
> >> >>
> >> >> We also want to avoid putting down a SHOULD respond revoked if a
> >> >> certificate is known to be not-issued, because that would require
> >> >> us
> >>to
> >> >> define what "known to be non-issued" actually means. And that
> >> >> could
> >>be
> >> >> quite tricky as OCSP responders by no means are required to have
> >> >> this knowledge.
> >> >>
> >> >> The OCSP responder simply have a number of tools to prevent the
> >>client
> >> >> from accepting a bad certificate.
> >> >> This update of OCSP simply allows responders to use the "revoked"
> >> >>response
> >> >> as a preventive measure, without mandating it.
> >> >>
> >> >> This is also related to activities in the CA Browser Forum where
> >> >>they put  down requirements on responders complying with CAB rules
> >> >>to not
> >>respond
> >> >> "good" to certificates that were never issued.
> >> >> With this update in OCSP, they can now mandate in their policies
> >> >>both the  fact that their responders MUST know if a certificate was
> >> >>never
> >>issued
> >> >>and
> >> >> MUST respond "revoked".
> >> >>
> >> >> So we allow other communities to raise the bar even if the base
> >>standard
> >> >> defines the response as optional.
> >> >>
> >> >> In theory we could possibly say that responding revoked is
> >> >> optional,
> >>but
> >> >> if you choose between revoked and unknown then you SHOULD
> favour
> >>revoked
> >> >> over unknown. But such nested requirements just feels bad and
> >>impossible
> >> >> to test compliance against. I'd much rather just leave it
> >> >> optional. I think the Note gives a clear recommendation on this
> >> >> and the rationale without spelling it out as a requirement.
> >> >>
> >> >> Does this answer your question?
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >> On 3/27/13 12:51 AM, "Black, David" <david.black@emc.com> wrote:
> >> >>
> >> >> >Hi Stefan,
> >> >> >
> >> >> >This looks good - thank you for the prompt response.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >It looks like my speculation on item [1] was wrong, so could you
> >> >>respond
> >> >> >to the question below, please?:
> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >[1] Section 2.2:
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >       NOTE: The "revoked" state for known non-issued
> >>certificate serial
> >> >> >> >               numbers is allowed in order to reduce the risk
> >> >> >> > of
> >>relying
> >> >> >> >               parties using CRLs as a fall back mechanism,
> >>which would be
> >> >> >> >               considerably higher if an "unknown" response
> >> >> >> > was
> >>returned.
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >Given this explanation, I'm surprised that the use of "revoked"
> >> >> >>instead of
> >> >> >> >"unknown" for a known non-issued certificate is a "MAY"
> >>requirement
> >> >>and
> >> >> >> >not a "SHOULD" requirement.  Why is that the case?
> >> >> >
> >> >> >--------------
> >> >> >
> >> >> >Beyond that, the proposed actions (or proposed non-actions) on
> >> >> >items [2]-[5] are fine with me, Sean's taken care of the author
> >> >> >permissions item
> >>from
> >> >> >idnits, and I assume someone has or will check the ASN.1 .
> >> >> >
> >> >> >Thanks,
> >> >> >--David
> >> >> >
> >> >> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> >> >> From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com]
> >> >> >> Sent: Monday, March 25, 2013 10:21 PM
> >> >> >> To: Black, David; sts@aaa-sec.com; mmyers@fastq.com;
> >> >>ambarish@gmail.com;
> >> >> >> slava.galperin@gmail.com; cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca;
> >> >> >> gen-art@ietf.org
> >> >> >> Cc: pkix@ietf.org; Sean Turner; ietf@ietf.org
> >> >> >> Subject: Re: Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> Hi David,
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> Thanks for the review.
> >> >> >> My reply in line.
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> On 3/26/13 1:25 AM, "Black, David" <david.black@emc.com> wrote:
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> >Authors,
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For
> >>background on
> >> >> >> >Gen-ART, please
> >> >> >> >see the FAQ at
> >> >> >><http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call
> >> >>comments
> >> >> >>you
> >> >> >> >may receive.
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >Document: draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
> >> >> >> >Reviewer: David L. Black
> >> >> >> >Review Date: March 25, 2013
> >> >> >> >IETF LC End Date: March 27, 2013
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >Summary:
> >> >> >> >This draft is on the right track but has open issues,
> >> >> >> >described
> >>in
> >> >>the
> >> >> >> >review.
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >This draft updates the OCSP protocol for obtaining certificate
> >> >>status
> >> >> >> >with some minor extensions.
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >Because this is a "bis" draft, I reviewed the diffs against
> >> >> >> >RFC
> >> >>2560.
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >I did not check the ASN.1.  I also did not see a writeup for
> >> >> >> >this
> >> >>draft
> >> >> >> >in the data tracker, and so will rely on the document shepherd
> >> >> >> >to ensure that the ASN.1 has been checked when the writeup is
> >>prepared.
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >I found five open issues, all of which are minor, plus one
> >> >> >> >idnits
> >> >>item
> >> >> >> >that is probably ok, but should be double-checked.
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >Minor issues:
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >[1] Section 2.2:
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >       NOTE: The "revoked" state for known non-issued
> >>certificate serial
> >> >> >> >               numbers is allowed in order to reduce the risk
> >> >> >> > of
> >>relying
> >> >> >> >               parties using CRLs as a fall back mechanism,
> >>which would be
> >> >> >> >               considerably higher if an "unknown" response
> >> >> >> > was
> >>returned.
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >Given this explanation, I'm surprised that the use of "revoked"
> >> >> >>instead of
> >> >> >> >"unknown" for a known non-issued certificate is a "MAY"
> >>requirement
> >> >>and
> >> >> >> >not a "SHOULD" requirement.  Why is that the case?
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >It appears that the reason is that the use of "revoked" in
> >> >> >> >this
> >> >> >>situation
> >> >> >> >may be dangerous when serial numbers can be predicted for
> >> >>certificates
> >> >> >> >that
> >> >> >> >will be issued in the future.  If that's what's going on, this
> >> >>concern
> >> >> >>is
> >> >> >> >already explained in the security considerations section, but
> >> >> >> >it
> >> >>should
> >> >> >> >also be mentioned here for completeness.
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> No, this is not the main reason. The main reason is the one
> >> >> >> stated
> >> >>as a
> >> >> >> Note: in this section:
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> NOTE: The "revoked" state for known non-issued certificate
> >> >> >>serial numbers  is allowed in order to reduce the risk of
> >> >> >>relying parties using
> >>CRLs
> >> >>as
> >> >> >>a
> >> >> >> fall back mechanism, which would be considerably higher if an
> >> >>"unknown"
> >> >> >> response was returned.
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >[2] Section 4.2.2.2:
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >       The key that signs a certificate's status information
> >>need not be
> >> >>the
> >> >> >> >       same key that signed the certificate. It is necessary
> >>however to
> >> >> >> >       ensure that the entity signing this information is
> >>authorized to
> >> do
> >> >> >> >       so.  Therefore, a certificate's issuer MAY either sign
> >>the OCSP
> >> >> >> >       responses itself or it MAY explicitly designate this
> >>authority to
> >> >> >> >       another entity.
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >The two instances of "MAY" in the above text were both "MUST"
> >> >> >> >in
> >>RFC
> >> >> >>2560.
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >The RFC 2560 text construction of "MUST" or "MUST" is a bit
> >> >> >> >odd,
> >>but
> >> >> >>the two
> >> >> >> >"MAY"s in this draft are even worse, as they allow "MAY do
> >>something
> >> >> >>else
> >> >> >> >entirely", despite being enclosed in an either-or construct.
> >> >> >> >I
> >> >> >>strongly
> >> >> >> >suspect that the latter was not intended, so the following
> >> >> >> >would
> >>be
> >> >> >> >clearer:
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >       The key that signs a certificate's status information
> >>need not be
> >> >>the
> >> >> >> >       same key that signed the certificate. It is necessary
> >>however to
> >> >> >> >       ensure that the entity signing this information is
> >>authorized to
> >> do
> >> >> >> >       so.  Therefore, a certificate's issuer MUST do one of
> >> >> >> > the
> >> >>following:
> >> >> >> >               - sign the OCSP responses itself, or
> >> >> >> >               - explicitly designate this authority to
> >> >> >> > another
> >>entity.
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> I Agree. I will adopt your text.
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >[3] Section 4.3:
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >Is the "SHOULD" requirement still appropriate for the DSA with
> >>SHA-1
> >> >> >>combo
> >> >> >> >(vs. a "MAY" requirement)?  This requirement was a "MUST" in
> >> >> >> >RFC
> >> >>2560,
> >> >> >>but
> >> >> >> >I wonder about actual usage of DSA in practice.
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> The change in algorithm requirements was provided by RFC 6277,
> >> >> >>and further  refined in this draft in accordance with requests
> >> >> >>from Sean
> >>Turner.
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >[4] Section 5, last paragraph:
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >       Responding a "revoked" state to certificate that has
> >>never been
> >> >> >> >       issued may enable someone to obtain a revocation
> >> >> >> > response
> >>for a
> >> >> >> >       certificate that is not yet issued, but soon will be
> >>issued, if
> >> the
> >> >> >> >       CA issues certificates using sequential certificate
> >>serial number
> >> >> >> >       assignment.
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >The above text after starting with the "if" is too narrow - it
> >> >>should
> >> >> >>say:
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >       if the certificate serial number of the certificate that
> >> >> >> >       will be issued can be predicted or guessed by the
> >>requester.
> >> >> >> >       Such prediction is easy for a CA that issues certificates
> >> >> >> >       using sequential certificate serial number assignment.
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >There's also a nit in original text - its first line should be:
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >       Responding with a "revoked" state for a certificate
> >> >> >> > that
> >>has never
> >> >> >>been
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> Good suggestions. I will update accordingly.
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >[5] Section 5.1.1:
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >       In archival applications it is quite possible that an
> >> >> >> > OCSP
> >> >>responder
> >> >> >> >       might be asked to report the validity of a certificate
> >> >> >> > on
> >>a date
> >> in
> >> >> >> >       the distant past. Such a certificate might employ a
> >>signing method
> >> >> >> >       that is no longer considered acceptably secure. In such
> >> >> >> >       circumstances the responder MUST NOT generate a
> >> >> >> > signature
> >>using a
> >> >> >> >       signing mechanism that is not considered acceptably
> >>secure.
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >This could use an additional warning that certificate archival
> >> >>should
> >> >> >> >not rely solely on signatures in archived certificates for
> >>ensuring
> >> >>the
> >> >> >> >validity and integrity of the archived certificates because
> >> >> >> >the
> >> >> >>signature
> >> >> >> >algorithm(s) may transition to no longer being considered
> >>acceptably
> >> >> >> >secure at some point after the certificates are archived.
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> This note if I remember correctly is imported from RFC 6277,
> >>which is
> >> >> >> incorporated into this document. The reason behind the text is
> >>only
> >> >>to
> >> >> >> avoid usages of insecure algorithms.
> >> >> >> Historical validation is a real can of worms that I really
> >> >> >> would
> >> >>like to
> >> >> >> keep a tight lid on. I really want to avoid doing
> >> >> >> recommendations
> >>in
> >> >> >>this
> >> >> >> space as it may trigger a whole flood of things that could be
> >>equally
> >> >> >> important to say about this subject.
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >Nits:
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >idnits 2.12.15 said:
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >  -- The document seems to lack a disclaimer for pre-RFC5378
> >>work,
> >> >>but
> >> >> >>may
> >> >> >> >     have content which was first submitted before 10 November
> >>2008.
> >> >> >>If
> >> >> >> >you
> >> >> >> >     have contacted all the original authors and they are all
> >> >>willing
> >> >> >>to
> >> >> >> >grant
> >> >> >> >     the BCP78 rights to the IETF Trust, then this is fine,
> >> >> >> >and
> >>you
> >> >>can
> >> >> >> >ignore
> >> >> >> >     this comment.  If not, you may need to add the
> >> >> >> >pre-RFC5378 disclaimer.
> >> >> >> >     (See the Legal Provisions document at
> >> >> >> >     http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info for more
> >> >> >> >information.)
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >This looks like it's ok because all the authors of RFC 2560
> >> >> >> >are
> >>also
> >> >> >> >authors of
> >> >> >> >this draft, but it should be double-checked.
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> I defer this one to Sean. I think he has this one under control.
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> Thanks again for the review.
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> /Stefan
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >Thanks,
> >> >> >> >--David
> >> >> >> >----------------------------------------------------
> >> >> >> >David L. Black, Distinguished Engineer EMC Corporation, 176
> >> >> >> >South St., Hopkinton, MA  01748
> >> >> >> >+1 (508) 293-7953             FAX: +1 (508) 293-7786
> >> >> >> >david.black@emc.com        Mobile: +1 (978) 394-7754
> >> >> >> >----------------------------------------------------
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >
> >>
> >>
> >
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix


From stefan@aaa-sec.com  Fri Mar 29 09:37:14 2013
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To: Piyush Jain <piyush@ditenity.com>, "'Black, David'" <david.black@emc.com>, <sts@aaa-sec.com>, <mmyers@fastq.com>, <ambarish@gmail.com>, <slava.galperin@gmail.com>, <cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca>, <gen-art@ietf.org>
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On 3/29/13 5:17 PM, "Piyush Jain" <piyush@ditenity.com> wrote:

>' "revoked" status is still optional in this context in order to maintain
>backwards compatibility with deployments of RFC 2560.'
>
>I fail to understand this statement about backward compatibility.
>How does "revoked" being "optional/required breaks backward compatibility?
>The only reason cited in the WG discussions to use revoked for
>"not-issued"
>was that any other approach would break backward compatibility with legacy
>clients. And now the draft says that revoked is optional because making it
>required won't be backward compatible.

Yes. Making it required would prohibit other valid ways to respond to this
situation that is allowed by RFC 2560 and RFC 5019.
Such as responding "good" or responding with "unauthorized" error.

>
>And it gives the impression that best course of action for 2560bis
>responders is to start issuing revoked for "not-issued", which is far from
>the originally stated goal to provide a way for CAs to be able to return
>revoked for such serial numbers.

The latter is what optional means.

/Stefan



From piyush@ditenity.com  Fri Mar 29 09:44:54 2013
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From: "Piyush Jain" <piyush@ditenity.com>
To: "'Santosh Chokhani'" <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>, "'Miller, Timothy J.'" <tmiller@mitre.org>, "'David A. Cooper'" <david.cooper@nist.gov>
References: <004f01ce2be4$f7eb64a0$e7c22de0$@ditenity.com> <CD7AFECE.A278%tmiller@mitre.org> <00fe01ce2c99$7b408f10$71c1ad30$@ditenity.com> <B83745DA469B7847811819C5005244AFF3DC9D30@scygexch7.cygnacom.com>
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Cc: 'pkix' <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN
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That is true.  In this case there will be no NC constraining the URNs.

A URN NC would only make sense for hierarchical URNs.


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Santosh Chokhani [mailto:SChokhani@cygnacom.com]
> Sent: Friday, March 29, 2013 9:29 AM
> To: Piyush Jain; 'Miller, Timothy J.'; 'David A. Cooper'
> Cc: 'pkix'
> Subject: RE: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN
>=20
> There is nothing to constrain when URN is UUID.
>=20
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Piyush Jain [mailto:piyush@ditenity.com]
> Sent: Friday, March 29, 2013 12:22 PM
> To: 'Miller, Timothy J.'; 'David A. Cooper'; Santosh Chokhani
> Cc: 'pkix'
> Subject: RE: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN
>=20
> Yes. Applying location constraints to URNs is the problem which must =
be
> fixed.
> Defining processing rules for URN constrains is probably nice to have.
>=20
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Miller, Timothy J. [mailto:tmiller@mitre.org]
> > Sent: Friday, March 29, 2013 6:27 AM
> > To: Piyush Jain; 'David A. Cooper'; Santosh Chokhani
> > Cc: 'pkix'
> > Subject: Re: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN
> >
> > So perhaps the problem is there's no way to apply a single NC rule =
to
> > URIs since the sub-types of URIs conflict in how names are
> > constructed.  I.e.,
> the
> > right fix is to discard the URI type and treat the sub-type of URLs
> > and
> URNs
> > separately.  This would permit separate NC processing for each, =
which
> seems
> > to be what Santosh is asking for.
> >
> > -- T
> >
> > On 3/28/13 1:49 PM, "Piyush Jain" <piyush@ditenity.com> wrote:
> >
> > >My apologies to the author(s) for being presumptuous and thank =
David
> > >for pointing to the discussion thread.
> > >
> > >So it seems that WG consciously refrained from defining matching
> > >rules for URNs.
> > >
> > >This implies if a CA has a permitted subtree constraint, any
> > >descendent certificate cannot have a URN name. Seems like a
> > >limitation which cannot be addressed without defining matching =
rules
for
> URNs.
> > >
> > >From: David A. Cooper [mailto:david.cooper@nist.gov]
> > >
> > >Sent: Thursday, March 28, 2013 11:04 AM
> > >To: Piyush Jain
> > >Cc: 'pkix'
> > >Subject: Re: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >On 03/28/2013 01:37 PM, Piyush Jain wrote:
> > >
> > >
> > >Santosh,
> > >
> > >I think I agree with you that constraining URN based on authority
> > >does not make sense.
> > >
> > >The text =AD =B3For URIs, the constraint applies to the host part =
of the
> > >name.=B2 from 5280 indicates that the author assumed that URIs will
> > >always have the authority component, which is a wrong assumption.
> > >
> > >
> > >RFC 5280 says:
> > >If a constraint is applied to the uniformResourceIdentifier name =
form
> > >and a subsequent certificate includes a subjectAltName extension =
with
> > >a uniformResourceIdentifier  that does not include an authority
> > >component with a host name specified as a fully qualified domain =
name
> > >(e.g., if the URI either does not include an authority component or
> > >includes an authority component in which  the host name is =
specified
> > >as an IP address), then the application MUST reject the =
certificate.
> > >
> > >This indicates quite clearly that the author did not assume that =
URIs
> > >will always have the authority component.
> > >
> > >See also
> > >http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/current/msg02179.html
> > ><http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/current/msg02179.html>
> > ("RFC
> > >3280bis and URI schemes without hostname").
> > >
> > >
>=20



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From: "Piyush Jain" <piyush@ditenity.com>
To: "'Stefan Santesson'" <stefan@aaa-sec.com>, "'Black, David'" <david.black@emc.com>, <sts@aaa-sec.com>, <mmyers@fastq.com>, <ambarish@gmail.com>, <slava.galperin@gmail.com>, <cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca>, <gen-art@ietf.org>
References: <00fc01ce2c98$ddc41770$994c4650$@ditenity.com> <CD7B80C0.5F100%stefan@aaa-sec.com>
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Date: Fri, 29 Mar 2013 10:12:38 -0700
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Cc: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [pkix] Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
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Not arguing that it should be required. I'm with you on keeping it optional.

It is your statement about backward compatibility to justify it that is
incorrect.
Backward compatibility "with deployments of RFC2560" is not affected in
either case. Legacy clients will continue to work whether you make it
required or optional.

You probably meant "maintain compliance with RFC 2560 and RFC 5019."

-Piyush

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com]
> Sent: Friday, March 29, 2013 9:37 AM
> To: Piyush Jain; 'Black, David'; sts@aaa-sec.com; mmyers@fastq.com;
> ambarish@gmail.com; slava.galperin@gmail.com; cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca;
> gen-art@ietf.org
> Cc: pkix@ietf.org; ietf@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [pkix] Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
> 
> On 3/29/13 5:17 PM, "Piyush Jain" <piyush@ditenity.com> wrote:
> 
> >' "revoked" status is still optional in this context in order to
> >maintain backwards compatibility with deployments of RFC 2560.'
> >
> >I fail to understand this statement about backward compatibility.
> >How does "revoked" being "optional/required breaks backward
> compatibility?
> >The only reason cited in the WG discussions to use revoked for
> >"not-issued"
> >was that any other approach would break backward compatibility with
> >legacy clients. And now the draft says that revoked is optional because
> >making it required won't be backward compatible.
> 
> Yes. Making it required would prohibit other valid ways to respond to this
> situation that is allowed by RFC 2560 and RFC 5019.
> Such as responding "good" or responding with "unauthorized" error.
> 
> >
> >And it gives the impression that best course of action for 2560bis
> >responders is to start issuing revoked for "not-issued", which is far
> >from the originally stated goal to provide a way for CAs to be able to
> >return revoked for such serial numbers.
> 
> The latter is what optional means.
> 
> /Stefan
> 



From david.cooper@nist.gov  Fri Mar 29 10:39:20 2013
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Subject: Re: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN
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    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">Santosh,<br>
      <br>
      On 03/29/2013 12:28 PM, Santosh Chokhani wrote:<br>
      <blockquote type="cite"><span style="color:#1F497D"> So, why are
          you hung up on the text in 5280 which most likely did not
          consider URN scenario.  If it did, please explain why a name
          constraint is meaningful to URN which not a hierarchical name
          in the first place.</span></blockquote>
      <br>
      The text in 5280 most definitely did consider the URN scenario. 
      That is why 5280 includes a sentence that says "if the URI either
      does not include an authority component...."<br>
      <br>
      I also pointed to an thread on the PKIX mail list with the subject
      "RFC 3280bis and URI schemes without hostname"
      (<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/current/msg02179.html">http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/current/msg02179.html</a>),
      and in one of the messages in that thread
      (<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/current/msg02171.html">http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/current/msg02171.html</a>),
      I referred to a thread from early 2007 with the subject "URN in
      subjectAltName"
      (<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/msg02513.html">http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/msg02513.html</a>).  I did
      a quick look at the "URN in subjectAltName" thread and saw that
      there was at least one message in that thread
      (<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/msg02641.html">http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/msg02641.html</a>) that
      specifically mentioned URNs and name constraints.<br>
      <br>
      I even checked my interoperability testing spreadsheet (from about
      4 years ago) and see that I tested this scenario and found two
      path validation implementations that implemented this aspect of
      name constraints:<br>
      <blockquote><font color="#3333ff">Issued end entity certificate
          (ValidNoAuthorityURI.cer) under SampleRoot.cer and verified
          that both clients would accept a URI without an authority
          component in the absence of a name constraint.  Created a
          subordinate (URInameConstraintsIntermediateCA.cer) that
          specifies a permitted subtree for URIs and three end entities,
          one with a URI that satisfies the constraint
          (ValidURInameConstraints.cer), one with a URI with no
          authority component [urn:uuid:...]
          (NoAuthorityURInameConstraints.cer), and one with a URI that
          uses an IP address to specify the host
          (InvalidURIIPaddress.cer).  Both clients accepted the
          certificate with the valid URI and rejected the other two
          certificates.</font><br>
      </blockquote>
      <br>
      Can you explain to me how all of those things happened if 5280 did
      not consider URN scenario?<br>
      <br>
      As to your other questions, I will simply point you to
      <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/current/msg02132.html">http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/current/msg02132.html</a>,
      where I said:<br>
      <blockquote type="cite"><font color="#3333ff">I am inclined to
          think that URIs that do not include an authority should be
          ignored. That is, they should be treated just as if they had
          been included in a different name form for which name
          constraints have not been defined. </font></blockquote>
      <br>
      So, unless I changed my mind later, I didn't even agree with the
      requirements that were put into 5280.  However, as editor it would
      have been my responsibility to reflect working group consensus in
      the document, not my own personal opinion.  So, I will not attempt
      to respond to your other questions, which seem to be asking me to
      defend the current text in 5280.  I am simply rebutting
      suggestions that URNs were never considered when the name
      constraints rules in 5280 were written.  I have no interest in
      either supporting or arguing against the current rules.<br>
      <br>
      Dave<br>
      <br>
      On 03/29/2013 12:28 PM, Santosh Chokhani wrote:<br>
    </div>
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      <div class="WordSection1">
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D">David,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoListParagraph"
          style="text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span
            style="color:#1F497D"><span style="mso-list:Ignore">1.<span
                style="font:7.0pt &quot;Times New Roman&quot;">       </span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span
            style="color:#1F497D">Can you explain what harm is does to
            accept a certificate if the upstream CA has URL constrained?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoListParagraph"
          style="text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span
            style="color:#1F497D"><span style="mso-list:Ignore">2.<span
                style="font:7.0pt &quot;Times New Roman&quot;">       </span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span
            style="color:#1F497D">Can you explain how a CA that wishes
            to constrain URL, but permit URN would do so.  Note that
            this is a real scenario as you know?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoListParagraph"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoListParagraph"
          style="text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span
            style="color:#1F497D"><span style="mso-list:Ignore">3.<span
                style="font:7.0pt &quot;Times New Roman&quot;">       </span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span
            style="color:#1F497D">Note that SAN description in 5280
            already require FQDN for the host for URI that require
            authority.  So, why are you hung up on the text in 5280
            which most likely did not consider URN scenario.  If it did,
            please explain why a name constraint is meaningful to URN
            which not a hierarchical name in the first place.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoListParagraph"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoListParagraph"
          style="text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span
            style="color:#1F497D"><span style="mso-list:Ignore">4.<span
                style="font:7.0pt &quot;Times New Roman&quot;">       </span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span
            style="color:#1F497D">I read the post you sent below and I
            read it as supporting what I am saying.  Do not constrain
            the URI that cannot have authority component to it.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
            style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier
            New&quot;;color:windowtext">“* Decide that this name type is
            not appropriate for URI schemes that tend not to use
            authorities.  <o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
            style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier
            New&quot;;color:windowtext"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
            style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier
            New&quot;;color:windowtext">* Relax the rules.  I strongly
            urge the WG not to take on the task of name constraints for
            URIs without authority in this document.”<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
            style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier
            New&quot;;color:windowtext"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
        <div>
          <div style="border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF
            1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in">
            <p class="MsoNormal"><b><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:windowtext">From:</span></b><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:windowtext">
                <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org">pkix-bounces@ietf.org</a> [<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org">mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org</a>] <b>On
                  Behalf Of </b>David A. Cooper<br>
                <b>Sent:</b> Thursday, March 28, 2013 2:04 PM<br>
                <b>To:</b> Piyush Jain<br>
                <b>Cc:</b> 'pkix'<br>
                <b>Subject:</b> Re: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN<o:p></o:p></span></p>
          </div>
        </div>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
        <div>
          <p class="MsoNormal">On 03/28/2013 01:37 PM, Piyush Jain
            wrote:<o:p></o:p></p>
        </div>
        <blockquote style="margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
          <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D">Santosh,</span><o:p></o:p></p>
          <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"> </span><o:p></o:p></p>
          <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D">I think I
              agree with you that constraining URN based on authority
              does not make sense.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
          <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"> </span><o:p></o:p></p>
          <pre><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">The text</span><span style="font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D"> – “</span>For URIs, the constraint applies to the host part of the name.” <span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">from 5280 indicates that the author assumed that URIs will always have the authority component, which is a wrong assumption</span><span style="font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1F497D">.</span><o:p></o:p></pre>
        </blockquote>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
            style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&quot;Times New
            Roman&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;"><br>
            RFC 5280 says:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
            style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&quot;Times New
            Roman&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;">If a constraint is applied to
            the uniformResourceIdentifier name form and a subsequent
            certificate includes a subjectAltName extension with a
            uniformResourceIdentifier that does not include an authority
            component with a host name specified as a fully qualified
            domain name (e.g., if the </span><span
            style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&quot;Times New
            Roman&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;;color:#3333FF">URI either does
            not include an authority component</span><span
            style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&quot;Times New
            Roman&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;"> or includes an authority
            component in which the host name is specified as an IP
            address), then the application MUST reject the certificate.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:12.0pt"><span
            style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&quot;Times New
            Roman&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;"><br>
            This indicates quite clearly that the author did <b>not</b>
            assume that URIs will always have the authority component.<br>
            <br>
            See also <a moz-do-not-send="true"
              href="http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/current/msg02179.html">http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/current/msg02179.html</a>
            ("RFC 3280bis and URI schemes without hostname").<o:p></o:p></span></p>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
  </body>
</html>

From SChokhani@cygnacom.com  Fri Mar 29 10:45:21 2013
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From: Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>
To: "David A. Cooper" <david.cooper@nist.gov>
Date: Fri, 29 Mar 2013 13:45:15 -0400
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David,

Thank you very much.

From: David A. Cooper [mailto:david.cooper@nist.gov]
Sent: Friday, March 29, 2013 1:39 PM
To: Santosh Chokhani
Cc: 'pkix'
Subject: Re: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN

Santosh,

On 03/29/2013 12:28 PM, Santosh Chokhani wrote:

So, why are you hung up on the text in 5280 which most likely did not consi=
der URN scenario.  If it did, please explain why a name constraint is meani=
ngful to URN which not a hierarchical name in the first place.

The text in 5280 most definitely did consider the URN scenario.  That is wh=
y 5280 includes a sentence that says "if the URI either does not include an=
 authority component...."

I also pointed to an thread on the PKIX mail list with the subject "RFC 328=
0bis and URI schemes without hostname" (http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/we=
b/pkix/current/msg02179.html), and in one of the messages in that thread (h=
ttp://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/current/msg02171.html), I referred=
 to a thread from early 2007 with the subject "URN in subjectAltName" (http=
://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/msg02513.html).  I did a quick look a=
t the "URN in subjectAltName" thread and saw that there was at least one me=
ssage in that thread (http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/msg02641.ht=
ml) that specifically mentioned URNs and name constraints.

I even checked my interoperability testing spreadsheet (from about 4 years =
ago) and see that I tested this scenario and found two path validation impl=
ementations that implemented this aspect of name constraints:
Issued end entity certificate (ValidNoAuthorityURI.cer) under SampleRoot.ce=
r and verified that both clients would accept a URI without an authority co=
mponent in the absence of a name constraint.  Created a subordinate (URInam=
eConstraintsIntermediateCA.cer) that specifies a permitted subtree for URIs=
 and three end entities, one with a URI that satisfies the constraint (Vali=
dURInameConstraints.cer), one with a URI with no authority component [urn:u=
uid:...] (NoAuthorityURInameConstraints.cer), and one with a URI that uses =
an IP address to specify the host (InvalidURIIPaddress.cer).  Both clients =
accepted the certificate with the valid URI and rejected the other two cert=
ificates.

Can you explain to me how all of those things happened if 5280 did not cons=
ider URN scenario?

As to your other questions, I will simply point you to http://www.ietf.org/=
mail-archive/web/pkix/current/msg02132.html, where I said:

I am inclined to think that URIs that do not include an authority should be=
 ignored. That is, they should be treated just as if they had been included=
 in a different name form for which name constraints have not been defined.

So, unless I changed my mind later, I didn't even agree with the requiremen=
ts that were put into 5280.  However, as editor it would have been my respo=
nsibility to reflect working group consensus in the document, not my own pe=
rsonal opinion.  So, I will not attempt to respond to your other questions,=
 which seem to be asking me to defend the current text in 5280.  I am simpl=
y rebutting suggestions that URNs were never considered when the name const=
raints rules in 5280 were written.  I have no interest in either supporting=
 or arguing against the current rules.

Dave

On 03/29/2013 12:28 PM, Santosh Chokhani wrote:
David,


1.       Can you explain what harm is does to accept a certificate if the u=
pstream CA has URL constrained?


2.       Can you explain how a CA that wishes to constrain URL, but permit =
URN would do so.  Note that this is a real scenario as you know?



3.       Note that SAN description in 5280 already require FQDN for the hos=
t for URI that require authority.  So, why are you hung up on the text in 5=
280 which most likely did not consider URN scenario.  If it did, please exp=
lain why a name constraint is meaningful to URN which not a hierarchical na=
me in the first place.



4.       I read the post you sent below and I read it as supporting what I =
am saying.  Do not constrain the URI that cannot have authority component t=
o it.

"* Decide that this name type is not appropriate for URI schemes that tend =
not to use authorities.

* Relax the rules.  I strongly urge the WG not to take on the task of name =
constraints for URIs without authority in this document."



From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org<mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org> [mailto:pkix-boun=
ces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of David A. Cooper
Sent: Thursday, March 28, 2013 2:04 PM
To: Piyush Jain
Cc: 'pkix'
Subject: Re: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN

On 03/28/2013 01:37 PM, Piyush Jain wrote:
Santosh,

I think I agree with you that constraining URN based on authority does not =
make sense.


The text - "For URIs, the constraint applies to the host part of the name."=
 from 5280 indicates that the author assumed that URIs will always have the=
 authority component, which is a wrong assumption.

RFC 5280 says:
If a constraint is applied to the uniformResourceIdentifier name form and a=
 subsequent certificate includes a subjectAltName extension with a uniformR=
esourceIdentifier that does not include an authority component with a host =
name specified as a fully qualified domain name (e.g., if the URI either do=
es not include an authority component or includes an authority component in=
 which the host name is specified as an IP address), then the application M=
UST reject the certificate.

This indicates quite clearly that the author did not assume that URIs will =
always have the authority component.

See also http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/current/msg02179.html ("=
RFC 3280bis and URI schemes without hostname").


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</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body bgcolor=3Dwhite lang=3DEN-US=
 link=3Dblue vlink=3Dpurple><div class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal>=
<span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>David,<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNor=
mal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMs=
oNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>Thank you very much.<o:p></o:p></span=
></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></=
span></p><div><div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padd=
ing:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span style=3D'font-size:10.=
0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif";color:windowtext'>From:</span></b><sp=
an style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif";color:window=
text'> David A. Cooper [mailto:david.cooper@nist.gov] <br><b>Sent:</b> Frid=
ay, March 29, 2013 1:39 PM<br><b>To:</b> Santosh Chokhani<br><b>Cc:</b> 'pk=
ix'<br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN<o:p></o:p></s=
pan></p></div></div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><div><p class=
=3DMsoNormal>Santosh,<br><br>On 03/29/2013 12:28 PM, Santosh Chokhani wrote=
:<br><br><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>=
So, why are you hung up on the text in 5280 which most likely did not consi=
der URN scenario.&nbsp; If it did, please explain why a name constraint is =
meaningful to URN which not a hierarchical name in the first place.</span><=
o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><br>The text in 5280 most definitely did=
 consider the URN scenario.&nbsp; That is why 5280 includes a sentence that=
 says &quot;if the URI either does not include an authority component....&q=
uot;<br><br>I also pointed to an thread on the PKIX mail list with the subj=
ect &quot;RFC 3280bis and URI schemes without hostname&quot; (<a href=3D"ht=
tp://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/current/msg02179.html">http://www.i=
etf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/current/msg02179.html</a>), and in one of the=
 messages in that thread (<a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/p=
kix/current/msg02171.html">http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/curren=
t/msg02171.html</a>), I referred to a thread from early 2007 with the subje=
ct &quot;URN in subjectAltName&quot; (<a href=3D"http://www.imc.org/ietf-pk=
ix/mail-archive/msg02513.html">http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/ms=
g02513.html</a>).&nbsp; I did a quick look at the &quot;URN in subjectAltNa=
me&quot; thread and saw that there was at least one message in that thread =
(<a href=3D"http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/msg02641.html">http:/=
/www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/msg02641.html</a>) that specifically me=
ntioned URNs and name constraints.<br><br>I even checked my interoperabilit=
y testing spreadsheet (from about 4 years ago) and see that I tested this s=
cenario and found two path validation implementations that implemented this=
 aspect of name constraints:<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=
=3D'color:#3333FF'>Issued end entity certificate (ValidNoAuthorityURI.cer) =
under SampleRoot.cer and verified that both clients would accept a URI with=
out an authority component in the absence of a name constraint.&nbsp; Creat=
ed a subordinate (URInameConstraintsIntermediateCA.cer) that specifies a pe=
rmitted subtree for URIs and three end entities, one with a URI that satisf=
ies the constraint (ValidURInameConstraints.cer), one with a URI with no au=
thority component [urn:uuid:...] (NoAuthorityURInameConstraints.cer), and o=
ne with a URI that uses an IP address to specify the host (InvalidURIIPaddr=
ess.cer).&nbsp; Both clients accepted the certificate with the valid URI an=
d rejected the other two certificates.</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoN=
ormal><br>Can you explain to me how all of those things happened if 5280 di=
d not consider URN scenario?<br><br>As to your other questions, I will simp=
ly point you to <a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/curren=
t/msg02132.html">http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/current/msg02132=
.html</a>, where I said:<br><br><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span s=
tyle=3D'color:#3333FF'>I am inclined to think that URIs that do not include=
 an authority should be ignored. That is, they should be treated just as if=
 they had been included in a different name form for which name constraints=
 have not been defined. </span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><br>So, =
unless I changed my mind later, I didn't even agree with the requirements t=
hat were put into 5280.&nbsp; However, as editor it would have been my resp=
onsibility to reflect working group consensus in the document, not my own p=
ersonal opinion.&nbsp; So, I will not attempt to respond to your other ques=
tions, which seem to be asking me to defend the current text in 5280.&nbsp;=
 I am simply rebutting suggestions that URNs were never considered when the=
 name constraints rules in 5280 were written.&nbsp; I have no interest in e=
ither supporting or arguing against the current rules.<br><br>Dave<br><br>O=
n 03/29/2013 12:28 PM, Santosh Chokhani wrote:<o:p></o:p></p></div><blockqu=
ote style=3D'margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt'><p class=3DMsoNormal><sp=
an style=3D'color:#1F497D'>David,</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal=
><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoLi=
stParagraph style=3D'text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo2'><![if !sup=
portLists]><span style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>1.<span style=3D'font:7.0pt "Tim=
es New Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span></span><![endif]=
><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>Can you explain what harm is does to accept =
a certificate if the upstream CA has URL constrained?</span><o:p></o:p></p>=
<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p>=
</p><p class=3DMsoListParagraph style=3D'text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0 lev=
el1 lfo2'><![if !supportLists]><span style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>2.<span styl=
e=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </s=
pan></span><![endif]><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>Can you explain how a CA=
 that wishes to constrain URL, but permit URN would do so.&nbsp; Note that =
this is a real scenario as you know?</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoLis=
tParagraph><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p><p cla=
ss=3DMsoListParagraph style=3D'text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo2'>=
<![if !supportLists]><span style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>3.<span style=3D'font:=
7.0pt "Times New Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span></span=
><![endif]><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>Note that SAN description in 5280 =
already require FQDN for the host for URI that require authority.&nbsp; So,=
 why are you hung up on the text in 5280 which most likely did not consider=
 URN scenario.&nbsp; If it did, please explain why a name constraint is mea=
ningful to URN which not a hierarchical name in the first place.</span><o:p=
></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoListParagraph><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;=
</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoListParagraph style=3D'text-indent:-.25=
in;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo2'><![if !supportLists]><span style=3D'mso-list:Ig=
nore'>4.<span style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span></span><![endif]><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>I read=
 the post you sent below and I read it as supporting what I am saying.&nbsp=
; Do not constrain the URI that cannot have authority component to it.</spa=
n><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;<=
/span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;f=
ont-family:"Courier New ;color:windowtext","serif"'>&#8220;* Decide that th=
is name type is not appropriate for URI schemes that tend not to use author=
ities.&nbsp; </span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font=
-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New ;color:windowtext","serif"'>&nbsp;</s=
pan><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;fon=
t-family:"Courier New ;color:windowtext","serif"'>* Relax the rules.&nbsp; =
I strongly urge the WG not to take on the task of name constraints for URIs=
 without authority in this document.&#8221;</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=
=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier New ;colo=
r:windowtext","serif"'>&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><sp=
an style=3D'color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal=
><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p><div><div style=
=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><=
p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma"=
,"sans-serif";color:windowtext'>From:</span></b><span style=3D'font-size:10=
.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif";color:windowtext'> <a href=3D"mailto=
:pkix-bounces@ietf.org">pkix-bounces@ietf.org</a> [<a href=3D"mailto:pkix-b=
ounces@ietf.org">mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org</a>] <b>On Behalf Of </b>Davi=
d A. Cooper<br><b>Sent:</b> Thursday, March 28, 2013 2:04 PM<br><b>To:</b> =
Piyush Jain<br><b>Cc:</b> 'pkix'<br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [pkix] URI Name Con=
straint and URN</span><o:p></o:p></p></div></div><p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp=
;<o:p></o:p></p><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>On 03/28/2013 01:37 PM, Piyush Ja=
in wrote:<o:p></o:p></p></div><blockquote style=3D'margin-top:5.0pt;margin-=
bottom:5.0pt'><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>Santosh,</=
span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>&nbs=
p;</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>=
I think I agree with you that constraining URN based on authority does not =
make sense.</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:=
#1F497D'>&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p><pre><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;f=
ont-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>The text</span><span style=
=3D'font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'> &#8211; &#8220;</spa=
n>For URIs, the constraint applies to the host part of the name.&#8221; <sp=
an style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F49=
7D'>from 5280 indicates that the author assumed that URIs will always have =
the authority component, which is a wrong assumption</span><span style=3D'f=
ont-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>.</span><o:p></o:p></pre><=
/blockquote><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-famil=
y:"Times New Roman , serif","serif"'><br>RFC 5280 says:</span><o:p></o:p></=
p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times N=
ew Roman , serif","serif"'>If a constraint is applied to the uniformResourc=
eIdentifier name form and a subsequent certificate includes a subjectAltNam=
e extension with a uniformResourceIdentifier that does not include an autho=
rity component with a host name specified as a fully qualified domain name =
(e.g., if the </span><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>URI either does not i=
nclude an authority component</span><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-fa=
mily:"Times New Roman , serif","serif"'> or includes an authority component=
 in which the host name is specified as an IP address), then the applicatio=
n MUST reject the certificate.</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal st=
yle=3D'margin-bottom:12.0pt'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"T=
imes New Roman , serif","serif"'><br>This indicates quite clearly that the =
author did <b>not</b> assume that URIs will always have the authority compo=
nent.<br><br>See also <a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/=
current/msg02179.html">http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/current/ms=
g02179.html</a> (&quot;RFC 3280bis and URI schemes without hostname&quot;).=
</span><o:p></o:p></p></blockquote><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font=
-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span=
></p></div></body></html>=

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From: "Piyush Jain" <piyush@ditenity.com>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
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Hi David,

Your interpretation of the text is right on target.
How, based on the past discussions in this WG, that is not the intent.

The sole reason cited for overloading the meaning of revoked status with
non-issued was that it allows new servers to interoperate with legacy
clients. The WG agreed that there are many better alternatives but they all
break compatibility with older clients. In fact, a more secure and complete
proposal by Denis was not adopted because of the same reason.

I believe that Stefan is trying to convey that requiring servers to return
revoked in this context will make them non-compliant with 2560 and 5019 as
opposed to breaking interoperability with legacy clients.

Cheers
-Piyush

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Black, David [mailto:david.black@emc.com]
> Sent: Friday, March 29, 2013 11:18 AM
> To: Piyush Jain; 'Stefan Santesson'; sts@aaa-sec.com; mmyers@fastq.com;
> ambarish@gmail.com; slava.galperin@gmail.com; cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca;
> gen-art@ietf.org
> Cc: pkix@ietf.org; Black, David
> Subject: RE: [pkix] Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
> 
> Hi Piyush,
> 
> The usual backwards compatibility concern is mixed new/legacy
> deployments.
> In this case, the specifics appear to be:
> 
> New clients with legacy servers cannot expect to see "revoked" in this
case.
> This matters because a hypothetical client coded to depend on a "revoked"
> response in this case won't work correctly with legacy servers (even
though
> it'd be rather questionable to code that dependency into a new client -
never
> underestimate the creativity and cleverness of implementers).
> 
> New servers with legacy clients risk breaking clients that can't cope with
> "revoked" in this case, as you noted:
> 
> >>> any other approach would break backward compatibility with legacy
> >>> clients.
> 
> Both of these are justifications for "optional", as these RFCs apply to
both
> clients and servers.
> 
> Thanks,
> --David
> 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Piyush Jain [mailto:piyush@ditenity.com]
> > Sent: Friday, March 29, 2013 1:13 PM
> > To: 'Stefan Santesson'; Black, David; sts@aaa-sec.com;
> > mmyers@fastq.com; ambarish@gmail.com; slava.galperin@gmail.com;
> > cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca; gen- art@ietf.org
> > Cc: pkix@ietf.org
> > Subject: RE: [pkix] Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
> >
> > Not arguing that it should be required. I'm with you on keeping it
optional.
> >
> > It is your statement about backward compatibility to justify it that
> > is incorrect.
> > Backward compatibility "with deployments of RFC2560" is not affected
> > in either case. Legacy clients will continue to work whether you make
> > it required or optional.
> >
> > You probably meant "maintain compliance with RFC 2560 and RFC 5019."
> >
> > -Piyush
> >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com]
> > > Sent: Friday, March 29, 2013 9:37 AM
> > > To: Piyush Jain; 'Black, David'; sts@aaa-sec.com; mmyers@fastq.com;
> > > ambarish@gmail.com; slava.galperin@gmail.com;
> > > cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca; gen-art@ietf.org
> > > Cc: pkix@ietf.org; ietf@ietf.org
> > > Subject: Re: [pkix] Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
> > >
> > > On 3/29/13 5:17 PM, "Piyush Jain" <piyush@ditenity.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > >' "revoked" status is still optional in this context in order to
> > > >maintain backwards compatibility with deployments of RFC 2560.'
> > > >
> > > >I fail to understand this statement about backward compatibility.
> > > >How does "revoked" being "optional/required breaks backward
> > > compatibility?
> > > >The only reason cited in the WG discussions to use revoked for
> > > >"not-issued"
> > > >was that any other approach would break backward compatibility with
> > > >legacy clients. And now the draft says that revoked is optional
> > > >because making it required won't be backward compatible.
> > >
> > > Yes. Making it required would prohibit other valid ways to respond
> > > to this situation that is allowed by RFC 2560 and RFC 5019.
> > > Such as responding "good" or responding with "unauthorized" error.
> > >
> > > >
> > > >And it gives the impression that best course of action for 2560bis
> > > >responders is to start issuing revoked for "not-issued", which is
> > > >far from the originally stated goal to provide a way for CAs to be
> > > >able to return revoked for such serial numbers.
> > >
> > > The latter is what optional means.
> > >
> > > /Stefan
> > >
> >
> >



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To: Piyush Jain <piyush@ditenity.com>, "'Black, David'" <david.black@emc.com>, <sts@aaa-sec.com>, <mmyers@fastq.com>, <ambarish@gmail.com>, <slava.galperin@gmail.com>, <cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca>, <gen-art@ietf.org>
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On 3/29/13 6:12 PM, "Piyush Jain" <piyush@ditenity.com> wrote:

>It is your statement about backward compatibility to justify it that is
>incorrect.
>Backward compatibility "with deployments of RFC2560" is not affected in
>either case. Legacy clients will continue to work whether you make it
>required or optional.

Legacy servers won't

/Stefan



From tmiller@mitre.org  Fri Mar 29 13:19:14 2013
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To: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>, Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>, Piyush Jain <piyush@ditenity.com>, 'pkix' <pkix@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN
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--_000_195DB2510AAA004391F58E28FCE2120008DBFC63IMCMBX01MITREOR_
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If the NC for URIs included the scheme-part, then a NC could apply to a URL=
 (or other URI with a host-part in the hierarchical-part) without impacting=
 a URN (which lacks a hierarchical-part entirely).  Unfortunately I don't s=
ee a way to do this in a backward compatible way.



Alternatively an exclusion clause for the URN scheme in 4.2.1.10 would have=
 a similar effect, but that seems ugly to me.



-- T





________________________________
From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [pkix-bounces@ietf.org] on behalf of Stefan San=
tesson [stefan@aaa-sec.com]
Sent: Friday, March 29, 2013 11:30
To: Santosh Chokhani; Piyush Jain; 'pkix'
Subject: Re: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN

From: Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com<mailto:SChokhani@cygnacom.co=
m>>
Date: Thursday, March 28, 2013 5:24 PM
To: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com<mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com>>, Piyus=
h Jain <piyush@ditenity.com<mailto:piyush@ditenity.com>>, 'pkix' <pkix@ietf=
.org<mailto:pkix@ietf.org>>
Subject: Re: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN

Stefan,

URN by definition do not have =93authority=94 component are not hierarchica=
l.

You are simply parroting what 5280 says and not explaining what the use of =
meaning of doing this is.

May be you should explain how an upstream CA will permit URN and still cons=
train URL.

I wish I could but I can't. Not given the current definition of name constr=
aints.

If you contrain URL in permitted subtree, I can't see given the current sta=
ndard, how you could allow a URN as matching that constraint.
Other than of course stick it into a new otherName instead of the SAN URI.

Maybe that would be your best bet as you in any case can't rely on standard=
 client behaviour to handle this.

/Stefan

--_000_195DB2510AAA004391F58E28FCE2120008DBFC63IMCMBX01MITREOR_
Content-Type: text/html; charset="Windows-1252"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<html dir=3D"ltr">
<head>
<meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3DWindows-1=
252">
<style id=3D"owaParaStyle">P {
	MARGIN-TOP: 0px; MARGIN-BOTTOM: 0px
}
</style>
</head>
<body style=3D"FONT-FAMILY: Calibri,sans-serif; WORD-WRAP: break-word; COLO=
R: rgb(0,0,0); FONT-SIZE: 14px" fPStyle=3D"1" ocsi=3D"0">
<div style=3D"direction: ltr;font-family: Tahoma;color: #000000;font-size: =
10pt;">
<p>If the NC for URIs included the scheme-part, then a NC could apply to a =
URL (or other URI with a host-part in the hierarchical-part) without impact=
ing a URN (which lacks a hierarchical-part entirely).&nbsp;&nbsp;Unfortunat=
ely I don't see&nbsp;a way to do this in a backward
 compatible way.&nbsp; </p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Alternatively an exclusion clause for the URN scheme in 4.2.1.10 would h=
ave a similar effect, but that seems ugly to me.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>-- T&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<div style=3D"FONT-FAMILY: Times New Roman; COLOR: #000000; FONT-SIZE: 16px=
">
<hr tabindex=3D"-1">
<div style=3D"DIRECTION: ltr" id=3D"divRpF398802"><font color=3D"#000000" s=
ize=3D"2" face=3D"Tahoma"><b>From:</b> pkix-bounces@ietf.org [pkix-bounces@=
ietf.org] on behalf of Stefan Santesson [stefan@aaa-sec.com]<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Friday, March 29, 2013 11:30<br>
<b>To:</b> Santosh Chokhani; Piyush Jain; 'pkix'<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN<br>
</font><br>
</div>
<div></div>
<div>
<div><span style=3D"TEXT-ALIGN: left; FONT-FAMILY: Calibri; FONT-SIZE: 11pt=
; FONT-WEIGHT: bold">From:
</span><span style=3D"TEXT-ALIGN: left; FONT-FAMILY: Calibri; FONT-SIZE: 11=
pt">Santosh Chokhani &lt;</span><a style=3D"TEXT-ALIGN: left; FONT-FAMILY: =
Calibri; FONT-SIZE: 11pt" href=3D"mailto:SChokhani@cygnacom.com" target=3D"=
_blank">SChokhani@cygnacom.com</a><span style=3D"TEXT-ALIGN: left; FONT-FAM=
ILY: Calibri; FONT-SIZE: 11pt">&gt;</span></div>
<span id=3D"OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION">
<div style=3D"BORDER-BOTTOM: medium none; TEXT-ALIGN: left; BORDER-LEFT: me=
dium none; PADDING-BOTTOM: 0in; PADDING-LEFT: 0in; PADDING-RIGHT: 0in; FONT=
-FAMILY: Calibri; COLOR: black; FONT-SIZE: 11pt; BORDER-TOP: #b5c4df 1pt so=
lid; BORDER-RIGHT: medium none; PADDING-TOP: 3pt">
<span style=3D"FONT-WEIGHT: bold">Date: </span>Thursday, March 28, 2013 5:2=
4 PM<br>
<span style=3D"FONT-WEIGHT: bold">To: </span>Stefan Santesson &lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com" target=3D"_blank">stefan@aaa-sec.com</a>&gt;=
, Piyush Jain &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:piyush@ditenity.com" target=3D"_blank">=
piyush@ditenity.com</a>&gt;, 'pkix' &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">pkix@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>
<span style=3D"FONT-WEIGHT: bold">Subject: </span>Re: [pkix] URI Name Const=
raint and URN<br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<blockquote style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #b5c4df 5px solid; PADDING-BOTTOM: 0px; M=
ARGIN: 0px 0px 0px 5px; PADDING-LEFT: 5px; PADDING-RIGHT: 0px; PADDING-TOP:=
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<p style=3D"WIDOWS: 2; TEXT-TRANSFORM: none; TEXT-INDENT: 0px; MARGIN: 0in =
0in 0pt; FONT: 11pt Calibri,sans-serif; WHITE-SPACE: normal; ORPHANS: 2; LE=
TTER-SPACING: normal; COLOR: rgb(0,0,0); WORD-SPACING: 0px" class=3D"MsoNor=
mal">
<span style=3D"COLOR: rgb(31,73,125)">Stefan,</span></p>
<p style=3D"WIDOWS: 2; TEXT-TRANSFORM: none; TEXT-INDENT: 0px; MARGIN: 0in =
0in 0pt; FONT: 11pt Calibri,sans-serif; WHITE-SPACE: normal; ORPHANS: 2; LE=
TTER-SPACING: normal; COLOR: rgb(0,0,0); WORD-SPACING: 0px" class=3D"MsoNor=
mal">
<span style=3D"COLOR: rgb(31,73,125)"></span>&nbsp;</p>
<p style=3D"WIDOWS: 2; TEXT-TRANSFORM: none; TEXT-INDENT: 0px; MARGIN: 0in =
0in 0pt; FONT: 11pt Calibri,sans-serif; WHITE-SPACE: normal; ORPHANS: 2; LE=
TTER-SPACING: normal; COLOR: rgb(0,0,0); WORD-SPACING: 0px" class=3D"MsoNor=
mal">
<span style=3D"COLOR: rgb(31,73,125)">URN by definition do not have =93auth=
ority=94 component are not hierarchical.</span></p>
<p style=3D"WIDOWS: 2; TEXT-TRANSFORM: none; TEXT-INDENT: 0px; MARGIN: 0in =
0in 0pt; FONT: 11pt Calibri,sans-serif; WHITE-SPACE: normal; ORPHANS: 2; LE=
TTER-SPACING: normal; COLOR: rgb(0,0,0); WORD-SPACING: 0px" class=3D"MsoNor=
mal">
<span style=3D"COLOR: rgb(31,73,125)"></span>&nbsp;</p>
<p style=3D"WIDOWS: 2; TEXT-TRANSFORM: none; TEXT-INDENT: 0px; MARGIN: 0in =
0in 0pt; FONT: 11pt Calibri,sans-serif; WHITE-SPACE: normal; ORPHANS: 2; LE=
TTER-SPACING: normal; COLOR: rgb(0,0,0); WORD-SPACING: 0px" class=3D"MsoNor=
mal">
<span style=3D"COLOR: rgb(31,73,125)">You are simply parroting what 5280 sa=
ys and not explaining what the use of meaning of doing this is.</span></p>
<p style=3D"WIDOWS: 2; TEXT-TRANSFORM: none; TEXT-INDENT: 0px; MARGIN: 0in =
0in 0pt; FONT: 11pt Calibri,sans-serif; WHITE-SPACE: normal; ORPHANS: 2; LE=
TTER-SPACING: normal; COLOR: rgb(0,0,0); WORD-SPACING: 0px" class=3D"MsoNor=
mal">
<span style=3D"COLOR: rgb(31,73,125)"></span>&nbsp;</p>
<p style=3D"WIDOWS: 2; TEXT-TRANSFORM: none; TEXT-INDENT: 0px; MARGIN: 0in =
0in 0pt; FONT: 11pt Calibri,sans-serif; WHITE-SPACE: normal; ORPHANS: 2; LE=
TTER-SPACING: normal; COLOR: rgb(0,0,0); WORD-SPACING: 0px" class=3D"MsoNor=
mal">
<span style=3D"COLOR: rgb(31,73,125)">May be you should explain how an upst=
ream CA will permit URN and still constrain URL.</span></p>
</blockquote>
</span>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>I wish I could but I can't. Not given the current definition of name c=
onstraints.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>If you contrain URL in permitted subtree, I can't see given the curren=
t standard, how you could allow a URN as matching that constraint.</div>
<div>Other than of course stick it into a new otherName instead of the SAN =
URI.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Maybe that would be your best bet as you in any case can't rely on sta=
ndard client behaviour to handle this.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>/Stefan</div>
</div>
<script id=3D"dstb-id" language=3D"javascript">if(typeof(dstb)!=3D "undefin=
ed"){ dstb();}</script></div>
</div>
</body>
</html>

--_000_195DB2510AAA004391F58E28FCE2120008DBFC63IMCMBX01MITREOR_--

From SChokhani@cygnacom.com  Fri Mar 29 13:25:17 2013
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From: Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>
To: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>, Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>, Piyush Jain <piyush@ditenity.com>, 'pkix' <pkix@ietf.org>
Date: Fri, 29 Mar 2013 16:25:12 -0400
Thread-Topic: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN
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Subject: Re: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN
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--_000_B83745DA469B7847811819C5005244AFF3DC9D48scygexch7cygnac_
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Tim,

I think using URN is risky.  May be the profile owners can be convinced to =
put these name in other names as Stefan suggested and transition over time =
to newer profiles.

From: Miller, Timothy J. [mailto:tmiller@mitre.org]
Sent: Friday, March 29, 2013 4:19 PM
To: Stefan Santesson; Santosh Chokhani; Piyush Jain; 'pkix'
Subject: RE: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN


If the NC for URIs included the scheme-part, then a NC could apply to a URL=
 (or other URI with a host-part in the hierarchical-part) without impacting=
 a URN (which lacks a hierarchical-part entirely).  Unfortunately I don't s=
ee a way to do this in a backward compatible way.



Alternatively an exclusion clause for the URN scheme in 4.2.1.10 would have=
 a similar effect, but that seems ugly to me.



-- T





________________________________
From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org<mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org> [pkix-bounces@iet=
f.org] on behalf of Stefan Santesson [stefan@aaa-sec.com]
Sent: Friday, March 29, 2013 11:30
To: Santosh Chokhani; Piyush Jain; 'pkix'
Subject: Re: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN
From: Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com<mailto:SChokhani@cygnacom.co=
m>>
Date: Thursday, March 28, 2013 5:24 PM
To: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com<mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com>>, Piyus=
h Jain <piyush@ditenity.com<mailto:piyush@ditenity.com>>, 'pkix' <pkix@ietf=
.org<mailto:pkix@ietf.org>>
Subject: Re: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and URN

Stefan,

URN by definition do not have "authority" component are not hierarchical.

You are simply parroting what 5280 says and not explaining what the use of =
meaning of doing this is.

May be you should explain how an upstream CA will permit URN and still cons=
train URL.

I wish I could but I can't. Not given the current definition of name constr=
aints.

If you contrain URL in permitted subtree, I can't see given the current sta=
ndard, how you could allow a URN as matching that constraint.
Other than of course stick it into a new otherName instead of the SAN URI.

Maybe that would be your best bet as you in any case can't rely on standard=
 client behaviour to handle this.

/Stefan

--_000_B83745DA469B7847811819C5005244AFF3DC9D48scygexch7cygnac_
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</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=3DEN-US link=3Dblue vli=
nk=3Dpurple><div class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'f=
ont-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>Tim,<o:p>=
</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-=
family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p=
 class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","s=
ans-serif";color:#1F497D'>I think using URN is risky.&nbsp; May be the prof=
ile owners can be convinced to put these name in other names as Stefan sugg=
ested and transition over time to newer profiles.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p c=
lass=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","san=
s-serif";color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><div><div style=3D'bord=
er:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=
=3DMsoNormal><b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-=
serif"'>From:</span></b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma=
","sans-serif"'> Miller, Timothy J. [mailto:tmiller@mitre.org] <br><b>Sent:=
</b> Friday, March 29, 2013 4:19 PM<br><b>To:</b> Stefan Santesson; Santosh=
 Chokhani; Piyush Jain; 'pkix'<br><b>Subject:</b> RE: [pkix] URI Name Const=
raint and URN<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&n=
bsp;</o:p></p><div><p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",=
"sans-serif";color:black'>If the NC for URIs included the scheme-part, then=
 a NC could apply to a URL (or other URI with a host-part in the hierarchic=
al-part) without impacting a URN (which lacks a hierarchical-part entirely)=
.&nbsp;&nbsp;Unfortunately I don't see&nbsp;a way to do this in a backward =
compatible way.&nbsp; <o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span style=3D'font-size:10.=
0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif";color:black'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span>=
</p><p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif";co=
lor:black'>Alternatively an exclusion clause for the URN scheme in 4.2.1.10=
 would have a similar effect, but that seems ugly to me.<o:p></o:p></span><=
/p><p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif";col=
or:black'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;fo=
nt-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif";color:black'>-- T&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></=
p><p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif";colo=
r:black'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;fon=
t-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif";color:black'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p><di=
v><div class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dcenter style=3D'text-align:center'><span s=
tyle=3D'color:black'><hr size=3D2 width=3D"100%" align=3Dcenter></span></di=
v><div id=3DdivRpF398802><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-bottom:12.0pt=
'><b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif";colo=
r:black'>From:</span></b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahom=
a","sans-serif";color:black'> <a href=3D"mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org">pkix=
-bounces@ietf.org</a> [pkix-bounces@ietf.org] on behalf of Stefan Santesson=
 [stefan@aaa-sec.com]<br><b>Sent:</b> Friday, March 29, 2013 11:30<br><b>To=
:</b> Santosh Chokhani; Piyush Jain; 'pkix'<br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [pkix] U=
RI Name Constraint and URN</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></s=
pan></p></div><div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span style=3D'font-size:11=
.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>From: </span></b><span=
 style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>=
Santosh Chokhani &lt;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><a href=3D"mailto:S=
Chokhani@cygnacom.com" target=3D"_blank"><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;fo=
nt-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>SChokhani@cygnacom.com</span></a></span><=
span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:bla=
ck'>&gt;</span><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div=
 style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in =
0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"C=
alibri","sans-serif";color:black'>Date: </span></b><span style=3D'font-size=
:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>Thursday, March 28,=
 2013 5:24 PM<br><b>To: </b>Stefan Santesson &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:stefan@a=
aa-sec.com" target=3D"_blank">stefan@aaa-sec.com</a>&gt;, Piyush Jain &lt;<=
a href=3D"mailto:piyush@ditenity.com" target=3D"_blank">piyush@ditenity.com=
</a>&gt;, 'pkix' &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">pki=
x@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br><b>Subject: </b>Re: [pkix] URI Name Constraint and UR=
N<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color=
:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><blockquote style=3D'border:none;=
border-left:solid #B5C4DF 4.5pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 4.0pt;margin-left:3.75p=
t;margin-right:0in' id=3D"MAC_OUTLOOK_ATTRIBUTION_BLOCKQUOTE"><p class=3DMs=
oNormal style=3D'WIDOWS: 2;ORPHANS: 2;word-spacing:0px'><span style=3D'font=
-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>Stefan,</spa=
n><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:=
black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'WIDOWS: 2;ORPHAN=
S: 2;word-spacing:0px'><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri=
","sans-serif";color:black'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNorma=
l style=3D'WIDOWS: 2;ORPHANS: 2;word-spacing:0px'><span style=3D'font-size:=
11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>URN by definition =
do not have &#8220;authority&#8221; component are not hierarchical.</span><=
span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:bla=
ck'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'WIDOWS: 2;ORPHANS: =
2;word-spacing:0px'><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","=
sans-serif";color:black'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal s=
tyle=3D'WIDOWS: 2;ORPHANS: 2;word-spacing:0px'><span style=3D'font-size:11.=
0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>You are simply parrot=
ing what 5280 says and not explaining what the use of meaning of doing this=
 is.</span><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-seri=
f";color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'WIDOWS:=
 2;ORPHANS: 2;word-spacing:0px'><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family=
:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=
=3DMsoNormal style=3D'WIDOWS: 2;ORPHANS: 2;word-spacing:0px'><span style=3D=
'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497D'>May be =
you should explain how an upstream CA will permit URN and still constrain U=
RL.</span><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif=
";color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p></blockquote><div><p class=3DMsoNormal=
><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p clas=
s=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:black'>I wish I could but I can't. Not g=
iven the current definition of name constraints.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div=
><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></s=
pan></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:black'>If you =
contrain URL in permitted subtree, I can't see given the current standard, =
how you could allow a URN as matching that constraint.<o:p></o:p></span></p=
></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:black'>Other than of =
course stick it into a new otherName instead of the SAN URI.<o:p></o:p></sp=
an></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p>&nb=
sp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:bl=
ack'>Maybe that would be your best bet as you in any case can't rely on sta=
ndard client behaviour to handle this.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p c=
lass=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></=
div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:black'>/Stefan<o:p></o:p=
></span></p></div></div></div></div></div></body></html>=

--_000_B83745DA469B7847811819C5005244AFF3DC9D48scygexch7cygnac_--

From internet-drafts@ietf.org  Fri Mar 29 13:34:22 2013
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Subject: [pkix] I-D Action: draft-ietf-pkix-est-06.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts director=
ies.
 This draft is a work item of the Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) Working=
 Group of the IETF.

	Title           : Enrollment over Secure Transport
	Author(s)       : Max Pritikin
                          Peter E. Yee
                          Dan Harkins
	Filename        : draft-ietf-pkix-est-06.txt
	Pages           : 49
	Date            : 2013-03-29

Abstract:
   This document profiles certificate enrollment for clients using
   Certificate Management over CMS (CMC) messages over a secure
   transport.  This profile, called Enrollment over Secure Transport
   (EST), describes a simple yet functional certificate management
   protocol targeting Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) clients that need
   to acquire client certificates and associated Certification Authority
   (CA) certificate(s).  It also supports client-generated public/
   private key pairs as well as key pairs generated by the CA.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-pkix-est

There's also a htmlized version available at:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-pkix-est-06

A diff from the previous version is available at:
http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-pkix-est-06


Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/


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From: "Piyush Jain" <piyush@ditenity.com>
To: "'Stefan Santesson'" <stefan@aaa-sec.com>, "'Black, David'" <david.black@emc.com>, <sts@aaa-sec.com>, <mmyers@fastq.com>, <ambarish@gmail.com>, <slava.galperin@gmail.com>, <cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca>, <gen-art@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
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Not sure if I understand.
Are you saying legacy servers won't work with 2560bis clients?

> On 3/29/13 6:12 PM, "Piyush Jain" <piyush@ditenity.com> wrote:
> 
> >It is your statement about backward compatibility to justify it that is
> >incorrect.
> >Backward compatibility "with deployments of RFC2560" is not affected in
> >either case. Legacy clients will continue to work whether you make it
> >required or optional.
> 
> Legacy servers won't
> 
> /Stefan
> 



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From: "Piyush Jain" <piyush@ditenity.com>
To: <pkix@ietf.org>
Date: Fri, 29 Mar 2013 16:42:47 -0700
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Subject: [pkix] Extended Validation Certificate OIDs
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Hi list,

It seems that every CA that issues an EV certificate today uses a different
certificate policy OID to indicate extended validation.
Is there a reason why EV OID is not standardized?


Thanks
-Piyush


From stefan@aaa-sec.com  Fri Mar 29 17:21:03 2013
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From: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>
To: Piyush Jain <piyush@ditenity.com>, "'Black, David'" <david.black@emc.com>, <sts@aaa-sec.com>, <mmyers@fastq.com>, <ambarish@gmail.com>, <slava.galperin@gmail.com>, <cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca>, <gen-art@ietf.org>
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Legacy servers would not comply with RFC2560bis IF revoked response for
non issued certs would be required.

/Stefan

On 3/29/13 10:06 PM, "Piyush Jain" <piyush@ditenity.com> wrote:

>Not sure if I understand.
>Are you saying legacy servers won't work with 2560bis clients?
>
>> On 3/29/13 6:12 PM, "Piyush Jain" <piyush@ditenity.com> wrote:
>> 
>> >It is your statement about backward compatibility to justify it that is
>> >incorrect.
>> >Backward compatibility "with deployments of RFC2560" is not affected in
>> >either case. Legacy clients will continue to work whether you make it
>> >required or optional.
>> 
>> Legacy servers won't
>> 
>> /Stefan
>> 
>
>



From yngve@spec-work.net  Fri Mar 29 17:39:35 2013
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Extended Validation Certificate OIDs
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On Sat, 30 Mar 2013 00:42:47 +0100, Piyush Jain <piyush@ditenity.com>  
wrote:

> Hi list,
>
> It seems that every CA that issues an EV certificate today uses a  
> different
> certificate policy OID to indicate extended validation.
> Is there a reason why EV OID is not standardized?

Each browser able to recognize EV certificates enable each Root  
*individually* as being able to issue EV certificates, this is based on  
evaluation of audits for the Root CA and agreements between the Root CA  
and the browser vendor. For that reason it does not really matter which  
OID is used, so each CA can obtain their own OID. It is also not desirable  
that any CA can insert an OID and be automatically considered to have  
issued an EV certificate.

In addition, theoretically, every subordinate CA under an EV-enabled Root  
can be provided with a distinct EV-OID different from the EV-OID(s) used  
by any other subordinate CA under that root, with the EV-OID being  
filtered in the certificate of the subordinate CA. This system (which is  
not actually in use) would allow a CA to ask the browsers to turn off EV  
for a specific subordinate CA that is (for whatever reason) no longer  
qualified to issue EV certificates, without affecting the other  
subordinate CAs or revoking that subordinate CA's certificate.

At present I am aware of one case where a CA is using two EV-OIDs, one for  
general sites, and one for a special class of certificates issued to  
government sites in that country.


-- 
Sincerely,
Yngve N. Pettersen

Using Opera's mail client: http://www.opera.com/mail/

From piyush@ditenity.com  Fri Mar 29 17:55:30 2013
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From: "Piyush Jain" <piyush@ditenity.com>
To: "'Stefan Santesson'" <stefan@aaa-sec.com>, "'Black, David'" <david.black@emc.com>, <sts@aaa-sec.com>, <mmyers@fastq.com>, <ambarish@gmail.com>, <slava.galperin@gmail.com>, <cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca>, <gen-art@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
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Agreed.

The text, however incorrectly states 
"revoked" status is still optional in this context in order to maintain
backwards compatibility with deployments of RFC 2560.'

Please note the subtle difference between being backward compatible with
deployments and being compliant with standards.

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:stefan@aaa-sec.com]
> Sent: Friday, March 29, 2013 5:21 PM
> To: Piyush Jain; 'Black, David'; sts@aaa-sec.com; mmyers@fastq.com;
> ambarish@gmail.com; slava.galperin@gmail.com; cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca;
> gen-art@ietf.org
> Cc: pkix@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [pkix] Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
> 
> Legacy servers would not comply with RFC2560bis IF revoked response for
> non issued certs would be required.
> 
> /Stefan
> 
> On 3/29/13 10:06 PM, "Piyush Jain" <piyush@ditenity.com> wrote:
> 
> >Not sure if I understand.
> >Are you saying legacy servers won't work with 2560bis clients?
> >
> >> On 3/29/13 6:12 PM, "Piyush Jain" <piyush@ditenity.com> wrote:
> >>
> >> >It is your statement about backward compatibility to justify it that
> >> >is incorrect.
> >> >Backward compatibility "with deployments of RFC2560" is not affected
> >> >in either case. Legacy clients will continue to work whether you
> >> >make it required or optional.
> >>
> >> Legacy servers won't
> >>
> >> /Stefan
> >>
> >
> >
> 



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From: "Piyush Jain" <piyush@ditenity.com>
To: "'Yngve N. Pettersen'" <yngve@spec-work.net>, <pkix@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Extended Validation Certificate OIDs
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Thank Yngve.

Am I correct to assume that the EV certificates are only issued to servers
and browsers are the only known clients that make use of such certificates?
I'm investigating the possibility of making use of EV status in closed
environments where trust in the CA is established through a bridge and
direct mapping of CA root to EV OID is not available to the RP.

I guess the correct approach in this case would be to define yet another EV
OID and propagate the EV information through policy mapping extensions in
certs issued by the bridge.

-Piyush

> -----Original Message-----
> From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
> Yngve N. Pettersen
> Sent: Friday, March 29, 2013 5:39 PM
> To: pkix@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [pkix] Extended Validation Certificate OIDs
> 
> On Sat, 30 Mar 2013 00:42:47 +0100, Piyush Jain <piyush@ditenity.com>
> wrote:
> 
> > Hi list,
> >
> > It seems that every CA that issues an EV certificate today uses a
> > different certificate policy OID to indicate extended validation.
> > Is there a reason why EV OID is not standardized?
> 
> Each browser able to recognize EV certificates enable each Root
> *individually* as being able to issue EV certificates, this is based on
> evaluation of audits for the Root CA and agreements between the Root CA
> and the browser vendor. For that reason it does not really matter which
OID
> is used, so each CA can obtain their own OID. It is also not desirable
that any
> CA can insert an OID and be automatically considered to have issued an EV
> certificate.
> 
> In addition, theoretically, every subordinate CA under an EV-enabled Root
> can be provided with a distinct EV-OID different from the EV-OID(s) used
by
> any other subordinate CA under that root, with the EV-OID being filtered
in
> the certificate of the subordinate CA. This system (which is not actually
in
> use) would allow a CA to ask the browsers to turn off EV for a specific
> subordinate CA that is (for whatever reason) no longer qualified to issue
EV
> certificates, without affecting the other subordinate CAs or revoking that
> subordinate CA's certificate.
> 
> At present I am aware of one case where a CA is using two EV-OIDs, one for
> general sites, and one for a special class of certificates issued to
government
> sites in that country.
> 
> 
> --
> Sincerely,
> Yngve N. Pettersen
> 
> Using Opera's mail client: http://www.opera.com/mail/
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix


From yngve@spec-work.net  Fri Mar 29 19:01:51 2013
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Extended Validation Certificate OIDs
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On Sat, 30 Mar 2013 02:08:40 +0100, Piyush Jain <piyush@ditenity.com>  
wrote:

> Thank Yngve.
>
> Am I correct to assume that the EV certificates are only issued to  
> servers
> and browsers are the only known clients that make use of such  
> certificates?

There is also an EV spec for Object signing, and it is AFAIK used by  
security features in Windows 8.

> I'm investigating the possibility of making use of EV status in closed
> environments where trust in the CA is established through a bridge and
> direct mapping of CA root to EV OID is not available to the RP.

It is generally not possible to create your own private EV Root CA and get  
it accepted by browsers, unless you go through the route of getting your  
Root embedded in the client Rootstores, which require annual audits under  
WebTrust or ETSI for both Normal CA and Extended Validation.

The only client that I am aware of that allow local control of the EV OID  
information is Windows Vista (MSIE) and newer, through special enterprise  
configuration mechanisms.

In all other cases I believe the information is hardcoded in the  
executable, or as in the case of Opera, distributed in a digitally signed  
format. These restrictions exist because of the strict requirements for  
being allowed to issue EV certificates and to enable the EV indication.

As for the most realistic options for acceptance in all browsers, you  
probably need to either establish an EV-enabled enterprise account with  
one of the recognized CAs or buy a Subordinate CA certificate from one  
that is allowed to issue EV certificates (which would require the full  
audit regime)

> I guess the correct approach in this case would be to define yet another  
> EV
> OID and propagate the EV information through policy mapping extensions in
> certs issued by the bridge.
>
> -Piyush
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
>> Yngve N. Pettersen
>> Sent: Friday, March 29, 2013 5:39 PM
>> To: pkix@ietf.org
>> Subject: Re: [pkix] Extended Validation Certificate OIDs
>>
>> On Sat, 30 Mar 2013 00:42:47 +0100, Piyush Jain <piyush@ditenity.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>> > Hi list,
>> >
>> > It seems that every CA that issues an EV certificate today uses a
>> > different certificate policy OID to indicate extended validation.
>> > Is there a reason why EV OID is not standardized?
>>
>> Each browser able to recognize EV certificates enable each Root
>> *individually* as being able to issue EV certificates, this is based on
>> evaluation of audits for the Root CA and agreements between the Root CA
>> and the browser vendor. For that reason it does not really matter which
> OID
>> is used, so each CA can obtain their own OID. It is also not desirable
> that any
>> CA can insert an OID and be automatically considered to have issued an  
>> EV
>> certificate.
>>
>> In addition, theoretically, every subordinate CA under an EV-enabled  
>> Root
>> can be provided with a distinct EV-OID different from the EV-OID(s) used
> by
>> any other subordinate CA under that root, with the EV-OID being filtered
> in
>> the certificate of the subordinate CA. This system (which is not  
>> actually
> in
>> use) would allow a CA to ask the browsers to turn off EV for a specific
>> subordinate CA that is (for whatever reason) no longer qualified to  
>> issue
> EV
>> certificates, without affecting the other subordinate CAs or revoking  
>> that
>> subordinate CA's certificate.
>>
>> At present I am aware of one case where a CA is using two EV-OIDs, one  
>> for
>> general sites, and one for a special class of certificates issued to
> government
>> sites in that country.
>>
>>
>> --
>> Sincerely,
>> Yngve N. Pettersen
>>
>> Using Opera's mail client: http://www.opera.com/mail/
>> _______________________________________________
>> pkix mailing list
>> pkix@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>


-- 
Sincerely,
Yngve N. Pettersen

Using Opera's mail client: http://www.opera.com/mail/

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On 3/30/13 1:55 AM, "Piyush Jain" <piyush@ditenity.com> wrote:

>Agreed.
>
>The text, however incorrectly states
>"revoked" status is still optional in this context in order to maintain
>backwards compatibility with deployments of RFC 2560.'
>
>Please note the subtle difference between being backward compatible with
>deployments and being compliant with standards.

No I don't get it. And I'm really trying.

This is what backward compatibility of a standard is.
A standard is backwards compatible if any valid implementation of the old
standard is also a valid implementation of the revised standard.

/Stefan



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> This is what backward compatibility of a standard is.
> A standard is backwards compatible if any valid implementation of the old
> standard is also a valid implementation of the revised standard.

And I always thought that compatibility applies to implementations.

Anyway, I'm pasting David's interpretation of the text that he sent in one
of the messages in this thread. I would appreciate it if you can share you
thoughts on this interpretation.
If this is how most people see it, they would conclude that both clients and
server would need to be updated together if servers start returning revoked
for non-issued. I know that this is not what you trying to convey.
 

Pasted from David's message
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
"The usual backwards compatibility concern is mixed new/legacy deployments.
In this case, the specifics appear to be:
New clients with legacy servers cannot expect to see "revoked" in this case.
This matters because a hypothetical client coded to depend on a "revoked"
response in this case won't work correctly with legacy servers (even though
it'd be rather questionable to code that dependency into a new client -
never underestimate the creativity and cleverness of implementers).
New servers with legacy clients risk breaking clients that can't cope with
"revoked" in this case, as you noted:"
End
~~~





From david.black@emc.com  Sat Mar 30 19:04:29 2013
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From: "Black, David" <david.black@emc.com>
To: Piyush Jain <piyush@ditenity.com>, "'Stefan Santesson'" <stefan@aaa-sec.com>, "sts@aaa-sec.com" <sts@aaa-sec.com>, "mmyers@fastq.com" <mmyers@fastq.com>, "ambarish@gmail.com" <ambarish@gmail.com>, "slava.galperin@gmail.com" <slava.galperin@gmail.com>, "cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca" <cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca>
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Date: Sat, 30 Mar 2013 22:03:11 -0400
Thread-Topic: [pkix] Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
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References: <023401ce2ce1$44448cd0$cccda670$@ditenity.com> <CD7D3A0F.5F1AA%stefan@aaa-sec.com>, <033001ce2daa$2826e150$7874a3f0$@ditenity.com>
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Cc: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>, "Black, David" <david.black@emc.com>
Subject: Re: [pkix] Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15
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> Anyway, I'm pasting David's interpretation of the text that he sent in on=
e
> of the messages in this thread. I would appreciate it if you can share yo=
u
> thoughts on this interpretation.
> If this is how most people see it, they would conclude that both clients =
and
> server would need to be updated together if servers start returning revok=
ed
> for non-issued. I know that this is not what you trying to convey.
I don't think that's a good inference ... but this is getting confusing, so
let's go back to the beginning.

An important consideration is that "revoked" is defined in RFC 2560, so all
existing clients have to be able to cope with that response, independent of
whether they comply with 2560 or 2560bis.  They apparently do cope just fin=
e,
as Piyush wrote:

> Legacy clients will continue to work whether you make it required or opti=
onal.
What's new is that there's an additional case, non-issued certificate
serial number, where a 2560bis server could return "revoked" but
a 2560 server will never return "revoked".  OTOH, use of "revoked"
can't be required in this case for the reasons described in Stefan's
new text in 2560bis.

That would appear to lead to the following:

- Server (responder) use of "revoked" for non-issued certificate
    serial numbers is optional for the reasons that Stefan described,
    but suggested when possible because it reduces the likelihood
    of relying parties falling back to CRLs by comparison to use of
    "unknown".  I'm carefully avoiding use of "SHOULD" here.
- Clients (requesters) MUST NOT depend on receiving "revoked" for
    non-issued certificate numbers because servers that comply
    with RFC 2560 won't do that.  According to Piyush, all existing
    deployed clients already meet this "MUST NOT" requirement, so
    nothing else is needed.

Stefan's text in -16 covers the first point.  The second point could
be added for additional explanation, but it would need to go outside
the "NOTE:" due to its use of "MUST NOT."

Thanks,
--David

________________________________
From: Piyush Jain [piyush@ditenity.com]
Sent: Saturday, March 30, 2013 8:53 PM
To: 'Stefan Santesson'; Black, David; sts@aaa-sec.com; mmyers@fastq.com; am=
barish@gmail.com; slava.galperin@gmail.com; cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca
Cc: pkix@ietf.org
Subject: RE: [pkix] Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15

> This is what backward compatibility of a standard is.
> A standard is backwards compatible if any valid implementation of the old
> standard is also a valid implementation of the revised standard.

And I always thought that compatibility applies to implementations.

Anyway, I'm pasting David's interpretation of the text that he sent in one
of the messages in this thread. I would appreciate it if you can share you
thoughts on this interpretation.
If this is how most people see it, they would conclude that both clients an=
d
server would need to be updated together if servers start returning revoked
for non-issued. I know that this is not what you trying to convey.


Pasted from David's message
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
"The usual backwards compatibility concern is mixed new/legacy deployments.
In this case, the specifics appear to be:
New clients with legacy servers cannot expect to see "revoked" in this case=
.
This matters because a hypothetical client coded to depend on a "revoked"
response in this case won't work correctly with legacy servers (even though
it'd be rather questionable to code that dependency into a new client -
never underestimate the creativity and cleverness of implementers).
New servers with legacy clients risk breaking clients that can't cope with
"revoked" in this case, as you noted:"
End
~~~






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<BODY ocsi=3D"x">
<DIV dir=3Dltr><FONT size=3D2 face=3D"courier new">&gt; Anyway, I'm pasting=
 David's interpretation of the text that he sent in one<BR>&gt; of the mess=
ages in this thread. I would appreciate it if you can share you<BR>&gt; tho=
ughts on this interpretation.<BR>&gt; If this is how most people see it, th=
ey would conclude that both clients and<BR>&gt; server would need to be upd=
ated together if servers start returning revoked<BR>&gt; for non-issued. I =
know that this is not what you trying to convey.<BR></FONT></DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr><FONT size=3D2 face=3D"courier new"><FONT face=3D"courier ne=
w">I don't think that's a good inference ... but this is getting confusing,=
 so</FONT></FONT></DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr><FONT size=3D2 face=3D"courier new"><FONT face=3D"courier ne=
w">let's go back to the </FONT></FONT><FONT size=3D2 face=3D"courier new"><=
FONT face=3D"courier new">beginning.</FONT></FONT></DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr><FONT size=3D2 face=3D"courier new"><FONT face=3D"courier ne=
w"></FONT></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr><FONT size=3D2 face=3D"courier new"><FONT face=3D"courier ne=
w"><FONT face=3D"courier new">An important consideration is that&nbsp;</FON=
T></FONT></FONT><FONT size=3D2 face=3D"courier new">"revoked" is defined in=
 RFC 2560, so all</FONT></DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr><FONT size=3D2 face=3D"courier new">existing </FONT><FONT si=
ze=3D2 face=3D"courier new">clients </FONT><FONT size=3D2 face=3D"courier n=
ew">have to be able to </FONT><FONT size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New">c<FONT fa=
ce=3D"courier new">ope with that response, independent of</FONT></FONT></DI=
V>
<DIV dir=3Dltr><FONT size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><FONT face=3D"courier ne=
w">whether </FONT></FONT><FONT size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><FONT face=3D"=
courier new">they comply with </FONT></FONT><FONT size=3D2 face=3D"courier =
new">2560 or 2560bis.&nbsp; They apparently do cope just fine,</FONT></DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr><FONT size=3D2 face=3D"courier new">as&nbsp;</FONT><FONT siz=
e=3D2 face=3D"courier new"><FONT size=3D2 face=3D"courier new">Piyush</FONT=
><A target=3D_blank></A> wrote:</FONT></DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr><FONT size=3D2 face=3D"courier new"></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr>&gt; Legacy clients will continue to work whether you make i=
t&nbsp;required or optional.<BR></DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr><FONT size=3D2 face=3D"courier new">What's new is that there=
's an additional case, non-issued certificate</FONT></DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr><FONT size=3D2 face=3D"courier new"><FONT face=3D"courier ne=
w">serial number,</FONT>&nbsp;where a 2560bis server </FONT><FONT size=3D2 =
face=3D"Courier New">could <FONT face=3D"courier new">return "revoked" but<=
/FONT></FONT></DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr><FONT size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><FONT face=3D"courier ne=
w">a 2560&nbsp;server will never return "revoked".&nbsp;&nbsp;</FONT></FONT=
><FONT size=3D2 face=3D"courier new">OTOH, use of </FONT><FONT size=3D2 fac=
e=3D"courier new">"revoked"</FONT></DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr><FONT size=3D2 face=3D"courier new">can't be </FONT><FONT si=
ze=3D2 face=3D"Courier New">re<FONT face=3D"courier new">quired in this cas=
e for the reasons described </FONT></FONT><FONT size=3D2 face=3D"Courier Ne=
w"><FONT face=3D"courier new">in Stefan's</FONT></FONT></DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr><FONT size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New"><FONT face=3D"courier ne=
w">new text in 2560bis.</FONT></FONT></DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr><FONT size=3D2 face=3D"courier new">That would appear to lea=
d to the following:</FONT></DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr><FONT size=3D2 face=3D"courier new"></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr><FONT size=3D2 face=3D"courier new">- Server (responder)&nbs=
p;use of "revoked" for non-issued certificate</FONT></DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr><FONT size=3D2 face=3D"courier new"><FONT face=3D"courier ne=
w">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </FONT>serial numbers</FONT><FONT size=3D2 face=3D"co=
urier new"> is optional for the reasons that Stefan described</FONT><FONT s=
ize=3D2 face=3D"courier new">,</FONT></DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr><FONT size=3D2 face=3D"courier new"><FONT face=3D"courier ne=
w">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </FONT>but suggested when possible&nbsp;</FONT><FONT =
size=3D2 face=3D"courier new">because it reduces the likelihood</FONT></DIV=
>
<DIV dir=3Dltr><FONT size=3D2 face=3D"courier new"><FONT face=3D"courier ne=
w">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </FONT>of relying parties&nbsp;</FONT><FONT size=3D2 =
face=3D"courier new">falling back to</FONT><FONT size=3D2><FONT face=3D"cou=
rier new"> CRLs by comparison to use of</FONT></FONT></DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr><FONT size=3D2><FONT face=3D"courier new"><FONT face=3D"cour=
ier new">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; "unknown"</FONT>.&nbsp; I'm carefully avoiding =
use of "SHOULD" here.</FONT></FONT></DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr><FONT size=3D2 face=3D"courier new">- Clients (requesters) M=
UST NOT depend on receiving "revoked" for</FONT></DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr><FONT size=3D2 face=3D"courier new"><FONT face=3D"courier ne=
w">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</FONT>non-issued&nbsp;</FONT><FONT size=3D2 fac=
e=3D"courier new">certificate numbers because&nbsp;servers that comply</FON=
T></DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr><FONT size=3D2 face=3D"courier new"><FONT face=3D"courier ne=
w">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </FONT>with RFC 2560&nbsp;</FONT><FONT size=3D2 face=
=3D"courier new">won't&nbsp;do that.</FONT><FONT size=3D2 face=3D"courier n=
ew">&nbsp; According to Piyush<A target=3D_blank></A>, all e</FONT><FONT si=
ze=3D2 face=3D"courier new">xisting</FONT></DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr><FONT size=3D2 face=3D"courier new"><FONT face=3D"courier ne=
w">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </FONT>deployed clients</FONT><FONT size=3D2 face=3D"=
courier new"><FONT face=3D"courier new">&nbsp;</FONT>already</FONT><FONT si=
ze=3D2 face=3D"courier new"><FONT face=3D"courier new"> </FONT>meet&nbsp;</=
FONT><FONT size=3D2 face=3D"courier new">this&nbsp;</FONT><FONT size=3D2 fa=
ce=3D"courier new">"MUST NOT" requirement, so</FONT></DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr><FONT size=3D2 face=3D"courier new"><FONT face=3D"courier ne=
w">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </FONT>nothing else is needed.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr><FONT size=3D2 face=3D"courier new"></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr><FONT size=3D2 face=3D"courier new">Stefan's text in -16 cov=
ers the first point.&nbsp; The second point could</FONT></DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr><FONT size=3D2 face=3D"courier new">be added for additional =
explanation, but it would need to go outside</FONT></DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr><FONT size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New">t<FONT face=3D"courier n=
ew">he "NOTE:" due to its use of "MUST NOT."</FONT></FONT></DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr><FONT size=3D2 face=3D"courier new"></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr><FONT size=3D2 face=3D"Courier New">Thanks,</FONT></DIV>
<DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2 face=3D"courier new">--David</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3D"Courier New"><FONT size=3D2></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV></FONT></=
DIV>
<DIV style=3D"DIRECTION: ltr" id=3DdivRpF555>
<HR tabIndex=3D-1>
<FONT color=3D#000000 size=3D2 face=3DTahoma><B>From:</B> Piyush Jain [piyu=
sh@ditenity.com]<BR><B>Sent:</B> Saturday, March 30, 2013 8:53 PM<BR><B>To:=
</B> 'Stefan Santesson'; Black, David; sts@aaa-sec.com; mmyers@fastq.com; a=
mbarish@gmail.com; slava.galperin@gmail.com; cadams@eecs.uottawa.ca<BR><B>C=
c:</B> pkix@ietf.org<BR><B>Subject:</B> RE: [pkix] Gen-ART review of draft-=
ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-15<BR></FONT><BR></DIV>
<DIV></DIV><FONT size=3D2>
<DIV class=3DPlainText>&gt; This is what backward compatibility of a standa=
rd is.<BR>&gt; A standard is backwards compatible if any valid implementati=
on of the old<BR>&gt; standard is also a valid implementation of the revise=
d standard.<BR><BR>And I always thought that compatibility applies to imple=
mentations.<BR><BR>Anyway, I'm pasting David's interpretation of the text t=
hat he sent in one<BR>of the messages in this thread. I would appreciate it=
 if you can share you<BR>thoughts on this interpretation.<BR>If this is how=
 most people see it, they would conclude that both clients and<BR>server wo=
uld need to be updated together if servers start returning revoked<BR>for n=
on-issued. I know that this is not what you trying to convey.<BR>&nbsp;<BR>=
<BR>Pasted from David's message<BR>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~<BR>"The usual bac=
kwards compatibility concern is mixed new/legacy deployments.<BR>In this ca=
se, the specifics appear to be:<BR>New clients with legacy servers cannot e=
xpect to see "revoked" in this case.<BR>This matters because a hypothetical=
 client coded to depend on a "revoked"<BR>response in this case won't work =
correctly with legacy servers (even though<BR>it'd be rather questionable t=
o code that dependency into a new client -<BR>never underestimate the creat=
ivity and cleverness of implementers).<BR>New servers with legacy clients r=
isk breaking clients that can't cope with<BR>"revoked" in this case, as you=
 noted:"<BR>End<BR>~~~<BR><BR><BR><BR><BR><BR></DIV></FONT></BODY></HTML>

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