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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: IETF PKIX <pkix@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] EC key pair
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Subject: Re: [pkix] EC key pair
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Erwann Abalea <eabalea@gmail.com> writes:=0A=
=0A=
>SCEP (as a draft) already supports enrolment of an EC public key with a=0A=
>request encrypted to the RSA public key of the CA/RA.=0A=
=0A=
Uhh, no it doesn't:=0A=
=0A=
   The message types, being based on CMS [3] and PKCS #10 [6], fully=0A=
   support algorithm agility but the requester has to use a key type=0A=
   that is supported by the server.  Specifically, they must employ a=0A=
   PKC algorithm capable of both encryption and signing.  RSA is the=0A=
   only widely-used algorithm that has these properties.=0A=
=0A=
>But SCEP is so old that it's probably not the best idea to play with it an=
d=0A=
>EC keys. It was changed as "Historic" some years ago, and the latest draft=
=0A=
>(september 2011) never went published.=0A=
=0A=
The latest draft is from March 2015.  It's also extremely widely deployed=
=0A=
(unless someone knows of something non-proprietary that's bigger, I'll say=
=0A=
it's the most widely-deployed cert enrolment protocol), so going with SCEP =
if=0A=
you can manage it ensures widespread support for your whatever-it-is.=0A=
=0A=
Peter.=


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Subject: Re: [pkix] EC key pair
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Peter Gutmann schrieb am 01.04.2015 um 09:02:
> Erwann Abalea <eabalea@gmail.com> writes:
> 
>> SCEP (as a draft) already supports enrolment of an EC public key with a
>> request encrypted to the RSA public key of the CA/RA.
> 
> Uhh, no it doesn't:
> 
>    The message types, being based on CMS [3] and PKCS #10 [6], fully
>    support algorithm agility but the requester has to use a key type
>    that is supported by the server.  Specifically, they must employ a
>    PKC algorithm capable of both encryption and signing.  RSA is the
>    only widely-used algorithm that has these properties.
> 

Why shouldn't an unrestricted EC public key (id-ecPublicKey) not be usable for both signature and encryption, e.g.,
ECDSA and ECIES?

-- 
Johannes


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--089e0149c272a23a370512a86014
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2015-04-01 9:02 GMT+02:00 Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>:

> Erwann Abalea <eabalea@gmail.com> writes:
>
> >SCEP (as a draft) already supports enrolment of an EC public key with a
> >request encrypted to the RSA public key of the CA/RA.
>
> Uhh, no it doesn't:
>
>    The message types, being based on CMS [3] and PKCS #10 [6], fully
>    support algorithm agility but the requester has to use a key type
>    that is supported by the server.  Specifically, they must employ a
>    PKC algorithm capable of both encryption and signing.  RSA is the
>    only widely-used algorithm that has these properties.
>

Note the "as a draft", I'm not talking about specific implementations.
And in the first example, the CA/RA key is used as the recipient of the
envelopedData part of the CMS, and it works perfectly if the CA/RA has an
RSA key (that's classic). Still in that first example, the PKCS#10 can
enclose an EC public key, be self-signed, etc. Nothing strange here.
The result is only signed.

The second example will only work if you accept RFC5753 or a
derivative/similar work to exchange the symetric key used to encrypt the
payload of that envelopedData. This will involve ECMQV or ECIES, or any
other similar thing based on ECDH/EC-ElGamal.


> >But SCEP is so old that it's probably not the best idea to play with it
> and
> >EC keys. It was changed as "Historic" some years ago, and the latest draft
> >(september 2011) never went published.
>
> The latest draft is from March 2015.  It's also extremely widely deployed
> (unless someone knows of something non-proprietary that's bigger, I'll say
> it's the most widely-deployed cert enrolment protocol), so going with SCEP
> if
> you can manage it ensures widespread support for your whatever-it-is.
>

https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nourse-scep/ lists the latest
version of the draft as 2011-09-07. I don't know where is this March 2015
version from.

-- 
Erwann.

--089e0149c272a23a370512a86014
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">2015-04-01 9:02 GMT+02:00 Peter Gutmann <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz" target=3D"_blank">pgut001@cs.auckland=
.ac.nz</a>&gt;</span>:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin=
:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)=
;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex"><span class=3D"">Erwann Abalea &=
lt;<a href=3D"mailto:eabalea@gmail.com">eabalea@gmail.com</a>&gt; writes:<b=
r>
<br>
&gt;SCEP (as a draft) already supports enrolment of an EC public key with a=
<br>
&gt;request encrypted to the RSA public key of the CA/RA.<br>
<br>
</span>Uhh, no it doesn&#39;t:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0The message types, being based on CMS [3] and PKCS #10 [6], fu=
lly<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0support algorithm agility but the requester has to use a key t=
ype<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0that is supported by the server.=C2=A0 Specifically, they must=
 employ a<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0PKC algorithm capable of both encryption and signing.=C2=A0 RS=
A is the<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0only widely-used algorithm that has these properties.<span cla=
ss=3D""><br></span></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Note the &quot;as a dra=
ft&quot;, I&#39;m not talking about specific implementations.</div><div>And=
 in the first example, the CA/RA key is used as the recipient of the envelo=
pedData part of the CMS, and it works perfectly if the CA/RA has an RSA key=
 (that&#39;s classic). Still in that first example, the PKCS#10 can enclose=
 an EC public key, be self-signed, etc. Nothing strange here.</div><div>The=
 result is only signed.</div><div><br></div><div>The second example will on=
ly work if you accept RFC5753 or a derivative/similar work to exchange the =
symetric key used to encrypt the payload of that envelopedData. This will i=
nvolve ECMQV or ECIES, or any other similar thing based on ECDH/EC-ElGamal.=
</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0p=
x 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);bo=
rder-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex"><span class=3D"">
&gt;But SCEP is so old that it&#39;s probably not the best idea to play wit=
h it and<br>
&gt;EC keys. It was changed as &quot;Historic&quot; some years ago, and the=
 latest draft<br>
&gt;(september 2011) never went published.<br>
<br>
</span>The latest draft is from March 2015.=C2=A0 It&#39;s also extremely w=
idely deployed<br>
(unless someone knows of something non-proprietary that&#39;s bigger, I&#39=
;ll say<br>
it&#39;s the most widely-deployed cert enrolment protocol), so going with S=
CEP if<br>
you can manage it ensures widespread support for your whatever-it-is.<br>
</blockquote></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><a href=3D"https://=
datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nourse-scep/">https://datatracker.ietf.org/d=
oc/draft-nourse-scep/</a> lists the latest version of the draft as 2011-09-=
07. I don&#39;t know where is this March 2015 version from.<br clear=3D"all=
"><div><br></div>-- <br><div class=3D"gmail_signature">Erwann.</div>
</div></div>

--089e0149c272a23a370512a86014--


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The CMS Data Content Type does not have an ASN.1 Type associated with it.=20

There are no "standard" RFCs in which Data Content Type is defined as an OC=
TET STRING.  In RFCs 5911 and 6268 "new" ASN.1 syntax is used to define Enc=
apsulatedContentInfo where eContent contains an Open Type.   In RFC 5911 th=
e "ct-Data" CONTENT-TYPE was initially defined as having a OCTET STRING typ=
e.   That was corrected in the errata and subsequent 6268.

-Pierce
________________________________________
From: RFC Errata System [rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org]
Sent: Tuesday, March 31, 2015 5:01 PM
To: Leonberger, Pierce (US SSA); jimsch@nwlink.com; mmyers@fastq.com
Cc: Kathleen.Moriarty@emc.com; iesg@ietf.org; pkix@ietf.org; rfc-editor@rfc=
-editor.org
Subject: [Errata Rejected] RFC5272 (4186)

The following errata report has been rejected for RFC5272,
"Certificate Management over CMS (CMC)".

--------------------------------------
You may review the report below and at:
http://www.rfc-editor.org/errata_search.php?rfc=3D5272&eid=3D4186

--------------------------------------
Status: Rejected
Type: Technical

Reported by: Pierce Leonberger <pierce.leonberger@baesystems.com>
Date Reported: 2014-11-18
Rejected by: Kathleen Moriarty (IESG)

Section: 3.2.1.3.2

Original Text
-------------
The Data content type allows for general transport of unstructured
   data.

   The Data content type is used by this document for:

      Holding the encrypted random value y for POP proof in the
      encrypted POP control (see Section 6.7).

Corrected Text
--------------
See Notes

Notes
-----
It's invalid for the encoding of an ANY or OpenType to have "unstructured" =
data.  See X.690 section 8.15:

8.15 Encoding of an open type
The value of an open type is also a value of some (other) ASN.1 type. The e=
ncoding of such a value shall be the complete encoding herein specified for=
 the value considered as being of that other type.

Note there's similar wording in X.209 section 21 for ANY:

21 Encoding of a value of the ANY type
The encoding of an ANY type shall be the complete encoding specified in thi=
s Recommendation for the type of the value of the ANY type.
 --VERIFIER NOTES--
The Data content type being referenced here is the Data content type from C=
MS.  This type is defined as using an OCTET STRING wrapper around the data.=
  Therefore unstructured data is not being placed at the ASN.1 level and th=
e referenced text does not apply.

--------------------------------------
RFC5272 (draft-ietf-pkix-2797-bis-07)
--------------------------------------
Title               : Certificate Management over CMS (CMC)
Publication Date    : June 2008
Author(s)           : J. Schaad, M. Myers
Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
Source              : Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509)
Area                : Security
Stream              : IETF
Verifying Party     : IESG=


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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: IETF PKIX <pkix@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] EC key pair
Thread-Index: AdBtJhy+A6PMvESNRA6XnOJTHxjgLg==
Date: Thu, 2 Apr 2015 09:19:25 +0000
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Johannes Merkle <johannes.merkle@secunet.com> writes:=0A=
=0A=
>Why shouldn't an unrestricted EC public key (id-ecPublicKey) not be usable=
=0A=
>for both signature and encryption, e.g., ECDSA and ECIES?=0A=
=0A=
For that you'd need to find a crypto library that does ECIES.  A quick Goog=
le=0A=
returns results for a JCE provider and Crypto++, but also tells me they won=
't=0A=
interoperate unless you patch one or both of them.  Then you need to write =
a=0A=
SCEP server that handles this from scratch, and then a SCEP client.  Oh, an=
d=0A=
the result won't interoperate with any other SCEP server or client out ther=
e.=0A=
=0A=
So yes, you can do EC with SCEP, in the same way that you can push a pea up=
 a=0A=
mountain with your nose...=0A=
=0A=
(Credit to Christopher Strachey for the analogy :-).=0A=
=0A=
Peter.=


From nobody Thu Apr  2 03:09:26 2015
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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: IETF PKIX <pkix@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] EC key pair
Thread-Index: AdBtLRQQo2W7xGmOSja3p7fuAf1GzQ==
Date: Thu, 2 Apr 2015 10:09:17 +0000
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Erwann Abalea <eabalea@gmail.com> writes:=0A=
=0A=
>https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nourse-scep/ lists the latest versi=
on=0A=
>of the draft as 2011-09-07. I don't know where is this March 2015 version=
=0A=
>from.=0A=
=0A=
You're looking in the wrong place, it's been rebooted as=0A=
http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-gutmann-scep-00.txt.=0A=
=0A=
Peter.=


From nobody Thu Apr  2 10:57:58 2015
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Date: Thu, 2 Apr 2015 10:57:14 -0700
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Subject: Re: [pkix] a question of cert (and OCSP) extension syntax
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--089e01493afa3456af0512c19225
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Stephen Kent writes:
> Since the bulk of the data items have an obvious ASN.1
> representation, and the certificate or TBS certificate are native
> ASN.1 structures, we feel that the decision to stuff all of the data
> items into an OCTET STRING is inappropriate, and that it sets a bad
> precedent for others developing certificate (and OCSP) extensions in
> the future

My sense is that it would be better for this data to be in ASN.1 for
consistency with the certificate itself.

-Ekr

--089e01493afa3456af0512c19225
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<div dir=3D"ltr">Stephen Kent writes:<div><div>&gt; Since the bulk of the d=
ata items have an obvious ASN.1</div><div>&gt; representation, and the cert=
ificate or TBS certificate are native</div><div>&gt; ASN.1 structures, we f=
eel that the decision to stuff all of the data</div><div>&gt; items into an=
 OCTET STRING is inappropriate, and that it sets a bad</div><div>&gt; prece=
dent for others developing certificate (and OCSP) extensions in</div><div>&=
gt; the future</div></div><div><br></div><div>My sense is that it would be =
better for this data to be in ASN.1 for</div><div>consistency with the cert=
ificate itself.</div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div></div>

--089e01493afa3456af0512c19225--


From nobody Fri Apr  3 17:36:16 2015
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From: Jeffrey Walton <noloader@gmail.com>
To: PKIX <pkix@ietf.org>
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Subject: [pkix] Certificate with Multiple Signers?
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I'm trying to find some reading on PKIX certificates modulo multiple
signers. I'm getting lots of hits back, but they are for related
technologies, like CMS and RFC 4135.

Is there any IETF reading on the subject? Perhaps an old RFC or a discussion?

(I know why I want it. Now I'm trying to figure out why its a bad idea
(otherwise, we would likely have it)).


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Date: Sat, 04 Apr 2015 06:00:43 +0200
From: Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Certificate with Multiple Signers?
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On 2015-04-04 02:36, Jeffrey Walton wrote:
> I'm trying to find some reading on PKIX certificates modulo multiple
> signers. I'm getting lots of hits back, but they are for related
> technologies, like CMS and RFC 4135.
>
> Is there any IETF reading on the subject? Perhaps an old RFC or a discussion?
>
> (I know why I want it. Now I'm trying to figure out why its a bad idea
> (otherwise, we would likely have it)).

Since there is no software out there which reads such certificates, you are
free to to do whatever you want :-)

It might be easier creating an entirely new certificate container.

BTW, multiple signers *is* probably a bad idea...

Anders

>
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
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From: Santosh Chokhani <schokhani@cygnacom.com>
To: "noloader@gmail.com" <noloader@gmail.com>, PKIX <pkix@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] Certificate with Multiple Signers?
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Certificate with Multiple Signers?
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I am not sure if there is any reading on it.

But, it can be accomplished by algorithm OID.  The OID semantics can dictat=
e if two or more algorithms created the signature and how the signature is =
embedded.  The ASN.1 for SIGNED MACRO can accommodate that using new algori=
thm OID for multiple signature algorithms (and signers).

The fields like AIA and CDP can also accommodate them.

However, Issuer DN cannot.  Neither can AKID, but with AIA, AKID can be vie=
wed as of less or no value.

Of course you will need to define your own path validation engine in terms =
of checking revocation using all applicable signer CDPs.

In short, lot of undefined, but one can create a profile to do this within =
V3 if one can live with single Issuer.

-----Original Message-----
From: pkix [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Jeffrey Walton
Sent: Friday, April 03, 2015 8:36 PM
To: PKIX
Subject: [pkix] Certificate with Multiple Signers?

I'm trying to find some reading on PKIX certificates modulo multiple signer=
s. I'm getting lots of hits back, but they are for related technologies, li=
ke CMS and RFC 4135.

Is there any IETF reading on the subject? Perhaps an old RFC or a discussio=
n?

(I know why I want it. Now I'm trying to figure out why its a bad idea (oth=
erwise, we would likely have it)).

_______________________________________________
pkix mailing list
pkix@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix


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Subject: Re: [pkix] Certificate with Multiple Signers?
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On 2015-04-04 14:11, Santosh Chokhani wrote:
> I am not sure if there is any reading on it.
>
> But, it can be accomplished by algorithm OID.  The OID semantics can dictate if two or more algorithms created the signature and how the signature is embedded.  The ASN.1 for SIGNED MACRO can accommodate that using new algorithm OID for multiple signature algorithms (and signers).
>
> The fields like AIA and CDP can also accommodate them.
>
> However, Issuer DN cannot.  Neither can AKID, but with AIA, AKID can be viewed as of less or no value.
>
> Of course you will need to define your own path validation engine in terms of checking revocation using all applicable signer CDPs.
>
> In short, lot of undefined, but one can create a profile to do this within V3 if one can live with single Issuer.

How useful would that be since there's probably no certificate processing SW out there that is likely to handle even just reading such a certificate?

Anyway, regardless if this is about adding trust through multiple attesters or if it is a crypto-algorithm thing, a more practical solution would be defining an extension holding URLs to the additional information.
By doing that you could migrate to a "better" system rather than requiring an over-the-board rewrite of everything.

Anders

>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: pkix [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Jeffrey Walton
> Sent: Friday, April 03, 2015 8:36 PM
> To: PKIX
> Subject: [pkix] Certificate with Multiple Signers?
>
> I'm trying to find some reading on PKIX certificates modulo multiple signers. I'm getting lots of hits back, but they are for related technologies, like CMS and RFC 4135.
>
> Is there any IETF reading on the subject? Perhaps an old RFC or a discussion?
>
> (I know why I want it. Now I'm trying to figure out why its a bad idea (otherwise, we would likely have it)).
>
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>


From nobody Sat Apr  4 09:07:53 2015
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Certificate with Multiple Signers?
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It could be useful for an authority to bind a set of attributes to a =
primary certificate
issued by a separate authority.  This may meet your needs without having =
a second
signer on the certificate.  Private extensions to an AC are certainly =
possible too although it
would seem constructive to bring any significant or useful extension to =
the working group.

See RFC 3281 and RFC 4486.  (There may be newer versions available.)

John


On Apr 4, 2015, at 9:05 AM, Anders Rundgren =
<anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com> wrote:

> On 2015-04-04 14:11, Santosh Chokhani wrote:
>> I am not sure if there is any reading on it.
>>=20
>> But, it can be accomplished by algorithm OID.  The OID semantics can =
dictate if two or more algorithms created the signature and how the =
signature is embedded.  The ASN.1 for SIGNED MACRO can accommodate that =
using new algorithm OID for multiple signature algorithms (and signers).
>>=20
>> The fields like AIA and CDP can also accommodate them.
>>=20
>> However, Issuer DN cannot.  Neither can AKID, but with AIA, AKID can =
be viewed as of less or no value.
>>=20
>> Of course you will need to define your own path validation engine in =
terms of checking revocation using all applicable signer CDPs.
>>=20
>> In short, lot of undefined, but one can create a profile to do this =
within V3 if one can live with single Issuer.
>=20
> How useful would that be since there's probably no certificate =
processing SW out there that is likely to handle even just reading such =
a certificate?
>=20
> Anyway, regardless if this is about adding trust through multiple =
attesters or if it is a crypto-algorithm thing, a more practical =
solution would be defining an extension holding URLs to the additional =
information.
> By doing that you could migrate to a "better" system rather than =
requiring an over-the-board rewrite of everything.
>=20
> Anders
>=20
>>=20
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: pkix [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Jeffrey Walton
>> Sent: Friday, April 03, 2015 8:36 PM
>> To: PKIX
>> Subject: [pkix] Certificate with Multiple Signers?
>>=20
>> I'm trying to find some reading on PKIX certificates modulo multiple =
signers. I'm getting lots of hits back, but they are for related =
technologies, like CMS and RFC 4135.
>>=20
>> Is there any IETF reading on the subject? Perhaps an old RFC or a =
discussion?
>>=20
>> (I know why I want it. Now I'm trying to figure out why its a bad =
idea (otherwise, we would likely have it)).
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> pkix mailing list
>> pkix@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> pkix mailing list
>> pkix@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix


--Apple-Mail=_9540C0D4-B08C-43B6-9327-9EF8B669727C
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Type: text/html;
	charset=us-ascii

<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dus-ascii"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space;">It =
could be useful for an authority to bind a set of attributes to a =
primary certificate<div>issued by a separate authority. &nbsp;This may =
meet your needs without having a second</div><div>signer on the =
certificate. &nbsp;Private extensions to an AC are certainly possible =
too although it</div><div>would seem constructive to bring any =
significant or useful extension to the working =
group.</div><div><br></div><div>See RFC 3281 and RFC 4486. &nbsp;(There =
may be newer versions =
available.)</div><div><br></div><div>John</div><div><br></div><div><br><di=
v><div><div>On Apr 4, 2015, at 9:05 AM, Anders Rundgren &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com">anders.rundgren.net@gmail.co=
m</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><div style=3D"font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
line-height: normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: =
0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;">On 2015-04-04 14:11, Santosh =
Chokhani wrote:<br><blockquote type=3D"cite">I am not sure if there is =
any reading on it.<br><br>But, it can be accomplished by algorithm OID. =
&nbsp;The OID semantics can dictate if two or more algorithms created =
the signature and how the signature is embedded. &nbsp;The ASN.1 for =
SIGNED MACRO can accommodate that using new algorithm OID for multiple =
signature algorithms (and signers).<br><br>The fields like AIA and CDP =
can also accommodate them.<br><br>However, Issuer DN cannot. =
&nbsp;Neither can AKID, but with AIA, AKID can be viewed as of less or =
no value.<br><br>Of course you will need to define your own path =
validation engine in terms of checking revocation using all applicable =
signer CDPs.<br><br>In short, lot of undefined, but one can create a =
profile to do this within V3 if one can live with single =
Issuer.<br></blockquote><br>How useful would that be since there's =
probably no certificate processing SW out there that is likely to handle =
even just reading such a certificate?<br><br>Anyway, regardless if this =
is about adding trust through multiple attesters or if it is a =
crypto-algorithm thing, a more practical solution would be defining an =
extension holding URLs to the additional information.<br>By doing that =
you could migrate to a "better" system rather than requiring an =
over-the-board rewrite of everything.<br><br>Anders<br><br><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><br>-----Original Message-----<br>From: pkix [<a =
href=3D"mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org">mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org</a>] =
On Behalf Of Jeffrey Walton<br>Sent: Friday, April 03, 2015 8:36 =
PM<br>To: PKIX<br>Subject: [pkix] Certificate with Multiple =
Signers?<br><br>I'm trying to find some reading on PKIX certificates =
modulo multiple signers. I'm getting lots of hits back, but they are for =
related technologies, like CMS and RFC 4135.<br><br>Is there any IETF =
reading on the subject? Perhaps an old RFC or a discussion?<br><br>(I =
know why I want it. Now I'm trying to figure out why its a bad idea =
(otherwise, we would likely have =
it)).<br><br>_______________________________________________<br>pkix =
mailing list<br><a =
href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a><br>https://www.ietf.org/ma=
ilman/listinfo/pkix<br><br>_______________________________________________=
<br>pkix mailing =
list<br>pkix@ietf.org<br>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix<br><br=
></blockquote><br>_______________________________________________<br>pkix =
mailing list<br><a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a><br><a =
href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix">https://www.ietf.org/m=
ailman/listinfo/pkix</a></div></blockquote></div><br></div></div></body></=
html>=

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Date: Sat, 04 Apr 2015 18:37:09 +0200
From: Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Certificate with Multiple Signers?
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On 2015-04-04 18:08, John Lowry wrote:
> It could be useful for an authority to bind a set of attributes to a primary certificate
> issued by a separate authority.  This may meet your needs without having a second
> signer on the certificate.  Private extensions to an AC are certainly possible too although it
> would seem constructive to bring any significant or useful extension to the working group.
>
> See RFC 3281 and RFC 4486.  (There may be newer versions available.)

Yes, this is still another possible application.

Now we just need to hear what Jeffrey actually had in mind :-)

Anders

>
> John
>
>
> On Apr 4, 2015, at 9:05 AM, Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com <mailto:anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com>> wrote:
>
>> On 2015-04-04 14:11, Santosh Chokhani wrote:
>>> I am not sure if there is any reading on it.
>>>
>>> But, it can be accomplished by algorithm OID.  The OID semantics can dictate if two or more algorithms created the signature and how the signature is embedded.  The ASN.1 for SIGNED MACRO can accommodate that using new algorithm OID for multiple signature algorithms (and signers).
>>>
>>> The fields like AIA and CDP can also accommodate them.
>>>
>>> However, Issuer DN cannot.  Neither can AKID, but with AIA, AKID can be viewed as of less or no value.
>>>
>>> Of course you will need to define your own path validation engine in terms of checking revocation using all applicable signer CDPs.
>>>
>>> In short, lot of undefined, but one can create a profile to do this within V3 if one can live with single Issuer.
>>
>> How useful would that be since there's probably no certificate processing SW out there that is likely to handle even just reading such a certificate?
>>
>> Anyway, regardless if this is about adding trust through multiple attesters or if it is a crypto-algorithm thing, a more practical solution would be defining an extension holding URLs to the additional information.
>> By doing that you could migrate to a "better" system rather than requiring an over-the-board rewrite of everything.
>>
>> Anders
>>
>>>
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: pkix [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Jeffrey Walton
>>> Sent: Friday, April 03, 2015 8:36 PM
>>> To: PKIX
>>> Subject: [pkix] Certificate with Multiple Signers?
>>>
>>> I'm trying to find some reading on PKIX certificates modulo multiple signers. I'm getting lots of hits back, but they are for related technologies, like CMS and RFC 4135.
>>>
>>> Is there any IETF reading on the subject? Perhaps an old RFC or a discussion?
>>>
>>> (I know why I want it. Now I'm trying to figure out why its a bad idea (otherwise, we would likely have it)).
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> pkix mailing list
>>> pkix@ietf.org <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> pkix mailing list
>>> pkix@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> pkix mailing list
>> pkix@ietf.org <mailto:pkix@ietf.org>
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>


From nobody Sat Apr  4 13:52:55 2015
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Certificate with Multiple Signers?
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> Now we just need to hear what Jeffrey actually had in mind :-)

I wanted to experiment with dual-signed certificates. The setup would
be a server that is accessible to the outside world, like a web server
with a X.509 certificate. Because its publicly accessible, it needs a
signature using a public CA. Internally, we use custom software, so we
certify it ourselves and don't need a public CA signature.

The internal software does not bother loading the CA Zoo. It loads all
the required certs for path validation, so it does not suffer the
"which directory" problem. The software does not even need things like
AKI's or DN's - it knows exactly what certificates should be used.

Avoiding the CA Zoo reduces attack surface, and *not* placing our CA
in the Zoo further reduces attack surface. So we don't suffer
Diginotars and SuperFishes; and we don't contribute to the problem.

I *think* multiple signers could be useful in practice. For example,
look at PKI bridging :). Or even what Google does with Google Internet
Authority G2/GeoTrust Global CA.

The thing with the Google/GeoTrust is GeoTrust certified Google's CA
(critical, CA:TRUE, pathlen:0). An additional signer could be used to
avoid the issues associated with a public CA certifying an external CA
(like governance, policy, procedure and cost).

Jeff

On Sat, Apr 4, 2015 at 12:37 PM, Anders Rundgren
<anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com> wrote:
> On 2015-04-04 18:08, John Lowry wrote:
>>
>> It could be useful for an authority to bind a set of attributes to a
>> primary certificate
>> issued by a separate authority.  This may meet your needs without having a
>> second
>> signer on the certificate.  Private extensions to an AC are certainly
>> possible too although it
>> would seem constructive to bring any significant or useful extension to
>> the working group.
>>
>> See RFC 3281 and RFC 4486.  (There may be newer versions available.)
>
>
> Yes, this is still another possible application.
>
> Now we just need to hear what Jeffrey actually had in mind :-)


From nobody Sat Apr  4 16:13:45 2015
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From: Jeffrey Walton <noloader@gmail.com>
To: PKIX <pkix@ietf.org>
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Subject: [pkix] Is it required that subject AKI actually match issuer SKI?
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I'm reading through RFC 5280, 4.2.1.1 Authority Key Identifier and
4.2.1.2 Subject Key Identifier.

I might be missing it, but I don't see where the subject's AKI is
required to match the issuer's SKI when the extension is present. The
closest I can find is from Authority Key Identifier (p. 26):

   The value of the keyIdentifier field SHOULD be derived from the
   public key used to verify the certificate's signature or a method
   that generates unique values.

I think the SHOULD is weak, and allows me to generate a random value
for the AKI that does not match anything.

Is it required that subject actually AKI match issuer SKI? Put another
way, should I fail path validation if the path is otherwise valid (but
AKI does not match SKI)?


From nobody Sat Apr  4 17:19:59 2015
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Is it required that subject AKI actually match issuer SKI?
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"Applications are not required to verify that key identifiers match
when performing certification path validation." -
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.2

On Sat, Apr 4, 2015 at 1:13 PM, Jeffrey Walton <noloader@gmail.com> wrote:
> I'm reading through RFC 5280, 4.2.1.1 Authority Key Identifier and
> 4.2.1.2 Subject Key Identifier.
>
> I might be missing it, but I don't see where the subject's AKI is
> required to match the issuer's SKI when the extension is present. The
> closest I can find is from Authority Key Identifier (p. 26):
>
>    The value of the keyIdentifier field SHOULD be derived from the
>    public key used to verify the certificate's signature or a method
>    that generates unique values.
>
> I think the SHOULD is weak, and allows me to generate a random value
> for the AKI that does not match anything.
>
> Is it required that subject actually AKI match issuer SKI? Put another
> way, should I fail path validation if the path is otherwise valid (but
> AKI does not match SKI)?
>
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix


From nobody Mon Apr  6 08:38:51 2015
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From: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
To: "noloader@gmail.com" <noloader@gmail.com>, Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] Certificate with Multiple Signers?
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Personally I don't see the point.  If what you're worried about is an activ=
e MitM who has access to a trust anchor and can issue impersonation certs, =
your options (in order of decreasing availability and effectiveness) are re=
ally only (a) client PKI authentication, (b) limiting the number of trust a=
nchors in authorized clients, (c) DANE [1], or (d) pinning. =20

These are the only techniques that obviate this kind of threat, and everyth=
ing except client authN has limited software support available. =20

Also, note that (b), (c), and (d) have the problem of being client-specific=
, meaning that if the *server* also wants assurance it has to have some mea=
ns of verifying that the client is configured as expected.  Good luck with =
that.

-- T

[1] Technically DANE is a specific instance of (b), in that it can provide =
an out-of-band signal that tells the client which CA to expect and effectiv=
ely reduces the number of anchors to 1, but getting a DANE record to the cl=
ient can be a problem in itself whereas an enterprise can control the trust=
 anchors in most clients via methods like standardized installs if they rea=
lly want to. =20

-----Original Message-----
From: pkix [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Jeffrey Walton
Sent: Saturday, April 04, 2015 4:53 PM
To: Anders Rundgren
Cc: PKIX
Subject: Re: [pkix] Certificate with Multiple Signers?

> Now we just need to hear what Jeffrey actually had in mind :-)

I wanted to experiment with dual-signed certificates. The setup would be a =
server that is accessible to the outside world, like a web server with a X.=
509 certificate. Because its publicly accessible, it needs a signature usin=
g a public CA. Internally, we use custom software, so we certify it ourselv=
es and don't need a public CA signature.

The internal software does not bother loading the CA Zoo. It loads all the =
required certs for path validation, so it does not suffer the "which direct=
ory" problem. The software does not even need things like AKI's or DN's - i=
t knows exactly what certificates should be used.

Avoiding the CA Zoo reduces attack surface, and *not* placing our CA in the=
 Zoo further reduces attack surface. So we don't suffer Diginotars and Supe=
rFishes; and we don't contribute to the problem.

I *think* multiple signers could be useful in practice. For example, look a=
t PKI bridging :). Or even what Google does with Google Internet Authority =
G2/GeoTrust Global CA.

The thing with the Google/GeoTrust is GeoTrust certified Google's CA (criti=
cal, CA:TRUE, pathlen:0). An additional signer could be used to avoid the i=
ssues associated with a public CA certifying an external CA (like governanc=
e, policy, procedure and cost).

Jeff

On Sat, Apr 4, 2015 at 12:37 PM, Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren.net@gmail=
.com> wrote:
> On 2015-04-04 18:08, John Lowry wrote:
>>
>> It could be useful for an authority to bind a set of attributes to a=20
>> primary certificate issued by a separate authority.  This may meet=20
>> your needs without having a second signer on the certificate. =20
>> Private extensions to an AC are certainly possible too although it=20
>> would seem constructive to bring any significant or useful extension=20
>> to the working group.
>>
>> See RFC 3281 and RFC 4486.  (There may be newer versions available.)
>
>
> Yes, this is still another possible application.
>
> Now we just need to hear what Jeffrey actually had in mind :-)

_______________________________________________
pkix mailing list
pkix@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix


From nobody Mon Apr  6 09:31:09 2015
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Is it required that subject AKI actually match issuer SKI?
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This turns out to be one of those things that makes you want to hit your head against the wall.  Brian has the correct cite for path validation, however "path formation" generally depends on matching AKI SKI pairs to select the right set of certificates for path validation and you do path formation before you do path validation.  

Alternately, you can try all possible matching SubjectName/IssuerName parent certificates to try and find a path through. (or if the AKI uses components [1] and [2] but not [0] do it that way).

Lastly, when you ISSUE such certificates, the AKI (if it uses component [0]) and SKI of the issuer (if present) should match... (and reading 5280, I see the language is actually wrong... *sigh*).  And how did we miss this for so long?   

Time for an errata.  

Mike


At 08:19 PM 4/4/2015, Brian Smith wrote:
>"Applications are not required to verify that key identifiers match
>when performing certification path validation." -
>http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.2
>
>On Sat, Apr 4, 2015 at 1:13 PM, Jeffrey Walton <noloader@gmail.com> wrote:
>> I'm reading through RFC 5280, 4.2.1.1 Authority Key Identifier and
>> 4.2.1.2 Subject Key Identifier.
>>
>> I might be missing it, but I don't see where the subject's AKI is
>> required to match the issuer's SKI when the extension is present. The
>> closest I can find is from Authority Key Identifier (p. 26):
>>
>>    The value of the keyIdentifier field SHOULD be derived from the
>>    public key used to verify the certificate's signature or a method
>>    that generates unique values.
>>
>> I think the SHOULD is weak, and allows me to generate a random value
>> for the AKI that does not match anything.
>>
>> Is it required that subject actually AKI match issuer SKI? Put another
>> way, should I fail path validation if the path is otherwise valid (but
>> AKI does not match SKI)?
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> pkix mailing list
>> pkix@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>
>_______________________________________________
>pkix mailing list
>pkix@ietf.org
>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix



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Date: Mon, 6 Apr 2015 12:41:10 -0400
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From: Jeffrey Walton <noloader@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Is it required that subject AKI actually match issuer SKI?
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On Mon, Apr 6, 2015 at 12:31 PM, Michael StJohns <mstjohns@comcast.net> wro=
te:
> This turns out to be one of those things that makes you want to hit your =
head against the wall.  Brian has the correct cite for path validation, how=
ever "path formation" generally depends on matching AKI SKI pairs to select=
 the right set of certificates for path validation and you do path formatio=
n before you do path validation.
>
> Alternately, you can try all possible matching SubjectName/IssuerName par=
ent certificates to try and find a path through. (or if the AKI uses compon=
ents [1] and [2] but not [0] do it that way).
>
> Lastly, when you ISSUE such certificates, the AKI (if it uses component [=
0]) and SKI of the issuer (if present) should match... (and reading 5280, I=
 see the language is actually wrong... *sigh*).  And how did we miss this f=
or so long?
>
> Time for an errata.

Oh, OK. If text is going to be changed, please consider adding some
verbiage so continuity is present between AKI and SKI.

As it stands, the intent or requirement does not seem to flow from one
to the other. That is, the subject's AKI must be present, but it does
not actually have to match a signer's SKI. I think there's an implicit
assumption that it will match, but its not really stated (unless I am
misreading it).

I think we are talking about the same thing, but I wanted to say it
just in case.

Jeff


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Subject: [pkix] Suggested replacement text for RFC5280, section 4.2.1.1
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--=====================_169915337==.ALT
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I realized there may be a problem in 5280 during this recent discussion.   The formation of the AKI keyIdentifier value derivation is probably incorrect or at the best incomplete.


Replace paragraph beginning "The value of the keyIdentifier...." in its entirety with:

If the Issuer has a certificate of its own (e.g. an intermediate CA or a trust root expressed as a certificate) and that certificate contains a SubjectKeyIdentifier extension, then the keyIdentifier field of this extension MUST be present and MUST contain the same value as that in the Issuer's SubjectKeyIdentifier.   

If the Issuer does not have a SubjectKeyIdentifier extension (either because it is a root not expressed as a certificate or because its certificate does not contain the extension), then the keyIdentifier of this extension SHOULD be derived from the public key used to verify the certificate's signature using one of the two methods described in 4.2.1.2. 

The extension may OPTIONALLY include either both or neither of the authorityCertIssuer and authorityCertSerial number fields - they must be included or excluded together.  Since these are only useful in the third or greater certificate in a chain, it is expected that the presence of these fields will be rare.

_____________________________________
Rationale:  The current language mirrors that in the SKI  section 4.2.1.2 which doesn't actually make a lot of sense. You don't want the AKI to be independent of the SKI if you can avoid it.   I think this change is still backwards compatible since path validation doesn't require these match.

Mike





--=====================_169915337==.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"

<html>
<body>
I realized there may be a problem in 5280 during this recent
discussion.&nbsp;&nbsp; The formation of the AKI keyIdentifier value
derivation is probably incorrect or at the best incomplete.<br><br>
<br>
Replace paragraph beginning &quot;The value of the
keyIdentifier....&quot; in its entirety with:<br><br>
If the Issuer has a certificate of its own (e.g. an intermediate CA or a
trust root expressed as a certificate) and that certificate contains a
SubjectKeyIdentifier extension, then the keyIdentifier field of this
extension MUST be present and MUST contain the same value as that in the
Issuer's SubjectKeyIdentifier.&nbsp;&nbsp; <br><br>
If the Issuer does not have a SubjectKeyIdentifier extension (either
because it is a root not expressed as a certificate or because its
certificate does not contain the extension), then the keyIdentifier of
this extension SHOULD be derived from the public key used to verify the
certificate's signature using one of the two methods described in
4.2.1.2. <br><br>
The extension may OPTIONALLY include either both or neither of the
authorityCertIssuer and authorityCertSerial number fields - they must be
included or excluded together.&nbsp; Since these are only useful in the
third or greater certificate in a chain, it is expected that the presence
of these fields will be rare.<br><br>
_____________________________________<br>
Rationale:&nbsp; The current language mirrors that in the SKI&nbsp;
section 4.2.1.2 which doesn't actually make a lot of sense. You don't
want the AKI to be independent of the SKI if you can avoid
it.&nbsp;&nbsp; I think this change is still backwards compatible since
path validation doesn't require these match.<br><br>
Mike<br><br>
<br><br>
</body>
<br>
</html>

--=====================_169915337==.ALT--


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Subject: Re: [pkix] Certificate with Multiple Signers?
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At 08:36 PM 4/3/2015, Jeffrey Walton wrote:
>I'm trying to find some reading on PKIX certificates modulo multiple
>signers. I'm getting lots of hits back, but they are for related
>technologies, like CMS and RFC 4135.
>
>Is there any IETF reading on the subject? Perhaps an old RFC or a discussion?
>
>(I know why I want it. Now I'm trying to figure out why its a bad idea
>(otherwise, we would likely have it)).


It's mainly a bad idea because the SignerInfo is distributed throughout the certificate (e.g. IssuerName, AKI extension, and another copy of the SignatureAlgorithm) rather than collected at the bottom with the signature itself.   You'd need a pretty massive re-write of the standard to fix this.

Instead you could use either a signed extension (i.e. I think this is how you get signed time stamps into the cert) or AC as an endorsement of said certificate.   

Mike

>_______________________________________________
>pkix mailing list
>pkix@ietf.org
>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix



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Subject: Re: [pkix] Is it required that subject AKI actually match issuer SKI?
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2015-04-06 18:41 GMT+02:00 Jeffrey Walton <noloader@gmail.com>:

> On Mon, Apr 6, 2015 at 12:31 PM, Michael StJohns <mstjohns@comcast.net>
> wrote:
> > This turns out to be one of those things that makes you want to hit your
> head against the wall.  Brian has the correct cite for path validation,
> however "path formation" generally depends on matching AKI SKI pairs to
> select the right set of certificates for path validation and you do path
> formation before you do path validation.
> >
> > Alternately, you can try all possible matching SubjectName/IssuerName
> parent certificates to try and find a path through. (or if the AKI uses
> components [1] and [2] but not [0] do it that way).
> >
> > Lastly, when you ISSUE such certificates, the AKI (if it uses component
> [0]) and SKI of the issuer (if present) should match... (and reading 5280,
> I see the language is actually wrong... *sigh*).  And how did we miss this
> for so long?
> >
> > Time for an errata.
>
> Oh, OK. If text is going to be changed, please consider adding some
> verbiage so continuity is present between AKI and SKI.
>
> As it stands, the intent or requirement does not seem to flow from one
> to the other. That is, the subject's AKI must be present, but it does
> not actually have to match a signer's SKI. I think there's an implicit
> assumption that it will match, but its not really stated (unless I am
> misreading it).
>

AKI/SKI matching is not mandatory in the normative X.509 validation
algorithm either. Is it necessary to introduce another difference in
behaviour between X.509 and RFC5280 validation algorithms?

-- 
Erwann.

--20cf3071cdd02e87680513112979
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
2015-04-06 18:41 GMT+02:00 Jeffrey Walton <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"=
mailto:noloader@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">noloader@gmail.com</a>&gt;</sp=
an>:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border=
-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span class=3D"">On Mon, Apr 6, 2015=
 at 12:31 PM, Michael StJohns &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mstjohns@comcast.net">m=
stjohns@comcast.net</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; This turns out to be one of those things that makes you want to hit yo=
ur head against the wall.=C2=A0 Brian has the correct cite for path validat=
ion, however &quot;path formation&quot; generally depends on matching AKI S=
KI pairs to select the right set of certificates for path validation and yo=
u do path formation before you do path validation.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Alternately, you can try all possible matching SubjectName/IssuerName =
parent certificates to try and find a path through. (or if the AKI uses com=
ponents [1] and [2] but not [0] do it that way).<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Lastly, when you ISSUE such certificates, the AKI (if it uses componen=
t [0]) and SKI of the issuer (if present) should match... (and reading 5280=
, I see the language is actually wrong... *sigh*).=C2=A0 And how did we mis=
s this for so long?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Time for an errata.<br>
<br>
</span>Oh, OK. If text is going to be changed, please consider adding some<=
br>
verbiage so continuity is present between AKI and SKI.<br>
<br>
As it stands, the intent or requirement does not seem to flow from one<br>
to the other. That is, the subject&#39;s AKI must be present, but it does<b=
r>
not actually have to match a signer&#39;s SKI. I think there&#39;s an impli=
cit<br>
assumption that it will match, but its not really stated (unless I am<br>
misreading it).<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>AKI/SKI matching is not=
 mandatory in the normative X.509 validation algorithm either. Is it necess=
ary to introduce another difference in behaviour between X.509 and RFC5280 =
validation algorithms?</div><div><br></div></div>-- <br><div class=3D"gmail=
_signature">Erwann.</div>
</div></div>

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Date: Mon, 6 Apr 2015 18:58:03 +0200
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Suggested replacement text for RFC5280, section 4.2.1.1
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2015-04-06 18:49 GMT+02:00 Michael StJohns <mstjohns@comcast.net>:

>  I realized there may be a problem in 5280 during this recent
> discussion.   The formation of the AKI keyIdentifier value derivation is
> probably incorrect or at the best incomplete.
>
> Replace paragraph beginning "The value of the keyIdentifier...." in its
> entirety with:
>
> If the Issuer has a certificate of its own (e.g. an intermediate CA or a
> trust root expressed as a certificate) and that certificate contains a
> SubjectKeyIdentifier extension, then the keyIdentifier field of this
> extension MUST be present and MUST contain the same value as that in the
> Issuer's SubjectKeyIdentifier.
>
> If the Issuer does not have a SubjectKeyIdentifier extension (either
> because it is a root not expressed as a certificate or because its
> certificate does not contain the extension), then the keyIdentifier of this
> extension SHOULD be derived from the public key used to verify the
> certificate's signature using one of the two methods described in 4.2.1.2.
>
> The extension may OPTIONALLY include either both or neither of the
> authorityCertIssuer and authorityCertSerial number fields - they must be
> included or excluded together.  Since these are only useful in the third or
> greater certificate in a chain, it is expected that the presence of these
> fields will be rare.
>
> _____________________________________
> Rationale:  The current language mirrors that in the SKI  section 4.2.1.2
> which doesn't actually make a lot of sense. You don't want the AKI to be
> independent of the SKI if you can avoid it.   I think this change is still
> backwards compatible since path validation doesn't require these match.
>

What if the Issuer has 2 certificates, with 2 different keyIdentifier
values? (method 1 and method 2, for example).

-- 
Erwann.

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
2015-04-06 18:49 GMT+02:00 Michael StJohns <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D=
"mailto:mstjohns@comcast.net" target=3D"_blank">mstjohns@comcast.net</a>&gt=
;</span>:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;b=
order-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div>
I realized there may be a problem in 5280 during this recent
discussion.=C2=A0=C2=A0 The formation of the AKI keyIdentifier value
derivation is probably incorrect or at the best incomplete.<br><br>
Replace paragraph beginning &quot;The value of the
keyIdentifier....&quot; in its entirety with:<br><br>
If the Issuer has a certificate of its own (e.g. an intermediate CA or a
trust root expressed as a certificate) and that certificate contains a
SubjectKeyIdentifier extension, then the keyIdentifier field of this
extension MUST be present and MUST contain the same value as that in the
Issuer&#39;s SubjectKeyIdentifier.=C2=A0=C2=A0 <br><br>
If the Issuer does not have a SubjectKeyIdentifier extension (either
because it is a root not expressed as a certificate or because its
certificate does not contain the extension), then the keyIdentifier of
this extension SHOULD be derived from the public key used to verify the
certificate&#39;s signature using one of the two methods described in
4.2.1.2. <br><br>
The extension may OPTIONALLY include either both or neither of the
authorityCertIssuer and authorityCertSerial number fields - they must be
included or excluded together.=C2=A0 Since these are only useful in the
third or greater certificate in a chain, it is expected that the presence
of these fields will be rare.<br><br>
_____________________________________<br>
Rationale:=C2=A0 The current language mirrors that in the SKI=C2=A0
section 4.2.1.2 which doesn&#39;t actually make a lot of sense. You don&#39=
;t
want the AKI to be independent of the SKI if you can avoid
it.=C2=A0=C2=A0 I think this change is still backwards compatible since
path validation doesn&#39;t require these match.<br></div></blockquote></di=
v><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div>What if the Issuer has 2 certificate=
s, with 2 different keyIdentifier values? (method 1 and method 2, for examp=
le).<br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div class=3D"gmail_signature">=
Erwann.</div>
</div></div>

--20cf3071cdd084e5490513113384--


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Subject: Re: [pkix] Suggested replacement text for RFC5280, section  4.2.1.1
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At 12:58 PM 4/6/2015, Erwann Abalea wrote:

>2015-04-06 18:49 GMT+02:00 Michael StJohns=
 <<mailto:mstjohns@comcast.net>mstjohns@comcast.net>:
>I realized there may be a problem in 5280 during this recent discussion.=C2=
 =C2  The formation of the AKI keyIdentifier value derivation is probably=
 incorrect or at the best incomplete.
>
>Replace paragraph beginning "The value of the keyIdentifier...." in its=
 entirety with:
>
>If the Issuer has a certificate of its own (e.g. an intermediate CA or a=
 trust root expressed as a certificate) and that certificate contains a=
 SubjectKeyIdentifier extension, then the keyIdentifier field of this=
 extension MUST be present and MUST contain the same value as that in the=
 Issuer's SubjectKeyIdentifier.=C2 =C2 =20
>
>If the Issuer does not have a SubjectKeyIdentifier extension (either=
 because it is a root not expressed as a certificate or because its=
 certificate does not contain the extension), then the keyIdentifier of this=
 extension SHOULD be derived from the public key used to verify the=
 certificate's signature using one of the two methods described in 4.2.1.2.=
=20
>
>The extension may OPTIONALLY include either both or neither of the=
 authorityCertIssuer and authorityCertSerial number fields - they must be=
 included or excluded together.=C2  Since these are only useful in the third=
 or greater certificate in a chain, it is expected that the presence of=
 these fields will be rare.
>
>_____________________________________
>Rationale:=C2  The current language mirrors that in the SKI=C2  section=
 4.2.1.2 which doesn't actually make a lot of sense. You don't want the AKI=
 to be independent of the SKI if you can avoid it.=C2 =C2  I think this=
 change is still backwards compatible since path validation doesn't require=
 these match.
>
>
>What if the Issuer has 2 certificates, with 2 different keyIdentifier=
 values? (method 1 and method 2, for example).


Umm... if they both refer to the same public key, then pick one or the other=
 - its a mostly don't care.  The functional matching is from the SKI to the=
 AKI not the reverse.  If they don't refer to the same public key, then pick=
 the one that can be used to verify the certificate. =20


>--=20
>Erwann.


--=====================_170859923==.ALT
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<html>
<body>
At 12:58 PM 4/6/2015, Erwann Abalea wrote:<br><br>
<blockquote type=3Dcite class=3Dcite cite=3D"">2015-04-06 18:49 GMT+02:00
Michael StJohns
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mstjohns@comcast.net">mstjohns@comcast.net</a>
&gt;:<br>

<dl>
<dd>I realized there may be a problem in 5280 during this recent
discussion.=C2 =C2&nbsp; The formation of the AKI keyIdentifier value
derivation is probably incorrect or at the best incomplete.<br><br>

<dd>Replace paragraph beginning &quot;The value of the
keyIdentifier....&quot; in its entirety with:<br><br>

<dd>If the Issuer has a certificate of its own (e.g. an intermediate CA
or a trust root expressed as a certificate) and that certificate contains
a SubjectKeyIdentifier extension, then the keyIdentifier field of this
extension MUST be present and MUST contain the same value as that in the
Issuer's SubjectKeyIdentifier.=C2 =C2&nbsp; <br><br>

<dd>If the Issuer does not have a SubjectKeyIdentifier extension (either
because it is a root not expressed as a certificate or because its
certificate does not contain the extension), then the keyIdentifier of
this extension SHOULD be derived from the public key used to verify the
certificate's signature using one of the two methods described in
4.2.1.2. <br><br>

<dd>The extension may OPTIONALLY include either both or neither of the
authorityCertIssuer and authorityCertSerial number fields - they must be
included or excluded together.=C2&nbsp; Since these are only useful in the
third or greater certificate in a chain, it is expected that the presence
of these fields will be rare.<br><br>

<dd>_____________________________________<br>

<dd>Rationale:=C2&nbsp; The current language mirrors that in the SKI=C2&nbsp=
;
section 4.2.1.2 which doesn't actually make a lot of sense. You don't
want the AKI to be independent of the SKI if you can avoid it.=C2 =C2&nbsp; =
I
think this change is still backwards compatible since path validation
doesn't require these match.<br><br>

</dl><br>
What if the Issuer has 2 certificates, with 2 different keyIdentifier
values? (method 1 and method 2, for example).</blockquote><br><br>
Umm... if they both refer to the same public key, then pick one or the
other - its a mostly don't care.&nbsp; The functional matching is from
the SKI to the AKI not the reverse.&nbsp; If they don't refer to the same
public key, then pick the one that can be used to verify the
certificate.&nbsp; <br><br>
<br>
<blockquote type=3Dcite class=3Dcite cite=3D"">-- <br>
Erwann.</blockquote></body>
<br>
</html>

--=====================_170859923==.ALT--


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Subject: Re: [pkix] Is it required that subject AKI actually match issuer SKI?
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At 12:55 PM 4/6/2015, Erwann Abalea wrote:

>2015-04-06 18:41 GMT+02:00 Jeffrey Walton=
 <<mailto:noloader@gmail.com>noloader@gmail.com>:
>On Mon, Apr 6, 2015 at 12:31 PM, Michael StJohns=
 <<mailto:mstjohns@comcast.net>mstjohns@comcast.net> wrote:
>> This turns out to be one of those things that makes you want to hit your=
 head against the wall.=C2  Brian has the correct cite for path validation,=
 however "path formation" generally depends on matching AKI SKI pairs to=
 select the right set of certificates for path validation and you do path=
 formation before you do path validation.
>>
>> Alternately, you can try all possible matching SubjectName/IssuerName=
 parent certificates to try and find a path through. (or if the AKI uses=
 components [1] and [2] but not [0] do it that way).
>>
>> Lastly, when you ISSUE such certificates, the AKI (if it uses component=
 [0]) and SKI of the issuer (if present) should match... (and reading 5280,=
 I see the language is actually wrong... *sigh*).=C2  And how did we miss=
 this for so long?
>>
>> Time for an errata.
>
>Oh, OK. If text is going to be changed, please consider adding some
>verbiage so continuity is present between AKI and SKI.
>
>As it stands, the intent or requirement does not seem to flow from one
>to the other. That is, the subject's AKI must be present, but it does
>not actually have to match a signer's SKI. I think there's an implicit
>assumption that it will match, but its not really stated (unless I am
>misreading it).
>
>
>AKI/SKI matching is not mandatory in the normative X.509 validation=
 algorithm either. Is it necessary to introduce another difference in=
 behaviour between X.509 and RFC5280 validation algorithms?


Please see the text I just sent.  I'm not proposing changing the validation=
 algorithm, just cleaning up the issuing guidance.

Later, Mike



>--=20
>Erwann.


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<body>
At 12:55 PM 4/6/2015, Erwann Abalea wrote:<br><br>
<blockquote type=3Dcite class=3Dcite cite=3D"">2015-04-06 18:41 GMT+02:00
Jeffrey Walton
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:noloader@gmail.com">noloader@gmail.com</a>&gt;:<br>

<dl>
<dd>On Mon, Apr 6, 2015 at 12:31 PM, Michael StJohns
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mstjohns@comcast.net">mstjohns@comcast.net</a>&gt;
wrote:<br>

<dd>&gt; This turns out to be one of those things that makes you want to
hit your head against the wall.=C2&nbsp; Brian has the correct cite for
path validation, however &quot;path formation&quot; generally depends on
matching AKI SKI pairs to select the right set of certificates for path
validation and you do path formation before you do path validation.<br>

<dd>&gt;<br>

<dd>&gt; Alternately, you can try all possible matching
SubjectName/IssuerName parent certificates to try and find a path
through. (or if the AKI uses components [1] and [2] but not [0] do it
that way).<br>

<dd>&gt;<br>

<dd>&gt; Lastly, when you ISSUE such certificates, the AKI (if it uses
component [0]) and SKI of the issuer (if present) should match... (and
reading 5280, I see the language is actually wrong... *sigh*).=C2&nbsp; And
how did we miss this for so long?<br>

<dd>&gt;<br>

<dd>&gt; Time for an errata.<br><br>

<dd>Oh, OK. If text is going to be changed, please consider adding
some<br>

<dd>verbiage so continuity is present between AKI and SKI.<br><br>

<dd>As it stands, the intent or requirement does not seem to flow from
one<br>

<dd>to the other. That is, the subject's AKI must be present, but it
does<br>

<dd>not actually have to match a signer's SKI. I think there's an
implicit<br>

<dd>assumption that it will match, but its not really stated (unless I
am<br>

<dd>misreading it).<br><br>

</dl><br>
AKI/SKI matching is not mandatory in the normative X.509 validation
algorithm either. Is it necessary to introduce another difference in
behaviour between X.509 and RFC5280 validation
algorithms?</blockquote><br><br>
Please see the text I just sent.&nbsp; I'm not proposing changing the
validation algorithm, just cleaning up the issuing guidance.<br><br>
Later, Mike<br><br>
<br><br>
<blockquote type=3Dcite class=3Dcite cite=3D"">-- <br>
Erwann.</blockquote></body>
<br>
</html>

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Date: Mon, 6 Apr 2015 19:26:15 +0200
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From: Erwann Abalea <eabalea@gmail.com>
To: Michael StJohns <mstjohns@comcast.net>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Suggested replacement text for RFC5280, section 4.2.1.1
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Le 6 avr. 2015 19:04, "Michael StJohns" <mstjohns@comcast.net> a =C3=A9crit=
 :
>
> At 12:58 PM 4/6/2015, Erwann Abalea wrote:
>
>> 2015-04-06 18:49 GMT+02:00 Michael StJohns <mstjohns@comcast.net >:
>> I realized there may be a problem in 5280 during this recent
discussion.=C3=82 =C3=82  The formation of the AKI keyIdentifier value deri=
vation is
probably incorrect or at the best incomplete.
>>
>> Replace paragraph beginning "The value of the keyIdentifier...." in its
entirety with:
>>
>> If the Issuer has a certificate of its own (e.g. an intermediate CA or a
trust root expressed as a certificate) and that certificate contains a
SubjectKeyIdentifier extension, then the keyIdentifier field of this
extension MUST be present and MUST contain the same value as that in the
Issuer's SubjectKeyIdentifier.=C3=82 =C3=82
>>
>> If the Issuer does not have a SubjectKeyIdentifier extension (either
because it is a root not expressed as a certificate or because its
certificate does not contain the extension), then the keyIdentifier of this
extension SHOULD be derived from the public key used to verify the
certificate's signature using one of the two methods described in 4.2.1.2.
>>
>> The extension may OPTIONALLY include either both or neither of the
authorityCertIssuer and authorityCertSerial number fields - they must be
included or excluded together.=C3=82  Since these are only useful in the th=
ird
or greater certificate in a chain, it is expected that the presence of
these fields will be rare.
>>
>> _____________________________________
>> Rationale:=C3=82  The current language mirrors that in the SKI=C3=82  se=
ction
4.2.1.2 which doesn't actually make a lot of sense. You don't want the AKI
to be independent of the SKI if you can avoid it.=C3=82 =C3=82  I think thi=
s change
is still backwards compatible since path validation doesn't require these
match.
>>
>>
>> What if the Issuer has 2 certificates, with 2 different keyIdentifier
values? (method 1 and method 2, for example).
>
>
> Umm... if they both refer to the same public key, then pick one or the
other - its a mostly don't care.  The functional matching is from the SKI
to the AKI not the reverse.  If they don't refer to the same public key,
then pick the one that can be used to verify the certificate.

My example was with the same public key.
Having a MUST that can potentially be wrong with valid use-cases isn't nice=
.
I was thinking about cross-certified CAs.

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<p dir=3D"ltr"><br>
Le=C2=A06 avr. 2015 19:04, &quot;Michael StJohns&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailt=
o:mstjohns@comcast.net">mstjohns@comcast.net</a>&gt; a =C3=A9crit=C2=A0:<br=
>
&gt;<br>
&gt; At 12:58 PM 4/6/2015, Erwann Abalea wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; 2015-04-06 18:49 GMT+02:00 Michael StJohns &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:m=
stjohns@comcast.net">mstjohns@comcast.net</a> &gt;:<br>
&gt;&gt; I realized there may be a problem in 5280 during this recent discu=
ssion.=C3=82 =C3=82=C2=A0 The formation of the AKI keyIdentifier value deri=
vation is probably incorrect or at the best incomplete.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Replace paragraph beginning &quot;The value of the keyIdentifier..=
..&quot; in its entirety with:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; If the Issuer has a certificate of its own (e.g. an intermediate C=
A or a trust root expressed as a certificate) and that certificate contains=
 a SubjectKeyIdentifier extension, then the keyIdentifier field of this ext=
ension MUST be present and MUST contain the same value as that in the Issue=
r&#39;s SubjectKeyIdentifier.=C3=82 =C3=82=C2=A0 <br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; If the Issuer does not have a SubjectKeyIdentifier extension (eith=
er because it is a root not expressed as a certificate or because its certi=
ficate does not contain the extension), then the keyIdentifier of this exte=
nsion SHOULD be derived from the public key used to verify the certificate&=
#39;s signature using one of the two methods described in 4.2.1.2. <br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; The extension may OPTIONALLY include either both or neither of the=
 authorityCertIssuer and authorityCertSerial number fields - they must be i=
ncluded or excluded together.=C3=82=C2=A0 Since these are only useful in th=
e third or greater certificate in a chain, it is expected that the presence=
 of these fields will be rare.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; _____________________________________<br>
&gt;&gt; Rationale:=C3=82=C2=A0 The current language mirrors that in the SK=
I=C3=82=C2=A0 section 4.2.1.2 which doesn&#39;t actually make a lot of sens=
e. You don&#39;t want the AKI to be independent of the SKI if you can avoid=
 it.=C3=82 =C3=82=C2=A0 I think this change is still backwards compatible s=
ince path validation doesn&#39;t require these match.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; What if the Issuer has 2 certificates, with 2 different keyIdentif=
ier values? (method 1 and method 2, for example).<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Umm... if they both refer to the same public key, then pick one or the=
 other - its a mostly don&#39;t care.=C2=A0 The functional matching is from=
 the SKI to the AKI not the reverse.=C2=A0 If they don&#39;t refer to the s=
ame public key, then pick the one that can be used to verify the certificat=
e.=C2=A0 </p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">My example was with the same public key.<br>
Having a MUST that can potentially be wrong with valid use-cases isn&#39;t =
nice.<br>
I was thinking about cross-certified CAs.</p>

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Date: Mon, 06 Apr 2015 14:13:57 -0400
To: Erwann Abalea <eabalea@gmail.com>
From: Michael StJohns <mstjohns@comcast.net>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Suggested replacement text for RFC5280, section  4.2.1.1
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At 01:26 PM 4/6/2015, Erwann Abalea wrote:


>Le=C2 6 avr. 2015 19:04, "Michael StJohns"=
 <<mailto:mstjohns@comcast.net>mstjohns@comcast.net> a =C3=A9crit=C2 :
>>
>> At 12:58 PM 4/6/2015, Erwann Abalea wrote:
>>
>>> 2015-04-06 18:49 GMT+02:00 Michael StJohns=
 <<mailto:mstjohns@comcast.net>mstjohns@comcast.net >:
>>> I realized there may be a problem in 5280 during this recent=
 discussion.=C3=82 =C3=82=C2  The formation of the AKI keyIdentifier value=
 derivation is probably incorrect or at the best incomplete.
>>>
>>> Replace paragraph beginning "The value of the keyIdentifier...." in its=
 entirety with:
>>>
>>> If the Issuer has a certificate of its own (e.g. an intermediate CA or a=
 trust root expressed as a certificate) and that certificate contains a=
 SubjectKeyIdentifier extension, then the keyIdentifier field of this=
 extension MUST be present and MUST contain the same value as that in the=
 Issuer's SubjectKeyIdentifier.=C3=82 =C3=82=C2 =20
>>>
>>> If the Issuer does not have a SubjectKeyIdentifier extension (either=
 because it is a root not expressed as a certificate or because its=
 certificate does not contain the extension), then the keyIdentifier of this=
 extension SHOULD be derived from the public key used to verify the=
 certificate's signature using one of the two methods described in 4.2.1.2.=
=20
>>>
>>> The extension may OPTIONALLY include either both or neither of the=
 authorityCertIssuer and authorityCertSerial number fields - they must be=
 included or excluded together.=C3=82=C2  Since these are only useful in the=
 third or greater certificate in a chain, it is expected that the presence=
 of these fields will be rare.
>>>
>>> _____________________________________
>>> Rationale:=C3=82=C2  The current language mirrors that in the SKI=C3=82=
=C2  section 4.2.1.2 which doesn't actually make a lot of sense. You don't=
 want the AKI to be independent of the SKI if you can avoid it.=C3=82 =C3=82=
=C2  I think this change is still backwards compatible since path validation=
 doesn't require these match.
>>>
>>>
>>> What if the Issuer has 2 certificates, with 2 different keyIdentifier=
 values? (method 1 and method 2, for example).
>>
>>
>> Umm... if they both refer to the same public key, then pick one or the=
 other - its a mostly don't care.=C2  The functional matching is from the=
 SKI to the AKI not the reverse.=C2  If they don't refer to the same public=
 key, then pick the one that can be used to verify the certificate.=C2 =20
>
>My example was with the same public key.
>Having a MUST that can potentially be wrong with valid use-cases isn't=
 nice.
>I was thinking about cross-certified CAs.


I don't think you're thinking this through.   You have two issuer=
 certificates A and B.  They have different  SubjectKeyIdentifier extensions=
  A.SKI and B.SKI.    The issuer, when it issues the subject certificate S=
 picks either A or B as the issuing certificate and copies the SubjectName=
 and SubjectKeyIdentifier from that certificate to the IssuerName and AKI of=
 the subject certificate respectively.  =20

When validating the subject certificate, the acceptor grabs the AKI from the=
 subject certificate along with the Issuer Name and goes looking for a=
 matching CA certificate eventually finding the certificate that the ISSUER=
 selected. =20

I'm pretty sure all that works.

Or would you like to provide an example - comprehensive please - where this=
 doesn't work?  Detail both the issuing side and the validation side please.

Later, Mike






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<html>
<body>
At 01:26 PM 4/6/2015, Erwann Abalea wrote:<br><br>
<br>
<blockquote type=3Dcite class=3Dcite cite=3D"">Le=C2 6 avr. 2015 19:04,
&quot;Michael StJohns&quot;
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mstjohns@comcast.net">mstjohns@comcast.net</a>&gt; a
=C3=A9crit=C2 :<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; At 12:58 PM 4/6/2015, Erwann Abalea wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; 2015-04-06 18:49 GMT+02:00 Michael StJohns
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mstjohns@comcast.net">mstjohns@comcast.net</a>
&gt;:<br>
&gt;&gt; I realized there may be a problem in 5280 during this recent
discussion.=C3=82 =C3=82=C2&nbsp; The formation of the AKI keyIdentifier val=
ue
derivation is probably incorrect or at the best incomplete.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Replace paragraph beginning &quot;The value of the
keyIdentifier....&quot; in its entirety with:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; If the Issuer has a certificate of its own (e.g. an intermediate
CA or a trust root expressed as a certificate) and that certificate
contains a SubjectKeyIdentifier extension, then the keyIdentifier field
of this extension MUST be present and MUST contain the same value as that
in the Issuer's SubjectKeyIdentifier.=C3=82 =C3=82=C2&nbsp; <br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; If the Issuer does not have a SubjectKeyIdentifier extension
(either because it is a root not expressed as a certificate or because
its certificate does not contain the extension), then the keyIdentifier
of this extension SHOULD be derived from the public key used to verify
the certificate's signature using one of the two methods described in
4.2.1.2. <br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; The extension may OPTIONALLY include either both or neither of
the authorityCertIssuer and authorityCertSerial number fields - they must
be included or excluded together.=C3=82=C2&nbsp; Since these are only useful=
 in
the third or greater certificate in a chain, it is expected that the
presence of these fields will be rare.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; _____________________________________<br>
&gt;&gt; Rationale:=C3=82=C2&nbsp; The current language mirrors that in the
SKI=C3=82=C2&nbsp; section 4.2.1.2 which doesn't actually make a lot of sens=
e.
You don't want the AKI to be independent of the SKI if you can avoid
it.=C3=82 =C3=82=C2&nbsp; I think this change is still backwards compatible =
since
path validation doesn't require these match.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; What if the Issuer has 2 certificates, with 2 different
keyIdentifier values? (method 1 and method 2, for example).<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Umm... if they both refer to the same public key, then pick one or
the other - its a mostly don't care.=C2&nbsp; The functional matching is
from the SKI to the AKI not the reverse.=C2&nbsp; If they don't refer to
the same public key, then pick the one that can be used to verify the
certificate.=C2&nbsp; <br><br>
My example was with the same public key.<br>
Having a MUST that can potentially be wrong with valid use-cases isn't
nice.<br>
I was thinking about cross-certified CAs.</blockquote><br><br>
I don't think you're thinking this through.&nbsp;&nbsp; You have two
issuer certificates A and B.&nbsp; They have different&nbsp;
SubjectKeyIdentifier extensions&nbsp; A.SKI and B.SKI.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
The issuer, when it issues the subject certificate S picks either A or B
as the issuing certificate and copies the SubjectName and
SubjectKeyIdentifier from that certificate to the IssuerName and AKI of
the subject certificate respectively.&nbsp;&nbsp; <br><br>
When validating the subject certificate, the acceptor grabs the AKI from
the subject certificate along with the Issuer Name and goes looking for a
matching CA certificate eventually finding the certificate that the
ISSUER selected.&nbsp; <br><br>
I'm pretty sure all that works.<br><br>
Or would you like to provide an example - comprehensive please - where
this doesn't work?&nbsp; Detail both the issuing side and the validation
side please.<br><br>
Later, Mike<br><br>
<br><br>
<br>
</body>
<br>
</html>

--=====================_174999066==.ALT--


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Date: Mon, 06 Apr 2015 15:06:58 -0400
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Is it required that subject AKI actually match issuer SKI?
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Jeff,

The motivation for SKI/AKI matching arises in path construction of path 
finding, not path validation.

It is an optimization, an alternative way to quickly find the right 
parent CA cert when there may be more than one with the same Subject 
name, e.g., during key rollover or in te case of cross certification.

Also recall that there is no standard for path construction. In path 
validation, the signature and issuer/subject checks are enough, so 
AKI/SKI matching is redundant.

Steve
>> ...
> Oh, OK. If text is going to be changed, please consider adding some
> verbiage so continuity is present between AKI and SKI.
>
> As it stands, the intent or requirement does not seem to flow from one
> to the other. That is, the subject's AKI must be present, but it does
> not actually have to match a signer's SKI. I think there's an implicit
> assumption that it will match, but its not really stated (unless I am
> misreading it).
>
> I think we are talking about the same thing, but I wanted to say it
> just in case.
>
> Jeff
>


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Subject: Re: [pkix] Suggested replacement text for RFC5280, section 4.2.1.1
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--001a1136b312cb753005131350d6
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2015-04-06 20:13 GMT+02:00 Michael StJohns <mstjohns@comcast.net>:

>  At 01:26 PM 4/6/2015, Erwann Abalea wrote:
>
>
> Le=C3=82 6 avr. 2015 19:04, "Michael StJohns" <mstjohns@comcast.net> a =
=C3=83=C2=A9crit=C3=82
> :
> >
> > At 12:58 PM 4/6/2015, Erwann Abalea wrote:
> >
> >> 2015-04-06 18:49 GMT+02:00 Michael StJohns <mstjohns@comcast.net >:
> >> I realized there may be a problem in 5280 during this recent
> discussion.=C3=83=E2=80=9A =C3=83=E2=80=9A=C3=82  The formation of the AK=
I keyIdentifier value derivation
> is probably incorrect or at the best incomplete.
> >>
> >> Replace paragraph beginning "The value of the keyIdentifier...." in it=
s
> entirety with:
> >>
> >> If the Issuer has a certificate of its own (e.g. an intermediate CA or
> a trust root expressed as a certificate) and that certificate contains a
> SubjectKeyIdentifier extension, then the keyIdentifier field of this
> extension MUST be present and MUST contain the same value as that in the
> Issuer's SubjectKeyIdentifier.=C3=83=E2=80=9A =C3=83=E2=80=9A=C3=82
> >>
> >> If the Issuer does not have a SubjectKeyIdentifier extension (either
> because it is a root not expressed as a certificate or because its
> certificate does not contain the extension), then the keyIdentifier of th=
is
> extension SHOULD be derived from the public key used to verify the
> certificate's signature using one of the two methods described in 4.2.1.2=
.
> >>
> >> The extension may OPTIONALLY include either both or neither of the
> authorityCertIssuer and authorityCertSerial number fields - they must be
> included or excluded together.=C3=83=E2=80=9A=C3=82  Since these are only=
 useful in the third
> or greater certificate in a chain, it is expected that the presence of
> these fields will be rare.
> >>
> >> _____________________________________
> >> Rationale:=C3=83=E2=80=9A=C3=82  The current language mirrors that in =
the SKI=C3=83=E2=80=9A=C3=82  section
> 4.2.1.2 which doesn't actually make a lot of sense. You don't want the AK=
I
> to be independent of the SKI if you can avoid it.=C3=83=E2=80=9A =C3=83=
=E2=80=9A=C3=82  I think this
> change is still backwards compatible since path validation doesn't requir=
e
> these match.
> >>
> >>
> >> What if the Issuer has 2 certificates, with 2 different keyIdentifier
> values? (method 1 and method 2, for example).
> >
> >
> > Umm... if they both refer to the same public key, then pick one or the
> other - its a mostly don't care.=C3=82  The functional matching is from t=
he SKI
> to the AKI not the reverse.=C3=82  If they don't refer to the same public=
 key,
> then pick the one that can be used to verify the certificate.=C3=82
>
> My example was with the same public key.
> Having a MUST that can potentially be wrong with valid use-cases isn't
> nice.
> I was thinking about cross-certified CAs.
>
>
>
> I don't think you're thinking this through.   You have two issuer
> certificates A and B.  They have different  SubjectKeyIdentifier
> extensions  A.SKI and B.SKI.    The issuer, when it issues the subject
> certificate S picks either A or B as the issuing certificate and copies t=
he
> SubjectName and SubjectKeyIdentifier from that certificate to the
> IssuerName and AKI of the subject certificate respectively.
>

Ok for your 2 issuer certificates A and B for the same CA. So A.subjectName
=3D=3D B.subjectName. Same public key in the example, but A.SKI !=3D B.SKI =
(for
whatever reason). If this CA issues a certificate C, and the paragraph is
changed as described, then C.AKI.keyId will be either equal to A.SKI or
B.SKI (but not both). Does the fact that C.AKI.keyId cannot be equal to
both contradict the MUST? If not, what's the purpose of this change?

When validating the subject certificate, the acceptor grabs the AKI from
> the subject certificate along with the Issuer Name and goes looking for a
> matching CA certificate eventually finding the certificate that the ISSUE=
R
> selected.
>

Let's say C.AKI.keyId =3D A.SKI.
If the validator follows your logic (consider only certificates with the
correct SKI in addition to the subjectName), then certificate B will never
be considered. If B links to a trust anchor while A doesn't (from the
validator point of view), validation fails.


> I'm pretty sure all that works.
>

It sometimes work (and sometimes fail) if the validator uses the AKI, it
will always work if the validator doesn't really care about the AKI.

So if the AKI doesn't provide super useful information for the validator
that MUST be checked, I don't see the point of being strict on what CAs set
it to.

The same reasoning can be used with
AKI.{authorityCertIssuer,authorityCertSerialNumber}, which will obviously
be different whatever the situation.

--=20
Erwann.

--001a1136b312cb753005131350d6
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
2015-04-06 20:13 GMT+02:00 Michael StJohns <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D=
"mailto:mstjohns@comcast.net" target=3D"_blank">mstjohns@comcast.net</a>&gt=
;</span>:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;b=
order-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div>
At 01:26 PM 4/6/2015, Erwann Abalea wrote:<br><br>
<br>
<blockquote type=3D"cite">Le=C3=82 6 avr. 2015 19:04,
&quot;Michael StJohns&quot;
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mstjohns@comcast.net" target=3D"_blank">mstjohns@comc=
ast.net</a>&gt; a
=C3=83=C2=A9crit=C3=82 :<span class=3D""><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; At 12:58 PM 4/6/2015, Erwann Abalea wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; 2015-04-06 18:49 GMT+02:00 Michael StJohns
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mstjohns@comcast.net" target=3D"_blank">mstjohns@comc=
ast.net</a>
&gt;:<br></span>
&gt;&gt; I realized there may be a problem in 5280 during this recent
discussion.=C3=83=E2=80=9A =C3=83=E2=80=9A=C3=82=C2=A0 The formation of the=
 AKI keyIdentifier value
derivation is probably incorrect or at the best incomplete.<span class=3D""=
><br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Replace paragraph beginning &quot;The value of the
keyIdentifier....&quot; in its entirety with:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br></span>
&gt;&gt; If the Issuer has a certificate of its own (e.g. an intermediate
CA or a trust root expressed as a certificate) and that certificate
contains a SubjectKeyIdentifier extension, then the keyIdentifier field
of this extension MUST be present and MUST contain the same value as that
in the Issuer&#39;s SubjectKeyIdentifier.=C3=83=E2=80=9A =C3=83=E2=80=9A=C3=
=82=C2=A0 <br><span class=3D"">
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; If the Issuer does not have a SubjectKeyIdentifier extension
(either because it is a root not expressed as a certificate or because
its certificate does not contain the extension), then the keyIdentifier
of this extension SHOULD be derived from the public key used to verify
the certificate&#39;s signature using one of the two methods described in
4.2.1.2. <br>
&gt;&gt;<br></span>
&gt;&gt; The extension may OPTIONALLY include either both or neither of
the authorityCertIssuer and authorityCertSerial number fields - they must
be included or excluded together.=C3=83=E2=80=9A=C3=82=C2=A0 Since these ar=
e only useful in
the third or greater certificate in a chain, it is expected that the
presence of these fields will be rare.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; _____________________________________<br>
&gt;&gt; Rationale:=C3=83=E2=80=9A=C3=82=C2=A0 The current language mirrors=
 that in the
SKI=C3=83=E2=80=9A=C3=82=C2=A0 section 4.2.1.2 which doesn&#39;t actually m=
ake a lot of sense.
You don&#39;t want the AKI to be independent of the SKI if you can avoid
it.=C3=83=E2=80=9A =C3=83=E2=80=9A=C3=82=C2=A0 I think this change is still=
 backwards compatible since
path validation doesn&#39;t require these match.<span class=3D""><br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; What if the Issuer has 2 certificates, with 2 different
keyIdentifier values? (method 1 and method 2, for example).<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br></span>
&gt; Umm... if they both refer to the same public key, then pick one or
the other - its a mostly don&#39;t care.=C3=82=C2=A0 The functional matchin=
g is
from the SKI to the AKI not the reverse.=C3=82=C2=A0 If they don&#39;t refe=
r to
the same public key, then pick the one that can be used to verify the
certificate.=C3=82=C2=A0 <br><span class=3D""><br>
My example was with the same public key.<br>
Having a MUST that can potentially be wrong with valid use-cases isn&#39;t
nice.<br>
I was thinking about cross-certified CAs.</span></blockquote><br><br>
I don&#39;t think you&#39;re thinking this through.=C2=A0=C2=A0 You have tw=
o
issuer certificates A and B.=C2=A0 They have different=C2=A0
SubjectKeyIdentifier extensions=C2=A0 A.SKI and B.SKI.=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0
The issuer, when it issues the subject certificate S picks either A or B
as the issuing certificate and copies the SubjectName and
SubjectKeyIdentifier from that certificate to the IssuerName and AKI of
the subject certificate respectively.<br></div></blockquote><div><br></div>=
<div>Ok for your 2 issuer certificates A and B for the same CA. So A.subjec=
tName =3D=3D B.subjectName. Same public key in the example, but A.SKI !=3D =
B.SKI (for whatever reason). If this CA issues a certificate C, and the par=
agraph is changed as described, then C.AKI.keyId will be either equal to A.=
SKI or B.SKI (but not both). Does the fact that C.AKI.keyId cannot be equal=
 to both contradict the MUST? If not, what&#39;s the purpose of this change=
?</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0=
 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div>
When validating the subject certificate, the acceptor grabs the AKI from
the subject certificate along with the Issuer Name and goes looking for a
matching CA certificate eventually finding the certificate that the
ISSUER selected.<br></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Let&#39;s say C.=
AKI.keyId =3D A.SKI.</div><div>If the validator follows your logic (conside=
r only certificates with the correct SKI in addition to the subjectName), t=
hen certificate B will never be considered. If B links to a trust anchor wh=
ile A doesn&#39;t (from the validator point of view), validation fails.</di=
v><div>=C2=A0<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 =
0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div>I&#39;m pretty s=
ure all that works.<br></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>It sometimes =
work (and sometimes fail) if the validator uses the AKI, it will always wor=
k if the validator doesn&#39;t really care about the AKI.</div><div><br></d=
iv><div>So if the AKI doesn&#39;t provide super useful information for the =
validator that MUST be checked, I don&#39;t see the point of being strict o=
n what CAs set it to.</div></div><div><br></div><div>The same reasoning can=
 be used with AKI.{authorityCertIssuer,authorityCertSerialNumber}, which wi=
ll obviously be different whatever the situation.</div><div><br></div>-- <b=
r><div class=3D"gmail_signature">Erwann.</div>
</div></div>

--001a1136b312cb753005131350d6--


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From: Jeffrey Walton <noloader@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Suggested replacement text for RFC5280, section 4.2.1.1
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On Mon, Apr 6, 2015 at 3:29 PM, Erwann Abalea <eabalea@gmail.com> wrote:
> 2015-04-06 20:13 GMT+02:00 Michael StJohns <mstjohns@comcast.net>:
>> ...
>>
>> I don't think you're thinking this through.   You have two issuer
>> certificates A and B.  They have different  SubjectKeyIdentifier extensions
>> A.SKI and B.SKI.    The issuer, when it issues the subject certificate S
>> picks either A or B as the issuing certificate and copies the SubjectName
>> and SubjectKeyIdentifier from that certificate to the IssuerName and AKI of
>> the subject certificate respectively.
>
> Ok for your 2 issuer certificates A and B for the same CA. So A.subjectName
> == B.subjectName. Same public key in the example, but A.SKI != B.SKI (for
> whatever reason). If this CA issues a certificate C, and the paragraph is
> changed as described, then C.AKI.keyId will be either equal to A.SKI or
> B.SKI (but not both). Does the fact that C.AKI.keyId cannot be equal to both
> contradict the MUST? If not, what's the purpose of this change?

Should this be:

    (A.subjectName == B.subjectName) && (A.sn == B.sn)

But I'd like to see a position paper on the subject of certificate
equality for circumstances such as these.

Jeff


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Subject: Re: [pkix] Suggested replacement text for RFC5280, section  4.2.1.1
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--=====================_181837620==.ALT
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At 03:29 PM 4/6/2015, Erwann Abalea wrote:

>2015-04-06 20:13 GMT+02:00 Michael StJohns=
 <<mailto:mstjohns@comcast.net>mstjohns@comcast.net>:
>At 01:26 PM 4/6/2015, Erwann Abalea wrote:
>
>
>>My example was with the same public key.
>>Having a MUST that can potentially be wrong with valid use-cases isn't=
 nice.
>>I was thinking about cross-certified CAs.
>
>
>I don't think you're thinking this through.=C2 =C2  You have two issuer=
 certificates A and B.=C2  They have different=C2  SubjectKeyIdentifier=
 extensions=C2  A.SKI and B.SKI.=C2 =C2 =C2  The issuer, when it issues the=
 subject certificate S picks either A or B as the issuing certificate and=
 copies the SubjectName and SubjectKeyIdentifier from that certificate to=
 the IssuerName and AKI of the subject certificate respectively.
>
>
>Ok for your 2 issuer certificates A and B for the same CA. So A.subjectName=
 =3D=3D B.subjectName. Same public key in the example, but A.SKI !=3D B.SKI=
 (for whatever reason). If this CA issues a certificate C, and the paragraph=
 is changed as described, then C.AKI.keyId will be either equal to A.SKI or=
 B.SKI (but not both). Does the fact that C.AKI.keyId cannot be equal to=
 both contradict the MUST? If not, what's the purpose of this change?


I'm beginning to think you're trolling.  Just in case you're not.

The the issuer first selects the specific issuer certificate and THEN=
 creates the subject certificate.  The MUST is with respect to that specific=
 issuer certificate.  The subject certificate chains through that issuer=
 certificate.   If you have a - insane case - where you have two identical=
 issuer certificates except for the issuer's SKI, then there is no=
 difference in certificate acceptance.  The actual worst case is where you=
 have two issuer certificates with identical public keys, two identical=
 SKI's, two identical SubjectNames but differing active extensions which=
 could cause you to come to different conclusions with respect to validation=
 (e.g. which policies are active, which subordinate names are permitted)=
 depending on which one you find.




>When validating the subject certificate, the acceptor grabs the AKI from=
 the subject certificate along with the Issuer Name and goes looking for a=
 matching CA certificate eventually finding the certificate that the ISSUER=
 selected.
>
>
>Let's say C.AKI.keyId =3D A.SKI.
>If the validator follows your logic (consider only certificates with the=
 correct SKI in addition to the subjectName), then certificate B will never=
 be considered. If B links to a trust anchor while A doesn't (from the=
 validator point of view), validation fails.


Yup - and your point is?    AFAICT this is a good thing.  If the owner of=
 the key pair for A/B wanted C to chain through B, then they should have set=
 the AKI to point to B's SKI.

In any event, this can happen even if both SKIs are identical.  That's why=
 doing it this way is NOT RECOMMENDED.  If you do it the way you're=
 suggesting, expect to go out of business as a CA shortly.


>=C2=20
>I'm pretty sure all that works.
>
>
>It sometimes work (and sometimes fail) if the validator uses the AKI, it=
 will always work if the validator doesn't really care about the AKI.
>
>So if the AKI doesn't provide super useful information for the validator=
 that MUST be checked, I don't see the point of being strict on what CAs set=
 it to.


See Steve's note and my first note. Basically the AKI/SKI pairing allows you=
 to easily select appropriate certificates from the database for path=
 building.  The AKI/SKI pairing doesn't actually play in the path validation=
 process though.  Without this pairing, you have to try ALL valid=
 certificates with matching SubjectName/IssuerName pairings (discarding=
 those whose public key couldn't possibly form your signature) and hoping=
 for the best.  There are path building algorithms that will (mostly=
 wrongly) do this.

Not setting it makes path building clumsy and path validation more=
 expensive.  Setting it incorrectly can prevent the selection of the=
 certificate for potential paths.  =20

To be fair, I wish the pairing was enforced as part of the path validation=
 simply to deal with some esoteric corner case.  But for a reasonably=
 competent CA and a reasonably competent root operator, this is mostly not=
 going to be an issue.

There are a *lot* of ways to screw up certificate issuing.  Congrats on=
 rediscovering at least two.

Mike




>The same reasoning can be used with=
 AKI.{authorityCertIssuer,authorityCertSerialNumber}, which will obviously=
 be different whatever the situation.
>
>--=20
>Erwann.


--=====================_181837620==.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<html>
<body>
At 03:29 PM 4/6/2015, Erwann Abalea wrote:<br><br>
<blockquote type=3Dcite class=3Dcite cite=3D"">2015-04-06 20:13 GMT+02:00
Michael StJohns
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mstjohns@comcast.net">mstjohns@comcast.net</a>
&gt;:<br>

<dl>
<dd>At 01:26 PM 4/6/2015, Erwann Abalea wrote:<br><br>
<br>
<blockquote type=3Dcite class=3Dcite cite=3D"">
<dd>My example was with the same public key.<br>

<dd>Having a MUST that can potentially be wrong with valid use-cases
isn't nice.<br>

<dd>I was thinking about cross-certified CAs.</blockquote><br><br>

<dd>I don't think you're thinking this through.=C2 =C2&nbsp; You have two
issuer certificates A and B.=C2&nbsp; They have different=C2&nbsp;
SubjectKeyIdentifier extensions=C2&nbsp; A.SKI and B.SKI.=C2 =C2 =C2&nbsp; T=
he
issuer, when it issues the subject certificate S picks either A or B as
the issuing certificate and copies the SubjectName and
SubjectKeyIdentifier from that certificate to the IssuerName and AKI of
the subject certificate respectively.<br><br>

</dl><br>
Ok for your 2 issuer certificates A and B for the same CA. So
A.subjectName =3D=3D B.subjectName. Same public key in the example, but A.SK=
I
!=3D B.SKI (for whatever reason). If this CA issues a certificate C, and
the paragraph is changed as described, then C.AKI.keyId will be either
equal to A.SKI or B.SKI (but not both). Does the fact that C.AKI.keyId
cannot be equal to both contradict the MUST? If not, what's the purpose
of this change?</blockquote><br><br>
I'm beginning to think you're trolling.&nbsp; Just in case you're
not.<br><br>
The the issuer first selects the specific issuer certificate and THEN
creates the subject certificate.&nbsp; The MUST is with respect to that
specific issuer certificate.&nbsp; The subject certificate chains through
that issuer certificate.&nbsp;&nbsp; If you have a - insane case - where
you have two identical issuer certificates except for the issuer's SKI,
then there is no difference in certificate acceptance.&nbsp; The actual
worst case is where you have two issuer certificates with identical
public keys, two identical SKI's, two identical SubjectNames but
differing active extensions which could cause you to come to different
conclusions with respect to validation (e.g. which policies are active,
which subordinate names are permitted) depending on which one you
find.<br><br>
<br><br>
<br>
<blockquote type=3Dcite class=3Dcite cite=3D"">
<dl>
<dd>When validating the subject certificate, the acceptor grabs the AKI
from the subject certificate along with the Issuer Name and goes looking
for a matching CA certificate eventually finding the certificate that the
ISSUER selected.<br><br>

</dl><br>
Let's say C.AKI.keyId =3D A.SKI.<br>
If the validator follows your logic (consider only certificates with the
correct SKI in addition to the subjectName), then certificate B will
never be considered. If B links to a trust anchor while A doesn't (from
the validator point of view), validation fails.</blockquote><br><br>
Yup - and your point is?&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; AFAICT this is a good
thing.&nbsp; If the owner of the key pair for A/B wanted C to chain
through B, then they should have set the AKI to point to B's
SKI.<br><br>
In any event, this can happen even if both SKIs are identical.&nbsp;
That's why doing it this way is NOT RECOMMENDED.&nbsp; If you do it the
way you're suggesting, expect to go out of business as a CA
shortly.<br><br>
<br>
<blockquote type=3Dcite class=3Dcite cite=3D"">=C2 <br>

<dl>
<dd>I'm pretty sure all that works.<br><br>

</dl><br>
It sometimes work (and sometimes fail) if the validator uses the AKI, it
will always work if the validator doesn't really care about the
AKI.<br><br>
So if the AKI doesn't provide super useful information for the validator
that MUST be checked, I don't see the point of being strict on what CAs
set it to.</blockquote><br><br>
See Steve's note and my first note. Basically the AKI/SKI pairing allows
you to easily select appropriate certificates from the database for path
building.&nbsp; The AKI/SKI pairing doesn't actually play in the path
validation process though.&nbsp; Without this pairing, you have to try
ALL valid certificates with matching SubjectName/IssuerName pairings
(discarding those whose public key couldn't possibly form your signature)
and hoping for the best.&nbsp; There are path building algorithms that
will (mostly wrongly) do this.<br><br>
Not setting it makes path building clumsy and path validation more
expensive.&nbsp; Setting it incorrectly can prevent the selection of the
certificate for potential paths.&nbsp;&nbsp; <br><br>
To be fair, I wish the pairing was enforced as part of the path
validation simply to deal with some esoteric corner case.&nbsp; But for a
reasonably competent CA and a reasonably competent root operator, this is
mostly not going to be an issue.<br><br>
There are a *lot* of ways to screw up certificate issuing.&nbsp; Congrats
on rediscovering at least two.<br><br>
Mike<br><br>
<br><br>
<br>
<blockquote type=3Dcite class=3Dcite cite=3D"">The same reasoning can be use=
d
with AKI.{authorityCertIssuer,authorityCertSerialNumber}, which will
obviously be different whatever the situation.<br><br>
-- <br>
Erwann.</blockquote></body>
<br>
</html>

--=====================_181837620==.ALT--


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Subject: Re: [pkix] Suggested replacement text for RFC5280, section  4.2.1.1
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At 03:49 PM 4/6/2015, Jeffrey Walton wrote:
>On Mon, Apr 6, 2015 at 3:29 PM, Erwann Abalea <eabalea@gmail.com> wrote:
>> 2015-04-06 20:13 GMT+02:00 Michael StJohns <mstjohns@comcast.net>:
>>> ...
>>>
>>> I don't think you're thinking this through.   You have two issuer
>>> certificates A and B.  They have different  SubjectKeyIdentifier extensions
>>> A.SKI and B.SKI.    The issuer, when it issues the subject certificate S
>>> picks either A or B as the issuing certificate and copies the SubjectName
>>> and SubjectKeyIdentifier from that certificate to the IssuerName and AKI of
>>> the subject certificate respectively.
>>
>> Ok for your 2 issuer certificates A and B for the same CA. So A.subjectName
>> == B.subjectName. Same public key in the example, but A.SKI != B.SKI (for
>> whatever reason). If this CA issues a certificate C, and the paragraph is
>> changed as described, then C.AKI.keyId will be either equal to A.SKI or
>> B.SKI (but not both). Does the fact that C.AKI.keyId cannot be equal to both
>> contradict the MUST? If not, what's the purpose of this change?
>
>Should this be:
>
>    (A.subjectName == B.subjectName) && (A.sn == B.sn)

The serial number has to be unique per issuer so this isn't actually a problem unless A.issuerName == B.issuerName as well.





>But I'd like to see a position paper on the subject of certificate
>equality for circumstances such as these.


See RFC3647  sections 4.4.6 through 4.4.8 for some ideas about name/key/keyid/issuer/extension relationships and what a CA should do in various cases.  It's not comprehensive, but this is where a lot of CAs start.





Mike



>Jeff
>
>_______________________________________________
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>pkix@ietf.org
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To: Erwann Abalea <eabalea@gmail.com>, Michael StJohns <mstjohns@comcast.net>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] Suggested replacement text for RFC5280, section 4.2.1.1
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On Mon, Apr 6, 2015 at 4:17 PM, Miller, Timothy J. <tmiller@mitre.org> wrote:
>> When validating the subject certificate, the acceptor grabs the AKI from the
>> subject certificate along with the Issuer Name and goes looking for a matching
>> CA certificate eventually finding the certificate that the ISSUER selected.
>
> Since this is all a *path construction* discussion and explicitly not a path validation problem, I thought I'd point out that practically speaking it doesn't matter.

Well, if you are using the standard and path construction to tease out
the validations, then it could be a real problem in practice.

(And I have not looked at RFC 6125 to see what it has to say about it).

> There is no obligation on the part of a Verifier to hunt for a valid path because, well, this can take forever

If you don't mind me asking, what is that problem called? It feels
like it should be called the "Which Certificate" problem in spirit of
the "Which Directory" problem. Or is this an instance of the "Which
Directory" problem (my gut tells me probably not).

Jeff


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From: Erwann Abalea <eabalea@gmail.com>
To: Michael StJohns <mstjohns@comcast.net>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Suggested replacement text for RFC5280, section 4.2.1.1
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2015-04-06 22:07 GMT+02:00 Michael StJohns <mstjohns@comcast.net>:

>  At 03:29 PM 4/6/2015, Erwann Abalea wrote:
>
> 2015-04-06 20:13 GMT+02:00 Michael StJohns <mstjohns@comcast.net >:
>  At 01:26 PM 4/6/2015, Erwann Abalea wrote:
>
>
>  My example was with the same public key.
> Having a MUST that can potentially be wrong with valid use-cases isn't
> nice.
> I was thinking about cross-certified CAs.
>
>
>
> I don't think you're thinking this through.=C3=82 =C3=82  You have two is=
suer
> certificates A and B.=C3=82  They have different=C3=82  SubjectKeyIdentif=
ier
> extensions=C3=82  A.SKI and B.SKI.=C3=82 =C3=82 =C3=82  The issuer, when =
it issues the subject
> certificate S picks either A or B as the issuing certificate and copies t=
he
> SubjectName and SubjectKeyIdentifier from that certificate to the
> IssuerName and AKI of the subject certificate respectively.
>
>
> > Ok for your 2 issuer certificates A and B for the same CA. So
> A.subjectName =3D=3D B.subjectName. Same public key in the example, but A=
.SKI
> !=3D B.SKI (for whatever reason). If this CA issues a certificate C, and =
the
> paragraph is changed as described, then C.AKI.keyId will be either equal =
to
> A.SKI or B.SKI (but not both). Does the fact that C.AKI.keyId cannot be
> equal to both contradict the MUST? If not, what's the purpose of this
> change?
>
> I'm beginning to think you're trolling.  Just in case you're not.
>
> The the issuer first selects the specific issuer certificate and THEN
> creates the subject certificate.  The MUST is with respect to that specif=
ic
> issuer certificate.  The subject certificate chains through that issuer
> certificate.   If you have a - insane case -
>

The subject certificate chains through every possible certificates of this
issuer, not the one arbitrarily chosen by the issuer.

----- [1]

> where you have two identical issuer certificates except for the issuer's
> SKI, then there is no difference in certificate acceptance.
>
-----


>   The actual worst case is where you have two issuer certificates with
> identical public keys, two identical SKI's, two identical SubjectNames bu=
t
> differing active extensions which could cause you to come to different
> conclusions with respect to validation (e.g. which policies are active,
> which subordinate names are permitted) depending on which one you find.
>
>
 When validating the subject certificate, the acceptor grabs the AKI from
> the subject certificate along with the Issuer Name and goes looking for a
> matching CA certificate eventually finding the certificate that the ISSUE=
R
> selected.
>
>
> Let's say C.AKI.keyId =3D A.SKI.
> If the validator follows your logic (consider only certificates with the
> correct SKI in addition to the subjectName), then certificate B will neve=
r
> be considered. If B links to a trust anchor while A doesn't (from the
> validator point of view), validation fails.
>
>
>
> Yup - and your point is?    AFAICT this is a good thing.  If the owner of
> the key pair for A/B wanted C to chain through B, then they should have s=
et
> the AKI to point to B's SKI.
>

Now, you're trolling.
The chain A->C is as valid as the chain B->C (appart from other things).
The CA identified by B,C can potentially decide that one of the chains is
invalid, but NOT by setting C.AKI to a particular value, precisely *because
validation doesn't take this into account*. You just admitted it in [1].

Cross-certification exists in practice. Some RP can trust a root RA,
another can trust root RB, a CA wants to be recognized widely so it asks to
be cross-certified by RA and RB (to get certificates A and B). Both RA and
RB have complete freedom to choose what will be set in {A,B}.SKI (see
4.2.1.2, there's no MUST here, RA and RB are not required to cooperate,
they can be completely unrelated entities) as in any other extensions.



> =C3=82
>  I'm pretty sure all that works.
>
>
> It sometimes work (and sometimes fail) if the validator uses the AKI, it
> will always work if the validator doesn't really care about the AKI.
>
> So if the AKI doesn't provide super useful information for the validator
> that MUST be checked, I don't see the point of being strict on what CAs s=
et
> it to.
>
>
>
> See Steve's note and my first note. Basically the AKI/SKI pairing allows
> you to easily select appropriate certificates from the database for path
> building.  The AKI/SKI pairing doesn't actually play in the path validati=
on
> process though.  Without this pairing, you have to try ALL valid
> certificates with matching SubjectName/IssuerName pairings (discarding
> those whose public key couldn't possibly form your signature) and hoping
> for the best.  There are path building algorithms that will (mostly
> wrongly) do this.
>

Why "wrongly"? Why avoiding an incomplete or wrong helper is a bad choice,
if it finds a valid chain?

Not setting it makes path building clumsy and path validation more
> expensive.  Setting it incorrectly can prevent the selection of the
> certificate for potential paths.
>


> To be fair, I wish the pairing was enforced as part of the path validatio=
n
> simply to deal with some esoteric corner case.  But for a reasonably
> competent CA and a reasonably competent root operator, this is mostly not
> going to be an issue.
>

Yet your proposed change is on certificate issuance and not on certificate
validation, and the proposed change has strictly zero effect in the
validation result of a certificate chain, and no security benefit.

SKI/AKI is only a helper, enforcing strict content on a helper is useless
if the RP has complete freedom to ignore them.
And honestly, checking "ALL valid certificates with matching
subjectName/issuerName pairings" isn't that expensive. Writing code that
builds chains with matching AKI/SKI and dealing with corner cases is much
more complicated.

--=20
Erwann.

--089e016338ee2538fb05131e4c4f
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">2015-04-06 22:07 GMT+02:00 Michael StJohns <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a hre=
f=3D"mailto:mstjohns@comcast.net" target=3D"_blank">mstjohns@comcast.net</a=
>&gt;</span>:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px =
0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-l=
eft-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div><span class=3D"">
At 03:29 PM 4/6/2015, Erwann Abalea wrote:<br><br>
</span><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span class=3D"">2015-04-06 20:13 GMT+02:0=
0
Michael StJohns
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mstjohns@comcast.net" target=3D"_blank">mstjohns@comc=
ast.net</a>
&gt;:<br>

</span><dl>
<dd><span class=3D"">At 01:26 PM 4/6/2015, Erwann Abalea wrote:<br><br>
<br>
</span><span class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite">
<dd>My example was with the same public key.<br>

</dd><dd>Having a MUST that can potentially be wrong with valid use-cases
isn&#39;t nice.<br>

</dd><dd>I was thinking about cross-certified CAs.</dd></blockquote></span>=
</dd></dl></blockquote><br><br>

<dd>I don&#39;t think you&#39;re thinking this through.=C3=82 =C3=82=C2=A0 =
You have two
issuer certificates A and B.=C3=82=C2=A0 They have different=C3=82=C2=A0
SubjectKeyIdentifier extensions=C3=82=C2=A0 A.SKI and B.SKI.=C3=82 =C3=82 =
=C3=82=C2=A0 The
issuer, when it issues the subject certificate S picks either A or B as
the issuing certificate and copies the SubjectName and
SubjectKeyIdentifier from that certificate to the IssuerName and AKI of
the subject certificate respectively.<br><br>

</dd><span class=3D""><br>&gt; Ok for your 2 issuer certificates A and B fo=
r the same CA. So
A.subjectName =3D=3D B.subjectName. Same public key in the example, but A.S=
KI
!=3D B.SKI (for whatever reason). If this CA issues a certificate C, and
the paragraph is changed as described, then C.AKI.keyId will be either
equal to A.SKI or B.SKI (but not both). Does the fact that C.AKI.keyId
cannot be equal to both contradict the MUST? If not, what&#39;s the purpose
of this change?</span><br><br>
I&#39;m beginning to think you&#39;re trolling.=C2=A0 Just in case you&#39;=
re
not.<br><br>
The the issuer first selects the specific issuer certificate and THEN
creates the subject certificate.=C2=A0 The MUST is with respect to that
specific issuer certificate.=C2=A0 The subject certificate chains through
that issuer certificate.=C2=A0=C2=A0 If you have a - insane case - </div></=
blockquote><div><br></div><div>The subject certificate chains through every=
 possible certificates of this issuer, not the one arbitrarily chosen by th=
e issuer.=C2=A0<br></div><div><br></div><div>----- [1]</div><blockquote cla=
ss=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;=
border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex=
"><div>where
you have two identical issuer certificates except for the issuer&#39;s SKI,
then there is no difference in certificate acceptance.</div></blockquote><d=
iv>-----</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"m=
argin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204=
,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex"><div>=C2=A0 The actual
worst case is where you have two issuer certificates with identical
public keys, two identical SKI&#39;s, two identical SubjectNames but
differing active extensions which could cause you to come to different
conclusions with respect to validation (e.g. which policies are active,
which subordinate names are permitted) depending on which one you
find.<span class=3D""><br><br></span></div></blockquote><div><br></div><blo=
ckquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left=
-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;paddi=
ng-left:1ex"><div><span class=3D"">
<blockquote type=3D"cite">
<dl>
<dd>When validating the subject certificate, the acceptor grabs the AKI
from the subject certificate along with the Issuer Name and goes looking
for a matching CA certificate eventually finding the certificate that the
ISSUER selected.<br><br>

</dd></dl><br>
Let&#39;s say C.AKI.keyId =3D A.SKI.<br>
If the validator follows your logic (consider only certificates with the
correct SKI in addition to the subjectName), then certificate B will
never be considered. If B links to a trust anchor while A doesn&#39;t (from
the validator point of view), validation fails.</blockquote><br><br></span>
Yup - and your point is?=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 AFAICT this is a good
thing.=C2=A0 If the owner of the key pair for A/B wanted C to chain
through B, then they should have set the AKI to point to B&#39;s
SKI.<br></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Now, you&#39;re trolling.</d=
iv><div>The chain A-&gt;C is as valid as the chain B-&gt;C (appart from oth=
er things). The CA identified by B,C can potentially decide that one of the=
 chains is invalid, but NOT by setting C.AKI to a particular value, precise=
ly *because validation doesn&#39;t take this into account*. You just admitt=
ed it in [1].</div><div><br></div><div>Cross-certification exists in practi=
ce. Some RP can trust a root RA, another can trust root RB, a CA wants to b=
e recognized widely so it asks to be cross-certified by RA and RB (to get c=
ertificates A and B). Both RA and RB have complete freedom to choose what w=
ill be set in {A,B}.SKI (see 4.2.1.2, there&#39;s no MUST here, RA and RB a=
re not required to cooperate, they can be completely unrelated entities) as=
 in any other extensions.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><blockquote cl=
ass=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px=
;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1e=
x"><div>
<br>
<blockquote type=3D"cite">=C3=82 <br><span class=3D"">

<dl>
<dd>I&#39;m pretty sure all that works.<br><br>

</dd></dl><br>
It sometimes work (and sometimes fail) if the validator uses the AKI, it
will always work if the validator doesn&#39;t really care about the
AKI.<br><br>
So if the AKI doesn&#39;t provide super useful information for the validato=
r
that MUST be checked, I don&#39;t see the point of being strict on what CAs
set it to.</span></blockquote><br><br>
See Steve&#39;s note and my first note. Basically the AKI/SKI pairing allow=
s
you to easily select appropriate certificates from the database for path
building.=C2=A0 The AKI/SKI pairing doesn&#39;t actually play in the path
validation process though.=C2=A0 Without this pairing, you have to try
ALL valid certificates with matching SubjectName/IssuerName pairings
(discarding those whose public key couldn&#39;t possibly form your signatur=
e)
and hoping for the best.=C2=A0 There are path building algorithms that
will (mostly wrongly) do this.<br></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Wh=
y &quot;wrongly&quot;? Why avoiding an incomplete or wrong helper is a bad =
choice, if it finds a valid chain?</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D=
"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;borde=
r-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex"><di=
v>Not setting it makes path building clumsy and path validation more
expensive.=C2=A0 Setting it incorrectly can prevent the selection of the
certificate for potential paths.</div></blockquote><div>=C2=A0</div><blockq=
uote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-wi=
dth:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-=
left:1ex"><div>
To be fair, I wish the pairing was enforced as part of the path
validation simply to deal with some esoteric corner case.=C2=A0 But for a
reasonably competent CA and a reasonably competent root operator, this is
mostly not going to be an issue.<br></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>=
Yet your proposed change is on certificate issuance and not on certificate =
validation, and the proposed change has strictly zero effect in the validat=
ion result of a certificate chain, and no security benefit.</div></div><div=
><br></div><div>SKI/AKI is only a helper, enforcing strict content on a hel=
per is useless if the RP has complete freedom to ignore them.</div><div>And=
 honestly, checking &quot;ALL valid certificates with matching subjectName/=
issuerName pairings&quot; isn&#39;t that expensive. Writing code that build=
s chains with matching AKI/SKI and dealing with corner cases is much more c=
omplicated.</div><div><br></div>-- <br><div class=3D"gmail_signature">Erwan=
n.</div>
</div></div>

--089e016338ee2538fb05131e4c4f--


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From: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
To: "noloader@gmail.com" <noloader@gmail.com>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] Suggested replacement text for RFC5280, section 4.2.1.1
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From nobody Tue Apr  7 07:46:22 2015
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Suggested replacement text for RFC5280, section 4.2.1.1
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This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
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Tim,

>> When validating the subject certificate, the acceptor grabs the AKI from the
>> subject certificate along with the Issuer Name and goes looking for a matching
>> CA certificate eventually finding the certificate that the ISSUER selected.
> Since this is all a *path construction* discussion and explicitly not a path validation problem, I thought I'd point out that practically speaking it doesn't matter.  There is no obligation on the part of a Verifier to hunt for a valid path because, well, this can take forever (proof is left as an exercise for the reader :).  In real implementations the Supplicant provides a candidate chain, and the Verifier simply checks it.  I.e., there is no construction step [1].
Not _all_ real situations work this way. The RPKI, for example, does not.

Remember that X.509 assumed the existence of "The Directory" aka X.500, 
so searching
for certs to discover a cert path was reasonable in that context.

We don't have "The Directory" but we also don't always know what set of 
trust anchors
are acceptable to an RP. Thus some hybrid mechanism is appropriate to 
enable path
discovery/construction. In different contexts different sets of 
assumptions may be
appropriate to help deal with this dilemma.

Steve



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<html>
  <head>
    <meta content="text/html; charset=windows-1252"
      http-equiv="Content-Type">
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  <body text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
    Tim,<br>
    <br>
    <blockquote
      cite="mid:195DB2510AAA004391F58E28FCE212004622BEAC@IMCMBX01.MITRE.ORG"
      type="cite">
      <blockquote type="cite">
        <pre wrap="">When validating the subject certificate, the acceptor grabs the AKI from the 
subject certificate along with the Issuer Name and goes looking for a matching 
CA certificate eventually finding the certificate that the ISSUER selected.
</pre>
      </blockquote>
      <pre wrap="">Since this is all a *path construction* discussion and explicitly not a path validation problem, I thought I'd point out that practically speaking it doesn't matter.  There is no obligation on the part of a Verifier to hunt for a valid path because, well, this can take forever (proof is left as an exercise for the reader :).  In real implementations the Supplicant provides a candidate chain, and the Verifier simply checks it.  I.e., there is no construction step [1].</pre>
    </blockquote>
    Not <u>all</u> real situations work this way. The RPKI, for
    example, does not.<br>
    <br>
    Remember that X.509 assumed the existence of "The Directory" aka
    X.500, so searching<br>
    for certs to discover a cert path was reasonable in that context.<br>
    <br>
    We don't have "The Directory" but we also don't always know what set
    of trust anchors<br>
    are acceptable to an RP. Thus some hybrid mechanism is appropriate
    to enable path<br>
    discovery/construction. In different contexts different sets of
    assumptions may be<br>
    appropriate to help deal with this dilemma.<br>
    <br>
    Steve<br>
    <br>
    <br>
  </body>
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--------------010307000508070007070500--


From nobody Tue Apr  7 08:11:19 2015
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Certificate with Multiple Signers?
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Jeff,

The short answer is that X.509 and RFC 5280 do not support more than
one sig per cert. There are numerous reasons for this, including the
complexity that would arise with respect to revocation, path discovery,
path validation, etc.

Steve
> I'm trying to find some reading on PKIX certificates modulo multiple
> signers. I'm getting lots of hits back, but they are for related
> technologies, like CMS and RFC 4135.
>
> Is there any IETF reading on the subject? Perhaps an old RFC or a discussion?
>
> (I know why I want it. Now I'm trying to figure out why its a bad idea
> (otherwise, we would likely have it)).
>
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>


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Subject: Re: [pkix] Suggested replacement text for RFC5280, section 4.2.1.1
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My concern is that if we do not have standard,
path construction is not very different from
path validation. Programmers would like to
follow RFC5280 to construct certificate paths
(it seems I am wrong).

Sorry for causing a lot of controversy. The
responsibility of a tester is to design as many
corner cases as possible. I made some test
certificates by simply appending some extensions
(including akid,skid) to one certificate, and
found that they can (or cannot) be verified against
another certificate. I submitted them to openssl/gnutls
forum, and the engineers also used RFC5280
to explain that they should or should not be verified.

OK, should we make it more clear in RFC5280?

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<div dir=3D"ltr">My concern is that if we do not have standard,=C2=A0<div>p=
ath construction is not very different from=C2=A0</div><div>path validation=
. Programmers would like to=C2=A0</div><div>follow RFC5280 to construct cer=
tificate paths</div><div>(it seems I am wrong).</div><div><br></div><div><d=
iv>Sorry for causing a lot of controversy. The=C2=A0</div><div>responsibili=
ty of a tester is to design as many=C2=A0</div><div>corner cases as possibl=
e. I made some test=C2=A0</div><div>certificates by simply appending some e=
xtensions=C2=A0</div><div>(including akid,skid) to one certificate, and=C2=
=A0</div></div><div>found that they can (or cannot) be verified against</di=
v><div>another certificate. I submitted them to openssl/gnutls</div><div>fo=
rum, and the engineers also used RFC5280=C2=A0</div><div>to explain that th=
ey should or should not be verified.=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>OK, sho=
uld we make it more clear in RFC5280?</div><div><br></div><div><br></div></=
div>

--001a113aa40c70aa35051325420b--


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Subject: Re: [pkix] =?utf-8?q?Certificate_with_Multiple_Signers=3F?=
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=0A =0AWithout knowing why you think you need it, I don't think you need it=
. =0A =0A1. If you want to to have two more more authorities signing off on=
 the certificate before it's issued, then do so, and have just one of them =
digitally sign the certificate.  The CP can specify what's going on, and th=
e certificate OID can codify the special business process. =0A =0A2.  If yo=
u want the certificate issued to a subject to chain to two or more differen=
t but valid roots (for instance because the one certificate is issued in co=
mpliance with two different communities of interest, or audit regimes etc) =
tehn issue two certificates from the different CAs to the one subject.  The=
n, when the subject is trying to assert compliance with community of intere=
st No. 1, they send to the RP a certificate chain anchored at Root 1, and w=
hen they want to demonstrate compliance with community of interest No. 2, t=
hey send a certificate chain anchored at Root 2. =0A =0ASee slides 9-11 of =
the slide deck here: [ http://lockstep.com.au/library/pki/demystifying_inte=
rnational_cr ]( http://lockstep.com.au/library/pki/demystifying_internation=
al_cr ).=0A =0ABut maybe I'm not even warm. =0A =0ACheers, =0A =0ASteve Wil=
son.=0A =0ALockstep =0Ahttp://lockstep.com.au =0A----------------------=0AL=
ockstep Consulting provides independent specialist advice and analysis =0Ao=
n digital identity and privacy. Lockstep Technologies develops unique =0Ane=
w smart ID solutions that enhance privacy and prevent identity theft.=0A=0A=
 =0A =0A =0A =0A =0A-----Original Message-----=0AFrom: "Jeffrey Walton" <no=
loader@gmail.com>=0ASent: Saturday, 4 April, 2015 11:36am=0ATo: "PKIX" <pki=
x@ietf.org>=0ASubject: [pkix] Certificate with Multiple Signers?=0A=0A=0A=
=0AI'm trying to find some reading on PKIX certificates modulo multiple=0As=
igners. I'm getting lots of hits back, but they are for related=0Atechnolog=
ies, like CMS and RFC 4135.=0A=0AIs there any IETF reading on the subject? =
Perhaps an old RFC or a discussion?=0A=0A(I know why I want it. Now I'm try=
ing to figure out why its a bad idea=0A(otherwise, we would likely have it)=
).=0A=0A_______________________________________________=0Apkix mailing list=
=0Apkix@ietf.org=0Ahttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
------=_20150408045657000000_12714
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<font face=3D"tahoma" size=3D"2"><p style=3D"margin:0;padding:0;font-family=
: tahoma; font-size: 10pt; word-wrap: break-word;">&nbsp;</p>=0A<p style=3D=
"margin:0;padding:0;font-family: tahoma; font-size: 10pt; word-wrap: break-=
word;">Without knowing why you think you need it, I don't think you need it=
.&nbsp;</p>=0A<p style=3D"margin:0;padding:0;font-family: tahoma; font-size=
: 10pt; word-wrap: break-word;">&nbsp;</p>=0A<p style=3D"margin:0;padding:0=
;font-family: tahoma; font-size: 10pt; word-wrap: break-word;">1. If you wa=
nt to to have&nbsp;two more more authorities signing off on the certificate=
 before it's issued, then do so, and have just one of them digitally sign t=
he certificate. &nbsp;The CP can&nbsp;specify what's going on, and the cert=
ificate OID can codify the special&nbsp;business process.&nbsp;</p>=0A<p st=
yle=3D"margin:0;padding:0;font-family: tahoma; font-size: 10pt; word-wrap: =
break-word;">&nbsp;</p>=0A<p style=3D"margin:0;padding:0;font-family: tahom=
a; font-size: 10pt; word-wrap: break-word;">2.&nbsp;&nbsp;If you want the c=
ertificate issued to a subject to chain to two or more different but valid =
roots (for instance because the one certificate is issued in compliance wit=
h two different communities of interest, or audit regimes etc) tehn issue t=
wo certificates from the different CAs to the one subject. &nbsp;Then, when=
 the subject is trying to assert compliance with community of interest No. =
1, they send to the RP a certificate chain anchored at Root 1, and when&nbs=
p;they want to demonstrate&nbsp;<span style=3D"color: #000000; font-family:=
 tahoma; font-size: 13.3333330154419px; font-style: normal; font-variant: n=
ormal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; or=
phans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; whi=
te-space: normal; widows: 1; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: =
0px; display: inline !important; float: none; background-color: #ffffff;">c=
ompliance with community of interest No. 2, they send a certificate chain a=
nchored at Root 2.&nbsp;</span></p>=0A<p style=3D"margin:0;padding:0;font-f=
amily: tahoma; font-size: 10pt; word-wrap: break-word;">&nbsp;</p>=0A<p sty=
le=3D"margin:0;padding:0;font-family: tahoma; font-size: 10pt; word-wrap: b=
reak-word;"><span style=3D"color: #000000; font-family: tahoma; font-size: =
13.3333330154419px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: =
normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; orphans: auto; text-al=
ign: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; wi=
dows: 1; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline=
 !important; float: none; background-color: #ffffff;">See slides 9-11 of th=
e slide deck here:&nbsp;<a href=3D"http://lockstep.com.au/library/pki/demys=
tifying_international_cr">http://lockstep.com.au/library/pki/demystifying_i=
nternational_cr</a>.</span></p>=0A<p style=3D"margin:0;padding:0;font-famil=
y: tahoma; font-size: 10pt; word-wrap: break-word;">&nbsp;</p>=0A<p style=
=3D"margin:0;padding:0;font-family: tahoma; font-size: 10pt; word-wrap: bre=
ak-word;"><span style=3D"color: #000000; font-family: tahoma; font-size: 13=
.3333330154419px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: no=
rmal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; orphans: auto; text-alig=
n: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; wido=
ws: 1; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !=
important; float: none; background-color: #ffffff;">But maybe I'm not even =
warm.&nbsp;</span></p>=0A<p style=3D"margin:0;padding:0;font-family: tahoma=
; font-size: 10pt; word-wrap: break-word;">&nbsp;</p>=0A<p style=3D"margin:=
0;padding:0;font-family: tahoma; font-size: 10pt; word-wrap: break-word;"><=
span style=3D"color: #000000; font-family: tahoma; font-size: 13.3333330154=
419px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; lette=
r-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start; t=
ext-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 1; word=
-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important; =
float: none; background-color: #ffffff;">Cheers,&nbsp;</span></p>=0A<p styl=
e=3D"margin:0;padding:0;font-family: tahoma; font-size: 10pt; word-wrap: br=
eak-word;">&nbsp;</p>=0A<p style=3D"margin:0;padding:0;font-family: tahoma;=
 font-size: 10pt; word-wrap: break-word;"><span style=3D"color: #000000; fo=
nt-family: tahoma; font-size: 13.3333330154419px; font-style: normal; font-=
variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: =
normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform:=
 none; white-space: normal; widows: 1; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stro=
ke-width: 0px; display: inline !important; float: none; background-color: #=
ffffff;">Steve Wilson.</span></p>=0A<p style=3D"margin:0;padding:0;font-fam=
ily: tahoma; font-size: 10pt; word-wrap: break-word;">&nbsp;</p>=0A<p style=
=3D"margin:0;padding:0;font-family: tahoma; font-size: 10pt; word-wrap: bre=
ak-word;"><span style=3D"color: #000000; font-family: tahoma; font-size: 13=
.3333330154419px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: no=
rmal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; orphans: auto; text-alig=
n: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; wido=
ws: 1; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !=
important; float: none; background-color: #ffffff;">Lockstep&nbsp;<br />htt=
p://lockstep.com.au <br />----------------------<br />Lockstep Consulting p=
rovides independent specialist advice and analysis <br />on digital identit=
y and privacy. Lockstep Technologies develops unique <br />new smart ID sol=
utions that enhance privacy and prevent identity theft.<br /></span></p>=0A=
<p style=3D"margin:0;padding:0;font-family: tahoma; font-size: 10pt; word-w=
rap: break-word;">&nbsp;</p>=0A<p style=3D"margin:0;padding:0;font-family: =
tahoma; font-size: 10pt; word-wrap: break-word;">&nbsp;</p>=0A<p style=3D"m=
argin:0;padding:0;font-family: tahoma; font-size: 10pt; word-wrap: break-wo=
rd;">&nbsp;</p>=0A<p style=3D"margin:0;padding:0;font-family: tahoma; font-=
size: 10pt; word-wrap: break-word;">&nbsp;</p>=0A<p style=3D"margin:0;paddi=
ng:0;font-family: tahoma; font-size: 10pt; word-wrap: break-word;">&nbsp;</=
p>=0A<p style=3D"margin:0;padding:0;font-family: tahoma; font-size: 10pt; w=
ord-wrap: break-word;">-----Original Message-----<br />From: "Jeffrey Walto=
n" &lt;noloader@gmail.com&gt;<br />Sent: Saturday, 4 April, 2015 11:36am<br=
 />To: "PKIX" &lt;pkix@ietf.org&gt;<br />Subject: [pkix] Certificate with M=
ultiple Signers?<br /><br /></p>=0A<div id=3D"SafeStyles1428432420">=0A<p s=
tyle=3D"margin:0;padding:0;font-family: tahoma; font-size: 10pt; word-wrap:=
 break-word;">I'm trying to find some reading on PKIX certificates modulo m=
ultiple<br />signers. I'm getting lots of hits back, but they are for relat=
ed<br />technologies, like CMS and RFC 4135.<br /><br />Is there any IETF r=
eading on the subject? Perhaps an old RFC or a discussion?<br /><br />(I kn=
ow why I want it. Now I'm trying to figure out why its a bad idea<br />(oth=
erwise, we would likely have it)).<br /><br />_____________________________=
__________________<br />pkix mailing list<br />pkix@ietf.org<br />https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix</p>=0A</div></font>
------=_20150408045657000000_12714--


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Subject: Re: [pkix] Certificate with Multiple Signers?
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> 2.  If you want the certificate issued to a subject to chain to two or more
> different but valid roots (for instance because the one certificate is
> issued in compliance with two different communities of interest, or audit
> regimes etc) tehn issue two certificates from the different CAs to the one
> subject.  Then, when the subject is trying to assert compliance with
> community of interest No. 1, they send to the RP a certificate chain
> anchored at Root 1, and when they want to demonstrate compliance with
> community of interest No. 2, they send a certificate chain anchored at Root
> 2.
Thanks Steve.

This is similar to what I am trying to accomplish; but I'm also what I
am trying to avoid. I'm trying to avoid it because it complicates
operations. For example, rather than configuring different
certificates based on a network interface (external vs internal), I
wanted to certify one certificate and serve the certificate and one
chain (well, two chains but that's just an implementation detail).

One certificate, one chain, and one server configuration makes it easy
on everyone. External software could use a CA from the CA Zoo; while
internal software could forgo the zoo and use the internal authority.

Thanks for the slides. I'll check them out later today. It may shot a
big hole in what I envisioned (as if lack of software support was not
a big enough problem).

Jeff


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Subject: Re: [pkix] Suggested replacement text for RFC5280, section 4.2.1.1
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> My concern is that if we do not have standard,
> path construction is not very different from
> path validation. Programmers would like to
> follow RFC5280 to construct certificate paths
> (it seems I am wrong).
I am afraid you are wrong, in this case. 5280 does not
specify path construction (perhaps, more properly, path discovery).
It defines the path validation procedure and imposes requirements on 
cert issuance.

We have a separate (Informational) RFC that discusses ways to effect
path discovery: RFC 4158 (http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4158.txt)
> Sorry for causing a lot of controversy. The
> responsibility of a tester is to design as many
> corner cases as possible. I made some test
> certificates by simply appending some extensions
> (including akid,skid) to one certificate, and
> found that they can (or cannot) be verified against
> another certificate. I submitted them to openssl/gnutls
> forum, and the engineers also used RFC5280
> to explain that they should or should not be verified.
I note that you said "... should or should not be verified." That statement
is about path validation, not path discovery/construction.
> OK, should we make it more clear in RFC5280?
make what clear? that the RFC imposes requirements on cert generation
and validation but does not define a path discovery standard?

Steve


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Subject: Re: [pkix] Suggested replacement text for RFC5280, section 4.2.1.1
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Hi Steve,

> We have a separate (Informational) RFC that discusses ways to effect
> path discovery: RFC 4158 (http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4158.txt)

Related: Should RFC 6125 mention the existence of RFC 4158 or direct
folks to it for path discovery/validation?

I was aware of RFC 6125, and I use it for guidance. But I was not
aware of RFC 4158. And RFC 6125 does not mention AKIs, SKIs, or RFC
4158.

Adding references to RFC 4158 might be useful to others who turn to
RFC 6125 for guidance.

Jeff


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Hi Steve,

> We have a separate (Informational) RFC that discusses ways to effect
> path discovery: RFC 4158 (http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4158.txt)

My apologies for another related question. Can/should RFC 4158 be used
to determine certificate "equivalence"? I've been looking for a
canonical reference for the subject matter from the IETF.

Also, RFC 4158 refers to some antiquated RFCs that have been
obsoleted. For example:

    Many other documents (such as [RFC3280]) cover
    certification path ...


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Subject: Re: [pkix] Suggested replacement text for RFC5280, section 4.2.1.1
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Read RFC 4158 (sec. 3.5.12) and can understand KIDs now.
Sounds like that they are redundant in most cases.

"NOTE:  Although required to be present by [RFC3280], it is extremely
   important that KIDs be used only as sorting criteria or as hints
   during certification path building.  KIDs are not required to match
   during certification path validation and cannot be used to eliminate
   certificates. "

Yuting

On Tue, Apr 7, 2015 at 2:22 PM, Jeffrey Walton <noloader@gmail.com> wrote:

> Hi Steve,
>
> > We have a separate (Informational) RFC that discusses ways to effect
> > path discovery: RFC 4158 (http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4158.txt)
>
> My apologies for another related question. Can/should RFC 4158 be used
> to determine certificate "equivalence"? I've been looking for a
> canonical reference for the subject matter from the IETF.
>
> Also, RFC 4158 refers to some antiquated RFCs that have been
> obsoleted. For example:
>
>     Many other documents (such as [RFC3280]) cover
>     certification path ...
>
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> pkix@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">Read RFC 4158 (sec. 3.5.12) and can understand KIDs now.=
=C2=A0<div>Sounds like that they are redundant in most cases.<div>=C2=A0<di=
v><div><div>&quot;NOTE: =C2=A0Although required to be present by [RFC3280],=
 it is extremely</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0important that KIDs be used only as=
 sorting criteria or as hints</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0during certification p=
ath building.=C2=A0 KIDs are not required to match</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0d=
uring certification path validation and cannot be used to eliminate</div><d=
iv>=C2=A0 =C2=A0certificates. &quot;</div></div><div><br></div><div>Yuting<=
/div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue, Apr =
7, 2015 at 2:22 PM, Jeffrey Walton <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:=
noloader@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">noloader@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span> wro=
te:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;=
border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:=
solid;padding-left:1ex">Hi Steve,<br>
<span class=3D""><br>
&gt; We have a separate (Informational) RFC that discusses ways to effect<b=
r>
&gt; path discovery: RFC 4158 (<a href=3D"http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc=
4158.txt" target=3D"_blank">http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4158.txt</a>)<=
br>
<br>
</span>My apologies for another related question. Can/should RFC 4158 be us=
ed<br>
to determine certificate &quot;equivalence&quot;? I&#39;ve been looking for=
 a<br>
canonical reference for the subject matter from the IETF.<br>
<br>
Also, RFC 4158 refers to some antiquated RFCs that have been<br>
obsoleted. For example:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Many other documents (such as [RFC3280]) cover<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 certification path ...<br>
<div class=3D""><div class=3D"h5"><br>
_______________________________________________<br>
pkix mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:pkix@ietf.org">pkix@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div></div></div></div></div>

--001a113aa40c17ca890513298999--


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Subject: Re: [pkix] Suggested replacement text for RFC5280, section 4.2.1.1
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On Tue, Apr 7, 2015 at 5:22 PM, Jeffrey Walton <noloader@gmail.com> wrote:
> Hi Steve,
>
>> We have a separate (Informational) RFC that discusses ways to effect
>> path discovery: RFC 4158 (http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4158.txt)
>
> My apologies for another related question. Can/should RFC 4158 be used
> to determine certificate "equivalence"? I've been looking for a
> canonical reference for the subject matter from the IETF.

So it appear to be no.

Sorting is discussed (section 3.2). To sort, I need the C++ equivalent
to operator< and operator==. But those details are not discussed.

So it appears the document only relies on name chaining (meaning the
subject name of the issuer certificate matches the issuer name of the
issued certificate), and not other methods of equivalence like like
public keys, {DN, public key} pairs, {DN, SN} pairs or {AKI, SKI}
pairs.

Jeff


From nobody Tue Apr  7 16:31:37 2015
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Subject: [pkix] How to handle organizational subordinate CA's when I want to stop the flow of trust?
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Hi Everyone,

In the case of an organization subordinate CA certified by a public
CA, I'd like to know how to stop the flow of trust when a name
constraint is not present.

Non-constrained organizational CAs seem to be a special case that
defies reasoning. They do away with the independent 3rd party auditor
that validates the signing request (the RA), and they are not
subjected to traditional public review/discussion process. Yet the
certificates they issue (like for domains and properties that they *do
not* control) are chained to a public CA which entitles them to all
the privileges of membership.

Are there any means to identify organizational level subordinate CAs
that are not constrained? How can we stop the flow of trust so that
when we have to use a public CA, we can terminate the trust when we
encounter a non-constrained subordinate CA?

Or are there other solutions to the problem? Building an offline list
of {Organizational Subordinate CAs,Domains} does not appear to be
feasible because CAs are not reporting their certification of them or
the names they are supposed to be issuing for.

I don't think its possible because the IETF cannot identify EV
certificates due to lack of Cert Policies extension (thanks Stephen,
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/current/msg33057.html). But
it never hurts to ask.

Thanks in advance.


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Jeffrey Walton <noloader@gmail.com> writes:

> On Tue, Apr 7, 2015 at 5:22 PM, Jeffrey Walton <noloader@gmail.com> wrote:

[...]

>> My apologies for another related question. Can/should RFC 4158 be used
>> to determine certificate "equivalence"? I've been looking for a
>> canonical reference for the subject matter from the IETF.
>
> So it appear to be no.

I suspect equivalence is context specific.

> Sorting is discussed (section 3.2). To sort, I need the C++ equivalent
> to operator< and operator==. But those details are not discussed.

There are possible properties to use for ordering in 3.5. The ordering
is context dependent and heuristic.

> So it appears the document only relies on name chaining (meaning the
> subject name of the issuer certificate matches the issuer name of the
> issued certificate), and not other methods of equivalence like like
> public keys, {DN, public key} pairs, {DN, SN} pairs or {AKI, SKI}
> pairs.

Several subsections of 3.5 give ways to say that certificates definitely
aren't candidates for continuing a path. The goal is to construct a
valid path (if one exists) as specified by RFC 3280 (now 5280), so the
algorithm can't (in general) use AKI and SKI to exclude paths. A
specific implementation might choose to exclude paths where AKI and SKI
do not match (OpenSSL's path verifier does that, IIUC).


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From: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
To: "noloader@gmail.com" <noloader@gmail.com>, Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] Suggested replacement text for RFC5280, section 4.2.1.1
Thread-Index: AQHQcImblccpqA4awU+Sx9vzoGFthZ1Ad6uA///E3NiAACJvcIAA27uCgACLFQCAAEC1gIAACk+AgADzQCA=
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Cc: PKIX <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] Suggested replacement text for RFC5280, section 4.2.1.1
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"Equivalence?" =20

What are you trying to achieve?

-- T

-----Original Message-----
From: pkix [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Jeffrey Walton
Sent: Tuesday, April 07, 2015 5:22 PM
To: Stephen Kent
Cc: PKIX
Subject: Re: [pkix] Suggested replacement text for RFC5280, section 4.2.1.1

Hi Steve,

> We have a separate (Informational) RFC that discusses ways to effect=20
> path discovery: RFC 4158 (http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4158.txt)

My apologies for another related question. Can/should RFC 4158 be used to d=
etermine certificate "equivalence"? I've been looking for a canonical refer=
ence for the subject matter from the IETF.

Also, RFC 4158 refers to some antiquated RFCs that have been obsoleted. For=
 example:

    Many other documents (such as [RFC3280]) cover
    certification path ...

_______________________________________________
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https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix


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From: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
To: "noloader@gmail.com" <noloader@gmail.com>, PKIX <pkix@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] How to handle organizational subordinate CA's when I want to stop the flow of trust?
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Subject: Re: [pkix] How to handle organizational subordinate CA's when I want to stop the flow of trust?
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If you're operating a subordinate to a public PKI and need to control who g=
ets to bind what kinds of names, then what you should be doing is operating=
 a private PKI. =20

If you *also* need public trust paths to the private PKI, that's what bridg=
ing is for.  You'd assert allowed and denied nameConstraints in the cross c=
erts as appropriate.  A one-way bridge cert would probably be all you'd wan=
t in this case--from the public CA to the private CA (sub or root)--this wo=
uld allow external verifiers to chain certs issued by the private CA, but w=
ould prevent internal verifiers from chaining certs issued by the public CA=
 (unless that public CA is directly trusted) [1].  Which is what I think yo=
u want. =20

If you're operating a private PKI and want to carve out internal namespaces=
 for some reason (e.g., merged corps or partnerships, or to enable a develo=
pment org room to experiment in production) you *can* assert name constrain=
ts in the subordinate CA certs.  AFAIK only Microsoft Certificate Services =
has this as an explicit feature (look up "qualified subordination"), and YM=
MV with validators--it *should* work with any library that supports name co=
nstraints, but constraints don't exist for all possible subjectAltNames and=
 there are plenty of proprietary and dangerous name types (e.g., Microsoft'=
s UPN name type) that will naturally have uneven support.  You can work aro=
und this by making nameConstraints critical but this can and will break som=
e use cases, and even then there's variation on how nameConstraints is inte=
rpreted.

If you're operating or interacting with any portion of a PKI that lacks any=
 kind of CPS (which is how I take "do away with the independent 3rd party a=
uditor that validates the signing request")  then you have much bigger prob=
lems and shouldn't be trusting that PKI for anything even if you could appl=
y a constraint.  Even private PKIs need rules.

We probably need a companion "PKI best practices" list.  :)

-- T
[1] US DoD has successfully used one-way trust with the FedPKI for similar =
purpose.

-----Original Message-----
From: pkix [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Jeffrey Walton
Sent: Tuesday, April 07, 2015 7:32 PM
To: PKIX
Subject: [pkix] How to handle organizational subordinate CA's when I want t=
o stop the flow of trust?

Hi Everyone,

In the case of an organization subordinate CA certified by a public CA, I'd=
 like to know how to stop the flow of trust when a name constraint is not p=
resent.

Non-constrained organizational CAs seem to be a special case that defies re=
asoning. They do away with the independent 3rd party auditor that validates=
 the signing request (the RA), and they are not subjected to traditional pu=
blic review/discussion process. Yet the certificates they issue (like for d=
omains and properties that they *do
not* control) are chained to a public CA which entitles them to all the pri=
vileges of membership.

Are there any means to identify organizational level subordinate CAs that a=
re not constrained? How can we stop the flow of trust so that when we have =
to use a public CA, we can terminate the trust when we encounter a non-cons=
trained subordinate CA?

Or are there other solutions to the problem? Building an offline list of {O=
rganizational Subordinate CAs,Domains} does not appear to be feasible becau=
se CAs are not reporting their certification of them or the names they are =
supposed to be issuing for.

I don't think its possible because the IETF cannot identify EV certificates=
 due to lack of Cert Policies extension (thanks Stephen, http://www.ietf.or=
g/mail-archive/web/pkix/current/msg33057.html). But it never hurts to ask.

Thanks in advance.

_______________________________________________
pkix mailing list
pkix@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix


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From: "Miller, Timothy J." <tmiller@mitre.org>
To: "noloader@gmail.com" <noloader@gmail.com>, "swilson@lockstep.com.au" <swilson@lockstep.com.au>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] Certificate with Multiple Signers?
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Certificate with Multiple Signers?
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I think it should be pretty clear by now that two servers and two certifica=
tes makes life easier for everyone.

Your use case is in a very small corner and doesn't deserve a standards fix=
.  This conversation alone has taken at least an order of magnitude more ti=
me than it would to stand up and configure a second server.

Don't let a misconception of elegance get in the way of "good enough."

-- T=20

-----Original Message-----
From: pkix [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Jeffrey Walton
Sent: Tuesday, April 07, 2015 4:04 PM
To: swilson@lockstep.com.au
Cc: PKIX
Subject: Re: [pkix] Certificate with Multiple Signers?

> 2.  If you want the certificate issued to a subject to chain to two or=20
> more different but valid roots (for instance because the one=20
> certificate is issued in compliance with two different communities of=20
> interest, or audit regimes etc) tehn issue two certificates from the=20
> different CAs to the one subject.  Then, when the subject is trying to=20
> assert compliance with community of interest No. 1, they send to the=20
> RP a certificate chain anchored at Root 1, and when they want to=20
> demonstrate compliance with community of interest No. 2, they send a=20
> certificate chain anchored at Root 2.
Thanks Steve.

This is similar to what I am trying to accomplish; but I'm also what I am t=
rying to avoid. I'm trying to avoid it because it complicates operations. F=
or example, rather than configuring different certificates based on a netwo=
rk interface (external vs internal), I wanted to certify one certificate an=
d serve the certificate and one chain (well, two chains but that's just an =
implementation detail).

One certificate, one chain, and one server configuration makes it easy on e=
veryone. External software could use a CA from the CA Zoo; while internal s=
oftware could forgo the zoo and use the internal authority.

Thanks for the slides. I'll check them out later today. It may shot a big h=
ole in what I envisioned (as if lack of software support was not a big enou=
gh problem).

Jeff

_______________________________________________
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Suggested replacement text for RFC5280, section 4.2.1.1
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Jeff,

> Hi Steve,
>
>> We have a separate (Informational) RFC that discusses ways to effect
>> path discovery: RFC 4158 (http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4158.txt)
> Related: Should RFC 6125 mention the existence of RFC 4158 or direct
> folks to it for path discovery/validation?
First, 6125 is a TLS WG doc, not a PKIX doc. It was written to deal with
the messy situation in the Web PKI environment (the browser context) and
should not be viewed as generally applicable to PKI. Also, in the browser
context pat building is generally easier, so the very general discussion
in 4158 is overkill.

> I was aware of RFC 6125, and I use it for guidance. But I was not
> aware of RFC 4158. And RFC 6125 does not mention AKIs, SKIs, or RFC
> 4158.
true, and probably OK for the reasons I cited above.
> Adding references to RFC 4158 might be useful to others who turn to
> RFC 6125 for guidance.
That's an issue for the TLS WG to consider, but I doubt that they will
see a need to do so.

Steve


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Subject: Re: [pkix] Suggested replacement text for RFC5280, section 4.2.1.1
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Jeff,

> Hi Steve,
>
>> We have a separate (Informational) RFC that discusses ways to effect
>> path discovery: RFC 4158 (http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4158.txt)
> My apologies for another related question. Can/should RFC 4158 be used
> to determine certificate "equivalence"? I've been looking for a
> canonical reference for the subject matter from the IETF.
"equivalence" is not a concept that comes to mind in the PKI arena.
> Also, RFC 4158 refers to some antiquated RFCs that have been
> obsoleted. For example:
>
>      Many other documents (such as [RFC3280]) cover
>      certification path ...
>
As I noted, a decision to update 4158 is not a PKIX matter.

Steve


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Subject: Re: [pkix] Suggested replacement text for RFC5280, section 4.2.1.1
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Jeff,


> On Tue, Apr 7, 2015 at 5:22 PM, Jeffrey Walton <noloader@gmail.com> wrote:
>> Hi Steve,
>>
>>> We have a separate (Informational) RFC that discusses ways to effect
>>> path discovery: RFC 4158 (http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4158.txt)
>> My apologies for another related question. Can/should RFC 4158 be used
>> to determine certificate "equivalence"? I've been looking for a
>> canonical reference for the subject matter from the IETF.
> So it appear to be no.
yep.
> Sorting is discussed (section 3.2). To sort, I need the C++ equivalent
> to operator< and operator==. But those details are not discussed.
>
> So it appears the document only relies on name chaining (meaning the
> subject name of the issuer certificate matches the issuer name of the
> issued certificate), and not other methods of equivalence like like
> public keys, {DN, public key} pairs, {DN, SN} pairs or {AKI, SKI}
> pairs.
Name chaining is the primary way to discover a cert path. AKI/SKI matching
is used to help speed up this process in certain circumstances, but it
is not a substitute for name chaining.

Steve



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Subject: Re: [pkix] How to handle organizational subordinate CA's when I want to stop the flow of trust?
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Jeff,
> Hi Everyone,
>
> In the case of an organization subordinate CA certified by a public
> CA, I'd like to know how to stop the flow of trust when a name
> constraint is not present.
>
> Non-constrained organizational CAs seem to be a special case that
> defies reasoning. They do away with the independent 3rd party auditor
> that validates the signing request (the RA), and they are not
> subjected to traditional public review/discussion process. Yet the
> certificates they issue (like for domains and properties that they *do
> not* control) are chained to a public CA which entitles them to all
> the privileges of membership.
The problem you cite is one of the unfortunate aspects of the current
Web PKI environment. It is less of a technical limitation than a business
issue. I've heard that there is an effort to push for more
organizational CAs to be name constrained, but it will take a while
to make that transition.

Steve


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To: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>, pkix@ietf.org
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From: Gervase Markham <gerv@mozilla.org>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] How to handle organizational subordinate CA's when I want to stop the flow of trust?
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On 08/04/15 15:06, Stephen Kent wrote:
> The problem you cite is one of the unfortunate aspects of the current
> Web PKI environment. It is less of a technical limitation than a business
> issue. I've heard that there is an effort to push for more
> organizational CAs to be name constrained, but it will take a while
> to make that transition.

Mozilla requires all third party intermediate CAs chaining to roots in
its program to be either:

a) name constrained; or
b) publicly disclosed and audited to the same standards as the CA.

The root CA is also held responsible for the activities of the holder of
the intermediate (a point which was relevant recently), which
incentivises them to make sure that said holder behaves appropriately.

This requirement was introduced (to a reasonable amount of wailing and
gnashing of teeth, I might add) a couple of years ago and became binding
on all CAs in the program in May 2014. My understanding is that some
enterprises chose to switch to a managed PKI model (where the CA holds
the private key), and some chose audit. Very few chose name constraints,
as the list of domains which they wanted to issue for changed frequently.

Gerv


From nobody Wed Apr  8 07:28:27 2015
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Subject: Re: [pkix] How to handle organizational subordinate CA's when I want to stop the flow of trust?
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Gervase,

Thanks for the statement re Mozilla's policy. I was going to cite Mozilla
on this, but was not absolutely sure.

Still, this is a problem, in general, since it is a per-browser policy, and
I think my characterization of this as a business vs. technical issue is 
accurate.
If folks who want to change domain names frequently were willing to get
a cert per domain, rather than acting as an intermediate CA with the ability
to issue any subordinate certs, this would not be a problem, right?

Steve
> On 08/04/15 15:06, Stephen Kent wrote:
>> The problem you cite is one of the unfortunate aspects of the current
>> Web PKI environment. It is less of a technical limitation than a business
>> issue. I've heard that there is an effort to push for more
>> organizational CAs to be name constrained, but it will take a while
>> to make that transition.
> Mozilla requires all third party intermediate CAs chaining to roots in
> its program to be either:
>
> a) name constrained; or
> b) publicly disclosed and audited to the same standards as the CA.
>
> The root CA is also held responsible for the activities of the holder of
> the intermediate (a point which was relevant recently), which
> incentivises them to make sure that said holder behaves appropriately.
>
> This requirement was introduced (to a reasonable amount of wailing and
> gnashing of teeth, I might add) a couple of years ago and became binding
> on all CAs in the program in May 2014. My understanding is that some
> enterprises chose to switch to a managed PKI model (where the CA holds
> the private key), and some chose audit. Very few chose name constraints,
> as the list of domains which they wanted to issue for changed frequently.
>
> Gerv
>


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To: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>, pkix@ietf.org
references: <CAH8yC8m+Uwh+9swOwNfMuVJzqOg1fPvua5uYBTqOtrAzDnPH+Q@mail.gmail.com> <552535D3.2030306@bbn.com> <55253797.4050407@mozilla.org> <55253B00.1060700@bbn.com>
From: Gervase Markham <gerv@mozilla.org>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] How to handle organizational subordinate CA's when I want to stop the flow of trust?
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On 08/04/15 15:28, Stephen Kent wrote:
> Still, this is a problem, in general, since it is a per-browser policy, and
> I think my characterization of this as a business vs. technical issue is
> accurate.
> If folks who want to change domain names frequently were willing to get
> a cert per domain, rather than acting as an intermediate CA with the
> ability
> to issue any subordinate certs, this would not be a problem, right?

Basically what you are saying is that they should use Managed PKI
(original CA holds the keys) rather than Enterprise PKI (enterprise
holds the keys). You would need to ask enterprises which prefer the
second model why they prefer it, and why the first model would be a
problem for them.

Gerv


From nobody Wed Apr  8 07:57:42 2015
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Suggested replacement text for RFC5280, section 4.2.1.1
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On 08/04/15 14:52, Stephen Kent wrote:
<snip>
> Name chaining is the primary way to discover a cert path. AKI/SKI matching
> is used to help speed up this process in certain circumstances, but it
> is not a substitute for name chaining.

It's worth noting that Microsoft's implementation does the opposite.

Key Identifier matching is compulsory...
   "Note: If a certificate’s AKI extension contains a KeyID, CryptoAPI
    requires the issuer certificate to contain a matching SKI. This
    differs from RFC 3280 where SKI and AKI matching is optional." [1]

...and Name matching is only performed if Key Identifiers are not used!
   "Name Match: If no information exists in the AKI or if the AKI
    extension is not in the certificate, name matching will occur." [1]


[1] 
http://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/4954.windows-xp-certificate-status-and-revocation-checking.aspx

-- 
Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online


From nobody Wed Apr  8 09:01:00 2015
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Date: Wed, 08 Apr 2015 11:59:00 -0400
From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
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To: Gervase Markham <gerv@mozilla.org>, pkix@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [pkix] How to handle organizational subordinate CA's when I want to stop the flow of trust?
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Gerv,

:
> On 08/04/15 15:28, Stephen Kent wrote:
>> Still, this is a problem, in general, since it is a per-browser policy, and
>> I think my characterization of this as a business vs. technical issue is
>> accurate.
>> If folks who want to change domain names frequently were willing to get
>> a cert per domain, rather than acting as an intermediate CA with the
>> ability
>> to issue any subordinate certs, this would not be a problem, right?
> Basically what you are saying is that they should use Managed PKI
> (original CA holds the keys) rather than Enterprise PKI (enterprise
> holds the keys). You would need to ask enterprises which prefer the
> second model why they prefer it, and why the first model would be a
> problem for them.
>
> Gerv
no, I am saying that they should get a new, name-constrained cert for each
domain, using the wildcard feature to accommodate different hosts within the
domain. This would be a preferable solution, since it prevents 
acceptance of
mis-issued certs (by RPs that enforce name constraints) rather than relying
on procedural means to remedy problems ex post facto. I assume that the 
major
impediment to this approach is cost, which is a business issue.

Steve



From nobody Wed Apr  8 09:02:44 2015
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Date: Wed, 08 Apr 2015 12:00:28 -0400
From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
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To: Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>, noloader@gmail.com
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Suggested replacement text for RFC5280, section 4.2.1.1
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Yes, Rob, their implementation is non-conforming, as noted on PKIX years 
ago.

Steve

> On 08/04/15 14:52, Stephen Kent wrote:
> <snip>
>> Name chaining is the primary way to discover a cert path. AKI/SKI 
>> matching
>> is used to help speed up this process in certain circumstances, but it
>> is not a substitute for name chaining.
>
> It's worth noting that Microsoft's implementation does the opposite.
>
> Key Identifier matching is compulsory...
>   "Note: If a certificate’s AKI extension contains a KeyID, CryptoAPI
>    requires the issuer certificate to contain a matching SKI. This
>    differs from RFC 3280 where SKI and AKI matching is optional." [1]
>
> ...and Name matching is only performed if Key Identifiers are not used!
>   "Name Match: If no information exists in the AKI or if the AKI
>    extension is not in the certificate, name matching will occur." [1]
>
>
> [1] 
> http://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/4954.windows-xp-certificate-status-and-revocation-checking.aspx
>


From nobody Wed Apr  8 09:36:41 2015
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To: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
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From: mrex@sap.com (Martin Rex)
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Is it required that subject AKI actually match issuer SKI?
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I'm missing the really important issue in this discussion, and that is:

  It will be perfectly OK for an RP to REJECT a certificate chain based
  on the fact that AKI->SKI chaining in provided certificate chain does
  not match.

Therefore the creation of a certification path that uses AKI in a
non-self-signed certificate that does not match the SKI of the next
level CA certificate would indicate a seriously defective CA.

To avoid such problems (in cross-CA scenarios), Certificate Signing
Requests (CSRs) from CAs ought to ALWAYS include the SKI of the
first CA certificate that was created with that Subject+public key,
in order to ensure that all future cross-CA certificates will contain
the very same SKI as the original CA certificate, matching the AKI in
certificates issued by that CA.


-Martin


From nobody Thu Apr  9 10:59:13 2015
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Date: Thu, 09 Apr 2015 13:58:45 -0400
From: Joel Kazin <joel.kazin1@verizon.net>
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Subject: [pkix] Public CAs using RSA 4096 and SHA2 (256)
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All,

I was recently asked how many Public CAs are using RSA 4096 and SHA2 
(256) for at least one of their public roots. Would anyone have an 
example of such a root?

Joel Kazin


From nobody Thu Apr  9 11:54:39 2015
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From: Jeffrey Walton <noloader@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Public CAs using RSA 4096 and SHA2 (256)
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On Thu, Apr 9, 2015 at 1:58 PM, Joel Kazin <joel.kazin1@verizon.net> wrote:
> I was recently asked how many Public CAs are using RSA 4096 and SHA2 (256)
> for at least one of their public roots.

Often, someone will build a list of approved CAs. For example, here's
a few lists:

* List of available trusted root certificates in iOS 8,
https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204132
* Mozilla Included CA Certificate List, https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:IncludedCAs
* (I can't find Microsoft's list - circular redirect)

Do you have criteria for what it means to be a Public CA? Are they the
CAs who sell their warez? Do you approve of their CPS? Are they local
or regional or or worldwide?

> Would anyone have an example of such a root?

>From Apple's list, Actalis Authentication Root CA, ANF Global Root CA,
Buypass Class 2 Root CA, Buypass Class 3 Root CA, CA Disig Root R2,
...


From nobody Thu Apr  9 23:21:42 2015
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Date: Fri, 10 Apr 2015 08:21:18 +0200
From: i-barreira@izenpe.net
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Thread-topic: [pkix] Public CAs using RSA 4096 and SHA2 (256)
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Public CAs using RSA 4096 and SHA2 (256)
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FYI, Izenpe has its root CA (and subordinate CAs) with 4k and SHA2 since =
2007. You can download from the Izenpe web site (www.izenpe.com)

Regards


I=F1igo Barreira
Responsable del =C1rea t=E9cnica
i-barreira@izenpe.net
945067705


ERNE! Baliteke mezu honen zatiren bat edo mezu osoa legez babestuta =
egotea. Mezua badu bere hartzailea. Okerreko helbidera heldu bada =
(helbidea gaizki idatzi, transmisioak huts egin) eman abisu igorleari, =
korreo honi erantzuna. KONTUZ!
ATENCION! Este mensaje contiene informacion privilegiada o confidencial =
a la que solo tiene derecho a acceder el destinatario. Si usted lo =
recibe por error le agradeceriamos que no hiciera uso de la informacion =
y que se pusiese en contacto con el remitente.

-----Mensaje original-----
De: pkix [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] En nombre de Joel Kazin
Enviado el: jueves, 09 de abril de 2015 19:59
Para: pkix@ietf.org
Asunto: [pkix] Public CAs using RSA 4096 and SHA2 (256)

All,

I was recently asked how many Public CAs are using RSA 4096 and SHA2
(256) for at least one of their public roots. Would anyone have an =
example of such a root?

Joel Kazin

_______________________________________________
pkix mailing list
pkix@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix


From nobody Fri Apr 10 08:14:45 2015
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Is it required that subject AKI actually match issuer SKI?
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Martin,

> I'm missing the really important issue in this discussion, and that is:
>
>    It will be perfectly OK for an RP to REJECT a certificate chain based
>    on the fact that AKI->SKI chaining in provided certificate chain does
>    not match.
definitely not true, other than the "right" of any RP to reject any cert 
for
any (locally defined) reason.
> Therefore the creation of a certification path that uses AKI in a
> non-self-signed certificate that does not match the SKI of the next
> level CA certificate would indicate a seriously defective CA.
mostly not true.

Steve


From nobody Fri Apr 10 11:45:16 2015
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From: mrex@sap.com (Martin Rex)
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Is it required that subject AKI actually match issuer SKI?
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Stephen Kent wrote:
> Martin,
> 
>> I'm missing the really important issue in this discussion, and that is:
>>
>>    It will be perfectly OK for an RP to REJECT a certificate chain based
>>    on the fact that AKI->SKI chaining in provided certificate chain does
>>    not match.
>
> definitely not true, other than the "right" of any RP to reject any cert 
> for any (locally defined) reason.
>
>> Therefore the creation of a certification path that uses AKI in a
>> non-self-signed certificate that does not match the SKI of the next
>> level CA certificate would indicate a seriously defective CA.
>
> mostly not true.

I am aware that a number of implementors do not realize such problems.

Maybe the issue becomes clearer when I explain how this affects
implementations.

When a digital signature verification fails, there are the following
common causes of the verification failure:

 (1)  the signed data was changed/corrupted (or wrong data, e.g. XMLdsig)
 (2)  the verifier used the wrong public key for verification
 (3)  the signature blob was changed/corrupted

and a relatively rare reason for failure:
 (4)  the public key used for the verification is corrupted

(3) is a little difficult to handle unless the corruption is obvious
    (incorrect size or incorrect encoding)

(2) is unfortunately common problem, but when RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures
    are used, then this failure can be nicely distinguished from (1)

When analyzing/troubleshooting failing interop scenarios, being able to
distinguish failure reason (1) from (2) is pretty important, in particular
for stuff like WSSec/XMLdsig.

A similar problem exists for X.509 because of a silly concept called
"self-issued certificate", which ought to have been prohibited, but wasn't.

With signature schemes such as DSA, ECDSA and RSA-PSS, failure cases
(1) and (2) are indistinguishable within the signature verify operation,
so it is perfectly sensible of PKI implementations to use AKI->SKI
chaining when building a certificate path or when verifying a
certificate path.


There is no _requirement_ for RPs to perform AKI->SKI matching when
composing certificate chains or when verifying certificate chains,
but it will be extremely reasonable for RPs to perform such matching
*whenever* an AKI is present in the subordinate certificate *PLUS* an SKI
is present in the CA certificate -- and fail with an error upfront,
skipping the magnitudes more costly public key crypto operation when
these two do not match.

It would be irresponsible for CAs to create cross-CA certificates without
ensuring that they use the EXACT SAME SKI that is used in the original
CA cert and which appears as AKI in all certificates signed by that CA.


-Martin


From nobody Mon Apr 13 04:18:31 2015
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Date: Mon, 13 Apr 2015 07:18:25 -0400
From: Tony Rutkowski <tony@yaanatech.com>
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This document was just posted at the ongoing
ITU-T SG17 meeting for adoption this week.
It was prepared by the two authors.

It would be very useful for those participating
in the meeting to know the PKIX views on these
proposed changes.   A number of them involve
IETF RFCs.

--tony

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--------------040403080507070200020901--


From nobody Mon Apr 13 05:20:32 2015
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From: "Erik Andersen" <era@x500.eu>
To: <pkix@ietf.org>
References: <20150408163635.56FEC1B26B@ld9781.wdf.sap.corp> <552BA601.9030902@yaanatech.com>
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Cc: Directory list <x500standard@freelists.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] Draft technical corrigendum to Rec. ITU-T X.509
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Just to clear some (intentional?) misunderstanding.

This document was not prepared by two authors. It has for a long time =
been
on our web-page (see
http://www.x500standard.com/index.php?n=3DIg.DraftTechnicalCorrigenda). =
It was
discussed on the Directory list and there was input for such =
distinguished
PKI experts as David Chadwick, Denis Pinkas and Santosh Chokhani.  Many
others had the change to contribute. I feel quite comfortable that the
referenced document is the result of a consensus process.

We, of course, welcome any constructive comments.

Erik

-----Oprindelig meddelelse-----
Fra: pkix [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] P=E5 vegne af Tony Rutkowski
Sendt: 13. april 2015 13:18
Til: pkix@ietf.org
Emne: [pkix] Draft technical corrigendum to Rec. ITU-T X.509

This document was just posted at the ongoing ITU-T SG17 meeting for =
adoption
this week.
It was prepared by the two authors.

It would be very useful for those participating in the meeting to know =
the
PKIX views on these
proposed changes.   A number of them involve
IETF RFCs.

--tony


From rick.sanders@gm.com  Mon Apr 13 08:40:10 2015
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From: Rick Sanders <rick.sanders@gm.com>
To: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: SHA2 Browser Migration
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Hi,

I am an Enterprise Security Architect at GM working on cryptographic manage=
ment. Lately, the browser community's push to SHA2 has quite a few people w=
orried at my company.

A move to SHA2 will require a significant amount of change in our productio=
n environments. Not to mention the ubiquitous communications between hetero=
geneous platforms and protocol versions. We're unclear of the impacts to ou=
r backend infrastructure.

Do you have any folks who are knowledgeable in this space? How could we eng=
age to learn more from them?


-Rick Sanders



Nothing in this message is intended to constitute an electronic signature u=
nless a specific statement to the contrary is included in this message.

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this message in error, please contact the sender and delete it from your co=
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<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri Light&quot;,sans-serif;color:#3B3838">Hi,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri Light&quot;,sans-serif;color:#3B3838"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri Light&quot;,sans-serif;color:#3B3838">I am an Enterprise Security Arc=
hitect at GM working on cryptographic management. Lately, the browser commu=
nity&#8217;s push to SHA2 has quite a few people worried
 at my company. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri Light&quot;,sans-serif;color:#3B3838"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri Light&quot;,sans-serif;color:#3B3838">A move to SHA2 will require a s=
ignificant amount of change in our production environments. Not to mention =
the ubiquitous communications between heterogeneous
 platforms and protocol versions. We&#8217;re unclear of the impacts to our=
 backend infrastructure.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri Light&quot;,sans-serif;color:#3B3838"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri Light&quot;,sans-serif;color:#3B3838">Do you have any folks who are k=
nowledgeable in this space? How could we engage to learn more from them?<o:=
p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri Light&quot;,sans-serif;color:#3B3838"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:14.0pt;color:#3B3838"><o:p>=
&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:14.0pt;color:#3B3838">-Rick=
 Sanders</span><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;color:#3B3838"><o:p></o:p></=
span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
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--_000_4819a3c4c7cc4850b06888864eea9dffDCMIPPEXCH002namcorpgmc_--


From nobody Tue Apr 14 07:59:12 2015
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To: Rick Sanders <rick.sanders@gm.com>, "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
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From: Gervase Markham <gerv@mozilla.org>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] SHA2 Browser Migration
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Hi Rick,

On 13/04/15 16:40, Rick Sanders wrote:
> Do you have any folks who are knowledgeable in this space? How could we
> engage to learn more from them?

The Mozilla discussion forum here:
https://www.mozilla.org/en-GB/about/forums/#dev-security-policy
is a good place to ask about Mozilla's attitude to such things. We'd be
interested to hear about what products/devices you have which have
problems with SHA-2 and how that affects general-purpose web browsers.

Although it's not cryptographically recommended, you can keep using
SHA-1 certs by chaining up to roots which are not embedded in current
web browsers. The 1024-bit roots we've been busy removing from the
Mozilla root store may be possible choices here, depending on your
situation and the range of the embedded root stores in your devices.

Gerv


From nobody Tue Apr 21 11:16:34 2015
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From: mrex@sap.com (Martin Rex)
Archived-At: <http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/pkix/lzxof0FzWs8mlRHZADstj5u0BDc>
Subject: [pkix] Use of CRL IssuingDistributionPoint extension by public CAs
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I'm encountering interop problems with the CRL-based revocation
information of a public CA, and to me it appears as if that public CA
might have misunderstood the applicable PKIX specification.

The public CA is including two http-URLs for CRL download in
an CRL Distribution Point extension of the certificates it issues
(that is OK and useful).

The two CRL distribution points currently distribute two different CRLs
(difference = 1 day, about 11 revocations per day), and both CRLs
contain a critical IssuingDistributionPoint CRL extension, which
makes both CRLs incomprehensible to a perfectly compliant RP that
does not implement this critical CRL extension.

The difference between the CRLs seems to be only the age (they have
the same CRL number, and the older of the two CRLs seems to only be
lacking the most recent revocations (as mentioned above, about 11).

I'm wondering whether the CRLs are *not* really scoped, and the inclusion
of the critical IssuingDistributionPoint CRL extension is based on a
misunderstanding of the PKIX specification.  The CA ought to be omitting
the IssuingDistributionPoint extension from its CRLs, so that these
become usable to all "compliant RPs".  The CA might be erroneously assuming
that CRLs pointed to by CRL DistributionPoint certificate extension
would have to include a critical IssuingDistributionPoint CRL extension.
I am not aware of any such requirement (and such a requirement would be
stupid, given that a critical IssuingDistributionPoint CRL extension
make a CRL immediately unusable for the general RP).


I was asked about the same interop problem about 9 months ago.  Back then,
I googled for other CRL distribution points with unscoped CRLs from that
CA, and google found be a download URL for that (up-to-date, same
issuer DName, same authorityKeyIdentifier).  Back then, the CRLs with
and without critical IssuingDistributionPoint CRL extension had the same
size & content.

Today I can still obtain that _unscoped_ CRL from the unpublished URL
(it is current, with same issuer DName and authorityKeyIdentifier),
but it only has about half the size of the scoped CRLs (i.e. it has
the same creation date as the newer of the scoped CRLs, but does not
show any of the 30 revocations of the past 3 days).

To me, this latter behavioiur just doesn't make sense.  The download URLs
in the certificate CRL Distribution Point extension are plain http,
so a man-in-the-middle could substitute the scoped CRL with the
unscoped CRL during download, and every PKIX-compliant RP would have
to accept that unscoped CRL (current, same issuer, same AKID).


Is this a general problem of public CAs that they're erroneously
issuing scoped CRLs (that aren't really scoped and that ought not to
carry a critical IssuingDistributionPoint CRL extension in the first place)?


-Martin


From nobody Tue Apr 21 16:59:20 2015
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From: Jeffrey Walton <noloader@gmail.com>
To: PKIX <pkix@ietf.org>
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Subject: [pkix] Certificate Transparency and user agent warnings
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According to the CT FAQ at
http://www.certificate-transparency.org/faq, there are three ways to
avoid warnings in some user agents:

  * X509v3 Certificate Extension
  * TLS Extension
  * OCSP Stapling

If a private PKI includes a subordinate in the chain that is name
constrained, then can that be used in lieu of the three methods above?

RFC 6962 does not discuss it (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6962).
But I feel like if the problem is issuing server certificates for
domains *not* authorized to do so, then name constraints seems like a
natural solution.

Thanks in advance.


From nobody Wed Apr 22 01:35:27 2015
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Use of CRL IssuingDistributionPoint extension by public CAs
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--089e0122f00089cf6005144c0af8
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Bonjour Martin,


2015-04-21 20:16 GMT+02:00 Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>:
>
> The public CA is including two http-URLs for CRL download in
> an CRL Distribution Point extension of the certificates it issues
> (that is OK and useful).
>
> The two CRL distribution points currently distribute two different CRLs
> (difference = 1 day, about 11 revocations per day), and both CRLs
> contain a critical IssuingDistributionPoint CRL extension, which
> makes both CRLs incomprehensible to a perfectly compliant RP that
> does not implement this critical CRL extension.
>
> The difference between the CRLs seems to be only the age (they have
> the same CRL number, and the older of the two CRLs seems to only be
> lacking the most recent revocations (as mentioned above, about 11).
>

If the thisUpdate fields also differ by 1 day, it's a compliant scope
limitation, IMO. Compliant doesn't mean it's unquestionable. The 1 day
difference for thisUpdate fields should prevent the case "The revocation
date should not precede the date of issue of earlier CRLs" found in X.509
8.5.2.4 and RFC5280 5.3.2.


> I'm wondering whether the CRLs are *not* really scoped, and the inclusion
> of the critical IssuingDistributionPoint CRL extension is based on a
> misunderstanding of the PKIX specification.  The CA ought to be omitting
> the IssuingDistributionPoint extension from its CRLs, so that these
> become usable to all "compliant RPs".  The CA might be erroneously assuming
> that CRLs pointed to by CRL DistributionPoint certificate extension
> would have to include a critical IssuingDistributionPoint CRL extension.
> I am not aware of any such requirement (and such a requirement would be
> stupid, given that a critical IssuingDistributionPoint CRL extension
> make a CRL immediately unusable for the general RP).
>

Let's assume this CA has a reason to scope those CRLs that way. Maybe the 2
URLs have different usage costs, maybe they want to sell some certificates
with more up-to-date revocation information. That's weird, but possible.
Removing the IDP changes the scope of the CRLs, and then they must have the
same content (CRLNumber MUST be taken from the same sequence, for example).

I was asked about the same interop problem about 9 months ago.  Back then,
> I googled for other CRL distribution points with unscoped CRLs from that
> CA, and google found be a download URL for that (up-to-date, same
> issuer DName, same authorityKeyIdentifier).  Back then, the CRLs with
> and without critical IssuingDistributionPoint CRL extension had the same
> size & content.
>
> Today I can still obtain that _unscoped_ CRL from the unpublished URL
> (it is current, with same issuer DName and authorityKeyIdentifier),
> but it only has about half the size of the scoped CRLs (i.e. it has
> the same creation date as the newer of the scoped CRLs, but does not
> show any of the 30 revocations of the past 3 days).
>

That becomes interesting, in a non-compliant and dangerous way, since a
substitution attack can occur.

To me, this latter behavioiur just doesn't make sense.  The download URLs
> in the certificate CRL Distribution Point extension are plain http,
> so a man-in-the-middle could substitute the scoped CRL with the
> unscoped CRL during download, and every PKIX-compliant RP would have
> to accept that unscoped CRL (current, same issuer, same AKID).
>
> Is this a general problem of public CAs that they're erroneously
> issuing scoped CRLs (that aren't really scoped and that ought not to
> carry a critical IssuingDistributionPoint CRL extension in the first
> place)?
>

It's not a *general* problem. But it happens, yes. You wrote it's a public
CA, could you share more detailed information? It could be discussed on
moz.dev.sec.pol, or at CABForum level.

-- 
Erwann.

--089e0122f00089cf6005144c0af8
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">Bonjour Martin,<div><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><=
br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">2015-04-21 20:16 GMT+02:00 Martin Rex <span d=
ir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mrex@sap.com" target=3D"_blank">mrex@sap.c=
om</a>&gt;</span>:<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px=
 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-=
left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
The public CA is including two http-URLs for CRL download in<br>
an CRL Distribution Point extension of the certificates it issues<br>
(that is OK and useful).<br>
<br>
The two CRL distribution points currently distribute two different CRLs<br>
(difference =3D 1 day, about 11 revocations per day), and both CRLs<br>
contain a critical IssuingDistributionPoint CRL extension, which<br>
makes both CRLs incomprehensible to a perfectly compliant RP that<br>
does not implement this critical CRL extension.<br>
<br>
The difference between the CRLs seems to be only the age (they have<br>
the same CRL number, and the older of the two CRLs seems to only be<br>
lacking the most recent revocations (as mentioned above, about 11).<br></bl=
ockquote><div><br></div><div>If the thisUpdate fields also differ by 1 day,=
 it&#39;s a compliant scope limitation, IMO. Compliant doesn&#39;t mean it&=
#39;s unquestionable. The 1 day difference for thisUpdate fields should pre=
vent the case &quot;The revocation date should not precede the date of issu=
e of earlier CRLs&quot; found in X.509 8.5.2.4 and RFC5280 5.3.2.</div><div=
>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px =
0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-=
style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
I&#39;m wondering whether the CRLs are *not* really scoped, and the inclusi=
on<br>
of the critical IssuingDistributionPoint CRL extension is based on a<br>
misunderstanding of the PKIX specification.=C2=A0 The CA ought to be omitti=
ng<br>
the IssuingDistributionPoint extension from its CRLs, so that these<br>
become usable to all &quot;compliant RPs&quot;.=C2=A0 The CA might be erron=
eously assuming<br>
that CRLs pointed to by CRL DistributionPoint certificate extension<br>
would have to include a critical IssuingDistributionPoint CRL extension.<br=
>
I am not aware of any such requirement (and such a requirement would be<br>
stupid, given that a critical IssuingDistributionPoint CRL extension<br>
make a CRL immediately unusable for the general RP).<br></blockquote><div><=
br></div><div>Let&#39;s assume this CA has a reason to scope those CRLs tha=
t way. Maybe the 2 URLs have different usage costs, maybe they want to sell=
 some certificates with more up-to-date revocation information. That&#39;s =
weird, but possible.</div><div>Removing the IDP changes the scope of the CR=
Ls, and then they must have the same content (CRLNumber MUST be taken from =
the same sequence, for example).</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"g=
mail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-=
left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">I was=
 asked about the same interop problem about 9 months ago.=C2=A0 Back then,<=
br>
I googled for other CRL distribution points with unscoped CRLs from that<br=
>
CA, and google found be a download URL for that (up-to-date, same<br>
issuer DName, same authorityKeyIdentifier).=C2=A0 Back then, the CRLs with<=
br>
and without critical IssuingDistributionPoint CRL extension had the same<br=
>
size &amp; content.<br>
<br>
Today I can still obtain that _unscoped_ CRL from the unpublished URL<br>
(it is current, with same issuer DName and authorityKeyIdentifier),<br>
but it only has about half the size of the scoped CRLs (i.e. it has<br>
the same creation date as the newer of the scoped CRLs, but does not<br>
show any of the 30 revocations of the past 3 days).<br></blockquote><div><b=
r></div><div>That becomes interesting, in a non-compliant and dangerous way=
, since a substitution attack can occur.</div><div><br></div><blockquote cl=
ass=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px=
;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1e=
x">
To me, this latter behavioiur just doesn&#39;t make sense.=C2=A0 The downlo=
ad URLs<br>
in the certificate CRL Distribution Point extension are plain http,<br>
so a man-in-the-middle could substitute the scoped CRL with the<br>
unscoped CRL during download, and every PKIX-compliant RP would have<br>
to accept that unscoped CRL (current, same issuer, same AKID).<br>
<br>
Is this a general problem of public CAs that they&#39;re erroneously<br>
issuing scoped CRLs (that aren&#39;t really scoped and that ought not to<br=
>
carry a critical IssuingDistributionPoint CRL extension in the first place)=
?<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>It&#39;s not a *general* problem. But=
 it happens, yes. You wrote it&#39;s a public CA, could you share more deta=
iled information? It could be discussed on moz.dev.sec.pol, or at CABForum =
level.</div></div><div><br></div>-- <br><div class=3D"gmail_signature">Erwa=
nn.</div>
</div></div>

--089e0122f00089cf6005144c0af8--


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Subject: Re: [pkix] Certificate Transparency and user agent warnings
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(Cross-posting to TRANS)

Jeffrey, does "private PKI" mean...

1. A publicly-trusted root, a publicly-logged intermediate, and 
non-logged end-entity certs.
or
2. A non-publicly-trusted root, a non-logged intermediate, and 
non-logged end-entity certs.

If 1, then please take a look at the mechanism in 6962-bis [1] for 
logging a name-constrained intermediate CA certificate in place of the 
end-entity certs issued under it.

If 2, then I suspect that this is out of scope for CT, since it seems 
likely that most CT logs accepted by browsers will only issue SCTs for 
(intermediate or end-entity) certs that chain to publicly-trusted roots.


[1] 
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-trans-rfc6962-bis/?include_text=1

On 22/04/15 00:59, Jeffrey Walton wrote:
> According to the CT FAQ at
> http://www.certificate-transparency.org/faq, there are three ways to
> avoid warnings in some user agents:
>
>    * X509v3 Certificate Extension
>    * TLS Extension
>    * OCSP Stapling
>
> If a private PKI includes a subordinate in the chain that is name
> constrained, then can that be used in lieu of the three methods above?
>
> RFC 6962 does not discuss it (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6962).
> But I feel like if the problem is issuing server certificates for
> domains *not* authorized to do so, then name constraints seems like a
> natural solution.
>
> Thanks in advance.

-- 
Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online


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Hi Rob,

Thanks.

> If 2, then I suspect that this is out of scope for CT, since it seems likely
> that most CT logs accepted by browsers will only issue SCTs for
> (intermediate or end-entity) certs that chain to publicly-trusted roots.

Yes, this is the case.

Is there a call-out or spec somewhere that states SCT is required of
public CAs; but not CAs for internal or private PKIs?

I'm concerned with an in-house, private PKI and the warnings that have
been showing up in Chrome.

Jeff

On Wed, Apr 22, 2015 at 5:03 AM, Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com> wrote:
> (Cross-posting to TRANS)
>
> Jeffrey, does "private PKI" mean...
>
> 1. A publicly-trusted root, a publicly-logged intermediate, and non-logged
> end-entity certs.
> or
> 2. A non-publicly-trusted root, a non-logged intermediate, and non-logged
> end-entity certs.
>
> If 1, then please take a look at the mechanism in 6962-bis [1] for logging a
> name-constrained intermediate CA certificate in place of the end-entity
> certs issued under it.
>
> If 2, then I suspect that this is out of scope for CT, since it seems likely
> that most CT logs accepted by browsers will only issue SCTs for
> (intermediate or end-entity) certs that chain to publicly-trusted roots.
>
>
> [1]
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-trans-rfc6962-bis/?include_text=1
>
>
> On 22/04/15 00:59, Jeffrey Walton wrote:
>>
>> According to the CT FAQ at
>> http://www.certificate-transparency.org/faq, there are three ways to
>> avoid warnings in some user agents:
>>
>>    * X509v3 Certificate Extension
>>    * TLS Extension
>>    * OCSP Stapling
>>
>> If a private PKI includes a subordinate in the chain that is name
>> constrained, then can that be used in lieu of the three methods above?
>>
>> RFC 6962 does not discuss it (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6962).
>> But I feel like if the problem is issuing server certificates for
>> domains *not* authorized to do so, then name constraints seems like a
>> natural solution.
>>
>> Thanks in advance.

