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I am out of the office until 19/08/2014.


Me encuentro fuera de la oficina hasta el 19/08/2014.
Si se trata de alguna cuesti=F3n urgente, por favor, escriba a
enrique.crespo@safelayer.com o a support@safelayer.com

I am out of the office until 19/08/2014
For any urgent matters, please contact enrique.crespo@safelayer.com or
support@safelayer.com



Note: This is an automated response to your message  "pkix Digest, Vol =
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From nobody Tue Aug  5 23:34:08 2014
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Subject: [pkix] [Editorial Errata Reported] RFC6844 (4070)
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The following errata report has been submitted for RFC6844,
"DNS Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) Resource Record".

--------------------------------------
You may review the report below and at:
http://www.rfc-editor.org/errata_search.php?rfc=6844&eid=4070

--------------------------------------
Type: Editorial
Reported by: JINMEI Tatuya <jinmei@wide.ad.jp>

Section: 3

Original Text
-------------
   $ORIGIN example.com
   .       CAA 0 issue "ca.example.net"


Corrected Text
--------------
   $ORIGIN example.com.
           CAA 0 issue "ca.example.net"


Notes
-----
The original text is obviously incorrect (or at least something not really intended) in that the owner name is absolute.  It just doesn't make sense to use $ORIGIN if we use an absolute owner name for the actual RR.  The "corrected text" is one representation of what I guess the author really intended.

There are other instances of the same kind of this error in this section, but I don't bother to list all of them as it should be obvious and the sense of the "fix" should be the same.

Instructions:
-------------
This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please
use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or
rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party (IESG)
can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary. 

--------------------------------------
RFC6844 (draft-ietf-pkix-caa-15)
--------------------------------------
Title               : DNS Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) Resource Record
Publication Date    : January 2013
Author(s)           : P. Hallam-Baker, R. Stradling
Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
Source              : Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509)
Area                : Security
Stream              : IETF
Verifying Party     : IESG


From nobody Wed Aug  6 02:19:52 2014
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From: "Erik Andersen" <era@x500.eu>
To: "'Sill, Alan'" <alan.sill@ttu.edu>
References: <000b01cfa1bc$b6872ef0$23958cd0$@x500.eu> <53C85314.3040102@yaanatech.com> <42131021-11E3-4806-9C05-0D6F40190A1C@ttu.edu>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] X.509 whitelist proposal
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Hi Alan,

 

Thanks for your comments. My proposal is a very initial proposal. I was just
eager to see reaction to the general approach.

 

I has primarily been concerned with the case where a RP only have 1-2 ms to
validate a received a PDU, meaning that the validation has to happen a
thousand times faster than in a traditional Web environment.

 

I will be very happy to receive some of the solutions you have seen work in
practice. I am always open to new ideas.

 

Kind regards,

 

Erik

 

Fra: Sill, Alan [mailto:alan.sill@ttu.edu] 
Sendt: 31. juli 2014 23:17
Til: Erik Andersen
Cc: Sill, Alan; stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie; pkix@ietf.org; wpkops@ietf.org;
tony@yaanatech.com
Emne: Re: [pkix] X.509 whitelist proposal

 

Erik, 

 

With the desire to wind this discussion back to its actual content and avoid
for the present further discussion of procedures, let me say that the use
case proposed is a familiar one in the world of extended use of PKI as an
authentication piece of access control systems in distributed infrastructure
environments. 

 

The solution invariably is to implement a separate authorization layer that
can work with the existing certificate infrastructure, which is out or scope
as a work item for any of the proposed groups.

 

My personal belief is that this is not worth pursuing in its present form. I
would be happy, off-list or on an individual basis, to pass on some of the
solutions that I have seen work in practice in distributed computational,
storage and other related control settings, some of which can be achieved
within the existing X.509 settings through the use, for example, of time
limited or otherwise membership-limited extended attribute certificates.

 

My suggestion, with great respect and due deference to its proposers, is to
drop the referenced proposal until exploration of appropriate authorization
technologies has been done and again offer to have that discussion off these
lists or on a different one.

 

Alan Sill, TTU

VP of Standards, Open Grid Forum

 

On Jul 18, 2014, at 12:49 AM, Tony Rutkowski <tony@yaanatech.com
<mailto:tony@yaanatech.com> > wrote:





Hi Steve,

The note below was distributed earlier on the ITU-T SG17
sub-group Q11/17 list by the group's rapporteur.  It might
be useful to gauge industry reaction in IETF and CA/B
Forum venues.

Note that although the document appears on an ITU-T
template, it has not been submitted.   In addition, although
the source is indicated as "Denmark," it is not apparent
that the source is any other than than the rapporteur 
himself, who is identified as the contact.  Lastly, although
the note asserts that "IEC TC57 WG15 (smart grid 
security) has requested the inclusion of whitelist 
support in X.509," there is no apparent liaison to
this effect.

--tony



-------- Original Message -------- 


Subject:

[T17Q11] X.509 whitelist support


Date:

Thu, 17 Jul 2014 14:43:30 +0200


From:

Erik Andersen  <mailto:era@x500.eu> <era@x500.eu>


To:

Directory list  <mailto:x500standard@freelists.org>
<x500standard@freelists.org>, SG17-Q11  <mailto:T13sg17q11@lists.itu.int>
<T13sg17q11@lists.itu.int>


CC:

SG17-Q10  <mailto:t13sg17q10@lists.itu.int> <t13sg17q10@lists.itu.int>

 

IEC TC57 WG15 (smart grid security) has requested the inclusion of whitelist
support in X.509. A preliminary proposal for such a feature may be found as
<http://www.x500standard.com/uploads/extensions/whitelistInX509.pdf>
http://www.x500standard.com/uploads/extensions/whitelistInX509.pdf

 

The feature may in some way be combined with the trust broker concept, which
probably will involve a number of changes.

 

As it is quite important that we have workable solution, any comment is
welcome. I hope you will find the time to review the proposal before it is
submitted to ITU-T.

 

Kind regards,

 

Erik

 


<whitelistInX509.pdf>_______________________________________________
pkix mailing list
 <mailto:pkix@ietf.org> pkix@ietf.org
 <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix>
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix

 


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lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D;mso-fareast-language:EN-US'>Hi Alan,<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D;mso-fareast-language:EN-US'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D;mso-fareast-language:EN-US'>Thanks for your comments. My proposal is a =
very initial proposal. I was just eager to see reaction to the general =
approach.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D;mso-fareast-language:EN-US'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D;mso-fareast-language:EN-US'>I has primarily been concerned with the =
case where a RP only have 1-2 ms to validate a received a PDU, meaning =
that the validation has to happen a thousand times faster than in a =
traditional Web environment.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D;mso-fareast-language:EN-US'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D;mso-fareast-language:EN-US'>I will be very happy to receive some of =
the solutions you have seen work in practice. I am always open to new =
ideas.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D;mso-fareast-language:EN-US'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D;mso-fareast-language:EN-US'>Kind regards,<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
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class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D;mso-fareast-language:EN-US'>Erik<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
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</b><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'> =
Sill, Alan [mailto:alan.sill@ttu.edu] <br><b>Sendt:</b> 31. juli 2014 =
23:17<br><b>Til:</b> Erik Andersen<br><b>Cc:</b> Sill, Alan; =
stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie; pkix@ietf.org; wpkops@ietf.org; =
tony@yaanatech.com<br><b>Emne:</b> Re: [pkix] X.509 whitelist =
proposal<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>Erik, =
<o:p></o:p></p><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>With the desire to wind this discussion back to its =
actual content and avoid for the present further discussion of =
procedures, let me say that the use case proposed is a familiar one in =
the world of extended use of PKI as an authentication piece of access =
control systems in distributed infrastructure environments. =
<o:p></o:p></p><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>The solution invariably is to implement a separate =
authorization layer that can work with the existing certificate =
infrastructure, which is out or scope as a work item for any of the =
proposed groups.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>My personal belief is that this is not worth pursuing =
in its present form. I would be happy, off-list or on an individual =
basis, to pass on some of the solutions that I have seen work in =
practice in distributed computational, storage and other related control =
settings, some of which can be achieved within the existing X.509 =
settings through the use, for example, of time limited or otherwise =
membership-limited extended attribute =
certificates.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>My suggestion, with great respect and due deference to =
its proposers, is to drop the referenced proposal until exploration of =
appropriate authorization technologies has been done and again offer to =
have that discussion off these lists or on a different =
one.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>Alan Sill, TTU<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>VP of Standards, Open Grid =
Forum<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>On Jul 18, 2014, at 12:49 AM, Tony Rutkowski &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:tony@yaanatech.com">tony@yaanatech.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:<o:p></o:p></p></div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><br><br><o:p></o:p></p><blockquote =
style=3D'margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt'><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Helvetica","sans-serif"'>Hi =
Steve,<br><br>The note below was distributed earlier on the ITU-T =
SG17<br>sub-group Q11/17 list by the group's rapporteur.&nbsp; It =
might<br>be useful to gauge industry reaction in IETF and CA/B<br>Forum =
venues.<br><br>Note that although the document appears on an =
ITU-T<br>template, it has not been submitted.&nbsp;&nbsp; In addition, =
although<br>the source is indicated as &quot;Denmark,&quot; it is not =
apparent<br>that the source is any other than than the rapporteur<span =
class=3Dapple-converted-space>&nbsp;</span><br>himself, who is =
identified as the contact.&nbsp; Lastly, although<br>the note asserts =
that &quot;IEC TC57 WG15 (smart grid<span =
class=3Dapple-converted-space>&nbsp;</span><br>security) has requested =
the inclusion of whitelist<span =
class=3Dapple-converted-space>&nbsp;</span><br>support in X.509,&quot; =
there is no apparent liaison to<br>this =
effect.<br><br>--tony<o:p></o:p></span></p><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Helvetica","sans-serif"'><br><br>--=
------ Original Message -------- <o:p></o:p></span></p><table =
class=3DMsoNormalTable border=3D0 cellspacing=3D0 =
cellpadding=3D0><tr><td nowrap valign=3Dtop style=3D'padding:0cm 0cm 0cm =
0cm'><p class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dright =
style=3D'text-align:right'><b>Subject:<o:p></o:p></b></p></td><td =
style=3D'padding:0cm 0cm 0cm 0cm'><p class=3DMsoNormal>[T17Q11] X.509 =
whitelist support<o:p></o:p></p></td></tr><tr><td nowrap valign=3Dtop =
style=3D'padding:0cm 0cm 0cm 0cm'><p class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dright =
style=3D'text-align:right'><b>Date:<o:p></o:p></b></p></td><td =
style=3D'padding:0cm 0cm 0cm 0cm'><p class=3DMsoNormal>Thu, 17 Jul 2014 =
14:43:30 +0200<o:p></o:p></p></td></tr><tr><td nowrap valign=3Dtop =
style=3D'padding:0cm 0cm 0cm 0cm'><p class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dright =
style=3D'text-align:right'><b>From:<o:p></o:p></b></p></td><td =
style=3D'padding:0cm 0cm 0cm 0cm'><p class=3DMsoNormal>Erik =
Andersen<span class=3Dapple-converted-space>&nbsp;</span><a =
href=3D"mailto:era@x500.eu"><span =
style=3D'color:#954F72'>&lt;era@x500.eu&gt;</span></a><o:p></o:p></p></td=
></tr><tr><td nowrap valign=3Dtop style=3D'padding:0cm 0cm 0cm 0cm'><p =
class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dright =
style=3D'text-align:right'><b>To:<o:p></o:p></b></p></td><td =
style=3D'padding:0cm 0cm 0cm 0cm'><p class=3DMsoNormal>Directory =
list<span class=3Dapple-converted-space>&nbsp;</span><a =
href=3D"mailto:x500standard@freelists.org"><span =
style=3D'color:#954F72'>&lt;x500standard@freelists.org&gt;</span></a>, =
SG17-Q11<span class=3Dapple-converted-space>&nbsp;</span><a =
href=3D"mailto:T13sg17q11@lists.itu.int"><span =
style=3D'color:#954F72'>&lt;T13sg17q11@lists.itu.int&gt;</span></a><o:p><=
/o:p></p></td></tr><tr><td nowrap valign=3Dtop style=3D'padding:0cm 0cm =
0cm 0cm'><p class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dright =
style=3D'text-align:right'><b>CC:<o:p></o:p></b></p></td><td =
style=3D'padding:0cm 0cm 0cm 0cm'><p class=3DMsoNormal>SG17-Q10<span =
class=3Dapple-converted-space>&nbsp;</span><a =
href=3D"mailto:t13sg17q10@lists.itu.int"><span =
style=3D'color:#954F72'>&lt;t13sg17q10@lists.itu.int&gt;</span></a><o:p><=
/o:p></p></td></tr></table><p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'margin-bottom:12.0pt'><span =
style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Helvetica","sans-serif"'><o:p>&nbsp=
;</o:p></span></p><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>IEC TC57 =
WG15 (smart grid security) has requested the inclusion of whitelist =
support in X.509. A preliminary proposal for such a feature may be found =
as<span class=3Dapple-converted-space>&nbsp;</span><a =
href=3D"http://www.x500standard.com/uploads/extensions/whitelistInX509.pd=
f"><span =
style=3D'color:#954F72'>http://www.x500standard.com/uploads/extensions/wh=
itelistInX509.pdf</span></a></span><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'><o:p></o:p>=
</span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>&nbsp;</spa=
n><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'><o:p></o:p>=
</span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>The =
feature may in some way be combined with the trust broker concept, which =
probably will involve a number of changes.</span><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'><o:p></o:p>=
</span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>&nbsp;</spa=
n><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'><o:p></o:p>=
</span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>As it is =
quite important that we have workable solution, any comment is welcome. =
I hope you will find the time to review the proposal before it is =
submitted to ITU-T.</span><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'><o:p></o:p>=
</span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>&nbsp;</spa=
n><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'><o:p></o:p>=
</span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>Kind =
regards,</span><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'><o:p></o:p>=
</span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>&nbsp;</spa=
n><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'><o:p></o:p>=
</span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-US =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>Erik</span>=
<span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'><o:p></o:p>=
</span></p></div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Helvetica","sans-serif"'><o:p>&nbsp=
;</o:p></span></p></div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Helvetica","sans-serif"'><br>&lt;wh=
itelistInX509.pdf&gt;_______________________________________________<br>p=
kix mailing list<br><a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org"><span =
style=3D'color:#954F72'>pkix@ietf.org</span></a><br><a =
href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix"><span =
style=3D'color:#954F72'>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix</span>=
</a><o:p></o:p></span></p></div></blockquote></div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div></div></div></body></html>
------=_NextPart_000_0031_01CFB168.52102A60--


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From: "Sill, Alan" <alan.sill@ttu.edu>
To: Erik Andersen <era@x500.eu>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] X.509 whitelist proposal
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Subject: Re: [pkix] X.509 whitelist proposal
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Erik, thanks for the reply and questions.

The situations that I describe for comparison are derived from automated gr=
id processing environments, in which it is not unusual to have tens of thou=
sands of processes start at once and also to need a very fast locally-based=
 system for authorization based on strong identity.

The classic grid security infrastructure (GSI) works by use of limited-life=
time extended attribute certificate proxies obtained in advance of the oper=
ation from authorization servers operated by virtual organizations (VOs). A=
uthorization occurs locally, based on a pre-defined list of DNs kept up to =
date out of band to establish membership in a VO.

To make this work, a certificate can be obtained from any CA within the tru=
st network, but must be registered ahead of use into the VO membership serv=
er (called a VOMS server) to establish that the DN of that certificate is i=
n the authorized list. Prior to use in an X.509 secured environment, the us=
er obtains a limited-lifetime proxy by presenting the certificate to the VO=
MS server and getting back a proxy containing the EAC fields.

When the proxy is presented to the end-point of use, the list of authorized=
 DNs for that proxy is checked, along with the validity of the EAC fields. =
This allows a cryptographically strong assurance that the DN is in the auth=
orized list for operations on that endpoint.

Subtleties that have evolved over time allow expression of groups and roles=
 to be carried by the proxy, so that a given certificate by itself can be a=
ssociated with different operations at different end points. Thus not only =
membership in the VO, but what that particular DN is allowed to assert that=
 it can do, can all be controlled with very fast local verification of auth=
orization based on the proxy presented.

Overall this is essentially as fast as presenting a straight X.509 certific=
ate, but allows much finer control over local authorization for particular =
operations by that DN.

I think it is one option among many that might work in your environment. Th=
ere are also options in which the proxy is generated and/or held on behalf =
of the user by an intermediary server, called a MyProxy server, that can be=
 deployed in various environments to simplify the proxy operations on behal=
f of a certificate holder (either human or automated); and there are also o=
ptions in which the entire X.509 infrastructure can be handled automaticall=
y or tied into other secure identity systems, but the above captures the ba=
sic workflow with regard to how membership and local authorization can be h=
andled quickly through the X.509 components.

In point of practice, most local authorization servers communicate with the=
 resources in their vicinity using XACML over SAML to handle local assertio=
ns at speed, which works well in environments up to many tens of thousands =
of local relying resources. The communication between these local authoriza=
tion servers and the central VOMS server to update membership lists is also=
 done securely at low update rates (typically a few to many times per day) =
to synchronize the DNs, groups and roles for the VO membership lists.

A starting point for learning more on this might be http://www.ogf.org/docu=
ments/GFD.78.pdf -- the Grid Security Infrastructure Message Specification.=
 You may also wish to read http://www.ogf.org/documents/GFD.189.pdf -- Rely=
ing Party Defined Namespace Constraints Policies in a Policy Bridge PKI Env=
ironment, http://www.ogf.org/documents/GFD.125.pdf -- the Grid Certificate =
Profile (shortly to be revised to GFD.225 with recent updates), and http://=
www.ogf.org/documents/GFD.182.pdf -- the VOMS Attribute Certificate Format.

These are just my opinions but are intended to answer your questions and I =
hope will provide background for my suggestion that a local authorization s=
ystem based on strong authentication can work to meet your needs in a distr=
ibuted environment.

Feel free to contact me offline and best regards,
Alan



On Aug 6, 2014, at 11:19 AM, Erik Andersen <era@x500.eu<mailto:era@x500.eu>=
> wrote:

Hi Alan,

Thanks for your comments. My proposal is a very initial proposal. I was jus=
t eager to see reaction to the general approach.

I has primarily been concerned with the case where a RP only have 1-2 ms to=
 validate a received a PDU, meaning that the validation has to happen a tho=
usand times faster than in a traditional Web environment.

I will be very happy to receive some of the solutions you have seen work in=
 practice. I am always open to new ideas.

Kind regards,

Erik

Fra: Sill, Alan [mailto:alan.sill@ttu.edu]
Sendt: 31. juli 2014 23:17
Til: Erik Andersen
Cc: Sill, Alan; stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie<mailto:stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>=
; pkix@ietf.org<mailto:pkix@ietf.org>; wpkops@ietf.org<mailto:wpkops@ietf.o=
rg>; tony@yaanatech.com<mailto:tony@yaanatech.com>
Emne: Re: [pkix] X.509 whitelist proposal

Erik,

With the desire to wind this discussion back to its actual content and avoi=
d for the present further discussion of procedures, let me say that the use=
 case proposed is a familiar one in the world of extended use of PKI as an =
authentication piece of access control systems in distributed infrastructur=
e environments.

The solution invariably is to implement a separate authorization layer that=
 can work with the existing certificate infrastructure, which is out or sco=
pe as a work item for any of the proposed groups.

My personal belief is that this is not worth pursuing in its present form. =
I would be happy, off-list or on an individual basis, to pass on some of th=
e solutions that I have seen work in practice in distributed computational,=
 storage and other related control settings, some of which can be achieved =
within the existing X.509 settings through the use, for example, of time li=
mited or otherwise membership-limited extended attribute certificates.

My suggestion, with great respect and due deference to its proposers, is to=
 drop the referenced proposal until exploration of appropriate authorizatio=
n technologies has been done and again offer to have that discussion off th=
ese lists or on a different one.

Alan Sill, TTU
VP of Standards, Open Grid Forum

On Jul 18, 2014, at 12:49 AM, Tony Rutkowski <tony@yaanatech.com<mailto:ton=
y@yaanatech.com>> wrote:


Hi Steve,

The note below was distributed earlier on the ITU-T SG17
sub-group Q11/17 list by the group's rapporteur.  It might
be useful to gauge industry reaction in IETF and CA/B
Forum venues.

Note that although the document appears on an ITU-T
template, it has not been submitted.   In addition, although
the source is indicated as "Denmark," it is not apparent
that the source is any other than than the rapporteur
himself, who is identified as the contact.  Lastly, although
the note asserts that "IEC TC57 WG15 (smart grid
security) has requested the inclusion of whitelist
support in X.509," there is no apparent liaison to
this effect.

--tony


-------- Original Message --------
Subject:

[T17Q11] X.509 whitelist support

Date:

Thu, 17 Jul 2014 14:43:30 +0200

From:

Erik Andersen <era@x500.eu><mailto:era@x500.eu>

To:

Directory list <x500standard@freelists.org><mailto:x500standard@freelists.o=
rg>, SG17-Q11 <T13sg17q11@lists.itu.int><mailto:T13sg17q11@lists.itu.int>

CC:

SG17-Q10 <t13sg17q10@lists.itu.int><mailto:t13sg17q10@lists.itu.int>


IEC TC57 WG15 (smart grid security) has requested the inclusion of whitelis=
t support in X.509. A preliminary proposal for such a feature may be found =
as http://www.x500standard.com/uploads/extensions/whitelistInX509.pdf

The feature may in some way be combined with the trust broker concept, whic=
h probably will involve a number of changes.

As it is quite important that we have workable solution, any comment is wel=
come. I hope you will find the time to review the proposal before it is sub=
mitted to ITU-T.

Kind regards,

Erik


<whitelistInX509.pdf>_______________________________________________
pkix mailing list
pkix@ietf.org<mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix


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<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3Dus-ascii"=
>
</head>
<body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-lin=
e-break: after-white-space;">
Erik, thanks for the reply and questions.
<div><br>
</div>
<div>The situations that I describe for comparison are derived from automat=
ed grid processing environments, in which it is not unusual to have tens of=
 thousands of processes start at once and also to need a very fast locally-=
based system for authorization based
 on strong identity.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>The classic grid security infrastructure (GSI) works by use of limited=
-lifetime extended attribute certificate proxies obtained in advance of the=
 operation from authorization servers operated by virtual organizations (VO=
s). Authorization occurs locally,
 based on a pre-defined list of DNs kept up to date out of band to establis=
h membership in a VO.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>To make this work, a certificate can be obtained from any CA within th=
e trust network, but must be registered ahead of use into the VO membership=
 server (called a VOMS server) to establish that the DN of that certificate=
 is in the authorized list. Prior
 to use in an X.509 secured environment, the user obtains a limited-lifetim=
e proxy by presenting the certificate to the VOMS server and getting back a=
 proxy containing the EAC fields.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>When the proxy is presented to the end-point of use, the list of autho=
rized DNs for that proxy is checked, along with the validity of the EAC fie=
lds. This allows a cryptographically strong assurance that the DN is in the=
 authorized list for operations
 on that endpoint.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Subtleties that have evolved over time allow expression of groups and =
roles to be carried by the proxy, so that a given certificate by itself can=
 be associated with different operations at different end points. Thus not =
only membership in the VO, but what
 that particular DN is allowed to assert that it can do, can all be control=
led with very fast local verification of authorization based on the proxy p=
resented.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Overall this is essentially as fast as presenting a straight X.509 cer=
tificate, but allows much finer control over local authorization for partic=
ular operations by that DN.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>I think it is one option among many that might work in your environmen=
t. There are also options in which the proxy is generated and/or held on be=
half of the user by an intermediary server, called a MyProxy server, that c=
an be deployed in various environments
 to simplify the proxy operations on behalf of a certificate holder (either=
 human or automated); and there are also options in which the entire X.509 =
infrastructure can be handled automatically or tied into other secure ident=
ity systems, but the above captures
 the basic workflow with regard to how membership and local authorization c=
an be handled quickly through the X.509 components.&nbsp;</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>In point of practice, most local authorization servers communicate wit=
h the resources in their vicinity using XACML over SAML to handle local ass=
ertions at speed, which works well in environments up to many tens of thous=
ands of local relying resources.
 The communication between these local authorization servers and the centra=
l VOMS server to update membership lists is also done securely at low updat=
e rates (typically a few to many times per day) to synchronize the DNs, gro=
ups and roles for the VO membership
 lists.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>A starting point for learning more on this might be&nbsp;<a href=3D"ht=
tp://www.ogf.org/documents/GFD.78.pdf">http://www.ogf.org/documents/GFD.78.=
pdf</a> -- the&nbsp;Grid Security Infrastructure Message Specification. You=
 may also wish to read&nbsp;<a href=3D"http://www.ogf.org/documents/GFD.189=
.pdf">http://www.ogf.org/documents/GFD.189.pdf</a>
 --&nbsp;Relying Party Defined Namespace Constraints Policies in a Policy B=
ridge PKI Environment,&nbsp;<a href=3D"http://www.ogf.org/documents/GFD.125=
.pdf">http://www.ogf.org/documents/GFD.125.pdf</a> -- the Grid Certificate =
Profile (shortly to be revised to GFD.225 with
 recent updates), and&nbsp;<a href=3D"http://www.ogf.org/documents/GFD.182.=
pdf">http://www.ogf.org/documents/GFD.182.pdf</a> -- the VOMS Attribute Cer=
tificate Format.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>These are just my opinions but are intended to answer your questions a=
nd I hope will provide background for my suggestion that a local authorizat=
ion system based on strong authentication can work to meet your needs in a =
distributed environment.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Feel free to contact me offline and best regards,</div>
<div>Alan</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
<div>
<div>On Aug 6, 2014, at 11:19 AM, Erik Andersen &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:era@x=
500.eu">era@x500.eu</a>&gt; wrote:</div>
<br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline">
<blockquote type=3D"cite">
<div lang=3D"DA" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple" style=3D"font-family: Helve=
tica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weigh=
t: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; orphans: auto; text=
-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal;=
 widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;">
<div class=3D"WordSection1" style=3D"page: WordSection1;">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);">Hi Alan,<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);">Thanks for your comments. My proposal is a =
very initial proposal. I was just eager to see reaction to the general appr=
oach.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);">I has primarily been concerned with the cas=
e where a RP only have 1-2 ms to validate a received a PDU, meaning that th=
e validation has to happen a thousand
 times faster than in a traditional Web environment.<o:p></o:p></span></div=
>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);">I will be very happy to receive some of the=
 solutions you have seen work in practice. I am always open to new ideas.<o=
:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);">Kind regards,<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);">Erik<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif; color: rgb(31, 73, 125);">&nbsp;</span></div>
<div>
<div style=3D"border-style: solid none none; border-top-color: rgb(225, 225=
, 225); border-top-width: 1pt; padding: 3pt 0cm 0cm;">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;">
<b><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;">Fra:<=
/span></b><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;=
"><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>Sill, Alan [<a href=3D=
"mailto:alan.sill@ttu.edu">mailto:alan.sill@ttu.edu</a>]<span class=3D"Appl=
e-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><br>
<b>Sendt:</b><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>31. juli 20=
14 23:17<br>
<b>Til:</b><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>Erik Andersen=
<br>
<b>Cc:</b><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>Sill, Alan; <a=
 href=3D"mailto:stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie">
stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie</a>; <a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.o=
rg</a>; <a href=3D"mailto:wpkops@ietf.org">
wpkops@ietf.org</a>; <a href=3D"mailto:tony@yaanatech.com">tony@yaanatech.c=
om</a><br>
<b>Emne:</b><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>Re: [pkix] X=
.509 whitelist proposal<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;">
<o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;">
Erik,<o:p></o:p></div>
<div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;">
<o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></div>
</div>
<div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;">
With the desire to wind this discussion back to its actual content and avoi=
d for the present further discussion of procedures, let me say that the use=
 case proposed is a familiar one in the world of extended use of PKI as an =
authentication piece of access control
 systems in distributed infrastructure environments.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;">
<o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></div>
</div>
<div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;">
The solution invariably is to implement a separate authorization layer that=
 can work with the existing certificate infrastructure, which is out or sco=
pe as a work item for any of the proposed groups.<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;">
<o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></div>
</div>
<div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;">
My personal belief is that this is not worth pursuing in its present form. =
I would be happy, off-list or on an individual basis, to pass on some of th=
e solutions that I have seen work in practice in distributed computational,=
 storage and other related control
 settings, some of which can be achieved within the existing X.509 settings=
 through the use, for example, of time limited or otherwise membership-limi=
ted extended attribute certificates.<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;">
<o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></div>
</div>
<div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;">
My suggestion, with great respect and due deference to its proposers, is to=
 drop the referenced proposal until exploration of appropriate authorizatio=
n technologies has been done and again offer to have that discussion off th=
ese lists or on a different one.<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;">
<o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></div>
</div>
<div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;">
Alan Sill, TTU<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;">
VP of Standards, Open Grid Forum<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;">
<o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;">
On Jul 18, 2014, at 12:49 AM, Tony Rutkowski &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:tony@yaa=
natech.com" style=3D"color: purple; text-decoration: underline;">tony@yaana=
tech.com</a>&gt; wrote:<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;">
<br>
<br>
<o:p></o:p></div>
<blockquote style=3D"margin-top: 5pt; margin-bottom: 5pt;">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;">
<span style=3D"font-size: 9pt; font-family: Helvetica, sans-serif;">Hi Stev=
e,<br>
<br>
The note below was distributed earlier on the ITU-T SG17<br>
sub-group Q11/17 list by the group's rapporteur.&nbsp; It might<br>
be useful to gauge industry reaction in IETF and CA/B<br>
Forum venues.<br>
<br>
Note that although the document appears on an ITU-T<br>
template, it has not been submitted.&nbsp;&nbsp; In addition, although<br>
the source is indicated as &quot;Denmark,&quot; it is not apparent<br>
that the source is any other than than the rapporteur<span class=3D"apple-c=
onverted-space">&nbsp;</span><br>
himself, who is identified as the contact.&nbsp; Lastly, although<br>
the note asserts that &quot;IEC TC57 WG15 (smart grid<span class=3D"apple-c=
onverted-space">&nbsp;</span><br>
security) has requested the inclusion of whitelist<span class=3D"apple-conv=
erted-space">&nbsp;</span><br>
support in X.509,&quot; there is no apparent liaison to<br>
this effect.<br>
<br>
--tony<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;">
<span style=3D"font-size: 9pt; font-family: Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br>
<br>
-------- Original Message --------<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<table class=3D"MsoNormalTable" border=3D"0" cellspacing=3D"0" cellpadding=
=3D"0">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td nowrap=3D"" valign=3D"top" style=3D"padding: 0cm;">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif; text-align: right;">
<b>Subject:<o:p></o:p></b></div>
</td>
<td style=3D"padding: 0cm;">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;">
[T17Q11] X.509 whitelist support<o:p></o:p></div>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td nowrap=3D"" valign=3D"top" style=3D"padding: 0cm;">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif; text-align: right;">
<b>Date:<o:p></o:p></b></div>
</td>
<td style=3D"padding: 0cm;">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;">
Thu, 17 Jul 2014 14:43:30 &#43;0200<o:p></o:p></div>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td nowrap=3D"" valign=3D"top" style=3D"padding: 0cm;">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif; text-align: right;">
<b>From:<o:p></o:p></b></div>
</td>
<td style=3D"padding: 0cm;">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;">
Erik Andersen<span class=3D"apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><a href=3D"=
mailto:era@x500.eu" style=3D"color: purple; text-decoration: underline;"><s=
pan style=3D"color: rgb(149, 79, 114);">&lt;era@x500.eu&gt;</span></a><o:p>=
</o:p></div>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td nowrap=3D"" valign=3D"top" style=3D"padding: 0cm;">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif; text-align: right;">
<b>To:<o:p></o:p></b></div>
</td>
<td style=3D"padding: 0cm;">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;">
Directory list<span class=3D"apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><a href=3D=
"mailto:x500standard@freelists.org" style=3D"color: purple; text-decoration=
: underline;"><span style=3D"color: rgb(149, 79, 114);">&lt;x500standard@fr=
eelists.org&gt;</span></a>, SG17-Q11<span class=3D"apple-converted-space">&=
nbsp;</span><a href=3D"mailto:T13sg17q11@lists.itu.int" style=3D"color: pur=
ple; text-decoration: underline;"><span style=3D"color: rgb(149, 79, 114);"=
>&lt;T13sg17q11@lists.itu.int&gt;</span></a><o:p></o:p></div>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td nowrap=3D"" valign=3D"top" style=3D"padding: 0cm;">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif; text-align: right;">
<b>CC:<o:p></o:p></b></div>
</td>
<td style=3D"padding: 0cm;">
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;">
SG17-Q10<span class=3D"apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><a href=3D"mailt=
o:t13sg17q10@lists.itu.int" style=3D"color: purple; text-decoration: underl=
ine;"><span style=3D"color: rgb(149, 79, 114);">&lt;t13sg17q10@lists.itu.in=
t&gt;</span></a><o:p></o:p></div>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 12pt; font-size: 12pt; font=
-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;">
<span style=3D"font-size: 9pt; font-family: Helvetica, sans-serif;">&nbsp;<=
/span></p>
<div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif;">IEC TC57 WG15 (smart grid security) has requested the inclusion of w=
hitelist support in X.509. A preliminary proposal for such a feature may be=
 found as<span class=3D"apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><a href=3D"http=
://www.x500standard.com/uploads/extensions/whitelistInX509.pdf" style=3D"co=
lor: purple; text-decoration: underline;"><span style=3D"color: rgb(149, 79=
, 114);">http://www.x500standard.com/uploads/extensions/whitelistInX509.pdf=
</span></a></span><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, san=
s-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif;">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, s=
ans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif;">The feature may in some way be combined with the trust broker concep=
t, which probably will involve a number of changes.</span><span style=3D"fo=
nt-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif;">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, s=
ans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif;">As it is quite important that we have workable solution, any comment=
 is welcome. I hope you will find the time to review the proposal before it=
 is submitted to ITU-T.</span><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: =
Calibri, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif;">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, s=
ans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif;">Kind regards,</span><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Cal=
ibri, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif;">&nbsp;</span><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, s=
ans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;">
<span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-s=
erif;">Erik</span><span style=3D"font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, san=
s-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;">
<span style=3D"font-size: 9pt; font-family: Helvetica, sans-serif;">&nbsp;<=
/span></div>
</div>
<div style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Time=
s New Roman', serif;">
<span style=3D"font-size: 9pt; font-family: Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br>
&lt;whitelistInX509.pdf&gt;_______________________________________________<=
br>
pkix mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org" style=3D"color: purple; text-decoration: u=
nderline;"><span style=3D"color: rgb(149, 79, 114);">pkix@ietf.org</span></=
a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix" style=3D"color: purp=
le; text-decoration: underline;"><span style=3D"color: rgb(149, 79, 114);">=
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix</span></a></span></div>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
<br>
</div>
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Subject: [pkix] [Editorial Errata Reported] RFC4210 (4078)
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The following errata report has been submitted for RFC4210,
"Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)".

--------------------------------------
You may review the report below and at:
http://www.rfc-editor.org/errata_search.php?rfc=4210&eid=4078

--------------------------------------
Type: Editorial
Reported by: Lijun Liao <lijun.liao@gmail.com>

Section: 5.3.4

Original Text
-------------
     CertOrEncCert ::= CHOICE {
         certificate     [0] Certificate,
         encryptedCert   [1] EncryptedValue
     }

Corrected Text
--------------
     CertOrEncCert ::= CHOICE {
         certificate     [0] CMPCertificate,
         encryptedCert   [1] EncryptedValue
     }

Notes
-----
The definition of CertOrEncCert in Section 5.3.4 and Appendix F of CertOrEncCert differs.

Instructions:
-------------
This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please
use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or
rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party (IESG)
can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary. 

--------------------------------------
RFC4210 (draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2510bis-09)
--------------------------------------
Title               : Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)
Publication Date    : September 2005
Author(s)           : C. Adams, S. Farrell, T. Kause, T. Mononen
Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
Source              : Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509)
Area                : Security
Stream              : IETF
Verifying Party     : IESG


From nobody Tue Aug 12 11:08:36 2014
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Subject: [pkix] Fwd: I-D Action: draft-turner-cmc-serverkeygeneration-02.txt
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Here=92s an updated draft that addresses comments we received from Peter =
Yee, fixes up some things the authors noted, and adds an ASN.1 module.  =
If you have comments please let us know: =
draft-turner-cmc-serverkeygeneration@tools.ietf.org.

spt

Begin forwarded message:

> From: internet-drafts@ietf.org
> Subject: I-D Action: draft-turner-cmc-serverkeygeneration-02.txt
> Date: August 12, 2014 at 14:04:35 EDT
> To: i-d-announce@ietf.org
> Reply-To: internet-drafts@ietf.org
>=20
>=20
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts =
directories.
>=20
>=20
>        Title           : CMC (Certificate Management over =
Cryptographic Message Syntax) Extensions: Server-Side Key Generation
>        Authors         : Jim Schaad
>                          Sean Turner
>                          Paul Timmel
> 	Filename        : draft-turner-cmc-serverkeygeneration-02.txt
> 	Pages           : 49
> 	Date            : 2014-08-12
>=20
> Abstract:
>   This document defines a set of extensions to the Certificate
>   Management over Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMC) protocol that
>   addresses the desire to support server-side generation of client key
>   material for certificates.  This service is provided by the
>   definition of additional control statements within the CMC
>   architecture.  Additional CMC errors are also defined.
>=20
>=20
> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-turner-cmc-serverkeygeneration/
>=20
> There's also a htmlized version available at:
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-turner-cmc-serverkeygeneration-02
>=20
> A diff from the previous version is available at:
> =
http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-turner-cmc-serverkeygeneration-02=

>=20
>=20
> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of =
submission
> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>=20
> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>=20
> _______________________________________________
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> Internet-Draft directories: http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html
> or ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt


From nobody Wed Aug 13 21:46:46 2014
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Date: Thu, 14 Aug 2014 06:46:23 +0200
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Hi Max,

Did you find any new useful PKIX tasks?
Edwards/DJB curves seem to be discussed everywhere so it should be an excellent target!
Microsoft has also released a bunch of new curves.
You will need to correlate with CRFG, WebCrypto, TLS, and JOSE.

Anders


From nobody Thu Aug 14 04:33:11 2014
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Anders,

Discussions of public key algorithms are the province of the CFRG, not PKIX.


Steve


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On 2014-08-14 13:33, Stephen Kent wrote:
> Anders,
>
> Discussions of public key algorithms are the province of the CFRG, not PKIX.

Of course.

But the inclusion of new algorithms in X.509 structures sounds
like a PKI(X)-like task.

Anders

>
>
> Steve
>
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>


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Subject: Re: [pkix] Edwards/DJB curves - New PKI(X) work?
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Anders Rundgren wrote on 14.08.2014 13:36:
> But the inclusion of new algorithms in X.509 structures sounds
> like a PKI(X)-like task.
> 

Well, "new algorithms" is not exactly the right term for introducing a new curve representation; it's rather a new
semantic of public keys, digital signatures and cryptograms. (There are some people on the CFRG advocating
standardization of simplified ECC-based signature algorithms, like Schnorr signatures, but currently, the discussion
focuses on curves and their representation.) But essentially, you are right: if we want to use new semantics in PKIX,
new specs for X.509 certs / CRLs, for CMS etc. would be needed.

However, it is yet too early for action. It is not yet clear, what exactly CFRG recommends to the tls WG. Even if
Montgomery curves or Edwards curves are chosen, there is still the option of using traditional (Weierstrass)
representation / semantic on-the-wire, as transformation is quite simple. See
https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg04816.html

Johannes


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Subject: Re: [pkix] Edwards/DJB curves - New PKI(X) work?
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On 2014-08-14 16:51, Johannes Merkle wrote:
> Anders Rundgren wrote on 14.08.2014 13:36:
>> But the inclusion of new algorithms in X.509 structures sounds
>> like a PKI(X)-like task.
>>
>
> Well, "new algorithms" is not exactly the right term for introducing a new curve representation; it's rather a new
> semantic of public keys, digital signatures and cryptograms. (There are some people on the CFRG advocating
> standardization of simplified ECC-based signature algorithms, like Schnorr signatures, but currently, the discussion
> focuses on curves and their representation.) But essentially, you are right: if we want to use new semantics in PKIX,
> new specs for X.509 certs / CRLs, for CMS etc. would be needed.

I'm not a cryptographer you know :-)

Anyway, wouldn't you need algorithms also like EdDSA-SHA256 or would ECDSA-SHA256 apply?
Again, pardon a non-cryptographer for asking stupid/strange questions...

Anders

>
> However, it is yet too early for action. It is not yet clear, what exactly CFRG recommends to the tls WG. Even if
> Montgomery curves or Edwards curves are chosen, there is still the option of using traditional (Weierstrass)
> representation / semantic on-the-wire, as transformation is quite simple. See
> https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg04816.html
>
> Johannes
>


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Subject: Re: [pkix] Edwards/DJB curves - New PKI(X) work?
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Anders Rundgren wrote on 14.08.2014 18:05:
> On 2014-08-14 16:51, Johannes Merkle wrote:
>> Anders Rundgren wrote on 14.08.2014 13:36:
>>> But the inclusion of new algorithms in X.509 structures sounds
>>> like a PKI(X)-like task.
>>>
>>
>> Well, "new algorithms" is not exactly the right term for introducing a new curve representation; it's rather a new
>> semantic of public keys, digital signatures and cryptograms. (There are some people on the CFRG advocating
>> standardization of simplified ECC-based signature algorithms, like Schnorr signatures, but currently, the discussion
>> focuses on curves and their representation.) But essentially, you are right: if we want to use new semantics in PKIX,
>> new specs for X.509 certs / CRLs, for CMS etc. would be needed.
> 
> I'm not a cryptographer you know :-)
> 
> Anyway, wouldn't you need algorithms also like EdDSA-SHA256 or would ECDSA-SHA256 apply?
> Again, pardon a non-cryptographer for asking stupid/strange questions...

The usage of ECDSA-SHA256 within PKIX is already fully specified in RFC 5758. The curve (more specifically, the elliptic
curve parameters) are a property of the public key not of the digital signature, DH value or cipher text.
In order to use other curves, you just need to replace the OID for the named curve which is a parameter of the
SubjectPublicKeyInfo according to RFC 5480.

As I said, there are ideas to define new digital signature algorithms, like Schnorr signature or EdDSA. The motivation
for this is both performance and ease of (secure) implementation, but is is perfectly possible to use Montogomery or
Edwards curves with ECDSA in a secure and efficient way. There has been some confusion about this, because Daniel
Bernstein has introduced his Edwards curve Ed25519 together with a new signature algorithm (and also suggested to use
the Montgomery curve Curve25519 for DH only), but this combination of curves and algorithms (and, actually, of a
specific arithmetic as well) is just an optimization, and does not really fit the modular approach of PKIX.

My perception is that CFRG (and tls WG) will take one step after another and will now standardize new curves only. After
that is accomplished, they might consider standardization of new signature algorithms, but this has not been decided yet.

-- 
Johannes


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Subject: Re: [pkix] Edwards/DJB curves - New PKI(X) work?
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On 2014-08-15 09:38, Johannes Merkle wrote:
> Anders Rundgren wrote on 14.08.2014 18:05:
>> On 2014-08-14 16:51, Johannes Merkle wrote:
>>> Anders Rundgren wrote on 14.08.2014 13:36:
>>>> But the inclusion of new algorithms in X.509 structures sounds
>>>> like a PKI(X)-like task.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Well, "new algorithms" is not exactly the right term for introducing a new curve representation; it's rather a new
>>> semantic of public keys, digital signatures and cryptograms. (There are some people on the CFRG advocating
>>> standardization of simplified ECC-based signature algorithms, like Schnorr signatures, but currently, the discussion
>>> focuses on curves and their representation.) But essentially, you are right: if we want to use new semantics in PKIX,
>>> new specs for X.509 certs / CRLs, for CMS etc. would be needed.
>>
>> I'm not a cryptographer you know :-)
>>
>> Anyway, wouldn't you need algorithms also like EdDSA-SHA256 or would ECDSA-SHA256 apply?
>> Again, pardon a non-cryptographer for asking stupid/strange questions...
>
> The usage of ECDSA-SHA256 within PKIX is already fully specified in RFC 5758. The curve (more specifically, the elliptic
> curve parameters) are a property of the public key not of the digital signature, DH value or cipher text.
> In order to use other curves, you just need to replace the OID for the named curve which is a parameter of the
> SubjectPublicKeyInfo according to RFC 5480.
>
> As I said, there are ideas to define new digital signature algorithms, like Schnorr signature or EdDSA. The motivation
> for this is both performance and ease of (secure) implementation, but is is perfectly possible to use Montogomery or
> Edwards curves with ECDSA in a secure and efficient way. There has been some confusion about this, because Daniel
> Bernstein has introduced his Edwards curve Ed25519 together with a new signature algorithm (and also suggested to use
> the Montgomery curve Curve25519 for DH only), but this combination of curves and algorithms (and, actually, of a
> specific arithmetic as well) is just an optimization, and does not really fit the modular approach of PKIX.
>
> My perception is that CFRG (and tls WG) will take one step after another and will now standardize new curves only. After
> that is accomplished, they might consider standardization of new signature algorithms, but this has not been decided yet.
>

Thanx for the update!
It looks very messy to me.

Personally I wonder if CFRG will be able to stop new signature algorithms
since OpenSSH already supports EdDSA:
http://www.gossamer-threads.com/lists/openssh/dev/57162

Anders


Anders


From nobody Fri Aug 15 08:00:09 2014
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Edwards/DJB curves - New PKI(X) work?
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On Aug 15, 2014, at 1:02 AM, Anders Rundgren =
<anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com> wrote:

> Personally I wonder if CFRG will be able to stop new signature =
algorithms
> since OpenSSH already supports EdDSA:

Please do not impute bad intentions on people you do not know. The CFRG =
is not trying to stop anyone from any curves, even the current ones.

--Paul Hoffman


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To: Johannes Merkle <johannes.merkle@secunet.com>, Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com>,<pkix@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Edwards/DJB curves - New PKI(X) work?
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At 03:38 AM 8/15/2014, Johannes Merkle wrote:
>The usage of ECDSA-SHA256 within PKIX is already fully specified in RFC 5758. The curve (more specifically, the elliptic
>curve parameters) are a property of the public key not of the digital signature, DH value or cipher text.
>In order to use other curves, you just need to replace the OID for the named curve which is a parameter of the
>SubjectPublicKeyInfo according to RFC 5480.


If I had to make a guess as to whether this is correct or not I'd say that it mostly isn't.  Starting with PKIX public key representation, the OID for the AlgorithmIdentifier.algorithm type idEcPublicKey specifies how the public key is formatted; the curve OID (included in the parameters field) merely describes the curve parameters by reference.   (Section 2.2 of RFC5480 - but other places as well).  So you can't really reuse that algorithm type identifier.

Then there's the actual verification process.  The code I use for example looks first at the SignatureAlgorithm field of a certificate.  When it sees "SHA256withECDSA",  it instantiates a Signature object of that specific type *before* grabbing the appropriate public key to initialize the verification operation.   In other words, I'm stuck with  FIPS186-3 compliant signature function trying to parse a DJB curve key.

Basically, while you're correct that the key  curve is going to determine how you verify the signature, I would be surprised if any code checks the key curve first as the current understanding is that ECDSA means SECG1/X9.62/NISP FIPS186-3 (which are basically the same math and representations).  

For PKIX at least for signatures you need:

1) An ASN1 public key representation (and the appropriate OID).  Since there's only one DJB curve(?is that correct or are two needed for signature and ecdh?), you could get away with just a new OID for AlgorithmIdentifier.algorithm.
2) The format of the bitstring that represents a signature 
3) One or more signature algorithms (e.g. SHA256withX, SomeOtherHashWithX, etc) and their OIDs.

I think that any attempt to use the current set of EC code points  for DJB curve data is going to lead to really bad interactions with existing code (included but not limited to PKIX, TLS and IPSEC).  Better to assign new code points where necessary.

Later, Mike











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Subject: [pkix] Looking for some clarification on how to correctly specify rfc822Name constraint for an X.509 certificate
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Recently we noticed that an end user S/MIME certificate was not
validated by our encryption gateway. The certificate in question was
issued by an intermediate certificate (which was again issued by a
Quovadis root) that contained an rfc822Name constraint. The rfc822Name
constraint was specified as follows:

@example.com

RFC 5280 specifies the format for rfc822Name constraints as follows:

"A name constraint for Internet mail addresses MAY specify a
particular mailbox, all addresses at a particular host, or all
mailboxes in a domain.  To indicate a particular mailbox, the
constraint is the complete mail address.  For example,
"root@example.com" indicates the root mailbox on the host
"example.com".  To indicate all Internet mail addresses on a
particular host, the constraint is specified as the host name.  For
example, the constraint "example.com" is satisfied by any mail
address at the host "example.com".  To specify any address within a
domain, the constraint is specified with a leading period (as with
URIs).  For example, ".example.com" indicates all the Internet mail
addresses in the domain "example.com", but not Internet mail
addresses on the host "example.com"."

(http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.10)

So the way I read this is that a constraint for the domain example.com
should be specified as

example.com

and not as

@example.com

This might explain why our Java based software refuses to validate the
end user certificate since test@example.com does not match the
@example.com constraint. Adding an @ symbol will also be problematic
when using the .example.com domain constraint since that would then
result in @.example.com.

To confuse things even more, Microsoft seems to mix the two options.
They use @example.com for constraining to the example.com domain but
.example.com for matching sub domains:

"UPN name constraints should always be entered as two separate entries
in the list of name constraints. One entry should include the ampersand
character (such as @nwtraders.com); the second entry should replace the
ampersand with a period (.), so this entry would be .nwtraders.com. This
format allows for the possibility of having a UPN of
subdomain.nwtraders.msft."

>From http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc737026%28v=ws.10%29.aspx

Is there any consensus on what the correct format is according to RFC 5280?

Are there other implementations that use @example.com instead of
example.com for rfc822Name constraints?

Kind regards,

Martijn Brinkers


-- 
CipherMail email encryption

Open source email encryption gateway with support for S/MIME, OpenPGP
and PDF messaging.

http://www.ciphermail.com

Twitter: http://twitter.com/CipherMail


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Subject: Re: [pkix] Edwards/DJB curves - New PKI(X) work?
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On 2014-08-17 05:16, Michael StJohns wrote:
> At 03:38 AM 8/15/2014, Johannes Merkle wrote:
>> The usage of ECDSA-SHA256 within PKIX is already fully specified in RFC 5758. The curve (more specifically, the elliptic
>> curve parameters) are a property of the public key not of the digital signature, DH value or cipher text.
>> In order to use other curves, you just need to replace the OID for the named curve which is a parameter of the
>> SubjectPublicKeyInfo according to RFC 5480.
>
> If I had to make a guess as to whether this is correct or not I'd say that it mostly isn't.  Starting with PKIX public key representation, the OID for the AlgorithmIdentifier.algorithm type idEcPublicKey specifies how the public key is formatted; the curve OID (included in the parameters field) merely describes the curve parameters by reference.   (Section 2.2 of RFC5480 - but other places as well).  So you can't really reuse that algorithm type identifier.
>
> Then there's the actual verification process.  The code I use for example looks first at the SignatureAlgorithm field of a certificate.  When it sees "SHA256withECDSA",  it instantiates a Signature object of that specific type *before* grabbing the appropriate public key to initialize the verification operation.   In other words, I'm stuck with  FIPS186-3 compliant signature function trying to parse a DJB curve key.
>
> Basically, while you're correct that the key  curve is going to determine how you verify the signature, I would be surprised if any code checks the key curve first as the current understanding is that ECDSA means SECG1/X9.62/NISP FIPS186-3 (which are basically the same math and representations).
>
> For PKIX at least for signatures you need:
>
> 1) An ASN1 public key representation (and the appropriate OID).  Since there's only one DJB curve(?is that correct or are two needed for signature and ecdh?), you could get away with just a new OID for AlgorithmIdentifier.algorithm.
> 2) The format of the bitstring that represents a signature
> 3) One or more signature algorithms (e.g. SHA256withX, SomeOtherHashWithX, etc) and their OIDs.
>
> I think that any attempt to use the current set of EC code points  for DJB curve data is going to lead to really bad interactions with existing code (included but not limited to PKIX, TLS and IPSEC).  Better to assign new code points where necessary.

GOST apparently required such measures as well:
http://tools.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4491.txt

Anders

>
> Later, Mike
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>


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Subject: Re: [pkix] Edwards/DJB curves - New PKI(X) work?
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Michael StJohns wrote on 17.08.2014 05:16:
> At 03:38 AM 8/15/2014, Johannes Merkle wrote:
>> The usage of ECDSA-SHA256 within PKIX is already fully specified in RFC 5758. The curve (more specifically, the elliptic
>> curve parameters) are a property of the public key not of the digital signature, DH value or cipher text.
>> In order to use other curves, you just need to replace the OID for the named curve which is a parameter of the
>> SubjectPublicKeyInfo according to RFC 5480.
> 
> 
> If I had to make a guess as to whether this is correct or not I'd say that it mostly isn't.  Starting with PKIX public key representation, the OID for the AlgorithmIdentifier.algorithm type idEcPublicKey specifies how the public key is formatted; the curve OID (included in the parameters field) merely describes the curve parameters by reference.   (Section 2.2 of RFC5480 - but other places as well).  So you can't really reuse that algorithm type identifier.
> 
> Then there's the actual verification process.  The code I use for example looks first at the SignatureAlgorithm field of a certificate.  When it sees "SHA256withECDSA",  it instantiates a Signature object of that specific type *before* grabbing the appropriate public key to initialize the verification operation.   In other words, I'm stuck with  FIPS186-3 compliant signature function trying to parse a DJB curve key.
> 
> Basically, while you're correct that the key  curve is going to determine how you verify the signature, I would be surprised if any code checks the key curve first as the current understanding is that ECDSA means SECG1/X9.62/NISP FIPS186-3 (which are basically the same math and representations).  
> 


You are right, I was imprecise. As I wrote in my previous message:

  Even if
  Montgomery curves or Edwards curves are chosen, there is still the option of using traditional (Weierstrass)
  representation / semantic on-the-wire, as transformation is quite simple. See
  https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg04816.html

My statement above (that using a new curve only requires a curve OID) only referred to the case that the representation
of the EC points don't change. In the alternative case, you are right: if we want to use new EC point semantics, new
specs for X.509 certs / CRLs, for CMS etc. would be needed.

> For PKIX at least for signatures you need:
>
> 1) An ASN1 public key representation (and the appropriate OID).  Since there's only one DJB curve(?is that correct or
are two needed for signature and ecdh?), you could get away with just a new OID for AlgorithmIdentifier.algorithm.
> 2) The format of the bitstring that represents a signature
> 3) One or more signature algorithms (e.g. SHA256withX, SomeOtherHashWithX, etc) and their OIDs.
>

I disagree with 2) though: In all Schnorr-like signatures, the signature consists of two integers, not (EC) group
elements. Thus, the EC point semantic has no influence on the signature encoding. It only has impact on the signature
generation and verification algorithms (e.g. defined in ANSI X9.62 and FIPS 186-4), but these are out of the scope of PKIX.

Of course, if new signature algorithms are introduced in PKIX (3), this implies that new semantics of signature values (2).

Johannes


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Subject: Re: [pkix] Edwards/DJB curves - New PKI(X) work?
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I guess the same issues belong to signature standards like JWS?
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-signature/

More stuff to consider includes the NUMS (Nothing Up My Sleeve) curves from Microsoft:
http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/projects/nums/

Anders

On 2014-08-18 10:55, Johannes Merkle wrote:
> Michael StJohns wrote on 17.08.2014 05:16:
>> At 03:38 AM 8/15/2014, Johannes Merkle wrote:
>>> The usage of ECDSA-SHA256 within PKIX is already fully specified in RFC 5758. The curve (more specifically, the elliptic
>>> curve parameters) are a property of the public key not of the digital signature, DH value or cipher text.
>>> In order to use other curves, you just need to replace the OID for the named curve which is a parameter of the
>>> SubjectPublicKeyInfo according to RFC 5480.
>>
>>
>> If I had to make a guess as to whether this is correct or not I'd say that it mostly isn't.  Starting with PKIX public key representation, the OID for the AlgorithmIdentifier.algorithm type idEcPublicKey specifies how the public key is formatted; the curve OID (included in the parameters field) merely describes the curve parameters by reference.   (Section 2.2 of RFC5480 - but other places as well).  So you can't really reuse that algorithm type identifier.
>>
>> Then there's the actual verification process.  The code I use for example looks first at the SignatureAlgorithm field of a certificate.  When it sees "SHA256withECDSA",  it instantiates a Signature object of that specific type *before* grabbing the appropriate public key to initialize the verification operation.   In other words, I'm stuck with  FIPS186-3 compliant signature function trying to parse a DJB curve key.
>>
>> Basically, while you're correct that the key  curve is going to determine how you verify the signature, I would be surprised if any code checks the key curve first as the current understanding is that ECDSA means SECG1/X9.62/NISP FIPS186-3 (which are basically the same math and representations).
>>
>
>
> You are right, I was imprecise. As I wrote in my previous message:
>
>    Even if
>    Montgomery curves or Edwards curves are chosen, there is still the option of using traditional (Weierstrass)
>    representation / semantic on-the-wire, as transformation is quite simple. See
>    https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg04816.html
>
> My statement above (that using a new curve only requires a curve OID) only referred to the case that the representation
> of the EC points don't change. In the alternative case, you are right: if we want to use new EC point semantics, new
> specs for X.509 certs / CRLs, for CMS etc. would be needed.
>
>> For PKIX at least for signatures you need:
>>
>> 1) An ASN1 public key representation (and the appropriate OID).  Since there's only one DJB curve(?is that correct or
> are two needed for signature and ecdh?), you could get away with just a new OID for AlgorithmIdentifier.algorithm.
>> 2) The format of the bitstring that represents a signature
>> 3) One or more signature algorithms (e.g. SHA256withX, SomeOtherHashWithX, etc) and their OIDs.
>>
>
> I disagree with 2) though: In all Schnorr-like signatures, the signature consists of two integers, not (EC) group
> elements. Thus, the EC point semantic has no influence on the signature encoding. It only has impact on the signature
> generation and verification algorithms (e.g. defined in ANSI X9.62 and FIPS 186-4), but these are out of the scope of PKIX.
>
> Of course, if new signature algorithms are introduced in PKIX (3), this implies that new semantics of signature values (2).
>
> Johannes
>


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Subject: Re: [pkix] Edwards/DJB curves - New PKI(X) work?
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As a few folks (incl. me:-) said elsewhere...

On 18/08/14 12:25, Anders Rundgren wrote:
> 
> More stuff to consider includes the NUMS (Nothing Up My Sleeve) curves
> from Microsoft:
> http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/projects/nums/

If you're interested in which new curves might make sense to use
in IETF work, please engage on that topic with the CFRG [1] who
are running a process now to tey reach consensus on some curves.

But let's not try do that in parallel here. When CFRG are done
then there will be some bits and pieces of work to be done here
perhaps, but not just yet.

Thanks,
S.

[1] https://irtf.org/cfrg


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Subject: Re: [pkix] Edwards/DJB curves - New PKI(X) work?
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On 2014-08-18 13:37, Stephen Farrell wrote:
>
> As a few folks (incl. me:-) said elsewhere...
>
> On 18/08/14 12:25, Anders Rundgren wrote:
>>
>> More stuff to consider includes the NUMS (Nothing Up My Sleeve) curves
>> from Microsoft:
>> http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/projects/nums/
>
> If you're interested in which new curves might make sense to use
> in IETF work, please engage on that topic with the CFRG [1] who
> are running a process now to tey reach consensus on some curves.

There are two issues here:

1. Creating external representations of Keys, Curves and Algorithms that
    can be reused by various standards in development or in need of a "refresh".
    This is actually a bit urgent since the using systems are designed *now*.

2. Recommending algorithms/curves to use is less critical since the proponents
    (which even includes *countries* like Russia/GOST, China/SM3 and USG/NIST),
    have already made their choices.  Internet-scale TLS server certificates and
    DNSSEC are exceptions that indeed need recommendations.

Anders


>
> But let's not try do that in parallel here. When CFRG are done
> then there will be some bits and pieces of work to be done here
> perhaps, but not just yet.
>
> Thanks,
> S.
>
> [1] https://irtf.org/cfrg
>


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Subject: Re: [pkix] Edwards/DJB curves - New PKI(X) work?
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On 18/08/14 15:23, Anders Rundgren wrote:
> On 2014-08-18 13:37, Stephen Farrell wrote:
>>
>> As a few folks (incl. me:-) said elsewhere...
>>
>> On 18/08/14 12:25, Anders Rundgren wrote:
>>>
>>> More stuff to consider includes the NUMS (Nothing Up My Sleeve) curves
>>> from Microsoft:
>>> http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/projects/nums/
>>
>> If you're interested in which new curves might make sense to use
>> in IETF work, please engage on that topic with the CFRG [1] who
>> are running a process now to tey reach consensus on some curves.
> 
> There are two issues here:
> 
> 1. Creating external representations of Keys, Curves and Algorithms that
>    can be reused by various standards in development or in need of a
> "refresh".
>    This is actually a bit urgent since the using systems are designed
> *now*.

I don't agree. Some of the CFRG discussion may touch on that
so getting ahead of them here would be a bad idea. And CFRG
have set themselves a target of getting back to the TLS WG
before November, so I'd recommend a bit of patience for now,
for this part of the puzzle.

S.

> 
> 2. Recommending algorithms/curves to use is less critical since the
> proponents
>    (which even includes *countries* like Russia/GOST, China/SM3 and
> USG/NIST),
>    have already made their choices.  Internet-scale TLS server
> certificates and
>    DNSSEC are exceptions that indeed need recommendations.
> 
> Anders
> 
> 
>>
>> But let's not try do that in parallel here. When CFRG are done
>> then there will be some bits and pieces of work to be done here
>> perhaps, but not just yet.
>>
>> Thanks,
>> S.
>>
>> [1] https://irtf.org/cfrg
>>
> 
> 
> 


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Subject: Re: [pkix] Edwards/DJB curves - New PKI(X) work?
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At 04:55 AM 8/18/2014, Johannes Merkle wrote:




>> For PKIX at least for signatures you need:
>>
>> 1) An ASN1 public key representation (and the appropriate OID).  Since there's only one DJB curve(?is that correct or
>are two needed for signature and ecdh?), you could get away with just a new OID for AlgorithmIdentifier.algorithm.
>> 2) The format of the bitstring that represents a signature
>> 3) One or more signature algorithms (e.g. SHA256withX, SomeOtherHashWithX, etc) and their OIDs.
>>
>
>I disagree with 2) though: In all Schnorr-like signatures, the signature consists of two integers, not (EC) group
>elements. Thus, the EC point semantic has no influence on the signature encoding. It only has impact on the signature
>generation and verification algorithms (e.g. defined in ANSI X9.62 and FIPS 186-4), but these are out of the scope of PKIX.


Sort of.  The representation for PKIX EC signatures using X9.63/FIPS186-3/SECG1 is 

BIT STRING encapsulating {
    SEQUENCE {
           INTEGER r,
         INTEGER s
     }
}

 - I assume that's what you mean for Schnorr signatures?

In DJB's ED25519, the signature is actually a single integer, and tucked away in his paper is the notation that the representation of that integer is little endian.

So you could use either of 

BIT STRING encapsulatiing {
    INTEGER s
}

or 
BIT STRING encapsulating {
    OCTET STRING SIZE (32) s   ; little endian representation of a 255 bit integer
}

or even

BIT STRING SIZE(255)

or 

BIT STRING


At this point I would assume new key type OID's, *maybe*  new curve OIDs if the curve  isn't implied by the key type, and new signature type OIDs and representations. 

Mike




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Subject: Re: [pkix] Edwards/DJB curves - New PKI(X) work?
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At 10:27 AM 8/18/2014, Stephen Farrell wrote:
>> 1. Creating external representations of Keys, Curves and Algorithms that
>>    can be reused by various standards in development or in need of a
>> "refresh".
>>    This is actually a bit urgent since the using systems are designed
>> *now*.
>
>I don't agree. Some of the CFRG discussion may touch on that
>so getting ahead of them here would be a bad idea. And CFRG
>have set themselves a target of getting back to the TLS WG
>before November, so I'd recommend a bit of patience for now,
>for this part of the puzzle.


There's at least two different things going on here - the possible selection of new curve/math/etc, and the representational aspects of those choices.  I've been commenting on/arguing about draft-turner-thecurve25519function with the authors and realized during that interaction that our process is really rather poorly set up to deal with these two items appropriately.

For example, the math in draft-turner... has no dependency at all on endianess (pretty much every element of the system is a bignum integer), but there are about 5-8 lines that state an absolute requirement that the representation of those elements when externalized be little endian.  Indeed, there have already been several arguments about representation of Curve25519 elements on the TLS mailing list and elsewhere.    I'm somewhat disturbed that this non-WG, non-IETF, CFRG draft could end up setting (or strait jacketing) representations for all IETF protocols without input from those involved in the protocol formation.

I guess the question comes down to competencies.  I believe the CFRG competent to rule on the security of the math.  I would suggest that it may be outside CFRG's purview to be directing protocol representations.  But the CFRG is not set up to handle the wide participation necessary to discuss representational forms nor would I really want it to be. 

So getting back to your point above - happy to have the CFRG pick the math.  But PKIX/TLS/IPSec et al should get a say in on-the-wire representation.  If we can keep those two separate in the decision process, I expect you'll have less dissent in later stages.

Mike







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Once we hear from the CFRG, and if there is interest, then a document
could be written, as an individual submission, and sponsored by one
of the Sec ADs.

Steve

> ...
> Of course.
>
> But the inclusion of new algorithms in X.509 structures sounds
> like a PKI(X)-like task.
>
> Anders


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Subject: Re: [pkix] Edwards/DJB curves - New PKI(X) work?
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On 18/08/14 19:20, Michael StJohns wrote:
> 
> I guess the question comes down to competencies.  I believe the CFRG
> competent to rule on the security of the math.  I would suggest that
> it may be outside CFRG's purview to be directing protocol
> representations.  But the CFRG is not set up to handle the wide
> participation necessary to discuss representational forms nor would I
> really want it to be.
> 
> So getting back to your point above - happy to have the CFRG pick the
> math.  But PKIX/TLS/IPSec et al should get a say in on-the-wire
> representation.  If we can keep those two separate in the decision
> process, I expect you'll have less dissent in later stages.

Sure. This isn't really that new though - algorithm RFCs tend
to be a little odd anyway in that they're often "imports" from
elsewhere, in this case the elsewhere is a bit closer (and new
curves are not quite the same as new algs). But in any case,
yes, we'll do the right thing.

That could be to separate the math and the on-the-wire stuff.
Or it may make more sense to keep those in one doc. In the
latter case we can make sure there's an IETF LC by simply
making it an IETF doc (as Steve K. mentioned in his mail).
Or it could be done by taking an experimental CFRG RFC and
putting that on the standards track via an IETF LC for that.
I doubt that latter would make sense but just note it to make
it clear we do have all the process tools to do whatever
ends up being needed.

That said, I do hope that we all take proper account of running
code where it exists and get involved in the discussion in the
right places at the right times so that this all doesn't take
twice as long as it needs to. (Sadly we're all quite good at
making that happen;-)

I suspect in practice it'd make most sense to get comments on
endianness etc around the time CFRG are finishing their work.
And then we can figure out process stuff so's it works out.

Cheers,
S.


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From: Erwann Abalea <eabalea@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Edwards/DJB curves - New PKI(X) work?
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2014-08-18 20:02 GMT+02:00 Michael StJohns <mstjohns@comcast.net>:

> At 04:55 AM 8/18/2014, Johannes Merkle wrote:
>
> >> For PKIX at least for signatures you need:
> >>
> >> 1) An ASN1 public key representation (and the appropriate OID).  Since
> there's only one DJB curve(?is that correct or
> >are two needed for signature and ecdh?), you could get away with just a
> new OID for AlgorithmIdentifier.algorithm.
> >> 2) The format of the bitstring that represents a signature
> >> 3) One or more signature algorithms (e.g. SHA256withX,
> SomeOtherHashWithX, etc) and their OIDs.
> >>
> >
> >I disagree with 2) though: In all Schnorr-like signatures, the signature
> consists of two integers, not (EC) group
> >elements. Thus, the EC point semantic has no influence on the signature
> encoding. It only has impact on the signature
> >generation and verification algorithms (e.g. defined in ANSI X9.62 and
> FIPS 186-4), but these are out of the scope of PKIX.
>
>
> Sort of.  The representation for PKIX EC signatures using
> X9.63/FIPS186-3/SECG1 is
>
> BIT STRING encapsulating {
>     SEQUENCE {
>            INTEGER r,
>          INTEGER s
>      }
> }
>
>  - I assume that's what you mean for Schnorr signatures?
>
> In DJB's ED25519, the signature is actually a single integer, and tucked
> away in his paper is the notation that the representation of that integer
> is little endian.
>

Even in Ed25519 the signature consists of two 256bits integers. Little/big
endian representation doesn't care here.
R is a compressed version of a point (concatenation of y and lsb of x).
S is the standard S.

-- 
Erwann.

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
2014-08-18 20:02 GMT+02:00 Michael StJohns <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D=
"mailto:mstjohns@comcast.net" target=3D"_blank">mstjohns@comcast.net</a>&gt=
;</span>:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div class=3D"">At 04:55 AM 8/18/2014, Johan=
nes Merkle wrote:<br><br>
&gt;&gt; For PKIX at least for signatures you need:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; 1) An ASN1 public key representation (and the appropriate OID).=C2=
=A0 Since there&#39;s only one DJB curve(?is that correct or<br>
&gt;are two needed for signature and ecdh?), you could get away with just a=
 new OID for AlgorithmIdentifier.algorithm.<br>
&gt;&gt; 2) The format of the bitstring that represents a signature<br>
&gt;&gt; 3) One or more signature algorithms (e.g. SHA256withX, SomeOtherHa=
shWithX, etc) and their OIDs.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;I disagree with 2) though: In all Schnorr-like signatures, the signatur=
e consists of two integers, not (EC) group<br>
&gt;elements. Thus, the EC point semantic has no influence on the signature=
 encoding. It only has impact on the signature<br>
&gt;generation and verification algorithms (e.g. defined in ANSI X9.62 and =
FIPS 186-4), but these are out of the scope of PKIX.<br>
<br>
<br>
</div>Sort of.=C2=A0 The representation for PKIX EC signatures using X9.63/=
FIPS186-3/SECG1 is<br>
<br>
BIT STRING encapsulating {<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 SEQUENCE {<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0INTEGER r,<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0INTEGER s<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0}<br>
}<br>
<br>
=C2=A0- I assume that&#39;s what you mean for Schnorr signatures?<br>
<br>
In DJB&#39;s ED25519, the signature is actually a single integer, and tucke=
d away in his paper is the notation that the representation of that integer=
 is little endian.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Even in Ed25519 the =
signature consists of two 256bits integers. Little/big endian representatio=
n doesn&#39;t care here.</div>
<div>R is a compressed version of a point (concatenation of y and lsb of x)=
.</div><div>S is the standard S.</div></div><div><br></div>-- <br>Erwann.
</div></div>

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Subject: Re: [pkix] Edwards/DJB curves - New PKI(X) work?
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Sent from my iPad

> On Aug 19, 2014, at 6:46, Erwann Abalea <eabalea@gmail.com> wrote:
>=20
>=20
> 2014-08-18 20:02 GMT+02:00 Michael StJohns <mstjohns@comcast.net>:
>>=20
>> In DJB's ED25519, the signature is actually a single integer, and tucked a=
way in his paper is the notation that the representation of that integer is l=
ittle endian.
>=20
> Even in Ed25519 the signature consists of two 256bits integers. Little/big=
 endian representation doesn't care here.
> R is a compressed version of a point (concatenation of y and lsb of x).
> S is the standard S.

*sigh* you're correct.  I misread a summary of the DJB paper.   Mike=

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<html><head><meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8"></head><body dir="auto"><div><br><br>Sent from my iPad</div><div><br>On Aug 19, 2014, at 6:46, Erwann Abalea &lt;<a href="mailto:eabalea@gmail.com">eabalea@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br><br></div><blockquote type="cite"><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">2014-08-18 20:02 GMT+02:00 Michael StJohns <span dir="ltr">&lt;<a href="mailto:mstjohns@comcast.net" target="_blank">mstjohns@comcast.net</a>&gt;</span>:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div class=""><br></div>
In DJB's ED25519, the signature is actually a single integer, and tucked away in his paper is the notation that the representation of that integer is little endian.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Even in Ed25519 the signature consists of two 256bits integers. Little/big endian representation doesn't care here.</div>
<div>R is a compressed version of a point (concatenation of y and lsb of x).</div><div>S is the standard S.</div></div></div></div>
</blockquote><br><div>*sigh* you're correct. &nbsp;I misread a summary of the DJB paper. &nbsp; Mike</div></body></html>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Looking for some clarification on how to correctly specify rfc822Name constraint for an X.509 certificate
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Since I did not get any response, I guess my question was not clear or I
should ask somewhere else. Any idea where to ask for some clarification
on rfc822Name constraints (see below).

Kind regards,

Martijn Brinkers


On 08/17/2014 03:04 PM, martijn.list wrote:
> Recently we noticed that an end user S/MIME certificate was not
> validated by our encryption gateway. The certificate in question was
> issued by an intermediate certificate (which was again issued by a
> Quovadis root) that contained an rfc822Name constraint. The rfc822Name
> constraint was specified as follows:
> 
> @example.com
> 
> RFC 5280 specifies the format for rfc822Name constraints as follows:
> 
> "A name constraint for Internet mail addresses MAY specify a
> particular mailbox, all addresses at a particular host, or all
> mailboxes in a domain.  To indicate a particular mailbox, the
> constraint is the complete mail address.  For example,
> "root@example.com" indicates the root mailbox on the host
> "example.com".  To indicate all Internet mail addresses on a
> particular host, the constraint is specified as the host name.  For
> example, the constraint "example.com" is satisfied by any mail
> address at the host "example.com".  To specify any address within a
> domain, the constraint is specified with a leading period (as with
> URIs).  For example, ".example.com" indicates all the Internet mail
> addresses in the domain "example.com", but not Internet mail
> addresses on the host "example.com"."
> 
> (http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.10)
> 
> So the way I read this is that a constraint for the domain example.com
> should be specified as
> 
> example.com
> 
> and not as
> 
> @example.com
> 
> This might explain why our Java based software refuses to validate the
> end user certificate since test@example.com does not match the
> @example.com constraint. Adding an @ symbol will also be problematic
> when using the .example.com domain constraint since that would then
> result in @.example.com.
> 
> To confuse things even more, Microsoft seems to mix the two options.
> They use @example.com for constraining to the example.com domain but
> .example.com for matching sub domains:
> 
> "UPN name constraints should always be entered as two separate entries
> in the list of name constraints. One entry should include the ampersand
> character (such as @nwtraders.com); the second entry should replace the
> ampersand with a period (.), so this entry would be .nwtraders.com. This
> format allows for the possibility of having a UPN of
> subdomain.nwtraders.msft."
> 
>>From http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc737026%28v=ws.10%29.aspx
> 
> Is there any consensus on what the correct format is according to RFC 5280?
> 
> Are there other implementations that use @example.com instead of
> example.com for rfc822Name constraints?
> 
> Kind regards,
> 
> Martijn Brinkers
> 
> 


-- 
CipherMail email encryption

Open source email encryption gateway with support for S/MIME, OpenPGP
and PDF messaging.

http://www.ciphermail.com

Twitter: http://twitter.com/CipherMail


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Date: Fri, 22 Aug 2014 12:04:06 +0200
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From: Erwann Abalea <eabalea@gmail.com>
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Cc: "<pkix@ietf.org>" <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] Looking for some clarification on how to correctly specify rfc822Name constraint for an X.509 certificate
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--047d7bdc99aa249136050134f5df
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8

In my view, there's no confusion in RFC5280. "@" is not required/accepted
in a rfc822Name element.
The fact that Microsoft choses another format for otherName:UPN does not
change the rfc822Name semantics (while validating against NameConstraints).

2014-08-22 10:08 GMT+02:00 martijn.list <martijn.list@gmail.com>:

> Since I did not get any response, I guess my question was not clear or I
> should ask somewhere else. Any idea where to ask for some clarification
> on rfc822Name constraints (see below).
>
> Kind regards,
>
> Martijn Brinkers
>
>
> On 08/17/2014 03:04 PM, martijn.list wrote:
> > Recently we noticed that an end user S/MIME certificate was not
> > validated by our encryption gateway. The certificate in question was
> > issued by an intermediate certificate (which was again issued by a
> > Quovadis root) that contained an rfc822Name constraint. The rfc822Name
> > constraint was specified as follows:
> >
> > @example.com
> >
> > RFC 5280 specifies the format for rfc822Name constraints as follows:
> >
> > "A name constraint for Internet mail addresses MAY specify a
> > particular mailbox, all addresses at a particular host, or all
> > mailboxes in a domain.  To indicate a particular mailbox, the
> > constraint is the complete mail address.  For example,
> > "root@example.com" indicates the root mailbox on the host
> > "example.com".  To indicate all Internet mail addresses on a
> > particular host, the constraint is specified as the host name.  For
> > example, the constraint "example.com" is satisfied by any mail
> > address at the host "example.com".  To specify any address within a
> > domain, the constraint is specified with a leading period (as with
> > URIs).  For example, ".example.com" indicates all the Internet mail
> > addresses in the domain "example.com", but not Internet mail
> > addresses on the host "example.com"."
> >
> > (http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.10)
> >
> > So the way I read this is that a constraint for the domain example.com
> > should be specified as
> >
> > example.com
> >
> > and not as
> >
> > @example.com
> >
> > This might explain why our Java based software refuses to validate the
> > end user certificate since test@example.com does not match the
> > @example.com constraint. Adding an @ symbol will also be problematic
> > when using the .example.com domain constraint since that would then
> > result in @.example.com.
> >
> > To confuse things even more, Microsoft seems to mix the two options.
> > They use @example.com for constraining to the example.com domain but
> > .example.com for matching sub domains:
> >
> > "UPN name constraints should always be entered as two separate entries
> > in the list of name constraints. One entry should include the ampersand
> > character (such as @nwtraders.com); the second entry should replace the
> > ampersand with a period (.), so this entry would be .nwtraders.com. This
> > format allows for the possibility of having a UPN of
> > subdomain.nwtraders.msft."
> >
> >>From
> http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc737026%28v=ws.10%29.aspx
> >
> > Is there any consensus on what the correct format is according to RFC
> 5280?
> >
> > Are there other implementations that use @example.com instead of
> > example.com for rfc822Name constraints?
>

-- 
Erwann.

--047d7bdc99aa249136050134f5df
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">In my view, there&#39;s no confusion in RFC5280. &quot;@&q=
uot; is not required/accepted in a rfc822Name element.<div>The fact that Mi=
crosoft choses another format for otherName:UPN does not change the rfc822N=
ame semantics (while validating against NameConstraints).<br>
<div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">2014-08-22 10:08 =
GMT+02:00 martijn.list <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:martijn.list=
@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">martijn.list@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span>:<br><bl=
ockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #=
ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
Since I did not get any response, I guess my question was not clear or I<br=
>
should ask somewhere else. Any idea where to ask for some clarification<br>
on rfc822Name constraints (see below).<br>
<br>
Kind regards,<br>
<br>
Martijn Brinkers<br>
<div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5"><br>
<br>
On 08/17/2014 03:04 PM, martijn.list wrote:<br>
&gt; Recently we noticed that an end user S/MIME certificate was not<br>
&gt; validated by our encryption gateway. The certificate in question was<b=
r>
&gt; issued by an intermediate certificate (which was again issued by a<br>
&gt; Quovadis root) that contained an rfc822Name constraint. The rfc822Name=
<br>
&gt; constraint was specified as follows:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; @<a href=3D"http://example.com" target=3D"_blank">example.com</a><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; RFC 5280 specifies the format for rfc822Name constraints as follows:<b=
r>
&gt;<br>
&gt; &quot;A name constraint for Internet mail addresses MAY specify a<br>
&gt; particular mailbox, all addresses at a particular host, or all<br>
&gt; mailboxes in a domain.=C2=A0 To indicate a particular mailbox, the<br>
&gt; constraint is the complete mail address.=C2=A0 For example,<br>
&gt; &quot;<a href=3D"mailto:root@example.com">root@example.com</a>&quot; i=
ndicates the root mailbox on the host<br>
&gt; &quot;<a href=3D"http://example.com" target=3D"_blank">example.com</a>=
&quot;.=C2=A0 To indicate all Internet mail addresses on a<br>
&gt; particular host, the constraint is specified as the host name.=C2=A0 F=
or<br>
&gt; example, the constraint &quot;<a href=3D"http://example.com" target=3D=
"_blank">example.com</a>&quot; is satisfied by any mail<br>
&gt; address at the host &quot;<a href=3D"http://example.com" target=3D"_bl=
ank">example.com</a>&quot;.=C2=A0 To specify any address within a<br>
&gt; domain, the constraint is specified with a leading period (as with<br>
&gt; URIs).=C2=A0 For example, &quot;.<a href=3D"http://example.com" target=
=3D"_blank">example.com</a>&quot; indicates all the Internet mail<br>
&gt; addresses in the domain &quot;<a href=3D"http://example.com" target=3D=
"_blank">example.com</a>&quot;, but not Internet mail<br>
&gt; addresses on the host &quot;<a href=3D"http://example.com" target=3D"_=
blank">example.com</a>&quot;.&quot;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; (<a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.10" targe=
t=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.10</a>)<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; So the way I read this is that a constraint for the domain <a href=3D"=
http://example.com" target=3D"_blank">example.com</a><br>
&gt; should be specified as<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"http://example.com" target=3D"_blank">example.com</a><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; and not as<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; @<a href=3D"http://example.com" target=3D"_blank">example.com</a><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; This might explain why our Java based software refuses to validate the=
<br>
&gt; end user certificate since <a href=3D"mailto:test@example.com">test@ex=
ample.com</a> does not match the<br>
&gt; @<a href=3D"http://example.com" target=3D"_blank">example.com</a> cons=
traint. Adding an @ symbol will also be problematic<br>
&gt; when using the .<a href=3D"http://example.com" target=3D"_blank">examp=
le.com</a> domain constraint since that would then<br>
&gt; result in @.<a href=3D"http://example.com" target=3D"_blank">example.c=
om</a>.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; To confuse things even more, Microsoft seems to mix the two options.<b=
r>
&gt; They use @<a href=3D"http://example.com" target=3D"_blank">example.com=
</a> for constraining to the <a href=3D"http://example.com" target=3D"_blan=
k">example.com</a> domain but<br>
&gt; .<a href=3D"http://example.com" target=3D"_blank">example.com</a> for =
matching sub domains:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; &quot;UPN name constraints should always be entered as two separate en=
tries<br>
&gt; in the list of name constraints. One entry should include the ampersan=
d<br>
&gt; character (such as @<a href=3D"http://nwtraders.com" target=3D"_blank"=
>nwtraders.com</a>); the second entry should replace the<br>
&gt; ampersand with a period (.), so this entry would be .<a href=3D"http:/=
/nwtraders.com" target=3D"_blank">nwtraders.com</a>. This<br>
&gt; format allows for the possibility of having a UPN of<br>
&gt; subdomain.nwtraders.msft.&quot;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;From <a href=3D"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc737026=
%28v=3Dws.10%29.aspx" target=3D"_blank">http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/=
library/cc737026%28v=3Dws.10%29.aspx</a><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Is there any consensus on what the correct format is according to RFC =
5280?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Are there other implementations that use @<a href=3D"http://example.co=
m" target=3D"_blank">example.com</a> instead of<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"http://example.com" target=3D"_blank">example.com</a> for r=
fc822Name constraints?<br></div></div></blockquote></div><div><br></div>-- =
<br>Erwann.
</div></div></div>

--047d7bdc99aa249136050134f5df--


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From: Carlisle Adams <cadams@uottawa.ca>
To: RFC Errata System <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org>, "stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie" <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>, "toka@ssh.com" <toka@ssh.com>, "tmononen@safenet-inc.com" <tmononen@safenet-inc.com>, "stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie" <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>, "Kathleen.Moriarty.ietf@gmail.com" <Kathleen.Moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>, "kent@bbn.com" <kent@bbn.com>, "stefan@aaa-sec.com" <stefan@aaa-sec.com>
Thread-Topic: [Editorial Errata Reported] RFC4210 (4078)
Thread-Index: AQHPtVkZFCg7WGKhZUKHUYRuLzq1h5vhpPRw
Date: Mon, 25 Aug 2014 17:14:13 +0000
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Subject: Re: [pkix] [Editorial Errata Reported] RFC4210 (4078)
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Hi all,

I agree that this change should be made so that the text in Section 5.3.4 i=
s identical to the corresponding text in Appendix F.

Carlisle.


-----Original Message-----
From: RFC Errata System [mailto:rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org]=20
Sent: August-11-14 7:27 AM
To: cadams@site.uottawa.ca; stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie; toka@ssh.com; tmonon=
en@safenet-inc.com; stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie; Kathleen.Moriarty.ietf@gmail=
.com; kent@bbn.com; stefan@aaa-sec.com
Cc: lijun.liao@gmail.com; pkix@ietf.org; rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org
Subject: [Editorial Errata Reported] RFC4210 (4078)

The following errata report has been submitted for RFC4210, "Internet X.509=
 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)".

--------------------------------------
You may review the report below and at:
http://www.rfc-editor.org/errata_search.php?rfc=3D4210&eid=3D4078

--------------------------------------
Type: Editorial
Reported by: Lijun Liao <lijun.liao@gmail.com>

Section: 5.3.4

Original Text
-------------
     CertOrEncCert ::=3D CHOICE {
         certificate     [0] Certificate,
         encryptedCert   [1] EncryptedValue
     }

Corrected Text
--------------
     CertOrEncCert ::=3D CHOICE {
         certificate     [0] CMPCertificate,
         encryptedCert   [1] EncryptedValue
     }

Notes
-----
The definition of CertOrEncCert in Section 5.3.4 and Appendix F of CertOrEn=
cCert differs.

Instructions:
-------------
This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please use "R=
eply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or rejected. When a deci=
sion is reached, the verifying party (IESG) can log in to change the status=
 and edit the report, if necessary.=20

--------------------------------------
RFC4210 (draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2510bis-09)
--------------------------------------
Title               : Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate =
Management Protocol (CMP)
Publication Date    : September 2005
Author(s)           : C. Adams, S. Farrell, T. Kause, T. Mononen
Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
Source              : Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509)
Area                : Security
Stream              : IETF
Verifying Party     : IESG


From hecht@hlrs.de  Tue Aug 26 05:55:43 2014
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Date: Tue, 26 Aug 2014 14:55:35 +0200
From: Martin Hecht <hecht@hlrs.de>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Gathering Consensus for progressing PKI standards (?)
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Hi all,

let me pick up the OCSP topic: especially with Heardbleed in mind there
is a strong need for a working and scalable revocation mechanism. OCSP
over DNS sounds interesting to me, but also working out a more compact
OCSP-like protocol, which may scale better for large revocation lists.
Such ideas which could one day replace the pki infrastructure as it is
implemented nowadays need to be discussed in some sort of a forum, which
would take care of improving the concepts and working out a proposal for
such new standards. Even if browsers implement those mechanisms with a
considerable delay, first working out the standards, then establishing a
working pki infrastructure which supports such new mechanisms would be
the way to go. Finally, the client software like browsers or embedded
devices would follow.

best regards,
Martin


__________________________________________________________________

* From: Massimiliano Pala <director@openca.org>
* To: pkix@ietf.org
* Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 13:45:58 -0400
* List-id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
__________________________________________________________________

Hi PKIX-ers,
I would like to have your opinion about a new proposal for resuming some
work about PKIX. I am working on some interesting items that I think
they might be useful to work on in the PKI (not only for just browser's
authentication) area and I was wondering if anybody would be interested
in re-open the PKIX WG and/or start a new WG where this work can be
accomplished. (I know many people when they hear about re-opening work
in the PKIX WG probably will have goose bumps, but I really feel there
is the need to
progress in this area) In particular I would like to gather your opinion
on the following items that I think it would be very important to work on:
* Dissemination of Revocation information via DNS (i.e., OCSP over DNS)
- improving the availability of OCSP responses and reducing operational
costs for supporting revocation for high-volume websites.
* Implementation of a more compact OCSP-like response format (different
format from OCSP that might provide the same level of security, but more
compact responses and lower network impact) for online authentication
* PKI Service Discovery - in other words, how to find services related
to a certificate (following up on the PRQP draft)
* Provisioning of PKI services via 0-configuration protocols that would
allow current standards (e.g., CMS, CMC, etc.) to be routed
over self-organizing networks (e.g., P2P)
* Integrating new advancements in crypto (ECC) into PKIX
For all these topics, I have a hard time identifying the right WG where
the right expertise can be found and discussions / standardizations can
happen. If there is no consensus on resuming a pkix or pkix-like WG. It
also seems that there are some requests from the SEC area meeting
suggesting that some discussions about PKIX could be a good thing. To
limit the lifetime of this WG, this work could be split into smaller WGs
with very limited scope (e.g., PKIXREV, PKIXECC, PKIX2P) for the
different projects (revocation, crypto, p2p, etc.) instead of having a
PKIX-like one that would have a more extended charter. I hope this
e-mail will spawn some interesting discussion and possibly a path to
move forward.
Cheers,
Max


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--20cf301cc022617bf3050190b3d6
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
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Martin:

Although I've been implementing crypto standards (ITU-T / RFC / ETSI) since
1996,
I have never participated in the definition of an RFC. I offer to help you
in this one.

Best Regards
Juan Gonz=E1lez Cardoso



On Tue, Aug 26, 2014 at 7:55 AM, Martin Hecht <hecht@hlrs.de> wrote:

>
> Hi all,
>
> let me pick up the OCSP topic: especially with Heardbleed in mind there
> is a strong need for a working and scalable revocation mechanism. OCSP
> over DNS sounds interesting to me, but also working out a more compact
> OCSP-like protocol, which may scale better for large revocation lists.
> Such ideas which could one day replace the pki infrastructure as it is
> implemented nowadays need to be discussed in some sort of a forum, which
> would take care of improving the concepts and working out a proposal for
> such new standards. Even if browsers implement those mechanisms with a
> considerable delay, first working out the standards, then establishing a
> working pki infrastructure which supports such new mechanisms would be
> the way to go. Finally, the client software like browsers or embedded
> devices would follow.
>
> best regards,
> Martin
>
>
> __________________________________________________________________
>
> * From: Massimiliano Pala <director@openca.org>
> * To: pkix@ietf.org
> * Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 13:45:58 -0400
> * List-id: PKIX Working Group <pkix.ietf.org>
> __________________________________________________________________
>
> Hi PKIX-ers,
> I would like to have your opinion about a new proposal for resuming some
> work about PKIX. I am working on some interesting items that I think
> they might be useful to work on in the PKI (not only for just browser's
> authentication) area and I was wondering if anybody would be interested
> in re-open the PKIX WG and/or start a new WG where this work can be
> accomplished. (I know many people when they hear about re-opening work
> in the PKIX WG probably will have goose bumps, but I really feel there
> is the need to
> progress in this area) In particular I would like to gather your opinion
> on the following items that I think it would be very important to work on=
:
> * Dissemination of Revocation information via DNS (i.e., OCSP over DNS)
> - improving the availability of OCSP responses and reducing operational
> costs for supporting revocation for high-volume websites.
> * Implementation of a more compact OCSP-like response format (different
> format from OCSP that might provide the same level of security, but more
> compact responses and lower network impact) for online authentication
> * PKI Service Discovery - in other words, how to find services related
> to a certificate (following up on the PRQP draft)
> * Provisioning of PKI services via 0-configuration protocols that would
> allow current standards (e.g., CMS, CMC, etc.) to be routed
> over self-organizing networks (e.g., P2P)
> * Integrating new advancements in crypto (ECC) into PKIX
> For all these topics, I have a hard time identifying the right WG where
> the right expertise can be found and discussions / standardizations can
> happen. If there is no consensus on resuming a pkix or pkix-like WG. It
> also seems that there are some requests from the SEC area meeting
> suggesting that some discussions about PKIX could be a good thing. To
> limit the lifetime of this WG, this work could be split into smaller WGs
> with very limited scope (e.g., PKIXREV, PKIXECC, PKIX2P) for the
> different projects (revocation, crypto, p2p, etc.) instead of having a
> PKIX-like one that would have a more extended charter. I hope this
> e-mail will spawn some interesting discussion and possibly a path to
> move forward.
> Cheers,
> Max
>
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>

--20cf301cc022617bf3050190b3d6
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">Martin:<div><br></div><div>Although I&#39;ve been implemen=
ting crypto standards (ITU-T / RFC / ETSI) since 1996,</div><div>I have nev=
er participated in the definition of an RFC. I offer to help you in this on=
e.</div>

<div><div><br></div><div>Best Regards</div><div>Juan Gonz=E1lez Cardoso</di=
v><div><br></div></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div class=
=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue, Aug 26, 2014 at 7:55 AM, Martin Hecht <span dir=3D=
"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:hecht@hlrs.de" target=3D"_blank">hecht@hlrs.de<=
/a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>

<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><br>
Hi all,<br>
<br>
let me pick up the OCSP topic: especially with Heardbleed in mind there<br>
is a strong need for a working and scalable revocation mechanism. OCSP<br>
over DNS sounds interesting to me, but also working out a more compact<br>
OCSP-like protocol, which may scale better for large revocation lists.<br>
Such ideas which could one day replace the pki infrastructure as it is<br>
implemented nowadays need to be discussed in some sort of a forum, which<br=
>
would take care of improving the concepts and working out a proposal for<br=
>
such new standards. Even if browsers implement those mechanisms with a<br>
considerable delay, first working out the standards, then establishing a<br=
>
working pki infrastructure which supports such new mechanisms would be<br>
the way to go. Finally, the client software like browsers or embedded<br>
devices would follow.<br>
<br>
best regards,<br>
Martin<br>
<br>
<br>
__________________________________________________________________<br>
<br>
* From: Massimiliano Pala &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:director@openca.org">direct=
or@openca.org</a>&gt;<br>
* To: <a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a><br>
* Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 13:45:58 -0400<br>
* List-id: PKIX Working Group &lt;<a href=3D"http://pkix.ietf.org" target=
=3D"_blank">pkix.ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>
__________________________________________________________________<br>
<br>
Hi PKIX-ers,<br>
I would like to have your opinion about a new proposal for resuming some<br=
>
work about PKIX. I am working on some interesting items that I think<br>
they might be useful to work on in the PKI (not only for just browser&#39;s=
<br>
authentication) area and I was wondering if anybody would be interested<br>
in re-open the PKIX WG and/or start a new WG where this work can be<br>
accomplished. (I know many people when they hear about re-opening work<br>
in the PKIX WG probably will have goose bumps, but I really feel there<br>
is the need to<br>
progress in this area) In particular I would like to gather your opinion<br=
>
on the following items that I think it would be very important to work on:<=
br>
* Dissemination of Revocation information via DNS (i.e., OCSP over DNS)<br>
- improving the availability of OCSP responses and reducing operational<br>
costs for supporting revocation for high-volume websites.<br>
* Implementation of a more compact OCSP-like response format (different<br>
format from OCSP that might provide the same level of security, but more<br=
>
compact responses and lower network impact) for online authentication<br>
* PKI Service Discovery - in other words, how to find services related<br>
to a certificate (following up on the PRQP draft)<br>
* Provisioning of PKI services via 0-configuration protocols that would<br>
allow current standards (e.g., CMS, CMC, etc.) to be routed<br>
over self-organizing networks (e.g., P2P)<br>
* Integrating new advancements in crypto (ECC) into PKIX<br>
For all these topics, I have a hard time identifying the right WG where<br>
the right expertise can be found and discussions / standardizations can<br>
happen. If there is no consensus on resuming a pkix or pkix-like WG. It<br>
also seems that there are some requests from the SEC area meeting<br>
suggesting that some discussions about PKIX could be a good thing. To<br>
limit the lifetime of this WG, this work could be split into smaller WGs<br=
>
with very limited scope (e.g., PKIXREV, PKIXECC, PKIX2P) for the<br>
different projects (revocation, crypto, p2p, etc.) instead of having a<br>
PKIX-like one that would have a more extended charter. I hope this<br>
e-mail will spawn some interesting discussion and possibly a path to<br>
move forward.<br>
Cheers,<br>
Max<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
pkix mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix</a><br>
</blockquote></div><br></div>

--20cf301cc022617bf3050190b3d6--


From nobody Tue Aug 26 19:31:51 2014
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Looking for some clarification on how to correctly specify rfc822Name constraint for an X.509 certificate
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        Erwann:

        That's not my reading of the section.  Three different cases are 
given for rfc822Name constraints, and the single-mailbox one contains an 
embedded at sign.  However, none of them start with an at sign.  It's 
pretty clear that the improper constraint in the example was intended to 
be equivalent to the domain-name-only format with no leading period, and 
should thus have been encoded with the at sign missing.  No compliant RP 
is required to interpret it, of course.

                Tom Gindin





From:   Erwann Abalea <eabalea@gmail.com>
To:     "martijn.list" <martijn.list@gmail.com>
Cc:     "<pkix@ietf.org>" <pkix@ietf.org>
Date:   08/22/2014 06:04 AM
Subject:        Re: [pkix] Looking for some clarification on how to 
correctly specify rfc822Name constraint for an X.509 certificate
Sent by:        "pkix" <pkix-bounces@ietf.org>



In my view, there's no confusion in RFC5280. "@" is not required/accepted 
in a rfc822Name element.
The fact that Microsoft choses another format for otherName:UPN does not 
change the rfc822Name semantics (while validating against 
NameConstraints).

2014-08-22 10:08 GMT+02:00 martijn.list <martijn.list@gmail.com>:
Since I did not get any response, I guess my question was not clear or I
should ask somewhere else. Any idea where to ask for some clarification
on rfc822Name constraints (see below).

Kind regards,

Martijn Brinkers


On 08/17/2014 03:04 PM, martijn.list wrote:
> Recently we noticed that an end user S/MIME certificate was not
> validated by our encryption gateway. The certificate in question was
> issued by an intermediate certificate (which was again issued by a
> Quovadis root) that contained an rfc822Name constraint. The rfc822Name
> constraint was specified as follows:
>
> @example.com
>
> RFC 5280 specifies the format for rfc822Name constraints as follows:
>
> "A name constraint for Internet mail addresses MAY specify a
> particular mailbox, all addresses at a particular host, or all
> mailboxes in a domain.  To indicate a particular mailbox, the
> constraint is the complete mail address.  For example,
> "root@example.com" indicates the root mailbox on the host
> "example.com".  To indicate all Internet mail addresses on a
> particular host, the constraint is specified as the host name.  For
> example, the constraint "example.com" is satisfied by any mail
> address at the host "example.com".  To specify any address within a
> domain, the constraint is specified with a leading period (as with
> URIs).  For example, ".example.com" indicates all the Internet mail
> addresses in the domain "example.com", but not Internet mail
> addresses on the host "example.com"."
>
> (http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.10)
>
> So the way I read this is that a constraint for the domain example.com
> should be specified as
>
> example.com
>
> and not as
>
> @example.com
>
> This might explain why our Java based software refuses to validate the
> end user certificate since test@example.com does not match the
> @example.com constraint. Adding an @ symbol will also be problematic
> when using the .example.com domain constraint since that would then
> result in @.example.com.
>
> To confuse things even more, Microsoft seems to mix the two options.
> They use @example.com for constraining to the example.com domain but
> .example.com for matching sub domains:
>
> "UPN name constraints should always be entered as two separate entries
> in the list of name constraints. One entry should include the ampersand
> character (such as @nwtraders.com); the second entry should replace the
> ampersand with a period (.), so this entry would be .nwtraders.com. This
> format allows for the possibility of having a UPN of
> subdomain.nwtraders.msft."
>
>>From 
http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc737026%28v=ws.10%29.aspx
>
> Is there any consensus on what the correct format is according to RFC 
5280?
>
> Are there other implementations that use @example.com instead of
> example.com for rfc822Name constraints?

-- 
Erwann. _______________________________________________
pkix mailing list
pkix@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix


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<tt><font size=2>&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Erwann:</font></tt>
<br>
<br><tt><font size=2>&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; That's not my
reading of the section. &nbsp;Three different cases are given for rfc822Name
constraints, and the single-mailbox one contains an embedded at sign. &nbsp;However,
none of them start with an at sign. &nbsp;It's pretty clear that the improper
constraint in the example was intended to be equivalent to the domain-name-only
format with no leading period, and should thus have been encoded with the
at sign missing. &nbsp;No compliant RP is required to interpret it, of
course.</font></tt>
<br><tt><font size=2><br>
 &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;Tom
Gindin</font></tt><font size=2 face="sans-serif"><br>
<br>
</font>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br><font size=1 color=#5f5f5f face="sans-serif">From: &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;
&nbsp;</font><font size=1 face="sans-serif">Erwann Abalea &lt;eabalea@gmail.com&gt;</font>
<br><font size=1 color=#5f5f5f face="sans-serif">To: &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;
&nbsp;</font><font size=1 face="sans-serif">&quot;martijn.list&quot;
&lt;martijn.list@gmail.com&gt;</font>
<br><font size=1 color=#5f5f5f face="sans-serif">Cc: &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;
&nbsp;</font><font size=1 face="sans-serif">&quot;&lt;pkix@ietf.org&gt;&quot;
&lt;pkix@ietf.org&gt;</font>
<br><font size=1 color=#5f5f5f face="sans-serif">Date: &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;
&nbsp;</font><font size=1 face="sans-serif">08/22/2014 06:04 AM</font>
<br><font size=1 color=#5f5f5f face="sans-serif">Subject: &nbsp; &nbsp;
&nbsp; &nbsp;</font><font size=1 face="sans-serif">Re: [pkix] Looking
for some clarification on how to correctly specify rfc822Name constraint
for an X.509 certificate</font>
<br><font size=1 color=#5f5f5f face="sans-serif">Sent by: &nbsp; &nbsp;
&nbsp; &nbsp;</font><font size=1 face="sans-serif">&quot;pkix&quot;
&lt;pkix-bounces@ietf.org&gt;</font>
<br>
<hr noshade>
<br>
<br>
<br><font size=3>In my view, there's no confusion in RFC5280. &quot;@&quot;
is not required/accepted in a rfc822Name element.</font>
<br><font size=3>The fact that Microsoft choses another format for otherName:UPN
does not change the rfc822Name semantics (while validating against NameConstraints).</font>
<br>
<br><font size=3>2014-08-22 10:08 GMT+02:00 martijn.list &lt;</font><a href=mailto:martijn.list@gmail.com target=_blank><font size=3 color=blue><u>martijn.list@gmail.com</u></font></a><font size=3>&gt;:</font>
<br><font size=3>Since I did not get any response, I guess my question
was not clear or I<br>
should ask somewhere else. Any idea where to ask for some clarification<br>
on rfc822Name constraints (see below).<br>
<br>
Kind regards,<br>
<br>
Martijn Brinkers</font>
<br><font size=3><br>
<br>
On 08/17/2014 03:04 PM, martijn.list wrote:<br>
&gt; Recently we noticed that an end user S/MIME certificate was not<br>
&gt; validated by our encryption gateway. The certificate in question was<br>
&gt; issued by an intermediate certificate (which was again issued by a<br>
&gt; Quovadis root) that contained an rfc822Name constraint. The rfc822Name<br>
&gt; constraint was specified as follows:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; @</font><a href=http://example.com/ target=_blank><font size=3 color=blue><u>example.com</u></font></a><font size=3><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; RFC 5280 specifies the format for rfc822Name constraints as follows:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; &quot;A name constraint for Internet mail addresses MAY specify a<br>
&gt; particular mailbox, all addresses at a particular host, or all<br>
&gt; mailboxes in a domain.&nbsp; To indicate a particular mailbox, the<br>
&gt; constraint is the complete mail address.&nbsp; For example,<br>
&gt; &quot;</font><a href=mailto:root@example.com><font size=3 color=blue><u>root@example.com</u></font></a><font size=3>&quot;
indicates the root mailbox on the host<br>
&gt; &quot;</font><a href=http://example.com/ target=_blank><font size=3 color=blue><u>example.com</u></font></a><font size=3>&quot;.&nbsp;
To indicate all Internet mail addresses on a<br>
&gt; particular host, the constraint is specified as the host name.&nbsp;
For<br>
&gt; example, the constraint &quot;</font><a href=http://example.com/ target=_blank><font size=3 color=blue><u>example.com</u></font></a><font size=3>&quot;
is satisfied by any mail<br>
&gt; address at the host &quot;</font><a href=http://example.com/ target=_blank><font size=3 color=blue><u>example.com</u></font></a><font size=3>&quot;.&nbsp;
To specify any address within a<br>
&gt; domain, the constraint is specified with a leading period (as with<br>
&gt; URIs).&nbsp; For example, &quot;.</font><a href=http://example.com/ target=_blank><font size=3 color=blue><u>example.com</u></font></a><font size=3>&quot;
indicates all the Internet mail<br>
&gt; addresses in the domain &quot;</font><a href=http://example.com/ target=_blank><font size=3 color=blue><u>example.com</u></font></a><font size=3>&quot;,
but not Internet mail<br>
&gt; addresses on the host &quot;</font><a href=http://example.com/ target=_blank><font size=3 color=blue><u>example.com</u></font></a><font size=3>&quot;.&quot;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; (</font><a href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.10" target=_blank><font size=3 color=blue><u>http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.10</u></font></a><font size=3>)<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; So the way I read this is that a constraint for the domain </font><a href=http://example.com/ target=_blank><font size=3 color=blue><u>example.com</u></font></a><font size=3><br>
&gt; should be specified as<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; </font><a href=http://example.com/ target=_blank><font size=3 color=blue><u>example.com</u></font></a><font size=3><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; and not as<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; @</font><a href=http://example.com/ target=_blank><font size=3 color=blue><u>example.com</u></font></a><font size=3><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; This might explain why our Java based software refuses to validate
the<br>
&gt; end user certificate since </font><a href=mailto:test@example.com><font size=3 color=blue><u>test@example.com</u></font></a><font size=3>
does not match the<br>
&gt; @</font><a href=http://example.com/ target=_blank><font size=3 color=blue><u>example.com</u></font></a><font size=3>
constraint. Adding an @ symbol will also be problematic<br>
&gt; when using the .</font><a href=http://example.com/ target=_blank><font size=3 color=blue><u>example.com</u></font></a><font size=3>
domain constraint since that would then<br>
&gt; result in @.</font><a href=http://example.com/ target=_blank><font size=3 color=blue><u>example.com</u></font></a><font size=3>.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; To confuse things even more, Microsoft seems to mix the two options.<br>
&gt; They use @</font><a href=http://example.com/ target=_blank><font size=3 color=blue><u>example.com</u></font></a><font size=3>
for constraining to the </font><a href=http://example.com/ target=_blank><font size=3 color=blue><u>example.com</u></font></a><font size=3>
domain but<br>
&gt; .</font><a href=http://example.com/ target=_blank><font size=3 color=blue><u>example.com</u></font></a><font size=3>
for matching sub domains:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; &quot;UPN name constraints should always be entered as two separate
entries<br>
&gt; in the list of name constraints. One entry should include the ampersand<br>
&gt; character (such as @</font><a href=http://nwtraders.com/ target=_blank><font size=3 color=blue><u>nwtraders.com</u></font></a><font size=3>);
the second entry should replace the<br>
&gt; ampersand with a period (.), so this entry would be .</font><a href=http://nwtraders.com/ target=_blank><font size=3 color=blue><u>nwtraders.com</u></font></a><font size=3>.
This<br>
&gt; format allows for the possibility of having a UPN of<br>
&gt; subdomain.nwtraders.msft.&quot;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;From </font><a href="http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc737026%28v=ws.10%29.aspx" target=_blank><font size=3 color=blue><u>http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc737026%28v=ws.10%29.aspx</u></font></a><font size=3><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Is there any consensus on what the correct format is according to
RFC 5280?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Are there other implementations that use @</font><a href=http://example.com/ target=_blank><font size=3 color=blue><u>example.com</u></font></a><font size=3>
instead of<br>
&gt; </font><a href=http://example.com/ target=_blank><font size=3 color=blue><u>example.com</u></font></a><font size=3>
for rfc822Name constraints?</font>
<br>
<br><font size=3>-- <br>
Erwann. </font><tt><font size=2>_______________________________________________<br>
pkix mailing list<br>
pkix@ietf.org<br>
</font></tt><a href=https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix><tt><font size=2>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix</font></tt></a><tt><font size=2><br>
</font></tt>
<br>
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